CHAPTER 4: LANGUAGE

In the beginning was the Word

4.1 Introduction

Already emerging as a fundamental mode of Being’s disclosure in *Being and Time*, language becomes a central theme in Heidegger’s subsequent writings. In his later writings, Heidegger supplements his existential analysis of *Being and Time* in two main ways: Firstly, with a philosophy of ‘overcoming’, and secondly, with a deepened enquiry into the nature of language. He believed that these would lead to an increased understanding of the question of Being. Thus, Heidegger’s later writings on language build upon his original questioning in earlier works.

In the first instance, Heidegger’s philosophy of ‘overcoming’ consists of a sequence of deconstructive readings of the eminent thinkers of the Western metaphysical tradition - Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche among others. These readings aim to take a step back from the onto-theological framework of metaphysics in order to reveal the underlying presuppositions of all metaphysics. For Heidegger, this ‘unthought’ starting point of metaphysics is the phenomenological horizon of the temporal experience of Dasein, where Being first shows itself to human being.

By subjecting the metaphysical thinkers of the Western tradition to such a phenomenological deconstruction, Heidegger wishes to show how the history of philosophy represents the history of Being as it unfolds and discloses itself in and through its own concealment. He insists that phenomenology does not aim to eradicate metaphysics, but only to rethink its obscured temporal foundations in a more accurate way. Thus, Heidegger’s deconstructive project is not intended as a refutation of metaphysics, but rather as a reinterpretation of its concealed dimensions. Deconstruction enables metaphysics to retrieve its own origins by recovering its forgetfulness of the temporality of Being.

According to Heidegger, the chief blunder of the metaphysical tradition is that it distorted the question of Being into that of the ‘being of beings’. This forgetting of Being (what Heidegger calls ontological difference) results in seeing Being in static, thing-like terms. In addition to this substantive image of Being comes the ‘humanisation’ of Being in Western thought. Heidegger asserts that this practice
began with Plato, and resulted in the dominance of the human subject and its calculating techniques over the world becoming characteristic of modern thinking⁵.

Heidegger asserted that even Nietzsche had remained ensnared within the traditional essence of metaphysics. He claimed that Nietzsche could not free himself from the Platonic opposition between being and becoming that plays an important role in the definition of the Eternal Return; as well as from the opposition between truth and appearance. This, according to Heidegger resulted in Nietzsche's inability to reach the true medium of philosophy and think the Greek Anfang at its true depth⁶.

The second major way in which Heidegger's later work developed the existential analysis of Being and Time is by means of a philosophical re-examination of language, particularly poetic language.

As mentioned in Chapter 1⁷, I support the view that although Heidegger's thought did undergo a reorientation after Being and Time, his work contains an underlying unity. I believe that Olafson's⁸ discussion of language as an example to illustrate this unity is fruitful, and so my discussion of Heidegger's thought on language will necessarily attempt to demonstrate this unity. Other authors, like Paul Ricoeur, for example, also see the theme of language as central in illustrating the continuity between the so-called 'Heidegger I' and 'Heidegger II':

It is my conviction, however, that the continuity between Heidegger I and Heidegger II lies mainly in the persistence of the circle which I described: the 'backward relatedness' between Being about which we are asking in the enquiry, and the enquirer himself, as a mode of being. Because the question is no longer an analytic of Dasein, this circle does not occur in the same way and is not expressed in the same terms. But it may be recognised as the center of the philosophy of language which, to a certain extent, replaces the analytic of Dasein. The same problems which have been linked to the self of Dasein now occur in the problem of language; they are linked to the problem of the word...⁹

4.2. What is language?

Today, it is assumed that language is the most powerful tool that humankind has ever developed. The skilful use of speech and writing enables human being to rise above
other mute animals. The development of civilisation itself seems to depend on human being's linguistic foundation. Language functions as an inseparable facet of human existence; in fact, language has been and continues to be so intimately a part of human being, that most often he is not reflexively aware of its presence.

Philosophical interest in the phenomenon of language is not new. From Plato's discussion of the cognitive range of language in the *Seventh Letter*, through to the period of modern philosophy, there has been sustained interest in language as a crucial theme in philosophy.

From the late eighteenth century, within the confines of modern epistemology, language was conceived as an instrument. From Locke through Hobbes to Condillac, an attempt was made to understand language within the confines of the modern representational epistemology made central by Descartes. In the mind, there are 'ideas' which are representations of an external reality. Knowledge consists in having representations that 'agree' with reality. We can only do this if we assemble our ideas according to a responsible procedure. Language plays an important role here. Why?

Words are given meaning by being attached to the objects they represent by means of the 'ideas' that represent them. The introduction of words facilitates the combination of ideas into a logical picture. For Locke and Hobbes, words allow us to grasp things in classes, and hence make synthesis possible. Non-linguistic intuition, in contrast to this, would be confined to the painstaking association of particulars.

