

**Towards the development of a "green" worldview,  
and criteria to assess the "green-ness" of a text:  
*Namibia Vision 2030* as example.**

**by**

**Sally Anne Harper**

**A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree**

**PhD**

**in the Department of Psychology at the**

**UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA**

**FACULTY OF HUMANITIES**

**SUPERVISOR: Professor Wilhelm Johann Jordaan**

**October 2008**

## Abstract

This study assumes, rather than debates, that there is an increasingly global environmental crisis – global warming, loss of ozone layer, biodiversity loss, deforestation and desertification, natural resource depletion, toxic pollution - brought about by western nations' abuse of the natural environment during nineteenth century industrialization, continuing through the twentieth century, and, many would argue, into the new millennium as well.

Greens have been warning of the dangers of human-induced climate change since the 1960s. And yet, their analysis of the reasons for the wide and global range of ecological problems currently being experienced, of which climate change is only one, is not widely known. And even less so, are their solutions to the ecological crisis.

This thesis, “Towards the development of a "green" worldview, and criteria to assess the "greenness" of a text: Namibia Vision 2030 as example”, poses two research questions, and undertakes three tasks. The first question asks: “What does ‘seeing green’ as worldview mean?” “Green” emerges as not only pro-environmental attitudes and behaviours, but a fundamental challenge to western-cultural views on Self, and on the Self/Other relationship, including our human-nature relationship. It represents a total worldview, with its own legitimating narratives, epistemology, ontology, ethics, and viewpoints on real-world political issues as well. The green worldview differs sharply *in its ultimate premises* from mainstream sustainable development. On the green view, only the radical changes in Self, the Self/Other relationship, and society’s structures, which a green worldview demands, will be sufficient to avert the impending ecological crisis.

A green worldview, while containing considerable diversity, is still sufficiently coherent and consistent that it can be reduced to a set of criteria and indicators for “seeing green”. This was the study’s second task.

The study’s third task co-incides with its second research question: “How green is Namibia Vision 2030s worldview?” *Namibia Vision 2030* is Namibia’s premier policy text designed to guide Namibia through a generation of sustainable development. Using the green criteria and indicators developed during the study, it is argued that particularly as far as this text’s ultimate premises on the human/nature relationship are concerned, its worldview is best described as pale green fading into grey.

### Keywords:

Environmentalism  
Environmental philosophy  
Ecologism  
Animal rights  
Deep ecology  
Social ecology  
Ecofeminism  
Green politics  
Die Grünen  
Namibia Vision 2030

## CONTENT

(A detailed content list is presented at the beginning of each chapter)

	<u>Page</u>
Abstract	ii
Content	iii
List of figures and tables	vi
Acknowledgements	viii

<b>RESEARCH QUESTION 1: WHAT DOES “SEEING GREEN” AS WORLDVIEW MEAN?</b>
---

<b>ONE</b>	<b>GENERAL ORIENTATION</b>	<b>1</b>
1.	Introduction	2
2	Worldview as context for the research questions	2
3	The research questions	4
4	An interdisciplinary approach	8
5	The research process	16
<b>TWO</b>	<b>SETTING UP THE SEEING GREEN DATABASE</b>	<b>19</b>
1	Methodology and method for research question 1	21
2	Historical context of “green” sample elements	26
3	Summary	52
<b>THREE</b>	<b>ANIMAL LIBERATION/RIGHTS FOR NONHUMAN NATURE</b>	<b>52</b>
1	Introduction	54
2	Legitimizing narratives	58
3	Epistemology	59
4	Ontology	60
5	Ethic	61
6	View of society	70
7	Praxis	74
8	Critique	75
9	Summary	78
<b>FOUR</b>	<b>DEEP ECOLOGY</b>	<b>81</b>
1	Introduction	84
2	Legitimizing narratives	90
3	Epistemology	92
4	Ontology	94
5	Ethic	104
6	View of society	112
7	Praxis	127
8	Summary	129
<b>FIVE</b>	<b>SOCIAL ECOLOGY</b>	<b>131</b>
1	Introduction	134
2	Legitimizing narratives	135
3	Epistemology	141



4	Ontology	144
5	Ethic	154
6	View of society	161
7	Praxis	171
8	Critique	172
9	Summary	175
<b>SIX</b>	<b>ECOFEMINISM</b>	<b>177</b>
1	Introduction	180
2	Legitimizing narratives	182
3	Epistemology	189
4	Ontology	192
5	Ethic	202
6	View of society	219
7	Praxis	227
8	Critique	228
9	Summary	228
<b>SEVEN</b>	<b>THE GREEN MOVEMENT: Die Grünen as example</b>	<b>231</b>
1	Introduction	234
2	Legitimizing narratives	237
3	Epistemology	248
4	Ontology	250
5	Ethic	258
6	View of society	265
7	Praxis	285
8.	Critique	286
9	Summary	287
<b>EIGHT</b>	<b>A SEEING GREEN WORLDVIEW</b>	<b>291</b>
1	Introduction	296
2	Legitimizing narratives	300
3	Epistemology	305
4	Ontology	309
5	Ethic	316
6	View of society	323
7	Praxis	345
8	Summary	346
<b>NINE</b>	<b>ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT</b>	<b>348</b>
1	Introduction	350
2	Historical and ethical context	352
3	Economic theory	355
4	Development theory	372
5	Ecology as science	377
6	The contribution of environmental philosophy	383
7	Sustainable development	392
8	Summary	402

<b>RESEARCH QUESTION 2: NAMIBIA VISION 2030: HOW GREEN IS ITS WORLDVIEW?</b>		
--	--	--

TEN	CRITERIA TO ASSESS THE GREEN-NESS OF A TEXT	403
1	Introduction	404
2	Methodology and method	409
3	Seeing green to grey-green: criteria and indicators	416
4	Criteria for assessing research	429
ELEVEN	<i>NAMIBIA VISION 2030s</i> WORLDVIEW: HOW GREEN?	431
1	Introduction	434
2	Reading the introductory sections to, and Part 1 (chapters 1-3) of Namibia Vision 2030	437
3	Reading Part 2 of Vision 2030 (chapters 4-6): its worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship: overview	453
4	Vision 2030 chapter 4: The People's quality of life (pp. 44 – 135)	454
5	Vision 2030 chapter 5: Sustainable resource base (pp. 136-173)	472
6	Vision 2030 chapter 6: Creating the enabling environment (pp. 174-216)	495
7	Reflections on the workability of the criteria and their indicators	502
8	One version of Namibia Vision 2030s worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship	504
TWELVE	REFLECTIONS	513
1	The problem: the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream thought	514
2	Can environmental psychology help?	515
3	Suggested further research	519
REFERENCES		521
APPENDIX	Digital copy of <i>Namibia Vision 2030</i>	[inside back cover]

## List of figures and tables

	<u>Page</u>
1 How worldview constructs reality (Mochelle, 1986, in Gough, 2003b)	3
2 Varieties of green thought (Wissenburg, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, p. 4)	5
3 Bateson's (1972, p. 499) Dynamics of the ecological crisis	12
4 "Apron diagram" depicting deep ecology as "derivational system" (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 77)	87
5 An industrial society compared with an ecological [or "green"] society (Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)	114
6 The evolution of social hierarchy	149
7 Conservative and radical understanding of sustainable development (Davidson's (2000, p. 29, Table 1) adaptation of Jacobs (1995, pp. 4-5)	394
8 How <i>Namibia Vision 2030</i> synthesizes Namibia's natural environmental policy and national planning process into an overarching development planning framework (GRN, 2004a, p. 15)	408
9 Pattern of environmentalist ideologies (O'Riordan, 1981, p. 376)	458
10 Goods and hidden services provided by natural aquatic ecosystems (ex Vision 2030 Theme 6, (GRN, 2002b), Table A 2.1, p. 16)	475
11 Some interlinked issues which threaten sustainable development in Namibia (Tarr, 2000, p. 12)	476
12 Dynamics of the ecological crisis (Bateson, 1972, p. 499)	477
13 Namibia's progress towards environmental sustainability as Millennium Development Goal (GRN, 2004b, p. 31)	482
14 Namibia's high endemism in biodiversity (ex Vision 2030 Theme 6 (GRN, 2002b), Figure A3.2, p. 33)	486
15 Existing and proposed land to maintain biological diversity (ex Vision 2030 Theme 6 (GRN, 2002b), Figure A3.4, p. 38)	490
16 Mines and prospecting licences in Namibia (ex Vision 2030 Theme 6 (GRN, 2002b), Figure A5.1, p. 64)	491

17	Land use: mining concessions (ex Vision 2030 Theme 6 (GRN, 2002b), Figure A4.1, p. 51)	492
18	Degree of environmental protection as faultline of contestation between conservative and radical sustainable development (Davidson's (2000, p. 29) adaptation of Jacobs, 1995, pp. 4-5)	499
19	Overview of criteria and indicators used in the analysis of <i>Namibia Vision 2030</i>	502
20	A Values-Beliefs-Norms theory of support for environmentalism and pro-environmental behaviour (Stern, 2000)	516
21	Major types of environmentally significant behaviours and causal variables (Stern, 2000)	517

## Acknowledgements

To Professor Jordaan: A special thanks for your guidance as supervisor in getting me this far [I never thought I would]. Looking back, it seems to me nothing short of a miracle that you could discern a possible PhD in the green haze with which I originally presented you! Thank you also, for “letting me be”, as I wandered down many fascinating pathways searching for the meaning of green, before re-directing me onto a Ph D route.....

And to all external examiners, thank you for helpful comment, suggestions, and direction.

My thanks to the many librarians who helped me trace the sources I needed for this study, and in particular to Lourett Visser of the University of Pretoria; to Robert Camp and Anne Vechtel for their help in providing documents and information on Die Grünen during a wonderful visit to the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis in Berlin; and to the staff of the University of Namibia’s Library and Archives.

To my friends, who supported me in many different ways, and good-humouredly tolerated my absent-mindedness about real-world things throughout the writing and finalizing of the thesis. What excuse can I use now?

And of course, to Kitti, who in one way or another, is present in every page of this thesis.

Windhoek, Namibia  
December 2007, and  
October 2008

## CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL ORIENTATION

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2. Worldview as context for the research questions</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2.1 The concept worldview</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>3. The research questions</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>3.1 A useful heuristic for “green”</b>	<b>5</b>
3.1.1 Red, blue, and green as political and philosophical colours	6
3.1.2 Green, ecologism and environmentalism	7
<b>4. An interdisciplinary approach</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>4.1 Psychology</b>	<b>9</b>
4.1.1 Mainstream psychology and social psychology	9
4.1.2 The emergence of environmental psychology	10
4.1.3 “Ecopsychology”	10
4.1.4 “New paradigm” psychology	11
4.1.4.1 Gregory Bateson	11
<b>4.2 Environmental philosophy</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>4.3 Green political theory, and other disciplinary fields</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>4.4 Environmental psychology’s strengths and limitations for this study: a summary</b>	<b>14</b>
4.4.1 Its strengths	14
4.4.2 Some limitations for this study	15
<b>5. The research process</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>5.1 Question 1. What does “seeing green” as worldview mean?</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>5.2 Question 2: How “green” is Namibia Vision 2030s worldview?</b>	<b>18</b>

## 1. Introduction

This study assumes, rather than debates, whether there is an increasingly global environmental crisis – global warming, loss of ozone layer, biodiversity loss, deforestation and desertification, natural resource depletion, toxic pollution (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000, p. 426; Oskamp, 2000a, pp. 374-375) - brought about by western nations' abuse of the natural environment during nineteenth century industrialization, continuing through the twentieth century, and, many would argue, into the new millennium as well. Human-induced climate change provides a good example. Social ecologist Murray Bookchin (Biehl, 1997a, pp. 7-8) already warned of its dangers in 1964, and global warming/climate change was Die Grünen's election theme in 1989. The task of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is to assess scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding of the risk of human-induced climate change. The IPCC's November 2007 synthesis report (IPCC, 2007 November, p. 1) concludes inter alia that "Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level ...". Despite early green warnings, only now, it seems, is climate change becoming a "hot topic", because of its economic implications (Stern, 2006) within the capitalist system. Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) confirms this assessment: "Whereas climate change used to be purely an environmental issue, it's now becoming as much an economic, trade and political concern" (*The Namibian*, Wednesday 31 January 2007, Climate change hitting developing countries worst, says world body, p. 7).

But the original context of environmental concerns such as climate change was actually far wider than merely pro-environmental; its context was the normativity of ecology as argued in the idea "green". In response to rapidly increasing environmental degradation, the "green" movement [or radical environmentalism, or radical ecology, or ecologism] and its worldview, sometimes called an "ecological" worldview, or "seeing green" (UK Green Party Jonathon Porritt's (1984) descriptive phrase), emerged in the late 1960s/early 1970s, particularly in North America, northern Europe (Scandinavia, Germany), and the United Kingdom, including some of its commonwealth countries, such as Canada, and New Zealand. It has been suggested that "...radical environmentalism could be viewed as the first fully "postmodern" *Weltanschauung*, thoroughly surpassing the modernist paradigm of the last three centuries..." (Frodeman, 1992, p. 318, his italics). "Green" represents not only a pro-nature orientation, but also, a western cultural, economic, and social critique.

This study's broad topic, and two specific research questions, are about (1) "green" as worldview or set of ideas, and (2) the presence or absence of "green" in *Namibia Vision 2030s* worldview. The idea of "worldview" is the context within which these questions unfold in the study.


## 2. Worldview as context for the research questions

I am interested in the history ["adventures" in Whitehead's (1967) phrase!] and assumptions of the dominant ideas of our western capitalist culture, those which economist and philosopher Schumacher, author of "Small is beautiful" (1974, p. 69, p. 68, p. 73), calls the "great and vital", the "leading" or "dominating" ideas of our culture and times – the ones we "think *with* or *through*" (p. 68), the ones which carry our culture's values, the ones which, according to him, are still "visited on the third and fourth generations" after their first emergence as influential. These socio-cultural ideas, loosely arranged together, can be considered a society's "worldview".

## 2.1 The concept worldview

This study accepts the structuralist assumption that a society's knowledge, social structures and practices are informed by an underlying and often implicit view of the world. The concept "worldview" has not been approached in this study philosophically-theoretically, as for example, via discussions by Anderson (1996), Berger and Luckmann (1966), Geertz (1973), and Macnamara (1980). It is understood in an "ordinary people" or "conversational" way, as an "image or picture of the world held by members of society" (Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, p. 448), the set of ideas we think with or through, in dealing with the world (Schumacher, 1974, p. 68), or as "a constellation of common values, beliefs, and shared wisdom about the physical and social environments" (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, p. 1013, citing Pirages, 1977, p. 6). A society's basic worldview forms "the core of a society's cultural heritage", and is expressed concretely in institutional forms. Even though that basic worldview might not be universally supported within a culture, it nevertheless "provides general guidance for both individual and societal behavior" (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, pp. 1013, 1014). The graphic below perhaps makes this clearer:

Figure 1: How worldview constructs reality (Mochelle, 1986, in Gough, 2003)



Even though this social structure is the product of a "particular socio-historical situation", and humanly constructed, because it is "a priori to individual experience", it "appears to the individual as the natural way of looking at the world" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 20). This socio-culturally embedded worldview, with its version of reality, its assumptions, and values, whose function is to provide orientation, explanation and meaning in our everyday lives, is conveyed from generation to generation primarily via our language. It is obvious, but worth repeating, that we are all born into a language, that is, we absorb the dominant worldview of our culture via our mother tongue long before we have the intellectual ability or interest to examine, question, or review its leading ideas, and form our own consciously-reflected on worldview.

The dominant western worldview, variously labelled as "the modernist paradigm of the last three centuries..." (Frodeman, 1992, p. 318), the "Cartesian world view" informed by Newtonian mechanics (Capra, 1983, pp. 37-62), "the industrial-technological world view" (Metzner, 1994), "the dominant social paradigm" (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984; Sylvan, 1985b, Figure 6a, p. 12), or the Enlightenment worldview (Hayward, 1995, p. 5), is generally seen as a combination of western Renaissance, Scientific Revolution, Enlightenment, and Industrial Revolution thought (Metzner, 1994, p. 164; Spretnak, 1993, p. 182). It comprises a family of ideas, some of which are (1) a mechanist ontology: "the universe as a mechanical system composed of elementary building blocks, the view of the human

body as a machine” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xix), (2) dominance over/rational mastery of nature [“the total conquest of nature by man” (Rodman, 1977, p. 97)] as essential to human progress, (3) the natural environment seen as a resource for humans, (4) a view of nature as providing ample resources, but (5) should these become scarce, science and technology will provide substitutes and solutions, (6) a “belief in unlimited material progress to be achieved through economic and technological growth” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xix), (7) materialism and consumerism prized, (8) a “view of life in society as a competitive struggle for existence” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xix), (9) the undervaluing or marginalization of “the feminine”, and (9) a tendency towards national, centralized structures (Sylvan, 1985b, Figure 6a, p. 12, with ideas also from Burr, 1995, p. 12; Callicott, 1994, p. 33; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xix; Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, p. 1069; Hayward, 1995, pp. 11-22; Wenz, 1997, pp. 206-207). This family of western ideas is argued to be gaining increasing world dominance through the economic rationalism and political liberalism of globalization (Jauch, 2001; Lemon, 2003, pp. 390-428).

Sociological theories on worldview assume, and so does this study, that “core cultural values and beliefs are important determinants of individuals’ beliefs, values, and attitudes” (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, p. 1014). Such sociological theories also assume, following Kuhn’s (1970) discussion of the concept “paradigm shift” in the natural sciences (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, p. 1013), that if there is dissonance between the dominant social paradigm, and real-world experience, calls for questioning and revision of its fundamental assumptions begin to emerge. As Capra and Spretnak (1984, p. xix) suggest, there has indeed been emerging since the nineteenth century, a set of ideas fundamentally at odds<sup>1</sup> with the dominant western worldview, which one can loosely call, an “ecological” worldview, or “seeing green” (Porritt, 1984). This alternative worldview can therefore be primarily understood as a critique of the dominant western socio-cultural industrial paradigm. Its ideas and values, which had already partly begun to emerge amongst dissident western European scientists and economists (Bramwell, 1989, 1994; Martinez-Alier, 1987) in the nineteenth century, began to gain wider public support during the late 1960s, and 1970s, when it became clearer that ideas of natural resource abundance to fuel unlimited material growth no longer fitted reality. Allied to other counter-cultural themes (Sylvan, 1985b, p. 12 and footnote 51), new social movement environmentalism matured from “street green” through the 1980s and 1990s into a new political ideology called “ecologism<sup>2</sup>”. It also appeared as a new field in philosophy, i.e., environmental philosophy/ethics.

It is frequently proposed that, or hoped for, that we are, or should be, in transition from the industrial technological worldview to an ecological (e.g. Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984; Metzner, 1994; Sterling, 1990), or green worldview (e.g. Porritt, 1984).

### 3. The research questions

The broad research topic then, is the “green” worldview. It has been divided into two research questions:

1. What does “seeing green” as worldview mean?, and
2. How “green” is *Namibia Vision 2030s* worldview?

---

<sup>1</sup> Hayward (1995), for example, seeks to reconcile ecological and Enlightenment thought

<sup>2</sup> Bramwell provides three short summaries of the key ideas of ecologism as new political viewpoint (1989, pp. 42-43; 1989, pp 233-234; 1994, p. 26). Dobson argues (1990, 1993, 2000) that “ecologism” has fulfilled “the three criteria normally set out for a collection of ideas to comprise a political ideology, that is, an analysis of political reality, a picture of the Good Life, and a theory of political action or strategy” (Dobson, 1993, p. 229). It may thus be added to the “most fundamental ideologies of the modern era...” (Dobson, 2000, p. 164) inherited from the nineteenth century, that is, Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism. While the latter three are all held to be “irredeemably anthropocentric” (Dobson, 2000, p. 176), ecologism distinguishes itself by the “ecocentrism of [its] radical greenery” (Dobson, 2000, p. 175). Some useful works on ecologism are Dobson (2000), Goodin (1992), and papers by various other authors under the editorship of Dobson and Lucardie (1993), Doherty and De Geus (1996), and Matthews (1996)

### 3.1 A useful heuristic for “green”

There is a vast amount of literature available on “seeing green” as appropriate response to the global environmental crisis. Given that, a small diagram in a paper by Marcel Wissenburg (1993, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, p. 4) provides a useful overview for some of the major ideas that will be addressed in this thesis:

Figure 2: Varieties of green thought (Wissenburg, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, p. 4)




Figure 1.1 Varieties of green thought

First, from top to bottom, the heuristic suggests that both the “green” and “grue” [Wissenburg’s term<sup>3</sup> for the dominant western worldview] worldviews involve at once, philosophical concepts, such as metaphysics and ethics; ideas from political philosophy and theory; and ideas from the “real world”, expressed in both extra-parliamentary [“new social movements”] and parliamentary political action. Reading across the diagram, Wissenburg suggests that at these three levels, green ideas diminish in importance from more important in the new social movements, to less important in political parties.

A key aspect of the two broadly opposing worldviews [“dark green” and “grue”] shown in Wissenburg’s heuristic, are their explicit or implicit theories of the human-nature relationship. Biocentrism<sup>4</sup>, the ecocentrism<sup>5</sup> not shown in Wissenburg’s heuristic, and anthropocentrism<sup>6</sup>, are all theories of value, moral standing, and normative ethics in environmental philosophy. While biocentrism and ecocentrism are usually ethical markers of an “ecological” worldview, anthropocentrism is a marker of the dominant western worldview. On “the anthropocentric view of the universe”, Bowers (1992, p. 110) notes that:

... What is essential about this aspect of Western consciousness is that it fosters a view of humans as primary, and the environment as a resource to be managed (a view that represents the more enlightened interpretation of the anthropocentric position). The thoughts, needs, and spirituality of humans is thus seen against a materialistic view of the rest of the world. Anthropocentrism does not foster a sense of interdependency in which a loss of topsoil (or of forest cover, clean atmosphere, etc.) would be experienced

<sup>3</sup> Derived from a combination of the colours green and blue; see section 3.1.1 next

<sup>4</sup> “A normative stance that holds that all living creatures have a good of their own, and have moral standing accordingly, and that their flourishing or attaining their good is intrinsically valuable” (Attfield, 2003, p. 189). A biocentric understanding does not grant moral standing to inanimate things, or non-living organisms, such as “species” and “ecosystems”. Biocentrists argue that they have no good of their own, thus cannot be benefited (Attfield, 2003, p. 11, p. 40)

<sup>5</sup> “The normative stance that holds that ecosystems have a good independent of that of their component individuals, and as such have their own moral standing, and that their attaining or sustaining their good has intrinsic value” (Attfield, 2003, p. 192)

<sup>6</sup> “A stance that limits moral standing to human beings, confines the scope of morality and moral concern to human interests, and regards nothing but human well-being as valuable intrinsically” (Attfield, 2003, p. 188)

as a diminishment of human worth and capability. Rather, the loss of topsoil would be viewed as a problem requiring a technological solution – just as other aspects of the biota pose technical problems in furthering “man’s” needs.

Expanding the moral community beyond the human species, as biocentrism and ecocentrism do, has political implications – it requires a radical restructuring of society (Lucardie, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993a, p. xi). At the political philosophical level, the diagram suggests that “green” manifests as “deep ecology” or “ecologism” at the biocentric/ecocentric or “dark green” end of the spectrum, shading off into a lighter green, before becoming the “grue” of the mainstream western worldview. There could be any number of positions too, within the spectrum.

Finally, the diagram suggests a “real world” aspect to “green”, to be found in the ideas of the new social movements, and those of political parties. Again, the figure suggests that “green” [eco-/biocentrism, ecologism, deep ecology and its companion eco-movements] is “darker”, and more important, in the ideas of the new social movements than it is in the ideas of the power-holders in politics and business. Wissenburg’s use of “green” and “grue” call for some explanation, which I present next.

### 3.1.1 Red, blue, and green as political and philosophical colours

Before the advent of “green”, the dominant, and opposing tendencies in the political ideological continuum, and party-political practice in industrialized societies, were characterized by the colours “red” and “blue”. Simply, red is the traditional colour of the political left, associated with Marxism, and socialism, and blue represents conservatism, and liberal capitalism. Green signifies ecologism as new political ideology (Dobson, 2000). Greens tend to emphasize that they represent neither left nor right in the political spectrum. They can combine with either blue, in which case, shared interests are likely to be valuing personal enterprise, and fighting bureaucracy (Naess, 1989a, p. 133). They can combine with red, the shared values then being social responsibility, opposition to hierarchical structures, and a “Very high priority of fighting undesirable ethical, social, and cultural consequences of the unrestrained market economy.” (Naess, 1989a, p. 133).

Several authors note the greater “natural” affinity between green and red, than between green and blue (Naess, 1989a, p. 133) in the political spectrum, and the connections between the emergence of the extra-parliamentary/parliamentary green movement and the political left (Bramwell, 1994; Goodin, 1992; Martinez-Alier, 1987). The connection is seen to be more with the disaffected, than the conventional left. Thus social ecologist Murray Bookchin (Chapter Five) thinks that the green movement is right to reject “a mere variant of conventional left orthodoxy dressed up in a few new environmental metaphors”, but on the other hand, “to fail to draw on left libertarian and populist traditions, particularly eco-anarchism” would be to cut itself off from “an important source of insight, wisdom, and social experience” (Chase, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 245). He urges the green movement to “consciously develop a left green perspective”.

Wissenburg uses “green” – from darker to lighter shades – to “... denote all variants of the environmentalist and ecologist persuasions” (1993, p. 3). He suggests that the difference between the darker and lighter green in his heuristic is both a philosophical and political difference:

The essential difference between deep and shallow ecology is philosophical. Unlike shallow ecologists, deep ecologists propose a fundamental change of mentality – often described as biocentrism or ecocentrism – away from traditional anthropocentrism. We ought to judge our actions from the point of view of nature as a whole, rather than from the partial position of man, because ... nature is the first and most important condition of human existence, or ... because nature has intrinsic value. Consequently, deep Greens do, and shallow Greens do not necessarily, defend a radically new society... (p. 5).

Environmental philosopher Sylvan (1985b, Figure 6(A), p. 12) notes the same difference, which he characterizes as:

**Deeper paradigms/deeper green positions:** Tending towards intermediate conservation; sliding into deep conservation. Examples of such paradigms/positions would be counter-culture, alternative environmental, extended deep ecology, and

**Shallower paradigms/paler green positions:** Tending towards no conservation, unrestricted development; sliding into a less shallow position of some constraints. Examples of such paradigms/positions would be the dominant western paradigm, or the state socialist paradigm.

Wissenburg's explanation of "grue" is that it "stands for [political] theories that used to be thought of as non-green in the days when concern about the environment was not 'in', but which turned green when the tide changed: socialism, conservatism, leftist liberalism, and some variants of Marxism." (1993, pp. 4-5). The essential difference between green and "grue", I understand Wissenburg to be saying (1993, p. 5), is their differing philosophical positions on the human-nature relationship, and the value of nature. Other authors suggest different colours to represent "not green". Sylvan (1985b, p. 17, his underlining) suggests that the differing "deeper" and "shallower" philosophical value theories and their accompanying radical or reformist social and political implications, would be better replaced by terms such as "green-ecology and grey-ecology", or "deep-green theory and pale-green theory". Goodin (1992, p. viii, p. 121) uses "brown" to signify not-green political positions.

In answering the first question of this study: What does seeing green as worldview mean?, I shall not be making any attempt to distinguish between "dark" and "pale" green. The distinction in which I am interested is between green and not-green, a distinction which Wissenburg's heuristic suggests is broadly equivalent to non-anthropocentrism and anthropocentrism expressed politically:

Strongly oversimplified, the questions we are dealing with here are those of tensions between new social movements and political parties, tensions between darker and lighter shades of environmental concern, tensions between ecologism in a broad sense and 'grue' political theories, and finally a fundamental conflict between anthropocentrism and biocentrism.

I shall be using "green" to mark non-anthropocentric positions, and "grey-green" instead of Wissenburg's "grue", to mark anthropocentric positions.

### 3.1.2 Green, ecologism and environmentalism

"Ecology means far more than just the scientific discipline. It has come to represent a "good" along with other goods such as "freedom" and "democracy", with its own implications for social and political thought. The "uptake of ecological ideas in social and political thought ... has led to a much broader understanding whereby ecology is claimed to be an intrinsically critical science with subversive and revolutionary potential such as to overturn old worldviews and inspire new values" (Hayward, 1995, p. 8). In the face of globally increasing ecological damage, it has become for many, "a source of values and a guide to action" (Hayward, 1995, p. 10) in creating a new human-nature relationship. But it is "an essentially contested concept" (Hayward, 1995, pp x-xi, p. 1), and, along with other authors, Hayward (1995, pp. 2-4) notes the difference between radicalism and reformism in ecological thought.

"Ecologism" is often equated with "deep green values and attitudes" (Wissenburg, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, p. 4; also Hayward, 1995, p. 226, footnote 68). Together with the terms ecologism and dark green, one can broadly group terms such as ecocentric environmentalism, radical ecology, "radical" environmentalism, new environmentalism, deep ecology, "Arcadian" scientific ecologists, "biological" ecologists, and "Fundi" green politicians. At the other end, one can group together with the term environmentalism, and the colours "grue", grey, brown, and grey-green, the terms technocentric environmentalism, "reform" environmentalism, "shallow" environmentalism, "shallow" ecology, "survival ecology" (e.g. Rodman, 1977, p. 83), "anthropocentric survival environmentalism"

(Sessions, 1995d, p. 174), “Imperial” scientific ecologists, “reform” ecologists, and “Realo” green politicians. Characteristically, notes Frodeman, (1992, p. 307), this latter kind of environmentalism feels comfortable within “the quantitative, analytical, and reductively economic rationality characteristic of modern [Western] culture”, which radical environmentalism [broadly equivalent to deep ecology in his view] does not.

Bramwell (1994, p. 19) points out the “vehement disagreements about names” within the ecological movement. She notes that Arne Naess, “the founder of deep ecologism, devotes several chapters of one of his books (Naess, 1989a) to defining ecology, ecologism, environmentalism and so on, but other members of the movement disagree with him.”. She argues that terminology used by insiders and outsiders differs too: “...the general public ... do not always differentiate clearly between environmentalist, ecologist, deep ecologist and Green.” (Bramwell, 1994, p. 19).

On the worldview differences between environmentalism and ecologism, this study follows the approach of political philosopher Dobson (1995, p. 1, cited in Hodgkinson and Innes, 2000, pp. 286-287, my italics), who, like Bowers (1992), suggests that “environmentalism argues for a managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption, while ecologism holds that a sustainable and fulfilling existence *presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of political and social life*” (Dobson, 1995, p. 1, my italics). One environmental psychology study broadly supports Dobson’s view: “Findings suggest that ecology [as a new value system] and environmentalism may be fundamentally different from one another as reflected by the contribution of different variables in the prediction of scale scores...” (Hodgkinson & Innes, 2000, abstract, and p. 293).

My interest in “green” in this study, both as a radically different understanding of the human/nature relationship, and as radical cultural/social/political critique, always tends more towards the earlier years of its emergence as a conglomerate of various new social movements, its more radical expressions, its darker shades, before it became theorized, “institutionalized, bureaucratized, and ... to a large extent, “co-opted”” (Sessions, 1987, p. 121) by the dominant western social paradigm. I turn next to this study’s interdisciplinary approach.

## 4. An interdisciplinary approach

Real-life issues hardly ever match traditional disciplinary approaches in applied scientific research. (Uiterkamp & Vlek, 2007, p. 175)

This study of “seeing green” is located in the academic field of environmental psychology. However, the philosophical, environmental-philosophical, and political-philosophical nature of “green” itself, as indicated in Wissenburg’s diagram, as well as the strengths and some limitations of environmental psychology, led naturally to adopting an interdisciplinary approach. I discuss next how (4.1) psychology, specifically environmental psychology, (4.2) environmental philosophy, and (4.3) other disciplinary fields, such as development theory, scientific ecology, environmental economic theory, and green political theory, have also informed this study. In (4.4), I consider in more detail, some of environmental psychology’s strengths, and limitations, as far as this study of “green” is concerned. And, in the final chapter of this study, I reflect again on environmental psychology’s role in raising awareness, and promoting knowledge of what “seeing green” means.

## 4.1 Psychology

### 4.1.1 Mainstream psychology and social psychology

Mainstream psychology has established itself as a branch of empirical science which seeks a true understanding of human nature and conduct. From its beginning, more or less in 1879 as a separate discipline (W.J. Jordaan, personal communication, January 2005), it was thus committed to the general goals of science, that is, to the description, explanation, prediction and control of objectively observable phenomena. Psychology was originally seen as the science that promised prediction and control of human affairs (Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, & Stephenson, 1988, p. 16).

Traditionally, even though psychology is concerned with human behaviour, it was slow to give attention to questioning the dominant western views on human-nature relationship<sup>7</sup>. It is, according to Kidner (1994, p. 359), “mute about the environmental crisis”, because, he suggests, “the ideological preconceptions that underpin the discipline are similar to those of the technological-economic system that is largely responsible for the degradation of the environment” (p. 359). He highlights three such preconceptions (1) its psychological model of the decontextualized individual “perpetuates and legitimates a world view in which the individual is seen as separate from the environment”; (2) “by locating itself within the Cartesian Paradigm of human rationality as the only basis of understanding, psychology reproduces an anthropocentric ideology that denudes nonhuman aspects of the natural world of essence and inherent value”, and (3) “by assuming a largely cognitive model of the person, psychology colludes in the denial of those aspects of Being that are capable of perceiving and protesting against the violence of environmental destruction” (Kidner, 1994, p. 362).

Psychology’s emphasis on decontextualized individualism was partially challenged by the emergence of social psychology, from which in turn, environmental psychology emerged. But social psychology itself is informed by two streams of thought: the socio-centred approach of sociological social psychology<sup>8</sup>, and an intra-psychological, individual-centred approach. It is this stream I think, which perhaps explains environmental psychology’s over-emphasis on cognition in understanding people-nature relations. The individual-centred approach in social psychology draws heavily on the Anglo-American doctrines of individualism and utilitarianism, and flourished in the American cultural ethos of “self-contained individualism” (Sampson, 1977, p. 769, in Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 17), or “ideological individualism” (Parker, 1992, p. 87, p. 88, and p. 91). This individualized variety of social psychology became a “science of the individual” in social contexts or settings (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 13). In this tradition, cognitivist models of the human being, and the human-nature relationship predominate.

---

<sup>7</sup> Experimental psychology is rather, a status quo supporter. Singer, for example, notes how a journal such as the *Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology* carries full descriptions of objectionable [in my view] experiments in which rats are forced to choose between starvation or electric shocks to see if they develop ulcers, which they do (Singer, 1973b, in Zimmerman, Callicott, Sessions, Warren, & Clark, 1993, p. 28)

<sup>8</sup> This stream is of interest for this study for its suggestions on a more *social* understanding of worldview formation. In this approach individual behaviour is understood in the context of “the conditioning functions of the social/societal structural context” (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 456). It traces its roots to Emile Durkheim, (1858-1917), who believed that “social facts are independent of and exterior to individual consciousness. Hence the ‘collective representations’ of a given society have an existence of their own.” (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 7). Durkheim’s theory of a society’s collective representations was later picked up and revised by French social psychologist Moscovici (1961) as a theory of “social representations”. But also informing sociological social psychology has been the long-standing continental interest in language as a social product, as a product of collective interaction, as “the medium in which the community shapes its individual members” and to which individuals, in turn, actively contribute (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 9). Sociological social psychology always emphasized that “no human experience or activity can (and should) be separated from its socio-cultural context” (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 9), and that would apply to the individual’s worldview as well

#### 4.1.2 The emergence of environmental psychology

Though environmental psychology's origins can be traced as far back as the 1940s in the USA (Gifford, 1987), it began to take on an own existence first during the 1960's, in response to a demand for social relevance, and to emerging environmental problems.

It was felt that traditional academic social psychology research was not contributing to social reform, economic justice and political equality (Sommer, 1991); instead it was seen to be supporting the dominant values of North American society (Burr, 1995, p. 97). The then traditional scientific laboratory-experimental model of social psychology was committed to investigating the individual's assumed intra-psychic states and processes in controlled conditions, uncontaminated by the messy variables of real life. Neither the problems investigated, nor their contexts, were real-life (Proshansky, 1991; Sommer, 1991).

Some social psychologists turned instead to Kurt Lewin's field theory and his model of action research (Proshansky, 1991), as well as Barker's (1968) behaviour-setting approach (Evans, 1996). The design professions (architecture, landscape planning) initially contributed significantly to environmental psychology's development as they considered the role of space and place in people's lives (Proshansky, 1991), though this close co-operation subsequently waned, at least in America (Evans, 1996, p. 3). The concept of sense of place though, continues to represent common ground for design professionals, environmental psychologists, and adherents of "seeing green".

A subsequent influence on environmental psychology was the metamorphosis of environmentalism in the 1960's from being an elitist concern of a few intellectuals to a widespread, broad-based environmental movement (Bramwell, 1994, p.8). Sommer (2000, p. 2, p. 3) notes that the American Psychological Association [APA] in the 1970s "established a task force to examine the roles psychologists might play in the environmental movement". Though this did lead to the establishment of APA Division 34 (Population and Environmental Psychology), the "original hope that psychologists could play a significant role in the environmental movement was not realized, as members of Division 34 began working with architects and planners, or doing basic research in EP and EBR, [Environmental Psychology; Environment and Behaviour] rather than collaborating with activist organizations ..." (Sommer 2000, p. 3). By the mid-1990s, environmental psychology had been mainstreamed (Evans, 1996, p.1).

However, two streams within the field of psychology did remain sensitive to the new social movements' demands for changed values, changed views on the human-nature relationship, and *changed society* - ecopsychology (4.1.3), and new paradigm psychology (4.1.4).

#### 4.1.3 "Ecopsychology"

"Ecopsychology" is neither Barker-inspired ecological psychology, nor environmental psychology, as its name might suggest. Reser (1995) characterizes it variously as "a very visible, popular and political representation of psychology vis-à-vis the environment" (p. 235), a "movement which purports to be setting a new agenda for psychology" (p. 240), a "social movement cum shifting societal consciousness" (p. 241). However, he does not see it as part of mainstream academic psychology.

Ecopsychology's roots correlate closely with "seeing green's" roots and iconic people (Chapter Two). Reser (1995, p. 238) traces ecopsychology's roots *inter alia* to the Romantic movement, Naturphilosophie, transcendentalism, the Gestalt movement, the human potential movement, Woodstock, the civil rights movement, the "social movement which arguably started with the first Earth Day on 22 April 1970", and Rachel Carson's (1962) *Silent Spring*. Amongst its principal exponents is Theodore Roszak, "historian/activist, steeped in the history of ideas and social

movements”, whose *The making of a counterculture* (1969) was itself part of the USA counterculture’s discontent with the government of the day, the Vietnam war, and environmental degradation (Reser, 1995, p. 235).

In setting out his conception of what “ecopsychology” is, Roszak (1992) draws on the insights of inter alia, deep ecology (Chapter Four), and of ecofeminism (Chapter Six), particularly feminist spirituality. Ecopsychology’s project “is to bridge our culture’s long-standing, historical gulf between the psychological and the ecological, to see the needs of the planet and the person as continuum”; to understand that there “is a synergistic interplay between planetary and personal well-being”. To “heal the ... fundamental alienation between the person and the natural environment” (Roszak, 1992, p. 14, and pp. 320-321, cited in Reser, 1995, p. 236), ecopsychology seeks to re-evaluate “certain compulsively ‘masculine’ character traits that permeate our structures of political power and which drive us to dominate nature...”, and to create instead, an “ecological ego”. The healing process relies on insights from both Freudian psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology, as well as the traditional healing techniques of indigenous peoples. While this study does not draw on ecopsychology, one does encounter, throughout the “seeing green” perspective, ecopsychology’s intense interest in an alternative view of the Self, and the restoration of a relationship with the planet whose emotional tone is one of “Care, trust, and love” (Roszak, 1992, p. 41, cited in Reser, 1995, p. 237).

#### 4.1.4 “New paradigm” psychology

“New paradigm” or ecosystemic thinking<sup>9</sup> in psychology also emerged in the 1970s as part of the 1970’s “paradigm shift<sup>10</sup>” in western science and culture. There is much in common between “new paradigm” thought and “seeing green”, probably because of the shared influence of general systems theory, the New Physics<sup>11</sup>, and a metaphysical application of scientific ecology’s insights into the role of the human being-in-environment<sup>12</sup>. Physicist Fritjof Capra, one of the green movement’s ideologists, and exponent of “new paradigm” thought, suggests that living systems theory “provides the most appropriate scientific formulation of the ecological paradigm” (Capra, 1987, in Sessions 1995 p. 23). Some of the concepts of “new paradigm” psychology/ecosystemic thinking in environmental psychology, such as “holism/systems theory”, “constructivism”, and “autopoiesis<sup>13</sup>”, are also found in indicator lists of the supposed worldview transition from the industrial to the ecological age (for example, Metzner, 1994, pp.163-172). In environmental psychology, in new paradigm psychology, and in literature on ecological or green thought, one encounters references to the work of Gregory Bateson. The discussion next is limited to some of his ideas on the concept of worldview, and the human-nature relationship.

##### 4.1.4.1 Gregory Bateson

We are beginning to play with ideas of ecology, and although we immediately trivialize these ideas into commerce or politics, there is at least an impulse still in the human breast to unify and thereby sanctify the total natural world, of which we are (Bateson, 1979, p. 27)

<sup>9</sup> Systemic or “ecosystemic” thinking has permeated clinical and community psychology (O’Connor & Lubin, 1984; Jordaan, 1980, pp. 165-171), as well as environmental psychology

<sup>10</sup> In the 1960s, historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn argued that scientific thought is defined by paradigms, or ‘conceptual world-views consisting of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by members of a given community’ (Audi, 1999, p. 479). Such paradigms can exist for long periods of time, as their proponents work on confirming and refining its details, but then anomalies begin to appear – observations which simply won’t ‘fit’ the paradigm. “The accumulation of anomalies triggers a crisis that is sometimes resolved by a revolution that replaces the old paradigm with a new one.” (Audi, 1999, p. 479). But Kuhn argued, as scientists with differing paradigms are as people living in different worlds, it takes a fundamental change or shift in assumptions to move from one paradigm to another

<sup>11</sup> Basically, quantum theory (McDaniel, 1983, p. 291)


<sup>12</sup> One such common area is the idea of holistic ecocentrism as philosophical theory of value in nature. J. Baird Callicott for example, pieces together from ecology as science, and from the New Physics [quantum physics], a “metaphysical ecology” to serve as basis for an environmental ethic (Warren & Cheney, 1993)

<sup>13</sup> Self-organization. According to Capra, self-organization in nature “...includes the processes of self-renewal, healing, homeostasis and adaptation.” It also includes a complementary dynamic of self-transformation, and self-transcendence (Capra, 1983, p. 285, cited by Fabel, 1994, p. 312)

Anthropologist/psychologist Gregory Bateson introduced into the social sciences, a new model for understanding human behaviour in human and physical context, based on insights from systems theory, communication theory, information theory (Bale, 1995; Berman, 1990, pp. 15-16; Kidner, 1994, p. 373) and ecology. In this model, “epistemology” played a pivotal role. Bateson defined epistemology *inter alia* as “...the net of premises which governs adaptation (or maladaptation) to the human and physical environment” (1971, p. 3, cited in Searight & Openlander, 1987). Bateson noted that this net of premises, or worldview, is *constructed* – it is as map to territory<sup>14</sup>. A good place to start then, in dealing with dis-comfort, dis-ease or pathology in any system, including a people-nature system, is to identify, review, and transform these fundamental, but mostly implicit, premises or assumptions [worldview] into more adaptive ways of dealing with nature.

Bateson’s work “spoke directly to questions of ecology and man’s relationship to the environment”, and his work was always value-laden (Berman, 1990, p. 16). Simply stated, Bateson argued for interconnectivity and consciousness, or “mind<sup>15</sup>” in nature, both “green” ideas. In 1972, Bateson (pp. 496-501) proposed an ecological understanding of the “environmental troubles” which were then just beginning to manifest themselves in American society. He presented the dynamics of the ecological crisis graphically as:

**Figure 3: Bateson’s (1972) systemic understanding of the crisis in human-nature relations**



and explained the systemic interconnections as

...The increase of population spurs technological progress and creates that anxiety which sets us against our environment as an enemy; while technology both facilitates increase of population and reinforces our arrogance, or “hubris”, vis-à-vis the natural environment ... [these factors are] self-promoting....: the bigger the population, the faster it grows; the more technology we have, the faster the rate of new invention; and the more we believe in our “power” over an enemy environment, the more “power<sup>16</sup>” we seem to have and the more spiteful the environment seems to be.

In short, Bateson (1972, pp. 496-501) believed “that *all* of the many current threats to man’s survival are traceable to three root causes: (a) technological progress (b) population increase (c) certain errors in the thinking and attitudes of Occidental culture. *Our ‘values’ are wrong.*” (1972, p. 498, my italics). Bateson’s critique of “hubris”, meaning, excessive self-confidence, or arrogance, correlates well with the consistent green call for an attitude of humility,

<sup>14</sup> Bateson believed for example that we can never know Das Ding an Sich; the thing itself is inaccessible to us; we can only know our ideas of it (Bale, 1995, p. 42) – “the map is not the territory, and the name is not the thing named” was Bateson’s (1979, p. 37) metaphor for this, borrowed from Alfred Korzybski

<sup>15</sup> Bateson proposed six criteria for establishing the presence of “mind” in, as he phrased it, an “aggregate”: “1. A mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components. 2. The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by difference, and difference is a nonsubstantial phenomenon not located in space or time; difference is related to negentropy [order] and entropy [randomness, disorder] rather than to energy. 3. Mental process requires collateral energy. 4. Mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains of determination. 5. In mental process, the effects of difference are to be regarded as transforms (i.e. coded versions) of events which preceded them. ... 6. The description and classification of these processes of transformation disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent in the phenomena.” Though he discusses these criteria at some length (1979, pp. 101-143), his explanations are not always easy to follow. Of interest and direct relevance to this study though, are the potentialities Bateson sees in nature-possessing-“mind”: (a) the capability of purpose, choice, and autonomy [control of self] which such a system’s recursive structure allows (b) the capability to learn and remember (c) the capacity for loss of autonomy through death/dissolution (d) the possible capacity of aesthetic preference. Bateson avoids directly addressing the “obscure” question of consciousness as a capacity

<sup>16</sup> Bateson firmly disbelieved that power, with its linear implications, could ever be an appropriate *notion* in eco-systemic context

reverence, or respect towards nature, as sine qua non for resolution of the planet's environmental problems. Much of the problem of "hubris", Bateson believed, lay in our epistemological [worldview] errors, and "Any error will propose pathology" (Bateson, 1977, cited in Dell, 1985). Not surprising then, to find Bateson's systemic human-natural environment understanding referred to in green movement thought<sup>17</sup>. However, despite these commonalities between ecosystemic thinking and "green", and ecosystemic thought's ability to provide a wider, and systemic, view of the global environmental crisis, neither it, nor environmental psychology is able to provide a framework sufficiently interdisciplinary (W.J. Jordaan, personal communication, January 2006) to accommodate all the themes and levels of Wissenburg's heuristic. I return to a further consideration of environmental psychology's strengths and limitations in section 4.4.

In ecopsychologist Roszak's view, "... psychology, whatever techniques it may use, is necessarily a *philosophical* pursuit, a critical examination of ethical conduct, moral purpose, and the meaning of life..." (Roszak, 1992, p. 41, cited in Reser, 1995, p. 237, my italics). Insights from environmental philosophy form an important part of this study's interdisciplinary approach.

## 4.2 Environmental philosophy

Environmental philosophy emerged in the 1970s together with the new social movements. It is, in itself, an interdisciplinary undertaking - it addresses "all of the major perspectives" on the human-nature relationship, including the "scientific, ethical, aesthetic, political, economic, and religious." (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 2). According to Zimmerman (1993, pp. vi-viii), the field of environmental philosophy covers three broad areas, which map fairly easily on to the dark green to "grue" spectrum of Wissenburg's (1993) diagram:

(a) 'Radical' ecophilosophy, which includes deep ecology (Chapter Four), social ecology (Chapter Five), and ecofeminism (Chapter Six). 'Radical' because these philosophies "claim that their analyses disclose the conceptual, attitudinal, and social origins of the ecological crisis", and because they argue that "only a revolution or a cultural paradigm shift can save the planet from further destruction". We need to address the deep roots of the ecological crisis, not merely its symptoms, they say (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii). The ecophilosophers are concerned with our most basic premises: ontological, epistemological, axiological.

(b) Environmental ethics. Here it is argued that progress could be made in ending the ecological crisis if we changed our anthropocentric ethical attitudes and granted 'moral considerability' to nonhuman beings. Current environmental ethical theories grant moral considerability or standing variously to all living things, only sentient living things, or to nonliving things as well, such as rivers, or mountains. Animal rights theory (Chapter Three), biocentrism and ecocentrism would fit here.

(c) Anthropocentric reformism (Chapter Nine: 6) which argues that "the root of our environmental problems is neither anthropocentric attitudes about humanity's place in nature, nor the political-economic structures that embody those attitudes ...". While nature has only instrumental value for human ends, these ends are as wide-ranging as basic nutrition and aesthetic pleasure. The way to deal with the environmental crisis [pollution, global warming, resource depletion] is "by enacting legislation, changing public policy, increasing education, returning 'public lands' to private ownership,

<sup>17</sup> For example, in deep green Fritjof Capra's thought on self-organisation in nature (Fabel, 1994, p. 310); in the work of Die Grünen philosopher, Manon Maren-Grisebach as influential thinker in the green movement in the USA, (1982, p. 33), and in that of Die Grünen's fundamental ideologist, Rudolf Bahro ("Fundamental thoughts on the crisis of The Greens", in Bahro, 1986, pp. 159-176, pp. 175-176, p. 228; see also p. 217, note 15 to "Fundamental thoughts on the crisis of the Greens"); as an example of the kind of ecological conservatism on which ecologically-oriented educational curricula should be based (Bowers, 1992, p 118ff); and as one of the "trends within, or at least on the fringes of, psychology which offer glimpses of a more fruitful approach" to transcending the individual-environment dichotomy "in which so many of our subtly destructive [environmental] attitudes and practices may be based" (Kidner, 1994, p. 373)

promoting wise ‘stewardship’ of nature, and otherwise encouraging more prudent use and more equitable allocation of natural resources” (Zimmerman, 1993, p. viii).

As all three of these environmental ethical areas are to be found in Wissenburg’s green to grue spectrum (Figure 2), a journey of discovery into environmental philosophy to clarify the basic assumptions of key concepts in the human-nature relationship was a necessary, and enjoyable, part of the study. Lacking any philosophical training though, I have deliberately avoided the technical, and often incomprehensible, arguments<sup>18</sup> which environmental philosophers use to argue that the other “... is wrong, dazed, bemused, or even crazed” [!] (Bruner & Oelschlaeger, 1994, p. 384).

### **4.3 Green political theory, and other disciplinary fields**

In the course of the study, but particularly in Chapter Nine: Environment and development, I also needed to venture into the fields of development theory, scientific ecology, and environmental economic theory. As the green perspective expresses itself increasingly formally and theoretically as “ecologism” in political philosophy, it was also impossible to avoid this field. Particularly green political theory (e.g. Dobson, 2000; Dobson & Lucardie, 1993; Doherty & De Geus, 1996; Goodin, 1992) was helpful in understanding many of the themes and values of “seeing green”. As with environmental philosophy, though, I have avoided becoming involved in complex political theory discussions [Is green political theory compatible with liberal democracy? for example] for which I am not academically trained.

### **4.4 Environmental psychology’s strengths and limitations for this study: a summary**

#### **4.4.1 Its strengths**

Environmental psychology has at least two strengths for this study. The first is that it “has always laid claim to a rather broad palette” (Gifford, 2007, p. 200) of interests. To initial fields of enquiry such as people’s experiences of their immediate physical and people-surroundings [architecture and space design, privacy, crowding, territoriality, the experience of urban open space, the restorative effects of nature, for example] in the real world, environmental psychologists have been steadily adding more global aspects of the human-nature relationship, such as climate change. Most recently, environmental psychologists are taking an interest in the topic of sustainability and sustainable development (Oskamp, 2000a, p. 373; Gifford, 2007, p. 199). Gifford, currently (2007) President of the Environmental Psychology Division of the International Association of Applied Psychology, sees this steady expansion of interests as a sign of environmental psychology’s maturation as social science discipline. Environmental psychology also takes an interest in the concept of worldview, because it is considered to be linked to a person’s beliefs, assumptions, values, motivations and attitudes towards nature. Such constructs are seen as antecedents to environmental concern, and pro-environmental behaviour (Bell, Greene, Fisher, & Baum, 1996, pp. 36-38; 2001, pp. 28-34; Stern, 2000).

And, as a second strength, environmental psychology has always been open to an interdisciplinary approach in dealing with the ecological crisis to which “seeing green” is one response:

... the environmental challenge is formidable enough to elicit contributions from every possible corner of the concerned scholarly world...” (Psychologist Robert Rapoport (1993, p. 173), reviewing several works on the environment, and musing on how they contributed to an emerging global environmental ethic).

---

<sup>18</sup> The editor of *Environmental Ethics*, Eugene Hargrove (1984, pp. 292-292) highlights the difficulties which readers interested in environmental matters but lacking formal training in philosophy, experience

Environmental problems are seen as “social issues” requiring a “multidisciplinary approach ... to achieve significant environmental progress” (Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, p. 367), and large-scale changes in environmental behaviour (Oskamp, 2000a, p. 375; Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, p. 366). Contributions to environmental psychology come not only from social psychological research [for example, on prosocial behaviour motivated by altruism and empathy (Schultz, 2000, p. 391), or on public support for social movements such as environmentalism, for example (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999, p. 81)], but also from sociology, and the field of public policy research (Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, p. 366). Volume 56(3) of the *Journal of Social Issues* (2000), devoted exclusively to describing the “current state of the environment and environmentalism”, presenting “new theories and research on environmental attitudes and behaviors”, and exploring “obstacles and ethical considerations in promoting proenvironmental action” (Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, p. 365), represents such interdisciplinary collaboration [although environmental philosophy is surprisingly absent]. It also highlights the difficulty of trying to accommodate human-nature relationship concerns within one academic discipline only.

#### 4.4.2 Some limitations for this study

But there are limitations to what environmental psychology can offer in a study of “seeing green” as worldview: (1) It defines “environmentalism” non-radically, (2) narrowly, and (3) it tends to focus on the *individual* cognitive-psychological constructs hypothesized to generate pro-environmental behaviour.

Since its brave beginnings in the 1960s, environmental psychology has, despite its earlier rejection of mainstream psychology, been co-opted into mainstream western culture and social science knowledge:

Environmental psychology as a specialized discipline within psychology has lost much of its visibility as a unique area within psychology over the past decade. ... The good part [of that] is that much of what environmental psychology brought to psychology has been fully adopted into mainstream psychology. (Evans, 1996, p. 1).

This means that environmental psychology does not address a key element of “seeing green”, that is, *its radical environmentalism, its cultural critique*. Definitions of “environmentalism” tend toward the non-radical, rather than the radical: Stern (2000, p. 411) defines it as “behaviourally ... the propensity to take actions with proenvironmental intent”. Zelezny and Schultz (2000, p. 367, their italics) take “environmentalism” broadly to mean, “*the processes associated with actions intended to lessen the impact of human behavior on the natural environment*”. And, though environmental psychologists are interested in worldview, they draw mostly on research work done by sociologists. It is sociologists who research the opposing worldviews which some have called the “dominant social paradigm”, and “the new ecological paradigm” (for example, Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978, 1984). (Environmental) psychologists’ interest appears limited to the link between worldview, and environmental values and concern (for example, research by sociologist and psychologist Stern and his colleague Dietz, 1994); they do not appear interested in the other, and interrelated aspects of a worldview, such as ontology, epistemology, or views of what it is to be a better human being. On the seeing green view (Chapter Eight) though, these, and not only environmental values, are all intermeshed reasons for the dominant western social paradigm’s violent and destructive attitude towards nature.

And, while recognizing that environmental destruction is a social issue requiring large-scale changes in environmental behaviour, (environmental) psychologists Zelezny and Schultz (2000, p. 366, my italics) contend that psychology’s focus is the individual level:

the changes that are required to solve our environmental crisis involve changes in individual behavior. Any policy, program, or intervention must produce change among individuals. An understanding of *individual-level* attitudes, motives, beliefs, intentions, or values will help to inform the development of such programs and also to explain why a particular program is, or is not, producing the desired changes.

So, from within a mainstream social science approach, (environmental) psychologists continue to seek ways “for understanding, predicting, and changing environmentally ... [detrimental] behavior, all with the goal of promoting environmentalism” (Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, pp. 370-371). A discussion of two leading theories (the New Ecological Paradigm, and Value-Belief-Norm theory) on the nature of environmentalism is delayed until Chapter Twelve, by which time, the reader has a better understanding of what seeing green means.

While there is now agreement that the link between positive environmental attitudes and positive environmental behaviour is weaker and more complex than originally hypothesized, the exact relationship of environmental concern to pro-environmental behaviour remains problematic (Bamberg, 2003, pp. 21-32; Stern, 2000, pp. 421-422). Some significant intervening or related variables now hypothesized to exist between environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviour, are adherence to either the Dominant Social Paradigm or the New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig & Jones, 2000); anthropocentrism or ecocentrism (Thompson & Barton, 1994, Table 1, p. 152); to values, beliefs and norms as in Stern et al.’s (1999) Value-Belief-Norm theory; “personal-philosophical values” and emotions (Grob, 1995), or to the amount of “empathy” or “perspective-taking” a person brings to an environmentally significant action (Schultz, 2000; Stern, 2000, p. 411). Environmental psychology research tends to focus on constructing models which will predict individual positive environmental behaviour, and then measuring how the hypothesized psychological variables affect concrete, observable, pro-environmental behaviours in the private or corporate sphere, such as support for policy measures which seek to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Nilsson, von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004), car sharing (Nordlund & Garvill, 2003), and water conservation (Corral-Verdugo, Bechtel, & Fraijo-Sing, 2003).

In summary, the main reason for environmental psychology’s limitations for this study is its mainstream nature. In an illuminating comment during their discussion of western views on nature, Bell et al. (1996, p. 38) suggest an explanation for this:

We [in briefly introducing themes such as ecocentrism, homocentrism, and deep ecology] have moved quite far from the traditional posture of psychology to at least attempt to remain objective and “value free”, yet we maintain that a familiarity with contemporary environmental thought is both instructive and necessary for an understanding of our culture’s view of nature...

And as we have seen, environmental psychology focusses predominantly on mainstream environmental thought, rather than on radical ecologism, and on the social-individual, rather than socio-cultural antecedents to environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviour.

Inavoidably then, but at least with blessings from environmental psychology, I have found it necessary in this study to consider insights from other fields too, such as environmental philosophy, green political theory, development theory, and environmental economic theory. My excursions into the field of sociology have been limited to some studies on the concept worldview, and its relation to environmental concern and behaviour. This combination then provides a framework comprehensive enough to encompass most aspects of “seeing green” (Chapter Eight).

## **5. The research process**

It will be useful to outline briefly here, how the research process pertaining to the research questions mentioned in Section 3, will unfold.

## 5.1 Question 1. What does “seeing green” as worldview mean?

The amount of material available on the range of green to grey-green ideas about the human-nature relationship, their philosophical bases [ontological, epistemological, axiological], and their real-world implications, is vast. It has therefore been necessary to select a representative “sample” of ideas from this “universe”, to serve as a “database” from which to synthesize what could be called, one version of the “seeing green” worldview.

Chapter Two has two broad aims. In section 1, I introduce environmental philosopher Richard Sylvan’s (1985b) qualitative thematic “survey method” which was used to answer research question 1. The chapter explains (1.1) how, using the principles of set theory as explained by Kerlinger (1985), the universe of “green” was defined, (1.2) how the “sample” of green was selected for the database, (1.3) how the “database” for “green” was set up, (1.4) how the “green” database is subsequently presented in Chapters Three to Seven, and (1.5), how Wissenburg’s (1993) “grue” element was dealt with in this study.

Section 2 of Chapter Two provides a broad historical context for the emergence of green and grey-green understandings of the human-nature relationship. More specifically, it describes (2.1) the nineteenth century beginnings of the ecological critique, (2.2) the early, and continuing “philosophical divide” between “green” ecocentrism/biocentrism on the one hand and grey-green [Wissenburg’s “grue”], “reform anthropocentrism” on the other, (2.3) the new social movements and “green” [the “real world” level in Wissenburg’s diagram], (2.4) political ideologies and “green” [“political” level], (2.5) environmental philosophy/ethics, and “green” [philosophical level], and (2.6) “grey-green”, represented by mainstream versions of sustainable development, vis-a-vis “green”. At the same time, within this discussion, I provide a justification of the elements selected, and not selected, for the “green” database, as well as for the different approach utilized for “grey-green”.

Chapters Three to Seven then present the viewpoints of the various “green” sample elements – Animal liberation/rights (Chapter Three); Deep ecology (Chapter Four); Social ecology (Chapter Five); Ecofeminism (Chapter Six), and The green movement: Die Grünen as example (Chapter Seven), under some of the standard themes which make up a worldview: legitimating narratives, epistemology, ontology, ethic, some views on socio-economic issues, and praxis.

Chapter Eight, entitled “Seeing green”, presents as worldview, one synthesis of the various ideas and themes of the sample elements in the seeing green database (Chapters Three to Seven). Though not everyone interested in seeing green might first want to work through the data base, I would recommend it, if they wish to experience something of the complexity, diversity, elusiveness, beauty, and challenge of “seeing green”.

Chapter Nine represents the “grue” side of Wissenburg’s heuristic. It essentially (1) re-justifies the exclusion of mainstream definitions of sustainable development from the seeing green database, (2) provides the historical and ethical context of environment and development/sustainable development, before introducing the main theoretical constituents of the environment-development field: (3) economic theory, (4) development theory, (5) ecology as science, (6) the contribution of environmental philosophy to concepts such as, “weak” and “strong” anthropocentrism, “weak” and “strong” environmental sustainability, “weak” and “strong” sustainable development, and “stewardship” as theory of motivation for sustainable development. Section 7 examines some of the differing conceptions of sustainable development, while section 8 provides a chapter summary.

## 5.2 Question 2: How “green” is Namibia Vision 2030s worldview?

Chapters Ten to Eleven address research question 2. Chapter 10 is concerned with methodology and method. Six main issues are covered. Section 1 presents an introduction to Namibia’s natural environmental policy, and its national development planning process, as background to why *Namibia Vision 2030* was chosen as representative text. Section 2 introduces the study’s interpretive methodology, as well as critical content analysis as method. Section 3 comprises a list of criteria and indicators for seeing green to grey-green, compiled from Chapters Eight, and Nine. Finally, in section 4, criteria for assessing the study’s research are discussed.

Chapter Eleven presents the results of the analysis and assessment of *Namibia Vision 2030*’s “greenness”, utilizing the criteria of seeing green to grey-green compiled in Chapter Ten, section 3. The chapter is divided into eight sections. Section 1 introduces the methodology and method used. Section 2 provides a page by page analysis of the Vision 2030’s title, table of contents, Foreword by the former President of Namibia, and Preface by the Director General of the National Planning Commission. It goes on to examine the document’s chapter 1, which provides the background to the Vision’s compilation; its chapter 2, which provides an overview of Namibia’s geography, history, economy, and so on; and its chapter 3, which broadly sets out the Vision, its objectives, and its strategies. Section 3 explains that the focus now changes to the text’s human-nature relationship, rather than on the greenness or otherwise of each issue [sub-vision] discussed in Vision 2030.

Sections 4 to 6 of Chapter Eleven follow the numbering of the text in Vision 2030. Thus section 4 discusses the Vision’s chapter 4: “The People’s quality of life”; section 5 discusses chapter 5: “Sustainable resource base”; and section 6 discusses the Vision’s chapter 6: “Creating the enabling environment”. Section 7 considers the “workability” of the criteria, and the breadth and depth of their indicators. Section 8 provides one version of *Namibia Vision 2030s* worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship.

The final chapter (Chapter Twelve) proposes some further research issues, and reflects on the possible role of environmental psychology in raising awareness and knowledge of “seeing green” in Namibia.

## CHAPTER TWO: SETTING UP THE GREEN DATABASE

<b>1. Methodology and method for research question 1</b>	<b>21</b>
1.1 Defining the “set” or “universe” of “green”.	21
1.2 Choosing the sample of “green”	22
1.3 Setting up the “green” database	23
1.3.1 Considering elements of a worldview, and placing them within a clarificatory context	23
1.4 Presenting the “green” data	26
1.5 Dealing with the grey-green [“grue”] of Wissenburg’s heuristic	26
<b>2. Historical context of “green” sample members</b>	<b>26</b>
2.1 The nineteenth century beginnings of the ecological critique	27
2.2 The “philosophical divide” between “green” biocentrism on the one hand and grey-green “reform anthropocentrism” on the other	28
2.2.1 Transcendentalism, Preservationism, and ecocentrism	28
2.2.2 Conservationism, for homocentric wise use	29
2.2.3 The emergence of 1970s environmentalism, and its continuing influence	30
2.3 The new social movements, and “green”	30
2.3.1 Contributing influences	30
(a) The emergence of holistic ecology	31
(b) Unprecedented growth via industrialization	31
(c) The counter-culture	32
(d) Resource depletion, the limits to growth idea	33
(e) USA foreign policy, and the peace movement	33
(f) The “green revolution”	34
(g) Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, and the “environmental fight”	34
(h) The 1968 student revolts	35
(i) The civil rights movement	35
2.3.2 The animal liberation movement	35
Is animal liberation part of “seeing green”?	36
2.3.3 The “green” movement	37
Is the West German “green movement”/ Die Grünen part of “seeing green”?	37
2.3.4 The ecology movement	39
2.3.4.1 Deep ecology	39
Is deep ecology part of “seeing green”?	40
2.3.4.2 Social ecology	41
Is social ecology part of “seeing green”?	41
2.3.5 Direct action eco-activism	41
2.3.5.1 Greenpeace	42
2.3.5.2 Earth First! (circa 1980 - )	42
2.3.6 Eco-feminism	43
Is Ecofeminism part of “seeing green”?	44
2.3.7 The environmental justice movement in 1980s USA	44
Is environmental justice part of “seeing green”?	44



<b>2.4 Ecologism as political ideology, and “green”</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>2.5 Environmental philosophy/ethics, and “green”</b>	<b>45</b>
2.5.1 Four homocentric models of the human-nature relationship	45
2.5.1.1 ‘Man as despot’	46
2.5.1.2 ‘Man perfecting nature’	46
2.5.1.3 ‘Man as steward’	47
2.5.1.4 ‘Resource conservation’	47
2.5.2 Towards a “greener” environmental ethic	48
(a) The alternative Christian “ecological” motif	48
(b) Muir’s thought	48
(c) Albert Schweitzer’s (1875-1965) “reverence for life”	48
(d) Aldo Leopold’s (1887-1948) “land ethic”	49
2.5.3 More recent “green” theories of environmental value	49
2.5.3.1 Biocentrism	49
2.5.3.2 Ecocentrism	50
2.5.4 The three radical ecophilosophies	51
<b>2.6 Environment and development [“sustainable development”], and “green”</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>3. Summary</b>	<b>52</b>

Chapter Two has two broad aims: in section 1, to explain Sylvan’s qualitative thematic survey method used in answering research question 1, and, in section 2, to provide the broad historical context for the emergence in western culture in the 1960s, of a changed understanding of the human-nature relationship. Two broad streams can be discerned in the history of this changed relationship. It is this “divide” which justifies on my view, discussing Wissenburg’s biocentric/dark green/ecologism perspective (Chapter One, Figure 2) separately from the grey-green environmentalism perspective shown on the right hand side of his diagram [his “grue”].

## 1. Methodology and method for research question 1

In this section, I introduce environmental philosopher Richard Sylvan’s (1985b) qualitative thematic “survey method” which I used to answer research question 1, with specific attention to (1.1) how, using the principles of set theory as explained by Kerlinger (1986), the universe of “green” was defined, (1.2) how the “sample” of green was selected for the database, (1.3) how the “database” for “green” was set up, and (1.4) how the “green” database is presented. At (1.5), I explain how I have dealt with Wissenburg’s grey-green environmentalism perspective.

Sylvan notes that the qualitative thematic survey method “is still a main method of research in the humanities, e.g. in history, history of ideas, and philosophy.” (Sylvan, 1985b, p. 18). In order to identify the “core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes” of his research topic [deep ecology in his case, “seeing green” in mine], Sylvan (a) assembled a set of sources on his topic, (b) identified and “unscrambled” the themes which seemed to be present or “emerge” from the identified sources, (c) discarded those themes which to him appeared “evidently remote and irrelevant” and then (d) applied “the elementary set operations of union and intersection” to the emerging or present themes in order to establish the “total theory” or “paradigm” [union] and “common core” [intersection] of his research topic. Before assembling sources, I first defined the “universe” to which they should refer.

### 1.1 Defining the “set” or “universe” of “green”.

With its references to “set operations”, “union” and “intersection”, Sylvan’s method appears to be a qualitative version of mathematical “set” theory methodology, as for example, described by Kerlinger (1986). To provide some methodological context, I have located my adaptation of Sylvan’s (1985b) survey method, within Kerlinger’s (1986) theoretical discussion of the set-approach to understanding a phenomenon.

Kerlinger (1986, pp. 45-46) notes that a set or universe is well defined “when it is possible to tell whether a given object does or does not belong to the set”. Sets are defined either by listing all the members of the set [“list definition”], or by giving a rule for determining whether an element does or does not belong to the set [“rule definition”].

There are some problems in trying to apply Kerlinger’s mathematical set definition rigorously in defining “universe”. The first problem is not only the *vastness* of the universe of “green” (Davis listed in 1989, more than 300 titles dealing with green thought (Wall, 1994, p. 256)), but also its *conflicting and contradictory nature* (Ferris, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, p. 151; O’Riordan 1981; Wall, 1994, p. 253, “Debates and strands”; Wissenburg’s heuristic in Chapter One, Figure 2). These two factors make providing a “list definition” of the set of “seeing green” difficult. The second problem lies in the wording of the first research question, the purpose of which is to come to an understanding of what “seeing green” means in the first place! Thus the alternative method of defining a set by providing a broad start-up “rule definition” of “seeing green” has been adopted to circumvent circular reasoning -

---

<sup>1</sup> I consistently use the form “Die Grünen”, with apologies for the incorrect German which this approach sometimes produces

that is, to state beforehand what constitutes “green”, followed by an analysis to determine what constitutes “green”! (W.J. Jordaan, personal communication, January 2006).

I adopted the following rough rule definition of “green”.

Any new social movement, political party, philosophy, or political ideology which describes itself as “green”, or is described by a reliable commentator as “green”, qualifies as a member of the “green” set.

In addition, guided by the concepts in Wissenburg’s heuristic (Chapter One, Figure 2), and his explanations (1993, pp. 4-5),

A member of the “green” set will tend towards biocentrism/ecocentrism as theory of environmental value, and propose radical, not reformist, changes to society.

This “rule definition” I felt, suggests more or less *where* to start looking for a sample of green, without defining in advance, in a circular way, *what* I was going to find. I would then be able to choose from the many new social movements and political parties of the late 1970s/1980s, a research sample from which to form a better understanding of *how* a biocentric/ecocentric environmental value theory, and radical political stance in principle, actually translates into “seeing green”.

## 1.2 Choosing the sample of “green”

I began, as Sylvan did, by “working through much of the literature and all the more basic work” on the delineated set. It would be entirely misleading to suggest that the sample finally chosen – animal liberation, deep ecology, social ecology, ecofeminism, and “street green” in its West German manifestation – was a random selection from the “green universe”, as set theory requires. Guided again by Wissenburg’s (1993) heuristic, the logical starting place for me was a history of “green”, where I early on found historian Wall’s definition (1994, p. 66) of “fundamental green” as animal liberation and deep ecology. Reading more on deep ecology as movement brings one automatically to the field of environmental philosophy/environmental ethics, where one encounters deep ecology’s radical social movement/philosophical close relatives, social ecology and ecofeminism. And reading Bramwell’s histories (1989, 1994) of ecologism [also a concept in Wissenburg’s heuristic] brings one to Die Grünen<sup>2</sup> as “canonical” (Goodin, 1992, p. 124, p. 131) green party, working, in their earlier years, closely with many grassroots movements. In this way, the sample selected itself, so to speak, and also limited itself. These areas alone represent a considerable amount of information.

Other samples of “green” could have been chosen. It could perhaps have included a detailed discussion of the peace movement, and/or the environmental justice movement, and/or some of the direct action ecocentric ecological groups, or the political ideology of ecologism, or the formal environmental philosophy of ecocentrism and biocentrism. I justify the choices that I made/did not make as part of the historical discussion in section 2 of this chapter. But I think the question rather is: is the sample actually chosen, a *defensible* sample of “seeing green”? I suggest that it is, because (a) it contains both social movements and a political party (b) the social movements/political party chosen, represent the full bottom to top range of Wissenburg’s real world action to philosophical reflection (c) the social movement/philosophies chosen represent the full range of metaphysical thought in Wissenburg’s spectrum: from the biocentrism of deep ecology to the “Something like a ‘weak’ anthropocentric viewpoint ...discernible in social ecology...” (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii) (d) it represents a time sample as well, in that radical ecology began to emerge in the mid-1960s, animal liberation in the early 1970s, and ecofeminism began to make its influence felt as environmental philosophy/ethics, in the 1990s (Warren, 1990).

---

<sup>2</sup> I consistently use the form “Die Grünen”, with apologies for the incorrect German which this approach sometimes produces

The task is then rather *not* to demonstrate the sample's randomness [it was not], but to show that each example selected qualifies as a member of the green set.

### 1.3 Setting up the “green” database

I then applied Sylvan's (1985a) next step, which is to identify and “unscramble” the philosophical bases, core and extension themes which were present in, or seemed to “emerge” from the sources. Happily, because Sylvan's topic of deep ecology [“fundamental green” in Wall's 1994, p. 66 view] claims to be a “total view”, and “seeing green” is often suggested to be a worldview as well (Goldsmith, 1992; Metzner, 1994; Sterling, 1990), the kind of themes identified by Sylvan were more or less directly applicable to research question 1. Sylvan's (1985a, p. 4) themes were: ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, ideology/religion, lifestyle, “policy”, “economics”, and “politics”; these last three I interpreted together to mean, political policies and programmes. These themes are broadly the elements of a worldview, as described by Macnamara (1980), for example.

#### 1.3.1 Considering elements of a worldview, and placing them within a clarificatory context

Broadly following Sylvan's approach (1985b), I initially considered seven worldview elements from which I hoped there would emerge what he called the “core themes” and “extension themes” within each sample member's worldview: aesthetics, legitimating narratives, epistemology, ontology, ethic, view of culture/society, and praxis.

After preliminary reading, I retained all of these worldview elements for application to each sample member's thought, with the exception of aesthetics. This because I found very little in the sources consulted on this topic, except surprisingly, in the thought of the political party Die Grünen (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, “Ansätze einer Kunstphilosophie im Rahmen grüner Politik”, pp. 126-134). Nor did I encounter a theory of environmental aesthetics in any sample member. “Seeing green” principles such as valuing nature's naturalness, its independent creativity, its diversity, complexity and inter-relatedness, its normativity, do though inform some environmental aesthetics theories (Botzler & Armstrong, 1993, Section 3 on Aesthetics, pp. 95-153; Goodin, 1992, pp. 19-54; Thompson, 1995). As Sylvan's method does allow the discarding of themes [my “elements”] which appear “remote”, I discarded aesthetics as worldview element for analysis.

Though not an element of a worldview, I wanted a “space” in which sample members' (often critical) assessments of one another's worldviews could be included if necessary. And finally, I felt that discussion of the six worldview elements selected, as well as their mutual critique by sample members, would benefit in presentation by being “sandwiched” between an introduction and summary.

All these aspects – the selected six elements of a worldview, the space for sample members' mutual critique, an introduction and a summary, I then numbered consecutively from 1 to 9, thus:

1. Introductory remarks
2. Legitimating narratives: myths, religion/s and/or spirituality, and/or philosophies, and/or ideologies, and/or rhetoric/metaphors employed
3. Epistemology
4. Ontology
5. Ethic
6. View of culture/society
7. Praxis
8. Critique of, and by, other sample members

## 9. Summary.

This conceptual framework represented a practical solution to the problem of how to present a discussion and analysis of each “green” sample member’s worldview, as well as how to facilitate cross-comparison between sample members’ views. In addition, by later preceding each of these discussion points with a chapter number, I was able to provide an easy standardized reference number for each aspect of the synthesized green worldview presented in Chapter Eight, and the “green” criteria checklist presented in Chapter Ten.

I discuss this standard nine-point format in more detail next.

1. **Introductory remarks:** Each sample member seemed to me to have its own “personality”, or way of presenting itself, which I wished to preserve. I utilize the introductory paragraph/s for general orientation, and also to highlight any particular aspect of the sample member’s perspective which would not “fit” into the remaining standard format.

2. **Legitimizing narratives:** This worldview element includes not only legitimating narratives such as spirituality, philosophy, or science, but also the rhetoric and metaphors employed – the “naming” employed. Naming “is a powerful instrument for ordering and structuring our perception of the world” (Li, in Gaard, 1993, p. 282). In this discussion, I understand rhetoric in its informal sense as effective persuasion via for example, slogans, myths, narratives or “stories”, images, metaphors, and keywords (Bruner & Oelschlaeger, 1994, pp. 377-396). Metaphors are argued to “play a critical role in human conceptualization”, to provide a link between abstract thinking and experience (Li, 1993, drawing on Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

Bruner and Oelschlaeger (1994, pp. 377-396) note environmentalism’s [meaning I think, ecologism’s] failure to come up with persuasive alternatives to the metaphors, myths, and assumptions of the dominant Western industrial paradigm. They also note the damage done to environmentalism’s [ecologism’s] initially promising radical rejection of the “...consumption, unrestricted economic growth, and the exploitation of the natural environment” present in the industrial growth paradigm (Bruner & Oelschlaeger, 1994, p. 382) by mainstream rhetoric such as “tree huggers”, “people haters” and “jobs vs. the environment”. Bramwell (1989, p.35, p. 243) notes the pervasive presence in the green perspective, of “Garden of Eden” myths, the “breakdown” narratives to explain the disruption of harmonious primal human-nature relationships, and the search for “the scapegoat”. Common rhetoric in “green” is that of “liberation”, “emancipation”, “salvation”, and “survival”. I note within this worldview element, each “green” representative’s key assumption on the cause of, and thus solution to, the ecological crisis.

### 3. Epistemology, and 4. Ontology:

Within the discipline of formal (environmental) philosophy, epistemology and ontology are two key and import-full concepts. However, in this study, all these concepts are used in a “conversational” or ordinary language way. Philosophy is taken to mean, disciplined “wondering” about things: bringing to light our hidden or implicit assumptions on a range of topics, and then critically examining them. Such topics of “wondering” include epistemology, ontology, and ethics, all inter-related, as I try to show in the next few paragraphs.

“Epistemology” is taken to mean, a study of how, and what, we are able to know with confidence, or otherwise phrased, what is the ultimate source of knowledge, which knowledge can be considered valid? Without at any stage entering into a philosophical discussion of the various theories of truth and knowledge available, I present and discuss under this worldview element, each sample member’s

views on knowing. On the whole, those who “see green”, tend to be critical of instrumental rationalism as *the way of knowing*.

Such wondering about how we may know is not mere wondering for wondering’s sake. Our usually implicit personal and socio-cultural views on what the ultimate source of knowledge is, deeply shape our views on what is real. Is reality to be explained entirely in terms of the physical and objective outside us, or do we wholly or partly actively construct it through the concepts embedded in our language? Is there a place for the meta-physical? Any worldview, green worldviews included, can thus be expected to propose an ontology. I use this technical philosophical term in a non-technical way to mean, each sample member’s views on the nature of things, and on being.

However, these two worldview elements – epistemology and ontology - are sometimes so intertwined within a sample member’s perspective, that they could not always be cleanly disentangled. Some of the sample members place their views on nature within an entirely different view of valid knowledge. Sometimes ontological discussion included views on the ideal human being - the field of psychology, practically. Sometimes the discussion is of Self vis-a-vis the Other, understood as both human *and* nonhuman, in which case it sometimes includes a view of motivation for ethical behaviour, or the role of human being in nature – aspects which could also be accommodated within standard discussion point 5: Ethic.

**5. Ethic:** Closely related to personal and socio-cultural ultimate assumptions on knowing, truth and reality, are then, what can be called “right” relationships between ourselves and what is “other” to our selves. Our understanding of what the Other really is, shapes our ethic. An ethic can be understood as comprising three parts: a belief system, a recommended attitude towards the Other, and a “system of rules and standards” (Mizzoni, 2004, p. 42). Under “Ethic”, I discuss for example, sub-themes such as the sample member’s theory of value, its scope of obligation, its theory of motivation, and what it requires from us as moral agents. What was originally striking for me about this topic in “seeing green”, is that no difference is made between an ethic for human beings, and an ethic for nature; both are included in the *same* ethic. I have not attempted within this worldview element, to reproduce all the intricate philosophical debate which one encounters, for example, in the pages of the journal *Environmental Ethics*, except as these might illuminate chosen concepts.

**6. View of society:** Under this worldview element, I discuss each “green” worldview representative’s critique of society, and any alternative vision of society offered. This usually entails presenting the sample member’s “issues”, for example, the use of animals in entertainment, human overpopulation, meaningful work, or western “maldevelopment”. “Real world” policies are sometimes included, particularly in the “street green”/Die Grünen sample member.

**7. Praxis:** How the sample member envisages bringing about the necessary changes in society – for example, through face-to-face democracy, direct activism, violent/non-violent civil disobedience, is presented here. An important assumption of green praxis is that personal beliefs and practices are also public political statements.

**8. Critique:** While this standard discussion point is not a formal element of a worldview, it does entail sample members’ mutual critique of some aspects of each other’s worldviews. Examples would be the critique by deep ecologists of the assumptions underlying animal rights theory, or critique by ecofeminists of the assumptions underlying deep ecologists’ understanding of the Self/Other relationship. Wherever possible, the particular green sample member’s assumptions and viewpoint are presented together with critique from other green sample members. For example, critique of the deep ecology ethic of ecological egalitarianism is presented within the standard discussion point Ethic. The

standard discussion point “Critique” is thus only utilized where this approach has not seemed appropriate or possible.

**9. Summary:** Here I present the sample member’s contribution to the idea “green”, as well as any other relevant comment.

There is no deviation from the format above in presenting each “green” sample member’s viewpoint. However, within each discussion point, it was not always possible to maintain a standard presentation across Chapters Three to Seven.

## 1.4 Presenting the “green” data

The data for the “green” sample members - animal liberation/rights, deep ecology, social ecology, ecofeminism and “street green”/Die Grünen - is presented in five consecutive chapters, that is, Chapters Three to Seven. The order is non-random, in that, following Wissenburg’s (Chapter One, Figure 2) diagram from top to bottom, the first four sample members represent primarily the philosophical/ethical level of abstraction, while the Die Grünen chapter represents a combination of Wissenburg’s political philosophy/theory, and “real world” levels. In Chapter Eight, I apply Sylvan’s “elementary set operations of union and intersection” to the data across all sample members, in order to establish the “total theory” or “paradigm” [union] and “common core” [intersection] of “seeing green”.

## 1.5 Dealing with the grey-green [“grue”] of Wissenburg’s heuristic

In Chapter Nine, I introduce what I see as the main ideas informing that viewpoint which Wissenburg (1993, in Chapter One: 3.1) places at the right-hand side of his heuristic on the diminishing importance of green ideas: anthropocentrism as metaphysic/ethic, and “shallow ecology/environmentalism” as political theory, as expressed in the policies and programmes of political parties at “real world” level.

Based on the historical survey in section 2, I show in Chapter Nine of the study, that (a) the concept of “sustainable development” as set out in the Rio Declaration (1992) represents this viewpoint, and (b) that my rule definition of “green” above, excludes it from the “green” database on the grounds of its strong anthropocentrism (Hattingh, 2002, p. 11). Such versions of sustainable development appear more at home on the grey-green side of the “philosophical divide”, whose nineteenth century origins I trace in section 2.2 of this chapter. In Chapter Nine, I consider the assumptions of some of ideas contributing to the field of “Environment and Development”, which I assume to be the academic home of sustainable development: economic theory, development theory, ecology, and to a lesser degree, environmental ethics. This latter includes (a) anthropocentrism as theory of value, (b) the varying versions – “stronger”, “weaker”, “absurd” - of the sustainability ethic (Achterberg, 1993, pp. 84-85), which underpins sustainable development, and (c) stewardship, which is the usual mainstream theory of motivation to environmental ethical behaviour. The focus of Chapter Nine is thus *not* on the kind of worldview elements presented in Chapters Three to Seven, and synthesized in Chapter Eight. This study makes no claim as to whether or not there is such a thing as a “sustainable development” perspective or worldview, or what its nature might be.

I turn next to the broad historical context of the emerging ecological critique of western society.

## 2. Historical context of “green” sample members

This section provides not only the broad historical context for the emergence of changed thinking on the human-nature relationship, but also the justification for the “green” sample selection. More specifically, it describes (2.1) the nineteenth century beginnings of the ecological critique, (2.2) the early, and continuing “philosophical divide” between ecocentric/biocentric “green” on the one hand

and the anthropocentrism typified by mainstream sustainable development on the other, (2.3) the new social movements and “green” [ground level of Wissenburg’s diagram, Chapter One, Figure 2], (2.4) political ideologies and “green” [the diagram’s mid level], and (2.5) environmental philosophy/ethics, and “green” [top level].

## 2.1 The nineteenth century beginnings of the ecological critique

There are basically three views on the historical roots of the “ecological perspective” as street movement, new political ideology [“ecologism”], and new field in philosophy [environmental philosophy]: (a) as an alternative, hidden, or underground current of thought dating back millennia, (b) as emerging around the 1960s/1970s, more or less together with, or as a result of, the 1973-74 oil crisis, or (c) the view followed in this study, as emerging around the nineteenth century, predominantly in the Nordic/Protestant countries of Europe, but only gaining “political bite”(Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 237) in the 1970s.

Some authors emphasize particular nineteenth century historical roots more than others. Wall (1994) notes inter alia, the Romantic writers’ contribution to social reform, and to the English utopian and anarchist tradition; Martinez-Alier (1987) writes mostly on the early nineteenth century ecological critique of classical economics. Bramwell (1989, 1994) pinpoints the beginnings of the ecological perspective and critique predominantly, but not exclusively, amongst the intelligentsia of mid to end nineteenth century Russia, Germany, and England. She highlights the contribution of German philosophical holism and monism, evolutionary theory, thermodynamics, organic biology, the emergence of ecology and ethology as new scientific disciplines, as well as the early ecological critique of economic theory.

Bramwell suggests that the ecological perspective which foreshadowed “ecologism” as new “political box” began to take shape around the 1880s. “Self-definition” about belonging in the box – considering yourself “an ecologist” in the political/normative<sup>3</sup> sense - began in the 1920s. The ecological perspective “remained a preserve of a small section of the European and American intelligentsia” until after the First World War (Bramwell, 1994, p. 2). In the 1930s there emerged “the group of ideas we call ecologism today. ... Environmentalism and ecologism took different paths. Ecologists called for complete social and economic change worldwide...” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 104). Although World War II interrupted the growth of the ecological perspective, it continued throughout the 1950s [alongside the maturing of ecology as natural science] as a more or less middle-class, conservative and values-based small-scale cultural critique movement, through to the early 1960s (Bramwell, 1989, p. 4; 1994, p. 8, p. 15). Bramwell’s key argument is that the ecological perspective became both a mass movement and a powerful political force in the 1970s, because “... the fusion of resource-scarcity economics with holistic biology ... gave force and coherence to ecological ideas” (Bramwell, 1989, p. xi).

O’Riordan (1981<sup>4</sup>) in his analysis of 1970s environmentalism, singles out the nineteenth century “philosophical divide” in the North American conservation movement as significant in explaining the ideological divisions which still continue today. I discuss the origins, nature and legacy of this philosophical divide next.

---

<sup>3</sup> Bramwell traces the first ‘normative’ use of the word “ecology” to 1915 (Bramwell, 1989, p. 14, and on p. 250, footnote 23 to Chapter 1: B. Moore, Snr., editor of *The Ecologist*. “ecology ... a point of view”, quoted in Worster’s (1985) *Nature’s Economy*, p. 203)

<sup>4</sup> O’Riordan’s first book “Perspectives on resource management” was published in 1971, and his second “Environmentalism” in 1976 (revised 1981). His typology of philosophical differences in environmentalism as ideology is one of the earliest

## 2.2 The “philosophical divide” between “green” biocentrism on the one hand and grey-green “reform anthropocentrism” on the other

At the heart of the “philosophical divide” are the differing theories of environmental value marked in Wissenburg’s diagram as biocentrism and anthropocentrism. The “divide” began with a sharp difference of opinion in 1897 between two friends in the North American Conservation movement, John Muir, and Gifford Pinchot, on a water provision development scheme<sup>5</sup> for San Francisco. The rift was so deep as to cause the Conservation movement to split into Muir’s “preservationists”, considered to be the “forefathers” of the ecocentric type of environmentalism which O’Riordan (1981) discerned in the 1970s (section 2.2.1), and Pinchot’s “conservationist” approach (section 2.2.2), to which one can broadly trace the “wise management” approach of O’Riordan’s 1970s “technocentric” environmental ideology. These two approaches developed broadly into the “green” and the “grue” [my grey-green] respectively of Wissenburg’s diagram. In section 2.2.3, I discuss the emergence of “environmentalism” as ideology, and its continued influence today.

### 2.2.1 Transcendentalism, Preservationism, and ecocentrism

Muir’s philosophical home was the North American Transcendentalist Club, founded in 1836 by Ralph Waldo Emerson [1803-1882], himself influenced by the English Romantics, and by Hindu philosophy. Another Transcendentalist, Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), is usually considered the first European-American environmentalist. His green ideas on the pursuit of spirituality, living the simple rural life, preservation of wilderness as public land, conserving natural resources on private land, and enjoying recreation in nature, were to be taken up in the early North American Conservation movement. O’Riordan (1981) traces their continuing influence in the 1970s “ecocentric” mode of environmentalism. Besides his spiritualism, Thoreau, who shared in the Transcendentalists’ Romantic heritage, was also a cultural critic, an activist, and a supporter of civil disobedience, providing inspiration for Tolstoy, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, deep ecology activists, and Die Grünen’s Petra Kelly. In Wall’s (1994, p. 10) opinion, he “clearly adhered to the Green package” because he “combined social awareness with environmental concern”, was “committed to civil disobedience” and “familiar with Hindu and Buddhist ideas on nature”. Deep ecologist Sessions (1995c, p. 100) also notes Thoreau’s “radical ecocentrism”.

John Muir<sup>6</sup> (1838-1914) is an iconic figure in the founding mythology of the green movement. Both Thoreau and Muir viewed nature as sacred, as a pantheistic expression of God (Sessions, 1994, p. 207). Their spiritual view of nature not only provided inspiration for the establishment of the early North American Conservation movement, but also continued in the ecocentric thought of Aldo Leopold (Callicott, 1994, p. 36; Wall, 1994, p. 105), deep ecology (Sessions, 1994, p. 207), the ecocentric mode of O’Riordan’s 1970s environmentalism, prominent greens such as David Foreman of the radical NGO Earth First! (Wall, 1994, p. 3), and of Rudolf Bahro, early German Green Party ideologist. VanDeVeer & Pierce (1994, p. 96) even trace a line of thought from Muir through to “advocates of the rights of trees such as Christopher Stone<sup>7</sup>”. Apart from Muir’s reverential attitude to nature, he also sought to preserve large areas of wilderness, primarily because he held that this was the only way to protect the health of important ecosystems. This concern appears again in deep ecology [Chapter Four, 4.1.4.2].

---

<sup>5</sup> Muir opposed, and Pinchot supported, a plan to flood the Hetch Hetchy Valley in the Yosemite National Park, as part of San Francisco’s water supply. Both men were friends of the President of the USA, and both canvassed his support for their point of view; Roosevelt gave permission in 1913 to flood the valley

<sup>6</sup> Born in Scotland, he arrived in America in 1849, there to become a naturalist, traveller, writer, scientist, expert on forestry management, protagonist for the eventual preservation of the Yosemite mountain area as park in 1890, and founder of the early Conservation movement’s key organization, the Sierra Club in 1892. The Club still exists today

<sup>7</sup> Stone’s work is discussed further in Chapter Three

### 2.2.2 Conservationism, for homocentric wise use

“The first great fact about conservation is that it stands for development. ...The first principle of conservation is the use of natural resources now existing ... for the benefit of people who live here now.” (Pinchot, 1947, p. 262, in Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 294)

In 1898, a year after the Preservationist/Conservationist parting of the ways, Pinchot (1865-1946) became head of the Division of Forestry. He was, through the Progressive Conservation Movement, of which he became President in 1910, to become active in USA politics as well (retrieved 6 April 2005 from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gifford\\_Pinchot](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gifford_Pinchot); and from [www.u-s-history.com](http://www.u-s-history.com)). Though Pinchot’s politics and conservation philosophy are intertwined, it is his conservation philosophy rather than his politics which is of interest here.

Pinchot was concerned to challenge the dominant understanding of his time of natural resources. On this view, all natural resources were open for immediate economic exploitation by a limited group of industrial businessmen. Pinchot opposed this elitism (Desjardins, 1993, p. 47, and p. 66, note 7). His vision for the Conservation movement was that “in time [it would] work out into a planned and orderly scheme for national efficiency, based on the elimination of waste, and directed toward the best use of all we have for the greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time” (Pinchot, 1914, pp. 23-25, cited in Desjardins, 1993, pp. 47-48). This excerpt from Pinchot’s book (1901, pp. 79-81, reproduced in Wall, 1994, p. 136) makes his position clear:

The central thing for which Conservation stands is to make this country the best possible place to live in, both for us and for our descendants. It stands against the waste of natural resources which cannot be renewed, ... it stands for the perpetuation of the resources which can be renewed, such as the food-producing soils and the forests; and most of all it stands for an equal opportunity for every American citizen to get his fair share of benefit from these resources, both now and hereafter.

Conservation stands for the same kind of practical commonsense management of this country by the people that every businessman stands for in the handling of his own business. It believes in prudence and foresight instead of reckless blindness; it holds that resources now public property should not become the basis for oppressive private monopoly; and it demands the complete and orderly development of all our resources for the benefit of all the people instead of the partial exploitation of them for the benefit of a few. It recognises fully the right of the present generation to use what it needs and all it needs of the natural resources now available, but it recognises equally our obligation so to use what we need that our descendants shall not be deprived of what they need.

Conservation has much to do with the welfare of the average man of today. It proposes to secure a continuous and abundant supply of the necessities of life, which means a reasonable cost of living and business stability. It advocates fairness in the distribution of the benefits which flow from the natural resources.

Although Pinchot’s “Resource Conservation and Development position” (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 101) was radical<sup>8</sup> for its time, it is today critiqued by non-anthropocentrists. While acknowledging that Pinchot was a man who supported “equitable and sustainable economics” (Wall, 1994, p. 126), and sought solutions to environmental problems such as deforestation (p. 12), Wall nevertheless describes his approach to nature as “essentially managerial” (p. 44), as seeking “ways of exploiting nature more efficiently rather than rejecting such assaults” (p. 44), as lacking “radical Green reverence for nature” (p. 44), as a conservationist rather than a deep Green approach (p. 126), as “hostile to the fundamentals of radical deep ecology” (p. 12), and unkindest cut of all?, as a “civil service environmentalist” approach (p. 12).

---

<sup>8</sup> Whatever one may think of Pinchot’s wise use of resources for human benefit approach, as Rodman points out, he was the first to take steps to “restrain the reckless exploitation of forests, soils, etc. characteristic of the pioneer stage of modern social development by imposing ethical and legal requirements” that these resources be used for the greatest good of the greatest number, including future generations, rather than just for the profit of the immediate few (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 121)

### 2.2.3 The emergence of 1970s environmentalism, and its continuing influence

In the 1970s, “environmentalism” began to emerge as ideology. From the start, O’Riordan notes, because of its philosophical antecedents, it presented itself in a dualistic, and contradictory, ecocentric-homocentric mode (1981, p. iii, and Figure 10.1 “The pattern of environmentalist ideologies”, p. 376). Arne Naess, deep ecologist, writing in 1973, a little before O’Riordan’s 1976 edition of *Environmentalism*, identifies the same two qualitatively different strands in environmentalism, but he calls them respectively, the deep ecology movement, and the shallow ecology movement (1973a). John Rodman’s 1970s essays (published in 1983) on emerging forms of ecological consciousness trace the same distinction, and so does John Ferris (1993). All four authors point out that these two broad forms of “environmentalism” differ *fundamentally* in their attitudes to nature, thus marking the difference between “seeing green” and in any other shade.

O’Riordan (1981) calls these two broadly differing versions of environmentalism, the ecocentric mode, and the technocentric mode. The 1970s ecocentric mode of environmentalism, which includes deep ecology, contains a strong element of spirituality, preaches the virtues of reverence, humility, responsibility, and care in human/nature relationships, and opposes what it sees as the arrogance of anthropocentrism. It sees nature as a delicate “web of life”, as the metaphor for an ideal society which seeks “permanence and stability based upon ecological principles of diversity and homeostasis” (O’Riordan, 1981, p. 1). In nature’s biodiversity and “symbiotic relationships”, are the messages of democracy and co-operation, and the celebration of cultural diversity (O’Riordan, 1981, pp. 3-4; also McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995; Naess’s several writings in Sessions, 1995). The ecocentric mode is in favour of technology provided it is low impact, but opposed to “bigness and impersonality in all forms” (O’Riordan, 1981, p. 1), including meaning-less work, and mega-cities. Development, if it means more industrial growth, more media-driven consumerism, and more environmental destruction, is regarded with deep suspicion, and certainly not as inevitable. Key features of 1970s ecocentric environmentalism are its bio-ethic [compare Wissenburg’s (1993) “biocentrism”], and its notion of the self-reliant community.

O’Riordan (1981, p. 1) sees the origin of his “technocentric mode” of environmentalism in the Conservationist half of the earlier Preservationist/Conservationist philosophical divide. He singles out as its key features<sup>9</sup>, an anthropocentric attitude to nature, an optimistic belief in science and technology’s capacity to deal with environmental problems, a belief in value-free objectivity, a predilection for numbers and statistics, and a managerial rationale vis-a-vis the environment: specialist expertise, and the use of tools such as environmental risk assessment, and environmental management planning.

## 2.3 The new social movements, and “green”

In this section, I discuss (2.3.1) contributing influences in the emergence of the “green movement”, followed by discussions of (2.3.2) the animal rights movement, (2.3.3) the green movement, (2.3.4) the ecology movement, (2.3.5) some direct eco-action groups, (2.3.6) ecofeminism, and (2.3.7) the environmental justice movement.

### 2.3.1 Contributing influences

Here I discuss how (a) the emergence of ecology as science (b) unprecedented industrial-driven growth, (c) the counterculture, (d) industrialism’s pollution and resource depletion, (e) USA foreign policy, (f) the misnamed “green revolution”, (g) the “environmental fight”, (h) the 1968 student revolts, and (i) the equal rights movement, all contributed to the emergence of “seeing green”.

---

<sup>9</sup> He gives them different headings, but I believe I have not lost his key thoughts

### (a) *The emergence of holistic ecology*

“Ecological science ... was strongly influenced by a philosophy of holism, from which it cannot be divided. ... Could Haeckel have given ecology its name without being familiar with his countryman Goethe’s holism?” (Wall, 1994, p. 3)

It is almost impossible to think of the emergence of the ecological worldview without the development of ecology, the science which gave philosophers, scientists and economists a growing understanding of the natural world, and of human’s beings’ place in it (Bramwell, 1989, p. 6; Wall, 1994, p. 104). The term “ecology” [“Ökologie<sup>10</sup>,”] was coined around 1869 by Haeckel<sup>11</sup> (Bramwell<sup>12</sup>, 1989, pp. 39-40; Wall, 1994, p. 104), sometimes described as biologist (Wall, 1994, p. 104), or zoologist (Bramwell, 1989, p. 4). He derived it from the Greek word “oikos” meaning “house”, or household unit. Though Linnaeus had been discussing the concept of an “economy of nature” a century earlier, his image of nature had been mechanical (Callicott, 1986, p. 306). But for Haeckel, ecology meant “the science of relations between organisms and their environment”, the study of “organisms in their context; their life-cycle, their environment and their place in the cycle of energy use” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 40).

Ökologie as term indicates not only the all-important shift in nineteenth century scientific thinking, from mechanistic to contextual and holistic biology, but a certain normativity as well. At the time, “Ökologie” also included “Ökonomie”, Aristotle’s concept, meaning a soundly organized, properly functioning household unit. Economical household management “implies that the use and conservation of resources is a moral activity as well as an economic one ...” (Bramwell 1989, pp. 14-15); it also implied that a well-run household was as self-sufficient as possible, husbanded its resources, and avoided waste and disorder (Bramwell, 1989, p. 41). Green thinking contains all these themes, and bases its vision of the ideal society on this original meaning of “Ökonomie” (Bramwell 1989, p. 41). By the 1950s, ecology as science was well established<sup>13</sup>, and was drawing on concepts from systems theory to describe and understand nature, such as stability, carrying capacity, and climax states. Eugene Odum’s oft-quoted *Fundamentals of ecology* appeared in 1971.

Worster (1991, p. xi, in Wall, 1994, p. 6) notes that even within the emerging science of ecology, there were two differing approaches: the Arcadian, and the Imperialist. “The Imperialist ecologist uses the subject to discover better ways of ‘managing’ nature for human benefit, the Arcadian advocates the ‘deep ecology’ approach of giving non-human life independent ethical status. The Imperialist seeks to exploit, the Arcadian to live in harmony<sup>14</sup>” (Wall, 1994, p. 6).

### (b) *Unprecedented growth via industrialization*

For western capitalist countries, the decades from the 1950s to the 1970s were a period of unprecedented and uninterrupted growth (O’Riordan, 1981). Science and industry, combining to produce an array of civilian and military technologies, led the way. “These new technologies, so it was

<sup>10</sup> “Ökologie” was to become one of Die Grünen’s “four pillars” of a radically new society

<sup>11</sup> Ernst Heinrich Haeckel (1834-1919), also philosopher. Martinez-Alier (1987) is not particularly complimentary about Haeckel, describing him as a ‘sun-worshipper’ (p. 115), tending towards social-Darwinism (pp. 12-13, p. 194), a ‘racist’ and contributor to the idea of *Lebensraum* (p. 101) which was subsequently misused by Hitler [though Haeckel could hardly be blamed for that]; and as being “kulturkämpferisch” (p. 202). Martinez-Alier is also dismissive of “today’s believers in holy and holistic ‘ecologism’” which he sees as right-wing, conservative, and derived from “the most mystic wing of Haeckel’s Monism” (p. 203). From here, Martinez-Alier makes a short leap towards also dismissing Rudolf Steiner’s Anthroposophy, “which joined with the irrational, apocalyptic ‘ecologism’ in which ‘back to nature’ is taken to mean ‘back to God and religion’ (p. 203). Bramwell’s view (1989) of Haeckel is altogether softer

<sup>12</sup> Bramwell (1989, pp. 39-40) gives the date as 1866

<sup>13</sup> For example, Schumacher (1973 [1986], pp. 111-112). cites from Ralph and Mildred’s Buchsbaum’s *Basic ecology*, which appeared in 1957

<sup>14</sup> Worster gives as an example of an Arcadian ecologist, Henry David Thoreau, who believed that nature “has an order, a pattern, that we humans are bound to understand and respect and preserve” (Worster, 1991, p. ix, in Wall, 1994, p. 104). Not surprisingly, Thoreau has provided inspiration for many Green thinkers, including Rudolf Bahro (Bramwell, 1989, p. 222, p. 225), and is also the source of an ever-recurring green theme, that of “the idyll of the Red Indian and his ability to live off and with the land” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 93). As example of an Imperialist scientific ecologist, Parsons (1977, in Wall, 1994, p. 104) gives Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), who in his *Dialectics of Nature*, “seeks to understand nature in order to control nature more efficiently for his species’ exclusive benefit”

said, seemed poised to cure all social ills of the time, if not engineer an entirely new civilization ... Nuclear power, it was avowed, would meet USA energy needs more or less for free; ... Miracle grains would feed humanity, and new pharmaceuticals would control formerly intractable diseases. Petrochemicals and petrochemical products – including plastics, food additives, detergents, solvents, and abrasives – would make life comfortable and provide labor-saving convenience for everyone....”. Pesticides were “touted as a kind of miracle product.... designed to increase agricultural productivity...” (Biehl, 1997a, pp. 4-5). Up until the 1973-74 energy crisis, the western industrial output was four times as much as it had been between 1900 and 1950, and for 25% of the world’s peoples, personal wealth increased by between 2 and 4% *every year*. Raw material prices, including energy, decreased steadily to below their real market worth, and the industrialized countries sold their high value-added products at inflated prices to the Third World through discriminatory trade agreements, an issue addressed particularly by Die Grünen [Chapter Seven]. Media advertising created ever-new consumer “needs” (O’Riordan, 1981, p. i-ii).

### (c) *The counter-culture*

The 1960s were the period of the counter-cultural social movements, with interests as disparate as self-realization, holistic health<sup>15</sup>, spirituality, the occult, or the sacred<sup>16</sup> (Berman, 1990, p. 14-15), alternative food and energy lifestyles, anti-consumerism (“voluntary simplicity”), “New Age” thought (Capra, 1983, pp. 455-466), grassroots democracy, post-colonialism, anti-racism, uninhibited sexuality, nationalism, socialism, anti-industrialism (Eisler, 1990, p. 23). Environmentalism too, was entering its “heyday” (1970-1972, O’Riordan, 1981, p. 65).

Dissident cultural thinkers<sup>17</sup> of the time in the USA could draw on the originally-European ideas of the nineteenth century Transcendentalists, as well as the ideas of intellectual dissidents who had fled Nazi Germany: post-Marxist Frankfurt school members, with their critique of rationalism gone wrong [their influence is especially strong in social ecology, Chapter Five], their western cultural critique (Hayward, 1995, p. 43), and their contribution to the political New Left. Students of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School were very effective in propagating New Left ideas, and radicalising both environmentalism and the student movement in the USA (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 12; Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 219).

There were other contributions to the North American dissident cultural consciousness in this period. One was Lynn White’s (1967) charge that the roots of our ecological crisis are to be found in the twin beliefs of medieval Latin Christianity: a belief in progress, and a belief in the legitimacy of exploiting the environment for human purposes, both underpinning a homocentric, exploitative attitude towards nature (Whitney, 1993, p. 157). Another contribution was the counter-cultural, counter-industrial society critique of writers such as Herbert Marcuse<sup>18</sup>, Illich (1971), Reich (1971), Callenbach (1972), and Theodore Roszak (1972, 1978). Bramwell (1994) discusses the proto-green themes of many of these writers<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> This movement aimed to end mechanistic medicine dispensed by experts, and to encourage self-responsibility for health

<sup>16</sup> Sacred is not easy to define, but there are links between it and Nature, e.g. Bateson’s writings on the sacred in Nature (1988) without ever equating that with God’s presence in it, or Berman’s (1981) writing on the “re-enchantment” of the world, or “the sense of nature as being alive and sacred” (Berman, 1990, p. 22)

<sup>17</sup> George Sessions (1987) provides a useful historical overview of people who contributed to the “ecological worldview” from the 1960s onwards

<sup>18</sup> Martinez-Alier links the “political bite” of the 1970s ecological critique to the 1968 student rebellion “which spread from Berkeley to Berlin” 1987, (p. 237), to Maoism and Guevarism, to Bloch’s Marxian utopianism, to a revival in anarchist communalism [of which Murray Bookchin’s social ecology work was one version], the dependency school of international relations [AG Frank’s “development of underdevelopment”] and Marcuse’s “uni-dimensionality” critique of the modern human being within a capitalist context (1987, pp. 237-238)

<sup>19</sup> Bramwell (1994) examines three of these in detail: Ivan Illich’s (1971) *Deschooling society* (Bramwell, 1994, pp. 61-68), Charles Reich’s (1971) *The greening of America*, influenced by Marcuse (Bramwell, 1994, pp. 69-73), and Ernest Callenbach’s (1972) *Ecotopia* (Bramwell, 1994, p.73-84). Common to these three works are a “cultural and moral criticism” of the manipulative, powerful and technology-backed state” (1994, p. 61), “a dislike of elitist power structures” (1994, pp. 82-83), a condemnation of the artificial work and worker anomie/alienation it engenders, and “a desire for ... an authentic and unalienated relationship to the means of production” (1994, pp. 82-83), a

Dr EF Schumacher<sup>20</sup>'s (1974) *Small is beautiful*, with its critique of materialism, and profit-driven mechanistic economy, was “germinal” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 171-172). His vision went “far beyond environmental protection”, emphasizing spirituality, “good work”, the need to re-introduce quality into human life, the importance of appropriate technology, and of “human scale” in all enterprises and institutions. In Capra and Spretnak’s view, he was to become “the prophet of the global Green movement” (1984, p. 171).

***(d) Resource depletion, the limits to growth idea***

Around this time, there was growing concern in western industrial societies about resource depletion. Ward and Dubos’ report to the United Nations appeared in 1972, as did the Club of Rome’s (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens) controversial report, *The Limits to Growth*, which predicted global disaster if then current rates of growth, consumption and pollution levels were not curbed (Neefjes, 2000, p. 14). Both Martinez-Alier (1987) and Bramwell (1989) point to the 1970s as the time when economic ecologism emerged as cultural-economic critique. The ideas and critique of the nineteenth century ecological economists partly re-emerged from the 1960s onwards, for example, in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s work on energy and entropy in the economic process, in Kenneth Boulding’s work on ecological limits to growth, and in Herman Daly’s work on energy, the environment and a steady-state economy (Bramwell, 1989; Gowdy, 1994, p. 45; Martinez-Alier, 1987). William Ophuls’ account of impending resource scarcity, and the need for a steady-state society, appeared in 1977. The notion of “sustainability” as opposed to continual growth began to gain acceptability in the 1980s (Gowdy, 1994, p. 45). Natural Resource Accounting emerged as a new discipline. The first international Multi-lateral Environmental Agreements, mainly on “the allocation and exploitation of natural resources such as wildlife, air and the marine environment” date from this period (Dalal-Clayton & Bass, 2002, p. 14). But what changed political ecology after 1980, in Ferris’s view, “... was the coming together of the peace movement and feminism with green concerns...” (1993, pp. 150-151).

***(e) USA foreign policy, and the peace movement***

The 1960s were also the time of the military Cold War East-West standoff. This involved a continued USA military involvement in Vietnam, the creation of military blocs in Europe, the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, the USA/USSR Cuba Crisis of 1962, and the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere by both the French and USA Governments in the 1960s and 1970s<sup>21</sup>. The USA’s foreign policy provided the impetus for on the street anti-Vietnam, anti-conscription, anti-nuclear, and pro-peace protests, as well the issuing of peace manifestos by citizens’ initiatives. In Europe and West Germany particularly, fears of a nuclear and ecological holocaust were acute: the proposed deployment of USA Pershing cruise missiles in West Germany in the early 1980s became a powerful motivator for the European/West Germany peace and green movements. Although the peace movement is “green” by description (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 447), I do not discuss it in a separate chapter, but as part of the green movement/Die Grünen (Chapter Seven).

---

belief that technology should “work for people rather than ... impose systems and structures upon them (1994, p. 62), a desire to release people’s inherent creative energy, stifled by mindless technology and capitalist consumerism, a critique of environmentally-damaging capitalist agriculture (p. 60), a commitment to decentralization and popular autonomy/power (1994, p. 63), a dislike of cars, traffic, and noise; a preference for small scale art and craftwork rather than mega-business (1994, p. 64), a dislike of large-scale urbanization, a preference for small communities networked through efficient, cheap public transport, and “a desire for a warm, harmonious, yet spontaneous collective way of life” (1994, pp. 82-83). These are all green themes

<sup>20</sup> “There can be no doubt that the influence of both Schumacher and Illich on the formation of green political ideology during the 1980s has been considerable” (Ferris, 1993, p. 152)

<sup>21</sup> From 1960-1966, the French Government tested its nuclear weapons in the atmosphere of the Algerian part of the Sahara Desert until Algeria’s independence in 1966; thereafter they moved the test area to the Moruroa Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, north east of Auckland, New Zealand (Brown & May, 1989, pp. 17-23). In the late 1960s/early 1970s, the USA Government was testing its nuclear weapons in the atmosphere near Amchitka Island, Alaska, in the north Pacific (May & Brown, 1989). Anti-nuclear activism was an early focus of Greenpeace

**(f) The “green revolution”**

The “green revolution” is the earliest use of “green” in connection with the environment that I have found in the literature. However “green” here is a misnomer in the normative ecological sense<sup>22</sup>. Some ecofeminists characterise the Green Revolution as an example of “patriarchal fantasies of technological development”, and as “a form of domination called developmentalism” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. x; also Curtin, 1995, p. 59). Green writer Capra<sup>23</sup> (1983) notes that the Green Revolution “helped neither the farmers nor the land nor the starving millions” (p. 271). Sustainable livelihoods writer Koos Neefjes (2000, p. 54) notes that it is “almost more famous for its failures and shortcomings” than for its supposed contribution to increased food production. It did however provide the backdrop for biologist Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* (1962), a landmark critique of American oil, herbicide, fungicide and pesticide-driven agribusiness.

**(g) Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring*, and the “environmental fight”**

Conspicuous pollution incidents in the 1960s, as well as chemical residuals build-up gave rise to widespread concern about environmental degradation (Bartelmus, 1986, p. ix). Goodin (1992, p. 10; also Attfield, 2003, p. 37; Sessions, 1995a, p. x) sees Carson’s *Silent Spring* (1962) as “the iconic marker” of the ‘first<sup>24</sup>’ environmental crisis of the 1960s/1970s, which sowed the first seeds of doubt about science and industrialism as the way to achieve societal progress. Up until then, “classical nature conservation” had not included “fighting the power-centers which were pushing mindless ‘development’”. The environmental fight ...inspired the rest of the world.” (Sessions 1995a, p. xi, citing Arne Naess, deep ecologist writer). Grassroots organizations within “the ecology movement” began to maintain and disseminate material “on environmental protection, organic farming, recycling of waste ... [and to provide] practical assistance in developing and applying soft technologies...”; many also belonged to the antinuclear alliances (Capra, 1983, p. 456).

Rachel Carson’s work ushered in “the Age of Ecology” (Sessions, 1987, p.105). Inspired “by the science of ecology and Albert Schweitzer’s Reverence for Life principle”, Carson was among the first to question “the direction and goals of Western society, including the ... ‘right’ to dominate and manage the Earth” (Sessions, 1995a, p. x). Deep ecologist Naess (1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 445; also Sessions, 1994, p. 209) traces “the beginnings of the international deep ecology movement” to her *Silent Spring*. Ecofeminists embrace her contribution too: “...Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* first raised a passionate voice of conscience in protest against the pollution and degradation of nature...although Carson was not an avowed feminist, many would argue that it was not coincidental that a woman was the first to respond *both emotionally and scientifically* to wanton human domination of the natural world.” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. ix, my italics: this is a typically green-ecofeminist approach to the human-nature relationship). While Carson’s critique elicited “major counterattacks from the chemical industry and the U.S. Department of Agriculture” (Sessions, 1994, p. 209), there was a

---

<sup>22</sup> The Green Revolution “promoted improved seed varieties (High Yielding Varieties, HYVs, which are normally hybrid seeds produced by in-breeding), widespread use of fertilisers and chemical pesticides, increased irrigation, and some mechanisation ...” (Neefjes, 2000, pp. 54-55). Several writers have commented negatively on it. Side effects of the Green Revolution have been that “... natural soil fertility and organic-matter content have been depleted; soil erosion enhanced; and health risks ... increased with the use of pesticides ... Dependency of farmers on external inputs ... sharply increased, and the medium to large farms benefited, while smallholders and subsistence farmers either did not benefit at all or actually became worse off. ... The Green Revolution’s main failure is that it has not managed to eliminate rural poverty and food insecurity ...” (Neefjes, 2000, pp. 54-55). Deep ecologist Arne Naess (1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 71) notes that the “green” revolution in the United States was “rather ‘blue’”, meaning, more economically than ecologically oriented. Martinez-Alier’s (1987, p. 244) views accord largely with those of Denis Owen, ecologist, already expressed in 1980 (Owen, p. 190, p. 206): the green revolution was too energy intensive, too destructive of the land and too expensive for those who needed it most. Martinussen (1997, pp. 140-142) assesses the Green Revolution from a development perspective, noting arguments in its favour, but also its high energy inputs, and negative ecological effects

<sup>23</sup> Fritjof Capra, research physicist, Californian “mystic”, author of books on “the new paradigm” (1983), and green politics (1984)

<sup>24</sup> There was a ‘second environmental crisis’ (Goodin, 1992, p.4) in the 1990’s, related to the increased risks associated with “possible global ecological catastrophes (such as global warming, and the depletion of the ozone layer)” (Giddens, 1990, in Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, pp. 646-647)

growing critique by “biologists, field ecologists, and conservation organization leaders” of “the ecologically destructive path of modern industrial growth societies” (Sessions, 1995a, pp. ix-x).

The first Earth Day<sup>25</sup> was held on 20 April 1971 (Nees, Green, & Treadway, 2003, p. 298). The 1972 United Nations Environmental Conference in Stockholm was the first acknowledgement by the “establishment” of social and political environmental conflicts (Naess, in Sessions, 1995, p. xi).

#### ***(h) The 1968 student revolts***

1968 was a momentous year in political history. In the USA, both Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy were assassinated; in Europe there was the Prague Frühling. The left-inspired student unrest of 1968 stretched from America to Europe. The student movement protested inter alia, racial and gender discrimination, as well as universities’ support of the military and big business (Capra & Spretnak, 1984; Singer, 1973b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 28). The student revolt played an important role in galvanising cautious environmentalism into a mass movement with political aspirations (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 445) – the “ecology movement”. Student radicals demanded that “the emerging environmental movement had to be ... politicised; they felt no real progress toward solving the ecological crisis would be made unless politicians were afraid of being kicked out of office if they attempted to block pollution and other legislation ...”, in short, the radical students had “a beneficial influence on politically activating ‘nature lovers’” (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 445).

#### ***(i) The civil rights movement***

The civil rights movement, inspired by powerful figures such as Martin Luther King, was also taking to the street in the 1960s in protest at racial oppression and lack of fundamental human rights and freedoms experienced by Blacks in the USA. This movement always held up the ideal of non-violence in its actions, an ideal repeated in the deep ecology movement, and in the green movement. The Black Liberation, Chicano liberation, Native American, and gay liberation movements were also becoming active (Rodman, 1977, p. 101). Liberal feminists, influenced by the work of Simone de Beauvoir (1965) (King, 1990, p. 110), were also demanding an end to oppression of women by men, and equal rights. There was often good synergy between the peace movement, in which many women were active, and the feminist movement, from which ecofeminism later emerged. The spirit of equal rights and its accompanying “liberation” motif, as well as feminism, played a role in the resurgence and radicalization of the animal rights movement, which began around the early 1970s (Rodman, 1977, p. 119, footnote 8).

### **2.3.2 The animal liberation movement**

The animal liberation movement is the first of five members in the “green” sample (Chapter Three).

It traces its origins to Utilitarianism and the humane movement, which came into being together in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century (Rodman, 1977, p. 86, p. 90) as a radical critique of abuse of human and animal well-being during the transition from traditional to modern urban/industrial society. It was a time, writes Rodman (1977, p. 90), when “sensitive members of the upper classes began to be able to put themselves in the place not only of victimized humans”, but also of victimized animals. In the twentieth century “the movement became respectable and relatively ineffectual ... after securing some of its objectives (anti-cruelty laws, humane transportation and slaughter laws, etc.), making its compromise with Science on the ‘vivisection’ issue, and settling down to ... maintaining shelters for

---

<sup>25</sup> After this original Earth Day, social ecologist Bookchin (Chapter Five) notes, Earth Day became a “shopworn” festival during which “millions of school kids were ritualistically mobilized to clean up streets and their parents were scolded by Arthur Godfrey, Barry Commoner, and Paul Ehrlich...” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 228)

stray cats and dogs...”. After World War II though, the “truce” with science was broken as animal experimentation in the name of scientific research increased.

At street level, the regeneration and radicalization of the humane movement began as part of the counter-cultural “paradigm shift” of the 1960s/1970s in the USA. Ruth Harrison’s influential expose of factory farming was published in 1964. Also in that year, there were legal arguments for creating rights for natural objects. In 1970, Cobb was writing on rights of the “subhuman world” (Rodman, 1977, footnote 11, p. 121), and a demand was made for “a Bill of Rights for all wild creatures, everywhere” (Rodman, 1977, footnote 11, p. 120). In 1972, a Declaration of the Rights of Animals was published (Davila, 1972, noted in Rodman, 1977, p. 119, footnote 8). Vegetarianism grew, based variously on moral/humane, holistic health, and ecological energy arguments. Ethological studies, and wild life documentaries, sharpened critique of zoos. Direct action campaigns to stop whale, dolphin and seal hunting were early concerns of Greenpeace, founded in 1970 in Canada (Brown & May, 1989). The Animal Liberation Front, a leaderless resistance movement, with no formal membership or hierarchy, was founded in the UK in the 1970s (Retrieved from Wikipedia, 17 March 2006, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal\\_Liberation\\_Front](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_Liberation_Front)). Moral philosophical discussion of the status of animals began in 1972. In 1973, Peter Singer’s review essay *Animal liberation* on which his 1975 influential book was based, appeared. This essay gave the animal liberation movement its name (Hursthouse, 2000, pp. 12-13).

### ***Is animal liberation part of “seeing green”?***

Animal liberation is not “green” by self-ascription, but on balance I think, by the description of other commentators. According to historian of green-ness Derek Wall (1994, p. 66): “Fundamental to Green thinking are the linked concepts of deep ecology and animal liberation. Proponents ... argue that other species and indeed ‘All life has intrinsic value’ (Bunyard and Morgan-Grenville 1987:281). Many believe that Greens can be separated from mere environmentalists by virtue of their adherence to such ‘bio-ethics’ (Dobson 1990:48)”.

Historian of ecogism Anna Bramwell does not completely agree. She notes that while for example, animal liberation issues such as animal rights, anti-vivisectionism, and vegetarianism are “deeply connected to the ecological world-view” (Bramwell, 1989, p.237), they can exist without the total commitment to global reform which is one of ecogism’s hallmarks. She sees these animal liberation issues as important, but subsidiary “...elements of the ecological ethic...” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 3). Professor of Philosophy Robert Goodin notes that while Greens do talk of “animal liberation” (Goodin, 1992, p. 74), animal liberationists are not so “self-consciously green” as for example those defending forests, and see themselves as “as at the most mere fellow-travellers with the greens” (Goodin, 1992, p. 132, footnote 43).

But by contrast again, O’Riordan (1981) singles out bio-ethics as marking off “ecocentric” from “technocentric” environmentalism [section 2.2.3 above], and green movement/Die Grünen fundamentalist ideologist Rudolf Bahro considered the question of whether or not one opposed animal experimentation to be “the litmus test” for being green (Sandford, 1986a, pp. 9-10). When Die Grünen at their June 1985 Hagen conference turned down a motion banning all animal experiments, and opted for a compromise motion instead, Bahro resigned (Bahro, 1985b, pp. 210-211).

I think the animal liberation movement is “green” because it was radical on several grounds:

- (a) Its attempt to “help us crystallize a ‘radical new conception of man’s relationship to the rest of nature’” (Rodman, 1977, p. 84), to find a new relationship to nature by extending moral considerability beyond human beings only [“moral extensionism”].

(b) Its widening of the motivational base for ethical behaviour from rational self-interest to *empathy with an Other*, to a capacity to put oneself in the place of the Other – perhaps one could call this, admitting *feeling* as a motivational base for ethical behaviour, not only rationality, and rational self-interest. At the time, as Rodman notes (1977, p. 86), people were looking for something “more expressive of their total sensibility” than the “homocentric”, “workaday”, “commonsense” language and outlook of Resource Conservation or Survival Ecology (Rodman, 1977, pp. 83-84). They were seeking “a new ‘myth’ that can comprehend what we feel as well as think about the rest of nature” (Rodman, 1977, p. 125, footnote 31), when trying to justify their efforts to protect or save nature.

(c) Its challenge to the dominant western industrial-technological society’s views on nutrition, and on animal experimentation in science.

### 2.3.3 The “green” movement

The West German green movement/Die Grünen is the last of the five members in the green sample (Chapter Seven).

Martinez-Alier notes that North American environmentalism “wilted” in the 1980s (1987, p. 237). By then though, the counter-cultural/ecological baton had been passed on to Europe, primarily through the literary works (Bramwell, 1994, p. 60, p. 83; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 36-37; Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 237) noted in 2.3.1(c) above. The European “green” movement, particularly as it emerged in West Germany, provides a good example.

American anti-establishment ideas reached Germany in the early 1970s (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 36-37), and were well received by those concerned about environmental issues such as river pollution and “Waldsterben”. By 1972, a decentralized grassroots ecological movement, called the Bundesverband der Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz<sup>26</sup> [BBU] had been formed; USA-educated Petra Kelly, feminist, and anti-nuclear campaigner (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 8), later to play a key role in the formation of die Grünen, was an active member. The interests of these citizens’ movements were originally conservative-values based, and a-political protection of the environment, but this changed towards a more street-political orientation during the latter half of the 1970s. Their interests sometimes co-incided with those of other social movements, such as the peace activists who opposed the use of nuclear power, and the stationing of long-range missiles in West Germany (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 29-30), the feminists, those espousing alternative, counter-cultural lifestyles in contrast to the prevailing industrial consumer culture (Bramwell, 1994, pp. 95-6; p. 96; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 14, pp. 29-30), or the remnants of the Marxist-inspired student movement left over from the 1968 “angry” student uprisings (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 11-12).

#### *Is the West German “green movement”/ Die Grünen part of “seeing green”?*

Yes, by self-ascription, and description by authors of standing. Writing in 1987 (in Sessions, 1995, p. 24), Capra indicates as part of “the European green movement”, “the feminist movement, the holistic-health and human-potential movements, various spiritual movements, numerous citizens’ movements and initiatives, Third World and ethnic liberation movements, and many other grassroots movements...”. The link between them, he suggested, was the realization “that they represent merely different facets of the same new vision of reality<sup>27</sup>”. Here is an extract from a piece which he wrote in

<sup>26</sup> Its concerns today are still archetypically “green”: ecologically and socially-friendly energy provision; a people-friendly transport system not based on more cars and more motorways; reduction of waste in production and consumption; no genetic modification (retrieved 1 August 2005 from <http://www.bbu-online.de/html/bbu.htm> )

<sup>27</sup> Again the idea encountered in the story of Greenpeace, that “green” symbolizes a new vision of society. This is really one of the key differences between today’s understanding of environmentalism which typically works within the establishment, and ecologism, which seeks a new global order, of which environmentalism is but a part

1984, together with ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, seeking to describe the green movement and its new vision of reality: The green movement

is an ecological, holistic, and feminist movement that transcends the old political framework of left versus right. It emphasizes the interconnectedness and interdependence of all phenomena, as well as the embeddedness of individuals and societies in the cyclical processes of nature. It addresses the unjust and destructive dynamics of patriarchy. It calls for social responsibility and a sound, sustainable economic system, one that is ecological, decentralized, equitable, and comprised of flexible institutions, one in which people have significant control over their lives. In advocating a co-operative world order, Green politics rejects all forms of exploitation – of nature, individuals, social groups, and countries. It is committed to nonviolence at all levels. It encourages a rich cultural life that respects the pluralism within a society, and it honors the inner growth that leads to wisdom and compassion. Green politics, in short, is the political manifestation of the cultural shift to the new paradigm. (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. xix-xx).

In the 1990s, Arne Naess was using the term “the green movement for social change” (Sessions, 1995f, p. 267) to describe the three “contemporary worldwide movements which call for grass roots activism” – the peace movement, the social justice movement, and what he called in that paper “radical environmentalism<sup>28</sup>” (Naess, 1992, revised 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 465). In 1996, environmental ethicist Robyn Eckersley more or less equated “green” with the “green movement” and with “green political parties”. Thus she writes: “I use the term ‘green’ (or ‘green movement’) to refer not simply to the environment movement but rather to a broader social movement (and its green party political offshoots) that is working to secure the so-called four pillars of green politics<sup>29</sup>: ecological responsibility, social justice, grassroots democracy and nonviolence” (Eckersley, 1996, p. 234, footnote 1).

But ever different, Bramwell suggests that in 1978, “green” was more a “convenient label” than anything else. She explains that at the time, “Hamburg saw a convention of various alternative list groups. This convention was named the Rainbow group, because all the alternative groups had their own colours; purple for the women’s movement, black for the anarchists and so on... In Germany the word [green] was more of a convenient label, an equivalent to the purple, the black and the red. Since a colour had to be found, “Green” was used ...” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 220).

Even if the colour green were a random choice, Die Grünen saw themselves as part of the global green movement: “Wir verstehen uns als Teil der grünen Bewegung in aller Welt” they said in their March 1980 Federal Programme (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4). We feel connected with all those working in the new democratic movement: “den Lebens-, Natur- und Umweltschutzverbänden, den Bürgerinitiativen, der Arbeiterbewegung, christlichen Initiativen<sup>30</sup>, der Friedens- und Menschenrechts-, der Frauen- und 3.-Welt-Bewegung”.

I should like to present one of Rudolf Bahro’s early 1980s [ca. 1981] comments on the green movement/Die Grünen in full, because it captures something of the elusive relationship between “green”, the “green movement<sup>31</sup>”, and Die Grünen:

...I would like to stress that the ‘Green’ movement should be understood in rather broad terms. The name itself is misleading, in that it conjures up images of trees, nature and so on, whereas in fact it is a broad ideological movement that reaches beyond the mechanisms of bourgeois society. Not that it ignores the existing reality, but it does not believe that Western industrial society can offer a solution to our problems. It combines a number of trends that are present in all classes of society and all political groups, creating a

---

<sup>28</sup> Elsewhere Naess calls it “the ecology movement” (Sessions, 1995f, p. 267)

<sup>29</sup> These are the four pillars of Die Grünen’s early political programmes (Chapter Seven)

<sup>30</sup> A reference to those seeking to re-interpret the Christian anthropocentric relationship to nature in an ecological way

<sup>31</sup> But note how Bahro here more or less equates the ecology movement with “green”. Elsewhere he uses “green” to mean the ecology *and* the peace movements (Bahro, 1986)

new field of interest in the sense that one talks of a magnetic field. It is difficult to absorb this into the existing party political system, *and so the ecology movement has turned into an alternative type of party*. I first saw for myself how people came from all different quarters to unite in the movement ... in 1979 ... (Bahro, 1984e, p. 130, my emphasis) ... it embraces trends like the peace movement, the third-world movement and the revival of basic Christianity in the Churches, so that we really need a better name than the 'ecology movement'<sup>32</sup> (in Bahro, 1984e, p. 131, also p. 137).

### 2.3.4 The ecology movement

Deep ecology, and social ecology, represent the second and third of the five members in the green sample (Chapters Four, and Five respectively).

#### 2.3.4.1 Deep ecology

Supporters of the deep ecology movement consider themselves heir to the tradition of Thoreau, Muir, Leopold, and the 1960s Ecological Revolution (Sessions, 1995h, p. 323). By the early 1980s, deep ecology philosophy was well known in Scandinavia<sup>33</sup>, and beginning to take hold in the USA. Capra's 1983 (pp. 458-459) account of the deep ecology movement as part of the new "ecological vision" emphasizes that its concerns were more than just environmental protection; he describes the movement as rooted in a rediscovery of older alternative philosophical, religious and spiritual traditions, committed to a new kind of science, which combines rational knowledge and intuition, and acknowledging the strong link between ecology and feminism (Capra, 1983, p. 462). The "deep ecology platform"<sup>34</sup> appeared in 1984; the 1985 Devall and Sessions book did much to popularize deep ecology in the USA.

Two people were prominent in explicating its contemporary philosophical position. One was Gary Snyder, in the USA. Snyder, Pulitzer Prize-winning poet and essayist, follower of Zen Buddhism, had already begun developing, together with ecologist Raymond Dasmann, and Peter Berg (Sessions, 1995a, p. xii), the philosophical foundations for an ecocentric bioregionalism<sup>35</sup> in the 1960s. Snyder's (1974) *Four Changes*, first written in 1969, is an early classic ecocentric/deep ecology essay (Sessions, 1995c, p. 101), and his influence continued throughout the next twenty-five years (Sessions, 1995a, p. xii). The other was academic philosopher Arne Naess in Norway, who according to Sessions (1987, p. 112) "both described and defined the deep ecology movement into existence". Naess was amongst the first professional philosophers to consider ecological problems in the context of philosophy. He began lecturing and writing on "Philosophy and ecology" at Oslo University in 1968 (Sessions, 1995a, p. xii; 1995d, p. 157), and at the Hong Kong University in 1972. In a paper<sup>36</sup> presented at a Third World Futures conference held in Bucharest, 1972, he distinguished between "a "shallow" anthropocentric technocratic environmental movement concerned primarily with pollution, resource depletion, and "the health and affluence of people in the developed countries" on the one hand, and the ecocentric, "Deep, Long-Range Ecology movement" on the other. (Sessions, 1995a, p. xii). Though Naess not once uses the word "environmentalism" in his article, which perhaps reflects his European rather than American heritage, Bret Wallach (2004, p. 9), of the University of Oklahoma, suggests that the article "dismissed the efforts of mainstream environmentalism as merely reformist and advocated instead a policy of environmental egalitarianism, in which all species had an equal right to co-exist. Here was a full-blown ecocentrism ...".

<sup>32</sup> Bahro goes on to wonder why it should be that the ecology movement mostly first came to the fore, and made the greatest impression, in countries which "are traditionally Protestant" (Bahro, 1984, p. 131); he names Scandinavia as one. Green historian Anna Bramwell (1994) also hypothesizes on the connection between "green" and Protestantism

<sup>33</sup> Founder Arne Naess's *Okologi, samfunn, og livsstil* [Ecology, community, and lifestyle] was published "in 1976 and later translated into Swedish" (Sessions, 1987, p. 112). I have also seen 1973 given as date of publication

<sup>34</sup> An eight-point statement of the deep ecology position discussed in Chapter Four

<sup>35</sup> Similar to the ecocentric self-reliant community described by O'Riordan (1981)

<sup>36</sup> Later published as "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology movement. A summary." in *Inquiry*, 16, 95-100

Deep ecologists emphasize the internal relatedness of ecosystems and the individuals comprising them, advocate deep-seated respect for all forms of life, appreciation of ecological diversity, symbiosis and complexity, rejection of social class, and decentralization and local autonomy (Sessions, 1994, p. 211). They critique population growth, indiscriminate industrialism and inappropriate use of technology, mindless consumerism, exploitative relations with nature, and perhaps above all else, the arrogance of western anthropocentrism. Far more than only “protecting or repairing the status quo, which is generally the goal of environmentalism, deep ecology encompasses the study of nature’s subtle web of interrelated processes and the application of that study to our interactions with nature and among ourselves...” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 30). Environmental philosopher Michael E. Zimmerman describes deep ecology as “a radical stream of the environmental movement. ... A primary distinction between deep ecology and reform environmentalism [shallow ecology] is that the former is nonanthropocentric in its attitude toward the natural world, while the latter is anthropocentric” (1990, pp. 138-139). By Naess’ description, the ecological movement focussed/is still focussed on achieving a societal transformation towards “wide ecological sustainability” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 219; also Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 446-448).

### *Is deep ecology part of “seeing green”?*

It is, both by self-ascription, and description by eco-philosophers. On founder of deep ecology Arne Naess’ descriptions, “green” means variously, the green movement, alternative movements, the deep ecology movement, the entire ecology movement, and green political parties.

For example, when asked in an interview in 1999 for his own definition of “Deep ecology”, Naess replied: “Deep Ecology - I could also call it "Green" - the Green Movement is a movement where you not only do good for the planet for the sake of humans but also for the sake of the planet itself. That's to say that you start from the whole of the globe and talk about the ecosystems, trying to keep them healthy as a value in itself. ....”; and “Otherwise I would say that deep ecology or the green movement is a movement of activists or being active amongst one's own friends ....” (Naess, 1999, in Kubiak, 1999).

And in answer to a question on the nature of Die Grünen’s agenda in Germany, or of the green party in Sweden, Naess replied: “Well, in West Germany where the term "green" was first used in politics, practically every alternative movement called itself green. So, it's a mixture of many different kinds. In Sweden, it's more really what I would call green or nearer the deep ecology movement. ... So, the Swedish greens are in my view very justly called green because their ecological basis is so sharp. ...” (Naess, 1999, in Kubiak, 1999).

Naess describes deep ecology as part of the ecology movement. For example, in discussing how difficult he thinks it is for a green political programme to accommodate all the extreme positions of the peace, social justice and ecology movements, he says “The main driving force of the Deep Ecology movement, as compared with the rest of the ecological movement ...” (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 452). And he sees the ecology movement as part of, but not the equivalent of, the green movement: For example, in a discussion of the Eight Points of the deep ecology platform in 1993, Naess remarks that there is a clear distinction between the ecological movement, and the Green movement, “of which the Deep Ecology movement is only a part” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 220, see also p. 219).

Other authors note the deep ecology – green link. Wall’s (1994, p. 66) comment that deep ecology is “fundamental to “green” thinking” has already been noted. Smith (1997, p. 5) links the two thus: “Arne Naess, the originator of the term ‘deep ecology’ and the progenitor of the green deep ecology ‘movement’ ...”. Professor of philosophy J. Baird Callicott writes in 1993 (1993a, pp. 3-4) that the deep ecology platform “has been adopted by members of the radical green movement...”. Political scientists Michael and Anderson (1987) characterize deep ecology as a “green story”. And ecofeminist Ariel

Salleh claims that deep ecology is “held back from maturation as a Green philosophy by its lack of a fully rounded political critique” (Salleh, 1993, p. 225).

#### **2.3.4.2 Social ecology**

Murray Bookchin, also described as “a major figure in anarchist and utopian political theory, theory of technology, urbanism, and the philosophy of nature” (Bookchin, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 354) is the person most associated with the social ecology wing of the ecology movement, sometimes also called “eco-socialism” (Goodin, 1992, p. 73). Like deep ecology, social ecology was also simultaneously a new social movement [i.e. grassroots political activism around particular issues], incipient new social theory (Lahar, 1996, p. 1), and eco-philosophy. It shares with deep ecology, feminism/ecofeminism and the animal welfare movement, the liberation/emancipation rhetoric of the time (Goodin, 1992, p. 74). Social ecology, via Bookchin, issued its call “for a radically new spirituality”, a “collective effort to change society”, and an “ethics of complementarity” toward nonhuman beings as early as 1965 (Bookchin, p. 355).

From the first meeting of greens in Northern America at Amherst in 1987, there were bitter disputes between deep and social ecologists. In 1988, Bookchin noted that

... the word ‘ecology’ [does not] put us all ... in the same boat against environmentalists who are simply trying to make a rotten society work by dressing it in green leaves and colourful flowers, while ignoring the deep-seated *roots* of our ecological problems. It is time to face the fact that there are differences within the so-called ‘ecology movement’ of the present time that are as serious as those between the ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecologism’ of the early seventies (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 229, his emphasis).

According to Bookchin (1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 228-229, p. 229), a “*coherent*” ecology is one “rooted in an ecological philosophy, ethics, sensibility, image of nature, and, ultimately, an ecological movement that will transform our domineering market society into a nonhierarchical cooperative one that will live in harmony with nature, because its members live in harmony with each other” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 229, his emphasis). Unless “...North American Greens and the ecology movement shift their focus toward a *social ecology* and let deep ecology sink into the pit it has created for us, the ecology movement will become another ugly wart on the skin of society....” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 238, his emphasis).

#### ***Is social ecology part of “seeing green”?***

Bookchin describes social ecology’s political position as “radically green”. He explains radically green as meaning, taking a stand together “with the left-wing tendencies in the German Greens and extra-parliamentary street movements of European cities; with the American radical ecofeminist movement; with the demands for a new politics based on citizens’ initiatives, neighborhood assemblies, and New England’s tradition of town-meetings; with non-aligned anti-imperialist movements at home and abroad; with the struggle by people of color for complete freedom from the domination of privileged whites and from the superpowers” (1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 236).

#### **2.3.5 Direct action eco-activism**

Although civil disobedience is a recurring green praxis, no direct action ecological groups have been included in the green sample. Examples of such direct action eco-active groups are Friends of the Earth, formed in 1969 (Goodin, 1992, p. 10), Greenpeace in 1970, the Environmental Life Force<sup>37</sup> in 1977, Earth First! around 1980, and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals [PETA] in 1980 by Ingrid Newkirk, inspired by Peter Singer (Goodin, 1992, p. 10). I discuss only Greenpeace and Earth

---

<sup>37</sup> Re-animated as the Earth Liberation Front in 1992 by some former members of Earth First! (Goodin, 1992, p. 10)

First! next, as two examples of the “new social movements”/“dark green” side of Wissenburg’s diagram (Chapter One, Figure 2).

### 2.3.5.1 *Greenpeace*

Greenpeace represents the earliest positive connection I have been able to find between “green” and “environmentalism plus social critique”. It was founded in 1970 by Jim Bohlen, and Irving Stowe, both practising Quakers<sup>38</sup>, and members of the Canadian branch of the USA-based Sierra Club, to protest the USA Government’s atomic bomb testing. It soon turned its attention to environmental issues as well. The small group’s distinguishing colour was green<sup>39</sup>. The name “Greenpeace” was coined by another early member, Canadian social worker Bill Darnell, to symbolize the close relationship between the ecology movement and the peace movement, and to convey visually, the coupling of concern for the planet’s environmental issues, with peaceful opposition to atomic weapons, in “a compelling new vision<sup>40</sup> for society (Brown & May, 1989).

### 2.3.5.2 *Earth First! (circa 1980 - )*

“Are you tired of namby-pamby environmental groups?” ... "No compromise in defense of Mother Earth!" (retrieved May 2005 from <http://www.earthfirst.org> )

Capra and Spretnak (1984, p. 30) note that the “deep ecology concept” “has informed American ecophilosophy and activism in recent years”, i.e. presumably, the late 1970s and early 1980s. Earth First!, which “promoted an ecocentric orientation and claimed<sup>41</sup> to be an activist component of the Deep Ecology movement” (Sessions, 1995a, p. xiii), provides a good example of dark green, direct eco-activism.

Dave Foreman, a deep ecology adherent (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 230), founded Earth First! in the early 1980s. It initially concentrated, and still does, on direct action to prevent inter alia, logging, dam building, other forms of development which may cause “destruction of wildlife habitats or the despoliation of wild places”, seal slaughter, and the spread of genetically modified organisms<sup>42</sup> (retrieved May 2005 from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth\\_First%21](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_First%21)). From the mid 1980s, Foreman increasingly turned towards, and promoted, the deep ecology philosophical approach, “which holds that all forms of life on Earth have equal value in and of themselves, without regard for their utility to human beings. Earth First!ers use this philosophy to justify an ecocentric view of the world in which intrinsic values for organisms and ecosystems outweigh their resource values.” (retrieved May 2005 from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave\\_Foreman](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave_Foreman) ).

Foreman and his group adopted what many consider dubious ethical<sup>43</sup> direct action practices, including the sabotage or destruction of infrastructure, “spiking” trees to make logging potentially injurious to loggers, and inflicting economic damage, tactics variously called “monkeywrenching”, “ecosabotage” or “ecoterrorism”. Foreman himself publicized these tactics widely in his writings; he and other Earth First!ers were also accused in the 1980s of making contentious misanthropic remarks in the course of

<sup>38</sup> I note this, because a strong element in the Quaker tradition is “bearing witness”, understood as a form of passive resistance, in which one gathers at the site of whatever activity or process is being condemned, and demonstrates opposition simply and effectively by sheer presence (Brown & May, 1989, p. 8). This is of course a tactic still used by Greenpeace today, and was also used by the peace and ecology movements of the 1970s

<sup>39</sup> “Am 15. September 1971 ... setzte die Phyllis Cormack ein grünes Dreiecksegel mit den Friedens- und Ökologie-Symbolen ....” (Brown & May, 1989, p. 12)

<sup>40</sup> The German text reads: “[It is generally agreed that Bill Darnell] schliesslich die dynamische Wortverbindung vorschlug, in der sich die Sorge um unseren Planeten mit der Opposition gegen Atomwaffen zu einer mitreissenden neuen Vision verknüpfte...” (Brown & May, 1989, p. 9)

<sup>41</sup> Callicott (1993a, pp. 3-4) describes “the eco-warriors of Earth First!” as deep ecology’s “covert operatives”

<sup>42</sup> A common green issue; see for example also the website of the BBU

<sup>43</sup> The question probably is: Is damaging property morally equivalent to inflicting bodily harm? (retrieved May 2005 from <http://www.wikipedia.org> )

their campaigns<sup>44</sup>. Less contentious Earth First! direct action practices today include educational campaigns, protests, and civil disobedience tactics such as tree sitting to prevent logging, road blockades, disruptive action to prevent environmental destruction while filing lawsuits, and locking supporters to heavy equipment to immobilize it. While critics of the movement consider such tactics eco-terrorism, Earth First!ers say it is “ecodefence” - the real terrorists are those who destroy the environment in the first place (retrieved May 2005 from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth\\_First%21](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_First%21) last modified 16 April 2005). After 1990, Earth First! moved increasingly towards adopting an anarchist political philosophy, calling itself a movement, a priority, not an organization (see Earth First! website <http://www.earthfirst.org> too), avoiding organized leadership or administrative structures, and promoting “decentralized, locally-informed activism based on communitarian ethics” (both retrieved May 2005 from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth\\_First%21](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_First%21)), against what it sees as a “lethargic, compromising, and increasingly corporate environmental community”.

### 2.3.6 Eco-feminism

Ecofeminism represents the fifth and last member in the sample of “seeing green” (Chapter Six).

The Women’s movement began in the late 1960s, and eco-feminism emerged in the mid-1970s (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. ix). The term “ecofeminism” was coined by Francoise d’Eaubonne in 1974 (Merchant, 1990a, p. 100; Warren, 1990, p. 125), but Spretnak (1990, p. 8) traces some of its ideas as far back as the 1940s, when Simone de Beauvoir noted the connection between patriarchy, and the domination of women and nature (Spretnak, 1990, p. 8). The first conference to address the idea of the linked domination of women and nature was held in 1974, at the University of California, Berkeley. Two seminal works, *Woman and nature* by Susan Griffin, and *The death of nature* by Carolyn Merchant followed in 1978 and 1980 respectively; and three key conferences - at Amherst, Massachusetts, at Sonoma State University, California, and in London - were held in 1980 and 1981 on women and the environment. Ecofeminism’s potential as an alternative to mainstream environmental ethics began to gain recognition around 1990 (Warren, 1990, p. 125).

Eisler (1990, p. 23) sees ecofeminism as an integration of interests from the peace, ecology and feminist movements of the 1970s. As grassroots political activism, new social theory, and philosophy, ecofeminism draws on the women’s movement’s multi-theoretical roots - liberal feminism, Marxist feminism [1960s critical Marxist theory], radical or cultural feminism [the source of women’s spirituality/nature-based religion (Spretnak, 1990, pp. 3-14)], socialist feminism, black and Third World feminisms, and postmodern feminism (Warren, 1997; Wilson, 1997).

Feminists argue that they have successfully shown that what was thought to be the “natural” social arrangements of western patriarchy, have actually been socially constructed by men in men’s interests, “to justify men’s control over women” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. ix). Contemplating the dual threats of nuclear annihilation and ecocide in the 1970s, feminist writers began to see, and to theorize connections between male consciousness and male manipulation of “everything defined as ‘other’, whether nature, women, or Third World cultures” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, pp. ix-x). Feminist Rosemary Radford Ruether commented in 1975:

Women must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to be one of domination. They must unite the demands of the women’s movement with those of the ecological movement to envision a radical reshaping of the basic socioeconomic relations and the underlying values of this [modern industrial] society. (Ruether, 1975, p. 204, in Warren, 1996, p. ix).

<sup>44</sup> Sessions (1995a, p. xiii, p. 280, and footnote 38 on p. 288) makes it clear that both Foreman’s misanthropy and views on population control are ‘antithetical’ (p. xiii) to Deep Ecology philosophy. He also points out that Foreman himself, in the same context of making his views on population control known, noted that “I am speaking for myself, not for Earth First!”. But see also Foreman’s sympathetic-sounding discussion with Murray Bookchin, seeking common ground between deep and social ecology (Chase, 1991)

### *Is Ecofeminism part of “seeing green”?*

Ecofeminism, its conjuncture of peace, ecologist, and feminist concerns, its concern to develop “worldviews and practices which are not based on models of domination” (Warren, 1996, p. ix), is green by self-ascription. In ecofeminist philosopher Charlene Spretnak’s view, the “arrogance and ignorance” of the dominant techno-industrial worldview “are being challenged to varying extents by environmentalist organizations and to a much deeper extent by a loose aggregate of movements whose members are sometimes called the “new” ecologists: ecofeminism, deep ecology, Green politics, bioregionalism, creation-centered spirituality, animal rights, and others ... they are ... feeling their way ... toward a way of being that is infused with ecological wisdom” (Spretnak, 1990, p. 4). And again, in the same author’s view “...women and men who become involved with Green politics for environmental reasons discover ecofeminism and deep ecology there” (Spretnak, 1990, p. 6).

Another ecofeminist, Starhawk, writes: “We [spiritually-based ecofeminists] have a certain perspective that I believe can be valuable politically and that is, in some way, linked to what I see ecofeminism and the Green movement attempting...” (Starhawk, 1990, p. 75). Or, [in thinking how to bring about a new consciousness in society, she writes] “...this is what I think we should do, and, if I were setting an ecofeminist or a Green agenda, this is how I would organize it...” (Starhawk, 1990, p. 80). Ecofeminist authors Diamond and Orenstein refer to ecofeminism’s ideology as “this tapestry in green” (1990, p. xii).

### **2.3.7 The environmental justice movement in 1980s USA**

Despite having widened its base from single-issue focussed environmentalists, and concerned middle class ecologists, to a mass social and political movement in 1970s and 1980s in Europe at least, environmentalism in America remained predominantly white, and concerned with “white” environmental issues (Taylor, 1997). Environmentalism crossed the colour line in the USA in the late 1980s, as the realization grew in the social justice movement that inequalities and discriminations based on race, class, and gender, were compounded by inequitable environmental burdens. Toxic waste dumps, nuclear waste storage sites, landfill sites, polluting industries, and incinerators, were deliberately and disproportionately sited in minority [people of colour] and low-income communities, often as a result of successful lobbying by wealthier, better-organized, better politically-connected [white] communities elsewhere.

Environmental justice became the motivating and rallying theme of a movement which although originally based in minority groups, now cuts across and builds bridges between groups traditionally segregated along race, ethnic, class and interest lines. In 1991, the environmental justice movement set out its 17 principles (Taylor, 1997). In the first of these principles, the environmental justice movement “Affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity, and the interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from ecological destruction”.

### *Is environmental justice part of “seeing green”?*

Logical thought suggests it must be: if one accepts Naess’s description of the green movement as comprising the peace movement, the ecology movement, and the social justice movement, then the environmental justice movement, as part of the social justice movement, must be part of “seeing green”. Taylor (1997) confirms the links: in a Venn diagram she suggests (Taylor, 1997, p. 65) that the environmental justice movement represents the intersection of interests between the environmental, ecofeminist, women’s, civil rights, and labour movements.

Still, reading through its principles, one has the clear impression that it operates more within a humanist “rights” and “justice” framework than an ecological framework. And Dobson (2000, p. 183) notes that “My own view is that the ‘justice’ and ‘environment’ agendas are related in the way that the

circles in Venn diagrams are related. That is to say, there are areas of common concern but it is a mistake to regard them as wholly and completely mapping on to one another. The powerful ‘environmental justice’ movement in the United States is often deployed as evidence that the environmental and justice movements can sing from the same hymn sheet, but a close examination of the US movement’s aspirations shows that it is more concerned with human justice than with environmental protection”. Even though I have not selected the environmental justice movement for closer examination in a separate chapter, we encounter its views in its critique of ecofeminism (Chapter Six).

## 2.4 Ecologism as political ideology, and “green”

Bramwell uses the term “ecologism” to mean a politically-radicalised environmentalism, a new “political box” at the time of its emergence, a political theory so encompassing that it should be considered simultaneously as a total western European cultural critique, a total worldview - what she sometimes calls “the ecological world-view” (1989, p. 237), an ideology in short, just as conservatism, liberalism and socialism are ideologies (1989, p. 15, p. 39).

The nature of ecologism as political ideology<sup>45</sup> vis-a-vis the three traditional western political ideologies is a vast separate field of enquiry (Dobson, 1993, p. 229). On Dobson’s view, ecologism makes three distinct new contributions: it causes us to re-view through a green-feminist lens, previous political theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, and to discover new [female] political authors; to re-view traditional political concepts such as rights, duties, distributive justice, autonomy, and democracy; and to deal with its widening of the political community to include non-humans (Dobson, 1993, pp. 229-233). Despite the obvious green of “ecologism”, I do not include it in the representative database of “seeing green”. Instead, the green sample includes the “total view” of Die Grünen (Chapter Seven), whom Bramwell considers a “flowering” of ecologism (1989, p. 6).

## 2.5 Environmental philosophy/ethics, and “green”

In this section, I discuss (2.5.1) four homocentric/anthropocentric models of the human-nature relationship available in the 1970s, as background to the “seminal<sup>46</sup>” calls for an environmental ethic which could “make good the shortcomings of traditional humanism” (Attfield, 2003, p. 9, and p. 37; also Sessions, 1995d, p. 156; Sylvan, 1973, p. 12); (2.5.2) early philosophical moves towards a greener, non-anthropocentric understanding of the human-nature relationship; (2.5.3) the newer “green” environmental value theories of biocentrism and ecocentrism; and (2.5.4) the selection of the three radical ecophilosophies (Chapters Four, Five, and Six) as members of the “seeing green” sample.

### 2.5.1 Four homocentric models of the human-nature relationship

Towards the late 1960s/early 1970s, a philosophical search for a new understanding of the human-nature relationship began. Australian philosopher and historian of ideas, John Passmore (1974) identified three models of the human-nature relationship available in the Christian-humanist heritage, for modification into an “environmental” ethic<sup>47</sup>: (1) man as despot (2) man as developer and perfecter of nature and (3) man as steward, the latter two models in his view, converging (Rodman, 1983; Sessions, 1987, p. 111). For better understanding, all three Christian-humanist models need to be

---

<sup>45</sup> Dobson (1993, p. 229) defines a political ideology as “an analysis of political reality, a picture of the Good Life, and a theory of political action or strategy”

<sup>46</sup> Three “seminal” (Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 3) papers of the time were (1) Norwegian Arne Naess’s 1972 “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movements – a summary” (Sessions, 1995a, p. xii, and Naess, 1973, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 151-155), (2) Richard Routley’s 1973 “Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?”, presented at the 15<sup>th</sup> World Congress of Philosophy in Varna, Bulgaria (in Zimmerman et al., 1993, pp. 12-21), and (3) Peter Singer’s “Animal liberation” (in *The New York Review of books*, 5 April 1973, in Zimmerman, 1993, pp. 22-32)

<sup>47</sup> All three were rejected by Australian philosophers Richard and Val Routley (later, Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood) as representing the “Western Domination [of nature] Assumption” (Sessions, 1987, p. 111)

placed within that Christian perspective which holds that nature, along with Adam as representative of the human species, forfeited divine grace at the time of the Fall<sup>48</sup> (Sessions, 1994, p. 219). Calvinism for example, saw “both humans and nature as sinful and in need of redemption” (Sessions, 1995d, p. 167). There is a Christian tradition that humans redeem themselves in God’s eyes by redeeming nature and restoring paradise (Sessions, 1994, p. 219). And for Bacon, the purpose of science was to “regain a command over nature that had been lost with Adam’s Fall in the Garden” (Sessions, 1995d, p. 161).

### 2.5.1.1 ‘Man as despot’

In 1967 University of California [UCLA] historian Lynn White published a controversial article<sup>49</sup> on the Judeo-Christian negative contribution to the environmental crisis. He critiqued its “...emphasis on God’s transcendence, the other-worldly destiny of the human, its orientation toward “progress”<sup>50</sup>, and its biblical notion of human “dominion”<sup>51</sup> over the Earth” (Smith, 1997, p. 72). White contended that Christianity “not only ... insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends”, but that it also “established a dualism of man and nature” (White, 1967, cited in Sessions, 1994, p. 207). He argued that this tradition “fostered a perception of nature as ‘other’, ... and allowed for a very exploitative exercise of dominion” (Smith, 1997, p. 72). Modern secular ideologies, such as Marxism, are essentially Judeo-Christian heresies, White claimed, and have not deviated from Christian ideas of progress, and “man’s rightful mastery over nature”. Modern science and technology, having developed within a Christian matrix, are also “permeated with Christian arrogance toward nature”. One must note here though, that Christians themselves are working hard towards finding a more benign Christian environmental ethic than the “despot” tradition (Guelke, 2004; Kay, 1988; McDaniel, 1983, 1994).

### 2.5.1.2 ‘Man perfecting nature’

The ‘man perfecting nature’ (Passmore, 1974) construction is traced to Aristotelian thought (Sessions, 1994, p. 216), and to the Judaic stewardship tradition (Katz, 1994, pp. 55-70). Passmore describes the ‘man perfecting nature’ position as a kind of moral justification for “development”: “... [we can think] of an area still in something like its original condition as ‘not yet developed’. To ‘develop’ land, on this view, is to actualize its potentialities, to bring to light what it has in itself to become, and by this means to perfect it... How is perfection to be judged: the presumption is still, in Aristotle’s manner, that nature is at its best when it fulfils men’s needs – that this, indeed, is its reason for existing, what its

<sup>48</sup> Attfield (2003, p. 35, citing Harrison (1999, pp. 102-107) also refers to nature’s order and perfection before the Fall. There are some fascinating ideas on the idea of the Fall. One interpretation is that it represents the shift from the hunter-gatherer lifestyle of the first humans, where nature provided fully for human needs, to the age of agriculture, when human beings began to take control of their food production. It has also been given a psychological/moral interpretation as the shift from being un-self-conscious, to conscious and aware of the “good and evil” uses of power over nature, and thus over other human beings too. Environmental ethicist J.B. Callicott traces the emergence of anthropocentrism to the shift represented metaphorically by the Fall, and suggests that it was the “original sin” (McDaniel, 1994, pp. 76-78, citing work from Wes Jackson, agro-ecologist, as well as Callicott’s own views (1991, p. 125). Ecofeminist Riane Eisler (1990, pp. 27-28) interprets the Fall as “based on folk memories of a time before ... brother turned against brother and man trod woman down under his heel”, a symbolic reference to the Neolithic period, when the early agrarian societies lived in peaceful harmony, and were not male-dominated (Eisler, 1990, pp. 27-28)

<sup>49</sup> “The historical roots of our ecological crisis”, 1967, first read at a December 1966 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and published in 1967 (Sessions, 1995a, footnote 5, p. xxv). According to Whitney (1993, pp. 151-169), White’s challenge to Christianity “to produce a more environmentally sensitive theology has generated a vast body of material both critiquing and defending the ecological stance of the Judeo-Christian tradition” (p. 151). Deep ecologist George Sessions considers this paper by White as a “classic of deep ecology” (Whitney, 1993, p. 158 and footnote 29). Steffen (1992) recognizes White’s role in “forcing the Christian community to confront itself on the issue of environmental protection” (p. 75) but nevertheless defends the biblical notion of dominion as “an ideal of responsible [environmental] action rather than as an authorization for callous disregard of the natural world” (p. 63). Robin Attfield (2003, pp. 31-32) doubts White’s dominion interpretation. Christian stewardship rejects teleological anthropocentrism, and is a “coherent ... interpretation” of the Bible’s central beliefs, which place a “high value” on the natural world with which humans are entrusted, a trust which calls for “human responsibility and answerability” (2003, p. 36) However, as White subsequently pointed out to his critics, leading thinkers could also equally have put a positive “spin” on the Judeo-Christian tradition; the point is, they didn’t. One should therefore ask: What purpose did the negative focus serve? Whose interests? (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, pp. 199-202; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 40-45)

<sup>50</sup> White negatively ascribed Western “faith in perpetual progress” to “Judeo-Christian teleology” (Sessions, 1994, p. 216). See as contrast, Jaki’s (1974) analysis of the positive contribution of Judeo-Christian thought to the evolution of a viable Western science, and so progress

<sup>51</sup> But subsequent writers have sought to re-instate the notion of dominion “as an ideal of responsible action rather than as an authorization for callous disregard of the natural world” (Steffen, 1992 p. 63)

potentialities are for. So to perfect nature is to humanize it, to make it more useful for man's purposes, more intelligible to their reason, more beautiful to their eyes..." (Sessions, 1994, p. 216, citing Passmore, 1974, pp. 32-33).

The humans perfecting nature model seems related to the "spiritual motif" in Western theology too, in which Santmire (1985) includes Teilhard de Chardin [1881-1955]'s work. In this view, the purpose of human existence is either transcendence of nature, or the humanizing of nature. For Teilhard de Chardin, nature was "an evolutionary process to be humanized through technological progress" (McDaniel, 1994, p. 72, drawing on Santmire, 1985, p. 170); a "stepping-stone" to human fulfilment, understood as transcending/humanizing nature; a fulfilment in which humans are liberated from nature's constraints (Sessions, 1994, p. 292). At the end of human life was divine life with God, *without* nature (McDaniel, 1994, pp. 72-73). de Chardin's thoroughly anthropocentric spirituality<sup>52</sup> is also found in the intellectual/social strand of New Age thought, and on deep ecologist George Sessions' view, can also be traced in the thought of social ecologist Murray Bookchin (Sessions, 1995g, pp. 292-300).

### 2.5.1.3 'Man as steward'

The 'man as steward' construction can be traced as far back as Plato<sup>53</sup> (Sessions, 1994, p. 215). It was also present in the Old Testament. Several scholars argue that "dominion" always meant beneficent governance of the kind exercised by Solomon, and environmentally responsible stewardship of nature, not its exploitation (Steffen, 1992; Katz, 1994; McDaniel, 1994).

The essence of stewardship is that "the end [purpose] of man's creation was that he should be the viceroy of the great God of heaven and earth in this inferior world: his steward [sty-warden], *villicus* (farm manager), bailiff or farmer of this goodly farm of the lower world" (Sessions, 1994, p. 215, citing Passmore, 1974, p. 30). The Benedictine monks at their monasteries for example, actively intervened in nature because they believed it was their duty to "work as partners of God in improving his creation or at least in giving it a more human expression... [St Benedict thought that] labor is like a prayer which helps in recreating paradise out of chaotic wilderness" (Sessions, 1994, p. 216, citing from Dubos, 1972, pp. 135-174).

Passmore's Christian-heritage image of 'man as steward' is the image re-articulated by most texts seeking an appropriate secular motivation for the ethic of sustainability; this is discussed further in Chapter Nine, section 7.3. The stewardship approach appears quite close to the "resource conservation" approach, which is one of the four versions of a new "ecological consciousness"<sup>54</sup> which John Rodman (1983, reproduced in Sessions, 1995, pp. 121- 130) discerned as emerging during the 1960s/1970s re-assessment of the human-nature relationship.

### 2.5.1.4 'Resource conservation'

Rodman (1977) identified a further human-nature relationship model which he called "Resource Conservation". This approach draws on the Pinchot half of the Muir-Preservationism/Pinchot-Conservationism philosophical divide heritage (section 2.2 above). It tends towards an economic rather than a religious, reverential and/or aesthetic attitude to nature. In the resource conservation view, pragmatic prudence suggests an "enlightened self-interest" ethic, where "interest" means, economic interests, and interests of power related to the control and use of natural resources (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 121-122). Later additions to this current of thought were interests such as human

<sup>52</sup> But supporter of deep ecology, and eco-theologian Thomas Berry is nevertheless able to draw on Teilhard's thought to propose a "neo-Teilhardian" cosmology (McDaniel, 1994, p. 72)

<sup>53</sup> "Man, they said, is sent to earth by God 'to administer earthly things', to care for them in God's name"

<sup>54</sup> These were Resource conservation, wilderness preservation, moral extensionism, and ecological sensibility

recreation, aesthetic pleasure, scientific knowledge, and the biological survival of human beings (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 122). The latter can be seen clearly for example, in the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, entitled “Ecosystems and Human Well-being<sup>55</sup>”.

In Rodman’s view, the “resource conservation” form of ecological consciousness, also called the “RCD [resource conservation and development] scientific management of Nature” approach (Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 301), is not a suitable starting point for “a general environmental ethic” for various reasons. These are discussed further in Chapter Nine, section 7.3.1, but a key reason is its absence of commitment to the idea of nature’s value-for-itself.

### **2.5.2 Towards a “greener” environmental ethic**

There had been foreshadowing of a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic before the 1970s: (a) a long-existing alternative “ecological” motif in Christian thought; (b) Muir’s nineteenth century “wilderness preservation” approach, (c) Albert Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” principle, and (d) Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic”.

#### ***(a) The alternative Christian “ecological” motif***

Santmire suggests that together with the “spiritual motif” in the “thoroughly ambiguous” Western Christian approach to nature (Linzey, 1990, pp. 52-55; McDaniel, 1994, p. 71, citing Santmire, 1985), there had always been a minor “ecological” tradition, to which belongs inter alia, Francis of Assisi [1182-1226]. White had for example proposed a return to the views of St Francis, who believed in “the equality of all creatures”, as a Christian solution to the ecological crisis (Sessions, 1995c, p. 101; see also Sessions, 1995g, p. 298; Mizzoni, 2004). In the alternative Christian ecological motif, the purpose of human existence is “community with nature”, appreciation of “nature’s blessings”, and awareness “that nature has value apart from its usefulness to human beings” (McDaniel, 1994, p. 71). At the end of human life, was divine life with God, *also* for nature. One finds references to this alternative Christian tradition for example, in deep ecology writings, and McDaniel (1994) bases his interpretation of modern Christian stewardship on it (Chapter Nine, section 7.3.2.1).

#### ***(b) Muir’s thought***

Rodman considers the exact value position of Muir’s “wilderness preservation” to be “ambiguous” - Muir never explicitly spoke in terms of nature’s intrinsic value. But, Rodman’s view is that had Muir been asked outright if the Yosemite had value in itself, “he would surely have said that it did” (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 123-124).

#### ***(c) Albert Schweitzer’s (1875-1965) “reverence for life”***

In his ethical thought, “Schweitzer contended that modern civilization is in decay because it lacks the will to love. He suggested that people should develop a philosophy based on what he termed ‘reverence for life,’ embracing with compassion all forms of life” (Microsoft Encarta, 1994). Something of Schweitzer<sup>56</sup>’s non-anthropocentric “reverence for life” principle is reflected in the small quote from his work below:

The great fault of all ethics hitherto has been that they believed themselves to have to deal only with the relations of man to man. In reality, however, the question is what is his attitude to the world and all life that comes within his reach. A man is ethical only when life, as such, is sacred to him, that of plants and animals as that of his fellow men, and when he devotes himself helpfully to all life that is in need of help. (Schweitzer, 1950, p. 310, in Velasquez, 1991, p. 12).

<sup>55</sup> Retrieved 10 June 2005 from [http://www.iisd.ca/media/biodiversity\\_wildlife.htm#international](http://www.iisd.ca/media/biodiversity_wildlife.htm#international)

<sup>56</sup> Ordained curate, medical missionary in French Equatorial Africa (now Gabon) theologian, ethical philosopher, musicologist, humanitarian, and 1952 Nobel Peace Prize winner. Religion was the thread running through all his interests; he found profound religious meaning not only in human beings’ accomplishments, but also in the natural world (Microsoft Encarta, 1994)

**(d) Aldo Leopold's (1887-1948) "land ethic"**

"The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land." ... "That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but that land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics" (Aldo Leopold, <http://www.aldoleopold.org>)

It is scarcely possible to follow debates on the green perspective without some background on Leopold's "land ethic". Although Leopold was "trained in the anthropocentric resource conservation ideology of Gifford Pinchot" before breaking with it<sup>57</sup>, his thought was also influenced by Darwin, Muir, Schweitzer and Asian philosophy (Sessions, 1987, pp. 113-114). In his 1949 *A Sand County Almanac*, Leopold reflected on "man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it" (Leopold cited by Sylvan, 1973, in Zimmerman et al, 1993, p. 12). His earlier Pinchot-type utilitarian view on the human/nature relationship had by 1949 changed to the view that the human being is a citizen of the land community like any other, and that no "ethical relation to land [i.e. "...soils, waters, plants, and animals..."] can exist without love, respect and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense." (Leopold, 1949 republished 1966, p. 239).

Some suggest that Leopold's land ethic was nothing new at all, simply an extension of conventional anthropocentric ethics – the extending of "rights" to plants and animals (Bramwell, 1994, p. 38; Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 127). But environmental philosopher Richard Sylvan seems to be saying that Leopold was suggesting that it is not that we should be extending our traditional morality to the environment, but that a "change in ...[our] ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations" is required (Sylvan, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 13). Sessions and Rodman argue that Leopold was not trying so much to establish a formal environmental ethical theory, as pleading for a move away from total anthropocentrism: "actually trying to bring about an ecocentric 'paradigm shift' or change in perception and consciousness" (Sessions, 1995c, p. 101). Leopold however, left an enigmatic heritage for environmental philosophy (section 2.5.3.2 below).

**2.5.3 More recent "green" theories of environmental value**

Environmental philosophy began as formal discipline in 1979 (Callicott, 1993a, p. 3). Among the many issues with which it concerned itself, anthropocentrism versus non-anthropocentrism was one. Biocentrism and ecocentrism represent two non-anthropocentric theories<sup>58</sup>.

**2.5.3.1 Biocentrism**

Recall that biocentrism as ethic is located on the dark green side of Wissenburg's heuristic (1993, in Chapter One, Figure 2). By the late 1970s, the work of philosophers such as Kenneth Goodpaster began to tentatively take moral philosophy "beyond animal liberation/rights into environmental ethics proper" (Callicott, 1993a, p. 7). Goodpaster's 1978 paper "On being morally considerable" proposed a "life-principle" ethic; it set the criterion for moral considerability as "being alive": things that are alive, have *interests*, a good of their own, and so may be benefited or harmed (Callicott, 1993a, p. 7). Such "life-centred" environmental ethical theories fall under the umbrella term "biocentrism": a "normative stance that holds that all living creatures have a good of their own, and have moral standing

<sup>57</sup> O'Riordan (1981, p. ix) sees Leopold as a "later disciple" of the Transcendentalists. But Leopold had originally trained as a forester in the Pinchot Conservationist managerial school of thought. For example, in 1933, Leopold wrote that "Effective conservation requires ... a deliberate and purposeful manipulation of the environment" (from Leopold's 1933 "Game management" book, cited in Bramwell, 1994, p. 37), which necessitated, in Bramwell's words, the "careful management of animal life, ... and working for an increase of those products of the wilderness that could be used or consumed by man" (Bramwell 1994 p. 37). But by 1949, when Leopold published his *Sand County Almanac*, there had been an almost complete reversal, a conversion. Somewhat tongue-in-cheek, Bramwell (1994, p. 39) remarks: "Here was the Gospel of Nature, a sermon in stones and sandflies..."

<sup>58</sup> I will not in this chapter or study, be pursuing further all the environmental ethical explanations of biocentrism and ecocentrism, and the various kinds of consequentialist/teleological or nonconsequentialist/deontological ethics which can be linked to them (Attfield, 2003)

accordingly, and that their flourishing or attaining their good is intrinsically valuable” (Attfield, 2003, p. 189).

Paul Taylor is a widely acknowledged proponent of biocentrism as an appropriate new human-nature environmental ethic (Mizzoni, 2004, p. 41). Four beliefs form the core of Taylor’s biocentrism:

- (a) The belief that humans are members of the Earth’s Community of Life in the same sense and on the same terms in which other living things are members of that Community.
- (b) The belief that the human species, along with all other species, are integral elements in a system of interdependence such that the survival of each living thing, as well as its chances of faring well or poorly, is determined not only by the physical conditions of its environment but also by its relations to other living things.
- (c) The belief that all organisms are teleological centers of life in the sense that each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own way.
- (d) The belief that human beings are not inherently superior to other living beings. (Taylor, 1986, pp. 99-100, in Mizzoni, 2004, pp. 42-43; see also Taylor, 1981, pp. 206-207).

While biocentrism is opposed to anthropocentrism as environmental ethical theory, it accords equal inherent worth and moral considerability only to *wild* organisms, both animal and plant<sup>59</sup>. Inanimate things are excluded (Callicott, 1993a, p. 8; VandeVeer & Pierce, 1998, p. 98). Also, only “individuals can be meaningfully said to have moral value in and of themselves. Neither species nor ecosystems embody moral value” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 346); they have no good of their own, thus cannot be benefited (Attfield, 2003, p. 11, p. 40). In opposition to the individualism of biocentrism, is the holism of ecocentric theories.

### 2.5.3.2 Ecocentrism

For ecocentrists, the key insight from scientific ecology is that “humans and their activities are inextricably integrated with the rest of the natural world in communal or communal-like arrangements” (Steverson, 1994, pp. 71-72). This ecological insight means that human anthropocentric valuing of the non-human environment needs to be reformed if we are to establish a truly environmental ethic, and not merely an ethic for use of the environment<sup>60</sup>.

Ecocentrism is formally defined as the value theory that *wholes*, such as the biosphere, ecosystems, populations, species, and biological diversity “have a good independent of that of their component individuals, and as such have their own moral standing, and that attaining or sustaining their good has intrinsic value” (Attfield, 2003, p. 192). But if wholes, rather than the welfare of individual organisms, is the focus of ecocentrism, this leaves as a problem, not only the question of moral considerability of individuals in the system, but their autonomy too (Lucardie, 1993b, pp. 21-35).

Foreshadowing ecocentric theories such as Callicott’s holistic environmental ethic, and deep ecology’s “biospherical egalitarianism<sup>61</sup>” – a “paradigmatic” example of ecocentrism, on Steverson’s view (1994, p. 72) - is Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic” (Rodman, 1983). Katz (1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1998, pp. 161-163) suggests that Leopold left behind him a “double holistic vision”, one of “land” as a community of members [which Katz follows], and the other of “land” as an organism.

---

<sup>59</sup> On Mizzoni’s (2004) discussion of Taylor’s biocentrism though, Taylor emphasizes respect for *all* living things

<sup>60</sup> Regan (1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 48, footnote 12) made this distinction

<sup>61</sup> Deep Ecology’s “biospherical egalitarianism” [Chapter Four] includes in its scope of moral standing, individual living things, species, and ecosystems, and also in principle, things such as rivers and mountains (Fox, 1989, in Sessions, 1995, p. 269; Naess, 1995b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 224)

Some statements in Leopold's work have been subjected to excruciating analysis by early environmental ethicists [for example, J Baird Callicott, and Holmes Rolston in early issues of *Environmental Ethics*] looking for inspiration for an academic environmental ethical theory (Foreman, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 52-53; Sessions, 1995c, p. 101). One oft-analyzed Leopold statement is "a land ethic changes the role of *Homo sapiens* from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members and also respect for the community as such" (Leopold cited by Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 9). This would seem to suggest that Leopold considered *both* individuals *and* communities in nature to have moral considerability/standing. It would be the interpretation which I favour, because as Callicott (1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 10) notes, Leopold's ethical ventures can be traced to Hume's insistence on benevolence, loyalty and sympathy as ethical motivators. Would one have sympathy for, and empathy with, an ecosystem but ignore the plight of one of its members?

But Callicott argues that Leopold meant that *only* "wholes" [ecosystems; species] had moral considerability, as another of his oft-cited statements seems to suggest: "A thing is right when it tends to promote the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise." (Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., pp. 9-10). Callicott thus expands on Leopold's "hints and suggestions" (1993a, p. 9) to propose an ecosystem-centred ethic. Environmental ethicist Attfield on the other hand, understands that Leopold's land ethic also "implies respect" for fellow community members (Attfield, 2003, p. 160). Holmes Rolston also drew on Leopold to formulate an environmental ethic which attempts to synthesize individualism [the claim "that any and every living thing is intrinsically valuable and thus morally considerable" (Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 11)] and holism. That is, the well-being of both individual non-human creatures *and* ecosystems is independent of human interests, both have intrinsic value (Callicott, 1993a, p. 11; also Attfield, 2003, p. 54 and p. 39). This is also how I understand deep ecologist Naess's explanation of biospherical egalitarianism<sup>62</sup> (Chapter Four: 5.4).

#### 2.5.4 The three radical ecophilosophies

The study does not examine the formal theories of biocentrism and ecocentrism any further. Instead, it concentrates on the three "radical" (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii) eco-philosophies, deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism (Chapters Four to Six). They are radical, because they (1) "disclose the conceptual, attitudinal, and social origins of the ecological crisis", and (2) because they argue that "only a revolution or a cultural paradigm shift can save the planet from further destruction" (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii). The other connection between the radical ecophilosophies and "green" is their critique of mainstream anthropocentrism. [Social ecologists, for example, adhere to what has been called a weak anthropocentric position (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii, and Chapter Five, par. 5.4)]. Ecofeminist philosopher Val Plumwood (1997, p. 328, p. 329) notes that the critique of anthropocentrism is fundamental to green thought; a core project of "the Green movement". As Bookchin suggests, green is "the color of radicalism" (Bookchin, 1988, in Chase, 1991, reproduced in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 244). These three ecophilosophies already form part of the "seeing green" sample.

#### 2.6 Environment and development ["sustainable development"], and "green"

Sustainable development's exclusion from the "seeing green" database on the grounds of its anthropocentrism was discussed in section 1.5 of this chapter. The fundamental difference between non-anthropocentrism, and anthropocentrism has also been highlighted throughout this chapter. But because sustainable development is a mainstream position, and philosophical "home" of *Namibia*

<sup>62</sup> Lucardie (1993b, p. 29) notes that in the dilemma of holism versus individualism, one can follow three paths: negate the dilemma, negotiate between the two, or opt for both, the latter being the route taken by Naess

*Vision 2030* (discussed in Chapter Eleven), some of its leading ideas and assumptions, together with a brief history of its development, is presented in Chapter Nine: Environment and development.

However, this does not mean to imply that there is *nothing* “green” in sustainable development, as Attfield’s (2003), Davidson’s (2000), and Hattingh’s (2002) discussions of Jacob’s (1995) models of radical and conservative sustainable development models (Chapter Nine: 7.2) will show.

### 3. Summary

Section 1 of this chapter explains the methodology and method used to answer research question 1: What does “seeing green” as worldview mean? It explained historian of ideas and environmental philosopher Richard Sylvan’s (1985b) qualitative thematic survey method, which seeks to identify the “core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes” of a research topic, in this case, a “seeing green” worldview. Six worldview themes were established. These are preceded by an introduction, and followed by a place for mutual critique, and a summary: 1. Introductory remarks, 2. Legitimizing narratives (myths, religion/s and/or spirituality, and/or philosophies, and/or ideologies, and/or rhetoric/metaphors employed), 3. Epistemology, 4. Ontology, 5. Ethic, 6. View of culture/society, 7. Praxis, 8. Critique of, and by, other sample members, and 9. Summary.

The ideas which comprise “seeing green” are extensive, and frequently contradictory. To provide a methodological context for the selection of a sample to represent a synthesized “seeing green” worldview, Sylvan’s qualitative survey method was located with set theory as explained by Kerlinger (1986). Following Kerlinger, a rough “rule definition” was developed to assist in outlining the universe of “green”:

Any new social movement, political party, philosophy, or political ideology which describes itself as “green”, or is described by a reliable commentator as “green”, qualifies as a member of the “green” set. Further, a member of the “green” set will tend towards biocentrism/ecocentrism as theory of environmental value, and propose radical, not reformist, changes to society (Wissenburg, 1993, pp. 4-5).

Using this rough rule definition of “green”, a representative sample of five members was selected from several possible members: animal liberation/rights, deep ecology, social ecology, ecofeminism, and green movement thought as represented by then West Germany’s Die Grünen. Sustainable development was excluded from the “seeing green” database on the grounds of its anthropocentric, grey-green rather than green, stance. Instead, it will be discussed within the field of environment and development, in Chapter Nine.

Section two of this chapter presented the historical and ethical context of the five sample members chosen, as well as those considered but not chosen: for example, the formal environmental philosophical theories of biocentrism and ecocentrism, ecologism as formal political ideology, the environmental justice movement, or activist groups such as Earth First! and Greenpeace as other possible representatives of new social movement thought.

The first of the “seeing green” sample members, animal liberation/rights, is discussed in Chapter Three next.

## CHAPTER THREE: ANIMAL LIBERATION/ RIGHTS FOR NONHUMAN NATURE

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>1.1 The relationship between animal liberation theory, environmental ethics, and “seeing green”</b>	<b>55</b>
1.1.1 Differing historical roots	55
1.1.2 Differing goals	55
1.1.3 Yet green	56
<b>1.2 “Crossing the species divide”: Singer, Regan, and Stone as early representatives</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>2. Legitimizing narrative/s</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>2.1 The rhetoric: liberation, rights, justice</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>2.2 The “machine” metaphor</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>3. Epistemology</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>4. Ontology</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>4.1 The view of nature</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>4.2 The view of the human being</b>	<b>60</b>
4.2.1 Singer’s view	60
4.2.2 Regan’s view	60
4.2.3 Stone’s view	61
<b>5. Ethic</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>5.1 The “theory” of motivation to ethical behaviour</b>	<b>61</b>
5.1.1 Singer	61
5.1.1.1 “Speciesism”	61
5.1.2 Regan	62
5.1.3 Stone	62
5.1.3.1 A different role for human beings	62
<b>5.2 The locus of value</b>	<b>63</b>
5.2.1 Singer’s sentience	63
5.2.2 Regan’s inherent value	64
5.2.3 Stone’s consciousness in nature	65
<b>5.3 The scope of the ethic</b>	<b>66</b>
5.3.1 Singer	66
5.3.2 Regan	66
5.3.3 Stone	66
<b>5.4 The moral obligation</b>	<b>67</b>
5.4.1 Singer	67
5.4.2 Regan	68
5.4.3 Stone	69
<b>6. View of society</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>6.1 Key assumption on causes of the ecological crisis</b>	<b>70</b>



<b>6.2 General critique of society</b>	<b>70</b>
<b>6.3 Specific Animal liberation/rights issues</b>	<b>71</b>
6.3.1 The use of animals in science	72
6.3.2 Commercial animal agriculture	72
<b>6.3.3 Wildlife harvesting and management</b>	<b>73</b>
6.3.3.1 Commercial and sport hunting, trapping, and wildlife harvesting	73
6.3.3.2 Hunting and culling in wildlife management	73
6.3.3.3 Predator control programmes	73
<b>6.3.4 Animals in education/entertainment for humans</b>	<b>74</b>
<b>7. Praxis</b>	<b>74</b>
7.1 Moral vegetarianism	74
7.2 Direct action; civil disobedience, ecological sabotage	75
<b>8. Critique of a sentience/rights-based ethic for animals</b>	<b>75</b>
8.1 No correlation between rights and duties/obligations	76
8.2 Homocentric, moral extensionist	76
8.3 Speciesist, hierarchical, degrading, implausible	76
8.4 Premised on an atomist, individualist ontology unsuitable for an environmental ethic	77
8.5 Premised on a “malestream” view of ethics and morality	78
<b>9. Summary</b>	<b>78</b>
9.1 Contributions to green	78
9.2 Animal liberation, and “green” revisited	80

## 1. Introduction

Fundamental to Green thinking are the linked concepts of deep ecology and animal liberation. Proponents of such ideas argue that other species and indeed ‘All life has intrinsic value’ (Bunyard and Morgan-Grenville 1987:281). Many believe that Greens can be separated from mere environmentalists by virtue of their adherence to such ‘bio-ethics’ (Dobson 1990:48). (Wall, 1994, p. 66)

The main objective of this chapter is to locate the content of the idea “animal liberation” as it appeared in the 1970s/early 1980s, as part of understanding the idea “green”. This chapter also introduces Christopher Stone’s seminal work (1975) on rights for non-human nature, even though it is not limited to animal liberation only. This, because I see in it<sup>1</sup>, a bridge from animal liberation thought to the common understanding in green, that *all* nature has value in itself, and not only an instrumental value for human beings.

In this introduction, I provide (1.1) a brief overview of the relationship between animal liberation theory, formal environmental ethics and “seeing green”, and (1.2) an introduction to Singer’s utilitarian<sup>2</sup>, Regan’s deontological<sup>3</sup>, and Stone’s legal perspectives, on moral status for parts/all of nonhuman nature. Thereafter follows (2) a discussion of their legitimating narratives, as well as their perspectives on (3) epistemology (4) ontology/psychology (5) ethics (6) view of society, and (7) praxis advocated. Some critique from green partners is presented in section 8. Section 9 comprises a summary of animal liberation/Stone’s liberation of nature ideas contributions to “seeing green”.

It hasn’t been possible in this chapter to fill the framework envisaged in Chapter Two comprehensively. The animal liberation movement does propose a radically<sup>4</sup> different moral relationship between people and animals – Singer and Regan both argue that in *some* sense, animals are equal to humans (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 2) - and also demands related radical changes in our society. Yet it does not represent the kind of “total view”, for which the comparative framework set out in Chapter Two [section 1.3.1] is designed, and which one finds for example, in deep ecology or green movement writings. Stone’s thought does come closer though.

---

<sup>1</sup> The idea that there is *some* link between the animal liberation movement, and Stone’s work, comes from John Rodman (1977), who reviewed Singer and Stone’s work simultaneously in a paper entitled “The liberation of nature?”

<sup>2</sup> Utilitarianism is a consequentialist ethical theory, that is, it judges the morality of an action by its consequences. Two principles are involved: equality, and utility. The principle of equality means that “the desires, needs, hopes, etc. of different individuals, when these are of equal importance *to* these individuals, *are* of equal importance or value no matter who the individuals are, prince or pauper, genius or moron, white or black, male or female, *human or animal.*” (Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, pp. 36-37, his italics). According to the utility principle [Bentham and Mill’s “Greatest Happiness Principle”, today interpreted mostly as minimizing pain, i.e. “negative utilitarianism” (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 13)], we ought to act so as to bring about the greatest balance of good over evil, for example, satisfaction over dissatisfaction, pleasure over pain, “taking the interests of everyone affected into account *and* counting equal interests equally” (Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 37, his italics; also Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman, p. 7; Dobson, 2000, p. 169; Rodman, 1977, p. 87). In the counting up of the aggregate positives and negatives, each individual “counts for one, and no one counts for more than one” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 347). To decide what I ought to do, when moral choices are involved, I do a kind of adding up or aggregation exercise. I metaphorically make a column for each option I have. Then within each option, I make sub-columns for “goods” and “bads”. Then below that I write for each individual affected by that option, his/her goods and bads. Then I total the goods/bads for each option. I am obliged to choose that option which shows the most likely best balance of goods over bads (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 80)

<sup>3</sup> Deontological theories such as Regan’s argue not from the consequences of an action but from pre-established moral rules. Actions, policies and practice are right when they comply with principles or rules which are themselves right, not as in the utilitarian, consequentialist/teleological view, when they produce a foreseeable balance of good over bad (Attfield, 2003, pp. 46-52; Velasquez, 1991, p. 436)

<sup>4</sup> Hursthouse (2000, p. 2, p.3) characterizes Singer and Regan as “extremists”

## 1.1 The relationship between animal liberation theory, environmental ethics, and “seeing green”

Animal liberation, the ecology movement, and “seeing green”, have an uneasy relationship (for example, Sagoff, 1993), despite the conflation of their twentieth century historical emergence<sup>5</sup> in western thought. On the one hand, the writings of some of the earliest animal liberation theorists [in this chapter, limited to Singer, and Regan. Mary Midgley’s (1978, 1984) work for example, is not included] represent a clear move away from traditional anthropocentrism (Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 5). Such distancing is a key marker of both the three radical ecophilosophies, and of “seeing green”. Animal liberation theories recognize the moral status of [some] animals in their own right, that is, independently of any use they have for, or pleasure they may provide to, humans. Yet their move towards an ethic which includes animals, not only humans, is critiqued, sometimes quite savagely, by some writers within the deep ecology<sup>6</sup> [section 8.4] and ecofeminist movements [8.5]. But both deep ecology, and animal liberation concerns are, as Wall’s (1994) definition above suggests, a characteristic of “green”.

How can this odd relationship be explained? Partly through their differing historical roots, their differing ontologies, and their differing goals. What provides admission to “seeing green” I think, is first, the common agreement that animal suffering matters morally, even though arguments for this premise differ, and second, the common demand for radical changes to society.

### 1.1.1 Differing historical roots

Some of the divergence can be traced to the differing pre-conflation histories of the two movements. The animal liberation/rights movement comes from the nineteenth century humane movement, which addressed both human and animal suffering, as well as from the equal rights spirit of the 1970s. Both heritages are underpinned by individualism. In contrast, the view that nature possesses value-for-itself, which is found in all three radical ecophilosophies, as well as in the formal biocentrism and ecocentrism of environmental ethical theory, is rooted in the emergence of the more holistically-inclined ecological perspective, iconically represented by Aldo Leopold. In the post-1970s, it was a matter of the two streams coming together and trying to find each other, rather unsuccessfully, judging by early debates, for example, in the journal *Environmental Ethics*.

### 1.1.2 Differing goals

Callicott (1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 4) notes the differing and sometimes conflicting goals of the animal liberation movement [the alleviation of the suffering and abuse of individual sentient animals by extending individualist utilitarian and deontological ethical theories to include them], and of the environmental movement [a concentration rather on ecosystem and biodiversity preservation, premised on a new holistic ethic, which became in formal environmental ethical theory, biocentrism and ecocentrism]. This led to a schism in the early 1980s, such that the two streams are now [1993] “recognized as separate fields of study each with its own agenda”, but that “most philosophers, ... [and] laypeople, regard them as being pretty much the same thing”. Environmental philosopher/ethicist O’Neil (2000, pp. 183-190), for example, summarizes his paper on animal liberation versus

<sup>5</sup> Singer’s review of “Animals, men and morals” was published in 1973 (Zimmerman et al., 1993), Naess’s paper on deep/shallow ecology which introduced the idea of “ecological egalitarianism” [Chapter Four] was read in 1972 (*Inquiry*, 16, 1973), Sylvan’s “Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?” appeared in 1973 (Sylvan, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993), and Regan’s “Animal rights, human wrongs” appeared in 1980 (*Environmental Ethics*, 2(2))

<sup>6</sup> Deep ecologist George Sessions particularly, appears to have a historical bone to pick with animal liberation theory, which he characterizes as “a relative latecomer on the ecophilosophical scene”, which had entered the ecophilosophical debate “quite tangentially” and whose main concerns “were, at best, peripherally related to the issues raised by ecology and the environmental crisis” (Sessions, 1995d, p. 157). Besides, he suggests, deep ecology’s ecophilosophical theorizing arose out of the influence of Thoreau, Muir, Jeffers, Leopold, Carson, Huxley, White and Snyder, while the roots of animal liberation are limited to the nineteenth century anti-cruelty to domestic animals movement. But this is not historically correct, as the English Romantics firmly coupled human social reform and animal reform in their radical social critique. Their concerns were also wider than only the domestic animal issue which Sessions suggests (Wall, 1994)

environmentalism thus: “Animal liberation and environmentalism generally are considered incompatible positions. But, properly conceived, they simply provide answers to different questions, concerning moral standing and intrinsic value<sup>7</sup>, respectively. The two views together constitute an environmental ethic that combines environmental justice and environmental care...”. An ethic of care is particularly associated with the radical ecophilosophy, ecofeminism [Chapter Six]. Metaphorically speaking, I think O’Neil is here trying to marry “malestream” [justice] with feminine principle [care] ethical thinking.

The three radical ecophilosophies, and the biocentrism and ecocentrism of environmental ethical theory, in their search for a non-anthropocentric view of nature’s value, all propose a different ontology to that of the dominant western worldview. Animal liberation theory does not [though Stone’s underlying liberation of nature theme certainly does]. This might be the reason that Paul Lucardie (1993b, in Dobson & Lucardie, p. 26) rejects animal rights/moral extensionist theories as not being “dark green”; on his view, only biocentrism and ecocentrism qualify. However, despite views such as Lucardie’s, and environmental ethical bickering, there is support from green insiders for Wall’s (1994, p. 66) statement that fundamental green – “dark” green – implies commitment to animal liberation.

### 1.1.3 Yet green

UK Green Jonathon Porritt (1984, p. 184, his italics), spells out the green animal liberation agenda unequivocally:

‘Whatever happens to the beasts happens also to us<sup>8</sup>. That’s a genuinely radical premise to work on, but it explains why many green activists are so deeply involved in upholding the basic rights of other species. For us, it is not enough to protect animals for practical, self-interested reasons alone; there is also a profoundly moral concern, rooted in our philosophy of respect for all that dwells on this planet. In the short term that means that the live export of farm animals for slaughter should be banned, voluntary codes on animal rights should be made mandatory, all imports into the UK of furs and skins and products deriving from endangered species should be prohibited, no experiment should be carried out on animals without an anaesthetic, and the use of animals for *all* tests on cosmetics, for tobacco and alcohol research, and in weapons or biological and chemical warfare programmes should be outlawed immediately. In the longer term, vivisection would be abolished, all hunting and coursing with hounds would be banned, battery farming would be phased out, our reliance on animals to meet our need for food would be reduced – and *then* we could start living in harmony with the rest of creation!

Similar concerns for animals as both individuals and species are found in statements by other green groups, such as the European Greens, the American Green Committees of Correspondence (Goodin, 1992), and by Die Grünen, as early as 1979, in their European elections platform<sup>9</sup>. I re-visit the connection between animal liberation theory, and “seeing green” in section 9.2 of this chapter.

---

<sup>7</sup> O’Neil argues that the two protagonists confuse moral standing with intrinsic value. Something which can be benefited or harmed has a right, and thus membership in the moral community – it has moral standing. Something has intrinsic value if its existence is a good in itself, apart from having any instrumental value for anything else. But if a thing such as a nonsentient mountain or river has intrinsic value, it does not necessarily mean, it has moral standing (2000, p. 185). His way out of the impasse, is to suggest that both an ethic of justice, and an ethic of care are proper parts of an environmental ethic

<sup>8</sup> From the well-known but fake Chief Seattle speech (Wall, 1994, p. 21)

<sup>9</sup> By 2004 though, green references to animal welfare are phrased more circumspectly, as for example in the European Green Guiding Principles (2004): “Sustainable agriculture must be based on the principle that animals should be treated as sentient beings”, “Whaling should only be allowed as accepted by the International Whaling Commission” (both in paragraph 5.5 of the principles), and “We will introduce the strictest controls on vivisection” (paragraph 5.8)

## 1.2 “Crossing the species divide”: Singer, Regan, and Stone as early representatives

In traditional ethics, the philosopher “identifies and justifies a property or characteristic that entitles the possessor to ‘moral considerability’.”<sup>10</sup> Callicott (1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 9) calls this, the “ethically enfranchising property...”. Ethical behaviour then comprises the rational, impartial and universal treatment of all members of the class possessing the enfranchising quality. In western traditional philosophy, the ethically enfranchising quality which sets humans apart from any other organism or thing, and which entitles them, and no other creature or natural object, to moral considerability, is variously, rationality, self-consciousness, human language, the capacity for morality, or simply being a human being. Nature has value only in so far as it serves human ends, from food, clothing and shelter, to industrial raw materials, to human aesthetic pleasure in wild or domesticated landscapes, and in their nonhuman inhabitants (Zimmerman, 1993, p. viii). Until the 1970s, the important Western moral philosophical traditions did not include an environmental ethic at all (Sylvan, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 14). So while an “ethic for animals is by no means the same as an ethic for the environment, ... to the extent that it constitutes a foray across the species divide, it is a start” (Dobson, 2000, p. 41). This is exactly the contribution of Singer, Regan and Stone.

Peter Singer’s utilitarian consequentialist animal liberation approach<sup>11</sup> was first presented in his review (1973a, 1973b) of Godlovitch, Godlovitch, & Harris’s (1971) *Animals, men and morals: An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans*. In it, and also in his *Animal Liberation* (1975), he argued for the extension of the sentience<sup>12</sup> criterion across the species divide. Whereas Singer argues that animal suffering matters morally, and we have an obligation to minimize it, Regan argues that animals have rights which matter morally, and we have direct duties to them vis-a-vis these rights.

Stone’s work, first published in the Spring 1972 issue of the *Southern California Law Review* (Rodman, 1977, p. 83, and footnote 11, pp. 121-122), doesn’t fit in any immediately obvious way into the idea of animal liberation, yet it shares the animal movement’s origins in the humane movement<sup>13</sup> (Rodman, 1977, p. 87), and its use of liberation rhetoric. During the 1970s, radically different conceptions of the human-nature relationship were emerging. According to Rodman, Stone’s work was an early, “sweeping statement ... of the increasingly popular view that Nature (not just animals) has, or should be given, rights” (Rodman, 1977, p. 86). Stone crossed the species line primarily by taking a developmental view of law. He wrote his 1972 essay to demonstrate to his students how changes in law follow changes in popular consciousness (Rodman, 1977, p. 122, footnote 12). Thus looking back, one can see how the western law system, following such consciousness changes, has successively been “making persons” of (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 112), and then extending rights to, some new entity, for example, ships and corporations [even though these are not persons, ordinarily understood], slaves, women, aliens, children, and human foetuses [though these latter two cannot act independently as persons ordinarily understood either] (Rodman, 1977, p. 91; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 96). The previously “unthinkable” becomes “thinkable”. The fascinating thing about Stone’s work is that he moves from prosaic discussion of legal precedent to a *radically* different ontology, which neither Singer nor Regan do.

<sup>10</sup> The “things that ought to be taken into consideration when action is in prospect, and that thus warrant respect” (Attfield, 2003, p. 11). In the terminology of Kenneth Goodpaster, these entities are ‘morally considerable’ (Attfield, 2003, p. 197)

<sup>11</sup> Botzler & Armstrong (1998, p. 350) call it, along with Regan’s approach, “zootic individualism”

<sup>12</sup> The ability of an organism to feel physical pleasure and pain; it is linked to the presence of a central nervous system (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 350)

<sup>13</sup> Rodman (1977) suggests that Singer [animal liberation] and Stone [rights of natural objects] share the humane movement’s basic approach of “attributing rights to nonhuman entities by virtue of humanoid qualities” (p. 94); and thus also “the moral/legal paradigm of entities, rights and obligations...” (p. 85)

## 2. Legitimizing narrative/s

In this section I highlight any myths, religion/s and/or spirituality, and/or philosophies, and/or ideologies, and/or rhetoric/metaphors employed as legitimizing narrative. I think that two can be identified: the liberation/rights/justice rhetoric (2.1), and the negative use of the machine metaphor (2.2).

### 2.1 The rhetoric: liberation, rights, justice

Singer employs mostly the rhetoric of liberation from oppression for his moral theory on animal liberation, though there are appeals to justice as well (Singer, 1973): as animals share with human beings the capacity for sentience, justice demands that their interests be considered as well as human interests (Rodman, 1977, p. 101). His liberation rhetoric serves really as his theory of motivation to ethical behaviour, and is discussed more fully in 5.1.3 below. But according to Rodman (1977, p. 86), Singer tends “to utilize the contemporary rhetoric of ‘liberation’ without fully comprehending what liberation might involve”. Rodman himself (1977) develops a comprehensive “liberation from domestication” rhetoric, not just for animals, but for the rest of nature too, including human beings. Benton (1993, p. 163) is dubious about the appropriateness of the liberation rhetoric. Animals lack moral agency, “full linguistic capacity”, and cannot claim their rights either. And if you cannot make claims on your own behalf, then you can’t really fit into the “liberal-individualist moral perspective... in which personal autonomy and self-avowal have a canonical status”. There is, he suggests, “an inescapably paternalistic or vicarious element in the ascription of rights to animals”. Not the stuff of which liberation rhetoric is made at all.

Regan employs more the rhetoric of justice, and argues that the animal rights movement “is cut from the same moral cloth” as the human rights movement. “The theory that rationally grounds the animal rights movement – respect for inherent value – also grounds the efforts of those working to secure rights for women, minorities, and workers” (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 83). Stone employs the notion of a thing’s holding legal rights, of counting “jurally”, i.e., having a legally recognized worth and dignity in own right (Stone, 1972, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 572).

### 2.2 The “machine” metaphor

The metaphor of animals as machines which Singer critiques [e.g. in 5.3.1] can be traced back to Descartes (Rodman, 1977, p. 104); although “there is ample evidence (including all the signs of suffering and ‘unnatural’ behaviour) that they are not” (Rodman, 1977, p. 100). In industrialized agriculture, animals are treated instrumentally “as mere ‘things’ whose output is to be maximised by whatever technical means available” (Benton, 1993, p. 173). This commonly-held view of animals-as-machines can be seen in an article on soaring farm animal populations in the Worldwatch Institute’s Vital Signs 2001-2002 (p. 101, p. 102). The entry is not in any way a plea for animal rights, merely a statement of livestock animal populations, resource consumption, and resource production. It notes, for example, that factory farm/feedlot intensive feeding of grain, antibiotics and hormones, turns livestock into “more efficient calorie converters”.

This kind of mechanistic approach in language [and outlook] to animals continues, despite the well-known fact that “the organic, psychological and social requirements of the animals themselves” generates obstacles and restraints. Captive animals continue to have social needs, which if not met, result in their ceasing to breed, showing developmental anomalies, becoming ill, behaving aggressively or self-destructively (Benton, p. 173). Singer (in Rodman, 1977, p. 99; Rodman’s emphasis omitted) notes the systematic suffering caused by “conditions which completely suppress all or nearly all the natural, instinctive urges and behaviour patterns characteristic of actions appropriate to the high degree

of social organization as found in the ancestral wild species and which have been little, if at all, bred out in the process of domestication”. Cannibalism among chickens, anaemia and ulcers among calves, Porcine Stress syndrome, are all objective behavioural signs of the stress engendered in such mechanistic-technological farming practices (Rodman, 1977, p. 99).

### 3. Epistemology

I have not encountered any direct or sustained discussion of epistemology in the sources I have read by, and on these authors. What I write in this section is inferred unless otherwise stated. On Stone’s epistemology, Rodman suggests it might be pragmatism: “Stone is a kind of legal existentialist/pragmatist with no fixed ontology...” (Rodman, 1977, p. 92). VanDeVeer & Pierce (1994, p. 96, my italics) write that: “Stone suggests that as we become more sensitive, we add more and more previously rightless entities to the list of [what counts as legal] persons. *His remarks on sensitivity and empathy raise questions about the role of rational argument in ethics.* ... In Stone’s view, it is only when we perceive nature as like us that we will be able to generate the love and empathy for the environment that in turn will enable us to attribute rights to it.”

Both Singer and Regan follow the traditional rational approach to ethics critiqued by ecofeminists [Chapter Six, section 5.4.3]. For example, Singer writes: “For we are capable of reasoning, and reason is not subordinate to self-interest. When we are reasoning about ethics we are using concepts that ... take us beyond our own personal interest...” (Singer, 1979, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 365). Rodman (1977, p. 84, p. 86) suggests that Singer argues his case for recognition of animals’ interests in avoiding suffering through “empirical evidence”, “logical argument”, “vigorous moral reasoning”, and “moral indignation”, rather than “sentimental appeals for sympathy”. But according to Callicott (1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 10), there is a minor tradition in western philosophy, in the work of David Hume<sup>14</sup>, which assigns some status to *feeling* - benevolence, sympathy, loyalty - as knowing. Singer’s work surely recognizes feeling as a way of knowing – how else does one recognize suffering? One has the odd idea that Singer is arguing rationally, that we must recognize feeling in ethics towards animals.

Regan refers consistently to the rationality of his ethic. An example: “The rights view – or so I believe – is rationally the most satisfactory moral theory. It surpasses all other theories in the degree to which it illuminates and explains the foundation of our duties to one another – the domain of human morality...” (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 81). Or, “...attempts to limit its scope [i.e. the rights view] to humans only can be shown to be rationally defective” (Regan, 1985, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 185, par. 26). Or, on the subject of whether human beings have an immortal soul, and whether this somehow sets them morally apart from animals, “Rationally, it is better to resolve moral issues without making more controversial assumptions than are needed ...” (Regan, 1985, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 186, par. 27). Regan is not without “heart” in the movement for animal liberation: “... there are times, and these are not infrequent, when tears come to my eyes when I see, or read, or hear of the wretched plight of animals in the hands of humans. ... Anger. Rage. Pity. Sorrow. Disgust. ....” (Regan, 1985, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 187, par. 34). But rights for animals has not merely emotion, but reason on its side [5.1.2] (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 78).

Rationalism in traditional western moral philosophy emphasizes individuality rather than community, an emphasis which can be seen in Regan’s and Singer’s work. Stone’s ontology is completely different.

---

<sup>14</sup> Hume [and Rawls] argues that the sphere of morality comprises two kinds of duties: duties of justice, and duties of compassion, benevolence or sympathy; the latter include duties to all animals capable of pleasure or pain (Hursthouse, 2000, p.82, footnote 4; p. 84; p. 87). On Hursthouse’s view (2000, p. 84), Singer places all his emphasis on this latter aspect of morality, while Regan places all emphasis on the former

## 4. Ontology

In this section, I discuss the three theorists' views on nature (4.1), and views of the human being (4.2).

### 4.1 The view of nature

I encountered no sustained ontological discussion of nature in the sources by, and on Singer consulted, or Regan's work. Rodman's comment (1977, p. 89) on Singer, that his "moral atomism that focuses on individual animals and their subjective experiences does not seem well adapted to coping with ecological systems", implies an atomist ontology. Presumably, the same non-holistic view of nature can be inferred from Regan's insistence on rights for individual animals, and the limited scope of his ethic [5.2.2 below].

By contrast, Stone presents a startlingly different view of nature – nature as possessing consciousness and subjectivity, nature seen as a whole (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 113), and as "one organism, of which Mankind is a functional part" [5.1.3.1].

### 4.2 The view of the human being

#### 4.2.1 Singer's view

Singer's view of the human being is not explicitly dealt with in the sources consulted by and on him. It must be individualism, because Singer grounds moral considerability for animals in Bentham's sentience, and Bentham's view on individual vis-a-vis society is the oft-quoted community as "fictitious body"<sup>15</sup> (Merchant, 1990b, p. 53; also Callicott, 1990, p. 114). What is attractive for me in Singer's animal ethic, despite critique of its individualism, is its suggestion that there can be an ethic grounded in the possibility of human *identification* with that which is non-human. We can recognize sentience in an Other, not only through logic and rationality, but through our own feeling and emotion. Rodman (1977, p. 90) notes in more formal terms, that Singer's "location of value in the subjective experience of sentient entities allows for no small amount of subjectivity in our moral appraisals, since our judgment about the inner experiences of others is either inferential, utilizing our criteria of evidence (the presence of a nervous system, the exhibition of what we recognize as pain behaviour, etc.), or sympathetic, depending upon our imaginative/emotional capacity to identify with others' sufferings, to put ourselves in their place". The idea of an ethic based in identification, is one encountered again in the deep ecology idea of "wide identification" [Chapter Four], and in the ecofeminist ethic of care [Chapter Six].

#### 4.2.2 Regan's view

Regan's rights approach is a surface-level indicator of an implicit individualist social ontology. The inherent value of the individual is independent of his/her positive or negative relationships with others, even though these can be significant (Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 43). In reflecting on the interests of the individual relative to that of the group, Regan notes that on the whole, "... the rights of the individual trump the goals of the group. ... the moral rights of the individual place a justifiable limit on what the group can do to the individual [bear in mind, that "individual" here refers not only to human beings, but Regan's "subjects-of-a-life" animals too (Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 41)]. An individual cannot be treated disrespectfully in the name of social good (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1995, p. 81). Regan is critical of those who "focus on the whole rather than on

---

<sup>15</sup> "... the community is a fictitious body composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is what? – the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it" (Bentham, 1823, Chapter 1, section 4, cited in Callicott, 1990, p. 114). Merchant (1990b, pp. 52-53) usefully contrasts Bentham and Mill's understandings of utilitarianism, which lead, on her view, respectively to an egocentric versus a homocentric ethic

the part (i.e. the individual)...”: “ paradigmatic right-holders are individuals ...”. The “environmental fascism” of holism, and the rights view, “are like oil and water; they don’t mix<sup>16</sup>” he thinks (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 358).

#### 4.2.3 Stone’s view

Stone’s view of the human being is discussed at 5.1.3 below.

## 5. Ethic

Here I present what I understand to be each writer’s (5.1) theory of motivation to ethical behaviour, (5.2) locus of value in nature, (5.3) description of the ethic’s scope, and (5.4) the moral obligation it entails.

### 5.1 The “theory” of motivation to ethical behaviour

#### 5.1.1 Singer

Drawing on the liberation rhetoric of his time, Singer’s motivation to act ethically towards animals is egalitarianism: to end the prejudice, discrimination, exploitation, inequality, and injustice of “speciesism<sup>17</sup>” (Singer, 1973; Singer 1979). An attractive feature of utilitarianism is its “uncompromising *egalitarianism*<sup>18</sup>”, writes Regan (1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 80, his italics).

Humans as individuals, Singer argues, are clearly *not* equal in aspects such as intelligence, abilities, leadership capacity, rationality, communication capability, capacity for self-direction, and so on, yet we still regard all individuals as equal, and judge it morally wrong if one human being violates such a human being’s interests. And, “ ... having accepted the principle of equality as a sound moral basis for relations with others of our own species, we are also committed to accepting it as a sound moral basis for relations with those outside our own species – the nonhuman animals” (Singer, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 360). Not to do so, is to be guilty of “speciesism”.

##### 5.1.1.1 “Speciesism”

For Singer, a liberationist is “someone ‘concerned about ending oppression and exploitation wherever they occur’”, and a liberation movement “is simply a demand for an end to prejudice and discrimination based on an arbitrary characteristic like race or sex [or species]” (Singer, in Rodman, 1977, p. 101). Just as racism and sexism are immoral, “because they violate the principle of equality of interests” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 359), so is “speciesism”. Speciesism is “the belief that we are entitled to treat members of other species in a way in which it would be wrong to treat members of our own species” (Singer, 1973b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 27). For example, racists “violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of another race. ... Similarly those I would call “speciesists” [human beings] give greater weight to the interests of members of their own species when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of other species [animals]” (Singer, 1979, p. 361 in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 361). In short, Singer argues that speciesism is a prejudice, just as is racism.

---

<sup>16</sup> But of course, it is possible to take a both/and approach, which is what deep ecologist Arne Naess does in his theory of value (Chapter Four)

<sup>17</sup> The term was coined by Richard Ryder, one of the contributors to Godlovitch, Godlovitch and Harris’s (1971) “Animals, Men and Morals” which Singer reviewed in 1973 (Singer, 1973b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 27)

<sup>18</sup> We encounter the idea of uncompromising egalitarianism as applicable also to nonhuman nature again in deep ecology

### 5.1.2 Regan

Regan is as opposed to speciesism as Singer (Hursthouse, 2000, pp.118-119). His motivation to ethical behaviour is also egalitarianism. As do humans, [some] animals have inherent value [5.2.2]. Because of this inherent value, these animals have equal moral rights with humans. For Regan, the motivation to ethical behaviour is the pursuit of equality through justice; there is no appeal to states of mind or dispositions of moral agents such as “kindness” [as opposed to cruelty], compassion, or concern (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 79, p. 80). Morality doesn’t reside in human beings’ mental states, it resides in their just actions.

### 5.1.3 Stone

Stone’s motivation to ethical behaviour I found difficult to separate from his view of nature, and his view of a “better” human being. All three topics are therefore discussed here together.

Essentially, Stone’s contention is that giving nature rights, would emancipate nature from “thinghood”, liberate ourselves from the dominator role in nature, and so make us better human beings (Rodman, 1977). A key notion in western culture is the possibility of *owning* a thing – an object, a part of nature, even at a stage in our history, a person. The western rights tradition derives from the idea of ownership<sup>19</sup>. The notions of property, and its ownership, are double-edged swords though, they hold us back from being all that we could be. Stone calls for a “radical new conception of man’s relationship to the rest of nature”, not only as a step towards surviving ecologically, but “from the point of making us far better humans” (1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 120):

If we only stop for a moment and look at the underlying human qualities that our present attitudes towards property and nature draw upon and reinforce, we have to be struck by how stultifying of our own personal growth and satisfaction they can become when they take rein of us. Hegel, in “justifying” private property, unwittingly reflects the tone and quality of some of the needs that are played upon:

‘A person has as his substantive end the right of putting his will into any and every thing and thereby making it his, because it has no such end in itself and derives its destiny and soul from his will. This is the absolute right of appropriation which man has over all “things”’ [Hegel, G. Hegel’s philosophy of right, 41 (T. Knox transl. 1945)].

What is it within us that gives us this need not just to satisfy basic biological wants, but to extend our wills over things, to objectify them, to make them ours, to manipulate them, to keep them at a psychic distance? Can it all be explained on “rational” bases? Should we not be suspect of such needs within us, cautious as to why we wish to gratify them? (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 120).

I think this short passage carries some of the meanings of “green” we encounter throughout the sample data: (a) the idea of a “radical new conception of man’s relationship to the rest of nature”, (b) the idea that the new relationship is not based on viewing nature as things which we own, objectify, manipulate, keep at a psychic distance, (c) the belief that personal growth is “stultified” by materialism, hence calls for “voluntary simplicity” in living, (d) the problematizing of the difference between satisfying basic needs on the one hand, and the desire to “own” things for ownership’s sake, and (e) the concern to become a “better” human being.

How do we, in Stone’s view, become better human beings?

#### 5.1.3.1 A different role for human beings

Essentially I think, by getting away from “the view that Nature is a collection of useful senseless objects”. Stone suggests we need to -

---

<sup>19</sup> In the context of rights for animals, Hursthouse also discusses the legalist origins of the notion of rights (2000, pp. 100-105)

develop ... our abilities to love – or, if that is putting it too strongly, to be able to reach a heightened awareness of our own, and others’ capacities in their mutual interplay. To do so, we have to give up some psychic investment in our sense of separateness and specialness in the universe ... This heightened awareness ... enlarges our empathy. We are not only developing the scientific capacity, but we are cultivating the personal capacities *within us* to recognize more and more the ways in which nature... is like us...<sup>20</sup> (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 120-121, his italics).

On Rodman’s view, Stone’s new role for the human being in nature involves heightened awareness, empathy, and love for anybody, anything, everything<sup>21</sup>. While Stone’s vision emancipates nature from “objecthood” (Rodman, 1977, p. 107), it also liberates humanity “from the constrictions of conventional scientific/technological/economic ‘objectivity’, which imposes the subject/object dichotomy upon the world” (p. 107), and from “the role of dominator and manipulator” (Rodman, 1977, p. 107).

Stone drew some of his inspiration at least for a different view of nature, and the human being’s role in it, from Dane Rudhyar’s<sup>22</sup> work. Rudhyar suggested that “Mankind’s function within the Earth-organism is to extract from the activities of all other operative systems within this organism the type of consciousness which we call “reflective” or “self” consciousness – or, we may also say to *mentalize* and give meaning, value, and “name” to all that takes place anywhere within the Earth-field...”. Stone seems to endorse this rather anthropocentric view of the human being’s role in nature [which recurs in social ecology], with the diffident comment that “...I do not think it too remote that we may come to regard the Earth, as some have suggested, as one organism, of which Mankind is a functional part – the mind perhaps: different from the rest of nature, but different as a man’s brain is from his lungs...” (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 121).

## 5.2 The locus of value

### 5.2.1 Singer’s sentience

Singer, working within the utilitarian moral tradition, begins from the idea of a human being’s capacity for sentience. Sentience - the capacity for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness - is the “vital characteristic that entitles a [human] being to equal consideration” (Singer, 1979, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 361); it is the “ethically enfranchising property or characteristic” (Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 9) which demands an extension of the moral sphere to include nonhumans. Singer (1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 24; Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 47) cites philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s well-known passage, which I repeat, because it illustrates one of Singer’s arguments, that the kind of prejudice which formerly operated towards slaves, continues to operate today towards animals:

The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day may come when the rest of animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the *os sacrum*, are reasons equally

<sup>20</sup> Rodman (1977, p. 92) thinks this might be Stone’s way of trying to “graft a new ethics and legal theory onto the stock of the old Cartesian/Kantian ontology that dichotomizes (human) subjects from (nonhuman) objects”

<sup>21</sup> Stone takes this idea from Carson McCuller’s “A tree, a rock, a cloud” (Rodman, 1977, p. 107)

<sup>22</sup> “In this short volume [i.e. his 1971 work] Rudhyar presents in a condensed form and direct style his approach to the basic problems facing our Western society. This book is especially addressed to the young people and to all creative minds dissatisfied with our present social and cultural way of life” (Prospectus). Rudhyar considered his major philosophical, metaphysical and psychological work to be his (1970) *The Planetarization of Consciousness. From the Individual to the Whole*, “the concentrated outcome of 50 years of years of thinking concerning the basic problems of human existence.”

(Retrieved 23 December 2006 from <http://www.daileyrarebooks.com/DaneRudhyarBibliography.htm>)

insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they *reason*? nor Can they *talk*? but, Can they *suffer*?

The question for Singer too is, do animals suffer? More basically, do they feel pain? We can never observe pain directly, not even in human beings, because it is a mental event, but we can infer it from external signs (Singer, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 24). Through behavioural manifestations such as writhing, screaming, yelping, other calls, physiological or neurological recordings, or pain avoidance behaviour, Singer concludes it can be generally agreed that animals feel pain<sup>23</sup>, therefore suffer (Singer, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 24). Sentience as criterion for moral considerability can therefore be extended beyond humans to animals as well. It is this ability to suffer which gives animals “interests”. Animals have an interest, equal to a human being’s interest, that their suffering should be taken into consideration.

### 5.2.2 Regan’s inherent value

Regan begins from the idea that a human being is a subject of a life, with inherent value.

Human beings are not simply alive, “*they have a life*” (Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 43, his italics), they are subjects of a life. Regan explains being the subject of a life<sup>24</sup> as

... we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. We want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely death – all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as individuals. (Regan, 1985, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 185, paragraph 26).

Being the subject of a life means that we have inherent value. Inherent value means something like the general right to be treated with respect, not to be used as a mere resource for others, not to be treated as a mere means to others’ ends (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 96). We have this inherent value, independently of whether we are valued by someone else, or have a use for, or serve the interests of, someone else (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 81). Because of our inherent value, we human beings may be postulated to have rights [human rights cannot be proved to exist] including the right not to be harmed for profit or pleasure of the group (Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, pp. 43-44).

This is the basic similarity we share with certain animals, they too are experiencing subjects of a life (Regan, 1985, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 185, par 26). They too have an inherent value of their own, meaning that they have the general right not to be used as a mere resource for others, not to be treated as a mere means to others’ ends, and to be treated with respect (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 96).

---

<sup>23</sup> I oversimplify here; Singer considers various philosophical and empirical arguments in his 1973 review essay and in his *Practical Ethics* (1979, readings from this latter available in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, pp. 360-366) before reaching this conclusion. Briefly, he argues that the nervous system of all vertebrates, and especially of birds and mammals is “fundamentally similar”; they share a common evolutionary history (Singer, 1979, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 363). Botzler & Armstrong (1998, p. 347) note bibliographical details of several studies done on animal pain and suffering

<sup>24</sup> In his 1983 book, Regan explained this more fully as: “To be the subject-of-a-life, ... involves more than merely being alive and more than merely being conscious ... [I]ndividuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else’s interests. Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value – inherent value – and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles ...” (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, pp. 351-352). “Receptacle” is derived from an analogy Regan provides elsewhere, of a cup and the sweet or bitter liquid it might contain. In utilitarianism, what has value [sweet is good and bitter is bad] is what’s *in* the cup, whereas in an inherent value theory such as his rights approach, what has value is the cup itself (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 80)

A being either is, or is not, a subject-of-a-life. There are no degrees of difference (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, pp. 351-352). “All who have inherent value have it *equally*, whether they be human animals or not” (Regan, 1985, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 186, par. 28, his italics). It makes no difference either whether the subject-of-a-life is a “moral agent”, or a “moral patient”<sup>25</sup>, both have inherent value. Regan’s rights theory is an egalitarian theory.

### 5.2.3 Stone’s consciousness in nature

Stone notes the vicious circle [“seamless web”] in which natural objects do not have rights: “...there will be resistance to giving the thing ‘rights’ until it can be seen and *valued for itself*; yet, it is hard to see it and *value it for itself* until we can bring ourselves to give it ‘rights’ – which is almost inevitably going to sound inconceivable to a large group of people” (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 113, my italics). It remains a thing, for the use of those who do have rights covered by law.

Why should we see Nature other than as a collection of things, or view it as having value for itself? By citing from Rudhyar’s work (1971, pp. 21-23, Rudhyar’s italics), Stone (1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 121) indirectly introduces the possibility of consciousness in Nature<sup>26</sup>:

The Earth is not *only* a material mass. Consciousness is not only “human”; it exists at animal and vegetable levels, and most likely must be latent, or operating in some form, in the molecule and the atom; and all these diverse and in a sense hierarchical modes of activity and consciousness should be seen integrated in and perhaps transcended by an all-encompassing and “eonic” planetary Consciousness.

Rodman suggests (1977, p. 92, also footnote 31 on p. 125) that by doing so, Stone “raises the possibility that subjectivity in the sense of sentience and/or consciousness may be present in all natural entities, vegetable as well as animal, and even ‘latent’ in molecules and atoms” (1977, p. 92). Stone is arguing here for a “new ‘myth’ that can comprehend what we feel as well as think about the rest of nature”, but with the reservation that it should be one which “can fit our growing body of knowledge of geophysics, biology and the cosmos” (Stone, 1975, p. 105, and Rodman on Stone, in Rodman, 1977, p. 125, footnote 31). But, notes Rodman, (1977, p. 92), Stone introduces “the postulate of universal subjectivity so indirectly and diffidently that he does not commit himself to its defense: it is an idea ‘not easy to dismiss’, a view that we ‘may’ come to hold” (Rodman, 1977, p. 92).

Stone also suggests that natural objects “...*can* communicate their wants (needs) to us, and in ways that are not terribly ambiguous.” Stone notes that he is able to judge with “certainty and meaningfulness”, for example, when his lawn needs water, and it’s not difficult to work out either, that trees prefer to be without smog. “We make decisions on behalf of, and in the purported interests of, others every day; these ‘others’ are often creatures whose wants are far less verifiable, and even far more metaphysical in conception, than the wants of rivers, trees, and land ...” (1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 117, his italics).

---

<sup>25</sup> Moral agents are “individuals who have a variety of sophisticated abilities, including in particular the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all considered, morally ought to be done and, having made this determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as they conceive it, requires. Because moral agents have these abilities, it is fair to hold them morally accountable for what they do ... In contrast to moral agents, *moral patients* lack the prerequisites that would enable them to control their own behavior in ways that would make them morally accountable for what they do. A moral patient lacks the ability to formulate, let alone bring to bear, moral principles in deliberating about which one among the number of possible acts it would be right or proper to perform. Moral patients, in a word, cannot do what is right, nor can they do what is wrong.” (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 351, his italics)

<sup>26</sup> VanDeVeer & Pierce (1994, p. 96) trace a line of thought here from transcendentalist John Muir through to “advocates of the rights of trees such as Christopher Stone”

## 5.3 The scope of the ethic

### 5.3.1 Singer

Singer's focus is on (a) animals capable of sentience, which he more or less equates with possessing a central nervous system. He places the fading of sentience "somewhere between shrimps and oysters" (Rodman, 1977, p. 89; also Singer, 1972, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 26), and (b) primarily on individual domesticated animals (Rodman, 1977, p. 87). Singer felt that the environmentalists of the time (late 1960s/early 1970s) were "more concerned with wildlife and endangered species than with animals in general", even though in his view, there is a similarity between treating "whales as giant vessels filled with oil and blubber" and pigs as "machines for converting grains to flesh" (Singer, 1975, p. 272, p. 25, in Rodman, 1977, p. 87).

Implicit in Singer's argument, Rodman suggests, is that the individual animals of ecosystems would have interests, but not species. Singer does not accord any greater worth to an animal belonging to a species with a higher ecological value, that is, value in terms of its function within the biosphere (Rodman, 1977, p. 126, footnote 34); sentience is the only criterion for moral considerability.

Plants are excluded from having animals' equal interests with human beings, because we "cannot observe behaviour suggesting pain – sensational claims to the contrary have not been substantiated – and plants do not have a centrally organized nervous system like ours [and animals]" (Singer, 1979, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 363). Inanimate natural objects are excluded on the same principle: "The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all ... It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare" (Singer, 1979, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 361).

### 5.3.2 Regan

By and large, the scope of Regan's ethic is limited to mammals and birds (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 97). More specifically, I understand Regan's scope (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, pp. 355-357) to include (a) normal mammalian animals (p. 355), (b) either wild or domesticated (p. 357), (c) aged one year or more (p. 355), (d) as well as infant mammalian animals (p. 356) which have the potential to reach the subject-of-a-life criterion [one is not prepared to ignore the rights of a human foetus or infant either, he notes], but (e), to exclude species: "Species are not individuals, and the rights view does not recognize the moral rights of species to anything, including survival"<sup>27</sup> (p. 356).

Regan is agnostic about whether inanimate nature - "rocks and rivers, trees and glaciers, for example" - are experiencing subjects of a life (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 82). Earlier, Regan (1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 48, footnote 12) had noted: "I do not believe it is absurd to think of natural objects which lack consciousness, or collections of such objects, as having inherent value, in the sense in which I use this expression. An *X* has inherent value if it has value logically independently of anyone's valuing *X*. I do not say this is easy to clarify or to defend, and it may be wrongheaded. At present, however, I believe it is a view that must be held, if we are to develop an environmental ethic, as distinct from an ethic for the use of the environment."

### 5.3.3 Stone

Stone's ethic extends to "forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called "natural objects" in the environment – indeed, to the natural environment as a whole" (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce,

---

<sup>27</sup> Regan is clear though, that the rights view is not opposed to efforts to save endangered species. We work to save animals of endangered species because the individual animals have valid claims and rights against us (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, pp. 356-357)

1994, p. 113). While his discussion focuses more on protecting wilderness, and wildlife, than on animal welfare (Rodman, 1977, p. 87), Stone does explicitly contrast “the homocentric approach of resource ‘conservationists’ with the approach of ‘humane societies’”, and refers briefly to “the pain and suffering of animals and other sentient objects” (Rodman, 1977, p. 125, footnote 29). The rights which Stone would assign to natural objects are not unqualified: “...to say that the environment should have rights is not to say that it should have every right we can imagine, or even the same body of rights as human beings have. Nor is it to say that everything in the environment should have the same rights as every other thing in the environment” (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 114).

## 5.4 The moral obligation

### 5.4.1 Singer

This can be briefly summarized as “equal consideration should be given to the like interests of all sentient beings” (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 32).

Singer, having established that “our concern for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess (although precisely what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do)”, then argues that “It is on this basis that we are able to say that the fact that some people are not members of our race does not entitle us to exploit them, and similarly the fact that some people are less intelligent than others does not mean that their interests may be disregarded. But the principle also implies that the fact that beings are not members of our species does not entitle us to exploit them, and similarly the fact that other animals are less intelligent than we are does not mean that their interests may be disregarded.” (Singer, 1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 170).

Therefore, “[i]f a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration, and, indeed, to count it equally *with the like suffering* (if rough comparisons can be made) of any other being.” (Singer, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 24, my italics). Such equal consideration of interests demands that animals are entitled to having their interest in pain avoidance considered. The egalitarianism of utilitarianism requires that animals ought to be brought within “the pale of morality” (Singer, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 27). But, as animals cannot organize themselves into a liberation movement, we have a moral obligation to speak up on their behalf, to bring about an end to their unjust treatment (Rodman, 1977, p. 101).

How does applying this equality [vis-a-vis minimizing animal suffering] work in practice? “It means, ... that we must take care when we compare the interests of different species. In some situations a member of one species will suffer more than a member of another species. In this case we should still apply the principle of equal consideration of interests but the result of so doing is, of course, to give priority to relieving the greater suffering” (Singer, 1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 171). For the next few paragraphs, Singer explains further what this might mean practically, through examples such as comparing the pain a baby might feel by being slapped, and which a horse might feel from a slap of similar force. Or the physical pain, and mental anguish of a person, and a mouse, both dying from cancer (Hursthouse, 2000, pp. 172-173). Or the suffering caused by confinement which a human might understand, but an animal not. He realizes that *precise* comparisons, which might have guided us in trying to alleviate the greater suffering, cannot be made.

But his key point is: “Precision is not essential. ... even if we were to prevent the infliction of suffering on animals only when the interests of humans will not be affected to anything like the extent that animals are affected, we would be forced to make radical changes in our treatment of animals that would involve our diet, the farming methods we use, experimental procedures in many fields of

science, our approach to wildlife and to hunting, trapping and the wearing of furs, and areas of entertainment like circuses, rodeos, and zoos. As a result, the total quantity of suffering caused would be greatly reduced; so greatly that it is hard to imagine any other change of moral attitude that would cause so great a reduction in the total sum of suffering in the universe” (Singer, 1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 173). These issues are considered further in section 6.

What are our obligations as far as the killing of animals is concerned? To answer this question, Singer first makes a distinction between a “person”, the latter defined as “a rational and self-conscious being”, and a non-person, that is, a sentient being which is not rational, not self-conscious/self-aware (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 52), does not have a grasp of itself as an entity with a past and a future, and does not have desires about its own future (Singer, 1993, pp. 89-90, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 51). The arresting thing about this explanation is that, on Singer’s view, some human beings are *not* persons, and some animals *are* persons (p. 56), and “... other things being equal, it will usually be more wrong, on utilitarian grounds, to kill a person than a non-person” (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 51, explaining Singer’s position).

Then, his utilitarian<sup>28</sup> position on killing non-person animals, as explained by Hursthouse (2000, pp. 52-53), but minimally expressed here, is as follows. There is nothing wrong with killing, provided it is stress-free, done painlessly, “and the animal is replaced by another whose existence will contain as much pleasure as the one who is killed would have” (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 52, explaining Singer’s position). But how to distinguish between animals which are persons and those which are non-persons, so that we can avoid the utilitarian greater wrong of killing a person rather than a non-person? Chickens, ducks and fish seem to be non-persons, cattle and sheep are possibly persons, and chimpanzees and dolphins are definitely persons (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 52).

Despite these distinctions, Singer ends up with the view that “at the level of practical moral principles, it would be better to reject altogether the killing of animals for food, unless one must do so to survive...” (Singer, 1993, p. 134, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 53).

### 5.4.2 Regan

The obligation in Regan’s ethic flows from every experiencing subject of a life’s equal inherent value. Inherent value confers on an individual a general right not to be used or treated as a mere resource for others; this general right embodies more specific rights such as “1. the right not to be killed just because one’s body would be useful to others, 2. the right not to be tortured; 3. the right not to be used as an experimental subject...” (Hursthouse, 2000, pp. 95-97). To treat a being having inherent value in ways that fail to show respect for that inherent value, “is to act immorally, to violate the individual’s rights” (Regan, 1985, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 185, par. 23), is to be guilty of speciesism.

Regan argues this obligation on the grounds of reason, step by step, which I reconstruct next:

(a) “When it comes to the case for animal rights, then what we need to know is whether the animals who, in our culture are routinely eaten, hunted and used in our laboratories, for example, are like us in being subjects of a life. And we *do* know this ...” (Regan, 1985 in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 82, his italics)

(b) “...the really crucial, the basic similarity is simply this; we are each of us the experiencing subject of a life, each of us a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. We want and prefer things; believe and feel things; recall

---

<sup>28</sup> The philosophical question of where Singer employs direct versus indirect utilitarianism in his discussion of killing animals for food, and animal experimentation, is discussed by Hursthouse (2000, pp. 40-41, pp. 53-54) but omitted here

and expect things. And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely death – all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced by us as individuals. And the same is true of those animals who concern us (those who are eaten and trapped, for example), they too, must be viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life with inherent value of their own. ...” (Regan, 1985 in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 82)

(c) “And since, in order to have the best theory of our duties to one another, we must recognize our equal inherent value, as individuals, reason – not sentiment, not emotion – reason compels us to recognize the equal inherent value of these animals ...” (Regan, 1985 in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 82)

(d) Possessing inherent value, these animals have a fundamental and equal right not to be harmed for the profit or pleasure of others; a fundamental and equal right to respectful treatment (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 349; Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 357). “*We are to treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that respect their inherent value*” (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p.352, his italics). It is a matter of justice to take their equal value into account. “Failure to show respect for the other’s inherent value is to act immorally, to violate the other’s rights” (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 81).

(e) We thus have direct<sup>29</sup> duties to subjects-of-a-life animals (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p.352). The onus of justification of infringement of their rights not to be harmed for profit or pleasure, must be borne by those infringing these rights (Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al. 1993, p. 46).

Where we suspect that animals’ rights are being infringed, we would be morally obligated to oppose such practices. “We ought not to back away from bringing ... [such] industries and related practices to a halt just because it is *possible* that the harm caused to the animals *might* be justified. If we do, we fail to mean it when we say that animals are not mere things, that they are the subjects of a life that is better or worse for them, that they have inherent value. As in the comparable case involving harm to human beings, our duty is to act, to do all that we can to put an end to the harm animals are made to endure. The fact that the animals themselves cannot speak out on their own behalf, the fact that they cannot organize, petition, march, exert political pressure, or raise our level of consciousness – all this does not weaken our obligation to act on their behalf. If anything, their impotence makes our obligation the greater ...” (Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 47, his italics).

### 5.4.3 Stone

Stone notes that natural objects [which odd phrase includes animals] such as polluted rivers, cannot seek redress in their own behalf (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 116). That is because in the western legal system, they do not meet the three criteria for rights-holders: they “have no standing<sup>30</sup> in their own right; their unique damages do not count in determining outcome; and they are not the beneficiaries of awards” (Stone, 1974, p. 116). In their own right, natural objects have counted for little, being considered rather “as objects for man to conquer and master and use... Even where special measures have been taken to conserve them, as by seasons on game and limits on timber cutting, the dominant motive has been to conserve them *for us ...*” (p. 116, his italics).

<sup>29</sup> That is, directly to the animal, not to the person who has an interest in the animal, or owns it (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 78-79)

<sup>30</sup> VanDeVeer & Pierce (1994, p. 97) explain this as “Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what traditionally has been referred to as the question of standing to sue” [cited in Stone, p. 62, from *Sierra v. Morton*. In this “landmark” case, the Sierra Club tried to prevent Walt Disney Enterprises from building a ski resort in the Mineral King Valley adjacent to the Sequoia National Park (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 96-97). The law requires that the party seeking review must itself have suffered an injury or itself have been adversely affected”

That natural objects have no standing and thus cannot be rights-holders, Stone argues, is not inevitable, not wise, and not defensible either on the grounds, for example, that natural objects cannot speak. “Corporations cannot speak either, nor can states, estates, infants, incompetents, municipalities or universities. Lawyers speak for them...” (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 116).

We could do with natural entities such as “eagles and wilderness areas” (p. 118) the same thing we do with “copyrighted works, patented inventions, and privacy: make the violation of rights in them to be a cost by declaring the ‘pirating’ of them to be the invasion of a property interest.” (p. 118). Then one could “...handle the legal problems of natural objects as one does the problems of legal incompetents – human beings who have become vegetable... someone is designated by the court with the authority to manage the incompetent’s affairs. The guardian ... then represents the incompetent in his legal affairs. Courts make similar appointments when a corporation has become “incompetent” – they appoint a trustee ... to ... speak for it in court when that becomes necessary” (p. 116). In this way, a “guardian-attorney” could speak for a polluted water body, smog-endangered trees, “the death of eagles and inedible crabs, the suffering of sea lions, the loss from the face of the earth of species of commercially valueless birds, the disappearance of a wilderness area” (Stone, 1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 118).

Once the natural object has judicial standing and rights, the guardian or trustee [an environmental organization, for example] can bring a suit for intervention, or damages, without first having to show that there is a presumption of injury to the interest of some affected human being (Rodman, 1977, p. 84; p. 122, footnote 11). The burden of proof is shifted away from those defending nature to those who wish to disturb nature. Such legal arrangements can of course be to human advantage, as they would presumably contribute towards slowing down resource pollution, resource depletion, global warming, and such like (Rodman, 1977, p. 119).

Stone’s proposed ethic therefore entails allocating to natural objects, standing to sue, and thus rights. I am not sure that Stone is going so far as to say that we must, or ought [understood as a moral obligation] to assign rights to nature, and “guardian-attorneys” to speak for nature’s rights, but he is saying, it wouldn’t be legally unprecedented to do so.

## 6. View of society

Here I present each author’s (6.1) key assumption on the cause/s of the ecological crisis, and (6.2) general critique of society. In (6.3) I combine and present all authors’ specific societal “issues”.

### 6.1 Key assumption on causes of the ecological crisis

Singer and Regan make no key assumptions on the cause of the ecological crisis which would entail radical structural changes to society - but the moral obligation identified in their ethic does. Stone, by utilizing water pollution and inappropriate development of wilderness as examples in his legal discussion, comes closer I think than either Singer or Regan in implying at least, the key cause of the ecological crisis - the lack of assignment of rights to nature.

### 6.2 General critique of society

Singer is critical of “two major contemporary institutions” of western industrial society, i.e., factory farming and the use of nonhuman animals in laboratory experimentation. He concludes that “the massive suffering inflicted upon nonhuman animals is both unnecessary and uncompensated by the relatively trivial benefits to humankind” (Rodman, 1977, pp. 85-86). Singer’s general critique is society’s failure to take the equal interests of animals, equally into account when weighing up animal

versus human interests. He argues that we *should* do so, in what we eat, how we farm, conduct our science, what we wear, and what we consider entertainment (Singer 1979, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 362). Singer's work aims to change the world (Rodman, 1977, p. 87), society and basic individual lifestyles (Rodman, 1977, p. 86).

Regan viewed the fundamental wrong in society vis-a-vis animals, as “the system that allows us to view animals as *our resources*, here for us ... Once we accept this view of animals – as our resources ... Why worry about their loneliness, their pain, their death?” (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 77, his italics). Under critique from Regan are inter alia, “the whaling industry, the cosmetics industry, the farming industry, the network of hunters-exporters-importers...” (Regan, 1980 in Zimmerman et al. 1993, p. 46). Regan too wants to radically change our economic structures. He describes the goals of the animal rights movement, of which he was an influential member, as [in the 1980s] “1. the total abolition of the use of animals in science 2. the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture 3. and the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping” (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 77). Even if by Dobson's standards (2000, p. 41), Regan's “extension of the moral community is timid indeed”, his proposals here represent a *radical* critique of western industrial society, and their implementation would require *radical* social and personal lifestyle changes.

Stone's critique of society in his “Should trees have standing?” appears [from Rodman's description, 1977] to be its willingness to allow wilderness (p. 87) to be opened up for Walt Disney-style “intensive recreational development” (p. 112; p. 122, footnote 12); he argues that the legal system should make allowance for “natural objects” such as streams and forests, “to seek redress [in such and similar cases of infringement of their rights, or damages caused them] in their own behalf” (Stone, 1972, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1994, p. 572). And in what seems like a back-to-front argument, he suggests that “... such far-reaching social changes are going to involve us in a serious reconsideration of our consciousness toward the environment<sup>31</sup>...” (Stone, 1972, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1994, p. 572).

I deal further with these and other animal welfare policy/programme issues next.

### 6.3 Specific Animal liberation/rights issues

The purpose of this section is to set out briefly, animal liberation/rights issues and positions, because one could reasonably expect such issues and viewpoints to be reflected in the policies and programmes of any political party espousing them. Equally, such issues will either not be reflected, or if reflected, not problematized in key texts such as *Namibia Vision 2030* (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2000a) if they are held to be unimportant by the political party/parties in power.

I limit the discussion here to the main issues brought up by the animal liberation/rights theorists discussed in this chapter: (6.3.1) the use of animals in science, (6.3.2) commercial animal agriculture, (6.3.3) wildlife harvesting and management, and (6.3.4) the use of animals in human education/entertainment. Viewpoints on these and other animal issues also form part of the data presented in Chapters Four to Seven, but I deal with those viewpoints in the context of their particular perspective.

---

<sup>31</sup> Rodman suggests that Stone undertakes a kind of reverse ontological exercise: you as human being begin by allocating rights to all natural objects, and then see what kind of ontology is suggested by this new way of looking at the world (Rodman, 1977, p. 92): “Stone is a kind of legal existentialist/pragmatist with no fixed ontology: legal systems *create* persons, property, and rights, and can do pretty much what they please – hence the language of ‘giving’, ‘granting’, and ‘extending’ rights predominates over the language of ‘recognizing’ or ‘acknowledging’ rights.” (Rodman, 1977, p. 92). Rodman finds it “suspicious when a new ontology suddenly appears upon the scene to support a moral/legal theory that is presented as desirable for practical reasons” (Rodman, 1977, p. 93)

### 6.3.1 The use of animals in science

The use of animals in science, and particularly vivisection, is an area where speciesism is operating at its clearest, Singer argues. He (1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, pp. 175-177) provides examples of sufferings inflicted which must surely move all but the most hardened human being to sympathy, even without a single ethical argument having been advanced. But it is the implicit assumptions of the use of animals in science which I wish to highlight here.

Both Singer (1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 175), and Rodman note “the long-standing paradox that experimental scientists regard certain nonhuman species as sufficiently like *Homo sapiens* to make experimentation on them seem worthwhile, yet sufficiently unlike *Homo sapiens* (in ways difficult to state within the framework of the scientific worldview) to make those experiments morally permissible” (Rodman, 1977, p. 119, footnote 8). If animals are sufficiently like us to make experimentation on them worthwhile [i.e., i.e., they do feel stress, they do feel pain, so their responses under experimentation tell us something about how humans might respond in similar situations], then the principle of equality, the equal consideration of interest in minimizing pain and suffering, must apply. Experiments on animals which do not serve “vital<sup>32</sup> medical purposes” and which do not “relieve more suffering than they cause” (Singer, 1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 175), or where “the benefits to humans are either non-existent or uncertain, while the losses to other species are certain and real” also infringe the principle of giving “equal consideration to the interests of all beings, irrespective of species” (Singer, 1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 176). Many animal experiments are simply wrong (Hursthouse, 2000, pp. 44-49). And on vivisection, “We have a moral obligation to ... oppose much, if not quite all,” of it (Regan, 1980, in Zimmerman et al., p. 38).

Regan’s view is: “In the case of using animals in science, *the rights view is categorically abolitionist*. Lab animals are not our tasters; we are not their kings. Because these animals are treated – routinely, systematically – as if their value is reducible to their usefulness to others, they are routinely, systematically treated with a lack of respect, and thus are their rights routinely, systematically violated. This is just as true when they are used in trivial, duplicative, unnecessary or unwise research as it is when they are used in studies that hold out real promise of human benefits. We can’t justify harming or killing a human being ... for these sorts of reasons. Neither can we do so even in the case of so lowly a creature as a laboratory rat. It is not just refinement or reduction that are called for, not just larger, cleaner cages, not just more generous use of anaesthetic or the elimination of multiple surgery, *not just tidying up the system. It is replacement – completely*. The best we can do when it comes to using animals in science is – not to use them. That is where our duty lies, according to the rights view” (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 83). The italics are mine, to highlight the link to the Chapter Two rule definition of “green”: *radical*, not reformist, changes to society.

### 6.3.2 Commercial animal agriculture

The rights view also takes an abolitionist position on commercial animal agriculture, including intensive factory and feedlot farming. “The fundamental moral wrong here is not that animals are kept in stressful close confinement, or in isolation, or that they have their pain and suffering, their needs and preferences ignored or discounted. *All these are wrong*, of course, but they are not the fundamental wrong. They are symptoms and effects of the deeper, systematic wrong that allows these animals to be viewed and treated as lacking independent value, as resources for us – as, indeed, a renewable resource. Giving farm animals more space, more natural environments, more companions does not right the fundamental wrong ... **Nothing less than the total dissolution of commercial animal**

---

<sup>32</sup> Testing the effects of shampoo, food colouring, alcohol and smoking on animals does not serve the *vital* interests of human beings. We see this use of “vitalness” as criterion again in the thought of the deep ecology movement

**agriculture will do this ...** The rights view's implications, then, as I have said, are clear – and are uncompromising” (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 83, his italics, my bold emphasis).

### 6.3.3 Wildlife harvesting and management

#### 6.3.3.1 Commercial and sport hunting, trapping, and wildlife harvesting

Hunting, trapping, and harvesting for either commercial purposes or for “sport”, are wrong, if not undertaken in the context of “protect[ing] ourselves against the innocent threats wild animals pose” (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 352). “The rights view categorically condemns the commercial harvesting of wild animals, not because those embarked on this business are, or must be, cruel or evil people, but because what they do is wrong. Justice will be done when, and only when, **we refuse to allow these commercial ventures to continue**” (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 352, my bold emphasis). Specific examples given by Regan include foxhunting in the UK, the annual Canadian seal slaughter, Japanese and Russian commercial whaling (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 352). Trade in, and the use of skin and fur – for example, in Namibia, the use of seal, or kudu skin for clothing, shoes, belts and other fashion accessories, or the harvesting of game for the meat/biltong industry - must by extrapolation, be wrong. In the rights view, “ ... morality requires **nothing less than the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping**” (Regan, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 83, my bold emphasis).

#### 6.3.3.2 Hunting and culling in wildlife management

Such activities undertaken in the name of wildlife management subscribing to the “philosophy of maximum sustainable yield” are equally wrong, because they infringe the animal's right to respect, grounded in its inherent value. “So it is that, according to the rights view, the overarching goal of wildlife management should not be to ensure maximum sustainable yield; it should be to protect wild animals from those who would violate their rights – namely, sport hunters and trappers, commercial developers who destroy or despoil their natural habitat in the name of economic interest and the like. .... the goal of wildlife management should be to defend wild animals in the possession of their rights, providing them with the opportunity to live their own life, by their own lights, as best they can, spared that human predation that goes by the name of ‘sport’. We owe this to wild animals, not out of kindness, nor because we are against cruelty, but out of respect for their rights. ... **wildlife managers should be principally concerned with *letting animals be...***” (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 352, my bold emphasis, but his italics). To manage natural entities is to deny their inherent autonomy: a form of domination.

#### 6.3.3.3 Predator control programmes

Predator control programmes in which wild animals are killed to protect sheep, for example, are wrong. In Namibia, the equivalent would be the killing, by shooting, trapping or poisoning, of cheetah or jackal which damage livestock. “Those who accept the rights view must work to bring an end to such predator control programs [Note the moral injunction to activism]. The official justification of these programs assumes that the predators cause losses to persons engaged in a justified enterprise – namely, the animal industry. Since the rights view denies that this industry's treatment of animals is morally justified, the harm done to predatory animals in the name of minimizing the financial losses of those engaged in this industry is morally to be condemned. In the struggle between those involved in the animal industry and those predatory animals who inhabit the lands used in the name of this industry, it is the industry, not the predators, that ought to go...” (Regan, 1983, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 352).

### 6.3.4 Animals in education/entertainment for humans

Animal liberation/rights theorists also problematize the confinement and use of animals for entertainment, such as in circuses, or rodeos (Rodman, 1977, p. 99, and p. 127, footnote 52, citing Singer's opposition to such "entertainment" since it involves capturing, imprisoning and tormenting animals), or the captivity of exotic animals for trade. Singer also opposed zoos because they involve the capture and confinement of animals, an opposition which I assume would extend to the confinement on Namibian game ranches of wild animals, ostensibly for "education", and to allow guests to view daily feeding.

## 7. Praxis

Both Singer and Regan's philosophy includes a moral obligation to speak up and act on behalf of animal liberation (5.4.1, 5.4.2). Two prominent manifestations of the obligation to act are (7.1) moral vegetarianism, and (7.2) direct action, including civil disobedience. Non-consumerism of animal-related products other than meat, for example, cosmetics tested on animals, animal skin/fur clothing, are not discussed further here, but are also advocated.

### 7.1 Moral vegetarianism

By "moral" vegetarianism is meant, our answer to the moral question of "what we are willing to count as food"? (Curtin, 1996, in p. 67), not the avoidance of meat on health-related grounds, or on ecological grounds<sup>33</sup>.

Singer is not arguing for total vegetarianism (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 21). First, he makes his case for moral vegetarianism "for citizens of industrial countries", "for those of us living in cities" (Singer, 1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, pp. 173-175, these citations on p. 174 and p. 175) on the grounds that they "can easily obtain an adequate diet without the use of animal flesh". In this scenario, eating meat does not necessarily contribute to our health, is not an energy- or land use-efficient way of producing food, and is a luxury based on unnecessary, and miserable animal suffering. In ethical language, "... we are considering a situation in which a relatively minor human interest must be balanced against the lives and welfare of the animals involved. The principle of equal consideration of interests does not allow major interests to be sacrificed for minor interests". Second, we should not be eating animals or animal products produced via factory farming practices, or in crowded feedlots, or in battery conditions (Singer, 1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 174). Such production methods are examples of speciesism. We must stop such practices, by avoiding supporting them through our custom (Singer, 1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, p. 174). The implication is, most of us should be vegetarians, and avoid other animal-related products, unless we **know** that the animals concerned have not suffered (Singer, 1993, in Hursthouse, 2000, pp. 174-175, and Hursthouse, 2000, pp. 21-23, my emphasis).

Regan argues moral vegetarianism (1980, in Zimmerman et al., p. 38), based on recognition of some animals' rights not be killed, and the practice of justice. Moral vegetarianism is not only a call to personal lifestyle change, but to radical social change as well. Singer for example sees vegetarianism as a kind of economic boycott, and civil disobedience (Rodman, 1977, p. 86); one could perhaps interpret this as "resistance" within the "revolution" and "liberation" rhetoric of the time. Vegetarianism as radical lifestyle and social change recurs throughout the green perspective, particularly in ecofeminism (Chapter Six). It should be remembered that this demand for moral vegetarianism is made within a context of western-type industrialism, in which it is possible for human beings to obtain their protein

---

<sup>33</sup> Such as, use of land "to grow crops to be converted into protein by animals who use 90 per cent of the proteins themselves, even when unable to exercise" (Singer, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 30); the early ecological economists and some English Romantics had similar ecological arguments

directly from vegetables (Rodman, 1977, p. 99), so that for most westerners, whether or not to eat meat is a *choice*, not a basic need, as it is in geographical locations where agriculture is not feasible.

## 7.2 Direct action; civil disobedience, ecological sabotage

According to Callicott (1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 4), the “ethical theory of animal liberation/animal rights has become the philosophical wing of an even more visible [than deep ecology] and increasingly militant movement.” Some prominent activist animal liberation groups include the International Fund of Animal Welfare [IFAW], founded in 1969; the Animal Liberation Front, founded in the UK in the 1970s; the Earth Liberation Front, founded originally as the Environmental Life Force in 1977; and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals [PETA], founded in 1980 (Goodin, 1992, p. 10; retrieved 17 March 2006 from <http://en.wikipedia.org> Animal Liberation Front entry).

Animal activists working to “improve animal welfare, prevent animal cruelty and abuse, protect wildlife and provide animal rescue around the world” (retrieved 17 March 2006 from <http://www.ifaw.org/ifaw/general/default.aspx> ) are generally “under no illusion” that the kind of changes they wish to see in bringing about diminishment of animal suffering, can be achieved “by the usual political processes<sup>34</sup>”, such as legislation (Rodman, 1977, p. 86). Within a rhetoric of liberation, animal activists and their organizations follow the “direct action” approach, which ranges from mild social influence actions such as signing petitions, writing letters to political leaders, implementing youth education programmes, forming groups of like-minded friends, and soliciting donations for animal liberation work, to “leaderless resistance”, in which animal activists in cells unknown to each other, operate on a “need to know” basis, seeking to inflict economic damage [which might include arson, vandalism, and threats to people involved in the businesses concerned] on targeted businesses.

Such activists may claim to have performed an “animal liberation action” – for example, on the webpage of the Animal Liberation Front – provided the action (1) “liberate[s] animals from suffering or potential suffering and place[s] them in good permanent homes or, where appropriate, release[s] them into their natural environment (2) damage[s] or destroy[s] property and equipment associated with animal abuse by (a) taking that property out of the arena of animal abuse so it can no longer cause harm, and (b) inflicting economic loss on the abusers with the intention of driving them out of business, and (3) [the activists have] take[n] all reasonable precautions not to endanger life of any kind (Best<sup>35</sup> 2004, retrieved 17 March 2006 from <http://en.wikipedia.org> Animal Liberation Front entry). Such actions clearly fall into the bracket of civil disobedience, even eco-sabotage.

## 8. Critique of a sentience/rights-based ethic for animals

This section does not address the critique of utilitarianism as moral theory, for example, as advanced by Regan. It touches only briefly [in 8.1] on one philosophical critique of Regan’s rights argument. Mostly, it focuses on some<sup>36</sup> of the critique of the animal liberation/rights ethic from ecological movement partners: (8.2) its homocentric, moral extensionist approach, (8.3) its speciesist, timid, degrading, and/or implausible scope, (8.4) its implicit atomist, individualist ontology, and “malestream” view of what it is to be a human being [more on this theme in Chapter Six, Ecofeminism]. (8.5) In sum, it is argued, it is an inappropriate model for an *ecological* ethic.

<sup>34</sup> Bahro’s disgust with Die Grünen’s compromise motion in the Bundestag in 1984, also illustrates that even a green political process can fail when it comes to choosing between the possibility of obtaining political power, and the principle of diminishing animal suffering

<sup>35</sup> A reference to Professor of Philosophy Dr Steven Best, editor of a collection of essays by animal-rights activists

<sup>36</sup> Not dealt with, for example, is O’Neil’s (2000, p. 183) charge that “A consistent proponent of animal liberation [seeking to establish ideal conditions for individual animals] should favor domestication of wild animals and elimination of animal predation, since these actions would decrease the overall suffering of animals”

## 8.1 No correlation between rights and duties/obligations

A key problem with all three approaches [Singer, Regan, Stone], it is argued, is that there can be in nonhuman nature, no clear correlation between rights on the one hand, and duties, responsibilities, or obligations on the other (Sylvan, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 19). Critics<sup>37</sup> argue that animals “cannot enter into agreements, exercise, transfer, enjoy, waive, etc., rights, they cannot recognize rights and corresponding duties” (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 106). Thus they cannot be members of the moral community (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 103). But that does not mean to say, that we have no duties towards them. Rights discourse – duties, obligations and corresponding rights - is not the whole of morality, even though as Hursthouse (2000, pp. 108-110) notes, the rights discourse is increasingly used in that way. There is besides, the duty of compassion, even though this duty is not linked to another being’s rights (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 105, p. 108). Some green writers use rights discourse in this latter sense, that is, when they use the expression “no right to”, they mean “it would be morally wrong to...”. It is also used in this sense in the deep ecology movement platform in Chapter Four.

## 8.2 Homocentric, moral extensionist

Despite its radical appearance, critics such as Rodman accuse animal liberation/rights theorists of continuing homocentrism. Singer and Stone’s ethic is homocentric, because both have “adopted the humane movement’s basic approach (attributing rights to nonhuman entities by virtue of humanoid qualities)” (Rodman, 1977, p. 94). Their work thus shares “a similar pattern: they pick a quality that is conceded to be normally possessed by humans; they make it the basis for the capacity for rights; then they find it writ large beyond the human pale....” (Rodman, 1977, p. 93). Singer picks sentience; Stone “picks consciousness as well as sentience, and suggests that it may well be present in all natural ‘objects’” (Rodman, 1977, p. 93). Regan picks inherent value. The “rights” model of nature, which is derived from the “evolving modern Liberal ‘philosophy of right’” (Rodman, 1977, p. 122, footnote 11), and which extends “human principles of morality and legality to interspecies relations and deal[s] with nonhumans as inferior humans” is in effect, a “humanization of nature” (Rodman, 1977, p. 98); a dubious “new” environmental ethical route to follow, in his view. It boils down to “moral extensionism”.

## 8.3 Speciesist, hierarchical, degrading, implausible

While Singer accuses others of “speciesism”, he is guilty of it himself, Rodman suggests. This is because in Singer’s ethic, other than sentient animals, those animals below the grey area marking the fading of sentience, and everything else besides, are “...left in a state of thinghood, having no intrinsic worth, acquiring instrumental value only as resources for the well-being of an elite of sentient beings. Homocentrist rationalism has widened out into a kind of zoocentrist sentientism. .... ‘an enlightened and humane form of speciesism, but ... still speciesism nevertheless’” (Rodman, 1977, p. 91). It creates in nature, a “hierarchy of moral worth”, with the strong possibility that the interests of those lower down the hierarchy are at the mercy of those higher up (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 125).

Regan’s extension of the moral community doesn’t fare much better with the critics. Dobson (2000, p. 41) considers Regan’s extension “timid indeed”. Benton (1993, p. 163) notes that Regan’s ethic admits only “... (mammalian individuals, and, possibly, some birds), whilst apparently withholding any direct moral status at all from the immense majority of animals (amphibians, reptiles, fish, insects, crustaceans, and so on) which unambiguously fail the subject-of-a-life test ... Rats must be accorded

---

<sup>37</sup> Curtin (1996, p. 68) refers for example to Alan White’s view (1989, p. 121) that animals cannot exercise a right, nor recognize a “correlative obligation”. Hursthouse (2000, pp. 100-113) also notes White’s views (amongst others) in her discussions of arguments for and against Regan’s rights position for animals

rights on equal terms with humans, whilst frogs, bees and butterflies are a moral free-fire zone in which ‘anything goes’” (Benton, 1993, p. 163).

While Singer, Stone and Regan accord some rights to nonhumans, it is on the degrading basis that nonhumans are a kind of “inferior” human being – “species-anomalies: imbeciles, the senile, ‘human vegetables’ – moral half-breeds having rights without obligations (Singer), ‘legal incompetents’ needing humans to interpret and represent their interests in a perpetual guardian/ward relationship (Stone)” (Rodman, 1977, p. 94). Rodman finds this kind of characterization of nonhuman nature “patronizing and perverse.” (p. 94). It fails to respect nonhuman beings/things “for having their own existence, their own character and potentialities, their own forms of excellence, their own integrity, their own grandeur...” (p. 94). The extensionism is not only degrading, but implausible too: in Stone’s case, it requires us to “adopt the implausible assumption that rocks (for example) are conscious” (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 125).

#### **8.4 Premised on an atomist, individualist ontology unsuitable for an environmental ethic**

Benton points out that the animal liberation/animal rights approach is located within a human social ontology “of autonomous individuals, contingently related, each resisting encroachment/interference on the part of the other, and seeking authoritative arbitration.” (1993, p. 167), and its associated “liberal-individualist discourse of universal rights” (p. 165). And, according to Botzler & Armstrong (1998, p. 350, my italics), Regan only includes as subjects-of-a-life, “adult mammals, because such animals exhibit the conscious *individuality* that is the basis of his concept of inherent value”.

This individualism is at odds with the holism required by an environmental ethic. Rodman (1977, p. 86) notes that animal liberation/rights “moral extensionist” approaches represent an “atomistic metaphysics that is so deeply embedded in modern culture, locating intrinsic value only or primarily in individual persons, animals, plants... rather than in communities or ecosystems...” (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 125), that its ethical system is ill-adapted<sup>38</sup> to coping with ecological systems, or species (Rodman, 1977, p. 89). Rodman also notes an internal tension in Stone’s simultaneous presentation of nature as “earth organism” and as rights-based individual entities<sup>39</sup>. Callicott agrees that “environmental concerns are predominantly holistic, not individualistic” and criticizes the individualistic approach<sup>40</sup> [whether based on sentience, rights, interests, or telos] as an inadequate basis for an environmental ethic (Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 9).

How do we allocate rights to the relationships evident in nature? How do we deal with conflicts between individuals and the collectivities in nature? For example, in a conflict of interest between the welfare of domestic or feral sentient animals and endangered plant species or overall ecosystem health, the ethic of an animal liberationist/animal rights activist would favour the welfare of the domestic and feral animals “even if that should mean further ecological degradation and the erosion of biodiversity” (Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 4). The sentience/rights approach assigns no superior moral status to endangered species, which is problematic for holists.

All in all, in the eyes of its critics at least, animal liberation/rights ethical theory cannot be seen either as “a revolution in ethics” (Rodman, 1977, p. 91), or as representative of “the new [ecological]

---

<sup>38</sup> But Loftin (1992 p. 257) notes that other writers, e.g. Mary Anne Warren (1992, p. 192), find the two ethics – [weak] animal liberation ethics and a land ethic – “complementary rather than mutually exclusive” and considers that an adequate worldview should include both

<sup>39</sup> Rodman suggests that Stone himself might not have been explicitly aware of this tension - organisms have “functions”, not rights. Rodman notes that “while functions *can* be translated into the language of rights and obligations it is only in a secondary and weak sense” (1977, footnote 36, p. 126)

<sup>40</sup> But see also Callicott’s discussion (1990, p. 103) of his 1980 antipathy towards animal liberation as individualistic, and his 1988 “olive branch” article

enlightenment” (p. 94). What is needed, Rodman suggests, is a “revolution in perception” (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 125), a kind of paradigm shift in consciousness of nature. He proposes (1983, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 121-130) “ecological sensibility” as a suitable form of ecological consciousness. Leopold’s “holistic ecosystem ethic”, which on Callicott’s view, gives primacy to ecosystems rather than any individual member of it, represents another such paradigm shift.

## 8.5 Premised on a “malestream” view of ethics and morality

An equal rights position is “neutral ... on whether there are differences between men and women” (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 47). Feminists argue that there *are* differences, and they matter (McLaughlin, 2003, pp. 55-56). Ecofeminists [Chapter Six, section 5] generally argue that utilitarian and deontological ethical theories such as those represented by Singer and Regan are written, as it were, “in the language of the father ... the language of fairness, justice, and rights.” (Lal, 2000, p. 162, citing Hallen (1995, p. 208), who in turn, cites Noddings (1984, p. 1)). A patriarchal ethic is rationalist, and based on the abstract and the universal. By contrast, non-malestream ethical language is “the language of the mother, the language of human caring, and of the memory equally of caring and being cared for...” (Lal, 2000, p. 162, again citing Hallen and Noddings). A feminine-principle ethic is also based on feeling, not only rationality, and pays attention to the particular - the concrete context, the particular relationship, in which the moral action is required (O’Neil, 2000, pp. 186-187).

## 9. Summary

I summarize here under 9.1, what I see as the contributing animal liberation/liberation of nature ideas to the meaning of “green”, under a **THEME HEADING**, a short description of that theme’s aspects, and where those aspects were discussed in this chapter. In section 9.2, I re-visit the animal liberation-green link suggested by Wall (1994).

### 9.1 Contributions to green

**WORLDVIEW:** Animal liberation/rights theory, while calling for a radically different human-animal relationship, and the radical re-structuring of our social and economic structures, does not include an explicit call for a fundamentally different worldview. Stone’s paper does go some way towards it though.

**LEGITIMATING NARRATIVE:** Three strands of rhetoric seem to predominate: (1) the rhetoric of egalitarianism in both Singer and Regan’s work [5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.2]; (2) of liberation or emancipation [there is a suggestion of liberation from domestication for animals in Singer’s work, and emancipation for nature from human beings, as well as human beings from themselves in Stone’s work [5.1.3]; and (3) of justice - Regan employs the same justice rhetoric as the human rights movement [2.1]. The machine metaphor is used negatively to convey our reification of animals as mere things, as resources-for-humans [2.2].

**EPISTEMOLOGY:** Rationality occupies most of the epistemological space in these authors’ writings on a new ethic towards [parts of] nature. But all make some space for the role of *feeling, sensitivity and empathy* in ethical questions [3, 4.2.1]. These “beginnings” of *felt* connection with the Other as basis for an environmental ethic, emerge strongly in deep ecology and ecofeminist thought too.

#### ONTOLOGY:

**-View of nature:** An atomistic conception of reality is inferred for both Singer and Regan [4.1]. Stone’s view of nature is completely different: nature as possessing consciousness and subjectivity [5.1.3], nature seen as an organism, a whole [5.1.3.1].

**-View of the human being:** Singer and Regan are inferred to adhere to western society's dominant individualism as their view of the human being [4.2.1, 4.2.2]. By contrast, Stone's view of the "better" human being includes ideas such as (a) a radically different conception of the human-nature relationship (b) which is *not* based on viewing nature as things which we own, objectify, manipulate, keep at a psychic distance (c) the belief that personal growth is "stultified" by materialism, (d) problematizing the difference between satisfying basic needs on the one hand, and the desire to "own" things for ownership's sake. Still, within this different view of the human-nature relationship, some critics suggest there are elements of homocentrism [5.1.3.1]

**THE ETHIC:** Singer, Regan, and Stone, all represent ethical theories which in different ways, and to differing extents, "cross the species divide". Thereby, all three represent a move away from the anthropocentrism of traditional ethical thought. Particularly Singer and Regan criticize the prejudice of "speciesism" [5.1.1.1]. All three allow that rationality is not the whole of ethical thinking: feeling does/should play a role in ethical thought and moral behaviour [3, 5.1.3].

The "morally enfranchising property" or locus of value in animals is seen by Singer as sentience [5.2.1], by Regan as inherent value [5.2.2], and by Stone in natural objects, including animals, as "subjectivity" or consciousness [5.2.3]. The common thought in all three is, that animals/natural objects have value in themselves, not only value for others.

Singer limits the scope of his ethic to individual sentient beings, species have no particular moral status. Plants and inanimate natural objects are excluded [5.3.1]. Regan's scope is those animals who are subjects of a life: basically, mammals and birds. More specifically, normal mammalian animals, either wild or domesticated, aged one year or more, as well as newly born wild mammalian animals which have the potential to reach the subject-of-a-life criterion. It excludes species as having moral status. Regan is agnostic about whether inanimate nature objects are experiencing subjects of a life [5.3.2]. Stone's ethic covers all natural objects, including animals, without saying that each of these "objects" has the same rights [5.3.3].

For Singer, the moral obligation is that equal consideration should be given to the *like* interests of all sentient beings [5.4.1]; for Regan, that we ought to respect animals' right not to be used as mere resources for others, including the right not to be killed, tortured, or used in experiments [5.4.2]. I am not sure that Stone is going so far as to say that we must, or ought [understood as a moral obligation] to assign rights to all natural objects, and "guardian-attorneys" to speak for their rights, but he *is* saying, it wouldn't be legally unprecedented to do so [5.4.3].

## VIEWS ON SOCIETY

**-Key assumption on ecological crisis:** Singer and Regan advance no premises on the human-nature relationship generally, only on the human-animal relationship. The key cause of the morally wrong inequality which they see in this relationship, is speciesism [5.1.1.1]. Stone implies that a key reason for the ecological crisis is the lack of assignment of rights to nature [6.1].

**-A critique of western industrial society's animal related economic and social structures –** Both Singer and Regan wish to radically reform, reduce, or abolish altogether, western industrial society's use of animals in its economic and social structures, for example, the

**--use of animals in science:** Experiments on animals which do not serve vital medical purposes, which do not relieve more suffering than they cause, or where "the benefits to humans are either non-existent or uncertain, while the losses to other species are certain and real, are morally wrong. There is a moral obligation to oppose much, if not quite all, vivisection. The animal liberation movement goal is the total elimination of the use of animals in science [6.3.1].

--**use of animals in commercial agriculture:** Factory farming, battery farming, and intensive feedlot practices are condemned. The animal rights movement demands the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture [6.3.2, 7.1]

--**use, and management, of wildlife:** Hunting and trapping for commercial purposes, or for “sport” [e.g. foxhunting, commercial whaling, commercial sealing], or to protect commercial farm animals against predators are wrong, unless undertaken to protect ourselves against the threats that wild animals pose. The animal liberation movement demands the total elimination of commercial, sport, and predator hunting, killing, and harvesting [6.3.3]. The use of such animal-related products is also inferred, on the rights view, to be morally wrong.

--**use of animals in education and entertainment:** The captivity and confinement of animals for such uses in zoos, circuses, rodeos is condemned. This is inferred to apply to the confinement of wild animals on game farms for “educational” purposes [6.3.4].

**PRAXIS** – The two most prominently advocated aspects of personal praxis as socio-economic statement are moral vegetarianism (7.1), and direct action, including civil disobedience, even eco-sabotage, in animal defence. (7.2). Other actions recommended, but not discussed in any detail are economic boycott, and non-consumerism of animal-related products other than meat, such as for example cosmetics tested on animals, and animal skin/fur clothing.

