CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL ORIENTATION

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1. Introduction

This study assumes, rather than debates, whether there is an increasingly global environmental crisis – global warming, loss of ozone layer, biodiversity loss, deforestation and desertification, natural resource depletion, toxic pollution (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000, p. 426; Oskamp, 2000a, pp. 374-375) - brought about by western nations’ abuse of the natural environment during nineteenth century industrialization, continuing through the twentieth century, and, many would argue, into the new millennium as well. Human-induced climate change provides a good example. Social ecologist Murray Bookchin (Biehl, 1997a, pp. 7-8) already warned of its dangers in 1964, and global warming/climate change was Die Grünen’s election theme in 1989. The task of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is to assess scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding of the risk of human-induced climate change. The IPCC’s November 2007 synthesis report (IPCC, 2007 November, p. 1) concludes inter alia that “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level ....”. Despite early green warnings, only now, it seems, is climate change becoming a “hot topic”, because of its economic implications (Stern, 2006) within the capitalist system. Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) confirms this assessment: “Whereas climate change used to be purely an environmental issue, it’s now becoming as much an economic, trade and political concern” (The Namibian, Wednesday 31 January 2007, Climate change hitting developing countries worst, says world body, p. 7).

But the original context of environmental concerns such as climate change was actually far wider than merely pro-environmental; its context was the normativity of ecology as argued in the idea “green”. In response to rapidly increasing environmental degradation, the “green” movement [or radical environmentalism, or radical ecology, or ecologism] and its worldview, sometimes called an “ecological” worldview, or “seeing green” (UK Green Party Jonathon Porritt’s (1984) descriptive phrase), emerged in the late 1960s/early 1970s, particularly in North America, northern Europe (Scandinavia, Germany), and the United Kingdom, including some of its commonwealth countries, such as Canada, and New Zealand. It has been suggested that “...radical environmentalism could be viewed as the first fully “postmodern” Weltanschauung, thoroughly surpassing the modernist paradigm of the last three centuries...” (Frodeman, 1992, p. 318, his italics). “Green” represents not only a pro-nature orientation, but also, a western cultural, economic, and social critique.

This study’s broad topic, and two specific research questions, are about (1) “green” as worldview or set of ideas, and (2) the presence or absence of “green” in Namibia Vision 2030 worldview. The idea of “worldview” is the context within which these questions unfold in the study.

2. Worldview as context for the research questions

I am interested in the history [“adventures” in Whitehead’s (1967) phrase!] and assumptions of the dominant ideas of our western capitalist culture, those which economist and philosopher Schumacher, author of “Small is beautiful” (1974, p. 69, p. 68, p. 73), calls the “great and vital”, the “leading” or “dominating” ideas of our culture and times – the ones we “think with or through” (p. 68), the ones which carry our culture’s values, the ones which, according to him, are still “visited on the third and fourth generations” after their first emergence as influential. These socio-cultural ideas, loosely arranged together, can be considered a society’s “worldview”.

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2.1 The concept worldview

This study accepts the structuralist assumption that a society’s knowledge, social structures and practices are informed by an underlying and often implicit view of the world. The concept “worldview” has not been approached in this study philosophically-theoretically, as for example, via discussions by Anderson (1996), Berger and Luckmann (1966), Geertz (1973), and Macnamara (1980). It is understood in an “ordinary people” or “conversational” way, as an “image or picture of the world held by members of society” (Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, p. 448), the set of ideas we think with or through, in dealing with the world (Schumacher, 1974, p. 68), or as “a constellation of common values, beliefs, and shared wisdom about the physical and social environments” (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, p. 1013, citing Pirages, 1977, p. 6). A society’s basic worldview forms “the core of a society’s cultural heritage”, and is expressed concretely in institutional forms. Even though that basic worldview might not be universally supported within a culture, it nevertheless “provides general guidance for both individual and societal behavior” (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, pp. 1013, 1014). The graphic below perhaps makes this clearer:

Figure 1: How worldview constructs reality (Mochelle, 1986, in Gough, 2003)

Even though this social structure is the product of a “particular socio-historical situation”, and humanly constructed, because it is “a priori to individual experience”, it “appears to the individual as the natural way of looking at the world” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 20). This socio-culturally embedded worldview, with its version of reality, its assumptions, and values, whose function is to provide orientation, explanation and meaning in our everyday lives, is conveyed from generation to generation primarily via our language. It is obvious, but worth repeating, that we are all born into a language, that is, we absorb the dominant worldview of our culture via our mother tongue long before we have the intellectual ability or interest to examine, question, or review its leading ideas, and form our own consciously-reflected on worldview.

The dominant western worldview, variously labelled as “the modernist paradigm of the last three centuries...” (Frodeman, 1992, p. 318), the “Cartesian world view” informed by Newtonian mechanics (Capra, 1983, pp. 37-62), “the industrial-technological world view” (Metzner, 1994), “the dominant social paradigm” (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984; Sylvan, 1985b, Figure 6a, p. 12), or the Enlightenment worldview (Hayward, 1995, p. 5), is generally seen as a combination of western Renaissance, Scientific Revolution, Enlightenment, and Industrial Revolution thought (Metzner, 1994, p. 164; Spretnak, 1993, p. 182). It comprises a family of ideas, some of which are (1) a mechanist ontology: “the universe as a mechanical system composed of elementary building blocks, the view of the human
body as a machine” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xix), (2) dominance over/rational mastery of nature [“the total conquest of nature by man” (Rodman, 1977, p. 97)] as essential to human progress, (3) the natural environment seen as a resource for humans, (4) a view of nature as providing ample resources, but (5) should these become scarce, science and technology will provide substitutes and solutions, (6) a “belief in unlimited material progress to be achieved through economic and technological growth” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xix), (7) materialism and consumerism prized, (8) a “view of life in society as a competitive struggle for existence” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xix), (9) the undervaluing or marginalization of “the feminine”, and (9) a tendency towards national, centralized structures (Sylvan, 1985b, Figure 6a, p. 12, with ideas also from Burr, 1995, p. 12; Callicott, 1994, p. 33; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. xix; Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, p. 1069; Hayward, 1995, pp. 11-22; Wenz, 1997, pp. 206-207). This family of western ideas is argued to be gaining increasing world dominance through the economic rationalism and political liberalism of globalization (Jauch, 2001; Lemon, 2003, pp. 390-428).

Sociological theories on worldview assume, and so does this study, that “core cultural values and beliefs are important determinants of individuals’ beliefs, values, and attitudes” (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, p. 1014). Such sociological theories also assume, following Kuhn’s (1970) discussion of the concept “paradigm shift” in the natural sciences (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, p. 1013), that if there is dissonance between the dominant social paradigm, and real-world experience, calls for questioning and revision of its fundamental assumptions begin to emerge. As Capra and Spretnak (1984, p. xix) suggest, there has indeed been emerging since the nineteenth century, a set of ideas fundamentally at odds\(^1\) with the dominant western worldview, which one can loosely call, an “ecological” worldview, or “seeing green” (Porritt, 1984). This alternative worldview can therefore be primarily understood as a critique of the dominant western socio-cultural industrial paradigm. Its ideas and values, which had already partly begun to emerge amongst dissident western European scientists and economists (Bramwell, 1989, 1994; Martinez-Alier, 1987) in the nineteenth century, began to gain wider public support during the late 1960s, and 1970s, when it became clearer that ideas of natural resource abundance to fuel unlimited material growth no longer fitted reality. Allied to other counter-cultural themes (Sylvan, 1985b, p. 12 and footnote 51), new social movement environmentalism matured from “street green” through the 1980s and 1990s into a new political ideology called “ecologism\(^2\)”. It also appeared as a new field in philosophy, i.e., environmental philosophy/ethics.

It is frequently proposed that, or hoped for, that we are, or should be, in transition from the industrial technological worldview to an ecological (e.g. Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984; Metzner, 1994; Sterling, 1990), or green worldview (e.g. Porritt, 1984).

3. The research questions

The broad research topic then, is the “green” worldview. It has been divided into two research questions:

1. What does “seeing green” as worldview mean?, and
2. How “green” is Namibia Vision 2030s worldview?

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\(^1\) Hayward (1995), for example, seeks to reconcile ecological and Enlightenment thought

\(^2\) Bramwell provides three short summaries of the key ideas of ecologism as new political viewpoint (1989, pp. 42-43; 1989, pp 233-234; 1994, p. 26). Dobson argues (1990, 1993, 2000) that “ecologism” has fulfilled “the three criteria normally set out for a collection of ideas to comprise a political ideology, that is, an analysis of political reality, a picture of the Good Life, and a theory of political action or strategy” (Dobson, 1993, p. 229). It may thus be added to the “most fundamental ideologies of the modern era…” (Dobson, 2000, p. 164) inherited from the nineteenth century, that is, Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism. While the latter three are all held to be “irredeemably anthropocentric” (Dobson, 2000, p. 176), ecologism distinguishes itself by the “ecocentrism of [its] radical greenery” (Dobson, 2000, p. 175). Some useful works on ecologism are Dobson (2000), Goodin (1992), and papers by various other authors under the editorship of Dobson and Lucardie (1993), Doherty and De Geus (1996), and Matthews (1996)
3.1 A useful heuristic for “green”

There is a vast amount of literature available on “seeing green” as appropriate response to the global environmental crisis. Given that, a small diagram in a paper by Marcel Wissenburg (1993, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, p. 4) provides a useful overview for some of the major ideas that will be addressed in this thesis:

Figure 2: Varieties of green thought (Wissenburg, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, p. 4)

First, from top to bottom, the heuristic suggests that both the “green” and “grue” [Wissenburg’s term for the dominant western worldview] worldviews involve at once, philosophical concepts, such as metaphysics and ethics; ideas from political philosophy and theory; and ideas from the “real world”, expressed in both extra-parliamentary [“new social movements”] and parliamentary political action. Reading across the diagram, Wissenburg suggests that at these three levels, green ideas diminish in importance from more important in the new social movements, to less important in political parties.

A key aspect of the two broadly opposing worldviews [“dark green” and “grue”] shown in Wissenburg’s heuristic, are their explicit or implicit theories of the human-nature relationship. Biocentrism4, the ecocentrism5 not shown in Wissenburg’s heuristic, and anthropocentrism6, are all theories of value, moral standing, and normative ethics in environmental philosophy. While biocentrism and ecocentrism are usually ethical markers of an “ecological” worldview, anthropocentrism is a marker of the dominant western worldview. On “the anthropocentric view of the universe”, Bowers (1992, p. 110) notes that:

... What is essential about this aspect of Western consciousness is that it fosters a view of humans as primary, and the environment as a resource to be managed (a view that represents the more enlightened interpretation of the anthropocentric position). The thoughts, needs, and spirituality of humans is thus seen against a materialistic view of the rest of the world. Anthropocentrism does not foster a sense of interdependency in which a loss of topsoil (or of forest cover, clean atmosphere, etc.) would be experienced

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3 Derived from a combination of the colours green and blue; see section 3.1.1 next
4 “A normative stance that holds that all living creatures have a good of their own, and have moral standing accordingly, and that their flourishing or attaining their good is intrinsically valuable” (Attfield, 2003, p. 189). A biocentric understanding does not grant moral standing to inanimate things, or non-living organisms, such as “species” and “ecosystems”. Biocentrists argue that they have no good of their own, thus cannot be benefited (Attfield, 2003, p. 11, p. 40)
5 “The normative stance that holds that ecosystems have a good independent of that of their component individuals, and as such have their own moral standing, and that their attaining or sustaining their good has intrinsic value” (Attfield, 2003, p. 192)
6 “A stance that limits moral standing to human beings, confines the scope of morality and moral concern to human interests, and regards nothing but human well-being as valuable intrinsically” (Attfield, 2003, p. 188)
as a diminishment of human worth and capability. Rather, the loss of topsoil would be viewed as a problem requiring a technological solution – just as other aspects of the biota pose technical problems in furthering “man’s” needs.

Expanding the moral community beyond the human species, as biocentrism and ecocentrism do, has political implications – it requires a radical restructuring of society (Lucardie, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993a, p. xi). At the political philosophical level, the diagram suggests that “green” manifests as “deep ecology” or “ecologism” at the biocentric/ecocentric or “dark green” end of the spectrum, shading off into a lighter green, before becoming the “grue” of the mainstream western worldview. There could be any number of positions too, within the spectrum.

Finally, the diagram suggests a “real world” aspect to “green”, to be found in the ideas of the new social movements, and those of political parties. Again, the figure suggests that “green” [eco-/biocentrism, ecologism, deep ecology and its companion eco-movements] is “darker”, and more important, in the ideas of the new social movements than it is in the ideas of the power-holders in politics and business. Wissenburg’s use of “green” and “grue” call for some explanation, which I present next.

**3.1.1 Red, blue, and green as political and philosophical colours**

Before the advent of “green”, the dominant, and opposing tendencies in the political ideological continuum, and party-political practice in industrialized societies, were characterized by the colours “red” and “blue”. Simply, red is the traditional colour of the political left, associated with Marxism, and socialism, and blue represents conservatism, and liberal capitalism. Green signifies ecologism as new political ideology (Dobson, 2000). Greens tend to emphasize that they represent neither left nor right in the political spectrum. They can combine with either blue, in which case, shared interests are likely to be valuing personal enterprise, and fighting bureaucracy (Naess, 1989a, p. 133). They can combine with red, the shared values then being social responsibility, opposition to hierarchical structures, and a “Very high priority of fighting undesirable ethical, social, and cultural consequences of the unrestrained market economy.” (Naess, 1989a, p. 133).

Several authors note the greater “natural” affinity between green and red, than between green and blue (Naess, 1989a, p. 133) in the political spectrum, and the connections between the emergence of the extra-parliamentary/parliamentary green movement and the political left (Bramwell, 1994; Goodin, 1992; Martinez-Alier, 1987). The connection is seen to be more with the disaffected, than the conventional left. Thus social ecologist Murray Bookchin (Chapter Five) thinks that the green movement is right to reject “a mere variant of conventional left orthodoxy dressed up in a few new environmental metaphors”, but on the other hand, “to fail to draw on left libertarian and populist traditions, particularly eco-anarchism” would be to cut itself off from “an important source of insight, wisdom, and social experience” (Chase, 1991, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 245). He urges the green movement to “consciously develop a left green perspective”.

Wissenburg uses “green” – from darker to lighter shades – to “... denote all variants of the environmentalist and ecologist persuasions” (1993, p. 3). He suggests that the difference between the darker and lighter green in his heuristic is both a philosophical and political difference:

> The essential difference between deep and shallow ecology is philosophical. Unlike shallow ecologists, deep ecologists propose a fundamental change of mentality – often described as biocentrism or ecocentrism – away from traditional anthropocentrism. We ought to judge our actions from the point of view of nature as a whole, rather than from the partial position of man, because ... nature is the first and most important condition of human existence, or ... because nature has intrinsic value. Consequently, deep Greens do, and shallow Greens do not necessarily, defend a radically new society... (p. 5).
Environmental philosopher Sylvan (1985b, Figure 6(A), p. 12) notes the same difference, which he characterizes as:

**Deeper paradigms/deeper green positions:** Tending towards intermediate conservation; sliding into deep conservation. Examples of such paradigms/positions would be counter-culture, alternative environmental, extended deep ecology, and

**Shallower paradigms/paler green positions:** Tending towards no conservation, unrestricted development; sliding into a less shallow position of some constraints. Examples of such paradigms/positions would be the dominant western paradigm, or the state socialist paradigm.

Wissenburg’s explanation of “grue” is that it “stands for [political] theories that used to be thought of as non-green in the days when concern about the environment was not ‘in’, but which turned green when the tide changed: socialism, conservatism, leftist liberalism, and some variants of Marxism.” (1993, pp. 4-5). The essential difference between green and “grue”, I understand Wissenburg to be saying (1993, p. 5), is their differing philosophical positions on the human-nature relationship, and the value of nature. Other authors suggest different colours to represent “not green”. Sylvan (1985b, p. 17, his underlining) suggests that the differing “deeper” and “shallower” philosophical value theories and their accompanying radical or reformist social and political implications, would be better replaced by terms such as “green-ecology and grey-ecology”, or “deep-green theory and pale-green theory”. Goodin (1992, p. viii, p. 121) uses “brown” to signify not-green political positions.

In answering the first question of this study: What does seeing green as worldview mean?, I shall not be making any attempt to distinguish between “dark” and “pale” green. The distinction in which I am interested is between green and not-green, a distinction which Wissenburg’s heuristic suggests is broadly equivalent to non-anthropocentrism and anthropocentrism expressed politically:

Strongly oversimplified, the questions we are dealing with here are those of tensions between new social movements and political parties, tensions between darker and lighter shades of environmental concern, tensions between ecologism in a broad sense and ‘grue’ political theories, and finally a fundamental conflict between anthropocentrism and biocentrism.

I shall be using “green” to mark non-anthropocentric positions, and “grey-green” instead of Wissenburg’s “grue”, to mark anthropocentric positions.

3.1.2 Green, ecologism and environmentalism

“Ecology means far more than just the scientific discipline. It has come to represent a “good” along with other goods such as “freedom” and “democracy”, with its own implications for social and political thought. The “uptake of ecological ideas in social and political thought ... has led to a much broader understanding whereby ecology is claimed to be an intrinsically critical science with subversive and revolutionary potential such as to overturn old worldviews and inspire new values” (Hayward, 1995, p. 8). In the face of globally increasing ecological damage, it has become for many, “a source of values and a guide to action” (Hayward, 1995, p. 10) in creating a new human-nature relationship. But it is “an essentially contested concept” (Hayward, 1995, pp x-xi, p. 1), and, along with other authors, Hayward (1995, pp. 2-4) notes the difference between radicalism and reformism in ecological thought.

“Ecologism” is often equated with “deep green values and attitudes” (Wissenburg, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, p. 4; also Hayward, 1995, p. 226, footnote 68). Together with the terms ecologism and dark green, one can broadly group terms such as ecocentric environmentalism, radical ecology, “radical” environmentalism, new environmentalism, deep ecology, “Arcadian” scientific ecologists, “biological” ecologists, and “Fundi” green politicians. At the other end, one can group together with the term environmentalism, and the colours “grue”, grey, brown, and grey-green, the terms technocentric environmentalism, “reform” environmentalism, “shallow” environmentalism, “shallow” ecology, “survival ecology” (e.g. Rodman, 1977, p. 83), “anthropocentric survival environmentalism”
“Imperial” scientific ecologists, “reform” ecologists, and “Realo” green politicians. Characteristically, notes Frodeman, (1992, p. 307), this latter kind of environmentalism feels comfortable within “the quantitative, analytical, and reductively economic rationality characteristic of modern [Western] culture”, which radical environmentalism [broadly equivalent to deep ecology in his view] does not.

Bramwell (1994, p. 19) points out the “vehement disagreements about names” within the ecological movement. She notes that Arne Naess, “the founder of deep ecologism, devotes several chapters of one of his books (Naess, 1989a) to defining ecology, ecologism, environmentalism and so on, but other members of the movement disagree with him.”. She argues that terminology used by insiders and outsiders differs too: “…the general public … do not always differentiate clearly between environmentalist, ecologist, deep ecologist and Green.” (Bramwell, 1994, p. 19).

On the worldview differences between environmentalism and ecologism, this study follows the approach of political philosopher Dobson (1995, p. 1, cited in Hodgkinson and Innes, 2000, pp. 286-287, my italics), who, like Bowers (1992), suggests that “environmentalism argues for a managerial approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption, while ecologism holds that a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of political and social life” (Dobson, 1995, p. 1, my italics). One environmental psychology study broadly supports Dobson’s view: “Findings suggest that ecology [as a new value system] and environmentalism may be fundamentally different from one another as reflected by the contribution of different variables in the prediction of scale scores…” (Hodgkinson & Innes, 2000, abstract, and p. 293).

My interest in “green” in this study, both as a radically different understanding of the human/nature relationship, and as radical cultural/social/political critique, always tends more towards the earlier years of its emergence as a conglomerate of various new social movements, its more radical expressions, its darker shades, before it became theorized, “institutionalized, bureaucratized, and ... to a large extent, “co-opted”” (Sessions, 1987, p. 121) by the dominant western social paradigm. I turn next to this study’s interdisciplinary approach.