In contemporary philosophy, a heightened degree of interest exists over the philosophical problems of language. Within the empiricist-analytic movement, there is the logical atomism of Bertrand Russell, the logical positivism of Rudolf Carnap, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of ordinary language, to name but a few perspectives that are linguistically oriented. Within the contemporary phenomenological-existential movement, there exists a similar interest in language, with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and others expressing a critical need for a philosophy of language. In Heidegger's philosophy, we find a similar deep concern for the foundations of language.
4.3 Heidegger's ways to language

In a similar vein to my discussion on Heidegger's conception of truth, I trace Heidegger's 'ways' to language by giving attention to various texts, in order to illustrate the basic progression and continuity of his philosophy of language. I will not, however, discuss each individual text in full here, since such a task would be repetitious. Therefore, I will use excerpts from the various texts in order to trace the development of his ideas on language.

Although Heidegger's interest in language dates from the very beginning of his career, as was previously mentioned, the analysis of Dasein's situational, understanding-interpreting way of being-in-the-world in *Being and Time* places language in a new context. In *Being and Time*, the realm of logic and 'assertions' falls into the category of presentational thinking, while language in its true essence, as primary articulation of the situational, historical understanding, is viewed as something belonging to the way of being of human being. From this position, Heidegger can later criticise theories that view language as a mere tool enabling communication.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger emphasises the importance of discourse or talk (die Rede) for language\(^\text{10}\), and the secondary character of assertions and propositions – the discourses of science and philosophy, journalism, politics and culture in general. He tells us that 'The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse'\(^\text{11}\), and stresses the importance of our listening to and heeding speech, suggesting that the silence that enables us to listen is more significant than all the noise of signification\(^\text{12}\).

An in-depth investigation into the theme of language only emerges relatively late in the text of *Being and Time* (§33-38). Yet, in the introductory description of the disclosedness of being-in-the-world, Heidegger mentions language, among other things, as one manifestation of an existential called logos (Rede)\(^\text{13}\). This cursory reference to language gives rise to the supposition that language will come to the fore only in a much later phase in the transcendental division. When, in *Being and Time*, the structure of man's disclosedness is brought to light in greater detail, we see that language forms part of the continuing explanation of human being's understanding\(^\text{14}\). The topic of language, therefore, follows naturally on from Heidegger's treatment of
understanding and interpretation. Just as an interpretation is grounded in understanding, so assertion is grounded in interpretation.

Heidegger begins by defining an assertion (statement) as a ‘... pointing out which communicates and defines’\textsuperscript{15}. Thus, assertions partake of the structures already manifest in wordless interpretative activities, such as mending a hammer. To decide how to mend a hammer involves an interpretative fore-structure that reveals our fore-structure of our understanding of the hammer when it is in use. Similarly, when we say that a hammer is ‘too heavy’\textsuperscript{16} for us, we pick out the object as having a certain character, and articulate the specific fore-conception that we have of it. Heidegger explains that: ‘Like interpretation in general, the statement necessarily has its existential foundations in fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception’.\textsuperscript{17}

Assertion, for Heidegger, therefore narrows down the focus of our concerns:

When confronted with something that is already manifest, with the hammer that is too heavy, determining must first take a step back. ‘Positing the subject’ dims beings down to focus on ‘the hammer there’ in order to let what is manifest be seen in its determinable definite character through this dimming down.\textsuperscript{18}

Thus, making an assertion about an object limits our openness to it.

Making an assertion is a possible activity for Dasein as a mode of his being-in-the-world, but employing our understanding of assertions as a model for human understanding of meaning \textit{per se} is an incomplete conception of language. Thus, Heidegger immediately introduces the term \textit{Rede} (discourse) as the existential-ontological foundation of language (including assertions)\textsuperscript{19}.

Being-there as openness, transpiring as being-in-the-world, discloses itself and its world meaningfully to itself via discourse. Discourse then belongs among the constitutive ways in which being-there-as-openness carries itself out as being-in-the-world. In discourse, a network of intertwining significations is fashioned, in the elucidating that permits self-orienting and self-directing as such. Discourse is, for Heidegger, not necessarily an utterance in words. ‘Speaking a lot about something does not in the least guarantee that understanding is thus furthered’\textsuperscript{20}. Yet, utterance in words also belongs integrally to this discourse. Words are not discrete and
isolated, external to discourse and supplied with meaning secondarily. Rather, the totality of significations articulated in discourse itself 'comes into language'\textsuperscript{21}.

Heidegger's distinction between assertion and discourse is therefore a distinction between a type of speech act and the conceptual framework upon which that speech act must draw. This does not, however, mean that Heidegger holds language and discourse to be identical. Language is the worldly manifestation of discourse. Discourse itself is not a worldly totality, but an \textit{existentiale} of Dasein – one of the three facets of Dasein's disclosedness, which includes attunement and understanding.

Discourse, mood (attunement) and understanding are discussed in \textit{Being and Time} as the three modes by which Dasein is being-in-the-world\textsuperscript{22}. Discourse is that \textit{existentiale} by which Dasein projects itself into the world and integrates itself with it by intelligibly articulating its possibilities. Discourse is related to attunement, since Dasein gives utterance to his mood by the intonation, modulation and tempo of his talk. Discourse is also related to understanding, since it allows us to communicate about things in the world. Thus, discourse, attunement and understanding are the three fundamental facets of Dasein's disclosedness that Heidegger identifies.