## 9. 2 Animal liberation, and “green” revisited

The chapter began with Wall’s statement that the concept of animal liberation is one fundamental aspect of green thought. Now that the basics of Singer’s utilitarian defence of sentient animals, and Regan’s rights defence of animals which are subjects of a life have been set out, one could revisit Porritt’s statement (1984, p. 184, his italics) of one green position on animals:

‘Whatever happens to the beasts happens also to us’. That’s a genuinely radical premise to work on, but it explains why many green activists are so deeply involved in upholding the basic rights of other species. For us, it is not enough to protect animals for practical, self-interested reasons alone; there is also a profoundly moral concern, rooted in our philosophy of respect for all that dwells on this planet. In the short term that means that the live export of farm animals for slaughter should be banned, voluntary codes on animal rights should be made mandatory, all imports into the UK of furs and skins and products deriving from endangered species should be prohibited, no experiment should be carried out on animals without an anaesthetic, and the use of animals for *all* tests on cosmetics, for tobacco and alcohol research, and in weapons or biological and chemical warfare programmes should be outlawed immediately. In the longer term, vivisection would be abolished, all hunting and coursing with hounds would be banned, battery farming would be phased out, our reliance on animals to meet our need for food would be reduced – and *then* we could start living in harmony with the rest of creation!

The concern to minimize animal suffering is there, so is the rights rhetoric. There is agreement with both Singer and Regan’s conclusion that “... much of our treatment of animals is wrong, especially the ways in which we use animals for food and in scientific experiments” and also their view that “ultimately, the way our societies are organized” (Hursthouse, 2000, p. 84) must change radically. But phrases such as “Whatever happens to the beasts happens also to us”, “our philosophy of respect for all that dwells on the planet” and “living in harmony with the rest of creation” go far beyond both the implicit individualistic ontology and specific scope of either Singer’s utilitarian, or Regan’s rights defence of animals. While Stone’s views might go some way towards explaining the implied holism and directly-stated respect for all life in Porritt’s description, one needs also to understand the other aspect of fundamental green thinking mentioned by Wall, that is, deep ecology. This is the topic of Chapter Four, next.

## CHAPTER FOUR: DEEP ECOLOGY

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>84</b>
1.1 The easy relationship between deep ecology, green philosophy, and green politics	84
1.2 Deep Ecology: versions, sources	84
1.3 Deep Ecology as a “total view”, a “derivational” system	85
1.3.1 “Shallow” vis-a-vis “deep” ecology	85
1.3.2 Naess’s “Apron diagram”	86
1.3.3 Level 1: “Ultimate premises”	87
1.3.3.1 Naess’s <i>personal</i> Level 1 philosophy, Ecosophy-T	88
1.3.4 Level 2: The 1984 deep Ecology “platform”, or “Eight Points”	88
1.3.4.1 The platform’s Eight Points	89
1.3.5 Levels 3 and 4 of the “apron”	90
<b>2. Legitimizing narratives</b>	<b>90</b>
2.1 Key thesis on environmental crisis	90
2.2 The imagery, the rhetoric	90
2.3 Philosophies and religions	91
2.4 Science	91
<b>3. Epistemology</b>	<b>92</b>
3.1 Gestalt perception	92
3.2 Emotion, physical feeling	93
<b>4. Ontology</b>	<b>94</b>
4.1 View of nature	94
4.1.1 Nature as “be-ing”, ultimate reality, and ultimate value	94
4.1.2 Nature as Gestalts, internally related, symbiotic, diverse	94
4.1.3 Nature as living and striving	95
4.1.4 Evolution, wilderness, free nature, and conservation biology	96
4.1.4.1 Techno-industrial culture a threat to continued evolutionary process	97
4.1.4.2 Large areas of wilderness and free nature must be set aside for ecological reasons	97
4.1.4.3 Human beings, particularly Third World peoples, vis-a-vis “free nature”	98
4.1.4.4 A Third World critique of wilderness preservation	99
4.2 View of the human being-in-nature	99
4.2.1 Introduction to Naess’s version of the “ecological self”	100
4.2.1.1 Identification	100
4.2.1.2 Naess’s view of the mature human being	100
4.2.2 Is the “ecological self” part of the deep ecology platform?	102
4.2.3 Critique	102
4.2.3.1 A totalitarian view of the individual	102
4.2.3.2 Unexamined, “male” assumptions on the self	103
<b>5. The ethic</b>	<b>104</b>
5.1 The theory of motivation to ethical behaviour	105

5.1.1 Biospherical egalitarianism: A rejection of anthropocentrism	105
5.1.2 Making the required paradigm shift	105
<b>5.2 The theory of value</b>	<b>106</b>
5.2.1 The “intrinsic” value of point 1	106
5.2.2 The “richness” and “diversity” values of point 2	106
<b>5.3 The scope</b>	<b>107</b>
5.3.1 The individual vis-a-vis the species	107
<b>5.4 The moral obligation [the “ethical prohibition”]</b>	<b>107</b>
5.4.1 All living beings have the same right to live and blossom	107
5.4.2 Making ethical decisions in cases of conflict	108
5.4.2.1 Vitalness	108
5.4.2.2 Nearness	109
5.4.2.3 Critique	109
5.4.3 The goal of the ethic: “wide ecological sustainability”	109
5.4.4 Animal welfare?	110
5.4.5 Critique of ecological egalitarianism	111
5.4.5.1 Amounts to a rejection of formal ethics	111
5.4.5.2 Is misanthropic, and fascistic	111
5.4.5.3 Favours the rational, universal, and abstract, rather than the particular	112
<b>6. View of society</b>	<b>112</b>
<b>6.1 Deep ecology vis-a-vis green movement views on the new society</b>	<b>113</b>
<b>6.2 The critique of western-style techno-industrial production and consumption ideology</b>	<b>114</b>
6.2.1 Progress, economic growth, and development as synonyms	115
6.2.2 The “right” to techno-industrial development,	115
6.2.3 ... despite its ecological and humanitarian failure	115
6.2.4 Techno-industrial definitions of development rest on materialism as value	116
6.2.4.1 Experiential Quality of Life advocated rather than high material Standard of Living	116
6.2.4.2 The impossibility, and undesirability, of globalizing western-style techno-industrialism	116
6.2.4.3 Ecodevelopment	117
6.2.5 Sceptical, to cautiously hopeful, views on sustainable development	117
<b>6.3 Some deep ecology economic issues</b>	<b>118</b>
6.3.1 The critique of GNP as indicator	118
6.3.2 Pollution, and natural resource use	119
6.3.3 Technology	120
6.3.3.1 Soft technology, and development	120
6.3.4 Agriculture	121
6.3.5 Meaningful work	122
<b>6.4 Social issues in a “green” society</b>	<b>122</b>
6.4.1 Cultural diversity	122
6.4.2 Population stabilization and reduction	122
6.4.2.1 Critique	124
6.4.3 Local autonomy, global control	125
6.4.3.1 Bioregionalism, and re-inhabitory communities	125
6.4.3.2 Global institutions	126
6.4.4 Peace	126
<b>6.5 Critique</b>	<b>126</b>
6.5.1 No social structure critique	126



6.5.2 Guilty of ecological reductionism	126
6.5.3 Insufficient attention to social justice issues	127
<b>7. Praxis</b>	<b>127</b>
7.1 “Verbalize a total view”	127
7.2 Speak out publicly	127
7.3 Co-operate, and communicate	127
7.4 Direct, non-violent activism	128
7.5 Personal lifestyle	128
7.6 What to do first?	129
<b>8. Summary</b>	<b>129</b>

## 1. Introduction

As a “total view”, the deep ecology movement “touches every major contemporary personal, economic, political and philosophical problem” (Naess, 1989a, p. 32). Though all of these viewpoints are potentially “green”, they cannot all be dealt with in any depth in this chapter. I have thus, under the standard aspects set out in Chapter Two, section 1.3.1, concentrated on those issues which appear to me as important for deep ecologists themselves, contentious for critics, and interesting to me personally.

In this introductory section then, these are (1.1) more evidence for the easy alliance between deep ecology, green philosophy and green politics, (1.2) a warning about the confusing number of versions of deep ecology and how I have dealt with that, and (1.3) why deep ecology claims to be a “total view”. Thereafter, the discussion follows the standard themes set out in Chapter Two. Section 2 is an introduction to deep ecology’s legitimating narratives; 3, its epistemology; 4, ontology; 5, ethic; 6, view of society; and 7, praxis. Section 8 contains a summary of deep ecology’s ideas. Critique from green sample partners has been dealt with under the appropriate theme heading.

### 1.1 The easy relationship between deep ecology, green philosophy, and green politics

The “greenness” of deep ecology was already established in Chapter Two, section 2.3.4.1. In a key paper in 1986 on some philosophical aspects of the deep ecology movement, Naess (1986a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 70-71) notes that there are several other “designations which cover most of the same issues”, including green philosophy and politics. Green political party programmes “usually imply changes on the same deep level as those implied by the Deep Ecology movement” (Naess, 1995a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 211). Dobson notes that “deep ecology informs radical green politics in a way that will not be obvious to those who make such politics [i.e. radical green politics] synonymous with environmentalism. Indeed, ecologism’s being informed by deep ecology is precisely what (partly) helps distinguish it from environmentalism...” (Dobson 2000, p. 40). Capra and Spretnak (1984, p. 30) suggest a specific link between deep ecology views and Die Grünen’s politics specifically [Chapter Seven]. Green politics are however carried on not only within formal green political parties, but in an extra-parliamentary way as well, in the green movement. Here too, authors, for example, McLaughlin (1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 90, citing Eckersley, 1992, Ch. 3), and Goodin (1992, p. 43), have all suggested that members of both the green political parties and the green movement support the principles of deep ecology.

### 1.2 Deep Ecology: versions, sources

Deep ecology is available in several different versions (Sessions, 1995e, p. 188-191), by its founder Arne Naess, and also by other deep ecology supporters, such as Warwick Fox, Bill Devall, John Seed, Fritjof Capra, John Rodman, Freya Matthews, to name some. Some of its emphases have also changed during its more than twenty five year existence. Such variation has confused and frustrated commentators. Environmental philosopher Sylvan, who strongly rejected deep ecology (1985a, 1985b), noted that: “There is ... a serious problem with deep ecology in finding out what it is, and even the clearer accounts offered differ in significant ways” (1985a, p. 2). And Grey (1993, p. 468) notes that between them, deep ecologists have not “produced an integrated and unified conception of deep ecology, but a discordant clamour of competing conceptions. ‘Deep ecology’ is a resonant phrase which has generated a lot of muddle”. Social ecologist Murray Bookchin [Chapter Five] is more blunt: deep ecology is “a ‘black hole’ of half-digested and ill-formed ideas ....” (1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 230).

My approach in this personal presentation of deep ecology movement ideas, has been to rely on as many writings by its founder Arne Naess as I could obtain<sup>1</sup>, as well as by authors carrying the Sessions (1995) “stamp of approval” as it were. *Not* carrying this stamp of approval is, for example, the 1985 deep ecology reader co-edited by Sessions and Devall, although it is frequently cited<sup>2</sup>. While I have consulted papers written by more, and less sympathetic critics, I have tried here, and in the other data chapters as well, to avoid the kind of formal environmental philosophical debate appearing in, for example, the journal *Environmental Ethics*.

### 1.3 Deep Ecology as a “total view”, a “derivational” system

“As a worldwide social movement, the international deep ecology movement is best characterized by the deep questioning process, the deep ecology platform and the apron diagram, and the life-styles and ecological social-political actions which tend to follow from the platform.” (Sessions, 1994, in Tucker & Grim, p. 210)

This section introduces deep ecology as a derivational system, within a “total view”, or “ecosophy<sup>3</sup>”, that is, an ecophilosophical worldview, which has true respect for nature and is in harmony with it (Naess, 1989a, p. 34). It is a “deep questioning” of the usually unquestioned assumptions of the dominant scientific worldview which distinguishes shallow from deep ecology [section 1.3.1]. An ecosophy is best depicted and explained in terms of Arne Naess’s “apron diagram”, which comprises four levels [section 1.3.2]. In section 1.3.3, the “ultimate premises” level, or Level 1, is explained, and Naess’s *personal* ecophilosophy, Ecosophy-T, is introduced. Section 1.3.4 presents the “heart” of the deep ecology position, that is, the Eight Point Platform at Level 2. Its tenets may be derived from many different sets of Level 1 ultimate premises, not only from Naess’s Ecosophy-T. Section 1.3.5 briefly introduces Levels 3 and 4 of the apron diagram.

#### 1.3.1 “Shallow” vis-a-vis “deep” ecology

“In the face of increasing environmental problems, the solutions proposed during the late 60s and early 70s revealed two trends<sup>4</sup>, one in which it was presumed that a piecemeal approach within the established economic, social, and technical framework is adequate, another which called for critical examination of the man-nature relation and basic changes which would affect every aspect of human life.” (Naess, 1989a, p. 163).

Over some 25 years of reflection, Naess has explained the difference between a “shallow” and a “deep” ecology as willingness to identify and undertake, insistently, consistently, and taking nothing for granted, deep questioning of one’s own fundamental assumptions in relation to the environmental crisis, and to organize them into an own worldview, the key aspect of which is the human-nature relationship. Further, a willingness to question every economic and political policy *in public*, to work towards deep personal change in attitude and lifestyle, as well as toward deep changes in society, in order to put the human-nature relationship on a deeper footing (Naess, 1973a; Naess, 1982a<sup>5</sup>, in Sessions, 1995, p. 27; Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 66, pp. 75-76; Naess, 1995a (written 1970,

<sup>1</sup> I was unfortunately unable to obtain a copy of the ten volume collection (approx 3650 pages!) of Arne Naess’s selected works, edited by Harold Glasser (2005), with assistance from Alan Drengson, and in co-operation with Naess, only a paper by Glasser (1997) in which he sets out his reasons for differing from Fox’s version of deep ecology

<sup>2</sup> Although Sessions himself is critical of this book - “...a semipopular exposition of deep ecology which unfortunately was hastily thrown together as a book from bits and pieces of previously published academic papers at the insistence of the publisher. It, too, misleadingly mixes Level 1 [personal philosophies of deep ecology adherents] with Level 2 aspects [the Deep Ecology platform] of the apron diagram” (Sessions, 1994, p. 224, footnote 13) - many writers do refer to it as definitive of the deep ecology position

<sup>3</sup> Ecophilosophy and “ecosophy”: Naess suggests that the first is a field of study within philosophy concentrating on human relations to nature; the second, a personal philosophy within this field (Naess, 1989a, p. 37)

<sup>4</sup> These “two trends” in environmental ideologies, noted briefly in Chapter Two, section 2.2.1.3, are reflected in O’Riordan’s well-known table (1981, p. 376, Figure 10.1); also reproduced in Naess, 1989a, p. 16. O’Riordan’s table is presented in this study’s Chapter Eleven as Figure 9)

<sup>5</sup> This is the “Simple in means, rich in ends: A conversation with Arne Naess” interview between Naess (1982a) and Bodian, at the Los Angeles Zen Centre, April 1982. Parts of it are also published in Devall and Sessions, 1985a, in VanDeVeer, 1994, pp. 220-222

revised 1990, first published in Sessions 1995), pp. 204-212).

The questioning process might lead a deep ecology follower to “problematize” many aspects of his/her culture and society, beyond only the resource scarcity and pollution crisis. Deep ecology’s “Problematizierung” can be seen as a “profound ‘existential’ undertaking”, where “profound” brings us into the realms of philosophy and religion (Naess, 1995a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 205, p. 206). Deep ecologists also attempt to “articulate the fundamental presuppositions underlying the dominant economic approach in terms of value priorities, philosophy and religion” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 75). They question the “rational” decisions flowing from them. Because deep ecology supporters hold an *integrated* worldview, “rational” must be understood in relation to *fundamental* premises. Supporters should question the “rationality” of decisions which offend ultimate premises, but do not offend at other levels (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 78).

These aspects – deep, public, broad, and “existential” questioning, the deepness of social changes demanded - set the deep ecology movement decisively apart from shallow ecology or the shallow environmental approach<sup>6</sup> (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 75; Naess, 1995a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 204-212; Sessions, 1995e, pp. 190-191): “...what characterizes the deep movement (in relation to the shallow) is ... *that* ‘deep questions’ are raised and taken seriously. Argumentation patterns within the shallow movement rarely touch the deeper questions: we do not find the complete social/philosophical *Problematizierung*” (Naess, 1995a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 210, his italics).

Though the label “deep” often comes under attack as smug, patronizing and arrogant, deep ecologists have not abandoned it (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994a, p. 211). Naess himself prefers to speak in an egalitarian way, of supporters of the deep or shallow ecology movement, rather than “deep ecologists” (Naess, 1986a, p. 83, footnote 6).


### 1.3.2 Naess’s “Apron diagram”

As a “total” view (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 76-78), deep ecology implicitly or explicitly involves “an ontology, methodology, epistemology, and ethics” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 84, footnote 10). It cannot be considered though, as a “finished philosophical system” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 76). It does include fundamental attitudes, beliefs, and norms which legitimate and motivate action (Naess, 1986a, p. 71; Sessions, 1995e, p. 189). Naess illustrates through his “apron diagram”, how the deep ecology platform is an implied “derivational system”, that is, the level 2 deep ecology platform principles [section 1.3.4] are derived from “ultimate premises” at level 1. In turn, deep ecologists derive their socio-economic critique from the platform, and their eco-activism from their cultural-socio-economic critique.

---

<sup>6</sup> Also called “reform environmentalism” as opposed to “radical environmentalism”

Figure 4: Naess's "Apron diagram" depicting deep ecology as "derivational system" (Naess, 1986a, p. 77)



### 1.3.3 Level 1: "Ultimate premises"

As we dig deeper into our philosophical premises, we eventually stop. Where we stop, represents our personal ultimate premises (Naess, 1986a, p. 77). Such a fundamental view is *intuitive*<sup>7</sup>, "as are all important views, in the sense that it can't be proven" (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 33) – you cannot prove the methodology of science, nor can you prove logic; both of them "presuppose fundamental premises" (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 33), or basic norms.

But clarifying one's ultimate premises is important, because deep ecology supporters should not be "philosophical and ethical cripples". Fundamental values should guide action where facts are not available. (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 34). As example: While scientists are generally trained to "defer taking a stand on an issue until all the facts are in..." (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 34), politicians tend to argue that "If you can't tell us authoritatively what the bad [ecological] consequences will be from this project, then we'll go ahead with it" (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 33). Such conflicting stands by opinion leaders can be confusing. But if we measure the issue or the project [for example, nuclear energy, or genetically modifying technology] against our fundamental values, against what is meaningful for us in life, we don't need to have read "thick books" and know "myriad facts" on the subject (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 34). Even though not all the scientific facts might be in, "common sense and intuition tell us that, [for example] if we continue to dump more oil into the sea, we will cause the destruction of life forms on a vast scale". Or, deep ecologists can oppose nuclear power because they have clarified their fundamental assumptions about what is needed for a life "simple in means and rich in ends". More energy consumption does not necessarily contribute to a fulfilling human life (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 34).

<sup>7</sup> "Intuition" and "intuit" are used frequently in the deep ecology literature. When a deep ecologist "intuits" something, it generally means, they are now speaking and acting from an ultimate premise, which is beyond proof of logical argumentation

Though deep ecology supporters act from deep philosophical or religious premises (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 78), these need not be identical (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 213). As a personal conviction, deep ecology does not require “unanimity in ontology and fundamental ethics” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 79).

### 1.3.3.1 Naess’s *personal* Level 1 philosophy, Ecosophy-T

Naess calls his own personal legitimating ecophilosophy for the eight-point Ecology platform [section 1.3.4], “Ecosophy-T”<sup>8</sup>. It is constructed around insights from Spinoza’s philosophy (Naess, 1973b, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 249-258; Sessions, 1995e, pp. 193-194), the Vedantic doctrine of nonduality<sup>9</sup> (Callicott, 1994, in Tucker & Grim, 1994, p. 36), Mahayana Buddhism (Curtin, 1994, p. 196), as well as from Gandhi’s non-violence philosophy (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 215; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 213).

Though Naess always insists that one can arrive at the deep ecology platform from various philosophical backgrounds, this chapter introduces some aspects<sup>10</sup> of his Ecosophy-T. Its ultimate premise Self-Realization! informs [for Naess] two of Deep Ecology’s most contentious aspects, that is, (1) the “wide identification” of the “ecological self” (Sessions, 1994, p. 210) [both are described in section 4.2], and (2) “biospherical egalitarianism” [in section 5]. This is a radically different understanding of the relationship between human beings and non-human nature, which has radical political and personal implications too. Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to read Ecosophy-T as *the* Deep Ecology philosophy (Glasser, 1997, pp. 74-79). Other deep ecologists, for example Warwick Fox, arrive at the same viewpoints – the ecological self, and ecological egalitarianism – from *differing* philosophies not examined in this chapter. *All* deep ecologists though, whatever their philosophical or religious/spiritual ultimate premises, commonly subscribe to the Eight Point platform.

### 1.3.4 Level 2: The 1984 deep Ecology “platform”, or “Eight Points”

In 1984, Arne Naess, together with George Sessions, formulated and published for the first time<sup>11</sup>, the deep ecology platform (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 83, footnote 4). The “Eight Points” express “the most general and basic views” shared by deep ecology supporters (Naess, 1989a, p. 28).

The platform fits in at Level 2 of the four-level “apron diagram”, developed at the same time (Sessions, 1994, p. 210). None of its points are Level 1 “ultimate premises”, rather they are “derived as conclusions” from such premises (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 78). The platform may be “justified” or “legitimated” by various sets of Level 1 ultimate premises. The intent of the platform is to allow for “a variety of paths to the same position” (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 91), but, “those who solidly reject one or more of these points should not be viewed as supporters of deep ecology” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 67-68). The question of “who is and who isn’t a Deep Ecologist can be settled by referring to the platform” (McLaughlin, 1993, p. 92, in Sessions, 1995, p. 92).

<sup>8</sup> The “T” refers to his mountain home Tvergastein, meaning “cross the stones” (Naess, 1989a, p. 4; Sessions, 1995e, p. 187)

<sup>9</sup> According to Callicott (1994, p. 36), it is the Vedantic doctrine of nonduality which inspires Naess to call for the cultivation of the experience of oneness with nature as a core practice of deep ecology

<sup>10</sup> It is impossible to do justice to Naess’s whole ecosophy within this chapter, and nor have I undertaken the detailed study of all its informing philosophies which that would require. I have limited its introduction to those aspects of it, which appear common amongst deep ecology supporters. For more detail, see for example, Naess, 1986a (in Sessions 1995, pp. 79-83); Naess (1989a); Sessions, 1994, pp. 210-211; Sessions, 1995, Part 3: “Arne Naess on deep ecology and Ecosophy”, pp. 185-259, which contains several papers by Naess

<sup>11</sup> The platform has appeared in various places, including Naess’s 1986a article “The Deep Ecological movement. Some philosophical aspects” (in Sessions, 1995, pp. 64-84), a paper which Sessions (1995b, p. 6) considers the “best short contemporary statement” of the Deep Ecology position. The paper also includes a shorter version of Naess and Sessions’s earlier comment on each of the eight points, which appeared in Devall and Sessions, 1985b (in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 215-220). The exact wording of the points differs from version to version – see for example, Naess’s version in Engel and Engel (1990, p. 88). In 1993, Naess (1993a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 213-221) “revisited” the Eight Points, to clarify them further, and to respond to criticism

Naess makes clear that the Eight Points are not a professional philosophical statement. Their aim is to provide “critics and doubters” with a “not too complex and detailed survey” of the deep ecology position. Perhaps they should rather have been entitled “A set of fairly general and abstract statements that seem to be accepted by nearly all supporters of the Deep Ecology movement” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 213-214, and p. 220). They have a “level of vagueness and ambiguity<sup>12</sup>” but within “tolerable limits” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 216-217). In a sense they are “provincial” - written in the language of educated people in rich countries. They need to be formulated as well “in the language of supporters in the non-industrialized parts of the Earth” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 220).

Deep ecologists (for example, McLaughlin 1993, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 90-91) argue that it is off the mark as it were, to target critique of the deep ecology perspective at any particular “philosophical reflection, religious conviction, personal experience, intuitions, mystical experience, [or] aesthetic perception” – such as Naess’s Level 1 Ecosophy-T, or Fox’s Transpersonal Ecology - which might inform the platform. “The *platform* is the heart of Deep Ecology ... , and it is this platform, not the various justifications of it, which should be the focus of argument about the value of Deep Ecology” (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 90, his italics, and footnote 13 on p. 93). In my own reading experience though, I have found that commentators on deep ecology draw no distinction<sup>13</sup> between the deep ecology platform and its various philosophical legitimations.

#### 1.3.4.1 *The platform’s Eight Points*

Sessions (1995e, p. 190) summarizes the platform as “essentially a statement of philosophical and normative ecocentrism together with a call for environmental activism”. Glasser (1997, p. 74) calls it “a radical, activist-oriented series of principles for ecological sustainability”. Its eight points are:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life *requires* a smaller human population.
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and greatness.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes. (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 68).

---

<sup>12</sup> Part of reading Naess is exactly that - feeling frustrated with his often vague, ambiguous and overlapping style [for which he offers no apologies], yet appreciating at the same time, his non-dogmatic, flexible approach. He suggests that alternative, similar sets of the Eight Points should be compiled: “It is unnatural that only one way of formulation could be convenient” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 214)

<sup>13</sup> For example, Golley (1987, p. 47) compares Naess’s 1973 personal ecosophy with the 1984 deep ecology platform and writes: “Clearly, the latter set of eight tenets differs from the first set of seven points. This inconsistency characterizes statements about deep ecology generally”

These principles or tenets, and the explanations of them which Naess himself, and other supporters of the deep ecology movement have offered over the years, will be cited throughout this chapter in support of the various deep ecology positions discussed.

### 1.3.5 Levels 3 and 4 of the “apron”

Level 3 comprises “general normative consequences and “factual” hypotheses, and Level 4 comprises the “concrete ecological decisions and actions” which represent conclusions reached from considering premises at Levels 1-3 (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 77; Sessions, 1995e, p. 189).

## 2. Legitimizing narratives

### 2.1 Key thesis on environmental crisis

Deep ecologists believe that the environmental crisis<sup>14</sup> has been brought about by the ontological divide between humanity and the rest of nature dominant in western culture, the anthropocentrism<sup>15</sup> which it generates, and the instrumental view of nature it legitimates. A change towards a more ecocentric, non-dualistic ontological understanding of nature, and a new understanding of self within it, must precede a change in our ethical attitudes towards nature.

### 2.2 The imagery, the rhetoric

The most frequently occurring image to negatively portray the dominant western techno-industrial society so consistently critiqued by deep ecology supporters, is an uncontrollable, monstrous machine – the “juggernaut of monoculture” as Rodman phrases it (1977, p. 114), or as Naess describes it:

It would ... be dangerous to suppose that any one group has full insight into and power over the techno-economic systems. The profundity of the [environmental] crisis is due in part to its largely uncontrolled character: developments proceed at an accelerating pace even though no group, class or nature has necessarily determined, planned, or accepted the next phase. Built-in mechanisms see to it that the tempo does not slacken. The cog-wheels have drawn us into the very machinery we thought was our slave... (Naess, 1989a, p. 24).

Positive connotations are ascribed to images such as “fields of relations”, “network” (Naess, 1989a, p. 49), and “systems” (Naess, 1989a, p. 79) to describe the nature of reality.

The rhetoric is often of resistance against oppression, emancipation from exploitation, liberation from domestication, of freedom. For those deep ecologists influenced by Spinozist metaphysics at least, freedom means something like, the power to act, or to “be”, without external restraint (Grange, 1985, p. 354, footnote 8). In human context, the mechanical-technical society is seen to tend towards totalitarianism, “for the essence of technique is efficiency and the autonomous individual, apt to be skeptical, irrational, and recalcitrant, is inefficient. For the general good therefore, the dangerous elements of individuality must be suppressed ... [The individual human being] must be fragmented and reshaped to participate contentedly in the smooth functioning of the technological State...”. Only in free nature “is it possible to escape this tyranny” (Drew, 1972, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 113-114, p. 116).

Not only the individual, but nature too must be liberated, as in this comment by Rodman (1977, p. 114) in the context of eco-activism against the damming of a river:

---

<sup>14</sup> Described by Naess (1989a, p. 23, his italics) as “*An exponentially increasing, and partially or totally irreversible environmental deterioration or devastation perpetuated through firmly established ways of [industrial] production and consumption and a lack of adequate policies regarding human population increase*”

<sup>15</sup> Anthropocentrism is discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine: Environment and Development, section 6

... acts of [deep] ecological resistance do not stem so much from calculations of enlightened self-interest...or from a conscientious sense of moral or legal obligation to see that justice is done to others, as from a felt need to resist the repression, censorship, or liquidation of potentialities that lie within both human and nonhuman nature, and to liberate suppressed potentialities from the yoke of domestication ... The threat perceived ... is the threat of a natural process interrupted and distorted, of the 'individuality' of a natural being made to conform to an artificial pattern imposed on it, of repression in the most general sense...In its broadest signification, the proposed dam is a threat to the very nature of things...

There is also a current of religious rhetoric. Deep ecology does have some of the characteristics of a religion - it may involve a conversion experience<sup>16</sup>, it contains a normative list of basic tenets [as in Christianity's commandments, or Tao's The Way]; there is a call to converts to live a personal lifestyle in accordance with these tenets, and also, a call to mission: to speak out, to save the planet (some ideas from Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 28; also section 6 in this chapter).

### 2.3 Philosophies and religions

A variety of ecocentrically-oriented western and eastern philosophies and religions also suggest ultimate premises for deep ecologists, who do not however necessarily subscribe to the entire doctrine in each case (Naess, 1995c, in Sessions, 1995, p. 400). These include Spinoza, and his influence on the European Romantic movement, the nineteenth century North American Transcendentalists such as Thoreau and Muir, Gandhi, Heidegger, Whitehead, Aldo Leopold's non-anthropocentric "land ethic", Rachel Carson's "reverence for life" ethic derived from Albert Schweitzer, those strands of Christianity which have moved away from "a crude dominating anthropocentric" theology, such as Franciscan Christianity<sup>17</sup>, Eastern spiritual/religious traditions such as Taoism<sup>18</sup>, Buddhism [inter alia, Zen, Dogen, Mahayana (particularly in association with Arne Naess (Sessions, 1987, footnote 40 on p. 124)], Baha'i, Native American spirituality, feminist spirituality (Capra, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 21; Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 79), pantheism, paganism, as well as the "ways of life of primal peoples around the world" (Sessions, G., 1994, p. 210; Sessions, G., 1995a, p. ix-x; Sessions, R., 1996, p. 151, footnote 2). Naess however always insists that one can arrive at the 1984 deep ecology platform from several different philosophical or religious standpoints (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 64-84).

The common thread of all these spiritual and philosophical approaches is their sense of the human being as part of, and not above nature, and the radically different kind of people-nature ethic which such an ontology suggests. In his usual trenchant style, though, social ecologist Murray Bookchin (Chapter Five) describes the deep ecology philosophically-eclectic approach as a "bizarre mix of Hollywood and Disneyland, spiced with homilies from Taoism, Buddhism, spiritualism, reborn Christianity, and, in some cases, eco-fascism" (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 229).

### 2.4 Science

The relationship of green thinking to science, particularly to conservation biology and ecology, as legitimation for the ecological [and deep ecology] worldview is complex. On the one hand, as noted in Chapter Two, the emergence of green thinking can be traced partly to the holistic biology and beginnings of ecology in the nineteenth century (Bramwell, 1989, 1994). Ecology was originally seen

<sup>16</sup> For example, Sessions (1995d, p. 165), refers to Muir's "pivotal experience" in 1864 in discovering rare white orchards and associating that experience with the idea that things exist for themselves, not for people; Leopold's conversion from Pinchot-type resource conservation to land as community is another example

<sup>17</sup> But neglecting the great *female* mystics, such as Hildegard of Bingen, Julian of Norwich, and Mechtilde of Magdeburg, according to ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak (1990, p. 11)

<sup>18</sup> Perhaps the deep ecologist whose name is most associated with Taoism, is physicist Fritjof Capra, who draws on both Taoism and the "new physics" to weave together his systems worldview (Callicott, 1994)

as the “subversive science”, its ideological status that of a resistance movement (Sessions, 1995c, p. 102; this is a reference to Shepard’s work, 1969), and its inspiration has “shown remarkable convergencies” all over the world (Naess, 1973a, p. 99). The science of ecology provides a ‘hard’ underpinning to Green holism (Wall, 1994). One encounters in the deep ecology literature, a valuing of ecosystem characteristics such as complexity, diversity and symbiosis (Naess, 1989a, p. 3), and phrases such as “powerful ecological principles”, “principles of ecological egalitarianism and of symbiosis” (Naess, 1973a, p. 96), and “ecological equilibrium” (p. 98), which provide the matrix for “Ecologically inspired attitudes” (p. 96) and “ecologically responsible policies” (Naess, 1973a, p. 95).

But on the other hand, the science of ecology, while inspiring and grounding the deep ecology movement’s views on nature, the human-nature relationship, and society, is not normative for these views in any absolutist sense. Naess’s view on science, and the science of ecology vis-a-vis deep ecology, has consistently been that neither science generally, nor ecology particularly, can provide the fundamental values and norms needed to anchor an ecological worldview, as these comments indicate:

(a) “All the sciences are fragmentary and incomplete in relation to basic rules and norms, so it’s very shallow to think that science can solve our problems. Without basic norms, there is no science ...” (Naess, 1982, in Sessions, 1995, p. 33). What sets the deep ecological movement aside from the science of ecology, is questioning underlying assumptions. Asking what is of value. Clarifying for yourself, what your ‘total view’ is. Seeking to move beyond scientific answers to questions and towards “*sophia*, ‘wisdom’, which relates to ethics, norms, rules, and practice” (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 27).

(b) Although “ecological knowledge ... [has] *suggested, inspired, and fortified* the perspectives of the Deep Ecology movement” (Naess, 1973a, p. 98, his italics), ecology “...is a *limited* science which makes *use* of scientific methods” (p. 99, his italics), but doesn’t for example, enquire into “what kind of society would be the best for maintaining a particular ecosystem – that is considered a question for value theory, for politics, for ethics” (Naess, 1982a, p. 27). Chemistry, physics or ecology as sciences pioneer change, but they do not ask if the change is *valued* change (Naess, 1989a, p. 24).

While supporters of deep ecology utilize science “to provide data for apocalyptic prophecies” about the Earth’s future (Bramwell, 1994, pp. 17), they are deeply critical of mechanistic, analytical (Bramwell, 1994, pp. 16), ‘masculine’ forms of science, and of the scientific worldview. Science in support of infinite progress is definitely not the answer. Science could be an important part of the solution to anthropocentrism, notes deep ecologist Michael Zimmerman, “but only if it is freed from its current enslavement to economic and nationalistic interests” (1990, p. 141).

### 3. Epistemology

Naess asks: “... is not the value-laden, spontaneous and emotional realm of experience as genuine a source of knowledge of reality [as that of the neutral sciences?]. If we answer ‘yes!’, what are the consequences for our description of nature? The deep ecology movement might profit from greater emphasis on spontaneous experience, on what is called the ‘phenomenological’ outlook in philosophical jargon” (Naess, 1989a, p. 32). Positivism cannot account for all that is involved in human-environmental relations (Grange, 1985, p. 351, footnote 1).

#### 3.1 Gestalt perception

Naess calls the immediate experience which dominates a child’s experience of reality, spontaneous perception; spontaneous in the sense that it has not been mediated by intellectual analysis. As I

understand Naess, the child experiences its reality as “Gestalt”, as whole [section 4]. But as we grow older, we systematically “delearn” this Gestalt experience to arrive at an “atomistic” understanding of reality. We then apprehend the world as “things in themselves<sup>19</sup>” and fail to “see” that they are embedded in “networks or fields of relations” ... “from which they cannot be isolated” (Naess, 1989a, pp. 48-49; Naess, 1989b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 241); we lose our ability for gestalt perception as we learn scientific observation (Naess, 1989a, p. 60). But claims Naess, it is “...crucial for members of the Deep Ecology movement to articulate reality in terms of gestalt perception and reality, for the competing claims of developers and environmentalists are often based on ... atomistic ‘marketplace’ perception, [this image is explained in section 4], as opposed to ecological gestalts” (in Sessions, 1995e, p. 193; also Naess, 1989b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 244).

A gestalt experience of the world is not dubious because it is “subjective”(Naess, 1989b, in Sessions, 1995, p.244). Objective science has traditionally argued that the primary qualities of things in nature such as size and shape are an objective part of the thing itself, but that their secondary qualities – colours, smells - are part of our private consciousness. This leaves us with a nature which is “soundless, scentless, colourless” (Naess, 1989a, p. 51, citing Whitehead’s joking comment). Through such viewpoints, “*human reality is severed from nature proper*” (Naess, 1989a, p. 53, his italics), and there remains “no good reason why we should not look upon such a bleak nature as just a resource” (Naess, 1989a, p. 65). But on the basis of his *relational* ontology [section 4], Naess argues that the qualities each of us perceives in nature are really there, even if we each experience them differently. There is no logical contradiction in this<sup>20</sup>, because the quality of the thing in nature is always relational to the being experiencing it: a thing or organism is *always* a thing or organism-in-relation, “there are no completely separable objects” (Naess, 1989a, p. 56). While part of the gestalt perception and experience of reality is not only re-learning to perceive things-in-relation, and developing a sensitivity for qualities in nature (Naess, 1989a, p. 51), it is also allowing the validity of *feeling* in our apprehension of nature.

### 3.2 Emotion, physical feeling

“The activism of the ecological movement is often interpreted as irrational, as a ‘mere’ emotional reaction to the rationality of a modern Western society. It is ignored that reality as spontaneously experienced binds the emotional and the rational into indivisible wholes...” (Naess, 1989a, p. 63).

In understanding Naess’s presentation of emotion, value, and reality (Naess, 1989a, pp. 63-67), I found Grange’s paper (1985, pp. 351-364) helpful<sup>21</sup>. Feelings are neither “untrustworthy reactions nor neutral readings of environmental stimuli”, they are “the basic way in which we encounter the world” (Grange, 1985, p. 351). Recognizing, and valuing the qualities of nature as in nature, and not only in ourselves, informs the characteristic deep ecology appreciation of “place” [discussed further at section 6.4.3.1], the appreciation of the rootedness of the local community [not to be confused with the local authority (Naess, 1989a, pp. 62-63)], and the recognition of the psychological costs of mobility.

On the capacity to experience or “feel” emotion, depends the capacity to identify with other life forms, to recognize empathetically that they too are striving towards self-realization [section 4.1.3]. Feeling motivates norms (Naess, 1989a, p. 64). Emotion is what makes identification possible, and

<sup>19</sup> The Kantian idea that it must be possible to describe things “as they are”, eliminating any observer influence (Naess, 1989a, pp. 48-49)

<sup>20</sup> A reference to Aristotle’s identity principle: a thing is either A or not A. Naess is here asserting the validity of both-and thinking

<sup>21</sup> In this paper, Grange explores formal philosophical-psychological questions such as: What is the place of our felt reactions to environmental settings? Are they to be regarded as private psychological states? Can we rely on them “as valid axiological indications?” Do they count “in any ontologically relevant way?” (Grange, 1985, p. 352). I accept Grange’s discussion as relevant to understanding deep ecology thought, because both he and Naess share Spinoza as inspiration. Grange also refers to Naess’s work on Spinoza in an ecological context as useful (1985, p. 353, footnote 4). I also found the paper helpful as an introduction to Spinoza’s understanding of reality [or nature, or God] “as One, as self-sufficient and as necessary” (p. 352), which seems not unlike Naess’s ontological understanding [section 4]

identification is an all-important element of the empathetic bond between humans and nonhumans which, deep ecology supporters argue, infuses ecological egalitarianism. The importance of *physical* feeling in apprehending nature is also recognized: “We can never separate human rationality from emotion, nor from intuition. Moreover, our thinking is always accompanied by bodily sensations and processes. Even if we often tend to suppress these, we always think *also* with our body” (Capra, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 22, his italics). Acknowledging feeling as a basic motivation for our worldviews is acceptable and desirable. “It then remains to investigate just what feelings we can accept as guiding ‘stars’ to justify our actions, and how to perceive these lights in a coherent system that articulates and explains our beliefs so as to translate them to action.” (Naess, 1989a, p. 67).

## 4. Ontology

A common “ultimate premise” in deep ecology supporters’ understanding of reality, I believe, albeit derived from differing philosophies and religions, is that reality is a unity [section 4.1], and that there is no ontological divide between humans and nature [section 4.2].

### 4.1 View of nature

Many supporters of the Deep Ecology movement “are inspired by ways of experiencing reality which clash with ... [the] dominant way of seeing reality”, which Naess describes as “... roughly that of a vast supermarket stocked with individual things that are extrinsically related to each other: like primitive atomistic conceptions. These relations are no longer conceived to be Newtonian and mechanistic, but are still largely seen as extrinsic relations between things in themselves ...” (Naess, 1989b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 244).

#### 4.1.1 Nature as “be-ing”, ultimate reality, and ultimate value

For Naess, nature as “ultimate reality” (Naess, 1989a, p. 3) means something like Spinoza’s metaphysical “substance” [or nature, or God], which is ontologically prior to the familiar Cartesian dualisms of thought/extension, idealism/materialism (Grange, 1985, p. 353). The nature of ultimate reality is “Be-ing”, and nature is always “be-ing” too (Grange, 1985, p. 354). “Be-ing” can be understood as “power to”. All aspects, parts, and dimensions of nature are in the act of expressing “power to” (Grange, 1985, p. 354). In ordinary non-philosophical language, I think this can be expressed as all parts of nature are always in the process of becoming, or unfolding. I understand this also as nature’s ultimate, absolute value. It explains for me, how Naess can see the first principle of the deep ecology platform as a norm derived from an ultimate premise, whereas others might see its principle 1 as an ultimate premise.

#### 4.1.2 Nature as Gestalts, internally related, symbiotic, diverse

Naess’s Spinozist-influenced view of nature, the human being, and the human-nature relationship (Grange, 1985, pp. 351-356) as essentially all the same thing, was first expressed in “field language”<sup>22</sup>, and later in Gestalt terms:

Rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of *the relational, total-field image*. Organisms as knots in the field of intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without the relation, A and B are no longer the same things. The total field model dissolves not only the man-in-environment concept, but every compact thing-in-milieu concept – except when talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication (Naess, 1973a, p. 95, his italics; also Naess, 1989a, pp. 28-29).

---

<sup>22</sup> Naess (1989a, p. 204) knew Kurt Lewin’s gestalt work, also influential in environmental psychology (Viljoen, Van Staden, Van Deventer, & Grieve, 1987, pp. 40-42)

Naess also describes reality as “Gestalts” within other Gestalts. A Gestalt, comprises a “whole” *and* its network of non-extensional, internal relations<sup>23</sup> (Naess, 1989b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 245). An internal relation differs from an external relation in that the very relations of a thing are part of its essence, its being<sup>24</sup>. Things derive their identity from the relationships within which they find themselves. Changing a thing’s relations has the effect of changing its being. While these are Level 1 ultimate premises, nevertheless, Naess urges members of the deep ecology movement to “articulate reality in terms of gestalt perception and ontology”, which is fundamentally different to the “supermarket” or “marketplace” view of the capitalist market economy, and of most developers (Sessions, 1995e, pp. 192-193; also Naess, 1989b, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 244-245). “*The difference between the antagonists is one rather of ontology than of ethics... one’s ethics in environmental questions are based largely on how one sees reality*” (Naess, 1989a, p. 66, his italics).

In everyday language, an ontology of phenomena internally related, means that “everything hangs together” (Naess, 1989b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 240). Capra suggested that the Eight Points of the deep ecology platform should include a reference to the “all things hang together” theme, perhaps phrased as “The fundamental interdependence, richness and diversity contribute to the flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth”. While agreeing with Capra’s content, Naess is - remarkably for him – quite categorical that any ideas of “things hanging together” or the kind of interdependence to which Capra refers, do not belong in the deep ecology platform, but rather to the Level 1 [or “ultimate premises” level] of the Apron Diagram. But having said that, he acknowledges that the kind of interdependence to which Capra refers, “is of the kind that supporters do, in fact, talk about”. From this kind of ontological understanding, is derived the deep ecology norm of being careful in our interventions in nature. Because we can never know the full complexity of a thing’s relationships, we can never be certain of the consequences of our actions (Naess, 1989b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 240).

A significant characteristic of nature’s interdependence for Naess is symbiosis, that is, the “ability to coexist and cooperate in complex relationships”. Symbiosis [“live and let live”] is a stronger principle<sup>25</sup> than the “ability to kill, exploit, and suppress”, Naess notes (1973a, p. 96), and valuable for him, because in his personal ecosophy, maximum symbiosis contributes to maximum diversity – of human cultures, as well as of nonhuman life forms. Together, symbiosis and diversity enhance all life forms’ chances of maximizing their self-realization, which is Naess’s single ultimate premise [section 4.2]. Respect for diversity is also a general norm [and “a natural delight”] for deep ecology supporters, provided it does not include “crude intrusive forms” such as ideologies that are destructive (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 29).

#### 4.1.3 Nature as living and striving

In Spinoza’s philosophy, “Nature does not act teleologically but rather emanates out of its own power [to]” (Grange, 1985, p. 354). This rather enigmatic sentence, I understand from Grange’s paper, means that all the dimensions of nature have “*conatus*”, that is “a striving” or “an attempting”. The striving or attempting is the effort “to remain in being, ... to take part in reality”. The primary urge of all that is reality, is to “be”, and to be itself (Grange, 1985, p. 355). It is as though all the Earth is “alive” in its striving to self-unfold.

<sup>23</sup> More technically, Naess writes: “An important distinction needs to be made between concrete contents and abstract structures. The spontaneous experiences we have are the concrete contents, whereas the interrelations between these experiences are the abstract structures. When we reflect upon and analyze the gestalt experience, we are clarifying the abstract relations between spontaneous experiences” (1989b, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 242-244; also Naess, 1989a). The concept “ecosystem” illustrates the two (Naess, 1989a, p. 67). But I don’t think any discussion of these two technical terms is needed to convey what I wish to say here, that is, that supporters of deep ecology are encouraged to “gestalt” perception, and gestalt ontology – to “see” things-in-internal-relationship, not discrete things, externally related

<sup>24</sup> Clearly not a postmodern view, which rejects the notion of “essence”!

<sup>25</sup> Reminding one of Kropotkin’s “mutual aid” argument in reply to the nature as red in tooth and claw argument. As did the early nineteenth century ecologists, Naess also draws normative conclusions for society from this observation

With this background, I found it easier to understand what Naess might mean by the ultimate single norm of his personal ecophilosophy, Self-realization! It is the right of every life form “to live and blossom”, the latter meaning, I think, the right to self-realize, to unfold, in the way of its species [“artgerecht” as the Germans say], and in an unfettered, unconstrained way. [Freedom! Liberation from domination!] The unfolding of every life form is connected to every other life form’s unfolding, in the sense that every other life form’s unfolding contributes to its own unfolding. It is this “conatus”, or “striving” which constitutes each life form’s intrinsic value (Naess, 1989a, pp. 163-165<sup>26</sup>).

Now, while not all who support the deep ecology platform do so from Naess’s personal ultimate premise Self-realization!, many, following living systems theory, do recognize in nature, a capacity for self-direction and self-autonomy. The most well-known version of this is James Lovelock’s (1979) Gaia hypothesis, suggesting that the Earth as a whole is a self-organizing organism (Wissenburg, 1993, pp. 8-9). Accepting the earth as “alive”, and with its own agenda as it were, must surely influence how one deals with it. It is this *kind* of thinking [and not Naess’s personal eco-philosophy], which informs the “prohibition” [point 3] and “obligation” [point 8] of the platform. First the ontology, then the ethic...

#### **4.1.4 Evolution, wilderness, free nature, and conservation biology**

Evolution, wilderness, free nature<sup>27</sup>, and conservation biology are topics not only close to the heart of supporters of the deep ecology movement [Sessions, for example, sets aside for them, an entire section of his 1995 reader], but favourite targets for deep ecology critics as well.

Supporters of deep ecology fight to preserve what still remains of wilderness, and to rescue from further encroachment, areas as yet only mildly “domesticated” or “humanized” by techno-industrial culture. Their arguments are along the following lines: (4.1.4.1) The evolutionary process has inherent value. Continued speciation and biodiversity is under threat from human beings’ excessive interference, particularly in the form of western-type techno-industrial culture. (4.1.4.2) For speciation/biodiversity to continue, large areas of habitat which have not been excessively interfered with by human beings, must be set aside and protected. Findings from conservation biology, a newly emerging science in the 1980s, support this point of view. (4.1.4.3) The value of such “free nature” areas lies not in their anthropocentric instrumental uses, for example, tourism, recreation, or “character-building”, but in their contribution to continued ecological processes, and their contribution to the maintenance of cultural diversity. However, because of their conviction that an alternative view of what it is to be human is fundamental to a changed human-nature relationship, supporters of the deep ecology movement are interested in how the techno-industrial culture [in their view] has “tamed” the human being, and how exposure to free nature could “liberate” him/her from domestication (Sessions, 1995h, p. 325), and/or enable a more harmonious human-nature relationship. (4.1.4.4) Some Third World writers are critical of the deep ecology wilderness/free nature position.

---

<sup>26</sup> Naess does not use “conatus” here, but did, for example, in discussing self-determination and diversity: “The more each particular being acts out of its own particular *conatus* – to use Spinoza’s term – the greater its potential diversity” (Naess, 1979, p. 234)

<sup>27</sup> By “wilderness”, Naess understands areas where people do not live, and resource extraction is prohibited. He uses the terms “near-wilderness” or “free nature”, (for example, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69) to mean, “areas of relatively sparse human habitation ... where wild natural processes are still essentially intact and dominant”. The human habitation, if present, is “nonexploitative bioregional living”, and/or traditional tribal living, which has minimum impact on wild ecosystems (Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995, p. 366). Naess’s “free nature” is not to be confused with social ecologist Murray Bookchin’s “free nature” concept [Chapter Five: 4.3], by which he meant quite something different. Looking back over human history, Naess “fantasized” that it probably would have been better had we left one third of the world wilderness, one-third free nature, and used the remaining third for bioculture, that is, areas where human beings intensively use and regulate the environment for human benefit (Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995, p. 368, p. 367)

#### **4.1.4.1 Techno-industrial culture a threat to continued evolutionary process**

“5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening”. (Deep ecology platform)

Western industrialism represents for deep ecology a “pernicious” phase in western development, perverting the “natural functioning of the planet” (Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 11). Where for billions of years the planet was self-organizing, human beings through western science, technology and industry are now determining the Earth’s future. They are able to do so, because the industrial establishment “is in possession of the natural resources of the planet, either directly, by corporate control, or indirectly, through governments subservient to the industrial enterprise”. Areas untouched by industrialism are so on the tolerance of industrial interests (Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 12). Yet in the last one hundred and fifty years or so, industrialism’s use of the Earth as a resource base has in many cases irrevocably destroyed what the universe has needed billions of years to produce, endangering the existence of other life forms, and our own as well. “Valuing diversity means freeing large areas of the earth from domination by industrial economy and culture” (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 87). Sachs (in Sessions, 1995, p. 438) too, within his critique of the concept “sustainable development”, briefly notes the failure of *homo industrialis* to live within nature’s limits.

#### **4.1.4.2 Large areas of wilderness and free nature must be set aside for ecological reasons**

“The second principle [of the platform] presupposes that life itself, as a process over evolutionary time, implies an increase of diversity and richness” (Naess, 1989a, pp. 29-30)]. Biological diversity is recognized as a fundamental value (Foreman<sup>28</sup>, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 55). Deep ecologists thus support a radically reduced interference policy because in their view, that would support continuing evolution and speciation<sup>29</sup> “through future millions of years” (Naess, 1989a, p. 46). The continued speciation of animals and plants, and the evolution of “highly different landscapes with their special organisms” require large areas to allow greater chances of survival (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 89). Most designated wilderness areas and game reserves are too small to allow for such speciation (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69; Naess, 1989a, p. 46, citing Soulé (1985)). Often their boundaries have been established according to political or other nonbiological criteria (Friedman (1988), cited by Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995h, p. 361). “Wilderness” and near-wilderness areas are needed to halt the “shocking” rate of anthropogenic species extinction as well (Friedman (1988), cited by Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995h, p. 361).

In the 1980s, deep ecology supporters relied on research findings from the [then] newly-emerging scientific discipline of conservation biology (Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995i, pp. 359-362), which appeared to deep ecologists, to continue the “Thoreau/Muir/Leopold tradition” (Sessions, 1995h, p. 323). On Sessions’ view (1995i, p. 360), conservation biology sought to integrate “ethical norms with the latest findings of ecological science”. Despite its confusing ‘conservation’ label, which deep ecologists mistrust for its “negative associations with Pinchot and the Resource Conservation and Development position” (Sessions, 1995i, p. 360), conservation biology is essentially a ‘preservation’ position. It is about setting aside “enough of the land area and functional components – the creatures *and* their habitat – to insure the continuance of processes which have co-evolved over immeasurable time” (Sessions, 1995i, p. 360). If necessary “not only entire watersheds”, but “complete, intact ecosystems should be preserved” (Sessions, 1995i, p. 361, citing conservation biologist, Mitch Friedman (1988)).

---

<sup>28</sup> Dave Foreman’s ecocentrically-inspired Earth First! was amongst the first eco-activist groups to realize that parks and protected areas should be set aside, not primarily for multi-purpose recreation, tourist scenic wonders, or other human utility values, but to protect biodiversity (Foreman, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 55)

<sup>29</sup> I note this here specifically, because of the astonishing critique by social ecologist Murray Bookchin, that deep ecologists “see” nature as a pretty picture postcard, rather than as evolutionary process

Particularly conservation biologist Michael Soulé's work (Naess, 1989a, p. 26, pp. 45-47; Sessions, 1995i, pp. 360-362) appeared to support the deep ecology viewpoints. It is easy to see why. Soulé<sup>30</sup> stated four norms as the basis of conservation biology: "(1) 'Diversity of organisms is good.' (2) 'Ecological complexity is good.' (3) 'Evolution is good.' (4) 'Biotic diversity has intrinsic value.'" (Naess, 1989a, p. 46). Biological diversity is valuable because it stabilizes ecological regimes, and retains a gene pool for future generations (Guha, 1989, p. 73). Some scientific ecologists, as well as supporters of deep ecology called for global ecosystem protection zoning and biological reserves (Sessions, 1995i, pp. 362-364). A parting thought here: today's support for biodiversity protection and biosphere reserves seem to be a legacy of 1980s deep ecology/conservation biology thought; stripped though, of either's normativity<sup>31</sup>, as far as the human-nature relationship is concerned.

#### ***4.1.4.3 Human beings, particularly Third World peoples, vis-a-vis "free nature"***

Several points need to be made about the "interference" noted in point 5 of the deep ecology platform. The first is the often-overlooked, but clearly stated point that "interference" here refers to "excessive" interference. Deep ecology supporters do not mean that human beings should not continue to modify their habitat, as do other species (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69). They do not mean, that indigenous people should be evicted from their ancestral land, or their vital needs ignored, in the name of wilderness<sup>32</sup> preservation: Such peoples have usually "found ways of living within those ecosystems without destroying them" (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 88). Sessions is specific in his comments on ecosystem preservation in a Third World context: "Unlike First World countries, which are now overdeveloped, overpopulated, and ecologically unsustainable, Third World countries need to improve their overall material standards of living, although along ecologically sustainable paths. It is unrealistic and unjust to expect Third World countries to turn to the protection of their wild ecosystems as [sic, but presumably "at"] *the expense* of the vital needs of their human populations...." (Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995i, p. 371, his italics). Deep ecology supporters *do* mean, that developing peoples should not follow the destructive path of western-style techno-industry (Naess, 1986, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69). They *do* mean, that "significant decrease of the extent of human habitation" (Naess, 1989a, p. 47) and in human population numbers in both First and Third worlds, is needed to achieve the kind of free nature areas they have in mind (Naess, 1989a, p. 47; Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995i, p. 371).

Deep ecology supporters are critical of the anthropocentric preservation of wilderness and "free nature" primarily for aesthetic, recreational, or tourism reasons (Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995i, p. 356), which usually involves commodification of nature as a tourist package, elaborate equipment, expensive transport, and bureaucratic-technocratic "management" (Drew, 1972, in Sessions, 1995, p. 114, p. 119). They prioritize the ecological, or "ecocentric" grounds for free nature's preservation (Sessions, 1995h, pp.323-324; Sessions, 1995i, pp. 356-362). While they reject preserving wilderness and free nature for "character-building" reasons, they do emphasize their role in repairing the estranged, degraded human religious/spiritual/sacred relationships to nature which they associate with the rise of techno-industrial culture (for example, Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 8-8; Turner, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 4146 on Gary Snyder's writings).

<sup>30</sup> It is of course ironic that Soulé, ecologist and former student of Paul Ehrlich (Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995i, p. 360), was later an enthusiastic supporter of "deconstructive ecology - see Chapter Nine: Environment and Development, section 5.4

<sup>31</sup> Both Naess (1989a, p. 46) and Sessions (1992, in Sessions, 1995i, p. 360) refer to the ethical or normative nature of conservation biology [at least, in the 1980s]. Sessions justifies it by referring to Soulé's (1985) paper

<sup>32</sup> "... it should be remembered that "wilderness" is an outsider's construct. Most of what appears to industrial peoples as wilderness has been steadily occupied or traversed by indigenous peoples for eons. Thus, preserving such areas from industrial regimes is not only protecting wilderness, but is, in some cases, also preserving indigenous peoples. The struggle for wilderness is both for biological and human diversity". (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 87)

#### 4.1.4.4 A Third World critique of wilderness preservation

Eastern scholar Ramachandra Guha (1989) has critiqued the applicability to the Third World of deep ecology ideas on preserving wilderness/near-wilderness<sup>33</sup>. In his opinion, the extension of their policies, deeply permeated by the divide in American environmentalism between Pinchot-type utilitarian conservationism, and Muir-type preservationism (p. 73), would have “very grave” (p. 72) consequences for Third World peoples, struggling with environmental problems such as food, fuel, and water shortages, soil erosion, and pollution (p. 75). In such circumstances, where the question is one of sheer survival, intervention in nature cannot possibly be guided by the preservation of biotic diversity, rather than human needs (p. 81, p. 74), as deep ecology wilderness policy implies. On his view, the deep ecology “obsession with wilderness” (p. 73) is just another variant of either “the imperialist yearnings” of western scientists, particularly biologists (pp 75-76), or of the kind of consumer luxury pursued by a rich American conservation elite (p. 79), “and the urban elite within the Third World” (p. 80). Worse, conservation projects such as “Project Tiger” have been foisted onto third World countries such as India by bodies such as the WWF and IUCN, keen to export the American invention of national parks (p. 75, p. 79), and assisted by a local “Indian feudal elite” (p. 75). “Success” has been achieved at the expense of evicting peasants from their reserves, and continuing to exclude them and their livestock (p. 75). There is in the deep ecology wilderness policy, an insufficient integration of ecological concerns with livelihood concerns (p. 81), an insufficient concern with equity and social justice issues<sup>34</sup> (p. 81), and a failure to criticize industrialized culture’s over-consumption and militarism as actually the major ecological offenders (p. 74, p. 82). Naess has replied<sup>35</sup> to Guha’s critique.

## 4.2 View of the human being-in-nature

The key problem area for deep ecologists in human-nature relations [what Plumwood terms, the “discontinuity problem”] is “the separation of humans and nature” in the dominant worldview (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 293). Identification of self with the other is “a key notion in deep ecology”, notes ecofeminist Val Plumwood (1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 295). However, accounts of it are vague, shifting and not always compatible. She discerns three different versions – John Seed’s “expanded self”, Warwick Fox’s “transcended or transpersonal self”, and Naess’s “indistinguishability” account [which Plumwood also calls the “holistic self” (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, pp. 293-298; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994b, pp. 247-248)]. Deep ecologists feel free to move amongst these differing versions at will, she notes (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 293). The version I discuss next in section 4.2.1, is that of Naess. In section 4.2.2, I assess, and conclude, that there are strong links between Naess’s version of self, and the deep ecology platform, justifying considering critique from ecology movement partners [4.2.3].

<sup>33</sup> This critique forms part of a package critique of what he sees as the defining deep ecology ideas. This is not the place to develop a critique of Guha’s (1989) understanding of deep ecology, but I was surprised that, inter alia, by his own admission (footnote 2, p. 303), the existence of Naess’s 1973 paper had to be pointed out to him, that he considers adherents of deep ecology not to have developed a critique of the over-consumption of the rich countries’ lifestyles, as in his comment that “Deep ecology runs parallel to the consumer society without seriously questioning its ecological and socio-political basis” (p. 79). The critique that it fails to question the socio-political base is common, but surely Guha’s critique that it fails to question industrial society’s *ecological* basis is off the mark?

<sup>34</sup> Social ecologist Murray Bookchin (Chapter Five) also criticizes deep ecologists for caring only about wilderness preservation and little or nothing about social justice issues

<sup>35</sup> In his 1991 paper “The Third World, wilderness, and deep ecology”, Naess (1995c, pp. 397-407) inter alia, states “Those people in the United States who are actively trying to stop the destruction of wilderness [in the United States (p. 401)] do not tend to publish *general proposals on how to treat apparently similar problems in the Third World*. At least this is true of the Deep Ecology movement. ...the real question is: *How can the poor be helped in a way that is sustainable in the long run?*” ...Is consumerism progress? ... It should be a universal goal for mankind to avoid all kinds of consumerism and concentrate, instead, on raising the basic quality of life for humans, including the satisfaction of their economic needs...” (p. 399, his italics)

## 4.2.1 Introduction to Naess's version of the "ecological self"

Naess's "ecological self is a view of human flourishing amidst the flourishing of all other life forms for their own sakes. It rejects the mechanistic view of the human being as a "social atom that is wholly independent of other people and the natural world" (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 140). Briefly, "human individuals attain personal self-realization, and psychological/emotional maturity when they progress from an identification with narrow ego, *through identification* with other humans, to a more all-encompassing identification of their 'self' with nonhuman individuals, species, ecosystems, and with the ecosphere itself" (Sessions, 1995e, pp. 189-190, my italics). The essence of the process of becoming an ecological self, is identification.

### 4.2.1.1 Identification

Identification is "a spontaneous, nonrational, but not irrational, process in which *the interest or interests of another being are reacted to as our own interest or interests*" (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 213, citing from Naess 1993c, p. 29, Naess's italics). Naess has also described identification as seeking to "maintain an intention to care, feel and act with compassion" towards "all living beings" (Naess, 1988, in VanDeVeer and Pierce, 1994, p. 225). This feeling of empathy or identification with other life forms, is akin to a religious or spiritual experience of being at one with something greater than yourself (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 30). Naess suggests that without the experience of identification with other life forms, "one is not so easily drawn to become involved in deep ecology" (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 30). Empathy with and compassion for other life forms presuppose identification (Naess, 1986b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 227).

### 4.2.1.2 Naess's view of the mature human being

Naess proposes his "Self-Realization!"/ecological self concept both as a metaphysical<sup>36</sup> quest - a tentative answer to the great "meaning of life" questions - "who we are, where we are headed, and the nature of the reality in which we are included" (Naess, 1986b, in Sessions, p. 225), as well as a psychological quest<sup>37</sup> towards becoming a mature, fully-developed human being. What follows is my own understanding of Naess's various explanations (for example, Naess, 1986b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 227-239; Naess, 1989a, pp. 163-177).

1. Psychological theories usually understand human maturity as progressive and positive development in personal and social relationships. But few understand maturity as also progressive

<sup>36</sup> I have avoided in this presentation, discussion of the relationship in Naess's ecosophy between the self and the Self ["atman" (Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 200, p. 215)]. Naess acknowledges the influence of Gandhi's metaphysics – the universal Self, the atman – in his own Self-Realization! norm (Naess, 1988, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 224; see also Naess's 1986 explanation of his understanding of atman as "large comprehensive Self (with a capital "S") embrac[ing] all the life forms on the planet (and elsewhere?) together with their individual selves (jives)." (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 80)

<sup>37</sup> Naess's position on the fully mature human being seems to be in broad agreement with Carl Roger's holistic, and phenomenological [but also "masculine", and rational!] account of the fully functioning human being. Without going into all the details of Roger's theory (see Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981, pp. 399-441; Meyer, Moore & Viljoen, 1989, pp. 373-395; Maddi, 1989), the human being is seen as an organism, whose central motivation is the "self-actualizing tendency". All living things, not just humans and animals, share this actualizing tendency (Maddi, 1989, p. 104), which is "the biological pressure to fulfill the genetic blueprint whatever the difficulty created by the environment" (Maddi, 1989, p. 104). The actualizing tendency is a biological fact, "rooted in the physiological processes" of the organism, and not "a psychological tendency" (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981, p. 404). Striving towards the good life, says Rogers, is not for the faint hearted, as it involves "the stretching and growing of becoming more and more of one's potentialities" (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981, p. 418). The fully-functioning, optimally-developed human being has the courage to allow for him/herself a wide variety of experiences, and is able to integrate them positively "within his self concept" (Meyer et al, p. 387), that is, there is congruence between self-concept and organismic potential (Meyer et al, p. 395). And, such a person "trusts himself increasingly when he [or she] has to choose behaviour appropriate to a specific situation". Rather than depending on social codes, norms or other external sources of influence, "he [or she] finds more and more that if he is open to all experiences his sense of what is right is a reliable guide to satisfactory behaviour" (Meyer et al, p. 387). Roger phrased this characteristic of the mature human being as "organismic trusting": "doing what 'feels right' proves to be a competent and trustworthy guide to behaviour which is truly satisfying" (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981, p. 417). This links nicely with Naess's arguments later in this section for "beautiful" rather than "moral" acts in a nature ethic (point 7 next)

development in human relationships with nature. This is an underestimation of human potentiality.

2. The “Self” of the Self-realization! norm is not the individualistic self of the “ego”, the “ego-gratification” self, but a “wider ecological self” based on an increasing identification with all life forms on the planet. “[W]ith maturity human beings will experience joy, and sorrow” when other life forms experience these. “Not only do we feel sad when our brother or a dog or a cat feels sad, but we will grieve when living beings, including landscapes, are destroyed”; we will identify with “tiny animals like flies or mosquitos fighting for their lives” or animals suffering (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 29; p. 30).

3. The possibility for developing this identification, this empathy, lies in opportunities for intimacy with other life forms, and personal intimate, experiences in nature [a condition with which environmental psychologists and environmental educators would agree]. Naess notes the “deep pleasure and satisfaction” we may derive from close forms of partnership with other forms of life, and suggests that the attempt to “ignore our dependence” [on other forms of life] and to “establish a master-slave role” *vis-a-vis* them, diminishes our chances as it were, of reaching full maturity; increases our chances of alienation from ourselves (Naess, 1973a, p. 96).

4. So, in simplified fashion, the thought chain is: opportunities for intimacy with other life forms → opportunities for empathy/identification with the community of other life forms. My narrow “self”, [which, although it is my mind and my body, cannot be reduced to either or both of these] expands to include their interests as my interests → my human maturity develops, and I am on the way to becoming an “ecological self”. This idea of increasing psychological maturity as dependent on relationships with other life forms, is in some ways, similar<sup>38</sup> to the concept in traditional African thought of “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu<sup>39</sup>” in which an individual person is *dependent* on other persons-in-community for his/her own personal development towards maturity as a human being (Schutte, 1993, pp. 46-53).

5. I begin to understand that if the diversity of other life forms is threatened, my own, and every other human being’s opportunities to develop into a fully mature [in Naess’s understanding of mature] “ecological self” are diminished. Love of ourselves<sup>40</sup> means that we try to assist in the self-realization of others by living according to the formula “live and let live”. Protecting diversity of life forms therefore also means protecting human opportunities to develop into ecological selves. The greater the diversity of these other life forms – individuals, societies, species - the greater are one’s opportunities for achieving this wider identification, this Self-realization (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 29-30). Threatening diversity threatens *every* life form’s opportunity to do this, because all life forms [ourselves included] form part of the interconnected ecological community. Each life form has the same right to develop into its own form of maturity. But here we are interested in what *human* maturity might mean.

6. Naess hypothesises that first, “mature human beings believe at least implicitly in the intrinsic value of non-human life, and in the diversity of life, and second, that they accordingly experience a strong need to oppose actions and policies incompatible with these beliefs. If the two

<sup>38</sup> But there are also essential differences, for example in the concept “seriti”, a thoroughly anthropocentric understanding of the human being’s place in nature (Schutte, 1993, pp. 52-54)

<sup>39</sup> “A person depends on persons to be a person” (Schutte, 1993, p. 8)

<sup>40</sup> Here Naess (1988, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 223) draws on Fromm’s (1956, p. 58, p. 59) understanding of the difference between self-love, and selfishness. In Fromm’s view, love of others, expressed as care, respect, responsibility, knowledge, is only possible, and goes together with the capacity for genuine self-love. Genuine self-love is not the same as narrowly defined market-economic self-interest. Hayward (1995, pp. 56-57) also draws on this aspect of Fromm’s work in explaining how rational self-interest could be enlightened to overcome commodification of self, and of nature

hypotheses are accepted, one may assert that there is a human need to protect nature for its own sake. This protection of the full richness and diversity of non-human life on Earth for its own sake acquires the status of usefulness for humans and is fully compatible with important forms of utilitarianism. I personally accept the hypotheses when ‘maturity’ is taken in the strong sense of all-sided (German *allseitige*) maturity” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, pp. 89-90).

7. As my human maturity/ecological self develops, so the need for me to act in terms of moral precepts towards other life forms diminishes. My moral behaviour changes from “moral acts” to “beautiful acts<sup>41</sup>”. I act from empathy [“identification”] towards other human beings and other life forms, not because that is what I ought to do, but because that is what I want to do. In environmental affairs, “perhaps we should try primarily to influence people towards performing beautiful acts. We should work on their inclinations rather than on their morality<sup>42</sup>,” (Naess, 1986b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 236).

#### 4.2.2 Is the “ecological self” part of the deep ecology platform?

Self-realization, along with ecocentric egalitarianism [section 5], is often considered to be one of the norms of the deep ecology movement (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 213, in the context of pp. 211-214). Sessions is adamant that Self-realization is “*not* a part of the Deep Ecology platform” and thus “not an identifying characteristic of the Deep Ecology movement!” (Sessions, 1995e, p. 190, his italics). Can the influence of Naess’s level 1 Self-realization! be seen in the deep ecology platform? I think so:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.

It seems justified to me then, to discuss some of the critique of the deep ecology view of the human being-in-nature.

#### 4.2.3 Critique

I limit myself to just two: one from social ecologist Murray Bookchin, and one from ecofeminist, Val Plumwood.

##### 4.2.3.1 A totalitarian view of the individual

Bookchin is bitingly critical of the deep ecology vision of realization of “self-in-Self”, based on the Devall and Sessions version of Self-realization. While agreeing that the “egotistical, greedy, and soloist bourgeois ‘self’ has always been a repellent being” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 233), contra-views on a de-individuated human being as ideal, are politically “extremely dangerous. Historically, “a ‘Self’ that absorbs all real existential selves has been used from time immemorial to absorb individual uniqueness and freedom into a supreme ‘Individual’ [such as in recent times, Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini] who heads the state, churches of various sorts, adoring congregations, and spellbound constituencies. The purpose is the same, no matter how much such a ‘Self’ is dressed up in

<sup>41</sup> A distinction made by Kant, which Naess supports. By “beautiful acts”, Kant meant acts done from inclination, even though on Kant’s view, such acts are suspect from a moral point of view; he advocated instead “moral acts”, acts performed from a sense of duty. Here Naess disagrees, supporting beautiful, rather than moral, acts (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 214, citing Naess, 1988)

<sup>42</sup> Naess considers “the extensive moralizing within the ecological movement” to be unfortunate (Naess, 1988, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 226)

ecological, naturalistic, and ‘biocentric’ attributes” (p. 232). Why, he asks, can there not be a view of the human being as “a free, independently minded, ecologically concerned, idealistic self with a unique personality that can think of itself as different from ‘whales, grizzly bears, whole rain forest ecosystems..., mountains and rivers, the tiniest microbes in the soil, and so on<sup>43</sup>?’” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 232).

Besides which, argues Bookchin (1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 233) typically for the social ecology position [Chapter Five], the problem is social-structural, not individual. It is not so much the “grasping, ‘anthropocentric’, and devouring” personalities of ordinary individuals which is causing the ecological crisis. Through the adroitness of the capitalist system – its mass media, the commodity culture, the market society - ordinary people have lost control over their own individuality<sup>44</sup> and freedom [the liberation rhetoric is also present in social ecology], to state leaders, giant corporations, corporate boards, and colluding government officials, who plunder the planet, rob women, people of colour, and the underprivileged. What is needed is not de-individuation of the self, but re-individuation, so that ordinary people can become active agents in “arresting the growing totalitarianism that threatens to homogenize us all into a Western version of the ‘Great Connected Whole’”! (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 233, p. 239).

#### 4.2.3.2 *Unexamined, “male” assumptions on the self*

Plumwood considers all three versions of the deep ecology self an unsatisfactory solution to the human-nature problem, from two differing viewpoints (1) a 1991 (in Zimmerman et al., 1993, pp. 293-298) critique of the implicit or unacknowledged rationalism underlying the deep ecology arguments for a changed self, and (2) a 1997 critique arguing that the green [more or less = deep ecology] critique of anthropocentrism is still based on a male, rationalist-inspired Self-Other ontology. The deep ecology critique would be better conceptualized as a centric-inspired model of oppression [Chapter Six, section 5.1] of the feminine aspect of self, and of the Other, either as person or nature. I discuss her critique of what she calls the Naess-“indistinguishability”, and the Fox<sup>45</sup>-“transcended self” account only. Her arguments can be summarized as:

- (a) While deep ecologists reject discontinuity in the sense of a boundary between self and nature<sup>46</sup>, their view of self goes to the other extreme by obliterating difference and thus relationship. The “indistinguishability” metaphysic, argues Plumwood, is an overpowerful tool doing the wrong job (1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 294). The real issue is not “the obliteration of all distinction”, the swallowing up of all else within an extended self, but a re-think of what it is to be an authentic human being. The indistinguishability metaphysic is confusing atomism and dualism, she suggests. One can reject dualism, “without denying the independence or distinguishability of the other” (1991, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 295). It is possible she suggests, to entertain a view of self-in-relation which rejects dualism, but does not amount to the sort of mержence of self into the whole which [on her account] deep ecologists advocate.

<sup>43</sup> Bookchin is citing here, without bibliographic reference, Devall and Sessions, 1985, in VanDeVeer and Pierce, 1994, p. 217

<sup>44</sup> The capitalist system is often criticized though for over-producing individuality, a critique of which Bookchin must have been aware. Perhaps he means, the capitalist system over-produces individuality, and then takes control of it as well

<sup>45</sup> Although not part of the deep ecology platform, Naess did consider Fox’s philosophy (1990, for example) to be an “important type of Level 1 ecosophy” (Sessions, 1994, footnote 13, p. 224)

<sup>46</sup> Naess suggests an ontology of “unbroken wholeness which denies the classical idea of the analyzability of the world into separately and independently existing parts” (Naess, quoted in Fox, 1982, p. 3 and p. 10, in Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, footnote 8, p. 305), and “... we can make no firm ontological divide in the field of existence ... to the extent that we perceive boundaries, we fall short of deep ecological consciousness” (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, p. 293, citing Fox, 1984 [Plumwood’s 1991b reference list provides no bibliographic details, but this same quotation appears in Devall & Sessions, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 216, ascribed to Fox, W. “The intuition of deep ecology” (Paper presented at the Ecology & Philosophy conference, Australia National University, September 1983. To appear in *The Ecologist* (England, Fall 1984). This paper by Fox subsequently appeared in *The Ecologist*, 14 (1984), 194-200]

Further criticisms are that (1) the indistinguishability/holistic account fails to account for nature's "distinctness and independence from us and the distinctness of the needs of things in nature from ours" (1991, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 295); (2) pathology emerges when human beings are unable to establish appropriate self-other boundaries (Donner, 1997, pp. 380-381); (3) it is important for women not to slide back into the loss of self-boundary, which is a particularly male view of the ideal female (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 295).

(b) Plumwood criticizes the "Transcended or Transpersonal Self" version for remaining trapped in the male view of moral behaviour, which is a "rationalistic preoccupation with the universal and its account of the ethical life as oppositional to the particular". On this view, personal, particular, and emotional attachments are ethically suspect; they must be counterbalanced by the impersonal, the abstract, the universal. Fox (1990, p. 12) for example, urges us to "strive for *impartial* identification with *all* particulars, the cosmos, discarding our identifications with our own particular concerns, personal emotions, and attachments". This, says Plumwood, is "the deep ecology version of universalization, with the familiar emphasis on the personal and the particular as corrupting and self-interested" (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, pp. 296-297, her italics). A view of ethical behaviour as comprising rejection of the particular and the partial precludes the kind of deep, personal attachment and ties to place which motivates so many western individuals, as well as indigenous peoples' attachment to their land, and which expresses itself "in very specific and local responsibilities of care" (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 297). The Transcended Self is just "another variant on the superiority of reason and the inferiority of its contrasts", and one which in addition, fails to recognize its underlying assumptions about what it is to be a human being vis-a-vis others and nature.

But are the various deep ecology views of the self *only* the unexamined male accounts that Plumwood says they are? A recurring theme in deep ecology literature does appear to be the need for human beings to modify "male-type" interactions with other life forms to more "female-like" forms of interaction (see for example, Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 14; Capra, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 22-23). It is argued that there must be a change from domination, ownership and control, to caring and sharing, from patriarchy to matriarchy, from the Male Principle to the Female Principle. Roszak's ecopsychology, particularly, which draws on deep ecology thought (Reser, 1995), seeks to "heal the ... fundamental alienation between the person and the natural environment" (Roszak, 1992, p. 14, and pp. 320-321, cited in Reser, 1995, p. 236), through, *inter alia*, re-evaluating "certain compulsively 'masculine' character traits that permeate our structures of political power and which drive us to dominate nature...", and to create instead, an "ecological ego". And it is surely clear from even the most critical reading of Naess's version of the ecological self, that it emphasizes emotion, caring, caring about particular life forms, and about particular places.

## 5. The ethic

Naess's ontology inavoidably leads to a radically different environmental ethic. *First*, the ontological understanding says Naess, then behaviour appropriate to ending the environmental crisis follows automatically, without moralizing, without formal ethical systems: "I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the world ... If deep ecology is deep it must relate to our fundamental beliefs, not just to ethics. Ethics follow from how we experience the world<sup>47</sup> ...." (Naess, 1989a, p. 20).

<sup>47</sup> Callicott (1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 4) writes that "deep ecology has become a "practice" aimed at directly *experiencing* connectedness with nature. Deep ecology seems, accordingly, vaguely anti-intellectual and overtly hostile to the impersonal (as the deep ecologists think of it) "ethical reduction" of what they believe should be a more intimate relationship to the natural world than that typical of morality."

As presented in the deep ecology platform's Eight Points, the ethic comprises a theory of value [points 1 and 2], an "ethical prohibition" [point 3], and an "obligation" [point 8] (Naess<sup>48</sup>, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 216). This section begins with a discussion of ecological egalitarianism as motivation to ethical behaviour [5.1], then discusses at 5.2, the theory of value; and at 5.3, the "ethical prohibition". Some aspects of the "obligation" are discussed in Section 7: "Praxis".

## 5.1 The theory of motivation to ethical behaviour

### 5.1.1 Biospherical egalitarianism: A rejection of anthropocentrism

All adherents of the deep ecology movement reject anthropocentrism as *the* root cause of the environmental crisis (Sessions, 1995f, p. 267). One motivation to do so, may be found in Naess's "biospherical egalitarianism"<sup>49</sup>:

*Biospherical egalitarianism – in principle.* The 'in principle' clause is inserted because any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation and suppression. The ecological field worker acquires a deep-seated respect, even veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from within, a kind of understanding that others reserve for fellow men and for a narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field worker, *the equal right to live and blossom* is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves. This quality depends in part upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself. (Naess, 1973a, pp. 95-96).

There is in the biosphere, a "core democracy" (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 29). Ecological egalitarianism sees human beings as very much "part and parcel" of the ecology of the natural world (Sessions, 1995f, p. 265), special (Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 8-18; Sessions, 1995f, p. 268), but not the only, inhabitants of the earth. The human being has "its own distinctive ... value"<sup>50</sup>, but this distinctiveness must be articulated within the more comprehensive context" (Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 10).

### 5.1.2 Making the required paradigm shift

The crucial paradigm shift needed to protect the planet from ecological destruction is a move "from an anthropocentric to a spiritual/ecocentric value orientation" (Sessions, 1995a, p. xxi); a move away from "dominating, exploiting, and destroying the planet" towards "harmonious living with nature" (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 28).

Another aspect of the paradigm shift required, is taking a long range view (Naess, 1982a, p. 29). "The wild ecosystems and species on the earth have intrinsic value and the right to exist and flourish, and are also necessary for the ecological health of the planet *and* the ultimate well-being of humans. Humanity must drastically scale down its industrial activities on Earth, change its consumption lifestyles, stabilize and then reduce the size of the human population by humane means, and protect and restore wild ecosystems and the remaining wildlife on the planet. This is a program that will last far into the twenty-first century ..." (Sessions, 1995a, p. xxi, his italics). Elsewhere, the long range view is

---

<sup>48</sup> The reference to points 1 and 2 of the platform as a "theory of value" is my interpretation, not Naess's

<sup>49</sup> Sometimes ecological egalitarianism is also called biological egalitarianism (Naess uses both in his 1973 paper), biocentrism [as in the Chapter One, Figure 2 Wissenburg heuristic], or ecocentrism. Deep ecologist Warwick Fox (1989, pp. 7-9) argues for the term "ecocentric" because it is more inclusive than "biocentric", because it carries more of the meaning of earth as home [from the Greek oikos] than does "biocentric", and because it conveys the idea that deep ecologists are concerned with equality for things that are both biologically and non-biologically "alive". Deep ecology's ecological egalitarianism seems to me, neither the formal kind of biocentrism found for example in Paul Taylor's work, nor the formal ecocentrism of environmental philosopher J. Baird Callicott

<sup>50</sup> I note this here, because of the critique of deep ecology as misanthropic

described as “the lifetime of the grandchildren of our grandchildren” (Naess, 1992, in Sessions, 1995, p. 463), i.e. a seven-generation view.

## 5.2 The theory of value

I understand the deep ecology theory of value to be stated in the first two principles of the deep ecology platform:

1. The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has intrinsic value. The value of non-human life forms is independent of the usefulness these may have for narrow human purposes. [This point is also presented as: “The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 86)]
2. Richness and diversity of life forms are values in themselves and contribute to the flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth.

The first principle [and even the second] may appear to many to be a Naess Ecosophy-T ultimate premise, rather than a “conclusion based on a set of premises”. In Naess’s view, it can be either, and for himself, it is the latter, derived from his single ultimate premise, Self-realization! (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 77). But it can be confidently assumed that the first tenet, which is essentially a rejection of anthropocentrism (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 86), is a commonly held view among deep ecology supporters: “I seriously think that the Eight Points ... should be acceptable without hesitation to nearly all supporters of the Deep Ecology movement” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 218).

### 5.2.1 The “intrinsic” value of point 1

Naess (for example, Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, pp. 88-89; Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 216) has used the terms “intrinsic”, “inherent”, “independent”, “for its own sake” interchangeably to express a view opposite to that of nature’s having only “utilitarian” value. Despite the use of the word “intrinsic” in point 1 of the Eight Points, Naess noted in 1993 that what he means is better expressed by the term “inherent value” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 216). This re-confirms his 1986 approval of Tom Regan’s understanding of inherent value: “The presence of inherent value in a natural object is independent of any awareness, interest, or appreciation of it by any conscious being” (Regan, 1981, in Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 83, footnote 5). This is the “watershed perception from which Deep Ecology flows” (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 86).

### 5.2.2 The “richness” and “diversity” values of point 2

Point 2 has also been called the “diversity norm” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 217). It presupposes that (1) “life itself, as a process over evolutionary time, implies an increase of diversity and richness”, and (2) the “so-called simple, lower, or primitive species of plants and animals” are not simply stepping stones along the evolutionary path towards “so-called higher or rational life forms” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69; 1989a, pp. 29-30); they have value in themselves.

But diversity does not guarantee the other value in nature identified by Naess: richness. “Why talk about diversity *and* richness? Suppose humans interfere with an ecosystem to such a degree that 1000 vertebrate species are each reduced to a survival minimum. Point (2) is not satisfied. *Richness*, here used for what some others call ‘abundance’, has been excessively reduced. The maintenance of richness has to do with the maintenance of habitats and the number of individuals (size of populations). No exact count is implied. The main point is that life on Earth may be excessively interfered with even if complete diversity is upheld.” (Naess, 1989a, pp. 29-30, his italics).

### 5.3 The scope

The scope of the ethic is *radically* comprehensive. The phrase “life” in tenet 1 of the platform is used in a “comprehensive non-technical way” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 68), to include the biosphere or “more professionally”, the ecosphere, itself including “individuals, species, populations, habitat, as well as human and non-human cultures”. It also extends to include aspects of the ecosphere many would consider non-living such as “rivers (watersheds), landscapes, ecosystems. For supporters of deep ecology, slogans such as ‘let the river live’ illustrate this broader usage so common in many cultures” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 68).

#### 5.3.1 The individual vis-a-vis the species

I found Naess’s inclusion of both individuals and species in his 1986 clarification of deep ecology appealing<sup>51</sup>. But Naess’s understanding of ecocentrism is unusual. While it does not exclude the collective, it has consistently tended towards the individual:

(a) “Many ecologists lament the preoccupation of ethics with particular specimens instead of populations. They demand a greater ethical concern with populations and animal and human societies, less preoccupation with the fate of individuals. Some add that the highest concern should be for ecosystems, not individuals, societies, or species. ... I presuppose in what follows that the arguments of these ecologists are taken seriously, but nevertheless persist in thinking of the realization of the potentials of *particular* living beings” (Naess, 1979, p. 234).

(b) “I try in my ecosophy to be consistent in my view that individual beings, and only individual beings, can have inherent value, and not classes of individuals as such ...”. “Point 2 [of the platform, which discusses diversity] makes this difficult if landscapes, or the whole Earth, are not taken to be individual beings. If taken otherwise, I would attribute value to some kind of mere multiplicity. I do not attach inherent value to species or families (as classes or sets of beings with more than one individual or element) but to diversity itself. From the “diversity norm”, plus various [personal] hypotheses, I derive norms of priorities: the defense, for instance, of threatened orders or families should have higher priority than that of species or subspecies, if there are no special reasons not to attach higher priorities to the latter...” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 217).

(c) In writing about Gandhi’s *advaita* (non-duality), Naess recalls Gandhi’s, and his own “belief in the individual”. For Gandhi, “The individual is the supreme concern” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 215).

### 5.4 The moral obligation [the “ethical prohibition”]

#### 5.4.1 All living beings have the same right to live and blossom

In his 1973 (1973a, p. 96) paper, Naess states that “*the equal right*<sup>52</sup> to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom”. Limiting this right to human beings is a form of anthropocentrism which is ultimately damaging to human beings too [this because I think, it limits development of Naess’s “ecological self”]. In 1982, before the distinction between personal legitimating philosophies and the deep ecology platform had been made, Naess considered the maxim

<sup>51</sup> Appealing because it appears to be a both-and approach, not the either/or of individuals or species that one encounters in the many environmental ethics debates on bio-centrism vs. eco-centrism. And I can intuitively agree with his definition of “inherent” - for millennia, there were no humans on Earth to appreciate the life-forms present, yet surely they had a value in themselves

<sup>52</sup> Expressed sometimes as the *same* right (Naess, 1995b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 224). The meaning is “No single species of living being has more of this particular right to live and unfold than any other species” (Naess, 1989a, p. 166)

“...every life form has in principle a right to live and blossom” a fundamental characteristic<sup>53</sup> of the deep ecology movement (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 28).

Though there is in deep ecology “a basic intuition...that we have no right to destroy other living beings without sufficient reason” (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 28-29), the caveat “in principle” is there because “any realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression” (Naess, 1973a, p. 95). Later<sup>54</sup>, but not in his 1973 paper, Naess sets out his distinction between “vital” and other needs, to help in deciding to what extent “killing, exploitation, and suppression are justifiable” [section 5.4.2 below].

Ecological egalitarianism is present in the Eight Point platform as point 3, which expresses the commonly-supported deep ecological “ethical prohibition”:

“3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs”

The phrase “no right to” is used in an ordinary, every day sense. In clarifying this point, Naess notes that “... it is not made sufficiently clear that the use of the expression “no right to” is an everyday use of the term “right” as in: “You have no right to eat your little sister’s food!” It is not meant to be identical in meaning with “You ought not to eat ...” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 217). At a stage, Naess wondered if this formulation were not “perhaps too strong”. But then, “considering the mass of ecologically irresponsible proclamations of human rights, it may be sobering to announce a norm about what they have no right to do.” (Naess, 1989a, p. 30).

In 1986, Naess provided no definition of what “vital need” means. It is “deliberately left vague” to allow for the “considerable latitude in judgment” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69) which might be needed in different climatic and cultural contexts.<sup>55</sup> In the 1990s, he explained that “The intention when using the strong term ‘vital need’ is to announce a limit of justifiable interference. Not every demand on the market proves that there is a corresponding need. Hundreds of millions of people have unsatisfied vital needs of the most pressing kinds; hundreds of millions of others are wasting the resources of the planet for purposes generally considered trifling and unworthy (although more or less unavoidable as things are)” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 91; also Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 217 for similar comments).

### 5.4.2 Making ethical decisions in cases of conflict

“My intuition is that the right to live is one and the same for all individuals, whatever the species, but that the vital interests of our nearest, nevertheless, have priority” (Naess, 1993b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 222)

The principle of ecological egalitarianism is often criticized as unhelpful in making choices in cases of conflict (for example, Hurwich (1986), in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 212). But Naess has provided two broad guidelines: vitalness, and nearness.

#### 5.4.2.1 Vitalness

The first guideline in choosing between vital needs of individuals regardless of their species, is that the greater vital interest has priority over the less vital. As a general principle, human beings too should be using natural resources to satisfy *vital* needs.

---

<sup>53</sup> “Not included in the eight points, but quite expressive of opinions among supporters of the deep ecology movement, is the following formulation: Every living being has the right to live and flourish.” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 91)

<sup>54</sup> Naess, 1993b, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 222-224

<sup>55</sup> “Where to draw the limit between vital and non-vital is a question that must be related to local, regional, and national particularities. Even then a certain area of disagreement must be taken as normal.” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 91)

Is testing of cosmetics on animals meeting a *vital* human need? No. If human beings' non-vital needs come into conflict with the vital needs of nonhumans, then humans should defer to nonhumans (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 74; Sessions, 1995e, pp. 191-192). Is wearing a fur coat meeting a vital need? It depends, says Naess (1995b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 222). A rich person who wears fur as a sign of wealth or status, or for warmth when other alternatives are available, is not meeting a vital need. It can be argued though, that a poor person who has no other option, *is* meeting a vital human need. It can also be argued that poor people are meeting a vital need if they take part in commercial whaling, or commercial logging, to earn a livelihood. Here Naess argues that considering the “fabulous possibilities open to the richest industrial nations”, they have a responsibility to ensure that poor communities are offered alternative ways of livelihood to prevent undue exploitation of species and ecosystems<sup>56</sup> (Naess, 1993b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 222).

#### 5.4.2.2 Nearness

Nearness is the second guideline in choosing between vital interests: “... the nearer has priority over the more remote ...” (Naess, 1993b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 222). Although the right to live is the same for all individuals regardless of species, “the vital interests of our nearest, nevertheless, have priority”. Thus he argues, we have special obligations to our own children; any animal may be killed in order to feed this child if this is vitally necessary (p. 224). Nearness in space, time, culture and species also plays a role – the nearer has priority over the more remote (p. 222). There is also a greater obligation to long-standing members of our community than to an accidental visitor. Naess also recognizes the role of “*felt nearness*”. Felt nearness shapes our capacity to suffer when other living beings suffer.

#### 5.4.2.3 Critique

Despite Naess's vitalness and nearness guidelines, some environmental ethicists (for example, Attfield, 2003, p. 40; ecofeminist supporter Cheney (1987)) argue that ecological egalitarianism provides no useful guiding principles for dealing with conflict between interests.

Naess grants that his suggested principles for dealing with human - nature conflict might appear “vague and ambiguous” or as “only vague general guidelines” (Naess, 1993b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 222, p. 224). Trying to establish a normative ethic which will guide us in dealing with differences between nonhuman beings is as complex as trying to establish a normative ethic for dealing with differences between human beings<sup>57</sup> (Naess, 1993b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 224). Fox too, suggests that deep ecologists are “not *intending* to advocate a specific set of guidelines for action; they are only intending to advocate a *general orientation*”. (1989a, p. 6, his italics). There is among supporters of the deep ecology movement, a “widespread intuitive appreciation of the *same* right of all beings to live and blossom” (Naess, 1993b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 224). Final action in cases of conflict should be within the deep ecologist “general attitude of being reluctant, *prima facie*, to interfere with the unfolding of A or B – indeed, to desire that both should flourish ...” (Fox, 1989, p. 7, his italics). Thereafter, vitalness and nearness criteria are applied.

### 5.4.3 The goal of the ethic: “wide ecological sustainability”

In explaining “wide ecological sustainability”, Naess writes:

Roughly, I call ecological sustainability *wide* (or ‘broad’) if and only if the change (‘development’) in life conditions on the planet is such that it ensures the full richness (abundance) and diversity of life-forms on the Earth (to the extent, of course, that humans can insure this). Every key word of this criterion, of course, needs

<sup>56</sup> Greenpeace follows this approach

<sup>57</sup> Sessions too notes that “... even highly developed traditional humanistic ethical theories, such as utilitarianism and “rights theory”, in which all humans are to be treated “equally”, can provide no “hard and fast” rules for adjudicating conflicts among humans.” (Sessions, 1995e, pp. 191-192). We see this for example, in the clashes between pro-life and pro-choice campaigners in the question of abortion, and in the incredibly complex ethical questions which arise from human stem cell research

clarification, but ‘wide’ sustainability is obviously different from the ‘narrow’ concept of ecological sustainability that is increasingly accepted politically: that is, the existence of short- and long-range policies that most researchers will agree will make ecological *catastrophes* affecting narrow *human* interests unlikely. This kind of narrow sustainability is politically acceptable today as a *goal* for ‘global development’. But broad ecological sustainability is concerned with the overall ecological conditions on the Earth, not only with the interests of humanity, and the dangerous concept of development is avoided. By ‘development’ is still meant something like an increase in Gross National Product, not an increase in quality of life. (Naess, 1992, in Sessions, 1995, p. 464, his italics).

“Wide” long-range ecological sustainability is “long-range ecological sustainability combined with a satisfactory life quality. A development or general pattern of change within and among communities, societies, or cultures is ecologically sustainable if it is compatible with restoring and maintaining the richness and diversity of planetary life (in the broadest sense). What is ‘satisfactory’ we scarcely need quarrel about as long as we agree that hundreds of millions of children live at unsatisfactory level” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, pp. 95-96).

And, “In short, it is my opinion that a *necessary, but not sufficient, criterion of the fully attained greenness of a society is that it is ecologically sustainable in the wide sense.*” (Naess, 1995c, in Sessions, 1995, p. 402, his italics).

#### 5.4.4 Animal welfare?

Given its views on ecological egalitarianism, I have found in the deep ecology literature, a surprising lack of concern for animal liberation issues such as factory farming, animal testing, or sport hunting. There are some vague general statements that the well-being of animals counted as food forms part of deep ecologists’ concerns (Naess, 1984b, p. 267). But on the whole the tendency seems to be academic-philosophical critique, such as that animal liberationists’ arguments are based in anthropocentric “moral extensionism” (Sessions, 1995c, p. 101), and/or ontological atomism, rather than true ecocentrism (Chapter Three, section 8). Using Wall’s (1994, p. 6) twin major fundamentals of green thought – deep ecology and animal liberation – the green of deep ecology in this respect appears shades lighter than that of the animal liberation movement (Chapter Three).

What is Naess’s view on animal liberation? Its intention is obviously included in his ecological egalitarianism (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, pp. 90-91), and aspects of it appear in the tenets of his preferred personal lifestyle<sup>58</sup>, which includes support for total or partial vegetarianism. If judged within a formal environmental ethics context, Naess appears to tend towards either utilitarianism or rights theory on animal liberation issues, as these extracts show:

(a) In clarifying the use of “no right to” in point 3 of the platform [“Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs”], Naess also notes that

It does not imply an affirmative answer to the question of the existence of the ‘rights of man’ or the ‘rights of animals’. Because of vast controversies in professional philosophy about the concept of ‘rights’, it may be unwise to use the expression ‘no right to’ in point 3. *I am not convinced about that, and the use of it opens up the good question, ‘Why can’t animals have rights?’ If the answer is ‘Because they can have no obligations’, this leads to the question ‘What about babies? The mentally ill?’.* Such discussions tend to lead people in the direction of softening their rigid views about humans being apart from non-human nature (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 217, my italics).

(b) In the course of a discussion on how “Self-realization”, understood as “a general abstract norm that the specific potentialities of living beings be fulfilled” might “work” in a mixed community of human beings, domestic, and wild animals, where such potentialities can be expected to conflict

<sup>58</sup> Point 20 suggests that if a conflict of interests between pets and wild species arises, a “tendency” to protect the latter is indicated, and point 25 suggests total or partial vegetarianism (Naess, 1984a, revised 1993, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 259 – 261)

(Naess, 1979, pp. 231-241), Naess notes that in the context of western-style industrial culture and its high material standard of living, "... the number of animals, especially mammals, subjected to suffering and a severely restricted life-style in the richest countries has increased exponentially. Never have so many highly sensitive beings been cruelly treated for such flimsy reasons" (p. 231). Naess is arguing here presumably from his own Spinozist ontological understanding: there is "an inner relation between joy ... and increase of power of realization, and sorrow ... and decrease of power of realization" (p. 233); sensitiveness to pain or behaviour as if in pain, in the Spinozist view of the human being, should "elicit sympathy and attitudes of identification"<sup>59</sup> (p. 236). This viewpoint aligns easily with Singer's utilitarianism (Chapter Three, section 5), and Naess does refer to the complementarity between the deep ecology demand for protection of the full richness and diversity of non-human life on Earth for its own sake, and "important forms of utilitarianism" (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, pp. 89-90). But there is also a direct reference to Regan's formal "rights" argument in defence of animals (Naess, 1979, p. 241, footnotes 6-8). Naess reiterates his unease with technical-philosophical or legal discussions about whether or not animals can have "rights", and refers to a fairly general ordinary everyday understanding that they do (1979, pp. 238-239). It is for him "...fairly unimportant whether the term 'rights' (of animals) is or is not used in the fight for human peaceful coexistence with a rich fauna" (1979, p. 231). One has the feeling that Spinozist-type identification arguments, rather than formal animal liberation theory, provide for Naess, sufficient justification for a radically different human-animal relationship.

#### 5.4.5 Critique of ecological egalitarianism

The ecological egalitarianism ethic of some deep ecology supporters [specifically Naess, Rodman and Sessions] has been critiqued on several grounds, including surprisingly! that it is "neither egalitarian nor fully biocentric", and as "setting man apart" (Watson<sup>60</sup>, 1983). I outline here, some objections which in my view, contribute something more to understanding what "green" is, or is not.

##### 5.4.5.1 Amounts to a rejection of formal ethics

Naess disagrees with Callicott's (1993b, p. 325) statement that "Deep ecology ... rejects ethics outright", and states clear support for the "search for an environmental ethic" (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 216). Ecofeminist Val Plumwood, while appreciative that deep ecology sees the human-nature "discontinuity problem" as not only restricted to ethics (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, p. 293), is critical of the overly phenomenological Self-realization ethic it does propose. On her view, Self-realization cannot substitute for, or obviate, "an ethical account of care and respect for nature" (Plumwood, 1991b, pp. 304-305, footnote 6). But I do see this as a 'green' feature – a recognition of nature's inherent value, without reference to any particular *formal* environmental ethical theory.

##### 5.4.5.2 Is misanthropic, and fascistic

"The deep ecology vision of humanity" remarks Bramwell (1994, p. 161) "is as a natural disaster, something like an exterminatory virus". Deep ecology's ecocentrism and resulting egalitarianism is frequently rejected, especially by social ecologists, as misanthropy<sup>61</sup>, "ecological fascism", and as being willing to "sacrifice people for the greater good of a supposed ecological community" (Wallach,

<sup>59</sup> In this paper, Naess uses connotative terms such as "responsible", "guilty", "misdeed", "cruelty" and "careful" in describing animal behaviour widely reserved for human behaviour only (p. 239), surely a result of his belief in the possibility of identification with nonhuman life forms? I am aware of, but do not pursue here, the critique that Spinoza's animal welfare credentials are suspect

<sup>60</sup> Naess (1984b) has replied to this critique

<sup>61</sup> But even Murray Bookchin, surely one of deep ecology's most outspoken critics, uses expressions such as "cancerous" to describe the maleffects of human society's hierarchical thinking on nature: "We can [as human beings] contribute to the diversity, fecundity, and richness of the natural world – what I call "first nature" – ... Or, our societies – "second nature" – can exploit the whole web of life and tear down the planet in a cancerous manner" (Bookchin, in Chase, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 240). Another example: the ideals of humanism "have been warped by a cancerous, patricentric, racist, capitalist, and bureaucratic society..." (Bookchin, in Chase, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 240)

2004, p. 9). Social ecologist Bookchin (1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 228-238; 1991, in Chase, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p.246), for example, critically discusses the standardly-cited cases of some deep ecologist supporters<sup>62</sup>, positions on AIDS, or on controlled immigration, or on food aid to Ethiopia. But deep ecology supporter George Sessions rejects such remarks as “antithetical to Deep Ecology philosophy” (Sessions, 1995a, p. xiii).

Naess is clearly not misanthropic<sup>63</sup>. His personal Ecosophy-T combines “respect for all individuals with respect for ecosystems” (Sessions, 1995d, p. 157). He is also aware that terms such as “egalitarianism” and “anthropocentrism”, which are often used to characterize positions on the deep-shallow spectrum, are open to misinterpretation. Terms such as egalitarianism “can properly imply that man is in some respects only a “plain citizen” (Aldo Leopold) of the planet on a par with all other species, but they are sometimes interpreted as denying that humans have any ‘extraordinary’ traits, or that, in situations involving vital interests, humans have no overriding obligations towards their own kind. But this would be a mistake: they have!” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 76). Again in 1991, he writes: “The main driving force of the Deep Ecology movement ... is that of *identification* and solidarity with all life. Humans are our nearest, in terms of identification of all life...”, and “Green parties should include ... plans [to] fight ...world hunger and for basic human dignity” (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 452, his italics).

### 5.4.5.3 Favours the rational, universal, and abstract, rather than the particular

Ecofeminist Val Plumwood (1991) critiques the deep ecology ethic, *inter alia*, for its ‘male’ tendency to favour the rational, the abstract, and the universal above the particular. But I suggest that the Naess deep ecology ethic at least, *does* give attention to the particular. For example, Naess suggests, in dealing with cases of people-animal conflict, that an *a posteriori* approach is useful. Rather than “applying previously adopted rules established by reason”, one also attempts to apply in each particular case, the “knowledge obtained by experience rather than by reason alone” (VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 212, citing Naess, 1979). And, note VanDeVeer & Pierce (1994, p. 213, commenting on Naess’s 1979 “Self-realization in mixed communities...” paper), “Whatever guidelines<sup>64</sup> are used by Naess *emerge from the situation* in which bears, wolves, sheep, and people find themselves” (my italics).

## 6. View of society

If your ecophilosophical reflection and clarification leads you to support points 1-5 of the Deep Ecology platform, then you will tend to agree with points 6 and 7 of the platform too (Naess, 1995a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 211):

6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and greatness.

This section begins with a clarification of deep ecology vis-a-vis green movement views on the new society [6.1]. There follows in 6.2, the deep ecology critique of western techno-industrial ideology; in 6.3, viewpoints on some economic issues; and in 6.4, issues of change in society’s structure. Personal

<sup>62</sup> For example, by Dave Foreman of Earth First! See Sessions, 1995a, footnote 14, p. xxvi

<sup>63</sup> Even Bookchin grants that Naess does not speak of humanity as intruders in nature (Bookchin, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 240)

<sup>64</sup> For example “Many factors are considered before a [particular] bear is condemned to death. What is his or her total record of misdeeds? How many sheep have been killed? Does he or she mainly kill to eat, or does he or she maim or hurt sheep without eating? Is particular cruelty shown? Is it a bear mother who will probably influence her cubs in a bad way? Did the sheep enter the heart of the bear area or did the bear stray far into established sheep territory?” (Naess, 1979, p. 237)

and social political activity towards attaining the deep ecology/green society, is discussed in section 7: Praxis.

## 6.1 Deep ecology vis-a-vis green movement views on the new society

There is no Deep Ecology blueprint for a society which satisfies the deep ecology platform, such as that developed in Edward Goldsmith's (1972) "Blueprint for survival". Hattingh (2002, p. 7) describes this blueprint as articulating

four main pre-requisites for a sustainable society (conceptualised as a state of equilibrium ... [1] a minimal disruption of ecological processes; [2] maximum conservation of resources and energy; [3] a population in which only losses are replaced; [4] a social system in which the individual does not feel limited by the first three conditions, but instead enjoys them. Such a social system was envisaged to consist of decentralised, self-sufficient communities in which people worked close to home, governed themselves and developed their own personal and communal identities, formed values and ideals in which they could take pride, and could be happier than they would have been in the anonymous mass existence of a centralised metropolitan life.

Though supporters of the Deep Ecology movement naturally work with supporters of the green movement, they do only part of the work (ecological sustainability) towards the three major requirements, in Naess's view, of a green society – that is, one which satisfies the requirements of peace, social justice, and ecological sustainability. *But* this green society must be one which is compatible with the deep ecology requirement of "wide" ecological sustainability ("protecting the full richness and diversity of Life on Earth"), and, it must manifest the same kind of respect for, and valuing of, deep cultural differences that deep ecologists accord the richness and diversity of non-human life forms. For that reason, it cannot be a society implemented through "social or political trends of the fascist or Nazi kind" (Naess, 1993a, pp. 219-220).

United Kingdom Green, Jonathon Porritt, in his book "Seeing green" (Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217), contrasts the politics of an industrial society with the politics of an ecological or "green" society. Many of his "green paradigm"'s distinguishing features<sup>65</sup> will become familiar either from this chapter, or Chapters Five to Seven.

---

<sup>65</sup> This, and other authors' similar attempts are discussed in Chapter Eight, section 1

**Figure 5: An industrial society compared with an ecological [or “green”] society**

Distinguishing features of a ‘Green paradigm’	
<i>The politics of industrialism</i>	<i>The politics of ecology</i>
A deterministic view of the future	Flexibility and an emphasis on personal autonomy
An ethos of aggressive individualism	A co-operatively based, communitarian society
Materialism, pure and simple	A move towards spiritual, non-material values
Divisive, reductionist analysis	Holistic synthesis and integration
Anthropocentrism	Biocentrism
Rationality and packaged knowledge	Intuition and understanding
Outer-directed motivation	Inner-directed motivation and personal growth
Patriarchal values	Post-patriarchal, feminist values
Institutionalized violence	Non-violence
Economic growth and GNP	Sustainability and quality of life
Production for exchange and profit	Production for use
High income differentials	Low income differentials
A ‘free-market’ economy	Local production for local need
Ever-expanding world trade	Self-reliance
Demand stimulation	Voluntary simplicity
Employment as a means to an end	Work as an end in itself
Capital-intensive production	Labour-intensive production
Unquestioning acceptance of the technological fix	Discriminating use and development of science and technology
Centralization, economies of scale	Decentralization, human scale
Hierarchical structure	Non-hierarchical structure
Dependence upon experts	Participative involvement
Representative democracy	Direct democracy
Emphasis on law and order	Libertarianism
Sovereignty of nation state	Internationalism and global solidarity
Domination over nature	Harmony with nature
Environmentalism	Ecology
Environment managed as a resource	Resources regarded as strictly finite
Nuclear power	Renewable sources of energy
High energy, high consumption	Low energy, low consumption

Source: Porritt (1984: 216–17).

Though the green movement expresses “broad visions of future Green societies” such as the one above, typically, Naess writes: “Personally, I envision deep cultural differences existing among Green societies in different parts of the world...”. (Naess, 1993a, pp. 219-220). The deep ecology movement exists in many different countries, with different traditions and different political systems; and there will always be differences necessitating compromise between fundamentalist and pragmatist positions in Green parties – fundamentalists will take a hard line on ecological issues; pragmatists will be willing to consider compromises which tend to support social justice (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 450-451). Besides, “The blueprints of green societies have so far been the work of industrial Westerners, a rather specialized fragment of humanity ...” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 95).

## 6.2 The critique of western-style techno-industrial production and consumption ideology

Supporters of the deep ecology movement critique the western-style techno-industrial ideology of production and consumption, which equates a society with its economy, and development with economic growth (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 429-431) [6.2.1]. Despite the ecological and humanitarian failure of the development concept, demand for development continues [6.2.2 to 6.2.3]. Deep ecology adherents are critical of techno-industrialist development’s ultimate values, which appear to confuse satisfying vital needs with consumerism. They deplore its increasingly global

cultural hegemony, and support alternative forms of development [6.2.4]. They vary from sceptical to cautiously hopeful in their assessments of sustainable development [6.2.5].

### 6.2.1 Progress, economic growth, and development as synonyms

‘Development’ was first conceptualised by USA President Truman as a great race by the world’s societies towards civilization. Defined as increased productivity, it became an American export to the rest of the world (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 429-430). A combination of technology and industry is seen by many ‘underdeveloped’/developing societies as delivering the increased national productivity needed to “catch up”. In the ideology of industrialism, growth, progress, and development are practically synonyms, as in Barry Commoner’s comment [from ‘Making peace with the planet’] (1990) cited in Sessions, 1995c, p. 98]: “...if humanity must give up progress, economic growth, and development – give up the modern world – to end its war against nature<sup>66</sup> and make peace with the planet, it would be a tragic defeat”. On this view, “... all growth is good growth and ... more growth is always better” (Capra, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 23). But industry-led progress comes at a price.

### 6.2.2 The “right” to techno-industrial development,

The 1992 Rio Conference was all about reconciling various factions’ demands for ecologically re-oriented societies, including environmental protection, with other factions’ demand for development. These latter demands emanated from both northern industrial concerns bent on continued economic growth and ‘underdeveloped’ countries demanding a “right to development” (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 428-429). Developing countries in pre-Rio meetings, demanded that environmental concerns be brought “in line with the imperatives of economic growth and development” (Sachs, in Sessions, p. 431).

### 6.2.3 ... despite its ecological and humanitarian failure

The Rio Declaration, writes Sachs, “ceremoniously emphasized the sacredness of development” and only thereafter considered the environmental needs of present and future human generations (Sachs, in Sessions, p. 428). Deep ecologist McLaughlin notes the “massive disruptions of ecological processes” industrialism requires for its ordinary functioning, its routine destruction of species and ecosystems, its current global disruption of climate<sup>67</sup> (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 85 and footnote 1 on p. 92). Societies refuse to accept the planet’s biological limitations (Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 16), or, as Sachs phrases it, to “live graciously within their means” (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, p. 429).

Apart from its environmental destruction, the mainstream development model has not eradicated poverty, but led to an increasing gap between haves and have nots. “The best one can say is that development has created a global middle class of individuals with cars, bank accounts, and career aspirations. It is made up of the majority in the North and small elites in the South...” (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 430-431). Since its discovery in the late 1940s, “development” has been re-invented several times to address its own failures – aid, with and without strings attached, “trade not aid”; hard, then soft technology transfer; human resource development, later called “capacity building” and “empowerment”; social development; rural development, and most recently, “sustainable development” (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, p. 433), which deep ecologists view with caution [section 6.2.5].

<sup>66</sup> Berry (1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 14) sees industrialism as “the ultimate expression of patriarchal dominance over the entire planetary process”. He identifies four basic “patriarchal oppressions”: “rulers over people, men over women, possessors over nonpossessors, and humans over nature”. This particular citation seems to refer to at least one of these patriarchal oppressions

<sup>67</sup> BBC World, in July 2006, for example, aired a disturbing programme about “global dimming”, and its intermingled, opposite effects to global warming. Scientists now agree, it claimed, that the failure of the monsoon in the 1980s, which caused millions of deaths in the Sahel, was caused by global dimming...

## 6.2.4 Techno-industrial definitions of development rest on materialism as value

The production and consumption ideology focuses on satisfaction of wants and desires rather than basic needs. Thomas Berry claims that “extravagant modes of commercial advertising” on an industrial scale have helped “to create new so-called needs and entice new customers to increase their material consumption” (Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 3, p. 9; Naess, 1989a, p. 25). The consumerism inherent in industrialism denies the distinction between vital needs and consumer wants. “There is a real difference between an Eskimo’s wearing the skin of a seal and one worn for social status in an affluent society .... Making the distinction opens to the possibility of more enduring forms of happiness and joy” (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 87, sentence order inverted). Nor is “green consumerism” sufficient, if it has not been accompanied by a questioning and rejection of a high-consumption lifestyle (Sessions, 1994, p. 214).

### 6.2.4.1 *Experiential Quality of Life advocated rather than high material Standard of Living*

Deep ecologists decry the “spiritual and psychic degradation” of human beings in industrial society. Former “spiritual, aesthetic, emotional and religious values” guiding the human-nature relationship have been replaced by money and utility values. Nature has no value until it is possessed and used by human beings (Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 12, and 13). While the Deep Ecology platform makes no direct statement on consumerism, many of its supporters choose a voluntary simplicity lifestyle [section 7.5], which they feel is more conducive than materialism to a life of quality.

Quality of life, though, is a difficult concept to describe, hence the “... vague, general suggestion ... made in point 7” of the platform: “The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of intrinsic value) rather than adhering to a high standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.” Naess is unapologetic about some economists’ criticism of the vagueness of the term “quality of life”. He thinks their criticism stems from the impossibility of quantifying the unquantifiable. “One cannot quantify adequately what is important for the quality of life..., and there is no need to do so.” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 70). But elsewhere he does suggest that, *inter alia*, some of its “fundamental aspects” are “... economic security, absence of stressful work, and lots of time for meaningful togetherness bridging the generations” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 94). I think one could also add, Naess’s vision of the benefits of long-term population reduction and stabilization [6.4.2].

Is spiritual change involved? Possibly, but not necessarily. Certainly, many supporters of deep ecology do act from spiritual motives. But although “...there need not necessarily be a shift towards spirituality when people attain a higher life quality combined with a stable or lower standard of living, the members of a community with good, intimate inter-personal relations may find that they use more time together in a relaxed way instead of ‘going shopping’. ... We, the rich, are poor in deep satisfactions requiring simple means ...” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 93). Important for Naess though, is that the spirit of this deep ideological, and/or spiritual change from “more” to “enough”, should be joyful, not grudging. “As long as environmentalism seems to require only denial and sacrifice, its political effectiveness will be limited” is McLaughlin’s opinion (1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 89).

### 6.2.4.2 *The impossibility, and undesirability, of globalizing western-style techno-industrialism*

Deep ecologists argue that developing nations should be helped to avoid the ecological and ideological pitfalls of western techno-industrialism (Naess, 1989a, p. 33).

They consistently note that from a resource point of view, the high material standard of living of western techno-industrial culture is not universalizable to all countries of the world. On ecological grounds, all countries should not seek to emulate, as seems to be their tendency, the “economic growth and development” path (Naess, written 1991, published 1995c, in Sessions, 1995, p. 403). Yet the Rio

documents “make clear that the South has no intention of abandoning the Northern model of living as its implicit utopia<sup>68</sup>.” (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, p. 432). Namibia is no exception: “The goal of our Vision [2030] is to improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their counterparts in the developed world, by 2030.” (Republic of Namibia, Office of the President, 2004, Foreword, p. 9). “Southern elites”, Sachs (in Sessions, 1995, p. 433) notes, “often justify their unmitigated pursuit of development<sup>69</sup> by ritual reference to the persistence of poverty, cultivating the worn-out dogma that growth is the recipe against poverty. Locked in their interests of power and fixed on the lifestyle of the affluent, they fend off the insight that securing livelihoods requires a careful handling of growth...”. This of course plays into the hands of growth-pursuing Northern governments and businesses, which eagerly export “cleaner technology” to ‘underdeveloped’ countries to manage/reduce the excesses of their burgeoning industrialism. On the waste side of the equation, carbon-dioxide emission credits trading between North and South becomes a market opportunity too.

Deep ecologists deplore the destruction of the hitherto often non-material values of indigenous cultures which accompanies the increasing global hegemony of western-style techno-industrialism. One of the most “insidious” effects of development has been “the dissolution of cultures ... not built around a frenzy of accumulation...[and] the gradual subordination of ever more aspects of social life under the rule of the economy” (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, p. 430).

For both ecological and ideological reasons, deep ecologists tend to support the alternative types of development meant by the 1980s term “ecodevelopment<sup>70</sup>”, in which the “poor and ‘backward’ countries should not look for the images of their own future in the ‘advanced’, industrialized countries. Rather each of them should look for such images in their own ecology and culture” (Martinussen, 1995, p. 154), or development through “soft” technology [6.3.3.1 below].

#### **6.2.4.3 Ecodevelopment**

Ecodevelopment emphasizes development adapted to particular ecological and cultural circumstances. Some of its features are

- (a) resource development for the satisfaction of basic needs; (b) development of a satisfactory social ecosystem; (c) rational (non-degrading and non-wasteful) use of natural resources in solidarity with future generations; (d) use of alternative environmentally sound production procedures; (e) use of alternative energy sources, in particular of the regional capacity for photosynthesis; (f) development and use of ecotechniques; (g) establishment of a horizontal authority ensuring participation of the population concerned and preventing any plundering of the results of ecodevelopment; (h) preparatory education to create social awareness of ecological values in development. (Bartelmus, 1986, p. 46).

The same kinds of ideas are found in Galtung’s “beta” technology-in-society [6.3.3.1].

#### **6.2.5 Sceptical, to cautiously hopeful, views on sustainable development**

On the whole, supporters of deep ecology are wary of the sustainable development concept, which argues that natural resources must be used efficiently, if sustainable economic growth is to be maintained. For example, social ecologist Barry Commoner, on Lewis’s view (1993, no page given, in Sessions, 1995, p. 98), suggests that “... the environmental crisis is not an ecological problem but a social and political problem...”. The challenge of environmentalism is to find ways of managing economic growth, not to change value-systems (Sessions, 1995c, p. 98, drawing on Lewis, 1993).

<sup>68</sup> Geographically-Northern but developing countries such as India and China are also following the same energy-hungry approach to development

<sup>69</sup> “If their lifestyle does not change, the rich power elites in poor countries will [also] be judged ecological and ethical misfits” (Naess, 1990, p. 95)

<sup>70</sup> As for example, developed by Ignacy Sachs (1974) (Bartelmus, 1986, p. 46; Martinussen, 1995, p. 154; W. Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, p. 440). There are similarities between Ignacy Sachs’ ecodevelopment and Galtung’s “beta” approach to development and technology [section 6.3.4.1]

“Shallow” environmentalists “... have no intrinsic objection to industrialism, but only to its excesses...” (Lal, 2000, p. 153). Governments and businesses have turned to scientific, economic and managerial expertise to deal with the environmental crisis, thus in Sachs’s view, locking “the perception of the ecological predicament into the very world-view which stimulates ... [its] pernicious dynamics” (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, p. 429). Scientists and economists look for the most efficient ways to maximise natural resource input and minimise waste output in relation to goods produced. Agenda 21 is packed with managerial and environmental economic phrases such as “integrated approach”, “rational use”, “sound management”, and “internalising costs” (Sachs, in Sessions, pp. 435-436). In Sachs’s view, sustainable development has “emasculate[d] the environmental challenge by absorbing it ...” into developmentalist assumptions (in Sessions, 1995, p. 433). It calls for “the conservation of development, not for the conservation of nature.” (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, p. 434). Worster (1993, in Sessions, 1995) shares Sachs’ concerns.

Naess is more hopeful. In so far as “sustainable development” represents a move away from notions such as “economic development”, “economic growth”, and “development”, it should “be greeted with joy and expectation” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 96). He hoped it would develop further into ‘ecological development’, and then long-range ‘ecosophical development’<sup>71</sup>, – with an emphasis on the need for wisdom (*sophia*) as much as on the need for science and technology. ... any model of ecologically sustainable development must suggest ways to avoid furthering the thoughtless destruction of cultures, or the dissemination of the belief in a glorious, meaningless life<sup>72</sup>.” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 87). Development is only sustainable, he suggests, if it meets the deep ecological requirement for wide ecological sustainability described in section 5.4.3.

## 6.3 Some deep ecology economic issues

Supporters of the deep ecology movement have something to say on almost every economic topic. The setting aside of large areas of free nature from human techno-industrial progress has already been discussed in section 4.1.4 above. Here I discuss briefly, [6.3.1] the commonly-held view on the limitations of GNP/GDP<sup>73</sup> as indicator of sustainability; and the deep and shallow positions on pollution [6.3.2], and resource use [6.3.3]. These tend to reflect the “deep” ecological demand for changes in worldview to deal with environmental problems, rather than the “shallow” or reform environmentalism demand for improved technology (Naess, 1989a, p. 96), greater efficiency in resource use, and implementation of legislation and agreements to deal with, for example, pollution, species annihilation, nuclear weapon proliferation, and protection against rainforest and wetland destruction. While these all have an important place in dealing with environmental problems, they do not question the underlying ultimate premises which produce these environmental effects. Only a “revolution in humanity’s understanding of itself and its place within nature” will halt environmental degradation (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 142). I also note views on technology [6.3.4], work [6.3.5], and agriculture [6.3.6]. These themes are found again in the West German green movement critique of industrial society.

### 6.3.1 The critique of GNP as indicator

Naess (1989a, pp. 110-116) is critical of GNP, on primarily, but not only, philosophical grounds: it is an indicator of progress towards a higher material standard of living, rather than of dwelling in situations of inherent value. Amongst his arguments are that GNP is not a measure of welfare, but of economic growth; it favours hard and distant, rather than softer, alternative technologies; it favours

<sup>71</sup> He also calls these concepts ‘ecologically sustainable development’ or ‘ecosophically sustainable development’ (Naess, 1990, p. 87)

<sup>72</sup> Naess is referring here to his belief that non-industrial cultures, unlike industrial cultures, “insist upon the meaningfulness of life” (1990, p. 87)

<sup>73</sup> Gross National Product [GNP] is obtained from Gross Domestic Product [GDP] by adding in net income from abroad (van Dieren, 1995, p. 67)

wants not needs; it discriminates against people working at home; it supports irresponsible and “unsolidaric”<sup>74</sup> resource consumption and global pollution (1989a, pp. 110-114).

Critiquing GNP as indicator is a “green” characteristic (Porrirt’s (1984, pp. 216-217) indicators of an industrial vis-a-vis a green society, section 6.1, Figure 5). Porrirt inter alia, parodies it as indicator of “Gross National Pollution” (1984, p. 47), criticizes it for counting as positive economic growth, the costs of managing the increasingly detrimental social and environmental costs of industrial production, and for not measuring increase in wellbeing. Ecological economists critique it on similar grounds [Chapter Nine, 3.4.2]: it reflects economic growth, not welfare, a concept which includes difficult quantifiables such as work quality, amount of leisure time available, and personal security. Crucially, they argue, in the context of the global natural environment, GNP does not accurately reflect the real costs of using natural resource inputs, of absorbing waste products from the production and consumption process, or of diminishing environmental function capability (Van Dieren, 1995, pp. 207-208).

### 6.3.2 Pollution, and natural resource use

Shallow ecology tends towards adopting technology to reduce and control pollution, promulgating laws<sup>75</sup> to control emissions, financing research to breed pesticide-resistant crop/animal strains, and even exporting polluting industries to countries where environmental standards are lower. It regards resources as resources-for-humans, there for those who have the technology to exploit them, and preferably for the present generation [as the assumptions implicit in the practice of discounting [Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.4, 3.4.3.5) suggest]. Market mechanisms are expected to ensure a maximally efficient path of resource depletion, because as resources become scarcer, prices will rise. More advanced technology is expected to find substitutes for the most needed resources, should they become too expensive for profitability (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 71-72).

Deep ecology supporters are concerned about both the overuse of energy, and its origin in non-renewable resources: There is not an energy crisis – “we have more than enough energy” - the problem is rather “a crisis of consumption” (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 28). The “long-range sustainable global policy must be that of worldwide stabilization and reduction of the use of energy and, in particular, energy which is derived from nonrenewable resources” (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 450).

But within their concerns about pollution and resource depletion, deep ecologists caution against fighting these to the detriment of the other principles of the Deep Ecology movement. Ecologically responsible policies are concerned only in part with pollution and resource depletion. Both must be seen within the wider ecological perspective of diversity, complexity, autonomy, symbiosis, and egalitarianism. Resources and habitats are there for all life forms, *for their own sake*; they cannot be conceptualized as having instrumental value for humans only, particularly if they are serving high standards of living and consumerism. There are other ethical implications too. Pollution control measures should not put the price of the goods and services concerned beyond the reach of the poor. Third and Fourth World countries cannot afford to pay the price of pollution control, so that exporting polluting industries there is a crime against all life forms. Such approaches compromise the total Deep Ecology package. Supporters should not work narrowly towards eliminating resource depletion, and reducing pollution, but retain the wider, deeper, long-term perspective (Naess, 1973a, p. 95; Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 71-72; Naess, 1989a, p. 139, 1995a, pp. 210-211).

---

<sup>74</sup> This is a reference to the impossibility of extending the western high, wasteful, material standard of living to all Third World societies [6.2.4.2]

<sup>75</sup> But there is some agreement between reform and radical environmentalist positions in the area of legislation and enforcement: “... for the future we may envision global institutions with some power not only to criticize certain states or companies but also to implement certain measures against states which violate the rules...” (Naess, 1989a, p. 139, writing on pollution)

### 6.3.3 Technology

Deep ecology is often associated with an anti-technology [thus, practically, anti-development] stance in principle, but the critique of technology and technocracy in development is far more nuanced than that. Its central concern is for a reviewed, and revised, relationship between technology and nature, between technology and culture, and between technology and the human being, both as individual and within his/her local community.

Technology is not culture-neutral (Naess, 1989a, pp. 93-96). Western culture is “is the only one in the history of mankind in which the culture has adjusted itself to the technology”, instead of vice versa (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 32; Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 73). In leading western industrial states, the “height of technical development is primarily judged... in terms of how the techniques can be assimilated in the economies of these states” (Naess, 1989a, p. 102) - a comment to be placed within the critique of how western industrial society increasingly equates its culture with its economy. While western cultures adjust their culture in accordance with where technology leads [technological determinism], other civilizations have been, or are, careful to adjust the latest technology to their cultural values and social goals. Techniques and technology need to be culturally, not simply economically, evaluated. Naess suggests some relevant questions to ask in this regard (1989a, pp. 95-96). They concern both human wellbeing matters such as risk of increased alienation between worker and product, and technological expertise-induced disparity in the workplace, and human-nature matters, for example, what is the new technology’s resource use intensity and pollution<sup>76</sup> risk?

There is an almost blind faith in technology to deal with the negative environmental effects of western-style industrialism (Naess, 1989a, pp. 96-97); changes in environmental consciousness, or the economic system are not presupposed. “This ... is one of the pillars of the shallow ecological movement” (Naess, 1989a, p. 96). But more such technology simply distances us more from nature: “When a technique is replaced by another which requires more attention, education, and is otherwise more ... detached, the contact with the medium or milieu in which the technique acts is diminished. To the extent that this medium is *nature*, the engagement in nature is reduced in favour of engagement in the technology. The degree of inattentiveness or apathy increases and thus our awareness of the changes in nature caused by the technique decreases” (Naess, 1989a, p. 103, his italics). Alienation from nature, as well as from meaningful, “intrinsic value” work, are not the only price tags of increasing technological sophistication.

#### 6.3.3.1 Soft technology, and development

Such industrial [“hard”] technology usually leads to more concern with means than ends, more centralization, more homogenisation, more bigness, more dependence on non-local markets. Instead, Naess echoes green movement “prophet”<sup>77</sup> Schumacher’s (1973) commitment to intermediate technology [Naess calls it “ecosophically sane technology” (1989a, p. 98)]. Like Schumacher, Naess criticizes industrial mass production: “The technology of mass production is in itself violent, ecologically harmful, ultimately self-destructive in its consumption of non-renewable resources and stupefying for the human person”. Supporters of deep ecology see decentralization, differentiation, and “soft” technology<sup>78</sup> not only as a way to reduce excessive interference in nature, but also “as a means to increased local autonomy and, ultimately, as a means to unfolding the rich potentialities of the human person” (Naess, 1989a, p. 97, p. 98).

---

<sup>76</sup> The problem of dealing with waste from nuclear energy plants has for example not yet been solved

<sup>77</sup> Capra and Spretnak’s description (1984, p. 171)

<sup>78</sup> They are aware of the usual mainstream economic fears: reduced profitability, reduced material standard of living, unemployment. I do not discuss their counter-arguments here

In discussing the cultural, economic, and technological aspects of “soft” as opposed to “hard” technology [and development], Naess (1989a, pp. 98-99) draws on the work of economist Johan Galtung<sup>79</sup>. I reproduce here the themes in, and Galtung’s descriptions of “beta” [“soft”; “intermediate”] technology, because they are dark-green, that is, *within a fundamentally different, ecological, worldview* [compare them for example, with Porritt’s stocktaking of “green” in Figure 5 above]. Though many of the strategies are today called “green”, they have been removed from the fundamentally different worldview which green demands:

“Food:	try to restore the old system that the food is grown within the horizon – local autarchy; also local preservation and storage; collectivise ground that can be used for food
Clothes:	try to restore patterns of local handicraft: symbiosis with food production
Shelter:	try to restore local building patterns with local materials; collectivise ground that can be used for housing
Medical care:	positive health care: participation, less separation between healthy and ill
Transportation, communication	try to restore patterns of walking, talking, bicycling, more car-free areas, cable TV, local media
Energy	solar/wind/wave/biogas networks
Defence	local defence patterns, non-violent groups
Comprehension	small-size units [similar to Schumacher’s “human” scale] comprehensible by anybody”

Based on deep ecology principles of diversity [section 6.4.1 below], supporters of deep ecology criticize the willy-nilly introduction of “hard” western-type technology into non-industrial countries, when the approach should rather be “soft”, alternative, appropriate technologies, which support or advance, rather than dictate, cultural aims (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 70; Naess, 1989a, pp.92-96). The aims and lifestyles of a non-industrialised society should not be assumed to be the same as those of a western industrial society (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 73). Any non-industrial society antipathy towards western-type, culturally-destructive technology should be heeded (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 73). Naess writes approvingly (1989a, pp. 101-102) of Gandhi’s “green teachings” on development via soft technology: opposition to centralization and urbanisation, pursuit of self-sufficiency, concern to protect spiritual richness as well as to eliminate material destitution.

In summary, the “technological developments in modern industrial societies have resulted in continuous pressures towards a kind of lifestyle repugnant not only to supporters of the deep ecology movement but to those in most alternative movements (Elgin, 1981)” (Naess, 1989a, p. 92).

### 6.3.4 Agriculture

The industrial technology applied in agribusiness infringes the diversity, as well as the excessive interference norms of the deep ecology platform [points 2 and 5]. Large scale monocropping reduces diversity. Large-scale irrigation unduly disturbs ecosystems as increasing amounts of fertilizers are needed to restore soil fertility damaged by increased salinity. Pesticides enter the food chain and destroy non-targeted species. Incorrect tillage methods reduce fertile soil to dust blown away in the wind, eliminating any possibility of habitat, let alone plant or animal speciation. Agriculture should rather take the form of multi-cropping, integrated pest management, and a variety of organic farming

<sup>79</sup> In the work on which Naess draws here, Galtung (1978) explored how an industrial society could make the transition from hard, through “alpha” [less “hard”] to “beta” [soft] technology. Galtung’s thought, which called for a thoroughly different view of the human being from the dominant “Homo *economicus*” view, also influenced the thought of early Die Grünen ideologist, Rudolf Bahro [Chapter Seven]

techniques, which interfere less with natural cycles, and can enhance the fertility of soils (McLaughlin, 1993, p. 88).

### 6.3.5 Meaningful work

In thinking about a quality work situation, Naess applies the ecological principle of connected complexity, not disconnected complicatedness. In the work context, this principle suggests that instead of meaning-less industrial-type workflow practices, where the worker reacts to bits and pieces of a final product which he/she does not see, and with which he/she has no opportunity to build a creative, satisfying relationship, there should be labour understood as “integrated actions in which the whole person is active, not mere reactions” (Naess, 1973a, p. 97). Naess applies the same principle of complexity to how a person may take part in the economy. That is, there should be “an integrated variety of means of living. (Combinations of industrial and agricultural activity, of intellectual and manual work, of specialized and non-specialized occupations, of urban and non-urban activity, of work in city and recreation in nature with recreation in city and work in nature...)” (Naess, 1973a, pp. 97-98).

## 6.4 Social issues in a “green” society

As with economic issues, supporters of deep ecology have something to say on several social issues. Of these, I think the most attention is devoted to the ideological critique of techno-industrial society [6.2 above]. Here are discussed [6.4.1] the inherent value of cultural diversity, [6.4.2] the need to stabilize and reduce human population to protect the diversity of both human cultures, and nonhuman species, and [6.4.3] the dual need to increase genuine local autonomy and strengthen global environmental control.

### 6.4.1 Cultural diversity

Arguments developed in favour of cultural diversity by supporters of deep ecology appear linked to the first three points of the platform (section 1.3.4). Instead of considering non-industrial, low technology societies as somehow backward by western standards (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 73), ecologically-inspired attitudes support diversity in “human ways of life, of cultures, of occupations, of economies” (Naess, 1973a, p. 96). Supporters of deep ecology oppose the “annihilation” of tribes and cultures (1973a, p. 96). Deep cultural diversity, and “marked” cultural pluralism are consistently repeated as norms (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 29; the 1984 platform (section 1.3.4); Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 88), derived for Naess, at least, from his principles of diversity and symbiosis (1973a, pp. 96-97). Development which is sustainable, seeks to maintain cultural diversity (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, pp. 94-95). Ecological egalitarianism also inspires the deep ecology tendency to oppose class in society [also on a global scale, as in “haves” and “have-nots”], and to expressions of solidarity with Third World peoples.

### 6.4.2 Population stabilization and reduction

For Naess I believe, the deeply contentious deep ecology platform position on the necessity of human population stabilization and reduction is derived from his principle of ecological egalitarianism [quoted in section 5.1.1]. But in the context of the deep ecology platform (section 1.3.4), I see it as a conclusion [points 4 and 5, the order is sometimes changed] derived from points 1 to 3:

5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life *requires* a smaller human population.

Because wide agreement on population stabilization and reduction is important for deep ecologists, Naess suggests that the wording of point 4 of the platform “*might*” be softened to something like “It would be better for humans to be fewer, and much better for non-humans” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 218, his italics).

World population is expected to rise from six to nine billion in the next 70 years (Clarke, 2003). Naess criticizes the shallow ecology movement for tending to see overpopulation as a threat mainly in developing<sup>80</sup> countries, while supporting population growth in the rich countries “for short-sighted economic, military or other reasons” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 72). Borders are defended against aliens, regardless of population or economic pressures elsewhere. Population reduction should have the highest priority in the industrial societies (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 73).

Optimum human population figures are discussed without reference to their effects on other life forms. Destruction of habitats is accepted as inevitable, and social relations of animals are ignored (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 73), based on inexplicit premises such as

Premise 1: Nature has no intrinsic value, so we need not have any animals or plants other than those which science or tradition tells us are useful for us. ...

Premise 2: If there is a conflict between the human urge for space for more human settlements and the urge of other species for more territory, humans have a priority and may even reduce the habitats of the others. (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 91).

It is not human population per se, but the size of the human population, and the extent of its interference in nature<sup>81</sup>, which is bringing about the rate of extinction of species that we currently experience, with a consequent lessening of “richness and diversity” in the world (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69, referring to Worldwatch Institute reports on species’ extinctions). Deep ecology critic William Grey (1993, p. 468) notes that “A great deal of hyperbole has been deployed in articulating the claims of deep ecology. It is common, for example, to encounter claims that destructive human activity – and in particular human technology - is threatening life on the planet; that we are disrupting the delicate fabric of the ecosphere, ... Such claims are exaggerated”. But are they? Botkin and Keller (2005), argue that “Human population growth is ...*the* underlying issue of the environment. Much current environmental damage is directly or indirectly the result of the very large number of people on the Earth and our rate of increase” (p. 4, their italics), and “Ultimately, we cannot expect to solve these problems unless we can limit the total number of people on Earth to an amount<sup>82</sup> the environment can sustain...” (p. vi). On 22 May 2005, International Biodiversity Day, the Biodiversity Synthesis Report of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, entitled “Ecosystems and Human Well-being” was released. A reviewer notes that it “concludes that human actions in the last 50 years have changed ecosystems more than any other time in history. It highlights unsustainable patterns of production and consumption resulting in biodiversity loss, and stresses the consequences of this loss, including the collapse of regional fisheries, climate change, pollution and invasive species...” (retrieved 10 June 2005 from [http://www.iisd.ca/media/biodiversity\\_wildlife.htm#international](http://www.iisd.ca/media/biodiversity_wildlife.htm#international) ).

---

<sup>80</sup> Naess makes an interesting point on the use of the term “developing country” – the term should either be avoided or applied to rich countries as well (1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, pp. 87-88; p. 95), because the latter continue to develop along ecologically unsustainable lines

<sup>81</sup> The noninterference, or lesser interference implied here, is not to say that humans should not modify ecosystems; other species do too. It is the nature and extent of the modification and destruction of wild species and ecosystems that is perturbing (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69). “We have already jostled many species out of existence and the near future promises an expansion of such extinctions” (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 87)

<sup>82</sup> They note that estimates of this figure range between 2.5 billion and 40 billion, depending on the quality of life we wish for each human being, including ourselves (p. 3). But 40 billion must surely represent the “Total Use Scenario”, which “envisages the whole surface of the planet being used or manipulated to serve human purposes” (Attfeld, 2003, p. 201), in which free nature no longer exists?

While recognizing that the subject of population management is “a touchy one<sup>83</sup>” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, p. 92), supporters of deep ecology criticize the World Commission on Environment and Development [WCED (Brundtland)] Report for neglecting the issue. “Policies based on expectations of great Earth-saving technological revolutions” to offset the population increase problem are irresponsible (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 93). Because it will take hundreds of years to stabilize and reduce the human population, “interim strategies” need to be developed now (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69). While many do believe that a reduction in human population would be a good thing for both humanity and non-human life, they don’t see how it could happen “within the scope of a decent ethics” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 217; also Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, pp. 91-93). Naess has some thoughts on *how* such reduction could be managed ethically (Naess, 1990, in Engel and Engel, 1990, p. 92).

The long range, deep position on global world population can be summarized as “... a number of people small enough to avoid gigantic bureaucracies and insufferable crowding, with easy access to free nature and spacious room for every activity consistent with ‘live and let live’” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 92). To get there, (1) population decrease is as imperative - if not more so - in the rich, developed nations, as in the poorer countries (2) governments in rich countries should “declare that nothing will be done to *counteract*” any self-emerging tendency towards a lower birth rate (3) “it is of central importance ...that more people outside of the economically richest countries realize that population reduction is compatible with maintaining, or increasing, the overall quality of life”, (4) there should be not only population stabilization but decrease, and (5) the decrease should be “by humane means which do not require a revolution or a dictatorship”; “cruelty and injustice should by all means be avoided” (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 29; Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, pp. 91-93; Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 217-219, his italics).

#### 6.4.2.1 Critique

Again, I present only some examples of critique<sup>84</sup> from other ecology movement groups: first social ecologist Murray Bookchin, then ecofeminist Ariel Salleh.

Social ecologist Murray Bookchin (1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 234-236) accuses deep ecologists of ignorant smugness on the population issue, and is concerned about what might lurk behind the Naess/Sessions’ comment<sup>85</sup> that “...the longer we wait the more drastic will be the measures needed”. He sees the deep ecology position on population stabilization and reduction, as “deep” support for the kind of reactionary Malthusian principles implicit in Social Darwinism. Neo-Malthusianism, argues Bookchin, provided the legitimating ideology for nineteenth and early twentieth century class domination, racism, androcentrism, British imperialism, and fascism, and underpinned the “Zero Population Growth” fanaticism of the 1970s environmental movement, which *inter alia*, demanded that “various ‘underdeveloped’ countries ... be granted or refused aid on the basis of their compliance to population control measures” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 235). As the problem is not insufficient food, but its inequitable distribution, deep ecologists’ position on ‘overpopulation’ really masks a reactionary position. What is needed to deal with population growth, is to expand women’s role in society, to provide all with decent lives, and to establish a sense of “creative meaning” in society (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 236).

While deep ecologist McLaughlin (1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 88) sees ecofeminists as playing an important role in the population debate, *inter alia*, through their struggle against culturally-approved

---

<sup>83</sup> He lists five assumptions or attitudes which make the subject a touchy one - see Naess, 1990, in Engel and Engel, 1990, p. 93

<sup>84</sup> Environmental ethicist Robin Attfield, for example, also considers Deep Ecology’s “advocacy of the goal of a reduced human population” as “highly problematic” (2003, footnote 8, page 26, also further views on population on p. 50, pp. 86-89, and chapter 4)

<sup>85</sup> Even though they note that the governments of India and China, for example, are [were then] debating the types of measures to be taken which are “consistent with human rights and feasibility” (Naess/Sessions, in Devall & Sessions, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 219)

rape/early coerced motherhood, or to transfer to women control over their own fertility via access to pregnancy prevention, and/or safe abortion practices, ecofeminist Ariel Kay Salleh accuses deep ecologists generally who support birth control measures as representative of “the long-standing patriarchal desire to dominate the female reproductive process” (Salleh, 1984, cited in Zimmerman, 1990, p. 146). The deep ecology support for population control “...partakes of the same rationalist and technicist world view that it otherwise critiques” (Lal, 2000, p. 161).

### 6.4.3 Local autonomy, global control

The principle of ecological equilibrium - which develops when a system is not unduly disturbed by outside influences<sup>86</sup> - suggests for deep ecologists that there should be “an impetus towards decentralization”, and “efforts to strengthen local self-government and material and mental self-sufficiency” (Naess, 1973a, p. 98). Long, centralized, hierarchical decision-making chains diminish self-determination for individuals and local cultures, diminish freedom of action, undermine self-sufficiency (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 32-33), and lose sight of local interests. The deep ecology view is that societies should be decentralized, “with small groups in local communities in control of their own resources” (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 32).

#### 6.4.3.1 Bioregionalism, and re-inhabitory communities

Bio-regionalism<sup>87</sup> can trace its roots *inter alia* to Howard Odum’s 1930s school of regionalism (Bramwell, 1994, p. 89). For Odum, regionalism “represents the philosophy and technique of self-help, self-development, and initiative in which each real unit is not only aided in, but is committed to the full development of its own resources and capacities” (Sale, 1985<sup>88</sup>, p. 240, cited in Bramwell, 1994, p. 89).

Bramwell (1994, pp. 87-92) suggests that bio-regionalism is based on two major ideas (1) The earth’s surface can be divided up into areas bounded by natural occurrences, such as “attributes of flora, fauna, water, climate, soils and landforms, and the human settlements and cultures those attributes have given rise to” (Sale, 1985, pp. 226, p. 228, cited in Bramwell, 1994, p. 88). The assumption seems to be that such areas have a natural diversity of resources, and (2) societies “would be happier, more self-sufficient, more diverse, the risk of conflict between people more contained, if they lived in a self-reliant way within these boundaries...” (Bramwell, 1994, p. 87). Self-reliance – which she notes is not as rigorous a demand as pure self-sufficiency, means that trade, with its wasteful use of resources, would be minimized, the bio-region “would be more stable, free from boom and bust cycles and distant political crises; it would be able to plan, to allocate its resources, to develop what it wants to develop at the safest pace, in the most ecological manner...” (Sale, 1985, p. 230, in Bramwell, 1994, p. 88).

A third idea on which Bramwell does not elaborate, but which I think is essential to the concept of bio-regionalism, is that of “dwelling in the land”. “Dwelling” means not owning the land as a piece of weekend real estate, or storehouse of resources, but learning to live *in* it and *with* it: “Bioregionalism means learning to become native to place, fitting ourselves to a particular place, not fitting a place to our predetermined tastes. It is living within the limits and the gifts provided by a place, creating a way of life that can be passed on to future generations” (Plant, 1990, p. 158). The sense of *place* is important in the idea of bioregionalism; one lives in a *particular* place, and with *particular*

<sup>86</sup> Naess phrases my simplification as “The vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the weight of influences from afar, from outside the local region in which that form has obtained an ecological equilibrium.” (Naess, 1973a, p. 98).

<sup>87</sup> Even though no paper on bioregionalism is included in Sessions’ definitive 1995 reader on deep ecology, deep ecologists “favor” the bioregional movement (Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 316; Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995, p. 366, p. 370; Zimmerman, 1990, p. 150). Gary Snyder, co-influential with Naess in formulating deep ecology’s ecocentrism, was also influential in the “bioregional/reinhabitory movement” (Sessions, 1995, p. xxvi, footnote 11). By the late 1970s, Snyder had “developed the foundations for ecocentric bioregionalism” together with ecologist Raymond Dasmann and Peter Berg (Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 316; Plant, 1990, p. 158; Sessions, 1995, p. xii; Zimmerman, 1990, p. 150). Kirkpatrick Sale, another deep ecologist theorist, also explicates bioregionalism as idea (Sessions, 1995, p. xxiii)

<sup>88</sup> Bramwell gives the year as 1984. I have consistently altered her 1984 to 1985

relationships and commitments to its people and landscape. Its “dwellers” have a sense of rootedness in, and kinship with, the place. Bio-regional communities are “...more cohesive, developing a sense of place, of community, of comradeship...” (Sale, 1985, p. 230, in Bramwell, 1994, p. 88).

Finally, a key idea in bioregionalism is the decentralization of power – “moving further and further towards self-governing forms of social organization” (Plant, 1990, p. 160) – a key idea also in the social ecology philosophy, although there, its roots are in Kropotkin’s anarchism (Chapter Five, sections 1, 5).

#### **6.4.3.2 Global institutions**

But sometimes saving the planet involves a choice between local autonomy and global control. Even though many of the ideals of “strong local communities formulated in the sixties and seventies can be retained”, in cases of conflict over ecological sustainability, the policies of local communities “must be controlled by regional and national political authorities” and these in turn, “must be controlled, to a much greater extent, by institutions that are global (and not only international)...” (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 450). Such coercion is justifiable, to attain ecological sustainability (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 448, p. 450; also Naess, 1995c, pp. 403-404).

#### **6.4.4 Peace**

“Typically”, many deep ecology supporters had been active in the peace movement before becoming environmental activists (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 213). Although their work is primarily in the ecology movement, supporters oppose cultural, economic *and* military domination of humans by humans (Naess, 1973a, p. 96), and are against group conflict (1973a, p. 97). The armament race is seen as an expression of industrialised technology, a contravention of the Gandhian-inspired deep ecology commitment to non-violence, and also incompatible “... with a high level of sustainable development” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 95).

### **6.5 Critique**

The Deep Ecology movement has been criticized as a social movement for concentrating on ecological issues and “not being sufficiently concerned with issues of social justice” (Sessions, 1994, p. 213, p. 214).

#### **6.5.1 No social structure critique**

“Bluntly speaking, deep ecology, despite all its social rhetoric, has no real sense that our ecological problems have their roots in society and in social problems”, according to social ecologist Murray Bookchin (1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 229), whose own social structure critique [Chapter Five] focuses on the evils of hierarchy, and the capitalist commodity system. In deep ecology thought, he charges, “Taoist and Buddhist pieties replace the need for social and economic analysis...” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 232).

#### **6.5.2 Guilty of ecological reductionism**

Deep ecology supporters are also guilty of what Bradford (1993, pp. 419-420) calls “ecological reductionism”, that is, they tend to “apply ecological models” to all social questions. But Bradford doubts that an ecological analysis is sufficient to explain all social history, conflict and problems. And social ecologist Bookchin [Chapter Five] flatly rejects what he sees as deep ecology’s reduction of humans from “social beings” to just another species [the “zoologization” of human beings (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 232)].

### 6.5.3 Insufficient attention to social justice issues

Reading the deep ecology literature, one would think, remarks Bradford (1993, pp. 420-421), that all human rights issues had been solved, and all that is now needed, is to extend ethics to include a land ethic. Deep ecologists are unrepentant. They point out that ecological unsustainability is still widely prevalent in industrial societies. Not only that, but development in formerly non-industrialised cultures and societies tends to be conceived by the new leaders, the new elites [as opposed to the traditional leaders, who generally knew how to live sustainably in relation to their natural resources] “as a matter of increase in industrial activity and consumption.” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 94).

Thus, given “the accelerating rate of irreversible ecological destruction worldwide” (Sessions, 1994, p. 225, footnote 18, citing Naess’s 1991 paper “Politics and the ecological crisis, *Revision*, 13(3), also published in Sessions, 1995, pp. 445-453), deep ecologists are justified in continuing to fight ecological unsustainability *wherever* it occurs<sup>89</sup>, even though any given society might not yet have reached its other green goals of peace, and social justice. The aims of the policies, and the activism, required by the deep ecology platform, though skewed toward wide ecological sustainability, are defensible. What deep ecology does in the political arena, is to widen all issues to eco-political issues: “from ‘resources’ to ‘resources for ...’; from ‘life quality’ to ‘life quality for ...’; from ‘consumption’ to ‘consumption for ...’”. Where ‘for...’ is, we insert ‘not only humans, but other living beings’” too (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 452).

## 7. Praxis

Point 8 of the deep ecology platform insists on an obligation towards social and personal change: “8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes”. Some of the ways of meeting this obligation are discussed next:

### 7.1 “Verbalize a total view”

Supporters of deep ecology “have an obligation to verbalize a total view” (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 28). A total view such as deep ecology “can provide a single motivating force for all the activities and movements aimed at saving the planet from human exploitation and domination” (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 28).

### 7.2 Speak out publicly

Part of the attempt to save what is left of the planet is a willingness to question every economic and political policy. Further, a willingness to do so *in public*, to “speak out”, and not remain silent (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 27; Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 66, pp. 75-76; Naess, 1995a (written 1970 revised 1990), in Sessions 1995, pp. 209-212). In environmental debates, there are many who know much about specific conservation issues in particular places, and many who hold strong views on human-environment relations, but there are very few who combine both, or who are prepared to speak out if they do. “When these people are silent, the loss is formidable” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 65).

### 7.3 Co-operate, and communicate

Deep ecology supporters must be flexible enough to co-operate and work together with those who have not yet had a deep-ecology type experience of wider identification with nature, or who work for the

---

<sup>89</sup> Naess calls on the norm of universalizability here – “if ecological sustainability is a necessity for any area, then it is a necessity for all areas” (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 448). This suggests to me for example, that reform environmentalism-like carbon trading could not accord with deep ecological principles

environment from a human interests, short-range point of view, or with environmental institutions and movements which must cater for a wide membership, or those movements, such as the anti-nuclear movement, which deal with related issues. But because deep ecology “involves basic views of man and the world”, it should never forget its fundamental principles, and the programmes flowing from those, such as human population reduction. While co-operating with such people and institutions though, deep ecologists should be “at the same time trying to expand and deepen their views in a new direction” (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 31). The call to mission!

“In the matter of political action”, wrote Naess, “I am very much inspired by the Gandhian approach of maximizing the communication on a friendly footing...” (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 34): friendly person to person contact, canvassing from house to house, disseminating the scientific knowledge we have about the ongoing ecological destruction, for example, or on global climate change, talking to people in language they are familiar with, and reaching out to those who do not necessarily “think like us” (p. 35).

#### **7.4 Direct, non-violent activism**

“There was a high degree of agreement about the need for, and acceptance of, ‘direct actions’ of some sort, and (what to me was a great thing) a clear consciousness about the limitations of the means to be used: nonviolence<sup>90</sup>. ... Reference to nonviolence should perhaps be included in the Eight Points” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 213)

Activism is considered “absolutely crucial” for bringing about the kind of social, political, and ecological changes needed to surmount the ecological crisis (Sessions, 1995e, p. 191). But equally crucially, it is to be non-violent activism. Civil disobedience is also part of deep ecology activism (Langlais, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 196). The close co-operation and mutual respect between the peace, social justice, and ecological activists in the green movement should continue (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 219). There must also be global action – action across borders – to bring about the needed “deep changes” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 70). This global work should preferably be extra-governmental. Negative interference by any government can be avoided, and more accomplished, by working through Non-governmental Organizations [NGO’s], some of which are global, and “grassroots to grassroots” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 70). Greenpeace provides an excellent example.

#### **7.5 Personal lifestyle**

“How important do you feel it is for individuals to practice deep ecology in their own lives?” Bodian asked Naess in 1982. Very, one could summarize his reply there (Naess, 1982a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 35). The lifestyles of deep ecology supporters<sup>91</sup> tend toward “(1) using simple means; (2) anti-consumerism; (3) efforts to satisfy vital needs rather than desires; (4) going for depth and richness of experience rather than intensity; (6) appreciation of ethnic and cultural differences; (7) a concern about the situation of the Third and Fourth Worlds and an attempt to avoid a standard of living too much different from and higher than the needy (global solidarity of life-style); (8) appreciation of life-styles which are universalizable, which are not blatantly impossible to sustain without injustice toward fellow humans or other species; (9) appreciating all life forms; (10) a tendency toward vegetarianism; (11) protecting wild species in conflicts with domestic animals; (12) efforts to protect local ecosystems; and (13) acting nonviolently.” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions 1994, p. 213).

---

<sup>90</sup> Naess’ views on direct non-violent action derive from Gandhi’s metaphysics. If one believes that “every living being is connected intimately”, and one is working towards “wide identification”, it follows that violent action is not an option (Naess, 1988, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 224; see also his reference in 1990, p. 95 to common deep ecology support for Gandhian non-violence)

<sup>91</sup> Naess personally has 25 lifestyle tenets (1984a (revised 1993), in Sessions, 1995, pp. 259 – 261)

## 7.6 What to do first?

“There is ample room for different opinions about priorities ... The frontier of the environmental crisis is long and varied, and there is a place for everyone.” (Naess, 1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 70).

## 8. Summary

I summarize here, not the contents of this chapter, but what I see as the contributing deep ecology ideas to the meaning of “green”, under a **THEME HEADING**, followed by a short description of its deep ecology ideas, and the broad location of those ideas in this chapter. Many of these ideas can be seen in Porritt’s (1984) defining characteristics of the “green paradigm” [Figure 5, paragraph 6.1]:

**WORLDVIEW:** Deep ecology supporters are expected to have clarified for themselves a “total view”, which includes the usual worldview aspects of ontology, epistemology, and ethics, and which centres around a respectful, and harmonious people-planet relationship, completely different from the dominant western worldview [1.3]. This fundamentally different worldview calls at the same time for immediate action and activism.

**LEGITIMATING NARRATIVE:** Anthropocentrism is critiqued as the root cause of our present ecological crisis [2.1; 5.1.1]. The image “machine” is used negatively to portray techno-industrial society, and “network” or “field” positively to convey ontological ideas of relationship. The rhetoric is of resistance, liberation, and salvation [2.2]. A variety of ecocentrically-oriented eastern and western philosophies, religions, spiritual understandings, and “ways of primal peoples” [2.3] legitimate support for the tenets of the deep ecology platform.

**EPISTEMOLOGY:** To a valuing of rational thinking, is added gestalt perception, an idea which accepts that spontaneous, holistic apprehension, emotion, physical feeling, and both-and approaches, all contribute to valid knowledge [3].

### **ONTOLOGY:**

**-View of nature:** Ultimate reality [or nature] is non-dualistic, and comprises gestalts within gestalts, internally related: “everything hangs together”. Nature is seen as living, either in the sense of self-realizing, or in the sense of the capacity to self-direction, self-autonomy. Such capacities constitute nature’s ultimate value [4.1].

**-View of the human being:** Human beings are an inseparable part of nature [4.2]. Through identification with all other life forms [“wide identification”], human beings should strive towards self-realizing into an “ecological self”, which is the definition of the fully mature human being. Human beings growing into full maturity believe implicitly or explicitly in the intrinsic value of non-human life, and in the diversity of life-forms. Their relationships with nature change inevitably from domination, exploitation, and utilitarian management, to respect and harmony. “Male” notions of what it is to be a human being vis-a-vis the Other, are to be balanced with the “feminine principle” [4.2.3.2].

**THE ETHIC:** Gestalt ontology and perception lead to an “informal” ethic of biological [or “ecospherical” or “ecological”] egalitarianism, which is not fully captured in either the biocentrism or ecocentrism of formal environmental ethics. Ecological egalitarianism recognizes the inherent value of all life forms, defined widely to include individual human beings, animals, and plants; collectivities such as cultures, species, and ecosystems, as well as natural entities not usually considered as “life forms”, such as landscapes, mountains and rivers. The aim of the ethic is to achieve “wide ecological sustainability” defined as protection on a global scale of the full richness and diversity of life forms on the planet [5].

- **Animal liberation issues:** Specific attention to animal liberation issues seems underdeveloped, to say the least. Naess excepted, deep ecologists seem to concentrate more on ontological and technical-philosophical critique of the animal liberation movement than they do on promoting animal welfare [5.4.4; Chapter Three, section 8].

## VIEWS ON SOCIAL ISSUES

-**The techno-industrial ideology of production and consumption** is critiqued as equating culture with economy, vital needs with consumerist wants, and high material standard of living (or materialism as value) with quality of life (intrinsic or “spiritual” values), thus destroying nature. Voluntary simplicity is advocated [6.2].

-**“Development”** [“progress”] equated with economic growth critiqued, as is its increasing global hegemony, which is destroying the diversity of the world’s cultures [6.2.4]. Alternative forms of development, such as “ecodevelopment”, including “soft” technology are preferred [6.2.4.3; 6.3.3.1]. ‘Sustainable’ development, if it does not subscribe to “wide ecological sustainability”, is not sustainable [5.4.3, 6.2.5].

-**Science:** Ecology, biology, and particularly conservation biology, provide support for both deep ecology ultimate premises and their socio-political implications. But however normative these scientific disciplines may appear, they must still be considered within the “total view”. Values must guide science, not science guide values [2.4, and 4.1.4.2].

-**Population size:** There should be not only global population stabilization but decrease; the decrease to be achieved through means consistent with human rights and non-violence [6.4.2].

-**Egalitarianism** amongst human beings is supported; there is a dislike of class distinction, including global class distinctions between haves and have-nots [6.4.1].

-**Third World solidarity:** Solidarity with Third World peoples is expressed, along with concern for protection of their cultural diversity; they should not follow the destructive path of western-style techno-industrial development [6.2.4.2].

-**Cultural diversity** valued [6.4.1].

-**Local autonomy, and self-reliance** favoured, including its expression as bioregionalism, re-inhabitory communities [6.4.3].

-**Sense of place** valued [6.4.3.1].

-**Global control institutions** to enforce ecological sustainability envisaged [6.4.3.2].

-**Pacifism** supported [6.4.4].

## VIEWS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

-**GNP** viewed as an indicator of economic growth rather than of “dwelling in situations of inherent value” [6.3.1]

-**Pollution, and natural resource depletion:** Legislation to control waste emissions, greater efficiency in resource use, including use of energy, are critiqued as a shallow, short-term, anthropocentric approach, which disregards ethical implications in relation to the poor peoples of the world, future generations, and nonhuman species. Together with global **energy use reduction**, and **renewable energy use**, “deep” worldview changes are demanded [6.3.2].

-**Technology:** technological determinism, and “hard” technology critiqued; culturally sensitive, ecologically-friendly, “soft” technology advocated [6.3.3].

-**Agriculture:** high-technology agriculture critiqued [6.3.4].

-**Work:** meaningful work demanded [6.3.5].

-**Wilderness and “free nature”:** ontological and axiological views on nature require large areas of wilderness and near-wilderness to be set aside [biospheres, reserves] from excessive human industrial-technological interference to allow for continued evolutionary biodiversity [4.1.4].

**PRAXIS** – forming and verbalizing a total view, lifestyle changes, direct non-violent action, civil disobedience, public “speaking out”; friendly, open communication with opponents are advocated [6].

## CHAPTER FIVE: SOCIAL ECOLOGY

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>134</b>
<b>2. Legitimizing narratives</b>	<b>135</b>
<b>2.1 Philosophy and political philosophy</b>	<b>135</b>
2.1.1 The western dialectical tradition	135
2.1.2 Marxism, and the neo Marxist Frankfurt School	135
2.1.3 The New Left, counter-cultural and eco-utopian ideas	136
2.1.4 Bookchin’s eco-anarchism	137
2.1.4.1 The left-libertarian tradition: Anarchism	137
2.1.4.2 Radical ecology	138
2.1.4.2.1 Radical ecology, not mystical ecology, or environmentalism	139
2.1.5 The need for a “left green perspective”	140
<b>2.2 Key thesis on environmental crisis</b>	<b>140</b>
<b>2.3 The rhetoric</b>	<b>140</b>
2.3.1 Preconditions for, and conditions of, freedom	140
<b>3. Epistemology</b>	<b>141</b>
<b>3.1 Affirmation of Enlightenment ideal of reason</b>	<b>141</b>
<b>3.2 The critique of instrumental rationalism</b>	<b>141</b>
<b>3.3 Dialectical reasoning</b>	<b>142</b>
<b>3.4 Dialectical naturalism as epistemology</b>	<b>143</b>
<b>4. Ontology</b>	<b>144</b>
<b>4.1 “First nature”</b>	<b>144</b>
4.1.1 Nature as a developmental graded continuum	144
4.1.2 Cosmos as organism with immanent mind	145
4.1.3 Cosmos as organism, displaying <i>nisus</i>	145
4.1.3.1 The emergence of subjectivity [self-identity]	145
4.1.3.2 Self-transformation and self-development	146
4.1.3.3 Increasing self-determination as “potentiality for freedom”	146
4.1.3.4 “Rational” and “irrational” development	146
<b>4.2 “Second nature”</b>	<b>147</b>
4.2.1 Relation of “second” to “first nature”	147
4.2.1.1. Human beings, and their societies, are as “natural” as nature	147
4.2.1.2 But human beings have a unique place in evolution	148
4.2.2 Second nature gone wrong	148
4.2.2.1 Social egalitarianism in early second nature	148
4.2.2.2 The evolution of social hierarchy	148
4.2.2.3 The idea of dominating nature	150
4.2.2.4 Integrating second nature with first nature	151
<b>4.3 “Free” nature</b>	<b>152</b>
4.3.1 View of the rational free, human being	153

<b>5. The ethic</b>	<b>154</b>
<b>5.1 The theory of motivation to ethical behaviour</b>	<b>155</b>
<b>5.2 The theory of value</b>	<b>155</b>
5.2.1 The special status of diversity as value	156
5.2.1.1 Diversity and stability	156
5.2.1.2. Diversity and freedom	156
5.2.1.3 Diversity and social progress	156
<b>5.3 The scope</b>	<b>157</b>
<b>5.4 The moral obligation: an ethic of complementarity</b>	<b>157</b>
5.4.1 Clarification of acceptable human intervention into first nature	158
5.4.2 Is the ethic of complementarity, anthropocentric?	158
5.4.2.1 Dualistic?	159
5.4.2.2 Transcendent?	159
5.4.2.3 Steering the direction of evolution?	159
5.4.2.4 Not the more familiar kind of anthropocentrism	160
5.4.2.5 But a rather interfering kind of stewardship, nonetheless	160
5.4.3 The animal welfare issue	161
<b>6. View of society</b>	<b>161</b>
<b>6.1 The critique of existing society</b>	<b>162</b>
6.1.1 Power	162
6.1.1.1 and the nation-state	162
6.1.2 Capitalism as economy and culture	163
<b>6.2 Scarcity, technology, and post-scarcity</b>	<b>164</b>
<b>6.3 The ecological rational [free] society</b>	<b>166</b>
6.3.1 Decentralization as human scale, communitarian, eco-communities	166
6.3.1.1 Understanding the “flight to the suburbs”	166
6.3.1.2 “Real” communities	167
6.3.1.3 Human scale: industry and agriculture as examples	167
6.3.1.4 The eco-community	167
6.3.1.5 Direct democracy	168
6.3.1.6 New dimensions in self-development	168
6.3.2 Decentralization as comprehensive local self-management	168
6.3.2.1 The community’s “neighbourhood assembly”	169
6.3.2.1.1. Citizenship	169
6.3.2.2 The municipalization of the economy	170
6.3.2.3 Confederalism	170
6.3.2.4 The transition from statism to libertarian municipalism	170
<b>7. Praxis</b>	<b>171</b>
<b>7.1 Political restructuring, not personal change</b>	<b>171</b>
<b>7.2 Avoid statist political practices</b>	<b>172</b>
<b>7.3 Create neighbourhood assemblies</b>	<b>172</b>
<b>8. Critique</b>	<b>172</b>
<b>8.1 The deep ecology/social ecology debate</b>	<b>172</b>



<b>8.2 The idea of hierarchy and domination is insufficient to explain “ecocide”</b>	<b>173</b>
<b>8.3 Insufficient attention to language</b>	<b>174</b>
<b>9. Summary</b>	<b>175</b>

## 1. Introduction

“The way human beings deal with each other as social beings is crucial to addressing the ecological crisis”  
(Murray Bookchin, social ecologist, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 354)

Social ecology is amongst the earliest of the three radical eco-philosophies, formulated over five decades<sup>1</sup> from the 1950s onwards, by its founder, and most influential proponent (Clark, 1993, p. 345, in Zimmerman et al., 1993; Gruen, 1997, p. 357; Wall, 1994, p. 251), American left libertarian socialist and political philosopher Murray Bookchin (Biehl, 1997a). His critique of chemicals in agriculture appeared in 1952 under the pseudonym Lewis Herber (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 258, footnote 17), and his environmental critique *Our Synthetic Environment* (1962) briefly predated Rachel Carson’s *Silent Spring* critique of the USA chemical industry, usually taken as the beginning of the “ecological revolution”. In 1971<sup>2</sup>, he co-founded the Institute for Social Ecology (<http://www.social-ecology.org>) in Vermont, USA. Apart from being a philosopher of nature, Bookchin is also steeped in the communitarian anarchist and utopian traditions (Clark, 1993, p. 351). His philosophical writings are by no means easily understandable<sup>3</sup>.

Bookchin (1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 236-237, his italics) has provided a helpful synopsis of the social ecology position [which included a jibe at deep ecologists generally as well]:

Social ecology is neither “deep”, “tall”, “fat” nor “thick”. It is *social*. It does not fall back on incantations, sutras, flow diagrams or spiritual vagaries. It is avowedly *rational*. It does not try to regale metaphorical forms of spiritual mechanism and crude biologism with Taoist, Buddhist, Christian, or shamanistic eco-babble. It is a coherent form of *naturalism* that looks to *evolution* and the *biosphere*, not to deities in the sky or under the earth for quasi-religious and supernaturalistic explanations of natural and social phenomena.

*Philosophically*, social ecology stems from a solid organismic tradition in Western philosophy, beginning with Heraclitus, the near-evolutionary dialectic of Aristotle and Hegel, and the critical approach of the famous Frankfurt School...

*Socially*, it is revolutionary, not merely ‘radical’. It critically unmask the entire evolution of hierarchy in all its forms, ... It is rooted in the profound eco-anarchistic analyses of Peter Kropotkin, the radical economic insights of Karl Marx, the emancipatory promise of the revolutionary Enlightenment ... .. revolutionary feminist ideals ... , ... communitarian visions<sup>4</sup> ... , and the various eco-revolutionary manifestoes of the early 1960s<sup>5</sup>.

*Politically*, it is *green* – radically green. It takes its stand with the left-wing tendencies in the German Greens and extra-parliamentary street movements of European cities; with the American radical ecofeminist movement....

*Morally*, it is *humanistic* in the high Renaissance meaning of the term...Humanism from its inception has

<sup>1</sup> The volume of Bookchin’s writing is considerable. “A thorough understanding of ... [Bookchin’s] project would require a reading of his most important books” writes Biehl (1997a, p. 11). These she lists as inter alia, *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (1971), *The Ecology of Freedom* (1982), *Remaking Society* (1989), *The Philosophy of Social Ecology* (especially the revised 1995 edition), and *Re-enchanting Humanity* (1995). Major excerpts from many of these are available in the Biehl (1997) reader on Bookchin. Some of Bookchin’s writings are also available in the Institute of Social Ecology’s online library at <http://www.social-ecology.org>

<sup>2</sup> According to Tokar (2006), it was 1974

<sup>3</sup> As he says himself “The ontological complexities that my assertions involve require a careful ... reading of my work ...” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 269). In discussing an ontological approach to ethics, Bookchin noted that: “If understanding this is too much to ask of people, then I simply do not know what to say. Admittedly, I ask for a great deal but I do not ask for what is impossible or unachievable”. (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992). My struggle to understand Bookchin is not solely due to lack of philosophical training. Simon (1990) also has to resort to phrases such as “I take this to mean...” (p. 222), and “This passage has proven to be very difficult to interpret...” (p. 223). Bookchin accuses those finding him difficult to understand, of not doing “the difficult intellectual work needed to understand his formulations” (Simon, 1990, p. 223)

<sup>4</sup> In this citation Bookchin mentions Paul Goodman and E.A. Gutkind. In his 1991 debate with deep ecologist Dave Foreman, Bookchin adds Lewis Mumford (Bookchin, in Chase, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 245)

<sup>5</sup> One of these was his own *Ecology and revolutionary thought*, 1964, under the pseudonym Lewis Herber, republished in his *Post-scarcity anarchism* (1974, pp. 55-82)

meant a shift in vision from the skies to the earth, from superstition to reason, from deities to people...Social ecology accepts neither a 'biocentricity' that essentially denies or degrades the uniqueness of human beings, human subjectivity, rationality, aesthetic sensibility, and the ethical potentiality of humanity, nor an 'anthropocentricity' that confers on the privileged few the right to plunder the world of life, including human life.....

The discussion which follows, adheres to the standard form set out in Chapter Two. Section 2 is an introduction to Bookchin's political philosophical background as legitimating narrative; 3, his epistemology; 4, ontology; 5, ethic; 6, view of society; and 7, praxis advocated. Section 8 contains critique from green sample partners, and 9, a summary of social ecology's ideas as presented in this chapter.

As preparation for the chapter, Bookchin's concept "nature" means simultaneously biological evolution ["first nature"], and human and social evolution ["second nature"]. The concept "free nature" represents the ideal ecological society.

## 2. Legitimizing narratives

Bookchin's political philosophy draws critically on Hegelian dialectics (2.1.1), and Marxism and neo-Marxism (2.1.2). He seems to have contributed as much, if not more, to the counterculture and the New Left, as he drew on it (2.1.3). He synthesised a new left libertarian political philosophy from a combination of traditional anarchism and ecology interpreted radically (2.1.4), and emphasized the need for a left libertarian green perspective in real world politics (2.1.5).

### 2.1 Philosophy and political philosophy

#### 2.1.1 The western dialectical tradition

Bookchin's social and political approach is grounded in the western dialectical tradition of Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx. On his view, this tradition offers the possibility of an objective knowledge and ethic, unlike the relativism of postmodernism (Biehl, 1997e, pp. 197-198). Without being either "Hegelian" or "neo-Hegelian", Bookchin drew on Hegel's interpretation of dialectics, while considering its culmination in a cosmic Spirit ["Geist"] or "Absolute" which is "perfect" in its fullness, wholeness, and unity<sup>6</sup> as unacceptable (Bookchin, 1990b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 211). "What I have tried to rescue from the Hegelian dialectic is a sense of potentiality and 'rational necessity', which means, not an unswerving determinism or teleology, but a recognition of the *logic* of a given, ever-developing situation" (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992, his italics). Marx's dialectical materialism was for Bookchin, too "wooden" and "mechanis[tic]" (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 267), and also unacceptable. He developed his own variant, which he called dialectical naturalism [section 3.2].

#### 2.1.2 Marxism, and the neo Marxist Frankfurt School

In the political spectrum, Bookchin distanced himself from Marxism (Tokar, 2006). But while critical of Marxism, he never broke completely with all its basic ideas, incorporating some of it into his social ecology, such as its theory of capitalist development, its theory of the commodity and "the notion that

---

<sup>6</sup> More fully, Bookchin explains his objections as "We may reject what Hegel called his "absolute idealism," the transition from his logic to his philosophy of nature, his teleological culmination of the subjective and objective in a godlike 'Absolute', and his idea of a cosmic Spirit (*Geist*). Hegel rarefied dialectical reason into a cosmological system that verged on the theological by trying to reconcile it with idealism, absolute knowledge, and a mystical unfolding *logos* that he often designated 'God.' Unfamiliar with ecology, Hegel rejected natural evolution as a viable theory in favor of a static hierarchy of Being. By the same token, Friedrich Engels intermingled dialectical reason with natural 'laws' that more closely resemble the premises of nineteenth-century physics than a plastic metaphysics or an organismic outlook, producing a crude dialectical materialism. Indeed, so enamored was Engels of matter and motion as the irreducible 'attributes' of Being that a kineticism based on mere motion invaded his dialectic of organic development." (Bookchin, 1990b, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 208-209)

complete freedom has material preconditions.” (Biehl, 1997a, p. 4; Biehl, 1997c, pp. 122-124). He rejected Marxism’s argument for the necessity of hierarchical relationships, authoritarianism and domination [including the domination of nature, as necessary precondition for human liberation], the creation of a centralized socialist state, and class analysis as an all-encompassing mode of social critique (Biehl, 1997c, p. 123). He was also “a sharp critic of vulgar Marxism’s economic determinism ...” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 263).

The Frankfurt School<sup>7</sup> was a group of philosophers, cultural critics, social scientists and writers associated with the Institute for Social Research, founded in Frankfurt in 1929. Their project was a critical social theory revision of Marx’s historical materialism (Audi, 1999, p. 324; Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, p. 254; Powers, 2001). The particular Frankfurt School idea of interest here is Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of instrumental reason. The main ground for their critique was its domination of nature in search of human emancipation [a Marxist heritage], a process which *also* led to the domination and dehumanization of human beings by human beings, expressed inter alia in a “totally administered society”, and a “manipulated, commodity culture” (Audi, 1999, p. 324). They contended that such domination brought with it a deep sense of alienation from both nature and fellow human beings (Goodin, 1992, p. 75, footnote 140). Social change was sought through an alternative “... non-instrumental and non-dominating relation to nature and to others” (Audi, 1999, p. 324).

Wall (1994, p. 29) attributes to Frankfurt School members Adorno and Horkheimer, the fusing of Marxism with “the politics of ecological concern”. The School directly created “the conditions for a fuller and more human Green politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Bookchin and Marcuse, ... the German Green movement, the American counterculture ... all owe an explicit debt to the Frankfurt School in their attempts to produce a living and ecologically aware politics” (Wall, 1994, p. 29). Bramwell (1994), Capra and Spretnak (1984, p. 12), Goodin (1992, p. 74), and Naess (1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 219) also trace the debt of the New Left, and its contribution to green politics in the 1960s and 1970s, to the School’s heritage.

### 2.1.3 The New Left, counter-cultural and eco-utopian ideas

The New Left enjoyed political significance from the late 1960s to the early 1980s (Sayer, 2000, p. 5). Central to its agenda was the “challenge to the bureaucratic character of modern government, and the call for self-management” (Doherty & de Geus, 1996, p. 5). It also represented a critique of instrumental rationalism for having contributed to a techno-bureaucratic society gone wrong. The views of the American New Left are perhaps best expressed in neo-Frankfurt School philosopher Marcuse’s (1964) *One dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society*. According to Bramwell, Marcuse’s work critiqued “the centralised, anomie-producing, state” (1994, p. 60), and advocated alternative society themes such as “the hunt for values, the preference for authenticity, meaning and tradition, ...” (p. 60), and “romanticism about personal liberation and the eroticisation of work” (p. 83). Marcuse’s ideas were influential both sides of the Atlantic. In Europe they manifested themselves in the radical thought of the 1960s West German “Ausserparlamentarische Opposition<sup>8</sup>”, and the 1968 trans-Europe student unrest (Bahro, 1984, p. 176, p. 178), two of the many alternative movements from which Die Grünen (Chapter Seven) emerged. In America, Marcuse’s ideas were taken up in the kind of 1970s countercultural eco-utopian critique of society represented by Roszak, Illich, Reich, and Callenbach [discussed in Chapter Two, section 2.3.1.c]. But Bookchin grew increasingly critical of the New Left’s drift towards Marxism-Leninism (Tokar, 2006).

<sup>7</sup> The names of psychoanalyst Erich Fromm, and philosophers Adorno, Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas are associated with the School, some of whose members fled to America ahead of the growing domination of Nazism in Germany

<sup>8</sup> The movement particularly opposed the passage of emergency security laws in West Germany in 1968 (Henning, 2001, p. 3)

Bookchin's own ideas, contained in a mix of anarchism and ecology, also permeated<sup>9</sup> the North American New Left/counter-culture (Biehl 2006; Tokar, 2006). Together, these ideas provided models for the green movement in the USA and abroad (Biehl, 2006), and the emerging green political parties of the 1980s (Doherty & de Geus, 1994, p. 5; Goodin, 1992, p. 74), including Die Grünen.

### 2.1.4 Bookchin's eco-anarchism

Bookchin's 1964<sup>10</sup> radical ecology manifesto "overtly called for revolutionary change as a solution to the ecological crisis. It advanced a conjunction of anarchism and ecology to create an ecological society that would be humane and free [of hierarchy and domination (Biehl, 1997a, p. 7)], libertarian and decentralized, mutualistic and cooperative" (Biehl, 1997a, p. 6). I discuss next the key ideas of anarchy (2.1.4.1) and their link to Bookchin's understanding of ecology's radical message (2.1.4.2).

#### 2.1.4.1 The left-libertarian tradition: Anarchism

Among Bookchin's earliest political-ideological influences, were his maternal grandmother's "quasi-anarchistic populist" ideas. He subsequently joined the Young Communist League, broke with Stalinism, and briefly embraced Trotskyism. With capitalism's consolidation and expansion in the 1940s and 1950s (Biehl, 1997a, p. 3, p. 4), it became clear to Bookchin that Marx's idea that "conflict between wage labour and capital would bring capitalism to an end had to be called into serious question" (Biehl, 1997a, p. 3). He turned instead to libertarian socialism, particularly social anarchism<sup>11</sup>, as "a viable revolutionary alternative in the postwar era." (Biehl, 1997a, pp. 3-4).

Bookchin has identified the main anarchist concepts as a libertarian, decentralized society in which communities are linked together confederally, instead of "statism"; a "balanced" community; direct or face-to-face democracy; and a "humanistic technology" (Bookchin, 1965a, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 69; Bookchin, 1995b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 170). In the anarchist vision, people "will attain full control over their daily lives" (Bookchin, 1967, in Biehl, 1997, p. 103); it is "a libidinal movement of humanity against coercion in any form" (Bookchin, 1969b, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 144-145). There is no state, no parliament (Bookchin, 1969b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 146). Mutual aid, "brotherhood", or communalism, including communal ownership of the means of production (Biehl, 1997a, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 3-4), are advocated instead of centralism and domination. The basic unit of society is the politically, economically, physically decentralized, human-scale, well-rounded or balanced community, harmonized with its surrounding countryside<sup>12</sup>. All citizens take part in the community's management via direct democracy in popular assemblies. Direct action is encouraged as a means of preserving "the spirit of revolt, to encourage spontaneity" (Bookchin, 1969b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 146). The well-rounded

<sup>9</sup> I have not tried to unravel here, whether Bookchin was actually contributing more to New Left/countercultural ideas such as those of Marcuse, Illich, Callenbach, and Reich, than he was drawing on them. According to Biehl (1997, p. 8), Bookchin "spent much of the 1960s criss-crossing the United States and Canada, indefatigably educating the counterculture and New Left about ecology and its revolutionary significance", and "At a time when 'ecology' was an unfamiliar concept to most people, he lectured indefatigably on the subject to countercultural groups throughout the United States. ... His 1960s essays were *very influential both in the counterculture and in the New Left* and were anthologized in *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (1971)." (Biehl, 2006, retrieved 5 October 2006 from <http://www.social-ecology.org> Follow link "Murray Bookchin obituary", my italics)

<sup>10</sup> Biehl (1997a, p. 12, footnote 11) notes that "Ecology and revolutionary thought" appeared in *Anarchy*, 1964, p. 5. It was re-published in slightly altered format in *Post-scarcity anarchism* (1974, p. 60)

<sup>11</sup> As opposed to individualist or "lifestyle" anarchism, which he characterizes as inwardlooking, narcissistic, "yuppie", and in the liberal-individualistic tradition. Personal insurrection is favoured over social revolution (Bookchin, 1995b, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 164-168). By contrast, social anarchism "...is ... heir to the Enlightenment tradition, with due regard to that tradition's limits and incompleteness. ... social anarchism celebrates the thinking human mind without in any way denying passion, ecstasy, imagination, play, and art. Yet rather than reify them into hazy categories, it tries to incorporate them into everyday life. It is committed to rationality while opposing the rationalization of experience; to technology, while opposing the 'megamachine'; to social institutionalization, while opposing class rule and hierarchy; to a genuine politics based on the confederal coordination of municipalities or communes by the people in direct face-to-face democracy, while opposing parliamentarianism and the state" (Bookchin, 1995b, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 168-169)

<sup>12</sup> Bookchin notes particularly nineteenth century anarchist Peter Kropotkin's "ecological visions and his practical concern with human scale, decentralization, and the harmonization of humanity with nature as distinguished from the explosive growth of urbanization and centralization ..." (Bookchin, 1990a, in Biehl, 1997, p. 153)

community is at the same time, an enabling milieu for the development of well-rounded individuals, an important issue for nineteenth century anarchists, who “... gave considerable attention to what they called integral education – the development of the whole man...” (Bookchin, 1969b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 146).

Anarchism recognizes the need for co-ordination between groups, for planning, and for unity in action, but based on voluntary consent, conviction, and insight, not on coercion, orders, decisions by a knowing few, or hierarchical control. Co-ordinated action is achieved on this basis by “affinity groups<sup>13</sup>” through assemblies, action committees, or local regional and national conferences (Bookchin, 1969b, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 146-147). Control is however always vested in the base community.

An anarchist society, argued Bookchin, “far from being a remote ideal has become a precondition for the practice of ecological principles” (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 20), for human survival (Bookchin, 1965a, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 69).

#### ***2.1.4.2 Radical ecology***

Already in the mid 1960s, Bookchin (1965a, in Bookchin, 1974) was writing of the revolutionary social implications of ecology as normative, its critical message, and its reconstructive message<sup>14</sup>.

Normative because, “Broadly conceived, ecology deals with the balance of nature. Inasmuch as nature includes man, the science basically deals with the harmonization of nature and man”. Ecology’s critical and reconstructive message, “... carried through to all its implications, leads directly into anarchic areas of social thought. For, in the final analysis, it is impossible to achieve a harmonization of man and nature without creating a human community that lives in a lasting balance with its natural environment” (Bookchin, 1965a, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 58).

Ecology deals with the totality of the natural world – all nature’s “aspects, cycles and interrelationships”. Its critical message is that humanity cannot upset nature’s basic cycles, or undermine its stability, or override or simplify its diverse, complex “subtly organized ecosystems”, or convert them into economically rationalized industrial production areas or raw material deposits, or create vast areas of synthetic concrete, metal and glass, - in short, disassemble a highly complex, diverse organic environment, and replace it with a simplified inorganic one, thereby reversing the evolutionary process - “without bringing into question the survival of man and the survival of the planet itself” (Bookchin, 1965a, in Bookchin, 1974, pp. 59-62, pp. 65-68, p. 76; citation p. 59). This is ecology’s critical message.

Ecology presents “this awesome message to humanity ... in a new social dimension” (Bookchin, 1965a, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 68). The imbalances humanity is producing in the natural world, the current reversal of organic evolution from diverse complexity to increasing homogeneity, “are caused by the imbalances ... [humanity] has produced in the social world” (p. 62): the “appalling contradictions between town and country, state and community, industry and husbandry, mass manufacture and craftsmanship, centralism and regionalism, the bureaucratic scale and the human scale” (p. 68). The problem, Bookchin writes, “runs even deeper. The notion that man must dominate nature emerges directly from the domination of man by man” (p. 63). But ecology also provides the metaphors for healing the alienation of humans from humans, and humans from nature.

---

<sup>13</sup> An idea encountered again in ecofeminism (Chapter Six: 7.1) and in Die Grünen, as part of their social defence concept (Chapter Seven: 6.4.2.2)

<sup>14</sup> Bookchin draws on the work of ecologist Charles S. Elton (Bookchin, 1965, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 66)

Ecology's reconstructive message "can be summed up in the word 'diversity'. From an ecological viewpoint, balance and harmony in nature, in society and, by inference, in behaviour, are achieved not by mechanical standardization but by its opposite, organic differentiation" (Bookchin, 1965a, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 70). Ecological stability "is a function not of simplicity and homogeneity but of complexity and variety. The capacity of an ecosystem to retain its integrity depends not on the uniformity of the environment but on its diversity" (Bookchin, 1982b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 34). Nature's wholeness represents not homogeneity, but "a dynamic *unity of diversity*" (p. 34, his italics). From natural ecology to social ecology: "...my description of the ecosystem: the image of unity in diversity, spontaneity, and the complementary relationships, free of hierarchy and domination ... [guides my] definition of the term 'libertarian'..." (Eckersley, 1989, pp. 107-108, citing from Bookchin, 1982a, p. 352). Bookchin's anarchist community "... would approximate a clearly definable ecosystem – it would be diversified, balanced, and harmonious..." (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 24), integrated into its local ecology – its resources, climate, soils, flora and fauna (Bookchin, 1965b, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 27-28), applying ecological principles to its farming practices ((Bookchin, 1965a, in Bookchin, 1974, pp. 71-72), and energy needs (pp. 72-75). Understanding its ecological roots, the community would respect "...the organic interrelationships that sustain it" (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 23) and make "a more intelligent and more loving use of its environment" (p. 23).

#### 2.1.4.2.1 Radical ecology, not mystical ecology, or environmentalism

Bookchin was critical of "mystical" interpretations of ecology:

American ecology movements -- and particularly the American Greens -- are faced with a serious crisis of conscience and direction. Will ecologically oriented groups and the Greens become a movement that sees the roots of our ecological dislocations in social dislocations -- notably, in the domination of human by human which has produced the very notion of dominating nature? Or will ecology groups and the Greens turn the entire ecology movement into a starry-eyed religion decorated by gods, goddesses, woodsprites, and organized around sedating rituals that reduce militant activist groups to self-indulgent encounter groups? (Bookchin, 1988b, opening paragraph).

He was also critical of environmentalism, as opposed to radical ecology<sup>15</sup>:

For good reason, more and more people are trying to go beyond the vapid environmentalism of the early 1970s and develop a more fundamental indeed, a more radical approach to the ecological crises that beleaguer us. They are looking for an ecological approach: one that is rooted in an ecological *philosophy, ethics, sensibility, image of nature*, and, ultimately, an *ecological movement* that will transform our domineering market society into a nonhierarchical cooperative society – a society that will live in harmony with nature because its members live in harmony with each other." (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 263, his italics; in slightly different wording also in Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 229),

and

I speak, here, of *ecology*, not environmentalism. Environmentalism deals with the serviceability of the human habitat, a passive habitat that people *use*, in short, an assemblage of things called 'natural resources' and 'urban resources.' Taken by themselves, environmental issues require the use of no greater wisdom than the instrumentalist modes of thought and methods that are used by city planners, engineers, physicians, lawyers – and socialists (Bookchin, 1971, his italics, in Biehl, 1997a, p. 8).

On Bookchin's view, environmentalism is "a less radical more technocratic approach" to ecological issues and environmental problems, which represents "mere environmental tinkering: instead of proposing to transform society as a whole, it look...[s] for technological solutions to specific environmental problems (Biehl, 1997a, p. 8). Deep ecologist Eckersley understands Bookchin's

<sup>15</sup> Biehl points out that Bookchin, not Naess, was the first to make this distinction, "anchoring it ... in a social and political matrix" (Biehl, 1997a, p. 8)

distinction between radical ecology and environmentalism as following “from Bookchin’s organismic philosophy, which recognizes subjectivity as present, however germinally, in all phenomena, not just humans. For Bookchin, it is crassly instrumental to reduce the richly textured ecocommunities (he prefers this term to *ecosystem* because of the latter’s mechanistic connotations) of nonhuman nature to a mere storage bin of raw materials for human use ... ” (Eckersley, 1989, p. 115).

### **2.1.5 The need for a “left green perspective”**

Bookchin was critical of “the ecological illiteracy of so much of the conventional left” (Bookchin, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 245). While he agreed that the green movement was “right to reject a mere variant of conventional left orthodoxy dressed up in a few new environmental metaphors...”, he felt that they would be cutting themselves off “from an important source of insight, wisdom, and social experience”, if they did not retain the “left libertarian and populist traditions, particularly eco-anarchism”. It is “very important that we consciously develop a left green perspective” (Bookchin, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 245). A key element of this was a complete rejection of all forms of hierarchy, and of capitalism. “I believe that the colour of radicalism today is not red, but green” (Bookchin, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 244).

## **2.2 Key thesis on environmental crisis**

It is social ecology’s thesis that “all our present ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems”, such as economic, ethnic, cultural and gender conflicts, and conversely, that ecological problems cannot be understood, or resolved, “without resolutely dealing with problems within society” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 354). Ecological problems are essentially social justice and political issues, “stemming from capitalism and problems of social hierarchy and social class domination” (Sessions, 1995f, pp. 265-266). It is the “hierarchical mentality” which pervades our society that gives rise to “the very idea of dominating the natural world” (Bookchin, 1993, p. 355).

## **2.3 The rhetoric**

Freedom!

“During the late 1960s and 1970s Bookchin’s anthropological historical and political explorations of the ‘legacy of freedom’ and the ‘legacy of domination’, as he called it, percolated through radical social movements – not only the ecology movement but the feminist, communitarian, and anarchist movements as well. The concept of hierarchy in particular [i.e., its critique], assimilated by the counterculture into conventional wisdom, has become essential to radical thought due largely to Bookchin’s insistence on its nature and importance in many lectures in the late 1960s.” (Biehl, 1997a, p. 9).

In Bookchin’s examination of these two legacies, writes Clark, humanity “...falls from its primordial unity with nature in ‘organic society’, it suffers through its long struggle [‘the history of freedom’] while in bondage during the ‘history of domination’, finally to regain its lost unity – at a higher level – with the achievement of ‘the ecological society’ (Clark, 1993, pp. 350-351) or “free nature<sup>16</sup>”.

### **2.3.1 Preconditions for, and conditions of, freedom**

According to Marx, the preconditions for freedom [in the sense of release from toil and necessity] were national unification, technological development and material abundance (Bookchin, 1969a, in Biehl, 1997, p. 141). In Bookchin’s writings, the major precondition for freedom is a humanistic, liberatory

---

<sup>16</sup> This theme is similar, Clark (1993, pp. 350-351) points out, to the story of the Fall and Redemption in Judeo-Christianity, in the self-alienation and self-reconciliation of Hegel’s Spirit, and in Marx’s “depiction of humanity’s enslavement to the realm of necessity and its striving toward the realm of freedom”

technology, which will enable humanity to move from scarcity and necessity, to a post-scarcity society. The conditions of freedom according to Bookchin are decentralization, the formation of communities, the human scale, and direct democracy. All these aspects of freedom are discussed in this chapter's section 6: View of society.

### 3. Epistemology

Social ecology subscribes to the Enlightenment ideal of reason (3.1), but continues the Frankfurt School critique of instrumental rationalism (3.2). Utilizing dialectical reasoning<sup>17</sup>, Bookchin (1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 359) calls social ecology's epistemology, "dialectical naturalism" (3.3). Despite being presented before ontology here, I understand Bookchin's dialectical naturalism, as epistemology, to be integral to his dialectical naturalism as ontology [section 4].

#### 3.1 Affirmation of Enlightenment ideal of reason

Social ecology via its Marxist heritage subscribes to the Enlightenment ideals of reason, science, and technology (Bookchin, 1991, in Chase, 1991, in Van de Veer, 1994, p. 245). With the emergence of ecological-political tendencies that embraced irrationalism, Bookchin emphasized that an ecological society "would neither renounce, nor denigrate reason, science, and technology" (Biehl, 1997a, p. 10). He was opposed to postmodernism, which in his view, had produced "chilling and dangerous" theoretical and ethical relativism, even nihilism (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992).

But social ecology continues the Frankfurt School critique of instrumental reason. More specifically writes Bookchin, our warped capitalist society has "reduc[ed] reason to a harsh industrial rationalism focused on efficiency rather than on an ethically inspired intellectuality; ... uses science to quantify the world and divide thought against feeling; ... [and] uses technology to exploit nature, including *human* nature, [however, that] should not negate the value of the underlying Enlightenment ideals" (Bookchin, 1991, in Chase, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 245, his italics).

#### 3.2 The critique of instrumental rationalism

Social ecologists problematize instrumental reason on three interrelated grounds – its separation from the moral context of nature, its misuse in rational self-interest, bureaucracy and capitalism, and its redefinition of reality to fit its basic principle of consistency, the latter discussed in section 3.3 (Biehl, 1993, pp. 377-379; Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 207-208).

Before the mechanistic ontology of nature replaced the organismic view, the Greek concept *logos* summed up the belief that there was in nature, an "immanent intelligibility"; that the human mind possessed the ability to discover and understand this intelligibility; and that there was a congruence between both (Biehl, 1993, p. 375). There is an order in reality that is not simply imposed on it by the human mind (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 215). Reason was a reason of moral purpose, of moral ends: to discover, and understand, this intelligibility, this order in nature, and its values.

But as the mechanistic ontology took hold, reason became separated from its moral context and moral purpose. Ethics was removed from reason's "discourse and concerns" (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 207). Instrumental rationality validated itself through the efficiency of its means, the pragmatic success it achieved, not through appeal to cherished values, ideals, goals or beliefs as moral ends (Biehl, 1993, p. 375). These became "irrelevant ... arbitrary matters of personal mood and taste" (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 207).

---

<sup>17</sup> Dialectical reasoning is a form of reasoning which originated in the Greek concept of *logos*, and blossomed particularly in Hegel's thought (Biehl, 1993, p. 384)

At the individual level, reason was “validated exclusively by its effectiveness in satisfying the ego’s pursuits and responsibilities” (Biehl, 1993, p. 378, citing Bookchin, 1982a, p. 270). Reason became an instrument for self-survival rather than for grasping ethical purpose or meaning; rationally-based self-interest, in effect. At social level, in the name of a mechanistic ontology, supposedly value-free instrumental rationality became the tool with which to *administer* human beings, a possibility which nation-states were quick to utilize in all spheres of human functioning, through increasing bureaucracy. In the economic sphere, instrumental rationality was applied to promote and protect the capitalist system by instrumentalizing people as sources of labour, and by commodifying ever more aspects of nature as goods and services to be exchanged in the fiercely competitive free market. “If the instrumental ethos reduced moral purpose to self-interest in order to survive, capitalism made competition a social imperative” (Biehl, 1993, p. 377).

Bookchin saw in dialectical reasoning as basis for his dialectical naturalism, the means of re-connecting rationality and ethics.

### 3.3 Dialectical reasoning

Bookchin subscribes to dialectical reasoning, rather than instrumental or analytical reasoning [Bookchin sometimes calls these two together, “conventional reasoning”]. He explains dialectical reasoning – no easy concept - by contrasting it with instrumental or conventional reasoning.

Instrumental reasoning is based on the identity principle [or A equals A, or consistency], and efficient causality (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 204-206). It “freezes” a phenomenon in order to understand it through analysis of its components [structure] and functioning (Biehl, 1993, pp. 383-384). Change is understood in terms of linear causality: “The causality that conventional reason describes, ... is a matter of kinetics: one billiard ball strikes another and causes them both to move from one position to another — that is to say, by means of *efficient cause*” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 205, his italics). Despite this external change, neither of these objects has changed in its essence. Based on these understandings of identity [consistency] and change, conventional thinking gives us indispensable knowledge about phenomena (Biehl, 1993, pp. 383-384), and has “contributed immeasurably to our knowledge of the universe” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 207).

But such thinking is unable to deal with the paradox of consistency and change in reality. Here, conventional reason “with its message of identity and consistency as truth” fails us, writes Bookchin, “not because it is false as such but because it has staked out too broad a claim for its own validity in explaining reality. It even redefines reality to fit its claim ....” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 208). Hegel resolved this paradox of identity and change in reality “by systematically showing that identity, or self-persistence, actually expresses itself *through* change as an ever-variegated unfolding of ‘unity in diversity’, to use his own words” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 208, his italics), i.e., there is an ongoing dialectic between identity and change. Hegel posited a dialectical or emergent causality. This is “not merely motion, force, or changes of form, but things and phenomena in development”. In dialectical causality, “the implicit becomes explicit through the unfolding of its latent form and possibilities” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 208). I think the critical difference in this view is, change is not *caused* by some prior event [“efficient cause”], but *elicited* by something like [but not] Aristotle’s “final” causes. Where Aristotle thought in terms of a deity as “final cause”, Hegel thought of the “imperfection”, “inadequacy” or “contradiction” implicit in a phenomenon as eliciting development. Change elicited through an internal carrot, and not caused by an external stick, as it were.

Analytical reasoning, which focuses on the structure and functioning of a phenomenon at a given moment, can only provide an incomplete account of this understanding of reality (Biehl, 1993, pp. 383-

384). Dialectical reasoning, which attempts to understand the ongoing dialectic between identity and change, fares better. Bookchin calls his version of dialectical reasoning applied to understanding reality, dialectical naturalism.

### 3.4 Dialectical naturalism as epistemology

Bookchin understands nature as evolution, and the nature of reality as “Being” and an ever-unfolding (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 210, p. 214), or development, through phases (Simon, 1990, p. 223, citing Bookchin, 1987a, p. 28). “Unlike conventional reason, dialectical reason acknowledges the developmental nature of reality by asserting in one fashion or another that *A equals not only A but also not-A*. ... Dialectical reason grasps not only how an entity is organized at a particular moment but how it is organized to go beyond that level of development and become *other* than what it is, even as it retains its identity. The contradictory nature of identity — notably, that *A equals both A and not-A* — is an intrinsic feature of identity itself. The unity of opposites is, in fact, a unity qua the emerging ‘other’, what Hegel called ‘the identity of identity and nonidentity’.” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 205-206, his italics).

The “intellectual challenge” then, is not to “*arrest...the fluidity of a phenomenon, by reducing it to its components at a fixed point in a development’s unfolding, and by turning them into hard and fast ‘facts’ or ‘data’ that are notable for their fixity rather than their logic of transformation. The emphasis of dialectic is, rather, on the transitions that account for a development*” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 268, his italics), those moments or periods in a phenomenon’s ongoing development, unfolding, or becoming, in which the phenomenon both is what it is, *and* the “other” it is becoming, as it seeks to make its implicit potentiality explicit (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 268). The transitions, rather than an analysis of the component parts, relationships, and functions of a phenomenon assumed to be static, are the focus of dialectical naturalism.

This “processual<sup>18</sup>” way of knowing calls for an appropriate methodology. Unlike positivism and sceptical empiricism, the methodology must have a feel for context, with a “vital sense of history, continuity, and immanent directionality”, and a different focus too: on transitions representing past, present and emerging future, not on reified moments in a phenomenon’s development (Bookchin, 1990d, pp. 268-269, p. 271). Bookchin introduces a dialectical methodology called “*eduction*”, which is “an exploration of [a potentiality’s] latent and implicit possibilities” (Bookchin [no bibliographical details], cited in Biehl, 1993, p. 385). It seeks to understand “the *inherent logic*” of a thing’s development: where it started, where it is now, and how it could be expected to progress towards wholeness, given its “immanent developmental logic” (Biehl, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 385, her italics). Extracting from Bookchin (1987a, p. 24), Eckersley (1989, p. 109) describes eduction as “a phased process that renders ‘the latent possibilities of phenomena fully manifest and articulated’”. In Bookchin’s own words, such an approach is creative because it ceaselessly contrasts ‘the free, rational and moral actuality of ‘what-could-be’ that inheres in nature’s thrust towards self-reflexivity with the existential reality of ‘what-is’” (Bookchin, 1987a, p. 31 in Eckersley, 1989, p. 109). Eduction seems to be a form of speculative reasoning, judging by this comment of Bookchin’s (1990d, p. 270): “....speculative reason has the all-important function of dealing with a notion of Being as becoming, of probing the implicit in the potential with a view toward grasping the logic of its unfolding, and finally, of trying to determine if that logic has been fulfilled”. These are ontological matters.

---

<sup>18</sup> As opposed for example, to deep ecologist supporter Robyn Eckersley’s “positivistic methodology” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 253)

## 4. Ontology

“Being as becoming” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 213, p. 214) sums up I think, Bookchin’s ontology. His dialectical naturalism is firmly “processual and organismic” rather than “factual and structural” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 269). It “is based overwhelmingly on *potentiality*, conceived as the configuration of a [phenomenon’s] development ....” (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992, his italics). Bookchin explains his version as “an ecological approach that sees nature in all its forms as self-organizing and self-formative with neither a cosmic subject nor mechanical ‘forces’ to inform a development<sup>19</sup>” (Bookchin, 1990d, pp. 267-268). Phenomena are seen as naturally “incomplete and unactualized in their development - not ‘imperfect’ in any idealistic or supranatural sense”. (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 211).

Social ecology’s dialectical naturalism as ontology comprises views on “biological evolution” or “first nature” (section 4.1), and “social evolution” or “second nature”, which comprises both human beings and the societies they create (section 4.2). Second nature has become warped (section 4.2.3), in that its developmental path is not rationally fulfilling its potentiality; it needs to be integrated into first nature, to become “free nature” (section 4.3).

### 4.1 “First nature”

Nature *is* natural evolution, in “the very real sense that it is composed of atoms, molecules that have evolved into amino acids, proteins, unicellular organisms, genetic codes, invertebrates and vertebrates, amphibia, reptiles, mammals, primates, and human beings – all, in a cumulative thrust toward ever-greater complexity, ever-greater subjectivity, and finally, an ever-greater capacity for conceptual thought, symbolic communication, and self-consciousness” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer, 1994, p. 237). In this section, which deals with nature as biological evolution, I attempt to unpack these ideas a little more, by introducing Bookchin’s nature as a developmental graded phenomenon (4.1.1), with immanent mind (4.1.2), displaying a specific *nisus* (4.1.3).

#### 4.1.1 Nature as a developmental graded continuum

Dialectical naturalism is a way of understanding nature [inorganic, organic and social] as development through contradiction (Biehl, 1993, p. 381). Each phenomenon contains within it, a kind of incompleteness - a contradiction [which it strives to overcome] between what it is at any given moment, and what it potentially should become in its maturity, when its development is fulfilled (Biehl, 1993, p. 381, p. 382, p. 384).

These contradictions are not as between two arbitrary states which have no connection with each other, but between states which stand in a developmental relationship to each other (Biehl, 1993, p. 384). The real-world examples usually given are the oak tree implicit in the acorn, or the bird implicit in the egg. “A thing or phenomenon in dialectical causality remains unsettled, unstable, in tension ... until it develops itself into what it ‘should be’ in all its wholeness or fullness” (Bookchin, 1990c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 211). Until a thing is what it has been constituted to become, it exists in a dynamic tension, because it is incomplete, unfulfilled or inadequate, in Bookchin’s terminology. “It cannot remain in endless tension or ‘contradiction’ with what it is organized to become without warping or undoing itself. It must ripen into the fullness of its being” (Bookchin, 1990c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 211). It is the resolution of the instability which arises from such contradiction or tension (Biehl, 1993, p. 382) that propels any organism’s growth, or self-formation, or self-development (Biehl, 1993, p. 382). What the *implicit* arrangement or potentiality in a phenomenon is, is rendered *explicit* or *actual* by its own self-

---

<sup>19</sup> A reference to the Hegelian idealistic, and Engels/Marxian mechanistic dialectic (Biehl, 1993, p. 385)

development. Such a transition in self-development is called an “Aufhebung”; that is, the organism transcends, yet also incorporates what it was, into its new state (Biehl, 1993, pp. 384-385).

In dialectical causality, cause and effect are not discrete from each other; but cumulative. In Bookchin’s words: “the implicit or ‘in itself’ (*an sich*), to use Hegel's terminology, is not simply replaced or negated by its more developed explicit or ‘for itself’ (*für sich*); rather, it is absorbed into and developed beyond the explicit into a fuller, more differentiated, and more adequate form — the Hegelian ‘in and for itself’ (*an und für sich*)” (Bookchin, 1995c, his italics, in Biehl, 1997, p. 212). As a phenomenon differentiates its potentiality into a new actuality, so that new actuality “becomes the potentiality for further differentiation and actualization” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 210). This introduces the idea of nature as a graded continuum, including past and present, but implying future as well, as the phenomenon unfolds towards richer degrees of wholeness (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 359).

The notion “continuum” also denies the idea that nature is hierarchically organized. “Ecology ... is an outlook that interprets all interdependencies (social and psychological as well as natural) nonhierarchically. Ecology denies that nature can be interpreted from a hierarchical viewpoint ...” (Biehl, 1997a, p. 8).

#### 4.1.2 Cosmos as organism with immanent mind

A mechanistic ontology and mechanistic science denies any rationality to nature, reserving that for the human mind only. Social ecology views the cosmos, and nature here on Earth, as neither mechanistic, nor “a meaningless flow of random events” (Biehl, 1993, p. 380). It is *because* nature displays a rationality, that its “immanent intelligibility” can be discovered and comprehended by a human rationality (Biehl, 1993, p. 375), which evolved out of it (Biehl, 1993, p. 386). The rationality is not simply and only a process in which the organism or species adapts to its niche and ecosystem. The rationality is displaying a tendency, direction, or *nisus*, which is a manifestation of mind at work in nature (Biehl, 1993, p. 381), a view also encountered in Bateson’s (1979) work.

#### 4.1.3 Cosmos as organism, displaying *nisus*

Dialectical naturalism discerns in nature’s developmental transitions, a tendency, direction, or *nisus*, an “immanent self-directiveness” (Bookchin, 1987a, p. 28, in Simon, 1990, p. 223), toward greater differentiation of life forms, self-organization, self-maintenance, self-realization of potentiality, subjectivity [or consciousness, or awareness], self-awareness, self-reflexivity and conceptual communication<sup>20</sup> (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 215-217).

Is nature’s immanent self-directiveness related to *telos*? Bookchin rejects the idea of “telos” in nature [inter alia, for its deterministic and hierarchical implications], if this should mean the traditional teleology of Aristotle and Hegel, i.e. “an unyielding *telos*” (1990d, p. 267), a pre-ordained end (1990d, p. 267). He uses rather the concepts “tendency”, “striving”, “directionality”, “organic entelechies” or “*nisus*” in nature, to indicate not a pre-ordained end, but “an actualization of what is implicit in the potential” of something in nature. Whether acorn, or human being (Bookchin, 1990d, pp. 267-268), the development is “open-ended, fluid, spontaneous, ... and free from predeterminations” (Biehl, 1993, p. 385).

##### 4.1.3.1 The emergence of subjectivity [self-identity]

“According to Bookchin, if we carefully examine evolutionary development, we find cumulative degrees of increased subjectivity” (Simon, 1990, p. 224). From its original inorganic state, nature

---

<sup>20</sup> Not necessarily in that order

developed through millennia first into initially relatively limited, undifferentiated unicellular organisms, then into multicellular organisms, which exhibited self-identity, and self-maintenance. Even the amoeba, as simplest example of organic life, “is busy maintaining itself” in “an environment that would otherwise tend to dissolve it”, thereby exhibiting “the existence of a germinal form of selfhood and a nascent form of subjectivity”, which clearly differentiates it from its inorganic context (Biehl, 1993, pp. 380-381). There is subjectivity throughout nature “that is latent even within matter/energy itself”, social ecologist Clark suggests (1993, p. 349).

#### ***4.1.3.2 Self-transformation and self-development***

Once self-identity and self-maintenance are established, the developmental process is marked by increasing self-transformation towards differentiation, flexibility, subjectivity, and self-direction (Biehl, 1993, p. 376). There is in nature, “a significant evolutionary trend toward intellectuality, self-awareness, will, intentionality, and expressiveness, be it in oral or body language” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 357). Clark’s view is that social ecology “proposes a principle of ecological wholeness that sees the entire course of planetary evolution as a process aiming at increasing diversity and the emergence of value”, or that the “directiveness” present in nature “is a movement toward the greater unfolding of value” (Clark, 1993, p. 345).

#### ***4.1.3.3 Increasing self-determination as “potentiality for freedom”***

The “greater differentiation of life-forms, increasing subjectivity and flexibility, and finally the emergence of intellectuality, intentionality, and a high order of choice” mentioned earlier, are the “precondition[s] for freedom” (Biehl, 1993, p. 380). According to Bookchin “One can find a visible and logical elaboration of subjectivity, diversity, flexibility, and rudimentary freedom in the simple choices that species make in participating in their evolutionary pathway” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 271). So an organism or species or ecosystem’s progressive unfolding is also an unfolding of its “potentiality for freedom” where freedom is understood as self-determination and self-directed activity<sup>21</sup>.

#### ***4.1.3.4 “Rational” and “irrational” development***

In the course of actualizing its potentialities, on its way to achieving “self-realization”, or what Hegel called “‘actuality’” (*Wirklichkeit*) (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 210), a phenomenon might develop irrationally or rationally. “External factors, internal rearrangements, accidents” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 215) might place a phenomenon on a developmental path which will fail to actualize its potentialities, in which case, it is an existing reality that is “irrational”, less than it could be, incomplete, “untrue”. “Although it is ‘real’ in an existential sense, it is unfulfilled and hence ‘unreal’ *in terms of its potentialities*” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 212, his italics).

By contrast, “rational”, “logical”, “real”, and “adequate”, are words Bookchin uses to describe a development which *is* following “its immanent self-development to its logical actuality” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 212, p. 215). That is, it is on the way to becoming what it is “structured” or “constituted” to become (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 210, p. 212), “by virtue of its *internal logic*” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 212, his italics). It is “more properly ‘real’ than a given ‘what-is’ that is aborted or distorted and hence, in Hegelian terms, ‘untrue’ to its possibilities” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 212).

Herein is an ethical implication for human beings: dialectical reasoning demands that we consider a phenomenon not simply as it exists [its “Realität” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 214)], but also speculate about [or “educate”] whether its development is on track, as it were, towards its implicit or

---

<sup>21</sup> This idea of self-direction or self-organization appears similar to the “autopoiesis” of ecosystemic thinking

immanent “actuality” [“Wirklichkeit”]. Or has its developmental path been aborted, or warped (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 213)? Does there need to be a re-orientation? “It would be philosophically frivolous to embrace the ‘what-is’ of a thing or phenomenon as constituting its ‘reality’ without considering it in the light of the ‘what-should-be’ that would logically emerge from its potentialities” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 213). “*Reason* has the obligation to explore the potentialities that are latent in any social development”, to “educate its authentic actualization, its fulfillment and ‘truth’”, and presumably, if it is not on track, then consider, and implement, whatever “new and more rational social dispensation” *would* set it on its logical developmental path (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 212, his italicization of “Reason”).

## 4.2 “Second nature”

Where “first nature” means inorganic and organic nature (Biehl, 1993, p. 381), “second nature” is humanity, “with its sociality, institutions, intellectuality, language, ethics, and political life” (Biehl, 1993, p. 387). Though it emerged from first nature, it remains a part of it, embedded in it (Biehl, 1993, p. 385) (section 4.2.1). Early second nature was characterised by social egalitarianism (4.2.2.1). However, this became warped by ideas of hierarchy and domination (4.2.2.2 - 4.2.2.3). There must be a radical dissolution of hierarchy and its manifestations in society before “free nature” – an ecological society – can be achieved (4.3).

### 4.2.1 Relation of “second” to “first nature”

One implication of the replacement of an organismic by a mechanist ontology, was that “human beings ... lost their [special] cosmological place”. Some scientist-philosophers in this tradition, for example, Bertrand Russell, viewed the human being in the scheme of things as “a mere accident in the cosmos, a chance spark in a meaningless world” (Biehl, 1993, p. 376). There existed “an unbridgeable dualism between mentality and the external world” (Bookchin, 1982a, pp. 238, cited by Biehl, 1993, p. 376), a philosophy or worldview in which social ideas such as mastery over nature easily find root (Biehl, 1993, p. 376).

#### 4.2.1.1. *Human beings, and their societies, are as “natural” as nature*

In the social ecology view, human beings are part of “the self-organizing thrust of natural evolution toward increasing subjectivity and flexibility” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 358), “squarely within organic evolution” (p. 357), a “product of the increasing subjectivity in first nature” (Biehl, 1993, p. 385). There is no “sharp bifurcation” of human from nonhuman nature (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 271), no “untenable disjunction” (Bookchin, 1993, p. 357), they are related in a natural continuum. Both share “... an evolutionary potential for greater subjectivity and flexibility” (p. 360).

Though they “always remain rooted in their biological evolutionary history”, human beings “produce a characteristically human social nature of their own” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 358). Society is merely the way humans inhabit their world, or adapt to and create an environment for themselves, just as nonhuman beings do, to the extent that their programmed instincts and abilities allow. What human beings do, is not discontinuous from first nature. It is natural evolution after all, which has “not only provided humans with the *ability*, but also the *necessity* to be purposive interveners into ‘first nature’, to consciously *change* ‘first nature’ by means of a highly institutionalised form of community we call ‘society’” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 237, his italics). Bookchin understands human works – societies, social institutions, science, and technology, for example - to be as “natural” as nature, because they are the products of human foresight, innovation and creativity, themselves all products of the natural evolutionary process (Bookchin, 1993, pp. 357-358). Second nature is therefore as “natural” as “first” nature in Bookchin’s view.

#### **4.2.1.2 But human beings have a unique place in evolution**

Human beings however, occupy a unique place in natural evolution (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 273). The graded continuum which links first and second nature is marked in the case of human beings, by “important qualitative distinctions” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 271):

Humanity’s awareness of itself, its ability to generalize this awareness to the level of a highly systematic understanding of its environment in the form of philosophy, science, ethics, and aesthetics, and finally, its capacity to alter itself and its environment systematically by means of knowledge and technology place it beyond the realm of subjectivity that exists in first nature (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 216).

Humanity is “the most richly developed ... being to emerge thus far in the earth’s evolutionary self-realization” (Clark, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 348), nature “rendered self-conscious” (Clark, 1993, p. 349), “the very knowingness of nature” (Clark, 1993, p. 352), “the self-reflexive voice of nature” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 273). Humanity’s unique position confers on it, special ecological responsibilities (section 5).

But early in its evolutionary history, second nature became “warped” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 273) or “distorted” (1990d, p. 264) by the idea of hierarchy, and the possibility of human domination and exploitation of other humans.

#### **4.2.2 Second nature gone wrong**

Human beings’ evolutionary social development has produced ideologies and antagonisms, “that have distorted humanity’s unique capacities for development”. Second nature has become “warped” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 258, citing from his 1987 paper, p. 38); a sign of which is the ecological crisis. Where there was originally social egalitarianism (4.2.2.1), social hierarchy evolved (4.2.2.2), with its ideas of ‘power over’ and domination, whether of humans over humans, or of humans over nature (4.2.2.3). Radical integration of second with first nature “along far reaching ecological lines<sup>22</sup>” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 258, citing from the same 1987 article, p. 32, p. 21) is needed (4.2.2.4).

##### **4.2.2.1 Social egalitarianism in early second nature**

In early second nature, certain egalitarian customs prevailed: those of “the irreducible minimum, usufruct, and mutual aid” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 366). I cite Bookchin’s explanation of these in full, because I think it suggests what has “gone wrong” with second nature, and also represents his ideal egalitarian, communitarian and caring “ecological” society (section 6):

[The irreducible minimum is]...the shared notion that all members of a community are entitled to the means of life, irrespective of the amount of work they perform. To deny anyone food, shelter, and the basic means of life because of infirmities or even frivolous behavior would have been seen as a heinous denial of the very right to live. Nor were the resources and things needed to sustain the community ever completely privately owned: overriding individualistic control was the broader principle of usufruct – the notion that the means of life that were not being used by one group could be used, as need be, by another. Thus unused land, orchards, and even tools and weapons, if left idle, were at the disposition of anyone in the community who needed them. Lastly, custom fostered the practice of mutual aid, the rather sensible cooperative behavior of sharing things and labor, so that an individual or family in fairly good circumstances could expect to be helped by others if their fortunes should change for the worse... (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 364).

##### **4.2.2.2 The evolution of social hierarchy**

One definition by Bookchin of hierarchies (1982a, p. 4, cited in Desjardins, 1993, pp. 242-243) is

---

<sup>22</sup> Section 2.1.4.2

The cultural traditional and psychological systems of obedience and command, not merely the economic and political systems to which the terms class and State most appropriately refer. ... I refer to the domination of the young by the old, of women by men, of one ethnic group by another, of ‘masses’ by bureaucrats who profess to speak of ‘higher social interests’, of countryside by town, and in a more subtle psychological sense, of body by mind, of spirit by a shallow instrumental rationality.

Desjardins (1993, p. 243) goes on to explain this excerpt as “Thus, hierarchies imply the existence of at least two groups, one of which holds power over the other. This power enables the ‘superior’ group to command obedience from the ‘inferior’ group. Hierarchies promote social systems of domination, in which the superior group is able to manipulate the inferior group to serve the purposes of the superiors while preventing the inferiors from pursuing their own true ends.”

Based on anthropological work, Bookchin speculates that in place of social egalitarianism, hierarchy emerged from differences in “biological facts such as lineage, gender distribution, and age differences”. Social customs developed around these biological facts, and became social institutions. Characteristic attitudes and values came to be associated with such institutions (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, pp. 361-365).

This process<sup>23</sup> (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, pp. 361-365) I have summarized in the table below:

**Figure 6: The evolution of social hierarchy**

In the “organic society” of prehistorical Europe, there exists primordial unity with nature (Biehl, 1997a, p. 9)
<p><b>NATURAL BIOLOGICAL FACT: BLOOD TIES</b>  <b>Social customs/institution:</b> Bloodties create families; intermarriage between families creates bands, clans, tribes  <b>Associated attitudes/values:</b> Initially a <b>kinship ethic</b> develops: one’s “own” are treated as “insiders”; there exists an ethic of solidarity and mutual obligation. All others are treated as strangers - “outsiders”. Within both insider and outsider groups, relationships are egalitarian [section 4.2.2.1]</p>
<p><b>NATURAL BIOLOGICAL FACT: AGE</b>  <b>Social customs/institution:</b> In the absence of writing, memory and tradition are significant sources of knowledge, customs, mores. This wisdom is usually held by the eldest members of the family, tribe, clan, etc. Hierarchical structures based on command and obedience slowly emerge - Councils of “Elders” are probably the earliest form of hierarchy  <b>Associated attitudes/values:</b> <b>Gerontocracy</b> becomes a form of hierarchy</p>
<p><b>NATURAL BIOLOGICAL FACT: SEX</b>  <b>Social customs/institution:</b> Division of duties between the sexes  <b>Associated attitudes/values:</b> Initially relations between these groups were complementary, no group dominated the other, both were needed “to form a relatively stable whole” (Bookchin, 1993, p. 362)</p>

<sup>23</sup> Compare Bookchin’s “breakdown theory” with the usual deep ecology version: In the beginning at least, of their historical emergence from nature (roughly pre-10, 000 years ago?), humans were integrated with, and lived in “primordial harmony” with the “larger earth community”. The dominant perspective in human-nature relationships was ecocentric (Sessions, 1995d, p. 158). But as humans sought for themselves a niche which satisfied their particular needs for food, clothing, shelter, community and communication, largely through the beginnings of agriculture (Sessions, 1995d, p. 158), the “great cultural worlds of the human developed, along with vast and powerful social establishments whereby humans became oppressive and even destructive of other life forms. Alienation from the natural world increased...” (Berry, 1987, in Sessions, 1995, p. 9). The first half of this theme is frequently encountered in deep ecology/green writing as the ecological Eden/Garden of Eden theme; in which certain cultures today are seen still to retain a nature-oriented cosmology (Sessions, 1995d, p. 158) which should preferably be left untainted by western culture

**NATURAL BIOLOGICAL FACT: SEX-FEMALE**

**Social customs/institution:** Food gathering, food planting, done mostly by women, leads to the formation of ‘sororities’ with own customs, belief systems and values. The economic independence of the group depends largely on women

**Associated attitudes/values: “Feminine” values: care, nurture.**

In what I see as Bookchin’s version of the “feminine principle”, he writes: “This marvel we call ‘Nature’ has produced a marvel we call homo sapiens – ‘thinking man’- and, more significantly for the development of society, ‘thinking woman’, whose primeval domestic domain provided the arena for the origins of a caring society, human empathy, love, and idealistic commitment.” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 237)

**NATURAL BIOLOGICAL FACT: SEX-MALE**

**Social customs/institution:** Hunting, and caring for animals, done mostly by men, leads to the formation of ‘fraternities’ or ‘men’s houses’ with own customs, belief systems and values. Fraternities, by virtue of their growing “civil” responsibilities, and the spread of warfare, supersede the largely domestic sphere of women in importance<sup>24</sup>. The change to animal draft power in agriculture accentuates this shift in predominance.

**Associated attitudes/values:** “Masculine” values: combat, aggression, **patricentricity**. Its most severe form is **patriarchy**, “an institution in which the eldest male of an extended family or clan has life-and-death command over all members of the group” (Bookchin, 1993, p. 363).

The emergence of property, class, capitalism, and nation-states follows

Some ecofeminists approve Bookchin’s hypothesis here, because he articulates a historical theory of hierarchy that begins with the domination of women by men, making way for domination by race and class, and the domination of nature (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. 293). Class exploitation is often seen in this way, i.e. as a form of hierarchical domination. Bookchin refers to Marxist theory which singles out “technological advances and the presumed material surpluses they produce to explain the emergence of elite strata – indeed, of the exploiting ruling classes” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 363). Both these things privilege male responsibilities over female responsibilities, and it is well-known that “surpluses are necessary to support elites and classes” (Bookchin, 1993, pp. 363-364). But this explanation doesn’t account for why many societies, which were rich in food supplies, remained egalitarian, and never developed elite strata. Bookchin was critical of Marx’s “central focus on economics and class” which in his view, “obscured the more profound role of social hierarchy in the shaping of human history” (Tokar, 2006). Abolishing class rule and economic exploitation is not to say that one removes hierarchy at the same time; hierarchical systems of domination are more deeply entrenched in society than class (Bookchin, 1993, p. 364).

The root form of exploitation to be removed from second nature is the very *idea* of hierarchy. Bookchin contends that it is the rise of hierarchy, or more specifically, its transformation from pre-eminence earned and respected, to something coercive (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 364), which planted the *idea* of human dominion over other humans. And, “... I conceive of hierarchy as a historical presupposition for the *idea* of dominating nature” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 264).

#### 4.2.2.3 *The idea of dominating nature*

The *idea* of human dominion over other humans is the primary source of the idea that nature is hierarchically organized<sup>25</sup>, and can also be dominated by humans (Bookchin, 1993, p. 365; also 1990d,

<sup>24</sup> Feminists and ecofeminists in their critique of patriarchy, also trace the “superior” value of the “public” over the “private” sphere to this shift

<sup>25</sup> One example to which Bookchin refers, is the idea of domination of nature inherent in the biblical stories of Adam and Noah, stories which he notes are “an expression of a *social dispensation*” (1993, p. 365). Domineering hierarchy is also to be found in the 7 000 year old Gilgamesh epic of Mesopotamia, and the Greek Odyssey. There is “ample evidence” of a “sweeping remaking and despoliation of the planet” by the elites of the Mediterranean basin and China “long before the emergence of modern science, “linear” rationality, and the “industrial society, to cite causal factors that are invoked so freely in the modern ecology movement”. Such harm to nature existed alongside to harm to humanity in the form of genocide, wars and “heartless oppression” (Bookchin, 1993, p. 366). Another such hierarchical idea is surely the Great Chain of Being, examined by Lovejoy (1936, reprinted 1960)

p. 264). Bookchin explains the “distinction between ideology and reality” in the domination of nature as:

I do not know how often I have to repeat that there is a distinction between the *idea* of dominating nature – an ideology – and actually dominating nature. ... my writings focus on the *idea* of dominating nature, not on the actual *dominating of nature*, which I repeatedly, indeed emphatically, claim is impossible.<sup>26</sup> ...

The distinction between “dominating nature” and the *idea* of dominating nature is not an idle one. I am not concerned exclusively with whether a given society (be it hierarchical or egalitarian) actually damages the ecocommunity in which it is located; I am also concerned with whether it *ideologically* identifies human progress with the idea of dominating nature. I am concerned, in effect, with a broad cultural mentality and its underlying sources – notably, the projection of the idea of social domination and control into nature – not with transient behavior patterns that come or go as a result of opportunistic, often historically short-lived circumstances. Under capitalism (corporate or state), the *idea* of controlling nature is a deeply *systemic* factor in social life... (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 262, his italics).

Bookchin’s primary insight here as far as “green” is concerned, I think, is the link he makes between the idea of hierarchy, and the idea of domination of nature inherent in capitalism as means to progress. Today’s politically correct version of progress is free market sustainable development, but the ideology vis-a-vis nature is essentially the same I think – “dominating” nature is today called, the “management” of natural goods and services for humanity’s benefit.

For Bookchin, the idea of hierarchy and domination precedes as ultimate cause, all other social malformations such as ethnicity and class (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 259), and particularly capitalism, as proximate cause of the ecological crisis (Biehl, 1997a, p. 9). “... I regard it [i.e., what he calls the solid entrenchment of hierarchy in our thinking] as a problem that must now be resolved if we are to achieve an ecological society” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 264). “Until human beings cease to live in societies that are structured around hierarchies as well as economic classes, we shall never be free of domination, however much we try to dispel it with rituals, incantations, ecotheologies, and the adoption of seemingly ‘natural’ ways of life” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, pp. 365-366).

We also need to overcome our “visions of nature as a hierarchical order” if we are ever to achieve the relationships with nature envisaged in deep ecology’s “respect for nature”, or “egalitarian outlook” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 264). Overcoming the idea of dominating a hierarchically-ordered first and second nature, so that both first and second nature may resume their rational ecological path of fulfilling their latent potentialities for freedom, can only be achieved through a “new dispensation” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 365; also Bookchin, 1990d, p. 264).

#### ***4.2.2.4 Integrating second nature with first nature***

Accepting that natural phenomena [including humanity and society] are dialectical phenomena displaying a recognizable *nisus* toward increasing subjectivity and freedom, generates a specific ethic. This discussion brings forward in some respects, Bookchin’s ethic of complementarity [section 5], and views on an “ecological society” [section 6], but both are related to the next phase in his evolutionary ontology, which he calls “free nature” [section 4.3].

Biehl (1993, pp. 386-387) suggests that dialectics can educe how human beings *should* be [i.e., rational, free, and self-conscious (Biehl, 1993, p. 388)], and what an ecological society based on an ethic of complementarity with first nature *should* be, compared to what they are at present. But “what society *should be* is vastly different from what it *is*. Where it should be rational and ecological if humanity’s potentialities are fulfilled, it is irrational and anti-ecological today” (Biehl, 1993, p. 387,

<sup>26</sup> Because, as I understand Bookchin, the “domination of nature is an oxymoron that is absolutely impossible to achieve if only because all phenomena are, in a broad sense, ‘natural’” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 262)

her italics). Second nature, as it currently is, “far from marking the fulfillment of human potentialities” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 361), more resembles “a fallen humanity” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 258), which contains the potential of “tearing down the biosphere” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 361). But second nature *also* contains the potential of development toward “an entirely new ecological dispensation”, and a new ecological society (Bookchin, 1993, p. 361). This can be achieved if humanity’s contact with nature is “restored at a fuller level of mutualistic harmony” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 258), if there is a “radical *integration* of second nature with first nature along far reaching ecological lines’ or what I call ‘free nature’” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 258, citing from Bookchin, 1987a, p. 32, p. 21, his italics).

From second nature to “free nature”, is another step in natural and social evolution, another transformation or *Aufhebung* (Biehl, 1993, p. 387).

### 4.3 “Free” nature

As I understand it, this *Aufhebung* is to be achieved through a “redemptive” social dialectic (Bookchin, 1967/1968, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 37): “... the absolute negation of *all* hierarchical forms *as such*” (p. 40, his italics):

The absolute negation of the state is anarchism – a situation in which .... [human beings liberate] all the immediate circumstances of their everyday lives. The absolute negation of the city is community – a community in which the social environment is decentralized into rounded, ecologically balanced communities. The absolute negation of bureaucracy is immediate ... relations – a situation in which representation is replaced by face-to-face relations in a general assembly of free individuals. The absolute negation of the centralized economy is regional ecotechnology – a situation in which the instruments of production are molded to the resources of an ecosystem. The absolute negation of the patriarchal family is liberated sexuality – in which all forms of sexual regulation are transcended by the spontaneous, untrammled expression of eroticism among equals. The absolute negation of the marketplace is communism – in which collective abundance and cooperation transform labor into play and need into desire. (Bookchin, 1967/1968, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 41).

These elements are to be found in Bookchin’s vision of the rational free, ecological society [section 6]. The above explanation makes it easier to understand, I think, Bookchin’s later descriptions of “free nature” and its ethic of complementarity:

Free nature represents the ‘synthesis’ of first and second nature in a qualitatively *new* evolutionary dimension in which ‘first and second nature are melded into a free, rational and ethical nature’ that retains the ‘specificity’ of first and second nature divested of all notions of ‘centricity’ (read: hierarchy) *as such*. The concept of free nature is meant to express precisely the ‘ethics of complementarity’, as Roderick Nash has recently put it in his account of my views<sup>27</sup>, in which human conceptual thought, placed not ‘over’ first nature but in the service of both natural and social evolution, forms a new *symbiotic* relationship between human communities and the nonhuman ecocommunities in which they are located (Bookchin, 1990d, pp. 258-259, his italics).

“Free nature” is the phase in evolution in which “both human and nonhuman nature come into their own as a rational self-conscious, and purposeful unity” (Biehl, 1993, pp. 387-388); it represents the *telos* in which both first nature and humanity, evolving in symbiosis, have fulfilled their potential, have reached “their full actualisation”(p. 388).

---

<sup>27</sup> Nash, 1989, p. 165

### 4.3.1 View of the rational free, human being

Bookchin's view of the human being, closely intertwined with what his view of society should be [primarily section 6], is influenced by his humanist, socialist and libertarian anarchist heritage (Biehl, 1997a, p. 14).

Biehl (1997a, p. 1) sums up the socialist heritage view of the human being as:

...People are ends in their own right, the socialist tradition asserted, not means for one another's use; and they are substantive beings, with considered opinions and deep feelings, not mass-produced things with artificially induced notions and wants. People can and should throw away the economic shackles that bind them, socialists argued, cast off the fictions and unrealities that mystify them, and plan and construct, deliberately and consciously, a truly enlightened and emancipated society based on freedom and cooperation, reason and solidarity. Material aims would be secondary to ethical concerns, people would have rich, spontaneous social relationships with one another, and they would actively and responsibly participate in making all decisions about their lives, rather than subject themselves to external authoritarian control.

From the libertarian anarchist tradition, Bookchin derived his emphasis on individual autonomy, and the individual's capacity to make rational ethical choices, unfettered "by the social burdens of suprahuman forces and all forms of domination, including statesmen, the authority of custom as well as the authority of the State" (Bookchin, 1990a, in Biehl, 1997, p. 153). There is for Bookchin, a similarity between the ecologist's emphasis on spontaneity in producing diversity, and the anarchist's emphasis on "social spontaneity": of "releasing the potentialities of society and humanity, of giving free and unfettered rein" to people's creativity (Bookchin, 1965, in Bookchin, 1974, pp. 77-78). A social situation should not rule, but release such creative potential (p. 78). The possibility of autonomous choice is all-important. Anything less represents a curtailment of the individual's freedom, and demands emancipation (Bookchin, 1990a, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 151-152).

The libertarian view of the autonomous human being is however, not the isolated egoism of the liberal view, which originated in an economic market context, as Bookchin explains: "Liberalism offered the individual a modicum of 'freedom', to be sure, but one that was constructed by the 'invisible hand' of the competitive marketplace, not by the capacity of free individuals to act according to ethical considerations. The 'free entrepreneur' on whom liberalism modeled its image of individual autonomy was in fact completely trapped in a market collectivity, however 'emancipated' he seemed ... He was the plaything of a 'higher law' of market interactions based on competing egos..." (Bookchin, 1990a, in Biehl, 1997, p. 152).

By contrast, the social anarchist tradition recognizes "the social matrix of individuality"; that "our individuality depends heavily on community support systems and solidarity" (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 180). We enhance our creativity, solidarity, sense of justice, self-development, and freedom "within a socially creative and institutionally rich collectivity" (Bookchin, 1987b, p. 180).

The same anarchist heritage emphasizes the importance of the well-rounded person, in whom the dualities engendered by the oppression of hierarchy, are knitted together again, by exposing "...man to the stimuli provided by both agrarian and urban life, to physical activity and mental activity, to unrepressed sensuality<sup>28</sup> and self-directed spirituality, to communal solidarity and individual

---

<sup>28</sup> According to Bookchin, a frequently unaddressed schism is the suppression of sensuality by reason, or of the body by the mind. In the anarchist view of the human being, the body is emancipated "in the form of a new sensuousness... A sheer sense of *joie de vivre* is closely wedded to the anarchic tradition, despite the arid patches of asceticism that surface in its midst ...". Bookchin writes approvingly of the Ophites, who "in the backwash of antiquity, reread the biblical scriptures to make knowledge the key to salvation; the snake and Eve, the agents of freedom; the ecstatic release of the flesh, the medium for the full expression of the soul..." (Bookchin, 1990a, in Biehl, 1997, p. 153)

development, to regional uniqueness and worldwide brotherhood, to spontaneity and self-discipline, to the elimination of toil and the promotion of craftsmanship. In our schizoid society, these goals are regarded as mutually exclusive, indeed as sharply opposed. They appear as dualities because of the very logistics of present-day society ... ” (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 21). Anarchist thought at its best “saw these contradictions clearly and tried to overcome them with an ideal of freedom ...” (Bookchin, 1990a, in Biehl, 1997, p. 154), i.e. through a redemptive social dialectic which expresses itself in concrete, alternative social arrangements.

In free nature, humanity embraces a new ethic of complementarity. In this ethic, human beings do not regard themselves as “the lords of creation”. Human needs and the needs of nonhuman life-forms are joined in a beneficial reciprocal relationship. Human beings are divided neither against the nonhuman world, nor against themselves (Biehl, 1993, p. 388).

## 5. The ethic

Dialectical naturalism contains within it, a naturalistic ethic, which in Bookchin’s view, is an *objective* ethic, based in evolution as ontology, which however avoids past abuse of nature philosophy to legitimate social aberrations such as fascism, anti-Semitism, imperialism, and racism. There is in the idea that first nature has immanent mind, displaying *nisus* towards increasing subjectivity and freedom [4.1.2, 4.1.3], and in a phenomenon’s successful or unsuccessful development towards its implied actuality, an ontological standard of what “the rational, the good, the just, or indeed the free” is (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992). Dialectical naturalism “forms an *objective* framework for making ethical judgements...”. Its ethic is not “merely a matter of personal taste and values”, but “factually anchored in the world itself as an objective standard of self-realization” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 214, his italics).

Bookchin rejects “the naturalistic fallacy”, that is, the failure to separate “ought” from “is”. Because he rejects Hume’s philosophical heritage, “with its lack of contextuality, historicity, or sense of direction” in which “virtually anything is possible if it can be stated consistently” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 255), he also rejects Hume’s argument that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is”. From a dialectical point of view, Bookchin argues that Hume’s is/ought dichotomy is “simply meaningless” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 270), a non-issue<sup>29</sup>. Using “eduction” as form of reasoning [section 3.2], evolutionary biology and ecology can act normatively as well (based on thoughts from Eckersley, 1989, p. 109). “The ‘ought’ or the ‘what should be’, in fact, is even more ‘real’ than an existential ‘is’ if it expresses the logical implications of the potential. It [“it” referring as I understand it, to the “ought”] is the *actual* (*wirklich*) qua the realization of the potential and, as such, the *rational*. The critical and moral implications of this view, as writers like Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse have pointed out, are sweeping indeed ... ” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 270, his italics).

While not comprehending fully what Bookchin is saying here, I understand at least that he means, that it is in the difference between the “what should be” of something, compared to what it “is”, that moral significance lies. There are moral dimensions to immanent potentiality becoming actuality. One is that the actualization might not happen. Something might interfere with it, or eliminate the process altogether. The thing might not become what its potentialities suggest it *ought* to become. Bookchin sees in this “distinction between the rational<sup>30</sup> and the accidental ... a significant moral ... insight”

<sup>29</sup> Committing the “naturalistic fallacy” seems to be a regular feature of the ecological worldview. Goldsmith (1992) also argues that Hume’s view is invalid. On Goldsmith’s view, the relation of is to ought cannot be reduced to a mere matter of logic; it is inescapably linked to a worldview as well (pp. 403-407)

<sup>30</sup> Bookchin’s term for what the thing’s potentialities suggest it ought to become. It is “rational” because the “ought” is not arbitrary but implicit in the phenomenon. “Accidental” would suggest randomness in nature’s evolution, which social ecologists refute

(Bookchin, 1990d, p. 267; also p. 269, p. 270)]. In the real-world example given earlier, the acorn might not become the oak tree. It might be prematurely eaten, or fail to find soil in which to germinate.

A second moral dimension of first nature is its symbiosis. While not denying opposition, conflict, and struggle as operating forces in nature [the traditional Marxist dialectical view of nature], Bookchin emphasizes reconciliation, co-operation, and harmony more (Simon, 1990, pp. 218-219, 223), much as nineteenth century anarchist Kropotkin's mutual aid in nature<sup>31</sup> thesis did. The success of an organism's unfolding of potentiality into increasing freedom "*depends on the existence of symbiotic cooperation at all levels*" of nature (Clark, 1993, p. 347, my italics). Socially, this milieu of mutual aid/symbiosis is best provided in the context of Kropotkin-like small-scale communities (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer and Pierce, 1994, p. 231). Hence the antipathy to hierarchy, the preference for local autonomy, and for communitarian values in political praxis found in Social Ecology's view of society [section 6].

## 5.1 The theory of motivation to ethical behaviour

How to achieve the "Aufhebung" from second nature to "free nature", the *telos* in which both first nature and humanity have fulfilled their potential, have reached "their full actualisation", of which Biehl (1993, p. 387, p. 388) spoke? It is only through a change in humanity's spiritual values – "a far-reaching transformation of our prevailing mentality of domination into one of complementarity" – that "an awakened humanity" will be able to "complement nonhuman beings own capacities to produce a richer, creative, and developmental whole – not as a "dominant" species but as a supportive one" (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 355).

However, the concept of spiritual regeneration in Bookchin's work has nothing to do with religion. Nature's self-evolving pattern of self-organization is not dependent on a "transcendent God or Spirit" (Eckersley, 1989, p. 102). Social ecology's call for the "respiritization of the natural world" is also not to be understood as, for example, some ecofeminists' understanding of the earth as goddess to be worshipped (Chapter Six). It "should not be mistaken for a theology that raises a deity above the natural world or that seeks to discover one within it." Its spirituality "is definitively naturalistic ... rather than supernaturalistic or pantheistic" (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 355).

Social ecology does not prioritise *any* form of spirituality above the social factors responsible for the degradation of nature. It is the "blind social mechanism" of the market, along with hierarchy and class, which is responsible for "turning soil into sand, ...poisoning air and water, and producing sweeping climatic and atmospheric changes..." (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 355) ... these are the factors which have far greater potential in shaping the future of the natural world than any "privatistic forms of spiritual self-regeneration" (Bookchin, 1993, p. 356).

## 5.2 The theory of value

Bookchin did not subscribe to "a priori vagaries like 'intrinsic worth' (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992), a concept which only humans could have come up with in the first place (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 217-218). Bookchin does consider that values in nature are values in themselves; he refers to "implicit" value: "... I am trying to say, following a long philosophical tradition, that values are implicit in the natural world..." (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 255, footnote 9). He identifies some of these values: "Mutualism [sometimes called symbiosis], self-organization, freedom, and subjectivity, cohered by social ecology's principles of unity in diversity, spontaneity, and nonhierarchical

---

<sup>31</sup> According to social ecologist Bradford, Kropotkin's thesis of mutual aid and co-operation in evolution "is now being vindicated by evolutionary theory's deepening understanding of symbiosis and mutualism in nature" (Bradford, 1993, p. 431)

relationships, *are thus ends in themselves ... Nature does not 'exist' for us*; it simply legitimates us and our uniqueness ecologically” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 273, my italics).

Other values are first nature’s “directionality” (Simon, 1990, p. 213), “increasing complexity”, “incredible mutability”, “fecundity” and “creativity” (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 257; Eckersley, 1989, p. 103 and footnote 15). Eckersley (1989, p. 103) provides a social ecology version of Leopold’s famous maxim<sup>32</sup>: “A thing is right when it tends to foster the diversity, complexity, complementarity, and spontaneity of the ecosystem. It is wrong when it tends otherwise”.

### 5.2.1 The special status of diversity as value

Diversity [variety, increasing differentiation] holds special value for Bookchin, because (1) it produces the equilibrium and stability in first nature needed to support advanced life; applied to both first and second nature, (2) it is a source of freedom, and (3) a measure of progress in society.

#### 5.2.1.1 Diversity and stability

Diversity is at the heart of what Bookchin calls ecology’s “critical” and “reconstructive” messages:

If we diminish variety in the natural world, we debase its unity and wholeness; we destroy the forces making for natural harmony and for a lasting equilibrium; and, what is even more significant, we introduce an absolute retrogression in the development of the natural world that may eventually render the environment unfit for advanced forms of life. To sum up the reconstructive message of ecology: If we wish to advance the unity and stability of the natural world, if we wish to harmonize it, we must conserve and promote variety” (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 20).

#### 5.2.1.2. Diversity and freedom

Eckersley (1989, p. 104) suggests that Bookchin accords to diversity “a special status as a guarantor of ongoing freedom”, and cites from his paper on “Freedom and necessity in nature: a problem in ecological ethics”:

Diversity may be regarded as a source not only of greater ecocommunity stability; it may also be regarded in a very fundamental sense as an ever-expanding, albeit nascent, source of *freedom* within nature, a medium of objectively anchoring varying degrees of choice, self-directedness, and *participation by life-forms in their own evolution* (Bookchin, 1986b, p. 5, his italics).

Some conceptual steps have been omitted in this particular Bookchin leap from diversity to freedom though. I understand his argument to be that variety [differentiation, diversity] is “a *precondition* for complexity in organisms and ecosystems” (Bookchin, 1995c, p. 215, his italics); it is the interactive and interdependent complexity which allows the emergence of subjectivity. As subjectivity accumulates in first nature, so it allows the increased choice and self-direction which constitutes freedom (based on Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 215, p. 216, p. 217).

#### 5.2.1.3 Diversity and social progress

Diversity produces the “ecological principle of wholeness and balance as a product of diversity” (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 21). How would this principle apply to social theory? In Herbert Read’s (1954/1971) discussion of the philosophy of anarchism, progress “is measured by the degree of differentiation within a society”. Closely associated with diversity in first nature is the spontaneity with which it arises. A society should therefore be one in which “the potentialities of society and humanity” are released, one in which people’s creativity is given “free and unfettered rein”. This is not achieved in societies of rule and domination, but in one in which “insight, reason, and knowledge” are

---

<sup>32</sup> “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold, [1949], 1966, p. 240)

recognized as the means for fulfilling the potentialities of a situation (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 21).

### 5.3 The scope

Bookchin's ethic covers the entire spectrum of nature as he understands it - first, second, and free nature: "...in my view, 'the only meaningful, long-term solution [is] to replace the modern world's 'odious morality' with a holistic, environmental ethic that ... [has] as its basis respect for all people and all nature'" (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 266, citing his own words, in Nash, 1989, p.p. 164-165). Complementarity as ethical obligation towards fellow human beings forms part of my discussion of Bookchin's views on society [section 6]. I focus next on human beings' obligations towards first nature.

### 5.4 The moral obligation: an ethic of complementarity

The concept of free nature is meant to express precisely the 'ethics of complementarity', ... in which human conceptual thought, placed not 'over' first nature but in the service of both natural and social evolution, forms a new *symbiotic* relationship between human communities and the nonhuman ecocommunities in which they are located. (Bookchin, 1990d, pp. 258-259, his italics)

Bookchin's ethic of complementarity as far as first nature is concerned, boils down to purposive human intervention in it, but with an important caveat.

Human beings, having understood the nature of nature – evolutionary, creative, mutualistic, fecund (Simon, 1990, p. 225 citing Bookchin, 1986a, p. 71), marked by a tendency towards increasing subjectivity, rationality, and freedom (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 259), have, as nature's "self-reflexive" voice (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 273), "a moral responsibility to function creatively in the unfolding of that evolution" (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 369). They should place their "intellectual, communicative, and social [traits] at the *service* of natural evolution<sup>33</sup> to consciously increase biotic diversity, diminish suffering, foster the further evolution of new and ecologically valuable life-forms, reduce the impact of disastrous accidents or the harsh effects of mere change" (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer, 1994, p. 237; his italics). Human beings should "complement nonhuman beings own capacities to produce a richer, creative, and developmental whole" (Bookchin, 1993, p. 355), even act "on behalf of life and evolution" (Clark, 1993, p. 349), helping nature along, as it were, in its own tendency towards self-transformation and self-development, towards greater diversity and greater value.

Here is the caveat:

Whether this species, gifted by the creativity of natural evolution, can play the role of a nature rendered self-conscious or cut against the grain of natural evolution by simplifying the biosphere, polluting it, and undermining the cumulative results of organic evolution is above all a *social* problem (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 237-238, his italics).

For Bookchin, the social problem can only be solved by a transition to a society free of the idea of hierarchy and domination, expressed in "palpable social institutions that will give active meaning to its goal [i.e. the complementarity ethic] of wholeness, and of human involvement as conscious and moral agents in the interplay of species" (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 369). This is the "free nature" stage of evolution.

---

<sup>33</sup> Biehl (1993, p. 387) writes similarly that in the complementarity ethic, humanity places its consciousness at the service of first nature, "by diminishing the impact of natural catastrophes, and promoting the thrust of natural evolution toward diversity and ending needless suffering, thereby fueling the creativity of natural evolution through its technics, science and rationality"

#### 5.4.1 Clarification of acceptable human intervention into first nature

I repeatedly encounter criticisms of my support of human intervention into nature ... As I have repeatedly emphasized, only in an ecological society can we hope that human ingenuity and technology will play an ecologically creative role. Rarely, however, do my deep ecology critics take cognizance of this position (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 272).

I derive next from Bookchin's 1990 paper, and other writings, what I see as clarifications of the kind of human intervention into nature which would be permissible within an ethic of complementarity:

- (1) Intervention is not "a desideratum under all circumstances" (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 272).
- (2) The intervention should protect, restore, and help those values in nature which Bookchin considers important, for example, mutualism, self-organization, unity in diversity, spontaneity, and nonhierarchical relationships (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 273).
- (3) It is dubious if any intervention within a capitalist system would count as "complementarity": "Let me explain again that I have no confidence that capitalism – either corporate or state – can intervene in first nature (or for that matter, in second nature) constructively" (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 272).
- (4) Complementarity demands prudence, not mastery. "Even if we were to make this advance [to a free nature society], it would be an essential part of my view that first nature is far too complex to be dealt with in anything but the most prudent manner" (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 255, footnote 6). This view is also present in his citation from his *Ecology of Freedom* (1982, pp. 24-25, repeated in Bookchin, 1990d, p. 257; also in Bookchin, 1982, in Biehl, 1997, p. 35):

To assume that science commands this vast nexus of organic and inorganic relationship in all its details is worse than arrogance; it is sheer stupidity. ... The compelling dictum 'respect for nature', has concrete implications. To assume that our knowledge of this complex, richly textured, and perpetually changing natural kaleidoscope of life-forms lends itself to a degree of 'mastery' that allows us free rein in manipulating the biosphere is sheer foolishness.

- (5) But it is unlikely that a case could be made against human interventions which are "very prudent, nonexploitative, and ecologically guided ... in an ecological society" (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 272, his italics). The concept "ecological society" [section 6] also has limiting implications on intervention into nature.

Deep ecology, writes Bookchin, "...must desist from calling everything "anthropocentric" such that every creative intervention of the human mind into first nature, within the framework of an ecological society, is assumed to be *ipso facto* undesirable" (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 272).

#### 5.4.2 Is the ethic of complementarity, anthropocentric?

Deep ecologists have accused social ecologists of ontological dualism, of seeing humanity as transcendent over nature, as seeking to steer the direction of evolution; generally, of being anthropocentric. It is essential to look carefully at this critique by deep ecologists, because, within the purpose of this study, it is saying that social ecology, in one important dimension at least, is not "green" [the Wissenburg heuristic, Chapter One, Figure 2; and the rough "rule definition"<sup>34</sup> of "green"

<sup>34</sup> "Any new social movement, political party, philosophy, or political ideology which describes itself as "green", or is described by a reliable commentator as "green" qualifies as a member of the "green" set. Further, a member of the "green" set will tend towards biocentrism/ecocentrism as theory of environmental value, and propose radical, not reformist, changes to society (Wissenburg, 1993, pp. 4-5)"

partly derived from it, in Chapter Two, section 1.1]. On balance though, it seems that Bookchin cannot be accused of anthropocentrism as it is normally defined. Even so, defined by dark green deep ecology standards<sup>35</sup>, his ethic of complementarity is too interfering in nature.

#### 5.4.2.1 *Dualistic?*

Deep ecologist Sessions (1995c, p. 97) charges that social ecology's 'second nature' view exemplifies a human/nature dualism. It is hard to find in Bookchin's ontological thought though [section 4.2.1.1], anything except a firm denial of any human/nature dualism. Even Robyn Eckersley, deep ecologist critic of Bookchin, grants that his numerous writings on social ecology "have sought to undermine the cleavage between the social and the natural and restore a sense of continuity between human society and the creative process of natural evolution..." (Eckersley, 1989, p. 100).

#### 5.4.2.2 *Transcendent?*

Sessions also critiques the second nature view as dualistic and anthropocentric in that human beings are able to escape the "predictability, determinism, environmental control, instincts and other mechanisms which 'imprison' other life forms" (Sessions, 1995c, pp. 101-102<sup>36</sup>). On this view, humanity has transcended nature (Sessions, 1995c, p. 97), implying also then, the transcendence of "natural laws and constraints" (Sessions, 1995c, p. 303).

Bookchin does speak of transcendence, but in the context of a second nature [humanity] which has overcome its hierarchical failings:

It is basic to my argument, ... that in an ecological society, no conflict need exist between the two [i.e. between human and nonhuman interests] precisely because second nature – with its hierarchical class, economic, ethnic and psychological malformations – is transcended in a harmonious relationship among humans and between humanity and nature (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 259).

And:

It is essential to emphasize that second nature is, in fact, an *unfinished*, indeed inadequate, development of nature as a whole. ... Hierarchy, class, the state, and the like are evidence – and, by no means, purely accidental evidence – of the unfulfilled potentialities of nature to actualize itself as a nature that is self-consciously creative. *Humanity as it now exists is not nature rendered self-conscious*. The future of the biosphere depends overwhelmingly on whether second nature can be transcended in a new system of social and organic conciliation, one that I would call 'free nature' – a nature that would diminish the pain and suffering that exist in both first and second nature. Free nature, in effect, would be a conscious and ethical nature, an ecological society.... (Bookchin, 1990b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 218, his italics).

#### 5.4.2.3 *Steering the direction of evolution?*

Deep ecologists have charged Bookchin with suggesting that humanity should "seize the helm of evolution"<sup>37</sup> (Bookchin, 1990d, p. 254, p. 258, commenting on this charge by Eckersley); that human beings, through their rationality, "can take control of the earth's evolutionary processes", and can "determine the direction of evolution" (Sessions, 1994, p. 220), a claim which Bookchin rejects (1990d, pp. 253-274).

<sup>35</sup> Chapter Four, point 5 of the deep ecology platform, in section 1.3.4, and primarily section 4.1.4

<sup>36</sup> Drawing on Shepard (1969, no page given)

<sup>37</sup> Eckersley wrote: "There are certain parallels ... between Bookchin's organismic philosophy and the interdisciplinary philosophy of the French theologian Teilhard de Chardin, although they should not be pressed too far. Both thinkers understand the evolutionary process in terms of advancing subjectivity that has reached its most developed forms in humans, who have become 'nature rendered self-conscious', at the helm of evolution" (Eckersley, 1989, p. 104). Eckersley's "helm" image possibly comes from Bookchin's interpretation of ecologist Charles Elton's image of nature as a boat: "The world's future has to be managed, but this management would not be just like a game of chess – more like steering a boat.' What ecology, both natural and social can hope to teach us is how to find the current and understand the direction of the stream." (Bookchin, 1982b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 35)

Bookchin does see humanity as playing a creative role in nature's further evolution, particularly towards increasing diversity (Bookchin, 1982b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 35), but again, it is within his vision of complementarity in "free nature": "The objective ethics of dialectical naturalism has a special importance in creating an ecological sensibility, in that it justifies the creative function that human beings can play in the evolutionary process in fostering biodiversity, preserving species, diminishing needless pain and suffering in the natural world, and the like. Dialectical naturalism provides the soundest basis that I know of for imbuing a free, ecologically oriented society with the ethical obligation to engage in the evolutionary function of humanity as potentially nature rendered self-conscious." (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992).

#### 5.4.2.4 *Not the more familiar kind of anthropocentrism*

Is the ethic of complementarity, anthropocentric as deep ecologist Sessions charges? Environmental ethicist Attfield (2003, p. 188) defines normative anthropocentrism as "A stance that limits moral standing to human beings, confines the scope of morality and moral concern to human interests, and regards nothing but human well-being as valuable intrinsically. (Literally, anthropocentrism of values, norms and principles)". Bookchin's anthropocentrism is not of this variety.

Deep ecology supporter Eckersley (1989, p. 115, her italics, my bold emphasis) writes that "Bookchin's anthropocentrism ... is not of the more familiar kind. Indeed, his philosophy of nature is in part a critique of mechanistic materialism and instrumentalism along with the idea that humans must dominate and control nature so as to adapt it to *human* ends. Rather, human activity must be guided by overarching evolutionary and ecological processes, **not the instrumental needs of humans**, an approach that seeks to reconnect human social activity with the natural realm". She also writes that "To be sure, Bookchin himself has made many early and important inroads into anthropocentrism. He has repeatedly emphasized his rejection of *environmentalism*<sup>38</sup>..." (Eckersley, 1989, p. 114, her italics). These comments seem to rule out the complementarity ethic as strictly anthropocentric.

#### 5.4.2.5 *But a rather interfering kind of stewardship, nonetheless*

The other idea abhorrent to deep ecologists is the amount of interference into natural processes which Bookchin's special role for human beings ["human stewardship of the earth" (Bookchin, 1987a, p. 32)] seems to legitimate. He writes: "From an evolutionary viewpoint, humanity has been *constituted* to intervene actively, consciously, and purposively into first nature with unparalleled effectiveness and to alter it on a planetary scale. To denigrate this capacity is to deny the thrust of natural evolution itself..." (Bookchin, 1990b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 216, his italics). There is in Bookchin's writings, a spirited defence of human interference in natural processes (for example, Bookchin, 1990d, pp. 272-273). Second nature has anyway, "all but absorbed first nature"; there is no part of the world "that has not been profoundly affected by human activity", such wild areas which continue to exist do so primarily as a result of human decisions; nearly all "the nonhuman life-forms that exist today are, like it or not, to some degree in human custody, and whether they are preserved in their wild lifeways depends largely on human attitudes and behaviour" (Bookchin, 1990b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 217).

Sessions argues that Bookchin's views positively encourage the "continued humanization and domestication" of "first nature" by "second nature", on the grounds that "the wild is 'liberated' and made 'free' when humans override natural spontaneous processes" (Sessions, 1994, p. 220<sup>39</sup>). Eckersley argues that Bookchin's "vision of human stewardship" is "troubling" in that it "does not qualify how and to what extent" we are to discharge our responsibility of promoting diversity in nature (Eckersley, 1989, p. 111). Simon (1990, pp. 223-224) also has concerns as to how specifically, humans

<sup>38</sup> Bookchin's understanding of environmentalism is presented in section 2.1.4.2 of this chapter

<sup>39</sup> "As with Marcuse, the wild is 'liberated' and made 'free' for Bookchin when humans override natural spontaneous processes and 'rationally' direct the Earth's evolutionary processes" (Sessions, 1995g, p. 304, citing Bookchin, 1990c, p. 204

are to co-operate “in the process of teleological development of which we are such a significant part”, such as, who decides what the potentialities in nature are, and which ones count as teleological development? Bookchin’s view that humanity’s distinctive intellectual, communicative, and social traits should be placed in the service of natural evolution to consciously increase biotic diversity, leaves deep ecologists “wondering what biotechnology company could present a better case to legitimate their activities?” (Fox, 1989, p. 16, footnote 28).

Environmental ethicist Attfield is also concerned: “Belief in stewardship also has its dangers. While stewardship is usually regarded as aimed at ‘preserving the face of the earth in beauty, usefulness and fruitfulness’ and therewith Earth’s species, attempts to take control of the entire surface of the planet, or of the entire evolutionary process, have been suggested in its name by (among others) the social ecologist Murray Bookchin, as realizing the creativity implicit in nature. This, however, is a domineering approach, out of keeping with stewardship...” (Attfield, 2003, p. 23, and footnotes 55 and 56 on p. 28<sup>40</sup>).

Even if we ever did achieve Bookchin’s ecological free nature society, and its harmonious complementarity ethic, it *is*, if not anthropocentric, then at least breathtakingly arrogant [presumptuous, in Eckersley’s view (1989, p. 111, p. 115), domineering in environmental ethicist Attfield’s view (2003, p. 23)] to think that humanity, which represents only a moment in evolutionary history, has understood evolution’s intent, and could or should forthwith assist in its further unfolding towards not mere diversity, but subjectivity. In the final analysis, I think, it is only one’s personal ultimate premises which can help one decide if human beings are entitled to guide [not just interfere with] nature’s general evolution.

### 5.4.3 The animal welfare issue

Despite its claims to being radically green [section 1], the issue of animal welfare - one of Wall’s (1994, p. 66) two qualifying criteria for “dark green” - appears to be a non-issue in social ecology. In all the sources personally consulted on social ecology, I encountered only one paragraph referring to one aspect of animal welfare, that is, the status of livestock in industrial agriculture:

Today food animals are being manipulated like a lifeless industrial resource. Normally, large numbers of animals are collected in the smallest possible area and are allowed only as much movement as is necessary for mere survival. Our meat animals have been placed on a diet composed for the most part of medicated feed high in carbohydrates. ... Our dairy herds are handled like machines, our poultry flocks, like hothouse tomatoes. The need to restore the time-honored intimacy between man and his livestock is just as pronounced as the need to bring agriculture within the horizon of the individual farmer. .... (Bookchin, 1962, in Biehl, 1997, p. 16).

The flavour here is decidedly human; farm animals are unlikely to have as their first priority, intimacy with the farmer. I encountered no discussion, for example, of how the ethic of complementarity is to be interpreted vis-a-vis the kind of animal welfare issues which concern the animal liberation theorists [Chapter Three], the ecofeminists [Chapter Six], or even Die Grünen [Chapter Seven, section 5.4.4]. As with the deep ecologists, attention to animal liberation issues in social ecology seems underdeveloped, to say the least.

## 6. View of society

The *Leitmotif* for social ecology is always that the causes of the ecological crisis are social in nature. The way to avert the danger of ecological disaster is to fundamentally transform present society “into a rational<sup>41</sup> and ecological one” (Biehl, 1997a, p. 7). The major characteristics of Bookchin’s “free

<sup>40</sup> These cite respectively, Hale, M. (1677), section 4, Chapter. 8, p. 370; and Bookchin (1987a, no page given by Attfield)

<sup>41</sup> Where “rational” means, that both first and second nature are firmly on the developmental path that their latent potentiality suggests they

nature” society were already introduced in section 4.3. Here I discuss some elements of Bookchin’s critique of existing hierarchical society (6.1), humanistic or liberatory technology as means of progressing to a post-scarcity society (6.2), and the major characteristics of his rational ecological society (6.3).

## 6.1 The critique of existing society

Bookchin’s critique of current society begins with an affirmation of Enlightenment values such as “humanism, naturalism, reason, science, and technology”. But second nature, as it exists today, is marked by “monstrous attributes”, such as hierarchy, the state, private property, class, and “a competitive market economy that obliges economic rivals to grow at the expense of each other or perish” (Bookchin, 1995c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 217). The two aspects of Bookchin’s critique of existing society discussed here are the concentration of power in hierarchical institutions such as the state (6.1.1), and capitalism as economic system and culture (6.1.2).

### 6.1.1 Power

Bookchin does not see power in the diffused way that postmodernists do. “The problem of dealing with the growing power of nation-states and of centralized corporations, property ownership, production, and the like is *precisely a question of power* – that is to say, who shall have it or who shall be denied any power at all” (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 192, his italics). Power is real, tangible, and solid, a “muscular fact of life” (p. 193). To ignore that is to “drift from the visionary into the ethereal ...” (p. 193). Power that is not in the hands of citizens, is in Bookchin’s view, power in the wrong place.

#### 6.1.1.1 and the nation-state

Bookchin does not favour the nation-state, “the principal source of nationalism, a regressive ideology, and of statism, the principle source of coercion” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 371). “Statecraft”, that is, the professional management of the state, is nothing other than “the exercise of its [i.e. the State’s] monopoly of violence, its control of the entire regulative apparatus of society in the form of legal and ordinance-making bodies, and its governance of society by means of professional legislators, armies, police forces, and bureaucracies” (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 193). By its very nature, the state is “a coercive, professionalized, and domineering phenomenon that never ceases to expand, to increase its powers, and to try in all circumstances to take over the entirety of social life” (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992). Political parties, with their hierarchical organization, and their attempts through power manoeuvres to occupy the offices which make and execute policy, are nothing other than miniature states (Bookchin, 1987b, p. 174).

He dismisses patriotism too: “ ‘Patriotism’, as the etymology of the word indicates, is the nation-state’s conception of the citizen as a child, the obedient creature of the nation-state conceived as a paterfamilias or stern father, who orchestrates belief and commands devotion...” (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 181). *Philia* [section 6.3.3.1], not patriotism, is the expression of true citizenship.

Only if the entire hierarchical power structure is radically democratized, will the principles of participation and complementarity be possible (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 193). If ordinary people are to regain power from the state, “the management of society must be deprofessionalized as much as possible. That is to say, it must be simplified and rendered transparent, indeed, clear, accessible, and manageable such that most of its affairs can be run by ordinary citizens” (p. 193). I single out this aspect of Bookchin’s thought because it provides the forgotten radical context

---

should be on, i.e. on their way to freedom

- as with so much of “green” - of today’s citizens’ polite requests for “transparency” in government. What is needed is a movement of people which will “*initiate* local steps to regain power in its most popular and democratic forms” (p. 193, his italics). It is only citizens participating in direct democracy who can “potentially eliminate the domination of human by human” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 372) and thereby, the human domination of nature. Part of this domination is capitalism as economic system, and as culture.

### 6.1.2 Capitalism as economy and culture

Unless we realize that the present market society, structured around the brutally competitive imperative of ‘grow or die’, is a thoroughly impersonal self-operating mechanism, we will falsely tend to blame technology as such or population growth as such for environmental problems. We will ignore their root causes, such as trade for profit, industrial expansion, and the identification of ‘progress’ with corporate self-interest (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 355).

To all his writing, notes Biehl (1997a, p. 11), “Bookchin brings a passionate hatred of the capitalist social order...”. Let’s not beat about the bush, or use metaphors such as “technological/industrial” society as the reason for our ecocide, says Bookchin (1988a, in VanDeVeer, 1994, p. 237), the problem is “the vested corporate and political interests we should properly call *capitalism*” (1988, in VanDeVeer, 1994, p. 238, his italics), one of the worst forms of hierarchal social order, and ecological destruction, now expressing itself in multinational mobile capital and globalization. Nor in the social ecology view, were the planned, state capitalisms of the East European communist states any better in this regard (Kovel, 1993, p. 407); they were “equally ecologically destructive” (Bookchin, 1991, in Chase, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 241). Social ecology’s major criticisms of modern capitalism are the a-morality of its market system, its devastating impact on the environment, its “commodification” and “marketing” of almost every aspect of human life, and its “aura of invincibility”.

The market system has acquired a life of its own, and is “*largely impervious to moral considerations and efforts at ethical persuasion*” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., p. 367; his italics; also p. 368). Maxims such as “‘business is business’ explicitly tell us that ethical, religious, psychological and emotional factors have absolutely no place in the impersonal world of production, profit, and growth” (p. 368). Progress is now defined in these terms, and no longer, as it once was, as “a faith in the evolution of greater human cooperation and care” (Bookchin, 1993, p. 367). Other elements of his market critique are: (1) It is no longer a place of exchange, providing for people’s moderate needs, but has become “a procreator of needs, many of which are simply useless” (2) It is a “bitterly competitive” (p. 367) system in which non-durable, non-repairable goods are produced “exclusively for sale and profit” (p. 367), and the media contribute to fostering their “mindless consumption” (p. 368). Large corporations have become skilled at turning people’s ecological concern into marketing ploys aimed at “green” consumerism<sup>42</sup> (p. 368). (3) The “driving imperatives” (p. 367) of the industrial market are capitalistic development, technological innovation, dehumanizing competition, profit, and expansionism – a kind of devour or be devoured mentality.

A society based on such an outlook must necessarily have a “devastating ecological impact” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., p. 368). Capitalism, “with its insatiable extraction of energy and resources and its relentless production of waste under the imperative of accumulation, is responsible for the ecological crisis. The capitalist must obey the rule of the maximization of profit or disappear, to be replaced by another who obeys; and since profits are made by the exploitation of nature, so must capital exploit nature on an ever-increasing scale” (Kovel, 1993, p. 406). This is exacerbated as the capitalist economy “becomes industrialized, monopolized, and globalized”. Small-

<sup>42</sup> “We live in a highly cooptative society that is only too eager to find new areas of commercial aggrandizement and to add ecological verbiage to its advertising and customer relations” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 356)

scale, local destruction of nature becomes “ecocide” (Kovel, 1993, p. 411). Corporate capitalism is for Bookchin, “*inherently* anti-ecological”. “Green” capitalism, “green” consumerism, and running workshops for corporate executives on how to adopt “ecologically sound business ethics” is nothing other than “shallow, reformist, and very naïve thinking” (Bookchin, 1991, in Chase, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 245, his italics).

Capitalism has gone beyond being only an economic system, to becoming an entire way of life, “based upon economization of human reality” (Kovel, 1993, p. 406). It “is penetrating into every aspect of daily life—into the family, personal relationships, the most intimate values—not only into all aspects of economic life. The supermarket and shopping mall are perhaps the best metaphors I have for the way in which [capitalism organizes] daily life ... People are being reduced to mere buyers and sellers, not fulfilled as individuals and citizens ... [there has been] what I call the *marketization* of everyday life, to coin a word—commodification is not a strong enough word ...” (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992, his italics). Capitalism has become “a grim social pathology” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 355).

Yet capitalism has about it, an “aura of invincibility”, a “mystique” (Kovel, 1993, p. 407), now strengthened by the failure of “the heroic socialist revolutions” to dislodge it (Kovel, 1993, p. 407). We “are only just beginning to understand what capitalism really *is*, and we can barely anticipate what it will become at a later period. ... We have yet to see how capitalism will unfold ...” (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992, his italics). Given that, Marx’s economic prognoses of capitalism’s further development are today irrelevant, and so are “the attempts of neo-Marxists to situate Marxian theories in contemporary life” (Bookchin, in Fotopoulos, 1992). What is needed is a *fundamental* social transformation (Bookchin, 1993, p. 369):

We are not simply talking about ending class exploitation, as most Marxists demand, as important as that is. We are talking about uprooting *all* forms of hierarchy and domination, in all spheres of social life. Of course, the immediate source of the ecological crisis is capitalism, but, to this, social ecologists add a deeper problem at the heart of our civilization – the existence of hierarchies and of a hierarchical mentality or culture that preceded the emergence of economic classes and exploitation. ... We need to search into institutionalized systems of coercion, command, and obedience that exist today and which preceded the emergence of economic classes. Hierarchy is not necessarily economically motivated. We must look beyond economic forms of exploitation into cultural forms of domination that exist in the family, between generations, sexes, racial and ethnic groups, in all institutions of political economic, and social management, and very significantly in the way we experience reality as a whole, including nature and non-human life-forms. (Bookchin, 1991, in Chase, 1991, in VanDeVeer, 1994, p. 244, his italics).

Bookchin considered the amazing advances in twentieth century technology to hold the potential for satisfying the preconditions for freedom in his “post-scarcity” society.

## 6.2 Scarcity, technology, and post-scarcity

“Liberatory” technology is the key which opens the door to Bookchin’s radical new society. His views must be understood though within the context of the idea of “scarcity”, both as material scarcity and as ideological pretext for centralized control of human beings by human beings, and domination of nature by human beings.