4. An interdisciplinary approach

Real-life issues hardly ever match traditional disciplinary approaches in applied scientific research. (Uiterkamp & Vlek, 2007, p. 175)

This study of “seeing green” is located in the academic field of environmental psychology. However, the philosophical, environmental-philosophical, and political-philosophical nature of “green” itself, as indicated in Wissenburg’s diagram, as well as the strengths and some limitations of environmental psychology, led naturally to adopting an interdisciplinary approach. I discuss next how (4.1) psychology, specifically environmental psychology, (4.2) environmental philosophy, and (4.3) other disciplinary fields, such as development theory, scientific ecology, environmental economic theory, and green political theory, have also informed this study. In (4.4), I consider in more detail, some of environmental psychology’s strengths, and limitations, as far as this study of “green” is concerned. And, in the final chapter of this study, I reflect again on environmental psychology’s role in raising awareness, and promoting knowledge of what “seeing green” means.
4.1 Psychology

4.1.1 Mainstream psychology and social psychology

Mainstream psychology has established itself as a branch of empirical science which seeks a true understanding of human nature and conduct. From its beginning, more or less in 1879 as a separate discipline (W.J. Jordaan, personal communication, January 2005), it was thus committed to the general goals of science, that is, to the description, explanation, prediction and control of objectively observable phenomena. Psychology was originally seen as the science that promised prediction and control of human affairs (Hewstone, Stroebe, Codol, & Stephenson, 1988, p. 16).

Traditionally, even though psychology is concerned with human behaviour, it was slow to give attention to questioning the dominant western views on human-nature relationship. It is, according to Kidner (1994, p. 359), “mute about the environmental crisis”, because, he suggests, “the ideological preconceptions that underpin the discipline are similar to those of the technological-economic system that is largely responsible for the degradation of the environment” (p. 359). He highlights three such preconceptions (1) its psychological model of the decontextualized individual “perpetuates and legitimates a world view in which the individual is seen as separate from the environment”; (2) “by locating itself within the Cartesian Paradigm of human rationality as the only basis of understanding, psychology reproduces an anthropocentric ideology that denudes nonhuman aspects of the natural world of essence and inherent value”, and (3) “by assuming a largely cognitive model of the person, psychology colludes in the denial of those aspects of Being that are capable of perceiving and protesting against the violence of environmental destruction” (Kidner, 1994, p. 362).

Psychology’s emphasis on decontextualized individualism was partially challenged by the emergence of social psychology, from which in turn, environmental psychology emerged. But social psychology itself is informed by two streams of thought: the socio-centred approach of sociological social psychology, and an intra-psychological, individual-centred approach. It is this stream I think, which perhaps explains environmental psychology’s over-emphasis on cognition in understanding people-nature relations. The individual-centred approach in social psychology draws heavily on the Anglo-American doctrines of individualism and utilitarianism, and flourished in the American cultural ethos of “self-contained individualism” (Sampson, 1977, p. 769, in Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 17), or “ideological individualism” (Parker, 1992, p. 87, p. 88, and p. 91). This individualized variety of social psychology became a “science of the individual” in social contexts or settings (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 13). In this tradition, cognitivist models of the human being, and the human-nature relationship predominate.

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7 Experimental psychology is rather, a status quo supporter. Singer, for example, notes how a journal such as the Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology carries full descriptions of objectionable [in my view] experiments in which rats are forced to choose between starvation or electric shocks to see if they develop ulcers, which they do (Singer, 1973b, in Zimmerman, Callicott, Sessions, Warren, & Clark, 1993, p. 28).

8 This stream is of interest for this study for its suggestions on a more social understanding of worldview formation. In this approach individual behaviour is understood in the context of “the conditioning functions of the social/societal structural context” (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 456). It traces its roots to Emile Durkheim, (1858-1917), who believed that “social facts are independent of and exterior to individual consciousness. Hence the ‘collective representations’ of a given society have an existence of their own.” (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 7). Durkheim’s theory of a society’s collective representations was later picked up and revised by French social psychologist Moscovici (1961) as a theory of “social representations”. But also informing sociological social psychology has been the long-standing continental interest in language as a social product, as a product of collective interaction, as “the medium in which the community shapes its individual members” and to which individuals, in turn, actively contribute (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 9). Sociological social psychology always emphasized that “no human experience or activity can (and should) be separated from its socio-cultural context” (Hewstone et al., 1988, p. 9), and that would apply to the individual’s worldview as well.
4.1.2 The emergence of environmental psychology

Though environmental psychology’s origins can be traced as far back as the 1940s in the USA (Gifford, 1987), it began to take on an own existence first during the 1960’s, in response to a demand for social relevance, and to emerging environmental problems.

It was felt that traditional academic social psychology research was not contributing to social reform, economic justice and political equality (Sommer, 1991); instead it was seen to be supporting the dominant values of North American society (Burr, 1995, p. 97). The then traditional scientific laboratory-experimental model of social psychology was committed to investigating the individual’s assumed intra-psychic states and processes in controlled conditions, uncontaminated by the messy variables of real life. Neither the problems investigated, nor their contexts, were real-life (Proshansky, 1991; Sommer, 1991).

Some social psychologists turned instead to Kurt Lewin’s field theory and his model of action research (Proshansky, 1991), as well as Barker’s (1968) behaviour-setting approach (Evans, 1996). The design professions (architecture, landscape planning) initially contributed significantly to environmental psychology’s development as they considered the role of space and place in people’s lives (Proshansky, 1991), though this close co-operation subsequently waned, at least in America (Evans, 1996, p. 3). The concept of sense of place though, continues to represent common ground for design professionals, environmental psychologists, and adherents of “seeing green”.

A subsequent influence on environmental psychology was the metamorphosis of environmentalism in the 1960’s from being an elitist concern of a few intellectuals to a widespread, broad-based environmental movement (Bramwell, 1994, p.8). Sommer (2000, p. 2, p. 3) notes that the American Psychological Association [APA] in the 1970s “established a task force to examine the roles psychologists might play in the environmental movement”. Though this did lead to the establishment of APA Division 34 (Population and Environmental Psychology), the “original hope that psychologists could play a significant role in the environmental movement was not realized, as members of Division 34 began working with architects and planners, or doing basic research in EP and EBR [Environmental Psychology; Environment and Behaviour] rather than collaborating with activist organizations ...” (Sommer 2000, p. 3). By the mid-1990s, environmental psychology had been mainstreamed (Evans, 1996, p.1).

However, two streams within the field of psychology did remain sensitive to the new social movements’ demands for changed values, changed views on the human-nature relationship, and changed society - ecopsychology (4.1.3), and new paradigm psychology (4.1.4).

4.1.3 “Ecopsychology”

“Ecopsychology” is neither Barker-inspired ecological psychology, nor environmental psychology, as its name might suggest. Reser (1995) characterizes it variously as “a very visible, popular and political representation of psychology vis-á-vis the environment” (p. 235), a “movement which purports to be setting a new agenda for psychology” (p. 240), a “social movement cum shifting societal consciousness” (p. 241). However, he does not see it as part of mainstream academic psychology.

Ecopsychology’s roots correlate closely with “seeing green’s” roots and iconic people (Chapter Two). Reser (1995, p. 238) traces ecopsychology’s roots inter alia to the Romantic movement, Naturphilosophie, transcendentalism, the Gestalt movement, the human potential movement, Woodstock, the civil rights movement, the “social movement which arguably started with the first Earth Day on 22 April 1970”, and Rachel Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring. Amongst its principal exponents is Theodore Roszak, “historian/activist, steeped in the history of ideas and social
movements”, whose *The making of a counterculture* (1969) was itself part of the USA counterculture’s discontent with the government of the day, the Vietnam war, and environmental degradation (Reser, 1995, p. 235).

In setting out his conception of what “ecopsychology” is, Roszak (1992) draws on the insights of inter alia, deep ecology (Chapter Four), and of ecofeminism (Chapter Six), particularly feminist spirituality. Ecopsychology’s project “is to bridge our culture’s long-standing, historical gulf between the psychological and the ecological, to see the needs of the planet and the person as continuum”; to understand that there “is a synergistic interplay between planetary and personal well-being”. To “heal the ... fundamental alienation between the person and the natural environment” (Roszak, 1992, p. 14, and pp. 320-321, cited in Reser, 1995, p. 236), ecopsychology seeks to re-evaluate “certain compulsively ‘masculine’ character traits that permeate our structures of political power and which drive us to dominate nature...”, and to create instead, an “ecological ego”. The healing process relies on insights from both Freudian psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology, as well as the traditional healing techniques of indigenous peoples. While this study does not draw on ecopsychology, one does encounter, throughout the “seeing green” perspective, ecopsychology’s intense interest in an alternative view of the Self, and the restoration of a relationship with the planet whose emotional tone is one of “Care, trust, and love” (Roszak, 1992, p. 41, cited in Reser, 1995, p. 237).

4.1.4 “New paradigm” psychology

“New paradigm” or ecosystemic thinking9 in psychology also emerged in the 1970s as part of the 1970’s “paradigm shift”10 in western science and culture. There is much in common between “new paradigm” thought and “seeing green”, probably because of the shared influence of general systems theory, the New Physics11, and a metaphysical application of scientific ecology’s insights into the role of the human being-in-environment12. Physicist Fritjof Capra, one of the green movement’s ideologists, and exponent of “new paradigm” thought, suggests that living systems theory “provides the most appropriate scientific formulation of the ecological paradigm” (Capra, 1987, in Sessions 1995 p. 23). Some of the concepts of “new paradigm” psychology/ecosystemic thinking in environmental psychology, such as “holism/systems theory”, “constructivism”, and “autopoeisis”13, are also found in indicator lists of the supposed worldview transition from the industrial to the ecological age (for example, Metzner, 1994, pp.163-172). In environmental psychology, in new paradigm psychology, and in literature on ecological or green thought, one encounters references to the work of Gregory Bateson. The discussion next is limited to some of his ideas on the concept of worldview, and the human-nature relationship.

4.1.4.1 Gregory Bateson

We are beginning to play with ideas of ecology, and although we immediately trivialize these ideas into commerce or politics, there is at least an impulse still in the human breast to unify and thereby sanctify the total natural world, of which we are (Bateson, 1979, p. 27)

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9 Systemic or “ecosystemic” thinking has permeated clinical and community psychology (O’Connor & Lubin, 1984; Jordaan, 1980, pp. 165-171), as well as environmental psychology

10 In the 1960s, historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn argued that scientific thought is defined by paradigms, or ‘conceptual world-views consisting of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by members of a given community’ (Audi, 1999, p. 479). Such paradigms can exist for long periods of time, as their proponents work on confirming and refining its details, but then anomalies begin to appear – observations which simply won’t ‘fit’ the paradigm. “The accumulation of anomalies triggers a crisis that is sometimes resolved by a revolution that replaces the old paradigm with a new one.” (Audi, 1999, p. 479). But Kuhn argued, as scientists with differing paradigms are people living in different worlds, it takes a fundamental change or shift in assumptions to move from one paradigm to another


12 One such common area is the idea of holistic ecocentrism as philosophical theory of value in nature. J. Baird Callicott for example, pieces together from ecology as science, and from the New Physics [quantum physics], a “metaphysical ecology” to serve as basis for an environmental ethic (Warren & Cheney, 1993)

Anthropologist/psychologist Gregory Bateson introduced into the social sciences, a new model for understanding human behaviour in human and physical context, based on insights from systems theory, communication theory, information theory (Bale, 1995; Berman, 1990, pp. 15-16; Kidner, 1994, p. 373) and ecology. In this model, “epistemology” played a pivotal role. Bateson defined epistemology inter alia as “…the net of premises which governs adaptation (or maladaptation) to the human and physical environment” (1971, p. 3, cited in Searight & Openlander, 1987). Bateson noted that this net of premises, or worldview, is constructed – it is as map to territory. A good place to start then, in dealing with dis-comfort, dis-ease or pathology in any system, including a people-nature system, is to identify, review, and transform these fundamental, but mostly implicit, premises or assumptions [worldview] into more adaptive ways of dealing with nature.

Bateson’s work “spoke directly to questions of ecology and man’s relationship to the environment”, and his work was always value-laden (Berman, 1990, p. 16). Simply stated, Bateson argued for interconnectivity and consciousness, or “mind” in nature, both “green” ideas. In 1972, Bateson (pp. 496-501) proposed an ecological understanding of the “environmental troubles” which were then just beginning to manifest themselves in American society. He presented the dynamics of the ecological crisis graphically as:

Figure 3: Bateson’s (1972) systemic understanding of the crisis in human-nature relations

and explained the systemic interconnections as

...The increase of population spurs technological progress and creates that anxiety which sets us against our environment as an enemy; while technology both facilitates increase of population and reinforces our arrogance, or “hubris”, vis-à-vis the natural environment ... [these factors are] self-promoting.... the bigger the population, the faster it grows; the more technology we have, the faster the rate of new invention; and the more we believe in our “power” over an enemy environment, the more “power” we seem to have and the more spiteful the environment seems to be.

In short, Bateson (1972, pp. 496-501) believed “that all of the many current threats to man’s survival are traceable to three root causes: (a) technological progress (b) population increase (c) certain errors in the thinking and attitudes of Occidental culture. Our ‘values’ are wrong.” (1972, p. 498, my italics). Bateson’s critique of “hubris”, meaning, excessive self-confidence, or arrogance, correlates well with the consistent green call for an attitude of humility.

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14 Bateson believed for example that we can never know Das Ding an Sich; the thing itself is inaccessible to us; we can only know our ideas of it (Bale, 1995, p. 42) – “the map is not the territory, and the name is not the thing named” was Bateson’s (1979, p. 37) metaphor for this, borrowed from Alfred Korzybski
15 Bateson proposed six criteria for establishing the presence of “mind” in, as he phrased it, an “aggregate”: “1. A mind is an aggregate of interacting parts or components. 2. The interaction between parts of mind is triggered by difference, and difference is a nonsubstantial phenomenon not located in space or time; difference is related to negentropy [order] and entropy [randomness, disorder] rather than to energy. 3. Mental process requires collateral energy. 4. Mental process requires circular (or more complex) chains of determination. 5. In mental process, the effects of difference are to be regarded as transforms (i.e. coded versions) of events which preceded them… 6. The description and classification of these processes of transformation disclose a hierarchy of logical types immanent in the phenomena.” Though he discusses these criteria at some length (1979, pp. 101-143), his explanations are not always easy to follow. Of interest and direct relevance to this study though, are the potentialities Bateson sees in nature-possessing—“mind”: (a) the capability of purpose, choice, and autonomy [control of self] which such a system’s recursive structure allows (b) the capability to learn and remember (c) the capacity for loss of autonomy through death/dissolution (d) the possible capacity of aesthetic preference. Bateson avoids directly addressing the “obscure” question of consciousness as a capacity.
16 Bateson firmly disbelieved that power, with its linear implications, could ever be an appropriate notion in eco-systemic context.
reverence, or respect towards nature, as sine qua non for resolution of the planet’s environmental problems. Much of the problem of “hubris”, Bateson believed, lay in our epistemological [worldview] errors, and “Any error will propose pathology” (Bateson, 1977, cited in Dell, 1985). Not surprising then, to find Bateson’s systemic human-natural environment understanding referred to in green movement thought17. However, despite these commonalities between ecosystemic thinking and “green”, and ecosystemic thought’s ability to provide a wider, and systemic, view of the global environmental crisis, neither it, nor environmental psychology is able to provide a framework sufficiently interdisciplinary (W.J. Jordaan, personal communication, January 2006) to accommodate all the themes and levels of Wissenburg’s heuristic. I return to a further consideration of environmental psychology’s strengths and limitations in section 4.4.

In ecopsychologist Roszak’s view,“.... psychology, whatever techniques it may use, is necessarily a philosophical pursuit, a critical examination of ethical conduct, moral purpose, and the meaning of life...” (Roszak, 1992, p. 41, cited in Reser, 1995, p. 237, my italics). Insights from environmental philosophy form an important part of this study’s interdisciplinary approach.

4.2 Environmental philosophy

Environmental philosophy emerged in the 1970s together with the new social movements. It is, in itself, an interdisciplinary undertaking - it addresses “all of the major perspectives” on the human-nature relationship, including the “scientific, ethical, aesthetic, political, economic, and religious.” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 2). According to Zimmerman (1993, pp. vi-viii), the field of environmental philosophy covers three broad areas, which map fairly easily on to the dark green to “grue” spectrum of Wissenburg’s (1993) diagram:

(a) ‘Radical’ ecophilosophy, which includes deep ecology (Chapter Four), social ecology (Chapter Five), and ecofeminism (Chapter Six). ‘Radical’ because these philosophies “claim that their analyses disclose the conceptual, attitudinal, and social origins of the ecological crisis”, and because they argue that “only a revolution or a cultural paradigm shift can save the planet from further destruction”. We need to address the deep roots of the ecological crisis, not merely its symptoms, they say (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii). The ecophilosophers are concerned with our most basic premises: ontological, epistemological, axiological.

(b) Environmental ethics. Here it is argued that progress could be made in ending the ecological crisis if we changed our anthropocentric ethical attitudes and granted ‘moral considerability’ to nonhuman beings. Current environmental ethical theories grant moral considerability or standing variously to all living things, only sentient living things, or to nonliving things as well, such as rivers, or mountains. Animal rights theory (Chapter Three), biocentrism and ecocentrism would fit here.

(c) Anthropocentric reformism (Chapter Nine: 6) which argues that “the root of our environmental problems is neither anthropocentric attitudes about humanity’s place in nature, nor the political-economic structures that embody those attitudes ...”. While nature has only instrumental value for human ends, these ends are as wide-ranging as basic nutrition and aesthetic pleasure. The way to deal with the environmental crisis [pollution, global warming, resource depletion] is “by enacting legislation, changing public policy, increasing education, returning ‘public lands’ to private ownership,

17 For example, in deep green Fritjof Capra’s thought on self-organisation in nature (Fabel, 1994, p. 310); in the work of Die Grünen philosopher, Manon Maren-Grisebach as influential thinker in the green movement in the USA, (1982, p. 33), and in that of Die Grünen’s fundamental ideologist, Rudolf Bahro (“Fundamental thoughts on the crisis of The Greens”, in Bahro, 1986, pp. 159-176, pp. 175-176, p. 228; see also p. 217, note 15 to “Fundamental thoughts on the crisis of the Greens”); as an example of the kind of ecological conservatism on which ecologically-oriented educational curricula should be based (Bowers, 1992, p 118ff); and as one of the “trends within, or at least on the fringes of, psychology which offer glimpses of a more fruitful approach” to transcending the individual-environment dichotomy “in which so many of our subtly destructive [environmental] attitudes and practices may be based” (Kidner, 1994, p. 373)
promoting wise ‘stewardship’ of nature, and otherwise encouraging more prudent use and more equitable allocation of natural resources” (Zimmerman, 1993, p. viii).

As all three of these environmental ethical areas are to be found in Wissenburg’s green to grue spectrum (Figure 2), a journey of discovery into environmental philosophy to clarify the basic assumptions of key concepts in the human-nature relationship was a necessary, and enjoyable, part of the study. Lacking any philosophical training though, I have deliberately avoided the technical, and often incomprehensible, arguments which environmental philosophers use to argue that the other “... is wrong, dazed, bemused, or even crazed” (!) (Bruner & Oelschlaeger, 1994, p. 384).

4.3 Green political theory, and other disciplinary fields

In the course of the study, but particularly in Chapter Nine: Environment and development, I also needed to venture into the fields of development theory, scientific ecology, and environmental economic theory. As the green perspective expresses itself increasingly formally and theoretically as “ecologism” in political philosophy, it was also impossible to avoid this field. Particularly green political theory (e.g. Dobson, 2000; Dobson & Lucardie, 1993; Doherty & De Geus, 1996; Goodin, 1992) was helpful in understanding many of the themes and values of “seeing green”. As with environmental philosophy, though, I have avoided becoming involved in complex political theory discussions [Is green political theory compatible with liberal democracy? for example] for which I am not academically trained.

4.4 Environmental psychology’s strengths and limitations for this study: a summary

4.4.1 Its strengths

Environmental psychology has at least two strengths for this study. The first is that it “has always laid claim to a rather broad palette” (Gifford, 2007, p. 200) of interests. To initial fields of enquiry such as people’s experiences of their immediate physical and people-surroundings [architecture and space design, privacy, crowding, territoriality, the experience of urban open space, the restorative effects of nature, for example] in the real world, environmental psychologists have been steadily adding more global aspects of the human-nature relationship, such as climate change. Most recently, environmental psychologists are taking an interest in the topic of sustainability and sustainable development (Oskamp, 2000a, p. 373; Gifford, 2007, p. 199). Gifford, currently (2007) President of the Environmental Psychology Division of the International Association of Applied Psychology, sees this steady expansion of interests as a sign of environmental psychology’s maturation as social science discipline. Environmental psychology also takes an interest in the concept of worldview, because it is considered to be linked to a person’s beliefs, assumptions, values, motivations and attitudes towards nature. Such constructs are seen as antecedents to environmental concern, and pro-environmental behaviour (Bell, Greene, Fisher, & Baum, 1996, pp. 36-38; 2001, pp. 28-34; Stern, 2000).

