Development and Differentiation: The Case of TILCOR/ARDA
Irrigation Activities in Sanyati (Zimbabwe), 1939 to 2000

By

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Promoter : Prof. I. Phimister
Co-promoter : Prof. A. S. Mlambo
“Don’t sell the peasant short; he’s more malleable than his image suggests, and his ancient ways contain a deal of folk wisdom that foreign innovators must stop scorning and start adapting” - C. M. Arensberg, “Upgrading Peasant Agriculture: Is Tradition the Snag?” 63.

Although “at the core of the world’s problems of underdevelopment lies the modernization [sic] of agriculture…the literature available for serious study of this central problem is still very inadequate and in some measure reflects the relative lack of priority [African] farming has suffered in the elaboration of development strategy” – Economist, August 22, 1964, 273.
ABSTRACT

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In this study, two rather distinct forms of differentiation are examined, namely class differentiation that was associated with peasant production (1939-1964) and that which manifested itself with the inception of irrigation schemes in the northwestern part of the country in general and Sanyati in particular in the period 1965 to 2000. The study is, thus, divided into two major parts.

Using a case study approach, this work particularly explores and documents the extent to which the twin processes of development and differentiation took place in Sanyati communal lands in Zimbabwe under both dryland and irrigation conditions from the beginning of the Second World War up to 2000. Research on Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR) or Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) schemes in Sanyati (Gowe and the Main Estate) reveals that differentiation as a process has been understudied. This is because of the tendency among scholars and government officials alike to construe ARDA schemes as being devoid of any signs of differentiation (i.e. as homogeneous societal entities) mainly because the plotholders (outgrowers) were allocated standardised or uniform sized plots averaging 3.5 ha which they farmed on a tenantry basis. However, this study challenges this basic assumption and argues that both dryland and irrigation farming in Sanyati facilitated commercialisation and the development of significant disparities in wealth among rural households. Clear patterns of socio-economic differentiation also emerge despite the proscribing effects of the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1950 and the adoption in the 1960s of a lease agreement structure by ARDA which in many ways threatened to incapacitate the irrigation plotholders’ advance towards accumulation. The lease agreement was the contract outgrowers entered into in order to have the right to use government allocated plots for a specified period of time (i.e. 99-year leases) at all ARDA irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe. Although such state interventionist measures threatened to arrest rural differentiation, the study argues that Sanyati peasants still had abundant initiative to blunt both the colonial and post-colonial states’ offensive.

Irrigation has been perceived in state policy circles primarily as a least cost means of famine relief and as a means of settling displaced farmers from Crown Land (government owned land) in the colonial period and other types of land categories after independence. This implies that the government developed schemes in the communal areas mainly on the strength of their social desirability alone. However, this study challenges scholarship which conceives the problem of rural development as no more than moving the rural population from a subsistence economy to a cash economy. It argues that such schemes
as Gowe, on the basis of cotton commodity production, at different stages in the period under review have transcended the social desirability objective and become a source of affluence and economic progress for some innovative and commercially oriented rural farmers. Indeed, the study demonstrates that the introduction of both cotton and irrigation in the 1960s deepened socio-economic inequalities among the plotholding households and dryland farming households in Sanyati.

The important questions the study will answer are:

1. What was the state of the peasant economy (based on dryland farming) in Sanyati prior to irrigation?
2. How far did peasant differentiation emerge in Sanyati prior to irrigation enterprise?
3. Did irrigation facilitate increased production of cotton and other crops as well as increased access to wealth/income?
4. To what extent did irrigation agriculture lead to the emergence of rural differentiation in the region?
5. Did the state (both colonial and post-colonial) promote rural differentiation?

Thus, the study evaluates peasant (especially dryland) agriculture from 1939 and irrigation farming from the 1960s and analyses how the relationship between ARDA-Sanyati and Gowe has developed since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) up to 2000. At the same time, elements of continuity or change in the interaction of the two are addressed within the context of the colonial and post-colonial paradigms in order to demonstrate how Sanyati society was differentiated in the two major periods under review.
DEDICATIONS

This thesis is dedicated to my children, Mark (Jnr), Miranda and Mike who always kept me motivated in their own little ways. I will always remember their prayers. The thesis is also dedicated to my parents Mr and Mrs Nyandoro for bringing me up and directing my academic career.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am unable to express in full my gratitude to my Supervisor, Prof. Ian Phimister, for his patient guidance of this study from beginning to end. He painstakingly went through all the drafts of this work and selflessly proffered invaluable advice and criticism as he ploughed through the formative and final versions of the thesis. Prof. Phimister has had the most profound impact on my doctoral studies. I want to extend my heart-felt gratitude to Prof. Phimister for being my Chief Supervisor and for the untiring assistance he has given me all the time. I thank him for his continued support and assistance throughout my research and for his attention to detail. I greatly appreciate the many and in-depth structural suggestions he made which have contributed immensely to giving this study its final shape. Professor Phimister deserves special thanks for his generosity and for the role he has played throughout my research which included ensuring that I secure financial support from the Ernest Oppenheimer Memorial Trust (EOMT) and a bursary from the University of Pretoria. Without him I might not have embarked on a PhD programme in the first place. The possibility of doing a PhD looked extremely remote given the difficulties of getting a sponsor for this project in my home country and other logistical problems. I am grateful to him for his encouragement, support and advice throughout this project.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to my Associate Supervisor, Prof. A. S. Mlambo, for going through all the drafts and making extensive editorial comments on them. Special thanks are due to him. His advice and guidance has been invaluable.

I would like to thank Prof. J. S. Bergh - Chairman of the Department of Historical and Heritage Studies - for his invaluable advice and for making his door open to me all the time when I needed his help. In a big way, he complemented my supervisors’ role by keeping a keen interest in my work and proffered important advice whenever he could. He also played a big role in recommending me for a UP bursary award.

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My sincere gratitude also goes to all the lecturers in the Department of Historical and Heritage Studies and the Secretary, Mrs T. Van Rensburg. I am also deeply indebted to the many colleagues outside the university environment especially Mr Simon Pazvakavambwa whose rich and diverse knowledge, insight and experience greatly enhanced my own understanding of Zimbabwe’s agricultural history, not least irrigation issues.

I would like to thank Dr. A. P. D. Masunungure for helping me formulate the hypothesis for my proposal and his unrelenting commitment in going through my early draft chapters (before his departure for the USA) and in the process making invaluable comments that helped shape this thesis. I also appreciate Prof. Sam Moyo’s support and advice.

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I also owe Ms Fiona Mubvumbi sincere thanks for the time she spent typing and printing the draft first chapter of my thesis as well as Mr Elton Gilbert for allowing me to interview him from his hospital bed at West End Hospital in Harare - a really touching moment for me in my academic career.

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Furthermore, I feel a great obligation to all my key informants/respondents. These include, the plotholders on the Gowe Irrigation Scheme, Estate employees, Sanyati dryland farmers, the former DC for Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, for helping me understand how Gowe operated in the colonial period, former and present TILCOR/ARDA Estate management, especially the former General Manager of ARDA, Dr Liberty Mhlanga, who accepted my probing and inquisitiveness with a cheerful good humour and a fore-bearing tolerance.

At ARDA, I want to thank the Chief Executive Officer, Dr. J. Z. Z. Matowanyika, for authorising me to use ARDA Archives and documents in the Records Centre section of the National Archives of Zimbabwe. This research would have relied on limited information had this authority not been granted because the ARDA sources housed there are not yet public archives and this would have compromised the quality of this thesis. I also want to acknowledge the rare assistance I got from the Sanyati Estate Manager, Mr Henry Chiona, and other estate officials who always supported me in their different ways during the course of this project. Mr Chiona in particular gave me access to official
correspondence, which contributed immensely towards giving my study originality. His broad insight about the local community (Sanyati) and ARDA operations in the country in general was extremely beneficial to me.

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It must be emphasised, though, that the people mentioned above should be absolved from any blame for the errors or shortcomings in the thesis. Unless, otherwise stated, opinions and conclusions expressed in this study are the sole responsibility of the author.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAB</td>
<td>Agricultural Assistance Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCOR</td>
<td>Associated Chambers of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADC</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Agricultural Development Fund/African Development Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFC</td>
<td>Agricultural Finance Corporation</td>
</tr>
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<td>AGRIBANK</td>
<td>Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRITEX</td>
<td>Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Agricultural Loan Fund/African Loan Fund</td>
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<td>AMA</td>
<td>Agricultural Marketing Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Agricultural Marketing Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>Assistant Native Commissioner/African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>APAs</td>
<td>African Purchase Areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>APLs</td>
<td>African Purchase Lands</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARDA</td>
<td>Agricultural and Rural Development Authority</td>
</tr>
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<td>AREX</td>
<td>Department of Agricultural Research and Extension</td>
</tr>
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<td>ARnI</td>
<td>Association of Rhodesian Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>Bantu Investment Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Blood Pressure</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSACo</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
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<td>BSAP</td>
<td>British South Africa Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBZ</td>
<td>Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Cotton Company Committee</td>
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<td>CCGA</td>
<td>Commercial Cotton Growers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Cameroon Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFU</td>
<td>Commercial Farmers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigations Department</td>
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<td>CMB</td>
<td>Cotton Marketing Board</td>
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<td>CNC</td>
<td>Chief Native Commissioner</td>
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<td>CONEX</td>
<td>Department of Conservation and Extension</td>
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<td>COTTCO</td>
<td>Cotton Company of Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Centre Party</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Cold Storage Commission</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Cotton Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>District Administrator</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<td>DDF</td>
<td>District Development Fund</td>
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<td>Department of Rural Development</td>
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<td>DEVAG</td>
<td>Department of Agricultural Development</td>
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<td>DMB</td>
<td>Dairy Marketing Board</td>
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<td>DZL</td>
<td>Dairiboard Zimbabwe Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECGC</td>
<td>Empire Cotton Growing Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESAP</td>
<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>ESC</td>
<td>Electricity Supply Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIF</td>
<td>Farm Irrigation Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GM</td>
<td>General Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMB</td>
<td>Grain Marketing Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Irrigation Co-ordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIMI</td>
<td>International Irrigation Management Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMT</td>
<td>Irrigation Management Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWMI</td>
<td>International Water Management Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAA</td>
<td>Land Apportionment Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDO</td>
<td>Land Development Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Mechanical Equipment Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOWD</td>
<td>Ministry of Water Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWEA</td>
<td>Kenyan Rice Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>Native Affairs Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NANGO</td>
<td>National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
NASA (UA) National Archives of South Africa (Union Archives)
NAZ (RC) National Archives of Zimbabwe (Records Centre)
NC Native Commissioner
NDF Native Development Fund
NDP National Democratic Party
NFAZ National Farmers’ Association of Zimbabwe
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NLHA Native Land Husbandry Act
NPAs Native Purchase Areas
NRB Natural Resources Board
NRZ National Railways of Zimbabwe
PC Provincial Commissioner
PDO Primary Development Officer
PICC Provincial Irrigation Co-ordinating Committee
PM Prime Minister
PNC Provincial Native Commissioner
POZ Parliament of Zimbabwe
PTA Parents Teachers Association
RAEO Regional Agriculture Extension Officer
RBZ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
RDPU Rural Development Promotion Unit
RF Rhodesia Front
RNFU Rhodesia National Farmers Union
RTA  Rhodesian Tobacco Association
SA  South Africa
SADC  Southern Africa Development Committee
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme
SGB  Sudan Gezira Board
SLA  Sabi-Limpopo Authority
TILCOR  Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation
TTLs  Tribal Trust Lands
UANC  United African National Congress
UDI  Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
USA  United States of America
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
VIDCO  Village Development Committee
WADCO  Ward Development Committee
WB  World Bank
WENELA  Witwatersrand Native Labour Association
WRMS  Water Resources Management Strategy
WTO  World Trade Organisation
WUAs  Water User Associations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>WW2</td>
<td>World War 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZANU (PF)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU (PF)</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Patriotic Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZBC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>ZBH</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings</td>
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<td>ZESA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZFC</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Fertiliser Company/Zimbabwe Farmers Corporation</td>
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<td>ZFU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Farmers Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMACE</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange</td>
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<td>ZIMBANK</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZIMCODD</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development</td>
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<td>ZIMPREST</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZINWA</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Water Authority</td>
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<td>ZISCO</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZNFU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe National Farmers’ Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZRP</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Republic Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZUPCO</td>
<td>Zimbabwe United Passenger Company</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

This study is an enquiry into the growth and development \(^1\) of peasant agriculture as well as the transformation and commercialisation of the peasant sector in Sanyati on the basis of irrigation. \(^2\) It primarily investigates the extent to which rural differentiation \(^3\) emerged at varying stages in the history of the area under review. The consequences of differentiation are also examined. It is important to document the differentiation process in this particular period and its consequences because the period reveals a number of continuities in the manner the Sanyati peasantry struggled to progress economically under the colonial regime. Although the first decade of independence ushered in a new era of prosperity for these irrigation and dryland farmers, the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and events afterwards revealed several consistencies with the past as the progress achieved since 1980 was gradually whittled away. This period is characterised by a cotton boom followed by a decline in production of the same crop in Sanyati. Sanyati is a vast and marginalised communal area situated approximately 100 km northwest of Kadoma Town - formerly Gatooma in the Mashonaland West Province of Zimbabwe (See Maps 1, 2 and 3). Because irrigation was preceded by a preoccupation to settle evicted African farmers \(^4\) from the Rhodesdale Estates, a former

\(^1\) Economic development is a complex process in which economic and non-economic factors are closely interwoven. It can best be defined by its major objective: the exploitation of all productive resources by a country or region in order to expand real income. A broader definition of development emphasises that development concerns not only man’s material needs, but also the improvement of the social conditions of his life. Development is therefore not only economic growth, but also growth plus change: social, cultural and institutional as well as economic. For this definition which will apply to this study see Paul Alpert, *Economic Development: Objectives and Methods*, (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 1.

\(^2\) Irrigation is much discussed and is often clearly defined. Irrigation has been defined by Israelsen as the artificial application of water to soil for the purpose of supplying water essential to plant growth and that it is also essentially a practice of supplementing natural precipitation for the production of crops. See O. W. Israelsen, *Irrigation Principles and Practices*, 2nd Edition, (New York: John Wiley, 1950), 405 and C. Barrow, *Water Resources and Agricultural Development in the Tropics*, (Harlow: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1987), 199 and 356. H. Ruthenberg, *Farming Systems of the Tropics*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 163, states that irrigation describes those practices that are adopted to supply water to an area where crops are grown, so as to reduce the length and frequency of the periods in which a lack of moisture is the limiting factor to plant growth. Similarly, FAO/UNESCO, *Irrigation, drainage and salinity*, (London: Hutchinson, 1973), 1 and 510, state that irrigation and drainage are processes which aim at the maintenance of soil moisture within the range required for optimum plant growth, and when the moisture available is not sufficient artificial application of water to the land by human agency is called irrigation. These definitions bear close resemblance to each other and for purposes of this thesis any of them is applicable.

\(^3\) Social differentiation examines the economic, political and normatively defined relations that underlie the construction of social categories. Social differentiation, embedded in inequalities of power, status, wealth, and prestige affects life chances of individuals as well as the allocation of resources and opportunities. This study explores specific strands of differentiation, that is, socio-economic and to some extent political that are integral aspects of non-irrigated and irrigated agricultural development. The question whether dryland agriculture or irrigation farming produces distinct forms of socio-economic inequality in Sanyati is an important one. This is because most studies of differentiation in Zimbabwe have been carried out on the dryland area but not much has been written about it in the irrigated sector. For this definition see Danielle Juteau, *Social Differentiation*, [http://policyresearch.gc.ca/page.asp?pagenm=pub_trends_social](http://policyresearch.gc.ca/page.asp?pagenm=pub_trends_social)

\(^4\) Africans were evicted to Sanyati in 1950 under the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA), which was passed by the colonial government in the same year, but was formally implemented in Sanyati in 1956. See
white ranching area owned by the British conglomerate, LONRHO, (See Map 4) the study starts in chapter two by analysing the historical evolution of Sanyati agriculture since the outbreak of the Second World War. The chapter provides the necessary background to the establishment by the District Commissioner (DC) for Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, of the Gowe 5 Pilot Smallholder Irrigation Scheme in the late 1960s and the Main Irrigation Scheme by the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR) around the mid-1970s.

The Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation was mandated in 1968 to spearhead rural development in this former British colony. This corporation was unique because it approximated in its structure and its functions to the type of organisation which J. Blume and other scholars have categorised as a “Development Agency” in that it had a monolithic managerial structure and, at the same time, engaged in commercial activities. 6 A large proportion of these activities involved the production of agricultural products for sale. It differed from many development agencies in other African countries in that it did not concentrate on a single type of production, but had embarked on a variety of enterprises. The scope of the corporation’s activities was very wide. For example, it was involved in the agricultural, industrial, commercial and mining spheres of the country’s development.

On the whole, this study traces the development of irrigation in Sanyati instituted under the auspices of the then Ministry of Internal Affairs which entrusted the office of the DC with all the administrative and managerial responsibilities relating to the operations of the scheme. It also examines the resultant socio-economic relationships that emerged since the inception of irrigation up to the end of the second decade of independence. The mandate to develop and operate rural schemes was subsequently bestowed on TILCOR, now the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA).

ARDA’s irrigation activities in Sanyati are represented by the Gowе Plotoholders or Smallholder Scheme and the Sanyati Main Irrigation Estate. At inception in September 1967 and March 1974, respectively, the two schemes adjacent to each other were operated and managed (save for the brief period the DC was in charge) by TILCOR whose parallel organisation in South Africa was the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC). 7 It was after independence in 1980 that the parastatal organisation adopted the

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5 N.B. In this study, Gowe refers to ARDA’s smallholder irrigation scheme in Sanyati (Mashonaland West Province) whereas Gokwe (Midlands Province) is an adjacent district to Sanyati.


7 NAZ, GEN-F/TRI, Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR): Sanyati Project Report, (Salisbury, Rhodesia: TILCOR, January 1974). The BIC effectively became a “Native” Corporation in 1961. Under and by virtue of the powers vested in the Governor-General of the Union of South Africa by section twenty-five of the Native Administration Act, 1927 (Act No. 38 of 1927) read with section twenty-one of the Native Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act No. 18 of 1936), he declared the BIC of South Africa Limited, constituted by section two of the BIC Act, 1959 (Act No. 34 of 1959), that it shall, for the
name ARDA. These schemes, which constitute my major area of investigation, are located in Sanyati – a northwestern part of Zimbabwe that is highly susceptible to drought. (For the specific geographical location of Sanyati Communal Lands and the aforementioned irrigation projects, (See Maps 5 and 6). Sanyati is a malarial, tsetse-infested lowland region with patchy and variable rains and was considered to be unsuitable for crop cultivation or animal husbandry by whites. The area’s ecosystem is typified by sparse vegetation, predominantly poor sandy soils and some domesticated animals in the form of cattle, goats and other livestock. In the early times, animal husbandry had been rendered almost impossible by the presence of tsetse fly (See Tsetse Map 7) but by 1950, tsetse control campaigns had registered significant successes.

The first people to inhabit this area are of Shona extraction and belong to the Karanga sub-ethnic group derogatorily referred to as “Shangwe.” Since the Rhodesdale evictions, the area is now inhabited by an assortment of both indigenous (“Shangwe”) and “immigrant” populations (“Madheruka”) who fall under paramount chiefs Neuso and Wozhele. (See Map 8 showing Neuso and Wozhele’s areas of jurisdiction). Up to the 1940s the economy of the people of Sanyati consisted of a combination of subsistence agriculture and pastoral pursuits. To a certain measure, they also gathered fruits and hunted animals then abundant in the area. However, subsistence farming was the chief sustainer of human life in the area which was created from people originally residing on the Rhodesdale Estates in the Midlands Province who were targeted for forced resettlement in the sparsely populated frontier regions of Sanyati and Gokwe. Three hundred and fifty six families were accommodated on the 28 000 hectare Sanyati “Reserve” (now Sanyati communal land) alone, each with an allocation of eight acres of arable land and ten head of cattle. However, by 1950/51 the exact number of cattle belonging to the new settlers who had been moved from Rhodesdale to Sanyati was not known, but some farmers already sold maize for cash and a total of 1 083 and 571 people in the Neuso and Wozhele chieftainships, respectively, were taxpayers by 1966.

purposes of sub-section (2) of section one of the Natives Land Act, 1913 (Act No. 27 of 1913) and paragraphs (a) and (a) bis of sub-section (1) of section twelve of the Native Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act No. 18 of 1936), be deemed to be a “Native” Corporation. See NASA (UA), BAO 1153/400 – 1166/400 Vol. 8066: File: 1160/400, Bantu Investment Corporation of SA – Enquiries, “Proclamation by His Excellency the Honourable Charles Robberts Swart, Governor-General of the Union of South Africa,” Department of Bantu Administration and Development, 46/12/2/1, 3.

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12 LDO Monthly Report, December, 1950 in NAZ, S160/DG/105/2/50, Gatooma district: sub-division: Sanyati reserve: 1950-1951, LDO Monthly Reports (Native Agriculture). N.B. LDOs were Land Development Officers working for the Agriculture Department, which fell under the Native Department in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
13 NAZ, MF 557: Mashonaland South Province: Gatooma District (Internal Affairs), 10 and 20. N.B. What is referred to as Mashonaland South in this Microfilm (MF) is now Mashonaland West Province of Zimbabwe.
The migrant labour system had also begun with the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand and diamond in Kimberly in South Africa towards the end of the nineteenth century. Local and foreign labour migrants from Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi) and Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) were also attracted to Southern Rhodesia’s (Zimbabwe) farms, mines and industries owned by the white settlers since the occupation of the country in 1890. The dire need for cheap labour led to massive recruitment of workers under the notorious “chibaro” system in Southern Rhodesia and by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA or WENELA) in South Africa. Since 1894 the need to raise money for various forms of tax, ranging from hut, dog, cattle and poll taxes, which were primarily instituted to procure African labour for European-owned enterprises, forced many men to search for work on the white farms and mines. The process of labour migration brought cash back into the community. Apart from utilising the cash to pay tax, migrant wages were also invested in cash crop farming. This in itself is enough testimony that the “Shangwe” economy was not traditional but quite commercialised.

This study argues that between the late 1930s and the early 1960s, the inhabitants of Sanyati were differentiated in socio-economic status on the basis of dryland agriculture. However, from the late 1960s onwards they became more differentiated with the advent of irrigation as a new wave of “immigrants” was encouraged to take up land as plotholders at Gowe.

Thus, the Sanyati smallholder project (Gowe), in particular, was construed with some major policy issues in resettlement, irrigation and water development in mind. As the population grew and with limited urban industrial opportunities to absorb it, because Rhodesian industry was still in its infancy, access to and use of water in rural areas targeted for resettling hordes of people being moved from white designated areas by the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) of 1930 and the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1950 became a paramount policy issue. The idea was not to create a differentiated

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14 The word chibaro was widely used by Africans throughout the regional economic system and is synonymous with contract labour, forced labour and slavery. Throughout most of Central Africa, work secured through a specially created labour recruitment agency, the Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (RNLB), became known as chibaro (“slavery” or forced labour). Chibaro-labour for the mines between 1903 and 1912 was obtained by outright coercion. Thus, chibaro was a system of excessive coercion in recruiting semi-skilled labour used in Southern Rhodesia since the turn of the twentieth century. For more detail on Chibaro-labour see Charles van Onselen, *Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia 1900-1933*, (London: Pluto Press Limited, 1976), 104-108.

15 Since 1900 the Southern Rhodesian mining industry faced competition from the Rand mines. Rhodesia was worried by the recruitment of locals by agents of the Transvaal industries particularly after the Boer War. After this war Rhodesian mines were faced with renewed and even stronger competition from the Rand. Hence, the Rhodesian authorities tried to safeguard their labour supplies through the *modus vivendi* agreement of 1901, in terms of which the WNLA agreed not to recruit in Rhodesia, Ngamiland or Zambezia, and, in return for exclusive recruiting rights in Portuguese East Africa (now Mozambique), to supply 12.5% of the workers recruited there to Rhodesia. See Van Onselen, *Chibaro*, 85 and *The Rhodesia Herald*, Salisbury: August 4, 1900.

peasantry. As will be demonstrated in this study, differentiation emerged as an unintended outcome of governmental policy.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The aims of this study are, inter alia:

(a) To trace the history of growth and development of peasant agriculture in the Sanyati communal lands from the 1930s to the 1960s;
(b) To examine efforts to transform and commercialise the peasant sector on the basis of irrigation from the 1960s to 2000; and in the main,
(c) To analyse how and measure the extent to which Sanyati residents were socio-economically differentiated before and after the introduction of irrigation schemes.

This study shows how far dryland and irrigation farming were instrumental in fostering development and rural differentiation in Sanyati. Irrigation was introduced in Sanyati in 1967 by the then District Commissioner for Gatooma, R. L. Westcott. Soon it was to progress under the directorship of TILCOR which was a corporate body which fell under the ambit of the then Ministry of Internal Affairs. Irrigation, though, was not a novel phenomenon in Zimbabwe as a whole, as smallholder peasant farmers established their own schemes since the early twentieth century. Although government intervention in smallholder irrigation began in the late 1920s, it is important to note that prior to the 1960s, Sanyati was not perceived as an area which was conducive to irrigation farming due to its semi-arid nature and the fact that the people of Sanyati had adapted relatively well to their ecological environment.

The study focuses on whether the introduction of cotton at the Gowe smallholder irrigation project as well as the Sanyati Main Scheme revolutionised life in and outside the schemes. It also examines the impact of government intervention in agriculture and government agrarian policies between 1939 and 2000 and how these affected society. An analysis is made of which peasants emerged winners and which ones became losers in this whole effort to use the new crop to accumulate wealth.

This study’s prime purpose, therefore, is to assess the impact of the two irrigation schemes and cotton on the material and other cultural aspects of the people concerned. It tests the hypothesis whether the total effect of state-run irrigation enterprises ushered in new socio-economic and political relations or not in both the irrigated and dryland area from the 1960s to 2000. It seeks to investigate if irrigation affected different people in different ways and created heterogeneous groups in Sanyati who were more clearly differentiated than before. The question whether the colonial and post-colonial state deliberately intended to promote social differentiation in the rural areas or not is an important one. This is so because the state, in the two periods, always remained silent on its intentions, but legislation such as the NLHA, coupled with the adoption of the

Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) after independence, heightened speculation that the state was not inclined to promote rural differentiation.

One can also investigate whether the post-independence period (1980-2000) represented a break or continuity with the past in the manner ARDA’s irrigation projects were run. This will be done by exploring and making a comparative assessment of how people were differentiated in Sanyati in the colonial and the post-independence era and examine whether the gap between rich and poor continued to widen after independence, thereby creating “a crisis of expectations.”

In this study, differentiation patterns that emerged in the pre-irrigation era as well as in the period after the introduction of this new technology are examined. This is done in an attempt to answer the central question in the study i.e. To what extent did rural differentiation take place in Sanyati on the basis of both rainfed and irrigation agriculture? Thus, the study evaluates peasant agriculture in two very important periods in the history of Sanyati communal lands.

**BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF TOPIC**

**Background:**

Sanyati’s ecology and its location in a semi-arid region, among other things, influenced the colonial government to implement various agricultural reforms in the 1930s through to the 1960s that were to impact positively and sometimes negatively on the lives of the general populace at large; a people whose traditional culture and economy determined acceptance or denial of colonial agrarian prescriptions. This also signalled how the people were going to be socially differentiated.

A number of changes occurred in agriculture at the end of the Second World War. Both the peasant and commercial farming sectors underwent considerable development since 1945. It is important to observe that, in Zimbabwe, the government has constantly been redefining its agricultural roles, policies and missions. Government policy from the 1940s to the 1960s seemed to have a deliberate bias towards large-scale commercial agriculture, which was largely dominated by whites. The period 1960s to 2000 seems to have experienced a dramatic “shift” in policy in favour of the smallholder agricultural sector, although large-scale agriculture continued to enjoy a dominant position. This was so particularly after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Smith regime in 1965. There was an invigorated drive to develop irrigation projects in communal lands in a move that was intended to curb the massive rural to urban drift by hordes of people in search of employment opportunities. From 1980 onwards, support to the small-scale sector was not only perpetuated but also intensified by the new government to stimulate African farming and participation in the economy, which previously had not been perceived as essential.

For example, On New Year’s Eve, 1982, the then Prime Minister (PM) of Zimbabwe (now the Executive President, Robert Gabriel Mugabe) declared 1982 the “Year of
"[National] Transformation" and announced a ten point policy plan. Of the ten points, one was specific to water and irrigation development: “The provision of water, as a basic domestic utility also crucial to Zimbabwe’s agriculture - especially in dry areas, will be accelerated in all communal areas [through the construction of new dams and canals], a move which should also boost irrigation schemes.” The Five Year Development Plan that was developed by the pre-independence government in 1978 had emphasised the vital role irrigation played in national development. It, among other things, included provision for a Z$147 million irrigation development programme. This commitment to irrigation was also adopted by the government after 1980. Thus, irrigation in the communal areas has been an important issue with successive colonial as well as independent governments. This is because of the inherently low developmental potential in these areas due to poor rainfall distribution and poor infrastructural development.

Apart from Sanyati, a similar shift was also occurring in Manicaland and Matabeleland where irrigation schemes such as Chisumbanje and Ngwezi were set up which led to the emergence of irrigation-driven differentiation. The promotion of differentiation, however, was not the government’s original objective. In spite of this there has been heightened interest among scholars in studies on differentiation in many parts of Zimbabwe.

From the 1930s to the 1960s, the agricultural history of Sanyati was characterised more by dryland production of such crops as maize, groundnuts, sorghum and rapoko. These were grown mainly for subsistence purposes and there were few differential gaps among people then. An element of commercialisation was adopted with the introduction of cotton in the 1960s and this led to the widening of the social and economic gap between people. Sanyati is now one of the most renowned cotton producing areas in the country. The area is highly prone to drought and therefore cotton, which is a drought resilient cash crop, thrives under these conditions.

Apart from the settlement objective, it is the incessancy of droughts in some parts of Zimbabwe, including Sanyati, that prompted the then Ministry of Internal Affairs to consider implementing irrigation enterprises countrywide in the 1960s. In the global context, irrigation (both small-scale and large-scale) can be perceived as a panacea to a host of economic and social problems besetting areas that are particularly susceptible to the ravages of the weather like drought. Whether there was drought or not, this situation did not prevent the emergence of rural differentiation. Greater forms of differentiation still occurred in the two schemes operated and managed by ARDA, formerly known as TILCOR.

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Any full understanding of TILCOR’s or ARDA’s operations and activities as well as differentiation in Sanyati must, therefore, include a detailed knowledge of the growth and development of the two irrigation schemes and the reasons for their emergence. The origin of these schemes can be explained in the context of the enormous influence exerted by one of the most prominent proponents of irrigation in the mainly drought-prone communal areas of Sanyati. This man as stated earlier was R. L. Westcott, the former DC Gatooma. On the basis of a preliminary study conducted by Nyandoro in 1997, it emerged that Westcott was the principal figure in charting the beginning and destiny of irrigation enterprise in Sanyati since UDI. The experiments he embarked upon were to differentiate the Sanyati community in many ways.

**Significance of topic:-**

The proposed topic is a significant area of study for several reasons. For instance, the contribution of the peasant sector and irrigation to economic growth cannot be overlooked. Whilst dryland farming is not a novel phenomenon in Sanyati, irrigation enterprise is definitely a relatively new idea in the area. This is so because it was never envisaged that irrigation would be a viable proposition in Sanyati with its arid history. Thus, when TILCOR was formed the aim of this government agency entrusted with the management, operation and development of the region was to increase productivity and improve production stability in this arid area in accordance with national objectives enunciated by the then Ministry of Internal Affairs.

It is important to note that, in the global context, much has been written on peasant agriculture as well as on irrigation farming, particularly large-scale irrigation schemes. Social differentiation as an academic discipline has also received its fair share of debate and criticism. However, the nature of differentiation that emerges in the Sanyati communal lands particularly with the introduction of irrigation does not seem to have generated much scholarly attention yet. As already indicated, a number of changes were introduced to the agricultural sector at the end of the Second World War. A new dimension of this study is that it demonstrates that the commonest forms of differentiation in Zimbabwe’s rural areas since or prior to 1945 have been on the basis of access to land, labour and gender. Nevertheless, the irrigation era (the 1960s onwards) ushered in new types of social relations. Because irrigation plotholders were allocated standardised plots (plots of the same size), socio-economic and political relations were no longer necessarily determined by access to land mainly but access to inputs. For instance, inputs such as capital and labour as well as the ability to pay the water rent and land rent tended to differentiate people more than access to land.

A common feature of smallholder irrigation development in Zimbabwe is that irrigators tend to farm the dryland (rainfed) lands as well. This practice is discouraged by government on the grounds that irrigation is intended to relieve land pressure on dryland resources and also that dryland activities depress the productivity of farmers on irrigated plots. However, a significant omission in the works that have been written on irrigation is a discussion of the relationship between irrigated and dryland farming. This study is a modest attempt to fill this void, but there is need for detailed follow up research on this
relationship which is construed in the literature as either symbiotic, exploitative or parasitic.

The major reasons justifying a study on development and differentiation in Sanyati can be found in the fact that, no detailed study exists on ARDA activities that attempts to explore the largely peculiar forms of socio-economic or rural differentiation wrought by irrigation technology in a very remote area of the country like this one. Most research projects on Zimbabwe have focused on the wider political economy and agrarian conditions but they have provided limited detail about ARDA irrigation in the northwest. Likewise, research, which has focused on Zimbabwe’s irrigation systems, has provided limited information on the peculiarities of irrigation schemes and about the context within which these operate in a frontier locality. What is needed is research that incorporates the inter-connectedness between the farmer/plotholder, the irrigation system, scheme management, the market, the surrounding community and the state and its many institutional facilities. Such an approach is essential because it leads to the co-ordination of irrigation enterprise, which, in turn, promotes sustained development, which is not only in line with government policy but also in line with the needs of the people. For example, the government through the former Ministry of Internal Affairs has identified irrigation farming as one of the opportunities for spearheading the development of low potential frontier communities of Zimbabwe such as Sanyati - a previously neglected communal agricultural sector – but not much effort has been made to encourage peasant participation in management. For development to take place it needed to integrate these elements, which are key to the realisation of this goal. This is arguably, the most important contribution of this study. The study has attempted to piece together the very scattered socio-economic data on TILCOR/ARDA schemes like the Sanyati Main Irrigation Estate and the adjoining Gowe Smallholder Irrigation component as well as the surrounding dryland to demonstrate the development of agriculture and the extent to which it influenced different forms of rural differentiation in Sanyati from the pre-irrigation era right through to the irrigation period. It focuses on ARDA because ARDA is the largest single irrigator of land in Zimbabwe.

The relationship that exists between the smallholder scheme and the Main Estate is peculiar compared to other schemes. What is particularly fascinating about this relationship is that, unlike most of the settler schemes initiated and run by TILCOR/ARDA, for example, Chisumbanje, Ngwezi, Antelope and Katiyo/Rumbizi, the Gowe Irrigation Scheme did not start off as an outgrowers scheme to an ARDA Core Estate (i.e. the Sanyati Main Estate). It was a pilot scheme. The Core Estate was only established almost ten years later, which affects social differentiation in its own significant way. In fact ARDA-Sanyati has had different experience from conventional settlement schemes such as Dande (Mashonaland Central), Tsovane (Masvingo) and the tea estates in the Manicaland Province of Zimbabwe where the main scheme preceded the smallholder or outgrowers scheme. Consequently, there are differences in social differentiation in Sanyati compared to the other schemes run by the same corporate

22 There were three other TILCOR schemes, namely Mushumbi, Muzarabani and Tjojtjolo, but these were composed of a core estate (state farm) only with no plotholding settlers or outgrowers. For Muzarabani and Tjojtjolo the land for their respective smallholder schemes had been demarcated but no actual allocation was
body. This makes the relationship between Gowe and the core estate the exception rather than the rule. Equally interesting was how growth point status would be achieved in Sanyati on the basis of irrigation and how a “black capitalist entrepreneur” started to emerge as the most influential economic class in this area. In fact, ARDA’s scheme at Sanyati is a successful example of a “Growth Point” and it serves to illustrate the Authority’s strategy of integrated development in the area. Thus, the study is a milestone in revealing how an irrigation-based growth strategy operated.

In the next section, an overview of irrigation development in Zimbabwe and Africa as a whole is presented in order to put the study in its national and continental context.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO AFRICAN IRRIGATION SCHEMES

The evolution of smallholder irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe - General background:

Irrigation development has been a peculiar feature of many regions in Africa. Colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe has also adopted similar irrigation experiments. R. Chambers who has examined in detail various settlement schemes in tropical Africa including irrigation projects has noted that, in general, “governments in less developed countries, whether still under colonial rule or independent, have launched projects for the re-organisation of agriculture and for the introduction into agriculture of more advanced technology.”

A number of studies on the development of irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe exist. These include works by R. Max, E. Musiiwa and M. Rukuni. For M. Rukuni, irrigation has played a more critical role in the success of commercial agriculture than on smallholder farms. He maintains that a major distinction between large-scale and smallholder irrigation is that the former is privately owned while the latter is largely government owned and administered. Undoubtedly, large-scale schemes emerged as an integral part...

made to settlers in the TILCOR days. N.B. Originally, there were only 8 TILCOR schemes namely Sanyati, Chisumbanje, Katiyo, Antelope, Ngwezi, Tjotjolo, Mushumbi and Muzarabani. Initially, Middle Sabi (which also has an outgrower section) was not a TILCOR scheme. It was incorporated into ARDA from the Sabi-Limpopo Authority. By the end of the TILCOR era only 5 schemes had outgrowers and these were Sanyati, Chisumbanje, Katiyo, Ngwezi and Antelope. N.B. This information was collated from Liberty Mhlanga, (Chairman, Land Settlement Board – Ministry of Lands and Land Resettlement), Telephone Discussion with Nyandoro, 11th November 2006. Mhlanga is the former ARDA General Manager.

of the commercialisation of agriculture whereas smallholder schemes were largely instituted by the government to provide food security in the drought-prone areas of the country. \(^{27}\) In some instances, smallholder irrigation schemes like Nyanyadzi, Nyamaropa and Nyachowa were established to settle blacks displaced from land taken over by white farmers, especially after the passage of the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) in 1930. \(^{28}\)

Since agriculture was the dominant industry in Zimbabwe, every effort was made to ensure that it remained the cornerstone of development in the country for some time to come. \(^{29}\) This partly explains the amount of emphasis put on developing large-scale commercial and later small-scale irrigation agriculture. Irrigation has always had a clear political content as it embodies land and water, two of the most contentious issues in Zimbabwean history in which colonial injustice is very obvious. Obviously, the preoccupation with economic growth and development and the economic problems of low-income countries has led to more general recognition of the crucial importance of the agricultural sector, both in providing for rapidly increasing human populations and in generating productivity in other sectors. \(^{30}\) Under these circumstances, what has been termed “smallholder” agriculture \(^{31}\) could not continue to be ignored any more, hence the focus in this section of the introduction on the development of smallholder irrigation farming in Zimbabwe which complements the bigger schemes.

The history of smallholder irrigation in Zimbabwe must be analysed within the broader context of a colonial power developing an agro-economic structure to control the vast majority of the black smallholder farmers. \(^{32}\) In cases where the colonial state created small-scale irrigation farms adjacent to a major estate it was driven among other things by the need for labour. The estate would exploit and exercise its legal monopoly \(^{33}\) over this labour. Because plotholders often owed their existence to the estate (Gowe was an exception to this rule only at inception before the advent of the Main Estate) they were obliged to provide it with labour. This meant that the plotholder was situated within a social and economic dynamic similar to sharecropping (where tenants worked for landowners in return for staying and growing their crops on that land) because an estate would not be a profitable venture without the aid of African tenants. \(^{34}\) However, contrary


\(^{31}\) Massell and Johnson, Economics of Smallholder Farming in Rhodesia, 1-2.

\(^{32}\) Rukuni and Eicher (eds.), Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Revolution, 127.

\(^{33}\) The TILCOR Act of 1968 gave estates recourse to the labour of the settler or outgrower schemes that were established in their vicinity.

\(^{34}\) Charles van Onselen has written the most recent and incisive studies on sharecroppers in South Africa.
to sentiments expressed by some Euro-centric scholars such as Gelfand, it is an erroneous view that irrigation was brought to Zimbabwe by European settlers. W. Roder has amply demonstrated the presence of irrigation systems in Zimbabwe that were initiated by indigenous cultivators (farmer-initiated irrigation schemes) and still run by them. Roder’s observation is important because, until very recently, irrigation was viewed to be a European introduction in Zimbabwe and no indigenous irrigation tradition was believed to exist in pre-colonial times. D. N. Beach, citing a publication in 1923 by J. Machiwenyika, provides a definitive refutation of this belief by arguing that the Manyika people, for example, practised irrigation before the coming of the Europeans. Thus, pioneer irrigation work in Zimbabwe was not the brainchild of white settler governments.

Clearly, from 1912 to 1927, smallholders constructed and operated their own irrigation projects. Government intervention in smallholder irrigation began in 1928 mainly in Manicaland. In fact, the first involvement of the colonial government in irrigation followed the appointment of Emery D. Alvord as an “Agriculturalist for the Instruction of Natives” in 1926. Alvord promoted the development of irrigation in eastern Zimbabwe (then eastern Southern Rhodesia), by helping farmers develop small irrigated plots of about one hectare or less (i.e. the so-called “comma-hectare” schemes), while they continued to rely heavily on rain-fed farming for the bulk of their family food supply.
Since most of these schemes were introduced in low-altitude and low-rainfall areas, the initial justification for government aid to smallholder irrigation was famine relief or food security. Such a view was also supported by the Indian Irrigation Commission, which was appointed in 1901 and proceeded to recommend in 1903 that the extension of irrigation as a means of protection against famine in areas of insecure and precarious cultivation was essential. Whilst the Commission acknowledged that putting up expensive irrigation works might not be directly remunerative to the Government, it advised that “the net financial burden which such schemes would impose on the state would not be too high a price to pay for the protection against famine which they would afford.” 42 On the basis of this recommendation several projects were immediately undertaken throughout the world including Zimbabwe.

From 1928 to 1935, Alvord’s priority was to assist schemes that had been established by missionaries. However, irrigation policy changed after he had returned from a study tour of irrigation projects on Indian reservations in the United States of America (USA) in 1935. 43 More schemes which included Mutambara, Nyachowa, Dewure/Devure and Nyanyadzi, located in the Sabi Valley in Manicaland, were constructed in the 1930s. 44 The period 1935 to 1945 was characterised by active but restricted development. 45 This was a war-driven policy objective. From 1946 onwards the government started to preoccupy itself with resettling Africans under the LAA. 46 In fact, after the Second World War there was a drive to expand Manicaland irrigation schemes. 47 It is imperative to note that by that time Sanyati was only inhabited by a few people from Neuso or was not yet settled officially. The intention of government then was to settle peasant farmers from designated white areas to so-called African Reserves/Native Reserves. In the period 1935-1956, the government’s grip on smallholder irrigation became stronger, culminating in attempts to implement the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) in 1951. 48 Primary consideration now shifted towards increasing the productive and carrying capacity of the schemes. 49 As a consequence, farmers were required by the government to

(a) give up rain-fed crop production and other non-irrigation activities;
(b) produce surplus food crops for the market, and later cash crops;
(c) practise prescribed crop rotations, and plant on specific dates; and
(d) pay water rates. 50

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43 Rukuni and Eicher (eds.), *Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Revolution*, 129.
44 Roder, *The Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects*.
45 Ibid.
46 Although the LAA was introduced in 1931, it was only in 1950 when its amendment into the NLHA specified removal of black farmers from white areas within a five-year period.
47 Rukuni, “An Analysis of Economic and Institutional Factors Affecting Irrigation Development in Communal Lands of Zimbabwe,” 34.
48 Roder, *The Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects*, 103-117.
The rationale behind this policy was that it was only through the provision of close government supervision that yields could be significantly raised. It was axiomatic, therefore, that a number of irrigation schemes had to be re-organised under government control.

Thus, after the amendment of the LAA in 1950, new irrigation projects were constructed as a means of absorbing the displaced African population. The following statement from a report by the Director of Irrigation, Southern Rhodesia (1950) lends support to the dualism perceived by government between irrigation development and resettlement objectives in the post-war period:

It is a truism that only land which will support a dense rural population is flat, irrigable land. We have neither large areas of flat land nor unlimited water resources in this country, but to accommodate the growing native population every available acre will have to be put to maximum use. There are extensive dry areas particularly in the Southern and South-Western parts of the Colony where the only means of bringing land to proper use will be by large scale gravity, or where gravity is not possible, by large scale pumping. These schemes will be very costly, and by ordinary standards, uneconomic, but it may well be found that any other solution to the population problem will be still less economic and far more undesirable. 51

Subsequently, an Irrigation Policy Committee was set up in 1960 to examine the justification of irrigation as a means of settling black farmers. 52 The recommendations of this Committee, which were released in 1961, can be summed up as follows:

(a) Irrigation was not the best way of settling displaced farmers. The population pressure in black areas was temporary and would slacken as more found employment on white farms.
(b) It would be more productive for government to invest in the industrial sector than irrigation.
(c) Future projects should be based on voluntary agreement of settlers (smallholders themselves), where the settlers will be able to meet the costs of construction, operation and maintenance. 53

Following the Committee’s findings there was, thus, a brief period up to 1965 when further construction of irrigation projects was halted. 54 Rising costs of construction and maintenance prompted the then Department of Native Agriculture to review its irrigation

54 Rukuni and Eicher (eds.), Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Revolution, 130.
development programme. However, after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence there was a new commitment to developing irrigation projects in Communal Lands, formerly Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs), as part of developing rural growth points in African areas to ensure the separate development of the races. 55 With this in mind, the government set up a parastatal (TILCOR), to develop, among other things, irrigation-based growth points in the communal areas. 56 As already indicated, by the middle of the twentieth century the process of promoting irrigation development in the rural areas had gathered momentum. Thus, in the northwestern frontier regions of the country the culmination of this process was the establishment by the DC for Gatooma initially of the Gowe Plotholders Scheme as a pilot project in September 1967 – a development which was subsequently followed by the inception of the Sanyati Main Irrigation Estate by TILCOR in March 1974.

As will be seen in the next section the promotion of small-scale irrigation originated as a backlash to the poor performance of the large-scale schemes in Africa between the 1920s and 1960s. It is now generally acknowledged that these schemes were a failure. The causes of this poor performance can be explained in terms of shortcomings in the design, management, operation, efficiency, equity and agricultural productivity of such schemes.

**The small and big schemes in Africa: Contextual framework:-**

In the global context, irrigation is an ancient technique, which dates back to 5000 years in Central Asia and a great deal further in Mesopotamia. It was used in Imperial China, in old Laos, in ancient Africa - entailing the use of the shaduf in Egypt, in Tanzania, in Zimbabwe and in old America before the advent of the Spanish. For millennia, farmers have used aqueducts, ditches and furrows with crude sluices to divert the water to their crops, giving them increased yields and lessening their dependence on the caprices of the weather. 57 Sometimes the practice of irrigation is considered to be more of an art than a science. Nevertheless, there is sufficient contemporary literature to belie this concept. New scientific and technological advancements in soils, water, plants and engineering have transformed irrigation into a modern science. Whilst traditional irrigation systems are still in operation in some parts of Africa it is an undeniable fact that since the beginning of the twentieth century small to large-scale, centralised and technology-driven schemes have emerged, but for illustrative purposes only a few well known examples will be used.

A historical background of African irrigation enterprise is essential to this discussion. Although it would appear to be an over-ambitious task to try and situate the ARDA Sanyati irrigation schemes in a wider African context because of their smallness relative to such grandiose schemes as Gezira (1925), the Cameroon Development Corporation

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55 Rukuni and Eicher (eds.), *Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Revolution*, 130.
(CDC) of 1947, the Kenyan Rice Project (MWEA) and the Gonja Development Company in Ghana (all instituted in the 1950s), an examination of these schemes reveals several similarities with the Sanyati projects as far as their immediate and long-term objectives are concerned. Sanyati, just like Gezira and many other projects, can be used to show how colonial agricultural philosophy determined the success or failure of irrigation as a whole. In both the big and small schemes land, water and finance were and are still the basic factors of production and indeed indispensable resources in the formulation of irrigation strategy.

It can be noted that African initiated irrigation schemes were forerunners to the schemes which were established on the continent by white settler governments. Colonial governments’ interest in irrigation only manifested itself later than most indigenous projects. A multiplicity of views has been advanced to explain why colonial governments in Africa were pre-occupied with establishing irrigation schemes. From the onset, their motivation was quite clear. In J. F. Munro’s opinion, such schemes were meant to increase “imperial self-sufficiency” in raw materials, particularly cotton. A typical example, although it is far bigger than the Sanyati Main Estate and Gowe put together, is the Gezira Scheme in the Sudan, which emerged as the centre-piece of British cotton growing promotion in Africa in the 1920s. Gezira was designed, primarily, to reduce British dependence on American sources of raw cotton. This is contrary to the popularly held view that the ultimate objective of all work in the field of irrigation is to help in raising the agricultural productivity of African peoples and, at the same time, increasing the tempo of economic development. This, notwithstanding irrigation was still going to be a major area of interest in Africa because of the fact that rainfall in many parts of rural Africa is erratic.

According to A. Gaitskell, under conditions of erratic rainfall, the creation of irrigation projects was bound to have a beneficial effect on the Africans. In this regard, the colonial state embarked on a drive to establish irrigation schemes for the following reasons:

(a) to have water conservation in a bid to fight hostile immutables like erratic rainfall and massive run-off as central and pivotal to developmental policies;
(b) to have irrigation schemes as an insurance against the dry years, and as a local source of famine relief in the drought-stricken areas;

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60 Ibid.
61 Wells and Warmington, Studies in Industrialization, 245.
63 Gaitskell, Gezira, 49.
(c) as an altruistic endeavour “to give the natives some educative example of realising both subsistence and surplus produce so as to uplift them”;
(d) as a way to cope with population explosion by having the schemes as safety-valves; and
(e) to avoid the rural-urban drift by providing the surrounding people with employment.  

It is true that schemes such as the Gezira provided employment and livelihood to a very large number of people. However, many shortcomings afflicted it throughout its years of operation. For instance, although the whole undertaking was depicted as a commercial partnership between the government, the Sudan Plantations Syndicate (the British Conglomerate which managed it) and the tenants, in reality it was only a partnership between the government and the Sudan Plantations Syndicate. Lamentably, the tenants had no direct say in the running of the scheme, save for being “a factor of production” (labour). A thorough evaluation of the evidence reveals that the concept of a business partnership was misplaced here. The fact that the Gezira Scheme formed a part of the capitalist system of production is indisputable. Equally discernible is the point that the scheme in its incipient stages or even later was responsible for the development of dependency and underdevelopment relationships between the Sudanese satellite and the metropolitan economies. This was particularly so because the greater percentage of the profits yielded by the cotton schemes were repatriated to further the commercial interests of the Lancashire manufacturers. In the process, African tenants could hardly extricate themselves from grinding poverty.

The irony of the situation was that the Gezira Scheme was established in 1925 with the object “to serve as a duplicate model for later irrigation schemes in Africa” high on the agenda. That one of the pioneer irrigation schemes had failed to ameliorate the spectre of rural poverty was, however, likely to militate against the success of similar projects in future. The cases of the CDC, MWEA and Gonja, to mention only a few, bear enough testimony to this fact.

In a nutshell, African farmers were not the major beneficiaries of the above irrigation schemes. There was nothing humanitarian about them. State-run irrigation schemes in Sanyati (the Main Estate and Gowe) were not altruistic ventures either. These schemes were not designed to benefit the plotholders at Gowe but the Estate or the State. The

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64 Gaitskell, Gezira, 49.
66 Ibid., 194. N.B. In fact, the whole concept of a business partnership is alien to Africa. In all its facets it is a part of the entire Western industrial culture.
68 Ibid., 206. See also Barnett, The Gezira Scheme, 14, 23, 93 and 161.
70 Ibid. See also Wells and Warmington, Studies in Industrialization, 245; Chambers, Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa, 7 and La Anyane, Ghana Agriculture, its Economic Development from Early Times to the Middle of the Twentieth Century, 171.
appointment of a political functionary of the State (in the person of the DC) to oversee
the running of the schemes meant that the primary responsibility for the two schemes lay
with the State and not with the people of Sanyati. The latter did not have any decision-
making powers regarding planning, ploughing and planting. Thus, just like most British
officials in the Sudan the colonial state in Zimbabwe was not in favour of creating an
independent peasant class but was interested in eliminating it. Whatever schemes were
embarked upon anywhere in Africa, therefore, were tailor-made to appease the African
farmers by showing them that the colonial governments were concerned with improving
their welfare. However, as already indicated, the elimination of the vicious circle of
poverty among the Africans was not a paramount consideration. Instead, the white
settlers were merely engrossed in efforts to boost agricultural production (food and
industrial crops) to meet the insatiable needs of a growing urban and rural population as
well as the industrial sector. 71 Thus, these projects were generally a pacifying tool - a
bulwark against the potential revolution by the few master farmers, shop and lorry
owners who approximated to the Gezira’s rural African middle-class. 72

Clearly, in social and economic terms, the record of past schemes has not been very
impressive. 73 Not only have they given rise to many problems, but they have also been
outright failures. Many large-scale irrigation schemes in Africa in most cases give a very
poor return on investment. For Jim Rowland the contribution of such schemes to overall
food supplies in sub-Saharan Africa is small, though it may be very important locally. 74
In Ghana, for instance, the Gonja Development Company, formed in 1950 with a share
capital of £1 million and with village settlement as one of its aims, folded up in 1956
having achieved, in the words of one authority, “nothing except extravagant expense for
the Ghana Government.” 75 Therefore, this scheme, taken together with the Gezira and
many others, failed to achieve sustainable agricultural development among the peasant
communities in Africa. ARDA’s successes and failures as an irrigation authority will
also be examined in this study.

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY (LITERATURE REVIEW)

Nyandoro’s 1997 study of Gowe in the Sanyati communal lands did not deal with
differentiation as a major theme, but it revealed that most peasant households involved in
dryland and irrigation farming were allocated approximately between 3 and 10 acres of
land by the colonial state under the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) of 1951. 76 The

71 T. J. Manyumbu, “Madzivadonto Irrigation Scheme: A Survey of Production and Marketing, 1958-
72 Barnett, The Gezira Scheme, 47.
75 Chambers, Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa, 7. See also La Anyane, Ghana Agriculture, its
Economic Development from Early Times to the Middle of the Twentieth Century, 171.
76 Mark Nyandoro, “The Gowe Plotholders Scheme: Growth and Development of an African Irrigation
History, University of Zimbabwe, June 1997. See also V. E. M. Machingaidze, “Agrarian Change From
Above: The Southern Rhodesian Native Land Husbandry Act and African Response.” International
Journal of African Historical Studies, 24(3), 1991, 557-589. The obsession by the Act with increasing the
productive and carrying capacity of communal areas has been dealt with at length by Eira Punt, “The
pre-independence era brought despair and almost insurmountable economic hardship to Sanyati farmers because they were deprived of land, agricultural loan facilities, operational autonomy and flexibility of action on their pieces of land. This made them very poor but it did not preclude social differentiation from emerging in the area. In an attempt to survive and realising that land was the chief resource of production, a handful of peasant farmers by independence, were utilising more than 10 acres, droves were frantically searching for land and a lot more others such as women and sons of both dryland and irrigation farmers were virtually landless. The few farmers who were cultivating more than 10 acres had manipulated the system of land allocation to have dual ownership of land (i.e. farmers hoped to maximise their economic gain by the dual possession and cultivation of dryland and irrigation holdings). Nyandoro’s study of Gowe confirms this, but as this study will demonstrate, land was not the only variable that influenced the occurrence of differentiation in rural Sanyati. This investigation in 1997 did not explore land issues in detail. It did not go beyond examining the growth and development of Gowe. The new study incorporates the element of class and social differentiation in Sanyati and contends that land was one of the bases of such differentiation. In his 1982 study of the Munyati area of Gokwe communal lands, L. de Swardt postulates that redistribution of land occurred through various “informal” land transactions involving marriage, share cropping, payment in kind and an exchange economy. 77 This could have determined social differentiation in Gokwe. Similarly, a variety of factors constitute the major causes of differentiation among the Sanyati peasantry. For example, a combination of farm and non-farm (off-farm) activities shaped the course of class differentiation.

In fact, the commonest forms of differentiation in Zimbabwe’s rural areas since and indeed prior to 1945 have been on the basis of access to land, labour, gender and off-land income, for example, migrant earnings. Nevertheless, the irrigation era (the 1960s onwards) ushered in new types of social relations in Sanyati. Because irrigation plotholders were allocated standardised plots, socio-economic and political relations were no longer necessarily determined by access to land mainly but access to inputs. For instance, inputs such as capital and labour tended to differentiate people more than access to land. The transition from dryland farming to irrigation agriculture by some farmers and how it enhanced or denigrated their societal standing (status) will be accorded emphasis. It is argued that irrigation significantly boosted levels of commercialisation. The rapid commercialisation of agriculture shaped people’s strategies to gain economic ascendancy. Both dryland and irrigation agriculture were manipulated by different groups within the Sanyati community to manoeuvre their way to relatively higher social positions. Large-scale commercial agricultural enterprise, introduced with the inception of the Sanyati Main Irrigation Scheme in 1974, in turn, determined patterns of socio-economic differentiation in the Sanyati region.


For a long time since colonisation in 1890, most historical writings on the agricultural sector and agrarian differentiation in Zimbabwe focused on the racial division of land and the inequalities between white “commercial” farmers and an increasingly marginalised “subsistence” sector. The rural population was usually conceptualised as a “peasantry” or “proletariat.” In posing two mutually exclusive categories, scholars tend to assign each Zimbabwean farmer to one or the other idealised, homogeneous category, with the result that all farmers took on the stereotypical and unrealistic attributes to their category. These conceptualisations tend to assume agrarian homogeneity with a single class identity, which, according to M. Neocosmos, is problematic. Even the new Zimbabwean leadership, while it has been acutely aware of the racial disparities and some associated rural-urban differences, has shown little awareness of differentiation or inequalities within the communal areas themselves. In Sanyati, master farmers and successful cash crop farmers are held up as models to be emulated, without taking into cognisance that whole communities could not be made up of master farmers alone. In the dryland farming zone of Sanyati, such farmers possessed more agricultural land and accumulated more cash than their irrigation counterparts. According to Coeraad Brand, it is, therefore, important to ask introspective questions about how some of these farmers (Master Farmers) managed to gain access, not only to more arable land than others in the community, but how they used resources at their disposal, for instance, land and labour to realise more income and set themselves as a class apart (own emphasis).

Recent writings on Zimbabwe, however, enhance our understanding of the process of agrarian change and differentiation in the rural areas. These include Phimister’s *Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*, Worby’s “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity” and Nyambara’s “History of Land Acquisition in Gokwe.” They have argued that most rural areas experienced considerable commercialisation during and after the colonial period and that commercialisation gave rise to various forms of socio-economic differentiation among rural households and communities. Scholars in this group have advanced various arguments about how differentiation occurred in rural Zimbabwe. They have pointed to differences in access to land between freehold and communal areas and within communal areas; differences in households’ access to off-farm income; the privileged position and political manoeuvrings of chiefs; differences in quality of land and differential access to labour, which is again related to other factors including access

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79 Michael Neocosmos, “Homogeneity and Differences on Swazi Nation Land” in M. Neocosmos (ed.), *Social Relations in Rural Swaziland: Critical Analyses*, (Manzini: University of Swaziland, 1987).
to off-farm income, polygamy and various forms of co-operative labour. However, none of these studies has alluded to the colonial state’s interest in Sanyati and how TILCOR and ARDA influenced and engendered particular forms of differentiation i.e. not only based on patterns of differential land holdings but ability to pay the water rate, land rent, ability to access Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF) loans, Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) loans, Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) loans, Co-operative Society loans and labour utilisation (permanent or seasonal/contract labour). This study will attempt to fill in these gaps in existing literature on peasant agriculture and social differentiation in Sanyati, hence give it its point of departure from the said works. These exceptionalisms precisely make Sanyati valuable as a test case for the study of development and differentiation.

It is important to note that some of the basic structural features constraining the differentiation process in Sanyati were developed in the so-called African reserves (now communal areas) during the colonial period. In this period, the state made stout effort to “flatten” or eliminate social differentiation in the countryside. It actually undermined existing patterns of differentiation. In Sanyati differential access to land existed but it tended to be overshadowed by the situation that obtained in neighbouring Gokwe. Differential access to land in Gokwe, for example, was quite pronounced. In this region, which Pius Nyambara studied, most households hold between 2 and 100 acres of farmland whereas in most communal areas of Zimbabwe the range is between 2 acres and 10. In Kandare village of Mt Darwin where Masst did her research, most men have between 7 and 10 acres of farmland, a few have between 10 and 15 acres, a situation which is akin to most rural households in Zimbabwe. In Gokwe, as Nyambara has noted, not only do some peasant households have land holdings far above the national average, but also the land disparities are fairly large. In Sanyati this is true of the dryland farming area. However, in the TILCOR/ARDA irrigation schemes such disparities do not exist as the Gowe plotholders or outgrowers were allocated standardised plots, a situation synonymous with egalitarian land holding. The only significant disparities arise when the size of land occupied by a smallholder irrigation farmer is compared to the enormous piece of land possessed by the Main Estate. This exceptionalism makes Sanyati valuable as a case for the study of differential and sometimes non-differential land holdings. State-run irrigation schemes in Sanyati,
therefore, present us with an opportunity to study the role of land differentiation and other forms of differentiation in the area.

Historical studies on Zimbabwe have noted that both pre-colonial and colonial societies were highly differentiated. With reference to the pre-colonial period, David Beach argues that “modern Shona traditions tend to stress Shona economic equality in the past,” and yet available archaeological and documentary evidence “make it clear that, from the greatest ruler at Zimbabwe to the poorest slave, there was a tremendous range of wealth and poverty … not all villages were equally wealthy and because of differences of the environment and other factors, some communities would be much worse off than others.”

“Thus, while some families and communities were becoming richer, others were collapsing as independent groups and being forced to enter the service of others as varanda (bondmen) or even as slaves.” Angela Cheater also points to the existence of the term hurudza in Shona language (a large-scale agricultural entrepreneur), and states that representatives of this class had, by the turn of the twentieth century, expanded their production, selling their produce to white and Indian traders (trader-producers), as well as to farming and mining compounds. This persisted and became even more conspicuous during the twentieth century. T. O. Ranger’s writings have demonstrated that throughout the colonial period “there was nothing … to prevent the emergence of differential land holdings and wealth disparities among rural communities.” He describes the process by which some people gained differential access to land, and points out that the 1930s witnessed the emergence of a significant number of large-scale plough-using entrepreneurs in the “reserves” (communal areas). Because of the wealth they had amassed, the “reserve” entrepreneurs could easily call upon the communal work parties for assistance in harvesting. Communal work parties were a common feature in Sanyati particularly during ploughing, weeding and harvesting. They are affectionately referred to locally as humwe (co-operatively-performed agricultural work).

Probably in response to the rapid proliferation of the “reserve” entrepreneurs, the enactment of the NLHA witnessed the intensification of demands to reduce the size of land and the number of cattle the people owned. In spite of this requirement, recent research on the impact of the NLHA on rural communities has shown that a great number of “reserve” entrepreneurs managed to avoid having their fields and cattle herds reduced. According to Phimister, richer cultivators generally refused to comply with state directives to limit the size of land they could plough and the number of cattle they could own. Hence, “a significant number managed to cling to [their] extensive plots which they

88 Ibid., 30.
continued to work more or less as they pleased … Owners of large cattle herds also continued to enjoy some success in blunting the worst of the state’s offensive.”

Although they were forced to reduce the number of cattle they could own (through culling and destocking), they succeeded in placing a big proportion of their herds beyond the reach of the state through leasing (kuronzera or mafisa) to members of extended families and to other clients. As will be seen in chapter two Ngwabi Bhebe, in his book entitled, *Benjamin Burombo*, describes the experiences of his own family in a way that confirms Phimister’s findings that the Bhebe family flouted many stipulations of the Act in order to survive. They fought very hard, not only to keep large herds of animals, but also to grab more land. This is a clear demonstration of people’s resistance to the totalitarian nature of the NLHA. In Sanyati, the people also resisted the dictates of the colonial state by either clandestinely or openly denouncing the small pieces of land allocated to them and destocking. They felt they had lost a fortune (livestock) before the campaign against tsetse bore fruit and they were not prepared to lose a lot more animals through destocking.

In his analysis of the performance of African agriculture during the NLHA, A. A. Le Roux found out that between 1948-1949 and 1950-1960 there actually emerged a more unequal pattern of land holding in the African “reserves” with 30% of “reserve” producers working 63% of all cultivated land. Le Roux argues that the trend towards an unequal distribution of the area under cultivation was in fact more pronounced at the end of the 1950s than it had been at the beginning of the decade. This is synonymous with what happened in Sanyati’s dryland area, as a number of farmers also held bigger pieces of land than others. This is clear indication that, to a large degree, Sanyati residents successfully resisted colonial attempts at social “engineering” during the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, differentiation in the countryside survived colonial efforts to stamp it out. Hence, according to Phimister, the actual impact of the LHA may have been overestimated, at the same time as the extent of differentiation among the peasantry was underestimated. Roux also discovered that cattle ownership had become more unequal: “As with crops two types of cattle owners had developed by 1960. One was a small-scale owner with a subsistence herd, the other was a large-scale owner who supplied the beef market.” In a more recent re-evaluation of the effects of the NLHA on rural communities, Phimister has similarly noted that “far from the LHA checking entrepreneurial individualism, the wealth gap between these two classes of farmers [the rich and the poor] actually increased during the 1950s.” Cattle ownership as a yardstick to measure rural differentiation was, nevertheless, more applicable to Sanyati dryland

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92 Phimister, *An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe*, 279.
93 Ibid.
95 Bhebe, *B. Burombo*, 5-6.
97 Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 225.
99 Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 237.
farmers as the irrigation plot holders at Gowe and the Estate were prohibited from rearing animals in the state-run irrigation schemes since they did not have any provision for grazing.

The colonial system since the passage of the Land Apportionment Act supported the existing pattern of small land holdings in the rural areas. In this connection, Masst asserts that “land holdings in the communal areas are small, are mostly located in infertile natural regions, and are situated far from the large markets.” In Sanyati peasants cultivated small plots of land. The area is dominated by poor sandy soils and the distance to markets mainly in Kadoma (formerly Gatooma) was an inhibitive factor to economic progress. There are similarities between Masst’s observations in her recent study of socio-economic differentiation among peasants in Kandare village in northeastern Zimbabwe with the situation that obtained in Sanyati, but the concurrence with Masst ends there because not all peasants in Sanyati had small land holdings. Others, through various means, managed to gain access to more or bigger pieces of land. Farmers in this latter category, therefore, became a more distinct and outstanding class of people because of the significant disparities in land holdings that existed.

In stark contrast to Zimbabwe, Tim Keegan, in his study of sharecropping and African class formation in South Africa’s maize belt, contends that little detailed empirical research has been undertaken on the nature and significance of the peasant economies in different areas of white settlement in South Africa, and on the precise mechanism of capitalisation and class formation which have transformed agrarian society and economy in the twentieth century. State intervention which took the form of loans for such purposes as fencing, dam construction, stock importation, seed and equipment grants, the extension of the railway network, the building of creameries and experimental farms, and action against animal and crop diseases and pests was often heavily skewed in favour of the white commercial sector and not the peasant sector. The latter scenario was, in many ways, replicated in colonial Zimbabwe.


103 Ibid., 201.

104 N.B. In apartheid South Africa peasant farmers were derogatorily referred to as “Kaffir farmers.”
Writing about land tenure on the Arabie-Olifants Small-Scale Irrigation Scheme in South Africa’s Northern Province Edward Lahiff argues that one of the rural pillars of apartheid was the so-called communal form of tenure. The forced removal of millions of black people from “white” farms and towns to the “reserves/homelands,” which began in earnest in the Free State with the Native Land Act of 1913, and which accelerated dramatically throughout the country in the 1960s and 1970s was another pillar of apartheid. Augmenting his argument, Lacey, Haines and Cross and Hendricks assert that communal tenure was an essential component of the migrant labour system, facilitating the concentration of the maximum possible number of Africans in the “reserves/homelands,” preventing the emergence of a stratum of rich peasants or capitalist farmers, and providing the basis for a high degree of social control through the “tribal” leaders who controlled access to land. This is very similar to the ordering of people and the social engineering that took place in Zimbabwe under the NLHA when large numbers of Africans were forced out of Rhodesdale. On this irrigation scheme state and parastatal agencies provide irrigation management and farmer support services in the same way ARDA does in Zimbabwe. However, since 1996 these agencies have been in severe decline, leading many plotholders to suspend or abandon agricultural activities.

According to a report of the Water Research Commission, South African farmer irrigation schemes are beset by problems which include security of tenure, size of units/plots, debts, product prices, marketing, inputs and services concerned with extension, mechanisation and other types of support. In Sanyati similar problems occurred and these have led to some plots lying idle or vacant. The major difference though was that whilst plot sizes ranged between 2 and 4 ha in Sanyati in the Arabie-Olifants Scheme the range was from 1 to 5 ha and in the latter scheme the plotholders


108 Vacant plots (unoccupied allotments in any given farming season) were created as a result of death to a plotholder who did not have a successor or an heir. Most plots fell vacant when farmers voluntarily moved back to their dryland holdings, purchased land in the small-scale commercial farming areas (formerly NPAs) or when inactive holders or beneficiaries were forcibly evicted for various farming offences ranging from loan refusals by the AFC or other finance houses because of indebtedness which was a reflection on performance (no loans were granted to poor performers) to failure to abide by scheme rules and regulations. For example, ARDA settler schemes were mandated to strictly follow set out irrigation discipline, which among other things entailed conforming to stipulated ploughing, planting, disposition of cotton stalks and watering schedules. N.B. The vacant plots were sometimes cultivated by the Sanyati Main Estate for its benefit and this did not go down well with the outgrowers who were always clamouring for more land but in vain.
were allowed to keep restricted numbers of livestock whereas the rearing of animals was strictly forbidden in the former.

In his 1988 study entitled, *Land Struggles and Social Differentiation in Southern Mozambique: A Case Study of Chokwe, Limpopo 1950-1987*, Kenneth Hermele, tried to come up with a condensation of rural development in Southern Mozambique. He argued that, from the mid-19th century onwards, some colonial attempts had been made to encourage immigration, including extending loans, technical assistance and social facilities to those who decided to settle in the countryside.\(^{109}\) However, in terms of national development, this policy was catastrophic because whole provinces were practically deprived of male labour at crucial times in the agricultural productive cycle. Many men had left Mozambique and were working in South Africa’s gold and diamond mines.\(^{110}\) This does not conform to what happened in Sanyati during the colonial era. “Immigrants” with master farmer certificates were welcomed not with a view that they would return to their original homes to provide labour. They would be permanently settled and start a new life altogether. Most of the “immigrants” in Sanyati came from Rhodesdale, Chivi, Shurugwi, Chivhu, Gutu, Mhondoro-Ngezi and Filabusi. In Mozambique, such peasants struggled to acquire decent pieces of land for settlement compared to their counterparts in Zimbabwe’s Sanyati region especially those who had attained master farmer status. Nonetheless, agricultural loans were not so easy to access. Loans were extended on the basis of excellent agricultural performance. However, consistent performance was difficult to achieve in Sanyati due to lack of loans and the recurrent spates of drought. The selective granting of loans, thus, gave birth to two social scenarios where the recipients of the loans comprised the class of “haves” and those who were not beneficiaries of this facility, the “have nots.”

Historical studies on rural differentiation in Zimbabwe by T. O. Ranger, I. Phimister and N. Bhebe have tended to concentrate their focus on differentiation on the basis of land and cattle ownership, labour, gender and age.\(^{111}\) Pius Nyambara’s PhD dissertation entitled “A History of Land Acquisition in Gokwe, Northwestern Zimbabwe, 1945-1997,” is no exception to this rule. Nyambara has written most recently and most incisively on Gokwe, a nearby district to Sanyati. The central focus of his study is the

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role of differential access to land resources within the broader context of socio-economic differentiation in Gokwe. It only makes passing references to Sanyati. Differentiation constitutes the main theme of this study. Like Nyambara’s work, it acknowledges the importance of land, labour, gender and age to differentiation discourse and a developmental approach is emphasised. However, its greatest point of departure from Nyambara’s work is that it is an investigation of the extent to which socio-economic differentiation emerged in Sanyati, which like Gokwe also lies in a frontier region of Zimbabwe, on the basis of TILCOR/ARDA irrigation activities (See Maps 9 and 10 showing ARDA’s agricultural and non-agricultural operations).

Studies on peasant agriculture in Zimbabwe in general are numerous. Eric Worby’s PhD thesis entitled “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity: Cotton, Commoditization and the Culture of Modernity in Northwestern Zimbabwe” is a recent addition to this rather very broad field of study. His central argument is that, in order to understand the implications of smallholder farmers becoming involved in a commodity crop like cotton, it is counterproductive to predict in advance that there is going to be a single process of class differentiation, but what actually transpires depends on questions of labour, identity and the culture of modernity. Throughout his thesis, Worby is invariably preoccupied with who deserves to be labelled a “modern” farmer? For him, labour forms and commodity relations are continually remade as farmers, traders, ethnographers and administrators argue over the signs of modernity and its antitheses. He makes spatial and sporadic allusions to Sanyati. Contrary to Worby’s central theme, this study is an examination of the extent to which socio-economic differentiation occurred in Sanyati on the strength of TILCOR or ARDA-operated irrigation schemes and how irrigation interacts with the dryland farming community to produce certain forms of social inequality.

Although Worby refers to ARDA’s major irrigation projects in Sanyati, the Main Estate and the Gowe Smallholder Scheme, this is done more or less in passing. He concentrates more on dryland farming in Tazivana Village of Goredema Ward (Gokwe) which is his major area of study. Using this small village as his springboard, Worby examines relations of power, labour and identity in time and social space. A detailed analysis of irrigation is, therefore, lacking in his work. A more significant difference with this study is the very small sample on which his work is based and the limitations of the time period he covers. This study, contrary to Worby’s illustrates the range of different insights which one working as an historian and not an anthropologist, brings to bear.

In fact, one of the major contributions of this study is that it helps rewrite the story of rural differentiation in an irrigation sector compared to what Nyambara and Worby have found in the dryland sector. It makes a very strong case for the different intensities of differentiation between dryland farming and irrigation farming settings, which is not captured by Nyambara and Worby in their works. Clearly, irrigation agriculture produced much broader forms of socio-economic differentiation than those found under dryland farming. This was so because irrigation facilitated cropping throughout the year whereas under rainland conditions crops can only be grown in summer and on a less productive or extensive basis. Dryland farmers’ chances of generating cash throughout the season were thus either very limited or non-existent. In most instances, this made them poorer than
their irrigation counterparts even during the boom period. The agricultural boom in Zimbabwe after independence intensified the socio-economic inequalities between the irrigators and the dryland farmers because the former had better access to credit and extension services than the latter. This dichotomy will be explored in detail in chapter five.

Other scholars who recently have written on Zimbabwe agriculture include William Masters and Friis-Hansen. In *Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe*, Masters evaluates the impact on farmers of the government’s economy-wide policies, focusing particularly on employment regulations and restrictions on international trade. He examines how policies towards land, credit and other inputs affect different types of farmers within the agricultural sector. Furthermore, Masters discusses the part played by markets for the main agricultural products and state marketing agencies like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Cotton Marketing Board (CMB – now the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe/COTTCO) and the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB – now Dairibord Zimbabwe Limited/DZL). In analysing the role of major agricultural product markets he shows how prices and marketing arrangements are sometimes favourable to but often undermine farm production. In particular, he emphasises how low-potential communal area farmers or smallholder farmers residing in remote, low-rainfall areas realise reduced real incomes compared to their large-scale commercial counterparts. He refers to irrigation only as a major type of economic investment in agriculture. He largely glosses over ARDA Estate and smallholder irrigation as well as the type of tenure applicable to settlers on parastatal schemes. The latter would bring out how smallholder irrigators’ productive capacity and initiative was constrained not by the general land tenure policy in the communal areas on the one hand and land tenure policy in the commercial areas on the other but by the lease agreement. This study covers ARDA leases in detail. On the whole, Masters addresses economic aspects but does not quite address the social impact of government intervention in smallholder agriculture and how that stimulated rural differentiation as this study does. Although Masters’ book mainly focuses on a limited period (i.e. the 1980s) and is very ‘economic’ in its approach it provides useful contextualising material for this study.

Friis-Hansen’s work, which is a case study of Silobela communal area not far from Sanyati, is important in illustrating issues pertaining to the importance of breeding and expeditious supply of inputs in particular seed prior to the planting season. The extent to which plant breeding satisfies the seed requirements of peasant or communal area farmers is discussed. He also analyses in a very small section the social differentiation of seed use by crop and variety which is a very limited form of differentiation compared to the one examined by this study which goes beyond merely looking at seed as a key differentiating factor. Besides this limitation, his work is important because in Zimbabwe there is growing awareness of the need for a broader and deeper understanding of the relationship between government and farmers. The seed sub-sector has assumed tremendous value in the light of the country’s stagnating crop yields and mounting food deficits. Although

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113 Esbern Friis-Hansen, *Seeds for African Peasants: Peasants’ Needs and Agricultural Research - The Case of Zimbabwe*, Publication (9), Centre for Development Research in co-operation with the Nordic...
the study is not on Sanyati but on Silobela, it also provides similar insights on the vulnerability of peasant communities if their input requirements (e.g. seed) are not delivered on time or are exorbitantly priced to a point that the end users would not afford them. He further contends that better adapted use of plant genetic resources and a wider perspective for plant breeding will be crucial to increasing productivity of crop production/output not only in Silobela but also in Zimbabwe as a whole. Nevertheless, whilst ARDA has great potential to produce seed for its Estates and outgrowers as well as the nation at large not much is being done in this field hence the settlers have to rely on the GMB, COTTCO, Seed-Co and other companies for the supply of essential inputs such as seed. In an area like Sanyati specialising in a commodity crop the timeous delivery of appropriate cotton seed varieties was central to development. The success of cotton based on appropriate seed varieties also stimulated the process of differentiation although this was not intended by the state.

Another scholar who has explored the importance of cotton commodity production in stimulating socio-economic differentiation though writing on Tanzania is Raikes. He illustrates that rural differentiation thrived on cotton especially in areas that were suitable for its cultivation. 114 This study focuses on rural differentiation (socio-economic differentiation) wrought specifically by irrigation agriculture in rural Sanyati and contrasts it with the forms of differentiation that characterised the surrounding dryland area both in the pre-irrigation and irrigation periods. It challenges the “Chayanovian” proposals about an undifferentiated peasantry in the colonial and post-colonial contexts.

Just like in the area of Tanzania studied by Raikes, rural differentiation in Sanyati, as elsewhere, cannot be adequately studied in isolation from the development of commodity production, the emergence of different socio-economic categories of farmers and the nature of the state as a whole which to a large extent has prompted responses to its policies which have heightened specific processes of differentiation. Because income distribution is less unequal for certain categories of farmers (e.g. the resource-poor) it can be assumed that rural differentiation is not significant in irrigation schemes. Such an argument has no solid basis when applied to Sanyati schemes. In Raikes’ words it clearly represents a static analysis which considers only the level of differentiation in terms of measurable material wealth and ignores the processes involved. 115 The processes were informed by the irrigators’ political connections, their relations with Estate management which sometimes determined preferential access to state resources such as loans/credit as well as direct accumulation emanating from individual investment in terms of time, capital/money and labour.

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115 Ibid., 286.
This study argues that in Sanyati rural differentiation was significant and that the possession of access to the means of production influenced the process of accumulation. Access to resources (land, capital and labour) varied from farmer to farmer. These variations can be used to attest to the emergence of rich and poor categories of farmers. This is an integral part of the “classic” process whereby the peasantry is internally differentiated with the emergence of rich peasants or kulaks gradually transforming themselves into capitalist or commercial farmers whose labour needs are provided by the poor peasantry. The latter are poor because they are either landless or lack the requisite farming resources to compete with their richer counterparts. In the colonial period rural differentiation was not considered to be a significant factor in Sanyati. The development of commodity production indicated important turning points which were related to different processes of socio-economic differentiation. In fact, it is difficult to talk of commodity production without differentiation.

Social differentiation, it can be observed, was also gendered. The plight of women in Zimbabwe’s agricultural industry in general and Sanyati in particular has been more pronounced than that of their male counterparts. Whilst women make a significant contribution to the success of agriculture as the major tillers and cultivators of the land, on the whole, they are given a raw deal by policy makers. With respect to colonial Lesotho as a British Resident Commissioner once remarked: Basotho women are “the breadwinners [since] the bread is usually earned by the women and the fields are cultivated by them.” 116 Because many men from Lesotho were migrant workers on South African mines, in the words of a Basotho woman: “The work belongs to men but we do all the work.” 117 The plight of women in agriculture is well documented. In Zimbabwe, for example, they are neither made recipients of agricultural loans nor controllers of the land which they spend so much time tending which also affects their social standing in society vis-a-vis that of their male counterparts. Women were generally not considered for plot allocation at Gowe-Sanyati because of reasons related to the system of tenure applicable to ARDA schemes. None or very few women were allocated plots. Under the system instituted by the DC as well as that adopted under the ARDA lease agreement a woman was assumed to have land once an allocation was made to her husband. This system was similar to the one applied to dryland agriculture where no or very few women were allocated land in their own right. Weinrich has confirmed this when she stated that most women had no land rights in their own name. 118 In this connection, while traditionally land was construed as an asset that belonged to all the people, Ruth Weiss’s contention that men exercised almost monopolistic control over it is also true for Sanyati. Hence, “Women worked the land, but had no say as to what should be planted or sold.” 119 Thus they were deemed to be a servile class of people.

117 A Basotho woman cited in Epprecht, This Matter of Women is Getting Very Bad, 2.
This perception of women was endorsed and entrenched by the colonial system which frequently sought to subordinate females to their male folk. Men were invariably considered to be the major decision-makers in nearly all fields of human endeavour, including agriculture. According to Schmidt, colonial officials were responsible for lending credence to this rather warped view of women’s role because they, “… accepted the premise that African females were perpetual minors under the tutelage of a male guardian, be it a father, uncle, husband or son.” However, this study is a clear departure from scholarship that eclipses or trivialises an objective understanding of women’s contribution in agriculture. Weinrich should, therefore, be applauded for denouncing, “… peasant farmers [who] make a concerted effort to prevent the emancipation of their women …” and want them to remain a subordinate class. Such gender divisions, though, should be seen as an illustration of the existence of social differentiation.

Viewing women as “the silent farm managers in the small scale commercial areas of Zimbabwe,” “ Unsung heroines in Tanzania,” and as “A neglected factor in social development” does underscore one significant point that women’s role in farm and non-farm activities can no longer be down played. Clearly, considering the fact that the less-to-do rural women are the major participants not only in child-rearing but also in the tillage of the land, planting of crops, weeding and harvesting, it should be acknowledged that “… they are the people who keep agriculture going in the rural area …” and thus should be accorded the right to own and control land in their own right. In fact, contrary to this, some Sanyati women, particularly those who adopted cotton earlier, due to their agricultural enterprise and acumen, have become wealthy and very powerful social figures, thereby disputing the premise that women cannot ascend to important positions in society.

J. Guy, speaking about the South African situation from the pre-colonial period to 1945, says that: “… it was the labour of women in agriculture supported by their domestic labour in the homestead, be that chiefly or commoner, which provided the subsistence base upon which society depended and the surplus upon which it was structured.” Indeed, the production of a surplus was an essential determinant of differentiation among the Sanyati peasantry as a whole. Similarly, Ruth Weiss contends that, “Its their sweat and blood that’s mixed into that soil… [so] they should have the right to decide on the

126 Jeff Guy, “Gender Oppression in Southern Africa’s Pre-Capitalist Societies” in E. Walker (ed.), *Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945*, (Cape Town: David Phillip, 1990), 35.
crops, on their disposal …” 127 In this sense, women’s experiences as cultivators were distinct in spite of the fact that they “… were exploited and [the] surplus value they produced was appropriated by the men.” 128 The role of Sanyati women in agriculture is, therefore, judged against this background. However, the complementarity of men and women’s roles should be acknowledged to come up with a more objective assessment of the two’s roles in agriculture and how they fit into the existing differentiation discourse.

A new dimension to the literature on gender has been provided by A. K. H. Weinrich (Sister Mary Aquina) who argues that rural women were not only denigrated to inferior roles on the basis of gender but also on the basis of race [racial discrimination against women] and generally low levels of academic attainment. In *Women and Racial Discrimination in Rhodesia* Weinrich examines the effects of social and economic structures in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) on women as well as women’s roles in what she terms traditional society and in the future of Zimbabwe. Because she was writing at the height of the liberation struggle (i.e. in the 1970s) by “future” she is referring to the post-independence period. The book, in the main, analyses from an anthropological perspective the effects of Rhodesian discriminatory policies on African life and in particular women. However, whilst she has done commendable work by highlighting the plight of women the book’s major limitation is its attempt to cover so many aspects about women ranging from politics (i.e. role in the struggle for independence), marriage, employment and so on. Although she has carried out nation-wide surveys of all the major settlement types including irrigation schemes among other things she has dismally failed to capture or mention in her analysis the position of women in the TILCOR type of settlement which was organised on the basis of a core estate and an outgrower or settler scheme. In fact, she does not address the extent to which women’s (i.e. the plot-holding strata of women) experiences as cultivators were distinct in such schemes as Sanyati where the lease conditions tended to affect women more than men. Presumably, in protest against society’s portrayal of the rural strata of women, Weiss argues: “women have moved away from [merely] demanding equal rights - they want more rights than men …” 129 as they perceive themselves not only as an integral part of the cog but as pivotal to the regeneration and success of agriculture as a whole.

In the Sanyati district where economic activities outside agriculture are virtually non-existent, it is argued in this study that differentiation was mainly on the basis of agriculture and, to a less extent, on the basis of non-farm activities and gender. Acknowledgement of this reality, according to Jean Bonvin, in his study on Burundi agriculture, paves the way for the identification of relevant features in the transformation of rural life and brings out the hidden mechanisms of economic and social change or provides the basis for the formulation of a strategy for the harmonious development of rural society. 130

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To date, some important and insightful works on smallholder irrigation farming in Zimbabwe have been written. These include W. Roder’s research paper, *The Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects*, N. Reynolds’ PhD thesis entitled, “A Socio-Economic Study of an African Development Scheme,” E. Manzungu and P. Van der Zaag’s book, *The Practice of Smallholder Irrigation: Case Studies From Zimbabwe*. Roder argues that the Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects in Manicaland were initiated in the 1930s when the government began to take an active role in the promotion of irrigation schemes in the rural areas. Such schemes, as Reynolds (based on his investigations of the Nyamaropa irrigation schemes) concurs with Roder, were justified, in the early years, on the grounds that they would provide a local source of famine relief. During the next two decades they continued to be regarded as having this as their primary role, but greater emphasis came to be laid on their value as a means of relieving population pressure. 131 Whilst this is true for the Sabi Valley and Nyamaropa projects, the implementation of similar schemes in Sanyati coincided with UDI, one of whose objectives was appeasement of the peasantry probably in an attempt to pre-empt possible rural resistance to the government. Nevertheless, government motives were far from being altruistic. Manzungu and van der Zaag’s book is a compilation of various essays on smallholder irrigation agriculture. Whilst this book gives some insights into smallholder irrigation farming, its greatest shortcoming is the general portrayal of irrigation issues and the tendency to focus more on the Manicaland projects to the exclusion of schemes in other parts of the country. It recognises the importance of water as a finite resource and discusses the imposition by the government of the water rate, land rent and some such fiscal measures, but analytical weaknesses permeate this book as it often glosses over important issues and stages. For example, it does not deal with the socio-economic impact of irrigation in detail. In fact, none of these works has attempted an in-depth analysis of the social differentiation wrought by the introduction of irrigation in Sanyati and how the Sanyati people responded to this new economic situation.

Development and T. Barnett, The Gezira Scheme: An Illusion of Development. Wells and Warmington argue that groundnuts, cocoa, palm produce and rubber - Nigeria’s four most important export crops - are all dominated by small-scale or peasant producers. Whilst this focus on peasant agriculture is quite refreshing (because large-scale schemes have often been emphasised), they quickly turn to the Cameroons’ lucrative plantation business. They point out that “plantation agriculture has become established in certain areas of … Nigeria, and in the … Cameroons it was … the dominant form of commercial activity.”¹³³ For example, the plantations account for virtually the entire palm oil, rubber and banana exports of the Cameroons.¹³⁴ The CDC, more or less operated like ARDA in Zimbabwe in the manner in which it directed and co-ordinated plantation agricultural activities. Although not concerned exclusively with the labour aspect of industrialisation,¹³⁵ this phenomenon features quite prominently in their book in which they imply that some form of differentiation might have emerged as a result of differential wage earnings in the agricultural sector. In the main, they do not espouse differentiation discourse in a similar manner to how the labour of the outgrowers, for instance, was utilised in the Sanyati case study.

La Anyane, writing about Ghana agriculture, stresses its economic development from the colonial up to the post-colonial period. He discusses the development of some irrigation projects although, the Gonja Development Company is emphasised. Chambers tries to incorporate smallholder schemes into his analysis. He examines the role of organisations in instituting irrigation-based development, but concentrates more on the MWEA and Gonja. However, it is from Barnett and Gaitskell’s works, although dealing with one of the biggest irrigation schemes in Africa, the Gezira in the Sudan, that this study draws a lot of inspiration to examine how irrigation agriculture engendered certain forms of economic and social differentiation quite diametrically opposed to those found under dryland agriculture. Tony Barnett in particular has made a detailed documentation of how the proceeds from cotton cultivation in the Sudan’s Gezira Irrigation Scheme were unequally shared among various stakeholders who included the Government, the tenants, the Local Government Councils, the Social Development Department and the Sudan Gezira Board (SGB). He states that

Four social categories can be distinguished in the Gezira. These are the administrators (who form part of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state), the nas tayyibin [which] include[s] rich tenants, merchants, lorry owners, money-lenders and other entrepreneurs, those tenants who are more dependent on their tenancy than upon any other source of income, and the labourers, those who depend mainly upon the sale of their labour in order to live.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Ibid.
¹³⁵ Ibid., 245.
In his view the tenants’ financial position was tenuous and they did not consider that they received an adequate return from their cotton. They felt relatively deprived and experienced poverty, both as individuals and as members of households.

The tenants in the Gezira Scheme occupy a position that is analogous to that of the Gowe plotholders in Sanyati where cotton profits were also unequally distributed between the smallholder irrigation farmers, the Sebungwe Co-operative Society and the TILCOR Estate to whom the DC Gatooma often ceded his management role. Broadly speaking, the Gezira tenants can be divided into two major categories, namely those who have resources (both economic and social) and those who do not. The first are tenants who are fairly wealthy. The latter category are those that feel relatively disadvantaged. According to Barnett “there are relations of credit and debt between these categories. But both categories, in their turn, stand in a common contractual relationship with the Gezira Board.”

However, whilst all these works are important to irrigation studies as a whole, they tend to focus more on the “Big Schemes” to the detriment of their smaller counterparts such as Gowe in Sanyati. A relatively new dimension in this study is the comparative analysis of the relationship between ARDA’s main irrigation scheme at Sanyati and its smallholder component (neighbour), Gowe, and how this determined or influenced social differentiation, an aspect which has not been fully covered by any of the works referred to above. How the attainment of growth point status engendered further forms of differentiation is quite striking.

In Sanyati, differentiation caused by the unequal relationship between Gowe and the Main Estate is pronounced. Not only do land disparities exist between Gowe and the Main Estate, but their income base also differs. Although the Main Estate often demanded the synchronisation of activities i.e. ploughing, planting and fertiliser application in order to achieve efficiency and viability, in reality, the relationship between the two schemes was more exploitative than mutually beneficial and differentiation, while it emerged, was an unintended consequence of irrigation. It is precisely this exceptionalism and others alluded to earlier, which make Sanyati valuable as a test case for the study of class and social differentiation. The area, therefore, provides an opportunity to study the role of dryland and irrigation farming in a process of sustained commercialisation of peasant agriculture. The development and progression of

139 S. C. Pazvakavambwa, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Land Reform and Resettlement, Office of the President and Cabinet, Personal Interview, Makombe Government Complex, Harare, 10th September 2004.
the area from peasant production to irrigation enterprise is a significant event in the
history of this frontier region. This is the gap that has been identified. By helping fill the
gap in the existing literature on development and differentiation the study will thus make
a relevant and significant contribution to knowledge.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research for this study has been primarily conducted in two countries, Zimbabwe and
South Africa. On the one hand, extensive research was conducted in the National
Archives of Zimbabwe and other libraries dotted around Harare and Kadoma. On the
other, further research was carried out in the Union Archives, University of Pretoria (UP),
University of South Africa (UNISA) and Department of Agriculture Libraries located in
and around greater Pretoria.

In analysing the theme of development and differentiation in rural Sanyati this work
adopts a case study approach. A variety of methods were used to solicit for information to
bolster this case study. These ranged from the use of direct observation in data collection,
secondary sources (including electronic and Internet resources) to archival research. To
complement the major secondary sources on the topic newspapers and magazines on rain-
fed and irrigation agriculture were consulted. Legislative debates and statutory
instruments were also important in putting the proposed study in its proper policy
framework.

Research leading to problem statement and hypothesis formulation, the writing of the
research proposal and chapter synopsis started towards the end of 2003. This study
commenced in earnest in 2004. Because of the need to visit the Records Centre (RC)
section of the Main Archives in Harare, which is the main repository of ARDA records
and the need to conduct field research in the rural areas of Sanyati, the author was, after
some difficulty, able to get three key letters which paved way for more detailed research
to start. The first was written by the ARDA CEO in August 2003 authorising the author
to access parastatal records and books from the RC and ARDA Library. The ARDA
Library in Harare has been a useful resource centre for this project. The second (June
2004) was written by the DA (Kadoma) introducing me to the political and traditional
leadership in Sanyati. It opened the door for a reconnaissance visit of the study area and
subsequently to carry out interviews with key individuals who included Gowe
plotholders, Chiefs Wozhele and Neuso, some village heads and local Department of
Agricultural Research and Extension (AREX), formerly the Department of Agricultural
Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) officials. The open-ended interviewing
method used in oral discussions with relevant people from the Sanyati and Gowe
Irrigation Schemes, Sanyati dryland farmers, former and present TILCOR/ARDA
management, the former DC for Gatooma, the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural
Resettlement officials and the former Director of the District Development Fund (DDF)
was fruitful. The method allowed the author to collect as many “life histories” of
individuals selected to represent key categories as possible, for example, chiefs,
headmen, young men/labour migrants, women, older established farmers, newcomers and
richer/poorer farmers. The third letter (April 2005), written by the ARDA Human
Resources Manager, introduced me to Sanyati Estate management. Earlier on another letter had been written granting the author access to Parliament Library in Harare.

Research progressed smoothly after the author had signed (in August 2003) a confidential clause with the Authority (ARDA) in line with the provisions of the Official Secrets Act of 1970, Section 4. It became easier after that to approach national, provincial and district offices requesting information on the ARDA Sanyati schemes. By visiting several of these offices the author was able to collect important data on ARDA’s irrigation schemes in the northwestern part of the country, which has helped put together a regional specific study. The reconnaissance visit helped the author to map out major strategies on the categories of people to interview. This was followed by several visits to solicit for more specific and detailed information on the socio-economic development of the area on the basis of irrigation. These survey visits allowed considerable understanding of the operations and activities of ARDA in the area and how the community responded to the new technological changes in agriculture. It was at this stage that some of the most useful hypotheses were developed. A major outcome of irrigation development was the emergence of levels of differentiation which transcended those hitherto known in the study area.

The preliminary stages of this research focused on reviewing secondary literature on rural development, peasant agriculture, irrigation and differentiation in the global, continental, national and regional contexts. This broad perception was quickly narrowed down to looking at development and differentiation in Sanyati. Given the imposing presence of the two ARDA irrigation schemes in this predominantly drought prone frontier or backwater region of the country and the information emerging from the literature, the study was therefore specifically concerned with exploring development and differentiation processes in an irrigation context.

The broader strategy was to use archival research (both public and oral) to come up with detailed information on ARDA-Sanyati which is the main subject of this study. Whilst the field survey used in-depth open-ended interviews to collect data from plotholder households, the Estate management, Estate employees and dryland farmers, the information gleaned from ARDA Library in Harare, the District Administrator’s office in Kadoma and the National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) was invaluable.

The author initially planned to study the growth and development of the TILCOR (now ARDA) Main Irrigation Estate at Sanyati established in 1974. However, the initial stages of the survey revealed that studying the scheme in isolation to the adjoining smallholder component (the Gowe Plotholders Irrigation Scheme) and how this impacted on the surrounding dryland communal sector presented a major limitation for policy formulation. A survey of the Estate alone would be inadequate to unravel the particular forms of development let alone differentiation which irrigation enterprise engendered in this area. The freedoms and constraints of participating in irrigation agriculture, the author felt, could not be adequately analysed in a context that overlooked the existence of other players in the community, notably the dryland sector. In fact, the performance of plotholder households, the Estate and the dryland farmers combined to reveal some
significant socio-economic developments. For example, irrigation led to the emergence of greater forms of inequalities and it also produced a complex developmental scenario centred on the growth point theory. It was at this stage that it was decided to incorporate both development and differentiation as the main theme.

It was originally not intended to use the questionnaire method because of its known limitations. However, after contacting the ARDA Chief Executive Officer and a former ARDA General Manager the two preferred that the author sends them a questionnaire to which they would respond. This was done, but knowing that more detailed responses could be extracted through face-to-face discussions the author insisted and ultimately prevailed on these officers to grant him oral interviews. Due to some official technicalities, however, some questions pertaining to policy issues were either evaded or were not fully answered. Instead of using inference to get the answers, the RC in Harare was used to get nearly all the archival information required to accomplish this project.

A very important stage in my research was when the former DC for Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, (who established the Gowe scheme as an officer in the then Ministry of Internal Affairs) agreed initially to respond to a questionnaire which was sent by post because of distance from Harare where the author is usually based and Ramsgate (South Africa) where the former DC was staying. He also agreed to give a telephone interview, but the cost of using this method was prohibitive. Subsequently, when a study grant for this project was made available, it became possible to visit him for an oral interview which shed a lot of light on the origins, operational and managerial aspects of the scheme. Because of the general lack of descriptive data on this scheme, the author decided to embark on many face-to-face interviews which were complemented by telephonic interviews. Telephonic and oral interviews were conducted with a number of other informants in Zimbabwe. Indeed, the greater part of the information that has shaped this study has been acquired through oral interviews with respondents who are too numerous to be mentioned by name and from documents housed in the RC of the NAZ. The information solicited by this survey augmented work on this case study scheme. The selection of the case study was based on a previous study on the area which was rather narrow in scope because it did not deal with the two irrigation schemes and the relationship between irrigation and dryland agriculture which this one is focusing on.

It is important to note that the preceding section comprises a historiographical survey of the secondary literature encountered on peasant agriculture in general. The literature that has been reviewed for the study was obtained during a process of sustained and extensive comparative research during and before survey design. Although existing main studies on irrigation like Roder’s *Sabi Valley Irrigation Projects* and Barnett’s *Gezira Scheme* were useful in formulating study ideas (in particular the hypothesis), it was still necessary to employ other information-gathering techniques at both national, provincial, district and scheme levels.
Methodological limitations and problems encountered during the research:-

The major problem, at least at the beginning of field research, was to convince respondents that the work was not being carried out to further the political ambitions of any party but that it was purely for academic purposes. This was necessary in the wake of the fact that this study commenced in earnest in 2004 a few years after the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) – the main opposition party in recent years to the Zimbabwe African National Union, Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). The standoff between Britain (the former colonial power) and Zimbabwe, which was a manifestation of the bilateral dispute between the two as a result of the adoption by the latter of contentious agrarian reforms in 2000, was reaching fever pitch. Because of the tense political climate, it was officially desirable for researchers to seek written authorisation before embarking on research projects particularly in the rural areas. It was also not easy to assure respondents that the material gathered would not be used for any purpose that was prejudicial to the spirit within which it was rendered. However, this hurdle was eliminated by the various letters the author carried around, the more readily accepted of them being the DA’s. On one field tour of Ward 23 in Chief Wozhele’s area, the DA’s letter diffused a near catastrophe for the author when after interviewing a group of headmen prior to their meeting at “Old Council” or Wozhele Business Centre which was to discuss the modalities of distributing inputs for the 2005 growing season a certain man who identified himself as a local or district ZANU (PF) chairman demanded to know the purpose of this visit. It was only on production of the DA’s letter that permission was granted.

Transport to some respondents especially those living far from the major road network was also a problem. Another problem was the apparent reluctance on the part of some illegal occupiers of Estate land to explain in full the circumstances that drove them to take this action. Their unwillingness to yield information might have been informed by the crude way which had earlier been used to force them out of ARDA land. Police actually set their makeshift homes on fire in an effort to make them comply with an order to vacate ARDA property, but the author was not aware of this incident. However, through interviewing various irrigation plotholders and dryland farmers it emerged that some local peasants and Gowe tenants illegally occupied Sanyati Estate land in their quest to have bigger plots for their cultivation arguing that the 2 to 4-ha plots allocated to them at Gowe were too small for their needs.

Apart from this, two other obstacles ought to be mentioned here. There were some financial constraints encountered during this study. These were mainly due to spiraling inflation in my home country (Zimbabwe). It was also difficult to gain access to the DC Gatooma’s Annual Reports on Gowe as these were permanently withdrawn by the issuing Ministry (Internal Affairs). Save for the information derived from oral interviews, most of the pertinent detail is contained in Estate files, which were not always so generously availed to the author during the course of this research. However, the problems encountered by the author have not prejudiced the quality of argument in this study.
STRUCTURE OF THESIS (OUTLINE OF THE THESIS)

The study is divided into seven major chapters conforming to specific time frames. The periodisation of the study is significant in that it encompasses major landmarks in the history of peasant agriculture in Sanyati. Chapter one which is the main introduction highlights the problem statement and hypothesis. It also reveals the study’s aims and major justifications. The literature review, research methodology and structure of the thesis are covered here. It also, on the one hand, gives a brief background history of the evolution of small-scale irrigation schemes in the communal areas of Zimbabwe. This helps put irrigation at Gowe in its local perspective. On the other, it tries to situate irrigation enterprise in its African context.

The second chapter focuses on peasant production in Sanyati prior to the inception of formal irrigation schemes. Agricultural development and earlier rural class formations are examined to discern their origins and how government emphasis on promoting the master farmer category impacted on socio-economic progress in the area. A major feature of this chapter is the forced eviction of Africans from Crown Land to Sanyati “Reserve” under the NLHA of 1950. This Act attempted to scuttle the process of rural differentiation by allocating the peasantry small and uneconomic land holdings. Numerous measures were adopted to deal with population pressure and “improve” the carrying capacity of the “Reserve.” These included the implementation of the centralisation policy and the enforcement of conservationist measures such as contouring and destocking. Opposition and resistance to these state measures whose central basis was the NLHA was rife. The chapter shows that a number of peasant farmers were able to overcome some of the prescriptions of the Act which militated against accumulation and became relatively wealthy rural producers. The advent of cotton commodity production enhanced their status even further. It was against this background that irrigation was introduced.

The factors leading to the establishment of the scheme, government motives or justifications for the creation of Gowe as a pilot irrigation scheme in the Sanyati communal lands in conjunction with its colonial objectives are presented and analysed in chapter three. The emergence of estate agriculture, which was spearheaded by TILCOR and later reinforced by the adoption of the ADA Act in 1971, is discussed. The wide-ranging debates culminating in the formation of ADA which was renamed ARDA in 1978 are an integral aspect of this chapter. In the main, the chapter focuses on state policy or strategies which informed the agricultural developmental trend in rural Sanyati throughout the period covered by this study.

Chapter four examines the impact of the establishment and development of the Gowe and Sanyati Main Irrigation Schemes as well as how various institutional factors (for example, the availability of loan facilities and extension personnel) determined the tempo of development and the extent of differentiation. The relationship that existed between the two schemes is also explored. Since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 the role of irrigation (compared to dryland agriculture) in boosting food productivity and allaying fears of hunger and starvation is emphasised. Because of its potential to generate cash for the growers and due to its resilience under arid conditions
cotton became a very popular crop in the Sanyati communal lands. In fact, it became as
the chapter argues one of the major bases of peasant differentiation. The differential
impact exerted by the cultivation of this crop on the community was enormous as distinct
categories of rich and poor were created. It is also argued in this chapter that cotton
commodity production broadened the income and social disparities between the core
estate and the smallholder component as well as between the plotholders and their
dryland neighbours. Clearly, irrigation agriculture in Sanyati engendered forms of
economic and social differentiation which are different to those experienced under
dryland agriculture. In addition, the chapter also argues that whilst classes existed in
Sanyati before the 1960s the element of class started to emerge in a more distinct manner
during the irrigation era. Various criteria distinguish the rich from the poor. For example,
irrigation plotholders were not only differentiated on the basis of land ownership or
gender, but also on their ability to pay the water rate, land rent as well as their ability to
access Agricultural Development Fund (ADF), Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF) and Co-
operative Society loans.

An examination of how the Gowu plotholders were battling to survive on small tracts of
land since the inception of the scheme in 1967 is also a major feature of Chapter four and
indeed subsequent chapters. Little effort was made to increase their plot sizes. The
problems of the Gowu irrigators were compounded by the fact that they were subjected to
the whims of the Agricultural Development Fund, the Agricultural Loan Fund and an
invariably bankrupt Co-operative Society.

Attention is also focused on why Gowu was accorded very high priority since the 1970s.
On the one hand, projects such as Gowu were generally meant to be a pacifying tool or a
bulwark against the potential revolution by the rural African middle-class. On the other,
however, with the envisaged and later formation of the Sanyati Main Estate, it became
clear that colonial policy would shift from a mere attempt to control and pacify the
indigenous population to a more protracted move towards the entrenchment of settler
hegemony under the auspices of TILCOR. The intricacies of this paradox will be
examined in this chapter. Chapter four provides the setting for chapter five.

Chapter five analyses the development of Gowu and the Main Estate in the post-
independence era (especially the first decade of independence). With particular reference
to the operations of the plotholders and the role of ARDA at Gowu, it raises and tries to
answer the question whether there were either continuities or a break with the past in the
manner in which the schemes were developing. The reactions of the Gowu irrigators to
their plight become more manifest in this chapter.

Government post-colonial objectives and the intended and unintended outcomes of
government interventionist policies in the ARDA Sanyati irrigation schemes are
examined. It is argued that the good rainy seasons and the availability of technical and
financial resources after independence contributed to the cotton boom. During the boom
period as a result of the intensified commercialisation drive differentiation as a process
assumed major proportions in rural Sanyati. The chapter analyses in detail the tenuous or
fragile relationships between the plotholders and the Estate on the one hand and the
government on the other. The major bone of contention was the inadequacy of the small plots allocated to the farmers and the highly detested lease agreement. Inconsistencies with people’s aspirations after independence led to a “crisis of expectations” among those who believed independence would bring more land and no charge (land rent) for utilising the land. This partly led to the unilateral seizure of vacant plots by land hungry plotholders. Possession of vacant plots coupled with access to other productive resources such as capital and labour enhanced some farmers’ productive capacity and enabled them to amass more wealth than their poorer counterparts. Clearly, cotton production levels rose to unprecedented levels under irrigation especially during the agricultural boom. Irrigation experience thus demonstrated that the technology can produce additional dimensions to rural differentiation.

Chapter six focuses on the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in Zimbabwe and its deleterious impact on Sanyati irrigation agriculture. Cotton, for years the mainstay of Sanyati agriculture, had declined in importance due to a combination of horrendous droughts and ESAP-related factors, primary among which were extremely low and uneconomic prices and the lack of markets for the crop. Due to the insistence on liberalisation of markets by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) the Gowe plotholders were adversely affected. The chapter argues that since marketed produce is a key aspect of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme, the lack of market outlets during ESAP reduced the economic viability of the project. The problem of marketing channels for inputs presented similar limitations. Many farmers, for example, were not able to access and use fertiliser hence yields were also low. A number withdrew from the scheme thereby leaving in their wake more vacant plots than ever seen at Gowe since the establishment of the scheme. The Estate withdrew its usual services (i.e. tillage, extension and transportation), whilst state subsidies dried up at the peak of these economic reforms.

Desperate plotholders, therefore, embarked on seizure of both vacant plots and Estate land in order to make ends meet. A major emphasis of this chapter is that differentiation as a process was arrested between 1991 and 2000 because of the many socio-economic problems wrought by this adjustment programme. These problems invariably persisted in the post-ESAP era. Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) was made even more difficult by ESAP and the unhealthy state of the economy. The state or ARDA needed to bequeath the scheme in a sound state for the plotholders to take it over and manage it effectively, but due to serious financial constraints this was not possible.

Chapter seven summarises and highlights the most important conclusions to emerge from this study.
CHAPTER TWO

PEASANT PRODUCTION AND DIFFERENTIATION: THE SANYATI HINTERLAND (1939 – 1964)

INTRODUCTION

A cursory look at Sanyati communal lands in this period does not portray a distinctive pattern of rural differentiation nor does it give a hint that towards the end of the 1960s the state would institute irrigation agriculture in the area which, subsequently was to influence differentiation in its own significant way. There has been little attempt by historians to engage in active discourse on development and differentiation in very remote parts of Zimbabwe such as Sanyati nor did the state show any interest in this area during the Second World War (1939 – 1945). Moves to open it up to people who were driven away from crown land only started at the end of the war. The 1940s, therefore, mark an important benchmark in the study of Sanyati because that is when the settlement of “immigrants” from Rhodesdale began, starting off as a mere trickle but soon becoming a flood in the 1950s especially after the promulgation of the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) in 1951. Immigration, to a large extent, reinforced the sort of differentiation that had already started to take root in this frontier region of the country since the pre-colonial period.