Often as a result of inequitable distribution of wealth, people have been, and are still, obliged to toil for long hours each day, either to wrest the goods they need for survival from a “stingy nature”, or to earn a livelihood. This is Marx’s “realm of necessity”. Bookchin sees material scarcity to blame for the emergence of hierarchy in our anthropological history [section 4.2.3.1]. It “provided the historic rationale of the development of the patriarchal family, private property, class domination, and the

state...” (Bookchin, 1971, p. 9, in Biehl, 1997b, p. 99). Apart from actual material scarcity, there is also the *idea* of scarcity<sup>43</sup>, utilized by authoritarian elites for ideological purposes of control – Bookchin would say, for domination and exploitation - of the many by an elite few. One need only think of the regulation of oil supply, or a food product, where surpluses are deliberately not released into the market in order to preserve the notion of scarcity, and thus a particular price, to realise that this kind of constructed scarcity is still part of our economy.

Practically, in our own age, scarcity and necessity have meant that there is simply not enough time for people to engage themselves in those pursuits which would contribute to the unfolding of their full potential as human beings, part of which, on the anarchist view, is political self-management. Because of its “pernicious social and political consequences”, the elimination of scarcity (the reduction of toil, and the ushering in of an age of abundance for all) is a longstanding vision in the socialist tradition (Biehl, 1997b, p. 100).

Bookchin’s argument is that up until the 1950s/1960s in western history, material scarcity was a function of *technology*’s limited ability to lessen the amount of time spent by humankind each day in “toil”. But with the advent of modern automation and “cybernation<sup>44</sup>”, modern technology is capable of delivering an abundance of goods in a fraction of the time previously needed. Western countries “... are now confronted by the possibility of a materially abundant, even toilless era in which most of the means of life can be provided by machines” (Bookchin, 1965d, in Biehl, 1997, p. 107). With the possibility of banishing scarcity, there could be no further justification for centralized authorities or the market to regulate distribution of goods and resources. The human being, now relieved of the burden of necessity through “liberatory technology”, would have the free time to pursue “erotic liberation” as well as “social and political revolution” (Biehl, 1997b, p. 100) in a “post-scarcity” society.

By “post-scarcity”, Bookchin means, not just freedom from material want, but the dissolution of all forms of hierarchy and domination, including capitalism, in a new, eco-anarchist society. By “liberatory” technology, he means not only the new, versatile, human-scale computer-based technologies which would reduce the amount of daily toil and free people to pursue liberation, but also the renewable energy technologies (Biehl, 1997b, p. 101) which would restore human beings’ relationship with nature: “To bring the sun, the wind, the earth, indeed the world of life back into technology, into the means of human survival would be a revolutionary renewal of man’s ties to nature” (Bookchin, 1965b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 30). These two kinds of technologies would provide the means of moving into a post-scarcity, eco-anarchist society, whose nature is suggested in this one of many of Bookchin’s descriptions:

...the decentralization of cities into confederally united communities sensitively tailored to the natural areas in which they are located. It means the use of ecotechnologies, and of solar, wind, methane, and other resources of energy, the use of organic forms of agriculture, the design of humanly scaled, versatile industrial installations to meet regional needs of confederated municipalities. It means, too, an emphasis not only on recycling, but on the production of high-quality goods that can last for generations. It means the substitution of creative work for insensate labor and an emphasis on artful craftspersonship in preference to mechanized production. It means the leisure to be artful and engage in public affairs. One would hope that the sheer availability of goods and the freedom to choose one’s material lifestyle would sooner or later influence people to adopt moderation in all aspects of life as a response to the ‘consumerism’ that is promoted by the capitalist market (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 370).

---

<sup>43</sup> Another explanation is the “social construction of scarcity”. Achterhuis (in Van Dieren, 1995, pp. 15-27, and drawing on the work of Toulmin, 1990), suggests that this began with Hobbes’ unsavoury view that people always struggle to acquire more and more, not because they need it to survive, but to prevent another from having it. There was constant strife to keep this kind of “scarcity” at bay. Locke too, “often considered to be the grandfather of our modern economy, is also obsessed by the idea” of humankind facing a perpetual scarcity (Achterhuis, in Van Dieren, p. 17)

<sup>44</sup> Bookchin’s term for the application of computer hard and software

New Left theorist Marcuse held a less optimistic view of the new abundance to be produced by advanced technology. He felt it would have “ambiguous social consequences. On the one hand, it would have the desirable consequence of making possible the liberation of the libido; but it would also generate the artificial satisfactions of consumerism and a new form of imperialism” (Biehl, 1997b, p. 100). Ecologist David Ehrenfeld has criticized Bookchin for his “toil-less technological” utopian optimism, claiming that “Bookchin and others like him have fled from reality to an altogether more soothing world of techno-pastoral dreams” (Sessions, 1994, pp. 220-221). But in Bookchin’s view, “liberatory technology” would at last enable human beings to recover from the great wound<sup>45</sup> inflicted on them by the advent of “propertied society” (Bookchin, 1967, in Biehl, 1997, p. 102). The precondition for freedom has been satisfied.

### 6.3 The ecological rational [free] society

Perhaps the greatest single failing of movements for social reconstruction--I refer particularly to the Left, to radical ecology groups, and to organizations that profess to speak for the oppressed--is their lack of a politics that will carry people beyond the limits established by the status quo (Bookchin, 2003).

The conditions of freedom, according to Bookchin, are decentralization, the formation of communities, the human scale, and direct democracy (Bookchin, 1969a, in Biehl, 1997, p. 141). His libertarian municipalism, a later version of his earlier eco-anarchism<sup>46</sup>, sought to provide all these conditions. As I understand it, its essence is an enriched meaning of “decentralization” as opposition to all forms of hierarchy and domination. I discuss next, decentralization expressed in human scale eco-communities (6.3.1), and in the politics of libertarian municipalism (6.3.2).

#### 6.3.1 Decentralization as human scale, communitarian, eco-communities

##### 6.3.1.1 Understanding the “flight to the suburbs”

In the 1960s, the social phenomenon of “flight to the suburbs” or urban exodus began. Bookchin interpreted this phenomenon as a kind of people-initiated decentralization. The city has reached its biological economic but also psychic limits (Bookchin, 1962, in Biehl, 1997, p. 15). In the metropolis milieu, “city man ... has reached a degree of anonymity, social atomization, and spiritual isolation ... virtually unprecedented in human history. Today man’s alienation from man is almost absolute. His standards of cooperation, mutual aid, simple human hospitality, and decency have suffered an appalling erosion...” (p. 19). There was also an alienation between town and country, between human and nonhuman nature. A “reconciliation” was not only desirable, but a necessity (p. 15). Millions of people, “however confusedly”, are attempting to restore a sense of human scale to their environment, and to recreate in the suburbs, an interaction with other humans, and with the land [through activities such as horticulture, or some handicrafts], with which they could cope as individuals.

This confirmed for Bookchin, the need for decentralization in all spheres of human life. The basic social unit is the community. The community is “real”, there is human scale in all spheres of human functioning, harmony is achieved with nature through respect for ecology, political power is exercised by citizens in face to face democracy, and there are opportunities for people’s genuine self-development and realization.

<sup>45</sup> “This technological revolution, culminating in cybernation, has created the objective, quantitative basis for a world without class rule, exploitation, toil, or material want. The means now exist for the development of the rounded man, the total man, freed of guilt and the workings of authoritarian modes of training, and given over to desire and the sensuous apprehension of the marvellous. It is now possible to conceive of man’s future experience in terms of a coherent process in which the bifurcations of thought and activity, mind and sensuousness, discipline and spontaneity, individuality and community, man and nature, town and country, education and life, work and play are all resolved, harmonized, and organically wedded in a qualitatively new realm of freedom. ... particularized, bifurcated society ... [will be replaced by] an organically unified, many-sided community. The great wound opened by propertied society ... can now be healed” (Bookchin, 1967, in Biehl, 1997, p. 102)

<sup>46</sup> In the 1990s, Bookchin broke with anarchism, and instead, “articulated a new political vision that he called communalism” (Tokar, 2006). Its essential elements remain the same however

### 6.3.1.2 “Real” communities

The human scale community is moderately sized: “... the megalopolis must be decentralized. A new type of community, carefully tailored to the characteristics and resources of a region, must replace the sprawling urban belts that are emerging today.” (Biehl, 1997a, p. 7, citing from Bookchin’s “Ecology and revolutionary thought”, in *Post-scarcity anarchism*, 1971, pp. 74-75). The community is not simply a geographical suburb, or town, or village, it is a “real” community (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 22). It constitutes the “most essential social political and, indeed, ethical sphere”. Within the community, “cooperative institutions in all areas of social life will begin to emerge. These will include mutualistic associations for child care and education, for production and distribution, for cultural creation, for play and enjoyment, for reflection and spiritual renewal” (Clark, 1993, p. 350). The community’s organization is based “not on the demands of power, as is inevitable under capitalist and statist institutions, but rather on the requirements for people’s self-realization as free social beings, and for a nondominating human interaction with the whole of nature. Such a conception of the political requires that institutions be humanly scaled, decentralized, non-hierarchical and based on face-to-face democracy” (Clark, 1993, p. 350).

### 6.3.1.3 Human scale: industry and agriculture as examples

Liberatory technology, particularly its replacement of large by ever smaller machines (Bookchin, 1965c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 24), and costly, specialized machines by “highly versatile, multipurpose machines” (Bookchin, 1965c, p. 24) promises human scale in industry, which can now be downsized from centralized national production to moderate-sized community level production, without being burdened by underused industrial facilities (Bookchin, 1965c, p. 25).

The decentralized community would help to reverse “gigantism” in agriculture: “Unless principles of good land use permit otherwise, a farm should not be smaller or larger than the individual farmer can command” (Bookchin, 1962, in Biehl, 1997, p. 16). Human scale agriculture, assisted by toil-relieving liberatory technology, would restore the possibility that “farmer and the soil can develop together, each responding as fully as possible to the needs of the other” (p. 16), and the “time-honored intimacy between man and his livestock” (p. 16). Agricultural and biological diversity are promoted (Bookchin, 1962, p. 18); organic, not chemical means of controlling agricultural pests (p. 18) are employed.

### 6.3.1.4 The eco-community

The decentralized community would also be an eco-community. The community is established after a careful study of its natural ecology (Bookchin, 1965b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 27). It would be “well integrated with the resources of the surrounding region” (Bookchin, 1962, in Biehl, 1997, p. 17). The ecological region forms “the living social cultural and biotic boundaries” of the community or communities which it supports (Bookchin, 1965b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 28). Land management is guided entirely by ecological principles (p. 27). Agriculture is highly mechanized, but “as mixed as possible” (p. 27), avoiding the ecological damage done by monocropping (Bookchin, 1982b, in Biehl, pp. 34-35). Flora and fauna diversity is practised both as biological means of controlling pests and “enhancing scenic beauty” (Bookchin, 1965b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 27). Farming units are generally small-scale (p. 28). Sharp gradients are covered by timber to prevent erosion and conserve water (p. 28). Crops are grown only in soils suitable for them (p. 28). The human scale eco-community “holds the greatest promise for conserving natural resources”; it would promote the use of local resources and ecotechnology<sup>47</sup> utilizing sources of energy such as “wind power, solar energy, and hydroelectric power” (Bookchin, 1962, in Biehl, 1997, p. 18), thus delaying, if not eliminating, the need to turn to nuclear

<sup>47</sup> Bookchin notes that many of his views, for example those on “ecotechnology” formulated in the mid-1960s, were “assimilated over time by subsequent ecology movements”, and re-expressed as “appropriate technology” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, footnote 6, p. 373)

energy (p. 18). The use of such alternative technology “would be a revolutionary renewal of man’s ties to nature” (Bookchin, 1965b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 30). Clean, quiet, slow-moving electrically-powered cars are used (p. 30). Communities are linked by rail, reducing scarring of the countryside (p.30).

In an unusually gentle passage, Bookchin writes: “Each community contains many vegetable and flower gardens, attractive arbors, park land, even streams and ponds that support fish and aquatic birds. The countryside, from which food and raw materials are acquired, not only constitutes the immediate environs of the community, accessible to all by foot, but invades the community. .... nature appears everywhere in the town, while the town seems to have caressed and left a gentle human imprint on nature...” (Bookchin, 1965b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 28).

#### **6.3.1.5 Direct democracy**

The decentralized community would “make an intimate and direct democracy possible” (Bookchin, 1982b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 32). This aspect, with its enriched notion of citizenship, is discussed in section 6.3.2.

#### **6.3.1.6 New dimensions in self-development**

Decentralized eco-communities, by restoring communal life, human scale, and harmony with nature, and by re-introducing complexity, offer the opportunity “to make individual life a more rounded experience” (Bookchin, 1962, in Biehl, 1997, p. 19), to create “new dimensions in self-development” (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 23). For example, enterprises could be established which combine industry with agriculture, thus allowing diversification of occupational activities for the same individual (Bookchin, 1962, in Biehl, 1997, p. 17; 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 22). There would also be the experience of direct face to face democracy through participation in the local assemblies which will manage the affairs of the community (Bookchin, 1965c, in Biehl, 1997, p. 24). The mature human being would approach something like the completeness of Homer’s *arete* – all round excellence in being human, rather than specialization (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 23).

These are not notions of reverting to an idealised primitive life, but a vision which combines the best of the past with a full use of modern technology, in a synthesis of “man and nature, nation and region, town and country” (Bookchin, 1962, in Biehl, 1997, p. 19). “I do not claim that all of man’s economic activities can be completely decentralized, but the majority can surely be scaled to human and communitarian dimensions. This much is certain: we can shift the center of economic power from national to local scale and from centralized bureaucratic forms to local popular assemblies. This shift would be a revolutionary change of vast proportions for it would create powerful economic foundations for the sovereignty and autonomy of the local community” (Bookchin, 1964, in Biehl, 1997, p. 25).

### **6.3.2 Decentralization as comprehensive local self-management**

Bookchin believes in the original meaning of the word politics, that is, self-management. In the political sense, people are not “constituents” or “taxpayers” [or, one could add, once-in-a-while voters], but “citizens” (Bookchin 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, p. 173), a concept with rich meaning for Bookchin. Libertarian municipalism seeks to restore the original meaning of politics, by “reopen[ing] a public sphere in flat opposition to statism, one that allows for maximum democracy in the literal sense of the term, and to create in embryonic form the institutions that can give power to a people generally” (Bookchin 1987b, in Biehl, p. 175).

These institutions are the neighbourhood assembly (6.3.2.1), which would also manage the decentralized economy (6.3.2.2). Matters requiring co-ordination across areas wider than just that controlled by the neighbourhood assembly, would be dealt with by confederations of neighbourhood

assemblies, or regional assemblies (6.3.2.3). I touch on the transition from statism to libertarian municipalism briefly in section 6.3.2.4.

### **6.3.2.1 The community's "neighbourhood assembly"**

In libertarian municipalism, municipalities self-manage their affairs through popular, face-to-face neighbourhood assemblies (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 178). The basic unit of political life, of "participatory politics" (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992) is the municipality. This should not be understood as the local authority. "Municipality" means rather a community - the villages or other localities where people are living together on human scale. In large towns and cities where human scale has been lost, "municipality" means individual neighbourhoods - "smaller communities which have a certain measure of identity" (Bookchin, 1987b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 176).

Instead of the remote and mediated nature of representative democracy, the popular neighbourhood assembly gives people a "discursive arena in which ... [they] can intellectually and emotionally confront one another, indeed, experience one another through dialogue, body language, personal intimacy, and face-to-face modes of expression in the course of making collective decisions" (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 181). A plurality of views is encouraged (Clark, 1993, p. 350). Direct democracy decisions are made through majority vote, not consensus (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992): "... policy decisions by these assemblies would vote on a majority-rule basis. (I am not a naive admirer of consensus except in small, intimate groups in which everyone is thoroughly familiar with everyone else.)".

The major business of the neighbourhood assembly is *policy-making*, as opposed to its execution, which is administration. Communities decide through their neighbourhood assemblies what policy to adopt/course of action to follow on specific issues, leaving their logistical execution and administration (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 177-178) to, for example, "mandated, carefully supervised boards of coordinators who could easily be recalled if they failed to abide by the decisions of the assembly's citizens" (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 371).

Any tendency to insular self-sufficiency (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 179), where that means not "prudence in dealing with material resources" (p. 187) but parochialism, is not true politics; neighbourhood assemblies must "enter into a network of mutual obligations", and work together with other neighbourhood assemblies in their region. That is, the interdependence of communities for satisfying material needs, and achieving common political goals, is a "crucial element ... for an authentic mutualism based on shared resources, produce and policy-making" (p. 179). This is achieved through a local confederation of assemblies (p. 178). Confederalism allows a community to retain its identity while "participating in a sharing way with the larger whole that makes up a balanced ecological society..." (p. 179). Part of the business of each neighbourhood assembly then, would be to elect delegates to the local confederation council, which would comprise delegates from a group of neighbourhood assemblies (p. 177). These delegates are strictly mandated, i.e. "rigorously instructed in written form to either support or oppose" whatever issue appears on the agenda of the local confederal council (p. 177). Delegates are also rotatable, and recallable (p. 177, p. 178).

#### **6.3.2.1.1. Citizenship**

The neighbourhood assembly represents "a school for citizenship" (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 182). It is not only that neighbourhood assemblies provide a space in which people can become familiar with, and gain experience in the political process (p. 181). As opportunities for the exercise of citizenship in a public, face-to-face space, neighbourhood assemblies provide what the ancient Athenians called "*paideia*", a process of character-building, of personality formation, of education, of forming a sense of public responsibility and commitment (Bookchin, 1987b, p. 181)

through participation in the political process. Citizenship means practising “the values of humanism, cooperation, community, and public service” in everyday civic life, in place of current society’s “commodification, rivalry, anomie, and egoism” (p. 182). Instead of the nation-state’s “patriotism”, community participation in neighbourhood assemblies generates “*philia*” or solidarity, a sense of civic commitment “... created by knowledge, training, experience, and reason – in short, by a political education developed during the course of political participation” (p. 181). “*Paideia*” produces “*philia*”, and the practice of politics takes on an ethical dimension, in which “...the communal interest ...[is] placed above personal interest, ... in which the personal interest ... [is] congruent with and realized through the common” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 372). It is the quality of *philia* that makes self-management possible (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992).

### **6.3.2.2 *The municipalization of the economy***

It is impossible to set out all Bookchin’s thought on this topic here, but basically, through the neighbourhood assembly, the community would also manage its economic life, which is organized on a municipal basis.

Municipalization of the economy brings “the economy as a whole into the orbit of the public sphere, where economic policy could be formulated by the *entire* community... The economy would cease to be merely an economy in the conventional sense of the term, composed of capitalistic, nationalized, or “worker-controlled” enterprises. It would become the economy of the *polis* or municipality. The ... citizen body in face-to-face assembly, would absorb the economy into its public business, divesting it of a separate identity...” (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 186, his italics).

More specifically, private property would be abolished (Biehl, 1997e, p. 173), and “From each according to his ability and to each according to his needs” would be institutionalized as part of the public sphere (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 186). Land and enterprises would be “... placed increasingly in the custody of the community – more precisely, the custody of citizens in free assemblies and their deputies in confederal councils ... In such a municipal economy – confederal, interdependent, and rational by ecological, not simply technological, standards – we would expect that the special interests that divide people today into workers, professionals, managers, and the like would be melded into a general interest in which people see themselves as citizens guided strictly by the needs of their community and region rather than by personal proclivities and vocational concerns. Here, citizenship would come into its own...” (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 184).

### **6.3.2.3 *Confederalism***

Confederal councils would be established, not only to link neighbourhood assemblies as an antidote to the threat of parochialism, but also to provide the means of addressing issues on a wider scale (Biehl, 1997d, p. 173). However, because they are comprised of strictly mandated, recallable, rotatable, fully accountable neighbourhood assembly delegates, power continues to be exercised from the bottom up. The functions of the confederal councils are purely administrative, that is, the co-ordination and execution of adopted policies, not policy-making, which remains the prerogative of the neighbourhood assemblies (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 178-179): “Wherever policy-making slips from the hands of the people, it is devoured by its delegates, who quickly become bureaucrats” (p. 179).

### **6.3.2.4 *The transition from statism to libertarian municipalism***

“These confederations would ultimately constitute a counterpower to the state, the corporations, and the market, and they could expand at the expense of those forces, ultimately mobilizing a confrontation with them” (Biehl, 1997d, p. 173). Bookchin understands this as a dialectical process: “... libertarian municipalism gains its ... integrity *precisely* from the dialectical tension it proposes between the nation-

state and the municipal confederation. Its ‘law of life’, to use an old Marxian term, consists precisely in its struggle with the State. Then *tension* between municipal confederations and the State must be *clear and uncompromising*. Since these confederations would exist primarily in *opposition* to statecraft, they cannot be compromised by state, provincial or national elections, much less achieved by these means....” (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 179, his italics). Eventually, communitarian and self-governing ecological communities would replace present capitalist and statist hierarchical institutions. The process can be expected to be slow (Bookchin, 1987b, in Biehl, 1997, pp. 190-191).

How statism and libertarian municipalism “...will relate to each other is a matter of the future--and for another generation to decide. For the present, Greens, social ecologists, and the like must try to create a new politics and a new public sphere based not merely on greater local control and municipal democracy but on confederal relationships between municipalities. I know of no other movement in the left that has advanced such an idea of *authentic* politics, or *politics* in its classical Hellenic sense as distinguished from *statecraft*, or involvement in parliamentarism” (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992, his italics).

## 7. Praxis

The praxis of *paideia* – all-round education through direct democratic political participation - has been noted [6.3.2.1.1]. Another characteristic of traditional anarchism’s “unwavering opposition to statism” (Bookchin, 1995b, in Biehl, 1997, p. 170; section 2.1.4.1) is direct action. So one finds in Bookchin’s own life many examples of protest activities: in the unions, against nuclear energy, against the Vietnam war, for civil rights, for ecology, for direct democracy (Biehl, 1993, p. 10).

### 7.1 Political restructuring, not personal change

He rejected the deep ecology-type idea that personal change and “redemption” would avert the ecological crisis:

Even as we denounce a materialistic and consumeristic mentality, we ourselves become avid consumers of costly, supposedly spiritual or ecological products, ‘green’ wares that bear lofty messages. ... Our mailboxes are flooded with catalogues, and our bookstores are filled with paperbacks that offer us new roads to mystical communion and a New Age into which we can withdraw and turn our backs to the harsh realities that constantly assail us. Often, this mystical withdrawal yields a state of social quietism that is more dreamlike than real, more passive than active. Preoccupied more with personal change than with social change, and concerned more with the symptoms of our powerless, alienated lives than with their root causes, we surrender control over the social aspects of our lives, even as they are so important in shaping our private lives. But there can be no personal ‘redemption’ without social ‘redemption’ ... (Bookchin 1995a<sup>48</sup>).

In Bookchin’s view, the profound transformation from second nature to free nature is not to be achieved through either “privatistic forms of spiritual self-regeneration”, or the “personalistic forms of consumption and investment that often go under the rubric of ‘green capitalism’” (Bookchin, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 356). The environmentalism [section 2.1.4.2.1] which statism generates<sup>49</sup>, is not the answer either. Only social action aimed at the social sources of the ecological crisis are sufficient to deal with humanity’s hierarchy-based domination of humanity and the natural world. Political restructuring has primacy over individual worldview change.

<sup>48</sup> Biehl has omitted this paragraph from her edited version of this paper. See elision identification (...) in Biehl, 1997, p. 208

<sup>49</sup> “In libertarian municipalism, you make a clear distinction between local politics and national politics, and you rightly reject participation in national politics, which, as the experience of the last ten years has also shown, leads directly to environmentalism rather than to the creation of a radical green movement” (Fotopoulos, 1992, in his interview with Bookchin, 1992)

## 7.2 Avoid statist political practices

Bookchin opposed participation in elections at any level of the state as a way of bringing about the kind of radical eco-social restructuring social ecology demands:

I would have no quarrel with a radical Green movement that worked with a conventional organization to prevent a specific ecological despoliation, such as the construction of a nuclear reactor. But I would emphatically oppose an electoral *coalition* with a party, however radical it may appear, that tries to gain seats in a statist or even quasi-statist body like the European Parliament, irrespective of the promises it makes. I learned to distrust the promises of statist parties--indeed, of parties generally ... (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos, 1992).

## 7.3 Create neighbourhood assemblies

The way to begin, is through the creation of local assemblies in one's neighbourhood, even if these initially have no more than "moral authority": "Although it is highly doubtful that even civic authorities [our municipalities] would allow a neighbourhood assembly to acquire the legal power to make civic policy, still less state and national authorities, let me emphasize that assemblies that have no legal power can exercise enormous moral power. A popular assembly that sternly voices its views on many issues can cause considerable disquiet among local authorities and generate a widespread public reaction in its favour..." (Bookchin, 1987b, revised 1995, in Biehl, 1997, p. 191).

Heady as Bookchin's ideas for direct democracy at community level are, one may wonder at their practicality. In Burlington, USA, Biehl (2006) notes that Bookchin "...attempted to put these ideas into practice by working with the Northern Vermont Greens, the Vermont Council for Democracy, and the Burlington Greens, retiring from politics in 1990".

## 8. Critique

In this section I focus (8.1) on the deep ecology/social ecology debate, but only in principle, (8.2) present a critique of Bookchin's thesis that the domination of nature is sufficiently explained by human domination of humans, and (8.3) note the critique that ecological politics generally gives insufficient attention to the role of language. Other critique, such as social ecology as anthropocentric was dealt with in section 5.4.2; doubts on Bookchin's optimistic view of "liberatory technology" were mentioned in section 6.2.

### 8.1 The deep ecology/social ecology debate

It is not difficult to find in the environmental philosophical literature, many examples of the sometimes-rancorous differences between deep and social ecologists, not presented in any detail here. Some of them, particularly Bookchin's, are colourful and entertaining, even if one doesn't agree with them. It helps to regain perspective on the agreements rather than differences between the two, if one reads the debate "Searching for agreement" (Chase, 1991) between Bookchin, and deep ecology activist Dave Foreman of Earth First!

Kovel<sup>50</sup> (1993, p. 407, my italics) provides a simple, yet incisive philosophical framework within which to understand most of the disagreements in the deep ecology/social ecology debate. At the same time, I think, he presents food for thought as to whether the debate could ever be completely resolved:

---

<sup>50</sup> Kovel's views are interesting in that he is a social ecologist, albeit a "dissenting" one, and also someone who is not unsympathetic to deep ecology. "I see myself on the social-ecological side in the dialogue of radical ecologies. I also, despite everything, remain heavily influenced by Marx, and this is itself a heterodox view within social ecology. This would seem to make me doubly removed from being able to view the claims of deep ecology sympathetically. However such is not the case. I have serious problems with the political obtuseness and/or reactionary implications of deep ecology. But deep ecology also calls attention to a profound estrangement from nature, which traditional Marxism has tended to reproduce and even social ecology has found difficult to apprehend..." (Kovel, 1993, pp. 407-408)

Ecological politics is praxis based upon an appropriation of what takes place at the interface between humanity and nature. We might heuristically say that this appropriation takes place in different ways according to the values given its two main terms, humanity and nature. Indeed two of the major branches of radical ecology – social ecology and deep ecology – have defined their differences precisely along this divide.

*Social ecology is grounded in the critique of domination*, especially the realization that no domination of nature takes place without the domination of humans. Thus it attends primarily to the human world. For social ecologists, the recovery of nature is a vital indeed essential goal but it cannot be the primary goal inasmuch as the natural world has to be approached through a transformation of the human world. *Deep ecology, by contrast, proceeds from the critique of anthropocentrism*, that which makes man the measure of all things and displaces the rest of nature into the realm of instrumentality. This, to deep ecology, is the “social order” that oppresses nature. From this perspective, the recovery of nature is primarily a matter of decentering the human world. For the deep ecologist, nature must come first, not only in terms of value, but also as the result of an epistemological shift.

It follows that the social-ecological critique of deep ecology accuses it of an indifference to key social distinctions such as class, race, and gender, as well as a romanticization of nature that ominously flirts with reactionary, even fascistic politics. By contrast, the deep-ecological critique of social ecology accuses it of recycling the traditional distancing between humanity and nature, which has characterized all modern politics, whether bourgeois or Marxist. These are of course extreme statements; and in practice there can be considerable convergence between the two tendencies. However the differences are real and stem from unresolved issues in the philosophy of nature....”

Rereading Biehl’s (2003, my italics) sketch of the development of Bookchin’s political-philosophical thought, though, it seems fair to say that Bookchin saw in the ecological crisis, “a new limit to capitalist expansion, one that held the potential to supersede the misery of the working class *as a source of fundamental social change*”, before he developed the idea of “revolutionary change as a solution to the ecological crisis”. This is *fundamentally* different to the deep ecological approach of wide ecological sustainability as end in itself.

## **8.2 The idea of hierarchy and domination is insufficient to explain “ecocide”**

Is the idea of hierarchy and domination sufficient to account for our present “ecocidal social formations” (Kovel, 1993, footnote 2, p. 416), as social ecology argues? From a Marxist perspective, Kovel suggests not. He cites the example of the Hunza, a strict hierarchical society in Pakistan’s remote mountainous areas, in which women “are sharply subordinated to men”, and in which “everybody bows down to the local prince”, and yet their “luscious” organic produce is highly praised by the health food and holism movements, and their lifestyle is so “salubrious” that it has “induced extraordinary longevity” and well-being. “Clearly, hierarchy in itself does not generate ecocidal degrees of the domination of nature. [Not just an idea, but] *An engine of exploitation and aggrandizement is required*”. This engine he suggests, is capitalism (Kovel, 1993, footnote 2, p. 416). As Bookchin also critiques capitalism [but within the idea of hierarchy] I take Kovel’s critique to mean that Bookchin places too little emphasis on capitalism as the proximate cause of ecocide.

From a deep ecology perspective, Warwick Fox suggests that “Bookchin ... insists far too much that there is a straightforward, necessary relationship between the internal organization of human societies and their treatment of the nonhuman world” (Fox, 1989, p. 16). He argues that “it is possible for a relatively egalitarian human society to be extremely exploitative ecologically” (Fox, 1989, p. 15, in Bookchin, 1990d, p. 263); “there is no necessary relationship between these two forms of domination” (Eckersley, affirming Fox’s viewpoint, in Eckersley, 1989, p. 101, footnote 7). Bookchin in turn, refutes both Fox and Eckersley’s viewpoints (1990d, pp. 263-266).

### 8.3 Insufficient attention to language

I extract from Kovel's critique of the "second nature" idea, two elements: (1) the idea of nature as a necessary "other" to humanness. This idea is also present in ecofeminism [Chapter Six], and Goodin's suggested theory of value in nature for green political theory [Chapter Seven, section 5.2.2]; and (2) insufficient attention to the role of language<sup>51</sup> in nature's domination by humans.

Kovel (1993, p. 408) criticizes the "profound estrangement from nature, which traditional Marxism has tended to reproduce" (1993, p. 408), but is also critical of the social ecology position that the world of humanity can properly be called "second nature". For him, there is a radical distinction between the human and natural worlds; the "one can [not] be continuously mediated into the other" (Kovel, 1993, p. 408) as social ecology suggests. Second nature has the "the stamp of humanness on it: the presence of signification" (p. 408). We can only relate to nature through the distinctly human invention of language. Signification creates a dialectic between human beings and nature. Kovel understands this dialectic as the tension of our participation in nature on the one hand, and our separateness, our radical difference<sup>52</sup> from nature on the other (p. 411-412). It is only if nature remains "other" to us, that it can engender in us an "attitude of respect, wonder and reverence" (Kovel, 1993, p. 412). We need to recognize and preserve nature's otherness, not to dominate it, but so that it can provide a source "from which we draw our own being ..." (p. 412).

Given that our relationship to nature is always mediated by language, "...ecological politics has [generally] not attended sufficiently to the domain of *language*" (Kovel, 1993, p. 408, his italics). "First of all, 'nature' is a word before it is a thing... when I, or any other person, regard nature, I do so through a prism constructed out of language. The only 'nature' that is real for any of us is a linguistically constituted field..." (p. 409). Our relationship to nature is always mediated by language. We should be aware of how, through our language, we may be engaging in a relationship of domination with nature, for example, capitalism's "economisation of reality, the reduction of everything to relations of exchange ... the ever-expanding power of money and the corresponding decline of the spiritual and the sacred" (p. 411, my italics).

Nature needs to be emancipated *in words* as well as in ecological acts. As Kovel says (1994, pp. 413-414) "... emancipation, whether of human slaves or a dominated nature, begins in the signified field... Politics expresses the choices made by the imagination, whether of freedom or repression. Social ecology should begin therefore with the emancipation of the imaginary, signified nature... We cannot collapse the human and natural worlds one into the other... We have only the choice as to how nature is to be signified: As an inert other, or ... an entity transfigured with spirit".

---

<sup>51</sup> From a promising beginning on the idea that we can only approach nature through signification, Kovel (pp. 408-416) passes through a useful critique of capitalism, before [for me] becoming obscure in a Freudian-like discussion of the ontological relationships between language and nature, and of the relationship between "poiesis and transformation" [also surely obscure to the uninitiated] illustrated by William Blake "as the poet of social ecology" (p. 413). Much of Kovel's argument is incomprehensible to me, but it does call for an awareness of how "Newtonian perception" as well as "liberal environmentalism" strips "spirit-qualities from existence in order to prepare the way for [capitalism's] commodification" and for "technical-instrumental views of nature" (Kovel, 1993, p. 414)

<sup>52</sup> Here Kovel is rejecting the deep ecology position which in his view, "seeks to abolish any sense of specialness from being human, any essential difference from the rest of nature" (Kovel, 1993, p. 411). But see Chapter 4, section 5.1.1, 5.4.2.2, and 5.4.5.2, all of which suggest to me that deep ecologists do not deny the "specialness" of being human within a radically non-dual ontology

## 9. Summary

Here, under a **THEME HEADING**, are summarized the main ideas of social ecology's contribution to seeing green, together with their primary location in the chapter:

**WORLDVIEW:** The concept worldview scarcely appears in Bookchin's writings. Social and political restructuring to address the ecological crisis has primacy over individual worldview change [7]. Nonetheless, social ecology as a specific philosophy of nature, and a comprehensive socio-economic programme, contains all the customary elements of a worldview.

**LEGITIMATING NARRATIVE:** Social ecology's ontology, epistemology, environmental ethic and radical political programme are all underpinned by its philosophy of dialectical naturalism, which draws on the western philosophical dialectical tradition [2.1.1]. Bookchin's political philosophy, which could be summed up as libertarian, combines insights from Marxism, neo-Marxism, and the New Left [2.1.2 – 2.1.3], anarchism and radical ecology. Both "mystical" forms of ecology, and environmentalism are rejected [2.1.4]. In real-world politics, he urged the necessity for a libertarian left-green perspective [2.1.5]. Social ecology's key thesis is that the ecological crisis is caused by the *idea* of hierarchy which arose in our anthropological history, leading to the possibility of human domination of humans, and human domination of nature. [2.2]. This provides the context for social ecology's rhetoric of freedom, for both humans and nature [2.3]

**EPISTEMOLOGY:** Social ecology affirms the Enlightenment ideal of Reason [3.1], but rejects its deterioration into a merely instrumental rationality, used to manipulate and dominate both human beings and nature [3.2]. Where instrumental/analytical thinking is unable to apprehend an organic nature defined by both identity and change [Being and Becoming], dialectical reasoning can [3.3]. Dialectical naturalism as epistemology is a kind of speculative reasoning, in which one seeks to understand the "inherent logic" of a phenomenon's development, where it came from, where it is now, and how it can be expected to unfold its further potentialities [3.4].

### **ONTOLOGY:**

**-View of nature:** Being and Becoming sums up Bookchin's ontological view of nature, which is complex. It comprises biological evolution or "first nature", and humanity and society or "second nature". First nature is seen as an organic, dialectic, developmental phenomenon, which displays as a whole, mind, and self-direction toward ever increasing subjectivity [4.1]. This tendency reaches its peak in humanity's self-awareness. Humanity is firmly part of nature, having emerged from it, yet also occupies a special place in evolution [4.2]. A key social ecology hypothesis is that second nature has not fulfilled its latent potentiality, but is on an irrational developmental path, entirely due to the idea of hierarchy which emerged early in our anthropological history. There must be a fundamental transition in second nature from hierarchy and domination of self and nature, towards "free nature", or an "ecological society" in which first and second nature pursue untrammelled, their progress towards freedom [4.3].

**-View of the human being:** Bookchin's view of the human being in free nature is derived from principles of anarchism, socialism and ecology. It is a libertarian view, closely related to Bookchin's view of the libertarian society. In this view [4.3.1], the human being is free to unfold his/her creative potential and develop into a well-rounded person, in the context of a libertarian, communitarian, society [6.3]. Part of becoming a well-rounded person is to take an active, and direct role in citizenship [6.3.2.1].

**THE ETHIC:** Based on dialectical naturalism as epistemology and ontology, social ecology advocates an ethic of complementarity towards both human and non-human nature. Non-metaphysical spirituality plays a minor motivational role [5.1]. Humanity's role vis-a-vis nature, given its special place in evolutionary history as nature's potential self-awareness, and "voice", is to assist the evolutionary process towards greater increase of diversity, nature's major value [5.2.1]. While this stewardship represents active and direct intervention in the evolutionary process, there are criteria for such intervention, the major one being, no intervention in the spirit of domination, such as capitalism, is acceptable [5.4.1]. Only radical social restructuring to eliminate the idea of hierarchy [6], will create the conditions in which an ethic of complementarity becomes possible.

- **Animal liberation issues:** Specific attention to animal liberation issues is practically absent. The only reference found was in humanistic vein [5.4.3].

### **VIEW ON SOCIETY**

The social ecology society is libertarian, decentralized, and eco-anarchist, a combination of ideas Bookchin later called "libertarian municipalism". Patriotism, statism, parliamentarianism, political parties, bureaucracy, and capitalism as economic system and cultural order, are all critiqued as manifestations of hierarchical thinking [6.1]. A major precondition for the transition from a society driven by the struggle against necessity and scarcity, to a society in which humanity has the time and milieu to unfold its full creative potential is the availability of a humanistic, "liberatory" technology. Modern advances in automation and computer technology are now able to deliver such liberatory technology [6.2]. In the radically new ecological post-scarcity society, decentralization is a key concept. It means "real" communities, human scale in all aspects of human life, and respect for ecological principles [6.3.1]. Decentralization also means, non-hierarchical face-to-face democratic self-management at all political and economic levels [6.3.2].

### **PRAXIS**

Recommended praxis includes an enriched meaning of citizenship [6.1.3.2.1], direct action, and the initiation at local level of the ideas of "community" and "assembly". "Privatistic" spiritualism, mystical ecology, environmentalism, green consumerism, and participation in statist elections at any level are rejected [7].

## CHAPTER SIX: ECOFEMINISM

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>180</b>
1.1 Ecofeminism’s “four minimal conditions”	181
1.2 Conceptual links between feminism and “ecology”	181
1.3 Ecofeminism’s project	181
1.4 Ecofeminism is not however homogenous	182
<b>2. Legitimizing narratives</b>	<b>182</b>
2.1 Feminist philosophies informing ecofeminism	183
2.1.1 Liberal feminism	183
2.1.2 Marxist feminism	184
2.1.3 Socialist feminism	184
2.1.4 Radical feminism	185
2.2 Spirituality	186
2.2.1 Earth/goddess worship	186
2.2.2 The western anthropological worldview shift in self-other relations	187
2.3 Key thesis on environmental crisis	187
2.4 Imagery, rhetoric	188
<b>3. Epistemology</b>	<b>189</b>
3.1 The Enlightenment’s “masculine model of man”	189
3.1.1 The “androcentric” premise on rationality, Self and Other	189
3.2 Domination metaphors in descriptions of malestream rationality	190
3.3 Malestream scientific epistemology critiqued	190
3.3.1 Alternatives	190
3.4 The “invisibility” of women’s ecological knowledge critiqued	191
3.5. Critique of ecofeminist epistemology	192
<b>4. Ontology</b>	<b>192</b>
4.1 Anthropological/depth psychology views of the male Self	192
4.2 Theorizing androcentric views on Self and Other	193
4.2.1 Plumwood’s “centrism”: masculine Centre/feminine Other as example	193
4.2.2 Warren’s “logic of domination”: theorizing the oppression of women and nature	195
4.2.2.1 Naturizing women, and feminizing nature in language	196
4.3 Ecofeminist views on Self and Other	196
4.3.1 Spretnak’s radical ontological nonduality	196
4.3.2 Relational, interdependent ontological understandings	197
4.3.2.1 The ambivalence around autonomy vis-a-vis connectedness	198
4.3.2.2 “Self-in-relation”	198
4.3.2.3 Are there women’s ways of being in the world?	199
4.3.2.4 The feminine principle	201
4.3.2.5 Partnership	201



<b>5. Ethic</b>	<b>202</b>
<b>5.1 A centric-based critique of anthropocentrism</b>	<b>202</b>
5.1.1 The anthropocentric view of nature as “colonized other”	203
5.1.2 The advantages of the centric critique of anthropocentrism	206
<b>5.2 Developing an ecofeminist ethic (including a nature ethic): key features</b>	<b>207</b>
5.2.1 Must meet “boundary conditions”	207
5.2.2 Is contextualist and pluralist	207
5.2.3 Is a theory-in-process	208
5.2.4 Is inclusivist	208
5.2.5 Does not claim to be “unbiased”	208
5.2.6 Denies abstract individualism	208
5.2.7 Takes the relationship itself seriously	209
5.2.8 Makes central, values under-represented in traditional ethics	209
5.2.9 But ecofeminists support a variety of environmental ethical positions	209
<b>5.3 The ecofeminist “ethic of care”</b>	<b>209</b>
5.3.1 Motivation	210
5.3.2 Locus of value	210
5.3.3 Scope	211
5.3.4 The moral obligation	211
<b>5.4 Animal ethics</b>	<b>212</b>
5.4.1 Documenting the oppression of animals	212
5.4.2 Theorizing the connections between abuse of women, and abuse of animals	212
5.4.2.1 Gruen’s symbolic “to serve/be served up”	212
5.4.3 The critique of the rights-based ethic in animal liberation context	213
5.4.4 Vegetarianism	215
5.4.4.1 Ecofeminist arguments for vegetarianism	215
5.4.4.2 Theory: The social construction of humans as predators, and animals as “meat”	217
5.4.4.3 Vegetarianism: An essential ecofeminist ethic?	217
5.4.5 Other animal ethics issues	219
<b>6. View of society</b>	<b>219</b>
<b>6.1 Ecofeminist theory applied at socio-political level</b>	<b>219</b>
6.1.1 “Manstream” vis-a-vis “the feminine principle” in green politics	219
6.1.2 One version of ecofeminism’s basic precepts at socio-political level	221
<b>6.2 Institutionalized violence: militarism as example</b>	<b>221</b>
6.2.1 Violence and aggression in environmental language	222
<b>6.3 Science and technology</b>	<b>222</b>
<b>6.4 Third World ‘maldevelopment’</b>	<b>223</b>
<b>6.5 Population</b>	<b>225</b>
<b>6.6 Social justice; environmental justice</b>	<b>226</b>
<b>7. Praxis</b>	<b>227</b>
<b>7.1 Consensual process</b>	<b>227</b>
<b>7.2 Direct action</b>	<b>227</b>
<b>7.3 Abstention from consumption of “the products of pain”</b>	<b>227</b>



<b>7.4 “Self”-work</b>	<b>228</b>
<b>8. Critique</b>	<b>228</b>
<b>9. Summary</b>	<b>228</b>

## 1. Introduction

Feminist theory focuses primarily on women's oppression<sup>1</sup>, repression, and backgrounding, which is commonly attributed to a patriarchal ideology<sup>2</sup> (for example, Rosemary Radford Ruether's (1975) work, in Li, 1993, pp. 273-274). Feminists analyze and theorize inter alia, gender roles under patriarchy, because these "are part of *the means* of domination and subordination in patriarchy" (Davion, 1994, p. 292, her italics). Feminists argue that they have successfully shown that what were thought to be the "natural" social arrangements of western patriarchy, have been socially constructed by men (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. ix). Feminist rhetoric is of women's liberation from patriarchy (Davion, 1994, p. 289).

Contemplating in the 1970s, the dual threats of ecocide and nuclear annihilation, feminist Ruether wrote that:

Women must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to be one of domination. They must unite the demands of the women's movement with those of the ecological movement to envision a radical reshaping of the basic socioeconomic relations and the underlying values of this [modern industrial] society. (Ruether<sup>3</sup>, 1975, p. 204, in Warren, 1996, p. ix).

Ecological feminism [often called ecofeminism<sup>4</sup>] is seen by some feminists (e.g., Salleh, 1992, p. 200) as another paradigm within "second wave", or 1960s/1970s feminism<sup>5</sup>. It began to emerge in the mid to late 1970<sup>6</sup>s, from "...various fields of feminist enquiry and activism: peace movements, labor movements, women's health care, and the anti-nuclear, environmental and animal liberation movements" (Gaard, 1993, p. 1), as well as women's spirituality/nature-based religion (Spretnak, 1990, pp. 3-14). Its first manifesto was formulated in 1980 (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 487), and its first anthology, edited by Caldecott & Leland, appeared in 1983 (Gaard, 1993, p. 3). Ecofeminism's potential as an alternative to mainstream environmental ethics began to gain recognition around 1990 (Warren, 1990, p. 125).

In this section, I note (1.1) ecofeminism's "four minimal conditions" (1.2) the conceptual links which ecofeminists see between feminism and ecology (1.3) ecofeminism's common "project", and yet (1.4) its non-homogeneity. Thereafter, the chapter follows the standard format: Section 2 is an introduction to ecofeminism's legitimating narratives; 3, its epistemology; 4, ontology; 5, ethic; 6, view of society;

---

<sup>1</sup> Freire (1972, 1978), and Young (1990) are examples I have encountered of feminist understandings of the concept of oppression

<sup>2</sup> Feminist Sheila Collins considered that "racism, sexism, class exploitation, and ecological destruction are four interlocking pillars upon which the structure of patriarchy rests" (Collins, 1973, no page given, cited by Li, 1993, p. 289). Warren (1987, p. 17, her italics) repeats this view of patriarchy [without acknowledging Collins] as "sexism, racism, classism *and* naturism". On Davion's (1996, p. 181) view, ecological feminists argue that "a reason/nature dualism underlies the conceptual framework of Western patriarchal cultures". Salleh (1993, p. 225) considers the "separation of humanity and nature" as "the lynch pin of patriarchal ideology"

<sup>3</sup> Li (1993, in Gaard, 1993, pp. 273-276) also discusses Ruether's view of the link between the oppression of women and the destruction of nature

<sup>4</sup> The term "ecofeminisme" was coined by Françoise d'Eaubonne in 1974 (Warren, 1990, p. 125)

<sup>5</sup> This chapter makes no attempt to do justice to the full range of feminist thought, but McLaughlin (2003) provides brief and useful feminist comment on major contemporary debates in social and political theory. The chapter cannot do full justice either, to the rich diversity of ecofeminism. Warren's (1997) "reader" on ecofeminism alone comprises more than 400 printed pages. I hope nevertheless, to have avoided the kind of conceptual confusion between the various theoretical strands of feminism and ecofeminism of which Salleh (1992) accuses deep ecologists. My primary sources on ecofeminism have been the anthologies by Diamond & Orenstein (1990), Gaard (1993), and Warren (1996, 1997)

<sup>6</sup> Many feminists/ecofeminists (for example, Donovan, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 173, and p. 188, footnote 29) document the origins of "first wave" feminism in the nineteenth century, including ["reading backwards" as it were], early ecofeminist work in the humanitarian, pro-vegetarian, and anti-vivisection movements. More contemporary early and major works on ecofeminism were Collard and Contrucci (1989), Plant (1989), and Diamond and Orenstein (1990). Warren (1990, p. 125, footnote 1) lists many more

and 7, praxis advocated. Section 8 contains critique from green sample partners, and 9, a summary of its ideas on these topics.

### 1.1 Ecofeminism’s “four minimal conditions”

In 1987, ecofeminist Karen Warren (Adams, 1996, p. 116; see Warren (1987)) listed “four minimal conditions of ecofeminism”: (1) there is an important connection between the domination of women and the domination of nature (Adams, 1996, p. 116); (2) these connections between the oppression of women and of nature must be understood (p. 117); (3) feminist theory and practice must include an ecological perspective (p. 118); and (4), ecological movements must include a feminist perspective (p. 131, footnote 6). Understanding, and theorizing the first two, could be considered ecofeminism’s “project” (section 1.3). Regarding the last two, Warren (1996, p. xiii) has identified the “conceptual links” between feminism and ecology, discussed next.

### 1.2 Conceptual links between feminism and “ecology”

“To me feminism is ecology and ecology is feminism. It’s a holistic way of looking at things” (Die Grünen’s feminist eco-activist Petra Kelly, speaking in 1983 to Capra & Spretnak (1984, p. 53))

Warren identifies several<sup>7</sup> “conceptual links” (1996, pp. xi-xvi) between feminism and environmental concerns. *If one grants these conceptual links, the implication is that the philosophy and politics of nature should be informed by feminist gender analysis* (idea from Davion, 1994, my italics). Those links discussed in this chapter to varying degrees are: (1) historical: the grounds for the twin domination of women and nature can be traced in western history; (2) empirical evidence: this documents *inter alia*, sexist-naturist language, disproportionate health risks to women and children from eco-hazards, degradation and pollution; and Third World women-unfriendly development (Gaard, 1993, p. 5); (3) symbolic: ecofeminists explore “the symbolic association and devaluation of women and nature that appears in art, literature, religion, and theology” (p. xiv); (4) “women’s spirituality”: a neglected but significant element in environmentalism, and of environmental ethics (Warren, 1996, p. xiv); (5) epistemological: ecofeminism investigates the prevalence of male versions of ‘reason’, ‘rationality’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘the nature of the knower’, particularly as they have produced the reason versus nature [or culture vs. nature] debate<sup>8</sup>, and how they permeate mainstream environmental ethics; (6) oppressive conceptual frameworks: value dualisms, and value hierarchies embedded in larger conceptual frameworks such as patriarchy, which is seen to undergird many “isms of domination” (p. xii), as well as hierarchy; (7) ethical: ecofeminists claim that that all these interconnections between the treatment of women and the treatment of nature “require a feminist ethical analysis and response” (p. xv); feminist environmental ethics are concerned to develop “theories and practices concerning humans and the natural environment which are not male-biased...” (p. xv); (8) political (praxis). Feminist theoretical perspectives can inform “grassroots activism and political concerns by developing analyses of domination which explain, clarify, and guide that praxis” (p. xvi). All these links inform the ecofeminist “project”.

### 1.3 Ecofeminism’s project

“Ecofeminism challenges all relations of domination” (Starhawk, 1990, p. 76)

Ecofeminists agree that there are links between the domination of women and the domination of nature, and that an understanding of the one will aid an understanding of the other (Davion, 1994, p. 288). As do feminists, ecofeminists point out the transcendent dualities<sup>9</sup> of western thought – male and

<sup>7</sup> Not all of them are pursued in this section or chapter. Warren lists them as historical and causal, conceptual, empirical and experiential, epistemological, symbolic, ethical, theoretical, and political (praxis) (1996, pp. x-xvi)

<sup>8</sup> In this regard, some ecofeminists draw on the critical theory of Horkheimer and the Frankfurt School (Warren, 1996, p. xiv)

<sup>9</sup> Ruether highlighted the transcendence in the dualisms of western [male] thought. Subjugation and exploitation of the one by the other is then justified as “natural” (Li, 1993, p. 274, discussing Ruether’s work)

female, mind and body, reason and emotion, universal and particular<sup>10</sup>, culture and nature, human and animal, for example. It is particularly the reason/nature dualism, which feminists see as underlying and justifying a whole series of domination and oppression “-isms” – sexism, ageism, racism, classism, for example (Davion, 1996, pp. 181-182). Ecofeminists add “naturism”, a term Warren<sup>11</sup> uses to mean, “the unjustified domination of nature” (Gaard, 1993, p. 5; Warren, 1997, p. 4).

A major philosophical project for feminism and ecofeminism, is analyzing and theorizing the connections between these different forms of oppression (Gruen, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 60; Plumwood, 1997, p. 327). In addition, because the categories “woman” and “animal” “serve the same symbolic function in patriarchal society” (Gruen, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 61), “...an adequate ecofeminist theory must not only analyze the joint oppression of women and nature, but must specifically address the oppression of the nonhuman animals with whom we share the planet” (Gruen, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 61). Basically, ecofeminists highlight and critique the “androcentric<sup>12</sup> and anthropocentric biases of Western civilization” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. xi). Such theorizing, they suggest, will contribute “to a fuller understanding” of the domination of nature by humans, and so to a “deeper” environmental ethic (Davion, 1994, p. 288).

#### 1.4 Ecofeminism is not however homogenous

Ecofeminism is not however, “a monolithic, homogenous ideology” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. xii). Ecofeminist Karen Warren explains: “Ecological feminism is the name of a variety of different feminist perspectives on the nature of the connections between the domination of women ... and the domination of nature. ... it is an open question ... how many, which, and on what grounds any of the proposed ecological feminist philosophies are properly identified as ecofeminist positions” (Warren, 1996, p. x). “No single theory is sought or expected to emerge”, notes Kheel (1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 243). There can be no one woman’s voice, because every woman comes from some race, class, age, marital status, region, nation, and so on. Feminism and ecofeminism are interested in solidarity against oppression, not “unity in sameness”, because they associate the latter with domination (Warren, 1990, pp. 131-132). They celebrate diversity.

Ecofeminist Chris Cuomo thinks however, that “an unqualified call for diversity in ecofeminism is uninformative, if not nonsensical”; not all differences are good differences, those that are good, must be identified (1992, pp. 357-358). Social ecologist Janet Biehl critiques ecofeminists for what she sees as their theoretical inconsistencies rather than what they regard as their healthy diversity (Gaard, 1993, p. 6). I deal in this chapter with ecofeminist diversity in opinion by using the method “Some ecofeminists say...”, and then giving an author as example. Such examples are not necessarily to be considered *the*, or only, ecofeminist position on any particular topic.

In developing its critique of androcentrism – which underpins the entire ecofeminist worldview – ecofeminism draws on a variety of legitimating narratives.

## 2. Legitimizing narratives

In this section I introduce briefly the feminist philosophies informing ecofeminism (2.1), ecofeminist spirituality (2.2), the ecofeminist key thesis on the cause of the ecological crisis (2.3), and the images and rhetoric that ecofeminist writers employ in expressing their viewpoint (2.4).

<sup>10</sup> The *particular* in patriarchal ideology is construed as personal and private, and subordinate to the *universal*, construed as political and public (based on Zimmerman, 1987, p. 35). It is a characteristic of ecofeminism that it elevates the personal, the private, and the particular, to equal importance in this dualism

<sup>11</sup> Anti-naturism rejects any way of thinking about, or acting towards nonhuman nature “that reflects a logic, values, or attitude of domination” (Warren, 1990, p. 141)

<sup>12</sup> Loosely, a male, disconnected sense of Self, an oppositional sense of Self/Other, a patriarchal orientation, and a power-based morality

## 2.1 Feminist philosophies informing ecofeminism

Several feminist philosophies inform ecofeminism: liberal feminism, Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, radical or cultural feminism, black and Third World feminisms, postmodern and psychoanalytic feminism (McLaughlin, 2003; Salleh, 1992; Warren, 1997; Wilson, 1997). I discuss next the four theoretical strands which appear<sup>13</sup> to have most influenced ecofeminism: (2.1.1) liberal feminism, (2.1.2) Marxist feminism, (2.1.3) socialist feminism, and (2.1.4) radical or cultural feminism.

Gruen characterises the first three “feminisms” [liberal, Marxist, and socialist] as the “anthropocentric feminisms” (1993, p. 75), for their underlying assumption that women’s liberation must take place within the “culture” half of the culture/nature dualism (p. 77); all three privilege the human being over nature, and specifically, over animals (p. 75). Some radical feminists, on the other hand, embrace the women and nature/animal connection (p. 77). All four positions are, on some ecofeminist views (e.g. Warren, 1987, p. 20), “inadequate, incomplete, or seriously problematic as a theoretical grounding of ecofeminist concerns”.

### 2.1.1 Liberal feminism

Liberal feminism, which emerged from the political theory of liberalism in the 1960s, is closest to the viewpoints of “the mother of modern feminism”, Simone de Beauvoir (1965, in King, 1990, p. 110). De Beauvoir’s ideas draw “on Hegelian metaphysics. In the Hegelian schema, the category of the Other<sup>14</sup>, as distinctively opposite to the Self, provides epistemological and ontological conditions for the development of self-consciousness...” (Li, in Gaard, 1993, p. 281). In patriarchal ideology, the masculine self [understood as a gender construction, not biological sex (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 306, footnote 21)] defines itself in opposition to the feminine other, and it is this conceptualization which underpins all forms of oppression, including the oppression of nature (King, 1990) – eliminate patriarchy, and all other forms of oppression “will likewise crumble” (King, 1990, p. 110).

Liberal feminism is about “equality for women in a system defined by men” (Salleh, 1992, p. 200). Liberal/radical rational feminists argue that women do not differ from men as rational, autonomous agents, and demand for women, equality, self-determination, and the same rights as men in all spheres of human functioning (Donner, 1997, p. 385; Gruen, 1993, p. 75; Zimmerman, 1990, p. 142). Women’s reproductive capacity should not impede their right to equality with men; access to contraception and the right to abortion are thus companion political issues (Salleh, 1992, p. 200). Some ecofeminists (e.g. Gruen, 1993, p. 76; Mies & Shiva, 1998, pp. 482-483) critique it for failing to problematize the system itself, for failing to see that it is a form of “catch-up” in which women demand an equal share of what men have taken from nature.

Liberal feminists/radical rational feminists reject the western historical women-nature connection. They deny that women have any special relationship with nature, because that view supports the very gender differences they wish to eliminate (King, 1990). Their approach to environmental issues is consonant with reform environmentalism, which proposes to achieve better human-nature relations through improved science, management of resources and regulation by legislation (Merchant, 1990a, pp. 100-101). Problematic for some ecofeminists, is liberal feminism’s drawing of the line of moral considerability at those nonhumans argued to be “rational, sentient, interest carriers, or rights holders” (Warren, 1987, p. 9).

---

<sup>13</sup> Drawing mostly on analyses by Gruen (1993, in Gaard, 1993, pp. 74-78), King (1990, pp. 106-121), and Merchant (1990a, pp. 100-105). McLaughlin (2003, p. 2), Salleh (1992, pp. 200-202), and Warren (1987, pp. 8-17), also discuss the different versions of feminism

<sup>14</sup> Self and Other is a constantly recurring theme in ecofeminist accounts of the oppression of women and nature

### 2.1.2 Marxist feminism

Marxist ideas “made an important contribution” to the development of second wave feminist ideas (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 50). True to their Marxist tradition, Marxist feminists do pay attention to structural changes to the system (Gruen, 1993, p. 76; Salleh, 1992, p. 200), particularly to political economy and class (King, 1990, p. 114). Labour is its prime category of analysis (King, 1990, p. 113). The root cause of women’s oppression is patriarchal capitalism (Merchant, 1990a), or, some feminists argue, patriarchy and capitalism as two oppressive but different systems working together (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 51). In this historical social construction, the role of women is passive, entailing unpaid labour and nurture in the private sphere of the home, whereas the role and responsibility of men is constructed as paid activity in the public sphere, and in the capitalist marketplace (Merchant, 1990a). Important issues for Marxist feminists, are “equal access to the means of production” (Gruen, 1993, p. 76), the “full-scale entry of women into the waged sector and the socialization of domestic functions” (Salleh, 1992, pp. 200-201). They work towards replacing patriarchy with “resocializing men and women into nonsexist, nonracist, non-violent, anti-imperialist forms of life” (Merchant, 1990a, p. 105).

Gruen (1993, pp. 76-77) critiques the Marxist feminist view of nature and animals: “...Marx viewed animals and nature as fundamentally distinct from human beings and as “objects” to be used in the service of humanity. ... the feminists who follow in the Marxist tradition continue to maintain their hierarchical position with regard to animals and the natural world” (Gruen, 1993, pp. 76-77).

### 2.1.3 Socialist feminism

On Merchant’s description (1990a, pp. 103-105), Marxist feminism and socialist feminism seem closely related. McLaughlin (2003, p. 2) refers to it as “Marxist/socialist feminism”. King considers socialist feminism “an odd hybrid – an attempt at synthesis of rationalist feminism (radical and liberal) and the historical materialism of the Marxist tradition” (King, 1990, p. 113). On Gruen’s view (1993, p. 77), socialist feminists “have developed a much more comprehensive theory than the Marxist feminists”. Together with their class analysis of society, they provide a gender analysis (Gruen, 1993, p. 77). They see women’s oppression as sex-based, understood as reproductive biology, and as a product of gender construction (Warren, 1987, pp. 13-14). They argue for women’s control over their own reproductive capacities<sup>15</sup>. They agree with the liberal feminists that women “must strive in all possible ways to demonstrate that we are more like men than different”; the women/nature connection must be severed (King, 1990, p. 114). They argue for “an egalitarian socialist state” (Merchant, 1990a p. 105), and call for “... a radical transformation of most existing institutions: the family, education, compulsory heterosexuality, government, and industry” (Gruen, 1993, p. 77).

Nonhuman nature is seen as the material basis of human life; social justice cannot be achieved without the earth’s well-being (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. xii). Thus socialist feminists support political and environmental action which develops “sustainable, non-dominating relations with nature”, and which improves the lot of working-class women, and women of colour (Merchant, 1990a, pp. 104-105). In King’s view however, socialist feminists do not attend enough to the domination of nonhuman nature (King, 1990, p. 114). She ascribes this to their commitment to “a central tenet of socialism” - a “direct relationship between the rationalization and domination of nature and the project of human liberation” (King, 1990, p. 115). Gruen also critiques the socialist feminists because “For the most part, ... [they] have not yet addressed the institutionalized oppression of animals and its relation to oppression generally.” (Gruen, 1993, p. 77).

---

<sup>15</sup> But suggests King, socialist feminist theory is “inadequate” to confront the new reproductive technologies available – should it be so that women’s reproductive capacities are now being “bought and sold in the marketplace, as one more form of wage labour”? (King, 1990, p. 114). McLaughlin (2003) also presents feminist comment on reproductive technologies in her chapter on “Social studies of technology” (pp. 160-181)

#### 2.1.4 Radical feminism

Merchant's (1990a) 'radical feminism' [called 'cultural feminism' or 'big picture'<sup>16</sup> feminism by Spretnak (1990, p. 5, p. 9 respectively), 'radical cultural feminism' by King (1990), or 'nature feminism' by others (King, 1990, p. 117)], also developed in the late 1960s and the 1970s.

Radical feminists do not wish to "obliterate" the differences between men and women, as did the early 1960s feminists; they do not wish to be like men. There is an essential 'feminine' which patriarchy has distorted; they theorize the differences between women and men (Zimmerman<sup>17</sup>, 1990, p. 142). They take the women's side, which they simultaneously see as nature's side (King, 1990, p. 111) in the culture/nature dualism (Gruen, 1993, p. 77). They "elevate what they consider to be women's virtues – caring, nurturing, interdependence – and reject the individualist, rationalist, and destructive values typically associated with men" (Gruen, 1993, p. 77).

While celebrating their biological sex, and reproductive role, radical feminists object to patriarchal control of female reproduction, and to the gendered construction of women as only home-loving reproducers, feeders and nurses. Radical cultural feminists argue that both women and nature possess elemental power; both must be "elevated and liberated through direct political action" (Merchant, 1990a, p. 101).

Cultural feminism is seen by King (1990, p. 117) also as "an appropriate response to the need for mystery and attention to personal alienation in an overly rationalized world" (King, 1990, p. 117). It is "mother" to the feminist spirituality movement (King, 1990, p. 111), which is committed to both personal and social change. Cultural feminism argues that since the original worship of the mother goddesses in Western history was replaced by the worship of male gods to whom the female deities became subservient, women and nature have been consistently associated, and consistently devalued (Merchant, 1990a; Spretnak, 1990). The "widespread slaughter of animals and the degradation of the environment are seen as the responsibility of the patriarchs" (Gruen, 1993, p. 77). Cultural feminism's spirituality movement also largely inspired the radical feminine peace movement (King, 1990, p. 111).

While some see this view of nature, and of women's culture based on a supposed women-nature connection, as "special", and liberatory, others see it as potentially dangerous (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. xi, Merchant, 1990a, p. 102). King (1990, p. 115) notes that particularly socialist feminists are "unsympathetic" to radical cultural feminists, she thinks for two reasons: first, they interpret radical cultural feminism as an "essentialist" position – male essences are different to female essences. Such a position can be seen both as exclusivist, and non-emancipatory. Second, they see it as being on the wrong side as it were, in the western philosophical epistemology-ontology, or knowing vs. being debate, in which men "know" and women are relegated to the "ontological slums" [!] of being (King, 1990, p. 115). Gruen (1993, p. 77) thinks that radical feminism, even though it is "at the other extreme" from the anthropocentric feminisms, actually "reproduces a particular patriarchal notion: the belief that women and nature are essentially connected", and feeds a "determinism that forever separates woman and man" (p. 78). It cannot therefore be truly liberatory - the oppressor and the oppressed "simply change their masks" (p. 78), while oppression remains.

Largely in agreement with King's (1990), Merchant's (1990a), and Warren's (1987) analysis of ecofeminism's feminist theoretical roots, Spretnak (1990, pp. 5-6) suggests that ecofeminism has been mostly associated with radical or 'cultural', or 'big-picture' feminism, and women's spirituality/nature-based religion (Spretnak, 1990, pp. 3-14), together with influences from critical social theory and the

---

<sup>16</sup> 'Big picture' because radical/cultural feminism examines "the deepest assumptions, values, and fears that inform the structures and expectations of patriarchal culture" (Spretnak, 1990, p. 9)

<sup>17</sup> But see Salleh's (1992) critique of Zimmerman's account of the various feminisms

environmental movement. Salleh adds post-structuralism as a theoretical influence on radical feminism (1992, p. 201).

Some writers distinguish two types of ecofeminism arising from all these roots – socialist ecofeminism, and radical ecofeminism, the latter being the more common form (Taylor, 1997, p. 62).

## 2.2 Spirituality

As do members of the other new social movements, many ecofeminists feel that a spiritual vacuum, along with political, technological and economic causes, lies at the root of the planet's destruction: "We have lost the sense that this Earth is our true home, and we fail to recognize our profound connection with all beings in the web of life" (Christ, 1990, p. 58). Spirituality in ecofeminist literature has not only a religious connotation, but also means variously, "respect for natural life processes" (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 56, footnote 25), the recognition that there is in every life form, a life-force, an "immanence"<sup>18</sup>, a spirit, which makes all things sacred (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 487). A deep sense of interconnectedness with all life-forms is part of this spirituality. Mies and Shiva (1998, p. 487) write that "As women in various movements – ecology, peace, feminist and especially health – rediscovered the interdependence and connectedness of everything, they also rediscovered what was called the spiritual dimension of life – the realization of this interconnectedness was itself sometimes called spirituality". There is however some critique of the spiritual strand within ecofeminism, both from those on the ideological left, and from those who see it as "luxury spirituality.... idealist icing on top of the material cake of the West's standard of living" (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 488).

While ecofeminist earth/goddess worship is clearly spirituality in metaphysical form (2.2.1), it also serves as metaphor for a "female" interconnected worldview replaced in anthropological history by the Sky God, "masculine", and oppositional, self-other worldview (2.2.2). I also understand the ecofeminist concepts of "the feminine principle" (4.3.2.4), and "partnership" (4.3.2.5) to be expressions [whether understood as spirituality in metaphysical or mundane form] of a non-masculine worldview. "Partnership" for example, is a theme expressed strongly at political level, by Die Grünen [Chapter Seven].

### 2.2.1 Earth/goddess worship

Spirituality, often in the form of Goddess worship (Spretnak, 1990, p. 5), is usually a strong element in radical cultural ecofeminists' descriptions of their worldview [see for example, Abbott, Eisler, Keller (M.L.), Spretnak, and Starhawk, all in Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, part 1). Their work is replete with references to early female goddesses such as Persephone, Demeter, Isis, Ishtar, and now to Gaia (Eisler, 1990, p. 23, p. 31). Eisler interprets biologists Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock's scientific Gaia [the Greek name for the Earth] hypothesis as "in essence ... a scientific update of the belief system of Goddess-worshipping prehistoric societies" (Eisler, 1990, p. 26). On King's view, the Gaia hypothesis (Lovelock, 1979), which understands the planet as "one single living organism" (King, 1990, p. 112), and which ascribes the power of autopoiesis [self-organization<sup>19</sup>] to it, increasingly confirms "what people in tribal cultures, what Witches, shamans, and psychics, have been saying for thousands of years", namely that the Earth is alive (Starhawk, 1990, p. 74). Immanence is a key feature of earth-based spirituality; others are "...interconnection, and community" (Starhawk, 1990, p. 73). There seems to be variation though in the extent of the sacred – just the Earth [as in Gaia-worship], or the Oneness which includes the Earth (Spretnak, 1990).

What ecofeminists found in the old earth religions was not a female version of Yahweh - "Yahweh with a skirt" as Spretnak (1990, p. 5) says - but a spirituality/religion which *valued* both women and

<sup>18</sup> Some ecofeminists such as Starhawk, equate immanence with sensual or sexual spirituality (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 487)

<sup>19</sup> Lovelock also claimed that Gaia was perfectly capable of looking after herself (Kheel, 1993, p. 251; Wissenburg, 1993, p. 9)

nature, which understood “the Divine as immanent in and around us<sup>20</sup>” (Spretnak, 1990, p. 5). At the beginning of this period of exhilarating spiritual discovery, Spretnak notes (1990, p. 6), “ecology was not on our minds; since moving out of that period into activism, ecology has never left our minds. Today we work for ecopeace, ecojustice, ecoeconomics, ecopolitics, ecoeducation, ecophilosophy, ecotheology, ...” (Spretnak, 1990, p. 6).

But as Starhawk notes: “Earth-based spirituality influences ecofeminism by informing its values. This does not mean that every ecofeminist must worship the goddess, [or] perform rituals...” (in Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 23). Ecofeminism is not a religion; “people of any belief system can take on board the ethical and political insights it offers” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 23).

### 2.2.2 The western anthropological worldview shift in self-other relations

The ecofeminist version of the “breakdown theory” [Chapter Two, section 1.3.1, aspect 2: Legitimizing narratives] locates the breakdown in harmonious people/planet relations around 4500 BC, when nomadic tribes from the Eurasian steppes invaded the near East, and Greece. The invaders are described as “Goddess-slaying, Sky-Father-worshipping nomadic horsemen...” (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 143). The nomadic tribes “replaced the nature-based and female-honoring religion of the Goddess in Europe, the Near East, Persia, and India with their thunderbolt God, removing that which is held sacred and revered from the life processes of the earth to the distant realm of an omnipotent, male Sky-God” (Spretnak, 1990, p. 11). These new “angry gods of thunder and war” (Eisler, 1990, p. 29) replace the creative, nurturing, and caring goddess/es they encounter; they support conquest and domination, expressed in war, and in patriarchal social arrangements. Spirituality was separated from nature, and from women<sup>21</sup> (Eisler, 1990, pp. 30-32). “Desacralized nature” justified the definition of human progress in opposition to, rather than with, nature (Spretnak, 1990, p. 11, p. 9; also Eisler<sup>22</sup>, 1990, pp. 23-34).

The evocative language represents the displacement of one worldview by another – ‘feminine’ values by ‘masculine’ or ‘patriarchal’ values. The displaced societies [which, it is important to note, were not matriarchal societies] were peaceful not warlike, not societies in which women were subordinate to men, but in which there was mutual respect; not societies in which the Earth was seen “as an object for exploitation and domination”. ‘Soft’ values such as partnership, caring, compassion and nonviolence were not devalued as ‘feminine’ (Eisler, 1990, p. 30; Starhawk, 1990, p. 76). These values are often summarized as “the feminine principle” [4.3.2.4] generating a “partnership” ethic [4.3.2.5].

### 2.3 Key thesis on environmental crisis

Ecofeminist Marti Kheel has suggested that “The ‘environmental crisis’ is, above all, a crisis of perception” (1993, p. 259). Ecofeminists generally locate the root cause of the environmental crisis in androcentrism, understood as a male, disconnected sense of Self (Gaard, 1993, p. 2, p. 3), a patriarchal orientation toward the Other, and a power-based morality (Gaard, 1993, p. 6; also Kheel, 1990, in Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, pp. 129-131). The (male) disconnected Self views everything else as “Other” to itself, and thus as a potential object of management, exploitation, domination, or oppression. It manifests itself structurally and systemically as patriarchy and hierarchy. Androcentrism is prior to deep ecology’s anthropocentric thesis, and also to social ecology’s hierarchy thesis. The solution to all forms of oppression, of which the environmental crisis is one manifestation, is an

<sup>20</sup> Spretnak is a believer in a One Mind kind of radical nondualist ontology (Spretnak, 1990, p. 8). See section 4.3.1

<sup>21</sup> This idea (Eisler, 1990, p. 31), also found in Gray’s (1981) *Green Paradise lost*, that spirituality was separated from women, because only men could attain “the higher states of spiritual being” (Gray, 1981, p. 6; reference from Ebenreck, 1983, p. 38), is historically fascinating, isn’t it? Where female priestesses were common in societies where the patriarchal viewpoint had not taken hold, they were disallowed where it had, notes Eisler. And still are, in some religions today...

<sup>22</sup> Eisler supports her presentation of these early civilizations by extensive reference to archeological discoveries

integrated Self, an interconnected sense of the Self/Other relationship, and a radical social transformation towards post-patriarchal values and structures.

## 2.4 Imagery, rhetoric

Images of nature as female create ecofeminist disagreement [section 4.3.2.3]. Merchant<sup>23</sup> has argued that the “image of the earth as ... nurturing mother has historically served as a cultural constraint restricting the actions of human beings. One does not readily slay a mother, dig into her entrails for gold, or mutilate her body....”. But some ecofeminists, such as Roach (1996) problematize the symbol “Mother nature” even when its use is intended positively, such as in the 17 principles of the environmental justice movement (Taylor, 1997, pp. 42-44). Ecofeminist Linda Vance “critiques the male environmentalist description of nature as mother, protectress, provider, and nurturer as based primarily in male desire, and argues for a feminist reconceptualization of nature as sister...” (Gaard, 1993, p. 7). Kheel (1993, p. 243, p. 248-255) is critical of nature portrayed as “Mother Nature”, or “a damsel in distress”, requiring rescue by the masculine hero [currently in the form of “reason” in malestream environmental ethics, in which, Kheel (1993, p. 251) argues, ethical conduct is conceptualized as “restraint of [male] aggression” by reason].

With the dawn of the Scientific Revolution, Merchant (1980) argues, it suited patriarchal scientists to re-image, from the sixteenth century onwards, nature as an unruly and disorderly woman (Li, 1993, pp. 277-279, discussing Merchant, 1980). One image is of nature as the Beast, “conceived as a symbol for all that is not human, for that which is evil, irrational, and wild” (Kheel, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 245). Kheel (1993, pp. 245- 246, p. 247) traces how often in western patriarchal thought - Sumero-Babylonian, Greek, Jewish, and Christian - the “hero” vanquishes “the demonic Beast” – the python, the three-headed Medusa, the serpent, the dragon, all often portrayed as female. With the rise of Enlightenment rationalism, increasing mechanization, and also increasing commercial and industrial interests, the image of nature as woman was increasingly replaced by mechanistic images (Merchant, 1980), or the “the image of nature as mindless matter, which exists to serve the needs of superior, rational ‘Man’.” (Kheel, 1993, pp. 246-247; Zimmerman, 1987, p. 25).

Positive images include nets (Spretnak, 1997, p. 427), webs<sup>24</sup> (for example, Christ, 1990, p. 58; Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. xiii), and weaving. These are employed to convey the kind of interconnectedness and relatedness eco-feminists advocate, for example, “Life on earth is an interconnected web, not a hierarchy...” (Gruen, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 80<sup>25</sup>). Warren refers to a “web-like decision making” framework, in place of hierarchical decision-making in ethics (Brown, 2004, p. 250, footnote 11, referring to Warren, 1987, p. 10). “Weaving” is sometimes used to describe the “fundamental dynamic of this universe” (Spretnak cited in Swimme, 1990, p. 20). Ecofeminists “reweave new stories ...” (Diamond & Orenstein<sup>26</sup>, 1990, p. xi), for example, Kheel (1993, p. 261) writes: “... As this tapestry begins to take shape, I stretch my imagination into the future and spin the following narrative...”. An ecofeminist direct action practice is sometimes to weave closed the doors of public buildings which are the focus of some or other ecofeminist issue.

The rhetoric is of liberation of all oppressed groups (Gaard, 1993, p. 5; Gruen, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 60). There is talk of “healing the wounds<sup>27</sup>” inflicted on people and the planet by oppression (Birkeland, 1993, p. 23).

---

<sup>23</sup> Merchant, 1983, p. 100, cited by Kheel, 1993, p. 251, and also by Li, 1993, p. 277

<sup>24</sup> Reminiscent of green author Capra’s “web of life” and deep ecologist Naess’s “biospherical net” ontological metaphors

<sup>25</sup> Citing from King, “The ecology of feminism and the feminism of ecology”, in Plant, 1989, p. 19

<sup>26</sup> Their anthology on ecofeminism (1990) is entitled “Reweaving the world”

<sup>27</sup> Also the title of Plant’s (1989) anthology on ecofeminism

### 3. Epistemology

“The critique of reason, rationality, and universal principles as male concepts is a familiar theme in many environmentalist, feminist and ecofeminist writings...” (Donner, 1997, p. 376)

Ecofeminists argue that rationalism is a *masculinist*, and not a universal, way of knowing. They argue further, that such androcentric epistemology colours all western dominant culture views on ontology [section 4], ethics/nature ethics [section 5], and infuses political and social structures as well [section 6].

This section necessarily begins with a partial ontological digression (3.1; and then section 4). From the critique of the “male” rational self, ecofeminists construct evidence of the connections between masculinity, rationality, and domination in our language of the Other, including nature (3.2), critique [masculine] scientific epistemology (3.3), and the invisibility [to men] of women’s, and local, non-expert knowledge (3.4). However, there has been “in-house” critique of what some ecofeminists see as the rejection by their sisters of the Enlightenment legacy of Reason [3.5].

#### 3.1 The Enlightenment’s “masculine model of man”

Where many feminists locate their accounts of the male psyche within depth psychology [section 4.1], Birkeland (1993, in Gaard, 1993, pp. 23-25) locates hers within Enlightenment thought. She suggests that besides celebrating the ideal of progress<sup>28</sup>, the Enlightenment also celebrated a “masculine model of Man”, the connection between the two being the supposed male possession of *rationality*. Human progress could be achieved by knowledge gained through a “... ‘masculinist’ notion of reason – removed from emotion and intuition and disciplined by scientific method...” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 24). In ethical thought too, Kant for example, strongly dichotomized universalized, disinterested reason, and emotion (Plumwood, 1991c, in Warren, 1996, p. 156).

##### 3.1.1 The “androcentric” premise on rationality, Self and Other

Presupposing I think, what Birkeland calls “the androcentric premise” of Self and Other, would be the feminist premise that there is such a thing as an “abstract masculinity” (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 56). This is an epistemology (rationality) which generates a specific ontology: a “dichotomous way of thinking about the world, which constructs a series of hierarchical oppositions – nature/culture, reason/emotion, and female/male – that legitimate patterns of oppression and domination.” (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 55).

The “androcentric premise” on rationality, self and other comprises five key ideas: (1) the creation of masculine and feminine archetypes, their polarization, and the elevation of values defined as masculine (rational, competitive, dominating, calculating) above those defined as female (emotional, nurturing, caring, accommodating) (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 25); (2) the idea that “masculine” Man is autonomous – independent of both nature and community. “This false sense of masculine autonomy underlies the alienation and anthropocentrism to which many environmentalists trace the modern crisis” (pp. 24-25); (3) masculinity is measured by distance from the feminine, by autonomy, and by the amount of “*power over*” others (p. 25; her italics); (4) a patriarchal association of women with nature seen as “feminine”. Rationalism underwrites “human chauvinism” or instrumentalism,

<sup>28</sup> Deconstructing Enlightenment values and claims is a feminist project (McLaughlin, 2003, pp. 5-7). On the Enlightenment view, “progress” was “self-realization through independence from necessity (nature) and freedom from social constraints (community)...” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 25). Mies & Shiva (1998, p. 482, their italics) also refer to the Enlightenment view of human freedom and happiness as “*an ongoing process of emancipation from nature, or independence from, and dominance over natural processes by the power of reason and rationality*”. On the links between Enlightenment values, such as rationality, and progress, ecofeminist Shiva (1988, p. xiv, in Hayward, 1995, p. 3) writes: “The Age of Enlightenment and the theory of progress to which it gave rise, was centered on the sacredness of two categories: modern scientific knowledge and economic development. Somewhere along the way, the unbridled pursuit of progress, guided by science and development, began to destroy life... The act of living and of celebrating and conserving life in all its diversity – seems to have been sacrificed to progress, and the sanctity of life has been substituted by the sanctity of science and development.”

“whereby things are valued only to the extent that they are useful to Man” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 25, p. 24); (5) the universalization of this masculine model of experiences and values: “...what men do not experience is regarded as somewhat unimportant, distant or unreal.” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 25).

### 3.2 Domination metaphors in descriptions of malestream rationality

Eco-feminist Warren (1997, p. 13) highlights how the connections between “masculine” rationality and domination of the Other operate empirically in language:

... domination metaphors and sexist language pervade philosophical descriptions of reason, rationality, and good reasoning: good reasoners knock down arguments; they tear, rip, chew, cut them up, attack them, try to beat, destroy, or annihilate them, preferably by “nailing them to the wall.”. Good arguers are sharp, incisive, cutting, relentless, intimidating ... Those not good at giving arguments are wimpy, ...nagging. Good arguments have a thrust to them; they are compelling, binding, air-tight, steel-trap, knock-down, dynamite, smashing and devastating bits of reasoning which lay things out and pin them down...

### 3.3 Malestream scientific epistemology critiqued

Ecofeminists critique the distance and domination inherent in “masculinist” or “patriarchal” scientific epistemology (Donovan, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 181). Drawing on Horkheimer and Adorno’s critical theory, as well as the work of several feminist writers, ecofeminist Donovan<sup>29</sup> rejects the Cartesian/Newtonian paradigm’s scientific epistemology (p. 175, 178), inter alia, in as far as it “converts reality into mathematical entities modeled on the physical universe...” (p. 174); its relegation of that which cannot be mathematized to the realm of the unimportant (p. 174); its a-contextuality (p. 177); its “inherent subject-object mode” and the “rationalist distancing” that entails (p. 183); its “psychology of domination”; its “pretensions” to universality which has the effect of erasing, subduing, and dominating “differences and particularities” (Donovan, 1993, p. 174). Donovan sees scientific epistemology as expression of the same rejection-of-the-feminine process by which boys become men<sup>30</sup> (p. 180) [section 4.1]. Drawing on Evelyn Fox Keller’s work (Keller, 1978), Donovan suggests that “the autonomy and objectivity of the male scientist reflect the basic dissociation from the feminine affective world required in the male maturation process” (p. 180). Supporter of ecofeminism cosmologist Brian Swimme argues that standard western scientific training has “chiseled to perfection” our minds “for controlling, for distancing, for calculating, and for dominating. The rest [of our minds] has been sacrificed in the surgery of patriarchal initiation” (Swimme, 1990, p. 16). The patriarchal stance is again revealed in language: where male-type science chooses as metaphor for the origins of the universe, “The Big Bang”; ecofeminist consciousness chooses “the Great Birth” (Swimme, 1990, p. 18).

#### 3.3.1 Alternatives

Feminist standpoint theory<sup>31</sup> argues that the differences in how men and women “see” the world are important, and it seeks to provide a framework “for exploring the importance of such differences” (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 47). Women’s experiences within the everyday life of the material world, and within a view of the self “that opposes dualisms, ... and is able to sense connection and continuities ‘both with other persons and with the natural world’” (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 56, citing Hartsock, 1998, p. 120), cannot be understood within the consciousness and ideology of those in power, which generally represents a “masculine” standpoint (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 57). In the words of Harding and

<sup>29</sup> Donovan’s critique is in the context of theorizing the “dominance over nature, women, and animals inherent in ... scientific epistemology” (1993, p. 179)

<sup>30</sup> In developing this idea, Donovan cites Hanna Fenichel Pitkin’s (1984, p. 230) work on Machiavelli’s psychological development, and also Evelyn Fox Keller’s *Gender and Science* (1978, pp. 187-205, especially p. 197) in Harding and Hintikka (1983)

<sup>31</sup> This and the next paragraph hardly does justice to standpoint theorizing – McLaughlin (2003, pp. 47-69) briefly but usefully presents its key perspective, feminist critique and “incorporations”, and its political uses

Hintikka's title (1983), feminists have explored alternative feminist perspectives on the philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics, and methodology.

Standpoint theorists such as Nancy Hartsock (1983, discussed in McLaughlin, 2003), Sandra Harding (1989, 1991, discussed in Donovan, 1993, and in McLaughlin, 2003), and Donna Haraway (1985, 1988, discussed in Donovan, 1993, and McLaughlin, 2003) undermine some of the implicit assumptions of malestream scientific epistemology, for example, that there is such a thing as transcendent objectivity [the "God-trick" (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 60)], and that only universal, abstract, objective knowledge is valid knowledge. They claim that what is presumed to be the universality of (malestream and mainstream) scientific knowledge, is actually situated knowledge (Sayer, 2000, pp. 51-52), it comes from somewhere (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 60) – it is a product of the scientist's race, gender and sexuality, and his/her society's media and technology. They argue that as science is dominated by white, western, male, middle-class, heterosexuals, the claim that their knowledge is "disembodied, unmarked by their position and character, and ... of universal applicability" (Sayer, 2000, p. 51) is disputable; their so-called universal knowledge comes from a very narrow social group (Sayer, 2000, p. 54). A standpoint theorist such as Harding does not discard the notion of objectivity; instead she argues for what she calls "strong objectivity", which "asserts that claims generated from particular locations will be 'less false' than others" (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 61; Sayer, 2000, p. 52 also discusses Harding's "strong objectivity"). A third important characteristic of standpoint theory is I think, its viewpoint that knowledge is not only situated, but political. It should generate political agendas and political action to improve the position of the marginalized and oppressed in the world (McLaughlin, 2003, pp. 67-68). I would include here, nature as a marginalized "group".

Ecofeminists argue for what I call, a relational methodology. Science's "will to know" need not be equated with "the will to power" [i.e. 'power over']; there are "ways of knowing the world that are not based on objectification and domination" (King, 1990, p. 120). Ruether suggests as alternative, that researchers adopt a "relational, affective mode popularly called "right-brain thinking", which moves beyond the linear, dichotomized, alienated consciousness characteristic of the "left-brain" mode seen in masculinist epistemology" (Donovan, 1993, p. 181<sup>32</sup>). Rachel Carson, for example, "... thought that loving the world was what science had to be about. That it is essential to love the natural world before you can understand it..." (Paley, 1990<sup>33</sup>). Female natural scientist Barbara McClintock's approach of "empathetic respect" towards that which is researched, of "letting the material speak to you", and allowing it to "tell you what to do next", rather than the imposition of preconceived mathematical models on it, is often quoted, also by Donovan (1993, p. 183).

There are also calls for "methodological humility" (Gruen, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 84, drawing on the work of Uma Narayan (1988)). Basically, this entails "... deep respect for difference", and "working together across difference". Also, in action, Gruen (1993, p. 84) writes, "one must always operate under the assumption that there may be something happening that cannot be immediately understood. ... Methodological humility suggests that there may not be one right answer to the problem of undoing patriarchal oppression....".

### 3.4 The "invisibility" of women's ecological knowledge critiqued

Malestream scientific epistemology tends to the view that particular knowledge situated in the experience of the marginalized is not valid knowledge. So an important ecofeminist epistemological task is to reveal the "invisibility" [to men] of women's ecological knowledge<sup>34</sup>, the ignoring of what

---

<sup>32</sup> Drawing on Ruether, 1983, p. 87

<sup>33</sup> Dedication to Rachel Carson by Grace Paley (1990), in Diamond and Orenstein (1990)

<sup>34</sup> Curtin (1997, pp.90-91) characterizes women's ecological knowledge as relational, inherently collaborative, situated not abstract, future-oriented therefore sustainable, and bodily, i.e. integrating "head and hand"

women know about their particular locality, especially when it comes to formulation of environmental policies and their implementation (Wilson, 1997, p. 391, p. 393), and to development projects involving natural resources in the Third World (Wilson, 1997, p. 403, p. 405). [This aspect is discussed in more detail at section 6.3, under the concept ‘maldevelopment’]. Ecofeminists argue that women’s ecological knowledge must be granted legitimacy in mainstream ways of knowing (e.g., Curtin, 1997, p. 86, in Warren, 1997).

### 3.5. Critique of ecofeminist epistemology

Some feminists/ecofeminists criticize their sisters for ignoring or rejecting Enlightenment legacies, including reason and rationality (e.g., social ecologist Janet Biehl, 1991, p. 1, in Donner, 1997, p. 375). Donner suggests that since feminists/ecofeminists generally also wish to affirm that women [and some argue, nature too] possess reason, careful thought must be given to which forms of rationality are to be rejected, and which retained (Donner, 1997, p. 376). The middle road viewpoint is not that reason must be replaced with emotion, or rationality with intuition, but that the two must be brought into better balance: “reason and emotion are symbiotically related, coequal sources of knowledge” (‘feminist epistemology’ in Audi, 1999, p. 305).

## 4. Ontology

Ecofeminist ontological views are usually simultaneous views of reality, self and other. Ecofeminists argue that prevailing western views of Self, and Self vis-a-vis Other [whether other people, nature generally, or animals particularly] are *masculine* ontological views. In section 4.1, I present what could be called a “depth psychology” (Meyer, Moore, & Viljoen, 1989, pp. 35-38) view of the masculine self. Ecofeminists have theorized what they see as androcentric views of Self and Other; two accounts are presented in section 4.2. Some ecofeminist ontological views are set out in section 4.3.

### 4.1 Anthropological/depth psychology views of the male Self

The “Sky God” with his thunderbolts, is seen by ecofeminists as the “projection of the male’s hierarchical, patriarchal, domineering, and authoritarian” view of self, and self vis-a-vis the other, including nature (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 143). Carl Jung, and psychotherapist Erich Neumann, on Zimmerman’s (1990) view<sup>35</sup>, have interpreted the replacement of the original female Earth Goddess or Great Mother by the male Sky God as representative of an increasing individuation of [male] consciousness from the relatively collective state of consciousness then obtaining: “They see the solar God as representing the clarity of the free-willed, self-assertive, *rational* ego-self. For this kind of individuated selfhood to be possible, according to Jung, the heroic ego had to escape from the embrace of the great Mother, who represents both the organic-bodily and the subconscious domain of human existence ... Rightly understood, the great Father can be regarded as a further development of the *individuating* and *transcendent* principles....” (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 143, my italics). The Father God, or Sky God, was construed as all-powerful, separate, and other-worldly [i.e. not material], and men construed themselves in his image. They dissociated themselves from their own bodies, from nature, and from women, who were now construed as being too associated with “the subconscious, prerational, collective, material, and emotional realms” (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 144). The organic and the subconscious became western humanity’s “dark side” – its mortality, dependence, and finitude. All these characteristics are projected by western humanity “upon the body and nature, which it then attempts to “dominate” and “control” (Zimmerman<sup>36</sup>, 1990, p. 140).

<sup>35</sup> Zimmerman presented in 1987 (pp. 24-25) a similar discussion, based on feminist Marilyn French’s (1985) work

<sup>36</sup> Zimmerman expands far more on this theme (1990, pp. 143-145) than I do here. The concluding sentence of his discussion is “The fierceness of the ego’s repression of the female, the bodily, and the natural is directly proportional to the ego’s recognition of its ultimate *dependent* status. ... the anxious ego finally claims to be independent of everything...” (p. 145)

This analysis appears in broad agreement with feminist interpretations of psychoanalytic object-relations theory<sup>37</sup> (McLaughlin, 2003, pp. 55-56), and also with Birkeland's "androcentric premise" introduced earlier. All suggest the ingredients of the masculine psyche as rational, separate, autonomous, transcendent over the Other. Expressed psychologically, these characteristics give rise to an alienated sense of one's own self, as well as an alienated, and dominating sense of self vis-a-vis the Other.

## 4.2 Theorizing androcentric views on Self and Other

Here I take as exemplary, Plumwood (1991b, 1997), and Warren (1990). Both of these authors, in different ways, theorize the connections between androcentric dichotomous views of self and other, and domination. I introduce first (4.2.1), Plumwood's centric model to illustrate how androcentrism's "Otherization" works vis-a-vis that which is/or construed as feminine, then Warren's "logic of domination" model, to illuminate the androcentric justification for the twin exploitation of women, and of nature as "Other".

### 4.2.1 Plumwood's "centrism": masculine Centre/feminine Other as example

Plumwood draws on feminist Nancy Hartsock<sup>38</sup>'s (1990) work which "discerns a common centric structure underlying different forms of oppression" (Plumwood, 1997, p. 327) – racism, sexism, ethnocentrism and colonialism, for example. There is an "omnipotent subject at the centre" which constructs everything else as other, and that other "as sets of negative qualities" (Plumwood, 1997, p. 336, citing Hartsock, 1990).

Plumwood (1997, pp. 337-341), within her project of proposing a "liberation" version of anthropocentrism [(p. 336); section 5.1.1 in this chapter], identifies five characteristic features of "centrism", or the "structure of Otherization" as she also calls it, and shows its applicability to androcentrism, interpreted as masculine Centre/feminine Other:

(a) **The Other as inferior** and therefore to be kept separate and radically excluded. Institutionalized systems of domination take advantage of cultural opportunities to clearly identify the Centre, usually portrayed as reason-as-male, by excluding the "inferiorized qualities of the periphery". Men are rational, and women are set apart as lacking in reason. Because they are different, lower, or on the periphery, their shared qualities with men are denied, and they are also denied equal access to socio-economic goods. "Separate 'natures' explain, justify, and naturalize widely different privileges... between men and women, block identification and sympathy, tendencies to question..." (Plumwood, 1997, p. 337).

(b) **Homogenization of the Other.** This allows differences to be disregarded. Everyone within the otherized group "is stereotyped as interchangeable, replaceable, all alike, homogenous" (p. 337). The other is not an individual but a class of interchangeable things viewed as resources

<sup>37</sup> Feminist/ecofeminist writers Nancy Chodorow, Dorothy Dinnerstein, and Elizabeth Dodson Gray, have all developed psychosexual accounts [but somewhat differing interpretations, on Li's account, 1993, pp. 279-280 at least] of the development of the male psyche. Zimmerman (1987, pp. 31-32) refers to Chodorow's object-relations theory in seeking to explain the male social atomist view of self and other. Ecofeminist Kheel (1990, in Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, pp. 130-131, and again in Gaard, 1993, pp. 247-248), also draws on the "psychoanalytic theory of object relations" to describe a male sense of self, replete with images of identification with the mother figure, the struggle for dis-identification through portrayal of the female as "darkness or Chaos, usually symbolized by a female-imagined form" (1990, p. 130), but also a subsequent yearning "to reexperience the original state of union" (1990, p. 131). She too, refers inter alia, to the work of Chodorow and Dinnerstein (1993, p. 264, footnotes 14 and 15), as does ecofeminist Li (1993, p. 279), in discussing Elizabeth Gray's work. Rosemary Radford Ruether (cited by Donovan, 1993, p. 180, from Ruether, 1975, p. 25) also writes of the male "war against the mother"; the "struggle of the transcendent ego to free itself from bondage to nature"

<sup>38</sup> King lists Nancy Hartsock as a socialist feminist (1990, p. 114); McLaughlin (2003, p. 54) describes her as seeking to re-interpret Marx's historical materialism through "women's experiences and forms of knowledge"

for the centre; diversity in the otherized group is only recognized to the extent that it serves the centre's needs.

Together, (a) radical exclusion and (b) homogenization, combine to “set up a polarized structure” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 337) which makes the two groups very different, yet everyone in each group the same, making the domination of the Other by the centre, natural, justified and justifiable. Proposed change in this status quo is often seen as challenge to tradition.

(c) **Denial, backgrounding.** Once the Other is set aside as separate and inferior, there is a tendency to both background<sup>39</sup> the Other, and to disclaim any dependency on the Other. “Women’s work” – home care, child care – is disvalued and treated as the “private” sphere, the background, against which the really important, male-dominated things happen in the “public” sphere – politics, corporate business, money markets. Women’s work in home care and childcare is still not recognized in national financial accounting generally. Namibian women are still radically disempowered, despite Namibia’s accession to all international agreements promoting women’s rights (Thomas, 2005). Thomas writes: “Namibian traditional cultures, as well as colonial history, neglected and oppressed women in many ways - to the point that until independence women were treated as minors”. She conducted her study “to determine whether this dismal state of affairs has changed since independence [1990] or not” and concluded that despite an enabling legal climate, male politicians have not taken active steps to level the political playing field for women, or to “educate men to share equally in housework and the raising of the children”. Namibian male politicians blame women for not coming forward, rather than “analysing and removing the many barriers and constraints facing women who enter the male dominated sphere of politics” (2005, Abstract, pp. i-ii). This is perhaps an example of what Plumwood calls, “... denial ... accomplished via a perceptual politics of what ... can be acknowledged...” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 338).

(d) **Incorporation.** The Other is defined not as a person in themselves, but a person in relation to the subject at the centre. Plumwood (1997, p. 338) cites Simone de Beauvoir’s (1965, p. 8) inditement: “humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being...[recall here Thomas’s (2005) reference to Namibian women being treated as minors before independence]; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute, she is the Other”. She is “lack”, “exception”, “negation”, and these things form the basis of her lower place in the social hierarchy, her inferiority, her exclusion (Plumwood, 1997, p. 338).

(e) **Instrumentalism.** Instrumentalism implies a denial of agency in the Other, the “use of the periphery as the means to the center’s ends” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 352, footnote 13). In the androcentric view, the female’s agency is downplayed, downgraded or denied. She is portrayed as passive, and as requiring a protector. She does not have value in her own right, but derives her “social worth instrumentally, from service to others” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 338), as in the popular slogan “Behind every successful man is a woman”.

---

<sup>39</sup> Salleh (1993, p. 234), drawing on Spender’s (1982) *Women of ideas and what men have done to them*, lists several “discursive strategies” and “common patriarchal procedures for dealing with intellectual and political challenges by women: ageism, appropriation, burial (of contribution), contempt (sexual), character assassination, the double bind, the double standard, harassment, isolation, charges of man hating, masculine mind, misrepresentation, namelessness, scapegoating, and witch hunting”

#### 4.2.2 Warren’s “logic of domination”: theorizing the oppression of women and nature

Warren’s “logic of domination” model has been influential in ecofeminist thought, and both critiqued and defended<sup>40</sup>. Warren (1997, pp. 19-20) suggests that the connection between *all* forms of oppression – whether it is called sexism, racism, colonialism, heterosexism, agism, anthropocentrism or naturism, is their common dualistic conceptual framework<sup>41</sup>, *understood within a “logic of domination”*. Three<sup>42</sup> features mark such an oppressive conceptual framework:

- (1) “value-hierarchical thinking”, that is, up/down thinking: what is “up” has more value, status or prestige than what is “down” (Warren, 1990, p. 128),
- (2) “value dualisms” - pairs of terms which are not complementary and inclusive, but oppositional and exclusive, and which place higher value, status or prestige on one term of the pair (p. 128). Contrary to what many feminists and ecofeminists suggest, Warren argues that “there may be nothing *inherently* problematic about ‘hierarchical thinking’ or even ‘value-hierarchical thinking’ (p. 128, her italics). They become problematic, i.e. oppressive, when understood within the third feature,
- (3) “a logic of domination”. It is the logic of domination, *coupled with* value-hierarchical thinking and value dualisms, which “justifies” subordination (p. 129, her italics). That is because a logic of domination “involves a substantive value system”. It contains the ethical premise/s needed (p. 128) to provide “the moral justification of subordination, that is, that superiority justifies subordination”.

Working together, these three features identify difference/similarity, establish inferiority, and justify subordination of that which is inferior or lesser. Together they constitute a justified and justifiable, *moral* hierarchy.

Warren suggests that an ecofeminist philosophical perspective “extends this sort of feminist critique of oppressive conceptual frameworks, and the behaviours of domination they give rise to, to nonhuman nature.” (Warren, 1997, footnote 52, p. 20). Here (based on another example in Warren, 1990, p. 130, not her exact example), is the oppressive framework linking the domination of women and nature, or the superiority of “culture” over “nature”<sup>43</sup> made visible:

- (1) Women are identified with the realm of the physical [or “nature”], and men are identified with the realm of the mental [or “humanity” or “culture”]
- (2) Whatever is identified with nature and the realm of the physical, is inferior to (“below”) whatever is identified with the “human” and the realm of the mental; or conversely, the latter is superior to/above the former
- (3) Thus, women [and/or “nature”] are inferior to (“below”) men [or “culture”]; or, conversely, men [culture] are/is superior to (“above”) women [nature]
- (4) For any X and Y, if X is superior to Y, then X is justified in subordinating Y
- (5) Thus, men are justified in subordinating women and nature, or, “culture” is justified in subordinating “nature”.

<sup>40</sup> The “logic of domination” concept is often referred to in the literature on ecofeminism, for example, Adams, 1996, p. 117; Cuomo, 1992, p. 351; Davion, 1996, p. 182; Gruen, 1993, p. 79. It has been critiqued *inter alia*, by Frodeman (1992, pp. 313-314), and critiqued and defended in a paper by Goff-Yates (2000)

<sup>41</sup> Warren (1990, p. 127, her italics) defines a conceptual framework as “a set of *basic* beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions which shape and reflect how one views oneself and one’s world”. An oppressive conceptual framework is one which is interpreted within a “logic of domination”. This logic “explains, justifies, and maintains relationships of domination and subordination” (Warren, 1990, p. 127)

<sup>42</sup> Warren’s 1997 version lists five features, but I think her 1990 version is the stronger and clearer of the two. The two additional features are (a) “power over” conceptions of power (b) “conceptions of privilege” which maintain and justify the dominance of those who are “up” over those who are “down”. She inserts them in that order between the (2) and the (3) of the 1990 version discussed here

<sup>43</sup> Wilson (1997, p. 400) notes that “There is a long sedimented history of thought which has opposed human culture to the natural world”

Such social constructions of women and nature have been successful because the oppressive conceptual framework of patriarchy underlies both. Part of the success of the patriarchal oppressive framework has been its “naturalization” of women, and its “feminization” of nature (Warren, 1990, p. 133, and footnote 14), a process which Warren documents empirically in sexist-naturist language.

#### **4.2.2.1 *Naturalizing women, and feminizing nature in language***

Warren (1997, p. 12) notes that many philosophers have argued “that the language we use mirrors and reflects our conceptions of ourselves and our world. When language is sexist or naturist, it mirrors and reflects conceptions of women and nonhuman nature as inferior to, having less prestige or status than, that which is identified as male, masculine, or “human” (i.e. male)”:

The language used to describe women, [and] nature ...often is sexist and naturist. Women are described in animal terms as pets, cows, sows, foxes, chicks, serpents, bitches, beavers, old bats, old hens, mother hens, pussycats, cats, ... birdbrains, and harebrains. Animalizing or naturalizing women in a (patriarchal) culture where animals are seen as inferior to humans (men) thereby reinforces and authorizes women’s inferior status. Similarly, language which feminizes nature in a (patriarchal) culture where women are viewed as subordinate and inferior reinforces and authorizes the domination of nature: ‘Mother’ nature is raped, mastered, conquered...; her secrets are ‘penetrated’...Virgin timber is felled... land that lies ‘fallow’ is ‘barren’, useless. The exploitation of nature and animals is justified by feminizing them; the exploitation of women is justified by naturalizing them. (Warren, 1997, p. 12).

### **4.3 Ecofeminist views on Self and Other**

“From the vantage point of ecofeminism, human beings are part of nature, and nature and culture are interrelated” (Li, 1993, p. 290)

Despite their rejection of patriarchal ontological dualisms, few ecofeminists propose a radically non-dualistic ontology. Spretnak is one of those who do (section 4.3.1). Ecofeminists tend rather to advocate “a relational, interdependent understanding of reality” (Spretnak, 1997, p. 425), one in which both difference and relatedness, autonomy and symbiosis, are recognized [section 4.3.2].

#### **4.3.1 Spretnak’s radical ontological nonduality**

Spretnak (1997, in Warren, 1997, p. 426) argues for a total rejection of the “core Western dualism of self versus world”, but sees at least three obstacles in the way of moving radical nonduality as ontology into respectable philosophy: (1) the predominant western worldview which rejects that which cannot be quantified (2) “the grip of ... postmodernism on much contemporary intellectual (particularly academic) thought”, and (3) feminist suspicion of nonduality based on bad experience with male versions of it (Spretnak, 1997, p. 426).

She conceptualises reality as an organism<sup>44</sup> possessing mind. The universe is “not just a thing but also a mode of being that has been continually unfolding since the time of the primordial fireball”. Mind is not something limited to individual organisms but also exhibited by the Earth as a “great biocybernetic system” in that it [and other systems and communities] appears to exhibit “immensely complex capabilities for self-organization and self-regulation” (Spretnak, 1997, p. 432).

She herself argues for the adoption of a holistic, systemic view of reality, that is, reality as systems within systems, parts which are wholes within other wholes. Her understanding of holism<sup>45</sup> is radical. She uses expressions such as “the oneness that is almost palpable”, or “the One Mind” (Spretnak, 1990, p. 8). She presents several examples to suggest that many people in many different cultures have

<sup>44</sup> But some ecofeminists, she notes, point to [male] political misuse of metaphors of organicism in the past (Spretnak, 1997, p. 428)

<sup>45</sup> One wonders if she too, like Gandhi, and Naess, is influenced by the Hindu notion of advaita [non-duality] “I believe” wrote Gandhi, “in the essential unity ... of all that lives” (Naess, 1974, p. 35, referred to by Naess, 1988, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 226, footnote 3)

experienced moments of total connection with all that there is, during which self-world boundaries learnt in the socialization process melt away (1997, pp. 429-432).

Her ontology/epistemology appears to be a blend of the postmodern acceptance of the social construction of reality, yet at the same time, she insists on its physical groundedness. She speaks of “our constitutive embeddedness in subtle biological, ecological, cosmological, and quantum processes ...” (Spretnak, 1997, p. 433). The human experience can not be totally ungrounded, free-floating and constructed as postmodernism suggests, because it also emerges from “one’s genetic inheritance of behavioural predispositions; one’s cognitive functions, which include the continuous resculpting of neuronal groups and pathways near synaptic interactions; the influence of bodily experience on metaphor, by which most conceptual thought is organized; the influences of landscape, weather, and other dynamics of one’s bioregion on imagination and mood; the self-regulating dynamics of the body-mind; the effect of daily exposures to strong and weak electromagnetic fields...” (Spretnak, 1997, p. 433). But we also need to recognize the power plays in human metanarratives and language games, and to “break out of the conceptual box that keeps modern society self-identified apart from nature” (Spretnak, 1997, p. 433).

On the difficult ecofeminist issue of separation and connectedness [4.3.2.1], Spretnak argues for a “polyvalent perception”, which would negate fears of overwhelming of the individual. She recognizes that “the subjectivity of every manifestation in the universe is ... real and precious” (1997, p. 434), and that there is “astounding diversity and profound *difference* in the universe” (p. 434, her italics), yet she says, all these manifestations *also* have their being within “the dynamic web of relationships that are *constitutive* for that being at a given moment” (p. 433, her italics).

Spretnak suggests that many ecofeminist ontologies don’t go nearly far enough towards understanding reality as a “gestalt of a subtle, unitary field of form, motion, space and time”, or existence as one [or many] “unitive dimensions of being” (Spretnak, 1997, p. 425). On her view, ecofeminist philosophers appear more comfortable with an ontology which proposes a solidarity “of thoroughly discrete beings” but not a “unity<sup>46</sup>”. While rejecting patriarchally-inspired Self-Other dualisms (Wilson, 1997, p. 400), many ecofeminists are also wary of replacing patriarchal “metaphysical and social atomism” with “metaphysical and social relationism” (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 147). They call for “a new version of selfhood or individuation, one that avoids isolated egos on the one hand and unconscious blending on the other” (1990, p. 147). Relational ontological understandings are more commonly found among ecofeminists than Spretnak’s radical nonduality.

### 4.3.2 Relational, interdependent ontological understandings

Karen Warren (Wilson, 1997, p. 390) for example, argues for a “nonpatriarchal” ontology, in which “we see ourselves as both co-members of an ecological community and yet different from other members of it” (p. 390). Kheel agrees: ecofeminist philosophy must be “wary” of a holism that “transcends the realm of individual beings”; a holistic interconnectedness means connectedness to both the larger whole, *and* to particular beings (Kheel, 1985, p. 135 summary and pp. 139-141; 1990, pp. 136-137; 1993, p. 261). Not to experience this both-and relationality, may “reflect the familiar masculine urge to transcend the concrete world of particularity in preference for something more ... abstract” (Kheel, 1990, in Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. 136).

In this section, I introduce the ecofeminist ambivalence around autonomy vis-a-vis connectedness [4.3.2.1]; their view of the Self-in-relation [4.3.2.2], their ambivalence about whether there are

<sup>46</sup> Spretnak points out (1997, p. 428) for example, that some ecofeminist philosophers are prepared to accept as ontological model, scientific ecological theory which conceptualizes reality as “discrete and relatively disconnected or autonomous holons and hierarchical levels of organization”, but dismiss as “dubious metaphysical holism” theories from physics which suggest otherwise

women's ways of being in the world [4.3.2.3], the 'feminine principle' [4.3.2.4], and the 'partnership' concept [4.3.2.5].

#### 4.3.2.1 *The ambivalence around autonomy vis-a-vis connectedness*

In the ecofeminist view, being human "*is to understand our connection to other people and to all other beings...*" (Christ, 1990, p. 67, her italics).

But in the midst of their concerns for interdependence, interrelation, connectedness and community, autonomy, individuality and agency for women remain important values. On the one hand, they have been so strongly construed as androcentric qualities, easily lending themselves to the logic of domination. But on the other hand, women have for so long been denied autonomy and individuality, and for so long been socialised to cater for/take second place to the needs of others, that feminists wish to protect their emerging autonomy. They are wary of any ontology proposing a merging of the self [male]/other boundary (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, pp. 284-309; Donner, 1997, in Warren, pp. 375-389).

Some ecofeminists construe Arne Naess's "ecological self" [Chapter Four, section 4.2] as an even further expansion of the male self (Spretnak, 1997, p. 434). Kheel is worried that Naess's ecological self doesn't discriminate between the differing socialization histories of men and women, and so is an unsuitable personal development/emancipation model for feminists/ecofeminists (Spretnak 1997, p. 428 and footnote 4 on p. 435). Donner (1997, pp. 379-381), drawing on Laing's (1964) work, suggests that failure to develop an appropriate boundary of Self, and sense of agency, leads to pathological behaviour. She agrees with Plumwood's critique of all three deep ecology versions of Self [Chapter Four, section 4.2.3.2] as too drastic an obliteration of all distinction between Self and Other, and supports Plumwood's "nonholistic but relational account of the self" which does not deny the "independence or distinguishability of the other", and "enables us to stress continuity without drowning in a sea of indistinguishability" (Donner, 1997, pp. 381-382, citing Plumwood, 1991, p. 14, and p. 19<sup>47</sup>).

#### 4.3.2.2 "Self-in-relation"

Instead of androcentrism's divided Self, self against other, and self against nature on the one hand, and what she sees as deep ecology's obliterated self on the other, ecofeminist Plumwood argues, as do other ecofeminists (Warren, 1999, p. 158, who calls the concept "relational selves") for the concept of an integrated "self-in-relation"<sup>48</sup> to the Other, whether understood as persons, the community, or nature, the focus in this section.

On Plumwood's view (1991c, in Warren, 1996, p.170), there "are two parts to the restructuring of the human self in relation to nature – reconceptualizing the human and reconceptualizing the self, and especially its possibilities of relating to nature in other than instrumental ways". Underlying both though, it must be remembered, is the consistent ecofeminist critique of masculine rationalism. So part

---

<sup>47</sup> These page numbers refer to Plumwood's paper as published in *Hypatia*, VI, 1 (Spring, 1991), 3-27. See Plumwood, 1991c, p. 165 and p. 170 for republished equivalent

<sup>48</sup> 'Self-in-relation' is a concept discussed in psychology/social psychology too, often drawing on feminist insights. Psychologist E.E. Sampson examined in 1988, the merits of "American individualism" versus what he called a preferable "ensembled individualism", based inter alia, on feminist Nodding's (1984) work. Social psychologist Burr (1995, pp. 109-110), in discussing alternatives to the individual/society dichotomy, describes Chodorow (1978) and Gilligan's (1982) psychoanalytic perspective on the differences between women's and men's sense of self thus: "[they] suggest that the predominant western notion of the highly individuated, self-sufficient, separate person describes primarily the experience of men. They argue that women's sense of self is that of the 'self-in-relationship', that women's identity is so closely bound up in their relations with others that for them the dividing line between self and other is less clear than for men. The suggestion here is that the person's identity lies in their relation to others, and is not an entity to be found inside the person". Burr also refers to Sampson's work. By 1990, Sampson was calling his "ensembled individualism", "embedded individualism" (Burr, 1995, p. 110, citing Sampson, 1990, p. 124). But still individualism!

of what is involved in challenging the human/nature dualism, is challenging “the centrality and dominance of the rational in the account of the human self” (Plumwood, 1991c, in Warren, 1997, p. 169).

In western culture, what it is to be “fully and authentically human”, has, Plumwood argues (1991c, in Warren, 1996, p. 169), “been defined oppositionally, by *exclusion* of what is associated with the inferior natural sphere” (p. 169, her italics). An important task for the self-in-relation, is to abandon masculine models of being “human”, which value “maximizing control over the natural sphere (both within and without)...” (p. 169), and to re-integrate into the self, those aspects of being human which in mainstream rationalist-inspired ontology, have been “split off, denied, ...construed as alien” (p. 169), or “devalued” (p. 168), for example, emotionality and sensuality, *because* they represent the feminine, the animal, the natural (p. 173). This would form an essential part of a strategy for “challenging ... the human/nature dualism”, because it would “provide a basis for the recognition of *continuities* with the natural world” (p. 169), rather than highlighting as “human” only those qualities such as rationality, abstract planning and calculation (p. 169), which illustrate our discontinuity from nature.

Feminist/ecofeminist theory argues that the rational autonomous self, making instrumental use of the Other, is neither a full, nor accurate, account of being human. To be human is also to be social and to be connected. We should see human beings rather as “*essentially* related and interdependent” (Plumwood, 1991c, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 301, her italics). This view of self-in-relationship is one that “enables a recognition of interdependence and relationship without falling into the problems of indistinguishability” (1991c, pp. 301-302) [Plumwood’s group term for the various deep ecology accounts of self]. It “acknowledges both continuity and difference, ... breaks the culturally posed false dichotomy of egoism and altruism of interests [relational interests are neither egoistic nor altruistic, says Plumwood (1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 306, footnote 19)];” and “it bypasses both masculine “separation” and traditional-feminine “merger” accounts of the self. It can also provide an appropriate foundation for an ethic of connectedness and caring for others...” (Plumwood, 1991b, pp. 301-302).

When Other is understood as nature, then the view of the human being as self-in-relation is one which recognizes both our continuity with nature and our distinctness from it. Relationship with nature is viewed as an essential rather than an accidental part of what it is to be human. On such an account, land, for example, is understood as something to which one can become as connected as to a human being, and not a piece of real estate, or instrumental backdrop for human activity. Such essential relationships with nature involve at least, recognition, not denigration, of the worth of particular relationships - to “places, forests, animals, to which one is particularly strongly related or attached and toward which one has specific and meaningful, not merely abstract, responsibilities of care” (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 303). It is important to note here that Plumwood is not arguing for a replacement of universality and rationality with particularity and emotion, because that would be to “implicitly ... accept the dualistic construction of these as oppositional”. What is needed is to re-integrate the personal, the particular, and the emotional, into environmental philosophy and ethics<sup>49</sup> (Plumwood, 1991b, p. 304, footnote 3).

#### ***4.3.2.3 Are there women’s ways of being in the world?***

Whether women should deny or celebrate a feminine essence, and accept or reject any particular affinity to nature, is also the site of ecofeminist ambivalence. Are women “essentially” different to men? Is the women-nature connection potentially emancipatory for women or not? (King, 1990, pp. 106-121). Will it contribute to lessening or eliminating ecological domination?

---

<sup>49</sup> Field (1995) however problematizes ecofeminist optimism about relational-self theories and place-based ethics

Some see the significance of ecofeminism as its recognition that women's ways of being in the world *are* different to men's ways. In this kind of "standpoint" feminism, women are seen to "possess an essential nature – a biological connection or a spiritual affinity with nature that men do not" (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 22). The "nature as female" idea is also "the central category of analysis" for radical feminists. Some radical feminists do, and some don't, urge women to celebrate their femaleness, and their close association with nature (Warren, 1987, p. 14).

The "essential" female, and interconnected sense of Self, is argued to give rise to a different kind of moral reasoning from that of the male, disconnected, sense of Self, even though both kinds are available to both sexes (Gaard, 1993, p. 2, citing Chodorow and Gilligan<sup>50</sup>'s ethical studies; Brown (2004, p. 253, footnote 20) cites several other feminist works on moral theory). This idea comes from work in psychology on the development of moral reasoning and judgement. Piaget and Kohlberg (based on studies with boys) claimed that the development of morality moves through invariant, hierarchical, and universal stages. In the higher stages of development, moral judgements are based on abstract reason, rationality, and universally-agreed to rules. Women have difficulty in reaching these higher stages (!) (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 74, p. 80). Gilligan (1982), who was a student of Kohlberg's, claimed by contrast, after her studies with girls, that the development of morality moves through non-invariant stages depending on life experience and context, that the higher stages of moral development are premised on relationship, meeting responsibilities, and providing care, in specific contexts, and that "Women and men can base judgements on an ethic of care or justice when notions of femininity or masculinity do not inhibit their psychological development" (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 80, Box 3.1, summarizing Gilligan's claims; also Schutte, 1993, discussing Gilligan's work).

On this view, morality is gendered: "Where men emphasise rights, women emphasise responsibility. Whereas men seek impartial judgement on the basis of equality through the agreement of all rational people, women seek to respond with selective care to each different situation of need. Men stress the justice of non-interference, women the necessity of caring involvement" (Schutte, drawing on Gilligan's work, p. 149). But Gilligan's claims have "been met with anxiety by feminists troubled with its perspective and conclusions" (McLaughlin, 2003, p. 80). McLaughlin discusses these concerns further (2003, pp. 80-83), and also a more public-political "rearticulation" of an ethic of care as social practice. Using an ethics of care as standard, for example (1) the extent to which, and way in which the state provides care for its citizens, as well as (2) the state's understandings of responsible citizenship can be evaluated and critiqued. Political change can be demanded (McLaughlin, 2003, pp. 83-89).

From the environmental philosophy viewpoint, ecofeminist theory supporter Jim Cheney (1987, p. 128) also notes that where men tend towards a theory of rights, justice and obligation as suitable basis for an environmental ethic, ecofeminism is concerned with "an ethics of love, care, and friendship". Environmental philosopher Zimmerman notes (1990, p. 143) though, that the viewpoint that women are "essentially" or biologically or "naturally" different, seems to confirm the misogynist viewpoint that these are the very qualities which make women 'inferior'. The qualities certainly cannot make them 'superior' because then we have moved no further in dismantling dualistic, hierarchical thought. Patriarchy has also distorted women's views of themselves, because many women buy into the male patriarchal version of what it is to be a female (Zimmerman, 1990, p. 143; Davion (1994) argues similarly). Ecofeminists Ynestra King and Janis Birkeland both repudiate the essentialist nature of women thesis as a part of ecofeminism, basically on the grounds that it is a patriarchal plot (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 22). Without a western patriarchal thought-split between culture and nature in the first place, the question would be a non-issue. And if women do see themselves as closer to nature than men, and men believe this too, it is the result of hundreds of years of cultural patriarchal

---

<sup>50</sup> Gilligan's work is often quoted in ecofeminist writing, for example, Warren's reference (1990, p. 140, footnote 27) to Gilligan's work on women's values, or Wilson (1997, footnote 51 on p. 409)

conditioning. The crucial point, it is argued, is that both aggressive as well as caring, gentle, non-dominating behaviour patterns are available to both sexes; the adoption of either is a matter of choice. “In short, men can subscribe to ecofeminism, and, in fact, their cooperation is necessary if we are to save the planet” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 23). Green theorist Dobson (2000, pp. 189-200) concurs: he is concerned that a “standpoint” ethic might border on abandoning slightly less than half the population [men!] as beyond redemption as far as reforming their environmental ethic is concerned.

#### 4.3.2.4 *The feminine principle*

There is no one “definition” in ecofeminism of what is meant by the “feminine principle”<sup>51</sup>, but the assumption is that it has something positive to offer in addressing the ecological crisis, developing an ecological consciousness, and generating an ecological society. In a women’s spirituality context, the feminine principle is understood as “intimate communion with the natural world” (Spretnak, 1990, p. 14), because that is where sacredness is (Starhawk, 1990, p. 73). Some ecofeminists mean by it, that instead of “power over” [domination, control] in structural and personal relationships, harmony, compassion, wisdom (Spretnak, 1990, p. 7) relatedness, and ‘power to’, that is, creative power (Eisler, 1990, p. 30; Starhawk, 1990, p. 76) are valued. Eisler (1990, pp. 23-24) refers to caring, compassion and non-violence as “‘feminine’ values”. Shiva critiques western development [section 6.4] *inter alia*, because it lacks the “feminine principle” by which she means, “the conserving, ecological principle”<sup>52</sup>, the recognition of diversity as asset, not threat, the abandonment of reductionism, duality and linearity, the rejection of the alienation and subjugation of women and nature. Davion (1994<sup>53</sup>) however suggests that some ecofeminists have not been critical enough of concepts of the “feminine” developed within a patriarchal culture. If patriarchy is damaging, then it has damaged the understanding of “the feminine” too.

The concept “partnership”, also found in ecofeminist literature, and taken up by Die Grünen [Chapter Seven] as the name of their ethic, can perhaps be understood as concrete “signifier” of the feminine principle.

#### 4.3.2.5 *Partnership*

A key concept in the ecofeminist vision of a new, non-exploitative, non-hierarchical society [which is *not* a matriarchal society (King, 1990, p. 120)] is what King (1990, p. 117) calls “partnership” – a “politics of heart and a beloved community, recognizing our connection with each other – and with nonhuman nature”. Eisler (1990, p. 28) talks of “partnership” as key principle in the new society. She describes it as “a way of organizing human relations in which beginning with the most fundamental difference in our species – the difference between male and female – diversity is *not* equated with inferiority or superiority”. Ecofeminists believe that their worldview also holds the promise of delivering a partnership environmental ethic – an ethic of care - which takes the connections between the twin oppressions of women and nature seriously (Warren 1990, p. 126).

<sup>51</sup> The concept ‘feminine principle’ comes from Taoism’s ‘yin’, as opposed to the male principle, ‘yang’. Though the concept of the Yin and Yang of nature is highly prized by some deep ecologists and ecofeminists, Jaki (1975, p. 45), in the context of the development of scientific thought, is highly critical: “This conceptual merry-go-round in which the Chinese mind was trapped can be seen in almost every page written by the Chinese of old on nature. The most striking expression of this can be found in the bewildering ramifications that grew out from the primitive notion of the Yin and Yang. The latter, which originally meant bright sunlight, was subsequently identified with the principle of maleness and also with the qualities of hardness and weightlessness. The Yin which originally referred to dark clouds, became the word for the feminine, soft, and heavy. Later connotations of the Yang extended to everything hot, dry, and pure, whereas the Yin became tied to anything cold, turbid, and moist. Again, fire was spoken of as Yang, and so was everything ready to extend or to move upward. Yin, in turn, was said to be the essence of water and of downward and contracting movements. Yang produced everything round and moving, while Yin represented squareness and stillness....”. He goes on to note the inadequacy and illogicality of the concepts Yin and Yang for developing scientific thought

<sup>52</sup> Shiva, 1990, p. 190. But it is not clear what Shiva means by the “ecological principle”. Davion (1994, p. 292) interprets Shiva’s “feminine principle” as “conservation and nurturing”

<sup>53</sup> In her analysis, Davion considers the viewpoints of Eisler (1990), Kheel (1990), Salleh (1984), Shiva (1990), and Swimme (1990) specifically

## 5. Ethic

Ecofeminists query the usually unquestioned premise which underlies much western ethical theory, that rationality is the specific difference which separates [male] humans from, places them in opposition to, and justifies their domination of, the world (Wilson, 1997, p. 391, p. 393). As feminist critique, ecofeminism is committed to “critique male bias in ethics wherever it occurs ...” (Warren, 1990, p. 138). Ecofeminists seek “to engage properly” with the rationalist, and dualist-ontological, assumptions underlying traditional moral philosophy, which have been carried over, unexamined, into environmental philosophy<sup>54</sup> (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, p. 284). Any environmental ethic which emerges from mainstream western ethics, and has failed to notice the western historical reality of women’s and nature’s exploitation, and to acknowledge and redress the patriarchal oppressive conceptual framework underlying the domination of both, is functioning from a “privileged and “unmarked” position” (Warren, 1990, p. 144). It would be “at best an incomplete, inaccurate, ... partial” and male-biased account of “what is required of a conceptually adequate environmental ethic” (Warren, 1990, p. 144). Anthropocentrism, undergirded by implicit androcentrism, is critiqued as just such a male-biased environmental theory of values and norms [section 5.1].

Ecofeminism is also committed “to *develop* ethics which are not male-biased” (Warren, 1990, p. 138, my italics). Warren has suggested that an ecofeminist ethic should operate within certain “boundary conditions” [section 5.2]. The “ethic of care” [section 5.3] is an example. An issue which was originally marginalized in the ecofeminist ethic of care was animal welfare, but since the 1990’s, ecofeminists have given considerable attention to the theory and praxis of this aspect [section 5.4].

### 5.1 A centric-based critique of anthropocentrism

Ecofeminist Val Plumwood considers the critique of anthropocentrism<sup>55</sup> as a core project of “the Green movement” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 328). However, she notes that it is an “embattled central concept” finding little support (pp. 328-329) from either those environmental ethicists unsympathetic or sympathetic to deep ecology/the Green cause. Those unsympathetic, exemplified by Grey (1993), whose views are discussed further in Chapter Nine, Environment and development (section 6.2.3), criticize it as a fatally flawed argument, “fit only for the dustbin”, because nature cannot “intelligibly be valued independently of human interests” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 329). Deep ecology as antidote to anthropocentrism has been criticized by Dobson<sup>56</sup> [whom I read as sympathetic to the Green cause], as perhaps giving “personal uplift” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 328) but appearing “to provide little help with practical Green action, strategy or politics.” (p. 328). In short, anthropocentrism as concept has been “denied legitimacy”, and its usefulness to the green movement has been challenged.

Plumwood herself thinks that the concept is one of “the major revolutionary insights of environmental thought” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 328); the “Green movement’s flagship” in the “liberation armada” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 328) of contemporary centrist critiques – androcentrism, phallocentrism, ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism, heterocentrism and so on, and fundamental to the Green critique (Plumwood, 1997, p. 329). She suggests that because the largely deep ecology version of it (p. 328) has attracted criticism, the Green movement has not been able to link its anthropocentric critique with the liberation theorizing and politics of the other centrist critiques.

---

<sup>54</sup> This sentence from Grey (1993, p. 464) illustrates Plumwood’s point I think: “Moral philosophy aims to provide a rational critique or justification of the principles which guide or govern human conduct. In this enquiry it is of course assumed that these principles are accessible to reason...”

<sup>55</sup> “A stance that limits moral standing to human beings, confines the scope of morality and moral concern to human interests, and regards nothing but human well-being as valuable intrinsically” (Attfield, 2003, p. 188)

<sup>56</sup> In his 1990 version of *Green Political Thought*, p. 70

What is required, Plumwood suggests, is a reconceptualization of anthropocentrism, applying feminist centric critiques of oppressive ontological dualism (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, pp. 298-300; Plumwood, 1997, p. 329). Such an approach – rather than the “indistinguishability” remedies of deep ecology, is, in her view, “theoretically illuminating ... [and] of practical value to the Green movement (Plumwood, 1997, p. 329). On her centric account, anthropocentrism cannot be admitted to the ecofeminist ethical space [section 5.2] because of its “naturism” [explained in section 1.3 of this chapter].

### 5.1.1 *The anthropocentric view of nature as “colonized other”*

Here I present more or less the centric structure as introduced at section 4.2.1, but now applied to the anthropocentric view of nature as “colonized other” (Plumwood, 1991b, 1997<sup>57</sup>). To maintain an integrated and stand-alone account, I have retained some thoughts already introduced elsewhere in this chapter.

#### (a) **A view of the Self rooted in rational individualism, itself a product of ill-conceived ontological dualism**

I think that Plumwood (1997) is essentially arguing that the deep ecologist conception and critique of anthropocentrism as human-centered, is still stuck in the psychological egoist assumptions of what it is to be human. In one sense, psychological egoism is a theory of human motivation - the belief that “human beings are so constituted that they must always act out of self-interest” (Velasquez, 1991, p. 560). The link between this view of Self to Bentham and Mill’s utilitarianism seems clear: human beings are so constituted that they must always act out of self-interest, construed as expedient social utility. The link to anthropocentrism as environmental ethic is also clear: human beings are so constituted that they must always act towards nature out of *human* self-interest. This is why, Plumwood suggests, deep ecologists call for alternative views of being human such as “wider identification of self” or “transcendence of self” (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, pp. 293-298).

But suggests Plumwood, what underlies psychological egoism [a “remarkably persistent, widespread, and socially fostered fallacy” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 335)], are *malestream* ontological views of the human being as (1) self divided against self, and (2) self divided from the other. This view of self is the product of a (masculine) dualist ontology which “typically polarizes difference and minimizes shared characteristics, construes difference along the lines of superiority/inferiority, and views the inferior side as a means to the higher ends of the superior side (the instrumental thesis). Because its nature is defined oppositionally, the task of the superior side, that in which it realizes itself and expresses its true nature, is to separate from, dominate, and control the lower side.” (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, p. 298). This leads to a view of Self as divided against itself – as in mind/body, and reason/emotion - as well as a view of an isolated, autonomous Self against the Other, whether this is construed as other human beings generally, females, nature, or animals. In adjudicating between Self and Other’s [here nature] interests, notions of rationality, justice, fairness, and impartiality are key features throughout mainstream ethical theory, and have been carried over into environmental ethical theory.

Plumwood illustrates this via Paul Taylor’s biocentric “respect for nature” approach [“biotic individualism” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 350)]. I particularly reproduce her argument here, because biocentrism is often seen as “marker” for “green”, as in the Wissenburg heuristic (Chapter One, Figure 2). Taylor’s theory, she argues, falls within a Kantian ethical framework, in which morality is based on rationality (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman, 1993, p. 287), and self-interest is contained, or held in check, by universalization. Thus Taylor argues that the attitude of respect towards

<sup>57</sup> Plumwood’s (1997, pp. 327-355) paper is packed with sophisticated philosophical argument. What I present here is a minimal but hopefully accurate description

nature is the only moral approach possible, because it is universalizing, self-containing, and disinterested, “that is, each moral agent who sincerely has the attitude advocates its universal adoption by all other agents, regardless of whether they are so inclined and regardless of their fondness or lack of fondness for particular individuals” (Taylor, 1986, p. 41, in Plumwood 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993 p. 285). Taylor discerns in “respect<sup>58</sup>”, “valuational, conative, practical and affective dimensions”, but highlights the cognitive valuational aspect as central - the other aspects should not be allowed to get the upper hand, because respect is an essentially cognitive matter. Thus the features of Taylor’s morality are reason, distance, disinterestedness, abstractness and universality (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 299) - that is, those aspects considered as “essential and valuable” about the (male) human being. Emotion manifested as love, care, the personal, the particular, the special, all become at best irrelevant, at worst, denied, or construed as alien and inferior (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 299).

But Plumwood (1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 288) argues that there is no necessary clash between general moral concern and caring for the particular, unless the latter is accompanied by exclusion of others from care, or chauvinistic attitudes towards them. Special relationships or empathy for particular beings in nature – a tree, river, special place, particular animal – provide continuities between ourselves and aspects of the natural world (1991b, p. 299), they are necessary steps towards “acquiring a wider, more generalized concern” (p. 288); our capacity to do so is “an index of our moral being” (p. 288). Taylor’s “respect”, she suggests, is merely the completion of a process of extending a masculine rational concept of ethics to nature - “universalization, moral abstraction, and disconnection, discarding the self, emotions, and special ties (all, of course, associated with the private sphere and femininity)” (p. 288).

The extension of rights theory to environmental ethics [as in animal rights theory, Chapter Three, and section 5.4.3 in this chapter] is also problematic. The concept of rights, Plumwood suggests, “requires *strong individual separation* of rights-holders ...” (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 289, my italics). And, in the context of discussing Tom Regan’s (1986) argument for rights for animals as a suitable environmental ethic, she notes that “Rights seem to have acquired an exaggerated importance as part of the prestige of the public sphere and the masculine, and the emphasis on *separation and autonomy, on reason and abstraction*” (Plumwood, 1991b, p. 290; my italics).

Since masculine views of what it is to be human – a rational, autonomous individual against an Other – is part of the human/nature problem, it is time, she thinks, to re-assess concepts such as concern, care, compassion and responsibility<sup>59</sup> as valuable moral concepts, and not simply as lesser, feminine, emotional, subjective, and private notions. They have the advantage that they are difficult to dichotomize as reason/emotion because they include both; they do not require reciprocity which the concept of “rights” does; they are able to account for indigenous peoples’ often spiritual relationship to the land in a way that the concept of “rights” cannot, and they extend to the natural world far less problematically than does the concept of rights, with its human-legal background - how does one apply principles of justice, fairness and rights to ecosystems? Above all, concepts such as concern, care, compassion and responsibility as moral concepts “treat ethical relations as an expression of self-relationship”, a far better basis for a non-instrumental attitude to nature [and other human beings] than

---

<sup>58</sup> By way of contrast, Plumwood (1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 289) argues that “the most important elements of respect, which are not reducible to or based on duty or obligation any more than the most important elements of friendship are, ... are rather an expression of a certain kind of selfhood and a certain kind of relation between self and other”

<sup>59</sup> Kheel (1993, p. 260) writes on the concept “responsibility” in nature ethics thus: “... genuine responsibility for nature begins with the root meaning of the word – ‘our capacity for response’. Learning to respond to nature in caring ways is not an abstract exercise in reasoning. It is, above all, a form of psychic and emotional health”. Gaard (1996, pp. 439-441) sounds a warning note on the concept of responsibility in ethics: “The logic of both rights and responsibilities is inadequate, rights because it relies on the separation of the individual from the community, and responsibilities because it has the potential to erase the needs of the individual in its emphasis on the community”

one based on a view of the human being as disconnected and self-interested (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, pp. 290-291, and footnote 1 on p. 304).

**(b) Radical exclusion of the Other**

In anthropocentrism, reason-as-human is the Centre. Nature is “sharply discontinuous or ontologically divided from the human sphere” (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 291). Nature is seen to be lacking in the essentially human characteristics of “mind” and agency. While the human physical body might be subject to natural laws, that which is essential, authentic and worthwhile in being human excludes the natural (Plumwood, 1991b, p. 299). Humanity is seen as “outside of and apart from ... nature” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 340). Because it is different, lower, or on the periphery, nature’s shared qualities with humans - self-organization, self-regulation, self-repair for example, are de-emphasized or denied. Despite evolutionary and genetic theory, humans are still “hyperseparated” from animals. Identification and sympathy with nonhuman living beings is blocked, tendencies to question the status quo are blunted (Plumwood, 1997, p. 337, p. 340).

**(c) Homogenization of the Other**

This move allows differences within the Other to be disregarded, for example, “the diversity of mindlike qualities found in nature and animals is ignored” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 340). Nature as Other/colonized other is viewed as interchangeable, replaceable “resources” for the Centre, i.e. rational human beings. Plumwood (1997, p. 341) argues that these ideas of interchangeability and replaceability are assumptions left over from the mechanistic worldview, which are inadequate ways of grasping nature’s complexity. The idea of bits and pieces of nature as replaceable and interchangeable may seem outdated, but it is precisely the assumption in the “weak sustainability” concept in natural resource accounting (Chapter Nine: Environment and Development, section 3.4.1.5). Diversity in the otherized group [“biodiversity” in nature] is primarily recognized to the extent that it serves humans’ socio-economic needs (Plumwood, 1997, pp. 340-341).

**(d) Denial, backgrounding**

Once the Other is set aside as separate and inferior, there is a tendency to background it. Nature is the backdrop against which we go about our daily affairs. Because consciousness of our dependence on it cannot quite be banished (Plumwood, 1997, p. 341), it is admitted into our discourse as a projected? “environmental vulnerability” against which we seek environmental security. Its “needs are systematically omitted from account and consideration in distributive decision making” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 341). Nature’s metaphoric resistance to excessive human interference - expressed as mad cow disease or bird flu perhaps, or massive mudslides from deforestation – is denied as anything other than a problem requiring additional technology. There is [implicit] denial from powerful politicians such as the president of America that global warming is a threat serious enough that signing the Kyoto Protocol *should* outweigh American economic interests (Gleneagles G8 conference, June 2005).

**(e) Incorporation**

The Other is defined not as something in itself, but as something in relation to humans-in-the-*centre*. “Environment” is a telling anthropocentric word here: human beings in the centre, and everything else surrounding them.

**(f) Instrumental use of the Other-as-Nature: instrumentalism**

Instrumentalism towards nature means viewing it as means to human ends, human interests (Plumwood, 1991a, p. 143). The critique of instrumentalism is an important aspect of the critique of anthropocentrism, not only to improve human relations with nature, but human relations with humans too: “The traditional Western freedom of action with respect to nature is in part the product of an instrumental view of it; instrumentalism is a close associate of domination, not just for nature but for

human groups also, and the rejection of instrumentalism is part of a broader picture of reevaluating human hierarchy in nature and in human social systems” (Plumwood, 1991a, p. 144). The link is the “the account of the self as disconnected and egoistic, having no non-accidental or defining relations to others and treating others – whether human or nonhuman – as no more than means to its independently conceived ends” (1991a, p. 148). Plumwood makes a telling point, I think, when she notes that “The strategy of accommodating environmental concerns through a broadening of instrumentalism [as example, I would think, through the concept of “enlightened self-interest”] results from a failure to critique these framework conceptions of self and human identity” (1991a, p. 148).

To return to the centrist critique. The western liberal humanist view of Self as rational, and autonomous, together with radical exclusion and homogenization of Nature as Other, combine to “set up a polarized structure” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 337) between humans and nature, instead of emphasizing their continuity. There appear to be “two quite different substances or orders of being in the world” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 341). Although this is a socially and theoretically (p. 302) constructed ontological dualism, the discontinuity appears “natural”. Nature’s “agency and independence of ends [*telos*] are denied and are subsumed in, or remade to coincide with, those of the human” (p. 341). Exclusion of mind-like qualities from nature sets it up as mechanistic, hostile and alien, to be vanquished, overcome, conquered, used. There is both “an oppositional and value dualism” at work here (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 292). Separate natures explain, justify, and naturalize widely different “rights” or consideration of interests, or moral standing. Otherness as inferiority is the justification for domination, exploitation, transcendence or prudent use of nature as natural resources for human beings. This is the instrumental thesis: the “inferior side [viewed] as a means to the higher ends of the superior side” (Plumwood, 1991b, p. 298); the “use of the periphery as the means to the center’s ends” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 352, footnote 13). Nature provides the means – resources - for human ends. It is also important that a strong distinction is made and maintained between the sphere of means and that of ends to maintain the sharp boundary/distance needed for instrumental use of particularly living things: how many of us would be prepared to visit a research laboratory utilizing animals?

### ***5.1.2 The advantages of the centric critique of anthropocentrism***

There are definite advantages, Plumwood argues, to seeing anthropocentrism as something other than only human-centeredness, as do the deep ecologists. I note just two:

- (1) A “liberation model” of anthropocentrism would allow deep ecologists/the green movement to draw on the extensive theoretical work<sup>60</sup> already done in the fields of feminism and critical social theory on rationalism (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 303), to show how it engenders and maintains oppressions.
- (2) The liberation/emancipation element of the centric model helps to close the gap between “ecophilosophy and ecopolitics”. It is all very well to believe that the answer to anthropocentrism’s human-centeredness is to pursue deeper philosophical or spiritual growth, but this does not provide a *practical* basis for ecological politics, ecological activism, or ecological education<sup>61</sup>. The liberation or “centric” model of anthropocentrism does<sup>62</sup>, by revealing the “regime of mastery” (Plumwood, 1997, in Warren, 1997, p. 346) – justified by the assumptions of rationality - that the “centric” structure of anthropocentrism sets up (Plumwood, 1997, pp. 341-343). Birkeland, for example, has drawn on the ecofeminist androcentric critique to provide a “platform” for ecofeminist political action [section 6].

<sup>60</sup> However, Plumwood does acknowledge, and discuss, the limitations of the centric model when applied as a model for the liberation of nature (1997, in Warren, 1997, pp. 348-351). A particular theoretical problem for ecofeminism is “speaking for the other”, rejected in liberation discourse as “insufferably arrogant” (p. 350). But seeing nature cannot speak in human language for itself, may we as humans speak for it?

<sup>61</sup> I disagree with Plumwood here – doesn’t the deep ecology platform provide a good starting point?

<sup>62</sup> Plumwood (1997, in Warren, 1997, p. 342) provides an example of such a practical programme designed to combat the different elements of the centric structure

## 5.2 Developing an ecofeminist ethic (including a nature ethic): key features

As alternative to rationalist-based ethical theories, Warren (1990, pp. 138-141) has identified the “preliminary boundary conditions” of an ecofeminist environmental ethic. From her 12-page discussion, I have extracted next what I understand to be its key features.

### 5.2.1 Must meet “boundary conditions”

An ecofeminist ethic sets out “boundary conditions”, but does not specify exactly what the content of the space within the ethical boundaries should be<sup>63</sup>. Any ethic wishing to be admitted to the ecofeminist ethical space as it were, must be clearly “anti-sexist, anti-racist, anti-classist, anti-naturist, and opposed to any “ism” which presupposes or advances a logic of domination” (Warren, 1990, p. 139). It must take the connections between the domination of women and the domination of nature seriously (p. 126).

### 5.2.2 Is contextualist and pluralist

An ecofeminist ethic is both contextualist and pluralist. Most nature ethicists<sup>64</sup>, Kheel argues (1993, p. 255), debate environmental morality “on an abstract or theoretical plane”. They “... [wrench] an ethical problem out of its embedded context” and “sever... the problem from its roots.”. We are confronted with dramatic choices in crisis situations: “Your daughter or your dog?” (Kheel, 1993, pp. 259-260<sup>65</sup>). Such examples of an adversarial approach are often found in environmental ethical literature. Donovan (1993, p. 184) writes: “... suppose one had to choose between a gnat and a human being. It is, in fact, precisely this kind of either/or thinking that is rejected in the epistemology identified by cultural feminism. In most cases, either/or dilemmas in real life can be turned into both/ands. In most cases, dead-end situations such as those posed in lifeboat ethical<sup>66</sup> can be prevented.” Wilson, too, notes that the ecofeminist “... care orientation seeks to find a perspective in which ... mutually exclusive dichotomies do not arise” (Wilson, 1997, pp. 399-400). Kheel notes that little thought is given to either the history or the rich context of the choices posed as moral crisis (Kheel, 1993, p. 256; also Brown, 2004, p. 253). Most ecofeminists I think, would agree with Kheel’s example from Iris Murdoch’s view that the moral life is “not something that is switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices. What happens between such choices [as I understand it, the particular, the contextual] is indeed what is crucial. ... at crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already over” (Kheel, 1993, p. 256, citing Murdoch, 1970, p. 37).

An ecofeminist ethic is pluralist, because it sees ethical discourse and practice “as emerging from the voices of people located in different historical circumstances” (Warren, 1990, p. 139). It values diversity and difference. There is not “*one picture* based on a unity of voices” against which ethical values, beliefs, attitudes and conduct can be assessed, but a “*collage or mosaic, a tapestry .....a pattern...*” (Warren, 1990, p. 139, her italics) which emerges from the very different voices of people located in very different places. Ecofeminists support a variety of ethical positions [5.2.9]. Cultural context and pluralism do however become problematic for those ecofeminists, like Gruen (1993), and Adams (1996), who argue that moral vegetarianism is an ecofeminist necessity [section 5.4.4].

---

<sup>63</sup> It is from this thought that I derived my start-up definition of “green” – its boundary conditions are non-anthropocentrism, and radical change to society, however these conditions allow for rich diversity within the enclosed green space

<sup>64</sup> Kheel (1993, p. 262, footnote 1) avoids the use of “environmental ethics”, which on her view, reinforces “a dichotomous view of “humans” and “the rest of nature”

<sup>65</sup> Also the title of a paper by Deborah Slicer, 1996, in Warren, 1996, pp. 97-113, on the morality of animal use in research: “Researchers constantly tell us that we must choose between “us” (human beings) and “them” (animals), between our daughters and our dogs. They tell us it is either medical progress via the current, virtually unchecked rate and standards of animal sacrifice, or else a return to the Dark Ages...” (p. 97)

<sup>66</sup> This is a reference to Singer and Regan’s (1985) *The dog in the lifeboat: An exchange*. In this exchange, Regan (p. 57) “maintains that with four normal adult humans and one dog, it is the dog who must be sacrificed” (Donovan, 1993, p. 186, footnote 10)

### 5.2.3 Is a theory-in-process

An ecofeminist ethic sees ethical theory as theory-in-process. It does contain some generalizations, but these themselves represent a pattern which has emerged from different voices describing different concrete ethical situations in a specific set of socio-economic and historical circumstances, and within a specific worldview<sup>67</sup>. It is particularly admittance of first person narrative and storytelling as acceptable methodology in constructing an environmental-ethic-in-process, which ensures that change in the ethic may/will take place, as “the material realities” of women’s lives change. But doesn’t this room for change also open the door to environmental exploitation? No, because one of the boundary conditions for an ecofeminist environmental ethic, is that it must be anti-naturist.

### 5.2.4 Is inclusivist

An ecofeminist environmental ethic is inclusivist – it gives epistemological and moral preference and legitimacy to “the felt experiences and perspectives of oppressed persons” (Warren, 1990, p. 140), whose oppression is linked with the oppression of the land, for example, those peoples dislocated from their own productive land onto marginal land. The inclusivist boundary condition minimizes any possible bias in generalized ethical decision-making arising from a skewed, or too small, sample. Above all, an inclusivist ethic must take women’s experiences seriously, and make them central (Cuomo, 1992, p. 353, commenting on Warren).

### 5.2.5 Does not claim to be “unbiased”

An ecofeminist ethic does not claim to be unbiased in the sense that it provides a value-neutral or objective point of view, because it holds that such neutrality is not possible: “in contemporary culture there really is no such point of view” (Warren, 1990, p. 140). The twin domination of women and nature is the product of differing but value-laden historical and socio-economic circumstances (Warren, 1990, p. 143). However, whatever bias an ecofeminist ethic does have, is towards the “centralizing the voices of oppressed persons” (Warren, 1990, p. 140), it is therefore more inclusive, and less partial, than those ethics which exclude such voices.

### 5.2.6 Denies abstract individualism

An ecofeminist ethic presents a different view of what it is to be human. It denies “abstract individualism”, Alison Jaggar’s term (1980, pp. 42-44) for the [male rational] idea that “it is possible to identify a human essence or human nature that exists independently of any particular historical context” (Warren, 1990, p. 141). Moral conduct can only be understood within “networks or webs of historical and concrete relationships” (Warren, 1990, p. 141). An ecofeminist ethic argues for different start-up attitudes to self and others from those proposed in mainstream ethical theory. We may think of ourselves, for example, as selves in relation to other selves, and therefore “connected”; not as isolated individuals conceptualised as “rights holders”, “interest bearers” or “sentient beings” (Warren, 1990, p. 135). We may see ourselves not as atomist “Robinson Crusoe” individuals (Warren, 1990, p. 141, footnote 28), but *constituted* by our relationships with others. Relationships with nonhuman nature are also, in part, “constitutive of what it is to be human<sup>68</sup>” (Warren, 1990, p. 143). An ecofeminist ethic should recognize both continuity with nature, in the sense of recognizing “ties to nature which are expressive of the rich, caring relationships of kinship and friendship” with both people and the land (Plumwood, 1991b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 298), yet also respect the differences between our needs and those of nature.

---

<sup>67</sup> I think here of Arne Naess’s example of the ethical difference between a woman from a rich industrialized society wearing a fur coat as status symbol, and an Eskimo wearing a fur coat as traditional protection against cold weather

<sup>68</sup> Compare this with just one statement from Relph’s (1976) discussion of place and placelessness: “A deep relationship with places is as necessary, and perhaps as unavoidable, as close relationships with people; without such relationships human existence, while possible, is bereft of much of its significance” (Relph, 1976, p. 41)

### 5.2.7 Takes the relationship itself seriously

Mainstream ethics tends to view a moral environmental relationship in terms of the moral rights, interests, points of view, and so, on that the human party to the situation may have, compared to the rights, or interests, or *telos*, or point of view, that the nonhuman party to the situation may or may not have, thus determining the latter's moral considerability (Warren, 1990, p. 137). An ecofeminist ethic argues that a moral relationship is not simply reducible to the values or rights or whatever, of each of the parties to the situation (Warren, 1990, p. 135 and footnote 15); it also recognizes *the relationship itself* as “a locus of value”. Moreover, the *quality of the relationship* also counts (Kheel, 1993, pp. 260-261) – is it an “imposed conqueror-type” or mastery-type relationship or “an emergent caring-type” relationship (Warren, 1990, pp. 135-136)? While some ethical rule might pre-define the relationship, the ethic also grows out of, emerges from, how the relationship itself is defining what we are as individuals (Warren, 1990, p. 141, footnote 30) in that moment.

### 5.2.8 Makes central, values under-represented in traditional ethics

An ecofeminist approach to moral theory, ethics and education “provides a central place for values typically unnoticed, underplayed, or misrepresented in traditional ethics” (Warren, 1990, p. 140), e.g., intuition as a mode of knowing (Merchant, 1990a, p. 101), and the values of love, caring, sharing, friendship, and appropriate trust. This does not exclude “considerations of rights, rules, or utility” (p. 140), which may additionally be appropriate when dealing with issues such as contracts, property relationships, or cost-effectiveness (Warren, 1990, pp. 140-141). But rights, interests, and such like, cannot be the *only* values in moral theory, education or ethical behaviour. The ecofeminist ethic is an ethic of *care*.

### 5.2.9 But ecofeminists support a variety of environmental ethical positions

Within environmental ethics, Warren (1996, p. xvi) notes, “There are consequentialist (e.g. eco-utilitarian, utilitarian-based animal liberation) and nonconsequentialist (e.g. human rights-based, rights-based animal liberation, land stewardship) positions that extend traditional ethical considerations to animals and the nonhuman environment. There are also nontraditional approaches (e.g. holistic Leopoldian land ethics, social ecology, deep ecology, ecological feminism). Ecofeminists and ecofeminist philosophers who address environmental issues can be found defending each of these sorts of positions” (Warren, 1996, p. xvi). On Warren's view of a pluralistic ethic, the “sorts of considerations and actions that will be morally relevant to any given particular case will be ... a matter of context, although always based on an ability to care” (Brown, 2004, p. 250, footnote 11).

## 5.3 The ecofeminist “ethic of care”

Ecofeminist philosophers reject the assumption that clinging to the rationalist concept of self and the instrumental view of nature that dominates Western philosophy is a viable way to frame a postpatriarchal environmental ethics (Spretnak, 1993, in Tucker & Grim, 1993, p. 184)

While an ecofeminist ethic may employ the discourse of rights in appropriate contexts, Warren notes that ecofeminism “involves a shift from a conception of ethics as primarily a matter of rights, rules or principles predetermined and applied in specific cases to entities viewed as competitors in the contest of moral standing” (Curtin<sup>69</sup> 1996, p. 66, citing Warren, 1990), to an ethic of care “based on human interconnectedness and responsibility to all life” (Gaard, 1993, p. 8, discussing Donovan, 1993, pp. 167-194). It is “... very different from the dominant instrumental ethic...”, notes ecofeminist Diamond (1990, p. 209). It is the sense of connectedness which provides the motivation for the ecofeminist ethic of care [5.3.1], its locus of value [5.3.2], its scope [5.3.4], and its moral obligation [5.3.5]. I have

<sup>69</sup> Deanne Curtin is a male supporter of ecofeminist values, as is Jim Cheney

chosen to illustrate the ethic of care more concretely in the ecofeminist position[s] on animal ethics [5.4].

### 5.3.1 Motivation

The sense of caring connectedness with “the larger whole” for which ecofeminists call (for example, Kheel, 1990, p. 137) requires “the willingness to empathetically enter into the world of others ....” (Curtin, 1996, p. 72). Motivation inheres not in any sense of respect for rights, or obligation to perform duties, but in the ecofeminist “felt sense of connection” with the other (Kheel, 1990, p. 128):

Unable to trust or draw upon a felt sense of connection, most environmental theorists endorse reason as the sole guide in our dealings with the natural world. The vast majority of theories that constitute the field of environmental ethics are thus axiological or value theories whose primary purpose is the rational allotment of value to the appropriate aspects of the natural world<sup>70</sup>. [new paragraph] Both ecofeminism and deep ecology share in common an opposition to these value theories with their attendant notions of obligations and rights (Kheel, in Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. 128)... The emphasis of both philosophies is not on an abstract or “rational” calculation of value but rather on the development of a new consciousness for all of life... (Kheel, 1990, p. 128).

It is the sense of self-in-relation that opens the door to caring, and then one must work on developing the capacity to care (Curtin, 1996, p. 74). The sense of relation or connection between Self and Other is deepened by concretely *experiencing* the actual context and conditions of the Other’s lived reality. This transforms a general attitude of “caring about” into a specific “caring for” experience (Curtin, 1996, pp. 72-73).

### 5.3.2 Locus of value

The “new consciousness”, “inward transformation” (Kheel, 1990, in Diamond & Orenstein, p. 128), or recognition of life as web-like relationality, does not necessarily lead though, to an ascription of objective, or “detached” intrinsic value to nature (Plumwood, 1991a, p. 140). Plumwood, for example, presents a non-instrumental, “relational” (1991a, p. 140) account of value in nature, “according to which value reduces neither to the valuers’ personal taste or preferences nor to objective qualities of valued items, and hence is neither subjective nor objective”. A promising criterion for moral considerability in nature is if the entity has an interest or good of its own, “not reducible to or dependent on that of humans” (p. 146). Plants, for example, “can be said to have to have needs, preferences, and interests<sup>71</sup>, provided we do not try to pack into these concepts notions of consciousness” (p. 146) ... I find no great difficulty with the suggestion that we should respect rocks, mountains, and ecosystems, ... for what is wanted in these cases is not so much the notion of an item having a good or welfare of its own as the broader one of it having a teleology, a goal, an end, or direction to which it tends or for which it strives, and which is its own. ...” (1991a, p. 147).

Diamond and Orenstein (1990, pp. xi-xii) discern three broad ecofeminist positions on value in nature: (1) the “Earth itself embodies spirit and ... the cosmos is alive” (Starhawk, 1990, p. 73), thus the Earth is “sacred unto itself” and has intrinsic value (2) human life and the life of the planet are intertwined, so the Earth is valued because it supports life<sup>72</sup> (3) an indigenous perspective in which both of the

<sup>70</sup> Kheel, in 1993, (p. 249) writes that “Today, many nature ethicists conceive of themselves ... as the owners of value, which it is their prerogative to mete out with a theoretical sweep of their pens. ... If a part of nature is accorded high value (typically by being assigned a quality that humans are said to possess, such as sentience, consciousness, rationality, autonomy), then it is allowed entrance into the world of ‘moral considerability’. If, on the other hand, it scores low (typically being judged devoid of human qualities), it is relegated to the realm of ‘objects’ or ‘things’, and seen as unworthy of ‘interests’ or ‘rights’. The conferral of value in ethical deliberation is conceived as the conferral of power...”

<sup>71</sup> She illustrates this thus: “When a plant label says ‘Prefers sunny, moist position’, none of us has any difficulty in knowing what that means or acting on it” (Plumwood, 1991a, p. 146)

<sup>72</sup> This is the viewpoint that only a healthy planet can support social justice

above are true<sup>73</sup>: the earth is sacred, has intrinsic value, *and* has life-support value for human beings (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, pp. xi-xii).

### 5.3.3 Scope

Reminiscent of Stone's story from Carson McCuller's "A tree, a rock, a cloud" (Rodman, 1977, footnotes 80 and 82, p. 129, and Chapter Three, section 5.5), the ethic of care can include "anybody, anything, everything". On my understanding, it is also a non-issue in the care ethic, whether the focus should be individuals, species or ecosystems, living or non-living entities. The issue is rather, the quality of the relationship with the other.

### 5.3.4 The moral obligation<sup>74</sup>

Caring is the cardinal ethical consideration for most ecofeminists. In an ethical context of recognition of diversity and pluralism, and "attunement to complexity and context" (Wilson, 1997, p. 401), they call for "concrete, loving actions" towards particular, individual others (Kheel, 1990, p. 137), and "restraint toward nature as opposed to the unrestrained use of our skills" to dominate nature (Wilson, 1997, p. 401).

Not all ecofeminists agree completely with the care ethic; some advise caution. Cuomo (1992, p. 354-355, drawing on Card's work, 1990, pp. 100-218) suggests that (female) caring for others holds potential dangers. "In fact, female caring and compassion for oppressors are cornerstones of patriarchal systems. Women have forgiven oppressors, stayed with abusive husbands and partners, and sacrificed their own desires because of their great ability to care for others. Claudia Card has argued that in the context of oppression the care ethic actually causes moral damage in some women and that, therefore, caring is not always a healthy and ethical choice for a moral agent." (p. 355).

Reciprocity is an important question for those subscribing to the care ethic. While some ecofeminists, such as Nel Noddings argue that "the caring relation ... requires... a form of *responsiveness* or *reciprocity* on the part of the cared-for" to be a complete act of caring (Curtin, 1996, p. 73, citing Noddings, 1984, p. 150, her italics), other ecofeminist-oriented authors either find Noddings' argument "unconvincing" (Curtin, 1996, p. 73), or contrarily, express real pleasure in the absolute *indifference* of the other to themselves as persons [for example, Warren's oft-cited rock-climbing story, 1990, pp. 134-138]. This would allow an ethic of care to stretch beyond only sentient nonhuman animals to ecosystems and inanimate natural objects – rocks, buildings, landscapes, places. The only limit to the "ethic of care" is one's *own* [understood as person, or community of persons] limits, that is, in one's own "ability to respond lovingly (or with appropriate care, trust, or friendship)" to an other (Warren, 1990, p. 138). Besides, asks Curtin, "Is it really caring for if something is expected in return?" (1996, p. 73).

Retaining the principle that caring does not require reciprocity, Curtin suggests that "caring" can mean both "caring for" and "caring about" (Curtin, 1996, in Warren, 1996, pp. 72-74; and O'Neil (2000, pp. 186-187), discussing Curtin's distinction). He suggests that where "caring for" can be interpreted as caring for specific things/living beings with whom one is in personal relationship in a definite context, "caring about" can mean the sense of empathetic connection with the plight of living beings/things in remote contexts, caused for example by environmental disasters, or military devastation, which are not part of one's immediate, personal context. Ethical caring can then be part of a political agenda.

---

<sup>73</sup> This can be seen as the source of many rituals of indigenous peoples around animals killed in the hunt, for example. See Abbot's (1990) paper exploring the idea that such rituals are designed to deal with the guilt feelings incurred by destroying - out of necessity - something sacred

<sup>74</sup> In ecofeminist context, this heading, with its connotations of rights and duties, is contentious; I retain it here to maintain cross-chapter comparison

I next consider the ecofeminist environmental ethic of care specifically applied to animals, because of Wall's assessment that fundamental to Green thinking "are the linked concepts of deep ecology and animal liberation ...." (Wall, 1994, p. 66).

## 5.4 Animal ethics

"Animals are part of nature. Ecofeminism posits that the domination of nature is linked to the domination of women and that both dominations must be eradicated. ... (Adams, 1996, p. 114)

Despite Adam's contention above, animal ethics was initially a marginalized or ignored issue in ecofeminist anthologies (Gaard, 1993, p. 6 and p. 12, footnote 12). Ecofeminists now document the oppression of animals [5.4.1], theorize the interconnections between the domination of women and animals [5.4.2], critique the animal rights approach as a suitable ethic for animal liberation [5.4.3], hold ambivalent views on vegetarianism as an essential ecofeminist praxis [5.4.4], but generally condemn the same animal abuses as do animal rights theorists [5.4.5].

### 5.4.1 Documenting the oppression of animals

As do the animal rights theorists, ecofeminists document the domination, exploitation, shocking cruelty to, and moving suffering of animals, *inter alia*, in scientific animal experimentation; cosmetics, cleaning materials, and poison testing; and factory farming for meat and milk (e.g. Gruen, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, pp. 62-74; Adams, 1996, in Warren, 1996, pp. 121-123; Slicer, 1996, in Warren, 1996, p. 105). Where animal rights theorists attribute the oppression to speciesism, ecofeminists argue that androcentrism/patriarchy are the root causes.

### 5.4.2 Theorizing the connections between abuse of women, and abuse of animals

Different theoretical frameworks within patriarchal ideology are seen to justify the interlinked domination and abuse of women and animals. For example, Gruen (1993) sees women and animals serving the same symbolic function in patriarchal society [5.4.2.1]. Adams (1996) argues that patriarchal ideology has ontologized animals as edible bodies called "meat", rather than recognising such animals as beings in themselves. I present her argument at section 5.4.4.2.

Dixon (1996, p. 181) critiques such theorizing<sup>75</sup>. Without presenting her arguments, her basic position is that "Feminists have obligations to liberate animals to the degree that they have obligations to liberate any oppressed population, but not because there are either theoretical, practical, or symbolic connections between women and animals".

#### 5.4.2.1 Gruen's symbolic "to serve/be served up"

Gruen (1993) claims that the categories "woman" and "animal"

serve the same symbolic function in patriarchal society. Their construction as dominated, submissive "other" in theoretical discourse (whether explicitly so stated or implied) has sustained male dominance. The role of women and animals in postindustrial society is to serve/be served up; women and animals are the used. Whether created as ideological icons to justify and preserve the superiority of men or captured as servants to provide for [sic; "food" intended?] and comfort, the connection women and animals share is present in both theory and practice. ... (Gruen, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 61).

Gruen identifies four different, but interwoven and mutually re-enforcing theoretical frameworks which separate man from woman and animals, and which "serve to justify" their oppression (1993, p. 62):

---

<sup>75</sup> Both Gaard and Gruen respond to her critique, in *Environmental Ethics*, 18 (1996), 439-441, and 441-444 respectively

(a) “the Myth of Man the Hunter”. In this anthropological account of social evolution, the woman, because she was smaller, weaker, and reproductive, could not join in the hunt; this was construed as making her naturally inferior<sup>76</sup>, and she, along with animals, was relegated to the sphere of non-culture (p. 62).

(b) The shift from nomadism to settled agriculture, and the domestication of animals. This is argued to have made “the recognition of the mechanics of reproduction” possible (p. 63). Men realized that women were not able to mysteriously and spontaneously produce life, but that they themselves were the seed carriers. “The keeping of animals would seem to have set a model for the enslavement of humans, in particular the large-scale exploitation of women captives for breeding and labor, which is a salient feature of developing civilizations” (Gruen, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 63, citing Fisher, 1979, p. 197). It established the belief that “the natural world could be controlled and manipulated” and “permitted the conceptualization of animals as sluggish meat-making machines and reluctant laborers, and women as breeders of children” (p. 63).

(c) Religious practices<sup>77</sup> within the rise of agriculture also offered “a particularly pernicious construction of women and animals as ‘others’ to be used” (p. 64). Both were sacrificed by men in an attempt to appease unpredictable supernatural beings, and reduce crop loss through natural disasters. In an “obfuscation of language”, Kheel notes that animals are said to be “sacrificed” at “the alters of science” [in laboratories], not killed (1993, p. 254).

(d) The mechanistic worldview which began with the scientific revolution of the sixteenth century, provided a fourth, and empirical theoretical framework for the manipulation of nature, women, and animals. “Epistemic privilege”, based on male detached reason, “firmly distinguished man from nature, woman, and animals” (p. 64).

The key premise I think, of Gruen’s argument, is that “While not often explicitly recognized, the theories that separate man from animal and man from woman inform virtually every aspect of daily life. Such ways of constructing reality ground patriarchal conceptions of the world and its inhabitants” (p. 64).

### 5.4.3 The critique of the rights-based ethic in animal liberation context

Though some ecofeminists [Adams<sup>78</sup>, for example, and Kheel (Curtin, 1996, in Warren, 1996, p. 67)] follow rights-based views<sup>79</sup> on animal liberation, one forms the impression from the ecofeminist literature, that the critique of the rights approach is greater than its support (for example, Zimmerman<sup>80</sup>, 1987, p. 34; Brown, 2004). It is argued that the discourse of rights and obligations is problematic for an ethic of care, on at least these grounds, taken primarily from Curtin<sup>81</sup>’s (1996) discussion of rights in an animal ethics context:

<sup>76</sup> Ecofeminist and animal activist Marthi Kheel (1990) has explored how hunting served, and continues to serve, male self-definition (Adams, 1996, p. 115)

<sup>77</sup> Here Gruen draws on the work of Daly (1973), (1978), and French (1985)

<sup>78</sup> “Not only is animal rights the theory and vegetarianism the practice, but feminism is the theory and vegetarianism is part of the practice” (Adams, 1989, p. 167, in Curtin, 1996, p. 67)

<sup>79</sup> I use “rights-based” in a non-technical way to mean, as Brown (2004) does, a theory that attaches “high significance to the notion of a moral right”, and not any more technical meaning, such as right-based moral theory contrasted with duty-based theory (2004, p. 248, footnote 5, and p. 249), a distinction which I have not studied. Brown helpfully and non-technically for the purposes of her paper, understands “right” as a moral right, not a legal right; duty to refer to a moral obligation that follows from an other’s rights, and obligation to mean those things one ought to do, whether or not they follow from an other’s rights (2004, p. 249)

<sup>80</sup> On Zimmerman’s summary (1987, p. 34), feminists critique the rights approach generally because it “(1) is androcentric, (2) regards nonhuman beings as having only instrumental value, (3) is hierarchical, (4) is dualistic, (5) is atomistic, (6) adheres to abstract ethical principles that overemphasize the importance of the isolated individual (7) denies the importance of feeling for informing moral behavior (8) fails to see the essential relatedness of human life with the biosphere that gave us birth.”

<sup>81</sup> Brown (2004, pp. 249-265) usefully discusses, but not in a specifically animal ethics context, Curtin’s summary of the anti-rights arguments. She goes on (pp. 254-265) to argue that rights-based moral theory can be re-interpreted to form a satisfactory basis for human relations with the nonhuman world including specifically animals; I do not however pursue her arguments here

(1) To look for, and find in animals, interests, sentience, or rights, is to emphasize the **sameness, or identity of moral interests** between human and nonhuman animals (Adams, 1996, p. 130, footnote 2; Curtin, 1996, p. 69, p. 71). This conflicts with the ecofeminist values of **pluralism, diversity and difference**. Nonhuman nature's interests, including those of animals, are different to human interests. Ecofeminist "loving perception"<sup>82</sup> as opposed to "arrogant perception" is a perception of the Other, including nonhuman animals, which recognizes and maintains the other as "independent, dissimilar, different" to ourselves, but still an object of potential love (Warren, 1990, pp. 136-138). The ecofeminist ethic tends to emphasize 'continuity with' the other, rather than 'sameness'.

(2) Unlike the rights approach view of the **person as autonomous**, the ecofeminist approach conceptualises **personhood as relational** (Curtin, 1996, p. 70, p. 71). We are what our relationships make us; that is valid for our relationships with animals too.

(3) The rights approach is "formalistic", that is, it sets up **universal and context-neutral** criteria for moral considerability (Curtin, 1996, p. 70, p. 71). Ecofeminists reject the supposed universality underling the rights-based animal ethic. An ecofeminist animal ethic is bound first and foremost to take **particular relationships with specific animals in specific contexts** into account (Curtin, 1996, p. 92). The care ethic is situated in "deep relatedness"; caring for particular human and nonhuman animals, or ecosystems or places, "in the context of their histories" (Curtin, 1996, p. 73). But the "caring about" dimension of the ethic of care means that we are capable of empathetic care for all animals, not only those with whom we come into contact.

(4) The rights approach is **adversarial**. It accepts a dualistic epistemology and ontology as normative (Gruen, 1993, pp. 79-80). One has rights *against* someone, and calls on neutral justice to enforce them. An ecofeminist ethic assumes instead, dialogue rather than conflict, and seeks a **mutual accommodation of interests** (Curtin, 1996, p. 70). As dialogue in human symbolic speech with animals is only possible through signing or body language, I am assuming here that Curtin means we are capable of "empathetic projection into another's life" in non-people contexts (p. 71).

(5) The rights approach emphasizes **rationality, objectivity, and neutrality or impartiality in ethical judgements** (Curtin, 1996, p. 70). Recall Regan's citing reason as the basis for recognizing animal rights: "And since, in order to have the best theory of our duties to one another, we must recognize our equal inherent value, as individuals, reason – not sentiment, not emotion – reason compels us to recognize the equal inherent value of these animals and, with this, their equal right to be treated with respect." (Regan, 1985, in VandeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 82). But ecofeminism seeks to make central, just such values as **emotion and feeling**, sympathy and compassion, which have been "typically unnoticed, underplayed, or misrepresented in traditional ethics" (quote from Warren, 1990, p. 140; also Gruen, 1993, p. 80). "The emotional force of kinship or closeness to another is a crucial element in thinking about moral deliberations" (Gruen, 1993, p. 79). It is not that emotion must replace reason in our ethical consideration of animals, but that there must be "a kind of unity of reason and emotion", a "fusion of feeling and thought" (Kheel, 1985, p. 144<sup>83</sup>).

(6) Traditional rationalist-based ethics **downplay the body as moral agent** (Curtin, 1996, p. 70, p. 71). But feminists/ecofeminists have sought to **re-instate the devalued body half of the mind/body dualism** in moral discourse generally (Curtin, 1996, p. 70), and animal ethics

---

<sup>82</sup> Warren (1990, p. 136) writes that "Feminist philosopher Marilyn Frye [1983, pp. 66-72] distinguishes between 'arrogant' and 'loving' perception as one way of getting at ... [the] difference in the ethical attitudes of care and conquest."

<sup>83</sup> But see Zimmerman, 1987, p. 35, for some differing feminist views

specifically. Moral vegetarianism can be considered an ethic of care expressed through the body as moral agent.

#### 5.4.4 Vegetarianism

“...[Moral vegetarianism is] an example of a distinctively ecofeminist moral concern: our relations to what we are willing to count as food” (Curtin, 1996, p. 74).

A key question for ecofeminists is, where we *do* have choices, what should we be willing to count as food? Some ecofeminists see vegetarianism as “a distinctively ecofeminist moral concern”, and “a core concept in an ecofeminist ethic of care” (Curtin, 1996, p. 74). They present arguments for vegetarianism [5.4.4.1], and theorize humans’ consumption of meat [5.4.4.2]. There is however disagreement on whether vegetarianism is, or is not, an essential aspect of the ecofeminist ethic of care [5.4.4.3].

##### 5.4.4.1 Ecofeminist arguments for vegetarianism

Ecofeminists present arguments for vegetarianism variously on (a) ecological grounds [for example, depletion of water supplies, demands on energy sources, contribution to methane gas in the atmosphere, damage to topsoil] (Adams, 1993, p. 214; Adams, 1996, pp. 118-121), (b) health grounds (Kheel, 1993, p. 270, footnote 58; Adams, 1996, pp. 118-121), (c) anti-elitist grounds: the effects of meat-eating are felt in oppressed and marginalized countries: a meat-based diet requires “six to seven times as much land as does a vegetarian diet” (Abbott, 1990, p. 39). This means that land once used to produced diverse subsistence crops is now converted to monocropping to produce beef for export, and (d) anti-violence and anti-killing grounds (for example, Curtin, 1996; Adams, 1996). I borrow Curtin’s phrase “moral vegetarianism” (1996, p. 79) to describe this kind of vegetarianism, discussed next.

Some of the “care ethic” arguments sound familiar from Singer’s sentience ethic, even though argued from different premises. Thus Curtin suggests that where choice is possible, not to follow contextual moral vegetarianism infringes the injunction to care by inflicting **pain** that “is completely unnecessary and avoidable”(Curtin, 1996, p. 76). Killing animals for food also infringes “the injunction to eliminate needless **suffering** wherever possible, and particularly the suffering of those whose suffering is conceptually connected to one’s own” (Curtin, 1996, p. 76). “One would have to be hardened to know the conditions factory-farm animals live in and not feel disgust concerning their treatment” (Curtin, 1996, p. 76).

There are however some new elements in the ecofeminist arguments for “moral” vegetarianism, that is, vegetarianism not motivated by health reasons:

- (a) the argument **from relation or identification, which leads to solidarity**: “Identification means that relationships with animals are redefined; they are no longer instruments, means to our ends, but beings who deserve to live and toward whom we act respectfully ... ‘The objectifying of women, the metaphors of women as pieces of meat, ... I resent that. I identify it with ways that especially beef and chickens also are really exploited. The way they stuff them and ruin their bodies...That is disturbing to me in the same way that I feel that I am exploited’ ... ‘When I thought that this was an animal who lived and walked and met the day, ... and could make attachments and had affections and dislikes [i.e. has social needs], it disgusted me to think of slaughtering that animal and cooking it and eating it’ ...” (Adams, 1996, p. 117, p. 118, citing from women she’d interviewed, p. 131, footnote 5). An animal ethic based on the “politics of identification” “speaks to responsibility and relationships”, rather than criteria for moral considerability (Adams, 1996, p. 131, footnote 6).

(b) **Violence** is argued as offensive to an ethic of care (Curtin, 1996, p. 76; Adams, 1996, p. 131, footnote 12<sup>84</sup>). The ecofeminist perspective argues that one's body *is* oneself, and being a silent co-partner in the violence of killing in order to eat meat, is to make "one's bodily self ... a context for violence" (Curtin, 1996, p. 76). The word "meat" itself, instead of "the dead body of an animal", obscures the true, violent, relationship between ourselves and the animals we kill to provide food for ourselves (Adams, 1996). Nonviolence demands vegetarianism.

(c) Some ecofeminists reject what they see as the **exploitation of the female capacity for reproduction, and "sexual politics" of meat** (Adams, 1990) encountered in intensive farming of terminal animals. "... 'Feminists realize what it's like to be exploited. Women as sex objects, animals as food. Women turned into patriarchal mothers, cows turned to milk machines. It's the same thing...' ..." (Adams, 1996, p. 117, citing from women she'd interviewed, p. 131, footnote 5). Animal welfare literature abounds with examples of sexually-named mechanical devices such as "rape racks", or "iron maidens" to extract the maximum economic benefit possible from the female reproductive capacity in animals. Some ecofeminists are thus vegans (Curtin, 1996, p. 76).

(d) Meat-eating is a patriarchal standard of what counts for food, **a symbol for masculinity** (Adams, 1987, pp. 51-55, in Gruen, 1993, p. 72). For example, in American advertising at least, "real men" are supposed to eat "real food", i.e. meat (Curtin, 1996, p. 77). That women don't quite make the patriarchal class, I suggest, is indicated by the presence of a "ladies steak" on most local menus. There are calls from some ecofeminists "to resist ideological pressures to conform to patriarchal standards" of diet (Curtin, 1996, p. 76). Adams presents a similar argument at 5.4.4.2.

(e) We should be **"getting closer to the effects of our everyday actions"** as they pertain to our choices around animals (Gruen, 1993, p. 79, and p. 89, footnote 59, a reference to Kheel's (1985) work). As does Kheel (1985), Gruen (1993, in Gaard, 1993, pp. 78-79) critiques animal rights theory as not only perpetuating the false dichotomy between reason and emotion, but allowing reason's customary abstraction from context, and denial of "embodied knowledge" (Adams, 1996, p. 132, footnote 13), to distance and insulate us from the effects of our everyday animal-related choices. We might decide on an abstract level, that we are justified in eating meat. But ecofeminist praxis would require us to "put our abstract beliefs to a practical test" (Kheel, 1993, p. 257). We could expose ourselves to the sights, sounds, and smells of intensive animal rearing, live transport, and the abattoir (Kheel, 1985, p. 145; Kheel, 1993, p. 257), for example, before deciding whether or not to count animals as food. Then at least, we would be taking co-responsibility for our participation in the "traffic in animals" (Adams, 1993, p. 197) – their production, transportation, slaughter and packaging (Adams, 1993, p. 197) - and not allowing its consequences to be mediated for us by others (Gruen, 1993, p. 79). Personhood is embodied, the food we eat becomes our bodies, and the mind-body, not only the mind, is a moral agent (Curtin, 1996). We can choose in favour of a non-abusive diet.

(f) All of the above arguments, in addition to arguments on the ecological and health consequences of animals as food, leads I think, to an important ecofeminist perspective: that **what we are willing to count as food, is not only a personal, but a moral, political, and economic statement** (Adams, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, pp. 195-218; Curtin, 1996, in Warren, 1996, pp. 66-81). A "politics of consciousness" is required – that is, concrete responses to the

---

<sup>84</sup> On the concept 'violence', Adams (1996, p. 132, footnote 12) says: "I use *violent* in the sense of the *American Heritage Dictionary's* definition: '[death] caused by unexpected force or injury rather than by natural causes.'"

oppression, and solidarity with the oppressed (Adams, 1993, pp. 212-213, drawing on Paolo Freire's work, 1972, 1978).

#### **5.4.4.2 Theory: The social construction of humans as predators, and animals as “meat”**

As an example of ecofeminist theorizing of meat-eating, Adams has argued (1993; 1996, pp. 123-125) that the western social construction of predation in nature as “natural”, of humans as predators requiring meat for survival and health, and of animals as “edible bodies”, all combine to portray meat-eating as “natural”. Death by predation in the animal world measures around 5% only, Kheel notes (1993, p. 257, and p. 270, footnote 60); the remainder of animal deaths are from non-predatory causes. But “We are asked, under patriarchy, to model our behavior not after the vegetarian animals but after the predators” (Kheel, 1993, p. 257). Those animals who do kill by predation must do so to survive (Kheel, 1993, p. 258). In contrast, human history “indicates a very mixed message” about the human need to eat animals for survival (Adams, 1996, p. 124). Adams notes that “we eat corpses in a way quite differently from any other animals – dismembered, not freshly killed, not raw, and with other foods present ...” (p. 124). In addition, many of us know stories about young children who, for a while, or sometimes permanently, refuse to eat meat once they are capable of understanding its origin. What *is* actually “natural” about human predation, Adams (1996, p. 124) asks? It has been socially constructed as natural to boost the meat economy, and to help rationalize the violence and oppression involved. This is accomplished by “ontologizing” the animals concerned as “meat”. In this social construction, the animal disappears. In Adams’ phrase, the referent becomes absent, enabling us to forget about the animal whose body and life it was, to resist having these facts made present to us (p. 125), and to avoid acknowledging our agency in the animal’s killing. Consumption has been successfully separated from production (p. 119).

Adams links this conceptual process [opaquely here, I think] to patriarchal ideology thus: “The absent referent results from and reinforces ideological captivity; patriarchal ideology establishes the cultural set of human/animal, creates criteria that posit the species difference as important in considering who may be means and who may be ends, and then indoctrinates us into believing that we need to eat animals. Simultaneously, the structure of the absent referent keeps animals absent from our understanding of patriarchal ideology and makes us resistant to having animals made present. This means that we continue to interpret animals from the perspective of human needs and interests: we see them as usable and consumable. Much of feminist discourse participates in this structure when failing to make animals visible” (p. 125). Elsewhere her argument is clearer: “To eat animals is to make of them instruments [the familiar ecofeminist argument against androcentrism’s instrumentalising]; this proclaims dominance and power-over” (1996, p. 129, and 1993, p. 213, where she speaks of ontologizing animals as ‘beings for another’ as a mark of oppression). Vegetarianism is a topic which becomes immediately salient when organizing an ecofeminist conference for example – to serve or not to serve meat? (Ecofeminist Task Force recommendation, item 7, 1990<sup>85</sup>).

#### **5.4.4.3 Vegetarianism: An essential ecofeminist ethic?**

Ecofeminists have differing views on whether vegetarianism or veganism should be an essential aspect of an ecofeminist ethic (Adams, 1993, p. 195; 1996, p. 126). There is a resistance towards categorically condemning all animal killing, because an ecofeminist ethic supports pluralism [section 5.2.2], and refuses to absolutize, a position some ecofeminists consider consistent with authoritarianism and “power-over” (Adams, 1996, p. 126, referring to Warren’s viewpoint on absolutizing).

Some argue against moral vegetarianism on the grounds that an ecofeminist ethic is contextual. Curtin (1996) agrees and disagrees. Ecofeminist moral vegetarianism is not an ethic of justice which responds

---

<sup>85</sup> Referred to by Adams (1993, pp. 195-196; p. 214; p. 215, footnote 4; p. 218, footnotes 58 and 59), and Gruen (1993, p. 89, footnote 66)

to some rationally-agreed on, universally present criterion for moral considerability, but a response to particular contexts and histories which may differ by locale, gender and class (Curtin, 1996, p. 74). In an ecofeminist ethic, it is not possible to say that eating meat is categorically wrong, in all circumstances, even though one is committed to moral vegetarianism (p. 75). Context as geographic locale also plays a role; some communities might not be able to grow food, and thus cannot have the option of vegetarianism (Curtin, 1996, p. 67). There might be cases<sup>86</sup> where it is justified. But where there is choice, it isn't.

There are cultural contextual grounds too. Many westerners watching the food channels on DSTV are struck by the Chinese willingness to consider almost any living thing as food. In what would be abhorrent for many meat-eating Westerners, it is possible in Chinese restaurants to choose from several different dog penis soups. Some ecofeminists argue that not to serve meat at feminist/ecofeminist gatherings, is to infringe on “the cultural traditions of women of color, for example”. Gruen (1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 82), citing Jane Meyerding (1982), critiques cultural deference to meat-eating: “... ‘It is a contradiction for feminists to eat animals with whom they have no physical or spiritual relationship<sup>87</sup> except that of exploiter to exploited ... I think concern for the lives of all beings is a vital, empowering part of feminist analysis; I don't think we can strengthen our feminist struggle against one aspect of patriarchy by ignoring or accepting other aspects' ...”. On Gruen's view (1993, p. 82), ecofeminists “argue that we need not and must not isolate the subjugation of women at the expense of the exploitation of animals. Indeed, the struggle for women's liberation is inextricably linked to abolition of all oppression”. By failing to “take into account the plight of animals, ... [we act out] one of the deepest patriarchal attitudes” (1993, p. 82).

In relational hunting, the animal is argued to have agreed to its hunting and death<sup>88</sup> in order to sustain the human hunting it (Adams, 1996, pp. 126-129). “Killing animals in a respectful act of appreciation for their sacrifice, this argument proposes, does not create animals as instrumentalities” (Adams, 1996, p. 126); a reciprocal relationship is supposed (p. 126). Adams wonders how there can be talk of reciprocity – “What does the animal who dies receive in this exchange? The experience of sacrifice? How can the reciprocity of the relational hunt be verified since the other partner is both voiceless in terms of human speech and furthermore rendered voiceless thorough his or her death?” (1996, p. 127). She rejects relational hunting as “mystification” really (p. 127) of what is simply just another example of patriarchal ontologizing of animal bodies as meat (1996, pp. 126-127).

Some ecofeminists see an essentialist ecofeminist vegetarianism as an infringement of their autonomy (Adams, 1993, pp. 210-211; Adams, 1996, p. 129) [section 4.3.2.1]. On this issue, Adams notes that “The question ‘Who decided that animals should be food?’ remains unaddressed. ... We must see ourselves in relationship with animals. ... The subordination of animals is not a given but a decision resulting from an ideology that participates in the very dualisms that ecofeminism seeks to eliminate. We achieve autonomy by acting independently of such an ideology.” (Adams, 1996, p. 129).

Others, like Nel Noddings, argue in defence of eating animals, provided that we ensure that their deaths are “physically and psychologically painless” (Adams, 1993, p. 208, citing Noddings, 1991, p. 420). On Adams' view (1993, p. 208 and p. 217, footnote 43), this argument represents an “ignorance about the act of slaughtering”, and a “flight from specificity”, because no such practice is attainable.

---

<sup>86</sup> It might for example be right to kill an animal if no other food exists for one's starving child (Curtin, 1996, p. 75)

<sup>87</sup> Meyerding is, I take it, referring to “relational” hunting, discussed in the next paragraph

<sup>88</sup> Abbott (1990, in Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, pp. 35-40) has argued that early shamanistic, animistic hunters had conflicted feelings about destroying the souls of the animals they hunted and killed, and developed religious rituals and beliefs to help deal with guilt, and ward off the animal's anger and revenge; one such belief being that the animal willingly “offers” itself as sacrifice

### 5.4.5 Other animal ethics issues

Without further discussion, I present here what could be considered a summary by one ecofeminist (Donovan, 1993, pp. 184-185) of animal ethics issues:

... it is clear that the ethic sketched here<sup>89</sup> would mean feminists must reject carnivorousness; the killing of live animals for clothing; hunting; the trapping of wildlife for fur (largely for women's luxury consumption); rodeos; circuses; and factory farming; and that they must support the drastic redesigning of zoos (if zoos are to exist at all) to allow animals full exercise space in natural habitats; that they should reject the use of lab animals for testing of beauty and cleaning products (such as the infamous 'LD-50' and Draize tests) and military equipment, as well as psychological experimentation such as that carried out in the Harlow primate lab at the University of Wisconsin<sup>90</sup>; that they should support efforts to replace medical experiments by computer models and tissue culture; that they should condemn and work to prevent further destruction of wetlands, forests, and other natural habitats. All of these changes must be part of a feminist reconstruction of the world.

## 6. View of society

"Ecofeminism is a value system, a social movement, and a practice, but it also offers a political analysis that explores the links between androcentrism and environmental destruction ..." (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 18).

When are social and political issues, feminist/ecofeminist issues? Usually, suggests Warren (1997, pp. 5-6), when they are located at the juncture<sup>91</sup> of feminist concerns; science, development and technology; and indigenous/local knowledge concerns. But any issue is an ecofeminist issue, if understanding it helps end women's / nature's subjugation and promotes their liberation (Warren, 1990, p. 127).

In this section, I consider first an interpretation of the ecofeminist perspective at socio-political level [6.1], and then some ecofeminist social issues: militarism [6.2], technology [6.3], uncritical western-style development introduced in developing countries [6.4], (over-) population [6.5], and social justice [6.6]. Animal ethics as social issue was discussed in section 5.4.4.

### 6.1 Ecofeminist theory applied at socio-political level

#### 6.1.1 "Manstream" vis-a-vis "the feminine principle" in green politics

Ecofeminist Janis Birkeland (1993, in Gaard, pp. 13-59) notes two basic orientations in green philosophy which inform political analysis, strategy, and programmes of action (p. 15, 16). Going beyond the usual left/right analysis, Birkeland identifies on the one hand what she calls "masculinist" or "manstream" green theory/ values, and on the other, a "feminist", or "feminine principle" system of values. She ties neither category exclusively to biological sex.

"Manstream" green philosophical theory she sees as divided into two streams, corresponding loosely to "left and liberal *strategies* for social change but *not* left and liberal ideology", a differentiation I don't pursue further (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 15). The "leftish" strategic approach, which excludes Marxism<sup>92</sup>, but includes social ecology [Chapter Five], and eco-socialism [introduced in Chapter Seven], considers structural change to precede personal change. The liberal strategic approach,

<sup>89</sup> As sketched in her paper, pp. 167-194, which entails "a fundamental respect for nonhuman life forms" (p. 184), is "life-affirming", and resists either/or thinking in choices between animals and people (p. 184)

<sup>90</sup> Department of Psychology

<sup>91</sup> If one imagines a Venn diagram of three overlapping circles, representing (1) feminism, (2) science, development and technology, and (3) native/indigenous/local perspectives respectively, then the area common to all three circles represents issues for eco-feminist philosophy and practice (Warren, 1997, pp. 5-6)

<sup>92</sup> Birkeland dismisses Marxist strategies as "inconsistent with green principles" (1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 15)

which includes deep ecology [Chapter Four], considers worldview change in individuals as “the primary means toward social transformation” (p. 15). Where the former cannot adequately theorize the political dimensions of the personal, the latter cannot theorize the structural dimensions of power (p. 16). Birkeland’s argument is that to the extent that both the “leftish” and the “liberalist” streams are “gender-blind and trapped in an androcentric prism” (p. 16), they fail in their green political analysis and strategies<sup>93</sup>, and impede personal and social transformation toward the kind of radically different ecological society (p. 15) needed to resolve the environmental crisis. Birkeland (1993, pp. 19-20) believes that “... of the many shades of green thought, ecofeminism offers the most comprehensive and incisive socio-political analysis to guide both self- and social transformation at this point in history” (p. 16).

Ecofeminism’s critique of androcentrism reveals the masculine, *power-over* orientation of the “pathological “isms” of modernity, including militarism, colonialism, racism, classism, sexism and capitalism. They all obtain their “legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are an inevitable part of human Society due to Man’s ‘inherent nature’. In other words, if Mankind is by nature autonomous, aggressive, and competitive (that is, ‘masculine’), then psychological and physical coercion or hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflict and maintain social order. Likewise, cooperative relationships, such as those found among women or tribal cultures, are by definition unrealistic and utopian” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 25). The male, supposedly gender-neutral, supposedly universal, understanding of the human Self, has removed “the *basis* of power relations... from the realm of political and social debate ...” (p. 26, my italics). The ideological basis of exploitative power structures is protected by appearing natural and inevitable.

But what needs to be changed in western society, is just the “Power Paradigm” (p. 17), that is, the *power* orientation of both personal relationships in our daily lives, and in structural relationships based on a “masculine” version of Self, which manifest as “Patriarchy<sup>94</sup>”, and “hierarchy<sup>95</sup>” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, pp. 16-17). How to motivate “power-driven men and molls to change their behaviour”, Birkeland asks (1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 53)?

For spiritually-inspired ecofeminists at least, political and social praxis is guided by the three key features of spirituality - immanence, interconnection, and community (Starhawk, 1990, p. 73):

...when we start to understand that the Earth is alive, she calls us to act to preserve her life. When we understand that everything is interconnected, we are called to a politics and set of actions that come from compassion, from the ability to literally feel *with* all living beings on the Earth. That feeling is the ground upon which we can build community and come together and take action and find direction... (Starhawk, 1990, p. 74, her italics).

Birkeland is dubious. She argues that because

...of the realities of power relationships in Patriarchal society, we must recognize that policies will not change until people with power in the military, corporate and bureaucratic establishments cooperate of their own accord. ... Rationalist approaches that appeal to intellect and religious approaches that appeal to spirituality have proven inadequate. ... if we are to move beyond power-based relationships, we should work to expose and redress the personal insecurities and unconscious motives underlying the power drive

<sup>93</sup> She considers in turn (pp. 38-53), strategies for green change such as influencing leaders, influencing individuals to change their personal values, spiritual change, [deep ecology-like] “identification”, and allowing one’s self, or pressure group or party, to be co-opted in the hope of winning green concessions

<sup>94</sup> Birkeland (1993, p. 17) describes “Patriarchy” as “the male-dominated system of social relations and values” justified by the systematic devaluation of the feminine principle. As a “narrower” definition of patriarchy, Birkeland (1993, p. 55, footnote 6) cites Lerner’s (1986, p. 239) definition of it as “the manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in society in general”

<sup>95</sup> Birkeland defines “Hierarchy” as the “relationships of command and obedience enforced by (Patriarchal) social structures and institutions” (1993, p. 17)

and *demystify the social conception of masculinity as power*. We should work to disassociate masculinity from the images of heroism, conquest and death defiance so familiar in militaristic fantasies; from the images of competitiveness, individualism, and aggression glorified in sport; from the images of objectivity, linearity, and reductionism exalted by science; and from the images of hierarchy, progress, and control entrenched in the technocracy.... (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 53, *her italics*).

### 6.1.2 One version of ecofeminism's basic precepts at socio-political level

Birkeland (1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 20) suggests that most ecofeminists would subscribe to the following “basic precepts” of an ecofeminist politics of reality:

1. Fundamental social transformation is necessary. We must reconstruct the underlying values and structural relations of our cultures. The promotion of equality, nonviolence, cultural diversity, and participatory, noncompetitive, and nonhierarchical forms of organization and decision making would be among the criteria for these new social forms.
2. Everything in nature has intrinsic value. A reverence for, and empathy with, nature and all life (or “spirituality”) is an essential element of the social transformation required.
3. Our anthropocentric viewpoint, instrumentalist values, and mechanistic models should be rejected for a more biocentric view that can comprehend the interconnectedness of all life processes.
4. Humans should not attempt to “manage” or control nonhuman nature, but should work with the land. The use of agricultural land should be guided by an ethic of reciprocity. Humans should intrude upon the remaining natural ecosystems and processes only where necessary to preserve natural diversity.
5. Merely redistributing power relationships is no answer. We must change the fact of power-based relationships and hierarchy, and move toward an ethic based on mutual respect<sup>96</sup>. We must move beyond power.
6. We must integrate the false dualisms that are based on the male/female polarity (such as thought versus action, the spiritual versus the natural, art versus science, experience versus knowledge) in our perception of reality. The dualistic conception of Patriarchy supports the ethic of dominance and divides us against each other, our “selves”, and nonhuman nature.
7. Process is as important as goals, simply because how we go about things determines where we go. As the power-based relations and processes that permeate our societies are reflected in our personal relationships, we must enact our values.
8. The personal is political. We must change the ideology that says the morality of the (female) private sphere has no application to the (male) public sphere of science, politics, and industry. We must work to rebalance the masculine and feminine in ourselves and society.
9. We cannot change the nature of the system by playing Patriarchal “games”. If we do, we are abetting those who are directly involved in human oppression and environmental exploitation. We must therefore withdraw power and energy from the Patriarchy. (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 20).

## 6.2 Institutionalized violence: militarism as example

Ecofeminists seek to expose the malestream worldview underpinning militarism and nuclearism<sup>97</sup> in an effort to end it. This particular analysis is based on that of Birkeland (1993, in Gaard, 1993, pp. 35-42). She argues, *inter alia*, that as 90% of violent crime is committed by men, and nuclear weapons are the product of male minds, a gender-neutral analysis will not successfully understand militarism (p.36).

<sup>96</sup> I note that Birkeland does not refer either here, or in point 4, to the usual ecofeminist “ethic of care”. However, it is unlikely that by her “respect” in point 5, she means the “respect” encountered for example, in Taylor’s biocentrism [section 5.1.1 (a)]. One feminist interpretation I have found of an ethic of respect, is in Ebenreck’s (1983, pp. 33-45) feminist partnership ethic in agriculture, based on respect, in which use does not mean destruction, but is a two-way process in which each returns to the other, something of value (p. 33, p. 41)

<sup>97</sup> Davion (1996) employs both Plumwood’s and Warren’s conceptual frameworks [section 4.2] to show the self/other dualism underlying the supposed rationality of “three mainstream discussions concerning the ethics of nuclear deterrence” (p. 181)

She notes how “masculinity” and “femininity” are concepts deliberately manipulated by the military. For example, basic training encourages men to distance themselves from their “feminine” side (Birkeland, 1993, p. 35, citing Spretnak, 1989, p. 134); peace activists are characterized as “poofsters” and “sissies” (p. 35); advertising deliberately links weapons sales [“the world’s largest business” (p. 37)] with power and sex. The “threatening and aggressive posturing” (p. 37) that accompanied the Cold War was “a deliberate marketing strategy of the corporate/industrial/military/bureaucratic complex” (Birkeland, 1986, cited by Birkeland, 1993, p. 36). Preventing war rather through pursuing world peace, she suggests, “has not really been tried. Perhaps this is partly because the armed forces really exist as an icon: they ‘represent and defend the masculine ethic<sup>98</sup>,’ rather than life.” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 36). An androcentric critique shows “the false dualisms that have been used by powerful interests to divide and rule ... These divisions are made plausible and encoded by “hierarchical dualism” – the organizing principle of Patriarchal thought.” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 37).

### 6.2.1 Violence and aggression in environmental language

Some ecofeminists, such as Kheel, have documented the routine use of violence in language. She sees this, together with negative images of the female and nature, as symptomatic of “the aggressive establishment of the masculine self through its opposition to all of the natural world” (Kheel, 1993, p. 247). It is not difficult to produce general examples replicating violence in our language, strangely, even when talking about dealing with environmental problems. For example, William Baxter (1974, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 303-307), in his “People or Penguins: The case for optimal pollution” writes: “... trade-off by trade-off, we should divert our productive capacities from the production of existing goods and services to the production of a cleaner, quieter, more pastoral nation up to – and no further than –the point at which we value more highly .... the next unit of environmental improvement that the diverted resources would create. ... I insist that the proposition stated describes the result for which we should be striving – and again, that it is always useful to know what your target is even if your weapons are too crude to score a bull’s-eye” (pp. 306-307).

### 6.3 Science and technology

Some of the ecofeminist critique of science was presented at section 3.3. Merchant showed that Bacon’s “masculinization of the early development of science, ... paved the way for the advances of modern technology...”. (Li, in Gaard, 1993, p. 286).

There are differences among feminists on the role of technology in the exploitation of both women and the environment<sup>99</sup> (McLaughlin, 2003, pp. Salleh, 1993, pp. 231-232). Eisler (1990, pp. 32-33) for example, praises technology as “part of the evolutionary impulse” (p. 32). Nor are only men capable of technological development: Li (1993, p. 287) notes the documentation of women’s contributions by Mumford (1966, p. 144), and Stanley (1983).

Feminist/ecofeminist critique is mostly directed at the masculine transcendent worldview<sup>100</sup> within which technology is created. Feminist/ecofeminist Petra Kelly saw technology as expressing ‘male’ values (McLaughlin, 2003, p.p. 167-168). Some ecofeminists “observe that the instrumental-rational

<sup>98</sup> Birkeland is citing here from Wajcman (1991, p. 146)

<sup>99</sup> “Liberal feminists, like their brothers, the reform environmentalists, imagine that solutions to social and ecological problems can be found within ‘the advanced industrial technostucture’ ... Marxist feminists ... argue that technology is neutral and that it is all a matter of who controls it” (Salleh, 1993, pp. 231-232)

<sup>100</sup> Ruether highlighted the *transcendence* in the dualisms of western [male] thought. Within the idea of transcendence, is also the idea of *infinitude*. In religion, it appears as the transcendence of death by life after death [women, it is argued, are by virtue of their biological makeup, more attuned to life as “coming-to-be-and-passing-away” than a search for transcendence]; in civilization, as the transcendence of nature’s limited resources by ever more sophisticated science and technology (Li, 1993, p. 274, discussing Ruether’s (1975) work). Zimmerman (1987, pp. 26-28) also discusses what Ruether calls the male “God project” as basis for the belief that one can transcend dependence on nature through technology

mode of production” through technology “inevitably trickles over into the sphere of consciousness and social relations.” (Salleh, 1993, p. 232). King (1990, p. 109) notes that in both capitalist and socialist states, technology is applied within “the anthropocentric notion that humanity should dominate nature and that the increasing domination of non-human nature is a precondition for true human freedom” (King, 1990, p. 109). Many feminists/ecofeminists are critical of recent developments in biotechnology, genetic engineering and reproductive technology (McLaughlin, 2003, pp. 176-180). Some see it as just another example of the male patriarchal desire to control both women’s and nature’s generative capacity (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 486).

In a “partnership” model of society, the highest priority would be given to technologies designed “to sustain and enhance life” (Eisler, 1990, p. 33), not to dominate and oppress it. Even where appropriate technology is applied, it sometimes fails to take the [often female] user view into account. As a striking example of supposedly appropriate technology in African context, Warren (1997, p. 9) quotes from Helmut Mylenbusch (1979, p. 18): “In Africa where sunshine is abundant but oil, coal and wood are scarce and expensive, a solar stove should really mean utmost happiness to women.... Field tests [however] ... showed what every ... local woman could have predicted: in the African bush, meals are prepared in the morning or in the evening when the sun has not yet risen or has already set. Furthermore: which cook wants to stand in the scorching sun?...”

Another example is in the location and maintenance of rural water supply points: location is often decided by the local head-man with a view to enhancing his prestige and status, rather than taking into account how far the women must walk to the water point; men are usually given the maintenance training (idea from Warren, 1997, p. 9). Such patriarchal technology is part and parcel of what Third World ecofeminist and eco-activist Vandana Shiva calls “maldevelopment”.

#### 6.4 Third World ‘maldevelopment’

Christopher Key Chapple (in Tucker, 1994, p. 121) sums up Shiva’s ‘maldevelopment’<sup>101</sup>, concept thus:

Vandana Shiva explicitly attacks the premises of third world development projects in her book *Staying Alive*, an eloquent appeal to reverse the drive for world homogenization based on the Western model. In addition to a more standard feminist critique, she also develops a theory of nature rooted in *prakrti* [the female principle] and *shakti* [strength – derived from biotic and abiotic nature e.g. from water in the river, or trees, or grass], thus using conceptual resources indigenous to Indian tradition. She points out that development policies often entail a shift from holistic, ecologically sound subsistence farming largely conducted by women to cash-crop farming of one product, often enhanced by technology, that is dominated by men. She refers to this practice as ‘maldevelopment’, stating that ‘it ruptures the co-operative unity of masculine and feminine, and places man, shorn of the feminine principle, above nature and women, and separated from both...Nature and women are turned into passive objects, to be used and exploited for the uncontrolled and uncontrollable desires of alienated man’. She contrasts the instantiated immediacy of *prakrti*, which views all things as part of a living continuum, with the deadness of things other than human as perceived in the Cartesian-scientific-technological model, wherein they are regarded only for their potential to be transformed into consumable goods...” (Chapple, in Tucker, 1994, p. 121).

More specifically, Shiva argues that –

##### **(a) Development based on the Western economic model, is simply a continuance of pre-independence colonialism in disguise in Third World countries**

---

<sup>101</sup> Shiva’s critique of western-style development is influential. Hayward (1995, pp. 104-106) who sums it up as comprising an instrumental attitude to nature, a continued male domination of women, and a continued domination of the values of a specifically western culture, uses it to illustrate an approach to development fundamentally at odds with environmental economics. Wenz (2002, pp. 399-401) bases much of his argument for multicultural anthropocentrism [“people should be free to accept or reject a foreign vision of human flourishing and a foreign path toward flourishing” (p. 399)] on Shiva’s critique of western development’s subordination of the poor, particularly women and children

“Development” remains on Shiva’s view, a patriarchal concept at heart, entailing the exploitation of women and natural resources both at home and in faraway places to feed the techno-industrial machine. The only difference is that whereas natural resources were monopolized pre-independence by the colonial power, post-independence, it is the “new national elites ... which mastermind ... the exploitation on the grounds of ‘national interest’” (Shiva, 1990, p. 190). “‘Development’ transfers resources from the poor to the well endowed” (Bandyopadhyay and Shiva, 1982, 1988, in Shiva, 1990, footnote 2, p. 301)

**(b) ‘Development’ is based on supposedly universal, but actually western, economic concepts and assumptions**

For example, concepts such as ‘poverty’, ‘productivity’, and ‘growth’, and their assumptions, have been universalized into a global economic model with no regard as to their suitability for non-westernized, non-industrialized peoples.

Shiva critiques the western cultural assumptions underlying the view of subsistence living as ‘poverty’. Subsistence economies which satisfy all basic and vital needs through self-provisioning, and which function in ecological harmony with their surroundings, she suggests, are not poor in the sense of real material poverty. “Yet the ideology of development declares them poor” (1990, p. 197), on the grounds that they are not participating in the market economy, and are not consuming “Western-style commodities produced for and distributed through the market” (p. 197). But by the time western-style development has removed land and water resources from sustenance needs through commercialization, and introduced western economy based developments such as cash crop production, commodity production, export production, technology, credit, surety and so on, increasing numbers of people, particularly the elderly, the women, the children, begin to experience *real* material scarcity and poverty, not culturally-defined poverty (pp. 197-200).

Shiva notes western construction of nature’s “passivity” as non-productivity and unproductiveness. Any process or work which does not “produce profits and capital” (Shiva, 1990, p. 192) is called ‘unproductive’. She argues that “the ideology of development is in large part based on a vision of bringing all natural resources into the market economy for commodity production” (Li, 1993, p. 280, citing Shiva, 1988, p. 9). Nature left to itself is understood not to be producing any goods or services which can be bought or sold in the marketplace. A clean river is not ‘productive’ unless it has been dammed; natural forests are not ‘productive’ unless they can somehow be brought into the market economy through the provision of genetic resources, or arts and crafts production – monoculture plantations of commercial species are by contrast, ‘productive’ (Shiva, 1990, p. 192), even though this practice severs forestry from its previously inter-related water management, agriculture and animal husbandry (Li, 1993, p. 289, on Shiva, 1988). Women’s work in providing for their family’s basic vital needs is not ‘productive’ (Shiva, 1990, p. 192). These are all Western assumptions on the meaning of productivity as production of commodities for profit (p. 192). For many non-Westernized peoples, productivity means rather, “producing life and sustenance” (p. 192). Local cultural food, music, stories and skills have value – are productive - only when they have been transformed into commodities such as “ethnic” food, music, folklore and objects for the tourist industry (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 485).

Gross National Product is not at all a measure of the growth of wealth or welfare. Shiva argues that once “commodity production as the prime economic activity is introduced as development”, GNP becomes more and more an indicator of how the potential of both nature and women “to produce life and goods and services for basic needs” (1990, pp. 194-195) is *decreasing*. This is because patriarchally-construed productivity and growth are ecologically destructive, a denial of the value of women and nature’s ‘passive’ work, and a source of further gender inequality.

**(c) ‘Maldevelopment’ increases male/female inequality in Third World countries**

Western patriarchal-style development, devoid of the feminine principle<sup>102</sup>, simultaneously subjugates women and nature, leaving both more impoverished than they ever were in their subsistence existence, and increases male/female<sup>103</sup> inequality. The logic of western style market-oriented development destroys the ready accessibility of women to those natural resources – food, fuel, fodder and water - from which they traditionally nourish their families. Instead, these resources are now controlled by male-dominated economic elites. Throughout the Third World, she suggests, “women, peasants, and tribal peoples are struggling for liberation from development as they earlier struggled for liberation from colonialism” (Shiva, 1990, p. 190).

**(d) Western-style development projects are resource and energy-intensive**

Western-style development projects “demand ever increasing resource withdrawals from the natural ecosystems” (1990, p. 195). They impair nature’s “productivity and renewability” because their “ecological destruction of soil, water, and vegetation systems” (p. 191) leaves little from which nature can renew itself. This in turn affects women, who, more directly than men, rely on nature’s continued production of renewable resources “for sustenance and livelihood” (p. 190, p. 197).

“Maldevelopment’, Shiva suggests (1990, p. 200) will only become genuine development when it abandons the “sacredness” of its patriarchal assumptions, and recovers the feminine principle.

## 6.5 Population

Salleh considers that “the targeting of ‘population control’ by white male environmentalists in the North has both racist and sexist dimensions” (1993, p. 232). Many North Americans, she says, oppose abortion back home but “endorse population control programs in Asia and South America” (p. 232). Even the argument from the “scarcity” of the Earth’s resources, is hypocritical if applied only to the Third World, because every child “born into the so-called advanced societies uses about fifteen times more global resources during his or her lifetime than a person born in the Third World” (pp. 232-233).

Ecofeminists do want to see women in control of their own fertility – they work against culturally-approved rape/early co-erced motherhood, and advocate women’s right to choose their own sexual partners, and their right to pregnancy prevention methods and safe abortion<sup>104</sup> (McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 88). They condemn the oppression they see in the growing numbers of homeless, abused, neglected, depressed, starving, mortally-ill, unplanned, children of the world, because they bear the heaviest environmental burden (Kurth-Schai, 1997, in Warren, 1997, p. 193).

Spretnak (1990, pp. 12-13) suggests that an ecofeminist response to the suffering brought about by population pressure in Third World countries would involve (1) a levelling off of the population growth everywhere and then decline (except for indigenous peoples under threat of extinction) (2) improved health and economic conditions for Third World women, because as child death rate goes down, so does birth rate (3) involvement of women at regional level in planning of population control programmes, health care, education and small-scale economic opportunities (4) ending political

---

<sup>102</sup> By the ‘feminine principle’, Shiva means “the conserving, ecological principle”, the recognition of diversity as asset, not threat, the abandonment of reductionism, duality and linearity, the rejection of the alienation and subjugation of women and nature

<sup>103</sup> In contrast to UN Decade for Women expectations, women’s impoverishment has increased further during post-independence western-style development (Shiva, 1990, pp. 190-191): the privatization of land which is part of western-style patriarchal development “displaced women more severely, eroding their traditional land-use rights”, the introduction of cash crops “undermined food production” (p. 190), development projects removed land, water and forests from women’s control, and made the collecting of food and fuel more time and energy intensive

<sup>104</sup> This issue was taken up strongly by the early Die Grünen (Chapter Seven)

struggles between indigenous cultural nations and the capitalist/socialist states around them, so that women of ethnic nations are not pressurized by their political leaders to have many babies so as to outnumber the enemy (5) the deconditioning, by governments and NGOs, of men from their patriarchal demand for several offspring to prove their virility.

## 6.6 Social justice; environmental justice

In section 4.3.2.3, I noted briefly the concerns that some feminists have with the implications of Gilligan's ethic of care, and how some have sought to re-articulate it as a public-political standard by which, for example, the state's care provision for its citizens, as well as its understandings of responsible citizenship, can be evaluated, critiqued, and political change demanded (McLaughlin, 2003, pp. 83-89).

Ecofeminists intertwine social justice issues with environmental issues. Justice, equality and peace "cannot be achieved apart from the well-being of the Earth" (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. xii); social justice and ecological stability are "intimately tied" (Shiva, 1990, p. 193). Recognizing and maintaining nature's harmony are "preconditions for distributive justice"<sup>105</sup> (Shiva, 1990, p. 193).

More often than not, it is the poor who are exposed to environmental hazards, and they who suffer most from environmental degradation (Starhawk, 1990, p. 82; Warren, 1999, pp. 151-153). The environmental justice movement seeks to simultaneously achieve social justice and ecological harmony. While it draws on elements of ecofeminism, it is also highly critical of it (e.g., Taylor, 1997). Taylor (1997) suggests<sup>106</sup> that while ecofeminists do "define... the theories, control and disseminate ideas, and craft political strategies" to address the woman/nature oppression, they otherwise match the "racial and socioeconomic profiles of traditional environmentalists, that is, they are predominantly white and middle class" (Taylor, 1997, p. 62). It is unsurprising that they haven't fully understood the issues of women of colour, nor do they "fully understand or accept the differences between white women and women of color" (p. 62).

Women-of-colour experience patriarchy differently to white women. Women-of-colour fight gender issues, but these are always intertwined with issues of racism as well. They face not only domination by white men, and men of colour, but by white women too. In addition, their men of colour are in turn dominated by white men. The whole experience is completely different. Besides which, ecofeminism is reluctant to discuss same-sex oppression of women (Taylor, 1997, p. 63).

Ecofeminism has been slow to take up racial equality as an issue. Fighting racial inequality is optional for white ecofeminists; it is not optional for women of colour. Ecofeminists have been critical of Marx's money and class dominance theory, arguing that gender is also a factor, but they have been slow to add race and colonialism as further factors of domination. When ecofeminists do mention these dominations, it is almost in passing; it has not taken root in the ecofeminist literature. Class *is* an issue for the environmental justice movement. Environmental degradation is particularly the lot of poor women of colour. Ecofeminists have pointed to the degradation of nature and linked it to "the degradation and devaluation" of women, but have not pointed to the capitalist, class and race basis of this nature degradation (Taylor, 1997, pp. 64-65). This failure provides a major reason why women of

---

<sup>105</sup> See Warren (1990) for "some ecofeminist worries" about environmental justice's distributive model

<sup>106</sup> Taylor (1997) for example also discusses differences between ecofeminists and environmental justice women of colour's understanding of religion and spirituality (pp. 66-67), takes some ecofeminists to task for using "dogmatic, totalizing language" (p. 68), cautions the ecofeminist movement to resist the imperialistic urge to co-opt the environmental justice movement (pp. 68-69), criticizes them for being more interested in the struggles of women in developing countries than in their own (p. 69), and expresses some doubt as to whether women of colour would be able to empower themselves and grow in the ecofeminist movement, because there, "ecofeminist beliefs, practices, and ideas are firmly under the control of white women..." (pp. 69-70). Taylor's position seems to be that while there is room for white ecofeminists in the environmental justice movement, it is best for women of colour to remain in the environmental justice movement

colour throw their lot in rather with men of colour, and rather in fighting for environmental justice, whose discourse is structured around racial equality (Taylor, 1997, p. 64).

## 7. Praxis

Ecofeminism considers itself a social movement (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 18), a “politics of resistance” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, pp. xiv-xv; Quinby, 1990, in Diamond and Orenstein, 1990, p. 122), particularly at local level, combined with “creative projects” (Lahar, 1996, p. 15) against “ecological destruction and patriarchal power” (Quinby, 1990, p. 127). A basic principle of ecofeminist praxis, is that it must be “life affirming, consensual, and nonviolent” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. xii). Cuomo (1996, p. 50) however, notes that some ecofeminist activist practices are “decidedly ‘in your face’...”. Praxis includes group decision making and consensus (Gruen, 1993, p. 83) [7.1], direct action [7.2], a suggested consumer boycott of animal-related “products of pain” (Gruen, 1993, p. 83) [7.3], and what I have called “Self”-work [7.4].

### 7.1 Consensual process

Starhawk appealingly! explains consensual process as follows: “Now consensus can drive you out of your mind with frustration sometimes, but there is a very important principle in it. That is, everyone in the group has power, and everyone has equal power because everyone has value. That value is accepted, it’s inherent, and it can’t be taken away. [new paragraph]. Along with the decision-making process goes a real care for the process that we use with each other. We listen to each other, we let each person have a say and hear each other and recognize that different people’s opinions may be important, even if we disagree with them. [We call it] feminist process...” and it is empowering (Starhawk, 1990, p. 77). Process works best in small groups, which ecofeminist political activists call ‘affinity groups’<sup>107</sup>. Together the affinity groups form networks and coalitions which act together in larger ways, but the basis is always “a small community of people who know and value each other personally” (Starhawk, 1990, p. 77).

### 7.2 Direct action

Feminists and ecofeminists have been involved in grassroots political action protesting issues as diverse as nuclear power, nuclear arms, toxic waste dumps, pesticides and herbicide spraying, genetically modified food, and the use of indigenous forests to supply industrial timber requirements, utilizing direct action methods and practices such as street blockades, large-scale mobilization of people, sit-ins, marches, peace camps, spiritualistic rituals, myth and traditional story-telling, web-weaving [often weaving closed the doors of important civic buildings], performance art happenings and street theatre, creating gardens on vacant city lots, or bulldozed strips of land (Lahar, 1996, p. 3), growing organic food, “tree-hugging” [the Chipko Andolan movement] (King, 1990, p. 118), and community tree planting [for example, Ms Wangari Maathai’s Kenyan greenbelt movement, in which rural women gather seeds from indigenous trees to ensure the continuance of the tropical forests on which they depend (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. xi; Merchant, 1990, pp. 101-105; Nelson, 1990, p. 185; Starhawk, 1990, p. 75).

### 7.3 Abstention from consumption of “the products of pain”

Some ecofeminists advocate refusal “to consume the products of [animal-related] pain”, such as those already summarized in section 5.4.5.

<sup>107</sup> An idea already encountered in Chapter Five on Social Ecology. It is also present in Die Grünen’s thought/praxis [Chapter Seven, section 6.4.2.2]

## 7.4 “Self”-work

Ecofeminism has shown that androcentrism is a social construction. So, “There is hope. Men and women in Western societies are increasingly seeking liberation from their Patriarchal programming. All sexes can work to affirm the values of caring, openness, nurturing, and nondefensiveness and the possibility of creating societies in harmony with all living beings. What is needed is more elbow grease....” (Birkeland, 1993, p. 54).

## 8. Critique

Perhaps the most destabilizing critique is that of the ecofeminist theoretical linking of the oppression of women with the oppression of nature, based on an argued affinity of women with nature. Li (in Gaard, 1993, quote on p. 272, p. 288), for example, suggests this supposed affinity to be a “[non] transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon”. She finds the reduction of ecological destruction to “traits associated with men (aggression, competition, and militarism), and ecological sensibility to traits associated with women (nurturing, caring, and compassion), reductionist (Li, 1993, p. 286), while acknowledging at the same time, that there does seem to be “a male-identified world view that is not necessarily shared by women” (p. 288). Li suggests that the ecofeminist praxis of seeking to end the interrelated –isms (classism, racism, sexism, naturism) has greater potential for cross-cultural applicability than its theorizing (Li, 1993, p. 289; Gaard, 1993, p. 10). Dixon (1996) critiques as unnecessary in the ecofeminist version of animal liberation, any theoretical, practical, or symbolic connection between women and animals [5.4.2].

Ecofeminists have also been critiqued for their theoretical inconsistency, and uncritical celebration of diversity [1.4]; their abandonment of Enlightenment legacies of reason [3.4], and their blindness to issues of importance for women of colour in the environmental justice movement [6.6]. Agarwal’s critique of ecofeminist analysis of development is noted in Chapter Nine, Environment and Development (section 4.2.3).

## 9. Summary

I summarize here the contributing ecofeminism ideas to the meaning of “green”, under a **THEME HEADING**, followed by a short description of the relative idea/ideas, and their location in this chapter.

**WORLDVIEW:** Ecofeminism provides anthropological and psychological explanations [2.2.2, 3.1, 4.1] for the dominant western cultural worldview, which it critiques as based on “masculinist” views on what it is to be a human being, a self in relation to others, and a self in relation to nature [4]. They call this a “malestream” worldview, and its accompanying value system and ethic [5], “androcentrism”. The androcentric critique runs like a thread through all aspects of the ecofeminist worldview. Their alternative worldview, which pointedly makes no claim to homogeneity, is informed by a variety of sometimes contradictory feminist theories [1.4, 2.1], ecologism [1.2], and women’s spirituality [2.2], of which the “feminine principle” and “partnership” are key expressions [4.3.2.4, 4.3.2.5]. The ecofeminism worldview includes “real-world” political analysis and praxis [6].

**LEGITIMATING NARRATIVE:** Androcentrism, defined as dominating, exploitative relations with the Other, particularly women, nature, and animals, is critiqued as the root cause of patriarchy, hierarchy, and the ecological crisis [2.3]. The ecofeminist project is to theorize the connections between all forms of oppression [1.3], two models for which are “the logic of domination”, and the centric model [4.2]. The rhetoric is of liberation for all oppressed groups [2.4]. The solution to all forms of oppression, of which the environmental crisis is one manifestation, is an integrated Self, and

an interconnected sense of the Self/Other relationship. Metaphors such as “network”, “web”, and “tapestry” express ecofeminists’ key alternative idea of connection [2.4].

**EPISTEMOLOGY:** Ecofeminism presents a sustained critique of Western culture’s dominant rationalism, argued to be a “masculine”, and not a universal, way of knowing. Specifically, it is critiqued for its ontological dualisms, its harsh opposition to emotion, its justification for instrumental relationships with the Other, its ignoring of women’s knowledge, and of non-formal knowledge [3.4]. There is opposition to scientific epistemology in as far as it is guilty of this critique [3.3]. Alternative epistemologies not aimed at “power over” that which is researched, are advocated instead [3.3.1].

## ONTOLOGY

**-View of the human being and nature:** Ecofeminist ontology usually deals integratedly with views of what it is to be a human being, the self/other relationship, and the self/nature relationship [4]. It criticizes in all these cases, malestream dichotomous and oppositional ontological views, and their inherent bias towards “power over” the other, whether from a model of oppression such as Warren’s “logic of domination” [4.2.2], or Plumwood’s “centric” model [4.2.1].

**-View of the human being:** The rationalist-generated malestream view of what it is to be a human being is criticized as a Self split between favoured “male values” and rejected or suppressed “feminine” values. Ecofeminists argue that the first step towards redressing inter alia, the ecological crisis, is a re-integration of the feminine into what it is to be a human being. Ecofeminists themselves are ambivalent as to whether to celebrate or reject a supposed feminine “essence” [4.3.2.3]. The “feminine principle” [4.3.2.4] however, appears unproblematic.

**-View of nature:** Few ecofeminists advocate a radical nondualistic ontology to replace male oppositionally-defined ontological views [4.3.1]. Mostly, they adopt a relational ontology of interdependence, which simultaneously recognizes connectedness and autonomy [4.3.2 and 4.3.2.2]. Autonomy vis-a-vis connectedness is a problematic issue for ecofeminists [4.3.2.1].

## THE ETHIC

Ecofeminists believe that their ecofeminist ethic holds “the power and the promise” of ending all oppression, specifically the twin oppression of women and nature. They critique anthropocentrism as one expression of androcentrism [5.1]. They see their task as unveiling malestream bias in environmental ethical theories, and have set “boundary conditions” for an ecofeminist ethic [5.2]. Instead of rationalist-inspired ethics geared towards the abstract, the universal, and a rights approach designed to mediate adversarial, oppressive relationships, they advocate a relational ethic of care which recognizes the role of emotion [5.3]. A “felt sense of connection” provides motivation [5.3.1]. The ethic is not based on any axiological theory but on the quality of the relationship [5.3.2]. It applies to both living and non-living beings [5.3.3]. Perhaps the lead moral response could be described as a call for “concrete loving actions” towards the other, whether person, nature, or animals.

**- Animal liberation issues:** Ecofeminists have also sought to theorize the patriarchal connection between the twin oppression of women and animals [5.4.2]. Most reject rights-based approaches to animal welfare issues [5.4.3]. They point out the social construction of meat-eating in patriarchal society [5.4.4.2], and present ecological, health, anti-elitist, and moral arguments for vegetarianism [5.4.4.1]. Some argue for, and some against, moral vegetarianism as necessity in an ecofeminist ethics of care [5.4.4.3]. From different premises to those of the animal rights ethicists, they reject more or less the same animal-related malpractices: animals misused and abused in science, food, sport and entertainment [5.4.4.5].

## VIEWS ON SOCIETY

Any socio-economic issue is a “women’s” issue if it contributes to understanding, and ending, women’s exploitation and domination. Ecofeminists claim that their worldview provides a real-world

basis for green socio-political critique and praxis, and a common ecofeminist political “platform” has been suggested [6.1].

Underlying the ecofeminist critique of militarism [6.2], technology [6.3], development [6.4], and moves towards population control [6.5] to reduce human environmental impact, is their critique of patriarchal values. While ecofeminists support environmental justice, they have been sharply criticized by their women-of-colour environmental justice sisters for their myopic misunderstanding of racism [6.6].

**PRACTICE:** Ecofeminist praxis includes consensual process [7.1], direct action [7.2], boycotting “products of pain” [7.3], and “Self”-work [7.4], the latter mainly understood as ridding oneself of patriarchal programming.



## CHAPTER SEVEN: THE GREEN MOVEMENT: DIE GRÜNEN AS EXAMPLE

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>234</b>
<b>1.1 Scope of this chapter</b>	<b>234</b>
<b>1.2 Sources</b>	<b>234</b>
<b>1.3 The 1960s/1970s ideas heritage of Die Grünen</b>	<b>235</b>
<b>1.4 “Ecological politics”</b>	<b>236</b>
1.4.1 The “Fundi” and “Realo” versions of ecological politics	236
<b>1.5 The objective of this chapter</b>	<b>237</b>
<b>2. Legitimizing narratives</b>	<b>237</b>
<b>2.1 The concept “Exterminism”</b>	<b>237</b>
2.1.1 The critique of militarism	238
2.1.2 The critique of patriarchy, hierarchy and bureaucracy	239
2.1.3 The critique of existing society’s “industrialism”	240
2.1.3.1 Advanced capitalism is aggressive, destructive, and unecological	240
2.1.3.2 Advanced industrial capitalism for everyone is impossible, and dangerous	241
2.1.3.3. There must be an alternative conception of “development”	242
2.1.3.4 Industrial capitalism’s work process is exploitative and alienating	243
2.1.3.5 Industrialism’s values of materialism and consumerism critiqued	243
2.1.3.6 Capitalism: total break, or “reformist ecologism”?	244
<b>2.2 Rhetoric, metaphors</b>	<b>245</b>
2.2.1 “Life” and “survival”	245
2.2.2 Machine metaphor	246
2.2.3 Emancipation, salvation, hope	246
<b>2.3 Die Grünen’s counter-exterminism ideology: core values</b>	<b>247</b>
<b>2.4 Key proposition on ecological crisis</b>	<b>248</b>
<b>3. Epistemology</b>	<b>248</b>
<b>3.1 “Netzwerkdenkens”</b>	<b>248</b>
<b>3.2 A critique of instrumental reason</b>	<b>249</b>
3.2.1 and a place for emotion in thinking	250
<b>4. Ontology</b>	<b>250</b>
<b>4.1 Some metaphysical thoughts: Philosophical holism and vitalism</b>	<b>250</b>
<b>4.2 A view of nature</b>	<b>251</b>
4.2.1 “Netzwerk” or holistic system	251
4.2.2 The interrelatedness of things [“Gesamttzusammenhänge”]	252
4.2.3 Cyclical process, change, and dynamic balance [“Werden und Gehen”; “Bewegung”]	252
4.2.4 “Ecology” as secure foundation for green movement thought, policy and practice	253
<b>4.3 A view of the human being</b>	<b>253</b>
4.3.1 Self-realization is a right	253



4.3.2 A re-orientation of personal values is needed	254
4.3.3 Spirituality in personal and social transformation	254
4.3.3.1 Spirituality amongst Die Grünen	255
4.3.4 From Homo <i>conquistador</i> to Homo <i>occidentalis simplicissimus</i>	256
4.3.5 “Frauenphilosophie”	257
4.3.5.1 Equal but different; the feminine principle [post-patriarchal values]	257
<b>5. The ethic</b>	<b>258</b>
<b>5.1 Theory of motivation to ethical behaviour</b>	<b>258</b>
<b>5.2 Theory of value</b>	<b>258</b>
5.2.1 Biocentrism and/or ecocentrism?	259
5.2.2 “Naturalness”	259
5.2.3 Vitalism, and preservation of the “Lebensbasis” as theory of value	259
5.2.3.1 Traces of “vitalism”	259
5.2.3.2 Sustaining the ecological life foundation [“Lebensbasis”]	260
<b>5.3 The scope of the ethic</b>	<b>261</b>
5.3.1 Biosphere, ecosystem and species protection	261
5.3.2 <i>And</i> animal welfare	261
5.3.2.1 Animal experimentation, factory farming	262
5.3.3 <i>And</i> future generations	262
<b>5.4 The moral obligation: protecting the “Lebensbasis”</b>	<b>263</b>
5.4.1 Observe the precautionary principle	263
5.4.2 Re-orient the growth economy to a cyclical, dynamic economy	263
5.4.3 Protect biodiversity and its habitat	264
5.4.3.1 Oppose biotechnology	264
5.4.4 Protect animal welfare	264
5.4.5 Protect land, water and air	264
5.4.6 Provide insight into ecological principles	265
5.4.7 Extend the United Nations role in environmental protection	265
<b>6. A View of culture/society</b>	<b>265</b>
<b>6.1 “Ökologisch”</b>	<b>266</b>
6.1.1. Ecology as normative for society	266
6.1.2 The economy	267
6.1.2.1 Re-orient the one-way growth economy to an ecological cyclical economy	267
6.1.2.2 The economy’s Gross National Product must be quality of life, not consumption	267
6.1.2.3 Prioritize “investments in the future”	268
6.1.2.4 The economy must deliver social justice	269
6.1.2.5 Democratize the economy and its management	269
6.1.2.6 Introduce publicly-accountable ecological bookkeeping	269
6.1.3 Energy	269
6.1.3.1 Stabilize energy use	269
6.1.3.2 Derive energy from renewable resources	269
6.1.3.3. Halt all atomic energy projects	270
6.1.3.4 Democratize and decentralize energy provision and storage	270
6.1.3.5 Increase research into alternative energies	270
6.1.4 Agriculture	270
6.1.4.1 The primary aim must be food security, and healthy food	270
6.1.4.2 Re-orient agricultural production to ecological, not industrial, production	270



6.1.5 Transport and mobility	271
<b>6.2 “Sozial” [or living in solidarity]</b>	<b>271</b>
6.2.1 Work, employment and unemployment	272
6.2.1.1 Work is for Self-realization, not only payment	272
6.2.1.2 Work must be a right	272
6.2.1.3 There must be protection against unemployment in the system	272
6.2.1.4 Democratize the economy, and its management	273
6.2.1.5 The use of technology must be democratically decided, and add to, not detract from the meaningfulness of work	273
6.2.2 Education	274
6.2.2.1 Education must be holistic, that is, involve the whole person	274
6.2.2.2 Education must produce people reflecting Die Grünen’s core values	274
6.2.3 Human habitat	275
Spatial planning must be “humanised”	275
6.2.4 Health	275
6.2.5 Third World issues	276
6.2.5.1 The population issue	277
6.2.6 Womens’ issues	277
6.2.6.1 Barriers to women’s equal legal rights, social roles, and work rights must be removed	277
6.2.6.2 Women must have control over their own fertility	277
<b>6.3 “Basisdemokratisch” [“grassroots” or direct democracy]</b>	<b>278</b>
6.3.1 “Dare to form communes”: the new “utopian” society	278
6.3.2 Extend people’s political space; democratize bureaucracy	279
6.3.3 Protect fundamental human rights	279
6.3.4 No discrimination against marginalized groups	280
6.3.5 Democratize public information, protect private data	280
<b>6. 4 “Gewaltfrei” [non-violence]</b>	<b>281</b>
6.4.1 The aim: radical, and global, eco-pacifism	281
6.4.1.1 Peace and ecology are indivisible	282
6.4.1.2 Peace and base democracy are indivisible	282
6.4.2 There should be no violence between peoples and nations	282
6.4.2.1 There should be radical disarmament	282
6.4.2.2 Social defence is the alternative to armed defence	282
6.4.2.3 Self-reliant, diverse bio-regionalism instead of one-dimensional technological-materialistic industrialism	283
6.4.3 A non-violent society can only be achieved through non-violent means	283
6.4.3.1 No physical violence	283
6.4.3.2 No hate behaviour	284
6.4.4 There should be no violence at institutional level	284
6.4.5 Dissent may be expressed through non-violent resistance, including civil disobedience	285
6.4.5.1 Green criteria for acceptable non violent resistance	285
<b>7. Praxis</b>	<b>285</b>
<b>8. Critique of, and by, other sample members</b>	<b>286</b>
<b>8.1 Their own corruption by power</b>	<b>286</b>
<b>8.2 Their “selling out” to the “system”</b>	<b>287</b>
<b>9. Summary.</b>	<b>287</b>

## 1. Introduction

“While trying to explain to journalists what green politics was all about in a crisp, quotable phrase, Petra [Kelly] reached hopefully for the words ‘feminism, ecology and non-violence’ ...” (Parkin, 1994, p. 116)

This chapter represents one possible “real world” combination of all three levels of Wissenburg’s heuristic, (Chapter One, Figure 2) - metaphysics/ethics, political philosophy and theory, and “real world” politics. It is the thought of the new social movements in West Germany around the end of the 1970s/early 1980s, as they moved from extra-parliamentary or “street” politics, to an “anti-party” party<sup>1</sup>, and then to an alternative “green” parliamentary opposition, tempered rather rapidly by “Realpolitik”. In this introduction, I note (1.1) the scope of the chapter, (1.2) sources used, and (1.3) some ideas which informed “Die Grünen” at the time of their establishment as national political party. In (1.4) I introduce their “ecological politics”, and its “Fundit” and “Realo” versions. In (1.5), I set out this chapter’s objective.

### 1.1 Scope of this chapter

This chapter is not a discussion of the green movement generally, or of the incipient ecologism of the time, or of its formalized green political theory<sup>2</sup>. It is limited to the green movement in West Germany, specifically to its expression in Die Grünen, who understood themselves as part of the green movement<sup>3</sup>, and primarily to the years from 1979 to 1985, because in this period, I believe, one can see green movement green at its street greenest<sup>4</sup>.

### 1.2 Sources

For the chapter, I use (a) Die Grünen’s party-political statements<sup>5</sup> of the time, (b) writings of some Greens actually involved at the time: philosopher Manon Maren-Grisebach<sup>6</sup>, political philosopher and ideologist Rudolf Bahro<sup>7</sup>, activist Petra Kelly<sup>8</sup>, and (c) deep ecologist Fritjof Capra and ecofeminist

---

<sup>1</sup> More on this idea at 8.1

<sup>2</sup> At the time of Die Grünen’s emergence [roughly, 1977-1979], ecologism did not exist as a formally-formulated ideology. Several detailed analyses of green political theory are now available, e.g. Dobson (2000), Dobson & Lucardie (1993), Doherty & De Geus (1996), Goodin (1992), and Matthews (1996)

<sup>3</sup> “Wir verstehen uns als Teil der grünen Bewegung in aller Welt” they said in their March 1980 Federal Programme (1980b, p. 4)

<sup>4</sup> Though some authors suggest that Die Grünen are an a-typical, and to-be-avoided example of street green politics transformed into electoral politics (Bramwell, 1994; Ferris, 1993), others consider Die Grünen’s 1983 Bundestag political platform (1983a) as “foundational”, “seminal”, even “canonical” for the green movement/green political position worldwide (Eckersley, 1996, in Doherty & de Geus, footnote 1, p. 234; Goodin, 1992, p. 184)

<sup>5</sup> Most of these are available from either Die Grünen’s website ([www.gruene.de](http://www.gruene.de)), or from the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis in Germany (<http://www.boell.de>)

<sup>6</sup> Dr Manon Maren-Grisebach, a philosophy professor, was one of Die Grünen’s chairpersons from 1981 to 1983. In 1982 she published *Philosophie der Grünen*, a book seeking primarily to make clearer the fundamentals of the worldview on which their political proposals were based (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 7)

<sup>7</sup> Rudolf Bahro, [“the epitome of Green fundamentalism” (Sandford, 1986, p. 8)], was the early Greens’ leading ideologist (Bramwell, 1994, p. 102; Goodin, 1992, p. 89, footnote 10; Sandford, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 7-10). He was well-schooled in Marx’s historical materialism (Bahro, 1984e, pp. 218-220), and in Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin’s versions of socialism, but was a critic of Marx (Bahro, 1984e, p. 219), and of “realexistierender Sozialismus” [“actually existing socialism”, a term coined to justify the difference between what Marx and Lenin had said, and what actually developed in the Soviet-dominated eastern socialist bloc (Bahro, 1984e, p. 47)]. He was deeply and negatively influenced by the 1968 Czechoslovakian “Prague Spring” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 49, p. 62). It convinced him that “progressive tendencies” in the East and West were basically the same, an idea he continued to hold during the formative years of Die Grünen (Bahro, 1984e, p. 56). In 1977 he published *The alternative in Eastern Europe*, a direct critique of “actually existing socialism” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 107), following which he was imprisoned in East Germany. He was permitted to leave East for West Germany under a general amnesty in October 1979 (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 26). Soon afterwards, Bahro joined Die Grünen (Bahro, 1984e; Sandford, 1986a), and became a member of their national executive committee (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. vii; Sandford, 1986a, p. 7). Bahro considered himself a utopian socialist, with a “populist orientation” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 220, p. 235). Other influences were, inter alia, Thoreau, Martin Luther King’s non-violent resistance (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xx), Thomas Münzer’s populist views on liberation (Bahro, 1984e, p. 220), and Gramsci’s ideas on cultural hegemony (Bahro, 1983e, pp. 61-62, 1983e, pp. 74-75; 1984e, pp. 59-60, pp. 220-221). According to Sandford (1986a, p. 9), Bahro was more interested in Die Grünen’s “accumulating a greater share of people’s consciousness” than he was in their acquiring formal political power. Bahro was also influenced by Norwegian resource economist Johan Galtung (Sandford, 1986b, p. 216), whose ideas were already introduced in Chapter Four:

Charlene Spretnak's (1984) recollections of interviews with West German and other European Greens during 1983 (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. viii).

### 1.3 The 1960s/1970s ideas heritage of Die Grünen

A variety of thought contributed to the genesis of Die Grünen's "ecological politics", and its "Fundist" and "Realist" versions [1.4.1]. Throughout this chapter's period, Die Grünen felt themselves in solidarity with, and a political voice for, the plethora of grassroots, and counterculture movements<sup>9</sup> from which they had emerged: "den Lebens-, Natur- und Umweltschutzverbänden, den Bürgerinitiativen, der Arbeiterbewegung, christlichen Initiativen, der Friedens- und Menschenrechts-, der Frauen- und 3.-Welt-Bewegung"<sup>10</sup>, (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4; also Bahro, 1983a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 42, Bahro, 1983d, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 51-54).

In 1983, Capra and Spretnak describe four, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory ideological groups<sup>11</sup> amongst Die Grünen: (1) the visionary/holistic greens, or the "moral" or "ideological Greens" concerned with the bringing about a new non-violent, non-exploitative society based on "the connectedness of things" (2) the Eco-Greens or "green Greens" who focused on protecting the natural environment and who included values-based conservatives as well as liberal ecological reformists (3) the peace movement Greens, many of whom joined the Greens from the anti-nuclear missile and peace movement; and (4) the radical-left, or Marxist oriented, or socialist, or "red" Greens (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 4-5, p. 23).

---

#### 6.3.3.1

<sup>8</sup> Kelly was born of German parents in Bavaria in November 1947. She moved with her family to the USA in 1960, where she completed her education with a BA degree *cum laude* (World Politics and International Relations) at the American University's School of International Service in Washington in 1970. Already as university student, Petra organized, took part in, and assimilated the ideas and political strategies of the anti-nuclear movement, the anti-Vietnam protest movement, and the civil rights movement. She returned to Europe in 1970, to complete her education. From 1973, Kelly worked in the European Economic Commission's Secretariat of the Economic and Social Committee, on social questions, health and education, and the environment. She was also active in the international and European women's, peace, anti-nuclear, and ecology movements. Between 1972-1979 she lectured in Japan and Australia on anti-nuclear and feminist issues, was involved in peace and social defence issues, and also a member of the Soziale Partei Deutschland [SPD]. In 1979, she became an executive member of the Bundesverband der Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz [BBU], and resigned from the SPD (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 8) to become one of Die Grünen's European parliamentary candidates. Kelly became one of Die Grünen's chairpersons in 1980, and was a speaker of the Green Parliamentary Group between March 1983 and March 1984 (Bramwell, 1994, pp. 101-102). "Kelly brought charismatic politics over from her American experience...The German Greens formed themselves in her mould, more than in that of any other activist..." (Bramwell, 1994, p. 110). But she was also a controversial figure in Die Grünen, both admired and resented [see for example, Capra & Spretnak's observations of Kelly, whom they met during their lecture/interview tours in 1982 and 1983, and her visit to the USA in 1983, of the ambivalence towards her amongst Die Grünen, and of her frustration with them (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 7-10). Other assessments of Kelly's contribution to "seeing green" and to Die Grünen, are Bramwell (1989, p. 222, p. 272 footnote 21, and 1994, pp.108-111), and former UK Green Sara Parkin (1994)

<sup>9</sup> As examples, Die Grünen list the freedom and human rights movements (1979, p. 11, p. 16), the international green movement (1980b, p. 4), the peace movement (Kelly, 1984, p. 38, p. 47, p.50, p. 57, p.59), the ecology movement (Kelly, 1984, p. 69), and the civil rights movement in Eastern European states (Kelly, 1984, p. 56). Bramwell (1989, 1994) highlights the fusion of nineteenth century German holism and vitalism with twentieth century resource economics. Ferris (1993, p. 149) argues that "Green politics have been shaped by (but are not synonymous with) three distinct social movements: those of feminism, ecology and peace". Capra and Spretnak identify the formative influences as (1) the environmental protection groups and the ecological movement (2) the anti-nuclear campaigners and peace movement (3) the alternative movement, and (4) the remains of the Marxist-inspired university student rebellion, i.e., the K-groups of either dogmatic or nondogmatic Marxist orientation (1984, p. 13)

<sup>10</sup> "the life, nature, and environmental protection associations, the workers' movement, Christian initiatives, the women's and Third World movements..."

<sup>11</sup> Bramwell (1989, p. 223) describes the early Greens as a coalition containing "the Red-Greens, the Green-Reds, the eco-libertarian wing represented by Hasenclaver, the eco-socialists like Schily, fundamentalists, realists and Buddhist revivalists"

## 1.4 “Ecological politics”

“ ... We represent a total concept...Our policies are guided by long-term visions for the future and are founded on four basic principles: ecology, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, and nonviolence”<sup>12</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p.4; translation from Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 30)

Die Grünen themselves described their ideas as “ecological politics”, a “total concept”, guided by a long-term perspective, and based on four interrelated fundamental principles [“pillars<sup>13</sup>”] - ecology as normative, living in solidarity, direct democracy, and non-violence. The ethic of ecological politics is “Partnerschaft”, the essence of which is recognition of mutual interdependence: “...Partnerschaft, die die wechselseitige Abhängigkeit anerkennt...” (Die Grünen, 1983a, p. 6).

While the key premises of each of the four fundamental principles or values are discussed separately in more detail at sections 6.1 to 6.4, they are all inter-related. In their documents, Die Grünen present views on the economy in terms of the values of ecology, solidarity and direct democracy (1983a, p. 6); views on living in solidarity [“sozial”] together with views on the need to live in harmony with nature [“ökologisch”], and the need for direct democracy; direct democracy is linked to ecological limits, as is non-violence; non-violence is seen as fundamental to an ecological society. The theme of “Partnerschaft” is pervasive.

### 1.4.1 The “Fundis” and “Realo” versions of ecological politics

The ideological *Fundi-Realo* split, which was incipient in Die Grünen’s birth really, occurred in 1985. Ideological traces of both are found in the political statements from 1980-1983.

In the context of this chapter, “Fundis” and “Realo” can be regarded as “more radical” and “less radical” ideas about society and economy. Fundamentalist Bahro saw the difference between Fundis and Realo as “fundamental opposition” to the industrial system on the one hand, and on the other, a reformist eco-socialism within the industrial system<sup>14</sup>. What Greens like Bahro wanted, was, “... a total alternative to the capitalist as well as the (pseudo-) communist industrial system...” (Bahro, 1983d, in Bahro, 1986, p. 55). By contrast, Realos argued that “Abbau und Umbau” [dismantling and re-building] of the industrial system was the better route. This is for example, the predominant view in Die Grünen’s (1983a) “Sinnvoll arbeiten – solidarisch leben ” programme against unemployment and decline in social welfare.

The ideological difference between Fundis and Realos also had to do with the chance to share in parliamentary power (Bahro, 1983e, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 60-85). Already in November 1982, delegates at the Hagen national congress had agreed to eight conditions on which they would “tolerate” an alliance with an SPD government, should that party win at the March 1983 elections (Sandford, 1986b, p. 213, note 2 to “Basic positions of the Greens”). By 1984, the party was, in Bahro’s view, more eco-socialist than green; the green reformist train to eco-industrialization had already departed (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 161, pp. 163-164). He was horrified when Die Grünen’s parliamentary group put forward proposals for *reducing* the military budget, rather than rejecting it outright (Bahro, 1984c,

<sup>12</sup> “Gegenüber der eindimensionalen Produktionssteigerungspolitik vertreten wir ein Gesamtkonzept. Unsere Politik wird von langfristigen Zukunftsaspekten geleitet und orientiert sich an vier Grundsätzen; sie ist ökologisch, sozial, basisdemokratisch und gewaltfrei” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4)

<sup>13</sup> The four pillars are present in the 1979 Europaprogramm, an indication that they were perhaps already decided on during the preparatory Frankfurt meeting, the minutes of which have not been preserved (pers.communication, Anne Vechtel, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, 15 October 2005). All principles except “gewaltfrei” were part of the draft Constitution presented for approval during the January 1980 Karlsruhe meeting. At Roland Vogt’s request, “gewaltfrei” was added (minutes of Karlsruhe meeting January 1980, p. 4 (Die Grünen (1980d))

<sup>14</sup> The reformist trend seems to have been led by Greens such as Joschka Fischer, Otto Schily, and Joseph Huber, the latter a “social-democratic writer and champion of an ‘ecological modernization’ to be led forward by industry and science” (Sandford, 1986b, p. 216, note 2 to “The Third World and us”)

in Bahro 1986, p. 160), as one would have expected from a party born, inter alia, of the peace movement. He was unconvinced that any new society could emerge from parliamentary politics; he saw any participation in red-green government as a betrayal of what the new social movements and the early Die Grünen (in his view) stood for (Bahro, 1983d, in Bahro, 1986, p. 54; Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 167). “The fundamentalists will either give the whole party a new basic direction – out of and not into the system .... or they will go off in their own basic direction. That will be above all a new unification with the movement....” (Bahro, 1984d, in Bahro, 1986, p. 177).

## 1.5 The objective of this chapter

Almost every political statement made by Die Grünen in the years 1979-1983, on almost any topic, could be construed as a seminal “green” real-world politics position. Their programme content, even if restricted to that period, is extensive, and could not be reproduced here. Capra and Spretnak (1984, pp. 29-142) discuss it broadly under seven key principles: ecology as normative, social responsibility, grassroots democracy, non-violence, decentralization, post-patriarchal perspectives, and spirituality. Goodin’s (1993, pp. 181-203) work includes a synthesized, generic, green political programme covering themes such as ecology, technology, social relations, and foreign relations, much of which is based on Die Grünen’s (1983a) *Sinnvoll arbeiten – solidarisch leben. Sofort programm gegen Arbeitslosigkeit und Sozialabbau*<sup>15</sup>. He ties their whole political programme together with what he calls their “green theory of value”, i.e “naturalness” (Goodin, 1993, pp. 19-85, p. 56, discussed at section 5.2.2). By contrast, I tie it together with the seldom-mentioned political-philosophical concept “exterminism” (section 2.1).

In this chapter then, my objective is to place what Die Grünen say in their political statements within what I see as the greater philosophical framework within which their by no means internally consistent “total concept”, and its four fundamental values, is embedded. The “total concept” is, I think, the “forgotten context” of what are today the rather watered-down, sustainable development versions of “seeing green”. It does injustice to Die Grünen’s standpoints on issues as varied as what it is to be a human being, or technology, or the economy, if they are lifted out of their green “total concept”. To do so, and to use them as add-ons in other political contexts [“Go Green – Vote Blue”], or as sales gimmicks in the marketplace [“go green” shopping bags], is to change their meaning.

The chapter now follows the standard presentation format: (2) a discussion of Die Grünen’s legitimating narratives, including “exterminism”, as well as their perspectives on (3) epistemology (4) ontology/psychology (5) ethics (6) view of society, (7) praxis advocated, (8) critique, and (9) a summary of Die Grünen’s contribution to “seeing green”.

## 2. Legitimizing narratives

In this section I introduce (2.1) the ideology of exterminism: Emancipation from exterminism is the framework within which Die Grünen’s critique of patriarchy, hierarchy, industrialism, and militarism makes sense. It provides the context for (2.2) their rhetoric, (2.3) their four pillars, which in combination, I understand as a counter-ideology to “exterminism”, and their (2.4) key premise on the cause of, and solution to, the environmental crisis.

### 2.1 The concept “Exterminism”

Bahro gave much thought to the articulation of exterminism (e.g. Bahro, 1983j, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 142-158; Bahro, 1984b, p. 137, p. 142; Bahro, 1984e, p. 204). He defined it as “the tendency towards mass destruction of all life”, and linked within it, “the industrial system, the dynamic of capital, the

---

<sup>15</sup> *Work meaningfully – live in solidarity. An immediate programme against unemployment and social welfare decline*

European cosmology, patriarchy, i.e. the whole mental drive of the spiral of death” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 27). The concept “exterminism” [the logic of self-destruction] does not appear directly as a word in Die Grünen’s political statements of the period, but indirectly, in phrases such as the “Dynamik der Selbstvernichtung” (Die Grünen, 1981, p. 4). It is present in the thought of Greens of the time though, as in Kelly’s comment “The ultimate result of unchecked, *terminal* patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe or nuclear holocaust” (Kelly, 1997, in McLaughlin, 2003, p. 168, my italics), and also in that of Porritt, and Vogt (section 4.1 of this chapter).

On Bahro’s view, exterminism manifests itself in “surface phenomena”, such as -

(1) militarism, i.e., the arms race and the tendency to nuclear war, (2) patriarchy, (3) the destruction of nature and culture by aggressive capitalist industrialism, and (4) the “daily exterminism” of mass starvation lived by the millions in the Third World, both as a result of capitalist industrialism’s relentless pursuit of raw materials, cheap labour, and new markets, and at the hands of their own ruling elites. Underlying and tying together these surface phenomena of exterminism is Bahro’s critique of pathological Western individualism (Bahro, 1984e, pp. 214-217).

I discuss next, the critique of (2.1.1) militarism, (2.1.2) patriarchy, hierarchy, and bureaucracy, and (2.1.3) industrialism. Bahro’s view of the human being is included in section 4.3. Throughout this discussion, I shall illustrate how Bahro’s political-philosophical critique of “exterminism” leaves real-world, empirical traces in Die Grünen’s political statements.

### 2.1.1 The critique of militarism

Here Bahro drew on the work of British historian EP Thompson, who shared Bahro’s thorough grounding in Marx’s historical materialism. Thompson was the European peace movement’s leading theorist. He demanded a “socialist humanism” as “a third way between the oppositional but mirrored ideologies of the Soviet and Natopolitan systems” (Soper, 1994), and also called on peace and human rights activists to pool their efforts “in a movement that would remove the weapons ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’ and take Europe ‘beyond the blocs<sup>16</sup>’” (Soper, 1994). An influential publication which he co-authored was the 1980 *Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament*, a key document for the European Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which called inter alia for a nuclear-free Europe from Poland to Portugal<sup>17</sup>. He was also articulator of the concept of exterminist nuclearism. In the 1980s, he identified this as an ideology held by military, government and corporate bureaucracies in both the United States of America and the [then] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which had acquired a life of its own beyond the control of ordinary people, was prepared to take world’s peoples to the brink of nuclear extermination, and was exploiting people’s fears in order to curb basic democratic rights (Bahro, 1984e, p. 204; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 68, p. 58).

Bahro criticized militarism driven by the aggressive industrial worldview of competition, economic growth, and advanced technology (Bahro, 1984e, p. 134, p. 138), which manifested itself in the arms race, the willingness to consider a “limited” nuclear war, and the political consensus in the 1970s/1980s for a “Rapid Deployment Force” to guarantee, through military means, an uninterrupted supply of natural resources for the industrial economy (Bahro, 1984e, p. 138, p. 141)]. Traces of Thompson’s and Bahro’s theorizing appear in Die Grünen’s political statements as, for example,

“The established parties conduct themselves as though on this limited planet Earth, unlimited increase in industrial production is possible. Through that, they are leading us into a dead-end decision between an atomic state, or an atomic war...” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4, par. 2)

“Instead of international easing of tensions and prospects for world peace, the struggle for areas containing

<sup>16</sup> A reference to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and Warsaw Pact blocs in Europe

<sup>17</sup> A direct link from Thompson’s work to the thought of Die Grünen can be seen in this sentence from their 1983 election manifesto: “Unser Ziel ist ein atomwaffenfreies Europa von Polen bis Portugal” (1983b, p. 5)

raw materials, and for new markets is sharpening. If the raw materials continue to be wasted as they are now, the danger will increase that limited raw materials are distributed through wars ... We completely reject considering any military measures designed to “protect” the provision of energy and raw materials, or access to markets ...” (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 3, and p. 6).

Kelly blamed patriarchy for militarism. Patriarchal values were to blame for the oppression of human beings by human beings, and of the earth by human beings. She described the nuclear arms race and nuclear technology as behavioural products of masculine values and thought (Kelly, 1984, p. 38). “The arms race, I believe, is insane, but an inevitable outcome of science in a world where men wage war against feminine values, women and nature. If we trace the myths and metaphors associated with the conquest of nature, we must conclude that humanity’s long term future depends on a radical re-evaluation of masculine institutions and ideologies” (From Kelly’s E.F. Schumacher Memorial Lecture, undated, in Kelly, 1984, p. 39). Nuclear technology was for Kelly “the epitome of violence”, in its death threat to people and nature, and in its withdrawal of money and expertise from such life-affirming activities as poverty alleviation (Parkin, 1994, p. 106).

All four values [ecology as normative, living in solidarity, direct democracy, and non-violence] can be understood as response to militarism, but perhaps “Gewaltfrei” [section 6.4], expressed as radical “Ecopax”, is the lead response.

### 2.1.2 The critique of patriarchy, hierarchy and bureaucracy

Die Grünen’s critique of patriarchy, hierarchy, and bureaucracy in social institutions and practices, is reflected in the political statements in terms such as “Herrschaftsverhältnisse”, “Hierarchiedenken” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 5, par. 2), “Obrigkeitsstaat” (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 11), “Polizei- und Überwachungsstaat” [this latter particularly i.c.w. nuclear energy (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 6)], “anonyme Apparate” (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 4), and “überhandnehmende Bürokratie”:

We reject the bureaucracy which is taking over our lives, and rendering the citizen helpless; we reject the increasing autocracy of the economic and state apparatus, and their increasing misuse of power.<sup>18</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 3).

I understand this particular critique to be largely inherited from the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School/New Left/countercultural critique of instrumental reason and demand for self-management already encountered in Chapter Five: Social Ecology.

Like Bookchin [their shared historical materialist background?], Bahro understood the emergence of patriarchy as the result of one of the earliest social conflicts, along with the generation conflict. He therefore believed, like Bookchin, that the feminist movement, in its critique of patriarchy, had a particularly liberatory role to play - humanity’s exterminist tendency could be overcome by rejecting patriarchal-type civilization.

Other than their countercultural heritage, Die Grünen also derived guidelines against hierarchy from ecology. During their 1983 visit, Capra and Spretnak asked Maren-Grisebach “about the political implications of multileveled order in nature, an order of systems within systems, integrating nonorganic materials as well into living systems”. She replied: “Integrated doesn’t mean primary or secondary. *Green politics must expose the tendencies to set up hierarchies...* [In arguments I try to intervene and say] ‘Why don’t you let yourselves be guided by the meaning of ecology, that everything is interwoven, that there is no such thing as a first or a second?’” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 32-33, my italics).

<sup>18</sup> “Wir wenden uns gegen die überhandnehmende Bürokratie, der die Bürger hilflos ausgeliefert sind, gegen die zunehmende Willkür und den zunehmenden Machtmissbrauch der wirtschaftlichen und staatlichen apparate” (1980c, p. 3)

As countervalues to patriarchy, hierarchy, and bureaucracy, Die Grünen proposed not only “Gewaltfrei” [no structural violence, no war, section 6.4] but also “Basisdemokratisch” [direct democracy, section 6.3]. Anti-hierarchical/bureaucratic values such as “Dezentralisierung”, “Überschaubarkeit”, “Selbstbestimmungsrecht”, and “Selbstverwaltung”, are advocated:

... wir [setzten] uns für direkte Demokratie ... [ein]. Dadurch werden Entscheidungen über öffentliche angelegenheiten am wirksamsten überschaubar. Diese form der Demokratie lässt sich auf dezentraler Ebene verwirklichen... (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 3).

### 2.1.3 The critique of existing society’s “industrialism”

Dobson (2000, p. 180) suggests that Greens believe that “industrialism<sup>19</sup>” is a “super-ideology” subsuming both capitalist and socialist modes of production, and leading to a dead-end in civilization.

Die Grünen were opposed to it:

Our politics ... opposes the exploitation of humanity and nature within the capitalist competitive economy and in the existing central planned economies ... The Greens want ... neither the growth, industrial, or social politics of capitalism or of any actually existing socialism ... (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 2; and annexure (p. 15))

The industrial system of European civilization, in which the human being is understood as exploiter and dominator of other human beings, and in which nature is experienced as an enemy has increasingly led society into a cul-de-sac... The exploitative relationship amongst human beings and towards nature has led humanity to the brink of extinction. (Die Grünen, 1981, pp. 1-2).

Their ideological critique of industrialism follows several lines: (2.1.3.1) of the capitalist system itself, and (2.1.3.2) of the impossibility of its extension to all peoples, based on ecological and social limits. An alternative concept of development is therefore needed (2.1.3.3). Capitalism’s human-exploitative work process (2.1.3.4), and its over-valuing of materialism (2.1.3.5) is also critiqued. There were however, agreements and differences amongst Die Grünen, on the role of industrial capitalism in the new alternative society (2.1.3.6).

#### 2.1.3.1 Advanced capitalism is aggressive, destructive, and unecological

Bahro described industrial capitalism as simultaneously the most aggressive, the most successful, the most destructive, and the most life-threatening form of production ever invented by human beings. “The merciless struggle to remove competitors – first between private individuals, then between firms, and finally between multinational and state corporations – has proved to be the mightiest economic impetus of all times. The East and the South are only emulating it; often with even worse direct consequences for the people affected.” (Bahro 1982a, in Bahro 1986, p. 11).

He pointed out the overlooked misfit between the humanist ideology of “progress”, endless growth, and ecological realities:

Marx took it for granted that inevitable development was to be equated with inevitable progress – but this is far from proven. If we look at biological evolution, we see that the development of a species is not a linear upward movement: a species can die, the evolutionary process can take a wrong turning. Every historical biologist will tell you that one has to fear for the survival of a successful species or genus that

---

<sup>19</sup> Sounding quite familiar from Die Grünen’s arguments here, green environmental philosopher Keekok Lee provides in 1993 (Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, pp. xii-xiii, 105-117) a radical ecological and social critique of industrialism. On her view, the idea of industrialism comprises (a) industrial modes of production, requiring at least two kinds of mass production to increase the productivity and efficiency needed to propel growth (i) the division of labour, and (ii) the use of machines produced by science and technology (b) constant pursuit of productivity and efficiency means more concentration of expertise in the hands of fewer people, deskilling of jobs, increasing replacement of people by machines (c) high universal consumption, practically guaranteed by inbuilt obsolescence (d) indefinite exponential economic growth. Her critique includes industrialism’s degradation of nature, its abuse of animals, its structural [inbuilt] unemployment, the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the few, its supply-led production which ignores non-profitable needs and stimulates profitable wants; its impossibility of global extension, because of its resource-use and waste-production intensity

disturbs the balance of the other species among which it lives. There is no biological analogy to the power and success of *Homo sapiens*. Marx never asked whether the earth might have finite limits, because in his time there were no limits in sight. But when we look at the rising world population, and cannot find a square inch of land that has not been dug up and cultivated or built on, it is clear that our material consumption and our squandering of energy and other resources cannot go on in the same way. (Bahro, 1984e, p. 143)

Production must take place within the biological equilibrium (Bahro, 1983i, in Bahro, 1986, p. 117). Die Grünen's "dynamische Gleichgewichtswirtschaft" ("Dynamically balanced economy", 1979, p. 2, par.2) reflects this biological principle: "Ausgehend von den Naturgesetzen und insbesondere von der Erkenntnis, dass in einem begrenzten System kein Unbegrenztes Wachstum möglich ist, heisst ökologische Politik ...."<sup>20</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4, my italics).

### 2.1.3.2 *Advanced industrial capitalism for everyone is impossible, and dangerous*

According to "the principles of social justice everyone should have what we ourselves have ..." (Bahro, 1982b, in Bahro, 1986, p. 23). But on his view, because the earth's resources are finite, it is "impossible to think in terms of an expanding industrial system for everyone" (Bahro, 1984e, p. 145). There "simply aren't enough resources" (Bahro, 1984e, p. 111) to reproduce "the present standard of living in the developed countries for the whole of the present population of the world"<sup>21</sup> (Bahro, 1984e, p. 147). That would mean "total natural catastrophe" (Bahro, 1982b, in Bahro, 1986 p. 23). Not only that, but the industrial economies' "excessive use" of non-renewable natural resources was also "at the expense of generations to come." (Bahro, 1984e, p. 144). But the crisis is not just one of limited natural resources, it is also a social one.

#### 2.1.3.2.1 *The centre-periphery argument*

He based this point of view on a centre-periphery argument (Bahro, 1984e, p. 208), familiar from ecofeminist Plumwood (Chapter Six, section 4.2.1, and 5.1). European capitalist-industrialism [the centre, the metropolis] had only been able to maintain its aggressive, expansionist thrust in support of economic growth "through exploitation of the periphery", through "Raubwirtschaft"<sup>22</sup> in peripheral countries. This took the form of underpaying them for their natural resources, or pressurising them through technological aid disguised as "development" to produce for the export market rather than for their own people's basic needs, or locating basic production there while retaining value-adding processes themselves. These moves reduced the periphery to dependence upon the centre. In Bahro's view, Third World poverty "is a consequence of capitalist industrial development" (Bahro, 1984e, p. 207). In Die Grünen's political statements:

...the interests of the exploited, the suffering, the hungry and the starving in the Third, even more so in the so-called Fourth World<sup>23</sup> of absolute poverty demand our withdrawal from the prevailing international division of labour (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 6).

But Bahro was well aware that "All experience shows that those who have less want to have the same as others, and essentially in the same form because it is the only one they can conceive" (Bahro, 1984e, p. 147). But the reality is, these developing countries do *not* have the colonial option. Their only option is for their own centres ["the metropolis"] to exploit their own periphery ["the hinterland"]. For the successful in the metropolis – the "elites" – the reward is a "Mercedes" culture; for those from the periphery, nothing but "third-class industrialization", as they move from the hinterland to a "shanty-

<sup>20</sup> "Based upon the laws of nature and above all the realization that infinite growth is not possible in a closed system...." (Die Grünen, 1985, p. 4)

<sup>21</sup> Bahro's interviewer was critical of this viewpoint, suggesting it to be "undemocratic", "harking back to the Stone Age", and condemning "poorer countries to continued poverty" (Bahro, 1984e, pp. 211-213). But Bahro remains adamant that the industrial route is inappropriate for humanity as a whole, not just for developing countries

<sup>22</sup> This concept is explained in Chapter Nine, section 3.2

<sup>23</sup> Bahro actually believed that there were only two "worlds": the expansive European capitalist-metropolitan-industrial civilization, and the non-capitalist other (Bahro, 1984e, pp. 203-204)

town on the edge of the city”, and then in the next generation, buying “a run-down car, trying to reproduce what exists in the metropolis” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 211-212). Western-type industrialism in the Third World/developing countries would mean “poverty for whole generations and hunger for millions” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 184), a “tunnel without an exit, because the living standard they are aiming for is no longer achievable” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 211).

As alternative: “We can only hope that their vision of the good life<sup>24</sup> is different from that in Washington, London or Paris” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 110). Those in the highly developed countries, where “the terrible treadmill is in operation”, need to tell other peoples not to “go further along this [existing] path” of industrial progress (Bahro, 1984e, p. 112):

We Greens consider it amongst our most important international tasks to remove here at home this destructive model of “the good life”, which lures the remainder of humanity into a tunnel without an exit. (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 7).

If all countries of the world pursued the aggressive worldview of industrial capitalism in the face of dwindling resources, how could its growth ever be maintained except by increased war-mongering? (Bahro, 1982a, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 18-19). War and ecological catastrophe would be inevitable in the long run (Bahro, 1984e, pp. 138-140). In Die Grünen’s political statements:

“A continued intensification of this energy imperialism will lead to political and military conflict...” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 10).

“Only a consistent peace politics can deflect the danger of war, which has also arisen from the struggle for increasingly limited raw materials (oil, uranium)” (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 7).

### ***2.1.3.3. There must be an alternative conception of “development”***

As did deep ecologist Naess [Chapter Four, section 6.3.3.1], Bahro drew on Norwegian resource economist Johann Galtung’s work<sup>25</sup> for an alternative model of development, not only for the Third World’s but also for the First World’s salvation from war and ecological disaster (Bahro, 1983f, in Bahro, 1986, p. 90). Galtung’s concept of development (Bahro 1984a, in Bahro 1986, pp. 123-131; Bahro, 1984e) was much more than just a soft-technology based, regionally appropriate self-reliance. In his view, the concept of development comprised culture, economy, social structure, and international relations, and must be considered at four levels:

- (1) **Nature.** This relates mostly to maintaining “the complexity and maturity of nature”, maintaining ecological balance (Bahro, 1984a, in Bahro 1986, p. 123).
- (2) **The world.** Important for Galtung here was that “one country does not transform others economically into its peripheral zones and that a country does not have defence forces at its disposal which are intended for offensive use” (p. 123).
- (3) **Social.** Two aspects are important. (a) An external anti-imperial policy on the one hand, non-intervention; on the other, a specific policy of not diminishing the scope of other countries “through aggressive economic policies” (pp. 123-124). (b) Nationally, self-reliance and self-sufficiency should be the main pillars of economic policy. A developing country should *not* make its raw materials available to a developed country<sup>26</sup>. “They should do something with these themselves, either

<sup>24</sup> Bahro’s hopes appear to be wishful thinking. Former East European nations are on the way to European-style consumerism, China’s demands for energy to fuel western-style economic progress are pushing oil prices to new highs based on nervous stock market expectations of scarcity (November 2007); Namibia’s Vision 2030 demands for Namibians the material standards of the western industrial nations

<sup>25</sup> Bahro had studied it (1984e, p. 180, p. 182), and had also held discussions with Galtung (Bahro, 1984a, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 123-131; 1984e, p. 169)

<sup>26</sup> Writing on neoclassical economics and principles of sustainable development, Goodland and Ledec (1998, p. 557) also suggest that, contrary to the hypothesis that increased growth in the industrialized countries will promote economic growth in developing countries, the alternative hypothesis that “increased resource consumption in the North actually hurts development prospects in the South, merits closer attention”

independently or in collaboration with each other, that is as South-South trade, not South–North. If this is problematic for us, that is our problem. We must find a solution for it, and the best solution is in general a green economic policy at home” (p. 124).

(4) **Personal.** Fundamental needs [which are beyond the “basic needs” concept] must be met. They are partially material, and partially non-material. The latter included “the possibility of attaining a state of identity with the world and with what is otherwise called the transpersonal or God, with the meaning of life, and something that has much to do with freedom. That you have possibilities of choosing, that it is not only possible to drive or listen to the radio but that you also have the material at your disposal to enable you to make spiritual journeys” (p. 123).

Galtung (Bahro 1984a, in Bahro 1986, pp. 127-128) advocated a specific, fixed order, six-point model for alternative development which would be applicable to both industrialized and Third World countries: (1) and (2) a seizure of power by the people, and a selective severing of ties vis-a-vis one colonial power [or metropolis] at a time (3) a re-distribution of the factors of production, which would include land reform, access to education, health, credit facilities and so on, but also a re-distribution of decision-making power (4) agricultural production aimed first at food security, and then at producing the raw materials needed for your own industry (5) then industrial production, first of simple consumer goods such as things needed in the home, before moving on to the production of capital goods, i.e. the means of production. (6) Then, when the previous strategies have been implemented to some extent, production for exchange, but primarily, South-South exchange.

Bahro’s/Galtung’s views are partly reflected in Die Grünen’s policy of peace and solidarity with Third World peoples [section 6.2.5].

#### ***2.1.3.4 Industrial capitalism’s work process is exploitative and alienating***

Crudely stated, in the Marxist critique of capitalist production, the employer pays the worker the subsistence labour value of the commodity produced, and pockets the surplus value as profit. This is exploitation, further enhanced where work processes are rationalized, and led, instead of being supported, by technology (Bramwell, 1989, pp.244-246). Topics such as the intrinsic meaningfulness of work serving human creative potential, the critique of alienating technology, or of the stress of conveyor-belt methods of production, are plentiful in Die Grünen’s political statements. As one example:

Technical progress and work organization follow a growth dynamic which is alien to people, and in which the development of creative powers cannot achieve its conscious expression<sup>27</sup> (Die Grünen, 1981, p. 2, par 1).

This last aspect is highlighted in section 6.2.1.5.