And, as a second strength, environmental psychology has always been open to an interdisciplinary approach in dealing with the ecological crisis to which “seeing green” is one response: ...

... the environmental challenge is formidable enough to elicit contributions from every possible corner of the concerned scholarly world...” (Psychologist Robert Rapoport (1993, p. 173), reviewing several works on the environment, and musing on how they contributed to an emerging global environmental ethic).

The editor of Environmental Ethics, Eugene Hargrove (1984, pp. 292-292) highlights the difficulties which readers interested in environmental matters but lacking formal training in philosophy, experience
Environmental problems are seen as “social issues” requiring a “multidisciplinary approach ... to achieve significant environmental progress” (Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, p. 367), and large-scale changes in environmental behaviour (Oskamp, 2000a, p. 375; Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, p. 366). Contributions to environmental psychology come not only from social psychological research [for example, on prosocial behaviour motivated by altruism and empathy (Schultz, 2000, p. 391), or on public support for social movements such as environmentalism, for example (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999, p. 81)], but also from sociology, and the field of public policy research (Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, p. 366). Volume 56(3) of the Journal of Social Issues (2000), devoted exclusively to describing the “current state of the environment and environmentalism”, presenting “new theories and research on environmental attitudes and behaviors”, and exploring “obstacles and ethical considerations in promoting proenvironmental action” (Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, p. 365), represents such interdisciplinary collaboration [although environmental philosophy is surprisingly absent]. It also highlights the difficulty of trying to accommodate human-nature relationship concerns within one academic discipline only.

4.4.2 Some limitations for this study

But there are limitations to what environmental psychology can offer in a study of “seeing green” as worldview: (1) It defines “environmentalism” non-radically, (2) narrowly, and (3) it tends to focus on the individual cognitive-psychological constructs hypothesized to generate pro-environmental behaviour.

Since its brave beginnings in the 1960s, environmental psychology has, despite its earlier rejection of mainstream psychology, been co-opted into mainstream western culture and social science knowledge:

Environmental psychology as a specialized discipline within psychology has lost much of its visibility as a unique area within psychology over the past decade. ... The good part [of that] is that much of what environmental psychology brought to psychology has been fully adopted into mainstream psychology. (Evans, 1996, p. 1).

This means that environmental psychology does not address a key element of “seeing green”, that is, its radical environmentalism, its cultural critique. Definitions of “environmentalism” tend toward the non-radical, rather than the radical: Stern (2000, p. 411) defines it as “behaviourally ... the propensity to take actions with proenvironmental intent”. Zelezny and Schultz (2000, p. 367, their italics) take “environmentalism” broadly to mean, “the processes associated with actions intended to lessen the impact of human behavior on the natural environment”. And, though environmental psychologists are interested in worldview, they draw mostly on research work done by sociologists. It is sociologists who research the opposing worldviews which some have called the “dominant social paradigm”, and “the new ecological paradigm” (for example, Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978, 1984). (Environmental) psychologists’ interest appears limited to the link between worldview, and environmental values and concern (for example, research by sociologist and psychologist Stern and his colleague Dietz, 1994); they do not appear interested in the other, and interrelated aspects of a worldview, such as ontology, epistemology, or views of what it is to be a better human being. On the seeing green view (Chapter Eight) though, these, and not only environmental values, are all intermeshed reasons for the dominant western social paradigm’s violent and destructive attitude towards nature.

And, while recognizing that environmental destruction is a social issue requiring large-scale changes in environmental behaviour, (environmental) psychologists Zelezny and Schultz (2000, p. 366, my italics) contend that psychology’s focus is the individual level:

the changes that are required to solve our environmental crisis involve changes in individual behavior. Any policy, program, or intervention must produce change among individuals. An understanding of individual-level attitudes, motives, beliefs, intentions, or values will help to inform the development of such programs and also to explain why a particular program is, or is not, producing the desired changes.
So, from within a mainstream social science approach, (environmental) psychologists continue to seek ways “for understanding, predicting, and changing environmentally ... [detrimental] behavior, all with the goal of promoting environmentalism” (Zelezny & Schultz, 2000, pp. 370-371). A discussion of two leading theories (the New Ecological Paradigm, and Value-Belief-Norm theory) on the nature of environmentalism is delayed until Chapter Twelve, by which time, the reader has a better understanding of what seeing green means.

While there is now agreement that the link between positive environmental attitudes and positive environmental behaviour is weaker and more complex than originally hypothesized, the exact relationship of environmental concern to pro-environmental behaviour remains problematic (Bamberg, 2003, pp. 21-32; Stern, 2000, pp. 421-422). Some significant intervening or related variables now hypothesized to exist between environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviour, are adherence to either the Dominant Social Paradigm or the New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig & Jones, 2000); anthropocentrism or ecocentrism (Thompson & Barton, 1994, Table 1, p. 152); to values, beliefs and norms as in Stern et al.’s (1999) Value-Belief-Norm theory; “personal-philosophical values” and emotions (Grob, 1995), or to the amount of “empathy” or “perspective-taking” a person brings to an environmentally significant action (Schultz, 2000; Stern, 2000, p. 411). Environmental psychology research tends to focus on constructing models which will predict individual positive environmental behaviour, and then measuring how the hypothesized psychological variables affect concrete, observable, pro-environmental behaviours in the private or corporate sphere, such as support for policy measures which seek to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Nilsson, von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004), car sharing (Nordlund & Garvill, 2003), and water conservation (Corral-Verdugo, Bechtel, & Fraijo-Sing, 2003).

In summary, the main reason for environmental psychology’s limitations for this study is its mainstream nature. In an illuminating comment during their discussion of western views on nature, Bell et al. (1996, p. 38) suggest an explanation for this:

We [in briefly introducing themes such as ecocentrism, homocentrism, and deep ecology] have moved quite far from the traditional posture of psychology to at least attempt to remain objective and “value free”, yet we maintain that a familiarity with contemporary environmental thought is both instructive and necessary for an understanding of our culture’s view of nature...

And as we have seen, environmental psychology focusses predominantly on mainstream environmental thought, rather than on radical ecologism, and on the social-individual, rather than socio-cultural antecedents to environmental concern and pro-environmental behaviour.

Inavoidably then, but at least with blessings from environmental psychology, I have found it necessary in this study to consider insights from other fields too, such as environmental philosophy, green political theory, development theory, and environmental economic theory. My excursions into the field of sociology have been limited to some studies on the concept worldview, and its relation to environmental concern and behaviour. This combination then provides a framework comprehensive enough to encompass most aspects of “seeing green” (Chapter Eight).

5. The research process

It will be useful to outline briefly here, how the research process pertaining to the research questions mentioned in Section 3, will unfold.
5.1 Question 1. What does “seeing green” as worldview mean?

The amount of material available on the range of green to grey-green ideas about the human-nature relationship, their philosophical bases [ontological, epistemological, axiological], and their real-world implications, is vast. It has therefore been necessary to select a representative “sample” of ideas from this “universe”, to serve as a “database” from which to synthesize what could be called, one version of the “seeing green” worldview.

Chapter Two has two broad aims. In section 1, I introduce environmental philosopher Richard Sylvan’s (1985b) qualitative thematic “survey method” which was used to answer research question 1. The chapter explains (1.1) how, using the principles of set theory as explained by Kerlinger (1985), the universe of “green” was defined, (1.2) how the “sample” of green was selected for the database, (1.3) how the “database” for “green” was set up, (1.4) how the “green” database is subsequently presented in Chapters Three to Seven, and (1.5), how Wissenburg’s (1993) “grue” element was dealt with in this study.

Section 2 of Chapter Two provides a broad historical context for the emergence of green and grey-green understandings of the human-nature relationship. More specifically, it describes (2.1) the nineteenth century beginnings of the ecological critique, (2.2) the early, and continuing “philosophical divide” between “green” ecocentrism/biocentrism on the one hand and grey-green [Wissenburg’s “grue”], “reform anthropocentrism” on the other, (2.3) the new social movements and “green” [the “real world” level in Wissenburg’s diagram], (2.4) political ideologies and “green” [“political” level], (2.5) environmental philosophy/ethics, and “green” [philosophical level], and (2.6) “grey-green”, represented by mainstream versions of sustainable development, vis-a-vis “green”. At the same time, within this discussion, I provide a justification of the elements selected, and not selected, for the “green” database, as well as for the different approach utilized for “grey-green”.

Chapters Three to Seven then present the viewpoints of the various “green” sample elements – Animal liberation/rights (Chapter Three); Deep ecology (Chapter Four); Social ecology (Chapter Five); Ecofeminism (Chapter Six), and The green movement: Die Grünen as example (Chapter Seven), under some of the standard themes which make up a worldview: legitimating narratives, epistemology, ontology, ethic, some views on socio-economic issues, and praxis.

Chapter Eight, entitled “Seeing green”, presents as worldview, one synthesis of the various ideas and themes of the sample elements in the seeing green database (Chapters Three to Seven). Though not everyone interested in seeing green might first want to work through the data base, I would recommend it, if they wish to experience something of the complexity, diversity, elusiveness, beauty, and challenge of “seeing green”.

Chapter Nine represents the “grue” side of Wissenburg’s heuristic. It essentially (1) re-justifies the exclusion of mainstream definitions of sustainable development from the seeing green database, (2) provides the historical and ethical context of environment and development/sustainable development, before introducing the main theoretical constituents of the environment-development field: (3) economic theory, (4) development theory, (5) ecology as science, (6) the contribution of environmental philosophy to concepts such as, “weak” and “strong” anthropocentrism, “weak” and “strong” environmental sustainability, “weak” and “strong” sustainable development, and “stewardship” as theory of motivation for sustainable development. Section 7 examines some of the differing conceptions of sustainable development, while section 8 provides a chapter summary.
5.2 Question 2: How “green” is Namibia Vision 2030’s worldview?

Chapters Ten to Eleven address research question 2. Chapter 10 is concerned with methodology and method. Six main issues are covered. Section 1 presents an introduction to Namibia’s natural environmental policy, and its national development planning process, as background to why Namibia Vision 2030 was chosen as representative text. Section 2 introduces the study’s interpretive methodology, as well as critical content analysis as method. Section 3 comprises a list of criteria and indicators for seeing green to grey-green, compiled from Chapters Eight, and Nine. Finally, in section 4, criteria for assessing the study’s research are discussed.

Chapter Eleven presents the results of the analysis and assessment of Namibia Vision 2030’s “green-ness”, utilizing the criteria of seeing green to grey-green compiled in Chapter Ten, section 3. The chapter is divided into eight sections. Section 1 introduces the methodology and method used. Section 2 provides a page by page analysis of the Vision 2030’s title, table of contents, Foreword by the former President of Namibia, and Preface by the Director General of the National Planning Commission. It goes on to examine the document’s chapter 1, which provides the background to the Vision’s compilation; its chapter 2, which provides an overview of Namibia’s geography, history, economy, and so on; and its chapter 3, which broadly sets out the Vision, its objectives, and its strategies. Section 3 explains that the focus now changes to the text’s human-nature relationship, rather than on the green-ness or otherwise of each issue [sub-vision] discussed in Vision 2030.

Sections 4 to 6 of Chapter Eleven follow the numbering of the text in Vision 2030. Thus section 4 discusses the Vision’s chapter 4: “The People’s quality of life”; section 5 discusses chapter 5: “Sustainable resource base”; and section 6 discusses the Vision’s chapter 6: “Creating the enabling environment”. Section 7 considers the “workability” of the criteria, and the breadth and depth of their indicators. Section 8 provides one version of Namibia Vision 2030’s worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship.

The final chapter (Chapter Twelve) proposes some further research issues, and reflects on the possible role of environmental psychology in raising awareness and knowledge of “seeing green” in Namibia.
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2.5.3.2 Ecocentrism
2.5.4 The three radical ecophilosophies

### 2.6 Environment and development [“sustainable development”], and “green”

### 3. Summary
Chapter Two has two broad aims: in section 1, to explain Sylvan’s qualitative thematic survey method used in answering research question 1, and, in section 2, to provide the broad historical context for the emergence in western culture in the 1960s, of a changed understanding of the human-nature relationship. Two broad streams can be discerned in the history of this changed relationship. It is this “divide” which justifies on my view, discussing Wissenburg’s biocentric/dark green/ecologism perspective (Chapter One, Figure 2) separately from the grey-green environmentalism perspective shown on the right hand side of his diagram [his “grue”].

1. Methodology and method for research question 1

In this section, I introduce environmental philosopher Richard Sylvan’s (1985b) qualitative thematic “survey method” which I used to answer research question 1, with specific attention to (1.1) how, using the principles of set theory as explained by Kerlinger (1986), the universe of “green” was defined, (1.2) how the “sample” of green was selected for the database, (1.3) how the “database” for “green” was set up, and (1.4) how the “green” database is presented. At (1.5), I explain how I have dealt with Wissenburg’s grey-green environmentalism perspective.

Sylvan notes that the qualitative thematic survey method “is still a main method of research in the humanities, e.g. in history, history of ideas, and philosophy.” (Sylvan, 1985b, p. 18). In order to identify the “core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes” of his research topic [deep ecology in his case, “seeing green” in mine], Sylvan (a) assembled a set of sources on his topic, (b) identified and “unscrambled” the themes which seemed to be present or “emerge” from the identified sources, (c) discarded those themes which to him appeared “evidently remote and irrelevant” and then (d) applied “the elementary set operations of union and intersection” to the emerging or present themes in order to establish the “total theory” or “paradigm” [union] and “common core” [intersection] of his research topic. Before assembling sources, I first defined the “universe” to which they should refer.

1.1 Defining the “set” or “universe” of “green”.

With its references to “set operations”, “union” and “intersection”, Sylvan’s method appears to be a qualitative version of mathematical “set” theory methodology, as for example, described by Kerlinger (1986). To provide some methodological context, I have located my adaptation of Sylvan’s (1985b) survey method, within Kerlinger’s (1986) theoretical discussion of the set-approach to understanding a phenomenon.

Kerlinger (1986, pp. 45-46) notes that a set or universe is well defined “when it is possible to tell whether a given object does or does not belong to the set”. Sets are defined either by listing all the members of the set [“list definition”], or by giving a rule for determining whether an element does or does not belong to the set [“rule definition”].

There are some problems in trying to apply Kerlinger’s mathematical set definition rigorously in defining “universe”. The first problem is not only the vastness of the universe of “green” (Davis listed in 1989, more than 300 titles dealing with green thought (Wall, 1994, p. 256)), but also its conflicting and contradictory nature (Ferris, in Dobson & Lucardie, 1993, p. 151; O’Riordan 1981; Wall, 1994, p. 253, “Debates and strands”; Wissenburg’s heuristic in Chapter One, Figure 2). These two factors make providing a “list definition” of the set of “seeing green” difficult. The second problem lies in the wording of the first research question, the purpose of which is to come to an understanding of what “seeing green” means in the first place! Thus the alternative method of defining a set by providing a broad start-up “rule definition” of “seeing green” has been adopted to circumvent circular reasoning -

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1 I consistently use the form “Die Grünen”, with apologies for the incorrect German which this approach sometimes produces
that is, to state beforehand what constitutes “green”, followed by an analysis to determine what constitutes “green”. (W.J. Jordaan, personal communication, January 2006).

I adopted the following rough rule definition of “green”.

Any new social movement, political party, philosophy, or political ideology which describes itself as “green”, or is described by a reliable commentator as “green”, qualifies as a member of the “green” set.

In addition, guided by the concepts in Wissenburg’s heuristic (Chapter One, Figure 2), and his explanations (1993, pp. 4-5),

A member of the “green” set will tend towards biocentrism/ecocentrism as theory of environmental value, and propose radical, not reformist, changes to society.

This “rule definition” I felt, suggests more or less where to start looking for a sample of green, without defining in advance, in a circular way, what I was going to find. I would then be able to choose from the many new social movements and political parties of the late 1970s/1980s, a research sample from which to form a better understanding of how a biocentric/ecocentric environmental value theory, and radical political stance in principle, actually translates into “seeing green”.

1.2 Choosing the sample of “green”

I began, as Sylvan did, by “working through much of the literature and all the more basic work” on the delineated set. It would be entirely misleading to suggest that the sample finally chosen – animal liberation, deep ecology, social ecology, ecofeminism, and “street green” in its West German manifestation – was a random selection from the “green universe”, as set theory requires. Guided again by Wissenburg’s (1993) heuristic, the logical starting place for me was a history of “green”, where I early on found historian Wall’s definition (1994, p. 66) of “fundamental green” as animal liberation and deep ecology. Reading more on deep ecology as movement brings one automatically to the field of environmental philosophy/environmental ethics, where one encounters deep ecology’s radical social movement/philosophical close relatives, social ecology and ecofeminism. And reading Bramwell’s histories (1989, 1994) of ecologism [also a concept in Wissenburg’s heuristic] brings one to Die Grünen as “canonical” (Goodin, 1992, p. 124, p. 131) green party, working, in their earlier years, closely with many grassroots movements. In this way, the sample selected itself, so to speak, and also limited itself. These areas alone represent a considerable amount of information.

Other samples of “green” could have been chosen. It could perhaps have included a detailed discussion of the peace movement, and/or the environmental justice movement, and/or some of the direct action ecocentric ecological groups, or the political ideology of ecologism, or the formal environmental philosophy of ecocentrism and biocentrism. I justify the choices that I made/did not make as part of the historical discussion in section 2 of this chapter. But I think the question rather is: is the sample actually chosen, a defensible sample of “seeing green”? I suggest that it is, because (a) it contains both social movements and a political party (b) the social movements/political party chosen, represent the full bottom to top range of Wissenburg’s real world action to philosophical reflection (c) the social movement/philosophies chosen represent the full range of metaphysical thought in Wissenburg’s spectrum: from the biocentrism of deep ecology to the “Something like a ‘weak’ anthropocentric viewpoint … discernible in social ecology…” (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii) (d) it represents a time sample as well, in that radical ecology began to emerge in the mid-1960s, animal liberation in the early 1970s, and ecofeminism began to make its influence felt as environmental philosophy/ethics, in the 1990s (Warren, 1990).

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2 I consistently use the form “Die Grünen”, with apologies for the incorrect German which this approach sometimes produces.
The task is then rather not to demonstrate the sample’s randomness [it was not], but to show that each example selected qualifies as a member of the green set.

1.3 Setting up the “green” database

I then applied Sylvan’s (1985a) next step, which is to identify and “unscramble” the philosophical bases, core and extension themes which were present in, or seemed to “emerge” from the sources. Happily, because Sylvan’s topic of deep ecology [“fundamental green” in Wall’s 1994, p. 66 view] claims to be a “total view”, and “seeing green” is often suggested to be a worldview as well (Goldsmith, 1992; Metzner, 1994; Sterling, 1990), the kind of themes identified by Sylvan were more or less directly applicable to research question 1. Sylvan’s (1985a, p. 4) themes were: ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, ideology/religion, lifestyle, “policy”, “economics”, and “politics”; these last three I interpreted together to mean, political policies and programmes. These themes are broadly the elements of a worldview, as described by Macnamara (1980), for example.

1.3.1 Considering elements of a worldview, and placing them within a clarificatory context

Broadly following Sylvan’s approach (1985b), I initially considered seven worldview elements from which I hoped there would emerge what he called the “core themes” and “extension themes” within each sample member’s worldview: aesthetics, legitimating narratives, epistemology, ontology, ethic, view of culture/society, and praxis.

After preliminary reading, I retained all of these worldview elements for application to each sample member’s thought, with the exception of aesthetics. This because I found very little in the sources consulted on this topic, except surprisingly, in the thought of the political party Die Grünen (Maren-Grisebach, 1982, “Ansätze einer Kunstphilosophie im Rahmen grüner Politik”, pp. 126-134). Nor did I encounter a theory of environmental aesthetics in any sample member. “Seeing green” principles such as valuing nature’s naturalness, its independent creativity, its diversity, complexity and inter-relatedness, its normativity, do though inform some environmental aesthetics theories (Botzler & Armstrong, 1993, Section 3 on Aesthetics, pp. 95-153; Goodin, 1992, pp. 19-54; Thompson, 1995). As Sylvan’s method does allow the discarding of themes [my “elements”] which appear “remote”, I discarded aesthetics as worldview element for analysis.