Earlier forms of differentiation can be traced back to many years before the encroachment of white settlers in the area. The indigenous population the white colonisers found in Sanyati in 1890 had a strong political economy which revolved around tobacco, the growing of various cereal crops and animal husbandry. The latter activity, however, was impeded by tsetse infestation which is discussed later in this chapter. A brief description of these people’s economy shows that prior to the NLHA and the forced resettlement of “immigrants,” the original inhabitants who were stigmatised as “Shangwe” practised shifting cultivation on the rich alluvial soils along the major rivers such as Munyati and Sakurgwe when the floods had receded. They also grew crops during the rainy season (summer) away from the river valleys (the banks of the river). It appears, therefore, that more than one crop was raised in the year. The range of crops grown included short season varieties of maize and a long season variety the locals called “Salisbury white, 8 lines, Kalahari or Bhogwe,” bulrush millet, finger millet (mhunga), sorghum (mapfunde), water melons (manwiwa), pumpkins (manhanga), sweet potatoes (mbambaira), groundnuts (nzungu), small leaf tobacco (fodya) and cotton (donje). Hunting, gathering and fishing also constituted an essential part of the Shangwe economy (i.e. supplemented the economy). Evidence from early travellers in northwestern

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142 For the geographical location of Rhodesdale see Map 4. Rhodesdale was bounded by a line roughly connecting Gwelo, Que Que, Hartley, Enkeldoorn, Umvuma, Lalapansi and Gutu. See Ngwabi Bhebe, B. Barombo: African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1947-1958, (Harare: The College Press, 1989), 74. N.B. Most of the people who were moved to Sanyati and Sebungwe (now Gokwe district) during the 1950s came from Rhodesdale, a vast ranch owned by the British multinational company, LONRHO. Before their eviction, they lived in Rhodesdale’s so-called Squatter Communities. Rhodesdale was also home to a number of former migrant workers from Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) who had resided there for years as labour and rent-paying tenants.
Zimbabwe, and from interviews with informants revealed that hunting in particular was at one stage a central feature of the economy. Shangwe hunters spent days trekking game in the vast forest areas of the Munyati area. The vast forests provided an invaluable source of a variety of fruits, leaves, roots (bulbs) and grasses which provided a major source of food especially in the period between the exhaustion of grain supplies and the next harvest. The NLHA and the allocation of land to vast numbers of “immigrants” not only restricted and deprived the Shangwe of a large part of their hunting grounds, but also limited their access to other natural products of the forest. Their gathering and hunting rights were, thus, curtailed. Relocations to the demarcated plots (under the NLHA) meant that the Shangwe had to give up land in the river valleys which they had cultivated for generations. The NLHA plots were “neatly” arranged in arable blocks of 8 acres laid out in a linear fashion (maraini) following the centralisation policy. Between the 1930s and 1950s, agriculture was mainly rainfed.

Although agriculture has been the mainstay of the Zimbabwean economy since time immemorial, Sanyati did not, however, have any irrigation history before the 1960s. For example, Sanyati never had irrigation in the formal (conventional) sense save for the small water projects or gardens littered along valleys of the Munyati River, around major boreholes which were sunk concurrently with the process of settling evicted African farmers from Rhodesdale, and the cultivating of crops near local wells and in the marshlands/wetlands or dambos. Thus, irrigation development in Sanyati occurred in an area that had no significant irrigation history. Whatever irrigation existed prior to ARDA schemes were relics of the old system of applying water to crops that pre-dated the colonial period.

In this chapter, earlier rural class formations are examined to discern what caused them and whether these were sustained or obliterated during the irrigation phase. The two captions at the beginning of this study underscore how the peasants’ contribution to agricultural development has been denigrated by historians who wrote during colonialism and how differentiation emerged despite concerted efforts by the colonial state to proscribe it. Perhaps, differentiation which was directed and dictated by the state, such as when it encouraged the emergence of a group of kulak farmers in the countryside, distinctly labelled “master farmers,” was the only one that was tolerated. The prime purpose of this “toleration” should be viewed as part of the larger colonial policy framework in which the government deliberately created the master farmer category, not precisely for the benefits it envisaged would accrue to this group, but as a guarantee of its own political survival. It guaranteed the government’s survival because the passage of the

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144 Ibid.
145 Small-scale capitalist peasants in the Soviet Union were known as kulaks, a name that spread to other socialist countries as well. In the 1980s Zimbabwe subscribed to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of scientific socialism. Thus, this Russian term is being used here to refer to Zimbabwean farmers with a capitalist orientation (i.e. master farmers) who were often equated to the kulak class. N.B. Wherever small-scale production is widespread the process of accumulation will steadily bring capitalist property into being and the most successful or fortunate peasants farming on a small or medium scale will become kulaks. For detail on what the word kulak means see János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 77-78 and 82.
Land Apportionment Act in 1930 divided land on racial grounds. Under the Act black farmers were allocated poor land resources in the so-called “native reserves” and this did not please them. The creation of a middle class category of farmers i.e. master farmers who were subsequently considered for irrigation plots and small-scale commercial farming was meant to placate the African population and make them think that the government was committed to improving the lot of the African farmer. This double-faceted nature of the colonial state will be explored in detail in the next chapter.

This chapter will attempt to illustrate the state of peasant agriculture and the extent to which society was differentiated in the period prior to the inception of irrigation. It will also demonstrate how the colonial state, equipped with its numerous interventionist measures, tried to “flatten” or eliminate differentiation in the countryside and how, in the process, it has been responsible for the impairment of peasant agricultural initiative and black economic advancement. This will be done by demonstrating how the peasant economy created by the colonial government has, to a certain degree, fostered African underdevelopment and at the same time underestimated the existence of differentiation in the area. The social structure that emerged in Sanyati between the 1930s and the 1960s will be used to prove the fallacy of the argument by Gelfand that Shona society was a homogeneous and egalitarian entity in the twentieth century – a society devoid of any signs of differentiation among its peasantry. Far from it, the emergence of classes can be traced back to the pre-colonial period. Several studies have revealed that by the turn of the twentieth century no African polity conformed to Gelfand’s perception of rural society, notably that it was universally traditional and egalitarian. This was so due to the political voice and the extent of agricultural commercial influence exhibited by the

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146 Peasant is not an easy term to define. In my study the term denotes a small-scale or smallholder communal farmer who since the latter part of the nineteenth up to the early twentieth century and indeed in subsequent decades up to the beginning of the new millennium has not been producing merely for subsistence needs only but for commercial purposes as well. This seems to tally with Hansen’s definition of this word when he says, peasants are not just small-scale farmers or entrepreneurs, nor are they simple commodity or capitalist producers, but they are producers with one foot in subsistence and the other in the market. See Esbern Friis-Hansen, Seeds for African Peasants: Peasants’ Needs and Agricultural Research - The Case of Zimbabwe, Publication (9), Centre for Development Research in co-operation with the Nordic Africa Institute, formerly the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, (Copenhagen, Sweden: Uppsala, 1995), 16.


peasant farmers. The level of commercialisation determined the extent of rural differentiation. Hence, it will be demonstrated in this chapter that differentiation as a process pre-dates the era of irrigation enterprise in Sanyati. It is as much a pre-colonial and post-colonial as it is also a pre-irrigation and irrigation phenomenon.

The immediate post-Second World War period ushered arguably the three largest waves of “immigrants” into Sanyati who were compulsorily removed from European and Crown land by the Responsible Government. The first group was forcibly moved to Sanyati in 1950; the second was moved in 1951; the third and last wave arrived in Sanyati in 1953, the year the Federation of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) was formed. These “immigrants” lived as squatters on European land before their ruthless eviction and subsequent settlement in Sanyati. This chapter analyses the nature of peasant society and economy in the two and a half decades prior both to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) of 1965 by Ian Douglas Smith and the inception of irrigation at Gowe (Sanyati) in 1967. One of its central arguments is that, by the turn of the century, it would be ill-conceived to speak of African society as being traditionalist and egalitarian. As a matter of fact, the increased commercialisation of the rural economy, especially with the introduction of plow agriculture and cotton on the one hand, coupled with labour migrancy on the other, led to clear forms of socio-economic differentiation manifesting themselves much earlier in Sanyati, thereby refuting the assumption that such an economy was markedly subsistence-oriented. It can be conceded that the forced removals from Rhodesdale might

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149 The Responsible Government was in power from the end of British South Africa Company (BSAC) rule in 1923 to the beginning of UDI in 1965. In this period, Rhodesia was a self-governing colony of Britain which was more representative of the white population. Since the hoped-for mining potential [the Second Rand] of the region had failed to materialise, agriculture became the country’s dominant enterprise and principal export earner. White settler farmers controlled much of this key sector and enjoyed a correspondingly dominant political importance. See William A. Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, (London: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 3.

150 It is difficult to come up with a universally accepted definition of the word “squatter.” Sometimes the terms “tenant”, “sharecropper” and “outgrower” have been used interchangeably to mean squatter. According to Giovanni Arrighi, the squatter system created a congenial atmosphere for white land owners because in return for use of land, African producers paid rent in labour or in kind or both. He views squatting in Southern Rhodesia as an institution that created semi-feudal relations and as one that promoted “The take off of European agriculture.” J. K. Rennie concurs with Arrighi when he says that the labour tenantry arrangement “was a relation of serfdom which emerged wherever white farmers with limited capital took land from agricultural peoples.” For Tabitha Kanogo, the term “squatter,” which originated in South Africa, “denoted an African permitted to reside on a European farmer’s land, usually on condition he worked (labour tenantry arrangement) for the European owner for a specified period. In return for his services, the African was entitled to use some of the settler’s land for the purpose of cultivation and grazing.” This perception of “squatter” is analogous to how the people who were moved to Sanyati were portrayed before their eviction from Rhodesdale. For detailed studies on squatters in Zimbabwe, Kenya and South Africa, see G. Arrighi, “Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianisation of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia,” Journal of Development Studies, 6(3), (1970), 209; John K. Rennie, “White Farmers, Black Tenants and Landlord Legislation: Southern Rhodesia 1890-1930s,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 5(1), (1978), 86; T. Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, (London: James Curry, 1987), 10 and C. Van Onselen, The Seed is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper 1894-1985, (Oxford: James Currey, 1996), 1-649.

have arbitrarily disrupted and redefined previous community-based relationships including fluid and dynamic ones, but at the same time these relocations did not dampen the people’s zeal to economically produce or reproduce themselves as a class.

The chapter also addresses the advent of cotton and the consequent differentiation that emerged. It examines the levels of accumulation experienced by certain categories of cotton cultivators in the 1960s to establish whether they transcended those witnessed in the previous two decades. The returns from the cultivation of this crop, often achieved at the instigation or insistence of the State, enabled some peasants to amass some wealth in their communities. The differential impact exerted by cotton agriculture on this frontier economy was prodigious by many standards. Clearly, some peasants benefited disproportionately from colonial agricultural schemes, while the majority were disadvantaged as demonstrated in this chapter.

STATE OF PEASANT AGRICULTURE: THE PRE-IRRIGATION ERA (1939 – 1951)

Peasant society and economy up to the promulgation of the NLHA in 1951: -

In the 1930s, when the government first began to take an active role in the promotion of irrigation schemes in the communal areas, there was no inkling that this same innovation would be introduced in Sanyati more than 30 years later. Irrigation did not seem to be a top priority in the government’s scheme to develop the peasant sector in the frontier region of Sanyati. Since the passage of the LAA the white settlers created separate areas for their own use and they did not want to compete with Africans on an equal footing. This policy was consolidated and intensified by the adoption of the NLHA twenty years later. In fact, racist ideology was prioritised in order to produce a skewed developmental economy dominated by whites. State intervention in agriculture was the order of the day and the material upliftment of the Africans was arguably not upper most in the minds of the white settlers of the country. Hence, colonial Zimbabwe’s racialised development regime has largely been responsible for shaping the face of peasant agriculture in the Sanyati communal lands.

The determination by the government to subordinate African economic interests to those of the white settlers that it represented was explicit in the racial policies it enunciated since and even prior to the implementation of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. It frequently stood in the way of African economic initiatives as it tried to ensure that the Africans did not compete on an equal footing with the whites. Life in the African areas was communal in character. It was the racial discriminatory policies in vogue since the passage of the LAA and the NLHA by the colonial government which led to the

153 In Zimbabwe five major categories of land can be identified, namely communal land; large-scale commercial land; resettlement land; small-scale commercial land and urban land. “Communal land” refers to any land that is communal land in terms of the Communal Land Act (Chapter 20:04) and any other land that was within the area of a district council on the 19th August 1988. See Rural District Councils Act (Chapter 29:13), Revised Edition, Harare: Government Printer, 1996, 442-443.
perception of Africans residing in rural areas as having few economic wants and reflecting them as uneconomic men; a premise this chapter is challenging on the basis of Sanyati’s practical experiences. Thus, in this period, the state made concerted effort to use racist propaganda to eliminate competition between black and white, which also implied the elimination of a black entrepreneurial class. Its motives regarding African development were far from being altruistic as demonstrated in a statement by Ian Douglas Smith. Smith, the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, illustrated this when he said in reference to demonstration policy: “Extension work was mainly conducted to improve farming systems i.e. extension officers went out into the field to translate the work of government specialists who were divided into research workers and scientific implementers of the programmes on to the ground.” “The prime consideration behind the inauguration of such development policies,” he added, “was to prevent the deterioration of the soil and allow an increased number of Africans to subsist in the reserves without the support of government famine relief in times of drought or crop failure.”

Because of settler racist policy coupled with the fact that Sanyati was a land-scarce area when compared to a land-abundant region like Gokwe labour migrancy to the white farms and mines of the Midlands and Mashonaland West Provinces of Zimbabwe was quite endemic by the 1950s. However, the whites did not anticipate the vital role labour migrancy played in the injection of wage remittances back into the peasant agricultural sector. These were crucial as they were utilised to boost agricultural production back home, although it should not be assumed that all migrants repatriated wages. According to Jacob Rukara “Some people used migrant wages to increase production [in their home areas]. Others did not and production in their districts stagnated” because such areas lacked this supplementary resource of production. He pointed out that Sanyati households with some relatives working in towns, mines or farms generally possessed the resources or farm implements (“zvibatiso”) which ameliorated the burden of carrying out agricultural tasks without the appropriate means with which to do so.

In a semi-autonomous settler colony such as Southern Rhodesia, it can be pointed out that the emerging post-war development regime was constituted to meet a set of very explicit requirements. On the one hand, the state was bent on maintaining white settler hegemony and ensuring that a constant supply of labour was guaranteed for white enterprise. On the other, it was considering the idea of achieving sustainable development in the African areas. Achieving the former alongside the latter sometimes produced numerous contradictions to a point that at times there was lack of coherence and consistency in the settler government’s policies and strategies regarding rural development. In the circumstances, Africans adopted their own methods to achieve prosperity with the result

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155 Demonstration policy entailed the use of demonstrators who gave African farmers agricultural extension advice i.e. on “proper” methods of farming which included conservationist education.
156 Ian Douglas Smith (Former Prime Minister of Rhodesia), Personal Interview, Belgravia, Harare, 28th September 1993.
157 Jacob Rukara, (Messenger in the DA Kadoma’s Office), Personal Interview, DA’s Office – Kadoma, 16th October 2004.
158 Rukara, Personal Interview.
that those with greater initiative became more successful. This chapter will demonstrate how some farmers progressed more than others.

From a Government point of view, rural agriculture was to be improved through the engagement of the Native Department which was directly responsible for the appointment of agricultural demonstrators and extension officers. In fact, the Agriculture Department (an arm of the Native Department) in the then Ministry of Internal Affairs through institutional development agents such as demonstrators, extension officers and Land Development Officers (LDOs) was designed, among other things, to provide material services and advice to the African peasantry throughout the country. This department also maintained official control over certain aspects of agricultural production, for example, registration of cotton growers’ numbers which was also utilised to facilitate marketing procedures and the disbursement of cash to farmers who had delivered their crop to the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB – now the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe, COTTCO) in Gatooma. 159 The two departments (Native Department and the Agriculture Department) actually became the best collaborators of governmental action.

Among the first demonstrators to be appointed and stationed in Sanyati were Lazarus Sithole and Macloud Mushawarima. 160 Sithole was transferred, with effect from the 1st of May 1947, from Ndanga District (Zaka) to Hartley District 161 for location on Sanyati Reserve where a demonstrator was urgently needed in connection with the settlement of that Reserve by “immigrants” from the Rhodesdale Estates. 162 Demonstrators were employed in marking out new lands for these people. For example, one of their major tasks entailed the preparation and marking out of lands for planting. 163 This was in line with the Agricultural Demonstration Policy adopted by E. D. Alvord, the Director of Native Agriculture in 1945. Policy circular No. 10 of 1945, under the heading Duties and Aims of Demonstrators, stipulated that “Agricultural Demonstrators are appointed to assist and advise Natives to make the most of arable and grazing lands. They receive

161 Hartley is now Chegutu. Gatooma (Kadoma), where the Sanyati reserve is situated, was an Assistant Native Commissioner’s station under Hartley from 01/09/1915 until 18/01/1957 when it became a full Native Commissioner station. Prior to 1915 there was a clerk in charge of Gatooma Pass Office, which was in Hartley District. See NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158081, Location C.19.5.6R, File: HIS 3, November 1968-November 1970, D. K. Parkinson for DC Gatooma to the National Archives of Rhodesia, Salisbury, 12th November 1968.
instruction and supervision from the District Land Development Officer regarding methods to be adopted.” It added:

Their duty is to instruct and advise in methods of tillage; conservation of soil and water; crop rotation; compost making and use; the planting, growing, harvesting, storage and use of various crops; pasture improvement, and other subjects connected with the use of land and to carry out the Government Agricultural policy for Natives.  

The demonstrators, in turn, worked hand in hand with the traditional leadership mainly chiefs such as Neuso and Wozhele to implement settler agricultural policies, projects and other measures deemed necessary by the government. For instance, when cotton was introduced, these demonstrators and such administratively appointed chiefs, together with compliant religious leaders, were tasked with the responsibility of persuading and convincing ordinary people to accept the rationale for cotton cultivation in suitable districts like Sanyati. This had the effect of alienating the Chiefs and headmen from their people. Hence, according to C. M. Arensberg, “A self-declared felt need… is better than imposed betterment; enlisting local leadership…” and that “peasants prove very ready to innovate when they really experience an improvement they can value themselves.”  

Thus, the engagement of traditional leaders in this way was often resisted and it tended to create social inequalities in the manner in which power and income were distributed between the two categories (chiefs and commoners). By giving the chiefs this vantage position, the state was not in any way stifling but promoting the emergence of differentiation in Sanyati. In fact, among its major activities and pursuits in Sanyati between the 1940s and 1960s, the state made a conscious effort to reconcile agrarian conservationist goals with the imperative to increase the prosperity of both Europeans and Africans. It also wanted to see, inter alia, the regularisation of anomalous tenurial arrangements and the rationalisation of agrarian techniques. This meant that agriculture’s success was not only based on the growing and marketing of produce. It had to take into account soil preservation measures, the granting of communal tenure to peasant farmers and the standardisation of agricultural methods to be applied to all rural areas in colonial Zimbabwe. Above all European and African areas were to be developed along different lines as enunciated by the LAA.

The objective here is to explore and identify how the various kinds of administrative procedures and practices authorised by the government coupled with peasant participation or resistance shaped the course of Sanyati agriculture and rural differentiation in this period. The questions that can be posed at this juncture are: Why were these objects of reform – tenure conservation and technique – conceived as necessary dimensions of a unitary colonial project devoted to “Native advancement”? Was modernisation, irrigation development and differentiation realisable on the strength

166 Worby “Discipline Without Oppression,” 103.
of these? Answering these questions requires an in-depth knowledge of the agricultural scenario as it unfolded in Sanyati in this period. According to Worby, “assigned a definitive tenure status under the LAA only in the 1950s and 1960s, development intervention arrived late in this region, and it arrived as a more fully articulated package than in the African reserves in the south and east of the colony.” 167 Despite this late encroachment of development intervention onto Sanyati, it can be pointed out that rural differentiation had manifested itself much earlier than the 1950s as a consequence of peasant agency and initiative.

Four additional features make Sanyati nearly unique in the colonial development picture. Most distinct is its perceived marginality in terms of distance from historical centres of missionisation, economic growth, population concentration and political power. Catholic and Baptist missions, for example, were only established in the Gokwe-Sanyati region between 1954 and 1963, and the construction of government schools only began in the late 1970s before increasing rapidly after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. Second, in the 1950s, the state never considered the idea of developing irrigation. Before the advent of irrigation, settler reaction to drought mainly included the distribution of food relief but, more importantly, it entailed encouraging peasant farmers to grow drought resilient crops such as cotton, mhunga and sorghum. This was confirmed by W. D. R. Baker, the Provincial Commissioner, Mashonaland South, when he stated: “A marked swing to drought resistant crops is expected [in the fight for the alleviation of hunger in the rural areas]” 168 – [own emphasis]. A more pressing task was to resettle the former Rhodesdalites. Third, the region is distinguished by the historical absence of competing claims by European settlers to land. A malarial, tsetse infested lowland with patchy and variable rains, it was considered to be unsuitable for crop cultivation or animal husbandry by whites. Given a choice, Chief Wozhele and his people would not have opted to settle in this place either. Finally, the occasion for the arrival of development in the region was the forced resettlement of entire villages or chiefdoms from the European farms and African “reserves” in the south and west of the colony.

The sequence and timing with which Sanyati received these “immigrants” had important consequences for differentiation. The coming of “immigrants” from the Rhodesdale Estates into Sanyati, with their vast agricultural knowledge and technique, boosted and intensified the rural differentiation process. They were generally viewed as possessing greater agricultural intelligence than their Shangwe counterparts. As already indicated, Sanyati began to receive these “immigrants” in 1950, when the coercive and rather insensitive model of development was reaching its apogee behind the passage of the NLHA of 1951. At this time, the local agricultural development staff were tasked with the responsibility of enforcing conservation and extension measures. This was a by-product of concern expressed in official circles about the state and extent of land degradation in the rural areas in general. According to Phimister, in 1954, the Natural

167 Worby “Discipline Without Oppression,” 103.
Resources Board (NRB) expressed alarm, if not despondency, at the extent and rate of soil erosion in the “reserves”:

The time for plain speaking has now arrived, and it is no exaggeration to say that at the moment we are heading for disaster. We have on the one hand a rapid increase taking place in the African population and on the other a rapid deterioration of the very land on which these people depend for their existence and upon which so much of the future prosperity of the country depends … the happenings in the Native reserves must be viewed in the light of an emergency and not as a matter that can be rectified when times improve, for by then the opportunity to reclaim will have passed. 169

What was ignored, though, was that the pieces of land allocated to Sanyati residents were too small to cater for the increase in both the human and animal population. Erosion was, therefore, largely a reflection of this oversight.

In addition to the small tracts of land allocated to each peasant household, conservation measures such as the construction by the Agricultural Extension Officers of contour ridges (makandiwa) that approximated to the width of a Jeep truck to combat erosion had the deleterious effect of significantly reducing the size of land a farmer could put under the plough. According to the Councillor for Ward 23, Jacob Mukwiza, the Jeep truck was actually driven through the contour to make sure that it measured up to the expected width. 170 Gully erosion, in particular, rendered large portions of land useless for productive purposes. Contouring was viewed as a panacea to the massive land degradation induced by surface run-off. As if this was not enough, the contour ridges, which the cultivators were coerced to erect to address the problem ate further into their already small plots culminating in stiff resistance against conservationist policy in general. In this case, erosion and not differential access to land was responsible for differential levels of production among the Sanyati peasants. To some extent, this plague facilitated the development of significant disparities in agricultural income. Therefore, the role of erosion, conservation and extension measures in enhancing land shortages and differentiation in the countryside should not be overlooked.

An important watershed in the agricultural history of Sanyati was that these local government officers evolved, in the 1960s, a flexible programme to introduce cotton production among African smallholder farmers, with results that have profoundly transformed much of the northwest quadrant of pre-colonial Zimbabwe which includes Sanyati, Gokwe and Chenjiri. Ironically, it is in Sanyati and some parts of Gokwe – some of the very last regions of the colony to be subjected to “development” – that the possibility of gaining a reasonable livelihood exclusively as a subsistence and cash crop farmer had been realised for many, although certainly not all rural households. According to Worby, whether this is because, or in spite of, lessons learned in the course

170 Jacob Mukwiza (Councillor for Ward 23), Personal Interview, “Old Council” or Wozhele Business Centre, Sanyati, 14th October 2004.
of many years of state intervention in agrarian practice remains an open question, but the
significance of the region’s late incorporation into the overall pattern of colonial
statemaking for its future position in the post-colonial national development regime
cannot be in any doubt. 171 The emergence of relatively clearer forms of rural
differentiation especially with the implementation of the cotton regime cannot be doubted
either. The cut-throat competition engendered among the peasant farmers by this
commodity crop rendered any notion of socio-economic homogeneity impeccably
impracticable.

The legislative framework: count down to the NLHA:

It is pertinent to observe that central government preoccupation with different forms of
legislation took shape in the 1940s. 172 Several authors have observed that it was during
this period that the removal of African tenants 173 from white designated farmlands to
overcrowded, land-scarce reserves like Sanyati foreshadowed a self-evident future of
poverty and eroding resources. 174 As already stated, the impoverished and marginalised
position of the peasantry did not preclude the emergence of rural differentiation in
Sanyati. Nevertheless, the blame for such a future was pinned upon farmers in those same
reserves rather than on the racial policies authorising forced resettlement. Thus, the
Natural Resources Act of 1941 summarised and addressed a decade of anxiety in the
Department of Native Affairs over the accumulating social and environmental effects of
an expansionist category of Africans, who were deemed to be plowing up an even greater
acreage of land in the “reserves.” 175 The Act was, above all, a programme of constraints
or prohibitions imposed on existing agricultural practices; it empowered Native
Commissioners (NCs) to “Depasture stock, give orders on so-called modern methods of
cultivation, prohibit the cultivation of land and control water.” 176 Just like the NLHA that
was passed subsequently, it sought to eclipse the emergence of rural differentiation, a
proposition that was going to prove difficult to implement given the level of
commercialisation extant among the peasants before and after they had harnessed cotton
as a cash crop.

Surprising enough, these seemingly genuine concerns did not immediately extend to
cover the northwestern “reserves” in Mashonaland West part of which comprises Sanyati.
The first systematic survey of the agricultural status of “Reserve Natives” conducted in

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171 Worby, “Inscribing the State at the ‘Edge of Beyond’: Danger and Development in North-western
172 M. Drinkwater, “Technical development and peasant impoverishment: land use policy in Zimbabwe’s
173 In certain contexts these are known as outgrowers, sharecroppers, plotholders, smallholders, settlers or
peasants. See Friis-Hansen, Seeds for African Peasants and Stephen F. Burgess, Smallholders and Political
174 T. O. Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study, (Harare:
175 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness.
a comparative view of these trends across British colonial Africa, see Sara Berry, No Condition is
Permanent: The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, (Madison: University of
1930 by the Department of Native Development noted that only ten cattle were enumerated in an area of 764,000 acres in the only two “reserves” surveyed in the Gokwe-Sanyati region (Impapa and Omay), adding that the “percentage of worn out land” was “nil” in these “reserves,” and that therefore no agricultural demonstration efforts of any kind were needed. The report concluded, the “natives are very backward, and until we can rid the country of tsetse fly their progress will be retarded.”

This evidence illustrates clearly that four “reserves” in the north-west (Sanyati, Sebungwe, Sibaba and Pashu) were excluded from the survey altogether on the grounds that they were “not occupied by natives” - an assertion that was likely a convenient fiction given that NCs began recording hut-tax collection from throughout this “unoccupied” region from as early as the turn of the century.

In 1944, the Commission on Native Production and Trade (Godlonton Commission) deemed it necessary to go beyond the establishment of negative sanctions in controlling the kinds of practices held to be destroying the agrarian base in most other parts of the country, and formulated a sweeping programme of “native” improvement that was to be finally institutionalised by the NLHA. The prescriptions formulated by this Commission were explicitly framed by a larger thesis on natural law and development, one intended to put in proper perspective “the relative obligations of the European and African races.”

For the Godlonton Commissioners, the displacement of the African occupants off the land by Europeans was justified in terms of the “natural laws which inexorably govern human existence” to which Africans must either adapt or else face extinction. As Holleman astutely observes, the Commission in this fashion, “reconstituted the Rhodesian social order as a product of the law of nature … Europeans thus being identified with progress and progress being enshrined in an inexorable law of nature, the legitimacy of white progressive leadership now fully sanctioned by law and logic.”

Such laws were used as legal justification to uphold the erroneous notion that African society was lagging behind in development and that it was basically traditional, subsistence-oriented, largely homogeneous, egalitarian in character and not differentiated at all.

Duty and discipline were thus introduced as the new instruments of African self-improvement in Sanyati, these characteristics being lauded as the distinguishing mark of “civilised” persons bearing allegiance to modern states. The Commission went on to express the opinion:

That forward peoples while preserving their settled economy have a duty by all reasonable and proper means to assist backward peoples to progress and for that
purpose to enforce discipline without oppression. It is also the duty of forward peoples to adapt themselves to the presence of such backward peoples in their midst. That it is the duty of backward peoples to contribute to their own advancement to the limit of their powers and to observe proper discipline.  

The duties of “forward” and “backward” peoples were thus seen to be reciprocal, but asymmetrical. The former had to “enforce discipline without oppression”; the latter, to embody that discipline themselves if development was to be achieved. To call this “discipline without oppression,” though, was hypocritical on the part of the settler regime as it implied two things – firstly, that the Africans willingly adopted it and secondly, that persuasion was employed to make Africans adhere to this very weird concept of natural discipline. However, the fact that it was enforced is irrefutable given the racial outlook and the hegemonic tendencies of the regime and there was nothing natural about it whatsoever.

Indeed, a preoccupation with the disciplined body as the diacritical sign of “civilisation” was everywhere apparent during this period. This enforcement of discipline and other measures at the behest of the NLHA was designed, therefore, to beat Africans into line, keep them under surveillance, facilitate the whites’ version of development which entailed exploiting the African race and to curb the emergence of differentiation in rural Sanyati which had already proved inevitable.

In giving legislative shape to the Godlonton Commission’s proposals, the NLHA aimed to redesign agrarian practice in ways that visibly embodied the spirit of discipline that both body and landscape required. There were essentially two dimensions to this process. First, by forcing Africans to deploy their labour in new ways on their own lands (practising systematic crop rotation, constructing contours, fencing off grazing areas and so on), order in the landscape could be used to both mirror and monitor the extent of progress. Such progress also reflected the social and economic class to which a farmer belonged. Second, by installing a regime of private property or individual units, rewards accruing from the disciplined and efficient application of labour and proper management of a plot of land would go directly to the owner of that land. For example, when demonstrators were appointed and the idea of demonstration plots was hatched, it was envisaged that:

The Demonstrator, after winning the confidence of a promising Native farmer, will tell him that he is prepared to help him obtain much larger yields from his lands by using better tillage methods. He will then offer to take over two acres of this man’s land, and with the owner’s full help work it in a proper manner by laying it out into a 4-course crop rotation

unit on 4 half-acre plots … The Demonstrator will direct the handling of the crop until after it is harvested and the yields determined. He will then turn the crop over to the owner.\(^{187}\)

These “technical” procedures, it was believed, would transform backward “tribesmen” into disciplined “modern” farmers. The rapid commercialisation of agriculture, however, can be used to refute the argument that African farmers were still primitive \(^{188}\) or backward and undifferentiated by the 1950s. Thus the “primitiveness” or otherwise on the part of the peasantry should not be over-emphasised.

According to Worby, Africans living in the Sanyati “reserve” and the Special Native Area of Gokwe during the 1940s were far removed from the cordon sanitaire of European life. \(^{189}\) It is imperative to note that, until the 1960s, the Sanyati region was perceived as the wild, remote and culturally backward domain of the “Shangwe” ethnic group. However, the people had already been drawn into a pattern of seasonal migration for employment – often for wages in kind – especially on European farms to the north-west of the highland commercial farming centre of Gatooma. Nevertheless, because some Africans believed they could use their stake in the land to prosper, they declined to sell their labour power to white employers, prompting the Provincial Native Commissioner (PNC), J. E. S. Turton, to lament “…[the] general shortage of labour of all kinds on the mines despite the general increase in wages.” \(^{190}\) He put the average wage on the mines at 22s.6d to 27s.6d and on the farms at 20s.0d to 22s.6d. \(^{191}\) Attractive though these wages might have seemed to the PNC, they failed to lure sufficient quantities of labour to meet the mines and farms’ requirements. On the one hand, this was sufficient testimony that Africans were indeed economic men. On the other, it can be pointed out that whilst since the 1940s the dryland cultivation of maize (a staple crop), rapoko, sorghum and pumpkins was undertaken in rural Sanyati in conjunction with livestock rearing (amid efforts to eradicate the tsetse menace), as well as hunting and gathering, the prevalence of labour migrancy was dictated mainly by excessive land pressure. In circumstances of land shortage, the need to eke out a living from off-farm activities naturally became greater. Thus, for those who migrated, labour migrancy and the earnings that were repatriated for purposes of boosting agricultural production became significant bases of differentiation.


\(^{188}\) The “primitiveness” of African peasants has been strongly challenged by a multitude of scholars, notable among them, I. Oxaal, T. Barnett and T. Booth (eds.), Beyond the Sociology of Development: Economy and Society in Latin America and Africa, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1975); Palmer and Parsons, The Roots of Rural Poverty and Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry. N.B. African peasants were market-oriented men and quite commercialised in their activities.

\(^{189}\) Worby, “Discipline Without Oppression,” 108.


\(^{191}\) Ibid., 2.
Sanyati, like Gokwe, suffered severe droughts in 1941 and 1942. These were followed, five or six years later, by an even worse drought in 1947. 192 1955 and 1961/1962 were also drought years. 193 The spectre of catastrophic droughts reduced peasant households’ capacity to produce food crops for their own consumption, let alone for sale. However, in spite of these calamities, intervention in rural agriculture by administrative authorities was still largely absent, the purview of the Native Department being limited in these areas largely to tax collection, dispute adjudication and the killing of rampaging elephant, kudu and other game for distribution as emergency food relief and as a conservation measure to promote agriculture. In the early years of settlement, game slaughter and tsetsefly control were considered essential as far as protecting human life and crops from rampaging wild animals, promoting conservation and agricultural development was concerned. In an interview, P. B. Fletcher, then Minister of Mines, Lands and Surveys, defended game shooting by saying, “the Southern Rhodesia Government Policy towards game is to protect and preserve wherever possible.” 194 He felt that the public had an incorrect view of the Government’s game policy. Continuing his defence, Flecther said:

It is not indiscriminate slaughter … We do our utmost to avoid slaughter. Our primary aim is to preserve and protect, but this has to be done in consideration with two vital factors - agricultural development and tsetsefly control. Private enterprise has invested a great deal of money in agricultural development and the taxpayer makes an appreciable contribution every year … In elephant control it is impossible to know the number of animals that will be killed. What people overlook about game is that practically the whole of the country is agricultural. There is a limit to the amount of game you can have in association with agriculture. Farming and big game don’t go hand in hand … The problem of game would then boil down simply to a question of protecting agriculture … Sometimes game rangers shoot elephants in self-defence. Elephants can do enormous damage … and to drive them back into their hinterland the Game Department shoots the minimum number necessary … Game cannot stand in the way of development. 195

To achieve development in Sanyati, the terrible tsetsefly menace also had to be eradicated. For Fletcher, “this has to be kept in check and eliminated where possible. It is, indeed, such a terrible menace that we have to use every known means at our disposal

193 In the 1961/1962 season drought hit many rural peasant farmers very hard as it wiped out the early maize and rapoko crop on which they entirely depended. The Minister of Native Affairs, H. Jack Quinton, who toured the drought-stricken areas described the situation as “serious in some parts,” with Matabeleland being the worst affected area. For example, some peasant farmers in Nkai and Ntabazinduna, by January 1962, were already considering approaching their local District Commissioner (DC) to warn Government of famine relief needs. For more detail on this drought see “Drought Hits Many Peasant Farmers” and “Cattle Position Serious,” The Central African Daily News, First Edition, 5(179), Saturday 6, 1962, 1.
194 “Fletcher Defends Game Shooting to Preserve Agriculture,” The Rhodesia Herald, Salisbury, Thursday, October 11, 1956, 11.
195 Ibid.
Field research confirms that wild animals (e.g. elephant) were killed for purposes of using the meat in the campaign against tsetse. The meat would be poisoned and used to lure or entice tsetsefly to death. The Minister emphasised that “if a means of fighting tsetsefly other than game slaughter were discovered, the Government would be only too pleased to adopt it.”

Whilst Fletcher’s argument is justified from a conservationist and agricultural point of view, it is not clear how the proceeds from the sale of ivory were used. By his own admission: “The tusks from these operations would be brought in and the Government would sell them. So far as he was aware, nothing had been done about the meat, although he understood that some of it had been consumed by Africans.” Ideally, there was need to plough back the profits derived from ivory sales into Sanyati agriculture, but regrettably, no official record exists to support this. Perhaps the only benefit obtained by Africans who participated in the hunting of elephants was the privilege to partake of the meat and practise agriculture in an elephant and tsetse-free environment. From a policy perspective, therefore, game and tsetse control were an integral part of the implementation of the NLHA in its formative years.

It can be noted that, the anxieties that gave rise to the NLHA originated in reserves far to the south and east, for example, Selukwe (Shurugwi), Gwelo (Gweru), Fort Victoria (Masvingo), Gutu and Chibi (Chivi), where the centralisation and alignment of African communities in the name of both conservation and of instilling modern farming practices had been underway for some two decades prior to the 1940s. The absence of centralisation in Sanyati can be explained by the fact that the policy could only be implemented where Native Reserves had been created. Some of the tenets of this programme were only effected concurrently with the NLHA because prior to the arrival of the Rhodesdalites, there were no Native Reserves in the area.

Worby has observed that a remarkable government document laying out a five-year plan for the implementation of the NLHA illustrates with striking clarity the importance of constructing a coherent explanatory narrative of past failures in these southern and eastern communities. He further says the document’s title: What the Native Land Husbandry Act Means to the Rural African and to Southern Rhodesia: A Five Year Plan that will Revolutionise African Agriculture is indicative of the Native Agriculture

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196 “Fletcher Defends Game Shooting to Preserve Agriculture,” 11.
197 Headman Lozane, Personal Interview.
198 “Fletcher Defends Game Shooting to Preserve Agriculture,” 11.
199 Ibid.
Department’s zeal to spearhead a “revolution” in African agrarian practice since the 1920s. “From 1926 onwards,” the document stated:

The history of Native agriculture in Southern Rhodesia has been that of a continuous battle between the steadily increasing pressure of a growing population on the restricted land resources, and the efforts of the Native Department to establish those methods which would check the soil erosion and human degradation which are the inevitable concomitant of the old system [i.e. shifting cultivation] under new conditions. By the middle forties it began to be recognized that propaganda, instruction and voluntary acceptance of the new methods were inadequate. With restricted funds and limited staff the Native Department was doing most valuable work and had achieved some remarkable results, but, faced with the background of centuries’ old tribal custom embodied in communal systems of land use, progress was slow.

It was believed that the economic and political stability of the Africans would be restored, with private title to land being the instrument through which individual men (Africans) would become the interested conservators of their land or natural resources in general. Hence,

A settled and thriving agricultural population is probably one of the best sheet-anchors of political stability, in particular when the land user has ownership rights, with appropriate safeguards in his own interest, in the land he occupies. Full implementation of the Native Land Husbandry Act will do more than stabilize the native agricultural population. By discontinuing a system which allows the native to vacillate between spells of work in the European area and spells of semi-loafing in the Reserve it will do much to stabilize also the industrial working population. An important factor in this context is that in general under the new conditions the families will be with the workers in the non-agricultural occupations and the workers will be with their families on the land, in contrast to the present position. Stabilized populations based on the complete family unit offer the soundest prospect both for the social advancement and the political stability of the African in the future.

Although no specific mention of differentiation was made in policy discourse, the full implementation of the NLHA was intended to scuttle this process. African progress was only tolerated in so far as it was subordinated to white settler interests. Notwithstanding this, differentiation on the basis of land ownership, labour, gender and capital accumulation became even more pronounced. Most of the Madherukas (“immigrants”)


self-allocated themselves land (madiro) \(^{206}\) and became employers of labour as they furthered their accumulation prospects and established more stabilised rural families (homes).

Thus, a “modernist” type of development envisioned “complete family units” replacing the ragged fragmented pieces of industrialised African social life. As one Native Affairs official aptly observes:

In no aspect of Native culture have the effects of the part-time system been more deplorable than upon family life and morals. The frequent and often long absence of large numbers of men from the reserves has led to a preponderance of the one sex over the other in both the European and the Native areas. The evils of this are too obvious to need elaboration. In the European areas the men turn to illicit and often impermanent unions, the offspring of which tend to grow up without discipline and in unsatisfactory surroundings. The absence of fathers makes for marital instability and deprives the children of that necessary paternal discipline and the wives of that help and support without which family life cannot be satisfactorily maintained. \(^{207}\)

It was against this backdrop that the Rhodesdalites were received and that the autocratic NLHA was implemented in Sanyati.

**The immigrant factor: From Rhodesdale to Sanyati and the contradiction of implementation:-**

Chief Wozhele, whose personal name was Munyaka, and his people used to live in Lalapanzi from where they were moved to Rhodesdale in 1925 by the Native Commissioner for Que Que, Hulley – commonly referred to as “Mudzviti 208 Hari” by the locals. Since Rhodesdale was a European ranching area, he was bound to be moved again to a settlement designed for Africans. This would be the culmination of an idea muted prior to the granting of responsible government to Rhodesia in 1923, when the question of allocating separate defined areas in which Europeans and Africans could respectively and exclusively acquire land had arisen in the Rhodesian legislature. Since the 1920s, a number of African applicants were denied permission to buy land by the Director of Land Settlement on the grounds that African ownership would depreciate the value of adjacent European land. \(^{209}\) The settlers also regarded the relatively small-scale purchases of land by the Africans which had taken place by 1921 as the beginning of a massive influx of advanced Africans into the European area. Hence, the Morris Carter Commission or the Lands Commission of 1925, which was appointed to test opinion on

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\(^{206}\) For more detail on madiro (freedom ploughing) see Nyambara, “A History of Land Acquisition in Gokwe.” In state corridors, to underscore the NLHA’s disapproval of this practice, madiro cultivators or peasants who disregarded the Act by overploughing were disparagingly labeled “illegal cultivators.”

\(^{207}\) Cited in Worby, “Discipline Without Oppression.” 110.

\(^{208}\) “Mudzviti” is a Shona word that is used to refer to the NC, District Commissioner (DC) or the District Administrator (DA).

\(^{209}\) NAZ, NAS S924/GI/1, Director of Land Settlement, B.S.A.C., July 18, 1921.
the question of land segregation in Rhodesia succinctly enunciated European fear of the “inevitable racial conflict” which would ensue if a policy of land segregation was not adopted then. 210 The Land Apportionment Bill which resulted from the Commission’s report became law in 1930. Although the law (LAA) did not take effect until April 1931, under the terms of the new Act, the rights of the Africans to land ownership anywhere in the colony were rescinded. 211 Africans were only compensated for this loss by being given the exclusive right to purchase land in the so-called Native Purchase Area (NPA) or move outright to what were known as Native Reserves. This partly explains why Wozhele was moved from Lalapanzi. Using the same argument, the Europeans also intended to set aside Rhodesdale for their occupation and push the African population further out of “white enclaves” such as Rhodesdale. However, this imminent move was deferred if not put on hold by the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. In the war against Hitler the African population was called upon to make its contribution in support of the Allied cause. As Rhodesian Europeans and Africans fought side by side for the attainment of a common objective, all racial differences seemed to have been swept under the carpet, only to be resurrected at the conclusion of the war.

No sooner had the war ended than the demobilised African soldiers started to be accorded the status of second-rate citizens. Wozhele’s people, in spite of their sacrifice in aid of the Allies, were not spared from the racist slant that was to dominate the post-war years. In 1946, a year after the termination of World War 2, in a less startling move to those familiar with the settler philosophy of the day, the NC for Que Que (now Kwekwe), Nasebet, in tandem with his Provincial Native Commissioner, unashamedly served Chief Wozhele with notification of removal in due course from Rhodesdale to Sanyati Reserve in the north-western part of the country. 212 In the following year, serious famine was allayed by the prompt and expeditious importation of yellow mealie-meal (known in local circles as “Kenya”) from the United States of America (USA). 1947 also marked the installation of boreholes and the construction of new roads in the Sanyati Reserve in preparation for the settlement of Wozhele’s people there. 213

On receiving the news of the impending eviction of Wozhele and his followers, Benjamin Burombo, affectionately known to his mass of supporters simply as B. B., the Organising Secretary of the British African Workers Voice Association 214 (The Voice, in short), stepped into Rhodesdale in 1950 viciously encouraging people to refuse removal. Much

212 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158086, Location C19.6.7F, File: DC’s File, District Information 1961-1971, Includes Programme of Events 1890 to 1961, Calendar of Events: Sanyati TTL.
213 Ibid.
214 Benjamin Burombo came into the political limelight in 1947 when he formed this association in Southern Rhodesia. Its headquarters were in Bulawayo. The association’s chief aim was to unify Africans politically and to fight for their better economic opportunities and social advancement.
as B. B. might not have countenanced it, the whites prevailed upon Chief Wozhele to go on a preliminary inspection of Sanyati Reserve. He was not pleased with what he saw during reconnaissance because the area was tsetse and mosquito infested. It resembled a jungle in that it was characterised by dense forest and was inhabited by dangerous wild animals such as elephants, lions, hyenas and poisonous snakes. There was hardly any decent infrastructure by way of roads, bridges, schools, stores, grinding mills or reliable water sources. Perhaps the most noticeable service that was provided by the government was a rudimentary road infrastructure to facilitate travel by the NC or DC. (See pictures showing the effort to clear bush and build a road linking Kadoma and Sanyati – Appendices I and II). The only distinguishable human inhabitants of the area at that time, the people of Chief Neuso, lived in one line in the middle of this thick bush. In spite of his resistance to go to this inhospitable backwater of the country, the Chief’s trip was immediately followed by the decisive meeting between the NC Gatooma, Finnis, and Que Que’s new NC, Buckley, at Elephant Hill (“Chomureza Hill”). This meeting which was also attended by Wozhele, signalled confirmation of his removal together with his people including Headman Mudzingwa to Sanyati despite Burombo’s influence of “Zuva Ravira.”215 (This term literally signified that the “sun has set”). It was coined to mean that the time had come to fight and resist unjust colonial prescriptions such as the forced removal of Africans from their original homes implemented under the ostracised LAA. Indeed, the die had been cast as the first wave of “immigrants” was forcibly moved to Sanyati in 1950. This year marked the beginning of repressive fast-track removals of unprecedented magnitude for most of the people living on Alienated and Crown Lands.

In a show of excessive force, the Rhodesdale residents or evictees were loaded into waiting lorries at short notice and transported into the inhospitably hot malarial lowlands of the Sanyati and Sebungwe districts. Most of the early “immigrants” were settled in villages under their own village heads and headmen, but formally under the ultimate jurisdiction of indigenous chiefs. Among the first evictees of Rhodesdale were 470 families under Chief Wozhele and his Headmen Mudzingwa and Lozane who were dumped in the Sanyati Reserve. Another group consisted of 1 000 families under Headmen Myambi and Chirima who were forcibly settled in Gokwe Special Native Area.216 December 11, 1950 was the deadline set by the Native Department for the final evacuation of people residing on the Rhodesdale Estates. 217 Accordingly, at a meeting held by members of the Native Department in September 1950, it was decided that “all families … moved from Rhodesdale would by force of circumstance be accommodated in the areas mentioned even if the size of what was regarded as an economic unit had to be

215 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158086, Location C19.6.7F, File: DC’s File, District Information 1961-1971, Includes Programme of Events 1890 to 1961, Calendar of Events: Sanyati TTL. N.B. Benjamin Burombo’s contribution marked the beginning of full-scale resistance to calculated massive movements of persons to various destinations in the country. For a more elaborate description of Burombo’s influence see Bhebe, B. Burombo, 1-160.

216 The new areas created from Unassigned Area were designated as “Special Native Areas” to distinguish them from the Native Reserves already provided for in the constitution, but to all intents and purposes the rights to land and methods of production within the special areas were no different. For more detail see M. Yudelman, Africans on the Land, 75, and P. S. Nyambara, “A History of Land Acquisition in Gokwe,” 75.

217 Bhebe, B. Burombo, 76.
reduced.” 218 The area set aside for habitation by those families that were relocated to Sanyati comprised very poor sandy soils and received little rainfall. Parts of it were tsetse infested and crop cultivation in such an area was associated with a considerable amount of risk. It was here that the “immigrants” dislodged from Rhodesdale were allocated land under the NLHA of 1951. 219

Just before the second wave of “immigrants” was dispatched to Sanyati in 1951, Chief Munyaka Wozhele died. One informant in Sanyati has narrated a deeply touching story of the pain, agony and anguish that accompanied these forced evictions. Joke Munyaka Wozhele who alleges that the late Chief was his grandfather, said:

The trauma caused by eviction from Rhodesdale led to my grandfather’s death. My grandfather was a High Blood Pressure (BP) patient, and was one of the staunchest opponents of eviction from Rhodesdale. He could not stomach the damage inflicted on his property [acquired from many years of hard work] during the process of eviction. As he helplessly watched the proceedings [which entailed hauling and wrecking his possessions onto the lorries waiting to take them to Sanyati] he crumbled under the weight of this pressure, collapsed and died on 9th August 1951. He must have suffered a sudden and severe stroke. 220

This evidence is corroborated by Pius Nyambara who quotes Anna Madzorera, Kesiya Madzorera’s wife, as saying:

… the government forced us to leave Roseday [sic]. They sent the police with big lorries and they forced us into lorries and brought us to Nyaje. They had to force us as we had not agreed to move to a place we did not know. We lost a lot of property in the process because the police just threw our things into trucks. They were very rough. 221

Similarly, a nationalist leader narrated the Rhodesdale evictees’ ordeal as follows:

On our way [home] many police trucks raced past us. When we arrived my uncle told us that the Europeans had just arrested the chief, because he told the people to resist. A police truck sped out of the village and we

218 NAZ, S1194/190/1, Report of a meeting held in September 1950.
220 Joke Munyaka Wozhele, Personal Interview, ARDA Main Irrigation Estate, Sanyati, 20th October 2004. See also NAZ, MF 557: Mashonaland South Province: Gatooma District (Ministry of Internal Affairs), 14.
could see the chief and some elders handcuffed and under guard … Later that day soldiers and police started ordering men to empty their houses and barns. When they refused they were arrested. Soldiers entered their houses and threw everything onto trucks, wrecking a lot of things in the process. Then they did the same with the barns, loading all the tools, grain, etc, into the same trucks. This over, the women, children and old people were put on top of their belongings and driven away. The animals had been rounded up and the boys were ordered to drive the herds north. It was a sorry sight - women, children, old people were weeping, the men arrested, homes set on fire and destroyed.  

Apparently, unperturbed by this tragedy, the whites still insisted that these people should depart for Sanyati; and under an Acting Chief Wozhele appointed with effect from 1st September 1951, they were moved to the Reserve. As if to add insult to injury, the Acting Producer of the Central African Film Unit in Salisbury (now Harare), was frantically preparing to film the movement of people to Sanyati. In his correspondence to the NC Que Que, copied to the Assistant Native Commissioner Gatooma, entitled “Film on movement of peoples” the Acting Producer did not hide his excitement at filming “the movement of Africans from the Que Que district to the Sanyati Reserve, Gatooma district … likely to take place shortly.” He went further to say:

This Unit has planned to film scenes of the movement proper, and also scenes of preparation in the Sanyati Reserve, these scenes [are] to be kept from inclusion in any future film made on the wide subject of the movement of peoples … on information from the Land Development Officer [LDO], Sanyati Reserve, it is understood that preparation activities will be continuing for at least three months.

In separate correspondence to the NC Que Que, copied to the NC Hartley and the ANC Gatooma when the movement to the Sanyati Reserve had commenced, he was delighted to inform his audience that: “Messrs. S. Peet and P. Young, of this Unit, will travel to Gatooma on the 20th August [1951]. The purpose of their visit will be, first, to view the movement activities and plan film coverage, and subsequently to do such filming as may be necessary.”

The purpose of such filming was not clear, but it is probable that this must have been used for propaganda purposes. However, with or without the film, opposition to eviction persisted. Presumably, out of fear that resistance to eviction might escalate to

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223 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 9 Sanyati and Ngezi: 1951-1964, The Acting Producer, Central African Film Unit, Salisbury, to NC Que Que and to ANC Gatooma), 20th July, 1951.
224 Ibid.
unmanageable proportions, in 1952 armed soldiers were deployed to deal with the situation. Huts and granaries belonging to persons who offered the last remnants of resistance were tied in chains and pulled down by lorries or bulldozers as the soldiers went on the rampage destroying huts and forcing people to move to Sanyati. In Lozane’s words: “Police, soldiers, guns and dogs were used to evict people and sacks were provided by government to pack goods and not every possession could be taken on board as a lot of personal belongings and a myriad other things were left behind, leaving an ineradicable sense of loss and deprivation in the minds of the victims.” 226 This must have been done with the approval of the newly appointed NC for Gatooma, O’Conner as no dissenting voice was heard from him. Through this callous and reprehensible way of handling resistance, all the people from Rhodesdale had been moved to Sanyati by 1953, the year the third and last wave of “immigrants” was settled. The following year, 1954, the Acting Chief whose personal name was Ndaba was installed as the substantive Chief Wozhele on 1st April. 227

However, eviction from Rhodesdale was not accepted without resistance. In correspondence by Finnis to the NC Hartley entitled: “Movement of Natives 1952: The Land Apportionment Amendment Act No.54/1951,” it was noted with grave concern that Wozhele’s people employed avoidance or diversionary tactics to resist eviction from Crown Land. The fear that these people were determined to stay in Rhodesdale despite the offensive that was launched against them was gaining currency by the day as revealed by the following statement:

A number of followers of Chief Wozhele are still resident on Rhodesdale (Gatooma). They were due to leave with Headman Mudzingwa for the Sanyati Reserve in 1950, but avoided this move by entering into the employ [labour contracts] of the Cold Storage Commission [CSC] who hold grazing rights on Rhodesdale (Gatooma). I understand the Cold Storage Commission will leave Rhodesdale (Gatooma) in April this year, and will take a number of these natives to another grazing area. It is possible that some of these natives presently employed will not move with the Commission, but will endeavour to remain on Rhodesdale (Gatooma). 228

In the light of the above, it was deemed necessary to issue a stern ultimatum to Wozhele’s people ordering them to leave Rhodesdale.

For the purposes of Section 5 (1) of the Land Apportionment Amendment Act No. 54 of 1951, I beg to suggest that the Proclamation so far as Rhodesdale (Gatooma) is concerned be worded to include all natives there residing and requiring them to leave by 31st August 1952 and to proceed to

227 NAZ, MF 557: Mashonaland South Province: Gatooma District (Ministry of Internal Affairs), 12 and 14.
either the Special Native Area in the Subungwe [sic] District or the Sanyati Reserve in the Hartley District. 229

According to R. L. Westcott, the NC Gatooma, “… it is a contravention of the Land Apportionment Act for a native to occupy, or be allowed to occupy, land in the European area unless he is in the employ of the owner, either full time or on a Labour Agreement basis.” 230 ANC Barlow avidly warned against “Native squatters” living on European ranches. The full text of the warning served on one Doreen’s Pride Ranch owner, T. J. Rorke, under the heading “Native Squatters” read:

I am informed that there are Native squatters living on your ranch where they have built huts, ploughed lands and are depasturing stock. I have to point out that unless these Natives are bona fide, full time employed by you, this would seem to constitute a contravention of the Land Apportionment Act, by you and by the Natives concerned. Section 26 of the Act prohibits the lease or occupation of land in the European area by a Native unless the Native is bona fide employed by the owner or occupier of such land, for so long as he is in such employment as necessitates his presence on such land. The same section prohibits an owner or occupier of land in the European area permitting a Native to occupy such land unless he is in bona fide employment. If the Natives are not bona fide employed, provision exists under Section 32 of the Act for Natives to occupy such land under Labour Agreements the terms of which must be approved by the Chief Native Commissioner, whereby such Natives are under the obligation of personally working for the owner. I would suggest that you take steps as soon as may be, to legalise the situation regarding Natives living on your property. 231

The eviction of such people from European designated land was often carried out swiftly. Barlow sometimes:

Ordered Natives to leave white Ranches [farms] in this ‘District’ [Gatooma] within a week. Regarding their standing crops I have told the Natives they must move and that they should either arrange to sell them as they stand to other Natives remaining on the farm, or arrange for them to be looked after until they can reap them at a later date. 232

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Cases of stiff resistance against eviction were reported to the British South Africa Police (BSAP). For instance, the following case was tabled by the ANC Gatooma for investigation by the Member-in-Charge, Battlefields, in terms of the alleged breach of the Land Apportionment Act 1941 (Rhodesdale):

In 1950 a large number of natives living on Rhodesdale, Selina Block, your area, moved to the Sanyati Reserve. A number moved on to neighbouring farms to avoid removal to the Reserve. I have recently [sent] two Messengers warning the remaining natives to move in terms of Proclamation No. 8/52. The Messengers report that a large number of natives who were living on Rhodesdale have moved with their cattle onto a farm owned by ‘Torr’ across the Ngezi River. This European may be Bartlett-Torr of Silver Star Ranch your area. The Messengers say these natives are not full time workers. There is no record of any Labour Agreement under the Land Apportionment Act in this office. Would you please investigate and prosecute if facts permit.  

Upon investigation, these allegations were categorically denied by Torr, whose full defence was:

I understand the nature of the enquiry, i.e. natives moving from Rhodesdale to my farm [Ranch] with their cattle etc and not working full time, and myself not having a Labour Agreement with them. Definitely no natives, to my knowledge have come from Rhodesdale to my farm as squatters. All the natives on my farm are signed on by me, and I give them full-time work. I came to Silver Star Ranch in February, 1947. There were three times as many natives squatting on the farm as there are now. Mr Nesbitt, the NC of Que Que interviewed these natives on the farm in October, 1947. Previous to this, these natives were working for me on a squatter basis, i.e. three months work, and three months off work. Mr Nesbitt gave them the choice of either becoming full time workers, or leaving the property. Two thirds of these natives left for Mzingwa [Mudzingwa] area, Rhodesdale, and the Goldfields Area. The remainder stayed on as permanent workers. They have been given the privilege of working some of my land for themselves, providing that the land was protected in conservation. They have been allowed to keep cattle but on a much reduced scale. With the quarantine of Epivagenitis on my farm at the moment, I have been unable to carry out the destocking, excepting for the male oxen stock. Since 1947, no natives have been allowed on this farm from Rhodesdale. If any have arrived here, I am unaware of it. All the natives on Silver Star Ranch were taken over in 1947, February, in similar squatter agreement as the Rhodesdale Squatter Agreement.

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234 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 1-7: 1951-1964, Eric Bartlett-Torr, Owner of Silver Star Ranch, Ngesi, in his response to the investigation by the Member-
After investigation and on the basis of Torr’s polished defence, the Member-in-Charge, Battlefields, had no option but to exonerate him which illustrated the flimsy grounds on which allegations were made against this farmer. Clearly there were numerous deficiencies and frailties in the manner the investigation had been conducted, thereby forcing the Member-in-Charge to conclude that: “‘Torr’s’ account was correct i.e. that no natives have moved from the Rhodesdale area to his farm to avoid going to the Sanyati Reserve and that the natives at present on his farm have been there since he took over the farm in 1947, and that they are all working full time for him.”

However, given the need for labour on big ranches such as Silver Star, Bartlett-Torr’s response to the allegations of harbouring squatters can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, being near to the Mondoro Reserve, it is possible Bartlett-Torr received plenty of labour whenever he needed it and so might not have desperately required the labour of the Rhodesdale evictees. On the other, it is likely that he was conniving with the squatters so that he would retain their labour for his seasonal requirements.

Although exact figures have not been provided, by 1953 it appears, the Sanyati Reserve was already over-crowded and the Office of the ANC Gatooma was making frantic efforts to block new claims to land by people who felt they had a right to move to the district consequent to the move from Rhodesdale to Sanyati. People needed to be registered by the ANC Que Que at the time of the movement in order to be legitimate claimants to land in Sanyati or thereafter, Que Que needed to confirm them as authentic “left overs from mass movements.” The ANC Gatooma was particularly querying the authenticity of a certain Matembo-Sayimoni (registration No. J 2022, Que Que) and Shebeni’s (No. X 3185 Que Que) claims because their names did not appear on his lists and thus constituted what were deemed “Irregular removals to Sanyati.” Accordingly, the ANC issued an injunction to prosecute those people who had moved without the express permission of the ANC for Que Que. It read: “Matembo-Sayimoni and Shebeni are no doubt exploiting a situation which has not been buttoned up properly. All Natives that do not appear on our lists should be prosecuted if they have moved without any advice of removal from Que Que.” However, it is probable that the two might have gone to work (wage employment) and were not registered at the time of the movement and, incidentally, had lost their right to land ownership in the Reserve. In subsequent correspondence with Que Que, the ANC Gatooma was prepared to reconsider Matembo and Shebeni’s case only if it was verified that their names existed on the original Rhodesdale list of evictees to Sanyati arguing that: “I have closed the general list and … If these persons should have been included in the Rhodesdale lot I can accept them but if they are from other kraals I cannot do so, as this would only start a series of unauthorised movements for the future.”

in-Charge, Battlefields, 18/3/52.


236 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 1-7: 1951-1964, ANC Gatooma to Land Development Officer (LDO), Sanyati, 3rd March 1953.

237 Ibid.

238 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 1-7: 1951-1964,
people to the Sanyati Reserve had been completed and that any new entrants would be a further strain to the existing carrying capacity of the area.

According to Headman Two Macleod Lozane (a former Primary School teacher), the evictions of thousands of Africans from Rhodesdale to various rural destinations throughout pre-independence Zimbabwe were “more of a political move than anything else” and were justified from a colonialist standpoint. M. Yudelman has argued that between 1941 and 1948 the African population in Rhodesia increased by more than 700,000 persons, while the area apportioned for their use had remained almost unchanged. The land position in the Native Reserves in the post-war period was such that 711,820 additional acres of land were urgently required for an estimated 71,182 African families, who lived outside the Native Reserves, on Alienated Land and Crown Land designated as European Land, Forest Areas and Unassigned Areas. The last straw was when Africans residing in these areas were required, much to their chagrin, to move out as a result of the implementation of the “politically-driven” Land Apportionment Act of 1930. The Act legalised the division of the country’s land resources between black and white. This marked a major turning point in colonial Zimbabwe’s racialised regime which in all respects became highly segregationist in outlook. Table 2.1 illustrates the categories into which the country was divided and the area in acres occupied by each category.

ANC Gatooma to the ANC Que Que, 13th March 1953. See also NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 1-7: 1951-1964, S. F. Finnis, ANC Gatooma to the Director of Native Agriculture, Causeway, Salisbury, 29th October, 1952.

Headman Lozane, Personal Interview.


African areas were known as Native Reserves until 1962. Since 1962 they were renamed Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). At independence in 1980 they were re-christianed Communal Lands. These were areas where Africans were considered to live according to their own “customs” under their traditional leaders. See A. K. H. Weinrich, Chiefs and Councils in Rhodesia: Transition from Patriarchal to Bureaucratic Power, (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1971), 5.

NAZ, S1194/190/1: Land for Native Occupation 1946-47, Reports of the Ad-Hoc Committee.
Table 2.1: Land Apportionment in Rhodesia, 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Category</th>
<th>Area (acres)</th>
<th>% of total area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natives Reserves</td>
<td>21 600 000</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Purchase Areas</td>
<td>7 464 566</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Area</td>
<td>49 149 174</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined Area</td>
<td>88 540</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forest Area</td>
<td>590 500</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unassigned Area</td>
<td>17 790 300</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The influx of white immigrants from Europe in the post-war period necessitated the evictions of a large number of Africans from Crown and Alienated Lands. To make way for the new immigrants, recourse was made to the policy of eviction of Africans from land so designated as Crown Land by the LAA, which, for security reasons lay somewhat dormant during the war years. The decade 1945-1955 saw at least 100 000 African “squatters” all over the colony being moved, often forcibly into overcrowded “reserves” and the inhospitable and tsetsefly-ridden Unassigned Areas. Despite efforts by the Department of Conservation to get rid of the tsetse fly menace through massive spraying campaigns and the engagement of “magotchas” (tsetse fly hunters), the tsetsefly was never completely eradicated. Notwithstanding this, many people were still moved and resettled in the small and overcrowded Sanyati Reserve under the NLHA.

These categories were defined as follows: European Area consisted of European owned land; Native Reserves were those enshrined in the Constitution and within which land was allocated according to African customary laws; Native Purchase Area was reserved for acquisition as farms for individual Africans and was regarded as compensation for the loss of the right to purchase farmland anywhere else in the country; Unassigned Area consisted of European – owned land, which if the owners so wished, could be transferred to Africans and thereafter would become a permanent part of the Native Purchase Area. The Forest Area consisted of land set aside for development as Forest Area Reserves, legally it lay within the European Area. The Unassigned Area consisted of poor, inhospitable land left under the unfettered jurisdiction of the state to be distributed at a later date among any of the other categories. See George Kay, *Rhodesia: A Human Geography*, (London: University of London Press, 1970), 51 and Second Report of the Select Committee on Resettlement of Natives, Salisbury: Government Printers, (1961), 15.

“Magotchas” was a term that was used in the context of the massive and intensive tsetse campaigns mounted by the government in the 1940s and 1950s to describe the tsetse fly hunters and the ruthless way they killed these insects. The method of killing tsetse fly by spraying their host (cattle) with toxic chemicals, which killed them instantly, was synonymous in local circles with literally butchering, torching, “braaing” or roasting (“kugocha” in Shona) these marauding pests/creatures.

NAZ, MF 557: Mashonaland South Province: Gatooma District (Ministry of Internal Affairs), 6; See also NAZ, MF 707; Mashonaland South Province: Gatooma District (Ministry of Internal Affairs); or NAZ, S2929/1/9: Sanyati Tribal Trust Land: Gatooma District (Ministry of Internal Affairs).
The Act, which was a key feature of the 1950s, was justified on the grounds that, by the end of the Second World War, Southern Rhodesia’s “Native Reserves” were seriously overcrowded and overstocked. An official investigation found that more than half of the so-called reserves were overstocked with cattle by 145%. The government responded to this situation by publishing a Native Reserves Land Utilisation and Good Husbandry Bill in 1948 which was later promulgated as the NLHA. Its stated objectives were wide-ranging: “to provide for the control of the utilisation and allocation of land occupied by natives; and to ensure its efficient use for agricultural purposes; and to require natives to perform labour for conserving natural resources and for promoting good husbandry.” ²⁴⁷ Phimister states that, the Act’s more specific objectives were:

(i) to provide for a reasonable standard of good husbandry and for the protection of natural resources by all Africans using the land;

(ii) to limit the number of stock in any area to its carrying capacity, and, as far as practicable, to relate stock holding to arable land holding as a means of improving farming practice;

(iii) to allocate individual rights in arable areas and in communal grazing areas as far as was possible in terms of economic units (See Table 2.2), and, where this was not possible due to over-population, to prevent further fragmentation and to provide for the aggregation of fragmentary holdings in economic units;

(iv) to provide individual security of tenure of arable land and individual security of grazing rights in communal grazing areas; and

(v) to provide for the setting aside of land for towns and business centers ²⁴⁸ in the African areas. ²⁴⁹


²⁴⁸ This was one of the earliest hints of the government’s desire to eventually adopt the Growth Point Policy which culminated in the establishment, in 1974, of the Sanyati Growth Point or Business Centre. It was an irrigation-based Growth Point. A preliminary evaluation of the origins and effects of a regional policy commonly known as the growth point strategy in Zimbabwe has been presented in Tshenesani Nigel Tapela’s 1985 study. He discusses this policy in terms of its contribution to both rural development and decentralised regional development. The period 1956-1975 marked the height of the “Decentralisation Policy” Debate in Zimbabwe. Chapter 2 of my thesis will address both the theoretical and practical basis of the growth point policy in Sanyati. For further discussion of this policy see Tshenesani Nigel Tapela “Growth Points and Regional Development in Zimbabwe: A Case Study of Sanyati, MA dissertation, Monstreal: School of Urban Planning, McGill University, October, 1985, 1-105, and K. H. Wekwete, “Growth Centre Policy in Zimbabwe: With Special Reference to District Service Centres” in N. D. Mutizwa-Mangiza and A. H. J. Helmsing (eds.), Rural Development and Planning in Zimbabwe, (USA: Avebury, 1991), 187-221.

²⁴⁹ Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 226.
Table 2.2: Recommended allocations of land and stock under the Land Husbandry Act.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Average Rainfall (inches)</th>
<th>Full Standard Holding</th>
<th>Acres of Grazing land per animal unit</th>
<th>Approx. total acreage per full holding</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acres of arable land</td>
<td>Numbers of Animal Units*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 or over</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 – 28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 – 24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 – 20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Essentially the Act was an attempt to attack the multifarious problems of erosion, land fragmentation and tenure, migratory labour and African agricultural traditions. Under this Act a “standard area” or “economic unit” of land was allocated per family unit (comprising a man, his wife and three children) by the NC under the direction of the CNC as primary allocative authorities, thus effectively usurping the right to allocate land by traditional chiefs. A “standard” or “economic” unit was defined by the architects of the Act as “a piece of land which, if farmed according to recommended procedures laid down by the Department of Native Agriculture, would serve not only to support the holder and his family at subsistence level, but was expected to be capable of producing a crop surplus for sale.” As illustrated in Table 2.2 above, the size of the “standard” unit was fixed according to the climatic and ecological configuration of each area, for instance, in high rainfall regions the standard holding was 6 acres, ranging to 15 acres in the driest areas. Ideally, a holding in the 28-inch rainfall area would have 8 acres of cultivable land. The producer’s stock would require 10 acres of grazing land per animal unit. His total requirement would be 68 acres, with the 8 acres of arable land to be farmed under crop rotation, combining a 2-acre fallow with grain and leguminous crops, which, if supplemented by the manure from cattle, would preserve the nitrogen in the soil. The position adopted by the Act has been backed by Ian Douglas Smith, the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, who has pointed out that the original type of agriculture in the country was what he called “peasant farming,” arguing that in the pre-colonial period “The people [Africans] … didn’t know anything about modern cropping, the use of manure and artificial fertilisers i.e. they didn’t understand scientific farming, for example, green cropping, crop rotation and the use of legumes.” This stipulation in the Act was aimed at intensifying production by changing what was perceived as the haphazard

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250 Cited in Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 227. N.B. The size of holdings was to depend on climatic conditions. More precisely, the size of “a full standard holding” depended on the size of the arable holding, and the amount of grazing land needed to maintain the livestock. All of these factors were to be adjusted according to rainfall conditions.

* This represented one large animal (for example, a cow) or two sheep, or three pigs, or the equivalent in other animals.

251 Ian Douglas Smith, Personal Interview.
system of “shifting” cultivation (referred to as “slash-and-burn” agriculture or chitemene in parts of Northern Zambia), to one more suited to a sedentary type of agriculture. \(^{252}\)

The NLHA was also intended to terminate what were perceived as “traditional” practices of land tenure by introducing “individual ownership.” The architects of the Act hoped that the concept of ownership would help reduce land fragmentation and give incentives to the peasant farmer to undertake improvements on the farm which in turn would assist in checking soil erosion thereby increasing agricultural productivity. Furthermore, the colonial state attempted to systematise land distribution in order to check African competition against white settler farmers while at the same time injecting some sort of egalitarianism which was believed to be an aspect of African “traditional” land holding practice.

It is important to note that, while the Act sought to equalise land holdings for the majority of rural households, it also created conditions for the emergence of a small class of large land holders. In Sanyati, these were among the many peasants who had challenged the 8-acre allocations per household. Given the very low rainfall it received and that it was not well endowed with fertile soils, the allocation of 8 acres per family was staunchly resisted. This land area was too small to sustain a family and their animal possessions neither was it sufficient to produce a saleable surplus as stipulated in the Act. Sanyati, being a land-scarce area compared to Gokwe was, therefore, more prone to erosion and an organised pattern of migratory labour.

It seems ironic, according to Holleman, that the primary motivation behind the NLHA that the land could not continue to cater for the subsistence needs of an ever-growing rural population had in fact long since been accepted by rural communities themselves. In colonial Zimbabwe evidence abounds that since the turn of the century, the peasant economy had ceased to depend entirely on agriculture, in that most cash requirements derived from wage incomes outside it. For Holleman, the stage had long since been reached whereby a large proportion of the average rural household income derived not from agriculture but from migrant labour. \(^{253}\) This shift in economic orientation by the migrant labourers was a result of the despicable size of household land holdings in Sanyati reserve. After land allocation under the NLHA, as revealed by the Mangwende Commission of Inquiry of 1961, although some landholders cultivated 10 or more acres, many households actually cultivated much less than the standard allocation of 6 to 8 acres. In areas of excessive land pressure such as Sanyati the restricted size of arable lots per family is attributable to the scarcity of available land. Thus, in Sanyati, where the land was less available than in neighbouring Gokwe, it seemed appropriate for the officials to apply the “tight formula” under the NLHA allocations as it was a question of survival for the landless peasants or those whose economic needs were not fully catered for by the restricted 8-acre allocations, to indulge in labour migrancy and other off-farm activities.


\(^{253}\) Holleman, *Chief, Council and Commissioner*, 63.
As will be demonstrated in this chapter, despite its perceived suitability to the Sanyati situation, the Act still engendered forms of resistance hitherto unknown since the passage of the LAA which preceded it. One of the stipulations of the NLHA was that, for one to be registered as a farming right holder, one had to be a cultivator of land in the area concerned on the date selected for implementation of the Act. As a result, many migrants who were absent at the time the allocations were made were simply not considered, and a considerable portion of the recognised rural village membership was deprived of its basic right to land. According to Simon C. Pazvakavambwa, in 1950, land was allocated in Sanyati on the basis of three principles; first, for settlement purposes; second, for cultivation and, third, for despasturing stock or grazing purposes. These were self-contained units allocated on a “stand alone basis” (i.e. individual allocation). However, these allocations did not anticipate three things. Firstly, that an increase in population would lead to a sub-division of the initial allocated land for cultivation. Since sons of “immigrant” farmers were not allocated land they encroached onto grazing areas or self-allocated themselves land, thereby reducing land for grazing. Secondly, it was not anticipated that there would be an increase in livestock because once a farmer got his allocation he would parcel out pieces of land to his sons. The sons would also acquire their own beasts and this had a multiplier effect. Destocking was a result of this lack of anticipation on the part of the settler government. Thirdly, the contribution of the urban economy to the rural economy through transfers was not considered. Because sons and daughters of communal farmers were not guaranteed life in the towns and mines, their only form of security was to invest in cattle in anticipation of retirement. This investment drive in cattle caused levels of off-take to remain very low (around 3%) against an increasing livestock population. Regarding the third point, the thinking of those who designed the NLHA was clearly spelt out by the Under Secretary in the Department of Lands and Agriculture when he remarked that “If a native enters a trade, such as shoemaking, for instance, and becomes industrialised he should not retain the right to land in the reserves … he is either a tradesman or a peasant farmer and should not be both. If he hankers after land, he should purchase land in the Native Purchase Area or a plot in a semi-urban area.”

In 1947 the CNC was even more emphatic when he remarked that “Once a final allocation of land [has been made], the Native will either become a peasant farmer only, adopting proper agricultural and soil conservation methods, or become an industrialised worker with his tentacles pulled out of the soil.” Clearly, one of the major aims of this

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255 Levels of off-take are measured in terms of slaughters that take place or the amount of sales outside the region (external disposals) including local slaughter. Involuntary off-take can take place due to disease outbreak and other factors, but anything that reduces the number of cattle through some managed process is called off-take.
256 Pazvakavambwa, Personal Interview.
257 NAZ, S1194/190/1, Under Secretary, Department of Lands and Agriculture to Secretary, Department of Lands and Agriculture, 3 April 1947.
258 Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, CNC and Director of Native Development for the year 1947 (Excerpts).
policy was to limit the number of people allowed to farm in the reserves. In fact, in post-war Southern Rhodesia where the relatively advanced urban sector demanded more African labour, senior civil servants in the government in particular were envisioning “stabilised” proletarian labour, whereby “an increasing number will become permanently divorced from the land” and “find a livelihood in the European areas.” 259 As Frederick Cooper has recently pointed out, the provision of housing for urban African labour was crucial to the stabilisation of labour. 260 The conditions of Africans in the urban areas were, however, deplorable. Several official reports and commissions of inquiry published in the 1940s and 1950s on African urban conditions revealed the dire conditions under which urban African workers lived: inadequate and poor housing, discriminatory legislation, poor wages, insecure tenure and lack of social security for African urban workers, all which discouraged many urban workers from cutting their ties to the land. 261 When the NLHA was introduced, it was expected that the consequences would create a growing class who would have no rights to farming land in the “Reserves,” and who would seek alternative livelihoods in the urban areas, and that alternative means of security would be found. It was hoped that the increasing industrialisation and economic opportunity in the urban areas would provide for this, but it did not. 262

Nevertheless, confidence returned at the start of Federation. The expansion in the economy which followed the Federation of Southern Rhodesia with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953, fully justified this hope. Secondary industry was booming. An additional boost was provided by the 1955 trade agreement with Pretoria which significantly increased the degree of protection provided for local industrialists. 263 Nevertheless, discussion in Cabinet in the same year was dominated by the pros and cons of speeding up implementation of the NLHA, hence it focused much more on problems in the “reserves” than on opportunities created by secondary industry. 264 In the years up to 1958, the opportunities for employment of Africans in the urban industrial centres were in excess of the number of school leavers, and the population in the reserves was relatively stabilised. However, from 1958 the situation began to change as political uncertainties grew regarding the future of the Federation. In 1960, the number of school leavers began to exceed the number of openings for work. 265 The Rhodesian economy experienced an economic slump and many young men could not secure employment. Faced with unemployment in the towns, and the absence of adequate social security

259 Ibid.
262 Report of the Secretary for Internal Affairs for the year 1962/63, 11.
264 Todd Papers, Cabinet Minutes, 6 May 1955 cited in Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 232.
there, many young men were thrust back to the only form of security they knew – a piece of land in the ‘reserves.’” Yet, they were denied that security. 266

In these circumstances, it is no wonder that strong resentment to the Act stemmed from the younger generation who did not qualify for initial rights to land, and for whom there was no land available to enable such rights to be granted. For the African nationalist groups, according to George Nyandoro, the Secretary General of the African National Congress (ANC), the NLHA “has been the best recruiter Congress has ever had,” and the nationalists drew much of their support from young urban workers rendered landless by the Act. 267 In fact, opposition to the Act was not only confined to the landless young men, it was equally strong among rural accumulators who saw the Act as a constraint on their accumulation. These rural accumulators took over the leadership of rural opposition to the colonial administration. They joined the ANC and became some of its staunchest supporters. In Makoni district, Ranger found out that the key leaders and opponents of the colonial administration in the aftermath of the NLHA were not landless young men, but members of the chiefly family, headmen and male peasant elders over 40 years. One of Ranger’s informants told him that “… You will find these [elders] on Kraalhead dares, school Boards, church leaders, etc … You will find the over 40s have a big influence for they are usually the ones with land, house and cattle.” 268 No matter how active the young men may have been in the nationalist parties, Ranger argues that the core of peasant radical nationalism in Makoni were the resident elders, who were determined to retain their hold on large plots. Chief Wozhele together with his royal lineage were not prepared to give up the practice of overploughing because in Rhodesdale they cultivated fields of up to 40 acres which was five times the standard allocation in Sanyati. In an interview, he confessed that “people disliked the NLHA because they were used previously to a life of no control.” 269 Despite the strictures imposed by the Act, Ndaba Wozhele and his kinship group, Mudzingwa, Tiki, Vere, Sifo, Ngazimbi and Mazivanhanga clung on to their abnormally extended plots and remained some of the largest cattle owners in the area.

It can be argued that chiefly lineages and resident male elders resisted the NLHA because the Act rendered them powerless in the allocation of land since their cherished prerogative to distribute or redistribute land among their subjects had been usurped. Norma Kriger notes that “Loss of the right to allocate land so outraged chiefs in the early 1950s it looked as if they and the nationalists would forge a lasting alliance.” 270 Phimister similarly argues that

268 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 163.
269 Chief M. T. Wozhele, Personal Interview, Chief’s Court, “Old Council”/ Wozhele Business Centre, Sanyati, 17th October 2004. During this interview, the Chief was ably assisted by Headman Samson Mudzingwa and Maunganidze Nyahwa (all members of his court).
alienated and embittered by the attempts of successive settler regimes to wrest control over the dynamics of rural accumulation from their grasp, a significant number of richer peasants turned away from cooperation with government agencies to embrace nationalist politics. It was the grievances and hopes of ‘the 30 per cent better-off’ African producers that crucially shaped both opposition to the NLHA and the kind of nationalism which emerged at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.  

It appears, therefore, that African nationalism in colonial Zimbabwe in the 1950s and early 1960s exhibited tendencies towards solidarity for a common cause between landless young men, elders and local leaders and rural accumulators alike. This apparent solidarity across generational and class lines was, however, to be short-lived. When the guerrilla war intensified from the mid-1970s, there developed a significant shift in rural alliance from solidarity for a common cause to divisions clearly along generational, class and gender lines. These issues will be explored further in chapter four.

Thus, the application of the NLHA evoked one of the greatest forms of resistance from rural Sanyati, which, among other things, forced the colonial state to suspend the implementation of some of the most controversial provisions of the Act especially the new principle of individual farming and grazing rights which was in conflict with old concepts regarding the security of rural tenure; and the haste as well as the totalitarian manner in which the Act was implemented particularly during the “speed-up” period from 1956 to 1961. According to Holleman, the Act became one of the most contentious measures passed by the colonial parliament and a clear target for bitter attack and resentment by the Africans. He argues that the Act faced stiff opposition because it was “discriminatory and restrictive and agrarian and therefore became almost inevitably associated with the Land Apportionment Act (1930), one of the most hated symbols of white authoritarianism and exclusiveness to the African.”

As already noted, Holleman has revealed that many young males who were away or absent performing migrant labour for periods ranging from a few months to several years were not considered for land allocation under the NLHA. This stipulation in the Act, “though logical from the legislator’s point of view, was often misunderstood and caused hardship and widespread resentment in the African communities. The individual claims to farming rights were to be based on actual occupation (‘lawful cultivation’) at an arbitrarily appointed date line.” Such a stipulation was completely “foreign and wholly irrelevant to land rights in indigenous society, which are based on membership of the local communities, a membership not affected by a person’s temporary absence on migrant labour”. Holleman further argues that conflict became inevitable when, upon the implementation of the NLHA, “the statutory requirements of security of tenure deprived a considerable portion of the recognized rural village membership of what it had

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271 Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 239.
272 Holleman, Chief, Council and Commissioner, 56.
273 Ibid., 61.
274 Ibid., 37.
275 Ibid., 65.
always believed to be its basic right to land. Among these, many of whom were young migrant wage earners preparing for a married rural life, this sudden deprivation was likely to engender a feeling of insecurity and sense of injustice, which was not easily dispelled by arguments, however pertinent, of an economic or legalistic nature.” 276

Writings on migrant labour in Southern Africa suggest that labour migrants and their families regarded labour migrancy as a stage in a man’s life through which he hoped to accumulate wealth to invest in agriculture. In his influential work on migrant labour in Lesotho, Colin Murray has argued that “the paradigm of the successful migrant career for a man is to establish his own household and to build up a capital base, through the acquisition of land, livestock and equipment, to enable him to retire from migrant labour and to maintain an independent livelihood at home.” 277 The case of C. L. Muzondo of Mhondoro Gavunga, Gatooma, who worked for Union Wide Aid Services, Johannesburg, South Africa (SA) can be used to illustrate how the NLHA deprived migrant workers of land. After discovering that the NC Gatooma (G. A. Barlow) had sub-divided his allocation so that other people could occupy certain portions of it, out of distress, he requested his employers to approach the NC’s office on his behalf to find out the reason for this sub-division. 278 In spite of the employers’ intervention, the NC remained adamant arguing that Muzondo had purchased the piece of land in question from a person who had moved to Northern Rhodesia and that the man who had sold it to him had no right to do so. Continuing his argument, Barlow said “prior to the implementation of the Native Land Husbandry Act, the land was held by Natives in Native Reserves under communal tenure” but since the implementation of the Act “certain land previously under cultivation [had] to be excluded from arable blocks by reason of conservation hazards and for other reasons,” so it was not possible for Muzondo’s original allocation to be allowed to remain intact. 279 According to Wozhele, sometimes land belonging to urban workers was encroached upon by other land-hungry peasants and indeed more encroachments occurred if the rightful owners did not challenge these encroachments. 280 By denying land in the “Reserves” to young men who were performing migrant labour, the NLHA stifled the ambition of the young men to establish their own independent households and to invest in agriculture.

The contradiction of implementation:

The settling of “immigrants” in Sanyati revealed numerous contradictions in the manner in which the exercise was going to be implemented on the ground. It was one thing to be a local officer given the task of bringing about its practical realisation and quite another

276 Holleman, Chief, Council and Commissioner, 66.
279 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 9 Sanyati and Ngezi: 1951-1964, G. A. Barlow (NC Gatooma) to Messrs Union Wide Aid Services, Johannesburg, 14th November 1960.
280 Chief Wozhele, Personal Interview.
to be subjected to its draconian prescriptions. Concretely, the reordering of African rural life had first to accommodate the political imperative to put an end, once and for all, to relations of labour tenancy on white farmland that had persisted in spite of the intentions of the LAA. This meant finding land for the forced resettlement of Africans deemed to be “squatt ing” on land designated for African purchase or residing as labour tenants on farms managed by absentee European owners as other white farmers actually signed or entered into labour agreements designed to retain labour on the farm or mine. Among those targeted were some 2 000 families residing on the Rhodesdale Estates in the Midlands. It was the destiny of most of them to be forcibly removed to the sparsely populated, malarial and tsetse-infested lowland regions of Sanyati and Gokwe. Their movement and subsequent settlement in Sanyati engendered peculiar forms of differentiation in the sense that a good number of them possessed master farmer qualities and advanced crop and animal husbandry skills as they had been exposed to demonstrator advice earlier in the southern “reserves.” They were almost a kulak class unto themselves, although this was not the intention of the planners to create such an influential rural class.

The planning methodology used by those officials required to carry out the forced relocation exercise was not premised on a concern to reunite “tribal” subjects with their homeland but rather to balance population numbers with what they called the “carrying capacity of humans and stock” in order to optimise the productivity of the land base. In the event, however, a certain pragmatism, born of the political necessity to move persons as expeditiously as possible, overrode the positivist rationale governing the entire exercise. As it is politically important to get the Natives off Rhodesdale,” concluded a meeting of NCs and assorted agricultural officers after a discussion of stock numbers and land allocations in the Gokwe Special Native Area and Sanyati, “they must be got in with less stock.”

It must be remembered that many of the technical personnel were indeed committed to finding the magic numbers that would ideally balance population with stock and grazing land, although many farmers owned more head of cattle than others and indeed than prescribed or stipulated under the NLHA, which was a manifestation of resistance to the Act. According to Lozane, his group was already rich from Rhodesdale. Mazivanhanga, for example, was one of the first people to own a store and a “lorry-bus.” He agues that his family and that of Mazivanhanga’s were the first to use planters in Sanyati, signifying the advent of “progressive farmers.” “We [Madheruka] brought commerce to Sanyati,” Lozane says adding, with typically Madheruka arrogance:

There was no store. We were the first to own a bus [Mazivanhanga’s]. My father was the first lorry owner in Sanyati. We used to market our maize in Que Que [Kwekwe] from Rhodesdale and continued to do so in Gatooma after eviction to Sanyati. My father’s stores were used as the first grain holding centres [GMB depots] before crops could be transported to the major GMB storage facilities in Gatooma.

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282 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 126-7.
283 Headman Lozane, Personal Interview.
Grain was delivered to Kadoma by the first transport owners who included Lozane, Chida Mukoki, Mazivanhanga and Tiki Wasarirevhu who also owned a store. In addition, they sold small grains like rapoko to the surrounding mines and traditional or opaque beer brewing companies like Chibuku Breweries. Lozane estimates that about three quarters of the Rhodesdale evictees possessed master farmer certificates hence they were more progressive than the locals whom they taught “modern” methods of farming. All these people also owned exceptionally large herds of cattle. Mazivanhanga seemed to have the largest herd estimated to be between 600 and 1 000, followed by Lozane with between 500 and 700. According to Lozane, “they evaded destocking by registering some of the cattle in the names of their children, their children’s wives [daughters-in-law] and other relatives (i.e. their nephews). The rest were registered in their own names.” Large cattle owners also adopted discrete methods to defeat the aims of the NLHA such as clandestinely dipping their cattle after the official dipping exercise had been conducted. In fact, A. A. Le Roux’s discovery confirms that cattle ownership had become more unequal: “As with crops two types of cattle owners had developed by 1960. One was a small-scale owner with a subsistence herd, the other was a large-scale owner who supplied the beef market.”

In a more recent re-evaluation of the effects of the NLHA on rural communities, Ian Phimister has similarly noted that “far from the LHA checking entrepreneurial individualism, the wealth gap between these two classes of farmers [the rich and the poor] actually increased during the 1950s.” This had two major implications. Firstly, what this signified was that it was extremely difficult if not impossible to come up with the magic wand that would assist officials to achieve an equalisation of the livestock resources Sanyati peasants owned. Secondly, it reveals that rural differentiation as a process was probably beginning to astound those (including the colonial state) who often wanted to project African society as traditional and egalitarian. It is plausible to argue that, in relation to Sanyati, the homogenous backwardness, traditionalism and subsistence orientation of African peasant farmers is, therefore, a myth that should be deconstructed and disaggregated so that a new story of rural transformation is written.

Technical officials, though, were under immense pressure from central government to modify their recommendations in accordance with political imperatives driven by post-war growth: “The boom in European agriculture and especially in ranching and tobacco production” writes Ranger, “led to the great investment estates being broken up into workable farms or ranches for sale or lease to whites. The investment companies, which had for so long wanted to keep rent-paying Africans on their land, now wanted to clear them off it as rapidly as possible.”

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284 Headman Lozane, Personal Interview.
285 Ibid.
286 Ibid.
288 Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 237.
289 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 103.
The following section shows how the peculiar history and timing of Sanyati’s exposure to the development protocols emanating from various government ministries and departments responsible for both the forced removals and the subsequent development and extension programmes in the 1950s and 1960s helps to account for the emergence of differentiation.

**HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT AND FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY: IRRIGATION STILL A PIPE DREAM (1952 – 1964)**

**Development protocols: Settlement and resistance to NLHA prescriptions**:-

The period from the 1950s through to the 1960s is significant in the developmental history of this area. As final settlement was taking shape, a plethora of other state-initiated or sponsored imperatives were concurrently pursued. The pre-occupation with conservationism, the construction of roads, bridges, dams or weirs, dip tanks, rest houses for visiting officials, and the drilling of boreholes by the Irrigation Department also took centre stage. Development protocols were not formalised on the basis of negotiation with the people towards whom implementation was targeted, but these were dictated from above and resentment of state measures became inevitable.

In fact, development in Sanyati between the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s was mainly undertaken within the context of the NLHA and Federal Government policies. In this period irrigation prospects were still remote. According to Phimister,

> The ‘long’ 1950s mark a key period in the history of colonial Zimbabwe. They were a time of dramatic economic, social and political change, not least in the countryside where the state embarked on a hugely ambitious programme to recast the prevailing pattern of African agricultural practice. The rural linchpin on which everything turned was the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 …

The Federal Government invariably saw it fit to subordinate its agricultural programmes to those already spelt out by its predecessors in the NLHA. From a historical perspective, Sanyati clearly depicts a landscape which many years of state intervention have yielded. A close examination of the landscape between the modern town of Kadoma in the heartland of Zimbabwe’s commercial farming Midlands and the communal lands (formerly “reserves”) of Sanyati and Gokwe starkly reveals the sedimented layers of Zimbabwe’s colonial and post-colonial experience with land allocation, population management and development. The entire area from the mining centres of Golden Valley and Patchway, stretching northwards into Sanyati is characterised by dense forest or shrubs and lacking evidence of human habitation. At long intervals, as Worby points out, this vista is punctuated by the raw appearance of newly cleared fields and clustered huts that signal the work of African farmers resettled there under government schemes that began shortly after independence in 1980.

Before that, these lands had been set aside for future settlement of European ranchers. Since settlement, fenced-off homesteads, each

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290 Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 225.
with a carefully apportioned allotment of residential land and perhaps three or four round or rectangular huts – brick walls under asbestos roofs – are crowded among baobab and mango trees. These developments, to some extent, epitomised the level of rural differentiation that characterised Sanyati communal lands at that time. The widespread adoption of cotton, despite earlier resistance, coupled with demonstrator advice, culminated in an increase in farm output, income and the number of affluent people in society. This wrought many changes to people’s tastes. Those who had become wealthy now preferred to buy clothes from retail shops in Kadoma and meat from nearby butcheries and built brick houses under asbestos roofing. This was in sharp contrast to the period when the people of this area wore animal skins as “… it is stated that long before the Europeans came the indigenous inhabitants wore skins. These skins were obtained from wild animals which [they] hunted or trapped.”

Agricultural development and the seeds of resistance (1954-64):

Once dumped into Sanyati the Rhodesdalites together with their hosts, the “Shangwe,” began summoning all their experience to survive in an otherwise inhospitable country. State assistance for these people was at best very minimal or at worst non-existent. Intervention by the State mainly favoured the advancement of settler hegemonic interests. In the first years of settlement these people grew crops but they were constrained by distance to the market. Under the circumstances, they were compelled to market their produce through African middlemen or trader-producers. However, the procedure for one to be a trader-producer was made tedious by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). One had to formally apply to the Native Commissioner of the district in which one wished to be registered. The NC would provide the necessary application form and arrange an “educational test [interview]” for the would-be applicant. One of the most stringent conditions set by the Secretary for the GMB was that: “You are not permitted to buy, as a Trader-Producer, any maize or grain until you receive a Registration Certificate from this office.” Thus, Jaison of Karoi had to abide by these regulations in order to get a certificate and commence his trade in Sanyati. Invariably, it took long to procure this document.

By the mid-1950s Sanyati’s agricultural productivity far exceeded that of the settlement years culminating in the staging of the inaugural Agricultural Show in 1955 which was presided over by NC Staunton, better known by the locals as NC Msana. Peasant exhibition stands revealed the amount of development that had taken place in this sector

292 Some indigenous people from both Sanyati and Gokwe resisted the introduction of cotton because it was not an edible crop and it did not provide any insurance against hunger.
293 NAZ, MF 557: Mashonaland South Province: Gatooma District (Ministry of Internal Affairs), 7.
295 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 22867, Location 18.5.3R, File: Cancelled Leases: Sanyati: Ngezi, Warnings Re: Buildings, pp. Secretary, Grain Marketing Board, Causeway, Salisbury to Native Jaison (X 8546 Uringwe, Madiro Stores, Karoi, 18th January 1954.
296 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158086, Location C19.6.7F, File: DC’s File, District Information 1961-1971, Includes Programme of Events 1890 to 1961, Calendar of Events: Sanyati TTL.
over a few years. Individual Madherukas’ presentations attracted official attention. A sharp contrast could easily be drawn between the quality of their produce and that of the Shangwe, attesting to the differential crop and animal husbandry skills the two groups possessed. The Gatooma-Hartley Agricultural Show which was held on the 22nd and 23rd August 1958 further confirmed this agricultural developmental trend. At the invitation of the Gatooma-Hartley Show Society, the office of the NC Gatooma in co-operation with the Native Commission, Hartley, put on a display at this Show that advertised the splendid performance of Sanyati agriculture as well as other regions. Items on display at the show included specimens of maize, mhunga, rapoko, groundnuts and other crops grown in the Sanyati, Ngezi and Mondoro “Reserves.” These were shown together with articles of sewing, handwork, carpentry, tinware and ornaments from these areas. The display was mainly illustrative and informative. As far as the NC Gatooma was concerned: “Together with a series of photographs showing all aspects of agricultural and development work in Native Areas and Reserves these [specimens] made an attractive and interesting stand” and consequently he thought that this item merited publication in the farmers magazine called The Harvester.

At these Agricultural Shows where the adjudicators mainly judged the field crops and cattle, the presence of the broadcasting and film units helped to mark an “auspicious occasion.” According to NC Barlow, the Show was primarily an agricultural affair in which Agricultural Demonstrators played the main role and school sports were merely incidental. The LDO only attended in an advisory capacity. Agricultural Shows encouraged competition among farmers. At these Shows farmers exhibited their cattle and crops and outstanding performers became recipients of a wide range of prizes canvassed by the LDO, Ronald R. Jack. The prizes which included scotch carts, ploughs, harrows and fertilisers, among others, were donated by corporate stakeholder companies like Windmill, the Zimbabwe Farmers Co-operative (ZFC), Pfizer and Rhodia (the biggest fertiliser producing company at that time).

In addition to Agricultural Shows, “Field Days” marked an important occasion for the peasants to exhibit their knowledge and skills of farming. Field Days were hosted to show an exemplary farmer – one who had adopted agricultural methods well on his field from the demonstration plot. More importantly, after establishing demonstration plots under the close supervision of specialist advisors, these events were held in order to advertise the success of a crop (e.g. cotton) to the farming population at large in the district. For the Madheruka, Agricultural Field Days provided an opportunity to

297 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 22867, Location 18.5.3R, File: AGR 2 - Agricultural Shows (1957-1958), G. A. Barlow (NC Gatooma) to the Chief Information Officer, Causeway, Salisbury, 28th August, 1958.
298 LDOs were responsible, inter alia, for pegging dams, weirs and instructed the building of contours. As liaison officers between the DC’s office and grassroot, they designed and supervised agricultural activities. They carried out agricultural and livestock demonstration, which included supplying demonstration plot inputs e.g., seed, fertiliser, pesticides etc. On the whole, they were involved in monitoring developmental progress on the ground.
299 Tarisai E. Chikombingo, (Department of Agricultural Research and Extension/AREX Supervisor), Personal Interview, AREX Sanyati, 19th October 2004.
300 Chikombingo, Personal Interview.
acknowledge and publicise the model of “development” that these “immigrants” thought of themselves as having imported. In recognition of their social standing, Chiefs Wozhele and Neuso were invited to these Agricultural Shows and Field Days in ex-officio capacity.

Centralisation in Sanyati:-

Centralisation was introduced to deal with population pressure. In a Circular Minute No. 309 of 1952 by the Director of Native Agriculture, R. M. Davies, to all the Provincial Agriculturists (for Northern Mashonaland, Matabeleland, Midlands, Southern Mashonaland and Manicaland), it was stated that there were considerable increases in population in many already overpopulated “Reserves.” It was also noted that the arable-grazing ratio in overpopulated “Reserves” was unbalanced. It followed, therefore, that if more taxpayers were given new lands then the situation would be further aggravated. On the other hand, if additional land was cultivated (madiro) it meant that the original centralised blocks were extended and new land was cultivated which was unsuitable.  

The NC was empowered to prohibit the cultivation of any new lands in cases where all the suitable arable land had already been occupied. According to the Director “if there is not strict control then when the Native Land Husbandry Act comes to be applied to a particular Reserve a very embarrassing situation will arise. In terms of the Act every native who is cultivating land at the date of proclamation must be granted a farming right for land in that Reserve.” What was more worrying to the Administration was that, in reality, Africans were extending their cultivations outside the original demarcated lands [madiro] especially above and below the contours, on stream banks, grass strips, vleis and even into streambeds. As a result, the Director observed that “The whole value of centralisation is nullified if there is not vigilance and control.” He added, “It is the duty of Demonstrators and Land Development Officers to report any unauthorised encroachments to the Native Commissioner who can take effective action.” However, encroachments occurred but they were hidden from official view as a depleted staff of only two Demonstrators for the whole Sanyati Reserve was insufficient to ensure adequate control.

In Sanyati, centralisation which commenced in 1950 was completed in 1953 with an estimated arable area under cultivation of 4 576 (at 8 acres average per household) and an

302 Ibid.
303 Madiro was the practice of grabbing land by land-hungry peasants wherever it was available irrespective of whether it was in restricted areas e.g. grazing lots or not. In short this can be described as “freedom ploughing” i.e. ploughing anywhere one wished regardless of NLHA regulations.
estimated arable area of 20,000 acres which was not yet under cultivation. An estimated number of 572 cultivators were allocated land individually. There was no block allocation in 1953. New or abandoned lands were authorised by the ANC Gatooma and allocated by the LDO. It was noted by the ANC that 1,500 acres comprised flat land and required no protection. 700 acres required contour ridging and the balance required contour grass strips.

In the ANC Gatooma’s response to a questionnaire on the NLHA sent by the Administrative Officer, Land Husbandry Act, in the events leading to the implementation of the Act in Sanyati, it was noted that centralisation had been satisfactorily carried out by June 1954 “with minor adjustments in hand” and buffer stripping was about to be started. A census conducted in the “Reserve” in 1954 revealed that there was an estimated 850 landholders or stockowners cultivating an estimated 6,800 acres (8 acres standard right). After successfully overseeing the completion of centralisation, the ANC believed that the NLHA should be implemented within the next five years and not later. The reason he advanced for this was that “Many Natives were settled in this area [Sanyati] and the limiting factor is water. [And] with very good organization the settlement can be kept well in hand before harm is done.” At that time, there was one LDO, one Community Demonstrator and three Agricultural Demonstrators to spearhead or pioneer the implementation of the Act. According to the ANC, the Act had to be implemented with haste:

With the settlement of Native ex Rhodedale the lines [maraini] in the Sanyati Native Reserve has [sic] been well planned with the exception of a settlement along the Umnyati [sic] River which is being eliminated with the passage of time … The immigrants are of a high order of intelligence and are co-operative. They will remain co-operative if we can introduce the provisions of the Land Husbandry Act now before the introduction means drastic destocking and other unpopular measures.

Later developments as will be demonstrated below proved that this hope was presumptuous.

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306 Ibid.

307 Ibid.


309 Ibid.

310 Ibid.

311 Ibid., 2.
Visit to Sanyati “Reserve” (1956):

After his visit, it was believed by the Land Development Officer (Land Husbandry), R. R. Jack, that the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act would not be difficult in Sanyati “Reserve.” The ANC Gatooma was advised to apply for Proclamation as soon as possible so that the LDO would be able to complete his Initial Survey before going on leave in September [1956]. The use of logs for the demarcation of lands was obviously unsuitable as these were so easily moved and were also subject to termite attack. A system of earth banks was worked out to demarcate the ends and sides of holdings as well as the grass strips between each area block.

According to the NC Gatooma, G. A. Barlow, land rights were not given in Sanyati “Reserve” under the Land Husbandry Act to people who were not ploughing land in 1956 when the Act was implemented and those under the age of 21 were not eligible to apply for land rights under the Act. The seeds of future generational conflict seemed to have been sown at this stage as young land aspirants were deprived of land at a time when chiefs and their entourage (including their offspring) frequently flexed their social muscle to obtain land.

Chiefs who were loyal to the Administration obtained more land, which enhanced their wealth and ensured that their children and other relatives had access to land despite the restrictions imposed by the NLHA. When Chief Ndaba Wozhele applied for a farm in the Chenjiri Native Purchase Area (NPA), his application was accorded top priority because according to NC Barlow, “This man [was] a good chief, very co-operative with the administration and exercise[d] good control over his people.” Based on this recommendation, the Secretary for Native Affairs did not hesitate to allocate Wozhele a farm in Chenjiri Division, Gatooma District. The Secretary also endorsed the NC’s submission that the Chief’s house in the Sanyati “Reserve” and its residential plot be regarded as a Chief’s Headquarters [used for his judicial and administrative duties] rather than a personal allocation.

His “Reserve” lands were allocated at his request to two of his sons. Subsequently, the Chief decided not to take up the Chenjiri farm, but sooner than later new land was block allocated to him by the NC. According to the NC, although a lot of stumping was required, Chief Wozhele “did not mind leaving his old lands since they had been allocated to his own family.”

The case of Ndaba illustrates how

312 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 9 Sanyati and Ngezi: 1951-1964, “Visit to Sanyati Reserve: 23rd to 27th April, 1956,” R. R. Jack (Land Development Officer, Land Husbandry, Office of the Provincial Agriculturist, Causeway) to the Provincial Agriculturist, the PNC and the ANC Gatooma, 30th April, 1956, 1.

313 Ibid.


317 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 8, 1961-1964:
powerful people (i.e. the chiefly family) obtained more land and became rich rural entrepreneurs because of the additional farming and grazing rights they got.

In fact, Sanyati is one of the areas to which newcomers (Madherukas),318 frustrated by land shortages and village centralisation in the south and south east of the colony, “came in search of land” in the 1950s. The Madherukas started cultivating fields which were conspicuously of irregular shape in relatively undulating topography. To the eye of the planner, the administrator and the extension agent, Sanyati lacks what James Scott has recently called “legibility”; 319 that is, it lacks the heavy markings on the landscape normally left behind by interventions of the modern, development state. Sanyati, like many parts of northwestern Zimbabwe in which indigenous people known as “Shangwe” until recently predominated, was touched only belatedly by “development.” Yet to mistake the absence of the formal signs of a modernised agrarian regime (fenced homesteads aligned along roads, contoured, orthogonal fields) for the absence of economic expansion, transformation and rural differentiation would be a serious error of judgement, for it is Sanyati, together with Gokwe, that has, to a greater extent, driven the emergence of the region as the foremost engine of cotton production and trade in all of post-independence Zimbabwe. Up to 2000 cotton was the mainstay of the Sanyati/Gokwe economy. Sanyati was undergoing great commercial transformation. Evidence of differentiation could not be disputed as differential land holdings, access to labour and cotton inputs were some of the bases of this process. Those farmers who embraced cotton and demonstrator advice early enough became distinct classes in their communities.

As already noted, the Sanyati Communal Land, once a malarial area with a foreboding presence of baboons, monkeys, leopards, hyenas, kudus, lions and elephants was densely populated with Africans forcibly resettled between 1950 and 1953 from farms reserved for European occupation on the Midlands. 320 Settled under the nominal authority of their own headmen, these “immigrants” suffered the attention of the state at the high watermark of the NLHA and the compulsory forms of rationalised settlement and resource management that it authorised.

On the eve of the forced resettlement exercise, the 28 000 hectare Sanyati “reserve” was reported by the ANC to be “virtually uninhabited” despite the presence of a government recognised chief (Neuso). After much debate over the carrying capacity of the “reserve” in relation to the required number of people to be moved, it was decided that 356 families could be accommodated, each with an allocation of 8 acres of arable land and ten head of cattle. 321 However, due to various forms of manoeuvrings, some farmers came to own

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318 For another discussion of the immigrants or “Madheruka” from Rhodesdale see Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity” and Nyambara, “A History of Land Acquisition in Gokwe.”
320 By 1956, the 875 families settled in the Sanyati reserve had exceeded the estimated “carrying capacity” by over 30%. See Government of Southern Rhodesia, Annual Report of the Director of Native Agriculture, R. M. Davies, for the year 1956, Chart viii.
321 NAZ, S160/DG/105/2/50 Gatooma district: sub-division: Sanyati reserve: 1950-1951, LDO Monthly...
larger pieces of land and larger herds of cattle than their counterparts. Freedom ploughing which was the unilateral right peasants gave themselves to cultivate wherever they wanted was quite widespread in Madiro Village (Ward 23) headed by Morgan Gazi. The village was given this name because of the massive land-grabbing that went on in defiance of NLHA stipulations. Most reserve entrepreneurs in this area cultivated up to 15 acres. Gazi says, because he was a nephew of Chief Wozhele, he cultivated about 18 acres, 322 10 acres more than the standard allocation, illustrating how rife and uncontrollable madiro ploughing was especially among people with chiefly connections (own emphasis). Accumulation of cattle by “reserve entrepreneurs” was not allowed. A ring or grazing permit which was issued in terms of Section 9 (2) of the NLHA No. 52 of 1951 entitled people to keep a maximum of between 10 and 20 head of cattle, but some enterprising peasants like Morgan Gazi’s uncle, Phillip Gazi, declared in 1952 that he had 10 head of cattle when in actual fact he had two. Over-declaring his herd gave him the leeway to increase his cattle herd later to a maximum of 10, 323 thereby making a mockery of the NLHA’s checks and balances at the peak of destocking measures. As a dip tank officer at the time (a portfolio he held up to 1970 when he was promoted to become a dip supervisor until 1992), Morgan Gazi did not reveal this over-declaration to the white officials. Phillip Gazi, as a result, was issued with a grazing permit for the 10 head of cattle he purportedly held. Clearly, this was made possible with the connivance of his cousin who used his position to access more land and help conceal the number of newly born calves to protect other “reserve entrepreneurs” from destocking, thereby helping to blunt the state’s offensive. Differential land and livestock holdings illustrate that the state, to a large degree, had failed to eliminate social differentiation in the rural areas. The human targets of these calculations recall that they were “chased away” from their homes in Rhodesdale because whites wanted to farm there; some remember being taken “family by family,” while others say they were loaded into trucks in groups of ten to twelve families at a time.