\textbf{4.4 Language as Interpretive Discourse}

As we have seen, language as interpretative discourse has its roots in human being's everyday existence in the world as a primordial interpretation of Being; it enables human being to interpret a thing as something that is intimately related to his project of being-in-the-world. For example, discourse does not simply assert that a rock is there, it also interprets the rock as something meaningful for human being's existence. Hermeneutic discourse recognises objects as instruments ready-to-hand. Each thing is disclosed as the bearer of a specific message. Hermeneutic discourse reveals beings in terms of their possible serviceability for human being.

Communication is more deeply understood as the interpretation of a common life-world, which involves human being responding to the other's project of meaning and vice versa\textsuperscript{23}. The things of human being's Dasein are disclosed as symbols of his relationship to other Daseins. In other words, hermeneutic discourse defines human being's individual being-there (Dasein) as a communal being-with-others\textsuperscript{24}.
Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic forms of existential discourse. The authentic form he calls ‘saying’ and the inauthentic form he calls ‘idle talk’. ‘Saying’ is our ability to remain responsible for our speech by remaining silent in order to listen and genuinely respond to the voice of Being. ‘Idle Talk’ is the opinionated chatter unmindful of the claim of other Daseins.

4.5 Language as Idle Talk

For Heidegger, language becomes idle talk when the speaker ceases to respond individually to the address of the other and is content to correspond to the anonymous chatter of ‘public opinion’. The existential responsibility of each I capitulates to the unthinking influence of ‘das Man’. Human being’s speech ceases to be authentically his own. His existence is no longer lived by him; it is lived for him by the impersonalised ‘das Man’.

Heidegger defines this alienated condition of language as an ontological groundlessness, where it becomes impossible to distinguish between a genuine utterance and mere verbalising. Idle talk acts as a form of closure that suspends any authentic interpretation of the being of human being. Anonymous clichés and catchwords protect us from self-interpretation and suppress the fundamental question of our rootedness in Being. The two most common ways in which this uprooted talk is conveyed are curiosity and ambiguity (double-speak).

Curiosity is an inauthentic being-with-others in that it seems to possess everything without having to commit itself to anything. ‘It seeks novelty only to leap from it again to another novelty … Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. This mode of being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of being of everyday Dasein, one in which it constantly uproots itself.

4.6 Language as Saying

For Heidegger, poetic language is the most authentic mode of human being’s being-with-others. Poetry recognises the rootedness of language in his authentic being-in-the-world and confronts him with the realisation that his being is ultimately rooted in death. In poetry, for example, a rose is no longer seen as a horticultural object, or a mere flower, or a symbol of something. Here, it exceeds all of our hermeneutic
projects and is allowed to be itself. Poetry is a privileged means for revealing ourselves as being-towards-death, for reminding us that our existence is finite. In poetry, Being is made manifest in all its otherness. Heidegger's ideas on poetic language are developed more fully in the texts after *Being and Time*, which I will discuss in more detail presently.

### 4.7 The Clearing (*Lichtung*)

In Heidegger's philosophy, language is essential to the fact that things show up at all (what Heidegger calls the 'clearing'). Heidegger claims that:

> Saying is showing. In everything that speaks to us, in everything that touches us by being spoken and spoken about, in everything that gives itself to us in speaking, or waits for us unspoken, but also in the speaking we do ourselves, there prevails Showing which causes to appear what is present, and fade from appearance what is absent... Saying pervades and structures the openness of that clearing which every appearance must seek out and every disappearance must leave behind, and in which every present or absent being must show, say, announce itself.\(^{31}\)

For Heidegger, the clearing cannot be identified with any of the beings that show up in it. It is not to be explained by them as something they cause, or one of their properties or as grounded in them. He tell us that:

> When we talk in an ontically figurative way about the *lumen naturale* in human being, we mean nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this being, the fact that it *is* in the mode of being its there. To say that it is 'illuminated' means that it is cleared in itself as being-in-the-world, not by another being, but in such a way that it *is* itself the clearing. Only for a being thus cleared existentially do objectively present things become accessible in the light or concealed in darkness. By its very nature, Da-sein brings its there along with it. If it lacks a there, it is not only factically not of this nature, but not at all a being. *Da-sein is its disclosure.*\(^{32}\)

Heidegger claims that Plato's notion of the Idea placed the clearing among beings. Plato thus gave an ontic account of the clearing. Heidegger felt that because the act
of ontically placing the clearing reflects a drive towards grasping it - exercising intellectual control over it - and this is manifest in the Will to Power. It represents a move towards subjectivism.

Heidegger’s investigation of language in *Being and Time* is thoroughly ontological, in that his expositions on language are always done in the context of allowing Being to reveal itself. When human being speaks, he discloses his being-in-the-world. His way of speaking, his intonation, modulation and tempo, reveals the particular manner in which he finds himself in the world. For Heidegger, then, language is a manner of Dasein’s being-in-the-world – language is human being's way of being.