Though not an element of a worldview, I wanted a “space” in which sample members’ (often critical) assessments of one another’s worldviews could be included if necessary. And finally, I felt that discussion of the six worldview elements selected, as well as their mutual critique by sample members, would benefit in presentation by being “sandwiched” between an introduction and summary.

All these aspects – the selected six elements of a worldview, the space for sample members’ mutual critique, an introduction and a summary, I then numbered consecutively from 1 to 9, thus:

1. Introductory remarks
2. Legitimating narratives: myths, religion/s and/or spirituality, and/or philosophies, and/or ideologies, and/or rhetoric/metaphors employed
3. Epistemology
4. Ontology
5. Ethic
6. View of culture/society
7. Praxis
8. Critique of, and by, other sample members

This conceptual framework represented a practical solution to the problem of how to present a discussion and analysis of each “green” sample member’s worldview, as well as how to facilitate cross-comparison between sample members’ views. In addition, by later preceding each of these discussion points with a chapter number, I was able to provide an easy standardized reference number for each aspect of the synthesized green worldview presented in Chapter Eight, and the “green” criteria checklist presented in Chapter Ten.

I discuss this standard nine-point format in more detail next.

1. **Introductory remarks:** Each sample member seemed to me to have its own “personality”, or way of presenting itself, which I wished to preserve. I utilize the introductory paragraph/s for general orientation, and also to highlight any particular aspect of the sample member’s perspective which would not “fit” into the remaining standard format.

2. **Legitimating narratives:** This worldview element includes not only legitimating narratives such as spirituality, philosophy, or science, but also the rhetoric and metaphors employed – the “naming” employed. Naming “is a powerful instrument for ordering and structuring our perception of the world” (Li, in Gaard, 1993, p. 282). In this discussion, I understand rhetoric in its informal sense as effective persuasion via for example, slogans, myths, narratives or “stories”, images, metaphors, and keywords (Bruner & Oelschlaeger, 1994, pp. 377-396). Metaphors are argued to “play a critical role in human conceptualization”, to provide a link between abstract thinking and experience (Li, 1993, drawing on Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

Bruner and Oelschlaeger (1994, pp. 377-396) note environmentalism’s [meaning I think, ecologism’s] failure to come up with persuasive alternatives to the metaphors, myths, and assumptions of the dominant Western industrial paradigm. They also note the damage done to environmentalism’s [ecologism’s] initially promising radical rejection of the “...consumption, unrestricted economic growth, and the exploitation of the natural environment” present in the industrial growth paradigm (Bruner & Oelschlaeger, 1994, p. 382) by mainstream rhetoric such as “tree huggers”, “people haters” and “jobs vs. the environment”. Bramwell (1989, p.35, p. 243) notes the pervasive presence in the green perspective, of “Garden of Eden” myths, the “breakdown” narratives to explain the disruption of harmonious primal human-nature relationships, and the search for “the scapegoat”. Common rhetoric in “green” is that of “liberation”, “emancipation”, “salvation”, and “survival”. I note within this worldview element, each “green” representative’s key assumption on the cause of, and thus solution to, the ecological crisis.

3. **Epistemology,** and 4. **Ontology:**
Within the discipline of formal (environmental) philosophy, epistemology and ontology are two key and import-full concepts. However, in this study, all these concepts are used in a “conversational” or ordinary language way. Philosophy is taken to mean, disciplined “wondering” about things: bringing to light our hidden or implicit assumptions on a range of topics, and then critically examining them. Such topics of “wondering” include epistemology, ontology, and ethics, all inter-related, as I try to show in the next few paragraphs.

“Epistemology” is taken to mean, a study of how, and what, we are able to know with confidence, or otherwise phrased, what is the ultimate source of knowledge, which knowledge can be considered valid? Without at any stage entering into a philosophical discussion of the various theories of truth and knowledge available, I present and discuss under this worldview element, each sample member’s
views on knowing. On the whole, those who “see green”, tend to be critical of instrumental rationalism as the way of knowing.

Such wondering about how we may know is not mere wondering for wondering’s sake. Our usually implicit personal and socio-cultural views on what the ultimate source of knowledge is, deeply shape our views on what is real. Is reality to be explained entirely in terms of the physical and objective outside us, or do we wholly or partly actively construct it through the concepts embedded in our language? Is there a place for the meta-physical? Any worldview, green worldviews included, can thus be expected to propose an ontology. I use this technical philosophical term in a non-technical way to mean, each sample member’s views on the nature of things, and on being.

However, these two worldview elements – epistemology and ontology - are sometimes so intertwined within a sample member’s perspective, that they could not always be cleanly disentangled. Some of the sample members place their views on nature within an entirely different view of valid knowledge. Sometimes ontological discussion included views on the ideal human being - the field of psychology, practically. Sometimes the discussion is of Self vis-a-vis the Other, understood as both human and nonhuman, in which case it sometimes includes a view of motivation for ethical behaviour, or the role of human being in nature – aspects which could also be accommodated within standard discussion point 5: Ethic.

5. Ethic: Closely related to personal and socio-cultural ultimate assumptions on knowing, truth and reality, are then, what can be called “right” relationships between ourselves and what is “other” to our selves. Our understanding of what the Other really is, shapes our ethic. An ethic can be understood as comprising three parts: a belief system, a recommended attitude towards the Other, and a “system of rules and standards” (Mizzoni, 2004, p. 42). Under “Ethic”, I discuss for example, sub-themes such as the sample member’s theory of value, its scope of obligation, its theory of motivation, and what it requires from us as moral agents. What was originally striking for me about this topic in “seeing green”, is that no difference is made between an ethic for human beings, and an ethic for nature; both are included in the same ethic. I have not attempted within this worldview element, to reproduce all the intricate philosophical debate which one encounters, for example, in the pages of the journal Environmental Ethics, except as these might illuminate chosen concepts.

6. View of society: Under this worldview element, I discuss each “green” worldview representative’s critique of society, and any alternative vision of society offered. This usually entails presenting the sample member’s “issues”, for example, the use of animals in entertainment, human overpopulation, meaningful work, or western “maldevelopment”. “Real world” policies are sometimes included, particularly in the “street green”/Die Grünen sample member.

7. Praxis: How the sample member envisages bringing about the necessary changes in society – for example, through face-to-face democracy, direct activism, violent/non-violent civil disobedience, is presented here. An important assumption of green praxis is that personal beliefs and practices are also public political statements.

8. Critique: While this standard discussion point is not a formal element of a worldview, it does entail sample members’ mutual critique of some aspects of each other’s worldviews. Examples would be the critique by deep ecologists of the assumptions underlying animal rights theory, or critique by ecofeminists of the assumptions underlying deep ecologists’ understanding of the Self/Other relationship. Wherever possible, the particular green sample member’s assumptions and viewpoint are presented together with critique from other green sample members. For example, critique of the deep ecology ethic of ecological egalitarianism is presented within the standard discussion point Ethic. The
standard discussion point “Critique” is thus only utilized where this approach has not seemed appropriate or possible.

9. Summary: Here I present the sample member’s contribution to the idea “green”, as well as any other relevant comment.

There is no deviation from the format above in presenting each “green” sample member’s viewpoint. However, within each discussion point, it was not always possible to maintain a standard presentation across Chapters Three to Seven.

1.4 Presenting the “green” data

The data for the “green” sample members - animal liberation/rights, deep ecology, social ecology, ecofeminism and “street green”/Die Grünen - is presented in five consecutive chapters, that is, Chapters Three to Seven. The order is non-random, in that, following Wissenburg’s (Chapter One, Figure 2) diagram from top to bottom, the first four sample members represent primarily the philosophical/ethical level of abstraction, while the Die Grünen chapter represents a combination of Wissenburg’s political philosophy/theory, and “real world” levels. In Chapter Eight, I apply Sylvan’s “elementary set operations of union and intersection” to the data across all sample members, in order to establish the “total theory” or “paradigm” [union] and “common core” [intersection] of “seeing green”.

1.5 Dealing with the grey-green [“grue”] of Wissenburg’s heuristic

In Chapter Nine, I introduce what I see as the main ideas informing that viewpoint which Wissenburg (1993, in Chapter One: 3.1) places at the right-hand side of his heuristic on the diminishing importance of green ideas: anthropocentrism as metaphysic/ethic, and “shallow ecology/environmentalism” as political theory, as expressed in the policies and programmes of political parties at “real world” level.

Based on the historical survey in section 2, I show in Chapter Nine of the study, that (a) the concept of “sustainable development” as set out in the Rio Declaration (1992) represents this viewpoint, and (b) that my rule definition of “green” above, excludes it from the “green” database on the grounds of its strong anthropocentrism (Hattingh, 2002, p. 11). Such versions of sustainable development appear more at home on the grey-green side of the “philosophical divide”, whose nineteenth century origins I trace in section 2.2 of this chapter. In Chapter Nine, I consider the assumptions of some of ideas contributing to the field of “Environment and Development”, which I assume to be the academic home of sustainable development: economic theory, development theory, ecology, and to a lesser degree, environmental ethics. This latter includes (a) anthropocentrism as theory of value, (b) the varying versions – “stronger”, “weaker”, “absurd” - of the sustainability ethic (Achterberg, 1993, pp. 84-85), which underpins sustainable development, and (c) stewardship, which is the usual mainstream theory of motivation to environmental ethical behaviour. The focus of Chapter Nine is thus not on the kind of worldview elements presented in Chapters Three to Seven, and synthesized in Chapter Eight. This study makes no claim as to whether or not there is such a thing as a “sustainable development” perspective or worldview, or what its nature might be.

I turn next to the broad historical context of the emerging ecological critique of western society.

2. Historical context of “green” sample members

This section provides not only the broad historical context for the emergence of changed thinking on the human-nature relationship, but also the justification for the “green” sample selection. More specifically, it describes (2.1) the nineteenth century beginnings of the ecological critique, (2.2) the early, and continuing “philosophical divide” between ecocentric/biocentric “green” on the one hand
and the anthropocentrism typified by mainstream sustainable development on the other, (2.3) the new social movements and “green” [ground level of Wissenburg’s diagram, Chapter One, Figure 2], (2.4) political ideologies and “green” [the diagram’s mid level], and (2.5) environmental philosophy/ethics, and “green” [top level].

2.1 The nineteenth century beginnings of the ecological critique

There are basically three views on the historical roots of the “ecological perspective” as street movement, new political ideology [“ecologism”], and new field in philosophy [environmental philosophy]: (a) as an alternative, hidden, or underground current of thought dating back millennia, (b) as emerging around the 1960s/1970s, more or less together with, or as a result of, the 1973-74 oil crisis, or (c) the view followed in this study, as emerging around the nineteenth century, predominantly in the Nordic/Protestant countries of Europe, but only gaining “political bite” (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 237) in the 1970s.

Some authors emphasize particular nineteenth century historical roots more than others. Wall (1994) notes inter alia, the Romantic writers’ contribution to social reform, and to the English utopian and anarchist tradition; Martinez-Alier (1987) writes mostly on the early nineteenth century ecological critique of classical economics. Bramwell (1989, 1994) pinpoints the beginnings of the ecological perspective and critique predominantly, but not exclusively, amongst the intelligentsia of mid to end nineteenth century Russia, Germany, and England. She highlights the contribution of German philosophical holism and monism, evolutionary theory, thermodynamics, organic biology, the emergence of ecology and ethology as new scientific disciplines, as well as the early ecological critique of economic theory.

Bramwell suggests that the ecological perspective which foreshadowed “ecologism” as new “political box” began to take shape around the 1880s. “Self-definition” about belonging in the box – considering yourself “an ecologist” in the political/normative\(^3\) sense - began in the 1920s. The ecological perspective “remained a preserve of a small section of the European and American intelligentsia” until after the First World War (Bramwell, 1994, p. 2). In the 1930s there emerged “the group of ideas we call ecology today. ... Environmentalism and ecologism took different paths. Ecologists called for complete social and economic change worldwide...” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 104). Although World War II interrupted the growth of the ecological perspective, it continued throughout the 1950s [alongside the maturing of ecology as natural science] as a more or less middle-class, conservative and values-based small-scale cultural critique movement, through to the early 1960s (Bramwell, 1989, p. 4; 1994, p. 8, p. 15). Bramwell’s key argument is that the ecological perspective became both a mass movement and a powerful political force in the 1970s, because “… the fusion of resource-scarcity economics with holistic biology … gave force and coherence to ecological ideas” (Bramwell, 1989, p. xi).

O’Riordan (1981\(^4\)) in his analysis of 1970s environmentalism, singles out the nineteenth century “philosophical divide” in the North American conservation movement as significant in explaining the ideological divisions which still continue today. I discuss the origins, nature and legacy of this philosophical divide next.

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\(^4\) O’Riordan’s first book “Perspectives on resource management” was published in 1971, and his second “Environmentalism” in 1976 (revised 1981). His typology of philosophical differences in environmentalism as ideology is one of the earliest.
2.2 The “philosophical divide” between “green” biocentrism on the one hand and grey-green “reform anthropocentrism” on the other

At the heart of the “philosophical divide” are the differing theories of environmental value marked in Wissenburg’s diagram as biocentrism and anthropocentrism. The “divide” began with a sharp difference of opinion in 1897 between two friends in the North American Conservation movement, John Muir, and Gifford Pinchot, on a water provision development scheme for San Francisco. The rift was so deep as to cause the Conservation movement to split into Muir’s “preservationists”, considered to be the “forefathers” of the ecocentric type of environmentalism which O’Riordan (1981) discerned in the 1970s (section 2.2.1), and Pinchot’s “conservationist” approach (section 2.2.2), to which one can broadly trace the “wise management” approach of O’Riordan’s 1970s “technocentric” environmental ideology. These two approaches developed broadly into the “green” and the “grue” [my grey-green] respectively of Wissenburg’s diagram. In section 2.2.3, I discuss the emergence of “environmentalism” as ideology, and its continued influence today.

2.2.1 Transcendentalism, Preservationism, and ecocentrism

Muir’s philosophical home was the North American Transcendentalist Club, founded in 1836 by Ralph Waldo Emerson [1803-1882], himself influenced by the English Romantics, and by Hindu philosophy. Another Transcendentalist, Henry David Thoreau (1817-1862), is usually considered the first European-American environmentalist. His green ideas on the pursuit of spirituality, living the simple rural life, preservation of wilderness as public land, conserving natural resources on private land, and enjoying recreation in nature, were to be taken up in the early North American Conservation movement. O’Riordan (1981) traces their continuing influence in the 1970s “ecocentric” mode of environmentalism. Besides his spiritualism, Thoreau, who shared in the Transcendentalists’ Romantic heritage, was also a cultural critic, an activist, and a supporter of civil disobedience, providing inspiration for Tolstoy, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, deep ecology activists, and Die Grünen’s Petra Kelly. In Wall’s (1994, p. 10) opinion, he “clearly adhered to the Green package” because he “combined social awareness with environmental concern”, was “committed to civil disobedience” and “familiar with Hindu and Buddhist ideas on nature”. Deep ecologist Sessions (1995c, p. 100) also notes Thoreau’s “radical ecocentrism”.

John Muir⁵ (1838-1914) is an iconic figure in the founding mythology of the green movement. Both Thoreau and Muir viewed nature as sacred, as a pantheistic expression of God (Sessions, 1994, p. 207). Their spiritual view of nature not only provided inspiration for the establishment of the early North American Conservation movement, but also continued in the ecocentric thought of Aldo Leopold (Callicott, 1994, p. 36; Wall, 1994, p. 105), deep ecology (Sessions, 1994, p. 207), the ecocentric mode of O’Riordan’s 1970s environmentalism, prominent greens such as David Foreman of the radical NGO Earth First! (Wall, 1994, p. 3), and of Rudolf Bahro, early German Green Party ideologist. VanDeVeer & Pierce (1994, p. 96) even trace a line of thought from Muir through to “advocates of the rights of trees such as Christopher Stone⁷”. Apart from Muir’s reverential attitude to nature, he also sought to preserve large areas of wilderness, primarily because he held that this was the only way to protect the health of important ecosystems. This concern appears again in deep ecology [Chapter Four, 4.1.4.2].

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⁵ Muir opposed, and Pinchot supported, a plan to flood the Hetch Hetchy Valley in the Yosemite National Park, as part of San Francisco’s water supply. Both men were friends of the President of the USA, and both canvassed his support for their point of view; Roosevelt gave permission in 1913 to flood the valley
⁶ Born in Scotland, he arrived in America in 1849, there to become a naturalist, traveller, writer, scientist, expert on forestry management, protagonist for the eventual preservation of the Yosemite mountain area as park in 1890, and founder of the early Conservation movement’s key organization, the Sierra Club in 1892. The Club still exists today
⁷ Stone’s work is discussed further in Chapter Three
2.2.2 Conservationism, for homocentric wise use

“The first great fact about conservation is that it stands for development. ...The first principle of conservation is the use of natural resources now existing ... for the benefit of people who live here now.” (Pinchot, 1947, p. 262, in Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 294)

In 1898, a year after the Preservationist/Conservationist parting of the ways, Pinchot (1865-1946) became head of the Division of Forestry. He was, through the Progressive Conservation Movement, of which he became President in 1910, to become active in USA politics as well (retrieved 6 April 2005 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gifford_Pinchot; and from www.u-s-history.com). Though Pinchot’s politics and conservation philosophy are intertwined, it is his conservation philosophy rather than his politics which is of interest here.

Pinchot was concerned to challenge the dominant understanding of his time of natural resources. On this view, all natural resources were open for immediate economic exploitation by a limited group of industrial businessmen. Pinchot opposed this elitism (Desjardins, 1993, p. 47, and p. 66, note 7). His vision for the Conservation movement was that “in time [it would] work out into a planned and orderly scheme for national efficiency, based on the elimination of waste, and directed toward the best use of all we have for the greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time” (Pinchot, 1914, pp. 23-25, cited in Desjardins, 1993, pp. 47-48). This excerpt from Pinchot’s book (1901, pp. 79-81, reproduced in Wall, 1994, p. 136) makes his position clear:

The central thing for which Conservation stands is to make this country the best possible place to live in, both for us and for our descendants. It stands against the waste of natural resources which cannot be renewed, ... it stands for the perpetuation of the resources which can be renewed, such as the food-producing soils and the forests; and most of all it stands for an equal opportunity for every American citizen to get his fair share of benefit from these resources, both now and hereafter.

Conservation stands for the same kind of practical commonsense management of this country by the people that every businessman stands for in the handling of his own business. It believes in prudence and foresight instead of reckless blindness; it holds that resources now public property should not become the basis for oppressive private monopoly; and it demands the complete and orderly development of all our resources for the benefit of all the people instead of the partial exploitation of them for the benefit of a few. It recognises fully the right of the present generation to use what it needs and all it needs of the natural resources now available, but it recognises equally our obligation so to use what we need that our descendants shall not be deprived of what they need.

Conservation has much to do with the welfare of the average man of today. It proposes to secure a continuous and abundant supply of the necessaries of life, which means a reasonable cost of living and business stability. It advocates fairness in the distribution of the benefits which flow from the natural resources.

Although Pinchot’s “Resource Conservation and Development position” (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 101) was radical8 for its time, it is today critiqued by non-anthropocentrists. While acknowledging that Pinchot was a man who supported “equitable and sustainable economics” (Wall, 1994, p. 126), and sought solutions to environmental problems such as deforestation (p. 12), Wall nevertheless describes his approach to nature as “essentially managerial” (p. 44), as seeking “ways of exploiting nature more efficiently rather than rejecting such assaults” (p. 44), as lacking “radical Green reverence for nature” (p. 44), as a conservationist rather than a deep Green approach (p. 126), as “hostile to the fundamentals of radical deep ecology” (p. 12), and unkindest cut of all?, as a “civil service environmentalist” approach (p. 12).