Records from the work of the officers in charge of resettlement in Sanyati reveal a preoccupation with the practical exigencies of getting boreholes drilled and roads, dip tanks and administrative housing constructed. A certain ambiguity is preserved in the description of how some of the work was carried out, as is evident in the monthly report submitted by the Land Development Officer for January, 1951:

> Surface erosion this season has convinced the majority of natives that contour ridges are an asset and a necessity. Many constructed ridges following the first heavy downpour of rain but unfortunately they were of a temporary nature and of insufficient strength to withstand subsequent heavy rains … Kraalheads are at present organizing to repair village roads

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322 Morgan Gazi (Madiro Village head, Ward 23), Personal Interview, Agricura, Sanyati Main Growth Point, Sanyati, 15th October 2004. Madiro Village is also known as Kufa or Chomupinyi.

323 Morgan Gazi, Personal Interview.
Dipping is again in operation coupled with a count of all stock in preparation for destocking.\footnote{NAZ, S160/DG/104/1A/50, LDO Que Que to Director, Native Agriculture, 4 March 1951.}

Most of the “immigrants” interviewed for this study recalled doing “chibaro” or forced labour building roads in the months after settlement, yet this is only indirectly suggested in correspondence and reports left by government administrators. The idea that Africans had in fact been persuaded to take on conservation and development tasks willingly persisted, despite evidence that resistance was prevalent. One LDO’s report to his superior indicates the desperate effort made to convince the Rhodesdale evictees of the virtues of these measures:

At … farmers meetings an effort was made to show how, by preserving grass, we can improve the quality of our rainfall, but by burning and overgrazing the veld, we encourage hail, floods, and erratic conditions. Furthermore, how, by unbalancing nature through the ruthless destruction of indigenous life, such as birds and game, we encourage the tick and insect life which destroys our cattle and crops.\footnote{NAZ, S160/DG/104/1A/50, LDO Que Que to Director, Native Agriculture, 4 November 1950.}

Yet, he goes on to report that, in meetings with Chiefs Gambiza and Chiwundura, solutions were being sought to the problems of cattle trespassing in agricultural areas during the summer growing season, and, rather more ominously, to “people destroying conservation works, roads, etc.”\footnote{Ibid.} It should be pointed out that the environment under which conservation measures were enforced was, indeed, fraught with insurrectionist tendencies among the peasants who bore the brunt of these stipulations whose rationale they openly or surreptitiously questioned. Hence, conservationist education was not voluntarily embraced in rural Sanyati, as some colonial officials would want us to believe. As will be observed later in this chapter, resistance against the payment of exorbitant dipping fees, destocking, contouring and other unpopular conservation measures was everywhere evident.

If Sanyati residents bore the full brunt of the NLHA as victims of both the forced displacement and the forced labour that it implied they also quickly demonstrated just how unworkable the idea of creating full-time yeoman farmers in an arid “reserve” on a severely restricted land base was. Virtually every family settled in the area subsequently combined farming with a wide range of wage-work (largely by men) and informal marketing (largely by women), both locally and in towns such as Kadoma and Kwekwe.

\footnote{NAZ, S160/DG/104/1A/50, LDO Que Que to Director, Native Agriculture, 4 March 1951.\footnote{NAZ, S160/DG/104/1A/50, LDO Que Que to Director, Native Agriculture, 4 November 1950.\footnote{Ibid. N.B. The officers were, no doubt, acutely sensitive to the unpopularity of forced conservation measures and its possible political entailments. Both passive and active opposition to conservation works (e.g., contour ridging, drain strips, gully dams and grazing rotations) had by this time become starkly apparent to Native Department personnel in land-scarce eastern reserves such as Weya and Tanda. See Ranger, \textit{Peasant Consciousness}, 152-3, whose evidence strongly suggests a direct link between such resistance and the emergence of support for nationalist politics in these areas, where conservation demands, after years of centralisation and land alienation, were perceived to be nothing other than the extraction of forced labour. For a comparative Southern African overview, see W. Beinart, “Introduction: The Politics of Colonial Conservation.” \textit{Journal of Southern African Studies}, 15, 1989, 143-62.}}}
The standard of living was higher for most labour migrants because their source of revenue was constant compared to the rural areas where it was seasonal. Migrant earnings, thus, contributed to further forms of differentiation. With the arrival of the Baptist mission and its associated school and hospital in 1963, education was avidly sought as a means of obtaining employment credentials. The establishment of a state-run irrigation scheme in the late 1960s (Gowe) and of a cotton ginnery and associated “growth point” for small businesses after 1976 increased opportunities for local employment, albeit at low wages. Yet, nobody, save the very poorest (particularly widows and divorced women) who had no other choice, attempted to emulate the happy ideal of the immobile, self-sufficient farmer offered up by development rhetoric. Poverty, on the part of women in general, however, could not halt the emergence of differentiation as some of them continued to strive to improve their economic condition and became relatively better off than others.

It is clear that the future envisioned for peasants by the NLHA did not materialise in Sanyati. In accordance with NLHA provisions, existing homesteads were moved into “lines” (maraini) along the first roads constructed in 1947, three years before the first “immigrants” were settled there. The clearance and cultivation of riverbanks was forbidden (a law that was still being enforced half a century later), although this was frequently breached, while the mission school and hospital actively sought to instil and enforce ideals of health, dress and hygiene among clients of both. Education provided by the Baptist school was to differentiate Sanyati peasants in a big way. For instance, a sizeable number of Baptist mission educated Africans who became demonstrators trained at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo Agricultural Training Institutes, and those who found work outside the reserve were behind the remittances that flowed or trickled back into rural agriculture.

**Impact of immigration:**

By 1963, when the decade-long experiment with the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland ended, 113 000 people had been forcibly relocated throughout Southern Rhodesia, and immigration to Sanyati faded to a trickle of relatives of those already resettled there. Differentiation among the “immigrant” groups was thus on the basis of affiliation to a particular kinship group. This was not, however, to be the end of immigration to the adjacent district of Gokwe. Further forced relocations of people into Gokwe continued unabated even after independence in 1980. These relocations of people into Gokwe were the consequence of compulsory evictions of people from white ranches. Although there are interesting overlaps, Gokwe is outside the scope of this study.

In fact, as knowledge of a newly opened area drifted back through networks of kin to the immigrants’ district of origin, land-hungry relatives from the home “reserve” or

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327 For more detail on the effects on the dryland farmers of growing crops in a particular season (e.g. summer) see Gerard J. Gill, Seasonality and Agriculture in the Developing World: A Problem of the Poor and Powerless, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1, 44-49, 52-59, and 68-73.
workmates from town came of their own accord to request land from local Sanyati headmen. However, although Sanyati was small and not as fertile numerous applications for land were lodged with the DC via the applicants’ respective headmen or chiefs. On arrival in Sanyati master farmer “immigrants” imparted their knowledge of agriculture to the “Shangwe” they found there. These new farmers were touted as having better farming skills than the locals and this gave them a sense of difference due to their exposure to the brunt of the disciplinary programme devised by the Native Agriculture Department in the 1920s which emphasised conservation ideals more than anything else. Indeed, it is striking that some of the post-war “immigrants” to Sanyati originated in reserves in the Fort Victoria (Masvingo) region where policies of centralisation and conservation were pursued earliest and with the greatest vigour. At the core of this programme was the replication of what was perceived to be an orderly way of planning settlement (homesteads) in a linear fashion. A cattle kraal was always situated adjacent to the home. Immediately after the homesteads were arable and then grazing lands. Attempts to “centralise” rural settlement patterns according to this plan began under the direction of the former missionary, E. D. Alvord, as early as 1929 in the Selukwe “reserves” and were soon duplicated in the other “reserves” of Victoria Province (Masvingo) and much later in Sanyati.

Only ten years later, “approximately 3.6 million acres had been centralised and over 1 100 villages laid out along ‘improved lines’ by community.” Throughout the country, long before the implementation of the NLHA, many of the eventual “immigrants” to Sanyati had already been exposed to the modernising regime of the Native Department – a regime aimed at sifting out the “forward” from the “backward” “natives”; and many had already adopted new identities within the hierarchy of achievement and practice laid out by Alvord: they became “Co-operators,” then “Plotholders” and, finally, “Master Farmers.” On the whole, the “immigrants” from Rhodesdale were seen by the colonial state as more industrious than the locals. According to the LDO Gatooma’s monthly report for October 1950, “Apart from a few exceptions the old settlers [the Shangwe] in the [Sanyati] reserve … [did] very little in the way of clearing or improving their lands …” The Madherukas, the majority of whom had attained master farmer status, were clearly a cut above the rest in terms of the modernisation expectations of the state and the agricultural sophistication they embodied compared to the “Shangwe.” This in itself signified the existence of differentiation.

329 Alvord embodied both missionary and agriculturalist identities.
332 R. W. M. Johnson in his work, “African Agricultural Development in Southern Rhodesia, 1945-1960,” Food Research Institute Studies, 4, (1964), 165-223, gives the following definitions: Co-operator, any farmer who uses manure or fertiliser, carried out some rotation, and plants his crops in rows (other than broadcast crops); Plotholder, a farmer who is under tuition by a demonstrator in order to become a master farmer, and whose cropping programme is recorded; Master Farmer, a plotholder who has reached a certain minimum standard of crops and animal husbandry as laid down by the Agriculture Department.
When demonstrators were appointed to Sanyati, starting with Lazarus Sithole in 1947, they insisted on strict crop and animal husbandry methods. The farmers were instructed to apply manure regularly (i.e. 30 scotch carts per acre) and plant a five-year rotation, each year putting manure on a different field. After the fifth year, one qualified to be a recipient of a certificate. Nevertheless, obtaining a certificate (Master Farmer Certificate) required not only that one adopt techniques such as crop rotation, manuring and the building of field contours. One had to present evidence of a profound transformation of the domestic environment as well and specifically to meet a set of stringent criteria: “They would check you(r) house to see if you had a nice dining room, you had to get two rooms – a living room and dining room. ‘Nice room,’ they might say ‘but you still [had] to plant a [mango or fruit] tree’ in your yard.”

Today there is hardly a homestead in Sanyati which does not boast of its own fruit orchard of banana, lemon, orange, mango, guava, peach or paw paw.

Sanyati’s indigenous residents did not know LDOs and agricultural demonstrators before the 1960s. In contrast to the south-eastern reserves, the contour-pegging of fields was undertaken only at the end of the decade when other provisions of the NLHA had long been abandoned. For the indigenous people of Sanyati, the “immigrants” from the southeast – people whom they derogatorily named madheruka after the sound of the Thames Trader and Bedford lorries that brought them – both advocated and embodied the prescriptions and ideals of the development regime. So did the missionaries, doctors, teachers and agricultural demonstrators (madhumeni) who came in their wake. The role played by the Baptist school, hospital, demonstrators and the “immigrants” in promoting differentiation among the people cannot be underestimated. The newcomers arrived espousing not only a set of abstract principles consonant with mainstream Christian values, but also embodying the complex habits instilled in them: the routines of dress, consumption and hygiene that had been part and parcel of Alvord’s demonstration efforts in areas like Shurugwi for more than three decades. The recognition, indeed the very assertion of their difference, was evident in their disparaging characterisation of the indigenes among whom they had come to live – people whom they called “Shangwe.” The madherukas distinguished themselves from the locals in that they built their houses with bricks and often put up a “latrine” and rubbish pit to conform with the standards of hygiene and cleanliness set by their demonstrators. The opposite is believed to be true of the local “Shangwe” people. Thus, differentiation manifested itself in multifarious forms, including on the agricultural productivity front and in the type of home they possessed and the levels of hygiene they tried to maintain.

In contrast to Nembudziya and Makore wards of Gokwe, Sanyati, like Copper Queen, by virtue of having been settled by “immigrants” from Rhodesdale, Belingwe (Mberengwa), Shabani (Zvishavane), Shurugwi and other areas of Masvingo Province in the southeast,

was much more advanced. It is hardly surprising that these new comers constituted the readily identifiable target for a novel and regionally specific rural development strategy, one that was rather ironically built around the cultivation of cotton, a cash crop already famous in colonial Africa for its association with brutal state coercion and economic disaster.  

336 In Sanyati, this crop was also central to the differentiation process that emerged from the 1960s onwards. Cotton, in the early years, was not necessarily the “Mother of Poverty” but was, in fact, instrumental in enriching some peasants.

Opposition and resistance to settler government measures:

Aware that the amount of land they had allocated the Africans was insufficient to carry existing stock including upholding all the rules enshrined within the conservationist ethos and partly out of genuine fear of African competition, the settler state instituted cattle destocking measures in Sanyati in 1956. The audacity with which the NC Gatooma’s office directed destocking left a sour taste in the mouth. The culling and destocking process was ruthlessly conducted. Ownership of large herds of cattle which the Madherukas were used to was immediately threatened. This programme was executed with such notoriety by NC Barlow that it earned itself the disparaging name, “Nhimura [muswe] yava Barlow.” To ensure that everyone abided by destocking stipulations, cattle rings (“marin’i/maringi”) were introduced in 1957. However, cases where destocking regulations were flouted were as numerous as the reasons were. Cattle, among other things, symbolised wealth, so rural accumulators resisted any measures designed to reduce their herds.

Destocking was an attempt to adjust the number of cattle rural Africans held in the light of limited land resources and conservationist concerns, but regardless of how ruthlessly it was applied, it could not conceivably alleviate the land shortage. This fact was only

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337 The quality of grazing in Sanyati varies from a carrying capacity of between 16 in some parts and 20 acres per beast in others. In terms of Section 8 (2) Act 52/51 the maximum number of animal units to be grazed was fixed at 10 per holder. For more detail on the carrying capacity of the Reserve see the Technical Survey Report: Sanyati Reserve compiled by the LDO for Sanyati, A. R. Vaughan Evans in NAZ (RC) Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 9 Sanyati and Ngezi: 1951-1964, “Technical Survey Report: Sanyati Reserve,” A. R. Vaughan Evans (LDO) to the Director of Native Agriculture, Causeway, 20th July, 1954, 1-9.
338 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158086, Location C19.6.7F, File: DC’s File, District Information 1961-1971, Includes Programme of Events 1890 to 1961, Calendar of Events: Sanyati TTL.
339 *Ibid*. N.B. Since he was responsible for implementing it, in Shona literally this meant NC Barlow’s destocking. During the implementation of the culling and destocking measures peasant farmers who owned more cattle than the stipulated maximum (of ten) were required to slaughter or sell the excess animals. To ensure that farmers abided by these rules the said cattle’s tails (“miswe” in Shona) would be cut by the dip tank officers as a mark that they were excess to requirements and should be disposed of, hence “nhimura muswe” or “gura muswe.” On the next cattle dipping day if a farmer brought such cattle for dipping then the dip officer was entitled to take legal action against the farmer for refusal to comply with destocking regulations. However, rural accumulators often succeeded to hide the excess animals by either dipping them after the official dipping exercise or registering them in the names of their relatives.
realised in 1959 when it was decided to embark on another chapter of land allocation. This revision of land allocation, though, was a belated call to correct an anomaly dating back to 1950 when the Rhodesdale evictees were settled in Sanyati. It was rather unpragmatic for the settler government to fail to anticipate an obvious human and animal population explosion by the late 1950s.

After 1960, probably as a reaction to the peasants’ massive investment drive in cattle, the LDO, J. E. Gamble, noted the importance of building additional cattle sale pens. The first cattle sales centre in the Sanyati “Reserve” with a weigh bridge had been established by Finnis shortly after March 1952. Some enterprising peasants took advantage of the sale pens to market their beasts although these were sold at very low prices. In the main, however, it appears, these sale pens were introduced to help Africans dispose of their “excess” cattle quickly. Thus, this was to complement destocking measures in an enormous way. At one of the cattle sales which commenced at 9.30AM on Monday 1st September, 1958 at the Sanyati Reserve Sale Pens, entries of about 230 head were anticipated. At all these sales the prescribed method of sale was “open auction without floor price” and any person was entitled to buy although it was white ranch owners, butchery owners and middlemen of long standing who could afford to buy many beasts sold at almost “give away” price. Writing to G. A. Barlow (the NC Gatooma), the ANC Gatooma, R. C. Plowden, testified in 1961 that a very common complaint by peasant farmers in Sanyati “Reserve” was: “The Government had done a lot to better the wages and working conditions of those engaged in employment in towns but that the prices of crops and cattle had not been raised sufficiently to compensate the Reserve farmer for his efforts.” Even the NC Gatooma concurred that the low prices of cattle and crops were generally deplorable when he said: “A general complaint … is that prices for cattle and crops have not risen proportionately to the increases in pay that labour in towns has received.” Prior to sale, cattle were graded and weighed as a guide to buyers and sellers. The NC for Gatooma, Barlow, required that: “Purchase must be for cash and a levy of 17½% of the purchase price is payable by the purchaser to the Native Development Fund [NDF]. This levy is additional to the purchase price.” To realise better returns on their investments, reserve entrepreneurs often evaded official marketing

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343 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 22867, Location 18.5.3R, File: Minutes of Farmers Meetings, G. A. Barlow (NC Gatooma) to the Secretary, Gatooma Farmers’ and Stockowners’ Association, Gatooma, 27th August 1958.
344 Ibid.
347 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 22867, Location 18.5.3R, File: Minutes of Farmers Meetings, G. A. Barlow (NC Gatooma) to the Secretary, Gatooma Farmers’ and Stockowners’ Association, Gatooma, 27th August 1958.
channels as they indulged in side marketing their beasts to the highest bidder. They side marketed grain as well. With regard to disposal of grain, considerably more rapoko was disposed of to “natives” at the mines than to authorised traders since it appears that they obtained a better price through this method. The amount disposed of in this way is impossible to assess except for the estimated total sales and income through legitimate channels and others for the 1952 harvest which have been given as 8 250 bags of maize fetching a total of £2 400; 123 bags of rapoko (£3 200) and 241 bags of groundnuts which fetched £2 900.

All cattle sales in the colony’s rural areas were conducted in terms of the Native Cattle Marketing Act No. 23/47. A seller was issued with a permit to sell cattle before entering into an agreement of sale. Such permits were issued under Section 6 of the Act. One permit given in 1949 to a certain Mary of Mudzingwa village read: “Permission is hereby granted to Mary of Mudzingwa, Gatooma District, to sell, otherwise than at a Native Department Sale, the following number and class of cattle: Cows 0, Bulls 0, Oxen 0, and Young Stock 1.” The validity of the permits usually ranged from 7 to 30 days. Buyers other than “natives,” were required by law to endorse on the permit the number of cattle bought and the endorsement was supposed to be signed and dated by the buyer. The permits were used for purposes of supervising and monitoring destocking measures, but stock owners often found a way round the Cattle Marketing Act which, in the first instance, was not designed to benefit them.

**Contours, dipping fees and peasant discontent:**

Lack of adequate land, the forced adjustment to the contour regime, the increase in dipping fees (tax) and destocking measures fomented a lot of discontent in the rural areas. The NC Gatooma complained that in the month of March 1961, he had been inundated with applications by “natives” of other districts for permission to move to Sanyati Reserve arguing that: “Allocation in Sanyati was completed last year [1960] apart from some 1 600 acres which was block allocated and where individual allocation will be done this year [1961].” He proceeded to say: “The possibility of allocating extra people on consolidated holdings in the ‘Jesi’ area is being investigated by Technical Block, but this is very much ‘in the air’ and to all intents and purposes there is no more land available in Sanyati … While it is difficult to refuse these applications and while I cannot quote any authority for my right to do so, nevertheless I am doubtful of the wisdom of allowing

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349 Ibid., 2.

350 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 22867, Location 18.5.3R, File: AGR 2 – Agricultural Shows (1957-1958), “Permit to sell cattle,” NC Gatooma, 07/04/49.

351 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 9 Sanyati and Ngezi: 1951-1964, G. A. Barlow (NC Gatooma) to the PNC, Mashonaland West, Causeway, 24 March, 1961.
them in, since they will merely increase the number of landless people in the reserve and probably be a source of trouble in the future."  

Due to land shortage, many people were ploughing in the grazing areas in spite of the threat of prosecution. For encroaching onto the grazing lot, offenders were charged under Section 42 of the African Affairs Act which empowered law-enforcement agents to prosecute them for disobeying the orders of the Chiefs and Headmen against this illegal practice. The law, nevertheless, proved quite cumbersome to enforce since some “Kraalheads” themselves were also ploughing in the grazing area. Complaints that “the grazing area is being completely taken up and that the cattle are dying of starvation” were frequently heard. As already noted, land shortage seemed to be compounded by the demand to erect contours for conservation purposes.

After the Planning Team from the Department of Native Agriculture’s visit to Sanyati Reserve between the 8th and 11th of June 1954, a strategy for the agricultural development of the area was adopted. One of its main focus was soil conservation. The Acting Assistant Director of Native Agriculture, T. G. Murton, accompanied the Animal Husbandry Officer and the LDO, Vaughan-Evans, on this tour of the Reserve, at the conclusion of which a discussion was held with the ANC, O’Conner. During the visit, it was generally observed that a grass cover in the grazing area should be maintained and that the concentration of cattle in certain parts was leading to the commencement of serious erosion. It was further observed that:

In the arable areas, a system of grass buffer stripping on grade should be commenced without delay. These buffer strips should be 4 vertical feet or a maximum of 70 yards apart. The drainage channels should be properly demarcated with banks, and roadstrips similarly so (a stone beacon could be used for road strips). The arable land should be individually allocated, on the lines of the Land Husbandry Act. Later when grass is established on the drainage channels, contours could be constructed, preferably by the landowners themselves, paid for from the Native Development Fund. The construction of stone terraces or banks at the approaches and vicinity of dips should [also] be done within the next year or two.

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352 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 9 Sanyati and Ngezi: 1951-1964, G. A. Barlow (NC Gatooma) to the PNC, Mashonaland West, Causeway, 24th March, 1961.
354 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 9 Sanyati and Ngezi: 1951-1964, V.O. Meredith (District Officer, Gatooma) to DC Gatooma, 5th November 1964.
355 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 9 Sanyati and Ngezi: 1951-1964, T. G. Murton, Acting Assistant Director of Native Agriculture (Native Agriculture Department, Causeway) to the Director Native Agriculture; the PNC (Northern Mashonaland); the Provincial Agriculturist (Northern Mashonaland); the ANC Gatooma and to the Land Development Officer (Sanyati Reserve), 20th July, 1954, 2.
356 Ibid.
Following a discussion of the above general observations with the LDO, the information necessary for the Technical Survey was also considered. Using this information, it was agreed that the priority development work which the LDO should carry out during 1955 should, among other things, include agricultural extension and soil conservation work. Extension work through demonstrations was to be provided by the LDO, Demonstrators and Supernumeraries or Extension Assistants (when available) emphasising early planting, compost making, stocking and winter ploughing, the greater use of “munga” (a good variety to be obtained from Makoholi and distributed free), Tseta Kaffir Corn and Radar as well as the tackling of mixed cropping and ensure its complete disappearance especially after individual allocation. Compost making, the rotating of crops and other such measures constituted what were described as improved methods of agriculture. Each agricultural demonstrator was ordered to commence buffer stripping on grade and drainage channel demarcation with the help of the Soil Conservation Officer. A stopgap measure was put in place to counteract any possible resistance against buffer stripping, that is:

Where the landowners refuse to co-operate in the marking of these buffer strips with their ploughs, it should be done with the Soil Conservation oxen or the tractor. The Soil Conservation tractor with the disc terracer should demarcate the drainage channels etc (sic), and gangs should finish there off. Permanent rangers should be appointed to see that buffer strips are not ploughed in the ploughing season.

Based on these general observations and preliminary findings, the LDO for Sanyati, Vaughan-Evans, proceeded to submit to the Director of Native Agriculture an “excellent” Technical Survey Report on Sanyati agriculture, for example, its arable and stock position as well as its conservationist thrust. As the Reserve lacks any distinct topographical features it was considered preferable to divide it and this Survey into zones on a vegetation and soil basis and as a result five fairly distinct zones (See Mozaics – Appendix III) can be differentiated. These are namely:

1. The Mopane Zone, covering an estimated 47 000 acres with very sparse grass cover, yellow mopane type of soils and the arable land just like the other four zones is in centralised blocks and under regular cultivation;

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357 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 9 Sanyati and Ngezi: 1951-1964, T. G. Murton (Acting Assistant Director of Native Agriculture) to the Director Native Agriculture et al, 20th July, 1954, 2.
358 Ibid., 3.
360 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158077, Location C19.2.10R, File: LAN 1-7: 1951-1964, the Administrative Officer Native Land Husbandary Act, Causeway, Salisbury to the ANC Gatooma, 30 June 1956. N.B. Serial Mosaic is the term applied to the technique of serial mapping by which photographs taken from the air (aerial photographs) are fitted together like a jig-saw puzzle; a technique used since World War 2 in the service of town-planning. Source: Alexander H. Irvine (ed.), Collins English Dictionary, (London: William Collins Sons and Company Limited, 1956), 656.
Jesi Bush Zone is very dense thicket of approximately 15 000 acres in size, situated in the central part of the reserve on white sandy soils and its stocking situation is rather ‘on the heavy side’; 3. Renje Vlei Zone which is approximately 12 000 acres big is a flat depression in the central portion of the Renje River and is merely a grazing area; 4. The Msasa, Mfuti [Mufuti], Acacia Zone is about 15 000 acres in size, situated on white sandy and grey silty loam soils in the central portion of the reserve east of the Renje Vlei and appears to provide the best grazing in the reserve; 5. Last but not least the Banks of the Umniati River is a narrow strip zone of alluvial soils occurring along the river, extending to approximately 10 000 acres and often realises good yields. 361

The five major zones are said to be relatively flat and, as such, the reserve was hardly affected by serious erosion requiring the building of contour ridges in the arable lands. However, this argument has been proved to be merely academic as most of the field informants testify to being compelled to erect contours and maintain them in good condition - a very laborious and onerous task indeed.

An advertisement often flighted by the Natural Resources Board (NRB) of Southern Rhodesia suggests that everywhere contours were encouraged: “Contour Ridges slow down the flow of water in our fields. They conserve the soil. They cost money to build but they save more. Keep them in good repair.” 362 In a written message, Dokotela Moyo, Vice President of the Southern Rhodesia African Farmers Union, said “African farmers could show other Africans that farming is the best science in this world” as “it is giving and will continue to give to the starving world,” adding that “it was the duty of all farmers to fight erosion and put right what has been spoilt by rains in the form of soil erosion and other agents of nature.” 363 He was probably being cautious and diplomatic enough to avoid direct mention of contours which had become a sensitive subject. In fact, all the people in the allocated area were warned regarding the completion of beacons and interrupted contours for which individual orders had already been given in terms of the Land Husbandry Regulations. Conscientising the people on the evils of erosion was prioritised because the problem of erosion was of special concern to Government, as it threatened the future of the Agricultural Industry and the National Economy. Recent statistical estimates show soil loss rates in Zimbabwe to be of the order of 50 to 80 tonnes per hectare per year from arable lands. It has been argued that at this rate of soil loss, extensive areas of the Communal Lands will not be able to sustain even subsistence yields in three decades from now. 364 Because contours entailed a lot of labour and were time consuming, resistance to contouring was unavoidable. Many villagers, including Joke Munyaka Wozhele and some of Neuso’s people, refused to comply with the order to

363 “A Prosperous New Year To Farmers,” The Bantu Mirror, Bulawayo, 20(43), Saturday, January 7, 1956, 1.
build contour ridges.  

365 Joke declared: “if these things are necessary somebody else must do them not me.”  

366 Neuso’s uncle challenged the NC to take him to his (NC’s) farm and see if he was also digging these contours he was forcing them to build. He bluntly told the District Officer, Meredith, that “You can take your gun and shoot me if you want … but I am not going to dig a single contour come hell come sunshine.”  

367 Similarly, in Ngezi-Mondoro Reserve, as admitted in confidential correspondence between NC Barlow and the PNC Mashonaland West, “a general order for the construction of interrupted contours on lands allocated last year [1960] was given on 25th January [1961], to be carried out by 1st May [1961]. To date, no effort whatever has been made to construct these and at the Assistant Native Commissioner’s [R. C. Plowden] meeting several speakers intimated that they had no intention of doing so.”

Resistance against contours coincided with the countrywide opposition to the proposed increase in dip fees. A report compiled by the ANC, Plowden, on meetings he held in the Reserves (Sanyati and Ngezi) to explain the increase revealed the insurrectionist mood that had gripped most rural constituencies. Sanyati is said to have received the imposition of dipping fees with a lot of calm. According to a report by Plowden:

In Sanyati the bad news was accepted philosophically and the only reaction was a request that collections be postponed to allow the people time to sell their crops. In view of the extremely bad season these people have suffered, this request has been accepted and the dip fee collections have been arranged to commence on 12th June [1961].

He revealed that a similar postponement had been arranged for Ngezi-Mondoro where collections were set to commence on 19th June 1961. However, deferring payment to a later date was not a solution. For Sanyati, the fact was that this was a calm before a storm, as nowhere in the country were such measures that had the effect of impoverishing Africans received without opposition. Resistance virtually assumed nationalistic proportions, as NC Barlow himself testified in respect to Ngezi-Mondoro:

In this Reserve … widespread dissatisfaction over the increase in fees has been expressed and I believe that there may be trouble when the time comes for the collection. People at Zimindo Dip have openly informed the Field Assistant that they will not pay the fee of 2/6 [2s.6d.] and that they will come to the collections with 2/- per beast only.

Barlow went further to state:

365 Joke Munyaka Wozhele, Personal Interview.
366 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
370 Ibid.
The main speaker at one meeting, Kraal head Makwawarara, is a kraal head in an area [in the north-west portion of the Reserve, adjoining the Mondoro Reserve of Hartley district] where considerable difficulty was experienced last year [1960] when land allocations were carried out. I understand from Mr. Plowden that his attack on the Government was vociferously applauded by the meeting.\(^{371}\)

This speaker had a large following in the area which he used to spread the gospel of resistance. Partly as a result of his influence in Headman Chizinga’s area, marked opposition was also voiced at the receipt of the two Land Husbandry Orders (increased dip charges and contours). Speakers maintained that more time should have been given to complete the interrupted contours and when asked suggested three years. Other speakers intimated that they wanted the order cancelled as they had no intention of completing these contours. Some of Neuso’s followers demonstrated their disenchantedment with contours and the increase in dipping fees when they filled up dip tanks with logs and burnt down demonstration schools, for example, Sirambe Farmer Training School and Katsime (Katsimi) Farmer Training School in Neuso and Wozhele’s areas respectively.\(^{372}\)

In the light of African opposition, the NC (Barlow) was hesitant to impose penalties on offenders for fear of aggravating the situation: “It is realized that the Act [NLHA] lays down penalties, but it will be difficult to enforce such orders in the face of a mass refusal.”\(^{375}\) He emphasised the volatility of the situation when he stated to the Provincial Native Commissioner, Mashonaland West: “I do not wish to be alarmist in this matter,


\(^{372}\) Andrew Kachinga, (Gambiza Village Head), Personal Interview, Chief Neuso’s Court, Nyimo Business Centre, Sanyati, 19th October 2004. Also Ephraim Parayangiwa, (Parayangiwa Village Head), Personal Interview, Kasirisiri turn off, Chief Neuso’s Court, Nyimo Business Centre, Sanyati, 19th October 2004.


\(^{374}\) Ibid., 2.

but do think there is a possibility of trouble over these dip fee collections. I would be grateful for advice as to the action to be taken if people do as they threaten, only produce 2/- per head. Should it be refused or should it be accepted as a payment on account?”

Not only dipping fees but also tax collections were detested. Tax evasion was a chargeable offence. Accused persons were charged for contravening Section 4 (2) read with Section 7 (1) of the Native Tax Act (Cap. 78) as amended. In 1960, P. F. Parsons, the Acting ANC Gatooma, wrote to the Registrar of the High Court; “it is not uncommon for natives [recalcitrants] to be charged with failing to pay ten or more years tax …”. He proceeded to say: “Offences against the Native Tax Act, are on the increase, and because of the difficulties of keeping track of defaulters, it is easy for a native to evade payment of tax if he so desires. It is felt that some sterner action must be taken in order to put down the offence so far as is possible.”

In juridical matters, Chief Wozhele and Neuso reported directly to the NC Gatooma. In fact, some tax collecting points were set up in both Sanyati and Ngezi Reserves. At such gatherings (tax collection meetings), it was not uncommon to find people who told the Chiefs, Headmen and Kraal Heads that they were not going to pay. However, they were compelled to do so through tax patrols mounted by the Police. Patrols were employed to check any “blatant disregard of the tax laws of the country,” but they did not mark the end of resistance.

**Opposition to conservation and peasant agency:**

In Southern Rhodesia’s interventions in rural agriculture, it is important to note that, in the two decades between the 1950s and 1960s, conservationism loomed large. The almost ubiquitous pre-occupation with soil conservation and the conservation of other natural resources have been seen as central to agricultural development. Government reports


378 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 99233, Location 14.18.9R, File: JUD 9 Review and Appeal JUD. High Court; JUD 9 to 23 (1957 to 1964),” Jud 9/1/60, Office of the NC Gatooma.”

379 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 99233, Location 14.18.9R, File: JUD 9 Review and Appeal JUD. High Court; JUD 9 to 23 (1957 to 1964),” Jud 18, Judicial – General Correspondence.”


on colonial Zimbabwe were intended to suggest conservation’s broader appeal than opposition to it. These, however, contradict reality, not least of all because of their resolutely official perspective and disregard for popular African opposition to state agricultural improvement in Sanyati.

Opposition to nearly all governmental action was synonymous with opposition to the rather unsympathetic bureaucratic state machinery and its authoritarian conservationist prescription, the NLHA. As amply demonstrated by the pundits of the Act, the number and quality of state functionaries on the ground was a crucial determinant of success. The Native Department was grossly understaffed and its efforts at rural agricultural improvement token. Agricultural improvement could not be achieved by imposing settler conservationist ideology on African subjects. A lot of persuasion and a great deal of transparency in implementation on the part of state officials coupled with an exercise to consult widely with their conservationist targets (Africans) would have carried the day for them. Shunning the latter meant that the NLHA was going to be implemented in Sanyati under the most unfavourable circumstances which militated against success.

Mamdani can be used to affirm the acute vulnerability of tribal subjects under communal tenure not only to illustrate summary dispossession but also draconian direct interventions to dictate land use. Conservation or the NLHA can be used to underpin the racially motivated social-engineering which was uninformed by any real understanding of or even interest in the African agricultural experience. The Act was ultimately deployed as a class weapon by Chiefs and other reserve entrepreneurs to resuscitate their fledgling economic fortunes, and wage a war against it.


The battle against destocking, for instance, dates back to the Rhodesdale days when some
320 squatters who owned 20 head of cattle or more protested against forced destocking
and other colonial injustices. In 1950, the ANC Que Que summoned these cattle owners
to his office and warned: “Some of you have 100 head … We cannot allow you to
continue destroying the grazing, and the land itself and the water supplies … By the end
of next year [1951] you must all have reduced your stock to 10 head … Sooner or later
you must leave Rhodesdale … I do not think you will be permitted to take large
heads.” These livestock owners, led by John Jack and his sons who owned a large herd
and over 500 acres of land, asked many incisive questions about destocking i.e.

1. Do the European owned cattle not cause as much damage? Why force
only the natives to destock? Have our cattle got two mouths? 2. Is
Rhodesdale a new thing that we cannot claim it as home? Were not most
of us here present actually born there? 3. Is Rhodesdale not overstocked
because farms have been sold to Europeans and we have been forced
altogether into one corner of it? 4. We are told we will some day be
moved. Why should we destock when we are to be moved? 5. How can I
feed my children without cattle? What shall I do when famine comes?
Why does the Government change policy so often? 8. During the war
[World War 2] we were told, “After the war you will all live in freedom.”
We were told “Help us to buy aeroplanes and after the war you will all be
free.” We helped. Now see what happens to us. Is this freedom? 9. Why
do you reduce us to ten head of cattle when we see Europeans who live
next to us with 1 000 head of cattle?

These questions duly demonstrate the hardly controversial proposition that indigenous
agency was one of the most effective ways of challenging a hamfisted political
machinery to abandon irrational economic practice. In fact, in the face of worsening
resistance to destocking, the NC Gwelo ordered the ANC Que Que to stop using what he
termed “shock tactics or giving out discriminatory orders.”

It was not surprising,
therefore, that by 1951, some of the officials in the Native Department denounced
destocking measures as “not only vague but that they should be suspended until a clear
and proper policy on the issue was formulated.”

A prevailing view is that African states “capture” small-scale farmers, exploiting them
and rendering them politically marginal and powerless to make an impact on
governments and the policy process.

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383 NAZ, LS104/1/50 ANC Que Que to NC Gwelo, 7 June 1950 cited in Nyambara, “A History of Land
Acquisition in Gokwe,” 64-65. See also Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 121-122.
384 NAZ, S1018/13A, ANC Que Que to NC Gwelo, 7 June 1950 cited in Nyambara, “A History of Land
Acquisition in Gokwe,” 65 and in Bhebe, B. Burombo, 87.
385 NAZ, S160/LS100/3A (106/1/50) Movement of Natives, NC Gwelo to ANC Que Que, 9 June, 1950
cited in Bhebe, B. Burombo, 87.
386 Bhebe, B. Burombo, 87.
387 Cited in Burgess, Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe, 1. The term “capture” is derived from
smallholders are inevitably powerless and perpetually vulnerable to exploitation by presenting the case of Zimbabwe where smallholders have acted effectively and have developed the political and economic voice necessary to influence the state and the policy process. Smallholder influence played a significant role in the agricultural and social transformation of Zimbabwe’s rural areas. In the literature on states, agricultural policy and smallholders in Africa, a debate has been waged between those who believe that governments can be reformed to play a more positive role in agriculture and those who think that agricultural institutions need to be privatised and market forces emphasised. 

Thus, in this debate, insufficient attention has been devoted to the issue of how farmers might think, speak and act in the process of shaping governments and their agricultural policies. Instead, farmers are referred to as victims – vulnerable and politically anaemic. The received wisdom that smallholders are incapable of counteracting the harmful agricultural policies of African governments has been articulated since the 1970s.

It is important to note the non-validity of the assumption that small farmers are inevitably disorganised and incapable of influencing governments. Indeed, in Sanyati, issues raised by farmers were responsible for defining policy and differentiation developed much more rapidly than previously anticipated despite the proscribing effects of the NLHA. As Ian Phimister has pointed out, interpretations of African agriculture are polarised between scholars who see peasant cultivators as “collapsing beneath accumulated weight of discriminatory practices, or surviving as a significant economic force well into the 1950s.” Such views, according to Phimister, obscure the large differences in experience between regions. By specifying processes of rural differentiation, it is possible to reconcile evidence of immiseration with signs of poverty. Hence, while some studies are concerned with examining the mechanisms by which peasants were exploited, others have moved beyond this to emphasise peasant agency by showing how peasants, through various forms of resistance, often frustrated settler efforts to introduce and institutionalise conservation measures such as contours and destocking among rural communities. As a social and economic class, peasant farmers remained intact. These circumstances reflect that Africans knew something about their

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389 Burgess, Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe, 1. For a Malaysian (Southeast Asian) comparative study on the almost permanent conspiracy of those regarded by society as “the weak” (the peasantry) against “the strong” (the rich, who often craft the legal codes governing the ownership, use and disposal of land and other resources) see James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 1-389.

390 Ibid., 2.

391 Ibid., 177


environments and that such knowledge ought to inform the design of conservation and development schemes on the part of colonial officials and that European science should build on local knowledge. 394

Contrary to arguments that denigrate peasant agency, it can be noted that resistance to the NLHA was quite rife among the “immigrants,” the majority of whom comprised the rural elites. Convinced that “good farming methods were almost impossible to enforce with lasting results under a communal system … [and that] there was great danger of further soil deterioration throughout the Reserves unless the system of land tenure was rapidly changed,” the Southern Rhodesian state decided to speed up the Act’s implementation. 395 A Five Year Plan was drawn up, which envisaged the transformation of about 30 million acres of “Native Reserves” by 1961. Nevertheless, this greatly accelerated programme, which turned on determining who had, and who did not have, access to land, cattle and an array of other resources in the “reserves,” meant that African opposition could hardly be prevented.

This opposition, in turn, fuelled the expansion of mass nationalism in the second half of the 1950s. “Any act whose effects undermine the security of our small land rights,” declared the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC) in 1958, “dispossess us of our little wealth in the form of cattle, disperse us from our ancestral homes in the reserves and reduce us to the status of vagabonds and as a source of cheap labour for the farmers, miners and industrialists - such an Act will turn the African people against society to the detriment of the peace and progress of this country.” 396 The NLHA, remarked George Nyandoro, was the best recruiter Congress ever had.” 397 According to Phimister, by 1961, rural resistance had escalated to an extent where it was assuming the dimensions of “a major revolt against the Act.” 398 Illustrating the volatility of the situation throughout the country as a result of opposition to the Act, Ngwabi Bhebe quotes Nyandoro as saying: “In October-November we [the ANC] received at our newspaper office reports from all over the country – Belingwe [Mberengwa], Enkeldoorn [Chivhu], Matobo, Sinoa [Chinhoyi], Umtali [Mutare] – of school buildings, teachers, houses, cattle-dipping tanks, beer-garden shelters being burnt down or destroyed.” 399 Land allocation maps were torn up by angry villagers, and Land Development Officers and their assistants assaulted. “Resistance got to the point where DCs [District Commissioners] could no longer hold meetings and the administration was grinding to a halt.” 400 In early 1962, implementation of the NLHA was suspended. Various writers

394 For a more detailed argument on this see Arenberg, “Upgrading Peasant Agriculture,” 63-69.
395 Garfield Todd Papers, Cabinet Minutes, 6 May 1955 cited in Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 227.
398 Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves,” 228.
have emphasised the poor planning and arrogant implementation which characterised the Act. 401 “Planning was by no means thorough,” concluded Bulman:

The greater error was in assessing the speed at which it was possible to implement the different stages, in 27 million acres of widely diverse Native Reserves, among two million people. By 1958 only 7 million acres were completed instead of 14 million. This was partly due to changes in the programme, unforeseen circumstances (for example, the need for recentralisation in some areas), new techniques (e.g. stereoscopic photography, unit planning), and staff shortages (photographers, surveyors, and agricultural officers) and bottle-necks in the supply of machinery. The NAD [Native Affairs Department] had, quite simply, undertaken more than they had realized. 402

**Events leading to the abandonment of the NLHA in 1962**:

Several official attempts were made to save the Act from imminent demise. The NC of Belingwe (Mberengwa), Hayes, in his speech addressing the Belingwe Branch of the African Teachers’ Association at Masvingo Mission on 21\(^{st}\) July, 1956 outlined the objectives and implications of the LHA: “Africans,” he said, “have been clamouring for such things as land rights, security of tenure and title deeds for many years. The Government has in the Land Husbandry Act evolved a partial solution to the problem as can be seen from the way it is being implemented in the target areas at the moment.” 403 He went on to say that the Act aimed at developing the Reserves economically and stressed the point that farming was not the only means of gaining a livelihood as there were many other avenues both in the rural and urban areas [probably encouraging labour migrancy]. 404 Explaining the meanings of certain technical terms found in the LHA, Hayes seemed to be at pains to come up with clear definitions of farming rights, grazing rights and the holding capacity of a grazing area.

After Hayes’ speech which was described as enlightening by his colleagues in the colonial government, many of the people present at the meeting fired a barrage of questions at him. Answering a question about who had the right of farming in the reserves, he said that all Africans had the right with the exception of minors and unmarried women. 405 Clarifying his reply, he said that all non-indigenous Africans [probably referring to labour migrants from Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique] had no right whatsoever to hold land in the reserves; the same applied to all indigenous Africans

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who were minors or had lost their farming rights or grazing rights for one reason or another. A teacher asked if members of his profession and other workers could hold land. The NC Belingwe (Hayes) replied that they could in their own home areas provided they complied with the demands of the Act.  

Clearly, the NLHA was applied with a great deal of haste. The 5-year plan to apply the Land Husbandry on the 40 million acres in all the African reserves, which was announced by the Minister of Native Affairs, P. B. Fletcher, in July 1955, was said to be in full swing. A progress report released by the Agricultural Department on Wednesday (14th November, 1956) for the 3 months ending September 30 showed that the work was ahead of schedule. For example, the acreage planned to be surveyed and allocated in 1956 was 2 702 000 acres, but on the 30th of September 2 882 166 acres, which exceeded the 1956 target, had already been done. Conservation planning, including the demarcation and centralisation of lands, was reported to be completed on 2 291 217 acres, which was 84% of the 1956 target, and allocation of rights completed on 768 767 acres, which was 28% of the 1956 target area.

The report admitted that there was a general shortage of African Agricultural Demonstration staff. The shortage, it was argued, was, fortunately, not being felt in some areas where the Act was being implemented because the areas were small (e.g. Sanyati), but, it was observed that, unless the output of demonstrators was stepped up considerably, there would be difficulty in carrying out follow-up work, as large areas would be completed next year (1957) and in subsequent years. Fletcher announced the following plan to deal with the shortage of African staff: “We will have to make more use of Supernumerary Demonstrators to make up for this shortage. Pegger staff is up to strength in all provinces except Matebeleland [sic] and in that province arrangements are in hand for training the additional 31 peggers required.”

One of the factors that heightened opposition to the NLHA was that rural farmers needed to be given authority to graze their cattle. Grazing stock without permission was a punishable offence. Chief Sigombe Mathema of Wenlock, Gwanda Reserve, and his right hand man, Headman Masole Nkala, for example, were among the 11 people who were arrested at Wenlock on Tuesday (9th January, 1962) for grazing stock without permits. The Central African Daily News Correspondent in Gwanda reported: “it appears there were also other people who had been arrested in Wenlock in connection with such offences as failure to dip their cattle and refusing to destock their cattle,” adding that, “… what is upsetting the people very much is the presence of police jeeps in the area shortly after the ‘troops had been around before Christmas, terrorising the people.’ ”

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407 “Husbandry Act Being Implemented Faster Than Expected,” The Bantu Mirror, Bulawayo, 21(36), Saturday, November 17, 1956, 1.
408 “Husbandry Act Being Implemented Faster Than Expected,” 1.
409 Ibid.
410 Ibid.
412 Ibid.
According to the *Daily News* Political Correspondent “Ukuru,” the United Federal Party Paper for Africans, had forecast the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act (which became the NLHA after several amendments) in its entirety in 1962. The paper also predicted the abolition of the Native Affairs Department.  

“Ukuru” projected that the year 1962 would be remembered in history as the year in which “true freedom” would be achieved in Southern Rhodesia, because, by the end of 1962, there will not be a trace of racial discrimination left on Southern Rhodesian Statute Books.” The paper told Africans that “The big news of 1962 will be the complete repeal of the Land Apportionment Act. This means that you, if you can afford it, will be able to buy land and live wherever you like in Southern Rhodesia, even in the big towns like Salisbury and Bulawayo.” Predicting the abolition of the Native Department it said: “It is certain that the Native Department will be abolished completely, following the recommendations of the Robinson Commission; and that its place will be taken by an administrative Department that will deal equally with the problem of all races.”

Two important scenarios emerge from this. On the one hand, the paper’s prediction was quite apt as the NLHA was eventually not only suspended but abandoned in 1962. On the other, the forecast that a new department bent on achieving parity between the races would replace the Native Department was to prove a misplaced and pretentious hope as the UDI era killed all this optimism. Incidentally, the UDI Government of Ian Smith and its State Departments became even more authoritarian and racist than “Ukuru” had ever imagined.

Convicting Africans for settling on Crown Land made the situation worse as far as the survival of the NLHA was concerned. For example, 75 men and women were reported to have appeared in the Gutu magistrate’s court to answer charges under the Land Apportionment Act. A Correspondent of *The Daily News* in the area said that the accused were charged under Section 8 (2) of the Act and that Advocate Herbert Chitepo (Zimbabwe’s first black lawyer) of Salisbury (Harare) conducted the defence. Of these, 52 (50 men and 2 women) were formally charged for contravening the Act. According to the Correspondent, although these people pleaded guilty to the charges levelled against them, they, however, maintained that they had settled on the Crown land which was close to Devure Native Purchase Area simply because “they had nowhere else to go,” and assured the magistrate that “they would be prepared to go anywhere in Southern Rhodesia where land could be made available for them.”

Land shortage and poor economic planning did not ameliorate the situation either. As Phimister has pointed out, the NLHA tried to impose “a mixed farming system of grain and cattle all over the country … [but] this system was quite unsuited to the low-rainfall

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414 Ibid.
415 Ibid.
416 Ibid.
418 Ibid.
areas [such as Sanyati], [while] in the high-rainfall Eastern areas, a great potential for intensive cash-crop farming was ignored.” Consequently, productivity fell and per capita income actually declined. On the whole, the Act “had been implemented too quickly and on too large a scale. It had been imposed from above, and where Africans had expressed doubt and advocated caution, they had been ignored. Not [sic] sufficient attempt had been made to gain understanding and support for the changes involved, and the high-handed, accelerated implementation had antagonized many, both through the mistakes made, and the failure to hear complaints.”

Recent studies have also not missed the intensity of peasant opposition to the NLHA. Ranger, for example, has written of “embittered peasants … and returning labour migrants who found themselves without land or cattle entitlement.” Similarly, Bhebe has described how many villages “were deserted, their occupants hiding in the bush,” when government officials arrived to enforce Land Husbandry measures. Obviously influenced by Benjamin Burombo, in 1955, at a large meeting in Shangani Reserve at the beginning of the ploughing season, people “declared that they were not going to have anything to do with the Land Development Officers, the Demonstrators and other agricultural Officers.” These were not empty threats, as the local Native Commissioner soon discovered.

He was told by one Headman Manguni ‘that the Voice Association had threatened that if any of the people were seen co-operating with … [the Native Commissioner] in connection with the Land Husbandry Act, their villages would be attacked at night and they would be beaten up.’ The Voice warned people that being in the presence of the Native Commissioner would be no safeguard as they would be beaten anyway. The people were thus afraid to co-operate with the Native Commissioner. When the latter went to Manguni’s area to start an evaluation of the lands, no one except Manguni turned up … The Native Commissioner was unable to do anything by way of implementing the Land Husbandry Act. The Voice in the meantime was expanding rapidly in the reserve.

On the whole, Africans resented the Act because it hampered their economic progress and did not intend to foster an African middle class in the reserves, but as far as the whites were concerned, any effective scheme for raising the reserves from impoverishment would have threatened the very basis of settler society. Quite plausibly, Floyd has noted that the NLHA was opposed by a broad and clearly diverse section of rural African society. Floyd, for example, conceded that “malcontents” included “those who have suffered considerable reductions in land and cattle, or those who have been caught in violation of some phase of the Act,” while Ranger has acknowledged that:

almost everyone in the reserves opposed it. In many reserves, entrepreneurial peasants farmed quite large areas of land. Under Land Husbandry they would have been allocated the standard 6 or 7 acres, so they naturally opposed its implementation. Many chiefs resented the loss

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420 Bhebe, B. Burombo, 107 and 108.
of their power to allocate land. Even peasants who were allocated more or less the same amount of land than they had previously farmed resented new and unpopular patterns of residence and the coercive commands of agricultural demonstrators and land development officers. 422

According to Phimister, without exception opposition to the Act came overwhelmingly from those people whom it threatened to render landless and Holleman was emphatic on this point:

Evidence from African witnesses … strongly suggested that the majority of agitators, though coming from Salisbury, were in fact young migrant labourers from the Mangwende area whom the Land Husbandry Act had made ineligible for farming rights in their own areas. They appeared to be the most vociferous and excitable elements who exhorted their tribesmen to resist land allocation and who threatened to resort to physical violence if people co-operated with the Administration. 423

As already noted, some of the severest critics of the Act were the landless, most of whom were absent from the reserves performing migrant labour. In the Mondoro Reserve, it was reported on 2nd October 1961 by Chief Nyika and Headman Chizinga and Mudumwa that European type Beers and Wine were being sold at week-end assemblies in the Reserve which were disguised as “Tea-Parties,” 424 but in essence these were meetings to map the way forward in the light of the NLHA’s cruel dictates. Confirming the same, Bulman noted that “In the towns, there were the stirrings of unrest, which spread to the reserves at weekends, from those who felt themselves dispossessed of a birthright.” 425 “If a man is told that he has no Native Land Husbandry rights and that he cannot be given any,” Bessant quoted a government commission as reporting, “then he is a ready-made supporter of the National Democratic Party [successor to the African National Congress] which promises land to all … he is ready to lend ear and hand to carry out the various illegal and subversive activities … Why not, he thinks: he has no job and no land, so what has he to lose?” 426 “Above all”, concluded Ranger, “those young men who were away in the towns and who lost land rights at the time of registration opposed implementation very strongly.” 427

Clearly, the authors of the NLHA grossly underestimated the number of people who would lose their right to land. From the very beginning, official calculations were thrown

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422 Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness*. 
427 Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness*. 

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out by a greater than expected degree of over-crowding in many reserves. The plan was also not sufficiently flexible to accommodate the thousands of people who attempted to return to the reserves when they lost their jobs during the economic recession precipitated by a slump in the price of copper after 1957. What can be gleaned from all this is that the issue of land rights affected a large and growing constituency, and it is least surprising that resistance to the NLHA was the embodiment of the numerous grievances the people had against the totalitarian and irrational nature of the Act, let alone the unrepresentative nature of the government. The slow tempo of African agricultural development up to the abandonment of the Act can be explained in this context.

**Peasant differentiation defies NLHA dictates:**

It is true that reserve entrepreneurs made concerted effort to survive in an otherwise difficult political and economic environment. As suggested by Phimister, rural elites were not destroyed by the Act. They were indeed some of the most vociferous opponents of the Act. This seems to contrast sharply with the belief that “entrepreneurial” peasants comprised only a tiny and dwindling minority of reserve inhabitants, whose backs were broken by the NLHA’s implementation, and whose protests were unimportant compared to those of the landless poor. Quoting Ranger, Phimister says “During the 1930s the Rhodesian government [had] set its [sights] against the kind of ploughman entrepreneurs who were emerging on a significant scale within the Reserves,” as “The redistributive procedures of ‘centralisation’ and ultimately of Land Husbandry were used to undercut such men; and … destocking of cattle was similarly used to reduce differentiation among cattle owners.” However, the assumption that “rural entrepreneurs” did not engage in cash-crop production and became differentiated is grossly misleading.

In fact, evidence to the contrary is galore. Le Roux has revealed that, at the end of the 1940s an estimated 52% of cultivated land in the reserves was farmed by 30% of the peasantry. This meant that there was increased land and cattle ownership despite stipulations of the NLHA as well as destocking measures. Having largely evaded earlier Native Department attempts to limit the acreage they could plough and the number of cattle they could own, this category of producers were no less determined to go their own way in the 1950s, and they did so with considerable ingenuity and remarkable success. To some extent they were helped by the fact, as indicated previously, that the initial implementation of the NLHA was extremely slow. It was largely confined to three reserves, and, even when the whole process was speeded-up between 1955 and 1961, the very haste with which it was carried out conferred an important degree of protection on better-off cultivators. “Consider the consequences of speed,” warned one observer in 1959. “Shoddy and inaccurate work can result in the field; errors in census taking can create serious difficulties as the later stages of the Act are implemented … Pacing of

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430 Ranger cited in Phimister, “Rethinking the Reserves.”
lands by foot rather than taping or chaining can lead to errors in acreage calculations of 20 to 25 per cent … A hasty and inaccurate check on number of livestock at [the] Kraal appreciation [Stage] will be perpetuated under the stock control regulations of the NLHA.”

This over-emphasis on speed meant that government officials inevitably skipped stages in the Act’s implementation. The insurmountable problems caused by the shortage of competent staff as well as other difficulties caused certain key provisions of the Act to be quietly abandoned. For example, “the requirement that arable land should be matched by a grazing area sufficient to enable the maintenance of fertility was dropped, cultivation rights were permitted in the grazing areas and a substantial degree of overstocking (30 per cent) was tolerated.”

In a recent study, Phimister states that, at the end of 1961, shortly before implementation was suspended, individual land allocations had been made in 54% of the area proclaimed in terms of the Act. As this applied only to 78% of the total acreage of the reserves and so-called Special Native Areas, it meant that even the formal implementation of the NLHA was confined to about 42% of reserves.

These figures suggest that, in nearly 60% of the reserves, cultivators were left in possession of their existing land holdings, and even where the provisions of the NLHA were carried out, deficiencies regarding staff made implementation difficult. For the limited staff that was available to the Native Department, any attempt at curbing madiro ploughing far exceeded their capacity. There were numerous cases of people self-allocating themselves land (“kuita madiro”) upon arrival from Rhodesdale in 1950. Self-allocation and the size of land they self-allocated themselves was dependent on the availability of individual or household productive resources like labour, draught power and other equipment (“zvibatiso”). When the NLHA was eventually implemented in Sanyati in 1956, it tried to limit allocations to the stipulated 8 acres but people who had self-allocated themselves more than the 8 acres tended to resist this limitation. Hence, “illegal extensions take place, or the ploughing of vacant plots is done by unauthorised people.”

The rampant nature of madiro is clearly reflected in Bhebe’s confession that

Out of the 15 acres which we had ploughed over the years, carefully cleared, annually fertilised with cattle manure only three acres were allocated to my mother and the rest was given to other people. Our savings also consisted of over 30 head of cattle and over 50 goats. The stock permit that was given to my mother authorised her to graze only 6 head of cattle. The rest of the stock we were supposed to dispose of at once by selling or slaughtering … Had we complied with the dictates of the colonial regime, my brother and sister and I would never have afforded the

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434 For more detail on “madiro” (Freedom ploughing) see Nyambara, “A History of Land Acquisition in Gokwe.”
school fees for our education … [but] for the next few years [after 1959] my family and many other people in the area, with the active connivance of the local dip-tank supervisor who was supposed to enforce stock-permit regulations and our chief, Mketi, who was assigned the task of enforcing regulations pertaining to the arable plots, fought very hard not only to retain our livestock but also to extend our plots into viable units.  

The basic point being conveyed by the foregoing is that a large number of better-off peasants came through the NLHA, if not exactly unscathed, then more or less intact. So much so, in fact, that in the 1950/60 season 30% of reserve producers were now working 63% of all cultivated land. What is clear from this is that the trend towards an unequal distribution of the area under cultivation was more pronounced at the end of the decade than it had been at its beginning. Cattle ownership had also become more unequal and this is validated by Roux’s assertion that: “as with crops two types of cattle owner[s] had developed by 1960. One was a small-scale owner with a subsistence herd, the other was a large-scale owner who supplied the beef market.”  

Over the same period, the real incomes of this “upper 30 per cent of African producers” were consistently higher than those of the lowest paid urban workers, and expanded faster than those of the majority of reserve cultivators.  

This does not imply, though, that opposition by “reserve entrepreneurs” to the NLHA was any less fierce after having escaped most of its provisions. On the contrary, it implies that resistance from this source was much more important than previously suspected. Alienated and embittered by the attempts of successive settler regimes to wrest control over the dynamics of rural accumulation from their grasp, a significant number of richer peasants turned away from co-operation with government agencies to embrace nationalist politics. Along with rural businessmen, school teachers and headmasters, as well as some chiefs and headmen, they assumed leadership positions in branches of the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Democratic Party (NDP). In Matabeleland’s Wenlock district, for example, the first chairman of an ANC branch was “the agrarian entrepreneur, Mark Docotela Ncube,” while at the other end of the country a few years later, the leaders of rural dissidence “were not landless young men or itinerant traders but members of the chiefly family, headmen and male peasant elders.”  

Undoubtedly, the grievances and aspirations of this “upper 30 per cent of African producers” crucially shaped both the kind of opposition to the NLHA and the particular brand of nationalism which was emerging at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. This very strong opposition was to remain an ingrained feature of the liberation war years in Zimbabwe.

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436 Bhebe, B. Burombo, 5-6.
438 Yudelman, Africans on the Land, 244.
439 Ranger, Peasant Consciousness, 75.
In fact, as far as resistance to the implementation of the NLHA was concerned what was specific about the Sanyati experience was the combined involvement not only of the agrarian entrepreneurs but also the participation in resistance to the Act by the poorer peasantry as well. Chiefs and headmen opposed the NLHA but not in as vociferous and open a manner as some of the traditional leadership in Mhondoro “Reserve.” Chiefs like Wozhele tried to exploit the position vested in them by the state to amass wealth by claiming ownership of multiple pieces of land some of which they bequeathed to their children/offspring. The Sanyati example reveals that the recent roots of differentiation were steeped in the community’s averseness to measures that were aimed at limiting the African’s economic opportunities. The people’s hate of the NLHA dates back to the early 1950s when this Act was deployed to force African farmers out of the so-called white ranching areas. On the whole, between the 1950s and 1960s this northwestern frontier portrays a wide array of complexities that determined rural differentiation and highlights the rather ambiguous relationships that distinguished the rich from the poor in what then was a predominantly rainland/dryland area. Although the power balancing strategies of the state and the preponderance of a single social category (i.e. the master farmer category) were emphasised to structure the rudiments of order and progress in rural development it can be noted that the master farmers were forever mindful of the hegemonic inclinations of the state. On the other hand, the fears of subjugation by the state and the master farmers on the part of the poor categories were quite pronounced. In Sanyati, therefore, the less-to-do peasants’ awe of the balancing as well as bandwagoning strategies of the state informed the nature of their resistance to such prescriptions as the NLHA. These nuances, which constitute how rural Sanyati was ordered and how differentiation progressed in this arid region have been captured in the broad categorisation of the local peasantry into “progressive” and “backward” farmers. The latter term was used in a generic fashion to refer to all farmers/ agrarian classes who resisted the so-called modern methods of farming which in reality entailed European methods of farming. They were seen as lagging behind. However, their action was a clear manifestation of resistance against the state whose inclinations during the colonial period as evidenced by the NLHA constrained or were not in favour of bolstering the peasant farmer in general.

Clearly, the scope for accumulation in the 1950s and 1960s was normally strictly limited by government planners of the day, who tended to limit the acreage and level of production of these individual producers in line with the quality control and technical criteria set by the state. As Cowen has suggested in another context, the aim of such measures is to generate the development of an undifferentiated middle peasantry, producing high-grade export crops (e.g. cotton in the case of Sanyati) under “controlled and increasingly technically advanced methods of production and to avoid the uncontrollable aspects of rich peasant differentiation.” 442 The advent of cotton in 1963

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and its influence on the differentiation process was quite considerable. In fact, the state tried to arrest rural differentiation to no avail.

**Introduction of cotton and socio-economic differentiation:**

In spite of the unfavourable political climate, the 1960s witnessed increased rural differentiation as some peasant households with sufficient resources diversified their agricultural pursuits and took to cotton cultivation. Far from being mere pawns in the colonial game, peasant households mainly of Madheruka extraction took the initiative and cultivated cotton and prospered, while others (notably the Shangwe and Madheruka with inadequate resources) objected to cotton growing and these malperformed economically. 1963 marked the introduction and development of cotton agriculture in Sanyati and the crop had significant ramifications on the process of differentiation. Rural households participated in cotton growing at various levels because of differential access to essential productive resources such as credit, labour, land, farm equipment (“zvibatiso”), other agricultural services like demonstrator advice and access to limited and distant markets in Kadoma. Those who embraced cotton earlier and possessed the requisite resources unquestionably became a “black capitalist entrepreneurial class.” In other words, it was towards these few leading prosperous farmers (Master Farmers) that the colonial agricultural officers devoted most of their efforts by giving them the advice they needed. In addition, Master Farmers dominated the growing of cotton because of the knowledge of farming which they brought with them from their areas of origin (e.g. Rhodesdale). They also dominated the co-operative societies through which much of the credit to purchase inputs as well as technical advice were channeled. Due to their growing influence, Master Farmers had access to adequate co-operative and hired labour in addition to family household labour. In this vein, therefore, cotton was to become one of the major causes of differentiation among the Sanyati peasantry.

As already noted, the majority of the rural households who lacked access to adequate essential productive resources derived limited if any benefits from participation in cotton growing. Actually, some of the resource-poor households did not grow cotton, but rather became a source of labour for the large-scale farmers. Quite appropriately, Worby has recently observed that, the introduction of cotton and the cotton boom that followed “generated its own regionally based class of aggressive entrepreneurs who were crossing residual historical boundaries in land tenure and labour markets to constitute a nascent class of large-scale black agrarian capitalists.” Those who did not join the bandwagon invariably lagged behind and constituted a class of less-to-do peasants. Although this latter category was poverty-stricken, the argument in this study is that its predicament did

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444 Yudelman, *Africans on the Land*, 140, defines Master Farmers as peasants who received training on experimental farms and followed improved methods of farming prescribed by the advisory services. A more comprehensive discussion of the origins of the Master Farmer concept will be provided in the next chapter.

not preclude the emergence of distinct classes of people in the area. This was so because, as agriculture became more commercialised especially with the introduction of cotton, a process of agrarian capitalist accumulation developed in Sanyati to benefit a few economically well-endowed peasant farmers who were akin to agrarian *Kulaks*.

The element of increased commercialisation led to the widening of the social and economic gap between Sanyati residents. Pius S. Nyambara’s findings in his case study of Gokwe bear a similar resonance with the pattern of differentiation found in Sanyati that, not every peasant household, let alone every individual peasant, derived similar benefits or experienced the same degree of success with cotton agriculture. According to M. Yudelman, in the process of differentiation, cotton benefited a few “progressive” farmers, the majority of whom were “immigrants” (Madheruka). Indeed, increased cotton production and high levels of marketed cotton were achieved by a minority of producers as some peasants definitely benefited from cotton agriculture, while others were disadvantaged hence the differential impact exerted by cotton cultivation on the peasantry. Quoting Lenin, C. A. Smith endorses the same view: “The prevalence of commodity economy … gives rise to competition among producers, and, while ruining the mass, enriches the few.” To a large extent, therefore, cotton commodity production in Sanyati was also instrumental in enriching a handful of peasants whilst at the same time ruining the greater spectrum of rural society. Hence, Sanyati did not conform, especially in the twentieth century, to the rather unorthodox and obsolete theories of a homogeneous peasantry propounded by Gelfand and others. In fact, for a region purportedly a backwater of Southern Rhodesian economic development going into the middle of the twentieth century, Sanyati has moved rapidly to occupy centre stage at the close of the 1990s. It now boasts a fairly developed economy by many rural standards and the area owes this distinction to being one of the oldest frontier regions of this former British colony to embrace cotton agriculture.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has argued that the actual impact of the NLHA may have been overestimated, at the same time as the extent of differentiation among the peasantry was underestimated. Truly Sanyati farmers were highly innovative entrepreneurs who

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447 Yudelman, *Africans on the Land*.
invariably did not resemble, in any way, a truncated peasantry. Rural elites may well have survived the Act, and in the process crucially shaping opposition to it. In the course of analysing the peasant economy in the pre-irrigation era in the context of colonial Zimbabwe’s pivotal Native Land Husbandry Act, this chapter has also argued that the Act was not an invincible creation as it was breached several times by the growing body of pro-active peasants. It has further suggested that the very success with which “reserve entrepreneurs” withstood the onslaught of the NLHA permitted this significant stratum of rural society to make its presence felt throughout the liberation struggle. By surviving the Act, the “upper 30 per cent of African producers” demonstrated that the colonial state machinery could not conceivably break the jaw of the rural elites nor could it dampen their march towards economic prosperity and political independence. This ensemble of resource rich peasants and their poorer counterparts, taken together with the income disparities that existed between them, revealed that twentieth-century Sanyati society was hardly economically and socially homogeneous but highly heterogeneous.

Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that, while writings on the NLHA have tended to see the Act as having had a restrictive effect on rural differentiation and accumulation because of its tendency towards equalisation of resources, the outcome was a skewed pattern of access to land (the basis of any rural differentiation). The contradictions inherent in the NLHA itself made it possible for the better-off to take advantage of these loopholes to enhance their accumulation prospects. While on the one hand, the Act disadvantaged the women, especially single women, and the young men, on the other, it produced a small class of rural accumulators. However, the ability of this small class of rural entrepreneurs to engage in further accumulation was greatly curtailed by stipulations in the Act (e.g. regarding size of land) but they always sought to fight its stipulations off. Although literature on the NLHA has emphasised that bitter opposition to the Act came from the landless young men, this chapter has demonstrated that fierce opposition also came from “immigrant” reserve entrepreneurs who saw the Act as a constraint on further accumulation. Thus, it is this chapter’s contention that conventional wisdom on the effects of the NLHA may have overstated the actual impact of the Act, while ignoring the extent of differentiation that emerged among the Sanyati peasantry notwithstanding the over-bearing presence of the Act.

The chapter has also revealed that the regime of “development” that emerged in post-war Southern Rhodesia was organised around a naturalised racial axis that differentiated among African and European populations in a three-fold manner i.e. economically, culturally and politically. Within their own communities Africans were also differentiated, as a series of legislative acts and administrative innovations were devoted to the reform of four principal domains of African rural life: the disciplining of hygienic practice, the stabilisation of the monogamous family, the regularisation of land tenure and the rationalisation of agrarian techniques. The state interventionistic measures were considered integral to the task of reconciling conservation imperatives with political exigencies, particularly the demand that Africans be removed from European-designated farmland while sustaining the promise to increase black prosperity – a major contradiction in policy discourse.
This analysis of Sanyati reserve illustrates the importance of the timing and sequence according to which hinterland regions were drawn into the prescriptive apparatus of the development regime. This malarial, tsetse-infested lowland, remote from the major axes of urban and industrial development, is located in a region distinguished by the historical absence of competing claims by European settlers to land. Sanyati began to receive “immigrants” forcibly resettled from Rhodesdale in the 1950s, at a time when the coercive and hyper-rational model of development was reaching its apogee behind the passage of the NLHA. Targeting “immigrants” who had already internalised the “discipline” of development and styled themselves as “modern,” Sanyati’s extension staff was able to institute a voluntary, cotton-based regime, one widely regarded as a model of African rural “advancement.”

By and large, it cannot be refuted that the unfolding rural differentiation process was more clearly recognised at the beginning of the 1960s as more and more peasants embraced the values and virtues of cotton growing. Although social inequalities existed in the early twentieth century, as cotton became firmly established, major and intractable forms of differentiation in the manner in which power and income were distributed set in. The intrusive effects of a market economy whose basis was cotton gave rise to a differentiation between rich and poor farmers which tended to alter the existing social and economic structure. Old economic forms were quickly giving way to new ones. The local staple crop, maize, was still being grown but greater emphasis was now placed on cotton by many households in Sanyati.

In this period, no doubt, growing economic differentiation was witnessed and “co-operative” agricultural work, known locally as humwe, became the order of the day as wealthier members of the community who could afford a lavish outlay on entertainment of groups of young men and women harvesting their fields emerged. However, a more detailed examination of cotton cultivation and the sort of differentiation it wrought upon Sanyati society particularly during the irrigation era will be conducted in chapter four as the area lacked an irrigation history prior to the 1960s. Indeed, the adoption of cotton in 1963 was responsible for stepping up the tempo of differentiation in rural Sanyati. To all intents and purposes, this was to represent a prelude to the kind of agricultural and developmental policies adopted by Ian Douglas Smith’s Rhodesia Front (RF) government when it unilaterally declared independence from Britain in 1965. The case of TILCOR/ARDA irrigation, to be discussed from chapter three onwards, would be incomplete without the history that preceded it. Irrigation did not take place in a vacuum. Whilst initially there were no signs of irrigation save for the few boreholes drilled by the Irrigation Department, events between the 1930s and 1960s including the climatic and ecological conditions of the area, pointed to a need for harnessing water in the Munyati River by the parastatal organisation and use it to alleviate the occurrences of frequent drought and hunger. Co-operatively

From the foregoing, it can be pointed out that irrigation was still unknown in Sanyati by 1964. Serious engagement with the irrigation debate on the part of the colonial government only took precedence in the latter half of the 1960s. After 1965, the state formulated key policy strategies to direct irrigation development as illustrated in chapter three. This chapter, however, has demonstrated that differentiation, as a process was not an irrigation phenomenon alone. Even in the decades prior to the inception of irrigation technology socio-economic differentiation had started to manifest itself in Sanyati quite clearly – this in spite of the futile onslaught by the colonial state machinery to “flatten” or eliminate it particularly at the high watermark of the implementation of the NLHA during the 1950s and early 1960s.
CHAPTER THREE

STATE POLICY/STRATEGIES (1965-1979)

INTRODUCTION

The chapter examines the many policy-oriented activities leading to the inception of both the smallholder scheme at Gowe and Estate irrigation agriculture in Sanyati that characterised the UDI period (1965-1979). It discusses government policy procedures or strategies that influenced the direction of agricultural development in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). After investigations into the possibility of irrigating winter and summer crops in the area were completed, it was agreed to set up the Gowe Pilot Irrigation Scheme in 1967. The chapter also argues that, the establishment of Estate agriculture or the Main Estate on whose basis a growth point was implemented in 1977 subsequently followed this development.

This chapter, therefore, discusses the major colonial objectives that dictated the need for irrigation at Gowe and the reasons why so much priority was placed on this scheme in the 1960s and 1970s. The factors leading to the formation of major institutions such as TILCOR, DEVAG and ARDA, together with these organisations’ chief objectives and operational roles, are also explored in order to put agriculture in Sanyati in its proper policy perspective.

The chapter further observes that, in policy circles, irrigation was perceived as a major way of stabilising the rural population, particularly in the wake of the Rhodesdale evictions of the 1950s. The new technology was also adopted as a measure to boost agricultural productivity in an area whose aridity did not inspire much hope in food sustainability without some form of irrigation. However, as the parliamentary debates on the formation of ARDA reveal, there were conflicting views on which type of organisation (between CONEX, DEVAG, TILCOR, the Agricultural Assistance Board/AAB, the Sabi-Limpopo Authority/SLA and ARDA) was best suited to achieving these twin objectives for the colonial government. These debates are covered in full towards the end of the chapter.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SMALLHOLDER SCHEME AND ITS OBJECTIVES

Gowe precedes TILCOR (Sanyati):

Most of the initial settlers at Gowe comprised the resettled population which had been evicted from Rhodesdale and other southern districts of colonial Zimbabwe in the early 1950s. These included subjects of chiefly lineages such as Wozhele, Mudzingwa and Lozane. The area was generally dry, but surveys on its suitability for irrigation only took place a decade later. Prior to the 1960s, Sanyati was not perceived as an area which was conducive to irrigation farming due to its semi-arid nature. This was proved to be a
fallacy in 1965 when the Department of Conservation and Extension (CONEX), 451 which fell under the ambit of the Ministry of Agriculture, started investigations into the possibility of irrigating an area of the Sanyati Communal Lands, which became known as Gowe. 452 The investigations included an assessment of the irrigation potential available not only in the African areas along the Munyati River but also in the European areas in the vicinity of the river.

Investigations were prompted by the fact that some white farmers in the adjacent ranching area along the Munyati (formerly Umniati) River had started irrigation on a small scale. 453 This was coupled with the fact that the introduction of irrigation was “a natural progression in the agricultural extension work.” 454 Complemented by the work carried out by the Gatooma (now Kadoma) Cotton Research Centre on pesticides in 1963, extension workers introduced cotton into Sanyati and nearby areas with considerable success. 455

The Group Conservation and Extension Officer for Gatooma, Peter G. How, in a letter to the Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South), R. J. C. Hope, observed that there was a great potential for supplementary irrigation in Sanyati from the summer flow of the Munyati River. 456 Large acreages of very suitable deep sandy loam soil were available close to the river, where pumping would be easy and relatively cheap.

In How’s opinion, owing to the long growing season in this area, crops such as cotton, groundnuts and burley tobacco could be planted with the rains and assisted during and at the end of the rainy season with irrigation from the normal flow of the Munyati river. 457 As far as cotton is concerned, it can be noted that by 1965 the potential of cotton cropping in Sanyati had already been proved and the desirability of establishing such a scheme (Gowe) from the national point of view could not be over-emphasised. For H. Weinmann, cotton growing together with weaving was a well-established and developed cottage industry among some African communities in Zimbabwe long before the Europeans arrived and this makes it indigenous to the country. 458

More importantly, a...
ready market for cotton existed as a result of the development of textile manufacturing industries since 1945. Cotton growing was also boosted by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith’s policy of self-reliance after his declaration of unilateral independence (UDI) in 1965.

Peter G. How hoped that part of an estimated annual sum of £100 000 set aside by the government in 1965 for the development of small-scale irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe’s communal areas could be used to implement the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. Nevertheless, in view of the serious drought situation in Matabeleland, the government decided that, for the next few years, these funds should be used in alleviating the “serious position” in that province. Plans for the implementation of Gowe were, therefore, temporarily shelved.

Efforts were resuscitated by the Group Conservation and Extension Officer before the end of 1965. Procedurally, he had to keep the District Commissioner (DC) Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, informed on developments regarding the investigations his Department were conducting into the feasibility of establishing Gowe. To the Group Officer’s relief, the DC (who was stationed at Gatooma from 1961 to 1972) was equally keen on the scheme. His enthusiasm for the scheme was illustrated by his granting of permission for the pump engine and borehole by the DC’s Rest Camp at Sanyati (See Appendix IV) to be used for irrigation purposes at this scheme, and by the many consultations he had with a number of interested players in the matter. For instance, discussions were held on the 10th of August 1965 by the DC with Paramount Chiefs, Neuso and Wozhele, as well as with the local people to solicit their consent. Both chiefs were very much in favour of an irrigation scheme at Gowe, which, as a necessary preliminary to its implementation, would have a small plot of irrigated cotton, for demonstration and training purposes within the Sanyati communal lands. It is important to note that chiefs Neuso and Wozhele’s approval was often sought in connection with land leases in the Sanyati communal lands. This was so because, traditional chiefs had the prerogative over the distribution of land in the rural areas, and lease applicants often consulted them.


459 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, File: “Gowe Irrigation Scheme: Sanyati TTL (EX CONEX),” J. W. Watermeyer (pp. Director of Conservation and Extension) to the Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South), 24th June 1965.

460 Ibid.

461 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., P. A. Davies, Assistant Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South) to the Provincial Commissioner, (Mashonaland South), 1st October 1965, 1.

462 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158087, Location C19.6.7F, File: LEA Sanyati (July 1963 - March 1970), J. R. Musgrave (pp. DC Gatooma) to J. K. S. Scotty (Lease Applicant - Sanyati), 16th January 1970.
By October 1966, the Provincial Water Engineer, P. G. Wright, had already drafted a preliminary report on the proposed scheme for submission to the Chairman of the Provincial Irrigation Co-ordinating Committee (PICC) for endorsement. The proposed scheme, which was accepted as “technically sound,” was for a pilot scheme of 100 acres with 25 farmers, each being allocated a 4-acre plot. The essence of pilot schemes has been studied quite extensively. For C. Agnew and E. Anderson in their study on irrigation in the arid realm: “Given the complex nature of irrigation it is not possible to design projects involving more than a few households without using pilot schemes. Pilot schemes are vital for establishing both environmental and human responses to proposed changes.”

J. R. Rydzewski proposed a sequence for irrigation development involving identification and pre-feasibility studies; feasibility studies; implementation; monitoring and evaluation. In his view, this ensured flexibility since the success of a project depended on being prepared to modify plans in the light of new information obtained through monitoring. A very radical opinion has been proffered by Palmer-Jones who has demonstrated that pilot studies did not necessarily provide “correct” responses. Citing a case study from Nigeria where problems were reported due to “uncooperative and lazy farmers,” he says this was only tackled through land control, taxation and other coercive measures. An alternative interpretation is that farmers were reluctant to participate in an irrigation scheme that would lead to financial difficulties in the case of wheat production and crop failure due to poor water control for rice fields. His conclusion, therefore, was that “the results of monitoring and pilot studies can … be misleading.” However, for the Ministry of Internal Affairs the establishment of Gowe on a pilot basis was sound because they were using it as a test case for a bigger project they were envisaging. In fact, the idea was more enthusiastically received by Sanyati residents than was the case in the West African area studied by Palmer-Jones. This was so because Sanyati was in dire need of irrigation because of its dry conditions compared to Nigeria. There were also no serious problems of water control in Sanyati because water supply was centrally managed by TILCOR or by pump attendants who were directly supervised by the Ministry of Water unlike in Nigeria where individual farmers grappled to control water.

When irrigation finally got off the ground, there were 18 original plotholders which figure rose to 36 in 1968, owning allotments that ranged in size from approximately 2 to 4 acres each. Plotholders did not have title deeds. Plots were held on a yearly lease.

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466 It is radical because it offers a far-reaching critic of the necessity of pilot schemes, which counteracts conventional wisdom represented by scholars like Agnew and Anderson about the viability of such schemes.
468 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File;
agreement and sub-leasing was not allowed. The DC provided various figures (e.g. 18, 25 and 36) of the total plotholder population. The seemingly conflicting figures reveal that, on the one hand, plotholder security was not very stable as evictions and voluntary withdrawals took their toll. On the other, there was an overwhelming response and interest by new applicants for plots hence the increase in number by 1968. Because of the small size of Gowe and variations in farming experience among plotholders it was impossible to allocate plots of exactly the same size hence 2 to 4 acres was the standard allocation each plotholder was entitled to since the inception of the scheme. In the final analysis, the approach used was to try and accommodate as many of the farmers who had expressed an interest to join and satisfied the selection criteria. The proposal was that the farmers would farm on a co-operative basis, with the Co-operative Society raising the necessary loans for the provision of spray equipment and other capital costs on the land, and the Government, through the Ministry of Water Development (MOWD), providing, running and maintaining the pumping scheme delivering water on to the land. This in due course would make Gowe a Pilot Co-operative Irrigation scheme in Sanyati.

Discussions and negotiations on the proposed scheme continued. On the 2nd of August 1966, as a matter of routine, K. F. Solberg (Convener of working party - MOWD), A. G. Pilditch (Planning Officer in the Department of Conservation and Extension, Mashonaland South) and D. B. Rowe (Water Engineer - Secretary) visited the scheme. The following day (3rd August, 1966), they convened a meeting of the working party at the DC’s office in Gatooma where the need for the scheme was agreed upon after consultations with the CONEX Irrigation Officer, J. W. Watermeyer. Subsequently, a provisional construction programme was drawn up as shown in Table 3.1.

With everything pointing in the right direction, the Deputy Secretary for Internal Affairs, Noel Robertson, writing on behalf of the Secretary for Internal Affairs, after his visit to Sanyati to inspect the proposed irrigation scheme, asked the DC to start stumping and clearing the site to be irrigated. Labour was sourced from the local community (who perceived it as the reincarnation of the chibaro process of the early 1950s because sometimes some element of coercion was employed), and once the labour force had been procured, it was engaged in the clearing, ploughing and levelling of the land. The purchase of spray equipment also needed to be considered, in as much as the DC had to consult the Health Inspector on the area to be set aside for village settlement. This was

469 R. L. Westcott, (Former DC Gatooma), Personal Interview, Ramsgate, South Africa, 12th July 2005.
470 Mafumana Mjoli, Gowe Irrigation or Agriculture Committee Chairman, Personal Interview, Gowe Irrigation Scheme, Sanyati, 14th May 2005.
473 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), N. Robertson to the PC (Mashonaland South), 28th February 1967.
necessary in light of the fact that the area earmarked for the project was still dense thicket and a haven to malaria carrying mosquitoes and other insects.

Table 3.1: Provisional Construction Programme (Gowe Irrigation Scheme)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>January - February, 1967</th>
<th>- Land cleared.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>February, 1967</td>
<td>- Tenders asked for pumping plant and irrigation scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>March, 1967</td>
<td>- Construction of pumphouse stage 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>April, 1967</td>
<td>- Pumping main installed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>September, 1967</td>
<td>- Installation of pump, engine and suction by fitter. Completion of pumphouse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>October, 1967</td>
<td>- Crops planted and irrigated 474</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By arrangement with the MOWD, minor irrigation projects for the financial year 1966/67 were considered and an allocation of £4 000 was approved for the implementation of Gowe-Sanyati on a subsidised basis. 475 An additional expenditure of £1 500 and £150 for the financial year, 1967/68, was estimated to cover for running costs and fencing respectively. 476

With the stage now set for the beginning of the project, it was gratifying to the Ministry of Internal Affairs to note that there was also no objection on the part of the Tribal Trust Land Board or its Chief Administrative Officer, W. H. H. Nicolle, to the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. 477 By July 1967, the stumping, clearing, ploughing and levelling had been completed. The laying of the pipeline through the lands was also completed at the end of the second week of August 1967. Westcott has argued that Gowe was different from most if not all irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe, in using overhead or spray irrigation, which eliminated the need for constructing canals and facilitated more accurate application of water and fuller realisation of cropping potential. Nevertheless, spray irrigation demanded full co-operation from the plotholders in the moving of spray lines and


475 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), L. G. Leach (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to PC (Mashonaland South), 9th November 1966.

476 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), N. I. Boast, (PC Mashonaland South) to the Secretary for Internal Affairs, 12th April, 1967.

efficiency in ensuring correct delivery of water from the sprinklers. Tractor mounted pumps belonging to the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) were to be used.

Thereafter, a pilot irrigation scheme of 80 acres, divided into 2 to 4 acre plots, was implemented at Gowe by the DC Gatooma in September 1967, with the first field of maize planted and completed on the 2nd of November, 1967. This now meant that Gowe would be declared an irrigable area in terms of Section 11 of the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967. The adoption of this Act was informed by the establishment of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage in 1950 which set in motion the International Hydrological Decade, begun in 1965 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) which proposed a 10-year programme for sustained and internationally co-ordinated scientific observations on water resource utilisation. This programme, among other things, sought to accelerate the study of water resources and the worldwide regimen of waters with a view to their rational management in the interest of mankind, and to improve the ability of the developing countries to evaluate their resources and use them to the best advantage.

The DC Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, therefore, established the Gowe Irrigation Scheme on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He was tasked with the responsibility of fully operating the scheme. Some of the first settlers at Gowe have testified to this fact. These include Norman Savata Gwacha, a former Gowe plotholder and Secretary of the Gowe Irrigation Co-operative, who is now concentrating on ploughing his 10-acre dryland plot in Kusi Village (next to Gowe) which is under Chief Wozhele, and E. Munengami, nicknamed “Mayor” by fellow plotholders because he is the only surviving pioneer member of the scheme. Gwacha was allocated an irrigation plot in September 1967 whilst Munengami joined the scheme a year later (September 1968). What then is clear from this is that the Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme pre-existed TILCOR’s main irrigation project at Sanyati, which commenced operations in March 1974.

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478 R. L. Westcott (Former DC Gatooma), Personal Interview, Ramsgate, South Africa, 12th July 2005.
480 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., J. L. Paul (Extension Officer - Sanyati/Chenjiri) to the DC Gatooma and the Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South), 30th November, 1967.
481 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 100816, Location 3.13.7F, File: AGR/16. Description of Irrigable Areas (July 1967 - November 1968), L.G. Leach (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to all PCs, 19th July, 1967.
483 R. L. Westcott, (Former DC Gatooma), Telephone Discussion with Nyandoro, 23rd April 1997. Westcott is now resident in Ramsgate, South Africa.
484 N. S. Gwacha (Communal Farmer and Former Secretary of Gowe Co-operative Society), Personal Interview, Kusi Village, Sanyati, 8th January 1997 and E. Munengami, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe, 8th January 1997.
485 Ibid.
**Colonial Objectives:**

Gowe was set up with a number of objectives in mind. It was designed to be a test case in smallholder irrigation in the Sanyati communal lands, irrigating 80 acres of various crops, amongst them cotton. Writing to the DC Gatooma on behalf of the Provincial Water Engineer, K. F. Solberg stated that this was intended to be a pilot scheme for the promotion of future development in the area. In his own assessment, Gowe was important as

(a) a training scheme in irrigation for the local inhabitants;
(b) an experimental scheme for a larger project (the establishment of the Sanyati Main Estate was looming in the distance); and
(c) an experimental unit to assess yields with overhead spray.  

From the onset, the need to involve local participants in the scheme was acknowledged. Objective (a) above, together with proven farming experience invariably determined the selection criteria that would be used to lure suitable tenants to Gowe. In the season 1965/66, applications for plots were invited. Chiefs Neuso and Wozhele, after approving the scheme, preferred plots that were allocated on an individual basis, but this did not materialise as the land was owned by the government and, therefore, had to be held on a yearly lease-holding system.

It was proposed that prospective applicants had to be residents of Sanyati, preferably with Master Farmer status since high standards were required in irrigation. Selection of applicants was, thus, based on qualification and experience. The former DC for Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, has confirmed this by saying, “Plotholders, who were in the main local Karanga, provided they were acceptable to the Tribal Authority, were selected on farming ability and experience; holders of Master Farmer Certificates [of course] would have had a priority.” He went on to illustrate that the selection criteria was not insensitive to gender considerations when he said “Although at the beginning there was only one female plotholder, [the late Keresina Simon, who was given a plot because her husband was old and frail - plot or allotment No. 16], the criteria for selection was as rational with no discrimination.” The plotholders were given one or possibly two years, in which to decide whether to remain on the scheme permanently or to return to their dryland holding. This meant that in the third year, participants would be asked to choose...

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488 Response to Questionnaire, Westcott to Nyandoro, 6th May 1997.
489 The scheme for Master Farmer awards became more important in the 1950’s when prospective African Purchase Area (APA) Farmers were obliged to obtain a Master Farmer certificate before qualifying to purchase a farm.
490 R. L. Westcott, (Former DC Gatooma), Personal Interview, Ramsgate, South Africa, 12th July 2005 and Response to Questionnaire, Westcott to Nyandoro.
491 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), R. L. Westcott to the PC (Mashonaland South),
between remaining in the scheme or giving up their dryland plot. The Extension Officer for Sanyati/Chenjiri, J. L. Paul, pressed for applications (done on “Purchase Area” application forms) to be submitted by farmers for the irrigation plots. Eventually, a committee consisting of chiefs Neuso and Wozhele, and representatives from CONEX and the DC’s Office selected applicants. Applicants were then interviewed on the 29th of August 1967 by the above panel, with the initial eighteen being allocated plots and residential sites on the 14th of September, the same year. The first successful applicants at Gowe were mainly composed of Sanyati residents (local Karanga) with a few farmers coming from as far afield as Chibi (now Chivi), Selukwe (Shurugwi), Charter (Chivhu), Gutu and Filabusi. As already stated, there was only one female plot holder at Gowe at the time of its inception in September 1967. The second woman, the late Emily Mazise, got a plot (No. 26) in 1968 because she was a widow with enough family labour to help change irrigation pipes. Emphasis, however, seemed to be on keeping the male population on the land.

The general argument on the part of Government was that colonial Zimbabwe was facing a “socio-political-human problem” largely wrought by what the settler government feared was a massive rural-urban drift. This was believed to offset the peace and security of the country as an increasing army of the unemployed and frustrated Africans was seen as potentially troublesome. In the colonial government’s view, for the maintenance of domestic peace and stability, it was essential to create employment, of one kind or another, for the thousands of unemployed Africans, either already in towns or flocking to them. The Secretary for Internal Affairs, W. H. H. Nicolle, felt that, whilst industry was making a valiant effort to absorb them, it was not growing fast enough to absorb all the African job seekers. Hence, it was incumbent on his Ministry to place or keep as many Africans as possible on the land, with the assurance that they would annually reap an abundance of food with a surplus, depending on their own industry, for sale. This could only be achieved through the development of efficiently run irrigation schemes wherever both water and land suitable for this purpose were available, and through their settlement on a subsistence and cash farming basis.
The primary objective of Gowe and, indeed, any other irrigation scheme, was not to make a few farmers rich but to make many self-supporting in food and thus assist the country’s economy by eliminating the almost annually costly famine relief measures. In general, the government was establishing irrigation schemes in the rural areas for the sole benefit of Africans residing particularly in low rainfall areas where drought and famine were almost endemic, but primarily the idea was to use schemes like Gowe, Chisumbanje and others to generate cash crop production to boost the country’s textile industry and exports. In the colonial period, more emphasis was placed on the production of subsistence crops mainly to allay food shortages. Thus, with assured and sufficient irrigation crops, the recurrent famines would be overcome and many thousands of Africans in the country would be kept “busy and contented.” However, as shall be demonstrated later in the next chapter, most farmers were inclined towards accumulation and the Africans in general could derive very little or no contentment at all from the schemes due to the general shortage of land, that is, the smallness of irrigation plots, coupled with the fact that Gowe together with other existing schemes were rather too small to accommodate all prospective irrigation farmers. This could hardly make the schemes self-provisioning entities as projected by the State.

It was also argued that once Gowe had reached a viable stage where it was able to provide optimum economic returns, the plotters would be permitted to take over the scheme from the government, since “all land in a government irrigation scheme will, in the first place, be leased to individuals and companies for a period of ten years with an option to purchase thereafter.” As will be seen later, this principle was never translated into practice.

A more predominant view is that the Government was interested in stifling potential resistance from below (i.e. from the plotters who were not only clamouring for more land but also for ownership of the smallholder scheme), and that it merely wanted to create what was termed, “a stable and satisfied irrigation population” (not a significant middle class strata) in order to gain political mileage. The following statement in the preliminary Project Report on Gowe supports this view: “Politically, the fact that Government is going to considerable expense to provide better living for people, is having a marked effect.”

Nevertheless, whatever the colonial government was doing with regard to African irrigation schemes was not altruistic. In this respect, the observation by Simon

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501 Ibid.
Pazvakavambwa, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Rural Housing and Social Amenities and the former Director of the Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX - now the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension/AREX), who in 1997 was the Technical Co-ordinator for the Water Resources Management Strategy (WRMS), on the real objectives for setting up, not only Gowe but also other irrigation schemes, like Ngwezi, Chisumbanje and so on, particularly after UDI, is an eye opener. Pazvakavambwa contends that, after 1965, many African irrigation schemes were established, as part and parcel of the post-UDI policies by Ian Smith (leader of the Rhodesia Front Party/RF that came into power in December 1962) of trying to convince Britain that his Government was doing something good for the Africans in this country, contrary to British feelings that he was ill-treating the African populace at large. 502 However, it is important to note that after 1965, Ian Smith was not worried about Britain’s opinions about how he treated Africans in Rhodesia. The schemes were motivated more by the need to make Rhodesia self-sufficient in certain raw materials (e.g. cotton), to strengthen the country’s economy in the face of international sanctions, to promote exports, to provide employment in the rural areas and to stem the rural-urban drift.

In any case, since its establishment, the Gowe Irrigation Scheme was seen as a venture that would spearhead development in the rural areas of Sanyati. In the colonial period, some of the most important agencies to ensure that this goal was achieved in Sanyati were TILCOR (1974-1980) and the Department of Agricultural Development (DEVAG - 1976/81).

Formation of TILCOR and the spectre of economic development:-

The formation of TILCOR took place against the backdrop of the increased influx of “immigrants” from Rhodesdale into rural Sanyati in the 1950s and early 1960s. In general the TTLs were extremely congested considering the fact that a total of 3 million Africans in Rhodesia resided there. This translated to 60% of the total population of the country at the beginning of the 1970s. 503 Nearly all of them subsisted on the land. Hence, rural economic problems in the Rhodesia of the 1960s and 1970s were steeped in the phenomenal population pressures that either derailed or cancelled out the tempo at which natural resources could be mobilised for sustainable economic development. The apparent prevalence of subsistence farming with low per capita incomes, scattered population and a lack of urban-commercial development to cater for rural needs, inadequate training and extension facilities, an underdeveloped rural infrastructure and a serious lack of trained manpower to sustain an accelerated development initiative combined with exceptionally rapid population growth placed a damper on development. 504 For example, by 1974 when TILCOR, which had been formed in 1968,

504 Taonga Mushayavanhu, “The Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR): Impact on Rural Development,” MA dissertation, Economic History Department, University of Zimbabwe, May 1989, 5. See also Annexure to “Proposals for a Five-Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector,”
established its Estate in Sanyati, 43% of the population of Rhodesia was under the age of fifteen with only 57% constituting the adult population. What this meant was that the dependence ratio was very high. These problems, coupled with those associated with land degradation and the failure by the NLHA to come up with an enduring solution, forced the government to make concerted efforts to try and stabilise the rural economic situation and at the same time protecting the economic position of the white minority.

It is of paramount importance to note that the development of Rhodesia’s communal areas was not designed to raise the standard of living of the people residing in those areas. Rather, the settler government’s aim was to bring the rural areas up to a state where they not only contributed positively to the national economy but also, more importantly, to a state where they could sustain even larger populations. This is precisely what the first Chairman of TILCOR who was appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs (L. B. Smith) in 1968, Warwick A. Bailey meant when he said, “It surely must be an inflexible part of human relationship that no sector of reasoned life should be allowed to endanger the durable continuance of any other sector.” In his elaboration of this point he maintained that, “It is imperative that the ruination of large tracts of Rhodesia is not only stopped but the land is brought up to a state where it contributes positively to the national economy.” Envisaging a bleak future for Europeans if the TTLs were not developed, Bailey told delegates to the Fifth Conference of Southern African Surveyors held in Salisbury:

> Every white Rhodesian’s duty is to do something for the Tribal Trust Lands … The future for the European in Rhodesia was extremely limited unless the TTLs were developed … The time has come when every white man in Rhodesia must accept that without the development of the tribal areas and the provision of job opportunity for Africans, the future for white people in this country is extremely limited.

The major aim was thus to contain the African threat to the “durable continuance” of the white population. Whatever benefit accrued to the African was a bonus as it was always subsidiary to this overall aim.

Negotiations to undertake development in TTLs with the Board of Trustees of Tribal areas commenced in February 1969 less than a year after the establishment of TILCOR’s first development project, namely the Katiyo Tea Estate along the banks of the Pungwe

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506 Ibid.
River in the Mutasa TTL of Manicaland in November 1968. In line with these negotiations, the TILCOR Annual Report for 1971/72 stated that the economic situation of the rural areas could be changed in three major ways, that is, through:

(a) economic development pitched to accommodate population growth or restraint;
(b) diverting pressure from the land to allow the establishment of permanently viable agricultural production units sufficiently flexible to respond to changing needs; and
(c) creating additional internal markets to expand the economic opportunities and incentives.

Another solution that was proposed was decentralisation. In May 1962 a policy of active decentralisation, known as Community Development, was adopted in Rhodesia. This was a carbon copy of the 1960 policy of decentralisation initiated by the Permanent Committee for the Decentralisation of Industry (later named the Board for the Decentralisation of Industries) in South Africa. The Government of the Republic argued that, whereas decentralisation first centred on the borders of “Bantu Homelands,” consideration was now also given to industrial development within the “Homelands” (“Bantustans”). In Rhodesia, Community Development, which has often been equated to economic development, was also adopted as a major instrument for rural development. Just as in South Africa, it aimed to bring development within African areas and reduce concentrating development effort outside them. An increasing need was seen to shift emphasis from central government control of development in the TTLs to “development from below,” which entailed involvement of the local communities in their own development.

Although the term “Community Development” was first formally

511 Decentralisation was a regional development policy aimed at promoting a wider and more balanced distribution of economic activity in the national space.
512 Community Development entailed people of each community being given responsibility for their own development, a responsibility which could only be discharged through communal organisation, formally and informally, for democratic planning and action. This was directly influenced by South Africa’s policy of “separate development.” See M. A. B. Mutiti, South Africa: Is it a Sovereign Independent State? (Harare: Aloe Press, 1985), Chapter 3.
defined at the 1948 Cambridge Conference on African Administration, attempts at decentralisation in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the 1950s. In 1956 the settler government of Southern Rhodesia made initial attempts to address the issue of spatial polarisation of economic development which was increasingly creating political pressures and unrest from both settler communities living away from the major centres as well as urban-based African nationalists and their African clientele in the rural areas. In this year, a Select Committee to report on decentralisation was appointed but its recommendations were largely ignored. Two years later, a second committee was nominated which recommended that a wider distribution of industry and urban growth was not only desirable but also essential to the future welfare of Rhodesia as a whole. These recommendations were largely frustrated by the political and administrative complexities of the federal structure to which Southern Rhodesia belonged. Thus, little progress was achieved with regard to implementation.

A third Select Committee was set up to inquire into, and report on ways and means of implementing decentralisation in Rhodesia. It submitted its findings in 1972 but, for the third time, no action was taken. According to Tapela, although this protracted inaction on the part of the settler governments since the 1950s regarding the implementation of the decentralisation policy was part of a more general problem characteristic of the policy formulation-implementation discourse, two specific practical causes of this quiescence are evident. Firstly, in 1974 the government’s ideas on decentralisation were elaborated in the white paper entitled Policy on Decentralisation. This paper defined decentralisation as “the economic development of growth points outside the major cities with particular reference to commercial and industrial activities.” The internal inconsistencies within this policy paper as well as its disregard for recommendations of the previous select committees were the major causes of the delay in implementing decentralisation. Secondly, there were no positive measures and clear guidelines for implementing such a policy. This was exacerbated by a slow-down in real growth in the economy in the 1970s and the escalation of the national liberation war. In particular, the vagaries of the war economy watered down or neutralised necessary political pressures coming from white representatives from the smaller and distant centres who formed the core of the most vocal and powerful advocacy for decentralisation. From 1974 to 1978, little had been accomplished regarding the implementation of decentralisation. This state of affairs is not surprising if it is recognised that the legal and administrative foundations


as well as the promotional aspects of urban decentralisation were still inadequate at that time. Similarly, it is doubtful whether there was enough political pressure or will to facilitate the location of economic activities at less favoured points or, worse still, in the TTLs.

The overall effect of the white paper, the Select Committees that preceded it, and subsequent legislation meant that the implementation of decentralised urban development between the 1950s and mid-1970s remained effectively limited to European areas. The concept was spread to the TTLs when TILCOR started promoting irrigation-based growth points in the rural areas. In fact, the ultimate objective of the Sanyati Project was “to create a growth point [and] a commercial centre must naturally be a component of such a growth point.” 518 The formation of TILCOR was to reinforce and complement the policy of Community Development and the work of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority (SLA) in a big way.

Emergence of Sanyati TILCOR Growth Point:-

Although TILCOR established itself in Sanyati in 1974 the problems of adopting decentralisation alluded to above made it difficult to create a growth point at that time. The ARDA growth point in Sanyati was only established in 1977 primarily because of favourable and specific advantages of siting which were linked to the existence of irrigation at Gowe and the Main TILCOR Estate in its vicinity. In fact, in 1974, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was responsible for the Affairs of “TTLs,” appointed TILCOR as its “agent in the initiation, promotion, planning, implementation and administration of growth points” in general. 519 More specifically, TILCOR’s aims and objectives were three-fold. In the first instance, it aimed to create rural growth points in the best possible situations away from the main centres. Secondly, such growth points were intended to profit or benefit the area around them, and lastly, TILCOR was geared to make jobs available, not only on the Estates and in the towns, but through improved conditions in the surrounding area. 520

Although TILCOR was basically an agricultural authority, these added responsibilities were justified for three main reasons. Firstly, there was a potential for development of urban centres, which could flourish from the agricultural operations of the corporation (e.g. at Gowe and the Main Estate). Secondly, TILCOR was at that time the “unchallenged authority working in communal areas” and therefore stood a better chance of understanding the situation there than any other agency. Thirdly, TILCOR had the financial and organisational ability to undertake the development of towns owing to its

519 TILCOR, TILCOR History, TILCOR, Internal, 1974, 2. N.B. A growth point, as TILCOR perceived it, entailed the development of primary industry (agriculture), secondary industry (crop processing), commercial services, welfare services and township services.
invested infrastructure and equipment and the presence of skilled personnel already engaged in TILCOR operations in the communal areas. 521 From selected and already established or designated TILCOR estates, the corporation was to be responsible for creating seven initially selected growth points namely, Sanyati, Mashumbi Pools, Mazarabani, Hauna, Tsholotsho, Ngwezi and Maphisa. (See Maps 11 and 12 of potential and established growth points or urban regions in Zimbabwe). TILCOR favoured the setting up of a few large Townships rather than the prevailing situation where there was what it called “ribbon development” (unplanned development) with business centres every three miles or so which meant that the average shopkeeper could not stay in business for a year. 522 What was more preferable to TILCOR was to have Councils and Tribal Land Authorities concentrating on one Township in each “TTL” in an effort to initiate major business ventures in all the “TTLs.” These were the principles which were applied and eventually marked the establishment of Sanyati as the first “New” Town (“Growth Point”) in colonial Zimbabwe under the auspices of TILCOR.

In addition to managing the existing Estate and laying out the town centre, TILCOR also had to operate an annex tenant farming scheme (Gowe) established in 1967 to teach basic principles of agriculture in general and irrigation techniques in relation to cash crop production in particular. As already indicated, schemes such as Gowe were to create a group of local African expert or Master Farmers who could later help spread demonstration effects in their areas by buying their own farms or leasing farms in the Native Purchase Areas or APAs, later known as African Purchase Lands (APLs), or merely practicing such skills in the communal areas. According to K. H. Wekwete, since the 1950s, growth centre planning has been one of the key features of regional development planning. 523 It was initially linked with industrial development and economic growth, but has increasingly shifted towards provision of basic services. In most developing countries, the objectives of the policy included:

(a) a desire to strengthen the settlement hierarchy to promote balanced and equitable development;
(b) promoting physical and social infrastructure development, particularly in rural areas;
(c) strengthening generation of diversified productive employment with linkages to the rural economy; and
(d) improving efficiency and delivery of services within a decentralised planning framework. 524

Something along these objectives was, therefore, attempted in Zimbabwe especially after the colonial government had realised in the 1960s that there were vivid signs of

521 TILCOR, TILCOR History, TILCOR, Internal, 1974, 2.
522 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280745, Location R19.10.5.3F, File: DEV/1 Planning Policy, “Township Services,” in Brief Notes on a Meeting Held Between TILCOR and ADA Staff in the TILCOR Board Room on the 23rd November 1971 at 8.30 AM, 4.
underdevelopment in the “TTLs,” which represented poorly developed areas with weak links to the urban centres of the country. In this decade, the European sector had a fairly well developed hierarchy of settlements reflecting its diverse activities represented by agriculture, mining, manufacturing and commerce. The urban settlement hierarchy reflected the “European” economy. The Africans were officially not urban dwellers. They were temporary sojourners in urban areas, who would retire to their rural homes. There were also no urban centres in the African areas, but small business centres providing limited basic necessities, hence it was important to embrace a growth policy geared to achieve a whole range of other social, political and economic objectives. The colonial realisation of the problem of underdevelopment in the rural areas led to the official adoption of the growth point policy, which was spearheaded by TILCOR - a parastatal organisation established by an Act of Parliament in November 1968. The policy was based on the logic of creating “African towns in African areas,” which would generate employment for Africans and halt the influx to European towns. The development of growth points was to take place within a framework that would consolidate the policy of separate development, as was the case with the “Homeland” growth points in South Africa.

Concerned about the dearth of economic development and the failure by the urban sector to absorb all job seekers, the Whitsun Foundation proposed in one of its Programme Support papers that integrating the rural areas (which constitute about 80% of the population) into the national economy was one durable solution to the challenges facing Rhodesia at the time. It argued that “a cornerstone of Rhodesia’s development strategy [was] to bring the TTLs into the mainstream of the economy.” This was essential because the low levels of physical and service infrastructure meant that the areas were characterised by low productivity of both land and labour. Average family incomes were under half that of the wages received at the lowest end of the formal sector and suffered considerable variability. As observed in chapter two, over the years, these areas have come to depend on money transfers from wage earners, but at a price – the able-bodied and those who provide much of the leadership are absent. Thus, the inability of the

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526 The Whitsun Foundation was conceived in 1974 by several leading Rhodesian business and professional men. The name, incidentally, derives from the fact that the first meeting of the prospective founders took place over the Whitsun weekend (holiday) in that year (1974). It was established as a private non-profit development agency in August 1975 and its broad objectives were to pursue the economic development of the country with specific reference to the least developed sectors of the economy. For more detail on the foundation see POZ Library, Box FR 2627-2647, File: FR 2636/49574 “The Whitsun Foundation – An Outline Prospectus,” (Salisbury: Whitsun Foundation, June 1978), 1 and POZ Library, Box FR 2126-2136, File: FR 2132/46950, Rhodesia National Farmers Union: Information Folder No. 16: The Whitsun Foundation, (Salisbury: Whitsun Foundation, November 1977).

527 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 272099, Location R19.3.12.1F: File: ADA/MAR/2 Marketing – General, Whitsun Foundation: Zimbabwe Promotion Council, s.a., 1.
formal sector to generate employment at the level commensurate with the rapid growth in population and especially of new entrants to the labour market meant that the greater part of the solution would have to be found in the countryside.

TILCOR, as the new body responsible for initiating development projects in the TTLs on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, “recognised the need to establish rural growth points as foci for service provision and modernisation of the basically subsistence economy.” 528 When TILCOR came to Sanyati, its functions were subsequently widened from merely those of developing irrigation schemes to include the creation of rural agricultural processing and marketing towns next to its estates. Founded in 1977, Sanyati is the largest of this first generation of irrigation-based growth centres and, by 1980, it had already attained growth centre status. (See Map 12 showing TILCOR/ARDA-promoted growth points). 529 The service region as assessed by TILCOR in 1976 was delineated to include the communal areas of Sanyati, Gandavaroyi, Sebungwe, Gokwe and also incorporated the APLs of Copper Queen and Chenjiri (See Maps 8 and 13). In line with fostering development in the rural areas the Ministry of Internal Affairs had, as early as 1972, confirmed that $200 000 had been earmarked for primary development on growth points and TILCOR had also accepted that they were going to plan accordingly with 1973 in mind although the best prospects in their projection were for 1974 or after. 530 Since the announcement of this capital injection into growth point development, TILCOR representatives started planning to visit the DC Gatooma (A. Cousins) in connection with the continued investigation and planning for the growth point, probably at Gowe. Subsequently, during the week starting 21st May 1973, Messrs D. Ashton and Stu Farrow from TILCOR Head Office paid a familiarisation visit to the areas which were being investigated. 531 The TILCOR Board of Directors comprising W. A. Bailey (Chairman), W. H. H. Nicolle, W. A. Pittman, J. A. M. Smith and W. D. Walker ensured that such visits became more frequent until the growth point was officially commissioned.