#### ***2.1.3.5 Industrialism’s values of materialism and consumerism critiqued***

Available in the green movement consciousness was Schumacher’s (1974) influential critique, on both spiritual and ecological grounds, of industrialist society’s materialism<sup>28</sup>. Both capitalism and Marxism

<sup>27</sup> The German reads: “Der technische Fortschritt und die Organisation der Arbeit folgen einer Wachstumsdynamik, die dem Menschen entfremdet ist und in der die Entwicklung der Produktivkräfte nicht seiner bewussten Gestaltung unterliegt” (Die Grünen, 1981, p. 2, par 1). I understand this in the sense of Bookchin’s “what is” failing to represent “what should be” (Chapter Five)

<sup>28</sup> “In the excitement over the unfolding of his scientific and technical powers, modern man has built a system of production that ravishes nature and a type of society that mutilates man. If only there were more and more wealth, everything else, it is thought, would fall into place. Money is considered to be all-powerful... The development of production and the acquisition of wealth have thus become the highest goals of the modern world .... (p. 246). [Yet] ... An attitude to life which seeks fulfillment in the single-minded pursuit of wealth – in short, materialism – does not fit into this world, because it contains within itself no limiting principle, while the environment in which it is placed is strictly limited. Already, the environment is trying to tell us that certain stresses are becoming excessive... (p. 23). [All this] implies, above all else, the development of a life-style which accords to material things their proper, legitimate place, which is secondary and not primary.” (pp. 246-247)

“saw the achievement of human happiness as basically conditional on the expansion of material goods’ production” (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 487). Both are based on the same conception of the human-nature relationship [the transcendence of dependence] (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 489). Bahro believed that there was a powerful connection between “ideological and material processes”; that material factors shape ideologies and whole civilizations (Bahro, 1984e, p. 118). “Under the capitalist pattern we have assumed that man needs everything that capitalism offers him, needs more and ever more. The fact that the earth’s resources are limited, like the earth itself, compels us to ask what man really needs for his development as a human being.” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 112). Industrial production, argued Bahro, is no longer “... geared to human needs but has become an end in itself<sup>29</sup>.” (Bahro 1982b, in Bahro 1986, p. 24).

Die Grünen advocate non-materialism, not because poverty is a desirable end in itself, but because non-materialism is the way of return to being fully human (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 21). Their non-materialist philosophy manifests itself as “das Prinzip der Sparsamkeit” within the Party (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 21); in solidarity with the Third World expressed in supporting Third-World goods; new kinds of development politics; in “hate for environmental destruction” (p. 21); in repugnance for the ethos of maximal consumption as bringer of happiness (p. 23); in the seeking of voluntary simplicity, inner peace, and integration in their personal lifestyles (p. 23).

At real world level, something of Die Grünen’s anti-material philosophy can be seen in this excerpt from their 1979 European political programme:

The new Europe can only become a reality if Europeans’ worldview changes: Images of the good life must be ‘liberated’ from an over-valuing of standard of living and quantitative, material single-mindedness. A more decisive meaning to life is to be found in peoples’ spiritual self-realization. The so-called ‘education’ of people for economic purposes must be changed into an education which enables them to fashion their own lives (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2, par.3).

#### ***2.1.3.6 Capitalism: total break, or “reformist ecologism”?***

In their political statements, Die Grünen consistently described growth and profit-oriented industrial capitalism as economic system and culture in negative terms: “Industriewachstumsgesellschaft” (1980c, p. 4); “quantitative Wachstum” (1980c, p. 3); “profitorientierte Wirtschaftsziele” (1980c, p. 3). They agreed on the source of the problem:

What we have here, is a single world system of unlimited power struggle, social injustice and destruction of nature (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 7),

and agreed on what they wanted to do:

We Greens want to put an end to this life-threatening growth ... As consumers, producers and taxpayers we want to make a difference now already, that foodstuffs are not poisoned, that Nature’s exploitation is reduced, that work is constituted in a less alienating way, and produces civic-minded and useful goods... (Die Grünen, 1981, p. 2, par. 2)

But there were differing interpretations of the role of capitalism in the new society. To deal with the ecological, social and economic crisis, Bahro argued that a cultural revolution (Bahro, 1984e, p. 112) was needed - the development of a world-wide alternative to the capitalist version of civilization (Bahro, 1984e, p. 113). He was adamant that “reformism” was not the road to the new society: “ ... the main criticism of reformism is that it wants to repair a system that we must leave behind us altogether. ... ‘Radicals against reformist ecologism!’ ” (Bahro 1982b, in Bahro 1986, p. 23, and p. 28). But here he parted company with many of Die Grünen. He was completely opposed to what he called a “policy

<sup>29</sup> Bahro, for example, comments that “More important than the quality or quantity of consumer goods, in my view, is the need for a new consumption pattern geared to the *qualitative* development of the individual, so that the length of young people’s education, for example, becomes a higher priority than the addition of one more piece of clothing to my wardrobe” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 103)

of ecological repair to the German [economic] model” (Bahro 1983e, in Bahro, 1986, p. 65) and “reformist tinkering that changes nothing essential whatsoever” (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 161). Die Grünen’s cyclical economy [section 6.1.2] could not be achieved, he argued, by “introducing a bit of ecological reason ...” (Bahro, 1982b, in Bahro, 1986 p. 25). Recycling, any expanded large-scale production for environmental protection (Bahro, 1982a, in Bahro, 1986, p.12), catalytic converters for cars, filters in factory chimneys<sup>30</sup>, for example, “are all primarily reformist ideas” (Bahro, 1982b, in Bahro, 1986, p. 25). They also sent out the wrong signals:

If we build a new eco-storey onto our metropolitan industrial system here ... we leave the whole of the rest of the world, degraded to the periphery, with the solid recommendation to first catch up with our auto-culture, the “good life” of Washington, London, Paris and Frankfurt” (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 162).

What we need, he said, is “a fresh start in the development of the [human] species” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 149), a new society “which no longer makes itself dependent on the production machine” (Bahro, 1982b, in Bahro, 1986, p. 25), in which the emphasis has changed from satisfying consumerist wants, to satisfying basic human needs, from pathological individualism to self-realization, in harmony with others and with the ecology. “In the face of the total catastrophe which is emerging from the womb of Western civilization to fall upon the whole of humanity, and which is inevitable if we don’t get at its roots, we cannot afford any more reformist half-measures. ... The only work which will stop the apocalypse is to cleanse and assemble the psychological forces for an Ecopax formation of culture” (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 176). In his commune-based new cultural order [section 6.3.1], he anticipated that “...as many people as possible ... [would] have a real option of dropping out and switching over to a different context of life, beyond wage-labour and the market” (Bahro, 1983c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 50).

But the reformist Greens believed that the capitalism as economy and culture *could* be re-oriented, and reformed. They favoured the “investments in the future” proposed in Die Grünen’s views of the new ecological cyclical economy [section 6.1.2], which Bahro rejected<sup>31</sup> as simply propping up the industrialist system through job creation and capital investment in eco-friendly industry and technology.

## 2.2 Rhetoric, metaphors

Die Grünen’s rhetoric and metaphors can be explained in terms of the concept of exterminism: (2.1.1) Life and survival [Leben und Überleben], (2.1.2) the machine metaphor, and (2.1.3) the rhetoric of emancipation, salvation, and hope.

### 2.2.1 “Life” and “survival”

One is struck by the recurrence of the themes of crisis, the threat to all life, and *survival* in the key source documents:

“...Europe is today threatened by an ecological and economic crisis, by a military catastrophe, and by a continual erosion of democracy and fundamental rights” (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2)

“ ... our central issue is survival ...” (Vogt, speaking to Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 68)

“The environment, peace, society and the economy now pose such a threat to survival that they can only be resolved by structural change...” (Kelly, 1984, p. 18)

<sup>30</sup> “It is quite right to want to install filters in factory chimneys. The direction this leads in, however, is away from the cultural revolution” (Bahro, 1983h, in Bahro, 1986, p. 109)

<sup>31</sup> Bahro considered the “investments in the future” [section 6.1.2] which were part of Die Grünen’s 1983 economic programme, “notorious” (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 161-162)

“The continued existence of life on our planet Earth can only be ensured through a survival society of all individuals and peoples” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 16, 1. Weltpolitik)

Much of this rhetoric of threat and holocaust must of course be understood within the historical context of the cold war standoff between East and West, the stationing of nuclear weapons on West German soil, nuclear weapon proliferation on both sides, and particularly, the readiness of both sides to use them. But their ideological context is exterminism. I suggest that the “seeing green” theme of the valuing of all life, is not exhausted by the environmental ethical biocentrism or ecocentrism usually suggested, for example, in Wissenburg’s heuristic in Chapter One. The concept “vitalism” [section 4.1] perhaps captures its essence more.

### 2.2.2 Machine metaphor

The machine metaphor [“Megamachine”, “Big Machine”, “Modern Megamachine” (Bahro, 1983j, in Bahro, 1986, p. 152)] appears in green movement rhetoric, to represent the industrial-technical system - for example in this excerpt from Bahro’s writings: “Whilst the independent, alienated Megamachine is preparing to collide against the bounds of the Earth, pressing us – its original creators – up against the wall and crushing us... .” (Bahro, 1982a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 11). Or, “Our parliamentary practice ...must concentrate on preventing any steps which continue in the same dangerous direction [i.e of expanding industrialism]. This means in particular all investments in the expansion of the Big Machine, i.e. any military installations, any installations of the nuclear industry, any projects to extend the heavy transport infrastructure (airports, motorways, trunk roads, canals, river straightening, ports), all large industrial projects, as well as all large projects in the school and university system, in the health service, and in public administration, the police, computerized control of society, etc.” must be stopped (Bahro, 1982a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 17). The metaphor as image appeared in a poster in Die Grünen’s offices<sup>32</sup>, and in their 1983 economic manifesto: under the caption “Technik-Opfer” is a picture of Charlie Chaplin caught up in the cogs of a machine. The accompanying text contains no reference to the picture. Clearly, the message of the machine metaphor was self-evident.

### 2.2.3 Emancipation, salvation, hope

This rhetoric is to be understood I think in the context of ordinary people’s experience of “exterminism”.

First existential fear, the realization by ordinary people that politicians in the East and West were busy with, and prepared to implement, plans for Mutually Assured Destruction (Kelly, 1984, p. 12). Together with fear [“Fear drives us...” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 15, pp. 17-19)], there were also amongst people, feelings of meaninglessness, apathy and pessimism, manifesting themselves in a lack of “Lernlust”, “Arbeitslust”, and “Lebenslust”, a “tiredness of the soul” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, pp. 11-12), and a laming sense of powerlessness [“Ohnmacht”]. This was ascribed to the terrifying militarism, in tandem with a bureaucratic state’s undermining of base democratic rights:

The politics of the established parties has, with its breaking down of democratic rights, ... elicited a milieu of adaptation and resignation... The results are a further and unchecked hollowing out of democracy, as well as powerlessness and fear amongst citizens... (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 9).

In that context, life itself, and the Earth, was experienced as both precious and vulnerable. “Standing up for life” is a green value (Kelly, undated, in Kelly, 1984, p. 11); green “is the colour of life, a future, and hope” (Die Grünen, 1979, page 3, paragraph 6).

The pervasive numbness which the unimaginably destructive power of [these] weapons has created, is

---

<sup>32</sup> A Thoreau poster hung on the walls of Die Grünen’s national headquarters in Bonn (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 43-44). “Let your life be a counter friction to stop the machine”, he counselled (Rodman, 1977, p. 118, citing from Thoreau’s “Civil disobedience” in Thomas (1966, p. 231)). Proto-green Lewis Mumford also employs the metaphor, for example, in his (1966) *The myth of the machine*

beginning to loosen its hold. Hope is beginning to spread, that despite our feelings of powerlessness in the face of over-powerful military structures, that survival may perhaps have a chance (Die Grünen, 1981, p. 1, par. 1).

The emphasis on “Selbstbestimmungsrecht” [self-determination] in the political documents (e.g. the founding Constitution (1980a, p.1, par. 5), where it is added to the four pillars as a value, or statements such as “Nur durch eine Selbstbestimmung der Betroffenen kann der ökologischen, ökonomischen und sozialen Krise entgegengetreten werden” in the Saarbrucker programme (1980b, p. 5), partly reflects the need, I think, for *psychological* emancipation from powerlessness.

### 2.3 Die Grünen’s counter-extermism ideology: core values

Now if one compares the critique of exterminism’s ideology above, with one example of Die Grünen’s “real world” analyses of society’s ills:

We have not only reached the limits of our economic system, but our whole industrial civilization is in a crisis which will prove to be our demise, if we are not prepared to alter our entire direction. The immediate is dominated by fears of unemployment, and decline in social security ... But behind that there arises threateningly, the danger of nuclear extinction, increased by stationing of new weapons of mass destruction ... as well as chemical and biological instruments of murder.

In the Third World, hundreds of millions of people are leading a life of misery because of the unfair international economic order...

And in ever-increasing tempo, the European initiated production methods, and lifestyle are spreading throughout the world, destroying the Earth which sustains us, especially the biosphere, from which we came... (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 3)

then I suggest that Die Grünen’s four cardinal values of ökologisch, sozial, basisdemokratisch, and gewaltfrei [the “four pillars”], and their “Partnerschaft” ethic, can be seen as a counter-ideology to “exterminism”.

Other green values pervade these five cardinal values. All oppose industrial hierarchical society’s values: holism instead of reductionism; re-integration [“Eingliederung”] instead of separation or pushing away [“Trennung” or “in die Ecke schieben”]; unravelling and decentralization [“entflechten” and “dezentralisieren”] instead of “Konzentration”; self-regulation and self-decision-making power [“Selbstverwaltung” and “Selbstestimmungsrecht”] instead of bureaucracy [“Burokratie”]; human-friendly social and economic scale [“überschaubar”] instead of gigantism [“mammoth” scale]; diversity [“Vielfalt”] instead of “mono”:

The one-sided orientation of school education ... must again be extended to include those areas which are essential for the development of the whole personality...<sup>33</sup> (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 13), AND “At the centre of health care stands the whole person. Illness is not simply a matter of disturbance in chemical and physical processes...<sup>34</sup> (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 10).

The growth oriented policy which brought about the overdevelopment and concentration in urban centres has also led to an extreme separation of living space, place of work, recreation, education, and shopping<sup>35</sup> (Die Grünen, 1985, p. 15) ... all these aspects of life must be spatially integrated with one another in meaningful ways. This means decentralization <sup>36</sup> (Die Grünen, 1985, p. 14)

The dismantling of mammoth-sized schools and universities which make difficult, the kind of education we

<sup>33</sup> “Die einseitige Ausrichtung der Schulbildung ... muss wieder um die Bereiche ergänzt werden, die für die Entwicklung der Gesamtpersönlichkeit unerlässlich sind”

<sup>34</sup> “Im Mittelpunkt der Gesundheitspflege steht der ganze hilfsbedürftige Mensch. Krankheit ist nicht nur eine Störung chemischer und physikalischer Prozesse ...”

<sup>35</sup> “Die wachstumsorientierte und konzentrationsfördernde Politik und Wirtschaft haben zur übermäßigen Trennung der Lebensbereiche, insbesondere von Wohnen, Arbeiten, Einkaufen und Freizeit geführt” (1980c, p. 5)

<sup>36</sup> “Die Lebensbereiche Wohnen, Arbeit, Erholen, Sich-Bilden, Einkaufen müssen in sinnvoller Weise räumlich miteinander verbunden werden. Das bedeutet Dezentralisierung...” (1980b, p. 14)

seek ...<sup>37</sup> (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 13) ..... The Greens demand ... decentralized and human-scale schools...<sup>38</sup>  
(Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 12)

...Partnership with nature and with people. This is best achieved in self-determined, self-maintaining, human-scale units in enterprise and administration ...<sup>39</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 5)

“... there must be attention to diversity and decentralization<sup>40</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 14).

## 2.4 Key proposition on ecological crisis

Die Grünen’s key proposition the cause of the crisis could be phrased something like:

The world-wide capitalist-industrial-materialistic-bureaucratic system, both western and socialist, is responsible for all current and interconnected crises, both at cultural level [the ecological crisis, the economic crisis, the military crisis, and social decline crisis] and at personal level [a sense of existential threat, pessimism, and powerlessness].

## 3. Epistemology

It appears correct to say that green movement epistemology combines (3.1) “Netzwerkdenkens”, which is a kind of dialectical thinking, (3.2), a neo-Frankfurt School critique of instrumental reason, and (3.2.1) a defence of the place of emotion in thinking.

### 3.1 “Netzwerkdenkens”

Maren-Grisebach (1982) notes, as does Schumacher (1974), the westerner’s carving up of the world into either-or propositions. Drawing on Hegel’s thought, she asserts that Die Grünen by contrast, are “Dialektiker” (1982, p. 56). Dialectical thinking dissolves distinctions, without denying any of them (p. 56). She equates dialectical thinking with “Netzwerkdenkens”: “Dialektisches Denken ist mit Netzwerk denken gleich...” (p. 56).

Then, from “Netzwerkdenkens” as norm, she derives two further norms:

(a) The first is that the nature of ecology itself suggests that there must be more to human thought than just the reconciliation of opposites: “Vernetzungen, Verkettungen, Überlagerung im kompliziertesten Wechselgefüge machen andere Entscheidungswege notwendig” (p. 59). So the lesson taken from “Netzwerkdenkens” by Die Grünen is the possibility of *more than* only an impoverished either-or option in thinking and doing<sup>41</sup> (1982, p. 59).

(b) Then she suggests that as the very nature of ecology is movement and change, becoming and passing, there should be in human thinking too, an open-ness to movement and change, to “process” thought, rather than a reification or “absolutising” (p. 58) of fundamentals. To ecology’s cycles, Maren-Grisebach traces the acceptance of process and change which is integral to the green way of thinking: “Veränderung bleibt ... das Stichwort, das ... auf den grünen Leib geschrieben ist” (1982, p. 49). She (1982, p. 57) cites as example, the comment on p. 37 of the 1980 Bundesprogramm (1980b): “This programme constitutes the current status of

<sup>37</sup> “Abbau von Mammutschulen und Mammutuniversitäten die eine Erziehung im dargelegten Sinne erschweren....” (1979, p. 13)

<sup>38</sup> “Die Grünen fordern ...dezentrale und überschaubare Schulen... (1980c, p. 12)

<sup>39</sup> “Partnerschaft mit der Natur und dem Menschen. Sie gelingt am besten in selbstbestimmten und selbstversorgenden überschaubaren Wirtschafts- und Verwaltungseinheiten.” (1980b, p. 5)

<sup>40</sup> “...auch hier [ist] auf Vielfalt und Dezentralisierung zu achten” (1980c, p. 14)

<sup>41</sup> Bahro doesn’t agree with this principle. For example, “So far we have got out of the question of the relationship between perspectives within the system and those transcending the system by saying “both one and the other” ...Anyone who still has a trace of Marxist training in them as far as method is concerned, can never be satisfied with this eclecticism, that is with the mixing of positions instead of integration on one particular position. A consistent programme will only be possible if we build either on the old principle or the new” (Bahro, 1983b, in Bahro, 1986, p. 46)

discussion amongst Die Grünen at national level. In accordance with our understanding of direct [or “base”] democracy, the discussion of the programme is being continued by all members, and informed by new insights, and practical experience.”<sup>42</sup> While their political opponents considered this non-fixing of ideas [“Nicht-Festsetzungen” (p. 56), “Nichtfestschreiben” (p. 57)], that is, their process-thinking, a sign of their instability (p. 57), Die Grünen considered it a strength, because it reflected life: “Green is the colour of continually-changing life” [“Grün meint die Farbe des sich ändernden Lebens” (p. 57)].

Together, these two kinds of thinking – both/and, movement and change – are the essence of *truly democratic* thinking, that is, base-democratic thinking, which is Die Grünen’s preferred way of making decisions [“Entscheidungsweg”]. Where one thinks only in terms of unchanging fundamentals, and either/or options, there the possibility exists that each party in the conversation will insist on his/her version of things as the only, and enduring, version of things. But where one allows diversity of thinking, coupled with the possibility of movement and change, there base-democratic decisions “*emerge*”, they are not “taken” or “made” [“Eine Entscheidung ist dann nicht getroffen, sondern sie *wird*” (1982, p. 59, her italics)]. In base-democratic thinking, no one person may speak for all the others, because no one person<sup>43</sup> has the truth. There is however a dynamic truth, and the way to it, is through base-democratic thinking: “Das Basisdemokratische ist als Mittel zur Wahrheitsfindung nicht zu leugnen, weil die Wahrheit eine der *Bewegung* ist” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 59, her italics).

Traces of Die Grünen’s “Netzwerk” thinking can be seen throughout their early philosophy and ideology: the conscious effort to re-unite rationality and emotionality in the human being’s relationship with nature, or rationality and intuition in the human being’s understanding of his/her world (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 11); a seeking after holism in the value of solidarity; yet individualism in the idea of self-realization; re-integration of body and soul in medicine (Kelly, 1984, p. 93), a restoration to the citizen of a sense of agency and autonomy, yet control by central authorities where necessary. Die Grünen sought to deal with these antinomies within a holistic philosophy [“ganzheitliche Philosophie”] (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 11).

### 3.2 A critique of instrumental reason

Traces of the Frankfurt School’s critique of instrumental reason (Chapter 5, section 2.1.2), its coupling of the domination of people and the domination of nature, the search for a new people-people, and new people-nature ethic are plentiful in Die Grünen’s key sources:

A complete break from our short-term and economically-oriented instrumental thinking is necessary...<sup>44</sup>  
(Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4)

We must give up our striving to rape and manipulate nature, if we want to survive<sup>45</sup> (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 9)

It is our conviction that we must combat the exploitation of nature by people, and of people by people, to be able to meet the acute and serious threat to life<sup>46</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4).

<sup>42</sup> “Dieses Programm schreibt den jetzigen Diskussionsstand der Grünen auf Bundesebene fest. Nach unserem basisdemokratischen Verständnis wird die Programmdiskussion von allen Mitgliedern laufend fortgesetzt, orientiert an neuen Erkenntnissen und Erfahrungen aus der Praxis”

<sup>43</sup> This belief probably underpins Die Grünen’s distrust of chairpersons, party representatives, or “top” functionaries: “weil sie so tun werden, als könnte *einer* immer rechthaben” (p. 59, her italics)

<sup>44</sup> “Ein volliger Umbruch unseres kurzfristig orientierten wirtschaftlichen Zweckdenkens ist notwendig...” (1980b, p. 4)

<sup>45</sup> “Wir müssen uns Streben, die Natur zu vergewaltigen und zu manipulieren, aufgeben, um zu überleben” (1979, p. 9)

<sup>46</sup> “Unsere Überzeugung ist, daß der Ausbeutung der Natur und des Menschen durch den Menschen entgegengetreten werden muß, um der akuten und ernststen Bedrohung des Lebens zu begegnen” (1980b, p. 4)

### 3.2.1 and a place for emotion in thinking

Perhaps within the same neo-Frankfurt School heritage, Maren-Grisebach writes of Die Grünen's wish for a return to a closer relationship with nature ["Naturzugehörigkeit"]. Our estranged relationship is compounded by the accumulation of plastic, concrete, and wire in our environment. While arguing that "Ecology" provides a secure fundamental value to guide the human-nature [and the human-human] relationship because it is based on science (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 32), she also writes freely (1982, pp. 24-26, p. 49) of the importance of allowing usually-repressed *feelings* for, or *sensations* of, nature ["Naturgefühle"] to re-emerge. She writes of Die Grünen's love for animals, of compassion for them ["Liebe zu Tieren, das Mitleid mit ihnen"], in the context of animal experimentation, industrial farming, habitat pollution, and misused draft animal power; of empathy with the forests being cut for industry. She writes of smelling the wet earth, feeling cold in the wind, tasting the soil on the plants from the ground [Namibians will think here of the *amajova* from the anthill!], feeling the ground underfoot, hearing the silence, absorbing the milieu. Similar to deep ecologist Naess's argument for a phenomenological apprehension of nature, Maren-Grisebach (1982) argues that thought is *permissably* phenomenological.

## 4. Ontology

In this section, I consider (4.1) the role of philosophical holism and vitalism in Die Grünen's ontological thought, and then present (4.2) a view of nature, and (4.3) a view of the human being.

### 4.1 Some metaphysical thoughts: Philosophical holism and vitalism

Bramwell has noted the influence of holistic biology in informing ecological ideas (Bramwell, 1989, p. ix); green historian Derek Wall (1994, p. 90) writes that "Green philosophy, as opposed to environmentalism ... always espouses holism ... Vitalism, the concept that living things are animated by a spark or force absent from the non-living is also sometimes embraced ...".

First, holism. German zoologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919)'s organic biology, and the vitalist thought of his student, biologist-philosopher Hans Driesch (1867-1941) contributed to the elements of holism and Monism in the German naturism tradition (Bramwell, 1989). From Maren-Grisebach's *Philosophie* it is clear that Die Grünen embrace a "ganzheitliche Philosophie" (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 11), and that she attributes some of their holism ["Ganzheit"] at least, to Haeckel's holistic understanding of ecology. His definition of ecology - "The economy of the Nature-Whole" (1982, p. 31) - is given prominence in her explanation of "ecology" (1982, p. 30), which, in her view, is an "Einheitslehre" (1982, p. 33).

What about vitalism? It would probably be going too far to assert the German heritage of holism, organicism and vitalism as the unifying philosophical basis for all the ecology-oriented Citizens' Initiatives of the 1970s, but it was clearly part of the thought of Roland Vogt, who came into Die Grünen from the executive of the Bundesverband der Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz [BBU, the alliance of Citizens' Initiatives for environmental protection], which, from its 1972 start, combined ecological and sociological concerns. Vogt, speaking to Capra and Spretnak around 1983, said:

The major problem with the growth the Greens are experiencing is that more and more people are coming into the party who are not really Green, not holistically minded. The core Greens may become a minority!" (Roland Vogt, founder member of the Greens, in Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 22).

Vogt made the interesting comment to Capra and Spretnak that "The original focus [of our activities] was ecology, then we joined peace, and then we realized neither had a chance without restructuring the economy. Once we realized that Green thinking can inform every area of politics and life and that *our*

*central issue is survival*, I created the term ‘vitalism’ as a contra-term to ‘exterminism’” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 68, my italics). UK Green Porritt (1984, pp. 217-218) also refers to the use of the concept “vitalism” in Germany as counter to the concept “exterminism”. Of course, one cannot be sure whether Vogt’s concept “vitalism” in response to exterminism was a deliberate or merely unintentional re-turning to the nineteenth century German-holistic-biological idea of vitalism, then used as counter to the physical thermodynamic determinism of entropy<sup>47</sup> and death (Bramwell, 1989, 1994). Vitalism is also posed as counter-attitude to the nihilism of exterminism in Bahro’s careful exposition of the latter (1983j, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 142-158; specifically the matrix on pp. 152-153).

## 4.2 A view of nature

Here I draw on Maren-Grisebach’s ontology, as presented in her *Philosophie der Grünen* (1982), because it, rather than Bahro’s critique of Marx’s historical materialist ontology<sup>48</sup>, is I think, traceable in Die Grünen’s founding political statements.

Capra and Spretnak (1984) were keen to draw parallels between the philosophy of Die Grünen, and the holism, interconnectedness, interdependence, and process-orientation of their own systems thinking philosophy<sup>49</sup>. According to them (1984, pp. 31-32), Die Grünen expressed the principles of systems theory “in numerous conversations ... and in much of their printed material”, but using terms other than “system<sup>50</sup>”, such as network, dynamic balance, and total interconnectedness [“Gesammtzusammenhänge”, “Zusammenhängen und Fließgleichgewichten” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 46, p. 49)] to express these principles.

### 4.2.1 “Netzwerk” or holistic system

Maren-Grisebach (1982, p. 71) used the metaphor of network<sup>51</sup> to convey the holistic structure of reality, for example, “Die sich durch die Natur ziehenden netzartigen Strukturen...”, or “Die grosse Vernetzung” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 32). A similar ontological understanding, and realization of its implications, can also be seen at “real world” level, in Kelly’s use of concepts such as “system”, “interconnection” and “whole”: “As human beings, we are collective creatures, living parts of various communities which interconnect to form a living social system. Thus we are responsible for the whole, for society and for the life system that supports us all.” (Kelly, 1984, p. 80).

In the political statements, one finds sometimes the network metaphor to convey nature’s holistic, interconnected quality, in expressions such as “Taking heed of the intermeshed and interconnected life circumstances of living and dead material”<sup>52</sup> (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 8), or “... the encouragement of thinking in terms of interrelated systems as the on-going goal of teaching, in order to encourage a better understanding of social interrelations, ecological cycles, and prevailing contradictions”<sup>53</sup> (Die Grünen, 1985, p. 40). But more often, the concept “household” is used, as in “Kreisläufe des Naturhaushalts” [“the cycles of nature’s household” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4, last paragraph)].

<sup>47</sup> The concept of entropy is explained in Chapter Nine, section 3.2

<sup>48</sup> See Bahro’s discussion, 1984e, pp. 213-218

<sup>49</sup> For example, Capra’s 1983 *Turning Point*; Spretnak’s 1982 *The politics of women’s spirituality* (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xiv)

<sup>50</sup> “We asked Manon Maren-Grisebach, a philosophy professor and one of the three speakers of the Green party from 1981 through 1983, about this paradox. ... She explained their preference for the terms ‘network science’ and ‘network thinking’ rather than ‘systems thinking’: ‘We who have grown up with the history of philosophy [which is more influential in European thought than American] have a certain aversion to the connotations of ‘system thinking’ because often in the course of the history of ideas ‘system’ stood for something that was closed, that was a self-contained doctrine and thus was quite different from a living object. ... Only since the nineteenth century have we begun to connect ‘system’ with living phenomena. ‘ ...’ (Maren-Grisebach in Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 32-33)

<sup>51</sup> It seems she derived this metaphor from the work of biologist Frederic Vester (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 34, p. 37)

<sup>52</sup> “Beachtung der vernetzten Lebenszusammenhänge von lebendiger und toter Materie” (1983b, p. 8)

<sup>53</sup> “Denken in vernetzten Systemen als durchgängiges Unterrichtsziel, um das Verständnis von ökologischen Kreisläufen und sozialen Zusammenhängen und Gegensätzen zu fördern.” (1980b, p. 32)

#### 4.2.2 The interrelatedness of things [“Gesamttzusammenhänge”]

In her conversations with Capra and Spretnak, Maren-Grisebach also touched on the interrelationship of things, a central ecological concept. She uses the words “Verkettungen” (for example, in Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 32), or “Gesamttzusammenhänge” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 46) to convey the idea of interrelatedness, drawing in places on Bateson<sup>54</sup>’s thought:

The emphasis on relations and interconnections - in Gregory Bateson’s words, ‘the pattern which connects the crab to the lobster and the orchid to the primrose and all four of them to me’ - is the foundation of Green thought and being ... This consciousness is simply there in the Greens” (Maren-Grisebach, in Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 32-33).

“Vernetzung” also means that the crises of society – economy, war, and environmental destruction, for example - cannot be considered in isolation, because they are interconnected and mutually-influencing in a thousand different ways: “...drohend zeigen sich die tausendfältigen Wechselwirkungen [holism and circular causality!] zwischen Wirtschaft, Krieg, Naturvernichtung, Bevölkerungsflut und neuen Grosstechniken” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 12).

Important to learn from ecology’s interrelatedness of things, is the message of symbiosis: co-operation between living things, and between them and their environment: “Unter Ökologie wird die Lehre vom Haushalt der Natur verstanden; besser das Zusammenwirken der Lebewesen untereinander und mit der Umwelt” (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2, my italics).

Whether “systems” or “network”-based, Capra and Spretnak (1984, p. 30) note that “Green politics, then, is inherently holistic in theory and practice. It is based on ecological, or ‘network’ thinking, a term used frequently by the Greens. Ecological thinking also includes the realization that the seemingly rigid structures we perceive in our environment are actually manifestations of underlying processes, of nature’s continual dynamic flux ...”.

#### 4.2.3 Cyclical process, change, and dynamic balance [“Werden und Gehen”; “Bewegung”]

From the thought of classical Greek philosopher Heraclitus, via Goethe’s influence [the Romantic input into ecologism which both Bramwell (1989) and Wall (1994) note], Maren-Grisebach (1982, p. 15) proposes a cyclical, and process understanding of ontology. She writes that “Zum Naturprinzip der grossen Vernetzung kommt ... die Bewegung, die Veränderung hinzu.” (1982, p. 49). She speaks of life’s natural and cyclical becoming and passing: “der Kreislauf von Werden und Vergehen” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 16). Within the becoming, being and passing of nature’s cycles, sometimes called “Bewegung” in the political statements, a dynamic balance can be discerned, which she calls “Fließgleichgewicht” (e.g. 1982, p. 71).

One finds in Die Grünen’s political statements, empirical traces of such dynamic balance ontological descriptions, for example, “... des eingespielten Gleichgewichts und der Kreisläufe der Natur (Die Grünen, 1979, page 9, par 3). The concept “stability” is also used to express this dynamic balance: “die Stabilität der Ökosysteme” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4). Ecological-ontological metaphors are carried over into their descriptions of the kind of economy they sought: a “dynamische Gleichgewichtswirtschaft” (Die Grünen, 1979, page 3, par 2), or a “dynamische Kreislaufwirtschaft” (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 4, par. 1).

<sup>54</sup> Maren-Grisebach (1982, p. 33) describes Gregory Bateson as a philosopher of the green movement in America

#### 4.2.4 “Ecology” as secure foundation for green movement thought, policy and practice

Maren-Grisebach, in her *Philosophie*, and in her conversations with Capra and Spretnak (1984, pp. 32-33), asserts that “Ökologie” provides a secure fundamental value for green philosophy because it is not based on belief, conviction, or the social construction of reality, but on science. Because ecology is about the laws of being [“Gesetze des Seins”] which include human beings too (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 32), it is “zwingend” - inavoidably normative one could say - if life on earth is to survive:

... *Ökologie ist zwingend*. ... Daher hat der Partei der Grünen mit ihrem Grundsatz *ökologisch* ein so sicheres Fundament. Das ist nicht Glauben, Überzeugung, Gesellschaftsentwurf, sondern *Wissen*. (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 32; her italics).

From the “is” of ecology’s holism, network and dynamic cyclical process, Die Grünen moved easily to “oughts”: the human being’s place in, and proper relationship towards nature [section 5], and how society, including its economy, should conduct itself (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 49, pp. 53-90).

Ecology at ontological level, become social ecology<sup>55</sup> at ideological level, has something to say about almost every aspect of human existence. For example, in the Europe programme (Die Grünen, 1979), all the following themes are placed in an ecological context: changing worldview and values (p. 3); preserving the basis of life for people, plants and animals (p. 2); considering the what, how, where and who of the production process from an ecological, not economical point of view (p. 2, 4, and 5); transport planning (p. 6); agriculture [a return to natural, as opposed to industrial processes in farming (p. 6); energy use (p. 7); environmental protection and natural resource planning (pp. 9-10); health care and delivery (p. 10); education (p. 13), foreign, and particularly Third World policy (p. 3); even fundamental and human rights (p. 11).

### 4.3 A view of the human being

The most fundamental view of the human being, is that humanity is part of the planet’s ecology:

Based on the laws of nature .... ecological politics [also] means understanding ourselves and our human environment as part of nature. The human life is also bound up with the regulatory cycles of the ecosystems... (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4).

I discuss next, (4.3.1) Self-realization as a right, (4.3.2) the need for a re-orientation of personal values, (4.3.3) the role of spirituality in achieving personal and social transformation, (4.3.4) Bahro’s *Homo occidentalis simplicissimus*, and (4.3.5) some of Die Grünen’s *Frauenphilosophie*.

#### 4.3.1 Self-realization is a right

For Die Grünen, a person’s self-realization is not only of decisive importance:

Die geistige und seelische Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen hat entscheidende Bedeutung (1979, p. 3, par 3),

it is a right:

“Wir gehen vom *Recht* auf Selbstverwirklichung eines jeden Menschen ... aus...” (1979, p. 13, my italics).

Their early political statements abound with views on what it is to be fully human: a being of creativity, of imagination, of soul or spirit, capable of mature critical thinking, self-initiative, self-responsibility, and self-determination, who should have the opportunity to unfold fully and freely, in solidarity with other human beings, and with nature (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 2, p. 4, p. 11, p. 26).

<sup>55</sup> Maren-Grisebach sometimes uses the concept “Sozialökologie” to represent the oughtness of ecology for human arrangements. Bahro too pursued the idea of social ecology (e.g. in Hosang, 2000, pp. 10-13). I have not attempted here to analyze to what extent each of their understandings of social ecology agrees with, or deviates from Bookchin’s social ecology philosophy (Chapter Five)

Two versions of how to achieve Self-realization are present in their early political statements – the one more radical than the other. In both, the human being is to be emancipated from the one-sided economic production<sup>56</sup> and materialism of the industrial society, from being a “wage-labour commodity and appendages to machinery” (interviewer’s comment, Bahro, 1983e, in Bahro, 1986, p. 81), into a work milieu in an ecological society which will free the individual’s creative capacities in service of self-realization. While Bahro’s cosmologically-anthropologically derived Homo *occidentalis simplicissimus* [a spiritual being in a spiritual community, almost] is the more radical view of the two, in that his ecological society is outside the world market, both versions require a re-orientation of personal values from the material to the spiritual.

#### 4.3.2 A re-orientation of personal values is needed

The basic premise in Die Grünen’s thought appears to be, that the industrial system, though self-created, is leading the individual towards a *false* and one-dimensional Self-realization locked into materialism and consumerism. A new understanding of Self-realization-in-ecology<sup>57</sup> is needed, a “Neugestaltung auf ökologischer Basis” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4, par 2):

Ein volliger Umbruch unseres kurzfristig orientierten wirtschaftlichen Zweckdenkens ist notwendig. Wir halten es für einen Irrtum, dass die jetzige Verschwendungswirtschaft noch das Glück und die Lebenserfüllung fordere; im Gegenteil, die Menschen werden immer gehetzter und unfreier. Erst in dem Masse, wie wir uns von der Überschätzung des materiellen Lebensstandards freimachen, wie wir wieder die Selbstverwirklichung ermöglichen und uns wieder auf die Grenzen unserer Natur besinnen, werden auch die schöpferischen Kräfte frei werden für die Neugestaltung eines Lebens auf ökologischer Basis (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4, Preamble, par. 2).

Die Grünen consistently linked their new design for civilization - deep societal and economic structural changes, together with changed attitudes to nature, to the need for personal transformation:

... wir müssen unser Leben grundlegend ändern, wir müssen die Zivilisation neu entwerfen... (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 3).

Um diese Ziele zu erreichen sind umfassende Wandlungen in der Einstellung des Menschen zu seinem Leben und zur Umwelt sowie Änderungen der Wirtschaft und der Gesellschaft nötig” (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2, par. 2)

That in spirituality, recognised or not, is the indissoluble link between a person and an ecologically-sustainable society is a generally “green” thought<sup>58</sup>. Spirituality is the practice needed “to dismantle ... previous psychological structures and be socialized anew” (Bahro, 1983f, in Bahro, 1986, p. 90).

#### 4.3.3 Spirituality in personal and social transformation

Calls for spiritual renewal, such as those from Illich (1971)<sup>59</sup>, Schumacher (1974), and Fromm (1976), were part of the 1970s green movement consciousness (Bramwell, 1994; Dobson, 2000, Ferris, 1993). Schumacher called for an end to the philosophy of materialism, and the “religion” of economism, which manifested itself in “a system of production that ravishes nature and a type of society that mutilates man” (1974, [1986 reprint], p. 246). Drawing on both Buddhism and Christianity, Schumacher suggested that to end the western social and environmental *malaise*, each of us could begin by putting “our own inner house in order” (Schumacher, 1974 [1986], p. 250; also cited by Dobson, 2000, p. 131). Erich Fromm’s 1976 work “To have or to be?” dealt with two possible modes

<sup>56</sup> “Fixation with economics is today *the* original Marxist sin” (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 172)

<sup>57</sup> Self-realization is also an important concept for the deep ecologists, but there mature self-realization is understood as increasing identification with nature. Die Grünen’s views, for all their “ecology” as value, seem to me far more homocentric

<sup>58</sup> “It seems to me so obvious that without some huge groundswell of spiritual concern the transition to a more sustainable way of life remains utterly improbable” (UK Green Jonathon Porritt, 1984, p. 210). Dobson phrases this “green” idea as “personal transformation leads to altered behaviour; which in turn can be translated into sustainable community living” (Dobson, 2000, p. 131).

<sup>59</sup> Bramwell (1994, p. 63) notes Illich’s “unworldly moral fervour, his interest in the state of humanity’s soul”

of existence: having (acquiring, controlling) and being (experiencing, sharing), and he argued that humankind must necessarily shift from the one to the other (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 54). According to Capra and Spretnak (1984, p. 54), the final chapter of Fromm's book "Features of a new society" was "a remarkable previewing of green politics"<sup>60</sup>.

#### 4.3.3.1 Spirituality amongst Die Grünen

This religious renaissance which is not an economic thing, ... is the living seed of the next social order ... This renaissance is as yet not a great river but it is already moving in countless brooks and rivulets. ... Otherwise it would hardly be possible to explain how even a new *political* party like the Greens has from the start – usually shamefacedly denied – a spiritual component ... (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 173-174, his italics)

Although most of Die Grünen interviewed by Capra and Spretnak in 1982 and 1983 felt there was a spiritual dimension to their green politics, "almost no one could discuss the concept"<sup>61</sup> except in vague terms" (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 53). Exceptions were Bahro, Kelly, and Roland Vogt, who "was not afraid of the language of spirituality" (Parkin, 1994, p. 80). Some Greens felt that the spirituality element had been stronger before they became a mainstream party, for example, the Anthroposophists [inheritors of Steiner's teachings] were more influential in the formative years; there had been a marked influx of radical left supporters as the Greens' electoral successes improved from 1979, and they followed Marxist tradition in rejecting any spiritual dimension to life anyway (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 53-55). Die Grünen's general manager Lukas Beckmann felt that the Greens did represent a spiritual movement, but that there were members "who still think in the old ways", who still needed to understand that "ecological politics involves a changing of themselves" (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 55).

The spirituality took both religious and secular forms. Kelly's spirituality, which was "conspicuous" (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 174; also Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 9) had a metaphysical basis.<sup>62</sup> Bahro too believed that no transformation of civilization could take place, unless there were a "conversion", "rebirth" or "psychological transformation" in individual human beings (New Left Review interviewer's understanding of Bahro's position, in Bahro, 1984e, p. 214 and p. 215). But a combination of freedom of spirit and a sense of connectedness in "Gemeinschaft" seems best to express the nature of Bahro's secular spirituality, rather than any religious understandings of God (Bahro, 1983f, in Bahro, 1986, p. 90; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 56 citing from Bahro's *From Red to green* (1984, no page number given); Bahro, 1984e, p. 221).

In summary, green political theorist Dobson (2000, p. 133) notes that spirituality "is of greater importance to the green perspective than is probably publicly realized....".

<sup>60</sup> Fromm's influence can be traced in Bahro's work. In 1984, Bahro asked: "What is fundamentalism? Externally it puts ecology before economics, and fundamental long-term interests before immediate short-term ones. ... Simply in order to survive it has to be a policy with spiritual impetus and moral standard. A policy of conversion in the metropolises begins with the readiness to change oneself ... Those who stand for the transition from Having to Being must make it clear that this means a change in values such as can only succeed through what up till now has been described as a religious experience. 'Transformations can only come from the transformed'" (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 171). In an interesting green movement link, deep ecologist Naess (1988) also draws on Fromm's work on self-ishness, and unself-ishness to inform his idea of "the ecological self" [Chapter Four, section 4.2]; and Bahro notes briefly, but approvingly, Naess's idea of the ecological self (Bahro, 1997, in Hosang, 2000, p. 28)

<sup>61</sup> They, and Kelly [and Bramwell too] ascribe this non-articulation of spirituality in politics to Hitler's misuse of the German (spiritual) naturist tradition in this regard (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 53-55)

<sup>62</sup> Her "extremely ambitious Catholicism" (Bahro, quoted in Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 9) for a start, but Kelly notes her own "uneasy relationship with the Catholic church", which she had left (Kelly, 1984, p. 59), particularly on the issue of abortion and birth control. See for example, her "A challenge for the Catholic Church", and "Open letter to Pope John Paul II" in Kelly (1984, pp. 59-65, and pp. 66-72). She was also interested in the then newly-emerging "liberation theology" as a kind of return to the values of early radical Christianity, Martin Luther King's Christianity, Gandhi's non-violence, Tibetan Buddhism (Bramwell, 1989, p. 222, p. 272 footnote 21; Bramwell, 1994, pp. 98-111; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 7-11; Kelly, 1984, p. 59, p. 70, p. 72, pp. 119-121), and in earth spirituality (e.g. Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 55; Kelly, 1984, p. 108)

#### 4.3.4 From *Homo conquistador* to *Homo occidentalis simplicissimus*

Bahro's critique of western pathological individualism, and his search for an ecologically-appropriate form of Self-realization, are intimately connected with his critique of exterminism, and his utopian view of a commune-based society.

Combining his own thought with that of resource economist and peace protagonist Johan Galtung<sup>63</sup>, and later with that of German philosopher Jean Gebser<sup>64</sup>, Bahro argued that the fundamental aggression of the "European form of individualism"<sup>65</sup> (Bahro, 1984e, p. 167, pp. 172-173) was cosmologically inspired (Bahro, 1984e, p. 215). There is, he suggested, "... an aggressive Indo-Germanic disposition"<sup>66</sup> inherent in our European civilization which was already displayed by the Hittites in Asia Minor, the Greeks at Troy, and the Germanic tribes in their struggle against Rome" (1984e, p.169). Over centuries, this aggressive, expansive disposition - "exterminist in its innermost dispositions, modelling itself on individual competition and the Olympia principle of 'more, higher, better, faster'<sup>67</sup>" (Bahro 1983f, in Bahro, 1986, p. 89; Bahro, 1984e, p. 213) - manifested itself as the European culture of capitalism (Bahro, 1984e, pp. 215-216), and in Galtung's concept of "*homo occidentalis*"<sup>68</sup> (Bahro, 1984e, p. 169).

While the process of human development (self-realization) is about "the full development of Individuality" (Bahro, 1984e, p. 217), which included uninhibited development of sensuality and sexuality<sup>69</sup> too (Bahro, 1983f, in Bahro, 1986, p.91), it is precisely in "European individualism", and its various exterminist manifestations, that human development went wrong. Bahro's view was that no "profound transformation in European civilization" could take place until the ethos of *homo occidentalis* had been "spiritually exorcised" (Bahro, 1984e, p. 169), and replaced by that of a *homo occidentalis simplicissimus* - not a pathologically individualistic Self-realization, but a self-realization in community<sup>70</sup>, producing for genuine material needs, and outside the world market.

To achieve emancipation from both *Homo conquistador* and industrial society, the right kind of alternative society was needed (Bahro, 1984e, p. 223). A commune-based society would provide a suitable alternative social structure, in which the individual would have "a sense of being sheltered by a community", and in which genuine human needs - physical, social, economic – are met, where technology is subordinated to genuine human needs, and in which a person's economic being and social being is more closely integrated (Bahro, 1984e, p. 222). A genuine communal spirit in genuinely

<sup>63</sup> The Galtung-Bahro cosmology-capitalism link is also mentioned by Bramwell (1989, pp. 28-29)

<sup>64</sup> Gebser's concept of *Homo integralis* is not discussed here; see Bahro, 1997, in Hosang, 2000, pp. 23-33

<sup>65</sup> While Bahro begins with a European cosmology to derive his view of the human being, he sees it as a view which encompasses all humanity (Bahro, 1984e, pp. 213-215)

<sup>66</sup> This is similar to the ecofeminist "breakdown" theory, in which the Goddess-worshipping cosmology of the matriarchal, peaceful, earth-loving Bronze Age tribes is dislodged by the Sky God – worshipping cosmology of the warlike Iron Age tribes (Chapter Six, section 2.2.1, and 4.1)

<sup>67</sup> This was the Leitmotif of green prophet Schumacher's (1974, pp. 129-130) "people of the forward stampede", who felt that the "threefold crisis" of society (see pp. 122-123) could be dealt with by "methods current", rather than a fundamental review of what it is to be human, and the human-nature relationship

<sup>68</sup> Galtung proposed that the European cosmological disposition, which he called "*homo occidentalis*", was primarily an expansive, aggressive, and conflict-oriented one, which at its most extreme, manifested itself as "*homo conquistador*" (Bahro, 1984, p. 169). The capitalist, aggressive, ever-expanding type of reproduction was the historical instrument by which this disposition advanced its interests. Galtung proposed instead, a culture and economy of self-reliance, based on "simple reproduction", a system which he thought particularly suitable also for Third World countries (Bahro, 1984e, p. 180)

<sup>69</sup> This because Bahro understood repression of sensuality as part of the patriarchal worldview: "I see the Christian and Buddhist hostility to sensuality as a tribute to patriarchy. The logos is male" (Bahro, 1984e, p. 217). Kelly too develops thoughts on sexual emancipation (1984, Chapter 7, pp. 109-118); Die Grünen proposed several measures to end discrimination against gays and lesbians, and to "equalize" homo- and heterosexuality (1980b, pp. 30-31)

<sup>70</sup> Die Grünen's philosopher Maren-Grisebach also reflected on the balance between individualism and community on ecological grounds: "Wenn wir für *Selbstbestimmung* und *Selbstverwirklichung* uns stark machen, dann kommen wir in Konflikt mit unserem Wunsch nach mehr *Gemeinschaft*, nach Abbau des Konkurrenzverhaltens und nach *kollektiven* Zusammenschlüssen. ...Der Zusammenhang von Ich und Gemeinschaft ist wie eine Vernetzung, nichts ist zuerst und nichts zuletzt...." (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, pp. 71-80; these citations from p. 71 and p. 75)

communal living was for Bahro [non-religious] spirituality. “Kommunismus verstehe ich als Begleitererscheinung jeglicher spiritueller fundierte Gemeinschaft”. He often referred to these grassroots communities, as invisible churches, or new monasteries [“Unsichtbaren Kirchen”, “neue Klöster”] (Herzberg & Seifert, 2000, p. 9, p. 8 respectively)]. Bahro’s vision of a commune-based society is discussed further at 6.3.1.

### 4.3.5 “Frauenphilosophie”

Capra and Spretnak note that feminism in Germany was originally a product of the Marxist-inspired student movement, and so until the mid-1970s, “much of it had a Marxist orientation” (1984, p. 20, footnote), critiquing hierarchy, patriarchy, and capitalism for women’s oppression. Its main ideas are discussed in Chapter Six, sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. Besides the Marxist/socialist feminist critique, Die Grünen’s ideological approach tended to link the oppression of women with the oppression of nature, and also take an “equal but different” view of what it is to be a female.

#### 4.3.5.1 *Equal but different; the feminine principle [post-patriarchal values]*

Maren-Grisebach, in her *Grüne Frauenphilosophie* chapter (1982, pp. 91-106), first dispels the traditional [patriarchal] notions that women are the more “feeling” sex [and thus are less rational], that they are the receptive sex [and thus have no creative role to play], and that they are “near to nature”. This was a particularly useful male construction, she notes, allowing the simultaneous patriarchal subjugation and exploitation of both, and the delimitation of the realm of culture as “male” territory (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, pp. 91-95).

But women do just relate to other human beings, and to nature, differently to men (Gilligan, 1982). The liberation that Die Grünen’s women sought, was *not* emancipation into male ways of being. “Gleichstellung *muss* aber nicht Gleichheit ... bedeuten. Vom Mittelpunkt der Natur her behalten wir die Unterschiede zwischen Mann und Frau. Wagen wir es ruhig, auch im Politischen Weibliches hereinzuschieben” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 99). Kelly agreed: “ ... In recent years, I have also observed that some women have sought to overcome their inferior role by becoming part of the masculine world (Mrs Thatcher, Indira Gandhi, etc.). When women fight for equal status with men, they run the risk of joining the ranks in times of war. We are so conditioned by masculine values that women often make the mistake of imitating and emulating men at the cost of their own feminism. When I assess the world of male values, it is clear to me that I do not want this kind of ‘equality’” (Kelly, 1984, p. 107). To achieve peace, Kelly urged men “to break out of their rigid patriarchal institutions”, and women “not to let themselves become corrupted by male power” (Kelly, 1983, in Kelly, 1984, p. 73). Bahro thought similarly. The kind of communal society he envisaged would only be possible if men were to give up the power orientation of the masculine consciousness, and “submit to the feminine part of their own nature. This seems to be a condition of salvation.” (Bahro, 1983g, in Bahro, 1986, p. 95). One of his many reasons for supporting the commune as new social unit, was that its structure would promote women’s liberation, and the emergence of “the feminine element” in the regulation of community affairs (Bahro, 1983f, in Bahro, 1986, p. 88).

Gender politics inside a still predominantly patriarchal framework was a hot topic for the early female Greens who pushed for “big-picture feminism<sup>71</sup>,” as part of a non-patriarchal, non-exploitative society. What the green movement women were seeking was a society in which the development of both masculine and feminine qualities was permissible (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 103), a liberation from fixed ideas of what it is to be a woman, and fixed ideas about male and female roles in society (p. 105).

<sup>71</sup> I understand this as equivalent to the radical feminist strand of ecofeminism (Chapter Six: 2.1.4). “Most of the Green women, and many of the men, see issues of women’s rights as part of a larger context of postpatriarchal values that are essential to the goal of a nonexploitative society. This sense of ‘big picture feminism’ is ... not widely understood outside the Green party and the feminist movement” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 52). But Die Grünen’s women had a difficult time of it in the world of politics, mostly because they were not interested in the male political style of operating (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 50-52)

Still, they opposed the call for women to join the army as a “perversion” of women’s legitimate interests in equal rights and full emancipation (Die Grünen, 1981, p. 8): “Frauen zum Bund – Nein Danke!” (Die Grünen, 1980a, p. 27).

## 5. The ethic

Unsere Politik ist eine Politik der aktiven Partnerschaft mit der Natur und dem Menschen [Our political standpoint is one of active partnership with both nature and human beings] (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4)

Die Grünen’s critique of the existing ethic towards nature, and their proposed “Partnership” ethic, usually deals with people and planet in the same breath. In place of instrumental reason’s domination of nature and people [“Unsere Politik ... wendet sich gegen die Ausbeutung von Mensch und Natur....” (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 2)], the appropriate relationship is active partnership with both nature and human beings (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4) in an ecological politics society. Here I focus on the people-nature dimension of the partnership ethic: (5.1) the theory of motivation to ethical behaviour, (5.2) the theory of value in nature, (5.3) the scope of the ethic, and (5.4) the moral obligation.

### 5.1 Theory of motivation to ethical behaviour

Maren-Grisebach<sup>72</sup> (1982) notes that there are two sources for Die Grünen’s “Partnerschaft” ethic with nature: either a mystical feeling of unity with all that is<sup>73</sup>, or, for those rational types for whom such “reverence” sounds uncomfortably like metaphysics, the simple message of natural science ecology: interrelationship, interdependence. But she argues, recognition of *relationship* rather than difference between people and nature [plants and animals], on either “mystical” [“gefühltes Ineinanderleben mit den Tieren” (p. 43)] or scientific-ecological grounds, should bring with it, a recognition of the *responsibilities* people have towards nature, a stepping-back from instrumental attitudes of dominion and exploitation (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, pp. 43-44).

The motivation is then to bridge the subject-object/people-planet divide created by instrumental reason, and to live in partnership with nature:

“... ecological politics ... [is for us] ... more than environmental protection ... Its particular aim is to bring people back again into partnership with nature<sup>74</sup> ...” (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 8).

Partnership with nature means not isolated practices of environmental protection in specific places, but a cyclical dynamic economy in harmony with nature’s capabilities, conservation of nature “out there”, and protection of the nature surrounding us right here [our environment]: in our towns and settlements (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 8).

### 5.2 Theory of value

In this section I consider (5.2.1) whether “biocentrism” or “ecocentrism” really do capture the essence of the green movement/ Die Grünen’s “theory” of value, (5.2.2) Goodin’s (1992) proposed theory of

<sup>72</sup> Philosophically, Maren-Grisebach (1982, pp. 39-46) discusses the western historical-social construction of the divide between humanity and nature, and particularly, between humanity and animals: humanity is created in God’s image, has rationality, creates cultures, is capable of symbolic communication through speech, has an eternal soul, all of which animals and plants do not have, so the social construction goes, which therefore legitimates humanity’s domination and exploitation of the animal and plant worlds. She discusses some of the alternative and opposite views available in western thought to this constructed divide: Aristoteles, Porphyrios, Francis of Assisi, Schopenhauer, Darwin, whose scientific theory of evolution seriously undermined the “otherness” of nature, and more recently, Albert Schweitzer. This is more or less the same alternative western philosophical tradition which inspires the bio-ethic of ecocentric environmentalism (O’Riordan, 1981) and the deep ecology movement’s ecological egalitarianism (Sessions, 1995)

<sup>73</sup> Perhaps as a result of Horkheimer and Adorno’s “ambitious and contradictory” attempts during the 1940s to re-orient instrumental reason through the injection of “transcendentalist nature reverence” (Wall, 1994, p. 21)

<sup>74</sup> “...ökologische Politik ... [ist für uns] mehr als Umweltschutz. ...[Es] will besonders zum Ziel, den Menschen wieder in Partnerschaft mit der Natur zu bringen...” (1980c, p. 8)

green value, and (5.2.3) my own thoughts on “vitalism” as a possible description of Die Grünen’s theory of value.

### 5.2.1 Biocentrism and/or ecocentrism?

The theory of value sometimes suggested for the green movement is “biocentrism” (Porritt’s “Distinguishing features of a green paradigm” (1984, pp. 216-217, in Chapter Four, as Figure 5). But as biocentrism does not acknowledge the intrinsic value of ecosystems, which Die Grünen do<sup>75</sup>, their “theory” appears to be something different. But it isn’t quite ecocentrism either, which, in formal environmental ethical form, values ecosystems and species as wholes, above their individual components<sup>76</sup>. Die Grünen value both wholes and individuals in nature.

### 5.2.2 “Naturalness”

Robert Goodin (1994, pp. 19-83) has proposed a green theory of value which is neither biocentrism or ecocentrism. He says charmingly that the theory “is *largely* my own invention”, and even if it is not the theory of value which underlies the green political programme, “it would be politically prudent for greens to adopt [it] forthwith”! (1994, p. 54, his italics). He believes that it is capable of subsuming many standard green culture and nature values (p. 55), such as liberation, authenticity, sustainability, and futurity.

Goodin holds that “naturalness” is the green source of value, on the grounds that

- a. it subsumes history and process as sources of value (1992, p. 27, footnote 17 on p. 27),
- b. “value-imparting properties are natural, rather than being somehow artefacts of human activities” (1994, p. 25), and that
- c. “those value-imparting qualities somehow inhere in the objects themselves, rather than in any mental states (actual or hypothetical, now or later) of those who partake of those objects” (1994, p. 25)
- d. “People want to see some sense and pattern to their lives” (1994, p. 37)
- e. “That requires, in turn, that their lives be set in some larger context” (1994, p. 37) and
- f. “The products of natural processes, untouched as they are by human hands, provides precisely that desired context” (1994, p. 37).

While Goodin’s is a perfectly plausible *generic* green theory of value in nature, it fails, I think, to capture the sense of threat, crisis and urgency in Die Grünen’s political statements.

### 5.2.3 Vitalism, and preservation of the “Lebensbasis” as theory of value

I suggest from a study of the source documents, that, understood in opposition to “exterminism” [section 2.1], the concept “vitalism” [section 4.1] - the ensured continuance of the “Lebensbasis” or “Lebensgrundlage” - best captures Die Grünen’s “theory” of value.

#### 5.2.3.1 Traces of “vitalism”

Die Grünen’s “theory” emphasises the value of life, - *all* life - and the need to protect that which supports life, for example, Maren-Grisebach’s comment that “Unser Thema der ‘Lebensgrundlagen’ is so bitter ernst...” (1982, p. 9). The industrial-technical society spends vast sums of money on the death and destruction of war, rather than protecting “Umwelt und Natur and das Leben” (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 9). Bahro refers to the “suicidal character of our civilization which amounts to the mass

<sup>75</sup> “... Auch das menschliche Leben ist in die Regelkreise der Ökosysteme eingebunden...” (1980b, p. 4)

<sup>76</sup> Attfield (2003, p. 189 and 192 respectively) defines biocentrism as “A normative stance that holds that all living creatures have a good of their own, and have moral standing accordingly, and that their flourishing or attaining their good is intrinsically valuable” and ecocentrism as “The normative stance that holds that ecosystems have a good independent of that of their component individuals, and as such have their own moral standing, and that their attaining or sustaining their good has intrinsic value”

extermination of humans, animals, plants and life itself ....” (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 162). He refers to the need for the creation of a new “biophile culture” (Bahro, 1984c, in Bahro, 1986, p. 176).

Political statements reflect the “value of all life” theme too: The 1979 Europe programme (1979, p. 3, par. 5) emphasizes that the fight for nature, the fight for all life, is as important as the fight for basic rights: “We have a passion for democracy and fundamental rights, and their non-violent realization. Our commitment to that is as important as for the preservation of all life!<sup>77</sup>”. The 1980 political programme repeats this theme<sup>78</sup> (1980b, preamble, par. 2).

Die Grünen considered their most important task to be “the conservation of the ecological life foundation [“Lebensbasis”] for people, and for the animal and plant life. Nature is particularly threatened in this respect<sup>79</sup>” (1979, p. 2).

### 5.2.3.2 Sustaining the ecological life foundation [“Lebensbasis”]

Sustaining the ecological life foundation “Lebensbasis” means above all, sustaining nature’s balance, nature’s stability:

The elimination of natural environments and the eradication of animal and plant species destroys *the balance of nature* and so our life basis<sup>80</sup> (Die Grünen, 1985?, p. 22, my italics).

*The ecological balance* is being sacrificed to the economy’s growth imperative and to the improvement of its competitive and profit opportunities...<sup>81</sup> (Own translation from Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 6, my italics).

We define ecological politics as those measures that understand human beings and our environment as being part of nature. Human life, too, is embedded in the life cycles of the ecosystems; we interfere with our actions and this, in turn, acts back on us. *We must not destroy the stability of the ecosystems....*<sup>82</sup> (Capra & Spretnak, 1985, p. 33, translating from Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4, my italics).

Sometimes the life of plants and animals is accorded its own value, along with that of human beings:

...Spatial planning is ... essential ... for the conservation of large reserves for nature. These serve not only people, but also the conservation of plant and animal species, which are otherwise doomed to certain death, closely followed by that of humanity<sup>83</sup> (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 9, par. 4).

... wetlands [must] be preserved and new ones created, because not only are they important habitats for animals and plants (Biotope), but also valuable water storage areas in times of drought<sup>84</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 8).

In an ecological society, the economy, lifestyle, and consumer patterns are informed by consideration for the environment ... by respect for the life of plants and animals. The present lifestyle of the industrial

<sup>77</sup> “Aus unserer Leidenschaft für Demokratie und Grundrechte und um ihrer gewaltlosen Verwirklichung willen ist unser Einsatz dafür ebenso wichtig wie der für die Erhaltung allen Lebens!” (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 3)

<sup>78</sup> “Die Zerstörung der Lebens- und Arbeitsgrundlagen und der Abbau demokratischer Rechte haben ein so bedrohliches Ausmass erreicht, dass es einer grundlegenden Alternative für Wirtschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft bedarf” (Die Grünen, 1980b, preamble, par. 2)

<sup>79</sup> “.die Bewahrung der ökologischen Lebensbasis für den Menschen und für die Tier- und Pflanzenwelt. Die Natur ist hier besonders gefährdet.” (1979, p. 2)

<sup>80</sup> “Die Einengung der natürlichen Lebensräume und die Ausrottung von Tier und Pflanzenarten zerstören das *Gleichgewicht* in der Natur und damit unsere Lebensgrundlage...” (1980b, p. 20, my italics)

<sup>81</sup> “Das ökologische Gleichgewicht wird dem Wachstumsstreben der Wirtschaft und der Verbesserung ihrer Wettbewerbs- und Gewinnchancen geopfert” (1980b, p. 6).

<sup>82</sup> “Ausgehend von den Naturgesetzen und insbesondere von der Erkenntnis, daß in einem begrenzten System kein unbegrenztes Wachstum möglich ist, heißt ökologische Politik, uns selbst und unsere Umwelt als Teil der Natur zu begreifen. Auch das menschliche Leben ist in die Regelkreise der Ökosysteme eingebunden: wir greifen durch unsere Handlungen ein und dies wirkt auf uns zurück. Wir dürfen die Stabilität der Ökosysteme nicht zerstören” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p.4)

<sup>83</sup> “...Raumplanung ist ...vonnöten ... zur Erhaltung grossräumiger Reservate der Natur. Diese dienen nicht nur dem Menschen, sondern auch der Erhaltung pflanzlicher und tierischer Arten, die sonst dem sicheren Untergang geeweiht wären, dem der Mensch bald folgen würde” (1979, p. 9, par. 4).

<sup>84</sup> “... Feuchtgebiete [müssen] erhalten und neu angelegt werden, weil sie nicht nur wichtige Lebensräume von Tieren und Pflanzen (Biotope) sind, sondern auch wertvolle Wasserrückhaltegebiete für Trockenzeiten darstellen” (1980c, p. 8)

countries threatens humanity's natural conditions of existence ...<sup>85</sup> (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 6).

But more often than not, the continued life of plants and animals is seen instrumentally:

The restoration of the ecological basis of life for humans, animals and plants is of primary importance since this single basis determines the well-being of a people<sup>86</sup> (Die Grünen, 1985?, p. 20).

The elimination of natural environments and the eradication of animal and plant species destroys the balance of nature and with it the foundation of human life. A biologically intact environment must be preserved or re-established if we are to secure for future generations a continuation of a life worthy of humankind<sup>87</sup> (Die Grünen, 1985?, p. 22).

These are altogether more anthropocentric statements than the theory of value found for example in deep ecology [Chapter Four, section 5.2], and provide a further argument that neither “biocentrism” nor “ecocentrism” quite captures Die Grünen’s theory of value. In agreement with Wissenburg’s scale for the “real world” level [Figure 2 in Chapter 1], they appear to “place” somewhere in the middle range between the biocentrism and anthropocentrism of his ethics level.

## 5.3 The scope of the ethic

### 5.3.1 Biosphere, ecosystem and species protection

So, based on both inherent and instrumental values, the scope of the ethic includes all life: animal, human, and plant; “das Lebewesen” (Die Grünen, 1979, page 1, par. 3, 1980b, p. 22). It expresses itself in protection for ecosystems and their species (1980b, p. 20), and in the protection of individual animals.

### 5.3.2 *And* animal welfare

Die Grünen also argued from “Ökologie”, as they sought to bring animal concerns into the political arena. Their premise is generally that industrialism has increased animal cruelty, and “The Greens, within their fundamental ecological framework are consistently committed to the protection of animals...”<sup>88</sup> (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 44, citing from the 1982 Bayern electoral programme, my translation).

But there were differences within Die Grünen on animal welfare. Particularly the left-Greens, given their Marxist heritage of human emancipation as ultimate value, had problems with animal welfare: “You would rather pat your neighbour’s dog than intervene to prevent her child from being beaten?” was a typical left criticism (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 45, my translation). Others had problems with the concept of animal rights, given that no corresponding responsibilities could be expected from animals. Still others supported the welfare of animals, but only in an *instrumental* way – animal welfare which served human interests was understandable and acceptable; animal welfare as an independent value was going too far, best left to formal ethical theory, or religious/personal conviction (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 45). The counter-response, suggests Maren-Grisebach (1982, p. 45) is that

<sup>85</sup> “In einer ökologischen Gesellschaft sind die Wirtschaftsweise, der Lebensstil und die Konsumgewohnheiten geprägt von Rücksicht auf Umwelt ... von Ehrfurcht vor dem Leben der Pflanzen und Tiere. Die gegenwärtige Lebensweise in den Industriegesellschaften gefährdet die natürlichen Existenzbedingungen der Menschen...” (1983b, p. 6)

<sup>86</sup> “Wiederherstellung der ökologischen Lebensgrundlagen für Mensch, Tier und Pflanze ist unerlässlich, weil nur diese letztlich das Wohlergehen eines Volkes bestimmen.” (1980b, p. 18)

<sup>87</sup> “Die Einengung der natürlichen Lebensräume und die Ausrottung von Tier und Pflanzenarten zerstören das Gleichgewicht in der Natur und damit unsere Lebensgrundlage: Eine biologisch intakte Umwelt muß erhalten oder wiederhergestellt werden, wenn ein menschenwürdiges Überleben unserer zukünftigen Generationen gesichert werden soll” (1980b, p. 20)

<sup>88</sup> “Die Grünen setzen sich im Rahmen ihrer ökologischen Grundhaltung konsequent für den Schutz der Tiere ein...”

love for animals does not exclude love for humans, in fact, where the one is missing, the other is doubtful<sup>89</sup> (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 45).

### 5.3.2.1 *Animal experimentation, factory farming*

The animal protection law is about to be amended in parliament, and our concern is with two key points which expose the nerve of our scientific-industrial barbarism: factory farming and animal experiments (Bahro, 1985a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 196)

These two issues were to become an area of tension in Die Grünen's thought between 1979 and 1985. In 1979 their position on animal experimentation was categorically that "Cruel animal experiments may not be conducted, even less so where their necessity cannot be shown" (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 10). But by 1985, when Die Grünen were in parliament, and had the opportunity of speaking in favour of this position, Bahro, at the Hagen Congress, accused the parliamentary group of backtracking in favour of "political feasibility" (Bahro, 1985a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 196). Instead of arguing for an "unqualified 'no'" and using the opportunity "to put forward their plan for a fundamentally different policy on health, research, agriculture and industry" (Bahro, 1985a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 196), the parliamentary group opted for restriction of animal experimentation in principle, with many "individual justified exceptions" allowed (p. 197).

Whether one opposed animal experimentation or not, was for Bahro, the "litmus" test for being green (Bahro, 1985a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 208). While this might appear to be strong support for Wall's (1994, p. 66) statement that fundamental green – "dark" green – implies commitment to deep ecology and animal rights, one must perhaps rather see Bahro's defence of animal rights here within his critique of the exterminist industrial system (Bahro, 1985b, in Bahro, 1986, p. 211). "As far as I can see", he wrote, "animal experiments are one of the most political questions we ever had to deal with. To become a radical in this area [i.e. to oppose it] means to slaughter one of the holiest cows in modern Western idolatry, the 'freedom of science'" (p. 202). He opposed animal experiments *inter alia*, because "... [they] have an extremely important role in underpinning, facilitating and justifying the machinery of progress with which we are working on our own annihilation" (p. 202; see pp. 200-209 for his full argument). The animal experimentation incident was the last straw for Bahro, who noted in his resignation statement that "There is not a single issue where the Greens are taking seriously the purpose for which they ostensibly entered the political scene" (p. 210). He resigned from Die Grünen on the following day (Bahro, 1985b, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 210-211).

Green arguments against factory farming too, were based not solely on objections to animal torture, but on the preservation of jobs in organically-based animal production, and the protection of countryside life (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 23).

### 5.3.3 *And future generations*

Die Grünen claimed that their "total concept" was a long-term one, as opposed to the short-term politics of industrial society. Their proposed ethic of partnership thus included future generations:

... the world's natural resources must be very sparingly used as the common, non-renewable inheritance of the human race; such a policy will ensure that the needs of people everywhere and of coming generations can be met<sup>90</sup> (Die Grünen, 1985?, p. 18).

Our politics is ecological, because they accord priority to the conservation of the natural conditions of

<sup>89</sup> She also presents (pp. 46-47) a short discussion of animal welfare in the philosophical context of is-ought, and instrumental-independent value, hoping for a time when our moral behaviour towards nature is not only grounded in instrumentalism

<sup>90</sup> "Die Bodenschätze der Erde müssen als gemeinsames - nicht erneuerbares - Erbe der Menschheit höchst sparsam verwendet werden, damit die Bedürfnisse der Völker und kommender Generationen auch noch einen Anteil erhalten können" (1980b, p. 20)

existence for us, and for future generations<sup>91</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 2).

I nowhere encountered any indication of how many generations are meant, such as one finds in the Deep Ecology long-range seven-generation view (Chapter Four, section 5.1.2).

## 5.4 The moral obligation: protecting the “Lebensbasis”

Die Grünen proposed a series of measures to reflect their “partnership” ethic with nature, from which I have extracted some principles, the first and foremost of which is (5.4.1) the precautionary principle, (5.4.2) a cyclical, dynamic economy, (5.4.3) protection of biodiversity, (5.4.4) protection of animal welfare, (5.4.5) protection of land, air and water, (5.4.6) awareness-raising on ecological principles, and (5.4.7) participation in global environmental protection measures. Some of the Greens’ specific proposals are mentioned in these paragraphs. More detail can be obtained from their 1980 Federal programme (Die Grünen, 1980b).

### 5.4.1 Observe the precautionary principle

The overriding principle to observe in protecting the Lebensbasis, is what we would call today, the “precautionary principle” to ensure that the delicate interrelationship of nature’s dynamic balance is not disturbed:

A prerequisite of an ecologically oriented political view is the recognition of the interdependence between the balance of nature and life cycles, and an awareness of the consequences of human interference in nature<sup>92</sup> ” (Die Grünen, 1985?, p. 22) ... Our greatest imperative must be the least possible alteration of natural processes. Our actions must be directed towards reversing the current disturbance of the ecosystem (Die Grünen, 1985?, p. 22)

...when a thing is meshed together in a complicated way, and is at the same time also in unending motion [change], it is highly *risky* to intervene. Without its being immediately obvious, some valuable dynamic connections could have been severed. So, never plan interventions, or specify projects from behind your desk, but first consult with those knowledgeable about interconnections and dynamic balances ....<sup>93</sup> (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 49, my translation and italics).

...In particular, ecological politics presents an all-encompassing rejection of an economy of exploitation and plundering of natural resources and raw materials, as well as *the destructive intervention* into the cycles of nature's household. (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 33, my italics).

### 5.4.2 Re-orient the growth economy to a cyclical, dynamic economy

Amongst Die Grünen’s demands to achieve a partnership relation with nature, was a cyclical dynamic economy, in which the “development and application of ways of production which ensure the greatest possible re-use, which use less energy and raw materials, and which are in harmony with the requirements of nature and the environment”<sup>94</sup> (1980c, p. 8). The “cyclical dynamic economy” is discussed under the value of “Ecology” at section 6.1.2.

<sup>91</sup> “Unsere Politik ist ökologisch, weil sie der Erhaltung der natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen für uns und die zukünftige Generationen den Vorrang einräumt...” (1980c, p. 2)

<sup>92</sup> “Die Kenntnis der Abhängigkeiten des eingespielten Gleichgewichts und der Kreisläufe der Natur sowie alle Folgen der menschlichen Eingriffe ist die Voraussetzung einer ökologisch orientierten Politik. ... Oberstes Gebot muss eine möglichst geringe Veränderung der natürlichen Abläufe sein. Unser Handeln muss darauf gerichtet sein, die heutige Störung der Ökosysteme rückgängig zu machen ... (1980b, p. 20)

<sup>93</sup> “...wenn etwas kompliziert verzahnt und dann noch in unaufhörlicher Bewegung ist, wird es höchst *riskant* einzugreifen. Ohne dass es gleich sichtbar wird, können schon wertvolle Fliessketten zertrennt werden. Also nie vom Verwaltungstisch aus Eingriffe planen und Projekte festlegen, sondern erstens den Kenner von *Zusammenhängen und Fließgleichgewichten* befragen ... (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 49, my italics)

<sup>94</sup> “die Entwicklung und Anwendung von Produktionsweise, die eine weitestgehende Wiederverwendung sicherstellen, weniger Rohstoffe und Energie verbrauchen und mit den Erfordernissen der Natur und Umwelt im Einklang stehen” (1980c, p. 8)

### 5.4.3 Protect biodiversity and its habitat

Uncontrolled human behaviour is exterminating an increasing number of species ever quicker, which is upsetting the ecological dynamic balance more and more (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 22, par. 6 “Tier- und Pflanzenwelt (Artenschutz”). Spatial planning must not only be oriented to securing space for industrial society growth, but to the preservation of habitat for animal and plant species to ensure their survival (1979, p. 9; 1980b, p. 20). The protection of indigenous animals and plants in their natural habitat must enjoy priority over economic development plans (1980b, p. 22, par. 6 “Tier- und Pflanzenwelt (Artenschutz”). A species register was to be implemented which would provide an overview of a species’ status. Other measures included the protection or re-instatement of original landscapes [“Urlandschaften”] and animal habitats, the re-introduction of endemic flora and fauna species decimated by hunting, protection for threatened species against hunting and trade (1979, p. 10; 1980b, p. 23), the substitution of chemical by biological control methods in agriculture (1980b, p. 23).

Die Grünen proposed the transfer of the responsibility for plant and animal protection away from the Ministry of Agriculture to a to-be-created Ministry of the Environment<sup>95</sup>, for environmental protection. But there was, Capra and Spretnak (1984, p. 35) note, divergent opinion on the creation of such a Ministry: “Some Greens maintain that such a top-level agency is necessary to develop effective positive programs as well as halting the damage. Other Greens are horrified at the thought of swelling the federal bureaucracy in the name of Green solutions”.

#### 5.4.3.1 Oppose biotechnology

Die Grünen were opposed to genetic manipulation of both animals and humans<sup>96</sup> (1980b, p. 23).

### 5.4.4 Protect animal welfare

Die Grünen’s use of the word “rights” in connection with animal welfare suggests a direct derivation from the animal rights/rights for nonhuman nature philosophy introduced in Chapter Three. To achieve the level of animal protection they sought, they proposed new or revised legislation, instructional information [“Aufklärung”], and awareness-raising (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, pp. 44-45).

They opposed “gruesome” seal hunting, “avian murder” [a reference to the bird trade in Italy], and industrial whaling (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 23). One principle informs the three main injunctions listed next, that is, “Animals may no longer be considered as objects, but must be accorded a special legal status” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 23):

- Animal torture is strictly punishable
- Agricultural animals must be kept in conditions according to their species-nature
- Reduce, strictly control, and eventually phase out, animal experimentation.

The 1980 Bundesprogramm (1980b, p. 23), Die Grünen’s first national political programme, contains several animal welfare provisions.

### 5.4.5 Protect land, water and air

Land, water and air can no longer be treated as a throw-away commodity (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 20) or convenient dumping ground (1980c, p. 8). Priceless drinking water, for example, was not something to be squandered on flushing toilets and washing cars (1980b, p. 21): “**We are concerned, and refuse to accept that it should be so**<sup>97</sup>” (1980b, p. 20, their bold emphasis). For *land*, Die Grünen’s guiding value in their proposed measures was protection of its regenerative capacity for present and future

<sup>95</sup> “Wir werden dafür sorgen, daß die Zuständigkeit für den Tier- und Pflanzenschutz vom Landwirtschaftsminister auf ein Umweltministerium übertragen wird.” (1980b, p.23)

<sup>96</sup> They place this opposition in the context of animal protection (1980b, p. 23)

<sup>97</sup> “**Wir sind beunruhigt und werden es nicht hinnehmen**” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 20, their emphasis)

generations; it was not to be “valued, marketed, or destroyed on primarily commercial grounds”<sup>98</sup> (1980b, p. 20). They proposed a series of radical measures, including limiting harmful emissions to land, water, and air, and the strict application of the polluter pays principle (“Verursacherprinzip”) (Die Grünen, 1979, pp. 9-10; 1980b, p. 20, pp. 21-22; 1980c, pp. 8-9). Many of their measures (for example, 1980b, pp. 20-23) have yet to be achieved today.

#### 5.4.6 Provide insight into ecological principles

A knowledge of nature’s interdependencies of highly attuned cycles and balances, as well as of the consequences of human intervention, is the premise of ecologically-oriented politics. Our primary aim is to make people aware of [give people insight into] these interconnections<sup>99</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 20, my translation).

This instructional, insight-promoting information [“Aufklärung”] should be provided both in schools, and in ongoing adult education, in a *philosophical-ecological context*: what Maren-Grisebach (1982, p. 52) calls “the science of networks” [“Vernetzungswissenschaft”]. This differs from the environmental education model envisaged by behaviourist-inclined environmental psychologists, or the model enthusiastically taken up in sustainable development literature: better environmental information → better environmental attitudes → better environmental behaviour. It should involve rather, a deep change of consciousness.

#### 5.4.7 Extend the United Nations role in environmental protection

At international level, Die Grünen argued for strengthening the role of the United Nations in “the protection of the planet’s ecological balance”<sup>100</sup> (1980b, p. 16). This would include the negotiation of international environmental protection treaties, the protection and restoration of the world’s forests as protection for global soil fertility and water and carbon cycles, and as protection against climate change, the protection of oceans against over-fishing, deep sea mining, and pollution (1980b, pp. 16-17).

## 6. A View of culture/society

Two, sometimes similar, sometimes different, but always intertwined views of the radical ecologically re-oriented society for which Die Grünen were striving, can be discerned in their early political statements. One can be called the fundamentalist “Total Alternative”, get-out-of/transcend-the-industrial-system vision (Bahro, 1983b, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 45-48). While Bahro’s writings on this topic are extensive, I think they can be reduced to three main ideas (1) the total rejection of capitalist expansionist production and culture, and (2) the commune as the basic social unit of the new society, adopting a self-reliant contractive economic system which would not form part of the world market [section 6.3.1], tied together by (3) a concept of “Selbstverwirklichung” not based on materialist values [section 4.3.3]. The second view could be called the “repair the system” view, which though “reformist” in Bahro’s view, is still radical by today’s standards.

Though Die Grünen themselves did not, I choose to present their views on *selected* social and economic issues in terms of their four fundamental values: (6.1) Ecology, (6.2) Living in solidarity, (6.3) Direct democracy, and (6.4) Non-violence. As suggested in section 2.3, these values represent a programmatic response to exterminism’s “logic of self-destruction”. As with the human-nature

<sup>98</sup> “überwiegend nach kommerziellen Gesichtspunkten abgeschätzt, vermarktet und vernichtet...” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 20)

<sup>99</sup> “Die Kenntnis der Abhängigkeiten des eingespielten Gleichgewichts und der Kreisläufe der Natur sowie alle Folgen der menschlichen Eingriffe ist die Voraussetzung einer ökologisch orientierten Politik”. Unser vorrangiges Ziel ist daher die Aufklärung der Bevölkerung über die Zusammenhänge (1980b, p. 20)

<sup>100</sup> “Die zusätzlich gewaltige Aufgabe der Vereinten Nationen ist die Bewahrung des ökologischen Gleichgewichts auf diesem Planeten.” (1980b, p. 16)

relationship, “Partnerschaft” is the salvational human-human ethic. It is to be achieved through a series of supportive values: self-decision-making, self-reliance, the establishment of human scale businesses and administrative units, the breakdown of dominating relationships, the elimination of the achievement and competitive orientation, the cultivation of solidarity, the exercise of direct democracy.

## 6.1 “Ökologisch”

Our politics is “ecological”, because it gives priority to the preservation of the natural conditions for existence, for us and for future generations, and because it orients itself towards peoples’ needs as well as their creative capacities. It is opposed to the exploitation of humanity and of nature within the capitalist competitive economy and in the existing centralist planned economies (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 2).

Under this value, I discuss Die Grünen’s views on (6.1.1) ecology as normative, (6.1.2) the economy, (6.1.3) energy issues, (6.1.4) agriculture, and (6.1.5) transport. Other ecological issues, such as habitat and species preservation, animal welfare, and protection of land, air and water, have already been discussed at section 5.4. Still other issues such as monetary and taxation policies<sup>101</sup>, though part of the ecological re-orientation of society, have been omitted altogether.

### 6.1.1. Ecology as normative for society

Capra and Spretnak explain the meaning of the ecology pillar in terms of deep ecology<sup>102</sup>:

The first of the ‘four pillars’, ecology, has several meanings in Green politics. All of them can be understood within the context of ‘deep ecology’, a concept that has also informed American ecophilosophy and activism in recent years. Far more than protecting or repairing the status quo, which is generally the goal of environmentalism, deep ecology encompasses the study of nature’s subtle web of interrelated processes and the application of that study to our interactions with nature and among ourselves. The teachings of deep ecology include implications for our politics, our economy, our social structures, our educational system, our healthcare, our cultural expressions, and our spirituality” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 30).

Die Grünen themselves, however, do not make this connection. In one explanation of their four fundamental values, (1980b, pp. 4-5), ecology is the primary value which –

- (1) is normative for the place of human beings in the order of things. We must understand ourselves, our society, and our economy, as part of nature
- (2) indicates that the proper ethical relationship to nature, to each other, and to future generations, is “aktive Partnerschaft”, best achieved through human-scale, decentralized, self-managing units in both economic and political spheres
- (3) rejects the power, competitive, and achievement-oriented relations of industrial society as “lebensfeindlich”.

Ecology, not economy, is now the value within which *all* issues in society are to be evaluated:

...Europe cannot remain trapped in the industrial society, which assesses all issues in economic terms. Europe’s future will be determined in future by ecology, not economy<sup>103</sup> (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2, par.4).

<sup>101</sup> These however favoured taxation of energy and raw material use, of products which were harmful to the environment and health, and tax concessions for small and medium businesses producing eco-friendly goods, and employing eco-friendly and base-democratic production processes (1980c, p. 4)

<sup>102</sup> So does deep ecologist Naess indirectly. “Whereas the shallow movement suggests increases in environmental budgets, forcing polluters to pay for the pollution caused, and many other changes in social policies, these proposed changes are not “deep”. Green political party programs usually imply changes on the same deep level as those implied by the Deep Ecology movement.” (Naess, 1995a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 211)

<sup>103</sup> “... Europa [kann] nicht bei der Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft stehen bleiben, die alle Fragen unter ökonomischen Gesichtspunkten behandelt. Die Zukunft Europas wird nicht mehr von der Ökonomie, sondern von der Ökologie bestimmt werden” (1979, p. 2, par.4)

## 6.1.2 The economy

Die Grünen's economy is not a "capitalist", or a "growth" or "global" economy, it is named and described in ecological concepts: it is a "dynamically balanced economy" or an "ecologically-appropriate, dynamic circular economy"<sup>104</sup>, a dynamically stable economy: "dynamische Gleichgewichtswirtschaft" (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 3, p. 4). The ethic of "Partnerschaft" is achieved by recognizing that the economy should not, by disturbing the ecological equilibrium, threaten the "Lebensbasis" for current and future generations. The one-dimensional, profit-oriented growth economy must become an ecological cyclical economy [6.1.2.1], it must deliver quality of life not quantitative growth [6.1.2.2], prioritize "investments in the future" [6.1.2.3], deliver social justice [6.1.2.4], be democratically controlled [6.1.2.5], and include ecological book-keeping [6.1.2.6] (1983a, pp. 6-8). Typically, Die Grünen's view of the economy's role in society is informed by their view of Self-realization [section 4.3]: work provides people with the opportunities to develop and express their capacities: "... die Chance, ihre Fähigkeiten breit zu entfalten" (Die Grünen, 1983a, p. 4).

### 6.1.2.1 Re-orient the one-way growth economy to an ecological cyclical economy

In the steady-state versus expanding economy debate, Die Grünen adopted the "limits" side:

The world's material resources, such as oil, coal or iron ore, are fast being depleted. Our civilization, with its established technology and structure of needs, cannot be maintained. I don't understand how one can refuse to face this. (Bahro, 1984e, p. 115).

Because development in the context of limits is inevitable...<sup>105</sup> (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2, par.2).

The limits to "endless growth in industrial production"<sup>106</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, Preamble, p. 4 par. 1) were not only ecological (land, water, air), but included human-social limits: the limits posed by the industrial society's growing dependence on the natural resources of other countries (the centre-periphery argument discussed at 2.1.3.2), and the limits posed by senseless and damaging materialism and consumerism (1979, p. 2, par. 6): "We Greens want to put a stop to this life-threatening growth..."<sup>107</sup> (1981, p. 2, par. 2, my translation).

In its place there should be an ecological cyclical economy based on a partnership ethic, both with people and nature:

An ecological economy rejects industrial growth as its guiding value... Ecological production understands the relationship between humanity and nature not as an exploitative one-way street, but as a partnership which recognizes mutual interdependence. An ecological economy recognizes social wealth therein, that nature is re-claimed, and preserved as a vital element for humanity<sup>108</sup> (Die Grünen, 1983a, p. 6, my translation).

### 6.1.2.2 The economy's Gross National Product must be quality of life, not consumption

Social wealth does not comprise, and is not measurable in, the quantities of goods and services consumed [GNP]. Industrial society's "consumer" and "throw-away" mentality (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4) is seen as a sop ["Ersatzbefriedigung"] for meaningless work (1983a, p. 6), and an inauthentic division between "work time" and "free time". Reduction of production to what a society *really* needs, would mean a radical reduction in work day hours, and offer self-chosen work and leisure opportunities: "freie Tätigkeit, die sich als Selbstzweck gilt" (1983a, p. 6). The Greens rejected the so-

<sup>104</sup> "dynamische Gleichgewichtswirtschaft" (1979, p. 3), an "ökologische angepasste, dynamische Kreislaufwirtschaft ...." (1979, p. 4)

<sup>105</sup> "Da die Entwicklung in die Knappheit unausweichlich ist..." (1979, p. 2, par.2)

<sup>106</sup> "unendliche industrielle Produktionssteigerung" (1980b, Preamble, p. 4 par. 1)

<sup>107</sup> "Wir Grünen wollen diesem lebensfeindlichen Wachstum ein Ende setzen..." (1981, p. 2, par. 2)

<sup>108</sup> "Eine ökologische Wirtschaft wendet sich ab von industriellem Wachstum als wirtschaftlichem Leitwert.... Ökologische Produktion sieht der Beziehung zwischen Mensch und Natur nicht länger als eine die Natur ausbeutende Einbahnstrasse, sondern als Partnerschaft ... Eine ökologische Wirtschaftsweise erkennt gesellschaftlichen Reichtum darin, die Natur als Lebenselement der Menschen zu erhalten und widerzugewinnen" (1983a, p. 6)

called “social market economy” [“soziale Marktwirtschaft”], in which every possible expression of being human, from work, to sport, to recreation and culture is commercialized (1983a, p. 6). Manipulative privately-controlled industrial advertising designed to increase consumerism is to be replaced by independent information which protects the consumer. Die Grünen advocated no advertisements over radio and television, and certain consumerist products such as cigarettes, alcohol, and sweets were to be barred from any advertisement at all (1980b, p. 7). “A free and socially-responsible society would render such ersatz consumption unnecessary; in its place would be quality of human life, which would unfold itself in free time and self-chosen activities. We Greens welcome all efforts which would enable such a new lifestyle to be practised”<sup>109</sup> (Die Grünen, 1983a, p. 6, my translation).

### 6.1.2.3 Prioritize “investments in the future”

In the less radical understanding of the new economy, an ecological cyclical economy would prioritize “investments in the future” (Die Grünen, 1983a, pp. 14-20), that is, the dismantling of life-threatening industries such as the nuclear and weapons industries, and re-orientation of their production to ecology-protecting activities, for example; a change to technology limited to the use of materials which would not upset the long-term sustainability of ecological balance; reduction in extraction rate, and thrifty use of energy and raw materials; the re-use of materials; the re-cycling back into nature of waste products; the production of durable, repairable goods. Instead of the economy’s primary orientation to imports, exports, and the world market, there should be local/regional production as close as possible to those who would be consuming it. Such production would not exclude meaningful, although reduced international trade<sup>110</sup> (1983b, p. 7).

The more radical interpretation of investments in the future was the call for funding of self-administered alternative projects *outside* the industrial system, outside the world market. To this end, “The Greens set themselves the goal of diverting one thousand million marks into the alternative sector, to make possible there a kind of primary accumulation for the new social formation. ... We consider it our main task to provide political cover for this long-term transitional process and to help secure the material foundation for it” (Bahro, 1982a, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 20-21). Traces of Bahro’s cultural “withdrawal from the industrial system” (Bahro, 1982b, in Bahro, 1986, p. 27) appear in Die Grünen’s political statements, as, for example:

The building up of *holistic community projects, which encompass all aspects of life*. The overcoming of the alienating division between theory and praxis, between mental and manual work, between where one resides and where one works, between work time and leisure time, can only be achieved in communities, in which holistic life connections can be established ... These communities should be diverse, and large enough to achieve self-provisioning ... to achieve the maximum possible independence from the existing, alienating economic and social systems. We associate with that a vision of larger communities, which do not orient themselves towards the structures of existing systems ... a whole new kind of grassroots social organization ... They [these communities] should form the germ cells of a new socially and ecologically-responsible society...<sup>111</sup> (Die Grünen, 1983a, pp. 23-24, their italics, my translation).

<sup>109</sup> “Eine frei und soziale Gesellschaft wird solchen Ersatzkonsum überflüssig machen; an die Stelle standardisierten Konsums wird eine Qualität des menschlichen Lebens treten, die sich in freier Zeit und selbstbestimmter Tätigkeit entfaltet. Wir Grünen begrüssen alle Ansätze, die einen solchen neuen Lebensstil praktizieren helfen”

<sup>110</sup> “soll eine möglichst verbrauchernahe Produktion in lokalen/regionalen Wirtschaftsräumen treten. Eine verbrauchernahe Produktion schliesst keineswegs einen sinnvollen, allerdings verringerten internationalen Handel aus” (1983b, p. 7)

<sup>111</sup> “Aufbau *ganzheitlicher Gemeinschaftsprojekte*, die alle Lebenszusammenhänge umfassen. Die Überwindung der entfremdenden Trennung von Theorie und Praxis, von Kopf- und Handarbeit, von wohnen und arbeiten, von Arbeitszeit und Freizeit, kan letztlich nur in Gemeinschaften gelingen, in denen sich ganzheitliche Lebensbezüge herstellen lassen. ... Diese Gemeinschaften sollen vielfältig und gross genug sein, um durch weitestgehende *Selbstversorgung* ... ein Höchstmass an Unabhängigkeit von herkömmlichen, fremdbestimmten Wirtschafts – und Gesellschaftssystemen zu gewinnen. Wir verbinden damit also die Vorstellung von Grossgemeinschaften, die sich nicht an den vom herkömmlichen System vorgegebenen Strukturen orientieren.... einen ganz neuen Typ sozialer Basisorganisation... Sie sollen somit zu Keimzellen einer neuen sozial und ökologisch verantwortlichen Gesellschaft werden...” (1983a, pp. 23-24)

#### ***6.1.2.4 The economy must deliver social justice***

The economy must not be oriented solely to short-term economic rationality and profit, but ensure the delivery of social justice, a concept including secure social services; a basic, but sufficient income for all; a fair distribution of goods produced so that the disadvantaged sections of society also benefit; meaningful and dignified work; protection against unemployment; and the use of technology which contributes to human quality of life and the conservation of nature (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 4; 1980b, pp. 7-8, pp. 25-27). The economy must also dismantle exploitative, inegalitarian economic relations with the Third World (1983b, p. 6, pp. 8-10). More detail is provided at 6.2.1 and 6.2.6.

#### ***6.1.2.5 Democratize the economy and its management***

This aspect of the cyclical dynamic economy is discussed at 6.2.1.4.

#### ***6.1.2.6 Introduce publicly-accountable ecological bookkeeping***

Here, as with the limits to growth idea, one sees the ideas-influence of ecological economics, which in the 1980s, was a “new field of knowledge” looking both for an academic home, and “plausible political groups” to adopt it as an ideology<sup>112</sup> (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 234). Martinez-Alier (1987) defines ecological economics<sup>113</sup> as the study of the use of energy in the economy (p. xv), which is viewed not as a “merry-go-round between producers and consumers, but rather as the one-way entropic throughput of energy and materials” (p. xv). Inputs into the economic process - the use of nature’s stocks and flows of energy and materials – must be taken into account, and outputs must include accounting for the production of waste. “Ecological economics questions the ability of the market to value such effects accurately...” (pp. xvii-xviii). Die Grünen’s demand for the introduction of a publicly-accountable ecological book-keeping in businesses, to track their environmental and social impact (1979, p. 4; 1980b, p. 8) was then, ahead of its time.

### **6.1.3 Energy**

Die Grünen’s critique of existing energy policy can be reduced I think to three main arguments: (a) non-renewable energy sources are limited (b) the use of nuclear energy poses threats to both the environment and to civil liberties, so is not a viable alternative to fossil fuel energy sources, and (c) the way forward is via people- and eco-friendly alternative energies (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 6). I identify five major demands: stabilize energy use [6.1.3.1], derive energy from renewable resources [6.1.3.2], halt all atomic energy projects [6.1.3.3], democratize and decentralize energy provision and storage [6.1.3.4], and increase research into alternative energies [6.1.3.5].

#### ***6.1.3.1 Stabilize energy use***

Currently available energy sources must be used sparingly, and their efficiency rate increased (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 6).

#### ***6.1.3.2 Derive energy from renewable resources***

Fossil fuel use must be decreased in favour of energy derived from alternative sources such as sun, wind, water, and biogas. An alternative energy network should be provided (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 8; 1980c, p. 6).

---

<sup>112</sup> He calls the ideological version of egalitarian ecological economics “ecological neo-narodism... an ideology for the dispossessed of the earth” (1987, p. 234). Neo-narodism is “pro-peasant” and pro-“energy-efficient traditional models of [agricultural] production” (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 235, p. 236), and opposed to an economic growth which helps preserve inequality (p. 236). It could be combined, he argued, “without excessive difficulty” with some varieties of anarchism and of Marxism (p. 247). Martinussen (1997) also mentions it in his discussion of development theory

<sup>113</sup> Also called energy economics (Bramwell, 1989, pp. 64-91), finite resource ecology (Bramwell, 1989), or human ecological energetics (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. viii)

### ***6.1.3.3. Halt all atomic energy projects***

Die Grünen considered nuclear energy to be a “Pakt mit dem Teufel” (1979, p. 7, par 3). It represented a threat to the environment, to people’s health (1981, p. 2, par. 4), and to fundamental and democratic human rights, because of the heightened security measures needed to reduce risk (1979, p. 2, par. 7). Nuclear plants are also a prime target in wartime (1981, p. 8). The nuclear process used to produce energy can just as well be used to produce nuclear weapons<sup>114</sup> (1981, p. 2, par. 4), which are a threat to the continuance of life itself (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2, par. 7; 1981, p. 2, par. 5, par. 7 as examples). All planning, construction, running of, and export of nuclear technology and facilities must be immediately stopped (1980c, p. 6).

### ***6.1.3.4 Democratize and decentralize energy provision and storage***

This demand involved decentralization of energy storage and provision, as well as allowing private enterprise to contribute to the energy provision network (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 5; 1980c, p. 6).

### ***6.1.3.5 Increase research into alternative energies***

There should be a complete re-orientation of research from fossil fuel energy to the raising of energy from alternative and renewable energy sources. To encourage that, the monopoly of the large energy concerns should be ended (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 6).

## **6.1.4 Agriculture**

In their 1980 election manifesto, Die Grünen succinctly summarize their viewpoint on agriculture. It again amounts to a holistic critique of industrial society:

We reject the industrialisation and chemicalization of agriculture, because it increasingly diminishes the number of rural jobs and businesses, makes the farmers increasingly dependent on industry and banking, desolates the landscape, decimates flora and fauna species, destroys the natural regenerative capacities of the soil and its vegetation, reduces food quality, leads to the torture of animals, and disturbs rural cultural life” (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 5).

I extract as their major demands:

### ***6.1.4.1 The primary aim must be food security, and healthy food***

Die Grünen argue that our continued human existence depends not on industrial production, but on agricultural production. The emphasis must be on a secure supply of healthy food, by which is meant, food produced organically (1980b, pp. 12-13).

### ***6.1.4.2 Re-orient agricultural production to ecological, not industrial, production***

Agriculture should not be dependent on industry (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 12). Kelly (1989, pp. 79-82) conveys some of the critique of industrial agricultural methods:

The structure of industrial agriculture is one of large fields, and mass application of artificial fertilisers, pesticides and high yield plants. Agriculture is currently organized on the basis of competitive pressure to expand and intensify. But this puts a strain on the whole ecological system. In agricultural terms, pressure to expand means draining marshlands with a purpose-built excavator and plastic pipes. Alternatively, it means clearing hedgerows or ploughing right up to the hedges bordering the woodlands. We Greens must become the parliamentary representatives of the birds, the plants and the marshes, the voice of ecological

---

<sup>114</sup> Bramwell (1994) in her critique of Die Grünen on this point, says that “Whether or not nuclear power plants can easily be put to military uses is a matter for controversy: atomic energy specialists say it is impossible” (p. 106). One does wonder then why the USA and the UN Atomic Energy Agency are currently [2007] so concerned about nuclear energy production in Iran and North Korea? Even more strangely she argues (p. 106) that [in 1994, after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986] “Certainly, there is as yet no evidence that nuclear energy has threatened democracy and human rights...”

stability (Kelly, 1984, pp. 79-82).

The European Union requirement for quantitative, industrial agricultural production must be re-oriented step by step towards ecologically-oriented production (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 7, par. 1); the latter's methods are "particularly economical in their use of raw materials and energy..." (Kelly, 1984, p. 79). Monocropping is critiqued (Die Grünen, 1980b, pp. 12-13). Ecological production protects jobs and the rural way of life (Die Grünen, 1980b, pp. 12-13): "The Greens do not want to see agriculture managed on industrial lines by a small number of employers. What we need is an agriculture where the backbone is provided by independent small and medium scale family enterprises. Farmers should remain farmers, not become agricultural industrialists" (Kelly, 1984, p. 79).

### 6.1.5 Transport and mobility

Industrial society mentality, and its resultant spatial planning, is blamed for the extensive road network needed to connect the separated spheres of peoples' lives [work, living, shopping, etc.], resulting in a people-unfriendly environment [noise, long-distances to be travelled, increased accident risk, aesthetic damage to intact landscapes, danger to people on bicycles], as well as damage to the ecology through vehicle emissions, the use of salt to improve slippery road surfaces, and irresponsible use of non-renewable energy.

From the many measures proposed by Die Grünen (1980b, pp. 14-15; 1980c, p. 5), I derive four principles:

- Make *all* transport more friendly to people and to the environment: less noise, less danger; less landscape destruction, less energy consumption, less pollution
- Favour space and energy-saving rail as urban and intra-national traffic network
- Ensure that the urban network is friendly to the handicapped, to pedestrians, and for bicycles
- Use the mass transport system whenever possible, rather than privately-owned cars.

## 6.2 "Sozial" [or living in solidarity]

Die Grünen provide a brief explanation of their value "sozial" as:

Our politics is - ... 'social', because we are of the opinion that humanity can only confront the ecological crisis when peoples' self-determination and their unrestricted unfolding can become a reality, jointly, and in solidarity with other people, and in harmony with their environment. We devote our energy to ensuring that the radical changes which the ecological crisis, and its overcoming, are bringing our way, will not add to the burden of the working population, of the disadvantaged and handicapped of our society. (1980c, p.2).

Their critique of the social welfare system, of work opportunities, work content, the role of technology<sup>115</sup>, and the injustice of unemployment, is perhaps conveyed most powerfully in their 1983 *Sinnvoll arbeiten – solidarisch leben* political statement (Die Grünen, 1983a). This document is also a site of the tensions between the fundamentalist get-out-of-the-system altogether versus the patch-up-the-industrial-model approach. Bahro noted that amongst the left-Greens, there was still a tendency to deal with unemployment along the [Marxist] lines of " 'wages and bread for everyone' – in other words, 'reproduce the world market and so on'", basically, redistribution within the system. What fundamentalist Greens were arguing for, was "redistribution out of the system: redistribution on a totally different foundation, not capitalist...", not based on "expanded reproduction or expansion [what Bahro called the "European" conception of reproduction], but on "simple reproduction" (Bahro, 1984e, p. 182). He was critical of the priority given in the programme (Die Grünen, 1983a) to the creation of new jobs rather than "self-confidently, positively and forcefully" outlining a total ecological alternative

---

<sup>115</sup> Bahro's critique of industrial technology is similar to Arne Naess's deep ecology critique: technology is dictating culture (Bahro, 1984, p. 138), rather than being adjusted to a society's cultural aims (Naess, 1982a, in Bodian, 1982, in Sessions, 1995, p. 32)

(Sandford, 1986, p. 213, note 3 under “This time the Greens. Why?”; Bahro, 1983a, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 36-38; Bahro, 1983b, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 45-48). Capra and Spretnak<sup>116</sup> (1984, p. 35) also comment on Die Grünen’s ideological differences in interpreting “sozial”. Despite these ideological differences, the humanistic ideals and core values of socialism<sup>117</sup> appear to be held in common.

Under this value, I discuss (6.2.1) Work, employment and unemployment, (6.2.2) education, (6.2.3) human habitat, (6.2.4) health, (6.2.5) social assistance, (6.2.6) Third World issues, and (6.2.7) womens’ issues.

## **6.2.1 Work, employment and unemployment**

This section comprises (6.2.1.1) work as means to Self-realization. This premise provides a context of understanding for demands of (6.2.1.2) work as a right, (6.2.1.3) a programme against unemployment, (6.2.1.4) democratization of the economy and the workplace, and (6.2.1.5), worker-controlled, humane technology.

### **6.2.1.1 Work is for Self-realization, not only payment**

Die Grünen condemned the meaninglessness, and physical and psychological destructiveness, of many jobs: “Die Arbeit vieler Menschen ist sinnentleert...” (1980c, p. 3), endured just for the sake of the money at the end of the day. They wanted to recover work as a “free self-decided activity, as an opportunity for self-unfolding<sup>118</sup>” (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 7). They were not so naive as to think that there would be no alienation, no “dreary and depressing moments” in some jobs and some work content, but then there must be egalitarianism in such jobs’ distribution amongst people (1983b, p. 7).

### **6.2.1.2 Work must be a right**

In the profit-oriented industrial work process, the few decide over the opportunities of the many to work at all. This is unjust. “We reject an economic order in which the economically powerful decide on the work process, the work product, and the conditions of existence for the vast majority of the people...”<sup>119</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 7). Forced unemployment [2 million people, projected to rise to 3 million by the end of 1983], and the dismantling of the welfare system, were pushing more and more people to the edges of society. Die Grünen saw this as an injury to the human condition generally: “Diese Globalverletzung menschlicher Tätigkeiten...” (1983a, p. 3). In a socially-oriented economy, there would be no unemployment, because the work – socially-necessary work serving material needs, not profit – would be fairly divided between all (1983a, pp. 6-7). There must be a programme against unemployment in the system.

### **6.2.1.3 There must be protection against unemployment in the system**

“Am I a proper human being only when I stand on the assembly line? ... Is my main concern wage-labour and income? Or is it the maintenance of life, something essentially natural?” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 173)

<sup>116</sup> On their view, radical-left Greens “read *sozial* as a codeword for socialism, that is, democratic Marxism”, a model not supported by the visionary, conservative, or liberal Greens [section 1.3], the majority of whom wanted a setup which was neither capitalist status-quo or communist-style socialism (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 35)

<sup>117</sup> Janet Biehl, social ecologist, sums up socialism’s values: “In the aftermath of the cold war, in a world that glorifies markets and commodities, it sometimes seems difficult to remember that generations of people once fought to create a very different kind of world. ... Yet for a century preceding the First World War, and for nearly a half century thereafter, various kinds of socialism – statist and libertarian; economic and moral; industrial and communalistic – constituted a powerful mass movement for the transformation of a competitive society into a cooperative one – and for the creation of a generous and humane system in which emancipated human beings could fulfill their creative and rational potentialities...” (Biehl, 2003, <http://www.social-ecology.org>, retrieved 9 October 2006, follow “Library”, then “Bookchin”, then “The Murray Bookchin Reader” link)

<sup>118</sup> “freie selbstbestimmte Tätigkeit, als Möglichkeit der Selbstentfalten (1983b, p. 7)

<sup>119</sup> “Wir wenden uns gegen eine Wirtschaftsordnung, in der die wirtschaftlich Mächtigen über den Arbeitsprozess, das Arbeitsergebnis und die Existenzbedingungen der grössten Mehrheit der Bevölkerung bestimmen...” (1980b, p. 7)

“At the crucial conference of the Greens last autumn [ca. 1982]”, Bahro wrote, “I attacked the section of the [1983 *Sinnvoll arbeiten- solidarisch leben*] draft programme on unemployment because it was completely based on the traditional left social-democratic model. Then I wrote something, very rapidly, in which I said that unemployment releases energies from the old bonds, that it gives us the opportunity to provide the unemployed with a new perspective. Of course the polemic developed in such a way that I was soon said to be arguing that five million unemployed are five million opportunities to climb out of the industrial system ...” (Bahro, 1984e, pp. 170-171). His point was that “...unemployment no longer causes the same hopelessness that it did twenty years ago. The existence of the Green alternative is an important factor in this. Unemployment is not just a crisis of need, then or now, but a crisis of identity for the individual. The immediate impression is that, out of work, you are a nobody. ... But according to social workers involved in this field, many young people begin to feel after a few months ... that perhaps work isn’t the most important thing after all, that it is necessary to rediscover themselves...Among at least half of the young generation today the search for identity through a career is definitely on the decline” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 176).

Despite Bahro’s view that a programme against unemployment, “by its very name” is “bound to the system and preserving the system” (Bahro, 1983b, in Bahro, 1986, p. 46), Die Grünen called for an active programme of job creation [“(die) Schaffung vieler Arbeitsplätze”] within the system. Many jobs could be created through their “Investments in the future” programme, for example, in the fields of alternative energy creation, alternative technology, the change-over from chemicalized to organic farming, the extension of the railway network, and environmental protection fields (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 4, 1983c) – Bahro’s despised eco-storey on the metropolitan industrial edifice! [2.1.3.7].

#### **6.2.1.4 Democratize the economy, and its management**

Ecological cyclical economic politics is also about solidarity politics:

Die Grünen support all movements which aim for decentralized and human-scale production units. The major businesses must be unravelled into human-scale enterprises, which are self-administered by those who work in them. Small, medium, and particularly alternative enterprises must be preserved, established and promoted<sup>120</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 8).

An ecologically-oriented economy is under democratic control, not the control of banks, insurance companies and multi-nationals (1983a, p. 5). Die Grünen were in favour of unravelling [“unbundling” in today’s terminology] massive business concerns, multi-nationals and monopolies, whether controlled by private capital or the state. The economy was to comprise self-managed businesses constituted at “überschaubare” scale [“human-scale”], and without hierarchical structures (1983a, p. 8). Die Grünen were opposed to employer autocracy [“Unternehmerwillkür”], and supported the extension of worker rights in the workplace (1980c, p. 4). “Essentially, it is those who are affected, who should be making the decisions about WHAT is produced, HOW, and WHERE”<sup>121</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 7, their capitalization; 1983a, pp. 7-8): “... workers themselves must be able to determine the work process, the planning, performance and the end result of their work”<sup>122</sup>, (1980b, p. 8).

#### **6.2.1.5 The use of technology must be democratically decided, and add to, not detract from the meaningfulness of work**

In the pursuit of profit, industrial capitalism not only rationalizes the work process through the division of labour, but wherever possible, substitutes technology for people. Mass unemployment was one

<sup>120</sup> “Die Grünen unterstützen alle Bewegungen, die sich für dezentrale und überschaubare Produktionseinheiten ... einsetzen. Die Grosskonzerne sind in überschaubare Betriebe zu entflechten, die von den dort arbeitenden demokratisch selbstverwaltet werden. Kleine, mittlere und vor allem alternative Betriebe sind zu erhalten, einzurichten und zu fördern” (1980b, p. 8).

<sup>121</sup> “Es geht im Kern darum, dass die Betroffenen selbst Entscheidungen darüber treffen, WAS, WIE oder WO produziert wird” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 7, their capitalization; 1983a, pp. 7-8)

<sup>122</sup> “Die Arbeitenden müssen über Arbeitsplanung, Arbeitsdurchführung und Arbeitsergebnis selbst bestimmen”

result; physical and mental stress another. It is not the person performing the work who decides on how the machine should operate, instead, the machine is dictating his/her work movements, and work pace<sup>123</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 8). People are exposed to physical and mental stresses which make them ill<sup>124</sup> (1980c, p. 3). Technology, which should properly be at the disposal of human creativity, and provide the conditions for self-realization, is now utilized in the service of cost efficiency, competitiveness, and profit (Bahro, 1982a, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 15-16). In such rationalized, automated processes, the organic connection which used to exist between the worker and his/her total product is dually broken – the hands-on element is no longer there, and the worker has only a partial, and often time-driven connection with the commodity produced. Such technology only compounds the alienation, and meaninglessness, of the industrial work process. As ecologically thinking and acting people, Die Grünen demanded a new work process orientation, in which technology does not dominate people, but in which people decide between different, human-scale, technological options<sup>125</sup> (1981, p. 2, par. 2).

But Die Grünen are not in principle anti-technology. They have a critical awareness of technology's capabilities; there where technology is human- and nature-friendly, it is used as a matter of course<sup>126</sup> (Maren-Grisebach, "Sind Die Grünen technikfeindlich?", 1982, pp. 107-125).

## 6.2.2 Education

Die Grünen's proposed measures on education are derived, I think, from one major premise: like work, education serves a person's "Selbstverwirklichung" or "Selbstfinden" (1979, p. 13; 1980c, p. 12) - a nostalgic 1970s phrase! Subsidiary premises (1979, p. 13; 1980c, p. 12) are that [6.2.2.1] education must be holistic, and [6.2.2.2] must produce people reflecting Die Grünen's core values [2.3].

### 6.2.2.1 Education must be holistic, that is, involve the whole person

The aim of Die Grünen's proposals was to change the structure of schools, as well as syllabus content (1980b, pp. 31-32). Schools must not be machines ("Schulmaschinen") primarily oriented towards producing economic beings. Instead of producing technocrats and "well-adjusted" [industrial society] citizens<sup>127</sup>, education must include spiritual, moral, and social responsibility components, as well as develop a person's physical and creative talents (1979, p. 13; 1980b, pp. 31-32). It must be daily-life oriented, break down the existing gulf between the worlds of learning and work (1980c, p. 12), and the gulf between the sexes too. A radical demand was, for example, home economics and child-rearing instruction as mandatory subjects in schools for both sexes (1980b, p. 26).

### 6.2.2.2 Education must produce people reflecting Die Grünen's core values

Education must produce people capable of and motivated to self-responsibility as well as social responsibility, ecological awareness, democratic behaviour, conflict negotiation, living in peaceful solidarity with, and toleration of, other human beings (Die Grünen, 1980b, pp. 31-32).

---

<sup>123</sup> "Der arbeitende Mensch bestimmt nicht den Gang der Maschinen, sondern diese diktieren seine Arbeitsschritte und sein Arbeitstempo"

<sup>124</sup> "Die Menschen sind physischen und psychischen Belastungen ausgesetzt, die sie krank machen..."

<sup>125</sup> "Als ökologisch denkende und handelnde Menschen streben wir eine neue Organisation der Arbeit an, in der ... die technologischen Möglichkeiten nicht als Sachzwänge über die Menschen beherrschen, sondern die Menschen die Alternativen der technischen Entwicklung nach menschlichen Mass bestimmen" (1981, p. 2, par. 2)

<sup>126</sup> "Grüne sind nicht technikfeindlich. Grüne sind technisch-skeptisch, sie sind technikbewusst. ... Da, wo sich die Technik –als naturverträglich, –als umweltgerecht und –als menschenfreundlich erweist, wird sie selbstverständlich eingesetzt" (Maren-Grisebach, "Sind Die Grünen technikfeindlich?", 1982, pp. 107-125).

<sup>127</sup> "Die einseitige Ausrichtung der Schulbildung und der Studiengänge auf industrielle Tätigkeiten, die den angepassten Bürger und Technokraten hervorbringt, muss wieder um die Bereiche ergänzt werden, die für die Entwicklung der Gesamtpersönlichkeit unerlässlich sind" (1979, p. 13)

### 6.2.3 Human habitat

The industrial society has forced people into “inhuman” mass areas of living and working [“Ballungsräumen”, “conurbations”], yet in which the different spheres of one’s life - work, living, shopping, leisure time – are physically separated, increasing energy consumption, using up green spaces. A different kind of spatial planning, other than one oriented only to purely economic interests, is needed to restore feelings of solidarity, a sense of human scaleness, and possibilities for direct democracy: a people-friendly living environment, taking into account the importance of culture and nature (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 14; 1980c, pp. 6-7). Human habitat spatial planning<sup>128</sup> must, in effect, also reflect Die Grünen’s core values [section 2.3].

#### *Spatial planning must be “humanised”*

There are two key thoughts in Die Grünen’s spatial planning measures, I think. Citizens should have opportunities for real participation in all urban planning [“wirkliche Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten”] (1980b, p. 14; 1980c, pp. 5-7), and spatial planning should be premised on the integration, not separation, of people’s life spheres. Conurbations should be broken down into human-scale entities, with integrated residential, business, and cultural areas, and self-management rights (“Stadtteildemokratie”). Community centres should be provided. Whole cultural and historical landscapes rather than single buildings should be preserved. Instead of disregarding nature’s aesthetic value in people’s habitat, it should be protected. Non-commercialized “green” and recreation spaces should be made available, as well as urban gardening lots. The building of massive projects such as canals and airports in previously “intact” landscapes should be stopped: not a “single square metre of land not previously built on” should be used, unless it were balanced by an equivalent area set aside for re-cultivation (Bahro 1982a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 17), a demand also present in the 1980 Bundesprogramm<sup>129</sup> (1980b). There should be an end to sealing off the landscape with concrete and tar (1979, pp. 9-10).

### 6.2.4 Health

On Die Grünen’s view, the ecological crisis – the poisoning of air, water, food and utensils – and the industrial society-engendered stress [noise, inhumane work conditions; lack of opportunities for meaningful human relations] which damages soul and spirit, is negating the beneficial effects of modern medicine (1979, p. 10; 1980b, pp. 34-35). Additionally, there is a danger that modern medicine is succumbing to domination by powerful economic interests, i.e., over-use of medication and sophisticated equipment produced for profit by private companies (1980b, p. 36; 1980c, p. 13).

Die Grünen advocated an “alternative, ecological and holistic medicine” (1980c, p. 13). Its premises are:

- (a) Holism rather than reductionism: “As central focus of health care, should be the person considered as needing total help<sup>130</sup>” (1979, p. 10). The potential contributory role of social, moral and psychological factors in illness must be considered together with chemical and physical factors (1979, p. 10).

<sup>128</sup> If only there were space here to note all the green ideas links! [But Bramwell (1989) has traced many of them]. It cannot be random that town planner, back-to-the-land, and small-scale community supporter Patrick Geddes (Bramwell, 1989, pp. 77-80) inspired the ‘organic ideology’ of town planner Lewis Mumford, (1895-1989), whom Martinez-Alier (1987, see index) also discussed for his contribution to ecological economics. Mumford was “a radical town planner and critic of the industrial ‘mega-machine’” (Wall, 1994, p. 91). He, in turn, inspired post-war Green thinkers such Murray Bookchin, who wrote books inter alia, on urban planning (Wall, 1994, p. 91 and Chapter Five, section 1). Bookchin’s thought was significant in green movement thought... hence I think, Die Grünen’s, as well as the UK Greens’ (Porritt, 1984, Chapter 4) very specific proposals on town planning

<sup>129</sup> “Dem Luft- und Wasserhaushalt wie der Natur überhaupt durch Bauten entzogene Grün- und Waldflächen sind immer voll zu ersetzen” (1980b, p. 21)

<sup>130</sup> This is a clumsy rendition of their elegant “Im Mittelpunkt der Gesundheitspflege steht der ganze hilfsbedürftige Mensch” (1979, p. 10)

(b) A focus, beyond preventative medicine and health care even, to root social causes: “The forces which are disturbing our health, and the health of the environment, are the same forces which drive our current economic system<sup>131</sup>” (1980b, p. 34). Preventative medicine and health care should also concern itself with providing insight-raising information about, and improvement of life conditions<sup>132</sup> (1980c, p. 13).

(c) Partnership and self-responsibility: Partnership between health care personnel and patient, as well as self-responsibility, could be achieved inter alia, by providing patients with comprehensive information on their treatment, access to their treatment files, insight into the outer-inner connections of their illness, such as between the need for an intact natural environment, humane living and working conditions, the need for healthy food and healthy eating habits, and substance use avoidance: “Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe” (1980 b, p. 34, 1980c, p. 13).

(d) Decentralized rather than centralized health care: “the creation and promotion of small medical centres, evenly distributed throughout urban areas and countryside, in which all the sub-disciplines of medicine are gathered together”<sup>133</sup> (1980c, p. 13).

### 6.2.5 Third World issues

Die Grünen’s Third World policy is best understood in terms of the ideological critique of the centre-periphery model of development [2.1.3.2], and its ideological alternative [2.1.3.3].

... ‘technology transfer’ ... industrial-capitalist ‘development’ are just different names for the plot between the north, and the so-called ‘elites’ of the south, who are only interested in their share of the cake, and in cementing the social basis of their power positions. Those are the main reasons behind the continued dependence and misery of half of humanity<sup>134</sup> (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 6).

We categorically reject the idea that ‘development’ means economic growth at the expense of irreplaceable natural and human capital. The model of development, and also so-called development aid are leading to countries in the ‘Third World’ being exploited by industrial countries, and robbed of their own resources and cultural ways of life<sup>135</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 18).

Instead, they said, “we will seek to develop together with Third World countries, new ecological ways of being, which will counteract their becoming victims of the increasing world crisis”<sup>136</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 18).

Material and social support from the rich countries will only have effect as help to self-help, if it contributes to recreating, supporting and extending those conditions in which the people there [i.e. the Third World] can create their own food, clothing, homes, health and education in self-responsibility, and in accordance with local conditions<sup>137</sup> (1983b, p. 7).

<sup>131</sup> “Die Kräfte, die unsere Gesundheit und eine gesunde Umwelt zerstören, sind die gleichen, die das gegenwärtige wirtschaftliche System antreiben” (1980b, p. 34)

<sup>132</sup> “Ursachenaufklärung und Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen” (1980c, p. 13)

<sup>133</sup> “Schaffung und Forderung von kleinen medizinischen Zentren, gleichmässig in Stadt und Land verteilt, in welchen alle medizinische Teildisziplinen einbezogen sind” (1980c, p. 13)

<sup>134</sup> “Technologietransfer” ... industriekapitalistische “Entwicklung” schlechthin sind nur ebensoviele Namen für das Komplott zwischen den nördlichen und südlichen sogenannten Elite, die sich nur um den Anteil am Kuchen und um die Sozialversicherung ihrer Machtpositionen streiten. Dahinter verbergen sich die Hauptursachen für die fortgesetzte Abhängigkeit und Verelendung der halben Menschheit” (1983b, p. 6)

<sup>135</sup> “Wir wenden uns mit Nachdruck dagegen, daß unter „Entwicklung“ lediglich Wirtschaftswachstum verstanden wird auf Kosten von unwiderbringlichem Natur- und Kulturkapital. Dieses Entwicklungsmodell und auch die sogenannte Entwicklungshilfe führen dazu, daß die Länder der „Dritten Welt“ von den Industriestaaten ausgebeutet, ihrer eigenen Lebensformen und Ressourcen beraubt werden...” (1980b, p. 18)

<sup>136</sup> This is a free translation of “... werden wir mit den Ländern der „Dritten Welt“ gemeinsam jene neuen ökologischen Verhaltensformen zu entwickeln versuchen, die davor bewahren, zu Opfern der heraufziehenden Weltkrise zu werden.” (1980b, p. 18)

<sup>137</sup> “Materielle und finanzielle Mittel aus den reichen Ländern werden nur dann als “Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe” für die Betroffenen wirken, wenn sie dazu dienen, diejenigen Bedingungen wiederherzustellen, zu stützen und auszubauen, unter denen sich die Menschen dort Nahrung, Kleidung, Wohnung, Gesundheit und Bildung gemäss den örtlichen Gegebenheiten in eigener Verantwortung verschaffen bzw. Bewahren

Die Grünen's Third World "partnership" policy (1980b, pp. 16-17, p. 18, p. 19; 1983a, pp. 8-10; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 63-66) aimed to end immoral exploitation, and ensure peace, and survival. Major policy elements, all of which can be understood as a "partnership" ethic in practice, included (1) solidarity between the greater peace movement and Third World liberation movements, (2) the right of developing peoples' to self-determination, (3) fair trade prices for raw materials, (4) a "help to self-help" policy achieved through a consistent basic needs ["Grundbedürfnisse"] strategy, emphasis on eco-friendly, intensive human-use, alternative technology, self-reliant economic activity [preferably independent of the world market], and food security, and (5) a call to industrialized nations to meet the target recommended by the United Nations of 0.7% of GNP for development aid, without conditions, or repayment requirements attached.

### **6.2.5.1 The population issue**

The deep ecologists' (Chapter Four) overriding concern about population reduction and stabilization, receives no more than one-sentence, but significant, attention in Die Grünen's 1980 Bundesprogramm: "The overpopulated countries must on their request receive all possible aid towards birth control, *because otherwise the problems are beyond solution...*"<sup>138</sup> (1980b, p. 17, my italics).

### **6.2.6 Womens' issues**

Women, noted Die Grünen, are disadvantaged and suppressed in almost every social sphere (1980b, p. 5). They are only ever "discovered" by [male] politicians during election time, or during times when they are needed in the economy. For the remainder of the time, they are reminded that their actual place is in the home. Their disadvantages there, in their careers, and in raising their family, continue to be ignored (1980b, p. 26; 1980c, p. 10). At fault is women's socialization into passivity, inappropriate education, and unequal allocation of social responsibility roles. That must change. Equal rights, and equal right to self-determination ["Gleichberechtigung"; "Selbstbestimmungsrecht"] are the operative values for women's emancipation (1980c, p. 10).

#### **6.2.6.1 Barriers to women's equal legal rights, social roles, and work rights must be removed**

Apart from the obvious demand for equal education, equal career opportunities, and equal pay, some of Die Grünen's more radical demands (1979, p. 12; 1980b, pp. 26-28; 1980c, p. 10; 1983a, p. 7, p. 27) were -

- Recognition of being a house-carer, and child-carer, *as a fully-paid career*
- Re-oriented thinking on role allocation in this regard: men to be equally involved in these two important social tasks
- Legislation preventing violence and discrimination against women, including the female youth, at all levels, and in all spheres of society. Women's centres to be recognized. Women officials to be present in health procedures, and judicial hearings, involving crime, rape and violence
- Part time work for men and women so that parents have time for raising children, politics and culture
- Protection of part time work through social insurance mechanisms.

#### **6.2.6.2 Women must have control over their own fertility**

Die Grünen noted in 1980, the contradiction in their own values on the issue of fertility: on the one hand, their valuing of all life; on the other, their insistence on women's right to decide for themselves on contraception and abortion (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 11). More or less repeating Kelly's views (Kelly,

---

können." (1983b, p. 7)

<sup>138</sup> "Die übervolkerten Länder müssen auf Wunsch alle Hilfen zur Geburtenkontrolle erhalten, weil sonst die Probleme unlösbar werden...." (1980b, p. 17)

1984, p. 71), or she theirs, they argue that decisions on abortion, which are actually personal moral and life circumstance decisions, cannot be a matter of criminality<sup>139</sup>: Rather, socially-responsive material and social help, better birth control methods, and “Aufklärung”, should obviate its necessity at all (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 11). Neither the State, nor doctors, should treat women as children incapable of making up their own minds, or discriminate against them<sup>140</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 28).

Despite their specific attention to women’s issues, Capra and Spretnak (1984) suggest that the feminist perspective is strangely lacking in Die Grünen’s 1980 Bundesprogram (1980b) in issues such as “militarism, economics<sup>141</sup>, education, and healthcare” (p. 50). They note (1984, pp. 65-66) that Die Grünen seem unconcerned that their insistence on the right to complete self-determination of developing peoples conflicts with the usually invidious position of women in such areas. Most rural women in the Third World suffer under institutionalized, and/or traditional patriarchy, a situation which Capra and Spretnak felt, compromised Green principles of non-exploitation, non-violence and social responsibility (1984, p. 65).

### 6.3 “Basidemokratisch” [“grassroots” or direct democracy]

Our politics is - ... ‘grassroots democratic’, because we are committed to direct democracy. In that way, decisions about public matters are the most effectively tracked. This form of democracy is best realized at decentralized levels. We are opposed to the bureaucracy which is currently gaining the upper hand, and rendering citizens helpless; opposed to the increasing capriciousness and the increasing misuse of power by the industrial and state apparatus. (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 3)

I understand this value, a key element of anarchism (Chapter Five, section 2.1.4.1), as a primary response to Die Grünen’s critique of patriarchy and hierarchy [section 2.1.2]. Hierarchical thought and its social-structural manifestations, which include a tendency to “cosiness” or collusion amongst powerful interests [“Verfälschung” (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 24)], and to surveillance [“Überwachung” (1980b, p. 24)], isolate and marginalize citizens, limit people’s Self-realization, create an atmosphere of fear, powerlessness, submissiveness, and moral cowardice [“Duckmäusertum” (1980b, p. 24)], and also threaten fundamental and human rights (1979, p. 11, par. 4). Instead of bureaucracy, there should be the greatest possible level of direct democratic decision-making, the greatest possible openness in public information provision.

In this section, I discuss (6.3.1) the role of communes in the new utopian society, (6.3.2) extending ordinary people’s political space, (6.3.3) protecting fundamental human rights, (6.3.4) minority rights, and (6.3.5) democratising public information while protecting private data.

#### 6.3.1 “Dare to form communes”: the new “utopian” society

“Dare to form communes<sup>142</sup>” is of course, fundamentalist Bahro’s challenge. In his view, the way to exit the industrial system into an alternative way of life and production in a new society which comprises an ecological cyclical economy, decentralized organization, and self-determination, is through the broad commune movement, which allows all three criteria simultaneously: “The commune is the germ cell of the social formation which will replace the existing one, the basic unit of the new social network” (Bahro, 1983d, in Bahro, 1986, p. 57). Commune-type communities would be able “...to develop the spiritual foundation from which a biophile culture beyond our suicidal patriarchal civilization can feed” (Bahro, 1983g, in Bahro, 1986, p. 95); to provide the framework of living within which the economy is subordinate to, and does not dictate, a system of values (Bahro, 1983f, in Bahro,

<sup>139</sup> “Die Schwangerschaftsunterbrechung kann als eine Frage der moralischen Einstellung und der persönlichen Lebensumstände nicht Gegenstand juristischer Verfolgung sein” (1980c, p. 11).

<sup>140</sup> “Keine Bevormundung und Diskriminierung der Frauen durch Staat und Ärzte”

<sup>141</sup> In 1983/84, Capra & Spretnak noted, women worldwide delivered 2/3 of total work hours performed, yet received 1/10 of the income and owned less than 1/100 of the property (1984, pp. 65-66)

<sup>142</sup> Bahro, 1983f, in Bahro, 1986, p. 86

1986, p. 89), to provide a context supportive of self-realization, rather than the “individualism” of capitalist industrialism. How to achieve this?

Through self-reliant decentralism, rather than dependence on the world market. Without discussing all its detail, Bahro’s idea was that the world market was to be dissolved in its present form, and reconstructed in another. “We must now enter into a phase of contraction, which in the first instance has to be economic. If I may pick an arbitrary figure<sup>143</sup>, ... an area fifty by a hundred kilometers wide. It must be possible to organize reproduction at this level: food, homes, schools, clothing, medicine, perhaps as much as ninety per cent of what we need. For another nine per cent we could deal on a national or provincial level, and for the further one per cent we would be dependent on a world market” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 180). The idea is that “you produce the things you need to become socialized and to reproduce yourself physically by your own labour” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 29). This paragraph scarcely does justice to Bahro’s vision, expressed in many papers. The important idea to convey here, is that the basis of the new society is a network of semi-autonomous communes, practising a self-reliant form of production outside the world market system. Traces of it in Die Grünen’s political statements were presented at 6.1.2.4.

### 6.3.2 Extend people’s political space; democratize bureaucracy

Risk more grassroots democracy! was Die Grünen’s challenge<sup>144</sup>. Direct democracy is a green idea borrowed from anarchism [Chapter Five, section 2.1.4]; it is qualitatively different from liberal democracy which is an indirect democracy based on tacit consent (Lucardie, 1993a, p. xii). It is best achieved in decentralized, human-scale units (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 3), whether in business, politics, or administration. “Überschaubarkeit” and decentralization are corollary values, and many 1983-Greens felt that the principle of decentralization should have been a fifth “pillar” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 47-49).

Through direct democracy, Die Grünen wanted to achieve the greatest possible devolution of decision-making power on ecological, social and democratic issues to citizens [“mehr eigene, autonome Befugnisse der Bürger, statt der zentralistischen Verwaltung” (1980c, p. 9)], including the right to petition for a referendum, and for plebiscites at local and regional levels (1980c, p. 9); to create political space for the citizens’ initiatives and the new social movements at all levels of government, so that they could make their political views known, and influence legislation; to extend ordinary people’s political space beyond voting once in a while, and to protect their right to meet unhindered, to demonstrate, to freedom of expression, and to access government officials. There should be the greatest transparency in, and accountability of, bureaucracy to Parliament, and of Parliament to citizens (Bahro, 1982a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 19; Die Grünen, 1979, pp. 11-12, p. 14; 1980c, p. 9; 1983b, pp. 11-12).

### 6.3.3 Protect fundamental human rights

Kelly believed that “One of the most important tasks for a parliamentary, extra-parliamentary party is to campaign for the recognition and protection of human rights. Food, health care, work, housing, freedom of religion and belief, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, humane treatment of prisoners – all these human rights ... continue to be abused. These rights derive from a human being’s right to life. Abuse of human rights can lead to the outbreak of war. Respect for human rights can help to build peace” (Kelly, 1984, p. 19).

Die Grünen describe fundamental and human rights as inter alia, “unscathed” [“unversehrtes”] life, healthy food, humane working conditions, an intact biosphere [“unversehrten Lebensraum”], right to

<sup>143</sup> Bahro recognized that exactly this area, and these ratios, were not everywhere possible in the world; what he was interested in was “the principle of contraction and the dissolution of the world market as we know it” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 180)

<sup>144</sup> Bahro, 1983a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 41, and Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 11

free gathering and demonstration, freedom of opinion (1979, p. 11). They believed that the ecological, economic, cultural, political, and religious dimensions of fundamental rights are indivisible, everywhere. They therefore supported freedom, and human rights movements<sup>145</sup> and initiatives everywhere (1979, p. 11):

We reject any political suppression anywhere in the world, and support all peoples and groups who commit themselves to achieving their freedom and democratic right to self-determination, against dictatorship, colonial oppression, and foreign domination<sup>146</sup> (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 24).

### 6.3.4 No discrimination against marginalized groups

Die Grünen critiqued the state's social support network as anonymous, discriminatory, unreliable, fostering dependence, and geared only to financial support. Awareness of, and insight into the reasons why people become "social cases", should replace discriminatory attitudes (1980c, pp. 4-5; 1983a, pp. 25-27).

In place of separation and isolation, solidarity with, and their integration into society (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 12; 1980b, p. 29), is the value guiding policy for all socially-marginalized groups: minority cultures, old people, the sexually different, the immigrants, the criminals, the handicapped, the "social cases": "We want to live together with them" (1980b, p. 36). Self-determination, self-management and self-realization for these groups are corollary values (1980c, p. 12). Minority groups and marginalized groups have the same fundamental rights as any other group (1979, p. 12, par. 1).

Multi-culturalism is valued. The Self-realization of minority cultures [such as that of the "Zigeuner"], must become a taken-for-granted right (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 12). Old people should not be cut off from their social environment, or treated as second-rate citizens. Preferably they should be helped to achieve their right to a dignified old age through close-to-home assistance in day-care or small centres which they help to manage (1980c, pp. 11-12). Homosexuality must be treated on the same equal rights footing as heterosexuality (1980c, pp. 11-12). "Prevailing politics must no longer encourage the isolation of our immigrant fellow-citizens and their deprivation of rights<sup>147</sup>" (Die Grünen 1983b, p. 12; based on the translation in Bahro, 1983a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 41). Criminals should not be subjected to solitary confinement, there should be equal and improved conditions for all prisoners, the aim of imprisonment should be help for self-help in re-socialization (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 12; 1980c, p. 9). The handicapped should also not be pushed into a corner somewhere. Opportunities to work must be made available to them; above all, physical infrastructure must be geared to their special needs (1980b, p. 36; 1980c, p. 14).

The social support net should be decentralized, self-administered, co-funded by local authorities, and also provide non-material help, in that it educated people ("Aufklärung") towards self-help, self-responsibility, and self-organization (Die Grünen, 1980c, pp. 4-5; 1983a, pp. 25-27).

### 6.3.5 Democratize public information, protect private data

Die Grünen's basic premise here is that effective direct democratic decision-making rests partly on the availability of multi-language, comprehensive, and multi-dimensional information, which is independent of particular economic, party-political<sup>148</sup>, advertising, or other monopoly interests. The

<sup>145</sup> One wonders how Die Grünen reconciled their values in a case such as Namibia, where achieving freedom and self-determination was accompanied by unspeakable violence on *both* sides?

<sup>146</sup> "Wir wenden uns gegen jede politische Unterdrückung in der gesamten Welt und unterstützen alle Völker und Volksgruppen, die für ihre Freiheit und demokratische Selbstbestimmung, gegen Diktatur, koloniale Unterdrückung und Fremdherrschaft eintreten. (1980b, p. 24)

<sup>147</sup> Bramwell (1994) notes that Die Grünen had proposed more legislation to protect the social and civil rights of women and minorities, including the [then] nearly 4 million foreign "guest workers" in Germany than any other party, but sees a contradiction in this latter aspect: the movement of goods and people, but seemingly not the movement of "Gastarbeiter", is a waste of energy

<sup>148</sup> "Parteiherrschaft und Proporzsystem bei Rundfunk und Fernsehen führen zu Einschränkungen der Meinungsfreiheit" (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 14)

media should regularly publish information on the interconnections between the ecological, economic and social crises (Die Grünen, 1980c, p. 13). Diversity in, decentralization of, and de-monopolization of information sources is the primary aim (1979, p. 14; 1980c, p. 13).

For Die Grünen, the gathering and analysis of data by public and private bodies represents a significant intrusion into the private and political sphere of every citizen, so much so, that they demanded the right to refuse to give such data. A duty should be imposed upon those collecting and analysing such data to explain its use or further transmission. They also called for the destruction of personal data and software which could potentially be politically misused (1980c, p. 10).

## 6.4 “Gewaltfrei” [non-violence]

Our politics is - ... ‘non-violent’<sup>149</sup>, because only in a non-violent society can the oppression of people by people and the violence of people against people be abolished. In a time in which politics both national and international is dominated by force and threat of force, we advocate many and diverse forms of non-violent resistance. Examples of such forms of resistance are ‘civil disobedience’ or active social resistance. (Die Grünen’s 1980 election manifesto, 1980c, p.3).

A major source of inspiration in Die Grünen’s non-violence principle was Gandhi’s Hindu principle of *ahimsa*<sup>150</sup> [non-violence] to all living things (Callicott, 1994, p. 33; Chapple, 1994, p. 117), and love. Kelly (1984, p. 30) refers to Gandhi’s “faith in the power of the spirit, and the superior strength of goodness, gentleness ...”. The ecological values of interconnectedness, interdependence and symbiosis (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 60) were also a source of inspiration. “Ökologie heisst Frieden!”<sup>151</sup>. Strengthening this value were at least two other contextual factors. First, the playing out of the West-East Cold War and the nuclear arms race in the years 1979-1983, between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] and Warsaw Pact blocs in West Germany<sup>152</sup>, and in those Third World countries under their influence. And second, they were mindful of what they considered to be the German heritage of subjugation, wars and genocide (1981, p. 8).

Under this non-violence value, I discuss (6.4.1) Die Grünen’s aim of radical, global pacifism, (6.4.2) non-violence between peoples and nations, (6.4.3) the need for non-violent means to reach non-violent ends, (6.4.4) the elimination of violence at structural level, and (6.4.5) the praxis of non-violent resistance, including civil disobedience.

### 6.4.1 The aim: radical, and global, eco-pacifism

Bahro’s ideological response to the militarism of exterminism was radical eco-pacifism [“Ökopax”<sup>153</sup>], which is not at all the same as “traditional pacifism”, the latter being simply part and parcel of the liberal, industrialist vision (Bahro, 1984e, p. 142). Die Grünen’s vision was of a gentle, violence-free,

<sup>149</sup> Die Grünen’s non-violence was influenced by the thought of Gandhi, Thoreau, Martin Luther King, Gene Sharp, and Prof Dr Theodor Ebert (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 61-62) of the Freie Universität Berlin. Since the 1960s, Ebert’s project had been to systematize the concept of non-violent action and civil defence. In 1989, he, Petra Kelly, and Roland Vogt, founded the Association for Civil Defence, a body working for non-violence and weapon free conflict management (retrieved 1 October 2006 from <http://www.soziale-verteidigung.de/> and [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodor\\_Ebert](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodor_Ebert) )

<sup>150</sup> *Ahimsa* [non-violence] and *aparigraha* [non-possession] are for example, the twin pillars of Gandhi’s self-sufficient, environmentally friendly system of economic reproduction [and colonial resistance!] (Chapple, 1994, p. 117). *Ahimsa* in relationships with both people and nature was for Gandhi a recurring theme: “How can we be non-violent to nature unless the principle of non-violence becomes central to the ethos of human culture?” (Gandhi in Swaminathan, 1990, p. xiii). It is surely a mark of Gandhian influence on Kelly that she refers to “living with cooperation, gentleness, non-possessiveness and soft energies”? (Kelly, 1984, p. 108)

<sup>151</sup> Motto of Die Grünen’s October 1981 federal meeting (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, p. 60)

<sup>152</sup> Capra & Spretnak (1984, pp. 57-81) present an account of this

<sup>153</sup> In Bahro’s view, both the old and the New Left of 1968 shared “the same conflict orientation” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 178), but the “Ökopax” of the Greens was young people’s answer to this: “a greater tolerance for a diversity of opinions”, a “greater acceptance of diversity of thought, of pluralism and the ability to unite around an agreed goal. This appears to me to be politically and culturally very important” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 178)

green [“sanfte, gewaltfreie, grüne”] society at peace both internally and externally (1983b, p. 5), in a world community also living together in non-violence (1981, p. 6). They hoped that they would find partners in the peace movement to achieve this “whole new world order” vision (citation from Bahro, 1984e, p. 229; Bahro, 1984e, p. 134, pp. 229-230; Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 6).

#### **6.4.1.1 Peace and ecology are indivisible**

Respect for the ecology of the planet [in the sense of protection of the life-base for all living beings], and the valuing of all living beings, were for Die Grünen indivisible from the achievement of peace: “Das Prinzip der Achtung und Wertschätzung allen Lebens – d.h. der Lebens- und Naturschutz – bildet für unsere ökologisch- und friedenspolitischen Ziele in gleicher Weise die Grundlage” (1981, p. 1). There could be no peace while societies continued with a lifestyle and means of production which depended on a continual inflow of natural resources - used extravagantly at that – because that merely laid the ground conditions for aggression against others holding the needed natural resources and cheap labour. Responsible in-country use of natural resources presupposes “the dismantling of tensions and the capacity for world peace”<sup>154</sup> (1981, p. 2, par. 3).

#### **6.4.1.2 Peace and base democracy are indivisible**

One finds in Die Grünen’s programme, statements such as “FRIEDEN IST FÜR UNS MEHR ALS DIE ABWESENHEIT VON KRIEG ... Frieden, Freiheit und Selbstbestimmungsrecht gehören für uns zusammen...”<sup>155</sup> (1980c, p. 7; their capitals).

Supporting radical peace meant for Die Grünen, supporting base democratic movements, and movements for human rights, civil rights, and liberation from either foreign domination or internal oppressive regimes everywhere. They specifically supported Third World peoples struggle for liberation from the domination of the power of any of the bloc countries: “there can only be peace for Third World peoples, if in their own development, they find a way to political and economic independence”<sup>156</sup> (1981, p. 5).

### **6.4.2 There should be no violence between peoples and nations**

Partnership and co-operation [“die partnerschaftliche Zusammenarbeit” (Die Grünen, 1980, p. 16, 1. Weltpolitik)] are the lead values for Die Grünen’s internal security and foreign policy. Principles for achieving this include (6.4.2.1) radical disarmament, (6.4.2.2) social defence, and (6.4.2.3) self-reliant, diverse bioregionalism.

#### **6.4.2.1 There should be radical disarmament**

Radical means radical, *inter alia*, (a) no arming anywhere in the world, (b) global disarmament (c) the destruction of all atomic, biological and chemical weapons, (d) no foreign troops on foreign soil, and (e) the conversion of munitions manufacture to peaceful purposes (Die Grünen, 1980b, pp. 17-18; 1980c, p. 7).

#### **6.4.2.2 Social defence is the alternative to armed defence**

Die Grünen proposed social defence<sup>157</sup> as alternative to military armament and defence (1980c, pp. 7-8). They defined it as defence with non-military means against an internal or external military attack. Its fundamental premise was that a people cannot be controlled indefinitely unless they consent to it

<sup>154</sup> “Abbau von Spannungen und die Fähigkeit zum Frieden in der Welt” (1981, p. 2, par. 3)

<sup>155</sup> Peace is for us more than simply the absence of war ... Peace, freedom and the right to self-determination belong for us together...”

<sup>156</sup> “Frieden kann es für die Völker der “Dritten Welt” nur geben, wenn sie in ihrer eigenständigen Entwicklung einen Weg in die politische und wirtschaftliche Unabhängigkeit finden” (1981, p. 5)

<sup>157</sup> Influenced by the work of Theodor Ebert and Gene Sharp (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 61-62). Parkin (1994, p. 106) notes that Kelly’s “bibles were Thoreau and Gene Sharp (an American expert on non-violent action)”

(1981, pp. 5-6). Where militarism assumes that the enemy will not be prepared to pay the high price demanded for violating a nation-state's borders, social defence assumes that the enemy will not be prepared to pay the high price of trying to remain safely in the occupied area (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 62; Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 17). Resistance is rendered through "Zivilcourage" and decentralized non-co-operation. Social defence also included self-provisioning and alternative, decentralized communication networks (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 17), backed up by "well-organized, tightly bonded affinity groups"<sup>158</sup> in every neighborhood who are prepared to conduct nonviolent civil disobedience on short notice", including tactics such as large-scale symbolic actions, economic boycotts by consumers and producers, social and political boycotts of institutions, strikes, overloading of facilities and administrative systems, stalling and obstructing, deliberate inefficiency, ostracism of persons, and numerous forms of non-compliance in all sectors of a society" (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 62). Die Grünen were however well aware of problems in gaining acceptance for the idea, as well as in its actual implementation (1981, pp. 5-6).

#### **6.4.2.3 Self-reliant, diverse bio-regionalism instead of one-dimensional technological-materialistic industrialism**

Die Grünen supported the principle of self-determination, self-reliance, and cultural diversity for all peoples as part of both the peace process, and world survival (1980b, p. 16 1. Weltpolitik). "Our aim is to preserve the self-sufficient capacity of each region of the earth. This reflects our principle of decentralization ... Each population group should be able to develop an economy suited to its ecology, and to preserve its indigenous culture. We condemn the presumptuousness of industrial nations, who in their own economic interests, wish to force their techno-material mono-civilization on all peoples"<sup>159</sup> (1980b, p. 16). Die Grünen's idea of a "Europe of the Regions" – human-scale, decentralized, self-managed areas whose boundaries are defined by geographical features, not national interests, fits here (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2; 1979 "Wirtschaft im Dienst des Menschen", section 3, p. 5; "Demokratie und Grundrechte in Europa", section 2, p. 11, section 3, p. 12; 1980b "Weltpolitik", p. 16; Parkin, 1994, p. 138).

### **6.4.3 A non-violent society can only be achieved through non-violent means**

Non-violent ends can only be achieved through non-violent means: "Ends and means cannot be seen in isolation from one another. They are inseparably joined and must agree with one another"<sup>160</sup> (Die Grünen, 1981, p. 6). There could be no physical violence, and no hate behaviour, in seeking to achieve a non-violent society.

#### **6.4.3.1 No physical violence**

An early problem for the "Gewaltfrei" value, was the opposition to the concept of active, *nonviolent* resistance from the early Greens' more Marxist-oriented members (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 45). This opposition had already manifested itself at the 1979 Offenbach congress where the radical-left group had demanded that non-violence be excluded as a green principle (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 35). The radical left Greens believed that resistance could be escalated into violence – along the lines of the Marxist "vision of armed struggle in the streets" - if non-violence to bring about social change proved ineffective (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 45). Radical left Hamburg Green Jurgen Reents suggested that "an absolute, inviolable ideology" of non-violence might mean that one remains

<sup>158</sup> A concept from anarchism, and from the American peace movement, where it was well-developed, and with which Kelly was familiar (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 62)

<sup>159</sup> "Unser Ziel ist, den einzelnen Regionen der Erde auch dann ihre Lebensfähigkeit zu erhalten, wenn sie auf sich selbst gestellt sind. Dies entspricht unserem Prinzip der Dezentralisierung ... Jedes Volk und jede Bevölkerungsgruppe soll die ökologisch gemässe Wirtschaft entwickeln und jedes Volk die ihm eigentümliche Kultur bewahren können. Wir verurteilen die Anmassung der Industrieländer, aufgrund wirtschaftlicher Interessen ihre technisch-materialistische Einheitszivilisation allen Menschen aufdrängen zu wollen" (1980b, p. 16)

<sup>160</sup> "Ziel und Weg können aber nicht getrennt voneinander gesehen werden, sondern sind untrennbar miteinander verbunden und müssen übereinstimmen" (1981, p. 6)

“morally clean”, perhaps even a “martyr”, but it could also mean that one ends up “politically without success” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 46). However, this was a position at odds with most Greens who felt, along with Petra Kelly<sup>161</sup>, that there was never justification for compromising the non-violence principle (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 45). Bahro agreed too: “I ... agree with the Greens’ idea that non-violent resistance has greater prospects of bringing about the necessary change: non-violence is a line followed only by those who are active supporters of a new world” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 119).

The value of non-violence extended to children’s upbringing as well. Die Grünen advocated no war toys for children, and also no physical violence or threats of it in their upbringing (1980c, p. 11).

#### **6.4.3.2 No hate behaviour**

Die Grünen believed that expressions of hate – in speech, physically, or psychologically (1981, p. 1, par 7) were incompatible with non-violence. There should be no hate speech; no violent talk: “Calling a policeman a pig means you have already abandoned a non-violent attitude” (Kelly, 1984, p. 31). Military style vocabulary should be avoided (1981, p. 7, par. 6). There should be no projection of “Feindbilder” [no construction of the Other as “enemy”] as psychological preparation for aggression against either external or internal opponents (1981, p. 1). People must be encouraged to believe in the “guten aktivierbaren Kern im Menschen”, and so to distinguish between the enemy-person [someone just like us] and his/her role (1981, p. 1, pp. 6-7). Sounding rather like Carl Roger’s unwavering, unconditional love for the person, while not necessarily agreeing with his/her behaviour (Hjelle & Ziegler, 1981, p. 412), Kelly believed that the “so-called enemy should be given the opportunity to rethink, to modify his behaviour, and to appreciate that any action we take is not directed against him as a person, but against the element of violence in his role. In this context, I would support the idea of a dialogue with the police and the armed forces, again as a means of focussing on the person, not his role in society.” (Kelly, 1984, p. 31).

#### **6.4.4 There should be no violence at institutional level**

Under the value of non-violence, Die Grünen condemned what Kelly called “structural violence”, that is, violence by the state through its institutions. Some examples they gave were the systematic marginalization of women in society through patriarchally-inspired social structures, failure by governments to vaccinate children against the most common and dangerous children’s diseases, the over-spending on military defence paid for in the currency of “poverty, inflation and despair in the world” (Kelly, 1984, p. 13), or expenditure on nuclear energy, paid for in the currency of insidious harm to health, future shortages of natural resources, and intolerable future environmental waste burdens (Kelly, 1984, pp. 11-14). Once in the Bundestag, the application of the structural non-violence principle became immediately problematic for Die Grünen. Can one authentically advocate non-violence while being part of the state machinery, itself violent? How does one justify when and where for example, the police should be called in to deal with a situation, such as tenants who do not pay their rent, even though they receive a welfare grant from the state? Should they be evicted by force once the necessary notices have been given? (Roland Vogt, speaking to Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 43). The problem, Vogt felt, was that “...there are still no thought-out concepts of how one can reconcile the demands of social responsibility with the demands of nonviolence” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 43).

---

<sup>161</sup> For Kelly, and for Die Grünen, “the ends do not justify the means. You cannot do away with violence by using violence, or war by waging war, or injustice by resorting to injustice. It follows, then, that the ends are part of the method of action, and likewise that the method of action is included in the ends” (Kelly, 1984, p. 19). She re-iterated this position during interviews with Capra and Spretnak: “... I cannot say that the violent people are part of the Green movement. I would like to include them once they see that violence is no solution, but right now their aims are diametrically opposed to an ecological society. Both our methods and our goals must be nonviolent...” (Kelly, in Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 71)

#### 6.4.5 Dissent may be expressed through non-violent resistance, including civil disobedience

“Dissent without civil disobedience is consent!” wrote Kelly (1984, p. 61), citing Thoreau. Die Grünen’s motto for non-violent resistance was “Be gentle and subversive” (Kelly, 1984, p. 32). Kelly personally understood non-violent opposition as an expression of “spiritual, physical and moral strength”, shown most clearly “by consciously and specifically *not doing* anything which could be construed as participating in injustice. This could mean *not* obeying unjustified orders, or *not* holding back in situations where injustice is being meted out to others.” (Kelly, 1984, p. 27, her italics).

Die Grünen argued that civil disobedience is a permissible non-violent strategy (1981, p. 7; 1983d, p. 1). They partly located its justification in the philosophical thought of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Thoreau<sup>162</sup>: “If ... the law is so promulgated that it of necessity makes you an agent of injustice against another, then I say to you: Break the law” (Translation by Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 44, of Thoreau in Die Grünen’s Peace Manifesto (1981, p. 7, par. 2). Kelly (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 44; Kelly, 1984, p. 32) defined civil disobedience as open and deliberate infringement of what are considered to be unjust laws and regulations “on grounds of conscience”. Those who employ this escalated form of non-co-operation and direct action “take full responsibility upon themselves for breaking the law ... They would rather receive punishment or violence, than become violent themselves, or incur the blame for other people’s violence by doing nothing”. To be consistent and effective, civil disobedience required more than only spontaneous action, it also required long-term objectives, political analysis, and intensive preparation (Die Grünen, 1981, p. 7).

##### 6.4.5.1 Green criteria for acceptable non violent resistance

Criteria for acceptable non-violent resistance included –

- (i) dialogue
- (ii) “legitimate action”, such as writing letters to the press, signing petitions, knocking on doors and canvassing, distributing leaflets
- (iii) “symbolic action” such as slogans, vigils, silent marches, as well as “light-hearted events” to raise public awareness on a particular issue or issues
- (iv) non-co-operation “with violent elements in the social system”; this would include legal methods such as strikes, consumer boycotts, non-violent sabotage, conscientious objection and non-acceptance of state honours
- (v) active propagation by teachers in schools of “Friedensfähigkeit” and awareness-raising of the environmental impacts of the “dominating ideology of technical progress”, especially nuclear energy, and active “de-enemizing” of the enemy by journalists in the media
- (v) “gentle” civil disobedience, including law infringement (Die Grünen, 1981, p. 7, par. 2; Kelly, 1984, pp. 31-32).

## 7. Praxis

In 1983, Die Grünen listed as ways of demonstrating dissent with the current industrial system, and opening the way to their new ecological politics society, non-violent resistance, intensive information, a “front of refusal”, the innovation of alternative projects, self-organization by those disaffected, struggle in the trade unions<sup>163</sup> and industries, and parliamentary work. In a nice example of ecosystemic recursivity, Die Grünen (1983a, p. 32) note that “Die Krise enthält aber auch eine Chance ... die gesellschaftliche Kräfte in diesem Lande zu mobilisieren und eine Umstrukturierung einzuleiten...”: The solution is in the problem.

<sup>162</sup> The concept comes from Thoreau’s thoughts in his essay “Resistance to civil government” (Turner, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 331-32)

<sup>163</sup> Bahro was however dubious about this role for the trade unions, as they were part of the very system which, in his view, had to be dismantled (Bahro, 1983e, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 60-85)

## 8. Critique of, and by, other sample members

I see the critique of Die Grünen as following three broad directions: (8.1) their corruption by parliamentary power, (8.2) their “selling out” as they increasingly followed the road of within-the-system accommodation and eco-industrialization. As the eco-reformist trend gathered momentum mostly after the Fundi-Realo break, it falls outside the period of this chapter, and so is not dealt with in any great detail, and (8.3) green political theory critique, such as the viability or otherwise of their direct democracy vis-a-vis the predominant western society representative democracy. This aspect also falls outside this chapter’s scope, and is thus not discussed further.

### 8.1 Their own corruption by power

Die Grünen believed that the political parties of the time had lost touch with, or were not listening to, the fears, worries and concerns of ordinary people on the street (Kelly, 1984, pp. 21-22). Instead of “responding to the demands of local action groups” (p. 22); they were “authoritarian ruling elites”, with “fat salaries”, working their way “up the party career ladder” (Kelly, 1984, p. 11, pp. 21-22). They were unconcerned with starvation, malnutrition and other basic needs in the Third World, while spending “\$2.3 million a minute” (Kelly, 1984, p. 12) on perfecting machinery capable of wiping people off the face of the earth; installing nuclear energy deleterious to people’s health, and failing to recognize that the very means of human survival – the earth’s natural resources - were becoming increasingly scarce (Kelly, 1984, pp. 11-14). “The system is bankrupt” wrote Kelly (1984, p. 12). Their 1980 Bundesprogramm therefore contained proposals on the democratization of all political parties (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 24).

Inwardly and outwardly, Die Grünen originally saw themselves as an anti-party Party (Kelly, 1984, p. 18), a “parliamentary, extra-parliamentary party” (Kelly, 1984, p. 19). Their founding constitution<sup>164</sup> contained measures to minimize or eliminate power and privilege within the party. Despite that, after their 1983 electoral success, Bahro noted a possible danger: the “incredible political weight” which Die Grünen’s parliamentary group [“Fraktion”] now had in relation to the green movement in West Germany as a whole. He felt it important that the Fraktion “doesn’t lose the link with the movement, that the discussion is built up from the base in such a way as to prevent the fraction from becoming too absorbed in Realpolitik” (Bahro, 1984e, p. 175).

There were originally ideals on eschewing parliamentary power. Kelly wrote that Die Grünen would not be seeking to “find a place in the sun alongside the established parties, nor to help maintain power and privilege in concert with them. Nor will we accept any alliances or coalitions” (Kelly, 1984, p. 18). But that was not everyone’s opinion. The question of whether or not to “tolerate” alliances with other parties constituted a further tension between the Fundi and Realo wings within the party: Die Grünen’s extraordinary June 1985 Hagen Bundesversammlung (1985) [the “base” of the party] resolved the issue between the fundamentalist and realo factions within the party by deciding that the full range of parliamentary options, from opposition to majority or coalition government should be open to the party<sup>165</sup>.

<sup>164</sup> Die Grünen’s constitution entrenched a number of measures designed to minimize or eliminate power and privilege within the party. They tried to avoid hierarchical structure (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 37). There was also originally, the rotation of leaders after a two-year period, a rule inherited from the steering committees of the grassroots movements to prevent the concentration of information and power in the hands of a few, or in charismatic leaders (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 41-42), or the “cult of personality” (Bramwell, 1994, p. 102). Party policy was set according to voting from the floor at large assemblies (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 36)

<sup>165</sup> “Gegenüber Teilen des fundamentalistischen Flügels stellt die Bundesversammlung fest: Für Die Grünen gehört die gesamte Bandbreite parlamentarischer Möglichkeiten von der Opposition bis zur Alleinregierung zu den selbstverständlichen Handlungsmöglichkeiten unserer parlamentarischen Arbeit. Eine freiwillige Selbstbeschränkung auf Opposition lehnen wir ab ... Gegenüber Teilen des realpolitischen Flügels stellt die Bundesversammlung fest: Das Streben nach Macht um nahezu jeden Preis als angebliche Schicksalsfrage der Grünen ist ...für die auf grundlegende Veränderung der Gesellschaft zielende Politik der Grünen nicht akzeptabel.” (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Chronik. Regieren? Streit der Strömungen 1984-1989. Retrieved 9 February 2005 from [http://www.gruene-partei.de/cms/gruene\\_work/rubrik/0/239.198489.htm](http://www.gruene-partei.de/cms/gruene_work/rubrik/0/239.198489.htm))

## 8.2 Their “selling out” to the “system”

Bahro too remained skeptical of any political party’s ability to remain untouched by the system of power within which it operated, either outwardly or inwardly. An indication of this was presented in section 1.4.1, and in Bahro’s views, for example, on the failure of Die Grünen’s parliamentary group to categorically oppose animal experimentation as “one of the holiest cows” (Bahro, 1985a, in Bahro, 1986, p. 202) of industrial science and research.

Social ecologist Bookchin is also critical of Die Grünen’s “appalling degeneration”; their “selling-out” to the system:

... most Greens, or at least many of the ones I have encountered--especially in Britain and Germany--are little more than environmental lobbyists. Up to now they have not created a new politics (and in Germany, perhaps they never will). Their leaders have tried to function as parliamentarians within a conventional party framework, and their programs, apart from the hortatory rhetoric that usually precedes the practical proposals, are as pedestrian as those of most center parties... I learned to distrust the promises of statist parties--indeed, of parties generally--after my very considerable experience with the Green parties in Europe, particularly the German Greens. *Die Grünen*, a classical example of a ‘nonparty-party’, ... has turned into a disgusting bureaucratic apparatus; ... and the party has increasing tailored its program and its policies to fit the needs of the status quo. None of these developments is accidental; indeed, during lecture tours of Germany over the past fifteen years, I vehemently warned that the party would move in the direction it has--not because I possess any clairvoyant power but because even the most superficial study of statism provides ample evidence that such developments are systemic. They are structured into the very nature of the state *as such*” (Bookchin, 1992, in Fotopoulos interview, his italics).

Today Die Grünen write that without their original idea of being a total alternative system, they would never have achieved parliamentary representation. The decisive difference since their formation, is that “we want to, we must, develop into a reform party, to remain successful” (Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen, 2002, p. 21). We “are no longer the ‘anti-party party’” (p. 21) – the green movement which did not wish to be part of the parliamentary system it rejected - we are the alternative party within the parliamentary (p. 21) [and capitalist, one could add] system. Co-optation completed?

## 9. Summary.

Here are summarized the green movement/ Die Grünen’s contribution to the idea of “green”, under a theme heading, a short description of their more, or less radical, but always intertwined ideas, and their location in this chapter.

**WORLDVIEW:** Die Grünen don’t use the concept “worldview” in their political statements. Instead they talk about a “Totalkonzept”, that is, a total concept ecological politics based on four main values: respect for ecology, living in solidarity, direct democracy, and non-violence. Of these, one could call “ecology” the lead value, the normative value context for all other values. “Partnerschaft” as ethic towards both people and nature, is a fifth value [1.4]. It is clear though from the writings of green thinkers of the time, that this “Totalkonzept”, apart from its explicit ethic, also included implicit views on epistemology [3], ontology [4], what it is to be a human being [4.3], and how society should constitute and conduct itself [6].

**LEGITIMATING NARRATIVE:** I have proposed that Die Grünen’s main legitimating narrative is exterminism [2.1]. Its critique of militarism, patriarchy, hierarchy, bureaucracy and industrialism, and their domination and exploitation, [2.1.1 –2.1.3], provide the context within which to understand Die Grünen’s rhetoric of Life and Survival [2.2.1], of their use of the Megamachine image to portray industrial society’s mindless destruction [2.2.2], and their rhetoric of emancipation, salvation, and hope

[2.2.3]. Exterminism also provides the context, I argue, in which to understand all five values, and their pervasive co-values - of holism instead of reductionism, inclusion instead of exclusion, dismantling instead of conglomerating, small scale instead of mammoth, diversity instead of one-dimensionality, self-determination instead of bureaucracy [2.3, 4.1, and 5.2.3].

**EPISTEMOLOGY:** It appears correct to say that Die Grünen’s implicit epistemology combines “Netzwerkdenkens”, an ecologically-modified kind of dialectical thinking, with the neo-Frankfurt School critique of instrumental reason’s domination of nature and people [3.2]. Die Grünen’s version of dialectical thinking proposes that (a) the nature of ecology itself suggests that there must be more to human thought than just the reconciliation of opposites, and (b) as the nature of ecology is movement and change, becoming and passing, there should be in human thinking too, an open-ness to movement and change, to “process” thought, rather than to reification or “absolutising” either-or thought [3.1]. Feeling in apprehending and knowing is awarded epistemological legitimacy [3.3].

#### **ONTOLOGY:**

**-View of nature:** Die Grünen’s view of nature contains nothing explicitly metaphysical, it is presented in ecological terms such as “household”, “network”, “cycles”, “ecosystems”, and particularly, “dynamic balance” [4.2.1 – 4.2.3]. Yet I suggest there might be in it, traces of nineteenth century German philosophical holism and vitalism [4.1].

**-View of the human being:** Within the normative view of ecology, human beings are to understand themselves as part of nature’s ecosystems and cycles [4.3 and 6.1.1]. Die Grünen understand being fully human – achieving Self-realization-in-ecology – as something beyond the one-dimensionality of industrial society’s “economic man”: a being of creativity, of imagination, of soul or spirit, capable of mature critical thinking, self-initiative, self-responsibility, and self-determination, who should have the opportunity to unfold fully and freely, in solidarity with other human beings, and with nature [4.3]. To achieve Self-Realization, simultaneous self-transformation *and* societal transformation [4.3.2, 6] is needed; in this spirituality plays an implicit role [4.3.3]. Die Grünen’s demand for women’s radical emancipation is based on their implicit view of women as socially equal to, but different from men. The “feminine principle” must be a part of the new society [4.3.5.1]. The most radical view of what it is to be a human being is Homo *occidentalis simplicissimus* [4.3.4.]

**THE ETHIC:** Vitalism as theory of value leads to an ethic of partnership, understood as people-people partnership [solidarity], and a people-nature partnership [5]. The partnership with nature is sometimes based on its independent value, but more often than not, on its instrumental role as life support for human beings, making vitalism a more anthropocentrically-inclined theory of nature’s value than biocentrism or ecocentrism [5.2.3]. The ethic’s scope includes nature’s cycles, ecosystems, and species, as well as individual animal welfare [5.3]. The moral obligation is to protect the “Lebensbasis” [5.4], including for future generations [5.3.3]. This entails observing the precautionary principle [5.4.1], re-orienting the growth economy to a cyclical, dynamic economy [5.4.2], protecting biodiversity and its habitat [5.4.3], protecting animal welfare [5.4.4], protecting land, water, and air [5.4.5], providing consciousness-changing environmental education [5.4.6], and strengthening the United Nations’ role in maintaining global ecological stability [5.4.7].

**- Animal liberation issues:** Based on the principle that animals may no longer be considered as objects, but must be accorded a special legal status. Die Grünen proposed several concrete measures to improve animal well-being.

#### **VIEWS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES**

**-The economy:** The ethic of “Partnerschaft” is achieved by recognizing that the economy [6.1.2] should not threaten the “Lebensbasis” for current and future generations by disturbing the ecological equilibrium. The uni-dimensional, profit-oriented growth economy must become an ecological cyclical

economy [6.1.2.1], it must deliver quality of life not quantitative growth [6.1.2.2], prioritize “investments in the future” [6.1.2.3], deliver social justice [6.1.2.4], be democratically controlled [6.1.2.5], and include ecological book-keeping [6.1.2.6]. Typically, Die Grünen’s view of the economy’s role in society is informed by their view of Self-realization [4.3].

**-Work, employment and unemployment:** Die Grünen’s critique of current society, their demands and measures for changed work politics [6.2.1] derive from their conviction that work is a means to Self-realization [6.2.1.1]. Following that premise, meaningful work is a right [6.2.1.2], the system must provide a programme against unemployment [6.2.1.3], work management must be democratized [6.2.1.4], and technology must be democratically controlled to ensure it contributes to Self-realization [6.2.1.5].

**-Energy:** Die Grünen’s critique of energy policy [6.1.3] can be reduced to three main arguments (a) non-renewable energy sources are limited (b) the use of nuclear energy poses threats to both the environment and to civil liberties, so is not a viable alternative to fossil fuel energy sources, and (c) the way forward is via people- and eco-friendly alternative energies. I identify five major demands: stabilize energy use [6.1.3.1], derive energy from renewable resources [6.1.3.2], halt all atomic energy projects [6.1.3.3], democratize and decentralize energy provision and storage [6.1.3.4], and increase research into alternative energies [6.1.3.5]

**-Agriculture:** Die Grünen rejected industrial agriculture; agriculture should be independent of industry [6.1.4]. Their major demands are food security and healthy food [6.1.4.1], and the step-by-step re-orientation of industrial agriculture towards organic farming [6.1.4.2].

**-Transport and mobility:** Industrial society mentality, and its resultant spatial planning, has meant that the different spheres of people’s lives have become disconnected, necessitating an extensive eco-unfriendly transport network [6.1.5] to re-connect them. Four principles underlie Die Grünen’s measures: (a) *All* transport is to be more friendly to people and to the environment (b) rail is to be favoured as urban and intra-national transport medium (c) in addition, the urban network must be people, including handicapped people, and cycle-friendly, (d) eco-friendly, energy saving, and noise-reduced engines must be researched and developed.

## VIEWS ON SOCIAL ISSUES

### (a) Living

**-Education:** Die Grünen’s premises and proposals on education [6.2.2] derive from their view that education serves Self-realization. Education must be holistic and promote a person’s full flowering, not only produce technocrats and “well-adjusted” citizens [6.2.2.1]. It must also produce people reflecting green values [6.2.2.2].

**-Human habitat:** The areas where humans live [6.2.3] must be “humanized”. In effect, human habitat spatial planning must reflect Die Grünen’s core values [2.3].

**-Health:** Die Grünen advocated an alternative, ecologically-based, and holistic health policy [6.2.4]. It should focus beyond prevention only to root social causes; provide decentralized rather than centralized health facilities and care; and promote self-responsibility for health.

**-Social assistance:** This must be decentralized, and self-administered in the community [6.2.5].

**-Women’s issues:** Equal rights [“Gleichberechtigung”] and equal rights to self-determination [“Selbstbestimmungsrecht”] are the major principles guiding policies on women [6.2.6]. Women must have equal legal, and social role rights [6.2.6.1], and control over their own fertility [6.2.6.2].

**-population size:** This receives only the barest attention [6.2.5.1] in the context of Third World issues, and amounts to providing help with birth control measures on request.

### **(b) Political arrangements**

**-living in communes:** The more radical version of ecological politics calls for a new commune-based society [6.3.1], outside the world market, in which a self-reliant ecological cyclical economy, and decentralized political self-determination, allow the achievement of authentic Self-realization.

**-direct democracy:** The aim of direct democracy [6.3.2] is to democratize government and bureaucracy, and to extend ordinary people's political space, through decentralization, and self-determination. Direct democracy serves Self-realization.

**-fundamental human rights:** Die Grünen's policy and measures here [6.3.3] included food, health care, work, housing, freedom of religion and belief, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, humane treatment of prisoners, "unscathed" ["unversehrtes"] life, and an intact biosphere. Minority groups and marginalized groups [6.3.4] have the same fundamental rights as any other group. Self-determination, self-management and self-realization should be the values guiding policies for all socially-marginalized groups.

**-information:** Die Grünen simultaneously demanded full information from government, bureaucracy and business to assist direct-democracy decision-making, and the greatest possible protection for private data ["Datenschutz"] [6.3.5].

### (c) Foreign relations

Die Grünen advocated radical, global eco-pacifism [6.4.1], which involves more than simply the absence of war. It presupposes respect for ecology [6.4.1.1], and base or direct democracy [6.4.1.2]. Principles for achieving this include [6.4.2.1] radical disarmament, [6.4.2.2] social defence, and [6.4.2.3] self-reliant, diverse bioregionalism, which includes protection of own culture.

**-including Third World issues:** Die Grünen's Third World policy is best understood in terms of the ideological critique of the centre-periphery model of **development** [2.1.3.2], and its ideological alternative, influenced by resource economist Galtung's thought on self-reliance and soft technology [2.1.3.3]. I extract five principles for Die Grünen's Third World policy [6.2.5], all expressions of the ethic of "partnership": (1) solidarity with liberation movements (2) the right to self-determination (3) fair trade prices for raw materials (4) a "help to self-help" aid policy, (5) a call to industrialized nations to meet the recommended 0.7% of GNP for development aid, without conditions, or repayment, attached.

### PRAXIS

In both public and private spheres, means of achieving ends must match ends [6.4.3]. That meant **non-violence:** no physical violence [6.4.3.1], no hate speech [6.4.3.2]. There was to be no structural violence [6.4.4]. Dissent could however be expressed through non-violent resistance, including civil disobedience [6.4.5], and other measures [7].

## CHAPTER EIGHT: A SEEING GREEN WORLDVIEW

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>296</b>
1.1 Other syntheses of the ecological or green worldview	296
1.2 What does seeing green mean?: Applying Sylvan’s method	298
1.3 Presentation of “seeing green”	299
<b>2. Legitimizing narratives</b>	<b>300</b>
<b>2.1 The feminist-ecological androcentric critique, which encompasses the ideas of anthropocentrism, hierarchy, and techno-industrialism</b>	<b>300</b>
2.1.1 Green stories	300
2.1.2 Hierarchy and patriarchy: their expressions as capitalism, industrialism, militarism, parliamentarianism, bureaucracy, techno-science, naturism, and “power over” critiqued	301
2.1.3 Metaphors	302
2.1.3.1 Mechanistic imagery used negatively	302
2.1.3.2 Relational, non-hierarchical imagery used positively	302
2.1.4 Rhetoric: resistance, liberation, emancipation, freedom!	302
2.1.5 Key theses on causes of ecological crisis	303
<b>2.2 Ecology seen as normative</b>	<b>304</b>
2.2.1 Green stories	304
<b>2.3 Spirituality as motivation in personal and social transformation</b>	<b>304</b>
2.3.1 Green stories	304
<b>3. Epistemology</b>	<b>305</b>
<b>3.1 Green stories</b>	<b>305</b>
<b>3.2 Rationalism problematized</b>	<b>306</b>
<b>3.3 Holistic [both/and], relational, dialectical, processual, epistemologies advocated</b>	<b>307</b>
<b>3.4 The role of language in dominating, exploitative, human-human, human-nature, human-animal relationships problematized</b>	<b>307</b>
<b>4. Ontology</b>	<b>309</b>
<b>4.1 A holistic, purposive view of reality/nature</b>	<b>309</b>
4.1.1 Green stories	309
4.1.2 A holistic view of reality	309
4.1.3 Nature as non-hierarchical	310
4.1.4. Nature as alive, manifesting rationality, consciousness, subjectivity, “mind”	310
4.1.5 Nature as manifesting “power to”, directionality, and self-organization, towards its own ends, such as greater complexity, diversity, self-reflexivity	310
4.1.5.1 but not a deterministic telos	310
4.1.6 Nature as displaying and maintaining dynamic balance and stability	310
<b>4.2 A reconceptualized human being vis-a-vis nature</b>	<b>311</b>
4.2.1 Green stories	311
4.2.2 Dichotomy between humans and nature [the “discontinuity problem”] rejected	311
4.2.3 Continuity rather than discontinuity with nonhuman nature emphasized	311



<b>4.3 A reconceptualized Self</b>	<b>312</b>
4.3.1 Green stories	312
4.3.2. Western atomist, aggressive, selfish individualism problematized	313
4.3.3. The new, better human being: liberated, re-integrated, embodied, connected	313
4.3.3.1 Complete liberation and freedom, especially for women, from all forms of hierarchy, patriarchy, and any other form of domination, or coercion	313
4.3.3.2 Unrepressed re-admittance of the body into what it is to be a fully-functioning human being	314
4.3.3.3 The ‘feminine principle’: feminine values re-integrated into views of the better person	314
4.3.3.4 The fully functioning person understood as the whole person: re-integrated, well-rounded	314
4.3.3.5 An interconnected sense of Self, in which a non-dominating, non-exploitative relationship with nature is part of what it is to be an integrated, mature, human being	315
4.3.3.6 Spirituality recognized	315
<b>5. Ethic, including a nature, and animal, ethic</b>	<b>316</b>
<b>5.1 Green stories</b>	<b>316</b>
<b>5.2 A different account of the ethical</b>	<b>316</b>
5.2.1 The epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning rational-instrumentalism towards nature (women, animals) critiqued	317
5.2.2 Emotion (including empathy, identification, care, compassion) re-integrated into accounts of the ethical	317
5.2.3 Context (the particular, the personal, the process, “place”) re-integrated into accounts of the ethical	317
5.2.4 The body re-admitted into accounts of the ethical	317
5.2.5 The rights concept in human-human, and human-nonhuman relationships rejected, problematized, and employed	317
5.2.6 Environmental ethical theory [biocentrism, ecocentrism] and its technical understandings of value in nature do not quite encompass seeing green’s nature ethic	318
<b>5.3 A “new consciousness” as motivation in bridging the human/nature (self/Other) divide</b>	<b>318</b>
5.3.1 Green stories	318
5.3.2 Recognizing nature’s value-for-itself	318
5.3.2.1 Nature’s value-for-itself ascribed to	318
5.3.2.2 Values in nature	319
<b>5.4 The scope of the green ethic, with focus on nature</b>	<b>319</b>
5.4.1 Green stories:	319
5.4.2 Variation in scope:	320
<b>5.5 The intent of the new nature ethic: long-range, wide ecological sustainability</b>	<b>321</b>
5.5.1 Green stories	321
5.5.2 Understandings of long-range ecological sustainability	321
5.5.3. Animal well-being achieved through appeals to identification, sentience, the practice of care, special legal status, rights (justice)	322
5.5.4 Ecological sustainability achieved philosophically by	322
5.5.4.1 Assigning legal standing to sue, thus rights, to some of nonhuman nature	322
5.5.4.2 Biospherical egalitarianism – empathetically respecting every life form’s equal or same right to “live and blossom”	322
5.5.4.3 Actively employing human creativity to restore and maintain biological evolution towards mutuality, diversity, and increasing subjectivity	322
5.5.4.4 Practising an ethic of care	322
5.5.4.5 Practising a partnership ethic with nature which protects the life basis for all living beings	322



<b>6. An ecological society: some real-world views on culture, politics, the economy, and the natural environment</b>	<b>323</b>
<b>6.1 Green stories</b>	<b>323</b>
<b>6.2 Key proposition: Fundamental, ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal reformation of ourselves, and society's structures needed</b>	<b>323</b>
6.2.1 Ecologically-informed, and/or post-patriarchal personal and social values advocated	323
6.2.2 Ecologically-informed, post-hierarchical forms of political and socio-economic organization advocated	324
6.2.3 Reform environmentalism is not the answer	326
<b>6.3 Authentic development, and the good life</b>	<b>326</b>
6.3.1 Green stories	326
6.3.2 Capitalism problematized/rejected as cultural/socio-economic system	327
6.3.3 Development understood as advanced capitalist techno-industrialism challenged	327
6.3.3.1 The ideology of "progress" and "industrialism" ["development"] critiqued	327
6.3.3.2 Materialism and consumerism critiqued as end values	327
6.3.3.3 Rational-instrumental science and technology, problematized, rejected	328
6.3.3.4 "Naturism" critiqued (instrumental exploitation, domination and destruction of nature)	329
6.3.3.5 Global "advanced" industrial capitalism problematized	329
6.3.4 An alternative conception of "the good life"	330
6.3.5 Alternative forms of development proposed	330
<b>6.4 Assuring ecological sustainability</b>	<b>331</b>
6.4.1 Green stories:	331
6.4.2 Take a long-range ecological protection, not short term economic view of the environment ["futuraity"]	331
6.4.3 Establish international controls to assure global ecological sustainability	332
6.4.4 Stabilize, reduce human population growth	332
6.4.5 Protect land, water and air's long-term capacity to sustain life	332
6.4.5.1 Reduce excessive intervention into/disturbance of natural processes and habitats; exercise prudence when intervening	332
6.4.5.2 Reduce waste, pollution, and wastefulness	332
6.4.6 Protect remaining biodiversity and its habitat	332
6.4.6.1 Set aside, and restore, large areas of "free nature" from human techno-industrial progress to protect biodiversity and its habitat	333
6.4.6.2 Scale down industrial activities which threaten wide ecological sustainability	333
6.4.6.3 Problematize biotechnology	333
6.4.7 Reduce resource consumption: energy as example	333
6.4.7.1 Stabilize and reduce use of non-renewable energy	333
6.4.7.2. Use renewable energy	333
6.4.7.3 Increase research into alternative energies	334
6.4.7.4 Avoid/stop all use of nuclear energy	334
6.4.7.5 Democratize and decentralize energy provision and storage	334
6.4.7.6 Favour energy-saving transport systems	334
6.4.8 Practice reciprocal land use: agriculture as example	334
6.4.8.1 A demand for organically-produced food; a rejection of genetically modified foods	334
6.4.8.2 Concern for the protection of human scale farming	334
6.4.8.3 Attention to animal welfare in farming	334
6.4.9 Treat animals ethically	335
6.4.9.1 Eliminate animal experimentation including vivisection, and product-testing, completely, or almost completely	335

6.4.9.2 Totally dissolve, or radically reform, commercial animal agriculture	335
6.4.9.3 Total or partial moral veganism, vegetarianism, as personal statement and economic boycott	336
6.4.9.4 Wildlife: commercial, culling and sport hunting, trapping, and related trade totally or partially condemned, except in cases of vital human need	336
6.4.9.5. No animals confined for education, or used in entertainment	336
6.4.9.6 Animal torture strictly punishable	336
6.4.10 Provide insight into, and exposure to, the interconnectedness of the ecological life basis	336
<b>6.5 An ecologically re-oriented economy</b>	<b>336</b>
6.5.1 Green stories:	336
6.5.2 Recognizes ecological limits, and promotes ecological sustainability	337
6.5.3 Practises ecological accounting, incl. “greening” of GDP as indicator of development	337
6.5.4 Prioritizes life-affirming economic activities	338
6.5.5 Delivers quality of life, not quantitative growth	338
6.5.6 Encourages production for needs not profit	338
6.5.7 Encourages ecologically-appropriate local production for local use	339
6.5.8 Democratic control, both of the economy, and in the workplace	339
6.5.9 Provides creative activity, not meaningless labour	339
6.5.10 Uses “soft” (non-demeaning, non-exploitative) technology	340
6.5.11 Provides a “social wage” for all	340
6.5.12 Protects people against misleading encouragement to materialism and consumerism	340
6.5.13 Practices fair trade/development aid	341
<b>6.6 Living in solidarity</b>	<b>341</b>
6.6.1 Green stories	341
6.6.2 “Masculine” values rebalanced with ecologically-informed, and/or post-patriarchal personal and social values	342
6.6.3 Non-violence, and radical peace	342
6.6.3.1 Militarism, nuclearism, and threat of force critiqued; instead, radical peace, total disarmament, locally-organized non-violent social defence	342
6.6.3.2 No structural violence	343
6.6.3.3 Dialogue, consensual process, respect for difference, not ‘power-over’ in our relations and actions	343
6.6.3.4 No physical violence; no hate behaviour, no violent speech, no vilification	343
6.6.3.5 Fair trade practices	343
6.6.4 Full emancipation for women; post-patriarchal gender roles	343
6.6.5 Multi-culturalism valued	343
6.6.6 Social inclusion	343
6.6.7 Non-patriarchal, holistic, close-to-home health care	343
6.6.8 Re-integrated, ecologically-harmonious human habitat spatial planning	343
6.6.9 Holistic, real-world education	343
6.6.10 Considering future generations	343
<b>6.7 Grassroots [“direct”] democracy</b>	<b>344</b>
6.7.1 Green stories	344
6.7.2 Decentralized political self-management, and real citizenship	344
6.7.3 Non-violent, direct action, including civil disobedience	345
6.7.4 Fundamental rights protected	345
6.7.5 Public accountability, and private data protection	345
<b>7. Praxis</b>	<b>345</b>
<b>7.1 Green stories</b>	<b>345</b>



<b>7.2 Living out/enacting your personal moral beliefs in the public sphere too</b>	<b>345</b>
<b>7.3 “Self-work”</b>	<b>346</b>
<b>8. Summary of “seeing green”</b>	<b>346</b>
<b>8.1 Its challenge</b>	<b>347</b>

## 1. Introduction

We live during a period of millennial change in the Western world view ... One world view, the modern mechanical world view, is gradually giving way to another. Who knows what future historians will call it – the organic world view, the ecological world view, the systems world view...? (Callicott, 1992, p. 142).

The purpose of this chapter is to provide, from the green sample database in Chapters Three to Seven, one possible answer to research question 1: What does “seeing green” as worldview mean? In this introductory section, I explain (1.1) that this study is by no means the first attempt to characterise the “green” worldview, yet why I felt that asking what “seeing green” means, was still worthwhile, (1.2) my approach in arriving at this particular synthesis of “seeing green”, and (1.3) how I have presented it. Thereafter, follows a textual presentation of a “seeing green” worldview under the by-now familiar themes of (2) legitimating narratives, (3) epistemology, (4) ontology, (5) ethic, with emphasis on seeing green’s nature and animal ethic, (6) views on political, social and economic issues, and (7) praxis. In section 8, I present a summary of seeing green’s key ideas. In Chapter Ten: section 3.4, I draw on this chapter to compile a list of criteria and indicators by which to judge the green-ness of any text, such as *Namibia Vision 2030* (Chapter Eleven).

### 1.1 Other syntheses of the ecological or green worldview

Other writers have attempted the task of synthesizing an ecological or green worldview, often in contradistinction to what they variously call “technocentrism”, “the politics of industrialism”, or the mechanist/Cartesian worldview. Those I have encountered are -

- a. O’Riordan, in his 409-page book, *Environmentalism* (1981). In Figure 10.1<sup>1</sup> “The pattern of environmentalist ideologies”, O’Riordan (1981, p. 376) seeks to characterise in brief phrases, the key ideas of “Ecocentrism”, which he divides into two versions, a more ecocentric version: “Deep environmentalists” and a less ecocentric version, called “Self-reliance, soft technologists”. In the next two columns, he presents the key ideas of the “Technocentrism” ideology, also in two versions: a less extreme version entitled “Accommodaters”, and a more extreme version, called “Cornucopians”;
- b. Porritt, in his 249-page book “*Seeing green*” (1984), provides on pages 216-217, a table entitled “Distinguishing features of a green paradigm”. In it he compares the worldviews of “The politics of ecology” with “The politics of industrialism”. This table was introduced in Chapter Four, Figure 4;
- c. Sterling, who wrote a 10-page chapter in Engel and Engel (1990, pp. 77-86), entitled “Towards an ecological world view”. On p. 82, he compares in Table 5.1, “Mechanistic versus Ecological World Views”, under what he calls, “Descriptors”, “Primary”, and “Secondary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views”;
- d. Metzner, who wrote a 10-page chapter in Tucker and Grim (1994), entitled “The emerging ecological worldview”. In an unnumbered table entitled “Transition from the industrial to the ecological age” (pp. 170-171), he compares key ideas in these two worldviews under descriptors such as “epistemology”, “values in relation to nature”, “technology” and “agriculture”.

<sup>1</sup> O’Riordan’s table is reproduced as Figure 9, in Chapter Eleven

<sup>2</sup> The keynote citation for this book was from fundamentalist Die Grünen Rudolf Bahro’s work, Die Grünen activist and founding party member Petra Kelly wrote its foreword, and Charlene Spretnak, deep ecologist and ecofeminist wrote of it that “No one who reads this book will ever again confuse ecological politics with mere environmentalism” (back cover). The book’s credentials are therefore a darker shade of “green”

- e. Edward Goldsmith, author of *Blueprint for survival* (1972), has also (1992) authored *The Way: An ecological world view*, a 442-page book, in which he describes the ecological worldview in terms of 66 principles, to which he devotes a chapter each.

All these writers' synthesizing attempts, but particularly the first four, have been invaluable in contributing to the ecological validity of this study, as I explain in section 1.3.1.

So why did I not in turn, synthesize their attempts – a seemingly obvious, and tempting, shortcut to understanding “seeing green”! - in order to reach a set of criteria by which the green-ness of any text could be assessed? For several reasons.

First and foremost, initially completely uninformed as to what “green” might mean, other than a vague “environmental-friendliness”, most of the descriptors were puzzling: “Land ethic: think like mountain” (Sterling, 1990, p. 82), or “Ecology, not environmentalism” (Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217). What did they mean?

The second reason, which emerged as my knowledge of the green sample members' viewpoints increased, was that the writers had been necessarily selective, as I have been, in their choice of indicators, or “markers”, but not always transparently so. I use Metzner's excellent table (1994, pp. 170-171) as example. Under “Role of the human”, he uses “extended sense of self” as descriptor of the Ecological Age, in contradistinction to the Industrial Age's “Individual vs. world”. There is no indication that this green marker comes from a *deep ecology* context, nor any indication either, that is a highly contentious understanding of Self, critiqued by social ecologists and ecofeminists alike (Chapter Four: 4.2.3). But, remaining with “Role of the human”, Metzner uses “ecological stewardship”, which I have assumed to be taken from a *social ecology* context (Chapter Five: 5.4.2.5), as marker of the human's role in the Ecological Age, and not, as could reasonably have been expected, the *deep ecology* “partner” to “extended sense of self” for the human's role in nature, which is “biospherical egalitarianism” (Chapter Four: 4.2.2, 5.1.1). *Social ecology*'s influence in his choice of phrases under the descriptor “Human/social values” is clear. Yet social ecologist Bookchin's rejection of any supernatural element in nature is not present in Metzner's list of indicators at “Theology and religion”. In neither Metzner's table, nor any of the other three tables, is Bookchin's sustained, and biting, critique of capitalism – fundamental to his *social ecology* critique - even mentioned. In other words, I found to be missing in the four summary syntheses: (1) the *philosophical/ideological context* of the key phrases/words chosen, something I consider all-important to retain the rich meaning of any particular green idea. It is exactly this discarding of the rich context of green ideas which makes their co-optation, and absorption, into mainstream thinking possible, which turns their “green-ness” to “grey”, “grue” or “brown”. (2) Also largely missing I thought, is an indication of *the variation*, or downright *disagreements*, in the different versions of green thinking. An exception here is O'Riordan's (1981, p. 376) table, which does seek to show “within-green” variation.

Other reasons were purely practical: it would have required taking some liberties with these writers' presentations to coax their descriptors and key phrases/words, into the kind of standard themes environmental philosopher Sylvan (1985b) encouraged in coming to grips with the ideas of a worldview. In addition, some of the indicators are so phrased as to be difficult to apply concretely to a text: Sterling's (1990) “The quality of interrelationships between systems equated with well-being”, or “Concern with the qualitative” are good examples, as is Porritt's “Ecology” (1984), or Metzner's (1994) “ecofeminism”. Finally, I wanted to arrive at a personal, not derived, understanding of what a “seeing green” worldview might mean.

## 1.2 What does seeing green mean?: Applying Sylvan's method

To produce *this* synthesis of a seeing green worldview, from which seeing green criteria will be derived in Chapter Ten, I followed Sylvan's (1985b) qualitative thematic survey method (Chapter Two, section 1). Sylvan began by (a) assembling a set of sources on his topic [deep ecology in his case, seeing green in mine], (b) identifying and "unscrambling" the themes which seemed to be present or "emerge" from the identified sources [the standard worldview elements of Chapters Three to Seven], (c) discarding those themes which to him appeared "evidently remote and irrelevant", and then (d) applying "the elementary set operations of union and intersection" to the present or emerging themes in order to establish the "total theory"/"paradigm" [union] and "common core" [intersection] of his research topic. It is step (d) with which this section 1.2 is concerned.

Here is Sylvan's description of it:

Once the sources are assembled a beginning can be made on unscrambling themes, something that calls for a good deal of judgement also, especially in such matters as deciding whether themes from different sources come to the same [thing] or not. Here and elsewhere care is required not to penetrate too deeply, to expose only so much of the surface themes as is necessary (a well-known principle in logical analysis). When the themes are duly marked out, there is some smoothing of the thematic data, for instance evidently remote and irrelevant themes in one source may be deleted. (It is like the judging of a diving contest or the massaging of statistic[s]: isolated wild elements are removed from the sample used for assessment.) Then the elementary set operations of union and intersection are applied, again subject to some qualification. In particular, if a very prominent theme in some formulations is omitted from, or only approximated in, one formulation, then that theme will be put, initially at least, in the intersection ...

Before presenting my own attempted synthesis, some comments are in order:

I wanted a substitute for Sylvan's mathematical-sounding "union" and "intersection" terms. Qualitative replacement terms often used are "core" and "periphery", but after intensive exposure to ecofeminist thought, that sounded too "centric" (Chapter Six: 4.2.1). It implies that ideas occurring more often, or on which there is consensus, are more important than ideas less agreed on, or occurring less often. Nor does this kind of quantitative approach "work" for seeing green: (a) The strongly present feminist critique of 'male' views on Self and Other in ecofeminism is not an explicitly-discussed aspect of all sample members, yet feminist thought is significant in seeing green (Ferris, 1993, p. 149, pp. 150-151<sup>3</sup>), (b) the sample members have been chosen to represent the different levels of Wissenburg's heuristic (Chapter One, Figure 2); it is to be expected then that their focus, and their choice of issues, differs, and (c), welcoming of diversity of opinion is itself a marker of green. So, instead of mathematical or centrist terms, I have settled for "Green stories"<sup>4</sup> to represent what seeing green is trying to say on any particular point.

It was indeed no easy task, as Sylvan warned, to decide to what extent ideas in the standard themes across the sample came to the "same thing", or not. For example, holism in perception of reality is a mostly common thought across the seeing green sample, but it varies from metaphysical understandings to emphatic naturalism (Chapter Eight: 4.1.2). There is agreement that animal suffering matters morally, and that economic policies must change to reflect that, but animal liberation theory and ecofeminism arrive at that conclusion from completely different epistemological and ontological premises. Ferris (1993, p. 151), in the context of wondering whether such a thing as green social

---

<sup>3</sup> "Green politics have been shaped by (but are not synonymous with) three distinct social movements: those of feminism, ecology and peace" (p. 149), and "What changed political ecology after 1980, was the coming together of the peace movement and feminism with green concerns. This injected into ecological thought the historic concerns of the left, especially the critique of social domination and concern with equality and justice." (pp. 150-151)

<sup>4</sup> I considered, but rejected "trend", as too linear, and "pattern" as conveying more orderliness than I found in seeing green. The concept "stories" can convey an important message, even if in a roundabout, rather than direct, way

policies is possible at all, notes that a “... careful documentation” of the “conflicting currents in green ideology” is required, and that the “spectacular synthesis ... transmitted by writers like Parkin<sup>5</sup> and Porritt is far from having been achieved either intellectually or politically....”. Diversity of opinion, not homogeneity, is a marker of green! Nevertheless, I do believe, along with the writers mentioned in this chapter’s section 1.1, and others such as Capra and Spretnak (1984), that such a thing as “seeing green” does exist.

### 1.3 Presentation of “seeing green”

It is no easy task to present seeing green’s diversity and complexity<sup>6</sup>, either compactly or coherently. Sterling (1990, p. 77) for example writes: “The most pressing need is for the emergence, clarification, and adoption of a new ecological world view ... Its articulation is inherently difficult, however, for it relates to a way of thinking and being which is far deeper and more extensive than any single attempt to express it, and which goes beyond any one individual’s interpretation....”.

In sections 2-7, I present in textual format, my understanding of seeing green’s ideas according to the standard worldview themes developed through Chapters Three to Seven. As far as possible, within-theme presentation has been standardized, under “green stories”, “variations”, “green sample data”, and “green external data”. These are explained next.

The worldview element/theme, and sometimes its sub-themes, begin with **green stories**, which are not to be understood as an exact quantitative reflection of how common a specific viewpoint is across the sample. Heeding Ferris’s call for “careful documentation” of conflicting ideas, **variations** in the green stories are pointed out. Then follows **green sample data**, presented as fully as possible, in the form of chapter and section references, to support the stories and their variations. This approach, though tedious, serves to remind the reader that all seeing green ideas are taken from a particular, and rich, philosophical/ideological context, *which informs their meaning*. The data provided also suggests, but only in a broad sort of way, the “sameness” of ideas across the green sample – for example the critique of patriarchy common to *ecofeminism* and *Die Grünen* owes its origins to feminist critique; the critique of hierarchy common to *social ecology* and *Die Grünen* can trace its origins to the counter-cultural influence of New Left thought.

In support of my green stories and their variations, I also refer the reader to similar ideas present in other authors’ attempts to synthesize seeing green [1.1 above]. Methodologically, I hope this **external green data** contributes to the ecological validity of the synthesis suggested here. Readers may judge for themselves to what extent this extraneously-derived green data supports or departs from my version of seeing green. Those external ideas which I did not encounter in the green sample elements, or which I encountered but did not include in my discussion, are clearly indicated in separately marked sections.

A note on the limitations of the synthesis. I feel somewhat dissatisfied with it, because it is a “flat” reflection of the richness, diversity, elusiveness, beauty, and challenge of the philosophical and ideological ideas which comprise each sample element. This synthesis is also limited in that the five base data chapters themselves represent a selection only of each sample member’s viewpoints on reality, self, and the self/nature relationship, based on some sources only. It is to be expected that some views on some issues are not represented here, for example, green views on sustainable fisheries, sustainable forestry, mining, or fiscal measures. Even so, despite these limitations, I am confident that the synthesis presented here, does convey the major ideas of “seeing green”.

---

<sup>5</sup> Sara Parker, former UK Green, author of a biography on Die Grünen activist Petra Kelly, now a colleague of Jonathon Porritt in the UK organization Forum for the Future ([www.forumforthefuture.org.uk](http://www.forumforthefuture.org.uk))

<sup>6</sup> “... the ecological world view is difficult to describe because it tends toward great complexity and because its elements and their origins are diverse. ...” (Bartlett, 1986, p. 234, noting Lynton K. Caldwell’s (1971, p. 209) “distillation” of it in *Environment: A challenge to modern society*)

## 2. Legitimizing narratives

The seeing green worldview blames a mixture of philosophical/ideological factors for the ecological crisis. Androcentrism, anthropocentrism, hierarchy, patriarchy, naturism, and western-techno-industrialism are the major candidates (2.1). The lessons of ecology are seen as normative for restoring what once were human beings' benign relationships with each other, and with nature (2.2). Spirituality, metaphysical or secular, provides essential motivation in the personal and social-structural transformation which comprises seeing green (2.3).

### 2.1 The feminist-ecological androcentric critique, which encompasses the ideas of anthropocentrism, hierarchy, and techno-industrialism

#### 2.1.1 Green stories

A key, and practically universal theme in the green sample is a critique of anthropocentrism (discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine: section 6), two formal environmental philosophical definitions of which are:

A stance that limits moral standing to human beings, confines the scope of morality and moral concern to human interests, and regards nothing but human well-being as valuable intrinsically (Attfield, 2003, p. 188).

... the philosophical perspective asserting that ethical principles apply to humans only, and that human needs and interests are of highest, and even exclusive, value and importance. Thus, concern for nonhuman entities is limited to those entities having value to humans (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998b, p. 309).

Some ecofeminists argue that androcentrism encompasses and explains anthropocentrism, and the idea of hierarchy too. Androcentrism is a 'male' and supposedly gender-neutral understanding of what it is to be a human being. Feminists/ecofeminists contend that its *masculine* dualistic, hierarchical, and dominating logic generates a Self divided against self, against human other, and against nature. They argue that it is therefore an even more fundamental conceptual framework than anthropocentrism within which to understand the green-suggested pathology of the human-human, and human-nature relationship. Androcentrism also encompasses seeing green's powerful critique of hierarchical and patriarchal thinking in the political and socio-economic spheres, including its justification of "naturism" – any way of thinking about, or acting towards nonhuman nature "that reflects a logic, values, or attitude of domination" (Warren, 1990, p. 141, in Chapter Six: 1.3).

Androcentric critique (understood to include the critique of anthropocentrism, patriarchy and hierarchy) forms the narrative context for seeing green's entire western cultural, psychological, ethical, social, and economic critique. Capitalism, militarism, parliamentarianism, authoritarian bureaucracy, and techno-science, are all critiqued as expressions of the 'power-over' [as opposed to creative "power-to"<sup>7</sup>] thought, competition, domination, manipulation and violence inherent in hierarchy and patriarchy (2.1.2). The androcentric/anthropocentric critique explains seeing green's rhetoric of liberation, of emancipation, from domination and oppression (2.1.3), its theses on the causes of the ecological crisis (2.1.4), its critique of western dominant views on, and demands for alternative views on epistemology, ontology and human-nature ethic.

---

<sup>7</sup> "Power to," means the power to act, or to "be", or to self-realize, without external restraint. It also refers to the Earth's immanent power to self-organize [autopoiesis]. It is creative power, rather than power-over. Some of its ideas-origins are variously Earth spirituality, Spinozist-influenced metaphysics, and the absence of hierarchy/ presence of symbiosis in nature, normatively understood. In seeing green, "power to" – an essential element of freedom - can be achieved by removing all forms of hierarchy, patriarchy, domination and oppression, and rebalancing "masculine" with "feminine-principle" thinking

**Green sample data:**

*deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.1, 5.1.1, 5.2, 5.4.1, and Ch 5: 8.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.2.2 and subdivisions; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1.3, 2.3, 3.1, 3.1.1, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.3.2.2, 5.1, 6.1.1, 6.1.2(3); *Die Grünen*: Ch 7: 2.1.

**Variations:**

1. *animal liberation theory* does not problematize androcentrism/anthropocentrism at all, but speciesism<sup>8</sup> - Ch 3: 5.1.1.1
2. *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone) problematizes the lack of legal standing for natural objects in the legal system, not anthropocentrism, but his critique of atomist individualism's desire to possess and to dominate begins to approach such critique - Ch 3: 5.1.3, 5.4.3, 6.1
3. Not "anthropocentricity", but the idea of hierarchy in human affairs, and projected onto nature, is blamed for human-human and human-nature oppression – *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.2.2
4. I understand as not unlike much of the androcentric critique<sup>9</sup>, yet different, *Die Grünen* Bahro's exterminism. Defined as the logic of self-destruction, or the tendency towards mass destruction of all life, it manifests itself in the surface phenomena of (1) militarism, (2) patriarchy (3) the destruction of nature and culture by aggressive capitalist industrialism, and (4) the "daily exterminism" of mass starvation in the Third World, both as a result of capitalist industrialism's relentless pursuit of raw materials, cheap labour, and new markets, and at the hands of their own ruling elites (Bahro, 1984, pp. 214-217) - *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.

**2.1.2 Hierarchy and patriarchy: their expressions as capitalism, industrialism, militarism, parliamentarianism, bureaucracy, techno-science, naturism, and "power over" critiqued**

**Green sample data:**

- a. Patriarchy – *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.2.3.2 last par., 6.2.1 footnote 66; *social ecology* Ch 4: 5.4.5.2 footnote 61; Ch 5: 4.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1, 1.2, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2.2, 4.3.2.3, 5.4.2, 5.4.2.1, 5.4.4.1(d), 5.4.4.2, 6.1.1, 6.1.2(9), 6.2, 7.4; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 4.3.4 footnote 67, 4.3.5
- b. Hierarchy – *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.2, 2.1.4, 2.1.4.1, 2.1.4.2.1, 2.1.5, 2.2, 2.3, 4.2, 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.3, 4.3, 4.3.1, 5.1, 5.4, 5.4.2.2, 6.1, 6.1.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.2, 8.1, 8.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1.2, 4.1, 6.1.1, 6.1.2(5); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.2, 2.1.3.2.1
- c. Statism, parliamentarianism – *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.4.3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 4.3, 4.3.1, 6.1.1, 6.1.1.1, 6.3.2 and subdivisions, 7.2, and Ch 7: 8.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.4.1, 8.1
- d. Bureaucracy – *social ecology* Ch 4: 5.4.5.2 footnote 61, Ch 5: 2.1.3, 3.2, 4.3, 6.1.1.1, 6.3.2.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.2
- e. Capitalism as cultural-economic system – stories and data at section 6.3.2, this chapter
- f. Militarism – stories and data at sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.3
- g. Techno-industrialism ("advanced" industrialism) – stories and data at section 6.3.3
- h. Techno-science – stories and data at section 6.3.3.3
- i. Naturism – stories and data at section 6.3.3.4
- j. power-over the Other; will to power – *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.2.2, 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.3, 6.1.1, 6.1.1.1, 6.3.1.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 3.1.1, 3.3.1, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.3.2.4, 5.4.4.2, 6.1.1, 6.1.2(5), 7; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.3.5.1, 8.1.

<sup>8</sup> Speciesism is "the belief that we are entitled to treat members of other species in a way in which it would be wrong to treat members of our own species" (Singer, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 27, in Ch 3: 5.1.1.1)

<sup>9</sup> I feel this interpretation is justified by Bahro's commitment to post-patriarchal perspectives [for example, Ch 7: 2.1.2]

## 2.1.3 Metaphors

### 2.1.3.1 Mechanistic imagery used negatively

“The Machine” or “mega-machine” image is used negatively to portray our reification of animals as mere things, for example, in intensive factory farming, as resources-for-humans; the reification of nature; an out-of-democratic-control industry, science and technology; or patriarchy-inspired western-style development in developing countries.

**Green data:** *animal liberation* Ch 3: 2.2, 5.3.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1 footnote 11, 5.4.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.4, 6.1.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.2.2.

### 2.1.3.2 Relational, non-hierarchical imagery used positively

Relational images are used to convey ontological understandings which emphasize interdependence rather than hierarchy.

#### Green data:

- “field”, “Gestalt” - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.2, 3.1, 4.1.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.1
- “net”, “network”, “web”, “mesh” - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.4.5.2 footnote 61; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.4, 5.3.2; *Die Grünen* 4.2, 4.2.1, 5.4.1.
- “collage”, “mosaic”, “tapestry” - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.2.2
- “household” [from “oikos”] - *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 5.4.1
- “community”, “ecocommunity” - *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2.1, 4.3, 5.4
- “system” and “ecosystem” - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.2, 2.4; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2, 4.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.1, 6.1.2(4); *Die Grünen* 4.2.1, 4.3.

#### Variations:

- Images of nature as mindless matter, or demonic [female] Beast, are also critiqued – *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.4, but
- Nature portrayed in images and metaphors as nurturing female causes ecofeminist ambivalence - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.1.1, 2.4.
- Some writers within *social ecology* (Bookchin, Ch 5: 2.1.4.2.1) and *Die Grünen* (Maren-Grisebach, Ch 7: 4.2 footnote 50) are wary of the mechanistic implications<sup>10</sup> of the term system/ecosystem and tend rather towards the concept “ecocommunities”.

## 2.1.4 Rhetoric: resistance, liberation, emancipation, freedom!

**Green stories:** The rhetoric is of egalitarianism, rights and justice, resistance, emancipation, liberation, and freedom [= choice, and self-direction].

**Variations:** The stories are variously of liberation for nature from humanity’s domination<sup>11</sup>, humanizing, domestication, or “thingification”; for women from patriarchy; for animals from

<sup>10</sup> Their concerns are valid if judged by influential early ecologist Arthur Tansley, who insisted that the term ‘ecocommunities’ carried organismic implications, and should be replaced by the term “ecosystem” to convey his view of nature “as a composite of strictly physical entities organized into a mechanical system” (Goldsmith, 1992, p. 18). The values implicit in the term “ecosystem” are discussed in Chapter Nine: 5.1

<sup>11</sup> Perhaps this is not stated emphatically enough. Modernity has defined human freedom *in opposition to* nature. This has given rise to two distinct, and opposing ethical traditions (Goulet, 1990, pp. 43-44). Given the key value of normative ecology, interdependence, both Goulet (1990, pp. 43-46), and Davidson (2000, pp. 35-37, referring to Goulet, 1990) discuss how to reconcile human freedom and nature’s freedom. Despite this, Goulet’s approach seems non-green to me, in that he continues to grant separate ontological status to nature, and to humanity, whereas “seeing green” rejects such ontological dualism. “Seeing green” is about seeking an end to the [masculinist] idea of human progress/development via the domination and exploitation of nature in a kind of “war” in which *either* humanity is “free” *or* nature is “free” [its integrity is maintained]. See for example, social ecologist Bookchin, in Chapter Five, section 4.2.2.3, ecofeminist authors in Chapter Six, sections 1.2, 1.3, 4.3.2.2 on the culture vs. nature debate, and naturism, or *Die Grünen*, Chapter Seven, section 2.1.3 on nature experienced as “enemy”

speciesism; for humanity from domestication, ‘necessity’, and any form of co-ercion; for Third World peoples from western ‘maldevelopment’; for ourselves from our role as dominators of nature. Some rhetoric is of healing, salvation, and survival.

#### Green sample data:

- a. Egalitarianism – *animal liberation* Ch 3: 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.2, 5.4.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.3.1, 2.4, 5.1.1.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.2.2.1
- b. Rights and justice – *animal liberation* Ch 3: 2.1
- c. Resistance, liberation, emancipation, freedom – *animal liberation* Ch 3: 2.1, 5.1.1.1; *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone) Ch 3: 5.1.3.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.2, 4.1.3; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.3, 4.1.3.3, 4.3, 4.3.1, 5.2.1.2, 8.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1, 1.4, 2.4, 5.1, 5.2.4, 5.2.5, 5.4.2, 5.4.4.3, 6.4(c), 7; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.2.3, 4.3.4, 6.4.1.2
- d. Life, survival, salvation/redemption for self and planet - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.2.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.6, 2.2.1, 2.2.3, 4.3.4
- e. “healing” the wounds inflicted on people and planet by hierarchy, oppression - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.4.

### 2.1.5 Key theses on causes of ecological crisis

**Green stories:** Seeing green has been insisting since the mid-1960s that there is a real, global, ecological crisis. A valid question here, I think, is: “Have we averted it, or is there still a crisis?” Yes, there is: “The scientists who mind the Doomsday Clock moved it forward two minutes on Wednesday [24<sup>th</sup> January 2007] to five minutes until midnight, symbolising the growing risk of the annihilation of civilisation, and for the first time said global warming was a threat...” (*The Namibian*, 25 January 2007, p. 7, article entitled “2007 is the crunch year on climate: enviro expert” citing from a NAMPA-Reuters report).

**Variations, and green sample data:** In that context then, green sample theses on the causes of the ecological crisis are variously:

1. *Animal liberation* theorists Singer and Regan make no key assumptions on the cause of the ecological crisis which would entail radical structural changes to society, but their ethic’s moral obligation to end animal suffering does. *Nonhuman nature rights* theorist Stone suggests that the lack of assignment of legal standing, thus rights, to some of nature at least, contributes to the environmental crisis – Ch 3: 5.1.3, 6.1

2. Anthropocentrism - the ontological divide between humanity and the rest of nature which it assumes, and the instrumental view of nature it legitimates – is the cause of the ecological crisis. A change towards a more ecocentric, non-dualistic ontological understanding of nature, and a new understanding of Self within it, must precede a change in our ethical attitudes towards nature – *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.1

3. “deep-seated social problems”, such as economic, ethnic, cultural and gender conflicts, are the source from which all our ecological problems arise. These problems cannot be understood, or resolved, “without resolutely dealing with problems within society” (Bookchin, 1993, p. 354). Ecological problems are essentially social justice and political issues, “stemming from capitalism and problems of social hierarchy and social class domination” (Sessions, 1995f, pp. 265-266). It is the “hierarchical mentality” pervading our society which gives rise to “the very idea of dominating the natural world” (Bookchin, 1993, p. 355) – Ch 5: 2.2

4. Androcentrism – the male disconnected sense of Self, its patriarchal orientation, its power-based morality – is the cause of the ecological crisis. The disconnected male Self views everything as “Other” to itself, and thus as a potential object of management, exploitation, domination, or oppression. Androcentrism manifests itself structurally and systemically as patriarchy, hierarchy, and naturism – *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.3

5. Advanced industrialism, both western and socialist, is responsible for all current and interconnected crises, both at cultural/socio-economic level, and at personal level – *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.4.

## 2.2 Ecology seen as normative

### 2.2.1 Green stories

Ecology was originally seen as the “subversive” science, and its ideological status that of a resistance or revolutionary movement (*deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.4). In social ecologist Bookchin’s phrase, ecology conveys both a critical message [what humanity is doing wrongly: broadly, seeking to dominate nature; disturbing its balance], and a reconstructive one [what humanity ought to be doing: broadly, re-harmonizing itself with nature; preserving nature’s richness, complexity, diversity] (*social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2). Ecology provides the secure foundation for seeing green’s thought, policy and practice (Maren-Grisebach, of *Die Grünen*, Ch 7: 4.2.4), and also our nature ethic. Rejecting the naturalistic fallacy<sup>12</sup> (e.g. *social ecology* Ch 5: 5, *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.2.4), seeing green proposes ecology as the value within which *all* issues in society are to be assessed, and from which personal and social values, and social structures and practices should be derived (section 6.2, this chapter).

Herein lies a green challenge to traditional views of science as supposedly value-free (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998a, p. 11). To varying degrees, social ecologists, deep ecologists, and *Die Grünen*, for example, all welcome natural science ecology as partly-normative for their ontological views, and views on the new human being, new self, and new society (e.g. *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.4; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.2.4). Deep ecologists saw the new science of conservation biology which emerged in the mid-1980s, as normative for their views on the conservation of “free nature” and biodiversity (*deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.1.4, 4.1.4.2).

**Variations:** *animal liberation theory* appeals not to radical ecology, but to the humanitarian rhetoric of rights and justice, to justify its nature (animal) ethic - Ch 3: 2.1.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.4, 4.1.4, 4.1.4.2, 6.5.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.3 footnote 9, 2.1.4.2, 3.2, 4.1.3.4, 5, 5.2.1.1; *Die Grünen* 1.4, 1.5, 2.1.2, 4.2.4, 6.1.1.

#### External green data:

Ecological (and other natural) laws dictate human morality (Deep environmentalists/self-reliance, soft technologists, O’Riordan, 1981, p. 376).

## 2.3 Spirituality as motivation in personal and social transformation

### 2.3.1 Green stories

Calls for spiritual renewal to end the philosophy of materialism, the “religion” of economism, and the pathology of individualism, are part of seeing green. Personal spiritual transformation is seen as essential in bringing about the new social transformation; in *Die Grünen* Bahro’s words, spirituality is the practice needed “to dismantle ... previous psychological structures and be socialized anew” (Bahro, 1983f, in Bahro, 1986, p. 90, and in Ch 7: 4.3.2). The sources of seeing green’s spirituality are diverse: alternative forms of Christianity such as the Christian mystics, St Francis, Meister Eckhart; Eastern religions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism; Earth or goddess worship; the animism of some “primal peoples”; and naturalism [respect for evolutionary process] are some. Spirituality also expresses itself as a rejection of domination, and as a deep commitment to genuine

<sup>12</sup> “Positivists hold that, because all value judgments are subjective and unreliable, they do not constitute ‘proper knowledge’. By positing the ‘naturalistic fallacy’ they claim that it is not possible to infer ‘ought’ from ‘is’, the *prescriptive* (value) from the *descriptive* (fact)” (Sterling, 1990, p. 79, his italics)

communalism/mutualism. In spirituality, recognized or not, is the indissoluble link between the re-conceptualized human being, the re-conceptualized self [section 4.3.3], and an ecologically-sustainable society [section 6].

#### Variations:

1. *Animal liberation theory* makes no mention of spirituality as motivation to the practice of animal rights. However, *nonhuman nature rights theorist* Stone, with his diffident suggestion that we recognize nature's possible consciousness and subjectivity, begins to approximate it, I think (Ch 3: 5.1.3, 5.1.3.1, 5.2.3).
2. In Bookchin's *social ecology* view, there is no support for metaphysical spirituality; spirituality is understood as authentic complementarity with both human and nonhuman nature. Structural change must precede personal spiritual change/redemption (Ch 4: 6.5.1, and Ch 5: 1, 2.1.1, 2.1.4.1, 2.1.4.2.1, 4.3.1, 5.1, 5.4, 6, 7.1, as examples).
3. Marxist-inspired elements within the green movement, tend to reject any spiritual dimension to life (e.g. *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.2; *Die Grünen*, Ch 7: 4.3.3.1).
4. Some green movement adherents critique what they see as "luxury spirituality [New Age and esoteric-type thinking for example] .... idealist icing on top of the material cake of the West's standard of living" (*ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.2).

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.3, 6.2.4.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1.2, 2.1.4, 2.2, 2.2.1, 5.3.2, 6.1.1, 6.1.2(2); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.5, 2.1.3.3(4), 2.1.3.5, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.3.1, 4.3.4, 6.3.1, 6.4.5.

#### External green data:

- a. A move towards spiritual, non-material values (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Animism: everything lives, not nature as background; nature as sacred, not nature as demonic/frightening; immanent divinity, not transcendent divinity; Creation spirituality<sup>13</sup>, not Creation as fallen, corrupt; pantheism and panentheism, not monotheism and atheism (Theology and religion in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

## 3. Epistemology

### 3.1 Green stories

Science originally referred to "the state or fact of knowing, and was contrasted with the notions of intuition or belief..." (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998a, p. 9). What separated science from intuition or belief, was dispassionate rationalism. Seeing green however, problematizes the primacy of reason and rationality as ways of knowing and acting, on various grounds (3.2): as divorced from the body as epistemological agent [i.e. the validity of feeling in knowing is denied; body as moral agent is denied]; as abstract, and universal; as generating a dualistic ontology; as legitimating rational-efficient, instrumental use of the Other [people and nature]; as favouring the analytical above the holistic; the value-free above the value-laden; and devaluing particular and local knowledge. In seeing green, *subjectivity, emotion, intuition, empathy, sensitivity, involvement, and value-recognition in knowing* are acknowledged, and appreciated.

<sup>13</sup> Presumably a reference to Mathew Fox's (1990) creation spirituality (for example, Reading 25 in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, pp. 228-235). I did not encounter it in the sources I consulted for each sample member, but from the Reading, it is clearly "green"

The seeing green critique of science and technology is not homogenous. Social ecology explicitly values humanist, non-rational-instrumental science and technology as “liberatory<sup>14</sup>” for the human condition (*social ecology* – Ch 5: 3.1, 6.2 as examples). Science’s supposedly value-free nature is critiqued on the one hand by some ecofeminists who reject this assumption (Ch 6: 3.3), and highlighted by deep ecologists on the other as unable, on its own, to provide normative values for society (Ch 4: 2.4). Consistently problematized, perhaps as heritage from Marcuse’s counter-cultural critique, is instrumental reason [e.g. economic rationality, rational self-interest], for its ethically bankrupt use of the Other for own ends. Rational-instrumental, exploitative forms of science, and of technology, which demean and dehumanize the human being, are exploitative of nature, and which provide short-term, “quick-fix” solutions to the ecological crisis rather than encouraging a review of fundamental values, are critiqued. This point is taken up again in section 6.3.3.3.

In addition to rationalism [but not instrumental rationalism], alternative holistic, dialectical, both/and, and process epistemologies are proposed (3.3). The influence of language in epistemological and ontological views is problematized: nature must also be emancipated from oppressive epistemological and ontological views in our words (3.4).

#### Variations:

1. Reason/rationality as way of knowing is preferred, not problematized - *animal liberation theory* Ch 3: 3, 5.4.2(c)
2. The Enlightenment ideal of reason is affirmed. Non-instrumental science and technology is valued: *social ecology* Ch 5: 1, 3.1, 4.2.1.2, footnote 33 at 5.4, 5.4.1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3.1.3, also in Ch 6: 3.5; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.2.1.5
3. Reason/rationality, and mechanistic, rationalist-instrumental, analytical, value-free, exploitative, context-inappropriate forms of science are seen as a “malestream” way of knowing, derived from a ‘masculinist’ worldview (Ch 6: 3.3): an oppositional view of Self [self divided against self], and oppositional view of Self/Other [other people, women, nature, animals], together with a devaluing of, and “power-over<sup>15</sup>” approach to, the Other – *ecofeminism* Ch 3: 8.5, and Ch 6: 1.2(5), 3, 3.1, 3.1.1, 3.3, 3.3.1, 4.3.2.2, 5
4. Least critically perhaps, the eco-socialist strands in *Die Grünen* championed an ecological reform of western industrialism, led forward by science and technology (Ch 7: 1.4.1).

## 3.2 Rationalism problematized

#### Green sample data:

Rationalism is problematized as -

- a. a dichotomising either/or epistemology, as in rationalism/emotion, thought/feeling, self/nature - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 3.1, 5; *ecofeminism* Ch 4: 4.2.3.2, and Ch 6: 1.2, 3.1, 3.1.1, 5.4.3(4), 6.1.2(6); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 3.1, 3.2.1
- b. a “severing”, distancing, subordinating, and instrumental epistemology - *nonhuman nature rights theory* Ch 3: 5.1.3.1, *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1 footnote 11, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1.3, 3.1.1, 3.3, 5, 5.1.1(a) and (f), 5.4.2.1, 5.4.3(4); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 3.2
- c. universalizing, homogenising. There is a demand for epistemological recognition of particular, local, and contextual knowledge, particularly women’s and non-expert ecological knowledge, and for recognition of difference - *ecofeminism* Ch 4: 4.2.3.2(b), and Ch 6: 3.1.1, 3.3, 5.1.1(c)
- d. unable to apprehend the paradox of consistency and change in reality as development, evolution: *social ecology* Ch 5: 3.3, 3.4

<sup>14</sup> Technology which will release human beings from the toil of producing the means of life, to pursue Self-realization (Ch. 5: 4.3, 6.2)

<sup>15</sup> Ruether highlighted the *transcendence* in the dualisms of western [male] thought, including in her view, the idea of transcendence of nature’s limited resources by ever more sophisticated science and technology (Li, 1993, p. 274, discussing Ruether’s (1975) work (Ch 6: 6.3))

- e. In addition, objective, analytical, reductionist, atomistic, scientific epistemology is critiqued - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 3.1, 3.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 3.3 and 3.3.1.

### 3.3 Holistic [both/and], relational, dialectical, processual, epistemologies advocated

#### Green sample data:

- Spontaneous, intuitive, non-analytical, “right-brain” thinking/knowing recognized - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.3, 3, 3.1, 3.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 3.3.1, 5.2.8
- Emotion re-admitted into thinking; empathetic, relational, affective knowing recognized – *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone) in Ch 3: 3, 5.1.3.1, *animal liberation theory* (sentience approach) Ch 3: 4.2.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.1, 3.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1.2, 3.3.1, 5.2.8; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 3.1, 3.2.1
- Non-analytical dialectical thinking, which strives to apprehend dynamic change, advocated – *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.1, 3.3, 3.4; a less philosophically-complex version of dialectical/process thinking is “network” thinking - *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 3.1, 4.2.2
- “standpoint” epistemology supported - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 3.3.1.

### 3.4 The role of language in dominating, exploitative, human-human, human-nature, human-animal relationships problematized

**Green sample data:** *Social ecology* Ch 5: 8.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 3.2, 4.2.2.1, 5.4.2.1, 6.2.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.4.3.2.

#### External green data on epistemology:

- Organic, holistic, participative, not mechanistic, reductionist, objectivist (Descriptors of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to mechanistic/Cartesian world views, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- Holistic synthesis and integration, not divisive, reductionist analysis (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- Reduction/integration, not reductionism (Epistemology of the ecological age, as opposed to that of the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- Intuition and understanding, not rationality and packaged knowledge (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- Concern with the qualitative, not emphasis on the quantitative<sup>16</sup> (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- Fact and value closely related, not fact and value unrelated; subject and object interactive, not subject and object separate; knowledge indivisible, value-laden, both empirical and intuitive, empathetic, not knowledge divisible, value-free, empirical, controlling; synthesis given greater emphasis, not analysis key to understanding (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- Unconscious values explicated, not “value-free” knowledge pursued (Education and research in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

<sup>16</sup> I understand this as a critique of quantification in the search for objective and precise knowledge, and as support for intuitive knowledge

**Related external green data ideas encountered but not included in green sample data:**

- a. Constructivism, not operationalism; Critical realism not logical positivism (Epistemology in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).
- b. Multidisciplinary, integrative, not Specialized disciplines; Unified worldview, not Science-humanities split (Education and research in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

(a) I did not directly encounter any rejection of operationalism or logical positivism in my sample reading. But I did encounter discussions of constructivism. Deep ecologist Naess notes that “The world we live in spontaneously cannot be degraded by being characterized as merely subjective. It is the real world we experience. Nothing is more real...” (Naess, 1989b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 244). Eco-feminist Charlene Spretnak is concerned about “...the ideological baggage ... of deconstructive postmodernism. Deconstructionists ... make a leap from noting that concepts are socially constructed to concluding that there is *nothing but* social construction in human experience. Every human perception appears to them to be socially invented in a particular time and place - *except* perceptions of difference....The perception of “nothing but difference” is believed by deconstructionists to be the sole island of neutrality from which one can scan social construction for 360 degrees” (Spretnak, 1997, p. 427, her italics). She rejects their notion of fundamental reality as nothing but difference, as well as their presentation of “the human story” as nothing but “power plays and language games” (Spretnak, 1997, p. 433), and insists on the physical groundedness of human experience (Ch 6: 4.3.1). Social ecologist Bookchin sees in the rationality of nature, an objective ground for ethics, and rejects postmodernism’s theoretical and ethical relativism (Ch 5: 5, 3.1). But there is also present in seeing green, a recognition of language’s constructive role (this section), and a highlighting of scientific epistemology’s western cultural origins (Ch 6: 3.3). Critical realism, which accepts the existence of a mind-independent world, recognizes the role of language in creating reality, the time-and-place social production of knowledge, and is more strongly committed to normative theory than most sociological theories (Sayer, 2000), does seem to be a good description of seeing green epistemology, as Metzner suggests, though I did not encounter any discussion of it in my sample reading.

(b) Although the idea of “Unified worldview, not Science-humanities split” was encountered in the sources consulted, it was not included in any sample member. The idea of science-humanities knowledge unified - a “*Ganzheitslehre*” - can be found in the work of Otto Neurath, nineteenth century ecological economist. Ecological economics is one of the many contributing ideologies to “green” (Martinez-Alier, 1987, Bramwell, 1989). Goldsmith also notes as a principle of the ecological worldview, that “Ecology is a unified organization of knowledge” (1992, pp. 1-6).

**Related external green data ideas not encountered**

- a. Multidimensional approach, not specialization (Secondary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- b. Cyclical concepts of time and causation, not linear concepts of time and causation (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82).

## 4. Ontology

### 4.1 A holistic, purposive view of reality/nature

#### 4.1.1 Green stories

Nature as a random phenomenon of separate, independent, human-usable parts is rejected (e.g. what *deep ecology* calls, the “supermarket” view (Ch 4: 4.1)). Instead, there is a holistic view of reality conveyed in non-hierarchical metaphors such as *gestalts*, systems or networks (4.1.2 - 4.1.3). Nature is understood non-dualistically, i.e. the sharp human-nature divide is rejected [stories and data at section 4.2]. Nature is seen as a single organism, or systems of organisms, or ecological *gestalts*, alive, manifesting consciousness, subjectivity, or mind, having its own “agenda” as it were, its own interests [“conatus”; “nisis”], which are becoming, or self-development, or self-evolution towards greater complexity, diversity, self-reflexivity, as well as a capacity for self-organization and self-direction [autopoiesis] in achieving its “agenda” (4.1.4 - 4.1.5). In *Die Grünen*’s real-world politics, this self-organization is primarily understood as manifesting in a dynamic ecological balance<sup>17</sup> and stability, which should not be disturbed. This ontological view (mind, nisis, conatus, self-organization) provides an objective basis (e.g. *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.1.3.4, 5), on which to ground a human-nature relationship ethic, and justifies, for example, the green demand for reduced excessive human interference in nature’s processes (Ch 4: 1.3.4.1, Ch 6: 6.1.2(4), Ch 7: 5.4.1 as examples).

#### Variation:

- a. The western non-holistic view of reality not problematized - *animal liberation theory* Ch 3: 4.1, 8.4
- b. Within and across the other sample members, there is variation in understandings of holism, from metaphysical understandings to dialectical naturalism
- c. On the feminist/ecofeminist critique, prevailing dominant understandings of humanity and nature are products of a ‘malestream’ ontology (Ch 6:3.1, 4.2).

#### 4.1.2 A holistic view of reality

##### Green sample data:

- a. A metaphysical, non-dualistic ontology; a belief in the unity, or Oneness, of all there is, sometimes denoted by the concept “Gaia” – *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.1, 4.1.1, 4.2.1.2 footnote 36, 4.2.3.2 footnote 46; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.2.1, 4.3.1
- b. Nature as single organism - *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone) Ch 3: 4.1, 5.1.3.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.2.1
- c. Nature as a single “household” - *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.1, 4.2.1
- d. Reality as *gestalts* within *gestalts*, where *gestalt* means, a “whole” and its network of non-extensional (internal) relations; or as an interconnected, interrelated network of systems within systems – *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.1.2, *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.1, *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.2.1, 4.2.2
- e. Reality as organismic but non-metaphysical, a “developmental whole”, a “unity of diversity” - *social ecology* Ch 5: 1, 2.1.4.2
- f. A relational, interdependent understanding of reality, one which recognizes both difference and relatedness, autonomy and symbiosis in nature – *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.2.

<sup>17</sup> In his discussion of this idea (Hayward, 1995, pp. 24-31, pp. 34-35), which goes together with ideas of holism and organicism, Hayward notes that it implies a kind of “teleological cosmology” (1995, p. 24) which is contested among ecological scientists, but “absolutely central” to other ecological scientists and ecologists [as in seeing green]. I discuss the idea more fully in Chapter Nine: 5.3

### 4.1.3 Nature as non-hierarchical

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.2.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.1.1, 4.2.2.3, 4.3; life as “web-like relationality” - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.4, 5.3.2.

### 4.1.4. Nature as alive, manifesting rationality, consciousness, subjectivity, “mind”

**Green sample data:** *Nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone) Ch 3: 4.1, 5.1.3.1, 5.2.3; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.1.3; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3.1, 4.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.2.1, 4.3.1, 5.1.1(c).

### 4.1.5 Nature as manifesting “power to”, directionality, and self-organization, towards its own ends, such as greater complexity, diversity, self-reflexivity

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology*, Ch 4: 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.1.4.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 3.4, 4, 4.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3, 4.1.3.2, 5 footnote 30, 5.2.1.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.2.1, 4.3.1, 5.1.1(b), 5.3.2.

#### 4.1.5.1 but not a deterministic telos

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.1.3; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.1, 4.1.3.

### 4.1.6 Nature as displaying and maintaining dynamic balance and stability

**Green sample data:** *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.1, 2.1.3.3(1), 4.2.3, 5.2.3.2, 5.4.1.

#### External green data on ontology:

- a. Organic, holistic, not mechanistic, reductionist, objectivist (Descriptors of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- b. Nature understood as being made up of interrelated wholes which are greater than the sum of their parts, not made up of discrete parts [where] the whole is no more than the sum of its parts (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- c. Concern with physical and metaphysical reality, not emphasis on material reality (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- d. Organismic, not mechanistic; universe as process/story, not universe as machine; Gaia: Earth as superorganism, not Earth as inert matter; life as autopoiesis, not life as random chemistry; holism/systems theory, not atomism (Scientific paradigms in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

#### Related external green data ideas not directly encountered:

Indeterminacy, probability, not determinism; chaos, nonlinear dynamics, not linear causality (Scientific paradigms in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

While I did encounter in the sample members, a rejection of a deterministic teleology in nature, I did not come across the idea of reality as indeterminacy or probability, or chaos as part of seeing green. On the contrary, I found the idea of order and purposivity in nature [section 4.1.5]. These ideas of indeterminacy and chaos probably reflect the 1990s “deconstructive” or “permissive” ecology viewpoint in ecology as science: “Earlier views of holistic natural communities working in stable associations are being replaced by images of nature as fundamentally erratic, discontinuous, chaotic, and unpredictable. ... However, this perspective is being challenged by some environmental philosophers.” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998a, p. 11, drawing on work by Worster (1990) and Callicott

(1996)). This shift in ecology-as-science thought is discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine, section 5.4.

## 4.2 A reconceptualized human being vis-a-vis nature

### 4.2.1 Green stories

In green stories, a call for a critical review of the “discontinuity problem” in the human-nature relationship is central. There must be a reconceptualization of what it is to be a human being, a reconceptualization of Self (wording from Australian *ecofeminist* Plumwood (Ch 6: 4.3.2.2)), and a correspondingly different ethic for nature [section 5, this chapter], in addressing current western pathological human-human and human-nature relationships. The reconceptualization of Self is discussed at section 4.3.

The idea of reconceptualizing the human being is not limited to ecofeminist thought. It is also present in German Fundi *Die Grünen* Bahro’s thought; he phrases it as the need for “a fresh start in the development of the [human] species” (Ch 7: 2.1.3.6). In *Die Grünen*’s real world political statements, it appears as a demand for a human being recreated on an ecological basis (Ch 7: 4.3.2). In the USA, *social ecologist* Bookchin argues for a fresh start for “second nature<sup>18</sup>” which has failed to live up to its potentiality for symbiosis, and has become “warped” through the idea of hierarchy (Ch 5: 4.2.2).

The reconceptualized human being is part of nature, not separate from it, or transcendent over it. The sharp ontological discontinuity between human beings and nature, or Self/world, or culture/nature, is problematized (4.2.2). Human beings’ continuity with nature is emphasized (4.2.3); there are calls for harmony with nature, that is, a recognition of a “necessary interdependence of all beings”, rather than the predominant western cultural value of human opposition to, struggle with, mastery and subjugation of nature (Hayward, 1995, p. 31, p. 59). The ideas-context from which human-nonhuman continuity is derived, varies from Hinduism’s *advaita*<sup>19</sup>, to Kropotkin’s nineteenth century anarchism, to feminist rejection of patriarchal dichotomizing epistemology. Alternative forms of political, economic, and social organization are proposed to provide the supportive context for the reconceptualized human being, and reconceptualized Self (section 6.2.2).

**Variation:** Seeing green acknowledges the specialness of the human being within human-nonhuman continuity, but to varying degrees, from ecological egalitarianism (deep ecology), to a relational connectedness which also recognizes nature as different, with different needs (some ecofeminists), to humanity as nature’s “voice” (social ecology). A common thought though, is that humanity’s specialness is *within* nature, and non-domineering (e.g. *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.1.1, 5.4.5.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 1, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2).

### 4.2.2 Dichotomy between humans and nature [the “discontinuity problem”] rejected

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.3, 4.2, 4.2.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.2, 4.2.1.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3, 4.3.1, 5.1.1(b), 5.1.1(f), 5.4.3(4), and Ch 4: 4.2.3.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.3.

### 4.2.3 Continuity rather than discontinuity with nonhuman nature emphasized

**Green sample data:**

- a. Recognizing speciesism in dealing with animals, as yet another unfounded and unrecognized human prejudice which must be rejected, along with racism, sexism, et al. - *animal liberation* Ch 3: 5.1.1.1, 5.1.2

<sup>18</sup> That is, humanity, “with its sociality, institutions, intellectuality, language, ethics, and political life” (Biehl, 1993, p. 387). Though it emerged from first nature, it remains a part of it, embedded in it (Biehl, 1993, p. 385, in Ch 5, section 4.2)

<sup>19</sup> Radical non-duality (*deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.3.1; *ecofeminist* Spretnak Ch 6: 4.3.1)

- b. A call to “give up some psychic investment in our sense of separateness and specialness in the universe”, to recognize more how nature is like us, rather than different to us – *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone) Ch 3: 5.1.3, 5.1.3.1
- c. A call for identification with, and empathy for “all living beings”<sup>20</sup> understood as part of an increasingly mature “ecological Self” - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.3.2, 5.4.5.2 [what some other green sample members critique as the submerged self, the totalitarian self, or the indistinguishability account of being human]
- d. A recreation of the human being living within ecology – *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.3.2.

**Variations:** Contrasting views, which acknowledge human beings’ continuity with nonhuman nature, yet also emphasize difference are -

1. A non-hierarchical understanding of human beings’ special relationship to nature, one in which human beings live with nature in a complementary, non-dominating relationship (“mutualistic harmony”), which has been achieved through a “redemptive social dialectic” (Ch 5: 4.3) - *social ecology* in Ch 4: 4.2.3.1, 6.5.2, and Ch 5: 4.2.2.3, 4.2.2.4, 4.3, 5.1
2. A felt sense of connection to the Other [nonhuman nature in this case], identification with the Other - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.3.1, 5.4.3(3), 5.4.3(5), 5.4.4.1(a) - but one in which “we see ourselves as both co-members of an ecological community and yet different from other members of it” (Warren, in Wilson, 1997, p. 390); one which recognizes nature’s “distinctness and independence from us and the distinctness of the needs of things in nature from ours” (Plumwood 1991, in Zimmerman et al., 1993b, p. 295) - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.2, 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 5.4.3(1).

**External green data on the reconceptualized human/nature relationship:**

- a. Intrinsic importance of nature for the humanity of man (Deep environmentalists, O’Riordan, 1981, p. 376). On my view though, this is not a deep ecology view, which clearly ascribes to nature its own value, regardless of its value for man’s humanity)
- b. Harmony with nature, not domination over nature (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- c. People and nature inseparable – relation is one of systemic energy (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- d. Co-evolution, symbiosis, not domination over nature; living as part of nature, not conquest of nature (Role of the human in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

## 4.3 A reconceptualized Self

### 4.3.1 Green stories

Essential in bringing about the possibility of relating to nature, and other human beings, in a non-instrumental way, is personal transformation, the reconceptualized Self (*ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.2.2). The dominant western individualist-rationalist view of what it is to be a fully developed, fully functioning human being, and a Self vis-a-vis the Other (including nonhuman nature), is problematized/critiqued (4.3.2). Alternative understandings of the self, variously informed by socialism, libertarianism, post-patriarchalism, and metaphysical ontological understandings, are proposed (4.3.3). In this chapter, I sometimes use the term ‘self realization’ to describe this green reconceptualized self, without meaning either *social ecology’s* or *deep ecology’s* specific, and differing, versions of Self-realization. This use should be clear from the context in which it appears.

---

<sup>20</sup> Recalling that things customarily understood as nonliving such as rivers, mountains, and landscapes are included in Naess’s understanding of “living”

### Variations:

1. Individualism explicitly supported, together with a rejection of holism - *animal liberation theory* (rights approach) - Ch 3: 4.2.2. The acceptance of individualism is inferred for the sentience approach in *animal liberation theory*, but with a suggestion that atomist individualism's implicit Self/Other [animals] divide can be bridged by the human capacity for identification - Ch 3: 4.2.1
2. *Deep ecology* (Arne Naess) gives primacy to the individual, but within the context of an understanding of "individual" that extends beyond human beings only, and within an extended sense of Self which seeks connection with the Other through empathetic identification – Ch 4: 4.2.1.2
3. *Ecofeminists* argue that the western-cultural sense of self - that is, a rationalist-individualist, disconnected sense of Self [self divided against self, an oppositional sense of Self/Other, a patriarchal/power-over orientation towards other human beings generally, and women, nature, animals specifically] is a male-based sense of Self (Ch 4: 4.2.3.2 as one example). Male-patriarchal accounts of Self, women and nature must be abandoned.
4. The *social ecology* view considers the cause of the ecological crisis to be social-structural (particularly hierarchy, and its manifestations as statism, parliamentarianism, capitalism, racism, classism), rather than located in pathological individualism. Still, *social ecology* (Ch 5: 4.3) espouses a rich definition of Self-realization as freedom.

#### 4.3.2. Western atomist, aggressive, selfish individualism problematized

The roots of western-style atomist, autonomous, and competitive individualism, with its inimical, instrumental stance towards other people, women, nature and animals, are argued variously to be grounded in cosmological, or anthropological, or psycho-sexual developmental accounts of the male psyche, or in Enlightenment humanism, or in the scientific-mechanistic worldview. Whatever its roots, western cultural individualism is rejected as pathological for relationships with both people and nature, and unsuitable for a holistic nature ethic.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 3: 8.4, and in Ch 4: 4.2.1, 4.2.1.2(2); *social ecology* Ch 4: 4.2.3.1, and Ch 5: 4.2.2 and 4.2.2.2, 4.3.1; *ecofeminism* in Ch 4: 4.2.3.2 and Ch 6: 3.1.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3.1, 5.2.6, 5.4.3(2), 6.1.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.6, 4.3.4.

#### 4.3.3. The new, better human being: liberated, re-integrated, embodied, connected

Green stories of a liberated, re-integrated, embodied, connected human being can be understood as a convergence of differing start-up premises in the green sample: the libertarian<sup>21</sup> anarchist-utopian informed<sup>22</sup> understandings of self-realization found in the thought of *social ecology* (Ch 5: 1, 4.3) and Fundi *Die Grünen* (Ch 7: 4.3), the self deeply connected to nature found in *deep ecology* (Ch 4: 4.2), and the felt sense of connection to the Other of *ecofeminism* as response to male dichotomizing epistemological and ontological assumptions (Ch 6: 4).

##### 4.3.3.1 Complete liberation and freedom, especially for women, from all forms of hierarchy, patriarchy, and any other form of domination, or coercion

The human being is conceptualized as capable of mature, self-responsible, and ethical behaviour (e.g. *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.3.1). There must be complete liberation, particularly, but not only, for women, from all expressions of patriarchal oppression. Freedom is ideally understood as self-chosen, self-directed, spontaneous, creative activity, within human-scale communities which are in harmony with each other, and with their natural environment. Liberation from the one-dimensional view of the

<sup>21</sup> Libertarianism, in metaphysics the view that determinism is false and that people are free to choose to act other than they do; in social philosophy, the view that the right to freedom from restraint takes priority over all other rights (Velasquez, 1991, p. 88). It appears to be a subset of Enlightenment humanism. Informally, I take libertarianism to rest on the assumption that the human being is capable of mature self-responsibility, making any form of hierarchy imposed on him/her, a restraint on his/her freedom to self-unfold creatively

<sup>22</sup> Based inter alia, on demands for re-integration of a Self split by the idea of hierarchy and domination

human being as *Homo economicus*<sup>23</sup>, and liberation from entrapment within techno-industrialism, is included in the vision.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 4.1.3.3, 4.3.1, 5.2.1.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.2.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.3.1, 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.3.5.1.

#### 4.3.3.2 *Unrepressed re-admittance of the body into what it is to be a fully-functioning human being*

As examples, in epistemology, “embodied” knowledge is recognized by the re-admittance of feeling into knowing; in ethics, the body is re-admitted as moral agent, for example, in what we count as food; the uninhibited development of sensuality and sexuality [including for homosexuals, for example] is advocated.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.2, 4.2.1.2 point 4; *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.3, 4.3.1 and footnote 28, 6.2 footnote 45; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.3(6), 5.4.4.1(b), 5.4.4.1(e); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.3.4.

#### 4.3.3.3 *The ‘feminine principle’: feminine values re-integrated into views of the better person*

In green stories of the better human being, and the better society, ‘masculine’ values are rebalanced with ‘feminine’ values, also sometimes called “post-patriarchal” values, or the ‘feminine principle’. This latter concept, easy to understand intuitively but elusive to articulate, is described variously as comprising the “soft” values (partnership, caring, compassion, nonviolence, nurturing, nondefensiveness, accommodation, and a welcoming of interdependence (*ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 3.1.1, 7.4); “intimate communion with the natural world” (Starhawk, *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.2.4) and the desire to conserve it (Shiva, *ecofeminism*, Ch 6: 4.3.2.4); or the recognition of diversity as asset, not threat, the abandonment of reductionism, duality and linearity, the rejection of the alienation and subjugation of women and nature (Shiva, *ecofeminism*, Ch 6: 4.3.2.4).

**Variation:** There are however within ecofeminism, ambivalent views on whether or not there is such as thing as a female “essence” (Ch 6: 4.3.2.3). Despite this, acceptance of the value of “the feminine” is demanded in new views of the Self, as well as an interconnected sense of Self vis-a-vis the Other.

**Green sample data:** *social ecology* Ch 5: Fig. 6: The evolution of social hierarchy in 4.2.2.2 [natural biological fact: sex = female]; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.1.4, 2.2.2, 4.3.2.4, 6.1.1, 6.1.2(8), 6.4(c), 7.4; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 4.3.5.1.

#### 4.3.3.4 *The fully functioning person understood as the whole person: re-integrated, well-rounded*

The separated spheres [whether through the idea of hierarchy, or the ideology of techno-industrialism] of the modern human being (*Homo economicus*) are re-integrated: city and country, mental and physical activity, work and play, passion and rationality. Academic education, work, health practice, recreation, and political praxis, should all be geared to addressing, and promoting, the development of the whole person, not merely *Homo economicus*.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.3.5; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 4.3.1, 6.2 footnote 45, 6.3.1.6; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.3.1.

<sup>23</sup> An abstract concept meaning a human being concerned with maximising utility, defined as want-satisfaction. “The source of value is found in subjective individual wants, not in the needs of other human beings or other species”. Any normative evaluation of a person’s definition of “want” is usually avoided in mainstream economic theory. (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 517). That is, personal preferences are normative. This idea is examined in more detail in Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.2, and 6.3.1

#### ***4.3.3.5 An interconnected sense of Self, in which a non-dominating, non-exploitative relationship with nature is part of what it is to be an integrated, mature, human being***

An interconnected sense of Self, a “self-in-relation”, in which we recognize our connection to, and develop our sense of community with, *all* living beings. A non-dominating relationship with nature is recognized as part of what it is to be an integrated, mature, human being.

##### **Variation:**

1. Animal liberation theory limits its discussion to relations with animals
2. Autonomy vis-a-vis connectedness, individualism vis-a-vis community are problematized, but also integrated, into an interconnected sense of self: (a) *ecofeminists* continue to prize autonomy, individuality, and agency for women (Ch 6: 4.3.2.1), (b) *Die Grünen* philosopher Maren-Grisebach proposes a dialectical, network view to accommodate what appear to be the opposite values of Ich and Gemeinschaft (Ch 7: 4.3.4 footnote 70).

**Green sample data:** *animal liberation* Ch 3: 5.1.1, 5.1.1.1, 5.1.2; *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone) Ch 3: 5.1.3, 5.1.3.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.2.1, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 6.2.4.1; - *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2, 4.3.1, 5.1, 5.4, 5.4.1(4), 5.4.1(5); *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.1.1, 2.3, 3.1.1, 4.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.2.1, 4.3.2.2, 4.3.2.4, 4.3.2.5, 5.1.1(a), 5.1.1(f), 5.2.6, 5.2.7, 5.3, 5.3.1, 5.4.3(2), 5.4.3(5), 5.4.4.1(a); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.3.4, 5.1, 6.1.2.1.

#### ***4.3.3.6 Spirituality recognized***

Stories and data on the role of spirituality, metaphysical and secular, in bringing about “inward” transformation towards seeing green [changed personal and social values, and related social-structural change] are presented at section 2.3 above.

##### **External green data on the reconceptualized Self:**

- a. Libertarianism, not emphasis on law and order (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Flexibility and an emphasis on personal autonomy, not a deterministic view of the future (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- c. Inner directed motivation and personal growth, not outer-directed motivation (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- d. A move towards spiritual, non-material values, not materialism pure and simple (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- e. Integration of concepts of work and leisure through a process of personal and communal improvement (Deep environmentalists/self-reliance, soft technologists, O’Riordan, 1981, p. 376)
- f. Extended sense of self, not individual vs. world (Role of the human in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- g. Reflection and creativity, not superiority and arrogance (Role of the human in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

## 5. Ethic, including a nature, and animal, ethic

### 5.1 Green stories

Seeing green tells stories of moral philosophy: what “the good life” is, and what right conduct should be. It critiques “the good life” as equated with the values of western capitalist techno-industrialism, and proposes alternative visions of the good life (section 6.3). These visions include a reconceptualization of authentic human development (section 4.3), and a reconceptualized human-nature relationship (section 4.2) which rejects anthropocentrism.

Seeing green tends to propose a single ethic, which is at the same time, a nature ethic (for example, *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5). For lack of a word or short phrase capable of encompassing all the nuances and variations within the various sample members’ description of their nature ethic, I call it an *empathetic, caring, respectful partnership ethic, one which recognizes nature’s value-for-itself* (e.g. *animal liberation* Ch 3: 1.1.3 or 5.2.2; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.2.1.2, 5.1.1, 6.3.2; an *ecofeminist* view in Ch 4: 5.4.5.1; more data at 5.5.5.2 – 5.5.5.5 in this chapter). It is in any event, not merely an anthropocentric-instrumental ethic which views nature as resources for human beings.

A key premise in green stories is that often unexamined, but dichotomising epistemological and ontological assumptions underpin our self/Other ethic (e.g. an *ecofeminist* view in Ch 4: 4.2.3.2). There is a new, different account of the ethical (5.2). A new consciousness, informed by alternative views of the human/nature relationship [4.2], what it is to be a better human being [4.3.3], and the recognition that nature has its own interests [4.1.1], which are independent of its usefulness to human beings, provide the motivation for a new nature ethic (5.3). The philosophical scope of the ethic varies widely, from some animals only, to all of animate and inanimate nature (5.4). The intent of the ethic is animal well-being and wide ecological sustainability, but the philosophical how-to of achieving these, varies widely (5.5).

### 5.2 A different account of the ethical

There is a new account of the ethical. The western epistemological and ontological assumptions which underpin and justify human rational-instrumentalism towards nature are rejected (5.2.1). Traditional western accounts of morality are widened to re-instate those aspects of morality which have been devalued in accounts of moral behaviour, particularly emotion, and the role which the human capacity for empathy, identification, and care, for example, should play (5.2.2). Instead of only the abstract, the a-contextual, and the universal, *context* is re-admitted – the personal, the particular, the process/history which preceded the actual ethical decision needing to be made. A sense of place is also recognized as a moral concern (5.2.3). The body is re-admitted as moral agent, for example, in what we are willing to count as food (5.2.4). The rights concept is problematized (5.2.5). The seeing green ethic does, through its rejection of anthropocentrism, tend towards the formal environmental ethical theories of biocentrism and ecocentrism, yet neither of these two concepts quite captures green’s diverse stories, or its less formal understandings of environmental ethical concepts such as intrinsic, inherent, or instrumental value<sup>24</sup>. Also, Bookchin’s ethic of complementarity, with its interventionist role for human beings, sounds anthropocentric, yet is a far cry from formal environmental philosophical anthropocentrism (5.2.6).

---

<sup>24</sup> Botzler and Armstrong (1998, p. 54) have a brief but useful description of these

### 5.2.1 The epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning rational-instrumentalism towards nature (women, animals) critiqued

**Green sample data:** *animal rights theory* Ch 3: 1.2; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5; *social ecology* Ch 5: 5; *ecofeminism* in Ch 3: 8.5, and Ch 6: 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 4.2.2, 5, 5.1.1(a), 5.1.1(b), 5.1.1(f), 5.4.4.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.1 footnote 72.

#### Variations:

1. *Social ecology*, with its belief in rationality in nature (Ch 5: 3.2), accords far greater emphasis to the role of reason in ethical accounts than do other sample elements [animal liberation theory excepted], but still rejects instrumental reason. On the social ecology view, dialectical naturalism contains within it, a naturalistic ethic, an *objective* ethic, a universal truth, based in ontology (Ch 5: 5).
2. *Ecofeminists* (Ch 6: 5) critique *any* ethical theory derived from a *male* adversarial sense of self, for example, in which concepts such as reason, distance, disinterestedness, abstractness and universality are given primacy. Any ethic, of which a nature ethic is a subset, must also include emotion - a sense of connectedness, care, partnership, or love – and also include the personal, and the particular, in ethical decision-making. They have theorized the key features of an ecofeminist environmental ethic (Ch 6: 5.2); one of these is insistence on *pluralism* in moral accounts.
3. *Ecofeminists* also theorize the epistemological/ontological connections in western cultural history between the domination of women, the domination of nature, and abuse of animals (Ch 6: 4.2.2, 5.4.2).

### 5.2.2 Emotion (including empathy, identification, care, compassion) re-integrated into accounts of the ethical

**Green sample data:** *animal liberation theory* (Singer) Ch 3: 4.2.1; nonhuman rights theory (Stone) Ch 3: 3; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 5.4.2.2, *ecofeminism* Ch 4: 4.2.3.2, and Ch 6: 5.1.1(a), 5.2.8, 5.4.3(1), 5.4.3(5); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 3.2.1.

### 5.2.3 Context (the particular, the personal, the process, “place”) re-integrated into accounts of the ethical

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.4.2.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 4: 4.2.3.2, 5.4.5.3, and Ch 6: 5.2.2, 5.2.6, 5.2.7, 5.3.4, 5.4.3. Sense of place data is presented at section 5.4.2.

### 5.2.4 The body re-admitted into accounts of the ethical

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.3(6), 5.4.4.1(b), 5.4.4.1(e).

### 5.2.5 The rights concept in human-human, and human-nonhuman relationships rejected, problematized, and employed

Within seeing green, the concept of “rights”, whether applied to humans, inanimate nature, or animals, is problematized, and often rejected, primarily because of its individualistic-rationalist assumptions and implications, and the conceptual difficulty of assigning rights to an ecosystem, for example. But the rights concept is also defended, and employed, both technically and loosely. Animal rights theory supports the rights concept far more, and much ecofeminist theory, far less.

#### Variations:

1. Rights concept employed, technically and loosely: *animal rights theory* Ch 3: 5; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.4.1, 5.4.4(b)
2. Problematized: *deep ecology* in Ch 3: 8, and in Ch 4: 5.4.4(a), 5.4.4(b); *ecofeminism* - Ch 6: 5.1.1(a), 5.2.6, 5.2.7, 5.3, 5.3.1, 5.4.3
3. Appropriateness in some contexts not denied: *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.4; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.1.1, 5.2.8, 5.2.9.

## 5.2.6 Environmental ethical theory [biocentrism, ecocentrism] and its technical understandings of value in nature do not quite encompass seeing green's nature ethic

**Green sample data:** *Animal liberation* Ch 3: 1.1.2; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.4.1, 5.2, 5.2.1, 5.3.1, 5.4.5.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 1, 5.4.2 and subdivisions; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.1, 5.1.1(a), 5.3.2, 6.1.2(2), 6.1.2(3), 6.1.2(4); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.2.1, 4.1, 5.2.1, 5.2.3.

### External green data:

- a. Ethics and ordinary life integrated, not separated (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- b. Biocentric/ecocentric, not anthropocentric/humanist<sup>25</sup> (Values in relation to nature in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, in pp. 170-171).

## 5.3 A “new consciousness”<sup>26</sup> as motivation in bridging the human/nature (self/Other) divide

### 5.3.1 Green stories

The motivating new consciousness towards nature is informed really, by two things –

(1) the different sample members' views of what it is to be a better human being, one of which is a sense of non-instrumental connectedness [based on metaphysical or scientific ecological understandings, or metaphysical/secular spirituality] with all that there is [data at 4.3.3 above, particularly 4.3.3.5]. This non-instrumental connectedness includes the usually underplayed or completely eliminated emotional values of identification, empathy, compassion, and care [5.2.2 above], and

(2) the recognition that nature has its own order, agenda, and autonomy (logos, conatus, nisus, autopoiesis) independent of its usefulness to human beings, and so deserves to be preserved for itself (5.3.2). Those things [values] which are understood as contributing to nature's continued existence, hold lessons for how human beings should be as people [4.3.3], and how they should better construct their society [6.2]. Emphasized as particularly valuable, are nature's symbiosis, its dynamic equilibrium (stability), and diversity.

### Variation:

1. Views of what it is to be a better human being vis-a-vis nature range in scope from rejecting speciesism to a Self totally identified with nature, or a Self which recognizes both its connection to, and difference from, nature [4.3.3.5]
2. In Bookchin's *social ecology* view, structural, not personal change is what will end our instrumental dealings with nature (Ch 4: 4.2.3.1, Ch 4: 6.5.1, and Ch 5: 5.1, 5.4, 6, 7.1 as examples)
3. Where exactly the locus of value in nature is, varies enormously (section 5.3.2.1 below).

### 5.3.2 Recognizing nature's value-for-itself

#### Green sample data:

#### 5.3.2.1 Nature's value-for-itself ascribed to

- a. Sentience; having interests – *animal liberation theory* (Singer), Ch 3: 5.2.1

<sup>25</sup> Hayward (1995, pp. 53-86) devotes an entire chapter to considering whether or not enlightenment and ecological values are necessarily opposed in the field of ethics; he ends it by advocating an ethic of “ecological humanism”

<sup>26</sup> Ecofeminist Kheel talks of a “new consciousness” (Ch 6: 5.3.1); deep ecologist Rodman talks of an “ecological consciousness” (in Sessions, 1995, pp. 121-130)



- b. Being the-subject-of-a-life, having inherent value, possessing rights – *animal liberation theory* (Regan), Ch 3: 5.2.2
- c. Subjectivity or consciousness in natural objects which includes living things – *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone), Ch 3: 5.2.3
- d. The life spirit in everything, thus the sacredness of everything - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.2, 5.3.2
- e. Its vitalism [striving for life] - *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.1, 5.2.3.1
- f. The striving (“conatus”) of each life form to unfold unfettered, in the way of its species (its flourishing, its well-being) - *deep ecology* Ch 4: point 1 of platform in 1.3.4.1, 4.1.3, 5.2
- g. The evolutionary process – its mutuality, creativity, diversity, “nisus” towards increasing complexity, subjectivity, freedom – *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.2.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2, 4.1.3 and subdivisions, 5.2
- h. Having its own interests, its own direction, its own goal - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.3.2
- i. its ability to sustain life, both human and nonhuman – *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.3.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.1, 5.2.3, 5.2.3.1.

### 5.3.2.2 Values in nature

- a. Purpose, directionality, self-organization - *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.3.2
- b. Egalitarianism, together with symbiosis [seen as contributing to diversity], mutualism, interdependence, co-operation, harmony rather than conflict – *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.4, 4.1.2, 5.1.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2, 5, 5.2, 5.2.1.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.2.2, 6.4
- c. Diversity, unity in diversity - *deep ecology* Ch 4: points 1-3 of platform in 1.3.4.1, 4.1.2, 4.2.1.2 points 5 and 6, 5.2, 5.2.2, *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2; 5.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.1.1, *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.1, 5.1.1(c)
- d. Equilibrium, “balance”, stability in nature [often seen as a function of diversity] - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.4.3; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2, 5.2.1, 5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.1, 2.1.3.3(1), 5.2.3.2, 5.4.1
- e. Complexity [also seen as a function of diversity] - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.4; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2, 5.2, 5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.3(1)
- f. Richness (abundance) - *deep ecology* Ch 4: point 2 of platform in 1.3.4.1, 5.2.2
- g. Spontaneity, as serving the unfolding of diversity – *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.3.1, 5.2.

### External green data:

Nature has intrinsic value, not nature has instrumental value (Values in relation to nature in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

## 5.4 The scope of the green ethic, with focus on nature

### 5.4.1 Green stories:

(1) Though the various ethics proposed in the seeing green sample include both human and nonhuman nature, the emphasis here is on human relationships with nature. However, an interesting difference in a seeing green ethic for human-human relationships, is its admittance of cultural diversity, and future generations, into the moral sphere. Sometimes “future generations” appears to mean future nonhuman generations too, for their own sake, not merely for humans’ sake.

(2) The scope of a seeing green ethic for nonhuman nature is extremely diverse, varying from individualism to holism, from some animals only, to all of nature, animate and inanimate, to “sense of place”. What the variation has in common though, is that seeing green extends the sphere of morality beyond human beings only.

## 5.4.2 Variation in scope:

### 1. Animals:

#### Included:

- (a) only those who are individual sentient beings. Sentience fades “somewhere between shrimps and oysters” *animal liberation theory* (Singer), Ch 3: 5.3.1
- (b) only those who are “subjects of a life”, basically, mammals and birds - *animal liberation theory* (Regan), Ch 3: 5.3.2
- (c) all – *nonhuman rights theory* (Stone; his is possibly a qualified approach though), Ch 3: 5.3.3, 5.4.3; *deep ecology* (but exact viewpoint on domestic/commercial animals not established) Ch 4: 5.3, 5.3.1; *social ecology* (again, exact viewpoint on domestic/commercial animals not established) Ch 5: 5.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.3.3, 5.4.4.3, 6.1.2(2); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.2.3.1, 5.2.3.2, 5.3.1, 5.3.2.

### 2. Plants:

- (a) Excluded - *animal liberation theory* (Singer), Ch 3: 5.3.1
- (b) Agnostic about their moral status - *animal liberation theory* (Regan), Ch 3: 5.3.2
- (c) Included - *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone, but possibly, a qualified approach), Ch 3: 5.2.3, 5.3.3, 5.4.3; *deep ecology* Ch 4: implied in 5.3; *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.3.2, 6.1.2(2); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.2.3.1, 5.2.3.2, 5.3.1.

### 3. Species:

- (a) excluded: *animal liberation theory* Ch 3: 5.3.1; 5.3.2
- (b) included in a both species and individuals approach - *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone<sup>27</sup>, but possibly, a qualified approach) Ch 3: 5.3.3, 5.4.3; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.3, 5.3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.1.2(2); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.2.3.2, 5.3.1.

### 4. Non-animal living things, biosphere, ecosystems, ecological processes:

- (a) excluded: *animal liberation theory* Ch 3: 5.3.1; 5.3.2
- (b) Agnostic about their moral status: *animal liberation theory* (Regan), Ch 3: 5.3.2
- (c) included: *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone, but possibly a qualified approach), Ch 3: 5.3.3, 5.4.3; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.3, 5.4.5.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.3.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.2.3.2, 5.3.1.

### 5. Inanimate natural objects:

- (a) Excluded: *animal liberation theory* (Singer), Ch 3: 5.3.1
- (b) Agnostic about their moral status: *animal liberation theory* (Regan), Ch 3: 5.3.2
- (c) Included: *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone, but possibly a qualified approach), Ch 3: 5.3.3; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.3, *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.3.2, 5.3.4.

- 6. Everything, whether animate, inanimate, individual, species, ecosystem, or ecosystemic process *nonhuman rights theory* (Stone, but possibly a qualified approach) Ch 3: 5.3.3, 5.4.3; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.3, 5.3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.3.3, 6.1.2(2); *Die Grünen* [but inanimate things are not expressly mentioned] Ch 7: 5.2.3.1, 5.2.3.2, 5.3.1, 6.4.1.1.

### 7. Sense of place

- deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.2, 6.4.3.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 4: 4.2.3.2(b), and Ch 6: 4.3.2.2, 5.1.1(a), 5.3.4.

<sup>27</sup> This is what I understand Stone’s position to be

## 8. Cultural diversity

*deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.1.2, 4.1.4, 6.1, 6.2.4.2, 6.4.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.2.2, 6.1.2.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.2.5, 6.3.4, 6.4.2.3.

## 9. Future generations

*deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.1.2, 6.2.4.3, 6.3.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.3.3.

# 5.5 The intent of the new nature ethic: long-range, wide ecological sustainability

## 5.5.1 Green stories

Influenced by deep ecologist Naess's hope for "beautiful" rather than "moral" acts towards nature (Ch 4: 4.2.1.2(7)), and the ecofeminist critique of (male) environmental ethical theory (section 5.1 of this chapter), I avoid here the term "moral obligation". The intent of the new nature ethic, which has various philosophical names in the different sample elements - "respect for interests", "respect for rights", "biospherical/ecological egalitarianism", "complementarity", "care", "partnership" - is long-range, wide, ecological sustainability. Though there is no numerical consensus on what "long range" means [one version is *deep ecology*'s "seven-generation" view (Ch 4: 5.1.2)], there is consensus that it must be longer than a short term, profit-oriented view of the planet's ecology (5.5.2). I use the term "wide" to mean, sustaining the "life base" for *all* living things in a way which preserves their diversity and abundance, not merely for their instrumental use by humans, but for their own sakes too. Human treatment of wild and commercially-farmed animals is firmly brought within the sphere of moral philosophy and ethical practice. It is thus a wider understanding than the natural-resource-management-for-human-beings ethic of environmental sustainability. While philosophical understandings of the new ethic for nature are presented here at section 5.5, its real-world expressions are discussed primarily at sections 6.4, and 6.5.

Supporting data for animal rights/well-being (5.5.3) is presented separately from Green sample data pertaining to wide ecological sustainability (5.5.4). This should not be interpreted as intending to suggest that animal liberation from oppression and exploitation is not a part of seeing green's wide ecological sustainability – it is.

**Variation:** There are considerable differences in

(1) how wide ecological sustainability should apply to animals. Singer and Regan's *animal rights theory* is more concerned with animal justice than it is with wide ecological sustainability, but formal and loose application of animal rights theory in defence of animals is also found in *deep ecology*'s ecological egalitarianism, in the *ecofeminist* ethic of care, and in *Die Grünen*'s partnership ethic. Some Marxist-inspired, and Realo-political elements of "seeing green" are less committed to animal rights (e.g. *Die Grünen*, Ch 7: 5.3.2, 5.3.2.1); and

(2) the philosophical means of achieving wide ecological sustainability. These various means, together with supporting data, are presented at (5.5.4).

## 5.5.2 Understandings of long-range ecological sustainability

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.4.1, 5.1.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.4, 5.3.3, 6.1.

### **5.5.3. Animal well-being achieved through appeals to identification, sentience, the practice of care, special legal status, rights (justice)**

#### **Green sample data:**

- a. Identification, recognition of sentience as criterion for equal consideration of interests, empathetic care - *animal liberation theory* (sentience approach), Ch 3: 1.2, 4.2.1, 5.4.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.2.1.2, 5.4.4(b); *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.4.1(a), 5.4.4.1(b), 5.4.4.1(c)
- b. Respect for the inherent value, thus rights, of an animal - *animal liberation theory* (Regan) Ch 3: 1.1.3, 1.2, 5.4.2
- c. Special legal status - *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.3.2, 5.3.2.1, 5.4.4.

### **5.5.4 Ecological sustainability achieved philosophically by**

#### **Green sample data:**

#### ***5.5.4.1 Assigning legal standing to sue, thus rights, to some of nonhuman nature***

*nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone) - Ch 3: 1.2, 5.4.3.

#### ***5.5.4.2 Biospherical egalitarianism – empathetically respecting every life form’s equal or same right to “live and blossom”***

The ethic of biological egalitarianism is to respect every life form’s equal or same right to “live and blossom”, employing the criteria of nearness and vitalness when faced with ethical dilemmas - *deep ecology* Ch 4: the *deep ecology* platform, specifically points 3, 5, 6, and 8 in 1.3.4.1, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 6.5.3.

#### ***5.5.4.3 Actively employing human creativity to restore and maintain biological evolution towards mutuality, diversity, and increasing subjectivity***

The ethic of complementarity requires human beings to respect the purposivity of natural evolution, to place themselves in service to it, for example, by reducing needless suffering, and to function creatively in its unfolding, but with important caveats - *social ecology* Ch 5: 4.2.1.1, 5.2.1.1, 5.4, 5.4.1 [the caveats], 5.4.2.2, 5.4.2.3.

#### ***5.5.4.4 Practising an ethic of care***

The ethic of care is perhaps best described as the ability to respond lovingly (with appropriate concern, compassion, trust, friendship, or responsibility) to an Other, without necessarily expecting reciprocity. More specifically as far as nature is concerned, it requires “restraint ... as opposed to the unrestrained use of our skills”. Whether or not an ethic of care includes total or partial veganism, or vegetarianism, is problematized - *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.1.1(a), 5.3.4, 5.4.4.3.

#### ***5.5.4.5 Practising a partnership ethic with nature which protects the life basis for all living beings***

The concept of partnership, which is found in both *ecofeminism* and *Die Grünen*, encompasses the idea of identification-leading-to-solidarity (e.g. *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.4.1(a)), which is then expressed in concrete actions. A partnership ethic with nature, which respects and values all life, will also ensure the continuity of the life basis. The ethic is transformed into action through a series of principles, some of which are the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle, the protection of biodiversity and its habitat, and participation in global environmental protection measures - *ecofeminism*: Ch 6: 2.2, 4.3.2.5, 6.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.4, 2.3, 5 [opening citation], 5.1, 5.2.3.2, 5.4, 6.1, 6.4.1.1.

### External green data:

- a. Biorights – the right of endangered species or unique landscapes to remain unmolested (O’Riordan, 1981 p. 376)
- b. Biocentrism, not anthropocentrism (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- c. Ecological stewardship, not Resource management (Role of the human in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- d. Instrumental and intrinsic values integrated through systemic value, not instrumental values (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82) – the “integrated through systemic value” part of this idea was not encountered in green sample elements, but the both instrumental value and value-for-itself approach to human-nature relationships was.

## 6. An ecological society: some real-world views on culture, politics, the economy, and the natural environment

### 6.1 Green stories

A key premise in seeing green is that radical, ecological reform of ourselves, and our societal structures is needed to deal with the ecological crisis, and to achieve ecological sustainability (6.2). The changes should be towards acceptance of ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal, personal and social values (6.2.1), towards ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal forms of social and political organization (6.2.2), and towards a non-anthropocentric nature ethic (discussed at section 5). Reform environmentalism – short-term political, economic, social or technical adjustments to western techno-industrialism - is not the answer (6.2.3). Long-term ecological sustainability must be achieved (6.3). Part of doing that is to arrive at new understandings of what authentic development and “the good life” mean (6.4). The economy must be ecologically re-oriented (6.5). Living in solidarity (6.6), and “grassroots” [direct] democracy (6.7) are also essential elements of an ecologically-reformed society.

### 6.2 Key proposition: Fundamental, ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal reformation of ourselves, and society’s structures needed

**Green sample data:** *animal liberation theory* Ch 3: 5.4.1, 6.2, 6.3.1, 6.3.2; *deep ecology* Ch 4: platform principles 6 and 7 in 1.3.4.1, 6, 6.1; *social ecology* 1, 5.4.2.2, 6.1.2, 7.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.3.2.