Language is the way of articulating and laying bare the ontological structure of the world onto a level of intelligibility that it shares in common with the latter insofar as both are projections of Dasein. Only human being has language, for it belongs exclusively and determinately to being-there as Being-in-the-world, i.e. to human being as the locus of the illumined open clearing via which Being reveals itself.

For Heidegger, language is therefore not an entity that exists, but the very giving of Being whereby everything exists. It is not a present object, but presencing. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, it is not something true, but the very coming to be of truth. Unlike beings (Seiendes) that are, language as Being (Sein) is not, for it is that whereby beings exist without itself being something that exists. I now aim to show that Heidegger continues this line of thought in his later works.

On the basis of his exposition on language in *Being and Time*, Heidegger continues in his later works to strongly dispute the conventional view of language. His view of language in the later works is strongly anti-subjectivist. The usual relation in which language is seen as a tool is inverted: ‘Language is not a tool at our disposal, rather it is that event which disposes of the supreme possibility of human existence.’

Heidegger insists that language is essentially not something that human subjects use instrumentally for the purpose of gaining conceptual control over their world. Rather, language is what displays human being - to himself and to others - as always already in the world. Heidegger speaks of language speaking, rather than human beings. He can do so because he claims that it is through language that disclosure to humans takes place. Language is thus entirely integral to human being’s manner of
existing because it is essential to the fact that things show up at all (the ‘clearing’ (Lichtung)).

Human being is, first and foremost, linguistically in the world\(^3^9\), not only because language allows him to define his world, but also because he comes to be defined as a worldly dweller through language. Humans are language animals, because they are the locus of this constitutive power of expression. Human being does not linguistically reveal a world that previously existed in muteness, but rather, to be a worldly inhabitant is to *dwell in language*.

We are always speaking, even when we do not utter a single word aloud, but merely listen or read, and even when we are not particularly listening or speaking but are attending to some work or taking a rest.\(^4^0\)

In these words that echo *Being and Time*, Heidegger shows us that he does not mean that our social and worldly existence is made available to us only when we vocalise or exchange words. Human being constitutes and persists in his worldliness through language, despite any silence or solitude. When we do not participate in conversation with others, or ourselves, we do not cease to dwell in language\(^4^1\).

Human being is this sense is an ongoing historical conversation. Language writes the text of our being-in-the-world. Heidegger says: ‘Language is the house of Being in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of being, guarding it.’\(^4^2\) Language cultivates interactive participation with what is manifest, the world and with-world, and brings into question that which escapes manifestation in its hiddenness - Being. As such, language constitutes our primordial abode.

The theme of language emerges strongly in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. In this essay, Heidegger evaluates the assertion by Parmenides that being is the same as that for which apprehending occurs\(^4^3\). In other words, there is being only when there is appearing, i.e. when there is disclosure\(^4^4\). Heidegger tells us that just as there can be no occurrence of Being without apprehending and vice versa, there can be no Being without language and no language without Being. If human being had no preknowledge of Being, then:

*Would there merely be a noun and a verb less in our language? No. There would be no language at all. No essent as such would disclose*
itself in words, it would no longer be possible to invoke it and speak about it in words. For to speak of an essent as such includes: to understand it in advance as an essent, that is, to understand its being.\textsuperscript{45}

Heidegger tells us that, on the other hand, human being could not be in any sense imaginable to us without language, ‘...for to be a man is to speak’\textsuperscript{46}. Human being did not invent language any more than he invented time or Being itself. ‘How could man ever have invented the power which pervades him, which alone enables him to be a man?’\textsuperscript{47}

As is the case in Being and Time, Unterwegs zur Sprache also takes its orientation from the spoken rather than from the written word. Here, as we have seen in Chapter 3, Heidegger finds the very essence of language in speaking and especially in saying (das Sagen). The being of language is ‘Saying that shows’.\textsuperscript{48} Thus, Heidegger views language not as an expression of human being, but rather as an appearance of Being. Thinking does not express human being; it lets Being happen as a language event. In this letting–happen lies the fate of human being, the fate of truth, and ultimately the fate of Being.

The idea that it is not human being who speaks but rather that language itself speaks becomes most explicit in Unterwegs zur Sprache. The human act of saying is what is specifically human, but the saying itself is an act by language. ‘We do not merely speak the language – we speak by way of it. We can do so solely because we always have already listened to the language. What do we hear there? We hear language speaking.’\textsuperscript{49}

4.8 The Greek Language

For Heidegger, the notion of poetry as a ‘piety of thinking’ is similar to the pre-Socratic model of language as logos. By logos, the pre-Socratics understood not some logical correlation between objects, but a hidden ontological attunement of the Word of human thinking and the Word of Being. Thus, Heidegger claims that:

... in the Greek language what is said in it is at the same time what is called... What it presents is what lies immediately before us. Through the audible Greek word, we are directly in the presence of the thing itself, not first in the presence of a mere word sign.\textsuperscript{50}
Post-Socratic metaphysics, on the other hand, reduced logos to logic.