530 NAZ (RC), Ministry Of Internal Affairs, Box 158089, Location C19.6.8R, File: LAN 9 Tribal Trust Lands General, Sanyati, March 1966 – May 1973, “Minutes of the 43rd Meeting of Representatives of TILCOR and Internal Affairs, Held in the TILCOR Board Room on Friday, 6th October 1972,” 2.
It should be pointed out, however, that the growth point policy is essentially a parallel strategy to the 1974 decentralisation policy in the sense that its conception was confined within the other national spatial system - TTLs - and under a separate administrative authority and statute. Using Sanyati growth point as an example, TILCOR launched a massive campaign to galvanise countrywide support for the new rural development package they had unveiled. In May 1978, the statutory body warned stakeholders of the consequences for Rhodesia of failing to seize the opportunity to decentralise and expand their businesses to cover the outlying areas of the country. TILCOR argued: “Major opportunities for industrialists will be found in the TTLs in the future and if existing organisations do not recognise this fact, an invasion of international companies with highly sophisticated management structures will move in to fill the vacuum.”

This was the message TILCOR were going to convey to the Association of Rhodesian Industries (ARnI) at their annual congress to be held at Victoria Falls from May 31 to June 2. A TILCOR spokesman told the Financial Gazette: “These international people will not be slow in recognising the potential and the opportunities that are available, but we believe that existing industrialists have the right to be the early worms in this case.”

This appeal came out of TILCOR’s realisation that their organisation, which started commercial operations in the “TTLs” in 1969, had up to that point (1978), only “scratched the surface” because not many growth points had been established. However, ten potential growth points existed and of these two had reached “urbanisation.” In one of these, namely, Sanyati, approximately 50% of the entrepreneurs involved were African. At that stage, TILCOR employed 130 Europeans and 6 000 Africans and it had capital assets valued at $17 million, 60% of which was government-owned and 40% privately owned.

Of its 37 executive members, two were African and one, Robbie Mupawose, had been appointed “group agriculturalist.” To further encourage local investors the spokesman said:

All that this grant-aided organisation [TILCOR] undertakes must, according to its terms of reference, be profitable, but once an enterprise is running it is open for any entrepreneur to take it over [and] African businessmen are becoming increasingly involved in these undertakings.

He went on to say:

Before the escalation of the war and world depression combined to curtail Rhodesian expansion, industry was generating 60-70000 new jobs a year [and] TILCOR envisaged a situation where, without the help of external “hand-outs,” Rhodesia could herself provide the necessary broad spectrum of expansion and fulfilment of job expectancy within a period of 15 years.

533 Ibid.
534 Ibid.
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
An assessment of development potential throughout the country suggested a figure of $750 million over 15 years as a realistic estimate and that this was a most attractive international investment prospect. TILCOR went on to stress the point that their plans did not take on board developments of the “new town” variety, which had been tried elsewhere. Instead, they envisaged a “natural evolution,” probably of market towns in the first place, followed by the establishment of secondary and tertiary industries, all based on a combination of existing natural resources to provide the necessary “catalyst.” The TILCOR contribution to the ARnI Congress formed part of a forum dealing with the broad theme of “Industry in Transition.” Indeed, the transitional period was not an easy one but once Sanyati had been established it revealed a number of lessons. How TILCOR impacted on the overall development of Sanyati (especially on the basis of its Main Irrigation Scheme) is very evident. The birth of the Main Irrigation Scheme in Sanyati, whose parent body (TILCOR) gave rise to the growth point, will be discussed later in chapter four.

**TILCOR Aims (1974-1980):**

With the advent of TILCOR at Sanyati in March 1974, the insistence on improving the lot of the pilot settler farmers assumed enormous dimensions. Paramount consideration was given to promoting a viable pattern of irrigation settlement at Gowe and to testing this pattern and the individual settlers for an initial period of three years, in which strict control of both the settlers’ production programme and their finances were exercised.\(^537\) In fact, under TILCOR the management of land, capital and labour was thrust into the hands of “technically qualified Europeans”\(^538\) who co-ordinated and made all decisions regarding land preparation, planting, irrigation, reaping, pest control, harvesting and marketing with “African” supervisors to simplify control of the fieldwork of the peasants.\(^539\) This system was perpetuated throughout the colonial era with no consideration of the settlers ever becoming independent decision makers.

The managers of the scheme, who were mainly white, also thought it incumbent upon themselves to ensure that the most suitable applicants (i.e. those of the highest quality) intending to join the scheme were selected. Preferably, the settlers had to have abundant previous farming, especially irrigation, experience.\(^540\) TILCOR’s objectives at Gowe can be equated with its objectives at Ngwezi, Antelope and Chisumbanje smallholder schemes, which had already attained outgrower status. The reasons for establishing these as outgrower schemes were very clear. Gowe, just like the other projects mentioned above, became an outgrower section in 1974 for purely strategic reasons. According to Pazvakavambwa, it was supposed to act as a “captive labour market” for the Sanyati

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\(^{539}\) Ibid., 2-3.

\(^{540}\) Ibid., 4.
Main Estate, which was set up in the same year. 541 In general, the mushrooming of outgrower irrigation schemes between 1965 and 1974 was, as already stated, part of a programme to boost textiles and exports. For M. G. Paraiwa, a former Senior Planner (Economist) with ARDA and a former Director of DDF’s Transport, Plant and Equipment Unit (now retired), the need to promote a viable pattern of irrigation settlement at Gowe was given a boost by TILCOR towards the mid-1970’s as a result of general Government policy to establish outgrower settlements at all its TILCOR and Sabi-Limpopo operated Estates. 542 Nevertheless, TILCOR pursued an apartheid-type of development policy, which was largely designed to curb the massively threatening rural-urban drift. 543 The Bantu Investment Corporation of South Africa Limited was designed to achieve similar objectives in what were disparagingly termed Bantu areas. The Senate and the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa enacted the BIC Act in 1959. In general, the object of this Corporation was to promote and encourage industrial and other undertakings and to act as a development, financial and investment institution among “Bantu persons” 544 in the “Bantu areas,” 545 and to provide for other incidental matters. Its more specific field of operation was confined exclusively to promoting and encouraging the economic development of Bantu persons and Bantu undertakings in the “Bantu areas”. This included:

(a) the provision of capital or means, technical and other assistance, the furnishing of expert and specialised advice, information and guidance;
(b) the encouragement and extension of existing industrial, financial and other undertakings;
(c) the encouragement and establishment of new industrial, financial and other undertakings;
(d) the encouragement of thrift;
(e) the planning and promotion of capital accumulation;
(f) the promotion of self-help in the economic sphere; and
(g) the undertaking of such further tasks as the Governor-General may determine and define by proclamation in the Gazette. 546

541 Pazvakavambwa, Personal Interview, 2nd April 1997.
542 M. G. Paraiwa, Personal Interview, Harare, 5th November 1996.
543 Pazvikavambwa, Personal Interview, 2nd April 1997. N.B. TILCOR’s effort in agriculture generally followed and complemented the efforts of the Internal Affairs Agricultural Officers. For more detail on this see NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280745, Location R19.10.5.3F, File: DEV/1 Planning Policy, “TILCOR’s Policy with Regard to Agriculture in the Tribal Trust Lands,” Brief Notes on a Meeting Held Between TILCOR and ADA Staff in the TILCOR Board Room on the 23rd November 1971 at 8.30 AM, 2.
544 NASA (UA), “Bantu person” referred to a “native” (African) as defined in section one of the Population Registration Act, 1950 (Act No. 30 of 1950), and included a “Bantu” company, a “Bantu” corporate body, a “Bantu” association and a “Bantu” partnership.
545 NASA (UA), “Bantu areas” referred to (a) the areas described in the Native Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act No. 18 of 1936), as scheduled or released “native” areas; and (b) the land and areas referred to in section four of the South-West Africa Native Affairs Administration Act, 1954 (Act No. 56 of 1954). N.B. South-West Africa is now the modern state of Namibia.
Just like the BIC, TILCOR had a mandate to operate in the rural areas and ensure that the African population was content and would not flood the towns in search of employment. This was part and parcel of the South African Government’s policy of separate development, which was a key racial segregationist feature of the Apartheid era.

The conversion, in 1974, of Gowe into an outgrowers scheme was a deliberate effort to retain a reliable pool of labour for the Sanyati Main Estate. In fact, on the whole, outgrowers were created to stop the movement of labour to the towns and cities, which in turn would help maintain a labour reservoir for TILCOR/ARDA schemes.

Scrutinised further, it can be seen that after 1974 the Gowe Settler Irrigation Scheme was intended to serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, the Gowe plot-holders were required to provide labour to the Core Estate on a tenantry basis, whereas on the other, the scheme was meant to be a source of revenue (income generation) for the tenants who received technical assistance from the Main Estate. This symbiotic and often exploitative relationship between Gowe and the Sanyati Core Estate continued to flourish up to 2000. The details of this relationship will be examined later in this study.


Agricultural extension work has an important and long history in Zimbabwe. A point that has been demonstrated in Chapter two is that, among African farmers, the Rhodesian government’s tradition of extension entailed using this service to enforce government rules and teach general management skills. Since the 1960s up to independence, there was increased use of extension services for the management of irrigation and grazing schemes, for land-use planning in resettlement and communal areas and for the enforcement of conservation rules. Historically, extension efforts for Africans began in 1926, with the appointment of an American former missionary, E. D. Alvord, to constitute the Department of Native Agriculture in the then Ministry of Native Affairs. The focus of early extension efforts was on crop separation, crop rotation, and manure use, through demonstration plots and the training of master farmers. However, these technologies were of limited value. As long as the African and European services remained separate the sharing of agricultural knowledge was not feasible.

Despite considerable extension efforts, at his retirement in 1946, Alvord made an illuminating admission of failure when he remarked that he had found no positive trend in yields either on demonstration plots or on farmer fields. In fact, as already noted in the previous chapter, in the 1950s and 1960s, relations between African farmers and

547 Pazvakavambwa, Personal Interview, 2nd April 1997.
548 Ibid.
government extension agents were decisively soured by the implementation of the NLHA. The Act imposed harsh restrictions on farmers, aiming “to provide for the control of the utilization and allocation of land occupied by natives to ensure its efficient use for agricultural purposes” and “to require natives to perform labour for conserving natural resources and for promoting good husbandry.” That is why the Act’s major provisions, namely freehold tenure, compulsory destocking and forced labour on soil conservation projects, were extremely unpopular, totally unsuccessful and eventually abandoned in 1961. It was the abandonment of the NLHA and the transfer of extension efforts from the Ministry of Native Affairs to the Ministry of Agriculture, which helped to restore some degree of professionalism to the extension service.

From a technical point of view, TILCOR’s efforts at Gowe were complemented by the Department of Agricultural Development (DEVAG). DEVAG’s activities at Gowe started in 1976. Prior to July 1 1978, the Ministry of Internal Affairs handled rural agricultural matters. From that date onwards, these matters were moved to the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development and renamed the Department of Agricultural Development. DEVAG, whose head office was in Salisbury, had eight provincial offices and 53 district offices. Of its 1 600 staff, about 1 450 were professionally or technically trained. The extension teams at head office and in the provinces could call on specialists in planning, conservation, training, agronomy, irrigation, livestock and pastures. The main objectives of DEVAG were to carry out the policies of government in relation to the agricultural development of the “TTLs”: to promote the development of the people in the “TTLs” through the medium of agricultural extension; and to examine, plan and implement agriculturally based rural development. Through these objectives it was hoped to raise per capita incomes and hence the standard of living and the quality of life of “TTL” inhabitants. It was also hoped that gradually “TTL” farmers would be brought into the cash economy, thereby contributing to the national economy. However, the contemporary wisdom that African farmers were no cash croppers has already been refuted. The wise use and conservation of natural resources was encouraged by DEVAG in the hope that agricultural production on a sustained basis would be raised. The major outcomes expected of this policy were that first it should provide sufficient food for the local population and secondly contribute to national production, particularly of exportable crops. The Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, which was initiated by the DC Gatooma on behalf of the then Ministry of Internal Affairs, was operated and controlled by this Ministry in conjunction with DEVAG. In the words of M. G. Paraiwa

Originally the scheme was managed by the former Ministry of Internal Affairs through the Gatooma District Commissioner, who continued to

551 Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 59.
554 Ibid.
555 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/GENERAL (Sanyati), E. F. Hanratty (Urban Controller) to S. G. Heilbrown (Water Apportionment Board, Ministry of Works, Power and Communications, Mbabani, Swaziland), s.a., 1. N.B. DEVAG was responsible for communal area extension.
administer it for the Ministry of Home Affairs, the successor to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to the end of June 1980. 556

However, he maintains “The day-to-day management of the scheme officially remained in the hands of DEVAG until the end of August, 1980, when this was transferred to TILCOR/Sanyati.” 557

During DEVAG’s tenure of office, the Gowe peasant farmers were trained and provided with extension advice. 558 The promotion of conservation awareness was accorded serious priority. This can be seen in the appointment, in 1976, of a Settlement Officer or a Settler Extension Manager, and Extension Assistants, who helped the farmers with information, inter-alia, on contouring, how to plough, what appropriate crops to grow, their rotation and what amount and type of fertiliser to apply. 559 In general, these Extension Assistants (sometimes referred to as Settlement Assistants) were site or plot supervisors who performed a liaison function between the tenants as a group and the Agricultural Department. The settlement officers imparted knowledge that enabled some plot holders to significantly raise their agricultural output. DEVAG continued to play this role as well as promoting the Master Farm scheme and good yields before the control of Gowe was handed over to TILCOR/Sanyati. Real transfer of control from DEVAG to Sanyati took place in September 1980, but on a managing agency basis, as TILCOR’s report and revenue and capital budgets for operating the scheme was still in the process of being considered by the Ministries concerned, and no final approval had been obtained yet. 560

The decision made in 1980 by the then Secretary for Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development to transfer the administration of Gowe from DEVAG to TILCOR was based on the consideration that TILCOR was already on the ground in the close vicinity of the scheme and so was better suited to providing services to the scheme than DEVAG. 561 Indeed, because Gowe was adjacent to an existing TILCOR project at Sanyati, it was logical that it be administered from this Estate. These developments coincided with the merger in October 1981 of the two pre-independence agricultural extension organisations - CONEX, which had operated only in the commercial farming areas, and DEVAG, responsible for communal area extension - to form a unified agency, the Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX), which has been renamed the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension (AREX) since 2003. 562 This seemed to mark a break in relationship between Gowe and DEVAG. Up to


557 Ibid., 3-4.

558 Ibid., 4.


560 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser, TILCOR Regional Manager (Mashonaland) to the Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development (Harare), 26th February, 1981, 1.

561 Ibid.

2000, the new agency, AGRITEX (now AREX), which falls under the Ministry of Agriculture, was providing very little or no extension service at all to the Gowe Irrigation Scheme.

It can be noted that both TILCOR and DEVAG had a mission to accomplish at Gowe. Overall, they were, among other things, mandated to promote rural development. In a related development the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Ian Douglas Smith, stressed:

It is our [RF Government] wish and our intention that we go on developing this country. We realize that it is very important that the country must be developed. We must stimulate the economy and help it to expand in order to take account of the continually increasing population. We must continue to try to maintain the peaceful conditions and the harmonious race relations which we have in Rhodesia and I believe that in these two regards we are an example to the rest of the world. We will try to maintain this.  

Nevertheless, viewed against the general background that the whites were mainly engrossed in strengthening and consolidating their economic and political grip on the country, the claim by Smith during parliament in 1968 and 1969 that his government was using these agencies to pursue altruistic motives in relation to the general welfare of rural Africans in colonial Zimbabwe is highly deceptive. The Africans were not the major beneficiaries of such colonial policies.

OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF GOWE (1970-1979)

High priority for Gowe:

Despite the hardships of the late 1960s, the 1970s were viewed as successful years. It is possible that the state was employing new rhetoric to pre-empt the escalating liberation struggle. In 1970, members of parliament, after noticing the success of many smallholder schemes, started to urge the Government to pursue with vigour and on a wider front, the establishment of irrigation schemes for the inhabitants of the poor rainfall areas. Gowe, in particular, was regarded as having huge potential and had to be given high priority for 1970. The scheme deserved priority because it was perceived to be producing excellent results. For example, at Gowe the net profits varied among plotholders from $119 to $493 depending on labour input. The commonest form of labour was household based.

566 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969).
However, a small group of well-to-do plotholders used the traditional voluntary work group (*humwe*) if they could not do all the work with the labour of their family. This group often preferred to work the land of rich plotholding irrigation entrepreneurs because they provided ample food and drink to the workers. The income from green maize was $10 per bag. Maize yields varied between 16½ and 45½ bags per acre, wheat between 15 and 21½ and cotton between 1 094 and 3 167 lbs. 568 These were the three major crops grown at the scheme, as it was almost impractical to practise a 4-crop rotation.

These results encouraged the white settler government to hold Gowe up as a “self-provisioning asset” in the drought-stricken area of Sanyati. As already noted, the initial irrigation surveys were concentrated in the low rainfall areas of the country, which was in keeping with the Government’s declared policy. In discussions leading up to the promulgation of the Agricultural Development Authority 569 Act of July 1971, the government considered it necessary to have an agency or corporation to plan, organise, co-ordinate and implement agricultural development projects in the national interest. 570 In spite of this official pronouncement, in Gowe the plotholders still received a raw deal. By 1972, they hardly afforded their own agricultural machinery. They continued to hire ADF ploughs and sometimes they got these on loan from Modern Farm Equipment Gatooma. 571 The plotholders paid the usual land preparation fee of $15.00. Such charges reduced the plotholders’ potential net income and, hence, Gowe could hardly be a “self-provisioning” scheme. A few better off small-scale irrigators, however, did not struggle to meet their own production costs.

In fact, the cost of production on each plot was quite heavy. The table below illustrates how high the cost of wheat production per plot was in 1973.

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569 The Agricultural Development Authority (ADA) is now the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA).
Table 3.2: COST OF PRODUCTION – WHEAT (1973)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>COST OF PRODUCTION (WHEAT - 1973)</th>
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<tr>
<td>EXPENDITURE</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Soil Preparation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Fertilisers “D” and “AN”</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Tokwe Seed</td>
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<td>4. Combining</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Transport of fertilisers</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Transport of wheat at 50c per bag</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. 33 sacks at 31c each</td>
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<td>8. Water Rates</td>
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<tr>
<td>RECEIPTS</td>
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<td>Average yield 33 bags at $6.40 each</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less cost of production</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated profit per plot</td>
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The Agricultural Officer, A. R. Harvey, contended that in 1973 the Gowe plotholders produced a total of 1 198 bags of wheat from 63 acres. In this year, the average yield per acre of 19 bags was regarded by the Agricultural Officer as “the best ever achieved at Gowe.” However, the so-called wonderful yields were not matched by the net profits that accrued to the farmers, which were estimated at $97,07 per plot. The relatively huge cost of production siphoned off and limited, to a large extent, the plotholders’ potential profit margin. Some of the plotholders’ accumulation prospects were seriously hampered by circumstances beyond their control.

The plight of the farmers was worsened since 1972 when the policy of giving loans for seed and fertiliser to “all and sundry” was drastically curtailed. In response to what the Secretary for Internal Affairs felt were unsatisfactory yields for the 1971/72 season (no figures have been quoted) as a result of the alleged poor standard of some farmers occupying the irrigation plots, it was declared that each farmer at Gowe was “now expected to pay for his requirements.” Very strong sentiments were also expressed that the Department of Internal Affairs needed to be more selective in future and to thoroughly

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573 Ibid.
574 Ibid.
576 Ibid.
assess the farmers’ ability before they were given full-sized plots to cultivate. The Secretary went further to justify his decision against giving loans to these farmers (especially those who were not delivering) when he asserted: “It is apparent that the farmer who has invested his own money in a crop achieves a much higher standard than one who has obtained a loan to purchase his seed and fertiliser requirements.” 577

Whilst there could be some measure of truth in this assertion, the Secretary for Internal Affairs seems to have overlooked the debilitating effects of the severe drought experienced in the 1972/73 season on the farmers’ performance. Equally ignored was the fact that the establishment of an irrigation holding called for a high level of capital investment by the settlers which was beyond the capacity of most of them. This, coupled with the curtailment of loans for seed and fertiliser, led many of the farmers to leave the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. 578 Obviously, the farmers found themselves in an unenviable position as they were hardly allowed to participate and take a share in the national cake. A point worth noting is that a lot of emphasis was placed on smallholder irrigation as a means of promoting socio-economic development in arid areas. Although output increased in certain cases, it can be argued that this was achieved at the expense of economic efficiency and organisational sustainability. The main reason for this partial success can be attributed to deliberate over-emphasis on centralised, bureaucratic planning and management of schemes, with insufficient attention being paid to the participation of farmers and other stakeholders. 579 It would appear, then, that what were termed “national interests” were, in fact, white settler interests.

In this instance, instead of bringing considerable benefit to the inhabitants of Gowe, settler agricultural policies, therefore, impacted negatively on the economy of this area as a whole. 580 The situation was not ameliorated either by the tense security position as a result of the liberation struggle and the 1972/73 drought. 581 The struggle intensified markedly between 1972 and 1979. During the war Ian Smith tried to appease Africans who had been disgruntled by being forcibly moved to infertile pieces of land by both the NLHA and the Land Tenure Act by setting up more irrigation projects in their areas. It was against this backdrop that TILCOR Sanyati Estate was established by the government in March 1974.

579 Whilst community participation is crucial for achieving sustainable development, it will not occur unless a conscious effort is made to ensure that the intended beneficiaries are empowered to make their own decisions and are allowed to take risks. N. B. The intended beneficiaries will not always be willing to make their own decisions and take risks unless there are benefits and opportunities to be had. Potential net benefits and opportunities must be demonstrated, where possible, by the development agents concerned or the government. More detail on the merits and demerits of community participation in development and on irrigation as an instrument of sustainable development in developing areas can be obtained from J. A. Thomas and W. J. Stilwell (eds.), Proceedings of the International Workshop on Smallholder Irrigation: Community Participation and Sustainable Development 27-29 April 1993, (Bergendal Camp, Kruger National Park, South Africa: the Water Research Commission/WRC, the Development Bank of Southern Africa/DBSA and the South African Sugar Association/SASA, October 1994), 1-89.
The Sanyati scheme was followed by the creation of several other rural ventures including a few urban ones such as the Seki (Seke) Industrial Projects in Chitungwiza. These developments did not, however, either stop the war or completely halt the process of differentiation but they definitely slowed it down. The Sanyati scheme continued to operate in an economy that was now under siege from two stand points of national magnitude, namely sanctions and the war. A number of factors made the Government to decide to create the Main Estate in spite of the war. The background reasons for this can be seen in the process that culminated in the formation of the Agricultural Development Authority (ADA), which later incorporated the rural aspect to become the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA).

**EMERGENCE OF ESTATE AGRICULTURE**

**Formation of ARDA – functions, powers and organisation:**

**Parliamentary Debates:**

By 1965 when the government declared UDI, agriculture had already become the engine of economic development in Southern Rhodesia. As far as the state was concerned, what was lacking at the time was a coherent and vibrant agricultural organisation which was all embracing and which had a national outlook. It is true that the Sabi-Limpopo Authority/SLA (1965), CONEX and TILCOR (1967) were already on the ground, but in terms of policy formulation an Agricultural Development Corporation or Authority (ADC/ADA) with clear principles and functions was missing.

Contributing to debate in parliament, H. R. Hack, the Chief Planning Officer of the SLA, emphasised the importance of understanding “principles and where we stand at the moment, because if you don’t understand where we stand at the moment, obviously our direction is going to be warped.” 582 He developed his argument by raising three pertinent points. The first one was that “agriculture provides the principal source of livelihood, directly and indirectly, for more than three-quarters of the country's population [and] if you’re talking about an Agricultural Development Corporation, you’ve got to start right there.” 583 Secondly, he conceded that, “Agriculture’s place in the internal economy is its importance in the export trade and as an earner of foreign exchange.” Hack stated the third point by saying: “… in Rhodesia, the number of European farmers is tending to remain static or declining slightly,” adding that, “In the Phillips Report – and several other reports that have been written on agriculture – it is stated emphatically that agriculture will continue to be our main industry for a considerable time to come by virtue of the resources of land, water and labour which we have…” Thus, great emphasis had to be put on developing this industry on which the success of the economy rested. Hence, “agriculture is the line that this country [Rhodesia] has got to promote if we’re going to get anywhere in the world.” Putting it in a nutshell, Hack observed that, in order to develop agriculture, the sector needed three basic elements, namely, “capital, water

582 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 1.

583 Ibid.
and markets.” How to achieve these three seemed to be the only sticky point in a country where “…the human skills, the research and the land [were] all available in quantity.”

For Hack, capital or finance could only be secured by producing well-documented land development project plans for presentation to outside investors. He argued that, in order “to draw capital in any shape or form [from Europe and the Americas]” project plans were crucial. As far as water is concerned, he believed Rhodesia was well endowed with this resource. However, the big question was “… where and how to harness these [water] resources to best advantage, and having harnessed them, how best to utilize them?” Continuing his argument, he insisted that, “… water harnessed now will double, treble and quadruple in value over the next twenty-five years.” Hence, any commodity that had the capacity to do that was a “sound investment by anybody’s standards.” Citing the example of South Africa to emphasise the value of investing in water, Hack stated that, within a period of three years, water which was conserved for agricultural development at £1 an acre foot in 1971, was being sold to Johannesburg (or brought out of agriculture to Johannesburg) at £30 an acre foot by 1974.

The Chief Planning Officer perceived labour as an essential component which hardly needed elaboration when he said: “I think labour is our biggest single resource, and if not utilized will become an embarrassment and possibly a very costly embarrassment.” On the other hand, he believed that securing markets was also crucial. In his opinion “markets are normally only secured where a quality product is available in volume [at the right price],” and this, he felt, “can only be done in agriculture, and agriculture … is the only thing we’ve got to play with in Rhodesia – industry is way behind.”

By making these submissions, Hack was trying to underscore the point that Southern Rhodesia needed an umbrella organisation that was capable of taking advantage of the availability of capital, labour, markets and water to foster agricultural development. It can be admitted that, although several institutions such as the Rhodesia National Farmers Union (RNFU), the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands Department, the Natural Resources Board, Research and Water Development existed, they were primarily service or administrative departments serving existing structures but not creating an organisation befitting the ADA bill which was being outlined in Parliament.

As the bill went through its various stages, legislators were at variance as to whether an ADA was necessary or not. Some of the questions that pre-occupied them included: 1. Who wants an ADA? 2. Why do we want an ADA? 3. Whose idea is it (who mooted the idea)? 4. What is an ADA going to do? 5. What are its terms of reference? 6. What is it going to fill – are you sure it is not filled already and isn’t it going to overlap something?

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584 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 1-2.
585 Ibid. , 2.
586 Ibid. , 2-3.
587 Ibid. , 4.
588 Ibid.
589 Ibid.
Responding to all these questions A. Griffith from the Ministry of Agriculture said: “The present delineation of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority's area is an arbitrary one … one which does not even include whole river catchments … This arbitrary delineation should be removed and the Sabi-Limpopo Authority should operate over the whole of the country …”

In essence, the Ministry of Agriculture were trying to demonstrate their unflinching support for an all-encompassing agricultural organisation. In their opinion, the concept of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority was not wide enough because what applied in the south-eastern Lowveld (where the SLA was situated) – i.e. the need for development – applied equally throughout the country. There was no greater need for development in the south-eastern Lowveld than there was anywhere else. In addition, it can be noted that sound exploitation of natural resources had to be the keynote of development throughout the country and not only in one sector of it. It is a fact that the SLA (the precursor to ARDA) obtained an annual grant of £3 million when other projects such as the Matabeleland Development Corporation and the Insiza Scheme in Bulawayo also required huge outlays of funds. Thus, it was felt that if the Sabi-Limpopo Authority were allowed to continue operating in the confined area of the south-eastern part of the country, there was a danger that there would be a concentration of funds in that area, to the detriment of the highveld and the country as a whole.

In fact, the position of the Ministry of Agriculture was that, instead of inundating them with funds, it would be more beneficial if the Sabi-Limpopo Authority, in the role of an ADA, prepared well-documented project reports or plans over the entire country for submission to interested investors. Since sound and comprehensive planning was essential to interest investors, Government, therefore, needed “an agency or corporation to plan and implement projects to the point where private enterprise can be attracted.”

According to Hack who had been sent by CONEX to the United States (US) to do a specialised course on farm planning and land utilisation,

> If we set up an ADA, hit the single weakest point in agriculture – assuming agriculture is our biggest resource – what is the single weakest point in agriculture – water – and do it exactly within the frame of our Act. Hit the water, harness the water for a purpose, project the purpose, finance it with sufficient capital. [That is the trick].

Although the Ministry of Agriculture favoured the creation of ARDA, general sentiment against it was also expressed. Referring to what he termed “latest revenue estimates,” E. R. Fothergill, a top executive of the SLA, pointed out that, the Agricultural Revenue Vote (i.e. a grant vote which was not recoverable) was £12 435 000. The Loan Vote,
which was recoverable, was £13 764 000 – making a total of between £26 million and £26.4 million. 594 Continuing his argument he noted that, the Ministry of Agriculture had an organisation which could do the functions of the ADA, that is, the Conservation and Extension Section (CONEX). Their revenue vote was £1.6 million. They had a staff of 2 179, of which 325 were European, mainly involved in field and research activities. They were also advisory to the Minister and “in their special resources,” they did not do planning and implementation. They did planning to a certain extent and they advised on it. However, of concern to Fothergill was why, “with all this high expenditure going on in Agriculture,” CONEX could not do planning and implementation and the harnessing of water on all the highveld projects. 595 In addition, he warned: “If an ADA is being formed, let’s face facts, there will be another huge organization built up [after the SLA], and this is the fear of both Treasury officials and of many Senior Agricultural Officials, and there will be a vast duplication of services.” 596

In one of the most ferocious attacks on the idea of forming an ADA, Fothergill observed that “… What Agriculture is heading for is three authorities,” namely, a Marketing Authority (the AMA), the Development Authority (ADA), and a Research and Specialist Authority or the Department of Research and Specialist Services. 597 This, in his opinion, was not a palatable situation, as it was feared that these organisations would end up trampling on each other’s toes. Questioning the rationale for setting up such an Authority he asked and promptly answered himself when he said that, if these three Authorities were set up, Treasury would, once more, spend an enormous amount of money, as it was already financing a vast organisation (CONEX). He proceeded to say, “I was in Treasury when [CONEX] was built and we were horrified at the rate of its growth and what it was doing.” Fothergill further lamented why such a huge organisation “with over 2 000 staff – mainly African, of course,” could not be re-organised under the control of Government to do the job? He insisted that, if this was not possible it would, therefore, be necessary to “fold it up and have an ADA then.” 598 This was, however, clear demonstration of his lack of support for an ADA, which he equated to “another empire” which would deplete state coffers. In his words, the formation of the new Authority was horrifying because “… it’s going to be millions again – it’s not just going to be thousands of pounds or hundreds of thousands, it’s going to be a colossal sum of money.” 599

His criticism of the new organisation did not end there. On learning that ADA would incorporate into its stride the Agricultural and Land Settlement Board, the Agricultural Assistance Board (AAB) and the Rural Land Board, Fothergill became even more vicious in his attack against it. He felt that the Authority had an onerous task to finance the activities of such a broad institution. Taken individually, all were under-performing. The AAB, for instance, was struggling to meet its cost of administration which, up to 1971, amounted to £85 000 annually. In addition, it had “a million pound loan vote for lending

594 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 7.
595 Ibid.
596 Ibid., 7-8.
597 Ibid., 8.
598 Ibid., 8-9.
599 Ibid.
money out,” but it was facing extreme difficulty in recovering the money from farmers. The costs of running the other two Boards were equally mammoth. After all, agriculture’s function of developing the lowveld, as set out in the SLA Act, had not yet been accomplished, because, by 1971, it was still “virgin ground” which required about twenty five years to put its development plan into effect. Hence, according to Fothergill, “… it’s a full-time job for a handful of specialized people over here.” At the same time, taking over all the three organisations - land settlement, the AAB, the Rural Land Board – was indeed very cumbersome and over-ambitious. For him, thus, “The minute you build an empire, your specialist work goes down the drain,” and this prompted him to categorically announce that, “I’m afraid I’m not a supporter of this ADA.” 600 Furthermore, threatening to resign if ADA was formed, he insisted:

It’s with feeling that I speak on the subject, because I think that we haven’t fulfilled our own function – and our own function is the Sabi-Limpopo Act – it’s a big Act and it’s a big job and it’s a great challenge. If this Board [is] going to go into an ADA, then I’m afraid I lose respect for it, and I would go too. 601

A more mellow view was presented by the former secretary and chief economist of the SLA, W. D. Mills. 602 In his submission, he advocated for the identification of the difficulties facing agricultural organisations, and in his view, the difficulty confronting the Minister of Agriculture and Government in deciding whether or not to go for this sort of organisation (ADA), was posed by figures like the following:

The Agricultural Assistance Board, including the Grain Committee, has got £2 million invested in a rescue operation. The Farm Irrigation Fund has got £1,7 million invested, again in something of a higher grade than a rescue operation, but nevertheless it is trying to assist Agriculture. There’s £13,5 million outstanding in Land Bank loans, of which £6,2 million is short term, and £11,3 [million] long term. There’s £3,6 million outstanding to the SLA on long term. This is £21 million invested. 603

These figures reveal that this was no mean expenditure by Government. Such spending, coupled by an unspecified “once in forty year loan” 604 disbursed in 1965, in addition to an announcement in 1968 and 1970 that Government had paid out nearly £3,5 million in drought relief, is indicative of the problem when it is measured against the fact that

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600 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 9.
601 Ibid.
604 Ibid.
drought had hit incomes and necessitated direct grants and subsidies. It also revealed that agriculture was not doing well.

As far as Mills was concerned, the question to be asked was: Was it possible to devise any statutory instrument, any sort of a tool at all, which could remedy this situation – which could have State control take an interest, a financial interest, and possibly write off dead capital, reconstruct the financial structures of farms, put these people back into a position where they could again hold their heads up and start making profits? He appreciated the fact that the AAB, in an effort to alleviate these difficulties, had “found that in many cases all you need to do is lend the man a plough or tractor for deep ploughing and early land preparation, and the next year his head’s up high and his tail’s up.” This would obviously empower the farmers whilst at the same time lessening the burden on the part of government as far as the disbursement of grants and subsidies was concerned.

While suggestions were made to extend, expand or dissolve the SLA and amalgamate it into this new organisation (ADA), it should not be forgotten, firstly, that the former was set up for a specific, identifiable and limited regional development project, including all the infrastructure. A new organisation (ADA) in some instances had to have these powers, but it would be less limited, less identifiable and a good deal less specific than to build dams, sell the water and get farming estates developed. Secondly, it must be remembered that the country’s resources were not unlimited. Such limited resources did not allow money to be put into all the worthwhile projects, hence the emphasis was to concentrate investment resources on a selected number of new growth points until these growth points reached a big enough scale for self-generating growth.

According to Mills it was not wise

To dissipate investment resources in penny packets all over the place … The Land Bank, in the view of the AAB, has got a lot of farmers into trouble – gentlemen, you won’t repeat that, please – because every year it has merely given him another short term loan, or a little bit of a longer term loan, and it has just put the skids under this chap, instead of taking hold of him and his financial structure and saying, we are going to reconstruct you financially, we are going to write off that dead capital – we are going to give you this – we are going to set you up in a proper way. After all … many Rhodesian farmers have been set up and are comfortable to-day because of that. Two or three farmers have gone bust. Well, what is the sense of making the present farmers go bust – just write off his dead capital … and in the end you have got somebody with less rope around his neck.

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605 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 11.
606 Ibid.
607 Ibid.
608 Ibid., 11-12.
Denouncing further the idea of an ADA, he said “This Agricultural Development Authority might be much more wide open to political influence than the SLA [which had a specific regional project].” This implied that influences aimed at “parceling out what the Americans call ‘pork barrel’” 609 were not tolerated. One of the major criticisms of the SLA was that the Authority’s dynamism was causing a disproportionate share of resources to go to the lowveld. However, Mills did not share this sentiment when he unequivocally stated:

If I were in a position where I was formulating a policy as to how I was going to handle this agricultural problem with all these constraints, … I would have something with the SLA’s dynamism operating right through the country – something which is geared specifically to a project, an organization which knows what it is doing, which has got the powers to do it. 610

Some of the major functions and duties of the SLA were to exploit, conserve and utilise the water resources with the object of promoting, facilitating and expediting the economic development of the lowveld in the national interest. It is true that water was one of the resources that needed to be manipulated in order to get the agricultural industry off the ground but it was felt that the new authority (ADA) should not confine itself solely to the utilisation of water. One of the criticisms directed at the SLA Act was that it was a little narrow in its approach because it started from the concept of water instead of starting with the concept of making a profitable agricultural industry. According to Mills,

It must aim to develop agriculture - dry land and irrigation - … it must not be tied specifically to water, because there are many instances of dry land farms in the country which, with a little bit of – perhaps a tractor here and dead capital written off there – can be put back on to a viable basis … it should not be concerned [just like the AAB] with agricultural debt adjustment, subsidies, drought relief or … crop and livestock research … it should move from a rescue operation – a staving off of creditors type of operation – to an operating department or a supervisory department. 611

He wanted to have a new organisation with very broad powers like TILCOR and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) – powers that entitled it to invest in anything that looked as if it was going to be profitable “to the end that the economic requirements of Rhodesia may be met.” This was an advocacy for a “bankable” organisation with all the assets it needed to carry out its work and which in time could build up sufficient trust

609 In America this term originated between 1905 and 1910 as a government appropriation bill or policy that supplies funds for local improvements designed to ingratiate legislators with their constituencies. This definition can be gleaned from the website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pork%20barrel
610 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 12.
611 Ibid. , 13-14.
in Government. Such an organisation needed an asset backing which would allow it to go to any capital market (any source of capital) and raise what funds it required for its operations whether in the highveld or lowveld. Something a good deal less top heavy was preferable.  

R. G. Pascoe, a representative of the RNFU, was in favour of an ADA that was run as a private enterprise. He was against handing it over to a Ministry or the Department of Agriculture. This would ensure that it would not be bogged down by Government or bureaucratic red tape. The success of the new authority, therefore, hinged on avoiding to be unduly influenced by Government or political factors.

Contributing to debate in support of ADA Timothy (“Tim”) Mitchell (a former president of the RNFU) said that, the Authority would fill in the void left by the Land Bank, the AAB and the Farm Irrigation Fund (FIF) loans, all of which, he denounced as having been “half-hearted sort of efforts to assist agriculture.” Without giving figures, he argued that, under their auspices money had been spent “in entirely the wrong way,” and that farmers had been given “too little to just get them going steadily downhill.” He continued by intimating that, CONEX (the brain child of Charles Murray) were not the right people either as they never had the authority. In his view, “CONEX were sitting with a vast amount of knowledge as to what certain areas required,” but “their knowledge went so far that it was never co-ordinated.” For him, the “CONEX system” should be discontinued as it entailed going on “giving out subsidies, drought relief” as well as ensuring that the inefficient AAB would be in “existence [until] eternity.” In light of this, he, thus, envisaged an authority of the nature of ADA “doing very much what [had] been done with the lowveld.” Mitchell went on to say: “I don’t envisage the AAB having to be taken over by this sort of authority, or the Land Bank, or the functions of subsidies at this stage. These are evils, which are with us because of wrong policy of the past.” By this, he meant, it was necessary to forget the failures of earlier agricultural organisations and that it was imperative to reformulate new agricultural policies and strategies. Hence, “Now, we must start somewhere to get the policy put right and the financial resources of the country used in the right way to get agriculture going. We talk about direction [because] there are areas in this country which are crying out, which are begging for this sort of support – Hartley, Gatooma.” On the one hand, he saw ADA as the only viable instrument through which new strategies would be implemented. On the other, he was

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612 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 14-17.
613 Ibid., 19.
616 CONEX’s responsibilities were mainly concentrated in the white commercial farming sector. See Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 59 and NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 19, 21 and 30.
618 Ibid.
calling for a gradualist approach, which would see development spreading from one area of the country to the other. In his view, “if you’re going to start trying to do a whole lot at once, you are going to fall flat on your face.”  

Thus, instead of availing millions of pounds to ineffectual organisations such as CONEX, this investment could be directed towards ADA. Mitchell must have convinced his colleagues in the colonial government when he summed up his contribution by saying: “Let’s stop giving [CONEX] all these millions … The Government must say straight you can’t go on supporting a great big organisation like this which is not fulfilling the very necessary function that agriculture requires.” His chief message was that, agriculture should not be sacrificed at the expense of inefficiency. Hence, “We cannot go on letting agriculture steadily go down the drain … with the right sort of people on an authority of this nature [ADA], who will not let themselves be side-tracked, who [will] work very much in the way [the SLA has] worked [in the lowveld] – I think this is going to start putting agriculture in a sound position.” The steady erosion of the economy, through subsidies and drought relief, had to be stopped. In fact, subsidies and food handouts only provide temporary relief as over-reliance on them usually “land the [farmer] in bigger trouble than he ever was before.”

Speaking against an ADA, J. J. L. de Kock (MP for Rusape) supported sentiments aired by Mills that an overall development authority for Southern Rhodesia was not ideal because the country would lose the specialisation it had achieved in certain regions. He believed specialisation brought about success in agriculture as revealed by the examples of the lowveld, which specialised in sugar and the Mazoe Valley, which prioritised citrus production. Hence, he suggested that Government should put forward regional authorities instead of putting up a top heavy overall authority. This would bring about competition between different authorities bidding for funds to Treasury and thereby preventing a move towards a system of socialist bureaucracy. In summarising his argument, de Kock insisted that,

We should have regional authorities who [sic] are in direct competition with each other bidding for funds … the final policy making will be made by Government and they will decide on what’s being put forward, and we’ll have a dynamic agricultural future if we could have this element of competition in the country bidding for funds and going flat out on it.

619 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 22.
620 Ibid.
621 Ibid.
622 Ibid.
Nicolle added his voice to the growing chorus of anti-ADA sentiments. Citing the example of Southern Rhodesia’s two main farming areas – the Mazoe Valley and Hartley-Gatooma – where year after year, more so in the Hartley-Gatooma area, he said:

The poor blokes get a drought. They put in their crop, everything in the garden’s green, and as soon as February comes the tap’s switched off and away they go. What happens? Government comes along and pumps more money in. And actually they’re doing more damage to that chap than if they could write off the whole outfit and let him start from scratch again – it would be cheaper in the long run. You’ve got £3½ million spent here on drought relief – you’re not helping this bloke, because all you’re doing is putting another rope around his neck the following year. 625

Making one of the most scathing attacks on the concept of an ADA, he delivered the following statement, which, ironically, can be used to reflect on ARDA’s performance and achievements since independence:

I’m not happy about the ADA as one big body. I think this would be wrong, it would be top heavy, and I don’t think [just like CONEX] it would ever get off the ground. It would be another organisation of which the overheads would be so terrific that I don’t think it would ever be a success. I think it would be the wrong approach to get all these bodies co-ordinated into one big body. I think it would be much better to have each – to have one going ahead and the rest following behind. 626

The validity or invalidity of this statement will be scrutinised more closely when the performance of ARDA 627 (whose activities were governed by Government policy and by the availability of funds) after independence is compared with that of the pre-independence period.

In the first chairman of the SLA, Herbert Jack Quinton’s opinion, it was imperative to examine what was wrong with agriculture. Observing that, “the keynote to the whole of our agricultural future is obviously water,” he felt that most of the predicament of this industry had been created basically by “a lack of or an uncertain rainfall over the last five years.” 628 The encroachment of drought onto northern Mashonaland, which was always

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626 Ibid., 26-27.
627 The Authority was constituted on July 1 1971 as the Agricultural Development Authority (ADA). However, in 1978 it was decided that since the organisation’s operations focused more on rural development it should be called the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA). In 1983 the then Minister of Agriculture, David Karimanzira, removed the “R” denoting the rural aspect of the organization, but the Prime Minister, Mugabe, insisted the “R” should be reinstated. See Liberty Mhlanga, (Chairman of Land Settlement Board in the new Ministry of Lands and Land Resettlement), Personal Interview, Borrowdale, Harare, 24th December 2006. N.B. Mhlanga is the former General Manager (GM) of ARDA. He was GM from 1981 to 1997.
628 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 27 and 29.
regarded as a fairly safe rainfall area, prompted Quinton to conclude that the first thing that needed to be considered was not the issue of markets but, how to subsidise this rainfall. Thus, he stated “I would rather see Government giving support prices to holding produce to place in markets, than pouring money willy nilly in to try and bolster up an agricultural industry that is tottering from another point of view – not from the point of view of markets [but water].” 629 Lending support to his colleague Mitchell had this to say:

There was no tobacco market at one time. This country produced tobacco and piled into the market [and later sold it to the Americans, Canadians etc]. So I don’t think unduly worry [sic] about not being able to get the markets when we produce our stuff. We have an advantage over many people, in spite of our geographic situation.

Using Matabeleland to emphasise the point that water and not markets was the one that had created the “down draught” (the problem agriculture was facing) and that the construction of dams and weirs was the answer to this problem Quinton proceeded to present the following challenge: “If one goes into Matabeleland and examines carefully the grazing facilities there, especially in the south-eastern corner, less than 40% of the grazing is being used. Why is it only being used? Because there is no water [and] every single time it comes back to water, water, water.” 631 He pointed out that, Rhodesia was blessed with water “even in the poorest of our rainfall,” adding that, “Under normal rainfall conditions, we get higher rainfall than the east of England, but we let it run away … our basic problem is to harness our water supplies which Water Development has done a lot of research on, but they haven’t got the machine to be able to harness it and to sell it.” Quinton decried the absence of proper project plans. In his own words, the Kyle-Bangala-Esquilingwe Weir in Masvingo “would never have been built if it hadn’t been for Hulett, who came with a utilisation plan for that water, and it was only by contractor-finance and Hulett’s making a certain amount of finance available that this dam was actually built.” 632 Clearly, waiting for an individual to come up with such initiative was “no way to develop a country.” The correct approach, he believed, was to have development plans of this nature done at country level “by Rhodesians for presentation to outside capital.” 633 For him, regional authorities were no option either because they were never dynamic enough or pushed enough to be able to get anywhere.

We’ve had a number of regional authorities in this country and [to no avail]. I think you’ve got to have one central body, if you’re going to do anything, that must be small in number [not top heavy], it must have a highly efficient staff, and it must go around and project plan. 634

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630 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 34.
631 Ibid. , 29.
632 Ibid.
633 Ibid. , 29.
634 Ibid. , 27-28.
The major regional authority at the time, the SLA, had its own limitations. Quinton himself conceded that, “it is too narrow to work entirely as Sabi-Limpopo. Sabi-Limpopo was [only] a guinea-pig.” 635 In his view, a more detailed, comprehensive and co-ordinated overall plan was important to launch agriculture on a sound footing. This would not be achieved by mobilising individual resources only because according to Quinton “This country was opened up by the cheek of the white man, the [zest] he obtained in agriculture and prices that were controlled for the local market to a very large extent,” adding that

Through the ages, we’ve enjoyed two or three booms in agriculture. We have got off the ground. But now we’re coming to the more mature stage of agriculture, where we are going to compete in the world in volume production at a very low margin of turnover [hence meticulous planning of production was essential]. 636

He was certain that the SLA was not the organisation that would raise agricultural production in a sufficiently impartial and nationally oriented way when he stated: “ … we’ve got to the stage now … [where] we’ve just got to produce, and I don’t see that the organisation [SLA] that we’ve got in being at the present moment will do it.” 637 At this point, the need for another machine that would proactively respond to the ever-changing demands of agriculture could not be over- emphasised. ADA seemed to be the answer.

In the early 1970s, however, no single bill ever raised as much controversy as the proposed ADA Bill. The wide-ranging debate that characterised this period is sufficient testimony to this. The Ministry of Agriculture was convinced that ADA would transform farming operations in the country. In an interview with the Financial Gazette, the Secretary for Agriculture, Adrian Griffiths, revealed that ADA would absorb the SLA during 1971 and called upon the SLA to get rid of some of its holding through the placing of settlers on 300-400 acres of irrigable land. During the interview, he stressed that the SLA was originally intended to be a development authority as opposed to a farming agency, which appeared to be beyond its capacity. He also admitted that it was UDI that had changed the direction of the SLA from a development authority to a farming agency, adding that, at the time of UDI, there were tremendous pressures for the saving and earning of foreign currency and, thus, pressure to go into wheat, cotton and groundnuts. 638

In confidential correspondence to the Secretary for Agriculture the Rhodesia National Farmers’ Union General Manager, J. R. Mellor, submitted comments made by the Union’s Planning Committee on the Third Draft of the ADA Bill, which largely bolstered the position already taken by the Ministry of Agriculture. For example, the Committee felt that it was essential for the ADA not to be constituted as merely another lateral agricultural

635 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 29.
636 Ibid., 31.
637 Ibid., 32.
organisation dealing with some aspect of agriculture in isolation but that it should be evolved as a superior authority responsible for overall agricultural control, co-ordination, planning and development with powers of implementation either by itself or agencies or through other organisations. Its activities had to be co-ordinated and its position consolidated so that its relationship to some existing organisations (AFC, SLA, Land Settlement, Water, Research and the AMA which operated in terms of separate legislation and appeared to be quite autonomous) could be used to establish various degrees of subordination of such bodies to it.

The RNFU was aware that the SLA was not subject to the provisions of the Bill, but the ADA Board, as constituted, would become the Board of the SLA. Whilst they appreciated that there might have been factors which precluded the incorporation of the SLA in the Bill, they insisted that,

the ultimate objective must be the full incorporation [notwithstanding the economic consequences of such action on ADA] of that organisation as soon as possible as there appears to be little if anything in the way of powers and functions to prevent this and its future operation as a subsidiary of ADA.

However, the Secretary of the Rhodesia Tobacco Authority (RTA), J. Morten, reacting to E. Woods from the Ministry of Agriculture’s position (during a meeting of the RNFU) that in the case of ADA it was undesirable to guarantee any sectional representation to any authority, be it the Tobacco Act or the Research Act said,

It was essential, in the interests of the successful functioning of the ADA, that there should be close contact and continuous liaison [provision for consultation] with the farming community [because] experience had proved that organisations dealing with agriculture tended, over a period of time, to become removed from the problems of the industry.
Despite the Ministry of Agriculture declining to bend over backwards to guarantee consultation with various organisations, the RNFU through their Secretary, C. W. Ball, demanded to be involved in deciding the composition of the new authority’s Board. For them “it was essential that organised agriculture be granted adequate representation on the Board of the ADA.” For instance, they suggested that at least one-third of the Board should consist of nominees from organised agriculture. However, ADA had the prerogative to choose its own Board.

The four major drafts of the ADA Bill gave the Authority enormous responsibilities. Because these responsibilities were broad and generated so much controversy, it is important to examine the most outstanding ones in detail. In the main, the Bill provided that ADA should identify, evaluate, plan, finance, develop and administer new agricultural development projects, e.g. irrigation schemes and new settlement areas. In short, the new organisation had to plan, co-ordinate and implement agricultural development including agricultural betterment schemes. It also had to improve the efficiency of the existing farming industry by means of longer term and structural improvements. These improvements, inter alia, entailed buying up and consolidating sub-economic farms; availing the necessary infrastructure; providing risk capital and management services; assisting co-operative ventures between farmers; facilitating research into optimum scales of production and farm management systems as well as the promotion of conservation works in co-operation with CONEX. Among its non-functions ADA would not be concerned with agricultural debt adjustment, agricultural credit assistance, subsidies, drought relief, crop or livestock research, and operating finance (except where it was investing in a new or amalgamated scheme solely or in partnership, or non-risk finance of a non-development character).

It should be noted that all schemes had to be evaluated on the basis required of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TTLDC or TILCOR). That is, any project or proposal dealt with by ADA had to be considered on its economic merits, irrespective of other considerations. It should further be noted that the Tribal Trust Lands and the SLA area were specifically excluded from the scope of these functions.

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644 The first draft was discussed in Parliament on 27 April 1970, the second on 26 June 1970, the third on 27 October 1970 and the fourth and final draft was on 5 January 1971. See NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA Bill, 1970/71.

To ensure that this set of functions was carried out ADA was bestowed with the appropriate powers, among other things, to raise loans on the capital market; to buy, own, lease and sell or expropriate land; to establish or operate irrigation, farming, ranching, forestry or settlement schemes and agricultural processing and marketing. The Authority was also empowered to establish, own, manage, or operate service companies; to act as the agent of Government in the construction of a new scheme or the reconstruction of an existing scheme and to have all the necessary administrative powers for the carrying out of the above functions and to exercise these powers. 646 These powers, however, were not applicable to Tribal Trust Lands or the SLA area.

To complement these functions and powers ADA had to adopt levels of organisation which were commensurate with its broad mandate. Because the task entrusted to the Authority was a very responsible one this necessitated the appointment of a full-time Chairman and Managing Director, instead of a part-time Chairman. The day-to-day business of the organisation was to be controlled by the General Manager, subject to the policy directives of his Chairman/Managing Director and Board. The two main-line functionaries were the Business Manager (responsible for co-ordination, long-term planning, and priorities between competing projects) and the Operations Manager (responsible for supervising projects and for the day-to-day operation of the regional divisions). Other functionaries were basically service departments. For example, these included the Financial Executive (tasked with raising funds, advising on allocation and settling the manner of finance of any project) and the Engineer (in charge of designing and building dams or any other necessary structures, including housing and sheds, and for maintaining these). There was also provision for the Secretariat whose brief was confined to purely administrative matters, including legal questions, personnel and public relations. 647

In addition, Regional Divisions were to be set up, as it was felt desirable to have individuals responsible on the ground in certain areas as a PLO exercise and as an identification point for finding projects and making preliminary appraisals. Nevertheless, there were doubts as to the efficacy of this divisional set-up. It was desirable merely to

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647 Ibid.

648 ADA had set up some Provincial Land Offices (PLOs) in some parts of the country. It had an officer or office in each province. For example, there was one PLO in Mutare and there were two such offices in Matabeleland, namely one for Matabeleland North with its head office in Bulawayo and another for Matabeleland South with its head office in Plumtree. The idea was part and parcel of the decentralisation exercise where ADA Estate Managers would report to the Provincial Land Officers in their respective areas and not directly to ADA Head Office in Harare. See Liberty Mhlanga, (Chairman, Land Settlement Board – Ministry of Lands and Land Resettlement, and former General Manager/GM of ARDA), Telephone Discussion with Nyandoro, 6 February 2007.
make persons in Head Office responsible for certain regions, and create ad hoc planning teams to write-up projects for the “Project Assessment Committee.”

Although this outline made by the Economics Branch of the SLA sets out in commendable detail the functions, non-functions, powers and organisation of the Agricultural Development Authority, as well as making some far-reaching policy statements, it did not, however, at any stage, set out the reason (justification) for its existence or what its terms of reference were. It was largely superfluous primarily because it failed to grant other stakeholders (e.g. the RNFU, the Rhodesian Tobacco Association/RTA and the Associated Chambers of Commerce/ACCOR) sufficient representation on the new organisation’s Board. This seemed to give the Authority enormous powers to plan, coordinate and implement agricultural development projects without necessarily consulting other players in the industry. The mandate it was given to purchase or expropriate land meant for settlement schemes led to fears that the government intended to introduce “State Farming” as opposed to private farming. One of its other weaknesses was perceiving the TTLs and the SLA as falling outside ADA’s functions and powers. This superfluity set the tone for the barrage of criticism of the Authority by numerous Rhodesia Front (RF) back-benchers.

The Agricultural Development Authority Bill and the powers it bestowed on the Authority caused a lot of consternation and indignation among RF members of parliament. Some of the Bill’s provisions, notably the powers given to the Authority, disturbed them and was a major reason for sharp clashes between RF back-benchers at one of the RF caucus meetings. It was generally anticipated that the Bill could cause a rift between the farming and urban business communities. On the one hand, representatives of organised commerce attacked the Bill, while on the other, RNFU leaders came out in favour of it. The Bill’s opponents asserted that the Authority was given unnecessary and dangerous powers in the Bill. They

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650 The Economics Branch of the SLA was tasked with the responsibility of making an economic and financial evaluation of the viability of the ADA due to be set up. It also outlined the functions, powers and nature of organisation for the new Authority that was to be created by Act of Parliament. Prior to this, it was the planning organ of the SLA.

651 Whether under capitalism or socialism, a State farm is a farm in which ownership of the farm and its management rests solely with the State. It thus excludes co-operatives in that they tend to be a mixture of individual or communal ownership combined with State involvement. This definition of State farming has been provided by Malcolm Wallis, Executive Dean of the Faculty of Commerce, Durban Institute of Technology, Personal Interview, Westville, Durban, 26th July 2005. See also Rhodesia Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 78, First Session, Twelfth Parliament, 25th August to 16th September 1970; 2nd March to 6th April 1971, (Salisbury: The Government Printer, 1970-71, 1043.
believed that, if the Bill became law, it would amount to State farming. One RF back-bencher described the Bill as “a bad piece of legislation” which gave the Authority “astronomical powers.” It was a common feeling that some of the Bill’s provisions were based on completely new principles and that the effect was to make the Authority “a law unto itself.” Supporters of the Bill within the RF caucus obviously remembered the difficulties experienced in the early days of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority as a result of inadequate legislation. They envisaged that the Bill would cover many of the contingencies met in farming development and that the Bill’s provisions would obviate the need for additional legislation later.

Under the powers given in the Bill, it can be reiterated that the Authority could, with the approval of the Minister of Agriculture or appropriate Minister, build or acquire dams, reservoirs, canals, irrigation works and hydro-electric power stations. It could raise or borrow money by the issue of debentures or debenture stock. It could manage, establish irrigation schemes, farming schemes, farmer training schemes, agricultural research and preparation or the processing or marketing of agricultural produce or any other commodity as it could also acquire interest in companies, whether or not promoted by the Authority. Furthermore, the Authority could also sell water or electricity or both and for its employees it could buy, build or lease houses; give guaranteed loans for house buying or improvements. The loans would not exceed three months’ salary or wages. Its powers under farming operations included the setting up, acquisition and management of farm stores (e.g. Takwirira Trading Stores) and the building of farm roads.

For the RNFU, such a mandate was what agriculture needed for many years. Hence, they did not associate themselves with attacks made by commerce on the Bill to establish an ADA, nor did they share the fears of the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ACCOR) that the Authority would create and maintain State farming projects in competition with farmers. Commenting in Salisbury (now Harare) on a report that organised commerce, industry and agriculture were to hold meetings over the Government’s plans to create the Authority, the RNFU general manager, John Mellor, said no such meetings had been arranged, and there had been no consultation or agreement between organised agriculture and the other two sectors (commerce and industry) that could possibly justify such a claim. Reaffirming his unwavering support for the Bill, he unequivocally stated:

The RNFU played a major part in the emergence of the proposed Authority and it does not therefore associate itself with attacks made by commerce on the Bills … The Bill goes a long way towards creating the concept of an over-all agricultural planning authority that the RNFU has pressed for. It provides the vehicle for co-ordinated development and planning and the

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652 Many white commercial farmers were against state farming because they perceived it as a socialist principle that favoured state control of industry against private ownership.
determination of priorities – something which has been needed for a long time. 655

Although organised agriculture was not entirely happy with certain aspects of the Bill, the RNFU regarded development schemes as an end to the ultimate aim of earliest possible individual settlement. According to Mellor, this, apparently, was also the aim of the Ministry of Agriculture, and it was, therefore unfortunate that this main purpose was not written into the Bill. This had to be done. Making another comment on the reported statement by ACCOR’s chief executive, Brian Stringer (the MP for Avondale) stated that the Bill meant the Authority would be able to run farms in competition with private enterprise. Mellor said the RNFU did not share these fears, as Large development schemes, the construction of major dams and irrigation projects must of necessity be financed by the Government. The establishment of these projects in turn creates the opportunity for investment by the private sector – with great benefit to the farming community, commerce and industry. 656

In further allaying ACCOR’s fears, he continued: In terms of the Bill it is understood that the board of the Authority would also be the board of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority and the Agricultural Land Settlement Board. This would be a powerful factor in ensuring co-ordination and rational distribution of development funds … [and] provision was made in the Bill for organized agriculture to be consulted on all appointments to the board of the Authority. 657

To guarantee efficient delivery of agro-business service, it was felt that the proposed Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and ADA Bills should have a clear convergence point. For example, if passed into law, the Bills that were to set up the AFC and ADA would go far towards underpinning the agricultural industry. They would also tighten control over it. The powers envisaged for the two bodies by the farming fraternity were formidable. It was believed that the AFC Bill would channel all normal Government financial help to farmers through one organisation, and the ADA Bill would concentrate planning, co-ordination and implementation of all agricultural development outside the Sabi-Limpopo scheme and the Tribal Trust Land into another. The AFC, for instance, could finance any undertaking remotely connected with agriculture, specifically including the acquisition of land, the supply of electricity, the conservation or control of soil or water; lend money to anyone to buy or build a town house; and stand between a farmer and his creditors. 658 In addition, the ADA and any subsidiary company could establish or manage schemes for irrigation projects, farms or ranches; the training and settlement of farmers; the preparation of agricultural produce “or any other commodity” for processing

656 Ibid.
657 Ibid.
or marketing; agricultural research; and would generally be responsible for all agricultural development in the European farming areas.

It was expected that the Rhodesian farmers, ever ready to protest their independence, would have objected in their numbers to these wide and in some cases overlapping powers and responsibilities, but organised agriculture seemed generally to welcome them. This seemed to be what the farmers wanted and what the economics-minded Ministry of Agriculture thought was good for them. Given Rhodesia’s peculiar circumstances, there was probably no harm in the prospect of the Agricultural Development Authority eventually settling and managing the highveld as the Sabi-Limpopo Authority did the lowveld. However, for agriculture to excel, it was imperative to end subsidised farming. In spite of all the bickering over the Bill, there seemed to be a common denominator in agriculture as illustrated by this statement: “But of one thing we have no qualms. If the ADA and the AFC work closely together the day of the subsidized inefficient farmer should be over. What help would the AFC give a farmer who did not measure up to ADA standards?” It is true that subsidies are not good for any economy or organisation because they do not provide it with sustainable competitiveness. Thus, they should be avoided if not abolished at all costs to ensure eternal economic survival.

The end of February 1971 marked the beginning of a significant chapter in support of an ADA. On 25 February, the Centre Party leader, Pat Bashford, concurred with fellow supporters of the Bill when he said the Agricultural Development Authority Bill was “absolutely necessary.” Asked to give his party’s official attitude towards the Bill, the publication of which had resulted in controversy among Rhodesian Front parliamentarians who believed that the ADA was given too much power, he stated that “The dangerously parlous state of the Rhodesian agricultural industry cannot be overstressed and legislation of this kind is absolutely essential to cope with present conditions.” Bashford also disagreed with the Bill’s critics who saw its provisions as amounting to State farming when he said

There was a need to revitalize the agricultural industry. Faced with present circumstances this could not be done by leaving the matter to normal economic forces … the Government was being genuine when it stated that it wanted private enterprise to operate freely in the agricultural sector. I don’t believe it has changed its policy of intervening only when private enterprise is unwilling or unable to cope.

He had also accepted in good faith Government statements that controls would be faded out as and when economic conditions improved and allowed private enterprise to re-enter. In his view the Government needed the powers to cope with the present situation facing the country and the agricultural industry and therefore legislation such as the ADA Bill was necessary. Further justifying the Bill Bashford aptly observed:

661 Ibid, 19.
662 Ibid.
I am reminded of the fact that when the RF first came to power it set up an agricultural advisory council. The council sat for about six months and then died because it had neither the money nor the power to do anything … I believe that that example of a top-level body being impotent is what has persuaded the Government to create something with the necessary powers, namely the ADA … if the CP [Centre Party] thought after detailed study of the Bill that the Minister or the ADA had too much power the party’s MPs [Members of Parliament] would deal with this during debates in the House of Assembly. But if in principle the Bill means the necessary powers to cope with the present situation facing the industry then this is what is wanted.  

Because the agricultural advisory council, which was a precursor to ADA, had failed and more and more organisations were giving the new Bill a thumbs up, all indications were that the Bill would soon become law. Adding their voice to the list of growing proponents of the Bill, the Rhodesian Tobacco Association (RTA), a very influential institution in its own right, joined the RNFU in its support for the Bill to establish an Agricultural Development Authority. The only reservation the RTA had was that they were anxious to see incorporated in the Bill specific provisions for the development and earliest possible settlement of agricultural land. They believed that the provision for the settlement of individual farmers would remove the fears that had led to recent accusations that the Bill would result in State farming.

As support for the Bill continued to strengthen, the President of the RNFU, R. G. Pascoe, questioned the motives of the chief executive of ACCOR in urging farmers to fight the Bill to establish an ADA. Pascoe described views expressed by Stringer as “ridiculous.” “What is this man thinking of?” he asked at a well-attended meeting of the Banket Farmers’ Association. “And why are we to fight this Bill?” The RNFU President gave credit to those who had masterminded the Bill when he stated that organised agriculture and the Ministry of Agriculture had been working on the Bill for three years adding that

The country needed a body to co-ordinate and plan agricultural development. Only the Government, through a statutory body, could undertake the planning and development of projects costing millions of dollars at a reasonable rate of interest. And only the Government, through consultation with interested parties, could decide on priorities. I must make it clear that the RNFU does not favour more and more statutory bodies, but the Agricultural Development Authority is a vital necessity and will remain so for many years.

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Lamenting what he perceived to be the effects of the proposed Bill, Stringer almost cynically suggested that

… acceptance of this Bill would mean acceptance of State farming, that Government will take over our farms and farm them on a State basis, and that we would all be servants of the State. What is obviously more worrying [to Stringer] is that when the Government has taken over all the farms it will then take over all the little shops, cafes and businesses that ACCOR is concerned with, and they will all be working for Government as well. 667

In reassuring Stringer, Pascoe said

Would any Rhodesians allow a Government to do this to us? I can tell Mr Stringer that the farmers of Rhodesia would never stand for that. We are satisfied that it is not the intention of the authority to go in for State farming, and that when it takes over an area for development the intention is to leave the owners on the land or, if they have sold their land, to resettle it at the earliest opportunity. 668

In addition, Pascoe said he had sought and accepted an assurance from the Minister of Agriculture that this would be official policy and that the Minister had also made “the very fine gesture” of agreeing to consult with the RNFU over the appointment of the members of the new board. As far as the RNFU was concerned, he stated

There is basically very little in the Bill that we object to, and it is interesting to note that neither the Association of Rhodesian Industries nor the Chamber of Mines has opposed the Bill. I am sure they can see that the authority will benefit not only agriculture but also their sectors [other sectors of the economy as well]. 669

In a clear message to drum up support for the Bill to sail through Parliament, Pascoe urged farmers (the RNFU) to question the motives of the people who were urging them to attack the Bill. Anticipating strong objections to the Bill by some RF members and ACCOR, which he believed was “continually criticizing and attacking agricultural Bills,” 670 he admitted that, the Minister was not going to have an easy task putting this Bill through the House because of likely dissentions from some RF back-benchers. This prompted him to make an appeal to farmers to “come out 100 per cent in support of our Minister to help in what he and we know is in the interests of the agricultural industry

668 “RNFU Chief Hits at ACCOR Claim,” The Rhodesia Herald, Salisbury: Saturday, February 27 1971, 11.
669 Ibid.
670 Ibid.
and the country.” 671 In an apparent attempt to draw ACCOR and its President, Jack Robinson, to his side, he stated plainly, “Commerce owes its very existence to the primary industries of this country [e.g. agriculture]. If these are sound, healthy and stable, the commercial and industrial sectors reap the benefit.” 672 Based on this statement, it can be observed that, in the first place, Pascoe did not expect that the agricultural industry would have any major objection to the Bill. Referring to his almost direct attack on ACCOR, he sounded rather conciliatory when he concluded by saying: “I don’t believe it is in anyone’s interest for people to wash their dirty linen in public, but this has been forced upon me, and I can assure the president of ACCOR … that I am more than willing to discuss with him any matters which affect our common interests.” 673

ACCOR’s silence on the ADA Bill, following the “outburst” by the President of the RNFU, had caused some surprise among members, reported the ACCOR magazine, Commerce. The reasons for this silence were two-fold; firstly, it was felt that little would be gained by replying to attacks on people rather than principles; and secondly, because the people (apparently referring to the RNFU) whose freedom was being impaired welcomed this legislation. 674 It should be made clear, the magazine added, that ACCOR had at no time opposed the Bill “in toto,” and had only said it believed the farming community would be making a serious error if it allowed this piece of legislation to go through without “substantial amendments which would safeguard the independence and autonomy of the Rhodesian farmer.” 675 It can be argued that one of the most serious aspects of this legislation was that, by delegating wide powers to the Authority, the Minister of Agriculture was insulating the implementation of his policy from direct criticism by the Legislative Assembly, as the affairs of such bodies could only be raised under certain very prescribed conditions, as Members of Parliament (MPs) had found with the Sabi-Limpopo Authority.

Strong support for the ADA Bill came from RF back-benchers only when the Bill had its second reading in the House of Assembly on 3 March 1971. The Minister of Agriculture, David Smith, moved the second reading of the Bill shortly after outlining to the House another major piece of agricultural legislation, the Agricultural Finance Corporation Bill. At this juncture, praise was heaped upon the Minister for his foresight in producing the Bill, which the majority of RF speakers said was essential for the development and planning of agriculture in future. 676 The controversial ADA Bill was, however, criticised in committee by two prominent Government back-benchers, William Bill Irvine (RF, Marlborough) and Theo M. Ellison (RF, Salisbury Central) for the wide powers it proposed to give the authority. These powers particularly referred to generating hydro-electric power, building dams, and establishing enterprises, which might otherwise be run by private enterprise. Irvine asked what the Authority’s reaction would be if private

671 “RNFU Chief Hits at ACCOR Claim,” The Rhodesia Herald, Salisbury: Saturday, February 27 1971, 11.
672 Ibid.
673 Ibid.
675 Ibid.
stores or canning plants were established where it already had established business itself and proceeded to assert that “I do not believe that the Authority has any right to get involved with private enterprise.” 677

The possibility of overlapping between the planning staff of the SLA, whose functions would be taken over by ADA, and that of CONEX was mentioned by Colonel G. H. Hartley (RF, Victoria). The Minister replied that while the planning staff of CONEX was concerned with Rhodesia as a whole, that of the Authority would be concerned only with particular schemes. By this he meant that, once a scheme had been planned by the Authority’s staff, CONEX would take over. He told Col. Hartley that the Authority would exercise overall control of the Lowveld irrigation settlement scheme and that a committee that would be answerable to the board of ADA would look after the Sabi-Limpopo area. After indicating that the ADA Board would be also the board of the Land Settlement Board, he further assured T. M. Ellison that the importance of land settlement was fully recognised and the Land Settlement Act would continue to operate, hence: “Land is an important and emotional matter and, for this reason, it is not proposed that the Land Settlement Act itself should be repealed.” 678 At the height of the liberation struggle in the 1970s, these MPs were not oblivious also of the fact that the issue of land was the rallying point of the war.

Save for the few critics of the Bill who condemned aspects of it, notably Bill Irvine and Theo Ellison, the Bill passed its second reading without incident, as there were no major objections. Several RF MPs who had reservations about some of the Bill’s provisions said they would deal with these at the committee stage. In his reply to the debate, Smith said it was the Government’s task to see that no impediments were placed in the path of Rhodesia’s development. With this in mind, agricultural policy ran along three main courses. These were development, reconstruction of the financial structure and marketing policy. 679

The Minister rejected the accusation that the Bill’s provisions amounted to State farming. Defending the Bill, he said:

Where private enterprise would not venture the State had to start a project or scheme. Experience had shown that once a State-sponsored scheme flourished, private enterprise came in and the State could withdraw. [Thus] Immediately they [State] can get out of it and hand over to private enterprise they will be glad to do it. 680

677 “Powers Given To ADA Are Too Wide, Say MPs,” The Chronicle, Bulawayo: Saturday, March 6, 1971, 2.
680 Ibid. See also “Powers Given To ADA Are Too Wide, Say MPs,” The Chronicle, Bulawayo: Saturday, March 6, 1971, 2.
He made no apologies for the wide powers given the Agricultural Development Authority under the Bill, adding that these were necessary in a growing country like Rhodesia as it was also necessary “to have sufficient vision to look far ahead” to prevent impediments to Rhodesian development. However, nothing could be done without the approval of the appropriate Minister, which, in turn, meant Cabinet approval for any scheme or plan.

Nearly all the stages in the processing of this Bill were characterised by a mixture of criticism and support for the new piece of legislation. The first Member to speak in the second-reading debate on the ADA Bill, George Hayman (RF, Mazoe), referring to the accusations of State farming levelled at the Bill, said there had been an outcry from commerce and industry that this would result from the Bill, but it was “somewhat comical” to see that the Bill was supported by the RNFU, which was “an independently minded body of men opposed to State farming.” The Minister himself put any fears to rest when he made a firm statement in the House of Assembly that the ADA Bill was not an attempt to introduce “State farming.” Nevertheless, he hastened to say that the creation of the Authority was not “a magic wand which will transform the industry over-night,” but was a long-term measure whose pace would be governed by what funds were available. Smith reiterated the point that the Bill was very important, not only for agriculture, but also for the country as a whole, since all the economy’s sectors were interdependent. In essence, it would give the whole country, except the “tribal lands,” State forests, and national parks, an authority on the lines of the Sabi-Limpopo one. Although the Bill gave the Authority wide powers to undertake work relating to development of agriculture, it is important to note that where the interests of other Ministries, such as Water Development, were involved, their approval would have to be obtained. Thus, “I hasten to stress as strongly as possible that this is not a move – and I repeat, not a move – to introduce or encourage State farming, for I am sure we are all agreed that farming is best left to the private sector,” said Smith.

Clearly the Minister was far-sighted in his mission to transform the agricultural sector, but this did not pre-empt reservations about certain aspects of the Bill. For instance, C. A. R. Savory (RF, Matobo) said he would have liked consideration to be given to a national ecological co-ordinating council and would have been happier if the Government had considered overall aspects of planning before introducing this piece of agricultural legislation. F. A. Alexander (RF, Sinoia/Umvukwes) said the ADA and the Agricultural Finance Corporation would not be a panacea for all farming ills. Unless profitability came back to farming, he felt, neither Bill would do any good. William Irvine (RF,}

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Marlborough) told the House: “I am utterly convinced that this Bill is not in the interests of existing European farmers in this country.”

Other parliamentarians of course appreciated the merits of the Bill. R. G. S. Simmonds (RF, Mtoko), for example, deplored criticism of the Bill by an official of ACCOR and wondered where some of these critics “would be today were it not for the agricultural industry.” He believed that the State was only going into private enterprise fields where the private sector was unable to take the initiative. A similar point was made by W. de Kock (RF, Rusape), who welcomed the fact that 38 settlers were soon to be settled on Lowveld farms as a result of State Enterprise. On behalf of the Centre Party, M. M. Bhebe (CP, Ntshonalanga) welcomed the Bill, particularly since the new Authority would be able to help farmers in the African Purchase Areas (APAs). He regretted, however, that the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) had been excluded from its operations. Just like Bhebe, R. E. D. Cowper (RF, Wankie) welcomed the Bill, which he described as “one of the most imaginative and forward looking pieces of legislation to come before this House.”

Replying to the debate, the Minister of Agriculture said the Government was not wedded to the principle of State farming. It was whole-heartedly in favour of private enterprise but there were times when the State had to step in to develop schemes for the good of the country. In justifying the exclusion of the TTLs, he said the Tribal Trust Lands already had their own development corporation. Apparently, he was referring to TILCOR. It can be argued that the Bill excluded TTLs because, before independence, responsibility for these areas was vested in TILCOR, which is now ARDA. The new organisation (ARDA), unlike its pioneering counterpart (ADA), now had responsibilities that cover the rural areas or communal areas (formerly the TTLs). Its mandate was broadened to cover these areas especially with the incorporation of these institutions (TILCOR and ADA) into ARDA after independence – a process started by the amalgamation of ADA, TILCOR, SLA and Agricultural Land Settlement into a single Board on June 1, 1978.

As the Government’s reorganisation plan for the national development of agriculture was getting into its stride with the formal establishment of the Agricultural Development Authority, speculation was increasing in farming circles about the man who would be chosen to head the new authority. There was a very strong field of potential candidates for the job. At the top of the list of “possibles” for this post was Jack Quinton, the dynamic Irish-born chairman of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority since its inception in 1965. Quinton seemed ideal for selection as its first chairman because the new authority would be similar in many respects to the SLA, which it was going to supersede. The only significant difference was that it would cover the whole country instead of a State farms existed in the agriculture of the classical system. In the Soviet Union the name that was used to mean state farms is sovkhozes. See Kornai, The Socialist System, 83 and Barry Munslow (ed.), Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism, (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1986), 19.

686 Ibid.
687 Ibid.
688 State farms existed in the agriculture of the classical system. In the Soviet Union the name that was used to mean state farms is sovkhozes. See Kornai, The Socialist System, 83 and Barry Munslow (ed.), Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism, (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1986), 19.
region only. However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that when an existing statutory organisation is superseded or absorbed by a new one, it is customary for the board of the existing organisation to resign on the day the legislation setting up the new body is promulgated. On such occasions, the Government may decide to appoint a member or members of the old board to the board of the new organisation.

As speculation continued to grow there was a strong body of opinion among farmers that the former president of the RNFU, Jeremy Field, would be asked to take on the new job. However, he was deeply involved with large-scale business and farming undertakings and may have felt disinclined to drop these in order to devote all his time to the demands of the new post. Another farmer-cum businessperson with an impressive record of achievement in business, farming and administration who was in the running for the post was Nick Cambitzis, chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). He had a wealth of experience in agriculture, business and in the field of statutory bodies. Mike Butler, a prominent Shamva farmer, who had done wonders as head of the Cotton Co-operative, was also favoured for his drive and business acumen which made a favourable impression, not only in farming circles, but also in commerce and industry. 691

In the final analysis, the Minister of Agriculture, David Smith, appointed Nicholas Cambitzis as chairman of the new Agricultural Development Authority which was due to start operations on July 1 1971. 692 Its principal function was to plan, co-ordinate and implement agricultural development throughout Rhodesia as opposed to the SLA, which concentrated on one specific area. Cambitzis served in the 1950s as a member of the Cold Storage Commission (CSC), 693 and was chairman of the Agricultural Production Committee from 1963 to 1965. With him on the board of the Authority were Messrs J. H. Charsley, D. Frost, R. T. Garvin, C. A. Heurtley, L. W. H. McLean, C. Millar, D. S. Morley and H. J. Quinton who all had enormous experience in the field of agriculture.

The inclusion of Quinton was a fitting tribute to his outstanding achievements as head of the SLA. Since the inception of this Authority he had guided the development of the Lowveld from “virgin bush” to large-scale irrigation farming. Charsley was a well-known Nyamandhlovu farmer and member of the Matabeleland North Farm Irrigation Fund Committee. He was also chairman of the Natural Resources Sub-Committee of the Rural Council. Frost was a member of the SLA Board. He was a farmer in Marandellas (now Marondera), a chartered accountant and a director of the Mashonaland Farmers’ Co-op. Garvin was also a member of the SLA Board, a farmer in the Eastern Districts and a

693 The CSC was and still is a residual buyer of cattle and goats as well as the largest processor and sole exporter of beef. See Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 81.
member of the Manicaland Farm Irrigation Fund Committee. Heurtley, a Bindura farmer, was chairman of the Land Agricultural Settlement Board and a former member of the Tobacco Corporation Board. He was a past president of the RTA and a former member of the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board and Tobacco Export Promotion Council. McLean, a prominent dairy farmer of the Midlands, was chairman of the Dairy Producers’ Association and a member of the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) Committee of the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA). Miller, a farmer near Glendale, was a member of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) Committee of the AMA and chairman of the Wendi Irrigation Proving Unit Committee.

Last but not least was Morley who was a chartered accountant and a member of the SLA Board. 695 This newly elected board had a special mandate to take agriculture, which seemed to be languishing in the doldrums out of the perennial problems besetting it. Their success or failure can best be judged by the extent to which they achieved their original objectives and how their overall performance is comparable to their successors, namely, the new ARDA Board after independence. ARDA’s performance in that period will be discussed in chapter five.

It is important to note that when this organisation was designed, it did not pay heed to the fact that methods of implementing different types of projects, for example, new or reconstruction projects, might require different types of expertise. There was need to introduce supervision for the setting up of “project implementation teams” led usually by the Development Branch, but with other experts seconded from time to time. Another issue facing the new organisation was the problem of over-centralisation. Although less costly in office rents, telephones and clerical staff, it was failing to achieve one of its objectives of covering and representing the whole country. Perhaps a countrywide Board would assist, as regional board members were not necessarily best able to identify promising projects.

Despite the progress that had been made up to this point, calls for an over-all, country-wide agricultural planning authority continued to be made in the Senate. After the Minister, Smith, had outlined the reasons for the Authority, Senator B. S. Ellis noted that the ADA Bill did not cover the TTLs. He would have liked to see a somewhat different Bill, providing mostly for an over-all “super authority” to plan for the whole country, and below this, separate development authorities for the European and African areas. 696 This was typical segregationist rhetoric that was reminiscent of the white position during the UDI period in spite of calls from Senator Chief Ndiweni that all agriculture – African and European – be placed under one Ministry. 697 In addition, Senator Ellis suggested that the Development Authority’s powers in the field of research should be extended beyond agriculture, as there was a need for technological, industrial and applied research on agricultural products in particular. He said there was no adequate research being carried out

694 The DMB was the sole buyer, seller, and transporter of raw milk in most areas and is also the largest processor of milk products. See Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 81.
697 Ibid.
on canning or storing, and there was no centralised research on the manufacture of tea and coffee.

Senator Olive Robertson said she had arrived at a similar opinion after studying reports of similar bodies in other countries. Referring to one of these reports, she said it had stressed the point that planning must begin on entire river systems, which in Rhodesia were drawn from the African and European land. Like his counterparts, Senator G. Fraser also saw the need for some overriding body, such as a Department of Economic Planning, committed to no particular sectional interest, which could advise the Government on planning and development on a national basis. 698 Another Senator, H. J. van Biljon expressed fears that the Authority would, in effect, be competing against individual farmers, as it would be able to acquire all the best land, and inquired what effect this would have on farmer “immigrants.” He, in fact, thought that this Authority would become a big employer of labour, which would aggravate the serious labour problems already experienced by many farmers. In response, the Minister stressed that the policy of the Government was to “occupy, utilize and develop our land and natural resources for the benefit of all its inhabitants.” It was also proposed to create a National Water Authority to co-ordinate planning of catchment areas for the benefit of all. Dealing with the necessity for a national planning authority to cover the whole country, the Minister reminded Senators that the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR) could deal more satisfactorily with the areas under its control. 699

Further answering a query by Senator Olive Robertson during the committee stage of this Bill on whether the provision enabling the authority to “acquire” existing businesses, included compulsory acquisition, the Minister assured her that this provision was entirely a voluntary one and explained that there was no power within the ADA Bill for the Government to expropriate. 700 Senator Ellis questioned why board members should be entitled to hefty salaries compared to other Government employees. In his opinion, these higher salaries were not justified because members of boards and authorities such as ADA were very often former civil servants, and their salaries as board members were generally greatly in excess of their former earnings. He added that the recruiting difficulties already experienced by the Civil Service would not be improved by the payment of such disproportionately high salaries. In defending his position the Minister of Agriculture indicated that the answer was a Civil Service salary review to bring the Civil Service salaries up to the level paid to other bodies because statutory boards also had to compete with private enterprise since it was wrong in principle that the salaries of these bodies should be tied to the Civil Service. 701

Notwithstanding all the defence and justifications for this Authority, ACCOR remained adamant and maintained that agriculture in the years ahead would have cause to regret the creation of ADA. In a special editorial of the latest issue of Commerce, the ACCOR magazine, fears were persistently expressed that the wide powers given to the Authority

699 Ibid.
701 Ibid.
were “an attack on the very fundamentals of the private enterprise system and would, in the countries to the north of us, be used as a means of taking control of all farms in private hands.” 702 It added,

We do not for one minute believe that this will happen with the present Government, but to have such legislation on the Statute Books should be unacceptable to all in private enterprise, be they merchants, miners, industrialists or farmers. It is easy to be wise after the event, but ACCOR is trying to be wise before the event, and remains convinced that agriculture as a whole will have cause to regret this piece of legislation in the years that lie ahead. 703

Such grave concern was premised, among other things, on the “indecent haste” with which legislation was being pushed through the Legislative Assembly. 704 Despite repeated requests from representative bodies for more time to consider Bills, the situation was, in fact, deteriorating as one unpalatable piece of legislation was followed by another. Legislation that had been recently considered, for example, included the ADA Bill, certain sections of which caused serious concern; the Municipal Amendment Bill, which placed extensive power in the hands of central Government, despite Government’s declared policy of community development; the Road Motor Transportation Bill, which implemented many of the Graylin Commission’s 705 recommendations; the Farmers’ Licensing and Levy Bill, which authorised the farmers’ unions to issue licences and retain the fees and to impose levies on certain agricultural products; and the Income Tax Amendment Bill, which closed a legal loophole in relation to the claiming of export expenditure for taxation rebate purposes.

Some of ACCOR’s concerns must have been addressed somewhat when towards the end of the 1970s fresh debate started on whether to amend the existing legislation so that the two Authorities (ADA and the SLA) could be combined to come up with a single entity for the entire country which could deal with the many overlaps that existed between the two. It was envisaged that such a measure would be implemented by the amendment of the ADA Act and the repeal of the SLA Act since the powers of the two Authorities were in many cases identical in their respective areas, while in some cases, such as those making provision for industrial and township development, the exclusion of such powers would have been

703 Ibid.
705 The Graylin Commission was a Transportation Commission appointed in August 1968 under the chairmanship of John Cranmer Graylin. The Commission, which published its findings in July 1969, had a broad mandate. Among its terms of reference the one that is important for this study is the recommendation whether members of syndicates and other organisations should be allowed to carry each other’s goods and perform other services and, if so, under what conditions, and whether any sector of the agricultural economy should receive special treatment. For detail on its wide terms of reference see POZ Library, Box OR 2514-2530, File: OR 2520/28928 Report of the Transportation Commission/Graylin Commission, (Salisbury, Rhodesia: The Government Printer, 10th July 1969), 1-2.
appropriate. However, the Board of the SLA agreed to inform the Secretary for Agriculture that “in view of the present situation,” it considered that the time was not opportune to change the existing legislation and combine the two Authorities.

Nevertheless, the initial step to amalgamate the two was taken when legislation was published in the Government Gazette of 21st April 1978, which transferred the responsibility for administration of the two Acts together with the Agricultural Land Settlement Act to the new Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development. This subsequently culminated in all land issues being combined through the formation of a single board (from June 1 1978) to administer the functions of the Agricultural Development Authority, the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation, the Sabi-Limpopo Authority and the Agricultural Land Settlement Board which was announced by the joint Ministers of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development, Jack Mussett and Aaron Mgutshini, on May 5 1978. The new board was responsible for each authority and had to ensure that there was no overlapping or duplication of functions. These four bodies had in the past variously promoted the interests of black and white farmers. The “Rural Development” suffix to the Ministry’s title was promulgated probably to stifle or contain racial conflict at the height of the liberation war. The *Financial Gazette* actually admitted that the new Board, to be known as the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), would be headed by or constituted under the chairmanship of Nick Cambitzi (chairman of the Industrial Development Authority).

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708 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, Confidential Correspondence, “Sabi-Limpopo Authority: Extract from the minutes of the meeting held on Tuesday, 7th February, 1978.”

709 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280745, Location R19.10.5.3F, File: DEV/1 Planning Policy, “Confidential Correspondence: Agricultural Development Authority – Possible Re-organisation of Ministry and Statutory Board Functions Under Changed Circumstances,” ADA, 30th August 1977. See also *Supplement to the Rhodesia Government Gazette*, Salisbury: Government Printer, 21st April 1978, 1101; NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, “Transfer Of Responsibility for Administering the Agricultural Development Authority Act (Chapter 100) and the Sabi-Limpopo Authority Act (Chapter 156),” H. W. Botha for Secretary for Agriculture to the Secretary, Agricultural Development Authority, 26th April, 1978, 1-2 and NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, “Agricultural Development Authority Act (Chapter 100), Sabi-Limpopo Authority Act (Chapter 156) and Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 137),” W. H. Dell for Secretary for Agriculture to the Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development, 26th April, 1978, 1-3.

Development Corporation of Rhodesia) and was intended to co-ordinate rural development activities throughout the country, as it was also seen as “a logical realignment of development functions along non-racial lines.” 711 At this point, Dennis R. Norman (the vice-president of the RNFU, who later became Minister of Agriculture) said the RNFU had felt that both white and black agriculture’s interests should be combined under one Ministry. 712 In fact, all parties campaigning in the 1980 election that ushered into power the Government of Robert Gabriel Mugabe considered rural development to be a vital aspect of their policies, and the function of the rationalised Ministry and board appeared to arouse considerable interest in the months ahead. In particular, the matter of land use and redistribution was expected to become particularly important under a majority rule government, especially where some of the more “land hungry” TTLs were concerned. The Government believed that “Experience elsewhere in Africa demonstrates that the prior formulation of a suitable authority and of possible action can avert many of the problems faced by the first majority government.” 713

In accordance with the constitution, the members of the Board of ADA and of TILCOR had to resign, but Engineer W. A. Bailey, the Chairman of TILCOR, agreed to serve as a member on the new Board and continued in his capacity as Managing Director of TILCOR. The RNFU expressed qualified approval of the amalgamation of the four rural development bodies announced by the Government. D. R. Norman said that his organisation was in favour of the amalgamation of these bodies, but he believed it would have been more logical to have them under the Ministry of Agriculture, and not under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Rural Development. Clearly, Rhodesia had a surfeit of boards, committees, councils and other organisations. 714 Thus, any measure that would reduce the number was welcome because it would address the difference of opinion about the functions of various ministries concerned with agriculture.

For instance, instead of having the agricultural extension activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs being transferred or falling within the compass of the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development, it sounded logical, as the RNFU argued, to have these, whether for white or black farmers, being under the new super-board under the Ministry of Agriculture. Nevertheless, Norman said, “we have already met the Co-Ministers 715 of the expanded Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development

715 The idea of Co-Ministers was mooted during the period of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia regime. This country was called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under the short-lived premiership of Bishop Abel Tendekai Muzorewa of the United African National Council (UANC) who won the elections held in April 1979. It was a compromise government that emerged after the signing on 3 March 1978 of the Internal Agreement between Smith and the so-called moderate leaders who included Muzorewa, Reverend Ndbaninji Sithole of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Chief Jeremiah Chirau of Zvimba who led a little known party called the Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation (ZUPO). In 1979 these men together with others from different political parties formed the so-called Government of National Unity, which among other things, was intended to allay the escalation of the liberation struggle. This government whose reign lasted for only a year was presided over by a leader who was generally perceived in Patriotic Front (PF)
and we have offered them and their officials our full co-operation.” He went on to say the RNFU had also met the new Co-Minister of Agriculture, J. Mandaza, to explain the body’s policies and objectives and stressed to him the importance of resolving the present poor viability problems apparent in farming which were the result of producer prices having lagged behind escalating costs of production. 716

Eventually, through a legislative amendment, the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development became the custodian of ADA, which as a result of the Bill of 1978, became ARDA. In fact, it was clause 4 of the Agricultural Development Authority Amendment Bill of 1978, which changed the name of the Agricultural Development Authority to the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority. 717 Clauses 7 and 8 conferred additional functions, duties and powers on the Authority. Whereas clause 11 repealed the provisions establishing a separate Agricultural Settlement Board for the European Area and the African Area and provided for a single Board, clause 12 repealed the provisions relating to co-operation between the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development, as the administration of the Act was assigned to the latter Ministry. Last but not least, clause 19 provided that the Board of the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR) would consist of those members who were on the Board of the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority and not of members separately appointed. 718

On the whole, the Bill of 1978 sought to amend 719 the Agricultural Development Authority Act (Chapter 100), the Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 137), the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Act (Chapter 159) by repealing the TILCOR Amendment Act No. 13 of 1976, the Sabi-Limpopo Authority Act (Chapter 156) and to provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing. The earlier Bill of 1970/71 set out to provide for the following: the establishment of an Agricultural Development Authority to promote and undertake agricultural development; to confer powers and functions on such Authority; to provide for a Board to control the operations of the Authority; to amend the Water Act (Chapter 268); to amend the Sabi-Limpopo Authority Act, No. 84 of 1964; to amend the Agricultural Land Settlement Act, No. 59 of 1969; and to provide for matters

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719 The amendment came in the form of three major drafts. The First Draft was read on 3rd April 1978; the Second on 28th April and the Third and Final Draft was produced on the 8th of May 1978. For more detail on this Bill see NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, Confidential Memorandum: Agricultural Development Authority Amendment Bill, Salisbury: Government Printer, 1978, 1-6.
incidental to the foregoing. In fact, ADA was a reconstitution of some functions of TILCOR and the SLA.

Therefore, in spite of all the objections from the critics of the ADA, the views of the Ministry of Agriculture and like-minded stakeholders in support of this organisation, in the end, predominated. ARDA was, thus, established by the ADA Act of July 1971 (amended in 1978) and was, subsequently, mandated, on a much broader basis, to promote irrigation agriculture in Zimbabwe. As of 2000, ARDA was still the executive Government agency responsible for overseeing irrigation development in the country. Estate irrigation agriculture in Sanyati, however, was introduced by TILCOR, which became ARDA in the early 1980s. The changeover from TILCOR to ARDA in the post-independence period will further be examined in chapter five. The Main Estate in Sanyati was born amid these debates and ARDA that has been running this scheme since 1978 was not in the first instance mandated to operate in communal areas (formerly TTLs).

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that, between 1965 and 1979, state policy stressed the development of small-scale irrigation projects in the rural areas. In fact, after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 the allocation of irrigation agricultural investment, although still more biased towards the large-scale commercial sector, had shifted from its earlier emphasis on favoured environments to more marginal or frontier regions such as Sanyati. Schemes like Gowe, in particular, were designed to promote rural development centred on irrigation-based growth points. Such efforts at decentralising development, apart from benefiting the inhabitants of outlying areas through, among other things, employment creation, were more inclined towards pre-empting what was considered to be massive rural-to-urban migration by hordes of unemployed Africans living in those areas.

It was this objective that impelled the colonial government to institute measures which culminated in the formation of rural development agencies such as DEVAG and TILCOR, both with a mandate to operate in the previously marginalised rural areas. The latter was subsequently reconstituted to form the Agricultural and Development Authority (ADA), now the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) in 1978. Because the independence government believed that rural development needed to be given priority to try and bring so-called peripheral areas closer to urban areas in terms of standards of living, it insisted on renaming the Authority ARDA to denote its rural development bias.

It has been noted further in this chapter that the creation of ARDA was laced with massive controversy as the parliamentary debates illustrate, but in the final analysis it can be argued that it was better to have a start towards the initiation and evolution of a national irrigation policy than to ignore this idea. The role of colonial policy, extension and demonstration activity, institutions such as DEVAG and TILCOR (now ARDA) cannot be underestimated in producing a regional development economy that was to transform the Sanyati countryside as it also generated new forms of differentiation.
especially based on cotton cultivation. Differentiation, though, as illustrated in this study, was not part and parcel of government intention. The impact of government policy on the Sanyati irrigation community will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPACT OF STATE POLICIES/STRATEGIES ON THE PEOPLE OF SANYATI (1965-1979)

INTRODUCTION

Chapter four examines the major consequences of UDI policies and strategies on the plotholding irrigation population in Sanyati. It outlines the various challenges facing the outgrowers in the smallholder scheme in light of limited loan facilities and the imposition of conservation measures designed to counteract the effects of soil erosion.

The chapter argues that the introduction of cotton in 1963, to a large extent, determined the nature of development and the extent of socio-economic differentiation in the area. More than any other crop cotton irrigation informed the process of rural differentiation. The irrigation period, in particular, provided many plotholders with the opportunity to become successful farmers. The chapter also analyses the differential impact exerted by cotton cultivation on the peasantry by arguing that while some peasants definitely benefited from cotton irrigation agriculture others were disadvantaged. As illustrated in this study, there were income disparities among plotholders as well as between the Gowe farmers and their dryland neighbours.

In addition, chapter four argues that, irrigation plotholders were not only differentiated on the basis of land ownership or gender, but also on their ability to pay the water rate, land rent as well as their ability to access Agricultural Development Fund (ADF), Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF) and Co-operative Society loans. For those farmers who could access such loans, irrigation provided an opportunity to become richer (better-off) than their counterparts who did not find it so easy to secure credit.

This period also witnessed the birth of the Sanyati Main Irrigation Scheme. The core estate’s interaction with Gowe is examined. This chapter advances the argument that the inception of both the smallholder irrigation scheme and Estate agriculture was responsible for heightening the levels of differentiation. TILCOR viewed the two sectors as enjoying a symbiotic relationship, but it is clear from this chapter that outgrower labour was often exploited for the benefit of the “Bigger Brother” (the Estate). The existence of the feudal landlord-tenant type of relationship between the two cannot be denied. The smallholder scheme (Gowe), therefore, can be used to illustrate the entrenchment of settler hegemony in Sanyati.

Last but not least, the escalation of the liberation struggle, especially after 1972, posed further challenges for both the smallholder scheme and the core estate. Whilst the former was not adversely affected since it was perceived as an African scheme, the latter was because it was seen as representing white enterprise. For example, it was difficult for the Estate to procure labour at the peak of the war. The establishment of protected villages (“keeps”) by the settler government to try and monitor the movement of the guerrillas
was, in itself, self-defeating as it hindered inflows of casual labour to the Estate (a state enterprise).


The struggle to survive:

Since its inception in 1967, there have been many challenges facing smallholder irrigation farmers at Gowe. In this area, as in other parts of rural Zimbabwe, irrigation was of paramount importance due to erratic and changing rainfall patterns. For the plotholders to eke out a living from the small pieces of land, which were allocated to them at the beginning, they had to strive to produce both subsistence and money-spinning crops on an intensive scale. The overall aim was to attain significant yields, which, in turn, would help raise farm incomes as well as standards of living. Success in this regard largely depended on the efficient utilisation of two scarce resources, land and water. 720

It is important to note that Gowe was launched amid pessimism from certain Ministry of Internal Affairs officials. This pessimism stemmed from the area’s aridity, its generally poor soils and the fact that some government officials were not sure if the liberation struggle which commenced in earnest in 1966, a year before the commissioning of Gowe, would not disrupt production. There was divided opinion in the Ministry, if not in the government, on the economic potential and viability of this irrigation scheme. The Preliminary Project Report stated: “From the economic aspect the scheme appears unattractive.” 721 After visiting the Gowe Irrigation Scheme on the 28th of November, 1967, Noel Robertson had this observation to make: “Not only is there nothing to be proud of here, there are grave doubts in my layman’s mind of the efficiency, durability and safety of the scheme.” 722 In the final analysis, the view that predominated was that the scheme was essential as an experiment in the development of the Sanyati communal lands. The first eighteen people to

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722 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C.36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. I, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), N. Robertson (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to the PC (Mashonaland South), 8th December 1967.
acquire plots at Gowe were, thus, given the responsibility to show the rest of Sanyati that this experiment had the potential to succeed.

Officially, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which took over the control and management of all irrigation schemes in the communal areas from the Ministry of Agriculture on 1st July 1967, had to assist in the realisation of this goal. Hence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs immediately published the Tribal Trust Land [Control of Irrigation Schemes] Regulations, designed to provide District Commissioners throughout the country with the necessary legal powers to ensure that all irrigation schemes were properly farmed by plotholders. This publication came in the wake of a visit to Pretoria (South Africa) by a Rhodesian Ministry of Agriculture delegation (from Salisbury) that attended the Conference on the “Regulations for the Control of Irrigation Schemes in Bantu Areas” in January 1963. The Conference, among other things, adopted the concept of lease agreements, the charging of water rates and how the Department of Bantu Administration and Development under which the BIC fell would appropriate land earmarked for the setting up of an irrigation scheme.

Similarly, the regulations published by Internal Affairs in 1967, also required all plotholders in Rhodesia, including those at Gowe, to enter into an agreement of lease and to pay a water rate which after two years of occupation, would amount to a maximum of £14 per acre per annum for all-the-year round irrigation. The two-year grace period was intended to give the plotholder an opportunity to learn the highly specialised methods of irrigation farming.

According to C. J. Perry who has written a research report on the pros and cons of water levies in countries such as Egypt, Australia and the USA including a case study on Iran, “A primary target for these interventions [water charges] is irrigation, because it is by far the largest consumer of water – typically 80 per cent – in most countries where shortage is a problem.” It is worth noting that in countries where water has been deemed to be plentiful, the role of water pricing as a means to ensure efficient allocation and productive use has attracted little attention among scholars, but because today water is manifestly scarce in many countries individuals, governments, donor agencies and international declarations advise that this commodity should be used frugally and should be treated as an “economic good.”

Treating it as such is the major rationale for water pricing because,

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728 This economic interpretation of the value and use of water has been emphasised by J. Briscoe, “Water as an Economic Good: The Idea and What it Means in Practice.” Paper presented to World Congress of ICID.
within irrigated agriculture or within an individual project, the farmer who receives irrigation and benefits from it is clearly privileged in relation to a farmer who does not receive irrigation water (i.e. dryland farmer). Thus, a service charge in the form of a water rate may be appropriate to recover a proportion of the benefits or to recover the costs of the service. The Gowe plotholders would have preferred a situation of non-payment for irrigation water in line with some irrigation projects where water is provided as a free service. Alternatively, much lower charges (although the whole idea of paying was staunchly resisted) could have consoled some of them.

However, the point the Sanyati tenants were missing was that non-payment would have placed a heavy burden on the government, which was already reeling from the effects of subsiding irrigation projects throughout the country. Actually, the damage that can be caused to an economy by providing water free of charge or at very low rates has been demonstrated both in Zimbabwe and other parts of the world where, even the low charges, supposed to be collected are, in fact, not collected. In essence, what this means in practice is that where charges are low or not collected at all, the direct beneficiaries of irrigation – who typically are a privileged group in most agrarian economies – receive their service at the expense of the economy in general, as scarce public resources are used first to finance project construction and subsequently, subsidise ongoing operations and maintenance costs. Therefore, it can be argued that, to achieve efficient water use, a price has to be attached to water and the price of water must be directly related to the volume delivered. If this rule is not applied strictly, there is bound to be abuse of a critical resource in life and this would not only be a negation of conservationist principles but also there will be nothing to bequeath to generations to come.

This water tariff for Gowe-Sanyati, which included the cost of land development, was calculated at £8 per acre for summer supplementary crops and £6 per acre for winter irrigation and was designed to exact, on average, a minimum net potential charge of £72 per acre. 

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729 The idea of subsidising irrigation schemes is not a novel phenomenon in Africa let alone in the world. It is now a proven fact that delivering water on philanthropic grounds is ruinous to any economy. South Africa realised this fact probably earlier than colonial Zimbabwe. This is why when the question of subsidy was raised in the Annual Report for 1928-1929 by the Republic’s Irrigation Department as soon as 1929 a decision of Cabinet was conveyed to this Department that the principle of subsidy had been approved. More detail on this issue can be gleaned from: the NASA (UA), TES: 7629: 78/127 Vol. 1, File: 78/127 Vol. 1, Water Affairs – Irrigation Schemes: Policy with Regard to Subsidising of Irrigation Schemes, Correspondence to October 1961, “Subsidies: Irrigation Schemes,” Irrigation Department (Union of South Africa) to The Secretary for Finance (Pretoria), 23rd October 1936.


731 The high cost of construction may make it difficult to achieve an attractive return on the initial investment. Viability is highly dependent on the value of the crops grown because world prices or even local prices for some major irrigated crops in Sanyati, for example, wheat, maize and cotton tend to fluctuate. In such cases diversified cropping, with ample opportunities for farmers to alter the proportions of the crops they grow, substituting a food crop for an export crop when prices are low, will help reduce the level of risk and increase the long-term viability of irrigation schemes.
annum on each irrigator. This, however, constituted a high water rate considering that the size of individual plots was kept at a bare minimum. As already noted, at Gowe, the plots seldom exceeded 4 acres in extent. In this instance, it can be argued that the consumers of irrigation produce living outside the schemes needed to make their contribution as well in recognition of the benefit they derived from these projects. Clearly, the most important benefit of irrigation to them was the overall reduction in food prices resulting from increased production by Gowe and the Main Estate when it was set up in the mid-1970s. Thus, the indirect beneficiaries of irrigation, the consumers of cheaper food, should have been happy to subsidise irrigation development through taxes.

It was on the 2-4 acre plots on the 80 acre Gowe Scheme, which were issued without any title deeds, that the farmers were expected to practise a 4-stage crop rotation involving maize, cotton, groundnuts and soya beans. The plots were too small for such a system of rotation, hence the clamours for more land which were directed at the DC. Some farmers discretely ploughed vacant plots before new incumbents took these up. This enabled them to surpass other plotholders’ annual income. In addition, fruits and vegetables were grown for sale. According to the CONEX Irrigation Officer, A. G. Pilditch, the total area of land set aside for horticultural purposes was 4 acres. Plotters were given equal portions of the garden to produce vegetables. The growing of vegetables, though on a small but intensive scale, enabled plotters to diversify their farming activities and keep the local market well supplied. A conservative estimate shows that about two out of every three families grew vegetables to satiate nutritional demands and generate some income. Those who had acquired more sophisticated skills of tending their gardens used the proceeds from vegetable sales to raise their socio-economic status. Westcott has testified to how lucrative this subsidiary task was when he made this comment: “An attempt to alleviate the discipline involved in an overhead spray scheme was made by allocating vegetable gardens which incidentally provided plotters with appreciable income.” In his view then, Gowe became “an example of the introduction, or rather, extension of modern farming techniques into the Trust Lands leading to higher standard of living and food production.” This was in sharp contrast to a general statement made in 1967 by the Secretary for Internal Affairs, W. H. H. Nicolle, in reference to the peasant farmers in the whole country: “We must not expect dramatic results in the field of agriculture. The African is an ultra-conservative

732 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 100816, Location 3.13.7F, File: AGR 7 Water Supplies General 97-117 (1966 - 1968), C. A. Hunter (pp. Secretary to the Treasury) to the Secretary for Agriculture, the Secretary for Mines and Lands, the Secretary for Internal Affairs, the Director of Water Development and the Chairman (ICC), 16th October, 1967, 2.
733 The initial 80 acres fell under what has been termed Gowe I. Of this total, only 70 acres were being fully utilised and the remaining 10 acres were either under-utilised or constituted vacant land.
734 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C.19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., J. L. Paul (Extension Officer - Sanyati/ Chenjiri) to the DC Gatooma and the Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South), 30th November, 1967.
736 R. L. Westcott, (Former DC Gatooma), Personal Interview, Ramsgate, South Africa, 12th July 2005.
737 Westcott, Personal Interview, 12th July 2005.
person and does not readily take to or see the need for change.”  

The statement by Nicolle bears close resemblance to the erroneous notion of a backward peasantry, which Arensberg has strongly criticised in another context, which states that: “Agriculture in the developing world will continue to limp and stumble as long as its backbone is the peasant [and that] everything is wrong with the peasant …”

Contrary to this old stereotyped view that Africans were conservative and unresponsive to the new economic opportunities, existing literature demonstrates that in the period under examination, Zimbabwean peasants in general and Gowe small-scale farmers in particular did respond to market forces by increasing their maize and cotton production for sale.

This was not a novel phenomenon, as Africans in the Sanyati area were already in contact with the money economy well before independence, as evidenced by the fact that the peasants had to increase their agricultural produce for sale and for their own sustenance. Thus, the battle to survive on the meagre tracts of land was launched with a lot of vigour at Gowe.

In fact, since November 1967 more and more people in Gowe were rotating their crops, applying fertiliser and instead of adhering to traditional food crops such as maize, they were also growing cotton, groundnuts, fruits (especially mangoes - mango orchards are a very conspicuous feature at this scheme), vegetables and soya beans. According to the Extension Officer for Sanyati/Chenjiri, J. L. Paul, maize and cotton were planted on the 2nd and 7th of November 1967, respectively. The S.H.52 maize seed variety, a high yielder, provided there is water, was grown. Due to very dry conditions before the rains started and the need for speed, night irrigation of maize and cotton was undertaken right through the month of November 1967 when there was no danger of loss of moisture through evaporation.

In 1967, when the rains were late in Sanyati, maize, sorghum and cotton crops were severely affected throughout the area, with the exception of the Gowe Pools Pilot Irrigation Scheme where, due to hard work by the plotholders in moving the spray lines and ensuring the correct delivery of water from the sprinklers, crops were growing well. This persuaded the CONEX Group Officer, P. G. How, to look at the scheme as “a first class illustration of

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742 Paraiwa, Personal Interview. See also C. Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, (Cape Town: David Philip, 1988), 132.
743 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., J. L. Paul to the DC Gatooma and the Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South), 30th November 1967.
744 Ibid.
745 Response to Questionnaire, Westcott to Nyandoro.
the real need of irrigation in the Sanyati TTL,“ notwithstanding the small size of the plots.

Among the crops that were said to be doing well were those of the former Secretary of the Gowe Co-operative Society, N. S. Gwacha, and his young brother, J. Gwacha, a former plotholder and currently one of the clerks at the Sanyati Depot of the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Ltd. (formerly Cotton Marketing Board - CMB). N. S. Gwacha and his brother were encouraged to join the Gowe Irrigation Scheme in 1967 by the Extension Officer for Sanyati/Chenjiri, J. L. Paul, under whom their father worked as a cook. After learning that Gowe was meant to promote Sanyati citizens, they were willing to join the scheme. In their first year on the scheme, the two Gwacha brothers and the other plotholders mainly grew maize and cotton under the then resident Agricultural Assistant or Demonstrator, MaCloud Mushawarima, who is currently the Supervisor for Sanyati’s Muzvezve I Resettlement Scheme. Among Mushawarima’s main duties was to assist the Gowe farmers realise excellent yields on their plots. Between the 1960s and 1970s, wheat, cotton and maize were grown by most of the plotholders. T. Nyamutova feels that of the three crops that made farmers to prosper particularly in the 1970s was maize because it was cheaper to grow and the only deduction by the DC was for the seed loan but there were so many deductions on the cotton crop e.g. tillage, seed, fertilisers, pesticides, water charges and packing material [bales].