8 Whatever one may think of Pinchot’s wise use of resources for human benefit approach, as Rodman points out, he was the first to take steps to “restrain the reckless exploitation of forests, soils, etc. characteristic of the pioneer stage of modern social development by imposing ethical and legal requirements” that these resources be used for the greatest good of the greatest number, including future generations, rather than just for the profit of the immediate few (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 121)
2.2.3 The emergence of 1970s environmentalism, and its continuing influence

In the 1970s, “environmentalism” began to emerge as ideology. From the start, O'Riordan notes, because of its philosophical antecedents, it presented itself in a dualistic, and contradictory, ecocentric-homocentric mode (1981, p. iii, and Figure 10.1 “The pattern of environmentalist ideologies”, p. 376). Arne Naess, deep ecologist, writing in 1973, a little before O’Riordan’s 1976 edition of Environmentalism, identifies the same two qualitatively different strands in environmentalism, but he calls them respectively, the deep ecology movement, and the shallow ecology movement (1973a). John Rodman’s 1970s essays (published in 1983) on emerging forms of ecological consciousness trace the same distinction, and so does John Ferris (1993). All four authors point out that these two broad forms of “environmentalism” differ fundamentally in their attitudes to nature, thus marking the difference between “seeing green” and in any other shade.

O’Riordan (1981) calls these two broadly differing versions of environmentalism, the ecocentric mode, and the technocentric mode. The 1970s ecocentric mode of environmentalism, which includes deep ecology, contains a strong element of spirituality, preaches the virtues of reverence, humility, responsibility, and care in human/nature relationships, and opposes what it sees as the arrogance of anthropocentrism. It sees nature as a delicate “web of life”, as the metaphor for an ideal society which seeks “permanence and stability based upon ecological principles of diversity and homeostasis” (O’Riordan, 1981, p. 1). In nature’s biodiversity and “symbiotic relationships”, are the messages of democracy and co-operation, and the celebration of cultural diversity (O’Riordan, 1981, pp. 3-4; also McLaughlin, 1993, in Sessions, 1995; Naess’s several writings in Sessions, 1995). The ecocentric mode is in favour of technology provided it is low impact, but opposed to “bigness and impersonality in all forms” (O’Riordan, 1981, p. 1), including meaning-less work, and mega-cities. Development, if it means more industrial growth, more media-driven consumerism, and more environmental destruction, is regarded with deep suspicion, and certainly not as inevitable. Key features of 1970s ecocentric environmentalism are its bio-ethic [compare Wissenburg’s (1993) “biocentrism”], and its notion of the self-reliant community.

O’Riordan (1981, p. 1) sees the origin of his “technocentric mode” of environmentalism in the Conservationist half of the earlier Preservationist/Conservationist philosophical divide. He singles out as its key features9, an anthropocentric attitude to nature, an optimistic belief in science and technology’s capacity to deal with environmental problems, a belief in value-free objectivity, a predilection for numbers and statistics, and a managerial rationale vis-a-vis the environment: specialist expertise, and the use of tools such as environmental risk assessment, and environmental management planning.

2.3 The new social movements, and “green”

In this section, I discuss (2.3.1) contributing influences in the emergence of the “green movement”, followed by discussions of (2.3.2) the animal rights movement, (2.3.3) the green movement, (2.3.4) the ecology movement, (2.3.5) some direct eco-action groups, (2.3.6) ecofeminism, and (2.3.7) the environmental justice movement.

2.3.1 Contributing influences

Here I discuss how (a) the emergence of ecology as science (b) unprecedented industrial-driven growth, (c) the counterculture, (d) industrialism’s pollution and resource depletion, (e) USA foreign policy, (f) the misnamed “green revolution”, (g) the “environmental fight”, (h) the 1968 student revolts, and (i) the equal rights movement, all contributed to the emergence of “seeing green”.

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9 He gives them different headings, but I believe I have not lost his key thoughts
(a) The emergence of holistic ecology

“Ecological science … was strongly influenced by a philosophy of holism, from which it cannot be divided. … Could Haeckel have given ecology its name without being familiar with his countryman Goethe’s holism?” (Wall, 1994, p. 3)

It is almost impossible to think of the emergence of the ecological worldview without the development of ecology, the science which gave philosophers, scientists and economists a growing understanding of the natural world, and of human’s beings’ place in it (Bramwell, 1989, p. 6; Wall, 1994, p. 104). The term “ecology” ["Ökologie"] was coined around 1869 by Haeckel[11] (Bramwell[12], 1989, pp. 39-40; Wall, 1994, p. 104), sometimes described as biologist (Wall, 1994, p. 104), or zoologist (Bramwell, 1989, p. 4). He derived it from the Greek word “oikos” meaning “house”, or household unit. Though Linnaeus had been discussing the concept of an “economy of nature” a century earlier, his image of nature had been mechanical (Callicott, 1986, p. 306). But for Haeckel, ecology meant “the science of relations between organisms and their environment”, the study of “organisms in their context; their life-cycle, their environment and their place in the cycle of energy use” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 40).

Ökologie as term indicates not only the all-important shift in nineteenth century scientific thinking, from mechanistic to contextual and holistic biology, but a certain normativity as well. At the time, “Ökologie” also included “Ökonomie”, Aristotle’s concept, meaning a soundly organized, properly functioning household unit. Economical household management “implies that the use and conservation of resources is a moral activity as well as an economic one …” (Bramwell 1989, pp. 14-15); it also implied that a well-run household was as self-sufficient as possible, husbanded its resources, and avoided waste and disorder (Bramwell, 1989, p. 41). Green thinking contains all these themes, and bases its vision of the ideal society on this original meaning of “Ökonomie” (Bramwell 1989, p. 41). By the 1950s, ecology as science was well established[13], and was drawing on concepts from systems theory to describe and understand nature, such as stability, carrying capacity, and climax states. Eugene Odum’s oft-quoted Fundamentals of ecology appeared in 1971.

Worster (1991, p. xi, in Wall, 1994, p. 6) notes that even within the emerging science of ecology, there were two differing approaches: the Arcadian, and the Imperialist. “The Imperialist ecologist uses the subject to discover better ways of ‘managing’ nature for human benefit, the Arcadian advocates the ‘deep ecology’ approach of giving non-human life independent ethical status. The Imperialist seeks to exploit, the Arcadian to live in harmony[14]” (Wall, 1994, p. 6).

(b) Unprecedented growth via industrialization

For western capitalist countries, the decades from the 1950s to the 1970s were a period of unprecedented and uninterrupted growth (O’Riordan, 1981). Science and industry, combining to produce an array of civilian and military technologies, led the way. “These new technologies, so it was

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[10] “Ökologie” was to become one of Die Grünen’s “four pillars” of a radically new society

[11] Ernst Heinrich Haeckel (1834-1919), also philosopher. Martinez-Alier (1987) is not particularly complimentary about Haeckel, describing him as a ‘sun-worshipper’ (p. 115), tending towards social-Darwinism (pp. 12-13, p. 194), a ‘racist’ and contributor to the idea of Lebensraum (p. 101) which was subsequently misused by Hitler [though Haeckel could hardly be blamed for that]; and as being “kulturkämpferisch” (p. 202). Martinez-Alier is also dismissive of “today’s believers in holy and holistic ‘ecologism’” which he sees as right-wing, conservative, and derived from “the most mystic wing of Haeckel’s Monism” (p. 203). From here, Martinez-Alier makes a short leap towards also dismissing Rudolf Steiner’s Anthroposophy, “which joined with the irrational, apocalyptic ‘ecologism’ in which ‘back to nature’ is taken to mean ‘back to God and religion’” (p. 203). Bramwell’s view (1989) of Haeckel is altogether softer

[12] Bramwell (1989, pp. 39-40) gives the date as 1866

[13] For example, Schumacher (1973 [1986], pp. 111-112), cites from Ralph and Mildred’s Buchsbaum’s Basic ecology, which appeared in 1957

[14] Worster gives an example of an Arcadian ecologist, Henry David Thoreau, who believed that nature “has an order, a pattern, that we humans are bound to understand and respect and preserve” (Worster, 1991, p. ix, in Wall, 1994, p. 104). Not surprisingly, Thoreau has provided inspiration for many Green thinkers, including Rudolf Bahro (Bramwell, 1989, p. 222, p. 225), and is also the source of an ever-recurring green theme, that of “the idyll of the Red Indian and his ability to live off and with the land” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 93). As example of an Imperialist scientific ecologist, Parsons (1977, in Wall, 1994, p. 104) gives Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), who in his Dialectics of Nature, “seeks to understand nature in order to control nature more efficiently for his species’ exclusive benefit”
Nuclear power, it was avowed, would meet USA energy needs more or less for free; ... Miracle grains would feed humanity, and new pharmaceuticals would control formerly intractable diseases. Petrochemicals and petrochemical products – including plastics, food additives, detergents, solvents, and abrasives – would make life comfortable and provide labor-saving convenience for everyone....”. Pesticides were “touted as a kind of miracle product.... designed to increase agricultural productivity...” (Biehl, 1997a, pp. 4-5). Up until the 1973-74 energy crisis, the western industrial output was four times as much as it had been between 1900 and 1950, and for 25% of the world’s peoples, personal wealth increased by between 2 and 4% every year. Raw material prices, including energy, decreased steadily to below their real market worth, and the industrialized countries sold their high value-added products at inflated prices to the Third World through discriminatory trade agreements, an issue addressed particularly by Die Grünen [Chapter Seven]. Media advertising created ever-new consumer “needs” (O’Riordan, 1981, p. i-ii).

(c) The counter-culture

The 1960s were the period of the counter-cultural social movements, with interests as disparate as self-realization, holistic health15, spirituality, the occult, or the sacred16 (Berman, 1990, p. 14-15), alternative food and energy lifestyles, anti-consumerism (“voluntary simplicity”), “New Age” thought (Capra, 1983, pp. 455-466), grassroots democracy, post-colonialism, anti-racism, uninhibited sexuality, nationalism, socialism, anti-industrialism (Eisler, 1990, p. 23). Environmentalism too, was entering its “heyday” (1970-1972, O’Riordan, 1981, p. 65).

Dissident cultural thinkers17 of the time in the USA could draw on the originally-European ideas of the nineteenth century Transcendentalists, as well as the ideas of intellectual dissidents who had fled Nazi Germany: post-Marxist Frankfurt school members, with their critique of rationalism gone wrong [their influence is especially strong in social ecology, Chapter Five], their western cultural critique (Hayward, 1995, p. 43), and their contribution to the political New Left. Students of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School were very effective in propagating New Left ideas, and radicalising both environmentalism and the student movement in the USA (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 12; Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 219).

There were other contributions to the North American dissident cultural consciousness in this period. One was Lynn White’s (1967) charge that the roots of our ecological crisis are to be found in the twin beliefs of medieval Latin Christianity: a belief in progress, and a belief in the legitimacy of exploiting the environment for human purposes, both underpinning a homocentric, exploitative attitude towards nature (Whitney, 1993, p. 157). Another contribution was the counter-cultural, counter-industrial society critique of writers such as Herbert Marcuse18, Illich (1971), Reich (1971), Callenbach (1972), and Theodore Roszak (1972, 1978). Bramwell (1994) discusses the proto-green themes of many of these writers19.

15 This movement aimed to end mechanistic medicine dispensed by experts, and to encourage self-responsibility for health
16 Sacred is not easy to define, but there are links between it and Nature, e.g. Bateson’s writings on the sacred in Nature (1988) without ever equating that with God’s presence in it, or Berman’s (1981) writing on the “re-enchantment” of the world, or “the sense of nature as being alive and sacred” (Berman, 1990, p. 22)
17 George Sessions (1987) provides a useful historical overview of people who contributed to the “ecological worldview” from the 1960s onwards
18 Martinez-Alier links the “political bite” of the 1970s ecological critique to the 1968 student rebellion “which spread from Berkeley to Berlin” 1987, (p. 237), to Maoism and Guevarism, to Bloch’s Marxist utopianism, to a revival in anarchist communalism [of which Murray Bookchin’s social ecology work was one version], the dependency school of international relations [AG Frank’s “development of underdevelopment” and Marcuse’s “uni-dimensionality” critique of the modern human being within a capitalist context (1987, pp. 237-238)
19 Bramwell (1994) examines three of these in detail: Ivan Illich’s (1971) Deschooling society (Bramwell, 1994, pp. 61-68), Charles Reich’s (1971) The greening of America, influenced by Marcuse (Bramwell, 1994, pp. 69-73), and Ernest Callenbach’s (1972) Ecotopia (Bramwell, 1994, p.73-84). Common to these three works are a “cultural and moral criticism” of the manipulative, powerful and technology-backed state” (1994, p. 61), “a dislike of elitist power structures” (1994, pp. 82-83), a condemnation of the artificial work and worker anomie/alienation it engenders, and “a desire for ... an authentic and unalienated relationship to the means of production” (1994, pp. 82-83), a
Dr EF Schumacher's (1974) *Small is beautiful*, with its critique of materialism, and profit-driven mechanistic economy, was “germinal” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 171-172). His vision went “far beyond environmental protection”, emphasizing spirituality, “good work”, the need to re-introduce quality into human life, the importance of appropriate technology, and of “human scale” in all enterprises and institutions. In Capra and Spretnak’s view, he was to become “the prophet of the global Green movement” (1984, p. 171).

(d) Resource depletion, the limits to growth idea

Around this time, there was growing concern in western industrial societies about resource depletion. Ward and Dubos’ report to the United Nations appeared in 1972, as did the Club of Rome’s (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens) controversial report, *The Limits to Growth*, which predicted global disaster if then current rates of growth, consumption and pollution levels were not curbed (Neefjes, 2000, p. 14). Both Martinez-Alier (1987) and Bramwell (1989) point to the 1970s as the time when economic ecologism emerged as cultural-economic critique. The ideas and critique of the nineteenth century ecological economists partly re-emerged from the 1960s onwards, for example, in Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen’s work on energy and entropy in the economic process, in Kenneth Boulding’s work on ecological limits to growth, and in Herman Daly’s work on energy, the environment and a steady-state economy (Bramwell, 1989; Gowdy, 1994, p. 45; Martinez-Alier, 1987). William Ophuls’ account of impending resource scarcity, and the need for a steady-state society, appeared in 1977. The notion of “sustainability” as opposed to continual growth began to gain acceptability in the 1980s (Gowdy, 1994, p. 45). Natural Resource Accounting emerged as a new discipline. The first international Multi-lateral Environmental Agreements, mainly on “the allocation and exploitation of natural resources such as wildlife, air and the marine environment” date from this period (Dalal-Clayton & Bass, 2002, p. 14). But what changed political ecology after 1980, in Ferris’s view, “... was the coming together of the peace movement and feminism with green concerns…” (1993, pp. 150-151).

(e) USA foreign policy, and the peace movement

The 1960s were also the time of the military Cold War East-West standoff. This involved a continued USA military involvement in Vietnam, the creation of military blocs in Europe, the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, the USA/USSR Cuba Crisis of 1962, and the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere by both the French and USA Governments in the 1960s and 1970s. The USA’s foreign policy provided the impetus for on the street anti-Vietnam, anti-conscription, anti-nuclear, and pro-peace protests, as well the issuing of peace manifestos by citizens’ initiatives. In Europe and West Germany particularly, fears of a nuclear and ecological holocaust were acute: the proposed deployment of USA Pershing cruise missiles in West Germany in the early 1980s became a powerful motivator for the European/West Germany peace and green movements. Although the peace movement is “green” by description (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 447), I do not discuss it in a separate chapter, but as part of the green movement/Die Grünen (Chapter Seven).

belief that technology should “work for people rather than … impose systems and structures upon them” (1994, p. 62), a desire to release people’s inherent creative energy, stifled by mindless technology and capitalist consumerism, a critique of environmentally-damaging capitalist agriculture (p. 60), a commitment to decentralization and popular autonomy/power (1994, p. 63), a dislike of cars, traffic, and noise; a preference for small scale art and craftwork rather than mega-business (1994, p. 64), a dislike of large-scale urbanization, a preference for small communities networked through efficient, cheap public transport, and “a desire for a warm, harmonious, yet spontaneous collective way of life” (1994, pp. 82-83). These are all green themes

From 1960-1966, the French Government tested its nuclear weapons in the atmosphere of the Algerian part of the Sahara Desert until Algeria’s independence in 1966; thereafter they moved the test area to the Moruroa Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, north east of Auckland, New Zealand (Brown & May, 1989, pp. 17-23). In the late 1960s/early 1970s, the USA Government was testing its nuclear weapons in the atmosphere near Amchitka Island, Alaska, in the north Pacific (May & Brown, 1989). Anti-nuclear activism was an early focus of Greenpeace
(f) The “green revolution”

The “green revolution” is the earliest use of “green” in connection with the environment that I have found in the literature. However “green” here is a misnomer in the normative ecological sense. Some ecofeminists characterise the Green Revolution as an example of “patriarchal fantasies of technological development”, and as “a form of domination called developmentalism” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. x; also Curtin, 1995, p. 59). Green writer Capra notes that the Green Revolution “helped neither the farmers nor the land nor the starving millions” (p. 271). Sustainable livelihoods writer Koos Neefjes notes that it is “almost more famous for its failures and shortcomings” than for its supposed contribution to increased food production. It did however provide the backdrop for biologist Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962), a landmark critique of American oil, herbicide, fungicide and pesticide-driven agribusiness.

(g) Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, and the “environmental fight”

Conspicuous pollution incidents in the 1960s, as well as chemical residuals build-up gave rise to widespread concern about environmental degradation (Bartelmus, 1986, p. ix). Goodin (1992, p. 10; also Attfield, 2003, p. 37; Sessions, 1995a, p. x) sees Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) as “the iconic marker” of the ‘first’ environmental crisis of the 1960s/1970s, which sowed the first seeds of doubt about science and industrialism as the way to achieve societal progress. Up until then, “classical nature conservation” had not included “fighting the power-centers which were pushing mindless ‘development’. The environmental fight ...inspired the rest of the world.” (Sessions 1995a, p. xi, citing Arne Naess, deep ecologist writer). Grassroots organizations within “the ecology movement” began to maintain and disseminate material “on environmental protection, organic farming, recycling of waste … [and to provide] practical assistance in developing and applying soft technologies...”; many also belonged to the antinuclear alliances (Capra, 1983, p. 456).

Rachel Carson’s work ushered in “the Age of Ecology” (Sessions, 1987, p.105). Inspired “by the science of ecology and Albert Schweitzer’s Reverence for Life principle”, Carson was among the first to question “the direction and goals of Western society, including the ... ‘right’ to dominate and manage the Earth” (Sessions, 1995a, p. x). Deep ecologist Naess (1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 445; also Sessions, 1994, p. 209) traces “the beginnings of the international deep ecology movement” to her Silent Spring. Ecofeminists embrace her contribution too: “…Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring first raised a passionate voice of conscience in protest against the pollution and degradation of nature...although Carson was not an avowed feminist, many would argue that it was not coincidental that a woman was the first to respond both emotionaly and scientifically to wanton human domination of the natural world.” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. ix, my italics: this is a typically green-ecofeminist approach to the human-nature relationship). While Carson’s critique elicited “major counterattacks from the chemical industry and the U.S. Department of Agriculture” (Sessions, 1994, p. 209), there was a

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22 The Green Revolution “promoted improved seed varieties (High Yielding Varieties, HYVs, which are normally hybrid seeds produced by in-breeding), widespread use of fertilisers and chemical pesticides, increased irrigation, and some mechanisation...” (Neefjes, 2000, pp. 54-55). Several writers have commented negatively on it. Side effects of the Green Revolution have been that “…natural soil fertility and organic-matter content have been depleted; soil erosion enhanced; and health risks ... increased with the use of pesticides ... Dependency of farmers on external inputs ... sharply increased, and the medium to large farms benefited, while smallholders and subsistence farmers either did not benefit at all or actually became worse off. ... The Green Revolution’s main failure is that it has not managed to eliminate rural poverty and food insecurity ...” (Neefjes, 2000, pp. 54-55). Deep ecologist Arne Naess (1986a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 71) notes that the “green” revolution in the United States was “rather ‘blue’”, meaning, more economically than ecologically oriented. Martinez-Alier’s (1987, p. 244) views accord largely with those of Denis Owen, ecologist, already expressed in 1980 (Owen, p. 190, p. 206): the green revolution was too energy intensive, too destructive of the land and too expensive for those who needed it most. Martinussen (1997, pp. 140-142) assesses the Green Revolution from a development perspective, noting arguments in its favour, but also its high energy inputs, and negative ecological effects

23 Fritjof Capra, research physicist, Californian “mystic”, author of books on “the new paradigm” (1983), and green politics (1984)

24 There was a ‘second environmental crisis’ (Goodin, 1992, p.4) in the 1990’s, related to the increased risks associated with “possible global ecological catastrophes (such as global warming, and the depletion of the ozone layer)” (Giddens, 1990, in Haralambos & Holborn, 2000, pp. 646-647)
growing critique by “biologists, field ecologists, and conservation organization leaders” of “the ecologically destructive path of modern industrial growth societies” (Sessions, 1995a, pp. ix-x).