Heidegger aims to restore to language the poetic status it once enjoyed as a measure of balance between the opposed poles of Being and thinking. The substitution of logic for logos resulted in the reduction of the presencing of Being (as *aletheia* or disclosure) to the representation of entities according to a pre-determined set of idealist categories. It also resulted in the reduction of language as a harmonious attunement of opposites.

Heidegger concludes that the reign of an exclusively instrumental logic has reached dangerous proportions in the modern technological era. Only by means of poetic thinking can light be thrown on the priority of logos over logic. Poetry can enable philosophy to reclaim its own origins in that thinking which corresponds to the saying of the Logos.

Poetic thinking, which lies at the root of genuine thinking, is a way of speaking in accord with Being - a speaking in co-respondence with language itself. Things do not exist as independent empirical facts. They only come into being in so far they are summoned by language that bestows meaning upon them. By deconstructing the purely utilitarian functioning of language in favour of a more poetic saying, Heidegger proposes to retrieve the forgotten Word of Being.

4.9 The Hermeneutic Project

As we have seen, Heidegger seeks a method of penetrating to the root of Western conceptions of being – a ‘hermeneutics’ that will allow him to reveal the presuppositions upon which Western conceptions of being have been based. In Husserl’s phenomenology, Heidegger found conceptual tools to enable this task, since phenomenology had opened up the realm of the preconceptual apprehending of phenomena. Yet, Heidegger was reluctant to accept Husserl’s phenomenology just as it was, because of Husserl’s willingness to trace all phenomena back to human consciousness. Such a standpoint grounded in subjectivity did not provide the framework in which Heidegger’s investigations could be undertaken fruitfully. Thus, the kind of phenomenology that Heidegger develops in *Being and Time* is called hermeneutic phenomenology.
The root word for hermeneutics is the Greek verb, *hermeneuein*, which simply means *to interpret*. In Heidegger's view, hermeneutics ultimately points to *Hermes*, the winged messenger of the gods, and to *hermios*, the priest who interprets the sayings of the Oracle of Delphi. Thus, hermeneutics can be traced back to the Greeks and the rise of Greek philosophy.\(^{52}\)

Hermes is the messenger of the Gods, he who brings a word from the realm of the wordless; *hermeios* brings the word back from the realm of the Oracle - *hermeneuein* is primordial interpretation, the bringing into word of what was previously not yet word. Hermeneutics can be understood then as the most primitive sense of 'to say'. From this coming to birth of word, of language, and its derived meanings of explaining as in bringing to understand, and translating, as in making a foreign tongue or meaning familiar in one's own tongue, arise.

Although Heidegger notes that he gave the answer to why he used the terms 'hermeneutic' in his work in the introduction to *Being and Time*,\(^{53}\) he goes on to say in *A Dialogue on Language* that he originally became familiar with the term in the course of his theological studies. Heidegger tells us that:

> In *Being and Time* the word 'hermeneutics' is used in a *still* broader sense, 'broader' here meaning, however, not the mere extension of the same meaning over a still larger area of application...In *Being and Time*, hermeneutics means neither the theory of the art of interpretation nor interpretation itself, but rather the attempt first of all to define the nature of interpretation on hermeneutic grounds.\(^{54}\)

Hermeneutics, in Heidegger's conception, is a fundamental theory of how understanding emerges in human existence. Understanding, in Heidegger's sense of the word, is the power to grasp one's own possibilities for being, within the context of the lifeword in which one exists.\(^{55}\) Understanding is not something which human being possesses, but rather a constituent element of being-in-the-world.\(^{56}\) An important aspect of understanding is that it always operates within a set of already interpreted relationships. The prestructure of understanding, always already interpreting and embedded in world, goes beyond the older model of the interpretive situation in terms of subject and object.
Understanding and meaningfulness are for Heidegger the basis for language and interpretation – ‘The statement’s pointing out is accomplished on the basis of what is already disclosed in understanding... The statement is not an unattached kind of behaviour which could of itself primarily disclose beings in general, but always already maintains itself on the basis of being-in-the-world’.

For Heidegger, the true foundation of language is the phenomenon of speaking, where something is brought to light. This is the hermeneutical function of language. Language as speaking is not an objective collection of words that human being can manipulate as objects. Language in this sense is neither an objective nor subjective phenomenon, but rather both together, since world is prior to both.

After *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s thinking becomes more ‘hermeneutical’ in the usual sense of the word, in that his thinking is centred on the interpretation of texts. He turns increasingly to reinterpreting earlier philosophers like Kant and Nietzsche, and also to interpretations of the poetry of Rilke, Hölderlin and Trakl. Philosophy becomes historical, a creative recovery of the past, a form of interpretation.

Heidegger’s contribution to hermeneutical theory is many-faceted. In *Being and Time*, he sees understanding itself in a radically new context. He also redefines the word ‘hermeneutics’ itself, identifying it with phenomenology, and with the basic function of words in bringing about understanding. In his later works, his focus shifts to the exegesis of texts, suggesting that he is a ‘hermeneutical’ philosopher in the more traditional sense of the term. Yet, Heidegger always approaches the themes of language, art, philosophy and understanding in terms of the process of disclosure, whereby Being comes to presence.