Nyamutova observed:

In the 1970s cotton seemed to benefit the DC more than the growers. The farmers did not get any meaningful return from their crop. Farmers hardly got $3 from their cotton sales. In 1977 I got a return on my cotton of 75 cents only. So, it was the DC’s crop.

These sentiments expressed by Nyamutova were, on the one hand, reflective of a plotholder who was disgruntled by the exploitive tendencies of the DC (the symbol of the state in Sanyati at that time) and, on the other, of a mouthpiece of fellow plotholders who had initially resisted cotton because it could not be eaten in times of famine. He might have resented also the element of force that accompanied the cultivation of this crop especially during the anti-Rhodesian international sanctions that started in 1965 following UDI. Notwithstanding Nyamutova’s sentiments, it is true that the production of wheat,
maize and cotton, in particular the latter, reached its all time colonial peak in the 1960s and 1970s even on the small allotments at Gowe. Distinct social and economic classes emerged in this period due to the combined effects of irrigation and the cultivation of cotton. To a large extent, Gowe farmers were cultivating small-standardised plots. Because of this, on paper, they appeared to be a homogeneous entity but, due to different levels of physical application and effectiveness in working their plots, differentiation emerged. However, because of the smallness of their plots and other factors, in order to survive, a lot of initiative was needed and many plotholders had a lot of it.

Apart from plotholder initiative, Gowe flourished in this decade due to other reasons such as the availability of demonstrator advice, effective pumps, fairly open lines of credit and the strict supervision by the DC. Signs of prosperity were revealed by a number of factor. For instance, the pump engines and pipes bought in the late 1960s were still in good functioning order by the end of the 1970s and this helped ensure a steady and efficient supply of water to plotholder crops. Farmers could access inputs easily from Co-ops and the DC. This enabled some farmers to increase their production and used the proceeds from cotton sales to build more decent homes, buy cars and accumulate livestock. Robson Maturure, a retired Criminal Investigations Department (CID) Officer, for example, bought an Austin Cambridge vehicle from the sale of his produce. (See Appendix V). Livestock wealth was quite visible on their dryland holdings. This was mainly because the raising of animals in the scheme was prohibited by the DC. Outstanding cotton irrigators also qualified to acquire farms in the NPAs like Copper Queen, which falls under Gokwe District, and Chenjiri in Sanyati where they could practice cotton cultivation on an extended scale because the PA farms were much bigger than the Gowe plots. This facilitated further accumulation. Copper Queen and Chenjiri were and are still renowned cotton growing regions in the northwestern part of Zimbabwe. Table 4.1 illustrates how the cotton growing momentum was maintained in these areas (compared to maize) following Melville Reid’s cotton extension programmes and the establishment of Gowe in 1967.

The success of cotton was, in turn, used to push for a better road system to Gatooma where cotton was mainly marketed before the establishment of the CMB (COTTCO) depot at Sanyati Growth Point in 1976. Because the marketing of produce was mainly routed through Copper Queen PA, Sanyati TTL and the Gatooma Rural District Council road to Gatooma, the Gatooma District Council was concerned that the roads involved were “carrying a high density of traffic, a great deal more than they were designed to carry, or financed thereto.” The Council argued that unless Maintenance Votes were increased, these roads would inevitably break down. It went further to suggest that the roads were of “national importance” and an integral part of the development of the region as well; so collective effort was required to facilitate a better transportation network. The need for improved roads also underscored the success of cotton in the area. Problems of a good road infrastructure were, to some extent, solved when the tarred strip road linking

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753 Regis Shayamiti (Kusi Village Headman, Ward 24), Personal Interview, Kusi Village, Sanyati, 15th May 2005.
754 Ibid.
this area and Gatooma was completed after the establishment of the TILCOR Growth Point in Sanyati in 1977.

Table 4.1: CROP PRODUCTION: GOKWE TTL – COPPER QUEEN AND CHENJIRI PURCHASE AREAS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>COPPER QUEEN PA</th>
<th>CHENJIRI PA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COTTON</td>
<td>MAIZE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>Almost Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/68</td>
<td>1500 acres</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/69</td>
<td>2000 acres</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>2800 acres</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>3200 acres</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9500 acres</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cotton @ 3.5 bales per acre average @ 2.5 bales per acre ave.
Maize @ 8 bags per acre average @ 8 bags per acre ave.
Bulk Crop – Cotton =11200 bales  10000 bales  


The advent of TILCOR also reduced transportation problems as the plotholders could now market their produce through the Estate. However, N. S. Gwacha pointed out that, in spite of this, the Estate gave rise to new problems for the tenants. In his opinion, Gowe was more profitable between 1967 and 1973, but with the installation of electricity after 1973, the plotholders were now required to pay water rates and the scheme was, therefore, no longer as profitable. However, there was no unitary method of achieving profitability. Some plotholders were rich or simply better off because they were innovative. Others were poor because they lacked not only resources but also the necessary innovation expected in an irrigation scheme.

Gowe: The role of the ADF, ALF and the Co-operative Society:-

Since the scheme started operating, the ADF provided tractors for ploughing and recovered its costs from the plotholders, as ox-drawn ploughs were not allowed. Livestock rearing was not permitted within the confines of the irrigation scheme because tractors and other agricultural equipment were provided by the ADF. The ox-drawn plough, therefore, had no place at Gowe. There was also no provision for grazing land within the scheme, but a livestock-fattening programme had been introduced by the livestock demonstrator for

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756 Norman Savata Gwacha, (Communal farmer and former Secretary of the Gowe Irrigation Co-operative Society), Personal Interview, Kusi Village, Sanyati, 15th May 2005.
farmers to sell beasts and make a handsome profit. N. S. Gwacha, who cultivated a 1.4 hectare (4 acre) plot remembers that in 1967, the ADF tractor service for ploughing was provided at the rate of £10 ($20) per plotholder. Primarily, the ADF was involved in the financing of the smallholder scheme, the provision of farm equipment and the financing of cropping activities. The prime source of credit to the Gowe irrigators was the Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF), and by paying a nominal membership fee, these farmers had access to full seasonal credit through their co-operative known as the Gowe Co-operative Society. A brief historical background of the formation and operation of co-operative societies in Zimbabwe’s African areas will help to situate the one at Gowe in its national context.

In 1954, the Government instructed that an investigation be carried out to discover whether co-operative societies had any role to play in the development of the African enterprise or not. It was found that while urban societies would have little value, agricultural societies would provide a needed service in the channelling of both input items to African farmers and the produce of these farmers to marketing bodies. In addition, they would provide a mechanism by which credit for the purchase of input items could be made available to African farmers. Early efforts were, however, concentrated on the African Purchase Lands (formerly APAs and now small-scale commercial farms) because of their more advanced farmers and greater output. Following this investigation, the first society was formed in Chitomborwizi African Purchase Land in 1956 and the first in a Tribal Trust Land in Madziwa in 1960.

From then, growth was steady. At the end of 1972, there were 291 primary societies – marketing and agricultural supply societies – with 33,000 members. These societies were later amalgamated into 11 marketing unions (secondary societies) in order to consolidate the negotiating power of the primary societies. The societies were controlled by the Co-operatives Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which administered both the Co-operative Companies Act and the Co-operative Societies Act. The Co-operative Societies Act was an enabling Act only, which provided the apparatus for the formation and registration of co-operatives. Strong controlling and inspection powers were provided to the Registrar by the Act. In 1967 the Sebungwe Co-operative Union Limited was formed, incorporating 27 co-operatives in the Gokwe, Gatooma and Que Que (now Kwekwe) areas. The Union provided several functions. For instance, it:

(a) accumulated the buying power of 27 member co-operatives with 2,500 individual members into a single purchasing body, thus providing extra leverage in negotiation for discounts;

(b) acted as banker for the member co-operatives, channelling all payments for crops through itself. This provided flexibility in the management of accounts;

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757 A. Masenga (Gowe Pump Attendant), Personal Interview, Gowe, 8th January 1997 and R. L. Westcott, Personal Interview, Ramsgate, South Africa, 12th July 2005.
758 N. S. Gwacha, Personal Interview, Sanyati, 9th January 1997.
(c) enabled the accounting and secretarial function at primary co-operative level to be kept to the lowest possible level, as the more complex functions were performed in Que Que;
(d) provided a training centre for staff which could ultimately disperse among primary societies; and
(e) because of the degree of control exercised in the Union, it made feasible the operation of retail outlets for member societies. In the past it had proved impractical for primary co-operatives to operate retail stores. 760

The Union, which was staffed and managed solely by Africans, operated a central warehouse in Que Que. It was this warehouse that supplied the needs of smaller co-operatives such as Gowe. The basic reason for the existence of the co-operatives was to meet the individual member’s problems in the financing of his crop (credit), the supply and transportation of input items into the farming area, and the transportation of produce out of it to the market. To obtain credit well in advance of the growing season, a member submitted to his local committee his list of requirements for seed, fertiliser and pesticides. The committee, on advice from co-operative staff, ensured that the amounts requested were in balance with the intended acreage. A member was required to sign a stop order in favour of the co-operative for the cost of these items, plus handling and transport charges. The individual member’s loans were consolidated into a single co-operative loan and application made to the District Commissioner by the co-operative for a communal loan.761

Provided that the previous year’s communal loan was completely liquidated, approval was granted and the co-operative became liable for repayment. As the individual delivered his crop, the stop order was paid off first in the normal way, and as soon as repayment was completed, the individual received full payment for his produce, less the usual transport and handling charges. The co-operative, however, remained responsible for the repayment of the communal debt to the ALF.

As far as agricultural inputs were concerned, orders for physical input items were consolidated and a single order placed through the Union. Delivery was made to a single collection depot, which was the secretary’s house, an African Development Fund (ADF) store, a trading store or simply a shelter under a tree. The secretary and his committee handled distribution and the individual farmers collected and transported their own requirements. Delivery to the central depot (collection point) was by Union transport or contract transport arranged by the Union. During the marketing season, seed cotton was delivered to the same depot by individuals, with individual identification on each bale. On delivery, a produce receipt recording the weight of cotton was issued, but no grade or value was attached and no payment was made at that stage. Once a truckload had accumulated, transport was obtained from the Union and the cotton was delivered as a single consignment to the ginnery. Individual bales were recorded on the Cotton Marketing Board paysheet under the “Yield Reference” heading, to enable the payment to be broken down to individuals by the Union. A notification and cash analysis was

761 Ibid.
provided to the bank for payment on its next visit to the area, and the secretary and committee drew the cash and made payment to individual growers. Standard Bank Gatooma operated a mobile bank unit that serviced Gowe-Sanyati. As already indicated, payment was not always prompt. The delay from delivery to payout was approximately two weeks in normal circumstances. In other circumstances the delay was quite extended.

From the grower’s point of view the co-operative’s function of credit disbursement was not perceived in the same way. Some farmers saw the co-operative as fulfilling its function satisfactorily but others felt swindled by it. From the administration side, the communal responsibility for the loan ensured that at least some degree of individual creditworthiness was established before the committee approved the loan. Whilst problems occurred, the system nonetheless resulted in a debt recovery rate in excess of 95%, a considerably higher figure than where individual responsibility was the rule.

Gowe, like other co-operatives, also needed input assistance or credit. The Gowe Co-operative Society, whose first Chairman was Isaac Mutengo, sourced agricultural loans from the Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF) through the Union on behalf of the plotholders. The Co-op, as it became known, operated under the Sebungwe Co-operative Union, which had its headquarters in Kwekwe and a sub-branch in Kadoma. At the head of the Co-op were many renowned Master Farmers. A number of Co-operative officers only referred to by N. S. Gwacha as Shipley, Charumbira, Gorora and Bhango served on the Gowe Co-op and dominated its affairs. Among them was Gwacha himself, whose main functions as Secretary included checking the records of produce, issuing pesticides and ensuring that plotholders secured loans. He prepared co-operative loan forms before they were signed by the chairman. Gwacha was virtually the accounting officer of the Co-op who used his position to influence loan disbursement to the plotholders. Every plotholder, provided he was not a bad debtor, was entitled to a loan because the majority did not have ample capacity to self-finance their own operations. Without these loans, the idea of having this scheme in the first place would have been meaningless. However, although he does not openly admit it, Gwacha used his vast influence in the Co-op to help his relatives, for example his own brother, Job, and others obtain loans. At a local level, it was he who made the final recommendation on who should be given a loan and who should not. Invariably, those who had kinship links with him not only received favourable recommendations but also were assured of receiving the loans which they used to purchase inputs and access technical advice. Many who were privileged to have kinship ties with Gwacha took full advantage of this to accumulate more wealth than their counterparts. By 1979 they owned large heads of cattle and exhibited wealth in a number of other ways. For example, Job Gwacha had a 60 strong head of cattle which in 2000 stood at 42 (a big number by many rural standards) because he sold some to pay school fees for his children and others have

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763 J. Gwacha, (Former Plotholder), Personal Interview, COTTCO Depot, Sanyati Growth Point, 9th January 1997.

764 N. S. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 8th January 1997.
fallen prey to marauding cattle rustlers. He had built a beautiful home for himself and owned many farming implements. In addition, his children attended some of the best boarding schools in the area, including the Sanyati Baptist Mission.

Meanwhile, the embezzlement of funds by Co-op officials was quite rampant. The misappropriation of co-operative funds by secretaries was a depressing and continuous problem. In confidential correspondence on the operations of Co-operative Societies in African areas in general, the Agricultural Development Authority (ADA – the forerunner to ARDA) observed that: “Because they [Co-op officials] were not full-time employees and coming as they did from the community and controlling more cash than was commonly seen in the area, the social pressure on the secretaries to misappropriate resources on behalf of relations was extremely difficult to resist.” Nevertheless, although some officials like Norman Gwacha fraudulently converted cash and other resources for their personal use, it is wrong to suppose that part-time employees are, of necessity, prone to corruption.

In fact, because of the negative stigma attached to corrupt tendencies, Job Gwacha was wary to talk about his brother, Norman’s, membership of the Gowe Co-op. In an interview, he instead, preferred to talk about their family’s prosperity which they derived from cotton cultivation. He confessed that from the 1960s to the 1970s the major crop that gave farmers including his brother (Norman) a lot of profit and untold riches was cotton. He pointed out that he grew the Alba seed variety which gave farmers more yield than the other cotton varieties and that it gave more profit when compared to crops such as wheat and maize. Illustrating his point further he said:

The price of cotton (i.e. 8 cents per kilogram) was very lucrative. The price of maize was very low. A full 90 kg bag of maize sold for only £1.6s. At that time wheat prices were also low and the wheat variety they grew (i.e. the tall Tokwe variety) did not give good yields.

The Gwacha example can be used to show that Norman’s position in the Co-op gave him and his kinsmen access to credit and ultimately riches. As the loans were performance related, every plotholder strove to do well but those with better access accumulated more than those with poor access to credit.

In the 1967/68 season, N. S. Gwacha produced 50 bags of maize and 8 bales of cotton. Of his 1,4 hectares, 0,7 ha. were planted to maize and the other half to cotton. His grade “A” maize and cotton were sold at the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and CMB in Kadoma at £1.2s.6p per bag and 8p per pound respectively. Locally, maize produced in 1967 was

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767 J. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 17th May 2005.
768 Ibid.
769 N. S. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 8th January 1997. N.B. Historically, the GMB began operations in 1931 as the Maize Control Board (MCB). In 1951, the MCB was renamed the Grain Marketing Board.
sold at $3.00 a bag. The Gowe Co-operative Society provided a useful service to its members by marketing their produce. The Sebungwe Union Transport, Carriers Transport, Swift, A. W. Transporters, the Fireson Transport Company (owned by a Somali transport operator based in Kadoma), and other private transport owners were often hired to ferry the farmers’ produce to the markets in Kadoma. The local CMB and the GMB depots at Sanyati had not yet been established. These were only established in 1976 and 1989 respectively. (See Map 14 for the location of planned and existing GMB and CMB Depots in Zimbabwe). It had been argued in the preliminary project report that the establishment of the scheme should be followed by the establishment of a local cotton ginnery for the processing of the cotton crop, but this did not materialise until much later.

Since 1967, in order to market produce, a plotholder at Gowe needed to be a registered member of the Co-op (with a Co-op number), and a holder of a Master Farmer certificate. The Co-op number indicated the produce items a farmer was dispatching to the market. In turn, the Co-op had a Growers card or number against which it sold plotholders’ produce. J. Gwacha vividly remembers that, in the 1967/68 season, his Co-op number, which had to be clearly labelled on each bale was 229, and the Co-op Growers card number was 027206A. To avoid erroneously marketing produce on another grower’s number and thereby risk losing the proceeds of a harvest it was important for a farmer to remember his or her number. It should be pointed out here that, before the CMB was formed as an arm of the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA), the Gowe plotholders marketed their cotton through the Cotton Company Committee (CCC), which was based in Kadoma. The CMB was only created in terms of the Cotton Marketing and Control Act Chapter 106 in 1969.

After the plotholders had sent their produce to the market, the Gowe Co-operative Society would receive cheques from the GMB and CMB, which in turn would be cashed by the Co-op officers at the Kadoma Standard Bank Branch. Eventually, the farmers would be paid in cash by the Co-op officers or the Standard Bank on production of a “producer’s statement.” This ensured that the money would not be paid out to fraudulent claimants, but subordination of the Co-op to Sebungwe sometimes disadvantaged the growers. In this connection, the former DC Gatooma lamented the fact that “Sebungwe covered a larger area


J. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 9th January 1997.

Ibid.

J. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 9th January 1997.

Cotton Marketing and Control Act, Chapter 106, 1969, 39. The CMB (now COTTCO) operates in close co-operation with the GMB as the sole buyer of raw cotton and processor of lint and seed. See Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 81 and Cotton Marketing Board (CMB), (various years), Annual Reports, Harare: CMB.

N. S. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 8th January 1997.

Ibid.
than Gowe and consequently introduced costs which were not applicable and delays in payments to the plotholders were quite commonplace.” 777

From an economic point of view, the Gowe Co-op also needed to survive by charging a “small” service fee. For instance, the Co-op bought seed, pesticides, fertiliser and other essential inputs from the Zimbabwe Fertiliser Company (ZFC), Windmill and Agricura. 778

It then sold these to the plotholders at the Co-op’s own mark up price. The Co-op’s price included a handling charge or service fee. The Co-op used its profits to settle its own debts to the ZFC, Windmill and Agricura. 779

Sometimes, the DC marketed plotholders’ produce on their behalf. T. Nyamutova, one of the well-to-do farmers at Gowe, remembers that, in the 1975/76 season, all plotholders grew and sold their crops on one growers’ card on the advice of the then DC, A. Q. Cozens. “We produced on one card and got our money from the DC after deducting the cost of inputs such as seed and fertiliser.” 780 However, the DC was an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs whose Co-operatives Branch administered the Co-operative Societies Act. Whilst there were problems associated with marketing produce through the Gowe Co-op, the co-operatives clearly represented a very convenient way for the plotholders to obtain their input items. The majority of co-operatives, save for the hitches pointed out by Gwacha, processed their orders efficiently and the goods were supplied practically at the user’s doorstep. This compares favourably with the alternative of ordering personally from outlets in the main centres, then depending on unreliable local contractors for the transport of these goods.

The control and organisation provided by the co-operatives were invaluable. From the grower’s point of view, the convenience of marketing through the co-operative brought considerable relief especially to the resource poor plotholders who could not afford to buy their input requirements for cash. From the Cotton Marketing Board point of view, the consolidation of Gokwe District’s (which included Sanyati) 1 935 individual growers by December 31, 1972 into only 19 accounts reduced drastically the volume of administrative work involved. 781 Nevertheless, not all producers, save for the resource rich and consistent performers, qualified for these loans. The others found it difficult to access credit and this impeded accumulation.

**Formidable Problems: Lack of Loans, Imposition of Fines and Evictions:**

Schemes like Gowe were invariably starved of credit facilities, and this almost incapacitated them, as they could not keep pace with maintenance costs. In spite of this, in 1974, TILCOR stated that, with the right amount of capital injection, professional management and the availability of irrigation equipment at low cost, “Gowe offers great scope for intensive

777 R. L. Westcott, (Former DC Gatoomaa), Personal Interview, Ramsgate, South Africa, 12th July 2005.
778 J. Gwacha, Personal interview, 9th January 1997.
779 Ibid.
780 T. Nyamutova (Vice Chairman, Gowe Irrigation Committee), Personal Interview, Gowe, 14th May 2005.
A number of problems, however, beset Gowe in its first season of operation. Loans were only availed to farmers through their Co-operative Society (i.e. the Gowe Co-op). Whilst the co-operative offered convenient service to some, it was cumbersome for other plotholders to conduct their business through a Co-op instead of dealing directly with the providers of services, such as the ADF, ALF, the CMB and GMB. Even the Secretary of the Co-op complained that, “it took them [plotholders] too long (i.e. 5 weeks or more) to get their payments from the Co-op for produce sold or delivered to the market.” Early payments would enable the farmers to have ready cash with which to pay school fees for their children and purchase food, clothing and other needs.

The tenure system was another cause for concern for the plotholders. Private ownership of land at Gowe and other communal irrigation schemes was, and still is, unknown. All land was owned by the government and was only allocated to individual plotholders on the basis of leasehold tenure. Because of this, individual Gowe farmers lacked the means and the incentives to invest in irrigation holdings. It was not appreciated that, private ownership of land would enable plotholders to raise capital on their own, using the land as collateral. Individual ownership would also provide an additional stimulus to the Gowe farmers’ efforts. From the outset, it was doubtful whether leasehold arrangements would be acceptable in the long-term to the Gowe irrigators, since there was little inducement for them to continue cultivating land in which they had no stake, except in a veritable effort to survive and avoid eviction. To demonstrate their disgruntlement against the existing tenure system, a few plotholders did demand to have title deeds. Others sought audience with the DC or the Minister of Internal Affairs to present their case for individual ownership of land but to no avail.

The position of the plotholders was not ameliorated either by the imposition of exorbitant water rates since 1967. In the 1967/68 season, N. S. Gwacha’s total water charge amounted to £26.10s, which was quite unaffordable considering his other needs, for example, food, clothes and so on. The plotholders resented paying what they considered to be exorbitant water rates, especially since the Thames Trader Engines and the Heath Robinson Pump operated by the MOWD were largely inefficient in supplying water to the Gowe plots. The first Pump Supervisor for Gowe, Elton Gilbert, whose chief duty was “to pump water from the Munyati River to the pump station and then to the irrigation scheme,” was finding it difficult to manage the water supply system.

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783 N. S. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 9th January 1997.
784 Ibid.
785 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 100816, Location 3.13.7F, File: AGR 7 Water Supplies General 97-117 (1966-1968), C. A. Hunter (pp. Secretary to the Treasury) to the Secretaries for Agriculture, Mines and Lands, Internal Affairs, the Director of Water Development and the Chairman (ICC), 16th October, 1967, 2.
786 Many farmers strove to produce good yields for their personal benefit and out of fear of eviction as poor agricultural performance entailed eviction.
787 N. S. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 9th January 1997.
788 Elton Gilbert, (Former Pump Supervisor for the Gowe Irrigation Scheme – Ministry of Water Development), Personal Interview, West End Hospital, Harare, 20th October 2006. Gilbert, who says water for irrigation was abstracted straight from the river (Munyati) into the 2 x 50 000 gallon pump station tanks, worked as supervisor and paymaster for his department (Water Development) from September 1967 to
difficult to operate what Noel Robertson described as an “amateurish water pumping installation.” To correct the situation, Water Development had to provide a “standby pump and engine.” Nonetheless, the pumping hitches afflicting Gowe were not completely eradicated.

In the light of these pumping problems, plotholders did not consider the high water rates they were charged to be justified. However, the government’s justification for the water rate was that “water, as a factor of production, should be paid for in the same way as other inputs like fertiliser, capital and land.” Water tariffs were also introduced to recoup Government expenditure on irrigation schemes in general, but such impositions had the effect of draining the farmers’ small net income. As indicated earlier, it was a prudent economic decision to charge a certain fee for water supplied, but whilst many plotholders were not objecting to paying for the water, they were objecting to the high rates charged. Clearly, they understood the rationale behind this requirement in as much as they knew that by being asked to pay exorbitant rates they were being exploited or short changed.

Apart from the issue of the water rate, the plotholders’ operations were affected by “the problem of livestock from the nearby dryland holdings overstepping boundaries and destroying irrigation crops, especially maize.” As if this was not enough, baboons were “an utter nuisance and a constant worry for plotholders.” They dug up seed just germinating and caused severe damage to plots. It was envisaged that these troubles would continue, particularly during reaping, and measures had to be considered to keep the baboons at bay. N. S. Gwacha has pointed out that, as a result of the baboon menace, the late Mheremhere Diura, was selected at a plotholders meeting in 1967/68 to mount an afternoon guard of the fields. Only an afternoon or “crop guard” was required because baboons were largely inactive during the night. Because of the baboon problem, crop harvesting had to occur simultaneously. The baboon menace ended, however, when the DC Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, allowed Diura to carry a gun and shoot the baboons. This, together with the erection of a barbed wire fence around the scheme in 1967 ended the plotholders’ problems with baboons.

December 1974. His departure from Gowe coincided with the establishment of the TILCOR Estate in Sanyati.

789 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C.36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), N. Robertson to the PC (Mashonaland South), 8th December 1967.
790 Ibid.
791 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 100816, Location 3.13.7F, File: AGR 7 Water Supplies General 97-117 (1966-1968), C. A. Hunter (pp. Secretary to Treasury) to the Secretaries for Agriculture, Mines and Lands, Internal Affairs, the Director of Water Development and the Chairman (ICC), 16th October, 1967, 5.
792 Ibid.
794 Ibid.
795 N. S. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 9th January 1997.
The success of the first irrigators led to growing local demand for further irrigation plots. According to N. Robertson, “The very success of the schemes and in particular of the Gowe Pilot Scheme in Sanyati has engendered tremendous interest amongst the tribesmen who are clamouring for schemes in their areas.” 

Because the plotholders exhibited a high level of industriousness on their plots, CONEX did not hesitate to send a recommendation to the DC for Gatooma to have the existing 80 acres extended to 120 acres. Eventually, in early 1968 a further 60 acres (Gowe II) was added, and “the whole scheme put on a more permanent basis.” This was the Government’s response to clamours for more land. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the addition of Gowe II did not do much to address the plotholders’ land hunger. It merely meant more people could be accommodated on the scheme and still cultivate the old standard size plot. This frustrated the aspirations of the resource rich tenants who were bent on further accumulation.

There was no difficulty, though, in finding plotholders for the scheme. A great deal of interest had been shown by sons of “Purchase Area farmers” for whom an irrigation scheme was an obvious answer to their settlement problem. Once the area had been settled, there was need to appoint an irrigation manager, who would be in full control of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. The following passage, extracted from the DC Gatooma’s Annual Report (1967/68), summarises what he felt was the importance of appointing an irrigation manager:

The limited experience here in establishing and running this scheme, has shown beyond all doubt that the irrigation specialist must be asked to plan from the beginning, as also, from the same point, must the overall supervision and running be entrusted to specifically trained persons. Unless this is done the optimum production will not be realised and the plotholder, who in this instance is working hard, will see his not very wide profit margin shrink through no fault on his part.

There was mounting criticism against the Extension Officer, J. L. Paul, who was roundly blamed by the DC (Westcott) for having, “no training or experience in irrigation farming.” In 1968, he was accused of having applied nitrogen to the cotton crop when it

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797 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 100817, Location, 3.13.8R, File: AGR/16/570-640 Irrigation Schemes (Individual) - March 1967 - December 1968, N. Robertson to The Provincial Water Engineer (Mashonaland) and the PC (Mashonaland South), 1st November, 1968.
799 The additional 60 acres comprised Gowe II. However, only 50 acres of the new portion were being fully utilised and the remainder (10 acres) lay vacant. The total area under cultivation at Gowe was, therefore, 120 acres.
802 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc. R. L. Westcott to the PC (Mashonaland South), 8th March 1968, 1.
803 Ibid.
was already “too late by a month.”  

He also angered members of the Gowe Co-operative by failing to comply with the organisation’s procedural requirements which stipulated that once the Co-op had disbursed inputs and chemicals it was the duty of the Extension Officer to advise farmers on the dates to sow seeds or plant, apply fertiliser and chemicals and in what quantities. Still insisting that Paul had violated a technical procedure, the DC further noted that, “With plotholders paying water rates and carrying out to the letter the instructions given them mistakes in technique can no longer be tolerated.”

It was against this background that the Primary Development Officer (PDO), T. R. Whiting, who had recently been on an irrigation course and scheme (i.e. the Tuli-Makwe Scheme in the Gwanda District) was appointed as Manager for Gowe on the 1st of April 1968. He was to undertake the normal duties of a resident field or agricultural assistant in view of the comparative smallness of Gowe. In light of the extensions to the Gowe Scheme, every effort was being made to provide the DC Gatooma with a Field Assistant by the 1st of July 1968. Before this was done Whiting had to do both jobs, that is, Manager-cum-Field Assistant.

Gowe also had two closely allied teams made up entirely of elected farmers that attended to scheme organisation. The two teams comprised a Management Board (the Gowe Irrigation Co-ordinating Committee - ICC) and a Co-operative Society. Basically, the Management Board dealt with the day-to-day field management and the plotholders’ Co-op attended to financial matters and the purchase of spray equipment. The CONEX and Co-op advisory service was available to offer technical advice as needed. An additional PDO was required for the Irrigation Manager, with effect from the 1st of July 1969. This would help lessen the burden on Whiting.

After consultation with CONEX, the Irrigation Managers who were made “ex Officio members” of the Co-op Committees, advised Co-operative officers what their seed and fertiliser requirements were before delivering these to the schemes. Co-ops kept all the records, arranged for repayment and also collected water rates. As a safeguard against

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804 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc. R. L. Westcott to the PC (Mashonaland South), 8th March 1968, 1.  
805 Ibid., 2.  
806 Ibid.  
807 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C.36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965-December 1969), L. G. Leach (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to the PC (Mashonaland South), 3rd April, 1968, 1. The agricultural assistant was required to be resident on the scheme in order to constantly impart knowledge and advice to the new irrigators as well as monitor progress on the ground. Westcott, Personal Interview, 12th July 2005.  
808 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C.36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965-December 1969), L. G. Leach (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to the PC (Mashonaland South), 3rd April, 1968, 1.  
810 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., L. G. Leach to the PC (Mashonaland South), 3rd April, 1968.
possible defaulters, Irrigation Managers ensured that when crops were reaped sufficient quantities were held back to cover outstanding loans and water rates.\footnote{NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., L. G. Leach to the PC (Mashonaland South), 3\textsuperscript{rd} April, 1968.} Although plotholders were not compelled to be members of the Co-op, circumstances sometimes, did force them to join, as illustrated in the following statement:

A plotholder may decline to become a member of a Co-op but as he will still be required to plant the correct seed and apply the recommended fertiliser on a specified date or get off the scheme he will in all probability find it to his advantage to join.\footnote{Ibid.}

It is significant to note that, in the early days of the scheme and on the insistence of the DC, irrigation work was largely routine, involving very strict adherence to instructions in order to ensure proper take off. Seed was distributed at the same time. The clearing and ploughing of fields had to conform to a clearly stipulated schedule, and, most importantly, watering schedules had to be observed by plotholders all the time. This illustrated that the plotholders’ area of decision in the productive process was tightly circumscribed, contrary to Westcott’s argument that “crops suitable to the area and yielding the highest output under the circumstances were chosen by the agricultural staff in conjunction with the plotholders.”\footnote{Westcott, Personal Interview, 12\textsuperscript{th} July 2005.} In reality, they could not choose the main crop they wanted to grow but only enjoyed limited choice in respect to their subsidiary crops. They had no leverage to choose when to plant and when to pick. Although some plotholders watered their plots illegally, officially, they had no choice as to the frequency and method of watering their crops. Thus, the conditions of tenancy in the scheme meant that the tenants were compelled to cultivate their plots in an appropriate way and in accordance with the scheme of crop rotation dictated by the field assistant in consultation with the DC who maintained that “with an overhead irrigation scheme there had to be uniformity,”\footnote{Ibid.} in the interests of efficiency and viability.

From the beginning of the scheme, a number of offences were punishable by eviction. For failure to conserve water and to plant, weed or fertilise crops on time, an offender was given a warning and, at the same time, served with a three-month notice to vacate his plot if the problem persisted. For other offences, such as habitual stealing, offenders were given four hours in which to pack their belongings and leave the scheme.\footnote{Ibid.} Because eviction was the penalty for failure to plant or fertilise on stipulated dates, plotholders, out of fear of an obvious fate that awaited them, were bound to co-operate with the irrigation officials, including the Co-op Officers who disbursed loans to them. By 1968 it was clear policy that ADF and ALF loans to African farmers on irrigation settlements would be channelled through Co-operative Societies.\footnote{Mjoli, Personal Interview, 14\textsuperscript{th} May 2005.} Regrettably, the Gowe Co-op was often in debt to the

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\begin{enumerate}
\item NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., L. G. Leach to the PC (Mashonaland South), 3\textsuperscript{rd} April, 1968.
\item Ibid.
\item Westcott, Personal Interview, 12\textsuperscript{th} July 2005.
\item Ibid.
\item Mjoli, Personal Interview, 14\textsuperscript{th} May 2005.
\item NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation scheme: Financial Plans, Water Reports etc. (1967-1971), R. R. Price (pp. Under Secretary Co-operatives and Loans Branch) to all Principal Co-operative Officers, 2\textsuperscript{nd} April, 1968, 1.
\end{enumerate}
ALF and sometimes not enough funds for the irrigators’ purposes were made available to the society for the purchase of essentials such as fertiliser and seed. At Gowe, the Extension Officer, J. L. Paul, aptly summed up the position that obtained in 1968 in the following words:

It appears that most Co-operative Societies, operating in African Areas are heavily indebted to the Agricultural Loan Fund and subsequently refused further credit. The well being of the Irrigation Scheme [Gowe] is therefore being subjected to a Co-op without means of finance. This is indeed a sorry state of affairs and optimum results cannot be obtained. 817

In spite of the problems, many plotholders increasingly endeavoured to improve their yields. A few plotholders on the Gowe Scheme, in an attempt to increase yields and maintain their security on the land, decided to retain their dryland plots. Such irrigators were, however, served with warnings that failure to give them up would result in their leaving the scheme when the crops for 1968 were harvested. 818 Some plotholders heeded the warning, but others did not as the quest to produce more and become richer took centre-stage.

In 1968, a number of plotholders tried their luck with wheat and beans on the encouragement of the Irrigation Manager, Whiting. Given the irrigators’ enthusiasm with these relatively new crops at Gowe, Whiting was convinced that, it was possible that “with care and attention of on the spot management an average of £100 per acre net profit will be produced this 12 month cropping period.” 819 In the same year, cotton profits were £40 - £50 per acre, and the farmers were aiming at higher profits in 1969. 820 They also decided to grow only half an acre of a high yielding maize variety (SR 52) per family because the farmers felt that this choice was not only more productive, but also left more of their acreage available for cash cropping. 821 Such kind of planning certainly did not make these plotholders “ultra-conservative” people as alleged earlier by the Secretary for Internal Affairs in his annual report for 1967. They were economic men who were fully cognisant of their economic needs.

Plotholder wheat and bean crops for 1968 were estimated by Whiting at a net value of ±£40 per acre. 822 In the final analysis, however, this estimate could not be realised due to mechanical and pumping faults, which took rather too long to be remedied. The failure to correct the faults immediately affected the plotholders’ yields. For example, in 1968, mechanical faults depressed the potential wheat yield by ±15%. Lack of appropriate advice,
in conjunction with mechanical faults, also depressed the potential bean yield by ±30%. Watering misadvice caused false germination and loss of 15% of bean seed and subsequent population; loss of a further 15% of yield due to unequal distribution of water with overlarge drop size, damaging broad leaved plants and panning soil. Further reduction in yield will occur with the damaging of imminent bean flowers.

Due to this untenable situation, the DC felt that, depending on yields, recommendations would have to be made for the partial remission of water rates. Actually, in terms of Section 38 of Circular 178, the DC Gatoomba was empowered to remit £3 per acre for the 1968/69 water rate in respect of 18 plotholders who were seriously affected, and the rate for the same plotholders was set at £7 for the year 1969/70. In addition, Whiting was of the opinion that, due to the mechanical faults, ADF compensation was necessary in some cases. Such gestures would be a great consolation to the plotholders for loss of projected yields.

However, the CONEX Group Officer, P. G. How, was not amused by this development, which seemed to be a result of Whiting’s negligence. During How’s visit to the scheme from the 12th to the 14th of August 1968, he had estimated that the wheat would yield ±18 bags per acre whilst the bean crop showed promise of a good yield. However, on his latest visit, on the 10th of September the same year, he doubted if the wheat would do better than 12 bags per acre and the beans 2-3 bags per acre. This, in How’s view, was entirely due to gross under-watering of the wheat and over-watering of the beans. Crops adjacent to the irrigation rainers were over-watered and those further away were drought-stricken, as the lack of pressure placed them largely out of range of the nearest rainer. Before these technical faults were corrected, the Irrigation Manager needed to have amended and adapted his watering schedules and spray lines. In other words, he should have compensated for the faults by juggling with water schedules. In spite of this need, sometimes he seemed to lack the initiative. As a result, Whiting could hardly be absolved from blame by How for this maldistribution of water: “I [How] cannot understand why Mr. Whiting had not seen this himself, and if he was uncertain what to do, [he should] have asked for advice. Unless,
of course it was his usual reluctance to ask for - or take - advice." This statement illustrated the growing tension between the Group Extension Officer and one of his senior lieutenants.

The deterioration of crops was noticed by the farmers and they too expressed great concern about the situation. In an attempt to redress the problem, the Group Officer advised Whiting that a demonstration plot of soya beans had to be grown by the plotholders, on the plots reserved for this purpose, to gain experience. A 4-acre demonstration or experimental plot, run by CONEX, together with a 10-acre orchard were established as part of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. The demonstration plot officials undertook investigations with the intention of finding more profitable crops. They also investigated the prospect of seed production. In this regard, the DC was convinced that “accurately controlled irrigation lends itself well to meeting quality requirements of seed production.” Almost every crop grown at Gowe was tried on the demonstration plot but the CONEX groundnut demonstration for the 1967 summer season was a failure, as the GMB (Gatooma) rejected the nuts because they were not up to the expected standard. In spite of this failure, on the whole, the idea of a demonstration plot was worthwhile to the Gowe farmers as it enabled them to obtain improved crop yields. The DC testified that yields by the farmers who grew their first crops on the Gowe Irrigation Scheme in Sanyati were a success. This, however, was the official view, which was not always reflected in practice.

On the one hand, although various factors, technical or otherwise, were preventing the realisation of the full crop yields possible on the Gowe Scheme since its inception, on the other, there was no doubt that the people in Sanyati saw the advantages of such a scheme. The desirability of establishing such a scheme, which had the potential to settle and introduce over 200 families into the cash economy, had already been proved. In this connection, it should be mentioned that since the introduction of cotton into Sanyati in 1963, there was a rapid increase in the number of growers and the acreage, and there was no evidence of any tendency by the plotholders to revert to subsistence farming. Although financing was carried out through the DC’s office and crops marketed by it, plotholders always retained part of the maize and wheat crops for home consumption and sales.

831 Ibid.
832 Ibid.
834 Ibid.
838 Westcott, Personal Interview, 12th July 2005.
There was some awareness too of the disadvantages such as the ascending scale of water rates and the eventual disposal or transfer of cattle and dryland holdings. This was because the DC forbade the rearing of cattle as well as the dual ownership of dryland and irrigation plots.

Between the 28th of October 1968 and the 31st of January 1969, Whiting was on leave and the Field Assistant, H. C. Jordaan, took over the responsibility of managing the Gowe Scheme in addition to his other duties. Jordaan faced a number of challenges from the time he was appointed. He had to implement some changes to ensure viability. For example, on seeing that the Gowe Irrigation Scheme was not large enough, he decided to discontinue the services of the Scheme Management Board or the ICC. He, however, retained the Gowe Co-op as well as the CONEX Demonstrators who functioned in an advisory capacity to the Irrigation Manager.

Under Jordaan’s management, most of the plotholders’ cash crops continued to be marketed (through the Co-op) in Kadoma. Only a few bales and bags were sold through other sources, and some maize was sold to unofficial buyers (private buyers) at an average price of $3.50 per bag in 1968. The Co-op’s handling charges and the ADF sales levy amounted to 2½% and 10% of total sales, respectively. Transport to Kadoma was charged at the rate of 75c per bale for cotton and 58c per bag for wheat. These charges affected the farmers in view of the fact that, in the planting season, there had been considerable concern over the incidence of the American Boll Worm. This worm, together with the drought, adversely affected the cotton crop, which, by December 1968, was in the flowering stage. CONEX had to re-arrange and step up the spraying schedule. Whilst this effort was quite commendable, yields hit an all-time low, which added to the problems already inflicting Gowe. These included the drought, technical faults, transport costs to markets in Kadoma, ADF sales levy, co-op handling charges, and the lack of adequate loan facilities from the ALF.

Notwithstanding all these problems, the Gowe Irrigation Scheme made steady progress. Although from an economic point of view, this scheme appeared unattractive due to insignificant farm incomes, it was considered essential for the continued development of the area in line with the original objectives. In support of this view, the Deputy Secretary for Internal Affairs, Noel Robertson, on 1st November 1968, commented: “In spite of the

843 Ibid., 2.
scheme appearing sub-economic, its value to the Tribal Area and the country in general cannot be calculated.”  

Robertson noted that Gowe and other irrigation schemes in the endemic famine areas of the country were a success story, as evidenced by the fact that: “Despite the supposedly worst drought in our history, up to date, Government has not been called upon for one penny piece for famine relief.” Thus, from an official point of view, by the end of 1968, Gowe was showing signs of rapid growth.

At the beginning of 1969, it was agreed, at a meeting between H. C. Jordaan and the plotholders, that only three crops a year would be grown, namely, cotton, maize and 75 acres of wheat. A four-crop rotation had proved rather difficult to implement due to the size of the plots. Most of the plotholders were encouraged to grow more maize for sale on the local market as they stood to realise more profit. The Regional Co-operative Officer, K. Hahn conceded that, ideally, members were supposed to sell their maize through the Co-op, but owing to the drought, they could sell more profitably locally (i.e. at £2 or $4 per bag).

Hahn added that locally sold maize would fetch more than if it were sent through the GMB, because when maize was sold through the GMB, an initial payment was made to the farmer, and once the GMB had sold it, the farmer could only receive more if the GMB had surplus to distribute. Since the plotholders were likely to make a profit by selling their maize on the local market, this would also enable them to repay their agricultural loans obtained through the Co-op. However, individual farmers (resource rich plotholders) who had the capacity to finance their own operations were free to do so. In reality, though, not many of the plotholders had sufficient capital to finance themselves. For example, buying a single bag of fertiliser through the Co-op for cash cost 5/-d and 7/3d in town (Kadoma) and very few could afford it.

Under the circumstances, the majority, if not all, were dependent on the Co-op for ALF loans, but the conditions under which they were entitled to a loan, including that disbursed through the DC’s office, were quite stringent. The Acting DC for Gatooma, D. K. Parkinson, clearly stated that if a farmer went into the new year with outstanding debts he could not get a new loan. This position was re-affirmed by Hahn when he said that outstanding loans were considered on a yearly basis and not on a crop basis and that loans were only granted on the strength of a plotholder’s past history (record).

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845 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 100817, Location 3.13.8F, File: AGR/16/570-640 Irrigation Schemes (Individual), March 1967 - December 1968, N. Robertson to the Provincial Water Engineer (Mashonaland) and to the PC (Mashonaland South), 1st November, 1968.
846 Ibid.
848 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, File: “Gowe Irrigation Scheme: Sanyati TTL (EX CONEX),” Minutes of a meeting held at Gowe Irrigation Scheme on 5th May, 1969, 1.
849 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, File: “Gowe Irrigation Scheme: Sanyati TTL (EX CONEX),” Minutes of a meeting held at Gowe Irrigation Scheme on 5th May, 1969, 1.
850 Ibid., 2.
851 Ibid., 1
852 Ibid.
serious drought in 1968, many farmers failed to pay back their loans in 1969. J. Gwacha argues that Parkinson was very strict and did not tolerate loan defaulters. \[853\] Defaulters were forced to make a double repayment as a deterrent in future. In 1969, one farmer, who had outstanding debts, was instructed by Parkinson to let a portion of his land lie fallow until he was in a position to clear his outstanding debts. \[854\] The farmer expected some mercy from the latter because his and the other plotholders’ profit for that particular year was very low. Nonetheless, Parkinson could not rescind his earlier decision and action such as this temporarily arrested differentiation in Sanyati because forcing a farmer to cease production had a negative impact on accumulation.

This and the charging of fines for various “farming offences” made the Acting DC very unpopular among the plotholders to a point where they nick-named him “Mbudziyazvara.” \[855\] This implied that, at the slightest provocation, he would demand very huge fines. He would unilaterally multiply the fines by the number of times he saw fit depending, in his opinion, on the gravity of the matter. Parkinson also threatened plotholders with eviction from the scheme for refusal to accept advice from CONEX and for ownership of both a dryland and an irrigation plot. A man with land in both places was adjudged to be an unsatisfactory plotholder for various reasons.

The DC himself, R. L. Westcott, spoke strongly against the dual ownership of land on the part of the plotholders and the penalty for infringing this rule tended to be draconian. He made his stance very clear when he said:

Plots on irrigation schemes were not adjuncts to dry land holdings, but were intended to support families independent of any other resource ... there were many people without land, such as the sons of Purchase Area farmers, and the numbers were increasing at an alarming rate. \[856\]

Those allocated irrigation plots, but who, at the same time, had dryland holdings, were then warned by the DC that, after two years in some cases, and one in others, they had to choose which type of farming they preferred to do. \[857\] Considering the fact that this was one way for the plotholders to redress their land hunger and become wealthy rural capitalists, Westcott’s policy of ordering those still cultivating their dryland plots to leave Gowe was regarded as authoritarian. However, in an interview, Westcott argued that, if a tenant neglected or was careless in the cultivation of his crops, he was evicted on the basis of poor performance, which militated against achieving the scheme’s long-term self-financing objectives. He also suggested that eviction was self-inflicted when he said

\[853\] J. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 9\textsuperscript{th} January 1997.
\[854\] NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme: Sanyati TTL (EX CONEX), “Minutes of a meeting held at Gowe Irrigation Scheme on 5\textsuperscript{th} May, 1969,” 3.
\[855\] \textit{Ibid}.
\[856\] NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., R. L. Westcott to the PC (Mashonaland South), 14\textsuperscript{th} February 1969.
\[857\] \textit{Ibid}.
Poor performance [anyway] would have led to poor yields and the individual would not have wished to stay and carry out the tasks of moving pipes when his plot was due for water, clearing his crop and generally caring for it especially when cotton was concerned for an inadequate yield. Peer pressure would also have played a part as inefficiency or lack of co-operation with his neighbours would probably have had an adverse effect on their crops. 858

There was a clause in the statute books that empowered the DC to terminate a plotholder’s right to irrigable land in cases of demonstrable underperformance but this did not change the images of authoritarianism already embedded in the tenants’ minds.

Equally totalitarian was Jordaan’s decision to withdraw permanently a small stand on which maize was growing, that had been allocated to the local Women’s Club by the previous manager (Whiting). 859 The Women’s Club on the scheme had been allowed to make use of one of the vacant vegetable garden plots as a source of revenue for their club. Jordaan’s argument was that the plot had not been used for this purpose as he saw some of the members of the club “actually eating the maize as if it had been grown for their individual benefit.” 860 The fact that there was very little or no gender sensitivity at Gowe would seem to be highlighted by this incident. It was also astonishing that the eating of maize (a staple food among the African population in Zimbabwe) was made such a big issue.

Such harsh decisions compounded the problems of the people in an otherwise very difficult season in which yields were generally poor. The 1968/69 maize and cotton yields averaged 24 bags per acre and 2 260 lbs per acre respectively. 861 The poor yield of the former was due to the replacement of the proposed soya bean crop with the No. 11 seed and this maize variety did not offer as high a yield as the No. 52 seed. These relatively poor yields and lack of profit considerably discouraged the plotholders and with the prospect of paying the full £14 per acre water rate from the 1st of July, 1969 onwards, 21 plotholders, among them J. Gwacha, decided to go back and concentrate on dryland farming. 862

As already mentioned, no loans were granted to plotholders who had accumulated debts. A number were mostly too heavily indebted to be able to finance the next crop. Invariably, it was these farmers who had failed or were “making strenuous efforts” 863 to repay their loans who eventually quit the Gowe Irrigation Scheme for dryland holdings. It can be pointed out that even after the Co-operative society had folded up on the 21st of October 1969, some 19

858 Westcott, Personal Interview, 12th July 2005.
859 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., B. B. Fitz-Patrick (PC - Mashonaland South) to the DC Gatooma, 12th February 1969.
860 Ibid.
862 Ibid.
former plotholders owing the Society money to the tune of £637 after being credited with the proceeds of the wheat crop, were still expected to pay this amount back. After the closure of the Co-op at the scheme due to bankruptcy, all business related to loans now fell within the jurisdiction of the Irrigation Manager.

The plotholders’ indebtedness assumed major proportions in 1969 when each farmer was supposed to pay about £16 for maize seed and fertiliser. Cottonseed, fertiliser and insecticide cost approximately £28, and to the cost of the cotton crop was added the price of a Cotton Spray Pump (£27.10.0d), which was a must for each plot. Cotton spraying was largely done by hand. Because it was hard to spray by hand, some plotholders did not undertake the task, resulting in poor yields. However, they did not necessarily attribute a low yield to poor spraying, and in comparing yields with those on the dryland (about 165 bags of maize on a 10-acre piece of land), they might have felt that these were only additional costs for being on the scheme and they would have been better off as dryland farmers than as irrigators. Some abhorred the manual spraying exercise and felt that by being asked to move irrigation pipes at times stipulated by the estate they were being exploited as labourers under the Scheme Manager. Therefore, for plotholders to realise the full crop potential, there was need to cut down on costs and in certain areas (i.e. cotton spraying) machinery was essential. Their failure to acquire the latter and escalating maintenance costs sometimes influenced their decision to leave.

Those who remained on the irrigation scheme entered the 1970s with a renewed vigour to excel. In the 1969/70 season, they cultivated the Alba, SR 52 and the Tokwe cotton, maize and wheat varieties, respectively. Most of the maize was marketed locally by the plotholders with varying amounts (i.e. between 1 and 25 bags) retained for family consumption. An average of a little over 2 bags of wheat was retained for consumption and there was a possibility that some barter of the cotton crop took place with local storekeepers. This was the situation that obtained at Gowe at the beginning of the 1970s. Official pronouncements indicated that Gowe entered the 1970s on a very strong footing. However, the plotholder’s position was precarious.

\[\text{References}\]

864 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), R. L. Westcott to the PC (Mashonaland South), 10th December 1969.
866 Ibid.
868 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), N. Shrive (pp. R. L. Westcott) to the PC (Mashonaland South), 20th October 1969.
869 Ibid.
870 Ibid.
Birth of Sanyati Main Estate: Rationale, Performance and Interaction with Gowe:-

Since the forced evictions from Rhodesdale in the 1950s, Wozhele’s people under headmen Mudzingwa and Dubugwane inhabited the area now occupied by the ARDA Main Irrigation Estate. They grew sorghum, rapoko, millet and groundnuts. These communities were, subsequently, moved by the government to the adjoining lands of Dubugwane (under Wozhele) and Maviru (controlled by Neuso) because the land they had earlier occupied was designated an “irrigable area” and was now required by the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the establishment of an irrigation scheme.

Under the law, the relevant Minister could appropriate all land or terminate any right of use or occupation over such land after serving the affected people with a written notice three months in advance, provided that those whose land was taken were compensated either with land elsewhere or with cash. The regulations also stated that any African who was in lawful occupation of an allotment on any such irrigation scheme or who was permitted to occupy and use land in the irrigable area would be deemed by the District Commissioner to be a probationer lessee in terms of sub-section (3) of section 9 of the Land Tenure Act of 1969. This is what was to define the relationship between Gowe and the Estate in Sanyati.

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871 Mukwiza, Personal Interview, 14th October 2004.
since the former’s take over by TILCOR who were going to run the pilot scheme in conjunction with their main scheme. 874

The plan to convert the area, originally inhabited by Mudzingwa and Dubugwane and its people into an irrigation estate, was already on the cards by the beginning of Gowe smallholder irrigation, as revealed by the Deputy Provincial Water Engineer, K. F. Solberg in 1967 when he stated: “The project [Gowe] is a pilot scheme for a larger scheme in future.” 875

When the state moved in to set up the Main Irrigation Scheme, Wozhele encouraged his subjects to be removed a second time after the viciously detested evictions from Rhodesdale. He supported their removal because he had witnessed the merits of irrigation at Gowe. The Chief had accepted that irrigation would be a major factor in the alleviation of drought and hunger. Some of the worst droughts occurred in 1964, 1965 and 1973, the last occurring one occurred just a year before the establishment of the Main Scheme. The DC Gatooma, A. Q. Cozens, provided the lorries and trucks that ferried the people of Mudzingwa and Dubugwane to Maviru. Compared to the earlier evictions of the same communities from Rhodesdale, their removal to Maviru was carried out in relatively amicable circumstances because the two major chiefs had approved them. There are some sources, however, that claim that Neuso was never consulted before the TILCOR/ARDA Estate was established. 876

Nevertheless, in 1974, the scheme started operating under Alex Harvey as the Estate Manager. Its major supply of irrigation water was from the 25 feet Lodestar Weir installed by the Hydrological Branch of the Ministry of Water Development. 877 The TILCOR or ARDA compound which houses the Estate’s permanent workers was named “Mudzingwa Village” after the Headman who had paved way for this project.

The Estate (1 000 ha in size), which was established in March 1974 with the aim of developing the surrounding Communal Area, included the Smallholder Settlement Scheme at Gowe, which was 120 hectares in size. 878 TILCOR was set up as a major vehicle for the development of an irrigation-based growth point at Sanyati. Gowe was not big enough to help accomplish this objective. On the whole, the reasons for setting up the Sanyati Main

876 Andrew Kachinga, (Gambiza Village Headman), Personal Interview, Chief’s Court, Nyimo Business Centre, Sanyati, 19th October 2004.
Estate (referred to in its draft stages as the Gowe Main Scheme) were varied. To some extent, the steady growth and development of the Pilot Scheme\(^{879}\) determined the creation of the Main Irrigation Project. However, in 1968 the MOWD, with the help of the DC Gatooma and the Group Conservation Officer, P. G. How, had started surveys of the project. The irrigation potential of the area had already been proved.\(^{880}\) It was envisaged that the capital cost to finance the first phase of the project, which involved the development of the relevant irrigation infrastructure, for example, road networks and weirs, was $426 000.\(^{881}\)

By the early 1970s, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was committed to sourcing the required funds because the Gowe Pools area had already been selected by this Ministry as one of the six TILCOR Growth Points in the country to be based on irrigation.\(^{882}\) A large and rapidly growing agricultural industry already existed in the area as evidenced by the fact that in 1972/73, the value of agricultural output in the entire Sanyati region, including Gowe, was estimated at $5 million, with 18 million kilograms of cotton accounting for $3.5 million.\(^{883}\) The Ministry of Internal Affairs’ view was that irrigation was not only going to boost agricultural production, but was also going to help stabilise it, thereby providing the basis for secondary industry.\(^{884}\)

It was, therefore, proposed that an irrigation project, occupying approximately 1 000 ha of land adjacent to the Gowe Pools Pilot Scheme, be developed. Water for Sanyati would be provided from the Robbs and Lodestar Weirs on the Munyati River. At the commissioning of the Scheme, it was agreed that the existing Pilot Scheme should continue operating as a separate entity until arrangements were made to absorb it into the Sanyati Estate.\(^{885}\) However, whilst the possibility of incorporating Gowe under the Main Scheme, was paramount in the colonial period, by the end of 2000, this had not materialised.

On the one hand, out of fear of contradicting UDI policies of African self-reliance and risk intensifying the liberation struggle, the colonial government endeavoured to secure the plotholders on the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. On the other hand, after Independence, the emphasis on making Gowe a “self-provisioning” asset took precedence. However, the relationship between Gowe and the Main Estate has been very unequal. The greater part of the profits have invariably accrued to the “Big Brother” (Sanyati) which has always had

\(^{879}\) NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. II: Gowe Irrigation Scheme (January 1970 - February 1976), T. A. Murton (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to the PC (Mashonaland South), 31\(^{st}\) March 1971.

\(^{880}\) NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 100816, Location 3.13.7F, File: AGR/16/183 Mashonaland ICC Minutes and Meetings (June 1967 - April 1969).

\(^{881}\) NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. II: Gowe Irrigation Scheme (January 1970 - February 1976), A. D. B. Yardley (PC - Mashonaland South) to The Secretary for Internal Affairs, 11\(^{th}\) April 1972.

\(^{882}\) NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. II: Gowe Irrigation Scheme (January 1970 - February 1976), L. J. de Bruijn (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to the PC (Mashonaland South), 3\(^{rd}\) March, 1972.

\(^{883}\) TILCOR: Sanyati Project Report, 1.

\(^{884}\) Mushayavanhu, “The Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR),” 35.

\(^{885}\) NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. II: Gowe Irrigation Scheme (January 1970 - February 1976), A. V. J. Muggleton (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs), 18\(^{th}\) October 1974.
more resources than the “young brother” (Gowe), 886 with the former exploiting the latter under the guise of improving the operational efficiency of the Gowe plotholders.

In the interests of increased efficiency, TILCOR started electrifying the pumping station at Gowe in 1974, in order for it to be able to maintain the water supply to the edges of the fields. 887 The pumping station was commissioned on the 1st of July 1975. 888 By then, all the plotholders were paying, via the Estate, the full water rate of $28.00 per acre charged by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 889 The charge was the irrigation farmers’ contribution to Government subsidisation of their scheme.

Focusing on the economic aspect of subsidies Wynn, working in Sudan, has argued that the tendencies of governments to use water charges for purposes of either subsidisation or taxation are economically undesirable, as in the case of Sudan, which taxes cotton, by making it bear the whole cost of irrigation, and subsidises other crops, by providing them with water free of charge. He proposed that the fixed costs of a dam and irrigation system should be isolated and recouped in the form of a levy on all land capable of receiving water from it (i.e. at the time when the land becomes capable of irrigation; not during construction; interest during construction is another element in fixed costs). 890 Such a system, however, would have been very difficult to implement in Sanyati where the plotholders were averse to paying either land rent or the water rate.

It is worth noting that by the 1974/75 season, Gowe had its fair share of problems. One of the major drawbacks of the scheme was competition for irrigation water with the Main Estate. Although Gowe had its own pumphouse, the plotholders were not in charge of this installation. Estate-appointed pump attendants operated it on their behalf. In this season, due to frequent pump breakdowns and the strict control of water supply by the core estate plotholders, feeling disadvantaged, asked several questions such as: 1. Who owned the water? 2. Who processed it? 3. Who controlled it? 4. For whose needs was it? and 5. Who can access it? 891 The last question was a result of non-delivery of water by the estate to farmers who had failed to pay their water rates and problems of supply to the smallholder scheme that seemed to be aggravated through illegal water abstraction by plotholders' non-irrigation counterparts in the dryland area. On the whole, these incisive questions by the plotholders revealed that something symptomatic to a water war was brewing between the

886 Pazvakavambwa, Personal Interview, 2nd April 1997.
887 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. II: Gowe Irrigation Scheme (January 1970 - February 1976), M. R. Jacobs (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to the Secretary for Water Development, 19th September 1974.
888 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. II: Gowe Irrigation Scheme (January 1970 - February 1976), A. A. Watt (pp. Provincial Water Engineer), to The Secretary for Internal Affairs, 28th May 1975, 1.
889 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. II: Gowe Irrigation Scheme (January 1970 - February 1976), A. Q. Cozens (DC Gatooma) to the PC (Mashonaland West), 11th February 1975.
891 T. Nyamutova, Personal Interview, Gowe, 14th May 2005.
tenants and the Main Estate, on the one hand, and the tenants and their dryland neighbours, on the other. Although the water shortages did not contribute to violent skirmishes, the plotholders did not hide their feeling or suspicion that their more powerful and richer upstream “Bigger Brother” was trying to use water as a weapon to sabotage them in order to force them to provide labour on the estate as well as honour their water rate obligations. 892

Another problem was caused by the excessive powers vested in the District Commissioner for Gatooma over the leases of land covered by this irrigation project. According to the Tribal Trust Land [Control of Irrigation Schemes] Act of 1967, he had the power to “give orders” with regard to methods of cultivation, types of crops to be grown, rotation times and manner of irrigation, the dates on which any kind of crops could be planted, treated or harvested, and so on. 893 Failure to comply with these orders entailed eviction and other forms of fines. The DC held this power up to June 1980, 894 and the effect was to make Gowe tenants nothing more than labourers of the Sanyati Main Estate and to limit their managerial experiences. It was, in fact, mandatory for the plotholders to provide labour to the TILCOR core estate. 895

Because irrigation is expensive, capital-intensive, and requires greater managerial skills than dryland agriculture, the Gowe tenants further found themselves in a difficult position since their capital base was not very sound. Before the establishment of the Sanyati Estate, the local Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the Cotton Marketing Board (CMB), now the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (COTTCO), there was virtually no local market for the plotholders’ cash produce. This prompted the farmers to travel long distances to sell their produce through the Co-operative Centre located at the DC’s Office (now the DA’s office) in Kadoma. 896 A Co-operative Officer stationed in the DA’s office advised the Gowe tenants on the marketing situation and he kept all the records of sale of produce. 897

In light of this experience, it would appear that one of the greatest achievements in Sanyati was the establishment of the GMB and the CMB depots, which were to significantly cut

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892 Since there was no history of antagonism between Gowe and the Estate as early as 1974 this must have marked its beginning since water has four primary characteristics of political importance i.e. extreme importance, scarcity, maldistribution and being a shared commodity. These seem to make internecine conflict over water more likely than similar conflicts over other resources. A number of studies have examined the tendencies towards water conflicts and what exacerbates them e.g. rampant population growth and water-wasteful economic development. Different scholars have perceived water in different ways. Mark Twain believes “Whisky is for drinking; water is for fighting.” However, more detailed studies on water conflicts have been carried out by Marq de Villiers, *Water Wars: Is the World’s Water Running Out?* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999), 3-365. Olga Cossi, *Water Wars: The Fight to Control and Conserve Nature’s Most Precious Resource,* (New York: New Discovery Books, 1993) and Leif Ohlsson (ed), *Hydropolitics: Conflicts Over Water as a Development Constraint,* (London: Zed Books, 1995).


894 NAZ (RC), (ARDA), Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati) M. G. Paraiwa, Paper P23/2C/Gowe/7, s.a., 3.

895 Pazvakavambwa, Personal Interview, 2nd April 1997.

896 Paraiwa, Personal Interview. N.B. Coop-organised transport sometimes took too long to arrive.

897 Paraiwa, Personal Interview.
down on the problems once faced by Gowe farmers when they used to transport their crops to Kadoma. The GMB depot at Sanyati growth point was established in 1989, while the Sanyati CMB depot was set up in 1976 and the cotton ginnery in 1984. According to the then COTTCO Manager for the Sanyati depot, S. Mandimika, up to 1983, the Sanyati CMB was just a “mere collection point” as cotton from the whole of Sanyati, including Gowe, was delivered to Chegutu for ginning. Currently, Sanyati has the largest rural cotton depot in the country that has served as a springboard for the growth of the town.

In addition, the Sanyati Estate, which managed the Gowe Settler Scheme, became the marketing and crop-processing centre for the greater area since it was next to the main road along which practically all produce was transported. The proximity of the Estate to Gowe, thus, helped the farmers to reduce transport costs. The need for a marketing institution in the vicinity of Gowe became greater in 1975 when about 30 Gowe settler farmers were allocated 1,24 hectares of land each (in what came to be known as Gowe II) because of the vast entrepreneurial skills they had demonstrated. These settlers operated a double-cropping programme incorporating maize and cotton. In succeeding years, the plotholders added sorghum, wheat, vegetables and groundnuts to their list of crops. Cotton became the main summer crop and wheat was the major winter crop grown under the spray systems of irrigation. Towards the end of the 1970s these crops recorded good yields which however were not as high as those achieved during the boom period in the 1980s partly because of the war. In the 1987/88 season, for example, the settlers achieved a cotton yield of 2 600 kg/ha and a wheat yield of 4 000 kg/ha, which was quite satisfactory for the small-scale farmers but rather higher than the yield (i.e. 2 300 kg/ha for cotton and 3 000 kg/ha for wheat) realised at the close of the 1970s.

It is important to note that Gowe is not endowed with very fertile soils. The sandy texture of the soil, coupled with the fact that the area is prone to persistent droughts, makes the cultivation of cotton (a drought resistant crop), on an irrigation basis, a worthwhile undertaking in this part of the country. As already mentioned, apart from cotton being indigenous to Zimbabwe, to a large extent, the proximity to Sanyati of the Cotton Research Institute in Kadoma has influenced the growing of cotton in this locality. The success of cotton at Gowe has also been determined by the fact that, of all the summer crops in

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898 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/General (Sanyati), Letter P23.2C/GEN/189, s.a.
899 J. Gwandira (GMB Manager - Sanyati Depot), Telephone discussion with Nyandoro, 23rd June 1997.
901 Mandimika, Telephone discussion with Nyandoro.
903 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/General (Sanyati), B. M. Visser, TILCOR Regional Manager (Mashonaland) to the Commission of Inquiry on Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Service, 4th December, 1980, 1.
905 Munengami, Personal Interview.
Zimbabwe which are suitable for irrigation and for which there is an assured market at stabilised prices, cotton, is by far the most remunerative.  

**Gowe: An attempt at settler hegemony:**

When TILCOR came to the area, it assisted the Gowe settlers with technical advice and, apart from preparing and planting the lands for them, the corporation also applied fertiliser and sprayed the crops. The Senior Field Foreman for ARDA, L. Madziire, who started working for the Corporation in March 1974 as a tractor driver, noted that settlers paid for these services, as well as water charges, from the proceeds of their yields; a position Westcott agrees with when he says, “the water rate was included or incorporated into the costs of the crop.” However, there was a general outcry against TILCOR’s exorbitant charges for the provision of these services. Ivy Nyamutova, the wife of T. Nyamutova (a plotholder and the then Vice Secretary of the Gowe Irrigation Committee which met regularly to deliberate on plotholder issues – See Appendix VI), argued that the majority of the plotholders were “disgruntled with having to pay water charges when such services as the repair of broken down pumps were not provided in time.” For her and many others, this was discouraging.

In February 1975, the then Chairman of TILCOR, W. Bailey stated how he and the Corporation viewed the settler scheme at Gowe: “There is nothing benevolent in this. There is nobody turning around and saying we must help the poor people.” Indeed, TILCOR was a vehicle for the furtherance of white settler interests and not the opposite. It was a “white-based Corporation” which had little or no interest in African areas. This was echoed in 1969 by A. D. B. Yardley of the Ministry of Internal Affairs when he said, he did not think the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation would be interested in Gowe because, “as they [TILCOR] are run on a company basis they must show a profit which they cannot do on small schemes.”

Although TILCOR was allegedly established in Sanyati in order to promote rural development, reality reveals otherwise. A number of impediments prevented the fulfillment of this objective at Gowe. One of the obstacles was the State itself. As an instrument of racial segregation, the colonial State always protected the interests of an elite group of people (the Whites) upon whom it depended for support. In this connection, P. Sweezy made an illuminating observation when he said: “any particular state is the child of the

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908 L. Madziire, (ARDA Sanyati Senior Field Foreman), Personal Interview, Sanyati Estate, 9th January 1997 and Westcott, Personal Interview, 12th July 2005.


911 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 100834, Location 25.10.2F, File: LAN/2/TTL, Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Act (June 1967 - November 1968), W. J. Harper (Secretary for Internal Affairs), 19th June, 1968, 3.
On the whole,

The direction and progress of rural development in Rhodesia, indeed of every sector of the economy were largely controlled by the policies of racial segregation adopted by successive European-dominated governments over ninety years of colonial rule.  

According to Paraiwa, there was nothing altruistic about the formation of TILCOR (Sanyati) as well as the Gowe settler component. There were more baneful effects than positive. For instance, exploitation of plotholder labour by the estate was increasing since 1974. The tenants were further disgruntled by an unclear lease system proposed by the Corporation, which did not give the settlers autonomy on their plots. Paraia concedes that the creation of the Gowe Pools Irrigation Scheme, which was integrated into ARDA (then TILCOR) in 1974, was a stopgap measure against African political agitation at the height of the Second Chimurenga (1966-1979). In fact, although

the blacks did not have ample means to influence government decisions, they had become politically conscious, and so, the government, as a pre-emptive measure, tried to carry out development activities as an excuse for not permitting blacks to become involved in making important decisions together with them [the whites].

For the government, therefore, “the best way for the people to accept White Settler Estates in their midst was to create outgrowers to the main State farm which would act as a catalyst for growth.”

This analysis shows that Africans throughout the country were economically disadvantaged and disgruntled. Hence, for Ian Douglas Smith to claim that Rhodesia had the happiest Africans in the world, was not only a mockery of reality but also grossly unacceptable. For instance, speaking in Chiredzi at a party held to mark the 5th anniversary of the Chiredzi Town Board Smith said “Rhodesia’s greatest asset was probably the peace and harmony among its people in a free society.” He added:

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914 Paraia, Personal Interview.
916 Paraia, Personal Interview.
918 The Chiredzi Town Board administered the Tsovane (“Tshovani”) Township or growth centre which was also developed on the basis of irrigation.
“People from over the world had said that Rhodesians, including the Africans, were the freest and happiest people they had seen ... When we look at the results of our system of government we should be well satisfied ... Rhodesia was a wonderful example of how people could progress in a free society.” 920

In another speech made in parliament in 1971/72 on the development programme aimed at expanding the economy generally and stimulating economic growth in what were known as Tribal Trust Lands after the proclamation of UDI, Smith stated that UDI was “a period in our [Rhodesia’s] history which will be marked by [happiness and] its economic development and expansion; an improvement in standards of living - especially that of the lower income groups [Africans].” 921 However, it is difficult to appreciate where the Rhodesian Africans derived their happiness from, given a scenario where the population was mainly rural in character and development in the African areas was subordinated to white commercial agriculture which was supposed to be the keystone of the economy. 922 Bearing this in mind, it is, thus, an inescapable fact that the Smith regime was more interested in impoverishing and marginalising the African peasantry than safeguarding their economic interests. In fact, nothing was done by the colonial government with the primary objective of benefiting the inhabitants of any rural area in Zimbabwe. 923

Gowe was no exception to this rule. Irrigation land was often disproportionately allocated. More land was granted to the Estate (1 000 hectares) 924 at the expense of outgrowers (120 hectares) at Gowe, yet there was a real need for the peasants to be involved in these projects in large numbers for their general upliftment. This kind of development, which took place in the Sanyati Communal Lands, did not provide any basis for the inclusion of local knowledge, skills or innovation. There was no participatory input at any stage of planning or implementation as the local political leadership (chiefs) was never consulted. 925 Chiefs Neuso and Wozhele were only “consulted” in order to rubber-stamp already existing colonial designs at Gowe. On the whole, therefore, the need to achieve settler hegemony could not be subordinated to any other aim. The lack of attention to African demands for more land, for example, meant that plot sizes remained small and inevitably erosion set in.

The erosion menace and conservation measures:

The over-cultivation of small but predominantly sandy plots meant that erosion would consequently become a menace. The spectre of soil erosion is one problem that needed urgent redress. On a global scale, soil erosion is widely viewed as a serious threat to the long-term capacity of world agriculture to produce food. In this respect, preventing the washing away of the top soil through erosion which reduces the productivity of the remaining soil is paramount. It has been noted with concern that ARDA’s smallholder scheme in Sanyati was highly susceptible to erosion. The former ARDA General Manager (GM), Liberty Mhlanga, has argued that “There was erosion because of the slope. Conservation was not properly developed. [Gowe] fields used to get flooded during a storm because of lack of conservation structures on the scheme.” Since the inception of Gowe, extension officers were engaged in efforts to ensure that the smallholder irrigation scheme was properly farmed using effective soil protection mechanisms. To prevent erosion-induced production losses, the first extension agents for Gowe, Lazarus Sithole and Macloud Mushawarima, prioritised the conservation of soils and forests. Plotholders were required to grow fruit trees as well as build contour ridges. Contours, in particular, were enforced amid resistance from the farmers who saw them as nothing less than structures that limited their ploughing land area. For G. Maturure, whilst land degradation generated productivity losses, enforcing “very wide contours” which extension superiors “could drive through,” caused relatively bigger yield discrepancies at a local level. He estimated that having contours on either side of a 2-ha plot reduced the yield by about 2%. Although his computation method is rather questionable, it cannot be denied that irrigation plotholders considered that, any reduction in plot size by the width of a jeep truck (the main vehicle used by extension demonstrators in the colonial period) on each side of the field, was a significant loss.

Notwithstanding the loss, plotholders, the majority of whom were master farmers, were deeply upset by a scenario where extension personnel dictated to them how to counteract the effects of erosion. A very vocal tenant, T. Nyamutova, argued “we fought for this land, so we should not be taught how to conserve the land (sic). Our forefathers practiced agriculture, but there was no erosion.” Referring to the African extension agents, he said, “these people think we don’t know [farming].” He proceeded to allege, in Shona, that, “taive tisingabvunzwi,” (meaning, our opinion was never sought). By this, he implied that, extension personnel had come to teach them the so-called new conservation

929 Grey Maturure (Plotholder and Gowe Irrigation Committee Member), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 9th January 1997.
930 Ibid.
931 T. Nyamutova, Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 14th May 2005.
techniques, which however, tended to shun indigenous knowledge. This was the major basis of resistance to the teachings of the agricultural officers deployed in Sanyati to address the effects of erosion.

Resistance to conservation partly emanated from the fact that, conservation technology and other agricultural teachings were regarded as imported practices and it was also partly necessitated by the small plots that the irrigators were allocated compared to the bigger plots they cultivated in Rhodesdale prior to the 1950s. Agricultural extension agents should not always expect farmers to accept prescriptions from above. To a large extent, local farmers’ opinions and decisions on conservation matters should also be respected. 932 At Gowe, just like in other parts of the country, the extension worker was expected to “teach” the plotholders good farming methods. However, apart from conscientising plotholders on the necessity of contours, no extension officer ever alluded to how repeatedly cultivating small pieces of land would contribute to the erosion menace. Prominent names of extension workers, which almost became synonymous with the Gowe Irrigation Scheme, were M. Mushawarima, Lazurus Sithole and Shupile J. Sithole. The latter, who in 2000, was still an Extension Officer under AGRITEX (now AREX), resides at his dryland holding in Mapani Village under Chief Wozhele. 933 The three performed a wide array of duties at the scheme. Because of the problem of erosion, they were engaged in the afforestation programme. They were responsible for planting the mango, orange, guava and lemon trees including the pegging of contours at Gowe and the Main Estate. 934 Apart from forestry conservation activities, they also provided technical know-how on all aspects of farming, for instance, irrigation management (water management), fertiliser application and ensuring that planting was done properly. 935

An extensive interview with S. J. Sithole revealed that the plotholders at Gowe were supposed to be recipients of the Extension Officer’s conservation knowledge and rarely were their (farmers) own views sought. 936 Such knowledge was often imported from western European countries such as Britain and the United States of America (USA). No or very little consultation was undertaken with such small communities as Gowe. They were merely expected to “receive” that education from appointed disseminators of that knowledge. 937 According to S. J. Sithole, apparently questioning the role of the extension worker, Gowe tenants were only told to “construct contours [and] no one told them why or asked them how they thought this could be done?” 938 Every plotholder was “forced to abide by measures that were designed by the DC to keep erosion in check.” 939 Non-compliance was punishable by eviction. However, there is no known-case of a farmer who was evicted, which suggests that, the strong objection to contour making of the 1950s and early 1960s,

933 S. J. Sithole, (AGRITEX Extension Officer), Personal Interview, Mapani Village, Sanyati, 10th January 1997.
934 Ibid.
935 Ibid.
936 Ibid.
938 S. J. Sithole, Personal Interview, Mapani Village, Sanyati, 10th January 1997
939 Ibid.
had now degenerated into passive resistance due to fear of eviction. Although it was important to curb erosion, this did not justify the coercive methods used to achieve that goal. Forcing people to adopt alien techniques of conserving the soil was generally resented. In fact, development work seems to suffer from an entrenched superiority complex with respect to the small farmer. The belief that “modern” or European technology is infinitely superior to that of the smallholder or peasant farmer should be abandoned. Africa, and indeed the whole “Third World,” is littered with relics of development projects, which were based on the assumption that the solutions to development could be drawn from western experience, with little need to examine the suitability of these to specific environments.  

It is true that contours were an essential conservation measure, but implementing them from above was perceived as part and parcel of the marginalisation of African knowledge by the government of Rhodesia, which, to a large extent, was also influenced by the west in its agricultural policies.

This is a very naive and wrong assumption. Perhaps African leaders could take a leaf from the former President of Tanzania, Julius Mwalimu Nyerere’s observation: “so-called leaders do entirely too much talking to the peasants. No one ever wants to listen to them.” Indeed, Zimbabwe smallholder farmers, including those at Gowe, also need to be consulted (i.e. on how to combat erosion) in order for them to participate fully in their own development, and if there is dialogue with these farmers there would be no reason to underestimate them. As already noted, very little consultation, if any, was conducted by TILCOR or ARDA especially on matters of policy relating to conservation issues.

However, while it cannot be denied that TILCOR’s policies of rural development, to some extent, benefited Gowe plotholders through the provision of a market, an increase in the range of crops produced and employment generation, it must be asserted that conservation measures implemented in liaison with the intended targets were bound to be more beneficial to agriculture as a whole. Efforts to address the problem of erosion did not end in this period. They were continued by ARDA after independence, as will be seen in the next chapter.

IRRIGATION: COTTON CULTIVATION AND DIFFERENTIATION

Early efforts to introduce cotton cultivation:

Cotton is a crop that flourishes both under dryland and rain fed conditions, and under irrigation. In parts of Africa with sandy soils and which receive scanty rainfall the crop does well because of its relatively greater capacity to withstand drought, compared to

941 R. Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First, (UK: Longman Group Ltd., 1983), 75.
other crops. In Sanyati, irrigation was introduced not only because the area was susceptible to drought but also it was adopted as a way of boosting cotton production in a more significant manner particularly at a time in the 1960s when the “golden leaf” (tobacco) was facing stiff competition on the international market from America who in 1968 was making “millions and millions of extra pounds … selling their tobacco to Britain instead of Rhodesian tobacco.”

According to the Minister of Agriculture, David Colville Smith, during the second reading of the Agricultural Development Authority Bill, “the agricultural industry has been under severe strain for a long time.” He went on to say this was due, in the main, to “the vagaries of the seasons and the large proportion of our total production which is exported and has to compete in world markets at prices which we cannot influence. Sanctions imposed since November 1965, particularly on tobacco, have naturally had a serious effect.” In the early 1960s, efforts to introduce cotton agriculture in the communal lands of Zimbabwe were stimulated by two major economic and political developments.

In the first instance, in the colonial scheme of things, the 1960s were a period of experimentation with African agriculture by state agencies. In this decade, serious efforts were made to promote cotton cultivation in Sanyati as well as other ecologically suitable outlying areas of the country such as Gokwe, Kana, Msengezi (a part of Hartley/Chegutu) and Mondoro (comprising Hartley and Gatooma districts). In the 1950s, agricultural demonstrators had been fully occupied with implementing agricultural reforms under the NLHA, and this was perpetuated in the succeeding decade. They continued to devote their attention to training Africans in improved methods of agriculture. As already indicated, their activities were, however, primarily directed towards the, so-called, “progressive” farmers. Secondly, the announcement, in 1965, of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Ian Douglas Smith was also a factor. Subsequently, the imposition of economic or trade sanctions on Rhodesia by the British Government placed sanctions on Rhodesia in which the country was suspended from the Commonwealth Preference Area and her goods no longer received preferential treatment on entering the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also banned purchases of Rhodesian sugar and tobacco – stopping a net total of 71% (by value) of Rhodesian exports to Britain. UDI and its political and economic repercussions on the country taken together with the ensuing need for greater self-sufficiency, not only improved the local market for Rhodesian-grown cotton but made it possible to offer higher prices for the crop, especially from 1965 to about 1972. For detailed studies on the impact of sanctions on the Rhodesian economy see A. J. Hawkins, Economic Growth and Structural Change and Economic Policy in Rhodesia 1965-1975, (Salisbury: Whitsun Foundation, June 1976); Hawkins T., “The Rhodesian Economy Under Sanctions,” Rhodesia Journal of Economics, 1, (August 1967), 44-58; R. B. Sutcliffe, “The Political Economy of Rhodesian Sanctions,” Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 7, (July 1967); Harry, R. Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia, (New York, USA: Syracuse University Press, 1983).
international community, was instrumental in forcing import substitution into non-agricultural activities. This was done at the expense of farm export earnings. Furthermore, a self-inflicted closing off of trade by the Rhodesian Government itself by imposing strict foreign exchange controls in an attempt to block capital flight and provide more political control over the economy induced a lot of pain into the economy. Sanctions had devastating implications especially on the tobacco industry, which was one of the chief pillars of Rhodesia’s agro-industrial base.

One way of counteracting the deleterious effects of sanctions was to practice crop-diversification, with cotton remaining a major cash crop. Lint or cotton fibre was required by the colonial state to feed a growing number of local spinning industries, which had emerged during and in the aftermath of the Second World War. Consequently, considerable effort was devoted by state officials to promoting cotton agriculture in suitable African areas, including Sanyati. However, the major factors in the establishment of the Gowe and Sanyati Main Irrigation Schemes were not only related to the decline of the Southern Rhodesian tobacco industry which was under stress from international sanctions but this development was also dictated by the requirements, not only of the imperial grand strategy, but of the necessity to create contented rural Africans in the face of escalating politico-economic problems. Once irrigation got under way, Sanyati was on the path to unprecedented development and differentiation as a process assumed much bigger dimensions.

Irrigation, mainly emphasising cotton, wheat, groundnuts and maize, together with Melville G. Reid’s ambitious cotton extension programme, combined to produce an agricultural miracle in Sanyati in the 1980s, but not necessarily in the succeeding decade. Cotton had become so popularised by Reid, the DC Gatooma, and research experts at the Gatooma Cotton Research Institute that the local community harnessed the crop almost wholesale. It offered incomparable prospects for prosperity for the farmers who did not hesitate to integrate this new technology into their lifestyles. According to M. G. Reid whose inseparable association with this fibrous crop earned him the accolade “Cotton Reid,”

Press, 1978), 1-296. The most recent assessment of the period Rhodesia was under sanctions has been compiled by William Minter and Elizabeth Schmidt, “When Sanctions Worked: The Case of Rhodesia Re-examined,” African Affairs, 87(347), (April 1988), 207-237.

In Gokwe and Sanyati, the introduction of cotton, together with extension services, has been attributed to the efforts of the Agronomist in the Extension Department, Melville G. Reid. See NAZ, Extract from the Gokwe Agricultural Officer’s Report: Ministry of Internal Affairs, October 1973.

Cotton growing in Sanyati and the adjacent Gokwe District was encouraged from 1963 onwards. It was popularised in these predominantly dry areas of Zimbabwe because it is a drought resistant crop that does well in those agro-ecological zones. Its cultivation was also stimulated by the stiff competition tobacco was facing from America. The campaign leading to the adoption of cotton in these areas entailed encouraging master farmers through experimental demonstration plots to grow the crop. This was done under the close supervision and advice of agricultural demonstrators. N.B. Demonstrators gave African farmers agricultural extension advice i.e. on “proper” methods of farming which included conservationist education.

S. C. Pazvakavambwa, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Rural Housing and Social Amenities, Personal Interview, Munhumutapa Government Offices, Harare, 7th June 2005. Reid is credited with establishing the cotton extension programme in the Gokwe-Sanyati region. However, Pazvakavambwa strongly feels that as far as Sanyati is concerned this is giving the Agronomist (Reid) credit that he does not deserve. According
The farmer who had always existed at a subsistence level was suddenly faced with the possibility of achieving an increase in income, not a slight increase in his normal income, but a two-, or three-, or even tenfold increase. He saw for the first time in his life the possibility of obtaining, by his own efforts, what to him was great wealth.\footnote{M. G. Reid, Senior Agricultural Officer, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1971 cited in Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity, 172. Greater detail on the cotton extension programme and its benefits is found in Melville Reid, “An Agricultural Programme at Gokwe.” Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 71, (1977), 54-60.}

There is a noticeably big contrast in the type of organisation found in the Main Scheme, on the one hand, and that of the Plotholders component, on the other. There were also significant disparities in the benefits that accrued to each one of these between the 1960s and 1970s as a result of irrigation and cotton. The core estate, in comparison to its outgrower section, derived immeasurable advantages in that it had the unreserved access and monopoly to the labour provided by the latter.

**Cotton irrigation: socio-economic disparities among plotholders and between Gowe and dryland:**

Prior to the advent of irrigation, most rural residential structures were made of pole and dagga, and they did not depict any signs of modernity. Brick architectural designs featured more prominently from the mid-1970s onwards almost ten years after the inception of irrigation. Because of the uncertainties on plotholder permanence on the scheme caused by restrictions imposed by the DC, not many Gowe plotholders were keen to build state of the art rural homes. Instead, they used proceeds from cotton sales to improve their dryland houses and homesteads where they felt their security of tenure was more guaranteed. Thus, plotholder progress and wealth was sometimes not reflected on the irrigation plots that were allotted to them but on the dryland adjuncts to these plots. However, the emergence of the Main Estate in 1974 gave the outgrowers a sense of insecurity, as it required large labour reserves in its vicinity to ensure large-scale productivity was achieved let alone maintained. Their own production sometimes suffered. However, a few farmers concentrated on cultivating their own fields and competed with the estate for labour. It was from that date onwards that resource-rich owners of irrigation plots embarked on refurbishing the old pole and mud houses or building magnificent brick homes within the scheme. The construction of brick houses by some plotholders, whether in or outside the scheme, was a veritable claim to status, for it enabled the house-holder to stand out and be distinguished as an example of a successful, progressive and development-oriented agrarian entrepreneur.\footnote{Territorially ARDA’s irrigation schemes in Sanyati are a far cry from the Gezira in the Sudan but a number of parallels can be drawn as far as cotton differentially impacted on the Main Scheme on the one
Although at the opposite extreme of these modern brick houses stand the poorest and most rudimentary mud plastered type of house, the construction of brick houses is indicative of the material changes that the Gowe Irrigation Scheme has brought to the lives of the plotholders. After a while, some plotholder households could boast of a vegetable garden, an orchard (See Appendices VII, VIII and IX), a car, a tractor, a radio set, among other possessions reflecting their newly-found prosperity. Their involvement in a cash economy and the standard of material upliftment they had come to enjoy had two major implications on the plotholders. Firstly, an awareness of cash values hitherto unknown in the Sanyati hinterland started to permeate life throughout the irrigation scheme and the adjacent dryland area. Secondly, the plotholders’ participation in the more rewarding cotton economy not only raised their standard of living but it also gave the tenants an appreciation of the relative deprivation they had experienced in the two decades after W.W.II when cotton had not been embraced in a big way. Mjoli, a holder of a Master Farmer Certificate acquired at the Government Experimental Farm in Msengezi, said that, in the 1960s and 1970s, cotton helped him achieve progress mainly because the soils were still very productive and gave excellent yields. Cotton was also the main crop encouraged by the DC because the farmers could use the money it generated to pay back their debts. With the adoption of irrigation technology at the Gowe Smallholder Scheme, there is irrefutable evidence that one particular group (i.e. the Master Farmer category), over the years, improved its economic and social position. The persistence and adaptability of the irrigators to changing circumstances and their ability to exploit the opportunities presented by an irrigation environment have been responsible for altering the pattern of differentiation in the area.

For instance, before the advent of irrigation, relying on their rainland holdings, peasant farmers participated in a flourishing trade in grain, tobacco, and some traditional wares of pottery or weaving. With the onset of irrigation agriculture, those farmers who were allocated plots at the Gowe Co-operative Scheme were able to produce even greater

hand and its tenants section on the other. An in-depth examination of differentiation in the Sudan’s Gezira Scheme can be gleaned from Tony Barnett, The Gezira Scheme, 30-180.

**953** See Appendices VII, VIII and IX showing Gowe Vegetable Gardens, Orchard, the local sale (marketing) of fresh vegetables and Gowe women sharing a joke over the vegetable produce.

954 See Appendix V for picture of a retired CID officer and plotholder (G. Maturure) with his newly acquired Austin Cambridge motorcar.

955 Mjoli, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005.

956 Svisvi Township, the point at which the five wards under Chief Nemangwe in Gokwe begin, is the area that used to be known as “Nyoka.” It is the site both of Chief Chireya’s old residence (before he was moved to the north in the early part of the 20th century by the colonial authorities) and that of the original police camp established in Gokwe in the 1890s. It was at “Nyoka” that the evanescent attempt was made to harness the local knowledge of tobacco production and trade for the benefit of settler commerce before 1938. For more detail on the tobacco industry of the “Shangwe” see B. Kosmin, “The Inyoka Tobacco Industry of the Shangwe People: the Displacement of a Pre-Colonial Economy in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1938” in Palmer and Parsons (eds.), The Roots of Rural Poverty, 268. According to Worby, “Remaking Labour: Reshaping Identity,” 173-174, 176-177 and 179, the name “Manyoka” (plural form) comes from a mopane tree in Svisvi where spears were said to be hidden. There was another tree also with a special spear and a snake inside. The people burned down the tree and later went to the spirit medium to report that they had done something wrong. What happened to them is not known, but that is how the place came to be known as Manyoka or Inyoka.
surpluses from their irrigated lands and, simultaneously, expanded their trade not only in grain but cotton as well. Perhaps, the only grey area in their changed economic circumstances was that they were often compelled to sell their crops to the Estate or the Co-operative Society which were not always offering the most lucrative prices for their produce. However, with this trade, many plotholders were able to accumulate enough capital to open retail shops, butcheries, grinding mills and become relatively better off despite the effects of sanctions against the UDI Government. One outstanding example is a man only referred to by Gilbert as Muzaya. He said, this man, who hailed from Chipinge (Manicaland Province), was a shop owner and “all scheme people came to buy from him,” adding that “another shining example was G. Maturure.”  

According to Gilbert, “When TILCOR bought them [Gowe outgrowers] over there were some who became rich because of irrigation and because TILCOR had developed more acres for them [i.e. Gowe II] to grow cotton and maize.” Acknowledging that “some of the farmers sold their produce at the Kadoma GMB,” he went on to state that, “A lot of people ‘with brains’ ‘vakabudirira ipapo apa,’” meaning that, those with access to markets and more initiative became very successful from farming on this scheme. This exhibition of wealth during the time of grinding sanctions was commendable. Thus, the wealth, which the outgrowers were able to amass, led them to become a prestigious group not only within the scheme but also in Sanyati as a whole. 

The opportunities enjoyed by the plotholders over their dryland counterparts were considerable. Irrigation enabled the plotholders to get a constant inflow of cash from January to December. They had the advantage of producing winter and summer crops, whereas the dryland peasant farmers depended for their livelihood on summer cropping only and, in the case of Sanyati, a good yield was not always guaranteed because of the vagaries of the weather. However, in a good season, dryland holders had greater opportunities of producing more because they cultivated larger pieces of land than their irrigation neighbours. On the contrary, irrigators were assured of a yield each cropping season. They also grew a wider variety of cash-generating crops than the dryland cultivators who mainly relied on either maize or cotton. Dryland farmers grew other crops such as groundnuts, beans, pumpkins and cucumber but these were not grown on a substantial scale to yield surpluses for sale. Gowe plotholders, in comparison, produced wheat, cotton, maize (which they sold as dry or green mealies), beans and groundnuts for the market. They were hardly affected by erratic rains in summer because they had irrigation water whenever they needed it. With proper planning, they could never run short of cash. Relatively higher and assured annual incomes, therefore, characterised life at Gowe compared to dryland agriculture. This also determined plotholder success and affluence. In this instance, it can be noted that irrigation created further forms of differentiation because of the opportunity for multiple cropping it offered. 

Paradoxically, as some plotholders were basking in the euphoria of success generated by the cotton miracle and a variety of irrigated crops, there were others who were finding it difficult to break even. The reasons for their lack of prosperity can be explained in their failure to command productive resources of their own or to influence the processes of

957 Gilbert, Personal Interview. 
958 Ibid.
credit advancement. Sometimes they were “blacklisted” for failure to pay back Co-op loans. This, in turn, determined the amount of money that flowed into their pockets, which, at best, was insignificant, and, at worst, amounted to nothing. The dichotomy between resource-rich and resource-poor within the plotholder strata is quite discernible. There is clear separation between those who have economic and social resources and those who do not, thereby illustrating the way in which money has come to mediate between and to differentiate peasants within the irrigation community. Poorer irrigators’ interaction with the Main Estate and the Co-operative Union provided further productive bottlenecks for them. The following section examines how the domineering presence of the Estate caused further forms of differentiation and the general plummeting of plotholder affluence the moment the “Bigger Brother” was created in 1974. Clearly, from this date onwards, Gowe assumed the position of a labour repository of the Main Irrigation Estate. \(^{959}\)

**Estate agriculture: opportunity or benign neglect?**

Gowe plotholders, unlike those in other irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe and many parts of Africa, saw themselves as groundbreakers that had more say in Sanyati’s new agrarian economy. Their personal sacrifice and devotion to irrigation and the commoditisation process was supposed to put them in a strong bargaining position in their relationship with the Estate. Nevertheless, any benevolence that TILCOR or the Estate might have promised did not materialise. The creation of the Main Scheme, instead, marked the beginning of long-term subordination of the Pilot Scheme to the whims of the former. All of a sudden the plotholders found themselves faced with countless disadvantages, which reminded them that the formation of the bigger irrigation scheme was not a benign gesture at all. As indicated by Pazvakavambwa in an interview, the smallholder scheme was, among other things, required to facilitate the easy recruitment of labour that was so desperately needed by the “Big Brother,” that was keen to register an instant impact in the field of irrigation. The Estate was, therefore, conveniently situated in close proximity to Gowe so that the labour objective would not be cumbersome to implement.

In practice, what this entailed was that the position of the plotholders, in relation to the Estate, meant that the provision of labour by the plotholders was not always a voluntary process. Barnett, who was writing on the Gezira Scheme made an observation that is consonant with or applicable to what evolved in the Sanyati Scheme when he said: “The decision by a plotholder to offer his labour to the Estate was mediated through an individual plotholder’s range of social and ultimately financial resources [at his disposal] and this became a major component of his class position.” \(^{960}\)

Because the plotholder was obliged to take advice from the Estate Manager to whom the DC Gatooma often ceded his management role, the scenario where the Manager categorised outgrowers as either “good” or “bad” farmers was not uncommon. This will be demonstrated in the next chapter. Given the influential position held by the Estate Boss, in the long-term, a plotholder’s class position in relation to the Estate, or the chief

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\(^{959}\) Pazvakavambwa, Personal Interview, 7th June 2005.

means of production, was partially determined by how he related to the Estate Manager and how the Estate management perceived him in terms of the “backward” or “progressive” dichotomy. Thus, this analysis serves to strengthen the distinctions in socio-economic power and influence between the bigger project and its smallholder neighbour in Sanyati.

Lines of credit or loan facilities were also controlled by the Estate Manager even in instances where the Gowe Co-operative Society, the GMB, CMB (COTTCO) or agro-chemical industries advanced input loans to the plotholders. This was so because the Estate played the role of selecting its plotholders and recommending to the providers of loans who was creditworthy and who was not. The sources of credit and finance institutions’ strict repayment conditions were also some of the major causes of debt among the irrigation tenants.

There were three reasons why a plotholder accumulated debts. One was the payment system operated by the Estate for grain or cotton delivered to the market, the mandatory deduction of costs incurred for services rendered, such as tillage and inputs. This method of payment was, in effect, a compromise between the Estate, which was not able to predict when, and for how much, it would sell the crop, and the plotholders who needed cash (but were invariably incapacitated by lack of cash) in order to support themselves and pay for the hiring of labour or the input needs of the succeeding season. Incidentally, the primary producer of a commodity like cotton had very little or no control over prices, hence the scheme operated very efficiently as a mechanism for the production of cotton at a price which created continual indebtedness for the majority of the tenants because of their obligations to the Estate. The other was the smallness of plotholders’ allotments. For example, a 2 or 4-acre plot was rather too small to be a very sound financial proposition. The third and final point was that the holder of a plot was party to a complex system of other payments such as land rent and the water rate. All these entailments, it should be conceded, moulded the tenant’s entire financial situation unless he had alternative sources of income other than those coming from the small plot.

In Sanyati, serious concern was expressed by holders of plots who felt that the Estate was exploiting them. Most tenants found it difficult to relate their cash income to the effort which they put into their work. Besides, they also found the rationale behind this payment system extremely incomprehensible apart from the mere fact that the Estate made certain, apparently arbitrary, payments to them. Lamentably, the payment system failed to build into it what Barnett has described as “stress periods,” when the plotholder found himself in a financially stressful position when no crop was being cultivated. In the Sanyati schemes, such periods of stress were during planting, weeding, the concurrent harvesting of summer maize and the picking of cotton, followed by the cutting and burning of cotton stalks, the time when the cotton cheque had already been expended as well as periods of persistent drought spells or during the ever so frequent breakdowns of irrigation pumps. These periods also coincided with the heavy demands for hired labour on the Estate. It

962 Barnett, *The Gezira Scheme*, 75-76.
was during and after these “stress periods” that plotholders were in dire need of cash or credit. For example, it was during the weeding and cotton-picking periods of the season that the labour demands of the irrigation plot were also high. Consequently, the labour demands of the plot frequently took up all the cash that might have been realised after the previous harvest, thereby leaving the plotholder, particularly the polygamous one, with little or nothing to cover the day-to-day costs of his household. On the other hand, during cotton picking periods the Estate wanted the tenant’s labour at a time the latter needed his own labour on the plot more than to give it to the Estate.

In addition to these Estate induced “stress periods,” the plotholder’s position was aggravated by a new sort of reality dawning on him that in spite of the original euphoria about the merits of this new technology an irrigation plot, small as it was, was not a very profitable undertaking after all. In fact, in this case for most tenants, it was responsible for the reproduction of a cycle of poverty and perpetual indebtedness to the ARDA Sanyati Main Irrigation Scheme. For them, the origins of debt and the precariousness of their financial position lay within the structure of the Main Irrigation Estate and its management. Most of the tenants were situated at the lowest level of a large producing concern (i.e. the Estate) and were bound by a predetermined contractual relationship. Only a few plotholders with a large reserve of economic resources were insulated from the basic stipulations or obligations to the Estate, which included, inter alia, tillage, planting and harvesting. Those who were not properly insulated ended up opting out of the scheme and concentrating their energies on their dryland plots. Clearly, there were relations of credit and debt between the smallholder and Estate irrigation categories, but both categories, in their turn, as similarly observed by Barnett for the Gezira, stood in a common contractual relationship with the state. This fact provides an additional element in the analysis of differential relations in Sanyati’s irrigation schemes.

The relationship between the two ARDA schemes was clearly an unequal one. A larger share of the profits accrued to the Estate, whereas a minute percentage of the proceeds went to the plotholders to cover the cost of labour, seed, agricultural implements, the use of tractors and plotholders’ profit. In reality, just like in the Gezira scheme, what this partnership or relationship between the plotholders and the Estate, about which the plotholders were not consulted and were not to be consulted throughout this period, did was to spread the risk of production without, at the same time, spreading the opportunity to participate actively in policy-making. In fact, the plotholder’s area of effective decision was, more often than not, almost entirely restricted to whether or not he should work for the Estate at given points in time and space. A more apt and relevant assertion that tallies in closely with the situation besetting the Sanyati tenant has been provided by Barnett when he says “Because the plotholder is not allowed to make production

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963 Field research has revealed that tenants were getting very little from their holdings and it is clear that the average return from cotton for the period 1965-1979 ranged between $100 and $500. See also T. Barnett, “Evaluating the Gezira Scheme: Black Box or Pandora’s Box,” in J. Heyer, R. Pepe and G. Williams (eds.), *Rural Development in Tropical Africa*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1981) and T. Bembridge, “Problems and Lessons from Irrigation Projects in Less Developed Countries of Africa,” *Development Southern Africa*, 3(4), (1986).


965 Ibid., 93.
decisions, he resembles the industrial wage-worker or other employee far more closely than he does the peasant.” 966 Attempts to devolve decision-making power, though, have been made but they have always been frustrated, because the attainment of such a goal would contradict the entire rationale of the scheme, which thrived on maintaining the plotholders as a subordinate category to its administration. That relationship made it easier for the Estate to exploit their labour.

Because cotton was the largest income earner in Sanyati, a strong bond between the plotholders (the “small rural irrigation capitalists”) and the Main Scheme should promote more production-oriented interaction. It is counterproductive for the local and national economy (both in the short and long-term) if the interests of the plotholders and Estate administrators are kept at variance. Given the fact that there was no alternative livelihood available to most of them, plotholders stayed trapped in a production situation, which offered them a regular but low standard of living with little hope of improvement. A more conciliatory approach to existing relationships was likely to raise agricultural productivity to much greater heights. The onus probably lay with the State to reconcile the two agrarian entities and ultimately create an atmosphere conducive to business. However, the colonial government found itself constrained to create an enabling environment and to spearhead further irrigation development at Gowe and the core estate as a result of the war.

**Impact of liberation struggle on ARDA irrigation:**

In the 1970s the war caused some production stoppages especially among the dryland farmers. Petros Bvunzawabaya, a former Sanyati Estate Manager, argues that the struggle (Second Chimurenga 1966-1979) directly affected the surrounding area where hordes of peasant cultivators were forced to stay in protected villages (“keeps”). 967 The time they went out to tend their fields was determined by the curfew that had been imposed on them which restricted movement from 3 o’clock in the afternoon to 8 o’clock in the morning. This meant that many hours of production were lost as the colonial state stepped up efforts to defeat the guerrillas by ensuring that they would not be in contact with the villagers who were accused of harbouring and feeding them. Some townships especially the Kasirisiri and Gowe business centres near the DC’s Rest Camp where the white troops were stationed were destroyed during the war. 968 Produce collection points run by co-operative societies 969 in the rural areas of Sanyati were closed down. To a large extent, the war disrupted the cultivation of cotton particularly in the rainfed area of the district as it made it difficult for extension agents to conduct their business of advising farmers under this situation. A number of young men and women “were

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967 Petros Bvunzawabaya, (Managing Director of Cynthesis Agriculture Pvt. Ltd. and Former Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Cynthesis Agriculture, Harare, 17th October 2006.
968 Ibid. See also J. Gwacha, (COTTCO Accounts Clerk and former Gowe plotholder), Telephone discussion with Nyandoro, 18th October 2006.
969 By the time the war intensified, the Gowe Co-operative Society which exclusively served the smallholder irrigation scheme had folded up. It collapsed in October 1969 not as a direct result of the war but because of corruption and mismanagement. N.B. A more detailed explanation of the operation of co-operative societies in Zimbabwe’s communal lands is given in Chapter five.
recruited to join the struggle and this deprived the rural community of an able-bodied labour-force.”  

According to the first black TILCOR General Manager, Robbie Mupawose, “The whole [agricultural] set up got caught up in the war situation and the government of Zimbabwe needs to go back and revitalise the rural development aspect of ARDA.”

Whilst literature on the effects of the liberation struggle on Sanyati’s two major irrigation schemes is rather sketchy, it is not possible that the war could have disrupted operations in the dryland area and left the adjoining irrigation sector untouched. Bvunzawabaya acknowledges that during the struggle there was contact between the Gowe irrigators and the fighters, but “because schemes like Gowe benefited Africans they were not targeted for attack by the guerrillas.” “Production-wise, the Sanyati schemes continued operating normally and no one lost his or her plot because of the war.”  

In fact, not a single ARDA irrigation estate was closed during the war, save for Mushumbi Pools on the Dande River. In his correspondence with Van Zeeland (the Head of Hatfield High School), the TILCOR Urban Controller, E. F. Hanratty, pointed out that “we have 11 Estates, one of which has had to be closed down because of the war. There are 3 in Matabeleland (1 in the North and 2 in the South), one in Mashonaland West, 2 (one closed) in the Zambezi Valley, and 3 in Manicaland [including an industrial estate at ‘Seki’]” However, Mupawose has made it clear that this scheme (Mushumbi), which was the second to be developed in the Zambezi Valley after Muzarabani, was not destroyed by the war. “What killed Mushumbi was a huge storm which carried the pump station/house into the river.” In an interview, Bvunzawabaya went on to say, although the Main Estate was seen as a symbol of white hegemony, it was spared from attack because it “assisted African settlers.” Nevertheless, smallholder irrigation productivity was to some extent affected because well-to-do plotholders who, in a good season, sometimes hired local labour from the surrounding community could not get all their labour requirements at crucial times during the war.

Labour supply constraints indirectly affected Estate farming as workers could only leave the “keeps” to work on the irrigation scheme as late as 8 o’clock in the morning and had to be back in the protected village by 3 o’clock in the afternoon. As the colonial government tried to defeat the guerrillas by denying them contact with the people, it was the Estate that felt the pinch because ideally it needed labour from as early as 6 o’clock in the morning to around 3 o’clock in the afternoon, the time the workers were supposed to be back in the “keep.” This had a negative effect on production since casual labour was often given specific targets, which needed to be accomplished within specific time frames. The war situation, thus, made it very difficult for the core estate to mobilise all the labour resources it required at certain times. However, the effects of the war on

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970 J. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 18th October 2006.
971 Robbie Mupawose, (Former General Manager of TILCOR and Former Secretary for Lands, Agriculture and Resettlement), Personal Interview, Monomotapa Hotel, Harare, 19th October 2006.
972 Bvunzawabaya, Personal Interview, 17th October 2006.
973 NAZ (RC), TILCOR, File: S10/EFH/ks, E. F. Hanratty (Urban Controller – TILCOR) to Wayne Van Zeeland (Hatfield School Head), 19th June 1979.
974 Mupawose, Personal Interview.
975 Ibid.
production were more pronounced on the dryland than on the irrigation sector. This partly explains why the average yields for Communal Lands irrigation schemes for the period 1970 to 1979 were always higher than those for dryland Communal Areas. (See table below).

Table 4.2: AVERAGE YIELDS (Kg/Ha) 1970-1979 – COMMUNAL LAND IRRIGATION SCHEMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Irrigation Communal Lands</th>
<th>Dryland Communal Lands</th>
<th>Dryland Commercial Farms</th>
<th>Dryland Smallscale Commercial Farms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>5 494</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>4 732</td>
<td>1 586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>2 256</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 025*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1 887</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>1 650</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>1 687</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>1 710</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>2 020</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>1 854</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya Beans</td>
<td>2 036</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 601</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>4 183</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finger Millet</td>
<td>1 724</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Commercial Irrigation

Clearly, it is an indisputable fact that from the mid-1970s up to the end of the war numerous factors militated against peasant agricultural prosperity in general. For example, the escalation of the guerrilla war and the accompanying insecurity and disruption of agricultural activities, a severe drought in the mid-1970s and the shortage of credit facilities all combined to impede accumulation and temporarily arrested differentiation as successful peasant farmers became the targets of resentment and attacks by the poor. Because of their prosperity sometimes they were labelled witches or sell-outs, which was obviously a vain attempt by the poor to obstruct the process of peasant accumulation which dates back to the colonial era. Indeed, it was a vain effort as the guerrillas soon discovered for themselves that a number of these accusations were not justified at all. The interview with Bvunzawabaya and other plotholders revealed that well-off plotholders were sold out to the soldiers “for having a son or daughter who had joined the ‘terrorist forces.’” “Because they were rich they were alleged to have accrued wealth from selling out activities.” Incidentally, as another former estate manager,

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977 One of the major themes in the relationship between the guerrillas and the peasants was that the attack against sell-outs (i.e. those who betrayed the guerrillas) and the long-established fear of and hatred of witches were bound together. See David Lan, *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*, (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1985), 134 and Norma Kriger, *Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
978 Bvunzawabaya, Personal Interview, 17th October 2006. See also Mjoli, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005 and Maturure, Personal Interview, 9th January 1997.
Gwerengwe, testified, the labeling of each other as “sell outs” was not only a liberation phenomenon, but also this phenomenon continued even after independence. For example, after the war well-to-do plotholders were targeted on the grounds that “anga ane mwana musoja aikurwisai.” 979 This literally meant that such plotholders should be persecuted for having a relative (e.g. son or daughter) who was fighting on the side of the enemy. Richer plotholders were also targeted by young men and women who were all deprived of land ownership rights by the ARDA lease agreement. This in essence revealed that the solidarity for a common cause, which characterised early resistance against the government, was later translated into divisions along generational, class and gender lines. Thus, since UDI, ARDA irrigation in Sanyati endured a number of problems which included sanctions, drought, lack of adequate loan facilities, unfavourable lease conditions and the war.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the inception of irrigation in Sanyati since the 1960s has met with mixed fortunes. It was not always a case of success but it was also a story of failed attempts to convince people to believe in the new technology as well as a new crop (cotton). One of its major contentions is that, to a large extent, smallholder irrigation benefited both the local and regional community, and to a lesser extent the national economy. The impact of smallholder irrigation (Gowe) obviously was minimal because of the small size of plots leased out to the irrigators by TILCOR or ARDA. In fact, complex projects like Gowe involving a great deal of administrative control and long-term involvement by the controlling agency (ARDA) were less likely to succeed than small schemes which require low levels of initial capital investment and provide maximum independence to the settlers (tenants). However, the impact of the Main Estate on the development not only of the surrounding community but also of the regional as well as the national economy cannot be underestimated.