The first Earth Day was held on 20 April 1971 (Nees, Green, & Treadway, 2003, p. 298). The 1972 United Nations Environmental Conference in Stockholm was the first acknowledgement by the “establishment” of social and political environmental conflicts (Naess, in Sessions, 1995, p. xi).

(h) The 1968 student revolts

1968 was a momentous year in political history. In the USA, both Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy were assassinated; in Europe there was the Prague Frühling. The left-inspired student unrest of 1968 stretched from America to Europe. The student movement protested inter alia, racial and gender discrimination, as well as universities’ support of the military and big business (Capra & Spretnak, 1984; Singer, 1973b, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 28). The student revolt played an important role in galvanising cautious environmentalism into a mass movement with political aspirations (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 445) – the “ecology movement”. Student radicals demanded that “the emerging environmental movement had to be … politicised; they felt no real progress toward solving the ecological crisis would be made unless politicians were afraid of being kicked out of office if they attempted to block pollution and other legislation …:”, in short, the radical students had “a beneficial influence on politically activating ‘nature lovers’” (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 445).

(i) The civil rights movement

The civil rights movement, inspired by powerful figures such as Martin Luther King, was also taking to the street in the 1960s in protest at racial oppression and lack of fundamental human rights and freedoms experienced by Blacks in the USA. This movement always held up the ideal of non-violence in its actions, an ideal repeated in the deep ecology movement, and in the green movement. The Black Liberation, Chicano liberation, Native American, and gay liberation movements were also becoming active (Rodman, 1977, p. 101). Liberal feminists, influenced by the work of Simone de Beauvoir (1965) (King, 1990, p. 110), were also demanding an end to oppression of women by men, and equal rights. There was often good synergy between the peace movement, in which many women were active, and the feminist movement, from which ecofeminism later emerged. The spirit of equal rights and its accompanying “liberation” motif, as well as feminism, played a role in the resurgence and radicalization of the animal rights movement, which began around the early 1970s (Rodman, 1977, p. 119, footnote 8).

2.3.2 The animal liberation movement

The animal liberation movement is the first of five members in the “green” sample (Chapter Three).

It traces its origins to Utilitarianism and the humane movement, which came into being together in the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century (Rodman, 1977, p. 86, p. 90) as a radical critique of abuse of human and animal well-being during the transition from traditional to modern urban/industrial society. It was a time, writes Rodman (1977, p. 90), when “sensitive members of the upper classes began to be able to put themselves in the place not only of victimized humans”, but also of victimized animals. In the twentieth century “the movement became respectable and relatively ineffectual … after securing some of its objectives (anti-cruelty laws, humane transportation and slaughter laws, etc.), making its compromise with Science on the ‘vivisection’ issue, and settling down to … maintaining shelters for

25 After this original Earth Day, social ecologist Bookchin (Chapter Five) notes, Earth Day became a “shopworn” festival during which “millions of school kids were ritualistically mobilized to clean up streets and their parents were scolded by Arthur Godfrey, Barry Commoner, and Paul Ehrlich…” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 228)
stray cats and dogs...”. After World War II though, the “truce” with science was broken as animal experimentation in the name of scientific research increased.

At street level, the regeneration and radicalization of the humane movement began as part of the counter-cultural “paradigm shift” of the 1960s/1970s in the USA. Ruth Harrison’s influential expose of factory farming was published in 1964. Also in that year, there were legal arguments for creating rights for natural objects. In 1970, Cobb was writing on rights of the “subhuman world” (Rodman, 1977, footnote 11, p. 121), and a demand was made for “a Bill of Rights for all wild creatures, everywhere” (Rodman, 1977, footnote 11, p. 120). In 1972, a Declaration of the Rights of Animals was published (Davila, 1972, noted in Rodman, 1977, p. 119, footnote 8). Vegetarianism grew, based variously on moral/humane, holistic health, and ecological energy arguments. Ethological studies, and wild life documentaries, sharpened critique of zoos. Direct action campaigns to stop whale, dolphin and seal hunting were early concerns of Greenpeace, founded in 1970 in Canada (Brown & May, 1989). The Animal Liberation Front, a leaderless resistance movement, with no formal membership or hierarchy, was founded in the UK in the 1970s (Retrieved from Wikipedia, 17 March 2006, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_Liberation_Front). Moral philosophical discussion of the status of animals began in 1972. In 1973, Peter Singer’s review essay Animal liberation on which his 1975 influential book was based, appeared. This essay gave the animal liberation movement its name (Hursthouse, 2000, pp. 12-13).

Is animal liberation part of “seeing green”? 

Animal liberation is not “green” by self-ascription, but on balance I think, by the description of other commentators. According to historian of green-ness Derek Wall (1994, p. 66): “Fundamental to Green thinking are the linked concepts of deep ecology and animal liberation. Proponents … argue that other species and indeed ‘All life has intrinsic value’ (Bunyard and Morgan-Grenville 1987:281). Many believe that Greens can be separated from mere environmentalists by virtue of their adherence to such ‘bio-ethics’ (Dobson 1990:48)”.

Historian of ecologism Anna Bramwell does not completely agree. She notes that while for example, animal liberation issues such as animal rights, anti-vivisectionism, and vegetarianism are “deeply connected to the ecological world-view” (Bramwell, 1989, p.237), they can exist without the total commitment to global reform which is one of ecologism’s hallmarks. She sees these animal liberation issues as important, but subsidiary “...elements of the ecological ethic....” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 3). Professor of Philosophy Robert Goodin notes that while Greens do talk of “animal liberation” (Goodin, 1992, p. 74), animal liberationists are not so “self-consciously green” as for example those defending forests, and see themselves as “as at the most mere fellow-travellers with the greens” (Goodin, 1992, p. 132, footnote 43).

But by contrast again, O’Riordan (1981) singles out bio-ethics as marking off “ecocentric” from “technocentric” environmentalism [section 2.2.3 above], and green movement/Die Grünen fundamentalist ideologist Rudolf Bahro considered the question of whether or not one opposed animal experimentation to be “the litmus test” for being green (Sandford, 1986a, pp. 9-10). When Die Grünen at their June 1985 Hagen conference turned down a motion banning all animal experiments, and opted for a compromise motion instead, Bahro resigned (Bahro, 1985b, pp. 210-211).

I think the animal liberation movement is “green” because it was radical on several grounds: (a) Its attempt to “help us crystallize a ‘radical new conception of man’s relationship to the rest of nature’” (Rodman, 1977, p. 84), to find a new relationship to nature by extending moral considerability beyond human beings only [“moral extensionism”].
(b) Its widening of the motivational base for ethical behaviour from rational self-interest to *empathy with an Other*, to a capacity to put oneself in the place of the Other – perhaps one could call this, admitting *feeling* as a motivational base for ethical behaviour, not only rationality, and rational self-interest. At the time, as Rodman notes (1977, p. 86), people were looking for something “more expressive of their total sensibility” than the “homocentric”, “workaday”, “commonsense” language and outlook of Resource Conservation or Survival Ecology (Rodman, 1977, pp. 83-84). They were seeking “a new ‘myth’ that can comprehend what we feel as well as think about the rest of nature” (Rodman, 1977, p. 125, footnote 31), when trying to justify their efforts to protect or save nature.

(c) Its challenge to the dominant western industrial-technological society’s views on nutrition, and on animal experimentation in science.

### 2.3.3 The “green” movement

The West German green movement/Die Grünen is the last of the five members in the green sample (Chapter Seven).

Martinez-Alier notes that North American environmentalism “wilted” in the 1980s (1987, p. 237). By then though, the counter-cultural/ecological baton had been passed on to Europe, primarily through the literary works (Bramwell, 1994, p. 60, p. 83; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 36-37; Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 237) noted in 2.3.1(c) above. The European “green” movement, particularly as it emerged in West Germany, provides a good example.

American anti-establishment ideas reached Germany in the early 1970s (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 36-37), and were well received by those concerned about environmental issues such as river pollution and “Waldsterben”. By 1972, a decentralized grassroots ecological movement, called the Bundesverband der Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz[26] [BBU] had been formed; USA-educated Petra Kelly, feminist, and anti-nuclear campaigner (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 8), later to play a key role in the formation of die Grünen, was an active member. The interests of these citizens’ movements were originally conservative-values based, and a-political protection of the environment, but this changed towards a more street-political orientation during the latter half of the 1970s. Their interests sometimes co-incided with those of other social movements, such as the peace activists who opposed the use of nuclear power, and the stationing of long-range missiles in West Germany (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 29-30), the feminists, those espousing alternative, counter-cultural lifestyles in contrast to the prevailing industrial consumer culture (Bramwell, 1994, pp. 95-6; p. 96; Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 14, pp. 29-30), or the remnants of the Marxist-inspired student movement left over from the 1968 “angry” student uprisings (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. 11-12).

**Is the West German “green movement”/ Die Grünen part of “seeing green”?**

Yes, by self-ascription, and description by authors of standing. Writing in 1987 (in Sessions, 1995, p. 24), Capra indicates as part of “the European green movement”, “the feminist movement, the holistic-health and human-potential movements, various spiritual movements, numerous citizens’ movements and initiatives, Third World and ethnic liberation movements, and many other grassroots movements…”. The link between them, he suggested, was the realization “that they represent merely different facets of the same new vision of reality[27]”. Here is an extract from a piece which he wrote in

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26 Its concerns today are still archetypically “green”: ecologically and socially-friendly energy provision; a people-friendly transport system not based on more cars and more motorways; reduction of waste in production and consumption; no genetic modification (retrieved 1 August 2005 from http://www.bbu-online.de/html/bbu.htm)

27 Again the idea encountered in the story of Greenpeace, that “green” symbolizes a new vision of society. This is really one of the key differences between today’s understanding of environmentalism which typically works within the establishment, and ecologism, which seeks a new global order, of which environmentalism is but a part.
1984, together with ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, seeking to describe the green movement and its new vision of reality: The green movement

is an ecological, holistic, and feminist movement that transcends the old political framework of left versus right. It emphasizes the interconnectedness and interdependence of all phenomena, as well as the embeddedness of individuals and societies in the cyclical processes of nature. It addresses the unjust and destructive dynamics of patriarchy. It calls for social responsibility and a sound, sustainable economic system, one that is ecological, decentralized, equitable, and comprised of flexible institutions, one in which people have significant control over their lives. In advocating a co-operative world order, Green politics rejects all forms of exploitation – of nature, individuals, social groups, and countries. It is committed to nonviolence at all levels. It encourages a rich cultural life that respects the pluralism within a society, and it honors the inner growth that leads to wisdom and compassion. Green politics, in short, is the political manifestation of the cultural shift to the new paradigm. (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, pp. xix-xx).

In the 1990s, Arne Naess was using the term “the green movement for social change” (Sessions, 1995f, p. 267) to describe the three “contemporary worldwide movements which call for grass roots activism” – the peace movement, the social justice movement, and what he called in that paper “radical environmentalism”28 (Naess, 1992, revised 1993, in Sessions, 1995, p. 465). In 1996, environmental ethicist Robyn Eckersley more or less equated “green” with the “green movement” and with “green political parties”. Thus she writes: “I use the term ‘green’ (or ‘green movement’) to refer not simply to the environment movement but rather to a broader social movement (and its green party political offshoots) that is working to secure the so-called four pillars of green politics29: ecological responsibility, social justice, grassroots democracy and nonviolence” (Eckersley, 1996, p. 234, footnote 1).

But ever different, Bramwell suggests that in 1978, “green” was more a “convenient label” than anything else. She explains that at the time, “Hamburg saw a convention of various alternative list groups. This convention was named the Rainbow group, because all the alternative groups had their own colours; purple for the women’s movement, black for the anarchists and so on... In Germany the word [green] was more of a convenient label, an equivalent to the purple, the black and the red. Since a colour had to be found, “Green” was used ...” (Bramwell, 1989, p. 220).

Even if the colour green were a random choice, Die Grünen saw themselves as part of the global green movement: “Wir verstehen uns als Teil der grünen Bewegung in aller Welt” they said in their March 1980 Federal Programme (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 4). We feel connected with all those working in the new democratic movement: “den Lebens-, Natur- und Umweltschutzverbänden, den Bürgerinitiativen, der Arbeiterbewegung, christlichen Initiativen30, der Friedens- und Menschenrechts-, der Frauen- und 3.-Welt-Bewegung”.

I should like to present one of Rudolf Bahro’s early 1980s [ca. 1981] comments on the green movement/Die Grünen in full, because it captures something of the elusive relationship between “green”, the “green movement”31, and Die Grünen:

…I would like to stress that the ‘Green’ movement should be understood in rather broad terms. The name itself is misleading, in that it conjures up images of trees, nature and so on, whereas in fact it is a broad ideological movement that reaches beyond the mechanisms of bourgeois society. Not that it ignores the existing reality, but it does not believe that Western industrial society can offer a solution to our problems. It combines a number of trends that are present in all classes of society and all political groups, creating a

28 Elsewhere Naess calls it “the ecology movement” (Sessions, 1995f, p. 267)
29 These are the four pillars of Die Grünen’s early political programmes (Chapter Seven)
30 A reference to those seeking to re-interpret the Christian anthropocentric relationship to nature in an ecological way
31 But note how Bahro here more or less equates the ecology movement with “green”. Elsewhere he uses “green” to mean the ecology and the peace movements (Bahro, 1986)
new field of interest in the sense that one talks of a magnetic field. It is difficult to absorb this into the existing party political system, and so the ecology movement has turned into an alternative type of party. I first saw for myself how people came from all different quarters to unite in the movement … in 1979 …(Bahro, 1984e, p. 130, my emphasis) … it embraces trends like the peace movement, the third-world movement and the revival of basic Christianity in the Churches, so that we really need a better name than the ‘ecology movement’ (in Bahro, 1984e, p. 131, also p. 137).

2.3.4 The ecology movement

Deep ecology, and social ecology, represent the second and third of the five members in the green sample (Chapters Four, and Five respectively).

2.3.4.1 Deep ecology

Supporters of the deep ecology movement consider themselves heir to the tradition of Thoreau, Muir, Leopold, and the 1960s Ecological Revolution (Sessions, 1995h, p. 323). By the early 1980s, deep ecology philosophy was well known in Scandinavia, and beginning to take hold in the USA. Capra’s 1983 account of the deep ecology movement as part of the new “ecological vision” emphasizes that its concerns were more than just environmental protection; he describes the movement as rooted in a rediscovery of older alternative philosophical, religious and spiritual traditions, committed to a new kind of science, which combines rational knowledge and intuition, and acknowledging the strong link between ecology and feminism (Capra, 1983, p. 462). The “deep ecology platform” appeared in 1984; the 1985 Devall and Sessions book did much to popularize deep ecology in the USA.

Two people were prominent in explicating its contemporary philosophical position. One was Gary Snyder, in the USA. Snyder, Pulitzer Prize-winning poet and essayist, follower of Zen Buddhism, had already begun developing, together with ecologist Raymond Dasmann, and Peter Berg (Sessions, 1995a, p. xii), the philosophical foundations for an ecocentric bioregionalism in the 1960s. Snyder’s (1974) Four Changes, first written in 1969, is an early classic ecocentric/deep ecology essay (Sessions, 1995c, p. 101), and his influence continued throughout the next twenty-five years (Sessions, 1995a, p. xii). The other was academic philosopher Arne Naess in Norway, who according to Sessions (1987, p. 112) “both described and defined the deep ecology movement into existence”. Naess was amongst the first professional philosophers to consider ecological problems in the context of philosophy. He began lecturing and writing on “Philosophy and ecology” at Oslo University in 1968 (Sessions, 1995a, p. xii; 1995d, p. 157), and at the Hong Kong University in 1972. In a paper presented at a Third World Futures conference held in Bucharest, 1972, he distinguished between “a “shallow” anthropocentric technocratic environmental movement concerned primarily with pollution, resource depletion, and “the health and affluence of people in the developed countries” on the one hand, and the ecocentric, “Deep, Long-Range Ecology movement” on the other. (Sessions, 1995a, p. xii). Though Naess not once uses the word “environmentalism” in his article, which perhaps reflects his European rather than American heritage, Bret Wallach (2004, p. 9), of the University of Oklahoma, suggests that the article “dismissed the efforts of mainstream environmentalism as merely reformist and advocated instead a policy of environmental egalitarianism, in which all species had an equal right to co-exist. Here was a full-blown ecocentrism …”.

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33 Bahro goes on to wonder why it should be that the ecology movement mostly first came to the fore, and made the greatest impression, in countries which “are traditionally Protestant” (Bahro, 1984, p. 131); he names Scandinavia as one. Green historian Anna Bramwell (1994) also hypothesizes on the connection between “green” and Protestantism
32 Founder Arne Naess’s Okologi, samfunn, og livsstil [Ecology, community, and lifestyle] was published “in 1976 and later translated into Swedish” (Sessions, 1987, p. 112). I have also seen 1973 given as date of publication
34 An eight-point statement of the deep ecology position discussed in Chapter Four
35 Similar to the ecocentric self-reliant community described by O’Riordan (1981)
Deep ecologists emphasize the internal relatedness of ecosystems and the individuals comprising them, advocate deep-seated respect for all forms of life, appreciation of ecological diversity, symbiosis and complexity, rejection of social class, and decentralization and local autonomy (Sessions, 1994, p. 211). They critique population growth, indiscriminate industrialism and inappropriate use of technology, mindless consumerism, exploitative relations with nature, and perhaps above all else, the arrogance of western anthropocentrism. Far more than only “protecting or repairing the status quo, which is generally the goal of environmentalism, deep ecology encompasses the study of nature’s subtle web of interrelated processes and the application of that study to our interactions with nature and among ourselves...” (Capra & Spretnak, 1984, p. 30). Environmental philosopher Michael E. Zimmerman describes deep ecology as “a radical stream of the environmental movement. ... A primary distinction between deep ecology and reform environmentalism [shallow ecology] is that the former is nonanthropocentric in its attitude toward the natural world, while the latter is anthropocentric” (1990, pp. 138-139). By Naess’ description, the ecological movement focussed/is still focussed on achieving a societal transformation towards “wide ecological sustainability” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 219; also Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 446-448).

Is deep ecology part of “seeing green”?

It is, both by self-ascription, and description by eco-philosophers. On founder of deep ecology Arne Naess’ descriptions, “green” means variously, the green movement, alternative movements, the deep ecology movement, the entire ecology movement, and green political parties.

For example, when asked in an interview in 1999 for his own definition of “Deep ecology”, Naess replied: “Deep Ecology - I could also call it "Green" - the Green Movement is a movement where you not only do good for the planet for the sake of humans but also for the sake of the planet itself. That's to say that you start from the whole of the globe and talk about the ecosystems, trying to keep them healthy as a value in itself. ...."; and “Otherwise I would say that deep ecology or the green movement is a movement of activists or being active amongst one's own friends ....” (Naess, 1999, in Kubiak, 1999).

And in answer to a question on the nature of Die Grünen’s agenda in Germany, or of the green party in Sweden, Naess replied: “Well, in West Germany where the term "green" was first used in politics, practically every alternative movement called itself green. So, it's a mixture of many different kinds. In Sweden, it's more really what I would call green or nearer the deep ecology movement. ... So, the Swedish greens are in my view very justly called green because their ecological basis is so sharp. ...” (Naess, 1999, in Kubiak, 1999).

Naess describes deep ecology as part of the ecology movement. For example, in discussing how difficult he thinks it is for a green political programme to accommodate all the extreme positions of the peace, social justice and ecology movements, he says “The main driving force of the Deep Ecology movement, as compared with the rest of the ecological movement ...” (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 452). And he sees the ecology movement as part of, but not the equivalent of, the green movement: For example, in a discussion of the Eight Points of the deep ecology platform in 1993, Naess remarks that there is a clear distinction between the ecological movement, and the Green movement, “of which the Deep Ecology movement is only a part” (Naess, 1993a, in Sessions, 1995, p. 220, see also p. 219).

Other authors note the deep ecology – green link. Wall’s (1994, p. 66) comment that deep ecology is “fundamental to “green” thinking” has already been noted. Smith (1997, p. 5) links the two thus: “Arne Naess, the originator of the term ‘deep ecology’ and the progenitor of the green deep ecology ‘movement’...”. Professor of philosophy J. Baird Callicott writes in 1993 (1993a, pp. 3-4) that the deep ecology platform “has been adopted by members of the radical green movement...”. Political scientists Michael and Anderson (1987) characterize deep ecology as a “green story”. And ecofeminist Ariel
Salleh claims that deep ecology is “held back from maturation as a Green philosophy by its lack of a fully rounded political critique” (Salleh, 1993, p. 225).