Heidegger moves beyond other theorists like Dilthey, since his conception of hermeneutics points to the event of understanding as such, and not to historical methods of interpretation as against scientific methods. Heidegger leaves the historical-scientific dichotomy that Dilthey devoted his work to behind, by claiming that all understanding is rooted in the historical character of existential understanding. In this, the way is cleared for Gadamer’s ‘philosophical hermeneutics.'
4.10 Technology and Language

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger had already suggested the direction of his later criticisms of presentational thinking in his discussion of the derivative character of ‘assertions’. In his later writings, Heidegger attempts to understand how Western thinking came to define thinking, Being and truth in essentially presentational terms. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Heidegger asserts that the earlier conception of truth as disclosure is lost in the Western development of metaphysics. What happens to thinking and language, under the sway of subjectivism, which expresses itself today in the frenzy for technological mastery?

In *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger reminds us that:

... words and language are not wrappings in which things are packed for the commerce of those who write and speak. It is in words and language that things first come into being and are. For this reason, the misuse of language in idle talk, in slogans and phrases, destroys our authentic relation to things.60

According to Heidegger, traditional philosophies tended to reduce language to formal or abstract expression. Language was considered in its scientific capacity of assertion. Assertion served the threefold purpose of designating, predicking and communicating. Words were used impersonally to define reality as a collection of objects present-at-hand. In assertion, words are frequently treated as little more than lifeless entities for the abstraction of reality. This reached its extreme in the modern reign of logical positivism.

‘Between the age of the tool and the age of mechanized technique there is that rupture, that pause in which a language is deployed, the language of ratio: calculative reason.’61 The main threat to human being’s discovery of his abode is the supposition that language serves a purely instrumental function. In a technologically structured world, the view of language as a tool or instrument has gained increasing currency. Today’s unrestrained technological objectification deforms language ‘into an instrument of reportage and calculable information...a manipulable object to which our thinking must conform.’62 Technological objectification reduces all words to terms, in the sense of instrumental designations for specific objects. Neologisms, abbreviations
and acronyms that proliferate in our technological society further this reduction. Words become sheer signs, ciphers that no longer evoke a historic worldliness. The relation between human beings and their world is lost. Heidegger notes that:

Speech is challenged to correspond to the ubiquitous orderability of what is present. Speech, when posed in this fashion, becomes information. It informs itself concerning itself, in order to establish securely, by means of information theories, its own procedure. Enframing, the essence of modern technology that holds sway everywhere, ordains for itself a formalised language – that kind of informing by virtue of which man is molded and adjusted into the technical-calculative creature, a process by which step-by-step he surrenders his ‘natural language’.63

The fact that worrying about such losses strikes many today as absurd is, for Heidegger, indicative of the fact that technological thought is hegemonic. It is a symptom of the one-track thinking that the technological life results in. According to Grange, there is a paradox inherent in technological language:

Technology, our great symbol of change, wants no part in its results. Its language, so desirous of fixing the movement of difference, betrays a paranoid streak. Like the moi of Lacan, technology dons a rigid suit of armour when it comes to naming its children. But that should not surprise, for the power sought by technology is always and everywhere power over as opposed to power to.64

When words become signs for speedy communication, they become one-dimensional. They may serve an instrumental purpose well, but they cease to resonate with the multiple chords inherent in language. Indeed, if language were successfully reduced to unequivocal signs, philosophic thought would become nearly impossible.

To insist that language is not reducible to utilitarian signs is not to say that language is somehow divorced from practical concerns and concrete life. Language is, in a sense, eminently practical. Our being-in-the-world is always as a historical being, and language constantly retrieves and preserves our historical embeddedness. Thus, dwelling in the medium of language is not without practical effect - those who pay attention to language are inevitably transformed by it65. What we do basically
depends on who we think we are, and who we think we are largely depends on the language by which we describe or define others and ourselves.

In the modern era, dominated by an increasingly technologised use of language, the caring for the word, which Heidegger commends to both the thinker and the poet, requires us to reach back into the silent abyss in search of a language capable of speaking Being in all its otherness. The task of creating such a poetic utterance in our times is both difficult and hazardous. Only by attending to the concealed origins of language can we learn to speak the words originally again. Accordingly, Heidegger sees poetry as the ‘conscience’ of the Word of Being, which upsets our natural consciousness and invites us to experience the strangeness of things.

Poetry is far more than an act of individual conscience. It involves a communal recollection. Authentic poetry can remind a community that they have been exiled from their tradition that must be sought after anew. Poetry allows human being to come home, but not in the sense of some exultant return to a fixed past, but rather in the sense of a future arriving that can never finally arrive. Language can then be ‘...the house of being in which man exists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of Being, guarding it.

Heidegger affirms that the communal vocation of poetry entails a historical project whereby we may recover what is no longer present as what is still to come. He concludes that Hölderlin’s poetry of homecoming acts as a summons to others to become hearers of the word that is coming, to become a community that turns from its abuse of language as mere idle talk or technical manipulation and return to the essence of language as a caring for the mystery of origins. The poet cannot do this by himself - he needs others to listen to his language of care and to take the burden of that care upon themselves.