The impact of the Major Irrigation Estate can be measured against the background that it was responsible for employment creation, provision of housing for its permanent workforce and development of a major irrigation-based growth point in the northwestern part of the country among other things. The Growth Point and the related services that it provides are largely attributable to the TILCOR-Estate irrigation idea, which was mooted by the colonial government some four decades ago. Sanyati is a hive of activity with the services that the GMB, COTTCO, GRAFAX Cotton (Pvt) Ltd, FSI Cotton, Cargill, Takwirira Trading and other retail shops are providing to the neighbouring farming community including parts of Gokwe along the Munyati River and close to the ARDA Estate such as Mero and Ganyungu. Cotton has been at the centre of this development.

Quite distinctly, cotton irrigation in Sanyati has produced very diverse forms of differentiation in the area between the plotholders, the Estate administration and the surrounding dryland communities. As already alluded to, literature on peasant cotton production in colonial Africa has demonstrated that wherever cotton was grown, it

979 J. Gwerengwe (Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Sanyati Estate, 2nd May 1996. See also Bvunzawabaya, Personal Interview, 17th October 2006.
generated significant social inequalities. Clearly, the main beneficiaries of the cotton programme in ARDA’s schemes were the resource-rich peasants of “immigrant” extraction who had ample access to essential productive resources, the Estate and of course the state. It is imperative to note that the Estate is mainly concerned with processes of control and it is an efficient means of relaying instructions downwards to the tenants, yet communication upwards is blocked. Therefore, there is very little feedback or contribution that comes from below. The DC, on the other hand, who was the overseer of the Estate, appeared to be the representative of the plotholders but in his supervisory role it was evident that he did not support the numerous calls for more land from the very people he purported to represent. For example, he would drive from Gatooma to the Estate merely to use the Rest House for his purposes and then drive back without attending to the growing clamours for bigger plots on the part of the Gowe tenants. In addition to his chief duties, this also made him an ever-present symbol of the authority of the Scheme. The DC’s attitude is understandable in the context of an Estate which was developed more with the interests of the state in mind than of the Gowe farmers.

Cotton agriculture is a labour and capital intensive venture and since the availability of capital was not always guaranteed to the plotholders a lot of personal initiative was required to compete with the rest and measure up to the expectations of the DC or the Estate management. It has been noted in chapter two that differentiation predated the irrigation era. This chapter has demonstrated that differentiation assumed much greater proportions with the advent of both cotton and irrigation. In the irrigation era, the bases of differentiation became more diversified. This was so as land and labour were no longer the only major determinants of this process. An array of factors ranging from the plotholder’s relationship with the Estate, the DC and his capital base which was also a function of his ability to meet land rent and water rate obligations increasingly became important bases of differentiation. For the majority of the Gowe tenants, however, participation in large-scale cotton growing was constrained by lack of adequate land, lack of sufficient productive resources, big enough loan packages and other agricultural support services, which were so generously availed to their white commercial counterparts by the Government and Agro-Finance Houses such as the AFC.

The chapter has also examined the impact of the liberation war on both the dryland and irrigation sectors in Sanyati. It has noted that the struggle had a more significant effect on dryland production than it had on ARDA irrigation. As far as the Estate was concerned the reduction in the activities of the labour force and reduced time of work because of the enforcement of an all-night curfew was its greatest impact. To some extent, the Second Chimurenga impeded accumulation among both the well-to-do and the less-to-do plotholders.

However, despite the problems experienced by the two irrigation schemes it cannot be doubted that with proper management, sufficient resources and higher levels of community participation (ownership) irrigation can be an instrument for sustainable development and for the promotion of social and economic differentiation in the rural areas. While irrigation has not benefited everyone the forms of socio-economic differentiation it engendered in Sanyati are significant. Clearly, in this period irrigation
differentiated peasant farmers more than the system of agriculture in the 1930s up to the early 1960s. Thus, the irrigation era led to the emergence of more distinct categories of rich (better off peasants) and poor than at any time before. Whether Independence provided a congenial economic and political environment for the development of rural differentiation will be examined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE

POST-INDEPENDENCE ERA: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE (1980-1990)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the period from independence on 18 April 1980 to 1990. The intended and unintended outcomes of government interventionist policies in the Sanyati irrigation schemes (Gowe and the Main Estate) are examined. The advent of a black government was welcomed by many peasant farmers. It was perceived as a government that would redress the injustices of the past and promote the interests of African farmers in particular. The chapter focuses on the process which determined interaction between the plotholders and the Main Estate and how the former manipulated new government agricultural policies to secure their individual and collective requirements. This process is manifested in the informal actions of the plotholders when contrasted with the formal rules and the governance and management systems in irrigation. Chapter five provides the setting for chapter six as the two irrigation schemes continued to be a prominent feature of Sanyati agriculture in the post-independence period. Management of these projects was taken over by ARDA whose aims and objectives, as shall be illustrated, provide a useful measure of assessment of the new government’s irrigation policies in the countryside.

In the main, the operations of Gowe and the Core Estate and the ensuing differentiation process that emerged in the period after the attainment of majority rule will be analysed.

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980 In this study the terms plotholders, settlers (save for references to white settlers), outgrowers, tenants and smallholders are used to denote small-scale irrigation farmers adjacent to ARDA Irrigation Estates. In other cases a tenant refers to one who rents land temporarily and a plotholder is one who farms on a plot but has no title deeds or perpetual rights.

981 The evolution of irrigation agricultural policy can best be explained against the background that when Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 it inherited a dual irrigation structure. The larger sub-sector comprised commercial, large-scale production of cotton, wheat, tobacco and soyabean. The smaller sub-sector comprised smallholder schemes scattered over the communal areas of the country where the majority of the peasant farmers live and practice both food and cash crop production. The devastating drought of 1981-1984 primarily re-focused the government’s policy of reducing dependency on rain-fed agriculture where this is feasible. One of the key issues of the policy is the role of smallholder irrigation in meeting this expectation and how smallholders could reduce dependency on government as far as developing and running the schemes is concerned. N.B. Problems related to achieving this overall objective stem from historical process and evolution of the schemes. A thorough evaluation of irrigation policy has been presented by Mandivamba Rukuni, “The Evolution of Irrigation Policy in Zimbabwe, 1900-1986,” Working Paper AEE 4/86 Presented at the Forum on Irrigation Systems and Applications, USA: Cornell University, (May 13-15, 1986), 1-15. See also Malcolm J. Blackie, “A Time to Listen: A Perspective on Agricultural Policy in Zimbabwe,” Working Paper 5/81 Presented as his inaugural lecture to the University of Zimbabwe, Salisbury: Department of Land Management, University of Zimbabwe, (1981), 1-9.

982 ARDA was given the responsibility of running all the settler schemes adjacent to its Estates by the Government under the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. The administration of the settlement schemes was initially under Internal Affairs. Later it was handed over to DEVAG and on the 11th September 1980 the schemes were handed over to TILCOR now trading in the name of ARDA. N.B. The Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) is a parastatal institution responsible for agricultural and rural development on behalf of government. It is the largest single irrigator of land in the country.
in an attempt to discern the element of continuity or change in the way the two irrigation schemes were run. This is explored through a detailed analysis of government intention and what was achieved on the ground. The gulf between the rich and the poor, which appeared not so easy to ascertain up to the 1960s, was broadened even further as the government availed abundant technical and financial resources at the onset of independence to empower formerly disfranchised and disadvantaged black farmers. For instance, substantial resources were invested in smallholder agriculture supporting the delivery of such services as extension, credit and marketing. Some plotholders enjoyed privileged access to these and became relatively wealthy but others who were less endowed with the same resources remained poor. Although the *Chavunduka Commission of Inquiry into the Agricultural Industry* discusses the weight of poverty and ecological degradation in the communal lands in detail, this chapter argues that poverty cannot be used to dispute the existence of greater forms of differentiation in the rural areas. The plotholders carried over their battle to improve their lot from the colonial period into the 1980s and most benefited from the re-invigorated drive to promote cotton cultivation in all the communal areas of the country. This drive, coupled with favourably wet seasons, contributed to the post-independence cotton boom not only in Sanyati but also throughout the country.

On the whole, government placed high emphasis on improving incomes in communal areas by promoting the commercialisation of agriculture and reducing the proportion of the population engaged in “subsistence” farming. This chapter demonstrates how agricultural growth and commercialisation informs and intensifies existing inequalities in peasant farmers’ access to the means of production. When the agricultural boom began in 1980, it is important to note that rural irrigators, just as in the period before independence, were expected to operate within a coercive-co-operative framework. In a land-shortage district like Sanyati, unequal access to land, water and credit produced numerous inequalities in income and wealth. The strength and power of peasant agency often assisted the farmers to influence policy but the mismatch of expectations between policy implementers and policy recipients is illustrative of the fact that government needed to make irrigators active decision-makers rather than mere consultative partners. A more co-operative framework had to be applied to government intervention in irrigation or agriculture in general for independence to fulfill its earlier promise of equitable distribution of land and other opportunities.

In spite of the smallholder irrigators’ determination to use the environment created by independence to improve their yields, their efforts were frequently hampered by the perennial cultivation of very small plots and the omnipresent influence of the ARDA Estate. No major effort was made to achieve a meaningful and equitable distribution of land between Gowe and the Main Estate. While the Main Estate was 1 000 hectares in

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984 Cotton is commonly referred to as the “white fibre” by the local farmers.
size, Gowe was about ten times smaller. The distribution of income was also skewed in favour of the “big landowner” – the Estate. The resultant “crisis of expectations” that emerged in the post-colonial period will be explored in this chapter as this partly contributed to the land invasions of 2000, a detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this study.

Individuals and households who had embraced irrigation before 1980 took maximum advantage of higher crop prices and improved agricultural services after independence to amass wealth. They used their earnings from the crop boom to expand their productive capacity. The more successful irrigators invested their instantaneous wealth in new farming equipment, made improvements to their dryland plots or purchased much bigger farms in the small-scale commercial farming areas of Chenjiri and Copper Queen. Those farmers who had not joined the irrigation bandwagon or did not own land in the dryland area lagged behind. These formed the lowest social strata in Sanyati in, what were, otherwise, years of prosperity. Hence, the cotton boom eluded them. This stratum also comprised irrigators whose plots had been seized after being declared vacant by ARDA.

The process of rural differentiation in the Sanyati irrigation schemes was not only exacerbated by influences from the changing political and economic landscape of Zimbabwe as a whole, but was complicated by the unilateral claim to other plots by land-hungry plotholders whenever these fell vacant. In apparent competition with the smallholder farmers, ARDA also laid claim to the vacant holdings. For instance, in the 1989/90 season, of the total Gowe hectrage of 120 ha under cotton, the outgrowers were cropping only 86 ha, whereas the central estate was utilising the 34 ha vacant plots. During the DC’s tenure of office there were clearly laid down rules on how vacant plots would be filled, but independence introduced a new form of land grabbing (madiro) at Gowe and within the Main Estate. Land grabbing of part of Estate land will be discussed in Chapter six.

As plotholder families were growing in size, some daring individuals began the unofficial process of seizing the land of those who had left the scheme for various reasons, as illustrated in Chapter four. Because land was never made available to the offspring of plotholders or “the rising stars” as one of Mjoli’s sons, Weddington, calls them, their

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988 Weddington Mjoli, (“Plotholder”), Personal Interview, Gowe, 14th May 2005. The term “Rising Star” has been coined by Weddington who sometimes prefers to call himself “Dhlaminii” which is his family’s totem. He occupies one of the vacant plots that has been unofficially obtained for him by his father upon marriage, which actually makes him an illegal plotholder. The “Rising Stars” are a new “revolutionary” group campaigning for land or irrigation plots at Gowe. They comprise sons of Gowe farmers who are now married but have been deprived of the opportunity to own or lease land because the land is simply not there. Their parents are also demanding that their sons be given first priority when ARDA is allocating vacant plots because their children have gained valuable experience in irrigation operations e.g. the proper handling of irrigation pipes, dealing with cotton pests et cetera. For more detail on this issue see NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Minutes of the General Meeting Held at Gowe Offices on 13 November 1989,” E. Chiwombe (Secretary – Gowe Irrigation
parents used their own resources and the inflow of capital from their migrant sons to plough more land which they viewed as lying idle after it had been vacated. This was a way of laying claim to the vacant plots on behalf of their children staying with them or away performing wage labour. Such unilateral seizures of land actually took place in spite of the fact that the Settlement Officer always warned the tenants against this practice. The full text of one of his warnings read:

Please be warned that illegal plots are prohibited. Therefore you are only permitted to cultivate those plots allocated to you when the scheme was initially demarcated. The degree of erosion on illegal plots is alarming. Moreover there are no conservation works. The land you are cultivating was earmarked for residential sites. In future, anyone found practicing illegal cultivation will lose his/her plot.

Ideally a vacant plot had to be filled in by someone whose name appeared on the official waiting list, but probably because of the need for political votes the Estate management, acting on behalf of the government, did not always intervene and question this practice which assumed major proportions between 1990 and 2000 as will be shown in the next chapter. The Government’s populist stance, therefore, inadvertently created a group of large land-owning plotholders at Gowe.

The process that led some farmers to plough more land than others helped to redefine positions of authority, relationships and social status in the ARDA irrigation schemes. For resource-rich plotholders, acquisition of more land has enhanced their productive capacity and cotton profits. Resource-poor plotholders have not benefited much from possession of vacant plots because their yields remained significantly low. However, both rich and poor irrigators are clinging on to such land for the benefit of their absent sons (e.g. Mjoli has a son working in Johannesburg and another in Bulawayo) and for speculative purposes. Differences in access to land have led to the accumulation of wealth by many innovative plotholders. This, in addition to the other bases of differentiation (i.e. access to labour and capital) in the Sanyati irrigation schemes, has led to the shifting in emphasis of the differentiation process. Commercialisation in agriculture has given rise to both wealthy and poor peasants, hence, throughout this period, the Sanyati rural economy was never an example of commercialisation without progressive peasant differentiation. Clearly, commercialisation or rather spontaneous commercialisation has occurred on plots of many peasant cultivators. Such

990 Generally, spontaneous commercialisation on peasant farms applies to those cash crops which do not require complex processing. It also occurs where existing processing facilities (e.g. cotton ginneries) become available to peasant producers. A case in point, which bares close resemblances with Sanyati, is cotton growing in the Lowveld of Swaziland. The peasant farmers in this area were keenly aware of price increases for this crop and the ensuing profitability of cotton cultivation on small farms. For further detail on commercialisation of this type see J. Hinderink and J. J. Sterkenburg, Agricultural Commercialization and Government Policy in Africa, (London: KPI Ltd., 1987), 79-80 and J. J. Sterkenburg and J. Testerink,
commercialisation is proof of the flexibility and adaptability of peasants to respond to new economic opportunities and to make use of income obtained from and outside the agricultural sector. In fact, one of the major contributions of this study is that it helps rewrite the story of rural differentiation in an irrigation sector compared to what Nyambara and Worby have found in the dryland sector.

Irrigation has produced additional dimensions to rural differentiation. The bases of such differentiation have also increased beyond the orthodox ones which are land, labour and capital. Manipulation of lease regulations, marketing principles and other policies determined plot holder survival. Overall irrigation development, Estate and settler performance in Sanyati were premised on aims enunciated by government since 1967 and modified in 1980. These objectives governed the operation of the smallholder scheme and were designed in such a way that they were in tandem with the ARDA lease arrangements, which invariably were resisted by many outgrowers.

**ARDA: Post-colonial objectives and opposition to irrigation leases**

When ARDA succeeded TILCOR in 1980/81, the need to improve the condition of the settler farmers assumed a lot of importance. The promotion of Gowe, which used to be run and administered by ARDA on behalf of the Rural State Land Division of the Ministry of Lands and Water Resources into a viable irrigation scheme, became paramount. In the post-colonial era, emphasis shifted significantly from a preference for subsistence crops in favour of the production of cash crops. As the Government of Independent Zimbabwe was "looking more beyond the subsistence level," more remunerative crops had to be grown, for instance, cotton and wheat.

In the period after Independence, Gowe, just like the other settlement schemes in the mould of Ngwezi (Plumtree), Antelope (Maphisa/Kezi), Tsovane, and Dande, was designed to cater for the average peasant with little to no formal education. The qualification criteria for candidates to become settlers at Gowe were, as before, based on master farmer skills, personal discipline and ability to manage one’s family workforce. On the whole, since 1980, land, water resources as well as professional management were made available by the Sanyati Core Estate, but labour was provided by the settlers themselves, who,

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“Agricultural Commercialization in Swaziland: Cotton Production on Swazi Nation Land,” Utrecht: Department of Geography of Developing Countries, University of Utrecht, (1982).


994 Historically, irrigation development has largely been a function of private investment. Recently, it has
depending on the success of their yields, sometimes hired contract workers to assist in the harvesting of produce.

After independence, whenever irrigation plots fell vacant, interested persons were invited to apply for occupancy of these.\footnote{996} By 1996, such plots were advertised and applications were vetted by the Agricultural Land Settlement Board which sits at ARDA.\footnote{997} Applicants had to be physically fit Zimbabwean citizens aged between 25 and 50.\footnote{998} Physical fitness was, however, difficult to determine as no clear yardstick has been put in place to measure it, fitness being determined merely on the basis of outward appearance.

Intending applicants were advised that tenancy would be granted on a leasehold basis. In the lease agreement ARDA, a body corporate established under and by virtue of Section 2 of the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority Act (Chapter 100), was referred to as the “Lessor” and the plotholder as the “Lessee.” The latter was allowed to hire a certain piece of land whose boundaries and abuttals were pointed out and agreed upon by the two parties. Such a “holding” would legally not exceed a maximum of 4 hectares.\footnote{999} Once an irrigation holding had been allocated, it was subject to the following terms and conditions:

(a) the lease was deemed to have commenced on the day of allocation. Provided its conditions were faithfully and fully carried out, the lessee shall have the free and undisturbed possession of the holding for an initial or probationary period of 2 years after which the lease shall continue indefinitely (i.e. for 99 years) unless terminated in the manner provided in the agreement;

(b) the annual rental for sprayline equipment, administration and pump house amounting to $219.00 per hectare per crop per annum shall be payable through the AFC Loan arrangement in each and every year during the currency of this lease at Sanyati Estate Offices or at such other place as ARDA may direct in writing. ARDA reserves the right to increase the rental after having taken account of escalation of costs without prior notice to the lessee;

(c) no warranty is given that the holding is necessarily an economic unit and ARDA accepts no liability or obligation in this respect; and

(d) the lessee shall permit any right of way necessary to give access to other properties or permit any other rights should he be required to do so by ARDA.\footnote{1000}

attracted more and more government attention. With the significant exception of the AGRITEX, now AREX-administered smallholder irrigation schemes, the ARDA concept for commercial small-scale farmers is to have a core estate which bears the cost of providing management assistance and services to the farmers as part of its overheads.

\footnote{995} Mhlanga, “Outgrower Settlement Schemes and the Commercial Settlement Scheme,” 2.


\footnote{997} Mhlanga, “Outgrower Settlement Schemes and the Commercial Settlement Scheme,” 4.


\footnote{999} NAZ (RC), Issued to ARDA by the Minister of Local Government property, Sanyati Gowe Irrigation Scheme, “Memorandum of an Agreement of Lease made and entered into between ARDA and the Plotholder,” s.a., 1.

\footnote{1000} NAZ (RC), Issued to ARDA by the Minister of Local Government property, Sanyati Gowe Irrigation
The lease was subject to the following additional conditions:

(1) the holding shall be used for agricultural purposes for the lessee’s exclusive benefit only;

(2) during the subsistence of the lease the lessee shall:

(a) personally, actively and continuously carry on farming operations on the holding. This was a very clear clause against the sub-leasing of irrigation plots;

(b) permit officers, servants, contractors and duly authorised agents of ARDA, together with such vehicles, equipment, implements, tools, animals and other things as may be necessary to enter upon the holding at all reasonable times for the purpose of inspection and for any other purpose that ARDA may require in order to exercise his rights under the lease;

(c) comply in all respects with the provisions of and regulations made under the Natural Resources Act (Chapter 150), Animal Health Act (Chapter 121), Noxious Weeds Act (Chapter 127) and all other laws relating to soil husbandry, farming practices and livestock management, and shall further comply with all requirements which in the opinion of ARDA are necessary for: (i) the prevention of damage to or deterioration of the source or course of public streams; (ii) the prevention and control of plant and animal pests and diseases; (iii) the control or eradication of weeds harmful to crops and livestock; and (iv) the protection against soil erosion of all lands through conservation practices and the maintenance of soil conservation works and the like;

(d) comply with existing or subsequent regulations imposed by the Department of Veterinary Services regarding the control and movement of animals;

(e) keep all permanent improvements on the holding in good order, condition and repair at his own expense;

(f) keep, or if so required by ARDA, cause to be kept by a person approved by ARDA, proper books and records of all farming operations and transactions carried on the holding, together with such records as ARDA may require for the purpose of assessing the costs of the lessee’s farming operations and his ability as a farmer. He shall further furnish to ARDA or his duly authorised agent within a time to be fixed by ARDA, in his discretion, such books and records together with a balance sheet as at a date to be fixed by ARDA, and profit and loss account of the farming operations carried upon the holding prepared by an Accountant or Management Service;

(g) reside on the scheme at a place approved by ARDA;

Scheme, “Memorandum of an Agreement of Lease made and entered into between ARDA and the Plotholder,” s.a., 1.
(h) undergo such training and instruction in irrigation farming as ARDA may require and attend such field days or farming demonstrations as ARDA may require;
(i) enter into an agreement with the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority for the supply of irrigation water and pay for the water as stipulated by ARDA from time to time;
(j) lay out the irrigable land on the holding, apply water through the flood system and drain water from the holding in accordance with the water requirement laid down by ARDA, and draw water from the system only at the times and in the manner approved by ARDA; and
(k) follow a cropping programme approved by ARDA. ¹⁰⁰¹

Last but not least, the lessee shall not, without the written consent of ARDA:

(a) permit any other person to occupy or use any land upon the holding;
(b) permit any person, which term includes a company whether or not owned and controlled by the lessee, to use any land upon the holding in terms of any sharecropping agreement or any contract whereby such person is to render any service or payment to the lessee in return for the right to use such land (a further clause against sub-leasing);
(c) carry out nor permit nor cause any other person to carry on any trading, commercial nor industrial operations upon the holding, provided that the lessee may sell or permit to be sold the fruits or produce of his farming operations in or from a place on the holding;
(d) engage in any other occupation or employment during the currency of the lease. This was a way of compelling the plotholders to devote all their time to their irrigation plots in order to maximise and stabilise agricultural production. Not surprisingly, ARDA was also using this as a way of ensuring a constant supply of labour from the Gowe Settler Scheme tenants to the Estate;
(e) cede or assign the said lease nor hypothecate (i.e. give as security or mortgage) any of his rights hereunder, nor sublet nor part with the possession of the holding or any portion thereof nor grant any portion thereof nor grant any form of right of occupation in respect of the holding or any portion thereof;
(f) absent himself from the holding for more than thirty consecutive days, without the knowledge of ARDA. This was another carefully calculated way of controlling and monitoring labour and guaranteeing scheme productivity; and
(g) depasture cattle, sheep, goats, donkeys or other animals on the holding. ¹⁰⁰²

¹⁰⁰¹ NAZ (RC), Issued to ARDA by the Minister of Local Government property, Sanyati Gowe Irrigation Scheme, “Memorandum of an Agreement of Lease made and entered into between ARDA and the Plotholder,” s.a., 2-3.
¹⁰⁰² NAZ (RC), Issued to ARDA by the Minister of Local Government property, Sanyati Gowe Irrigation Scheme, “Memorandum of an Agreement of Lease made and entered into between ARDA and the
To ensure uniformity of purpose it was mandatory for plotholders on all ARDA schemes in the country to abide by these stipulations. A major loophole in the lease agreement, though, was its apparent total disregard for female land rights in irrigation. One of the former Sanyati Estate Managers, Petros Bvunzawabaya, has observed that women were considered for plot ownership but “they were very few,” adding that “Officially, less than five women were allocated plots [and] the others obtained plots through inheritance.”  

Job Gwacha insisted that “Men only were allocated plots by the DC. It was felt that women were not good farmers as men … Women [only] got land after the death of their husbands.” Robbie Mupawose concurs with Bvunzawabaya and Gwacha by saying “Women were always sidelined [but] not because it was a principle.” This seems to confirm Pankhurst and Jacobs’ findings that land tenure policies in the communal areas stipulated that land was held by a male household head with wives only having access to land through the household head or husband.  

Although a few women plotholders had been allocated land in the smallholder irrigation scheme the lease arrangement did not specifically spell out the position of female holders in this period. Nonetheless, their reduced access to land is very clear. Thus, their tenure status remained unclear if not obscure since the time of the DC. During his time the authority to allocate land was vested in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but after independence this authority was held by the Ministry of Lands acting on behalf of government. The two ministries primarily gave land to individual male heads of families most of whom were certificated master farmers. However, when irrigation commenced in Sanyati in 1967, no record existed of female master farmers, hence they did not qualify for plots on that score. The tenure system, therefore, practically discriminated against women and rendered them insignificant despite their contribution to irrigation production. This, as shall be demonstrated in chapter six, stimulated socio-economic disparities that were also gender based and qualification oriented.

Notwithstanding this, there were also clear regulations governing the termination of plotholder leases. For example, ARDA reserved the right to cancel the lease forthwith, or after such notice as ARDA may deem fit, in the event of any breach of the terms and conditions herein or if in the opinion of ARDA, the lessee has permitted his farming activities to decline to such an extent that the holding is not being properly farmed. The lease may be further terminated as follows:

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1003 Bvunzawabaya, Personal Interview, 17th October 2006.
1004 Telephone Interview, Nyandoro with Job Gwacha (COTTCO Accounts Clerk), 18th October 2006.
1005 Mupawose, Personal Interview.
(a) by the lessee giving not less than three months notice in writing of his intention to do so; and

(b) forthwith upon the death or insanity of the lessee, notwithstanding the fact that ARDA may in its sole discretion enter into a further agreement of lease with the lessee’s heirs or successors.

For example, when Meki Zimunda who was farming Plot D5 passed away during the course of the 1988/89 season, the Settlement Officer for Sanyati, N. T. K. Kamudzandu who assumed duty on the 5th of October 1987, recommended that his wife, Elizabeth, who was born on 28 December 1944, takes over the plot since she was the most active partner in the farming operations. He also requested for the signing of a new lease agreement by the proposed lessee (Elizabeth). The Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement duly approved this recommendation in July 1990. However, Elizabeth requested permission to transfer her plot to a close relative since she had decided to revert to her old profession as a teacher. Although the Agricultural Land Settlement Board in its meeting of November 1986 had granted authority to ARDA to effect such changes an unusual request like this required the Board’s approval.

When cancelling lease agreements, ARDA may at its sole discretion make any agreement which in its opinion is equitable for the disposal or management of any crop which may be in the ground at the time of the lessee’s death or insanity; or forthwith, if the property of the lessee is attached in execution of judgement of any court, or should the lessee’s estate be declared insolvent, or if the lessee surrenders his estate as insolvent. Upon termination of the lease for any reason, ARDA shall have the right to resume possession of the holding without prejudice, however, to his rights to claim arrears of rent, damage or otherwise. Where the lease has been terminated no compensation shall be payable to the lessee, his trustees, assignee or legal representatives as the case may be for improvements effected on or to the holding. This makes it difficult for tenants to effect meaningful developments on the holding. In addition, prior to vacating the holding upon termination of the lease, the

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lessee shall destroy all crops and crop residues as are required by regulation to be destroyed, notwithstanding that the date prescribed for such destruction falls after the date by which the lessee is required to vacate the holding and if the lessee fails to comply with this condition ARDA shall have the right to effect such crop destruction and to claim the costs from the lessee. On the whole, ARDA or any person authorised by it shall have the right free of charge and without compensation to lay and construct roads, irrigation works, conservation works, pipe lines, electric lines, sewers, drains and works ancillary thereto upon or under the said land and to enter thereon at all reasonable times for the purposes of operating, inspecting, repairing, maintaining or renewing such works whether in existence to or after the date thereof.  

The conditions set out in the lease agreement underlined the fact that the state had a greater say in the sort of differentiation that emerged in ARDA’s irrigation schemes, not only in Sanyati but also throughout the country. A social and economic mobility, if not mode of stratification, which was controlled by ARDA, characterised most of its schemes. The impermanency of status accorded the outgrowers was just as counterproductive as it was self-defeating. It meant that the lease could be revoked any time. Such discretionary authority exercised by ARDA gave the corporate body enormous powers that were sometimes detrimental to settler progress. The feeling among the targets of ARDA policies was one of inadequate disenthralment. It can be noted that the conditions of the lease-hold tenure that obtain on the Gowe plots combine with the historical scarcity of capital for their occupants to produce less visible effects on the landscape. Clearly, plotholders were less inclined to make major improvements on the land due to the non-availability of title deeds.

At Independence, Gowe was placed under Model C of the Communal Lands Act which did not provide for any security of tenure and thereby encourage innovation. The Act was different from the Purchase Areas Act whereby a farmer rents to buy, whereas under the Communal Lands Act a farmer only has usufruct rights to land. Under the latter Act, farmers were told: “whilst you are within the scheme you are not allowed to do what you want, but expected to do what you are assigned to by the owner of the land.” This stipulation in the Act curtailed independence of action by the Gowe farmers which also affected productivity. On qualification, a settler was allocated a village stand with essential water supplies and sanitary facilities. These were rather inadequate. Each applicant was also expected to have a minimum capital outlay of $1 000.00 in cash, for their initial expenditure on the plot. Because there was no accommodation facility, successful applicants were expected to erect their own houses.

However, in Sanyati, the conditions of lease did not go unchallenged by some Gowe I and II irrigation plotholders who felt disadvantaged by them. (For the position of Gowe I in

1012 NAZ (RC), Issued to ARDA by the Minister of Local Government property, Sanyati Gowe Irrigation Scheme, “Memorandum of an Agreement of Lease made and entered into between ARDA and the Plotholder,” s.a., 4.

1013 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Minutes on Lease Agreement Held at Gowe Irrigation Scheme Offices on the 9th September 1986,” 1. N.B. This was the first lease agreement meeting with the Gowe plotholders.


1015 Ibid.
relation to Gowe II See Appendix X). In a stunning revelation of the plight of Gowe farmers, G. Katsande, acting on behalf of the Secretary for the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, admitted that he and B. F. Vutabwarova of the same Ministry had a meeting at Ngungunyana Building in Harare on September 23 1986 with four farmers who came to the capital from the Gowe Irrigation Scheme claiming to have been sent on a representative capacity to complain and also to clarify their position against the introduction, a couple of weeks earlier, of the Lease Agreement between ARDA and the individual farmers. The four representative farmers were T. Mandivava (then Chairman of the Gowe Farmers Irrigation Committee), C. Mhara (then Vice Chairman of the same committee), T. Masawi (Secretary), and A. M. Motsi (Vice Secretary). 1016 They made three major accusations. Firstly, the farmers alleged that they were forced to sign the lease agreements. Secondly, they stated that they were not told the entire implications to their livelihoods and general welfare of the new agreement. In particular, their protestations were stronger on the issue of rates, which they considered to be too high to be sustained from their crop yields. The farmers complained that if the total crop expenses were compared to the crop income after taking land rent, sprayline equipment and irrigation charges into consideration they would not remain with any profit. Finally, the irrigators also alleged that the amounts they paid as diesel charges for tillage purposes were inflated due to the fact that the diesel tanks are situated at Sanyati Estate which is far from their scheme. Therefore, the tractors waste a lot of diesel in travelling from the point of refuelling to the tillage point. In the circumstances, they would rather have a tank at their scheme. 1017

In view of these and other complaints put forward by these farmers, the Ministry concluded that ARDA’s working relations with them was “not all that good” and needed “to be put right.” 1018 However, these allegations were refuted by ARDA. In providing answers to the plotholders’ three main grievances, D. P. Mtetwa, the Rural Development Co-ordinator or the Settler Programmes Co-ordinator for ARDA, defended his organisation by saying the

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1016 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Settler Problems: Middle Sabi Scheme and Gowe Irrigation Scheme,” G. Katsande (for Secretary for Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement) to the General Manager (ARDA) – Attention D. P. Mtetwa (Rural Development Co-ordinator - ARDA), 1st October 1986, 1. N.B. The full irrigation committee also included E. Chiwombe (member), D. Mafumana/Mjoli (member) and Chirandata (member). However, these three were not part of the delegation that went to Harare to present plotholder grievances. Save for these representative delegations monthly, quarterly, annual reports and other communication with ARDA Head Office tried to give details of all the problems encountered and any grievances aired by the farmers including issues requiring further investigation. See NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “ARDA Memorandum: Monthly, Quarterly, Annual Reports and General Communication with Head Office,” R. Maposa (Settlers Programme Co-ordinator) to Settlement Officer – Middle Sabi Stage IIIA, Settlement Officer – Chisumbanje Estate, Settlement Officer – Sanyati Estate, Settlement Assistant – Antelope Estate and Outgrowers Supervisor – Katiyo Estate, 21st February 1990.


farmers were not forced to sign the lease agreements because this issue was an outstanding one from B. M. C. Sibanda’s Final Working Report on all schemes \(^{1019}\) and the farmers knew about the lease agreements months before signing them. He went on to say the full implications of the new agreement were well explained to the farmers, but they only wanted to claim for land title deeds in a scheme situated in the communal area. Title deeds could not be granted in such an area because all communal land in the country is deemed state land. It was pointed out that the rates stated at the first meeting on 9 September 1986 were not final and a considerable reduction had been made after cutting down some of the administration costs \(^{1020}\) of running that scheme. An economic and financial analysis done in the same year for Chisumbanje, Tsovane, Middle Save Stage III A and Sanyati Gowe I and II settlement schemes revealed that a charge of $219,00 per hectare per crop per annum at a minimum of 2 hectares per farmer per crop per year was manageable. For example, the average Sanyati settler’s yields of cotton alone was above 2,500 kgs/ha at a ± gross income of 65 cents per kg which gives one average farmer a total gross income of $1,625,00 per hectare per cotton crop per year. \(^{1021}\) The average input costs \(^{1022}\) per hectare was about $800,00, which gives a farmer a ± net income per hectare per crop per settler per annum of $825,00 ($1,625,00 – $800,00). Therefore, a farmer subtracted about $219,00 per hectare per that crop per year for administration, pump house, irrigation equipment and other expenses and leaves the farmer with an average of $606,00 net income per hectare per crop per year. \(^{1023}\)

Finally, ARDA argued that the amount paid by the settlers as diesel charges for tillage purposes was never inflated. The way this was calculated was uniform at all ARDA Estates in Zimbabwe. The calculation is as follows:

**Total Mechanical Equipment Unit (MEU) expenditure**

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\text{Total number of litres used/consumed} \times \text{charge-out rate}^{1024}
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\(^{1019}\) This report was compiled by B. M. C. Sibanda shortly before he left ARDA. Before his departure he was the Rural Development Co-ordinator for the Authority.

\(^{1020}\) Since 1980 to 1986 all administration costs (i.e. the day to day costs of running the scheme) were met by ARDA without any return of income. From 1986 onwards it was seen by ARDA that farmers could meet the administration costs, consisting of sprayline equipment ($47.00 per ha), irrigation charges ($100.00 per ha) and land rent ($100.00 per ha), and still be viable. The expenses per hectare were $247.00 ($47.00 + $100.00 + $100.00). For a 3ha plot, therefore, the total charges were fixed at $741.00 per year on all crops. It was felt that with plot sizes that varied from 3ha to 4ha per farmer this would enable the farmer to pay for the administration expenses and still be viable. However, for resource-poor plotholders irrigation viability still remained a pipe dream. Given these charges resource-rich outgrowers also clamoured for more land but less charges.


\(^{1022}\) Input costs were an indication of the source of finance (AFC or Bank loan). Input costs for each settler farmer were calculated on a per hectare basis for each crop grown.


\(^{1024}\) NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Settler Problems: Middle Save Stage III A Scheme and Gowe Irrigation Scheme,” D. P. Mtetwa (Rural
This “charge-out rate” is used across the board on an Estate for all tillage on the Estate Sections and the settlers. The installation of diesel tanks at the Gowe Settlers’ Scheme plus security costs was actually an added expenditure to be borne by them.

This was ARDA’s defence. However, while ARDA denied the representative farmers’ allegations, there was some truth in these accusations. On the question of the charge-out rate, serious anomalies were revealed. For example, the Settler Programmes Co-ordinator admitted that the per litre rates, which included actual fuel costs and overhead expenses, were considered by the tenants as excessive when compared to the price of diesel fuel bought at the nearest filling station at Sanyati Growth Point. To further complicate the issue, the ARDA rates were being compared with the District Development Fund (DDF) rates, which, according to the farmers, were lower. Unfortunately, it never dawned on the farmers who were making these comparisons that the DDF fleets only came in for ploughing but not for planting, spraying, harvesting and transporting hence their charges appeared cheaper. Regarding the first complaint, the Rural Development Co-ordinator, D. P. Mtemwa, confessed that the confusion surrounding the signing of the leases was internally fuelled when he said:

Maybe the inconvenience was caused by the Estate Manager, Mr Mutambirwa, who had told farmers not to sign the lease agreement, due to the fact that farmers will be handed over to Agritex to administer the scheme, but he was told by Head Office to reverse his statement which he had published.


1025 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowе Pools Settlement Scheme, “Memorandum - Sanyati-Gowe Settlement Scheme: Settlers’ Grievance Paper Submitted Through DA’s Office (Kadoma),” Settler Programmes Co-ordinator to Planning and Development Controller, 21st March 1989, 2. N.B. Although this source does not divulge specific figures to illustrate this comparison, oral interviews with the Gowe farmers reveal that ARDA’s tractor charges were $528.00 per ha whereas DDF charges were a paltry $100.00 per ha. A. T. Chishiri (Gowe Committee Member and Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 2nd May 1996 furnished the author with these figures.


1027 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowе Pools Settlement Scheme, “Minutes of 2nd Lease Agreement Meeting Held in the Estate Manager’s Office on the 14th October 1986 at 12.30 PM,” 1. N.B. The Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX, now AREX) has the mandate for irrigation development, and is directly involved with the planning, design and operation of most smallholder irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe. It also co-ordinates and directs donor participation in irrigation development. However, the confusion referred to above might have emanated from the new Estate Manager’s apparent ignorance that settler schemes throughout the country are not administered by AREX, then AGRITEX, but by the government through ARDA which at that time fell under the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement. Today ARDA falls under the reconstituted Ministry of Agriculture.
Most of the disputes emanated from the interpretation of the lease agreement. N. K. Kamudzandu, the Settlement Officer, conceded: “It is very difficult to administer the scheme because of indiscipline due to the fact that there are no rules currently governing the scheme … the proposed meeting on the issue [should] be held so as to make the scheme governable.” Complainants against land rent became even stronger when individuals took it upon themselves to write directly to the Co-ordinator. In one such incident Elias Matamba, a Gowe II plotholder writing on behalf of his semi-literate colleague, Moffat Gomani, stated that the latter wanted clarification on land rent which he was being forced to pay. Citing the unfairness of the practice in operation at Gowe he said:

We were supposed to grow beans (sic) during the winter season of 1987. But due to the fact that our water pipes broke down, our turn to plant appeared (sic) after planting time so we were (myself and four others) told that it was late for beans (sic). We were not offered any other alternative. Our plots remained unplanted. But now I was surprised by our Settlement Officer who told us that we owed ARDA land rent of up to $800.00. This, he said was for the winter crop, which he claims is the agreement as per our lease (sic) forms. But when we pointed out that it was impossible to raise the money without the crop, our cry was turned down. So help us please.

Responding to Gomani’s letter, Mtetwa accused him of resisting payment of properly instituted rent and failure to establish a winter bean crop in the 1986/87 season as per the cropping programme approved by the Lessor (ARDA). He was also one of the five people who resisted slashing down his cotton crop or cutting stalks by end of May 1987, maintaining that he would pick to the last ball. Referring to the broken pipe the Co-ordinator reminded Gomani that had he adhered to the experts’ advice of stopping picking cotton by end of May 1987 and followed an approved cropping programme he would have definitely established his 1986/87-winter bean crop well before the bursting of the underground pipe. However, the wrangle between Gomani and ARDA persisted when the former insisted that he had not erred at all because he had followed the Settlement Officer’s directive and that the pipe break down Mtetwa was referring to was secondary to an earlier one. Challenging the allegations of breaching the settler contract he said:

As it is, it’s the Lessor (ARDA) who is breeching (sic) our lease agreement’s terms … by trying to benefit from the holding [D8] that is supposed to be used for agricultural purposes for the Lessee’s exclusive benefit only … [and] by barring the farmer to personally, actively and continuously carry on farming operations on the holding.


1031 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme,
Despite this settler’s effort to defend himself, ARDA maintained that he should act in compliance with the very lease contract which he was so vociferously questioning. In short, this settler was being advised, on the one hand, to pay his rent and on the other to behave like a master farmer or still face eviction. In reality, though, the increase in irrigation charges affected Sanyati farmers more adversely than other peasants in Gokwe for example since they cultivated smaller plots which meant that their total net incomes were also low. Invariably, this reinforced farmer tendencies to rely on supplementary dryland plots notwithstanding official effort to discourage this practice.

Even the DC was reluctant to select people who already farmed dry land to join the irrigation scheme. Primarily, experienced farmers were preferred. To date, qualification criteria to become a plot holder at Gowe are still based mainly on exhibition of “master farmer” qualities. In an advertisement for vacant plots that appeared in a Friday issue of The Herald, ARDA made the selection procedure for prospective irrigation plot holders abundantly clear:

Applicants must be citizens of Zimbabwe who are 25 years and above but not over 50 years, must be physically fit and have farming experience preferably in irrigation. Intending applicants are advised that tenancy will be granted on a lease-hold basis. Each applicant is expected to have a minimum of $1 000 in cash. Successful applicants in the case of Chisumbanje, Middle Save and Tsuvane will be required to rent accommodation which is available in the scheme. In the case of Sanyati scheme there is no accommodation facility, and applicants are expected to build their own houses.

In fact, the Government of Zimbabwe has decided to alter the existing settler selection system to give more emphasis to Master Farmers or farmers with a proven record and potential to fully utilise the land at their disposal irrespective of whether they are Sanyati residents or not. Because the land area of Zimbabwe is limited, Gowe and the country at large cannot afford to under-use this valuable natural resource with impunity.

However, since people with “master farmer” qualities were ARDA’s target group, a multitude of African peasants have not been catered for under this programme, which could delay the elimination of the scourge of poverty among Zimbabwe’s rural population. One of the handicaps confronting the government is the failure to acquire more land for

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1034 “ARDA - Agricultural and Rural Development Authority: Irrigation Plots – Chisumbanje Settlement Scheme (4 vacant plots), Middle Save Stage IIIA (4 vacant plots), Tsuvane Settlement Scheme (7 vacant plots), Sanyati Settlement Scheme (7 vacant plots),” The Herald, Harare: Friday June 22 1990.
1035 Rukuni and Eicher (eds.), Zimbabwe’s Agricultural Revolution, 312.
redistribution; otherwise the net could have been cast much wider to embrace all the rural folk.

Last but not least, ARDA envisages a situation in which the Gowe plotholders will eventually take full charge of their own affairs. ARDA with the backing of the Ministry of Lands and Water Resources and now the Ministry of Agriculture is hoping to phase out the virtual dependence of Gowe on the Main Estate and offer the former to independent settlers if they “prove efficient and viable.” 1036 The idea is to try and “economically empower the settlers to enable them to do their own planning and make decisions.” 1037 The need for the Gowe settlers to “grow” and become “self-sustaining entities” 1038 has been repeatedly and publicly stated for some time now.

It has been argued that after an establishment, initiation and grooming period, the settlers should mature and become increasingly autonomous. This should eventually eliminate the need for a “core estate.” 1039 The “Core estate” is essentially vital in the provision of technical advice to the Gowe farmers. However, conflicts arise between the Main Estate management at Sanyati and the Gowe plotholders due to the misconception of each other’s intentions. Clearly, settlers need to be in control of the critical factors of production if their operations are not going to be prejudiced. These include, mechanical equipment to control timing of operations and working capital. On the strength of this, settler schemes such as Gowe should be handed over control to operate on their own terms in line with the goals set out at the time of their inception. Overall agricultural development and the operational performance of Gowe and the Core Estate from 1980 to 1990 will be analysed in the context of these post-colonial objectives.

IRRIGATION AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

**Entanglement with grass root development:**

In the colonial period the state had emphasised smallholder irrigation agriculture as a precursor to rural development in Sanyati. Precisely six years before the dismantling of settler rule, the Sanyati Estate was established by TILCOR to bolster rural development initiatives which had been started by the DC for Gatooma in the 1960s. It was development that was based mainly on irrigated cotton. “Immigrant” entrepreneurs who had been moved from European Crown Land since the 1950s spearheaded cotton cultivation in Sanyati and its adjacent areas. Their astute farming organisation accompanied by their highly developed marketing strategies led to the emergence of an auspicious class of rural irrigation and dryland capitalists who thrived on this crop. Although land was a major constraint to accumulation, the “immigrants” were determined to take advantage of the cotton programme that had been vigorously

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1036 S. S. Musodza, (Principal Executive Officer, Department of Lands and Technical Services), Personal Interview, Harare, 15th October 1996.
1037 A. Jaure (ARDA, Assistant General Manager, Planning and Development Services), Personal Interview, Harare, 5th September 1996.
1038 Ibid.
encouraged by the colonial government since the early 1960s. Most of them became so successful from delivering huge amounts of cotton to Gatooma and other clandestine or unofficial markets that they built corrugated iron or asbestos-roofed houses, erected shops and even employed labour on their irrigation plots. Others were poor and subjected to inadequate water and sanitary facilities as well as substandard housing. Following a number of health meetings and surveys carried out on the Gowe Irrigation Scheme the health inspectorate recommended the provision of improved water and sanitary facilities, a proper housing scheme and the services of a village health worker within the scheme. In spite of this dire need for amenities at Gowe there was no improvement for many years prompting the Settler Programmes Co-ordinator, R. Maposa, to correctly observe as late as 1989 that “The issue of providing decent accommodation for the Sanyati-Gowe Settler Farmers has remained unresolved since the days when the scheme was transferred from the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development to ARDA.” He expressed concern when he said “The present arrangement, whereby Settler Farmers build their huts on plots scattered all over the scheme makes it very difficult to provide adequate and decent amenities.” In addition, general scheme management was made difficult by a number of factors prominent among which were the following:

(a) Agricultural inputs are acquired and transported to these residential plots by the individual settler farmers, and their subsequent utilisation on the irrigated plots is difficult to monitor and control;
(b) Water application on the irrigated plots is uneven as a result of pressure fluctuations in the irrigation system due to the fact that some farmers obtain their drinking water from in-field hydrant positions;
(c) The harvesting and marketing of the produce is difficult to monitor, since some farmers “illegally” transport their produce to their homesteads for parallel or side marketing purposes; and
(d) Eviction as a disciplinary measure is difficult to implement, since those evicted continue to occupy homesteads on the scheme and resort to illegal cultivation of erosion prone dryland portions around the irrigated blocks.

1040 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Memorandum: Rural Development Promotion Unit’s Handover/ Takeover Final Working Report - Set/10 Sanyati-Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme,” Settler Programmes Co-ordinator to Settlement Officer - Sanyati, 26th August 1988, 3. N.B. Gowe settlers do not have houses provided for them by ARDA as is the case with other similar schemes, and this complicates management especially with evicted farmers because they remain living on the scheme using water from the pump house. Farmers live in their self-built poll and dagga houses/huts. However, well-to-do farmers have built decent brick houses for themselves.
1042 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Sanyati-Gowe Settlement Scheme – Settler Accommodation Facilities,” R. Maposa (Settler Programmes Co-ordinator – ARDA) to the Secretary Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Causeway, Harare – Attention R. L. Nkomo, copied to the Controller (Planning and Development), the Regional Manager (Mashonaland), the Estate Manager (Sanyati) and the Settlement Officer (Sanyati – Gowe Settlement Scheme), 20th September 1989, 1.
1043 Ibid.
1044 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme,
Given this position, it was crucial to provide funds to develop a decent residential area for the settler farmers to ensure effective reorganisation and sustainable agricultural production on the scheme. Poor farmers like F. Tizira, David Mjoli and R. Muponda who in the summer of 1988/89 harvested cotton worth $3 186.00, $3 906.00 and $3 782.70, each hardly afforded building their own decent housing. These, including H. Marufu, had also been refused loans by the AFC. On the contrary, the well-to-do plotters built better shelter for themselves. The most successful, for example, Thompson Nyamutova, Office Dangaiso and Ephraim Chiwombe who in the summer of 1988/89 produced total cotton yields of 11 671, 10 311 and 11 332 kgs and realised total incomes of $10 501.20, $9 277.20 and $10 198.80 respectively also engaged cotton pickers during bumper harvests and occasionally staged lavish hunwes to assist in a wide array of activities ranging from weeding, picking and cutting of stalks. These became the envy and subjects for emulation by their poorer counterparts.

Cotton and colonial administrative practice, thus, had tended to complement market forces in promoting a class differentiation within rural Sanyati which was akin to most major cotton-producing areas in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa. In view of this unfolding differentiation process it is less paradoxical that the Zimbabwean government decided in 1980 to seek a new rural development strategy at the “grass roots” which focused on equalisation of social and economic status. The strategy found expression in the co-operative movement. In January 1980 the Marketing and Co-operative Services Section of the Ministry of Home Affairs circulated a paper which set forth the Government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s plans for “the development of the black co-operative movement to facilitate a very considerable expansion of its services to tribal farmers and farmers in the former Purchase Land.” The paper stressed: “With the end of the war now in sight, the time has come to examine the role that the Co-operative Movement will be called upon to play in the future.” As a consequence of the historical development of Zimbabwe, communal farmers faced major obstacles in

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“Sanyati-Gowe Settlement Scheme – Settler Accommodation Facilities,” R. Maposa (Settler Programmes Co-ordinator – ARDA) to the Secretary Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, Causeway, Harare – Attention R. L. Nkomo, copied to the Controller (Planning and Development), the Regional Manager (Mashonaland), the Estate Manager (Sanyati) and the Settlement Officer (Sanyati – Gowe Settlement Scheme), 20th September 1989, 1-2.


1047 Ibid.


delivering surplus production to the market.\footnote{Chavunduka Commission, 10.} At independence this necessitated, therefore, plans for the development of marketing facilities and the arrangements for financing such development. It was against this backdrop that co-operative marketing institutions were evolved.

The major functions of the co-operatives included the supply of agricultural inputs to large numbers of small farmers, spread over a large area, and the marketing of their crops. In justifying the creation of these institutions or marketing agencies the government argued that world-wide\footnote{In many countries of the world marketing agencies were one means of rectifying unfair business practices by countervailing the power or competition provided by middlemen (i.e. the intermediaries through whom price jolts are transmitted in an economy). Because the agricultural industry is characterised by perfect competition, naturally farmers themselves feel vulnerable in such an oligopolistic economic environment and can seek redress by setting up marketing agencies of their own. The classic form has been the co-operative. These play an important, sometimes even a dominant, role in several countries. For example, Denmark’s emergence as an exporter of bacon and dairy produce in the late nineteenth century was based on co-operative marketing agencies. Similarly, in the 1920s the co-operatives founded by Western Canadian farmers wrested control of grain exporting from private merchants. For a detailed assessment of several marketing policies in the world see Graham Hallett, \textit{The Economics of Agricultural Policy}, Second Edition, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), Chapter 12.} they were the most satisfactory type of organisation to provide these services and that the farmers benefited greatly from participating in the running of these societies. Nevertheless, the ordinary membership was often systematically sidelined from administering these institutions. Administrative responsibilities were thrust squarely on government-appointed co-operative officials. By 1980 there were 12 co-operative unions and 326 co-operative societies throughout the country serving the African farming community.\footnote{NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 272099, Location R19.3.12.1F: File: ADA/MAR/2 Marketing – General, “Proposals for Development of the African Co-operative Movement.” C. B. Roberts (Director, Marketing and Co-operative Services – Ministry of Home Affairs, Causeway, Salisbury, to the Controller Agricultural and Rural Development Authority for attention E. R. Tillett, Causeway, Salisbury, 23\textsuperscript{rd} January 1980, 1.} These in spite of suffering in varying degrees the effects of the war, were nonetheless, deemed by government to be sufficiently viable, given financial assistance, to form the foundation on which to build an efficient marketing and supply service. The financial assistance required can be categorised under three headings, namely (a) immediate or short-term reconstruction grants to be applied for through Provincial Commissioners (PCs or NCs); (b) medium and long-term loans for capital items or financial requirements for capital expansion; and (c) seasonal finance for the purchase of crops and the procurement of agricultural requisites.\footnote{NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 272099, Location R19.3.12.1F: File: ADA/MAR/2 Marketing – General, “Proposals for Development of the African Co-operative Movement.” C. B. Roberts (Director, Marketing and Co-operative Services – Ministry of Home Affairs, Causeway, Salisbury, to the Controller Agricultural and Rural Development Authority for attention E. R. Tillett, Causeway, Salisbury, 23\textsuperscript{rd} January 1980, 1.} The projected capital expansion consisted of 31 depots situated at various centres throughout the country.

In Mashonaland West, Sanyati together with Karoi and Chegutu was also selected for the location of the proposed co-operative depots (See Map 14). These depots were required as distribution centres for agricultural inputs and also served as marketing centres for the following purposes: (a) the processing of payments and debt recoveries in respect of
controlled crops and (b) the receipt and bulking up of uncontrolled crops. The depots were operated by the co-operative unions that were responsible for the capital and interest re-payments which were spread over a minimum of 25 years. In order to provide the agricultural marketing service required by the large numbers of people in the rural areas it was necessary for the co-operative societies to re-open their produce collection points closed during the war. Approximately 1 000 such points were planned but the majority consisted of nothing more than an open piece of ground where produce could be bulked into economic lorry loads. Others were more elaborate with “fencing, hard-standing and limited storage space.” The latter were at the end of the chain of supply for the distribution of inputs, and facilitated the provision of a more sophisticated marketing service than the basic collection points that purchased produce for spot cash.

It is important to note that the marketing and supply service envisaged was to be provided for all the people in the rural areas and former purchase areas. It was not only confined to members of co-operatives. Membership of co-operatives was, however, open to those who wanted to join, but the services provided by the co-operatives were available to all who wished to use them. It was accepted that the appropriate channel for loan funds to the co-operatives should be the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and that the loans should be secured by mortgage bonds over the fixed assets of the co-operatives concerned. In some cases it was also desirable to obtain notarial bonds over all assets of the co-operatives. In all cases conditions were written into the agreements to give powers to the Registrar of Co-operatives and his staff to exercise a degree of control over the activities of the co-operatives. While the third category focused on seasonal finance for marketing and the procurement of agricultural inputs it was often a target for criticism. One of the major criticisms of co-operatives concerned delays in payments to farmers for the produce that they would have delivered. The main reason for this is the inevitable delay between accepting produce, “bulking it into economic loads,” delivering it to the government marketing boards (often the only legal buyers at a price determined by them) and then waiting for payment from the boards. These delays, however, could be


1055 The Ministry of Home Affairs had accepted that for the co-operatives to perform the task of supplying inputs to farmers efficiently, and as cheaply as possible, it was essential that they had adequate buildings and access to sufficient funds after the war.


1057 Ibid.

1058 Ibid.

1059 The Agricultural Finance Corporation actually wanted the co-operatives to take over full responsibility for the supply of inputs to all communal farmers who qualified for AFC loans.

1060 Anne O. Krueger, Maurice Schiff and Alberto Valdés, “Measuring the Effects of Intervention in
overcome if the co-operatives had overdraft facilities made available to them. Lamentably, the amounts that the banks were prepared to give without guarantees or security were inadequate to meet the total need. Similar delays were encountered with supplies of inputs and as a result the co-operatives were unable to take full advantage of early delivery rebates and discounts because they did not have access to adequate funds. It was imperative, therefore, that government guarantees for overdrafts be made available to those co-operative unions that agreed to operate in accordance with advice given by government staff. In fact, a heavy responsibility was placed on the staff of the Marketing and Co-operative Services Section to ensure that the co-operatives measured up to their responsibilities to the people and the Government. In order that this responsibility was properly discharged, steps were taken to ensure that the section was provided with an establishment commensurate with its responsibilities.

On the one hand, following government advice would enable them to engage in the purchase of uncontrolled crops for spot cash, make prompt payment for deliveries of controlled crops and carry adequate stocks of agricultural inputs to satisfy the demand. On the other, it however, made it difficult for ordinary members to wrestle co-operative control from the government or local notables who had also developed strong ties with the government. In the Gowe Irrigation Scheme it was already the case that a minority of predominantly cotton growing households controlled the major part of the cotton market and available labour resources. Successful adaptation to cotton farming on a commercial basis had enabled some irrigators to expand their holdings by illegally laying claim to plots vacated by those going back to their dryland plots or those who had just acquired land in the NPA. Others were compelled by their economic position wrought by their limited resources, late adaptation or outright refusal to grow cotton to continue to farm the original small plots. Wealthier plotholders had reinforced their dominance by lending resources to the less well endowed and sometimes by influencing trade between the scheme at Gowe and the outside world especially the trade in vegetables with the Sanyati Growth Point. In short, a relatively privileged irrigation rural class had emerged under colonial rule and had secured control of many crucial economic and irrigation resources after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980.

Existing forms of social and economic differentiation since the colonial period have revealed that after independence egalitarian institutions were more or less impractical despite government’s avowed position on community development and scientific

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1062 Some Sanyati peasants had earlier proved recalcitrant to grow cotton because it could not be eaten.
socialism. Official references to Co-op Societies or farmer organisations in Zimbabwe did not disregard the alarming precedent of the period 1950s to 1960s when there had been a brief efflorescence of both government and privately constituted marketing co-operatives. These in effect became alliances of rural notables, that is, chiefs, irrigation committee members, traders and state representatives for the pursuit of private gain. Clients of these dignitaries were expected to join and sell their harvest to the “co-operative” so that dependence on the patron was increased. Although local notables like the Gwachas did not readily accept this, they regarded the institution as their private property. It was easy for them to access credit. Cotton loans were used, above all, to satisfy the personal needs of the more affluent classes in Sanyati irrigation who often purchased grinding mills, retail shops and trucks that were used to ferry cotton bales to the market. This confirms the existence of differentiation in Sanyati and helps dispel a popular misconception that these peasant cultivators are “primitively homogeneous” and that African rural society is classless. 1063

The Zimbabwean government’s response to the perceived growth of rural differentiation at independence was contained in the community development programme of “Rural Animation” 1064 similar to the one adopted in post-colonial Senegal, originally conceived with a view to bringing about a new peasant consciousness which would undermine the dominance of the nascent rural bourgeoisie. This was an initiative in the direction of a rural “African Socialism.”1065 The new government, as much as its successor, thus, tried to stifle the unquestionably rising wave of rural differentiation. However, socialist orientation could not supplant capitalist commercial enterprise already entrenched in many sectors of the Zimbabwean economy including agriculture. The supposedly animation movement subsequently became moribund as benefits persistently flowed above all to the already privileged irrigators with a capitalist orientation hence the intensification of socio-economic differentiation in the rural areas continued unabated.

More and new producer co-operatives were established by the government throughout rural Zimbabwe in the mid-1980s. Their functions were to be effectively restricted to provision of credit, supply of agricultural implements and other input materials and marketing of members’ produce. The proclaimed purpose of this “programme of co-operation” was to end the exploitative tendencies of the colonial marketing system, which had maintained peasants in semi-permanent indebtedness. 1066 However, the new system

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1065 *Ibid*.

of government scarcely prevented “immigrant” entrepreneurs from seizing and perpetuating their control over wealth in Sanyati. The less well-endowed members of the community often resigned themselves to the idea that the co-operative was “not their affair.” 1067

At the same time, as already seen in chapter four, co-operative officials used their positions to turn the institution for their own economic purposes. They were able to profit from their status as privileged intermediaries. A wide variety of illicit and fraudulent arrangements flourished. For example, cotton growers were defrauded by being unjustifiably accused of delivering wet fibre, stuffing bales with stones to augment their weight or being subjected to false weighing scales. Some of these arrangements, such as the elementary device of the false weighing scales, have a long history in the Sanyati cotton trade. Even the central estate was sometimes accused of delivering wet cotton to the CMB (now COTTCO). In one incident recorded in the 1987/88 season, CMB Sanyati had bitterly complained through ARDA Head Office that Sanyati Estate “had been continually dispatching wet cotton to their Depot.” 1068 Responding to these allegations the Estate Manager denied any wrongdoing when he said:

This had provoked the consciences of the managers because they had never done so with the exception of cotton with trashes. Had this happened, the Authority [ARDA] could have responded [by] writing unpalatable memos to the managers concerned. 1069

His defence revealed that he was not amused by this development whose authenticity seemed very difficult to prove. Various government services that were channeled to the peasants through co-operative officials were also subject to abuse or fraudulent practices. For instance, agricultural credit, relief food supplies, medical supplies, refunds on the sale of crops, all became objects either of commercial speculation or of differential distribution to those with kinship or other ties to officials. It can be noted that legislation establishing co-operatives and other state marketing institutions had a number of loopholes that were exploited by corrupt officials to their advantage. Economic inequalities in rural Sanyati were thus strongly reinforced by the co-operatives as much as they were exacerbated by cotton commoditisation and commercialisation. The experience of co-operative movements elsewhere reveals that there was nothing particularly unusual with Sanyati as H. A. Landsberger in another context has identified this model as that of the “co-operative path to capitalism.” 1070

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1069 Ibid.
As a general rule, co-operative societies across the world are born of the producers’ desires, but in Zimbabwe they have been the work of the government. At the end of colonial rule, just like in the succeeding decades a number of co-operative officials had emerged as the rural privileged elements. Most of them had amassed a lot of wealth compared to the irrigation and dryland holders of land who were not co-operative officials. The licit and illicit benefits that accrued to these rural notables can indeed be seen as the price of their political co-operation or alliance with government. By a series of measures the government after independence had made it necessary if not compulsory for all rain-fed and irrigation farmers to join a co-operative in order to sell their crops. “Membership” in the irrigation committees not least in the co-operative did not of course imply any effective control of the institution from below. Co-operative committee meetings were rather silent gatherings, held only in the presence of government officials who could ensure that popular decisions were in conformity with administrative regulations. Thus, agricultural marketing co-operatives can be seen as the subordinate local agencies of the national bureaucratic apparatus. The extent of central control has of course been justified as necessary to help the “illiterate” peasants to help themselves. Yet in view of the widely decried and continuing failure to provide members with basic services this expectation becomes increasingly illusory. Hence co-operatives have indeed come to appear more parasitic on existing production than generative of economic progress.

Both dryland and irrigation farmers grew increasingly aware of the disadvantage imposed by their marketing intermediaries. The malpractices of these co-operatives were naturally resented. Some peasants evaded the government’s economic control exercised through co-operatives by side-marketing their produce. Since the 1980s, others as a means of an effective passive resistance to low prices and exploitation by the state have drastically reduced the amount of cotton they grow. In this category are farmers who were concentrating on maize which is much cheaper to produce and less labour intensive than cotton. Many others were producing more beans than cotton. These were unfortunately constrained by unanticipated bean seed shortages.

A peculiar matter concerning bean seed shortage was brought up in a meeting held on 20 December 1988 between ARDA management and the Gowe tenants. Ephraim Chiwombe alluded with dismay to what he termed as an unfair management practice done when bean seed for that season was issued out. The speaker said he was given insufficient seed while a counterpart with the same hectrage as his was given 9 bags instead of 7. In defence, the Settlement Officer said Chiwombe’s mode of comparison was based on ignorance because the farmer who was given more seed had a bigger area on the 4 ha-standard allocation for Gowe II and giving him more seed was a justified requirement. The meeting heard that it was through this misunderstanding that the complainant, Chiwombe, assaulted the Settlement Officer (Kamudzandu).


1072 The Estate Manager,
Gwerengwe, who chaired the meeting advised that there should be no animosity between settlers and their superior. He stressed the importance of working together harmoniously and urged farmers to bring their grievances to his office, through the Settlement Officer in the event of failure to reach a compromise with the latter. This incident illustrates the disproportionate manner in which ARDA distributed inputs such as seed, which was not different from the selective way in which the AFC allocated loans. The farmers, though, expected more sympathy from ARDA than from a distant partner like the AFC.

During the same meeting farmers queried the groundnut seed shortage to one of the farmers. They alleged that the smooth running of the Sanyati Rural Development Planning Unit (RDPU) was being hindered by lack of constant management at the Estate resulting in inconsistent rules and regulations. Furthermore, they called for a document which states their rights as settler farmers. The Chairman replied that their rights were as laid down in the lease agreement forms. He asked the house to avoid “making historical references and instead look at matters as they currently appeared.”

Gwerengwe as Chairman called for a comment from the Settlement Officer regarding groundnut seed. Kamudzandu said groundnut seed could have been easily obtained but it was realised that the planting period had elapsed. He said there was an understanding between management and the affected farmer, that he be allocated 3 ha of an already established groundnut crop in the Estate vacant plot. In return, the farmer’s 5 ha were to be used for soya bean trial. The farmer, who happened to be in the meeting, did not object to this arrangement.

With permission from the Chairman of the meeting, Charles Mhara, the Gowe Settlers Chairman, interjected to caution his team to “stop discussing specific problems but keep to given topics.” In making this point of interjection, he appeared to be on the side of the Estate but he was actually warning against digressing from the main agenda. Farmers also asked why they had to pay land rent even if a crop was not established because of ARDA’s fault. The Estate Manager responded by saying if a cropping programme was presented on time, he did not see why farmers should fail to get inputs from the Estate. This came in the wake of the Gowe farmers’ claim that their cropping programme had

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ARDA Management and Gowe Settlers.” 1.

1073 This Unit is also known as the Rural Development Project Unit, Rural Development Promotion Unit or the Rural Development Production Unit.


1075 Settler farming refers to operations by small-scale commercial farmers who are attached to the ARDA and sugar estates. The farmers generally do not have title deeds to their plots.


1077 Ibid . 2.

1078 Ibid.

1079 Land rent was part of ARDA’s sundry income (administration income) derived from levying the outgrowers a tenant’s fee. See NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Gowe RDPU Operating Accounts for 3 Months to 31 January 1990 – Sanyati Estate,” N. Kamudzandu (Settlement Officer).
been dramatically altered without explanation and that the new programme left them operating “below the poverty datum line.” 1080 They further claimed that they used to grow two crops in summer, namely maize and cotton and beans or wheat in winter, but this was no longer the case. Due to diseases on some plots, the summer cotton crop was also replaced by groundnuts on the affected plots and for the 1987 and 1988 winter seasons farmers were allowed to grow sugar beans which proved to be very lucrative. 1081 However, it is important to note that pest and disease outbreaks played a significant part in determining crop combinations. From the 1987/88 to the 1988/89 seasons the disease fusarium wilt had put a halt to the growing of cotton on some plots. Nematodes were also threatening the cotton, sugar bean and soyabean crops. 1082 The bone of contention in this issue, though, was the fact that Scheme Management had opposed the growing of maize on the irrigated land as this was economically non-viable and was not going to receive sponsorship from traditional financiers notably the AFC and ZIMBANK. Nonetheless, as far as management was concerned, the payment of land rent was obligatory and did not need to be mixed with the issue of input distribution.

Despite the position adopted by financiers like the AFC, Gowe tenants were not happy that they were prohibited from growing food crops especially maize. In one incident in the 1987/88 season, they alleged that the Estate had sent a tractor to destroy crops established within their allocated stand perimeters. They said while they were not permitted to grow maize in the Irrigation Scheme, they had to survive by ploughing in the limited area of their stands, which crop the Estate destroyed. Management argued that whatever crop was destroyed, it was because the farmer had violated a regulation and ploughed beyond the demarcation line. 1083 There was a controversy as to the perimeter of stands. Chiwombe produced a map which was briefly studied. The map was not of much use because it was a confusing “bull board.” However, in the long discussion that followed, the Estate Manager agreed that there was an anomaly in how plotholder stands had been demarcated. He promised that he was going to liaise with the Planning Department so that stands would be properly marked. In a conciliatory tone he further pointed out that if it was established that the destroyed crop was within the allocated area, the loss suffered by the farmer would be compensated for, but if the reverse became the case then no farmer should dispute the decision made. He drew the attention of farmers to

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1081 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Memorandum - Sanyati-Gowe Settlement Scheme: Settlers’ Grievance Paper Submitted Through DA’s Office (Kadoma),” Settler Programmes Co-ordinator to Planning and Development Controller, 21st March 1989, 1-2. N.B. In attendance at the presentation of this “Grievance Paper” was a DA’s office official, M. Dzinoreva, who stood in for the DA who was on sick leave.
the Estate’s responsibility on conservation works, saying ploughing on unrecommended places caused serious drainage which the Estate was obliged to control.

In another development, it was heard that the farmers’ bean crop had been harvested and was still lying idle in the Estate shed awaiting sale. The Estate Manager said ARDA was not prepared to buy the bean crop at the given price of $2 per kg. The farmers argued that there was a need for the crop to be bought so that they would return loaned sums to the financiers who were charging them interest. They also indicated that they were in dire need of school fees and other personal requirements. The Manager instructed the Settlement Officer and the Senior Bookkeeper to contact possible prospective buyers as a matter of urgency. In the meanwhile, the farmers requested management to consider seriously their position in the Gowe Irrigation Scheme, regarding food. They said they were starving because the money that was left after paying their financiers was not enough for their families. They admitted that it was because of hunger that some farmers resorted to ploughing indiscriminately.

Farmers persistently requested to be allowed more hectrage since many plots were vacant. The central estate Manager pointed out that it was government policy to keep the hectrage on the minimum per farmer so that more people could be accommodated in the scheme. He said the motive behind this was to educate as many people as possible on farming methods for the good of the nation. At this point farmers informed the meeting of their unhappiness at being denied more land and exercising their experience and knowledge gained over the years by mere drivers and pump attendants. In reply, the Manager deliberately avoided the question of land when he once more emphasised on the need for good relations between the two groups. He said, since farmers were expected to know the basics, they should not be refused to comment on, or advise the drivers where necessary.

Regarding electricity, Chiwombe said farmers were also interested in the monthly electricity bill. He represented popular sentiment when he said they wanted to see how the charges were shared between ARDA vacant plots and themselves. His request was unanimously accepted. Continuing with their diverse complaints, farmers called for clarification on wire maintenance. They said, they were expected to maintain the fence,

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1085 Ibid.
1087 Ibid.
1089 Ibid.
when in fact, in their opinion, this fence should be maintained by the Estate out of the land rent paid.\textsuperscript{1091} Moreso, they said ARDA had its vacant plot within the fenced area. The Senior Bookkeeper remarked that the statement was not wholly true, saying that at one time the Estate sent their maintenance man to work on the wire.\textsuperscript{1092} The meeting also heard that the Estate had in possession, a battery charge belonging to farmers.\textsuperscript{1093} They claimed that since the charge was theirs, they should be allowed to have their batteries charged free. They argued that the recently introduced fee of $3.00 needed an explanation. Noone in the meeting, however, could confirm that the current battery charge in the workshop belonged to farmers although it was mentioned that the particular charge was purchased in 1972 and was brought to the estate around that period. It was, then, resolved that a follow up on the charge will be made.\textsuperscript{1094} B. M. C. Sibanda, the Rural Development Co-ordinator, told the meeting that the Security Guards who escorted the Settlement Officer, on the day the crops were destroyed instilled fear in the Gowe neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{1095} He said since the officer had not committed a crime, why was this matter not solved on a much lighter note. In an emotional speech, Sibanda said the guards were aggressive and abusive whilst noting that despite their presence the Settlement Officer was attacked. He concluded by saying, if the exercise of destroying crops was justified, there was no need for the estate to send their policemen. The Manager (Gwerengwe), in his closing speech, said all problems had been taken note of and where possible things will be corrected. He said since this was his first meeting with the farmers, it was his hope that relations would quickly improve.\textsuperscript{1096} Indeed, relations needed remedying as the central estate thrived on the labour of the same outgrower farmers with whom antagonism seemed to be growing.

**Estate labour: Harmony or acrimony:**

Most of Sanyati’s residents, both rich and poor, have in common a distinctively cosmopolitan outlook which distinguishes them readily from the people of Gokwe across the Munyati river. These perceived differences emanate not only from the local dominance of “immigrants,” the core of whom were transferred from the Rhodesdale Estates between 1950 and 1953, but also from historical peculiarities arising from land shortages. Because of land scarcity the majority of Sanyati dryland and irrigation plotholders did not engage in the form of domestic farm management that Angela Cheater calls the “traditional idiom of accumulation,” which was a labour-intensive strategy characterised by the recruitment of several wives, other affines and distant

\textsuperscript{1091} NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, Fence Maintenance - “Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Estate Manager’s Office on 20 December 1988 by ARDA Management and Gowe Settlers,” 3.

\textsuperscript{1092} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1093} NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, Battery Charge - “Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Estate Manager’s Office on 20 December 1988 by ARDA Management and Gowe Settlers,” 3.

\textsuperscript{1094} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1095} NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, Police Probe - “Minutes of a Meeting Held in the Estate Manager’s Office on 20 December 1988 by ARDA Management and Gowe Settlers,” 4.

\textsuperscript{1096} Ibid.
agnates onto the farm to work as quasi-labour tenants. For example, because of limited carrying capacity there are fewer polygamous marriages and more absent spouses compared to Gokwe. What this meant was that households that became wealthy had at least one member working at Sanyati Growth Point or in Kadoma. Thus, Sanyati was caught in a labour trap, and one of the best investments a peasant farmer could make was to educate his family so that they could obtain urban employment. However, to pay for this education he too had to seek work as a wage earner. In this instance, the farm family was left with only wives, young children and old people. Such peasant or irrigation families usually lacked the labour resources necessary for successful agricultural production. Their long engagement with the wage economy, their proximity to the main route through which all produce was evacuated to the market and their intensive exposure to the labour discipline imposed by Estate and smallholder irrigation gives Sanyati more developmental sophistication compared to Gokwe.

In fact, so keen were Sanyati peasants to improve their access to markets after independence that they volunteered in 1981 to contribute one dollar for every cotton bale they delivered that year to pay for the construction of a wide tarred road through the communal area to the Sanyati CMB depot. Such civic activities were aimed at economic improvement. This degree of civic participation or at least co-ordination was also manifest in the relationship between the community of communal area farmers and the ARDA Estate. Before the mid 1980s it appears there was abundant labour supply to pick cotton from both the outgrowers and their communal area neighbours. The coming of independence coupled with the economic buoyancy caused by the cotton boom made peasants engaged in the cotton growing business reluctant to provide picking labour as they concentrated on their own fields. With the demand for workers by communal area farmers, labour deficiencies became acutely commonplace in the two ARDA irrigation schemes. The acute shortage of casual labour on the Estate in particular was partly attributable to the harnessing of cotton by many local peasants and partly to the crippling boycott by the communal area farmers who would ordinarily be earning extra money by picking there.

Appealing for help in one of the meetings held at ARDA Sanyati and attended by ARDA management, honourable local chiefs, school headmasters, Parents Teachers Association (PTA) Chairmen, the local council Chairman and Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) representatives, the then Estate Manager, Gwerengwe, said “the estate relied on locals, both adults and children, to provide manual labour and that without their valuable contribution, the nation as a whole would face up to a crisis in production.” He added: “it was of paramount importance that the local community … establish good relations with the Authority.” Taranhike, the Workshop Manager at the time,

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1098 The road between Golden Valley (Patchway) and the southern border of Sanyati remains for the most part a dangerous single-lane tar strip.
1100 Ibid.
informed the meeting about the incentives the Estate management was offering for the 1989 cotton-picking period. These were as follows:

(a) The price per kg would be 6 cents for school children and 7 cents for adults;
(b) That school children would be provided with “mahewu” (a traditional sweet brew) and teachers would be offered lunch;
(c) That transport would be provided as usual; and
(d) Prizes of $300,00 were offered for picking 80 000 kgs and above, $200,00 for picking 50 000 kgs and above and $100,00 for picking any amount exceeding 25 000 kgs plus a certain percentage for extras on targeted kilograms. 1101

In spite of these seemingly lavish incentives, there was still an air of incertitude among those who attended the meeting. This uncertainty emanated from ARDA’s reluctance to offer packages that were lucrative enough to lure the hordes of available local labour. From the many divergent views expressed at this meeting, it was clear that most parents were not happy with the parastatal’s labour arrangements which were not community friendly. This signaled the beginning of a labour boycott. A catalogue of grievances was presented to the Estate management for their consideration if there was to be an amelioration of the pickers’ crisis facing them. These grievances were articulately presented as follows:

(a) Parents, in particular PTA chairmen, requested for an increase in the price per kilogram picked;
(b) Parents wanted guarantees on safety in the transportation particularly of children. They quoted an incident in the 1985-picking season in which a school child fell from a tractor and died. In this connection Chambe, the Neuso Primary School Headmaster, suggested that a meeting be arranged between ARDA management and Neuso parents where ARDA should apologise for this unfortunate disaster, which has ever since created strained relations between the School and the Estate. He said parents were still bitter about the incident and were quite unwilling to permit their children to come for cotton picking;
(c) Parents expressed with serious concern their disapproval of the offer of “just” mahewu to the children who were expected to pick cotton after a hard day’s work at school. They requested management to review the matter;
(d) Parents called for a solution to what they termed “daylight robbery.” They alleged that weighing scales were being “adjusted” to read false figures.
(e) Headmasters advised ARDA to give trophies and souvenirs to schools as incentives;
(f) Headmasters advised ARDA to identify themselves as much as possible with schools by way of offering prizes at school competitions and in other variable activities;

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(g) Parents called upon management to offer employment to successful school leavers. 1102

In short ARDA were being urged to stop exploiting pickers especially school children and to implement safety regulations. They had (in the post-independence opinion of the community) a social responsibility to plough back into society the proceeds of their enterprise. The general consensus was that if all these matters presented during the meeting were resolved amicably, there was bound to be firmer relations between the Estate and the local community. It was also hoped that the outcome of the meeting would bear fruitful results in the future. 1103

In reply to some of the points put forward the Estate Manager said: “The price per kg would then be 7 cents to all [pickers]” but emphasised on clean cotton from school children. He made it clear that the Estate was not going to prepare food for school children probably because it was financially draining because of their numbers. The Manager further pointed out that improvements on transport would be made by way of fitting angle irons on lorry and tractor edges. He must have riled a large section of the meeting when he mentioned that the possibility of accidents could not be overruled but that all necessary precautions to avoid them would be taken. On the other points raised (i.e. d to g) the Estate Manager’s response was not immediately reassuring as he said he could not give replies offhand as he would have to consult his team before coming out with solutions. 1104 However, his reply agitated most parents as ARDA continued to appear disinclined to promise comprehensive concessions to the pickers.

The boycott revealed the extent of resentment the pickers felt towards the Estate management which was subject to constant changes. Apparently, ARDA did not have an unblemished labour record. The Estate Accounts Clerk, Alexander Machicha, revealed during an interview that in 1985/1986 and in 1987/1988 the labour crisis was so serious that the army was called to assist. 1105 The soldiers were deployed to pick cotton on separate blocks of the Estate as a way of exercising “maximum” discipline on civilians and the army. 1106 However, even this drastic use of military labour had proved as costly as it was ineffectual. The army had been dispatched to rescue ARDA’s cotton crop, but of

1104 Gwerengwe (Estate Manager), Sanyati Main Estate, File: 6.1 Management Meetings, “Minutes of the Meeting Held in the Sanyati Guest House on Saturday 25 February 1989 to Review the Cotton Picker Turn Out,” 2.
1105 A. Machicha, (ARDA Sanyati Estate Accounts Clerk), Personal Interview, ARDA Sanyati, 17th May 2005.
the four hundred-strong contingent released for this purpose only 200 soldiers lasted
more than one and a half to two weeks. The rest chose to go home soon after withdrawing
their labour. Apparently, armed labour is expensive. According to the Regional Agritex
Extension Officer (RAEO) based at Sanyati, “they must be fed breakfast, lunch and
supper everyday, and they must be fed what they want, or you will be in trouble.” The
RAEO also confirmed the story of the Sanyati community boycott of ARDA; “they got
off the ARDA truck and ran straight for the Gowe Irrigation Scheme.” 1107 The local
chairman of the National Farmer’s Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ), which represented
the communal area farmers, told the RAEO that it was a question of poor public relations
on ARDA’s part. Claims of inept public relations were authenticated by the local CMB
manager when he narrated the ordeal of the pickers:

… the children of ARDA workers had been locked up for two days for
eating groundnuts that dropped off the back of a company lorry … also
ARDA was paying less than the prevailing piece wage rate in the
surrounding communal area. They finally raised the rate, but only after …
requiring that the workers grade the cotton into 3 separate bags as they
picked, reducing the picking rate to under 10 kg per day. 1108

ARDA’s labour procurement problems can be underscored by the many recruitment
forays they launched as far afield as Binga, Mhondoro, Rio Tinto, Chegutu and Gokwe.
In one incident, the RAEO also confirmed that a trailer had been sent all the way to Binga
to recruit pickers, but the trailer had broken down and the truck came back with only 20-
30 workers – a far cry from the figure of 300 that had been anticipated. A further 200
pickers had been expected to come from Mhondoro communal lands but not as many
turned up. 1109

This was not the first time that ARDA had experienced such problems. Each year, the
new managers, who seemed to come and go with alarming frequency, mounted similar
efforts to police the casual labour force in this way – a wretched labour record indeed.
They did so in apparent ignorance if not denial of the existence of a wider market with
which the Estate was in fact competing for agricultural labour.

Since loans became widely available to Sanyati and Gokwe peasants and the creation of
jobs clearing land especially in land-abundant Gokwe, weeding and picking for
“immigrant” entrepreneurs, the flow of workers that used to come to ARDA annually
from local sources, including Gokwe and the Zambezi Valley, virtually dried up. Hence
the Estate is now perennially shackled by the absence of a ready supply of labour. As
already indicated in the previous chapter the attempt to discipline labour was not
confined to the Estate lands alone but extended to ARDA’s fifty tenants in the attached

1107 The Regional Agritex Extension Officer (RAEO) cited in Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping
1108 Sanyati CMB Manager cited in Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity,” 211.
1109 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 6.1 Management Meetings – “ARDA Sanyati Estate No. 71:
Minutes of an Extraordinary Meeting Held in the Estate Manager’s Office on 11 April 1988 at 2.00 PM,” 1.
See also the RAEO cited in Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity,” 211.
Gowe Irrigation Scheme as well where the ARDA Estate behaved like a feudal Estate with the people in there as serfs. These outgrowers, who leased 1110 three to four-hectare plots from ARDA, were denied any control over their cropping practices at all, with irrigation and tractor services being supplied by the Estate according to a recommended or predetermined schedule (i.e. the synchronisation of activities) so as to realise economic yields. 1111 The cost of these services was then attached as a stop order on their cotton deliveries to the CMB, along with the cost of loans taken for fertiliser and pesticides. In fact, one aspect of all the delivery systems associated with settler production which seems problematic is the stop order method of loan recovery whereby debts owed to ARDA, AFC, ZIMBANK and the Co-ops are recovered from any sales made by farmers to the CMB or GMB before any surplus is paid out to them. 1112

Since 1986 the farmers have been charged rent for the land as well, which was a source of deep resentment among the tenants. Stop order arrangements continued to be detested because they impoverished the outgrowers. One Gowe tenant interviewed by Worby, Masauke M, explained the details of the tenancy contract in a tirade of complaints:

Things started to go bad in 1985/86 … when the extension workers on the scheme told them to wait too long before harvesting their irrigated winter wheat. The crop was damaged by early rains and lost most of its value. His first delivery of cotton in 1986/87 was worth $3 097.60 but all of it was deducted to pay off the stoporder to the AFC. Then he sent 5 more bales to the CMB, but received no check at all: they had simply deducted the proceeds from his outstanding debt. Then he sent two more bales; again, he received nothing. Finally, he sent 33 bags of maize to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), but the AFC again took all the proceeds, so he began to sell his remaining maize for 50 cents per teacup to other farmers. 1113 He still has Z$655,26 in debt remaining from that year … and

1110 In the settler irrigation scheme land leases were granted by the then Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement to original recipients of plots (i.e. the first generation of plotholders who were hand-picked from a small cadre of Master Farmers deemed capable of managing a farm/plot as a business enterprise – an expectation, according to Angela Cheater, Idioms of Accumulation, 9, that only emerged in government policy after 1948 as positive measures of farming viability were not really established until the mid-1960s ). It was not easy for sons in the second generation to inherit the lease from their fathers.


1113 Technically, this practice constitutes what is termed the side marketing of produce, which is affectionately known as the “black” market or in contemporary terms the parallel market. However, whilst this practice has proliferated since the 1980s as a way by farmers to beat off inflation or to run away from
suspects that ARDA is keeping some of the inputs that have been charged to his stoporder. 1114

A receipt for his latest cotton delivery revealed that the total value of his cotton delivery of 10 bales, less rental on the cotton packs (Z$55.00), was Z$1 585.63. His basic AFC stop order deduction was $1 553.63 plus an additional $30.00 for transport and a $2.00 stop order or processing fee. When all these inbuilt costs had been taken into account the “balance” to be paid out to him was “Nil.” 1115

Such a system restricted plotholder performance, notwithstanding the unwillingness by the Estate to allow farmers to cultivate the so-called undemarcated lands. Some Gowe tenants like Judith Chikowore challenged these restrictions. When ARDA management ordered her to destroy the cotton plants growing in a portion of the field that her family had, in defiance of regulations, ploughed with their own oxen, 1116 she said, “you can come and destroy the plants yourself.” 1117 They challenge the Estate in other, less overt ways as well. For example, they did that by hiring casual labour at better rates of pay or with better conditions of work. 1118 However, resource-poor plotholders who had no access to AFC loans were not in a position to hire labour. These were often compelled to resort to piecemeal working arrangements on the Estate characteristic of tenants with poor access to lines of credit. The working relationship between the Estate and the outgrowers was more of an acrimonious than a harmonious affair and captures the ideals of lowered moral value on the part of the Gowe tenants.


The way forward: Changing basis after Independence:

The attainment of Independence by Zimbabwe in April 1980 seemed to herald a new phase in the development of smallholder and Estate farming. For many, time had come to implement the necessary structural and managerial changes which were obviously long over-due. The pre-independence era emphasised agricultural development based on a core estate. On the one hand, it had brought a lot of despair and untold economic hardship to the Gowe plotholders. They had been deprived of land, agricultural loans, markets, autonomy and flexibility of action on their plots. As shown in earlier chapters, in the colonial period increasingly inflationary agricultural prices the practice is illegal. The early 1960s to the mid-1980s was a period marked by significant volatility in the prices of major agricultural commodities on the international market hence peasants devised these survival mechanisms.

1115 Ibid., 212.
1116 The keeping of cattle in the Gowe Irrigation Scheme for long a taboo was in the 1980s being practiced by most plotholders in contravention of standing regulations because ARDA tillage services had gone beyond the reach of many.
1117 Judith Chikowore cited in Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity,” 212. See also Judith Chikowore, (Gowe Irrigation Committee Member and Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 2nd May 1996.
1118 Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity,” 212.
state power was used in a multitude of ways to guarantee labour supply. The ever present influence of European commercial farmers continued to skew the availability of agricultural resources and the marketing services to their own benefit and, very secondarily, towards a few of their African neighbours on the other divide of the main railway line. On the other hand, with independence there were enormous pressures to diversify the benefits and integrate the black farming community into the mainstream economy. The Government of newly independent Zimbabwe expressed its intentions of stimulating economic development in the African areas, which it argued were lagging behind. This, for the agricultural sector implied an acceleration of the commercialisation process. In pursuit of a new development ideology the post-independence period, therefore, became characterised by intensified intervention and control by the national government and parastatal institutions like ARDA over the agricultural sector. One of the main objectives of this intervention was to stimulate irrigation performance very broadly defined by the International Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI) as “… the results delivered by an irrigation system towards a set of objectives including productivity, equity, reliability, sustainability, profitability and quality of life.”

Thus, the coming of Independence, which ushered in a black government, was heartily welcomed as a move that would radically redress the existing socio-economic and political imbalances in the country. The new government was expected to give a further boost to the regeneration not only of Gowe but also all the small-scale farming interests which had hitherto been neglected. More resources had earlier been expended for the benefit of commercial or Estate agriculture. It is not a secret that the future of Zimbabwe largely depends on the success of the agricultural sector. The government, through ARDA, therefore, had to create the right framework for the maximum implementation of the rural development programme.

ARDA, which succeeded TILCOR after 1980, was set up as a planning and co-ordinating agency for rural development. Its major functions are to plan, co-ordinate, implement and promote:

(a) agricultural and rural development in Zimbabwe;
(b) schemes for the betterment of agricultural and rural development; and

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1119 State intervention is one of the main characteristics of post-independence agricultural policy in Zimbabwe.
(c) schemes for the development and utilisation of specific State lands.\textsuperscript{1123}

To a large measure, these functions were similar to TILCOR’s stated objectives. Since all communal land in Zimbabwe is classified as State land, the government was obliged to institute and promote development in such areas including Gowe. The success of the State in this endeavour will be measured later in the course of this chapter.

**Relationship between ARDA (Sanyati) and Gowe:**

This section will give insights on ARDA’s operations and its association with the Gowe settlers who reside adjacent to the Sanyati Main Estate. As a key instrument of State involvement in the development of agriculture and overall rural development in its wider sense,\textsuperscript{1124} ARDA’s efforts in enhancing the standard of living of the rural folk in Sanyati will be examined.

The Gowe settlers were expected to adopt similar cropping schedules as outgrowers to the core estate. This was a requirement for all the settlement schemes in the country. ARDA’s argument was that, it was essential for the settlers and the Estate to synchronise operations to lessen the burden of water, administrative and extension management.\textsuperscript{1125} The settlers, however, viewed this as being subordinated to the parastatal. A major problem was likely to hinge around the need to provide the settlers with various services in connection with their agricultural operations. Since the inception of the Main Scheme the assumption and practice was that services would be provided from a central Mechanical Equipment Unit (MEU).\textsuperscript{1126}

The MEU was supposed to have sufficient capacity to serve both the ARDA Estate at Sanyati and the Gowe Settler Scheme. Settlers were expected to hire machinery at the same rates as the Main Estate. Before the take-over from DEVAG of the Gowe Settler Scheme by ARDA in 1980, the settlers were paying for land preparation only at the rate of ±$30,00 per hectare, and free infield transport was provided by the DA for Kadoma.\textsuperscript{1127} It was hoped that the Estate Manager, who controlled the MEU, would exercise his discretion in this connection in such a way as not to prejudice the settlers. If the Estate Manager were to use his discretion in a manner that was prejudicial to settler interests, the future of the settlement scheme could be jeopardised.\textsuperscript{1128}

As of 1990 (and even beyond), the Scheme was divided into Gowe I and II, which at full capacity consists of 36 and 58 settlers respectively who are accommodated on 3 to 4 hectare plots per holder after the enlargement of the Scheme to 120 ha in 1974.\textsuperscript{1129} The restructured

\textsuperscript{1123} *Statistical Yearbook of Zimbabwe 1987*, (Harare: Central Statistical Office, 1987), 140.
\textsuperscript{1124} *Spearheading Zimbabwe’s Future, ADA Booklet*, (Harare: NCR City Printers, s.a.), 1.
\textsuperscript{1125} Jaure, Personal Interview.
\textsuperscript{1128} Paraiwa, “Policy Proposals for TILCOR-Administered Settlement Schemes,” 3.
\textsuperscript{1129} NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/General (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to the Regional Manager (TILCOR-Mashonaland), 15th December 1980. See also Mhlanga, “Outgrower Settlement Schemes and the Commercial Settlement Scheme,” 3. N.B. Gowe I denotes Stage I settlers, and
and increased plot sizes on the scheme has slightly improved the performance of the farmers. Productivity has also reasonably gone up since some of the farmers’ commitment has improved. However, other settlers are not very productive and co-operative. On the whole, these settler farmers contribute towards scheme operating costs and the cost of shared services which include electricity and water charges, maintenance of infrastructure and land rent. In June 1985 ARDA signed a contract with the Electricity Supply Commission, ESC, now the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, ZESA, to increase the supply capacity to serve the Gowe Irrigation Project. The Authority, after protracted deliberations, accepted the installation of a 200 KVA to 300 KVA transformer at a connection fee of $3 500,00.

Land charges are levied on all settlers and these are either based on the costs of developing the scheme or the estimated current value of the land. In the TILCOR days, land rent, in its current form, was not demanded from the plotters, but a similar payment, known then, as a land preparation fee was charged on the small pieces of land. It can be noted that in the 1980/81 cropping season, the settlers owned relatively small tracts of land, that is, 1.4 hectares per plot holder at Gowe I and 1.2 hectares at Gowe II. Notwithstanding the size of the plots and the land charges, the settlers were realising fairly reasonable profit margins judging by the demand for loans shown in these tables:

**TOTAL LOAN REQUIREMENTS: 1980/81 SEASON**

**Table 5.1: GOWE I CROPPING PROGRAMME: PLOT SIZE 1.4 Ha**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Private) Enterprise</th>
<th>Cotton</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area ha.</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per ha. Costs</td>
<td>$262.86</td>
<td>$285.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Costs per settler</td>
<td>$184.00</td>
<td>$200.13</td>
<td>$384.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of settlers = 36  
Total Loan requirements = 13 828,68


Table 5.2: GOWE II CROPPING PROGRAMME: PLOT SIZE 1.2 Ha.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Cotton</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area Ha.</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Ha. Costs</td>
<td>$262.86</td>
<td>$285.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Costs per settler</td>
<td>$157.72</td>
<td>$171.54</td>
<td>$329.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. of settlers = 58
Total Loan requirements = $19 097.08
Total Loan requirements Gowe I and II = $32 925.76

The economic performance of an average irrigator was measured at between $854.00 and $995.00 per farmer for Gowe II and I respectively. Better than average settlers did even better. Compared to the minimum wage of $30.00 per month or $360.00 per annum gazetted by the government for farm workers in 1980/81, the settlers were capable of earning well over twice the relative minimum wage. Although this was not the optimum income that a single settler might have wanted to get, it is only being used as an indication that the plotholders were making some economic headway.

The explanation for the sizeable profits the plotholders made in the season in question can be found in good yields during the agricultural boom and in the fact that total irrigation charges were quite manageable. For instance, each plotholder paid $40.00 in total irrigation expenses. Furthermore, the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) was willing to disburse the required loans to 89 of the 94 settlers after ARDA had produced crop budgets for each one of them. It can be pointed out here that such loans were granted to recipients upon application and were based on strict repayment conditionalities.

1137 Ibid.
Before independence, the financing of inputs was the responsibility of the Agricultural Loan Fund (ALF), an undertaking of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (now the Ministry of Home Affairs), which was administered by the Kadoma District Administrator for Gowe. \(^{1140}\)

The new arrangement was that the AFC would provide seasonal credit to the Gowe settlers, \(^{1141}\) starting with the 1980/81 summer cropping programme. On the other hand, the day-to-day administration of the loans was in the hands of ARDA, who advised settler borrowers on their indebtedness on a monthly basis. \(^{1142}\)

**Starved of loans: Limited facilities hamper smallholder irrigation:**

A very problematic area has been in the sphere of finance. Many small-scale farmers have been starved of loans to raise their agricultural performance. Real problems for the farmers started in 1982 when the AFC (now the Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe, AGRIBANK) decided to revise its arrangements for the extension of credit facilities for the Gowe plotholders. \(^{1143}\)

The idea was to bring the Gowe Scheme which was managed by the Rural Development Promotion Unit, RDPU, within the Agricultural Operations Division of ARDA, in association with the Sanyati Estate Management, into line with the system of credit in vogue at Chisumbanje (Chiredzi). \(^{1144}\)

Basically, the proposals were as follows:

(a) that individual loan facilities are negotiated by each farmer with the AFC on the basis of an agreed budget and then consolidated into a Single Loan Facility available to TILCOR/ARDA, Gowe, to be disbursed on a monthly basis;

(b) income from the sale of crops be retained by the Estate, from which the full AFC debt, with interest, is liquidated;

(c) interest charged by the AFC will be recovered from farmers by ARDA on a per hectare basis;

(d) farmers be paid out any amounts due to themselves by the Estate immediately the final crop proceeds have been received;

(e) monthly statements of costs incurred by individual farmers will be issued to them by the Estate;

(f) the liability for amounts remaining unpaid in the event of a crop failure will remain with the individual farmers. In order to protect AFC and ARDA


\(^{1141}\) ARDA Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31\(^{st}\) October 1986, 11.


\(^{1144}\) NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 271081, Location R19.3.11.9F, File: EST/4D Middle Sabi Estate - Water, I. Moyo (Planning and Development Controller) to the Senior Irrigation Engineer, 16\(^{th}\) September 1985. See also ARDA Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31\(^{st}\) October 1985, 11; and ARDA Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31\(^{st}\) October 1984, 9.
interests it will be necessary for farmers to sign Acknowledgements of Debt for the amount of their loans and for an endorsement to be registered against leases [if available]; and

(g) individual farmer’s accounts are to be kept by TILCOR/ARDA at Sanyati and to be available for inspection at any time.\textsuperscript{1145}

These were really stringent measures imposed on the farmers, who were in the meanwhile contriving to force the parastatal out of any involvement in the Gowe Settlement Scheme. Even the AFC Branch Manager, Western Division, R. R. C. Davis, understood that “there could be problems with certain of the Gowe settlers in that they may be reluctant to relinquish their individual Growers Cards [or Marketing Cards] but in the circumstances, it would be necessary for this to be a condition of any assistance granted.”\textsuperscript{1146} In short, the AFC were seeking collateral security for their loans.

Inevitably, the system of individual registration of Growers with the GMB and the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe (formerly CMB), when it came to marketing their produce, had to be abandoned. It had to be abandoned in favour of Estate control of all inputs as per agreed budgets and loans.\textsuperscript{1147} ARDA would be debited accordingly, and market the crops under the Sanyati Estate Registration and Growers Number.\textsuperscript{1148} In turn, the Estate would distribute the proceeds to the farmers after the necessary deduction for inputs and interest. This had the effect of perpetuating the exploiter-exploited relationship between Gowe and the Main Estate or the subordination of Gowe to the Main Estate.

Furthermore, it was difficult for farmers to market their wheat or be recipients of wheat loans, granted in 1981 at the rate of $335,00 and $280,00 for Gowe I and II respectively.\textsuperscript{1149} In this year, the AFC was unable to finalise the loans for a large number of farmers on both sections of Gowe, because they were not registered as wheat growers with the GMB. Among the unregistered farmers were J. Chikowore,\textsuperscript{1150} M. Sakala and J. Makusha of Gowe I as well as S. Sibanda, T. K. Munoti and L. Chigogo of Gowe II.

This lack of finance partly explains why Chikowore has been cited as an example of a “horrible” or “very unsuccessful” farmer by the former Estate Manager.\textsuperscript{1151} It is important to note that Estate management influences how farmers are perceived in the “modern” and “backward” dichotomy. The yardstick used to measure failure here, could quite easily be at fault. Admittedly, the truth was that since 1978 wheat was among the controlled group of crops together with maize, sorghum, groundnuts, soya beans, coffee, cotton and tobacco.\textsuperscript{1152}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1145} NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), R. C. Davis (Branch Manager, West - AFC) to the Secretary (TILCOR), 12\textsuperscript{th} February 1982, 1-2.
\bibitem{1146} Ibid., 2.
\bibitem{1147} NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to the Agricultural Finance Corporation Small Farmers Credit Scheme (AFC - SFCS), 17\textsuperscript{th} August 1981.
\bibitem{1148} Ibid.
\bibitem{1149} NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), S. J. Edmondstone (Managers Assistant, West) to TILCOR, 10\textsuperscript{th} August 1981, 2 and 3.
\bibitem{1150} Chikowore, Personal Interview.
\bibitem{1151} Gwerengwe, Personal Interview.
\bibitem{1152} NAZ, Agricultural Marketing Authority: Economic Review of the Agricultural Industry of Zimbabwe for the Year Ending 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1986, 21 and 50.
\end{thebibliography}
The marketing of these commodities in the urban areas as a whole, and in Sanyati town in particular, was deliberately declared a government monopoly, which has been in effect since the Maize Control Act of 1931. The Act, which was replaced in 1950 by the Grain Marketing Act (No.31), placed the marketing of grain under statutory control. Today the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA), set up in 1967, co-ordinates the operations of four boards (CMB, GMB, DMB and CSC) which handle the marketing of commodities which are subject to Statutory Control.

The marketing control of certain crops, in conjunction with the unavailability of loans or high interest charged on loans has adversely affected smallholder farmers’ agricultural activities. For example, in 1986 the AFC itself admitted that there were no major changes in the Corporation’s lending policies. The viability and repayment capacity of agricultural programmes remained the main criteria for processing loan applications. Loan advances were also made after careful evaluation of the risks attached to each application for financial assistance. Risks like drought and crop diseases sometimes are a hindrant to the Gowe plotholders’ quest for loans, as high levels of indebtedness by some farmers to the corporation make them ineligible for further loans until they pay up. In 1989, the AFC embarked on group lending in the small-scale farming sector as a deliberate strategy to arrest rising loan administration and processing costs. According to J. Gwacha, since that date, the plotholders had to group themselves and make an estimate of their agricultural

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1154 *Zimbabwe: Towards a New Order*, 55-56.
1155 *Statistical Yearbook (1987)*, 140.
1157 *Ibid*.
1159 Cotton plants from the settler scheme at ARDA Sanyati were often infected by Fusarium wilt. It can be assumed that Estate crops also succumbed to this fungal disease because it is more prevalent on sandy soils characteristic of this irrigation scheme than verticilium wilt (also a fungal disease) which is common on heavy soils. Fusarium wilt’s symptom expression is enhanced by hot weather conditions (i.e. mean daily temperatures above 23°C) found in this area. The commonest cotton problem pests were the red bollworm (requiring at least 2 sprays of the chemical, carbaryl) and the heliothis, jassids and aphids (requiring at most 4 sprays of a combination of thionex and dimethoate). The jassids and aphids could do with at least 2 sprays of dimethoate per season. For more detail on these crop diseases see NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Wilted Plants on Settler’s Farm - ARDA Sanyati,” R. Chinodya (Senior Research Officer – Pathology, Cotton Research Institute, Kadoma) to the Deputy General Manager, ARDA Harare (Attention – J. Made); copied to the Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati (Attention - Kamudzandu, Settlement Officer), 3rd March 1988 and NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “N. Kamudzandu: Cotton Production - Settlement Officer’s Quarterly Report for November 1989 to January 1990.”
1161 *Ibid*.
requirements. This estimate was presented to the AFC, who in turn, assessed the needs and repayment capacity of the farmers before approving the loan.

Once the loan had been approved, the plotholders obtained a cheque from the AFC, which they took to COTTCO especially for a quotation to buy such inputs as fertilisers and cottonseed. Prior to 1980, the Corporation, which was established in 1971 through an Act of Parliament, only served the large-scale white-dominated Commercial Farming Sector. This evidence has been corroborated by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) who argue that up to 1980 scarcely any communal area farmers were extended credit and that the bulk of the loans extended were to farmers in natural region II which is not where the bulk of the communal area population is located. (See Map 15 showing Zimbabwe’s Natural Regions). COTTCO, on the other hand only, provided input assistance to plotholders who have a three-year proven farming record. In a similar fashion to the AFC’s policy, COTTCO also prefers group lending. It advances non-financial loans to smallholder farmers who can organise themselves in groups of 30-50 each. J. Gwacha has made it clear that “COTTCO does not give cash loans to small-scale farmers but only to commercial farmers.” However, it would benefit the Gowe plotholders more if COTTCO were to consider giving them both material and financial loans under conditions that would not peculiarly exacerbate indebtedness and lead to the imminent collapse of the scheme.

Because of the unfavourable loan climate, calls were being made for the government to put in place low-interest loans to assist small-scale farmers who have been marginalised for years and cannot utilise their farms to full capacity due to financial limitations. Indeed, limited loan facilities continued to hamper smallholder irrigation in this period despite government effort to have this service extended to all members of the farming fraternity. Farmers were finding it difficult to secure loans not only from the AFC, but even the Zimbabwe Farmers’ Union (ZFU) has failed to come up with a solution to the financial problems besetting the small-scale farmers.

This failure could also mean failure to adopt practical steps to mitigate against food shortages due to persistent droughts. Although irrigation schemes such as Gowe have been designed to sustain many communal farmers, and that in public fora it has been stated

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1162 J. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 9th January 1997.
1163 Gwacha, Personal Interview.
1165 DANIDA, Zimbabwe: Assistance to the Resettlement Credit Scheme, 16-17
1167 Ibid.
1168 Ibid.
1171 “Let’s Have Plan to Transform Peasant Farming,” The Herald, Harare: (Thursday February 1 1996), 11.
that smallholder farming is high on the agenda, this feat might not be achievable unless there is determined effort on the part of government to make the AFC (AGRIBANK today) and other financial institutions such as the Zimbabwe Banking Corporation, ZIMBANK, agro-industrial concerns, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or the donor community in general bail out this group of farmers. All the farmers were granted loans for the 1990/91 season despite such plotholders as Tasara Govoro, E. Sibanda, E. Chirandata, David Mjoli and A. M. Motsi’s 1989/90 cotton crop being a complete write off due to high weed infestation which encouraged pests like aphids, heliothis bollworm and red spider mite. The latter actually got out of control because of these farmers’ reluctance to spray against the mites. Most farmers in Gowe II were also reluctant to apply the nematicide, carbofuran, to control nematodes in their bean crop but this did not affect their loan applications in the short term. In the long term it did. Chikowore and Chiwombe were subsequently not considered for loans because of poor performance. The outbreak of the fusarium disease also made it difficult for them to pay back the previous loan. In the face of the fusarium disease and lack of loans to purchase, among other things, a cotton curator, which is very expensive, the farmers’ yields continue to decline in as much as their repayment capacity continues to dwindle.

A more secure land tenure system could also be considered by the government. This could curtail the rigorous exercise of culling and eviction of existing plotholders. For instance, in consultation with the Estate Manager who seems to have taken over the functions of Settlement Officer since the departure, in 1981/82, of the then Settlement Officer or Extension Manager for Gowe I and II and Copper Queen, Terrence Ngwena, the current and past performance of the plotholders is assessed and those who do not meet requirements are sometimes served with eviction orders. Eviction, though difficult to effect in practice, is mainly on the basis of poor agricultural performance and failure to repay AFC loans. Watering outside the irrigation schedule also warranted eviction. A case in point involved N. Mavengere (Plot No. B2) who was repeatedly warned by the Settlement Officer for this “farming offence.” One such warning read:

You are warned that on 27 August 1989 you deliberately (sic) opened two irrigation lines which were outside the irrigation schedule thereby severely

1172 “Smallholder Farming High on Agenda,” The Herald, Harare: (Friday October 25 1996), 7.
1175 “Call for More Secure Land Tenure System,” The Sunday Mail, (Harare, December 3 1995), 7. N.B. Under the Lease Agreement there was clear-cut reluctance on the part of Government to grant ARDA settler farmers security of tenure.
1176 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to the Estate General Manager (Chisumbanje), 23rd October 1981. N.B. Since the departure of Terrence Ngwena and before the appointment of N. K. Kamudzandu there has been a steady whittling away of the power and independence of the field staff. The latter was the last Settlement Officer to be engaged by ARDA, which currently leaves the Estate Manager doubling up as Estate Administrator and settler adviser.
1177 Musodza, Personal Interview.
1178 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to the Gowe Settlement Officer; Sanyati Estate Manager and the Budget Controller, 26th August 1981, 1.
lowering pressure on blocks which were being irrigated. This affected the irrigation efficiency adversely. On some occasions I warned you verbally not to carry out any operations without being instructed to do so but to my surprise this behaviour is not stopping. If this type of behaviour doesn’t stop forthwith, I won’t hesitate to recommend your eviction from the scheme.

Sometimes farmers are evicted because of their failure to devote sufficient time to their plots, and effect correct management as they have divided interests in the dryland portion of the surrounding communal areas. Although ARDA has insisted that these farmers’ interests must be either centred on the scheme, or dryland holdings elsewhere and not both, it can be noted that some of them were genuinely moving in search of new “economic frontiers.” These farmers hoped to maximise their economic gain by the dual cultivation of dryland and irrigation plots. In view of this, then, the assertion that Gowe was or is a “self-provisioning asset” is a misconception which should be dispelled at once.

On the strength of this argument alone, it can be noted that ARDA-Sanyati, in this particular respect, is not achieving some of the objectives for which it was set up. Perhaps, it is axiomatic that Gowe is not doing so well, especially considering the fact that the Sanyati Estate, which is supposed to run and manage it, does not seem to be an effective and viable developmental agent. Broadly speaking, the Estate is continually operating at a loss.

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1180 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser (TILCOR Regional Manager-Mashonaland) to The Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 26th February, 1981, 2.

1181 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to the Gowe Settlement Officer; Sanyati Estate Manager and the Budget Controller, 26th August 1981, 1.

1182 Paraíwa, Personal Interview.

it is ironical that the Core Estate, which is itself a loss-making organ, should be employed as a medium through which the economic betterment of Gowe and the surrounding areas can be achieved. If ARDA is really serious about making Gowe plotholders successful small-scale commercial producers, it in the first instance, has to make Sanyati Estate commercially viable so that it becomes a case worth emulating by the Gowe settler outgrowers and other peasant communities in the country.