#### 6.2.1 Ecologically-informed, and/or post-patriarchal personal and social values advocated

Ecologically-informed, and/or post-patriarchal personal, social, and political values are advocated, such as re-integration instead of separation or marginalization; unbundling and decentralization instead of concentration, self-management instead of hierarchy and bureaucracy; human-scale instead of gigantism; diversity as opposed to homogeneity and “mono” (Ch 7: 2.3). All these values can be well-conceptualized within social ecologist Bookchin’s “redemptive dialectic” to achieve freedom for the individual, and a free society, i.e. one in which human beings and nature live in complementarity (Ch 5: 4.3, 6.3). I repeat his description of it here from Ch 5: 4.3, because I think its idea underpins much of “seeing green’s” less, but still radical, view of an ecologically-reformed society:

The absolute negation of the state is anarchism – a situation in which ... [human beings liberate] all the immediate circumstances of their everyday lives. The absolute negation of the city is community – a community in which the social environment is decentralized into rounded, ecologically balanced communities. The absolute negation of bureaucracy is immediate ... relations – a situation in which

representation is replaced by face-to-face relations in a general assembly of free individuals. The absolute negation of the centralized economy is regional ecotechnology – a situation in which the instruments of production are molded to the resources of an ecosystem. The absolute negation of the patriarchal family is liberated sexuality – in which all forms of sexual regulation are transcended by the spontaneous, untrammled expression of eroticism among equals. The absolute negation of the marketplace is communism – in which collective abundance and cooperation transform labor into play and need into desire (Bookchin, 1967/1968, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 41).

#### Green sample data:

- a. The ‘feminine principle’ recognized – stories and data already presented at section 4.3.3.3
- b. Interdependence, solidarity, mutual aid, complementarity, reciprocity, partnership valued - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.4, 4.1.2, 5.1.1, 6.4.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 4.2.2.1, 4.3.1, 5, 6.3.1.2, 6.3.2.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.3.2.5; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.4, 2.3
- c. Pluralism, diversity, difference as asset- *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.4.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.4, 6.3.3.1, 6.4.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.2.1.3, *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1.4, 4.3.2.4, 4.3.2.5, 5.2.2, 5.4.3(1), 6.1.2(1), 7.1, 8; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.3, 6.4.1 footnote 153 on Ökopax.
- d. Non-violence and radical peace – data at 6.6.3.

#### External green data:

- a. Emphasis on the cooperative, not the competitive (Secondary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- b. Cooperation, not competition (Economic systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- c. Ecofeminism, partnership, not sexism, patriarchy; respect and value differences, not racism, ethnocentrism; Social ecology, egalitarianism, not hierarchies of class and caste (Human/social values in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- d. Increasing diversity and integration, not homogeneity and disintegration (Secondary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- e. Pluralistic societies, not cultural homogeneity (Political systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

### 6.2.2 Ecologically-informed, post-hierarchical forms of political and socio-economic organization advocated

Decentralization and human-scale are key green values. Their ideological context is opposition to all forms of hierarchy, domination and coercion (e.g. Ch 5: 6.3). Local autonomy [self-determination, self-management, self-reliance], and direct democracy are further key values in post-hierarchical forms of political and socio-economic organization. Instead of the power-over mentality of patriarchy, hierarchy, militarism and bureaucracy, participatory, non-aggressive, non-competitive, non-hierarchical and egalitarian forms of organization and decision-making are advocated. The decentralized, human-scale *community* [not to be confused with the local authority (*deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.2)] is the basic political, social, economic and ethical unit [for example, *social ecology* Ch 5: 6.3.1.2] of the transformed society. It is well-rounded, in that it has psychologically and spatially re-integrated the separated areas of our lives. It is also ecologically-appropriate, and integrated with its physical surroundings. The community is seen as the supportive physical, social, economic and psychological context for the reconceptualized human being, and the reconceptualized Self [sections 4.2, and 4.3, of this chapter].

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 3.2, 6.3.3.1, 6.4.3, 6.4.3.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 2.1.4.2, 2.3.1, 4.3, 4.3.1, 6.2, 6.3.1.2, 6.3.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.1.2(1); *Die Grünen*: Ch 7: 1.5, 2.1.2, 2.2.3.

**Variation:** The same values are expressed in some of the more radical forms of political, social and economic community organization, which are conceptualized as outside statism/parliamentarianism, outside the capitalist market economy, and whose boundaries are determined by natural features and biomes, rather than history and nationalism. These alternative, and more radical social formations are understood as the ideal way to combine ecological sustainability, solidarity in living, and personal self-realization:

1. Bioregionalism/reinhabitory communities - *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.4.3.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.4.2.3
2. Small scale eco-communities/communes [this overlaps to a certain extent with data on communities above] - *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 2.1.4.2, 2.3.1, 4.3, 6.3, 6.3.1, 6.3.1.1-6.3.1.6, 6.3.2, 6.3.2.1-6.3.2.4; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.4.1, 2.1.3.6, 4.3.4, 6, 6.1.2.3, 6.2, 6.3.1
3. Libertarian municipalism instead of statism – *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4, 2.1.5, 4.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.2.1, 6.3.2.2, 6.3.2.3, 6.3.2.4.

**External green data on radical forms of community organization:**

- a. Internationalism and global solidarity, not sovereignty of nation state (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Multi-national federations, not nation-state sovereignty (Political systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- c. Decentralized bioregions, not centralized national authority (Political systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

**External green data on less radical, but still ecologically-informed, and post-hierarchical forms of political and socio-economic organization:**

- a. Post-patriarchal, feminist values, not patriarchal values (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Emphasis on smallness of scale and hence community identity in settlement, work, and leisure (Deep environmentalists/self-reliance, soft technologists, O’Riordan, 1981 p. 376)
- c. Decentralization, human scale, not centralization, economies of scale (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- d. Non-hierarchical structure, not hierarchical structure (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- e. Decentralization of power, not centralization (Secondary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, in p. 82)
- f. Integration of concepts of work and leisure through a process of personal and communal improvement (Deep environmentalists/self-reliance, soft technologists, O’Riordan, 1981 p. 376)
- g. A co-operatively based, communitarian society, not an ethos of aggressive individualism (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- h. Community-based economies, not multi-national corporations (Economic systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

- i. Production for use, not production for exchange and profit (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- j. Self-reliance, not ever-expanding world trade (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217).

### 6.2.3 Reform environmentalism is not the answer

Achterberg (1993, p. 84) notes that in the literature,

... two visions of the nature and solution of environmental problems are traditionally distinguished. First, there is a 'superficial' or reformist vision ('environmentalism'). According to this vision, environmental problems are mainly management problems, soluble within the context of the dominant political and economic system, and without any rigorous change in our values and culture. [new paragraph]. Second, there is a profounder vision, aiming at more structural change ('ecologism': for example, 'deep ecology'), according to which a radical change in our attitude towards nature, and therefore also in our political and social system, is necessary (see, for example, Dobson 1990: 13, 33).

Seeing green critiques "reform environmentalism", "reformist ecologism", or "anthropocentric reformism" which

argues that the root of our environmental problems is neither anthropocentric attitudes<sup>28</sup> about humanity's place in nature, nor the political-economic structures that embody those attitudes. Rather, air and water pollution, wasteful use of natural resources, and the like, stem from ignorance, greed, and shortsightedness. Such factors may be addressed by enacting legislation, changing public policy, increasing education, altering tax laws, returning 'public lands' to private ownership, emphasizing moral obligations to future generations of humans, promoting wise 'stewardship' of nature, and otherwise encouraging more prudent use and more equitable allocation of natural resources. According to these reformists, while nature has value only as an instrument for human ends, those ends range from the food provided by plants and animals to the aesthetic pleasure provided by a beautiful wild landscape. (Zimmerman, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. viii).

Instead, it calls for a total rejection of western industrialism's anthropocentrism [androcentrism, hierarchy, patriarchy], and its expression in socio-cultural-economic structures.

**Variation:** eco-socialists within *Die Grünen* were more disposed towards reform environmentalism (Ch 7: 1.4.1, 2.1.3.6) than were the Fundis; so are *liberal feminists* (Ch 6: 2.1.1 as example).

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.1, 1.3.1, 5.4.3, 6.2.5, 6.3; 6.3.2, 6.3.3; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.2.1, 4.3, 5.4.1, 5.4.2.4, 7.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.1, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 6.1.2(1), 6.1.2(9); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.4.1, 2.1.3.6, 6.1.1 footnote 102.

**External green data:** Ecology, not environmentalism (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217).

## 6.3 Authentic development, and the good life

### 6.3.1 Green stories

Seeing green problematizes capitalism as cultural/socio-economic system (6.3.2). It critiques the idea that development means advanced capitalist techno-industrialism, and on a global scale (6.3.3). Alternative ideas of 'the good life' are proposed (6.3.4), with alternative development models to reflect these different values (6.3.5).

<sup>28</sup> More on anthropocentrism in Chapter Nine: Environment and development, section 6

### 6.3.2 Capitalism problematized/rejected as cultural/socio-economic system

Under neo-Marxist and counter-cultural influence, or in terms of ecology normatively understood, capitalism as cultural/socio-economic system is critiqued, for its aggressive, competitive, expansive spirit, its “commodification” and intensive media-marketing of almost every aspect of life, its overvaluing of materialism and consumerism, its failure to deliver social justice, its dehumanizing and alienating work processes and technology, its exploitation of nature. There is support for eco-socialism [for example, strongly expressed in *Die Grünen’s* (1983) *Sinnvoll arbeiten – solidarisch leben*], envisioned as a democratic transformation of society from below, by groups such as the workers/labour movement/trade unions, and including inter alia, collective ownership and base democratic control of the economy, as well as basic social provision.

**Green sample data:** *ecofeminism* - Ch 6: 2.1.2, 6.6; *Die Grünen* - Ch 7: 1.4.1, 2.1.3, 2.1.3.1, 2.1.3.2, 2.1.3.4, 2.1.3.5, 2.1.3.6, 4.3.5, 6.1, 6.1.2, 6.2.

**Variation:** Some strands in seeing green (*social ecologist* Bookchin, Marxist-informed feminists, Fundi *Die Grünen*) reject capitalism altogether, whether in western free-market form, or the centralist planned forms of communism, or eco-socialism, as a hierarchy/patriarchy/centric-inspired, ecologically-destructive cultural/economic system.

*social ecology* - Ch 4: 4.2.3.1, Ch 4: 5.4.5.2 footnote 51, and Ch 5: 2.1.2, 2.1.4.2.1, 2.1.5, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.2.2.3, 4.3.1, 5.1, 5.4.1, 6.1, 6.1.2, 8.2; *Die Grünen* [Fundi version] - Ch 7: 2.1.3.6, 6, 6.3.1.

### 6.3.3 Development understood as advanced capitalist techno-industrialism challenged

The Enlightenment ideology of “progress”<sup>29</sup>, now understood as western scientific-techno-industrialism, which tends to equate a society with its economy, and development with economic growth (Sachs, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 429-431, in *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.2), is challenged (6.3.3.1). The critique includes problematizing materialism and consumerism as values (6.3.3.2); instrumental science and technology (6.3.3.3); the instrumental exploitation of nature (6.3.3.4), and global advanced capitalism for all (6.3.3.5).

#### 6.3.3.1 The ideology of “progress” and “industrialism” [“development”] critiqued

While social ecologist Bookchin (Ch 5: 1, 3) affirms Enlightenment values, he critiques any degradation of Enlightenment rationalism into instrumental rationality. Thus he rejects any understanding of “progress” which involves the domination of people, or the idea of dominating or controlling nature (Ch 5: 4.2.2.3). Ecofeminist Shiva critiques the Enlightenment model of progress as dependent on a “masculine” model of what it is to be human (Ch 6: 3.1). Development devoid of the ‘feminine principle’ is critiqued – *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4. Shiva also criticizes notions of progress which elevate “modern scientific knowledge and economic development” to “sanctity” (for example, Shiva, 1988, p. xiv, in Hayward, 1995, p. 3), or which include the idea of human transcendence of dependence on nature (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 489).

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* - Ch 4: 2.1 footnote 14, 2.2, 4.1.4.1, 4.1.4.3, 6.2.1-6.2.3, 6.3.3; *social ecology* - Ch 5: 2.1.3, 4.2.2.3; *ecofeminism* - Ch 6: 3.1, 6.4; *Die Grünen* - Ch 7: 2.1.3 and footnote 19, 2.1.3.1, 2.1.3.2.1, 2.1.3.5, 2.2.2.

#### 6.3.3.2 Materialism and consumerism critiqued as end values

Both capitalism and Marxism “saw the achievement of human happiness as basically conditional on the expansion of material goods’ production” (Mies & Shiva, 1998, p. 487). Economic growth becomes practically equated with moral desirability (idea from Mark Sagoff, in Botzler & Armstrong,

<sup>29</sup> On the Enlightenment view, “progress” was “self-realization through independence from necessity (nature) and freedom from social constraints (community)...” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 25). Human progress could be achieved by knowledge gained through a “... ‘masculinist’ notion of reason – removed from emotion and intuition and disciplined by scientific method...” (Birkeland, 1993, in Gaard, 1993, p. 24, in *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 3.1)

1998, p. 517, footnote 5). Industrial society-type materialism and consumerism, including “green” consumerism which does not query materialism [the pursuit of wealth] as value, are therefore problematized as representing the good life. Production should be for vital needs rather than consumerist wants.

**Green sample data:** *nonhuman nature rights theorist* Stone - Ch 3: 5.1.3.1; *deep ecology* - Ch 4: 4.1.4.4 footnote 35, 5.1.2, 5.4.2.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.2.4.1; *social ecology* - Ch 5: 4.3.1, 6.1.2, 6.2, 7.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4, 6.4(b); *Die Grünen* - 2.1.3.2.1, 2.1.3.5, 4.3.2, 6.1.2.2.

**External green data:**

- a. Implication that materialism for its own sake is wrong, and that economic growth can be geared to providing for the basic needs for those below subsistence levels (Deep environmentalists/self-reliance, soft technologists, O’Riordan, 1981 p. 376)
- b. A move towards spiritual, non-material values (Distinguishing features of a green paradigm, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- c. The quality of interrelationships between systems equated with well-being, not the power of a unit equated with well-being (money, influence, resources) - (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82). The meaning of this ecological worldview indicator is unclear to me from Sterling’s discussion, but I take it as related to a non-materialistic view of well-being.

**6.3.3.3 Rational-instrumental science and technology, problematized, rejected**

Ambivalent seeing green stories on science were presented at section 3: Epistemology. Consistently problematized, perhaps as heritage from Marcuse’s critique of scientific and technical rationality, and their logic of domination (Stevenson, 1998, p. 28; see also Ch 2, section 2.3.1 “The counterculture”, and Ch 5: 2.1.2), are rational-instrumental, exploitative forms of science, and of technology, which demean and dehumanize the human being, are exploitative of nature [see also 6.3.3.4 below for data on “naturism”], and which provide short-term, “quick-fix” solutions to the ecological crisis rather than encouraging a review of fundamental values. There must be a reviewed, revised, non-dominating, non-exploitative relationship between technology and culture, technology and nature, technology and the human being (Ch 4: 6.3.3), technology and women (Ch 6: 6.3). *Within these premises*, soft technologies are favoured – supporting green sample data is presented at section 6.5.10.

**Variations:**

1. Non-instrumental science and technology is valued: *social ecology* Ch 5: 1, 3.1, 4.2.1.2, footnote 33 at 5.4, 5.4.1, 6.2, 6.3.1.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.2.1.5.
2. *Ecofeminism* critiques and rejects mechanist, rationalist-instrumental, analytical, value-free, exploitative, context-inappropriate forms of science and technology as an expression of a ‘masculinist’ worldview - Ch 6: 3.3, also sections 3.1, and 3.2 in this chapter.
3. Less critically, the eco-socialist strands in *Die Grünen* championed an ecological reform of western industrialism, led forward by science and technology - Ch 7: 1.4.1.

**Green sample data:** *animal liberation theory* Ch 3: 6.3.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 2.4, 3.1, 4.1.4.1, 6.3.3; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 2.3.1, 3.1, 3.3, 4.1.2, 5.4.1(4); *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 3.3, 3.3.1, 3.5, 6.3; *Die Grünen* 2.1.1, 2.1.3.4, 5.4.3.1, 6.1.2.1, 6.1.2.4, 6.1.3.3, 6.2, 6.2.1.4, 6.2.1.5, 6.2.5.

**External green data:**

- a. Lack of faith in modern large scale technology and its associated demands on elitist expertise, central state authority, and inherently undemocratic institutions (O’Riordan, 1981, p. 376)

- b. Discriminating use and development of science and technology, not unquestioning acceptance of the technological fix (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- c. Ecocentric, not technocentric (Descriptors of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to mechanistic/Cartesian world views, Sterling, 1990, p. 82).

#### 6.3.3.4 “Naturism” critiqued (instrumental exploitation, domination and destruction of nature)

Instrumentalism implies a denial of agency in the Other [here, nature], the “use of the periphery as the means to the center’s ends” (*ecofeminism* Ch 6: 4.2.1 (e)), and is unethical (section 5 of this chapter). It is variously blamed on anthropocentrism, hierarchy, or androcentrism. In this latter critique, instrumentalism is a product of a (male) dualist ontology which “typically polarizes difference and minimizes shared characteristics, construes difference along the lines of superiority/inferiority, and views the inferior side as a means to the higher ends of the superior side (the instrumental thesis, Ch 6: 5.1.1 (a)).

Seeing green critiques that form of techno-industrial development which (a) is informed by hierarchical, patriarchal ideas [“power over” ideas] of the human-nature relationship, particularly the idea that human mastery over nature is necessary for progress, (b) excludes “the feminine principle” [section 4.3.3.3] in the use of natural resources, (c) sees nature in human-instrumental terms and utility values only, (d) disrupts ecosystems and ecological processes, for current and future generations, because short term economic development is seen as having priority over ecological sustainability, and (e) “manages” environmental impacts on nature via rational-instrumental science and technology, rather than changing fundamental values and accepting the idea of natural limits.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology*, Ch 4: 4.1.4.1, 6.2.1 footnote 56, 6.3.3, 6.3.3.1; *social ecology* Ch 4: 5.4.5.2 footnote 61, and Ch 5: 2.1.4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.2.3, 6.1.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1.3, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2.2, 3.1.1, 4.2.2, 5.1.1(f), 5.2.1, 6.3, 6.4, 6.4(c), 6.4(d); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3, 2.1.3.1, 2.1.3.2, 6.2.5.

#### 6.3.3.5 Global “advanced” industrial capitalism problematized

Global advanced industrial capitalism for all is problematized as (a) assuming universality of western economic concepts, such as “development” understood as ever-increasing commodity production, “poverty” equated with subsistence living, and “productivity” in nature equated with production of commodities from natural resources for profit; (b) representing increased production for wants [want-satisfaction is an economic definition of utility] rather than vital needs; (c) leading to increased poverty, and increased international economic inequality. In the Third World, advanced capitalism creates “new elites”, increases the economic gap between haves/have-nots, between men and women, and between the North and South, through, inter alia, unfair trade practices, and unfair division of labour. (d) It is ecologically impossible to universalize on a global scale, without encouraging militarism to secure access to natural resources, and (e) reduces cultural diversity through its homogenizing nature.

##### a. assuming universality of western economic concepts

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.2.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4(b).

##### b. producing for wants rather than vital needs

**Green sample data:** *animal liberation theory* Ch 3: 5.1.3.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.2.4; *social ecology* Ch 5: 6.1.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.2.1, 2.1.3.5.

**c. increasing national and global economic inequality**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.2.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4(a) and (c); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.2.1, 6.2.5.

**d. being ecologically impossible to globalize; encouraging militarism**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology*, Ch 4: 6.2.3, 6.2.4.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.1, 2.1.3.2, 2.1.3.2.1, 6.4.1.1.

**e. destroying cultural diversity**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology*, Ch 4: 6.2.4.2, 6.2.5; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.2.5, 6.4.2.3.

### 6.3.4 An alternative conception of “the good life”

Seeing green proposes an alternative conception of the good life, preferably spiritually-based, but if not, then at least based on rejection of consumption as bringer of happiness, rejection of non-material values, and valuing quality of life rather than increasingly higher standards of living. The “good life” conceptualized, as *Die Grünen* Bahro phrases it, as “... our auto-culture, the ‘good life’ of Washington, London, Paris and Frankfurt” (Bahro, 1984, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 161-162, in Ch 7: 2.1.3.6) is critiqued.

The new understanding of the good life [“quality of life”] manifests itself in the personal sphere, for example, as voluntary simplicity, not simply as a rejection of materialism and consumerism, but also as a statement of global solidarity with have-nots. In the public sphere, new understandings of the good life generate alternative forms of development for the Third World which deliver what is needed locally to combat poverty, hunger and sickness, not to promote western economism. “Solidarity” development politics (aid with no strings attached, for example) are proposed. Data on alternative development models is presented at section 6.3.5.

**Green sample data:** *nonhuman nature rights theory* (Stone) Ch 3: 5.1.3.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: point 7 of platform in 1.3.4.1, 5.4.3, 6, 6.2.4.1, 6.2.4.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4; *Die Grünen*: Ch 7: 2.1.3.2.1, 2.1.3.3, 2.1.3.4, 2.1.3.5, 2.1.3.6, 6.1.2.2.

**External green data:**

- a. Sustainability and quality of life, not economic growth and Gross National Product [GNP] (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Voluntary simplicity, not demand stimulation (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217).

### 6.3.5 Alternative forms of development proposed

Alternative forms of development which do not reproduce patriarchal oppression of women, do not rest on materialism and consumerism as values but meet people’s fundamental needs, value their dignity, recognize the role of spirituality in human development, protect cultural diversity, recognize ecological limits and protect nature’s diversity, which are regionally appropriate, tend towards increased economic self-reliance, harness renewable energies and soft technologies (see this chapter, section 6.5.10), and maintain international peace are recommended. Two positive examples are “ecodevelopment” (*deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.2.4.3), and Norwegian resource economist and peace activist Johann Galtung’s work (*deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.3.3.1, *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.3). A negative example is Shiva’s ‘maldevelopment’ (*ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4).

Sustainable development is viewed with scepticism or caution, because of its anthropocentrism, or neo-colonialism-in-disguise: *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.4.3, 6.2.5, 6.5.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.1.4.3, 5.4.3, 5.4.5.2, 6.2.4.2, 6.2.4.3, 6.3.3.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4; *Die Grünen*: Ch 7: 2.1.3.3, 4.3.4 footnote 58, 6.2.5, 6.4.2.3.

**External green data:**

- a. Self-reliance, not ever-expanding world trade (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Production for use, not production for exchange and profit (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- c. Local production for local need, not a ‘free-market’ economy (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- d. Appropriate technologies, not profit-driven technologies (Technology in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).
- e. Labour-intensive production, not capital-intensive production (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217). This idea was not encountered.

## 6.4 Assuring ecological sustainability

... it is my opinion that a *necessary, but not sufficient, criterion of the fully attained greenness of a society is that it is ecologically sustainable in the wide sense* (Naess, 1995c, in Sessions, 1995, p. 402, his italics, in Chapter Four: 5.4.3).

### 6.4.1 Green stories:

Ecological limits are recognized as the ultimate “bottom line” for all endeavours of the current generation, as well as of future generations. The conditions of life must be preserved, excessive interference in nature’s stability/equilibrium/balance must be reduced, and the economy must be ecologically re-oriented [green stories and data on this aspect at 6.5]. Achieving ecological sustainability requires (6.4.2) a long-range approach [“futurity”] which protects the basis of all life, not a short term profit-oriented view of the planet’s ecology; (6.4.3) global controls, despite the green insistence on decentralization and self-management; (6.4.4) the curtailment of human population growth; (6.4.5) protection of land, water, and air’s capacity to sustain life; (6.4.6) immediate preservation of the planet’s remaining biodiversity, and its habitat; (6.4.7) reduction of natural resource consumption, particularly of energy; (6.4.8) the practice of reciprocal land use; (6.4.9) the ethical treatment of animals; and (6.4.10), education in the interconnectedness of the life base in schools, and in continuing education.

### 6.4.2 Take a long-range ecological protection, not short term economic view of the environment [“futurity”]

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.1.2, 5.4.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.4, 2.1.3.2, 6.1.

**External green data:**

- a. Ecological stewardship, not resource management (Role of the human in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- b. Preserve biodiversity, not nature as resource; Protect ecosystem integrity, not exploit or conserve (Values in relation to nature in the Ecological age, as opposed to the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

### 6.4.3 Establish international controls to assure global ecological sustainability

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch4: 4.1.4.2, 6.4.3.2, *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.4.7.

### 6.4.4 Stabilize, reduce human population growth

The curtailment of population growth globally [not only in the Third World] is recognized, but not without contention, as one challenge among many which must be dealt with *in non-totalitarian, non-patriarchal ways*, if ecological sustainability is to be achieved. Various approaches proposed are to expand women's role in society; enable women to control their own fertility; increase women's health and economic welfare; end political leaders' demands for more babies to increase national strength; de-condition men from their patriarchal demands for more children.

**Variation:** Calls for population control are critiqued as First World elitism, and/or male attempts to control women's fertility (*social ecology*, and *ecofeminism* in Ch 4: 6.4.2.1).

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.4.1 point 4, 2.1 footnote 14, 4.1.4.3, 5.1.2, 6.4.2; *social ecology* in Ch 4: 6.4.2.1, *ecofeminism* in Ch 4: 6.4.2.1, and Ch 6: 6.5; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.2.5.1.

### 6.4.5 Protect land, water and air's long-term capacity to sustain life

Although all principles listed under "Ecological sustainability" can be understood as aimed at protecting land, water, and air's regenerative capacity to sustain life, this aspect refers to (6.4.5.1) prudence in intervention into nature's processes, unless all the effects of the intervention are known [the 'precautionary principle']; (6.4.5.2) the reduction of harmful emissions to land, water, and air [today's 'polluter pays' principle; the concept of the Clean Development mechanism, for example]; and the reduction of wastefulness – the 'three R's': reduce, recycle, and re-use. Examples of reduction in wastefulness would be the physical separation of drinking water from water for other uses, the production of durable goods, and the elimination of elaborate packaging. Reduction of natural resource use is dealt with at 6.4.7.

#### 6.4.5.1 Reduce excessive intervention into/disturbance of natural processes and habitats; exercise prudence when intervening

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology*, Ch 4: 1.3.4.1 point 5, 4.1.2, 4.1.4.2, 5.2.2, 5.4.1, 6.4.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.4.1(4); *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.1.2(4); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.4.1.

#### 6.4.5.2 Reduce waste, pollution, and wastefulness

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology*, Ch 4: 6.2.4.3, 6.3.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 6.1.2, 6.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.1, 5.4.2, 5.4.5.

#### External green sample data:

- a. Recycling, reusing, not waste overload (Technology in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- b. Protect and restore ecosystems, not exploitation/consumerism (Technology in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

### 6.4.6 Protect remaining biodiversity and its habitat

Some of seeing green's measures to maintain biodiversity [diversity and abundance] and its habitat include the implementation of a species register to provide an overview of species' status, the re-introduction of endemic flora and fauna species, protection for threatened species against hunting and trade, and the protection or re-instatement of original landscape (*Die Grünen*, 1979, p. 10; 1980b, p. 23; Ch 7: 5.4.3). Other measures, for which green sample data is presented next, include setting aside,

and restoring large areas of free nature, scaling down industrial activities which threaten wide ecological sustainability, and opposing biotechnology.

**6.4.6.1 Set aside, and restore, large areas of “free nature”<sup>30</sup> from human techno-industrial progress to protect biodiversity and its habitat**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.1.4, 4.1.4.2, 5.1.2, 6.4.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.4.3.

**6.4.6.1.1. Nature tourism**

Seeing green tends to oppose the “commodification” of such areas for nature tourism. **Green sample data:** *nonhuman nature rights theorist Stone* Ch 3: 6.2; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.1.4.3.

**6.4.6.2 Scale down industrial activities which threaten wide ecological sustainability**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.1.2; *social ecology* Ch 5: 6.3.1.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.4.3.

**6.4.6.3 Problematize biotechnology**

**Green sample data:** *Ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.4.3.1.

**External green data:**

Preserve biodiversity, not nature as resource; protect ecosystem integrity, not exploit or conserve (Values in relation to nature in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

**6.4.7 Reduce resource consumption: energy as example**

The entire seeing green energy approach is best understood within green alternative stories of the reconceptualized human being [4.3.3], the good life, and authentic human development [6.3]. Increased energy consumption should not be understood as a mark of progress. Non-renewable energy sources are limited: their use must be stabilized to within ecological limits, and their efficiency rate must be increased. Military use of nuclear energy is rejected. Civil use of nuclear energy is not favoured, as it poses threats to life, to civil liberties, to the basis of life, particularly in wartime, and to future generations. The way forward is via people-friendly, and eco-friendly, alternative energies such as biogas, sun, wind, and water, which allow the use of alternative [‘soft’] technologies, and which have the potential of promoting grassroots democratic, and local, energy self-sufficiency. Private alternative energy enterprise should be allowed to contribute to the energy network, which is ideally decentralized. There must be increased research into alternative energy generation.

Another obvious starting point in reducing resource consumption is energy saving, people and nature-friendly transport systems [the stereotypical image of a “greenie” on a bicycle fits here], within a spatial planning approach to human habitat which has re-integrated, for example, the severed areas of work, living, play, and shopping [6.6.8]. Some green indicators are –

**6.4.7.1 Stabilize and reduce use of non-renewable energy**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.2.1, 6.3.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.3.1.

**6.4.7.2. Use renewable energy**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.2.4.3, 6.3.3.1; *social ecology* 6.3.1.4, *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.3.2.

---

<sup>30</sup>“Free nature” is meant here in the deep ecology sense (Ch 4: 4.1.4), not social ecologist Murray Bookchin’s “free nature” (Ch 5: 4.3)

#### **6.4.7.3 Increase research into alternative energies**

**Green sample data:** *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.3.5.

#### **6.4.7.4 Avoid/stop all use of nuclear energy**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.3, 6.3, 7.3; *social ecology* 6.3.1.4, 7.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.2, 6.3, 7.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.1, 6.1.3.3.

#### **6.4.7.5 Democratize and decentralize energy provision and storage**

**Green sample data:** *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.3.4.

#### **6.4.7.6 Favour energy-saving transport systems**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.3.3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 6.3.1.4; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.5.

#### **External green data:**

- a. Renewable sources of energy, not nuclear power (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Reliance on renewables, not addiction to fossil fuels (Technology in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- c. Low energy, low consumption, not high energy, high consumption (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217).

#### **6.4.8 Practice reciprocal land use: agriculture as example**

To illustrate reciprocal land use, I use agriculture. Reciprocal agriculture means, agriculture in partnership with the land, which works on a complementary, not a one-way industrial-extractive, basis. It operates at human scale; maintains the landscape and preserves flora and fauna species; respects ecological limits; replaces chemical with biological control methods in food production, thus contributes to food quality; practices multi- rather than monocropping to maintain biodiversity; keeps industrial animals in conditions respecting their species-nature [i.e. a reflection of the animal liberation theory argument from sentience]; protects rural culture and rural jobs.

**Variation:** Animal liberation theory, invoking the concept of rights (Regan), rejects commercial animal production for food altogether [section 6.4.9.2 below]. Seeing green also includes calls for complete or partial moral vegetarianism [6.4.9.3] both as personal ethical practice and public economic boycott of industrialized animal production methods.

Some green markers are -

##### **6.4.8.1 A demand for organically-produced food; a rejection of genetically modified foods**

##### **6.4.8.2 Concern for the protection of human scale farming**

**Green sample data** on 6.4.8.1 and 6.4.8.2: *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.3.4; *social ecology* Ch 5: 1, 2.1.4.2, 5.4.3, 6.2; 6.3.1.3; 6.3.1.4; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.1.2(4); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.4.

##### **6.4.8.3 Attention to animal welfare in farming**

Green sample data is presented at 6.4.9.

**External green data:**

- a. Land ethic: think like mountain<sup>31</sup>, not land use: farming, herding (Relation to land in the transition to the Ecological age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- b. Poly and permaculture, not monoculture farming; Community and family farms, not agribusiness, factory farms; Biological pest control, not chemical fertilizers and pesticides; Preserve genetic diversity, not [Use of] vulnerable high-yield hybrids (Agriculture in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

**6.4.9 Treat animals ethically**

**Green stories:** There is a call for radical changes to scientific, and economic structures and practices, as well as personal practices, which negatively affect animal well-being.

**Variation:** The philosophical ultimate premises which bring animal well-being into accounts of the ethical vary from ontological conceptions of human-nonhuman continuity, to arguments from sentience and rights [section 5, this chapter]. There is thus also real-world variation in what constitutes their ethical treatment:

**6.4.9.1 Eliminate animal experimentation including vivisection, and product-testing, completely, or almost completely**

**Green sample data:**

- a. Totally abolish animal experimentation, or, reduce it to experimentation for certainly-known vital needs only, strictly control it, and eventually phase it out, replacing it with computer models and tissue culture - *animal liberation theory* Ch 3: 1.1.3, 6.2, 6.3.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.5; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.4.4
- b. A moral obligation to oppose much, if not quite all vivisection, vivisection only with anaesthetic - *animal liberation* Ch 3: 1.1.3, 6.3.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.5; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.3.2.1
- c. Product testing [weapons including chemical and biological warfare methods, cosmetics, tobacco, alcohol, cleaning materials] rejected – *animal liberation* Ch 3: 1.1.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.5.

**6.4.9.2 Totally dissolve, or radically reform, commercial animal agriculture**

**Green sample data:**

- a. Total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture including intensive factory and feedlot farming – *animal liberation* (Regan), Ch 3: 6.2, 6.3.2, 7.1
- b. Animal suffering in factory, battery, and feedlot farming inter alia through the use of mechanistic-technological farming practices condemned; agricultural animals must be kept in conditions according to their species-nature; live transport to be banned - *animal liberation theory* (Singer), Ch 3: 1.1.3, 2.2, 6.2, 6.3.2, 7.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 5.4.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.4.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.4.4
- c. The killing of animals is acceptable, provided that the animals involved are non-persons, the killing is pain-free, and stress-free - *animal liberation* (Singer), Ch 3: 5.4.1, 7.1; some writers within *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.4.3. Despite that,

---

<sup>31</sup> The ideas-context for this indicator is assumed to be Aldo Leopold, who advocated thinking like a mountain, or thinking ecologically (from Bartlett (1986, p. 233) who refers to Leopold's work in his discussion of ecological rationality). The phrase is taken up in the title of a book co-authored by deep ecologist Naess: *Thinking like a mountain: Towards a council of all beings* (Seed, Fleming, Macy, & Naess, 1988), and also in his own 1989a (pp 2-3) discussion of "mountain thinking" – the idea that modesty and humility should inform the human being's relationships with the natural world

#### **6.4.9.3 Total or partial moral veganism, vegetarianism, as personal statement and economic boycott**

**Green sample data:** *animal liberation* Ch 3: 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 (by implication), 7.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.4.4, 7.5; some writers within *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4, 5.4.4, 5.4.4.1(c), 5.4.4.2, 5.4.4.3, 5.4.5.

#### **6.4.9.4 Wildlife: commercial, culling and sport hunting, trapping, and related trade totally or partially condemned, except in cases of vital human need**

**Green sample data:** *animal liberation* Ch 3: 1.1.3, 6.2, 6.3.3; *deep ecology*, Ch 4: 5.4.2.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.4.3, 5.4.5; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.4.4.

#### **6.4.9.5. No animals confined for education, or used in entertainment**

**Green sample data:** *animal liberation*, Ch 3: 6.3.4; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.4.5.

#### **6.4.9.6 Animal torture strictly punishable**

**Green sample data:** *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 5.4.4.

### **6.4.10 Provide insight into, and exposure to, the interconnectedness of the ecological life basis**

The emphasis on insight in environmental education which one finds in *Die Grünen*'s thought for example, is derived I think, from the libertarian-anarchist view of the human being, in which the emphasis is on voluntary consent, and conviction, in human action (for example, *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1), rather than on behaviourist environmental education approaches. Environmental education is not only about awareness raising, or even insight: it should involve a deep change of consciousness, a sense of harmonious relatedness with nature.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.3.1 footnote 9, 4.2.1.2(3), 5 footnote 47, 6.2.4.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.2.1, 5.4.6.

## **6.5 An ecologically re-oriented economy**

### **6.5.1 Green stories:**

Green stories on an ecological re-orientation of the economy should be understood within the alternative stories of what it is to be a better human being (this chapter, section 4.3), an alternative conception of “the good life” (section 6.3.4), alternative models of development (6.3.5), and the conviction that *ecological sustainability* (6.4) is the ultimate “bottom line” of any human endeavour. This latter is in contradistinction to the sustainable development assumption that a simultaneous “triple bottom line” - economic, social and environmental sustainability - is possible.

An ecologically-oriented economy recognizes ecological limits (6.5.2); has introduced ecological accounting, including “greening” of Gross Domestic Product [GDP] as indicator of authentic development (6.5.3); prioritizes life-affirming economic activities (6.5.4); delivers quality of life, not quantitative growth (6.5.5); encourages production for reproduction [needs] not profit (6.5.6); makes place for ecologically-appropriate, self-managed, self-reliant forms of living (6.5.7); is democratically-controlled, also in the workplace (6.5.8); provides meaningful work (6.5.9); uses non-demeaning, non-violent technology (6.5.10); protects against unemployment (6.5.11); protects people against misleading encouragement to materialism and consumerism (6.5.12); and practices fair trade (6.5.13).

**Variations:** The tension between the more radical get-out-of-the-system versions of a green economy, and the less, but still radical ecological re-orientation of capitalism as economic system, is evident in the principles listed below.

### 6.5.2 Recognizes ecological limits, and promotes ecological sustainability

The ecological limits to growth idea – finite energy sources; acceptable limits to climate change - as a contributing influence in seeing green was introduced in Chapter Two: 2.3.1(d). Botzler and Armstrong (1998, p. 517, and footnote 4) briefly but usefully characterize steady-state economics as “stress[ing] the limits to resource use based on the carrying capacity of the earth”. The economy is seen as a subsystem of the natural environment. By contrast, mainstream economics “... maintain[s] that the earth’s carrying capacity is a function of the state of human knowledge and technology”. The ideas of mainstream economic theory are taken up in more detail in Chapter Nine, section 3. A seeing-green, ecologically-oriented economy takes the “limits” or “steady-state” side of the limits vs. continually-expanding economy debate, within the context of a “partnership”, not instrumental-only, ethic with nature.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 4.1.4.1, *social ecology* Ch 5: 6.1.2, *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.1, 2.1.3.2, 2.1.3.5, 5.4.2, 6.1.2.1.

#### External green data:

- a. Resources regarded as strictly finite, not environment managed as a resource (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Ecological limits determine technical limits, not few or no technological or ecological limits (Primary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- c. Limits to growth, not limitless progress (Economic systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- d. Steady-state economy or qualitative growth, not undifferentiated economic growth (Secondary characteristics of ecological/holistic world views, as opposed to those of a mechanistic/Cartesian worldview, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- e. Steady-state, sustainability, not “Economic development” (Economic systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- f. Economics based on ecology, not no accounting of nature (Economic systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

### 6.5.3 Practises ecological accounting, incl. “greening” of GDP as indicator of development

This idea comes from modern environmental economics which began to emerge in the 1970s, informed by the radical egalitarian approach of nineteenth century ecological economists (Chapter Two: 2.3.1(d), and Chapter Nine: 3.3). Seeing green critiques the ecology-independent and individualistic assumptions of GNP/GDP, and searches for greener indicators of human development which take ecological sustainability and quality of life into account. An ecologically-oriented economy practices publicly accountable ecological bookkeeping.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.3.1; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.4(b); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.2.6.

Although today’s natural resource accounting firmly situates the economic cycle within the ecological cycle, by accounting for natural resource inputs and outputs - the use of nature’s stocks and flows of energy and materials, and the production of waste - there are varying understandings of ecological sustainability. These are discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine: Environment and Development, section 3.4.

**External green data:**

Economics based on ecology, not no accounting of nature (Economic systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

**6.5.4 Prioritizes life-affirming economic activities**

An ecologically-oriented economy prioritizes what *Die Grünen* called “investments in the future”. By this they meant, for example, the radical idea [by western industrialism standards] of dismantling life-threatening industries such as the nuclear, weapons, and chemical industries, their re-orientation to life-affirming, ecology-protecting economic activities, and appropriate re-skilling of the employees involved.

**Green sample data:** *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.2.3.

Seeing green also advocates a change to production techniques which limit resource use to a level which does not upset the long-term sustainability of the ecological balance; reduces emissions [for example, today’s global concept “Clean Development Mechanism”], uses energy thriftily [“energy-efficiency”]; re-uses materials; re-cycles waste products sustainably back into natural ecological cycles; and reduces wastefulness through, for example, the production of useful, durable, repairable goods. Data on this aspect is presented at section 6.4.5.2: “Protect land, water and air’s long-term capacity to sustain life”.

**6.5.5 Delivers quality of life, not quantitative growth**

An ecologically-oriented economy delivers not increased production and quantitative growth but quality of life. Some understandings of this nebulous concept are a milieu which preserves diversity in both human and nonhuman nature, ensures that people’s fundamental needs [understood as more than just basic needs] are met, provides an environment in which people are free of oppression, and have unfettered opportunities to develop their creative capacities, and undertake self-chosen activities. In essence I think, seeing green’s alternative conceptions of “the good life” and of “authentic development” [as for example in Galtung’s conception, Ch 4: 6.3.3.1] represent what is meant by “quality of life”. Data on these ideas is presented at sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5.

The “quality of life” concept also includes ideas such as social egalitarianism: a fair distribution of goods produced so that the disadvantaged sections of society also benefit, a “social wage”, that is, a basic, but sufficient income for all (stories and data at 6.5.11); and social inclusion, understood partly at least, as secure, caring, social services (stories and data at 6.6.6).

**External green data:** Sustainability and quality of life, not economic growth and GNP (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217).

**6.5.6 Encourages production for needs not profit**

An ecologically-oriented economy encourages production for reproduction – i.e., production reduced to what society really needs, and not production for profit, materialism and consumerism. This would provide meaningful work for all, reduce working hours, allow genuine self-realization, and reduce the ecological burden of production.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.4.1, point 3, 6.2.4.3, 6.3.3.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.2.2, 6.2.1 and subdivisions, 6.3.1.

**External green data:**

- a. Implication that materialism for its own sake is wrong, and that economic growth can be geared to providing for the basic needs for those below subsistence levels (Deep environmentalists/self-reliance, soft technologists, O’Riordan, 1981 p. 376)
- b. Production for use (Distinguishing features of a green paradigm, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217).

**6.5.7 Encourages ecologically-appropriate local production for local use**

An ecologically-oriented economy encourages ecologically-appropriate, local economic production, particularly of food, for local use. This value is partly reflected in some supermarkets’ attempts today, to reduce ‘food miles’ travelled. In its more radical forms, local production for local use is part of self-managing, self-reliant forms of social living and economic production, such as bioregionalism, or communes, inside or outside the market system [data on this idea is presented at 6.2.2: “Ecologically-informed, post-hierarchical forms of political and socio-economic organization advocated”, and 6.3.3: “Alternative forms of development proposed”].

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.3.3.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.2.3, 6.3.1.

**External green data:**

- a. Community-based economies, not multi-national corporations (Economic systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).
- b. Local production for local need, not a ‘free-market’ economy (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217).

**6.5.8 Democratic control, both of the economy, and in the workplace**

An ecologically-oriented economy is under democratic control, not the control of banks, insurance companies, or multi-nationals. The economy is decentralized, and integrated into all-round community living. Production units are local, and human scale, not giant corporates. Small, self-managed businesses without hierarchies are favoured. What should be produced, where it should be produced, and how it should be produced – particularly, the introduction of technology in the workplace - is democratically determined and controlled. In the more radical forms of decentralized economy, such as *social ecology*’s municipalized economy, or Fundi *Die Grünen* communitarian living, the community’s economy is managed through direct [face to face] democracy.

**Green sample data:** *social ecology* Ch 5: 6.3.1.3, 6.3.1.6, 6.3.2.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.4, 6.2.1.4, 6.2.1.5.

**External green data:**

- a. Emphasis on smallness of scale and hence community identity in settlement, work, and leisure (Deep environmentalists/self-reliance, soft technologists, O’Riordan, 1981 p. 376)
- b. Community-based economies, not multi-national corporations (Economic systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- c. Decentralization, human scale, not centralization, economies of scale (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217).

**6.5.9 Provides creative activity, not meaningless labour**

An ecologically-oriented economy provides meaningful and dignified work, that is, activity which contributes to a person’s self-unfolding and self-realization, rather than work for a wage only. The ideas context is anarchism, as well as ecological complexity, understood normatively.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.3.5; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.3, 4.3, 6.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.2, 6.2.1.1.

**External green data:**

- a. Work as an end in itself, not employment as a means to an end (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Integration of concepts of work and leisure through a process of personal and communal improvement (Deep environmentalists/self-reliance, soft technologists, O’Riordan, 1981 p. 376).

**6.5.10 Uses “soft” (non-demeaning, non-exploitative) technology**

Usually within alternative understandings of development (section 6.3.5), and a reviewed, revised, non-dominating, non-exploitative relationship between technology and culture, technology and nature, and technology and the human being (Ch 4: 6.3.3), an ecologically-oriented economy uses “soft” [“alternative”, “liberatory”, “partnership”, “intermediate”, “ecosophically sane”, “beta”] technology. This is essentially eco-appropriate, human-scale technology which is at the service of a person’s self-realization, and which contributes to human quality of life rather than an economic rationality which serves profit. Mass mechanized production should be balanced by craftpersonship and handicrafts.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.2.4.3, 6.3.3, 6.3.3.1; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1 footnote 11, 2.1.4.2, 2.3.1, 3.1, 4.2.1.1 together with 4.2.2.4 and 4.3, 4.3.1, 5.4.1 opening citation, 6.2, 6.3.1.1, 6.3.1.4; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.4, 6.2.1.5.

**External green data:**

- a. Discriminating use and development of science and technology (Distinguishing features of a green paradigm, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Appropriate technologies, not profit-driven technologies (Technology in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).
- c. Labour-intensive production, not capital-intensive production (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217). [This idea was not encountered].

**6.5.11 Provides a “social wage” for all**

The idea of a “social wage” for all came into green thought from the egalitarianism and redistributionism of the nineteenth century ecological economists (Bramwell, 1989, p. 87, p. 221, and footnote 73 on p. 260). An ecologically-oriented economy must provide protection against unemployment in the form of a basic income grant<sup>32</sup>, because work is regarded as a right.

**Green sample data:** *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.2.1.2, 6.2.1.3.

**Variations:** *Social ecology’s* libertarian municipalism, and Fundi *Die Grünen’s* outside-the-system communitarian living, do not place the same emphasis on formal employment within the system.

**6.5.12 Protects people against misleading encouragement to materialism and consumerism**

An ecologically-oriented economy protects people against misleading encouragement [advertising] to materialism and consumerism [today’s ‘consumer rights’].

**Green sample data:** *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.2.2.

---

<sup>32</sup> In Namibia, the basic income grant [BIG] is church, not government-led, as one might expect (Haarmann, 2005; “BIG goes it alone” / Denver Isaacs, *The Namibian*, Wednesday 14 February 2007, p. 3)

### 6.5.13 Practices fair trade/development aid

An ecologically-oriented economy practices fair trade to redress the inegalitarian First World/Third World international division of labour, and unfair prices paid for natural resources. The fair trade principle [egalitarian development politics] also seeks to promote self-help, self-reliance, protection of livelihood opportunities, and locally-appropriate development in those areas where natural resources are acquired by “the centre”. The ideological context here is critique of the centre/periphery global development model, and the ideology of alternative development models.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 5.4.2.1, 6.3.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6:6.4(a); *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.2.1, 2.1.3.3(3), 6.2.5, 6.4.1.1.

## 6.6 Living in solidarity

### 6.6.1 Green stories

The value of solidarity is derived from both symbiosis [interconnectedness and interdependence] in ecology normatively understood, as well as from Gandhian principles such as *advaita* [radical ontological nonduality], *ahimsa* [non-violence], and *aparigraha* [non-possession].

Today, “living in solidarity”<sup>33</sup> is roughly translated in mainstream development as “social responsibility”. In green stories, the solidarity concept is richer. *Identification with the other* means one espouses “solidarity politics”, that is, living in genuine community, partnership, co-operation, gentleness, and non-possessiveness, with other human beings.

Nature is included in green solidarity politics: “How can we be non-violent to nature unless the principle of non-violence becomes central to the ethos of human culture?” (Gandhi in Swaminathan, 1990, p. xiii, in Ch 7: 6.4 footnote 150). Stories and data for philosophical and practical living in partnership with nature are presented at sections 5 and 6.4 respectively.

This section (6.6) focuses on solidarity relations with people. Above all else, living in solidarity - “partnership” – requires a rebalancing of “masculine” with “feminine” qualities and values in our personal and social-structural values (6.6.2). These values - ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal values – are introduced at section 6.2.1 in this chapter. In a sense, living in solidarity with one’s Self also requires reclaiming one’s ceded, estranged, or denied other half – data pertaining to this aspect is presented at section 4.3.3.

The most fundamental expression of living in solidarity is (6.6.3) non-violence, and peace, the latter considered by deep ecologist Naess to be one of the three criteria<sup>34</sup> of a truly green society (Ch 4: 6.1). Peace is understood radically, not merely as absence of war, but as an end to power-over thought and action: (a) no militarism, as this is a symptom of aggressive, dominating, competitive, possessive relations with others, particularly when used to ensure access to natural resources and markets. No militarism includes radical disarmament, and the conversion of death-dealing industries to life-affirming production. (b) There should be no inherent violence in society’s structures, for example, no intentional or unintentional, formal or informal abuse of any section of the population, as in disproportionate health risks for the poor, women or children from eco-hazards, or, as a Namibian example, the holding of people longer than the legal period in detention without being charged before a magistrate, because of administrative delays in the judicial system. (c) There should be no physical violence; no hate behaviour in either the public or private spheres. A **variation** here is the lesser commitment of some Marxist-informed seeing green elements to the principle of non-violence (Ch 7: 1.4.1, footnote 151 in 6.4.1, 6.4.3.1). On the green view, radical peace includes ethical trade practices,

<sup>33</sup> One of the four interrelated pillars of Die Grünen’s “total concept” (Ch 7: 1.4)

<sup>34</sup> The other two are wide ecological sustainability, and social justice

particularly in relation to natural resources (section 6.5.13). Radical peace is indivisible from grassroots democracy; stories and data on this green marker are presented in section 6.7.

Living in solidarity also includes -

(6.6.4) sustained attention to women’s full emancipation, reducing/eliminating their oppression and exploitation [for example, domestic violence against women; equalizing their education, work, and recreation opportunities; ensuring that women are in control of their own fertility; promoting non-patriarchal gender roles in society, because “male’-defined gender roles for women have been “... part of *the means* of domination and subordination in patriarchy” (Davion, 1994, p. 292, her italics, Ch 6:1) [e.g. both men and women to be involved in house-caring, and child-rearing]; and the revision of socio-economic structures to support such non-patriarchal sex and gender roles;

(6.6.5) the valuing of cultural diversity;

(6.6.6) social inclusion - ecology’s egalitarianism translates into ideas such as “a social ecosystem”: secure social services, a basic, but sufficient income for all [the “Social Wage” already discussed at 6.5.11], and the social inclusion, and rights protection, of the marginalized [prisoners, social welfare cases, the elderly, the disabled, the mentally-ill as some examples];

(6.6.7) holistic health care, which addresses the whole body-mind person, delivered as close to home as possible, and emphasizing transparency, self-determination and self-responsibility in the healing process. Health care must also address those social-structural factors which are detrimental to health, such as techno-industrialism’s poisoning of air, soil, water, and food, high noise levels, stress engendered through automated work processes, and the co-optation of the medical industry by profit-seeking companies;

(6.6.8) spatial re-integration to match our psychological re-integration. Human habitat spatial planning should seek to re-integrate the areas of our lives artificially segregated by techno-industrialism: living space, place of work, recreation, education, and shopping for example. Spatial planning should seek to restore feelings of solidarity, and human scale, in daily living, rather than concentrating people in mega-cities; to provide and protect green spaces; and to preserve architectural and other expressions of the aesthetic in humanly-scaled cities. Citizens must be given genuine participation opportunities in urban planning.

(6.6.9) Integral education designed to develop the whole person, to support self-realization [4.3.3], to produce people imbued with the values needed in a new ecological society, and not just to ensure a person’s economic usefulness to society. Holistic education also seeks to re-integrate learning and living. Genuine participation in the political process is seen as part of a person’s well-rounded education; this aspect is discussed at “Grassroots democracy” section 6.7.2;

(6.6.10) Living in solidarity, means living in solidarity with future generations as well.

## **6.6.2 “Masculine” values rebalanced with ecologically-informed, and/or post-patriarchal personal and social values**

Supporting data for this aspect has already been presented at section 6.2.1 “Ecologically-informed, and/or post-patriarchal personal and social values advocated”. Not discussed there were the ecological/post-patriarchal values of non-violence, and peace, next at 6.6.3.

## **6.6.3 Non-violence, and radical peace**

### ***6.6.3.1 Militarism, nuclearism, and threat of force critiqued; instead, radical peace, total disarmament, locally-organized non-violent social defence***

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.3.3.1, 6.4.4; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 2.2.2, 6.1.1, 6.1.2(1); 6.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.4.1, 2.1.1, 2.2, 2.2.3, 4.3.5.1, 6.4, 6.4.1, 6.4.1.1, 6.4.2.

#### **6.6.3.2 No structural violence**

**Green sample data:** *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 6.2, 6.6; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.4.4.

#### **6.6.3.3 Dialogue, consensual process, respect for difference, not ‘power-over’ in our relations and actions**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 7.3; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 5.2.7, 5.2.8, 5.4.3(4), 6.1.1, 6.1.2(1), 6.1.2(7), 7.1, 7.4; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 3.1, 6.4.3.

#### **6.6.3.4 No physical violence; no hate behaviour, no violent speech, no vilification**

**Green sample data:** *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.4.3, 6.4.3.1, 6.4.3.2, 6.4.5.1.

#### **6.6.3.5 Fair trade practices**

Supporting data for this aspect is presented at section 6.5.13.

#### **External green data:**

- a. Nonviolence, not institutionalized violence (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Commitment to nonviolence, not militarism (Political systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

#### **6.6.4 Full emancipation for women; post-patriarchal gender roles**

**Green sample data:** *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1, 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.1.1-2.1.4, 6.4(c), 6.5; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 4.3.5, 4.3.5.1, 6.2.2.1, 6.2.6.

#### **6.6.5 Multi-culturalism valued**

**Green sample data** is presented at section 5.4, point 8: “Cultural diversity”

#### **6.6.6 Social inclusion**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.2.4.3; *ecofeminism* – Ch 6: 2.1.2, 5.2.4, 5.2.5, 6.6; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.1.2.4, 6.3.4.

#### **External green data:**

Low income differentials, not high income differentials (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217).

#### **6.6.7 Non-patriarchal, holistic, close-to-home health care**

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.3.3.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.2.4.

#### **6.6.8 Re-integrated, ecologically-harmonious human habitat spatial planning**

**Green sample data:** *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 6.3.1.1, 6.3.1.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.3, 6.1.5, 6.2.3.

#### **6.6.9 Holistic, real-world education**

**Green sample data:** *social ecology* Ch 5: footnote 45 in 6.2, 6.3.2.1.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.3, 6.2.2.

#### **6.6.10 Considering future generations**

**Green sample data** is presented at section 5.4.2, point 9 “Future generations”.

## 6.7 Grassroots [“direct”] democracy

### 6.7.1 Green stories

Green stories of grassroots [direct] democracy, instead of western liberal indirect/representative democracy, are to be understood within an anarchist political critique of hierarchy, the feminist critique of patriarchy, and the normativity of the assumed absence of hierarchy in ecology. Supporting data for the green critique of hierarchy, patriarchy, bureaucracy, and power-over mentality is provided at section 2.1.2.

Decentralized decision-making, and human-scale functioning in the political, socio-economic and environmental spheres are seen as the necessary counter to the kind of hierarchy, bureaucracy, and technocracy which disempowers ordinary citizens. There are radical demands for self-determination [self-choice], self-direction, self-management, self-responsibility. Such free, unfettered, creative not enforced, choice-from-below, is understood to contribute to the anarchist/humanist vision of the fully-functioning human being. It also represents, in feminist critique, liberation from patriarchal, power-over relationships, and liberation from the patriarchal viewpoint that the personal is not political – on the feminist critique, the personal *is* political (Ch 6: 6.1.2(8)).

Grassroots democracy’s most radical expression is face-to-face democracy in eco-communitarian living. In less radical understandings, it means authentic citizen participation in the political process. This requires society’s management to be de-professionalized, simplified, and made transparent, so that power can be returned to ordinary citizens, where it belongs. Understandings of citizenship are far wider than merely voting once in a while; citizens’ initiatives and public referenda are part of citizenship too. Active and responsible participation in the political process is held to be an essential part of an individual’s holistic development (6.7.2). Today’s rather watered-down expressions of grassroots democracy are “participatory democracy” and “public participation”.

Direct action, which may range from mild social influence actions (letters, petitions, demonstrations, marches, street theatre for example), to economic boycott, civil disobedience, or forming “neighbourhood assemblies” with moral if not legal power, is considered an essential element of both the public democratic process, *and* self-realization (6.7.3). It should be non-violent in nature.

Genuine democracy respects fundamental rights, understood widely as having not only political, but also ecological, economic, cultural, and religious dimensions, and including the rights of minorities. Government is fully accountable to Parliament, and Parliament is fully accountable to its citizens. Democratic governance makes public information transparently available, and free of party-political interest, to enable genuine citizen participation. At the same time, it respects the privacy of its citizens’ personal data (6.7.4 - 6.7.6).

**Variations:** In the more radical anarchist-utopian influenced green stories, statism and parliamentarianism are rejected altogether, in favour of radical forms of decentralized political self-management such as communitarianism, which includes economic self-management as well [more stories and data on this aspect at 6.3.2 and 6.7.2]: *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 4.3, 4.3.1, 6.1.1, 6.1.1.1, 6.3.2 and subdivisions, 7.2, 7.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 1.4.1, 6.3.1, 8.1, 8.2.

### 6.7.2 Decentralized political self-management, and real citizenship

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 6.4.3; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 4.3, 6.1.1.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.3.1.5, 6.3.2, 6.3.2.1, 6.3.2.1.1; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.3, 6.3.2.

### 6.7.3 Non-violent, direct action, including civil disobedience

**Green sample data:** *animal rights theory* Ch 3: 5.4.1, 5.4.2, 6.3.3.1, 7.1, 7.2; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.4.1 opening paragraph, 2.2, 6.5.3, 7.4; *social ecology* Ch 5: 2.1.4.1, 7; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1.2, 7, 7.2; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.4.5, 6.4.5.1.

### 6.7.4 Fundamental rights protected

**Green sample data:** *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 6.3.3, 6.3.4.

### 6.7.5 Public accountability, and private data protection

**Green sample data:** *social ecology* Ch 5: 6.1.1.1; *Die Grünen*: Ch 7: 6.3.2, 6.3.5.

#### External green data:

- a. Internationalism and global solidarity, not sovereignty of nation state (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- b. Humans and environment focus, not national security focus<sup>35</sup> (Political systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171)
- c. Importance of participation in community affairs, and of guarantees of the rights of minority interests. Participation seen both as a continuing education and political function (Deep environmentalists/self-reliance, soft technologists; O’Riordan, 1981, p. 376)
- d. Participative involvement, not dependence upon experts (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- e. Descriptors: participative (Ecological/holistic world views, Sterling, 1990, p. 82)
- f. Direct democracy, not representative democracy (Distinguishing features of the politics of ecology in a green paradigm, as opposed to the politics of industrialism, Porritt, 1984, pp. 216-217)
- g. Egalitarian democracies, not patriarchal oligarchies (Political systems in the transition to the Ecological Age, from the Industrial Age, Metzner, 1994, pp. 170-171).

## 7. Praxis

### 7.1 Green stories

“Praxis” is used loosely in this study to mean, living out/enacting your moral beliefs in the public sphere (7.2) as well as undertaking “self-work” (7.3). Praxis is informed by the feminist/ecofeminist conviction that the personal is political. In seeing green, personal lifestyle choices represent not only a quest for self-realization, or inward transformation, but a political demand for social-structural change too. Some writers within *deep ecology* and *ecofeminism* have formulated philosophical-political platforms (Ch 4: 1.3.4, and Ch 6: 5.1.2, 6.1.2 respectively) to guide political action based on the new ecological/non-patriarchal consciousness.

A **variation** here is Bookchin’s view in *social ecology* (Ch 5: 7.1, also in Ch 4: 4.2.3.1) that there can be no personal redemption without social redemption.

### 7.2 Living out/enacting your personal moral beliefs in the public sphere too

Direct action and civil disobedience as examples of direct democratic personal-political practice are discussed at 6.7.3.

<sup>35</sup> The context for this Metzner green marker, is a critique of patriarchal nation-states

Other examples of living out your personal beliefs in the public sphere are consumer boycott, perhaps expressed as voluntary simplicity in protest against materialism and consumerism, or as demonstration of global solidarity against international economic inequality, or as boycott of animal-related “products of pain”, expressed in veganism, vegetarianism or semi-vegetarianism, or not wearing fur where one has choice, or refusing to buy products [cosmetics, poisons, weapons] tested on animals, or not attending events in which animals are exploited for entertainment.

**Green sample data:** *animal liberation* Ch 3: 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 (by implication), 7.1; *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3.4.1 opening paragraph and point 8, 7.5; some writers within *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 1.2(8), 5.4.4.1(e), 5.4.4.1(f), 5.4.4.3, 5.4.5, 6.1.2(7), 6.1.2(8), 6.1.2(9), 7.3; *Die Grünen* Ch 7: 2.1.3.5.

### 7.3 “Self-work”

Some of the “Self-work” or inward, or self-examination work needed to achieve the transformation to a greener society is, for example, clarifying for yourself your worldview [your ultimate premises and values], making the paradigm shift needed to move towards an ecocentric value orientation, or liberating yourself from the idea of hierarchy, or “patriarchal programming”. Another aspect is speaking out in public in support of issues valued in seeing green, instead of remaining silent.

**Green sample data:** *deep ecology* Ch 4: 1.3, 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.3.3, 2.4, 5.1.2, 7.1, 7.2; *ecofeminism* Ch 6: 7.4.

## 8. Summary of “seeing green”

Seeing green’s stories are about the pathological western Self/Other relationship [Self divided against self, against other human beings, against “the female”, against women, against nature, against animals], of which the ecological crisis is one manifestation. There will be no solution to this crisis, until the pathological Self/Other relationship is healed.

Within that context, one summary of seeing green’s key ideas is -

1. A fundamental critique of the dominant western capitalist techno-industrial society, including of the [masculinist] ontological idea that there is a Self/Other dichotomy, of the epistemological dominance of [masculinist] science, of the idea that human progress entails the conquest, mastery or exploitation of nature, thus legitimating an instrumental ethic towards the natural world; of the values of technological and rational efficiency, materialism and consumerism.
2. A fundamentally different view of self, of self vis-a-vis other persons, and of self vis-a-vis nature, is necessary to re-orient western culture, and to address the increasingly global ecological crisis.
3. A nature ethic which “crosses the species divide” in one way or another, to include some, or all of nature, *for its own sake*, not merely for human-instrumental reasons. There is agreement that long-range, wide ecological sustainability, and animal suffering, matter morally, not merely instrumentally.
4. Personal transformation, and radical political and socio-economic changes are needed to achieve a green, or ecological society. This transformation involves the adoption of ecological/post-patriarchal values.
5. Adherents of seeing green are required to try to implement the necessary changes in self and in society’s structures, by clarifying their worldview, and by living out/enacting their personal beliefs in the public sphere.

## 8.1 Its challenge

While proponents of an ecological or “seeing green” worldview consider the normativity of their views on Self/Other to be rooted objectively in ecology, critics have accused them of being romantic, wrong, and radical (Anderson, 1996; Bramwell, 1994). Whether romantic or wrong, seeing green’s challenge to the mainstream social construction of reality has been perturbing. When its marginalization through ridicule failed (Bramwell, 1989, p. 12), its more radical elements were quietly sidelined, and its less radical elements quickly incorporated (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) into mainstream politics, in a process *Die Grünen’s* Petra Kelly called “Themenklau”, and historian of ecologism Anna Bramwell calls “clothes-snatching”.

What happens in this phenomenon, is that the mainstream neutralizes the subversivity of seeing green by co-opting some of its safer aspects [recycling, alternative energy, “soft” technology, “participatory” democracy], but remaining silent on its demand for a radically-changed Self, human/nature relationship, and society. On Sachs’s view (also noted in Ch 4: 6.2.5), for example, sustainable development has “emasculate[d]<sup>36</sup> the environmental challenge by absorbing it” into developmentalist assumptions (1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 433). Bramwell went so far as to contend in 1994, that the Green movement was in decline<sup>37</sup>, by which she meant, “... the end of the brief era of dedicated Green national politics...” (1994, p. 1).

This mainstream co-opting, de-radicalising tendency can be seen, I believe, in the next chapter on Environment and Development, Chapter Nine. This introduces the theoretical framework for the field of “environment and development”, which I assume to be the equivalent of Wissenburg’s “grue” [my grey-green] on the right hand side of his heuristic on the diminishing importance of green ideas (Chapter One: Figure 2).

---

<sup>36</sup> An unfortunate word choice which any ecofeminist would challenge; still, Sach’s meaning is clear!

<sup>37</sup> On a more positive note, she felt that such talk about the decline of the green movement “does not imply that environmentalism [Bramwell is using “environmentalism” here as shorthand for “radical environmentalism”, which is more or less, “ecologism” or “seeing green”] is finished...” (Bramwell, 1994, p. 1). The “impetus of radical ecologism still perturbs the fabric of our time, and will do so for many more years, as its creed leaks into the vulnerable texture of mass consciousness...” (pp. 5-6). The now-current attention to climate change by ordinary people, which is forcing both politicians and economists to act, is a good example

## CHAPTER NINE: ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>350</b>
1.1 The “diminishing importance of green ideas” viewpoint	350
<b>2. Historical and ethical context of environment &amp; development discourse</b>	<b>352</b>
2.1 The “progress”- development link	352
2.2 The UN Development decades (1960s – 1980s)	352
2.3 Tension between perspectives on development and environment	353
2.4 The 1987 WCED (Brundtland) report	354
2.5 The Earth Summit, 1992	354
2.6 The new ethic: “sustainability”	354
<b>3. Economic theory</b>	<b>355</b>
3.1 Mainstream economics	355
3.1.1 Rational self-interest, and its “further enlightenment”	356
3.1.2 Utility theory	357
3.1.3 Economic rationality	357
3.2 Early ecological economics: its radicalism	358
3.3 The emergence of environmental economics	359
3.4 Natural resource accounting (NRA)	360
3.4.1 “Sustainability”, and “environmental sustainability”	360
3.4.1.1 Kinds of environmental sustainability	361
3.4.1.2 “Absurdly strong sustainability”	361
3.4.1.3 “Strong sustainability”	362
3.4.1.4 “Sensible sustainability”	363
3.4.1.5 “Weak sustainability”	363
3.4.1.6 The difficulty of achieving even weak sustainability	364
3.4.1.6.1 Requisites for achieving at least weak sustainability	365
3.4.2 Gross Domestic Product [GDP] and its “greening”	365
3.4.3 Natural resources and the market	366
3.4.3.1 The relationship between market efficiency and ownership rights	366
3.4.3.2 The problem of ‘needs’ vis-a-vis ‘preferences’	367
3.4.3.2.1 “Comparative advantage”	368
3.4.3.3 The problem of ecological externalities	368
3.4.3.4 The ethical problem of future economic agents	369
3.4.3.5 Discounting: actual choices made on behalf of future generations	369
3.4.3.6 Cost-benefit analysis [CBA], and “willingness to pay”	370
3.4.4 How green is environmental economics?	371
<b>4. Development theory</b>	<b>372</b>
4.1 Early macroeconomic growth and development theories	373
4.2 Alternative Western models of development	373
4.2.1 The “Re-definition of development goals” school of thought	373



4.2.2 The “theories of civil society” approach	374
4.2.2.1 The idea of “community”	374
4.2.2.2 People-led development	374
4.2.3 The Gender, Environment and Development [the GAD or GED] approach	374
<b>4.3 Non-western conceptions of development</b>	<b>375</b>
<b>4.4 The inclusion of the natural environment in development thought</b>	<b>376</b>
<b>5. Ecology as science</b>	<b>377</b>
<b>5.1 The implicit values in the term “ecosystem”</b>	<b>377</b>
<b>5.2 Implicit values in differing understandings of ecosystem “health”</b>	<b>379</b>
<b>5.3 Understandings of “health”, and environmental policies</b>	<b>379</b>
5.3.1 The ‘conservationist’ version	379
5.3.2 The preservationist version	380
5.3.3 The “green” implications of differing environmental policies	381
<b>5.4 “Deconstructive” or “permissive” ecology</b>	<b>381</b>
<b>6. The contribution of environmental philosophy</b>	<b>383</b>
<b>6.1 Strong and weak anthropocentrism</b>	<b>384</b>
<b>6.2 Arguments for “weak” or “enlightened” anthropocentrism</b>	<b>385</b>
6.2.1 The constitutiveness theory	385
6.2.2 The motivation theory	386
6.2.3 The inevitability of anthropocentrism claim	386
6.2.4 The convergence claim	387
<b>6.3 Norton’s weak anthropocentric ethic</b>	<b>388</b>
6.3.1 The theory of value	388
6.3.2 The “ethic of resource allocation”	389
<b>6.4 Could weak anthropocentrism at all qualify as “seeing green”?</b>	<b>391</b>
<b>7. Sustainable development</b>	<b>392</b>
<b>7.1 Ecology-based, and free-market based development paradigms</b>	<b>393</b>
<b>7.2 “Stronger/radical” and “weaker/conservative” sustainable development models</b>	<b>394</b>
7.2.1 Jacob’s (1995) conservative to radical model	394
7.2.2 Goodland and Ledec’s (1998) five principles model	396
7.2.3 Barrett and Grizzle’s (1999) holistic model	397
<b>7.3 “...a new ethic of conservation and stewardship”</b>	<b>397</b>
7.3.1 Conservation	398
7.3.2 Stewardship	398
7.3.2.1 Western Christianity religious versions	399
7.3.2.2 Secular versions	400
7.3.2.3 Stewardship and anthropocentrism	400
7.3.3. How are we doing as environmental stewards?	401
<b>8. Summary</b>	<b>402</b>

# 1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is four-fold. First, in subsection 1.1, it is to re-justify the exclusion from the exposition of “seeing green” set out in Chapters Three to Eight, of the “diminishing importance of green ideas” perspective or worldview which Wissenburg (1993, p. 4) places at the right hand of his heuristic, and to specifically name that perspective, the “environment and development” perspective. The chapter’s second purpose is to provide a brief introduction to what I understand as the main theoretical constituents of the environment and development perspective [sections 2-7 of this chapter], and to place the concept of “sustainable development” within this perspective. Then, (3), to use that discussion to develop indicators which suggest the presence in any text of an environment and development perspective, and the diminishing importance it ascribes to green ideas. (4) Finally, as *Namibia Vision 2030* subscribes to the concept of sustainable development (Government of the Republic of Namibia, Office of the President, 2004a, p. 11), and employs an environmental economics approach to nature, this chapter also serves as theoretical context for Chapter Eleven, in which the greenness of *Vision 2030*s worldview is assessed.

## 1.1 The “diminishing importance of green ideas” viewpoint

In Chapter One: 3.1, Figure 2, I introduced Wissenburg’s (1993, p. 4) heuristic on varieties of green thought.




Figure 1.1 Varieties of green thought

Wissenburg’s heuristic suggests, in capital letters, that a key difference between the dark green/lighter green worldview of the more left-hand side of his heuristic, and the “grue” or more right-hand side, is its different valuing of nature. In his heuristic, biocentrism means that nature is seen not only as having instrumental value for human beings, but also value-for-itself. This viewpoint was confirmed throughout the green sample under names such as an ethic of “biological egalitarianism”,

“complementarity”, “partnership” and “care” for nature. By contrast, grue [what I call, grey-green] thought adopts an anthropocentric view of nature’s value: nature has value only in as far as it contributes to human well-being. This is [almost<sup>1</sup>] a stand-alone argument for excluding any anthropocentric viewpoint from the green sample.

A second justification for excluding any anthropocentric outlook from the seeing green sample, is that the changed ethic towards nature implied by a non-anthropocentric morality, necessarily implies radical re-structuring of society – a reform of our systems of production, consumption and disposal, of our population policies, of our patterns of increasing mobility of people and resources, of our use of animals, of our ideas of what sufficient protection for nature’s continued evolutionary processes comprises, for example. Yet, as pointed out in Wissenburg’s heuristic, and also confirmed in this study (Chapter Eight, 6.2.3), “seeing green” places no trust in “environmentalism” – an outlook in which “environmental problems are mainly management problems, soluble within the context of the dominant political and economic system, and without any rigorous change in our values and culture” (Achterberg, 1993, p. 84) – to solve the environmental crisis. In essence, reform environmentalism

<sup>1</sup> “almost”, because as explained in section 7.2 of this chapter, some versions of the concepts sustainability and sustainable development do include nature’s value-for-itself

fails to see that the root cause of the environmental crisis is just the anthropocentrism [or androcentrism from the ecofeminist viewpoint] derived from a [malestream] view of human beings apart from, and transcendent (Hayward, 1995, pp. 54-55) over nature, which seeing green critiques.

As a third means of justifying the exclusion of any anthropocentric viewpoint from the seeing green perspective, one need only, I suggest, link anthropocentrism as theory of value to the environment and development perspective, and “sustainable development” to the environment and development perspective. This I do specifically in sections 2.4 and 2.6 of this chapter.

However, this is not to say that there is *nothing* “green” about the concept sustainable development. As I also seek to show throughout this chapter, the concept does contain traces of green, depending on whether or not it adopts weaker or stronger versions of environmental sustainability (section 3.4.1). Sustainable development also comes in more radical, or more conservative versions (section 7), the more radical models tending to be the greener. However in the mainstream versions of sustainable development usually adopted by the United Nations [UN] system, national governments and political parties, the green ideas are no longer dark and radical, but rather grey-green, and safely domesticated. Anthropocentrism remains their understanding of the human-nature relationship.

Environment-development concerns are myriad. One need only, for example, visit the website of the International Institute for Sustainable Development ( <http://www.iisd.ca> ) which provides multimedia informational resources for environment and sustainable development policy makers on a daily basis, to see the range of environment-development issues. Some of these are sustainable development, human development, trade and investment, biodiversity and wildlife, chemicals management, climate and atmosphere, forests, deserts and land, water and wetlands. This chapter does not attempt to address all these issues; instead the focus is on the implicit/explicit ontological, epistemological and ethical assumptions of some key concepts in each of the fields which inform environment-development discourse.

In section 2 of this chapter, I briefly outline the history of the idea of sustainable development, primarily as background to the “weaker” and “stronger” versions encountered later in this chapter of the concepts “anthropocentrism”, “sustainability” and “sustainable development”. In sections 3 to 6, I introduce the primary fields<sup>2</sup> which inform “sustainable development” - mainstream economic theory, and environmental economics [section 3], development theory [section 4], ecology as science [section 5], and a *far* less influential input from the field of environmental philosophy [section 6]. This discussion provides a context in which to highlight and problematize the implicit assumptions of some of the key concepts commonly occurring in each contributing field. Section 7 suggests that, depending on whether or not intrinsic value is ascribed to nature, and which versions of anthropocentrism and environmental sustainability are espoused, the concept “sustainable development” comes in “stronger” and “weaker” versions.

---

<sup>2</sup> According to sustainable livelihoods practitioner Koos Neeffjes (2000, pp. 20-30), four disciplines concern themselves with human-environment relationships, each generating different theories on this relationship: (a) ecology, (b) political ecology, (c) environmental economics, and (d) what he calls the field of “gender, environment, and development” with theoretical roots in ecofeminism and political ecology. I believe I accommodate all these in my presentation here

## 2. Historical and ethical context of environment & development discourse

Section (2.1) highlights the continued “progress”- development link, (2.2) the failures of development in the United Nations 1960s – 1980s development decades, (2.3) the tensions between various environment and development perspectives, which (2.4) the 1987 Brundtland Report sought to reconcile, in (2.5) the new concept and ethic, of “sustainability”.

### 2.1 The “progress”- development link

The former Enlightenment-inspired ideal of “progress” (Attfield, 1983; Hayward, 1994) has in our times, re-invented itself first as economic development, and then as sustainable development (Naess, 1990, p. 87). Green concerns on the homocentric, and hierarchical-instrumental assumptions embedded in the concept “progress” have already been noted (Chapter Eight: 6.3.3.1). Implicit in the new term “sustainable development” however, the notion of human progress through exploitation [now “management” and “sustainable use”] of the natural environment still persists. Neefjes (2000, p. 44), writing from within development theory, confirms this link: the meaning of sustainable development, he notes, is problematic “and there are differing views in North and South on its practical translations into processes of *human progress*” (2000, p. 44, my italics). It is the homocentrism/anthropocentrism (section 6) of mainstream [United Nations] interpretations of development/sustainable development which sets them definitively apart from “seeing green”.

### 2.2 The UN Development decades (1960s – 1980s)

Development “is generally accepted to be a process that attempts to improve the living conditions of people”, or as a “process to improve human welfare”, such improvement relating to both physical and non-material wants (Bartelmus, 1986, p. 3, p. 7). In the First United Nations Development Decade (the 1960s), it was believed that the power behind development was economic growth (Elliott, 1994, p. 5), and that the development problems of the underdeveloped nations “would be solved quickly through the transfer of finance, technology and experience from the developed countries” (Elliott, 1994, p. 5). But the expected effects did not happen, and the price of economic growth’s industrialism and consumerism was high. To the objectives for its Second Development Decade (the 1970s), the UN added the objective of social justice, which aimed to improve the distribution of the results of economic growth, and eliminate dependency. Phrases such as “The pollution of poverty”, “Growth with equity” and “Redistribution with Growth” (Elliott, 1994, p. 6, p. 10), as well as the “basic needs<sup>3</sup>” approach to development date from this period (Bartelmus, 1986, pp. 11-12). Eight years later though, decolonized nations had still not established economic independence (Bartelmus, 1986, p. 12), nor was there evenly-spread material well-being (Elliott, 1994, p. 6). The UN’s Third Development Decade (the 1980s) therefore envisaged the implementation of the New International Economic Order<sup>4</sup>, but by 1986, no agreement could even be reached in initiating the global negotiations needed to achieve it (Bartelmus, 1986, p. x).

---

<sup>3</sup> The 1974 Cocoyoc seminar of experts was organized inter alia by the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP). Its Declaration [drafted by Barbara Ward] identified as basic needs, food, shelter, clothing, health, and education. The Cocoyoc Declaration’s guiding philosophy was the articulation of a kind of development “capable of meeting the ‘inner limits’ of basic human needs for all the world’s people and of doing so without violating the ‘outer limits’ of the planet’s resources and environment” (Clarke & Timberlake, 1982, p. 58). Martinussen (1997, p. 295) characterizes it as bringing together “two major strands of the alternative [development] movement: those who had argued that highest priority should be given to satisfying the basic needs for food, water and shelter, and those who were primarily concerned about the destruction of the environment and exhaustion of non-renewable natural resources”

<sup>4</sup> Already adopted in principle by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 (Bartelmus, 1986, p. 4)

By then, it was generally recognized that “development” was a problematic concept. The supra-national effects of acid rain, ozone depletion and global climate change which became noticeable in the late 1980s, in contrast to relatively local environmental problems such as pollution and resource depletion, elevated the environment to international problematic status as well. There was a growing realization of the interdependence of poverty, environmental degradation and development<sup>5</sup>, and of the interdependence of developed and developing nations in dealing with the twin problems (Clarke & Timberlake, 1982, pp. 57-64; Elliott, 1994, p. 11).

### 2.3 Tension between perspectives on development and environment

But tension between environmental protection and human development had been evident from the start. Prior to the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, industrialized nations expressed their concerns for more limited economic growth, and better environmental protection, while developing nations pushed for economic justice, and “catching up” with the western industrialized nations. Although development and environment were “sold” as two sides of the same coin, there was definite tension between the two concerns: would environmental concerns be allowed to hamper human progress [development]; would environmental issues be considered more important than human rights? (Clarke & Timberlake, 1982).

The 1972 Stockholm Declaration<sup>6</sup> took a stand on these concerns: “We hold that of all things in the world, people are the most precious...<sup>7</sup>”. On the one hand it noted that “Natural resources must be safeguarded” [Principle 2], but that “Environment policy must not hamper development” [Principle 11] (Clarke & Timberlake, 1982, p. 9). The tension continued in publications such as the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN, 1980), which sought to reconcile nature conservation with development. To this document, Bartelmus (1986, pp. 39-61) traces a new approach to development planning, embodied in the concept of “ecodevelopment”, based on a knowledge of ecosystem dynamics, and using “ecostrategies” and “ecotechniques”<sup>8</sup>. Other authors see in it, the beginnings of the new concept of “sustainable development” (Achterberg, 1993, p. 85; Engel & Engel, 1990, p. xiv; Neefjes, 2000, p. 27). Another less anthropocentric document was the *World Charter of Nature* (1982).

In 1991, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) published its *Caring for the Earth: A strategy for sustainable living* (Achterberg, 1996, p. 173). This latter report (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991) articulates a vision for sustainable living [rather than simply “development”] based on nine ethical principles, one of which is “respect and care for the community of life (an ethical principle that defines *a duty of care for other people and for all forms of life, now and in the future*)” (Hattingh, 2002, p. 10, my italics and bold emphasis). On Hattingh’s (2002, p. 12) view, the report proposes “a revolutionary paradigm shift in our ethical perspective... in which

---

<sup>5</sup> For example, some environmental effects of poverty include deforestation, destruction of vegetative cover, desertification, and settlement in ecologically marginal areas. In turn these contribute to loss of soil fertility, declining land productivity, fuelwood shortages, vulnerability to extreme climactic conditions. All of which set off another cycle of poverty-environmental degradation (Elliott, 1994, Figure 2.3 The poverty and environment connection, p. 19)

<sup>6</sup> The Stockholm Conference produced the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, comprising a Proclamation and List of (26) Principles, an Action Plan (109 recommendations), the establishment of the UN Environmental Programme [UNEP] (Clarke & Timberlake, 1982). It also produced the pre-work leading to the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild flora and fauna (CITES), which aims, inter alia, to monitor species loss on an international basis. Clarke and Timberlake (1982, pp. 13-14) note that the 1972 Stockholm Action Plan revolved around two major goals: increasing knowledge of the environment, and protecting and improving its quality. According to them, by 1982, the first had developed into the field of environmental assessment, and the second – “the concept of environmental management” had “broadened into the concept of sustainable development, which requires the inclusion of social, cultural and economic values... In other words, ... develop in a sustainable manner”

<sup>7</sup> “We hold that of all things in the world, people are the most precious.” – Tang Ke, leader of the Chinese delegation. There is a certain irony here, given ongoing international concern about China’s human rights record. Nevertheless, such anthropocentrism reflects the general tone of UN-led sustainable development

<sup>8</sup> Here Bartelmus (1986, p. 54 and Table 3.3 on p. 55) refers to the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980) advocacy of “appropriate spatial distribution of human activities to meet three basic objectives: (a) maintenance of essential ecological processes and life-support systems; (b) preservation of genetic diversity (c) sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems”

concerns about the well-being of humans are embedded within respect for the community of life, without negating the moral imperative of addressing the needs of the poor and the destitute.”

## 2.4 The 1987 WCED (Brundtland) report

In 1984, the UN established the World Commission on Environment and Development [WCED] to investigate the possibilities of harmonizing environmental and developmental issues, and to recommend management strategies (Neefjes, 2000, p. 14). By the end of the 1980s, “eco”-development had been overtaken by “sustainable development”.

Other than the oft-quoted definition of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 43, cited in Bramwell, 1994, pp. 141-142), the WCED report (1987, p. 9, p. 46, in Achterberg, 1993, p. 85, my italics) also defined sustainable development as “a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet *human needs and aspirations*”.

Representing a “strong anthropocentric position” (Hattingh, 2002, p. 11), the WCED report was adopted at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development [“UNCED” or “Earth Summit”], in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Namibia as newly independent nation was also present.

## 2.5 The Earth Summit, 1992

Two key documents to emerge from the Earth Summit were the Rio Declaration which contains 27 principles for sustainable development (Neefjes, 2000, p. 196), and Agenda 21, intended as a locally-conceived and managed programme “for promoting sustainable development from 1992 through the twenty-first century” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 14). The Commission on Sustainable Development [CSD] was specifically formed to ensure and monitor progress on Agenda 21<sup>9</sup> (Neefjes, 2000, p. 14). During the Earth Summit, governments also made a commitment to draw up and adopt a National Sustainable Development Strategy<sup>10</sup> [NSDS] (Dalal-Clayton & Bass, 2002, p. 13). A more recent UN-initiated sustainable development document is the *Millennium Declaration* and its Millennium Development Goals [MDG], to which Namibia has also committed itself. The Rio Declaration and the Millennium Declaration are discussed in more detail in Chapter Eleven, section 5.2.6, at □Biodiversity loss (pp. 164-165 of *Vision 2030*).

## 2.6 The new ethic: “sustainability”

At the time of its international launching at the end of the 1980s, “sustainable development” was put forward not only as a new environment-development strategy, but “sustainability<sup>11</sup>” was seen as a *new morality* (Engel, 1990, p. 1; my emphasis). In the words of its “mother”, Gro Harlem Brundtland, it

---

<sup>9</sup> According to Neefjes (2000, p. 15), at Earth Summit II (1997) it was agreed that “Agenda 21 had achieved only limited success”, and the CSD itself as “not regarded as very effective or influential...”. By 1998 Agenda 21 was perceived as not having “fully addressed the environmental problems of developing countries”. Nevertheless, Article 22 of the Millennium Development Goals declaration reaffirms commitment to both the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21: “We reaffirm our support for the principles of sustainable development, including those set out in Agenda 21 [footnote 7], agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.” (United Nations General Assembly, A/Res/55/2, 18 September 2000)

<sup>10</sup> Compiling a National Sustainable Development Strategy [NSSD] is also supported in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] /United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] Sustainable Development Strategies Resource Book (Dalal-Clayton & Bass, 2002).

<sup>11</sup> The first ‘official’ use of the term “sustainable” is usually traced to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature/United Nations Environment Programme/World Wildlife Fund [IUCN/UNEP/WWF] 1980 publication ‘World Conservation Strategy’ (Bramwell, 1994, p. 141; van Dieren, 1995, p. 88). It seems to have only achieved widespread use around 1989. Martinez-Alier’s (1987) otherwise excellent index does not contain the word, nor does Peter Bartelmus’s (1986) *Environment and Development*

was to be “a new holistic ethic in which economic growth and environmental protection go hand-in-hand around the world” (Engel, 1990, p. 1). It has been hailed as the “moral attitude to the future” (Barry, 1996, p. 118); no time should be lost, suggested another author, in “elevating sustainable development to a global ethic” (Swaminathan, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. xii) for dealing with the environmental crisis. The new morality appears in the Millennium Development Goals as “conservation and stewardship”, discussed in more detail in section 7.3.

The “sustainability ethic” of the WCED (Brundtland) Report, is however, no matter how holistically presented, an anthropocentric ethic (Achterberg, 1993, p. 86; Elliot<sup>12</sup>, 1994, Hattingh, 2002, p. 9), to the extent that it sees nature only as a resource for human well-being. As explained by Brundtland herself: “Our message is, above all, directed towards people, whose well-being is the ultimate goal of all environment and development policies” (WCED report, 1987, p. xiv, in Achterberg, 1993, p. 86). On Hattingh’s view (2002, pp. 10-12, his italics), “the Earth Summit of 1992 and its attendant documents (the *Rio Declaration* and *Agenda 21*) represent a step backwards to a strong anthropocentric interpretation of sustainable development” (Hattingh, 2002, p. 11). The clear anthropocentrism of UN-led sustainable development places it in my view, within the field of environment and development, rather than within “seeing green”. It provides the context for an environmental economics view of nature, and the human-nature relationship. I turn next to some key assumptions in the field of economic theory, of which environmental economics is a part.

### 3. Economic theory

Economic theory is a key constituent of environment and development thought, in that development economics, or development studies, emerged from the field of economics. Economic reasoning is often portrayed as neutral and rational. This section deals with some key concepts in mainstream economic theory which are value-laden, but rarely say so. Broadly, the section covers (3.1) a brief introduction to mainstream economic theories, (3.2) the early [nineteenth century] ecological economists’ radical critique of mainstream economics, and their proto-green egalitarian concerns, (3.3) the re-emergence of some of its elements in environmental economics, (3.4) several key economic concepts in the context of natural resource accounting, and (3.5) a brief critique of environmental economics’ androcentrism.

#### 3.1 Mainstream economics

Economics is concerned with the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods and services, and particularly with the most efficient possible human allocation of scarce resources, including both renewable and non-renewable natural resources, to different and often competing, human needs or ends. It involves both macroeconomics, which is more concerned with national patterns of income and expenditure, and micro-economics, more concerned with supply, demand, and pricing of goods and services in competitive markets (Martinez-Alier, 1987).

Until the emergence of the ecological economic critique in the nineteenth century, prominent schools of thought in economic theory<sup>13</sup> were those of Mercantilism and the Physiocrat School [16<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For example, in Elliott’s useful book on sustainable development in developing countries, references to morality are anthropocentric: “The call for sustainable development in the future stems from the fact that such inequalities [of access to the natural resource base] not only are morally wrong but also threaten the environmental basis for livelihoods and development aspirations across the globe” (Elliott, 1994, p. 19). Another example: [in the context that “...it is unrealistic to expect poor people to conserve resources for the future when they are struggling for survival” (p. 39)]

<sup>13</sup> Martinussen (1997, pp. 18-31) provides a brief overview of development theory’s economic theory heritage. The classical economic school is associated with the names of Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo, who put forward a labour theory of value: the amount of labour a worker used to produce an article, determined its price. Price was also explained on the assumption of scarcity – fears of limitation of supplies derived from the law of diminishing returns, and Malthusian fears of population exceeding available material resources. Smith, Malthus and Ricardo typify the laissez-faire economic approach, while John Stuart Mill [*Principles of political economy* (1848)] represents a bridge between laissez-faire and welfare economics. Marx was an articulate critic of capitalism’s exploitation of the worker, who had nothing but his labour to bring to the market

centuries], the classical economic school, and marginal utility theory. In this section, I introduce briefly (3.1.1) Adam Smith's concept of enlightened self-interest, (3.1.2) the individual preference satisfaction of utility theory, and (3.1.3) the concept of (instrumental) economic rationality, all three at odds with "seeing green".

### 3.1.1 Rational self-interest, and its "further enlightenment"

Adam Smith (1723-1790)'s classical economic theory assumes rationalism as epistemology, individualism as social ontology, and within the latter, a view of the human being as acquisitive, greedy, self-centred, and competitive<sup>14</sup> (van Dieren, 1995, p. 162). In his *Wealth of Nations*, published 1776, Smith applied the philosophy of rational self-interest – a combination of these ideas – to the economy. According to his *laissez faire* theory, government interference in business and commerce must be reduced to a minimum, and businessmen left to pursue their own best interests in a market of free competition, where supply and demand would ensure the efficient production of those goods society wanted most. The discipline of such open competition between self-interested businessmen would not only ensure maximum profit to the individual, but as if "led by an invisible hand"<sup>15</sup>, the self-interested businessman would be ensuring maximum profit for society too.

van Dieren (1995) argues that Smith's "invisible hand" metaphor was intended to signify that the free market, open to uncontrolled supply and demand forces, also obeyed a 'law of nature', just as science was discovering that nature did, and social philosopher August Comte thought he discerned in the development of society. This natural economic 'law' would regulate prices and wages (Velasquez, 1991, p. 514), and free trade would provide the answer to all society's scarcity<sup>16</sup> problems, provided that it was not interfered with. According to van Dieren, Smith intentionally used the 'invisible hand' metaphor to convey the sense of a continued metaphysical guidance of human economic destiny [i.e., unlimited growth]. He felt this to be necessary because Enlightenment thinking, which exalted "science, technology and mechanization" (van Dieren, 1995, p. 4), had replaced the former role of Divine Providence in guiding human affairs. The "invisible hand" of free market trade became the economy's guidance instead.

Finally, Smith's rational self-interest approach also accorded with the principle of *utility*, in which the good is held to be the greatest happiness [progress as individual pleasure, provided it did not directly harm another] for the greatest number of people (Velasquez, 1991, pp. 513-514). More recently, given

---

<sup>14</sup> Collins and Barkdull (1995) reject the view that Smith "was an ardent defender of a narrow conception of egoism" (p. 231), a common misrepresentation by those who criticize neoclassical economic theory. "Contrary to the view that he advocated unrestrained greed, Smith actually argued that the pursuit of self-interest in economic matters, appropriately conditioned by moral principles, would result in general welfare benefits, albeit unintentional" (p. 231). Wenz (1997, p. 215), writes that Smith had more balanced views than the "unrealistically egoist account" of Hobbes or Bentham, and that he was concerned that economic rationality should not be applied to all areas of life. Still, there seems to be consensus that greedy, competitive, possessive, and self-interested individualism is the view of the human being assumed in market societies (Davidson, 2000, p. 27, p. 28, p. 34)

<sup>15</sup> The well-known 'invisible hand' metaphor appears in a passage where Smith is arguing that the individual engaging in market place activity is more interested in domestic industry than foreign industry, and motivated by self-interest rather than by any public interest: "...By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it..." (Bullock, 1909, p. 379, cited in Velasquez, 1991, p. 514)

<sup>16</sup> According to Hans Achterhuis, Professor of Eco-philosophy, the discourse of scarcity, begun already in the 17<sup>th</sup> century writings of Hobbes and Locke, was more fully elaborated by Smith a century later. Smith believed that "scarcity" is the original condition of all humanity; human beings must wrestle with it first simply to survive and then later, to achieve comfort. It is nature's hostility which generates this scarcity, but if humanity could conquer nature through labour, then peace and abundance would be achieved (Achterhuis in van Dieren, 1995, p. 21). The suggestion of *limits* to the mastery of nature in order to deliver economic abundance via free trade in the marketplace, therefore encounters stiff resistance, as for example, the vociferous opposition to the "Limits to Growth" report presented to the Club of Rome in 1972 (van Dieren, 1995, p. 4). "Scarcity" and "limits" are thus critiqued in some ecological environmental literature as ideological elements in economic theory, for example, van Dieren (1995, pp. 21-28), and also in social ecology, for example, the "post-scarcity" society advocated by Murray Bookchin (Clark, 1993, p. 349)

the increasing ecological damage caused by industrialization, it has been argued by some (Hayward, 1995, p. 54ff), and rejected by others (Hayward, 1995, pp. 61-62), that a “further enlightenment” (p. 61) of rational self-interest which “entails recognizing how it is in the human interest to adopt principles of environmental concern” comprises an ethic for the environment sufficient to avert ecological disaster, without abandoning the enlightenment-humanist idea that the human being is *apart from*, not part of nature, and “the prime, and perhaps only, locus of intrinsic value in the world [anthropocentrism] (Hayward, 1995, p. 54, p. 62).

### 3.1.2 Utility theory

From the late 1870s, marginal utility theory emerged as an alternative explanation of price and of consumer behaviour. Marginal utility theory proposes that the value of a thing is its utility or subjective value, so its consequent subjective exchange value. On this view, the price of an article is not so much determined by the quantity of human labour it contains [the labour theory of value], but by how much the consumer would be *willing to pay* to obtain the utility or satisfaction contained in the last or “marginal unit” purchased, either for self, or for its consequent subjective exchange value in the market. Individual [psychological] consumer preference for one more unit of any given commodity rather than labour invested, sets the market price; market price is the decisive element in explaining how resources are eventually allocated (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 16, p. 6). The consumer is assumed to act *rationally*, i.e. to maximize their utility, their welfare, in spending their income (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 92; “Economics”, “Jevons”, and “William Stanley” in Microsoft Corporation Encarta; Sagoff, 1986, p. 131).

### 3.1.3 Economic rationality

The phrase “economic rationality” or “economically rational” appears frequently in texts on natural resources.

Rationality is a complex philosophical concept (Bartlett, 1986, p. 222, p.228). Not only are several forms of rationality<sup>17</sup> distinguished, but distinctions are drawn between procedural and substantive rationality as well (Bartlett, 1986, pp. 223-227). Substantive rationality refers to the choices (or decisions) and actions “ ‘...appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints’ ” (1986, p. 224<sup>18</sup>, p. 239), and is on Bartlett’s (1986, pp. 223-224) view, the predominant understanding of rationality in economics<sup>19</sup>(p. 223). *How* rational economic substantive rationality is, is dependent only on how successful the choices and actions are, in attaining the actor’s goals (p. 224, 226), usually understood as maximizing utility, or satisfying personal preferences. It is thus an instrumental rationality (p. 226), based on the criterion or standard of efficiency (p. 227) in means (p. 228).

Other than efficiency as value, another key value of economic rationality is maximization of behaviour (Bartlett, 1986, pp. 224-225, and footnote 11 on p. 225), for example, of self-interest. This is *Homo economicus*<sup>20</sup>. Maximizing<sup>21</sup> is not an ecological value: “organisms in nature tend to *satisfice* rather

<sup>17</sup> For example, besides economic rationality, Bartlett also identifies technical, legal, social, and political rationality (Bartlett, 1986, p. 229); Drysek (1987, in Ferris, 1993, p. 147) identifies ecological, legal, social, economic and political rationality

<sup>18</sup> Bartlett is here citing from Simon, 1964, p. 573

<sup>19</sup> “Classical economics has always been based on the assumptions of substantive rationality and an optimizing goal – a theory of best solutions” (Bartlett, 1986, p. 224)

<sup>20</sup> An abstract concept meaning a human being concerned with maximising utility, defined as want-satisfaction. Any normative evaluation of a person’s definition of “want” is usually avoided in mainstream economic theory. That is, personal preferences are normative, and want-satisfaction is judged in terms of the Pareto-efficiency criterion only: “... an action is considered economically efficient if no one is harmed while at least one person benefits. Whether an individual benefits is left to the sole judgment of that individual. The source of value is found in subjective individual wants, not in the needs of other human beings or other species” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 517). Nature is seen instrumentally only

<sup>21</sup> “Maximizing” is an economic value, which on ecological economist Daly’s view, contains “no notion of optimal scale” (Daly, 1985, in Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, p. 169). Evolutionary biology suggests that organisms tend to “satisfice” rather than “maximize”. They “tend to find

than *maximize...*”, notes Davidson (2000, p. 34, her italics), referring to Simon’s (1983, p. 85) understanding of satisficing behaviour as behaviour “which does not strive for ‘optimal’ solutions, but rather tolerable or ‘good enough’ solutions” (Davidson, 2000, p. 34, footnote 29). The normative implication of ecology here is preference for the relational and symbiotic, rather than the competitive behaviour which economic rationality assumes.

Economic rationality, which Bartlett (1986, pp. 236-237) describes as “anthropocentric, utilitarian, and materialistic”, has become “pre-eminent” in the modern world, to the point where it is practically equated with rationality (Bartlett, 1986, p. 236).

### 3.2 Early ecological economics: its radicalism

Recall Bramwell’s thesis (1989, p. xi) that seeing green was born inter alia, of a fusion between holistic biology [which later developed into ecology], and the nineteenth century ecological economic critique. Several authors on green thought (Bramwell, 1989; Hayward, 1995; Martinez-Alier, 1987) note the early ecological economists’ radical demand that economy be subsumed under ecology, and their contribution to green/ecological thought.

The early ecological economists were motivated not so much “by the emotional identification of nature and beauty found in the biologists discussed earlier, nor by the Romantic or sensuous response to landscape found in the United States and England” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 65). But what the early holistic biologists and early ecological economists did share in common, is acceptance of the concept of entropy<sup>22</sup> in the 2<sup>nd</sup> law of thermodynamics. Like the holistic biologists, some early ecological economists did not hesitate to draw metaphysical and normative conclusions from the principles of thermodynamics (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 119, p. 135, p. 149).

The early ecological economists had “a science-based fear for the future of human survival” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 65), fear of land shortage and consequent failure to produce enough food to feed everyone (p. 66), and “a sense of injustice over what they saw as inequitable distribution of energy resources” (p. 65). Many of their radical proto-green concerns (Martinez-Alier, 1987; Bramwell, 1989) have been taken up in the seeing green worldview. Some are:

- (1) agricultural energetics, which in the green perspective, is linked to such diverse themes as support for ruralism [“back to the land”], land reform, living in communes, self-sufficiency, moral criticisms of trade, support for anarchism and peasant ideology, and, instead of a labour or utility theory of economic value, an energy theory of value<sup>23</sup>. This latter aspect is beginning to appear in mainstream environment and development environmental reporting as carbon emission levels;

---

niches which protect them from competition, and ... many organisms establish symbiotic relationships to further their chances of survival” (Davidson, 2000, p. 34). Competition is avoided in favour of the relational community

<sup>22</sup> In science, heat is referred to by two functions: energy and entropy. Although the energy in the universe is a constant, there is a tendency towards the dissipation of energy, that is, there is a tendency for entropy to reach a maximum. Entropy refers to the quantity of energy which can no longer be transformed into other forms of energy (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 47). Practically speaking, “any use of heat to produce work is accompanied by an irrecoverable loss of energy, to be seen as an increase in entropy” (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 79). So, entropy is *irreversible* energy loss. Dissipated heat cannot do work again (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 79, p. 112). Though recycling can slow down the growth of entropy, it cannot reverse it (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 79)

<sup>23</sup> Energetics is the study of the flow of energy and the cycles of materials. Between 1880-1883, Podolinsky sought to reconcile his energy theory of value with the Marxist labour theory of value (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 5, p. 51) Although Podolinsky’s agricultural energetics [and Ostwald’s “energetische Imperativ”] provided an opportunity for Marx and Lenin to amend their labour theory of value, the opportunity was missed (Martinez-Alier, 1987), contributing to what was later to become a troublesome gap between Marxism and ecologism. There was tension for example, between left-Greens and ecological greens in the early Die Grünen; authors such as Lee (1980, pp. 3-16; 1982, pp. 339-343), Routley (1981, pp. 237-244), and Tolman (1981, pp. 63-74), published papers in *Environmental Ethics* in the 1980s, either portraying, or rejecting, Marx as an “environmental hero”. The Marxism-ecologism divide is not insignificant in Namibian context, given the ruling party SWAPO’s pre-Independence Marxist-Leninist socialist ideology

- (2) the concept “Raubwirtschaft<sup>24</sup>” which is evident in seeing green’s critique of the North-South divide, and its demand for ethical trade and aid;
- (3) population growth vis-a-vis the earth’s carrying capacity;
- (4) economic growth in relation to poverty;
- (5) the proper role of science, technology, and planning in society.

Other concerns, such as Otto Neurath’s “Naturalrechnung<sup>25</sup>”, which I understand as the genesis of green ecological economics’ emergence in the 1970s, appear in more domesticated form in environment-development discourse as natural resource economics. What primarily distinguishes early ecological economics from mainstream natural resource economics, I think, is its explicit normativity - its radical egalitarianism<sup>26</sup> and accompanying redistributionism, its ecologically-based critique of the rapidly industrializing European society of the time.

### 3.3 The emergence of environmental economics

Though ecological economics seemed to appear suddenly on the political scene in the 1970s (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. viii), with books such as Boulding’s (1970) *Beyond economics: essays on society, religion and ethics*, and the 1972 Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s report (Meadows et al.’s *The limits to Growth*<sup>27</sup>,) for the Club of Rome, its roots can be traced to the nineteenth century egalitarian ecological economics heritage (Martinez-Alier, 1987), and Martinez-Alier (1991) himself. Bramwell credits the 1970s emergence of ecological economics as a primary reason for the metamorphosis of discredited right-wing conservative environmentalism, which had partly emerged from nineteenth century holistic biology, into a broad-based, Left-inclined, radical ecologism<sup>28</sup> or green perspective (Bramwell, 1989, p. 4; 1994, p. 8, p. 15).

Today there are two broad streams of thought on accounting for the natural environment in economics – a more mainstream, reformist, environmental economics, represented best perhaps by Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier’s (1989) *Blueprint for a green economy* (Hayward, 1995, p. 104), and a more “ecological” school of thought, represented inter alia by Georgescu-Roegen’s (1971) *The entropy law and the economic process* (Hayward, 1995, “Ecology into economics won’t go”, pp. 104-113). There are differences of opinion between the two streams, some of which should become clearer in section 3.4 next, on natural resource accounting.

<sup>24</sup> A concept developed by geographer Jean Brunhes from an earlier idea by German geographer Ernst Friedrich (1867- ?), who observed that the grave devastation which accompanied civilization was not seen amongst “primitive folk” (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. xvii). Capitalism’s development was to be understood in terms of increased Raubwirtschaft “in order to support the living standards of the rich” (p. xix). Martinez-Alier (1987) makes the interesting allegation that in the 1980s, there was “a political attempt by the wealthy to move the ecological agenda away from the issue of Raubwirtschaft. Thus, in the wake of the Brundtland Report [1987], the study of poverty has become more fashionable (and richly funded) than the study of wealth as the main threat to the environment” (p. xi). He *almost* [but does not] suggest that the wealthy nations’ focus on poverty as the major threat to sustainability is deliberately designed to distract attention from wealth as a threat. The north, with its power and wealth, has, right from the United Nations conference on Environment and Development in Rio in 1992, set the world’s environmental agenda

<sup>25</sup> Martinez-Alier (1987) draws on Neurath for a critique of classical economy’s methodological individualism, a topic which links with themes such as discounting, the mechanism which informs inter-generational allocation of exhaustible resources, and externalities. All these issues are under discussion in modern natural resource accounting literature, and literature on integrated environmental and economic accounting in national accounting (van Dieren, 1995; United Nations, 2000). They are also discussed in this chapter

<sup>26</sup> Martinez-Alier (1987) calls the ideological version of egalitarian ecological economics “ecological neo-narodism... an ideology for the dispossessed of the earth” (1987, p. 234). Neo-narodism is “pro-peasant” and pro-“energy-efficient traditional models of [agricultural] production” (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 235, p. 236), and opposed to an economic growth which helps preserve inequality (p. 236). It could be combined “without excessive difficulty” with some varieties of anarchism and of Marxism (p. 247). Martinussen (1997) also mentions narodism in his discussion of development theory

<sup>27</sup> Martinez-Alier (1987) in his review of early ecological economics literature does not mention “Limits”. Nevertheless it caused a considerable stir, with its insistence that human beings were recklessly consuming non-renewable natural resources (van Dieren, 1995, pp. 1-5; Schumacher, 1973 [1986], pp. 99-101). Schumacher was critical though, of the report’s failure to concentrate attention “on the one material factor the availability of which is the precondition of all others and *which cannot be recycled* – energy” (1974, p. 101)

<sup>28</sup> “I argue that today’s Greens, in Britain, Europe and North America, have emerged from a ... shift from mechanistic to vitalistic thought in the late nineteenth century. It was the fusion of resource-scarcity economics with holistic biology that gave force and coherence to ecological ideas [that is, the ecological perspective]” (Bramwell, 1989, p. xi)

### 3.4 Natural resource accounting (NRA)

Sustainable development has been argued to represent a compromise in the early 1970s economic growth vs. the environment debate (Hayward, 1995, p. 96), to be achieved partly through the inclusion of natural resource accounting in the economy. The 1992 Earth Summit recommended that governments implement a System of integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting [SEEA<sup>29</sup>] to account for the stocks and flows of their environmental resources in “satellite accounts” parallel to their country’s System of National Accounting [SNA] (UN 2000, p. 4, par. 4, p. 162, par. 431). Briefly, environmental accounting seeks to factor the economic costs of natural asset depletion and degradation into a country’s economic policies (UN 2000, p. 149, par. 395). Its use indicates a country’s commitment to conserving the natural assets of its economy (UN 2000, p. 148, par. 393).

Integrated environmental and economic accounting adopts an anthropocentric utilitarian view of nature: “The environment is ... an important contributor to both production and human welfare, through three broad sets of environmental functions: (a) Resource functions: the provision of resources, including space for human activity; (b) Waste absorption functions: the neutralization, dispersion or recycling of wastes from human activity; (c) Environmental service functions: the maintenance of a habitable biosphere, including the stratospheric ozone layer, climate stability and genetic diversity; and the provision of services for human amenity, recreation and aesthetic appreciation.” (UN 2000, p. 5, par. 15).

In this section, the point is not to convey exactly how Natural Resource Accounting “works”, but to highlight the usually implicit assumptions and ethical implications of some of its key concepts: (3.4.1) “sustainability” and “environmental sustainability”, (3.4.2) Gross Domestic Product, (3.4.3) the valuing of natural resources in the marketplace. Section (3.4.4) presents a brief green critique of environmental economics.

#### 3.4.1 “Sustainability”, and “environmental sustainability”

In this section, I deal with environmental sustainability: its different versions (3.4.1.1 – 3.4.1.5), and the difficulty of attaining even weak sustainability (3.4.1.6).

“Perhaps” write Gowdy and Olsen (1994, p. 170, my italics) “the most important contribution of *ecological* economics is the notion of environmental sustainability as a binding criterion”. Sustainability is an economic term, meaning the maintenance of “capital”, in the sense that the Middle Ages merchant traders meant “capital”, that is, human-made capital (van Dieren, 1995, p. 100). But the concept “sustainability of capital” is now broadly applied. One finds references to social, economic, institutional/organisational, as well as environmental sustainability (Neefjes, 2000, p. 5), each of which requires something different to be sustained. So economists want utility to be sustained, social scientists “want institutions to be reproduced and sustained”, and social capital [i.e. general social cohesion, social networks, civic participation, networks of trust (Neefjes, 2000, p. 49)] improved; health professionals want human health improved, and “ecologists want species and ecosystems to be conserved” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 48).

My focus is on the notion of environmental sustainability. Its name was changed in the 1987 WCED (Brundtland) Report to “sustainable development” (Martinussen, 1995, p. 150). This is hardly an insignificant change. It focuses the attention away from the natural environment, and towards human

<sup>29</sup> In 1993, the UN Statistics Division set out an SEEA framework (Commission of the European Communities, IMF, OECD, UN, World Bank, 1993; United Nations, 1993). Thereafter, parts of the SEEA were tested in different countries (UN 2000, Preface, p. 1), and the results of the trials brought together in the interim UN (2000) “Integrated environmental and economic accounting. An operational manual”. (UN 2000 p. 4, par. 13). The Government of the Republic of Namibia Ministry of Environment and Tourism’s NRA programme uses the handbook as guideline. One of the persons contributing to the UN 2000 operational manual was Glen-Marie Lange (UN 2000 p. iv), who authored/co-authored a series of Namibian natural resource accounting papers published by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism

development. It is for me, yet another marker of the taming of “seeing green”’s wide, long-range ecological sustainability (Chapter 8: 5, and 5.5) to the “grey-green” of sustainable development.

van Dieren (1995, Figure 7.1, p. 101) provides a nutshell description of environmental sustainability [“ES” as opposed to “social sustainability” and “economic sustainability”] as

Although environmental sustainability is needed by humans and originated because of social concerns, ES itself seeks to improve human welfare by protecting the sources of raw materials used for human needs and ensuring that the sinks for human wastes are not exceeded, in order to prevent harm to humans. Humanity must learn to live within the limitations of the physical environment, both as provider of inputs (“sources”) and as a “sink” for wastes (Serageldin, 1993). This translates into holding waste emissions within the assimilative capacity of the environment without impairing it and by keeping harvest rates of renewables within regeneration rates. Quasi-ES can be approached for non-renewables by holding depletion rates equal to the rate at which renewable substitutes can be created (El Serafy, 1991).

With a more practised eye, one can recognize this as an anthropocentric, and “weaker” environmental sustainability approach. Various theories of environmental sustainability have been proposed, ranging from “stronger” to “weaker” versions. Some authors consider the debate between supporters of either end of the spectrum as similar to debates between the “stronger” and “weaker” forms of sustainable development (Attfield, 2003, p. 132), discussed in section 7 of this chapter.

#### **3.4.1.1 Kinds of environmental sustainability**

Various typologies of environmental sustainability have been constructed. Pearce et al. (1989, in Neefjes, 2000, p. 28) offer two kinds of environmental sustainability – “strong” and “weak”. Dobson (1998 in Neefjes, 2000, p. 49) discusses three types – “natural value”, “irreversible nature” and “critical natural capital”; and van Dieren (1995, pp. 103-104), four – “absurdly strong”, “strong”, “sensible”, and “weak”. Achterberg (1993, pp. 84-85) identifies sustainability as occupying a range from “ecologist”/ecocentric to “environmental”/anthropocentric.

The critical variables differentiating these differing versions are (a) *what* is to be sustained? Within this question, *to what extent* is the substitution of “natural capital” by human-made capital [such as technology, machines, infrastructure], and human-social capital [individual skills, capacities; social cohesion, institutional and support networks] considered acceptable? (b) *for whom* is the natural environment to be sustained?, and (c) on the question of inter-generational equity, *for how long*? I shall try to assimilate all these models to van Dieren’s integrated environmental and economic accounting approach, highlighting the position of each model on the critical questions of What? For whom?, and How long?

#### **3.4.1.2 “Absurdly strong sustainability”**

This type - seemingly condemned from the start by its name! - appears in both van Dieren’s and Dobson’s typology (as the ‘natural value’ type), and their descriptions of it are much the same. Its objective is the sustaining of natural value. Non-renewable resources can not be used up at all; and “for renewables, only net annual growth rates could be harvested....” (van Dieren, 1995, p. 104). No substitutability between human-made and natural capital is allowed in the “absurd” version, nor the compensation for the loss of some natural aspect by another (Neefjes, 2000, on Dobson, p. 49). Nature is preserved not only for human beings, but also, because of its intrinsic value, for its own sake. Many deep ecology supporters are found in this group (Neefjes, 2000, on Dobson, p. 49), indicating that it represents a “seeing green” position. van Dieren does not answer the “how long” question, nor, on Neefjes’ description (2000, p. 49) does Dobson.

### 3.4.1.3 “Strong sustainability”

Somewhere between “absurdly strong”, and the “strong” sustainability discussed here, is Dobson’s ‘irreversible nature’ type of environmental sustainability (Neefjes, 2000, p. 49), which does not appear in any other typology I have seen. “Degradation of some parts of nature cannot be reversed, and adherents of this type hold that those parts cannot be substituted, even though they may not necessarily be critical for human beings. Compensation for this irreversible loss is impossible, and protection is an important strategy”. Human welfare is central, but parts of nature have an “intrinsic value that goes beyond human utility” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 49, describing Dobson’s (1998) position. The *For how long?* question is not addressed in Neefjes (2000, p. 49) description of Dobson’s “irreversible nature” type of sustainability. Even so, I think it clear that this type of sustainability would also fit into a seeing green perspective.

Strong sustainability appears in both van Dieren and Pearce et al.’s typology. *What* is to be sustained? The van Dieren “strong” version requires maintaining the different kinds of capital [thus natural assets too] intact, and separately. *Within* each form of capital, substitution is permissible. Thus, for natural capital, “receipts from depleting oil should be invested in ensuring that energy will be available to future generations at least as plentifully as enjoyed by the beneficiaries of today’s oil consumption” (van Dieren, 1995, p. 104). Or, to give a “human capital” example, if there are investment reductions in one kind of education, these must be offset by investment in other kinds of education, *not* by improved infrastructure for example (van Dieren, 1995, p. 104).

Remaining with the *What?* question, Pearce et al.’s version requires that “the next generation [should] inherit... an equal or better stock of natural assets” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 28). But on my understanding of Neefjes (2000, pp. 29-30) description, even Pearce et al. (1989) followed a compromise position between strong and weak sustainability in sustainable development: they identify *some* environmental resources as “critical capital”, which must be conserved in order to provide “a flow of services to the economic system” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 29). And in this compromise approach, Neefjes notes (p. 30), “they promote substitutability even for exhaustible resources”, and reject an approach in which “environmental assets somehow lie outside the realm of money values” (Pearce et al., 1989, page not given in Neefjes but possibly near p.28, cited in Neefjes, 2000, p. 30).

*For whom?* van Dieren’s “strong” description gives no indication of whether natural capital is to be sustained for its intrinsic value, or for its usefulness to humans value. Pearce et al., on Neefjes description (2000, p. 28), subscribe to a “sustainable utility” approach, meaning that the “well-being of a defined population should be at least constant over time and preferably increasing” (Pearce et al., 1989, -p. 32). This would mean that whatever is being preserved, is being preserved for people.

*For how long?* van Dieren (1995) does not address this question. Pearce et al. [again, on Neefjes description of it, 2000, p. 28] talk of “the next generation”.

On Neefjes view, the “stronger” kinds of environmental sustainability are untenable. Leaving aside the unlikelihood that any government would for example forbid extractive mining in its economic policy, there is also the problem of poor people, who “have little capacity to forgo consumption... they cannot easily ... pass on similar natural wealth to the next generation and thus hand over an equal standard of consumption and survival potential” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 29). Strong sustainability is “impossible to achieve, locally or globally, without forgoing resource consumption by the better-off, i.e. the high-consumers...” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 56).

#### 3.4.1.4 “Sensible sustainability”

“Sensible” sustainability, which seems to be another case of persuasive naming, appears only in van Dieren’s (1995, p. 103) typology:

Sensible sustainability would require that, in addition to maintaining the total level of capital intact, some concern should be given to the composition of that capital between natural, human-made, human, and social. Thus, oil may be depleted as long as the receipts are invested in other capital (e.g. human capital development) elsewhere; but, in addition, efforts should be made to define critical levels of each type of capital, beyond which concerns about substitutability could arise and these should be monitored to ensure that patterns of development do not promote a total decimation of one kind of capital no matter what is being accumulated in the other forms of capital. This assumes that while human-made and natural capital are substitutable over a sometimes significant but limited margin, they are complementary beyond that limited margin. The full functioning of the system requires at least a mix of the different kinds of capital. Since we do not know exactly where the boundaries of these critical limits for each type of capital lie, it would behoove the sensible person to err on the side of caution in depleting resources (especially natural capital) at too fast a rate (van Dieren, 1995, p. 103).

What can we extract from this? *What* is to be maintained? - the total capital, with some regard for its distribution between natural and non-natural. Natural capital may also be substituted by non-natural capital. Neither the *For whom?* nor the *For how long?* questions are addressed by van Dieren. The key point in this approach is, I think, that “...efforts should be made to define critical levels of each type of capital, beyond which concerns about substitutability could arise and these should be monitored ...”.

#### 3.4.1.5 “Weak sustainability”

Weak sustainability is listed in both Pearce et al.’s and van Dieren’s typology, and seems partially equivalent to Dobson’s “critical natural capital”.

*What* is to be preserved? Pearce et al.’s version requires only that the next generation [the answer to the *For how long?* question] should inherit a total stock of wealth, whether in natural or human-made assets, that is equal to or better than the current one (Neeffjes, 2000, p. 28). This is much the same as what van Dieren says (1995, p. 103); there is no regard for the exact mix of capitals, because the one is considered substitutable for the other. Recall here some oppositional seeing green views: ecofeminist Plumwood’s view that such ideas of interchangeability and replaceability in nature are assumptions left over from the mechanistic worldview (Chapter Six: 5.1.1(c); and deep ecologist Naess’s critique of what he called the supermarket view of nature (Chapter Four: 4.1).

Dobson (on Neeffjes, 2000, p. 49 description) gives a more specific answer to the *What?* question. In his “critical natural capital” version, those natural resources are retained “that are ‘critical to the production and reproduction of human life’. Critical capital can either be renewable or non-renewable; if it is non-renewable, it can still be substituted, such as fossil fuels that can be substituted with energy sources from already existing technology. Critical capital can also be non-substitutable and non-renewable, in which case protection remains the only option for sustaining it.”.

The *For whom?* answer is for human beings. Neeffjes (2000, p. 49) specifically notes that Dobson’s “critical natural capital” description of environmental sustainability is “... entirely anthropocentric, that is, primarily concerned with human welfare and therefore fully consistent with most notions of sustainable development”. The *For how long?* question is addressed only in the Pearce et al. version, the answer being “the next generation”. (Neeffjes, 2000, p. 28).

Now, according to my reading of Achterberg’s discussion of sustainability (1993, pp. 84-86), this is the version of environmental sustainability which sustainable development espouses:

The guideline or criterion for sustainable development that the Commission [i.e. the World Commission on Environment and Development] applies is the next generation's prospect of disposing of a stock resource that is at least as large as the one inherited by the present generation. The capital to be left behind not only comprises goods and the like, produced by man, but also natural resources or the total of these: the 'natural capital' (WCED 1987: 52ff, 57ff; and Annexe 1 under 2). Apparently, the WCED regards capital produced by man and natural capital as interchangeable, and to be valued in the same terms – namely, in terms of their usefulness to the quality of human life. This is a disputable perspective, quite apart from the extremely anthropocentric attitude which is expressed by such a view. ...

To cast that assessment of the sustainable development position in the terms of this discussion: The answers to the questions *What is to be preserved*, *For whom?* and *For how long?* are much as suggested by other authors cited in this section – a weak environmental sustainability position.

Achterberg (1993, pp. 84-86) calls this kind of sustainability, the “environmental” kind as opposed to the “ecological” kind of sustainability, which recognizes nature's value-for-itself:

In the literature ... two visions of the nature and solution of environmental problems are traditionally distinguished. First, there is a 'superficial' or reformist vision ('environmentalism'). According to this vision, environmental problems are mainly management problems, soluble within the context of the dominant political and economic system, and without any rigorous change in our values and culture.

Second, there is a profounder vision, aiming at more structural change ('ecologism': for example, 'deep ecology') according to which a radical change in our attitude towards nature, and therefore also in our political and social system, is necessary. ...

The value perspective of environmentalism is anthropocentric, that of ecologism is fully ecocentric. Ecocentric in this sense does not mean subordination of human values to (those of) nature, but complete recognition of nature's intrinsic value. ...” (Achterberg, 1993, pp. 84 - 85).

On this view, then, one could then reasonably associate a weak environmental sustainability position with the right hand side of Wissenburg's heuristic which uses the same two descriptors – “ecologism” and “environmentalism” - to broadly distinguish green perspectives from “grue” [grey-green] perspectives respectively. As mainstream versions of sustainable development subscribe to weak environmental sustainability, this suggests clearly to me that sustainable development represents a grey-green, not green perspective, thus supporting its exclusion from the green sample. Weak environmental sustainability is also a far cry from seeing green's long-range, wide ecological sustainability (Chapter Eight: 5.5).

#### **3.4.1.6 The difficulty of achieving even weak sustainability**

Even though the weak environmental sustainability position allows substitution of natural capital by non-natural capital, Holland has “shown that the prospects of measuring natural capital are illusory” (Holland, 1999, pp. 46-68, cited in Attfield, 2003, p. 133). It would also be “... particularly important to discover what limits there may be to the substitution of technology for natural capital” (Attfield, 2003, p. 133). Neefjes (2000, p. 29) suggests that some kind of formal in-country accounting other than Gross Domestic Product [GDP] would surely be needed to keep track of any transformation of “natural” into “human” value. But such an exercise, he argues, would involve the “almost surreal endeavour” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 29) of seeking to quantify and compare in money terms, the value [price], for example, of a predatory animal species against the value of an animal husbandry industry, the value of a traditional self-sufficient local livelihood against the value of power for the national grid. Further complications would be, how to assess economically, any spiritual value inhering in nature? Or the market price of as yet unknown services which the natural environment might provide? (Neefjes, 2000, p. 29). On his view, it is an almost impossible task to ensure even weak sustainability.

#### 3.4.1.6.1 Requisites for achieving at least weak sustainability

Even Norton's *weak* anthropocentrism ethic, that is, the most enlightened of all forms of anthropocentrism [discussed in section 6.3 below] requires, to maintain the resource base across generations, that there should be (a) for renewable resources, models which indicate what the maximum sustainable yield of a resource is, so that present generations do not harvest beyond this limit, (b) for non-renewable resources, "depletion schedules" in place, and steps identified and taken to ensure in the process of depletion, the provision of suitable substitutes (Norton, 1986, p. 200, footnote 22). So achieving even weak inter-generational environmental sustainability seems dependent, from both an environmental ethical, and environmental economic point of view, on at least some form of integrated economic and environmental accounting by the government of the day.

#### 3.4.2 Gross Domestic Product [GDP] and its "greening"

A country's system of national accounts includes *stocks* of assets used in the production of goods and services, and *flows* of goods and services resulting from production (United Nations, 2000, p. 2, par. 3). The level of a country's Gross Domestic Product, its breakdown by economic sector, and its rate of growth "are still regarded as the most important indicators of national economic performance and structural change" (United Nations, 2000, p. 15, paragraph 47 of SEEA manual). GDP is often used to guide international development aid and investment opportunity decisions (United Nations, 2000 p. 148, par. 392).

While it is an indicator of production and consumption, GDP has several deficiencies<sup>30</sup>, one of which is its failure to measure "the standing or 'asset' value of natural resource or other economic 'stocks'" (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 556). Mineral resources, or forests, for example, only enter into GDP once they have been converted into "a measurable economic flow" (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 556). It also fails to measure such "flows" as natural resource depletion and degradation. Though it is usually argued that depreciation of produced assets "is of a limited ... magnitude" (United Nations, 2000, p. 15, par. 48), which does not affect meaningful in-country interpretation, or cross-country income comparison, "Environmental deterioration, which may be viewed as a charge against gross income, ... may vary considerably from country to country and from year to year and cannot be presumed to be of a standard size for either temporal or geographical comparisons" (p. 15, par. 48). A national accounting system that does not account "for the private and social costs of the use of natural resources and the degradation of the environment, ... may send wrong signals of progress to decision makers who may then set [their] society on a non-sustainable development path." (United Nations, 2000 p. 2, par. 2).

GDP cannot be an indicator of either environmental sustainability or human welfare/social progress until it shows the environmental impacts of economic activity (United Nations, 2000, p. 5, par. 14-15; p. 15, par 47, p. 159, note 1), and has been "pruned" to account for the costs of natural capital consumption (p. 15, par. 48), including depletion and degradation through pollution for example. Such a "pruned" GDP is called in the UN (2000) operational manual for integrated environmental and economic accounting "EDP" [environmentally adjusted net domestic product]. Producing such an EDP is dependent though, on the possibility of accounting for natural resources in the market, discussed next.

---

<sup>30</sup> As a complete measure of the wealth or welfare of a country, GNP [obtained from GDP by adding in net income from abroad (van Dieren, 1995, p. 67)] is "flawed" because "it does not measure income distribution, social wellbeing, or the value of nonutilized but available resources. The Gross National Product includes economic activity which is devoted to compensating for environmental damage, and it ignores natural resource depletion as well as production for subsistence, even though self-sufficient production may often be preferable to market-oriented production" (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 553). It makes no distinction between social or environmental goods and bads either: "If everyone who owns a car suddenly has an accident with it, GNP will go up; if everyone who owns a house installs a solar heater, GNP will ultimately go down!" (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 556)

### 3.4.3 Natural resources and the market

In free market environmentalism<sup>31</sup>, the key to effective natural resource management is to package as much of nature as possible as “goods” and “services”, over which there are property rights, so that these can be priced, and exchanged in the market (Anderson & Leal, 1998, pp. 537-538). The assumption is then that market processes will determine optimum amounts of resource use (section 3.4.3.1) in social welfare, understood as preference satisfaction, or utility maximisation. There are however problems in the concept “preferences” (section 3.4.3.2). Market discipline over natural resource use breaks down (Anderson & Leal, 1998, p. 538) when “externalities<sup>32</sup> allow costs to be imposed on others without their consent” (p. 538). Section 3.4.3.3 addresses the problem of ecological externalities.

There is also the problem of future economic agents – how should their preferences be taken into account in market processes (section 3.4.3.4)? The practice of discounting in estimating future costs and benefits, while appearing rational and neutral, actually favours present rather than future economic agents [“future generations”] (section 3.4.3.5).

Sometimes though, it is simply not possible to own every possible natural resource, and allow the market to set its price. Where such pricing is not possible, economists resort to “shadow” pricing in cost-benefit analyses (Sagoff, 1986, p. 130), obtained through methodologies such as “willingness to pay” (section 3.4.3.6).

#### 3.4.3.1 *The relationship between market efficiency and ownership rights*

“The key ... to effective markets in general and free market environmentalism in particular is the establishment of well-specified and transferable property rights” (Anderson & Leal, 1998, p. 537)

Economic efficiency in free market economy is usually<sup>33</sup> described in terms of “Pareto optimality<sup>33</sup>” (Goodland & Ledec<sup>34</sup>, 1998, p. 554; Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, pp. 164-165). Sagoff (1986, p. 131) refers to efficient markets as those “in which all transactions are voluntary and costs are not ‘externalized’ to third parties”. Elsewhere he describes an efficient market as “one in which all resources are fully owned and traded by informed individuals without transaction costs or bargaining problems”. It is assumed that an efficient market, thus defined, will allocate natural resources “in an optimal way” (Sagoff, 1986, p. 130; also Anderson & Leal, 1998, pp. 537-538). Market prices will force both producers and consumers to weigh up the costs and benefits of any economic transaction. Price will “discipline consumers to allocate their scarce budgets among competing demands, and ... discipline producers to conserve on scarcer, higher-priced resources by finding substitutes that are less scarce.” (Anderson & Leal, 1998, p. 538). And optimal or efficient allocation is assumed to be one which “maximizes the satisfaction of preferences over the long run. ... [This is assumed to be good because] the satisfaction of preferences ... increases ‘welfare’ or ‘utility’” (Sagoff, 1986, p. 131). Allocatory efficiency is further assumed to promote macro-economic prosperity, though Sagoff doubts this (Sagoff, 1986, p. 131).

---

<sup>31</sup> This section refers inter alia to the work of Sagoff (1986, 1998), and Anderson and Leal (1998), who disagree on whether or not free market environmentalism adequately protects natural resources

<sup>32</sup> Martinussen explains externalities as “costs (and benefits) not borne by agents engaged in economic activity” (Martinussen, 1997, p. 155)

<sup>33</sup> “Assume that two consumers are endowed with some initial amounts of goods X and Y. Given the neoclassical assumptions of perfect information, and no impediments to free exchange, it can be shown that these (utility maximizing) individuals will trade until they reach the point where no further trading can make one better off without making the other worse off. This situation is called Pareto optimality. When Pareto optimality is reached, the rates at which the consumers are willing to substitute one good for another are equal and no further trade will take place. Neoclassical policy analysis, for the most part, consists of searching for things that interfere with free exchange and the movement towards Pareto optimality. ... a Pareto optimal position ... [is] the most efficient allocation of goods (and inputs), given the initial conditions and the array of underlying assumptions” (Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, pp. 164-165)

<sup>34</sup> Goodland and Ledec describe the “Pareto optimum” as “a state of the economy in which all economic resources are allocated and used “efficiently”, such that it is impossible to make anyone economically better off without making someone else economically worse off” (1998, p. 554)

From an environmental economics point of view, the lack of property rights over many natural resources is an impediment to efficient resource allocation, because this prevents their pricing and exchange in the market (Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, p. 165; Sagoff, 1986, p. pp. 129-130); there is said to be “market failure” or “absence of markets”. The belief in market efficiency explains, I assume, the strong tendency in free market environmentalism to package as much of nature as possible as “goods” and “services” capable of being owned, and thus priced and exchanged in the market (Anderson & Leal, 1998, pp. 537-538). But even where the natural environment is owned and priced, the market tends not to take fully into account all the environmental costs - pollution, degradation, resource exhaustion, waste assimilation, for example - incurred in goods production, or service delivery (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 16, p. 6). Sagoff argues that radical environmentalists [who, roughly speaking, hold an ecologist or seeing green perspective] are more likely than reform environmentalists to reject resource economists’ belief in market allocative efficiency (1998, p. 543, p. 545), and cost-benefit analyses (p. 545) to protect natural resources. They “look to politics<sup>35</sup> to keep markets, however efficient, from replacing our natural birthright” (Sagoff, 1998, pp. 541-542) with consumerism and pollution (p. 547).

Anderson and Leal (1998, p. 539) though have no great faith in the political process [via sustainable development] to provide the necessary discipline in natural resource use. Sustainable development requires “political regulation to discipline consumers and producers and limit economic growth. In the absence of growth, those at the bottom of the economic ladder can only improve their lot by taking from those at the top, so population must be controlled, consumption must be curtailed, risks must be limited, new environmental ethics must be developed, and wealth must be redistributed”. The problem with this approach is that it, rather unrealistically, “depends on omniscient, benevolent experts<sup>36</sup>” (p. 539). Besides, government is just as likely to externalize costs as is the free market entrepreneur taking advantage of unowned natural resources (p. 538).

#### 3.4.3.2 *The problem of ‘needs’ vis-a-vis ‘preferences’*

The WCED (Brundtland) definition of sustainable development talks about meeting the *needs* of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.

In mainstream economy discourse, it is individual *preferences*, not basic needs, which influence market supply and demand. Early ecological economist Lancelot Hogben (1895-1975), professor of Biology and Society at the London School of Economics, had already suggested that classical economists’ idea of the primacy of “individual preferences”, as revealed by the transactions of economic agents in the market, was suspect, because capitalist propaganda had taught people to want the undesirable goods produced by capitalism, not the things they needed most. In his view, people’s needs were to be understood in terms of, but not reduced to, “the calorific requirements of nutrition”; not capitalist market goods. But such attempts to educate people to reject social status consumerism in social behaviour are condemned in classical economic theory as infringement of economic agents’ personal economic freedom (Martinez-Alier, 1987). The critique of consumerism and materialism, and support of production to meet needs, rather than wants and profit, are familiar “seeing green” themes (Chapter Eight: 6.3.3.2, and 6.5.6).

<sup>35</sup> But one must keep in mind that this political process is for Sagoff, “libertarian environmentalism” which upholds “the separateness and inviolability of the individual” (p. 552) and the protection of property rights (p. 552), and which rejects “collective ends as dubious as economic efficiency” (1998, p. 550) or social welfare defined in terms of utility maximization [individual preference maximization] (Sagoff, 1998, p. 543)

<sup>36</sup> To attain appropriate technology, correct population level, and a proper environmental ethic, political managers must “possess technical knowledge about quantities and qualities of resources, both human and physical, and they must have knowledge about what constitutes the material needs of both present and future generations. Furthermore, they must set aside any self-interest to manage for the benefit of present and future generations” (Anderson & Leal, 1998, p. 539)

In modern ecological economist Martinez-Alier's (1987) view, orthodox economic theory avoids the question of objective needs, preferring instead the subjectivism of "mysterious" (p. 157) and "inscrutable" (p. 158) individual preferences and valuations, without ever querying their moral origin or content. Armstrong-Buck (1986, pp. 252-253) notes as "difficulty ... utilitarianism's insistence on equality of consideration of all individuals...". This "means that we have no way to discriminate between preferences other than to count how many individuals prefer what. .... Is right action simply a matter of what most people prefer?" (Armstrong-Buck, 1986, pp. 252-253). Environmental ethicist Bryan Norton too, in his concept of "weak anthropocentrism" [section 6.3 below] also problematizes "felt preferences" of individuals as sole and suitable basis for an environmental ethic. Hayward (1995, p. 102) notes that *whose* preferences are to count, will remain those of the power-holders, until "all preferences have an equitable chance of being heard and being effective". And finally, because economic utilitarianism focuses attention on the preferences of individual *human* economic agents, "...objective interconnections in an ecosystem as well as nonsentient beings who feel no preferences at all are not directly considered ..." (Armstrong-Buck, 1986, pp. 252-253). Hayward (1995, p. 102) also poses the question of why only human interests should matter in economic decision-making.

#### 3.4.3.2.1 "Comparative advantage"

A pragmatic problem in the wants versus needs debate, is the concept of "comparative advantage". This concept, in ecological "division of labour" terms, has "historically ... encouraged many developing nations to depend on a small number of agricultural export commodities, while attending less to domestic food production" (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 558); there is a tendency for domestic per-capita food production to decline. There is thus "lively debate" (p. 558) on the proper balance for a developing country between export crops [overseas consumer preferences] and domestic food production [local basic needs].

Goodland and Ledec (1998, p. 558) add several environmental concerns:

Agricultural commodity projects are usually sited on prime agricultural land in order to maximize the yields needed to support the investment. This can impair indigenous food production, which is often pushed to more marginal land as a result. Indigenous food production on marginal land often threatens ... protective cover. Overgrazing is also more difficult to avoid on marginal land. Agricultural commodity projects need modern highways, with all their environmental impacts, including unplanned settlement and inappropriate land use in ecologically fragile areas. Many cash crops are often grown as large-scale monocultures, while food grown for local consumption by small farmers is more readily adapted to polyculture and agro-forestry systems. Monocultures are less desirable from an environmental standpoint because of their vulnerability to pests and diseases, their often-heavy reliance on biocides and chemical fertilizers, and their suitability for using heavy machinery which often compacts or otherwise damages the soil.

#### 3.4.3.3 *The problem of ecological externalities*

In classical and neo-classical economic theory, externalities are usually defined as "unintentional side effects of production and consumption that affect the levels of consumer utility and enterprise costs" (Bartelmus, 1986, p. 10). Botzler and Armstrong (1998, p. 517) call it the "... 'spillover effects of someone's production or consumption that affect the well-being of other producers and consumers'. These effects are not directly reflected in market transactions...". Externalities are sometimes referred to as the problem of "missing markets", or "market failure". Botzler and Armstrong note that the "free-market or neo-classical strategy for abating environmental problems ['externalities' such as pollution, soil erosion, losses or gains in wildlife habitat] is that of improving markets by figuring out ways to internalize externalities" (1998, p. 517). Ecological economist Martinez-Alier (1987, p. xxv) defines externalities more normatively as "... a word which describes the shifting of uncertain social costs, or possibly benefits, to other social groups, whether 'foreigners' or not, or to future generations".

Ecological economics critiques conventional economics' externality analysis, because it makes a series of debatable assumptions: (a) that it is possible to know the needs and preferences of future generations, as far as future natural resources are concerned, (b) that it is possible to know what technological advances there might be in the recovery of exhaustible resources, or what new resources might be discovered, (c) thus that it is possible through the practice of discounting, to assign future monetary values to present non-renewable resources. This last includes further assumptions about (i) the amount of reserves currently available, (ii) the possible demand of all future generations, (iii) what rate of discount, across what time-horizon [the how many generations? question already encountered] is appropriate, and (iv) the rationality of discounting at all (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 4).

Martinez-Alier argues that current mainstream economic analysis of ecological externalities is not rational (1987, p. xiii), or value-free, as often claimed. Actually, analysis of externalities cannot exist separately "from a society's moral evaluation of the rights of other social groups" (1987, p. xxv). Politics and ethics both play a role because human affairs cannot be decided by economic rationality alone (1987, p. xxv). He suggests that conventional resource economists are uncomfortable with ecological economics, because it threatens to swamp them "in a sea of externalities whose evaluation by conventional economic methods presents intractable problems" (p. xii).

#### **3.4.3.4 The ethical problem of future economic agents**

"Cost-benefit analyses often discount future costs and benefits by a fixed percentage each year, thereby assigning less present worth to future [human beings] than to present human beings...." (Wenz, 2002, p. 396).

Neo-classical economists claim that the economy, including the allocation of scarce resources, can be explained *rationally*, in terms of *individual* needs and preferences. So how do economists rationally apply the concept of individual preferences to future economic agents, who have the "ontological" difficulty [as Martinez-Alier, (1987, p. 17) dryly remarks], of not being able to make their preferences, valuations, and willingness-to-pay known in the present-day market, when it comes to the inter-generational allocation of scarce, non-renewable resources?

The bottom line is that the market for exhaustible resources "simply ... cannot operate unless agents have some estimates about present and future availability, and unless they attribute a certain present value to future demand" (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 44). So the market does give weight to future demands for exhaustible resources, for example, in the form of a present value. What is not made clear, is that the economic agents who do this in the present, are also people who hold particular views about the possibilities of scientific and technological progress, about the meaning of wealth and welfare, and who bring to the market place, their own individual preferences and values which are *subjective and psychological*, and not objective.

Here Martinez-Alier (1987, p. 156), argues that although "economic theory abhors moral principles", when it comes to making supposedly rational policy choices about the inter-generational distributive allocation of exhaustible resources, and wastes (p. x), resource economists *are* actually making moral choices, through the practice of 'discounting'.

#### **3.4.3.5 Discounting: actual choices made on behalf of future generations**

If sustainability is the new global ethic, then each present generation must find some political-moral-economic basis of sharing resources and wastes with future generations. Discounting - the practice of calculating the future costs and benefits of an asset into its current value - is assumed to provide this basis. The proper rate of discount is a favourite topic of disagreement between ecological and neoclassical environmental economists (Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, p. 166, and footnote 17).

The how-to of discounting assumes the appearance of a mathematical formula, but as the rate of discount within it represents moral/ethical assumptions; it is *not* ethically neutral. For example, if the discount rate is  $r$  percent per year then a payment of \$ $A$  after  $n$  years is worth  $A(1+r)^n$  in current dollars, after discounting (Grafton, Pendleton & Nelson, 2001)<sup>37</sup>. Grafton, Pendleton, and Nelson (2001, my italics) baldly note that a “discount rate”, is, in “consumption analysis, a factor by which future welfare or utility is multiplied to indicate that *future consumption is less valuable in the present than current consumption*. See time preference.” [my italics]. Turning to their definition of “time preference”, we learn that it is “1. *a preference for consumption in the present rather than in the future*. ....” . Bartlett (1986, p. 237, footnote 54) makes this even clearer: “The future in economic reasoning is discounted at rates based on investment rates of return, making the present value of costs and benefits occurring more than forty years in the future [approximately one generation that is] practically zero.”

Strict intergenerational equity in natural resource conservation would mean giving equal importance to future and present needs, that is, adopting a zero rate of discount (Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, p. 168; Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 163). But the economically rational thing to do, is to discount the future environmental benefits and costs [including irreversible loss] of a project to net present value. So one finds that the discount rates commonly used in an analysis of a project’s costs and benefits, are 10% and more, meaning, that the value of an environmental amenity “disappears after only a few years” (Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, p. 168), investments with long-term benefits are discouraged and those with long-term costs are promoted (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 559; Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, p. 167). On Gowdy and Olsen’s view (1994, p. 167) “The existence of a positive discount rate goes against the very notion of environmental sustainability.”

The rate of discount is then scarcely only an issue of rational economic efficiency:

“A given rate of discount of the future implies a given ethical attitude towards future generations” (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 158).

“The use of any particular discount rate  $r$ ... [in calculations of costs and benefits] operationalizes a subjective judgment of the relative importance of the present and the future. It is a normative proposition expressed in mathematical terms, rather than a neutral or objective quantitative assessment” (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 559).

#### 3.4.3.6 Cost-benefit analysis [CBA], and “willingness to pay”

“...mainstream resource economists define ‘social welfare’ in terms of ‘preference satisfaction’ and measure ‘preference’ in terms of willingness to pay” (Sagoff, 1998, p. 543)

Cost-benefit analysis<sup>38</sup> [CBA] and “willingness to pay” are two concepts often encountered in resource economic approaches to natural resource issues, but they are not uncontentious, as they contain several assumptions, not always made clear:

(1) Economics is about “allocating the resources available to society in a way that maximizes social well-being” (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 554). Mainstream resource economists define social welfare in terms of competing preference satisfaction, rather than need satisfaction (Sagoff, 1998, p. 543) [section 3.4.3.2 above]

(2) Often in specific projects, choices or trade offs between their various economic, social and environmental impacts [positive and negative] have to be made, and CBA is one way of making

<sup>37</sup> Gowdy and Olsen’s simpler! explanation is: “For example, one hundred tons of coal, at a discount rate of ten percent, may be worth \$1 000 if delivered today, \$900 if delivered a year from now, approximately \$800 in two years, and so on) (Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, p. 166)

<sup>38</sup> Which is suggested to be a “degraded” form of utilitarianism (Armstrong-Buck, 1986, p. 252).

such choices. Preferences are reduced to money terms, and an analysis of their costs and benefits is undertaken to identify the most efficient choice. In such CBA, tangible environmental goods and services<sup>39</sup> are often underestimated, or not taken into account [the ecological externalities problem in section 3.4.3.3 above], because they are public goods, and not priced in the marketplace. But intangible environmental goods and services may also possess spiritual, or represent ethical values which are beyond pricing (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 555).

(3) Where such market pricing is not possible, resource economists resort to “shadow” pricing (Sagoff, 1986, p. 130) to obtain a “market” value for these tangible and intangible environmental goods and services. This is usually done through contingent valuation methodologies, such as establishing a consumer’s “willingness to pay” (van Dieren, 1995, pp. 242-243; Sagoff, 1998, p. 543), including willingness to forgo consumption that negatively affects the environment (van Dieren, 1995, p. 243). The “willingness to pay” method is however critiqued on several grounds: it favours those with more money; it cannot account for the difference between what people say they are willing to pay and what they would actually pay; it doesn’t eliminate the “free rider” problem [if enough other people are willing to pay then I can ride free]; it assumes almost perfect knowledge<sup>40</sup> by the consumer of all the negative and positive impacts involved [importantly, this in turn assumes accountability and transparency in the agency conducting the willingness to pay research], including the costs of short and long-term, perhaps irreversible, impacts on the natural environment (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, pp. 557-558; Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, pp. 169-170; van Dieren, 1995, pp. 242-243).

(4) In CBA, the preferences of future economic agents are usually discounted in favour of present economic agents’ choices [3.4.3.4, 3.4.3.5 above]; and

(5) “preferences” of nonhuman living beings are ignored.

Shadow pricing methodologies are “incomplete” (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 555), and “In practice, physical estimation of the environmental effects of a proposed project usually amounts to little more than educated guesswork” (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 554). And perhaps even more significant, the observation in van Dieren (1995, p. 171, my bold emphasis) that “physical environmental accounting does **not** enable policy makers to make a tradeoff between economic and environmental gains and losses... The *U.N. Handbook on Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting* acknowledges this.”

### 3.4.4 How green is environmental economics?

It appears to me that environmental economics is nothing other than “economic anthropocentrism”, to use Wenz’s phrase (2002, pp. 395-396), quite obvious in descriptions of nature as “nonproduced natural assets” (van Dieren, 1995, p. 243). Hayward (1995, p. 90, p. 100, p. 102, p. 104, p. 107, p. 115) consistently describes environmental economics as a non-critical, reformist, anthropocentric enlightened self-interest position, i.e. it recognizes “no sources of value in nature other than those which assume the form of human preferences”, and it retains “an instrumental attitude towards natural resources” (p. 104). Barrett and Grizzle (1999, pp. 33-34) also link natural resource economics with a strong or heavy anthropocentric position (section 6.1).

---

<sup>39</sup> “Environmental services are beneficial functions performed by natural ecosystems, such as maintenance of water flow patterns, protection of soil, biodegradation of pollutants, recycling of wastes, support of fisheries and other economically important living resources, and regulation of climate...” (Goodland & Ledec, 1998, p. 555)

<sup>40</sup> Recall that perfect or near perfect information is one of the assumptions underlying the possibility of reaching economic efficiency, or the Pareto optimum (Gowdy & Olsen, 1994, p. 164, and pp. 169-170)

Ecofeminist Janis Birkeland suggests that the anthropocentrism of environmental economics is just another expression of androcentrism. She argues that despite its increased attention to the natural environment, environmental economics has failed to address its inherent gender, ethnic, and colour blindness. It continues to depend on the neoclassical economics assumption “that the economic agent is none other than our Western male archetype – a self-interested and autonomous individual who makes rational choices by weighing costs and benefits to himself ...” (Birkeland, 1996, p. 335). Environmental economic theories and methods “which flow from androcentric<sup>41</sup> origins must be suspect, because they tend to abstract and naturalise instrumental relationships”. Not only do they establish and maintain power in the social order, but they also “facilitate the exploitation of nature” (Birkeland, 1996, p. 334). In summary, natural resource economics conducted within a reformist, anthropocentric environmental economics perspective tends rather toward a grey-green than green perspective; inter alia, retaining a strong link between economic growth and development (Hayward, 1995, p. 104).

## 4. Development theory

Development economics, or development studies<sup>42</sup>, began to emerge from the general field of economics at the beginning of the 1950s, concurrently with the political decolonization of Asia, the middle East, and later, Africa (Martinussen, 1997, p. 19).

Development “is a value word; it embodies ideals and aspirations and concepts of what constitutes the good society.” (Hayward, 1995, p. 97). On Martinussen’s (1997) view, three broad streams of thought can be distinguished within the development field. The first two should be understood within mainstream Western philosophy, with its emphasis on the world as profane, on rationalism as epistemology, on human superiority, and on domination over nature via science and technology as the highway to “progress”. By contrast, many Third World philosophies contain fundamentally different conceptions of the human-nature relationship, and thus potentially differing understandings of development.

Under the combined influence of all these schools of thought, the notion of “development”, originally understood as increased production and consumption [economic growth] through economic transformation/modernisation to deliver increased incomes, has gradually expanded to include sensitivity to wider cultural, political, and societal issues, such as national economic [not only political] independence, the elimination of poverty, increased human welfare, increased human capacity at all levels of society, including that of the poor/marginalized/deprived, to partake in, make, and implement development decisions (Martinussen, 1997, pp. 18-30, pp. 34-43) which respect environmental sustainability in cultural context. Development theory has moved from an economic growth interpretation, to a rights-based interpretation of development<sup>43</sup> understood broadly as reduction of poverty and an enhanced quality of life (Attfield, 2003, p. 127), on a sustainable basis.

---

<sup>41</sup> Recall from Chapter Six: 5.1.1(a) ecofeminist Plumwood’s suggestion that psychological egoism is a “remarkably persistent, widespread, and socially fostered fallacy” (Plumwood, 1997, p. 335), underpinned by *malestream* [androcentric] ontological views of the human being, inter alia, as self divided from the other

<sup>42</sup> I make no claim to have undertaken any in-depth study of the field of development, of its ethic, or its theories and strategies; instead I have consulted what seem to me to be a few excellent books, such as Martinussen (1997), mostly, but not only, on some of the theories informing mainstream and alternative models of development, and on agriculture and natural resources in economic development; Neeffjes (2000), who elaborates on a household-based sustainable livelihoods understanding of environmental sustainability, which is used by some development agencies in Namibia; Martinez-Alier (1987) and van Dieren (1995), who articulate the ecological economics critique of mainstream economic accounting, and propose alternative strategies, mainly for the state and corporate economy sectors of society, and Coetzee, Graaff, Hendricks, and Wood (2001) who look at development theory, policy and practice in a southern African context

<sup>43</sup> The 1986 United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development defined it as “a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all its inhabitants on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom...” (Attfield, 2003, p. 127)

In this section, I sketch (4.1) early macroeconomic growth and development theories, (4.2) alternative streams of Western Enlightenment thought on development, (4.3) fundamentally different non-western conceptions of development, and (4.4) the late inclusion (1970s) of the natural environment in development theory.

## 4.1 Early macroeconomic growth and development theories

Mainstream economic development theory comprises two broad and divergent schools of thought (a) pro-capitalist/market theories which have their roots in classical political economy as it was articulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (section 3.1 above), and (b) theories with roots inter alia, in the sociological work of Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Karl Marx. Particularly the latter's critical work on the political economy of capitalism contributed to the capitalist-critical dependency, under-development, and socialist production theories of (Third World) development.

The earliest development theories tended towards macro-economic growth (Martinussen, 1997, p. 297), and paid little attention (i) to issues of social inequality such as economic poverty, with attendant problems of no education, poor housing, and undernourishment, (ii) to the linked *political* poverty, in the sense of being politically passive, poorly informed and poorly organized to take part in the political process (Martinussen, 1997, pp. 296-300), or (iii) to gender inequality (Martinussen, 1997, pp. 306-308). Alternative 1970s models which did centre on the “basic needs<sup>44</sup>” concept were pushed into the background during the 1980s Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] and World Bank focus on neo-classical economics and structural adjustment programmes (Martinussen, 1997, p. 301). However alternative approaches to development re-appeared, with focus on poverty reduction, social welfare, and ‘sustainable human development’. I discuss next these alternative models of development - not their content (see for example, Martinussen, 1997, pp. 303-306), but their overall aims, and their theoretical/ “ideas” heritage.

## 4.2 Alternative Western models of development

Martinussen (1997) identifies two schools of thought within this “alternative” stream, the “re-definition of development goals” school of thought, and the “theories of civil society” approach. The “gender, environment, and development” approach could be considered a third alternative western development model.

### 4.2.1 The “Re-definition of development goals” school of thought

This school of thought traces its theoretical roots to John Stuart Mill<sup>45</sup> (1806-1873), and to the social liberalism of the nineteenth century (Martinussen, 1997, p. 293). Whereas mainstream economic development theories emphasize economic growth and industrialization as development goals (Martinussen, 1997, p. 278), this school of thought tends to emphasize “welfare and human development with increased personal choices as the higher-order objectives” (Martinussen, 1997, p. 291). Amartya Sen's (1985) “capabilities” work would fit here too. Martinussen (1997, p. 294) quotes what for him is a key thought in the “re-definition of development goals” approach:

The questions to ask about a country's development are ... What has been happening to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three of these have become less severe, then beyond doubt there has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, and especially if all three have, it would be

---

<sup>44</sup> These include (1) individuals' and families' food, shelter, clothes, and other daily life necessities requirements (2) access to public services such as safe drinking water, sanitation, health, education (3) opportunity and ability to “participate in, and exert influence on, decision making both in the local community and in national politics” (Martinussen, 1997, pp. 298-299)

<sup>45</sup> Mill's defence of a stationary scenario for capitalist and population growth (Dobson, 2000, p. 77), and opposition to the mindless growth/progress of industrialism, is for example, approvingly cited by deep ecologist George Sessions (Sessions, 1995, p. 164)

strange to call the result ‘development’, even if per capita income had soared. (Seers<sup>46</sup>, 1972)

#### 4.2.2 The “theories of civil society” approach

This second alternative development model traces its theoretical roots variously to nineteenth century social liberalism, Gramsci’s conception of civil society (Martinussen, 1997p. 294), and to Romanticism and utopianism. It thus shares ideas-links with “seeing green”. I discuss two of what I see as its main ideas next, the idea of “community”, and people-led development.

##### 4.2.2.1 The idea of “community”

Martinussen notes that “conservative romanticism and utopian socialism, ... were both normative reactions against the emerging nineteenth century capitalist society and the accompanying centralisation and institutionalisation of state power. ... These two ideologies [i.e. conservative romanticism and utopian socialism] each in its particular way, promulgated ideas about a better society based on community in the sense referred to by the more precise German word *gemeinschaft*, not on society as *gesellschaft*. Conservative romanticism wanted to preserve what were seen as the more human-friendly local communities of the past. Utopian socialism wanted to introduce such communities to replace alienating capitalism. [new paragraph] This basic preoccupation with, and positive assessment of, small local communities – outside the reach of the state and the corporate, capitalist economy – can be identified in many of the contemporary alternative development conceptions and theories” (Martinussen, 1997, p. 294). This idea of genuine community, or living in solidarity [“conviviality” as it is sometimes called, for example, Illich (1973)], whether inside or outside “the system”, is a prominent part of “seeing green” (Chapter Eight: 6.2.2).

##### 4.2.2.2 People-led development

The “theories of civil society” approach focuses attention on both the *local community* and the *household* “as sufficient bases and frameworks for human welfare” (Martinussen, 1997, p. 291). The household is seen not just as a unit of consumption, but a unit of production too, such as household care activities, and informal economic activity outside the market economy (Martinussen, 1997, pp. 310-311). Within this more normative<sup>47</sup> stream of development thought (p. 289) for example, can be accommodated the ideas of civil society participation in environment-development discourse. These range from decentralized people-managed development (Martinussen, 1997, pp. 331-341), to less radical ideas such as the “public participation” advocated by *Namibia Vision 2030* in urban development for example (Vision 2030, p. 174), or the “public participation” process in environmental impact assessment, management and monitoring advocated by the Windhoek-based Southern Africa Institute for Environmental Assessment’s Calabash programme.

#### 4.2.3 The Gender, Environment and Development [the GAD or GED] approach

A third alternative area focuses on the role of women in development. Gender researchers can be divided into two main positions, the Women in Development [WID] approach, followed by many governments and international organizations including the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], and the Gender and Development [GAD] approach. Martinussen discusses each briefly (1997, pp. 307-308).

The WID approach appears to follow liberal feminism’s [Chapter Six, section 2.1.1] objective of demanding equal opportunities and rights for women, while the GAD approach [which Neefjes (2000, p. 26) refers to as the GED or Gender, Environment and Development approach] focuses on how

<sup>46</sup> No pages given in Martinussen’s (1997) bibliography, p. 369

<sup>47</sup> In the sense that it problematizes economic growth by asking if other understandings of development are more preferable (Martinussen, 1997, p. 289)

gender structures women-environment relationships in real-world practice<sup>48</sup>. While according to Martinussen (1997, p. 306), the GAD/GED approach has not yet had any discernible impact upon mainstream development research, it is according to Neefjes (2000), part of the political ecology-informed<sup>49</sup> sustainable livelihoods approach, broadly followed by some development agencies at community level in Namibia.

Martinussen surprisingly makes no reference to ecofeminism which I believe *has* attempted to theorize the relationships between gender discrimination, development, and the natural environment. Though ecofeminism specifically critiques Western mainstream development models as paternalistic, neo-colonial, dismissive of indigenous women's intimate yet scientific knowledge of their environment, and insensitive to their land-dependent roles as providers and carers [Chapter Six: 6.3, 6.4], it does not escape critique by writers within the GAD/GED field.

According to Neefjes (2000, p. 25<sup>50</sup>), Agarwal (1998<sup>51</sup>) from the GAD/GED school, critiques ecofeminism on the grounds that it (a) fails to recognize that concepts of nature, culture and gender vary across cultures, (b) fails to differentiate women by class, ethnicity, and caste (c) fails to address power<sup>52</sup> and economic differences as sources of dominance, concentrating instead on ideological arguments, and also fails to show how ideological differences are constructed (d) fails to really address “the actual material relationship that women may have with nature” (e) limits itself to rural people and environments only.

By contrast, feminist political ecology informed GAD/GED emphasizes “material relations” and “their structuring by gender relationships”, particularly as these are manifested in “gendered knowledges of environments, sciences, and technologies”. Simply, negative environmental change, whether insidious or catastrophic, and attempts to reduce or mitigate environmental stress, will have differing impacts on men and women, and social castes and classes. GED writers suggest that in sustainable development in practice, attention should be paid to “(a) the gendered division of labour and responsibility which influences women's particular relation to environmental change; (b) gendered property rights, as a mediator in gender-environment relationships; (c) gendered positioning in households, communities, and other institutions; (d) the influence on gender relationships and gender –environment relations of the wider political economy; and (e) ecological characteristics that determine the processes of gender and environmental change” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 26). This feminist political ecology approach seems to represent a female-oriented homocentric move away from the more eco-centric ethic of care embraced in eco-feminism [Chapter Six].

### 4.3 Non-western conceptions of development

Non-western worldviews provide “countervailing and very fundamental alternatives to ‘Western’ thinking<sup>53</sup>” (Martinussen, 1997, p. 290) and so differing views on development too. These alternatives are often based on non-secular, spiritual or metaphysical understandings of the human-nature relationship, for example, those found in Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, or Chinese yin/yang philosophy

---

<sup>48</sup> For example, “gender-determined division of labour, men's and women's knowledge of environmental resources, gendered control over technology, gendered property rights...” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 111)

<sup>49</sup> “Political ecology is an attempt to develop a theory of environmental change in its social, economic and political context. It has been developed from research and experience in diverse settings in the rural, developing world. It is rooted in social-political science and geography....” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 21). In this field, Blaikie and Brookfield's work (1987) is “important” (p. 21)

<sup>50</sup> Martinussen (1997, pp. 307-308) also comments on the content of the GAD critique

<sup>51</sup> Neefjes (2000, p. 248) does not give a page number

<sup>52</sup> Power issues are critical, Neefjes (2000, pp. 100-101) argues, because they sit at the heart of who participates in the process of social change. Power can be looked at as “power to” [individual empowerment: increased awareness, improved confidence, better negotiation skills, stronger social networks]; “power over”; and “decentered power” – this latter appearing similar to a poststructural understanding

<sup>53</sup> For this reason, they are discussed in some detail in environmental philosophical literature, for example, in Engel and Engel (1990), Tucker and Grim, (1994), or Botzler and Armstrong (1997). Neefjes (2000) also provides brief characterizations of these alternative spiritual/religious views of nature

(Martinussen, 1997, p. 290; Neefjes, 2000, pp. 11-12). Two non-western views on environment and development have been briefly discussed in this study: Dr Vandana Shiva's ecofeminist critique of western development in Chapter Six, and Ramachandra Guha's critique of the relevance of radical western environmental ideas [deep ecology] to development in non-western societies in Chapter Four.

#### 4.4 The inclusion of the natural environment in development thought

The specific inclusion of the natural environment as a factor in development theory is recent. Up until the 1970s (Martinussen, 1997, p. 149), mainstream development economic theories took for granted that “the depletion of natural resources, increasing pollution and other environmental problems are of a temporary and surmountable nature. The basic assumption was that human innovativeness and technological development would provide solutions in the long term” (Martinussen, 1997, p. 143).

The natural environment appears in development theory today as a “problem”. Martinussen (1997, pp. 154-161) identifies, without “delving” too deeply into them, two main perspectives in social science research on the environment as a theoretical development problem. One, which is “broadly in line with neo-classical economics, does not regard capitalist development as the problem. Rather, capitalism and production under market conditions are seen as part of the solution to many environmental problems. When the market economy advances, and when the previously free goods – water, land, forests, etc. are assigned economic values, unrestrained exploitation will be significantly limited. The reasoning behind this assertion is that environmental deterioration to a large extent is the consequence of pervasive externalities<sup>54</sup> in the extraction, processing, transport, consumption and disposal of goods and services. ... By ‘correcting’ the distortions in the price/market system arising from such externalities – that is by assigning costs to environmental damage and forcing these costs upon the relevant actors – governments can assist in improving resource management without hindering continued capitalist development” (Martinussen, 1997, pp. 155-156). This approach would accord more with a grey-green perspective; a development perspective critical of capitalism, such as that discussed next, would tend to represent a greener position.

The second position on the environment as a “development problem” is “... in line with classical dependency [economic] theories” and claims that “most global environmental problems are the outcome of the unrestrained development of capitalism. Environmental problems faced by Third World countries ... are further aggravated because of global processes of economic exploitation. Transnational corporations, particularly the large agro-business firms, are the major actors in these processes. ... many resource-depleting and polluting firms are attracted to the poor countries as a result of the more lenient policies and regulations pertaining to their activities in poor, peripheral as opposed to affluent, centre countries. ... most poor countries have not dared to introduce ... restrictive policies for fear of scaring away foreign investors<sup>55</sup>.” (Martinussen, 1997, p. 155). These differing approaches to the environment in development appear as different sustainable development models in the UN system (section 7.1).

---

<sup>54</sup> Martinussen explains externalities as “costs (and benefits) not borne by agents engaged in economic activity” (1997, p. 155)

<sup>55</sup> This does seem intuitively true of the “Ramatex” saga in Windhoek. Established without any publicly available environmental impact assessment, suspension of usual labour rights, and on astonishingly favourable economic conditions from the Windhoek Municipality, Ramatex is now in the process of withdrawing on the alleged grounds, *inter alia*, of hostility from local pro-environmental groups [though changes in international trade regulations seem the more likely ground]. It leaves behind it, possible significant environmental damage in the form of toxic waste (for example, *The Namibian*, Vol 21, No. 95, 26 May 2006, “Million-\$ toxic question hangs over Ramatex”). The entire saga is I think, a worthy topic of research on how easily ‘economic sustainability’ might take precedence over ‘environmental sustainability’. See also Shindondola and Jauch, (2003)

## 5. Ecology as science

In this section I introduce, within narrow confines, the idea that ecology as science<sup>56</sup> is not neutral. Drawing on environmental philosophical literature, I seek to show (5.1) that the term “ecosystem” is not value-free, but contains implicit ontological and epistemological assumptions, (5.2) the value assumptions present in differing conceptions of ecosystem “health”, and (5.3), that *anthropocentric* normative understandings of ecosystem health inform real-world environmental policy. In (5.4), I introduce the idea of “the ecology of chaos” [or instability, or disequilibrium], a notion found in scientific ecology, and followed also by some development theorists.

### 5.1 The implicit values in the term “ecosystem”

“Ecological science ... was strongly influenced by a philosophy of holism, from which it cannot be divided. ... Could Haeckel have given ecology its name without being familiar with his countryman Goethe’s holism?” (Wall, 1994, p. 3)

One of scientific ecology’s keywords, “ecosystem” was specifically promoted in order to rid the science of ecology of its holistic organicism - a seeing green idea (Chapter Eight: 4.1), and to re-establish a mechanistic view of nature.

The basic premise or assumption of organicism is that the relationship between the parts of a thing are not arbitrary and extrinsic, but are inherent – the relationship has not been imposed on the thing from outside; the relationships are a part of, not extra to, the thing itself. In the idea of organic unity is implied the concept of totality, wholeness, or “holism”. The two conditions of this organic unity are (1) the parts are in keeping with each other and the whole (2) alteration of a part unavoidably means, alteration of the whole (Orsini, 2003; Wallach, 2004). The whole is also understood to have “emergent” properties – it can neither be reduced to the sum of its parts, nor understood completely in terms of them.

The key implication of organicism, unsettling to some, is that there is purpose in evolution. The idea is present in both the social and natural sciences. Early nineteenth century holistic biology understood nature as seeking balance, equilibrium, harmony (Callicott, 1986, pp. 306-307, Neefjes, 2000, p. 53). In the early twentieth century [approximately 1900 to 1930], American biologist Frederick Clements spoke of biotic “communities” in nature. Plant communities could be understood in terms of dynamic succession, from immature to mature, from pioneer to climax species (Callicott, 1986, pp. 306-307, Neefjes, 2000, p. 53). Zoologist Charles Elton, whose ideas influenced social ecologist Bookchin (Chapter Five, section 2.1.4.2), was also suggesting in the 1920s, that we conceive of ecological relationships as uniting plants, animals, soil, air, water, into “biotic communities” (Callicott, 1990, p. 122). Forester and proto-green Aldo Leopold (Chapter Two: 2.5.2(d)) likewise based his view of nature on the organic idea<sup>57</sup> of the “community”, defined by him to include not just people, but also “soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively, the land” (Leopold [1949] 1966, p. 219), which he saw as an *ethical* community. French philosopher Henri Louis Bergson (1859-1941) contended that “biological evolution is not consistent with or even well served by a mechanistic philosophy...” (Audi, 1999); anthropologist Gregory Bateson (Chapter One: 2.1.3) proposed the concept of mind-in-nature as informing organic process, chemist James Lovelock in his 1979 Gaia theory hypothesized that life on Earth, its atmosphere, oceans, the biosphere, and its soils, are all part of a self-organizing organism (Neefjes, 2000, pp. 20-21; Steverson, 1994, p. 80; Weston, 1987, p. 217; Wissenburg, 1993, pp. 8-9). Modern biologists such as Maturana and Varela (Dell, 1985; Steverson, 1994, p. 87) speak of

<sup>56</sup> Scientific ecology, which apart from holistic biology, has roots in geography, soil science, hydrology and climate studies (Neefjes, 2000, p. 20), is variously defined, but essentially means the “Study of life and interactions between organisms, and between organisms and their biotic and abiotic environment” (Grafton, Pendleton & Nelson, 2001)

<sup>57</sup> But according to Callicott (1986, p. 308), Leopold also described nature in terms of [Tansley’s] “physics-born ecosystem model”

“autopoiesis”, a term which describes an organism’s characteristic qualities of self-organization, self-renewal, and self-interest in survival<sup>58</sup>.

The more mechanistic term “ecosystem” was deliberately coined in 1935 by British ecologist Arthur George Tansley to replace the concept “community” (Callicott, 1986, p. 307), “redolent of organicism” (Wallach, 2004). Tansley proposed instead a “quantitative, thermodynamic, biophysical model of nature” (Callicott, 1986, p. 308), based on physics, not holistic biology, as model, to transform ecology “into a value-free, exact quantitative science”, with no “mystic overtones<sup>59</sup>” (Callicott, 1986, p. 307).

Tansley’s “ecosystem” is a deliberate epistemological and ontological choice. Goldsmith (1995, p. 2, p. 18, p. 261) notes that on Tansley’s view, a mature science

must isolate the basic units of nature [and must] ‘split up the story’ into its individual parts. It must approach nature as a composite of strictly physical entities organized into a mechanical system. The scientist who knows all of the properties of the parts studied separately can accurately predict their combined results.

The concept “ecosystem” is also an anthropocentric choice, a value choice against the idea of purposive ecological succession to a climax, and its contribution to the idea of stability in nature as normative (Goldsmith, 1995, pp. 260-264). Clements considered that nature “did not move aimlessly but in a steady flow toward stability” (Goldsmith, 1995, p. 260). Tansley was keen to discredit this idea (Goldsmith, 1995, p. 261). He “insisted that man, with his great ingenuity, was capable of creating his own climax, an ‘anthropogenic climax’ as he called it, which he insisted could even be superior to the natural variety” (Goldsmith, 1995, p. 261).

Goldsmith (1995, p. 261) argues that rejecting the idea of ecological succession, paves the way for the acceptance of economic development’s destruction of nature. Bruner and Oelschlaeger (1994, pp. 389-390) argue similarly that Tansley set the stage for the “mainstreaming” of ecology [sometimes called the “New Ecology” to signify its adherence to Tansley’s quantifiable ecosystem model (Callicott, 1986, p. 302, footnote 2)], for its co-option by the industrial state:

... consider that Arthur Tansley’s subtle but overwhelming influence on mainstream ecology turned virtually on a single word: *ecosystem*. ... Tansley’s “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational concepts and Terms” systematically dismantled the idea of ‘the ecological *community* as a complex organism<sup>60</sup>’ ... By substituting the word *ecosystem* ..., Tansley divorced himself as a person from the natural community of life and attempted to confine nature study to ‘the purely material exchange of energy and of such chemical substances as water, phosphorus, nitrogen, and other nutrients....<sup>61</sup>’. In this way, mainstream ecology perpetuates the paradigm of classical physics, especially in its denial of any connection between knowing subjects and known objects (since to claim any connection, as does deep ecology, is mysticism) and in its emphasis on ‘scientific’ measurement of ecosystem energetics. The result ... is that ... the voice of ecology is functionally constrained to serve the ends of the industrial state.” (Bruner & Oelschlaeger 1994, pp. 389-390, their italics).

There are also traces of the non-anthropocentric normative organicism idea in the stability-diversity hypothesis of ecosystem health, and the environmental ethical implications of the ideas of preservation and conservation, to which I turn next.

---

<sup>58</sup> “A system is autopoietic, when despite the fact that it undergoes substantial change over time, certain continuity and order persists throughout that change. ... Radical and sudden changes or alterations in a system serve to disrupt this continuity and, consequently, destroy the identity of the system” (Steverson, 1994, p. 87). Bateson had already in 1979, identified autonomy as a capacity of a phenomenon possessing “mind”

<sup>59</sup> I take the “mystic overtones” to be a reference to the nineteenth century vitalist thought in organicism (Chapter Seven, section 4.1)

<sup>60</sup> Kingsolver and Paine, 1991, p. 310

<sup>61</sup> Worster (1985), pp. 301-302

## 5.2 Implicit values in differing understandings of ecosystem “health”

“Ecosystem health is a normative concept: a bottom line. It represents a desired endpoint of environmental management ...” (Costanza, in Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 35)

McShane (2004), with reference to philosophical, ecological, and medical literature, considers inter alia, whether or not ecosystems exist at all, and if so, whether or not they can be considered organisms at all (pp. 228-230). If they are not organisms, can one speak of them at all as “bearers of health”, in either a literal or metaphorical sense<sup>62</sup>? My interest is in the concept of a “healthy” ecosystem: “Talk of ecosystem health has experienced a dramatic rise in popularity over the last fifteen years or so to the point where the concept is now widely used in both popular and academic discussions of environmental problems ... [but] no consensus has developed about what the term ... is really supposed to mean....” (McShane, 2004, p. 227).

The point that McShane makes, on which I wish to build here, is that “health is an inherently normative concept, as it is by its very definition a good state. But what kind of goodness is it? That is to say, in what sense<sup>63</sup>, and *for whom*, does health have normative import?” (p. 233, my italics).

## 5.3 Understandings of “health”, and environmental policies

There seem to be broadly, within the “equilibrium ecology<sup>64</sup>” school of thought at least, two contrasting understandings of ecosystem “health”, which proto-Green Leopold characterized as the A-B cleavage within conservation (Leopold [1949] 1966, pp. 236-241). The different understandings of “health” generate differing environmental policies, which environmental ethicist Bryan Norton (1986), no doubt harking back to the Muir-Pinchot philosophical divide in the early North American Conservation movement [Chapter Two, section 2.2.1.2], couples with the ideas of ‘preservationism’ vis-a-vis ‘conservationism’.

### 5.3.1 The ‘conservationist’ version

In the “conservationist” version, Tansley’s “quantitative, thermodynamic, biophysical model of nature ... was immediately turned to economic advantage as a powerful new weapon in mankind’s age-old campaign to conquer nature. With the quantitative precision of which ... [his] energy circuit model was capable, ecosystems could be made more “productive” and “efficient” so as to “yield” a higher calorific “crop”” (Callicott, 1986, p. 308). ‘Conservationists’ tend to emphasize predictable “availability of resources for humans over time” (Norton, 1986, p. 214). Their objectives are “fairly straightforwardly, ... utilitarian [the greatest good for the greatest number... over the long run” (p. 216)] ... they emphasize a hedonistic, material sense of human good” (p. 210). ‘Conservationists’ obtain these objectives by careful human management of ecosystems to produce a steady flow of resources for human use (p. 215). Commercial criteria are applied to maximize resource outputs (p. 214). In such manipulated ecosystems, “the forces of ecological competition and evolutionary selection no longer operate” (Norton, 1986, p. 216), productivity for human ends is high, but diversity is low (de la Court, 1993, pp. 129-130, in Hayward, 1995, p. 109). But such a system is potentially unstable. Some manipulated ecosystems show stable resource production over a considerable period, but then break down, because the “reserves” of the biotic system have been simultaneously heavily taxed (Norton, 1986, p. 215). The breakdowns often occur “in conjunction with extreme climatic conditions, as in drought-related disasters occurring in sub-Saharan Africa, but their real cause is overexploitation,

<sup>62</sup> She concludes that although “what the world presents us with is a bunch of interacting stuff” (p. 242), the entities we call ecosystems are not “discovered” but are delineated by people with reference to their “research interests and theoretical predilections” (p. 236); whether or not they *are* organisms is a philosophical red herring, at least in relation to whether or not they can be considered healthy. It “makes just as much sense to call an ecosystem healthy as it does to call a person or plant healthy” (p. 228)

<sup>63</sup> She concludes that the kind of goodness implied in “health” is “the good for” kind, i.e. in the sense of health as part of something’s well-being, welfare, or interests (McShane, 2004, pp. 233-235)

<sup>64</sup> There is also a “disequilibrium” school of thought, discussed at 5.4 below

which has destroyed the reserves inherent in a system that has functioned through equally severe conditions over past centuries” (p. 215). So, on the ‘conservationist’ view, a managed ecosystem is “healthy”, if in its managed regimen, it shows *resource stability*, and *resilience*, that is, “the ability ... to return, quickly and reliably, to prior levels of functioning following a natural or induced disturbance” (Norton, 1986, p. 216) to deliver goods and services for people. Such ecosystems are often in the “pioneer” stage of ecological succession: “A pioneer ecosystem... is among other things highly productive, which of course endears it to our modern production-oriented society which can cream off the apparently surplus biomass” (Goldsmith, quoted in de la Court, 1993, p. 130, in Hayward, 1995, p. 108).

### 5.3.2 The preservationist version

The other, more holistic-organicist or “preservationist” version of ecosystem health is contained in the diversity-stability hypothesis<sup>65</sup>, that is, that intra- and inter-species interactions – co-operation (symbiosis), competition, altruism<sup>66</sup> - contribute to an ecosystem’s stability (Lemons, 1981, pp. 219-230). Biotic diversity has been noted to be higher in mature and undisturbed ecosystems (Sagoff, 1985, pp. 107-109); diversity is thus seen as contributing to stability. A stable system is one which has a higher resilience and greater recuperative capacity in the face of human perturbation, such as anthropogenic climate change, or natural perturbation, such as a tsunami or volcanic eruption. Stable systems are argued to be more predictable too (Lemons, 1981, pp. 219-230; Norton, 1986, p. 217; Neefjes, 2000, p. 53).

But, the “catch” in the stability-diversity thesis is that human beings do not yet understand enough, and perhaps never will, about the exact contribution of each of the intra- and interspecies relationships with their abiotic environment, to be able to predict confidently the consequences of any extensive human intervention (Lemons, 1981, p. 222). Lovelock also warned that “humanity needs to take great care, because of all the unknown factors that influence the Earth’s sub-systems: the systems are too complex for the full results of any action to be predicted...” (Neefjes, 2000, p. 20). There is among ‘preservationists’, “a lack of confidence in our scientific ability to manipulate ecosystems without undermining ... [their] diversity” (Norton, 1986, p. 214). Particularly violent or pervasive alterations might have unforeseen effects (p. 215). By contrast, non-interference, or mild and gradual alterations, tend not to overwhelm the long-term dynamic diversity-stability of the ecosystem, which means it remains healthy, and predictable (pp. 212-213). Thus ‘preservationists’ advocate that wild species should be preserved from extinction, and ecosystems from alteration, by setting aside areas which “...must be exempted from human management, manipulation, and exploitation” (Norton, 1986, p. 214). This is of course, an element in seeing green’s long-range, wide ecological understanding of sustainability (Chapter Eight: 6.4.6).

On Norton’s (1986) view then, a ‘preservationist’ would argue that “A particular ecosystem is stable and healthy if it is operating according to the life processes that created and sustained it. Its mechanisms of competition and natural selection are functioning, and it is changing, maturing, but according to a natural interplay of abiotic and biotic forces.” (Norton, 1986, p. 217). Such an ecosystem can also be thought of as approaching, or in, the climax stage of ecological succession, a stage which by comparison to the pioneer stage, “is very unproductive. ‘This must be so ... because the

---

<sup>65</sup> Norton traces this hypothesis to Leopold, whose argument he presents as: “Premise 1: diversity is created and sustained by the ecological and evolutionary struggle of species to exist. Premise 2: intense human use (exploitation) of ecosystems requires management according to an unnatural regimen (the functioning of the system and the mix of species is regulated by the intention to maximize resource outputs, not by the forces of competition and natural selection). Premise 3: over the long term, such manipulation is compatible with protecting biological diversity only if human manipulators act with complete knowledge of ecological relationships (dependencies among species). Premise 4: we lack such knowledge now, and for the foreseeable future. Therefore, Premise 5: human management, especially when it alters ecosystems abruptly through technological manipulation, causes loss of biological diversity and alteration of ecosystem functioning over time.” (Norton, 1986, pp. 212-213)

<sup>66</sup> Steverson (1994, p. 78) lists the three major types of interaction as predation, competition, and symbiosis

climax is the most stable state possible in the local biotic, abiotic and climactic circumstances' ...” (Goldsmith, quoted in de la Court, 1993, p. 130, in Hayward, 1995, p. 108). Interruption or disruption of an ecosystem’s progress towards the climax stage of ecological succession, such as that caused by industrial development, can be argued to be “an anti-evolutionary process” (Hayward, 1995, p. 109).

### 5.3.3 The “green” implications of differing environmental policies

But there is of course a fundamental opposition in the policies these differing understandings of ecosystem “health” generate: both cannot be applied to the same piece of land. “The progression of a pond into a marsh and eventually to a forest is a favourite example of [preservationist] dynamic stability. *Conservationists are unlikely to use this concept of stability [as “health”]* if, for example, they hope to sustain a fish population in the pond” (Norton, 1986, p. 217, my italics).

Can only ‘preservation’ environmental policies which are underpinned by non-anthropocentrism, be green? Ecocentrist Leopold seems to suggest so. On his view, those who hold a view of “land as a biota” rather than just land as soil for human commodities, “feel... the stirrings of an ecological conscience” ([1949] 1966, p. 237). “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold, [1949], 1966, p. 240; Lemons, 1981, pp. 219-230). From this much-interpreted statement, I understand Leopold to mean that a system is “healthy” if it is relatively undisturbed, or human disturbance of it has been slow, gentle, and local, rather than rapid, violent, and wide in scope (Leopold, [1949] 1966, pp. 232-233). Its biotic diversity is relatively high, and human beings guarantee continuance for members of the biotic community, whether or not they possess actual or potential economic value (Leopold, [1949] 1966, pp. 225-230).

But environmental ethicist Norton argues that weak anthropocentrists can just as well support ‘preservationist’ type environmental policies, *without* getting involved in ontologically questionable, ecocentric, intrinsic views on nature. Anthropocentrists could argue for ‘preservationist’ policies on grounds such as human interests narrowly conceived [basically, short to medium term; and/or short-term profit maximization], human interests widely conceived, such as preserving genetic diversity for the development of new products for human use, preserving ecosystem functioning for its goods and services, or untouched/nearly untouched nature for its aesthetic and transformative<sup>67</sup> values, and *possibly*, also on non-anthropocentric, intrinsic grounds. But the non-anthropocentric grounds are not *necessary* for ‘preservation’-type policies (Norton, 1986, pp. 212-213). Norton’s viewpoint is discussed in more detail in section 6.

## 5.4 “Deconstructive<sup>68</sup>” or “permissive<sup>69</sup>” ecology

Several writers note that earlier views of nature as purposefully tending towards an ecological climax stage of dynamic balance and stability are now “out of fashion”; or “under siege”:

Earlier views of holistic natural communities working in stable associations are being replaced by images of nature as fundamentally erratic, discontinuous, chaotic, and unpredictable. ... However, this perspective is being challenged by some environmental philosophers. (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998a, p. 11, drawing on Worster (1990) and Callicott’s (1996) work).

In the early twentieth century ... ecosystems [were interpreted] as teleological entities seeking ever higher stages of ecological succession, culminating in climax. Today this superorganismic view of ecosystems is out of fashion in academic ecology, which has become thoroughly reductionistic and stochastic. Whether

<sup>67</sup> See section 6.3.1 on the role of experience in nature in helping to clarify the value distinction between felt preferences and considered preferences. Norton (1986, p. 217) suggests here that preservationists suppose that “contact with nature builds character and tends to counteract the modern tendency toward materialism and greed”

<sup>68</sup> Callicott’s (1996) phrase

<sup>69</sup> Neeffjes’ term, 2000, p. 54

this epistemological commitment has more to do with academic ecology's desire for permission to worship in the temple of science than with the intrinsic superiority of the reductionist view remains an open question" (Dryzek, 1990, p. 206).

There is within ecology as science, a school of thought, according to environmental philosopher Callicott (1996), busy deconstructing in post-structural fashion, some of the former "master narratives" of ecology. The concepts "biotic community", and "ecosystem" are "under siege"<sup>70</sup>; the "hallowed 'law' of ecology" that ecosystems tend towards mature, equilibrium states, and that such stability depends on biological diversity, "has been all but repealed" (Callicott, 1996, p. 354, 355). As environmental ethicists – at least those who base their ethics on the insights of scientific ecology<sup>71</sup> – have, or ought to "acquire at least a rudimentary ecological literacy" (Callicott, 1996, p. 368), several authors<sup>72</sup> in *Environmental Ethics* address the basic contentions, environmental ethical, and environmental policy implications of the "equilibrium" vis-a-vis the "disequilibrium" models in scientific ecological thought. In the next paragraph I briefly sketch the fundamentals of the "ecology of instability", or "ecology of chaos" view.

On the "instability" or "chaos" view of nature, the concept of ecosystem [understood as stable biotic community] has become suspect. Biotic communities do not persist as integrated units of interdependent species which come and go as one, populations do not oscillate predictably but fluctuate irregularly, the high correlation between species diversity and stability is questioned [some stable ecosystems are not diverse, and in some cases, disturbance increases diversity]; disturbance, disequilibrium, and flux is nature's normal state; individualism rather than holism is emphasized (Callicott, 1996, pp. 354-355, and 360-361; Hettinger & Throop, 1999, pp. 7-10).

The disequilibrium school of thought is seen as either definitive (Callicott, 1996, p. 361 and footnote 36) or "far from achieving the status of a dominant paradigm" (Hettinger & Throop, 1999, p. 10), depending it seems, on the writer's commitment to the concept diversity-stability, and / or sociological factors (Hettinger & Throop, 1999, p. 10 and footnote 28) – the latter one way perhaps of morally justifying increasing human intervention in nature as population, industrialisation and technology pressures increase?

What implications might "deconstructive" ecology have for "seeing green"? First, the scientific credibility of concepts such as biotic community, integrity, equilibrium, balance, stability, and diversity<sup>73</sup>, is crucially important for those philosophers basing their environmental ethic on scientific ecology, and for those seeking to derive environmental policies from them. Ecocentric environmental

---

<sup>70</sup> An image Callicott takes from Soulé (1995)

<sup>71</sup> Even so, there are widely differing opinions on whether or how scientific ecology can inform such environmental ethics. As examples: J. Baird Callicott has been steadily developing since the early 1980s, a holistic, ecocentric environmental ethic based on Leopold's "land ethic" (Warren & Cheney, 1993, pp. 90-116), and the organic interpretation which he sees can be given to the New Physics and the New Ecology (Callicott, 1986, pp. 301-316). Golley, (1987, pp. 45-55), ecologist, finds that the twin key intuitions of ecocentric deep ecology [Self-realization, and ecological egalitarianism] "coincide with [scientific] ecological understanding" (p. 52). By contrast, environmental philosopher Steverson (1994, pp. 71-88), argues that ecology as science provides only a weak foundation for ecocentrism. Warren and Cheney (1993) refute Callicott's (1986) understanding of ecology, and conclude that the "state of the art" model of ecology, that is, the "hierarchy theory" model is the appropriate one on which to base an environmental ethic. Zabinski (in Warren, 1997, pp. 314-324) refutes their understanding. McShane (2004) comes to the conclusion that while it makes sense to care for ecosystems, that "isn't the same as showing that we all *should* care for them, since on ... my ... analysis, all making sense comes to is not being mistaken. But, of course, not being mistaken in doing certain things isn't the same as being obliged to do them. So more work would have to be done to get the conclusions drawn here to yield anything approaching the kind of moral obligations towards ecosystems that some environmental ethicists would like to see" (McShane, 2004, p. 245)

<sup>72</sup> I found three papers useful to obtain an overview of the conflicting arguments: Steverson (1994), Callicott (1996), and Hettinger and Throop (1999)

<sup>73</sup> Hettinger and Throop (1999, pp. 5-7) provide useful "definitions" of some of these concepts

ethicists such as J. Baird Callicott<sup>74</sup>, have for example, felt compelled to review, but not abandon, their ethic in the light of disequilibrium ecology (Mizzoni, 2004, pp. 48-52).

Second, the disequilibrium ecological model problematizes, even rejects, the seeing green normativity of ecology. If disharmony, disturbance and disruption are nature's normal state, then "anything goes". Ecologists Pickett and Ostfeld (cited in Callicott, 1996, p. 371-372), although subscribers in part at least to the new understanding (Callicott, 1996, p. 355, footnote 12; Hettinger & Throop, 1999, p. 8, footnote 16), note that "...the flux of nature is a dangerous metaphor. The metaphor and the underlying ecological paradigm may suggest to the thoughtless and greedy that since flux is a fundamental part of the natural world, any human-caused flux is justifiable..."

This is certainly suggested in Koos Neefjes Oxfam handbook (2000) on sustainable livelihoods, in which he notes that scientific ecology now increasingly describes local and global ecosystems in terms of dynamism, disequilibria, uncertainty, even chaos (Neefjes, 2000, p. 20). In this "permissive ecology" (Neefjes' term, 2000, p. 54, my italics), "...ecologists do not just accept that ecosystems are affected by human use, but assume that shaping them by *human interference is a right*, if not a need ....". He concludes from this that "... *nature no longer sets the standard for what is good*" Neefjes' interpretation does seem to accord with the suggestion that some subscribe to the "deconstructive ecology" view on anthropocentric grounds.

## 6. The contribution of environmental philosophy

Environmental philosophical/ethical theory represents a *far* less influential input into the environment-development field. Environmental philosophy/ethics began as a new field in philosophy in the 1970s (Chapter Two: 2.5), by which time, economic development/development theory was well-established (Chapter Nine: 4). Environmental ethicist Bryan Norton (1986) notes that "the burgeoning literature of environmental ethics is read mainly by other philosophers, and occasionally by environmental policy analysts, but seldom by environmental activists and managers" (1986, p. 202). This situation was still evident in 2004<sup>75</sup> (From the Editor, *Environmental Ethics*, Spring 2004, Vol 26, Nr 1, p. 4). It is fairly unlikely then, that formal environmental ethical theory forms part of either Namibian bureaucratic or party-political policy-making<sup>76</sup>. But sustainable development discourse does contain implicit value assumptions about the natural environment, which have ethical implications.

In Chapter Two: section 2.5.3, I briefly introduced biocentrism and ecocentrism as theories of value in environmental philosophy. Both recognize nature's value-for-itself as well as its instrumental value for humans. The overall purpose of this section is to equip the reader with an understanding of their theoretical "opposite", anthropocentrism, represented on the right hand of Wissenburg's heuristic, and to recognize its "strong", and "weak" or "moderate", versions when implicitly present in a text. Section

<sup>74</sup> Callicott went so far as to amend Leopold's dictum "A thing is right... etc" to "A thing is right when it tends to disturb the biotic community only at normal spatial and temporal scales. It is wrong when it tends otherwise" (Callicott, 1996, p. 372)

<sup>75</sup> Commenting on the early years of the journal, and the situation in 2004, the Editor wrote: "People in philosophy who were not sympathetic to the field often claimed that the papers were too applied to be considered philosophy ... People in environmental affairs who were unsympathetic argued, to the contrary, that the papers were so theoretical that they had no practical application at all. This controversy, of course, continues even today... Unfortunately, people in philosophy and environmental affairs still have not developed a relationship comparable to that between philosophers and the medical community..." (From the Editor, *Environmental Ethics*, Spring 2004, Vol 26, Nr 1, p. 4).

<sup>76</sup> "From the viewpoint of policy making, there are two obvious reasons why environmental ethics has not penetrated environmental policy formation. The first is that scientific, economic, and legal (and not ethical) discourses are the exclusive languages spoken in the temples of environmental policy making. Each of these technical languages rests on a set of unexamined norms that pretend to be ethically neutral but hide numerous controversial ethical issues ... Ethics simply never comes up in day-to-day environmental decision making. The only priests allowed into the temple of environmental decision making are scientists, engineers, economists, and lawyers... the second reason ... is that most environmental ethics literature is either much too abstract to engage real environmental decisions or completely irrelevant to the kinds of ethical issues that usually come up in environmental controversies ...." (Brown, D.A., 2004, p. 111)

(6.1) introduces varieties of anthropocentrism, before focusing on “strong” and “weak” anthropocentrism, (6.2) presents the main arguments for “weak” anthropocentrism, and (6.3) presents my understanding of environmental ethicist Bryan Norton’s version of “weak” anthropocentrism. Section (6.4) considers whether his version of weak anthropocentrism could qualify as “seeing green” rather than merely grey-green.

## 6.1 Strong and weak anthropocentrism

In the synthesis of seeing green in Chapter Eight: 2.1.1, two formal definitions of anthropocentrism were presented, to which I now add a third, which makes the connection between environmental philosophy, and its real world implications explicit:

- (1) “A stance that limits moral standing to human beings, confines the scope of morality and moral concern to human interests, and regards nothing but human well-being as valuable intrinsically” (Attfield, 2003, p. 188).
- (2) “... the philosophical perspective asserting that ethical principles apply to humans only, and that human needs and interests are of highest, and even exclusive, value and importance. Thus, concern for nonhuman entities is limited to those entities having value to humans.” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998b, p. 309).
- (3) “By *anthropocentrism* ... [is meant] both the idea that human interests, human goods, and/or human values are the focal point of any *moral evaluation* of environmental *policy*, and the idea that these human interests, goods, and values are the basis of any *justification* of an environmental *ethic*” (Katz, 1999, pp. 377-378, his italics).

Several varieties of anthropocentrism appear in the literature. Wenz (2002) writes of “generic”, “egocentric”, “racist”, “nationalist”, “economic”, “ethnocentric”, and “multicultural” anthropocentrism. I limit this discussion to other authors’ differentiations of anthropocentrism into “strong” and “weak” versions, and present two understandings of these: first, Barrett and Grizzle’s version (1999, pp. 33-34), and then Botzler and Armstrong’s (1998) explanation of Bryan Norton’s version (1982, 1984, and 1986).

Barrett and Grizzle’s version (1999, pp. 33-34) reads:

‘Strong’ (or ‘heavy’) anthropocentrists emphasize human dominion over nature and treat the nonhuman environment primarily as a bundle of natural resources to be managed and exploited for maximal human gain. This is the view that is captured in much of natural resource economics. In the strong anthropocentric tradition, the moral value of things is reducible without remainder to the value it creates for human beings, whether through the generation of monetary income through resource exploitation, or of pleasure through amenities use or simply knowledge of the existence of ecosystems in their natural state. In this view, environmental protection is purely a means to the ends of human utility maximization, and thus is not always worth pursuing. The ecosystem has only instrumental value, not intrinsic worth..... (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34)

‘Weak’ (or ‘broad’ or ‘long-sighted’) anthropocentrism, by contrast, focuses not on immediate human gratification so much as on the satisfaction of basic needs for the whole human community, present and future, and maintenance of the ecosystem of which we are a part. ... As in the ‘basic human needs’ literature in international development, the emphasis falls on ensuring all humans enjoy adequate standards of nutrition, health, shelter, water and sanitation, and education. Somewhat more generally, Sen<sup>77</sup>’s capabilities and freedoms approach captures the essence of this concern to try to provide all persons, across space and time, with the capabilities to choose to (not) satisfy basic human needs. ... Given uncertainty about dynamics and interactions, the weak anthropocentric approach often favours caution with respect to resource exploitation ... sometimes best expressed in the emerging field of ecological economics. Moreover, like ecocentrists and biocentrists, weak anthropocentrists often ascribe intrinsic value to nature. But, where

---

<sup>77</sup> Sen, 1985

nonhuman species threaten the satisfaction of basic human needs (e.g. elephants that trample crops, malarial mosquitoes), weak anthropocentrists may oppose environmental protection...” (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34)

“The weak anthropocentrist world view is distinct from the strong version in that social activists assert the moral imperative of care for marginalized communities – which might include unrepresented future generations. It also generally rejects the cost-benefit analysis – especially the sort that discounts future costs and benefits – that guides strong anthropocentrist decision-making, and they acknowledge nature’s intrinsic value...” (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34).

Botzler and Armstrong (1998, pp. 309 - 310) describe Norton’s explanation of strong and weak anthropocentrism as:

Bryan G. Norton, ... argues that two types of anthropocentrism are prevalent in Western society. The first, strong anthropocentrism, is characterized by the notion that nonhuman species and natural objects have value only to the extent that they satisfy a “felt preference”. A “felt preference” is any fulfillable human desire – whether or not it is based on thought and reflection. ...

... The second type, weak anthropocentrism, is distinguished by the affirmation that nonhumans and natural objects can satisfy “considered preferences” as well as “felt preferences”. A “considered preference” is a human desire or need that is based on careful deliberation, and is compatible with a rationally adopted world view, incorporating sound metaphysics, scientific theories, aesthetic values, and moral ideals. Thus, weak anthropocentrists value nonhuman entities for more than their use in meeting unreflective human needs: They value them for enriching the human experience.

According to Botzler and Armstrong (1998, p. 310) strong and weak anthropocentrism are not always sharply distinguished; there is a range of positions between the two. As “strong” anthropocentrism is clearly not-green, I focus attention next on “weak” anthropocentrism which can be understood as a grey-green position, some might think, possibly even “pale green”.

## 6.2 Arguments for “weak” or “enlightened” anthropocentrism

“Sophisticated”, or “environmentally enlightened anthropocentrism” (Attfield, 2003, p. 43, p. 72) has “several vigorous champions” (Attfield, 2003, p. 42), who argue for it variously on the grounds<sup>78</sup> of (1) the constitutiveness theory or (2), the “motivation” theory, or (3) the “inevitability of anthropocentrism” claim, or (4) the “convergence claim”.

### 6.2.1 The constitutiveness theory

“The flourishing of many other living things ought to be promoted because they are constitutive of our own [human] flourishing” (John O’Neill’s view, 1993, p. 24, in Attfield, 2003, p. 42).

This is an Aristotelian account of human flourishing (Attfield, 2003, p. 67; Davidson, 2000, pp. 32-35). It entails a much broader of view of human well-being than simply satisfying individual preferences. It also includes concern for the development of human capacities, the belief that the individual should be actively involved in collective or community life, and “... promoting the flourishing of other ‘individual living things and biological collectives as an end in itself, simply because the flourishing of nonhuman nature is constitutive of human flourishing’ ...” (Davidson, 2000, pp. 33-34, citing O’Neill, 1993, p. 24).

Janna Thompson (1990)<sup>79</sup> also argues that natural things and natural processes enhance our lives, in part at least, through the possibilities they provide for our own human spiritual enrichment (Attfield, 2003, p. 66). In David Cooper’s view (1995, p. 146, in Attfield, 2003) of normative anthropocentrism,

<sup>78</sup> I take these grounds from Attfield (2003). He does not however list Grey’s “inevitability” argument, which I include as background to its rejection by ecofeminist Plumwood (1997, in Warren, 1997, 327-355)

<sup>79</sup> Ecofeminist Val Plumwood (1991a) provides a critique of Thompson’s viewpoint

nature's "otherness" provides the backdrop against which human beings can evolve differing cultures, and also the greater perspective that nature's processes "unfold heedless of our often petty concerns". It thus provides a sense of proportion and an antidote to human arrogance (Attfield, 2003, p. 67). This is not unlike Goodin's (1992) green theory of value, briefly introduced in Chapter Seven: 5.2.2. There is no need therefore to locate intrinsic value in nature's entities and processes (Attfield, 2003, p. 66; Thompson, 1990, p. 160); our obligations to other living things derive from our own living a flourishing life (Attfield, 2003, p. 68). Ecofeminist Plumwood (1991a, p. 148) calls this kind of approach, "broadened instrumentalism".

### 6.2.2 The motivation theory

The motivation theory is underpinned by the constitutiveness theory. It holds that "we should care for and promote natural goods simply because such care is constitutive of a flourishing human life (Attfield, 2003, pp. 197-198). It is suggested that together these anthropocentric theories provide a definition of what constitutes the good human life which is appealing, and also a theory of human motivation sufficient to stir people to environmental action (Attfield, 2003, pp. 65-68). Human flourishing is the only thing that can, and does, underlie human motivation (Attfield, 2003, p. 74).

### 6.2.3 The inevitability of anthropocentrism claim

Anthropocentrist Grey<sup>80</sup> (1993) critiques non-anthropocentric attempts to ground an environmental ethic in what he calls (1993, p. 463 and p. 464 as examples) "the grand evolutionary biology perspective of our environmental predicament" argument<sup>81</sup>. He suggests that this perspective - that millions of years of our Earth's evolutionary history have gone, and millions more are probably still to come - "provides a *reductio ad absurdum* of the cluster of non-anthropocentric ethics which can be found under the label 'deep ecology'" (p. 463), and other viewpoints. While it may be enriching for us to step out of our time and place-bound human skins and view our environmental dilemma from such a long-term perspective<sup>82</sup>, "it is neither relevant nor helpful for human action" (p. 464).

What is wrong with "billion year timeframe[s]", and "galactic spatial perspectives" is that they are "the wrong scale for judgments about importance"<sup>83</sup>; and one of the things wrong with them is that they are not recognizably human" (p. 467). And once the scale *is* recognizably human, the ascription or recognition of value to guide human conduct cannot be other than anthropocentric (p. 468). Nor is there any need to apologize for this: "Within the moral world we do occupy a privileged position" (p. 464).

To summarize some of Grey's (1993) arguments: He suggests that calls for a non-anthropocentric ethic are (1) doomed to failure because anthropocentrism is "natural and inevitable" (2) all proposed alternatives to an anthropocentric ethic contain covert anthropocentrism anyway, and (3) unnecessary, because anthropocentrism "turns out to be perfectly benign" (p. 469), provided it is "suitably enriched and enlightened" (p. 466), by which he means, that traditional anthropocentrism's "characteristically short-term, sectional, and self-regarding elements" should be rejected (p. 466). We can only meet non-anthropocentric concerns for the earth's living systems "if we assume a set of values (that is, preference rankings), based on human preferences" (Grey, 1993, p. 473), (4) incongenial. Once we "eschew all human values, interests and preferences" suggests Grey (1993, p. 473), we are confronted with too many alternative ethical possibilities, "not all of which are congenial to us. And that matters."

<sup>80</sup> I present this argument in more detail, because of its critique by ecofeminist Val Plumwood (1997, in Warren et al., 327-355)

<sup>81</sup> Plumwood (1997, in Warren et al., pp. 329-332) calls this the "cosmic" argument

<sup>82</sup> Deep ecologists do call for a long-range time perspective. They are concerned about "the fate of the planet" (Grey, 1993 p. 468) if we don't change our interfering ways. But as yet, I have not encountered a deep ecology demand for the kind of "expansive perspective of evolutionary biology" which Grey calls on to show that deep ecologists' and others' search for a non-anthropocentric ethic is "a hopeless quest" (p. 473)

<sup>83</sup> Grey however (1993, p. 467 and footnote 6) does not support Passmore's (1974) view that our concern for and obligations to the future need stretch no further than our immediate descendants, because "concern can be extended only to what we can recognize and love", a view which he later qualified according to Grey

(p. 473). Human flourishing is just as legitimate a part of rich, diverse, and vibrant biospherical flourishing as nonhuman flourishing (p. 473); (5) implausible. For example, recognizing autonomy, internal self-direction, self-organization, *telos* and the like, as properties in nature conferring intrinsic value<sup>84</sup>, would bring with it the “implausible” notion that we have obligations “to respect the equilibrium states of inorganic systems [such as rocks, or mountains decomposing]. It also leaves us with definite conflict of interest problems [the favourite example being the HIV virus’s “wish” to fulfil its *telos*, vis-a-vis the human interest to survive] which can only be solved anyway “by appeal to a value system which favours human interests” (p. 471). In short, a properly adjusted anthropocentric ethic provides “a satisfactory ethic of obligation and concern for the nonhuman world”, without delivering the confusion (p. 466) which would ensue, were we to follow genuinely non-anthropocentric views.

### 6.2.4 The convergence claim

On environmental ethicist Bryan Norton’s view,

- (i) there is a consensus<sup>85</sup> emerging amongst socio-economists and environmentalists, “on how to treat nature .... based on widespread acceptance of much ecological theory and a common desire to protect nature to some extent, if for different reasons” (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, p. 23);
- (ii) ethics and policies which serve the interests of human beings, will also serve the interests of nature, as “no long-term human values can be protected without protecting the [evolutionary] context in which they evolved” (Attfield, 2003, p. 42, p. 112, citing Norton, 1991, p. 240), and
- (iii) “...our obligations to future humans generate and support the same policies as those advocated in approaches that recognize intrinsic value in non-human nature [for example, the seeing green nature ethic] and direct obligations towards it, since ‘our culture’s distant future’ is at stake” (Attfield, 2003, p. 42, and pp. 112-115, citing Norton, 1991, p. 241).

Norton states his convergence hypothesis thus:

The convergence hypothesis, which I have offered as an alternative to the traditionally divisive characterization of environmentalists as split between “shallow”, anthropocentric, resource managers and “deep”, nonanthropocentric, environmental radicals, states that *provided anthropocentrists consider the full breadth of human values as they unfold into the indefinite future, and provided nonanthropocentrists endorse a consistent and coherent version of the view that nature has intrinsic value, all sides may be able to endorse a common policy direction.*” (Norton, 1997, p. 87, his italics).

Norton’s convergence claim is based on a “weak” anthropocentric ethic, which is broadly equivalent to what Hayward (1995, p. 59-62, particularly footnote 11) calls an environmental ethic based on an enlightened self-interest [section 3.1.1 above]. I discuss Norton’s environmental ethic next.

<sup>84</sup> Grey lists here, John Rodman (1983, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 121-130), Val Plumwood (1991a, pp. 139-149), and J. Baird Callicott (1989)

<sup>85</sup> Norton’s convergence claim is both supported and rejected. Some support is provided by some environmental psychology research. For example, Bjerke and Kaltenborn (1999) note that “...Two philosophical views of the human-environment relation are relevant here. One of them is the ... ecocentric (or biospheric) view, which includes concern for nonhuman objects and ecosystems even if conservation of them involves human sacrifice (Stern & Dietz, 1994; Oksanen, 1997). The second is the anthropocentric view, which holds human needs above other values, and which implies a support for protection of the environment if it satisfies human needs (Gardner & Stern, 1996, Chap. 3). Both views will often be activated in support of the same environmental policy, for example efforts to reduce air pollution, but for very different reasons” (Bjerke & Kaltenborn, 1999, p. 416). But there is also evidence from environmental psychology research to support the hypothesis that “economic beliefs are more fundamental than environmental beliefs and are thus overriding in decisions that involve trade-offs” between the economy and the environment (Hodgkinson & Innes, 2000, p. 293). Axelrod (1994 in Axelrod and Suedfeld, 1995, p. 188) also notes that “Preservation will be paramount only if those charged with harvesting a resource believe that preservation is in their best economic interest. Research suggests that economically-oriented people, when placed in situations of economic-ecological conflict, are likely to pursue immediate economic gain even when it means that significant ecological loss will occur”. Environmental ethicist Mikael Stenmark (2002) rejects Norton’s convergence theory and shows how anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism generate differing environmental policies relating to, as examples, population growth, wilderness preservation, and wildlife management. Many technical-environmental philosophical arguments for and against Norton’s viewpoint are also made in the series of papers representing the Norton-Callicott debate in *Environmental Ethics*

### 6.3 Norton's weak anthropocentric ethic

I concentrate on Bryan G. Norton's version of weak anthropocentrism for several reasons. It is rooted in pragmatism (Katz, 1999, p. 379), an approach often attractive to environmental policy and political decision-makers; it links with the critique of "*Homo economicus*" encountered in seeing green; it calls for strong environmental protection, because it argues that much in non-human nature contributes to human welfare construed widely; and it shares with "seeing green", the view that there must be transformation in human values. However, Norton's weak anthropocentrism does *not* accord intrinsic value to nature, as does Barrett and Grizzle's weak anthropocentrism.

Based on Norton's 1982, 1984, and 1986 papers, I discuss next my understanding of his theory of value (6.3.1), and his ethic (6.3.2).

#### 6.3.1 The theory of value

"Felt preferences" and "considered preferences" are key concepts in Norton's distinction between "strong" and "weak" anthropocentrism. The idea of *Homo economicus* and its related personal ["felt"] preferences as want-satisfaction in mainstream economic theory was introduced briefly in Chapter Eight: 4.3.3.1 and sections 3.1.3 and 3.4.3.2 of this chapter. Norton explains that: "A value theory is strongly anthropocentric if all value countenanced by it is explained by reference to satisfactions of felt preferences of human individuals" (Norton, 1984, p. 134), that is, if nonhuman species and natural objects have value only to the extent that they satisfy *any* fulfillable human desire or need, whether or not it is based on thought and reflection (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 310). Or phrased the other way around, strong anthropocentrism "takes unquestioned felt preferences of human individuals [such as high consumptive lifestyles, based on an exploitative and extractive use of nature as "a storehouse of raw materials" (Norton, 1984, p. 135)] as determining value" (Norton, 1984, p. 135). Economists often construct "interests" from people's "felt preferences" because these contain no value judgments; are not part of a considered worldview – "decision makers need only ask people what they want, ... compute the preferences satisfied by the various possible courses of action, and let the resulting ordinal ranking imply a decision" (Norton, 1984, p. 134).

Weak anthropocentrism affirms that nonhumans and natural objects can satisfy both "felt preferences", and "considered preferences" [which Norton also calls "ideals" (1984, p. 138)]. "A considered preference is any desire or need that a human individual would express after careful deliberation, including a judgment that the desire or need is consistent with a rationally adopted world view [or worldview adopted on religious grounds, or grounds of spiritual development (1984, p. 136) – a world view which includes fully supported scientific theories and a metaphysical framework interpreting those theories, as well as a set of rationally supported aesthetic and moral ideals." (Norton, 1984, p. 134). Weak anthropocentrists "deny that preference satisfaction is the only measure of human value" (p. 138). They argue that considered preferences act as a limit upon felt preferences (p. 138).

Norton argues that the weak anthropocentric approach provides two crucial resources for environmentalists (1) If the considered worldview "emphasizes the close relationship between the human species and other living species", then environmentalists "can also make a case for ideals of human behavior extolling [maximum] harmony with nature". Such ideals would be critical of purely exploitative relationships with nature (Norton, 1984, p. 135, and pp. 146-147). (2) It makes place for valuing human experiences "that provide the basis for value formation". That is, it recognizes the value formation that is implicit in comparing one's felt preferences with one's considered worldview, and realizing that some of the felt preferences need to be adjusted towards "considered preferences" if they are to be consonant with a rationally-considered worldview. For example, the "... current, largely consumptive attitudes towards nature... do not fit into a rationally defensible worldview" (Hayward, 1995, p. 61, discussing Norton's environmental ethic). Norton gives an example: "To the extent that

environmentalists can show that values are formed and informed by contact with nature [a favourite deep ecology theme, for example], nature takes on value as a teacher of human values. Nature need no longer be seen as a mere satisfier of fixed and often consumptive values – it also becomes an important source of inspiration in value formation” (Norton, 1984, p. 135).

On Norton’s view, weak anthropocentrism is an attractive position for environmentalists, and political decision-makers, because it provides a framework within which to develop “powerful” and rationally defensible reasons “for protecting nature” (Norton, 1984, p. 135), without having to adopt “radical, difficult-to-justify claims” of (p. 138), or making “questionable ontological commitments” (p. 148) to, intrinsic value in nature’s nonhumans and natural objects.

### 6.3.2 The “ethic of resource allocation”

Within his weak anthropocentrism, Norton introduces his proposed “ethic of resource allocation” (1984, p. 145), the principles and corresponding moral obligations of which I understand to be:

(a) It is a two-tiered system, comprising an individualist, and a non-individualistic level. This latter is necessary, because on Norton’s argument, an individualistic ethic is unsuitable for application to nonhuman nature.

(b) At the individualistic level in present generation time, should conflicts of interest arise over resource allocation, they should be dealt with via the usual rules of distributive fairness, “derived from the principle of no harm [to others]” (1984, pp. 139-140). While Norton does not mention the notion of ‘distributive social justice’ in the present generation, I assume that he would accommodate it here. **The theory of value at the individual level is “the prima facie equality of felt preferences of individual humans”** (p. 146).

(c) But the weakly anthropocentric environmental ethic cannot be only individualistically-based, that is, it cannot restrict environmental value only to the satisfaction of felt preferences of human individuals (Norton, 1984, p. 141). It must also protect a stable flow of goods and services from the resource base “through indefinite time” (p. 143), to ensure the continuance of “human consciousness” in the universe (p. 143) [“a good thing because a universe containing human consciousness is preferable to one without it” (p. 143)]. This is not at all the same thing as satisfying the felt or considered preferences of present individuals. **At this non-individual level, “the value of ongoing human life and consciousness ... [is the] central value principle** (p. 146).

(d) **“An ethic of resource allocation should apply to nonrenewable resources as well as to renewable ones and should also imply a population policy”** (Norton, 1984, p. 145). I describe Norton’s resource allocation ethic in (e) and (f), and consider here his population policy, which he describes as

...the level of population in any given generation should be determined by the requirements for the stability of the resource flow. Such a determination would be based on an assessment of (a) how many people are consistent with the maximal sustainable yield of renewable resources and (b) how many people are consistent with a level of use for nonrenewable resources which does not outstrip the ability of the existing technology to produce sustainable substitutes. A population principle follows, in turn, from this stability principle. One need not identify future individuals or worry about utilities of possible individuals on this approach. The obligation is to maintain maximum sustainable yield consistent with the stability of the resource flow. The population principle sets a population policy for a generation as a whole based on the carrying capacity of the environment. Questions about who, in a given generation, should have children and how many each individual can have, may be treated as questions of interpersonal equity among the existing individuals of any

given generation (Norton, 1984, pp. 145-146).

(e) “[Maintaining the stability of the resource base across generations] implies that, with respect to renewable, or interest-bearing resources, present generations should not harvest more than the maximum sustainable yield of the resource.” (Norton, 1984, p. 145)

Norton’s notion of ‘stability’ here is not the same thing as the normative value ascribed to ecological stability in seeing green: “It is an open (and controversial) question as to what stability of ecosystems means” (Norton, 1984, p. 144). Further, there are controversies concerning the extent to which there are scientifically supportable generalizations about what is necessary to protect ecological stability. For example, he argues that it is highly controversial whether diversity, in general, promotes and/or is necessary for ecological stability. These controversies are too complex to enter into here, but they are relevant. [Norton discusses the concept of ecosystem stability in more detail in his 1986 article, and relates it to ideas of resilience vis-a-vis predictability of ecosystems, which I briefly introduced in section 5.3.1 above.]

To ensure that present generations do not harvest more than the maximum sustainable yield of any renewable resource, requires that (1) models for sustaining maximal yield of productive systems as well as management regimes are in place (Norton, 1986, footnote 22, p. 200), and (2) **“To the extent that scientists know what is necessary to protect the resource base, there is an obligation to act upon it. Further, there is an obligation, where knowledge is lacking, to seek that knowledge in order to avoid unintentional destruction....”** (Norton, 1984, pp. 144-145).

(f) What does ‘stability’ imply with respect to nonrenewable resources? It does not imply in Norton’s view, no utilization. Maintaining the possibility of human consciousness in the universe requires resource use; so there must also be “a constant supply of resources available for utilization by succeeding generations” (Norton, 1984, p. 145); a stable resource base must be maintained “through indefinite time” (1984, p. 146). The relevant ethical principle and obligation is: **“Present humans may use up nonrenewable resources, provided they take steps to provide suitable substitutes”** (Norton, 1984, p. 145), utilizing science and technology. “If, for example, the present generation uses up a major portion of the accumulated fossil fuels available, they will have done nothing wrong if they leave the next generation with a technology capable of deriving energy from renewable resources such as the sun, wind, or ocean currents. There are significant trade-offs available back and forth between renewable and non-renewable resources.” (Norton, 1984, p. 145).

Depletion schedules for nonrenewable resources would need to be drawn up, and management regimes put into place (Norton, 1986, p. 200, footnote 22).

(g) Norton (1984) recognizes that the ethical obligations constituting his “ethic of allocation”, other than requiring “actions necessary to retain a stable resource base through indefinite time” (p. 146) do not specifically state what to do. But in principle, as suggested in (e) above, scientific evidence and knowledge<sup>86</sup> can indicate the actions necessary to fulfil the obligation. Where scientific knowledge “is insufficient to decide whether and how certain practices are destructive ... **the obligation is to be cautious and to proceed to obtain the information necessary.**” (Norton, 1984, p. 146).

---

<sup>86</sup> But he notes that even what scientists already know, for example, that clearcutting tropical forests on steep slopes causes disastrous erosion or that “intense tilling monocultures” causes loss of topsoil, is “systematically ignored” in environmental policy (Norton, 1984, p. 145)

## 6.4 Could weak anthropocentrism at all qualify as “seeing green”?

Many of the values of weak anthropocentrism, as described at least by Barrett and Grizzle, are green-sounding (section 6.1). Yet a practically universal theme in the sample elements of seeing green is a critique of anthropocentrism [or hierarchy, or androcentrism, Chapter Eight: 2.1.1]. Even the weak anthropocentrism based on the constitutiveness approach, ecofeminist Plumwood (1991a, p. 148) has called, “broadened instrumentalism”, and instrumental-only positions towards nature are categorically rejected in seeing green (Chapter Eight: 6.3.3.4).

Norton’s position does seem different from an entirely grey-green perspective. But is it “green”? Yes and no, but ultimately no, I suggest. Yes, many of its values are “green”, and its environmental policies are far more protective than those normally associated with instrumental anthropocentrism. But based on the kind of critique already encountered in seeing green, there are some other aspects of Norton’s weak anthropocentric view which I would like to problematize:

- a. What Norton’s weak anthropocentrism values above all in the universe, is “ongoing human consciousness”. This value enables Norton to advocate strong environmental protection without “questionable ontological commitments” (1984, p. 148), referring to the nonanthropocentrist belief in nature’s having its own interests and autonomy in achieving them, thus, having value-for-itself [Chapter Eight: 5.3]. While Norton’s sidestepping of the intrinsic value question might be a pragmatic approach as far as environmental policy is concerned, part of the green critique of anthropocentrism is just its critique of dominant western cultural ontological assumptions on nature, and the human-nature relationship [Chapter Eight: 5.2.1]. But Norton remains committed to anthropocentrism, with its ontological assumptions of a human-nature divide, an assumption rejected in seeing green (Chapter Eight: 4.2.1), and particularly in the sample element deep ecology, with its insistence on biological egalitarianism. Even Arne Naess, ultra-tolerant of a diversity of ultimate premises to guide ecologically-sensitive policies and practices, requires some kind of “wide identification” with nature (Glasser, 1997, pp. 82-84), presumably as a move towards dissolving the human-nature divide which Norton’s weak anthropocentrism appears to keep intact.
- b. Nor does the green critique of homocentric ontology centre only around its failure to recognize nature’s value-for-itself; it also problematizes the standard western view of the human being. For example, ecofeminist Plumwood suggests that even the kind of broadened instrumentalism which Norton’s ethic represents [it could encompass spiritual values, for example], “... should be rejected ... [because] such an approach misses out on the challenge to the framework of human domination *and the revision of the concept of the human self*. Instrumentalism is part of the account of the self as disconnected and egoistic, having no non-accidental or defining relations to others and treating others – whether human or nonhuman – as no more than means to its independently conceived ends. The strategy of accommodating environmental concerns through a broadening of instrumentalism results from a failure to critique these framework conceptions of self and human identity.” (Plumwood, 1991a, p. 148, my italics). Green thought characteristically provides such a critique (Chapter Eight: 4.2 and 4.3).
- c. Norton refers to nature in material, economic metaphors: resources, goods, services, flows.... devoid of any spiritual principle, or principle of purposive self-organization. This does sound rather like Regan’s (1981) identification of a management ethic, an ethic *for the use* of the environment, and not a genuine environmental ethic: an ethic *of* the environment (Regan, 1981). One cannot help but note that Norton’s resource allocation ethic tends to support western liberal capitalist reform environmentalism, consistently critiqued in the green perspective. No arguments are presented for a fundamental restructuring of society along normative ecological lines, as is the case in seeing green. In support of my view here, Hayward (1995, p. 62, my italics) writes that “Moderately anthropocentric environmentalism *would issue in a gradualist, or*

- reformist, strategy* whose aim is to heighten awareness that it serves no one's interest to (over-) exploit natural resources or treat other beings cruelly or inhumanely...".
- d. Norton argues that Leopold [Chapter Two: 2.5.2(d)] was a nonanthropocentrist but used anthropocentric arguments to advance his case. Should modern intrinsic value environmentalists wish to follow the same pragmatic route in order to advance the protection of more nature through environmental policy, they could, Norton suggests. This is a theme that others examine too (for example, Nees, Green, Treadway, et al., 2003, p. 295; Stenmark, 2002, p. 135). However, this approach while possibly pragmatic, is non-green, in that [dark] greens advocate that means must match ends. As example, Petra Kelly's insistence on the unacceptability of violent protest to achieve peace (Chapter Eight: 6.4, 6.4.3.1).
  - e. Norton's weak anthropocentrism, as set out in his 1982, 1984, and 1986 papers at least, fails to address the issue of animal welfare. The anthropocentric-instrumental mechanization of animals in industrial agriculture, or their instrumental use in scientific experimentation and product-testing is not problematized, as it is in seeing green.

There is no objective way, I suppose, to determine whether or not Norton's weak anthropocentrism should be categorically excluded from seeing green. Its proposed environmental *policies* sound green. But, I would argue, its *ultimate premise* that ecological processes should be preserved to ensure "ongoing human consciousness" does not. On a green view, other "consciousnesses" also have [to varying degrees, depending on which green sample element one selects] a legitimate interest in the preservation of their own ongoing consciousness, independent of that of human beings. A personal final decision would depend on one's acceptance or rejection of two of seeing green's ultimate premises, that is, that nature has value-for-itself, and that it is our wrong human-nature relationship which is the root cause of the environmental crisis.

By contrast, classifying the anthropocentrism of mainstream sustainable development as mostly grey-green does appear easier. Achterberg (1993, pp. 84-86, cited in section 3.4.1.5 of this chapter) considers the WECD's perspective that human-produced capital and natural capital are interchangeable as a "disputable perspective, quite apart from the extremely anthropocentric attitude which is expressed by such a view...". Dobson (1999, Ch.2, in Attfield, 2003, p. 136) argues that The World Commission on Environment and Development [WECD] construes nature anthropocentrically as a stock of goods and services indispensable for human survival. Attfield (2003, p. 136, and footnote 38 on p. 155) however, considers this view controversial. He notes that on p. 57 of the WECD report, there is an explicit recognition of the intrinsic value of nature. Despite this example of green thought, I have suggested in section 3.4.1.5 of this chapter, that the WECD could be considered to follow the weakest possible version of environmental sustainability. I also suggest (section 7.3 of this chapter) that its conservation and stewardship ethic appear largely anthropocentric. Various interpretations of sustainable development are available, which can be broadly grouped into more conservative, or more radical versions. These are discussed next.

## 7. Sustainable development

Though the WECD (Brundtland) report spelt out "core issues" in sustainable development, and necessary conditions<sup>87</sup> for achieving it, the precise meaning of sustainable development remains unclear, debated, and contested – dozens, hundreds, of interpretations exist (Achterberg, 1993, pp. 84-

<sup>87</sup> The WCED identified as "core issues" for sustainable development, "Population and development; Food security; Species and ecosystems; Energy; Industry; The urban challenge." "Necessary conditions for sustainable development are "A political system that secures effective citizen participation in decision-making; An economic system that provides for solutions for the tensions arising from disharmonious development; A production system that respects the obligation to preserve the ecological base for development; A technological system that fosters sustainable patterns of trade and finance; An international system that fosters sustainable patterns of trade and finance; An administrative system that is flexible and has the capacity for self-correction" (Elliott, 1994, Figure 1.2 "Core issues and necessary conditions for sustainable development as identified by the World Commission on Environment and Development, p. 4, citing from WECD (1987))

87; Bramwell, 1994, p. 141, Hayward, 1995, p. 97, Neefjes, 2000, p. 44). There appears to be agreement that it is concerned with both aggregative [what is the good life, the good society?] and distributive [who gets what<sup>88</sup>, when, and how?] issues, and revolves around the concepts of environmental protection, equitable access to current resources, and intergenerational allocation of resources: “environment, equity and futurity” (Hayward, 1995, p. 97). But sustainable development represents “a conceptual compromise” in the environment-development debate (Achterberg, 1996, p. 171; this chapter, section 2.2). It is an ideological issue (Hattingh, 2002, p. 5, pp. 14-15), and therefore a politically-contestable issue (Davidson, 2000, p. 28). Any particular version presented in a text should be assessed to determine whether or not it tends towards economic growth/market-based versions (7.1), or perhaps “stronger” or “weaker” versions (7.2). In section (7.3), the “new ethic of conservation and stewardship” is presented.

## 7.1 Ecology-based, and free-market based development paradigms

Elliott (1994, pp. 107-112), writing about development paradigms after the effects of the Ecological Revolution, notes three contrasting approaches to environment and development in the sustainable development debate: the “market-based”, the “neo-Marxist” [not discussed here], and the “ecology-centered” paradigms, which she traces back to the differing histories and theories of development and of “environmentalism”.

On her view –

The starting point for proponents of the ecology-centered approach is that economic growth and environmental conservation are contradictory. They are anti-growth and advocate a steady-state economy and the distribution of resources more equitably. This approach therefore has a conception of sustainable development which is in opposition to that of the WECD which believes that technical solutions to environmental degradation can be found through economic growth. The two are, however, in agreement concerning the role of local participation and action as the practical basis for tackling many environment and development problems in the developing world.

Two examples of this seeing-green, ecology-based type of sustainable development would be Goldsmith’s (1972) *A Blueprint for survival*, and Porritt’s (1984) green paradigm society, both discussed in Chapter Four: 6.1.

By contrast,

The market-based approach to development and the environment starts from the principle that growth and technical advancement in a free-market economy are the keys to sustainable development in the future. Success is seen to depend on sufficient political will and the ability to place a market value on the environment and the economic functions that it enables. Proponents of this approach therefore tend to show greater support for the recommendations of the WCED than those of the ecology-centered approach. It is suggested that, through modification of established economic formulae and techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, it is possible to put a correct value on the environment and ensure that the next generations inherit environmental assets which are not less than (although perhaps different from<sup>89</sup>) those which the current population enjoys.

Collins and Barkdull (1995, p. 227) also suggest that free-market development and increased concern for environmental protection are in conflict. Free market advocates might no longer be supporters of unchecked industrialism, but “they still rely on such stratagems as rephrasing environmental problems as economic opportunities (recycling), emphasizing the need to clarify property rights<sup>90</sup>, encouraging

<sup>88</sup> The “what” Hayward (1995, pp. 98-100) more or less equates with the question of environmental sustainability, discussed in section 3.4.1

<sup>89</sup> This appears to be a reference to whether or not one subscribes to the “weaker” or “stronger” version of sustainability as ethic

<sup>90</sup> “The Brundtland Report calls for securing property rights (in particular land rights) as a key issue on the road to sustainable development,

voluntary improvements in personal and corporate behavior, and tinkering with economic incentive systems (such as trading pollution credits)” (1995, p. 228). The best way to address the tension, they suggest, is for government to intervene via stakeholder “mediating structures” which are “(1) funded by government rather than private sources, (2) independent of government, (3) democratically controlled, (4) accountable, (5) impartial, and (6) authorized to impose just and fair decisions on affected parties” (p. 240).

There are also stronger/radical and weaker/conservative versions of sustainable development.

## 7.2 “Stronger/radical” and “weaker/conservative” sustainable development models

When the Brundtland Report definition of sustainable development – “... development that meets the needs of the present without limiting the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 43, cited in Bramwell, 1994, pp. 141-142) - is presented unproblematically as it so often is, it not only masks (i) the many inexplicit assumptions in the key concepts of the disciplinary fields which are its academic home, (ii) the differing ideologies represented by differing versions – Hattingh (2002) for example, discerns four ideologically differing versions - but also, (iii) the existence of more, or less, radical versions (Attfeld, 2003, pp. 129-130, p. 137). Three examples will suffice to substantiate this.

### 7.2.1 Jacob’s (1995) conservative to radical model

Jacobs’ conservative to radical model features in several discussions of sustainable development (Attfeld, 2003, pp. 126-132; Davidson, 2000, pp. 28-31; Hattingh, 2002, pp. 14 to 15 and footnote 16 on p. 16). Jacobs’ argument is that while “the objective of sustainability has been generally accepted by radical greens, technocrats, and capitalists alike” (Davidson, 2000, p. 28), there is debate about how it should be interpreted, and implemented. He has identified four “faultlines of contestation”. Davidson (2000, p. 29, Table 1) has usefully adapted his discussion (Jacobs, 1995, pp. 4-5) to table form, shown next.

Figure 7: Conservative and radical understanding of sustainable development.

FAULT LINES OF CONTESTATION	CONSERVATIVE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT	RADICAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
<i>Degree of Environmental Protection</i>	“Weak” Permits trade-offs between economic growth and protection	“Strong” Acknowledges intrinsic values in natural environment
<i>Equity (intragenerational and intergenerational)</i>	Nonegalitarian Accepts limited global redistribution	Egalitarian Recognizes global maldistribution of wealth and responsibilities to future generations
<i>Participation</i>	“Top-down” Participation is limited to implementation stage Of instrumental value only	“Bottom-up” Directed to both objective-setting and policy-implementation Of intrinsic value
<i>Breadth of Subject Area</i>	Narrow interpretation Restricted to the maintenance of the resource base	Broad interpretation Includes both the maintenance of environmental integrity and sound human development— “quality of life issues”

TABLE 1. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS.

which is possibly one of the least criticized recommendations it made” (Neeffjes, 2000, p. 53)

Between them, Attfield (2003, pp. 126-132), Davidson (2000, pp. 28-31), and Hattingh (2002, pp. 14-15), explain Jacobs' (1995) models as meaning:

(a) Differing degrees of environmental protection. Hattingh (2002, pp. 14-15) suggests that this 'faultline' represents an ideological answer to the fundamental value question "What is so important that we should strive to maintain it forever? Is it expansion in material growth; consumption; survival; needs satisfaction; quality of life; the flourishing of life on earth; the diversity and abundance of life on earth; or the ecological basis of life in general?" Differing answers lead to differing degrees of environmental protection. These can vary from the 'weak' ... position that the benefits of environmental protection have to be balanced or traded off against those of economic growth, that is, *environmental conservation*, while the 'strong' version holds that economic activity is subject to *environmental limits*. The latter is based on the notions of "carrying capacity"<sup>91</sup> and "maximum sustainable yield" (Attfield, 2003). The degree of environmental protection itself can vary from notions such as the precautionary principle [itself available in stronger and weaker forms; the 1992 Earth Summit Rio Declaration containing the weaker version (Attfield, 2003, pp. 144-146)], to the carrying capacity of ecosystems, or to the idea of intrinsic value in nature.

(b) Differing interpretations of equity. Hattingh (2002, pp. 14-15) sees this 'faultline' as ideologically differing answers to the fundamental value question "With a view to whom or what should we pursue the sustainability of this valuable something? Do we do it for the sake of nature, or the sake of people; do we do it for the sake of the rich or that of the poor; or for the sake of the whole of the community of life?" Davidson (2000, p. 30) explains equity more narrowly as involving "a commitment to ensure the basic needs of those living now and in the future". She notes a tension between North and South interpretations of equity, the South emphasizing egalitarian redistribution of global resources, and the North tending to resist this interpretation "because of ... [its] fundamental challenge to levels of production and consumption and established patterns of global economic relations" (p. 30). The North is accused of adopting more "environmental" than "developmental" interpretations of sustainable development, and failing to confront the fundamental limits and contradictions of the "growth paradigm" (p. 30).

(c) Differing versions of participation. Again, Hattingh (2002, p. 15) provides a useful fundamental value context for the answers to this question: "How should we pursue sustainability? From a centralised position in a top-down manner with experts and science and technology; from a participative position in a bottom-up manner in which consensus, as well as indigenous and cultural knowledge systems, plays a large role; or with a combination of these approaches as circumstances and context dictate?"

On Davidson's view,

The "top-down" version ... is that favored by most governments, because, by limiting participation to major stakeholders, including business, local government, interest groups and other nongovernment organizations, they can retain control of the sustainable development agenda. It is a technocratic strategy in that objectives are set by governments using experts, with public participation limited to the implementation stage of policy formulation ... reform strategies are more likely to be concerned with issues such as waste reduction, recycling, and energy conservation. By contrast, the 'bottom-up' approach involves public participation in both the setting of objectives and implementation, since participation is held to be a good in itself – that is, it has intrinsic value. For managerialists,

<sup>91</sup> Goodland and Ledec (1998, footnote 2, pp. 561-562) define carrying capacity as "the maximum number of a given species that can be supported indefinitely by a particular habitat, allowing for seasonal and random change, without any degradation of the natural resource base that would diminish the maximum population in the future. Carrying capacity is analogous to the sustainable rate of harvest and is in turn dependent on the size of the resource stock"

participation has extrinsic value; it is a means to implement sustainable development. (Davidson, 2000, pp. 30-31)

(d) Differing interpretations of the subject area covered by the concept of sustainable development. Here Hattingh's (2002, p. 15) fundamental value question to which differing answers may be provided, is: "How would we know that we have moved nearer to or further away from sustainable development? Do we make use of financial indicators alone; do we use wider and more comprehensive economic indicators to assess costs and benefits; do we use indicators from social and political life...; do we use indicators from nature - for example the behaviour of indicator species ...; or do we combine all of the above? And exactly how do we determine the threshold values that should apply to any set of indicators..., and whether they are exceeded or not?"

On Davidson's view, the "broader understanding [of sustainable development] flows from the notion that environmental protection is not possible without sound human development, a development which is not synonymous with income growth." (Davidson, 2000, p. 31). Quality of life criteria are extended to include "not just environmental quality but also basic human needs for self-fulfilment, equal opportunity, and access to education and information, participation, protection of local and indigenous culture, and human-scale development..." (p. 31). The broader understanding includes social restructuring, if needed, to address poverty, and improvement in quality of life (Attfield, 2003, p. 131).

Davidson (2000) devotes much of her paper on sustainable development to arriving at a fuller understanding of "sound human development", during which she inter alia, embraces O'Neill's (1993) re-interpretation of Aristotelian human well-being in an ecological light, and Goulet's (1991) ecological wisdom in development ethics. She concludes that "sustainable development must ensure sound human flourishing, by furnishing those goods which ensure human autonomy (survival, opportunities for participation, and a good life); second, it must preserve and foster forms of community well-being, which ensure connection with past and future time perspectives; and third, it must preserve and foster ecosystem viability. Sound human development consistent with ecosystem viability *is really only possible with the radical interpretation of sustainable development*" (Davidson, 2000, p. 40, my italics).

### **7.2.2 Goodland and Ledec's (1998) five principles model**

While Goodland and Ledec (1998) are clear that a "... primary goal of sustainable development is to achieve a reasonable (however defined) and equitably distributed level of economic well-being that can be perpetuated continually for many generations" (1998, p. 559), they present what I see as a "stronger<sup>92</sup>" version of sustainable development. Their version depends on an understanding of sustainability which "implies a transition away from economic growth based on depletion of non-renewable resource stocks and toward progress (i.e. improvement in the quality of life) based more on renewable resources over the long run" (p. 559). Their sustainable development model is based on five principles:

1. Sustainable development should seek to optimize between, and not maximize any one of the three categories of human well-being (a) economic efficiency (b) equitable distribution of economic resources [several future generations can be implied in this too, based on their discussions of "Irreversibility and preservation of future options" and "Discount rate" (pp. 557-559)], and (c) non-economic values such as human dignity and pride, civil liberties, aesthetics, religious and spiritual concerns (p. 559)

---

<sup>92</sup> Based on their strong support of intergenerational equity in allocation of natural resources

2. It is prudent to assume that future generations' need for natural resources (soil, air, water, forests, fisheries, plant and animal species, energy, minerals) "will not be markedly less than ours" (p. 560). Therefore, sustainable development implies using renewable natural resources in a way which does not deplete them [they must be harvested on a sustained yield basis], degrade them, "or otherwise diminish their usefulness for future generations" (p. 560)

3. Non-renewable resources must also be used in a way which "does not unnecessarily preclude easy access to them by future generations" (p. 560). That is, used natural resources must be systematically recycled, not dumped as waste "in a dispersed manner" (p. 560)

4. Sustainable development implies depleting non-renewable energy resources "at a slow enough rate so as to ensure the high probability of an orderly societal transition to renewable energy sources" (p. 560)

5. In the case of agricultural "or other biologically-based projects", even if the crop pays for the costs of imported inputs such as energy and nutrients (e.g. diesel, biocides, fertilizers), "sustainability implies the permanent maintenance of biological productivity on the site", it should not be damaged for example, by soil compaction or decrease in organic matter (p. 560).

### 7.2.3 Barrett and Grizzle's (1999) holistic model

Barrett and Grizzle, (1999, p. 25), in their holistic approach to sustainability, also tend toward what I see<sup>93</sup> as a "stronger" version of sustainable development:

The common denominator beneath any serious definition of sustainable development includes (1) the maintenance of ecological conditions necessary to maintain an ecosystem supportive of human life, and (2) some notion of intergenerational equity, i.e. that current generations cannot expend so much natural capital as to leave future generations predictably worse off than contemporary folk. For many people, including us, sustainable development is somewhat more expansive, also depending upon (3) achievement and maintenance of social cohesion among humans, based on mutual respect, care and justice, to maintain a social system supportive of human life, and (4) safeguards to protect the intrinsic value and associated collective biotic rights of extrahuman creation. (1999, p. 25).

Based on just these three examples, it appears that some indicators of a "stronger" version of sustainable development would be (1) sensible or even strong environmental sustainability (sections 3.4.1.4, 3.4.1.3). There should at least be recognition to some degree, of nature as possessing intrinsic value (Chapter Two: 2.5.3), (2) intra-generational egalitarianism in environmental goods and bads (section 3.4.3.4, 3.4.3.5). There should be, if not deep ecology-type egalitarianism for the whole community of life, concern at least, for nature's future interests (3) valuing of the notion of "community", and a bottom-up community participation approach in development planning (section 4.2.2), (4) social restructuring (not dealt with in this chapter, but see Chapter Eight: 6.2).

The new vision of morality/the good life in sustainable development discourse as sustainability, is matched by a "new ethic of conservation and stewardship", discussed next.

## 7.3 " ...a new ethic of conservation and stewardship"

As example, the Millennium Declaration, under section IV **Protecting our common environment**, contains the following three clauses:

21. We must spare no effort to free all of humanity, and above all our children and grandchildren, from the

---

<sup>93</sup> Based on their allocation of intrinsic value to nature

threat of living on a planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose resources would no longer be sufficient for their needs.

22. We reaffirm our support for the principles of sustainable development, including those set out in Agenda 21, [footnote 7] agreed upon at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.

23. We resolve therefore to adopt in all our environmental actions **a new ethic of conservation and stewardship** and, as first steps, we resolve:

- To ...<sup>94</sup> (United Nations General Assembly A/Res/55/2 18 September 2000).

### 7.3.1 Conservation

Conservation as ethic is symbolized by influential USA forester Gifford Pinchot (Chapter Two: 2.2.1.2, and 2.5.1.4), whose understanding of it was “the best use of all we have for the greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time” (Pinchot, 1914, pp. 23-25, cited in Desjardins, 1993, pp. 47-48). Its philosophical context is utilitarianism: “Pinchot’s conservation movement fits squarely within the utilitarian tradition” (Desjardins, 1993, p. 48), that is, of maximizing public utility by maximally satisfying individual preferences (wants) (p. 51), motivated by rational self-interest (p. 52). Profit is the evidence that market processes are satisfying individual preference demand (p. 52). However, Pinchot’s resource conservation approach specifically included future generations.

In Rodman’s view, the “resource conservation” form of ecological consciousness, also called the “RCD [resource conservation and development] scientific management of Nature” approach (Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 301), is not a suitable starting point for “a general environmental ethic” for at least three reasons. First, because its “ethic of ‘wise use’ remained within the worldview of anthropocentric utilitarianism”, which assumes that the value of the non-human biotic/abiotic world is limited to its instrumental value to humans. Second, its assumption that only the human world possesses intrinsic value, and that the non-human world possesses only instrumental value, is arbitrary because (a) it is not necessary<sup>95</sup> - not all world cultures have made this assumption and (b) it is not justified, because no one has yet succeeded in identifying that “essence” or “observable, morally relevant quality” which at the same time categorically includes humans yet excludes non-humans (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 122). Lastly, implementing fully its viewpoint that most things natural have some human use, implies a potential “total-use scenario” which would leave little in its natural [un-used and therefore wasted] condition. “Given the arbitrariness of the first principle, the second amounts to an unjustifiable species imperialism” (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 123).

### 7.3.2 Stewardship

“The logic of the term *steward*” says Gunn (1983, p. 152, his italics) “is three-place: X is steward for Y over Z...”. This logic comes in two versions: the religious version (7.3.2.1), in which human beings are stewards for God or a higher Being/Beings over the planet, and the secular version (7.3.2.2) in which human beings are steward for future human generations over the planet. In both versions of environmental stewardship as new human-nature relationship, the key ideas are (1) humans do not own the Earth, they hold it as a trust, a “common heritage” (2) they are responsible for its care, and (3) they are also answerable as to how they perform their role as stewards and trustees (Attfield, 2003, p. 21, p. 169).

Both versions of environmental stewardship are unavoidably hierarchical and arguably anthropocentric. Stewards are not equal beings among equal beings, but beings who, while answerable

<sup>94</sup> This clause goes on to refer to the full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the sustainable development of forests, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Convention to Combat Desertification, the unsustainable exploitation of water resources, ameliorating the effects of natural and manmade disaster, and the human genome sequence

<sup>95</sup> A lay interpretation of the philosophical concept “necessary” would be that the second thing *must* flow from the first thing – reaching a final in a sporting event is necessary but not sufficient for winning the final...

elsewhere, are nevertheless *superior* to those over whom they have stewardship (Gunn, 1983, pp. 149-151). Think by contrast of the notions of “biological egalitarianism”, “complementarity” and “partnership” encountered in “seeing green”’s human-nature relationship.

### 7.3.2.1 *Western Christianity religious versions*

In the western Christian understanding of stewardship, “God has entrusted the care of the nonhuman world to humans, and has given us the power to control it and the ability to make moral choices” (Gunn, 1983, p. 152). Gunn does not mean though, the “dominion<sup>99</sup>” interpretation of stewardship based on “teleological anthropocentrism<sup>100</sup>”, and controversially condemned<sup>101</sup> by White (1967) as the root cause of the ecological crisis. Attfeld argues that Christian stewardship rejects teleological anthropocentrism, and is a “coherent ... interpretation” of the Bible’s central beliefs, which place a “high value” on the natural world with which humans are entrusted, a trust which calls for “human responsibility and answerability” (2003, p. 36). On his view (1991, chapter 3; 1999, chapter 3; and 2003, opening section of chapter 2), to call Christian environmental stewardship anthropocentric, is controversial.

McDaniel (1994) argues that as Christians, we must confess that we *do* tend to feel separated from the rest of creation, that we “partake of ‘anthropocentric consciousness’” (p. 80). And we must accept that as human beings, “we are doomed to dominion” – there is simply no way that six billion humans – projected by United Nations estimates to be 11 billion by the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century – can live on earth “without exercising inordinate rule over other creatures and their habitats, if only to meet basic needs for food and shelter. To meet these needs, much manipulation will be required, for good or ill” (McDaniel, 1994, p. 75, p. 74). He suggests that in exercising our inevitable dominion, we need an image of “right dominion<sup>102</sup>” (p. 75), and he sees this in terms of dominion-as-stewardship. Stewardship remains potentially problematic though, because “The idea easily lends itself to attitudes of separation from the rest of creation. If dominion-as-stewardship is to be affirmed, emphasis must be placed on the fact that the stewards themselves are creatures among creatures, human nodes in the broader web of life” (McDaniel, 1994, p. 74). Stewardship must be exercised with a “compassion that mirrors God’s own” (p. 74). “Right dominion” - compassionate stewardship - implies “kindly use in a spirit of respect”, “minimum abuse of domesticated animals and minimum impact on wildlife and habitats”. It invites us to maximise the quality, not quantity, of human life, and to develop societies which are both just and ecologically sustainable (p. 75).

Where White (1967) argued for St Francis’s “reverential egalitarianism<sup>103</sup>,” (Attfeld, 2003, p. 33) as alternative to the “dominion” model, scientist Rene Dubos<sup>104</sup> (Sessions, 1995g, p. 298) called in the 1970s for a modern-day version of stewardship located in the Benedictine stewardship tradition. On his interpretation, this tradition sought not only to protect nature against human misbehaviour, but also to

<sup>96</sup> A “low profile life style ... seems appropriate to one who is charged with taking care of God’s good world. The Bible is not very specific about this, but certainly the deliberate (or careless) extermination of species, the poisoning of lakes, rivers, and air, the destruction of soil fertility and land stability seem *quite incompatible* with a recognition of our stewardship over God’s creation” (Gunn, 1983, p. 152, his italics)

<sup>97</sup> “the belief that the whole of creation exists for the sake of humanity” (Attfeld, 2003, p. 31)

<sup>98</sup> The controversy around the Western Christian dominion interpretation of the human-nature relationship, is mentioned briefly in Chapter Two: 2.3.1(c)

<sup>99</sup> A “low profile life style ... seems appropriate to one who is charged with taking care of God’s good world. The Bible is not very specific about this, but certainly the deliberate (or careless) extermination of species, the poisoning of lakes, rivers, and air, the destruction of soil fertility and land stability seem *quite incompatible* with a recognition of our stewardship over God’s creation” (Gunn, 1983, p. 152, his italics)

<sup>100</sup> “the belief that the whole of creation exists for the sake of humanity” (Attfeld, 2003, p. 31)

<sup>101</sup> The controversy around the Western Christian dominion interpretation of the human-nature relationship, is mentioned briefly in Chapter Two: 2.3.1(c)

<sup>102</sup> He suggests that the Christian peace traditions’ lifestyles [Mennonites, Hutterites, Quakers] provide examples of authentic human rule – non-violence towards people, the animals, and the earth (footnote 9, on pp. 81-82)

<sup>103</sup> Favoured by deep ecologists. Fundi Green Rudolf Bahro also considered the Franciscan-Christian human-nature ethic as an ‘alternative’ to the Christian dominion tradition (Bramwell, 1989, p. 25).

<sup>104</sup> Who coined the slogan “Think globally, act locally” (Attfeld, 2003, p. 5 and note 9, p. 26)

develop human activities “which favour a creative and harmonious relationship between man and nature” (Attfeld 2003, pp. 33-34, citing Dubos, 1974, pp. 130-131). Reverence for nature is not enough, Dubos argued, because humanity will always make impacts on nature; there needs to be an accompanying “willingness to accept responsibility for a creative stewardship of the earth” (Attfeld, 2003, pp. 33-34, citing Dubos, 1974, pp. 130-131). Still, it is worth remembering that Dubos was a supporter of enlightened anthropocentrism, which, on his interpretation, “... acknowledges that, in the long run, the world’s good always co-incides with man’s own most meaningful good.” (Dubos, cited in Rolston, 1975, p. 104, in Hayward, 1995, p. 60).

Dubos co-authored in 1972 with Barbara Ward, *Only one earth: The care and maintenance of a small planet*, the commissioned report of the UN Stockholm Conference on the human environment (Bramwell, 1994, p. 115; Sessions, 1995g, p. 298). This report aimed to alert the western world to impending ecological disaster if we did not review our “philosophical, theological, and technological perspectives on nature” (Moore, 1990, p. 104). Ward too, believed in the Christian stewardship tradition, and her challenge was:

When we confront the ethical and the natural context of our daily living, are we not brought back to what is absolutely basic in our religious faith? On the one hand, we are faced with the stewardship of this beautiful, subtle, incredibly delicate, and fragile planet. On the other, we confront the destiny of our fellow man, our brothers. How can we say that we are followers of Christ if this dual responsibility does not seem to us the essence and heart of our religion?” (Ward, 1973, cited in Moore, 1990, p. 104).

Their report helped to establish the ‘stewardship’ tradition within the UN’s sustainability approach (Sessions, 1995g, p. 298).

### 7.3.2.2 *Secular versions*

“... talk of ‘stewardship’ readily suggests a God in the background; can atheists accept it? They surely can if it is pointed out that we are stewards for our posterity...” (Midgley, 1997, p. 100)

In a secular version of Gunn’s (1983, p. 152) logic of stewardship “X is steward for Y over Z...”, human beings are stewards for future human generations over the planet. The secular version is really better understood<sup>105</sup> as a form of trusteeship over “the common heritage of humankind” for its beneficiaries (Attfeld, 2003, pp. 169-172, discussing and generalizing Pardo’s (1975), and Agius’s (1998) views on oceans, and biotechnology respectively). On this kind of view, the common heritage is “resources to which all present and future human beings have or will have a right of access. Every generation has obligations to humanity to conserve and transmit this heritage.” (Attfeld, 2003, p. 169, my italics)

### 7.3.2.3 *Stewardship and anthropocentrism*

It is just so, that human beings “are the only responsible agents capable of planning for the future (whether human or non-human), and the responsibilities of preserving the planetary biosphere and providing for foreseeable future needs are theirs.” (Attfeld, 2003, p. 171).

Stewardship though is critiqued as a homocentric, anthropocentric attitude. Humans are called upon to “... manage nature for the benefit of the human species, not for the intrinsic benefit of other species.” (Merchant, 1990b, p. 55). This is quite clear from the *The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment* which assessed the consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being (<http://www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx> retrieved 7 April 2007). Sylvan is critical of the stewardship position, seeing it as “inconsistent with an environmental ethic” (Sylvan, 1973, in Zimmerman, 1993, p. 14). His objection to stewardship essentially hinges on its tolerance of “complete interference” with,

<sup>105</sup> This idea is from Gunn (1983, p. 152) “The trustee’s duty is to the beneficiaries, typically future generations”

and total use of, the earth's land, whereas an environmental ethic would insist that some parts of the earth's surface at least should be protected from such scenarios: "... in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas<sup>106</sup>, they [i.e. both the more dominant "dominion" and lesser "co-operative" traditions introduced in section 7.3.2.1] will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for human ends, 'humanized'" [and here Sylvan notes that the total use principle is tied to a resource view of nature (Sylvan, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 14 and footnote 6 on p. 21)]. According to deep ecologist George Sessions, "the year after his book appeared, Passmore withdrew his endorsement of the anthropocentrism of both the "stewardship" and the "man perfecting Nature" positions [these positions were briefly introduced in Chapter Two, section 2.5.1], claiming, "We do need a 'new metaphysics' which is genuinely not anthropocentric ... The working out of such a metaphysics is, in my judgment, the most important task which lies ahead of philosophy ... This is the only adequate foundation for effective ecological concern" (Passmore, 1974, in Sessions, 1995g, p. 300, and footnote 37, p. 308, which refers to p. 260 of Passmore's 1975 paper, "Attitudes towards Nature").

Attfield (2003) on the other hand, argues that the passage which Sessions cites from Passmore "was almost certainly not a withdrawal of support for stewardship, and was certainly not said to be so. It was a recognition of the shortcomings of anthropocentrism." (Comment by Attfield as thesis external examiner, 7 April 2008). Attfield believes that most adherents of stewardship do reject anthropocentrism (2003, p. 23). Leaving aside just what Passmore meant, I do think Attfield takes a rosy view of the concept "stewardship", in that it might be optimistic to think that any ruling political party would share it. His version of humanity's care-taking of nature involves respecting it (Attfield, 2003, p. 23), is "incompatible with the instrumental approach of managerialism" (p. 23), opposed to "the perpetual pursuit of interference<sup>109</sup>" in nature, and in favour of "letting be<sup>110</sup>" (p. 23), recognizes interests other than human interests, and takes "... non-human interests seriously enough for them sometimes to outweigh human interests" (Attfield, 2003, p. 43).

"Answerability" is of course a key element in either religious or secular versions of stewardship. In either case, it is a hypothetical answerability, in this life at least. Perhaps one way to cut through the rhetoric of both, is to examine any text's stance on environmental sustainability (3.4.1), and discounting (3.4.3.5)?

### 7.3.3. How are we doing as environmental stewards?

Attfield is convinced that stewardship "remains a significant metaphysical belief, capable of inspiring more specific principles of environmental ethics...and also capable of motivating people to live responsibly" (Attfield, 2003, p. 36). So how are we doing as environmental stewards?

The world has reached a critical stage in its efforts to exercise responsible environmental stewardship. Despite our best intentions and some admirable efforts to date, degradation of the global

<sup>106</sup> It is often said that the expanding third world population is not as great an environmental problem as the resource consumption and pollution of industrial societies. But it is quite clear in Namibia at least, that expanding population both forces human beings onto marginal lands encouraging desertification, and exiles wildlife from their natural habitat, turning them into "problem animals"

<sup>107</sup> See principle 3 of the Deep Ecology platform

<sup>108</sup> This notion of 'letting be' comes from the holistic philosophy of Martin Heidegger, sometimes seen as an early ecological philosopher (Attfield, 2003, footnote 58, p. 28; Bramwell, 1989 – see the many references to Heidegger in her index; Wall, 1994, p. 3). "Letting be" is also an important element in the concept of "place", as so wonderfully interpreted by Relph, 1976. Attfield (2003, p. 23) thinks that stewardship includes the idea of "leaving creatures and their habitats alone" as part of "letting-be"

<sup>109</sup> See principle 3 of the Deep Ecology platform

<sup>110</sup> This notion of 'letting be' comes from the holistic philosophy of Martin Heidegger, sometimes seen as an early ecological philosopher (Attfield, 2003, footnote 58, p. 28; Bramwell, 1989 – see the many references to Heidegger in her index; Wall, 1994, p. 3). "Letting be" is also an important element in the concept of "place", as so wonderfully interpreted by Relph, 1976. Attfield (2003, p. 23) thinks that stewardship includes the idea of "leaving creatures and their habitats alone" as part of "letting-be"

environment continues unabated, and the world's natural resource base is being used in an unsustainable manner (Message of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, Nairobi, 5 February 2007).

This might partly be, because while “many greens, environmental activists, and ... some public sector bureaucrats, confined largely to environmental protection agencies” tend towards the radical understanding of sustainable development (Davidson, 2000, p. 31), Attfield (2003, p. 131) notes that central governments and business interests, tend to favour a weaker interpretation of sustainable development.

## 8. Summary

Much of the chapter was devoted to setting out the key implicit assumptions and values of the disciplinary fields contributing to the environment-development field, which is the home of sustainable development discourse: economic theory, development theory, ecology as science, and to a far lesser degree, environmental ethics.

A key task throughout the chapter was to re-justify the exclusion of the environment and development perspective [and with it, the UN WCED version of sustainable development], from the “seeing green” worldview or perspective presented in Chapters Three to Eight. The reasons were briefly, mainstream sustainable development's adherence to anthropocentrism as theory of value for nature, its adherence to a “weak” version of environmental sustainability, its advocacy of reform environmentalism – basically more efficient management of nature as a resource for humans through measures such as improved legislation and technology, rather than a complete re-think of the human-nature relationship, of what it is to be a human being, and its failure to take up the green challenge of a fundamental re-orientation of society's values and structures in accordance with a normative interpretation of ecology.

However, this does not mean to imply that there is *nothing* “green” in sustainable development; as Attfield's (2003, pp. 126-132), Davidson's (2000, pp. 28-31), and Hattingh's (2002, pp. 12-15) discussions of Jacob's (1995, pp. 4-5) models of radical and conservative sustainable development models show (section 7.2). For example, measures to curb natural resource use, and environmental degradation, or to increase decentralization, self-management, public participation, and self-realization are “green”. But I believe it is the *ultimate premises* context from which these measures derive – ecology as normative for what it is to be a human being, for human-human, and for human-nature relationships - which colour these measures from dark to grey-green.

## CHAPTER TEN: CRITERIA TO ASSESS THE GREEN-NESS OF A TEXT

<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>404</b>
<b>1.1 Namibia’s natural environment policy</b>	<b>404</b>
1.1.1 Namibia’s Green Plan for the Earth Summit, 1992	404
1.1.2 The “12-point plan”, 1993	405
1.1.3 The environmental assessment policy, 1995	405
1.1.4 The Environmental Management Act	405
1.1.5 Commitment to the Millennium Development Goals	406
1.1.6 National Assessment for WSSD, Johannesburg, 2002	406
<b>1.2 Namibia’s national development planning (NDP) process</b>	<b>407</b>
<i>1.3 Namibia Vision 2030</i>	<b>407</b>
<b>2. Methodology and method</b>	<b>409</b>
<b>2.1 Methodology: an interpretive approach</b>	<b>409</b>
2.1.1 Social action theories	409
2.1.2 Semiotic and semiology approaches	409
2.1.3 Mass communication theory, and the semiotic critique of ideology in mass communication	410
2.1.3.1 The neo-Marxist cultural hegemony encoding/decoding model	410
2.1.3.2 Assessment of the encoding/decoding model for this study, and how it has been used	410
<b>2.2 Method: Critical qualitative content analysis</b>	<b>411</b>
2.2.1 The problem with quantitative content analysis	411
2.2.2 Qualitative content analysis (Berelson, 1952) as alternative	412
2.2.3 Updating Berelson’s (1952) qualitative content analysis	413
2.2.4 Some technical issues in qualitative content analysis	414
2.2.4.1 The units of analysis	414
2.2.4.2 The hypotheses, categories and indicators of content analysis	415
<b>3 Seeing green/grey-green: criteria and indicators</b>	<b>416</b>
<b>3.1 The green categories or criteria</b>	<b>416</b>
<b>3.2 The grey-green criteria</b>	<b>417</b>
<b>3.3 Providing indicators for the criteria</b>	<b>418</b>
<b>3.4 The “seeing green” criteria/indicators checklist</b>	<b>419</b>
<b>3.5 Testing the seeing green criteria</b>	<b>429</b>
<b>4 Criteria for assessing research</b>	<b>429</b>
<b>4.1 The traditional criteria of validity, reliability, and generalizability</b>	<b>429</b>
<b>4.2 Social usefulness/action as additional criterion</b>	<b>430</b>

## 1. Introduction

This chapter begins to address research question 2: **Using the “seeing green” worldview as criterion, how green is Namibia Vision 2030?** Four main issues are covered. Firstly, section 1 introduces briefly (1.1) the key documents reflecting Namibia’s sustainable development policy vis-a-vis the natural environment, and (1.2) Namibia’s national development planning process. The final purpose of both section 1.1 and 1.2 is not only to demonstrate Namibia’s commitment to sustainable development, but also to motivate the choice of Vision 2030 as trial text in this study. Section 1.3 explains briefly the Vision 2030 process, and how it links with Namibia’s natural environment policy, and the national planning process.

In section 2, I explain the interpretive methodology and method - critical qualitative content analysis – used to answer research question 2. In section 3, I derive a table of criteria and indicators of “seeing green”, which is derived from Chapter Eight, as well as from some of the key ideas in the field of Environment and Development introduced in Chapter Nine. They will be used in Chapter Eleven, in a content analysis of *Namibia Vision 2030*’s worldview, to assess its green-ness. In section 4, I address the problem of research criteria which are suitable for the study’s qualitative approach.

### 1.1 Namibia’s natural environment policy

Namibia has to date no National Sustainable Development Strategy, and accompanying National Environmental Action Plan (Blackie, 2000), to which governments attending the 1992 Earth Summit committed themselves (Dalal-Clayton & Bass, 2002, p. 13). It did however, at its birth as independent nation, commit itself to the principle of “sustainability” through its Constitution (Government of the Republic of Namibia [GRN], ca. 1990, pp. 51-52). This constitutional commitment is subsumed as a section of Article 95 which deals with “Promotion of the welfare of the people”:

<i>Principles of State Policy</i>	
<b>Article 95</b>	<b>Promotion of the Welfare of the People</b>
<p>The State shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the following:</p> <p>.....</p> <p>(1) maintenance of ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological diversity of Namibia and utilization of living natural resources on a sustainable basis for the benefit of all Namibians, both present and future; ...</p>	

Thereafter Namibia’s government published a series of key policy documents on the natural environment, of which I believe the more important are:

#### 1.1.1 Namibia’s Green Plan for the Earth Summit, 1992

The objective of Namibia’s 1992 Green Plan (Environment and Development) was “to secure for present and future generations a safe and healthy environment and a prosperous economy” (GRN, 1992, cover page). It was compiled by the then Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism under the guidance and editorship of its former Director, Dr Chris Brown, in consultation with a series of government and non-governmental bodies, for presentation to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, or “UNCED” or “Earth Summit”, in 1992. It represented Namibia’s first policy statement to the international environment/development community on its shift to the “new paradigm of sustainable development” (GRN, 2002a, p. ii). Namibia was also a

signatory to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and to the three other important documents emerging from the Earth Summit: Agenda 21, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Convention on Biological Diversity (retrieved from <http://www.dea.met.gov.na/international/international.htm> on 7 February 2003).

### **1.1.2 The “12-point plan”, 1993**

Following the Earth Summit, the then recently-established Directorate of Environmental Affairs within the Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism, published *Namibia's 12 point plan for integrated and sustainable environmental management* in April 1993, again under the leadership of its Director, Dr Chris Brown. As its title suggests, the plan set out 12 points “aimed at promoting sustainable development and wise natural resource management throughout Namibia”. The plan included (1) a confirmation of the constitutional framework for environmental protection and management in Namibia, (2) the development of environmental policies, (3) the review of existing/compilation of new environmental legislation, (4) the identification of Namibia’s main environmental issues to guide an envisaged Environmental Action Plan, (5) a Biodiversity Information System to meet Namibia’s international commitments in this regard, (6) the promotion of partnership as a key strategy to achieving sustainable development through programmes such as [eco-] tourism development, and the community-based natural resource management programme, (7) the development of regional environmental profiles to guide sustainable regional development, an initiative which later also included the National Atlas and the State of the Environment reports, (8) the maintenance and extension of Namibia’s protected area network which underpins Namibia’s biodiversity protection, and tourism promotion, (9) environmental education and training, (10) environmental protection largely based on commitment to the strategy of environmental assessment, and (11-12) national/international co-operation on special programmes such as the combating of desertification (GRN, 1993).

Within the framework of the 12 point plan can also be seen Namibia’s commitment in principle to, and active support of several international treaties and conventions. Amongst the Multinational Environmental Agreements signed by Namibia are the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer, the Ramsar Convention on wetlands, the Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal, the United Nations Framework Convention on climate change and associated Kyoto Protocol, the United Nations Convention to combat desertification, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and as early as 1991, the Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (CITES) (GRN, 2002c, p. 118).

### **1.1.3 The environmental assessment policy, 1995**

*Namibia's environmental assessment policy for sustainable development and environmental conservation* was published in 1995 (GRN, 1995). It was the product of a preparatory workshop held in September 1992, and the contributions of people experienced in environmental management from both government and non-government bodies, inside and outside Namibia. Once again, Dr Chris Brown provided “constant support and leadership” (GRN, 1995, p. 17).

### **1.1.4 The Environmental Management Act**

The 1995 environmental assessment policy envisaged an Environmental Commissioner and Environmental Board, each of which would derive their powers and duties from an ‘Environmental Assessment Act’ (GRN, 1995, p. 5). In subsequent draft legislative thinking, these two legal entities and their legitimating Act became the Sustainable Development Commissioner and the Sustainable Development Board. While not wishing to provide here an analysis of the history of draft legislation around this topic [which at a stage included, then excluded, pollution and waste management], or

speculate on the reasons for the delay, the “forthcoming” (Blackie, 2000) Environmental Management Act has not been passed to date [2007<sup>1</sup>].

### 1.1.5 Commitment to the Millennium Development Goals

Perhaps the next milestone in Namibia’s policy commitment to sustainable development came with Namibia’s pledge, as one of the United Nations member states, to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). One could consider Namibia particularly committed to the MDG process, given that its Prime Minister of the time, Theo-Ben Gurirab, oversaw its drafting, and the then President of Namibia, Dr Sam Nujoma, co-chaired the Millennium Summit (GRN/UN System in Namibia, 2004c, p. i).

Namibia’s Government understands the MDG process to link closely with *Namibia Vision 2030* (GRN, 2004b, p.1):

The Government of the Republic of Namibia is implementing the Millennium Declaration and systematically monitoring the MDGs within the context of national and sectoral development frameworks. The MDG campaign forms part of the national process of strengthening policies that can mobilise all Namibians and the international community behind the grand Vision for the year 2030, through which Namibia will enjoy “Prosperity, Harmony, Peace and Political Stability”.

The first MDG progress report was published in 2004 (GRN, 2004b).

### 1.1.6 National Assessment for WSSD, Johannesburg, 2002

The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg in 2002 represented the ten-year follow-up to the Earth Summit, during which Namibia had entered the international environment/development community. Preparation for Namibia’s WSSD report (GRN, 2002a) was practically co-temporaneous with the participatory development of National Development Plan II (NDP2) and its subsidiary Regional Development Plans, (section 1.2. next), as well as the initial stages of *Namibia Vision 2030*’s compilation (section 1.3).

The primary purpose of the 2002 WSSD National Assessment was to report on Namibia’s progress since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, to list its challenges (for example, the social and environmental debts inherited from the Namibia’s colonial history), and successes in ‘implementing sustainable development options’ (for example, the way in which NDP2 ‘attempts to incorporate the most important issues relating to environment and its sustainability into most of its objectives and strategies’ (GRN, 2002a, p. 4), and to set out the way forward in addressing Namibia’s local and global sustainable development issues.

In the National Assessment, Namibia listed its achievements in the face of a significant inherited colonial social and environmental debt as

- a full Ministry to deal with Namibia’s shift to sustainable development
- new policies and legislation aimed at environmental management
- commitment to international agreements and instruments aimed at environmental conservation
- the devolution of rights and responsibilities over natural resources to local communities in an effort to link poverty eradication and environmental protection
- special programmes to combat desertification, and pollution, to protect biodiversity, promote sound woodland management, and land use planning
- the establishment of an environmental information system to inform environmental management planning and including projects such as regional profiles, the National Atlas and the State of the Environment reports

---

<sup>1</sup> This was written in September 2007. The Act was promulgated in December 2007 (Government Gazette of the Republic of Namibia, No. 3966, 27 December 2007. It has not yet (September 2008) come into operation

- raising awareness of, and gearing environmental education to, Namibia's particular sustainable development issues,
- the steady transformation of national development plans from development plans to sustainable development plans.

Namibia's WSSD National Assessment also characterized the launching of the Vision 2030 initiative [section 1.3], as a "process of great significance for sustainable development in Namibia" (GRN, 2002a, pp. ii-iii).

## 1.2 Namibia's national development planning (NDP) process

Despite the existence of article 95 of the 1990 constitution, the 1992 *Green Plan*, and the 1993 *12 point plan for integrated and sustainable environmental management*, the natural environment was not at the heart of Namibia's first full-scale development plan, i.e. National Development Plan 1, which covered the period 1995/1996 – 1999/2000. NDP1 identified its key target areas as "stimulating and sustaining economic growth; creating employment; reducing inequalities in income distribution; and reducing poverty". However, one of the six strategies identified to achieve these targets was "Ensuring that development is sustainable" (GRN, 2001, p. 44, and Box 3.1 on page 47). This could be interpreted perhaps as an inexplicit commitment to environmental sustainability as part of national development planning.

National Development Plan 2 (2001/2002 to 2005/2006), called in Namibia's 2002 WSSD assessment, a "National Sustainable Development Plan" (GRN, 2002a, Foreword, p. iii) was based on an extensive review of both NDP 1 and the Green Plan (GRN, 2002a, Foreword, p. iii). The sustainability of the natural environment had by now become a central principle in development planning. Within Vision 2030's vision of "sustainable and equitable improvement in the quality of life of all people in Namibia" (GRN, ca 2001b, p. 50), one of NDP2's nine development objectives is "To enhance environmental and ecological sustainability" (GRN, ca 2001, p. 50, and p. 52). One of NDP2's six national strategies to achieve the NDP2 national development objectives is "Promoting sustainable use of natural resources and environmental management" (GRN, ca 2001, p. 53).

Again, of significance for the choice of Vision 2030 as trial text, the foreword to NDP2 notes that ".... (NDP2) is part of a longer-term development perspective (Vision 2030) for Namibia. ... NDP2 policies, therefore, are geared to achieve the medium-term objectives of the Vision." (GRN, ca 2001, Foreword, p. xiii).

## 1.3 Namibia Vision 2030

The Director-General of the National Planning Commission noted in his preface to *Namibia Vision 2030*, that "Namibia's 2030 Vision is one of the most important initiatives undertaken in the country since the drafting and acceptance of the National Constitution" (GRN, 2004a, p. 13).


The first President of the Republic of Namibia, Dr Sam Nujoma, initiated the idea of Vision 2030 in 1998. The Vision itself, published in 2004 as *Namibia Vision 2030. Policy framework for long-term national development*, rests on an extensive consultation process: a survey of opinion leaders, regional sensitization and aspirations workshops, a National Aspirations conference, and preparatory workshops for the compilation of the Vision's eight supporting thematic reports:

1. Inequality and social welfare
2. Peace and political stability
3. Human resources development and institutional capacity building
4. Macroeconomic issues
5. Population, health and development

6. Namibia’s natural resources sector
7. Knowledge, information and technology
8. Factors of the external environment.

*Namibia Vision 2030* comprises a framework intended to set out clearly, “... where we are today as a nation, where we want to be by 2030 and how to get there” (GRN, 2004a, p. 9). Figure 8 illustrates how *Vision 2030* intends to link Namibia’s short-term five-year development planning approach to this long-term perspective (GRN, 2004a, untitled and unnumbered table, p. 15).

**Figure 8: How *Namibia Vision 2030* synthesizes Namibia’s natural environmental policy and national planning process into an overarching development planning framework**



A “vision” has been described as “the operational definition of values” (Thomas, 1998, p. 44). I feel confident that a worldview analysis of Vision 2030, as Namibia’s premier policy and programme setting document, will provide a reliable indication of the philosophical and real-world “green-ness” of its values.

## 2. Methodology and method

In this section, I discuss the study's (2.1) interpretive methodology approach, and (2.2) use of critical qualitative content analysis as method.