In On the Way to Language, Heidegger tells us that poetry becomes a 'piety of thinking' whenever the poet enters the ‘play of language’, thereby suspending the common approach to speech as a utilitarian vehicle of information. We do not represent language to ourselves - language presents itself to us and speaks through us.

Heidegger speaks of poetry as a sacred or mysterious language, but this does not entail an elitist cult of transcendental otherworlds. By using language in a strange
way, the poet estranges us from our familiar use of words in order to restore a sense of originality to their earthly origins. Poetry and philosophical language are both strange because they represent non-representational linguistic activities. Heidegger also discovers that the two are akin in that they both search out Being. One must be cautious, however, not to mistake this kinship between poetry and philosophy as a complete identification of the two.

When the poet incarnates Being within the word, Being therein appears in its fresh and vital creation. The constant utilization of the linguistic structure in which this creation appears can, however, make the latter static and solidify its novelty into a literal depictive linguistic structure; it is the thinker's, that is the philosopher's task to preserve the metaphorical, presentational character of the language ... Once the poet has linguistically revealed Being through non-representational, metaphorical language, that revelation can be concealed in the repeated use of that language and the literal founding of it. It is at this point that the philosopher - the thinker - assumes his professional role of preserving the metaphorical, non-literal meaning of the poet's language.

One should not mistake Heidegger's primary meaning of poetry with the poet's actual writing in verse form. Poetry (Dichtung) in its essential, original sense is for Heidegger the linguistic creation or allowing-to-be of things. Verse making, or poetry in the narrow sense (Poesie), depends upon Dichtung and is derived from it.

Given this original poetry as the letting-be of what is, it becomes manifest that language in its pristine form is for Heidegger, poetry. Dichtung is the actual creation of language in and through its letting beings be. As a result, the primordial act of naming is a linguistic use very different from the naming activity of representational language. In everyday depictive language, a name refers to something already designated; in poetry (Dichtung), the name creates the entity as named. The purpose of poetic language is to make things manifest - to make things appear in their unconcealment. Poetry presents things in language for the first time by calling them into appearance, and at the same time preserving these appearances. The mystery is shown in poetic language, rather than pictured as some kind of entity in a representational context.
Language is the chief mode within which Being shows itself – poetic discourse discloses reality by making it manifest. To say means to show or to let appear. Language in its primordial sense then is essentially a manifestation. To say something is Dasein's way of bringing it to Being. This disclosure by human being is its way of owning something – appropriation is a key characteristic of language.

As we have seen, for Heidegger, there is a close relationship between language and thinking. In fact, he asserts that 'All reflective thinking is poetic, and all poetry in turn is a kind of thinking. The two belong together by virtue of that Saying which has already bespoken itself to what is unspoken because it is a thought as a thanks.'

Heidegger tells us that traditional metaphysics is problematic because it has failed to utilise the proper manner of expressing its subject matter, Being. Traditional philosophers have allowed Being to slip into oblivion, metaphysicians have failed to think of and articulate Being correctly since their language and their thoughts have approached Being from a literal, representational point of view. The question about Being has lapsed into an inquiry about things. Heidegger's philosophical aim is to overcome this misunderstanding of traditional metaphysics and ask the question of Being anew.

In the Letter on Humanism, Heidegger asserts that "To bring language ever and again this advent of Being that remains, and in its remaining waits for man, is the sole matter of thinking." Here the emphasis falls on man as a respondent to the address of Being. The arrival of Being in language is described in terms of the word Geschick – destiny. Heidegger claims that what is needed in the present world crisis is less philosophy and more attentiveness to thinking. For Heidegger, thinking ‘...gathers language into simple saying.’

4.11 Truth and Language

For Heidegger, we may share in truth only because we share in language. How and why does the truth of poetic discourse differ from the truth of proposition discourse? As we have seen, for Heidegger, the proposition fixes securely, settles, places. The statement states, stops all movement, closes the process. Propositions put subjects and objects in their proper place, they involve possession of meaning. They assume
the self-possession of the Cartesian cogito. Propositions represent a static reality, and their truth is one that always simply says what it says and is what it is.

Apophantical truth, the truth of assertions, statements and propositions, lets things appear in a very distinctive way. It is not a way that gives the thing freedom in showing itself. The assertion evidences a tendency to master and dominate.

Assertions are aimed at some fixed state of reality. The correspondence theory locates our experience with truth in a representational relationship - a relationship determined by the structure of subject and object. This structure conditions the character of our involvement with things. According to Heidegger, this character is oppositional, confrontational and marked by aggression. Truth, in the sense of correctness, is always an exercise of power. Thus, in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, he asks:

> Can such an assault perhaps be avoided? - and how? Only, certainly, by granting the thing, as it were, a free field to display its thingly character directly.\(^{83}\)

Poetising discourse allows for a sensuous, phonological field for the play of sound and sense. Truth as *aletheia* appreciates this field of play, where presences and absences are intertwined. Truth as correctness does not. Poetising discourse is a discourse that stays in touch with our pre-ontological pre-understanding of the world. In poetising discourse, both sound and sense require a theory of truth that accommodates their 'ecstatic' play within a 'free field'. Truth as correctness cannot do justice to the interactive processes essential to poetising discourse. Truth as *aletheia* can, because it is hermeneutical - it lets sound and sense play in the interplay of presence and absence, identity and difference.