More importantly, withdrawing ARDA management and services and handing the scheme over to the settlers would be ideal on the grounds that the parastatal’s scheme costs can never be justified in economic terms. Its either ARDA are top-heavy or they are ill funded. The former description is more applicable than the latter as the organisation has been well financed and heavily subsidised by the state. Its overall performance does not seem to justify the hefty investment Government is making in it. ARDA itself has admitted to incurring not economic but huge social costs and expenditure to service the settlers at all its schemes. Among some of the major social costs it incurs include the cost of supplying water for irrigation; maintenance and repairs of irrigation equipment; and the regular measurement of water usage. Regrettably, at Sanyati, and indeed anywhere in Zimbabwe, conversion from estate to individual settlement as will be seen in chapter six has not yet been accomplished in practice. The idea, therefore, only continues to be cherished in principle. ARDA’s very lethargic approach in weaning its settler components has been its major bane. Outgrowers have not been sufficiently economically empowered to achieve this goal and it should be remembered that weaning them is a process not an event. It needs time. Success in this regard is, therefore, pretty remote and is not even in sight in comparison to the Tsovane and Dande Irrigation Schemes which the Ministry of Lands and Water Resources thinks are drawing much nearer to fulfilling this expectation than Gowe.

However, these two schemes (Dande and Tsovane) are beyond the scope of this study.

**Cotton, profitability and the dilemma of loans:**

As already noted in previous chapters cotton cultivation did not bestow equal benefits to all the growers. Attempting to answer the question whether growing cotton was a profitable venture for peasants in a place like Sanyati with limited land available and theoretically no land market at all through which people might be able to invest in production on a larger scale is not an easy task. The answer lies in the agro-business acumen vested in individual farmers. Some irrigators who exhibited rare qualities produced phenomenally high yields. Others under similar circumstances but without the necessary liquidity to purchase inputs at the start of the cotton season suffered production setbacks. Their profit margins were either very low if not negligible. Plotholders such as Charles Mhara and Ennie Nyandoro fell into

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1186 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 349225, Location R24.10.11.11F, File: SET/16 Settlers Budget, “Memorandum,” D. Saungweme (Small Livestock Development Planner) to Settlement Officers (Chisumbanje, Middle-Sabi, Antelope, Ngwezi, Mzarabani, Sanyati and Pungwe Valley), 22nd May 1984.
1187 Musodza, Personal Interview.
this category. On the contrary, Thompson Nyamutova and Office Dangaiso were probably near the apex of prosperity achieved by cotton growers in the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. Their sons working in town repatriated earnings that to a large extent subsidised their fathers’ agricultural investments. For households like these that drew on a constant, year-round source of income in order to finance the cash purchase of crop inputs and labour, the growing of cotton was an economic boon, but for their poorer counterparts who did not have a regular wage income the precariousness of their position was too obvious to warrant elaboration. They were in a big dilemma. Their net agricultural income was despicably low. Without much recurrent turnover from their plots and without any off-farm earnings such resource-poor farmers depended upon a small-farmer credit facility administered since 1980 through the parastatal AFC. It was so small that it did very little to alleviate their financial distress.

While the state, through the AFC, may have envisioned an increasingly rationalised and regimented relationship with its peasant clients, those clients themselves did not have so clear an understanding of the obligations into which they were being drawn. In the smallholder irrigation scheme farmers seemed uncertain as to what the exact role of the AFC in their particular circumstance was. Although its role was seen by the state as aiding cotton growers to become rich the growers viewed it as an organisation that impoverished and marginalised them. The farmers’ perception of this lending institution was informed by the stringent and totally inflexible repayment conditions attached to each loan. Plotholders subscribing to the loan programme were obligated to take deliveries of fertiliser and seed whose full value they had to pay back irrespective of whether there was a drought or not, which placed them in a perennial debt-trap. The loan was repaid through a stop order attached to the card number of the registered grower and this number was also sewn onto the grower’s bales for easy identification of a grower’s cotton for purposes of payment. The occurrence of drought meant poor or no yields and subsequently failure to honour their debt obligations. Whenever this happened it incapacitated them, as they would not qualify for another loan from the AFC. Failure to get an AFC loan also meant that their leases would have to be terminated. Once terminated the Land Settlement Board, upon ratification, would then cancel their leases, which made the farmers’ position immensely precarious.

As leases were cancelled land belonging to the affected lessees was immediately declared vacant. There were several reasons that led to lease cancellations. After the 1986/87 summer cotton harvest, for example, plots C1 and C2 of 3 ha and 4 ha respectively fell vacant. The former belonged to Garu Musariraone of Gowe I and the latter to Kariba Siamusandano of Gowe II. The two settlers failed to obtain loans from AFC because of their poor performance, side marketing and failure to honour their loans with AFC. Musariraone owed the AFC $4 596.00 whereas Siamusandano owed $2 537.56 accumulated since 1983.

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1188 The loans themselves were of three types. Firstly, short-term loans were limited to $348.00 per farmer in 1987/88 and comprised seed, fertiliser and pesticides. A special additional amount could be allocated for a ULV or backpack sprayer. Secondly, medium-term loans of 3-5 years were given for cattle, a scotch cart or a tractor. Finally, long-term loans – usually 10-30 years and reserved for large-scale farmers – were for the purchase of lorries, irrigation equipment etc.

1189 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Vacant Plots at Sanyati – Gowe I and II Settlement Scheme,” D. P. Mtetwa – (for General Manager - ARDA) to the Secretary for Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement - Attention B. F. Vutabwarova and
Both of them were non-resident on the scheme and used to manage their plots by remote control. Siamusandano’s crop management was said to be “below model C standard.” He was not following advice and was viewed as “a self-styled farmer who [believed] in delegating without any follow ups.” Hence, he was farming “communally than commercially,” which jeopardised his chances of getting a fresh loan. They were both interviewed by AFC local management and ARDA’s Settlement Officer in an effort to see if they could be able to secure money elsewhere and pay their dues to Sanyati AFC Branch Office. Nevertheless, because they had side marketed their previous crop and used the money for their own personal needs, they were unable to pay AFC or get any other source of funds. The lease agreement was always enforced to discourage side marketing of crop packs (obtained through AFC loans), side marketing of produce (to avoid AFC loan repayment), the illegal practice of keeping livestock on the scheme and the cultivation of erodible areas off the irrigated lands. Hence, these two offenders were ultimately evicted from the scheme for not following advice and it is understood they acquired land elsewhere. As soon as they had been dismissed ARDA began to seek Land Settlement Board approval, as was common practice, to re-allocate new settlers to the plots as a matter of urgency since Estate management could not utilise them due to budget constraints. As already noted those farmers who flouted the provisions of the lease agreement were removed from the scheme and their place taken up by more deserving applicants as a way of rationalising plot allocation. New incumbents were necessary because if vacant plots were not filled, there would be the hazard of pests affecting other settlers’ cotton crop.

The plotholders were forced into this debtor-creditor relationship with the AFC because loan refusal by a smallholder irrigation farmer was officially not tolerated. The case of Imbayago Sekerere (Plot No. B6) who joined Gowe on the 1st of May 1977 bears ample testimony to this. This farmer initially had not applied for a loan and was approached on several occasions by the Settlement Officer for Sanyati to go to AFC offices to register for a loan but he “was deliberately delaying.” Finally, he went to AFC Sanyati Branch and as a pre-condition for a loan was asked to produce vouchers and receipts for previous crops to prove if he had marketed through the right channel and had paid his debt since stop orders for Gowe farmers were ineffective and every farmer had been advised to pay cash to clear the loan. However, Imbayago, despite being an above average producer, never produced these documents because he was black marketing part of his produce and was a bad debtor as reflected by his erratic payments tabulated below.


Ibid.

Ibid.


NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “AFC Loan Refusal,” N. Kamudzandu (Settlement Officer Sanyati) to Settlers Programme Co-ordinator, 11th December 1987, 1.
Table 5.3: DEBT POSITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1984/85</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>Summer</td>
<td>Winter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loaned</td>
<td>2 026</td>
<td>1 030</td>
<td>2 781,07</td>
<td>1 409,72</td>
<td>2 878,38</td>
<td>2 798,05</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Paid</td>
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<td>1 320,83</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>978,63</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total owed = $8 888.59

PRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ha</th>
<th>Total Harvest (kgs)</th>
<th>Average Yield (kgs/ha)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>84/85</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>8 864</td>
<td>3 165</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84/85</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>5 335</td>
<td>4 445</td>
<td>Wheat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85/86</td>
<td>4,2</td>
<td>8 200</td>
<td>1 952</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85/86</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>5 196</td>
<td>3 711</td>
<td>Wheat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>86/87</td>
<td>3,0</td>
<td>6 339</td>
<td>2 113</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>86/87</td>
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<td>1 800</td>
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<td>Beans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Black marketing and failure to honour debt payments led to the severance of this farmer’s association with the AFC. Incidentally, he had no other source of income to finance the 1987/88-summer crop. Since there was no alternative source of finance the Settlement Officer for Sanyati, N. K. Kamudzandu, did not hesitate to recommend eviction after declaring him inactive on the scheme and that the affected plot should be immediately filled. Similarly, Peter Ngandu (Plot No. D1), a satisfactory performer, who owed the AFC $7 783,87 but was frequently absent from the scheme without authority was presumed to have deserted because he black marketed part of his produce and could not pay back his loan. The Settlement Officer then recommended that a new tenant should take over the plot since the farmer had shown that he was no more interested by

1193 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “AFC Loan Refusal,” N. Kamudzandu (Settlement Officer Sanyati) to Settlers Programme Co-ordinator, 11th December 1987, 1.
1194 Ibid., 2.
not applying for a new loan. Probably, his departure was caused by a self-realisation that he had no future in the scheme. Another tenant, Shadreck Takawira (Plot No. B5), whose crop management skills were also satisfactory but whose chief defect was black marketing, was refused a loan because he was a bad debtor. He was asked by the AFC to pay some money into their account to which he agreed but never did so even under constant reminders. Because he had no alternative source of income to finance the 1987/88-summer crop he could not avoid eviction. As already indicated in this chapter, the eviction clause was always evoked by ARDA in the event of any breach of the terms and conditions of the lease and whenever the parastatal felt that the lessee had permitted his farming activities to decline to such an extent that the holding was not properly farmed. Nevertheless, evicting farmers from land to which they had become physically and emotionally attached for failing to pay the AFC debt was cruel and painful. It revealed iron-handedness on the part of this lending institution and gross lack of empathy with the farmers by ARDA.

The moneylenders never considered the impact of drought. Between 1982 and 1985, the national irrigated area dropped from 165 000 ha to 136 000 ha as a result of the severe drought. In the same period, although there are no statistics to back this up, a number of plots in the irrigated area lay idle due to the financial strain imposed by this natural calamity. Despite the AFC expanding its services to the extent that in the 1985-86 season over 85 000 peasant farmers were given loans worth $41.8 million, the iron hand it exercised on the farm recipients of credit was also evident. Following the drought in 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1987, a certain peasant farmer called Ruza K originally from Njelele in Gokwe who settled in Gunyungu in 1963 before subsequently moving to Sanyati in 1979 to join his mother after the death of his father recalls how heavy-handed the AFC was in dealing with farmers who had failed to pay back their loan. Although the AFC had apparently agreed to give him a special dispensation to pay back only half the loan amount in light of the drought he was still outraged:

The AFC must understand that if I get 10 bales, they must leave me half-half (i.e. with five) so that I have something left for school fees and for food. Instead they take everything. Who is to blame if we can’t plough after a drought year if they refuse to give us another loan? It can encourage someone to grow maize only, at Z$17 a sack - - - nothing!

Reinforcing his father’s position his son whose name has not been provided chided: “Our father had better work doing maricho (casual labour) for my brother and I, because if he dies, his debt will fall on us!”

1198 DANIDA, Zimbabwe: Assistance to the Resettlement Credit Scheme, 14-15.
In the dryland area agricultural activity came to be characterised by the huge demand for input loans from the state, represented at that time by the AFC, and attempts on the part of those overburdened by these loans to evade payment. Some farmers like Sophie M (an “immigrant” from Masvingo) of Kasirisiri, a relatively poor ward bordering the Chenjiri small-scale commercial area, until 1982 sold cotton to the CMB on her father-in-law’s grower’s card. Sophie and her husband got their growers cards in 1987 and 1982 respectively. In 1988 their family delivered two bales through the card belonging to Sophie’s mother-in-law in order to avoid paying back the Z$387,00 loan they had accessed from the AFC for a one-hectare packet of pesticides and fertilisers. The evasion of loan repayment by diverting cotton sales through cards unburdened by debt seemed to be a perfectly tenable strategy to ensure accumulation as long as new family members could obtain cards. However, to send cotton through more distant relatives or friends required a high degree of trust since the cheque was issued in the name of the cardholder who must then share the proceeds with others who would have used the same card to send bales.

Whilst loan evasion might have been rampant in the dryland area it was not so liberally extended in ARDA’s outgrower sections throughout the country. The omnipresent “policing” role of the Estate and the state’s “co-operation” with the AFC in “developing” the Gowe I and II settlers ensured that there were no incidents of loan evasion in the ARDA smallholder irrigation schemes. Centrally controlling the loan disbursement and repayment system meant that ARDA and subsequently AFC kept a tight rein on the settler farmers. Concerning the 1987 bean crop produced by Gowe I and II farmers, an AFC official, A. T. Rusare, demanded that the selling arrangements had to comply with his Corporation’s requirements. In a letter to Mtetwa of ARDA he directed that “the beans being bought by Deltrade shall have the funds for payment forwarded to you [ARDA]. After the delivery of all the beans and final payment made, then the whole amount shall be forwarded to AFC whose loan schedules will be waiting.” In giving assurance to AFC, Mtetwa promised to abide by standing lending regulations when he concurred that “payment of the beans being bought by Deltrade through our Head Office [ARDA]; shall be forwarded to AFC after final payment for you [AFC] to facilitate refunds to ARDA and various farmers at the … scheme as per your loan schedules with the respective settlers.” Contractually, Gowe farmers paid their loans to the AFC through ARDA. In fact, in conformity with this procedure after the settlers had delivered their 1987/88 bean crop (496 bags x 90 kgs) to Deltrade, ARDA received a total amount of $78 120.00 and forwarded a cheque for the same amount to the AFC. Thus, given this system the avoidance of loan repayment by changing identities or

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creating fictive growers was not commonplace at Gowe. This gave the AFC the advantage of recouping most of the loans disbursed to the smallholder irrigators.

Sanyati farmers on the whole were quick to realise that the AFC was a profit-seeking enterprise and that it represented the government. They were equally aware that the cost of inputs purchased with these loans had been rising faster than the buying price offered by the CMB (COTTCO) for cotton and that they were being squeezed. The profitability of growing cotton could therefore be maintained by shifting allegiance to a new loan provider whose repayment conditions were less stifling. Continued attachment and repayment of accumulated loans to the AFC meant that the plotholders’ net income would be negative. This became sufficient justification for the plotholders’ abrogation of the loan contract with “Finance” as the AFC had come to be known.  

They immediately shifted their allegiance to a local commercial bank, the Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Limited (ZIMBANK Sanyati). The Bank Manager, C. Dangaiso, confirmed in 1988 that his corporation had started assisting farmers such as Mafumana Mjoli, David Mjoli, Judith Chikowore, Simon Mushonga, Cephas Wira, Office Dangaiso, Thompson Nyamutova, Ngazimbi Mavengere, Kandulu Chipala, Edington Munengami, Ephraim Chiwombe and Charles Mhara. Because of this ARDA was advised that “all monies due or may become due should be sent direct to the Manager, ZIMBANK Limited, Sanyati Branch.”

In the 1988/89 season ARDA made out a cheque to the bank for $65 835,00 in respect of winter beans purchased by the parastatal from the Sanyati Gowe settler farmers at a price of $1,75 per kg. From the end of the 1980s onwards bean production, which was jointly financed by this registered commercial bank and the AFC, had become one of the major success stories and indeed one of the main bases of differentiation apart from cotton. The breakdown of the amount of $65 835,00 which is detailed below reveals that some farmers were performing better than others.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1205}}\text{Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity,” 209.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{1206}}\text{NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Gowe Settlement Farmers,” C. Dangaiso (Manager – Zimbank Sanyati Branch) to the Financial Controller, (Attention: C. Kupakuwana, ARDA Harare), copied to the Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati, 12th October 1988.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{1207}}\text{Ibid.}\]
Table 5.4: Gowe, ZIMBANK-financed Winter Bean Production (1988/89)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Farmer</th>
<th>Total Weight (Kgs)</th>
<th>Total Amount ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T. Nyamutova</td>
<td>5 940</td>
<td>10 395,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Mhara</td>
<td>3 960</td>
<td>6 930,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Mavengere</td>
<td>6 120</td>
<td>10 710,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Chiwombe</td>
<td>3 870</td>
<td>6 772,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Wira</td>
<td>4 500</td>
<td>7 875,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O. Dangaiso</td>
<td>5 940</td>
<td>10 395,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Mjoli</td>
<td>2 340</td>
<td>4 095,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Mushongha</td>
<td>4 950</td>
<td>8 662,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37 620</td>
<td>65 835,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the same season ARDA sent a cheque for $61 385.16 payable to AFC Sanyati. This payment was in respect of winter beans purchased by the parastatal from the Sanyati Gowe settler farmers at the ruling price of $1.75 per kg. This amount, which was broken down as follows, also demonstrates the generally poor performance of farmers in this category:

Table 5.5: Gowe, AFC-financed Winter Bean Production (1988/89)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Farmer</th>
<th>Total Weight (Kgs)</th>
<th>Total Amount ($)</th>
<th>Deductions ($)</th>
<th>Net Payable ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P. Chekeche</td>
<td>1 980</td>
<td>3 465,00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 465,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Chengu</td>
<td>2 970</td>
<td>5 197,50</td>
<td>53,46</td>
<td>5 144,04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Gomani</td>
<td>2 970</td>
<td>5 197,50</td>
<td>20,23</td>
<td>5 177,04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Marufu</td>
<td>2 610</td>
<td>4 567,50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 567,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Matapure</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>6 615,00</td>
<td>14,49</td>
<td>6 600,51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Mungoha</td>
<td>2 520</td>
<td>4 410,00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 410,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Muponda</td>
<td>1 890</td>
<td>3 307,50</td>
<td>42,39</td>
<td>3 265,11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Motsei</td>
<td>4 950</td>
<td>8 662,50</td>
<td>67,66</td>
<td>8 590,84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Muzanenhamo</td>
<td>2 520</td>
<td>4 410,00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 410,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Tizira</td>
<td>1 710</td>
<td>2 992,50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 992,50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Ranganai</td>
<td>3 780</td>
<td>6 615,00</td>
<td>156,61</td>
<td>6 458,39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Ziunda</td>
<td>3 600</td>
<td>6 300,00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6 300,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35 280</td>
<td>61 740,00</td>
<td>354,84</td>
<td>61 385,16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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A close examination of the statistical information presented in these tables reveals that the small number of farmers who were financed by ZIMBANK was the more successful compared to the many whose production was sponsored by AFC. Clearly, Nyamutova, Mavengere and Dangaiso were the most successful. This was because they had paid off their loans contrary to some of their counterparts like Chengu, Gomani, Matapure, Muponda, Motsi and Gidion Ranganai who were in arrears to the tune of the amounts reflected in Table 5.5 above, demonstrating that farmers from a range of income groups all received loans, but the impact of such assistance on their production was different. Mavengere, in particular, realised better yields because he sometimes clandestinely opened more irrigation lines for his use. In that winter season farmers like E. Sibanda, M. Musauki and Tasara Govoro who had been struck off the loans register for poor performance were recommended by Kamudzandu for loan reconsideration. This was due to the fact that they had harvested 67, 63 and 48 bags of beans respectively. Sibanda’s total yield weighed 6 030 kgs whereas Musauki and Govoro’s was 5 670 and 4 320 kgs each. Selling at $2,00 per kg, they realised varying incomes of $12 060,00, $11 340,00 and $8 640,00 which qualified them for an AFC loan. However, by 1990 farmers like Mafumana Mjoli (hugely indebted to ZIMBANK to the tune of $13 997,68), E. Munengami (owing $10 888,03) and C. Mhara (owing an amount of $9 676,73) could hardly pay up. They were inextricably indebted to this commercial bank. In spite of previous arrears and their virtual credit unworthiness they continued to press for more loans every growing season. What this flirtation with ZIMBANK and AFC meant was that the Gowe farmers were not achieving a complete break with finance, but were simply moving from one lender to another. This was not without its consequences as competition between ZIMBANK and AFC had a huge effect on accumulation.

It is a common tenet of many policy package recommendations for the development of peasant agriculture in different countries that improved access to externally supplied and often state-controlled production resources is needed. According to M. J. Drinkwater when such recommendations are made one of two attitudes appears to be adopted.

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1211 Total yield refers to marketed produce and the total income realised per farmer after selling that produce. It did not include the amount retained for home or domestic consumption.
1212 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Memorandum: Loan Reconsideration,” N. Kamudzandu (Settlement Officer – Gowe Irrigation Scheme, Sanyati) to the Branch Manager-AFC Mashonalnd West, copied to the Settlers Programme Co-ordinator, Senior District Inspector (Chegutu) and the District Inspector (Sanyati), 9th November 1989.
1215 Such resources include seed and fertiliser inputs, credit, marketing facilities, research and extension advice, and in some cases even land.
Either it is taken for granted that it is in peasant farmers’ interests to have improved access to these externally supplied and controlled resources, and thus to be thoroughly incorporated within a single, state-regulated national economy, or, because incorporation is the main concern, it is an irrelevance whether or not such access is entirely beneficial to peasant producers.  

That such policies may not always be in the interest of a peasant population, especially where the state has an overt intention to extract agricultural surpluses on unfavourable terms has been pointed out by Hyden and Bates, amongst others. However, in Zimbabwe generally and Sanyati in particular few researchers have attempted to write from the perspective of peasant or communal area farmers’ interest. Similarly, not many questions have been posed whether state incorporation of this kind was wholly desirable or not. Clearly it was desirable to those who benefited from it, especially the rural notables. Their poorer counterparts extracted little if any recognisable benefit from it. Thus, in quantitative terms the delivery of credit to peasant outgrowers can be claimed to be a growing success, although in terms of access the greatest percentage of the loans extended have been either to the richer plotholders, the “Bigger Brother” (the Estate) or to the much larger commercial farmers.

Thus, an essential factor influencing the impact of loans is the type of farmer they are made to. Whether or not not loans should be made to poorer farmers is much debated and in practice it is usually only the better-off farmers who receive them. Different types of farmers have differential access to production resources including education. This affects farmers’ ability to successfully utilise the inputs being supplied through credit and thus to repay the loans. This point may seem axiomatic, yet often the resource distinctions between “rich” and “poor” farmers which affect their capabilities appear underemphasised. For example, ARDA through its settlement officers only gives one type of advice to the tenant farmers and thus implicitly assumes that this is appropriate for all of them. The agricultural extension agency in Zimbabwe (AREX, then AGRITEX) also proffers similar advice to the farmers. ARDA, together with AREX, should therefore take more practical steps to give advice that recognises the farmers’ differential access to productive resources. Such an approach is likely to enhance peasant productivity in a big way.

Over the years cropping, advice and agro-financing has been restricted to the production of cotton and maize in summer and wheat in winter. Prior to 1980, a 4-crop rotation involving cotton, maize, wheat and groundnuts or beans had been practised. At independence, half of the total area of the plot was planted to maize and the other half to cotton, while the maize area was double-cropped to wheat in winter. Although groundnut was grown it was not

a very popular crop. Of the few farmers who tried this crop some realised good yields whilst others were not so successful. In the 1988/89 summer season, for example, the best producers were E. Chirandata and N. Mavengere who produced 7,067 kgs each compared to the lowest producer, K. Chipala, with 3,848 kgs. The general expectation though was that every farmer, rich or poor, given available resources, should be able to do well. However, groundnut production was less well funded than cotton and beans and lack of adequate funding meant that the dilemma of loans persisted as some farmers’ yields remained low.

**Crop yields: Measure of Estate and settler productivity:**

Apart from the need for finance from various lenders smallholder irrigation agriculture in Sanyati also required ARDA’s administrative and technical support to improve yields. This support irrespective of the strings attached to it to some extent raised settler farm output. A detailed performance of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme for the 1982/1983 season can be illustrated in figures. Although maize, cotton and wheat were grown during this season only the details of individual settler farmers’ performance for maize and wheat are given in Tables 5.6 to 5.9 below.

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Table 5.6: Gowe I Maize Yield 1982/83.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plot No.</th>
<th>Yield in bags/plot (0.7/ha)</th>
<th>Yield in Tonnes/ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4.16</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.38</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4.68</td>
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<td>5.33</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average per plot in bags x 90 kgs = 32 bags
Average yield in tonnes per ha = 4.16 tonnes
Total yield = 104 tonnes

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1221 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 349225, Location R24.10.11.11F, File: SET/16 Settlers Budget, “Rural Development Planning Unit (RDPU),” R. D. Nyahangare (Settlement Officer Sanyati) to D. Saungweme (Small Livestock Development Planner), 8th June 1984.
Table 5.7: Gowe II Maize Yield 1982/83.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plot No.</th>
<th>Yield in bags/plot (0.6/ha)</th>
<th>Yield in Tonnes/ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.03</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.12</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>46</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5.15</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5.15</td>
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<td>82</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>6.07</td>
</tr>
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<td>84</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
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<td>85</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Average yield per plot in bags x 90 kgs = 30 bags
Average yield in tonnes per ha = 4.55 tonnes
Total yield = 153 tonnes

Gowe I total = 25.4 ha
Gowe II total = 33.6 ha
Total bags shelled Gowe I = 1,149 x 90 kgs
Total bags shelled Gowe II = 1,664 x 90 kgs
Scheme average for both sections = 4.77 tonnes/ha

This scheme average for the two sections of Gowe was generally lower than the normal of about 6 tonnes per hectare because of the drought. ARDA could not cope with water requirements of this crop either.

1222 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 349225, Location R24.10.11.11F, File: SET/16 Settlers Budget, “Rural Development Planning Unit (RDPU),” R. D. Nyahangare (Settlement Officer Sanyati) to D. Saungweme (Small Livestock Development Planner), 8th June 1984.
# Table 5.8: Gowe I Wheat Yield 1982/83.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plot No.</th>
<th>Yield in bags/plot/ha</th>
<th>Yield in Tonnes/ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.56</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>4.29</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.77</td>
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<td>4.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.56</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.42</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.90</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
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<td>27</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>4.56</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average yield per plot in bags x 90 kgs = 31 bags
Average yield in tonnes per ha = 4.03 tonnes
Total yield = 101 tonnes
Table 5.9: Gowe II Wheat Yield 1982/83.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plot No.</th>
<th>Yield in bags/plot (0.6/ha)</th>
<th>Yield in Tonnes/ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
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<td>2.57</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>1.51</td>
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<tr>
<td>63</td>
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<td>3.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Average yield per plot in bags x 90 kgs = 15 bags
Average yield per ha in tonnes = 2.3 tonnes
Total yield = 72 tonnes

Gowe I total hectares = 25 ha
Gowe II total hectares = 32 ha
Total bags combined Gowe I = 1116 x 90 kgs of wheat
Total bags combined Gowe II = 795 x 90 kgs of wheat
Scheme average for both sections = 3.12 tonnes per ha

It is important to note that the Gowe II average was low not because of drought as the wheat was well irrigated, but because the plotholders were badly hit by termites. According to ARDA they refused to take extension advice to apply dieldrin which resulted in about 50% loss of crop.1224

These tables point to significant variations in output by the smallholder farmers. Several factors such as personal initiative, coupled with having the “right” political connections or links with the state, sound relations with the estate bosses which in turn guaranteed the “right” to use unoccupied or untenanted plots as well as preferential access to facilities such as water, pipes, agricultural advice, tractors and other vital equipment account for these differences. Whilst these tables give a clear indication of Gowe’s maize and wheat production it is not possible to do the same for cotton because of the intricacies involved in the harvesting and marketing of this crop. For example, the cotton is picked and weighed individually daily and marketing is also done individually. Therefore, there is a tendency to mix cotton from within and without the scheme. Black marketing compounded the problem. Therefore, to attempt to submit figures would not show an accurate picture. However, rough cotton yield surveys on a couple of the more honest farmers show a variation in yield of between 2 000 and 3 000 kg/ha with an average of 2 400 kg/ha.1225

1223 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 349225, Location R24.10.11.11F, File: SET/16 Settlers Budget, “Rural Development Planning Unit (RDPU),” R. D. Nyahangare (Settlement Officer Sanyati) to D. Saungweme (Small Livestock Development Planner), 8th June 1984.
1224 Ibid.
1225 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 349225, Location R24.10.11.11F, File: SET/16 Settlers Budget, “Rural
For the 1983/84 season maize was dropped on AFC advice because the crop was not profitable. The discouragement of this staple crop, however, did not take into account household consumption factors and the fact that crop surpluses from the scheme were sold locally to villagers who had maize deficit problems. The Corporation was prepared to finance cotton despite its inedibility. The cotton hectrage was then doubled to 116 ha. Sixty hectares of wheat were planned but only 25 ha were planted. It is important to note that the settlers paid for all direct crop costs which according to the submitted budgets for 1983/84 were estimated at a total expenditure of $99 644.00. Direct crop expenditure was the total cost of supplying water for irrigation or irrigation electricity ($19 628.00), fertiliser and seed ($35 334.00), transport ($10 920.00), herbicides and pesticides ($9 822.00), land preparation ($15 300.00), harvesting and packing ($8 160.00) and insurance cover ($480.00). As a rule, all direct crop costs were claimed as RDPU income from AFC. The costs they were not paying for were for administration expenses which in the 1983/84 fiscal year were pegged at a total of $112 310.00. This figure was calculated to include, inter alia, the cost of maintenance and repairs of irrigation equipment as well as the maintenance and repairs of scheme fences, roads and buildings; the cost of supplying water and electricity including water to the communal area; entertainment, education, health and welfare. These were categorised as social costs which were mainly incurred on Estate employees’ salaries, wages, irrigation bonuses and other expenses.

ARDA Sanyati Estate’s direct crop costs of $103 977.00 for the 1982/83 season were slightly higher than the Gowe figures for 1983/84, but its administration expenses of $55 143.00 were much lower than those for Gowe. The operating account or budget for 1985/86 prepared by ARDA’s Agricultural Operations Division which fell under the RDPU revealed that in running the Gowe Settlement Scheme the parastatal suffered net administration overheads to the tune of $152 319.00 - a huge figure by any standards - which also translated to a net loss of $152 319.00. These statistics illustrate that ARDA was incurring more costs to run the smallholder scheme at Gowe than to run the Estate itself, which partly explains why the former needed to be made independent. The figures for Gowe were essential to calculate project viability. Using these budgets, the Rural Development Co-ordinator was working out a new viability basis not only for Sanyati but...
also for each scheme in the country. The plan included guaranteeing the Estate the basis on
which to produce cotton and other crops for the local as well as the export market.

Sanyati’s Main Scheme produces a variety of cash crops chief among which is cotton. In
fact, ARDA Estates in Zimbabwe contribute relatively significant amounts of crops to
national production. A comparison of ARDA’s production of the three major controlled
crops (cotton, wheat and maize) with national production of the same crops for the period
1982 to 1984 can be used to illustrate its contribution to the agricultural industry. The
Table below shows ARDA’s performance over a three-year period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products (Units Tons)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ARDA Production</th>
<th>ARDA % Share of National Production</th>
<th>Estimated National Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Controlled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Cotton</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>14 585</td>
<td>26,1%</td>
<td>157 673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>15 314</td>
<td>25,5%</td>
<td>167 280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>20 000</td>
<td>24,3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Maize</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>9 530</td>
<td>0,7%</td>
<td>1 391 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3 555</td>
<td>0,6%</td>
<td>616 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2 700</td>
<td>0,3%</td>
<td>798 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Wheat</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20 768</td>
<td>9,8%</td>
<td>212 945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>11 312</td>
<td>9,1%</td>
<td>124 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>23 728</td>
<td>39,5%</td>
<td>92 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Imports</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Consumption</td>
<td>Exports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Cotton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12 051</td>
<td></td>
<td>52 431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11 444</td>
<td></td>
<td>45 775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12 434</td>
<td></td>
<td>69 735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Maize</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 000 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>491 982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>610 000</td>
<td>1 200 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>252 305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600 000</td>
<td>1 200 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Wheat</td>
<td>31 403</td>
<td>244 348</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57 167</td>
<td>181 417</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>160 000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.10: ARDA PRODUCTION TREND VERSUS NATIONAL PERFORMANCE

1229 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 272099, Location R19.3.12.1F: File: ADA/MAR/2 Marketing – General,
“ARDA Production Versus National Production of Selected Agricultural Products,” R. D. Mshoperi
This table apart from illustrating ARDA’s contribution to national production of certain major crops also reveals the considerable disparities in yields between the parastatal and its settler growers. As already noted this can be explained in terms of the cordialness of the relations between the three major players, that is the state, the estate and the plotholders. These relationships, though not so much in favour of the small-scale irrigators, determined the amount of resources, technical or otherwise, that were availed by the state to boost productivity. One of the purposes of these tabulated figures was to assist management measure the Authority’s effort in meeting the nation’s food and raw material needs.

Gowe just like the Main Estate largely concentrated on cotton, as maize was not as profitable. However, the continuous cultivation of cotton had a debilitating effect on soil fertility. Gowe II, for example, was very badly eroded in 1980. In spite of this, the emphasis on cotton growing has never changed because the farmers realise handsome profits with which to pay back their loans. The perennial cultivation of this crop, therefore, means that erosion remains one of the leading plagues not only of Gowe but also Sanyati agriculture.

**Erosion continues unabated: The need for more land:**

Due to the continuous cultivation of the small pieces of land, the soils eventually got exhausted. Even the Chavunduka Commission of 1982 acknowledged that the process of land degradation was increasing at a rapid and frightening pace. The situation was aggravated by the alleged lack of commitment and dedication to duty by the extension assistants, L. Sithole and M. Mushawarima, who were originally DEVAG employees but later seconded to ARDA. The two extension assistants, whose involvement with Gowe dates back to the colonial period, were sometimes accused of unilaterally absenting themselves from work or when they were available, their performance “left a lot to be desired.” On one occasion Sithole spent two days away from the scheme on the pretext that he was collecting his pay and attending an extension staff meeting in Kadoma. Because soil erosion continues to affect Sanyati agriculture, Sithole had been instructed by ARDA on the 17th of October 1980 to peg and construct contours in the Gowe II block of land. However, by the 29th of the same month, he and Mushawarima had only managed to peg two contours, which had a total length of not more than 300 metres. This dragging of feet occurred in spite of repeated requests by ARDA to get the job done quickly as the maize crop on Gowe II had to be planted.

(Marketing Officer) to Deputy General Manager (ARDA), 27th July 1984.

1230 Job Gwacha (COTTCO Records Clerk, former plotholder and Kusi Village communal farmer), Personal Interview, COTTCO, Sanyati Growth Point, 9th January 1997. See also Robson Muponda, (Gowe II Irrigation Committee Member), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 14th May 2005 and Goliath Mangweni, (Communal Farmer), Personal Interview, Kusi Village, Sanyati, 18th May 2005.

1231 Chavunduka Commission, 26.

1232 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), G. Fischer (TILCOR, Sanyati, Gatooma) to Lister, the Provincial Agricultural Officer (Mashonaland West), 29th October 1980.

1233 Ibid.
The two settlement assistants’ main excuse was that they were always occupied by
meetings. This untenable situation was of grave concern to ARDA who were doing their
“best to make a success of running this scheme (Gowe) and [were] being continually
hampered by staff that should be working for its improvement not its downfall.” 1254
Nevertheless, whilst the issue of ineffectual extension staff is clear, ARDA seemed to be
running away from the crux of the problem. As has been acknowledged in chapter four,
overcrowding and the attendant problem of soil erosion could not be solved without
allocating adequate land to the Gowe plot holders, the majority of whom were Master
Farmers who were used to tilling bigger tracts of land in their home districts. It can be
succinctly pointed out that more land was required to accommodate these people
satisfactorily.

One of the extension assistants who joined Gowe in the 1980s, S. J. Sithole, supports this
view when he says:

From a conservation point of view, contour ridges were good, but the farmers whom
the Conservationist had to convince to accept the contours, whilst they appreciated
the importance of these structures, felt they [contours] would negatively impinge on
[the farmers’] already small pieces of land. 1235

He goes on to say that, although the plotholders initially resisted the idea of contours
because they “reduced the size of their plots” they later accepted it after seeing that “their
fields were being further reduced not by contours but by erosion.” 1236 In 1988 the
Settlement Officer agreed that the degree of soil erosion was alarming on the whole scheme
due to the absence of adequate conservation works. 1237 With or without erosion and
contours, therefore, the need to increase the size of plots for the production of more cash
crops could not be over-emphasised.

Even ARDA Regional Manager for Mashonaland, B. M. Visser, admitted that the plot sizes
at Gowe were inadequate if the farmers were to meet realistic input costs and certain fixed
charges. 1238 Consequently, a proposal was made that plots should be increased to a
minimum of 2.8 and 2.4 hectares and a maximum of 3-4 hectares for Gowe I and II
respectively. 1239 It was envisaged that this decision would further encourage those
participating in the scheme to devote all their energies to the venture to realise increased
returns and at the same time solve the problem of dual ownership of land. Nonetheless, the
proposed plot sizes were still not big enough to adequately meet the subsistence and cash

1234 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), G. Fischer
(TILCOR, Sanyati, Gatooma) to Lister, the Provincial Agricultural Officer (Mashonaland West), 29th
October 1980.
1236 Ibid.
1237 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme,
“The Settlement Officer’s Report for the Period up to 29th February 1988,” N. Kamudzandu (Settlement Officer -
ARDA Sanyati Estate).
1238 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to
the Gowe Settlement Officer; Sanyati Estate Manager and the Budget Controller, 26th August 1981, 1.
1239 Ibid.
requirements of the plotholders. A lot needed to be done by the government to achieve a more equitable distribution of land among the peasantry in general.

Because many plotholders were basically rural accumulators who were hungry for more land they availed themselves the opportunity of cultivating extra pieces of land whenever plots fell vacant. Sometimes they encroached on land that had not been set aside for cropping. The Estate Manager even conceded:

For years both the Estate Management and the RDPU Officers have paid a blind eye to the illegal cultivation (ploughing beyond their land requirement) of the ARDA farm by the registered Gowe settler farmers. This malpractice has only got worse over the years and by now [1988] the whole settler residential area is under cultivation. 1240

This was happening on highly erodable sandy soils devoid of any soil conservation measures. Consequently, the damage to the land resource was not difficult to imagine. The rate of siltation at the Gowe suction pool was enormously rapid and for the first time ever, the pool dried up during the 1988 dry season. Continued cultivation of these lands could only accentuate this problem. In fact, this illegal cultivation and the soil denudation that accompanied it earned ARDA severe criticism from the Natural Resources Board (NRB). It is clear that the whole settler community was involved in this illegal cultivation “as a means of supplementing their contracted or leased plots.” 1241 The effect was that some inputs designated for the official plots found their way onto these illegally cultivated lands. The registered output was, therefore, the combination of official and illegal plot yield. According to the Estate Manager “This scenario [distorted] all designed production objectives and indeed field records.” Hence, “any violations [of the terms of the Lease Agreement] … must, of necessity, result in eviction.” 1242 Members of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme were, thus, genuinely worried about their security under the lease at a time when ARDA was more concerned about curbing the pernicious effects of erosion. Indeed, their future in the scheme was not assured. The imposition of a land charge further complicated matters.

**Land rent: Justice or injustice:**

The plotholders, despite the shortage of land, were furthermore required to pay land rent. This demand was instituted in 1986. Charles Mhara, a plotholder and former Gowe Irrigation Chairman, emotionally pointed out that the farmers were “not happy and will never be happy about the payment of land rent in independent Zimbabwe.” 1243 In 1987 land rent was charged at $72.00 per plot. 1244 Ten years later the plotholders paid land rent to the

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1241 Ibid.
1242 Ibid.
1243 Charles Mhara, (Plotholder and Former Gowe Irrigation Committee Chairman), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 9th January 1997.
1244 Mafumana Mjoli (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 9th January 1997.
According to Munengami the total land rent charged for his 4-hectare plot was $1 280.00 per season. He was disappointed with this exorbitant land charge because of the frequent pump breakdowns and the long time taken to repair them. Munengami contends that, this had the effect of reducing yields and poor yields made financiers reluctant to grant agricultural loans. His objection to land rent stems from the fact that before independence nothing of the sort existed. He feels that the government should not profit from land transactions since to do so in circumstances where the land had been expropriated from the Africans in the first place, was morally wrong.

In a very bitter tone, Munengami says, with regret, in Shona, “Taiti tiri kurwira vhu muhondo asi hapana kurwira vhu kwatakaita kana tobhadhariswa vhu.” Literally translated this means “we thought we were fighting to regain possession of the land (soil) during the war but when the war came to an end we were surprised that we were being asked to pay rent for the same soil.” By this, he was questioning the rationale behind paying a fee to be allowed to cultivate the soil for which the people had fought during the liberation struggle. Another plotholder, T. Nyamutova, who was part of the delegation that went to Harare in 1987 to see the Minister of Lands and Rural Resettlement and express their bitterness against the institution of land rent still feels cheated. After informing the Minister that they had been “duped into signing the land rent agreement forms by the Sanyati Estate Manager,” they were surprised to find that the Minister did not sympathise with their plight. Instead, he argued that they should not have signed the agreement paper had they not understood it. The delegation then returned to Gowe in extreme despair. The position taken by the Minister, however, confirms the fact that the concerns of the plotholders were often disregarded. In fact, there was very little or no participatory consultation with the plotholders in matters that affected their own livelihoods.

The Estate Manager, J. S. Mukokwayarira, admitted that the demand for land rent had become one of the most contentious issues at Gowe after independence. There was stiff resistance against its payment. Whilst acknowledging the existence of opposition he, however, was adamant that land rent was justifiable. In his memorandum to the RDP Co-ordinator, he complained: “The Sanyati Gowe Settlement Farmers are causing the Estate a lot of unnecessary problems over the land rent issue,” adding that “Some resist land rent payment because of their crop failure, [and others] resist payment because they have failed to establish a crop for a season.”

For example, during the 1986/87-cotton season the

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1245. S. Mapondera (Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Sanyati Estate, 8th January 1997. N.B. Mapondera replaced Gwerengwe as Estate Manager with effect from 1st October 1996.
1246. Munengami, Personal Interview.
1247. Ibid.
1248. Ibid.
1249. Ibid.
1250. Ibid.
1251. Ibid.
1252. Ibid.
RDPU Co-ordinator explained to the settlers the advantages of growing sugar beans vis-à-vis wheat. To the farmers he emphasised the importance of the timeliness of operations although at times, due to equipment breakdown, delays had been encountered. Scheme management tried to justify the frequent breakdowns by saying that these affected the Estate and the smallholder scheme equally. Clearly, the Estate was less affected because it could use other pumps not only the one at Gowe Pools. To ensure timeous operations the tenants were required to finish picking their cotton by the last week of May in order to establish their beans in early June. This would entail a loss of their last 2 top bolls but was seen as a worthy sacrifice for a better impending bean crop. The bean crop would also be removed in time for the October cotton crop. Nevertheless, when it came to implementation the farmers resisted slashing down their cotton crop by end of May. They maintained they would pick to the last boll. This delayed the planting of beans. The bean crop was to be established in late June to the first week of July. On the 9th July 1987, under-ground water pipes burst at the Estate-Gowe junction. There was no water till the 18th of July. This period of water scarcity meant that the last 14 ha could not be planted. The tenants affected were R. Muponda, Plot No. D10; M. Mungofa, Plot No. D7; G. Maturure, Plot No. D9; M. Gomani, Plot No. D8 – all cultivating 3 ha each and G. Ranganayi, Plot No. D11 (2 ha). Scheme management’s explanation of this “delay” on the settlers’ plots was that it was “a product of a vicious circle created as a result of the farmers’ insistence on picking every boll on the cotton plant and their unwillingness to slash their cotton early enough to allow land preparation for the winter crop.” At the same time the above tenants were demanding from the Estate a Land Rent refund of $3 066.00 i.e. 14 ha x $219.00. A “sober” explanation of the mechanism and implication of land rent to these 5 tenants by the Estate Manager on the 11th of January “would not stop them boiling over.” In their angry mood they proceeded to the local police camp to report that ARDA had defrauded them of their money in the guise of land rent.

The Manager conceded that it was very disquieting to work under such relations. In defending the introduction of land rent and at the same time opposing the suggestion of rent refunds he proffered the following argument:

The external auditors had a scrutiny of the land rent collected vis-à-vis the RDPU Administration Overheads. Land rent collected was more than

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N. Kamudzandu and NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Settlement Officer’s Monthly Report for March 1990 – Gowe Irrigation Scheme.” N. Kamudzandu. N.B. As long as the land rent problem was not resolved and remained the “talk of the place” generally the working atmosphere between the Estate and Gowe would not improve.


1257 Ibid., 1-2.

1258 Ibid., 2.
Administration Overheads by $1 320,00. The auditors’ verdict was that this sum was an opportunity sundry income [administration income] and as such not refundable to tenants. Rent is rent irrespective. We overrecovered [sic] by reason of salary increase freeze for the year 1986/87. If the freeze should thaw this year, we are going to underrecover [sic] in 1988 and the Estate is to sustain the loss. If the concept of land rent is to be upheld and honoured, the office of the RDPU Coordinator should intervene with fuller explanations to the settlers. The Estate is still obliged to help the settler farmer as long as the settler farmer puts his house in order. But I cannot see a chance of ARDA refunding $3 066,00 to the settlers for the bean crop they did not grow as sitting tenants. 1259

Reiterating the position of the Estate regarding land rent he said:

The Estate holds the view that all sitting tenants must pay a sum of $438,00 per hectare per annum notwithstanding. We hold that Section 2 of the Land Lease Agreement which states inter-alia that ‘$219.00 per hectare per crop per annum’ is just but the modality of payment towards the fixed $438.00 per hectare per annum. 1260

All effort to explain this mechanism to the tenants met with determined resistance. This was so because the stance taken by the Estate regarding land rent was not different to that of the Minister. The situation was aggravated when the Estate Manager insisted, in flagrant disregard of mounting opposition, that the tenants should pay the land charge as required under the lease agreement. The request for a reduction of the land rent could only be considered when authentic records of performance were produced by the farmers which in turn would be used to determine their Gross Margin and Returns per dollar invested figures to reflect enterprise viability. 1261 Any hope of achieving a thaw in relations between the two bickering parties was, therefore, destroyed.

In further pursuance of justice the Gowe tenants decided to approach the highest office in the district for arbitration. Exasperated members of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme who leased plots from ARDA Sanyati Estate had approached the then District Administrator, B. B. Chahuruva, on several occasions wanting assistance to their problems. Towards the end of 1988 they sought audience with him again. They stated that they were seeking solutions on “a wide range of issues including their legal rights and status which they seem[ed] ignorant about, policy matters regulating their operations in the scheme and administrative problems affecting their day-to-day activities.” 1262 At this penultimate


1260 Ibid. , 1.


1262 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme,
meeting with the DA, the insensitivity of ARDA to settler grievances was brought to the fore. The DA Kadoma, ARDA Estate Manager (Gwerengwe) and seven representatives of the farmers attended the meeting. When the farmers tried to articulate their problems the Estate Manager advised them to seek redress with the ARDA General Manager’s office in Harare as he pointed out that most of the issues raised fell outside his purview. Not satisfied with this response the tenants appealed to the DA for assistance. The District Administrator admitted:

The farmers have now approached me to formally seek a meeting with a representative from your office to explain to them their legal position vis-à-vis ARDA, their rights, policy matters governing their scheme and a host of administrative issues they claim perturb them. Apparently a significant number of farmers have left the scheme in pique and it seems more are inclined towards following suit if better communication with ARDA is not effected. My role as District Administrator in this matter is merely to facilitate communication which seems to be uneasy at the local level. I would be most obliged if the aspirations of these disgruntled members to have an audience with your office were met. Please advice whether and when the proposed meeting can take place preferably on site.

Nevertheless, the District Administrator’s intervention failed to break the impasse between the “warring parties,” as ARDA refused to budge to settler demands thereby paving way for open hostilities and more meetings of this nature. ARDA made it clear that arrangements would be made by the officer responsible at Head Office for the administration of the Settlement Schemes under its control to organise a meeting with the Estate Manager and Settlement Manager or Officer to investigate the problems which the members of the Scheme had raised with the DA. However, it was considered that it was necessary to obtain full details of the settlers’ problems before further action could be taken.

In March 1989 the Gowe settlers sent another grievance paper through the DA’s office. Although the way land rent was expended at state level was explained at various fora the settler farmers still queried the method of determining it and further alleged that the yield estimates used to calculate their viability were excessive. Even today, they also want

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to be given a detailed statement of how the money collected as land rent is used on the Scheme since they allege that no maintenance is actually carried out on their plots. The farmers concurred with Scheme Management on their reluctance to keep records to reflect the authentic yields or output from their plots which are necessary for the calculation of Gross Margin and Return per dollar figures as a means of determining enterprise viability. On this issue, Scheme Management suggested that this reluctance to divulge authentic figures was due to the rampant black marketing of both inputs and outputs on the Scheme as a whole. However, management was too naïve to advance such a reason which ignored the tenants’ affinity for accumulation. Under-declaring yields was a common tactic they employed to avoid land rent exactions and thereby use the opportunity to further their accumulation interests.

In a related development, ARDA was blamed for insisting on settler discipline without taking an introspective look at itself – its conduct and its manner of handling outgrowers’ complaints. In one instance the Settler Programmes Co-ordinator even appealed to other stakeholders’ intervention to ensure the enforcement of discipline. For example, he asked that the settler farmers be addressed by a quartet comprising ARDA officials, Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, the DA’s office officials and local Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front, ZANU (PF), officials to explain the role of ARDA in rural development and the need for discipline on the scheme. Towards the end of the 1989/90 season the outgrowers held a meeting with the local Member of Parliament (MP) and lodged the usual complaints. They petitioned the MP to assist them obtain title deeds which would give them more farming independence. Other complaints hinged on the charge-out rate which was too high, the acute shortage of tractors for tillage and the lack of decent accommodation and purified water for the settlers. Despite the MP promising to seek audience with the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement on the matter, no immediate redress came through. The 1990s, therefore, ended on this acrimonious note as far as ARDA and the settlers’ relations were concerned. In fact, as the Gowe settlers claimed, ARDA was completely disinterested in them and their welfare. They believe ARDA cannot assist them, as it is also a producer - a competitor -, which puts its interest first, and those of the tenants last. Quite evidently, farming implements are made available very expensively and late when ARDA has finished with them, resulting in the tenants planting late and producing very low yields. Tenants claim the ultimate objective of ARDA is to force them off the land


through creating hardships for them or turning a blind eye to their problems. This they argue is in sharp contrast to when the scheme operated under Ministry of Internal Affairs. To support their claim, they say there are many vacant stands presently and that no one is willing to take them up because of the unfavourable conditions on the Estate.

The farmers also claim the Ministry of Lands had promised them assistance to build better houses when the Minister visited the area. The question of housing was never followed up although both Scheme Management and settler farmers agreed that drastic action was required to correct the situation. Scheme Management revealed that a plan had been drawn up (Drawing No. GO-3 dated May 1983) by B. M. C. Sibanda but it had either been shelved or forgotten in spite of the fact that it required immediate attention. It needed urgent attention particularly in view of the significant potential ripple effects it could have on both farmer morale and scheme management. A more disciplined and systematic management structure could evolve as seen at Middle Sabi.

Finally, outgrowers question whether there has been a shift in Government policy towards irrigation schemes in the country. They claim that most of what is happening at ARDA is contrary to Government policy which should support the small farmer. Hence, they feel ARDA is bent on squeezing the very farmer it is supposed to support. It can be noted that in the past the small farmer was heavily subsidised. However, the policy today is that the scheme must be self-supporting with strict adherence to regulations. Rigid observance of regulations means that the settler-management instrument is not favourable since communications at the local level are very difficult.

Apart from the shortage of land and problems arising from the exaction of land rent, there is a host of other factors which seem to impair settler agricultural performance. The area is characterised by poor soils and insufficient water supply in excessively dry years because “what used to be perennial rivers are now, most of the time, sand beds” due to siltation. Some of the major causes of siltation are the illegal vegetable gardens on either side of the Lodestar Weir, ploughing down stream and too close to the Munyati river banks by the

1271 Ibid., 2. N.B. Most plotholders view the conditions on the Estate as appalling.
1274 J. Gwerengwe (Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Sanyati Estate, 2nd May 1996.
1275 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 272081, Location R19.3.11.9F, File: EST/9A Sanyati Estate: Water Vol. 2, “Siltation Robbs and Lodester Weirs for Sanyati Estate,” D. P. Mhetwa (ARDA Regional Secretary) to the
people of Mero or Ganyungu and Chikari Matsito Settlement areas. Due to economic hardships the people are trying to find alternative means of survival through gold panning along the river. This activity has also intensified the siltation problems.

The major weirs, for example, the Robbs and Lodestar are now silted and cannot store reasonable quantities of water. The inadequacy of water in the Munyati river to serve both the Estate and Gowe II at Changwe, Gowe I at Gowe Pools abstraction point, domestic and industrial requirements especially during the critical dry season periods was a major limiting factor. Water shortage problems were compounded by the illegal abstraction for communal and cattle purposes, which compelled the estate management to contemplate mounting a “Night Irrigation Curfew.” The so-called “Rebel” water abstraction points needed to be guarded over night because this is when the activity was quite rampant.

On the other hand, the main rivers, especially the Munyati, have been rather “over-dammed” up stream. Thus, both Gowe and the Main Estate require another big dam down stream to curb the draining of a lot of water to Lake Kariba particularly during flood periods. It was hoped that the Ministry of Lands and Water Resources, which was responsible for Gowe and the Estate, would address this problem as a matter of urgency, but this has not happened. The construction of the proposed Kudu Dam at the confluence of the Munyati and Ngondoma rivers (See Map 5), if undertaken, could provide a lasting solution.

The frequent and regular maintenance, as well as repair of the Gowe water pumping installations is another necessity. Sometimes repair work takes too long before it is effected. Most of the delays in fixing the pump station problems were due to lack of spare parts or lack of foreign currency to import these. Thus, land rent and a host of other factors were viewed as unjust by the outgrowers who also perceived the parastatal as an institution not inclined towards their betterment but their doom.
Strained relations: The “Crisis of Expectations”:-

Plotholder voices against what they have termed “malpractices” and “exploitation” by ARDA have been incessant. The plotholders’ grievances and complaints have been mainly channelled through the Committee of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme which is headed by a Chairman. The current Chairman of the Committee is Mafumana Mjoli. Their disenchantment with ARDA, among other things, has assumed multifarious attributes. Since this can be used to gauge the success or otherwise of the entire scheme, the multifaceted nature of their problems, therefore, deserve attention here. It has been noted with serious concern that “When TILCOR came to us they promised that they would work hand in hand in agreement with plotholders on every job they will be carrying [out] in the scheme.” In practice, this expectation has not been fulfilled. Instead, in the eyes of the plotholders, exploitative tendencies on the part of the corporate body have manifested themselves more and more.

Plotholders have expressed profound dissatisfaction with the “unrealistic” charges demanded by ARDA for services rendered to the former, which were said to deviate from what had been promised. Continuities with the TILCOR days can be discerned here. The farmer previously paid a fixed ADF charge of $70,00 per annum, which was broken down into $40,00 for summer and $30,00 for winter crops. Each settler was expected to bear the total costs of water applied, which could have been twice as much as before on full irrigation requirements. However, the summer crop cost could be variable depending on the availability of rains and the actual costs could not have been much higher compared to the previously fixed charges.

The tables below reflect the water requirement cost distribution at Gowe I and II in 1981.

Table 5.11: WATER REQUIREMENT COST DISTRIBUTION (1981):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
<th>Summer Cropping</th>
<th>Winter Cropping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOWE I</td>
<td>$1800</td>
<td>$1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOWE II</td>
<td>$2486</td>
<td>$2486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1284 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), the Chairman (G. Maturure) and the Secretary (T. Masawi) of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme to the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 5th February 1981, 2.
1285 B. Jongwe, (Chairman, Gowe Irrigation Committee), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 8th January 1997. N.B. The chairmanship changes hands almost on a rotational basis among the sitting tenants or plotholders. The current Chairman is Mafumana Mjoli.
1286 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), the Chairman (G. Maturure) and the Secretary (T. Masawi) of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme to the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, 5th February 1981, 1.
1287 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to the Gowe Settlement Officer; Sanyati Estate Manager and the Budget Controller, 26th August 1981, 2.
1288 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to Estate Manager (Sanyati), 1st June 1981, 1.
Table 5.12: COST PER PLOT (1981):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
<th>Maize</th>
<th>Cotton</th>
<th>Wheat</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOWE I (1,4ha.)</td>
<td>0,7 ha.</td>
<td>0,7 ha.</td>
<td>0,7 ha.</td>
<td>$175,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$50,00</td>
<td>$50,00</td>
<td>$75,00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOWE II (1,2ha.)</td>
<td>0,6 ha.</td>
<td>0,6 ha.</td>
<td>0,6 ha.</td>
<td>$150,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$42,86</td>
<td>$42,86</td>
<td>$64,28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per ha. Costs</td>
<td>$35,71</td>
<td>$35,71</td>
<td>$53,58</td>
<td>$125,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Irrigation costs, which were charged at these rates, imposed a heavy burden on most of the plotholders. The less-to-do farmers in particular were caught up in the cost and performance-related bottlenecks concurrently imposed by the Estate on the one hand and the government on the other.

Land preparation charges also had a similar effect. The charge of $1,80 per litre of diesel for the MEU operation on Sanyati Estate was not favourably perceived as it was to be passed on in its entirety to the settlers for their land preparation requirements. Bearing in mind the fact that there would be no subsidisation by the government, the settlers had to strive for their own sustenance. It was often argued that in this type of settlement scheme, the settlers were regarded as “commercial farmers” who had to bear the true inputs, which contained no subsidising element. However, because the Gowe settlers had grown accustomed to previously subsidised rates, they categorically resisted the charge rates dictated to them by the Estate. In fact, to regard these settlers as “commercial farmers” was an overstatement. An examination of the size of their plots, the level of farm inputs, loan opportunities available to them and their annual income would reveal, beyond doubt, that these people were peasant farmers pure and simple. No doubt they strove to earn cash and have a decent life style, but the commercialisation drive they possessed was always obstructed and limited by ARDA policies which were unfavourable.

Most of the plotholders perceive ARDA’s tractor charges as much higher than those charged by the District Development Fund (DDF) as far as ploughing and discing is concerned. The only snag was that the DDF, as a cheaper option, was not always available when the farmers needed this service. This was due to bureaucratic red tape.

**Continuity or change: Further “Crisis of Expectations”:-**

ARDA found itself in the invidious position of having to be the agency to impose higher land preparation costs, which had previously remained unchanged by DÉVAG over at least

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1289 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to Estate Manager (Sanyati), 1st June 1981, 1.
1290 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser to the Gowe Settlement Officer; Sanyati Estate Manager and the Budget Controller, 26th August 1981, 2.
1291 Ibid.
1292 Ibid.
a period of 5 years. The parastatal’s argument was that land preparation costs charged to the settlers were justifiably higher because they were based on “present day costs.” The Authority felt it had to make the necessary adjustments to keep pace with the rocketing cost of living since Independence. Nevertheless, such a departure from past practices was automatically looked upon with suspicion, hence the allegation levelled against ARDA that it was exploiting the settlers by over-charging them on tractor, fertiliser and chemical inputs. A list of complaints which was subsequently drawn up mainly contained questions why ARDA had unilaterally hiked tillage and input costs; why the parastatal was ignoring settler participation in decision making and why Gowe in spite of being a pilot irrigation project in Sanyati was being treated as an appendage to the Estate.

What is clear from this list of grievances is that ARDA had deviated from the original agreement with the settlers, which stated that the settlers would always be consulted whenever any work was to be carried out on the land and any other matter affecting them. In a nutshell, the factors, which contributed to this crisis situation between the settlers and ARDA, were as follows:

- lack of empathy for the settlers on the part of the Estate Management;
- lack of consultation of the settlers by the management in matters of vital concern to them;
- the arbitrary manner of management in dealing with the settlers;
- the abruptness in dealing with settlers;
- the condescending attitude of the management towards the settlers; and
- the bullying tactics of the management towards settlers.

Equally clear from the evidence is that the settler representatives were adamant that they should not continue to be treated as an extension of the Main Estate. They wanted to be isolated from the Main Sanyati Irrigation Scheme. Indeed, there was need for due respect to be paid to the settlers by everyone concerned since the small-scale scheme existed specifically for them as outlined in the original objectives. Unfortunately, they rarely got this respect.

In the final analysis, the settlers started to blame the government for their plight, because most of the farmers “thought they [sic] were going to be a great change as from the previous government. But now it shows things are becoming harder than before.” With specific reference to ARDA, it was further remarked that

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1293 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser (TILCOR Regional Manager - Mashonaland) to The Secretary, (Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development), 26th February 1981, 2.
1294 Ibid.
1296 Ibid., 3.
1298 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), the Chairman (P. Kuzangah) and the Secretary (T. Masawi) of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme, Sanyati, to the Ministry of

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there had been no effective and noticeable changes in attitudes by TILCOR [now ARDA] management since the inception of majority rule government early last year [1980] but instead the opposite had happened and there had been a hardening of attitudes by TILCOR Management.¹²⁹⁹

Thus, because of the disadvantages the plotholders experienced as a result of their relationship with the Main Estate, they perceived the problems as political. Expression of their grievances was, obviously, never muted. The irrigators, contrary to general expectation after independence that the small-scale farmers would be loath to challenge the state machinery, exhibited no fear of political repercussions in voicing their problems. Their voice was loudly and clearly heard in almost every meeting with ARDA, Government officials and in their own irrigation committee meetings, illustrated earlier.

This aptly summarises how the independence government has lamentably failed to redress the horde of problems smallholder or African farmers, as a whole, are currently experiencing. In fact, the action of the Gowe plotholders was probably a product of the “crisis of expectations,”¹³⁰⁰ which has been prevalent in the country since Independence. It also demonstrates very graphically how peasant agency was at work in the post-independence period. This level of discontent was also a by-product of the development of dissatisfaction reminiscent of the development of a vociferous nationalist movement in both the rural and urban areas in the 1960s and 1970s.

IRRIGATION AND RURAL DIFFERENTIATION.

In Sanyati’s state-run schemes agriculture has become synonymous with the irrigation of cotton, maize and wheat. Sugar beans, soya beans, groundnuts and tomatoes are sometimes grown. These cash crops and in particular cotton, adopted as part of a state-sponsored programme, and to some extent beans enabled the farmers who were deemed to be subsistence producers to achieve an unprecedented increase in income and wealth. The entire area constitutes a booming economy that is anchored by the production and trade in cotton and, together with Gokwe, produces a complex regional economy. Sanyati town itself grew around cotton whose production as well as agricultural extension services had been rehabilitated after the disruptions caused by the guerrilla war (1966-1979). The “immigrants” from Rhodesdale and the southeast of the country had a greater say in this rehabilitation process because of their considerable farming skills which made them dominate economic and political life in the area. Most of them became schoolmasters, major cotton transporters, shop owners, master farmers and extension workers. Cotton pioneers and “immigrant” entrepreneurs such as the Madheruka (“immigrants” from the southeast of Zimbabwe) have been behind Sanyati’s cotton

success story. Apart from the wealth they derived from selling their own produce, Worby correctly observes that many made small fortunes purchasing the cotton of cash-poor farmers and reselling it at a profit to the CMB (COTTCO). Such transactions were illicitly carried out because of the legal implications behind them and as such not all the plottolders had the guts to engage in this rather risky business. The close monitoring of plotholder production made this impossible, hence, this clandestine activity was rife in the dryland section of the community more than anywhere else. Thus, whilst this practice occurred in many parts of Sanyati’s dryland area, it was not as widespread in the ARDA irrigation schemes.

However, cotton continued to register impressive results. Increased production and distance from major markets informed the process that gave birth to numerous handling centres. The rapid expansion of the cotton boom into Sanyati communal lands after independence outstripped the capacity of parastatal institutions such as the AFC and the CMB to retain control over the very processes they had set in motion. The chaos at the transit depots and the deep involvement of civil servants and some “immigrant” farmers in the side marketing of cotton were ample illustrations of this. Indeed, the transformations brought by the boom period to the northwest of Zimbabwe had a profound impact not only on the dryland sector but also on Sanyati’s irrigation schemes.

Sanyati: Cotton and the new irrigation capitalists:

Sanyati, small as it is, had no land left for ambitious cotton farmers with capital to expand. Because of the existing pressure for land in the dryland area bordering the irrigation schemes, there was virtually no prospect for the expansion of the schemes themselves. However, both the dryland farmers and irrigation plottolders continued to cultivate their small pieces of land and produce a saleable surplus. Although they sold produce, there were limits to accumulation because of the small size of their plots, the predominantly poor soils and, above all, the area’s proneness to drought, which makes access to water very critical. Contrary to Mpetwa of ARDA’s statement that “after taking into account all expenses basing from the actuals against the actual income, a middle management farmer will remain with a profit of $3 367.00 plus,” this was not the case for some farmers. The farmers disagreed with these figures which grossly inflated their real income. They often complained that their crop expenses far outweighed their crop income. Hence the majority of them were not operating at a profit. The farmers who were doing well, however, still demanded a reduction of the various deductions on their net income because these acted as a brake on accumulation.

For both these farmers a number of institutional factors facilitated production. Sanyati farmers’ cotton cultivation skills have always been boosted by their close proximity to

1301 Because such dealings were illegal, offenders risked being arrested or evicted from the scheme. For not selling through the official channel sometimes they were denied further access to input loans which had a negative effect on their next harvest.
the Kadoma Cotton Research Institute, an institution established in 1925 by the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation (ECGC) and taken over in 1947 by the government to develop more productive seed strains tailored to local growing conditions and to respond more effectively to changing international markets. In the ECGC’s vicinity is the Cotton Training Centre (CTC), born out of efforts begun in 1972 by the Commercial Cotton Growers Association (CCGA) to train field supervisors and pest scouts for white farmers. It was just before independence that its mandate was dilated to include the training of small-scale cotton growers the majority of whom were black farmers. Under the auspices of the CTC selected farmers, extension workers (including ARDA Settlement Officers), university students and even foreign agricultural officers went through an intensive residential training course in crop, pest and conservation management. Field Recorders also attended cotton refresher or production courses at the same centre.

The establishment of the CTC was financed by the Agrochemical Industry (Windmill, Agricura and Shell Chemical) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and for a long time before the current impasse between Zimbabwe and leading industrialised nations like Britain and the USA continued to draw on operating grants from USAID, the European Economic Community (EEC – now the European Union/EU) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations (UN). Support for agricultural initiatives was strong between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. Since 2000 much less is going into the area of development assistance. Dwindling donor financing is hampering multilateral agricultural projects. Very little is being done to prevent the swindling of peasant farmers either by the state or trans-national organisations. Currently, a new initiative to protect smallholder cotton farmers from being ripped off by the government or multinational companies has been mounted by the Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) called the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODOD). Its achievements are still to be evaluated.

Among other institutions the CCGA had a rather nefarious agenda. Analysing this institution, Worby rightly observes that the Commercial Cotton Growers Association apparently had everything to gain from embracing the small farmers in this way. This gesture must have suggested to the new government that white farmers were now willing to lend a hand and share expertise with their poorer brethren in the impoverished communal areas. At the same time, the CCGA may have already recognised the strength that thousands of black cotton farmers would add to their own efforts to lobby for higher

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1305 Available statistics reveal that 12 000 commercial farm employees were trained by the CTC between 1972 and 1987. In the same period over 17 000 communal area farmers had also received training. These statistics can be gleaned from: “Cotton in Zimbabwe,” The Herald: Special Supplement, Harare: (June 17, 1986), 2 and Agriserve, (Harare: 1987), 81. See also Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity,” 197. N.B. The Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) is an international development agency (IDA). IDAs have many of the same characteristics as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), especially service organisations as opposed to technical organisations.
1306 Telephone Interview, Nyandoro with Deprose Muchena (USAID), 2nd November 2005.
1307 ZIMCODOD is an NGO whose primary concern is to assist small-scale farmers improve their productive capacity and access to markets.
crop and input prices. Less obviously, the training programme must have addressed the old fears of some white farmers that the cotton fields of some “untutored” African growers would provide a haven for pests that would endanger the “national” industry.

Two major scenarios emerge from this. On the one hand, if any single interest sought to gain from the expansion of the cotton-training programme, it was the multinational-owned fertiliser and pesticide companies that sought to develop the untapped potential demand for their products among hundreds of thousands of African cultivators in places like Sanyati. In this regard, the CCGA Chief Executive Officer (CEO) suggested at the time: “It is obviously in the interests of manufacturers of pesticides, fertilizers and other products for the agricultural industry to expand their markets. We will be introducing the use of these products to farmers, who otherwise would never know about their applications.” On the other, the farmers who had the brazenness to harness this chemical technology produced greater yields which were an important distinguishing mark from the yields of their kinsmen who either least afforded these or were reluctant to embrace this new technology.

Cotton benefited both the farmers and the lorry owners who ferried the farmers’ produce, initially, to the CMB main depot in Kadoma and, later, to Sanyati since the establishment of the local depot in 1976. Cotton was transported at $23.00 per bale in the late 1980s and, at these rather extraordinarily high rates, its transportation was yielding some individual transporters a gross income of well over $5,000.00 a week, a handsome profit which was rarely achieved by the greater percentage of the communal growers and the smallholder irrigators themselves per annum. That cotton transporters were making more money than the farmers themselves is less surprising because some unscrupulous transporters charged more than the commercial rates, which, of course, varied from season to season. Farm owners-cum transport owners like the Mazivanhanga family were among the wealthiest people in the area. These farmers and lorry drivers engaged in the buying and selling of cotton. In fact, the crop was of considerable profit to the lorry-driving agrarian capitalists. In the independence era, their appetite for accumulation had been made greater by the favourable economic and political environment created by the government. Outgrower families were not among the major lorry drivers, though, but some “immigrant” plotholders used proceeds from cotton to put up family stores at Sanyati Growth Point when it was established in 1977. For most of them the small pieces of land they cultivated imposed limits to accumulation to a point that they became ultimately interested in investing not only in cotton but retail shops some of which were used to buy local producers’ cotton at cheaper prices and then selling it at higher prices.

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1309 Ibid.
1311 Nyamutova, Personal Interview.
1312 Morgan Gazi (Madiro Village head, Ward 23), Personal Interview, Agricura, Sanyati Main Growth Point, Sanyati, 15th October 2004. N.B. Major transport companies compete for the cotton transshipment contract especially during bumper harvest years. To avoid serious transport bottlenecks sometimes the contractor or the CMB itself sub-contracted additional, privately owned lorries such as Lozane and Mazivanhanga’s to move cotton expeditiously out of the Sanyati district. Later the business came to be dominated by distant transport owners from Chegutu, Kadoma and Harare.
Others, in particular G. Maturure, established a family retail business within the Gowe irrigation scheme to service the area. He used the profits to buy a car and a bicycle.

During the 1988/89 season Maturure planted a quarter of his plot to cotton and reaped a total of 22 bales and grossed $4,617.00. All the plotholders put together planted 64 hectares of cotton (excluding the 6 ha from vacant plots C1 and D1 cultivated by the central estate), picked about 650 bales and realised a gross income of approximately $103,177.80. This excluded the $15,859.80 realised by the Main Estate on their two plots. Estimated average cotton yields for 1989/90 were between 700 and 2,600 kgs per ha. Maturure had deliberately reserved three quarters of his plot for beans the following season. In that season he achieved a phenomenal total yield per ha of 2,070 kgs against an average yield for all plotholders of 1,218 kgs per ha. He was closely followed by E. Chiwombe with 1,958 kgs per ha. The lowest ranked bean producer was David Mjoli with 518 kgs per ha. Put together, all the 22 Gowe farmers who grew beans that particular season produced a whopping total of 26,786 kgs and realised handsome profits selling their crop at $2.00 per kg. Farmers like G. Maturure together with K. Muzanenhamo, A. Motso and G. Chekeche had, by the winter of 1990, benefited immensely from irrigation that they cleared their outstanding AFC loan accounts at a time when another outgrower, C. Mhara, had an outstanding balance of $11,177.35. Admittedly, he was less likely, short of it being wholly redeemed by the Corporation, to pay up this colossal debt not even in the foreseeable future. By the same winter other successful farmers, notably T. Nyamutova and O. Dangaio had also paid all their dues to ZIMBANK with the exception, among others, of M. Mjoli who was still owing a sum of $7,695.66. It is clear from the few farmers that managed to free themselves from the burgeoning debt burden that Sanyati’s cotton boom, together with the accelerated cultivation of beans, had generated its own regionally based class of aggressive entrepreneurs who were crossing residual historical boundaries in land tenure and labour markets to constitute a nascent class of small-scale irrigation capitalists at Gowe.

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1314 Ibid. N.B. Plotholders were not happy that the Estate was not paying land rent for the vacant plots it was utilising. For more information on this complaint see NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Operating Accounts for 10 Months to 31 August 1990 – Cost Centre (Sanyati Estate No. 72): ARDA Gowe Settlement Scheme – Settlement Officer’s Report for August 1990,” N. Kamudzandu.
1317 Ibid.
1318 Ibid.
Some very successful plotholders who did not have adequate family labour hired cotton pickers during peak periods from the surrounding community. Since farmers were assured of a crop even in times of drought, cotton – a drought resistant crop - became very popular. It also generated employment for both rich and poor even in difficult years. Worby has cited a case of an agrarian capitalist from Sanyati only referred to as Charity C. who deigned to pick cotton for a week on the irrigated Gowe scheme during the 1986/87 drought. For him “this underscored … not only the flexibility with which labour moved between different agricultural sectors that might have different abilities to survive climatic and economic change but also the fluidity with which individuals circulated through economic positions over time.” However, the system of hiring labour was not so common in the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. Sometimes in a bumper harvest year like 1988 workers were so scarce that they were able to drive up the price of their labour twice over the course of the season and Gowe plotholders could not afford them. The smallness of the irrigation plots made it difficult particularly for resource-poor irrigators to engage alternative non-wage systems such as work parties (humwe) or rotational work groups (machangano). The solution for these plotholders has been to tap as well as depend on family or household labour. However, it was not an uncommon feature in the Main Irrigation Estate to engage wage labour.

The Estate hired pickers from the adjoining communal area, parts of Gokwe, the Zambezi Valley (especially the Tonga country), the sparsely populated Muzvezve Resettlement Area which is situated along the road from Kadoma to Sanyati and sometimes the army was called upon to assist when labour supply conditions were acute. The pickers were paid at rates determined by the Estate Manager per kg of cotton picked and the Estate provided extra incentives such as food and other inducements. Whilst the ARDA Estate employs about 250 permanent employees it, however, almost entirely depends on casual or seasonal (maricho) workers – 1 500 annually – for the bulk of its labour requirements. These performed seasonal work since the inception of the Estate in 1974 and continued to promote the “casualisation” of the labour force to this day. For the ARDA Chief Executive Officer, “most of them have been so seasonal that they are almost permanent.” The engagement of semi-skilled casual labour was a departure from a proven practice since the Second World War when the large mine owners and big ranchers had been interested in recruiting a more highly skilled, permanent or stable labour force that would settle permanently on the mines or farms with their families.

The Estate’s recruitment policy, which entailed the hiring of more contract workers as opposed to permanent employees, was a common means of avoiding the higher labour costs entailed by post-independence minimum wage legislation applicable only to full time farm workers. The stipulated minimum wage in the 1980s was $30.00 per month –

\[^{1321}\] Ibid., 201. N.B. Estate managers go out into the villages to negotiate and solicit for contract labourers from traditional chiefs. The bulk of ARDA Sanyati Estate employees are contract workers and retaining them on a long-term basis is very costly. See J. Z. Z. Matowanyika, (ARDA Chief Executive Officer), Personal Interview, ARDA Head Office – Harare, 20th October 2006.  
\[^{1322}\] Matowanyika, Personal Interview.  
itself a pittance by any standards. Having established themselves as capitalist irrigators, the plotholders at Gowé sought to draw on opportunities for profit that were becoming available as a result of Sanyati’s cotton miracle. The story of the cotton boom highlighted the changes that were occurring in the regional agrarian economy and how this led to the emergence of cotton irrigation capitalists in the area.

**Irrigation agriculture: Modernising impact:**

The development of Sanyati has been premised on irrigation agriculture. The establishment first of Gowé and later the Main Estate as well as the proliferation of cotton growing since the 1960s influenced the creation of an irrigation-based town or growth point in the late 1970s. Sanyati Growth Point, which is older than Gokwe, was established almost three years after the TILCOR Estate.\(^{1324}\) It was a logical choice for a business centre because it was a focal point for many areas in the northwest because of its proximity to already-established urban centres such as Kadoma, Kwekwe and Chegutu. The growth point was established around a number of pre-independence objectives. In the decade before independence, Sanyati was clearly envisioned as the future nucleus of development in the region, serving as one of the pilots for the “growth point” strategy of the Rhodesian government. That strategy aimed to maximise benefits thought to emanate from optimal concentrations of people and economic activities in central places such as Sanyati. By integrating regional cash crop production with agro-processing and by providing training and infrastructure to support a core of master farmers on irrigation schemes, the growth point strategy was intended to divert the surplus labour flowing to the towns back into the rural zones from which they originated.\(^{1325}\) These objectives continued to drive the developmental tempo in the area even in the post-independence era. It is important to note that the Sanyati town population has grown rapidly since 1977 with the number of residents recently estimated at between 3 000 and 5 000, swelling to

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\(^{1324}\) TILCOR, renamed ARDA in 1981/1982 and ADA in 1989, was a parastatal created by the Smith regime in order to promote development in what were then known as Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs). Under the TILCOR model, a central irrigated estate devoted to the production of cash crops was established with the hope that it would provide both rural employment and associated “spin-offs.” Before the inception of the Main Estate in 1974 Gowé had not existed as an outgrower component. Gowé plotholders became outgrowers situated on the periphery of the Estate, utilising the latter’s irrigation and machinery, and marketing their produce through TILCOR only after 1974. The Estate’s total irrigated area is approximately 1 200 ha although only 1 000 ha are being utilised. Its production cycle entails the cultivation of cotton, groundnuts and sugar beans in summer, wheat and green maize (mealies) in winter. It employs roughly 250 permanent staff and 1 500 seasonal workers annually. The 36 outgrowers account for a further 120 ha. The Sanyati cotton depot was opened in 1976 and upgraded to a ginnery in 1984 – the first in a communal area. Its ginning capacity was doubled to 50 000 tonnes annually in 1989. See Agriserve (Pvt) Ltd., *The Impact of Sanyati Gin on Smallholder Cotton Production: Report to United States Agency for International Development and Cotton Marketing Board Zimbabwe*, (Harare: Agriserve and Ronco Consulting Corporation, May 1986, Appendix 10); Whitsun Foundation, *Rural Workshop and Machinery Centre: Report and Recommendations of the Director on the Proposed Rural Workshop and Machinery Centre, Sanyati TTL*, (Salisbury: Whitsun Foundation Project, 1977) and Tapela, “Growth Points and Regional Development in Zimbabwe.” The growth point at Sanyati was first established in 1977 and 3 864 persons were recorded in the 1982 census.

between 7 000 and 8 000 with the influx of seasonal workers, traders and transporters during the cotton harvesting period.  

Although the growth point at Sanyati has given rise to a variety of small-scale manufacturing, service and distribution enterprises and continues to serve as a major conduit through which crops and people flow to and from remote parts of Gokwe, Sanyati’s orientation is undeniably still towards the major towns of the highlands to the southeast especially Kwekwe and Kadoma. Because Gowe-Sanyati is small and its soil fertility is deteriorating as a result of population pressure, cotton monoculture and due to some farmers’ inability to buy inorganic fertilisers, potential yields have reached a ceiling. As a consequence, some male plotholders and their sons seek full-time employment either locally or in town, thereby leaving behind their spouses to manage the small irrigation plot or the dryland plot in the crowded “reserve.” In this respect, the demographic and residential history of many Sanyati households illustrates the “split” family prototype that has been observed by Wolpe, Bush and Cliffe which features heavily in “labour reserve” models of most rural economies.  

This confirms the aptness of Worby’s argument that such models posit that women’s labour in underdeveloped and resource-poor “reserves” like Sanyati historically served to subsidise the cost of reproducing wage-labour for employers in industrialising centres such as Kadoma and Kwekwe. However, it should be pointed out that, in a number of instances, female participation in production activities also mirrors their class position in society.

This case exemplifies the extraordinary range and complexity of exchange relations that Sanyati households are engaged in at various points in time. Their strong links to the formal wage economy are obvious. For instance, over 80% of the Sanyati households had a history of wage-employment in the family, although the dominant sources of employment had shifted over the last thirty years from the mines, towns and farms in the former European highlands to local jobs with the CMB ginnery, GMB, the ARDA agricultural estate and the District Council. With limited land, it is clear that households in Sanyati were unable to accumulate capital through cultivation alone. Thus, the manner in which labour was deployed in this district was not at variance with conventional wisdom about the substantive activities and wider economic functions of a rural labour “reserve.”

Estate and smallholder irrigation agriculture in Sanyati does not concentrate on producing subsistence crops which is an unreliable enterprise. As already demonstrated in this chapter, an array of cash crops was grown for sale at the Growth Point and beyond. This

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1329 Agriserve (Pvt) Ltd., The Impact of Sanyati Gin on Smallholder Cotton Production, 64. See also Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity,” 203.
means that despite outgrowers cultivating small plots, they are not merely eking out a living, but they are also engaged in accumulation. The Estate produces, among other things, cotton and wheat, which help to finance, to some extent, their own operations, but to a large extent, head office operations. The Gowe plotholders, on the other hand, are more than willing to cover maize uncertainties by continuing to invest in cotton – a crop that can be easily exchanged for cash, which can then be used to purchase locally available grain. In the diversified wage-labour economy that embraces both the communal and small-scale commercial areas (Copper Queen and Chenjiri), as well as the parastatal ARDA Estate, the plotholders, who since 1974 exist as a “semi-proletarianised peasantry,” are able to rely on the availability of casual employment opportunities to earn cash and cover food shortages. Well-to-do irrigation farmers can hire local labour on their plots for specific tasks such as ploughing, weeding and harvesting just like any “capitalist” farmer. The basic difference is that most of them do not own mechanical equipment such as tractors, harrows and ploughs. Their plight is further compounded by the fact that they lack other means of production such as cattle, since the DC effected the prohibition order against livestock rearing in the Gowe Irrigation Scheme in 1967. They cannot hire machinery from the Growth Point because it is expensive. As a result, in order to fully utilise their plots, they have to rely on the ARDA Estate for the provision of traction power and this has intensified their subordination to it.

Conclusion

In conclusion, therefore, irrigation agriculture precipitated wider forms of socio-economic differentiation than those found under dryland farming. This was partly due to irrigation’s capability to produce both a summer and a winter crop – a very remote possibility in the rain-fed area. It was also partly attributable to the fact that cropping in the irrigated area was conducted on a more intensive basis than in the non-irrigated area where it was mainly extensive. Plotholders, therefore, profited from increased yields per hectare per annum. Cash inflows to these farmers were also guaranteed throughout the year. On the whole, the decade 1980 to 1990 witnessed broader differentiation processes compared to the two earlier periods because of the cotton boom and the increase in the number of services availed to farmers at independence. More of these services were distributed on a more intensive though disproportionate basis in the outgrower schemes than in the dry farming area. Plotholders received credit from a wide spectrum of lenders. Various institutions such as ARDA itself, the Co-operatives, the AFC and ZIMBANK

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1330 The boundaries of the Copper Queen small-scale commercial farms in Gokwe were drawn in 1962 three years after the Chenjiri farms on Sanyati’s northeastern flank were similarly demarcated for African purchase and occupation. The most recently available evidence for the region produced by the Surveyor-General in 1983 indicates 210 demarcated farms in Chenjiri and 282 in Copper Queen, although the latter figure has increased recently to 408 with the subdivision of large unallocated farms in the northern section. 1982 census figures indicate a total of 19 177 persons and 3 220 households for both of these areas, plus the Copper Queen Resettlement Areas I and II and the Sechuru Resettlement Area. See Agriserve (Pvt) Ltd., *The Impact of Sanyati Gin on Smallholder Cotton Production*, 64. An unknown number of “squatters” were probably not enumerated even though many, who entered these areas during the war, were eventually allocated plots.

1331 Worby, “Remaking Labour, Reshaping Identity,” 204.
supported them. Despite plotholder reservations with lease conditions, marketing arrangements, land charges and other unpalatable services, as the main developmental agent of outgrower sections, ARDA offered a more comprehensive package to the recipients than any other single organisation. The Authority attended to all aspects of farming such as ploughing, planting, irrigation water supply, extension advice and marketing.

Despite the many services plotholders received there were, however, big differences in social structure between dryland and irrigation producers. Traditionally, most peasants were mixed farmers who specialised in crop cultivation and livestock rearing, hence, their agriculture was highly diversified. On the contrary, irrigation farming was extremely specialised. For example, once allocated irrigation plots farmers had to give up everything they were doing. They were not allowed to keep cattle and were barred from staying with relatives on these plots. There were no traditional leaders either. The DC, ARDA, the Estate Manager or the Minister of Lands was the ultimate authority in Sanyati irrigation, a role that has been taken over by the Minister of Agriculture. Thus, there was a completely different social structure in irrigation and this system was weaker than the typically peasant one where there were communal arbitrative and credible social structures in the form of chiefs and headmen.

This chapter has further demonstrated that the rural commercialisation process associated with the post-independence cotton boom did not only widen the accumulation gap between plotholders but also shows that cotton or the “white fibre” was not the only source of differentiation in this period. It can be asserted that there emerged different forms of socio-economic differentiation in Sanyati because it was not only the actual cultivation of the “white fibre” that led to peasant accumulation. A number of activities ranging from the cultivation of other crops, access to loan facilities, inputs, land, labour and off-farm income made Sanyati farmers relatively wealthy. Thus, in order to understand the implications of smallholder farmers becoming involved in a commodity crop like cotton it is counterproductive to predict in advance that there is going to be a single process of class differentiation, but what actually transpires depends on questions of opportunities available to individual households and the economic culture of the region which for years has been beyond the surveillance of the state.

If, from the outset, farmers who were already wealthy, that is, those with Master Farmer certificates or proven farming experience (which category excluded women) were the only ones selected to occupy irrigation plots at Gowe the question to ask is would rural differentiation manifest itself clearly? The assumption is that there would be no poor farmers in this case. However, as demonstrated in this chapter Sanyati outgrowers were differentiated on the wide basis of (a) gender (b) personal capacity; political connections; (d) connections with the Estate management and (e) privileged access to vacant holdings, water, irrigation pipes, tillage and extension services. The economic and social status of the plotholder was, thus, determined by how he related to the Main Estate

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1332 Although Gowe tenants were allocated plots of approximately the same size, they possessed differential farming experience as farmers think and plan differently. Some plan ahead of others whilst many were already wealthy from Rhodesdale.
and the state. The relationship with the Estate, though, was a prescriptive one. For instance, a plotholder was told how to irrigate his crops. He would plant, weed and harvest when told to do so. Refusal to obey these instructions entailed removal from the scheme. In such a highly paternalistic relationship the plotholder was, therefore, not learning anything from his association with the Estate. He was a glorified labourer. There was no other system he could go to save for the more prosperous ones who could afford to purchase land in the small-scale commercial farming sector.

There were numerous consistencies as well as inconsistencies in the manner the two irrigation schemes were operated in the first decade of independence in contrast to the way they were administered in the colonial period. The latter period was characterised by much stricter discipline than the former. The regulatory framework imposed by the state through the DC would not be challenged. This does not mean that there were subsequently no rules and regulations but irrigation discipline had become more relaxed as evidenced by the many deputations sent to challenge Estate, ARDA or parent ministry authority since 1980. These were meant to ameliorate plotholder suffering, but in spite of these representations irrigation plotholders have remained in a parlous state. There is, thus, much continuity in the manner of administering these schemes, although some changes can be discerned.

The chapter also illustrates that ARDA tried to administer its schemes in a uniform manner. The monthly, quarterly and annual reports were designed to ensure uniformity in the recording and reporting systems adopted on the ARDA managed settlement schemes. The data presented in these reports was used in planning and evaluating scheme performance with a view towards ensuring sustainable production. However, attempting to achieve sustainable production on the basis of limited access to land and other services such as finance was reflective of lack of genuineness on the part of government. Insufficient land and finance impeded plotholder progress. Those who were recommended for loans by ARDA’s Settlement Officer often received them and those who were not did not. Differentiation was, therefore, enhanced by the selective practice of agricultural extension, whose agents limited credit to those who followed “approved farming practices.” Selectivity of this nature meant one particular class of farmers became more affluent than the other hence the inappropriateness of the term egalitarian classlessness for Sanyati. This society was neither traditional nor homogeneously egalitarian. Thus, although notions of an undifferentiated peasantry abound these do not apply to Sanyati.

In spite of the occasionally unfavourable loan climate, this chapter has demonstrated how significantly the agricultural boom of the 1980s contributed to heightened forms of socio-economic inequalities. The end of the war ushered in an era of prosperity for some peasant irrigators. Others remained in the doldrums of this same prosperity. Outgrower disenchantment with policies that clipped their wings and proscribed accumulation prospects in this period became very pronounced. The farmers were perturbed not only by lease arrangements that deprived them of land ownership but also by numerous other injustices that perennially tied them to the whims of the Estate. To a large extent, this contributed to the emergence of the “crisis of expectations” reminiscent of the post-
independence period. However, although they did not succeed all the time to wring the sort of concessions they wanted from Estate management, the mere fact that they made themselves heard had a consoling and liberating effect on them. Feeling liberated from the tyranny and overbearing influence of the Estate, however, did nothing to reduce their seemingly eternal dependence on it. The forced reliance on Estate services heightened uncertainties about settlers ever achieving their full emancipation from Estate control. Demands on their labour continued to escalate. The story of this decade thus captures the social, economic and moral decadence of the Estate’s relationship with the outgrower - the goose that lay the golden egg – in as much as it expresses the ideals of lowered moral value on his part. This was so because first, the outgrowers had been forced into a very small scheme and then they were relegated to mere labourers in a scheme they perceived as their own. It was more painful for them to accept a subordinate position in spite of being the pioneers of irrigation in Sanyati.

Despite the problems experienced by the tenants the relative advantages they derived from independence and the boom period that ensued were considerable. A sizeable number became rich. Proceeds from selling cotton, beans and other crops had a positive effect on their standard of living. However, irrigation did not bestow equal opportunities on the tenants. Some benefited more than others from their participation in this enterprise. Because ARDA still wanted the settler scheme to act as their exclusive labour reservoir it can be concluded that their action was designed to maintain it as such and proscribe the emergence of differentiation. Obviously, accumulation militated against labour supply, but the various tactics employed by outgrowers to challenge Estate authority meant that their march towards accumulation could not be hindered. The post-independence era, therefore, unleashed a flurry of activities that aided accumulation and widened the differential gap between irrigation farmers. In fact, with the cotton boom differentiation as a process transcended any proportions ever witnessed in Sanyati since the 1960s.
CHAPTER SIX


INTRODUCTION

In the post-1990 period a number of socio-economic and political changes occurred which impacted on the process of differentiation among the groups under study. This chapter focuses on the ESAP period in Zimbabwe. It examines the problems confronting Sanyati agriculture and the effect of economic liberalisation on the area’s irrigation economy. It also attempts to establish whether different individuals, households (both male and female-headed ones) or groups within the Sanyati community reacted in the same way to the new challenges both irrigation and dryland farming were facing. It would seem that peasant responses were quite varied. Some farmers failed to comprehend why, suddenly, cotton growing, for several decades the hub of this thriving rural economy, had become a liability in the 1990s. Others quickly realised that the days of cotton success were over and shifted their focus to maize and beans, among other crops. Still others hoped this was a momentary setback that would be rectified with the end of the drought and through strong government measures. Least did they know that the government had become so incapacitated by global monetary demands that prospects for spearheading a successful cotton programme were almost non-existent. State intervention in rural development had been drastically curtailed. The onus now seemed to be on individual farmers’ ability to be enterprising and innovative. Those who did not subscribe to the belief that commodity crops, in combination with the role of the state, were the only factors that would redeem them from abject poverty progressed relatively well compared to their colleagues who kept on hoping that the cotton miracle (1960s-1980s) would one day return to grace Sanyati agriculture. Such hope was not matched by reality on the ground.

Government land, economic, and political policies in this period are reviewed to ascertain the extent to which these propelled farmers to adjust to the new situation. In general, it seems that people abandon old ideas and practices and embrace new ones only after the latter have proved beneficial. These considerations are integral aspects of rural differentiation and class formation as some farmers adapt relatively quickly to new opportunities while others refuse to change, thereby lagging behind. In this period, adaptation or otherwise was dictated mainly by the economic environment and consequences wrought by ESAP. During this programme, most irrigation tenants reaped so few if any benefits at all from irrigation that they were not willing to remain on their plots. In fact, the period 1991-2000, more than any other in the history of Sanyati, witnessed massive withdrawals from irrigated agriculture, a process that led to many plots staying vacant. The biting economic situation did not encourage new farmers to join the scheme, hence, the number of vacant holdings that were cultivated by the central estate or were illegally cultivated by some plotholders increased.

In an effort to revamp the country’s economy the Government of Zimbabwe adopted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1991. The programme was abandoned in 1995 because it did not bring about the anticipated economic prosperity. Instead it brought economic ruin.
In spite of the increase in the number of vacant plots, the irony of the situation is that these could not be taken up easily at a time when hordes of people were made economically redundant when they lost their jobs during massive retrenchments. These people were either released into the rural areas where opportunities to start a new life as a farmer were limited or they opted to stay in the cities where they led miserable lives. With respect to Sanyati, the early 1990s experienced a huge influx of “immigrants” most of whom were retrenched from the giant Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO), the state-run ARDA Estate, the agricultural marketing parastatals (COTTCO and GMB) and other companies in Sanyati, Gweru, Kwekwe, Kadoma, Harare and Bulawayo. Several skilled and semi-skilled workers were laid off from their jobs as a result of the effects of ESAP as enterprises began to downsize their operations. Commercial farms around Sanyati offered retirement packages to a number of farm workers. Patchway, Golden Valley, Cam and Motor gold mines in Kadoma and other mines like Chakari Gold in Chegutu also retrenched miners and most of these families found their way into Sanyati villages, but there was nowhere to invest their earnings. Fresh land allocations had ceased since the 1960s as this resource had already become scarce due to the limited land area characteristic of the district. Despite irrigation’s proven benefits to the rural community, irrigation plots were too limited if not too small to absorb all the victims of the retrenchment and forced retirement system. Although according to official statements vacant holdings could be taken up by those willing to, in practice it was not as easy. Furthermore, irrigation did not inspire much confidence among the prospective farmers because it was no longer as viable during the 1990s as it was before. Cotton was not doing exceptionally well in this period. The farmers complained that they did not want to grow cotton because of poor soils and unremunerative prices. The small irrigation plots were not worth investing in because of the low prices offered on the local or domestic market. In addition, the small plots barely generated high volumes of quality products for the regional, continental and international markets due to the dwindling financial, extension and other vital services coupled with high costs of production. It should be pointed out that cultivating 3 or 4 ha, as is the case at Gowe, is very expensive because the cost of electricity and water can hardly be recouped on such small pieces of land. Thus, the overall income realisable on the tiny plots is relatively low, hence the lure to the scheme has been minimal in comparison to the early days. The only major advantage as far as income is concerned is that the smallholder farmers at Gowe can

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1334 ZISCO Steel in Redcliffe, Kwekwe, was formerly known as the Rhodesia Iron and Steel Company (RISCO). It is the largest iron and steel firm in Zimbabwe located about 150 km from Sanyati town. In the 1980s and 1990s the firm faced a lot of financial and viability problems, which led to the scaling down of its operations. This resulted in the forced retrenchment of many skilled as well as semi-skilled workers. In October 1993 alone, 1 000 workers were retrenched and awarded packages of between ZS3 000,00 and ZS7 000,00. For a comprehensive analysis of the performance of ZISCO Steel in historical context see E. S. Pangeti, “The State and Manufacturing Industry: A Study of the State as Regulator and Entrepreneur in Zimbabwe, 1930 to 1990,” PhD thesis, Harare: University of Zimbabwe/UZ, (December 1995).


double crop (i.e. grow one crop in summer and another in winter), unlike dryland cultivators who can only grow one crop in summer.

The Main Estate, which for many years had been playing a custodial role with regard to the smallholder scheme, found itself in a serious financial quagmire. In the circumstances, it was trying to quietly withdraw, thereby depriving the plotholders of traditional state or Estate support. With the “guardian” role of the ARDA Estate being gradually removed, irrigation in Gowe has become one big nightmare. It is militating against agricultural recovery. However, the efficacy of the Estate’s guardian role should not be over-emphasised because it would hardly survive without the injection of state funds. It is true that from a productivity point of view, the Estate was never known to enjoy any prosperity, so its relative success and that of the tenant scheme was more the result of the strong subsidisation element up to the 1980s. The second decade of Zimbabwe’s independence ushered in colossally intractable problems for the state as subsidies dried up. Government was actually forced to redefine its role in the operation and maintenance of schemes. It no longer subscribed to its old paternalistic role in irrigation, where subsidisation was strong. The resultant impact directly dislocated the bigger irrigation project and this also signified the beginning of operational hiccups for the small-scale scheme. For the Main Estate, the escalation of financial problems inevitably culminated in ARDA’s decision to shut it down in 2000. Gowe virtually collapsed too. During the difficult 1990s, some Gowe farmers thought they could resuscitate dwindling accumulation prospects by abandoning cotton in favour of other crops, demanding the transfer of the management of the scheme to the plotholders and embarking on a process of land grabbing. Thus, this period witnessed the open onslaughts not only on the rising number of vacated plots but also on Estate land. Although fresh invasions of Estate land, since the ones that occurred in 1992 and 2000 have not been reported, those who helped themselves to Estate land have not been dislodged to this day, indicating a very serious administrative and political crisis.

Clearly, some plotholders and dryland farmers made money from the sale of other crops. However, on the whole, irrigation did not produce significant forms of rural differentiation between 1991 and 2000. The cotton miracle had abruptly come to an end and those who did not know any other form of agricultural survival, apart from the one proffered by cotton, literally collapsed under the weight of the new economic challenges. A number tried to raise their status by acquiring more land for themselves from the vacant plots and Estate land. However, for these desperate farmers, land could not be a strong basis for differentiation because they could not make any meaningful improvements on such land because it was illegally acquired. They farmed it in fear that they could be evicted at any moment. Clearly, irrigation development was hampered by the exigencies of ESAP. As will be demonstrated in this chapter, accumulation was made more and more difficult, not least by the fact that the new economic programme was punctuated by horrendous droughts and the stark reality that the cotton miracle had run its full circle in Sanyati. By 2000, both dryland and irrigation agriculture had not recovered, and for a typically agro-based economy such as Sanyati, this meant that agriculturally driven differentiation had been put on hold for some time or for an indefinite period.

The immediate post-1990 period:

The cotton boom had ended by 1990. The options for many peasant farmers were limited. As already noted in preceding chapters, agriculture is the mainstay of Zimbabwe’s economy. Although the sector contributes only about 18% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by 2000 it was the country’s largest foreign currency earner and about 40% of the country’s exports were of agricultural origin. About 70% of the population is directly dependent on it for formal employment and agriculture provides about 60% of raw materials to industry. Recent experiences, especially the periods during and immediately after the severe droughts of 1986/87, 1991/92 and 1993/94, have shown that the performance of the country’s economy is directly related to the performance of the agricultural sector. The economy performs well when agriculture is thriving. Immediately after 1990 there were clear signs that agriculture and in particular cotton growing in Sanyati’s dryland and irrigation areas was hugely compromised by a variety of factors, chief among which were the unrelenting droughts and the deleterious effects of ESAP.

The severe drought in particular meant that yields were very poor. According to E. Munengami “in 1992 the excessively dry conditions and the [declining water levels]” in the normally reliable Munyati River, together with the “frequent pump break downs,” made it impossible for the plotholders to achieve “above average yields.” Another Gowe irrigator, G. Maturure, has corroborated this evidence by arguing that “due to the failure of rains,” even the most successful performer could not surpass the wheat average yield of 19 bags per acre achieved in 1973 and the maize average yield of about 4½ tonnes per ha or 30 bags per plot realised in the 1982/83 season. The former Estate Manager, J. Gwerengwe, summed up the position by saying “This was [probably] the worst drought [since irrigation was introduced] in terms of its impact on plotholder and estate production,” adding that “Less-endowed families suffered more.” Because yields were not high enough for many plotholders (i.e. the resource-poor, the aged, the infirm and even some of the resource-rich) it was very difficult for the whole scheme to maintain substantial grain reserves which are often used as an index of scheme food

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1339 E. Munengami, (Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 8th January 1997.

1340 G. Maturure, (Gowe Irrigation Committee Member and Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 9th January 1997.

1341 J. Gwerengwe, (Estate Manager – ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Sanyati Estate, 2nd May 1996.

1342 Grain reserves are most commonly measured in terms of carryover stocks i.e. the amount, depending on
security for a given season. At the beginning of 1991, underachievers included G. Tasara and F. Tizira, who could not produce because they failed to receive loans from the AFC due to previous arrears, and an unnamed old farmer who had completely failed to raise a yield because his field was overwhelmed with weeds. He had failed to weed because, apart from his age, he could not hire labour due to lack of money. Such problems led to a lowering of the harvest. The decline in settler production can also be attributed to the fact that of the total scheme hectrage of 120 only 79 ha were being utilised by Gowe I and Gowe II tenant farmers combined. This meant that a whopping total of 41 ha (about 34% of the scheme) were vacant plots.

Although so many plots lay vacant, the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement recommended only 11 new applicants for allocation of irrigation land in January 1991. Existing settlers sent delegations to the Minister of Lands imploring him to allow them to take over the vacant plots, but their efforts were ignored. This was so because the Ministry maintained that it was “policy [that] each settler should not have an excess of 4 ha.” Such utterances came at a time when new incumbents of plots were not easy to get because in the 1990s, the selection criteria had been further complicated by the insistence on the part of the Agricultural Land Settlement Board that candidates could only be short listed if they had a proven academic background, sound agricultural education, experience in agriculture, and cash in the bank and also if their

the region, of both food grains and feed grains in storage at the time the new crop is harvested and begins to come in. This definition has been provided by Lester R. Brown and Erik P. Eckholm, By Bread Alone, (Oxford: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1975), 58.

Food security requires that all individuals in a population possess the resources to assure access to enough food for an active and healthy life. This definition has been furnished by Michael Weber and Thomas Jayne, “Food Security and its Relationship to Technology, Institutions, Policies and Human Capital,” Agricultural Economics Staff Paper (88-16), (East Lansing, Michigan, USA: Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, 1988).


Ibid. N.B. Vacant plots had risen to 48 by the 1996/97-summer season (i.e. 21 for Gowe I and 27 for Gowe II). See also Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, “Gowe Irrigation Scheme – Sanyati Estate No. 71: Farmer’s Land Allocation Codes 1996/97 Summer Season,” J. K. Gwerengwe (Estate Manager).


Since Independence, plotholders referred all their problems to ARDA Sanyati as a matter of protocol. The Estate Manager forwarded the problems on their behalf to ARDA Head Office before the latter sent them to the Minister of Lands for final arbitration. However, in the 1990s plotholders increasingly succeeded in circumventing this channel to air their grievances directly with the Minister. Because sometimes they did not get any ministerial responses, they began to suspect that the Estate Manager was not taking up their problems for them.


If the process to acquire land was made difficult then this meant vacant plots would also take a long time before they were filled which forced agriculture to stagnate.
employment status was known. This was used to determine their credit worthiness and to ensure that the selected settlers would have demonstrated some form of success in their original communal homes so that settlement would open greater opportunities and challenges for them.

Among the eleven was Ernest Forichi Ngwena from Nyakapupu Small-Scale Commercial farming area in Guruve. He had an advanced master farmer certificate, $700,00 in the bank plus 26 head of cattle. Clayton Gwatsvaira was an ex-combatant and was highly recommended by AGRITEX. He had $2 000,00 in the bank plus 6 goats and 10 head of cattle. Alexander Badza had no master farmer certificate but had obtained a grade “C” in agriculture at “O” Level. He had $600,00 in the bank plus 15 goats, 10 head of cattle and owned a poultry project. Badza worked for the DDF in Bikita but was willing to quit if allocated an irrigation plot. Arnold Gonhi was also selected because he had gained irrigation experience on his father’s plot in Middle Save Stage IIIA. He had $2 300,00 in the bank but no livestock. Misheck Ngwayi was a holder of master farmer and cotton scouting certificates. He had $2 150,00 in the bank, 10 goats and 6 head of cattle. Margaret Muparuri was one of the few female recipients of plots at Gowe-Sanyati. She had a master farmer certificate, $1 600,00 in the bank plus 10 head of cattle and she was described as an above-average farmer by AGRITEX.

However, cash declarations by applicants for plots were not always authentic as some of them connived with richer relatives to put some money into their accounts on the understanding that they would return it once the application had gone through. A case in point is Gladys Chekeche who in her project plan (asset appraisal) falsely stated that she had substantial investments in her home area and had a fat bank account approximating to $3000,00. Being a daughter of a renowned small-scale commercial farmer, her submission to the Land Settlement Board was “highly regarded,” but in reality she had been temporarily “loaned” an equivalent sum by her father to facilitate the smooth

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1351 This did not mark the official acceptance of cattle in the scheme. The cattle prohibition order was still upheld as animals continued to be perceived as an irritation if not a nuisance to irrigation farmers.

1352 S. Mapondera, (Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Sanyati Estate, 8th January 1997. Mapondera who took over from Gwerengwe on 1st October 1996 says in 1997 there were only 6 female plotholders at Gowe. This was clearly not acceptable as a recent Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) survey on women’s view of the land question states that all the problems of women regarding land and all related issues stem from the fact that women are excluded from decision making processes. For detail on the disadvantages women face because they are not direct land owners see National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO), “Meet The President Programme,” – Land Question: Women’s View, Harare Sheraton Hotel, International Conference Centre, 1st August 1994, 1.

passage of her application for a plot at Gowe. She admitted that once the application procedure had been completed she was expected to return the full amount at no extra cost. Many would-be plotholders, such as David Mayose, Taguma Chengu and Misheck Ngwayi connived with relatives in the same way. Such kinship networks meant that some of the new plotholders entered the scheme without the financial resources with which to carry out irrigation farming; hence the need to seek loans always arose as soon as they were allocated a plot. This can be linked to the inability by the smallholder scheme to produce enough food to feed the local community for the greater part of the 1990s. The Estate Managers in this decade (Jacobus Gwerengwe, 1988-1996 and Stanford Mapondera, 1997-1999) testified that droughts and ESAP had a devastating impact on the productivity of Gowe. “The scheme, which was producing average yields of 20 bales of cotton per ha in the 1970s, 1.8 tonnes of maize per acre in the 1980s and approximately 20 bags of wheat per acre in the 1970s was achieving much less after ten years of independence.” Gwerengwe further noted that between 1990 and 2000 despicable yields of not more than 10 bales of cotton per ha were realised and both wheat and maize yields had declined to half of the 1970 and 1980 levels respectively. These statistics illustrate that the smallholder scheme was producing far below potential. Failure by the scheme to produce adequate grain reserves, thus, put the surrounding communal area, particularly during years of drought and ESAP, in a highly vulnerable position as it occasionally relied and still relies on ARDA irrigation to provide a perilously thin buffer against the vagaries of weather, plant disease and other incidentals.

This failure to adopt practical steps to mitigate food shortages due to persistent droughts had far reaching consequences for Sanyati as its population starved. One of the worst was the “great drought” of 1991/92, which compelled more than 5 million people throughout the country to request food handouts. Gowe farmers were seriously affected by the drought. Due to the catastrophe, E. Munengami, M. Mjoli, D. Mjoli, K Chipala, C. Mhara and K. Mushonga could not grow any crops in the 1992/93 season because they failed to get loans from the AFC, as they had not paid back the previous loan (i.e. 1991/92 loan). Representing his colleagues, Chipala stated that “We were not entitled to further loans until we had cleared our debt [and] without support from our traditional financiers we were stuck.” At the same time, engines had recurrent breakdowns and some plots were not being utilised. According to the Settlement Officer, N. T. K.

1354 Gladys Chekeche, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 17th May 2005.
1355 Ibid.
1356 David Mayose, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 12th May 2005; Taguma Chengu, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, 12th May 2005 and Misheck Ngwayi, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, 17th May 2005.
1357 J. Gwerengwe (Former Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Sanyati Growth Point, 18th May 2005. See also S. Mapondera (Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Sanyati Estate, 8th January 1997.
1358 J. Gwerengwe (Former Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Sanyati Growth Point, 18th May 2005.
1359 “Let’s Have Plan to Transform Peasant Farming,” The Herald, Harare: (Thursday February 1 1996), 11.
1361 E. Munengami, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 8th January 1997.
1362 K. Chipala, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 16th October 2004.
Kamudzandu, this drought could have been mitigated to some extent had the 30 vacant plots (from Gowe I and II) in that season been under cultivation. Notwithstanding all these problems, it can be noted that the lease agreement which had remained unchanged for many years also contributed to low productivity as the farmers, who were finding it increasingly difficult to access ARDA machinery which was either grounded due to shortage of spare parts or failure by the Estate to procure diesel, were not allowed to use their oxen for ploughing.

The new applicants for plots had indicated livestock in their declaration of assets oblivious of the fact that animal rearing was prohibited at Gowe. After being allocated plots, many brought their animals with them. Several such plotholders, including the old plotholders, were served with written warnings by the Estate Manager for flouting the lease agreement by keeping animals in the scheme. Among the old farmers who were warned in February 1993 were N. Mavhengere, G. Maturure, K. Muzanenhamo, C. Wira, T. Nyamutova and D. Mjoli. The tone of the letters was the same for all of them.