### 2.1 Methodology: an interpretive approach

In what I see as “fitting in” with “seeing green”, I have chosen an interpretive methodological approach. As opposed to entirely structural approaches to understanding social phenomena, an interpretive approach recognizes that individuals’ meanings are socially and recursively informed. A further reason for choosing an interpretive methodology is my background training in psychology and environmental psychology. Not only do I not have the requisite training in sociology to undertake an analysis of the social structures involved in the production and implementation of *Namibia Vision 2030*, but an analysis of the assumptions of its implicit or explicit worldview is personally more appealing.

Some interpretive methodologies are (2.1.1) social action theories including those of Max Weber and Clifford Geertz, and (2.1.2) semiotic and semiology approaches. These I introduce briefly before focussing (2.1.3) on the semiotic critique of ideology in mass communication, as developed by the United Kingdom [UK] Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham.

#### 2.1.1 Social action theories

The basic assumption of social action theory, which began with the work of Max Weber, is that social action is informed by subjective, but socially informed, beliefs, meanings and values. Clifford Geertz’s (ca. 1973) ‘symbolic theory of action’, which underpins his work on religion and on ideology as cultural symbolic systems, follows the social action perspective. Geertz assumes that (1) the culture of any society comprises patterns of meanings gathered up in symbol systems, such as religion, or science, or philosophy. Geertz calls this the culture’s “ethos”, and I have taken it as loosely equivalent to “worldview”; (2) these symbol systems or worldviews, or ideologies [which can be understood as a worldview applied in the interests of a social group either holding, or wishing to obtain or retain political power] both legitimate, and act as models *of* reality, and models *for* reality, for members of that society; (3) people’s symbol systems exist in “private” thought but have both been constituted in, and continue to influence, the public domain [the social constitution of reality by human beings in interaction]; and (4) understanding social action requires understanding the meanings and values of the symbol systems/worldviews/ideologies informing it.

#### 2.1.2 Semiotic and semiology approaches

These related approaches are also concerned with the meaning conveyed by symbols and signs; both have developed from de Saussure’s structural approach to language. Semiology is the continental version which later developed into structuralism and post-structuralism. Within this latter version, Haralambos and Holborn (2000, p. 935) group [structural] neo-Marxist approaches and theories such as Gramsci’s cultural hegemony, Lee Harvey’s critical social research, and, also, Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) and Norman Fairclough’s “discourse analysis” approaches (1989, 1992, 1997). Semiotics is the Anglo-American continuation, and it is often found in mass media theory, which is discussed next.

### **2.1.3 Mass communication theory, and the semiotic critique of ideology in mass communication**

Mass communication theory is interested in how the state apparatus disseminates and maintains a particular version of the ideal society, and a particular set of values [ideology], through mass communication, and the extent to which these messages are taken up by, and influence the behaviour of members of society. It seems not incorrect to me, to conceptualize *Namibia Vision 2030* as a mass communicative approach to the topic of the environment in development.

The ideology critique of mass communication theory comprises several approaches (Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, pp. 936-949; Morley, 1980), related both to the structure/content of the message, as well as its reception by readers/viewers [the “audience”]. I shall concentrate here on the ideology-in-communication critical work done by media researcher David Morley (1980), of the UK Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham. Morley (1980) and his research team were interested in how the British Broadcasting Corporation television programme *Nationwide* “encoded” its “preferred” view of reality [a worldview, one could say] in its programme content, and how audiences “decoded” the programme content. Though the focus of their research was a television programme, Morley’s neo-Marxist/Gramscian cultural hegemony approach to mass communication seems easily applicable to the content of a view of reality such as *Namibia Vision 2030*.

#### ***2.1.3.1 The neo-Marxist cultural hegemony encoding/decoding model***

This approach to mass communication theory argues that the [official] media “make meanings and organize them into systems or codes which help to make the world comprehensible to viewers and readers: they provide order and help us link together what would otherwise appear to be separate events. However, only a relatively small number of codes – organized into an ideology [or worldview] – are used to interpret reality: these become taken-for-granted sets of ideas. They are so taken for granted that they are ‘invisible’ [because shared] to those who use them to interpret the world” (Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, pp. 940-941).

The “text” then, although it represents dominant interests in a society, appears as obvious, natural, unproblematic, just common sense really. But as Morley (1980, p. 139) notes, “...the point is that ‘common sense’ always has a particular historical formulation; it is always a particular combination constituted out of elements from various ideological fields and discourses”.

Though the creators of a communication or “text” might present a hegemonic or “preferred” encoding of events – or a dominant framework of meanings, or what Morley calls, a preferred “ideological problematic” – the “text” cannot close off all possible meanings. Readers/viewers are assumed to actively ‘decode’, or re-interpret, re-define, or deconstruct (Morley, 1980, p. 143, 144) the framework of interpretation proposed in the communication. They might simply agree with the “preferred” reading, perhaps because the “ideological problematic” encoded in the communication is ‘invisible’ to them, or they “see” it and agree with it anyway; they might reject it outright in an oppositional reading of the text, or negotiate with it in some way. It is also possible that the discourse of a text is just so far removed from the reality of some readers that they fail to make any reading of it at all (Morley, 1980, p. 134).

#### ***2.1.3.2 Assessment of the encoding/decoding model for this study, and how it has been used***

Morley’s cultural hegemony mass communication encoding/decoding model is a personally attractive potential theoretical framework for the study for several reasons.

The first is its *semiotic* or meaning-making approach to worldview/ideology critique. It does not see ideology as totally structuring the individual, fixing him or her in ‘subject’ positions, but recognizes

the meaning-making that the reader brings to the text. It also avoids the overwhelming concentration of Foucauldian-type discourse-analytic approaches on analysis of power, struggle, conflict, control, oppression, repression and so on.

The encoding/decoding model accepts that there is a link between language, the social nature of thought and consciousness, the construction of social reality, and the limits/potentials which language holds for social and individual [political] action. Morley relies not only on Volosinov (1973), but also on Mills, who argued that: “It is only by utilising the symbols common to his group that a thinker can think and communicate. Language, socially built and maintained, embodies *implicit exhortations and social evaluations* ... By acquiring the categories of a language, we acquire the structured ‘ways’ of a group, and along with language, the *value-implications* of those ‘ways’. ... along with language, we acquire a set of social norms and values. A vocabulary is not merely a string of words; immanent within it are societal textures – institutional and *political* co-ordinates.” (Mills, 1939, p. 433, my italics, in Morley, 1980, p. 25).

What is the link between words and the potentials/limits of individual and social [political] action? Mills (1939, in Morley, 1980, pp. 24-25) phrases it thus: “The limits of what I can do intentionally are set by the limits of the descriptions available to me; and the descriptions available to me are those current in the social groups to which I belong. If the limits of action are the limits of description, then to analyse the ideas current in a society (or subgroup of it) is also to discern the limits within which rational, intended action necessarily moves in that society (or subgroup)”. So Mills is proposing “a theory not only of the social and psychological, but also of the political, determinations of language and thought.” (Morley, 1980, p. 25)

My interest in Morley’s model for understanding mass media communication lies in its “encoding” half. I want to see what values are upheld or rejected in the silent assumptions of *Namibia Vision 2030*’s encoding. My hope is that reading *Namibia Vision 2030* “through” the seeing green criteria list developed in section 3.4, will better enable readers to actively ‘decode’, or deconstruct the “framework of interpretation” proposed in it, enabling them in a reflected-upon way, to agree with the encoded ‘preferred’ reading, reject it outright in an oppositional reading of the text, or negotiate with it in some way. In other words, to “see”, and agree or disagree with the “preferred” view of reality which *Namibia Vision 2030* offers, and take political action accordingly.

A final reason. The “decoding” half of Morley’s model offers the possibility of future research into whether, and how readers do deconstruct *Namibia Vision 2030*.

To make explicit *Namibia Vision 2030*’s “preferred” worldview, and to assess its green-ness, I chose content analysis, a time-honoured method in mass communication research.

## **2.2 Method: Critical qualitative content analysis**

In this section, I address in (2.2.1), the often-encountered reservations about quantitative content analysis. In sub-section 2.2.2, Berelson’s (1952) qualitative content analysis is introduced. How I have “updated” Berelson’s method, is presented in sub-section 2.2.3. In sub-section 2.2.4, I explain how the seeing green criteria/indicators checklist developed in section 3.4 of this chapter, will be used to guide the actual content analysis of *Namibia Vision 2030* in Chapter Eleven.

### **2.2.1 The problem with quantitative content analysis**

Content analysis originated in the field of mass communication theory as an attempt to gain a degree of quantitative control over message content to assist analysis of message effect (Morley, 1980, p. 4). Its basic method is to decide which themes are of interest, to count their presence, and then make

deductions as to the significance of the totals arrived at. Simplistically, for example, one could count and compare the number of times the natural environment is described as “resources”, “sources” or “sinks”, and compare that with how often the word “nature” is used in *Namibia Vision 2030*. Should ‘resources’, ‘sources’ and ‘sinks’ outnumber ‘nature’ as descriptor of the physical environment, one could possibly begin to hypothesize that its worldview tends towards the grey-green “industrial-economic” rather than the “ecological” or “green”.

But I agree with Parker’s view (1992, p. 2) that content analysis used quantitatively to analyze a text such as *Namibia Vision 2030* is “likely to come to grief because ... [it makes] a fundamental mistake about the nature of meaning”. The fundamental mistake is to believe that “Words and phrases ... come ready packaged with a specific delimited meaning that a researcher can know as if they were fixed and self-contained” (Parker, 1992, p. 2). Rather the researcher must be able to appreciate that the words and phrases form patterns in a text, and “when we attempt to grasp patterns in a text [which is really what one is trying to do – what are the “patterns” which make up Vision 2030s worldview?] we always have to carry out that exercise against a cultural backdrop” (Parker, 1992, p. 2). Seeing green is essentially, a *cultural* critique. Western Enlightenment humanism, and western advanced industrial capitalism, for example, represent some of the cultural backdrop against which to make sense of seeing green’s legitimating narratives.

### 2.2.2 Qualitative content analysis (Berelson, 1952) as alternative

But content analysts, for all their positivist talk, are not as insensitive to meaning as Parker suggests. For example, “class”, and “family” as concepts and values have also been subjected to cultural critique via content analysis (Berelson, 1952, p. 116). Here is an extract from a research report, using content analysis as method: “Both the higher and lower literature of poetical realism after 1830 (in Germany) emphasize unceasingly the virtues of the middle-class family... The concentration of the middle-class periodical on the family meant in practice a specific selection in its contents. All its articles laid stress on the moral aspect of things; if social realities were not completely concealed, good care was taken not to probe them too thoroughly...” (Berelson, 1952, p. 117).

Berelson (1952), in one of the standard texts on content analysis, devotes an entire chapter (chapter 3, pp. 114-134) to qualitative content analysis. He discusses its extensive use “in literary criticism and intellectual and cultural history generally, as well as a sizeable amount of writings in political history, political and social philosophy, rhetoric, and indeed any field in which *the close reading of texts is followed by summary and interpretation* of what appears therein” (p. 114, my italics). Not the frequency of specific themes, but their presences and absences, and the *meaning* of these, is the approach of qualitative content analysis.

Berelson then goes on to note the ways in which qualitative content analysis differs from quantitative analysis. That is not my interest. My interest is rather in deciding whether or not his exposition of qualitative content analysis, used together with an informal understanding of the concept “worldview”, has potential for “placing” a text such as *Namibia Vision 2030* somewhere along the green to grey-green to grey spectrum.

According to Berelson,

(a) qualitative content analysis pays attention to presences and absences in the text: “In the political sphere, considerable power is assigned to this form of content analysis ... on the ground that it can take account of both the communication and the historical contexts...” (Berelson, 1952, p. 120). This aligns easily enough with the seeing green criteria/indicators checklist presented in section 3.4 of this chapter. For example, a text either problematizes the use of nuclear energy [“green”], or it does not [“grey-green”].

(b) Berelson remarks that “...the interest of the qualitative analyst lies less often in the content as such and more often in other areas to which the content is a cue, i.e. which it ‘reflects’ or ‘expresses’ or which is ‘latent’ in the manifest content” (1952, p. 124). The text’s content is also seen “... as a ‘reflection’ of ‘deeper’ phenomena” (p. 123), a “convenient indicator” for things going on in the text other than the expressed content. These other things might be ideology (p. 124), or an insight into the psychology of the person/ persons who created the text (p. 124), or the “intentions of a communicator” and the possible “effects upon the audience” (p. 122). In content analysis jargon, this is the “non-content” of a communication. “Non-content” is not the same as absences in a text, it is probably better understood as ‘meta-content’. During the close reading, the researcher/analyst makes inferences about/interpretations of intentions, motivations, and effects (Berelson, 1952, p. 122).

(c) Qualitative analysis utilizes more complex themes than quantitative analysis, does not seek to reduce the complexity of themes to atomistic units, but to “take them in the large on the assumption that meanings preside in the totality of impression, the Gestalt, and not in the atomistic combination of measurable units” (Berelson, 1952, p. 126).

Through this brief discussion, I hope to have shown that the usual criticisms aimed at content analysis – its supposed lack of attention to culture, history, and the social context of meaning - are unfounded. There is no reason why a qualitative use of content analysis cannot be an appropriate way of analysing the green-ness of any text’s implicit or explicit worldview, using a checklist such as that proposed in section 3.4.

### 2.2.3 Updating Berelson’s (1952) qualitative content analysis

Given that Berelson’s discussion of qualitative content analysis was written in the 1950s, some might feel that it needs postmodern updating. However, even social psychologists working within the discourse analysis school of social research at some stage employ content analysis to come to grips with their texts of interest, for example, Potter and Wetherell (1987, pp. 158-176), and Parker (1992, pp. 125-126).

I suggest that Berelson’s qualitative content analysis approach can be “updated” through awareness of all the insights into “texts” and textual analysis provided, for example, by social constructionism<sup>2</sup>, “discourse analysis”, or “deconstruction”, without either subscribing to the postmodern love of revealing relations of power and suppression in discourse, or applying any particular discourse analytic method to *Namibia Vision 2030* as text.

Let me illustrate. My start-up assumption is that *Namibia Vision 2030* is a written “text” which can be examined via qualitative content analysis to elicit a description of its explicit or implicit worldview. Any worldview is a “set of ideas replete with its key words ....” (Lemon, 2003, p. 365), phrases, metaphors, images and so on. Historical philosopher Lemon uses Lyotard’s postmodern critique of Marxism as metanarrative as example, and then, understanding “metanarrative” as a set of ideas, links it to the concept of worldview thus:

... Lyotard came to reject Marxism because he saw it as just another version of the attempt to impose a universalistic *set of ideas* and *values* upon the world. Lyotard called such attempts ‘*metanarratives*’ and the essence of his ‘postmodernism’ revolves around exposing and challenging them. By a ‘metanarrative’ he is referring to the *suppositions* he sees as interwoven in entire ways of thinking [worldviews]. The latter are articulated via their own kinds of discourse [phrases, metaphors, images and so on], and manifested in corresponding practices and institutions ..... (Lemon, 2003, p. 365; comments in brackets, as well as the

<sup>2</sup> Indeed, it is necessary to grasp these intellectual arguments, simply because “green” and “postmodern” do not always sit comfortably together

bold italics are mine).

Lemon (2003, p. 365, my bold emphasis) then writes: “This set of ideas, replete with its **key words**, **assumptions** about the nature of ‘society’, **and values**, served to legitimate a particular **outlook** which pervaded the approach to life shared by millions.”

This approach is not much different from critical discourse analyst Norman Fairclough’s (1989, pp. 109-168) understanding of keywords, key phrases, and metaphors as “traces of, and clues to” the implicit or explicit assumptions, and ideas, of a “metanarrative” or “discourse” [worldview]. Nor is it much different from Berelson’s explanation of the nuances of qualitative content analysis in 2.2.2 above. It has simply focussed the attention of the content analyser on the presence or absence of key words, key ideas, key phrases, metaphors, or images which are used explicitly or implicitly in the text, in association with the various elements [epistemology, ontology, view of human being, nature ethic as examples] of a worldview.

The next step of a postmodern discourse analysis via content analysis, would be a critical examination of power relationships, via questions such as those that Hattingh (2002, p. 14) poses about sustainable development as discourse:

Whose interests are served by adopting this or that agenda of sustainable development? Whose power is served and through which mechanisms? And who or what stands to win or lose in which ways from adopting this particular agenda of sustainable development, rather than that one? Are new forms of dependency created by adopting this or that interpretation of the agenda of sustainable development? Are new forms of domination and exploitation created...?

But the posing of such ideological questions to the worldview of *Namibia Vision 2030* which I hope to make more explicit in this study, and their answering, I leave to other researchers.

#### **2.2.4 Some technical issues in qualitative content analysis**

Content analysis, whether quantitative or qualitative, requires pre-decisions on some technical issues, such as (2.2.4.1) the units of analysis (Berelson, 1952, pp. 135-146), and (2.2.4.2), the categories of content analysis (pp. 147-168).

##### **2.2.4.1 The units of analysis**

Berelson makes three technical distinctions here:

(a) between the “recording unit” and “the context unit” (1952, pp. 135-142). The recording unit is the smallest body of content in which the focus of interest can occur. This may be a word, a sentence, a paragraph, a theme, or an entire unit, such as a chapter, or book. The focus could also be a character [person] in the text, or an item such as tables, or figures in a text, as opposed to the text itself, or a theme. The content analysis need not be limited to one recording unit only (Berelson, 1952, p. 143). In this study’s qualitative approach, the focus is on the standard worldview themes identified in Chapter Two. Because the purpose of qualitative analysis is not to count the number of occurrences of the focus of interest in a pre-specified “recording unit”, no distinction has been made in the study as to whether a theme [or its related keywords, phrases or “absences” or “meta-content”] appeared as a word, or in sentences, paragraphs, tables, and figures.

The “context unit” is “the largest body of content that may be examined in characterizing a recording unit”. In this study, the “context unit” is primarily *Namibia Vision 2030*, which is taken to mean the “Main document” of 248 pages. Where I have felt it necessary to make *Namibia Vision 2030*’s implicit or explicit standpoint on any worldview element clearer, for example, its views on population, or the

natural environment, the “context unit” also includes the eight thematic reports which informed *Namibia Vision 2030* (Figure 8 in section 1.3 of this chapter). The discussion in Chapter Eleven always makes this extension of the context unit clear.

Berleson’s (1952, pp. 142-146) next two concerns are (b) a distinction between the unit of classification, and the unit of enumeration, and (c) the use of a prior analysis of a unit to characterize a larger unit for later analysis. As I understand both these technicalities to be related more to quantitative than qualitative analysis, and as neither have been used in this study, I do not discuss them further.

#### **2.2.4.2 The hypotheses, categories and indicators of content analysis**

“Content analysis stands or falls by its categories...” (Berelson, 1952, p. 147).

Content analysis which is not based on “a clearly formulated problem” and “fully-stated, dependent hypotheses and questions” (Berelson, 1952, p. 162), or which utilizes the “hit-or-miss method of analyzing ‘everything’ in a body of content in the hope that ‘something will turn up’...” (p. 162), or is based on “vaguely drawn or poorly articulated categories” (p. 147), is, in Berelson’s view, almost certain to be “of indifferent or low quality” (p. 147), unproductive, and uneconomic (p. 162). The key to successful content analysis lies in careful formulation of a hypothesis/hypotheses, analysis categories, and their indicators.

The to date unstated “problem” for this study has been the unsubstantiated idea that although Namibia has an impressive on-paper pro-environmental image (section 1.1 of this chapter), as an environmental psychology post-graduate, and former worker in the environmental management consultancy world, I experience a qualitative difference between what is *said*, i.e. *written as policy*, in Namibia, and what actually happens in practice. Some examples are the lengthy finalization of the Environmental Management Act (section 1.1.4), the contentious Epupa hydro-electric power scheme (Friedmann, in Miescher & Henrichsen, 2000, pp. 222-235), the Ramatex textile factory saga<sup>3</sup>, the clubbing of seal pups despite international censure (former Wildlife Society of Namibia files now held by its successor body, the Namibian Environment and Wildlife Society (NEWS)), or the implementation of The Green Scheme in the north without an Environmental Impact Assessment as required by Namibian policy (pers. comm. Dr Peter Tarr, Southern Africa Institute for Environmental Assessment, 22 November 2007). There appears to be a “gap” somewhere. This became a tentative informal hypothesis: Namibia’s natural environment policies aren’t really, i.e. fundamentally, “green”.

But what does “green” mean? It became clear from my reading, which culminated in Chapter Eight, that “seeing green” is a total worldview, a total western cultural critique, not only a viewpoint about the natural environment. The tentative hypothesis evolved into something like: “The worldview within which Namibia’s natural environment policies are generated, is not really green; that might explain the ‘gap’ between policy and practice”. The reasons for the choice of *Namibia Vision 2030* as test “worldview” for this hypothesis have already been set out in section 1 of this chapter.

To “test” this informal “hypothesis”, “categories” of analysis were developed which largely approximate the themes which environmental philosopher Sylvan pursues in his research into deep ecology as worldview (Chapter Two: 1.3.1). The categories can also be understood as sub-

---

<sup>3</sup> Ramatex, a Windhoek-based textile factory, is Namibia’s own example of the effects of a globalizing economy. Under Namibia’s Foreign Direct Investment scheme, Ramatex was allowed to commence operations in 2002 under suspension of Namibia’s Labour Act of 1992, and without any publicly available Environmental Impact Assessment as well (Shindondola & Jauch, 2003, pp. 4-5, p. 39). This despite the Cabinet-approved Namibia Environmental Assessment Policy, and a commitment by the Windhoek City Council to environmental sustainability within its area of jurisdiction. Ramatex has remained contentious because of its labour record, its large-scale water use, and hazardous waste streams. Civil society/NGO criticism of both the Epupa and Ramatex projects has been met with considerable antagonism by the Government, which has characterized such criticism as environmental extremism (Friedmann, 2000, p. 230), propaganda charades, and paternalistic arrogance (Aloe, February 2002)

“hypotheses”, for example, “*Namibia Vision 2030s* implicit or explicit ontology is unlikely to be a holistic, organismic, purposive view of reality/nature” [category 6, in section 3.4 of this chapter]. I have however preferred to pose the categories as questions: “Does *Namibia Vision 2030s* implicit or explicit ontology tend towards a holistic, organismic, purposive view of reality?”

As content analysis categories are “often quite generalized ... they require the designation of specific, concrete indicators which represent the categories yet refer directly to the particular content under analysis” (Berelson, 1952, p. 163). Berelson warns that “If the categories cannot be formulated in terms of analyzable indicators, then a content analysis cannot be done. On the other hand, if the indicators easily fit the content, but bear only a remote relation to the categories, then the content analysis is not worthwhile” (p. 164).

With this warning in mind, as well as his admonition (Berelson, 1952, pp. 164-165) that “the hypotheses should adequately express the problem, the categories adequately express the hypotheses, and the indicators adequately express the categories”, the seeing green checklist was compiled. It is presented next.

### 3 Seeing green/grey-green: criteria and indicators

In this section, I explain (3.1) how the understanding of “green” in Chapter Eight has been reduced to categories, (3.2) how grey-green criteria derived from Chapter Nine have been added to them, and (3.3) how indicators have been provided for each criterion. In (3.4), I present the full checklist, which is assumed to cover the range of views indicated in Wissenburg’s heuristic (Chapter One, Figure 2), that is, from dark and pale green on the left, to grey-green and grey on the right. In (3.5), I explain how the criteria will be tested.

#### 3.1 The green categories or criteria

The understanding of “seeing green” presented in Chapter Eight, has been distilled into 18 categories, or criteria, or broad themes of analysis. They are arranged under the by-now familiar headings of legitimating narratives, epistemology, ontology, moral philosophy [“the good life”], ethics, as well as views on development, the natural environment, the economy, social cohesion, and the political process. Each category has an identifying number, from 1 to 18. They represent sub-hypotheses, or questions, that one might put to any text. Thus, in a “green” text, one would expect that:

#### LEGITIMATING NARRATIVES

1. The idea of androcentrism, including the ideas of anthropocentrism, hierarchy, and patriarchy, are critiqued [or, phrased as a question, Are the ideas of androcentrism, anthropocentrism, hierarchy, or patriarchy, critiqued in this text?]
2. Western capitalist techno-industrialism as definition of “the good life”, is challenged
  3. Ecology is seen as normative
4. Spirituality is recognized as necessary for personal and social transformation

#### EPISTEMOLOGY

5. Rationality/rationalism as sole way of knowing is critiqued, problematized

#### ONTOLOGY

6. A holistic, organismic, purposive view of reality/nature is proposed
7. There is philosophical concern for a reconceptualized human being/nature relationship
8. There is philosophical concern for a reconceptualized Self

**ETHIC, WITH FOCUS ON AN ETHIC FOR NATURE**

9. There is an account of the ethical generally, which differs from standard [or “masculine”] western accounts
10. The ethic for nature is ecological sustainability, understood as long-range, and “wide”, and not as only human-instrumental environmental sustainability

**REAL-WORLD SEEING GREEN POLITICS IN AN ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY**

*SOME VIEWS ON SOCIAL REFORM*

11. Fundamental, ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal reformation of society’s values and structures are proposed

*SOME VIEWS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT*

12. Long-range, wide, ecological sustainability is placed at least on a par with, if not ahead of social or economic sustainability
13. Animals are treated ethically

*SOME VIEWS ON THE ECONOMY*

14. The economy is ecologically re-oriented

*SOME VIEWS ON LOCAL AND GLOBAL SOCIAL COHESION*

15. Living in solidarity is advocated
16. Non-violence, and radical peace are advocated

*SOME VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL PROCESS*

17. Grassroots [“direct”] democracy is advocated
18. Living/enacting your personal moral beliefs in the public-political sphere is encouraged.

Hereafter, these criteria are presented in two-column tabular format. Column A contains the criterion’s identifying number, and Column B, its description.

**3.2 The grey-green criteria**

“Sustainable development”, and not “seeing green”, is the discourse of environment and development. Its central ideas sometimes differ so widely from “seeing green”, that I felt the provision of some grey-green criteria was justified, particularly to enable a reader to recognize whether a text is presenting “weaker” or “stronger” versions of anthropocentrism, environmental sustainability, or sustainable development (Chapter Nine). These criteria have been included in the checklist as counterpart to their “seeing green” versions, and given the same criterion number, only preceded by the letters GG [“grey-green”]. As examples:

A	B
1	The ideas of androcentrism, anthropocentrism, hierarchy, and patriarchy are critiqued
GG 1	There will be a tendency towards “weak” anthropocentrism [grey-green], or perhaps even “strong” anthropocentrism [practically grey]

Or,

A	B
10	Ecological sustainability is understood as long-range, and wide, not merely as human-instrumental-only environmental sustainability
GG 10	A grey-green text is more likely to tend towards “sensible” [more grey-green] or “weaker” [less grey-green] versions of environmental sustainability. Conceptual answers to the questions What is to be sustained of the natural environment, and to what extent?, For whom?, and For how long? are likely to tend toward: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. What is to be sustained? Substitutability between the various types of capital – natural (renewable and non-renewable), human-made, and human-social – is acceptable <i>up to a point</i>, after which it is not.</li> <li>b. For whom is the natural environment to be sustained? For people.</li> <li>c. For how long is the inter-generational equity to last? The next generation only.</li> </ul>

### 3.3 Providing indicators for the criteria

(a) Indicators and sub-indicators are provided to help in applying the criteria. They too are numbered in accordance with their main criterion. Indicative, not exhaustive, supporting data is given for the criteria/indicators. As example:

A	B
<b>8</b>	<b>There is philosophical concern for a reconceptualized Self (Ch 8: 4.3, 4.3.1)</b>
8.1	Western atomist individualism problematized as a Self/Other relationship? (Ch 8: 4.3.2). For example,
8.1.1	Homo <i>economicus</i> implicitly or explicitly critiqued?
8.1.2	Aggression, competitiveness, and related adversarial values critiqued?
8.1.3	A ‘male’ disconnected sense of Self critiqued?
8.2	The new Self as liberated, re-integrated, embodied, connected? (Ch 8: 4.3.3)
8.2.1	Complete liberation and freedom, especially for women, from all forms of hierarchy, patriarchy, and any other form of domination, or coercion (Ch 8: 4.3.3.1)
8.2.2	Unrepressed re-admittance of the body into what it is to be a fully-functioning human being (Ch 8: 4.3.3. 2)

(b) The same indicator may be used for more than one criterion. Such use should be clear from the numbering in column A. For example, criterion 4 below also utilizes indicator 2.3 from criterion 2:

A	B
<b>4</b>	<b>Spirituality is recognized as necessary for personal and social transformation (Ch 8: 2.3, 4.3.3.6)</b>
4.1	▶ Solidarity lifestyles with have-nots advocated
4.2	▶ Living in authentic community with other human beings, and in a partnership ethic with nature advocated
2.3	▶ Materialism and consumerism critiqued as values (Ch 8: 6.3.3.2)

### 3.4 The “seeing green” criteria/indicators checklist

The seeing green criteria are presented next in tabular format:

<b>SEEING GREEN CRITERIA IN TABULAR FORMAT</b>	
<i>N.B. The number in Column A is the reference number of the criterion or indicator. Column B describes the criteria/indicators. They should be understood within the context of ideas presented in Chapter 8 or Chapter 9</i>	
<b>LEGITIMATING NARRATIVES</b>	
<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>The ideas of androcentrism, anthropocentrism, hierarchy and patriarchy [their value dualisms and logic of domination] are critiqued? (Ch 8: 2, 2.1)</b>
	<p><i>Androcentrism:</i> A male, disconnected sense of Self; a patriarchal orientation, and a power-based morality (Gaard, 1993, p. 2, 3, 6; also Kheel, 1990, in Diamond &amp; Orenstein, 1990, pp. 129-131). The (male) disconnected Self views everything else as “Other” to itself, and thus as a potential object of management, exploitation, domination, or oppression. It manifests itself structurally and systemically as hierarchy and patriarchy (Ch 6: 6.1.1)</p> <p><i>Hierarchy:</i> “The cultural, traditional and psychological systems of obedience and command, not merely the economic and political systems to which the terms class and State most appropriately refer. ... I refer to the domination of the young by the old, of women by men, of one ethnic group by another, of ‘masses’ by bureaucrats who profess to speak of ‘higher social interests’, of countryside by town, and in a more subtle psychological sense, of body by mind, of spirit by a shallow instrumental rationality” (Bookchin, 1982, p. 4 in Ch 5: 4.2.2.2). The idea of hierarchy gives rise to domination (Ch 5: 2.3) and a “power-over” the Other mentality (Ch 6:6.1.1)</p> <p><b>Antithesis: emancipation from value dualisms, understood within a logic of domination, or power-over thinking; egalitarianism; complementarity; self-management</b></p> <p><i>Patriarchy:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “hierarchical dualism ” is the “organizing principle” of patriarchal thought (Birkeland, 1993, Ch 6: 6.2)</li> <li>• “the male-dominated system of social relations and values” justified by the systematic devaluation of the feminine principle (Birkeland, 1993, Ch 6: 6.1.1, footnote 95)</li> <li>• “the structure of patriarchy” considered to rest on the “four interlocking pillars” of “racism, sexism, class exploitation, and ecological destruction” (Collins, 1973; in Warren’s (1987) words, “sexism, racism, classism <i>and</i> naturism”, both in Ch 6: 1, footnote 2)</li> <li>• “the manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in society in general” (Birkeland, 1993, Ch 6: 6.1.1, footnote 95)</li> </ul> <p><b>Antithesis: adoption of the “feminine principle”</b></p> <p><i>Anthropocentrism:</i> “... the philosophical perspective asserting that ethical principles apply to humans only, and that human needs and interests are of highest, and even exclusive, value and importance. Thus, concern for nonhuman entities is limited to those entities having value to humans.” (Botzler &amp; Armstrong, 1998b, p. 309).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “a reason/nature dualism underlies the conceptual framework of Western patriarchal cultures”; the “separation of humanity and nature” considered as “the lynch pin of patriarchal ideology” (Davion, 1996, and Salleh, 1993, respectively, in Ch 6: 1, footnote 2)</li> <li>• “the domination of human by human which has produced the very idea of dominating nature” (Bookchin, 1988, Ch 5: 2.1.4.2.1 read together with 4.2.2).</li> </ul> <p><b>Antithesis: nature has value-for-itself</b></p>
1.1	Anthropocentrism as lead value in the human-nature relationship critiqued either as theory of value in nature, and/or as contributing to the ecological crisis? (Ch 8: 2.1, 2.1.1)
GG 1.1	If the text tends towards anthropocentrism, is the tendency towards “weak” anthropocentrism [grey-green], or “strong” anthropocentrism [more or less grey] (Ch 9: 6.1)
GG 1.1.1	<p>Strong anthropocentrism</p> <p>a. “nonhuman environment primarily as a bundle of natural resources to be managed and exploited for maximal human gain. This is the view that is captured in much of natural</p>

	<p>resource economics...” (Barrett &amp; Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34, Ch 9: 6.1)</p> <p>b. “... The ecosystem has only instrumental value, not intrinsic worth.....” (Barrett &amp;Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34, Ch 9: 6.1)</p> <p>c. “...is characterized by the notion that nonhuman species and natural objects have value only to the extent that they satisfy a “felt preference”. A “felt preference” is any fulfillable human desire – whether or not it is based on thought and reflection. ...” [i.e. a “considered preference”] (Botzler &amp; Armstrong, 1998b, pp. 309 – 310, Ch 9: 6.1)</p> <p>d. “takes unquestioned felt preferences of human individuals [such as high consumptive lifestyles, based on an exploitative and extractive use of nature as “a storehouse of raw materials” (Norton, 1984, p. 135)] as determining value” (Norton, 1984, p. 135, Ch 9: 6.3.1)</p>
GG 1.1.2	<p>Weak [or sophisticated, or enlightened] anthropocentrism (Ch 9: 6.1), 6.3.2)</p> <p>a. “ ...focuses not on immediate human gratification so much as on the satisfaction of basic needs for the whole human community, present and future ...,” (Barrett &amp;Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34, Ch 9: 6.1)</p> <p>b. “Given uncertainty about dynamics and interactions, the weak anthropocentric approach often favours caution with respect to resource exploitation ... ” (Barrett &amp;Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34, Ch 9: 6.1)</p> <p>c. “It also generally rejects the cost-benefit analysis – especially the sort that discounts future costs and benefits – that guides strong anthropocentrist decision-making...” (Barrett &amp;Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34, Ch 9: 6.1)</p> <p>d. “and they acknowledge nature’s intrinsic value<sup>4</sup>...” (Barrett &amp;Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34, Ch 9: 6.1)</p> <p>e. denies “... that preference satisfaction is the only measure of human value” (Norton, 1984, p. 138); considered preferences within a reflected-upon worldview should act as “ ... a limit upon felt preferences” (Norton, 1984 p. 138, Ch 9: 6.3.1)</p> <p>f. The environmental ethic of such a reflected-upon worldview would include at least the following resource allocation principles (Ch 9: 6.3.2):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. The theory of value at the individual level is “the prima facie equality of felt preferences of individual humans” (Norton, 1984, p. 146)</li> <li>ii. At the non-individual level, “the value of ongoing human life and consciousness ... [is the] central value principle (p. 146).</li> <li>iii. An ethic of resource allocation should apply to nonrenewable resources as well as to renewable ones (Norton, 1984, p. 145) [indicator 14.2.2],</li> <li>iv. and should also imply a population policy” (Norton, 1984, p. 145) [indicator 12.2]</li> </ol>
1.2	<p>Some or all of the following expressions of hierarchy and ‘power over’ vis-a-vis other human beings critiqued?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nationalism, statism, parliamentarianism, militarism, classism, sexism, racism, authoritarian bureaucracy in human affairs (Ch 8: 2.1.1)</li> <li>• Instead, there is respect for difference, dialogue? (Ch 8: 6.6.3.3)</li> </ul>
1.3	<p>Is ‘naturism’ critiqued as expression of the idea of hierarchy and “power over” the Other, in this case, nature? (Ch 8: 2.1, 4.2.1, 6.3.3.4)</p> <p>[‘naturism’, any way of thinking about, or acting towards nonhuman nature “that reflects a logic, values, or attitude of domination” (Warren, 1990, p. 141 in Ch 6: 1.3); the instrumental exploitation, domination, management or destruction of nature]</p>
1.4	<p>Relational metaphors are welcomed, employed, and mechanistic metaphors employed negatively or rejected (Ch 8: 2.1.3)</p>
1.5	<p>The problematic role of language in Self/Other relationships (humans, women, nature, animals) highlighted? (Ch 8: 3.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sexist, mechanistic, aggressive, hostile language in representing human-human relationships, or the human-nature relationship is problematized, avoided?</li> </ul>

<sup>4</sup> Note that Norton’s version of weak anthropocentrism does not accord intrinsic value to nature (Ch 9: 6.3)

1.6	Rhetoric employed is of liberation: (Ch 8: 2.1.4) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>liberation from oppression for all oppressed human groups [this would include liberation from racism, tribalism, colonialism]</li> <li>liberation for women from patriarchy</li> <li>liberation for animals from speciesism or inegalitarianism</li> <li>liberation for nature from human domination</li> <li>liberation for ourselves from our dominator role, amongst other human beings, and in nature.</li> </ol>
-----	--

<b>2</b>	<b>Western capitalist techno-industrialism as definition of “the good life”, is challenged?</b> (Ch 8: 2.1.1, 6.3.1, 6.3.3, 6.3.3.1)
2.1	Some or all of the following characteristics of western [“North”] capitalist techno-industrialism as definition of ‘the good life’ are challenged:
2.1.1	Capitalism [e.g. its ecological destruction, alienation, war-propensity, inegalitarianism] problematized/rejected as cultural/socio-economic system? (Ch 8: 6.3.2, 6.3.3.5) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Market system problematized</li> <li>The “economization of reality” critiqued?</li> <li>Advanced industrial capitalism on a global scale problematized [globalization]</li> </ol>
2.1.2	Industrialism critiqued (Ch 8: 6.3.3.1)
2.1.3	Materialism and consumerism critiqued as end values (Ch 8: 6.3.3.2)
2.1.4	Instrumental science and technology problematized; if not rejected (Ch 8: 3.2, 6.3.3.3)
1.3	Is ‘naturism’ critiqued as expression of the idea of hierarchy and “power over” the Other, in this case, nature? (Ch 8: 2.1, 4.2.1, 6.3.3.4) [‘naturism’, any way of thinking about, or acting towards nonhuman nature “that reflects a logic, values, or attitude of domination” (Warren, 1990, p. 141 in Ch 6: 1.3); the instrumental exploitation, domination, management or destruction of nature]
2.2	Alternatives to “North” understandings of “the good life” (Ch 8: 6.3.4, 6.3.5), and conceptual models of development proposed, other than development as capitalist techno-industrialism [i.e. free-market models of sustainable development]? (Ch 8: 6.3.4, 6.3.5; Ch 9: 7.1). [For example, development embracing more radical environmentalism would be one in which “...economy and technology are ecologically sensitive, one whose values and attitudes are ‘ecocentric’, whose politics are ‘ecologicistic’ and whose view of ecology itself is deep rather than shallow” (Hayward, 1995, p. 2)]
GG 2.2	A grey-green text is more likely to propose “sustainable development” as development model
GG 2.2.1	If the sustainable development model is embraced, does it tend more toward the “stronger” version? (Ch 9: 7.2) <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>sensible or even strong environmental sustainability (Ch 9: 3.4.1.4, 3.4.1.3 respectively)</li> <li>intra-generational egalitarianism expressed in zero rate of discount for example for non-renewable resources (Ch 9: 3.4.3.4, 3.4.3.5), or “depletion schedules”, and steps have been identified, and are being taken, to ensure in the process of depletion, the provision of suitable substitutes for non-renewable resources [indicator 14.2.2 b]. For renewable resources, models have been established which indicate what the maximum sustainable yield of a resource is, so that present generations do not harvest beyond this limit [indicator 14.2.2 a]</li> <li>a bottom-up local participation approach in development planning, which involves public participation in both the setting of objectives and their implementation, “since participation is held to be a good in itself – that is, it has intrinsic value. For managerialists, participation has extrinsic value; it is a means to implement sustainable development.” (Davidson, 2000, pp. 30-31, in Ch 9: 7.2.1c; see also Ch 9: 4.2.2)</li> <li>social restructuring (Ch 8: 6.2)</li> <li>a view of nature as possessing intrinsic value and rights (Ch 2: 2.5.3), OR</li> </ol>



GG 2.2.2	<p>the “weaker” version? (Ch 9: 7.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. weak environmental sustainability (Ch 9: 3.4.1.5)</li> <li>b. a non-zero rate of discounting is adopted in economic decisions pertaining to future economic agents (Ch 9: 3.4.3.5)</li> <li>c. a more top-led, managerialist approach to development planning: (Ch 9: 7.2.1c): “The ‘top-down’ version ... is that favored by most governments, because, by limiting participation to major stakeholders, including business, local government, interest groups and other nongovernment organizations, they can retain control of the sustainable development agenda. It is a technocratic strategy in that objectives are set by governments using experts, with public participation limited to the implementation stage of policy formulation.” (Davidson, 2000, pp. 30-31, in Ch 9: 7.2.1c)</li> <li>d. a reform environmentalism approach [indicator 11.3]</li> </ul>
-------------	---

<b>3</b>	<b>Ecology seen as normative? (Ch 8: 2.2, 4.1, 4.1.1-4.1.6, 5.3.2.2)</b>
3.1	<p>Specific values in nature are recognized as normative for personal and social values?:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Self-organization, self-reliance</li> <li>b. Egalitarianism</li> <li>c. symbiosis [seen as contributing to diversity], mutualism, interdependence, co-operation, toleration, harmony rather than conflict</li> <li>d. Diversity, unity in diversity</li> <li>e. Complexity</li> <li>f. Richness (abundance)</li> <li>g. Spontaneity</li> </ul>
3.2	<p>Specific values in nature are recognized as normative for environmental sustainability? (also Ch 9: 5.3.2, 5.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Purpose, directionality, self-organization</li> <li>b. Symbiosis [seen as contributing to diversity], mutualism, interdependence, co-operation, harmony rather than conflict</li> <li>c. diversity (complexity, richness understood as abundance) and stability (equilibrium, “balance”)</li> </ul>
GG 3	<p>A grey-green text might espouse a “deconstructive” or “permissive” ecology (Ch 9: 5.4)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Nature is described in terms of disequilibrium as normal state: unstable, erratic, discontinuous, chaotic, unpredictable</li> <li>b. The diversity-stability link is problematized, downplayed, or rejected</li> </ul>

<b>4</b>	<b>Spirituality recognized as necessary for personal and social transformation? (Ch 8: 2.3, 4.3.3.6)</b>
4.1	Living in authentic <i>community</i> with other human beings, and in a partnership ethic with nature advocated?
2.1.3	Materialism and consumerism critiqued as end values (Ch 8: 6.3.3.2); lifestyles-of-enough proposed

<b>EPISTEMOLOGY (Ch 8: 3, 3.1)</b>	
<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Rationality/rationalism as sole way of knowing critiqued, problematized? (Ch 8: 3.2)</b>
5.1	Instrumental rationality problematized? (Ch 8: 3.2)
GG 5.1	A grey-green inclined text is likely to embrace “economic rationality” (Ch 9: 3.1.3)



2.1.4	Instrumental, or “masculine” science and technology problematized, if not rejected? (Ch 8: 3.2, 6.3.3.3)
5.2	Holistic, relational, dialectical-process epistemologies advocated? (Ch 8: 3.3)

<b>ONTOLOGY (Ch 8: 4)</b>	
<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>A holistic, organismic, purposive view of reality/nature? (Ch 8: 4.1, 4.1.1-4.1.6)</b>
6.1	Nature as alive, organismic, holistic, non-hierarchical?
6.2	Nature as manifesting consciousness, subjectivity, “mind”?
6.3	Nature as manifesting directionality, and self-organization?
6.4	Nature as tending toward, and maintaining where achieved, greater complexity, diversity, dynamic balance and stability?
GG 6	A grey-green inclined text tends to describe nature in materialist, mechanistic, or economic terms: (Ch 9: 5.1, 5.2, 5.3.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. “natural environment” rather than “nature”; “ecosystem” rather than “ecocommunity”</li> <li>b. the economization of reality: nature as resources, environmental goods and services, sources and sinks, a “conservationist” understanding of ecosystem health</li> </ul>

<b>7</b>	<b>Philosophical concern for a reconceptualized human being/nature relationship? (Ch 8: 4.2, 4.2.1)</b>
7.1	Sharp dichotomy between humans and nature problematized/rejected? (Ch 8: 4.2.2), and human continuity rather than discontinuity with nonhuman nature emphasized? (Ch 8: 4.2.3)
1.1	Anthropocentrism problematized/rejected? (Ch 8: 2.1, 2.1.1)

<b>8</b>	<b>Philosophical concern for a reconceptualized Self? (Ch 8: 4.3, 4.3.1)</b>
8.1	Western atomist individualism problematized as a Self/Other relationship? (Ch 8: 4.3.2). For example,
8.1.1	Homo <i>economicus</i> implicitly or explicitly critiqued?
8.1.2	Aggression, competitiveness, and related adversarial values critiqued?
8.1.3	A ‘male’ disconnected sense of Self critiqued?
8.2	The new Self as liberated, re-integrated, embodied, connected? (Ch 8: 4.3.3)
8.2.1	Complete liberation and freedom, especially for women, from all forms of hierarchy, patriarchy, and any other form of domination, or coercion (Ch 8: 4.3.3.1, 6.3.3.3)
8.2.2	Unrepressed re-admittance of the body into what it is to be a fully-functioning human being (Ch 8: 4.3.3.2)
8.2.3	The ‘feminine principle’: feminine values re-integrated into views of the better male or female person (Ch 8: 4.3.3.3)
8.2.4	An interconnected sense of Self, in which a non-dominating relationship with nature is <i>also</i> part of what it is to be an integrated, mature, human being (Ch 8: 4.3.3.5, 5.3.1)
8.2.5	The fully functioning person understood as the whole person: re-integrated, well-rounded (Ch 8: 4.3.3.4)
8.2.6	Real-world, integrated, holistic and ongoing education, geared to the development of the whole person, not merely Homo <i>economicus</i> , and including meaningful participation in political life (Ch 8: 6.6.1, 6.6.9, 6.7.1).

<b>ETHIC, WITH FOCUS ON AN ETHIC FOR NATURE</b>	
<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>An account of the ethical generally which differs from standard [or “masculine”] western accounts? (Ch 8: 5.2)</b>
9.1	A single ethic for people, and for nature (Ch 8: 5.1)



9.2	The epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning rational-instrumentalism towards nature (women, animals) critiqued (Ch 8: 5.2. 1)
9.3	Emotion (empathy, identification, care, compassion) re-integrated into accounts of the ethical (Ch 8: 5.2.2)
9.4	Context [the particular, the personal, “place”] re-integrated into accounts of the ethical (Ch 8: 5.2.3)
9.5	The body re-admitted into accounts of the ethical (Ch 8: 5.2.4, 4.3.3.2)
9.6	The rights concept in human-human, and human-nonhuman relationships rejected, or problematized, even if employed (Ch 8: 5.2.5)

<b>10</b>	<p><b>An ethic for nature in which ecological sustainability is understood as long-range, and wide, not merely as human-instrumental-only environmental sustainability?</b> (Ch 8: 5.1, 5.5, 5.5.1)</p> <p>The nature ethic described approximates the following description: <i>An empathetic, caring, respectful partnership ethic, which extends beyond a humans-only focus, recognizing also nature’s value-for-itself, now, and on a long-term basis</i></p>
10.1	<p>“Long-range” means long-range, not short-term political-economical (Ch 8: 5.5.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some more specific indicator than “future generations” is given, for example, the “seven generations” criterion?</li> </ul>
10.2	“Wide” means,
10.2.1	nature’s value-for-itself, not only as resources-for-humans, is recognized? (Ch 8: 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.2.1), In turn, this means that
10.2.2	<p>the scope of the nature ethic is extended conceptually beyond human interests only? (Ch 8: 5.4, 5.4.1, 5.4.2)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To some or all of nature, whether animate, inanimate, individual, species, ecosystem, or ecosystemic process, <i>because of its value-in-itself</i>, not merely its resources-for-humans value?</li> <li>• Animal wellbeing (some, or all animals) admitted into the sphere of morality? [animal welfare/liberation]</li> </ul>
10.3	<p>Ecological sustainability is to be achieved through any of the following ethical approaches? (Ch 8: 5.5.3, 5.5.4, 6.6.1)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assigning legal standing to sue, thus rights, to some of nonhuman nature</li> <li>Biospherical egalitarianism – empathetically respecting every life form’s equal or same right to “live and blossom”</li> <li>Actively employing human creativity to restore and maintain biological evolution towards mutuality, diversity, and increasing subjectivity</li> <li>Practising an ethic of care</li> <li>Practising a non-violent, partnership ethic with nature which protects the life basis for all living beings</li> </ol>
GG 10.3	<p>A grey-green text is more likely to emphasize the concepts “conservation” and “stewardship” (Ch 9: 7.3).</p> <p>[To establish whether these concepts are anthropocentrically or ecocentrically understood, ask the questions What? For whom, and For how long? For a quantitative indicator of the For how long? question, see indicator 14.14]</p>
	<p>Earlier relevant criteria/indicators which might be helpful in assessing a text’s ethic for nature are –</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1 Anthropocentrism rejected?</li> <li>1.3 Naturism problematized?</li> <li>3.2 Specific values in nature are recognized as normative for environmental sustainability? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Purpose, directionality, self-organization</li> <li>Symbiosis [seen as contributing to diversity], mutualism, interdependence, co-operation, harmony rather than conflict</li> <li>Diversity (complexity, richness understood as abundance) and stability (equilibrium, “balance”)</li> </ol> </li> </ol>

<b>REAL-WORLD SEEING GREEN POLITICS IN AN ECOLOGICAL SOCIETY (Ch 8: 6, 6.1)</b> [N.B. These are to be understood within the context of seeing green's legitimating narratives, epistemology, ontology and ethic, described above]	
<b>SOME VIEWS ON SOCIAL REFORM</b>	
<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>Fundamental, ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal reformation of society's values and structures proposed? (Ch 8: 6.2, 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.3, 6.3.1, 6.3.4, 6.3.5, 6.5.5, 6.6.2)</b>
11.1	<b>Values:</b> ecologically-informed values [indicator 3.1], and/or post-patriarchal social values advocated (Ch 8: 6.2.1, 6.6.2), for example, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The 'feminine principle' recognized</li> <li>b. Egalitarianism</li> <li>c. Emphasis on the co-operative, not the competitive: interdependence, solidarity, mutual aid, complementarity, reciprocity, partnership valued</li> <li>d. Pluralism, diversity, difference as asset</li> </ul>
11.2	<b>Structures:</b> ecologically-informed, and/or post-hierarchical forms of political and socio-economic organization advocated (Ch 8: 6.2.2)
11.2.1	More radical indicators: (Ch 8: 6.2.1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Rejection of statism, nationalism, patriotism, and bureaucracy as forms of hierarchy and patriarchy, in favour of ecologically-based regions, and radical self-management [direct or face to face democracy] in all spheres of our everyday lives</li> <li>b. A rejection of the city in favour of decentralized, well-rounded, ecologically-balanced communities</li> <li>c. A rejection of a capitalist, market, and centralized economy in favour of local, community-managed, regionally-appropriate, self-reliant, outside the market economies which utilize eco-technology</li> <li>d. A rejection of the patriarchal family in favour of "liberated sexuality" [understood as practised between equals] (Bookchin, 1967/1968, in Bookchin, 1974, p. 41, Ch 5: 4.3)</li> </ul>
11.2.2	Less radical indicators (Ch 8: 6.2.2): Emphasis on <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. human scale instead of gigantism</li> <li>b. unbundling and decentralization instead of concentration</li> <li>c. egalitarianism, local autonomy, self-management instead of hierarchy and bureaucracy</li> <li>d. re-integration instead of separation or marginalization</li> </ul>
11.3	Reform environmentalism alone rejected as insufficient to resolve the ecological crisis? (Ch 8: 6.2.3)
GG 11.3	A grey-green text is more likely to espouse "reform environmentalism" (Ch 8: 6.2.3), which holds that there is no need for radical reform of those structures of society which embody anthropocentric attitudes [e.g. capitalism which views nature-as-resources-for-humans].  Instead, the following kinds of measures are advocated: <p>"...enacting legislation, changing public policy, increasing education, altering tax laws, returning 'public lands' to private ownership, emphasizing moral obligations to future generations of humans, promoting wise 'stewardship' of nature, and otherwise encouraging more prudent use and more equitable allocation of natural resources" (Zimmerman, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. viii, in Ch 8: 6.2.3), OR</p> <p>"For some people, especially optimists and those with an interest in continuing 'business as usual', what is needed is to modify present practices – for example, by introducing lead-free petrol and ozone-friendly aerosols – but without questioning the need for the products, let alone the underlying values of the resultant green consumerism or green capitalism. ... Common to reformist positions in general, ...is the view that concern with the environment can appropriately and adequately be taken up within prevailing modes of thought and action. ..." (Hayward, 1995, p. 2)</p>



<b>SOME VIEWS ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT</b>	
<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>
<b>12</b>	<b>Policies place long-range, wide, ecological sustainability at least on a par with, if not ahead of social or economic sustainability? (Ch 8: 6.4, 6.4.1, 6.4.2)</b>
12.1	Policies tend to follow a ‘stronger’ environmental sustainability approach (Ch 9: 3.4.1.1 – 3.4.1.3)
GG 12.1	<p>A grey-green text is more likely to tend towards “sensible” or “weaker” versions of environmental sustainability (Ch 9: 3.4.1.4, 3.4.1.5, 3.4.1.6, 3.4.1.6.1).</p> <p>Conceptual answers to the questions What is to be sustained of the natural environment, and to what extent?, For whom?, and For how long? are likely to tend toward:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is to be sustained? Substitutability between the various types of capital – natural (renewable and non-renewable), human-made, and human-social, is acceptable <i>up to a point</i>, after which it is not<sup>5</sup>.</li> <li>For whom is the natural environment to be sustained? For people</li> <li>For how long is the inter-generational equity to last? The next generation only</li> </ol> <p>These conceptual answers require that some kind of formal in-country accounting other than GDP is undertaken to keep track of any transformation of “natural” capital into “human” capital (Neeffjes, 2000, p. 29 in Ch 9: 3.4.1.6). Indicators of such natural resource accounting are provided at indicator 14.2</p>
12.2	<p>Human population growth rate stabilized/reduced (Ch 8: 6.4.4, Ch 9: 6.3.2 (d))</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a weak (enlightened) anthropocentrism position [indicator GG 1.1.2] would set a population policy for a generation as a whole based on the carrying capacity of the environment</li> </ol>
12.3	Excessive [i.e. non-vital] intervention into natural processes reduced, or at least, precautionary principle applied (Ch 8: 6.4.5; Ch 9: 5.3.2, 5.3.3);
12.4	Biodiversity and its habitat protected (Ch 8: 6.4.6)
12.4.1	Large areas of “free nature <sup>6</sup> ” set aside from human techno-industrial progress
12.4.2	Industrial activities which threaten wide ecological sustainability scaled down
12.4.3	Biotechnology/genetic modification problematized
12.5	Reduced resource consumption advocated: energy as example (Ch 8: 6.4.7)
12.5.1	Stabilized and reduced use of non-renewable energy advocated (Ch 8: 6.4.7.1)
12.5.2	Increased reliance on renewable energy advocated (Ch 8: 6.4.7.2)
12.5.3c	Research into alternative energies increased (Ch 8: 6.4.7.3)
12.5.4	Nuclear energy problematized/rejected (Ch 8: 6.4.7.4)
12.5.5	Energy provision and storage decentralized, democratized (Ch 8: 6.4.7.5)
12.5.6	Energy-saving transport systems advocated (Ch 8: 6.4.7.6)
12.6	<p>Reciprocity in land use: agriculture as example (Ch 8: 6.4.8)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Concern for the protection of human scale in farming</li> <li>Concern for animal welfare/rights in agriculture</li> <li>Preference for organic production methods which protect soil fertility</li> <li>Preference for organic, non-genetically modified foods</li> </ol>
12.7	Consciousness-changing environmental education advocated? (Ch 8: 6.4.10)
12.8	Participation in global control measures to promote natural environment protection? (Ch 8: 6.4.3)

<b>13</b>	<b>Animals are treated ethically? [animal liberation/welfare] (Ch 8: 6.4.9)</b>
13.1	Animal experimentation including vivisection, and product-testing, eliminated completely, or almost completely (Ch 8: 6.4.9.1)
13.2	Commercial animal agriculture totally dissolved, or radically reformed (Ch 8: 6.4.9.2)
13.3	Wildlife: commercial, culling and sport hunting, trapping, and related trade totally or partially condemned, except in cases of vital human need (Ch 8: 6.4.9.4)

<sup>5</sup> Thus, “efforts should be made to define critical levels of each type of capital, beyond which concerns about substitutability could arise and these should be monitored to ensure that patterns of development do not promote a total decimation of one kind of capital no matter what is being accumulated in the other forms of capital” (van Dieren, 1995, p. 103, in Chapter 9: 3.4.2.4)

<sup>6</sup> In the *deep ecology* meaning of this phrase (Ch 4: 4.1.4)

13.4	No animals confined for education, or used in entertainment (Ch 8: 6.4.9.5)
13.5	Animal torture strictly punishable (Ch 8: 6.4.9.6)

<b>SOME VIEWS ON THE ECONOMY</b>	
<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>
<b>14</b>	<b>The economy is ecologically re-oriented?</b> (Ch 8: 6.5, 6.5.1)
2.1.1	Capitalism [e.g. its ecological destruction, alienation, war-propensity, inegalitarianism] problematized/rejected as cultural/socio-economic system (Ch 8: 6.3.2, 6.3.3.5) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Market system problematized</li> <li>b. The “economization of reality” critiqued?</li> <li>c. Advanced industrial capitalism on a global scale problematized [globalization] (Ch 8: 6.3.3.5)</li> </ul>
14.1	Ecological limits to economy recognized? (Ch 8: 6.5.2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A National Sustainable Development Strategy has been drawn up as agreed at the 1992 Earth Summit? (Ch 9: 2.5)</li> </ul>
14.2	Natural resource accounting introduced as formal part of development planning? (Ch 8: 6.5.3)
14.2.1	A System of integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting [SEEA <sup>7</sup> ] to account for the stocks and flows of their environmental resources in “satellite accounts” parallel to their country’s System of National Accounting [SNA] has been introduced as agreed at the 1992 Earth Summit (UN 2000, p. 4, par. 4, p. 162, par. 431) (Ch 9: 3.4).
14.2.2	If yes, and assuming the adoption of “sensible” or “weak” versions of environmental sustainability [indicator GG 12.1], to keep track of any transformation of “natural” capital into “human” capital (Neefjes, 2000, p. 29 in Ch 9: 3.4.1.6), do any of the following exist: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. for renewable resources, models which indicate what the maximum sustainable yield of a resource is, so that present generations do not harvest beyond this limit (Ch 9: 3.4.1.6.1, 6.3.2(e))</li> <li>b. for non-renewable resources, “depletion schedules”, and steps have been identified, and are being taken, to ensure in the process of depletion, the provision of suitable substitutes (Ch 9: 3.4.1.6.1, 6.3.2(f))</li> <li>c. measures to “green” GDP as indicator of human welfare? [e.g. GDP is “pruned” to account for the costs of natural capital depletion, and for degradation [through pollution for example] as depletion of natural capital] (Ch 9: 3.4.2, 6.3.2 by implication)</li> </ul>
14.3	Non life-affirming economic activities problematized (Ch 8: 6.5.4)
14.4	Base-democratic production: What should be produced, where it should be produced, and how it should be produced to be determined and controlled by those involved (Ch 8: 6.5.8)
14.5	Community-based economic activities and self-reliance favoured (Ch 8: 6.2.1, 6.2.2)
14.6	Ecologically-appropriate local production for local use encouraged (Ch 8: 6.5.7)
14.7	Production for needs not profit encouraged (Ch 8: 6.5.6)
14.8	Waste generation, pollution, and wastefulness in production, consumption, and disposal problematized, reduced/eliminated. At the least, the “polluter pays” principle is applied (Ch 8: 6.4.5)
14.9	Instrumental technology problematized (Ch 8: 6.3.5, 6.5.10)
14.9.1	Non-demeaning, non-exploitative, technology demanded in the workplace
14.9.2	“Soft”/alternative technologies within different understandings of development favoured
14.10	Work provides creative activity, not meaningless labour (Ch 8: 6.5.9)
14.11	A basic social income for all (Ch 8: 6.5.11)
14.12	Misleading encouragement to materialism and consumerism is critiqued (Ch 8: 6.5.12)
14.13	Fair [ethical] trade/development aid is practised (Ch 8: 6.5.13)
14.14	More than one future human generation included in economic decisions (Ch 8: 5.4.1(1), 6.6.1, 6.6.10;

<sup>7</sup> In 1993, the UN Statistics Division set out an SEEA framework. Thereafter, parts of the SEEA were tested in different countries (UN 2000, Preface, p. 1), and the results of the trials brought together in the interim UN (2000) “Integrated environmental and economic accounting. An operational manual”. (UN 2000 p. 4, par. 13)

	Ch 9: 3.4.3.4, 3.4.3.5). [A quantitative indicator here is a discount rate in economic decisions which affect future generations set at, or close to, zero]
--	--

SOME VIEWS ON LOCAL AND GLOBAL SOCIAL COHESION	
A	B
<b>15</b>	<b>Living in solidarity is advocated? (Ch 8: 6.6, 6.6.1)</b>
15.1	Communitarian living advocated. Whether the more radical forms [such as eco-communes, see also indicator 11.2.1], or less radical forms [indicator 11.2.2] are advocated, all forms insist on the idea of <i>community existing in harmony with nature</i> as essential to genuine self-realization (Ch 8: 6.2.2, 6.7.1)
15.2	Full emancipation for women [women's liberation] (Ch 8: 6.6.1, 6.6.4; see also indicator 8.2.1)
15.3	Post-patriarchal gender roles (Ch 8: 6.6.1, 6.6.4)
15.4	Multi-culturalism valued (Ch 8: 5.4.1(1), 6.6.1, 6.6.5)
15.5	Fundamental rights of, and social inclusion of the marginalized, the vulnerable, the sexually different recognized (Ch 8: 6.6.1, 6.6.6, 6.7.1, 6.7.4)
15.6	Non-patriarchal, holistic, close-to-home health care (Ch 8: 6.6.1, 6.6.7)
15.7	Re-integrated, ecologically-harmonious human habitat spatial planning (Ch 8: 6.6.1, 6.6.8)
10	An empathetic, caring, respectful, partnership ethic with nature, which extends beyond a humans-only focus, recognizing also nature's value-for-itself, now, and on a long-term basis (Ch 8: 6.6.1)

<b>16</b>	<b>Non-violence, and radical peace are advocated? (Ch 8: 6.6.1, 6.6.3)</b>
16.1	Militarism, nuclearism, and threat of force critiqued; instead, radical peace, total disarmament, locally-organized non-violent social defence (Ch 8: 6.6.3.1)
16.2	No structural violence (Ch 8: 6.6.3.2)
16.3	No physical violence; no hate behaviour, no violent speech, no vilification; instead, dialogue (Ch 8: 6.6.3.3, 6.6.3.4)
14.3	Non life-affirming economic activities such as weapons-production, problematized (Ch 8: 6.5.4)

SOME VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL PROCESS	
A	B
<b>17</b>	<b>Grassroots ["direct"] democracy is advocated? (Ch 8: 6.7, 6.7.1)</b>
1.2	Some or all of the following expressions of hierarchy and 'power over' vis-a-vis other human beings critiqued? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nationalism, statism, parliamentarianism, militarism, classism, sexism, racism, authoritarian bureaucracy in human affairs (Ch 8: 2.1.1)</li> <li>Instead, there is respect for difference, dialogue? (Ch 8: 6.6.3.3)</li> </ul>
17.1	<i>Real</i> citizenship, not participative democracy now and then, promoted (Ch 8: 6.7.1, 6.7.2)
17.2	Non-violent, direct action, including civil disobedience permissible, required even (Ch 8: 6.7.1, 6.7.3)
17.3	Transparency, public accountability, responsive bureaucracy demanded (Ch 8: 6.7.1, 6.7.5)
17.4	Privacy of personal data protected (Ch 8: 6.7.1, 6.7.5)

<b>18</b>	<b>Living out/enacting your personal moral beliefs in the public-political sphere encouraged? ["the politics of lifestyle"] (Ch 8: 7, 7.1, 7.2)</b>
18.1	Self-work [reviewing your worldview; freeing yourself from "patriarchal" programming] advocated (Ch 8: 7.3)
18.2	Voluntary simplicity in lifestyle [sometimes as expression of spirituality – criterion 4]
18.3	Economic boycott of unecological goods and services, including <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>total or partial moral veganism, vegetarianism (Ch 8: 6.4.9.3, 7.2)</li> </ul>
17.2	Non-violent, direct public action, including civil disobedience (Ch 8: 6.7.1, 6.7.3)

### 3.5 Testing the seeing green criteria

To achieve the state of content analysis perfection he envisages, Berelson (1952) allows that definition and redefinition of hypotheses, categories and indicators might be necessary. It can even be that close reading of text suggests new ideas, from which new categories and indicators are inferred (1952, p. 164, p. 167). The “workability” of the criteria was assessed simultaneously with their application during the reading of Vision 2030 in Chapter Eleven. The results are presented there, in section 7.

## 4 Criteria for assessing research

In this section, I reflect on what criteria could be considered to assess the plausibility of the results of a qualitative, and interpretive content analysis, such as undertaken in this study. The traditional criteria by which to judge social science research are reliability, validity and generalizability (4.1). Ecosystemic (Rappaport, 1987, 1990) and critical social science research schools frequently add the possibility of social action as assessment criterion (4.2).

### 4.1 The traditional criteria of validity, reliability, and generalizability

The problem of **validity** is this: – is the “instrument” [in this case, the criteria and indicator checklist] measuring what it is intended to measure? I have attempted to address this problem by providing references from Chapters Three to Eight, and Chapter Nine, for the categories and indicators chosen.

The problem of **reliability** is a problem of “objectivity”. I see a twofold “objectivity” problem in answering research question 2. The first relates to the criteria themselves. There is a subjective element in what a writer chooses to include or exclude as a seeing green criterion. Other writers’ criteria lists (Chapter Eight, section 1.1) varied in number from O’Riordan’s (1981) eight characteristics of ecocentric-environmentalist ideologies to Goldsmith’s (1992) list of 66 principles comprising an ecological worldview. My list of 18 seeing green criteria is no exception to such selectivity. It has hopefully been reduced though, and “inter-rater” consistency increased, by enabling the reader to compare my criteria with theirs.

There is of course, also a subjectivity present in the indicators selected to represent the criterion, as well as in the depth of the discussion on which the indicator is based. I noted in Chapter Eight, section 1, that not all issues encountered in my base green data reading had been captured in a seeing green indicator, giving as example, green views on forestry, fishing and mining. In retrospect, I see in the list, a tendency perhaps, to over-discuss topics relating to seeing green’s philosophical, psychological and ethical demand for a changed self, self/other and human-nature relationship, and to under-represent as indicators, and under-discuss, real-world issues such as poverty alleviation, or fiscal policies. This must be interpreted not as seeing green’s lack of attention to such issues, but as “clues to/traces of” my own interest in environmental-philosophical/psychological, rather than sociological issues. The criteria and indicators I have created, represent *one* possible sample. Other researchers would no doubt create different indicators from the base data chapters.

The second “objectivity problem” lies in applying the criteria to the text. It is generally agreed in ecosystemic environmental psychology research [and social constructionist psychological research], that there is no possibility of the researcher’s being able to work absolutely objectively with the text/s of the study. The researcher cannot do otherwise than approach the text from some perspective: “No human being can step outside of her or his humanity and view the world from no position at all” (Burr, 1995, p. 160), a viewpoint endorsed in “seeing green”. In addition, objectivity is impossible for a researcher when searching for [on her view], implicit assumptions, and “absences” in a text. Some

intuition is inevitable: when “look[ing] for ‘implicit’ themes suggested by the *absence* of certain terms .... a degree of intuition *must* be deployed...” (Parker, 1992, p. 126, his italics).

Coyle (1995, pp. 255-256) has suggested that one way of not closing down all meaning in the text to the researcher’s own particular interpretation, is to present, together with his/her textual interpretations, as much as possible of the relevant text – to offer “significant amounts of raw data” in order to show how it supports the “reading” he/she has offered: “Readers can thus judge for themselves whether the interpretations are warranted and can offer alternative interpretations”. I have followed this suggestion. Another way in which a researcher can approach “objectivity” is through reflexivity and transparency<sup>8</sup>. That is, the researcher openly acknowledges his/her worldview, his/her reasons for involvement in the research, and seeks to be continually aware of, and make clear to the reader, how these might be affecting the research process. I have sought to make clear throughout this study, that my own worldview tends towards “dark green”.

The extent to which a study’s results can be **generalized**, is dependent upon the sampling procedure used. The sampling procedure for “seeing green” was described in Chapter Two, section 1.2. I suggest that, judging by the generous measure of correspondence between the seeing green worldview derived in Chapter Eight from the sample database (Chapters Three to Seven), and the elements of seeing green described by other authors in Chapter Eight, the criteria should be generalizable to other texts. But that would be a matter for further research by others.

The “workability” of the criteria and indicators, as opposed to their validity, reliability, and generalizability, is assessed throughout Chapter Eleven, and summarized in section 7 there.

## 4.2 Social usefulness/action as additional criterion

Ecosystemic<sup>9</sup>/social constructionist research schools, and critical social research schools, also suggest that the work should have social usefulness. The purpose of the research is not to discover the “truth”, but to highlight its real-life usefulness, and the intervention, change, or social action which it suggests (Burr, 1995, p. 171). The flavour of this social action varies in the community psychology action research/social constructionist account. According to Powers (2001, p. v) it is “radical political action”, while Gergen (1999, p. vi) rather less vigorously phrases it as offering “opportunities for creative deliberation and action”, and of finding ways of “creatively constructing alternatives or additions to existing beliefs and practices”. Burr’s (1995, p. 162) version is “any usefulness that the researcher’s ‘reading’ of a phenomenon might have in bringing about change for those who need it”.

As already indicated in section 2.1.3.2 of this chapter, my hope is that the seeing green/grey-green criteria developed in this study, and their application to *Namibia Vision 2030*, will better enable readers to actively ‘decode’, or deconstruct the “framework of interpretation” proposed in it, enabling them in a reflected-upon way, to agree with it, reject it outright, or negotiate with it in some other way. In other words, to “see”, and agree or disagree with the “preferred” view of reality which *Namibia Vision 2030* offers, and take political action (which on the green view, includes one’s private life actions!) accordingly.

As a further modest contribution to social usefulness, I suggest in the final chapter, how environmental psychology might better help in resolving the ecological crisis.

---

<sup>8</sup> Bateson’s (1979, p. 29) dictum was that “... right or wrong, the [researcher’s] epistemology shall be explicit. Equally explicit criticism will then be possible”. By epistemology, Bateson meant, worldview

<sup>9</sup> For example, as applied in the action research of community psychology

## CHAPTER ELEVEN: HOW GREEN IS *NAMIBIA VISION 2030*s WORLDVIEW?

<b>1.0 Introduction</b>	<b>434</b>
<b>1.1 Seeing green briefly recalled</b>	<b>434</b>
<b>1.2 Methodology for research question 2 briefly recalled</b>	<b>434</b>
<b>1.3 Method and presentation explained</b>	<b>435</b>
<b>2.0 Reading the Introductory texts to, and Part 1 of <i>Namibia Vision 2030</i></b>	<b>437</b>
<b>2.1 Page by page analysis</b>	<b>437</b>
Cover and inside title page	437
Table of contents, pp. 3-4	437
Acronyms and abbreviations, pp. 5-8	438
Foreword by former President Nujoma, pp. 9-12	438
Page 9	438
Page 10	439
Page 11	440
Page 12	440
Preface by National Planning Commission Director General, pp. 13-16	440
Page 13	440
Page 14	441
Page 15	443
Page 16	443
Acknowledgements, p. 17	443
Part One: Background and summary of vision	443
Title page, page 18	443
Chapter 1, Background to Vision 2030, pp. 19-23	443
Page 19	443
Pages 20-21	444
Pages 21-22	444
Pages 22-23	444
Page 24	444
Chapter 2, Namibia – An overview, pp. 25-37	444
Page 25: 2.1 Introduction	444
Pages 25-27: 2.2 Geography	444
Page 28: 2.3 People	445
Pages 28-29: 2.4 Political history	445
Pages 29-30: 2.5 Economy, and 2.6 Social debt	445
Pages 30-31: 2.7 Environmental debt	445
Pages 31-32: 2.8 Post-independence progress	445
Page 32: 2.9 Challenges for the future	446
Pages 32-33: 2.10 Comparative advantages	446
Pages 33-34: 2.11 “Principles cherished by the Nation”	447
Pages 34-36: 2.12 “Identification of priority issues”	447
Pages 36-37: 2.13 “New ways of thinking”	448
Chapter 3, <i>Namibia Vision 2030</i> , pp. 38-42	448

Page 38: 3.1 Introduction	448
Page 38: 3.2 Issues for Vision 2030	448
Pages 38-40: 3.3 Namibia Vision 2030	449
Pages 40-41: 3.4 Objectives of Vision 2030	450
Pages 41-42: 3.5 Broad strategies for Vision 2030	451
<b>2.2 Reflections on the assessment so far</b>	<b>452</b>
<b>3.0 Reading Part 2 of Vision 2030: its worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship: overview</b>	<b>453</b>
<b>4.0 Vision 2030 chapter 4: The People’s quality of life (pp. 44–135)</b>	<b>454</b>
<b>4.1 Population and health (pp. 44-60)</b>	<b>454</b>
4.1.1. Population size and growth (pp. 44-47)	454
4.1.2 Migration, urbanisation and population distribution (pp. 47-50)	459
4.1.3 Population age and sex distribution (pp. 50-53)	459
4.1.4 Healthy living for longevity (pp. 53-57)	460
4.1.5 Promoting healthy human environment (pp. 57-60)	460
<b>4.2 Wealth, livelihood and the economy (pp. 61-77)</b>	<b>460</b>
4.2.1 Macroeconomic environment (pp. 61-65)	460
4.2.2 Transport infrastructure (pp. 65-69)	461
4.2.3 Employment and unemployment (pp. 69-74)	462
4.2.4 Data and research (pp. 74-77)	463
<b>4.3 Developing a knowledge-based society (pp. 77-100)</b>	<b>463</b>
4.3.1 Information and communication technology (pp. 77-82)	463
4.3.2 Production technology (pp. 83-87)	463
4.3.3 Education and training (pp. 87-96)	465
4.3.4 Early childhood development (pp. 96-99)	466
4.3.5 Aspects of the legislative/regulatory framework (pp. 99-100)	466
<b>4.4 Equity: individuals, community and the state (pp. 101-135)</b>	<b>466</b>
4.4.1 Poverty reduction (pp. 101-108)	466
4.4.2 Gender and development (pp. 108-110)	467
4.4.3 Youth and development (pp. 111-115)	468
4.4.4 Senior citizens (pp. 116-117)	468
4.4.5 People with disabilities (pp. 117-120)	469
4.4.6 Fostering and orphanage (pp. 120-122)	469
4.4.7 Culture and tradition (pp. 122-125)	469
4.4.8 Civic affairs (pp. 125-128)	470
4.4.9 Public safety (pp. 128-130)	470
4.4.10 Civil society and its organisations (pp. 131-133)	471
4.4.11 The family (pp. 133-135)	471
<b>5.0 Vision 2030 chapter 5: Sustainable resource base (pp. 136-173)</b>	<b>472</b>
<b>5.1 Freshwater and associated resources (pp. 136-140)</b>	<b>473</b>
<b>5.2 Production systems and natural resources (pp. 140-170)</b>	<b>476</b>
5.2.1 Land and agricultural production (pp. 140-142)	479
5.2.2 Forestry (pp. 146-150)	479
5.2.3 Wildlife and tourism (pp. 150-157)	480
5.2.4 Fisheries and marine resources (pp. 157-161)	483
5.2.5 Non-renewable resources (pp. 162-164)	483



5.2.6 Biodiversity (pp. 164-170)	484
<b>5.3 The urban environment (pp. 170-173)</b>	<b>494</b>
<b>6.0 Vision 2030 chapter 6: Creating the enabling environment (pp. 174-216)</b>	<b>495</b>
6.1 Sustainable development (pp. 175-179)	495
6.2 International relations (pp. 179-184), 6.4 Peace and security (pp. 187-190), and 6.5 Regional integration (pp. 190-197)	497
6.3 Development co-operation (pp. 184-187)	498
6.6 Globalisation (pp. 197-200)	499
6.7 Democratic governance (pp. 201-204), and 6.8 Decentralisation (pp. 204-208)	500
6.9 Responsible decision-making (pp. 209-212)	500
6.10 Institutional capacity for development (pp. 212-216)	501
<b>7.0 Reflections on the “workability” of the criteria and their indicators</b>	<b>502</b>
7.1 On the relevance of the criteria	502
7.2 On the breadth and depth of the indicators	503
<b>8.0 One version of <i>Namibia Vision 2030s</i> worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship</b>	<b>504</b>
8.1 Legitimizing narrative: the “good life” of London, Washington or Paris	504
<b>8.2 Its ultimate premises</b>	<b>505</b>
8.2.1 Epistemology	505
8.2.2 Ontology	506
8.2.2.1 View of nature	506
8.2.2.2 View of the human being	506
8.2.3 View of the human-nature relationship	507
8.2.4 The ethic for nature	508
<b>8.3 The green-ness of Vision 2030s vision for Namibian society?</b>	<b>508</b>
8.3.1 A “serious” nature and environmental policy?	509
8.3.2 Radical peace?	510
8.3.3 Sustainable development in Vision 2030: “stronger” or “weaker”?	511
<b>8.4 How green is Vision 2030s worldview?: Conclusions</b>	<b>512</b>

## 1.0 Introduction

Research question 2 (Chapter One, section 3) is: How green is *Namibia Vision 2030*'s worldview? The main purpose of this chapter is to attempt to answer this question, but, as I explain in section 3 of this chapter, with focus primarily on its human-nature relationship. A parallel task is to assess whether or not the seeing green criteria list is sufficient to enable a reader to form a confident opinion on the green-ness of a text: do the criteria “work”? Are they relevant, is the coverage of their indicators “wide” enough, are the discussions from which they were developed, “deep” enough?

### 1.1 Seeing green briefly recalled

Chapter Eight set out seeing green's stories about the pathological western Self/Other relationship - Self divided against self, against other human beings, against “the female”, against women, against nature, against animals. On the green view, there will be no solution to the ecological crisis, until the pathological Self/Other relationship, which is its context, is healed.

One summary of seeing green's key ideas is -

1. A fundamental critique of the dominant western capitalist techno-industrial society, including of the [masculinist] ontological idea that there is a Self/Other dichotomy, of the epistemological dominance of [masculinist] science, of the idea that human progress entails the conquest, mastery or exploitation of nature, thus legitimating an instrumental ethic towards the natural world; of the values of technological and rational efficiency, materialism and consumerism.
2. A fundamentally different view of self, of self vis-a-vis other persons, and of self vis-a-vis nature, is necessary to re-orient western culture, and to address the increasingly global ecological crisis.
3. A nature ethic which “crosses the species divide” in one way or another, to include some, or all of nature, *for its own sake*, not merely for human-instrumental reasons. There is agreement that long-range, wide ecological sustainability, and animal suffering, matter morally, not merely instrumentally.
4. Personal transformation, and radical political and socio-economic changes are needed to achieve a green, or ecological society. This transformation involves the adoption of ecological/post-patriarchal values.
5. Adherents of seeing green are required to try to implement the necessary changes in self and in society's structures, by clarifying their worldview, and by living out/enacting their personal beliefs in the public sphere.

### 1.2 Methodology for research question 2 briefly recalled

The methodology used is critical qualitative content analysis, as set out in Chapter Ten, section 2.2. This involves close attention to key ideas, words or phrases present or absent in the text, which might represent clues to/traces of an implicit worldview, and specifically, of its view of the human-nature relationship. The focus throughout is on what *Namibia Vision 2030* says, or implies, or fails to say, when compared with the seeing green worldview criteria list. It is not to subject to critical analysis, the viability of the Vision's contents, nor to establish whether or not it is reaching its “Targets”, for example, those set for 2005. Though I do on occasion ground what the Vision says in what is actually happening in real Namibian life, this has not been a primary aim of this chapter's critical analysis.

Finally, the assessment in this chapter does not re-enter into a discussion of the ideas which contributed to the establishment of any green criterion or its indicators. Those mentioned in this chapter should therefore be understood within the context of ideas discussions in Chapter Nine on environment and development; and Chapter Eight, the synthesis of “seeing green”, which is itself only an abstraction of far richer discussions of its constituents in Chapters Three to Seven. Sometimes I found it helpful to refer directly to one of the base data chapters, and sometimes it was necessary to refer directly to

seeing green source documents such as early Die Grünen political programmes (1980b, 1983). Without reference to the base data context, the discussion in this chapter runs the risk of appearing “shallow”, and ungrounded.

### 1.3 Method and presentation explained

Within that methodology, I dealt with the tasks of this chapter as follows:

(a) I began by reading what I consider the introductory section of Vision 2030. This comprises the Foreword, Preface, and Part 1 of Vision 2030’s Main Document (pp. 9-42). In turn, Vision 2030s Part 1 comprises:

- In its chapter 1, the background to the Vision as key policy document;
- in its chapter 2, an overview of Namibia: its people, their history, their future challenges, and particularly, the “Principles cherished by the nation”, “...priority issues” and “New ways of thinking”, and
- in its chapter 3, a summary of the sources which informed the final Vision 2030 text:
  - (i) the eight research or “thematic” reports (Chapter Ten, Figure 8):
    1. Inequalities and social welfare,
    2. Peace and political stability,
    3. Human resources, institutional and capacity building,
    4. Macro-economic issues,
    5. Population, health and development,
    6. Natural resources and environment,
    7. Knowledge, information and technology, and
    8. External environment, and
  - (ii) views on these thematic reports as gathered during
  - (iii) the opinion leader survey, and
  - (iv) the National Aspirations Conference.

From this page by page reading of Vision 2030s introductory texts (Foreword, Preface, Part 1), I hope to show that a reader could, using the green worldview criteria even superficially, come to some tentative conclusions on whether any given text contains an explicit or implicit worldview, and whether this worldview tends to be more, or less, green. The results of this paragraph by paragraph analysis are presented in section 2 of this chapter Eleven.

(b) I then read Part 2 (pp. 43-216) of the *Namibia Vision 2030 Main Document*. Essentially, this presents the Vision:

**A prosperous and industrialised Namibia,  
developed by her human resources, enjoying peace, harmony and political stability.**

which is broken up into what the text calls three overarching concepts:

<b>The People’s Quality of Life</b>	<b>Sustaining the resource base</b>	<b>Creating the enabling environment</b>
-------------------------------------	-------------------------------------	--

These three overarching concepts form the content of chapters 4, 5, and 6 of the Vision 2030 Main Document. Each chapter is presented as a series of issues with a matching Sub-Vision, 43 in all:

<b>Vision 2030</b> <b>A prosperous and industrialised Namibia,</b> <b>developed by her human resources, enjoying peace, harmony and political stability.</b>		
<b>The People's Quality of Life</b>	<b>Sustaining the resource base</b>	<b>Creating the enabling environment</b>
Chapter 4	Chapter 5	Chapter 6
25 issues/Sub-Visions	8 issues/Sub-Visions	10 issues/Sub-Visions

The presentation of each issue in Vision 2030 follows the same pattern:

- (i) an introductory discussion,
- (ii) a Sub-Vision,
- (iii) a summary box [Current situation, Things to do, Things to avoid, Worst-case scenario, and Where we want to be (2030)],
- (iv) Targets,
- (v) Objectives, and
- (vi) Strategies.

The unit of analysis for chapters 4-6 of Vision 2030 was not page by page, but issue/Sub-Vision by issue/Sub-Vision. There were always three tasks in assessing each issue and its Sub-Vision:

- (1) deciding whether or not it related to the Vision's human-nature relationship, which is my primary interest. If it did, I discussed it in some detail,
- (2) deciding whether or not it contained any clues to/traces of, the other elements of a worldview - epistemology, or ontology, for example. If it did, I highlighted these, and
- (3) assessing the relevance of the criteria, and breadth and width of their indicators.

Occasionally during the discussion of Vision 2030s chapters 4-6, it was necessary to read what some of its contributing thematic reports had to say on some of these issues, or to read external documents to which *Namibia Vision 2030 Main document* refers. The discussion always makes such external sourcing of information clear. I report on chapters 4 – 6 of Vision 2030 Main Document in sections 4 – 6 of this Chapter Eleven.

So, to summarize Chapter Eleven's analysis and presentation of Vision 2030:

- section 2 presents a page by page analysis of introductory texts to, and Part 1 of Vision 2030;
- section 3 explains the narrowing of focus from a page by page assessment of the Vision 2030s worldview generally, to an issue/Sub-Vision-based discussion of its human-nature relationship, and
- sections 4-6 comprise a discussion of Vision 2030s chapters 4 – 6.

Because confidence in this Chapter's assessment of Vision 2030 rests ultimately on confidence in the seeing green criteria, I present my own subjective critique of these in section 7, to be read together with Chapter Ten, section 4.1.

And finally, in Section 8, I bring together, and draw some conclusions on, one construction of the *Namibia Vision 2030 Main Document* worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship.

A word on referencing Vision 2030 in this chapter. It appears throughout as (Vision 2030, page number). However, in the study's reference list, it is entered as Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2004a, *Namibia Vision 2030 Main Document*.

## **2.0 Reading the Introductory texts to, and Part 1 of *Namibia Vision 2030***

As explained above, the task of this section two, which begins with Vision 2030's cover page and ends with its p. 42, is (2.1) to establish whether one can pick up such a text and, using the green worldview criteria list as guideline, form an idea of its green-ness from a superficial page-by-page reading. In (2.2), I reflect on the analysis so far.

### **2.1 Page by page analysis**

#### **Cover and inside title page**

1. The values prosperity, harmony, peace and political stability are given prominence. 'Harmony' is an ecological/green value [green indicator 3.1c], and so is 'peace' [green criterion 16]. Will the value 'harmony' be understood in the text, to signify *also* an end to the war with nature (its "rational domination", its "mastery") which is assumed necessary in the enlightenment understanding of progress/development (Hayward, 1995, p. 11; Oskamp, 2000a, p. 382), and critiqued in seeing green [green indicator 1.3], or will it refer to people-people relations only? And, does 'peace' mean seeing green's radical peace, or does its understanding still allow for money to be spent on 'life-threatening' activities such as armies and weapons, which would not be 'green' [indicators 16.1 and 14.3]?

2. The sub-title is 'Policy framework for long-term national development'

Two thoughts here. Long-term is coupled to the year 2030, so 'long-term' in this text means at most 30 years – one generation. Not the 'long-term' meant in seeing green at all [indicators 10.1, 14.14].

And is it at all significant that the cover page talks not about 'sustainable development', just 'development'? Might this suggest a tendency to equate development with economic development, which would suggest that the text adopts a 'weaker' [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.2] rather than a 'stronger' version of sustainable development?

#### **Table of contents, pp. 3-4**

What presences/absences, 'clues to/traces of' are there here?

1. The first one that strikes me is 'Namibia's comparative advantages': chapter 2, p. 32. This is a term which is associated with mainstream economic theory, and reformist environmental economics, in which nature is unproblematically conceptualized as resources for humans [grey-green criterion GG 6]. It is also a concept which is problematized for possibly jeopardizing production for local needs in favour of overseas market wants (Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.2.1; not a green approach [indicators 14.6 and 14.7]). So again, could one perhaps expect the text to embrace a conception of development as mainly economic growth? [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.2].

2. However, I note the heading of the Vision's chapter 4, p. 44, which suggests that the document will deliver a vision of 'quality of life', rather than 'standard of living' conceived only economically; this is a potentially green understanding of development [Chapter Eight: 6.3.4].

3. 'Employment and unemployment', p. 69, suggests that we are dealing here with a mainstream vision of society, if I think by contrast, of radical green's visions of alternative communitarian societies, outside industrialization and the world market [green indicator 11.2.1].

4. Technology features twice in the headings for the Vision's chapter 4 on 'quality of life' – p.77, and p. 83. Will technology which represents instrumental attitudes to people, or nature, or both, be problematized, as it is in seeing green [indicators 2.1.4, 14.9]?
5. I see also in chapter 4, 'equity' – p. 101, and 'gender' – p. 108, two prominent green issues [indicators 3.1.b, and 15.2 and 15.3 respectively], as well as suggestions of the green commitment to social inclusion of the marginalized [indicator 15.5]: women, senior citizens, those with disabilities, orphans, the sexually different....
6. The headings 'Civic affairs' and 'Civil society and its organisation' in the Vision's chapter 4 – will these reflect the fundamentally green rejection of hierarchy [indicator 1.2], commitment to direct democracy and decentralization [indicator 11.2.2], and real citizen participation in political life [criteria 17 and 18]?
7. The heading of chapter 5 – 'Sustainable resource base' prompts two early thoughts: 'resource base' is a clue to/trace of an anthropocentric, and seeing green-problematized valuing of nature [grey-green criterion GG6 and indicator 1.1]. 'Resource base' is also a clue to/trace of a reformist environmental economic approach, rejected in seeing green as a sufficient solution to the environmental crisis [indicators 11.3; GG 1.1.1].
8. Will the 'Sustainable development' given as a title in chapter 6, p. 175, be a stronger or weaker version of sustainable development? [indicator GG 2.2]. Sustainable development, through seeing green eyes at least, needs to prove its credentials as something more than just free market business as usual, with a few green trimmings added [indicator GG 11.3].
9. Here at chapter 6, p. 201, p. 204, is mentioned 'Democratic governance' and 'decentralization' – two potentially green-sounding values [indicator 11.2.2 and criterion 17].

### Acronyms and abbreviations, pp. 5-8

No comment.

### Foreword by former President Nujoma, pp. 9-12

#### *Page 9*

p. 9, par 1: Already here, 'quality of life' [**'the good life'**, in other words] is defined for Namibians as "the level of their counterparts in the developed world". So, here is valorized what seeing green problematizes, i.e. progress as industrialization [indicator 2.1.2], with its attendant fundamentally flawed **human-nature relationship** [green criterion 7, as just one example of the green critique of mainstream understandings of the human-nature relationship].

p. 9, par. 1: also here, and in par. 2, the talk is of 'development', not 'sustainable development', suggesting perhaps a 'weaker' version of sustainable development? [GG 2.2.2]

p. 9, par. 2: 'long-term perspectives' as equivalent to 30 years, which is roughly equivalent to one generation, is by green standards, short-term [indicators 10.1, 14.14].

p. 9, par. 3: "Our future is about the people". Here is a direct, and unproblematized, anthropocentric statement [green indicator 1.1]. There is not a mention of nature, nor even of the grey-green term 'natural resources', in this paragraph. Nature is backgrounded, invisible. However, concern for food security, within certain conditions, *is* a green issue [Chapter Eight: 6.5.7].

p. 9, par. 4: Here is talk of "a diversified, open market economy". This suggests that one cannot expect in this text, radical economic green-ness, i.e. a critique of the capitalist market economy, and a favouring of communities living outside the market system [indicators 2.2, 11.2.1.c for example], or even a radically changed society [see point 4 of the brief summary of seeing green in section 1.1 of this

Chapter]. This *absence* suggests that Vision 2030 is likely to embrace reform environmentalism rather than radical ecology [indicator 11.3].

p. 9, par. 4: “a resource-based industrial sector” - here are at least three clues to/traces of grey-green-ness rather than dark green:

- (i) one of anthropocentrism - nature as resources for humans [grey-green indicator GG 1.1.1];
- (ii) one of ‘the good life’ as unproblematized industrialism [green indicator 2.1.2]; and
- (iii) one of the promotion of ‘competitiveness’, rather than seeing green’s favouring of the values of harmony, symbiosis, and interdependence [green indicator 3.1.c].

pp. 9-10: Two things strike me here. The use of the term ‘sustained development’ – a Freudian slip indicating a weaker version of sustainable development? [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.2]. Not the same thing as ‘sustainable’ development, surely? And quite apart from the reformist re-affirmation of commitment to a market-based economy, there seems to be a naive belief that a growth economy can deliver full employment, something no industrialized nation has achieved. Nor does economic growth necessarily reduce joblessness, according to the International Labour Organisation (*The Namibian*, 26 January 2007, p. 15, Global growth fails to reduce joblessness). Compare here, Die Grünen Rudolf Bahro’s fundamentally green critique of employment and unemployment in a market system, in Chapter Seven: 6.2.

### **Page 10**

p. 10, par. 1: Here –

- (i) a grey-green commitment to keep up with western-defined globalization, problematized in green indicator 2.1.1, and criticized as maldevelopment by some ecofeminists (Chapter Six: 6.4);
- (ii) an uncritical or at least unproblematized belief in science and technology as the way to progress [green indicator 2.1.4], and
- (iii) another unproblematized commitment to industrialization as means to **the good life** [green indicator 2.1.2].

p. 10, par. 2: A further unproblematized commitment to technology [green indicators 2.1.4, 14.9].

p. 10, par. 3: Equity and tolerance are emphasized here; both strong green values [indicators 3.1.b, 3.1.c]. But ‘land’ appears to be seen solely in an anthropocentric and instrumental way as ‘productive resource’ – a not-green view [grey-green criterion GG 6 and indicator GG 1.1.1].

p. 10, par. 4: Here, in its proclamation of a definite *moral* content to **the good life**, is an indication that the Vision does not adhere to mainstream political liberalism’s neutrality, in which government declines to prescribe the moral good life. The peace, equity, and social inclusion proposed here are all green values [green criterion 16, green indicators 11.1.b, 15.5]. It is not clear yet, whether the envisaged moral emphasis is within a context of renewed spirituality, which would also be a marker of seeing green [green criterion 4].

p. 10, par. 5: The emphasis here on ‘external threats’, ‘destabilizing elements’, and warfare as protection against security threats, is militaristic, and hence a non-green language use vis-a-vis the Other [green indicator 1.5]. It cannot be argued that the Vision 2030 text is insensitive to the ontological role of language, for there is implicit recognition of it in a discussion of women and development (p. 110), for example, under “Strategies”, which include language adjustments to change women’s ontological status. Seeing green would look to a radical understanding of peace – the dismantling of armies, security forces, and weaponry, and social, rather than the armed defence envisaged here [indicators 14.3, 16.1, 16.3].

### *Page 11*

p. 11, par. 1: ‘Partnership’ is a strong green value! [green indicator 11.1.c]. But its green-ness fades on reading the rest of the paragraph, which is only about partnership between people, and Namibians, specifically. There is nothing about partnership with nature, which would be a marker of a green understanding of partnership [green criterion 10].

p. 11, par 2: (i) There is a commitment here to *sustainable* development, but this qualifier has up until now, not been used consistently in the text, suggesting that [economic] development is the over-riding aim; (ii) the use of the concept ‘driving force’ - emphasized in bold too! - suggests an underlying mechanist **ontology** which is not-green [grey-green criterion GG 6 and green indicator 1.5 for example]; (iii) unproblematized science and technology [green indicator 2.1.4] are again seen as agents of development; (iv) ‘sustainable agriculture’ is a term usually reserved for organic-based, reciprocal agriculture, yet the Vision would seem to mean rather, commercialized agriculture (p. 9, par. 4 of the Foreword) which is problematized in seeing green [indicators 12.6, 13.2]; (v) peace [green criterion 16], social justice [green indicator 15.5] and gender equality [green indicator 15.3] are all green values.

p. 11, The challenges, par. 1: Militaristic and thus not-green terminology [green indicator 1.5] is again used here, perhaps unwittingly: “*deploying* - to the fullest – our human and natural resources’ (my italics).

p. 11, The challenges, par. 2: (i) The values listed here - peace, human rights, individual freedoms, civil liberties, good governance, equity, poverty alleviation - are all green values; (ii) the Foreword’s understanding of ‘security’ appears more grey-green than green [green indicator 16.1]; and (iii) land is seen again in an anthropocentric and instrumental-only way as ‘productive resource’ [grey-green criterion GG 6 and indicator GG 1.1.1].

p. 11, ‘Environmental degradation’ – will the concern only be for its consequences for humans?

p. 11, The challenges, par 3: The promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises [SMEs] here is a green value, particularly if it entails promoting locally-oriented, ecologically-appropriate self-sufficiency, and base democratic management in economic affairs [indicators 14.4 to 14.6].

pp 11-12, The challenges, par. 4: Again here is the not-green use of a military metaphor [green indicator 1.5]: ‘As we *march forward...*’ (my italics). It seems doubtful that a text can employ military metaphors and be committed to radical green peace [indicator 16.1] at the same time.

### *Page 12*

p. 12, par 1: Again a not-green military metaphor [indicator 1.5]: “... as well as *mobilizing...* resources.” (my italics).

p. 12, par 2: This final paragraph represents one version of the document’s vision of **the good life**: “... an industrial nation enjoying prosperity, interpersonal harmony, peace and political stability’. Industrialism, if not problematized, is not-green [indicator 2.1.2].

### **Preface by National Planning Commission Director General, pp. 13-16**

#### *Page 13*

p. 13, par. 3: presents another version of **the good life**:

Everyone would like to have access to good education for their children, good and accessible health care, a

clean and productive environment, an efficient and profitable economy that supports full and rewarding employment, low levels of crime, a just and tolerant society and meaningful transparent governance.

One would need to read the whole document to see whether these ingredients of the good life are understood in a green way. In seeing green, (a) ‘good’ education would mean real-world, integrated, holistic education, intended to promote the full flowering of a person’s potential, and not merely to produce Homo *economicus*, well-suited to the industrial production system [green indicator 8.2.6]; (b) ‘good’ health care would mean, non-patriarchal, holistic, close-to-home health care [indicator 15.6]; (c) an efficient and productive economy would mean, an ecologically-oriented economy [green criterion 14], (d) a ‘just and tolerant society’ would be one in which fundamental, ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal reformation of society’s values and structures are proposed [green criterion 11] and in which living in solidarity [green criterion 15], non-violence and radical peace are advocated [green criterion 16]; and (e) ‘meaningful, transparent governance’ would be within a green understanding of democracy, which is considerably more direct than traditional western representative democracy [green criterion 17]. The green-ness of the text’s understanding of these ingredients of the good life should become clearer as one reads further.

#### Page 14

p. 14, “The Key Elements for the Vision for 2030 will depict;

(i) That interpersonal harmony, and peace are green values [criteria 15 and 16] has already been noted; but the emphasis here on ‘achievement’, if it is intended to signify an adversarial or competitive orientation towards the Other, would not be compliant with green [indicators 11.1.a, 11.1.c].

(ii) Here might be noted again, that to realize the four desired values – prosperity, interpersonal harmony, peace, and political stability, would require ecological sustainability [green criterion 10], yet this key green value is *absent* in “the collective wish of the Namibian people”.

p. 14, “The People and Resource Base will Reflect that’:

This paragraph essentially presents one version of the document’s **view of nature**.

Natural resources- the nation’s ecological wealth: healthy, productive land with effective water and mineral cycling leading to infrequent, low-level drought and flooding. Perennial rivers running permanently and clear, underground water levels stable and no silting of dams. No atmospheric pollution from croplands and rangelands and minimal pollution from urban and industrial areas will be permitted. Farms and natural ecosystems shall be productive, diverse, stable and sustainable – socially, economically and ecologically. Forests, savannas, deserts, wetlands, coastal and marine ecosystems will be open, diverse, stable and productive.

Its ontological greenness can therefore be assessed against criterion 6, whether it implies a re-conceptualized human-nature relationship against criterion 7, and whether it adheres to or differs from a mainstream and non-green anthropocentric valuing of nature, against criterion 1.1.

Some early questions to consider in establishing the green-ness of the view of nature described in this paragraph are:

(i) ‘healthy, productive land’: It is difficult at this early stage of reading the text, to say what its understanding of ‘healthy’ and ‘productive’ (Chapter Nine: 5.2 and 5.3) might be – an understanding of healthy and productive as in the high biomass production, but more unstable, stage of early ecological succession [grey-green criterion GG 6], healthy as productive-for-humans, or ‘healthy’ as in

an ecosystem having reached its (purposive?) state of dynamic equilibrium/stability? [green indicators 3.2 and 6.4].

(ii) “Farms and natural ecosystems shall be productive, diverse, stable and sustainable”. The emphasis here on the values “diverse, and stable”, suggests that the text here supports the key green diversity-stability hypothesis [indicators 3.2.b, 3.2.c, 6.4], and not a deconstructive or permissive understanding of ecology [grey-green criterion GG 3]. But will there be any implicit or explicit suggestion later in the text of the seeing green understanding that nature’s *purposeful* tendency towards diversity and stability is a property which confers on it, intrinsic value, that human intervention in nature therefore has normative, not merely instrumental-productive implications? [seeing green indicators 6.3 and 6.4]

(iii) “ecological sustainability” is a green value [green criterion 10]. How it is understood is not yet clear.

(iv) The value “open” applied to an ecosystem broadly means, the degree to which an ecosystem [or conservation area] allows for connectivity with, and biotic mobility between, other ecosystems/conservation areas<sup>1</sup>. It is argued by some writers in ecology-as-science<sup>2</sup> that a greater degree of ‘openness’ in ecosystems/conservation areas contributes positively to the evolutionary process by enabling species richness, and countering species extinction. Even though the term ‘open’ was not personally encountered in deep ecology thought, which takes a dark-green stance on biodiversity conservation [Chapter Four: 4.1.4, 4.1.4.2], “openness” in biotic conservation is clearly a dark-green value.

(v) But at this stage of reading, it is not yet clear *for whom* these values in nature are valuable, though the term ‘Natural resources’ at the beginning of the paragraph perhaps represents a clue to/trace of non-green anthropocentrism, even strong anthropocentrism [green indicator 1.1; grey-green indicator GG 1.1.1]. An answer to the *For whom?* question will also indicate whether or not the text tends towards a ‘weak’ environmental sustainability approach [green indicator GG 12.1].

#### pp. 14-15, A Basic Principle, and Sustainable Development

The text commits itself explicitly here to the concept of sustainable development, as expressed in the United Nations Agenda 21 which formed part of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. Mainstream UN understandings of sustainable development tend more towards grey-green<sup>3</sup> than green [GG 2.2]. Some initial thoughts then are (i) the text here makes no mention of the contested nature of the concept ‘sustainable development’, essentially presenting it as an unproblematic and unproblematized concept, or (ii) of its conservative to radical versions (Chapter Nine: 7.2). It is still too early to tell towards which version the text tends more. But (iii), I understand commitment to the concept ‘sustainable development’ to be a clue to/trace of an unproblematized anthropocentric view of nature [green indicator 1.1]. Finally (iv) one might ask what the text’s understanding of ‘future generations’ is? In other words, *for how long* must what be sustainable for whom? This is one of the three key questions to ask of a text’s understanding of ecological sustainability [grey-green indicator GG 12.1].

---

<sup>1</sup> Oral communication Dr Chris Brown, Executive Director of the Namibia Nature Foundation, team leader of Vision 2030s thematic report 6 on natural resources (NPC, 2002c, no page number but last line of Foreword) and leader in the production of Namibia’s “Green Plan” and “12-point Plan” (Chapter Ten: 1.1.1 and 1.1.2)

<sup>2</sup> Diamond (1975) proposed six principles of nature reserve design: large vs small; single large vs several small of equal area; close together vs dispersed; clustered around each other vs in-line; connected vs unconnected; round vs elongated. These principles are still debated in ecology-as-science’s “island theory” of biotic conservation

<sup>3</sup> On (environmental) psychologist Oskamp’s view (2000a), the WCED/Brundtland *Our common future* vision of sustainable development “does not actually represent a sustainable scenario” (p. 384), and its environmental impact is “terrible” (p. 381).

### **Page 15**

p. 15, The National Development Process<sup>4</sup>

Here we have one possible answer to the *For how long?* question. This paragraph suggests that “Vision 2030 provides ... [a] long-term perspective”. One can perhaps safely already assume, that “long-term” is understood as thirty years, or one generation, which in seeing green, amounts to nothing more than a short-term political-economic perspective [green indicators 10.1, 14.14].

### **Page 16**

p.16, par. 1

The value of ‘partnership’ emphasized here has already been noted [p. 11, par. 1] as a strong green value [indicators 3.1.c, 4.1, 11.1.c, and criterion 15]. However further reading of the paragraph again suggests that the partnership value is limited to people-people relationships: the key green value of partnership with nature [green criterion 10] is *absent*.

p. 16, par. 2

Both this paragraph, and the Acknowledgements (p. 17) suggest that the green value of bottom-up participation in development planning [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.1.c] was followed. But a reading of Appendix 2 suggests that this text’s understanding of a participatory approach is more managerial than bottom-up. This could mean, in turn, that the text tends towards a ‘weaker’ version of sustainable development [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.2.c].

### **Acknowledgements, p. 17**

The same comment as at p. 16, par. 2.

## **Part One: Background and summary of vision**

### **Title page, page 18**

No comment

## **Chapter 1, Background to Vision 2030, pp. 19-23**

### **Page 19**

p. 19, Introduction, par 1

Here again, quality of life – **the good life** - is defined as that of Namibians’ “counterparts in the developed world”. In other words, an unproblematized techno-industrial society, rejected in seeing green in so far as it confuses standard of living with quality of life [green indicator 2.1].

p. 19, Introduction, par 4

Despite the commitment to the principle of sustainable development on p. 14, the word choice is simply ‘development’. References to its sustainability are *absent*.

p. 19, Why a vision for Namibia?, par. 1

Here, in the first paragraph, the reference *is* to sustainable development. But in the remaining four paragraphs of this section, there is a reversion simply to ‘development’. ‘Development’ rather than

---

<sup>4</sup> NDP2 expired in 2005/2006, and NDP 3, which will cover the next 5-year planning period was scheduled for release in August 2007. Its overall theme is “Accelerated economic growth through deepening rural development” (*The Namibian*, 24 January 2007, p. 5, Govt prepares new development plan, public, private sector can participate). NDP 3 has not yet been released (pers. comm. Brigitte Weidlich, *The Namibian*, September 2007)

‘sustainable development’ is also the term used in the final paragraph of pp. 21-22, Implementation of the Vision. *Internalized attitudinal*, as opposed to *written* commitment to sustainable development in this text appears less than consistent.

### ***Pages 20-21***

The Vision formulation strategy

The commitment here to public participation in policy formulation is a green-sounding value. However, the description of the public participation process described here, and in Appendix 2, section 2.6, pp. 235-238, is not the kind of radical direct democracy envisaged in green criterion 17, nor even the bottom-up kind of development planning envisaged in ‘stronger’ versions of sustainable development [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.1.c]. In both these criteria, people themselves determine objectives and strategies, rather than being ‘sensitized’ about them (p. 21, the ‘Sensitization Mission’s aims) from above.

### ***Pages 21-22***

Implementation of the Vision

The same comment as at p. 19, Why a vision for Namibia?, par. 1, applies here.

### ***Pages 22-23***

Organisation of this document

This section identifies the three major concepts to emerge from what is called “the visioning process”: “the People’s Quality of Life”, a green-sounding value (Chapter Eight: 6.5.5); “Sustaining the Resource Base” which is a clue to a not-green and anthropocentric valuing of nature [green criterion 1], and “Creating the Enabling Environment”, which at this stage, suggests neither seeing green or grey-green.

### ***Page 24***

No comment on this blank separator page.

## **Chapter 2, Namibia – An overview, pp. 25-37**

### ***Page 25: 2.1 Introduction***

No comment.

### ***Pages 25-27: 2.2 Geography***

In section 2.2 Geography, paragraphs 2 and 3 (p. 25), “productive” is used more than once to describe the land; however no definitive answer can yet be given to the question *productive for whom?* [grey-green indicator GG 12.1], which would give a broad indication of the text’s ecocentric or anthropocentric orientation.

No comment on the maps on p. 26.

On p. 27, only paragraph, (i) water is recognized as a scarce natural resource, which might be related later in the text – chapter 5 perhaps? - to an explicit recognition of ecological limits to the economy, a marker of seeing green [indicator 14.1]. (ii) Further reading is expected to indicate whether the concern expressed here for availability of drinking water for livestock animals is an instrumental, anthropocentric concern only [seeing green in any event (differentially) problematizes commercial

animal production – green indicator 13.2], or relates also, to concern for the animals themselves, a seeing green value [green indicator 10.2.2].

**Page 28: 2.3 People**

No comment.

**Pages 28-29: 2.4 Political history**

No comment on the paragraphs on p. 28.

Here in the second and third paragraphs (p. 29), is mentioned resistance to colonization, a form of hierarchical oppression. Resistance to, and liberation from such oppression is a marker of green [indicator 1.6.a].

**Pages 29-30: 2.5 Economy, and 2.6 Social debt**

p. 29, 2.6 Social debt

(i) The critique of the destruction of traditional, as opposed to western, forms of culture is a marker of seeing green, which values multi-culturalism [green indicator 15.4]

(ii) Again a **view of nature** and land as ‘natural resources’ in the 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph. This is now becoming a consistent and not-green ontological tendency [grey-green indicator GG 6]. The use of ‘resources’ in the Vision’s view of nature far outweighs less economically-oriented terms such as ‘landscape’, ‘wilderness’, or even ‘nature’ [This statement is based on the count results of a search for these four terms in *Namibia Vision 2030 Main document*, which any reader having access to a digital copy of Vision 2030, and Adobe Reader software, can undertake and verify]. The predominance of the term “natural resources” represents I suggest, a trace of/clue to strong anthropocentrism [grey-green indicator GG 1.1.1], and a grey-green economisation of reality [grey-green indicator GG 6].

**Pages 30-31: 2.7 Environmental debt**

The first paragraph (p. 30) contains (i) an acknowledgement of the reliance of Namibia’s economy on its natural resources. There is as yet no indication of whether or not the text accepts these limits, a marker of seeing green [indicator 14.1], or seeks to transcend them, in a grey-green way, through instrumental science and technology [indicator 2.1.4].

(ii) Both the first and second paragraphs (p. 30) contain a critique of the environmental exploitation and degradation of the colonial regime. This is a marker of seeing green, even though it has not been included in the list of criteria in Chapter Ten. See for example, the ecological economists’ critique of the concept of ‘Raubwirtschaft’ (Chapter Nine: 3.2); the ecofeminist critique of centrism, and ‘logic of domination’ (Chapter Six: 4.2.1 and 4.2.2); and Fundi Die Grünen Bahro’s centre-periphery critique of development based on colonial exploitation (Chapter Seven: 2.1.3.2.1).

However, it remains to be seen whether the Vision proposes grey-green reform environmentalism [indicator 11.3], or the green, fundamentally changed **human-nature relationship** [criterion 7] to replace colonial exploitation and degradation of the environment.

**Pages 31-32: 2.8 Post-independence progress**

(i) In its use of the terms “resources”, “stocks”, and “exploitation”, the first paragraph under this heading (p. 31) contains several clues to/traces of grey-green-ness: an anthropocentric view of nature’s value [green indicator 1.1]; and an economization of reality [grey-green criterion GG 6]. The sustainable use of resources *for humans* is to be achieved by changes in property rights, legislation, stock counting and monitoring. This is a reform environmentalism approach [green indicator 11.3],

rather than the fundamental changes in the human-nature relationship for which seeing green argues [green criterion 7].

(ii) Paragraph 2 (p. 31) contains a suggestion that water resources might prove to be a limiting factor in sustainable development, which approaches a green view of gracious acceptance of ecological limits to the economy [green indicator 14.1].

**Page 32: 2.9 Challenges for the future**

Paragraph 2.9 “challenges for the future” distinguishes between ecological and environmental capital, but does not explain the difference between these two concepts. The by now generally-naturalized concept of “capital” in mainstream thought, actually implies an economization of nature, a marker of grey-green-ness [grey-green indicator GG 6]. The concepts “efficient use of resources” and “comparative advantages”, both reformist environmental economic terms (Chapter Nine: 3.3 and 3.4), tend to strengthen this suggestion.

**Pages 32-33: 2.10 Comparative advantages**

p.32, “comparative and competitive advantages” and “fully exploited”  
Do such concepts, even though by now naturalized to the point of invisibility, not also represent traces of/clues to the kind of adversarial approach in self/other relationships critiqued in seeing green? [green indicator 8.1].

p. 32 “relatively small population”  
I focus on these words here, because seeing green, except in the case of marginal human populations, would argue for a *global* stabilization and reduction of population growth as one way of maintaining long-range, wide ecological sustainability [green indicator 12.2]. And even ‘weak’ (or ‘sophisticated’, or ‘enlightened’) anthropocentrism would set a population policy for a generation as a whole based on the carrying capacity of the environment [green indicator GG 1.1.2.f.iv]. Population vis-a-vis ecological sustainability in development is unproblematic in this paragraph at least. It might however be addressed in Vision 2030s chapter 4, section 4.1 on Population and Health. The absence of the qualifier ‘sustainable’ for ‘development’ is again noted.

p. 32, “clean and uncontaminated meat and fish, tourism, ... biodiversity and wilderness”  
A **view of nature** presented in economic advantage terms, in a global market.

p. 32, “... rich cultural diversity”;  
The valuing here of, and tolerance towards, cultural diversity, maintenance of one’s own culture in the face of globalizing and totalizing western capitalist culture (p. 33, first paragraph), and social harmony (p. 33, first paragraph) are strong green values [indicators 11.1.d; 15.4]. It is as yet unclear whether they are derived from the seeing green viewpoint of ecology as normative for personal and social values [green criterion 3.1].

p. 33, first bullet point, “... economic growth and progress”  
This coupling of terms suggests a trace of/clue to a non-green and ‘enlightenment’ understanding of progress, with its underlying premise of the necessity of an adversarial relationship between people and nature (Chapter Eight: 6.3.3.1).

p. 33, second bullet point, “globalization”  
Here a non-green, unproblematic acceptance of western capitalist globalization [green indicator 2.1.1.c].

p. 33, second bullet point, “harness aggressively”, “optimising”, “competitive advantages”  
Without exception, these are all non-green values, and dependent on a non-green adversarial, *Homo economicus* **view of the human being**. This contention is strengthened by the economic **rationality** implicit in the term ‘optimise’ (Chapter Nine: 3.1.3). There is no trace here of the green demand for a radically different Self, or radically different non-adversarial self/other relationship [green indicator 8.1].

p. 33, third bullet point, ‘mega-cities’

The avoidance of mega-cities supported here is a green value, in so far as it supports decentralization, solidarity, and human scale in human habitat spatial planning [indicators 11.2.1.b; 11.2.2, 15.7].

***Pages 33-34: 2.11 “Principles cherished by the Nation”***

“Good governance” (p. 33) is a green value to the extent that it means full transparency, accountability, accessibility to public information, and protection of private data [indicators 17.4 and 17.5].

“Partnership” (p. 33). *Absent* in this understanding of partnership, which is a green value [indicator 11.1.c], is the key green idea of partnership also with nature [criterion 10’s description of a green ethic for nature, and indicator 10.3.e, for example].

“Comparative advantage” (p. 33), “People-centered economic development” (p. 34), “Sustainable development” (p. 34)

(i) Despite the re-affirmation of the principle of sustainable development here, which is generally held to seek a balance between environmental, economic and social goods, primacy appears to be given to the economic aspect, which would suggest a falling short of green indicator 12. The explanation of sustainable development given – that it ‘embraces all the other principles’ – also fails to mention ecological sustainability.

(ii) The concept development here, as elsewhere noted, continues to appear often without its qualifier ‘sustainable’ – a backgrounding of [environmental] sustainability?

“People-centered economic development” (p. 34)

A non-green principle, both in its explicit and unproblematized anthropocentrism [green indicator 1.1], and its equation of development with economic development.

“National sovereignty and human integrity” (p. 34)

(i) This paragraph essentially presents one version of Vision 2030’s **view of the human being**. It could be, but is not here, compared for its green-ness with seeing green criterion 8.

(ii) The nationalism and statism cherished here are problematized in radical versions of seeing green, as expressions of the idea of hierarchy, and power-over [green indicator 1.2].

“Environment” (p. 34)

Absent here is a statement on ecological sustainability as cherished principle – essential for any kind of development!

“Peace and security” (p. 34)

While radical peace is a green value [green criterion 16], it would not include the militaristic overtones already identified elsewhere in the Vision’s understanding of security.

***Pages 34-36: 2.12 “Identification of priority issues”***

p. 35, final paragraph, “The concept of sustainable development is the cornerstone...”

This paragraph does note that “economic development, social development and environmental development” should be “adequately addressed at the same time...”. But the concept “environmental *development*” (my italics) does not sound the same as seeing green’s ‘ecological sustainability’ [green criterion 10] in which the *reduction* of excessive interference in nature, its ‘letting be’, rather than its ‘development’, are important ingredients. And the inevitable question in trying to determine a text’s broad valuing of nature [anthropocentric or ecocentric?]: environmental development *for whom?*

p. 36, first paragraph, ‘Wealth needs to be thought of in financial terms...’

The **view of nature** in this paragraph is of ‘natural resources’ as environmental wealth. The final sentence is ‘Only when all three forms of wealth [i.e. environmental, social, financial] are stable and positive by [being? (word or words missing in text)] linked to production, will sustainable development be achieved.’ I pick out this idea that environmental wealth is only ‘positive’ when linked to production, because it is exactly this *western*, and not universal, economic idea that nature is ‘passive’ and ‘unproductive’ until taken up in a market economy, that ecofeminist and critic of western-style sustainable development Vandana Shiva refutes (Chapter Six, section 6.4(b)).

***Pages 36-37: 2.13 “New ways of thinking”***

A fundamentally changed way of thinking about the human-nature relationship [a key part of seeing green [green criterion 7] is *absent* from the bulleted list (pp. 36-37) of “important” new ways of thinking and working...

p. 36, 2<sup>nd</sup> par. of section 2.13

In the phrase “Chapter 5 covers the ecological and environmental issues of sustaining the resource base...” is again the distinction between ecological and environmental issues, which remains unclear at this stage. The continued **view of nature** as “resource base” by now confirms the text’s grey-green economization of reality [grey-green indicator GG 6].

p. 37, Figure 2.8: Structure ... of the Vision 2030 Report

The **view of nature** in this diagram (green oval) is presented in more detail under the oval as ‘Sustaining the resource base (ECOSYSTEMS)’. Against the background of the discussion of the implicit values in the term “ecosystem” (Chapter Nine: 5.1), I take this word choice to be a clue to/trace of a (philosophical) mechanist, reductionist, rather than an organic, holistic, and more green [green criterion 6] view of nature.

**Chapter 3, *Namibia Vision 2030*, pp. 38-42**

***Page 38: 3.1 Introduction***


No comment

***Page 38: 3.2 Issues for Vision 2030***

This paragraph gives a further clue to/trace of the text’s grey-green anthropocentric orientation [green indicator 1.1]: The issue of “Natural resources and environment’ is identified as an issue for its usefulness in *peoples’* development. Nature’s value-for-itself [green criterion 10] is, in this paragraph at least, *absent*.

**Pages 38-40: 3.3 Namibia Vision 2030**

p. 38, Box 1, The Vision



Here, in what can be argued as a key summary of the Vision's **view of the good life**, presented in a key chapter,

- (i) industrialization as value is not problematized as in seeing green [green indicator 2.1.2];
- (ii) nature, the base for all life, is *absent* as key value, backgrounded, even in its grey-green version as sustainable natural resource base. To illustrate how easily this green value could have been included: "A prosperous and industrialized Namibia, developed by her human resources, enjoying peace, harmony, political stability *and environmental sustainability*"; and
- (iii) any feminist/ecofeminist [even the radical feminists I think, in this case] would critique the androcentric personification of Namibia as female in this vision, because the text so far takes a possessive and managerial approach to "her resources".

pp. 39-40

The explanation of the key values on these two pages essentially provides another description of the Vision's view of **the good life**. One can note that the definition of "prosperity" (p. 39) is largely, but not exclusively, presented in economic terms: "sustained high economic growth", "decent wage", "gainfully employed", "access to productive resources", "equity in income distribution".

Many of the elements in the Vision's view of the good life however represent green values, for example, in the paragraph on "Prosperity" (p. 39),

- (i) equity [green indicator 11.1.b]. A qualification though: the equity here means equity amongst humans, and not the radically-green ecological egalitarianism of, for example, deep ecology (Chapter Four: 5.1.1),
- (ii) a social security support system guaranteeing a decent quality of life for the disadvantaged/marginalized. This is particularly a viewpoint espoused by Die Grünen (Chapter Seven: 6.1.2.4), and incorporated in green indicator 15.5,
- (iii) the rejection of all kinds of -isms, as symbols of a hierarchical, power-over mentality [green indicator 1.2], and
- (iv) in the 'Harmony' paragraph (p. 39), for example, the emphasis on living together in harmony, and the recognition of diversity are also green/ecological values [green indicator 11.1.c].

However, I do experience some hesitancy in reading this version of the good life:

- (i) The term "critical mass" in the 'Industrialised Nation' paragraph (p. 39), is a mechanist metaphor, perhaps representing a trace of an underlying mechanist worldview, both rejected in seeing green [indicators 1.4, 1.5, and Chapter 8: 1.1]. This mechanist approach might however not yet represent a tendency?

(ii) There is a strong emphasis in the ‘Harmony’ paragraph (p. 39) on family as institution (“sacred”, and “fundamental”), as well as a reference to child discipline. As family is not problematized as social institution, the high value placed on it here could contain implicit patriarchal and hierarchical tones, at least as these two concepts are understood in social ecology (see the description of hierarchy in green criterion 1, and also Bookchin’s rejection of the domination inherent in patriarchal family arrangements, in Chapter Five: 6.1.2, 5<sup>th</sup> paragraph; and 6.2). Some ecofeminists also call for a radical transformation of the family as social institution (Chapter Six: 2.1.3). Seeing green tends more towards the *community* as basic social unit [green indicator 11.2]. Seeing green’s support for liberated sexuality [green indicator 8.2.2] as part of the re-conceptualized Self also appears at odds with the restrictive phrasing “Men and women marry (as provided for in the Constitution)...”

(iii) Another is the unproblematized acceptance of rights in the Vision’s view here of the **Self/Other relationship**. Even though some seeing green adherents find the rights concept useful in their quest to gain recognition of nature’s value-for-itself, making explicit, and problematizing, the concept’s underlying adversarial self/other ontology is a green marker [green indicator 9.6]. A green ethic would tend to be based more, or also, on alternative concepts such as identification, reciprocity, care and partnership [green indicator 9.3] in self/other relationships, rather than only on the justice concept.

“(iv) The phrase “the fear of God” in the ‘Harmony’ paragraph (p. 40) is a trace of a *western* Christian understanding of God (Armstrong, 1999). It is precisely the western interpretation of Christianity, with its traditionally ‘male’ view of the human being, and often anthropocentric attitude towards nature, that is problematized in seeing green. Under the influence of seeing green, several attempts to ecologize, and re-interpret, the western Christian dominion/stewardship tradition are underway (Chapter Two: 2.5.1; Chapter Nine: 7.3.2).

(v) The final paragraph of the ‘Harmony’ section contains

(a) another instance of the non-green mechanistic metaphor [indicators 1.4, 1.5] “driving force” (p. 40), as does the first paragraph of the “Peace and political stability” section (p. 40). The human being is reduced to an atomist “element in the system’ where seeing green would strive for more relational language, and

(b) another confirmation of a ‘male’-value-oriented ethic of justice here – “*just* and morally upright society” (p. 40, my italics) – rather than the more ‘feminine’ seeing green ethic of care [green indicator 9.3]. Traces of this androcentric ethic are found in paragraph 4 of “Peace and political stability” (p. 40) too – “fairness”, “neutrality”. Into this last value, any ecofeminist would, I think, read the ‘male’ preference for universality in ethical standards, rather than the seeing green attention to context and particularity [green indicator 9.4].

(vi) The phrase “*man-made ... calamity*” (my italics) in the 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph of “Peace and political stability” (p. 40) would be taken by a feminist/ecofeminist as another trace of androcentrism [green criterion 1], and confirmation of its disastrous ecological results! Perhaps the authors of this text, while explicitly espousing here and elsewhere the more green concepts of gender responsivity, and care (3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph), are unaware of their deep-seated androcentrism?

### **Pages 40-41: 3.4 Objectives of Vision 2030**

p. 40 “... in which all citizens are able to realise their full potential”

So far, this preliminary assessment has suggested a largely economic **view of the human being**, which on the green view, falls far short of the human being’s full potential [green indicator 8.2]. Further reading of the text might however challenge this initial assessment.

pp. 40-41

The objectives listed here range in colour from green to grey-green. For example, a value such as

(i) “gender responsivity” (objective (i) on p. 40) is green to the extent that it means women’s liberation and re-conceptualized post patriarchal gender roles for men and women in society [indicators 15.2 and 15.3],

(ii) caring (objective (i) on p. 40) is a green value in so far as it is based on a relational ontology [green indicator 8.2.3, for example], re-admits the emotional into the ethical [green indicator 9.3], and includes caring about and for nature [green indicator 8.2.4]

(iii) citizens reaching their full potential (objective (i) on p. 40) would include meaningful work in the many-faceted green sense [green indicator 14.10], some of which would be base-democratic production [green indicator 14.4], and the use of non-demeaning, non-exploitative technology in the workplace [green indicator 14.9.1], all the aspects of the reconceptualized Self set out under green criterion 8, and opportunities for meaningful and direct democratic participation and self-management [indicators 17.1, 17.2]

(iv) the value of democracy (objective (ii) on p. 41) is green to the extent that it allows self-management in political affairs, or at the least, meaningful political participation [green indicator 17.1]

(v) one would need to read further in the text to establish what is meant by the definitely green-sounding values “(vi) ecological well-being” (p. 41), and “(vii) eco-friendly nation” (p. 41).

Objectives which sound more grey-green, are those associated with unproblematized (at this stage of the document, at least) western style industrial capitalism [green criterion 2.1.2], held up here on p. 41 in objectives (iv) and (vii) as end value; or the competitive spirit mentioned on p. 41 in objectives (iii), (iv) and (vii) [green indicator 8.1.2]. One could also be cautious about the green-ness of a text which presents nature in terms of “natural capital” (objective vi on p. 41), unless this is within a context of at least ‘sensible’ ecological sustainability [grey-green indicator GG 10.1] or tending towards ‘strong’ ecological sustainability (Chapter Nine: 3.4.1.3).

### ***Pages 41-42: 3.5 Broad strategies for Vision 2030***

(i) Not enough detail about what “sustainable” in the context of a “sustainable, efficient, flexible and competitive” economy in strategy (i) on p. 41 might mean here, or in strategy (xvii)’s “sustainable economic climate” (p. 42) is yet available. The green-ness of “sustainable” would need to be assessed against for example criteria 10, 12 and 14.

(ii) The word “efficient” used in strategy (i) on p. 41 is often a clue to/trace of an **epistemology** characterised by economic rationality, critiqued in seeing green for its instrumental approach to the Other, including nature [grey-green indicator GG 5.1]. And, as already pointed out, a competitive orientation toward the Other (the same strategy) is not a green value either [green indicator 11.1 for example].

(iii) The meaning of ‘gainful’ (objective (iii) on p. 41) is not yet clear, but if the text does provide more information, its green-ness could be assessed against green indicator 14.10. The concept of “full ... employment” within the market-orientation which this document unproblematically accepts, rules out this text as embracing radical green ideas on the economy [indicators 2.1.1, 11.2.1.c, 14.4, 14.5 as examples].

(iv) The strategy or value ‘excellent, affordable health care for all’, (strategy (iv) on p. 41), and strategy (v) relating to HIV/AIDS (p. 41), are green to the extent that they mean, non-patriarchal, holistic, close-to-home health care [green indicator 15.6.]

(v) The concern for food security expressed in strategy (vi) on p. 41 is a green value, provided it is understood within a context of local production for local needs, production for local consumption not profit [indicators 14.6, 14.7], and production based on reciprocal agriculture [green indicator 12.6].

(vi) Strategy (vii) on p. 41 could be assessed for its green-ness against indicator 8.2.6: Real-world, integrated, holistic and ongoing education, geared to the development of the whole person, not merely *Homo economicus*, and including meaningful participation in political life.

(vii) “Leveraging” in strategy (viii) on p. 41 is a further use of mechanistic metaphor, suggesting perhaps by now a tendency rather than unreflected-on use. Such a tendency would be rejected in seeing green [grey-green criterion GG 6, green indicator 1.4,], as a clue to/trace of a mechanist ontology and epistemology.

(viii) The values of interpersonal harmony in strategy (ix), and peace in strategy (xi) on p. 41 have already been commented on as green values.

(ix) The term “morally upright” in strategy (x) on p. 41 does not convey quite the same flavour as seeing green’s conviction that renewed *spirituality* is needed for the personal and social transformation [green criterion 4] that constitutes seeing green, but perhaps the content of “morally upright” will become clearer later in the document.

(x) “Maintaining stable, productive and diverse ecosystems managed for long-term sustainability” in strategy (xii) on p. 41 provides another description of the Vision’s **view of nature**. Within the context of the whole document, all the terms in this description could be unpacked and assessed for their green-ness against markers such as indicator 3.2, and criterion 10. The results of such unpacking should also indicate whether the text tends toward a “stronger” or ‘weaker’ interpretation of environmental sustainability [green indicator 12.1 and grey-green indicator GG 12.1]. This in turn would help to establish whether the text represents a “stronger” or ‘weaker’ version of sustainable development [indicators GG 2.2.1 and 2.2.2].

(xi) The tolerance expressed in strategy (xiv) on p. 42, as well as in strategy (x) on p. 41, and the valuing of diversity, are both green values [green indicator 11.1].

(xii) The ‘low-level’ bureaucracy mentioned in strategy (xv) on p. 42 is a green value to the extent that it distances itself from hierarchical, power-over thinking [green indicator 1.2], and allows the practice of real citizenship [green indicator 17.1]. Public responsiveness and accountability are also green values [green indicator 17.3].

(xiii) Land in strategy (xvi) on p. 42 is again seen as productive resource for use by human beings, i.e. in an anthropocentric way, rather than in the more green way, as of a community of living beings, in which human beings are also just citizens.

## 2.2 Reflections on the assessment so far

Using the seeing green criteria, it does seem possible to construct from the pages of *Namibia Vision 2030 Main document* read so far, the main ingredients of a worldview:

- (a) There have been explicit references to the philosophy and principles of sustainable development (p. 13, p. 14).
- (b) There are explicit descriptions of “the good life” as western-style techno-industrialism.

(c) It seems too early to speculate on what the text's implicit epistemology might be, but the unproblematized references to science, and use of environmental economic terminology so far, might be a clue to/trace of a rational-instrumental epistemology.

(d) There have been clues to/traces of an implicit ontology: mechanistic metaphors are used; nature is described primarily in economic terms; unproblematized references to an ethic of justice and rights suggest an implicit atomist ontology as far as human-human relationships are concerned.

(e) As far as the human/nature relationship is concerned, there are already several indications of anthropocentrism.

(f) On the text's ethic for nature, the implicit commitment to anthropocentrism displayed so far, would suggest that the text follows an instrumental approach to environmental sustainability. Further reading might indicate whether this will tend towards a 'weaker' or 'stronger' version.

(g) One can expect in Part 2, which discusses the Sub-Visions of Vision 2030 in more detail, to be focussed on 'real-world' issues, also an essential element of a worldview.

The assessment of the indicators' usefulness [their coverage, and depth] continues in sections 4 – 6 of this Chapter, which deal with the Vision's views on The People's quality of life (section 4), Sustaining the resource base (section 5), and Creating the enabling environment (section 6). The numbering and topic of sections 4 –6 in this Chapter therefore match the chapter numbering of those topics in the Vision.

In section 3 next, I explain that the method changes now from assessing the Vision's general worldview page by page, to a more issues/Sub-Vision-based assessment of its human-nature relationship.

### **3.0 Reading Part 2 of Vision 2030: its worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship: overview**

In this section, rather than investigate in detail to what extent each of the 43 issues and their Sub-Visions which Part 2 of Vision 2030 discusses, is green, I shall be focussing more on what each Sub-Vision and its discussion [regardless of the particular issue] conveys of the text's explicit or implicit view of the human–nature relationship, within its view of the good life. I defend this focus because I believe, along with seeing green, that our instrumental relationship with, and valuing of, nature must be revised, if we are to avert the ecological crisis, and honour the evolutionary process<sup>5</sup>. And personally, because environmental philosophy and environmental psychology, rather than sociology, development or economic theory, are my interests.

Within this delimitation, I ask the following five questions of the Vision 2030 text:

1. What is its view of the good life?
2. What is its view of nature [i.e. terrestrial nature]?
3. Does it re-conceptualize the dominant anthropocentric human-nature relationship?
4. What is its ethic for nature?
5. Does it provide a framework for a 'serious'<sup>6</sup> environmental policy?

---

<sup>5</sup> "... nature as well, in the world that we have received and used, must have the opportunities to survive (integrity) in the diversity which is characteristic of the biosphere. This is a non-anthropocentric argument. Nature *deserves* these opportunities when its 'self-standingness' and its own or intrinsic value have been recognized" (Achterberg, 1993, p. 97, his italics).

<sup>6</sup> "By 'serious environmental and nature policy', I mean a policy that aims at structural changes within society in order to achieve an enduring solution to environmental problems, or at least to create a situation in which they can be controlled. Such a policy is not only directed at maintaining nature as a basis of our social activities for generations to come (sustainability of our use of the environment), but also at protecting, maintaining and developing nature for its own sake (sustainability of nature) (Achterberg 1990)" (Achterberg, 1993, pp. 81-82). A serious environmental policy not only delivers human well-being but also does justice to/seeks to protect "the intrinsic values of plants, animals and ecosystems" (Achterberg, 1993, p. 87). And, deep ecologist Arne Naess: "In short, it is my opinion that a *necessary, but not*

The seeing green criteria most related to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship are:

**1. What is Vision 2030s view of the good life?**

Criterion 2: Is Western capitalist techno-industrialism as definition of “the Good Life” challenged? (Ch 8: 2.1.1, 6.3.1, 6.3.3, 6.3.3.1)

**2. What is Vision 2030s view of nature?**

Criterion 5: Is rationality/rationalism as sole way of knowing critiqued, or problematized? (Ch 8: 3, 3.1)

Criterion 6: Is there a holistic, organismic, purposive view of reality/nature? (Ch 8: 4.1, 4.1.1 – 4.1.6)

**3. Does Vision 2030 re-conceptualize the dominant anthropocentric human-nature relationship?**

Criterion 1: Are the ideas of androcentrism, anthropocentrism, hierarchy and patriarchy [their value dualisms and logic of domination] critiqued ? (Ch 8: 2, 2.1)

**4. What is Vision 2030s ethic for nature?**

Criterion 10: Is there an ethic for nature in which environmental sustainability is understood as long-range, and wide, not merely as human-instrumental-only sustainability? (Ch 8: 5.1, 5.5, 5.5.1)

*A seeing green ethic for nature will approximate the following description: An empathetic, caring, respectful partnership ethic, which extends beyond a humans-only focus, which recognizes nature’s value-for-itself, now, and on a long-term basis.*

**5. Does it provide a framework for a ‘serious’ environmental policy?**

Criterion 12: Do policies place long-range, wide, ecological sustainability at least on par with social or economic sustainability? (Ch 8: 6.4, 6.4.1, 6.4.2)

Criterion 13: Do policies provide for radical changes to ensure animal liberation/welfare? (Ch 8: 6.4.9)

Criterion 14: Is an ecologically-reoriented economy proposed? (Ch 8: 6.5, 6.5.1)

Criterion 11: Are fundamental, ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal reformation of society’s values and structures proposed? (Ch 8: 6.3, 6.3.1, 6.3.4, 6.3.5, 6.5.5, 6.6.2): Specifically, is reform environmentalism alone rejected as insufficient to resolve the ecological crisis? (Ch 8: 6.2.3)

On the grounds of answers to these five questions, I should be able to assess whether or not *Namibia Vision 2030s ultimate premises* are green. I turn now, in section 4 of this Chapter, to a reading of Vision 2030s chapter 4 on The People’s Quality of Life.

## **4.0 Vision 2030 chapter 4: The People’s quality of life (pp. 44–135)**


### **4.1 Population and health (pp. 44-60)**

#### **4.1.1. Population size and growth (pp. 44-47)**

*A healthy and food-secured nation in which all preventable, infectious and parasitic diseases are under secure control; people enjoy a high standard of living, good quality life and have access to quality education, health and other vital services. All of these translate into long life expectancy and sustainable population growth. (p. 46).*

---

*sufficient, criterion of the fully attained greenness of a society is that it is ecologically sustainable in the wide sense.” (Chapter Eight: 6.4, his italics)*



The “fantastic” growth” of the world’s human population in the Industrial Age is “a central source of the Earth’s environmental problems” (Oskamp, 2000a, p. 376; chart also). Limits to population growth is a serious seeing green concern. Vision 2030s stance on this issue provides then a “litmus test” of its green-ness on this aspect of the human nature relationship. The key part of this Sub-Vision is its last sentence: “All of these translate into ... sustainable population growth”. This sentence can be related to assessing whether or not the text proposes a “serious” environmental and nature policy, via

indicator 12.2: Human population growth rate stabilized/reduced?

To do so, I will consider, together with Vision 2030s section 4.1.1, (a) Thematic report 5: *Population, health and development* (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2002b; hereafter GRN, 2002b) which informed the Vision 2030 Main document (Vision 2030, p. 15), and (b), Namibia’s 1997 National Population Policy for sustainable human development (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1997; hereafter GRN, 1997).

Namibia’s 2001 population was 1,830,330 (Vision 2030, p. 45). Following the medium variant of the population projection model used (Vision 2030, p. 45, Table 4.1), the text envisions a population of about 3.5 million in 2030 (p. 46, Summary box Population size and growth (Where we want to be (2030), 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet point), the result of a planned reduction in the population growth rate from 2.6% in 2001, to 2.0% by the year 2030. Still, this represents an almost-doubling in population numbers within a 30 year period. In a Ministry of Environment and Tourism Research Discussion paper [Nr 21, August 1997] on environmental threats and opportunities in Namibia, Byers (1997, p. 56) notes that

Given the threat to sustainable development, GRN should have a population policy that explicitly recognizes that because of Namibia’s aridity, its sustainable carrying capacity for people is low, and that its current population [i.e. in 1997] is already using about all of the resources of the country. Thus, any population growth will be hard to handle. As for any country, the objective of the policy should be to achieve a zero population growth rate as soon as possible, thus eventually stabilizing the absolute population size.

Curiously though, Vision 2030s Sub-Vision 4.1.1 and its discussion (Vision 2030, pp. 44-47), make no explicit mention of what seeing green also sees as the crucial relationship between the land’s carrying capacity for people, and its population policy.

Vision 2030 ascribes considerable importance (p. 46, summary box Population size and growth, Things to do, 1<sup>st</sup> bullet point; Things to avoid, 1<sup>st</sup> bullet point) to the design and implementation of an Action Plan for the 1997 **National population policy for sustainable development**. The policy’s major goal is “to contribute to the improvement of the standard of living and quality of life of the people of Namibia ... through the harmonisation of the dynamics of Namibia’s population ... with the country’s resource potentials in order to accomplish development objectives (GRN, 1997, p. iv). While the policy talks about “the harsh and fragile nature of the country’s ecological environment” (p. 1, also p. 15), and notes that Namibians’ livelihoods depend on the country’s natural resources (water, land, energy) (p. 19, principle 6.9), it never goes so far as to say that this means that *Namibia has a limited carrying capacity for people*. Instead of seeking to estimate that carrying capacity, and limiting population growth to within it, the population policy emphasizes rather “the need to develop strategies that use these dwindling resources in a more efficient and sustainable manner” (p. 19, principle 6.9). A population policy objective is to “achieve proper management and sustainable utilization of the resources of the environment through reduction of both unsustainable consumption and production

patterns and the development of appropriate policies and programmes” (p. 20, objective 7.2.7). However, no strategy is listed under “Population policy strategies” to achieve this, other than that “environmental education shall be promoted, with emphasis on efficient management of natural resources, at all levels of the educational system as well as in the population at large” (p. 22, strategy 8.4.1). This responsibility is allocated to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (p. 32, section 11.12).

**Theme report 5: *Population, health and development*** (GRN, 2002b), even though it notes in its executive summary that Namibia’s “natural endowment” is the basis of any development (p. xi), does not in its more than 90 page discussion of population, health and development, contain more than a few sentences on the land’s carrying capacity for people. It notes that Namibia is “not a richly endowed land in terms of agriculture. A significant part of the countryside is classified as desert or semi-desert, and ecological conditions are harsh” (p. 1). The last paragraph on page 2, and the first paragraph on p. 3, note the ecological limits to agriculture, “the fragility of Namibia’s ecology” as well as current pressure on natural resources. A telling sentence is this:

Continued natural growth in the rural areas of Namibia, even when reduced by the impact of HIV/AIDS, is likely to further increase pressure on natural resources, even if efforts continue to be made to support environmentally sensitive development programmes.

Despite this sobering assessment, there is no explicit recognition in the theme 5 report that Namibia’s ecological carrying capacity for people is *limited*. There is an oblique reference to it in the population policy mission statement to “ensure sustainable development through the harmonisation of Namibia’s population dynamics ... with the country’s financial and natural resource availability and potential.” (GRN, 2002b, p. 12), a phrasing it appears to have taken from the 1997 National population policy. The theme report 5 SWOT<sup>7</sup> analysis on population (GRN, 2002b, p. 96) notes only the following as an environmental threat: “Resource endowment makes it difficult to improve household food security, thus maintaining high levels of migration”. There is no mention of Namibia’s water scarcity in this report (section 5.1 of this Chapter to come). In its chapter 6 Overall strategies, section 6.2 on Population (GRN, 2002b, pp. 93-94), the theme report’s strategies for population policy, population management, and population dynamics make no mention of environmental limitations.

But even a weak anthropocentric position is brave enough to recognize that the environment’s carrying capacity *limits* population numbers, and to make an explicit connection between that carrying capacity and a sustainable national population policy [grey-green indicator GG 1.1.2.f.iv and green indicator 12.2]. Vision 2030s strategies for managing population size and growth (Vision 2030, p. 47) do not include any plans to establish the land’s carrying capacity. But despite this *absence*, Sub-Vision 4.1.1s notion of “sustainable population growth” is at least pale green in that it seeks to *reduce* Namibia’s population growth rate.

However, in its approach to “harmonising” natural environment capacity with increasing population numbers, it is grey-green. Despite current pressure on natural resources, and current levels of environmental degradation, the envisaged “harmonisation” is not to be achieved through radical reduction of population growth rate to zero or near-zero, but through the reform environmentalism approach:

(i) The National Population Policy (GRN, 1997, pp. 15-16, my italics) notes that

If natural resource management is not improved, rapid population growth will lead to further degradation of the environment and reduction of the ability of the resource base ... to support future generations. Therefore efforts should be made *to enhance the productivity of natural resources* and protect essential

---

<sup>7</sup> Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats

eco-system functions, to tackle and to improve understanding of Namibia's environmental constraints and how to support a growing population and economy within them.

(ii) The Vision 2030 theme 5 report talks of sustainable approaches to urbanisation which will relieve pressure on rural natural resources (p. 14, 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet under "Rural-urban balance"), the sustainable utilisation of natural resources (p. 14, 5<sup>th</sup> bullet under "Rural-urban balance"), the development of "appropriate institutional mechanisms for land and resource management" at local level (p. 14, 2<sup>nd</sup> bullet under Environment and sustainable development), environmental education which emphasizes "efficient management of natural resources" (p. 15, 1<sup>st</sup> bullet point under Population information, education and communications), and legislative measures (p. 15).

The only concessions I see in these documents to the limits which ecology places on population growth is the customary grey-green technical-managerial approach. This is an example of that optimistic and rational-instrumental approach to environmental problems which O'Riordan terms "technocentrism" (Chapter Two: 2.2.1.3, Chapter Four: 1.3.1, footnote 4), and which is also a feature of grey-green "reform environmentalism" [green criterion 11.3]. His table showing the dualistic patterns of environmentalist ideologies (ecocentrism/technocentrism, or ecological/environmental) is shown next, as Figure 9:

Figure 9: O’Riordan’s pattern of environmentalist ideologies (O’Riordan, 1981, p. 376)




Figure 10.1. The pattern of environmentalist ideologies.

The population reduction advocated in the three documents (Vision 2030, Theme report 5 on Population, health and development, and the National Population Policy) is exclusively homocentric. An ecocentric orientation to population policy would approach that of the deep ecology viewpoint:

“4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life *requires* a smaller human population.” (Ch. 4: 1.3.4.1).

Absent from the Vision 2030 section 4.1.1 discussion, is any reference to the benefits of reduced human population pressure on, for example, habitat for other species. The National population policy’s title alone suggests an anthropocentric orientation. This is confirmed by reading for example, its Principle 6.3 (GRN, 1997, p. 19), which “places people (the national population) at the centre of development”. While Principle 6.9 of the policy (GRN, 1997, p. 19) expresses concern for water, productive land and energy, these are seen instrumentally as resources for livelihoods and the economy, an anthropocentric orientation. Thematic report 5’s Vision for the Population refers to

homocentric issues such as heightened economic growth, dealing with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, increased human life expectancy, and progress towards establishing Namibia as a higher middle income country (GRN, 2002b, p. x, p. 92). Theme report chapter 2: “Population in development” (GRN, 2002b, pp. 6-23) makes not a single mention of the impact of an increasing human population on non-human species.

While *Namibia Vision 2030*’s population policy is pale green in its desire to reduce the population growth rate, this is within a context of anthropocentric, reform environmentalist grey-green. The avoidance of expressly linking Namibia’s low carrying capacity for people to a policy of stabilizing population growth rate to near-zero, suggests to me, *strong* anthropocentrism.

#### **4.1.2 Migration, urbanisation and population distribution (pp. 47-50)**

*There is free movement of the population within the country and population distribution is maturely adjusted to the location of resources for livelihood. Namibia is a highly urbanised country with about 75 per cent of the population living in proclaimed urban centres, while the predominance of Windhoek has considerably reduced as a result of growth of other urban centres throughout the country. (p. 49).*

Indicator 15.7: Re-integrated, ecologically-harmonious human habitat spatial planning, partly relates to this Sub-Vision, and a superficial assessment in terms of it would confirm that seeing green values [indicators 11.2.1.b, 11.2.2.b] are opposed to the high urbanisation envisaged here, unless it also includes spatial planning which supports the value of *community*. The seeing green database (Chapters Three-Seven) did not discuss migration and population distribution. This could be remedied by further research, beginning perhaps with the policies and programmes of the early Die Grünen (the 1980b Saarbrucker programme, the 1983 Sindelfingen programme).

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the Vision’s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed further.

#### **4.1.3 Population age and sex distribution (pp. 50-53)**

*Namibia is a just, moral, tolerant and safe society with legislative, economic and social structures in place to eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity between women and men, the diverse ethnic groups and people of different ages, interests and abilities. (p. 51).*

The relevance of this Sub-Vision to the section heading under discussion here – population age and sex distribution (p. 50) – is unclear. This section heading in Vision 2030 should probably rather have been the “Equity in age and gender matters” which is the title of the summary box on p. 52, and in which context, the Sub-Vision would make more sense. The green-ness of Vision 2030 views on gender equity could be assessed against the green demand for a total rejection of the ideas of hierarchy and patriarchy [criterion 1, and indicator 1.2], indicator 15.2 which demands full emancipation for women, including their right to manage their own fertility, as well as indicator 15.3 which calls for post-patriarchal gender roles for men and women. Other than a broad green indicator dealing with the rejection of the idea of racism [indicators 1.2], there is no specific indicator to assess the green-ness of a text’s affirmative action stance, which is also a concern of this section. However, the indicators do address the issue of inclusion of the socially marginalized, such as the elderly [green indicator 15.5], also discussed here, but not in any great depth (Chapter Seven: 6.3.4).

The issues of race, age and gender equity, which form the content of section 4.1.3 of the Vision, do not relate to the Vision’s human-nature relationship, and so are not discussed further.

#### **4.1.4 Healthy living for longevity (pp. 53-57)**

*Namibia is free of the diseases of poverty and inequality; and the majority of Namibians are living healthy lifestyles, provided with safe drinking water and a comprehensive preventive and curative health service, to which all have equal access. (p. 55).*

Though this Sub-Vision does not fall within the ambit of the five specific questions (section 3) being asked of Vision 2030's worldview, there are in the seeing green list, some indicators which can be related to it: the green demand for egalitarianism [indicator 11.1.b], and also for holistic and non-patriarchal and close-to-home health care [indicator 15.6]. Given its preciousness for life, Die Grünen were particularly concerned about the wasteful use of water on non-life-conserving activities (Chapter Seven: 5.4.5). This could have been included as another indicator under green criterion 12, but was not. Concern is also expressed for food security in this section of Vision 2030. This is a green viewpoint (Chapter Eight: 6.5.7), to the extent that achieving it is understood within a context of local production for local needs, production for local consumption not profit [indicators 14.6, 14.7], and production based on reciprocal agriculture [indicator 12.6].

#### **4.1.5 Promoting healthy human environment (pp. 57-60)**

*All the people of Namibia have equitable access to high quality and affordable health care services; the health infrastructure is strong, equitably distributed, and is being supported by adequate human, material and financial resources. (p. 58).*

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the Vision's human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed further. However, it could be related to indicator 15.6 to assess its green-ness.

## **4.2 Wealth, livelihood and the economy (pp. 61-77)**

### **4.2.1 Macroeconomic environment (pp. 61-65)**

*Namibia operates an open, dynamic, competitive and diversified economy that provides sustained economic growth, the basis for availing resources for the fulfilment of major national objectives like poverty reduction, human resource development, employment creation, and the provision of adequate social services and infrastructural facilities. (p. 63).*

This Sub-Vision is related to the human-nature relationship. Amongst the many topics covered in this section, are the need for 'accelerated' (p. 61) and 'sustained' (p. 63) economic growth, Gross Domestic Product [GDP], the Gini-coefficient, employment and unemployment, trade, and balance of payment.

The fundamental and unmentioned assumption underlying this whole section, and indeed the whole document, is an uncritiqued acceptance of capitalism [green indicator 2.1.1], and of its internal and external market economy. Production for profit instead of for needs, is not critiqued [green indicator 14.7]; the need to industrialize and to be a part of globalizing capitalism's free trade is taken as given (Objective, on Vision 2030 p. 65). The following excerpts from elsewhere in the Main Document support this assertion:

It has been shown that Namibia can position itself to be responsive, reactive, proactive and manage change effectively and efficiently. Namibia should embrace globalization, and not be afraid of or resist it – but rather to manage and harness aggressively the opportunities that it offers for optimising Namibia's comparative and competitive advantages; (p. 33)

The benefits of globalisation outweigh the costs of that free trade results in countries that specialise in the production of those goods efficiently, while importing goods that they cannot produce efficiently, from other countries. (p. 197, section 6.6, wording as it is in Vision 2030).

The Sub-Vision expresses a desire for ‘sustained’ economic growth<sup>8</sup>. This is a neo-classical economic assumption which equates economic growth with success (Hayward, 1995, p. 93) and progress. On the seeing green view, sustained economic growth is an impossibility; ecological limits to growth must be recognized [green indicator 14.1]. Even on the sustainable development natural resource accounting view, economic growth can only take place within the limits of a country’s stocks and flows of natural resources (Chapter Nine: 3.4). But *absent* in this section at least, is any reference to the introduction of a System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting [SEEA], as agreed at the 1992 Earth Summit, and reflected in Agenda 21<sup>9</sup>, section 8D “Establishing systems for integrated environmental and economic accounting” [green indicator 14.2].

GDP features frequently in this section as a macro-economic indicator. The text points out that “GDP per capita can hardly be used to accurately reflect the welfare of the population in a country where income distribution is highly skewed” (p. 62). It corrects this inaccuracy by referring to Namibia’s unacceptable Gini-coefficient<sup>10</sup>. Although the Vision explicitly considers Namibia’s natural resources as the ecological wealth on which the Vision’s achievement rests (p. 14), *absent*, and unproblematized therefore, in this section at least, is any mention of the skewed vision which GDP growth gives of losses and gains in Namibia’s environmental stocks and flows [green indicator 14.2.2.c]. A “greened” GDP – known as “EDP” [Environmentally adjusted Gross Domestic Product] is needed to correct such skewness (Chapter Nine: 3.4.2); Namibia does not have such an indicator. Nor does the “Macroeconomic Environment” summary box on p. 64 suggest under its “Things to do”, the need for *formal* establishment of natural resource accounting at all [green indicator 14.2].

This absence, together with the absence of an SEEA, and absence of a greened GDP, suggests that the text might tend towards a ‘weaker’ interpretation of environmental sustainability [green indicator GG 12.1].

#### 4.2.2 Transport infrastructure (pp. 65-69)

*Safe and cost-effective transport infrastructure is available throughout the country, and so also specialised services in their different modes, to balance the demand and the supply thereof in an economically efficient way; and there is freedom of participation in the provision of transport services, subject mainly to quality regulation. (p. 66).*

This Sub-Vision relates to Vision 2030’s human-nature relationship indirectly here, but directly elsewhere, through the key phrase “in an economically efficient way”. This is a trace of grey-green instrumental economic rationality-speak, a marker of an instrumental **epistemology** [grey-green criterion GG 5.1]. Efficiency as value is strewn throughout the Main Document text. A word search<sup>11</sup> for the root spelling ‘Efficien’ [which allows for the occurrence of both ‘efficiency’ and ‘efficient’] delivers several instances of its use, on topics ranging from development (p. 12), to the economy (p. 14), health provision (p. 60), entrepreneurship (p. 65), education and training (p. 87), and infrastructure (p. 200), to name some.

But it is the application of economic, instrumental rationality to human dealings with nature which marks this text as, in this respect, not-green [GG 5.1]. Some examples are:

<sup>8</sup> It sets a GDP growth of 6.2% by 2030 (p. 63, Targets by 2030). Actual growth in 2006 was estimated at 4.6% in 2006, and projected at 4.8% for 2007 (Bank of Namibia Director of Research Dr John Steytler in the Namibian, 14 March 2007, p. 12, Positive prospects for Namibian economy). The Bank of Namibia said that GDP growth rate needed to grow at an average of around 11% per year for the goals of Vision 2030 to be reached (The Namibian, 2 April 2007, p. 11, ‘Strive harder for Vision 2030’)

<sup>9</sup> Namibia has though, adopted the UN Agenda 21 principles (Vision 2030, p. 14, A basic Principle).

<sup>10</sup> This was 0.70 at the time of Vision 2030s publication (Vision 2030, p. 62); it has since dropped to 0,6 (The Namibian, 28 February 2007, Poverty rate down, says new survey); the Vision (p. 63) sets a target Gini coefficient of 0,3 by 2030

<sup>11</sup> Using Full Reader Search in Adobe Reader 8.0

(a) In the context of land and agricultural production:

To ensure that all Namibians have equitable access to land and other natural resources, and that these resources are sustainably and efficiently used, while maximizing Namibia's comparative advantages. (p. 145)

Compare this instrumental approach with the desire in seeing green for use of land in the spirit of reciprocity with nature [green indicator 12.6].

(b) In the context of management of marine fisheries for greater economic growth:

It is important to note that Namibia's post Independence marine fisheries management policies have been commended internationally for their effectiveness and efficiency. (p. 162; also p. 157)

(c) And in the context of biodiversity protection:

- Create incentives for landowners and managers to diversify into wildlife and tourism in more efficient and cost effective ways. (p. 169).

Although it is not a selected green criterion, *absent* from this discussion on infrastructure is a seeing green prioritizing of Namibia's *railway* infrastructure as an energy-saving, environmentally-friendly transport network [green indicator 12.5.6]. The emphasis instead is on the provision of transport services "in an economically efficient way" (p. 67, *Where we want to be (2030)*), and focussed exclusively on human well-being [employment creation, poverty alleviation, economic growth (p. 67, *Where we want to be (2030)*)]. Nature is implicitly backgrounded. However, there is in the Transport Infrastructure summary box (p. 67), under Things to do, one potentially green note: "Design user friendly urban traffic system". This system will be green to the extent that it is easily accessible, practically free for users, and ecologically harmonious [green indicator 15.7].

#### 4.2.3 Employment and unemployment (pp. 69-74)

*The economic environment is suitable for all citizens who are able and willing to work, and there is full employment in the economy, with a well-established and functioning Labour Market Information System for the effective management of the dynamics of the labour force. (p. 72).*

This Sub-Vision and its discussion is not directly relevant to Vision 2030's human-nature relationship, but it could be related to seeing green indicators such as 14.9: Instrumental technology problematized, and 14.10: Work provides creative activity, not meaningless labour. Where these provide insufficient depth to judge the green-ness of this Sub-Vision, Die Grünen's "canonical" (Goodin, 1992, p. 184) 1983 electoral platform provides a compromise fundamental/radical eco-socialist green view on employment and unemployment.

In reading through this section, I note **the view of nature** presented under Objective on p. 74:

To ensure that all factors of production in an economy (land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship) are fully utilised.

This represents another marker of a grey-green text, in which nature – land in this case - is described in only, or predominantly, economic instrumental terms [the economization of reality], a grey-green tendency [grey-green criterion GG 6]. The difference between this understanding, and for example, proto-green Leopold's understanding of land as an ethical community comprising all living beings (Chapter Two: 2.5.2.d), is considerable.

#### **4.2.4 Data and research (pp. 74-77)**

*Namibia has a wealth of accurate, reliable and current information on aspects of its population in relation to social and economic development planning and programme management; through research, the range of information available on population and development in Namibia is consolidated, the national research programme continues to identify and fill gaps in knowledge. (p.75).*

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the selected human-nature relationship criteria.

However, nor did the seeing green database include any intensive discussion of green views on data gathering by the State, except for the green demand for protection of privacy in data collection, and the demand for personal information gathered by the State to be open to the person concerned [green indicator 17.4]. Someone interested in this aspect of societal functioning could fill this gap in indicator coverage.

However, in its discussion here of research, the Vision appears to take an unproblematized stance on the benefits of science and technology (p. 75). This aspect could be assessed against green indicator 2.1.4: Instrumental, or ‘masculine’ science and technology problematized, if not rejected?

#### **4.3 Developing a knowledge-based society (pp. 77-100)**

##### **4.3.1 Information and communication technology (pp. 77-82)**

*Advanced microelectronics-based Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are used to achieve social and economic transformations in Namibia; the costs of ICTs continue to fall as their capabilities increase, and ICTs are being applied throughout all sectors of the economy and society to serve development goals. (p. 79).*

This Sub-Vision is not directly related to the Vision’s human–nature relationship. However, I must note here, a gap in the seeing green list of indicators.

Indicators 2.1.4 and 14.9 are related to a seeing green problematization of technology, and thus in principle, to computer technology as well. However Chapter Eight contains no discussion of ICT, largely because at the time of street green’s emergence, computer technology, and its application in the fields of work, science, and information and communication, was in its infancy. Social ecologist Bookchin held rosy views on “cybernation” as means to a “materially abundant, even toilless era in which most of the means of life can be provided by machines” (Bookchin, 1965d, in Biehl, 1997, p. 107, in Chapter Five: 6.2). But in their early programmes, Die Grünen were concerned about computers’ possible demeaning effects in the workplace: “Computers are given the most important work to do, while humans are left to carry out meaningless mechanical activities...” (1980b, Section 4. Work and technology, pp. 8-9, this quote on p. 8; the 1983 Sindelfingen programme, p. 7, paragraph (b) is also relevant). They were also concerned about the increased dangers of an undemocratic, and non-transparent use of personal data which computer technology made possible (Chapter Seven: 6.3.5). A more in-depth, and modern green view of information and communication technology can be obtained by reading for example Die Grünen’s 2002 base programme. It continues to highlight inter alia, traditional green concerns such as the necessity for democratic access to, and democratic control of the information created through ICT.

##### **4.3.2 Production technology (pp. 83-87)**

*Namibia is an industrialised nation, with a viable natural resources export sector, increased size of skills based industrial and service sector, and market oriented production; there is high level of self*

*sufficiency, reliable and competitively priced energy, meeting the demand of households and industry.* (p. 85).

Indicators 2.1.4 and 14.9 can be related superficially to this section too, as well as indicator 12.5, which provides reasonable depth in the seeing green view on energy, but they are not amongst the assessment criteria selected for this section.

This Sub-Vision is however directly related in some ways to the assessment's focus on the human-nature relationship. Despite the statement in the opening paragraph of Vision 2030s section 4.3 Developing a knowledge based society that

The modern world is moving from heavy industry to a knowledge-based economy based on specialist services, specialised industries, communications, and information technologies. Namibia needs to fast track its development process, and springboard over the heavy industry development path taken by the industrialised countries...(p. 77)

the Sub-Vision on Production Technology (Section 4.3.2. of Developing a knowledge based society), confirms again, industrialization as an end [and non-green – indicator 2.1.2] value in **the good life**: “Namibia is an industrialised nation...” (p. 85). The only aspect of heavy industry singled out for *implied* critique is its heavy water use:

We must focus on high value-added services, specialised industries that are modest in their water requirements[,] and information technology. (p. 77)

This is a key sentence, because it highlights – only indirectly though – that water scarcity (section 5.1 to come) is a key limiting factor to sustainable development in Namibia. However, this section's **view of nature** presents an image of Namibia as “rich in [natural] resources” (top of p. 83, and Summary box, Current situation, first bullet point, p. 86), limited only by skills and technological capacity to use these resources. This image of unlimited natural resources to fuel industrialization, provided they are used sustainably (Summary box, Where we want to be (2030) first bullet point, p. 86), persists throughout the main text [despite worries in section 4.1.4 on population growth and the already considerable pressure of people on natural resources], and is perhaps a clue to/trace of the optimism which O’Riordan sees as part of “Cornucopian” technocentrism (Figure 9). The critically limiting factor of water availability vis-a-vis Namibia’s expanding population, is backgrounded here.

As the Sub-Vision which opened this section, as well as its discussion in the text makes clear, industrialization is highly valued both as part-definition of the good life, and as means to attain it. Examples from page 83 are:

“The shortage of human capacity ... are factors contributing to the low rate of Namibia’s industrialisation”, and

“Newly educated Namibian technicians and engineers could engage themselves in the maintenance area as a starting point where they can gain experience and additional knowledge to drive [another clue to/trace of a mechanist **ontology**!] the industrialisation of the country..”.

Otherwise stated, *Namibia Vision 2030* fails to offer an alternative conceptual model to development as capitalist techno-industrialism [green indicator 2.2]. One trace of this failure is left in the phrasing of the Sub-Vision:

Namibia is an industrialised nation, *with a viable natural resources export sector* (p. 85, my italics).

Compare that with Galtung’s alternative model of development for emerging countries (Chapter Seven, section 2.1.3.3.(c)), one aspect of which was that a developing country should *not* make its raw materials available to a developed country. “They should do something with these themselves, either

independently or in collaboration with each other, that is as South-South trade, not South-North. If this is problematic for us [industrialized countries], that is our problem. We must find a solution for it...”. Namibia’s growing export of its natural resources (uranium, fish, marble, copper) to a rapidly industrializing China, does not I think, meet Galtung’s requirements<sup>12</sup> (The Namibian, 5 February 2007, p. 7, The Chinese charm offensive; The Namibian, 4 April 2007, p. 11, Namibia and China sign thirteen agreements).

And of course, a clear mark of the absence of an alternative development model to capitalist techno-industrialism [green indicator 2.2], is the Sub-Vision’s reference to “market oriented production”. A more radical version of seeing green would have encouraged as priority, local production for local needs, and production for exchange above profit, rather than participation in the [global] market system [indicators 14.6 and 14.7]. Vision 2030 by contrast, encourages Namibia’s participation in globalization [section 4.2.1].

The inclusion of a sub-heading and discussion of “Natural resources” (p. 83) under the heading “Production technology” is a telling clue to this text’s **view of nature**, I think: nature is seen mechanically [a technological means], and economically [a factor of production]. Quite unlike seeing green’s view of nature as organic, holistic, pursuing its own interests and agenda [green criterion 6].

And, I cannot resist noting in passing, another clue to this text’s non-green economization of reality, via its strong views here on education serving to produce, rather than to critique, Homo *economicus* [green indicator 8.1.1]: “entrepreneurship and technological innovation training” are to be integrated into the education system from early childhood (Objectives, 2<sup>nd</sup> bullet point, p. 87); education in science and technology is also to be prioritized (Strategies, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> bullet points, p. 87). Homo *economicus* is based on a competitive aggressive **view of the human being**, confirmed in this section on production technology by the value placed on competitiveness (for example, p. 83, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph, 6<sup>th</sup> paragraph, the Sub-Vision on p. 85, the Summary box, Current situation, 6<sup>th</sup> bullet, on p. 86, Objectives, 6<sup>th</sup> bullet, p. 87).

### 4.3.3 Education and training (pp. 87-96)

*A fully integrated, unified and flexible education and training system, that prepares Namibian learners to take advantage of a rapidly changing environment and contributes to the economic, moral, cultural and social development of the citizens throughout their lives. (p. 89.)*

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the selected human-nature relationship criteria, but could be partly assessed via green indicators 8.2.5 and 8.2.6. However the discussion supporting these indicators is not deep enough to assess all the aspects covered in this section of Vision 2030. It could be remedied partly by reading deep ecologist Arne Naess’s views (1989, see ‘education’ in Index, p. 219), or those of social ecologist Murray Bookchin (in Biehl, 1997, for example), or early Die Grünen proposals for reform of education, and the education system, or views contained in charters such as those of the European (European Greens, 2004, 2006) or USA Greens.

Despite that limitation, I believe a seeing green perspective would problematize

- (a) the [over-?] emphasis placed in this section on science and technology, if of the variety which merely perpetuates western techno-capitalism’s instrumental attitude towards nature;
- (b) the Objective (p. 95) of an education and training system which is “capable of producing a balanced supply of human resources, in response to demands in the labour market”. This is again nothing other

<sup>12</sup> “...President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa warned that China’s push for raw materials from Africa held the risk of a “colonial relationship” (The Namibian, 5 February 2007, p. 7, The Chinese charm offensive)

than education to produce Homo *economicus* [green indicator 8.1.1], or cogs which will slot easily into the industrial machine, to use Die Grünen's imagery. Not a seeing green **view of the human being**.

#### **4.3.4 Early childhood development (pp. 96-99)**

*All children aged 0 to 6 years have opportunities for early childhood development, in addition to the care of individuals and communities. (p. 97)*

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the selected human-nature relationship criteria, so is not discussed in that context.

No specific indicator was developed for the seeing green criteria list by which the green-ness of the Sub-Vision proposed here could be assessed. However, as can be expected from their partial genesis from the women's liberation movement, children are a special concern in Die Grünen's early political programmes (for example, 1980b, Section V 2.5 Children, p. 34). In line with their demand for post-patriarchal gender roles [indicator 15.3], they proposed a series of measures which would enable either parent to remain at home with their young children, and be paid to do so, even though not in a formal job at the time. They also encouraged the kind of parenting education programmes which Vision 2030s section 4.3.4 envisages.

#### **4.3.5 Aspects of the legislative/regulatory framework (pp. 99-100)**

*Cross-sectoral internal and external developments in the field of knowledge, information and technology are constantly monitored to assess their impact on the rights of the individual and the functioning of society and the national economy, and appropriate legislation and regulations are promulgated. (p. 100).*

The objective of this section of Vision 2030 is to "ensure the safe use of science and technology systems, including indigenous knowledge, while upholding the constitutional provisions for education and training" (p. 100). ICT and education have already been discussed above.

But some of the topics in this discussion in Vision 2030 can be related to and assessed in terms of the seeing green criteria/indicators:

- (a) I interpret "Legislation in place to protect the rights of the individual..." (Summary box, p. 100, Where we want to be (2030), 1<sup>st</sup> bullet point) as a reference to either data privacy protection or freedom of access to information, or both. These are green ideas [indicators 17.3, 17.4]
- (b) There is an unproblematized affirmation of an ethic of justice and rights, which on many ecofeminist views, is an ethic generated by an androcentric, atomist, rather than relational view of Self/Other relationships [seeing green criterion 1, and indicator 9.6].
- (c) The discussion refers to biotechnology, and the national policy on biotechnology. This latter policy could be assessed in terms of seeing green indicator 12.4.3, which is wary of biotechnology's potential threat to biodiversity, or which is undertaken within an instrumental science/technology orientation, rather than in a reciprocal/partnership orientation to nature [indicator 12.6].
- (d) *Absent*, in what is surely the perfect location in which to discuss it, is any discussion of a changed science/technology ethic towards nature.

### **4.4 Equity: individuals, community and the state (pp. 101-135)**

#### **4.4.1 Poverty reduction (pp. 101-108)**

*Poverty is reduced to the minimum, the existing pattern of income-distribution is equitable and disparity is at the minimum. (p. 104).*

This Sub-Vision is not directly related to the criteria selected to assess Vision 2030's human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail.

No indicator has been developed to assess the green-ness of a text's poverty reduction stance, which must be considered a gap under criterion 15 Living in solidarity, because poverty reduction is part of the radical egalitarianism and redistributionism of ecological economics (Chapter Nine: 3.2), which contributed to ecologism's emergence as radical cultural critique (Chapter Two: 2.3.1.d).

Seeing green's radical egalitarianism in resource sharing, and solidarity of lifestyle with have-nots, appears in sustainable development discourse, and in Vision 2030, as a rather tamer "equity", one of the three "desiderata" of the WCED/Brundtland Report (Hayward, 1997, p. 97; the other two being "environment" and "futuraity"). Poverty reduction assumes in sustainable development discourse, the same kind of legitimating narrative status which seeing green accords to a western counter-cultural critique, or ecology as normative. But ecological economist Martinez-Alier (1987, p. xi), for example, takes the cynical view that poverty reduction as story is deliberately cultivated by the Northern elites in order to deflect too much probing into their continued and inequalitarian pursuit of resource-intensive, and ever higher standards of living. It is often noted that this standard of living, for example that of the USA, "is not replicable in the rest of the world because it implies such a disproportionate use of the earth's resources" (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 237; see his comments on "Raubwirtschaft" in Chapter Nine, section 3.2).

Martinez-Alier points out that underlying the growth and poverty alleviation debate is an ethical question not always clearly spelt out, particularly in the context of the developed world vis-a-vis the developing world. If continual economic growth *is* possible, then developed world countries currently enjoying the high standard of living aspired to by the rest of the world [Namibia included], are not called upon to introduce any fundamental change to their lifestyle – 'tinkering' perhaps, but not a *fundamental* re-organization. By "assuming miraculous technical change and economic growth in the future" (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 236), they expect that developing countries will eventually reach the same high standard of living as in the developed countries, and there is thus no need to give up "the last great conservative ideology" (p. 15) of growth, or to become involved in the painful business of redistribution of wealth. But, if continued growth is *not* possible, if our energy reserves are indeed limited, and not capable of delivering the same high standard of living across all peoples and all countries, should the developed countries then not be sharing the available resources in an egalitarian way, starting right now? And, closer to home, what about Die Grünen Rudolf Bahro's contention that the elites in developing countries should also be engaging in the same kind of egalitarian, distributionist thinking [e.g. the introduction of a Basic Income Grant (indicator 14.11)], rather than pursuit of what he called, the "Mercedes culture"? (Chapter Seven: 2.1.3.2.1).

As far as the text's human-nature relationship is concerned, one can note, while reading this section 4.4.1, that it continues the text's commitment to market development (p. 101), and again presents **an economic view of nature**: "Namibia is *endowed with rich natural resources*, such as diamonds and other mining products, fish, agriculture and outstanding [nature-based?] tourist attractions. This has led to a relatively high per-capita income....". (p. 101, my italics). [*Absent* again however from this cornucopian view of nature, is Namibia's limited access to water]. This economic view of nature continues on p. 102 (my italics), in the context of a discussion on land, in the phrase "Access to *productive assets* also determines the vulnerability of households".

#### 4.4.2 Gender and development (pp. 108-110)

*Namibia is a just, moral, tolerant and safe society, with legislative, economic and social structures in place that eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity between women and men, the diverse ethnic groups, and people of different interests. (p. 109).*

This Sub-Vision and section is not directly related to the criteria selected to assess Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail. However, it can be related to the seeing green criteria list which includes demands for the social inclusion of women equal to men<sup>13</sup>, for women’s local, non-expert livelihood knowledge to be taken into account in development planning, for post-patriarchal gender roles in society, and for an end to structural violence [criteria 15.2, 2.1.4, 15.3 and 16.2 respectively, but see also Chapter Six: 3.4 and 6.3 for ecofeminist views on “standpoint epistemology” and its relationship to development, and Chapter Nine: 4.2.3 for differing approaches to the role of women in development].

#### 4.4.3 Youth and development (pp. 111-115)

*Namibia will be a just, moral, tolerant and safe society, with legislative, economic and social structures in place that eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity and a conducive environment for child and youth development. (p. 113)*

This section covers a variety of real world issues pertaining to the youth: substance abuse, teenage pregnancies, HIV/AIDS and other negative health behaviour patterns, high unemployment rate, for example. No specific green indicators were developed for these issues, but the street-greenness of the measures proposed here (Vision 2030, pp. 114-115) to deal with these and other youth issues could possibly be judged by Die Grünen’s children and youth policies developed subsequent to 1980 (the 1980 base programme mentions only that such policies were under development), and also the section on youth unemployment and training in the 1983 Sindelfingen political platform (Die Grünen, 1983).

Anyone interested in constructing this document’s implicit **epistemology**, might take this next sentence as yet another marker of a mechanist, and linear worldview:

The youth’s ideas on democracy and politics allows one to *predict* the political future of the country. The opinions they form at present will *impact* on this generation of opinion-makers and voters as they grow older and assume their positions in the economy and political system.” (p. 112, my italics)

Phrasing such as “allows one to speculate on [or make an informed guess on] the country’s future political tendency. The opinions they form at present will affect this generation...” could have been used, but was not.

The section does relate in one specific way to the **human-nature relationship**, which, as one expects by now from this document, is cast in economic, and enlightened self-interest terms:

“One of the five priority areas of action of the National Youth Policy focuses on environment and agriculture, especially environmental degradation as a result of deforestation, desertification, and soil erosion. Young people have a responsibility to be actively involved in the protection and conservation of the natural resources of Namibia. ...” (p. 112).

The ethic of conservation mentioned here is discussed in more detail at Biodiversity loss (pp. 164-165) under section 5.2.6.

#### 4.4.4 Senior citizens (pp. 116-117)

*The elderly citizens are acknowledged and well esteemed for their past contributions to the development of our country, and in their old age they are well cared for and remain happy senior citizens in a safe and loving environment. (p. 116).*

<sup>13</sup> For example, African Heads of State at the 1997 SADC Summit set a quota of 30% for appointments of women into positions of higher authority. Namibia along with some other African states, is “lagging behind at 20 per cent” (*The Namibian*, 9 February 2007, SADC states fail to meet women quota)

This Sub-Vision and section is not directly related to the criteria selected to assess Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail.

However, it can be related to the seeing green criteria list through criterion 15: Living in solidarity, which includes demands for the social inclusion, physically and emotionally, of the elderly [indicator 15.5]. Indicator 16.2: No structural violence, is also related. Pleasantly green in this Sub-Vision, is the implicit characterization of human-human relationships not only in terms of justice, rights and duties, but balanced by the ‘feminine’ value of care (Chapter Eight: 4.3.3.3). The summary box “Senior Citizens”, and sub-section “Where we want to be (2030)” has reverted though, to ‘malestream’ values such as “honour and respect” (p. 117). To support my contention that there is an implicit androcentric murmuring through this text, note the phrase [again!] “man-made and or natural calamities” (Objectives, 1<sup>st</sup> bullet, p. 117). This despite the commitment to gender responsivity in language given on p. 110 (Strategies, 4<sup>th</sup> bullet point). The limitations of indicator 15.5 noted at Vision 2030 section 4.1.3 apply here too.

#### **4.4.5 People with disabilities (pp. 117-120)**

*Namibia is a caring state and society, which pays particular attention to vulnerable people and groups, who are unable to utilise capabilities, care for themselves or get assistance from family networks. (p. 119)*

This Sub-Vision and discussion can also be related to the seeing green indicator 16.2 No structural violence, and indicator 15.5: Social inclusion of the disabled. “We want them to live with us”, said Die Grünen (1980b, p. 46) in their 1980 street-green political programme (1980b, section V.9. 4, p.46).

However, it is not directly related to the Vision 2030 human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed any further.

#### **4.4.6 Fostering and orphanage (pp. 120-122)**

*Families are available and willing to accommodate orphans and are being assisted, when necessary, by the government/community through a well managed public orphanage programme, in which such disadvantaged children are supported to live a meaningful life that prepares them adequately for the future. (p. 120).*

Though this Sub-Vision, and its discussion could be related in principle to the same seeing green indicators as those related to the social inclusion of the marginalized [16.2, 15.5], there is no discussion in the base data chapters on orphans, orphanages or fostering. This indicator gap would need to be filled by those interested in this aspect of seeing green’s demand for living in solidarity.

#### **4.4.7 Culture and tradition (pp. 122-125)**

*People and society are tolerant and supportive of a diversity of religious beliefs, cultures and ethnicity, and work to optimise the strengths of diversity. (p. 123).*

This should have been the section in which the authors of the text, had they been serious adherents of seeing green, would have problematized western techno-industrialism as economy and culture. However any such problematization is entirely *absent*, thereby conferring on the western capitalist version of **the good life**, the mantle of “naturalness”. And while the text notes that changes in culture are “necessary and inevitable” (p. 122), the other key cultural changes demanded in seeing green – a reconceptualized Self [criterion 8], a reconceptualized Self/Other relationship, including the human relationship with nature [criterion 7] are equally absent. These absences are clues to/traces of a grey-green text which embraces reform environmentalism rather than radical ecogism.

The section is a curious mixing of shades of green. More-green tones are present in the condemnation of colonialism and racism, though it is unclear whether this is on the grounds of the idea of hierarchy and ‘power-over’ [seeing green indicator 1.2]. Diversity, a green value, is recognized as strength; multi-culturalism is valued too [indicators 11.1.d, 15.4]. The freedom of expression of beliefs, and religions, noted in the summary box, “Current situation” (p. 124) is a strong green value (Chapter Seven: 6.3.3), though freedom of expression of cultural practices produces ecofeminist ambivalence on vegetarianism, for example, as absolute expression of an animal ethic of care (Chapter Six: 5.4.4.3). Less-green is the phrase “the fear of God” (p. 123), suggesting a western understanding of Christianity (Armstrong, 1999), problematized in seeing green as far as its dominion/stewardship-informed human-relationship with nature is concerned. Again too, is the already noted trace of a mechanist **ontology** in the phrase ‘driving force’, as well as a suggestion of an androcentric ethical understanding in the phrase “just and morally upright” society (p. 123). And the word ‘optimise’ in the Sub-Vision wording is a clue to/trace of an economic rationality, usually understood as an instrumental **epistemology** (Chapter Nine: 3.1.3).

#### **4.4.8 Civic affairs (pp. 125-128)**

*All Namibians have national documents, and there is a smooth and efficient regulative and controlling mechanism for refugees and immigrants into Namibia as well as their residence in the country, supported by a well developed criminal justice system. (p. 126)*

This Sub-Vision and section is not directly related to Vision 2030’s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail.

As far as the indicators’ assessment is concerned, registering of vital events (p. 125) could be related to the green concern for privacy of data and access to information gathered by the state on self [indicators 17.3, 17.4]. But as the base data chapters do not discuss international migration, no seeing green indicator was developed for this topic. It is however one on which a street-green viewpoint could easily be constructed (for example, from Die Grünen, 1980b, section V.5.1 Discrimination against foreigners, p. 38).

#### **4.4.9 Public safety (pp. 128-130)**

*Namibia provides a socio-cultural environment which marginalises social evils and creates a societ[y], in which the rule of law and order is respected, and which, to a large extent, is free from violence. (p. 129).*

Given its roots inter alia in the feminism and peace social movements, rejection of domination and violence is a key value in seeing green. The section could be assessed in terms of criteria relating to gender equity, and radical peace, which rejects both physical and structural violence [criterion 16, indicators 15.2, and 15.3]. Namibia has high rates of violence against women:

Prime Minister Nahas Angula, who officiated at the closing ceremony [of a national conference aimed at ending gender-based violence], said it was evident from daily reports in the media that gender-based violence had reached alarming proportions. ‘Due to some traditional stereotypes, women and girls are viewed as second-class citizens and – worse – the properties of men. I urge all traditional leaders to address these harmful traditional practices within our communities,’ he emphasised (*The Namibian*, Monday 25 June 2007, p. 3 “Women treated as property”).

This Sub-Vision, and its discussion of violence against women and children – rape, domestic violence and child abuse – appear not to be directly related to Vision 2030’s human-nature relationship. But on the feminist/ecofeminist view, violence against women, and violence against nature are *coupled subsets of the same androcentric construction of the Self/Other relationship*, which manifests itself in

the related ideas, structures, and values of hierarchy, patriarchy, and naturism. This contention is explored in detail in Chapter Six: 4.2 as Warren's logic of domination, and Plumwood's centric critique, and in Chapter Eight: 6.6.1, where I wrote that:

Nature is included in green solidarity politics: "How can we be non-violent to nature unless the principle of non-violence becomes central to the ethos of human culture?" (Gandhi in Swaminathan, 1990, p. xiii, in Ch 7: 6.4 footnote 150).

Where Vision 2030 assumes that pursuing a strategy of gender equity will eventually ease human-human violence (p. 129, 4<sup>th</sup> paragraph), a green viewpoint would suggest that the entire text should also be critically assessed for its continued implicit or explicit stance on *violence towards nature* [e.g. naturism: indicator 1.3]. For on the green view, even if the gender equity strategy succeeds, naturism is a continuing expression of the idea of hierarchy and domination rejected in seeing green. Could one successfully argue for example, that the annual clubbing of seals permitted in Namibia's protected areas, is *not* just another a manifestation of physical violence, unless one *also* argues that animals are beyond ethical concerns?

The Vision 2030 objective (p. 130) of ending violence in Namibia:

*Objective*

To ensure that people in Namibia enjoy peace and harmony in their relationships, and violence (including homicide, rape, human abuse of all descriptions) is completely eliminated in relationships at home as well as outside, within the community and in the country.

fails then, in its **view of the Self/Other relationship** here, to make any connection between the seeing green linked ideas of human-human and human-nature violence [indicator 8.2.4].

#### **4.4.10 Civil society and its organisations (pp. 131-133)**

*Civil society, its individuals, groups and organisations are highly resourceful and co-operate with Government and its agencies at local, regional and national level; respect each other and strive to consolidate democratic ideals, and collaborate in social and economic development for the benefit of all. (p. 132).*

This Sub-Vision is not directly related to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail. Its green-ness could be assessed though, in terms of the seeing green understanding of direct democracy and real citizenship [criterion 17].

In passing, one can note in this discussion of the links between civil society organizations and development, again, the *absence, the backgrounding*, of nature. The 4<sup>th</sup> paragraph (p. 131) and the Summary box on p. 132, refer to a variety of civic organisations which on the authors' view *are* related to development: community development committees, small business organizations, women's groups, trade unions, teachers' groups, church groups... but no grassroots environmental organizations, such as those whose presence was so strong in the emergence of the green movement (Chapter Two: 2.3.3).

#### **4.4.11 The family (pp. 133-135)**

*The family is sacred and well respected, and parents fulfil their responsibilities, while children remain obedient and responsible. (p. 133).*

This Sub-Vision is not directly related to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail.

Its green-ness would be difficult to assess though, as there is in the seeing green criteria only a minimal, and implied negative reference to the family as expression of hierarchy and patriarchy [social ecologist Bookchin and some feminists are particularly outspoken here].

Intuitively though, I feel that there are in the text of Vision 2030, lingering traces of hierarchy, and patriarchy, in its stern, cold morality, expressed here in this section, and elsewhere:

- The family is “sacred” (p. 133, Summary box The Family, “Where we want to be (2030), 1<sup>st</sup> bullet point, p. 134)
- “Disrespect for family authority” (p. 129), and breakdown in family structure, are cited as a cause of crime (p. 129) and ‘Moral degeneration’ (p. 133)
- There are references to “a high sense of morality” as opposed to “widespread moral decadence” (Summary box for civil society and its organisations”, p. 132, “Where we want to be (2030), and “Worst-case scenario”)
- The church, and the family, are two western-cultural social institutions which have been critiqued for patriarchal attitudes. Nevertheless, they are the *unproblematized* social bodies which will generate Namibia’s desired moral status: “Church ... must actively contribute to the upholding of morality in our society” (Summary box, p. 132, “Where we want to be”, 4<sup>th</sup> bullet; and Sub-Vision on p. 133)
- The androcentric “Respect” [not “feminine principle” values such as warmth, love, or caring] is a key value in family relationships (Sub-Vision, p. 133)
- Children are “obedient” (Sub-Vision, p. 133), and “disciplined” (p. 134, Summary box the Family, “Where we want to be (2030)”, 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet point) - surely both a clue to/trace of commitment to the ideas of hierarchy and patriarchy?

Missing for me in this text is the warm, mutual-aid solidarity of community and spirituality, which, on my understanding of seeing green [criterion 4, and indicator 4.1], will generate “where we want to be” in our Self/Other relationships. But any researcher interested in this aspect would need to develop a seeing green indicator based on a more focussed discussion of critique of patriarchal institutions such as family and church than provided in this study (see for example Chapter Five: 6.1.2, 5<sup>th</sup> paragraph; and 6.2; also Chapter Six: 2.1.3 on the family, Chapter Two: 2.5.1; Chapter Nine: 7.3.2.1 on the western Christian church).

Part of where seeing green wants to be in its Self/Other relationships, is a re-conceptualized, partnership ethic with nature, so it is with great interest that the assessment of Vision 2030s chapter 5, on sustaining the resource base, begins next.

## 5.0 Vision 2030 chapter 5: Sustainable resource base (pp. 136-173)

As preparation for reading this key chapter on the human-nature relationship, as well as environmental sustainability in Vision 2030, I first read the authoritative, well-constructed and presented thematic report, produced by the Namibia Natural Resources Consortium<sup>14</sup>, which informed it: Theme 6: Natural resources sector (GRN, 2002c).

It is evident that the Consortium’s approach and philosophy were influential in informing the final Vision 2030 Main document generally, and its chapter 5 specifically. Some examples of its influence are:

---

<sup>14</sup> Consortium members were Dr. Chris Brown, Dr Peter Tarr, Dr John Mendelsohn, Dr Jon Barnes, Mr Carl !Aribeb and Mrs J. Tarr (Vision 2030, p. 234)

(a) Much of Theme 6s Foreword is taken up in the Vision 2030 Main document as the Preface by the Director General of the National Planning Commission (Vision 2030, pp. 14-16). In particular, three “higher-order questions” were asked in the preparation of the Theme 6 report:

- “1. What is the national ideal that we are all working towards?”
2. What is the cornerstone of our approach and philosophy?”
3. How does this initiative fit into the national development process?”

These higher-order questions, the theme 6 report diagram on the national planning process, and the view of nature which appears in their report as “How the ... resource base will have to be” [all in the Theme 6 Foreword], appear in the Vision 2030 Main document on pp. 14-16.

(b) Much of Theme 6s Executive Summary is taken up in the five different sections of the Main document’s chapter 5. As one example, its Executive Summary on freshwater and freshwater resources (pp. v-vii) appears in Vision 2030 (Main document) on pp. 136-137, only slightly edited.

(c) Much of section 6.1 of Vision 2030 on Sustainable Development is taken from the Theme 6 report. For example, the key threats to sustainable development listed in the report (GRN, 2002c, pp. 76-77) are the same as those listed, with minor editing changes, in Vision 2030, pp. 175-176. Another example is the inclusion on p. 142 in the Vision 2030 Main document, of the Theme 6 report’s Figure B1.1 (GRN, 2002c, p. 78) on “Some of the interlinked issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia”.

It would also be fair to say, that Theme 6’s report “Key strategies” (GRN, 2002c, section 3, pp. 79-89) has largely informed the Vision 2030 discussion of sustainable development as its cornerstone philosophy on pp. 14-15, as well as in chapter 6: 6.1, pp. 175-179.

The Theme 6 report adopts a vigorous, and explicit, environmental economics approach to nature, an approach which has implicitly permeated Vision 2030s view of nature so far. I shall be referring to the Theme report 6 during the discussion of Vision 2030s chapter 5, and its eight Sub-Visions, beginning next. Other than seeking to understand the Vision 2030 chapter 5 view of nature, a recurring key question will be, what is its view of environmental sustainability? What is to be sustained?, For whom? and For how long? Answers to these questions will provide an indication of whether the text’s ultimate human-nature relationship premise is anthropocentric [grey-green] or ecocentric [dark green].

## 5.1 Freshwater and associated resources (pp. 136-140)

*Namibia’s freshwater resources are kept free of pollution and are used to ensure social well-being, support economic development, and to maintain natural habitats. (p. 137).*

This Sub-Vision provides a clue to/trace of a homocentric and economic **view of nature** in the word ‘resource’. Water as resource is to be sustained for social well-being [homocentric/anthropocentric], and economic development [also homocentric/anthropocentric]. Less easy to pigeon-hole, is the phrase “to maintain natural habitats”. The answer to the *For whom?* question here is not immediately clear.

Unlike the largely cornucopian view of “natural resources” appearing elsewhere in Vision 2030, the discussion here (p. 136) begins with a clear, and green acknowledgement [indicator 14.1], of the limits to growth posed by water scarcity in Namibia:

*Namibia suffers from extreme water scarcity. The only permanently flowing rivers lie near to, or form part of, the country international boundaries. The lack of readily available freshwater in the interior of the country remains the most important limiting factor for development.*

The limitation which water scarcity will impose on development is again stated on p. 137, 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph: “As water in some areas becomes scarce and expensive, development options become increasingly limited”.

□ Broad overview of Namibia’s water resources and consumption (p. 136)

The discussion of water resources here is almost exclusively focussed on human use: on farms, in towns, livelihoods for local fishers, economic activities such as aquaculture and agriculture. There is though, at the 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet point, a potentially ecocentric statement:

The water table associated with these rivers is high and their banks characteristically support vegetation that provides important resources for people *and wildlife* living in the arid areas of Namibia (p. 136, my italics).

This small italicised statement leaves room to wonder about the answer to the *For whom?* question. Are these resources for wildlife important for the sake of the wildlife [which would constitute a green recognition of nature’s value-for-itself], or only because wildlife represents an economic opportunity for humans?

□ Future water demand, freshwater depletion and degradation (pp. 136-137)

The *For how long* question is answered in the first sentence here as 30 years, which simply echoes the time frame set by the Vision as a whole.

This section expresses green-sounding concern for the health of the environment, its over-exploitation, its vulnerability to pollution. But *For whom?* For humans: “Freshwater depletion and degradation threatens human and livestock health, and socio-economic development. It reduces livelihood options and exacerbates rural poverty. ... As water in some areas becomes scarce ..., development options become increasingly limited.” (p. 137, 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph).

□ Efforts to reduce freshwater depletion and to enhance the value of water (p. 137)

This section sets out the strategies which Namibia employs to realize its goals of “social well-being, economic development and environmental health”, the latter goal, one is beginning to suspect, in service of the two former, and not on an equal footing with them [seeing green criterion 12]. In the strategies listed here, and their phrasing, are three points of interest, I think:

(i) “*Tools* such as Natural Resource Accounting and Strategic Environmental Assessment are being adopted. Ultimately these tools will help guide policies regarding future water use, and will prevent *impact* on freshwater ecosystems and the resources and services that they provide.” (p. 137, my italics).

“Tools” and “impact” are again traces of/clues to a mechanist worldview, but in the world of environmental management, their use has naturalized the **ontology** they mirror to the point of invisibility.

(ii) Namibia has no National Environmental Action Plan (Blackie, 2000, pp. 135-136); no Environmental Management Act in operation as yet (September 2007), and therefore no Commission on Sustainable Development; and no System of integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting [SEEA – green indicator 14.2.1] to account for stocks and flows in Namibia’s ‘natural resources’. One could perhaps, as substitute, investigate the extent to which the results of the donor-funded Natural Resource Accounting programme mentioned here are being taken up in the national development planning process (Vision 2030, p. 15). This is done in section 5.2.2.

(iii) *Absences* are also of interest. Given this section’s explicit recognition of water scarcity in Namibia (see also Theme 6 report, p. 15, Box A2.1, which characterizes Namibia as suffering from “Absolute water scarcity” and “High water stress”), many of Die Grünen’s early demands (1980b, pp. 21-22) to preserve water have not yet been implemented in Namibia. These include the compulsory erection by businesses of effluent purification plants for water recycling, and separate transmission systems for water destined for life-support as opposed to industrial use.

□ Summary box “Freshwater and Associated Resources” (p. 138)

I highlight here, the glimpse which the summary box provides of this chapter’s **view of nature**: “essential ecological services” (“Current situation, 7<sup>th</sup> bullet), and “valuable resources and essential services” (“Things to avoid”, 4<sup>th</sup> bullet), “Productive and healthy natural wetlands with rich biodiversity” (“Where we want to be (2030), 5<sup>th</sup> bullet).

This is basically a view taken from Theme 6 report’s Table A2.1 “Goods and Hidden Services Provided by Natural Aquatic Ecosystems” on p. 16, and reproduced next as Figure 10:

Figure 10: Goods and hidden services provided by natural aquatic ecosystems (ex Theme 6, 2002c, Table A2.1)

VALUABLE GOODS	Vital services (indirect use values of aquatic ecosystems)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•→ Freshwater. Essential for life processes, maintaining human health, agriculture and industry.</li> <li>• Riverine and wetland vegetation. Can be used for grazing, building materials, fuel and food.</li> <li>•→ Aquatic animals. Fish and other edible aquatic animals provide a valuable source of income and protein to rural subsistence communities.</li> <li>•→ Wild birds and terrestrial animals concentrate around natural water bodies. These rich and varied wildlife populations can be used by communities for food and to attract tourists to an area.</li> <li>•→ Fertile soils. Floodplains associated with the seasonal flooding of rivers contain organically rich silt and other sediments that provide a rich substrate for cultivation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•→ Rooted aquatic plants (like reeds and rushes) reduce floods by regulating stream flow. In addition aquatic plants improve water quality by recycling excess nutrients.</li> <li>•→ Many small water animals are detritivores. By breaking down and consuming dead and decaying plant and animal matter these animals play a vital role in aquatic food chains and help to keep natural water sources clean.</li> </ul>

Quite apart from the obvious, and grey-green economization of reality [GG 6] conveyed here – “goods” “services”, “efficiency” - there is also a grey-green anthropocentric orientation [GG 1.1] – the goods and services are mostly for homocentric benefit: human health, agriculture, industry, building materials, fuel, tourists.

□ Summary box “Freshwater and Associated Resources” (p. 138), read together with

□ Strategies (pp. 139-140)

These two sections, taken together, are replete with grey-green, environmental economic-, and reform environmentalism-speak [GG 11.3]. With their abundant references to legislation, education and awareness, improved management and monitoring, changed policies, price structure incentives and disincentives, efficient use, improved technology, and so on, almost all the ingredients of indicator GG 11.3s description of reform environmentalism are present:

Reform environmentalism holds that there is no need for radical reform of those structures of society which embody anthropocentric attitudes [eg capitalism which views nature-as-resources-for-humans]. Instead, the following kinds of measures are advocated:

“...enacting legislation, changing public policy, increasing education, altering tax laws, returning ‘public lands’ to private ownership, emphasizing moral obligations to future generations of humans, promoting wise ‘stewardship’ of

nature, and otherwise encouraging more prudent use and more equitable allocation of natural resources” (Zimmerman, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. viii, in Ch 8: 6.2.3).

It is not that these strategies are not pro-environmental in their stance, they are. But they are not ecological, as seeing green understands ecology as normative: the key context of western cultural critique, and changed Self/Other relationship, including fundamentally changed attitudes to nature, is *absent*.

□ Targets for Freshwater and Associated Resources

The threat of water scarcity in Namibia by 2016 – halfway through the Vision 2030 period – is presented quite starkly here, making the cornucopian images of natural resource abundance, or understatement of Namibia’s limited ability to support a growing population, elsewhere in the text appear out of touch with reality, unless interpreted as a sign of technocentrism’s boundless optimism and faith in technological progress (Figure 9 in this chapter).

## 5.2 Production systems and natural resources (pp. 140-170)

This section of Vision 2030s chapter 5 covers land and agricultural production (5.2.1), forestry (5.2.2), wildlife and tourism (5.2.3), fisheries and marine resources (5.2.4), non-renewable natural resources (5.2.5), and biodiversity (5.2.6).

It also includes Figure 5.1, which depicts “Some of the interlinked issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia. This is the first of two aspects of this section on which I wish to focus next. Here is Figure 5.1 from Vision 2030, p. 142, reproduced as Figure 11:

Figure 11. Some of the interlinked issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia (Tarr, 2000, p. 12)




Figure 5.1: Some of the interlinked issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia

What for me is strikingly absent from this assessment of the causes of the ecological crisis – here cast in the grey-green mode of threats to sustainable development of people – is the human species. It is as though it is invisible to itself, as from its centric position, it surveys its en-virons: degradation, pollution, urbanization, and so on. The *person*, the locus of valuing of, and attitudes towards nature is *absent*. This backgrounding of the human species, the person, means that Vision 2030 loses an opportunity to re-conceptualize the human-nature relationship [criterion 7], and at individual level, also an opportunity to urge the undertaking of the kind of self-work – actively thinking about one’s worldview, and reviewing it, which seeing green demands [indicator 18.1].

Consider now by contrast, ecosystemic thinker and early green guru Gregory Bateson’s (1972, Fig 1, p. 499) view of the causes of the ecological crisis, which was introduced in this study’s Chapter One, as Figure 3. It is re-presented here as Figure 12:

Figure 12. Bateson’s Dynamics of ecological crisis (1972, p. 499)




Fig. 1 The Dynamics of Ecological Crisis

Here, what Bateson calls “Hubris” – the human being’s attitude of arrogance towards nature – is an integral part of the dynamics of the ecological crisis, together with the other aspects which the two diagrams share in common: pollution, population, famine (poverty), for example. This is a key difference, I think, and marks Bateson’s understanding of the ecological crisis as green, requiring both reform environmentalism, *and* a philosophical re-conceptualization of the human-nature relationship to resolve it. One may say then, that seeing green criterion 7: Is there philosophical concern for a re-conceptualized human-nature relationship? is not met in Vision 2030’s depiction of the ecological crisis here.

The second aspect I wish to highlight, is on p. 141 of Vision 2030, at the 4<sup>th</sup> bullet point:

- ▶ Educating all Namibians with respect to environmental and development issues, and the *total economic value* of Namibia’s natural resources

The phrase ‘total economic value’ is an *explicit view of nature* economized, that up until now, has been implicitly suggested in economic-speak terms and values such as “comparative advantage”, “natural resources”, “natural capital”, “efficient”, “maximise” and “optimise”. The text’s consistent

economization of reality marks it as grey-green [criterion GG6]. This approach surely derives from the Theme report 6 (GRN, 2002c), which explicitly adopts the homocentric-utilitarian Total Economic Value approach. I provide next three examples taken from it.

(1) The first is in the context of a discussion of Namibia’s “comparative advantages within the global market” (GRN, 2002c, p. 74 (p. 75 of electronic text)):

**Abundant and diverse wildlife populations** that are well adapted to Namibia’s harsh climatic and physical conditions, and have extremely high *direct* and *indirect use value*. Some species of wildlife in Namibia also have high *non-use value* which include the values perceived in their preservation for later use (their *option value*) or their value as resources to be handed down to future generations (their *bequest value*). (italics as in original text)

(2) The second example (Box 1.2 on p. 75 of the Theme 6 report (p. 76 of electronic version)) is in the context of “Capitalizing on comparative advantage – the sustainable development of the Namib Desert through the recognition of Total Economic Value”

The Namib Desert spans a great diversity of habitats that incorporate spectacular tracts of natural scenery including well-wooded ephemeral rivers, the Fish River Canyon, extensive sand dunes and vast open plains. In addition, it incorporates areas of high species endemism ...

In today’s overcrowded, rapidly developing world, natural environments which provide solitude, silence and natural beauty have become sought after commodities. In this light the Namib Desert must be regarded as a valuable national asset unique to Namibia ...

... The above [a discussion of sustainable use options] illustrates that, although largely useless in terms of direct value from land use activities like agriculture, the *Total Economic Value* of the Namib Desert is immense. With careful planning and the right mechanisms in place, all values associated with this unique piece of land could be captured as income on a sustainable basis.

(3) The third is within the context of “Improving development planning and reducing the negative impacts of industrialization”.

*a) Prepare economically and ecologically rational development plans*

Economically and ecologically rational development plans are essential for sustainable development.

- Such plans aim to make a positive net contribution to the economy in terms of Total Economic Value (TEV). Ultimately, it is essential for Namibian decision makers to recognise, not only the direct values, but also all the other values of natural resources in Namibia. This is because these values are associated with people’s willingness to pay<sup>15</sup>. With the right mechanisms in place, all values associated with natural resources could be captured as income by those investing in the resource (i.e. the nation and local communities of Namibia). (GRN, 2002c, p. 82; p. 83 of electronic text)

These three examples show to my mind, an explicit, entirely economic, and entirely instrumental **view of nature**. Silence in nature seen as “commodity”. Land as “useless” if not under production. Land and non-human species having no value-for-themselves other than their direct, indirect, option, or bequest value for humans.

And, Namibians are *to be educated* in adopting this homocentric, instrumental **view of the human-nature relationship**. This is not what is envisaged in seeing green indicator 12.7: Is consciousness-changing environmental education advocated? Vision 2030s Figure 5.1 (p. 142), in combination with this small bullet point (Vision 2030, p. 141, at the 4<sup>th</sup> bullet point), place for me, every Sub-Vision, Objective and Strategies list in this entire section 5.2 “Production Systems and Natural Resources” discussed next, within the context of grey-green, anthropocentric reform environmentalism [GG 11.3], rather than the radical ecologism of seeing green.

<sup>15</sup> This is the Contingent Valuation Method in environmental economics. The text here is silent on its shortcomings as a means of valuing natural resources and nature in monetary terms. See for example, Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.6 and van Dieren, 1995, p. 171, p. 209

### 5.2.1 Land and agricultural production (pp. 140-142)

*Land is used appropriately and equitably, significantly contributing towards food security at household and national levels, and supporting the sustainable and equitable growth of Namibia's economy, whilst maintaining & improving land capability. (p. 144).*

This green-ness of this sub-section could be assessed in terms of indicator 12.6: Reciprocity in land use: agriculture as example. The discussion which supports this indicator (Chapter Eight: 6.4.8) provides an adequate starting point, I think.

The anthropocentric-instrumental tenor of the text, now established beyond doubt, I suggest, continues in statements such as: “The environmental manifestations of land degradation in Namibia ... are causes of economic loss and escalating poverty, through declining agricultural production and a loss of food security...” (p. 143), and in the Sub-Vision’s “Land is used... supporting the sustainable ... growth of Namibia’s economy...” (p. 144).

And the emphasis on rights to ownership of, and tenure over natural resources throughout this sub-section, is a good example of the discussion in Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.1 on the necessary relationship (in environmental economic thought) between ownership rights and market efficiency in natural resource allocation.

### 5.2.2 Forestry (pp. 146-150)

*Namibia's diverse natural woodlands, savannahs and the many resources they provide, are managed in a participatory and sustainable manner to help support rural livelihoods, enhance socio-economic development, and ensure environmental stability. (p. 148).*

No indicator was developed to assess the greenness or otherwise of the forestry objectives and strategies proposed here. There would be sufficient information available in literature on emerging green thought, to do so, given early green opposition to Pinchot-type forestry management practices (Chapter Two: 2.2.1.1 – 2.2.1.2), the forest preservation concern inherent in emerging Nordic Europe ecologism (Bramwell, 1994, p. 26), and Die Grünen’s concern too (Chapter Seven).

The phrase “environmental sustainability” in this Sub-Vision can however be related to the selected seeing green indicator 12.1: Do policies tend towards a ‘stronger’ environmental sustainability approach? This, as described in Chapter Nine: 3.4.1.1 – 3.4.1.3, would entail policies supporting “absurdly strong”, “irreversible nature” or “strong” environmental sustainability, in which there would be for example, no substitution, or very limited, and fully-accounted for substitution between natural and human-made capital. These types of environmental sustainability also take nature’s value-for-itself into account.

How does this sub-section fare against seeing green indicator 12.1? Let’s begin with the *For whom?* aspect of environmental sustainability. The section lists, as expected, the benefits of maintaining forest ecosystems for humans, [“sources of economically valuable products”, “fuel, construction materials, wild foods, medicine, and browse and grazing for livestock” (p. 146)]. It misses an opportunity to make even a modest statement in support of nature and wildlife’s value-for-itself in this sentence: “In addition they [the woodland ecosystems] support a wealth of biodiversity and game, *which are the mainstay of the tourism sector...*” (p. 146, my italics).

Reading the text generously though – giving it the benefit of doubt - perhaps the reference to riparian deforestation (p. 147, immediately below Figure 5.2) which “has led to ... threats to biodiversity (invertebrates, mammals and bird species)” implies a greener nature-has-value-for-itself view, for one

may assume that not all the invertebrates, mammals and bird species meant here have human use value? The same generosity could perhaps be accorded to the sentence on p. 148 that “These [i.e. “fast growing, exotic soft wood tree species” (p. 148)] are unable to support native birds, insects, mammals and other wildlife adapted to the natural vegetation of an area”. The Strategies (on p. 150) also include a reference to “Extending the Protected Areas Network to incorporate as many natural wetlands and river systems (and their accompanying vegetation) as soon as possible”, which is a green value. Do these examples represent clues to/traces of nature’s value-for-itself, or are they really only instrumental grey-green values in service of tourism? The sections on Wildlife and Tourism (5.2.3), and Biodiversity (5.2.6) to come might help answer this question.

What about the substitution aspect of environmental sustainability; i.e. what measure of substitutability between human and natural “capital” is considered acceptable? [this is the *What of nature must be sustained?* question]. Any level of substitution requires well-established natural resource accounting (NRA). Vision 2030 chapter 5 mentions this approach on pages 137, 139, and 140 in connection with water, for example, “Tools such as Natural Resource Accounting<sup>16</sup>. and Strategic Environmental Assessment are being adopted” (p. 137).

For any kind of environmental sustainability – even the “sensible” or “weaker” versions which tend to be adopted in grey-green texts, - to be “serious”, there must not only be natural resource accounting, but *integrated* environmental and economic accounting (United Nations, 1993a). In Namibia, natural resource accounting is centred primarily in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, even though some of the accounts which were initially developed there, have subsequently been handed over to their responsible line ministries (water accounts, for example). The National Accounts on the other hand, are developed and published by the Central Statistics Office of the National Planning Commission (NPC). While there is informal exchange of information between the economists of these various government bodies, and the natural resource accounts developed so far influence individual sectoral policy planning, constraints of time, money and staff in the NPC have so far prevented the establishment of formally integrated environmental and economic accounting<sup>17</sup> (oral communication, Dr Jonathon Barnes, resource economist in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 26 July 2007). Seeing green indicator 14.2.1 for an ecologically re-oriented economy is thus at the moment not met. Because the fully operational natural resource accounting needed to ensure even ‘weaker’ forms of environmental sustainability [GG 12.1] is absent, this suggests in turn, that Vision 2030 adopts a ‘weaker’ version of sustainable development, in this respect at least [GG 2.2.2].

### 5.2.3 Wildlife and tourism (pp. 150-157)

*The integrity of Namibia’s natural habitats and wildlife populations are maintained, whilst significantly supporting national socio-economic development through sustainable, low-impact, consumptive and nonconsumptive tourism. (p. 152)*

A different **view of nature** emerges in this section. In fact, this is one of the few places in the text which uses the word “nature”. In addition to the usual goods-and-services approach, there emerges in this sub-section, descriptions and values such as “a wildlife-centered experience” (p.151), “spectacular arid scenery and wide-open spaces” (p. 151), “solitude, silence and natural beauty” (p. 151), and, interestingly, a “sense of place” (p. 153, Wildlife and Tourism summary box, Things to do, 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet;

<sup>16</sup> In 1993, the Government of Namibia established with donor aid, a small environmental and resource economics unit in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism to “support government in bridging the gap between conservation and economics” (<http://www.dea.met.gov.na/programmes/nra> 21 January 2004). Direct and indirect donor funding for the Natural Resource Accounting programme, which commenced in 1996, ended in 2006. In that period, natural resource accounts were developed to varying degrees for the fisheries, forestry, minerals, water, energy, livestock and wildlife sectors. Satellite accounts have been developed for tourism, but these do not include the nature on which eco-tourism is based (oral communication, Dr Jon Barnes, resource economist in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 26 July 2007)

<sup>17</sup> There are currently (November 2007) donor-funded plans to establish a NRA unit within the National Planning Commission

Things to avoid, 5<sup>th</sup> bullet, Worst-case scenario, 2<sup>nd</sup> bullet). However “sense of place” appears not to mean the seeing green emotional connection to place, or the re-inhabitory sense of living in harmony within an ecological niche, or the ethical implications of these understandings (Chapter Eight: 5.2, 5.2.3, 5.4.2), but aesthetic pleasure for transient tourist consumption: “tourist enterprises using low impact designs, materials and technologies, so as not to damage the environmental or cultural assets that tourists seek to experience...” (Wildlife and Tourism summary box, Things to do, 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet).

The use of the word “nature” in this section, as in “nature-centered tourism” (Wildlife and Tourism summary box, Where we want to be (2030), 5th bullet) is fascinating. Why not “environmental goods and services-centered tourism”? Or “natural resources-centered tourism”? Is this perhaps a subtle recognition that nature cannot be reduced to sources, sinks and services alone? Could it be an indirect acknowledgement that nature has its own agenda? But this ineffable “other” quality in the natural environment, acknowledged in the use of the word “nature”, is itself quickly economized and commodified: “valuable natural assets” (p. 151), “sought after commodities” (p. 151), and on p. 166 (3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph of section entitled Conservation outside protected area...), a “unique tourism product”. Clear signs of a grey-green ontological view [criterion GG 6].

The meaning of “healthy” on which I speculated in the view of nature presented on p.14 of Vision 2030: “The ... Resource Base will reflect that...”, also begins to acquire definition as meaning economically productive, rather than nature’s progress towards fulfilling its purposivity, if one reads bullet point 14 under Where we want to be (2030) in the Wildlife and Tourism summary box on p. 153: “Healthy, diverse and productive wildlife populations of economically important species...”.

This section advocates strong and green-sounding support for wildlife conservation (p. 150, 1<sup>st</sup> bullet point under 5.2.3). Much of this is to be achieved through Namibia’s Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programme, to which Vision 2030 devotes in its section 5.2.3, considerable space. Progress in adoption of the programme throughout Namibia serves as one indicator for Namibia’s international reporting on progress towards meeting Goal 7 of the Millenium Development Goals (MDG), to which Namibia is a signatory (GRN, 2004b). Such international reporting fulfils seeing green indicator 12.8: Participation in global control measures to promote natural environment protection?. As Figure 13 (taken from GRN, 2004b, p. 31) next shows, MDG Goal 7 relates to environmental sustainability:

Figure 13: Namibia’s progress towards environmental sustainability as Millenium Development Goal  
(GRN, 2004b, p. 31)

## GOAL 7

### Ensure Environmental Sustainability

#### ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

INDICATOR	1990	2001	2006 target	Progress towards target
Land area protected to maintain biological diversity, as percentage of all land:				
Protected areas	13.6%	16.8 %**	15.1%	Good
Registered conservancies	0.0 %	4.9 %	10.9 %	Slow
Freehold land	5.0 %	6.1 %	8.5 %	Slow
GDP per unit of energy use	-	0.27 NSTJ*	0.45 NSTJ	Lack of data

Source: Ministry of Environment and Tourism.

Note: Table excludes other state land managed for biodiversity protection, e.g. tourism concessions and non-proclaimed wildlife areas.

\* = 2000; \*\* = 2004

So what can one learn from this section of Vision 2030 about its understanding of environmental sustainability, i.e. do its policies tend to follow a “stronger” environmental sustainability approach [seeing green indicator 12.1], or the “sensible” or “weaker” versions of environmental sustainability which mark a grey-green text [indicator GG 12.1]. I propose to focus here only on Vision 2030s view of wildlife. Biodiversity views will be considered in this Chapter’s section 5.2.6.

From the text, it is clear that the view of wildlife is as an “industry” to be managed (Wildlife and Tourism summary box, Where we want to be (2030), 12<sup>th</sup> bullet point). *Absent* in the innocent 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph of p. 152 “There is a growing interest among tourists ... to visit the seal colonies ...” is the commercial clubbing of seals, annually protested by animal rights activists (<http://www.boycottnamibia.co.za/> visited 16 August 2007). One may learn in a local newspaper from a coastal tourist lodge owner, that “the seal tours are between 10h00 and about 17h00, whereas the culling takes place in the early morning...He said by the time tourists can enter the reserve, there are no signs left that seals had been killed there” (*The Namibian*, Wednesday 25 July 2007, p. 3, Lodge says it’s not organising seal hunt trips). The explicit support given to sport fishing, trophy hunting (p. 151), commercial game farming (p. 156, 1<sup>st</sup> column top left), and live game sales (p. 156, 1<sup>st</sup> column bottom left) would also be rejected out of hand by the animal rights view in seeing green (Chapter Three: 6.3.3). Here then the text fails to meet the radical seeing green indicator 13.3 i.c.w. wildlife:

Commercial, culling and sport hunting, trapping and related trade totally or partially condemned, except in cases of vital human need.

From a less radical, but still seeing green viewpoint, the text achieves at most grey-greenness for its wildlife conservation policies, for these appear to focus exclusively on wildlife’s economic value for humans: investing in wildlife is advocated for its “resulting tourism development opportunities” (p. 151), recovering wildlife populations on land outside parks is advocated for its “economic opportunities” (p. 151, last paragraph), maintaining wildlife population integrity is advocated for its contribution to “national socio-economic development” (Sub-Vision, p. 152). Conservation policies in some cases would appear to distinguish between species which are “economically important” (Wildlife

and Tourism summary box, Where we want to be (2030), 14<sup>th</sup> bullet point), and those which are not. A thoroughly anthropocentric, and instrumental view of wildlife, which accords with grey-green indicator GG 12.1 when the *For whom* is the wildlife to be sustained question is answered as unequivocally as it is here – for example in the Objective on page 157: “To advance sustainable management of wildlife ... for the social and economic well-being of the people of Namibia”. Particularly the instrumental-only concern for economically important species strikes me as an example of naturism [seeing green indicator 1.3]. I would take this section of Vision 2030 then to mean that it tends towards a “sensible” or “weaker” environmental sustainability approach.

#### 5.2.4 Fisheries and marine resources (pp. 157-161)

*Namibia’s marine species and habitats significantly contribute to the economy without threatening biodiversity or the functioning of natural ecosystems, in a dynamic external environment. (p. 158).*

No indicator was developed to assess the greenness or otherwise of the fisheries and marine resources objectives and strategies proposed here. It could probably be developed inter alia by starting with Die Grünen’s early views on the fishing industry (1980b, Section II, 7.3, p. 13).

The by-now well-established economic **view of nature** continues in this section, with phrases such as “commercially exploitable fish species” (p. 157), “maximum sustainable yields of fish stocks”(p. 157), as well as “marine species and habitats significantly contribute to the economy” in the Sub-Vision (p. 158). The value “healthy” in nature continues to be understood as *economically* productive: “... as a result of poor management, overexploitation of some of the most productive fisheries occurred.” (p. 157). Pollution is to be strictly controlled for example for this will lead to “increased exportation of high value fish and increased mariculture opportunities” (Where we want to be (2030), the Fisheries and Marine Resources summary box on p. 159).

There is one brief glimpse of a green concern for those fish species not possessing high economic value in the 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet point at the top of page 158 (my italics): “Fishermen inadvertently kill and *waste* large numbers of marine species when they target one economically valuable species”. One million sharks are for example caught in Namibian waters as “bycatches” (*The Namibian*, Tuesday 24 July 2007, p. 5, Namibia to host fisheries secretariat). The Things to avoid list in the Fisheries and Marine Resources summary box on p. 159 continues this concern: “The targeting of by-catch species and any activities that threaten marine biodiversity or cause pollution”.

Continued use of the phrase “efficiency” (3<sup>rd</sup> par. Under Vision 2030 section 5.2.4, repeated at the top of page 161), and the use of “cost-effective” (14<sup>th</sup> bullet point under Strategies on p. 161) leaves clues to/traces of economic instrumental rationality - a preferred **epistemology** in a grey-green text [GG 5.1], and problematized in seeing green [indicator 5.1].

#### 5.2.5 Non-renewable resources (pp. 162-164)

*Namibia’s mineral resources are strategically exploited and optimally benefited, providing equitable opportunities for all Namibians to participate in the industry, while ensuring that environmental impacts are minimised, and investments resulting from mining are made to develop other, sustainable industries and human capital for long-term national development. (p. 162).*

Economic instrumental rationality continues here to be this text’s preferred **epistemology**, as in this section’s Objective (p. 164, my italics): “To *exploit* Namibia’s non-renewable resources *optimally* and equitably for the benefit of all”.

Indicator 14.2.2 relating to non-renewable resources can be usefully applied to this Sub-Vision and its discussion. This indicator, which assumes the existence of natural resource accounting, asks whether, as part of its keeping track of the stocks and flows of natural capital, depletion schedules exist for non-renewable resources [such as minerals], and whether steps have been identified, and are being taken, to ensure in the process of depletion, that suitable substitutes are provided.

Now, we have seen that natural resource accounts do exist for Namibia's minerals (section 5.2.2. of this Chapter), but I do not propose to enquire into their exact status, or whether or not they meet this indicator. What is clear from the wording of Sub-Vision 5.2.5, is that the non-renewable resources policy it advocates, allows us to answer the *What?* question of environmental sustainability [GG 12.1]. There is clear substitutability of 'natural' and 'human' capital here: "...while ensuring that ... investments resulting from mining are made to develop other, sustainable industries and human capital ..." (p. 162). Even the weaker environmental sustainability approach problematizes substitutability between the various types of capital beyond a certain point [indicator GG 12.1a], a point which can only be established through full-scale natural resource accounting. The Sub-Vision also answers the *For whom?* question: "... for long-term national development" [of people] (p. 162). The *For how long?* question is implicitly answered too, for this text's understanding of long-term is 30 years. Putting all these answers together, again suggests that this text tends towards a "sensible" or "weaker" version of environmental sustainability [indicator GG 12.1].

*Absent* in this section's discussion of non-renewable resources, is any problematization of the potential contribution of Namibia's uranium mining to nuclear technology (p. 162). This connection however exists in the political and public consciousness, as for example, in the opening sentence of an article which appeared in *The Namibian*, Tuesday 20 March 2007: "Namibia's progress towards the forefront of the global nuclear power industry has been accelerated by last week's opening of the Langer Heinrich Uranium Mine". The article notes further Namibian President Pohamba's statement that "Our Government advocates the use of uranium for peaceful purposes in countries where Namibian uranium is exported... the option to explore the peaceful use of nuclear fuel for power generation and other peaceful purposes should not be closed for Namibia<sup>18</sup>." (Elma Roberts, p. 14 under the title "Langer Heinrich heralds nuclear future"). But seeing green would problematize, or reject outright, *all* nuclear technology, on the grounds of its threat to the community of life, and its threat to civil liberties (indicator 12.5.4).

## 5.2.6 Biodiversity (pp. 164-170)

*The integrity of vital ecological processes, natural habitats and wild species throughout Namibia is maintained whilst significantly supporting national socio-economic development through sustainable low-impact, high quality consumptive and non-consumptive uses, as well as providing diversity for rural and urban livelihoods. (p. 167).*

Biodiversity/ecological process protection and environmental sustainability are interconnected. I regard this sub-section of Vision 2030 then, as a good indication of the kind of environmental sustainability it envisions – "stronger" or "weaker"? A key differentiating aspect of these two versions, is the value they accord to nature: instrumental or intrinsic or both? A strong statement of seeing green's

---

<sup>18</sup> The World Energy Council, through the Ministry of Mines and Energy, commissioned a study to develop energy scenarios for Namibia until the year 2050. The report, titled *Namibian Energy Policy Scenarios until Year 2050*, investigates, inter alia, nuclear energy as an option for Namibia. However, "given the current technical standards, uncertain fuel supply and economic parameters and conditionalities, nuclear energy was regarded as unfeasible and was thus not included in Namibia's energy mix until 2050.". The report, submitted to the WEC in July 2007, is currently under review and not yet available in the public domain (written communication from Robert W Schultz, Energy Desk Coordinator, Desert Research Foundation of Namibia, 31 August 2007)

commitment to ecocentric biodiversity protection and environmental sustainability is found in the deep ecology platform<sup>19</sup> (Chapter Four: 1.3.4.1), but specifically in its first few points:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life *requires* a smaller human population.
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed....”

On the seeing green view, environmental sustainability is an end-value, a value-in-itself value, not an instrumental value only. So, as always, the key questions to keep in mind in trying to understand whether a text follows a predominantly stronger [seeing green indicator 12.1] or weaker version of environmental sustainability are: What is to be sustained, For whom? and For how long? One could also ask the question *How?* I think. The answer to this question represents for me, the conceptual nature ethic guiding the policies – is it similar to seeing green kinds such as biospherical egalitarianism, reciprocity, care [seeing green indicator 10.3], or is it perhaps the more grey-green conservation and stewardship [GG 10.3] approach? So, while reading through what this section of Vision 2030 has to say on biodiversity, let us keep these four questions in mind.


□ Namibia’s biodiversity and wildlife resources (p. 164)

This section highlights that the high prevalence of endemic species shown to exist so far in Namibia, is located in the Namib Desert and in the pro-Namib transition zone. This is depicted in Figure 14 next:

---

<sup>19</sup> Glasser (1997, p. 74, in Chapter Four: 1.4.3.1) calls the platform “a radical, activist-oriented series of principles for ecological sustainability”

Figure 14: Namibia's high endemism in biodiversity (ex GRN, 2002c, Theme 6, Figure A3.2, p. 33)



□ The critical importance of Namibia's wildlife resources (p. 164)

The answer to the *For whom* are species useful? question in this paragraph is *For people*, directly and indirectly. This is stated explicitly: "only some species are directly useful to humans", and implied I suggest, in the matching "indirect benefits" [to humans]". Species are seen as resources and functions for humans: food, fibre, medicine, tourism opportunities. Ecosystems are valued for what they can do for humans: "vital genetic material ... that is regularly required to enhance domestic crop and livestock species" (p. 164). The last sentence under the heading "The critical importance of Namibia's wildlife

resources”, on the benefits of ecosystem functions “These include the provision of life sustaining air, water and productive soils”, appears to be cast homocentrically too: *productive* soils.... But perhaps there might be, in the phrase “all species, even those that are too small to see, are of ecological importance” a hint of recognition of nature’s value-for-itself?

□ Biodiversity loss (pp. 164-165)

There is another implicit answer to the For whom? question in this paragraph too, in the form of “future generations” (p. 164). We can safely assume this means future *human* generations, because the loss is described as “vulnerability to drought, floods and other extreme events” which in turn threaten food supplies, sources of wood and medicines, the ability of rural communities to sustain themselves (p. 164). The viewpoint is homocentric. It is the *exclusive* focus on nature’s value for humans which makes this section non-green. I can find no clue to/trace of the idea that nature also has value-for-itself, an essential part of the seeing green both/and approach:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human *and* non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. (Point 1 of the deep ecology platform, Chapter Four: 1.3.4.1, my italics).

Another clue to/trace of this section’s grey-greenness lies in its approach to addressing the problem of biodiversity loss: answers will be found not in re-conceptualizing the pathological [on seeing green’s view] human-nature relationship, but in managerial techniques such as “secure and exclusive tenure” (2<sup>nd</sup> par. on p. 165), “intersectoral policy co-ordination” (2<sup>nd</sup> par. on p. 165), and “effective management” (3<sup>rd</sup> par. on p. 165). The seeming suggestion in the second paragraph that something needs to be done about reducing human population pressure [a seeing green demand] to prevent biodiversity loss for its own sake, is, in the context of the discussion of section 4.1.1 of Vision 2030 on population (section 4.1.1 of this Chapter 11), really an instrumental-only view.

In the third paragraph of page 165 is also a clue to/trace of the **conceptual ethic** guiding biodiversity protection: “The successful *conservation*...”. The word choice “conservation” is meaning-full, and harks back to the early philosophical divide in environmentalism, discussed in Chapter Two. As noted in Chapter Nine: 7.3.1, conservation was, from its beginnings, an anthropocentric, utilitarian nature ethic. In the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980), conservation is defined as “the management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 89). It is the environmental ethic upheld in key United Nations sustainable development texts such as the Rio Declaration (1992), and Agenda 21 (1992), to which Namibia subscribes (Vision 2030, p. 14, A Basic Principle).

Both these UN system documents subscribe to, rather than critique, anthropocentrism [seeing green indicator 1.1]. As its first principle, the Rio Declaration places *human beings* at the centre of sustainable development (principle 1). It then considers human development “a right” (principle 3); confirms eradicating poverty as an “indispensable requirement” for sustainable development “in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living” (principle 5). While noting that peace, development and environmental protection are “indivisible” (principle 25), environmental protection is nevertheless *subsumed under* the development process (principle 4). Thus, on my interpretation, further principles relating directly to the natural environment (principle 7) or to legislative/managerial measures for protecting it, are also subsumed under the objective of sustainable *human* development (cited text from Quarrie, 1992, pp. 11-13). Environmental ethicist Atfield (2003, p. 154, footnote 2) considers the Rio Declaration to represent an “explicitly anthropocentric posture”.

The anthropocentric approach to nature in Agenda 21 is essentially captured, in my view, in the title to its Section II: “Conservation and management of resources for development” (Quarrie, 1992, p. 96 and index to Agenda 21, p. v). There is in Agenda 21, one brief lapse from the otherwise consistently instrumental view of nature as storehouse of goods and services for humankind. It appears in the foreword by Maurice Strong, then Secretary-General to UNCED, and key author of the altogether more ecocentrically-inclined Earth Charter<sup>20</sup>: “ A new world order, as we move into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, must unite us all in a global partnership – which always recognizes and respects the transcending sovereignty of nature, of our only one Earth” (Quarrie, 1992, p. 9).

The United Nations Millennium Declaration, 2000, to which Namibia has subscribed, also adopts an anthropocentric, conservation ethic for nature. The following extract shows that its “respect for nature” is grounded not on nature’s intrinsic value, or value-for-itself (the ecocentric view), but on nature’s instrumental value for humans:

“ I. Values and principles

... 6. We consider certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. These include: ...

Respect for nature. Prudence must be shown in the management of all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the precepts of sustainable development. Only in this way can the immeasurable riches provided to us by nature be preserved and passed on *to our descendants*. The current unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed *in the interest of our future welfare and that of our descendants*.” (United Nations General Assembly A/Res/55/2 18 September 2000; my italics).

Absent however from Vision 2030 is any reference at all to the idea of either “respect for nature” or the stewardship ethic, which the Millennium Declaration embraces:

“IV Protecting our common environment

.... 23. We resolve therefore to adopt in all our environmental actions, a new ethic of conservation *and stewardship*....” (United Nations General Assembly A/Res/55/2 18 September 2000; my italics)

It is not that these ethical ideas in the context of nature are unknown in Namibia. They appear explicitly in Namibia’s strategic plan on biodiversity and development, in its basic principle 2:

“2. Namibia’s thousands of life forms ... warrant our *respect and stewardship*, whether or not they are of direct use to us.” (GRN, ca. 2000, p. 23, my italics).

Vision 2030s silence on stewardship as the UNs most recent (but still anthropocentric) nature ethic (Chapter Nine: 7.3.2) is intriguing. However, I am at a loss even to surmise the reasons for this absence.

The last sentence of the 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph (p. 165, my italics) contains a glimpse of another **view of the human-nature relationship**:

“The successful conservation of this entire area ... will depend ... on the establishment of a cross-boundary conservation zone, linking *unspoiled habitats* and some of the ...”.

As one can only assume that people have been responsible for the “spoiling” occurring elsewhere, the text misses here, an opportunity to review what it also seems to believe implicitly, that the existing human-nature relationship is abusive.

---

<sup>20</sup> Submitted in draft form to the Rio Summit in 1992, finalized only in 2000 outside the UN system, and still not recognized at the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 2002 (<http://www.earthcharter.org/> visited 2 June 2006)

Lastly, the *For how long* question is here answered differently, in the sense that “future generations” clearly means to convey a longer time frame than the one generation so far implied in the Vision 2030 text.

□ The importance of wildlife harvesting to subsistence economies (p. 165)


The answer to the *For whom* question here is *people*. The protection of the traditional way of life of subsistence communities is a seeing green value, in as far as the communities are still practising their traditional ways of ensuring environmental sustainability. There is common ground then between the seeing green view, and the sentence which closes this section: “There is no conflict between using natural resources and the notion of conservation, provided that resources are used sustainably and equitably” (p. 165).

□ Contribution of protected areas to wildlife conservation and biodiversity protection (pp. 165-166)

Vision 2030 sees protected areas as “the principal means of maintaining essential ecological functions and conserving biodiversity and *scenic areas*” (p. 165, my italics, to mark this phrase as **a view of nature**). If one were in doubt as to the answer to the *For whom?* question, it is supplied in the next sentence: “for tourism, capture for resale, research and education” (p. 165).

One can relate this paragraph’s biodiversity maintenance strategy to seeing green indicator 12.4.1: Large areas of “free nature” set aside from human techno-industrial progress? Figure 15 next, taken from the Theme 6 report, shows land intended to be protected through parks and conservancies to maintain biological diversity:


**Figure 15: Existing and proposed land to maintain biological diversity** (Vision 2030 Theme 6 report, Fig. A3.4, p. 38)




The deep ecology concept (Chapter Four: 4.1.4) of “free nature” in seeing green indicator does *not* mean “wilderness”. By “wilderness”, Naess understands areas where people do not live, and resource extraction is prohibited. He uses the terms “near-wilderness” or “free nature”, (for example, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69) to mean, “areas of relatively sparse human habitation ... where wild natural processes are still essentially intact and dominant”. The human habitation, if present, is “nonexploitative bioregional living”, and/or traditional tribal living, which has minimum impact on wild ecosystems (Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995, p. 366).

However, mineral prospecting, and mining, the latter surely a prime example of extractive techno-industrialism, is permitted in land areas which are already, or will become, protected areas for the maintenance of biodiversity. Figures 16 and 17 next, if compared with Figure 15 above showing existing/proposed parks and conservancies, make this clear:

Figure 16: Mines and prospecting licences in Namibia (Vision 2030 Theme 6 report, Figure A5.1, p. 64)



**Figure 17: Land use: mining concessions** (Vision 2030 Theme 6 (GRN, 2002b), Figure A4.1, p. 51)



Vision 2030 also notes that mining continues to be allowed in protected areas, at least presumably until the zoning referred to in the Things to do list (1<sup>st</sup> bullet) of the summary box Non-renewable Resources (p. 163) is in place. This approach is not without its critics: Tarr, co-author of the Theme 6 report (2002c), notes in a subsequent paper (2007 June, in preparation, p. 1) that

As a developing country, Namibia understandably wants to reap benefits from all aspects of its resource base, and there are as yet no signs that government is prepared to ban mining in areas of high conservation, tourism or scientific value. This is in spite of the fact that it has stated its intention in the Constitution to place great value on the conservation and wise management of living and non-living natural resources....

Further exacerbating factors noted by Tarr (2007 in prep) are “Ineffective use of Impact Assessment tools... because they are either not done, are poor quality or done too late in the planning process, and/or the results of EAs [Environmental Assessments] are simply ignored in decision making” (Assessment of challenges, p. 11). Nor is the Environmental Management Bill which will inter alia manage the environmental impacts of mining, yet promulgated (September 2007), despite Namibia’s commitment to the principles of Agenda 21 (Vision 2030, p. 14, A Basic Principle), and years of discussions (Chapter Ten, section 1.1.4).

From this, I argue that Vision 2030, even if it does intend setting aside large areas of “free nature” as protected areas, does not fully meet the seeing green indicator of protecting them from human techno-industrial progress. A weaker [GG 12.1], rather than stronger version of environmental sustainability seems predominant.

□ Conservation outside protected areas: conservancies and CBNRM initiatives (p. 166)

Land area protected to maintain biological diversity also includes the setting aside of a fixed percentage of land under conservancy protection. Namibia has included the percentage of land registered as communal and private conservancies as one of its indicators of its progress towards meeting Millennium Development Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability (Figure 13 in this Chapter). The location of existing and planned communal conservancies can be seen in Figure 15 above.

Taking a closer look now at Vision 2030s discussion of “Targets for community based natural resource management” (pp. 154-156), it is clear that the protection for natural resources offered within the CBNRM programme for land and its resources [biodiversity] is *exclusively* for people – “Communal area residents” (e.g. p. 155, Table 5.1, row 4, columns 3 and 4).

This anthropocentric orientation persists in documents related to the Strengthening the Protected Area Network (SPAN) project. This Ministry of Environment and Tourism project is funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and is designed as three phases, covering the period 2004 - 2016. It is referred to in Vision 2030 on page 150, 6<sup>th</sup> bullet, in the context of a discussion of natural wetlands and river systems. Although the SPAN website refers to improved park management in Namibia as its main aim, improved protected area management would be a better description. In turn, such improved management “...is expected to significantly contribute to the national and local *economy* through park tourism” ([www.span.org.na](http://www.span.org.na) visited 30 July 2007, follow Project link, my italics). The **view of nature** here as a tourism product was already discussed under Vision 2030s section 5.2.3 Wildlife and tourism (pp. 150-157).

Lastly one can note that the **epistemology** of economic rationality dominant throughout this text so far, continues in this biodiversity section, replete with economic-speak such as “competitiveness” “efficient” and cost-effective” (for example, Summary box Biodiversity, p. 168, Things to do, 9<sup>th</sup> bullet, and 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet). The key-term “cost-effective” brings up the question of discounting, which as conveyed in Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.4-3.4.3.6, is seen by ecological economists as comprising ethical choices made on behalf of future economic agents. Ecological [as opposed to neo-classical environmental] economists advocate a zero, or close-to-zero discount rate in cost-benefit analyses of nature-based enterprises which will affect future generations. Discussions with a resource economist in the Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism however, indicate that the Ministry has set a standard 8% discount rate in cost-benefit analyses related to proposed nature-based enterprises (oral communication, Dr Jonathon Barnes, resource economist in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 26 July 2007). This would be at odds then with seeing green indicator 14.14: More than one future human generation included in economic decisions?

There is also a clue to/trace of the mechanist **ontology** which frequently accompanies economic rationality as epistemology in the concept of “economic instruments” in the opening sentence of Strategies, (b), p. 169.

A closing thought on nature’s value-for-itself vis-a-vis Vision 2030s **view of nature**. The idea of nature’s having value-for-itself is not unknown in Namibian government policy. It is explicitly stated in Namibia’s ten-year strategic plan of action for sustainable development through biodiversity

conservation 2001-2010 (GRN, ca. 2000). Its Part A contains, on pp. 22-23, the biodiversity strategy's goal, and fifteen fundamental principles. While the goal is homocentric, and the valuing of nature anthropocentric:

The goal of the Government of the Republic of Namibia through this strategic plan is to protect ecosystems, biological diversity and ecological processes, through conservation and sustainable use, thereby supporting the livelihoods, self-reliance and quality of Namibians in perpetuity (p. 22),

one of the fifteen fundamental principles contains an explicit reference to nature's value-for-itself:

2. Namibia's thousands of life forms *have intrinsic value* and importance, and warrant our respect and stewardship, whether or not they are of direct use to us. (p. 23, my italics).

Such explicit recognition in Vision 2030 is absent. There *might* be muted suggestions of it in phrases such as "Recognise that wildlife tourism on communal land is a valid land-use option with high potential to combat poverty, stimulate rural development *and* conserve biodiversity" (p. 168, Summary box Biodiversity, 2<sup>nd</sup> bullet under Things to do, my italics), or in the Sub-Vision "the integrity of vital ecological processes, natural habitats and wild species throughout Namibia is maintained *whilst* significantly supporting national socio-economic development..." (p. 167, my italics), or in the phrase "Extended and well managed protected areas network to include biodiversity 'hotspots'.." (summary box, p. 168, "Where we want to be (2030)", 6<sup>th</sup> bullet), but these are drowned out by a strident chorus of anthropocentric voices. Or, to change the metaphor, one could conjecture that the idea *might* be there, cunningly concealed beneath a grey-green economic cloak, so as to slip it by the Namibian decision-makers unnoticed. Given that the national biodiversity strategy explicitly recognizes the concept of nature's value-for-itself, one can only conclude that its *absence* in Vision 2030 is deliberate.

### 5.3 The urban environment (pp. 170-173)

*Despite high growth rates, Namibia's urban areas will provide equitable access to safety, shelter, essential services and innovative employment opportunities within an efficiently managed, clean and aesthetically pleasing environment. (p. 171).*

This Sub-Vision and its discussion is not directly related to the five questions being asked of the Vision 2030 Main document text, and so is not discussed in any detail.

I note in passing though some aspects which do provide clues to/traces of this section's worldview:

(i) the many references to Agenda 21 (on p. 170, 6<sup>th</sup> paragraph of section 5.3, and p. 173, Strategies (e), 1<sup>st</sup> bullet, for example) as guide for local authorities [not the same as seeing green's "community"]. Agenda 21 is generally agreed to represent a "strong" anthropocentric **human-nature relationship** position (Hattingh, 2002, p. 11). Its tendency towards reform environmentalism rather than radical ecologism is reflected in Vision 2030s section 5.3, in its emphasis on planning (p. 170, 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph under section 5.3), policies, legislation, and management (p. 173, Strategies)

(ii) The tendency to employ mechanistic metaphors [rejected in seeing green indicator 1.4] continues in phrases such as legislation as "planning *tool*" (p. 170, 5<sup>th</sup> paragraph under section 5.3, my italics), and is another clue to/trace of a mechanist **ontology**.

The section is not all grey-greenness though. There is a **view of nature** in the city as "green spaces" (p. 171, 4<sup>th</sup> paragraph) instead of the usual sources, sinks and services approach. The bicycle-friendly approach advocated in the Summary box (p. 172, things to do, 5<sup>th</sup> bullet) is also green in its desire to lessen climate change (though a reference here to the energy-saving aspect of bicycles would have been an additional green feather in the Vision 2030 cap). So is the emphasis on accountability,

decentralization, partnership, and caring in Strategies (e) and (f) on p. 173. Though a whole series of indicators would apply to assessing the green-ness of this sub-section, one could perhaps begin with seeing green indicator 15.7: Re-integrated, ecologically-harmonious human habitat spatial planning.

## 6.0 Vision 2030 chapter 6: Creating the enabling environment (pp. 174-216)

As indicated in its opening paragraph, chapter 6 of Vision 2030 covers a variety of topics which it describes as “the necessary conditions for the realization of sustainable development” (p. 174, 2<sup>nd</sup> paragraph), specifically, “democratic governance, peace and political stability; national, global and regional security; regional integration; international relations; development cooperation; and globalisation.” (p. 174).

With the exception of its section 6.1 on sustainable development, most of the topics covered in chapter 6 of Vision 2030 do not relate directly to the five questions being asked of the text. I propose then a different approach in reading and discussing chapter 6. The focus of my discussion will be sub-section 6.1, Sustainable development. I then group together, and discuss together, what seem to me the related “necessary conditions” of 6.2 International relations (pp. 179-184), 6.4 Peace and security (pp. 187-190), and 6.5 Regional integration (pp. 190-197). This is followed by discussion of topic 6.3 Development Co-operation, and thereafter, in numerical order, the topics of Globalisation (6.6), Democratic governance (6.7), Decentralisation (6.8), and Responsible Decision-making (6.9).

In the discussion of all these topics, I continue the approach taken so far in my assessment of the text. That is, whether or not they relate directly to the five questions being asked, I continue to be alert to any presences/absences, and “clues to/traces of” their worldview. And I continue too, my assessment of the coverage and depth of the seeing green indicators.

### 6.1 Sustainable development (pp. 175-179)

*Namibia develops a significantly more equitable distribution of social well-being, through the sustainable utilization of natural resources in a mixed economy, characteristic of higher income countries, primarily through stronger growth and poverty-reduction. (p. 177)*

This study never claimed to be an in-depth study of the concept of sustainable development (Chapter Nine). But what is noticeable in this Vision 2030 discussion of the concept, are some crucial *absences*. The standard, and bland, definition of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present, without limiting the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” is presented at the beginning of the section (p. 175). It remains silent over the differing versions available: Jacobs (1995, in Chapter Nine: 7.2.1) “faultlines of contestation” distinguishing more radical from more conservative understandings, or Hattingh’s (2002) four ideologically-differing versions. While the Vision 2030 chapter 6 discussion notes that sustainable development calls for environmental protection, there is no suggestion that this too, comes in stronger and weaker versions (Chapter Nine: 3.4.1), a key differentiating factor being the accordance, or not, of value-for-itself to nature. These absences naturalize (strong) anthropocentrism through silence.

What explicit statements, or traces of/clues to does this section’s discussion of 14 key threats to sustainable development in Namibia (pp. 175-177), its summary box (p. 178), Objective (p. 179), and Strategies (p. 179) provide on the five questions being posed to this text?

(a) **The good life** continues to be that of “higher income countries” (Vision 2030, Sub-Vision, p. 177). Primarily stronger economic growth (Sub-Vision on p. 177) is going to get us there. Centric

industrialization (which got these countries to where they currently are) is problematized in threat (iii) as “inappropriate” if it does not “make optimal use of Namibia’s comparative advantages” (p. 175). Its negative effects will be addressed by “preparing economically and ecologically rational development plans” (p. 179, Strategies, 5<sup>th</sup> bullet). Entirely absent here, or elsewhere in the text, is the seeing green cultural critique of industrialism [indicator 2.1.2]. Threat (vii) agrees with the green view that wealth and “excessively consumptive lifestyles” (p. 176) push us closer to our ecological limits. However, not a rethink of our worldview and its values [seeing green indicator 18.1], which even weak anthropocentrist Bryan Norton demands (Chapter Nine: 6.3.1), but “policy incentives” will address this issue.

(b) Two **views of nature** can be seen in this sub-section. The one in the Summary Box on p. 178, under the heading, Where we want to be (2030), is, for want of a better description, an ecology-as-science description:

- Healthy, productive land with effective water and mineral cycling, leading to infrequent, low-level drought and flooding.
- Farms and natural ecosystems are productive, diverse, stable and sustainable – socially, economically and ecologically.
- Forests, savannas, deserts, wetlands, coastal and marine ecosystems are open, diverse, stable and productive.

Reality is predominantly seen as “natural resource capital” (p. 178, summary box on Sustainable Development, Things to do, 4<sup>th</sup> bullet; p. 179 Objective; p. 179, Strategies, 6<sup>th</sup> bullet), for human benefit. For example,

- population growth is seen as a threat (i), not because it diminishes other species’ opportunities for self-realization, flourishing and well-being, but because it means increased demand amongst people (Namibians) for natural resources (p. 175)
- biodiversity loss (iv) “impacts on our development options” and threatens “our [humans] very survival” (p. 176)
- the land’s low productive capability will be further degraded if the “open access” and lack of tenure problems are not dealt with (v). The use of words and phrases such as “conflict”, “incentives for people” and “dissipation of net benefits”(p. 176) marks this approach to nature as homocentric.

But in this statement, on p. 179:

**Objective**

To achieve the development of Namibia’s ‘Natural Capital’ for the benefit of the country’s social, economic and ecological well-being.

might there be, again concealed within a grey-green environmental economic cloak, a hint of clear green in the idea that Namibia’s natural capital is to be developed for its *own* well-being?

(c) The partnership **ethic** which is strongly emphasized in this sub-section (for example, p. 175, 1<sup>st</sup> bullet under the heading 6.1 Sustainable Development; p. 178, summary box Sustainable Development, Where we want to be (2030), first three bullets), fails to include the seeing green partnership with nature [criterion 10 description]. Indeed, *any* conceptualization at all of **an ethic for nature** is absent in this section. Not even a lack of commitment to the customary grey-green ethical approach of conservation is listed as a threat to sustainable development.

(d) The **human-nature relationship** is explicitly instrumental. In the wording of the Sub-Vision (p. 177), *Namibians* will achieve a more equitable distribution of social well-being “through the sustainable utilization of natural resources”.

(e) A “**serious environmental and nature policy**”. What is striking about threat (xiv) is the *acceptance* of climate change it seems to convey (p. 177). This intuition is confirmed in the last bullet point of Strategies (p. 179), which is “Preparing for the adverse impacts of climate change”. There is no indication here of seeing green’s normative understanding of ecology. I read these two references to climate change as a pragmatic invitation to “adapt or die”, rather than as a challenge to reverse a *morally* wrong situation. This is a clue to/trace of the kind of reform environmentalism which seeing green rejects [seeing green indicator 11.3].

As part of this reform environmentalism approach however, Namibia is signatory to several key multi-national environmental agreements such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Framework Convention on Climate change and its associated protocols (GRN, 2002c, Appendix 5, p. 118; p. 119 in electronic text), even though this is not mentioned in Vision 2030. Participation in global control measures to promote natural environment protection is a seeing green indicator [12.8].

There are some other clues to/traces in this section, of other aspects of the text’s worldview that I would like to note. One is an alternative to this text’s usual economic rationality as **epistemology** approach which appears in threat (xii) on page 177:

Rapid modernisation threatens the survival of valuable traditional knowledge and practices in Namibia. Traditional knowledge is seldom acknowledged as providing any contribution to development - despite the fact that it is often better suited, than Eurocentric technology, to conditions in Namibia.

This is a clear seeing green view [indicator 5.2]. To the extent that it also values *women’s* local knowledge in development, it is practically an ecofeminist view (Chapter Six: 3.4 and 6.3).

There are again signs of an underlying mechanist **ontology** in the use of a keyword such as “mechanisms” in the summary box Sustainable Development, p. 178, Things to do, 2<sup>nd</sup> bullet. The editors could just as easily have used words such as “modes” or “approaches”, but didn’t. The biodiversity loss which in threat (iv) “*impacts* on our development options” (p. 176) is another mechanistic metaphor.

## **6.2 International relations (pp. 179-184), 6.4 Peace and security (pp. 187-190), and 6.5 Regional integration (pp. 190-197)**

*A new international order, has been established based on sovereign equality of nations, where sustainable development, peace and human progress is ensured. (Sub-Vision for 6.2 International Relations, p. 182)*

*Collective regional and international peace and security have been accomplished (Sub-Vision for 6.4 Peace and Security, p. 188)*

*Namibia enjoys full regional integration in terms of socio-economic and political structures through effective supra-national organisations. (Sub-Vision for 6.5 Regional Integration, p. 192).*

I propose to deal with these three sub-sections together, as they are closely related. None of the Sub-Visions and their discussion is directly related to the five questions being asked of the Vision 2030 (Main document) text, and so are not discussed in any detail. Their green-ness could be assessed for

example, in terms of green values such as egalitarianism and partnership [seeing green indicator 11.1], its more radical critique of statism and nationalism as expressions of the idea of hierarchy and the value of power-over [seeing green indicator 1.2], as well as seeing green's demands for non-violence, and radical peace [seeing green criterion 16]. I note again though, that references to “military hardware”, and “well-trained and well-equipped army” (p. 189, summary box Peace and security, “Things to do” 1<sup>st</sup> bullet point, and “Where we want to be (2030)”, 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet point) mark this text as falling short of the radical green understanding of non-violence and peace.

One lack to note here in the seeing green criteria list are indicators on the kind of monetary agreements discussed in section 6.5 Regional Integration. Policies on this real-world issue were only at a developmental stage in early Die Grünen political programmes (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 10; Die Grünen, 1983a, pp. 28-30).

I also wish to note two presences and absences, clues to/traces of, which might help in constructing one version of Vision 2030s worldview:

The first is, further clues to/traces of the mechanist **ontology** already noted elsewhere:

The ‘Foreign Policy Response Model’ presented in Fig 6.1, is used to illustrate how Namibia could deal with the external challenges which will *impact* on the country in the years up to 2030, and which will *impact*, to a greater or lesser degree, on the attainment of the objectives set by Vision 2030 (p. 180, my italics).

Again I suggest that the editors could just as well have used words such as “affect” or “influence” instead of “impact”, but didn’t.

A further clue to/trace of this text’s mechanist ontology – often closely linked to economic rationality as epistemology - can be seen in the sentence immediately preceding the Sub-Vision on International Relations: “NEPAD will serve as a recovery development plan *and an economic engine*.” (p. 182, my italics). In the context of strategies to achieve peace and security, the first bullet point is: “Using collective security as an *instrument* of national security” (p. 190, my italics). Such word choices might appear inconsequential, but seeing green takes the ontological role of language in Self/Other relationships seriously [seeing green indicator 1.5].

The second is an indication that Namibia sees globalization, problematized in seeing green [indicator 2.1.1.c], as part of its view of **the good life**. The “best case” scenario (p. 194) for Namibia as far as economic integration is concerned, is that in the period 2025-2030 “Namibia is fully integrated into the global trading and financial system” (p. 197, 5<sup>th</sup> bullet point from top of page).

### 6.3 Development co-operation (pp. 184-187)

*Namibia has achieved a level of transformation in the flow of development cooperation resources, and has advanced from a recipient of grant assistance to a provider of assistance to countries in need. (p. 185)*

The green-ness of this Sub-Vision could be assessed against seeing green indicator 14.13: Fair [ethical] trade/development aid is practised. The thought in the sentence at the bottom of page 184 of Vision 2030, “...external assistance should not perpetuate dependency ...” is clearly green.

One sentence in this Sub-Vision’s discussion of development co-operation perhaps represents a “clue to/trace of” which might help in judging whether the Vision 2030 text meets one of the seeing green criteria for a “**serious environmental and nature policy**”, that is, criterion 12: Do policies place long-range, wide, ecological sustainability at least on par with social or economic sustainability”? Here it is:

*“The main priority of development cooperation remains poverty reduction through economic growth. This can only be achieved.... through sustainable development that is socially balanced.... Environmental preservation is a new interest of the 1990’s. It is now integrated with development issues for commitment to sustainable development. (p. 185, first two paragraphs at the top of the page, my italics).*

Despite Vision 2030s commitment to sustainable development which supposedly gives equal consideration to environmental, social and economic issues, the concept “development” frequently appears in this text without its qualifier “sustainable” – the best example being the sub-title of Vision 2030: “Policy framework for Long-term National Development”. And here, I feel, the balance between the three is tipped towards economic growth. Compare here too the first “faultline of contestation” in Jacobs (1995) understanding of conservative vis-a-vis radical sustainable development, which was discussed in Chapter Nine: 7.2.1:

**Figure 18: Degree of environmental protection as faultline of contestation between conservative and radical sustainable development** (Davidson’s (2000, p. 29) adaptation of Jacobs, 1995, pp. 4-5)

FAULT LINES OF CONTESTATION	CONSERVATIVE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT	RADICAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
<i>Degree of Environmental Protection</i>	“Weak” Permits trade-offs between economic growth and protection	“Strong” Acknowledges intrinsic values in natural environment

We saw this trade-off clearly in that mining is allowed in areas which are, or will be, “protected” areas. Also, up till this point in the text, Vision 2030 has given no acknowledgement of intrinsic values in the natural environment. All this suggests to me that Vision 2030 tends rather, on this “faultline”, towards a conservative understanding of sustainable development.

There are continuing clues to/traces of a non-green mechanist **ontology**:

Another trend is the move towards decentralised cooperation, a political *instrument* that also creates a new financial approach. Government spending for development cooperation is then organised on a local rather than a central lever [level] (p. 185, my italics).

Though decentralization and local autonomy are strong green values, the green-ness is somewhat tarnished by being phrased as “a political instrument”.

## 6.6 Globalisation (pp. 197-200)

*The benefits of technology, trade, investment and capital flows have contributed to a significant reduction in poverty in most regions of the world, and Namibia enjoys optimal participation and integration in the global village. (p. 198).*

What traces of/clues to can this section provide on the five questions being posed to this text?

(a) First, the Sub-Vision (p. 198), and the mostly positive assessment of globalization in the three opening paragraphs of section 6.6 (p. 197), make clear that the text here supports a capitalist, free-market model of sustainable development. This naturalization of the free market sustainable development model is assisted by the text’s silence on alternative models, such as an “ecology” model, or “neo-Marxist” model (Elliott, 1994, pp. 107-112, in Chapter Nine: 7.1). Seeing green problematizes free-market, techno-industrialist models of development [criterion 2].

(b) An earlier **view of the good life** for Namibians as equivalent to “higher income countries” (Sub-Vision, p. 177) is here confirmed by the specific comment that “Globalisation would not bring Namibia to the level of the USA and Japan overnight” (p. 197). But seeing green argues that for developing countries to reach the levels of these industrial countries is simply impossible, given the planet’s ecological limits<sup>21</sup>, and developing countries’ lack of colonies to exploit [seeing green indicator 2.1.1.c]. Seeing green would also reject the values required for successful participation in globalization, such as the explicit mention of competition (p. 198, “competitive edge” in 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph; and “compete” on p. 199, summary box Globalisation, Things to do, 1<sup>st</sup> bullet, 6<sup>th</sup> bullet, p. 200, Strategies, last bullet point), and implied in economic values such as “exploit their comparative advantage” (p. 197, 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph under 6.6 Globalisation). The rational economic and instrumental, but un-ecological values (Chapter Nine: 3.1.2 footnote 18, 3.1.3) of “efficiency” (p. 197), and of “maximisation” (p. 199, summary box Globalisation, Things to do, 6<sup>th</sup> bullet) are also evident in this text. In short, this section of Vision 2030 actively seeks globalization (Objective, on p. 200), where seeing green would critique it [seeing green indicator 2.1.1.c].

### **6.7 Democratic governance (pp. 201-204), and 6.8 Decentralisation (pp. 204-208)**

*Namibia maintains, consolidates and extends the good governance practices of a multi-party democracy with high levels of participation, rights, freedoms and legitimacy (under the Constitution), which continue to serve as a model for other countries. (Sub-Vision for 6.7 Democratic Governance, p. 202).*

*Local communities and regional bodies are empowered, and are fully involved in the development process; they actually formulate and implement their respective development plans, while the national government - working hand in-hand with civil society organizations - provides the enabling environment (laws, policies, finance, security, etc.) for the effective management of national, regional and local development efforts. (Sub-Vision for 6.8 Decentralisation, p. 207).*

These two issues are so closely linked, that they may be grouped together. Neither Sub-Vision relates directly to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, but both can be assessed by beginning with seeing green criterion 17: Grassroots [“direct”] democracy advocated? and its indicators, as well as indicator 11.2: Ecologically-informed, and/or post-hierarchical forms of political and socio-economic organization advocated?

Vision 2030 traces ruling party support-in-principle for the idea of decentralization as far back as 1989 (p. 205). Despite such early support, and intervening initiatives by the ruling party government, consultations in 1996 “revealed that decentralisation was not proceeding as expected” (p. 205, 4<sup>th</sup> paragraph). A decentralization policy was approved in 1997. A Decentralization Implementation Plan is currently [2004] “in its final draft form” (p. 206, last paragraph). May one attribute the painfully slow implementation of decentralization to lingering commitment to the idea of hierarchy, so critiqued in seeing green [criterion 1]?

### **6.9 Responsible decision-making (pp. 209-212)**

*Namibia’s goal is to promote and strengthen “smart partnerships” for sustainable development, to optimise her comparative and competitive advantages, and to generate and manage good quality information and knowledge by supporting and fostering active and critical science and research through well-structured national institutions, as well as in partnership with institutions abroad. (p. 210.)*

---

<sup>21</sup> Oskamp (2000a, p. 377, citing an estimate by Wackernagel & Rees (1996) notes that “increasing the rest of the world to the resource-use level of the United States and Canada would require the land and other natural resources of three Earths – an obviously impossible ambition”

Despite its title, this section is essentially about “smart partnerships”, and the value of information generated through “critical” science and research (Sub-Vision, p. 210) in promoting sustainable development. Partnership is a green value, so indicator 4.1, and criterion 10 would be relevant. On the seeing green view, partnership with nature would be amongst the smartest partnerships of all. But the discussion of partnership in section 6.9 falls short of green-ness in that it fails to include nature *as partner*. That is, nature does appear in the discussion as “clean and uncontaminated fish and meat”, “biological diversity”, “scenic diversity”, and “wilderness” (p. 209), but these are immediately placed into a homocentric and instrumental economic context to be “exploited” (p. 211, summary box Responsible Decision-making”, Where we want to be (2030), 2<sup>nd</sup> bullet; p. 212 Objectives, 1<sup>st</sup> bullet point; p. 212 Strategies, introductory sentence) as “comparative advantages” in a globalised market (p. 209, last sentence of first paragraph under 6.9).

One may note again, the **view of the good life** as that of the “Industrialised countries” which spend “up to 60% of their GDP, in one form or another, on science and technology.” (p. 210). Seeing green problematizes instrumental science and technology [indicator 2.1.4]. It is not clear whether this section’s call for “vibrant science and technology research, with particular attention to areas related to Namibia’s comparative advantages and development needs” (p. 211, summary box Responsible Decision-making”, Where we want to be (2030), 3<sup>rd</sup> bullet) is of the instrumental kind which seeing green problematizes. However, given the instrumental **view of nature** here as “comparative advantage”, it would seem so.

## 6.10 Institutional capacity for development (pp. 212-216)

*Namibia has well-established democratic institutions that provide the enabling environment for effective participation of all citizens in modern social and economic development. In support of the process of capacity-building, the nation’s education system consists of public and private initiatives that, together respond adequately to the challenges of modern technologically developed and industrial society by producing all the required managerial, technical and professional personnel. (p. 213).*

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and the related assessment criteria. Though its focus is on institutional capacity-building (p. 213, last paragraph before Sub-Vision), much of that depends on human capacity-building. The expression “human capital” has become so naturalized, that its origins in an economization of reality as **ontology** pass practically unnoticed. This **view of the human being** as capital to serve the industrial machine is confirmed in phrases such as “the nation’s education system consists of ... initiatives that respond adequately to the challenges of modern technologically developed and industrial society by producing all the required managerial, technical and professional personnel” (Sub-Vision, p. 213), and, “Uncoordinated educational policies cause over-production of graduates in disciplines that do not reflect the labour market signals for capacity” (p. 214, summary box Institutional capacity for development, Worst-case scenario, 2<sup>nd</sup> bullet point). This explicitly Homo *economicus* view of the human being may be compared with the seeing green re-conceptualization of the Self in criterion 8.

Now that the reading of the Vision 2030 text through seeing green glasses is completed, I reflect next on the relevance of the seeing green criteria, and the breadth and depth of their indicators.

## 7.0 Reflections on the “workability” of the criteria and their indicators

Thoughts on the reliability, validity and generalizability of the criteria and their indicators are presented in Chapter Ten, section 4.1. Here I reflect on the “workability” of the criteria: their relevance (7.1), the breadth of the indicators, and the depth of their discussion (7.2).

### 7.1 On the relevance of the criteria

All 18 green criteria could be related to terms, issues, and values appearing in the Vision 2030 Main Document (Cover to p. 216). Most of the indicators were useful too, as the table next shows:

**Figure 19: Overview of criteria and indicators used**

Green criterion 1 ✓	6.3 ✓	11.1.d ✓
1.1 ✓	6.4 ✓	11.2 ✓
[GG 1.1]	GG 6 ✓	11.2.1 ✓
GG 1.1.1 ✓		11.2.1.a
GG 1.1.2.f.iv ✓	Green criterion 7 ✓	11.2.1.b ✓
1.2 ✓	7.1 ✓	11.2.1.c ✓
1.3 ✓		11.2.2 ✓
1.4 ✓	Green criterion 8 ✓	11.3 ✓
1.5 ✓	8.1 ✓	GG 11.3 ✓
1.6.a ✓	8.1.1 ✓	
	8.1.2 ✓	Green criterion 12 ✓
Green criterion 2 ✓	8.1.3	12.1 ✓
2.1 ✓	8.2 ✓	GG 12.1 ✓
2.1.1 ✓	8.2.1	12.2 ✓
2.1.1.c ✓	8.2.2 ✓	12.3
2.1.2 ✓	8.2.3 ✓	12.4
2.1.3	8.2.4 ✓	12.4.1 ✓
2.1.4 ✓	8.2.5 ✓	12.4.2
2.2 ✓	8.2.6 ✓	12.4.3 ✓
GG 2.2 ✓		12.5 ✓
GG 2.2.1.c ✓	Green criterion 9 ✓	12.5.1
GG 2.2.2 ✓	9.1	12.5.2
GG 2.2.2.c ✓	9.2	12.5.3
	9.3 ✓	12.5.4
Green criterion 3 ✓	9.4 ✓	12.5.5
3.1 ✓	9.5	12.5.6 ✓
3.1.b ✓	9.6 ✓	12.6 ✓
3.1.c ✓		12.7 ✓
3.2 ✓	Green criterion 10 ✓	12.8 ✓
GG 3 ✓	[description of nature ethic] ✓	
	10.1 ✓	Green criterion 13 ✓
Green criterion 4 ✓	[10.2]	13.1
4.1 ✓	10.2.1	13.2 ✓
	10.2.2 ✓	13.3 ✓
Green criterion 5 ✓	10.3 ✓	13.4
5.1	GG 10.3 ✓	13.5
GG 5.1 ✓		
5.2 ✓	Green criterion 11 ✓	Green criterion 14 ✓
	11.1 ✓	14.1 ✓
Green criterion 6 ✓	11.1.a ✓	14.2 ✓
6.1	11.1.b ✓	14.2.1 ✓
6.2	11.1.c ✓	14.2.2

14.2.2.c ✓	14.14 ✓	16.3 ✓
14.3 ✓		
14.4 ✓	Green criterion 15 ✓	Green criterion 17 ✓
14.5 ✓	15.1	17.1 ✓
14.6 ✓	15.2 ✓	17.2 ✓
14.7 ✓	15.3 ✓	17.3 ✓
14.8	15.4 ✓	17.4 ✓
14.9 ✓	15.5 ✓	17.5 ✓
14.9.1 ✓	15.6 ✓	
14.9.2	15.7 ✓	Green criterion 18 ✓
14.10 ✓		18.1 ✓
14.11 ✓	Green criterion 16 ✓	18.2
14.12	16.1 ✓	18.3
14.13	16.2 ✓	

Some indicators could not be related to Vision 2030 at all - those which are not marked with a ✓ in the above table. I list next (7.2) for any reader for whom the seeing green criteria list appears useful, issues in Vision 2030 not covered by an indicator in the criteria list, and issues in Vision 2030 covered by an indicator and discussion, but not to any great depth:

## 7.2 On the breadth and depth of the indicators

Some issues encountered in *Namibia Vision 2030* are not covered by an indicator in the seeing green criterion list:

- 4.1.2 Migration and population distribution
- 4.1.3 Population age and sex distribution
- 4.1.3 Affirmative action
- 4.1.4 Water protection and use
- 4.3.1 Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
- 4.3.4 Early childhood development
- 4.4.1 Poverty reduction
- 4.4.3 Youth problems such as substance abuse, teenage pregnancies, HIV/AIDS and other negative health behaviour patterns, high unemployment rate
- 4.4.6 Orphans, orphanages, and fostering
- 4.4.8 National documentation vis-a-vis registration of vital events, and international migration
- 4.4.11 Family as expression of the ideas of hierarchy and patriarchy
- 5.2.2 Forestry
- 5.2.4 Fisheries
- 6.5 Monetary policy

Some issues are covered by an indicator, but the discussion on which the indicator was based could probably be deepened, depending on one's personal interest in the issue:

- 4.1.3, and 4.4.4 The elderly/senior citizens (indicator 15.5)
- 4.2.3 Employment and unemployment (indicators 14.9 and 14.10)
- 4.2.4 Gathering of population (personal) data by the State (indicator 17.4)
- 4.3.3 Education (indicator 8.2.6)

I make suggestions on further research on the criteria/indicators in Chapter Twelve, section 3. But I conclude here by re-iterating my confidence in the synthesis of seeing green in Chapter Eight, as well as its summary, repeated in section 1.1 of this chapter.

## 8.0 One version of *Namibia Vision 2030s* worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship

It is Vision 2030s worldview, more specifically the green-ness of its assumptions on the human-nature relationship, which interests me, for these provide the *ultimate premises context* within which Vision 2030s policies and programmes on the natural environment are to be understood. I present briefly next what I see as one version of Vision 2030s worldview, based on the critical qualitative content analysis of this chapter. The discussion broadly follows the standard order in which worldview themes have been presented throughout this study.

### 8.1 Legitimizing narrative: the “good life” of London, Washington or Paris<sup>22</sup>

#### The Doomsday Clock

The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'* Doomsday Clock conveys how close humanity is to catastrophic destruction--the figurative midnight--and monitors the means humankind could use to obliterate itself. First and foremost, these include nuclear weapons, but they also encompass climate-changing technologies ... Fossil-fuel technologies such as coal-burning plants powered the industrial revolution, bringing unparalleled economic prosperity to many parts of the world. ... Fifty years later, leading scientists agree that carbon-burning technologies continue to make Earth warmer at an unprecedented rate. ... The future looks even bleaker, as scientists continue to observe cascading effects on Earth's complex ecosystems (<http://www.thebulletin.org/minutes-to-midnight/> retrieved 25 August 2007).



I find in *Namibia Vision 2030* no urgent sense of an impending ecological crisis, which provides the legitimacy for seeing green's normative understanding of ecology [seeing green criterion 3], and linked demands for a radical re-conceptualization of the Self, Self–Other relationships, and an accordingly changed society. Even at real-world, political-party level, the early Grünen insisted that ecology must be the value within which all other values are to be understood:

“...Europe cannot remain trapped in the industrial society, which assesses all issues in economic terms. Europe's future will be determined in future by ecology, not economy” (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2, par.4).

Fundi Die Grünen Bahro argued (Chapter 7: 2.1.3.2.1) that “All experience shows that those who have less want to have the same as others, and essentially in the same form because it is the only one they can conceive” (Bahro, 1984, p. 147). This “form” was achieved through colonialism's exploitation of people and nature. Western-type industrialism in the Third World/developing countries, he felt, would mean “poverty for whole generations and hunger for millions” (Bahro, 1984, p. 184), a “tunnel without an exit, because the living standard they are aiming for is no longer achievable” (Bahro, 1984, p. 211).

“We Greens consider it amongst our most important international tasks to remove here at home this destructive model of “the good life”, which lures the remainder of humanity into a tunnel without an exit” (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 7).

But it is just that standard of living currently practised in countries in the “developed” world, and critiqued in seeing green [green criterion 2], which appears as legitimating narrative in Vision 2030:

The goal of our Vision is to improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their counterparts in the developed world, by 2030.... (Vision 2030, p. 9).

---

<sup>22</sup> Bahro, 1984, p. 110

Even though Vision 2030 notes that

Namibia does not have to work through the development pathways followed by the current industrialised countries. Instead, by concentrating on skills development, services and its comparative advantages, Namibia can leap ahead to where currently developed countries are likely to be in 30 years. (p. 33, last bullet point of paragraph 2.10 Comparative advantages)

the route to progress which it recommends, remains industrialization. Its critique of industrialization is limited to extravagant water use (p. 77, 175), and a potential failure to make full use of economic comparative advantages (p. 175). Other unnamed negative impacts of industrialization are to be managed by “preparing economically and ecologically rational development plans” (p. 179). On Vision 2030’s view, industrialization will allow Namibia to participate in the international global capitalist market system. Industrialization in Vision 2030 is not only a means, but an end too (p. 38, Box 1, The Vision). Seeing green’s radical economic and cultural critique of industrialization is absent in *Namibia Vision 2030*, marking it in this respect, a grey-green rather than green text.

As in seeing green, there is in the Vision 2030 worldview, a definite *moral* content to the good life. Where seeing green condemns the pursuit of materialism and consumerism as morally bankrupt values [indicator 2.1.3], and prescribes renewed spirituality as motivation to personal and social transformation [criterion 4], Vision 2030 critiques Namibian society’s “moral degeneration” (p. 13) evident in high rates of teenage pregnancy, alcohol and drug abuse, indecent assault, irresponsible parenthood, and undisciplined children (p. 133, p. 134). Western Christianity is to provide “the driving force” for “promoting a high sense of morality” in society (p. 132), “the maintenance of a just and morally upright society” (p. 40), and “the moral basis of our interpersonal dynamics, harmony and peaceful co-existence” (p. 40). The difference between seeing green and Vision 2030s view of morality, I see as threefold: first, spirituality in seeing green begins as an overwhelmingly *personal* experience, a “conversion” almost. Conversion leads to “conviviality”, that is, living in authentic community with other human beings, *and* with nature [indicator 4.1]. There is no connection in Vision 2030 between “a high sense of morality” and a changed relationship with nature. And, where seeing green problematizes the presence of the idea of hierarchy and patriarchy in both the western church and family as social institutions, Vision 2030 does not.