2.3.4.2 Social ecology

Murray Bookchin, also described as “a major figure in anarchist and utopian political theory, theory of technology, urbanism, and the philosophy of nature” (Bookchin, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 354) is the person most associated with the social ecology wing of the ecology movement, sometimes also called “eco-socialism” (Goodin, 1992, p. 73). Like deep ecology, social ecology was also simultaneously a new social movement [i.e. grassroots political activism around particular issues], incipient new social theory (Lahar, 1996, p. 1), and eco-philosophy. It shares with deep ecology, feminism/ecofeminism and the animal welfare movement, the liberation/emancipation rhetoric of the time (Goodin, 1992, p. 74). Social ecology, via Bookchin, issued its call “for a radically new spirituality”, a “collective effort to change society”, and an “ethics of complementarity” toward nonhuman beings as early as 1965 (Bookchin, p. 355).

From the first meeting of greens in Northern America at Amherst in 1987, there were bitter disputes between deep and social ecologists. In 1988, Bookchin noted that

… the word ‘ecology’ [does not] put us all … in the same boat against environmentalists who are simply trying to make a rotten society work by dressing it in green leaves and colourful flowers, while ignoring the deep-seated roots of our ecological problems. It is time to face the fact that there are differences within the so-called ‘ecology movement’ of the present time that are as serious as those between the ‘environmentalism’ and ‘ecologism’ of the early seventies (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 229, his emphasis).

According to Bookchin (1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 228-229, p. 229), a “coherent” ecology is one “rooted in an ecological philosophy, ethics, sensibility, image of nature, and, ultimately, an ecological movement that will transform our domineering market society into a nonhierarchical cooperative one that will live in harmony with nature, because its members live in harmony with each other” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 229, his emphasis). Unless “…North American Greens and the ecology movement shift their focus toward a social ecology and let deep ecology sink into the pit it has created for us, the ecology movement will become another ugly wart on the skin of society….” (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 238, his emphasis).

*Is social ecology part of “seeing green”*?

Bookchin describes social ecology’s political position as “radically green”. He explains radically green as meaning, taking a stand together “with the left-wing tendencies in the German Greens and extra-parliamentary street movements of European cities; with the American radical ecofeminist movement; with the demands for a new politics based on citizens’ initiatives, neighborhood assemblies, and New England’s tradition of town-meetings; with non-aligned anti-imperialist movements at home and abroad; with the struggle by people of color for complete freedom from the domination of privileged whites and from the superpowers” (1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 236).

2.3.5 Direct action eco-activism

Although civil disobedience is a recurring green praxis, no direct action ecological groups have been included in the green sample. Examples of such direct action eco-active groups are Friends of the Earth, formed in 1969 (Goodin, 1992, p. 10), Greenpeace in 1970, the Environmental Life Force in 1977, Earth First! around 1980, and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals [PETA] in 1980 by Ingrid Newkirk, inspired by Peter Singer (Goodin, 1992, p. 10). I discuss only Greenpeace and Earth

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37 Re-animated as the Earth Liberation Front in 1992 by some former members of Earth First! (Goodin, 1992, p. 10)
First! next, as two examples of the “new social movements”/“dark green” side of Wissenburg’s diagram (Chapter One, Figure 2).

### 2.3.5.1 Greenpeace

Greenpeace represents the earliest positive connection I have been able to find between “green” and “environmentalism plus social critique”. It was founded in 1970 by Jim Bohlen, and Irving Stowe, both practising Quakers, and members of the Canadian branch of the USA-based Sierra Club, to protest the USA Government’s atomic bomb testing. It soon turned its attention to environmental issues as well. The small group’s distinguishing colour was green. The name “Greenpeace” was coined by another early member, Canadian social worker Bill Darnell, to symbolize the close relationship between the ecology movement and the peace movement, and to convey visually, the coupling of concern for the planet’s environmental issues, with peaceful opposition to atomic weapons, in “a compelling new vision” for society (Brown & May, 1989).

### 2.3.5.2 Earth First! (circa 1980 - )

“Are you tired of namby-pamby environmental groups?” ... "No compromise in defense of Mother Earth!" (retrieved May 2005 from [http://www.earthfirst.org](http://www.earthfirst.org)).

Capra and Spretnak (1984, p. 30) note that the “deep ecology concept” “has informed American ecophiiosophy and activism in recent years”, i.e. presumably, the late 1970s and early 1980s. Earth First!, which “promoted an ecocentric orientation and claimed to be an activist component of the Deep Ecology movement” (Sessions, 1995a, p. xiii), provides a good example of dark green, direct eco-activism.

Dave Foreman, a deep ecology adherent (Bookchin, 1988a, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 230), founded Earth First! in the early 1980s. It initially concentrated, and still does, on direct action to prevent inter alia, logging, dam building, other forms of development which may cause “destruction of wildlife habitats or the despoliation of wild places”, seal slaughter, and the spread of genetically modified organisms (retrieved May 2005 from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_First%21](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_First%21)). From the mid 1980s, Foreman increasingly turned towards, and promoted, the deep ecology philosophical approach, “which holds that all forms of life on Earth have equal value in and of themselves, without regard for their utility to human beings. Earth First'lers use this philosophy to justify an ecocentric view of the world in which intrinsic values for organisms and ecosystems outweigh their resource values.” (retrieved May 2005 from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave_Foreman](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave_Foreman)).

Foreman and his group adopted what many consider dubious ethical direct action practices, including the sabotage or destruction of infrastructure, “spiking” trees to make logging potentially injurious to loggers, and inflicting economic damage, tactics variously called “monkeywrenching”, “ecosabotage” or “ecoterrorism”. Foreman himself publicized these tactics widely in his writings; he and other Earth First'lers were also accused in the 1980s of making contentious misanthropic remarks in the course of...
their campaigns. Less contentious Earth First! direct action practices today include educational campaigns, protests, and civil disobedience tactics such as tree sitting to prevent logging, road blockades, disruptive action to prevent environmental destruction while filing lawsuits, and locking supporters to heavy equipment to immobilize it. While critics of the movement consider such tactics eco-terrorism, Earth First!ers say it is “ecodefence” - the real terrorists are those who destroy the environment in the first place (retrieved May 2005 from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_First%21](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_First%21) last modified 16 April 2005). After 1990, Earth First! moved increasingly towards adopting an anarchist political philosophy, calling itself a movement, a priority, not an organization (see Earth First! website [http://www.earthfirst.org](http://www.earthfirst.org) too), avoiding organized leadership or administrative structures, and promoting “decentralized, locally-informed activism based on communitarian ethics” (both retrieved May 2005 from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_First%21](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earth_First%21), against what it sees as a “lethargic, compromising, and increasingly corporate environmental community”.

### 2.3.6 Eco-feminism

Ecofeminism represents the fifth and last member in the sample of “seeing green” (Chapter Six).

The Women’s movement began in the late 1960s, and eco-feminism emerged in the mid-1970s (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. ix). The term “ecofeminism” was coined by Francoise d’Eaubonne in 1974 (Merchant, 1990a, p. 100; Warren, 1990, p. 125), but Spretnak (1990, p. 8) traces some of its ideas as far back as the 1940s, when Simone de Beauvoir noted the connection between patriarchy, and the domination of women and nature (Spretnak, 1990, p. 8). The first conference to address the idea of the linked domination of women and nature was held in 1974, at the University of California, Berkeley. Two seminal works, *Woman and nature* by Susan Griffin, and *The death of nature* by Carolyn Merchant followed in 1978 and 1980 respectively; and three key conferences - at Amherst, Massachusetts, at Sonoma State University, California, and in London - were held in 1980 and 1981 on women and the environment. Ecofeminism’s potential as an alternative to mainstream environmental ethics began to gain recognition around 1990 (Warren, 1990, p. 125).

Eisler (1990, p. 23) sees ecofeminism as an integration of interests from the peace, ecology and feminist movements of the 1970s. As grassroots political activism, new social theory, and philosophy, ecofeminism draws on the women’s movement’s multi-theoretical roots - liberal feminism, Marxist feminism [1960s critical Marxist theory], radical or cultural feminism [the source of women’s spirituality/nature-based religion (Spretnak, 1990, pp. 3-14)], socialist feminism, black and Third World feminisms, and postmodern feminism (Warren, 1997; Wilson, 1997).

Feminists argue that they have successfully shown that what was thought to be the “natural” social arrangements of western patriarchy, have actually been socially constructed by men in men’s interests, “to justify men’s control over women” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, p. ix). Contemplating the dual threats of nuclear annihilation and ecocide in the 1970s, feminist writers began to see, and to theorize connections between male consciousness and male manipulation of “everything defined as ‘other’, whether nature, women, or Third World cultures” (Diamond & Orenstein, 1990, pp. ix-x). Feminist Rosemary Radford Ruether commented in 1975:

> Women must see that there can be no liberation for them and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to be one of domination. They must unite the demands of the women’s movement with those of the ecological movement to envision a radical reshaping of the basic socioeconomic relations and the underlying values of this [modern industrial] society. (Ruether, 1975, p. 204, in Warren, 1996, p. ix).

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44 Sessions (1995a, p. xiii, p. 280, and footnote 38 on p. 288) makes it clear that both Foreman’s misanthropy and views on population control are ‘antithetical’ (p. xiii) to Deep Ecology philosophy. He also points out that Foreman himself, in the same context of making his views on population control known, noted that “I am speaking for myself, not for Earth First!”. But see also Foreman’s sympathetic-sounding discussion with Murray Bookchin, seeking common ground between deep and social ecology (Chase, 1991)
Is Ecofeminism part of “seeing green”?

Ecofeminism, its conjuncture of peace, ecologist, and feminist concerns, its concern to develop “worldviews and practices which are not based on models of domination” (Warren, 1996, p. ix), is green by self-ascription. In ecofeminist philosopher Charlene Spretnak’s view, the “arrogance and ignorance” of the dominant techno-industrial worldview “are being challenged to varying extents by environmentalist organizations and to a much deeper extent by a loose aggregate of movements whose members are sometimes called the “new” ecologists: ecofeminism, deep ecology, Green politics, bioregionalism, creation-centered spirituality, animal rights, and others … they are … feeling their way … toward a way of being that is infused with ecological wisdom” (Spretnak, 1990, p. 4). And again, in the same author’s view “…women and men who become involved with Green politics for environmental reasons discover ecofeminism and deep ecology there” (Spretnak, 1990, p. 6).

Another ecofeminist, Starhawk, writes: “We [spiritually-based ecofeminists] have a certain perspective that I believe can be valuable politically and that is, in some way, linked to what I see ecofeminism and the Green movement attempting…” (Starhawk, 1990, p. 75). Or, [in thinking how to bring about a new consciousness in society, she writes] “…this is what I think we should do, and, if I were setting an ecofeminist or a Green agenda, this is how I would organize it…” (Starhawk, 1990, p. 80). Ecofeminist authors Diamond and Orenstein refer to ecofeminism’s ideology as “this tapestry in green” (1990, p. xii).

2.3.7 The environmental justice movement in 1980s USA

Despite having widened its base from single-issue focussed environmentalists, and concerned middle class ecologists, to a mass social and political movement in 1970s and 1980s in Europe at least, environmentalism in America remained predominantly white, and concerned with “white” environmental issues (Taylor, 1997). Environmentalism crossed the colour line in the USA in the late 1980s, as the realization grew in the social justice movement that inequalities and discriminations based on race, class, and gender, were compounded by inequitable environmental burdens. Toxic waste dumps, nuclear waste storage sites, landfill sites, polluting industries, and incinerators, were deliberately and disproportionately sited in minority [people of colour] and low-income communities, often as a result of successful lobbying by wealthier, better-organized, better politically-connected [white] communities elsewhere.

Environmental justice became the motivating and rallying theme of a movement which although originally based in minority groups, now cuts across and builds bridges between groups traditionally segregated along race, ethnic, class and interest lines. In 1991, the environmental justice movement set out its 17 principles (Taylor, 1997). In the first of these principles, the environmental justice movement “Affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity, and the interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from ecological destruction”.

Is environmental justice part of “seeing green”?

Logical thought suggests it must be: if one accepts Naess’s description of the green movement as comprising the peace movement, the ecology movement, and the social justice movement, then the environmental justice movement, as part of the social justice movement, must be part of “seeing green”. Taylor (1997) confirms the links: in a Venn diagram she suggests (Taylor, 1997, p. 65) that the environmental justice movement represents the intersection of interests between the environmental, ecofeminist, women’s, civil rights, and labour movements.

Still, reading through its principles, one has the clear impression that it operates more within a humanist “rights” and “justice” framework than an ecological framework. And Dobson (2000, p. 183) notes that “My own view is that the ‘justice’ and ‘environment’ agendas are related in the way that the
circles in Venn diagrams are related. That is to say, there are areas of common concern but it is a mistake to regard them as wholly and completely mapping on to one another. The powerful ‘environmental justice’ movement in the United States is often deployed as evidence that the environmental and justice movements can sing from the same hymn sheet, but a close examination of the US movement’s aspirations shows that it is more concerned with human justice than with environmental protection”. Even though I have not selected the environmental justice movement for closer examination in a separate chapter, we encounter its views in its critique of ecofeminism (Chapter Six).

2.4 Ecologism as political ideology, and “green”

Bramwell uses the term “ecologism” to mean a politically-radicalised environmentalism, a new “political box” at the time of its emergence, a political theory so encompassing that it should be considered simultaneously as a total western European cultural critique, a total worldview - what she sometimes calls “the ecological world-view” (1989, p. 237), an ideology in short, just as conservatism, liberalism and socialism are ideologies (1989, p. 15, p. 39).

The nature of ecologism as political ideology vis-a-vis the three traditional western political ideologies is a vast separate field of enquiry (Dobson, 1993, p. 229). On Dobson’s view, ecologism makes three distinct new contributions: it causes us to re-view through a green-feminist lens, previous political theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, and to discover new [female] political authors; to re-view traditional political concepts such as rights, duties, distributive justice, autonomy, and democracy; and to deal with its widening of the political community to include non-humans (Dobson, 1993, pp. 229-233). Despite the obvious green of “ecologism’, I do not include it in the representative database of “seeing green”. Instead, the green sample includes the “total view” of Die Grünen (Chapter Seven), whom Bramwell considers a “flowering” of ecologism (1989, p. 6).

2.5 Environmental philosophy/ethics, and “green”

In this section, I discuss (2.5.1) four homocentric/anthropocentric models of the human-nature relationship available in the 1970s, as background to the “seminal” calls for an environmental ethic which could “make good the shortcomings of traditional humanism” (Attfield, 2003, p. 9, and p. 37; also Sessions, 1995d, p. 156; Sylvan, 1973, p. 12); (2.5.2) early philosophical moves towards a greener, non-anthropocentric understanding of the human-nature relationship; (2.5.3) the newer “green” environmental value theories of biocentrism and ecocentrism; and (2.5.4) the selection of the three radical ecophilosophies (Chapters Four, Five, and Six) as members of the “seeing green” sample.

2.5.1 Four homocentric models of the human-nature relationship

Towards the late 1960s/early 1970s, a philosophical search for a new understanding of the human-nature relationship began. Australian philosopher and historian of ideas, John Passmore (1974) identified three models of the human-nature relationship available in the Christian-humanist heritage, for modification into an “environmental” ethic: (1) man as despot (2) man as developer and perfecter of nature and (3) man as steward, the latter two models in his view, converging (Rodman, 1983; Sessions, 1987, p. 111). For better understanding, all three Christian-humanist models need to be

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45 Dobson (1993, p. 229) defines a political ideology as “an analysis of political reality, a picture of the Good Life, and a theory of political action or strategy”.


47 All three were rejected by Australian philosophers Richard and Val Routley (later, Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood) as representing the “Western Domination [of nature] Assumption” (Sessions, 1987, p. 111)
placed within that Christian perspective which holds that nature, along with Adam as representative of the human species, forfeited divine grace at the time of the Fall\(^{(49)}\) (Sessions, 1994, p. 219). Calvinism for example, saw “both humans and nature as sinful and in need of redemption” (Sessions, 1995d, p. 167). There is a Christian tradition that humans redeem themselves in God’s eyes by redeeming nature and restoring paradise (Sessions, 1994, p. 219). And for Bacon, the purpose of science was to “regain a command over nature that had been lost with Adam’s Fall in the Garden” (Sessions, 1995d, p. 161).

2.5.1.1 ‘Man as despot’

In 1967 University of California [UCLA] historian Lynn White published a controversial article\(^{(48)}\) on the Judeo-Christian negative contribution to the environmental crisis. He critiqued its “….emphasis on God’s transcendence, the other-worldly destiny of the human, its orientation toward “progress”\(^{(50)}\), and its biblical notion of human “dominion”\(^{(51)}\) over the Earth” (Smith, 1997, p. 72). White contended that Christianity “not only … insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends”, but that it also “established a dualism of man and nature” (White, 1967, cited in Sessions, 1994, p. 207). He argued that this tradition “fostered a perception of nature as ‘other’, … and allowed for a very exploitative exercise of dominion” (Smith, 1997, p. 72). Modern secular ideologies, such as Marxism, are essentially Judeo-Christian heresies, White claimed, and have not deviated from Christian ideas of progress, and “man’s rightful mastery over nature”. Modern science and technology, having developed within a Christian matrix, are also “permeated with Christian arrogance toward nature”. One must note here though, that Christians themselves are working hard towards finding a more benign Christian environmental ethic than the “despot” tradition (Guelke, 2004; Kay, 1988; McDaniel, 1983, 1994).

2.5.1.2 ‘Man perfecting nature’

The ‘man perfecting nature’ (Passmore, 1974) construction is traced to Aristotelian thought (Sessions, 1994, p. 216), and to the Judaic stewardship tradition (Katz, 1994, pp. 55-70). Passmore describes the ‘man perfecting nature’ position as a kind of moral justification for “development”: “… [we can think] of an area still in something like its original condition as ‘not yet developed’. To ‘develop’ land, on this view, is to actualize its potentialities, to bring to light what it has in itself to become, and by this means to perfect it… How is perfection to be judged: the presumption is still, in Aristotle’s manner, that nature is at its best when it fulfils men’s needs – that this, indeed, is its reason for existing, what its

\(^{(48)}\) Attfield (2003, p. 35, citing Harrison (1999, pp. 102-107) also refers to nature’s order and perfection before the Fall. There are some fascinating ideas on the idea of the Fall. One interpretation is that it represents the shift from the hunter-gatherer lifestyle of the first humans, where nature provided fully for human needs, to the age of agriculture, when human beings began to take control of their food production. It has also been given a psychological/moral interpretation as the shift from being un-self-conscious, to conscious and aware of the “good and evil” uses of power over nature, and thus over other human beings too. Environmental ethicist J.B. Callicott traces the emergence of anthropocentrism to the shift represented metaphorically by the Fall, and suggests that it was the “original sin” (McDaniel, 1994, pp. 76-78, citing work from Wes Jackson, agro-ecologist, as well as Callicott’s own views (1991, p. 125). Ecofeminist Riane Eisler (1990, pp. 27-28) interprets the Fall as “based on folk memories of a time before … brother turned against brother and man trod woman down under his heel”, a symbolic reference to the Neolithic period, when the early agrarian societies lived in peaceful harmony, and were not male-dominated (Eisler, 1990, pp. 27-28)

\(^{(49)}\) “The historical roots of our ecological crisis”, 1967, first read at a December 1966 meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and published in 1967 (Sessions, 1995a, footnote 5, p. xxv). According to Whitney (1993, pp. 151-169), White’s challenge to Christianity “to produce a more environmentally sensitive theology has generated a vast body of material both critiquing and defending the ecological stance of the Judeo-Christian tradition” (p. 151). Deep ecologist George Sessions considers this paper by White as a “classic of deep ecology” (Whitney, 1993, p. 158 and footnote 29). Steffen (1992) recognizes White’s role in “forcing the Christian community to confront itself on the issue of environmental protection” (p. 75) but nevertheless defends the biblical notion of dominion as “an ideal of responsible [environmental] action rather than as an authorization for callous disregard of the natural world” (p. 63). Robin Attfield (2003, pp. 31-32) doubts White’s dominion interpretation. Christian stewardship rejects teleological anthropocentrism, and is a “coherent … interpretation” of the Bible’s central beliefs, which place a “high value” on the natural world with which humans are entrusted, a trust which calls for “human responsibility and answerability” (2003, p. 36) However, as White subsequently pointed out to his critics, leading thinkers could also equally have put a positive “spin” on the Judeo-Christian tradition; the point is, they didn’t. One should therefore ask: What purpose did the negative focus serve? Whose interests? (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, pp. 199-202; VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, pp. 40-45)

\(^{(50)}\) White negatively ascribed Western “faith in perpetual progress” to “Judeo-Christian teleology” (Sessions, 1994, p. 216). See as contrast, Jaki’s (1974) analysis of the positive contribution of Judeo-Christian thought to the evolution of a viable Western science, and so progress

\(^{(51)}\) But subsequent writers have sought to re-instate the notion of dominion “as an ideal of responsible action rather than as an authorization for callous disregard of the natural world” (Steffen, 1992 p. 63)
potentialities are for. So to perfect nature is to humanize it, to make it more useful for man’s purposes, more intelligible to their reason, more beautiful to their eyes…” (Sessions, 1994, p. 216, citing Passmore, 1974, pp. 32-33).