### 4.12 Summary

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger carried out his investigation of language within the general context reflected in the statement 'Da-sein has Language'. Twenty three years later, this formulation would be superseded by the view that 'man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man.'\(^{85}\) This is not to say that the analysis of *Being and Time* was completely overturned, but that it was this analysis that led Heidegger to an
experience of the ‘origin’ of the question of Being that could no longer be formulated in the ontological language of that text. If there is a change between Heidegger’s earlier and later work, there is also an important continuity. *Being and Time* intends to raise anew the forgotten origin, the oblivion of the question of Being. The oblivion of the understanding of Being is precisely what makes thinking possible, so that it is not the result of this oblivion that must be thought, but the oblivion itself. ‘What was a question in *Being and Time* becomes a process of questioning in the later work.’

What Heidegger realised as a result of the existential analytic of *Being and Time* is that the origin of the meaning of Being could not be represented in the metaphysical language that operates in the space opened by the ontological distinction between Being and beings, but could only be approached by thinking that difference as such. This point is explicitly made in various places in the later work, including the essay *Language*, where difference (Austrag), thought of in terms of Trakl’s word ‘threshold’, is described as the rift that bids us to come to the transformation with language, out of the difference into the difference by responding. Here is the heart of Heidegger’s shift in focus from *Being and Time* to *Time and Being*, a shift grounded in a new understanding of language. Heidegger tells us that here, everything is reversed and that:

> The division in question was held back because thinking failed in the adequate saying of this turning [Kehre] and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics. The lecture ‘On the Essence of Truth’, thought out and delivered in 1930 but not printed until 1943, provides a certain insight into the thinking of the turning from ‘Being and Time’ to ‘Time and Being’. This turning is not a change of standpoint from Being and Time, but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which Being and Time is experienced, that is to say, experienced from the fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being.

Yet, while it is important to keep in mind the continuity between the ontological orientation of *Being and Time* and the task of thinking the difference as such by which that orientation is given (the task of thinking undertaken in Heidegger’s later work), it is also important to realise the significance of the change that has taken place.
On the one hand, Heidegger dismisses the assessment that *Being and Time* ended in a 'blind alley' and says that the thinking that 'hazards a few steps in *Being and Time* has even today not advanced beyond that publication'. Yet on the other hand, Heidegger states that 'perhaps in the meantime it has in one respect come farther into its own matter.' This 'one respect' is the difference between a kind of philosophising which deals with its subject matter at arm's length without risking itself in the process and one that does. But the fact that the orientation of Heidegger's thinking does change, even if the object of his thought does not, indicates that there must have been a risk already involved in the writing of *Being and Time*, a risk which Heidegger opened himself to in desiring to raise anew the question of the meaning of Being.

There is continuity between *Being and Time* and Heidegger's later work insofar as the meaning of Being remains the guiding question, but in the later writing, this question has given rise to a more fundamental kind of thinking and questioning. It is no longer a matter of trying to grasp the question of Being 'explicitly and transparently', but of allowing oneself to be gripped by the experience of the difference which keeps explicitness and transparency always just out of reach.

Heidegger proposes that 'The thinking that inquires into the truth of being and so defines man's essential abode from Being and toward Being is neither ethics nor ontology ... The answer is that such thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this distinction.' It is thinking in the fullest sense. The manner in which this thinking comes to pass is as saying (*Sage*). This saying is dwelling, in the manner of 'being-in' as this is worked out in *Being and Time*. Here, being-in as being-with partially constitutes the structure of care. Thinking is the 'recollection of Being and nothing else', but this recollection is also a building, for thinking builds upon the house of Being. Heidegger reminds us that '...man is not only a living creature who possesses language along with other capacities. Rather, language is the house of Being in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of Being, guarding it.'

Language as the house of Being elucidates thinking, understood as the recollection of Being in its most primordial form. Language, in its primary function of saying, has the function of bringing about a healing transformation of human being. Dasein, freed into its inherent possibilities by that meditative poetic thinking, which is basically a
thanking, enters onto a path of creative self-transformation. Thinking may not be sufficient to this task on its own, but it is a necessary condition in Heidegger’s view.
Heidegger’s interest in language dates from the very beginning of his career with his dissertation The Doctrine of Judgement in Psychologism: A Critical and Positive Contribution to Logic and his dissertation on Duns Scotus’ doctrine of categories and meaning.


See page 3 in Chapter 1.


40 Ibid., p. 154.


44 Ibid., p. 101.

45 Ibid., p. 82.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., p. 156.


49 Ibid., p. 124.


55 Ibid., p. 131.


57 Ibid., p. 146.


69 Ibid., p. 241.


72 M. Heidegger, The Way to Language in On the Way to Language P.D. Hertz (trans),

See *ibid.*, p. 146.


See Chapter 3, p. 73-81.