The sense of urgency in Vision 2030 is not to avert any impending ecological crisis brought about by an environmentally destructive and/or morally wanting view of the good life, but for Namibians to achieve western techno-industrialism. It is not that Vision 2030 ignores ecological concerns in achieving this version of the good life; it does not - the “ecologically rational plans” serve as example, even though they may be critiqued on seeing green grounds for their economic-instrumental rationality. It is that seeing green’s radical critique of western cultural ultimate premises on Self and Other – androcentrism, hierarchy, militarism, naturism, for example, is absent.

## 8.2 Its ultimate premises

### 8.2.1 Epistemology

Epistemology is the pair of glasses, if you will, through which we seek to know the world. Throughout this chapter, I have suggested that Vision 2030 implicitly places primacy on rationality as epistemology. The idea of rationality “is that there is one correct procedure” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 49), and in the Vision 2030 text, non-green economic rationality [seeing green indicators 5.1, and GG 5.1] is this correct, and unproblematized, way of knowing. Seeing green critiques rationalism as primary way of knowing [seeing green criterion 5], on at least two grounds: for its undervaluing of subjectivity, emotion, intuition, empathy, sensitivity, involvement, and value-recognition in knowing (Chapter Eight: 3.1), and for the instrumental use of the Other – people and nature - which it legitimates.

## 8.2.2 Ontology

Through its grey-green rational epistemological glasses, I suggest that Vision 2030 on the one hand, tends to mechanize reality [It also economizes reality, as I note in 8.2.2.2]. Callicott (1986, pp. 302-303) describes the “received metaphysical foundations of the modern world view” as including “a fundamental ontology of atomic materialism” (p. 303), a “material, reductive, particulate, aggregative, mechanical, geometric, and quantitative paradigm”. Implicit in such a view, is the idea that one can reduce things to separate, replaceable, components which can be manipulated. Even though the science of ecology has shown that this is not an accurate ontological reflection of reality, it persists at implicit level in the Vision 2030 text. If this seems a far-fetched assessment, consider Vision 2030s use of metaphors such as “elements”, “driving force”, “critical mass”, “tools”, “instruments”, “leveraging” and “impacts”. Seeing green [indicators 1.4, 1.5, and 8.1 for example] critiques such mechanistic metaphors as indicative of a non-relational, and instrumental view of the Self/Other relationship.

### 8.2.2.1 View of nature

On the other hand, Vision 2030 describes nature in terms of ecosystems. The text itself provides no definition of an ecosystem. But it has been defined elsewhere by a member of the Consortium (Vision 2030, p. 234), which produced the Theme 6 report on natural resources (GRN, 2002c), as “A dynamic system of plant, animal (including humans) and micro-organism communities and their non-living physical environment interacting as a functional unit. The basic structural unit of the biosphere, ecosystems are characterised by interdependent interaction between the component species and their physical surroundings...” (Tarr, July 2007 in prep., Glossary of Terms). In Vision 2030, ideal ecosystems are described in strong green value terms such as open, stable, diverse, and complex [indicators 3.2.b, 3.2.c, 6.4].

This appears close to the seeing green’s organismic, holistic, purposive view of nature [criterion 6], except in one important respect: purposivity. Both the term, and the idea of purposivity - i.e. the autonomy of living beings pursuing their own agenda - is absent in Vision 2030s description of ecosystems. Instead, there is talk of “productivity”, which is consistently homocentrically economized, rather than seen as ecosystemic productivity-for-themselves. Ecosystems are basically presented as goods and services; sources and sinks for humans, which can be given a “total economic value” (p. 141). Such “economization of reality”, which downplays nature’s autonomy, thus value-for-itself, is critiqued in seeing green [indicator 2.1.1].

### 8.2.2.2 View of the human being

Influenced by its view of ecology as normative, and the eco-feminist critique of androcentrism (Chapter Eight: 2.1.1), seeing green radically re-conceptualizes what it is to be a human being. Western atomist, aggressive individualism is problematized, particularly its manifestation as *Homo economicus* [indicator 8.1.1]. There are in seeing green, wonderfully rich, alternative views of the human being as an “ecological self”, or “self-in-relation”, to name but two, and correspondingly different understandings of self-realization. I contend though, that all explicit statements of the valuing of partnership and harmony to the contrary, the implicit and dominant view of the human being in Vision 2030 is *Homo economicus*. Namibians are to be trained to fill slots in the industrial, capitalist market system, surely the most aggressive economic system yet devised, and dependent for its success on an atomistic view of human beings pursuing their own, however enlightened, self-interest. In an economic context, the Vision 2030 text is replete with positive evaluations of human qualities such as aggression and competition.

Hayward (1995) explains well I think, how these two ideas – nature as goods and services, and the human being as *Homo economicus*, are linked in the predominantly economic view of development which I suggest Vision 2030 follows:

... [an] enlightened conception of human development ... would necessarily heed natural limits and promote the ideal of working in harmony with nature. [new paragraph] Yet it has to be acknowledged that such an enlightened conception of human development is not the one most usually pursued in the modern world. A different conception of development prevails – one which is defined, above all, *economically*. The goal of economic development is, of course to maximize human welfare; but on the prevailing view of it, welfare is measured first and foremost by the quantity of goods consumed, and human potentialities are measured largely in terms of their productive employment. This conception of development, so closely tied to the idea – and ideal – of economic growth, is in many respects the antithesis of ecological ends. For it is precisely the drive to maximize the production of material goods which is provoking the overuse of resources, destruction of habitats, disturbance of ecosystems, and so on. (Hayward, 1995, p. 87).

### 8.2.3 View of the human-nature relationship

As shown in many examples in this chapter, Vision 2030 adopts a grey-green anthropocentric understanding of the human-nature relationship, rather than the seeing green ecocentric understanding.

Can one now at this stage characterize Vision 2030s anthropocentrism as tending at least toward the “better” [from a seeing green perspective] “weak” or “sophisticated” or “enlightened” version [indicator GG 1.1.2], rather than strong anthropocentrism?

Let’s remind ourselves of some of the descriptions provided in Chapter Nine, sections 6.1, and 6.3.2 of this study, of the more-green “weak” anthropocentrism, and compare them with the Vision 2030 text:

“ [It]...focuses not on immediate human gratification so much as on the satisfaction of basic needs for the whole human community, present and future ...,” (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34)

“It also generally rejects the cost-benefit analysis – especially the sort that discounts future costs and benefits – that guides strong anthropocentrist decision-making...” (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34)

“and they acknowledge nature’s intrinsic value<sup>23</sup>...” (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34)

denies “... that preference satisfaction is the only measure of human value” (Norton, 1984, p. 138); considered preferences within a reflected-upon worldview should act as “ ... a limit upon felt preferences” (Norton, 1984 p. 138).

The environmental ethic of such a reflected-upon worldview would include at least the following resource allocation principles: ... [it] should apply to nonrenewable resources as well as to renewable ones (Norton, 1984, p. 145) [see indicator 14.2.2], and

should also imply a population policy” (Norton, 1984, p. 145) [see indicator 12.2].

On the whole, I would say that Vision 2030 does *not* satisfy the spirit of these descriptions of “weak” anthropocentrism. My main reasons for this are that Vision 2030 -

- (i) explicitly avoids according intrinsic value to nature, although policy-makers are aware of this concept through Namibia’s strategic plan for biodiversity protection,
- (ii) does not prioritize the fully implemented natural resource accounting programme which would be needed to satisfy environmental ethicist Bryan Norton’s understanding of renewable and non-renewable resource allocation in weak anthropocentrism (Chapter Nine: 6.3.2),
- (iii) does not reject cost-benefit analysis where natural resources are involved, and fails, on the ecological economics view, to ensure inter-generational equity in future costs and benefits through its standardized 8% discount rate ( Conservation outside protected areas: conservancies and CBNRM initiatives (p. 166) under this chapter’s section 5.2.6),
- (iv) fails to explicitly place its envisioned population growth rate within the context of Namibia’s limited carrying capacity for people (section 4.1.1 of this chapter), and
- (v) for me the strongest reason of all, makes no reference to the need for people to reflect on their worldviews, including their understanding of the human-nature relationship (section 5.2 of this chapter, specifically its discussion of Figures 11 and 12).

<sup>23</sup> But recall that Norton’s version of weak anthropocentrism does not accord intrinsic value to nature (Ch 9: 6.3)

#### 8.2.4 The ethic for nature

A seeing green nature ethic (Chapter Eight: 5.1, 5.5, 5.5.1, and criterion 10) approximates the following description: “An empathetic, caring, respectful, partnership ethic, which extends beyond a humans-only focus, recognizing also nature’s value-for-itself, now, and on a long-term basis”. In other words, key markers of such an ethic would be (i) crossing the species divide in some way or another to admit non-humans into the sphere of morality, (ii) a recognition of both instrumental and intrinsic value in nature, and (iii), a focus on the long-term [understood as at least more than one generation] rather than on the short term political-economic. I find none of these markers in the Vision 2030 text.

Vision 2030 contains no explicit discussion of the role of an environmental ethic in achieving sustainable development. There is no trace even, of the concept of “stewardship”, which one could have expected because (i) there are religious versions of stewardship (Chapter Nine: 7.3.2.1) within the Christian conception of morality to which Vision 2030 subscribes, and (ii), “stewardship” is an established secular approach within the UN sustainable development system.

Instead, one must assume from indirect references to the concept, that Vision 2030 subscribes to “conservation” as its environmental ethic. In Chapter Nine: 7.3.1, I noted deep ecologist Rodman’s view that the “resource conservation” form of ecological consciousness, also called the “RCD [resource conservation and development] scientific management of Nature” approach (Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 301), is not a suitable starting point for “a general environmental ethic”, on at least two grounds. First, because its “ethic of ‘wise use’ remained within the worldview of anthropocentric utilitarianism”, which assumes that the value of the non-human biotic/abiotic world is limited to its instrumental value to humans. Second, its assumption that only the human world possesses intrinsic value, and that the non-human world possesses only instrumental value, is arbitrary because (a) it is not necessary - not all world cultures have made this assumption and (b) it is not justified, because no one has yet succeeded in identifying that “essence” or “observable, morally relevant quality” which at the same time categorically includes humans yet excludes non-humans (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 122). Conservation is an ethic for the human *use of nature*, rather than an ethic *for nature* (Regan, 1980, in Chapter 3: 5.3.2).

And, on the Vision 2030 view, conservation as environmental ethic must somehow “pay its way”, as it were; it must have a direct land-use, or a clearly-demonstrated, of benefit to humans, indirect use. For example, in the context of a discussion on wildlife conservation and biodiversity protection in protected areas, one may read that “It is now generally accepted that to make conservation efforts sustainable, they must contribute in some meaningful way towards rural development” (Vision 2030, p. 166).

To sum up, I would suggest that the ultimate premises of Vision 2030s ethic for nature are little more than grey.

### 8.3 The green-ness of Vision 2030s vision for Namibian society?

Here I do not intend to assess in any further detail than already suggested in this chapter, the green-ness of each of the 43 real-world issues which Vision 2030 covers. Instead I am going to partly use the three-point heuristic frequently suggested by Naess for assessing the green-ness of a society:

... it is important to retain a vision of what we would consider a perfect Green society. Among the proponents of the ideals of a Green society, there is fairly substantial agreement that an established Green society is supposed to have reached three main goals, of which only one is ecological sustainability. The two others are the goals of the peace movement and those of the social justice movement (if we allow the term “social justice” to have a wide meaning that includes the elimination of large scale human starvation and subjugation). (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 447).

Of these three, I feel confident, within my academic training, and this study, to assess the green-ness of Vision 2030's ecological sustainability (8.3.1), and its vision for peace (8.3.2). In section 8.3.3, rather than commenting on the green-ness or otherwise of Vision 2030s social justice vision, I attempt to characterize its understanding of sustainable development.

### 8.3.1 A “serious” nature and environmental policy?

Does the text's worldview, specifically, its understanding of the human-nature relationship, provide the framework for what Achterberg calls, a “serious environmental and nature policy” (Achterberg, in Wissenburg, 1993, p. 15)? We can remind ourselves here of what Achterberg means by this:

By ‘serious environmental and nature policy’, I mean a policy that aims at structural changes within society in order to achieve an enduring solution to environmental problems, or at least to create a situation in which they can be controlled. Such a policy is not only directed at maintaining nature as a basis of our social activities for generations to come (sustainability of our use of the environment), *but also at protecting, maintaining and developing nature for its own sake* (sustainability of nature) (Achterberg 1990)” (Achterberg, 1993, pp. 81-82, my italics).

A serious environmental policy not only delivers human well-being but *also does justice to/seeks to protect ‘the intrinsic values of plants, animals and ecosystems’* (Achterberg, 1993, p. 87, my italics).

Through its rational epistemological glasses, Vision 2030 sees nature primarily as an economic reality. And because the holy grail of economic thinking is efficiency, this legitimates the instrumental-only attitude towards nature we have seen in this text. This approach, which robs nature of any value-for-itself, cannot on my view, be the framework for a “serious” environmental and nature policy, as Achterberg, or seeing green, means it [indicator 12.1].

I further argue that Vision 2030s understanding of environmental sustainability approximates at most the grey-green “sensible” or “weaker” version [indicator GG 12.1]. In this version, conceptual answers to the questions What is to be sustained? will tend toward accepting substitutability between the various types of capital – natural (renewable and non-renewable), human-made, and human-social *up to a point*, after which it is not. Thus, notes environmental economist van Dieren, “efforts should be made to define critical levels of each type of capital, beyond which concerns about substitutability could arise and these should be monitored to ensure that patterns of development do not promote a total decimation of one kind of capital no matter what is being accumulated in the other forms of capital” (van Dieren, 1995, p. 103). Such monitoring requires that some kind of formal in-country accounting other than GDP is undertaken to keep track of any transformation of “natural” capital into “human” capital (Neefjes, 2000, p. 29 in Ch 9: 3.4.1.6). But we have seen in this chapter's discussion, that Namibia's natural resource accounting programme is neither developed to this extent, nor as yet formally integrated with the country's economic accounting.

Answers to the question For whom is the natural environment to be sustained? will tend towards “For people” in the “sensible” or “weaker” versions of environmental sustainability. We have seen that this is so in Vision 2030. And finally, in such weaker versions of environmental sustainability, the answer to the question of how long the inter-generational equity is to last? is for the next generation only. This too we have seen in Vision 2030.

I conclude then, that Vision 2030s understanding of environmental sustainability is of the “weaker” variety, tending towards reform environmentalism rather than seeing green's understanding of long-range, and wide, ecological sustainability.

### 8.3.2 Radical peace?

Here I wish to reflect briefly on Vision 2030s understanding of peace, recalling at the same time, that its ultimate premises context is the brief glimpses this text has given us of its understanding of the Self/Other relationship.

Given its roots *inter alia* in the feminism and peace social movements, rejection of domination and violence, and the promotion of peace, harmony and partnership are key values in seeing green. They are also valued in Vision 2030, for example in this objective (p. 130):

*Objective*

To ensure that people in Namibia enjoy peace and harmony in their relationships, and violence (including homicide, rape, human abuse of all descriptions) is completely eliminated in relationships at home as well as outside, within the community and in the country.

I argue on four grounds though, that the text, despite this vision, falls short of the seeing green understanding of radical peace and non-violence, also one of Naess's three criteria for a green society.

(i) Vision 2030 fails to radically re-conceptualize the human-nature relationship. Nature continues to be seen as Other. Neither the standard western cultural sharp dichotomy between humans and nature is problematized, nor is human continuity with, rather than discontinuity with nonhuman nature emphasized (seeing green indicator 7.1). Not only does the Vision 2030 value of partnership fail to include nature as partner, but Namibians are to be educated in instrumental relationships with nature (section 5.2s discussion of 4<sup>th</sup> bullet point on p. 141).

(ii) Vision 2030 appears to espouse conflicting values as far as the human-human relationship is concerned. On the one hand, peace, harmony, partnership and caring between people are proposed, all strong green values. The text's vision that peace between men and women, and differing social and age groups must be established, is also green. On the other hand, the competitive, aggressive even, relationships demanded in successful economic functioning are valorized. This is problematic from a seeing green point of view, for, as we have seen, this text takes a predominantly economic view of reality, seeing nature as goods and services, people largely in a *Homo economicus* light, and the education system as functioning effectively when it "produces" people suited to instrumental techno-industrialism.

And, as argued in section 4.4.9 of this chapter, on the feminist/ecofeminist view, instrumental relationships with women, and instrumental relationships with nature, are *coupled subsets of the same androcentric construction of the Self/Other relationship*, which manifests itself in the ideas, structures, and values of hierarchy, patriarchy, and naturism. The Vision 2030 text, in this aspect of its understanding of the self/other relationship, fails then, to make any connection between the seeing green linked ideas of human-human and human-nature violence [indicator 8.2.4].

(iii) Vision 2030s understanding of peace and security falls short of the radical green understanding, which would require the dismantling of armies, security forces, and weaponry, rather than the upgrading of military forces and military hardware envisaged in Vision 2030 [indicators 14.3, and 16.1]. The use of military metaphors found in this text is also a sign of a non-green Self/Other relationship.

(iv) Namibia is the world's 5<sup>th</sup> largest uranium producer, producing 8% of annual world demand (*The Namibian*, 15 May 2007, p. 5, "Use of Namibian uranium only for 'peaceful purposes'). *Absent* in the Vision 2030s discussion of energy resources for production is any problematization of uranium mining's contribution to nuclear technology (p. 30, p. 162). Vision 2030 mentions nuclear energy not

at all. The Namibian Government's White Paper on Energy Policy (GRN, 1998), which according to Vision 2030 (p. 85) "encourages the exploration and exploitation of the country's energy resources in a sustainable manner", says nothing at all about nuclear energy either.

But as discussed under section 5.2.5 in this chapter, the President of Namibia has not excluded the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in Namibia. According to a local newspaper, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov held private talks with Namibia's President and Prime Minister in March 2007 on the possible construction off the Namibian coast, of "floating" nuclear power plants (*The Namibian*, Friday 23 March 2007, p. 3, "We want no Chernobyl: Earthlife"; *The Namibian*, Wednesday 28 March 2007, p. 5, "NSHR in nuke protests").

No green text, as part of its radical understanding of peace, would have missed the opportunity to problematize, and reject outright, any use of nuclear technology, "peaceful" or otherwise (seeing green indicator 12.5.4).

### 8.3.3 Sustainable development in Vision 2030: "stronger" or "weaker"?

Vision 2030 subscribes to the "philosophy and principles" of sustainable development (Vision 2030, p. 14), without indicating that there are more conservative or radical understandings of this concept, or "stronger" [tending more towards green] and "weaker" versions [indicator GG 2.2].

Some indicators of the stronger versions [indicator GG 2.2.1] are that they tend towards

- a. sensible or even strong environmental sustainability, including a view of nature as possessing intrinsic value and rights,
- b. intra-generational egalitarianism expressed in zero rate of discount for example for non-renewable resources or "depletion schedules", and steps have been identified, and are being taken, to ensure in the process of depletion, the provision of suitable substitutes for renewable resources. For renewable resources, models established which indicate what the maximum sustainable yield of a resource is, so that present generations do not harvest beyond this limit
- c. a bottom-up local participation approach in development planning, which involves public participation in both the setting of objectives and their implementation, "since participation is held to be a good in itself – that is, it has intrinsic value. For managerialists, participation has extrinsic value; it is a means to implement sustainable development." (Davidson, 2000, pp. 30-31)
- d. social restructuring.

Weaker versions [indicator GG 2.2.2] tend towards

- a. weak environmental sustainability [GG 12.1]
- b. a non-zero rate of discounting is adopted in economic decisions pertaining to future economic agents (Ch 9: 3.4.3.5)
- c. a more top-led, managerialist approach to development planning: (Ch 9: 7.2.1c): "The 'top-down' version ... is that favored by most governments, because, by limiting participation to major stakeholders, including business, local government, interest groups and other nongovernment organizations, they can retain control of the sustainable development agenda. It is a technocratic strategy in that objectives are set by governments using experts, with public participation limited to the implementation stage of policy formulation." (Davidson, 2000, pp. 30-31, in Ch 9: 7.2.1c)
- d. a reform environmentalism approach.

While one cannot absolutize, I suggest that the Vision 2030 understanding of sustainable development tends towards the "weaker" version on at least three grounds discussed extensively in this chapter: (i) it accords no intrinsic value to nature, (ii) it tends towards weaker environmental sustainability, and (iii), it embraces reform environmentalism.

#### **8.4 How green is Vision 2030s worldview?: Conclusions**

To answer research question 2: How green is Vision 2030s worldview?, I argue on the strength of this chapter's discussion, that it is no more than grey-green at most – Wissenburg's "grue" introduced in Chapter One, Figure 2. This is not really surprising. From his heuristic, which illustrates how green ideas diminish in importance from dark green in the new social movements, to what he calls "grue" in political parties' thought, one could already have expected *Namibia Vision 2030* as political document to be anthropocentric rather than ecocentric in its valuing of nature, and to adopt a 'reform environmentalism' rather than radical ecological approach. My assessment of this "real world" level text confirms Wissenburg's hypothesis.

## CHAPTER TWELVE: REFLECTIONS

<b>1. The problem: the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream thought</b>	<b>514</b>
<b>2. Can environmental psychology help?</b>	<b>515</b>
<b>2.1 Values-Beliefs-Norms theory</b>	<b>515</b>
<b>2.2. The New Ecological Paradigm</b>	<b>517</b>
<b>3 Suggested further research</b>	<b>519</b>

Chapter One opened with the assumption that there is an increasingly global ecological crisis. It introduced the idea of “seeing green” as an alternative western worldview to what has been called, inter alia, the Enlightenment worldview, or the “dominant social paradigm”. I also introduced there, Wissenburg’s heuristic (1993, in Chapter One, Figure 2) which suggested that green ideas diminish in importance from more important in ecocentric/biocentric environmental philosophy, green political ideology, and real world new social movements, to less important in anthropocentric environmental philosophy, mainstream political ideologies, and in the policies and programmes of real-world political parties. The analysis in subsequent chapters of what “seeing green” means, and the application of self-generated green/grey-green criteria to a real world, ruling political party-led text such as *Namibia Vision 2030* in Chapter Eleven, confirmed Wissenburg’s heuristic.

In Chapter One, I also noted the difficulty of accommodating all aspects of the idea “green” within the discipline of environmental psychology, and presented a justification for an interdisciplinary approach to understanding “green” as a response to the global ecological crisis. It is these two “circles” – the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream thought, and whether or not environmental psychology can contribute to averting the ecological crisis - that I wish to “close” in this chapter, in sections (1) and (2) respectively. In section 3, I make some suggestions for further research.

## 1. The problem: the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream thought

I found the overwhelmingly anthropocentric, economic rationality approach of *Namibia Vision 2030* a stark contrast to seeing green. Given radical environmentalism’s or seeing green’s contention that the ecological crisis can only be addressed by a fundamental change in beliefs, and accompanying fundamental social and economic changes, the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream texts such as *Namibia Vision 2030* must represent a political problem. It is hardly less a problem for environmental psychologists seeking to find the antecedents of their more narrowly defined environmentalism (Chapter One: 4.4.2). I wondered if the University of Namibia [UNAM] offered its students - our future policy-makers and decision-takers - any insights into what radical environmentalism means, other than its mainstream pro-environmental behaviour meaning? I limited my enquiry to a text study of the courses listed in its 2007 Prospectus. I did not for example, interview academic staff on course content.

Unsurprisingly, the mainstream approach of natural resource management is well-represented in UNAMs Prospectus. One example is the two-week course (EBL6159) in Resource Management offered as part of the Faculty of Science’s MSc in Biodiversity Management and Research (University of Namibia, 2007b, p. 116). Another is the Environmental Economics Course offered by the Faculty of Economics and Management Science, Department of Economics (University of Namibia, 2007a, p. 42). Its course content sounds quite familiar from Chapter Nine: Environment and Development:

- Market failure, public goods, common resources, externalities
- Cost-benefit analysis, Discounting and inter-generational equity
- Valuation methods
- Management of renewable and non-renewable resources, resource rents, property rights
- Old and new debates on environmental problems
- Policy instruments for environmental management
- Economic sustainability – definitions, planning and policy implementation for a better environment
- Environmental accounting
- Development, economic growth and the environment

International environmental issues – trade and the environment, international treaties.

I then searched the UNAM Prospectus for some course which would also present alternatives to mainstream anthropocentric and economic-utilitarian managerialism: perhaps a course in environmental philosophy, or environmental ethics, or environmental psychology, or ecologism as political ideology, or environmental education? I found none of these.

## 2. Can environmental psychology help?

Given this “absence”, how could Namibian university students be introduced to the ideas and cultural-socio-economic challenges of seeing green? I argue here that Environmental Psychology holds the potential to do so, provided it is prepared to meet certain challenges.

In the 1990s, Kidner (1994, p. 368) charged mainstream psychology with “muteness” about the environmental crisis, and wondered if environmental psychology had something to offer: “One might look to the rapidly growing field of environmental psychology for effective comment on the human relationship with the natural world. However, one finds that in this area, too, the anthropocentric viewpoint is overwhelmingly predominant ...”. Supporting Kidner’s contention, is leading environmental psychologist Robert Gifford’s view (2007, p. 205) that the WCED/Brundtland Report’s anthropocentric understanding of the human-nature relationship, represents a “utopian” (!) definition of sustainability. On the other hand, psychologists Zelezny and Schultz (2000, p. 366) refute Kidner’s charge of muteness. Titles of papers such as Oskamp’s (2000b) “A sustainable future for humanity? How can psychology help?” show that psychology is indeed trying to help resolve the environmental crisis. And psychologists are well aware of ecocentrism as an alternative theory of environmental valuing (e.g., Thompson & Barton, 1994).

In Chapter One, I noted as strengths of environmental psychology, its interest in worldview, in “environmentalism”, in researching increasingly global aspects of the real-world human-nature relationship, and its open-ness to, insistence really, on an interdisciplinary approach in solving our ecological problems. Environmental psychology holds promise then, as one possible academic “home” for an exploration of the ideas and themes of seeing green. To illustrate the challenges that it must however meet in doing so, I briefly discuss what I see as leading work on “environmentalism” and “ecology” in the field, and its limitations: (2.1) the Values-Beliefs-Norms work of Stern and his colleagues, and (2.2) Dunlap and colleagues’ work on the New Ecological Paradigm. In section 3, I suggest that research on a revised environmental psychology syllabus would be a valuable contribution to understand green ideas on the nature of, and remedy for, the increasingly global ecological crisis.

### 2.1 Values-Beliefs-Norms theory

The Values-Beliefs-Norms [V-B-N] theory can be considered, I think, as a premier example of social-psychological theorizing on environmentalism [i.e. environmentalism understood primarily as individual-based pro-environmental concern and behaviour]. In developing their explanation of environmentalism, Stern et al (1999, p. 85) reviewed six main social-psychological theories:

1. “Worldview” theories such as that of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), “which explains environmentalism in terms of an egalitarian ‘cultural bias’ or ‘orienting disposition’ (Stern, 2000, p. 413, p. 414; Stern et al., 1999, p. 86). They also considered Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig and Jones’ (2000) theory which proposes that environmentalism “flows from adopting a New Environmental (or Ecological) Paradigm, within which human activity and a fragile biosphere are seen as inextricably interconnected” (Stern, 2000, p. 411).

2. Inglehart’s (1977, 1990, 1995, 1997) *post-materialist values theory*, which “holds that a new set of ‘post-materialist’ social and political values and attitudes is emerging in the industrial world as a result of increasing affluence and security. These values emphasize quality of life and self-expression as important desiderata in a society, in contrast to materialist values that have emphasized economic well-being and personal and national security” (Stern et al., 1999, p. 86; also Stern, 2000, p. 411).

3. *Sacredness of nature theories*. Stern et al (1999) also considered


the idea that a spiritual or religious world view may have an important influence on environmentalism (White 1967; Greeley 1993; Kempton, Boster and Hartley 1995; Eckberg and Blocker 1996; Dietz, Stern and Guagnano 1998). We focused on the view that people who hold nature sacred, whether because it was created by God or because it is sacred in itself, are more active in supporting environmental protection. Religious or spiritual beliefs may be especially important because they offer an absolute standard that supersedes appeals to efficiency, practicality and expedience. (Stern et al., 1999, p. 86; also Stern, 2000, p. 411).

Stern et al. (1999) included in their own proposed Values-Beliefs-Norms [VBN] theory of support for environmentalism and pro-environmental behaviour, the three other theories of environmentalism which they had identified:

4. Schwartz’s (1972, 1977) *moral norm-activation theory* of altruism in pro-environmental behaviour,
5. Schwartz and colleagues *personal values theory* which “links proenvironmental behavior to particular basic types of values” (Stern et al. 1999, p. 85; also Stern, 2000, pp. 411-412), and
6. Dunlap and colleagues’ *New Ecological Paradigm theory*.

Stern (2000) presents the Values-Beliefs-Norms theory of support for environmentalism schematically as:

**Figure 20: A Values-Beliefs-Norms theory of support for environmentalism and pro-environmental behaviour (Stern, 2000, p. 412)**



**Fig. 1.** A schematic representation of variables in the VBN theory of environmentalism<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup>Arrows represent postulated direct effects. Direct effects may also be observed on variables more than one level downstream from a causal variable.

<sup>b</sup>Empirically, measures of egoistic values have been negatively correlated with indicators of environmentalism.

Results of empirical research on VBN theory show that there are four “causal variables” for “environmentally significant behaviors”, and that of these, “personal moral norms are the main basis for individuals’ general predispositions to proenvironmental action” (Stern, 2000, p. 413):

**Figure 21: Major types of environmentally significant behaviours and causal variables** (Stern, 2000, p. 421)

**Table 3. Major Types of Environmentally Significant Behaviors and Causal Variables Influencing These Behaviors**

Causal variables	Environmentally significant behaviors
<i>Attitudinal</i> General environmentalist predisposition <sup>a</sup> Behavior-specific norms and beliefs <sup>b</sup> Nonenvironmental attitudes (e.g., about product attributes) Perceived costs and benefits of action	<i>Environmental activism</i> <i>Nonactivist public-sphere behaviors</i> Environmental citizenship (e.g., petitioning, joining groups) Policy support
<i>Personal capabilities</i> Literacy Social status Financial resources Behavior-specific knowledge and skills	<i>Private-sphere environmentalism</i> Consumer purchase behaviors Maintenance of household equipment Changes in equipment use, lifestyle (curtailment) Waste disposal behaviors “Green consumerism”
<i>Contextual factors</i> Material costs and rewards Laws and regulations Available technology Social norms and expectations Supportive policies Advertising	<i>Other</i> Behaviors affecting organizational decisions
<i>Habit and routine</i>	

<sup>a</sup>The VBN theory incorporates various attitudinal variables believed to create this predisposition.

<sup>b</sup>These norms and beliefs figure prominently in applications of norm-activation theory and the theory of planned behavior to specific proenvironmental behaviors.

It is not my intention here to discuss this theory of support for “environmentalism” in any further detail – a full description of it is given in Stern et al. (1999), and Stern (2000). What I wish to highlight here, is its narrow understanding of environmentalism. Pro-environmental behaviour is but one aspect of seeing green. It is unclear to me how Stern et al’s model could explain for example, such green and non-environmental related behaviours as demands for grassroots democracy, inclusive models of social welfare delivery, or demands for radical peace. Nor do the model’s “causal variables” make room for radical cultural critique. Dunlap, Van Liere, and colleagues’ New Ecological Paradigm work appears to hold more promise in this respect.

## 2.2. The New Ecological Paradigm

Dunlap, Van Liere, and colleagues’ New Ecological Paradigm is of particular interest for this study because it is (1) a *worldview* explanation of environmentalism (2) it is “prominent... in social psychology” (Stern, 2000, p. 411), and widely used (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 428), and (3) because it claims to be able to measure “seeing the world ecologically” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 428). This should be broadly the same thing as “seeing green”. But on my view, the NEP doesn’t fulfil its promise.

Dunlap and Van Liere’s (1984) sociological work on the “Dominant Social Paradigm” was briefly mentioned in Chapter One: 2.1. They conceptualized it then as comprising eight major dimensions: “(1) commitment to limited government, (2) support for free enterprise, (3) devotion to private property rights, (4) emphasis on individualism, (5) fear of planning and support for the status quo, (6) faith in the efficacy of science and technology, (7) support for economic growth, and (8) faith in future abundance (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, pp. 1014-1015). Their empirical work showed that support for the Dominant Social Paradigm was negatively correlated with environmental concern (p. 1018).

In other sociological<sup>1</sup> research, Dunlap, van Liere, Mertig and Jones (2000, p. 425) argue that in contrast to the Dominant Social Paradigm, a New Ecological Paradigm is emerging:

The emergence of global environmental problems as major policy issues symbolizes the growing awareness of the problematic relationship between modern industrialized societies and the physical environments on which they depend (Stern et al., 1992). Recognition that human activities are altering the ecosystems on which our existence – and that of all other living species – is dependent and growing acknowledgement of the necessity of achieving more sustainable forms of development give credence to suggestions that *we are in the midst of a fundamental reevaluation of the underlying worldview that has guided our relationship to the physical environment* (e.g. Milbrath, 1984). ... [new paragraph] In this context, it is not surprising to see that traditional measures of ‘environmental concern’ are being supplemented by instruments seeking to measure ‘ecological consciousness’ (Ellis & Thompson, 1997), ‘anthropocentrism’ (Chandler & Dreger, 1993), and ‘anthropocentrism versus ecocentrism’ (Thompson & Barton, 1994)... (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 426, my italics).

Dunlap and Van Liere believe that implicit within environmentalism is “ a challenge to our fundamental views about nature and humans’ relationship to it.” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 427). Their original 12-item New Environmental Paradigm (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978) focussed “on beliefs about humanity’s ability to upset the balance of nature, the existence of limits to growth for human societies, and humanity’s right to rule over the rest of nature.” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 427). [All seeing green themes!]. On Dunlap et al’s view (2000, p. 427), the NEP Scale can be “fruitfully employed to examine the structure and coherence of ecological worldviews and the relationships between these worldviews and a range of more specific environmental attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 431). In short, they say, “a proecological orientation or ‘seeing the world ecologically’, reflected by a high score on the NEP Scale<sup>2</sup>, should lead to proenvironmental beliefs and attitudes on a wide range of issues...” (p. 428).

So, if the NEP Scale can be considered a mainstream sociological/social-psychological shorthand version of “seeing ecologically”, what is its content? Briefly, it hypothesizes five facets<sup>3</sup> of an ecological worldview (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 432):

- (1) the reality of limits to growth
- (2) anti-anthropocentrism
- (3) the fragility of nature’s balance
- (4) rejection of exemptionalism, that is, rejection of the idea prominent in the DSP, that human beings unlike other species, are exempt from the constraints of nature
- (5) belief in the possibility of an ecocrisis.

Support for, or rejection of these five facets of an ecological worldview is measured through 15 statements (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 432, and 431). These statements are listed below and related to each of the five worldview facets:

1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support (Facet 1)
2. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs (2)
3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences (3)
4. Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unliveable (4)
5. Humans are severely abusing the environment (5)
6. The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them (1)
7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist (2)
8. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations (3)

<sup>1</sup> This is perhaps why Stern et al (1995) criticized NEP theory for its lack of grounding “...in social-psychological theories of attitude structure” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 427).

<sup>2</sup> Most studies have found support for the NEP to be positively related to younger ages, better education, and liberalism as political ideology (Dunlap et al., 2000, pp. 429-430)

<sup>3</sup> As alternative view, Hayward (1995, pp. 31-32), from within political philosophy, offers three “core ecological values”: live in harmony with nature; overcome anthropocentric prejudice; recognize intrinsic value in beings other than humans value

9. Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature (4)
10. The so-called “ecological crisis” has been greatly exaggerated (5)
11. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources (1)
- 12 Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature (2)
- 13 The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset (3)
- 14 Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it (4)
15. If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe (5)

Although the NEP is claiming to describe the essential facets of an ecological worldview, it is really only describing one (important) facet: the human-nature relationship. But on the green view, the human-nature relationship is itself located within, is the product of, implicit, unchallenged epistemological and ontological assumptions. There will be, on the green view, no real solution to the ecological crisis until *all* the facets of our dominant western cultural worldview change - its epistemology, ontology, moral philosophy, psychology, and political and economic practices too. These elements of seeing green’s *cultural-philosophical* critique are absent in Dunlap et al’s New Ecological Paradigm. In section 3 next, I suggest inter alia, that further research seems needed before environmental psychology can fulfil its promise to address the ecological crisis.

### 3 Suggested further research

It is customary in a study such as this, to suggest future avenues of research. I make next three suggestions pertaining directly to the content of this study, and one concerning the role of environmental psychology in dealing with the ecological crisis.

(1) The seeing green criteria created in section 3.4 of Chapter Ten, represent *one* possible sample from the base data in Chapters Three to Nine. They should nevertheless be generalizable to other texts, but as suggested in section 4.1 of Chapter Ten, this should be verified and amplified by analysing policies similar to *Namibia Vision 2030*. The indicators I have created should also be generalizable to other texts. However, other researchers with other interests than mine might wish through further research to verify this, or to deepen the discussion of some indicators, or include in the criteria, indicators for those aspects of seeing green which I did not. These are listed in Chapter Eleven, section 7.2.

(2) One of the reasons I employed Morley’s cultural hegemony encoding/decoding model as methodology (Chapter Ten, section 2.1.3.2) was because I felt its “decoding” half offers the possibility of future research into whether, and how, ordinary members of the public do actually deconstruct *Namibia Vision 2030*.

(3) And for those researchers interested in ideology, a critical examination of *Namibia Vision 2030*s power relationships, via questions such as those that Hattingh (2002, p. 14) poses about sustainable development as discourse, is surely a tempting prospect:

Whose interests are served by adopting this or that agenda of sustainable development? Whose power is served and through which mechanisms? And who or what stands to win or lose in which ways from adopting this particular agenda of sustainable development, rather than that one? Are new forms of dependency created by adopting this or that interpretation of the agenda of sustainable development? Are new forms of domination and exploitation created...?

But, based on the discussion in section 2 of this chapter - Can environmental psychology help in reversing the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream thought? – I believe that the further research for which this study calls, more than on any of the topics listed above, is on the role which

environmental psychology might play in the academic training of our future Namibian policy-makers and decision-takers on what green really means.

Environmental psychology is capable of speaking to the environmental crisis, and does so, but in mainstream language, and partially. And that is just the challenge, isn't it, which environmental psychology must meet: it must recognize, and respond to seeing green's fundamental challenge to mainstream views of the good life, to alleged mainstream androcentric assumptions on the nature of knowledge, of reality, on what it is to be a human being, and on the nature of Self-Other relationships, whether these are with people or the planet.

To do so, environmental psychology needs to continue reaching out to other disciplines:

The world has problems but universities have departments (Brewer, 1999, p. 328, in Uiterkamp & Vlek, 2007, p. 194).

It is ... critical to underscore the need to draw on insights from across the behavioral and social sciences, because the important causal variables [of pro-environmental behaviour] lie in the domains of various disciplines and because the variables interact. Thus, interdisciplinary research is necessary for full understanding (Stern, 2000, p. 422).

This reaching out should not be restricted only to mainstream academic fields such as sociology, political theory, education, and environmental philosophy/ethics. It is also on my view, critically necessary that environmental psychology should reach beyond its present mainstream confines to the ideas and values of the new social movements: radical peace, feminism, and ecology. Only then will it be able to present in its research, the full range of green ideas, and, to borrow Carol Gilligan's (1982) phrase, speak "in a different voice".

What is needed now I believe, is research on how to set a new agenda for environmental psychology (Reser, 1995, Chapter One, section 4.1.3).

## REFERENCES<sup>1</sup>

- Abbott, S. (1990). The origins of God in the blood of the Lamb. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 35-40). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Achterberg, W. (1993). Can liberal democracy survive the environmental crisis? Sustainability, liberal neutrality and overlapping consensus. In A. Dobson & P. Lucardie (Eds.), *The politics of nature. Explorations in green political theory* (pp. 81-101). London & New York: Routledge.
- Achterberg, W. (1996). Sustainability, community and democracy. In B. Doherty & M. de Geus (Eds.), *Democracy & green political thought. Sustainability, rights and citizenship* (pp. 170-187). London & New York: Routledge.
- Achterhuis, H. (1995). The history and roots of growth. In W. van Dieren (Ed.), *Taking nature into account: toward a sustainable national income. A report to the Club of Rome* (pp. 15-27). New York: Copernicus.
- \*Adams, C. (1987). The sexual politics of meat. *Heresies*, 6 (1987), 51-55.
- \*Adams, C. (1989). *The sexual politics of meat: A feminist-vegetarian critical theory*. New York: Continuum.
- Adams, C.J. (1993). The feminist traffic in animals. In G. Gaard (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, animals, nature* (pp. 195-218). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Adams, C.J. (1996). Ecofeminism and the eating of animals. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. 114-136). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- \*Agarwal, B. (1998). The gender and environment debate. In R. Keil, D.V.J. Bell, P. Penz, & L. Fawcett (Eds.), *Political ecology: global and local* (no page numbers given). London: Routledge.
- \*Agius, E. (1998). Patenting life: Our responsibilities to present and future generations. *Philosophy and Medicine*, 55, 67-83.
- Aloe*. *The monthly newsletter for the residents of Windhoek*. Windhoek: City of Windhoek, 1991-.
- American Psychological Association. (2005). *Concise rules of APA style*. Washington: American Psychological Association.
- Anderson, T.L., & Leal, D.R. (1998). Reading 58. Free market environmentalism. In R. G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong, S.J. (Eds.), *Environmental ethics: Divergence and convergence* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 527-540). Boston: McGraw Hill.
- Anderson, W.T. (1996). Four different ways to be absolutely right. In W.T. Anderson (Ed.), *The Fontana post-modernism reader* (pp. 106-112). London: Fontana Press.

---

<sup>1</sup> In this reference list, I have (1) maintained a distinction between references which I have and have not read. Thus an author/authors prefixed by an \*, is a source cited by an author used in this study, but which I have not read, and (2) tried to establish as closely as possible when a paper, article or book was first written by an author

- Armstrong, K. (1999). *A history of God. From Abraham to the present: The 4000-year quest for God*. Vintage: London.
- Armstrong-Buck, S. (1986). Discussion papers. Whitehead's metaphysical system as a foundation for environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, 8, 240-259.
- Attfield, R. (1983). *The ethics of environmental concern*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- \*Attfield, R. (1991). *The ethics of environmental concern* (2nd ed.). Athens, GA and London: University of Georgia Press.
- Attfield, R. (1999). *The ethics of the global environment*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, and Purdue University Press, West Lafayette, IN.
- Attfield, R. (2003). *Environmental ethics: An overview for the twenty-first century*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Audi, R. (Ed.). (1999). *The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- \*Axelrod, L.J. (1994). Balancing economic needs with environmental concerns: What factors guide individual action? *Journal of Social Issues*, 50, 89-104.
- Axelrod, L.J., & Suedfeld, P. (1995). Technology, capitalism, and Christianity: Are they really the three horsemen of the eco-collapse? *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 15, 183-195.
- Bahro, R. (1982a). Basic positions of The Greens. For an ecological answer to the economic crisis. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 11-22). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1982b). Human beings are not ants. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 23-29). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1983a). This time the Greens – Why? Draft for an election appeal. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 30-44). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1983b). Overcoming the gravitational pull of the industrial system. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, ans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 45-48). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1983c). No stand-in for Eppler. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 49-50). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1983d). To what end are we consolidating our forces? Propositions in preparation for the Open National Delegate Conference (Hanover). In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 51-59). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1983e). If only the thing was more stable! In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 60-85). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1983f). Dare to form communes. Ten propositions on the line of the social alternative. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 86-91). London: Heretic Books.

- Bahro, R. (1983g). Why communes? In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 92-98). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1983h). Withdrawal from the world is no solution. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 104-110). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1983i). We need a lot more empty space in our minds and in our feelings! In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 111-122). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1983j). Notes for a lecture on 'Dimensions of exterminism and the idea of general emancipation.' In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 142-158). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1984a). The Third World and us. Conversation with Johan Galtung (i). In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 123-131). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1984b). We are defeated. That is not exactly unimportant. Conversation with Johan Galtung (ii). In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 132-141). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1984c). Fundamental thoughts on the crisis of the Greens. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 159-176). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1984d). Are we heading in or out? In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 177-188). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1984e). *From red to green. Interviews with New Left Review*. London: Verso.
- Bahro, R. (1985a). A lesson in compromise. A Green animal protection law based on alternative concentration camp logic? In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 196-209). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1985b). Statement on my resignation from the Greens. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.). (1986). *Building the Green movement* (pp. 210-211). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1986). *Building the green movement* (Ed. J. Sandford; Trans. M. Tyler). London: Heretic Books.
- Bahro, R. (1997). Die Idee des Homo integralis – oder ob wir eine neue Politeia stiften können. In M. Hosang (Ed.) (2000), *Rudolf Bahro. Ein Leben und eine Philosophie für die Zukunft von Mensch und Erde. Texte von und zu ihm zur Ausstellung in der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin aus Anlass seines 65. Geburtstages*, (pp. 23-33). Berlin: Rudolf-Bahro-Archiv, Universität von Berlin.
- Bale, L.S. (1995). Gregory Bateson, cybernetics, and the social/behavioural sciences. *Cybernetics and human knowing*, 3(1), 27-45.
- Bamberg, S. (2003). How does environmental concern influence specific environmentally related behaviours? A new answer to an old question. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 23, 21-32.

- \*Bandyopadhyay, J., & Shiva, V. (1982). Political economy of technological polarisations. *Economic and political weekly*, 17 (November 6, 1982), 1827-1832.
- \*Bandyopadhyay, J., & Shiva, V. (1988). Political economy of ecology movements. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 23 (June 11, 1988), 1223-1232.
- Barker, R.G. (1968). *Ecological psychology. Concepts and methods for studying the environment of human behavior*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Barrett, C.B., & Grizzle, R. (1999). A holistic approach to sustainability based on pluralism stewardship. *Environmental Ethics*, 21, 23-42.
- Bartelmus, P. (1986). *Environment and development*. Boston: Allyn & Unwin.
- Bartlett, R.V. (1986). Ecological rationality: Reason and environmental policy. *Environmental Ethics*, 8, 221-239.
- Barry, J. (1996). Sustainability, political judgement and citizenship: Connecting green politics and democracy. In B. Doherty & M. de Geus (Eds.), *Democracy & green political thought. Sustainability, rights and citizenship* (pp. 115-131). London & New York: Routledge.
- Bateson, G. (1972). *Steps to an ecology of mind. Collected essays in anthropology, psychiatry, evolution, and epistemology*. Northvale: Jason Aronson.
- Bateson, G. (1979). *Mind and nature: A necessary unity*. s.l.: Fontana/Collins.
- Bateson, G., & Bateson, M. (1988). *Angels fear: An investigation into the nature and meaning of the sacred*. London: Century Hutchinson.
- \*Baxter, W. (1974). *People or penguins. The case for optimal pollution*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Bell, P.A., Greene, T.C., Fisher, J.D., & Baum, A. (1996). *Environmental psychology* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.). Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
- Bell, P.A., Greene, T.C., Fisher, J.D., & Baum, A. (2001). *Environmental psychology* (5<sup>th</sup> ed.). Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers.
- \*Bentham, J. (1823). *An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Benton, T. (1993). Animal rights and social relations. In A. Dobson & P. Lucardie (Eds.), *The politics of nature. Explorations in green political theory* (pp. 161-176). London & New York: Routledge.
- Berelson, B. (1952). *Content analysis in communication research*. Glenco, Illinois: The Free Press.
- Berger, P.L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Berman, M. (1981). *The reenchantment of the world*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

- Berman, M. (1990). The cybernetic dream of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In J. Clark (Ed.), *Renewing the earth. The promise of social ecology. A celebration of the work of Murray Bookchin* (pp. 12-32). London: Green Print.
- Berry, T. (1987). The viable human. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 8-18). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- \*Best, S. (Ed.). (2004). *Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals*. Retrieved 17 March 2006 from Wikipedia <http://en.wikipedia.org> Animal Liberation Front entry.
- \*Biehl, J. (1991). *Finding our way: Rethinking ecofeminist politics*. Boston: South End Press.
- Biehl, J. (1993). Dialectics in the ethics of social ecology. In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark, J. (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 374-389). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Biehl, J. (Ed.). (1997). *The Murray Bookchin reader*. London: Cassell.
- Biehl, J. (1997a). Introduction [to The Murray Bookchin Reader]. In J. Biehl (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 1-12). London: Cassell.
- Biehl, J. (1997b). Introduction [to Chapter Five: Scarcity and post-scarcity]. In J. Biehl (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 99-101). London: Cassell.
- Biehl, J. (1997c). Introduction [to Chapter Six: Marxism]. In J. Biehl (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 122-124). London: Cassell.
- Biehl, J. (1997d). Introduction [to Chapter Eight: Libertarian municipalism]. In J. Biehl (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 172-173). London: Cassell.
- Biehl, J. (1997e). Introduction [to Chapter Nine: Dialectical Naturalism]. In J. Biehl (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 197-199). London: Cassell.
- Biehl, J. (2006). *Murray Bookchin obituary. Obituary by Janet Biehl for the Burlington Free Press*. Retrieved October 2006 from <http://www.social-ecology.org> [follow Bookchin obituary link].
- \*Birkeland, C. (1986). *The cold war and the weapons industry*. Hobart: University of Tasmania, Department of Environmental Studies.
- Birkeland, J. (1993). Ecofeminism: linking theory and practice. In G. Gaard (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: women, animals, nature* (pp. 13-52). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Birkeland, J. (1996). Comment. Beyond economic man: a commentary. *Environmental Ethics*, 18, 335-336.
- Bjerke, T., & Kaltenborn, B. (1999). The relationship of ecocentric and anthropocentric motives to attitudes toward large carnivores. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 19(4), 415-421.
- Blackie, R. (2000). Government policies on sustainable development in Namibia. In B. Fuller & I. Prommer (Eds.), *Population-Development-Environment in Namibia. Background readings* (pp.

135-152). Windhoek: University of Namibia Multidisciplinary Research and Consultancy Centre/International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.

- \*Blaikie, P., and Brookfield, H. (1987). *Land degradation and society*. London: Methuen.
- Bodian, S. (1982). Simple in means, rich in ends. An interview with Arne Naess. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 26-36). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- \*Bookchin, M. [under pseudonym Lewis Herber] (1962). *Our synthetic environment*. New York: Alfred A Knopf.
- Bookchin, M. (1962). Decentralization (from “Our synthetic environment”, 1962). In J. Biehl, (1997). (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp.14-20). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1964). Anarchism and ecology (from “Ecology and revolutionary thought”, 1964). In J. Biehl, (1997). (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp.20-24). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1965a). Ecology and revolutionary thought. In M. Bookchin (1974), *Post-scarcity anarchism* (pp. 55-82). London: Wildwood House.
- Bookchin, M. (1965b). Ecological technology (from “Toward a liberatory technology”, 1965). In J. Biehl, (1997). (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 26-31). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1965c). The new technology and the human scale (from “Toward a liberatory technology”, 1965). In J. Biehl, (Ed.) (1997), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 24-25). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1965d). The problem of want and work (from “Toward a liberatory technology”, 1965). In J. Biehl, (Ed.) (1997), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp.105-107). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1967). Conditions of freedom (from Post-scarcity anarchism, 1967). In J. Biehl, (Ed.) (1997), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp.101-105). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1967/1968). Post-scarcity anarchism. In M. Bookchin (1974), *Post-scarcity anarchism* (pp. 31-54). London: Wildwood House.
- Bookchin, M. (1969a). Marxism and Leninism (from Listen, Marxist!, 1969). In J. Biehl, (Ed.) (1997), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp.128-144). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1969b). The two traditions: Anarchism (from Listen, Marxist!, 1969). In J. Biehl, (Ed.) (1997), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp.144-149). London: Cassell.
- \*Bookchin, M. (1971). *Post scarcity anarchism*. San Francisco: Ramparts Press.
- Bookchin, M. (1974). *Post-scarcity anarchism*. London: Wildwood House.
- \*Bookchin, M. (1982a). *The ecology of freedom: The emergence and dissolution of hierarchy*. Palo Alto: Cheshire Books.

- Bookchin, M. (1982b). Social ecology (from the Ecology of freedom, 1982). In J. Biehl, (Ed.) (1997), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 31-36). London: Cassell.
- \*Bookchin, M. (1986a). *The modern crisis*. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers.
- \*Bookchin, M. (1986b). Freedom and necessity in nature: A problem in ecological ethics. *Alternatives*, 13(4), (no pages given, but includes p. 5).
- \*Bookchin, M. (1987a). Thinking ecologically: A dialectical approach. *Our generation*, 18, 3-40.
- Bookchin, M. (1987b). The new municipal agenda (from “From Urbanization to Cities”, 1987, revised 1995; with interpolations from various essays). In J. Biehl, (Ed.) (1997), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp.173-196). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1988a). Social ecology versus deep ecology. In D. VanDeVeer & C.Pierce (Eds.) (1994), *Environmental ethics and policy book: Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 228-238). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing. [Originally published in *Socialist Review*, 88(3) (1988), 11-29.]
- Bookchin, M. (1988b). The Crisis in the Ecology Movement. [Green Perspectives, 6, May 1988]. Retrieved 12 October 2006 from the website of the Institute for Social Ecology, <http://www.social-ecology.org/article.php?story=20031117103040125>.
- Bookchin, M. (1990a). Anarchy and libertarian Utopias (from Remaking Society). In J. Biehl, (1997) (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp.150-156). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1990b). A philosophical naturalism (from the introduction to “The Philosophy of Social Ecology”, 1990). In J. Biehl, (1997) (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 203-218). London: Cassell.
- \*Bookchin, M. (1990c). *Remaking Society: Pathways to a green future*. Boston: South End Press.
- Bookchin, M. (1990d). Recovering evolution: A reply to Eckersley and Fox. *Environmental Ethics*, 12, 253-274.
- Bookchin, M. (1991). Searching for agreement: A dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman. S. Chase (Ed.). (1991). Extracts from *Defending the Earth: A dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman* in D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce (Eds.) (1994), *Environmental Ethics and policy book: Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 238-246). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Bookchin, M. (1992). The Transition to the Ecological Society: An Interview [with Murray Bookchin] by Takis Fotopoulos, September 11, 1992. [Electronic version]. Retrieved 5 October 2006 from <http://www.social-ecology.org/article.php?story=20031118112334543> [use <http://www.social-ecology.org> and follow “Library” link, then “Murray Bookchin” if url is not working ]. [Originally published in *Society and Nature*, 1(3), (1993)].
- Bookchin, M. (1993). What is social ecology? In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark, J. (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 354-373). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

- Bookchin, M. (1995a). *A philosophical naturalism*. [Electronic version of the introduction to *The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism* (2nd ed. Revised). Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1995]. Retrieved October 2006 from <http://www.social-ecology.org> [follow links "Online library", no page numbers].
- Bookchin, M. (1995b). Critique of lifestyle anarchism (from Social anarchism or lifestyle anarchism?, 1995). In J. Biehl (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 164-171). London: Cassell.
- Bookchin, M. (1995c). Dialectical naturalism. In J. Biehl (Ed.), *The Murray Bookchin reader* (pp. 197-224). London: Cassell [Excerpts by Biehl from the Introduction to *The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism* (2nd ed., revised), (pp. 3-11, 13-15, 16-24, 26-7, 28-33). Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1995. This introduction is available unedited online as *A philosophical naturalism*. Retrieved October 2006 from <http://www.social-ecology.org>, follow links "Online library". No page numbers appear in the online version].
- Bookchin, M. (2003). *Libertarian Municipalism: An Overview*. Retrieved October 2006 from <http://www.social-ecology.org> [follow link "Online library"]].
- Botkin, D.B., & Keller, E.A. (Eds.). (2005). *Environmental science: Earth as a living planet*. (5<sup>th</sup> ed.). New York: John Wiley and Sons.
- Botzler, R.G., & Armstrong, S.J. (Eds.). (1998). *Environmental ethics: Divergence and convergence* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Boston: McGraw Hill.
- Botzler, R.G., & Armstrong, S.J. (1998a). The role of science. In R. G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong (Eds.), *Environmental ethics: Divergence and convergence* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 9-12). Boston: McGraw Hill.
- Botzler, R.G., & Armstrong, S.J. (1998b). Anthropocentrism. In R. G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong, (Eds.), *Environmental ethics: Divergence and convergence* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 309-311). Boston: McGraw Hill.
- \*Boulding, K. (1970). *Beyond economics: Essays on society, religion and ethics*. Michigan: Ann Arbor.
- Bowers, C.A. (1992). The conservative misinterpretation of the educational ecological crisis. *Environmental Ethics*, 14, 101-127.
- Bradford, G. (1993). Toward a deep social ecology. In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark, J. (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 418-437). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Bramwell, A. (1989). *Ecology in the twentieth century. A history*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Bramwell, A. (1994). *The fading of the Greens. The decline of environmental politics in the west*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- \*Brewer, G.D. (1999). The challenges of interdisciplinarity. *Policy sciences*, 32, 327-337.
- Brown, M., & May, J. (1989). *Die Greenpeace Story*. [The Greenpeace story. (T.M. Höpfner, Trans.)]. Hamburg: Interbook Verlagsgesellschaft.

- Brown, D.A. (2004). Comment: Environmental ethics and public policy. *Environmental Ethics*, 26(1), 111-112.
- Brown, R. (2004). Righting ecofeminist ethics: The scope and use of moral entitlement. *Environmental Ethics*, 26(3), 247-265.
- Bruner, M., & Oelschlaeger, M. (1994). Rhetoric, environmentalism, and environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, 16, 377-396.
- \*Buchsbaum, R., & M. (1957). *Basic ecology*. Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press .
- \*Bullock, C.J. (1909) (Ed.). *Adam Smith (1776). The wealth of nations*. New York: Colliers.
- Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen. (2002). *Die Zukunft ist grün. Grundsatzprogramm*. [The future is green. Base programme]. Berlin: Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen.
- \*Bunyard, P., & Morgan-Grenville, F. (1987). *The green alternative: Guide to good living*. London: Methuen.
- Burr, V. (1995). *An introduction to social constructionism*. London: Routledge.
- Byers, B.A. (1997). *Environmental threats and opportunities in Namibia: A comprehensive assessment*. Government of the Republic of Namibia, Ministry of Environment and Tourism research paper 21. Windhoek: Ministry of Environment and Tourism.
- \*Caldecott, L., & Leland, S. (1983). (Eds.). *Reclaim the Earth: Women speak out for life on earth*. London: Women's Press.
- \*Caldwell, L.K. (1971). *Environment: A challenge to modern society*. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books-Doubleday.
- \*Callenbach, E. (1972). *Ecotopia*. New York: Bantam Books.
- \*Callicott, J.B. (1980). Animal liberation: A triangular affair. *Environmental Ethics*, 2, 311-338.
- Callicott, J. B. (1986). The metaphysical implications of ecology. *Environmental Ethics*, 8, 301-306.
- \*Callicott, J.B. (1988). Animal liberation and environmental ethics: Back together again. *Between the species*, 4, 163-169.
- \*Callicott, J.B (1989). *In defense of the land ethic: Essays in environmental philosophy*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Callicott, J.B. (1990). The case against moral pluralism. *Environmental Ethics*, 12, 99-124.
- \*Callicott, J.B. (1991). Genesis and John Muir. In C.S. Rob & C.J. Casebolt (Eds.), *Covenant for a new Creation: Ethics, religion, and public policy*. Mary Knoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books.
- Callicott, J.B. (1992). Rolston on intrinsic value. A deconstruction. *Environmental Ethics*, 14, 129-143.

- Callicott, J.B. (1993a). Introduction [to Environmental Ethics]. In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark, J. (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 3-11). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- \*Callicott, J.B. (1993b). The search for an environmental ethic. In T. Regan (Ed.), *Matters of life and death* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., pages unknown, but include pages 325-330). New York: McGraw Hill.
- Callicott, J.B. (1994). Toward a global environmental ethic. In M.E. Tucker & J.A. Grim (Eds.), *Worldviews and ecology: religion, philosophy and the environment* (pp. 30-38). Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Callicott, J.B. (1996). Do deconstructive ecology and sociobiology undermine Leopold's land ethic? *Environmental Ethics*, 18, 353-372.
- Capra, F. (1983). *The turning point: Science, society, and the rising culture*. London: Flamingo.
- Capra, F. (1987). Deep ecology. A new paradigm. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 19-25). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Capra, F., & Spretnak, C. (1984). *Green politics*. New York: E.P. Dutton.
- \*Card, C. (1990). Gender and moral luck. In O. Flanagan & A.O. Rorty, *Identity, character and morality: Essays in moral psychology*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- \*Carson, R. (1962). *Silent spring*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Chapple, C.K. (1994). Hindu environmentalism: Traditional and contemporary resources. In M.E. Tucker, & J.A. Grim (Eds.), *Worldviews and ecology: Religion, philosophy and the environment* (pp. 113-123). Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Chase, S. (1991). (Ed.). Searching for agreement: A dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman. Extracts from *Defending the Earth: A dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman* in D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce (Eds.) (1994), *Environmental Ethics and policy book: Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 238-246). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Cheney, J. (1987). Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology. *Environmental ethics*, 9, 115-45.
- \*Chodorow, N. (1978). *The reproduction of mothering*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Christ, C. P. (1990). Rethinking theology and nature. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 58-69). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Clark, J. (1993). Introduction [to Social Ecology]. In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren and J. Clark, J. (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 345-353). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Clarke, R., & Timberlake, L. (1982). *Stockholm plus ten. Promises, promises? The decades since the 1972 UN Environment Conference*. London: Earthscan.

- Clarke, T. (2003). Science update. Population boom threatens wildlife. *Nature*, 25 July 2003.
- \*Clements, F. (1916). *Plant succession: an analysis of the development of vegetation*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington.
- \*Cobb, J.B. (Jnr). (1970). The population explosion and the rights of the subhuman world. *IDOC International*, North American edition, 12 September 1970, New York.
- Coetzee, J.K., Graaff, J., Hendricks, F., & Wood, G. (2001). *Development: theory, policy, and practice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- \*Collard, A., & Contrucci, J. (1989). *Rape of the wild: Man's violence against animals and the Earth*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Collins, D., & Barkdull, J. (1995). Capitalism, environmentalism, and mediating structures: From Adam Smith to stakeholder panels. *Environmental Ethics*, 17, 228-244.
- \*Collins, S. (1973). *A different heaven and earth*. Valley Forge: Judson Press.
- \*Commission of the European Communities, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations, and World Bank (1993). *System of National Accounts*. (UN publication, Sales no. E.94.xvii.4).
- \*Commoner, B. (1990). *Making peace with the planet*. New York: Pantheon.
- \*Cooper, D.E. (1995). Other species and moral reason. In D.E. Cooper & J.A. Palmer (Eds.), *Just environments: intergenerational, international and interspecies issues*. London: Routledge.
- Corral-Verdugo, V., Bechtel, R.B., & Fraijo-Sing, B. (2003). Environmental beliefs and water conservation: An empirical study. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 23, 247-257.
- \*Costanza, R. (1992). Toward an operational definition of ecosystem health. In R. Costanza, B.G. Norton, & B.D. Haskell (Eds.), *Ecosystem health: new goals for environmental management* (pp. unknown). Washington D.C Island Press.
- Coyle, A. (1995). Discourse analysis. In G.M. Breakwell, S. Hammond and C. Fife-Shaw (Eds.), *Research methods in psychology* (pp. 243-258). London: Sage.
- Cuomo, C. (1992). Unravelling the problems in ecofeminism. *Environmental Ethics*, 14, 351-363.
- Cuomo, C. (1996). Toward thoughtful ecofeminist activism. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. 42-51). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Curtin, D. (1994). Dogen, deep ecology, and the ecological self. *Environmental Ethics*, 16, 195-213.
- Curtin, D. (1995). Making peace with the Earth: Indigenous agriculture and the Green Revolution. *Environmental Ethics*, 17, 59-73.
- Curtin, D. (1996). Toward an ecological ethic of care. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. 66-81). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

- Curtin, D. (1997). Women's knowledge as expert knowledge. In K.J. Warren (Ed.), *Ecofeminism. Women, culture, nature* (pp. 82-98). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Dalal-Clayton, B., & Bass, S. (2002). *Sustainable development strategies: A resource book*. [Electronic version]. International Institute for Environment and Development, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, United Nations Development Programme.
- \*Daly, H. (1985). The circular flow of exchange value and the linear throughput of matter-energy: A case of misplaced concreteness. *Review of Social Economy*, 44, 279-297.
- \*Daly, M. (1973). *Beyond God the Father*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- \*Daly, M. (1978). *Gyn/Ecology*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Davidson, J. (2000). Sustainable development: Business as usual or a new way of living? *Environmental Ethics*, 22, 25-42.
- \*Davila, V. (1972 April). Declaration of the rights of animals. *Everywoman*, 31, pp. unknown.
- Davion, V. (1994). How feminist is ecofeminism? In D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce, *The environmental ethics and policy book. Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 288-295). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Davion, V. (1996). When lives become logic problems: Nuclear deterrence, an ecological feminist critique. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. 181-196). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- \*Davis, E. (1989). *Ecosphilosophy: A field guide to the literature*. San Pedro: Miles.
- \*de Beauvoir, S. (1965). *The second sex*. London: Foursquare Books.
- \*de la Court, T. (1993). Beyond Brundtland: Green Development in the 1990s. *New Bulletin of Science, Technology, Society*, 13, pp. not given, but include 120-131.
- Dell, P.F. (1985). Understanding Bateson and Maturana: Toward a biological foundation for the social sciences. *Journal of Marital and Family Therapy*, 11, 1-20.
- Desjardins, J.R. (1993). *Environmental ethics. An introduction to environmental philosophy*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Devall, B., & Sessions, G. (1984). The development of natural resources and the integrity of nature. *Environmental Ethics*, 6, 293-322.
- \*Devall, B., & Sessions, G. (1985). *Deep ecology: Living as if nature mattered*. Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books.
- Devall, B., & Sessions, G. (1985a). Interview with Arne Naess [1982]. In D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce, *The environmental ethics and policy book. Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 220-222). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

- Devall, B., & Sessions, G. (1985b). Deep ecology. In D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce, *The environmental ethics and policy book. Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 215-220). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- \*Diamond, J. M. (1975). The island dilemma: Lessons of modern biogeographic studies for the design of natural reserves. *Biological Conservation*, 7, 129-145.
- Diamond, I. (1990). Babies, heroic experts, and a poisoned earth. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 201-210). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Diamond, I., & Orenstein, G.F. (1990). (Eds.). *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism*. San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Die Grünen (1979). *Die Grünen. Alternative für Europa*. [The Greens. Alternative for Europe. (The Europe programme)] Bonn: Selbstverlag.
- Die Grünen (1980a). *Satzung der Bundespartei Die Grünen*. Karlsruhe: [Selbstverlag?].
- Die Grünen (1980b). *Das Bundesprogramm* [The federal programme. (The Saarbrücker programme)]. Bonn: Selbstverlag.
- Die Grünen (1980c). *Die Grünen. Ökologisch Sozial Basisdemokratisch Gewaltfrei. Wahlplattform zur Bundestagswahl 1980*. [The Greens. Ecological, socially responsible, base-democratic, non-violent. Election platform for federal elections, 1980]. Bonn: Selbstverlag (?).
- Die Grünen (1980d). Protokoll des Gründungsparteitags der Bundespartei “Die Grünen” in Karlsruhe, Stadthalle, am 12. und 13. Januar 1980.
- Die Grünen (1981). *Friedensmanifest*. Verabschiedet von der 4. Ordentlichen Bundesversammlung der Grünen vom 2.- 4.10.1981 in Offenbach. [Peace manifesto adopted by the 4<sup>th</sup> ordinary general assembly of the Greens, Offenbach, 2-4 October 1981]. S.l:s.n.
- Die Grünen (1983a). *Sinnvoll arbeiten – solidarisch leben. Gegen Arbeitslosigkeit und Sozialabbau*. [Work meaningfully – live in solidarity. Against unemployment and the dismantling of the social welfare system]. Bonn: Die Grünen.
- Die Grünen (1983b). *Diesmal Die Grünen. Warum? Ein aufruf zur Bundestagswahl 1983*. [This time the Greens. Why? Federal elections 1983 appeal]. Bonn: Grünen.
- Die Grünen (1983c). *Lässt die Republik erGrünen!* [Make the Republic green! Pamphlet for 6 March 1983 Bundestag election]. Bonn: Die Grünen.
- Die Grünen (1983d). *Auflösung der Militärblöcke – Raus aus der NATO. Erklärung zur Friedenspolitik der Grünen, verabschiedet von der 6. Ordentlichen Bundesversammlung vom 18.-20.11. 1983 in Duisburg*. [Dismantle the military blocs. Get out of NATO. Explanation of the Greens’ peace politics, adopted by the 6th ordinary federal assembly, Duisburg, 18-20.11.1983]. S.l: s.n.
- Die Grünen (1985?). *The programme of the Green Party of the Federal Republic of Germany*. Bonn: Die Grünen. [undated but taken into stock in Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis in 1985]. S.l: s.n.

- Die Grünen (1985). *Regieren? Streit der Strömungen 1984-1989. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Chronik.* Retrieved 9 February 2005 from [http://www.gruene-partei.de/cms/gruene\\_work/rubrik/0/239.198489.htm](http://www.gruene-partei.de/cms/gruene_work/rubrik/0/239.198489.htm) .
- \*Dietz, T., Stern, P.C., & Guagnano, G.A (1998). Social structural and social psychological bases of environmental concern. *Environment & Behavior*, 30, 450-471.
- \*Dinnerstein, D. (1976). *The mermaid and the minotaur: Sexual arrangements and the human malaise.* New York: Harper and Row.
- Dixon, B.A. (1996). The feminist connection between women and animals. *Environmental Ethics*, 18, pp. 181-194.
- \*Dobson, A. (1990). *Green political thought.* London: Unwin.
- Dobson, A. (1993). Afterword. In A. Dobson & P. Lucardie (Eds.), *The politics of nature. Explorations in green political theory* (pp. 229-234). London & New York: Routledge.
- \*Dobson, A. (1995). *Green Political Thought* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). London: Routledge.
- \*Dobson, A. (1998). *Justice and the environment: Conceptions of environmental sustainability and dimensions of social justice.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- \*Dobson, A. (Ed.). (1999). *Fairness and futurity: Essays on environmental sustainability and social justice.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dobson, A. (2000). *Green political thought* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed.). London and New York: Routledge.
- Dobson, A., & Lucardie, P. (Eds.). (1993). *The politics of nature. Explorations in green political theory.* London: Routledge.
- Doherty, B., & de Geus, M. (Eds.). (1996). *Democracy and green political thought. Sustainability, rights and citizenship.* London: Routledge.
- Donovan, J. (1993). Animal rights and feminist theory. In G. Gaard (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, animals, nature* (pp. 167-194). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Donner, W. (1997). Self and community in environmental ethics. In K.J. Warren (Ed.), *Ecofeminism. Women, culture, nature* (pp. 375-389). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- \*Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. (1982). *Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of technological and environmental dangers.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Drew, W. (1972). Killing wilderness. In G. Sessions (Ed.), (1995). *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 113-120). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- \*Drysek, J.S. (1987). *Rational ecology.* Oxford: Blackwell.

- Dryzek, J.S. (1990). Green reason: Communicative ethics for the biosphere. *Environmental Ethics*, 12, 195-210.
- \*Dubos, R. (1972). *A God within*. New York: Scribner.
- \*Dubos, R. (1974). Franciscan conservation versus Benedictine stewardship. In D. Spring & E. Spring (Eds.), *Ecology and religion in history* (pp. 114-136). New York: Harper & Row.
- \*Dunlap, R.E., & Van Liere, K.D. (1978). The “new environmental paradigm”: A proposed measuring instrument and preliminary results. *Journal of environmental education*, 9, 10-19.
- Dunlap, R.E., & Van Liere, K.D. (1984). Commitment to the Dominant Social Paradigm and concern for environmental quality. *Social Science Quarterly*, 65(4), 1013-1028.
- Dunlap, R.E., Van Liere, K.D., Mertig, A.G., & Jones, R.E. (2000). Measuring endorsement of the New Ecological Paradigm: A revised NEP scale. *Journal of Social Issues*, 56(3), pp. 425-442.
- Ebenreck, S. (1983). Discussion papers. A partnership farmland ethic. *Environmental Ethics*, 5, 33-45.
- \*Eckberg, D.L., & Blocker, J.T. (1996). Christianity, environmentalism and the theoretical problem of fundamentalism. *Journal for the scientific study of religion*, 35, 343-355.
- Eckersley, R. (1989). Divining evolution: The ecological ethics of Murray Bookchin. *Environmental Ethics*, 11, 99-116.
- \*Eckersley, R. (1992). *Environmentalism and political theory: Toward an ecocentric approach*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Eckersley, R. (1996). Greening liberal democracy. The rights discourse revisited. In B. Doherty & M. de Geus, M. (1996) (Eds.), *Democracy and green political thought. Sustainability, rights and citizenship* (pp. 212-236). London: Routledge.
- Eisler, R. (1990). The Gaia tradition and the partnership future: An ecofeminist manifesto. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism*, (pp. 23-34). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- \*Elgin, Duane (1981). *Voluntary simplicity*. New York: Morrow.
- Elliot, J.A. (1994). *An introduction to sustainable development: The developing world*. London & New York: Routledge.
- \*El Serafy, S. (1991). The environment as capital. In R. Constanza (Ed.), *Ecological economics* (pp. 168-175). New York: Columbia University Press.
- \*Elton, C. (1927). *Animal ecology*. New York: Macmillan.
- Engel, J.R. (1990). Introduction: The ethics of sustainable development. In J.R. Engel & J.G. Engel (Eds.), *Ethics of environment and development: Global challenge, international response* (pp. 1-23). London: Belhaven Press.

Engel, J.R., & Engel, J.G. (1990). (Eds.). *Ethics of environment and development: Global challenge, international response*. London: Belhaven Press.

*Environmental Ethics*. Albuquerque, New Mexico: John Muir Institute for Environmental Studies and University of Mexico, c. 1979-

European Greens (2004). *Guiding principles*. As agreed upon during the conference at Masala, Finland, June 20th 1993, As updated by the 15th Council, Malta, 2-4 May 2003 and by the 16th Council, Luxembourg, 7-9 November 2000; As confirmed by the 4th Congress, Rome, 20-22 February 2004. Retrieved 6 January 2005 from <http://www.europeangreens.org/info.html> .

European Greens (2006). The Charter of the European Greens. European Green Party Guiding Principles. Adopted at the 2<sup>nd</sup> EGP Congress, Geneva, 13-14 October 2006. Retrieved 21 November 2007 from [http://www.europeangreens.org/cms/default/rubrik/9/9341.the\\_charter\\_of\\_the\\_european\\_greens.htm](http://www.europeangreens.org/cms/default/rubrik/9/9341.the_charter_of_the_european_greens.htm) .

Evans, G.W. (1996). *Current trends in environmental psychology*. [Electronic version]. Retrieved 29 November 2004 from <http://www.ucm.es/info/Psyap/iaap/evans.htm> .

Fabel, A.J. (1994). Environmental ethics and the question of cosmic purpose. *Environmental Ethics*, 16, 303-314.

Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and power*. London: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and social change*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers (Polity Press).

Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical discourse analysis. In T. van Dyk (Ed.), *Discourse as social interaction. Discourse studies: A multidisciplinary introduction*, vol. 2. London: Sage.

Ferris, J. (1993). Ecological versus social rationality. Can there be green social policies? In A. Dobson & P. Lucardie (Eds.), *The politics of nature. Explorations in green political theory* (pp. 145-158). London: Routledge.

Field, T. (1995). Caring relationships with natural and artificial environments. *Environmental Ethics*, 17, 307-320.

\*Fisher, E. (1979). *Woman's creation*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Foreman, D. (1991). The new conservation movement. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 50-56). Boston & London: Shambhala.

Fotopoulos, T. (1993). The transition to the ecological society: An interview [with Murray Bookchin] by Takis Fotopoulos, September 11, 1992. Retrieved 5 October 2006 from <http://www.social-ecology.org/article.php?story=20031118112334543> . [Use <http://www.social-ecology.org> and follow library link, then "Murray Bookchin" if link is not working]. Originally published in *Society and Nature*, 1(3).

\*Fox, W. (1982). The intuition of deep ecology. Paper presented at Environment, ethics and ecology conference, Canberra. [Also published under the title *Deep ecology: A new philosophy of our*

time? *The Ecologist*, 14 (1984), 194-200; also referenced by Devall and Sessions, 1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 216, as “The intuition of deep ecology” (Paper presented at the Ecology & Philosophy conference, Australia National University, September 1983. To appear in *The Ecologist* (England, Fall 1984)]

- Fox, W. (1989). The deep ecology-ecofeminism debate and its parallels. *Environmental Ethics*, 11, 5-25.
- Fox, W. (1989). The deep ecology-ecofeminism debate and its parallels. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 269-289). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Fox, M.T. (1990). A mystical cosmology: Toward a postmodern spirituality. In David R. Griffen (Ed.) (1990), *Sacred Interconnections*, SUNY. Reprinted as Creation spirituality in R.G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong (Eds.) (1998), *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and convergence* (pp. 228-234). Boston: McGrawHill.
- \*Fox, W. (1990). *Towards a transpersonal ecology: Developing new foundations for environmentalism*. Boston: Shambala.
- \*Freire, P. (1972, 1978). *Pedagogy of the oppressed*. New York: Penguin.
- \*French, M. (1985). *Beyond power: Women, men, and morality*. New York: Summit Books.
- \*Friedman, M. (1988). How much is enough?: Lessons from conservation biology. In M. Friedman (Ed.), *Forever wild: Conserving the Greater North Cascades ecosystem* (pages unknown, but include p. 34). Bellingham: Mountain Hemlock Press.
- Friedmann, J.T. (2000). Mapping the Epupa debate: Discourse and representation in a Namibian development project. In G. Miescher & D. Henrichsen (Eds.), *New notes on Kaoko: The northern Kunene Region (Namibia) in texts and photographs* (pp. 222-235). Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien.
- Frodeman, R. (1992). Radical environmentalism and the political roots of postmodernism: Differences that make a difference. *Environmental Ethics*, 14, 307-319.
- \*Fromm, E. (1956). Selfishness, self-love, and self-interest. In Clark E. Moustakas (Ed.), *The Self: Explorations in personal growth*. New York: Harper.
- \*Frye, M. (1983). In and out of harm’s way: Arrogance and love. *The politics of reality. Essays in feminist theory*. New York: The Crossing Press.
- Gaard, G. (1992). (Ed.). *Women, animals, and nature*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- \*Galtung, J. (1978). *Alpha and beta structures in development alternatives*. Collected papers of Johan Galtung. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.
- \*Gardner, G. T. & Stern, P. C. (1996). *Environmental Problems and Human Behavior*. London: Allyn and Bacon.

- Geertz, C. (ca. 1973). Ideology as a cultural system. In C. Geertz, *The interpretation of cultures: selected essays* (pp. 193 – 233). New York: Basic Books.
- \*Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1971). *The entropy law and the economic process*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Gergen, K.J. (1999). *An invitation to social construction*. London: Sage.
- \*Giddens, A. (1990). *The consequences of modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- \*Gifford, R. (1987). *Environmental psychology: Principles and practice*. Massachusetts: Allyn & Bacon.
- Gifford, R. (2007). Environmental psychology and sustainable development: Expansion, maturation, and challenges. *Journal of social issues*, 63(1), 199-212.
- \*Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development*. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.
- Glasser, H. (1997). On Warwick Fox's assessment of deep ecology. *Environmental Ethics*, 19, 69-85.
- \*Glasser, H. (2005). (Ed., with assistance from Alan Drengson, in co-operation with Arne Naess). *The Selected Works of Arne Naess*, Volumes 1-10. The Netherlands: Springer.
- \*Godlovitch, R., Godlovitch, S., & Harris, J. (Eds.). (1971). *Animals, men and morals: An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans*. New York: Taplinger.
- Goff-Yates, A. (2000). Karen Warren and the logic of domination. *Environmental Ethics*, 22, 169-181.
- \*Goldsmith, E. (1972). *Blueprint for survival*. London: Tom Stacey.
- Goldsmith, E. (1992). *The way. An ecological world-view*. London: Rider.
- Golley, F.B (1987). Deep ecology from the perspective of ecological science. *Environmental Ethics*, 9, 45-55.
- Goodin, R.E. (1992). *Green political theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Goodland, R., & Ledec, G. (1998). Reading 60. Neoclassical economics and principles of sustainable development. In R. G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong, S.J. (Eds.), *Environmental ethics: Divergence and convergence* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 553-563). Boston: McGraw Hill.
- \*Goodpaster, K. (1978). On being morally considerable. *Journal of Philosophy*, 75, 308-325.
- Gough, N. (2003). Textwork in educational enquiry: Narrative analysis and critique. A presentation during the Rhodes University Environmental Education Unit Research design decisions course: Practical design decisions focussing on research in the people-environment-education interface, 15-20 September 2003.

- Goulet, D. (1991). Development ethics and ecological wisdom. In J.R. Engel & J.G. Engel (Eds.), *Ethics of environment and development: Global challenge, international response* (pp. 36-49). London: Belhaven Press.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia. (ca 1990). *The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia*. Windhoek: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia (1992). *Namibia's Green Plan (Environment and Development). Namibia's green plan to secure for present and future generations a safe and healthy environment and a prosperous economy*. Windhoek: Ministry of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia. (1993). *Namibia's 12 point plan for integrated and sustainable environmental management*. Windhoek: Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Directorate of Environmental Affairs.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia. (1995). *Namibia's Environmental Assessment Policy*. Windhoek: Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Directorate of Environmental Affairs.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia. (1997). *National policy for sustainable human development*. Windhoek: Office of the President, National Planning Commission.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia. (1998). *White paper on energy policy*. Windhoek: Ministry of Mines and Energy.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia. (ca. 2000). *Biodiversity and development in Namibia. Namibia's ten-year strategic plan of action for sustainable development through biodiversity conservation 2001-2010*. Windhoek: Ministry of Environment and Tourism, National Biodiversity Taskforce.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia. (ca 2001). *Second national development plan (NDP2) 2001/2002 – 2005/2006*. Windhoek: Office of the President, National Planning Commission.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia. (2002a). *Namibia's National Assessment for the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002*. Windhoek: Ministry of Environment and Tourism, Directorate of Environmental Affairs.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia, (2002b). *Population, health and development (Theme 5). A contribution to Vision 2030*. Windhoek: Office of the President, National Planning Commission.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia, (2002c). *Natural resources sector (Theme 6). A contribution to Vision 2030*. Windhoek: Office of the President, National Planning Commission.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia, (2004a). *Namibia Vision 2030. Policy framework for long-term national development. Main document*. Windhoek: Office of the President.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia. (August 2004b). *Millenium Development Goals*. Windhoek: Office of the President, National Planning Commission.
- Government of the Republic of Namibia and the United Nations System in Namibia. (2004c). *United Nations Namibia common country assessment, 2004*. Windhoek: GRN/UN in Namibia.

- Gowdy, J.M. (1994). Progress and environmental sustainability. *Environmental Ethics*, 16, 41-55.
- Gowdy, J.M., & Olsen, P.R. (1994). Discussion papers. Further problems with neoclassical environmental economics. *Environmental Ethics*, 16, 161-171.
- Grafton, R. Q., Pendleton, L. H., & Nelson, H. W. (2001) *A dictionary of environmental economics, science and policy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Grange, J. (1985). Being, feeling, and environment. *Environmental Ethics*, 7, 351-364.
- \*Gray, E.D. (1981) *Green Paradise Lost*. Wellesley: Roundtable Press.
- \*Greeley, A. (1993). Religion and attitudes toward the environment. *Journal for the scientific study of religion*, 32, 19-28.
- Grey, W. (1993). Anthropocentrism and deep ecology. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 71(4), 463-475.
- \*Griffin, S. (1978). *Woman and nature*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Grob, A. (1995). A structural model of environmental attitudes and behaviour. *Journal of environmental psychology*, 15, 209-220.
- Gruen, L. (1993). Dismantling oppression: An analysis of the connection between women and animals. In G. Gaard (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, animals, nature* (pp. 60-90). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Gruen, L. (1997). Revaluing nature. In K. Warren, (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature* (pp. 356-374). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Guelke, J.K. (2004). Looking for Jesus in Christian environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, 26(2), pp. 115-134.
- Guha, R. (1989). Radical American environmentalism and wilderness preservation: A Third World critique. *Environmental Ethics*, 11(1), 71-83.
- Gunn, A.S. (1983). Traditional ethics and the moral status of animals. *Environmental Ethics*, 5, 133-153.
- Haarmann, C., and Haarmann, G. (Eds.) (2005). *The basic income grant in Namibia. Resource book*. Windhoek: Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia.
- \*Hale, M. (1677). *The primitive origination of mankind, considered and examined according to the light of nature*. London: Printed by William Godbid for William Shrowsbery.
- \*Hallen, P. (1995). Making peace with nature: Why ecology needs feminism. In A. Drengson & Y. Inoue (Eds.), *The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology* (pages unknown but include p. 208). Berkeley: North Atlantic Publishers.
- Haralambos, M., & Holborn, M. (2000). *Sociology: Themes and perspectives*. London: HarperCollins.

- \*Haraway, D. (1985). A manifesto for cyborgs: Science, technology and socialist feminism in the 1980s. In L. Nicholson (1990) (Ed.), *Feminism/postmodernism* (pp. 190-233). London: Routledge.
- \*Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledge: The science question in feminism as a site of discourse on the privilege of partial perspective. *Feminist Studies*, 14(3), 575-599.
- \*Harding, S. (1989). Feminism, science and anti-Enlightenment critiques. In L. Nicholson (1990) (Ed.), *Feminism/postmodernism* (pp. 83-107). London: Routledge.
- \*Harding, S. (1991). *Whose science? Whose knowledge? Thinking from women's lives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- \*Harding, S., & Hintikka, M.B. (1983) (Eds.), *Discovering reality: Feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Hargrove, E. (1984). On reading environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, 6, 291-292.
- \*Harrison, R. (1964). *Animal machines: The new factory farming industry*. London: V. Stuart.
- \*Hartsock, N. (1983). The feminist standpoint: Developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism. In S. Harding & M.B. Hintikka (Eds.), *Discovering reality: Feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and philosophy of science* (no pages given). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
- \*Hartsock, N. (1990). Foucault on power: A theory for women? In L. Nicholson (Ed.) (1990), *Feminism/postmodernism* (pp. 157-176). New York: Routledge.
- \*Hartsock, N. (1998). *"The feminist standpoint revisited" and other essays*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview.
- Hattingh, J. (2002). On the imperative of sustainable development: A philosophical and ethical appraisal. In J. Hattingh, H. Lotz-Sisitka, & R. O'Donoghue (Eds.) (2002), *Environmental Education, Ethics and Action in Southern Africa* (pp. 5-16). Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.
- Hayward, T. (1995). *Ecological thought: An introduction*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Henning, D. (2001). The German Greens and the nuclear industry. Retrieved 31 August 2006 from [http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/jun2001/grns-j26\\_prn.shtml](http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/jun2001/grns-j26_prn.shtml)
- Herzberg, G., & Seifert, K. (2000). Rudolf Bahro – eine biographische Skizze. In M. Hosang (Ed.), *Rudolf Bahro. Ein Leben und eine Philosophie für die Zukunft von Mensch und Erde. Texte von und zu ihm zur Ausstellung in der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin aus Anlass seines 65. Geburtstages* [Rudolf Bahro. A life and a philosophy for the future for people and the earth. Texts by and about him for the exhibition in the Humboldt University in Berlin on the occasion of his 65<sup>th</sup> birthday] (pp. 3-9). Berlin: Rudolf-Bahro-Archiv, Universität von Berlin.
- Hettinger, N., & Throop, B. (1999). Refocusing ecocentrism: De-emphasizing stability and defending wildness. *Environmental Ethics*, 21, 3-21.

- Hewstone, M., Stroebe, W., Codol, J-P., & Stephenson, G.M. (1988). *Introduction to social psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hjelle, L.A., & Ziegler, D. J. (1981). *Personality theories: Basic assumptions, research and applications*. Auckland: McGraw-Hill.
- Hodgkinson, S.P., & Innes, J. (2000). The prediction of ecological and environmental belief systems: The differential contributions of social conservatism and beliefs about money. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 20(3), 285-294.
- \*Holland, A. (1999). Sustainability: Should we start from here? In A. Dobson (Ed.), *Fairness and Futurity: Essays on environmental sustainability and social justice* (pp. unknown). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hosang, M. (Ed.). (2000). *Rudolf Bahro. Ein Leben und eine Philosophie für die Zukunft von Mensch und Erde. Texte von und zu ihm zur Ausstellung in der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin aus Anlass seines 65. Geburtstages*, (pp. 23-33). Berlin: Rudolf-Bahro-Archiv, Universität von Berlin.
- Hursthouse, R. (2000). *Ethics, humans and other animals*. London: Routledge.
- \*Hurwicz, E.M. (1986). Review of Deep ecology: Living as if nature mattered, by Bill Devall and George Sessions (Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985). *Ecology Law Quarterly*, 13, 770-771.
- \*Illich, I. (1971). *Deschooling society*. New York: Harper & Row.
- \*Illich, I. (1973). *Tools for conviviality*. New York: Harper & Row.
- \*Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- \*Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- \*Inglehart, R. (1995). Public support for environmental protection: Objective problems and subjective values in 43 societies. *Political Science and Politics*, 15, 57-71.
- \*Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Summary for Policymakers of the Synthesis Report of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report. Draft copy 16 November 2007. - Subject to final copyedit. Retrieved 23 November 2007 from [http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4\\_syr\\_spm.pdf](http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf) .
- IUCN/UNEP/WWF. (1980). *World Conservation Strategy: Living resource conservation for sustainable development*. Gland, Switzerland.
- IUCN/UNEP/WWF (1991). *Caring for the Earth. A strategy for sustainable living*. Gland, Switzerland.

- \*Jacobs, M. (1995). *Reflections on the discourse and politics of sustainable development, Part 1: Faultlines of contestation and the radical model*. Lancaster: Lancaster University Centre for the Study of Environmental Change.
- \*Jaggar, A (1980). *Feminist politics and human nature*. Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld.
- Jaki, S.L. (1974). *Science and creation – from eternal cycles to an oscillating universe*. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press.
- Jauch, H. (2001). *Playing the globalisation game: The implications of economic liberalisation for Namibia*. Windhoek: Labour Resource and Research Institute.
- Jordaan, W.J. (1980). Psychology: Two views of man. In M. Macnamara (Ed.), *World Views* (pp. 135-174). Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Katz, E. (1985). Organism, community, and the “substitution problem”. In D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce (Eds.) (1994), *Environmental ethics and policy book: Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 161-171). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Katz, E. (1994). Judaism and the ecological crisis. In M.E. Tucker & J.A. Grim (Eds.), *Worldviews and ecology: religion, philosophy and the environment* (pp. 55-70). Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Katz, E. (1999). A pragmatic reconsideration of anthropocentrism. *Environmental Ethics*, 21, 377-390.
- Kay, J. (1988). Concepts of nature in the Hebrew Bible. *Environmental Ethics*, 10, 309-327.
- \*Keller, E.F. (1978). Gender and Science. In S. Harding & M.B. Hintikka (Eds.) (1983), *Discovering reality: Feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, methodology, and the philosophy of science* (pp. 187-205). Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Keller, M.L. (1990). The Eleusinian mysteries: ancient nature religion of Demeter and Persephone. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 41-51). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Kelly, P. (1984). *Fighting for hope*. Boston: South End Press.
- Kelly, P. (1997). Women and power. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature* (pp. 112-119). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Kerlinger, F.N. (1986). *Foundations of behavioral research*. Fort Worth: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
- Kheel, M. (1985). The liberation of nature: A circular affair. *Environmental Ethics*, 7, 135-149.
- Kheel, M. (1990). Ecofeminism and deep ecology: Reflections on identity and difference. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 128-137). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Kheel, M. (1993) From heroic to holistic ethics: The ecofeminist challenge. In G. Gaard (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, animals, nature* (pp. 243-272). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

- Ki-Moon, B. (2007). Message [of the Secretary-General] to Session of the UNEP Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum, Nairobi, 5 February 2007. Retrieved February 2007 from <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?ArticleID=5510&DocumentID=500&l=en> [Or go to <http://www.unep.org/> then follow links to News Centre, then Speeches, and then use search engine].
- Kidner, D.W. (1994). Why psychology is mute about the environmental crisis. *Environmental Ethics*, 16, 359-376.
- King, Y. (1990). Healing the wounds: Feminism, ecology, and the nature/culture dualism. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 106-121). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- \*Kingsolver, J.G., & Paine, R.T. (1991). Conversational biology and ecological debate. In L. A. Real & J.H. Brown (Eds.), *Foundations of ecology: Classic papers with commentaries*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Kovel, J. (1993). The marriage of radical ecologies. In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 406-417). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Kubiak, W.D. (1999). *The Nancho consultations. Verbatim excerpts* [from an interview with Arne Naess while on a lecture tour in 1999 in Japan]. Retrieved 1 April 2005 from <http://www.nancho.net/advisors/anaes.html> .
- \*Kuhn, T. (1970). *The structure of scientific revolutions* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kurth-Schai, R. (1997). Ecofeminism and children. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature* (pp. 193-212). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Lahar, S. (1996). Ecofeminist theory and grassroots politics. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. 1-18). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- \*Laing, R.D., & Esterson, A. (1964). *Sanity, madness, and the family*. London: Tavistock.
- \*Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lal, V. (2000). Gandhi and the ecological vision of life: Thinking beyond Deep Ecology. *Environmental Ethics*, 22, 149-168.
- Langlais, R. (1991). Living in the world: Mountain humility, great humility. In G. Sessions (Ed.), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 195-203). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- \*Lee, D.C. (1980). On the Marxian view of the relationship between Man and Nature. *Environmental Ethics*, 2, 3-16.
- Lee, K. (1993) To de-industrialize – is it so irrational? In A. Dobson & P. Lucardie (Eds.), *The politics of nature: explorations in green political theory* (pp. 105-117). London: Routledge.

- Lemon, M.C. (2003). *Philosophy of history: A guide for students*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Lemons, J. (1981). Cooperation and stability as a basis for environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, 3, 219-230.
- Leopold, A. (1949; republished 1966). *A Sand County almanac and sketches here and there*. London: Oxford University Press.
- \*Lerner, G. (1986). *The creation of patriarchy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- \*Lewis, C. (1993). Telling stories about the Future: Environmental history and apocalyptic science. *Environmental History Review*, 17(3), 43-60.
- Li, H. (1993). A cross-cultural critique of ecofeminism. In G. Gaard (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, animals, nature* (pp. 272-294). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Linzey, A. (1990). For God so loved the world. In D. VanDeVeer, & C. Pierce (Eds.) (1994), *Environmental Ethics and policy book: Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 52-55). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing. [Originally published in *Between the species*, 6(1), pp. 12-16].
- Loftin, R.W. (1992). Scientific collecting. *Environmental Ethics*, 14, 253-264.
- Lovejoy, A.O. (1936 reprinted 1960). *The great chain of being: A study of the history of an idea*. New York: Harper & Row.
- \*Lovelock, J.E. (1979). *Gaia: A new look at life on earth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lucardie, P. (1993). Introduction. In A. Dobson & P. Lucardie (Eds.), *The politics of nature. Explorations in green political theory* (pp. x-xv). London: Routledge.
- Lucardie, P. (1993). Why would egocentrists become ecocentrists? On individualism and holism in green political theory. In A. Dobson & P. Lucardie (Eds.), *The politics of nature. Explorations in green political theory* (pp. 21-35). London: Routledge.
- Macnamara, M. (Ed.). (1980). A theory of world pictures. In M. Macnamara (Ed.), *World Views* (pp. 16-40). Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Maddi, S.R. (1989). *Personality theories. A comparative analysis*. Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole.
- \*Marcuse, H. (©1964) *One dimensional man: Studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Maren-Grisebach, M. (1982). Geschichte und Staat. *Philosophie der Grünen*. Kritisches Forum, Band 267. [Philosophy of The Greens. History and state. Critical Forum, volume 267.] München: Günther Olzong Verlag.
- \*Martinez-Alier, J. (1991). Environmental policy and distributional conflicts. In R. Costanza (Ed.), *Ecological economics. The science and management of sustainability* (pp. 118-136). New York: Columbia University Press.

- Martinez-Alier, J., with K. Schlüpmann. (1987). *Ecological economics. Energy, environment and society*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Martinussen, J. (1997). *Society, state and market: A guide to competing theories of development*. London: Zed Books.
- Matthews, F. (1996). (Ed.). *Ecology and democracy*. London: Frank Cass.
- McCullers, C. (ca. 1960s). *A tree. A rock. A cloud*. Full text retrievable on 27 November 2007 from [http://www.osu.cz/ffi/kaa/dokumenty/kolar/tree\\_rock\\_cloud.htm](http://www.osu.cz/ffi/kaa/dokumenty/kolar/tree_rock_cloud.htm), also available at Literature online. Cambridge: Proquest Information and Learning, 2002.  
[http://libaccess.mcmaster.ca/login?url=http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx\\_ver=Z39.88-2003&xri:pqil:res\\_ver=0.2&res\\_id=xri:lion-us&rft\\_id=xri:lion:ft:ref:EALKN031:0](http://libaccess.mcmaster.ca/login?url=http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2003&xri:pqil:res_ver=0.2&res_id=xri:lion-us&rft_id=xri:lion:ft:ref:EALKN031:0).
- McDaniel, J. (1983). Physical matter as creative and sentient. *Environmental Ethics*, 5, 291-317.
- McDaniel, J. (1994). The garden of Eden, the fall, and life in Christ: A Christian approach to ecology. In M. E. Tucker & J.A. Grim (Eds.), *Worldviews and ecology: Religion, philosophy and the environment* (pp. 71-82). Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- McLaughlin, A. (1993). The heart of deep ecology. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 85-93). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- McLaughlin, J. (2003). *Feminist social and political theory. Contemporary debates and dialogues*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McShane, K. (2004). Ecosystem health. *Environmental Ethics*, 26(3), 227-245.
- \*Meadows, D.H., Meadows, D.L., Randers, J., & Behrens III, W.W. (1972). *The limits to growth*. New York: Universe Books.
- \*Merchant, C. (1980). *The death of nature*. San Francisco, Harper & Row.
- \*Merchant, C. (1983). Mining the Earth's womb. In J. Rothschild (Ed.), *Machina ex dea: Feminist perspectives on technology* (pages unknown, but include p. 100). New York: Pergamon Press.
- Merchant, C. (1990a). Ecofeminism and feminist theory. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 100-105). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Merchant, C. (1990b). Environmental ethics and political conflict: A view from California. *Environmental Ethics*, 12, 45-68.
- Metzner, R. (1994). The emerging ecological worldview. In M.E Tucker & J.A. Grim (Eds.), *Worldviews and ecology: Religion, philosophy and the environment* (pp. 163-172). Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Meyer, W.F., Moore, C., & Viljoen, H.G. (1989). *Personality theories – from Freud to Frankl*. Isando: Lexicon.

- \*Meyerding, J. (1982 November-December). Feminist criticism and cultural imperialism (Where does one end and the other begin). *Animals' Agenda*, 2, 22-23.
- \*Michael, D., & Anderson, W.T. (1987 November). Now that progress no longer unites us. *New Options*, 33, pages unknown.
- Microsoft (R) Encarta. Copyright (c) 1994 Microsoft Corporation. Copyright (c) 1994 Funk & Wagnall's Corporation). [Electronic version]. Entries on "Comte, August", "Economics", "Jevons", "William Stanley", "Schweitzer, Albert".
- \*Midgley M. (1978). *Beast and man: The roots of human nature*. Ithaca N.Y: Cornell University.
- \*Midgley M. (1984). *Animals and why they matter*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Midgley M. (1997). Sustainability and moral pluralism. In T.D.J. Chappell, *The philosophy of the environment*, (pp. 89-101). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Mies, M., & Shiva, V. (1998). Reading 52. Introduction to ecofeminism. In R. G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong, (Eds.), *Environmental ethics: Divergence and convergence* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 480-489). Boston: McGraw Hill.
- \*Miescher, G., & Henrichsen, D. (Eds.). *New notes on Kaoko: The northern Kunene Region (Namibia) in texts and photographs*. Basel: Basler Afrika Bibliographien.
- \*Milbrath, L.W. (1984). *Environmentalists: Vanguard for a new society*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press.
- \*Mill, J.S. (1852). *Principles of political economy*. London: Parker (1848).
- \*Mills, C.W. (1939). Language, logic and culture. In *Power, politics and people*. London & New York: Oxford University Press. [also available in Mills, C.W. (1963). *Power, politics and people. The collected essays of C. Wright Mills*. New York: Oxford University Press].
- Mizzoni, J. (2004). St Francis, Paul Taylor, and Franciscan biocentrism. *Environmental Ethics*, 26, 41-56.
- \*Mochelle, R. (1986). Future choice - An environment design approach. *Curriculum Perspectives*, 6(2), 52.
- Moore, R.J. (1990). A new Christian reformation. In J. R. Engel & J. G. Engel (Eds.), *Ethics of environment and development* (pp. 104-113). Tucson: The University of Arizona Press.
- Morley, D. (1980). *The Nationwide audience: Structure and decoding*. BFI [British Film Institute] Television Monograph 11. London: British Film Institute.
- \*Mumford, L. (1966). *The myth of the machine*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- \*Murdoch, I. (1970). *The sovereignty of good*. London: Cox and Wyman.

- \*Mylenbusch, H. (1979). Appropriate technology – fashionable term, practical necessity, or new social philosophy? *Development and Co-operation*, 3, pages unknown but include p.18.
- Naess, A. (1973a). The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement. A summary. *Inquiry*, 16, 95-100.
- Naess, A. (1973b). The place of joy in a world of fact. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 249-258). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- \*Naess, A. (1974). *Gandhi and group conflict*. Oslo: Universitets-forlaget.
- Naess, A. (1979). Self-realization in mixed communities of humans, bears, sheep, and wolves. *Inquiry*, 22(1-2), 231-241.
- Naess, A. (1982a). Simple in means, rich in ends. An interview with Arne Naess [by] Stephan Bodian. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 26-36). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1982b). [Interview with Arne Naess. 1982]. In B. Devall & G. Sessions (1985). *Deep ecology: Living as if nature mattered* (pp. 74-76). Layton: Peregrine Smith Books. Reprinted in D. VanDeVeer, & C. Pierce, (Eds.), *The environmental ethics and policy book. Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 220-222). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Naess, A. (1984a). Deep ecology and lifestyle. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 259-261). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1984b). A defence of the deep ecology movement. *Environmental Ethics*, 6, 265-70.
- Naess, A. (1986a). The deep ecological movement. Some philosophical aspects. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 64-84). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1986b). Self-realization. An ecological approach to being in the world. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 225-239). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1988). Self realization: An ecological approach to being in the world. In J. Seed, J. Macy, P. Fleming, & A. Naess (1988). *Thinking like a mountain: Towards a council of all beings* (pp. 19-30). Reproduced in D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce (1994) (Eds.), *The environmental ethics and policy book* (pp. 222-226). Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Naess, A. (1989a). *Ecology, community and lifestyle. Outline of an ecosophy*. (D. Rothenberg, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Naess, A. (1989b). Ecosophy and Gestalt ontology. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 240-245). Boston & London: Shambhala.

- Naess, A. (1990). Sustainable development and deep ecology. In J.R. Engel & J.G. Engel, (Eds.), *Ethics of environment and development: Global challenge, international response* (pp. 87-96). London: Belhaven Press.
- Naess, A. (1991). Politics and the ecological crisis: An introductory note. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 445-453). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1992, revised 1993). Deep ecology for the twenty-second century. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 463-467). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1993a). The deep ecology “eight points” revisited. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 213-221). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1993b). Equality, sameness, and rights. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 222-224). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- \*Naess, A (1993c). Identification as a source of deep ecological attitudes. In P.C. List (Ed.), *Radical Environmentalism: Philosophy and tactics* (pages unknown). Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Naess, A. (1995a). Deepness of questions and the deep ecology movement. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 204-212). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1995b). Equality, sameness, and rights. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 222-224). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1995c). The Third World, wilderness, and deep ecology. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 397-407). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Naess, A. (1999). *The Nancho consultations. Verbatim excerpts*. [Interview of Arne Naess by David Kubiak] Retrieved 1 April 2005 from [http:// www.nancho.net/advisors/anaes.html](http://www.nancho.net/advisors/anaes.html) .
- \*Narayan, U. (1988 Summer). Working together across difference: Some considerations on emotions and political practice. *Hypatia*, 3, 31-47.
- \*Nash, R. (1989). *The rights of nature: A history of environmental ethics*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Neefjes, K. (2000). *Environments and livelihoods: Strategies for sustainability*. Oxford: Oxfam.
- Nees, D., Green, V.E., Treadway, K, Lafferty, J., Vanyo, M, Date, P., & Sprinkle, R.H. (2003). Activism, objectivism, and environmental politics. *Environmental Ethics*, 25, 295-312.
- Nelson, L. (1990). The place of women in polluted places. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world* (pp. 173-188). San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.

- Nilsson, A., von Borgstede, C., & Biel, A. (2004). *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 24(3), 267-277.
- \*Noddings, N. (1984). *Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- \*Noddings, N. (1991). Comment on Donovan's 'Animal rights and feminist theory', *Signs*, 16, (pages unknown but include p. 420).
- Nordlund, A.M., & Garvill, J. (2003). Effects of values, problem awareness, and personal norm on willingness to reduce personal car use. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 23, 339-347.
- Norton, B.G. (1982a). Environmental ethics and nonhuman rights. *Environmental Ethics*, 4, 17-36.
- Norton, B.G. (1982b). Environmental ethics and the rights of future generations. *Environmental Ethics*, 4, 319-337.
- Norton, B.G. (1984). Environmental ethics and weak anthropocentrism. *Environmental Ethics*, 6, 131-148.
- Norton, B.G. (1986). Conservation and preservation: a conceptual rehabilitation. *Environmental Ethics*, 8, 195-220.
- \*Norton, B. G. (1991). *Toward unity among environmentalists*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norton, B.G. (1997). Convergence and contextualism: Some clarifications and a reply to Steverson. *Environmental Ethics*, 19, 87-100.
- O'Connor, W.A., & Lubin, B. (1984). (Eds.). *Ecological approaches to clinical and community psychology*. New York: John Wiley.
- \*Odum, E. (1971). *Fundamentals of ecology*. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders.
- \*Oksanen, M. (1997). The moral value of biodiversity. *Ambio*, 26, 541-545.
- \*O'Neill, J. (1993). *Ecology, policy and politics: Human well-being and the natural world*. London: Routledge.
- O'Neil, R. (2000). Animal liberation versus environmentalism: The care solution. *Environmental Ethics*, 22, 183-190.
- \*Ophuls, W. (1977). *Ecology and the politics of scarcity*. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman.
- O'Riordan, T. (1981). *Environmentalism* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). London: Pion.
- Orsini, G.N. (2003). Organicism. In *Dictionary of the history of ideas*. Retrieved May 2005 from The Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/> .

- Oskamp, S. (2000a). Psychological contributions to achieving an ecologically sustainable future for humanity. *Journal of social issues*, 56(3), 373-390.
- \*Oskamp, S. (2000b). A sustainable future for humanity. How can psychology help? *American Psychologist*, 55, 496-508.
- Owen, D.F. (1980). *What is ecology?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- \*Pardo, A. (1975). *The common heritage: Selected papers on ocean and world order: 1967-74*. Malta: University of Malta Press.
- Parker, I. (1992). *Discourse dynamics: Critical analysis for social and individual psychology*. London: Routledge.
- Parkin, S. (1994). *The life and death of Petra Kelly*. London: Pandora.
- \*Parsons, H. (1977). *Marx and Engels on ecology*. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- \*Passmore, J. (1974). *Man's responsibility for nature: Ecological problems and western traditions*. New York: Scribner.
- \*Passmore, J. (1975). Attitudes toward Nature. In R.S. Peters (Ed.), *Nature and conduct* (pp. 251-264). Royal Institute of Society Lectures, vol. 8. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- \*Pearce, D., Markandya, A., & Barbier, E.B. (1989). *Blueprint for a green economy*. London: Earthscan.
- \*Pickett, S.T., & Ostfeld, R.S. (1995). The shifting paradigm in ecology. In R.L. Knight & S.F. Bates (Eds.), *A new century for natural resources management*. Washington: Island Press.
- \*Pinchot, G. (1901). *The Fight for Conservation*. Garden City, New York: Harcourt Brace.
- \*Pinchot, G. (1914). *The training of a forester*. Philadelphia: Lippencott.
- \*Pinchot, G. (1947). *Breaking new ground*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- \*Pirages, D.C. (1977). Introduction: A social design for sustainable growth. In D.C. Pirages (Ed.), *The sustainable society* (pp. 1-13). New York: Praeger.
- \*Pitkin, H.F. (1984). *Fortune is a woman: Gender and politics in the thought of Niccolo Machiavelli*. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- \*Plant, J. (Ed.). (1989). *Healing the wounds: The promise of ecofeminism*. Philadelphia: New Society.
- Plant, J. (1990). Searching for common ground: Ecofeminism and bioregionalism. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world* (pp. 155-161). San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
- \*Plumwood, V. (1991). Nature, self, and gender: Feminism, environmental philosophy, and the critique of rationalism. *Hypatia*, 6(1), 3-27.

- Plumwood, V. (1991a). Discussion papers. Ethics and instrumentalism: A response to Janna Thompson. *Environmental Ethics*, 13, 139-149.
- Plumwood, V. (1991b). Nature, self, and gender: Feminism, environmental philosophy, and the critique of rationalism. In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicot, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren and J. Clark. (Eds.) (1993), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 284-309). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Plumwood, V. (1991c). Nature, self, and gender: Feminism, environmental philosophy, and the critique of rationalism. In K. Warren (1996) (Ed.), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. 155-180). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Plumwood, V. (1997). Androcentrism and anthropocentrism. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature* (pp. 327-355). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Porritt, J. (1984). *Seeing green. The politics of ecology explained*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). *Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour*. London: Sage Publications.
- Powers, P. (2001). *The methodology of discourse analysis*. London: Jones and Bartlett.
- Proshansky, H.M. (1991). The field of environmental psychology: Securing its future. In D. Stokols & I. Altman (Eds.), *Handbook of environmental psychology*, Vol. 2 (pp. 1489-1510). New York: John Wiley.
- Quarrie, J. (Ed). (1992). *Earth Summit '92. The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Rio de Janeiro 1992*. London: The Regency Press.
- Quinby, L. (1990). Ecofeminism and the politics of resistance. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein, (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 122-127). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Rapoport, R. N. (1993). Environmental values and the search for a global ethic. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 13, 173-182.
- Rappaport, J. (1987). Terms of empowerment/exemplars of prevention: Toward a theory for community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 15(2), 121-147.
- Rappaport, J. (ca. 1990). Research methods and the empowerment social agenda. In P. Tolan, C. Keys, F. Chertok & L. Jason (Eds.), *Researching community psychology: Issues of theory and methods*. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
- \*Read, H. (1954; 1971). The philosophy of anarchism. In *Anarchy and order: Essays in politics* (pp. unknown but include p. 37). Boston: Beacon Press.
- Regan, T. (1980). Animal rights, human wrongs. *Environmental Ethics*, 2(2), 99-120. Reprinted in M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark (1993) (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 33-48). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

- Regan, T. (1981). The nature and possibility of an environmental ethic. *Environmental Ethics*, 3, 19-34.
- Regan, T. (1983). Reading 39. Extracts from The case for animal rights. In R.G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong (1998). *Environmental ethics. Divergence and convergence*. (pp. 351-359). Boston: McGrawHill.
- Regan, T. (1985). The case for animal rights. In P. Singer (Ed.), *In defence of animals* (pp. 13-26). Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Reprinted in D. Van deVeer & C. Pierce, *The environmental ethics and policy book. Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp.77-84). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.
- \*Regan, T. (1986). *The case for animal rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- \*Reich, C. (1971). *The greening of America*. London: Allen Lane.
- Relph, E. (1976). *Place and placelessness*. London: Pion.
- Reser, J.P. (1995). Whither environmental psychology? The transpersonal ecopsychology crossroads. *Journal of environmental psychology*, 15, 235-257.
- \*Roach, R. (1996). Loving your mother. In K. Warren (Ed.) (1996), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. 52-65). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Rodman, J. (1977). The liberation of nature? *Inquiry*, 20, 83-131.
- Rodman, J. (1983). Four forms of ecological consciousness reconsidered. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 121-130). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- \*Rolston, Holmes III. (1975). Is there an ecological ethic? *Ethics*, 92, 93-109.
- \*Roszak, T. (1969). *The making of a counterculture*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- \*Roszak, T. (1972). *Where the wasteland ends: politics and transcendence in postindustrial society*. Garden City N.Y.:Doubleday.
- \*Roszak, T. (1978). *Person/planet: the creative disintegration of industrial society*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday.
- \*Roszak, T. (1992). *The voice of the Earth: An exploration of ecopsychology*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Routley (later Sylvan), R. (1973). Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? [Paper presented at the 15<sup>th</sup> World Congress of Philosophy in Varna, Bulgaria]. Reproduced in M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicot, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark, J. (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 12-21). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Routley (later Plumwood), V. (1981). On Karl Marx as an environmental hero. *Environmental Ethics*, 3, 237-244.

- \*Rudhyar, D. (1970). *The Planetarization of Consciousness. From the Individual to the Whole*. The Netherlands: Servire/Wassenaar.
- \*Rudhyar, D. (1971). *Directives for new life*. San Francisco: Ecology Center Press.
- \*Ruether, R.R. (1975). *New woman/new earth: Sexist ideologies and human liberation*. New York: The Seabury Press.
- \*Ruether, R. (1983). *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward feminist theology*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- \*Sachs, I. (1974). Ecodevelopment. *Ceres*, 17(4), pp. unknown.
- Sachs, W. (1995). Global ecology and the shadow of 'development'. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 428-444). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sagoff, M. (1985). Fact and value in ecological science. *Environmental Ethics*, 7, 99-116.
- Sagoff, M. (1986). Process or product? Ethical priorities in environmental management. *Environmental Ethics*, 8, 121-138.
- Sagoff, M. (1993). Animal liberation and environmental ethics: bad marriage, quick divorce. In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren and J. Clark (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 84-94). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Sagoff, M. (1998). Reading 59. Free-market versus libertarian environmentalism. In R. G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong (Eds.), *Environmental ethics: Divergence and convergence* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 540-553). Boston: McGraw Hill.
- \*Sale, K. (1985). *Dwellers in the land. The bioregional vision*. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
- Salleh, A. (1984). Deeper than deep ecology: The ecofeminist connection. *Environmental Ethics* 6, 339-345.
- Salleh, A. (1992). The ecofeminism/deep ecology debate: A reply to patriarchal reason. *Environmental Ethics*, 14, 195-216.
- Salleh, A. (1993). Class, race, and gender discourse in the ecofeminism/deep ecology debate. *Environmental Ethics*, 15, 225-244.
- \*Sampson, E.E. (1977). Psychology and the American ideal. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35, 767-782.
- Sampson, E.E. (1988). The debate on individualism. Indigenous psychologies of the individual and their role in personal and societal functioning. *American Psychologist*, 43(1), 15-22.
- \*Sampson, E.E. (1990). Social psychology and social control. In I. Parker & J. Shotter (Eds.), *Deconstructing social psychology* (pp. unknown). London: Routledge.

- Sandford, J. (1986a). Introduction. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.) (1986), *Building the Green movement* (pp. 7-10). London: Heretic Books.
- Sandford, J. (1986b). Notes. In R. Bahro (M. Tyler, Trans.) (1986), *Building the Green movement* (pp. 213-219). London: Heretic Books.
- \*Santmire, H.P. (1985). *The travail of nature: The ambiguous ecological promise of Christian theology*. Philadelphia: Fortress press.
- Sayer, A. (2000). *Realism and social science*. London: Sage.
- Schultz, P.W. (2000). Empathizing with nature: The effects of perspective-taking on concern for environmental issues. *Journal of social issues*, 56(3), 391-406.
- Schumacher, E.F. (1974). *Small is beautiful. A study of economics as if people mattered*. London: Abacus.
- Schutte, A. (1993). *Philosophy for Africa*. Cape Town: UCT Press.
- \*Schweitzer, A. (1950). *The philosophy of civilization*. New York: Macmillan.
- Searight, H.R., & Openlander, P. (1987). The new epistemology: clarification and clinical application. *Journal of strategic and systemic theories*, 6(1), 52-56.
- \*Seed, J., Fleming, P., Macy, J., & Naess, A. (1988). *Thinking like a mountain: Towards a council of all beings*. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers.
- \*Seers, D. (1972). What are we trying to measure? *Journal of development studies*. April, pp. unknown.
- \*Sen, A. (1985). *Commodities and capabilities*. Amsterdam: North Holland.
- Sessions, G. (1987). The deep ecology movement: A review. *Environmental Review*, 105-125.
- Sessions, G. (1992). Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 356-375). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sessions, G. (1994). Deep ecology as worldview. In M.E. Tucker & J.A. Grim (Eds.), *Worldviews and ecology: Religion, philosophy and the environment* (pp. 207-227). Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Sessions, G. (Ed.) (1995). *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism*. Boston: Shambhala.
- Sessions, G. (1995a). Preface. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. ix-xxvii). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sessions, G. (1995b). What is deep ecology? Introduction. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 3-7). Boston & London: Shambhala.

- Sessions, G. (1995c). Historical roots of deep ecology. Introduction. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 97-103). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sessions, G. (1995d). Ecocentrism and the anthropocentric detour. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 156-183). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sessions, G. (1995e). Arne Naess on deep ecology and ecosophy. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 187-194). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sessions, G. (1995f). Deep ecology and ecofeminism, social ecology, the Greens, and the New Age. Introduction [to Part Four]. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 265-268). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sessions, G. (1995g). Deep ecology and the New Age movement. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 290-310). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sessions, G. (1995h). Wilderness, the wild, and conservation biology. Introduction. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 323-330). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sessions, G. (1995i). Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 356-375). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sessions, R. (1996). Deep ecology versus ecofeminism: Healthy differences or incompatible philosophies? In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. 137-154). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- \*Shepard, P. (1969). Introduction: Ecology and Man - a Viewpoint. In Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley (Eds.), *The Subversive Science: Essays Toward an Ecology of Man* (pp. 1-10). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Shindondola, H., & Jauch, H. (2003). Ramatex: On the other side of the fence. Windhoek: Labour Resource and Research Institute (LaRRI).
- \*Shiva, V. (1988). *Staying alive: Women, ecology and development*. London: Zed Books.
- Shiva, V. (1990). Development as a new project of western patriarchy. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world* (pp. 189-200). San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
- \*Simon, H.A. (1964). Rationality. In J. Gould & W. L. Kolb (Eds.), *A dictionary of the social sciences*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
- Simon, T.W. (1990). Varieties of ecological dialectics. *Environmental Ethics*, 12, 211-231.

- \*Singer, P. (1973a). Review essay on R. Godlovitch, S. Godlovitch., & J. Harris. (Eds.) (1971). *Animals, men and morals: An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans*, New York: Taplinger. *The New York Review of Books*, 5 April 1973.
- Singer, P. (1973b). Animal liberation. Reprinted from *The New York Review of Books*, 5 April 1973, in M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark, J. (1993) (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 22-32). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- \*Singer, P. (1975). *Animal liberation: A new ethics for our treatment of animals*. New York: Random House.
- Singer, P. (1979). Reading 40. Equality for animals? [Extracts from his *Practical ethics*, 1979, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 48-54, 60-62, 68-71]. In R.G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong, *Environmental ethics. Divergence and convergence* (pp. 359-366). Boston: McGrawHill.
- Singer, P. (1993). *Practical ethics* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5, reprinted in R. Hursthouse (2000). *Ethics, humans and other animals* (pp. 169-177). London: Routledge.
- \*Singer, P., & Regan, T. (1985). *The dog in the lifeboat: An exchange*. *New York Review of Books*, 25 April 1985.
- Slicer, D. (1996). Your daughter or your dog? A feminist assessment of the animal research issue. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. 97-113). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Smith, P. (1997). *What are they saying about environmental ethics?* New York: Paulist Press.
- Snyder, G. (1974). Four changes. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 141-150). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Sommer, R. (1991). Dreams, reality, and the future of environmental psychology. In D. Stokols & I. Altman (Eds.), *Handbook of environmental psychology*, Vol. 2 (pp. 1489-1510). New York: John Wiley.
- Soper, K. (1994). Obituaries/Profiles. E.P. Thompson, 1924-1993. In *Radical philosophy*, Spring 1994, retrieved 20 September 2006 from <http://www.radicalphilosophy.com> .
- \*Soulé, M. (1985). What is conservation biology. *Bioscience*, 35, 727-734.
- \*Soulé, M. (1995). The social siege of nature. In M. Soulé, & G. Lease (Eds.), *Reinventing nature? Responses to postmodern deconstruction* (pages unknown, but include p. 138).
- \*Spender, D (1982). *Women of ideas and what men have done to them*. London: Routledge.
- \*Spretnak, C. (Ed.) (1982). *The politics of women's spirituality*. Essays on the rise of spiritual power within the feminist movement. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books.

- \*Spretnak, C. (1989). Naming the cultural forces that push us towards war. In D. E. Russell (Ed.), *Exposing nuclear phallacies* (pp. 127-159). New York: Pergamon.
- Spretnak, C. (1990). Ecofeminism: Our roots and flowering. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 3-14). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Spretnak, C. (1993). Critical and constructive contributions of ecofeminism. In M.E Tucker & J.A. Grim, J.A. (Eds.), *Worldviews and ecology: Religion, philosophy and the environment* (pp. 181-189). Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Spretnak, C. (1997). Radical nonduality in ecofeminist philosophy. In Warren, K. (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature* (pp. 425-436). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- \*Stanley, A. (1983). Women hold up two-thirds of the sky: Notes for a revised history of technology. In J. Rothschild (Ed.), *Machina ex dea: Feminist perspectives on technology*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Starhawk (1990). Power, authority, and mystery: Ecofeminism and Earth-based spirituality. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 73-86). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Steffen, L.H. (1992). In defense of dominion. *Environmental Ethics*, 14, 63-80.
- Stenmark, M. (2002). The relevance of environmental ethical theories for policy making. *Environmental Ethics*, 24, 135-148.
- Sterling, S.R (1990). Towards an ecological worldview. In J.R. Engel & J.G. Engel (Eds.), *Ethics of environment and development: Global challenge, international response* (pp. 77-86). London: Belhaven Press.
- Stern, N. (2006). Stern review on the economics of climate change. Final report to the [UK] Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 30 October 2006. Retrieved 30 December 2006 from [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent\\_reviews/stern\\_review\\_economics\\_climate\\_change/sternreview\\_index.cfm](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm)); also <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6098362.stm> retrieved 30 October 2006).
- Stern, P.C. (2000). Toward a coherent theory of environmentally significant behavior. *Journal of social issues*, 56(3), 407-424.
- \*Stern, P.C., & Dietz, T. (1994). The value basis of environmental concern. *Journal of social issues*, 50(3), 65-84.
- Stern, P.C, Dietz, T., Abel, T., Guagnano, G.A., & Kalof, L. (1999). A value-belief-norm theory of support for social movements: The case of environmental concern. *Human Ecology Review*, 6(2), 81-97.
- Stevenson, L.F. (1998). Is scientific research value-neutral? In R.G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong (1998) (Eds.), *Environmental Ethics: Divergence and convergence*, (pp. 24-31). Boston: McGrawHill.
- Steverson, B.K. (1994). Ecocentrism and ecological modelling. *Environmental Ethics*, 16, 71-88.

- Stone, C.D. (1972). Reading 62. Should trees have standing? In R.G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong, *Environmental Ethics. Divergence and convergence* (pp. 571-580). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Stone, C.D. (1974). Should trees have standing? – Towards legal rights for natural objects (pp. 3-18, 24, 27-33, 45-46, 48-54). Portola Valley: Tioga Publishing Company. In D. VanDeVeer & C.Pierce (Eds.) (1994), *Environmental ethics and policy book: Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 112-124). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- \*Stone, C. (1975). *Should trees have standing?: Toward legal rights for natural objects*. Special review edition. New York: Avon Books.
- Swaminathan, M.S. (1990). Foreword. In J.R. Engel & J.G. Engel (Eds.), *Ethics of environment and development: Global challenge, international response* (pp. xii-xiii). London: Belhaven Press.
- Swimme, B. (1990). How to heal a lobotomy. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world: The emergence of ecofeminism* (pp. 15-22). San Francisco: Sierra Book Club.
- Sylvan, R. (1973). Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicott, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark, J. (1993) (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. 12-21). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Sylvan, R. (1985a). A critique of deep ecology. Part 1. *Radical Philosophy*, 40, 2-12.
- Sylvan, R. (1985b). A critique of deep ecology: Part II. *Radical Philosophy*, 41, 10-22.
- \*Tansley, A.G. (1935). The use and abuse of vegetational concepts and terms. *Ecology*, 16, 292-303.
- Tarr, J. (2000). *Issues and threats to sustainable development in Namibia*. [Windhoek]: Government of the Republic of Namibia, Ministry of Environment and Tourism.
- Tarr, P.W. (June 2007 in preparation). *Prospecting and Mining in the Skeleton Coast Park. An assessment of issues and options relating to impacts and management*. Windhoek.
- Taylor, D.E. (1997). Women of color, environmental justice, and ecofeminism. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature* (pp. 38-81). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Taylor, P.W. (1981). The ethics of respect for nature. *Environmental Ethics*, 3, 197-218.
- Taylor, P.W. (1986). *Respect for nature: A theory of environmental ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- The Namibian. 1985 - Windhoek, Namibia. Printed by Free Press Printers.
- Thomas, E.K. (2005). *Political empowerment of women in Namibia since Independence*. Unpublished Master in Public Policy and Administration thesis. University of Namibia, Windhoek, & Institute of Social Studies, The Hague.
- Thomas, J.W. (1998). Reading 5. Integrity as professionalism: Ethics and leadership in practice. In R. G. Botzler & S.J. Armstrong, S.J. (Eds.), *Environmental ethics: Divergence and convergence* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 42-48). Boston: McGraw Hill.

- \*Thomas, O. (1966). *Walden and civil disobedience*. New York: Norton.
- Thompson, J. (1990). Discussion papers. A refutation of environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, 12, 147-160.
- Thompson, J. (1995). Aesthetics and the value of nature. *Environmental ethics*, 17, 291-305.
- Thompson, S.C., & Barton, M.A. (1994). Ecocentric and anthropocentric attitudes toward the environment. *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 14, 149-157.
- Tokar, B. (2006). *Murray Bookchin tribute. Murray Bookchin, visionary social theorist, dies at 85*. Retrieved October 2006 from Institute of Social Ecology website <http://www.social-ecology.org> [follow Bookchin tribute link].
- Tolman, C. (1981). Karl Marx, alienation, and the mastery of nature. *Environmental Ethics*, 3, 63-74.
- \*Toulmin, S. (1990). *Cosmopolis: The hidden agenda of modernity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tucker, M.E., & Grim, J.A. (1994). (Eds.). *Worldviews and ecology: Religion, philosophy and the environment*. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.
- Turner, J. (1991). 'In wildness is the preservation of the world'. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1995), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 331-338). Boston & London: Shambhala.
- Uiterkamp, A.J., & Vlek, C. (2007). Practice and outcomes of multidisciplinary research for environmental sustainability. *Journal of environmental psychology*, 63(1), 175-197.
- United Nations (1993). *Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting. Handbook of national accounting. Studies in methods, No. 57*. Sales No. E.91.xvII.18.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and United Nations Environment Programme. Studies in Methods. (2000). Series F. No. 78. Handbook of National Accounting. *Integrated environmental and economic accounting: an operational manual*. New York: United Nations.
- University of Namibia. (2007a). [Prospectus] *Faculty of Economics and Management Science*. Windhoek: The University of Namibia.
- University of Namibia. (2007b). [Prospectus] *Faculty of Science*. Windhoek: The University of Namibia.
- VanDeVeer, D., & Pierce, C. (Eds.). (1994). *Environmental ethics and policy book: Philosophy, ecology, economics*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.
- VanDeVeer, D., & Pierce, C. (1994a). Deep ecology and social ecology. Preview. In D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce (Eds.), *Environmental ethics and policy book: Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 211-215). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.

- VanDeVeer, D., & Pierce, C. (1994b). Ecofeminism. Preview. In D. VanDeVeer & C. Pierce (Eds.), *Environmental ethics and policy book: Philosophy, ecology, economics* (pp. 246-250). Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.
- Van Dieren, W. (Ed.). (1995). *Taking nature into account: A report to the Club of Rome. Toward a sustainable national income*. New York: Copernicus.
- Velasquez, M.G. (1991). *Philosophy, a text with readings*. Belmont: Wadsworth.
- Viljoen, H., van Staden, F., Grieve, K., & van Deventer, V. (1987). *Environmental psychology: An introduction*. Isando: Lexicon.
- Volosinov, V.N. (1973). *Marxism and the philosophy of language*. Cambridge, M.A: Harvard University Press.
- \*Wajcman, J. (1991). *Feminism confronts technology*. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Wall, D. (1994). *Green history. A reader in environmental literature, philosophy and politics*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Wallach, B. (2004). *Belief systems*. [Electronic version revised 2004 from the version published in Encyclopedia of global change: Environmental change and human society, Oxford University Press, 2003]. Retrieved 4 May 2005 from the website of the University of Oklahoma Department of Geography <http://geography.ou.edu/>.
- \*Ward, B., & Dubos, R. (1972). *Only one earth: The care and maintenance of a small planet*. London: A. Deutsch.
- \*Ward, B. (1973). *A new creation? Reflections on the environmental issue*. Justice in the world, 5. Vatican City: Pontifical Commission Justice and Peace.
- Warren, K. (1987). Feminism and ecology: Making connections. *Environmental Ethics*, 9, 3-20.
- Warren, K. (1990). The power and promise of ecological feminism. *Environmental ethics*, 12(3), 125-146.
- Warren, K. (Ed.). (1996). *Ecological feminist philosophies*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Warren, K. (1996). Ecological feminist philosophies: An overview of the issues. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecological feminist philosophies* (pp. ix-xxvi). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Warren, K. (Ed.). (1997). *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Warren, K. (1997). Taking empirical data seriously. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature* (pp. 3-20). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Warren, K. (1999). Environmental justice: some ecofeminist worries about a distributive model. *Environmental Ethics*, 21, 151-161.


- Warren, K., & Cheney, J. (1993). Ecosystem ecology and metaphysical ecology: A case study. *Environmental Ethics*, 15, 99-116.
- \*Warren, M.A. (1992). The rights of the nonhuman world. In E.C. Hargrove (Ed.), *The animal rights/environmental ethics debate: The environmental perspective*. Albany: SUNY Press. [originally published in *Environmental Philosophy*, 1983].
- Watson, R.A. (1983). A critique of anti-anthropocentric biocentrism. *Environmental Ethics*, 5, 245-256.
- Wenz, P.S. (1997). Philosophy class as commercial. *Environmental Ethics*, 19, 205-216.
- Wenz, P.S. (2002). Environmental synergism. *Environmental Ethics*, 24, 389-408.
- Weston, A. (1987). Forms of Gaian ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, 9, 217-230.
- \*White, A. (1989). Why animals cannot have rights. In T. Regan, and P. Singer (Eds.), *Animals rights and human obligations* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed). Englewood Cliffs New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- White, L. (1967). The historical roots of our ecological crisis. *Science*, 155, 1203-1207.
- \*Whitehead, A.N. (1933, reprint 1967). *Adventures of ideas*. New York: Free Press.
- Whitney, E. (1993). Lynn White, ecotheology, and history. *Environmental Ethics*, 15, 151-169.
- Wilson, H. (1997). Kant and ecofeminism. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature* (pp. 390-411). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Wissenburg, M. (1993). The idea of nature and the nature of distributive justice. In A. Dobson & P. Lucardie (Eds.), *The politics of nature: explorations in green political theory* (pp. 3-20). London: Routledge.
- World Commission of Environment and Development [WCED]. (1987). *Our common future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Worldwatch Institute. (2001). *Vital signs 2001-2002. The trends that are shaping our future*. London: Earthscan.
- \*Worster, D. (1985). *Nature's economy. A history of ecological ideas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- \*Worster, D. (1990). The ecology of order and chaos. *Environmental Review*, 14(1-2), 1-18.
- \*Worster, D. (1991). *Nature's economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Worster, D. (1993). The shaky ground of sustainability. In G. Sessions (Ed.) (1990), *Deep ecology for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new environmentalism* (pp. 417-427). Boston & London: Shambhala.

- \*Young, I.M. (1990). The five faces of oppression. In I.M. Young, *Throwing like a girl and other essays in feminist philosophy and social theory* (pp. 39-65). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Zabinski, C. (1997). Scientific ecology and ecological feminism: The potential for dialogue. In K. Warren (Ed.), *Ecofeminism: Women, culture, nature* (pp. 314-324). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Zelezny, L. C., & Schultz, P.W. (2000). Promoting environmentalism. *Journal of Social Issues*, 56(3), 365-371.
- Zimmerman, M.E. (1987). Feminism, deep ecology, and environmental ethics. *Environmental Ethics*, 9, 21-44.
- Zimmerman, M.E. (1990). Deep ecology and ecofeminism: The emerging dialogue. In I. Diamond & G.F. Orenstein (Eds.), *Reweaving the world* (pp. 138-154). San Francisco: Sierra Club Books.
- Zimmerman, M.E. (1993). General introduction. In M.E. Zimmerman, J. Baird Callicot, G. Sessions, K.J. Warren, & J. Clark, J. (Eds.), *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology* (pp. v-x). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Zimmerman, M.E., Callicot, J. B., Sessions, G., Warren, K.J. & Clark, J. (Eds.). (1993). *Environmental philosophy: From animal rights to radical ecology*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.



# NAMIBIA VISION 2030

NAMIBIA VISION 2030



Prosperity, Harmony, Peace and Political Stability

## Policy Framework for Long-term National Development Main Document

Office of the President  
Private Bag 13356  
Windhoek

2004




*Prosperity, Harmony, Peace and Political Stability*

# Namibia Vision 2030

**Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development  
(Main Document)**

**Office of the President  
Windhoek  
(2004)**



© Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2004

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

Published in 2004 by  
Office of the President  
Windhoek

Design and Layout by AIM Publications (Pty) Ltd  
P.O. Box 40303, 21 Körnerstrasse,  
Windhoek, Namibia.  
Tel:+264 61 24 1440 Fax:+264 61 241447

ISBN 99916-56-03-0

Printed by NAMPRINT, Windhoek, Namibia



	<i>Acronyms and Abbreviations</i>	5
	<i>Foreword</i>	9
	<i>Preface</i>	13
<b>1.</b>	<b>CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO VISION 2030</b>	<b>19</b>
	Introduction	19
	Why a Vision for Namibia	19
	The Vision Formulation Strategy	20
	Implementation of the Vision	21
	Organisation of this Document	22
<b>2.</b>	<b>CHAPTER TWO: NAMIBIA – AN OVERVIEW</b>	<b>25</b>
	Introduction	25
	Geography	25
	People	28
	Political History	28
	Economy	29
	Social Debt	29
	Environmental Debt	30
	Post-independence Progress	31
	Challenges for the Future	32
	Namibia’s Comparative Advantages	32
	Principles Cherished by the Nation	33
	Identification of Priority Issues	34
	New Ways of Thinking	36
<b>3.</b>	<b>CHAPTER THREE: NAMIBIA VISION 2030</b>	<b>38</b>
	Introduction	38
	Issues for Vision 2030	38
	Namibia Vision 2030	38
	Objectives of Vision 2030	40
	Broad Strategies for Vision 2030	41
	Milestones	42
<b>4.</b>	<b>CHAPTER FOUR: PEOPLES’ QUALITY OF LIFE</b>	<b>44</b>
	Population and Health	44
	Population Size and Growth	44
	Migration, Urbanization and Population Distribution	47
	Population Age and Sex Distribution	50
	Healthy Living for Longevity	53
	Promoting Healthy Human Environment	57
	Wealth, Livelihood and the Economy	61
	Macroeconomic Environment	61
	Transport Infrastructure	65
	Employment and Unemployment	69
	Data and Research	74
	Developing a Knowledge-based Society	77
	Information and Communication Technology (ICT)	77
	Production Technology	83
	Education and Training	87
	Early Childhood Development	96
	Aspects of the Legislative/Regulatory Framework	99

# TABLE OF CONTENTS





	Equity: Individuals, Community and the State	101
	Poverty Reduction and Social Safety Nets	101
	Gender and Development	108
	Youth and Development	111
	Senior Citizens	116
	People Living with Disabilities	117
	Fostering and Orphanage	120
	Culture and Tradition	122
	Civic Affairs	125
	Public Safety	128
	Civil Society and its Organisation	131
	The Family	133
<b>5</b>	<b>CHAPTER FIVE: SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE BASE</b>	<b>136</b>
	Freshwater and Associated Resources	136
	Production Systems and Natural Resources	140
	Land and Agricultural Production	142
	Forestry	146
	Wildlife and Tourism	150
	Fisheries and Marine Resources	157
	Non-renewable Resources	162
	Biodiversity	164
	The Urban Environment	170
<b>6</b>	<b>CHAPTER SIX: CREATING THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT</b>	<b>174</b>
	Sustainable Development	175
	International Relations	179
	Development Co-operation	184
	Peace and Security	187
	Regional Integration	190
	Globalisation	197
	Democratic Governance	201
	Decentralization	204
	Responsible Decision-making	209
	Institutional Capacity for Development	212
<b>7.</b>	<b>APPENDICES</b>	<b>217</b>
	National Aspirations Conference	218
	Organisation of the Conference	218
	Welcoming Remarks	219
	Keynote Address	221
	Vote of Thanks	225
	The Vision Formulation Process	227
	Members of the Steering Committee	239
	Members of the National Core Team	241
	Namibia Vision 2030:	
	Members of the National Committee	243
	Vision 2030 Project Office	246
	List of Materials / Documents produced under	
	The Vision 2030 Project	247



## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ARI	Acute Respiratory Infection
ACP	African, Caribbean, Pacific Countries
ADB	African Development Bank
AGOA	African Growth Opportunity Act
ASP	Application Service Provider
ATM	Asynchronous Transfer Mode
AU	African Union
BADEA	Banque Arab du Development en Afrique
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
BTP	Build Together Programme
CBI	Cross Border Initiatives
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resource Management
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CBT	Community-Based Tourism
CD	Compact Disc
CET	Common Excise Tariff
CFA	Communaute Financiere Africaine
CMA	Common Monetary Area
COD	Congress of Democrats
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COSDEC	Community Skills Development Centre
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DIP	Decentralisation Implementation Plan
DOTS	Directly Observed Treatment Shortcourse
DRAMs	Dynamic Random Access Memories
DRFN	Desert Research Foundation of Namibia
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
DVD	Digital Versatile Disc
DWA	Department of Water Affairs
EA	Environmental Assessment
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Military Observer Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIF	Environmental Investment Fund
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EMP	Environmental Management Plans
EPI	Expanded Programme on Immunisation
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
EPLs	Exclusive Prospecting Licences
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FPRM	Foreign Policy Response Model
FTA	Free Trade Area
GDP	Gross Domestic Product



GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
GFCF	Gross Fixed Capital Formation
GIPF	Government Institutions Pension Fund
GNP	Gross National Product
GRN	Government of the Republic of Namibia
GSP	Generalised System of Preferences
GSM	Global System for Mobile Communications
HDI	Human Development Index
HPI	Human Poverty Index
HIS	Health Information System
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IATCP	Inter Agency Technical Committee on Population
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICZMP	Integrated Coastal Zone Management Plan
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate
ISO	International Standards Organization
IT	Information Technology
LAN	Local Area Network
LNS	Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
MAG	Monitor Action Group
MAP	Millennium African Recovery Plan
MARPOL	International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
MET	Ministry of Environment and Tourism
MF	Ministry of Finance
MFAIB	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information and Broadcasting
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola
MLRR	Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation
MMR	Maternal Mortality Rate
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MOL	Ministry of Labour
MOP	Ministry of Prisons
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOF	Ministry of Fisheries
MOHSS	Ministry of Health and Social Services
MOHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MONOUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MRLGH	Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing
MTI	Ministry of Trade and Industry
MTC	Mobile Telecommunications Corporation
MWACW	Ministry of Women Affairs and Child Welfare
MWTC	Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication




NACHE	National Advisory Council for Higher Education
NAI	New African Initiative
NAMCOL	Namibia College of Open Learning
NANGOF	Namibia Non-Governmental Organisations Forum
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Namibia Broadcasting Corporation
NCC	National Communications Commission
NCCI	Namibia Chamber of Commerce and Industry
NDF	National Defence Force
NDP	National Development Plan
NEACB	National Examination, Assessment and Certification Board
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NEPLs	Non-exclusive Prospecting Licenses
NEPRU	Namibia Economic Policy Research Unit
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIED	National Institute for Educational Development
NIMT	Namibia Institute of Mining and Technology
NLTPS	National Long-term Perspective Studies
NPCS	National Planning Commission Secretariat
NQA	Namibia Qualifications Authority
NTA	National Training Authority
NTCP	National Tuberculosis Control Programme
NUNW	National Union of Namibian Workers
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PC	Personal Computer
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PON	Polytechnic of Namibia
PEAC	Presidential Economic Advisory Council
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SME	Small and Medium Size Enterprises
SSC	Social Security Commission
STDs	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
SWATF	South West Africa Territory Force
TACs	Total Allowable Catches
TB	Tuberculosis
VAT	Value Added Tax
VET	Vocational Education and Training
VTB	The Vocational Training Broad
VTC	Vocational Training Centre
UN	United Nations





UNAM	University of Namibia
UNAVEM	United Nations Angolan Verification Mission
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNTAG	United Nations Transitional Assistance Group
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WAMU	West African Monetary Union
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone
WASP	Water and Sanitation Programme
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organisation
WTO <sup>2</sup>	World Tourism Organisation ( <i>noting that the acronym WTO is used for the World Trade Organisation</i> )
ZERI	Zero Emission Research Initiative
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WCU	World Conservation Union





## Why Vision 2030?

A national vision is a perception of the future, which reveals and points to something new, beyond what is already available and accessible. The goal of our Vision is to improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their counterparts in the developed world, by 2030. In order to get there, we need a framework that defines clearly where we are today as a nation, where we want to be by 2030 and how to get there. Defining this framework in operational terms is visioning. Visioning for a nation means creating multiple alternative development strategies and integrated implementation approaches, for reaching the goal of future development.


Namibia Vision 2030 presents a clear view of where we are, where we want to go from here, and over what time frame. It is a vision that will take Namibia from the present into the future; a vision that will guide us to make deliberate efforts to improve the quality of life of our people. It is designed as a broad, unifying vision which would serve to guide the country's five-year development plans, from NDP 2 through to NDP 7 and, at the same time, provide direction to government ministries, the private sector, NGOs, civil society, regional and local Government authorities. Therefore, Namibia vision 2030 will create policy synergies, which will effectively link long-term perspectives to short-term planning.

## Expected changes

Our future is about the people. Therefore, at the centre of the visioning exercise is concern for the population in relation to their social (particularly health), economic and overall well-being. For example, how many Namibians? How well are they living? Where do they live, and what do they do for a living? All the questions about the welfare and well-being of the people of this country at any point in time, even beyond 2030, are about our population and the conditions under which they live and commonly agreed living standard at a given point in time. The Vision will transform Namibia into a healthy and food-secure nation, in which all preventable, infectious and parasitic diseases (including HIV/AIDS) are under secure control; people enjoy high standards of living, a good quality life and have access to quality education, health and other vital services. All of these aspirations translate into a long life expectancy and sustainable population growth.

The Vision is also designed to promote the creation of a diversified, open market economy, with a resource-based industrial sector and commercial agriculture, placing great emphasis on skills development. In addition, the Vision will promote competitiveness in the export sector, in terms of product quality and differentiation.

In support of the objectives of Vision 2030, capacity building will be pursued with the utmost vigour by both the private and public sectors, to facilitate the implementation of the Vision. The capacity building process (including institution restructuring and building, and human resource development) will continue to be promoted by the existence of a suitable, enabling environment in terms of political stability and freedom, a sound legal system, economic



Dr. Sam Nujoma  
PRESIDENT OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA



resources and opportunities, and social norms which are conducive to sustained development. All of this must be well understood by most of the population. In order to realise the objectives of capacity building in Vision 2030, human resource information management systems will be strengthened; the ultimate objective is to balance the supply and demand in the labour market and in this way achieve full employment in the economy.

As required by this Vision, the country will operate a totally integrated, unified, flexible and high quality education and training system, that prepares Namibian learners to take advantage of a rapidly changing global environment, including developments in science and technology. This, in turn, would and that contribute to the economic and social development of the citizens. There will be equal access to excellent educational and vocational training institutions and quality sports services/facilities by all, with basic education placing emphasis on Science and Mathematics. Public education, covering every area of life and living, will be an integral part of the system of continuing education, which is free and open to everyone in Namibia. Moral education will be well integrated into the school curricula. In order to meet the exigencies of industrial transformation, Namibia will continue to monitor cross-sectoral internal and external development in the field of “knowledge, information and technology” and assesses its impact on the rights of the individual and the functioning of society and the national economy.

Arising from the overall capacity building investments, Namibia will be transformed into a knowledge-based society, and changes in production and information technology will revolutionise all aspects of the manufacturing process. Relationships with customers and suppliers and the manner in which products are marketed and sold, would receive quality attention.

Over a decade after Independence, Namibia is yet to overcome the legacy of extreme inequalities based on race and left behind by the ‘apartheid’ regime. Vision 2030 is expected to reduce inequalities and move the nation significantly up the scale of human development, to be ranked high among the developed countries in the world. There will thus be a pervasive atmosphere of tolerance in matters relating to culture, religious practices, political preference, ethnic affiliation and differences in social background. The Vision will facilitate equity in access to social services and facilities, as well as access to productive resources such as land and capital.

Namibia will be a just, moral, tolerant and safe society with legislative, economic and social structures in place to eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity between women and men, the diverse ethnic groups, and people of different ages, interests and abilities.

While Namibia enjoys internal peace and stability, numerous external threats which have the potential to disrupt and derail the country’s socio-economic progress, can be discerned. These threats do not emanate from States *per se* nor from the projection of State power, but from non-traditional forms of conflict and unconventional warfare. Therefore, Namibia will continue to be at the forefront of SADC efforts to create a collective security framework, based on the relevant SADC Protocols on politics, defence and security, signed by regional heads of state. While collective security offers the best and most effective instrument of



national security, regional security will also serve to thwart de-stabilizing elements by denying them succour and sanctuary in member states.

One of the major principles upon which our Vision is based is ‘partnership’. Partnership is recognised as a major prerequisite for the achievement of dynamic, efficient and sustainable development in the country. This involves partnership between government, communities and civil society; partnership between different branches of government, with the private sector (the business community), non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations and the international community; partnership between urban and rural societies and, ultimately, between all members of Namibian society.

While the principle of sustainable development is the cornerstone on which the strategies for realizing the objectives of Vision 2030 pivot, the **driving force** among the complex agents of our development comprises the following:

- Education, Science and Technology
- Health and Development
- Sustainable Agriculture, and
- Peace and Social Justice
- Gender Equality

### The challenges

The major challenge of this Vision is for all of us (Government, private sector, civil society, as well as individuals) to make a determined effort to concentrate on resolving, not just addressing, very important national problems. This document: *Namibia Vision 2030 – Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development*, presents a clear view of the major national problems and how these problems can be effectively resolved by deploying-to the fullest-our human and natural resources.

Successful implementation of the Vision would require the existence of a conducive enabling environment, which guarantees peace and political stability. In this regard, we are challenged to continue to acknowledge the pre-eminence of the Namibian Constitution as the basic law, which contains, *inter alia*, all the ingredients of a democratic state including peace, security and political stability. By continuing to uphold the tenets of our Constitution, we strengthen human rights, individual freedoms, civil liberties and multi-party democracy. Our emphasis will also be on good governance, and we should continue to improve on issues relating to equity in terms of access to productive resources, including land, environmental degradation, growing poverty and economic stagnation.

The business community will be challenged to make increasing contributions to the education and training sector, since it is the major recipient of the products of the system. In addition, the business sector will be challenged to make realistic inputs into development plan formulation at national and regional levels, as well as make contributions to the implementation of such plans. In particular, Vision 2030 will challenge the business community to enhance international trade, implement Affirmative Action, create employment opportunities for the country’s growing labour force and facilitate the expansion of small and medium scale enterprises.

Namibia’s future will also depend largely on the people themselves; much will depend on our ability and willingness to respond with innovation and commitment




to new challenges. If we are to survive as a nation, perhaps the greatest challenge we face now is to eradicate HIV/AIDS, as well as all preventable infectious and parasitic diseases through healthy living. As we march forward in implementing the programmes of this Vision, we should be prepared to ask ourselves, from time to time, if we are truly on course and on time.

But the immediate challenge we face as a nation, now that we have a Vision document that defines our country's future development possibilities, is to ensure that the Vision is translated into reality. As a step in that direction, the next Phase (Phase2) of the Vision Project should be to develop implementation strategies and integrated programmes and projects, as well as mobilizing both human and financial resources. The programmes of Vision 2030 have specific targets and periodically, through the National Development Plans, we will evaluate the Vision programme's performance. By the year 2030, with all of us working together, we should be an industrial nation enjoying prosperity, interpersonal harmony, peace and political stability.



**Sam Nujoma**  
**President of the Republic of Namibia**





Immanuel Ngatjizeko  
**Director General**  
National Planning Commission

Namibia's **2030 Vision** is one of the most important initiatives undertaken in the country since the drafting and acceptance of the National Constitution.

The Vision 2030 planning process commenced in January 1998, when His Excellency the President, Dr Sam Nujoma, drew attention to the need for members of the Cabinet to be clear about "... where we are, where we wish to go, and over what time frame." As a result, eight teams were tasked by the National Planning Commission to undertake research that would comprehensively chart the course.

A long-term vision is a unifying concept for a nation. Everyone would like to have access to good education for their children, good and accessible health care, a clean and productive environment, an efficient and profitable economy that supports full and rewarding employment, low levels of crime, a just and tolerant society and meaningful transparent governance.

Such vision also offers the nation an ideal to work towards. Furthermore, it sets key targets and identifies some approaches that could be applied. The eight thematic reports which feed into this long-term vision are:

1. Inequality and Social Welfare
2. Peace and Political Stability
3. Human Resources Development and Institutional Capacity Building
4. Macroeconomic Issues
5. Population, Health and Development
6. Namibia's Natural Resources Sector
7. Knowledge, Information and Technology, and
8. Factors of the External Environment

In preparing these reports for Vision 2030, three higher-order questions were asked, namely

1. What is *the national ideal* that Namibia is working towards?
2. What is *the cornerstone* of Namibia's approach and philosophy?
3. How does the national development process fit into the vision?

## THE NATIONAL IDEAL

### The Key Elements for the VISION for 2030 will Depict:

The people of Namibia as well developed, prosperous, healthy and confident in an atmosphere of interpersonal harmony, peace and political stability; and as such, Namibia is a developed country to be reckoned with as a high achiever in the comity of nations.

In essence, it is the collective wish of the Namibian people, and the Vision for 2030 and beyond, that Namibia enjoys:

- *Prosperity,*
- *Interpersonal Harmony,*
- *Peace, and*
- *Political Stability*

### The People and Resource Base will Reflect that:

People are the nation's human wealth: a population of healthy, well-educated, skilled, pro-active and financially stable people with a broad range of talents and positive attitude towards themselves, their fellow citizens, their country and global humanity. Foreign professional people and global businesses will perceive Namibia as a good environment in which to invest and from which to do local and international work, thus creating both wealth and employment.

Natural resources- the nation's ecological wealth: healthy, productive land with effective water and mineral cycling leading to infrequent, low-level drought and flooding. Perennial rivers running permanently and clear, underground water levels stable and no silting of dams. No atmospheric pollution from croplands and rangelands and minimal pollution from urban and industrial areas will be permitted. Farms and natural ecosystems shall be productive, diverse, stable and sustainable – socially, economically and ecologically. Forests, savannas, deserts, wetlands, coastal and marine ecosystems will be open, diverse, stable and productive.

### A Basic Principle


The concept of *sustainable development* is the cornerstone on which this work was based. Namibia has subscribed to this approach in its National Constitution, and has committed itself internationally, by adopting the United Nations Agenda 21 principles. The philosophy and principles of *sustainable development* cut across all sectors. Indeed, sustainable development is achieved only where sustainability in all sectors of endeavour is attained – social, economic and ecological. For the purposes of this study, *sustainable development* is defined as follows:

## Sustainable Development

... development that meets the needs of the present without limiting the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

**The National Development Process**

Namibia has embarked on a process of preparing and implementing five-year NDP. One shortcoming in these plans is that they tend to address immediate needs – a road, a clinic, a water point. What is missing in the process is a longer-term vision towards which each five-year plan should be working, including both the immediate needs of roads and water points, and the longer-term components that are needed to build a prosperous, productive and sustainable society. Vision 2030 provides this long-term perspective. The Vision 2030 initiative needs to be effectively linked and integrated into the NDP process, both institutionally and procedurally, to bring the two into highly productive synergy. The diagram below illustrates how this should be done.




The overriding prerequisite for the achievement of dynamic, efficient and sustainable development in Namibia is **Partnership**. Partnership between government and civil society, between different branches of government, with the private sector, non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations, and the international community. Between urban and rural societies and, ultimately, between all members of Namibian society. Vision 2030 is an initiative that can help to unify all Namibians to achieve their long-term development needs and initiatives, and promote and nurture partnerships.

This report draws on the eight thematic reports. It also draws on a national “Aspirations” workshop, a Decision-makers survey, regional consultations, Ministry-priorities and objectives, and a host of other national and local consultative and planning initiatives, including Regional Development Plans, Namibia’s second five-year NDP and Namibia’s Assessment Report to the World Summit for Sustainable Development.



Hon. Immanuel Ngatjizeko

**Director General, National Planning Commission**



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The National Core Team for Vision 2030 was constituted by the National Planning Commission in April 2001, to serve as the technical coordinating body for all activities pertaining to the formulation and production of the Vision. Mr. Isaac Kaulinge, then Secretary to the Presidency, was appointed the National Coordinator and leader of the National Core Team until April 2002. Ms Erica Shafudah, Under Secretary, Ministry of Finance took over the Leadership of the Core Team from April 2002 till March 2004 when the project was completed.

Other members of the National Core Team are Mr. Victor Tonchi, University of Namibia; Mr. Alfred van Kent, Ministry of Higher Education, Training and Employment Creation; Mr. Ipumbu Shiimi, Bank of Namibia; Dr. Mary Seely, Desert Research Foundation; Dr. Nestor Shivute, Ministry of Health and Social Services; Ms. Sylvia Demas, National Planning Commission; Mr Penda Kiiyala, Directorate of Development Cooperation NPC; Dr Taati Ithindi-Shipanga, Ministry of Health and Social Services. Mr. Peter Mbome was the Project Administrative Officer, and Prof. Oladele O. Arowolo served as Consultant to the Vision 2030 project.

The Core Team benefited from research works carried out by the eight multidisciplinary groups it constituted to address aspects of the Vision formulation issues in the country. The research group leaders were: Dr. Berth Terry (SIAPAC); Dr. H Mu Ashekele (University of Namibia); Mr. Zach J.N Kazapua (University of Namibia); Mr. Mihe Goamab (Bank of Namibia); Ms. Jane King (SIAPAC); Dr. Chris Brown (Namibia Natural Consortium); Dr. Roland W. Losch (The Polytechnic of Namibia) and Mr. Joel H. Eita (NCCI).

The contributions of members of the National Committee for Vision 2030, including all the Regional Governors, and the NPC Steering Committee are gratefully acknowledged.

The consultative process undertaken by the National Core Team took us to all the regions and involved meetings with opinion leaders (including Cabinet Ministers and Managers in the business community), representatives of Trade Unions, Non-Governmental Organisations, religious leaders, traditional leaders, the media, line Ministries and various other interest groups in the country. The Core Team appreciates the cooperation and support received from individuals and groups too numerous to mention here.

The National Core Team enjoyed working in collaboration with the then Director General, National Planning Commission, Hon. Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila and her successor, Hon. Immanuel Ngatjizeko. The team also acknowledges the support of Mr. Hanno Rumpf, former Permanent Secretary, NPC, and that of his successor, Mr. Samuel/Goagoseb. The technical and financial support of the UNDP to the project is also gratefully acknowledged.



**Erica Shafudah**

National Coordinator, Namibia Vision 2030 Project  
March 2004

**NAMIBIA VISION 2030**



**BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF VISION**



## 1. BACKGROUND TO VISION 2030

### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

The stimulus for formulating a vision for Namibia was provided by His Excellency, the President, Dr. Sam Nujoma, through his statement to the Cabinet in January 1998. In that address, he called on the Cabinet to deliberate on its vision for Namibia: “a vision that will take Namibia from the present into the future; a vision that will guide us to make deliberate efforts to improve the quality of life of our people to the level of their counterparts in the developed world by the year 2030”.

Such a vision, according to the President, called for a determined effort by all concerned to “concentrate on resolving, not just addressing, very important national problems”. In practical terms, the call was for a comprehensive mission statement based on a critical review of past performance in all sectors of the economy and society, objective situation analysis and imaginative as well as realistic projection into the future, by the year 2030. As envisaged by His Excellency, the President, the vision would require built-in mechanisms for the monitoring and evaluation of predetermined targets in all the sectors, including annual and five-yearly evaluations, and a major review of performance every decade.

In response to the challenge of Vision formulation, Cabinet directed the NPC to coordinate the activities that would lead to the production of a shared national vision for the country over the next 30 years.

Vision formulation for a country is, therefore, an exercise in planning for the management of future development. Otherwise referred to as National Long-term Perspective Studies (NLTPS), a national vision provides the people with a sense of direction, discovery and destiny. Popularised in Africa by the UNDP since 1992, the NLTPS concept is a complimentary approach to current efforts by African governments (including Namibia) to reform their economies and societies. Its focus is on providing a systematic process for developing and implementing consistent long-term development strategies, based on active participation of the people at each stage of the process (UNDP, 1998:5). Many African countries have already formulated their visions, and many more are at one stage or another in that process.

### 1.2 WHY A VISION FOR NAMIBIA?

The Government has, since Independence established a planning system based on medium-term plans, for promoting sustainable socio-economic development in Namibia. There is, however, as yet no articulated long-term national plan (or vision) or scenarios within which the short and medium development goals are to be based.

Based on policy oriented research on key national strategic issues, and on a process of discussion and dialogue (involving the private sector, civil society and the donor community) on the long term goals and future of the country, Vision 2030 provides long term alternative policy scenarios on the future course of development



in Namibia at different points in time up until the target year 2030. The Vision provides guidance to planning questions such as the following:

- Given the past and current conditions, what would development in the country portray by year 2015, 2020 and 2030?
- What do the people want their country to depict by these future points in time?
- What should Namibians do, between now and year 2030, to elevate the country to the level of a developed society?

It is clear that the dynamic process in the long-term future is more important for planning than the end point of the process. Perspective thinking is particularly relevant for the short-and medium-term implementation of long-term planning targets.

Long-term perspective plans are also useful for anticipating changes, and for understanding events that are likely to happen. For example, given the current level of development, what would education scenario look like by the year 2015, 2020 and 2030? What would happen if dropouts from school increased if the Government succeeded in eradicating illiteracy by year 2015? What would happen if the current and planned HIV/AIDS activities succeeded in eradicating the disease by year 2010, for example?

These are pertinent questions, particularly because they directly influence development and investment decisions, expenditure and the allocation of funds. They are directly linked to public policies and decision-making. Therefore, Namibia Vision 2030 will create policy synergies, which will effectively link long-term perspectives to short-term planning. Long-term perspectives are needed to understand the future repercussions of the past and current policies and planning activities.

### 1.3 THE VISION FORMULATION STRATEGY

A key element in the vision formulation process was that it must be a shared vision, developed through national dialogue. Unless it is a shared vision, it may not be socially and politically acceptable. Therefore, as a tool for social dialogue and part of good governance, the Vision process in Namibia involved, as much as possible, the major social groups, at national and regional levels, in various aspects of the formulation process.

It was precisely for the above reason that the interests of all stakeholders were solicited to make contributions to this national dialogue about the future of Namibia. Representatives of the Government, operators in the private sector (commerce and industry) and representatives of civil society were consulted to make contributions to the national dialogue on the future of the country. This approach allows for the interest of the people through their contributions at the implementation stage.

The immediate challenge faced by the vision management, was to establish a credible information base from which the vision would be derived. As a start, the NPC compiled a background document that put together much of the information available on the different sectors of our economy and society.

As a way of determining people's aspirations for the future, a survey of 'Opinion



Leaders' in the country was conducted in April/May 2000 by the NPC, and findings of this study proved most valuable in the determination of the issues for the multi-disciplinary research that provided the core of the vision information base.

The National Core Team, a group responsible for the technical coordination of the visioning process, organised a 'Sensitization Mission' to the 13 regions of the country (July/August 2001), the aim of which was to share the objectives and strategy of the Vision 2030 project with the general public through a series of regional workshops. These workshops provided ample opportunity to discuss the various aspects of the project, well as an opportunity for the collection of information on the peoples aspirations for the future.


The National Committee on Vision 2030 was established with an overall objective to provide technical advice to the NPC on issues pertaining to the formulation of Vision 2030, and appropriate strategies for its implementation. In accordance with its terms of reference, the National Committee provided advice to the National Core Team and the NPC on key strategies and issues considered relevant to the formulation of a broad-based vision for the country in year 2030. These included identification of critical development and management issues; by what means; how the vision would be realised; and a strategy for consolidating and improving on progress made. Members of the National Committee included distinguished Namibians from the private and public sectors, and the civil society. Each of the 13 Regional Governors in the country were members of the National Committee.

The Vision 2030 management employed the services of Multi-disciplinary Research Groups to undertake a study of Namibia's past and current experience in development and the prospects for the future, bearing in mind its natural, material and financial resources, and its cultural, regional and international context. The thematic reports (see Figure 1.1) of this study, as well as other documents in the information base, were publicly discussed at the National Aspirations Conference held in May 2002, as part of the vision formulation process by the National Core Team. Information from these research reports formed the basis of the Vision formulation. The Conference also served to ensure popular participation in the vision formulation process. (See Appendix 1, for additional information on the National Conference, and speeches by HE, The President).

#### 1.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VISION

It was made clear throughout all the consultation processes – workshops held for the preparation of the eight thematic reports, the survey of opinion leaders, the regional sensitization and aspirations workshops conducted by the Core Team and the National Aspirations Conference – that people want and expect Vision 2030 to be competently and comprehensively implemented.

Following the dissemination of Vision 2030 to the general public, Vision 2030 management will be re-defined and transformed from a policy formulation to a coordinating agency for implementation, using a comprehensive Master Plan for Vision 2030. To ensure effective implementation of Vision 2030, an appropriate institutional framework will be developed.



**Figure 1.1: Namibia - Issues for Vision 2030 Formulation**

Most of the strategies proposed in the Strategic Framework for Long Term Development are broad statements of objectives. In order to fulfil these objectives, certain actions must be taken. These activities, if successfully undertaken, will ultimately lead to the realization of the Vision. Therefore, for each of the stated objectives, the strategic questions that must be addressed through the coordinating role of the Vision implementing organ, are the following:

- What is the range of activities involved in achieving an objective?
- Who will do what?
- What is the time-frame for accomplishing the objective?
- With what amount of human, material and financial resources will this be done?
- How will achievements be measured?
- By what means will the indicators of progress be verified?
- What are the risks being assumed?

The Vision itself will provide the necessary internal dynamics which will facilitate the realisation of the goals. In essence, the Vision provides the framework to design broad strategies for long-term national development, to be implemented through NDP2 and subsequent Medium Term Plans and their respective budgets. Therefore, NDP2 constitutes the first of the six consecutive programme elements of Vision 2030. This is where the five-yearly planning cycles, currently in use, will continue to provide a sound basis for the monitoring and evaluation of the vision objectives.

## 1.5 ORGANISATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document is divided into three parts. **Part One** contains three chapters namely, Introduction (Chapter 1); overview of Namibia as a nation – the land, people, economy and society, and the challenges we face as a nation (Chapter 2). The theme-based results of the sensitization mission as well as the eight research groups; the views of ‘Opinion Leaders’ and the Vision of the public sector were elaborated on and presented to the National Aspirations Conference and these were summarised in Chapter 3.

**Part Two** of this Vision document represents a synthesis of information gathered, discussed and agreed upon during the visioning process for Vision 2030. Based

on the steps described above, three overarching concepts emerged. The People's Quality of Life' is of the utmost importance for the Vision. This encompasses integrated material from several of the initially identified working themes such as 'inequality and social welfare', 'human resource development and institutional capacity-building', and 'population, health and development'. A second major concept to emerge from the synthesis is 'Sustaining the Resource Base.' Although organised around sub-topics such as 'production systems and natural resources', it, perforce, encompasses and integrates materials from the original themes such as 'inequality and social welfare'. The third major concept to appear from the synthesis is 'Creating the Enabling Environment.' Focusing predominantly on the original themes described as 'peace and political stability' and 'factors of the external environment', this third major concept embraces and integrates aspects of, *inter alia*, the original theme of 'human resource development and institutional capacity-building'. Part Two is designed to help the reader of these documents focus on the three overarching concepts that emerged during the visioning process, while not losing site of details identified during that overall process.

*Part Three* contains the Appendices to this volume.





## 2. NAMIBIA – AN OVERVIEW

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides a brief description of Namibia, its geography and people – past and present. It sets out some of Namibia’s comparative advantages, the principles that we cherish as a nation and how we should approach our long-term development.

### 2.2 GEOGRAPHY

Namibia is situated in south western Africa between latitudes 17° 30’ S and 29° S, and longitudes 12° E and 25° E. Namibia has a land area of some 842 000 km<sup>2</sup> and is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, South Africa to the south and Botswana to the east. The largest northern border is with Angola, but in the far north-east of the country it shares a common border with Zambia and a point of contact with Zimbabwe. The country is divided into 13 regions (Figure 2.1).

Namibia is an arid country with generally low (Figure 2.2) and highly variable (Figure 2.3) rainfall. Annual rainfall varies from less than 20mm along the coast to more than 600mm in the northeast. A large part of Namibia is classified as desert, and three different desert systems are found within its boundaries. These are the Namib to the west, an ancient desert of sand seas and gravel plains; the Kalahari to the east, characterised by deep sand with no surface water, except for temporary pans, but which has a specific and fairly extensive vegetation; and the Karoo to the south, which is characterised by low rainfall and unproductive soils. However, it supports an extensive vegetation of low-growing, often succulent, shrubs.

Only 8% of the country receives over 500mm raining which is regarded as the minimum necessary for dryland cropping, and, this is concentrated in the north-east, mainly in the Caprivi region. The central regions of the country have relatively productive soils and reliable rainfall. These soils, while not sufficient to support crop production, are nevertheless well vegetated and help to support livestock. The Kalahari and Karoo regions are also used for extensive livestock production, with mainly large stock in the Kalahari and small stock in the Karoo. With regard to the northernmost parts of the central region, seasonal water is received in the form of local rainfall as well as flooding down an inland delta of drainage channels, which are linked to the Cuvelai river system in Angola. Considerable rain-fed subsistence-crop production also takes place in this region. Land uses across the country are shown in Figure 2.4.





Perennial water sources are very scarce. Such rivers are found only on Namibia's boundaries – the Orange river in the south, the Kunene and Okavango rivers in the north and the Zambezi and Kwando-Linyanti-Chobe river systems associated with the Caprivi (Figure 2.5). Natural springs occur in various scattered locations across the country and there are a few eastward- southern- and extensive westward-flowing ephemeral rivers, which carry only surface water for a few days a year. However, they provide important underground aquifers from which water can be abstracted by people and animals throughout most years. Other underground aquifer systems vary in distribution and water quality. An extensive deposit of fine fossil water occurs in the central/northern region, known as the Karstveld.




Figure 2.5: Perennial and ephemeral rivers




Figure 2.6: Human population distribution



## 2.3 PEOPLE

Namibia's population size was estimated to be 1.8 million in the 2001 census. With its low population density, compared to most countries in Africa, Namibia makes up 3% of Africa's land area, but only 0.2% of its population. This is mainly due to the fact that a large part of the country is too dry for human settlement. While there are on average only about 2 people per km<sup>2</sup>, people are not spread evenly across the country. Most of the rural people live in the north and north-east of the country (Figure 2.6) and some 40% of the population lives in urban areas (compared to about 10% in 1936).

Palaeontological evidence indicates that the history of human settlement in Namibia goes back to prehistoric times. Nomadic people-ancestors of today's San-lived a hunter-gatherer lifestyle both inland and along the coast of Namibia, for thousands of years. Later arrivals included the Nama and the Damara people. Livestock-owning pastoralist/agriculturalists including ancestors of today's Owambo and Herero people moved into Namibia from east-central Africa in various waves of migration, some purportedly date back to the 10<sup>th</sup> century. Before the arrival of Europeans in Namibia, the country was populated by various groups of nomadic pastoralists, as well as several other groups of more settled pastoralists/agriculturalists. Clashes between communities occurred periodically, especially over grazing rights. Complex kingdoms and chieftancies, with well defined social and cultural traditions and structured economies, were in existence.

The arrival of explorers and settlers from Europe began on a small scale in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, but the harshness of the Namibian coast, exacerbated along its entire length by the Namib desert, prevented any serious attempts at settlement. By the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, however, considerable numbers of Europeans, particularly Germans, were beginning to migrate to the area, as explorers, travellers, traders, hunters and missionaries.

## 2.4 POLITICAL HISTORY

In 1878 the United Kingdom annexed the harbour of Walvis Bay. In 1883 a German trader, Adolf Luderitz, claimed the rest of the coastal region for Germany, and in 1884 the whole of the country was declared a German protectorate.

The colonial period in Namibia was a violent one. German colonists gained control of land, mineral and other resources by a mixture of purchase, theft and application of superior military power. The period between 1890 and 1908 was one of many conflicts between the Germans and Namibian ethnic groups, and resulted in the decimation of the indigenous Namibian populations. Estimates suggest that more than 70% of the Herero people, 50% of the Nama people and 30% of the Damara people were exterminated during the 'Great War of Resistance' of 1904-1908. After 1908 Namibians living in the 'Police Zone' were not allowed to own cattle, and were forced to take work on white-owned farms, or as indentured labour. Ethnically divided 'native reserves' were established.

German rule in Namibia came to an end with the outbreak of World War 1 and the Allied occupation of Namibia. In 1920, the League of Nations granted South Africa a mandate which gave it full power of administration and legislation over the territory. The mandate required that South Africa promote the material and

moral well-being and social progress of the Namibian people, but this was not upheld. Farmland which had previously been taken over by Germans was now given out or subsidised, to Afrikaaner settlers.

The League of Nations was dissolved in 1946, and the newly formed United Nations took over its supervisory authority over South West African territory (now Namibia). The UN declared Namibia a trust territory with rights of self-determination, but South Africa refused to acknowledge this. In 1966 the UN revoked South Africa's mandate and set up a council with authority for the territory, but South Africa continued to ignore this authority.

In the meantime in 1948, the Afrikaner led National Party had gained power in South Africa and brought in the 'apartheid' system of segregation, which they enforced in Namibia as well as South Africa. This led to the relocation of many indigenous Namibians from their homes both in urban and rural settings. In 1970 the South African government adopted the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, which recommended the parcelling of Namibia's land into different 'homelands' for different racial groups, with the central block of most productive farmland reserved as 'commercial farmland,' which could be owned by whites only – a policy which has left a considerable legacy of resource degradation. Resistance to South Africa's domination began in the 1950s. Many Namibians went into exile. In 1966 the armed struggle began, with guerrilla attacks on South African-controlled South West Africa. The struggle intensified over the next 20 years.

International pressure for Namibia's independence built up and diplomatic negotiations intensified. Pressure was put on South Africa to accept the UN resolution 435, which called for the holding of free and fair elections in Namibia, under UN supervision and control, as well as the cessation of war by all parties. Eventually, after an 11 month UN monitored transition period, Namibia gained independence on the 21<sup>st</sup> March 1990, after 106 years of colonial rule. On March 1, 1994 the coastal enclave of Walvis Bay and 12 offshore islands were also transferred to Namibia by South Africa, and the colonial period was effectively ended. The years of colonial rule, however, had left an indelible mark on the face of the country – socially, economically and environmentally.

## 2.5 ECONOMY

While some of the legacies of colonial rule were positive, including a well-developed infrastructure, with harbours, schools, clinics, storage dams, boreholes and water pipelines and one of the best roads systems in the world, the detrimental legacies were more far-reaching. It included a significant financial debt, taken out in Namibia's name by South Africa, a huge social debt, and an equally huge environmental debt - all of which have had a significant effect on the economy of the developing, independent Namibia. Nevertheless, the financial debt was eventually written off after negotiations between Namibia and South Africa.

## 2.6 SOCIAL DEBT

The colonial period had resulted in a total disruption of traditional life of Namibian people. Resettlement programmes had removed people from their ancestral homes and hampered their traditional forms of agriculture and pastoralism, wars had



decimated their population groups, indentured labour practices had disrupted family life, and colonial legislation had disempowered traditional structures of authority.

Colonial rule, and particularly apartheid policies, had also led to severe handicaps making it difficult for indigenous Namibian people to take control of the changed country. Apartheid had led to highly skewed development objectives, which in turn had led to rural and urban poverty, skewed distribution of wealth and unequal access to land and natural resources. Such legislation had also reserved most well-paid jobs with entrenched responsibility for white people and allowed only inferior education for people of other races, while access to medical resources for the majority of the population had also been limited. Foreign missionaries, who had been active in South West Africa throughout the colonial period, had tried in a small way to control these trends, and some Namibians had opportunities while in exile in other countries; but in general only a few Namibians had access to adequate primary health care, education and a challenging work experience. As a result, at Independence Namibia found itself with a huge skills deficit, which will take decades to address meaningfully.

## 2.7 ENVIRONMENTAL DEBT

Namibia's economy relies heavily on its natural resources. Both renewable and non-renewable natural resources had been severely exploited during colonial times. Long-term and cross-sectoral planning had been ignored, and sustainability had never been an issue, especially as it became obvious that the political situation would have to change.

Large scale hunting, often for sport, had decimated game populations throughout the colonial period. Drastic over-exploitation of the rich pelagic fish resources, off Namibia's coast in the 1960's and 1970's, had led to the collapse of populations of commercially important species. Mining had dominated the economy in the 1980's as large quantities of diamonds, uranium, semi-precious stones, base metals, industrial minerals and dimension stones were removed, often with little care about the ensuing environmental damage. The greatest damage of all however, had been done to Namibia's farmlands, largely as a result of the implementation of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission in 1970. This resulted in the country being divided into blocks of land on the 'homelands' principle, with different blocks being designated for the use of different ethnic groups – thus leading to the creation of 'Owamboland', 'Hereroland', 'Damaraland,' etc. These homelands were created on marginal farmland while the best farmland of the country was reserved as 'commercial farmland' and were available to whites only. This led to a situation where large numbers of the population were concentrated in small areas of marginal land and this led to an inevitable overexploitation of whatever resources those homelands could supply. Owamboland, for example, was designated as the area north of the Etosha pan - an area which receives some seasonal water from local rainfall as well as the extensive Cuvelai drainage system from Angola which allows cultivation of pearl millet in most years. This area became home to 40% of the Namibian population, and deforestation and desertification quickly became major problems.

The commercial farmlands, too, ran into problems of environmental degradation. South African government policy allowed for 'drought relief' schemes for white



farmers. This meant that in dry years farmers did not have to de-stock their farms in order to survive financially. The result was overgrazing of grasses and subsequent problems with thorn bushes out-competing grasses until previous rangeland became thicket, which drastically reduced productivity.

Another major problem the new government had inherited was that of ownership of land. The white farmers who owned the commercial farmland at the time of Independence had mostly bought their land from others, or inherited it through several generations of ownership in the same family. They believed it belonged to them. Indigenous Namibians, whose ancestors had been forced off the same land by earlier generations of Europeans, also believed that the land should be theirs. Land reform issues are always a source of major contention in developing countries, and Namibia is no exception.

## 2.8 POST-INDEPENDENCE PROGRESS

Since the time of Independence, the Namibian government has taken major steps towards addressing previous imbalances. The Government has upheld the country's constitutional provisions, as well as put in place other relevant policy and legislative frameworks; implemented extensive country-wide immunisation campaigns which have drastically reduced infant mortalities; undertook the massive task of providing basic education for all Namibians, and higher education for many; has introduced stringent legislation controlling over-exploitation of fisheries resources and instigated a research institute and on-going research projects to monitor stocks; brought in extensive changes involving not only conservation but also sustainable utilisation of natural resources and cross-sectoral co-operation towards these objectives; and continues to seek solutions to the land reform question. Many rural villages have been linked up to the national power grid, and safe water has been brought within reach of many rural communities, by pipeline or canals.

The general atmosphere in Namibia in 2003 is that of commitment to further development and positive change. There is still a huge discrepancy in wealth. Poverty remains a serious problem, and at the same time land reform is still considered a thorny issue. It is well known that education for all is a difficult and expensive goal to achieve. Many of the natural resources which have been lost due to exploitation in the past cannot be recovered. Ecological balances have been disrupted and alien species introduced. Bush encroachment is complex, and expensive to reverse. Woodlands have been cut down, top-soil lost due to erosion, salination of soil has occurred and groundwater has been polluted. Water resources are also under increasing pressure. Since Independence, the government has made considerable efforts to provide safe water to most rural households, but much of this is being taken from underground aquifers in an unsustainable way. Long-term politically and economically viable solutions for ensuring a safe and reliable water supply for Namibia's populations, have yet to be found.

One of the most daunting development challenges facing Namibia today is the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Namibia is among the countries in the world which have prevalence ratios among pregnant women which exceed 20%. Such a high prevalence ratio is bound to have significant impact on various aspects of the socio-economic life of individuals, families and communities. Children will be particularly hard hit by the epidemic, since they will be affected in two ways: Firstly, those children, who are infected through their HIV positive mothers during



pregnancy or during or after birth, are expected to die before the age of five years. On the other hand children will also be affected by the death of one or both parents, leaving them orphaned.

The loss of those members of the household who would usually be the breadwinners, will impact negatively on household income. In addition, households will be expected to care for AIDS patients at least for some of the time before their death. This will be an additional financial as well as psychological burden on households. Pension moneys received by the elderly household members may be the only source of income in many households, and may result in younger members taking up employment earlier than usual. It must therefore be expected that the education of these children will be compromised. In general, it can be assumed that the impact of AIDS will decrease household income and substantially increase expenditure for at least a certain period of time. This might lead to reduced household savings and a marked increase in poverty.

## 2.9 CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

Namibia is changing and developing rapidly. This speed of development presents the country with new challenges:

- to ensure it achieves real benefits for people, and that these benefits are spread equitably across society;
- to ensure that development does not undermine the country's future potential and life-support systems. Instead, it should build national and local capital at three levels: economic and financial capital, human and social capital, ecological and environmental capital;
- to make optimal and efficient use of resources, opportunities and Namibia's comparative advantages – over both the short and the long-term.

## 2.10 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES

Namibia has a large number of comparative and competitive advantages over other countries in the world. The list below sets out some of the more obvious advantages, none of which has been fully exploited. Indeed, we have not even scratched the surface of some of the potential that exists:

- Namibia is a country that is not prone to catastrophes (volcanoes, earthquakes, floods, etc.) other than droughts, for which Namibia can prepare itself by implementing reliable drought mitigation and drought response strategies through means of drought preparedness;
- Because of its relatively small population, Namibia can achieve a unity of purpose and a national momentum for change and appropriate development;
- As a result of its good infrastructure, communications network, technological focus and location, Namibia can develop as a centre for transport, communications and other service industries which require such infrastructure, such as banking and insurance;
- Due to its political stability, relative security and congenial living environment, Namibia, and in particular its capital city, is an attractive place from which to do business;
- Namibia has the potential to assume a leading role in the world in terms of the supply of clean and uncontaminated meat and fish, tourism, and in the fields of biodiversity and wilderness;
- It's rich cultural diversity, adds depth to Namibia's capacity, resilience and its quality of life. This diversity of peoples also shows how cultural harmony can be achieved through tolerance and honouring differences;



- Namibia is a country where people are proud of their culture, and take it with them in the development pathway, thereby evolving a unique blend of traditional and modern, in ways that integrate social harmony with economic growth and progress;
- It has been shown that Namibia can position itself to be responsive, reactive, proactive and manage change effectively and efficiently. Namibia should embrace globalization, and not be afraid of or resist it – but rather to manage and harness aggressively the opportunities that it offers for optimising Namibia’s comparative and competitive advantages;
- Namibia could work towards being a service-based economy, through being a skills and knowledge-based society. Linked to this is the opportunity to retain a dispersed economy in small to medium-sized towns and villages with excellent infrastructure and communications networks. This will allow Namibia to avoid the problems of a society living in mega-cities;
- For all the above reasons, Namibia does not have to work through the development pathways followed by the current industrialised countries. Instead, by concentrating on skills development, services and its comparative advantages, Namibia can leap ahead to where currently developed countries are likely to be in 30 years.

## 2.11 PRINCIPLES CHERISHED BY THE NATION

### ***Good Governance***

We continue to acknowledge the pre-eminence of the Namibian Constitution as the basic law, which contains, *inter alia*, all the ingredients of a democratic state, including peace, security and political stability. By continuing to uphold the tenets of our Constitution, we strengthen human rights, individual freedoms, civil liberties and multi-party democracy. Our emphasis is also on good governance, and we continue to improve on issues relating to equity in access to productive resources, and in reducing environmental degradation, poverty and economic stagnation.

### ***Partnership***

We believe in creating a conducive environment for gender equality and working together as the key to economic progress and social harmony. This is the essence of partnership. It entails partnership between government, communities and civil society, between different branches of government, with the private sector, non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations and the international community; between urban and rural societies and, ultimately, between all members of Namibian society.

### ***Capacity enhancement***

The development of our country is in our hands, and our people are the most important resource of the country; therefore, we consider investing in people and our institutions to be a crucial precondition for the desired social and economic transformation. This calls for increasing investments in institution-building, in education and training (including, promotion of science and technology), and implementing health/ population and related programmes and policies.

### ***Comparative advantage***

We shall capitalise on Namibia’s comparative advantages and provide suitable incentives to use our natural resources in the most appropriate and efficient way possible. This would ensure that the decision-makers of today will continue to



create a safer, healthier and more prosperous future for all Namibians.

### ***People-centred economic development***

Undoubtedly, we need economic growth and diversification to achieve sustainable development. Emphasis is on the welfare of the people, aiming at human development, equitable and balanced growth, resulting in a growing industrial sector, a modernised agricultural sector, and an enabling macro-economic and political environment.

### ***National sovereignty and human integrity***

We cherish our national sovereignty and it must be preserved at all costs; great value is also attached to Namibian tradition and culture. However traditional ideas and practices which tend to inhibit progress towards development targets, may be sacrificed in the interest of the nation. At the centre of all we do are the people of Namibia – healthy, brave, empowered, innovative, fully employed, confident and determined to succeed; everyone has a role to play, on a level playing field, unhindered by race, colour, gender, age, ability, ethnicity, religious affiliation or political inclination.

### ***Environment***

Our environment is clean, and we will continue to keep it so.

### ***Sustainable development***

We fully embrace the idea of sustainable development; the type of development that meets the needs of the present, without limiting the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. To this end, we encourage people to take responsibility for their own development and promote development activities that address the actual needs of the people and require increasing community contributions to development services and infrastructure. Indeed, the principle of sustainable development is a cornerstone of Namibia's vision, since it embraces all the other principles. Without capacity, partnership and good governance, there will be no sustainable development.

### ***Peace and Security***

Namibia is a relatively peaceful country, and we shall continue to uphold the principle of domestic and regional peace and security being an indispensable condition for the country's socio-economic development.

## **2.12 IDENTIFICATION OF PRIORITY ISSUES**

Planning for long-term sustainable development requires that the Vision adopts a strategic approach. A strategy is simply a plan of action to address a complex situation. Within the complexity of a given or evolving situation, a strategic approach helps to identify key or priority issues. Such issues could be prioritised in the following manner:

- Identify a range of solutions and, where necessary, develop scenarios
- Address the most important issues which, at the same time, offer good opportunities for success while also providing good benefits to society
- Link short-term needs (action) to medium-term targets and long-term visions
- Address complex implementation arrangements, when issues cut across sectors and mandates, where authority and responsibility are not clear, and when needing to link local initiatives to district, regional, national and to global initiatives



- Create integrated approaches, and genuine partnerships between government, business, communities, NGO, academic institutions, donors, etc., because environmental and sustainable development issues and challenges are too complex to be resolved by any one group acting alone, and
- Build on existing plans, processes and strategies.

The last point is important, since no country ever starts from scratch. There is always a history of existing institutions, existing collaboration and partnership, existing plans, visions and ideas. Strategic approaches should look for ways of linking, for examples, to Namibia’s National Development Planning processes, and to build on these.

The concept of sustainable development is the cornerstone on which development-thinking throughout world hinges. Namibia has subscribed to this approach since the United Nations Convention on Environment and Development (the so-called Rio Convention or Earth Summit) in 1992 in Brazil, and was an active participant at the World Summit for Sustainable Development (the so-called Rio +10 Summit) in Johannesburg in 2002. The conditions for sustainable development can only be met if at least the three fundamental objectives of economic development, social development and environmental development are adequately addressed at the same time, within politically and culturally acceptable ways. These three objectives underpin the concept of sustainable development and must each be considered in detail (Figure 2.7).




Figure 2.7: The systems of sustainable development

Working to achieve sustainable development is a complex and challenging undertaking, but one which is essential for the future of every nation and her people. It is challenging because it requires new thinking, new integrated approaches, new partnerships, and new evaluation systems. Wealth needs to be thought of in financial terms (investments, capital infrastructure), in social terms (human capital in the form of health, education, skills, innovation), and in environmental terms (status and health of natural resources such as fish stocks, forests, rangelands, water, wildlife and soils). Only when all three forms of wealth are stable and positive by linked to production, will sustainable development be achieved.

### 2.13 NEW WAYS OF THINKING

A national long-term vision provides the direction in which all partners should be moving, including government, the private sector, NGOs, universities, communities and civil society as a whole, as well as the support from international development partners. A vision provides a strong framework for collaboration and cooperation.

Achieving Vision 2030 requires a paradigm shift from sector development to integrated approaches through strategic partnerships. This means that some structural changes may be required, as well as innovative thinking.

The following “new ways” of thinking and working are important:

- Move from developing and implementing a fixed plan, which gets increasingly out of date ... towards operating an adaptive, dynamic system or *process* that can continuously improve. Vision 2030 is thus a process, not a plan;
- Move from a view that it is the state or government alone that is responsible for sustainable development... towards one that sees responsibility to society as a whole – a *full partnership* where the state helps create the enabling environment for sustainable development;
- Move from centralised and controlled decision-making ... towards *sharing* results and opportunities, transparent negotiations, cooperation and concerted actions;
- Move from a focus on outputs (e.g. projects and laws) ... towards a focus on *outcomes* (e.g. impact) that actually contribute to achieving goals and visions – which require good quality participation and process management;
- Move from sectoral planning... towards *integrated planning* – within and between sectors and institutions.

The structure of this document has been designed to facilitate this process-based, integrated planning approach to development through partnership, sharing and with a clear focus on outcomes (Figure 2.8). Chapter 3 of the report gives an overview of the issues covered in Vision 2030. Chapter 4 addresses the socio-economic issues around peoples’ quality of life, while Chapter 5 covers the ecological and environmental issues of sustaining the resource base and our means of production. Chapter 6 addresses cross-cutting processes that help create the necessary enabling environment for Namibia to proceed along its chosen development path.

Implementation of these approaches requires strong political leadership and support from all sectors of society, ranging from the local to national levels. To get a whole country to work constructively and effectively together, requires a



clear National Strategy to give guidance and direction – a National Strategy that has been developed by a broad partnership of stakeholders who want to see their country develop - for both present and future generations. In short, it requires a long-term Vision, or Vision 2030.




Figure 2.8: Structure of the Main Body of the Vision 2030 Report.

### 3. NAMIBIA VISION 2030

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

Since Independence, the Namibian government has adopted planning as a management tool to help ensure effective decision-making. Five-year development plans, beginning with NDP1 for the period 1995 – 2000, are at the heart of this strategy. This chapter provides a summary of the national Vision for 2030, the main objectives and broad strategies for its implementation.

#### 3.2 ISSUES FOR VISION 2030

In formulating this Vision, the process called for identification and careful analysis of our problems as a nation. These issues were addressed by the Vision 2030 formulation process through a national opinion survey, futures research, regional consultations and national dialogue. The major elements of our national issues identified are the following: Inequalities and social welfare; Peace and political stability; Human resources, institutional- and capacity-building; Macro-economic issues; Population, health and development; Natural resources and environment; Knowledge, information and technology; and factors of the external environment. The vision formulation process was based on careful analyses and reviews of Namibia's past and current experience in development, given its natural, material and financial resources, and its cultural, regional and international context.

#### 3.3 NAMIBIA VISION 2030

The development issues listed above were carefully analysed and, based on research findings and an analysis of the aspirations expressed by the people, an overall national Vision (Box 1) has been formulated. The appropriate scenario selected was derived from the broad objectives of this Vision, and has served to guide identification of strategic ideas, which would form the basis for development planning.

#### Box 1: Namibia Vision 2030

A prosperous and industrialised Namibia, developed by her human resources, enjoying peace, harmony and political stability.

The following terms, as used in the Vision, are elaborated upon; abundant prosperity; interpersonal harmony; peace and political stability.

### ***Prosperity***

It pertains to existence of a condition of sustained high economic growth that places Namibia in the ‘high income’ category of nations, eliminates duality in the economy and ensures equity in the pattern of economic growth. All Namibian workers earn a decent wage, that allows them to live a life well above the poverty level; and for the disadvantaged, the social security support guarantees a decent quality of life. All Namibians, who are able and willing, have the opportunity of being gainfully employed, or have access to productive resources. There is equity in income distribution across all groups, and the disparity between rural and urban living, in terms of social and economic conditions, is at its lowest. Namibians are healthy, empowered, innovative, confident and determined to succeed; everyone has a role to play, and the playing field is level, unhindered by race, colour, gender, age, ethnicity, religious affiliation or political inclination.

### ***Industrialised Nation***

As an industrialised country, Namibia’s income per capita base had grown to be equivalent to that of the upper income countries, resulting in a change in status from a lower middle income country to a high income country. Manufacturing and the service sector constitute about 80 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. The country largely exports processed goods, which account for not less than 70 percent of total exports. This has given rise to a significant reduction in the export of raw material. Namibia has an established network of modern infrastructure such as rail, road, telecommunication and port facilities. The country has a critical mass of knowledge workers and the contribution of the small and medium-size enterprises to GDP is not less than 30 percent. Unemployment has been significantly reduced to less than 5 percent of the work force.

### ***Harmony***

A multi-racial community of people living and working together in harmony, and sharing common values and aspirations as a nation, while enjoying the fruits of unity in diversity. Men and women marry (as provided for in the Constitution) and enjoy marital love and stability of union, and families extend compassion and love to those who are widowed or in one or the other form of marital disharmony.

The family is upheld as sacred and the most fundamental institution in the society. Parents (mothers, fathers, guardians) are well aware of and fulfill their responsibilities to their children, while children remain disciplined and have an inalienable right to survival, development, protection and participation in society. Families are available and willing to accommodate orphans, and are assisted, where necessary, by the government/community through a well managed public orphanage programme. Such a programme allows these disadvantaged children to be supported to live a meaningful life which prepares them adequately for the future. People living with disabilities and other vulnerable persons are well integrated into the mainstream of society. They have equal rights under the law and are facilitated to participate actively in the economy and society.

Society respects and upholds the right of every person to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote his/her culture, language, tradition or religion



in accordance with the Constitution. Although Namibia remains a secular society, Christianity is the most popular religion, which holds promise for the moral upbringing of our children, and shapes the moral basis of our interpersonal dynamics, harmony and peaceful co-existence. Above all, the fear of God guides decision-making in Namibia and provides the driving force for the maintenance of a just and morally upright society.

### ***Peace and political stability***

There exists in the country true freedom of expression, speech and association, compatible with the letter and spirit of the Constitution of Namibia; the political environment is conducive to voluntary formation or dissolution of political parties; and every individual is recognised as an important element in the system, which provides level playing field for all players. The people of Namibia make their own decisions and do so at their own level in terms of political, cultural, economic and social development matters; they set their own priorities, plan, implement and monitor their development programmes.

Namibia creates an enabling environment in terms of sustainable social and economic advancement which could be defined as a “condition free from all possible impediments to actualising development”. It embodies peace, security, democratic politics, availability of resources, appropriate legal instruments, co-operative private sector, and a supportive public service. In essence, we consolidate and maintain peace and political stability.

All people in Namibia enjoy a safe environment (to a great extent free from violence and crime), share and care for those in need and are prepared to face and respond to any man-made and or natural calamities. Namibia is a fair, gender responsive, caring and committed nation in which all citizens are able to realise their full potential in a safe and decent living environment.

The multi-party democratic principle of popular participation is well entrenched in the Namibian society; the political parties are active; the civil society is vibrant, and a mature, investigative and free media is in operation. There are independent ‘watch-dog’ institutions that ensure the implementation of anti-corruption programmes, and monitor activities of government, the private sector and civil society organisations and agencies. The government is there to promote social welfare, social profitability and public interest; and the action of officials are being constantly checked to see if they are in line with these cherished social values. Public officials maintain ethical standards with regard to trust, neutrality, probity, professional honour, confidentiality and fairness. There is constant checking to determine continued adherence to these values.

Namibia thrives on an environment of regional and international peace and security. Development cooperation with all friendly nations is strong, and is based largely on trade and mutual exchange of opportunities; dependency on foreign development aid is minimal, if at all. Namibia is part and parcel of organised regional structures, in which it can contribute to the political, economic and social wellbeing of the people.

### **3.4 OBJECTIVES OF VISION 2030**

The major objectives of this Vision are to:

- (i) Ensure that Namibia is a fair, gender responsive, caring and committed nation, in which all citizens are able to realise their full potential, in a safe and decent living environment.



- (ii) Create and consolidate a legitimate, effective and democratic political system (under the Constitution), and an equitable, tolerant and free society, that is characterised by sustainable and equitable development and effective institutions, which guarantee peace and political stability.
- (iii) Develop a diversified, competent and highly productive human resources and institutions, fully utilising human potential, and achieving efficient and effective delivery of customer-focused services which are competitive not only nationally, but also regionally and internationally.
- (iv) Transform Namibia into an industrialised country of equal opportunities, which is globally competitive, realising its maximum growth potential on a sustainable basis, with improved quality of life for all Namibians.
- (v) Ensure a healthy, food-secured and breastfeeding nation, in which all preventable, infectious and parasitic diseases are under secure control, and in which people enjoy a high standard of living, with access to quality education, health and other vital services, in an atmosphere of sustainable population growth and development.
- (vi) Ensure the development of Namibia's 'natural capital' and its sustainable utilization, for the benefit of the country's social, economic and ecological well-being.
- (vii) Accomplish the transformation of Namibia into a knowledge-based, highly competitive, industrialised and eco-friendly nation, with sustainable economic growth and a high quality of life.
- (viii) Achieve stability, full regional integration and democratised international relations; the transformation from an aid-recipient country to that of a provider of development assistance.

### 3.5 BROAD STRATEGIES FOR VISION 2030

In order to realise the objectives of Vision 2030, the following strategic elements should be considered in the long-term perspective plan for Namibia:

- (i) Maintaining an economy that is sustainable, efficient, flexible and competitive;
- (ii) Operating a dynamic and accessible financial sector;
- (iii) Achieving full and gainful employment;
- (iv) Providing excellent, affordable health care for all;
- (v) Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS into development policies, plans and programmes;
- (vi) Creating access to abundant, hygienic and healthy food, based on a policy of food security;
- (vii) Providing full and appropriate education at all levels;
- (viii) Leveraging knowledge and technology for the benefit of the people;
- (ix) Promoting interpersonal harmony among all people;
- (x) Operating a morally upright and tolerant society that is proud of its diversity;
- (xi) Ensuring an atmosphere of peace, security and hope for a better life for all;
- (xii) Maintaining stable, productive and diverse ecosystems managed for long-term sustainability;
- (xiii) Establishing and sustaining business standards of competence, productivity, ethical behaviour and high trust;



- (xiv) Upholding human rights and ensuring justice, equity and equality in the fullest sense for all, regardless of gender, age, religion, ethnicity, ability or political affiliation;
- (xv) Maintaining a low-level, responsive bureaucracy;
- (xvi) Implementing a land- and natural resource policy that ensures fair access by all to the means of production;
- (xvii) Establishing and operating a fiscal policy that distributes wealth fairly, and encourages production, employment and development of wealth in a stable and sustainable economic climate;
- (xviii) Operating a responsive and democratic government that is truly representative of the people, and able to adhere to transparent, accountable systems of governance, proactively;
- (xix) Achieving collaboration between public, private and Civil Society organisations, in policy formulation, programming and implementation;
- (xx) Maintaining sound international policies that ensure effective cooperation, favourable trade relations, peace and security.

### 3.6 MILESTONES

The major challenge of this Vision is for all of us (government, private sector, Civil Society as well as individuals) to make a determined effort to concentrate on resolving, not just addressing, very important national problems. As we march forward in implementing the strategies of this Vision, we should be prepared to ask ourselves, from time to time if, indeed, we are on course. The programmes of Vision 2030 have specific targets and, periodically, through the National Development Plans and related programme instruments, we will evaluate the Vision programme performance.

Milestones are interval targets or indicators and are very useful for monitoring progress towards the achievement of a desired objective. Following the approval of Vision 2030, it is planned that a national strategy implementation workshop will be convened to reach an agreement on the way forward in translating the objectives of the Vision into reality. This will set the stage for the formulation of an Action Plan for Vision implementation, including the determination of programme targets.

To this end, milestones are provided in this Vision document, which are indicated as ‘targets’, to give an overall impression of where we are going and how the assumed future state would develop step by step. It is, however, difficult to construct quantitative indicators for some of the objectives of the Vision, such as: peace and political stability; good governance; popular participation; knowledge-based society; etc. In such cases, as illustrated with aspects of Information Technology and Natural Resources/ Environment, simple descriptions are provided to indicate the anticipated direction of progress. The scenario box for each Sub-Vision provides information on ‘Where we want to be in 2030’ and these items should also be read as targets. At a later stage, when programming for Vision implementation, each objective will have corresponding programme targets, including interval targets, apart from the empirical indicators shown in this Vision document.

By the year 2030, as we commit ourselves to the strategies of this Vision, we should be an industrial nation, enjoying abundant prosperity, interpersonal harmony, peace and political stability.



**PART TWO**

**SYNTHESIS OF THE VISION 2030 ISSUES**



## 4. PEOPLE'S QUALITY OF LIFE

### 4.1 POPULATION AND HEALTH

The Vision for Namibia in 2030 is about the people. Therefore, at the centre of the visioning exercise was concern for the population in relation to their social (particularly health), economic and overall well-being. How many Namibians? How well are they living? Where do they live, and what do they do for a living? All the questions about the welfare and well-being of the people of this country, at any point in time, even beyond 2030, is about our population's living conditions. In essence, the dynamics of our population and the associated social, economic, demographic, environmental and political factors are critical elements in visioning, scenario-building and determining of strategic elements that would translate the vision for 2030 into reality.

#### 4.1.1 Population Size and Growth


The available evidence suggests that though relatively small in size (1,826,854 in 2001), the population of Namibia experienced a high growth rate of over 3.0 per cent in the decade before Independence (1981 – 1991). Against the official projections that anticipated a continuation of the growth trend well beyond 2000, the negative impact of HIV/AIDS on health and longevity of the people has reduced the growth rate from the projected estimate of 3.0 percent per annum to 2.6 percent (1991-2001).

Given the continuing negative effect of HIV/AIDS on the population in the immediate future, the growth rate of the population will be further curtailed to about 1.5 percent or below annually until about 2015, when the worst impact of the epidemic will probably be seen. The overall population size will, however, not be reduced as a result of the pandemic; and even in the worst-case scenario, as shown in Table 4.1, Namibia will have a population of about 3.0 million by 2030.

Initial estimates based on the 1991 census indicated that the population of Namibia would continue to increase, from 1.4 million in 1991, to 1.63 million in 1996 to 1.9 in 2001 and 3.5 million in 2021, based on an anticipated annual population growth rate of slightly over 3%. These projections were based on the high fertility rates prevailing at the time. However, because of HIV/AIDS, these initial assumptions needed to be reconsidered. Projections by 5-yearly intervals for the three scenarios are contained in Table 4.1, and illustrated in Fig. 4.1

Year	Low Variant	Medium Variant	High Variant
2001	1.83	1.83	1.83
2006	2.02	2.14	2.25
2011	2.19	2.39	2.61
2016	2.39	2.66	3.01
2021	2.57	2.93	3.41
2026	2.78	3.23	3.86
2030	2.98	3.49	4.27

**Table 4.1: Namibia - Population Projections (in millions)**  
Based on the 'High', 'Medium' and 'Low' Variants of the Projection Model.



**Figure 4.1. Projected Population, 1991 - 2030**  
Based on the 'High', 'Medium' and 'Low' Variants of the Projection Model


The results of the 2001 population census show a total population of 1,830,330 for the country. The variations in the projections shown in Table 4.1 are due to differences in the assumptions made about the future course of mortality and



fertility during the Vision period. Due to uncertainty about the future course of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the projections of the population should be reviewed periodically during this period. It is, however, suggested that the 'Medium Variant' of the projection should guide Vision implementation from the beginning.

**Sub-Vision**

*A healthy and food-secured nation in which all preventable, infectious and parasitic diseases are under secure control; people enjoy a high standard of living, good quality life and have access to quality education, health and other vital services. All of these translate into long life expectancy and sustainable population growth.*



### ***Targets for Population and Health***

- Reduction in the population growth rate from the annual average growth rate of 2.6 % (1991 – 2001) to 2.4% by 2015, 2.2% by 2025, and 2.0% by the year 2030.
- Reduction in the infant mortality rate from 53 per 1000 live births in 2001 to 30 per 1000 live births by 2015; 15 per 1000 in 2025; and 10 per 1000 in 2030.
- Reduction in the maternal mortality rate from 271/100,000 live births in the year 2002 to 80 per 100,000 in 2015; 50 per 100,000 in 2025; and 20 per 100,000 in 2030.
- Reduction in the total fertility rate from the 2002 level of 4.2 to 3.5 by the year 2015; 3.0 by 2025, and 2.0 by 2030.
- Full immunization coverage from 65% in 2002, to 70% in 2015, to 75% in 2025, and 80% in 2030.
- Increase contraceptive prevalence rate from 37.8% in the year 2002 to 50% by the year 2015; 65% by 2025; and 80% by 2030.

### ***Objectives***

- To reduce mortality from all causes, including HIV/AIDS.
- To revive the population policy and implement it effectively.
- To make health services adolescent/youth friendly and accessible to all.
- To make anti-retroviral drugs available to and affordable the public.
- To intensify population information, education and communication (IEC) through appropriate means taking, into account people with disability.

### ***Strategies***

- Providing treatment and care for those infected and limiting the further spread of the disease.
- Developing a comprehensive Action Plan and reviving the institutional structures in place for programme implementation.

Institutional responsibilities for resolving population and related health problems are clearly stated in the ***Population Policy for Sustainable Human Development (1997)***. While all the sectors are involved and their respective duties defined, overall technical coordination of policy implementation is vested in the NPC, supported by the National Advisory Committee on Population.

#### **4.1.2 Migration, Urbanisation and Population Distribution**

Migration has historically been male dominated and mostly from the northern communal areas to the commercial farming, mining and manufacturing areas in the centre and south. The distribution of Namibia's population is highly uneven, being closely linked to agro-ecological conditions and thus economic and social opportunities. While the national population density in 2001 was 2.1 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, one of the lowest in Africa, in Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana and Oshikoto Regions it was 13.2 persons/km<sup>2</sup>. These four regions contain 6.8% of Namibia's land area, but had 44.9% of the total population in that year (see population total by Region, Fig. 4.2).




Figure. 4.2: Population by Region(2001)

Only 27% of Namibia’s Population was urbanised in 1991; by 2001 the proportion of the population living in urban areas increased to 33%. One important demographic characteristic of the urban population in Namibia is the very high rate of growth. While the overall national population increased at 3.1 percent per annum from 1981 to 1991, the urban population registered a growth rate of 5.6 per cent, and the rural population 1.97 per cent.

At the current rate of urban population growth it is estimated that the population of Namibia would be 43 percent urbanised, with about 1 million people residing in urban places by the year 2006, and 50 percent by 2010; 60 per cent by 2020, and 75 per cent urbanised by 2030. The major factor promoting the rapid rate of urbanisation in the country is rural-to-urban migration, mainly of young men and women in search of better social and economic opportunities. This trend is likely to continue during the Vision period. The trend in urbanisation is shown in Fig. 4.3.





Figure. 4.3: Urbanisation Trend in Namibia

**Sub-Vision**

*There is free movement of the population within the country and population distribution is maturely adjusted to the location of resources for livelihood. Namibia is a highly urbanised country with about 75 per cent of the population living in proclaimed urban centres, while the predominance of Windhoek has considerably reduced as a result of growth of other urban centres throughout the country.*



**Objective**

The overall objective is to achieve integrated rural and urban development in which living conditions and social and economic opportunities are adequate for all.

**Strategies**

- Promoting rural and urban development,
- Ensuring that overall social and economic development is commensurate with the degree of urbanization of the population,
- Enhancing the capacity of local authorities to function effectively,
- Harmonizing the local markets for agricultural trade, including removal of the “red line”.
- Upholding the constitutional provisions for international migration as well as the appropriate immigration policies.

**4.1.3 Population Age and Sex Distribution**

As in most developing countries, the Namibian population is very youthful. Children below the age of 15 years constituted 42% of the population in 1991, resulting from persistently high levels of fertility and declining levels of infant mortality. Older persons aged 60 years and over made up 7.0% of the 1991 as well as the 2001 population, most of them enumerated in rural areas.

The results of the 2001 population census indicate that close to 40% of the total population is under 15 years of age. This shows little change from 43% in 1991 and the estimate of 41% by the CBS in 1996. The 2001 census report also shows that rural areas, where 67% of the population live, have relatively more young people (44%) as well as more senior citizens or those 60 years and over (8%) compared to the urban population, where there are 30% and 4% young and old persons respectively. The majority of urban residents (64%) is made up of the economically active age group (15-59 years) compared to 46.3% of the rural population. Overall, senior citizens constitute a small percentage of the total population (7%) in the 2001 census report and this, as shown in Figure 4.4, is not expected to increase appreciably during the Vision period, as a result of the effect of HIV/AIDS on the population.




Figure 4.4: Population Projection by Age Groups

The 2001 total population of 1,830,330 for the country shows that there were 942,572 females (or 51% of the total) and 887,721 males (see regional distribution of population by sex in Figure 4.5). This implies a sex ratio (defined as the number of males per 100 females) of 94.0 in 2001, virtually unchanged from 1991 when it was 94.8. Regionally, however, there are considerable variations due to migrants' selectivity. (Internal migration distorts sex ratios and these, therefore, vary widely between age cohorts and urban/rural populations). Sex ratios in the 2001 census report vary widely among the 13 regions in the country between a low of 83 for Ohangwena to a high of 115 for Erongo; and also between 91.9 for the rural population of the country to 99.1 for the urban population.




Figure. 4.5: Population Distribution by Region and Sex (2001)

**Sub-Vision**

*Namibia is a just, moral, tolerant and safe society with legislative, economic and social structures in place to eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity between women and men, the diverse ethnic groups and people of different ages, interests and abilities.*

## Equity in Age and Gender Matters

### What to do

- Intensify the provision of population education at all levels of the education system.
- Provide population education to the general public.
- Educate men and women on gender and development issues.
- Ensure the reproductive rights of women.
- Empower youth and women through adequate education and access to gainful employment.

### Where we want to be by 2030

- Equity between women and men in social, economic and political matters.
- Fairness in dealing with people of different ages, interests and abilities.
- Men and women have equal access to opportunities for livelihood.
- Girls remain in schools as long as boys, and women also participate in science.

### Current situation

- Namibia has a youthful population, with 42% of the population under 15 years of age in 1991, and estimated to be 40% in 2001.
- Children and young people under 30 years of age make up over 70% of the population.
- Older persons aged 60 years and above make up about 7% of the total population as a result of overall short life expectancy at birth in the population.
- There are higher proportions of both the young and the old populations in the rural areas compared to the urban areas.
- Women outnumbered men in the ratio of 100:94 in 2001 in the total population, but there are regional distortions due to migration.

### What not to do

- Planning without consideration for gender.
- Planning for the people without considering differences in population structure, by age.
- Discrimination in access to social services and economic opportunities based on gender, age, and ethnicity.
- Senior citizens, disabled people are treated just as

### Worst-case scenario

- Rampant discrimination due to age, sex, and disability.
- Relevant social and economic policies that provide support to disadvantaged groups, are not implemented.
- Young people have poor education, girls are worse off and older persons and the disabled have no chance to compete.

### **Objectives**

The objectives are to:

Ensure that the young people of Namibia are educated, skilled, motivated, confident, assiduous, responsible and healthy, and are thus empowered to play an active role in shaping a better society, which will be their inheritance and their duty to sustain and manage in the future.

- Ensure that the elderly citizens are acknowledged and respected for their past contributions to the development of our country, and in their old age they will be well cared for and remain happy senior citizens in a safe and loving environment.
- Improve the situation of the disabled based on enhanced recognition of their rights and abilities, much as in other countries, through improved and expanded training and support programmes.

### **Strategies**

- Providing quality education for all.
- Creating adequate employment opportunities for all those who are active and willing to work.
- Implementing the Affirmative Action initiatives so that those disadvantaged and people living with disabilities are well represented in the work place at all levels.
- Disaggregating all data by gender, for effective planning, and increasing the flow of information on important gender issues and law reform.
- Implementing all relevant policies and legislations, and providing the appropriate setting for women to give input on law reform proposals.

#### **4.1.4 Healthy Living for Longevity**

Namibia operates a health care system aimed at ensuring equity of access to quality health care services to all; promoting community involvement and greater citizen participation in the provision of health services; providing affordable health services; facilitating co-operation and inter-sectoral action with all major players in the provision of health care; instituting measures to counter major health risks including the prevailing communicable diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, etc; and ensuring the development of human resources in sufficient numbers for staffing various health delivery systems.

In addition, the health system aims at ensuring the development of a national health care system that is capable of providing a fully comprehensive range of preventive, curative and rehabilitative health care that is cost-effective, sustainable and acceptable to the most disadvantaged communities, promoting equity and facilitating the effective implementation of defined strategies and interventions.

- AIDS makes a significant contribution to poor health and to low life-expectancy. Hospitalisation and deaths due to HIV/AIDS-related complications have been steadily increasing, thus putting an additional burden on the health systems. Since 1996, AIDS has been the leading cause of deaths in Namibia. Figure 4.6 illustrates HIV/AIDS' contribution to hospitalisation and death as a proportion of the total admissions and deaths.




Figure. 4.6: AIDS Related Admissions and Deaths as % of Total

Recent estimates derived from the 2001 population census indicate that the life expectancy at birth in Namibia was 50 and 48 years respectively for females and males. This shows a significant decline from the 1991 estimates of 63 and 59 years respectively for females and males, largely due to the effect of HIV/AIDS.

The Government of Namibia has in place a detailed, multi-sectoral strategy for combating HIV/AIDS, and which recognises the epidemic as the most serious challenge to development in the country. The national response to HIV/AIDS aims to reduce transmission to below epidemic levels and to mitigate its impacts across individuals, families, communities and sectors. Sectoral strategies and targets are detailed in the 1999/2004 National Strategic Plan, which is among the most comprehensive in the region. It is of interest that, despite the high rate of HIV infection and widespread knowledge of the mode of transmission, only 28.2% of all women (married or unmarried) have ever used a condom, and an extremely low 8.9% are currently using condoms.

Currently, family planning services are available in 93% of Government health facilities. However, in 2000, only 61% of all women had used a modern contraceptive method at least once in their lives. It is noteworthy that, given the atmosphere of HIV/AIDS, only 9% of all women use condoms. Use of antenatal facilities is also generally popular, since 91% of women who had given birth during the 1995-2000 period, had been assisted during birth by trained medical personnel.

The results of the 2001 population census indicate that over 82% of all households in the country have access to safe water; the proportion is higher in urban (98.4%) than in the rural areas (79.9%). The census report also indicates that about 54% of the households in the country have no toilet facility, using the bush instead; over 70% of the households in the urban areas use flush toilets compared to 10% in the rural households.

While Namibia is considered to be food secure at the national level, many households are still vulnerable to chronic or acute food insecurity due to low agricultural production, recurrent drought, low incomes and limited off-farm employment opportunities. Despite the Government's strong commitment to the reduction of food insecurity and malnutrition during the First Food and Nutrition Decade (which will end in 2002), progress has been limited.

The above Government strategies and programmes aimed at improving the health of the population will succeed to the extent that the people themselves are willing and able to take advantage of the opportunities and facilities being provided. These health programmes, in addition to the provision of services, also provide information and education on various aspects of life and healthy living for the individual, family and the community. These include information/education on family formation and family planning services, prevention of infectious and parasitic diseases (such as HIV/AIDS, TB, STDs, malaria and vaccine preventable diseases), as well as other causes of ill health and death. Information and services are also being made available to the public through these programmes on nutrition, feeding and drinking habits, physical activities for healthy development and environmental hygiene.

The challenge is for each individual, family and community to take advantage of the services and facilities provided by the Government and related agencies in support of healthy living.

***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia is free of the diseases of poverty and inequality; and the majority of Namibians are living healthy lifestyles, provided with safe drinking water and a comprehensive preventive and curative health service, to which all have equal access.***



## Healthy Living for Longevity

### Things to do

- Implement effectively the Primary Health Care Programmes, including HIV/AIDS, Safe Motherhood, TB, Malaria, etc.
- Provide public education on healthy living.
- Improve the health infrastructure, particularly in rural areas.
- Ensure food security at household level.

### Where we want to be by 2030

- Namibia is a healthy, food secured nation.
- Average life expectancy is about 69 years for both sexes, since death rates across the ages are low.
- All communicable diseases are under control, including HIV.
- People have access to safe drinking water, adequate housing and sanitation.
- All couples have access to and use effective means of family planning.

### Current situation

- The leading causes of death in Namibia are AIDS, TB, malaria, gastroenteritis, cancer, pneumonia, prematurity, malnutrition, congestive heart failure, and cerebro-vascular accident accounting for 76% of all deaths in the hospitals.
- According to the 2002 sentinel sero survey among pregnant women, the HIV prevalence ratio stands at 22.0%.
- The cumulative number of HIV positive cases from 1986-2002 is 116 475.
- According to the 2000 Namibia Demographic and Health Survey, 5% of children are severely underweight, 2% are severely wasted and 8% are severely stunted.
- 91% of women have access to antenatal care services provided by a doctor or a nurse.
- 75% of the population have access to safe water.
- 41% of the population have access to sanitary means of excreta disposal.

### Things to avoid

- Simply maintain current efforts and level of resources in implementing health programmes.
- Centralise the provision of health services.
- Restrict the flow of information on health matters.

### Worst-case scenario

- Number of HIV-positive people increases from 219,00 in 2002 to 500,000 in 2030.
- Little behaviour change in spite of knowledge of Reproductive Health and the spread of HIV/AIDS.
- HIV-infected persons are not given treatment due to cost factor.
- HIV/AIDS not factored into policies and planning.

### **Objective**

The overall objective is to ensure that Namibians enjoy a healthy, productive and long life.

### **Strategies**

- Intensifying programmes of health education, targeting the different sections of the population in order to achieve behaviour change for disease prevention and cure.
- Assisting the health personnel to deal with the stress and burdens of HIV/AIDS on the health system.
- Investing adequate resources in the fight against HIV/AIDS epidemic and associated diseases, including treatment of those infected and providing support to orphans.
- Focusing on total quality management of the health programme.
- Developing and managing a comprehensive Food Security Network.
- Maintaining emphasis on primary health care within the context of decentralisation, both deconcentration and devolution.
- Increasing the focus on training medical and paramedical personnel, and helping to ensure service provision in remote rural areas.
- Improving the distribution of infrastructure to ensure service provision in remote areas.
- Continuing to improve access to health care and health facilities in previously under-served regions, must remain a priority.
- Improving the HIS data collection, management and dissemination; and strengthening feedback to those involved in the HIS chain of data collection so that local use is encouraged.
- Ensuring that all development plans and sectors include and implement HIV/AIDS responses in their efforts.
- Strengthening Reproductive Health and Family Planning programmes with the aim of ensuring that women gain more control over their reproductive health. This would include strengthening the identification and treatment of STD's.
- Based on a consideration of the various aspects of stigma, policies will be developed and plans will be implemented to achieve destigmatisation.
- Developing an understanding of the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic across all sectors.
- Achievement of these objectives will be dependent on sound political leadership and the involvement of all sectors (Public, private, Civil Society) of Namibian society.

#### **4.1.5 Promoting Healthy Human Environment**

The health management system in the country is designed to promote a healthy living environment for all Namibians through the elimination of vaccine-preventable diseases; and the attainment of the highest level of environmental sanitation, community and personal hygiene in order to eliminate air, water and vector-borne diseases. In addition, the health-care programme is designed to attain the highest level of responsible behavioural practices in order to eliminate STD's, HIV infection and alcohol and substance abuse. The system also supports treatment of physical and mental illnesses.


The Government of Namibia inherited, at Independence, a health care delivery system which was curative-oriented, and fragmented along racial and ethnic lines. Following Independence, a national health system was put in place and the Primary Health Care (PHC) strategy was adopted with emphasis on preventive, promotive and rehabilitative health care. The Government is in the process of decentralizing health services. This has involved the deconcentration of responsibilities to the regional level with the establishment of 13 health regions, in line with the 13 administrative regions. A total of 34 health districts have been created.

Currently, the provision of health care in Namibia is split between Government (70-75%), missions (15-20%) and the private sector (5%). The missions are not-for-profit providers, and subsidised by the state through the MOHSS. The private sector is mainly urban and provides health care through 11 medium sized hospitals.

The results of these efforts to re-orient the health service delivery system are demonstrated in the improvements in basic health indicators, such as fertility rates, infant mortality rates, etc. These Government programmes are based on a series of policies, e.g., those related to primary health-care, tuberculosis control, malaria control, etc. However, such decentralisation is taking place within the context of continuing personnel shortages, particularly at the professional level.

#### ***Sub-Vision***

***All the people of Namibia have equitable access to high quality and affordable health care services; the health infrastructure is strong, equitably distributed, and is being supported by adequate human, material and financial resources.***



## Promoting Healthy Human Environment

### Things to do

- Maintain the health care principles of equity, accessibility, affordability and community participation.
- Streamline training of medical staff and support the training of Namibian doctors.
- Intensity support for the expansion of health infrastructure throughout the country.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Healthy environment for all Namibians.
- Healthy facilities within easy reach of people in rural and urban places.
- Adequate housing, with water and sanitation facilities for all.
- Medical facilities have adequate staff (doctors, nurses, etc) mostly Namibians.

### Current Situation

- About 80% of the population live within 10km of a public health facility; leaving about 380,000 people, largely in rural areas, without ready access to health facilities.
- The ratio of population per public service doctor is 7,500; the severity of health staff shortages increases the further away one is from the capital cities.
- Focus of the health delivery strategy is Primary Health Care, with emphasis on community health, preventative measures and on treatments that can be provided relatively cheaply (mainly through outreach points, clinics, health centres and district hospitals).
- Most rural dwellers live in sub-standard houses without water and sanitation facilities.

### Things to avoid

- De-emphasise community participation in health matters.
- Rely on expatriate medical personnel.
- Reduce health budget for economic reasons.
- Concentrate health services and facilities in the cities so as to gain the economy of scale.

### Worst-case scenario

- Poor transport and communication infrastructure hamper the provision of health services to the rural population.
- Inadequate information on health matters make it difficult for communities to participate in public health programmes.
- Continued health staff shortages worsen the health situation.

### *Objectives*

The overall objectives are to:

- Improve the physical and mental health status of all Namibians, and
- Improve and maintain the social well-being, self-reliance and coping capacities of individuals, families and communities.
- Strengthen and consolidate the Primary Health Care programmes;
- Improve the quality of Institutional and Curative Health Care services;
- Strengthen the Health System Management and Development;
- Improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Resource Allocation and Functional Management.

### *Strategies*

- Ensuring that the health facilities are accessible to all and well equipped with both human and material resources, and the services are affordable and of acceptable and high quality.
- Strengthening the health system so that the system is effectively responsive to the increasing demands, and Primary Health Care/Community-based Health Care is playing a dominant role in health-care delivery, which is effective and efficient.
- Promoting institution and human capacity-building in the health sector in order to ensure there is appreciable increase in the number of health facilities and the staff establishment sufficient to meet increasing demands.
- Effectively decentralising health services and facilities to the political regions and the communities.
- Developing the HIS to provide timely, accurate data, available for planning and decision-making.
- Establishing a research institution responsible for research and production of drugs, especially the antiretroviral drugs.
- Strengthening and expanding Information, Education and Communication (IEC) programme, and ensure its effective and efficient implementation.
- Formulating an occupational health policy, including quality control measures for good processing industries. Implement the policy effectively.
- Ensuring the availability of affordable antiretroviral drugs to all HIV-infected Namibians.
- Changing the policy of confidentiality on HIV/AIDS for it to be treated as all other diseases.

## 4.2 WEALTH, LIVELIHOOD AND THE ECONOMY

When Namibia became independent in 1990, the economy was stagnant, growing at 1.1% in the 1980's. Its wealth remained highly skewed, with 5% of the population enjoying close to 80% of wealth in the country. There was widespread poverty and high unemployment. The access to basic services remained extremely limited to the majority of the population.

The direction economic policy-after Namibia's Independence - was to break the vicious cycle of poverty, skewed income inequality and high unemployment, and to build a foundation for self-sustaining economic growth and development. The main policy focus has, therefore, been to ensure macro-economic stability for ensured economic growth, poverty reduction and increased employment. It also ensures an enabling regulatory framework which aims to promote micro-economic reforms and efficiency, through trade and industry policy, rural and agricultural policy, and rural infrastructure development.

Since Independence, Namibia has achieved some notable success with regard to policy objectives through improving access to basic social service and infrastructural provision. Its broader macro-economic policy has been supportive of ensuring a stable and improved investment climate and moderately improved economic growth. Despite such improvements, Namibia's economic vision still remains central to the need of its desire to enhance the standard of living and to improve the quality of life of all the Namibian people. This can be achieved only if there is accelerated economic growth and sustainable economic development in the country.

### 4.2.1 Macroeconomic Environment

Although economic growth in Namibia started to improve considerably after Independence, the level of growth has not been sufficient to address the many social evils facing the country. During 1990-95, economic growth reached an average growth rate of 5 percent, surpassing the average of 1.1 percent during the previous decade. However, growth slowed thereafter, reaching a level of 3.5 percent during 1996-2000. (See Table 4.2 for projections of selected macro-economic indicators for the country up to 2030).

The high growth rates achieved in the first half of the 1990's were mainly primary sector driven, whereas the low growth in the latter part was due to adverse external influences, such as climatic and marine conditions with their attendant effects on agriculture and fisheries, and fluctuations in international commodity demand and prices, which impacted on mineral production and exports. to be about 7%. Taking into account a rapidly increasing population, real GDP per capita growth actually fell from 1.9% in the first part of the 1990's to 0.4% in the last part of the 1990s.

Although gross domestic investment improved remarkably after Independence, the level has remained insufficient to spur higher rates of economic growth needed to reduce poverty and the high unemployment rate. On average, gross domestic investment has hovered around 20 per cent of GDP during the first period after Independence, falling short of the high level saving of about 25 per cent of GDP which the country has been able to generate during the same period. As a result, a substantial amount of money is being invested outside the country.



Macroeconomic Indicators	1990	1996	2001	2006	2011	2016	2021	2026	2001
	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2030
Population growth#	3.1	2.9	2.6	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.1	2.0
Real GDP	5.0	3.5	3.5	3.7	4.5	6.3	7.3	9.4	5.8
Real GDP per capita	1.9	1.5	1.8	2.2	3.2	4.4	5.2	7.3	4.0
Real Fixed formation growth	7	3.7	5	6.2	7.7	9.9	12.7	15	9.4
Real Consumption growth	4.1	4.8	1.3	2.6	3.1	6.3	8	7.5	4.8
Inflation	10.7	8.5	9.0	7.7	7.8	6.1	4.5	4.5	6.6
Gini Coefficient	0.70	0.70	0.69	0.63	0.55	0.47	0.39	0.30	0.50
Employment ^	1.0	1.2	2.7	3.2	3.4	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.4
Trade Balance (%GDP)	-6.0	4.3	-0.9	-0.3	-4	-5.9	-5.9	-5.0	-3.6
Budget Deficit (%GDP)	-2.7	-3.8	-3.2	-3.7	2.4	-1.0	-0.3	0.0	-0.7

**Table 4.2: Selected Macro-economic Indicators 1990-2030**

*Note: With the exception of population, these are actual figures, whereas the rest are projections, #Population HIV/AIDS adjusted, ^ Employment growth obtained from Group on Human Resources. Figures are expressed in percentages, or averages, unless otherwise stated.*

The inflation rate in Namibia is largely determined by price determination in South Africa, since 80% of Namibia's imports come from South Africa. The inflation rate grew on average by 12.7% during 1990-1995. It started to decline moderately during the second half of the 1990s, averaging 8.5%.

Namibia has one of the most unequal income distributions in the world, posing a Gini coefficient of 0.70. This is extremely high when compared to 0.58 for the average Gini coefficient for SADC, excluding the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique. A Gini coefficient that is above 0.55 is an indication of a very unequal income distribution. Hence, GDP per capita can hardly be used to accurately reflect the welfare of the population in a country where income distribution is highly skewed.

Despite the government's efforts to create jobs, unemployment in Namibia has been recorded to be as high as 33.8% of the labour force. The level of under-employment in terms of very low levels of productivity and income, or insufficient work, is also widespread among workers in the traditional economy. Job-creation in Namibia has been rather luster lacking, and the structure of the labour force has not changed in line with expected trends. Instead, it has exhibited a decline in employment. Total employment fell over the period 1991-1997 by some 9.5%. The declining levels of employment are particularly evident in the primary industries, notably agriculture and mining, while employment grew within the

fishing sector. Employment in the primary industries declined by about 29% between 1991 and 1997, or by about 5.6% per annum on average.

Since Independence, Namibia's balance of payments has mostly recorded overall surpluses. These surpluses have been generated by the current account because the capital account has largely recorded net outflows throughout this period, resulting from the investments of pension funds and life insurer outside the country. The surpluses recorded on the current account were largely on account of investment income and transfers from customs union. On the other hand, the trade account has continued to register deficits since imports have remained larger than exports during the post- Independence period. Consequently, the trade deficit averaged about six per cent of GDP between 1990 and 2000.

Since 1990, the Government has been engaged in re-orienting Namibia's fiscal policy towards fiscal prudence and discipline with the objective of attaining overall macro-economic stability and laying the foundation for sustainable development, which is the basis for poverty alleviation and employment creation. The budget deficit, as a percentage of GDP, was recorded as 2.7% in the first half of the 1990s, but it declined to 3.4% during the 1996-2000 period.

### ***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia operates an open, dynamic, competitive and diversified economy that provides sustained economic growth, the basis for availing resources for the fulfilment of major national objectives like poverty reduction, human resource development, employment creation, and the provision of adequate social services and infrastructural facilities.***

### ***Targets by 2030***

- GDP and GDP per capita growth of 6.2% and 4.4% respectively
- Low unemployment level of 2.3% and an inflation rate averaging 4.5% per annum
- 10% primary, 42% secondary and 48% government sector of GDP
- Investment growth at 10.2%
- Gini coefficient at 0.3
- Trade deficit at 3.3% GDP
- Budget deficit at 1.5% GDP
- Substantial investment in rural infrastructure

## Macro-economic Environment

### Things to do

- Promote export development and competitiveness
- Promote efficient production and savings investment culture
- Promote an efficient services sector
- Consciously ensure external debt sustainability
- Establish an integrated industrial strategy
- Promote the existing EPZs
- Adopt spatial measures that are appropriate to different areas.
- Promote access to financial services.
- Ensure supply and efficiency of entrepreneurship
- Ensure supply and allocation of capital
- Promote skills development
- Support information and communications technology
- Promote regional integration
- Import relevant skills to augment shortage
- Modernise agriculture and develop competitive rural economies
- Facilitate economic empowerment and promotion of women and disadvantaged groups
- Establish a framework for national development and rural transformation
- Create a healthy labour force and society
- Create a literate and well-informed society
- Promote full employment

### Where we want to be (2030)

- High standard of living as reflected in high per capita income.
- Low unemployment and inflation rate.
- High economic growth of at least above 5% annually.
- Open, resource-based and diversified economy, with GDP growth being secondary sector (export oriented manufacturing and knowledge intensive) industry-driven.
- Well developed and modernised agricultural sector.
- Substantial investment in rural infrastructure, with flourishing SME and EPZ sectors.
- Highly skilled and productive labour force with high levels of employment.

### Current situation

- The average GDP growth is at 4.0%
- Low and declining per capita income
- High income inequality with Gini coefficient of 0.70
- Unemployment at 33.8% and rising. Employment growth is at 1.0 percent
- Poverty still widespread
- 20% Primary and 15% Secondary sector share of GDP.
- 55% Government contribution to GDP
- Inflation averaging at 10%
- Investment growth at 10%
- Trade Deficit as a % of GDP is at -6.0%
- Budget Deficit above 3%

### Worst-case scenario

- Slow GDP growth rate of 2.7% or less with negative growth in GDP per capita
- Still primary sector driven economy subjected to depressed commodity prices, adverse weather and environmental conditions
- Unemployment reaches 55% with 20% inflation rate
- Investment growth is near zero and income inequality worsens to 0.85
- Policy on diversification fails, thus trade balance deteriorates.
- Low productivity with a large unskilled labour force.
- Government deficit reaches 10% of GDP

### Things to avoid

- Heavy reliance on primary sector as the driving force for economic Growth.
- Promoting a relatively closed and protectionist economy with small or non-existent industrial capacity.
- Widespread poverty and skewed income distribution.
- Docile labour force with high unemployment.

### **Objective**

To ensure that Namibia is an industrialised country of equal opportunities, which is globally competitive, realising its maximum growth potential on a sustainable basis with an improved quality of life for all Namibians.

### **Strategies**

- Creating an open, dynamic, competitive and diversified economy.
- Promoting and sustaining sound macro-economic management.
- Creating employment opportunities.
- Ensuring consistency between macro-economic stabilisation and long-term development.
- Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS into macro-economic policies and programmes.
- Promoting integrated urban and rural development.
- Promoting regional economic integration and an industrial base.
- Reduction of poverty and income inequality.
- Fostering attitude-transformation and developing individual initiatives.
- Creation of a vibrant labour market information system to reduce unemployment.

## **4.2.2 Transport Infrastructure**

The transport sector is critical to the development of all sectors of the economy and in the promotion of national as well as regional integration. Namibia is relatively well supplied with road, aviation, maritime and rail transport infrastructure. However, there are imbalances in the regional coverage, particularly regarding roads and railways.

Until 1995, the road transport sector was still regulated in terms of the Road Transportation Act, 1977 (Act No. 74 of 1977), under which the market was dominated by a few large operators, making it difficult for previously disadvantaged Namibians to gain access to the market. Government, in a bid to redress this shortcoming, published the White Paper on Transport Policy in 1995 and the resultant recommendations are being implemented.

The transport sector has been implementing certain bold strategies in support of its objective to provide effective and efficient transport infrastructure, efficient and safe operation of transport services, and achievement and maintenance of quality standards in transport. These include:

- a) Institutional reform - review of the role of Government in transport, institutional reform, promotion of competition and user pricing;
- b) Adoption of labour-based road construction and maintenance, as a means of employment-creation and the alleviation of poverty, while maintaining effectiveness and efficiency;
- c) Review of parastatals in the transport sector, leading to the establishment of Air Namibia as a separate company and the consolidation of the remaining business of TransNamib Limited as TransNamib Holdings Ltd, operating as transNamib Limited for road-and NamRail for rail transport;
- d) Development of appropriate plans and policies, including: the National Transport Development Plan; the National Transportation Master Plan; the Roads Master Plan; the new Road Traffic and Transportation Act; and Maritime Development.

The main challenges faced by the transport sector are the following:

- Expansion and maintenance of road infrastructure network to uncovered places in rural areas and others.
- Adequate maintenance of existing road network;
- Provision of road linkages to neighbouring countries;
- Maritime development (policy and legal framework, sea transport, port management, shipping and trade, navigational aids and services, capacity-building, etc);
- Maintenance of existing infrastructure.
- Promotion of public/private partnership in infrastructures-development and operation.
- Railway network to cover the country.
- Development of air navigation and airspaces infrastructure to meet demand;
- Capacity-building in support of the sector, particularly in Civil Aviation, Meteorological Services and Maritime Affairs.

#### *Sub-Vision*

*Safe and cost-effective transport infrastructure is available throughout the country, and so also specialised services in their different modes, to balance the demand and the supply thereof in an economically efficient way; and there is freedom of participation in the provision of transport services, subject mainly to quality regulation.*



## Transport Infrastructure

### Things to do

- Expand road infrastructure network to uncovered places in rural areas and others.
- Design user friendly urban traffic system.
- Adequately maintain existing transport network.
- Provide road linkages to neighbouring countries.
- Promote public/private partnership in infrastructure development and operation.
- Railway network to cover the country.
- Develop and implement appropriate Acts/ Policies.
- Develop air navigation and airspaces infrastructure to meet demand.
- Develop capacity in support of the sector, particularly in Civil Aviation, Meteorological Services and Maritime Infrastructure Affairs.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Safe and cost-effective transport infrastructure is available throughout the country, serving rural and urban communities.
- Urban transportation makes adequate provision for the different categories of residents – pedestrians, cyclists, motorists, and people with disabilities.
- Specialised transport services in their different modes are available to balance the demand.
- Transport services (road, air and maritime) are provided in an economically efficient way.
- There is freedom of participation in the provision of transport services, subject mainly to quality regulation.
- The transport sector contributes to economic growth, employment creation, and poverty reduction in a competitive, safe, efficient, effective, reliable and affordable manner.
- Adequate capacity exists in support of the sector, including Civil Aviation, Meteorological Services and Maritime Affairs.
- Namibia is a transport hub within the region.

### Current situation

- Namibia is relatively well supplied with road, aviation, maritime and rail transport infrastructure.
- There are imbalances in the regional coverage, particularly regarding roads and railways.
- Government, in a bid to redress this shortcoming published the White Paper on Transport Policy in 1995 and the resultant recommendations are being implemented.
- Government has carried out institutional reform - review of the role of Government in transport, promotion of competition and user pricing.
- The sector is adopting labour-based road construction and maintenance, as a means of employment-creation and the alleviation of poverty, while maintaining effectiveness and efficiency.
- Review of parastatals in the transport sector led to the establishment of Air Namibia as a separate company and the consolidation of the remaining business of TransNamib Limited as TransNamib Holdings Ltd, operating as transNamib Limited for road and NamRail for rail transport.
- Government has developed some appropriate plans and policies, including: National Transport Development Plan; National Transportation master Plan; Roads Master Plan; new Road Traffic and the transportation Act.

### Worst-case scenario

- imbalances in transport coverage.
- Vast rural areas remaining inaccessible by any means of transport.
- Transport facilities too costly for the poor.
- Namibia poorly linked by transport to other countries in the region.

### Things to avoid

- Neglect maintenance of existing and new transport infrastructure.
- Inadequate transport coverage of rural areas.

### *Objectives*

The main objectives of the transport sector are to:

Contribute to national development through the provision of transport services that are equitably distributed throughout the country and which contribute to economic growth, employment creation, and poverty reduction in a competitive, safe, efficient, effective, reliable and affordable manner; and to render the provision, management and maintenance of transport services on an economical and long-term sustainable basis.

The objectives of the transport sector are to:

- implement a comprehensive culture change plan;
- develop private sector expertise in the construction and maintenance of roads on a tender/contract basis;
- draw up and implement a master plan of development for each of the airports/aerodromes of the airports company;
- draw up and implement an aviation communication and navigation aids master plan;
- commercialise air navigation services and create an autonomous Civil Aviation Authority;
- set up an appropriate maritime administration;
- revise and promulgate new maritime legislation;
- develop maritime training to provide qualified seafarers;
- promote the employment of Namibian seafarers to the international shipping industry;
- install appropriate measures to protect the integrity of the Namibian waters;
- ensure the implementation of the approved recommendations of the Independent Task Force on TransNamib Ltd;
- draw up and implement a master plan for the development of a meteorological services infrastructure in Namibia.
- commercialise most of its functions that can more efficiently be performed in a commercial environment;
- maximise the involvement of the private sector in the provision of services currently provided by the department;
- promote and participate in the establishment of additional maintenance and repair centres in the regions in order to enhance efficient maintenance and avoid unnecessary expenses;
- train, through special training courses, workshops and seminars all personnel of the ministry to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of staff and to foster professionalism;
- computerise the administrative functions of the ministry to ensure efficient performance and sound financial control;
- transform the stores financial system to that of a trade account;
- introduce the provisioning of non-standardised stock items, according to customer needs; and
- improve the efficiency and productivity of the government garage, including the commercialisation of certain functions which can be performed more efficiently in a commercial environment.

### *Strategies*

The broad strategies of the transport sector include the following:

- implementing the policies contained in the White Paper on Transport Policy;
- restructuring the Ministry as provided for in the MWTC 2000 Project;
- ensuring that new institutional structures are effective and responsive to technological and international developments;
- staffing the new institutional structures and the department with fully trained Namibians;
- implementing the road-user charging system;
- establishing the road fund administration, roads contractor company and roads authority, and to have these fully operational;
- reviewing appropriate aviation user charges;
- implementing the recommendations of the aerodromes Master Plan;
- promoting accession to relevant maritime conventions;
- approving the training and examination of seafarers in Namibia;
- issuing and registering seafarers and promoting the registration of ships and vessels;
- ensuring seaworthiness of ships and vessels;
- ensuring the prevention and combating of marine pollution;
- revising all relevant legislation, including the National Transportation Corporation Act, 1987;
- drawing up legislation for quality control of rail services; and
- putting in place a Namibian Meteorological Services Act.
- standardising basic building designs;
- creating a commercial account for fixed asset management;
- introduce appropriate adjustment of lease rental tariffs and categorizing all accommodation;
- implementing commercialisation principles and ideas to strengthen and
- increase the capacity of the organisation prior to becoming a fully fledged commercial entity;
- decentralizing cleaning services and the transfer of security services;
- reviewing the air transport service to meet the needs of user ministries;
- accelerating the vehicle replacement programme of the government garage.

### **4.2.3 Employment and Unemployment**

High and persistent unemployment is one of the key weaknesses in the Namibian economy. Dealing with unemployment is complex. Granted, in almost all economies at almost any time, many individuals are unemployed. That is, there are many people who are not working but who say they want to work in jobs like those held by individuals similar to them, at the wages those individuals are earning. However, in Namibia unemployment is of a structural nature in that there is a mismatch between skills and available jobs. There are also institutional bottlenecks that may inhibit job creation, such as the dominance of trade unions in both the private and public sectors, although the extent of its impact on employment and wages in Namibia is not well researched. Unemployment is estimated to be as high as over 30 per cent.

A recent study (2000) found that unemployment has been growing since the 1970's in spite of the fact that the economy has only a small labour force of about half a



million people. According to this study, there were about 20,000 people unemployed in 1970 compared to about 170,000 people in 1998. If these figures are true, then unemployment increased from 7.7 per cent in 1970 to 32.1 percent in 1998. Contrast this with growth in nominal GDP that was about N\$151.6 million in 1970 and in 1998 stood at N\$16,826 million (N\$8,165 million in 1990 prices). This strongly suggests that the economy has performed dismally at creating additional jobs, without controlling for other dynamics such as post-Independence population growth.

The economically active population in the country was estimated at 612,618 in 1997, made up of 307,454 men and 305,165 women. Based on the broad definition, the unemployment rate was 34.5% for the whole country; the rate was higher for women than for men (40.4% against 28.6%, respectively); and lower in urban areas (32.4%) than in rural areas (36.1%).

As pointed out earlier, unemployment in Namibia is very much of a structural nature, characterised by the following structural features:

- Limited size of the domestic market
- Economic dualism and labour market segmentation
- Declining productivity in agriculture
- Weak performance of the manufacturing sector

It has also been found that unemployment in Namibia has been accompanied by rising capital intensity, which implies that some substitution of labour for capital took place. Agriculture and fishing; trade, repairs and hotels; real estate and business services; and transport and communication are the only sectors that had employment intensity indexes greater than 1 for at least 14 years in total over the period 1970 to 1998.

Not surprisingly, mining, manufacturing and the general government were found to be highly capital intensive. Only fishing and agriculture were found to be consistently labour-intensive over the investigation period. Therefore, technological choice in the modern sector is critical and policies/incentives schemes that subsidises capital without corresponding subsidies for the use of labour, should be guarded against.

The Government has put in place a number of policy measures and programmes, to encourage local and foreign investment in the economy of Namibia, with the view to diversifying productive activities and creating employment opportunities for the country's fast-increasing labour force. These include:

- i. Affirmative Action (Employment) Act No. 29 of 1998, for the enhanced participation and integration of previously disadvantaged groups in society in the labour market, and the promotion of equal opportunity in employment;
- ii. White Paper on Labour Based Works (September 1998), for positive contribution to poverty reduction and employment creation;
- iii. National Employment Policies for Job Creation and Protection of Workers (May 1997), to provide a legal framework for employment promotion and creation;
- iv. Public Service Act No. 13 of 1995, for establishment, management and efficiency of the Public Service and regulation of employment;
- v. Employee Compensation Act No. 30 of 1941 (amended by Act 5 of 1995), for the establishment of Employees Compensation Accident Fund and Accident Pension Fund.

In 1995, the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development produced a National Agricultural Policy, which outlined the objectives of the agricultural sector, and strategies for achieving the objectives. The objectives included, among others, achieving growth and stability in farm incomes; ensuring food security and improved nutritional status; creating and sustaining viable employment and general livelihood opportunities in rural areas.

During 1997, the Ministry of Trade and Industry came up with a policy paper on small business development, whose general stance was pro-development of small business, as a way of involving the majority of the people in productive activities. The specific objectives of the policy were to: increase the real income accruing to the small business sector; diversify activities away from low value-added and crowded activities; and increase the involvement of small business in manufacturing activities. The government regarded the development of small business (small-scale and informal sector enterprises) as holding the key to employment and the economic empowerment of a large section of the population.

In spite of these policy incentives, which were put in place to promote investment in the economy and stimulate employment, especially in the manufacturing sector, employment still remains a major problem as the economy of Namibia remains heavily dependent upon tertiary and primary industries.

The results of the 1997 Namibia Labour Force Survey show that agriculture remains the largest employer of labour in the country, employing 36.6% of those economically active. This was followed by the wholesale and retail trade sector (8.4%), private households (7.1%), and community/personal services (6.1%). The private sector employed 44% of the workforce, followed by Government. A fairly large proportion of the workforce (11.7%) is classified as ‘unpaid family worker’, while 9% are self-employed.

The 2001 census results, illustrated in Figure 4.7, indicate that the workforce is dominated by Private and Public Services, employing 57.1% of all workers, followed by agriculture, hunting, fishing (25%) and manufacturing (12.3%).




Figure. 4.7: Employment Workforce by Industry and Gender (2001)



As indicated by the educational characteristics of the workforce, only a very small proportion of the employed is skilled: 12.5% of the workforce has no formal education; 44% has only full or partial primary education; and less than 1.0% has post-secondary education.

The 2001 census figures show that the overall unemployment rate is 31%, higher for females (35.9%) than for males (26.8%). Unemployment is remarkably high among the youth; 40.4% for those aged 15-19; and 46.9% for those 20-24 years of age. As illustrated in Fig.4.8, there are significant differences over the employment rate by age for both sexes; the rate is higher for females in all ages up to age 64.




Figure. 4.8: Unemployment Rate by Age and Sex (2001)

Although the Labour Act of 1992 stipulates that no child under the age of 14 years may be employed for any purpose, the 1999 Namibia Child Activity Survey found that 16.3% of children between 6 and 18 years of age were employed.

**Sub-Vision**

*The economic environment is suitable for all citizens who are able and willing to work, and there is full employment in the economy, with a well-established and functioning Labour Market Information System for the effective management of the dynamics of the labour force.*

## Employment and Unemployment

### Things to do

- Promote vigorously employment creation policies and programmes.
- Implement the existing labour laws and policies in the country and international conventions to which Namibia has committed herself.
- Promote the effective development and operation of small and medium scale enterprises.
- Provide training in business development and management to both in-school and out-of-school men and women.
- Encourage the development of self-employment among potential job seekers.
- Ensure that education and training programmes address the demands in the labour market.
- Place emphasis on technical education and training at all levels and facilitate such training by providing adequate financial support.
- Institute measures that will increase labour productivity.
- Encourage people to work with their hands.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- There is decent work for all who are willing and able.
- Healthy labour conditions exists
- There is social justice, equity and fair labour practices
- There is compliance by all with the legislation on affirmative action and equal opportunities in employment.
- Namibian workers earn at least a decent wage.
- Child labour is non-existent.
- Employment protection is pursued
- Industrial peace/harmony is maintained.
- The Labour Market Information System is in operation in all the regions, and is effective.
- A continuing process of institutional and human capacity building is enhancing productivity of labour.
- The workforce has access to and effectively utilises modern technology in production, marketing and communication.

### Current situation

- High and persistent unemployment is one of the key weaknesses in the Namibian economy.
- The 2001 census figures show that the overall unemployment rate is 31%, higher for females (35.9%) than for males (26.8%). Unemployment is remarkably high among the youth, namely 40.4% for those aged 15-19; and 46.9% for those 20-24 years of age.
- The Government has put in place a number of policy measures and programmes, to diversify productive activities and create employment opportunities, for e.g. Affirmative Action (Employment) Act No. of 1998, White Paper on Labour Based Works (September 1998); National Employment Policies for Job Creation and Protection of Workers (May 1997); Public Service Act No. 13 of 1995; Employee Compensation Act No. 30 of 1941 (amended by Act 5 of 1995).
- Employment still remains a major problem as the economy of Namibia remains heavily dependent upon tertiary and primary industries.

### Things to avoid

- Placing barriers on capacity development.
- Discouraging the operation of small and medium scale enterprises.
- Not implementing employment creation policies and programmes.
- Passive support to programmes of education and training, particularly in science and technology

### Worst-case scenario

- Widespread unemployment and under employment.
- Abundant supply of unskilled workers.
- Declining labour productivity and rising wages.
- Labour unrest.
- Predominance of foreign workers

### **Objective**

To ensure that all factors of production in an economy (land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship) are fully utilised.

### **Strategies**

- Placing competent people in the right places with clear job descriptions to prevent duplication of efforts.
- Promoting self-employment by creating the enabling environment for the SME sector, including access to loan for micro and macro enterprises.
- Maintaining an effective Labour Market Information System.
- Creating job opportunities for all categories of workers.
- Promoting local business people.
- Training people in specific skills needed.
- Applying non-discriminatory employment policy in all sections of our society.
- Creating a conducive environment for investors and providing practical training for self-employment.
- Formulating and implementing appropriate employment creation policies and programmes.
- Encouraging disadvantaged persons to exercise their skills.
- Equipping people with skills to compete in the market environment.
- Supporting capacity-building initiatives at all levels.

#### **4.2.4 Data and Research**

National data on macro-economic issues are collected through the Population and Housing Census, undertaken every ten years, with preliminary results from the 2001 census just released. Other national surveys include the Household Income and Expenditure Survey; the 1999 Living Conditions Survey; the Namibia Labour Force Survey, 1997, 2001; the 1999 Child Activity Survey. National social and economic data have also been collected through the 1994/95 Namibia Agricultural Census and the series of Annual Agricultural Production Surveys since 1996/97. Health data have been collected through the Demographic and Health Surveys (1992 and 2000). The Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for vital registration (the continuous and timely registration of vital events, i.e. births, deaths and marriages). However, coverage is far from universal; it has been estimated that only 20.3 percent of the expected total live births in the country were registered in 1991, and 27.2 percent in 1992, with better coverage reported in urban than rural areas.

The National Population Policy for Sustainable Development provides for the collection and dissemination of national social, demographic, economic and related data for planning purposes and encourages the strengthening of existing institutions established for this purpose (e.g., the Central Bureau of Statistics; the line Ministries; etc). In line with the Policy's multi-sectoral approach, the need to adopt collaborative approaches to data collection, analysis and dissemination is being fostered among the relevant agencies. Virtually all the Government sectors collect official data, but most of these are not analysed to provide information to the public.

Research is being undertaken in the country by numerous institutions both public and private (Unam; the PoN; National Forestry Research Centre; National


Botanical Research Institute; DRFN; NEPRU; Namibia Nature Foundation; Central Veterinary Laboratory; National Forensic Laboratory; Namibia Meteorological Service; and some other ministries, agencies and parastatals).

The review for NDP2 formulation shows that private sector research activities in Science and Technology are limited. However, there is no mechanism for monitoring research activities in the country. Therefore, the scope of research activities and their impact on planning and development in general are difficult to determine. It is planned that during the NDP2 cycle, Government will initiate, among others, four key co-ordinating Science and Technology institutions; namely, i) Commission for Research, Science and Technology; ii) the Centre for Innovations, Research and Entrepreneurship of Namibia; iii) National Council on Higher Education; and: iv) Science and Technology Information Centre.

In order to support Science and Technology research in public institutions and encourage private participation, Government plans to create a common resource pool, the Science and Technology Innovation Fund. The Fund will finance national research under the guidance of the National Commission for Research, science and Technology. Research on macroeconomic issues will continue to be supported by Government and private agencies through their conventional channels.

***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia has a wealth of accurate, reliable and current information on aspects of its population in relation to social and economic development planning and programme management; through research, the range of information available on population and development in Namibia is consolidated, the national research programme continues to identify and fill gaps in knowledge.***



## Data and Research

### Things to do

- Strengthen the existing institutions that are responsible for generating data and information for development planning (Central Bureau of Statistics and other Ministries collecting social and economic, and environmental data);
- Create adequate capacity for research in social and economic development in Namibia through the higher institutions of learning.
- Develop a national research agenda on social and economic issues and implement it.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- There are adequate scientific data and information (social, demographic, economic, environmental,) for development planning and programme management.
- There is complete registration of births, deaths and marriages.
- The existing institutions that are responsible for generating data, and conducting research for development planning continue to operate efficiently.
- There are adequate resources for data collection, analysis and dissemination of data and information.
- Adequate capacity exists for training and research in Science, technology, as well as social and economic development and environmental issues in Namibia.
- Adequate research is done in support of an active, dynamic and competitive Science and Technology sector in Namibia.
- There is a general understanding of development issues in the country.
- Research covers a wide range of development issues in the country, and information on research is accessible.
- There is adequate funding of data collection, research and information dissemination for development planning and programme management.

### Current situation

- National data are collected through the Population and Housing Census, undertaken every ten years since 1991.
- Other national surveys include the Household Income and Expenditure Survey; the 1999 Living Conditions Survey; Labour Force Surveys, 1997 and 2001; Annual Agricultural surveys, 1996 to 2002.
- Health data are collected through the Demographic and Health Surveys (1992 and 2000) conducted by the Ministry of Health and Social Services, with support from other research agencies.
- Vital registration is carried out by the Ministry of Home Affairs but coverage is incomplete.
- Research works are being undertaken in the country by numerous institutions both public and private, but there is no mechanism to monitor the range of activities.
- It is planned that during the NDP2 cycle, Government will initiate, among others things, four key co-ordinating Science and Technology institutions.
- In order to support Science and Technology research work in public institutions and encourage private participation, Government plans to create a common resource pool, the Science and Technology Innovation Fund.
- Research on macro-economic issues will continue to be supported by Government and private agencies through their conventional channels.

### Things to avoid:

- Discourage research in Science and Technology; as well as social and economic research and data collection.
- Reduce resources to institutions responsible for research, data collection and analysis.
- Collect data without analyzing.
- Non-dissemination of data and information.

### Worst-case scenario

- Existing data for planning are outdated
- Planning is done without adequate data and information
- Programme monitoring and evaluation inhibited due to lack of data
- Research is neglected

### *Objectives*

- To organise and co-ordinate data collection, processing, and dissemination at all levels of the economy and society.
- To ensure the continuous production of necessary data for development planning, plan monitoring and evaluation and progress reporting.
- To ensure that, through research, the range of information available on development issues in Namibia is consolidated, adequate and accessible for planning and programme management.

### *Strategies*

- Implement a National Statistical System, through consultations with producers and users of statistics in the country, consisting of decennial censuses, universal and complete vital registration (births, deaths, marriages), official records laboratory studies and special surveys.
- Strengthening the existing and new institutions involved in the collection, analysis and dissemination of scientific and macro-economic and related data for planning.
- Strengthening capacity-building for research and programme implementation by the existing institutions and through networking.
- Promoting timely and continuous collection, analysis and dissemination of data from all sources;
- Promoting research on science and technology and emerging development issues such as HIV/AIDS, orphans, ageing and socio-cultural factors affecting demographic behaviour, particularly sexuality, family formation, migration, gender discrimination, etc.
- Integrating Namibia Vision 2030 issues into the school curricula at all levels; building capacity in the training of teachers; and designing and publishing instructional materials on Vision 2030.

## **4.3 DEVELOPING A KNOWLEDGE-BASED SOCIETY**

The modern world is moving from heavy industry to a knowledge-based economy based on specialist services, specialised industries, communications, and information technologies. Namibia needs to fast track its development process, and springboard over the heavy industry development path taken by the industrialised countries. We must focus on high value-added services, specialised industries that are modest in their water requirements and information technology. To achieve this, we will have to transform ourselves into an innovative, knowledge-based society, supported by a dynamic, responsive and highly effective education and training system.

### **4.3.1 Information and Communication Technology (ICT)**

Advanced micro-electronics-based Information and Communication Technologies (ICT's) are at the heart of recent social and economic transformations in the industrialised and much of the developing world. These technologies are now being applied to all sectors of the economy and society. The growth in the use of ICT's is aided by persistent price reductions and the continuing improvements in their quality and capabilities. Greater use of ICT's opens up new opportunities for Namibia and other developing countries to harness these technologies and services meet their development goals.

Worldwide, ICT is developing at an impressive rate and the trends for future developments include wireless access and digital technology developments; ever-increasing access to information for education, entertainment, health and lifestyle through the Internet; growth in e-business; expansion of ‘virtual world’ (education, social, information-sharing, entertainment); and the development of mechatronics (merging of electronic and mechanical devices).

Namibia’s ICT sector suffers from a lack of trained and skilled ICT human resources. Most organisations, therefore, import these skills from other countries. This importation is made difficult by bureaucracy.

Limited investment and focus in this area reduces the potential for Namibia to benefit optimally from the many opportunities offered by ICTs. Unless this changes, Namibia will lose its current Human Development Index rating and fall behind other developing countries, which are implementing ICT development plans.

The primary reason for Namibia’s poor ICT development status, is the inadequate levels of achievement of school leavers in mathematics, and science. The proportion of Namibian students enrolled in science subjects in 1995-97 was only 4% of all tertiary-level students. Although, Namibia is one of several countries in southern Africa with good ICT access, there are some limitations. Key limitations include:

- The lack of competition in the telecommunications field, which is dominated by Telecom Namibia Ltd.
- No hardware manufacturers and a limited number of software developers in Namibia. All hardware and standard software are mainly imported from South Africa.
- International bandwidth of 7.2Mb, is very low compared to international standards outside Africa.
- Connectivity costs in Namibia are relatively high.
- All households and businesses must use the services of Telecom Namibia for Internet access.
- Only 7.2% of households have access to a computer and 38.6% to a telephone (see Figure 4.9, based on 2001 census data).
- Some e-business activities take place in Namibia, but all web pages hosted in Namibia have a very slow access rate due to low bandwidth.
- Namibia’s libraries are poorly equipped to play their vital role in the ‘Age of Information’. Very few offer Internet access. None had any media other than reading material available (no videos, CDs, DVDs etc) and only a very limited number of periodicals. There is also a lack of qualified librarians.




Figure 4.9: Access by Households to TV, Telephone and Computer (2001)

**Sub-Vision**

*Advanced microelectronics-based Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are used to achieve social and economic transformations in Namibia; the costs of ICTs continue to fall as their capabilities increase, and ICTs are being applied throughout all sectors of the economy and society to serve development goals.*



## Information & Communication Technology

### Things to do

- Develop and implement a comprehensive ICT policy.
- Integrate ICT education and training in school curricula.
- Invest in research for development to promote local ICT industries.
- Improve access to ICT facilities for all members of the Namibian society.
- Enhance bandwidth both internally and externally to at least 1 GB.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Comprehensive national ICT policy fully implemented.
- IT training from pre-primary through to tertiary education.
- A university of Applied Science and Technology with adequate support established.
- Collaboration among science and technology research groups involved in ICT, in developed world and Namibia, entrenched.
- Internet access available to and used by most Namibians.
- Internet access costs reduced and speed improved to high level.
- Internet-based training facilities reach all Namibians.
- Wireless networks installed across the country.
- Significant local production of ICT equipment achieved.
- Incentives and subsidies for computer hardware purchase available.
- Support for entrepreneurs in ICT available.
- ICT infrastructure and services advanced.

### Current situation

- Growth and importance of ICTs in social and economic sectors worldwide
- Persistent price reductions and improvements in quality and capabilities of ICTs worldwide
- Lack of trained and skilled ICT human resources in Namibia
- Dependence on imported skills and technical knowledge
- Poor level of education in mathematics, sciences and technological skills
- Inadequacy of investment in ICTs
- Lack of focus on ICT development by government.

### Things to avoid

- Government does not implement ICT policy
- Inadequate investment into improving basic education in this area (including mathematics, IT and natural sciences)
- Insufficient support for students in engineering, ICT and natural and applied sciences
- No subsidies to reduce computer hardware prices
- No support for companies providing additional Internet access services to create competition
- No financial support for local ICT production industries
- No investment or policy to increase Internet access across Namibia
- No investment into improving Internet access speed in Namibia.

### Worst-case scenario

- No ICT policy, thus leading to stagnation of ICT development.
- Basic education in mathematics, IT and science stays on current poor levels
- Namibians remain essentially illiterate in ICT.
- Limited access to ICT facilities.
- Internet access costs remain at current high level, or increase
- Internet access speed remains at current low level or decreases
- ICT/Internet access only available in limited urban areas
- No investment in modern wireless communication technology
- Dependence on imported foreign equipment, services, knowledge and expertise in ICT.

### ***Targets for ICT Development***

The future deployment and use of ICTs in Namibia with the objective to provide economic benefit for all members of the Namibian society requires at least the implementation of the following strategies:

- Developing, implementing and monitoring a national ICT policy;
- IT training from pre-primary education, and high financial support of students in applied sciences;
- Investments in electrical/electronic engineering, and computer science education; establishment of a University of Applied Science and Technology with high financial support, virtual Internet based-training facilities used to reach all Namibians;
- Support of co-operation of the Namibian institutions with international research institutions;
- Provisions of benefits for PC purchase, free broadband Internet access for the public;
- Support for ICT/Internet access centres in rural areas is given, and installation of wireless LAN implementations in identified centres of the country;
- Support of companies specialised in hardware design in conjunction with mechatronics;
- Namibian and foreign entrepreneurs in the areas of ICT are financially supported;
- Investments in governmental ICT infrastructure and IT services.

Priority must be given to the development, implementation, and monitoring of a comprehensive ICT policy for Namibia. After the successful implementation of the policy, which must have the support of all sections of the population, the industries and the government, we can expect the following development:

#### **2005:**

- PC prices in Namibia are among of the lowest in the world due to financial support and reduced taxes;
- Small companies assemble PCs and equipment in Namibia;
- Telecentres are active in several rural centres in Namibia;
- The connection bandwidth of Namibia to the Internet backbone is increased by the factor 100 compared to the value in 2001;
- Wireless high-speed networks are implemented in all larger cities in Namibia;
- Due to massive advertisement campaigns, financial benefits and world class curricula and lecturers, 50% of all Namibian students study at the University for Applied Science in the areas of electrical-electronic engineering and computer science;
- Virtual learning programmes and facilities – in combination with the telecentres – allow all Namibians access to further training and education;
- Selected governmental institutions provide e-business services to the Namibian public and to foreign investors.

#### **2010:**

- The ICT graduates establish a large number of small companies supported by foreign capital;



- Namibia has the largest wireless high-speed network in the world and foreign companies invest in research institutions in Namibia;
- Due to the low prices for IT equipment and the local production of solar-energy supported power supplies, in addition to wireless LAN technology, people in nearly all rural areas in Namibia have access to the Internet;
- The virtual learning programmes developed in Namibia are used worldwide;
- Media technology is another area which benefits from ICT know-how available in Namibia;
- The increased use of ICT in production and service industry makes the Namibian industry competitive on the world market;
- All governmental institutions provide e-business services to the Namibian public and to foreign investors.

**2020:**

- ICT companies in Namibia generate a significant amount of tax income and employment opportunities;
- Media technology services are another growing industry segment targeting worldwide export markets;
- Namibian ICT experts are working in neighbouring African countries and gain worldwide experience;
- Namibia exports more and more knowledge and knowledge-based products to the world markets.

**2030:**

- The ICT sector is, economically the most important sector in Namibia;
- Namibian-based ICT service companies are competitive players on international markets;
- Namibia is exporting, to a large extent, tailor-made hard- and software to the worldwide market using e-business.

***Objective***

To have fully developed and implemented a national ICT strategy with sufficient funds allocated to support local ICT production and ICT training and education, resulting in a significant increase in the use of ICTs in Namibia, providing economic benefit for all members of Namibian society.

***Strategies***

- Developing, implementing and monitoring a comprehensive national ICT policy.
- Producing and using ICTs to social and economic advantage – reduce risks by forging a dynamic relationship between human and technological resources.
- Integrating ICT education and training into education and training system
- Developing human resources for effective national ICT strategies – through education and training in relevant technological and scientific skills.
- Factoring HIV/AIDS into ICT development strategies.
- Improving access to ICT facilities for all members of the Namibian society.
- Strengthen and co-ordinate existing ICT expertise within Namibia.
- Encourage collaboration of Namibian institutions with international research institutions.
- Investing in research and development and promoting local ICT industries.
- Reducing costs to access through encouraging competition among telecommunications companies.



### 4.3.2 Production Technology

#### *Natural Resources*

Namibia is rich in resources but, like other developing countries, is hampered by challenges such as poverty, unemployment and crime. However, Namibia does have a number of positive factors in its favour. The country is politically stable and has good infrastructure including roads and communications. The government is committed to rural and urban developments, and emphasis is placed on health, education and other socio-economic matters.

Namibia's current industries are centred around the food sector – with the exception of mining. These industries include fishery; processing of farming and game products (meat, tannery, and dairy); and processing of agricultural products (mills, breweries). In terms of technology, on the whole, the companies working in these areas are up to standard. One of the major problems they face is the limited number of adequately trained people to maintain the equipment. This is a major contributing factor to non-competitive productivity.

The manufacturing and vendor sector needs to be nourished and developed. There are currently several constraints – the lack of funds for entrepreneurs because of the conservative approach of the banking sector; the lack of many major industries resulting in low vendor industry growth; insufficient technical support from development agencies (both NGO and governmental); and again the lack of local technical skill and knowledge.

#### *Technical Capacity*

Highly educated technicians and engineers are scarce, making it difficult for companies to conduct their own research and development. The technical and scientific skills and knowledge of a whole generation need uplifting. For this Namibia will have to turn to foreign experts for a while. This can enhance Namibia's efforts to become self-sufficient in the handling and development of machinery and technology.

The shortage of human capacity with technical skills, innovation and high productivity are factors contributing to the low rate of Namibia's industrialisation. Other factors are, the lack of adequate financial support from the finance sector, and suitable loans from banks.

At present, most of the services performed within the country are competitive but heavily reliant on foreign expertise. Posts at an advanced level cannot be filled adequately by Namibians. Newly educated Namibian technicians and engineers could engage themselves in the maintenance area as a starting point where they can gain experience and additional knowledge to drive the industrialisation of the country and, in the future, enable Namibian development and technology.

#### *Energy Resources and Services*

Energy provides essential inputs for other economic sectors and social services. The lack of access to energy services constitutes a major obstacle to sustainable development. An industrialised nation needs to be at least partially independent of foreign energy. Namibia experiences a very diverse situation: some small (urban) areas are quite well supplied with energy while other – mostly quite large – areas

have very little or no electrical energy supply at all. Moreover, the energy sources available in the rural areas are mostly uneconomic, inefficient and usually environmentally unfriendly.

The most cheapest and most effective form of power generation is gas turbines using natural gas. Low cost power and its (almost) unlimited availability is the main requirement for any industrial growth. When located close to a very massive mining sector project and a fresh water source, makes it more ideal. Kudu gas is located roughly 30 kilometres from Oranjemund. With gas available, many down - the - line industries can be set up.

Namibia depends on imports for its liquid petroleum fuel. Liquid fuels is available countrywide at prices that reflect actual costs of delivery to the consumer through a network of service stations and general dealers. The Government, through the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), regulates the prices, but the intention is to gradually ease price controls.

Research has revealed that there is an ongoing increase in prices of petroleum products. Non-petroleum producing countries have to devise means of how to best manage the deregulation, liberalisation and expansion and expansion of the petroleum market. Rural electrification is one of the priority programmes which was started immediately after Independence. N\$203 million have been invested in the programme, and more than 15,000 rural centres were connected to the national power grid. The rural electricity consumption has increased by 37.3% from 1994 to 1999.

The Electricity Control Board (ECB) was established in 2000 as the regulator of the Namibian electricity sector under Electricity Act 2000. As from July 2001 companies/institutions have to acquire a license from the ECB for generation, distribution and supply of electricity.

Four important power transmission expansion projects of national significance were completed during NDP1. The 400kV of 900km inter-connector project is one of the biggest capital projects in Namibia to date to increase the power supply capacity. It will strengthen security of supply through integration into the future Southern African Power Pool western corridor, from the Inga hydroelectric plant, through Angola, to South Africa. A feasibility study on Epupa hydropower was completed in 1998 and handed over to the Governments of Namibia and Angola. The feasibility study indicates that there is a capacity of about 400MW. Potential sites have been identified for a hydro power plant downstream of Ruacana.

#### *Renewable energy*

The Government has worked on a biogas pilot project, using Indian technology, to alleviate energy constraints. Biogas is an alternative energy for lighting and cooking and also has a rural development component. The raw material used to produce biogas is cow dung, which is also used as fertiliser. Ten domestic biogas plants were constructed countrywide and it is planned to expand the project.

Biomass fuels are the main sources of energy used for heating and cooking by most rural areas and some urban informal settlements. The availability of wood

resources in some areas is decreasing due to the lack of alternative fuels. In 1998, the Government established a National Biomass Programme to address the needs and problems that communities face on biomass resources.

*Policies*

The Government has put in place a policy framework that encourages the exploration and exploitation of the country's energy resources in a sustainable manner. The Namibian White Paper on Energy Policy was promulgated by Parliament in May 1998. The White Paper on Energy touches on issues of urban and rural energy needs, economy, electricity, oil and gas, renewable energy, economic empowerment, environment, health and safety, energy efficiency and conservation, regional energy trade and co-operation.

*Sub-Vision*

***Namibia is an industrialised nation, with a viable natural resources export sector, increased size of skills based industrial and service sector, and market oriented production; there is high level of self sufficiency, reliable and competitively priced energy, meeting the demand of households and industry.***



## Production Technology

### Things to do

- Encourage shift of value of profession towards technically oriented knowledge and skills, and the promotion of an enterprise culture.
- Support co-operation between Namibian educational/research institutions and international institutions.
- Promote research and development: water, renewable energy, deregulation and taxation.
- Promote and increase attractiveness of Namibia as a site for industry, services and business.
- Support joint ventures with outside investors.
- Promote new SME industries and improve financing schemes for new businesses by reworking current banking system.
- Establish aid agencies and technical institutes to support new enterprises and improve mentorship with international experts.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Natural resources are sustainably used.
- Local vendors are involved in projects at all possible levels.
- Skills-based industry sector growing.
- Namibia largely self-sufficient with reliable and competitively priced energy, meeting industry demands, plus some export of energy.
- Production of energy from renewable sources – solar, wind and water in place.
- Solar hydrogen production in place.
- High level of awareness of value of energy and water.
- High level of responsibility towards the environment and pollution evident.
- Water access technologies in place (reclamation, desalination etc).
- Small enterprises have grown to service major national projects.
- Financing schemes for new businesses in place.
- Support from technical institutes and agencies, and mentorship from local and international experts available for new enterprises.
- Namibia viewed as an attractive site for industry and business.
- Proper education and technical training has allowed the nation to add value to its resources.