The humans perfecting nature model seems related to the “spiritual motif” in Western theology too, in which Santmire (1985) includes Teilhard de Chardin [1881-1955]’s work. In this view, the purpose of human existence is either transcendence of nature, or the humanizing of nature. For Teilhard de Chardin, nature was “an evolutionary process to be humanized through technological progress” (McDaniel, 1994, p. 72, drawing on Santmire, 1985, p. 170); a “stepping-stone” to human fulfilment, understood as transcending/humanizing nature; a fulfilment in which humans are liberated from nature’s constraints (Sessions, 1994, p. 292). At the end of human life was divine life with God, without nature (McDaniel, 1994, pp. 72-73). de Chardin’s thoroughly anthropocentric spirituality is also found in the intellectual/social strand of New Age thought, and on deep ecologist George Sessions’ view, can also be traced in the thought of social ecologist Murray Bookchin (Sessions, 1995g, pp. 292-300).

2.5.1.3 ‘Man as steward’

The ‘man as steward’ construction can be traced as far back as Plato (Sessions, 1994, p. 215). It was also present in the Old Testament. Several scholars argue that “dominion” always meant beneficent governance of the kind exercised by Solomon, and environmentally responsible stewardship of nature, not its exploitation (Steffen, 1992; Katz, 1994; McDaniel, 1994).

The essence of stewardship is that “the end [purpose] of man’s creation was that he should be the viceroy of the great God of heaven and earth in this inferior world: his steward [sty-warden], villicus (farm manager), bailiff or farmer of this goodly farm of the lower world” (Sessions, 1994, p. 215, citing Passmore, 1974, p. 30). The Benedictine monks at their monasteries for example, actively intervened in nature because they believed it was their duty to “work as partners of God in improving his creation or at least in giving it a more human expression… [St Benedict thought that] labor is like a prayer which helps in recreating paradise out of chaotic wilderness” (Sessions, 1994, p. 216, citing from Dubos, 1972, pp. 135-174).

Passmore’s Christian-heritage image of ‘man as steward’ is the image re-articulated by most texts seeking an appropriate secular motivation for the ethic of sustainability; this is discussed further in Chapter Nine, section 7.3. The stewardship approach appears quite close to the “resource conservation” approach, which is one of the four versions of a new “ecological consciousness” which John Rodman (1983, reproduced in Sessions, 1995, pp. 121-130) discerned as emerging during the 1960s/1970s reassessment of the human-nature relationship.

2.5.1.4 ‘Resource conservation’

Rodman (1977) identified a further human-nature relationship model which he called “Resource Conservation”. This approach draws on the Pinchot half of the Muir-Preservationism/Pinchot-Conservationism philosophical divide heritage (section 2.2 above). It tends towards an economic rather than a religious, reverential and/or aesthetic attitude to nature. In the resource conservation view, pragmatic prudence suggests an “enlightened self-interest” ethic, where “interest” means, economic interests, and interests of power related to the control and use of natural resources (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 121-122). Later additions to this current of thought were interests such as human

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52 But supporter of deep ecology, and eco-theologian Thomas Berry is nevertheless able to draw on Teilhard’s thought to propose a “neo-Teilhardian” cosmology (McDaniel, 1994, p. 72)
53 “Man, they said, is sent to earth by God ‘to administer earthly things’, to care for them in God’s name”
54 These were Resource conservation, wilderness preservation, moral extensionism, and ecological sensibility
recreation, aesthetic pleasure, scientific knowledge, and the biological survival of human beings (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 122). The latter can be seen clearly for example, in the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, entitled “Ecosystems and Human Well-being”.

In Rodman’s view, the “resource conservation” form of ecological consciousness, also called the “RCD [resource conservation and development] scientific management of Nature” approach (Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 301), is not a suitable starting point for “a general environmental ethic” for various reasons. These are discussed further in Chapter Nine, section 7.3.1, but a key reason is its absence of commitment to the idea of nature’s value-for-itself.

2.5.2 Towards a “greener” environmental ethic

There had been foreshadowing of a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic before the 1970s: (a) a long-existing alternative “ecological” motif in Christian thought; (b) Muir’s nineteenth century “wilderness preservation” approach, (c) Albert Schweitzer’s “reverence for life” principle, and (d) Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic”.

(a) The alternative Christian “ecological” motif

Santmire suggests that together with the “spiritual motif” in the “thoroughly ambiguous” Western Christian approach to nature (Linzey, 1990, pp. 52-55; McDaniel, 1994, p. 71, citing Santmire, 1985), there had always been a minor “ecological” tradition, to which belongs inter alia, Francis of Assisi [1182-1226]. White had for example proposed a return to the views of St Francis, who believed in “the equality of all creatures”, as a Christian solution to the ecological crisis (Sessions, 1995c, p. 101; see also Sessions, 1995g, p. 298; Mizzoni, 2004). In the alternative Christian ecological motif, the purpose of human existence is “community with nature”, appreciation of “nature’s blessings”, and awareness “that nature has value apart from its usefulness to human beings” (McDaniel, 1994, p. 71). At the end of human life, was divine life with God, also for nature. One finds references to this alternative Christian tradition for example, in deep ecology writings, and McDaniel (1994) bases his interpretation of modern Christian stewardship on it (Chapter Nine, section 7.3.2.1).

(b) Muir’s thought

Rodman considers the exact value position of Muir’s “wilderness preservation” to be “ambiguous” - Muir never explicitly spoke in terms of nature’s intrinsic value. But, Rodman’s view is that had Muir been asked outright if the Yosemite had value in itself, “he would surely have said that it did” (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 123-124).

(c) Albert Schweitzer’s (1875-1965) “reverence for life”

In his ethical thought, “Schweitzer contended that modern civilization is in decay because it lacks the will to love. He suggested that people should develop a philosophy based on what he termed ‘reverence for life,’ embracing with compassion all forms of life” (Microsoft Encarta, 1994). Something of Schweitzer’s non-anthropocentric “reverence for life” principle is reflected in the small quote from his work below:

The great fault of all ethics hitherto has been that they believed themselves to have to deal only with the relations of man to man. In reality, however, the question is what is his attitude to the world and all life that comes within his reach. A man is ethical only when life, as such, is sacred to him, that of plants and animals as that of his fellow men, and when he devotes himself helpfully to all life that is in need of help. (Schweitzer, 1950, p. 310, in Velasquez, 1991, p. 12).

Ordained curate, medical missionary in French Equatorial Africa (now Gabon) theologian, ethical philosopher, musicologist, humanitarian, and 1952 Nobel Peace Prize winner. Religion was the thread running through all his interests; he found profound religious meaning not only in human beings' accomplishments, but also in the natural world (Microsoft Encarta, 1994)
(d) Aldo Leopold’s (1887-1948) “land ethic”

“The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.” … “That land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, but that land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics” (Aldo Leopold, http://www.aldoleopold.org)

It is scarcely possible to follow debates on the green perspective without some background on Leopold’s “land ethic”. Although Leopold was “trained in the anthropocentric resource conservation ideology of Gifford Pinchot” before breaking with it\(^\text{57}\), his thought was also influenced by Darwin, Muir, Schweitzer and Asian philosophy (Sessions, 1987, pp. 113-114). In his 1949 *A Sand County Almanac*, Leopold reflected on “man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it” (Leopold cited by Sylvan, 1973, in Zimmerman et al, 1993, p. 12). His earlier Pinchot-type utilitarian view on the human/nature relationship had by 1949 changed to the view that the human being is a citizen of the land community like any other, and that no “ethical relation to land [i.e. “…soils, waters, plants, and animals…”] can exist without love, respect and admiration for land, and a high regard for its value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense.” (Leopold, 1949 republished 1966, p. 239).

Some suggest that Leopold’s land ethic was nothing new at all, simply an extension of conventional anthropocentric ethics – the extending of “rights” to plants and animals (Bramwell, 1994, p. 38; Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 127). But environmental philosopher Richard Sylvan seems to be saying that Leopold was suggesting that it is not that we should be extending our traditional morality to the environment, but that a “change in …[our] ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations” is required (Sylvan, 1973, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 13). Sessions and Rodman argue that Leopold was not trying so much to establish a formal environmental ethical theory, as pleading for a move away from total anthropocentrism: “actually trying to bring about an ecocentric ‘paradigm shift’ or change in perception and consciousness” (Sessions, 1995c, p. 101). Leopold however, left an enigmatic heritage for environmental philosophy (section 2.5.3.2 below).

2.5.3 More recent “green” theories of environmental value

Environmental philosophy began as formal discipline in 1979 (Callicott, 1993a, p. 3). Among the many issues with which it concerned itself, anthropocentrism versus non-anthropocentrism was one. Biocentrism and ecocentrism represent two non-anthropocentric theories\(^\text{58}\).

2.5.3.1 Biocentrism

Recall that biocentrism as ethic is located on the dark green side of Wissenburg’s heuristic (1993, in Chapter One, Figure 2). By the late 1970s, the work of philosophers such as Kenneth Goodpaster began to tentatively take moral philosophy “beyond animal liberation/rights into environmental ethics proper” (Callicott, 1993a, p. 7). Goodpaster’s 1978 paper “On being morally considerable” proposed a “life-principle” ethic; it set the criterion for moral considerability as “being alive”: things that are alive, have *interests*, a good of their own, and so may be benefited or harmed (Callicott, 1993a, p. 7). Such “life-centred” environmental ethical theories fall under the umbrella term “biocentrism”: a “normative stance that holds that all living creatures have a good of their own, and have moral standing

\(^{57}\) O’Riordan (1981, p. ix) sees Leopold as a “later disciple” of the Transcendentalists. But Leopold had originally trained as a forester in the Pinchot Conservationist managerial school of thought. For example, in 1933, Leopold wrote that “Effective conservation requires … a deliberate and purposeful manipulation of the environment” (from Leopold’s 1933 “Game management” book, cited in Bramwell, 1994, p. 37), which necessitated, in Bramwell’s words, the “careful management of animal life, … and working for an increase of those products of the wilderness that could be used or consumed by man” (Bramwell 1994 p. 37). But by 1949, when Leopold published his Sand County Almanac, there had been an almost complete reversal, a conversion. Somewhat tongue-in-cheek, Bramwell (1994, p. 39) remarks: “Here was the Gospel of Nature, a sermon in stones and sandflies…”

\(^{58}\) I will not in this chapter or study, be pursuing further all the environmental ethical explanations of biocentrism and ecocentrism, and the various kinds of consequentialist/teleological or nonconsequentialist/deontological ethics which can be linked to them (Attfield, 2003)
accordingly, and that their flourishing or attaining their good is intrinsically valuable” (Attfield, 2003, p. 189).

Paul Taylor is a widely acknowledged proponent of biocentrism as an appropriate new human-nature environmental ethic (Mizzoni, 2004, p. 41). Four beliefs form the core of Taylor’s biocentrism:

(a) The belief that humans are members of the Earth’s Community of Life in the same sense and on the same terms in which other living things are members of that Community.

(b) The belief that the human species, along with all other species, are integral elements in a system of interdependence such that the survival of each living thing, as well as its chances of faring well or poorly, is determined not only by the physical conditions of its environment but also by its relations to other living things.

(c) The belief that all organisms are teleological centers of life in the sense that each is a unique individual pursuing its own good in its own way.


While biocentrism is opposed to anthropocentrism as environmental ethical theory, it accords equal inherent worth and moral considerability only to wild organisms, both animal and plant. Inanimate things are excluded (Callicott, 1993a, p. 8; VandeVeer & Pierce, 1998, p. 98). Also, only “individuals can be meaningfully said to have moral value in and of themselves. Neither species nor ecosystems embody moral value” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 346); they have no good of their own, thus cannot be benefited (Attfield, 2003, p. 11, p. 40). In opposition to the individualism of biocentrism, is the holism of ecocentric theories.

2.5.3.2 Ecocentrism

For ecocentrist, the key insight from scientific ecology is that “humans and their activities are inextricably integrated with the rest of the natural world in communal or communal-like arrangements” (Steverson, 1994, pp. 71-72). This ecological insight means that human anthropocentric valuing of the non-human environment needs to be reformed if we are to establish a truly environmental ethic, and not merely an ethic for use of the environment.

Ecocentrism is formally defined as the value theory that wholes, such as the biosphere, ecosystems, populations, species, and biological diversity “have a good independent of that of their component individuals, and as such have their own moral standing, and that attaining or sustaining their good has intrinsic value” (Attfield, 2003, p. 192). But if wholes, rather than the welfare of individual organisms, is the focus of ecocentrism, this leaves as a problem, not only the question of moral considerability of individuals in the system, but their autonomy too (Lucardie, 1993b, pp. 21-35).

Foreshadowing ecocentric theories such as Callicott’s holistic environmental ethic, and deep ecology’s “biospherical egalitarianism” – a “paradigmatic” example of ecocentrism, on Steverson’s view (1994, p. 72) - is Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic” (Rodman, 1983). Katz (1985, in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1998, pp. 161-163) suggests that Leopold left behind him a “double holistic vision”, one of “land” as a community of members [which Katz follows], and the other of “land” as an organism.

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59 On Mizzoni’s (2004) discussion of Taylor’s biocentrism though, Taylor emphasizes respect for all living things
60 Regan (1980, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. 48, footnote 12) made this distinction
61 Deep Ecology’s “biospherical egalitarianism” [Chapter Four] includes in its scope of moral standing, individual living things, species, and ecosystems, and also in principle, things such as rivers and mountains (Fox, 1989, in Sessions, 1995, p. 269; Naess, 1995b, in Sessions, 1995, p. 224)
Some statements in Leopold’s work have been subjected to excruciating analysis by early environmental ethicists [for example, J Baird Callicott, and Holmes Rolston in early issues of *Environmental Ethics*] looking for inspiration for an academic environmental ethical theory (Foreman, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, pp. 52-53; Sessions, 1995c, p. 101). One oft-analyzed Leopold statement is “a land ethic changes the role of *Homo sapiens* from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members and also respect for the community as such” (Leopold cited by Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 9). This would seem to suggest that Leopold considered both individuals and communities in nature to have moral considerability/standing. It would be the interpretation which I favour, because as Callicott (1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 10) notes, Leopold’s ethical ventures can be traced to Hume’s insistence on benevolence, loyalty and sympathy as ethical motivators. Would one have sympathy for, and empathy with, an ecosystem but ignore the plight of one of its members?

But Callicott argues that Leopold meant that only “wholes” [ecosystems; species] had moral considerability, as another of his oft-cited statements seems to suggest: “A thing is right when it tends to promote the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” (Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., pp. 9-10). Callicott thus expands on Leopold’s “hints and suggestions” (1993a, p. 9) to propose an ecosystem-centred ethic. Environmental ethicist Attfield on the other hand, understands that Leopold’s land ethic also “implies respect” for fellow community members (Attfield, 2003, p. 160). Holmes Rolston also drew on Leopold to formulate an environmental ethic which attempts to synthesize individualism [the claim “that any and every living thing is intrinsically valuable and thus morally considerable” (Callicott, 1993a, in Zimmerman et al., p. 11)] and holism. That is, the well-being of both individual non-human creatures and ecosystems is independent of human interests, both have intrinsic value (Callicott, 1993a, p. 11; also Attfield, 2003, p. 54 and p. 39). This is also how I understand deep ecologist Naess’s explanation of biospherical egalitarianism (Chapter Four: 5.4).

### 2.5.4 The three radical eco-philosophies

The study does not examine the formal theories of biocentrism and ecocentrism any further. Instead, it concentrates on the three “radical” (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii) eco-philosophies, deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism (Chapters Four to Six). They are radical, because they (1) “disclose the conceptual, attitudinal, and social origins of the ecological crisis”, and (2) because they argue that “only a revolution or a cultural paradigm shift can save the planet from further destruction” (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii). The other connection between the radical eco-philosophies and “green” is their critique of mainstream anthropocentrism. [Social ecologists, for example, adhere to what has been called a weak anthropocentric position (Zimmerman, 1993, p. vii, and Chapter Five, par. 5.4)]. Ecofeminist philosopher Val Plumwood (1997, p. 328, p. 329) notes that the critique of anthropocentrism is fundamental to green thought; a core project of “the Green movement”. As Bookchin suggests, green is “the color of radicalism” (Bookchin, 1988, in Chase, 1991, reproduced in VanDeVeer & Pierce, 1994, p. 244). These three eco-philosophies already form part of the “seeing green” sample.

### 2.6 Environment and development [“sustainable development”], and “green”

Sustainable development’s exclusion from the “seeing green” database on the grounds of its anthropocentrism was discussed in section 1.5 of this chapter. The fundamental difference between non-anthropocentrism, and anthropocentrism has also been highlighted throughout this chapter. But because sustainable development is a mainstream position, and philosophical “home” of Namibia...
Vision 2030 (discussed in Chapter Eleven), some of its leading ideas and assumptions, together with a brief history of its development, is presented in Chapter Nine: Environment and development. However, this does not mean to imply that there is nothing “green” in sustainable development, as Attfield’s (2003), Davidson’s (2000), and Hattingh’s (2002) discussions of Jacob’s (1995) models of radical and conservative sustainable development models (Chapter Nine: 7.2) will show.

3. Summary

Section 1 of this chapter explains the methodology and method used to answer research question 1: What does “seeing green” as worldview mean? It explained historian of ideas and environmental philosopher Richard Sylvan’s (1985b) qualitative thematic survey method, which seeks to identify the “core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes” of a research topic, in this case, a “seeing green” worldview. Six worldview themes were established. These are preceded by an introduction, and followed by a place for mutual critique, and a summary: 1. Introductory remarks, 2. Legitimating narratives (myths, religion/s and/or spirituality, and/or philosophies, and/or ideologies, and/or rhetoric/metaphors employed), 3. Epistemology, 4. Ontology, 5. Ethic, 6. View of culture/society, 7. Praxis, 8. Critique of, and by, other sample members, and 9. Summary.

The ideas which comprise “seeing green” are extensive, and frequently contradictory. To provide a methodological context for the selection of a sample to represent a synthesized “seeing green” worldview, Sylvan’s qualitative survey method was located with set theory as explained by Kerlinger (1986). Following Kerlinger, a rough “rule definition” was developed to assist in outlining the universe of “green”:

Any new social movement, political party, philosophy, or political ideology which describes itself as “green”, or is described by a reliable commentator as “green”, qualifies as a member of the “green” set. Further, a member of the “green” set will tend towards biocentrism/ecocentrism as theory of environmental value, and propose radical, not reformist, changes to society (Wissenburg, 1993, pp. 4-5).

Using this rough rule definition of “green”, a representative sample of five members was selected from several possible members: animal liberation/rights, deep ecology, social ecology, ecofeminism, and green movement thought as represented by then West Germany’s Die Grünen. Sustainable development was excluded from the “seeing green” database on the grounds of its anthropocentric, grey-green rather than green, stance. Instead, it will be discussed within the field of environment and development, in Chapter Nine.

Section two of this chapter presented the historical and ethical context of the five sample members chosen, as well as those considered but not chosen: for example, the formal environmental philosophical theories of biocentrism and ecocentrism, ecologism as formal political ideology, the environmental justice movement, or activist groups such as Earth First! and Greenpeace as other possible representatives of new social movement thought.

The first of the “seeing green” sample members, animal liberation/rights, is discussed in Chapter Three next.