### Current situation

- Namibia is rich in resources but hampered by limited capacity to use these resources.
- Besides mining, Namibia's current industries centre around the food and beverage sector.
- Current industries up to standard technologically.
- Main problem is lack of adequately trained people to maintain equipment.
- Namibia dependent on foreign experts to rectify this shortage in local technical knowledge.
- Service sector competitive but reliant on foreign experts. Posts at advanced level cannot be filled adequately by Namibians.
- Manufacturing and vendor sector lacking funds, sufficient technical support from development agencies and local technical expertise.

### Worst-case scenario

- Namibia's technological development remains at its current level, thus the country depends on imported products.
- The level of science and technology education does not improve, thus continued dependence on expatriates.
- Insufficient financial support for SMEs and entrepreneurs in the industry, so they remain at their current level or even decrease in number.
- Natural resources are depleted.
- No progress in the use of renewable energy sources
- Poverty increases.

### Things to avoid

- Planning major projects without focus on the country's natural resources.
- No major projects implemented.
- Lack of focus on vendor-oriented projects.
- No encouragement of local participation in major projects.
- No investment into improving education and training in science and technology.
- Continued reliance on imported technical skills and expertise.
- No investment in any sectors of industry.
- No research in this area or co-operation with international research bodies.
- Insufficient financial and mentor support for SMEs.
- No investment and research into renewable energy sources.
- No education about value of energy, water and other natural resources.

### **Objectives**

- To achieve enhanced local technological development, with a focus on appropriate technology;
- To integrate entrepreneurship and technological innovation training into the education and training system from early childhood;
- To achieve high value-added products and services.
- To achieve security of energy supply through an appropriate diversity of economically competitive and reliable sources.
- To ensure that households and communities have access to affordable and appropriate energy supplies.
- To ensure that the energy sector is efficient, making contributions to Namibia's economic competitiveness.

### **Strategies**

- Basing industry and major projects on Namibia's natural resources (e.g. power generation from 'Kudu Gas' at Oranjemund; a national water transfer and management system to optimise sustainable water use, including social and ecological needs; and use of lime and gypsum resources).
- Investing in mining, food-processing and service sector.
- Prioritising education in science and technology.
- Encouraging local participation in major projects, and ensuring that projects are vendor-oriented.
- Acquiring highly educated trainers for the education of Namibians (especially in the fields of science and technology).
- Promoting renewable energy sources and implementing projects for production from these sources to meet industry demand.
- Promoting the reduction of HIV/AIDS.
- Establishing duty-free corridor network along roads joining capitals of SADC countries and ports on east and west coasts.
- Ensuring that organisation and management of major projects are maintained and administered by technical experts.
- Adhering to sound environmental standards in the distribution and consumption of energy.
- Promoting self-sufficiency and access to energy services.
- Ensuring cost-effective energy services.
- Subscribing to taxation measures on oil/liquid fuels for reinvestment into other areas of high priority.
- Emphasising social development, human technical capacity building and regional development in the production and distribution of energy.
- Meeting the country's energy demands reliably and competitively.
- Reducing dependency on traditional fuel.


### **4.3.3 Education and Training**

Government has made big investments in education and training since Independence. Many changes have been made in the education system with new curricula introduced at all levels, efforts to improve the qualifications of teachers and other instructors and to obtain a suitably qualified teaching force. There have been big improvements in the infrastructure, and several reforms have been introduced to improve access, equity and efficiency in the system. There are,



however, several areas where further improvements need to be made. The system is fragmented, with few opportunities for learners to pass from one provider of education and training to another. The fragmentation is, however, being resolved through legislative and policy interventions. In spite of the investment that has been made in new buildings for schools, tertiary institutions and learning centres, there are still schools with insufficient classrooms and other facilities, and some areas are not adequately provided with libraries or learning centres.

The four colleges of education are producing teachers for basic education, but only 49.6% of the teachers in service are well-qualified. On its part, the University of Namibia is producing an increasing number of graduate teachers. To be recognised as a fully qualified teacher, the minimum qualification required is a degree or diploma in education. Presently only 46.9% have reached this level. The other teachers have the chance to upgrade their qualifications with the Basic Education Teachers Diploma through in-service training, or through a number of other programmes offered by other training providers. The supply of qualified personnel at all levels of education is inadequate. Curricula at all levels have been reformed after Independence, but at certain levels and areas there is still some foreign influence. The Grade 12 examinations are mostly set and marked according to the requirements of the Cambridge International Examinations and various tertiary qualifications are certified by South African boards. However the curricula and examinations are undergoing constant revision to make them more relevant to Namibia. The NQA is working on a qualifications framework, as well as establishing unit standards for all occupational classes. The results of the 2001 census show that out of the estimated total population aged 15 and above, who left school, 33.5% did not complete primary school. This figure was made up of 32.4% females and 34.7% males (details illustrated in Figure 4.10). Only 2% of adults who had left school have a university education, with slightly more males (2.6%) than females (1.8%).



**Figure 4.10: Population 15+ Years, Left School, by Educational Attainment and Sex (2001)**

About 90% of school-age children are in school, with nearly 100% of the lower primary age group. The schools have introduced a system to improve their internal efficiency, whereby the number of repeaters has been reduced to less than 15%, and there is no repetition at the end of Grade 10 or Grade 12. There are only places in senior secondary schools for about 50% of the learners completing basic education. Learners who fail the Grade 10 or Grade 12 examinations are provided with opportunities to improve on their results through NAMCOL, TUCSIN and



other organisations. The proportion of female learners in the school system is about 50% but in certain subject areas, such as agriculture, science and commercial subjects, females are under-represented at both secondary and tertiary levels.

Although the number of centres catering for pre-school children has increased considerably, early childhood centres still only cater for the needs of about 31 percent of children aged between 3 and 6. Training of workers is provided by a number of NGOs and there is no provision by government. There are many opportunities for life-long learning provided by government, parastatal companies, private companies and non-governmental organisations. Some result in qualifications while others improve the skills and competencies of the participants without giving them a certificate. The government has a national literacy programme which has made big advances in providing literacy education for adults, with the rate currently estimated at about 80%. Further efforts are needed to bring it up to the desired level of at least 90%. There is often a problem of articulation between one programme and another and there is no recognised path for adults to improve their qualifications from literacy up to the highest levels.

Government builds a large number of new schools each year and improves the facilities at others, but there are still schools where learners do not have proper classrooms and communities where the distance from a school makes it difficult for the children, especially the young ones, to attend school. The lack of classrooms and physical facilities is not uniform across regions with certain regions being under-resourced. Many schools in the rural areas do not have water, electricity or a telephone, which limits their access to modern forms of communication.

A number of government institutions have established centres to extend their services throughout the country. The four open and distance learning providers in Namibia namely, the PON, UNAM, NAMCOL and NIED in conjunction with the Ministries of Basic and Higher Education, have established a trust which enables learners from any of these organisations to use the facilities of their Centres. There are currently 37 of these Centres, ranging from fully equipped level one learning centres to minimally equipped level two centres. At present there are five Vocational Training Centres funded by Government, and a number of private vocational training facilities which exist for the provision of vocational education and training. In addition, there are a number of specialised colleges addressing specific areas such as Agriculture, Fisheries, Mining and Art. The GRN should provide an enabling environment in which research and inquiry are encouraged at all levels. Research priorities should be determined and incentives should be provided for the kind of research that the country needs. In all research activities supported in the country, links to the country's institutions and research capacity building by Namibians, should be promoted.

### ***Sub-Vision***

***A fully integrated, unified and flexible education and training system, that prepares Namibian learners to take advantage of a rapidly changing environment and contributes to the economic, moral, cultural and social development of the citizens throughout their lives.***



## Education and Training

### Things to do

- Conduct a comprehensive review of all curricula.
- Develop and implement Human Resource Development Plans.
- Establish more Vocational Training Centres and Community Skills Development Centres (COSDEC).
- Strengthen the teaching of mathematics, science and technology at all levels.
- Import mathematics, science and technology teachers to augment the limited supply available from Namibian institutions.
- Integrate entrepreneurship-training into the education system.
- Achieve all 'Education for All' objectives
- Create awareness of HIV/AIDS at all levels of education.
- Sustain physical and communication infrastructure for education and training.
- Implement education sector HIV/AIDS Policy and Strategy.
- Strengthen Knowledge Creation (Research) Capacity.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Education system is unified and adequate education infrastructure provided in all regions.
- Access to lifelong learning exists for all when and where they require it.
- Access to senior secondary education exists for at least 80% of learners.
- Access to tertiary and career-oriented education exists for at least 75% of school leavers.
- Large number of multi-purpose learning centres are providing access to the Internet as well as education and training.
- Well-qualified teaching staff available for all levels.
- A national curriculum focusing on science and technology, which equips the learners with competencies to continue their education after school, exists.
- Basic education concentrates on literacy and numeracy.
- A national education system allows learners to accumulate learning achievements as and when they need them.
- There exists a modularised curriculum that allows for small units of learning to be assessed and certified.
- A well-functioning research and development system is in place.
- Early childhood education and development provided.
- Schools and Tertiary institutions are enhancing skills and other competencies.

### Current situation

- Provision for teacher training, but only 50% of teachers adequately qualified.
- Inadequacy of qualified personnel at all levels.
- Curricula revision is on-going.
- National qualifications framework being formulated.
- Equal representation of male and female learners, except in some subject areas.
- Internal efficiency at the primary level, but less than 20% reach senior secondary.
- Out of the estimated total population aged 15 and above who left school, 33.5% did not complete primary school. This was made up of 32.4% females and 34.7% males.
- Many providers of lifelong learning through various modes, but lack of framework to enable learners to pass from one level to another.
- Many schools in the six northern regions lack proper classrooms and other facilities.
- A number of learning centres already available.

### Worst-case scenario

- Fragmented education system managed and controlled by different structures
- Uncoordinated policy for the use of ICT for learning
- Little improvement in enrolment in Science and Technology fields
- Automatic promotion being practised.
- Majority of learners do not complete senior secondary education
- Insufficient number of qualified teachers for science, technology, ICT and vocational training
- Curricula development not fully localised
- Curricula not relevant to the needs of the community and country.
- No system of quality control

### Things to avoid

- Maintain separate structures with overlapping functions.
- No effective coordination of policies at all levels.
- Unhealthy competition between government-funded institutions.
- New learning centres established in urban areas at the expense of rural areas.
- Ignoring HIV/AIDS and its impact.
- Limiting the number of learners who gain access to senior secondary education.
- Failing to expand the provision of tertiary education
- Failing to place emphasis on mathematics, science, technology and English language proficiency

### *Targets for Education and Training*

- Expand access to secondary schools for the target age group by 2006.
- Provide all schools with drinking water and electricity where the necessary infrastructure will be constructed by 2006.
- Equip all schools with school furniture by 2006.
- By 2015, there should be at least one teacher for every 35 learners in primary and 30 learners in secondary schools. Government is working towards having 90% of the structures permanent by 2015 opposed to the current 84% permanent and 16% non-permanent.
- By 2010 no more unqualified or under-qualified teachers in Namibia.
- Minimum qualification required to be appointed as a teacher in Basic Education would be a Teacher's Diploma (for Primary Schools) and a Bachelor of Education Degree for Secondary Schools.
- By 2005 a coherent Vocational Education and Training Policy Framework will be in place.
- By 2005 the National Examination, Assessment and Certification Board is established and has localised the IGSCCE and HIGSE Examination System.
- By 2030 Vocational Training Centres are established in all regions.
- The literacy education rate for adults was 80% in 2001, expected to increase to 90% in 2015 and ultimately 100% by the year 2030.
- Achieving a 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.
- Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, emphasising girls' full and equal access to and achievement in Basic education of good quality.
- Provide those who live with disabilities, access to lifelong learning by 2030.
- Encourage the development of lifelong learning in Namibia through institutional and staff development by 2006.

### *Building and Restructuring National Institutions for Posterity*

As of end of 2002, the regulations, policies, directives and guidelines, provided for in the recently (2001) promulgated Education Act, are in place therefore. The National Education Advisory Council, which would be a statutory mechanism for education stakeholders at large to discuss basic education policy development with government authorities in a formalised and authorised manner, is established in terms of the Act.

By 2005, the National Examination, Assessment and Certification Board (NEACB), established by the Education Act and which broadly confirmed the role and mandates of the pre-Independence 'Examination Board,' has localised the IGSCCE and HIGSCCE examination system. The NQA, being responsible for overall quality assurance for education and training, is assuring the moderation of the primary, secondary and vocational education and training national examinations.

The NIED is transformed into an autonomous institution, in order to serve the two ministries' portfolio objectively in terms of teacher education, development and support at colleges of education under the Ministry of Higher Education, and curriculum development for basic education which resort under the Ministry of Basic Education.



The VET system is reformed and transformed and administered by an autonomous NTA, providing for a greater involvement of the commercial and industrial sectors in the development of the VET system, which is being financed through a Training Levy. VTC's and other training providers have been transformed into autonomous institutions.

The Higher Education Act is passed by parliament, providing an umbrella to the existing UNAM and PON Acts, and has defined the role of the Ministry of Higher Education, and other stakeholders, in higher education. The Act also established the National Advisory Council for Higher Education (NACHE), to advise the Ministry of Higher Education on the strategic requirements of the higher education system. It would also budgetary procedures for the higher education system as a whole and recommend priorities on completing claims for resources, the development, coordination, productivity, efficiency and accountability of higher education institutions. Furthermore, the NACHE will aculeate the monitoring and evaluation of staff development and management policies of higher education institutions; the administration of subsidies to higher education institutions, in accordance with the proposed funding formula.

#### *Supply of Human Resources*

In drawing up human resource supply projections by professional category for the period 2001-2030, the year 2000 is taken as the base year. It is then assumed that the growth rates derived will remain the same over the entire projection period, except for: (a) Medical Doctors, who are envisaged to increase at the rate of 2.0 percent per year; (b) Engineers, who are also envisaged to increase at 2.0 percent per year; (c) Non-technical secondary personnel, who are expected to decline at 0.4 percent per year; and (d) Unskilled and semi-skilled primary workers, who are expected to decline at 1.4 percent per year. The results of these projections are illustrated in Fig. 4.11 below.

#### *Financial, Real Estate and Business*

According to all the three economic growth scenarios, demand for the professional category of labour used in the delivery of financial, real estate and business services, will exceed supply throughout the period 2001-2030. The pace of production of this professional category of labour should be stepped up both at UNAM and at the PON. Scholarships should also be sought to facilitate the training of people in this professional category at the Master's and Ph.D levels in the SADC Region and further a field, to produce highly specialised people who can handle more complex situations relating to the delivery of these services.

#### *Natural Science*

According to the three economic growth scenarios, demand for this professional category of labour will be more than ten times greater than supply over the entire period 2001-2030. There will be need for very rapid increases in numbers of students pursuing natural science courses at UNAM and at the Polytechnic of Namibia.

#### *Social Science*

According to the three economic growth scenarios, demand for this professional category of labour will be at least four times higher than supply. Institutions which produce this category of labour need to increase their intakes very significantly, for supply to catch up with demand.

*Medical Doctors*

Demand for medical doctors will be significantly higher than supply over the entire period 2001-2030. It is high time Namibia started producing medical doctors trained in various specializations. The pre-medicine programme already started at UNAM is, therefore, a step in the right direction, towards the establishment of a school of medicine.

*Agro and Natural Resources*

With diversification of agriculture and further development of the tourism industry, demand for this professional category will be far in excess of supply.




Figure 4.11: Human Resource Supply by Profession

*Engineers*

Demand for engineers already exceeds supply, and will continue to be increasingly greater than supply unless immediate measures are taken to step up the pace of production of engineers. Plans to establish the PON as a University of Applied Sciences and Technology are steps in the right direction, and which should be given support.

*Technicians*

The high demand for technicians calls for the expansion of the Diploma programmes of the PON and those of the other vocational institutions in the country. Well-defined systems of accreditation should be designed to enable Diploma graduates to move on to Degree programmes in technology.

*Health Nurses*

At the current population: nurse ratio, demand for nurses will exceed supply throughout the entire period, 2001 – 2030. Institutions producing nurses should step up their rates of production so as to reconcile supply with demand, and possibly, to reduce the population: nurse ratio.

*Teachers*

At the current rate of production of teachers, supply already exceeds demand. However, full employment will still be achievable by reducing students / teacher ratio, although this would call for more financial resources to the education sector.

*Technically Skilled Workers*

This professional category will absorb most of those who will be moving out of the categories of *non-technical secondary* and *unskilled and semi-skilled primary careers*. Vocational training centres and community skills development centres need to be expanded, to absorb those who will be graduating at the primary and secondary school levels. Also, vocational education should be incorporated into the school system, so that some students who leave school would already have technical skills which could make them competitive in the labour market.

*Non-Technical Secondary Workers*

Full employment for this category of labour will be attained by around the year 2010, after which demand will exceed supply. It should be a deliberate strategy to reduce the number of people who enter the labour market in this category.

*Unskilled and Semi-Skilled Primary Workers*

This is another category of labour whose size in the labour force should be reduced. Full employment will be achieved around the year 2015, after which demand will exceed supply.




Figure 4.12: Percentage Shares of Professionals in Employment

### ***Objectives***

- To ensure an integrated, unified and flexible education and training system which is accessible to all Namibians from early childhood.
- To achieve an affordable and pragmatic education and training system, capable of producing a balanced supply of human resources, in response to demands in the labour market.
- To ensure that the society is comprised of people who are literate, skilled, articulate, innovative, informed and proactive.

### ***Strategies***

- Unifying the management and regulation of public education and training under one policy-making and implementing structure, at national level.
- Modularising the curricula and revision of delivery methods to take advantage of the newest technologies.
- Strengthening the ICT, science and technology components of the curricula at all levels of the education and training system, including adult education.
- Integrating ICT in education and training.
- Establishing multi-purpose learning centres throughout the country so that all learners will have access to ICT and other learning resources.
- Strengthening the initiative to provide wider access to education and training through open and distance learning methods.
- Promoting open and distance learning.
- Strengthening and sustaining physical infrastructure.
- Establishing a university of applied science and technology.
- Developing and implementing a national knowledge management and knowledge creation (research) strategy, with particular emphasis on science, engineering, technology and innovation.
- Providing access to early childhood education for pre-school children.
- Increasing the number of learners specialising in science, technology and ICT.
- Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the education and training system.
- Implementing the education and training sector HIV/AIDS Policy and Strategy.
- Implementing an assessment-based national accreditation system under an integrated National Qualifications Framework.
- Establishing a national quality assurance system led by a strong national inspectorate.
- Upgrading the academic and professional qualifications of all educators, including English language proficiency
- Strengthening the Human Resource Development Fund of the Republic of Namibia and ensuring that all human resource development activities of the Namibian government should be conducted under the auspices of the Fund.
- Establishing a data base on the available human resources, as well as their specialisations, under the auspices of the National Human Resource Advisory Committee of the NPC.
- Developing a programme to educate the public on Namibia's population policy.
- Providing in-service training programmes for unqualified and under-qualified teachers, and utilising advisory teachers and inspectors as mentors in student support programmes
- Educating all Namibians on the importance of good governance, social



- democracy, participatory decision-making and sustainable development
- Integrating moral education that encourages a culture of respect and honesty into the school curriculum at all levels.
- Utilising the National Qualifications Framework of the NQA to provide for better articulation between formal and non-formal skills acquisition, and between VTCs and the PON.
- Establishing effective linkages of VTCs with in-company training programmes of private sector organizations, through the introduction of institutional training components in the VTCs curriculum.
- Utilizing the training potential of private sector companies to their fullest, through tax incentives, by enticing them to (i) increase the nett number of apprentices in apprenticable trades and (ii) improve the supply of trained instructors to the VTB for curriculum design and development.
- Strengthening co-operation between government, employers, employer organisations, employees and trade unions, on all matters relating to human resources development through the National Human Resource Advisory Committee of the NPC.
- Improving the quality of police training and establishing police training centres in all regions.

#### 4.3.4 Early Childhood Development

Early Childhood Development (ECD) occurs during the first years of the longer period of childhood, which extends to age 18. Many of the principles of development that apply to early childhood will pertain to the later years as well. “Early childhood,” as is commonly known, spans the period from birth to the first year or two of primary school. But programs of early childhood-care cannot ignore the period before birth, since the health and well-being of the expectant mother contribute greatly to the healthy development of the embryo - and the latter to the health of the newborn.

By providing children a fairer and better start in life, ECD programs have positive long-term benefits, including gains on future learning potential, educational attainment and adult productivity. Improving early child development also helps to promote social and gender equity. It helps to break the vicious cycles of poverty in two ways - by giving support to women and older girls, allowing them to earn and learn, and by providing children with a better base to draw upon in later years. Comprehensive child development programs help to counter discrimination and, if done right, programs can bring men into the child-rearing process. Efforts to break negative models of gender socialisation that marginalise and devalue girls and affirm boys, need to start with the earliest socialisation of the child, well before the age of six years.

Early childhood programming can also serve as an important entry-point for community and social mobilisation, promoting participation, organisation and a better quality of life for older as well as younger members of the community. In view of this, Government promotes ECD through the Directorate of Community and Early Childhood Development in the Ministry of Women Affairs and Child Welfare (MWACW).

The number of ECD centres has substantially increased over the last years.




According to the 2001 Population Census, around 31 percent of children of 3 - 6 years are attending ECD centres. The census report indicates that there are no significant differences between female and male children participation in ECD programmes in 2001. However, participation in ECD programmes varies significantly in terms of region: less than 20 percent of children in the Caprivi, Kunene and Otjozondjupa regions are involved in ECD programmes, while over 40 percent of children are involved in the Khomas, Omusati and Oshana regions. There is as yet no concrete information regarding the enrolment of children aged 0 - 3 years in ECD programme.

***Sub-Vision***

***All children aged 0 to 6 years have opportunities for early childhood development, in addition to the care of individuals and communities.***



## Early Childhood Development (ECD)



### Objectives

- To promote and support quality, sustainable and holistic Integrated Early Childhood Development for children aged 0 - 6 years.
- To develop the capacity of ECD care-givers/workers through skills development and the provision of quality training, and to promote the recognition of ECD as a profession, as a means to ensure quality care.

### Strategies

- Implementing the approved ECD Policy through the integration of services

- for children, among relevant stakeholders.
- Supporting communities to establish ECD facilities with the aim to increase the attendance of children at ECD centres, including HIV/AIDS affected and infected children.
  - Initiating parental education programs in communities on the importance of ECD and developing programs to increase access to ECD services, including programmes for orphans and vulnerable children, children with special needs and children aged 0 - 3 years.
  - Developing innovative ECD programs for children in rural, isolated and marginalised communities, such as San and Ovahimba children.
  - Developing universal curricula for ECD care-givers and establishing an appropriate accreditation system for training institutions and agencies, to ensure adequate training standards.
  - Strengthening the existing National, Regional and Constituency ECD Committees, and promoting linkages among them in order to improve the delivery of services and expansion of the ECD program.
  - Developing communication materials and strategies on improved child- and maternal care practices.
  - Establishing a comprehensive database on ECD and development, and appropriate mechanisms for documentation, collection, review and exchange.

#### 4.3.5 Aspects of the Legislative/Regulatory Framework

Namibia's Constitution guarantees the fundamental rights and responsibilities of individuals and society, and is relevant to the advances made in science and technology. It guarantees "justice for all" in Article 1, and in chapter 3 elaborates on human rights and freedoms. Article 20 states that all persons have a right to education and that primary education shall be compulsory. Academic freedom and the freedom to carry on a trade are protected by Article 21, while the maintenance of the ecosystem, essential ecological processes and biological diversity are covered in Article 95. Article 95 also deals with property rights and Article 13 protects the fundamental privacy of the individual. The rights of people to education and the government's responsibility are covered by the Education Act together with its statutes and regulations.

Biotechnology is currently being addressed in draft national legislation. The legislation will cover areas such as agriculture, the environment and health. Biotechnological research or the commercial use of genetically modified organisms, are dealt with by various existing Acts, but they do not take into account the latest advances in science and technology. However, a national policy, 'Enabling the safe use of bio-technology', has been published.


Work has yet to be finalised on the legal and commercial frameworks, financial issues or intellectual property rights which are affected by advanced communication technology. The Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Protection Act of 1994 deals with copyright protection, but needs to be amended to accommodate the implications of e-commerce.

Two old Acts which deal with trade marks and merchandise marks, are not well suited to deal with domain names and protect the rights of domain name holders.



**Sub-Vision**

*Cross-sectoral internal and external developments in the field of knowledge, information and technology are constantly monitored to assess their impact on the rights of the individual and the functioning of society and the national economy, and appropriate legislation and regulations are promulgated.*



**Objective**

To ensure the safe use of science and technology systems, including indigenous knowledge, while upholding the constitutional provisions for education and training.

**Strategies**

- Conducting a thorough analysis of existing legislation affecting ICT.
- Developing legislation to cover contracts concluded by e-mail or on the WWW.
- Amending the Copyright Act to accommodate ICT.
- Developing appropriate national science and technology legislation.

Establishing common measures for the evaluation of risk from the use of genetically modified organisms, and monitoring their use.



#### 4.4 EQUITY: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITY AND THE STATE

Since economic growth does not necessarily guarantee equitable development, the nation must ensure that social and economic development programmes reach the poor and vulnerable. This can be achieved by

- implementing effective poverty reduction measures
- creating equitable access to opportunities in all 13 regions of the country
- mainstreaming gender
- building sustainable futures for young people
- recognising and promoting the role of senior citizens
- providing care and support in cases of dire need
- This section addresses the plight of vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups and those who live in situations of poverty or face a situation of falling into poverty. The following three interlinked challenges are addressed:
  - Poverty-reduction – creating opportunities to utilise economic and social capabilities
  - Gender and age – recognising and supporting the strength of women, young people and senior citizens
  - Social security and safety-nets – caring for those in need

##### 4.4.1 Poverty Reduction

At first glance, Namibia appears to be doing relatively well when compared with other sub-Saharan African countries. Since Independence there has been political stability brought about mainly by the policy of national reconciliation, and a firm commitment to constitutional, democratic governance. Namibia inherited a well-functioning physical infrastructure, which has since been maintained and expanded, strong underpinnings for market development, sound economic policy, and a reasonably well-organised public administration, albeit segregated along apartheid structures. In addition, Namibia is endowed with rich natural resources, such as diamonds and other mining products, fish, agriculture and outstanding tourist attractions. This has led to a relatively high per-capita income that classifies Namibia as a low middle-income country. However, these initial impressions are misleading. Namibia is among the most dualistic countries in the world – both economically and geographically. The statistical average figure covers contrasting wealth and poverty, which is highlighted by the Gini-coefficient. The UNDP Human Development Report 1998 indicated a Gini-coefficient of 0.67 for Namibia, which is the highest value recorded worldwide. As of 1996, the per capita income of its 1.7 million people amounted to about US\$ 2,080 and real growth rate has averaged around 4% annually since Independence.

It is for this reason that Government remains committed to broad-based and equitable development policies and strategies, allocating well over 40% of its annual budget to social services (education and health-care – including social safety-nets).

Ten percent of households (5.3% of the population) having the highest economic standard i.e. the highest per-capita income, are consuming about 44% of the total private consumption. On the other hand, 90% of households (94.7% of the population) are consuming about 56% of the total private consumption. Furthermore, the richest 10% of the society receive 65% of income. Poverty is also concentrated among groups which have historically been disadvantaged. Huge

income disparities exist between language groups, ranging from N\$27,878 to N\$1,416 female-headed households are more prone to poverty than male-headed households. Cultural and social conditions in Namibian society perpetuate women's unequal status, especially in terms of their entitlements to resources and access to decision-making.

Poverty exists, *inter alia*, amongst subsistence farmers, farm and domestic workers as well as the unemployed. Elderly people and people with disabilities, young women and men, and recent migrants into marginalised urban areas are disproportionately affected by poverty. Finally, many poor households rely on the social pension as an important source of income.

The causes of poverty are complex, but some major factors can be identified. Economic growth averaged some 3.8% since Independence, which is substantially higher than over the pre-Independence decade. However, population growth estimated to be between 2.2% and 3.1% has levelled out the growth of the economy resulting in almost stagnant per-capita growth and rising unemployment.

Access to productive assets also determines the vulnerability of households. Whilst there are 4,076 farmers owning 6,403 commercial farms, with an average farm size of more than 5,884 hectares occupying 44% of Namibia's total surface, communal land constitutes 41%. Communal land is often of a lesser quality or poorly developed, but supports about 1 million people, or 95% of the nation's farming population. Located predominantly in the north and the north-eastern part of the country, the core of poverty exists in this sub-sector. Moreover, the lack of access to credit, technical and managerial services, have constrained the expansion of self-employment.

Inequity affects all 13 regions of the country differently in terms of income distribution, access to resources, social services and opportunities as well the regional ability to cope with the impact of trends, shocks and seasonality factors differs.

There are sharp regional variations in terms of both the HDI (Life expectancy is 42 for Caprivi and 57.5 for Erongo; Adult literacy is 94% for Khomas and 57% for Kunene; School enrolment is 74% for Omaheke, 64% for Otjozondjupa and 50% for Oshana; Income disparity is N\$ 11,359 for Khomas and N\$ 1,070 for Ohangwena. A similar pattern emerges for the regions in terms non-survival, illiteracy, underweight children, poor water supply, limited health services, poor living standards and number of poor households. For example, Ohangwena has the lowest living standard due to fact that more than 60% of the people do not have access to health services and adequate water supply. The HIV/AIDS prevalence has shortened the average lifespan of Namibians especially in the Caprivi. Khomas seem to progress well but has a high incidence of underweight children probably as a result of the large influx of migrants to the peri-urban squatter settlements.

There are marked differences between rural and urban areas thus the current pattern of rural-urban migration. The rural populations are more disadvantaged in terms of income, education, health-care and employment opportunities, outside the subsistence sector. Eighty five percent of consumption-poor households are located



in rural areas, making their living from subsistence farming primarily in the northern and north-eastern communal areas. However, pockets of poverty are also found in the southern regions, where income inequality is higher than other regions. The gap in average rural and urban income and living standard gives a strong incentive for rural-urban migration, as evidenced by the growth of informal settlements in peri-urban areas of almost all urban centres in the country. This is exacerbated by limited private sector investment programmes, which lead to low income and standard of living. About 51% of the rural people are engaged in subsistence agriculture with limited opportunities and support services, whereas 4/5 of urban citizens depend on wage employment with an expanding employment base. This situation therefore necessitates a comprehensive rural development strategy towards increased rural employment opportunities, and development of small-medium enterprises.

There are also differences in main sources of income between rural and urban areas. In rural areas subsistence farming constitutes 51%, wages in cash only 27% and business account for only 5%. In urban areas, subsistence farming account for only 2%, whereas wages in cash and business account for 77% and 8%, respectively. Access to services also shows gross inequality.

The combination of Namibia's geographic vastness and its good quality physical and institutional infrastructure creates an opportunity for it to become an increasingly important land transport bridge in Southern and Central Africa. This transport role creates new manufacturing, construction and trading opportunities – initially, primarily within the region, and complemented increasingly by manufacturing production for world markets more broadly.

Namibia's long-run future depends on its being able to make the transition from a resource-dependent economy, to one which thrives as a producer of manufactures and services. This is achieved through investments in people - in education and health - of a quantity and quality sufficient to reverse the devastating legacy of apartheid and colonialism.

For the short- and medium-term, Namibia relies on a multitude of income-generation and safety-net initiatives from a diverse variety of segments of the economy, both private and public. These include smallholder crop cultivation, tourism and promotion of small-and medium enterprises.

Even with success in agriculture, tourism and SME development, many people will remain economically marginalised - pointing to the need for a safety-net adequate to protect the vulnerable. Labour-intensive public works is a vehicle for expanding employment, stabilizing incomes during periods of drought, and building infrastructure (especially gravel-based rural roads) in the countryside.

It is envisaged that inland fisheries will increase, providing significant opportunity for poverty alleviation, employment and food security in rural areas. Also, community-based management structures will facilitate the sustainable exploitation of inland aquatic resources in the communities that traditionally utilise such resources.

Financial assistance, in the form of grant transfers, is an important component to Namibia's national safety-net that prevents the most needy from falling further



into poverty and deprivation. It is a direct support measure that Government deals with in a sympathetic and judicious manner. The level of economic development has been encouraging enough to continue with social pension payouts. However, the issue of the level of coverage and entitlement remains as well as the level of social protection resources available to finance it.

Social pension schemes in Namibia have evolved over a considerable period of time and with that, the ability to adjust the administration of this scheme, which has lent both credibility and viability to the scheme in terms of the extension of coverage and the inclusion of vulnerable groups. The National Pension scheme is based on flat rate universal, non-contributory and non-taxable grant-transfers, regardless of other income, for rich and poor alike. This scheme presently includes grants for old age, disability, child maintenance and foster parent care.

Government is presently reforming its Pension Schemes. The Basic State Grant Bill (Act of 2000) is in the processes of being promulgated by Parliament. It will repeal the National Pensions Act of 1992 and will provide the legal mechanism for all grant-based transfer programmes, including non-contributory old age pensions, to be combined in one. In addition, the Basic State Grant Programme is bound to introduce a simple means tested approach, which will exclude non-poor pensioners from the purview of the scheme.

In order to provide an integrated approach to poverty-reduction, Government developed a Poverty Reduction Strategy for Namibia, in December 1998, focusing on three major areas of concern:


- How to foster more equitable and efficient delivery of public services;
- How to accelerate equitable agricultural expansion; and
- Options for non-agricultural economic empowerment such as informal and self-employment initiatives.

Following the adoption of Poverty reduction strategies, the National Poverty Reduction Action Programme was approved with the objective to identify programmes, projects and services which would focus on poverty-reduction during the NDP2 cycle.

Namibia's needs are large and, as with all countries, its public resources are limited. Consequently, a vital step in achieving effective governance and poverty reduction is to focus these scarce resources on areas of highest collective priorities.

#### ***Sub-Vision***

***Poverty is reduced to the minimum, the existing pattern of income-distribution is equitable and disparity is at the minimum.***



### ***Selected Poverty Reduction Targets***

#### *Access to Water*

Progress regarding water supply coverage has been made since Independence, and the targets for 2007 and 2010 seem reasonable, based on current progress. If the implementation continues at the current rate with steady financial and human resources backing the programme, it is predicted that 100 percent coverage for both urban and rural areas can be reached by the year 2030. The milestones are shown below.

#### *Water*

- Increase water provision from 75% (2000) of the rural population to 80% by 2006; 85% by 2010; 90% by 2015; 95% by 2020; and to cover 100% of the rural population by 2030.
- Maintain the current levels of access (95%) to potable water in urban areas till 2006; and achieve 100% coverage by 2010.
- Ensure that 50% of all water supplied achieves full cost recovery by 2006; increasing to 60% by 2010; 70% by 2015; 80% by 2020; 90% by 2025; and to 100% by 2030.

- Decentralise 95% of regional rural water supply resources to the regional councils by 2006; and 100% by 2010.
- Implement gender policy with respect to the water sector by 2006.

*Sanitation*

Figure 4.13 depicts the trends in sanitation coverage for urban areas, for rural areas and nationally (e.g. total). For urban areas, during the first few years after Independence, urban sanitation services were considered “generally good with an estimated coverage ranging from 95 percent in municipalities to about 60 percent in communal towns” (DWA 1993). However, the WASP Committee was concerned about the magnitude of the backlog, especially in light of increased urbanisation and the corresponding high population density, which is conducive to the transmission of infectious diseases. Regarding rural areas, while the number of human waste disposal facilities has expanded since Independence, the majority of rural Namibians continue to rely on the bush for human waste disposal. As can be seen in Figure 4, availability and access to toilets in rural areas is far below the population coverage for urban areas. It should also be noted that, based on the trend to date, the target of 60 percent coverage in rural areas by 2006 seems to be overly optimistic.




Figure 4.13: Percentage of Population with Acceptable Sanitation Facilities (Urban, Rural and Nationally)

*Housing*

Figure 4.14, using an estimate of 1,500 houses being built each year and assuming a backlog of 37,000 houses by projecting in five year intervals to the year 2030, indicates that Namibia might be able to meet its housing needs by the year 2025. This is based on the assumption that the country can keep up with any increased urbanisation and population growth rates. However, using a backlog figure of 80,000 houses, Namibia would have provided only for just over half of the population’s housing needs by the year 2030, if it builds 1,500 houses each year. If 3,000 houses are built each year, the housing needs might be met by the year 2020.






Figure 4.14: Housing Coverage 1990 to 2030 Based on Three Projections for Construction

Selected Housing Sector Targets:

- Access to adequate shelter for 60% of the low-income population by 2006
- Build 9,590 houses until 2006 under the decentralised BTP
- Put in place operational revolving credit funds with all local authorities and regional councils by 2005
- NHE to construct 7,937 houses at a value of N\$419million
- NHE to develop 3,371 plots at an estimated cost of N\$143million
- Land is secured and improved for 3000 households in urban areas
- 1,000 affordable houses are constructed by 2006

Selected Targets for the Social Welfare Sector:

- Achieve full social integration for 10,000 people with disabilities by 2006
- Develop a legal framework for policy monitoring and evaluation by 2006
- By 2006 establish the National Council on Disability
- Develop and implement plans that meet the needs of people with disabilities in at least six of the Regional Councils by 2006

**Objectives**

- To minimise disparity in the distribution of income.
- To ensure that all Namibians earn a decent income that affords them a life well above the poverty line.

**Strategies**

- Ensuring that there is equitable distribution of income.
- Ensuring that all people enjoy equitable access to services and resources with limitations and barriers removed.
- Ensuring that economic opportunities match the needs, and an effective system is in place to balance off any regional disparity.
- Implementing HIV/AIDS reduction strategies.
- Harmonizing, internalizing and institutionalizing all Government policies and legislation, regionally, according to the needs of the region, and implemented

through comprehensive and well co-ordinated sectoral, cross sectoral, regional and community level projects and programmes.

- Implementing the millennium development goals in the country.
- Creating public awareness about available services and ensure the broadest level of information dissemination through a range of innovative activities, including Braille media, vernacular language, sign language interpretation, and the active involvement of traditional authorities, churches and civil society.
- Building capacity to deliver services and ensure networking and support from the private sector to exchange experiences at community and group levels.
- Reviewing and adjusting re-distributive opportunities from central levels and ensuring prudent public targeted expenditures, particularly education and health, and retaining high levels of commitment to social services as well as ensuring quality outputs. To do this, ongoing impact analysis and outcomes measurement become crucial activities.
- Creating minimum standards for service-delivery.
- Making resources and opportunities available and accessible to all interested and well-intended stakeholders, to support national development programmes which seek to address regional poverty.
- Ensuring sustained economic growth and intensification of employment creation opportunities.

#### 4.4.2 Gender and Development

Gender refers to all socially given attributes, roles and activities assigned to men and women because of their sex (being male or female). There are strong indications of inequality in relationships between men and women in terms of the conditions and positioning. For example, women are still underrepresented in male dominated professions such as economics and science, where they constitute only 35% to 29% respectively. The area where major differences are seen between men and women is in access to opportunities/resources and decision-making. Women's participation in the labour force is lower than that for men, 49% to 60%. Variations also occur when a comparison is drawn between subsistence and wage employment, 44% of female headed households depend on subsistence agriculture and only 28% make a living from wage employment. More than 50% of men depend on wage labour and only 29% from subsistence farming.

The colonial era strengthened women's traditional subordination. The migrant labour structure forced women to take over the tasks of men in the subsistence agriculture areas and to raise their children alone. During drought years, the women were dependent on remittances from male family members, which deepened traditional patriarchal domination. Deteriorating conditions in rural areas forced many women to migrate to urban areas to look for work, but more than 60 percent ended up as low paid domestic servants.

Before Independence, women were poorly represented in all positions of influence. Only two women occupied senior positions in the civil service. No women were school principals, inspectors or heads of departments. Girls were underrepresented in science and economic studies and were mainly being trained to be nurses or teachers.

The following are still strongly present in the Namibian society:

- A large percentage of Namibia's households are female-headed. Female


households are often worse off than male-headed households. Opportunities for employment are limited and the women juggle many different burdens at the same time, and this will intensify with the spread of HIV/AIDS.

- Regional disparities still exist in enrolment of girls in schools.
- The high number of rapes that occur in Namibia each year reflects the past and current unbalanced situation between men and women. In addition to the direct physical and psychological damage done to the rape victims, the threat of rape makes many women live in fear and often restricts their movement and activities.
- Gender-based Affirmative Action in employment has largely focused on the educated middle class.
- In addition to Affirmative Action issues, women have made gains in other areas related to labour and employment. The Labour Act has for the first time included labour legislation relations in the domestic and agricultural sectors, allowing domestic workers and farm workers some access to the judicial arm of the state. “Unlike reforming labour legislation, the practical aspects of enforcing these laws will not be easy.” The domestic work sector happens to be one of the most vulnerable sectors in the Namibian labour market.
- In 1996, there were an estimated 24,000 domestic workers; about 10% of all employed women work as domestic workers, and one in every 20 women over the age of 15, is a domestic worker.
- In recent years the focus on empowerment of women in society has been to promote women to positions in public office. Although important, this will not resolve fundamental issues affecting women.
- Legally binding quotas for women on party lists have also enhanced participation of women at local government levels, but participation of women remains weak at regional and national elections.
- Many long-awaited laws that affect women have not yet been finalised, including laws on child maintenance, inheritance, the recognition of customary marriages and divorce. There is a solid network of various NGOs working on the issues, and government, with the creation of the Ministry of Women Affairs and Child Welfare, has shown how seriously it takes the strengthening of the role of women in Namibian society.

### *Sub-Vision*

***Namibia is a just, moral, tolerant and safe society, with legislative, economic and social structures in place that eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity between women and men, the diverse ethnic groups, and people of different interests.***





### **Objective**

To mainstream gender in development, to ensure that women and men are equally heard, and given equal opportunities to exercise their skills and abilities in all aspects of life.

### **Strategies**

- Establishing participatory and gender-responsive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms;
- Involving the traditional authorities in gender sensitisation programmes with emphasis on family and inheritance.
- Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in gender development strategies.
- Addressing, clarifying and harmonizing the misconceptions on gender and review and recommend language and nomenclature (terminology) adjustments to organizations responsible for ensuring that gender is properly mainstreamed.
- Intensifying the implementation of the existing Gender-and related policies, programmes and legislations.
- Undertaking proper gender studies to provide accurate information on men and women.
- Building capacity of researchers, trainers and planners in participatory and gender responsive methods for data collection, analysis, interpretation and planning.

#### 4.4.3 Youth and Development

The 2001 census report shows that children and young people aged 30 years and below constitute 70% of the total population of the country. About 51% of the youth population of about 1.3 million are females, and 71% of the total rural and 64% of the urban population are young people.

Investing in people, in their education and health and in creating opportunities for them have been the main development aims of Government after Independence. More than 20% of the annual budget has been allocated for education. Enrolment rates in primary education has risen to over 95%, but the quality of education and attainment of primary education remain serious challenges. High numbers of dropouts from school, before Grade 7, may nullify the high investments and propel young people back into the situation of illiteracy.

Young people in Namibia are both a major human resource for development and key agents for social change, economic development and technological innovation. Developing the capacity of the youth to participate in their own development and national development, will not only have a major positive impact on short-term social and economic conditions, but also on the well-being and livelihood of future generations. However, youth are often perceived as not yet being productive or contributing members to society, and are sometimes overlooked.

Namibian youth are also growing up in a environment that includes a variety of harsh realities, such as: inequality and poverty impacting on almost half of Namibia's households, food insecurity and poor nutrition for many households, alcoholism, drug abuse, various health and social problems associated with HIV/AIDS and teenage pregnancies, crime and violence, physical and emotional abuse, high rates of school drop-outs, high unemployment levels, low wages, lack of or insufficient expertise and capital required to undertake entrepreneurial initiatives, lack of or inequitable access to information and recreational activities and increasingly dysfunctional family life. All of this, coupled with the detrimental impact of HIV/AIDS, contribute towards an unhealthy environment for the youth of today and poor prospects for the future.

The situation for rural youth in particular is exacerbated by a harsher environment, with fewer resources and more problematic access to important development interventions, relevant training and information. Rural areas are characterised by extremely low farm productivity, limited potential for income-generating activities and self-employment, a high degree of poverty, household food insecurity and poor nutritional status. The response of many rural youth is to leave the rural area for the towns and cities with the hope of obtaining a job and a brighter future.

Teenagers demonstrate a high level of negative health-related behaviours. Women are generally infected with HIV/AIDS at an earlier stage than boys. Besides the high rates of HIV transmission, teenagers will continue to be affected by other negative health behaviour patterns, including high pregnancy rates, alcohol and drug abuse.

Of all the problems facing young people, unemployment is one of the most critical issues. The situation in Namibia for youth unemployment mirrors a global situation.



Of the total 185,258 unemployed persons in Namibia (2001 census) 59% are in the youth age group. The combined unemployment and under-employment rate amongst the youth is even higher. Similar to the total labour force, unemployment rates are higher for young women than for young men. In contrast to the general labour force population, the youth in urban areas have higher rates of unemployment than for those in rural areas. This suggests that most of the youth who are actively seeking jobs, are looking for work in urban areas.

Unemployment is a significant macro-economic problem for Namibia, but unemployment amongst the youth deprives young people of the opportunity to participate fully in national development. Needless to say, such disenfranchisement of youth can have serious consequences for Namibian society. Violence, crime and substance abuse are related to youth unemployment, and this situation demands an all-out effort to create jobs through policy-making and programmes.

When not in school or in employment, it is important for the youth to be engaged in useful, worthwhile activities that provide them with the opportunity to learn lifeskills and to interact in a positive manner with their age mates. The various secondary schools in urban areas are also usually better equipped to cater for the physical recreation, sport and leisure requirements of the youth through various after-school and week-end programmes. However, for the youth of a lower-income class, access to many of these recreational activities is limited because they are too costly. The Multi-Purpose Youth Resource Centres, which provide recreational, sport and cultural facilities and venues to young people at six sites around the country, target the out-of-school and unemployed youth.

One of the five priority areas of action of the National Youth Policy focuses on environment and agriculture, especially environmental degradation as a result of deforestation, desertification, and soil erosion. Young people have a responsibility to be actively involved in the protection and conservation of the natural resources of Namibia. There are a number of existing programmes for youths and further opportunities that can be accessed by youths in the areas of agriculture and the environment. Some of these specific programmes, and others within government, NGOs and the private sector, have been designed to provide urban and rural youth with training to enhance their preparedness for formal employment or to generate their own income through self-employment. Others aim to provide an experimental learning environment to enhance the youth's self-esteem, self-confidence, self-discipline, sense of responsibility, ability to identify, analyse and help solve problems, and to encourage a commitment to the country's development.

The youth's ideas on democracy and politics allows one to predict the political future of the country. The opinions they form at present will impact on this generation of opinion-makers and voters as they grow older and assume their positions in the economy and political system. The youth are often perceived as being more progressive than the rest of the society. Higher literacy rates and exposure to modern education also mean that today's youth will be able to access and digest more information and will be better informed about public authorities and policy choices. Students, in particular, are important because they are best equipped to articulate current policy shortcomings and shape the demands of the youth.



Some of the youth have special needs including those in conflict with the law and youth living out on the streets. The most common crimes committed by juveniles are shoplifting, housebreaking, theft, and assault with grievous bodily harm. About 4,500 youth between the ages of 15-30 years were in prison in 1998. An average of 375 juveniles were in prison each year during the period 1995-1997. Ninety-three of all incarcerated juveniles did not have the benefit of legal representation at their hearings, juvenile prisoners had daily contact with adult prisoners, and 33 percent reported incidents of personal abuse by adult prisoners. The Juvenile Justice Programme and Forums were established to ensure juvenile offenders' rights are not denied and to seek alternatives to incarceration. Through the Juvenile Justice Forums, the circumstance of juvenile offenders have improved.


It is a harsh reality that many children may grow up marginalised economically and emotionally. The fact that more than half of all children today are disadvantaged by families that are, to one extent or another suffering from some form of dysfunction, will have a negative impact on Namibian society by the year 2030 unless major changes are made. The hardship that many young Namibian children experience during their early years, especially in the most disadvantaged communities, will impact on their emotional, physical-and social development. This could have serious economic and psychological effects on their adult lives. Should the trend of children growing up without one or both parents continue, and with less support from their extended families, it will have a negative impact on the future generations of this country. Most grandparents are not in a position to provide the required stimulation, guidance and financial care for these children. If fathers and mothers do not contribute financially to the upbringing of their children, more children will have problems attending school and obtaining access to health care and other basic services.

#### ***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia will be a just, moral, tolerant and safe society with legislative, economic and social structures in place to eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity and a conducive environment for child and youth development.***



## Youth and Development



### *Selected Youth and Sports Sector Targets*

- Reach 90% of youth with correct sexual and reproductive health information for protection from HIV/AIDS by 2005
- Ensure that 90% of young people have the opportunity to acquire appropriate skills for HIV prevention by 2005
- Ensure that 90% of young people have free and convenient access to quality condoms

- Reduce the number of youth offenders by 10% by 2005
- Reduce the number of youth repeat-offenders by 20%, by 2005
- Reduce the number of substance use/abuse related cases by 40% by 2004
- Provide basic sport facilities in all 13 regions by 2006
- Win at least four gold medals in international competitions yearly in the sport codes boxing, cycling, swimming and marathon, and medals in other codes, from 2004
- Win at least three gold medals at the Olympic Summers Games 2004

#### *Objectives*

- To ensure that all young men and women in Namibia are given opportunities for development through education and training, and motivated to take up entrepreneurial opportunities and are well equipped with skills, abilities and attitudes
- To ensure that children remain disciplined and have an inalienable right to survival, development, protection and participation in the development of society.

#### *Strategies*

- All children under the age of six years are given opportunities for early childhood development in addition to the care of communities and individuals;
- Young men and women are motivated and supported to take up entrepreneurial opportunities and are well equipped with skills, abilities and attitudes;
- Ensuring provision of available, accessible, quality child-care for all families who require it and provide plenty of recreational areas and opportunities for children.
- Providing level of government funding for child care similar to that for public schools;
- Ensuring provision of adequate salaries for child-care workers.
- Implementing appropriate HIV/AIDS reduction policies and programmes for the youth;
- Ensuring provision of adequate supervision for all young children such as after school-care, tutors, summer programs, cultural, and social experiences.
- Safeguarding children in early care and education programs from harm and promote their learning and development; eliminate unsafe, substandard day-care.
- Promoting responsible parenthood by expanding proven approaches (provide solid information and support to parents, as well as more intensive assistance when needed);
- Enabling communities to have the flexibility and the resources (funding) they need to mobilise, on behalf of young children and their families, responsible behaviour;
- Private sector engages itself more actively in youth development through apprenticeship, exposure and job attachment; and
- Strengthen and expand existing youth development initiatives.
- Providing opportunities for senior citizens to act as mentors and use their experiences and skills outside the family system.




#### 4.4.4 Senior Citizens

Traditionally in most Namibian communities it is expected that the nuclear or extended family would take care of their elderly. In situations where the 'middle generation' is away earning in urban areas, or dead as a result of AIDS, this structure might collapse and the elderly would then be left with young children, particularly in rural areas. The increasing deaths owing to AIDS and changes in cultural traditions, will also increase the need for more Government expenditure on pensions and health-care.

Only 120,000 out of some 500,000 economically active Namibians are covered by formal contributory pension schemes, such as the Government Institutions Pension Fund (GIPF) and about 400 existing private pension funds. Currently, only about 7% of the population is 60 years of age and over. The World Bank estimates that this ratio is expected to grow to about 21% over the next few decades. Consequently, the old age dependency ratio is expected to rise from about 11% to 36%. Existing pension arrangements are not well suited to meet the challenges of an ageing population. The non-contributory National Pensions Scheme, which is non-taxable and which was established in 1992 by the National Pensions Act, currently provides (in the old age category) N\$ 250 to 96,767 pensioners, whereas the other contributory schemes provide pensions for some 15,000 retirees, generally on very generous terms, but these pensions are taxable. Presently, the SSC, which was established in 1995 under the Social Security Act of 1994, does not provide for old age pensions, but has established the goal of setting up a National Pensions Plan, as reflected in the Draft Social Security Act of 1999.

##### *Sub-Vision*

*The elderly citizens are acknowledged and well esteemed for their past contributions to the development of our country, and in their old age they are well cared for and remain happy senior citizens in a safe and loving environment.*



**Objectives**

- Ensuring that all people in Namibia enjoy a safe environment (to a great extent free from violence and crime), share and care for those in need, and are prepared to face and respond to any man-made and or natural calamities.
- Ensuring that Namibia is a country where all citizens, policy makers and planners are aware of and sympathetic towards the vulnerability of everybody, and that is able to make a valuable contribution.
- Ensuring that the social security system in Namibia provides the greatest coverage of integrated contributory and non-contributory schemes.

**Strategies**

- Caring for the elderly.
- Providing adequately for the various needs of our senior citizens.

**4.4.5 People With Disabilities**

The 2001 population census report shows that the number of people with disabilities in Namibia is around 85,567 or 4.7% of the total population, almost equally distributed between males and females, but higher in the rural than urban areas (see Figure 4.15). People with disabilities are found in the following categories: 37.6% have hand or leg impairment; 35% are blind; 21.4% are deaf; 11.4% have speech impairment; 5.6% who have mental disability. While categories of disability do not appear to vary significantly across males and females, 51.3% of all people living with disability are females.




Figure 4.15: Disabled Population by Area and Sex (2001)

Poverty and disabilities often go hand in hand, and high health costs compound the problems of the disabled. The people with disability are disproportionately represented amongst the poor. They are more highly represented amongst unpaid family workers and the self-employed, with most having low incomes, and are under-represented amongst the private and public sectors. Almost 70% of this population group earn their living from agriculture. It is assumed that those with disabilities have higher levels of unemployment. As shown in Figure 4.16, Omusati, Kavango and Ohangwena have the largest concentration of people with disabilities, representing 6.4%, 5.5% and 5.5% of their population respectively.





Figure 4.16: Population with Disability by Region and Sex (2001)

People with disability are often prevented from using public services and attending public functions, because the design of and facilities in buildings prevent disabled people from participating e.g. no wheel chair access. A lack of awareness among the public about disability results in discrimination and isolation of people with mental and physical limitations. Children who are deaf, blind or have other physical and mental handicaps are often not sent to school, because people incorrectly think they cannot learn. Many teachers are not trained to assist these children.

State social pensions are available to disabled persons aged 16 and older who have been medically certified as unable to work. In 1990, 5,500 disabled persons aged 16 years and older received such pensions. By 1997, this figure nearly doubled with 11,114 people receiving this grant. The Labour Act prohibits discrimination, harassment or dismissal on the basis of disability. In addition, the Affirmative Action Act includes disabled persons as one of the three categories for affirmative action.

**Sub-Vision**

*Namibia is a caring state and society, which pays particular attention to vulnerable people and groups, who are unable to utilise capabilities, care for themselves or get assistance from family networks.*



### **Objective**

To ensure that people living with disabilities are well integrated into the mainstream of the Namibian society.

### **Strategies**

- Review the policy and ministerial framework concerning people living with disabilities, and ensure that budgetary allocations are responsive to the special needs of people living with disabilities.
- Reforming and improving the social security system to ensure adequate coverage.
- Enhancing the recognition of the rights of people living with disabilities through improved and expanded training and support programmes.
- Using Affirmative Action initiatives to lead people living with disabilities to being fairly represented in the work place at all levels.
- Providing funding and resources for training and support programmes for those living with disabilities.

### **4.4.6 Fostering and Orphanage**


The 2001 census figures show that 87,587 children aged 0-14 years have one one surviving parent, or 12% of all children in this age group. Slightly over 1% of all children in this age category are orphaned. The growing number of orphans due to AIDS, is a real problem.

The number of AIDS orphans in Namibia has grown astronomically since 1995, when a few thousand children were orphaned, to about 35,000 in 2001. This figure will go as high as 190,000 by the year 2021. More than 20% of Namibia's children live in poverty. Looking after children of relatives was common in earlier years. There was usually an 'ebb and flow' of children and resources, with child caregivers relying on the family members who were engaged in wage employment.

Important family relations and co-dependencies have been disrupted because of HIV/AIDS, and the resulting orphans. Support networks within the community and extended family are still relatively intact with traditional life style and values so that extended families are able to absorb orphans. However, with the number of adult deaths escalating, the care of orphans will soon require additional family capacity. Children who have lost parents qualify for maintenance and foster parent grants. The coverage in this grant (in contrast to the old age category) is very low.

### **Sub-Vision**

***Families are available and willing to accommodate orphans and are being assisted, when necessary, by the government/community through a well managed public orphanage programme, in which such disadvantaged children are supported to live a meaningful life that prepares them adequately for the future.***



**Objective**

To provide opportunities to disadvantaged children, including orphans, which will prepare them for, and make them live, a meaningful and happy life.

**Strategies**

- Ensuring that the needs of vulnerable groups are built into development planning at all levels.
- Establishing and funding centres for orphans and vulnerable children.
- Applying means tested approaches to all social grants.



- Reviewing, adjusting and providing social safety-nets.
- Informing families and the community about the requirements for getting financial assistance as provided for under the Child Protection Act.
- Building and supporting an adequate number of orphanage rehabilitation centres in the communities.
- Designing and implementing a national orphanage policy and programme.
- Providing necessary support to orphans and other disadvantaged children.
- Ensuring that all necessary documents for processing of social grants are made available to guardians.
- Facilitating the process of adoption and fostering.
- Formulating and implementing appropriate policies and legislation in favour of orphans and children from outside marriage.

#### 4.4.7 Culture and Tradition

Culture is defined as the shared products of human group or society. These shared products include values, language, knowledge and material objects. Culture is not static and thus changes are both necessary and inevitable. The natural and social environments constantly change, and so must the relationship of any human society to them. Cultural change can be set in motion by developments within a culture or by the influence of foreign cultures.

The colonial and apartheid systems were based on racial discrimination. After Independence, most Namibians have embraced the policy of reconciliation and for many, attitudes are changing. There is a trend towards recognising the strength of diversity, the chance to identify and apply indigenous approaches to challenges facing the nation. In the last decade there has been a re-awakening of cultures and traditions, strongly supported by government policy. Generally, the various mix of cultures in Namibia is now considered as an asset to the country and should no longer be the cause of discrimination or harassment.

Before Independence, language was another aspect of Namibia's culture that was used as a basis for people to be marginalised. By then, African mother-tongue languages were the most widely spoken, but Afrikaans was the official language of the colonial administration. Afrikaans was also the language of instruction in most schools. After Independence the new Constitution adopted English as the official language of Namibia, without trying to diminish in status other Namibian languages.

The 2001 population census included a question on language usually spoken or most often spoken at home (as opposed to languages in which people are literate). The results show that Oshiwambo is the most frequently spoken language at home in the country, with 49% of the households communicating in it. As illustrated in Figure 4.17, this is followed by Nama/Damara 11.5%; Afrikaans 11.4%; Kavango 9.7%; Otjiherero 7.9%; Caprivi 5.0%; English 1.9%; San 1.2%; German 1.1%; Tswana 0.3%; other European 0.5%; other African 0.4%.

Outside of the formal education system, other language problems persist which create marginalisation. Access to information can be greatly reduced if one does not speak one of the major languages of this country. Problems based on language

differences will gradually be solved as more people receive language and literacy training, and as more people gain experience in using English in every day life.





Figure 4.17: Households by Main Language Spoken (2001)

There is freedom of religious association and everyone, irrespective of religious inclination, subscribes to the moral principles of self respect, respect for others, honour to whom honour is due, and the importance of human dignity. Although Namibia remains a secular society, in accordance with the Constitution, Christianity is the most popular religion, and it holds promise for the moral upbringing of our children, and shapes the moral basis of our interpersonal dynamics, harmony and peaceful co-existence. Above all, the fear of God guides decision-making in Namibia, and provides the driving force for the maintenance of a just and morally upright society.

**Sub-Vision**

*People and society are tolerant and supportive of a diversity of religious beliefs, cultures and ethnicity, and work to optimise the strengths of diversity.*



**Objective**

To achieve a multi-racial community of people living and working together in harmony, and sharing common values and aspirations as a nation, while enjoying the fruits of unity in diversity.

**Strategies**

- Building on ethics and moral values that are rooted in the traditional and cultural society;
- Building on rich cultural and traditional practices;
- Considering effective future roles of traditional authorities;
- Promoting, recognizing and celebrating active citizenry and identifying and promoting role models.
- Resolving the issues of marginalisation based on racial lines.
- Using cultural practices to discourage the spread of HIV/AIDS.
- Ensuring that society respects and upholds the rights of every person to enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote any culture, language, tradition or religion, in accordance with the Constitution.
- Using the Church and other civic organizations to uphold and promote high moral values in the Namibian society.

- Ensuring that the country's multi-ethnic/multi-racial character is well appreciated by all, and there is a pervasive atmosphere of mutual respect for each other.

#### 4.4.8 Civic Affairs

Internal security and stability in the country are ensured by the combined efforts of the Police, the Justice system and Civic Affairs, among others. Civic responsibilities include the management of the national population registers (which entails, among others, registration of births, deaths and marriages, issuing national identification cards, passports and the granting of citizenship); the regulation and control immigration and emigration and; the recognition and control of refugees in Namibia. In addition, civic duties include the provision of professional forensic services with the view to aid the criminal justice system in the country.

##### *Registration of vital events*

Vital registration (the continuous and timely registration of vital events, i.e. births, deaths and marriages), if complete and reliable, offers the best source of data for issuing identity documents and the computation of fertility, mortality and marriage rates in a country or region.

The current system of vital registration by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is based on the Marriage Act of 1961, as well as the Births, Marriages and Deaths Registration Act of 1963, both as amended by the Marriages, Births and Deaths Amendment Act of 1987. According to a provision of this Act regarding the registration of births, every birth must be registered within fourteen (14) days; however, the practice has been that a birth must be registered within a year of the actual date of birth.

Apart from the problem of delayed registration, the process of registration of vital events in general is affected by some administrative and logistical problems, which set a limit on the extent of coverage of all events. Given the vast extent of the country and its dispersed rural population, immense difficulties in registering births, deaths and marriages are encountered, especially among the rural population. The result is that coverage is far from universal; however, better coverage is reported in urban areas. Each of the 13 regions of the country has one civil registration office.

Also a problem is the failure to collect identity documents timeously. In 2001, the Regional Offices of MHA was confronted with up to 70,000 uncollected identity documents. The Ministry continues to remind the public about this and related civic responsibilities.

##### *International Migration*

Each person departing from or entering the territory of Namibia is required by law, to complete the Departure Form or the Arrival Form at the port. It is the duty of the officials at the post to return such completed forms to the Ministry of Home Affairs for registration.

In spite of the fairly long history of compilation of arrival and departure forms in Namibia, the records have not been used to analyse the volume of immigration



into and emigration out of Namibia. However, the Central Statistics Office publishes data on arrivals and arriving tourists by purpose and nationality, in its *Annual Abstract of Statistics*. In addition, questions on ethnic nationality in the censuses provide a basis for estimating the number and characteristics of foreigners in Namibia.

The 2001 population census identified 56,923 persons in the country as Non-Namibians and, of this number, 43 percent are from Angola, while 39 percent are from other SADC countries, while 12 percent are from European countries. What is not known is how many Namibians are residing permanently in other parts of the world.

Between Angola and Namibia there is also a continuing current and counter-current of human movements, legal and illegal. This pattern can also be observed to some extent at the borders of all the six neighbouring countries, and need to be closely studied.

### ***Refugees***

Regarding refugee administration, the UNHCR in Namibia is working closely with the Government to monitor the treatment of refugees, and to assist in looking after their welfare. Government established a Camp that can accommodate up to 13,000 refugees at Osire. The Namibian Refugee (Recognition and Control) Act, 1999, Act 2 of 1999 that was enacted by Parliament in 1999, will soon be in force.

### ***Sub-Vision***

***All Namibians have national documents, and there is a smooth and efficient regulative and controlling mechanism for refugees and immigrants into Namibia as well as their residence in the country, supported by a well developed criminal justice system.***

## Civic Affairs

### Things to do

- Create a professionally run police organisation with all the necessary skills in the areas of forensic examination, fingerprint and document examination (fraud).
- Strengthen the human and institutional capacity of the agencies managing Civic Affairs, commensurate with the mission.
- Intensify efforts to complete the registration of births, deaths and marriages throughout the country.
- Remove all obstacles to the issuance of national documents to all citizens.
- Enforce legislation to minimise, if not eradicate, illegal immigration into the country.
- Computerise all the registration systems, including border posts.
- Continue to support and protect refugees/asylum seekers in accordance with the international conventions.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Registration of vital events (births, deaths, marriages) is universal, complete and reliable.
- All Namibians have national documents.
- The national criminal justice system is well developed.
- Regional Registration and Immigration offices have adequate human and institutional capacity and appropriate infrastructure.
- Comprehensive national database on civic matters exists and is accessible nationally and regionally within SADC.
- Forensic services are available and efficient, aiding the criminal justice system.
- Appropriate support is available for all refugees and asylum seekers in the country.
- Illegal immigration is reduced to the minimum.

### Current Situation

- Internal security and stability in the country are being ensured by the combined efforts of the Police, the Justice system and Civic Affairs.
- Civic duties are being carried out by the MHA, and these include the management of the national population registers (which entails, among others, registration of births, deaths and marriages, issuing national identification cards, passports and the granting of citizenship); the regulation and control persons into Namibia and their residence in the country and their removal as well as the recognition and control of refugees in Namibia.
- The provision of professional forensic services is also done by the MHA with a view to aid the criminal justice system in Namibia.
- Current level of vital registration is low due to logistical and other problems, and up to 70,000 identity documents are uncollected.
- Records of arrivals in and departures from Namibia are also being kept by the MHA and these are analysed by the Central Statistics Office in its *Annual Abstract of Statistics*.
- The 2001 population census identified 56,923 persons in the country as Non-Namibians and, of this number, 43 percent are from Angola, while 39 percent are from other SADC countries
- Refugees are being catered for by Government in Osire Camp with the assistance of UNHCR in the country, in accordance with international conventions.

### Things to avoid

- Discourage continuous registration of births, deaths and marriages.
- Limit issuance of national documents for certain groups or elements in the population.
- Impose barriers on immigration.
- Refusal to accommodate refugees/asylum seekers.

### Worst-case scenario

- Poor coverage of vital registration.
- Most nationals have no documents.
- Illegal immigration is uncontrolled.
- Refugees/asylum seekers are not recognised.

### *Objectives*

- To provide all Namibians with national documents;
- To maintain a well developed criminal justice system in Namibia.
- To achieve efficient management of international migration issues; and
- To support and protect refugees/asylum seekers, in accordance with the relevant international conventions.

### *Strategies*

- Improving statistical data for planning and development purposes;
- Ensuring full computerisation of civil registration (birth, marriages and death), and the issuance of passports, permits and visas.
- Ensuring speedy and efficient provision of national documents;
- Ensuring the reduction or cessation of all chances of forgery of national documents;
- Completing the late registration of birth process.
- Introducing appropriate policies and legislative framework, and ensure the required amendment of legislations.
- Improving the institutional framework and harmonise it with the regional and international institutional standards.
- Ensuring a well trained and professional personnel with skills to fully render quality services;
- Having a central database that is accessible to all Government institutions and other stakeholders, including SADC member countries;
- Having all border posts computerised;
- Ensuring reasonable and affordable infrastructures (sufficient regional and sub- regional registration and immigration offices, recreational facilities and staff accommodation in regions and especially at border posts, as well as the provision of water);
- Determining the need for and establishment of more border posts;
- Eradicating the trend of illegal immigrants;
- Providing support and protection for refuges/asylum seekers, in accordance with the relevant international conventions; and
- Providing professional forensic services to aid the criminal justice system.

#### **4.4.9 Public Safety**

Independent Namibia has emerged from a society in which authority and law enforcement agencies were not respected, but rather seen as the enemy. After Independence, Namibia had to instill a new sense of trust in the law maintaining agencies and achieve a degree of co-operation between the community and uniformed members of society.

Namibia, today is faced with three serious problems, which endanger peace and harmony in society – that of rape, domestic violence and child abuse. Each year about 600 cases of rape and 150 cases of attempted rape are reported to the Namibian police. Because it is believed that only about one in every 20 rapes that take place are actually reported to the authorities, as many as 15,000 people a year could be victims of rape or attempted rape.

Other violence against women and children, such as domestic violence and child



abuse, occurs throughout urban and rural areas in Namibia, and cuts across class, race, gender and age. More than 20 percent of all violent crime in Namibia occurs in the form of domestic violence. At least 2,000 cases of domestic violence are reported to the police annually. On average, about 300 cases of child abuse are reported each year. Rape, indecent assault, general assault make up some two-thirds of all reported child abuse cases, with rape alone accounting for over half. In response to this situation, the Namibian Police has opened Women and Child Protection Units throughout the country to encourage community members to come forth and report violence, and provide assistance to the victims.

Violent crimes such as armed robberies murders, house-breaking and assaults are also prevalent in the country, and these could endanger the current peace and harmony enjoyed today. Similarly, Namibia is faced with the possibility of illegal trafficking and smuggling of small firearms, which require our collective response with regional partners. In dealing with violent crimes, the Namibian Police have established several specialised units, such as the Commercial Crime Unit, Motor Vehicle Theft Unit and Drug Law Enforcement Unit, in order to ensure the prevention and combating of various crimes.

The causes of crime are also closely linked with high unemployment rates, particularly amongst young people. Such causes include disrespect for family authority, drug-and alcohol abuse and in general the perception of a bleak future for a high percentage of the Namibian population. The rapid urbanisation witnessed in recent years has led to the wild-fire-effect multiplication of squatter settlements, which has resulted in breeding grounds and hideouts for criminals, thus contributing significantly to the causes of crime.

A change in the situation will occur if the current unbalanced situation between men and women in Namibian society, improves. It is also assumed that the current state of violence will soon reach a peak, since more cases are reported and greater publicity is given to what used to be 'hidden' forms of violence. The Namibian public should soon become less tolerant, knowing that this type of violence is not part of a 'normal' society, and intensify efforts to stop the violence. Sufficient human and financial resources will be committed to counseling and rehabilitation services. Human and financial resources will be committed to a sustained campaign aimed at preventing anomalies and in so doing avert crime.

***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia provides a socio-cultural environment which marginalises social evils and creates a societ, in which the rule of law and order is respected, and which, to a large extent, is free from violence.***



## Public Safety

### **Things to do**

- Build the community to combat crime, in close co-operation with law-enforcement agencies.
- Effective enforcement of existing legislation.
- Establish effective measures and strategies to meaningfully re-integrate people responsible for and affected by crime, domestic violence, drug-and substance abuse etc.
- Introduce tighter legislation to control the abuse of alcohol and drugs,
- Promote respect for common public spaces (decency and morality) and discourage littering and urinating in public
- Curb the rapid urbanisation being observed – decentralise services and employment opportunities.
- Establish effective measures and strategies aimed at the prevention of disorderly and criminal behaviour.
- Create and establish a well-coordinated criminal justice and welfare administration cluster .
- Form a well-managed criminal justice and welfare administration cluster comprising of MOHSS, MHA, MBESC, MOJ, MOP, MHE, MWACW.

### **Where we want to be (2030)**

- Citizens' trust in the ability of uniformed services to provide protection.
- High levels of vigilance in the community and co-operation with law-enforcement agencies.
- Low levels of crime, violence and abuse.

### **Current situation**

- Tacit tolerance in the community for what is viewed as 'petty crimes'.
- Cultural norms that may tolerate violent behaviour against women and children.
- Little respect for the rule of law and order.

### **Worst-case scenario**

- People and communities take the law into their own hands.
- An escalation in crime and violence.
- Unhindered and accelerated urbanisation.
- Little respect for public or common spaces (abuses include littering and indecency).

### **Things to avoid**

- Continue tolerating violence and treat it as part of a normal society.
- Heavy-handed practices of law enforcement agencies.
- Inconsistency in the enforcement of laws
- Corruption among officials

### **Objective**

To ensure that people in Namibia enjoy peace and harmony in their relationships, and violence (including homicide, rape, human abuse of all descriptions) is completely eliminated in relationships at home as well as outside, within the community and in the country.

### **Strategies**

- Institutionalizing local structures to ensure ownership such as traditional courts.
- Reviewing implications of all current interventions on violence and how they could be strengthened (e.g. legislative implications on violence and property regime including inheritance).

#### 4.4.10 Civil Society and its Organisations

Prior to Independence in 1990 there was little opportunity for civic involvement in Namibia. However, a number of civic organisations, such as churches, trade unions, student movements and women's organisations were active in promoting development in the country.

There are two fundamental features of civil society – that of the family and community system and that of organisations of civil society, in which members of society can become civic actors. Such civic organisations, non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations and civil society organisations have emerged in Namibia in their hundreds during the past decade. They perform functions and roles between the family and the state.

There are past and present factors that have shaped the situation of civil society in Namibia. Whilst strong emphasis should be placed on developing forms of civil society that are uniquely Namibian by the way they respond to the social, cultural, and historical systems of Namibia and its many local, ethnic and national characters, there is also much that can be learnt from other countries. This will include the contribution that civic participation makes to certain national goals such as democracy and development. It is believed that this can be achieved through improved and sustained partnership with Government at all levels – local, regional and national. Partnership is poised to create synergy in development efforts, with both partners – Government and civil society playing their distinctive roles. Such a partnership will avoid overlap and duplication, and ensure that scarce resources are spent to achieve the maximum benefit for the beneficiaries.


The laws and institutions that promote democracy in any country are only as strong as the way they are used by the citizens. Democracy implies some degree of activity - of participation: in the electoral process, by casting one's vote, by serving on community development committees, by attending public meetings, or joining a small business organisation, or women's group, or trade union. It may mean proposing development plans to the local authority, or meeting with teachers at a local school meeting. In most cases, it requires personal or collective initiative. Citizen involvement in community or social organisations increases their potential for political involvement since organisational involvement means social interaction, and social interaction can lead to political activity. Civic culture is, therefore, conducive to a stable democracy because it creates a balance between the power of government elites and the responsiveness of government to the demands of its citizens.

There are special benefits that come from involving people in development efforts. It can build community pride, promote ownership and responsibility, teach skills and create learning experiences. It can also mobilise resources that are within communities and promote a stronger social cohesion. Government, immediately after Independence has, through the recognition of the important role that civil society plays in development, included civic organization-involvement in policy development and implementation. There is hardly a policy of Government in which the role of civil society is not mentioned. Government recognises that development has to be bottom-up and include active participation of citizens and their organisation, thus 'democratising development'.



**Sub-Vision**

*Civil society, its individuals, groups and organisations are highly resourceful and co-operate with Government and its agencies at local, regional and national level; respect each other and strive to consolidate democratic ideals, and collaborate in social and economic development for the benefit of all.*



**Objective**

To ensure that Civil Society Organisations are well guided by a comprehensive policy framework, working in close partnership with Government, utilising their enhanced capacities and comparative advantage fully in their advocacy for the people and the promotion of tolerance and morality.

**Strategies**

- Networking to resolve pressing development problems in the communities.
- Using Civil Society organizations, including the Church, to promote tolerance and high moral values in society.
- Promoting effective participation of all key stakeholders by objectively



- identifying their institutional profiles for inclusion.
- Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in the development agenda.
- Supporting an appropriate policy framework for CSOs operations.

#### 4.4.11 The Family

The family is the fundamental unit of society. It is the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, and should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance, so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community.

The report of the 2001 population census shows that on average, women in Namibia gave birth to 4 children, a decline from 6 children in 1991. The report also shows that households were made up of an average of 5 members, mostly headed by males (55%).

Families in Namibia are under stress due to several factors, including HIV/AIDS, changing patterns in marriage and divorce, widowhood, inheritance and the relationship between mothers and fathers. Moral degeneration amongst young Namibians is evident especially in towns and cities, as evidenced by high rates of teenage pregnancy, alcohol and drug abuse and indecent assaults.

The majority of Namibians are married under customary law, although civil marriages are on the increase. Polygamous marriages are declining in number, while informal relationships and adultery remain common, and are thought to be rising. Given the high number of domestic violence cases in Namibia, improved access to divorce might be necessary.

While there will be an increase in civil marriages, many Namibians will still choose to marry under customary law, and others will be in 'live-in' relationships or 'loose partnerships'. The rights of women in these unions will remain insecure because, although customary marriages are socially recognised and informal unions will become more acceptable, neither will be recognised legally.

133

While the ideal family in Namibia has always been that both parents should raise the child, and that the extended family and the community would support them in this regard, this ideal family has deteriorated in many cases. Almost half of all children are raised by someone other than the biological mother. Often this person is not someone who would normally have cared for a child in traditional circumstances (e.g. aunts, wives of uncles, etc.).

Non-maintenance from fathers is a serious problem, contributing to poverty in female-headed households and the poor quality of life of many children. Existing methods of obtaining maintenance through the courts are not very effective, and need some changes. Maintenance and inheritance laws will be updated and promulgated to provide the maximum benefits to women and children. These laws will be enforced more diligently than at present.

#### *Sub-Vision*

*The family is sacred and well respected, and parents fulfil their responsibilities, while children remain obedient and responsible.*



## The Family

### Things to do

- Providing children with adequate living standards, including access to health care, rights to education, play and cultural activities from an early age.
- Legal provision and assurance of adequate safeguard from harm, and special care for those who are disadvantaged.
- Empowerment of children to play an active role in society.
- Appropriate laws enforced.
- Encourage communication on development issues, including HIV/AIDS.
- Campaign strongly and disseminate information against the use and abuse of alcohol and drugs, and teenage pregnancy.
- Introduce laws to keep under-aged children and the young persons away from consuming alcohol and drugs.
- Encourage foster parenthood.
- Discourage teenage pregnancy and child prostitution.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- The family is sacred and upheld as the most fundamental social unit.
- Parents (mothers, fathers, guardians) are well aware of and fulfil their parental responsibilities.
- Children remain disciplined and have an inalienable right to survival, development, protection and participation in the development of society.

### Current situation

- The family is the fundamental unit of society. The majority of Namibians are married under customary law, although civil marriages are on the increase.
- Average number of children born per woman has declined from 6 in 1991 to 4 in 2001.
- About 45% of the households are headed by females.
- Polygamous marriages are declining in number, while informal relationships and adultery remain common, and are thought to be on the increase.
- Almost half of all children are raised by someone other than their biological mother,
- With AIDS there will be an increased number of widows, widowers and elderly people supporting their grandchildren.
- Many young Namibians (aged 10 - 17) use and abuse alcohol and drugs.
- Many young Namibian girls become mothers before their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday.

### Things to avoid

- Planning without consideration for the family.

### Worst-case scenario

- Parents neglect their parental responsibilities.
- Continued alcohol and drug abuse, rising teenage pregnancy, delinquency.

### ***Objectives***

To uphold the family as sacred and most fundamental social institution.

To ensure that parents (mothers, fathers, guardians) are well aware of and fulfil their parental responsibilities.

### ***Strategies***

- Retaining social involvement of the extended family and community networks in providing support and social safety-nets.
- Strengthen and enforce the laws against child abuse.
- Educating the public and families on practices that constitute child abuse.
- Enforcing the law on the prohibition of child labour.
- Ensuring that there are enough social workers in each region to identify cases of child abuse and take the necessary steps to correct the situation.
- Discouraging the spread of HIV/AIDS.
- Ensuring that children are provided with protection through the institution of marriage.
- Developing and implementing programmes to attract street kids to rehabilitation centres.
- Ensuring that adoption is understood by all citizens.



## 5. SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE BASE

### 5.1 FRESHWATER AND ASSOCIATED RESOURCES

Namibia suffers from extreme water scarcity. The only permanently flowing rivers lie near to, or form part of, the country international boundaries. The lack of readily available freshwater in the interior of the country remains the most important limiting factor for development.

#### *Broad overview of Namibia's water resources and consumption*

- Water in Namibia is scarce due to low and highly variable rainfall and high rates of evaporation.
- Although perennial rivers have the greatest potential as water resources, they are located far from the areas of highest demand. Sustainable management of perennial rivers in Namibia is difficult because several countries share them.
- All rivers that originate within Namibia's borders are ephemeral. The water table associated with these rivers is high and their banks characteristically support vegetation that provides important resources for people and wildlife living in the arid areas of Namibia.
- Storage dams on Namibia's ephemeral rivers are subject to high losses through evaporation. Although necessary for water supply to farms and towns, the impoundment of ephemeral river flow can have serious environmental and social implications, since it causes a lowering of the water table and reduces downstream underground aquifer recharge.
- Due to shortages in surface water, Namibia relies heavily on groundwater reserves. These reserves are subject to low recharge rates from rainfall and periodic ephemeral floods. Despite this, groundwater is vital for farmers and most towns throughout western and central Namibia.
- Approximately 50 % of Namibia's total population live in the proximity of the northern perennial and seasonal rivers, and are involved with fishing activities; 90% of these people derive some income from the sale of fish. Fish numbers in the Okavango River have declined dramatically since 1984. The major cause for declining freshwater fish populations in Namibia is over-fishing.
- With Namibia's limited freshwater resources, it is generally accepted that aquaculture does not have large potential as a major economic activity. Current aquaculture projects in the northern rural areas have met with many problems, most of which will be difficult to overcome without causing environmental degradation, and are similar to those experienced in other areas of sub-Saharan Africa.
- Although agriculture accounts for over 70% of the water used in Namibia, it contributes little more than 10% to GDP. The value added to the water used for agricultural activities in Namibia (especially irrigation) is very low (an estimated N\$7.2/m<sup>3</sup>) when compared to that used for manufacturing (N\$272/m<sup>3</sup>) or tourism and other service sectors (N\$574/m<sup>3</sup>).

#### *Future water demand, freshwater depletion and degradation*

Over the next 30 years, water demand in Namibia will increase rapidly in some areas (in particular all expanding urban areas, many of which are located far from easily accessible sources of water) and only moderately in others. The current

problem of distributing the available water to where it will most be needed, will be exacerbated and, due to full exploitation of developed resources, expensive new water sources (for example, desalination plants and new dams) will need to be developed. Water demand for irrigation, currently the main water consumer, is expected to increase considerably.

Namibia is extremely vulnerable to the effects of water pollution – mainly because of the country’s limited supply of surface water and high dependency on groundwater sources. Once it has been contaminated, groundwater is almost impossible to clean up. In the absence of strictly implemented local and transboundary policies, pollution from pesticides, excess fertilisers and other substances is likely to increase in the decades to come.

Freshwater depletion and degradation threatens human and livestock health, and socio-economic development. It reduces livelihood options and exacerbates rural poverty. In addition, increasing costs of supply are inevitable, since expensive new infrastructure needs to be developed. As water in some areas becomes scarce and expensive, development options become increasingly limited. Cost recovery of the capital spent on developing expensive new water resource infrastructure is likely to become more and more difficult – especially as the number of teenage headed households are set to increase drastically over the next few decades, as a direct result of the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic.

*Efforts to reduce freshwater depletion and to enhance the value of water*

It is recognised that the enforcement of Integrated Water Resource Management and Water Demand Management strategies are essential if our goals regarding social well-being, economic development and environmental health are to be realised. To date, efforts to reduce the threats to water resources in Namibia have been extensive and include:

- Adopting a stricter economic approach to water pricing to encourage all sectors to use water as efficiently as possible.
- Water conservation initiatives including efforts to reduce evaporative losses from dams the development of water re-use and reclamation strategies and the development of alternative water sources.
- Using water in the most economically viable and ecologically sound manner. Tools such as Natural Resource Accounting and Strategic Environmental Assessment are being adopted. Ultimately these tools will help guide policies regarding future water use, and will prevent impact on freshwater ecosystems and the resources and services that they provide.
- Improving catchment, river and aquifer management through the establishment of several agreements between Namibia and her neighbours regarding shared river basins. In addition, rural communities are becoming increasingly responsible for their own water points through the establishment of water point committees.

***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia’s freshwater resources are kept free of pollution and are used to ensure social well-being, support economic development, and to maintain natural habitats.***

## Freshwater and Associated Resources

### Things to do

- Adopt a new Water Act in place of the outdated Water Act of 1956.
- Vigorously implement water demand management approaches and develop mechanisms to encourage more efficient water use.
- Promote high value-added economic uses for water.
- Improve catchment, river and aquifer management.
- Implement Integrated Pest Management for disease control (malaria, sleeping sickness) and crop pest control wherever viable, to reduce contamination of Namibia's limited water supplies.
- Ensure the strict implementation of the relevant national legislation.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Water allocated and used efficiently.
- Irrigation of only high value and strategic crops on suitable soils.
- Equitable access to potable water.
- Clean, unpolluted water.
- Productive and healthy natural wetlands with rich biodiversity.
- Appropriate tenure over wetland resources.
- Optimal and strategic economic development options.

### Current situation

- Much improved access to potable water.
- Improved water demand management.
- Increased demand.
- Increasing costs of supply.
- Increasing threats of water pollution.
- Inadequate education and knowledge regarding the importance of natural wetland systems.
- Insufficient focus on conserving wetlands and recognizing essential ecological services in water legislation.

### Things to avoid

- Subsidies for water which encourage wastage and misuse.
- Devegetation and overgrazing of livestock within catchment areas, along floodplains and along the banks of rivers. This increases sediment transportation in downstream areas and is directly responsible for an increase in flood severity during periods of high rainfall, dam siltation, reduced rates of aquifer recharge and reduced water quality.
- Over-fishing and the use of unsustainable methods for catching fish (such as the use of mosquito nets that remove immature fish as well as adults from the population).
- Inappropriate development near to natural wetlands, causing a loss of valuable resources and essential services

### Worst-case scenario

- Water used for low value purposes.
- Severe water depletion and extremely high costs of supply.
- Polluted and degraded water.
- Loss of natural wetlands and freshwater biodiversity.
- Reduced livelihood, economic development options and poverty.
- Increasing health problems.
- Potential conflict with neighbours over shared resources.

### *Targets for Freshwater and Associated Resources*

While high rainfall variability and the accompanying threat of drought are the most critical constraints facing Namibia's water resources, water demand continues to rise. As a consequence, water scarcity has become a problem for all areas that are placed geographically far from the perennial water sources. The DWA has estimated that the country's developed water sources are able to supply a total of 600mm<sup>3</sup> per annum. Based on projections for future water demand (estimated to grow at 2.2% per annum), these developed sources are likely to be fully exploited by 2016. Even if stricter Water Demand Management practices are enforced, the central areas of Namibia (in particular the high growth points in the Khomas Region) are expected to experience full use of currently developed sources by 2012.

Over the next 30 years, water demand in Namibia will increase rapidly in some areas (in particular, all expanding urban areas) and only moderately in others. The current problem of distributing the available water to where it will be most needed, will be exacerbated and, due to full exploitation of developed resources, expensive new water sources (for example desalination plants, new dams, long pipelines and water from foreign countries) will need to be developed.

The proportion of water used for high value uses, e.g. tourism (N\$ 574/ m<sup>3</sup>), other service sectors and high value crops (e.g. grapes and dates), should increase relative to the proportion used for low values uses, e.g. irrigation of low value crops (N\$7.2/ m<sup>3</sup>), (e.g. maize).

- By 2030, equitable access to water should be supported by water pricing that reflects the cost of water supply with subsidies being fully transparent and mainly restricted to lifeline amounts for low income users.
- Greater dissemination and use of Namibia's Natural Resource Accounting programme to inform policies and future development.
- The proportion of water reused and recycled is increased.
- The proportion of water derived from alternative water sources, e.g. desalination, has increased.
- Number of basin management committees that are established and functioning, has increased.
- Number of Water Point Committees that are established and functioning, has increased.

### **Objective**

To achieve equitable access to potable water and freshwater resources by all.

### **Strategies**

- Formulating and implementing new water policies which focus on Water Demand Management principles, appropriate pricing, and water efficient technology and which recognise the fact that the natural environment is a user of water and that natural water sources and wetlands are important providers of vital processes and services.
- Promoting sustainable, equitable and efficient water use; and moving away from strategies of expanding Namibia's water supply to meet projected water demand.
- Developing appropriate technologies for the promotion of freshwater fishing.
- Vigorously implementing water demand management approaches and develop



mechanisms to encourage more efficient water use through:

- Educating people about the need to conserve water
- Recovering water supply costs in urban and rural areas. The adoption of stricter economic approaches to water pricing using block tariffs for all domestic, agricultural and industrial users, will help to ensure that excessive consumers subsidise lower volume (and lower income) users
- Improving awareness on water conservation options
- Promoting more efficient end-use technology (e.g. improved irrigation technology)
- Discouraging domestic production of unsuitable cash crops in favour of imports by charging for “free” water
- Encouraging the active participation of users and beneficiaries in regulating water access and management in rural areas through the further establishment of the rural water point committees
- Making full use of tools such as Natural Resource Accounting and Strategic Environmental Assessment to ensure that water is used in the most economically viable and ecologically sound manner – particularly in the agricultural, manufacturing and tourism sectors
- Promoting high value-added economic uses for water (e.g. nature centered low-impact tourism and high value crops such as dates and grapes) and the importation of water-intensive goods (e.g. maize).
- Improving catchment, river and aquifer management through the strict implementation of agreements between Namibia and her neighbours, regarding shared river basins.
- Implementing Integrated Pest Management for disease control (malaria, sleeping sickness) and crop pest control wherever viable, to reduce contamination of Namibia’s limited water supplies
- Abolishing all economically unsound subsidies that encourage water wastage and the large-scale use of pesticides and fertilisers that can cause water pollution.
- Improving water source monitoring techniques and ensure that all wastewater is disposed of safely.
- Ensuring the strict implementation of the relevant national legislation.
- Develop and enforce legislation to protect natural wetlands (the creation of a Wetlands Policy), and the resources and services they provide, from damaging human impacts.
- Promoting the joint management of river basins, through information exchange and joint research, harmonization of policies, and coordinated policy implementation.

## 5.2 Production Systems and Natural Resources

This section covers six interlinked and significant components of Namibia’s ecological support base and economic potential, namely:

- the issue of tenure - peoples’ rights, responsibilities and authority over land and natural resources;
- achieving sustainability in the land and agricultural sectors, and the need for diversified livelihoods;
- promoting sustainability of the forestry sector - timber and non-timber forest products;

- sustaining the coastal and marine fisheries and ecosystems;
- wildlife and tourism - optimising Namibia's comparative advantage; and
- minerals, prospecting and mining - harvesting the earth's bounty with minimal impacts.

These interlinked issues are illustrated in Figure 5.1.

Whilst an appropriate and consistent policy environment is at the heart of Vision 2030, effective institutional arrangements are critical for implementation. In order to achieve a sustainable future, Namibians need to work together and government must facilitate and embrace the contributions of civil society. In summary, three elements are essential for success: a common vision, a clear and consistent strategy, and a concerted team effort.

Ultimately actions that can effectively reverse unwelcome trends and reduce threats to Namibia's natural resource capital, should be focused on the following broad areas

- Filling in the gaps in our knowledge regarding natural resources
- Tackling the root causes of the key issues that threaten sustainable development through the adoption of integrated political, technical and economic measures
- Improving public access to environmental information
- Educating all Namibians with respect to environmental and development issues, and the *total economic value* of Namibia's natural resources
- Capitalising on Namibia's comparative advantages, promoting diversification, "off land" economic opportunities and value-adding to natural resources
- Maintaining and promoting freedom of the press – in order to keep the public well informed regarding the facts associated with environmental and developmental issues
- Making policy formulation processes accessible to all stakeholders and providing more opportunities for NGOs and community groups to participate in decision-making.




Figure 5.1: Some of the interlinked issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia

### 5.2.1 Land and Agricultural Production

#### *Low land capability - a severe constraint to sustainable agriculture*

In Namibia surface water is scarce, availability of grazing is variable and livestock-carrying capacity is low. These natural environmental constraints severely limit the development of rain-fed cultivation and commodity-farming throughout most of the country. Despite these constraints, a large percentage of the land is used for agricultural purposes, and many thousands of families still “live off the land” for their livelihoods. Considering the low capability of the land for husbandry, it is not surprising that Namibia’s agricultural sector is subject to uncertain output, regular crop failure and a drain on state finances, through heavy subsidies and drought relief.

#### *Land distribution and ownership*

- Between 60% and 70% of Namibia’s population practice subsistence agro-pastoralism on communal land, which is state owned, and constitutes approximately 41% of the total land area.
- Less than 10% of the people live in the freehold farming areas. This privately owned land constitutes approximately 44% of the total land area. 1.5 % of the total land area is comprised of exclusive diamond concession areas. 13.5 % has been proclaimed as nature conservation areas.

- On average freehold agriculture contributes less than 4 % to the GDP (including meat processing) and 27% of exports. Since the 1970's, many freehold livestock farmers have moved towards mixed game/livestock farming. This diversification helps to create a valuable buffer against drought.
- Agriculture in the communal areas is vital for the livelihood of most rural households. Distant markets limit the development of farming in the communal areas, and agricultural incomes are low and variable. Veterinary fences that prevent the spread of contagious livestock diseases have limited the export marketing opportunities of communal farmers.
- Not all farmers in Namibia can be defined as “serious”. There are many absentee farmers who own freehold land, and illegal fencing of prime areas of supposedly communal land by wealthy individuals has become common.

#### *Land degradation – threatening future agricultural output*

Land degradation reduces the production potential of the land. It occurs when there is a decline in plant cover or when one type of vegetation is replaced with other, often less productive, species. Namibia's arid savannah systems, and dry woodland areas that have reverted to savannah-type systems as a result of extensive deforestation, are the most susceptible to land degradation.

The environmental manifestations of land degradation in Namibia - soil erosion, bush encroachment and soil salination - are causes of economic loss and escalating poverty, through declining agricultural production and a loss of food security. This leads to human migration, rapid urbanisation and an increased need for the government to import food.

Land degradation in Namibia is usually attributed to overgrazing, land clearing for crop farming or inappropriate cultivation techniques. Ultimately, however, desertification occurs as a result of incorrect policies, incentives and regulations that encourage inappropriate land management practices. The lack of tenure, the inequitable access to land and a lack of integrated planning are all important factors contributing to land degradation in Namibia.

#### *Trends in agricultural growth, rural household food security*

Although Namibian producers currently supply all of the nation's red meat requirements, the country has suffered a grain deficit since 1964. Through its National Agriculture Policy, government aims to expand irrigation activities up to five-fold but makes no mention of strategies needed to reduce environmental impacts associated with soil salinisation, pesticide run-off and control over the use of potentially polluting fertilisers that are likely to accompany irrigation expansion. Increasing pollution from these substances could threaten Namibia's future meat exports to European markets. In addition this policy does not reject the use of subsidies for any products that may enhance agricultural production. While it is generally accepted that there is no potential to intensify veld grazing without increasing land degradation in the country, the National Agricultural Policy also proposes the expansion of livestock production onto under-utilised land north of the Veterinary Cordon Fence.


Although 94% of rural households identify agriculture as their main activity, it has begun to make a declining contribution to communal farmers' household income. In most years, households are unable to produce enough grain for the family's requirements.



It is expected that national consumption of fish will increase significantly as a result of improved availability of marine fish in inland areas, increased production from freshwater aquaculture facilities and greater production of freshwater fisheries.

**Sub-Vision**

*Land is used appropriately and equitably, significantly contributing towards food security at household and national levels, and supporting the sustainable and equitable growth of Namibia’s economy, whilst maintaining & improving land capability.*



### **Objective**

To ensure that all Namibians have equitable access to land and other natural resources, and that these resources are sustainably and efficiently used, while maximizing Namibia's comparative advantages.

### **Strategies**

- Creating economically and ecologically rational land-use plans to ensure that land is used optimally and not just for direct-use activities like agriculture.
- Placing emphasis on manufacturing, service provision and other secondary or tertiary activities which hold the greatest promise for economic growth, income generation, and poverty reduction, to promote diversification away from the agricultural sector.
- Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in agricultural development programmes.
- Encouraging local value-adding through domestic processing of meat products. Improve awareness of market requirements for agricultural produce and monitor market responses to Namibian products.
- Implementing land redistribution policies that promote equity among the people of Namibia.
- Implementing agricultural and resettlement policies aimed at “serious” farmers and the rural poor
- Implementing policies that discourage the use of wood fuel and help combat climate change.
- Focusing on food security and not food self-sufficiency. Although new irrigation projects, which aim for self-sufficiency, will create jobs, they require enormous subsidies and are capable of accelerating land degradation through pollution, soil salination and high water demands. Thus crops whose production is intensive in the use of scarce natural resources (in particular water), should be imported.
- Improving the quality of education and environmental education.
- Ensuring that all new projects programmes and policies do not proceed without a thorough Environmental Assessment (EA).
- Improving political will and good governance.
- Extending the Affirmative Action programme being implemented by the Agribank (usually available to individuals who qualify because of their ownership of sufficient stock) to groups, consortiums, companies, etc. so that people can reach the target by two or more people working together.
- Securing tenure over all natural resources to be assigned to communities, and a major capacity-building programme to be undertaken in order to develop community institutions capable of allocating land rights and managing natural resources sustainably.
- Rehabilitating degraded land and water bodies.
- Providing incentives for family planning and education services combined with appropriate and diversified land-use options.
- Recognising the interdependence between agriculture and other issues, and in particular, water management and biodiversity conservation.
- Providing appropriate, effective, decentralised and integrated support services (extension, research, education, credit, marketing, etc.).
- Providing incentives for people to protect themselves against present and future extreme events, e.g. incentives to ...
- Encourage rapid destocking and marketing of livestock to reduce pressure on rangelands during times of drought.



- Developing effective and sustainable uses of land and natural resources which do not threaten their future productivity, by:
  - Adopting more adaptive and responsive agricultural methods e.g replacing a monoculture of food and cash crops with viable intercropping systems, crop rotation or agro forestry.
  - Ensuring that irrigated land is well drained, practicing night-time irrigation and leaving land fallow for part of the year in order to reduce the chances of soil salinisation.
  - Adopting integrated pest management (IPM) in an attempt to reverse the trend of rising pesticide use, which threatens human health and Namibia's comparative advantages in the global fish and meat markets.
  - Maintaining the genetic integrity of *Sanga* cattle and other indigenous livestock and crop gene pools.
  - Encouraging research, development and testing of new CO<sub>2</sub> responsive heat and drought resistant crop cultivars (in preparation for future climates that could become hotter and drier). Identify cost-effective, flexible and adaptable management approaches and national disaster response strategies to the potential impacts of Climate Change, that could affect the livelihoods of Namibia's rural poor.

### 5.2.2 Forestry

Forest ecosystems play multiple roles – at global and local levels. They provide life-sustaining environmental services through the provision of oxygen, the absorption of carbon dioxide and the stabilising of climate systems, and are sources of economically valuable products.

Namibia's natural physical and climatological conditions allow for almost 80% of the land to support trees and shrubs, incorporating vegetation types that range from a variety of wooded savannahs (in the central part of the country) to dry woodlands (which predominate in the north central and north eastern regions). The savannahs are characterised by various species of thorn trees, shrubs and grasses while the woodlands are dominated by several hardwood tree species and a wide variety of fruit trees.

The woodland ecosystems enhance the livelihoods of the majority of Namibians directly through the supply of fuel, construction materials, wild foods, medicines, and browse and grazing for livestock. In addition they support a wealth of biodiversity and game, which are the mainstay of the tourism sector. In addition to these direct-use values,

Namibia's woodland and savannah ecosystems play a vital role in maintaining environmental health through soil stabilisation and climate control. Namibia has limited, but valuable, hardwood timber resources. Value addition, also at community level, should be promoted as an alternative to increasing the volume of raw timber production. Manufacturing should be diversified away from curio carvings to high value items that are suitable for export.

Uncontrolled and unplanned fires pose the greatest threat to forests and woodlands other than unsustainable harvesting, and also affect grazing land severely. The management of fires requires a cross-sectoral approach and community involvement.

Government is responsible for developing appropriate policies, legislation and strategies aimed at sustainable forest management, data collection and analysis, resource monitoring, research, education and extension. In addition, it incorporates aspects of control over resource utilisation, the promotion of trade, and conservation of forested land for national and global benefits.

Unsustainable deforestation of natural woodland has occurred in many parts of the country and is most severe in those areas that have the highest population density, including the north-central and north-eastern regions and on the outskirts of Namibia’s rapidly expanding urban areas. The consequences of unsustainable deforestation include increased rainfall run-off and soil erosion, declining soil fertility, changes in the local water cycle, a loss of biodiversity and increased rates of global warming.

The results of the 2001 population census reveals that wood is the primary energy source for cooking for about 62% of households in Namibia. In Caprivi 89% of all households use wood for cooking (see Figure 5.2) and 80% of all dwellings are made from wood. However, most deforestation in the north central area and north-eastern areas of Namibia have resulted from land clearing for agriculture.




Figure 5.2: Percentage of Households Relying on Wood for Cooking (2001)

Riparian (Riverine) forests along the northern perennial rivers have been particularly badly deforested owing to human and cattle population pressure. This has led to destabilisation of river banks, soil erosion, reduced water quality, threats to biodiversity (invertebrates, mammals and bird species), and a noticeable reduction in available resources. Approximately 70% of the riverine vegetation has been lost along the Kavango River.

Developing woodlots and establishing forest plantations can help to alleviate some of the impacts of deforestation - but only partially. Although they reduce the rate of global warming and can provide some economic benefits, planted forests tend

to favour fast growing, exotic soft wood tree species. These are unable to support native birds, insects, mammals and other wildlife adapted to the natural vegetation of an area. In addition, exotic tree species can cause dramatic changes to the nature of the soil and can drain it of vital nutrients.


Alien invasive trees (including *Prosopis* sp. and *Nicotiana glauca*) are prevalent throughout the westward flowing ephemeral river systems. These exotic trees spread rapidly, do not support as much biodiversity and compete aggressively with indigenous species for water and space.

Government currently has inadequately qualified staff; community forest reserves still do not have management plans; a lack of knowledge regarding sound forest management; the destructive effects of over-harvesting; and repeated burning continue to undermine the good intentions of decentralisation. There is limited co-ordination between and support from land management ministries.

***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia's diverse natural woodlands, savannahs and the many resources they provide, are managed in a participatory and sustainable manner to help support rural livelihoods, enhance socio-economic development, and ensure environmental stability.***





**Objective**

To ensure equitable access to, and appropriate tenure over land, woodland and forest resources, as well as their sustainable utilisation.

### *Strategies*

- Encouraging co-ordination between community-based initiatives and within the GRN and NGOs involved.
- Improving knowledge regarding the complex ecological processes involved in woodland ecosystems, in order to develop and implement appropriate management practices.
- Establishing education programmes focused on the all-encompassing value of natural forests and the consequences of deforestation. In particular focus on public awareness regarding the damaging effects of over-harvesting and fires.
- Enhancing professional competence and training within the forestry sector and develop incentives to retain qualified and motivated forestry officers.
- Protecting existing natural woodlands and increase their productivity by declaring Forest Reserves or Managed Areas (especially on uninhabited land that still supports healthy natural vegetation).
- Extending the Protected Areas Network to incorporate as many natural wetlands and river systems (and their accompanying vegetation) as soon as possible.
- Encouraging the rehabilitation of forest and vegetation cover in the catchment areas of the Chobe, Kwando, Okavango Rivers and on the ephemeral river systems which have suffered deforestation.
- Promoting appropriate land-use practices and habitat protection practices to all areas that are at risk of deforestation.
- Using bush encroachment species to manufacture charcoal, wood chips and other wood-based products. These products must be made easily available for the local population, thus relieving deforestation pressure in the most population-dense areas of the country.
- Supporting only those afforestation programmes that use appropriate indigenous species and/or harmless exotic species.
- Combating deforestation by encouraging the development of affordable and appropriate technology e.g. wood efficient stoves.
- Developing and maintain nurseries for indigenous tree species. Use these plants to rehabilitate degraded woodland and savannah ecosystems, and to encourage homeowners to plant indigenous rather than exotic species in their gardens.
- Providing incentives for sustainable forest management and education services, combined with appropriate and diversified land-use options.
- Promote the use of alternative fencing and construction materials, as well as sources of household energy.

### **5.2.3 Wildlife and Tourism**

Tourism is an important employment generator in Namibia, particularly in the rural areas where most tourism activities occur. In addition Tourism contributes to Namibia's national economy through the provision of many diverse services including accommodation, restaurants, transport, entertainment and financial services. Currently there are limited data available in Namibia to analyse the 'multiplier' economic impact of tourism. Consequently the full contribution of this sector to the national economy is underestimated. In addition to its contributions to the national economy, Namibia's tourism industry is capable of:-

- Contributing to wildlife conservation and biodiversity protection;

- Contributing to poverty alleviation, particularly in rural areas, through direct and indirect employment; and
- Improving the earning ability of rural women and enhancing traditional Namibian culture by stimulating trade in basketry, pottery and other traditional crafts.

Land–use for tourism in parts of Namibia, outside protected areas, has extremely high economic potential. Through the CBNRM program, communities in communal areas invest in wildlife and benefit from the resulting tourism development opportunities.

Since Independence, tourism has grown rapidly from 254,978 international tourist arrivals in 1993 to 757,201 in 2002, representing a growth rate of almost 200 percent. It is also predicted that within a few years tourism will become the leading economic sector in our country. According to the World Tourism Organization (WTO<sup>2</sup>), the number of international tourist arrivals world-wide grew by 2.7% in 2002 after a decrease of 0.5% in 2001. In contrast, Namibia experienced a healthy tourist increase of 12.9% for 2002, indicating a competitive advantage. WTO<sup>2</sup> forecasts indicate that by 2010, Africa’s share of international tourists will have more than doubled, taking 1995 as the base year. Globally, tourism accounts for one in every 12 jobs. According to a visitor survey conducted in Namibia by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism at the end of 2002, tourist expenditure in Namibia for that year amounted to approximately N\$4 billion.

Almost all tourists visiting the country expect a wildlife-centred experience – either through game-viewing, bird-watching, hiking, sport fishing or trophy-hunting. Namibia’s biggest attraction is undoubtedly its sparsely populated, spectacular arid scenery and wide-open spaces. In today’s over-crowded, rapidly developing world, natural environments are disappearing fast. Consequently, the solitude, silence and natural beauty that many areas in Namibia provide are becoming sought after commodities that must be regarded as valuable natural assets. Preserving these assets is fundamental to developing tourism as a sustainable economic sector and helping Namibia to maintain a comparative advantage within the global market.

A total of 29 conservancies have been registered on State land by 2003, amounting to about 7, 405, 200 ha or nine percent of Namibia’s total land mass. Approximately 40,000 people, usually above the age of 18, are currently signed up as registered conservancy members. However, the number of beneficiaries triples once people below the age of 18 are added. These registered conservancies are distributed across the Caprivi, Kunene, Erongo, Otjozondjupa, Omusati, Hardap and Karas regions, while additional ones are emerging in the Kavango, Oshikoto and Omaheke regions. A systematic approach towards the registration of communal conservancies is needed to halt the uncoordinated mushrooming of these conservancies.

Recovering wildlife populations on land outside State-owned parks, present economic opportunities. Conflicts between people and wildlife might increase, especially species that damage crops and predate on livestock. Innovative ways are needed to address such conflicts, principally by creating and facilitating opportunities for generating economic value out of such wildlife rather than the payment of compensation.

Community-based tourism (CBT) offers significant potential for economic development in rural areas. The benefits of CBT result from the employment of community members and cash income from tourism enterprises (which increased from N\$0.73 million in 1998 to N\$12.02 million in 2003). Tourists visiting CBT enterprises increased from 30,000 in 1999 to over 70,000 in 2002 and are projected to grow to more than 90,000 by 2004.

There is a growing interest among tourists not just in both marine and inland sport-fishing, but also to visit the seal colonies and to watch whales and other marine cetaceans.

Like all other economic activities, tourism uses resources, produces wastes and creates environmental, social and cultural costs and benefits in the process. Rapid growth in tourism aiming at short-term economic benefits, can easily result in more negative than positive impact - including the degeneration of traditions and cultural values, and environmental damage to tourist sites and natural settings.

Namibia's tourism sector operates in extremely arid and ecologically sensitive areas. Thus, it is essential that attention is paid to all potential environmental and social impacts that can result from tourism activities. These are summarised as follows:-

- Scarring of landscapes and damage to wildlife habitats through off-road driving and careless behaviour;
- The unsustainable use of scarce resources (e.g. water and wood);
- Pollutants from sewerage, domestic waste, chemical cleaners and litter;
- Intrusions on local cultures and values; and
- Economic distortions.

In many parts of the world tourism products have been ruined in a very short period of time as a result of *ad hoc* planning. To avoid a similar situation, a sustainable Tourism Master Plan was developed. This Master Plan seeks to increase high quality tourism activities with low impact on the environment. It implies an increase in the volume of high spending tourists who stay longer and travel to most parts of the country. Tourism products and benefits would be spread throughout the country to relieve pressure on some of the key attractions such as Etosha National Park, the coastal regions, Namib Desert and the eco-tourism products of the Northwestern regions. Cultural tourism will become a prominent product since it does not disrupt economic activities or invade the personal space of local people.

Tourism is already playing a very important role in economic development. However, its full potential has neither been explored nor exploited.

#### ***Sub-Vision***

***The integrity of Namibia's natural habitats and wildlife populations are maintained, whilst significantly supporting national socio-economic development through sustainable, low-impact, consumptive and non-consumptive tourism.***

## WILDLIFE AND TOURISM

### Things to do

- Provide tourists with information on ecological and cultural values within the country of destination.
- Take effective steps to reduce the volume of waste associated with travel and tourism activities.
- Design tourist enterprises using low impact designs, materials and technologies, so as not to damage the environmental or cultural assets that tourists seek to experience and that sustain the local community. In other words, to maintain a *sense of place*.
- Distance publicly from any illegal, abusive or exploitative forms of tourism.
- Meet and preferably exceeding relevant national labour standards.
- Extend conservancies to new areas.
- Update State-owned park management and development, and diversify tourism development while placing strong emphasis on high value-low impact tourism.
- Promote the training of persons engaged in or entering the tourism industry, to ensure that they are adequately trained to provide quality services.
- Improve and accelerate income generation on conservancies to lessen dependence on Government and other providers of support.

### Current situation

- Excellent progress made on CBNRM initiatives and private tourism enterprises.
- Sustainable Tourism Master Plan was developed and is ready for implementation.
- State-owned park management systems and tourism facilities need to be upgraded to reflect the modern standards of tourism and park management.

### Things to avoid

- Poor tourism planning and a lack of a clear vision for the tourism industry.
- Declining standards of park management and land management in prime tourism areas
- Uncontrolled low quality mass tourism
- Tourists who negatively affect the experience and enjoyment of other tourists
- Anything that threatens Namibia's unique *sense of place*
- Uncontrolled water use and waste generation.
- Political instability, crime and regional problems that might threaten the tourism industry.
- Inadequately trained staff, poor service and poorly maintained facilities
- "Leakage" of tourism-generated foreign exchange.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Well managed parks and nature reserves.
- Well maintained camps in National Parks with excellent services.
- Strong partnerships between government and private sector.
- CBNRM extended into all viable rural areas to improve livelihoods.
- Protection of Namibia's unique tourism product-focus on low impact, high quality nature centred tourism.
- Strategic approach to tourism planning.
- Discerning tourists.
- Equity participation and distribution of benefits to enhance socio-economic empowerment of the previously disadvantaged communities.
- A multifold increase in contribution to our GDP, and will remain one of the key leading economic sectors in our country. Enterprise development on communal land (e.g. community-owned lodges, tourism information centres, tourism related infrastructure, high quality craft products, improved tour guiding systems).
- An efficient system of registering, licensing tourism enterprises and maintaining high quality standards, will be in place and funded by the collection of levies.
- Tourism and wildlife increasingly contributing to economic growth for sustainable development of Namibia.
- Ownership and management of the tourism and wildlife industry are representative of all Namibians.
- Namibia, as a tourist destination, offers a high quality experience, with high economic value to the country and low negative impacts on the environment and society.
- Healthy, diverse and productive wildlife populations of economically important species on land outside State-owned parks, integrated into economic activities on farmland, and making a significant contribution to the national economy.
- Modern and sustainably managed State-owned parks with diversified and regionally competitive tourism.
- Conservancy system that is self-sufficient through income-generation and dependency on Government only for technical advice and assistance.

### Worst-case scenario

- Poor land-use planning and zoning result in prime tourism areas that have low direct-use value and/or ecologically sensitive (e.g. biodiversity hotspots) used for other activities (e.g. inappropriate agriculture).
- Loss of Namibia's unique tourist product and a "sense of place" due to mass.
- Poor service and maintenance of facilities.
- Over-utilization of wildlife due to uncontrolled offtake.

*Targets for Community Based Natural Resources Management*

Table 5.1 sets out the expected future growth and development of the CBNRM programme under two different scenarios. In the first, the programme remains focused largely on wildlife and tourism. In the second, the programme provides for a holistic, integrated approach to renewable natural resources, with conservancies being empowered to manage and hold group tenure over also their rangeland, woodland, water, freshwater fish and the land itself. Both scenarios show excellent results and returns, but the integrated and holistic approach offers far greater opportunities, and the basis for a truly innovative, empowering and appropriate form of sustainable rural development. The financial benefits to conservancies, from just the wildlife and tourism components of CBNRM, projected to 2030 and calculated on conservative figures, is shown in the chart below.




Figure 5.3: Projected Conservancy Benefits 2030

**Table 5.1 Targets for Communal Area Conservancies**

KEY INDICATORS	2003 Current Situation	2030 Scenario No. 1: Conservancy legislation primarily supports development of wildlife & tourism resources	2030 Scenario No. 2: Conservancy legislation expanded to allow management of other common resources (i.e. rangelands, community forests, water, etc.)
Number of registered conservancies	A total of 29 communal area conservancies have been registered as of December, 2001, while an additional 33 are at various stages of formation.	It is estimated that approximately 65 communal area conservancies could be registered for the specific purposes of developing and managing wildlife and tourism resources.	Should the GRN recognise conservancies as a common property management mechanism for other communal resources (i.e. rangelands, community forests, water, fresh water fisheries, etc.), then it is estimated that more than 160 conservancies could form on communal lands.
Number of hectares of land & natural resources managed through communal conservancies	7,405,200 hectares	It is estimated that 15,000,000 hectares of communal area would be suitable for management of wildlife & tourism resources. This is equivalent to 18.2% of Namibia's land mass (or 44% of communal lands).	It is estimated that a total of 24,000,000 hectares would be suitable for a conservancy common property management mechanism if rangelands & community forests were managed by conservancies. This is equivalent to 29.2% of Namibia's land mass (or 71% of communal lands).
Number of people benefiting from conservancies	40,000 are presently benefiting in registered conservancies, while more than 75,000 people are currently participating in the communal area conservancy movement.	Given a conservative population growth rate of 2.0% per annum (taking into consideration the impact of HIV-AIDS) and expansion of the conservancy movement to other parts of the country, it is estimated that over 250,000 communal area residents would benefit from conservancies by 2030 under the current legislation.	Given the same projected growth rate and, should the legislation be expanded to include other common property resources, then it is conceivable that more than 900,000 communal area residents could benefit from better managed natural resources by 2030.
Expansion of conservancy programme and wildlife habitats	Currently, conservancies are predominantly forming in parts of the Hardap, Karas, Kunene, Erongo, Caprivi, Omusati and Otjozondjupa regions.	Given the sparse settlement patterns and potential wildlife habitat, conservancies should cover many portions of the Oshikoto, Ohangwena, Kavango, Oshana, and Omaheke regions as well. As a consequence, wildlife (as an income generator and drawcard for tourism) will be more widely dispersed and supported throughout all of these regions.	Conservancies would be established in all regions under this scenario.



<p>Links and partnerships between communal conservancies and commercial game farmers.</p>	<p>Very limited contact, with freehold conservancies now covering some 4 million ha and expressing an interest in closer collaboration</p>	<p>Close links and cooperation, resulting in sharing of expertise, translocation of wildlife, partnerships around trophy-hunting, capture and live sale, cropping and tourism; linked marketing, joint training, etc.</p>	<p>Expansion of natural resource management and enterprises to all natural resources. Close cooperation around agriculture, marketing, tourism, wildlife and forestry management, significant sharing of skills and opportunities, etc.</p>
<p>Income &amp; benefits being generated in communal areas through tourism activities.</p>	<p>Presently, it is estimated that tourism enterprises in communal areas are generating approximately N\$58,233,000 in gross revenues, of which only N\$4,732,885 are documented as returning to community members.</p>	<p>Given the anticipated growth of the tourism industry (which is very conservatively calculated in the attached Annex), the anticipated increased in the number of joint ventures &amp; community tourism enterprises, it is estimated that employment and cash benefits from tourism will exceed N\$3,978,450,000 by year 2030, of which more than N\$795,691,000 will be directly benefiting communities.</p>	<p>In addition to the massive benefits reflected in the previous column, the subsistence benefits to community members from better managed resources, will be reflected in improved livelihoods and reduced support costs to the GRN in managing its national resource base and the people dependent upon it.</p>
<p>Income &amp; benefits generated from trophy &amp; subsistence hunting and live game sales.</p>	<p>Presently, hunting concessions in communal areas are generating in excess of N\$3,217,000 of hunting fees. It is estimated that total revenues generated from hunting operations in these concessions generated more than N\$9,000,000 of which N\$1,350,362 was returned to conservancies in 2001. However, there is immense scope for increasing the number of concessions and the current off-take rate (which in nearly all instances is less than 3% of the huntable game populations.</p>	<p>Should conservancy game populations continue to expand, then it is possible to project increases of 20% per annum in returns for trophy hunting (i.e. through increased supply and exchange rate savings) and other subsistence uses of wildlife, bring the annual projected returns by 2030 to N\$844,893,255, of which conservancies and their members would directly receive N\$340,212,802 in benefits.</p>	<p>Should the veterinary red line be moved further northwards and eastwards, thereby allowing the conservancies in the Kunene and Otjozondjupa to sell live game, then estimated additional benefits of N\$62,000,000 could be realised by conservancies by the sale of live game by 2030.</p>

### **Objective**

To advance sustainable management of wildlife and tourism for the social and economic well-being of the people of Namibia.

### **Strategies**

- Improving and accelerating income-generation on conservancies to lessen dependency on Government and other providers of support.
- Facilitating opportunities for people to derive economic value from wildlife species that impact on farming and livelihoods.
- Updating State-owned park management and tourism development, while placing strong emphasis on high-value, low-impact tourism.
- Providing adequate training for persons involved in the tourism industry, to ensure quality services.
- Developing and enforcing appropriate environmental and tourism legislation.

## **5.2.4 Fisheries and Marine Resources**

Namibia's entire coastal zone falls within the Namib Desert and is characterised by low rainfall and limited freshwater resources. The inshore marine environment provides valuable migration and nursery habitats for many marine organisms.

Namibia's marine ecosystem is dominated by the Benguela Current, and supports vast populations of commercially exploitable fish species, some of which are shared with Angola and South Africa. The climatic conditions that determine prevailing winds, ocean currents, water temperature and fish stock distribution vary with temporary changes in the earth's atmosphere. As a result, the maximum sustainable yields of fish stocks fluctuate from one season to the next.

The marine fisheries sector is an important foreign exchange earner, and a significant employment generator for Namibia. Prior to Independence, the country's fishing industry was subject to open access and, as a result of poor management, overexploitation of some of the most productive fisheries occurred. After Independence, Namibia took firm control of the country's territorial waters and the marine fisheries sector grew rapidly - largely as a result of an increase in fish processing which adds value to landed fish. Since 1990, considerable improvements have been made regarding the monitoring and regulation of Namibia's fish stocks and the country's post Independence marine fisheries management policies have been commended internationally for their effectiveness and efficiency.

In order to prepare a long term vision for Namibia's natural resources, it is useful to look at the lessons learnt from global trends. At least 70% of the world's commercially important marine stocks are reported to be either in a state of depletion, in the process of collapsing or slowly recovering. Furthermore, many marine ecosystems throughout the world have begun to display signs of irreversible damage. The causes and consequences of declining fisheries and marine environment degradation are summarised as follows:

- Variable environmental conditions, which are difficult to predict and could increase in response to atmospheric changes linked to global warming.

- Poor management and overexploitation of fish stocks.
- Coastal degradation is currently limited in Namibia. However it is likely to increase with growing coastal development over the next 30 years. Human activities responsible for coastal degradation include: The draining and clearing of lagoons and estuaries; upstream dams, deforestation and agricultural and urban pollution, which have had a detrimental effect on water quality entering the river mouths, reducing their potential as a fish-nursery area; marine pollution, caused when seagoing vessels accidentally or purposefully deposit sewerage, oil and other wastes into the ocean.
- Fishermen inadvertently kill and waste large numbers of marine species when they target one economically valuable species.

An increase in exports of high value fish products to overseas markets is likely. In addition, more efficient trade and improved export markets for marine products to landlocked countries within the SADC region, are expected. Mariculture and low impact nature centred tourism are two areas where there is great potential for expansion.

Currently, there is limited aquaculture in Namibia, but it is a sector with great potential. Aquaculture can contribute towards sustained food security, income and employment for many Namibians.

Commercial marine aquaculture is limited to oysters, mussels and seaweed production in Lüderitz harbour and in salt-ponds around Walvis Bay and Swakopmund. Commercial freshwater aquaculture of tilapias and cat fishes is undertaken in the Hardap Dam. There are also small-scale operations raising fingerlings for sale to small scale aquaculture ventures at Ongwediva Rural Development Centre, Omahenene and Katima Mulilo. It is anticipated that culture-based fisheries will develop to complement and enhance the production of freshwater fish.

#### ***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia's marine species and habitats significantly contribute to the economy without threatening biodiversity or the functioning of natural ecosystems, in a dynamic external environment.***

## Fisheries And Marine Resources

### Things to do

- Encourage local value-adding through domestic processing of fish products.
- Create marine reserves especially in areas suspected to be important for fish breeding,
- Improve access to knowledge regarding the marine environment.
- Ensure that data collection is standardised, stored adequately, and made easily available to technicians, managers and the public.
- Secure regional cooperation that enables access to and joint management of shared fisheries resources, including information exchange and joint research; harmonization of policies; coordinated policy implementation.
- Develop human capacity for the industry.
- Ensure that access to marine stocks continues to be regulated by quota allotments and strict fishing rights.
- Develop marine and freshwater aquaculture.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Sustainable yields reached and managed effectively to prevent overexploitation.
- Improved understanding of the dynamics of the Benguela system.
- Strict pollution control leading to increased exportation of high value fish and increased mariculture opportunities.
- Marine reserves and an increase in high earning, low-impact nature centred tourism activities.
- Intensive commercial marine and freshwater aquaculture.

### Current situation

- Good monitoring and regulation of fish stocks by Government.
- Improved value-adding.
- Limited but increasing marine pollution.
- Limited understanding of Benguela ecosystem dynamics.
- Limited aquaculture.

### Things to avoid

- Subsidising the fishing industry, creating tax breaks and market interventions that could encourage unsustainable fishing practices.
- The targeting of by-catch species and any activities that threaten marine biodiversity or cause pollution.
- All impact resulting from increased numbers of visitors to the coast (including litter, sewerage, water demand, traffic and noise).
- Avoid any new developments that do not have an acceptable Environmental Management Plan. Such developments could be harmful to human health and/or the environment, and threaten sustainable development.

### Worst-case scenario

- Increasing pollution, coastal degradation and biodiversity loss.
- Industry becomes too powerful and exerts pressure on Government to allocate TACs that are unsustainable.
- Overexploited and declining fish stocks
- Reduced economic development and employment options.

**Targets for Marine Resources**

One optimistic scenario for fish harvesting predicts good recovery of fish stocks to maximum sustainable yields by 2016. On the basis of this scenario, the fisheries sector could experience a growth rate of 6-9% between 1998 and 2017.

Once maximum sustainable yields are reached, no further growth in harvesting can be expected, but if managed properly, and concerted efforts are made to ensure the value adding of harvested fish, this sector could remain a high earner on a sustainable basis beyond 2030.

The industry foresees an increase in exports of high value fish products to overseas markets. In addition, the opening of the Trans-Caprivi and Trans-Kalahari highways are expected to result in more efficient trade and improved export markets for marine products to landlocked country's within the SADC region.

In addition, there is considerable potential for expanding mariculture and diversifying the marine resources sector. In particular, nature centred tourism activities (for example, low impact whale/seal watching and visits to the offshore islands for bird-watching) provide ideal opportunities for economic growth.




Figure 5.4: Possible Growth Within the Marine Resource Sectors (2000-2030)



It is important to note that Namibia's post Independence marine fisheries management policies have been commended internationally for their effectiveness and efficiency.

**Objective**

To achieve increasing and sustainable yields of fisheries and marine resources for the development of the economy and the benefit of the people of Namibia.

**Strategies**

- Setting TACs at conservative levels in order to promote the sustainability of resources and to enhance the recovery of depleted stocks.
- Adopting and implementing all the policies and programmes in support of sustainability and equity.
- Utilizing the services of expert consultants to assist Government fisheries scientists in setting their estimates for TACs.
- Developing new ways of adding value to Namibia's marine products.
- Improving awareness of market requirements for marine produce, and monitor market responses to Namibian products.
- Adopting and implementing a well researched ICZMP in an attempt to limit unnecessary coastal degradation, without restricting coastal development. This ICZMP aims to reduce conflict of interests in resource utilisation and ensures co-ordination and co-operation between the many stakeholders involved with coastal development, including sectors involved with fishing, urban development, tourism, offshore oil and shipping.
- Planning with care any future coastal developments (including those pertaining to tourism, town expansion and industry), and using of tools such as Environmental Impact Assessment, in order to avoid threats to communities and damage to natural areas and marine life.
- Developing strategies that create incentives for fishing companies to adopt more sustainable fishing practices (e.g. the introduction of by-catch fees).
- Enforcing regulations set by MARPOL which counteract all forms of marine pollution.
- Ensuring that all port authorities provide facilities for the retrieval and correct disposal of oily ballast water and other waste matter that accumulates on board ships.
- Continuing research, involving outside researchers, into the functioning of the marine environment and marine biodiversity.
- Establishing and maintaining mechanisms that secure financial resources that can feed directly into the marine fisheries sector and will boost the funds available for the maintenance and improvement of Namibia's marine capital (e.g. the Fisheries Investment Fund).
- Encouraging entrepreneurial drive and redirect investment so that environmentally friendly economic and livelihood options are opened up for the poor - e.g. promote small scale mariculture enterprise development.
- Identifying cost-effective, flexible and adaptable management approaches and national disaster response strategies to the potential impact of sea-level rise and other impact linked to climate change, that could affect the marine resource sector. Once identified, such impact must be incorporated into Namibia's national development plans.



### 5.2.5 Non-renewable Resources

Namibia is endowed with a rich variety of mineral resources. Diamonds remain the country's premier mining commodity, although uranium, gold, copper, salt, zinc, lead and fluorspar. semi-precious stones, industrial minerals and dimension stone are also produced. Mining related activities, other than formal mines include mining claims, NEPLs, EPLs, and formal mines. Currently there are only 15 active mines in Namibia.

Virtually all mining output is exported. In 1998, minerals represented approximately 36% of Namibia's merchandise exports, but contribution to GDP has fallen from approximately 28% in the 1980's, to current levels of between 12%-14%. In addition to its national importance, mining has stimulated significant infrastructure development, and has been responsible for supporting a variety of community initiatives, conservation projects, training and skills-development programmes and various other social causes in Namibia.

Despite rising costs, uncertain prices and variable labour relations, mining is likely to maintain its significant contribution towards Namibia's socio-economic development over the next three decades. The small-scale mining sector is expected to grow in relative terms and there is the possibility for the development of "mining tourism", where operating mines provide tourism experiences, such as going underground or searching for diamonds. In the case of the Swakopmund salt mine, the idea of mining-linked tourism can be developed further – to embrace a nature centred experience, as this mine is also a registered private nature reserve and one of the best localities in Namibia for observing shorebirds.

If poorly planned or badly managed, mining can result in a great variety of impacts which threaten human health and environmental integrity. However, with modern Environmental Assessment applied during planning and the implementation of EMP during the operational phase, mines in Namibia are increasingly better planned, and negative impacts can usually be mitigated and localised. Moreover, mines are under increasing pressure to obtain ISO certificates which would enhance their chances of selling their commodities to Western markets. Despite these recent improvements, a century of mining with little or no planning to reduce environmental damage, has impacted heavily upon large areas in Namibia, especially in the Namib Desert. There are currently approximately 40 abandoned, unrehabilitated mines in Namibia, of which 40% are in nature reserves.

#### *Sub-Vision*

***Namibia's mineral resources are strategically exploited and optimally benefited, providing equitable opportunities for all Namibians to participate in the industry, while ensuring that environmental impacts are minimised, and investments resulting from mining are made to develop other, sustainable industries and human capital for long-term national development.***

## NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES

### Things to do

- Develop land-use plans that identify the most economically viable land-use options for Namibia's thirteen regions, and which set clear guidelines for zoning (i.e. setting aside specific areas where mining should be restricted).
- Enact the Environmental Management Bill and ensure that all mining activities are preceded by an EA study, and that EMPs are developed and implemented.
- Affected communities must be informed about the potential environmental impacts of mining activities in their area.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Mining well planned, resulting in minimal, if any, impacts on human health and the environment.
- All mines fully rehabilitated after closure.
- Investments resulting from mining are used to develop other sustainable industries and human capital for long term national development.
- Strong small-scale mining sector.

### Current situation

- Mining contributes significantly towards Namibia's socio-economic development.
- Mining companies have stimulated infrastructure development and supported a variety of community initiatives, training and skills-development programmes.
- Currently there are approximately 40 abandoned, unrehabilitated mines in Namibia, of which 40% are in nature reserves.
- Mines are increasingly better planned and mining management shows improved awareness of environment and human health issues.

### Things to avoid

- Inappropriate prospecting and mining activities, especially for low value minerals within protected areas and areas of high ecological sensitivity and/or tourism potential.
- Abandonment of prospecting sites and mines without appropriate rehabilitation.

### Worst-case scenario

- Poorly managed mining activities result in a variety of hazardous impacts that threaten human health and environmental integrity.
- No mine rehabilitation.
- Mines established in ecologically sensitive areas in absence of zoning.
- No investment made to support other sustainable economic activities.

### **Objective**

To exploit Namibia's non-renewable resources optimally and equitably for the benefit of all.

### **Strategies**

- Setting targets in the EMP to be met by management, and indicators that track progress towards a more sustainable mine. It is the responsibility of the mine managers to ensure that every staff member understands the goals of the EMP
- Enacting and implementing Namibia's Pollution Control Bill.
- Ensuring that hazardous waste is handled and disposed of in the safest way possible, and that
- Ensuring that mines hold the ultimate responsibility for cleaning up their own polluting wastes. This will encourage a reduction in the amount of waste that is produced.
- Ensuring that mines obtain ISO 14001 certificate, because this will enhance their chances of selling their commodities to Western markets in future decades.

## **5.2.6 Biodiversity**

### *Namibia's biodiversity and wildlife resources*

Biodiversity may be defined as the variety and variability among living organisms and the natural environments in which they occur. Namibia's biodiversity includes innumerable species of wild plants and animals, which inhabit the country's six major biomes. Only a small number (possibly as little as 20%) of Namibia's wildlife species have been described to date. Of the 13 637 species that have been described, almost 19 % are endemic or unique to Namibia. This high prevalence of endemic species is most pronounced in the Namib Desert and pro-Namib transition zone.

### *The critical importance of Namibia's wildlife resources*

Despite the fact that only some species are directly useful to humans as sources of food, fibre, medicine or tourism, all species, even those that are too small to see, are of ecological importance. Natural ecosystems provide vital genetic material (an invaluable resource that is regularly required to enhance domestic crop and livestock species), as well as the indirect benefits associated with certain ecosystem functions. These include the provision of life sustaining air, water and productive soils.

### *Biodiversity loss*

Although it may not always be obvious, no environmental crisis will have a more lasting impact on future generations than the widespread loss of biodiversity. Each time a species is lost, our ecosystems become less complex. As ecosystems lose complexity, outbreaks of pests and disease become prevalent and essential ecological functions become disrupted. Ultimately, the loss of wild species increases vulnerability to drought, floods and other extreme events like global climate change. In turn, these impacts threaten food supplies, sources of wood and medicines, and the ability of rural communities to sustain themselves. Direct causes of biodiversity loss include:

- The loss, fragmentation and conversion of natural habitats (due to deforestation, land degradation, urban development, etc). Most severely

threatened habitats are riparian forests along the banks of the perennial rivers, wetlands, woodland and savanna biomes.

- The unsustainable harvesting of wild plants and animals and wildlife products
- Air, soil and water pollution
- The introduction of alien invasive organisms that threaten the survival of indigenous species
- Water management schemes and the regulation of perennial river flow by dams.

Human population pressure, poverty, the lack of secure and exclusive tenure and insufficient intersectoral policy co-ordination are the most important indirect causes of biodiversity loss in Namibia. It can be assumed that those areas in Namibia that have the highest human population and livestock densities, and which have been subjected to extensive land clearing, are those that have suffered the highest losses in biodiversity.

Many wetland sites are parts of larger systems, usually with significant components in unprotected areas or in other countries. This means that transboundary and multisectoral approaches are usually needed for their effective management. Other transboundary biodiversity conservation challenges exist. For example, the extensive wildlife herds that migrate seasonally between northern Botswana, north-eastern Namibia, Zimbabwe and parts of Zambia and Angola must be considered as valuable shared resources – together with certain ecosystems (particularly those associated with rivers). The successful conservation of this entire area within SADC, and the ultimate survival of its tourism industry, will depend to some extent on the establishment of a cross-boundary conservation zone, linking unspoiled habitats and some of the established parks in these five countries.

#### *The importance of wildlife harvesting to subsistence economies*

Currently about 67% of Namibia's population live in rural areas. At a national level it is estimated that 33% of total household consumption in rural areas comes from wild foods. The most important wild products that are harvested include: firewood, wood for construction and woodcarvings; thatching grasses; medicinal products and veld foods (from nuts, fruits, leaves, roots and bark, meat from game animals and fish).

165

There is no conflict between using natural resources and the notion of conservation, provided that resources are used sustainably and equitably.

#### *Contribution of protected areas to wildlife conservation and biodiversity protection*

Namibia's national parks and reserves remain the principal means of maintaining essential ecological functions and conserving biodiversity and scenic areas. The wildlife resources within the parks are used for tourism, capture for resale, research and education. Despite this, Namibia's parks and reserves face many challenges including:

- Lack of linkages to local, regional, and national planning and management systems, which sometimes leads to inappropriate development within protected areas
- Increasing pressure for protected areas to be used for emergency grazing or reallocation due to land reform
- Communities generally see parks as land that only benefits government and foreign visitors



- Parks are extremely expensive to run and maintain. Only a small percentage of the funds generated by Namibia's National Parks are put back into park management.

It is now generally accepted that to make conservation efforts sustainable, they must contribute in some meaningful way towards rural development. Conservancies and CBNRM initiatives have had much success in this regard since 1996.

*Conservation outside protected area: Conservancies and CBNRM initiatives*

Namibia's conservancy programme meets most of Namibia's National Development objectives – it has created employment, provides economic and managerial empowerment, enhanced rural development, helps to alleviate poverty and, at the same time, has contributed to biodiversity conservation.

Conservancies offer opportunities for communities in remote communal areas to generate cash revenues and employment. At present, conservancies have legal rights over a narrow resource base that includes wildlife and tourism. However, eventually conservancies could become common property management bodies responsible for managing all natural resources, including land, rangelands, forests, fresh water fisheries, and water. To date, 29 communal conservancies have been registered and an additional 33 are under development. The registered conservancies encompass approximately 4 million hectares of prime wildlife habitat, while the emerging conservancies cover an additional estimated 5-7 million hectares. Currently, more than 30,000 people benefit directly from improved resource management in registered conservancies, and an additional 60,000 – 80,000 will soon fall under the conservancy umbrella.

Conservancies receive the majority of their income from the tourism industry. The comparative advantages of this industry over other subsistence uses of natural resources (e.g. livestock grazing) is immense. Most tourists are willing to pay for high quality, low impact nature-centred experiences with foreign exchange. In addition, anticipated growth in the world tourism industry is high. Provided it looks after its unique tourism product, Namibia is likely to be the chosen destination for many affluent tourists seeking a nature centred experience, in the decades to come.

A direct result of devolving rights and responsibilities to communities over wildlife has been a dramatic increase in wildlife numbers outside of protected areas. This in turn has led to community empowerment and local management of the resource.

Despite these successes, certain policy constraints threaten the conservancy programme's long-term potential. In summary,

- Wildlife tourism is not yet recognised as a valid land-use option that can replace other direct land-uses (like agriculture) in certain areas.
- Supportive legislation to assist conservancies with integrated resource management plans has not yet been developed.
- NGO's and the private sector are vital partners in the CBNRM programme. Private sector investment incentives in communal conservancies must be developed.

### ***Projections to the year 2030***

By 2030 approximately 65 communal area conservancies covering approximately 15,000,000 hectares (44%) of communal land, could be registered for the specific purposes of developing and managing wildlife and tourism resources. It is estimated that over 250,000 communal area residents could benefit from these conservancies. However, if group tenure within conservancies is extended to rangeland, woodland, water, freshwater fish and the land itself, many more opportunities and benefits will arise. This will, however, demand strong partnerships and significant sharing of skills and opportunities between agricultural, marketing, tourism, wildlife and forestry management personnel from the GRN, private sector and NGOs. Under this scenario, projections to 2030 may be summarised as follows:

- Approximately 160 conservancies could be established on communal lands, covering an estimated 24,000,000 hectares (equivalent of 29.2% of Namibia's land mass or 71% of communal land)
- More than 900,000 communal area residents could benefit from better managed natural resources under this scenario
- There will be improved livelihoods and reduced support costs to the GRN in managing its national resource base and the people dependent upon it
- Should conservancy game populations continue to expand, then it is possible to project increases of 20% per annum in returns for trophy-hunting (i.e. through increased supply and exchange rate savings) and other subsistence uses of wildlife, bring the annual projected returns by 2030 to N\$844,893,255, of which conservancies would directly receive N\$340,212,802 in benefits.

### ***Sub-Vision***

***The integrity of vital ecological processes, natural habitats and wild species throughout Namibia is maintained whilst significantly supporting national socio-economic development through sustainable low-impact, high quality consumptive and non-consumptive uses, as well as providing diversity for rural and urban livelihoods.***

## Biodiversity

### Things to do

- Combat poverty and population growth.
- Recognise that wildlife tourism on communal land is a valid land-use option with high potential to combat poverty, stimulate rural development and conserve biodiversity.
- Create incentives for landowners and managers to diversify into wildlife and tourism in more efficient and cost effective ways.
- Continue to extend conservancies into all viable areas on communal land.
- Encourage and develop private sector investment incentives in communal conservancies. NGOs and the private sector are vital partners in the CBNRM programme.
- Enforce legislation regarding the illegal export of indigenous species and the import and/or propagation of alien invasive species.
- Ensure that all important Namibian ecological diversity are represented in State-owned parks;
- Strengthen management and biodiversity conservation-value of State-owned parks by improving management planning and the financial resources for implementation;
- Update the management and tourism infrastructure in parks to maintain Namibia's competitiveness as a tourism destination

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Diminished rates of biodiversity loss.
- Rehabilitated and productive riparian forests, woodland and savannah biomes.
- CBNRM extended into all viable rural areas.
- Equitable access to and appropriate tenure over all natural resources through CBNRM initiatives.
- Strong partnerships and significant sharing of skills and opportunities between GRN, private sector and conservancy stakeholders.
- Extended and well managed protected areas network to include biodiversity "hotspots" and trans-boundary areas.
- Improved land-uses and optimal livelihoods achieved.
- Vibrant, productive rural areas.

### Current situation

- Habitat loss due to human population pressure, poverty, the lack of secure and exclusive tenure and insufficient inter-sectoral policy co-ordination.
- Insufficient understanding of the importance of Biodiversity to human and economic health.
- Inadequate network of protected areas and poor management of parks.
- Excellent progress made on conservation efforts outside of protected areas as a result of CBNRM initiatives.

### Things to avoid

- Sectoralism, which results in limited co-ordination between the various sectors that deal with natural resources.
- No land-use planning and zoning off of certain areas for different economic activities.
- Deforestation, and other unsuitable land management practices that cause land degradation, to continue.
- Inadequate protection of natural wetlands and riverine systems and their accompanying flora and fauna;
- Over-exploitation of freshwater fish, riverine vegetation and all other natural resources.
- Failure to protect Namibia's threatened and endangered species.
- Preventing NGOs and the private sector continuing their support of the CBNRM programmes.
- Inadequate and/or inconsistent implementation of Namibia's Environmental Management Bill, Waste Management and Pollution Control Bill and other legislation that aims to ensure sustainable development with minimal costs to human health and the natural environment.

### Worst-case scenario

- Rapid rates of biodiversity loss resulting in outbreaks of pests and threats to human health.
- Increased vulnerability to drought, environmental change and loss of productivity.
- Threats to food supply, sources of medicines and wood.
- Reduced livelihood options and increasing rural poverty.
- Decline in Namibia's tourism potential.

### **Objective**

To achieve diminished rates of biodiversity loss and ensure equitable access of all Namibians to and appropriate tenure over all natural resources.

### **Strategies**

- a) Improving the policy environment regarding land-use management by:
- Developing economically and ecologically viable land-use plans that identify the most suitable land-use options for Namibia's thirteen regions, and which set clear guidelines for zoning (i.e. setting aside specific areas for low impact, high quality tourism and others for direct use activities like agriculture and mining).
  - Implementing the Environmental Management Act. This will help to reduce threats to human health, ecosystems and resources from poorly planned development activities.
  - Developing supportive legislation to assist conservancies with integrated resource management plans.
  - Including representative parts of all important Namibian biodiversity in State-owned parks;
  - Strengthening management and biodiversity conservation value of State-owned parks by improving management planning and the financial resources for implementation;
  - Updating the management and tourism infrastructure in parks to maintain Namibia's competitiveness as a tourism destination.
- b) Introducing as many economic instruments as possible, which can be used to help finance sustainable development options and/or discourage environmentally unfriendly practices that threaten human health and limit long-term economic prosperity. These include:
- Introducing tax reforms and environmental taxes by taxing environmentally unfriendly or pollution-generating imports and inappropriate land use practices;
  - Reducing subsidies that encourage environmentally unsound practices (for example the use of pesticides, water and coal which threaten biodiversity and environmental health in general);
  - Establishing and maintaining the EIF to help ensure that at least some of the revenue generated from tourism activities in state owned parks, will be used to help conserve the environmental resource base;
  - Providing loans, grants or subsidies that will encourage sustainable, environmentally friendly practices (for example, the use of solar and other renewable energy resources; Integrated Pest Management practices, instead of highly polluting pesticides); and
  - Implementing strict "polluter pays" principles through the Waste Management and Pollution Control Bill.
- c) Improving the knowledge base regarding natural resources and biodiversity in Namibia through:
- Training and improved finances for relevant research and monitoring; and
  - Recognizing and utilizing local (indigenous) knowledge held by rural communities about their environment.
- d) Developing and implementing initiatives aimed at the transboundary management of north-eastern Namibia and the Namib Desert.



e) Combating deforestation and loss of habitat through land degradation, by providing rural communities with electricity and/or renewable energy sources.

### 5.3 THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

Urban environments play a vital role in the provision of employment, shelter, services and as centres of education. They hold promise for sustainable development because of their ability to support a large number of people, while limiting their *per capita* impact on the natural environment. However, the rapid amassing of people in towns and cities can have tremendous impact and managing the urban environment sustainably has become a major global challenge. An important part of meeting this challenge is *planning*. The locality of a town, and the way in which it is built and managed, will ultimately affect the quality of life of its residents.

In Namibia, rapidly growing informal settlements on the outskirts of towns are generally associated with localised deforestation, increasing waste management problems, increasing crime, poverty, limited access to adequate sanitation and isolated incidents associated with the spread of communicable, waterborne diseases. There is also the growing problem of unemployment. Unemployment in Namibia's urban areas is currently estimated at 31.5 %; about 37% of women and 27% of men in the labour force are unemployed.

Rapid urbanisation in Namibia has occurred largely as a result of high rates of population growth, drought, a decline in the ability of the land to support growing populations and the perception that there is an easier and better life in towns and cities. Namibia's current rates of urbanisation are high and 75% of the country's population could be living in towns and cities by 2030.

Local Authorities in the larger towns are autonomous in most aspects of their management. However, skills and expertise are concentrated in the Windhoek and Walvis Bay municipalities, whilst smaller municipalities have to rely on external consultants and/or the Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing for their human resources.

While Environmental Assessment has been seen as a means of reducing unnecessary impact upon human health, the land and resources, legislation has yet to be passed and this planning tool is inconsistently implemented during urban developments.

Thus far, only two local authorities in Namibia (the Windhoek and Walvis Bay municipalities) have introduced Local Agenda 21 initiatives. There is insufficient public awareness of Agenda 21 and environmental issues in general. Environmental issues appear to be a relatively low priority on personal and political agendas in Namibia, in both rural and urban environments.

Since Independence, the formation of parastatal organisations for electricity and water supply has provided the opportunity to improve service provision and efficiency. The establishment of Namibia's Water and Sanitation Committee in 1990 has led to an improvement in access to potable water and sanitation facilities. At Independence less than 50% of the rural population had adequate access to a reliable source of safe water. The 2001 census report shows that about 98 % of

urban and 80% of rural households have access to safe water. The report also shows that over 70% of the households in the urban areas use flush toilets, compared to less than 10% in rural areas.

Despite these notable improvements, declining water quality is a problem even in many improved water supply systems. Although the spread of waterborne diseases in Namibia's growing squatter areas is low, problems periodically emerge even in the dry, desert towns. For example, during May 2001 an outbreak of diarrhoea in the squatter area outside Swakopmund caused 25 people to be hospitalised during the east wind period.

While equitable access to health facilities and health education has improved considerably since the early 1990's, medical services are still affected by a shortage of adequately trained medical doctors. Health services are expected to deteriorate as the health care system becomes over-burdened with HIV/AIDS patients, and there is a brain-drain of well-qualified doctors and nurses.

Although local authorities in some of the major towns (in particular Walvis Bay and Windhoek) and the private sector have made efforts to improve waste management, there has been inadequate commitment to provide incentives for improved waste management and pollution control – particularly the reduction, recycling and re-use of waste materials and the adequate handling and disposal of hazardous wastes. Illegal dumping in green spaces and dry river beds has developed into an immense problem in all urban areas.

Regardless of Namibia's problems relating to waste management, some exciting zero emission (ZERI) projects have been proposed by NGOs and the private sector. The UNAM Integrated Bio-system project provides an excellent example.

There has been improved access to urban land and incentives to invest in and develop land through the systematic proclamation of smaller towns and the adoption of the National Housing Policy. The self-help *Build Together Programme* (BTP) provides low interest rate loans to individuals. This programme has helped many families in peri-urban areas to build their own homes. Despite these efforts, the BTP has managed to redress only less than 3% of Namibia's housing backlog per annum – a figure which, due to population growth and the increasing number of informal settlements in urban areas, has begun to decline.

There has been good progress in road development. In particular, there has been a dramatic upgrading of roads and infrastructure in formerly neglected parts of Namibia.

Despite Namibia's trends regarding increasing crime and domestic violence, services to protect civilians, provide support to victims of violent crime or shelter for the growing numbers of AIDS orphans, remain inadequate. Namibia's Police Force suffers from limited resources, and the small numbers of victim shelters that exist are inadequate and mostly run by volunteers and NGOs, with a shortage of funds and little or no support from the authorities.

### ***Sub-Vision***

***Despite high growth rates, Namibia's urban areas will provide equitable access to safety, shelter, essential services and innovative employment opportunities within an efficiently managed, clean and aesthetically pleasing environment.***



## The Urban Environment

### Things to do

- Maintain population growth at sustainable levels
- Slow down rates of urban migration aim for economically sound and environmentally safe sustainable rural development options (e.g. CBNRM initiatives)
- Practice responsible architecture – design buildings around the environment, not bulldoze through it.
- Develop Youth Clubs run by trained adults, in all areas, and create recreation centres.
- Make Windhoek and all of Namibia’s large towns “Cyclist friendly”. This will reduce traffic congestion and contribute to mitigating the effects of Global Warming.
- Identify and implement cost-effective, flexible and adaptable management approaches and national disaster response strategies to the potential impact of sea-level rise for each coastal settlement.
- Reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Healthy, self-sufficient rural populations and reduced rates of rural-to-urban migration.
- Well planned, well managed, clean, safe and aesthetically pleasing urban areas.
- Recreation facilities (parks, monuments, museums, etc) available in cities.
- Equitable access to land and essential services.
- Opportunities for innovative and sustainable employment.
- Pro-active, citizens with high levels of civic pride, involved in decision-making.

### Current situation

- High rates of urbanisation, unemployment and increasing urban crime.
- Improved provision of essential facilities and services (shelter, water, sanitation, roads and health) to all urban areas since Independence.
- Poor knowledge of Local Agenda 21 initiatives.
- Insufficient sharing of knowledge and experience between the larger more established local authorities and smaller ones.
- High incidence of peri-urban deforestation and illegal dumping.
- Poor hazardous waste-control and limited efforts at reducing and recycling wastes.
- Inadequate services to protect civilians, provide support to victims of violent crime or shelter for the growing numbers of AIDS orphans.

### Things to avoid

- No effort to enhance sustainable rural development and land-use options.
- A lack of planning which paves the way for environmental degradation, overburdening of existing infrastructure, a lack of access to suitable land, adequate shelter and essential services.
- Urbanisation spilling over in an ad hoc manner into:
  - Sensitive coastal areas, causing the destruction of valuable ecosystems and their resources.
  - Reclaimed wetlands
  - Areas that could be used for agricultural purposes.
- No effort to develop Local Agenda 21 initiatives
- Discouraging decentralisation and public participation
- Limited waste management and hazardous waste control especially in green spaces and informal urban areas.
- Uncontrolled crime
- Negligent governance, which ignores vital issues pertaining to sustainability; decentralisation; efficiency; accountability; public participation; and security.
- A loss of green spaces in urban areas, noise pollution and aesthetically unpleasant sights and smells which can erode civic pride, lower morale and result in a loss of well-being amongst urban residents.

### Worst-case scenario

- Aesthetically unpleasing, uncontrolled urban sprawl and informal areas.
- Increasing poverty and uncontrolled crime.
- Health hazards associated with poor waste management and limited access to adequate water supplies and sanitation services.
- Citizens with low morale, limited civic pride and minimal involvement in decision-making.

### **Objective**

To achieve integrated urban and rural development in which there are opportunities for innovative and sustainable employment, with well planned, well managed, clean, safe and aesthetically pleasing urban areas.

### **Strategies**

- a) Incorporating a clear urban development plan into the national development plans, to reduce the need for land conversion, improve infrastructure for water supply, provide opportunities for water and energy savings and to make recycling of waste and water more cost effective.
- b) Implementing HIV/AIDS reduction policies, plans and programmes.
- c) Improving urban environmental management by:
  - Developing more effective waste collection systems through public/private partnerships (especially those that encourage to use of informal labour).
  - Implementing strict legislation for the treatment of hazardous wastes
  - Adopting sustainable energy policies that are cost effective and environmentally friendly.
- d) Harmonising objectives and policies and ensure close coordination of actions between GRN and the private sector on issues to do with pollution control, child welfare and crime prevention.
- e) Improving urban governance through:
  - Drafting Local Agenda 21 Action Plans for each Urban Settlement – thus aiming for social, economic and environmental sustainability.
  - Decentralising responsibilities and resources to the lowest appropriate level;
  - Developing effective partnerships with and among all actors of civil society (particularly the private and community sectors);
  - Making local authorities accountable to their citizens, improving access to Government information;
  - Encouraging public participation in all decisions regarding urban development;
  - Striving to create and maintain safe public spaces (e.g. involve citizens in crime prevention or developing a public awareness campaign to encourage gender awareness and tolerance of diversity).
- f) Developing suitable and caring shelters for victims of violent crime, domestic violence, street children and the growing number of AIDS orphans.
- g) Encouraging town-to-town co-operation and exchange of experiences, and lessons learnt.



## 6. CREATING THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

Creation of an enabling environment is essential for the attainment of sustainable development. Such an environment is complex, and embraces broad issues such as democratic governance; peace and political stability; national, global and regional security; regional integration; international relations; development cooperation; and globalisation.

These various tenets are internal and external factors that constitute the enabling environment, and are regarded as necessary conditions for the realization of sustainable development. It is, therefore, imperative for Namibia to work towards the creation and maintenance of an enabling environment, which ensures peace and political stability, for development to be realised.

Peace has been conceived as the absence of war in the western political discourse. This ‘negative’ definition (negative, because it defines by negation) has since been questioned by many authors who prefer a ‘positive’ approach in which peace is viewed as the attainment of security, justice, welfare, freedom, and self-fulfilment. This Vision takes the positive approach to the meaning of peace.

Peace cannot exist outside political stability and acceptance by the citizens of the existing institutions and economic structures and their products. It is a compromise among citizens susceptible to agitation by any situation that provokes social, political and economic woes. Therefore, it exists in a society with stratified obligations and responsibilities, and with a power structure supported by a collective desire to respond to both internal and external aggression. There is a direct relationship between peace and development; while war does not necessarily prevent economic growth, it is inimical to development.

Political stability presupposes the absence of conflicts of whatever nature within the broad civil society. It is a product of broad consensus on national policies and principles, and is an embodiment of tolerance. Both the leaders and those who are led must internalise and practice democracy in order for it to be sustained, and the national Constitution must provide clear guidelines that purposively articulate how government intends to achieve specific levels of desired life quality. Most importantly, the national leadership must be genuinely committed to it, and the government administration must adhere to the principles of justice.

In addition, for political stability to be sustained the environment in and surrounding the country must be devoid of destabilising activities, for these could undermine the prevailing peace. Therefore, political stability manifests only in a society where the individual’s interests succumb to those of the majority, and fundamental rights and freedoms are given their cardinal role as pillars of democracy and development.

The goals of the Namibian struggle for Independence were framed in terms of social justice, popular rule and socio-economic transformation, thus the legitimacy of the post apartheid system of governance rests on its ability to deliver transformation or, at any rate, to redirect resources to address the socio-economic causes of poverty and potential conflict. And since attaining independence,



Namibia has enjoyed peace and political stability over the last decade. This is owed mainly to the democratic governance framework that accommodates civil and political rights of citizens.

However, the sustenance of this atmosphere of peace to the year 2030 requires concerted efforts for the expansion of democracy beyond the confines of the formal procedures of political practices, so that it is also felt in the socio-economic arena. Continued prevalence of widespread poverty would, in the eyes of those affected, imply government's unwillingness to change the status quo, or its inability to improve their economic conditions. Therefore, the challenge calls for a functioning social-democratic framework, underpinned by a robust and sustainable system of equitable social provisioning for the basic human needs of all citizens, in terms of, among others, education, health, housing, water, sanitation, land, etc.

## 6.1 Sustainable Development

Sustainable development is the type of development that meets the needs of the present, without limiting the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It encourages people to take responsibility for their own development and promotes development activities that address the actual needs of the people, and require increasing community contributions to development services and infrastructure. Sustainable development calls for the following:

- Partnership (between government, business, communities, NGOs and CBOs, academic institutions, international community and donors, rural and urban communities, etc.);
- Capacity enhancement (human and institutional);
- Good governance, accountability and transparency;
- Democracy and human rights;
- Environmental protection;
- Peace and political stability.
- Gender equality.

The concept of sustainable development arises, in part, from the realization that it is impossible to separate economic and social issues from environmental issues. In order to pursue sustainable development, strategies that result in a minimum amount of damaging impact but which promote social and economic development must be adopted. Namibia's Ideal Vision for 2030 is one that fully embraces the idea of sustainable development.

The key threats to sustainable development in Namibia

- Population growth and settlement patterns:* Population growth directly affects future demand for natural resources, rates of urbanisation and poverty.
- Increasing water stress.* Namibia's limited freshwater resources are being placed under increasing stress due to population growth, rapid urbanisation and economic growth.
- Poorly planned development and inappropriate industrialisation:* A lack of strategic planning can lead to inappropriate developments that do not make optimal use of Namibia's comparative advantages, and place unnecessary pressure on limited resources such as water.

- iv) *The loss of biodiversity*: The loss of biodiversity impacts on our development options. It disrupts ecosystem stability and the functions that underpin our very survival (e.g. the provision of clean air and water, the control of soil erosion and floods, and the assimilation of wastes).
- v) *Unresolved land issues*: Low land capability means that Namibia's soils are easily degraded. In addition, the unequal distribution of land, if not resolved in the near future, will lead to conflict that could destabilise our entire society and economy. The lack of secure group tenure does not provide incentives for people to care for the land and invest in its improvement. The "open access" problem in Namibia is economically and environmentally unsound as it leads to environmental degradation, dissipation of net benefits and reduced production.
- vi) *Widespread poverty and inequality*: Namibia has one of the most highly skewed income distributions in the world. This means that there is significant poverty and inequality in the country. Poor people have few options but to depend on primary production for food and energy and, therefore, can result in tremendous strain on natural resources.
- vii) *Wasteful consumption patterns*: Wealth can also threaten sustainable development. Wealthy people and communities often choose to have resource intensive lifestyles. If they do, they become responsible for high rates of energy and raw material consumption, and for producing large amounts of polluting waste. Policy incentives are vitally important to dissuade the wealthy members of society to reduce their excessively consumptive lifestyles.
- viii) *Poor governance*: Governance affects efficiency within the civil service, equity, political stability and democracy. Equity and transparency have been highlighted as the most important aspects of governance which need to be addressed in Namibia. In addition, the slow adoption of decentralisation, the lack of intersectoral planning and co-ordination between ministries and stakeholders, and low levels of public participation in decision-making, on some key issues, threaten good governance in Namibia.
- ix) *Unhealthy competition with neighbouring countries for shared natural resources*: Improved and sustained co-operation and co-ordination regarding policies and policy-implementation is essential to avoid future inequitable use, pollution and conflict over shared water, marine fisheries and wildlife resources.
- x) *Underdevelopment of human resources*: Inequalities (particularly by race and gender) in education levels, skills training and capacity-building still exist in Namibia, despite efforts to redress past injustices. The resulting lack of skilled labour and limited human resources restricts private sector development and public sector functioning. Current trends of a declining skills-base (e.g. parks and wildlife management) are of great concern, and Namibia needs to decide on the road ahead in terms of management systems and partnership arrangements. While the creation of parastatals and agencies is based on sound principles and should continue, in some cases they have not performed well

and have resulted in negative perceptions.

- xi) The HIV/AIDS epidemic:* The prevalence of the HIV/AIDS epidemic undermines human well-being and economic prosperity by reducing the quantity and quality of the labour force. In addition, it wipes out past investments in education and training and places a strain on communities and households that need to care for orphaned children, the sick and dying.
- xii) Limited research for development:* Rapid modernisation threatens the survival of valuable traditional knowledge and practices in Namibia. Traditional knowledge is seldom acknowledged as providing any contribution to development - despite the fact that it is often better suited, than Eurocentric technology, to conditions in Namibia. Even though a lot of useful information currently exists, there are significant gaps in our knowledge regarding many issues relating to sustainable development and environmental issues.
- xiii) Unstable macroeconomic environment:* A stable macroeconomic environment is vital for economic growth and poverty reduction. Despite some positive macroeconomic trends since the early 1990's (for example, a steady reduction in the inflation rate, Namibia's macroeconomic environment is not considered stable as yet.
- xiv) The adverse impacts of global atmospheric change:* Under climate-change conditions there is the possibility that Namibia's climate will become hotter and drier, with increased variability and more frequent and prolonged periods of drought. These conditions will exacerbate current problems regarding water management, food production and human health. Superimposed over the major issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia are the country's harsh climatic conditions, which increase vulnerability to land degradation, water resource depletion and restrict development activities.

#### ***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia develops a significantly more equitable distribution of social well-being, through the sustainable utilization of natural resources in a mixed economy, characteristic of higher income countries, primarily through stronger growth and poverty-reduction.***



## Sustainable Development

### Things to do

- Establish domestically determined procedures that integrate environment and development issues into decision-making at all levels.
- Develop or improve mechanisms that facilitate the involvement of all concerned individuals, groups and organisations in decision-making.
- Namibians must work together and government should facilitate and embrace the contributions of civil society.
- Promote actions that can effectively reverse unwelcome trends, and reduce threats to Namibia's natural resource capital.
- Allocate more resources to the previously neglected areas (regions).
- Support household level income generating self-help projects (e.g., brick-making, sewing, etc.).
- Support and encourage diversification of agricultural projects in communal areas
- Encourage the establishment and provide support to agricultural cooperatives.
- Create more credit opportunities for low income borrowers.
- Accelerate the smooth redistribution of land.
- Accelerate the process of removing the 'Red Line'.
- Develop aquaculture.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Partnership is maintained between government, private sector and civil society.
- Partnership is upheld between urban and rural societies and, ultimately, between all members of Namibian society, males and females.
- All Namibians are unified around their long-term development needs and initiatives, and promote and nurture partnerships.
- Poverty and income disparities are significantly reduced.
- All Namibians have access to economic opportunities.
- Land is fairly distributed.
- Economic development is sustainable.
- Government continues to assist the poor with a spending emphasis on the provision of public goods.
- Healthy, productive land with effective water and mineral cycling, leading to infrequent, low-level drought and flooding.
- Farms and natural ecosystems are productive, diverse, stable and sustainable – socially, economically and ecologically.
- Forests, savannas, deserts, wetlands, coastal and marine ecosystems are open, diverse, stable and productive.

### Current situation

- Low land capability means that Namibia's soils are easily degraded.
- Issues of equity and transparency, the slow adoption of decentralization, are outstanding.
- Inequalities in education levels, skills training and capacity-building still exist in Namibia, despite efforts to redress past injustices.
- Namibia's macroeconomic environment is not yet considered stable.
- Namibia has a harsh climatic conditions, which increase vulnerability to land degradation
- The threat of HIV/AIDS remains.
- Gender inequality in access to productive resources

### Things to avoid

- Ignore the effect of population dynamics
- Unhealthy competition with neighbouring countries for shared natural resources.
- Underdevelopment of human capital
- Poor governance
- Wasteful consumption patterns
- Leave land issues unresolved over a long period of time

### Worst-case scenario

- Government acts alone without much input from private sector and non-Governmental organisations;
- Neglect of the land issues, leading to widespread public discontent and agitation;
- Widespread environmental deterioration;
- Highly unstable macroeconomic climate;
- Underdeveloped human resources;
- Increasing poverty and inequality.

### **Objective**

To achieve the development of Namibia's 'Natural Capital' for the benefit of the country's social, economic and ecological well-being.

### **Strategies**

- Harmonizing population dynamics and the impact of rapid urbanisation with social and economic development factors;
- Reducing poverty and inequality, particularly gender-based inequality.
- Solving Namibia's land issues by choosing the most viable land-use options, implementing appropriate land distribution and resettlement policies, developing and maintaining economically and ecologically sound systems of tenure over all natural resources and, combating land degradation;
- Reducing water stress, through management of human, agricultural and industrial water demand; and by improving access to potable water for the rural poor;
- Improving development planning and reducing the negative impact of industrialization, by preparing economically and ecologically rational development plans;
- Ensuring progress on the Environmental Management Act (EMA) to prevent the erosion of Namibia's renewable natural resource capital, and to optimise the benefits from Namibia's non-renewable natural resources (i.e minerals);
- Enhancing biodiversity conservation through improvements in the policy environment, extension of the protected areas network, and improvement of biodiversity information;
- Improving governance by speeding up the devolution process, improving service provision and resource management efficiency, upholding principles of human rights, civil liberties and multi-party democracy, and by maintaining and improving peace, stability and political commitment;
- Improving co-ordination and planning with neighbouring countries for shared natural resources
- Building up Namibia's human capital through education, training and capacity-building, including meeting Namibia's HIV/AIDS epidemic and other health challenges;
- Improving access to existing knowledge and filling in knowledge gaps through improving access to knowledge, research and development;
- Creating a more stable macro-economic environment and stimulating private entrepreneurship; and
- Preparing for the adverse impacts of climate change.

## **6.2 International Relations**

Since Independence in 1990, Namibia has occupied a high international profile. This high profile has contributed towards countering the widely perceived marginalisation of the African continent. Namibia exemplified to the international community a model African country with democratic governance, peace, political and civil stability, the rule of law and low level of corruption.

Namibia hosted the SADC Summit that transformed SADCC into SADC. It was also in Windhoek in August 2000 that SADC was restructured in order to reflect an organisation that responds best to the needs of the new millennium.



In 1991, the task of co-ordination of the sector for Marine Fisheries and Resources within the SADC region was given to Namibia. Through its efforts Namibia developed the SADC Fisheries Protocol which was signed by the Heads of State and Government of all the SADC member states, in 2001. The Protocol has the objective to promote responsible and sustainable use of the living aquatic resources and aquatic ecosystems within the SADC region.

Namibia agreed to a proposal to peacefully resolve the potentially explosive issue of the Kasikili Island with Botswana. Both countries agreed to refer the matter to the ICJ in The Hague, with the express undertaking to accept whatever verdict was reached.

As a mid-wife for Namibia's birth (Independence), the UN became a forum where Namibia played some significant roles. Namibia was elected as Africa's Non-Permanent member of the Security Council for the period 1999 to 2000; Namibia held a rotating Presidency of the Security Council in August 2000 and led the Security Council's fact-finding mission to East Timor, which paved the way for an independence referendum and UN peacekeeping intervention; an assumption by Namibia of the Presidency of the 54<sup>th</sup> Session General Assembly in 1999, for 12 months.

African Heads of State and Governments, in June 2001, launched the successor of the OAU, the A.U. This step represents, historically, the closer political, economic and institutional integration of the African continent. NEPAD has also been formulated to be implemented within the AU framework. It is an African Recovery blueprint for development strategies for the entire continent. Africa stands a better chance with NEPAD in realising its ideals, because NEPAD serves as a pillar of the African Union. NEPAD would contain projects and programmes, well formulated and properly costed, that would be marketed to donor countries for financial support.

In the long run, the AU will more or less resemble the EU. While espousing the Pan-Africanist ideal of a united Africa, the building blocks of the AU should be the existing regional organisations, such as SADC, COMESA, ECOWAS, East African Community, etc. It is easier to unite a number of large regional blocks that have achieved important internal integration milestones, than to unite 51 disparate countries.

Namibia's primary political, diplomatic and security arena is the African continent. What happens in Africa would affect Namibia's vital interest to varying degrees. Namibia operates a coherent national policy response to counteract any negative external factors and accentuate the positive factors. The 'Foreign Policy Response Model' presented in Fig 6.1, is used to illustrate how Namibia could deal with the external challenges which will impact on the country in the years up to 2030, and which will impact, to a greater or lesser degree, on the attainment of the objectives set by Vision 2030.






Figure 6.1: Foreign Policy Response Model



The point of departure of the model is the assumption that Namibia's primary political, diplomatic and security arena is the African continent. What happens in Africa affects Namibia's vital interest to varying degrees, and there is a need for a coherent national policy response to counteract the negatives and accentuate the positives. The intellectual point of departure of the model is a so-called "concentric circle of interests". Fig. 6.1 illustrates the policy inter-relationships between Namibia (represented by the rectangle on the left of the model) and the rest of Africa.


*The smallest circle* represents the four bordering states with which Namibia has developed bilateral security management systems in the form of Joint Commissions on Defence and Security. *The middle circle* represents the rest of the SADC nations not bordering Namibia. *The outer concentric circle* in the model represents the rest of the African continent beyond the SADC region. *Outside of the concentric circles* is the rest of the world, where Namibia's interaction would be conducted within the context of the UN and its institutions and resolutions.

Namibia will continue to play an active role in international relations. The Namibian Government will campaign for an increased role of a multilateral approach towards international relations. For this reason, Namibia will continue to pursue the reform and democratisation process of the UN system. At a continental level, Government will support the full functioning of the AU so that the Union can play a pivotal role in ensuring sustainable development. NEPAD will serve as a recovery development plan and an economic engine.

#### ***Sub-Vision***

***A new international order, has been established based on sovereign equality of nations, where sustainable development, peace and human progress is ensured***





**Objective**

To strive towards a new international order based on sovereign equality of nations where sustainable development, peace and human progress is ensured.

**Strategies**

- Focusing Namibia’s primary political, diplomatic and security efforts on the African continent.
- Ensuring harmony between Namibia and the four bordering countries that share bilateral security management systems of Joint Commissions on Defence and Security.

- Seeking international cooperation to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS.
- Upholding, with the SADC nations, the regional approach as mandated by the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (Namibia would act in concert with other SADC member states).
- Following the UN and AU mandates in Namibia's relationships with the rest of Africa beyond the SADC region, with emphasis on conflict prevention/resolution and peacekeeping.
- Upholding international conventions in relationships with the rest of the world, where Namibia's interaction is within the context of the UN and its institutions.

### 6.3 Development Co-operation

Development Co-operation is the process through which aid is provided by External Funding Agencies (EFAs) to recipient countries in order to achieve a mutually agreed goal. Each sovereign and equal partner realises the objectives that it has intended to achieve. The development partners' relationship should be co-ordinated and managed very carefully. Aid should be supplementary to the recipient country's own domestic resources and should not supplant them.

Between 1990 and 1998, grants to Namibia doubled (from N\$ 283 million to N\$ 780 million). During the same period, grants and soft loans represented, on average, about 12.5% of the revenues of the Government of Namibia. It can, therefore, be stated that Namibia is not aid-dependent as is the case with a number of African countries where aid constitutes more than 50% of the government budget.

Bilateral donors have provided the bulk of development assistance. Since 1991, bilateral donors have contributed about 75% of the total aid while multilateral donors have provided about 25%. Assistance from the UN Agencies has dramatically decreased since Namibia's independence (UNDP is a case in point). In 1990, UN Agencies contributed some N\$ 12.5 million that accounted for 20% of multilateral development assistance, while in 1998, that figure dropped to N\$ 9.3 million, representing 5.1% of multilateral development assistance. The assistance from the bilateral donors has steadily increased.

About 50% of the development assistance has gone to finance human resources development and social sectors (potable water, housing and sanitation). Some 17% of the aid resources were invested in natural resources sectors (agriculture, forestry and fisheries), while 16% went to transport and communication sectors. The rest were invested in administration (development) and regional development.

External development assistance should be guided by the national development priorities and geared towards institutional and human resources and capacity-building, poverty reduction, employment creation and income-generating projects. External assistance should also improve the status of marginalised groups, promote environmental sustainability, revive and sustain the economic growth and development of rural areas and the provision of essential services. It should also promote democracy, human rights, good governance, participatory development, transparency and accountability.

However, external assistance should not perpetuate dependency or undermine national priorities, development efforts and policies. The main priority of




development cooperation remains poverty reduction through economic growth. This can only be achieved in the long run through sustainable development that is socially balanced and where local/grassroots people participate.

Environmental preservation is a new interest of the 1990's. It is now integrated with development issues for commitment to sustainable development. Emphasis is now put on rural and urban development as an integrated approach. Incorporation of the rural-urban link in development assistance is a long process. Another trend is the move towards decentralised cooperation, a political instrument that also creates a new financial approach. Government spending for development cooperation is then organised on a local rather than a central lever.

There is increased cooperation between government and NGOs whereby the role that NGOs play in the development process is recognised by the government. To this end, the Partnership Policy between Government and Civil Society is to be finalised in 2004.

### ***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia has achieved a level of transformation in the flow of development co-operation resources, and has advanced from a recipient of grant assistance to a provider of assistance to countries in need.***



## Development Co-operation

### Things to do

- Develop medium term plan for development programs to develop guidelines for the acceptance of donor support.
- Strengthen relations/cooperation between Namibia and its development cooperating partners.
- Assign diplomatic representatives in as many countries as possible
- Increase industrial and trading base;
- Balance the utilisation of Namibia's natural resources between Namibia and investors who exploit our natural resources;
- Have a conscious policy that ensures that foreign experts impart skills and knowledge to Namibians so that local people replace the foreign experts when they leave the country;
- Maintain harmonious relations with development partners.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Development cooperation with all friendly nations is strong and is based largely on trade and mutual exchange of opportunities;
- Dependency on foreign development aid is eliminated;
- Protocol signed with donors in accordance with the aims and objectives of Vision 2030.
- Namibia continues to be a member of the global village.
- Namibia is playing an effective role in regional and international organizations.
- Peaceful negotiation with other countries achieved.

### Current situation

- Between 1990 and 1998, grants to Namibia doubled (from N\$ 283 million to N\$ 780 million); but grants and soft loans represented, on average, about 12.5% of the revenues of the Government.
- Namibia is not aid-dependent as is the case with a number of African countries.
- The main priority of development cooperation remains poverty reduction through economic growth.
- About 50% of the development assistance has gone to finance human resources development and social sectors (potable water, housing and sanitation).
- Some 17% of the aid resources were invested in the natural resources sectors (agriculture, forestry and fisheries) while 16% went to transport and communication sectors.
- The rest were invested in administration (development) and regional development.

### Things to avoid

- Dependence on donor support.
- Conflict of interest on the part of the external organization such as donors.
- Initiate unsustainable small and medium income generating projects.
- Overexploitation of natural resources.
- Replace internal resources with external resources.

### Worst-case scenario

- Over-dependence on foreign aid.
- Weak natural resource base.
- Unsustainable development programmes in place.

### **Objectives**

- To ensure that Namibia becomes a donor country and does not receive foreign aid any longer;
- To achieve qualitative change in relations between Namibia and industrialised countries, which transforms Namibia from an aid-recipient country to a trading state and business partner.

### **Strategies**

- Sensitising Namibian business people and utility companies to exploit the opportunities that exist in the African market;
- Through regional and international fora, Namibia vigorously promotes free trade and investment flows and the transfers of appropriate technology;
- Encouraging more foreign direct investment (FDI);
- Strengthening and diversifying relations between Namibia and its development partners;
- Gradually replacing external resources with internal resources.
- Maintaining peaceful coexistence with neighbouring countries.
- Formulating and implementing policies on Development Cooperation

## **6.4 Peace and Security**

The 1990's was a decade that witnessed great events taking place around the world, and have had a direct influence on Namibia and other African countries. The decade marked the end of the Cold War with the breaking up of the Soviet Union into independent states. In the midst of all these, Namibia became an independent, sovereign and democratic state. Many African countries also started to embrace democratic rule and free-market economic policies, thereby paving a genuine way for the fight against poverty and under-development. Apart from internal socio-economic factors that usually influence Namibia's development, other external factors that influence the course of our socio-economic development would have to be highlighted. Among such factors are those of peace and security.

On the African continent, armed conflicts and civil unrests are the main threats to peace and security. Armed conflicts have occurred in many ways. They either come in a form of civil wars or territorial disputes between two countries. The African continent has also witnessed a number civil unrests, normally characterised by student and labour unrests; ethnically motivated violence or *coup d'etat*.

All these actions may lead to devastating effect on the local population and the most vulnerable being women and children. Armed conflicts and civil unrests lead to the displacement of populations, destruction of property, the breakdown of civil authority and, ultimately, impedes socio-economic development.

Since Independence, Namibia has enjoyed peace and political stability. The security of the country had so far not been under any serious threat. Prior to the cessation of civil conflict in Angola, Namibia had to deal with some cross border hostilities on the part of Unita. The secessionist attempts in the Caprivi Region in August 1999 provided an impetus for vigilance against possible civil strife.




The security of Namibia also impinges upon its active involvement in regional and international peace initiatives. Since Independence, Namibia has been involved in a number of peace-keeping efforts.

International Syndicates are posing serious and credible threats to Namibia through organised crime. Money laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling and natural resource exploitation are the focus of international crime syndicates. Namibia's rich diamond resources and well-established financial services industry could entice the syndicates to set up their operations in Namibia. This would create a serious political and socio-economic destabilising situation in Namibia.

***Sub- Vision***

***Collective regional and international peace and security have been accomplished.***





### **Objective**

To achieve peace and security within the nation and the international community.

### **Strategies**

- Using collective security as an instrument of national security.
- Employing Regional security to thwart destabilising elements by denying them succour and sanctuary in SADC member states.
- Operationalizing Protocols in terms of military doctrine, sharing of intelligence information, regional security institutions and joint intervention procedures.
- Providing military training for all youth, with emphasis on military discipline.
- Ensuring professionalism in the defence mechanism by having a well-trained and well-equipped army, and adequate infrastructure for the entire Defence Force.
- Reducing HIV/AIDS infection.
- Modernizing the Namibian Defence Force to ensure the effective participation of Namibia in regional, continental and international conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions.

## **6.5 Regional Integration**

Regional integration refers to agreements between groups of countries in a geographic, regional attempt/effort to reduce and remove tariff and non-tariff barriers to the free flow of goods, services and factors of production between each other. It has been perceived as a vehicle for overcoming the constraints of small economically size of nations. The ability to industrialise has been hampered by the small economic size, especially in the area of import substitution, a concept that many African countries adopted soon after their Independence. Regional integration was, therefore, perceived as a means to facilitate the structural transformation of African economies.

Trade creation and trade diversions are two concepts of regional integration. Regional integration should foster trade creation and avoid trade diversion. Trade creation occurs when an economic union leads to the growth of intra-union trade (when union members experiencing expanded trade have lower costs than the rest of the world suppliers). Trade diversion occurs when an economic union leads to an expansion in intra-union trade in which the costs are higher than those in competitor countries in the rest of the world. Currently, Namibia belongs to about four regional blocks, namely SADC, SACU, CMA and ACP.

*i) Southern African Development Community (SADC):* SADC has a membership of 14 Southern and Eastern African countries. The Windhoek Treaty of 1992 changed the Southern Africa Development Co-ordinating Conference to the Southern Africa Development Community. In August 2000, the Windhoek Summit approved the restructuring of SADC in order to make its structures and institutions appropriate to carry out its mandate successfully.

*ii) Southern African Customs Union (SACU):* The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement was concluded in 1969 between South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, replacing the Customs Union Agreement of 1910. Namibia became part of the Agreement formally in 1990, after her independence. Under the 1969 Agreement, the Union aims to maintain free exchange of goods and services between member countries. It provides for a Common Excise Tariff (CET), which is set unilaterally by South Africa. Under

the old Agreement (1969), South Africa is the custodian of the SACU revenue pool, therefore, all customs and excise duties collected are paid into South Africa's national Revenue Fund. The revenue is shared among the members states, according to the formula as stipulated in the 1969 Agreement. Each member state's share is therefore calculated accordingly, except for South Africa, which receives the residual. For the BLNS countries, SACU revenue constitutes a greater share of their revenue. For Namibia, the SACU Revenue accounts for about 30 per cent of its total revenue.

With the CET being set unilaterally by South Africa, this arrangement is viewed to be undemocratic and non-transparent. Amongst others this called for the re-negotiation of the 1969 SACU Agreement. The re-negotiation process started off in 1994 with the objectives of democratising the governance of SACU, setting of new institutional arrangements, and deciding on a new revenue formula, amongst others. After a lengthy and protracted re-negotiation process, the new Agreement was finally signed in October 2002.

*iii) Common Monetary Area (CMA):* In 1986, the CMA agreement between South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland replaced the Rand Monetary Area Agreement. The currency of South Africa circulates in these countries.

The CMA is divided into 3 categories: definitional; operational; and economic. The definitional category provides legal interpretation of the agreement. The operational category outlines the operational procedures, such as the collection and exchange of monetary statistics. It deals with the provision of consultation on matters of common interest, procedures for settling disputes and procedures for terminating/amending the agreement. The economic category deals with issues such as legal tender, intra-CMA transfer of funds, access to capital markets, foreign exchange transactions and compensatory agreements and payments to LNS countries for using the Rand (on par with their own currencies).

Monetary policy in CMA implies that the convertibility requirement means that foreign exchange assets back the domestic currency issued. Membership of the CMA also implies that Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland lose control over the nominal exchange rate as an instrument of economic policy.

*iv) African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP):* In 1975, nine members of the EU and 45 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries signed the Lome Convention I in Togo. The EU was interested in securing the supply of raw materials and export markets for their products. ACP countries were interested in aid in order to boost their economic development. This included Stabex and Sysmin facilities to soften the impacts arising from uncertainty in weather conditions; fluctuations in prices of minerals; and dependency on a single or few export commodities.


Currently, the Cotonou Agreement is being implemented. It was signed in Benin in June 2000. It provides for Euro 24.7 billion for a period of 20 years (2000 – 2020). Namibia, which is dependent on export earnings of mining products, received assistance of about Euro 40 million through Sysmin since 1994. The following entities benefited the Namibia Institute of Mining and Technology: the Okorusu Fluorspar Mine; and the Small Miners Assistance Fund.



*Sub-Vision*

*Namibia enjoys full regional integration in terms of socio-economic and political structures through effective supra-national organisations.*





**Objective**

To ensure that Namibia is part and parcel of organised regional structures in which it can contribute effectively to the political, economic, social well being of the people.

**Strategies**

- Playing a leading role in ensuring the establishment of effective and operational supra-national regional institutions;
- Implementing and observing all the SADC Protocols in order to benefit maximally.
- Strengthening the effective functioning of the AU.

### *Targets for the External Environment*

The approach to forecasting the future external environment is to sub-divide the 29-year timeframe of Vision 2030 into 5-yearly intervals. The assumption is that the present events in the external environment shall play out *mutatis mutandis* from their present forms till approximately 2005, hence the selection of the 2006-2010, as the point of departure of the model. Within these 5-yearly periods, the external environment has been forecasted, using scenario techniques based on best case, and worst case. The best case scenario is chosen for Vision 2030 as follows:

2006 – 2010

- UNITA has laid down arms and is now part of the political landscape of Angola. The Angolan government continues with the implementation of a multi-billion dollar reconstruction and development plan, with support from the international community. An important component is a national re-integration scheme and small-arms buy-back programme supported by the UN, AU and SADC.
- The Inter-Congolese Dialogue has culminated in a new democratic constitution and free and fair elections. The new democratically elected president is committed to national reconciliation, unity and economic reconstruction. The international community, in exchange for wide-ranging economic reforms, cancels Mobuto-era debts.
- Zimbabwe is on a steady course of economic development. The land reform exercise is completed to the satisfaction of all stakeholders, and significant foreign investment is flowing into the country.
- South Africa's third democratically elected president has been sworn in, and the results of the GEAR policy are being manifested through higher GDP growth rates, increased foreign direct investment and significant job creation in the economy.
- Stronger regional institutions have been created that are better able to help member states resolve internal conflicts, and plans are under consideration for supra-national institutions like the SADC Court of Appeal, SADC Court of Arbitration, SADC Monetary Policy Commission, etc.
- SACU Secretariat is established, with a Council of Ministers, a Commission composed of senior officials as an advisory body to the Council, Technical Committees, and as a sanctioning authority.
- Namibia has implemented the visa requirements for AGOA and enjoys the benefit of access to the United States of America market. Namibia reaps the benefits of AGOA by exporting its goods (textiles) to the United States free of duties. This will contribute to the diversification of the Namibian exports away from the traditional mineral exports.
- More countries implement the SADC Trade Protocol. Member countries start reducing tariffs among each other. Category A product tariffs are immediately phased out, while those on products in category B, are gradually removed.
- Namibia continues to enjoy non-reciprocal access to the EU markets, thus increasing its beef and grape exports to the Union.
- Debt-relief has been affected in a significant number of AU member states, including Nigeria, Algeria and Kenya, allowing previously highly indebted

poor countries, to undertake comprehensive economic reforms with a “clean slate”.

- A joint AU-UN-EU-World Bank conflict-resolution framework is created to provide an effective African conflict early-warning system, conflict resolution framework and intervention procedures/mechanisms/capabilities.
- Namibia and its relevant neighbouring SADC states have reached a binding agreement on their mutual borders, both on land and maritime.
- Namibia has become actively involved in the implementation of NEPAD and has been invited to become part of its steering mechanism.

### 2010 – 2015

- Regional institutions are being strengthened. A common regional currency and central bank is in the process of being created. Several accretions of national sovereignty and state power are transferred to SADC, and a SADC Constitution- that overrides or supersedes national constitutions- is agreed upon. More SADC countries begin to converge their macro-economic indicators.
- Angola proceeds on a path of democratic governance, reconstruction and development. New oil discoveries are made in deep-water areas, providing an impetus to further economic recovery. Anti-bandit operations are finally concluded with the surrender of the last armed bandit gangs.
- The UN Security Council is reformed with the status of permanent member state being enlarged to include one regional power from each of the continents. This provides for a more democratic form of regional representation. The powers of the reformed Security Council in terms of international peace and security are increased.
- Two major transmission systems from Grand Inga in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are to deliver cheap power to Southern Africa and Europe, one line down through Angola and Namibia to South Africa and another north through the Sahara to Western Europe.
- Conflict resolution mechanisms are firmly in place at the regional and continental levels, allowing for effective rapid response to emerging conflicts in or between member states of the AU.
- SADC Trade Protocol ratified and implemented by all member states, which leads to the expansion of intra-SADC trade.
- SACU renegotiations complete, and relevant institutions solving disputes and determining common external tariffs, have been set up. The BLNS countries reviewed their taxation base in order to forestall themselves from the effect of the EU-South African Free Trade Agreement.
- SADC establishes a common external tariff, a move that will lead to the formation of the customs union.

### 2015 – 2020

- A regional central bank is fully established and a core group of states, including Namibia, introduce the new regional currency. The SADC central bank is responsible for the monetary policy in the SADC monetary area, covering the initial core states.
- A directly elected SADC regional parliament is established with powers to review, harmonise and veto national legislation.
- The AU continues with efforts at continental unity through the creation of



various supra-national political, economic, judicial and legislative bodies.

- SADC member states implement policies that will lead to convergence in macro-economic indicators as an important criterion for monetary integration.
- SACU renegotiations completed and relevant institutions established. These are Boards of Trade and Tariffs to set up the common external tariffs for SACU. South Africa Board of Trade and Tariffs is no longer the sole institution to set up the common external tariff. The revenue sharing formula of SACU revisited to give fair share of revenue to the BLNS.

#### 2020 – 2025

- SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security is upgraded to the SADC Mutual Defence Treaty.
- All SADC member states adopt a common regional constitution with key provisions such as abolishing the death penalty, protection of human rights and democratic governance.
- A common regional foreign policy framework and institutions are created, allowing the member states to better meet the challenges and uncertainties of an evolving world order.
- More states adopt the common currency after meeting macro-economic eligibility criteria.

#### 2025 - 2030

- Concrete steps are taken by the regional bodies (SADC, ECOWAS, Maghreb Union, and East-African Community) to harmonise political, economic and institutional arrangements as the precursor to continental unity.
- The AU establishes the African Monetary Stabilisation Fund with the assistance of the Bretton Woods institutions to provide balance of payments and macro-economic stabilisation support to AU member states in need.
- More legislative powers are devolved by member states to the SADC regional parliament.
- Namibia's development co-operation relationship with its international collaboration partners shifts from the weighted association of donor/recipient towards the balanced connection between sovereign trading partners.
- Achievement of regional peace and stability in region.
- Regular democratic, free and fair elections are held throughout the Southern African Region.
- Land in the Southern African Region is equitably redistributed.
- Absence of crime in Namibia and armed conflicts in the region.
- The Southern African Region has established a collective response towards bringing to an end the illegal trafficking of small arms.

- Namibia contributes actively towards the attainment of strengthened regional organisations and democratised international institutions;
- Namibia continues to serve, both regionally and internationally, as an example of a strong democracy and a model of good governance.
- Namibia continues to further the strides towards African unification.
- Namibia benefits significantly from investments in economic and infrastructural development in order to compete globally.
- Namibia is fully integrated into the global trading and financial system.
- The Namibian economy becomes lucrative, to such an extent that there is net inflow of capital from other countries into Namibia's economy.

## 6.6 Globalisation

Globalisation is the integration of national economics throughout the world through trade, capital flows, the exchange of technology and information and movement of people. Since the 1990's, globalisation has become a major topic of discussion and concern in economic circles. The move towards a more integrated world has opened up a wide potential for greater growth, and it presents opportunity for developing countries to raise their living standards. However, concerns about the risks of marginalisation of developing countries have given rise to a sense of misgiving among developing countries. Globalisation benefits consumers and producers in the form of increasing trade, which will give them wider choice of low cost goods, often incorporating more advanced technologies. Access to world markets allows countries to exploit their comparative advantages more intensively, while being exposed to the benefits of increased international competition. The rapid increase in capital and private ventures/opportunities available to Namibia, has accelerated the pace of its development beyond what it could otherwise have achieved. The benefits of globalisation outweigh the costs of that free trade results in countries that specialise in the production of those goods efficiently, while importing goods that they cannot produce efficiently, from other countries.

However, the risks of globalisation include the following: the investment capital seeks out the most efficient markets, while producers and consumer seek the most competitive suppliers. This would expose and intensify existing structural weaknesses in individual economies.

The economic globalisation and restructuring through new technologies has created many options for capital flight, for instance, relocation of production and outsourcing. Critics of globalisation assert that global economic power is shifting away from national governments towards supra-national institutions (WTO, WB/IMF). Globalisation is characterised by the fact that decisions that affect a lot of people are no longer made by national governments, but instead by a group of unelected bureaucrats in the supra-national institutions.

Globalisation would not bring Namibia to the level of the USA and Japan overnight. As globalisation progresses, we should focus on the development of our own



resources, otherwise globalisation in some sense could be suicidal. We need to identify a competitive edge upon which Namibia's position in the world economy will be based. We should strengthen our industrial capacity in order to pursue realistic goals dependent on our natural endowment.

There has been an enormous increase in global trade and in private capital flows to developing countries. However, Africa has not kept pace with this growth. Foreign direct investment, for instance, has increased to all developing countries, but Africa's share is below 5%. Such development points to a trend towards Africa's marginalisation in world trade and FDI. The challenge facing Vision 2030 for Namibia is to design public policies that maximise the downside risks of destabilisation and marginalisation.

With regard to investment promotion, we should also encourage investors who are already in Namibia. By the year 2030, local human resources should be adequate for development promotion.

Tourism offers Namibia a huge opportunity for development of our economy. To enjoy this opportunity in the long run, peace and stability should be our partner. Consequently, tourism should be promoted in order to contribute to our economy. Less privileged people should also be involved in this sector. For Namibia to succeed in the tourism industry, the country should be marketed extensively abroad.

Globalisation on its own would not bring us to the level of the developed countries. We should simultaneously focus on the development of our own resources. Namibia should identify a competitive edge upon which her position in the world economy will be based.

#### ***Sub-Vision***

***The benefits of technology, trade, investment and capital flows have contributed to a significant reduction in poverty in most regions of the world, and Namibia enjoys optimal participation and integration in the global village.***

## Globalisation

### Things to do

- Establish and maintain structures (roads, telecommunications media and health services) that can compete with the rest of the world.
- Create positive atmosphere and incentives for foreign direct investments.
- Create awareness of Namibia's potentiality.
- Promote human and institutional capacity-building.
- Assess and capitalise on the country's comparative advantage in the sectors such as, Agriculture, Tourism, Fishing and Mining.
- Train Namibians to acquire skills and knowledge to be able to compete in the context of globalisation. Design public policies that maximise the downside risks of destabilisation and marginalisation.
- Encourage investors who are already in Namibia.
- Develop local human resources for development promotion.
- Promote tourism in order to contribute to our economy.
- Focus on the development of our own resources.
- Identify a competitive edge upon which Namibia's position in world economy will be based.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Namibia has achieved significant investments in economic and infrastructural development, and is competing globally;
- Namibia is fully integrated into the global trading and financial system;
- The Namibian economy is very lucrative so that there is net inflow of capital from other countries into the country's economy.
- Access to world markets allows Namibia to exploit their comparative advantages more intensively, while being exposed to the benefits of increased international competition.
- The rapid increase in capital and private ventures/opportunities available to Namibia, has accelerated the pace of its development beyond what it could otherwise have achieved.

### Current situation

- Globalisation is the integration of national economics throughout the world through trade, capital flows, the exchange of technology and information and movement of people.
- Globalisation would not bring Namibia to the level of the USA and Japan overnight.
- There has been an enormous increase in global trade and in private capital flows to developing countries. However, Africa has not kept pace with this growth.
- Foreign direct investment, for instance, has increased for all developing countries, but Africa's share is below 5%.
- Such development points to a trend towards Africa's marginalisation in world trade and FDI. The challenge facing Vision 2030 for Namibia is to design public policies that maximise the downside risks of destabilisation and marginalisation.

### Things to avoid

- Namibia's potential is unknown to the global village
- Underdevelopment of human capacity.
- Creating barriers against international transfer of technology.
- Trade barriers.
- Policy lapses.

### Worst-case scenario

- Namibia's share in the global economy remains small;
- Namibia experiences large-scale movement of capital across national boundaries.

***Objective***

To ensure that Namibia enjoys optimal participation and integration in the global village.

***Strategies***

Namibia's strategic response to globalisation include the following:

- Ensuring good governance;
- Maintaining quality and efficiency of infrastructure, industrial production and services;
- Improving productivity of labour and promoting harmonious labour relations.
- Remaining competitive in the international market.



## 6.7 Democratic Governance

The Republic of Namibia was established as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State based on the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all. Therefore the Constitution is the basic law which contains, *inter alia*, all the ingredients of a democratic state including peace, security and political stability. In creating a democratic state, the Constitution provides and protects fundamental rights and freedoms of all Namibians.

The freedom of speech and press is well established in our society. In order to strengthen these freedoms Namibia has more than three active and very critical newspapers, which contain all kinds of news and information, including comments from individual persons. None of these newspapers have been subjected to harassment of any kind during the past ten years. In addition, the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation transmits live talk-shows on both radio and television where people call-in to express their views without any form of punishment or persecution. In maintaining peace and political stability, freedom of expression is important in order for people to express their views on issues that may disturb peace and political stability. The freedom of the press also contributes to peace and stability in that the people should be informed of the policies of the government by independent monitors. This, in turn develops the nation to make informed choices when electing representatives to government.

The Constitution is the supreme law of Namibia. It is designed to guide the nation in the development of its policies. The rights that are entrenched cannot be taken away from the citizens; it signifies importance to the person and also to the development of the human race.

Although Namibia did not choose to deal with its past injustices in the form of a Truth Commission, the government has supported and adopted policies aimed at reconciliation. None of the previously disadvantaged persons were expelled from the country due to their involvement with the previous colonial government. Instead, the government, in particular the Ministry of Basic Education and Culture has endorsed policies aimed at integrating all races in all schools in Namibia. This was necessary since, at Independence, there were different schools for different races. The National Assembly enacted the Racial Discrimination Act, to punish discrimination based on race, and to prohibit the dissemination of ideas promoting one race or tribe as superior to the others. Namibians of all races currently live together in the country. This, in many ways, is an indicator that there is peace in the country.

The weakness of peace and political stability in Namibia lies in the economic disparities between the poor and the rich. The reduction of poverty is difficult to address constitutionally since it depends upon the availability of resources. The main threat to peace and political stability is violations of human rights.

Without good governance and accountability it would be difficult to achieve and maintain peace, political stability and sustainable development. As was witnessed in the 1990's in Africa, the masses rose against regimes that were perceived to be corrupt, unaccountable and not pursuing a people-oriented development agenda.

Namibia was fortunate that it gained its independence in the early 1990's, a period that marked a trend towards democratisation in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. It has been observed that gaining independence at that particular point in time ensured a significant inclusion of democratic principles in the Namibian Constitution.

The Namibian Constitution has in place various safeguards that ensure accountability in government. It clearly provides for the separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary (see Articles 40, 63 and 78 of the Namibian Constitution). It further provides, among others, for the establishment of the Public Service Commission (article 112), and the Office of the Ombudsman (article 89). These are all important administrative and democratic safeguards. If effectively implemented, they will enhance openness in government. It should also be noted that the Public Service Commission's procedures for appointing personnel at different levels of the Public Service, strengthen accountability and transparency. In addition, the Ombudsman's Office was created to promote administrative accountability in the public service.

#### *Sub-Vision*

*Namibia maintains, consolidates and extends the good governance practices of a multi-party democracy with high levels of participation, rights, freedoms and legitimacy (under the Constitution), which continue to serve as a model for other countries.*



## Democratic Governance

### Things to do

- Consolidate and realise the existing constitutional principles.
- Continue to hold regular democratic elections
- Ensure the autonomy and effectiveness of the Electoral Commission.
- Strengthen popular support for electoral mechanisms
- Sustain and improve voter education programs
- Continue to allocate funds to election commission for civic education.
- Encourage other participants (parties, NGO's, and others) to contribute to these efforts.
- Strengthen contributions of electronic media to these efforts
- Continue to use local language where necessary
- Establish an information system that enables the broad spectrum of citizens to understand all issues affecting them.
- Ensure freedom of expression and other fundamental human rights.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- The Namibian people continue to actively participate in decision making through free, fair and frequent elections, as well as through other consultative processes.
- The government operates in an effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable manner at all levels, under acceptable constitutional principles.
- The Namibian people and government continue to support and actively exercise their constitutionally guaranteed political rights.
- The respect for these rights is extended to all individuals and groups in a spirit of tolerance, fairness and responsibility to the whole society.
- A Namibia that enjoys a tolerant and free political environment.
- Allows and encourages people to participate through political parties of their own choice in free, fair and regular elections
- The Namibian people are continuously and effectively informed of their democratic rights.

### Current situation

- The Constitution is the supreme law of Namibia
- The Namibian Constitution has in place various safeguards that ensure accountability in government.
- The freedom of speech and press is well established in our society.
- Although Namibia did not choose to deal with its past injustices in the form of a Truth Commission, the government has supported and adopted policies aimed at reconciliation. None of the previously disadvantaged persons were expelled from the country due to their involvement with the previous colonial government.
- The weakness of peace and political stability in Namibia lies in the economic disparities between the poor and the rich.

### Things to avoid

- The independence of judiciary is not respected
- Legal system functions undermined
- Disregard for the laws by all citizens.

### Worst-case scenario

- Ineffective and inefficient enforcement of law at all levels of government.
- State policies do not reflect the wishes and aspirations of the people.
- The best interests of the people are disregarded.
- Namibia's Independence and sovereignty are not protected.
- Abuse of human rights.

### *Objectives*

- To ensure that the Constitution of Namibia is upheld by all as the fundamental law of our sovereign and independent republic, set to protect and guarantee the rights and freedoms of everyone.
- To have a truly democratic government, and a government which operates in an effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable manner at all levels, under acceptable constitutional principles.

### *Strategies*

- Creating an enabling environment against social/political conflict and corruption, and for democratic participation.
- Undertaking free, fair and frequent elections.
- Creating effective partnerships among the different levels of government and the public.
- Encouraging popular participation.
- Strengthening human and institutional capacities.
- Strengthening the checks and balances in the governmental system (e.g. watch-dogs and parliament).
- Developing appropriate policies and legislation to realize good governance (e.g. freedom of information).
- Increasing democratic participation through decentralization.
- Educating all people on the constitutional and human rights adhered to by Namibia.
- Creating an environment of tolerance.
- Encouraging people to respect the rights of others while exercising their rights.
- Enforcing and pro-actively extending the realisation of human rights.

## **6.8 Decentralisation**

The challenges facing national development, such as economic disparity, poverty, disease, limited skills base and many others, are primarily about making decisions on social, economic and environmental priorities, and on forms of investment, production and consumption. These decisions must be made and dealt with by governance systems at local, regional, national and global levels. Governance is simply the process or method by which society is governed. Two major trends, which can be either complementary or contradictory, are increasingly relevant for governance: decentralisation and devolution on the one hand, and globalisation on the other.

It is recognised that many social and environmental issues are better managed at the local level, where authority, proprietorship/tenure, rights and responsibilities are devolved to appropriate local institutions and organisations, such as aspects of education (school boards), running of towns and villages, water-point and rangeland management, wildlife and forest management, etc. On the other hand, issues arising from globalisation processes, such as trade liberalisation, global communications, foreign investment through multinational corporations and global environmental impact such as climate change and ozone depletion, require global rules and governance systems.

The challenge for effective governance in support of sustainable long-term development is to (a) determine which issues are best addressed at which level; a good general principle is to decentralise and devolve to the lowest effective level; (b) ensure coherence between policy options pursued at different levels; and (c) find ways to ensure that local people can properly exercise their option to be involved, even where it appears that the policy agenda is best focused at national or global levels. This call for capacity-building, both human and institutional, is aimed at all levels of governance.

The conception and introduction of the Policy of Decentralisation in Namibia has its origins in the South West Africa People's Organization's (SWAPO) Political Manifesto of 1989, on Local Government and Housing. The manifesto provided that 'under the SWAPO government there would be democratically elected authorities in rural and urban areas, in order to give power to the people at grass-roots level, to make decisions on matters affecting their lives'. That vision on local governance was later enshrined in the Constitution of independent Namibia as Chapter 12. It provides for a system of regional and local government in the country. Article 102(1) specifically provides for structures of regional and local governments. It states that, "for purposes of regional and local government, Namibia shall be divided into regional and local units which shall consist of such regional and local authorities as may be determined and defined by an Act of Parliament".

In 1992 Parliament put into effect the constitutional provision under Chapter 12 by enacting the Regional Councils Act, 1992 (No. 22 of 1992) and Local Authorities Act, 1992 (No. 23 of 1992). The two pieces of legislation instituted the introduction and implementation of Decentralisation in the country. Both Acts provided for the determination and establishment of councils; qualifications and elections of councillors; management committees of councils; chief executive officers and other officers/employees of the councils; powers, duties, functions, rights and obligations of councils and financial matters in respect of both regional and local authorities councils.

In 1996, more than three years after the enactment of the Regional Councils and Local Authorities Acts of 1992, the Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing (MRLGH) decided to consult various stakeholders to determine whether decentralisation was on course. The consultations revealed that decentralisation was not proceeding as expected. Consequently, a policy dialogue ensued on what was realistically possible to decentralise further, in what time frame decentralisation should take place, and with what resources it should be effected.

The policy dialogue culminated in the preparation of the Decentralisation Policy document, which was approved by Cabinet on 11 December 1996, and by the National Assembly in September 1997. The policy was officially launched on 30 March 1998. The document identifies functions to be decentralised, and lays down implementation guidelines, resource strategies and the choice of the form of decentralisation the country is going to take.

In the document it is proposed that decentralisation go through various stages with the ultimate aim being devolution. The exercise (decentralisation) portrays to the regional councils and local authorities as independent entities. It is designed



to be phased-in by region or local authority, by functions and within functions. It is also proposed that some functions be decentralised immediately, and others in the intermediate term and in the long-term.

The implementation of the policy was kick-started through delegation, as an interim measure. Under delegation, regional councils and local authorities are to act as principal agents under the direction of the central government. Central government remains responsible for financing the cost of programmes of delegated functions. To that end, line ministries have been requested to indicate the amount of funds budgeted and approved for the delegated functions and services by programme and per region. At the same time the Ministry of Finance and MRLGH are expected to work out technical details regarding the modality of financial transfers under delegation. There is to be a contractual relationship between the centre and councils for which the terms and conditions will be determined by the central government.

For all delegated functions, matters of operation become the responsibility of the regional councils and local authorities. Line ministries are required to list all matters of operations in respect of the delegated functions, and to provide guidelines on them (including the professional technical standards to be attained) to regional councils and local authorities. The regional officer, as chief executive of the regional council, is to assume the overall charge and supervision of all the line ministries' delegated officials in the region.

To facilitate implementation of the decentralisation policy, the government in 2000 passed the following legislation: The Local Authorities' Amendment Act, 2000; The Regional Councils' Amendment Act, 2000; The Decentralisation Enabling Act, 2000; and The Trust Fund for Regional Development and Equity Provisions Act, 2000.

Although Government is fully committed to the process of decentralisation, it has not as yet been able to carry all the central government ministries with it. For decentralisation to be successful, there needs to be commitment on the part of all the relevant stakeholders. Despite line ministries having been asked by the Secretary to the Cabinet, way back in 1998, to identify the precise operations to be decentralised, and the staff and resources to accompany delegation, only very few ministries have prepared themselves for the implementation process, to date and only two ministries have indicated a possible, gradual transfer of functions, staff and funds for the financial year 2001. In the light of this state of affairs, and acknowledging the fact that the line ministries in all probability will not be capable of working out action plans without external assistance, the MRLGH has resolved to create cross-ministerial taskforces, assigned the responsibility of transforming the DIP into concrete action-oriented work plans.

The DIP, which was prepared by MRLGH, aims at providing all stakeholders involved in the decentralisation implementation process with an instrument to guide them (Ministries, Regional Councils and Local Authorities) through the various phases of the implementation process. Presently, the DIP is in its final draft form. Upon finalisation of the DIP, the next step would be to work out terms of reference for the various taskforces to be established; to appoint the members of the taskforces and to start preparing ministerial action plans.



The Ministries of Finance and RLGH have provided adequate technical details regarding the modality of financial transfers to the regional administration. There is to be a contractual relationship between the centre and councils for which the terms and conditions will be determined by the central government. For all functions, matters of operation become the responsibility of the regional councils and local authorities. Line ministries are required to list all matters of operations in respect of the delegated functions, and to provide guidelines on them (including the professional technical standards to be attained) to regional councils and local authorities. The regional officer, as chief executive of the regional council, is to assume the overall charge and supervision of all the line ministries' delegated officials in the region.

***Sub-Vision***

***Local communities and regional bodies are empowered, and are fully involved in the development process; they actually formulate and implement their respective development plans, while the national government - working hand-in-hand with civil society organizations - provides the enabling environment (laws, policies, finance, security, etc.) for the effective management of national, regional and local development efforts.***



## Decentralisation

### Things to do

- Determine which issues are best addressed at which level;
- Decentralise and devolve to the lowest effective level;
- Ensure coherence between policy options pursued at different levels;
- Find ways to ensure that local people can properly exercise their option to be involved, even where it appears that the policy agenda is best focused at national or global levels;
- Embark upon capacity-building, both human and institutional, at all levels of governance.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Namibia is a country with streamlined governance systems in place, that truly support the needs of the people by creating efficient enabling conditions, and that are accountable and effective in promoting policy implementation.
- Appropriate and thorough devolution and decentralisation processes have occurred in accordance with the Decentralisation Policy.
- The principles of human rights are upheld, civil liberties and multi-party democracy are firmly entrenched and defended, and comprehensive approaches to reduce crime and domestic violence, to promote peace, stability and social integration have been implemented.
- All the necessary institutional and organisational change effected at national, regional and local levels in support of decentralisation.
- Decentralisation proves to be cost effective.
- Adequate capacity and financial resources are available for the smooth and effective operation of government at Regional and Local Authority levels.
- Regional governments design and implement their respective development plans within the context of NDPs.
- Decentralisation accepted as the most effective means of service delivery.

### Current situation

- Decentralisation Policy was launched on 30 March 1998.
- To facilitate implementation of the decentralisation policy, the government in 2000 passed the necessary enabling legislation in 2000: The Local Authorities Amendment Act, 2000; The Regional Councils Amendment Act, 2000; The Decentralisation Enabling Act, 2000; and The Trust Fund for Regional Development and Equity Provisions Act, 2000.
- Although Government is fully committed to the process of decentralisation, it has not as yet been able to carry all the central government ministries with it.
- The MRLGH has resolved to create cross-ministerial taskforces assigned the responsibility of transforming the DIP into concrete action-oriented work plans.
- The Ministry of Finance and MRLGH have provided adequate technical details regarding the modality of financial transfers to the regional administration.

### Things to avoid

- Neglect human and institutional capacity building.
- Piecemeal implementation of the Decentralisation Policy.
- Decentralisation and devolution of authority without financial and related resources.
- Limiting political participation at local level.

### Worst-casescenario

- Decentralisation process uncoordinated.
- Development planning and plan implementation become increasingly centralised.
- Regional and Local Authorities are controlled and governed directly from the centre.
- Local participation in governance is limited.

### **Objective**

To achieve effective governance in support of sustainable long-term development through decentralisation and devolution of authority to the lowest effective level so that local people can properly exercise their option to be involved in decision-making and management of resources.

### **Strategies**

- Implementing all aspects of the Decentralization Policy;
- Empowering local authorities to improve their revenue generating capacities and exercise control over the management of their affairs;
- Encouraging the people of Namibia to make their own decisions and to do so at their own level regarding political, cultural, economic and social development matters;
- Empowering the regions to reduce HIV/AIDS.
- Providing adequate financial and other resources for government operations at Regional and Local Authority level;
- Building human and institutional capacity in support of local governance;
- Enhancing the capacity of the people at local level to set their own priorities, plan, implement and monitor their development programmes;
- Providing central Government support to local government development initiatives.

## **6.9 Responsible Decision-making**

Namibia has a long list of global advantages, some of which it shares with other southern African countries. However some are unique to Namibia, either as stand-alone advantages, or when seen in, the context of other factors, such as Namibia's peace and stability, its good infrastructure and communications network and its highly developed and convivial capital city. Such comparative advantages include its cultural and biological diversity, its clean and uncontaminated fish and meat, its scenic diversity, tourism potential and wilderness, its position to facilitate regional transport, communications, services such as banking, insurance and other forms of skilled commerce, and many others. Where one has a comparative advantage, globalisation becomes an opportunity, not a threat.

The best means of harnessing the potential of our comparative advantages are through partnerships. This is the key to economic progress, to social harmony and to sustainable development. It involves partnerships between and within different sectors and levels of government, communities and civil society, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, research and training institutions, rural and urban societies, and with the international community – essentially, individuals in their institutional and private capacities working together for the greater good. Government has an important role to fulfil – to create the enabling environment through policy and, if necessary, legislation, to create incentives and, where necessary, to develop a regulatory framework. The better the policy, the less effort government should need to expend on its implementation and regulation; the rest of society will implement.

The creation of good policies that optimise our comparative and competitive advantages through smart partnerships, requires a sound knowledge base, which



in turn is acquired from good information. Information is obtained from science and research, and institutions that are able to nurture and share information and knowledge. Industrialised countries spend up to 60% of their GDP, in one form or another, on science and technology. Least developed countries typically spend less than 1% of their GDP on these sectors. The generation of information and knowledge, except in a few cases of protection from competition, must be placed in the public domain so that it is used by the greatest number for the greater good of all.

***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia's goal is to promote and strengthen "smart partnerships" for sustainable development, to optimise her comparative and competitive advantages, and to generate and manage good quality information and knowledge by supporting and fostering active and critical science and research through well-structured national institutions, as well as in partnership with institutions abroad.***



## Responsible Decision-Making

### Things to do

- Harness the potential of our comparative advantages through partnerships.
- Establish partnership between and within different sectors and levels of government, communities and civil society, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, research and training institutions, rural and urban societies, and with the international community.
- Encourage individuals in their institutional and private capacities to work together for the greater good.
- Government should create the enabling environment through policy and, if necessary, legislation, to create incentives and, where necessary, to develop a regulatory framework.
- Invest in science and technology research for the generation of information.

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Namibia's comparative and competitive advantages optimally and sustainably developed, in an increasingly global environment;
- There exists a conducive and dynamic enabling environment for the evolution of "smart partnerships" to effectively exploit Namibia's comparative advantages, as well as other development opportunities;
- There is vibrant science and technology research, with particular attention to areas related to Namibia's comparative advantages and development needs;
- Namibia is in a position where relevant, high quality information and knowledge are readily accessible within the public domain.

### Current situation

- Namibia has a long list of global advantages, such as Namibia's peace and stability, its good infrastructure and communications network and its highly developed and convivial capital city.
- Comparative advantages include its cultural and biological diversity, its clean and uncontaminated fish and meat, its scenic diversity, tourism potential and wilderness, its position to facilitate regional transport, communications, services such as banking, insurance and other forms of skilled commerce, and many others.

### Things to avoid

- Discourage science and technology research.
- Protect the generation of information and knowledge such that it is used by a limited number of people only.
- Operate without the benefit of the partnership strategy.

### Worst-case scenario

- Inadequate enabling environment for the operation of the partnership strategy.
- Not utilising our comparative advantage in regional and global competition.
- Treat globalisation as a threat.
- Policies that require more government effort and less society involvement in implementation and regulation.

### Objectives

- To optimally and sustainably develop and exploit Namibia’s comparative and competitive advantages, in an increasingly global environment;
- To establish a conducive and dynamic enabling environment for the evolution of “smart partnerships”, to effectively exploit Namibia’s comparative advantages, as well as other development opportunities;
- To strengthen science and research, with particular attention to areas related to Namibia’s comparative advantages and development needs, and to be in a position where relevant, high quality information and knowledge are readily accessible within the public domain.

### Strategies

Continually exploring ways in which Namibia can identify and sustainably exploit its comparative and competitive advantages by:

- Developing conducive policy environments for different sectors to optimise the transition from local to global exploitation of these advantages, with strong incentives and, where necessary, a regulatory framework that ensures equity, fair practice and sustainability
- Creating and nurturing a positive and supportive environment for the development and growth of “smart partnerships”, to best promote Namibia’s comparative advantages and development needs
- Creating a national commitment to sustainable development:
  - as a *process* and not a fixed plan
  - as the responsibility of *society as a whole*, not just the state or government
  - as *sharing* information, knowledge and opportunities, and not under centralised command and control structures
  - as having a focus on *outcomes* (i.e. impact), not outputs (e.g. laws, project activities such as meetings, etc.)
  - as an *integrated* initiative – within and between sectors and institutions – and not as a set of sectoral activities
  - as a locally and domestically-driven and financed process, with resources trickled in over the necessary period of time, and not as costly short-term “projects”.
- Creating a conducive and supportive environment for public-interest scientific and research organizations, to build their capacity to generate and share information, to build knowledge and to disseminate this as widely as possible.
- Developing strong incentives for information to be shared widely in the public domain, with all government institutions leading by example.

## 6.10 Institutional Capacity For Development

Namibia’s national capacity is the combination of human resources, institutions, and practices that enable it to achieve its development goals. Capacity building is both the vehicle for, and the object of, national development. The process requires a suitable enabling environment in terms of political stability and freedom, a sound legal system, economic resources and opportunities, social norms which are conducive to sustained development and which are well understood by most of the population. Capacity-building includes, but extends far beyond, the traditional approaches of human resource planning, education and training, and employment generation.

The apartheid system created a most negative and uncondusive environment for development of skills required for effective consummation of the benefits of Independence. As a consequence, capacity to implement post Independence programmes has generally fallen short of optimum requirements. Namibia's capacity building challenge is, however, far from daunting, because the political and economic foundation for development is relatively strong. Namibia's unique colonial legacy has created capacity gaps in terms of the general level of education of the majority of the population, and a relative shortage of indigenous professional and technical personnel.

The Government has initiated a study funded by the WB on the subject of Human Capital Development and Knowledge Management. This initiative aims at identifying gaps in Namibia's Human Capital Investment and Development Strategies, and proposed strategies to fill these gaps.

Key areas of capacity-building being pursued by Government as part and parcel of the overall strategy for sustained political, social, and economic development are the following: the Enabling Environment, the Public Sector, the Private Sector, Civil Society, and Education, Training and Learning.

A sound macro-economic environment is required for the achievement of the desired human and institutional capacity-building. In this regard, Government is responding to the challenges of : (i) Capacity to maintain the status quo; (ii) Capacity to realistically adjust the macro-economic environment and bring it in line with the aspirations of independent Namibia (i.e. issues of equity); (iii) Capacity of the public sector to implement and sustain development programmes; (iv) Capacity of the public sector to manage the regulatory framework within which the private sector operates; and (v) Capacity to manage the utilisation of environmental resources sustainably.

The human aspects of capacity building have already been addressed in Chapter 4, under "Education and Training". The focus in this section is on institutional capacity-building for development.

### ***Sub-Vision***

***Namibia has well-established democratic institutions that provide the enabling environment for effective participation of all citizens in modern social and economic development. In support of the process of capacity-building, the nation's education system consists of public and private initiatives that, together, respond adequately to the challenges of modern technologically developed and industrial society by producing all the required managerial, technical and professional personnel.***



## Institutional Capacity for Development

### What to do

- Adopt and implement appropriate national capacity building strategy for sustained political, social, and economic development.
- The public sector, private sector and Civil Society must work together to implement the national capacity building strategy.
- Government should continue to create the enabling environment for all actors in development to operate effectively.
- Undertake comprehensive institutional restructuring.
- Reduce the spread of

### Where we want to be (2030)

- Well established democratic institutions that provide the enabling environment for effective participation of all citizens in social and economic development.
- Education and training institutions that respond effectively to the challenge of modern industrial society by producing all the required managerial, technical and professional personnel.

### Current situation

- Namibia has established a multi-party democratic system, and there is a good measure of racial and political tolerance.
- Namibia is yet to achieve the objective of equipping and empowering all her citizens to contribute effectively to the modern economic sector and challenge of nation building.
- The education system is battling with capacity gaps in the general level of education of the black majority population created by colonial legacy, and a relative shortage of indigenous professional and technical personnel.
- The infrastructure is well developed to attract private Investment but there is need to create conditions more favourable to efficiency, profitability, and value

### What not to do

- Approach capacity building as a government initiative, with or without private and Civil Society participation.
- Allow training and educational institutions to pursue their programmes independently without reference to national development priorities.
- Pursue institution and human capacity building without a comprehensive national policy and programme.

### Worst-case scenario

- Poor management and debasement of democratic institutions lead to decay of institutions and underutilised capacities.
- Uncoordinated educational policies cause over-production of graduates in disciplines that do not reflect the labour market signals for capacity

### *Objectives*


- The overall objective is to ensure that Namibia's human and institutional capacities are well developed and adequate to meet the challenges of a highly developed society.
- To ensure that Namibia has efficient and well-structured national institutions fully utilising human potential and delivering an effective, client-centred service to produce well-qualified and trained human resources, with qualifications which are nationally, regionally and internationally recognised.
- Public and Private Institutions offer services appropriate to customer needs giving value for money through competitive process
- To ensure that Namibia has a diversified, competent and highly productive labour force, with only low levels of unemployment, which meets the requirements of an equally diversified economy.

### *Strategies*

- Providing a sound regulatory framework not only to define the role of political leadership and the civil services, but also to guide the operations of the private sector – including laws and regulations relating to property, commerce, civil disputes, monopolies, banks and capital markets, environmental protection, etc.
- Intensifying all the efforts by Government in providing an enabling environment for the establishment, growth and sustained functioning of public, private, foreign, local, cooperative, individual and family enterprises.
- Ensuring that Government succeeds in rationalising the Public Service, as well as in reducing the size of the public sector.
- Supporting the training of the staff of weak NGO's to build up skills for organisation and management, project identification and preparation, for research, monitoring and evaluation, and for networking, lobbying and advocacy.
- Supporting human capacity-building to enable the regions plan and implement development programmes to promote popular participation and regional development;
- Facilitating the implementation of the National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS (1998-2004), the Poverty Reduction Action Programme and National Population Policy for Sustainable Human Development.
- Factoring HIV/AIDS into capacity-building at the operational level;
- Developing and implementing appropriate framework for the application of Affirmative Action in all areas defining access to social and economic opportunities for correcting the imbalances in access to opportunities inherited from the colonial period;
- Improving the economic capacity through: i) reviewing Namibia's investment promotion strategy with a view to attracting export-oriented investments from Europe, Asia, and America; ii) reducing the high cost of labour, in relation to output, by improving the general level of basic education and by greater flexibility in the labour market; iii) extending the incentives given to manufacturing firms to promote training to investors in other sectors as well; iv) taking a stronger position with South Africa regarding high import tariffs in the SACU regions, which raise the costs of doing business, and undermine Namibian's export competitiveness.




- Putting in place a transparent process of performance measurement, evaluation and related rewards for members of senior management, by the corporate governing bodies of institutions
- Adopting social and environmental management practices, by both public and private institutions in Namibia, that allow them to measure their impact by means of accepted performance indicators, on the communities within which they operate
- Adopting and communicating (public and private institutions in Namibia) to external stakeholders, clear guidelines and standards for organisational integrity, against which organisational and individual activities are measured.
- Ensuring, by institutions in Namibia, regular disclosure on all financial and non-financial issues of relevance and interest to stakeholders and the public at large.
- Providing short and long-term training in project planning and sustainable management of resources to all regional council managers.
- Improving service provision and resource management efficiency through public/private partnerships (including joint ventures, the outsourcing of management tasks to parastatals, the private sector and civil society groups and organisations) which hold great promise for improved efficiency regarding service provision and resource management.



## Namibia Vision 2030

# PART THREE



## APPENDICES





## APPENDIX 1

### 1. NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS CONFERENCE

*(Held at Safari Hotel, Windhoek, 20-24 May 2002)*

#### 1.1 Purpose of the National Conference

The purpose of this Conference was mainly to provide a public forum for reviewing the four sources of information, and deriving appropriate vision for the country as well as strategies to realise the vision. Specifically, the national conference considered the following background documents:

- *Report on the Views of Opinion Leaders on Vision 2030;*
- *Vision and Challenges for the Sectors;*
- *National Aspirations and Strategies as Expressed at Regional Consultations, and;*
- *Reports (eight Thematic Reports) of the Multidisciplinary Research on Vision 2030.*

Based on a critical evaluation of these documents and inputs by participants, the Conference came up with the key elements of the Vision 2030 statement, as well as broad scenarios and strategies.

#### 1.2 Organisation of the Conference

The National Core Team for the Vision 2030 project organised this National Aspirations Conference as part of their efforts in coordinating the activities that would lead to the formulation of Vision 2030 for Namibia.

The Conference was held from 20 to 24 May, 2002 at the Safari Hotel, Windhoek. The schedule of the conference made provision for the presentation and discussion of the four background documents described above, with focus on the research reports. The conference attracted 300 delegates from a broad spectrum of the Namibian society.

In order to assure a thorough discussion of the papers, ample time was allowed for discussion by appointed discussants as well as the participants. Apart from general comments and discussions at plenary, the fourth day of the Conference was devoted to in-depth group discussions to assure full and effective participation by conference delegates.

The last session of the workshop was handled by the National Coordinator, during which a summary of the key elements of the Vision Statement was presented.



## WELCOMING REMARKS

by \_\_\_\_\_

***Hon. Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila, MP***

Director General, National Planning Commission

***Your Excellency, the President of the Republic of Namibia***

***Honourable Ministers***

***Members of Parliament***

***Regional Governors and Councillors***

***Your worships, mayors of cities and towns***

I am most delighted to have your company this morning. According to our programme we shall be together for the whole of this week. This meeting is also honoured with the presence of H.E. the President. The President's presence here is a clear manifestation of the commitment of Government to the Vision formulation.

I hope that this commitment demonstrated by the highest office in our land will be emulated by all of us here present through our active participation and meaningful contribution to the workshop's deliberations. But more importantly, our commitment must be shown through active participation in the implementation of the Vision that will emerge from the process of consultation we have been pursuing.

Namibia offers us mass endowments that are the envy of many Nations. We have, however, continued to live in poverty amidst this wealth. To end the misery of poverty we must, therefore, unleash our creativity, summon the commitments and perseverance that have earned us the freedom and independence we enjoy today to transform our resources into wealth for all our people.

This is the only way we can give meaning to our hard-won independence. And this is the essence of the Vision 2030 and its formulation process: to mobilise the Namibian people to chart out their future destiny, a destiny of peace, prosperity and welfare for all our people, and to work out pathways for harnessing our resources, and the creativity, innovativeness and energies of our people towards the full realization of their destiny.

This means, in formulating our Vision, we should not only concentrate on what new things must be done, but also on where we need to change the ways in which we do things in order to optimise outcomes. This includes how we should complement each other in our actions.

### *Purpose of the conference*

The purpose of the conference is to provide a public forum for reviewing the four sources of information, and derive appropriate Vision for the country, as well as strategies to realise the Vision. The Conference will consider the following background documents:

- Report on the Views of Opinion Leaders on Vision 2030;



- Vision and Challenges for the Sectors;
- National Aspiration and Strategies as expressed at Regional Consultations; and
- Reports of the Multidisciplinary Research on Vision ...

#### *Visioning*

A national Vision is a perception of the future, which reveals and points to something new, beyond what is already available and accessible. In his call to the challenges of visioning for Namibia, H.E. the President perceives a future (by 2030) when the quality of life of the people of Namibia would have improved “to the level of their counterparts in the developed world”.

In order to get there, we need a framework that defines clearly where we are today as a nation, where we want to be by 2030 and how to get there. Defining this framework in operational terms is visioning. Visioning for a nation means creating multiple alternative development strategies for researching the goal of future development.

The process of Vision formulation has been an involved one, and involves five Broad Interactive Phases:

- Issue identification
- Basic Studies;
- Visioning;
- Scenario Construction and Strategy Formulation; and
- Development Planning.

#### *Expected accomplishments*

At the end of the 5-day National Conference on the aspirations of the people of Namibia in the next 30 years, it is expected that the following output will be realised:

- National dialogue on the future of Namibia will be undertaken;
- Issues from research reports, regional aspirations report, views of opinion leaders and challenges for the sectors discussed and harmonised;
- National delegates and general public well-informed and sensitised about the Vision 2030 formulation process;
- Elements emphasizing the aspirations of the Namibian people, will form the base of the Vision agreed.

Since this is the beginning of the critical stage of Vision formulation, we will still have to follow up with individual organisations represented here today, to call upon partners to further articulate the Vision, set scenarios and develop strategy.

I would like to thank the President for taking time out of his busy schedule to come and officiate at this conference.

I thank you.

## KEYNOTE ADDRESS

by

**His Excellency, The President - Dr. Sam Nujoma**

*Master of Ceremonies*

*Honourable Ministers*

*Honourable Governors and Regional Counsellors*

*Your Worships, Mayors of our Cities and Towns*

*Your Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps*

*Members of the Core Team & National Committee for Vision 2030*

*Members of the Media*

*Fellow Citizens*

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you all to this epoch-making National Aspirations Conference. The conference is part of our programmes to consolidate the content of Vision 2030. Its format is based on our democratic process and the principle of popular participation to which we have adhered since Independence. It is for those reasons that you are all gathered here for the next four days to engage in meaningful dialogue on the future of our beloved country.

I am particularly pleased that the institutional structures for the Vision 2030 formulation process, such as the National Core Team, the National Committee for Vision 2030, and other supporting structures, are in place and all represent a cross section of our society. Through this approach we have a common responsibility to determine and to shape our destiny.

I believe that through commitment we will achieve the Vision of bringing the quality of life of all our people to the level of their counterparts in the developed world by the year 2030. Your gathering this morning is an important part of the process of formulating a Vision for our country to achieve that goal. It is also evidence of the fact that we are indeed committed to this challenge.

The process of formulating Vision 2030 for our country is well thought-out and well considered. It has involved various efforts to encourage popular participation. Towards that end, regional workshops were held to enlist the interest and contribution of the people at all levels. In the same vein, multi-disciplinary research on various issues was conducted to strengthen the formulation and implementation of the Vision. It is equally encouraging to know that the process is anchored on a critical review of past performance in all the sectors of our economy and society, objective situational analysis and imaginative as well as realistic growth projections to the year 2030.

At this stage, I would like to thank all those who have been actively involved in this process so far, particularly the National Planning Commission, as well as the



National Core Team and members of the National Committee for Vision 2030, for their contribution and commitment. However, I would like to emphasise that many challenges still lie ahead on our road to make Vision 2030 a reality.

### *Master of Ceremonies*

Let me start with the challenges of this National Conference on the “Aspirations of the People of our Country” and their hopes for the future. You have all been invited here to engage in constructive dialogue and deliberations on the future of our country. A significant body of scientific evidence has been gathered through research. It will be presented to this conference for in-depth debate and serious consideration. You are expected to bring your knowledge and collective wisdom to bear on shaping a clear Vision for Namibia. This includes the knowledge and wisdom which cannot be learnt from books, but which is gained from our history, tradition, personal skills and professional experience.

In expressing your collective aspirations for our country, you should be bold, imaginative and realistic. No issue, however politically sensitive, should be swept under the carpet in your deliberations. I call upon you to critically analyse all relevant issues that are at stake. This includes topics on race, social inequalities, and social welfare, population, poverty and importance of human resources development, capacity-building, economic empowerment, access to land and other means of production as well as good governance, accountability and transparency. Other socio-economic issues which cannot be ignored include public support services, peace, security and political stability, democracy and decentralization, globalization and international politics.

As conference participants, you are challenged to provide a framework that will seek to resolve, not only address, the problems confronting our society. Therefore, your Vision for our country must be accompanied by an appropriate mission, or a road map, which leads towards the aims and objectives, which are expressed in the Vision. Your Vision should reveal and point to something new, beyond what is already available and what is known. Your road-map towards the future must involve doing things differently, not merely business as usual.

While we all recognise that the future is filled with uncertainties, we must build our Vision for our country on the philosophy of success in the face of all hurdles. The mission of our Vision must be to resolve all those issues that may inhibit future development and to set ambitious targets which will challenge all sectors of our economy into determined and focused action.

It is important to note that whichever scenario you finally adopt for the Vision and its implementation, the interest of our people must come first. Our national sovereignty must be preserved at all costs. You must also be prepared for the fact that those practices and norms that may inhibit progress towards development targets may have to be sacrificed in the interest of the nation.

Through your collective aspirations, we should have a Vision for our country, well guided by sound democratic principles and in which everyone has a sense of belonging and a role to play. It must lead to the consolidation of a society in which the playing ground is level for everyone, unhindered by race, colour, gender, age, religious inclination or political affiliation.



***Master of Ceremonies***

I am aware that the Vision 2030 management team faces many challenges in articulating our collective aspirations and developing a Vision for our country. Obviously, the immediate challenge must be the finalisation of the Vision formulation process. The Vision 2030 Team has the responsibility to produce Vision 2030 for Namibia together with appropriate scenarios and strategies for Vision implementation. I trust that you will all respond positively to this challenge.

However, beyond Vision 2030, the Vision team must develop a Vision for itself in response to the following questions.

- 1) What institutional structure or structures will be required to implement the Vision?
- 2) How will the strategic framework for Vision implementation dovetail into the existing national and regional planning, as well as other plan implementation processes?
- 3) By what kind of mechanisms will the people continue to be involved in translating the Vision into reality?
- 4) How shall we achieve the required mobilization of human, material and financial resources for the implementation of this Vision?
- 5) How shall we ensure that our march forward, from the inception of the Vision, is in line with the road map charted for the Vision?

As the Vision team ponders over these issues, I would like to suggest that your operational mechanisms should establish a continuing dialogue between mission and Vision, realizing that the unfolding realities of the world are dynamic and flexible. Such a dialogue would enable the team to adopt emerging and useful techniques in addressing the future.

We must be careful not to change or manipulate our Vision away from our main aims and objectives. However, the scenarios being used for your strategic planning should be subject to ongoing reviews as new and useful techniques emerge and fresh evidence is obtained and the reality of the future unfolds in ways different from interim targets. In essence, the process of implementing the Vision, through subsequent National Development Plans, must be carefully monitored and evaluated. The outcomes of such evaluations must be used for necessary decision-making.

***Master of Ceremonies***

I would like to draw your attention to the challenges we face as a nation in translating Vision 2030 into reality.

The question that should be uppermost in our minds is: Vision 2030 for whom? This Vision is being formulated for all our people and for the benefit of all Namibians. Therefore, I call on all Namibian citizens to close ranks, come together and work in unity for our own interest, in the interest of our families and the future generations.



We must view the Vision as a veritable policy framework for breaking the barriers of ethnic divisions, class segregation and disharmony in our society. The Vision should provide a sound basis for us all to march forward in unison, as a nation and as a people with a common agenda.

For the Vision to be realised, it will demand sacrifices and commitment by all of us. Your imaginative strategies for implementing this Vision will call for new ways of doing things, new approaches to resolving problems and as such, a fundamental change in mindsets as well as new attitudes towards other people, resources, institutions and the society at large.


To achieve this Vision for our country, all individuals, groups and communities must get involved. We must be prepared to make sacrifices; and we must emphasise those aspects that unite us and eliminate all forces of division. The Vision is for all of us, regardless of our political affiliations, social standing or gender.

I wish the delegates to the National Aspirations Conference for Namibia Vision 2030 success in all their deliberations. We look up to you and the Vision Team for a Vision that best defines our collective aspirations, and the compilation of appropriate scenarios and strategies for the implementation of Vision 2030.

With these few words, I now have the honour to declare this National Aspirations Conference for Namibia Vision 2030, officially open.

Long live the Republic of Namibia!

I thank you.



## VOTE OF THANKS

by \_\_\_\_\_  
*Ms. P. T. Akwenye, Director, Directorate of Development Planning, NPC*

*Your Excellency, the President of the Republic of Namibia*

*Honourable Members of Parliament*

*Members of the Diplomatic Corps*

*Honourable Governors and Regional Councillors*

*Distinguished Delegates*

*Media Practitioners*

*Ladies and Gentlemen*

In Namibian culture, when an elder has spoken, a child has almost nothing else to say – but there is always an expectation to say THANK YOU. Your presence here in mass is a source of encouragement to me to express my profound gratitude for the opportunity afforded to me to give the Vote of Thanks.

Your Excellency, when the news about the Vision broke in 1998, I am sure some of us did not care much about it because we are living today, and not tomorrow. As time went by we realised that we might not be there in person to experience the achievements of the Vision, but we have to preserve our national heritage for the generations to come.

We have a good example at hand that, if our President and some of you present here today did not have a dream (Vision) to free this country, we wouldn't have had peace, democracy and economic prosperity we are all enjoying today. That alone acted as a stimulant for us to appreciate the idea of a Vision. Therefore, no amount of words can express our thanks for this wonderful idea. Comrade President, you did it once again, you responded to the call of our people, your people.

Distinguished invited guests, the turnout speaks for itself. You are here because you are committed to the future of this country. Let us face the challenge and come up with an acceptable and achievable Vision. The rest of the nation is waiting to hear about the outcome of this conference.

Comrade President, rest assured that we will use the rest of the week productively in considering all the challenges you referred to, and find amicable solutions in addressing them. Comrade President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will fail in my duty if I do not thank the Director of the National Planning Commission, Hon. Kuugongelwa-Amadhila who has accepted the responsibility to host the project in the NPC.

At the Apex of the organizational structure for the Visionary management, there is a National Committee. These are the people who have been working tirelessly to ensure the smooth operation of the Visioning process. A big 'thanks' to you all.

The documents we are discussing today are the outcome of a consultative process involving the Multi-disciplinary Research Teams and our generous public who served as source information. Well done to you all. If it were not for the generosity of the UNDP and the solidarity of our Government, the Government of the Republic of Namibia, the Vision 2030 project would not have been taken off the ground. We still look upon you to see us through this process. We also call upon other development partners to follow suit.

Particular thanks also go to the electronic and print media present here. You are encouraged to disseminate the information about the Vision widely throughout the country. To the Organising Committee and the Safari Hotel Management and Staff, keep up the good work for the whole week.

Once more, I THANK YOU Comrade President, and everybody present.



## 2. THE NAMIBIA VISION 2030 FORMULATION PROCESS

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of a national vision is to provide answers to questions about the future of the country. Such questions relate to the future of the nation as an entity, the supporting institutions, the policy environment, the future of groups, organizations, communities and individuals. As often asked in vision formulation in the Africa region, the questions for vision are generally the following [African Futures]:

- What are the long term aspirations and goals of the society? (i.e. what kind of a nation would the people like Namibia to be in the future, in 30 years?).
- What are the characteristics of the society and the issues facing it which could affect the ability of the country to create that desired future? (i.e. what are the main trends, uncertainties, future-bearing events, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats within the internal and external environment of the society that are important for the future?).
- What are the alternative future scenarios? (i.e. given the issues and factors identified above, in what kind of environment would the society be expected to function in the future?).
- Given the scenarios identified above, what should be the vision of the society? (i.e. what kind of a society should the nation be striving to create in the future given foreseeable possibilities and constraints?).
- What are the strategic issues and challenges that must be confronted if the society is to achieve its vision? What are the strategic options available to address these strategic issues?
- What are the appropriate development strategies for the nation, and how should it proceed with development?

A vision formulation process seeks to address issues about future development posed above. In proceeding to examine these and related questions about Namibia, the Vision Project has adopted the NLTPS process, as developed by the African Futures, which proceeds in five broad interactive phases: namely, issues identification; multidisciplinary research; scenario construction; strategy formulation and; development planning. Each of the interrelated five phases is defined briefly, with information on what was done in arriving at the Namibia Vision 2030 process.

In its ideal form, NLTPS is a people-centred learning process toward a shared national vision. It is arrived at by consensus, and should, therefore, prove to be reasonably implementable.

### 2.2 DATA AND INFORMATION BASE

Visioning calls for a critical review of past performance in all sectors of the economy and society, objective situation analysis and imaginative as well as realistic projection into the future, that is the year 2030. This is why a large body of data, as well as up-to-date information, is needed; to identify the major problems



of the society, and through critical analysis relate the past to the current situation and from there make a bold but realistic projection into the future.

In this regard, our current efforts started with identification of development issues in the country. A review of available documents led to the production of a Background Document for the Vision Project, as well as the development of the Vision Project Document.

In this context, the vision project identified 8 broad themes (and their elaboration) for strategic studies to be conducted on key national issues. By mid-May 2001, the Steering Committee for Vision 2030 was able to put together 8 Multidisciplinary groups of researchers to undertake the scientific research work that visioning entails.

In support of the research process, the National Planning Commission conducted a survey of ‘opinion leaders’ in the country in April 2000, asking for their views on the future of Namibia. Based on analysis of data collected from this study, a report titled Views of Opinion Leaders was prepared to serve as input into the vision formulation.

In addition, the National Core Team for Vision 2030 conducted a series of sensitization workshops in the 13 regions of the country (July/August, 2001) to enlighten the general public about the Vision 2030 project. The regional workshops also collected useful information from the people on their aspirations, based on the 8 thematic areas and the issues already defined in the project document.

Already, the Office of the Prime Minister had coordinated the vision of the Government sectors, resulting in the publication of the document ‘Namibia – A Decade of Peace, Democracy and Prosperity, 1990-2000’ (March 2000).

A National Aspirations Conference was organised in May (20-24) in Windhoek, mainly to provide a public forum for reviewing these four sources of information, and to derive appropriate vision for the country, as well as scenarios and strategies to realise the vision. Specifically, the national conference considered the following background documents:

- *Report on the Views of Opinion Leaders on Vision 2030;*
- *Vision and Challenges for the Sectors;*
- *National Aspirations and Strategies as Expressed at Regional Consultations;*  
*and*
- *Reports of the Multidisciplinary Research on Vision 2030.*

Based on a critical evaluation of these documents and inputs by participants, the Conference came up with preliminary Vision statement and its elaboration, as well as broad scenarios and strategies.

Thereafter, the National Core Team constituted yet another experts group in August 2002, to consolidate all the information available for the vision formulation exercise. Based on the report of this consolidation group early in the first quarter of 2003, the Core Team produced the Draft of the Vision document as well as the Technical Document which constitute the strategic framework for the Vision itself.

## 2.3 PHASE 1: VISION FORMULATION PROJECT

The Vision 2030 Project Office is located in the NPC Secretariat. A private consultant, Prof. Arowolo, had worked on preliminary activities of this project leading to the formulation of the Project Document in June 2000. He was appointed Project Consultant by mid-February 2001, and was charged with responsibility for the revision and implementation of the project work plan.

### *Development Objective*

The overall objective of this project is to achieve high prosperity and quality of life for the population of Namibia by enhancing national development through adopting a visionary and participatory approach, and strengthening national capacities for long-term perspective development.

### *Immediate Objectives*

The immediate objectives of Namibia Vision 2030 are:

- i) Formulate a shared long-term national vision of what Namibia's future would be by year 2030;
- ii) Prepare a national development strategy that would elaborate the policies and programmes needed to meet the objectives identified in the vision statement; and
- iii) Enhance the capacity of the Government and civil society to design and implement national economic policies, programmes, and projects and to increase the capacity of the government to take a lead role in the management of development co-operation.

### **Project Activities**

The following is a list of the activities undertaken by this project, i.e. not necessarily in order, as they will all appear in a separate work plan including timing and responsible institutions/individuals: -

- (a) Setting up the institutional framework for Namibia Vision 2030.
  - Establish a National Committee for Namibia Vision 2030
  - Establish a National Core Team
  - Establish small Multidisciplinary Work Groups.
- (b) Prepare terms of reference and meeting schedules for the above-mentioned committees.
- (c) Prepare a detailed work plan
- (d) Organise a national training workshop on the methodology of the project.
- (e) Identify the major key factors, variables and issues.
- (f) Collect strategic information for Namibia's future. Make comprehensive inventory of relevant studies available.
- (g) Review the important and relevant literature.
- (h) Organise a workshop to identify national aspirations.
- (i) Formulate a vision statement.
- (j) Research the key factors and variables (past and present).
- (k) Organise a workshop for the multidisciplinary work groups.
- (l) Analyse the main agents of social change.
- (m) Analyse the interfacing between the internal situation and the external environment.

- (n) Examine carefully the strategic key questions about the future of the country.
- (o) Identify areas for further in-depth supplementary studies, if needed.
- (p) Design strategies for attaining the Vision;
- (q) Prepare first draft of Vision 2030 document.
- (r) Organise consultations with various stakeholders on first draft of the Vision document.
- (s) Incorporate the consolidated report into a Second Draft Vision document.
- (t) Prepare and disseminate final Vision document.

### Project Outputs

At the end of the this phase of the project, various materials were produced and disseminated, as appropriate. The list of materials produced by the Vision 2030 Project is provided in Appendix '7'. The two major outputs of the Namibia Vision 2030 Project are:

- i) Republic of Namibia, *Namibia Vision 2030: A Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development, Main Document*. National Planning Commission, Windhoek, (August 2003).
- ii) Republic of Namibia, *Namibia Vision 2030: A Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development, Summary*, National Planning Commission, Windhoek, (August 2003).

### 2.4 METHODOLOGY AND STRATEGY

The methodology proposed for NLTV 2030 has been developed by the African Futures and variably applied in a large number of countries in the continent. It consists of 5 steps, which are:

- a) Issues identification
- b) Basic studies
- c) Scenarios and visioning
- d) Strategy formulation
- e) Development planning

The methodology was adapted to the local situation in the country, taking into consideration the timing, human, financial and material resources needed, as well as the capacity limitations in the country. However, emphasis was placed on the process of conducting the vision, strategic research and capacity-building for long term planning in the country. The first four steps defined above took the project through its First Phase (Phase I), that of Vision formulation. The next phase after the production of the Vision document is the Vision Implementation Phase, or Phase II.

The strategy of this project (Phase I) was anchored in a participatory approach for the formulation of a shared national vision, and operational strategies for the development of Namibia. The participatory approach was chosen in order to build national consensus on the way forward. This national consensus was reached through an extensive national dialogue between the major stakeholders of the Namibian society.

It was also based on the co-ordination of activities of the various committees and work groups. The exercise involved a series of national consultations and workshops involving participants from all the major stakeholders in development.



The project provided financial assistance to enable the work groups to participate actively in the vision, thus ensuring a wide ownership of the outputs. Technical advice was provided by the UNDP, through its office in Namibia and the African Futures Project based in Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire).

## 2.5 STRATEGIC STUDIES ON KEY NATIONAL ISSUES

Vision 2030 will provide a long-term perspectives framework for medium and short-term implementation of development projects and programs. As such, the Vision has been based on careful analyses and reviews of Namibia’s past and current experience in development, given its natural, material and financial resources, and its cultural, regional and international context. It also involved a careful assessment of the strengths and weaknesses and an evaluation of the opportunities and threats related to the welfare of the population.

In this context, the following were the broad themes for strategic studies, conducted by local consultants, on key national issues: -

Theme	Research Issue	Research Group
1	<p><b>Inequalities and social welfare</b></p> <p>Inequalities with regard to Gender; Youth; the Elderly.</p> <p>Inequalities regarding access to quality Education; potable Water; Health services and facilities; Sanitation; Housing; Electricity; Productive resources; Information; Employment; Income.</p> <p>Social welfare considerations including (but not limited to):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Race and race relations</li> <li>Ethnicity, minority group and marginalisation</li> <li>Inheritance</li> <li>Nuptiality (including marriage, separation, divorce, widowhood)</li> <li>Mothers and fathers</li> <li>Family, children, and adoption</li> <li>Orphanage</li> <li>Religion</li> <li>Language and other aspects of culture</li> <li>People with disability</li> <li>Child abuse</li> <li>Domestic violence</li> <li>Rape</li> <li>Affirmative Action.</li> <li>Government policies and programmes</li> <li>Role of the Private Sector, including NGOs</li> </ul>	<p>SIAPAC</p> <p>Mr. Randolph Mouton (Dep Director) PO Box 90144, Windhoek Tel: 061-220531 Fax: 061-235859</p> <p>Dr. Beth Terry (<i>Leader</i>) Ms Lindi Kazombaue</p> <p>Dr. David Cownie</p>





<p><b>2</b></p>	<p><b>Peace and political stability</b>  Namibia's Independence and sovereignty  The Constitution  Multi-party democracy, Political Communication/Dialogue  Civil education  Morality  Ethnicity, Language, Nationality, Religion and Tolerance  Poverty-reduction  Legal system and Human Rights  Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association  Law enforcement  Criminality, Punishment and Rehabilitation  Administration of Justice  Decentralization  Popular participation  Good governance, Transparency, Accountability  Public service  Resource-allocation, resource-distribution, fairness  State policies</p>	<p>University of Namibia  Multidisciplinary Research Centre  Private Bag 13301  Tel: 206 3051 / 2  Fax: 206 3050 / 3684</p> <p>Dr. H. Mu Ashekele  (Team Leader)  Dr. T. O. Chirawu  Dr. Royson M. Mukwena  Prof. Lazarus Hangula</p>
<p><b>3</b></p>	<p><b>Human resources, institutional- and capacity-building</b>  Labour force dynamics  Labour productivity  Human resource development (education, training)  Capacity-building for economic management  HIV/AIDS  Human resource utilization  Full employment  Industrial and Occupational classification  Efficiency in public and private institutions  Building and restructuring national institutions for posterity  Private and public sector inter-relations</p>	<p>University of Namibia  Office of the Registrar  Tel: 061-206 3083</p> <p>Mr. Zach JN Kazapua  (Team Leader)  Dr. J.E. Odada</p> <p>Mr. Phanael M. Kaapama</p>





<p><b>4</b></p>	<p><b>Macro-economic issues</b>  Macaoeconomic policy  Industrialization  Economic growth  Infrastructure (Transport, communication, electricity)  Modernization of agriculture  Income distribution  Urban dynamics and rural transformation  Inflation  International trade  Wage rate  Diversification and economic competitiveness  Job creation  The Private Sector  Development programme management (monitoring &amp; evaluation)  Namibian dollar  Public sector and parastatals</p>	<p>University of Namibia  P/Bag 13301  Windhoek  Tel: 206 3774</p> <p>Mr. Mihe Gaomab  (team Leader)  Mr. Daniel Motinga  Mr. Johny Steytter</p> <p>Mr. Albert Matongela</p>
<p><b>5</b></p>	<p><b>Population, health and development</b>  Population policy and programme management  Population dynamics  Population growth  Urbanization  Internal migration and population distribution  Rural population  International migration  Total fertility  Reproductive Health  Abortion  Life expectancy  Infant and childhood mortality  Early childhood development  Food security and nutrition  Maternal mortality  Major causes of death  HIV/AIDS  Disability  Ratio of population to medical personnel  Ratio of population to medical resources/ facilities  Gender; children; youth; elderly  Refugees; displaced persons; resettlement; rehabilitation  Population data (Census; Vital Registration; Records)  Population research and information.</p>	<p>SIAPAC  Mr. Randolph Mouton  (Dep Director)  PO Box 90144, Windhoek  Tel: 061-220531  Fax: 061-235859</p> <p>Ms. Jane King  (Team Leader)  Dr. Chris Tapscott</p> <p>Ms.Hopolang Phororo</p>



<p><b>6</b></p>	<p><b>Natural resources and environment</b> Land Water Agriculture Mining Fisheries Wildlife Tourism Forestry Desertification Sustainable resource utilization Biodiversity Settlement patterns Human capital Poverty Education  Policies and programme management.</p>	<p>Namibia Natural Resource Consortium (NNRC) PO Box 6322, Ausspanplatz, Windhoek. Tel: 061- 220 579 E-mail: jtarr@iafrica.com.na  Dr. Chris Brown (Team Leader) Dr. Peter W. Tarr Dr. John Mendelsohn Dr. Jon Barnes Mr. Carl !Aribeb  Mrs. J. Tarr</p>
<p><b>7</b></p>	<p><b>Knowledge, information and technology</b> Basic education Public education Moral education Knowledge, experience, skills, confidence Technology Technology transfer Early childhood development Vocational training Higher education Information Communication</p>	<p>The Polytechnic of Namibia Windhoek Tel: (061) 2072521 / 2072064 Dr. Roland W. Losch (Leader) Dr. Jens Dietrich Mr. Herbert Greis Ms. Chuma Mayumbelo Mr. Corneels Jafta <i>Research Assistants:</i> Ms. L. Aamambo Mr. Stefan Schultz Mr. K. Asokhan</p>
<p><b>8</b></p>	<p><b>Factors of the external environment</b> Development cooperation Globalization Peace and security Regionalization International relations</p>	<p>NCCI, Windhoek Mr. Joel H. Eita (Team Leader) Mr. C. Schumann Mr. Mburumba Appolus Mr. Jean-Marie Ndimbira</p>

## Terms of Reference for the Groups

The Steering Committee deliberated on the terms of reference for these studies and invited comments from the selected groups before finalisation. All researchers were selected from the country based on a list of resource persons developed by the NPC. Each group agreed to its specific terms as approved by the Steering Committee. The reviews were succinct and policy oriented. The research in each thematic area was expected to provide answers to the following set of questions:

- Based on the review of the available information on the thematic area, what are the strengths of the country in that area?
- What are the main issues/factors, weaknesses, threats and limitations which could affect the ability of the country to create a desired future?
- What are the strategic options available and/or needed to address these issues, factors, weaknesses, etc.
- What needs to change?
- What would the future look like?
- How would the situation unfold in each thematic area?

The research also required the collection of primary data where necessary through small-scale interviews, focused group discussions, or participant observation. Information collected was processed and used as part of the inputs into vision formulation, construction of multiple scenarios on the future of the country, and in formulating development strategies for realizing the aim and objectives of the Vision.

## 2.6 VISION FORMULATION MANAGEMENT

### The Challenge of Managing the Vision

The challenge of visionary management is navigating through chaos and uncertainty that defines the future, utilizing both rational and intuitive creativity to define the future and how to get there. In managing the Namibia visioning process, the initial question was ‘what type of vision?’ Management was guided by the principle of popular participation to which this Government has adhered since Independence. The project management constituted a broad based National Committee to guide the process, and made other moves to involve the general public in the process.

Visionary management faces the challenge of formulating as well as implementing the Vision. Phase I of this project focused on the task of producing the Vision 2030. At the apex of the organizational structure for this phase was the National Core Team, made up of experts in various fields, and supported by the National Committee, the Steering Committee and the NPC. The management facilitated the production of Namibia Vision 2030 document.

The Vision itself will provide the necessary internal dynamics that allows the goal to be realised; and built-in mechanisms for the monitoring and evaluation of predetermined targets in all the sectors, including yearly, five yearly evaluations and a major review of performance every decade. This is where the five-yearly planning cycles in use will provide a sound basis for the monitoring and evaluation of the Vision objectives.

However, the next phase of the project (Phase II) will have to respond to the challenge of implementation, including design of a comprehensive Action Plan, and the implementation of a broad mechanism for the monitoring and evaluation of the national programme activities.

### **Institutional Arrangements**

The NPC was charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating all the multi-sectoral activities that would lead to the foundation of Vision 2030 for Namibia. From the national perspective, the Vision must be internally driven in order to assure ownership. All available resources were mobilised to address the research process necessary for the articulation of the Vision: its objectives, the goal, and strategy.

In its coordinating role, NPC ensured that the entire process was internally driven in order to ensure effective coordination of the national dialogue that was expected to produce the Vision for the country. This called for a careful search for local talents and experts in order to facilitate the research process.

### ***Steering Committee***

It was against this background that the NPC established a Steering Committee for Vision 2030 in January 2001. Before then, certain preliminary activities on the Vision project (namely, interviews of Opinion Leaders; formulation of the Project Document) were monitored by an ad hoc committee of the NPC. The list of members of the Steering Committee is shown in Appendix '3' of this document.

The overall objective of the Steering Committee was to serve as the technical organ of the NPC in all the administrative, financial and technical matters pertaining to the formulation of Vision 2030 and production of the Vision document and its wide dissemination.

In this regard, the Steering Committee, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Hanno Rumpf, Permanent Secretary, NPC, held meetings as regularly as possible and facilitated the execution of the following activities between January and July 2001:

- Determination of the Terms of Reference for the Steering Committee.
- Financial administration of the project.
- The appointment of the Project Consultant.
- Establishment of the project office and facilities, recruitment of a Secretary and a Driver, and the provision of a vehicle for the project.
- Requests for external support to the project, by making contacts with African Futures (Abidjan) and the Japanese Government for specific interventions.
- Establishment of the National Core Team and determination of their Terms of Reference.
- Compilation a list of resource persons for the various consultancy activities of the project.
- Identification of the 8 Multidisciplinary Work Groups, determination of their Terms of Reference, and commissioning of research work.
- Up-dating the list of members of the National Committee on Vision 2030.
- The workshop on Project Strategy and Methodology (May 2001) for the

Core Team, National Committee, Steering Committee and the Work Groups.

- The report of Interviews of opinion leaders prepared by the Consultant.
- Participating in the Regional Sensitization Mission.
- Consideration of the integration of a Media Programme into the work plan and budget of the Project.

***National Core Team***

The National Coordinator was mandated to consolidate the development and sustain the effective functioning of the institutional setup for the formulation of Vision 2030; namely, the National Core Team, the National Committee and the Multi-disciplinary Work Groups. In addition, he/she had the overall responsibility to co-ordinate activities that would lead to the formulation of Namibia Vision 2030 and broad strategies for its implementation.

The National Core Team for Vision 2030 (NCT) served as the technical coordinating body for all activities pertaining to the formulation of the Vision, its production and dissemination. The mandate of the National Core Team is to develop a vision for Namibia up to year 2030. (See Appendix ‘4’ for membership). Guided by the Work Plan, the Team shall perform the following specific duties:

- Determine the terms of reference for long-term perspective studies in the following areas:
  - Inequalities and social welfare;
  - Political stability, peace and sustainable development;
  - Human resources, institutional and capacity building;
  - Macro-economic issues;
  - Population, Health and development;
  - Natural resources and environment;
  - Knowledge, information and technology;
  - Factors of the external environment.
- Identify resource persons in the country and commission these studies.
- Set up mechanisms to coordinate the studies, including monitoring of the research process and evaluation of reports.
- Coordinate the activities of the multidisciplinary groups conducting research;
- Organise national and regional workshops and seminars to discuss issues about Vision 2030.
- Construct scenarios for the future of Namibia till 2030.
- Determine appropriate strategies towards the realization of Vision 2030 for Namibia.
- Develop an Action Plan for implementing Vision 2030 for Namibia.
- Produce the final report of the Vision 2030 Project, including
  - i) Main Document ‘Namibia Vision 2030’
  - ii) Summary of the Main Document
  - iii) Technical Report, incorporating Background Research Papers
- Disseminate ‘Namibia Vision 2030’ as appropriate.

***National Committee for the Namibia Vision 2030 Project***

The National Committee on Vision 2030 was established with an overall objective to provide the technical advice to the NPC on issues pertaining to the formulation




of Vision 2030 for Namibia, and appropriate strategies for its implementation. In addition, it was envisaged that the National Committee would advise the National Core Team and the NPC on key strategies and issues considered relevant to the formulation of a broad based vision for the country in year 2030, such as identification of critical development and management issues, by what means and how the Vision would be realised, and strategy for consolidating and improving on progress achieved. (See Appendix '5' for the list of National Committee members).

Based on the above objective, the Government empowered the Committee to perform the following specific duties:

- Advise the National Core Team and the NPC on key strategies and issues considered relevant to the formulation of a broad based vision for the country in year 2030, such as identification of critical development and management issues, by what means and how the vision will be realised, and strategy for consolidating and improving on progress achieved;
- Assist the National Core Team and the NPC Secretariat to consider submissions by all stakeholders and make recommendations for their integration into the Vision 2030 document;
- Consider the Draft of Vision 2030 and make inputs into its finalisation;
- Make contributions to the National Dialogue on Vision 2030;
- Assist in achieving the formulation of Vision 2030 for Namibia; and
- Periodically consider the monitoring and evaluation reports on the Vision.

The Project Office, located in the NPC, provided support to the activities of the committees, and coordinated the production of the Vision materials. (See Appendix '6').



**3. MEMBERS OF THE NAMIBIA VISION 2030 STEERING COMMITTEE**

Mr. Hanno Rumpf  
Permanent Secretary (Committee Chairman)  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek

Ms. Erica Shafudah  
Deputy Director (Deputy National Coordinator, Vision 2030)  
Development Planning Division  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek

Ms. Sylvia Demas  
Deputy Director  
Directorate of Multilateral Cooperation  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek

Mr. Onno Amutenya  
Deputy Director  
Information Systems Centre  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek

Mr. Peter Mbome  
Administrative Officer, Vision 2030  
Information Systems Centre  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek

Ms. Regina Ndopu  
Director  
Regional Decentralisation Division  
Ministry of Regional, Local Government and Housing  
Windhoek

Mr. M. Kafidi  
Information Systems Division  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek





Mr. Jotham A. Mwaniki  
Consultant  
Central Statistics Bureau  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek

Mr. Erastus Nekuta  
Administrative Officer  
Office of the President  
State House  
Windhoek

Prof. Oladele O. Arowolo  
Consultant, Vision 2030 Project  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek



**4. MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL CORE TEAM**

Mr. Isaac Kaulinge

Secretary to the Presidency (National Coordinator, Vision 2030, up to April 2002)

State House

Windhoek

Ms. Erica Shafudah

Deputy Director (National Coordinator, Vision 2030, from May 2002)

Development Planning Division

National Planning Commission

Windhoek

Mr. Victor Tonchi

Senior Lecturer

Faculty of Economics and Management Science

University of Namibia

Windhoek

Mr. Alfred van Kent

Director of Science and Technology

Ministry of Higher Education, Training and Employment Creation

Windhoek

Mr. Ipumbu Shiimi

Principal Economist

Bank of Namibia

Windhoek

Dr. Mary Seely,

Director

Desert Research Foundation

P.O. Box 20232

Windhoek

Dr. Nestor Shivute

Under-Secretary

Ministry of Health and Social Services

Windhoek



Mr. Penda Kiiyala  
Director, Development Cooperation  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek

Dr. Taati Ithindi  
Medical Superintendent  
Ministry of Health and Social Services  
Windhoek

Ms. Sylvia Demas  
Deputy Director, Development Cooperation  
National Planning Commission  
Windhoek





**APPENDIX 5**

5. NAMIBIA VISION 2030: MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE

No	Name	Position/Institution	Address	Tel/Fax	E-mail
1	Mr Jafet Isaak	Director MFIB	P/Bag 13347 WHK	Tel: 2829111 Fax: 220265	jisaack@mfa.gov.na
2	Mr. T. Shinavene	Director MFAI B	P/Bag 13344 WHK	Tel: 222246 Fax: 220177	tshinavene@namibia.com.na
3	Ms. R. Mabakeng	Deputy Director MWAW	P/Bag 13359 WHK	Tel: 061 2833152 Fax: 061 221304	womenaffairs@mys.gov.na
4	Mr. D.A. Keendjele	Manager SSC	P/Bag 13223 WHK	Tel: 2807028 Fax: 211765	sscdavid@iafrica.com.na
5	Dr. C. Hoveka	Economist Bank of Namibia	Box 2882 WHK	Tel: 2835103 Fax: 2835067	chris.hoveka@bon.com.na
6	Mr. R. Mbetjiha	UNAM	P/Bag 13301 WHK	Tel: 2835103 Fax: 2835231	rmbetjiha@unam.na
7	Mr. G. Shinyala	National Council Secretariat	P/Bag 13371 WHK	Tel: 2028071 Fax: 226121	
8	Dr. D. Hansohm	Director NEPRU	Box 40710 WHK	Tel: 228284 Fax: 231496	nepru@nepru.org.na
9	Mr. C. Tjirera	Deputy Director Office of the President	P/Bag 13339 WHK	Tel: 2707111 Fax: 221770	
10	Dr. P. Swarts	Director NIED	P. Box 2034 Okahandja	Tel: 062 502446 Fax: 062 503640	pswarts@nied.edu.na
11	Ms. E. Negumbo	Commissioner MOHA	P/ Bag 13200 WHK	Tel: 2922022 Fax: 2922185	
12	Mr. H.L. Awaseb	Director MoJ	P/ Bag 13248 WHK	Tel: 2805220 Fax: 240064	hawaseb@moj.gov.na
13	Mr. P. Swart	Director MRLGH	P/ Bag 13289 WHK	Tel: 2972225 Fax: 226049	
14	Mr. K. Hikuama-Mupaine	Director MOL	P/ Bag 19005 WHK	Tel: 2066262 Fax 212323	kmupaine@mol.gov.na



15	Mr. J.E. Kandjeke	Director MOD	P/Bag 13307 WHK	Tel: 2042013 Fax: 2042036	
16	Mr. P. Mwatile	Director MFMR	P/ Bag 13355 WHK	Tel: 2053028 Fax: 2053076	pmwatile@mfmr.gov.na
17	Mr. V. Wium	Director MOFMR	P/ Bag 13355 WHK	Tel: 2053043 Fax: 2053076	vwium@mfmr.gov.na
18	Mr. I.K. Mutilitha	Deputy Director MTI	P/Bag 13340 WHK	Tel: 2837111 Fax: 220148	
19	Mr. S.E Ndjaba	Deputy Permanet Secretary MOF	P/Bag 13295 WHK	Tel: 2092528 Fax 230903	
20	Mr. K. Egumbo	Strategic Executive Municipality of Windhoek	Box 59 WHK	Tel: 290170 Fax: 2902111	khe@windhoekcc.org.na
21	Mr. P. Amunyela	Deputy Director MLRR	P/Bag 13341 WHK	Tel: 2088711 Fax: 2088736	pamunyela@mwtc.gov.na
22	Mr. J. Njoka	Deputy Commissioner MOPCS	P/Bag 13281	Tel: 2846239 Fax: 223606 Cell: 0811294324	njoka@iafrica.com.na
23	Ms. N. Nghipandulwa	Secretary-General NUNW	Box 610099 Windhoek	Tel: 262247 Fax: 2161926	nunw@mweb.com.na
24	Mr. U. Dempers	Executive Officer NANGOF	Box 70433 Khomasdal	Tel: 239469 Fax: 239471	nangof@iafrica.com.na
25	Mr. T. Shaanika	CEO NCCI	Box 9355 WHK	Tel: 228809 Fax: 228809	Ncci@ncci.com.na
26	Dr. C. Jackson	Economic Adviser UNDP	P/Bag 13329 WHK	Tel: 2046234 Fax: 2046203	clement.jackson@undp.com
27	Mr. P. Amunyela	Deputy Director MWTC	P/ Bag 13341 WHK	Tel: 2088711 Fax: 224401	
28	Mr. Kavari	Controller NBC	P.O. Box 321 WHK	Tel: 2913143 Fax: 247327	Vkavari@nbc.com.na
29	Mr. L. Haukongo	Deputy Director NPCS	P/ Bag 13355 WHK	Tel: 2834111 Fax: 226501	lhaukongo@npc.gov.na



30	Ms. P. Kali	Deputy Director MOL	P/ Bag 19005 WHK	Tel: 2066258 Fax: 212323	pkali@mol.gov.na
31	Hon. S.B Sibalatani	Governor Caprivi Region.	P/Bag 13295 WHK	Tel: 2092528 Fax: 230903	
32	Hon. S. Nuujoma	Governor, Erongo Region	P/ Bag 5-019, Swakopmund	Tel: 064 412700 Fax: 064 412701	
33	Hon. P. Boltman	Governor, Hardap Region	P/Bag 2017 Mariental	Tel:063 240728 Fax: 063 240527	
34	Hon. S Goliath	Governor, Karas Region	P.O. Box 384, Keetmanshoop	Tel: 063 222068 Fax: 063 223538	karas@iafrica.com.na
35	Hon. J.A. Pandeni	Governor, Khomas Region	P.O. Box 3379 Windhoek	Tel: 221441/2 Fax: 220317	krc@mweb.com.na
36	Hon. S. Tjongarero	Governor, Kunene Region	P/Bag 502 Opuwo	Tel: 065 273077 Fax: 065 273171	
37	Hon. B. Mwaningange	Governor Ohangwena Region	P/Bag 13185 Eenhana	Tel: 065 263038 Fax: 065 263033	
38	Hon. S. Karupu	Governor, Okavango region	P/Bag 2082, Rundu	Tel: 066 255396 Fax: 066 255036	
39	Hon. L. Macleod	Governor, Omaheke region	P/ Bag 2277 Gobabis	Tel: 062 563191 Fax: 062 562432	mcleod@omorcouncil.com.na
40	Hon. S Kayone	Governor, Omusati region-	P/Bag 523, Ombalantu	Tel: 065 251019 Fax: 065 251078	
41	Hon. C. Kashiupulwa	Governor, Oshana region	P/Bag 5543 Oshakati	Tel: 065 220441 Fax: 065 221292	
42	Hon..V. Kamanya	Governor, Oshikoto Region	P.O. Box 1116 Tsumeb	Tel: 067 221435 Fax: 067 220729	
43	Ms. B. Artivor	CEO PEAC	P/Bag 13338 Windhoek	Tel: 061 2056111 Fax: 061 256413	bartivor@op.gov.na
44	Hon. G. Uushona	Governor Otjozondjupa Region	P.O. Box 1682 Otjiwarongo	Tel: 067 303702 Fax: 067 302760	kambiaze@yahoo.com



## APPENDIX 6

### 6. VISION 2030 PROJECT OFFICE: NPC

#### Staff

Mr. Peter Mbome  
Project Administrative Officer

Ms. Ruusa Ilonga  
Project Secretary

Mr. Steve Biko Ngiwewelekwa  
Project Driver

Prof. Oladele O. Arowolo  
Project Consultant



## 7. LIST OF MATERIALS/DOCUMENTS PRODUCED UNDER THE VISION 2030 PROJECT

- 1) Arowolo, O.O, ***Visioning, Scenario Building And Strategy Formulation***, Discussion Paper, Prepared for the Namibia Vision 2030 Project, (April 2002).
- 2) National Planning Commission, ***Background Document for Namibia Vision 2030***, National Planning Commission, Windhoek, (March 2001).
- 3) National Planning Commission, ***Project Methodology and Strategy***, Report of a Workshop organised for Members of the National Core Team, National Committee and the Multidisciplinary Working Group, held at the Continental Hotel, Windhoek (08 May 2001).
- 4) National Planning Commission, ***Approach to Namibia Vision 2030***, Vision Project Office, Windhoek, (June 2001).
- 5) Republic of Namibia, Office of the President, ***Media Conference on Namibia Vision 2030***, Held at the National Planning Commission Secretariat, Windhoek (06 July 2001).
- 6) Namibia Vision 2030 Project, ***Regional Sensitization Mission (July – August 2001)***, Vision Project Office, National Planning Commission, Windhoek, (November 2001).
- 7) Namibia Vision 2030 Project, ***National Aspirations and Strategies as Expressed at the Regional Consultations***, Vision 2030 Project Office, Windhoek (December 2001).
- 8) Vision 2030 Project Office, ***Namibia Vision 2030: People’s Aspirations for the Future***, Proceedings of the National Aspirations Conference (Held at Safari Hotel, Windhoek, 20-24 May 2002).
- 9) Vision 2030 Project Office, ***Views of Opinion Leaders***, National Planning Commission, Windhoek, (March 2001).
- 10) The National Planning Commission, ***Inequality and Social Welfare (Theme 1): A Contribution to Vision 2030***, Windhoek, (October 2002)
- 11) The National Planning Commission, ***Peace and Political Stability (Theme 2): A Contribution to Vision 2030***, Windhoek, (October 2002)
- 12) The National Planning Commission, ***Human Resources Development and Institutional Capacity Building (Theme 3): A Contribution to Vision 2030***, Windhoek, (October 2002).
- 13) The National Planning Commission, ***Macroeconomic Issues (Theme 4): A Contribution to Vision 2030***, Windhoek, (October 2002).
- 14) The National Planning Commission, ***Population, Health and Development (Theme 5): A Contribution to Vision 2030***, Windhoek, (October 2002).
- 15) The National Planning Commission, ***Natural Resources Sector (Theme 6): A Contribution to Vision 2030***, Windhoek, (October 2002).
- 16) The National Planning Commission, ***Knowledge, Information and Technology (Theme 7): A Contribution to Vision 2030***, Windhoek, (October 2002).
- 17) The National Planning Commission, ***Factors of the External Environment (Theme 8): A Contribution to Vision 2030***, Windhoek, (October 2002).
- 18) Republic of Namibia, ***Namibia Vision 2030: A Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development***, (Main Document), National Planning Commission, Windhoek, (2003).
- 19) Republic of Namibia, ***Namibia Vision 2030: A Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development***, (Summary), National Planning Commission, Windhoek, (2003).