You are keeping cattle in the scheme. This is in violation of your lease agreement. Your animals are a menace to other settlers’ crops. They also necessitate the Estate to have crop guards twenty-four hours a day. You are hereby required to comply with the terms of your lease agreement and move your cattle out of the scheme. You are also required to close all the holes you cut in the fence of the scheme ...

Copies of such warnings were sent to the Settlement Co-ordinator for his information. It should be noted, however, that if a settler farmer’s crops were destroyed by another’s or a dryland farmer’s cattle and the offending party refused to compensate him/her for the damage caused it was very difficult to launch a legal suit. It was a cumbersome process because farmers taking on responsibility for maintenance and operation needed legal titles and rights. Lamentably, they did not have these because they were not provided for in the lease. Therefore, in the absence of legal titles they were not and are still not able to enforce their regulations on their own members, or to sue outsiders who damage their facilities. In addition to damage to crops by cattle, natural calamities and lack of supporting services also resulted in low yields.

The effects of low productivity as far as cotton was concerned were more telling. Although cotton was not a food crop, it played a big role in ensuring food sustainability during its heyday (i.e. 1960s to 1980s). It was also instrumental in intensifying the disparities in wealth between Sanyati peasants. Clear categories of rich and poor farmers emerged. The 1990s did not bring much joy to cotton cultivators as the crop was not only affected by drought but was also no longer receiving the incentives that hitherto made every farmer want to grow it. Ploughing, extension advice and input support schemes,


which had been deployed to good effect in the 1960s and 1970s, were virtually dead. Agricultural loans which seemed every farmer’s right with the coming of independence in 1980 now disappeared or were given on extremely stringent conditions which did not take into account the changed macro-economic environment. Repayment terms had to be adhered to whether there was a drought or not. For K. Mushonga, “a certain fraction of the proceeds from cotton went into debt settlement [and] depending on previous arrears it could amount to three quarters of the total or could leave a grower in further arrears.” 1365 The result was that both irrigation and dryland farmers became averse to growing cotton whose return did not justify the enormous cost of production. These problems coupled with the fact that in the 1990s, cotton was no longer as responsible for peasant prosperity as before due, among other things, to depressed prices, signaled the end of the miracle. The end was affirmed by the adoption of ESAP, which did very little if anything at all to render support to the small-scale cotton irrigators and their dryland partners.

THE INTRODUCTION OF ESAP

Background:-

By independence, Zimbabwe had become a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB). As a member of the two multi-lateral financial agencies, it occasionally secured standby credit from the IMF as happened in 1983 when she got Z$375 million. 1366 This amount was disbursed to offset the financial crisis facing the country as a result of the economic downturn of the early 1980s. In return, Zimbabwe in 1991 agreed to devaluation, restoration of internal and external balance of payments, cuts in development programmes and government subsidies. 1367 This meant that she had, in fact, adopted the IMF/WB Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). 1368 Thus, the state, which used to play a pivotal role in cushioning the small as well as the big farmers from several problems via subsidies and other expedient measures, had been forced by ESAP to take a back seat. A lot of financing and marketing hitches arising from the vacuum left by a retreating state were witnessed. Farmers were invariably made to scout for their own markets especially against the backdrop that it was not easy for plotholder farmers at Gowe to penetrate the more lucrative foreign or international markets let alone solicit for independent or private funding of their farm operations. The expectation that there would be increased smallholder and black farmer participation in the government’s new export production policy was nullified by the lack of equal commitment on the part of the same government to use ESAP to integrate on advantageous terms this group of farmers. The new export environment provided by ESAP gave the large and predominantly white farmers so many comparative advantages despite the fact that they devoted smaller amounts of land than expected to new export

1365 K. Mushonga, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 16th October 2004.
1367 Ibid.
1368 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the developing world were designed jointly by the IMF and the WB. It is not surprising that save for Ghana, which is venerated as an example of success, SAPs were characterised by failure wherever they were adopted mainly because they failed to take local economic, social, geo-political and other conditions into cognisance.
crops, in particular, horticultural crops. Multinational corporations and white commercial farmers enjoyed the marketing opportunities availed by the programme to large business concerns. Indeed, one of the most often repeated charges against SAPs is that they benefited the big companies and the wealthy members of society at the expense of the poor. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, small schemes like Gowe could not penetrate the new markets created by ESAP. Clearly, the disparities between black and white farmers became wider. In some instances, the gap between black farmers themselves increased as ESAP-induced poverty took its toll. The socio-economic effects of the new programme, therefore, are fundamental to understanding burgeoning rural poverty, which occurred at the height of the rhetoric of globalisation and economic prosperity for developing nations.

Indeed, ESAP was hatched as part of a programme to integrate Zimbabwe into the rapidly globalising world. For Mlambo and Pangeti, globalisation entailed the internationalisation of corporate production, distribution of goods and services as well as the removal of all institutional barriers to trade and capital to facilitate the opening up of markets. It was not a secret that to achieve the opening up of markets government should withdraw its active role in directing the economy. That role was perceived as socialist oriented and detrimental to the well being of, among other things, organised agriculture. It was in this context that the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) President, Peter MacSporran, in August 1994 called for “an end to government interference in the market place” to prevent what he called “further damage to the agricultural sector’s economy.”

The adoption of ESAP effectively marked the government’s renunciation of the socialist ideology it purportedly pursued since independence in 1980. ESAP in Zimbabwe, which was part of a push to open up the economy to the outside world, was externally imposed although no economic crises prevailed apart from frequent droughts, declining external terms of trade and low levels of foreign investment, which in turn led to low levels of employment growth. Since ESAP was introduced in 1990/91, the policies influencing the nature and scale of irrigation development in the whole country have been changing in tandem with changing and varied agrarian incentives, which were globally

determined. Production processes became oriented more towards the needs of global markets, which in a number of ways nominally arrested the tempo of rural differentiation. Small schemes like Gowe and even the Sanyati Main Estate could not directly export their produce. Any cotton that was earmarked for the external market was exported by COTTCO on their behalf. Under the new economic arrangements, the richer peasantry to a certain extent accessed the foreign market more than their poorer colleagues, which also signaled the disproportionate distribution of structural adjustment benefits. In reality the unequal benefits, which accrued to farmers as a result of structural reforms, fuelled the economic disparities between the irrigation farmers that had existed since time immemorial even further. The renewed struggle to survive between the resource poor and their richer counterparts in the context of the increasingly market-based pricing policies for agricultural commodities and growing inequality in access to irrigation equipment exacerbated the competition for ownership of diminishing socio-economic resources. In fact, Zimbabwe’s economic adjustment process has intensified rural disparities by creating a class of poor plotholders on the one hand and very rich ones on the other. The richer plotholders emerged in spite of the constrictive framework within which they operated.

ESAP promoted increased rural economic differentiation among Sanyati’s dryland and irrigation farmers. This differentiation was caused by unequal accessibility mainly to local markets for crops like maize and beans since external markets were not always accessible to these frontier farmers. ESAP did not quite lead to uneven capital accumulation in the rural sector as far as the proceeds from cotton were concerned. This was so because greater commercial crop production and marketing were directly threatened as cotton became increasingly unpopular. From the 1960s to the 1980s, it was the most profitable crop to grow in Sanyati, but in the 1990s a number of factors made it to be progressively associated with abject poverty than ever before. For example, it was extremely difficult for farmers to obtain inputs and ARDA tractors were not provided on time despite the insistence that farmers should plough and plant at the same time. In fact, at a meeting with the tenants, the Settlement Co-ordinator, Mutsvairo, advised farmers to plant at the right time for optimal yields. However, the farmers complained that “services given to them are very late every year,” and crop prices are also announced late every time but the Co-ordinator said “It is due to late payments from the financiers because ADA cannot authorise operation to the farmers before credit facility is provided.”

Thus, ARDA was reaffirming the fact that mechanical equipment was neither made available on time nor were crop prices determined before the marketing season as will be illustrated later in the chapter. The marketing environment was made increasingly unpredictable for the farmers and there was little inducement to put a particular crop under cultivation given the numerous price uncertainties that prevailed throughout this decade. Trade liberalisation, exchange rate devaluation, domestic agricultural market

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deregulation and agricultural export promotion had far reaching effects on smallholder irrigation as these ESAP-induced measures did not always guarantee success. Not all rural agricultural products found a niche in the new and global markets that emerged with the inauguration of ESAP. This led to constant erosion of rural incomes.

Responses to declining farm incomes and poverty never really reached popular proportions but resentment of ESAP-induced difficulties was clear. As already noted, this was particularly so because Gowe plotholders did not have access to the export-oriented markets that the new economic programme was trying to promote. This was contrary to the fact that ESAP, initiated in 1990/91 by the Government of Zimbabwe, promised to improve rural livelihoods through improved productivity and higher prices via market processes. Zimbabwe’s liberalisation programme promised dramatic agricultural growth beyond 5% per annum and reduced poverty through employment and incomes growth and accelerated rural development. The specific policy thrust was that the concentration of agricultural production or land use on new non-traditional exports such as horticulture, wildlife and related tourism land uses would yield positive environmental and socio-economic benefits. Nonetheless, this policy benefited other regions that were endowed with such exports and not Sanyati. Sanyati and other areas’ disadvantage did not influence any change in policy. Liberalising domestic markets and encouraging exports were, thus, considered the main paths to the growth of Zimbabwean agriculture. However, a fundamental problem with the ESAP framework was that it did not directly address the key constraints which confronted the small-scale or communal area farmers prior to the programme and after, in their efforts to respond to new market incentives. Key amongst these smallholder constraints were the narrow and discriminatory land and financial markets, distorted water rights which favoured the large-scale commercial farmers, and the lack of access to essential infrastructure such as dams and irrigation field equipment and transportation which could make for more effective land use. ESAP did not favour large-scale investment in water development as had been recommended by some analysts (including the then PM, Mugabe, in his 1982 declaration) in order to tackle the problems of low agricultural productivity and employment development. It was only after realising the strain on the national economy exerted by the 1992 and 1994

1376 Ibid., 51.
1378 Moyo, 1989, cited in Moyo, *Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe*, 51-52. For a similar discussion of the impact of lack of water rights on small-scale farmers see also ZFU, “Meet The President Programme,” Harare Sheraton Hotel, International Conference Centre, 1st August 1994.3 and The Association of Rural District Councils, “Meet The President Programme,” Harare Sheraton Hotel, International Conference Centre, 1st August 1994, 1. N.B. Because irrigation water rights on all rivers have been fully subscribed by large-scale commercial farmers it is very difficult for smallholder farmers to benefit through tapping natural flowing water resources in national rivers.
1379 Mugabe had declared 1982 as the “Year of National Transformation” in which more emphasis would be placed on developing water or irrigation infrastructure. For detail see chapter one of this study, 24-25 and ILO, 1989 and Moyo, 1989 cited in Moyo, *Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe*, 52.
droughts that Government of Zimbabwe policy shifted its thrust towards mobilising more finance for dam construction in communal areas to increase the small farmers’ share of water rights and to encourage private dam development.

In this policy context, the ESAP period (1991-1995) offered no concrete resources for smallholder export-led growth in commodities such as horticulture and tourism, as had happened in Kenya, due to the restrictive land, water and infrastructural conditions of communal areas. Government effort to promote irrigation especially by small farmers was, therefore, derailed by high water tariffs and the ever-escalating costs of acquiring and maintaining equipment. The long-standing skewed distribution of these resources in favour of the large-scale commercial farmers suggested that it was only the latter that could effectively respond to new ESAP incentives. Thus, export incentives, forex (foreign exchange) allocations and accounts as well as inherited fiscal biases in favour of the large-scale commercial farmers encouraged their responsiveness to land use diversification, intensification and export orientation. For instance, forex was allocated mainly to large farmers with a history of given scales of output to purchase imported large-scale farm machinery.

These developments meant that, at the end of the programme, ESAP had remained a potential rather than a real instrument of change for the greater contingent of small-scale farmers like those found in Gowe and Sanyati as a whole. Government, which shifted dramatically from the protective regime of the 1980s to the SAP regime of the 1990s, was largely to blame for increasing rural farmers’ poverty instead of increasing their wealth. By accepting ESAP with all its prescriptions it was actually helping small-scale farmers to remain poor. For Mupawose the programme did not bestow tangible benefits to Gowe and other small-scale schemes because “the ESAP entity got clouded in politics and failed to make sense [economic sense].” Thus, the experience with ESAP between 1990 and 1995 produced the combined impact of the steady devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, the freeing of agricultural commodity markets from parastatals, and agricultural commodity price decontrol as well as the shift in the real and nominal prices of the entire range of agricultural commodities. For example, by 1995, all the major commodity markets had been liberalised, opening the marketing to private buyers and contractors, while by 1996, three of the agricultural parastatals were ready for privatisation. Massive devaluation against the US dollar occurred first in 1991 at over 90%, followed by a decline of over 20% in 1993 and 1994, and steady declines of around 10% each year up to 1996 occurred. As already indicated, devaluation also meant increasingly moving away from the era of direct grants and subsidies (i.e. 1960s-1980s) which was central to bailing out the Sanyati core estate and its outgrower component both in good and bad times. In fact, from the 1960s right up to the 1980s the image of vulnerability in Sanyati irrigation was not so apparent. Funds were more readily available and subsidies helped

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1382 Moyo, Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe, 52.
1383 Ibid.
1384 Ibid. 53.
1385 Mupawose, Personal Interview.
1386 Moyo, Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe, 55.
1387 Ibid.
TILCOR, which subsequently became ARDA, to hide the now all too familiar image of vulnerability. The advent of ESAP, the withdrawal of subsidies and the malperformance of the economy changed the operational viability of many State enterprises not least ARDA. Perpetual losses on the part of ARDA as will be illustrated later in the chapter seriously threatened their survival. This picture has not changed since the turn of the new millennium because there is no huge injection of funds coming from Government to bail them out. According to the ARDA Chief Executive Officer (CEO), J. Z. Z. Matowanyika,

The long-term productivity of the Authority started deteriorating in the 1990s. In direct response to ESAP we [ARDA] were privatising and not allocating resources to parastatals. Since 1993/94 there was no investment in irrigation. The last investment was in 1992/93. The support and production base of the Authority including the support from the major investor (the Public Sector Investment Programme/PSIP) were declining.1389

The dire state of ARDA is worsening and recently it has led to its failure to raise salaries to pay its workforce.1390

During the TILCOR days, some services to the parastatal’s schemes, for example, tillage, discing and planting “were going for free” due to heavy government subsidisation. However, with the advent of ESAP the same services and a host of others dried up. ARDA no longer got government grants or subsidies. The new arrangement was that the Estate was to provide services to plotholders and plotholders, in turn, were to pay for the services. A significant change from the past was that ARDA was called upon to operate on a commercial basis and generate funds from its own resources, that is, “ARDA was now required to make profit whilst TILCOR was allowed to function as a developmental agency.” 1392 The IMF and WB emphasised that Zimbabwe’s budget deficit would be reduced not only through the phasing out of subsidies to parastatals such as ARDA but also through a cut in the size of the civil service and the introduction of cost-recovery measures for social services such as education and health. The end of subsidies marked the beginning of problems for ARDA, which for years was accustomed to huge government subsidisation of their scheme operations and throughout ESAP the Sanyati Estate was operating at a loss. It had always operated at a loss but between 1991 and

1388 Some of the State enterprises or parastatal organisations which include ARDA whose lack of viability and persistent bungling is bleeding the fiscus are Air Zimbabwe and the Civil Aviation Authority of Zimbabwe (CAAZ), Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO), the District Development Fund (DDF), Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings (ZBH), Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO), Cold Storage Company/Commission (CSC) and Hwange Colliery. Given the scarcity of funds these parastatal institutions can hardly justify Government’s huge injection of limited funds to bail them out. Nevertheless, apart from ARDA the others are outside the scope of this study.
1391 Mapondera, Personal Interview.
1392 Ibid.
2000 the extent of loss assumed enormous proportions. Invariably, problems of the Estate reflected on the performance of the smallholder scheme adjacent to it.

**Irrigation performance: Merits and demerits of ESAP (1991-1995):**

Due to financial hardships wrought by ESAP, during the 1991/92 season only the 70 ha making up Gowe II were under cotton and the entire Gowe I (50 ha) was fallow. This necessitated the cropping of this section of the scheme by the Estate from mid-February 1992. 1393 ESAP and a severe drought in 1992 adversely affected agricultural production. One of the Gowe plotholders, B. Jongwe, recalls that his “first bean crop” was affected by this drought. 1394 He, however, did not quantify the extent of loss. In fact, the 1991-95 reform programme was “greeted by the most economically devastating drought ever experienced in the history of the country,” which resulted in some sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, witnessing a serious decline in productivity. 1395 The Zimbabwean economy, heavily reliant on the agricultural sector for growth, suffered a 7% decline in 1992 due to the crippling drought, and only registered a marginal growth of over 1.6% in 1993. 1396 The manufacturing sector, which depended on agriculture for its success, was also experiencing problems. Thus, the disastrous 1991/92 season had an adverse impact on the economy because of the linkages of the agricultural sector with the manufacturing industry. The situation was worse for arid zones such as Sanyati. Its dryland farmers were hardest hit. Due to a combination of drought and capital deficiencies the ARDA irrigation schemes in Sanyati were not spared from the problems. For example, Gowe bean yields were very low because of the following constraints: (a) shortage of irrigation water due to the drought; (b) daily power (electricity) cuts due to economic hardships; and (c) a viral disease which was worsened by water shortage 1397 leading to low plant populations, minimal flowering and podding. 1398 Only four AFC-financed farmers managed to establish a winter crop and “the rest could not secure loans [despite submitting their claims] on time due to the rather bad financial position of AFC.” 1399 In the same year (1992), one female plotholder, M. Mungofa, could not secure a loan

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1394 B. Jongwe, (Plotholder and Chairman of the Gowe Irrigation Committee), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 8th January 1997. N.B. It was his first crop because he joined the scheme in 1992 from Bikita in Masvingo Province. His arrival at Gowe in 1992 coincided with one of the worst droughts to hit the country in recent years.


1397 Today the relationship between the Estate and Gowe has become increasingly circumscribed because Gowe does not have its own water supply. It relies on Main Estate infrastructure to deliver water to the plotholders, but that infrastructure is now too archaic to deliver efficient service.


from the AFC for operations, as her yields were always low. As a result, her plot was declared vacant and was subsequently advertised for occupancy by other applicants. Furthermore, problems of fusarium wilt (a disease that withered the cotton crop) were experienced in Gowe I in the 1992/93 season and no cotton could be grown there. Maize was therefore grown as an alternative summer crop and wheat was planted in winter, but still as indicated earlier yields remained low. In fact, there were poor harvests not only in Sanyati but also in many parts of the country and this dampened economic recovery prospects in the period after this drought. Reduced harvests affected the spending power of many rural people. This very difficult season also witnessed the transfer of Kamudzandu (Settlement Officer), and Gowe Irrigation Scheme had to be run by one of the Section Managers from the Estate. In the absence of a trained settlement officer production declined even further. For instance, some plot holders reaped less than 7 bales per ha for cotton, others produced far less than 1,8 tonnes per acre for maize and wheat production was virtually abandoned.

A combination of other factors also aggravated the situation. For example, by 1993 breakages and shortages of pipes and sprinklers were alarming. Besides, the maintenance budget could not cover these expenses, as there was little money on that budget. In this regard Matowanyika openly admitted that “We [ARDA] have not revamped our irrigation systems since the 1960s. Sprinklers, pumps [and other equipment] need replacement. We need massive investment by the shareholder [i.e. Government].” In fact, irrigation systems at ARDA Sanyati had become too obsolete and, therefore, too expensive to maintain. In 1993 only 30 hectares were under wheat at Gowe I because of pump problems. A good yield had been anticipated, but due to water shortage, the yield estimate declined. J. Chikowore, an “immigrant” female plot holder from Mhondoro Ngezi, who joined the scheme on the 29th of September 1979 who has been quoted by the then Estate Manager (Gwerengwe) as an example of “a struggler and a very unsuccessful farmer” testified that one pumping engine broke down in February 1995 and

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1400 The figures to illustrate how low her yields were, however, have not been provided.
1402 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1992/93,” R. Mhindu (Section Manager) to the RDPU Co-ordinator.
1404 Gwerengwe, Personal Interview, 18th May 2005
1406 Matowanyika, Personal Interview.
1407 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “RDPU Monthly Report for the Month Ending 30th September 1993,” J. K. Gwerengwe (Estate Manager, Sanyati). N.B. The report compiled by the then Estate Manager, Gwerengwe, however does not say what the estimates and the yield expected were, but the report underscores general agricultural decline in the 1990s.
was only repaired towards the Easter Holidays in April the following year. Most of the delays in fixing the pump station problems were worsened due to the continued lack of spare parts or lack of foreign currency to import these at the peak of ESAP. She contends that this could have severely affected crops, especially maize and cotton, had it not been for the good rainy season in 1995/96. Nevertheless, even in a good year production was sometimes hampered by high tractor charges.

Alson Tami Chishiri, another plotholder who joined Gowe from Glendale in December 1994, feels that ARDA’s tractor charges of $528.00 per hectare for ploughing and discing were too exorbitant compared to those charged by the District Development Fund (DDF), which was $100 per hectare. This settler, who has been described by the former Estate Manager (Gwerengwe) as “a good farmer,” sees the DDF as “almost providing free service” in relation to ploughing and discing and therefore more preferable than ARDA. This view is shared by many plotholders some of whom argue that the farmers did not only resort to using the cheaper DDF tractors but also started indulging in panning activities in the valleys of the Munyati river in order to supplement their income. However, gold panning along the river also intensified the siltation woes and the local police were working hard to rectify the problem, which according to J. Chikowore, had largely been wrought by the harsh economic climate under ESAP. The Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) was also concerned by the increasing siltation of rivers through gold panning activities and was imploring government to enact strong laws to curb this catastrophe to the country’s river/water systems.

Clearly, due to the hardships brought about by ESAP, the people were trying to find alternative means of survival. One activity that flourished due to the hard economic times was side marketing of plot holder as well as dryland produce. Black marketing of produce assumed endemic proportions during the ESAP era as plotholders grappled to make ends

1408 Chikowore, Personal Interview and Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, “Minutes of Gowe Farmers Meeting Held in the Estate Manager’s Office on 3 December 1996 at 9.00am,” S. Mapondera (Chairman and Estate Manager). N.B. The dilapidated state of most of the irrigation infrastructure was due to neglect and incomprehensive maintenance services. For an assessment of pump breakdowns in another part of Zimbabwe, namely Masvingo, see E. Berejena, J. Ellis-Jones and N. Hasnip, “Gender-sensitive Irrigation Design: An assessment of the implications of pump breakdown and community participation in irrigation schemes, Masvingo Province, Zimbabwe,” Report OD143, Part 5, (Howbery Park, Wallingford, UK: HR Wallingford Ltd.), 1999.

1409 Chikowore, Personal Interview.

1410 A. T. Chishiri (Plot holder and Gowe Irrigation Committee Member), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 2nd May 1996. N.B. This plot holder assumed occupancy of his plot almost two years after the Land Settlement Board had approved him in January 1993 as one of those allotted land at Gowe-Sanyati. See also NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 349224, Location R24.10.11.11F, File: ADA/SET/8 Agricultural Land Settlement Committee, “Lists of Approved Applicants Recommended by the Agricultural Land Settlement Board: Agricultural Development Authority Irrigation Plots,” G. J. Makombe (Land Administration - Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development) to Liberty Mhlanga (the General Manager, ARDA), 28th January 1993, 3.

1411 Gwerengwe, Personal Interview.

1412 Chishiri, Personal Interview.

1413 Chikowore, Personal Interview.

meet by bypassing the official marketing channels (the GMB and COTTCO) because of the generally low prices they were offering. This was in spite of the warning to farmers by the Settlement Co-ordinator [Mutsvairo] to rely on one financier and to stop black marketing produce. He insisted: “Any farmer who does it [black marketing] again will be evicted from the scheme.” Nevertheless, side marketing of produce continued as low commodity prices made it impossible for poor irrigation tenants like M. Mjoli, D. Mjoli and E. Munengami to pay back loans owed to the ZIMBANK. In March 1991, D. Mjoli and Munengami owed $8 793, 61 and $7 185, 61, respectively. Mafumanja Mjoli’s outstanding balance had within a year escalated from $7 695, 66 in the winter of 1990 to $13 175, 94 by March 1991. As at 10 July the same year (1991), this farmer’s bank overdraft stood at $16 728, 85. It was so heavy a debt that paying it in one season by a farmer of his means was impossible. N. Mavengere, a plotholder who hailed from “Tsetse Fly Line” under Chief Wozhele and who joined the scheme in August 1970, recalls that ZIMBANK was advancing loans to him since 1993, but in the 1995/96 season, he could not secure a loan from the bank because his cotton crop which had been affected by a viral disease, Fusarium/Fusarium, better known to the locals as “vatsome” wilt, had made him unable to pay back the previous loan. It was at this juncture that he and other plot holders had to seek alternative assistance from COTTCO, Sanyati. These were not the only ones in this sort of predicament. The list is almost endless, but these examples taken from the top-four most indebted farmers illustrate the ever-growing plight of the irrigators at Gowe in the 1990s. Many tenants became increasingly ensnared in the albatross of credit in this period and it confirms the general failure of agriculture due to SAPs not only in Zimbabwe but also in other countries. For instance, Peter Gibbon clearly illustrates agricultural decline in such countries as Kenya and Ghana due to liberalisation wrought by ESAP. One major similarity, of course, is the widespread poverty it engendered

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1418 N. Mavengere (Plotholder and Gowe Irrigation Committee Chairman), Personal Interview, Gowesanyati, 9th January 1997; Chishiri, Personal Interview, 9th January 1997; and Grey Maturure (Plotholder and Gowe Irrigation Committee Member), Personal Interview, Gowesanyati, 9th January 1997. N.B. To prevent heavy infestation and extensive damage to cotton by Fusarium wilt it is imperative to exercise proper weed control, as dirty fields are often more vulnerable to the disease than clean fields. It is also important to implement a strict pest management programme, which entails spraying, inter alia, for red bollworm, heliothis, jassids and aphids. For more detail on this see NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348041, Location R24.9.6.1R, File: SET/10 Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, “N. Kamudzandu: Cotton Production - Settlement Officer’s Quarterly Report for November 1989 to January 1990.”

1419 Mavengere, Personal Interview, 9th January 1997 and Ennie Nyandoro (Wife of Plotholder and Gowe Irrigation Committee Member), Personal Interview, Gowesanyati, 9th January 1997.

and its failure to implement reforms that would help raise the productivity of African agriculture if not that of the developing countries in general.

ESAP made it very difficult for outgrower farmers particularly the less-to-do or resource-poor to secure credit. Continued occupancy of a plot depended on a farmer’s ability to access a loan to finance his irrigation activities. The penalty for incapacity to obtain a loan was eviction from the scheme. The former Estate Manager, J. K. Gwerengwe, made it very clear that membership of the Gowe Settlement Scheme and use of its facilities was only guaranteed to those who had secured the necessary finance from either ZIMBANK or AFC. In a letter collectively addressed to C. Mhara, E. Chirandata, M. Mjoli, S. Mushonga, D. Mjoli, M. Mungofa and K. Chipala he said:

You failed to secure finance to pay for land rent and to operate your … allocated plots. You are therefore de-facto no longer part of the Scheme. I am giving you until the end of March to secure finance or get out of the Scheme. In the meantime you will have no rights to the plots and gardens and any piece of land or equipment that belongs to the Scheme. There should be no gardens as you no longer qualify to operate them. Surrender all the field equipment that might be in your possession to the Settler Committee [Gowe Irrigation Committee]. The Committee will hand [it] over to pump house staff.\(^{1422}\)

Insisting that the farmers should be productive on their plots was important, but in the absence of credit for inputs, it was equally important for the Estate or the Government to help the farmers with inputs for a stipulated period so that they could build a cash flow base before they could be left to their own devices. The Estate had a social or moral obligation to do this for the Gowe community, but sometimes the community expects rather too much from the former, which means that a reduction in Estate resources has a very direct impact on Gowe plotholder performance.

**ESAP: The “winners” and “losers”**:\(^{1421}\)

Prior to ESAP there were weaknesses that were already apparent in the scheme. These included limitations in production as a result of the smallness of the plots, lack of adequate financial support to the farmers, growing indebtedness on the part of resource-poor tenants in particular and technical problems. The impact of ESAP on Sanyati irrigation as demonstrated in this chapter deepened the problems. This differed from the earlier weaknesses of the project in the sense that input loans were either difficult to get or were unavailable during and after ESAP. In the SAP and post-SAP periods most smallholders could not afford to purchase essential inputs such as fertiliser from their

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\(^{1421}\) There are a total of eight settlement schemes adjacent to ARDA farms at Chisumbanje, Middle Save, Tsovane, Sanyati, Antelope, Ngwezi, Rusitu and Katiyo. See ARDA Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31 October 1992, 4 and ARDA Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended 31 October 1993, 4.

own coffers because the prices were prohibitive. From the mid-1990s up to the beginning of 1997 individual plotholders paid prices approximately higher than $64,00 for maize seed and fertiliser per bag and roughly more than $112,00 for cottonseed, fertiliser and other chemicals.\cite{1423} These prices far exceeded the 1969 costs for the same inputs. Hence the use of chemical fertilisers was extremely low and as a result yields were also low. Some farmers save for the top performing ones (the rich or more fortunate) actually no longer applied any chemical fertilisers. On the one hand, this hampered agricultural growth because optimum yields of hybrid seeds could not be realised without fertiliser.\cite{1424} On the other hand, the low loan repayment rates and termination or non-availability of agricultural loans were inextricably tied to the ESAP era. During this programme, it can be noted that marketed produce was a key aspect of the Sanyati project. Thus, the lack of market outlets (i.e. a new problem created by ESAP) during these reforms reduced the economic viability of the project. The problem of marketing channels for inputs presented similar limitations.

In little of this are the “winners” as both the resource-rich and their poorer counterparts found themselves at the mercy of a programme that emphasised foreign markets to the detriment of local ones. The intermittent droughts and the drying up of government subsidies that punctuated ESAP worsened the plight of the farmers. Therefore, a crucial point worth emphasising is that the fragile or limited processes of social differentiation which this study has been tracking up until the 1990s, proved incapable of withstanding the subsequent crises, whether ESAP-induced or otherwise.

On the whole, the Gowe plotholders emerged the biggest “losers” during and at the end of ESAP. Hardly could they recover after that. Neither could ARDA nor the state resuscitate their earlier support to the outgrower section. Indeed, the impact of ESAP on the people’s lives and the operations of the scheme was more negative than positive. The programme worsened their plight.

As already illustrated in this chapter, ESAP worsened the position of outgrowers due to its encouragement of the market system. After the opening up of markets, some buyers (e.g. National Foods) “came with cash on the spot and bought all the maize and wheat.”\cite{1425} GRAFAX, FSI and some private individuals also enticed the growers to sell their cotton and realise immediate cash returns. This forced the irrigators to avoid the traditional buyers namely COTTCO and Cargill. Ready cash lured farmers into side marketing their produce but in the process evading paying ARDA loans. In this instance, ARDA were the biggest “losers” because the Authority did not have a standing contract with the new players on the market to enable them to recover their money disbursed to plotholders in the form of inputs and other services. Loan evasion, however, did not entitle the growers to another credit facility in future, which subsequently affected their performance. Clearly, ESAP affected farmers differently. Poor farmers’ situation was aggravated by the lack of further support from either ARDA or the state. These farmers also took time to shift their focus from cotton, which was no longer as remunerative as

\cite{1423} E. Munengami, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 8\textsuperscript{th} January 1997.
\cite{1424} Djurfeldt et al, \textit{Addressing Food Crisis in Africa}, 4.
\cite{1425} Bvunzawabaya, Personal Interview, 17\textsuperscript{th} October 2006.
other crops such as maize and beans, and this meant that they struggled throughout ESAP. As one outgrower put it, “The ESAP reality was that failure at the beginning meant failure throughout,” 1426 and those who did not recover became “losers.” Nevertheless, already rich or more successful tenants were doing relatively better during economic liberalisation. They quickly diversified their production by adopting the cultivation of beans, green mealies and horticultural crops like tomatoes. These did not completely abandon cotton in spite of its low market price. They were the “winners” since most of them (e.g. N. Mavhengere) were capable of paying off their loans and could retain a “surplus of about 3 bales for sale to best advantage [i.e. to cash buyers].” 1427 Nonetheless, the deleterious effects of this programme on society as a whole could not be denied.

**Social impact of ESAP:**

ESAP ushered in an era of retrenchment and forced retirement, thereby raising in an unprecedented manner the levels of unemployment. As a number of industries were rationalising and scaling down their operations, it was clear that irrigation in Sanyati could not absorb all the victims of retrenchment being offloaded into the area, and even if it could, for some retrenchees, it was not the sort of alternative they were seeking. What retrenchment and forced retirement did, in effect, was to serve as a rite of passage into a life bereft of social supports and the personal and social identity that a person hitherto had enjoyed. It is true, as testified by the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, that society is usually divided into classes or strata in accordance with the degree of power, status and wealth that each controls and ESAP has contributed in no small measure to widening the gap between the social strata. 1428 It has increased poverty in the lower stratum, for example, by the higher costs they pay on food, water charges, irrigation equipment, farm inputs and other essentials. Although Gowe is no longer paying land rent since 1999 the plotholders are still paying water rates to ARDA. ARDA in turn pays to ZESA on behalf of all plotholders. ARDA keeps the Gowe ZESA card and levies each plotholder according to the hectrage he/she has under irrigation. M. Mjoli remembers paying in one month a water rate of $1 572, 30. 1429 Mjoli’s working sons (one of his sons works in South Africa) sometimes remit money to help their father purchase inputs and pay the water rate. If the water rate is not paid ARDA prohibits a plotholder to irrigate or grow crops. 1430 Some plotholders who are failing to break even and pay their bills are Muzanenhamo and Vambe due to old age; Simon Mushonga because he owns both a dryland and an irrigation plot, so there is no proper management and Muponda who is polygamous. His two wives do not co-operate with each other and their frequent bickering is hindering farming progress. 1431 Another

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1427 Bvunzawabaya, Personal Interview, 17th October 2006.
1429 M. Mjoli (Plotholder and Chairman of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 14th May 2005.
1430 *Ibid*.
1431 M. Mjoli, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005.
reason for their failure is that the four farmers do not have working children who assist them with remittances.

Apart from these individual handicaps, there was a general air of social and economic insecurity. In fact, Gowe plotholders feel they are no longer doing better than dryland farmers. This is because the latter use their oxen for draught power and they do not know the effect of engine breakdowns because they do not use the conventional electricity-powered irrigation systems, which are expensive. Thus, dryland farmers do not pay extra costs for tillage and water like their irrigation counterparts. In a good season, dryland farmers produce three to four times more on their communal fields, which are also larger than irrigation plots. Gowe though has great potential to produce more if engines and pumps are fixed or if new ones replaced the obsolete ones. Nevertheless, the fortunes of ARDA (the Authority that was supposed to attend to these problems) had also plummeted due to the spiralling effects of adjustment. Hence, cotton, which needed watering at crucial stages of its growth, suffered. This coupled with the difficulties of low prices and lack of markets imposed by ESAP aggravated the situation of the smallholder scheme and caused serious anxieties among the tenants. As already indicated, confronted with these problems, some farmers opted to quit the scheme and went back to their dryland holdings.

The problems of cotton growing were further reflected in the increase in the number of cotton suicides. Suicides were not new but their incidence seemed to increase with an increase in intensity of the economic crisis in the 1990s. Field research in Sanyati indicates a pervasive pattern of dubious selling arrangements that led to cotton suicides especially by aggrieved spouses of peasant farmers. Cotton money or cotton cheques that were not taken home after encashment were a cause for divorce and numerous suicides not only in the irrigation schemes but also in the surrounding communal areas. According to Headman Lozane, the period 1990 to 2000 marked the peak of “cotton deaths” in Sanyati. On average, two deaths were recorded per week at the Sanyati Baptist Hospital and this was the trend almost every cotton season.

Cotton suicides afflicted male-headed households more than households that were headed by women. Clearly, there were few female-headed households in Sanyati irrigation. The women who headed their own households were fairly independent. Farming as household heads helped them exert more control over resources and benefits, but they suffered disparity in their ability to access services (e.g. tillage and input loans), water and advice. They produced and marketed their own crops. Just like male-headed households, they used agricultural proceeds to make farm improvements, pay school fees for their children as well as buy food and clothes for themselves. However, their female counterparts who were not household heads often found the going tough in that they lacked autonomy and their operations were mainly directed by their male folk. They always helped farm the

1432 Nyamutova, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005.
1433 J. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 17th May 2005.
1434 N. S. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 15th May 2005.
1435 Headman Lozane, Personal Interview.
1436 Ibid. N.B. Lozane sounded very authoritative in giving these statistics because during this period (1990-2000) he was responsible for death registry in the Health Information Office of the Sanyati Baptist Hospital.
plot but only in return for no meaningful payment or they were given an exploitation wage. Thus, such women who carried out what Ingrid Palmer has called “women’s unremunerated work in household-associated tasks” sometimes benefited from the provision by their husbands of “a social wage.” 1437 Because it was a mere pittance, women in irrigation’s social status hardly rose above that of men save for those who leased their own plots like J. Chikowore, M. Muparuri and M. Mungofa. Those who were not allocated plots in their names were in an unenviable position especially during the cotton-selling season. Some husbands did not come back home for some days after getting the cheque. Confirming this, Chancellor says: “husbands who sell the crop at a distance often return home without a share of the profit for the wife and her children and for next season’s planting.” 1438 Chancellor was citing occurrences at small-scale schemes in Africa in general but there is very close resemblance with the issues that led to cotton suicides in Sanyati. The woman would have played an invaluable role in ploughing, planting, weeding and harvesting the crop but it was the husband who controlled the cheque and had a big say in how the money would be expended.

Some women challenged men’s privileged access to cotton profits, 1439 but these were a minute fraction and sometimes they risked being assaulted or divorced. Most of them felt powerless and could not wrestle the money from their extravagant husbands some of whom used it to marry new wives. This was in spite of what Ruth Weiss observed in another context that “its their sweat and blood that’s mixed into that soil.” 1440 Indeed, women worked the land and it is an undeniable fact that “… they are the people who keep agriculture going in the rural area …” 1441 but according to Weinrich, they “were exploited and [the] surplus value they produced was appropriated by the men.” 1442 In fact, married women complain that while a crop is in the ground and needs their care, relations with their husbands are amicable, but when the crop is harvested and ready to sell, attitudes harden against them. Therefore, the triple blow of tilling the land, not getting the money and learning that the husband was marrying or flirting with another woman forced a number to despair and commit suicide. However, Jacob Mukwiza maintains, “Cotton income did not cause as many cases of suicide in Sanyati as in Gokwe.” 1443

1441 Ibid.
1443 Mukwiza, Personal Interview.
The cases of cotton suicides or the fact that some women challenge men’s control of cotton profits should not be viewed in isolation to the general lack of security of tenure by rural women. Land tenure is often cited, as limiting women’s access to resources, and it is true that, in the majority of government smallholder schemes not least Gowe, land “ownership” is vested in male household heads. Because ownership and permits to occupy or use land are often in male hands, this restricts the rights of women to realise cash from crops they grow. Nonetheless, women secure user rights to utilise irrigated land and are major users of irrigation, often relying on it exclusively to feed themselves and their families. Two major issues illustrate the disparity between men and women in relation to land in Sanyati. Firstly, user rights for men are not secure because of the terms enshrined in the irrigation lease agreement. User rights for women are not only insecure because of the strictures imposed by the lease but also they are less secure because they depend largely on the relationship of women with husbands and male relatives. This limits women’s motivation to maintain and invest in irrigation land. Secondly, production is limited by resources for both men and women but the latter’s access to resources such as land, loans and extension advice is even more limited because the irrigation plots are often registered in the name of the husband and not the wife. Loan providers, therefore, do not recognise the wife but the husband under whom the plot is listed and from whom they can recover the loan. With the availability of resources production, which determines the value of land as a livelihood asset, is therefore guaranteed. Men because of access to resources can therefore produce and women because of lack of resources cannot produce on their own account. This is painful for women who more than their husbands toil in the fields for long hours almost throughout the year. In addition to working in the fields they have to fulfill domestic obligations such as child rearing, cooking, washing and other chores so regarded as feminine in traditional African culture. Thus, even if the plot is registered in the name of the husband most of the productive work is done by women, hence irrigation intensifies the drudgery in their daily routine.

As Gowe is demanding that the scheme be handed over to plotholders, these differences between men and women must, therefore, be considered when developing strategies for irrigation turnover or irrigation management transfer (IMT) which is far from being accomplished at Gowe-Sanyati. However, the situation is gradually changing. Women are increasingly allocated land, and more women now hold plots at Gowe compared to the DC’s time although the number of female plotholders is still a far cry from the figure expected by the women themselves. In fact, in Sanyati women decry the absence of NGO activity. After observing the work of the National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (NANGO) in other parts of the country, J. Chikowore feels the coming on board of an NGO could elevate the status of women in Gowe. Her

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1444 The irrigation tenants do not actually own this land. They farm it on a lease basis. ARDA or the government leases out this land on condition that the settlers abide by the terms of the lease agreement.
1445 There are still more male than female plotholders at Gowe. For example, only 6 plots out of a total of 36 are in female hands.
1446 Chikowore, Personal Interview. N.B. Because Chikowore often experienced problems to secure loans in spite of being a plotholder at Gowe she always thought the reason had something to do with her being a female holder of an irrigation plot. Her sentiments in support of NGO involvement/participation in Sanyati stemmed, therefore, from her awareness of the existence and role of NANGO in championing the rights of women to land and other agricultural resources.
observation could be right judging by how these institutions have been operating to address female developmental needs in other countries of Africa. Clearly, in many countries NGO developments often favour women, and private donors promptly respond to women’s requests. Entire schemes are often dedicated to women for food production. In Eritrea, for instance, women have influenced local land allocation by proving themselves capable in both operation and maintenance of commercial irrigation activity. In some parts of Africa, working as groups, they have been granted rights to cultivate that are better than those currently available to local men. Although women in Zimbabwe have demonstrably shown similar qualities they are not always allocated land and entire schemes as happened in Eritrea. Gowe in particular is still grappling with trying to convince the Authority (ARDA) to transfer management to the outgrowers. However, if this were to materialise, management is likely to be transferred to male plotholders who are not only in the majority but also the tenure system seems to be tilted in their favour. Hence, the women are likely to lose out. This analysis, therefore, illustrates that there are land tenure differences between men and women in Sanyati irrigation.

The issues of tenure were among the problems that contributed to poverty in ARDA outgrower schemes and the surrounding non-irrigated areas. Due to the disproportionate disbursement of loans and other irrigation services there is a lot of poverty in Sanyati irrigation especially among the resource-poor plotholders. ESAP led to its entrenchment in the dryland and irrigation sectors of the area. This poverty manifests itself in general failure by women to access plots and failure by both female and male plotholders to access inputs and other farming needs since the beginning of the 1990s. Women are among the poorest irrigators. As already noted, women’s poverty relative to the whole group of irrigators in Sanyati is generally a result of social norms, particularly those relating to land tenure and that women’s bargaining position within households is comparatively weak. Poverty affects Sanyati irrigators in two major ways. Firstly, poverty among irrigators reduces the potential for production and, secondly, poverty in the surrounding communities reduces the potential for profit. Hence poverty is threatening to arrest the process of differentiation that had gathered so much momentum prior to the 1990s. In addition, structural adjustment (ESAP) has already significantly raised the costs of inputs, affecting women disproportionately because they are among the poorest irrigators, in relation to accessibility to both cash and other resources. The impact of adjustment has been severe on those who were already poor, but a number of men were doing relatively well in comparison to women because the former were privileged in that plots, agricultural loans and other resources were often allocated in their favour. The ability to command resources, therefore, differentiates Sanyati male and


1449 The status quo is supported by strong traditional views in the community at large, but ARDA and the government are worsening the plight of women by refusing to budge to calls to revoke the lease agreement which largely determines who owns an irrigation plot at Gowe and who does not.

female peasants. The ability to control resources has been one of the bases of differentiation since the introduction of ESAP and it continues to be the case in Zimbabwe in the post-ESAP period. On the Gowe irrigation scheme there is a range of wealth among the farmers although the level of affluence has declined due to ESAP, post-ESAP and drought-related hardships. Drought and structural adjustment, as already indicated, militated against agricultural production.

ESAP on the whole ushered in an era of poverty and disproportionate benefits among the farmers. Indeed, poverty is closely related to social inequality and it is less startling, therefore, that it was aggravated by this programme. The impoverishment of many peasants created by ESAP has resulted in their failure to constantly produce and, subsequently, this led to many school dropouts due to peasant parents’ inability to pay the school fees of their children. Whether in rural villages or in urban centres, many students withdrew from schools both at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. By 1995 the impressive gains made since independence in the agricultural, educational, health and other sectors were steadily eroded mainly as a result of ESAP, which Zimbabwe began implementing in 1991. As the smaller scheme was counting its social and economic losses, the Estate also was finding it difficult to withstand the problems posed by liberalisation. As a result, it failed to achieve optimum yields.

**Estate production (1991-1995):**

It was not only the smallholder entity that was tottering under the effects of structural adjustment. Estate production also plummeted during ESAP. Tables 6:1 and 6:2 below show the differences in crop yields for the Estate for a 4-year period. They are representing the major crops only.

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1451 This can be contrasted with the period after independence when there were no dropouts largely because the government had adopted measures to expand education facilities to service those areas that had hitherto been neglected by the colonial administrations. In this period among the social reforms adopted by the Mugabe government were the provision of free primary education and free health services to benefit the poor majority most of whom live in the countryside.
Table 6.1: ARDA SANYATI ESTATE: CROP YIELD ANALYSIS FROM 1991/92 TO 1993/94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ha</td>
<td>Total Yield</td>
<td>Ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>598 816</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15 375</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37 000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>106 062</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/Beans</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>2 099</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/nuts</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>215 500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: 1 indicates that the Estate devoted 500 ha to cotton in the two seasons 1991/92 and 1992/93, revealing an increase of 170 100 kgs in cotton production in that period. There was an increase in production at the beginning of ESAP because of relatively high prices and the availability of foreign markets for cotton. The hectrage and the yield (agricultural production) dropped markedly and quite predictably during the peak of ESAP between 1993/94 and 1994/95 because of increasingly low prices and lack of external markets to absorb the local product. Bvunzawabaya has pointed out that “International markets were not open to Gowе farmers and the estate” since certain criteria had to be met first. Essentially, an “export permit” had to be obtained by a farmer intending to sell his/her produce on the foreign market. Thus, it was “difficult to sell directly outside because of the need for a permit from the National Cotton Council.” In addition, a farmer had to be in possession of a contract indicating his market, which entitled him to sell outside Zimbabwe. It should be pointed out that in a good season, ARDA Sanyati produces about a third of the country’s cotton in terms of quantity, but in this period productivity sank to a very low level as reflected in the table.

The table also shows that total cotton, banana, tomato and maize yields for 1991/92 were lower than those for 1992/93. This was largely due to the effects of drought, which together with the problem of pump breakdowns, led to a reduction by 328 ha in the hectrage sown to cotton in 1993/94. Since 1992 the Estate was not growing groundnuts as the crop needed a lot of labour and the market for groundnuts was not good. No wheat was grown in 1992 and 1995, but a total yield of 394 000 kgs for wheat in 1993/94 was the highest for this period. All maize that was not intended for seed was sold as green mealies. Seed maize was only tried in the 1993/94 season. It was grown on 30 ha, yielding a total of 87 800kgs and an

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1453 Bvunzawabaya, Personal Interview, 17th October 2006.
1454 Ibid.
1455 Gwerengwe, Personal Interview, 2nd May 1996.
average yield per hectare of 2 900kgs. The drought, financial problems and frequent pump breakdowns did not lead to the attainment of very high yields. However, without these problems, it can be argued that crop yields can go up manifold with irrigation as compared to dryland enterprise, and smallholder irrigation schemes such as Gowe can be reliable sources of income especially given the advantage they have to double crop.

Table 6.2: ARDA SANYATI ESTATE: CROP YIELD ANALYSIS FOR 1994/95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Ha</th>
<th>Total Yield</th>
<th>Ave Yield Per/Ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>269 956</td>
<td>1 740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>115 069</td>
<td>3 835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>88 000</td>
<td>18 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>223 992</td>
<td>7 466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sugar Beans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 1994/95 season, an even smaller hectrage was devoted to cotton and the yield was also low. The high cost of chemical inputs and the lack of markets during ESAP did not promote the cultivation of a crop whose demands on labour were also phenomenal. Because the Estate is approximately 1 000 ha in size this means a paltry 215 ha were cultivated and 785 ha were fallow in this season, signifying real viability problems for ARDA Sanyati. In fact, agriculture for Zimbabwe, normally a surplus food producer, declined as reflected in the two tables not only because of ESAP but also as a result of droughts between 1991/92 and 1994/95. This also partly explains why the Main Estate registered considerable losses of $475 376,00; $976 759,00; $382 818,00; $318 371,00 and $742 831,00 in 1990/91, 1991/92, 1992/93, 1993/94 and 1994/95 respectively.  

Thus, the economy of Sanyati and that of Zimbabwe in the 1990s continued to be adversely affected by the devastating droughts and by an economic environment characterised by falling commodity prices, rising protectionist barriers and heavy debt service burdens. After the 1992 drought a dry spell continued to linger around the country as another “horrendous drought” occurred in 1994. Following this drought, economic reforms suffered a major setback. Hence, according to Mlambo, the programme (ESAP) that opened with a drought was also “bade farewell [sic] by a second drought in 1994/95.” Because of drought and

other export-oriented difficulties one of the problems during ESAP were mounting “parastatal debts.” As a consequence of these debts, ARDA was not able to extend its usual services to Gowe. In the words of Liberty Mhlanga, “ESAP was a parallel activity. It did not help ARDA. It did not benefit outgrowers [as] we [ARDA] continued to operate on Ministry of Agriculture funds.” Reinforcing the same point Matowanyika asserted “The Agricultural and Rural Development Authority was pushed into a survival mode by ESAP. Structural adjustment denied ARDA the resources to support the smaller scheme [Gowe].” Because the Authority was not able to assist its smallholder section this caused a lot of indignation and anxiety among the plotholders who wondered how, under the circumstances, their plight was going to be ameliorated. They were being weaned off rather prematurely. It was partly out of this anxiety and partly out of sheer need to carve out new accumulation prospects that some Gowe farmers embarked on the invasion of Estate land starting in 1992.

**Invasion of Estate land (1992-2000):**

Demands for fertile or bigger pieces of land in Zimbabwe by the peasantry date back to the colonial period. In Sanyati such demands were more clearly articulated after the passage of the NLHA when land-hungry farmers resorted to numerous strategies, which ranged from outright purchase to clandestine seizure of land through the informal madiro system. In Edziwa Village to the South of the Main Estate, madiro practice was quite rife. Edziwa Village was established when the remnants of the Rhodesdale evictees were settled there by the colonial government in 1954 under Headman Virima. In 1992 people from different surrounding areas such as Lozane, Mudzingwa, Dubugwane and the Gowe Irrigation Scheme invaded the Estate area adjacent to the village, which is now headed by Village Head, Edziwa. With the coming of these people, the village was extended and subsequently divided into the “Old Line” (comprising the 1954 settlers) and the “New Line” which was established by the new settlers who came in 1992. The “New Line” now surpasses the older settlement in size. It has 75 households whereas the “Old Line” has 30.

*Programme*, ix. In short, this new programme, which succeeded ESAP, became known as ZIMPREST. ESAP’s successor, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), was launched in 1997. It was aimed at correcting the deficiencies of ESAP, but it continued the same thrust of macroeconomic policies as ESAP with more focus on economic and social issues. However, this new programme was never really implemented.


1462 The debts accumulated because ARDA was not operating at a profit throughout this period (1991-1995).


1464 Matowanyika, Personal Interview.

1465 Africans in Sanyati, in opposition to the NLHA, were extending their cultivations outside the original demarcated lands in a process that came to be known locally as madiro or freedom ploughing. This process entailed self-allocating themselves land in order to boost their prospects for accumulation.

1466 Hlalisekani Dube, (ARDA Sanyati Estate Administration Clerk and Edziwa Communal Farmer), Personal Interview, ARDA Sanyati, 19th May 2005.


not affected by the removals in 1974 to pave way for the Sanyati Main Estate. They did not fall within the boundary demarcated for that project. However, the people who form the “New Line” are illegal settlers because they invaded Estate land. Hlalisekani Dube who now occupies a 5½ ha plot left Lozane Village, Ward 24, for Edziwa in April 1993. He and his father embarked on this move because they argued that they had accumulated a lot of cattle and therefore wanted “a big place” to farm and keep their cattle. They were also driven by what they called “very fertile soil for any type of crop, for example, cotton, maize, groundnut and sorghum which do very well even without the application of chemical or artificial fertilisers.”

In 1994 Edziwa people from “New Line” were forced by the government to vacate Estate space they were illegally occupying. They refused to be moved and in this year, in typical Rhodesdale style, all their homes were set on fire by ZRP forces from Chegutu to force them out. After this incident some of them left whilst others did not move out as they simply moved their homes to different locations but still within the ARDA Estate. However, they all returned during the major land invasions in 2000 and to this day they continue to stay on Estate land. The official silence surrounding their illegal stay coupled with the length of time they have stayed there seems to be giving their tenure some legitimacy. Clearly, the matter has now assumed political dimensions. It is now politically sensitive to resuscitate the idea of evicting or in their case re-evicting these people from Estate land. Several but intermittent meetings have been held since 1992 involving the local MP, Estate Manager and other stakeholders over this issue. However, all these meetings confirm the difficulties of taking the route of eviction particularly after repeated warnings by successive MPs in the area that “ARDA should not arbitrarily evict people.” Thus, ARDA is “failing to regularise things [deal with the invasion of their land] because of political connotations behind this issue.”

As already indicated, some people from Gowe took part in the invasion of the Estate in 1992. At the Gowe Irrigation Scheme, demands for more land or bigger plot sizes have also been voiced for many years since the inauguration of the scheme. Plotholders are not happy about the size of plots they hold. They feel plots of 3 ha (7½ acres) or 4 ha (10 acres) are small and not viable. They have been proposing 10 ha (25 acres). Confirming this escalating demand for land, the Estate Manager, Henry Chiona, asserted:

> People are demanding a share of the Estate. They are actually farming or growing cotton on Estate land. Now we [ARDA] have illegal settlers on

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1469 The 1974 removals mainly affected Mudzingwa Village.
1470 Dube, Personal Interview.
1471 Dube, Personal Interview.
1473 Dube, Personal Interview. See also Machicha, Personal Interview, 17th May 2005.
1475 Bvunzawabaya, Personal Interview, 17th October 2006.
1476 Petros Bvunzawabaya, (Former Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, ARDA Head Office, Harare, 21st May 2004.
the Estate. About 30 such settlers are staying on the Estate. Another chunk of Estate land was taken over by the [Johan Marange] Apostolic Church who have been holding their annual church meetings here since 1977. To date, they have built a permanent centre fully installed with electricity. Some of the land claimants are offspring of Gowe plotholders. Others are from the business community in the Sanyati Township. Estate land to [sic] them looks more lucrative. Because of irrigation they think if they get this land irrigation facilities will be extended to them. The problem, which started in 1992, got worse in 2000/2001. The problem needs to be politically settled. The Chief [Wozhele], Headman Lozane, the DA and the local MP have been informed about the problem. The Chief together with the Headman have told the illegal settlers to move out. The MP said ‘let the problem be resolved after elections [March 2000].’

The stance by the MP was not only a bad precedent for the future but incapacitated Estate management whenever confronted with the same problem. Failure to deal with the situation decisively has extended these settlers’ illegal tenure. Their status has reached near permanency. Edziwa and Gowe people’s action in 2000, although illegal as stipulated in the country’s statute books, was not a novel phenomenon. The 1992 land seizures of part of Estate land to the south by the same people preceded the main land invasions of 2000. Frustrated that the Land Acquisition Act passed in 1992 did not address their hunger for land, these people unilaterally invaded Estate land. ARDA has tried and is still trying in vain to jettison them from the said land. As already stated, political intervention has failed to yield the result desired by ARDA. It seems to have complicated the whole process. Fresh land invasions in 2000 made it even more difficult for government to force Edziwa people out of ARDA property. It was not only difficult for government to do so but it was also politically untenable for government to evict these people at a time invasions on a much wider scale were being carried out elsewhere in the country with government saying nothing about it. How could the same government, which had remained mum about other invasions, denounce the land claims of Edziwa people? Thus, without government making any firm official statement to the contrary the invasions were bound to spiral. The land invasions of 2000 in their broader sense, however, are beyond the scope of this study.

THE POST-ESAP ERA

The financially cumbersome situation up to 1995/96 set the developmental tone for the remaining part of the decade. ARDA owed its financiers large sums of money. The parastatal found itself so much in dire financial straits that it was difficult for it to fulfill its obligations towards Gowe. This has also influenced the relationship that exists

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1477 The Estate Manager, Henry Chiona, calls them “squatters,” but there is evidence that the parishioners sought permission from the then Estate management to build their centre near the Munyati River and hold annual meetings there. It is believed they chose this site because of the abundance of firewood and free-flowing water from the Munyati. The permission was duly granted, and the Johan Marange centre they set up in Sanyati (right on the ARDA Estate) is the second largest in Zimbabwe after the one in Macheke. It is, thus, a misnomer to call them illegal settlers.

1478 Henry Chiona, (Estate Manager, ARDA Sanyati), Personal Interview, Sanyati Estate, 13th May 2005.
between the two where the latter perceives itself as having been abandoned by the Estate and has to strive to fend for itself. There has been a nominal weaning process. In fact, the weaning process is not being transparently done. To a certain extent, it seems logical to argue that Gowe had long been weaned off in the late 1980s when support to the outgrower section fundamentally dwindled. It diminished to the extent that the Estate was no longer supplying certain essential services to its “smaller brother,” for example, inputs, mechanical equipment and advice. This can be attested to by the fact that the Estate was now recruiting labour from outside – a sign that the symbiotic relationship had broken down. Ideally, Gowe should be supplying the Estate with most of its labour requirements, but because most of the outgrowers had prospered from cultivating and selling their own crops and even employed labour on their irrigation plots they shunned Estate labour. Furthermore, the differential gap in income between plotters and Estate employees makes this impossible. For example, the lowest paid Estate worker realises the same income with the least successful plotholder. The most successful Gowe farmer is better off than the lowest paid Estate worker and this explains why the Gowe tenants do not want to work for the Estate.

As already noted, instead of work for ARDA the most successful Gowe plotters, just like the most successful dryland farmers, invariably employ labour in their own right. Because most of them are growing cotton, it is also difficult for both the plotters and the Estate to get labour during the picking period because almost everyone will be concentrating on harvesting their own crop. Both ended up involved in searching for pickers at the same time. For the plotters the task of procuring labour was not easy either because humwes (traditional voluntary work groups/parties to assist each other in the fields) were no longer as popular. Since ESAP they had become very expensive to host. Therefore, in the 1990s, as work parties (humwe) gradually went into oblivion, it was only possible for irrigation tenants and dryland farmers to get the labour of very close friends and their own children. This can be contrasted with the mid-1970s when humwes, nhimbes (rotational work groups or a variant of work party) and machangano (a variant of work party) made labour relatively abundant as agriculture was flourishing.

**Agricultural recovery or decline (1996-2000):**

In spite of the difficulties of the earlier period, some farmers seemed to have emerged from the crisis unscathed. An exceptional case of success in the post-ESAP period was Munengami who, for the 1995/96 season, sold 18 bales of cotton and obtained a cheque for $21,000,00. Of the amount he received, he paid out COTTCO a sum of $12,000,00 for fertiliser, pesticides and seed. A further $4,000,00 went to AFC in loan repayment. This gave Munengami a profit of $5,000,00. He made this profit despite the generally poor market prices for crops. However, a substantial part of this profit was swallowed by land rent which had been hiked from $72,00 in 1987 to $1,300,00 per plot in 1995. Such an exorbitant charge affected farmers’ plans for the following season.

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1479 S. C. Pazvakavambwa, (Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Rural Housing and Social Amenities), Personal Interview, Munhumutapa Government Offices, Harare, 7th June 2005.
1480 E. Munengami, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 8th January 1997.
Production was affected by other factors too. For example, there was a decline in crop production due to soil exhaustion. According to Ivy Nyamutova, “the soil is now too exhausted to yield much.”

She went further to demonstrate her point by saying: “In 1970, 0.7 ha could yield between 11 and 15 bales of cotton but now [i.e. since the mid-1990s] 1 ha yields 7 to 8 bales.”

Yields of between 5 and 8 bales per hectare were achieved in 1996. Commodity prices remained not only unstable but also unpredictable. From a financial point of view, therefore, the 1995/96 season was disappointing. This is so because crop yields are perhaps the most common measure of agricultural productivity and cotton yields were not the best in many years as will be demonstrated later in the chapter.

On the whole, cotton in the 1990s contributed little to plotholders’ progress because the soils had become exhausted thereby needing more fertilisers to yield increased output. Inflationary prices made cotton farming an unprofitable undertaking. Water rates rose incredibly. Water charges, for example, had risen from $1 572, 30 per month in November 1997 to about $200 000, 00 per annum for both winter and summer cropping in 2000.

Frequent pump engine breakdowns meant infrequent supply of water and because of lack of water the growth and development of cotton balls was strained. The major cotton buyer, COTTCO, was also not paying handsomely for plotholders’ crop at a time when input (seed and fertiliser) prices had soared beyond sustainable levels. Furthermore, after plotholders had delivered their cotton, this parastatal body continued to make “ruthless deductions” (i.e. debited plotholders) to recover the cost of inputs it had supplied for that particular season. Massive deductions on their net income obviously impeded accumulation and occasionally provoked some response. Neuso farmers, in particular, sought government intervention to stop a nefarious practice where “companies that gave loans sometimes confiscated property which was not even bought with cotton money in order to recover their loans.”

Cotton in Sanyati, contrary to the earlier years, now resembled a commodity in crisis because making a living from the “white fibre” has, according to Job Gwacha, become “a hopeless, hurting game.”

The farmers - both dryland and irrigation - berate the main buyer of their commodity, COTTCO, and insist, “We are getting nothing out of cotton. We are losing too much money on it. We got families to feed. We are getting back to maize.”

The switch to maize seemed to be encouraged by government who told farmers to devote more hectares to maize especially in the face of the severe and protracted droughts up to 2000. Thus, cotton and its lack of profitability made a number of farmers to concentrate on crops such as green mealies and beans that required fewer inputs.

Opportunities for side marketing maize and beans to try and get a better price from surrounding dryland farmers or other buyers existed whereas cotton selling was mainly a COTTCO monopoly. Indeed, for a long time “cotton led to general development of the

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1482 Ivy Nyamutova, (Wife of Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 9th January 1997.
1483 Ibid.
1484 T. Nyamutova, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005 and M. Mjoli, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005.
1485 M. Mjoli, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005.
1486 Chief Neuso, Personal Interview.
1487 J. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 17th May 2005.
1488 Ibid. See also Shayamiti, Personal Interview.
rural population in Sanyati, but there is not very rapid development today because of low returns. Farmers even suspect high profiteering by Cotton Companies.” 1489 Clearly, between the 1960s and 1980s cotton, (dubbed as the farmers’ “cash cow,”) 1490 was largely responsible for differentiating rural farmers in Sanyati, but from the 1990s through to 2000 green and dry mealies as well as beans were more responsible for differentiating plotholders into rich and poor. An example of a successful farmer in this period was E. Chiwombe who bought cattle from the sale of maize and beans. His herd now stands at 18. He also built a good home, neatly fenced his homestead, and bought a car and a tractor. His farming operations were made easier by the fact that he had a fat bank account and had all the farm implements that he needed, for example, ploughs and harrows. By 2000 he no longer relied on ARDA for tillage.

Another plotholder who owes his affluence to the cultivation of maize and beans and, to some extent, cotton is B. Jongwe who originally came from Bikita in Masvingo Province. Between 1992/93 and 1996/97 he sold green mealies to “Harare lorry owners,” and sold dried beans to Blue Ribbon Foods (Harare) “because they were the highest bidder buying at $400,00 per kg. GMB Sanyati was buying at $290, 00 per kg, so it didn’t make [economic] sense [for him] to sell in Sanyati.” 1491 As at 2000 he owned a retail shop combined with a bottle store at the small business centre situated within the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. He bought this shop in 1998. In 2000 he was the only plotholder running a grocery store at the Gowe Business Centre. 1492 The rest of the shop owners at this centre are not Gowe farmers. Local dryland farmers own most of the shops and grinding mills here. These are people who have accumulated wealth at different stages from both farm and off-farm activities in various districts throughout the country.

T. Nyamutova used sales of green mealies to build a beautiful brick but grass-thatched hut in 1998 and a magnificently plastered brick and asbestos-roofed house in the same year. He started concentrating on green mealies and beans in 1995 because “it cost a lot of money to produce cotton for very little return.” 1493 Nyamutova who has always been critical about the benefits of cotton cultivation since colonial times, however, accepts that, between 1980 and 1990, farmers got better return from cotton because it was planted when the buying price had already been announced. Thus, it gave farmers the opportunity to decide what quantity to grow and how much inputs like fertilisers and seed to buy. 1494

Nevertheless, he complained: “Since 1995 Gowe plotholders are just growing cotton and other crops before the selling price is known and this does not motivate farmers.” 1495 Responding to a request to announce producer prices in advance which was made by the Chairman of the Commercial Grain Producers’ Association, Tok Arnold, at a CFU

1489 Chikombingo, Personal Interview.
1490 J. Gwacha, Personal Interview, 17th May 2005.
1491 Bernard Jongwe (Gowe Plotholder and former Chairman of the Gowe Irrigation Committee), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 16th October 2004.
1492 E. Chiwombe (Plotholder and Vice Secretary of the Gowe Irrigation Scheme), Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 14th May 2005. See also Jongwe, Personal Interview, 16th October 2004.
1493 T. Nyamutova, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005.
1494 Ibid.
1495 Ibid.
Congress in August 1994, the then Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development, Kumbirai Kangai, confirmed Nyamutova’s complaint when he told delegates: “Government will not revert to announcing a pre-planting producer price as this was in conflict with current economic reforms which require market forces [to] determine prices.” At a press conference following his announcement of the 1993/94 prices and marketing policy, Minister Kangai also rejected Tok Arnold’s call for government to return to an announcement of a maize pre-planting price to enable farmers to plan for “the forthcoming season [1994/95].” In this instance Kangai replied, “what he’s doing is inviting me and government to go again into the control (situation) which we are trying to get away from.” He then reiterated: “We are saying market forces should determine exactly what is going to happen. I don’t set pre-planting prices or selling prices. We want the market itself to determine these prices.”

It is, therefore, true as Nyamutova argues that “farmers knew the price of their cotton when their bales were being offloaded from the scotch carts or hired lorries at the COTTCO depot.” To avoid the obvious inconvenience of taking produce back home, farmers were forced by this catch 22 situation to sell their cotton to the state agency (COTTCO) even if the price offered was not attractive. Because produce had to pay for the previous year’s loan, delivering to COTTCO was the only guarantee that they would get next season’s inputs. This was typical exploitation of farmers and, because cotton is not an edible crop, farmers were forced to “leave it there [in COTTCO hands]” in return for a pittance. Therefore, after 1995, instead of cotton making farmers prosper, it made them poor through low prices and limited loans. Those who were denied loans could not afford inputs for the following season. It should be pointed out, however, that some plotholders failed because of their own poor management and also because they sold cotton inputs instead of using them for the purpose they were intended.

In this period, the unresolved issue of settler lease agreements and low crop prices were some of the major problems stifling efforts at recovery. The tenants maintain that the conditions of lease should be revisited if progress is to be achieved, but ARDA has persistently closed its ears to these demands, which at their worst have a tendency to hamper productivity. For instance, the agreement of lease prevented the lessee (Gowe settler farmer) from owning irrigation equipment such as pipes and risers (sprinklers). These were the property of the lessor (ARDA). They were merely loaned out to the tenants during the currency of the lease, but upon expiration of the agreement, they had to be returned in their original state to the lessor. The lessee would pay for any damage or loss suffered to the irrigation pipes and risers. In addition, he/she paid for the services of

1496 The Farmer: Zimbabwe Farming News Magazine, 64(31/32), Harare: Modern Farming Publications, (August 4/11, 1994), 16. N.B. Announcing pre-planting prices had become the norm since independence. The era of price controls came to an end with the implementation of ESAP.
1498 Ibid.
1499 Ibid.
1500 T. Nyamutova, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005.
1501 Ibid.

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the pump minder and for any administration overheads that the lessor raised. The last two clauses placed an unnecessary financial burden on the tenants considering that they could carry out some of the responsibilities they were being asked to pay for on their own. The lease arrangement, therefore, had some negative effects on settler performance, as it had remained unresolved for rather too long. This, among other farming inconveniences, has led outgrowers to demand the handover to them by ARDA of the smallholder component and its infrastructure. ARDA, on the other hand, has resisted moves intended to achieve this irrigation management transfer. Granting the settlers autonomy or full independence would endanger Estate interests especially those linked to the supply of labour. Continued bickering between the Estate and the outgrowers does not promote production either. A lot of things needed to be put right to boost irrigation performance. One of them was the need to improve commodity prices, which had tumbled during structural adjustment.

In an effort to resuscitate cotton production, which had apparently declined due to no or few real incentives during ESAP, Quton Seed Pvt Ltd, a company interested in promoting a new seed variety for commercial purposes, came up with an offer of a more attractive price than the ruling price. Inviting farmers and farmer organisations (including ARDA) to help boost its seed stocks, the company’s General Manager (GM), R. F. Jarvis, appealed to the farmers to deliver their Albar SZ 9314 variety grown in the 1998/99 season to nearby COTTCO Depots. He promised: “The Company will [in turn] purchase all … A and B Grade deliveries for seed purposes at a premium rate of $1.44/kg over and above the ruling producer price.” In addition the GM informed growers that the SZ 9314 commercial variety was “released recently” and management intended “to bulk up as much seed as possible of this ‘cultivar’ in an effort to expedite commercial plantings in the 1999/2000 season.” He further assured them: “This is a very high yielding variety with great potential, and therefore, it is management’s desire to afford as many growers as possible the opportunity to grow the new variety in the millennium.” This was indeed a rare opportunity for ARDA Sanyati and other cotton growers who were willing to deliver to COTTCO and in the process realise better cash returns on their crop. Such cash incentives coupled with awards given by COTTCO for the “cotton grower of the year” also helped raise cotton yields, though marginally, as they had the effect of

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1503 Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) has not yet been achieved at Gowe-Sanyati. However, its merits and demerits will be discussed later in the chapter.
1504 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.6 Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Correspondence, “Purchase Offer of your Entire A and B Grade Albar SZ 9314 Commercial Crop,” R. F. Jarvis (General Manager, Quton Seed Company Pvt Ltd.) to All 1998/99 Season Albar SZ 9314 Commercial Growers, copied to the Chief Executive Officer/CEO (ARDA), 15th February 1999, 1. N.B. At ARDA the position of General Manager was changed to that of Chief Executive Officer towards the end of the 1990s.
1505 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.6 Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Correspondence, “Purchase Offer of your Entire A and B Grade Albar SZ 9314 Commercial Crop,” R. F. Jarvis (General Manager, Quton Seed Company Pvt Ltd.) to All 1998/99 Season Albar SZ 9314 Commercial Growers, copied to the Chief Executive Officer/CEO (ARDA), 15th February 1999, 1.
1506 Ibid.
1507 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.6 Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Correspondence, “Cotton
encouraging farmers to refocus on cotton, a crop which in the 1990s had become as 
unpopular as it had been in colonial times. It should be pointed out that farmers who were 
not sure of COTTCO’s genuineness, however, did not respond to this call as, in their 
opinion, the parastatal now symbolised low prices. Such sporadic incentives did not boost 
farmer confidence in the economy. A longer-term incentive package was more preferable 
to farmers and, in its absence, the long-term effect of this was that cotton yields never 
really rose to the pre-ESAP levels.

**Estate performance (1996-2000):**

After ESAP, management anticipated an improvement in Estate performance. This 
expectation was predicated on a hope that the macro-economic environment would also 
have improved to facilitate higher productivity. However, as illustrated by the table below, 
hardships that militated against an agricultural renaissance in the post-ESAP era still existed 
because hectages under cultivation and yields never really increased.

**Table 6.3: ARDA SANYATI ESTATE: CROP YIELD ANALYSIS FROM 1995/96 TO 
1996/97**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>1995/96</th>
<th>1996/97</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ha</td>
<td>Total Yield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>220 359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>167 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>63 056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>208 623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/Beans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G/nuts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>182 500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As in earlier seasons, maize was sold as green mealies. From the table, it can be discerned 
that the Estate, just like Gowe, was placing less and less emphasis on cotton in order to 
minimise expenditure on this cash and labour intensive crop. Because cotton prices had 
fallen, continually growing the crop made the central estate fail to recoup rising production 
costs. ESAP had ended, but its impact continued to be felt so many years after. This is partly 
why ARDA Sanyati only utilised 300 ha and 291 ha of its total size in 1996 and 1997 
respectively. Generally, Estate land was being under-utilised and yields were low. Low 

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*Company Grower of the Year Award Presentation Ceremony,” C. P. Tamirepi (for Business Unit Manager, 
Sanyati Cotton Company Depot) to the Manager (ARDA Sanyati Estate), 3rd September 1998.*

*Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.6 Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Correspondence, “Cotton 
Company Grower of the Year Award Presentation Ceremony,” C. P. Tamirepi (for Business Unit Manager, 
Sanyati Cotton Company Depot) to the Manager (ARDA Sanyati Estate), 3rd September 1998.*
yields in turn meant that the Main Irrigation Scheme was under performing in the post-SAP period.

Wheat was another major crop whose harvests had also declined due to limited funds, low market prices and pumping problems caused by earlier droughts and moribund irrigation equipment. Due to pumping problems, the irrigated winter wheat crop in 1997/98 continually suffered from water stress hence reduced yields. The table below illustrates the wheat yields for that year.

Table 6.4: ARDA SANYATI ESTATE WHEAT YIELD (1997/98)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th>Harvested Kgs</th>
<th>Yield/Hectare</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2A</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11 700 Kg</td>
<td>975 Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>54 400 Kg</td>
<td>2 092.3 Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5A</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8 750 Kg</td>
<td>729.2 Kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>74 850 Kg</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These yields were relatively low. The Estate did not have sufficient funds to devote more hectares to wheat against the background of its worst losses in the two seasons preceding the 1997/98 one. For example, in 1995/96, it incurred a loss of $1 958 077.00 followed in quick succession by a record loss of $5 185 648.00 in 1996/97. Therefore, as the decade wore on, ARDA Sanyati was not operating at a profit hence the core estate continued to perform badly in the post-ESAP period. The Estate, let alone ARDA Head Office could hardly finance their own operations. They always sought assistance directly from government or from other government agencies such as the Cotton Company of Zimbabwe. In 1997 ARDA Sanyati appealed to COTTCO for a sum of $1, 5 million to finance the cost of herbicides for use on their 300-hectare cotton crop. Because many companies, not least COTTCO, were struggling to make ends meet in the post-ESAP period, only $400 000, 00 was made available to the central estate. Unable to raise the difference of $1,1 million from other sources, S. Mapondera, the then Estate Manager, sent a second request to his COTTCO counterpart at Sanyati for more funds to finance the cotton crop. His letter read:

We [Sanyati Estate] do appreciate the assistance of Four Hundred Thousand Dollars received on the 30th December 1997. Our requirement still stands at $1, 5 million; we still have a shortfall of $1, 1 million. [This] total is for herbicides only. It does not include pesticides and weeding labour costs, which are currently required.  

1511 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.6 Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Correspondence, “Request for More Funds to Finance our Cotton Crop 300 Ha,” S. Mapondera (Sanyati Estate Manager) to the Business Unity Manager (COTTCO Sanyati), 4th January 1998.
Clearly, they were going to ask for more to cover pesticides and labour costs in future. Why they did not make one comprehensive submission is unclear. Whilst the erratic disbursements made it difficult for ARDA Sanyati to expand their productive capacity, it should be appreciated that COTTCO disbursed loans to the Estate based on the latter’s previous performance, which was disparagingly low. Eventually, and seemingly under duress, COTTCO released the remaining $1,1 million. However, ARDA Sanyati continued to request more funds for their cotton crop and various other needs such as chemicals, fertilisers, and ZESA bills. The Estate Manager, Mapondera, in particular, suggested that the credit be “disbursed in one tranche because of the escalating input costs due to the crashing Zimbabwe dollar.” Their demands for cash became almost perennial as evidenced by the fact that in early 1999, they approached Fairacres, an ARDA Estate based in Kwekwe, seeking a loan. In soliciting for assistance from this sister estate, Mapondera wrote:

We are desperately in need of crop chemicals mainly grass and lay bye herbicides. The Estate is currently out of cash. At present we have no option but to seek assistance from you. Could you please kindly assist us with funds [$261 516, 00] to buy … cotton inputs [Gramoxone, Bladex and Fusilade]? We will pay back in five installments at a rate of over $50 000, 00/Month starting in February 1999.

The more the Estate obtained these loans the more enmeshed in debt it became. Mapondera’s successor, Petros Bvunzawabaya, was also forced to live off credit because it was almost impossible to overhaul the financial problems created by his predecessors for the Estate overnight. It was because of the inherited financial difficulties that Sanyati Estate under the new manager had to ask for spot payment from COTTCO for their 1998/99 cotton crop. In his communication to his counterpart at COTTCO, the then Estate Manager, Bvunzawabaya, defied the manner of normal business practice when he requested payment on delivery. He wrote:

We are currently facing cash flow problems and this has adversely affected our cotton-picking operations. We need to pay our ZESA bills for irrigation done in [sic] our late crop. Could you please arrange for us a spot payment to the tune of $400 000, 00 for our deliveries as from 3 May 1999.

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1512 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.6 Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Correspondence, “Request for More Funds to Pay for Chemicals, Fertilisers and ZESA Bills - $1 500 000,00,” S. Mapondera (Sanyati Estate Manager) to the Business Unity Manager (COTTCO Sanyati), 28th December 1998.

1513 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.6 Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Correspondence, “Credit Disbursement and Increment,” S. Mapondera (Sanyati Estate Manager) to the Land Extension Officer (COTTCO Sanyati), 14th October 1998.

1514 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.6 Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Correspondence, “Memorandum - Request for Funds to Purchase Cotton Chemicals,” S. Mapondera (Sanyati Estate Manager) to the Estate Manager (Fairacres – Kwekwe), 20th January 1999.

1515 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.6 Cotton Company of Zimbabwe Correspondence, “Cash Payment of $400 000,00,” P. Bvunzawabaya (Agricultural Development Authority Sanyati Estate Manager) to the
In asking for cash payment on delivery of their cotton to COTTCO, the Sanyati Estate Manager was also reiterating a fact which had become all too familiar since the 1990s that hard times had befallen ARDA. Financial resources were so totally limiting that the Estate was not achieving its production targets. Funds were not only inadequate they were, in fact, unavailable. Matowanyika has testified that the government was not allocating resources to parastatals since 1993.\(^{1516}\)

It is necessary to point out that the poor performance of the Estate should not be taken in isolation to other factors. For instance, it was a reflection of poor performance not only on the part of the government agency (ARDA) but also the national economy. At a meeting held on 18 February 1998, the ARDA Board itself “expressed great concern about the poor results of the Authority for the [financial] year ended 31 October 1997.”\(^{1517}\) The Board then resolved to institute an external investigation into the Authority under which a Board Committee was appointed to draw up the terms of reference. Management was requested to identify the causes of the poor performance, which in 1996/97, measured in monetary terms, amounted to $64 million.\(^{1518}\) In appraising the Board on their findings Management indicated that during the year under review (1996/97) the Authority\(^ {1519}\) lost sales revenue of $25.5 million due to: (a) low yields mainly because of excessive rains; (b) late planting because the rains came late into the season; (c) excessive rains brought with them diseases and pests. Pest control was particularly difficult as maize was affected by gray leaf and soya beans was affected by frog eye disease, and in some cases there was water logging and leaching; (d) lower prices on the market for wheat, cotton and maize against escalating direct input costs such as labour, electricity, water, chemicals and fertilisers among others; and the fact that (e) agronomic practices were worsened by the excessive rains.\(^ {1520}\)

Furthermore, it was observed that the heavy overheads at Head Office contributed to the poor performance of the Authority. These amounted to $23 million, which represented 7% of the total costs. The estate overheads of $64 million representing 19% of the total costs also depressed the operating results. Together the overheads amounted to $87 million representing 26% of the total production costs. The size of the interest on overdraft of $18 million was alarming and also contributed to the poor results.\(^ {1521}\) This evidence has been corroborated by the Sanyati Estate Accounts Clerk, Alexander Machicha, who says between 1993 and 1998 the Sanyati Estate got overdraft facilities from the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ – now the Jewel Bank of Zimbabwe).\(^ {1522}\)

\(^{1516}\) Matowanyika, Personal Interview.
\(^{1517}\) Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: Regional Managers Meetings and Reports, ARDA, February 1998, 1.
\(^{1518}\) Ibid.
\(^{1519}\) The Authority refers to the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA).
\(^{1520}\) Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: Regional Managers Meetings and Reports, ARDA, February 1998, 1.
\(^{1521}\) Ibid.
\(^{1522}\) Alexander Machicha, (ARDA Sanyati Estate Accounts Clerk), Personal Interview, ARDA Sanyati, 17\(^{th}\) May 2005.
Deliberately avoiding figures, he went on to say “by 1999 the overdraft advanced to the Estate had become so huge that CBZ converted it into a cash loan facility.”

After the investigation, Management came up with a SWOT analysis of their objectives as a way of remedying the situation. The strengths of the Authority were seen to include the following: (a) a large pool of skilled and experienced manpower; (b) free land, adequate water supply and developed infrastructure; (c) abundant wildlife; (d) abundant labour force for some estates; (e) big buying power; and (f) a lot of unused land capacity for such projects as sugarcane. However, whilst these strengths existed the Authority was beset by numerous weaknesses, which threatened its estates’ viability. Among some of its major shortcomings were: (a) lack of marketing capacity and skills; (b) bureaucracy particularly in relation to capital releases; (c) absence of investigations into variances reported by estates to management in management reports; (d) top-heavy Head Office; (e) high indirect costs at estates; (f) a sprinkle of incompetent managers/workers resulting in sub-standard product quality; (g) old machinery and inadequate supply of machinery; (h) lack of priority on development projects (sometimes concentrating on non-core business to the detriment of core business); (i) ineffective communication (i.e. mainly top-down and not bottom-up communication strategy); (j) non-indiscriminate remunerations between performers and non-performers (i.e. no performance-related rewards as far as wages, salaries and bonuses were concerned); (k) non-competitive remuneration compared to what the private sector and other parastatal organisations were offering; (l) diluted management on Authority operations; (m) lack of marketing intelligence; (n) lack of modern technology especially on irrigation; and (o) lack of finance. This was excellent self-introspection by the Authority, but it is surprising that, aware of their weaknesses as they were, they have not fully addressed these problems hence ARDA continues to register losses almost every year. For example, losses ranged from such figures as $475 376, 00 in 1990/91 to $5 185 648, 00 in 1996/97.

Although it can be argued that ARDA were not doing well because they were plagued by such threats as droughts; the unfavourable macro-economic environment; escalating input costs; declining market prices; and competition both local and international, they still...
had great opportunities at their disposal to overturn these disadvantages. For example, the Authority has potential overseas markets, among other things, for wildlife, horticultural products and tea; down stream industries with value added on Authority products for the local markets; water rights; cheap money from COTTCO, Cargill and other sources; and, last but not least, presence in different ecological zones of the country. In fact, as already alluded to, after identifying the causes of poor performance Management came up with sound recommendations, which had they been strictly followed through, they were set to help improve ARDA and subsequently estate performance. These were as follows: (a) market at best advantage should be given great attention; (b) appoint marketing agencies according to need; (c) restructure Head Office and reduce it to Chief Executive, 2 Accountants, 6 Auditors, 1 Administration, 2 Human Resources/HR, 3 Secretaries and 3 Front Office Staff/Registry; (d) devolve some administration duties at Head Office to the estates; (e) outsource or subcontract specialist services as and when needed; (f) estate managers to report directly to the Chief Executive; (g) estate managers be put on contract and be given performance targets; (h) pay competitive market related salaries; (i) restructure estates in order to reduce administration overheads; (j) source cheap funds in order to reduce the impact of overdraft interest on operations; (k) have a representative on the Zimbabwe Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ZIMACE) panel/board; (l) construct storage and drying facilities; (m) upgrade present irrigation facilities and introduce new technology; (n) improve on the management and enforcement of contracts; (o) appropriate training should be given adequate attention; and, last but not least, (p) ensure minimum development on resettlement land (i.e. focus more on core business such as the growing of crops in Mashonaland and the rearing of livestock in Matabeleland).

These recommendations tried as much as possible to make the Authority’s objectives SMART that is Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Reliable and fall within a given Time frame or be Time-oriented. Sound as these objectives appeared, they however lacked implementation. There was no special task force appointed to ensure their full implementation. This limitation coupled with fluctuating prices, administrative and operational problems has made ARDA’s task of turning around its fortunes very difficult. Agricultural producer prices were always changing from time to time reflecting a steady rise in nominal terms. For almost all the commodities, the real prices in terms of the United States/US dollar (using end of year exchange rates) never rose enough to reach the price levels of the early 1980s. These price shifts were accompanied by an average annual rate of inflation of about 30%. Inflation had a deleterious effect on the incomes of all the farmers in Zimbabwe in general and the low-income or the resource-poor groups in particular.

1530 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: Regional Managers Meetings and Reports, ARDA, February 1998, 3.
1531 ZIMACE was phased out in 2001.
1532 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: Regional Managers Meetings and Reports, ARDA, February 1998, 3-4. N.B. Investing in non-core business was counterproductive for ARDA at this difficult moment. The parastatal had to refocus its attention on its core business, which was to produce crops and help feed the nation.
1533 Moyo, Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe, 55.
1534 Ibid.
David Mjoli made a very illuminating remark about how inflation in the 1990s affected cotton growers’ aspirations in Sanyati when he said: “Cotton has a faint challenge [limited prospects of enriching farmers] now as compared to the 1970s and 1980s because of inflationary changes which mean that the price and item [commodity] are at war to meet our [farmers’] commitments.”

An additional burden was that farmers could not use the previous season’s prices as guaranteed prices for the following season in decision-making. It is disconcerting to note that cotton farmers are invariably reduced to “price takers” who are forced to wait for price announcements after the harvest, regardless of input credits and labour costs. This means that the “white fibre” is no longer as viable a crop as it used to be in the 1960s right up to the 1980s. Instead of enriching farmers it is now engendering poverty. Government and its marketing agencies should, thus, be urged to set producer prices before the cropping season to facilitate planning on the part of the growers who are not happy about the low prices the cotton crop in particular is fetching on both the domestic and international markets. The very low prices have made some farmers decide not to grow the crop at all. ARDA’s distributive or redistributive capacity of irrigation resources (i.e. water, mechanical equipment and inputs) is exacerbating the situation because it has increasingly become unequal and inconsiderate of the needs of the smallholder scheme. This has caused a number of anxieties, which have prompted some farmers to abandon cotton growing or spontaneously decide to leave the scheme in preference for dryland farming. For the Estate, such actions militated against agricultural recovery in the post-ESAP period. This was so because the farmers who usually sold their cotton through ARDA, in addition to providing crucial reserves of labour, had in the past significantly helped to raise the levels of the crop the Authority would in turn sell to COTTCO on its own behalf or on behalf of the outgrowers.

The Millennium Recovery Plan: Did agriculture recover by 2000? -

Agricultural recovery could only be achieved on the basis of full and sustained production. The harder the times the more government needed to sympathise and empathise with the plotholders. The Estate Managers and ARDA should have sought strategies that ensured continued production and which at the same time took into cognisance the plight of the plotholders which was never ameliorated by the debilitating effects of ESAP. Estate production could have been complemented in a major way had a lasting solution been found to the problem of credit and markets. The Gowe plotholders were prevented from irrigating their crops if they had not paid their debt. For instance a number of plotholders who included A. Badza, G. Maturure, N. Mavhengere, T. Nyamutova, and C. Mhara were in the winter of 2000 refused permission to irrigate their maize due to non-payment of their arrears to the Estate. Regarding both the winter

1535 David Mjoli, Gowe II Plotholder, Personal Interview, Gowe-Sanyati, 14th May 2005.
and summer cropping, the then Estate Manager, P. Bvunzawabaya, argued that “because of the current situation [financially difficult period after ESAP] the estate can no longer afford to sponsor people who are not keen to honour their debts.” 1538 This decision was rather harsh. Judging by some of them like G. Maturure and T. Nyamutova’s excellent farming record since they joined the scheme it is imperative to note that failure on their part to pay had been necessitated by circumstances beyond their control. The generally harsh economic climate characterised by few markets and extremely low market prices for irrigation produce was central to their malperformance and resultant failure to redeem their loans. It is clear that this was not a case of willful default on their part. In all fairness to their contribution to the success of Gowe they should have been given a grace period in which to pay their outstanding balances whilst they continued with production. This was not to be. Maturure, Mavhengere and Mhara were only allowed to go ahead with irrigating their winter maize after they had paid a substantial amount of their debt. In granting them permission to irrigate the Estate Manager wrote to the Gowe Irrigation Committee Chairman, B. Jongwe, in July the same year advising the affected farmers to “irrigate [only] one hectare of maize since [they] had paid more than half of their debt.” 1539 The earlier action to suspend production directly militated against the objective of food security, nutrition and agricultural sustainability. However, the Estate continued with its operations in spite of the fact that it was also hugely indebted to service/loan providers such as COTTCO and Cargill to name only a few.

There was little prospect that the smallholder scheme could wave the magic wand and raise productivity when the Main Estate from which it drew so many resources was going through a very lean patch. The “Bigger Brother” was actually struggling to justify its existence. As Mhlanga observed, “The parastatal is overstretched as far as [cash] demands are concerned and it is getting less money from government or it is getting too little too late.” 1540 Indeed, the poor performance of the plotholder farmers was a reflection of the broader financial and economic crisis besetting the state agency (ARDA) and the country as a whole at the beginning of the new millennium. For example, in a monthly report for November 2001 it was noted that crop planting could not start because of “lack of inputs and money.” 1541 The Mechanical or Maintenance Equipment Unit (MEU), which is the hub of Estate operations, was frequently incapacitated by lack of diesel, petrol, engine and gearbox oil for its field equipment. Because of the Estate’s failure to pay fuel providers, the bulk tanks were taken away by Mobil Zimbabwe. Consequently, an appeal was made to “any Estate with drums” to help the Sanyati Estate. 1542 Before new diesel containers were installed, at least 20 drums had to be made available as a stopgap measure. An assessment of mechanical requirements revealed that

1538 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: 8.9 RDPU – Scheme Correspondence, “2000/2001 Irrigation,” P. Bvunzawabaya (Estate Manager – Sanyati) to B. Jongwe (RDPU – Committee Chairman), 9th November 2000.
1542 Ibid.
by November 2001, the Estate had 1 tractor and 1 plough when it needed about 5 tractors and 5 ploughs. At least 600 sprinklers, complete with river assemblies, were required. In addition, at least $1 million was urgently required to replace hydrant taps for the irrigation system which had been vandalised. Inputs such as fertiliser, chemicals and herbicides were also in short supply. The situation was compounded by the fact that most of the irrigation equipment had been taken by other Estates. Cannibalisation of equipment by sister Estates took place during the temporary closure in 2000 and the Estates in question were reluctant to return it. To restore viability to Sanyati such equipment had to be returned or else the Estate had to borrow equipment from a sister Estate, which was untenable if agricultural progress was to be achieved by all the Estates.

Given these facts, how could the small-scale irrigators be expected to do well when the Estate itself was struggling to produce results? For instance, in the face of several economic challenges, although the GMB Manager had promised: “farmers who are under irrigation scheme are going to be given first priority when issuing inputs [for summer cropping].” It was not to be the end of their problems. For example, in an astonishing turn of events, the Assistant Accountant for ARDA Sanyati, Nyahwa, at a meeting with Gowe farmers, told the farmers “to find alternative ways of ploughing besides using [ARDA] tractors since diesel is very difficult to find these days.” Vacant plots were also not yielding satisfactory results. Because of this, at the same meeting, farmers were asked to stop illegal cultivation and compelled to surrender vacant plots as these belonged to ARDA. It was argued, “If vacant plots are given to Gowe children, there could be continuous unproductive problems which are already existing between parents and children.” Thus, it was agreed by the meeting that, in line with the laid down modus operandi, vacant plots should be advertised nationally and all those willing to apply should do so.

In fact, since the 1990s there has been a lot of in-fighting over vacant plots among irrigation farmers. As already alluded to, many plotholders are illegally utilising these plots. Clearly, the issue of vacant plots should be revisited and new people asked to take over the plots in order to promote the regeneration of agricultural productivity at a time when the agricultural industry, on the whole, is going through one of its leanest spells in history. Alternatively, two possible solutions could be considered. On the one hand, the intrusion of Estate land could be curbed if the “invaders” of that land were selected to take up these plots that have been lying idle for a long time. On the other, the long-standing clamours for bigger plots by Gowe farmers could be addressed by re-allocating

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1544 The closure lasted up to 2001 and was necessitated by numerous viability problems.
1545 Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: Monthly Reports (Various Years) – “ARDA Sanyati Estate: Minutes of Meeting with Gowe Farmers Held at 9.00 am on 19 September 2002 in the Assistant Accountant’s Office,” 1.
1546 Ibid.
1547 Ibid.
1548 Chiona, Personal Interview.
these to existing farmers who have the resources and capacity to cultivate an enlarged area. Indeed, a few farmers who have unilaterally allocated themselves vacant plots are realising the benefit. According to T. Nyamutova, “Plotholders who have claimed more land from the vacant plots are performing and progressing much better than those with smaller pieces of land.” These include Nyamutova himself, E. Chiwombe, B. Jongwe and others who now possess nearly all the essential equipment and cash to “effectively farm” their plots. The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that initially, land ownership was not the basis of differentiation within the Gowe-Sanyati Scheme, but since 1992 it has become so especially due to plotholders claiming, though illegally, vacant plots and segments of Estate land. Earlier, the DC rigidly enforced the tenets of standardisation of plots and as a result differentiation could not be achieved on the basis of land ownership.

Re-allocating these vacant plots to existing farmers would, of course, increase local disparities in land holding and intensify socio-economic differentiation in Sanyati, but this seems to be a plausible idea instead of maintaining the current decision-making apathy regarding the issue of these plots which, in turn, has adverse implications on the viability of the entire smallholder irrigation project. Indeed, leaving land lying idle is one of the factors hampering development. There are varied perceptions on whether vacant plots should or should not be filled. Three major interpretations have been given to explain the demands for vacant plots by incumbent plotholders. Firstly, it is clear they want more land part of which they can bequeath to their landless offspring. Secondly, the Estate Manager views it as “sheer greed by occupiers of vacant plots because they are not necessarily doing better than those with small plots.” Perhaps the Manager was not aware how some plotholders had benefited from utilising more land or he was simply echoing official policy, which was predicated on the idea that before these plots were advertised and taken up they belonged to ARDA. Thirdly, plotholders argue, “Vacant plots should be taken over by us [them] because it’s difficult to maintain irrigation that passes through the vacant plots.” ARDA, the traditional custodian of Gowe, does not even know who the authority to solve this problem of vacant plots is, but plotholders claim it is the responsibility of the Minister of Agriculture. Thus, there is still a lot of confusion surrounding the issue, but in the interests of production, the plots should not go for many years without occupants. That there are many unoccupied plots at Gowe is indicative of the Authority’s own inadequacies.

As already indicated, aware of these weaknesses, ARDA has failed to come up with a turn around strategy that ensures viability hence they have continued to register losses even under the so-called Millennium Recovery Plan. The Sanyati Estate is no longer viable. Estate capacity to produce at sustainable levels has gone down and sales are also low. The irrigation system has become too old to be viable. The Estate Manager, Mapondera, was roundly condemned in the late 1990s for failure to rectify the downward

1549 T. Nyamutova, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005.
1550 E. Chiwombe, Personal Interview.
1551 Chiona, Personal Interview.
1552 Nyamutova, Personal Interview, 14th May 2005.
1553 Chiwombe, Personal Interview.
spiral in Estate production. Due to soil problems and serious malperformance by the core Estate, a decision to close shop was made by the Regional Manager, B. Noko, hence ARDA Sanyati ceased operations between November 2000 and October 2001. \footnote{Alexander Machicha, (ARDA Sanyati Estate Accounts Clerk), Personal Interview, ARDA Sanyati, 12th May 2005.} The Estate also closed down due to lack of funding, loss making and poor management of parastatal bodies generally. However, during closure the office administration continued operating and a truncated field staff continued to maintain the small hectrage of cotton and banana. As stated earlier, it was during the closure that other Estates began vandalising or cannibalising Sanyati equipment. The limited staff that was left on site could not control the vandalisation of equipment by individuals and other ARDA Estates sometimes on the authority of Head Office. \footnote{Chiona, Personal Interview.} The Estate re-opened in 2002 after the Chief of the area, Wozele, local Headmen and other Community leaders felt they had been robbed of an entity that was providing a service to them. \footnote{Ibid.} By that date, the Estate had not quite recovered from this setback. Suggestions have been made on how to re-launch the scheme on a viable basis again. Within government circles, irrigation management transfer of the smallholder component has been proffered as one of the solutions that could assist ARDA defray some of its production costs.

**Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT):-**

One of the solutions that has been suggested to improve the performance of schemes is Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT). Instances of successful management transfer in smallholder irrigation systems in several African countries, however, are very few. A number of pre-conditions for successful transfers have been identified. These would entail addressing the following problems: (a) history of dependency on the Main ARDA Estates (b) high irrigation costs (c) absence of credit, input and output markets (d) land tenure issues (e) irrigated holding size (f) institutional support systems for sustainable farmer-managed irrigation. \footnote{Sanyati Main Estate, ARDA, File: Monthly Reports (Various Years) – “ARDA Sanyati Estate: Monthly Report for Month Ending 15th November 2001,” B. Chiripamberi (Estate Manager), 1. N.B. For similar views on irrigation management transfer see Douglas J. Merrey et al, “Can Irrigation Management Transfer Revitalise African Agriculture? A Review of African and International Experiences,” in Sally and Abernethy (eds.), *Private Irrigation in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 95-104. See also T. J. Bembridge, “Guidelines for the Rehabilitation of Small-Scale Farmer Irrigation Schemes in South Africa,” Paper for the International Seminar on the Performance of Large and Small-scale Irrigation Schemes in Africa, 15-19 November, Abuja, Nigeria: (1999) and D. L. Vermillion, “Irrigation Management Turnover: The Shift from Agency to Local Control,” *Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture*, (4), (1994).} It is important to note that during the last two decades, countries with sizeable irrigation sectors have been transferring the management of irrigation systems from government agencies to Water User Associations (WUAs), individual farmers or other local non-governmental organisations but it was not quite the case in Zimbabwe especially in the ARDA schemes save for the case of Tsovane Irrigation Scheme. \footnote{Tsovane Irrigation Scheme is beyond the scope of this study.} Irrigation management transfer in ARDA schemes has not emerged as a very strong policy objective. In Sanyati the local committees such as the Gowe Irrigation Committee (which is headed by a chairman) represent a small step in this...
direction. Quite evidently, in the 1990s (i.e. during the second phase of the resettlement programme) conflict arose in communal areas under stress for land, for example Save Valley and Sanyati, where ARDA is operating about 7 000 ha and 1 000 ha respectively.\footnote{Government of Zimbabwe, “Issues Arising From the Meet-The-President Session on Land” – Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU) Submission, F. T. Maziwisa (for Secretary for Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development) to the General Manager (ARDA), 30\textsuperscript{th} August 1994, 2. See also ZFU, “Meet The President Programme,” Harare Sheraton Hotel, International Conference Centre, 1\textsuperscript{st} August 1994, 2.}

It is the view of communal farmers in these areas that once ARDA has demonstrated what can be done, the potential and possibilities of an area, ARDA should recoil and remain a satellite with infrastructural facilities, equipment and technical training, and the locals take over the irrigation and production programmes. However, at ARDA Sanyati the management maintains that Gowe is not yet ripe for the weaning process to start. It should continue to exist as the Estate’s “small brother.” Notwithstanding the financial crisis of the 1990s, the Estate always lent assistance to the smallholder scheme. Gowe has relied on the Estate since 1974 in terms of technical and material resources. The Estate Manager, Henry Chiona, maintains, “The farmers are unable to stand on their own. For example, when the Estate closed down in 2000 they also collapsed – they could not sustain themselves. When the Estate re-opened they re-opened too. To this day they remain debtors to the Estate.”\footnote{Chiona, Personal Interview. See also J. Chide (Maintenance Equipment Unit/MEU – Workshop Manager), Personal Interview, ARDA Sanyati, 18\textsuperscript{th} May 2005.}

Nevertheless, the Estate Manager accepts that “to reduce the financial burden on ARDA the Gowe plotholders need to be weaned because their ‘parasitic dependency’ on the host [the Estate] can no longer be sustained” but cautions that “they must be given time to be weanable.”\footnote{Ibid.}

He went on to say “The Estate has given them 5 years to be partially weaned and 10 years to be totally weaned off.”\footnote{Chiona, Personal Interview.} However, ARDA does not seem to be genuine in fulfilling this objective, although the Gowe farmers “want their irrigation scheme to be detached from the Main Estate.”\footnote{Mhlanga, Personal Interview, 25\textsuperscript{th} September 2006.} It is clear that the farmers need training to prepare them for the weaning process. In order to efficiently run their scheme they should be given capacity in the area of administration, finance utilisation (bookkeeping) and to have their own equipment or machinery whereas ARDA can assist them with irrigation infrastructure and machinery repairs. Nonetheless, no practical steps in this direction have been taken by the parastatal to date, which implies that the latter is adamant to press this self-destructive button since IMT would exterminate their traditional supply of labour.\footnote{Gowe has been Sanyati Estate’s labour repository since 1974.}

Thus, the evidence for transfer of ARDA schemes to farmers is not strong, but the evidence for reduction of government expenditure given the financial strain the country finds itself in may be the most persuasive item. Although IMT has not quite taken root in Zimbabwe’s irrigation sector, it should be pointed out that the programme is being implemented in Asia and Latin America under a variety of labels namely management
transfer, turnover, self-management and participatory irrigation management. A common objective of the various programmes is to curtail the role of government agencies in irrigation management and give farmers more control and responsibility for managing irrigation systems. In most instances, governments pursue management transfer programmes to reduce their recurrent expenditures on irrigation, enhance agricultural productivity levels and stabilise deteriorating irrigation systems. Clearly, Irrigation Management Transfer, the programme for transferring the managerial responsibilities, including cost recovery and system maintenance, to legalise Water User Associations, is the main mode of decentralisation within the irrigation sector. IMT is extensive in Mexico, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey and the Philippines and is picking up in countries such as India, Morocco, Indonesia and Pakistan. While China has a tradition of involving communities in lower level irrigation management, Australia and western parts of the United States have arrangements such as irrigation districts where farmers have far greater and more direct managerial and financial responsibilities. In Spain, the proposal to grant full autonomy to basin organisations is likely to advance the process of decentralisation still further.

A question to ask is when will ARDA embark on this programme, which would help defray a huge chunk of unnecessary expenditure? Another question often asked is whether the irrigation schemes that were transferred to farmer management were performing better than under state agency management? This could be a lesson for Zimbabwe. Judging by ARDA attitudes, the answer to the first question is not clear. They have not yet indicated a commitment to transfer management or devolve power to the Gowe smallholder irrigators. In respect to the second question it can be argued that there is very little experience in Zimbabwe with IMT to make a concrete answer. What can be assumed is that devolution of the plotholder scheme could see improved performance as the sense of belonging and ownership it will engender a positive spirit. It is also an important step for the government to take given the non-

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1568 Ibid.

1569 Saleth and Dinar, The Institutional Economics of Water.

1570 Ibid.
availability of public funds to continue supporting Gowe. In fact, without management transfer the outgrowers will continue to view the scheme as ARDA’s and not theirs. Such attitudes hinder productivity. Clearly, the smallholder scheme is no longer benefiting much from its association with ARDA largely because the latter has withdrawn or is clandestinely withdrawing the services it used to provide. This lack of openness is despicable and keeps confusing the settlers whether they are still part of ARDA or not. On the whole, the success of IMT in Zimbabwe and the world at large has not been fully documented. What this analysis reveals, therefore, is that although there is extensive literature on irrigation management transfer, no clear analytical paradigm has yet emerged on ARDA schemes. It also illustrates that as long as ARDA does not wean off Gowe and continues to try and support this scheme on its tight budget the Estate itself will not recover. The latter would be a strong case in favour of management transfer.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that in Sanyati socio-economic disparities among the dryland and irrigation farmers were intensified by ESAP and subsequent agrarian crises. The Main Estate and the smallholder scheme never really recovered from these problems, which were accompanied by very serious drought situations. On the one hand, in this period the following features emerged: several structural changes to agriculture wrought by ESAP took place; various socio-economic and political dynamics whose basis was the IMF, World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) occurred and further transformations characteristic of the post-ESAP period were implemented. On the other, these developments particularly the ones influenced by ESAP on cotton commodity production had injurious effects on the differentiation process that had gathered so much impetus in the preceding decade. The process was temporarily arrested by an unfavourable economic climate to agricultural growth and development. Gowe irrigators together with dryland farmers struggled to secure credit because of the financial stringency imposed by ESAP. It was also not easy to secure export markets, which were vital for peasant aggrandisement and economic regeneration. Very few commercial farmers penetrated the international market. It was more difficult for irrigation plotholders and their dryland neighbours to have an export capacity. The export permit was difficult to obtain. Most small-scale farmers were caught up between outright collapse and survival. However, to emphasise the deleterious impact of ESAP on the poor is not to say that the reform programme impacted negatively on all sectors of the economy. 1571 Clearly, some sections of the economy and society did benefit from the programme. As Mlambo has stated it is, in fact, the very nature of such programmes to promote uneven development. 1572 This is why one of the criticisms against SAPs is that they benefited the big industrial concerns and the already rich members of society to the detriment of the poor.

The context for irrigation development in Zimbabwe was changing rapidly and drastically during the 1990s and 2000s. On the one hand, there is increasing scepticism about the returns to public investment in irrigation development, and a resulting decline

1571 Mlambo, The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, xi.
1572 Ibid.
in such investment. On the other hand, there are continued serious concerns about food insecurity and economic underdevelopment in Zimbabwe in general and Sanyati in particular. Because episodes of food scarcity continue to occur frequently in the dry northwestern parts of Zimbabwe, the rehabilitation of the Sanyati irrigation facilities is an important way of addressing the issue of low productivity and food security. The core Estate is not in a position to help achieve the concept of food self-sufficiency in the area. Estate performance in all areas has not been commendable. ARDA’s technical capacity is inadequate. The parastatal lacks operational capital and facilities for research and seed production. It has limited tillage capacity and lacks critical machinery and equipment to serve the agricultural needs of both the central estate and the outgrower section. This together with the ongoing battle between ARDA and the small-scale irrigation farmers to have the conditions of lease repealed means the latter have been experiencing battered moral which in turn does not help boost production.

What is clear is that there is unfinished business between the Estate or ARDA and the tenants. Some of the farmers continue to put pressure on the government to review the TILCOR/ARDA Act especially the highly detested conditions of lease that impact negatively on settler performance while others are demanding the handover to them by ARDA of the smallholder component and its infrastructure (IMT). These emerge as clear areas of dialogue but the parastatal often stifles any prospect for discussion of these issues. As already indicated, ARDA is finding it difficult to revitalise Gowe but at the same time they are unyielding to calls for Irrigation Management Transfer. If management transfer is properly orchestrated it could bring many operational advantages for both the Main Estate and the outgrower section.

Given the problems highlighted in this chapter, most of which were quite formidable it can be noted that the agricultural landscape in the second decade of independence was very gloomy. It was very difficult for agriculture in general and irrigation in particular to recover at Sanyati by the turn of the new millennium. Because ESAP was externally imposed (not “home grown” as the former Minister of Finance, Bernard Chidzero, once claimed) it was not well adapted to addressing the heterogeneous agrarian needs of Zimbabwe let alone Sanyati’s smallholder irrigation system. It has been argued that ESAP-based macro-economic and agrarian policies were intended to curb excessive and irrational state intervention in the economy, 1573 but it is imperative to observe that the state still should play a central role in the development of any country. State role cannot be completely withdrawn. A case in point is the agricultural growth and the considerable improvement in the quality of life of the Zimbabwean peasantry during the first decade of independence as observed in the previous chapter. This success was partly due to peasant initiative and partly due to strong government intervention in agriculture in spite of the numerous socio-economic, environmental and other challenges that faced the country between 1980 and 1990.

From 1991 to 2000 the role of the state in the transformation of agriculture in Sanyati and Zimbabwe as a whole was circumscribed partly by ESAP and partly by rather unclear agrarian policies. The major bases of socio-economic differentiation remained pretty

1573 Moyo, Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe, 18.
much the same, although by its very nature ESAP led to the emergence of a small group of well-to-do and a large group of less-to-do irrigation farmers within the smallholder sector. Bigger agricultural concerns were not severely crippled by the programme because for them export permits were not so difficult to access compared to smaller enterprises. Thus, large-scale or commercial irrigators benefited more under the so-called liberalised environment than their small-scale counterparts. ARDA schemes, as epitomes of large-scale or estate agriculture, though, were constrained by the sudden dearth of state subsidies and inept administration. The failure by ARDA Sanyati Estate to adapt to the new situation is reflected in its repeatedly registering operational losses throughout the decade (i.e. 1991-2000). The failure of the Sanyati Main Estate reverberated on Gowe thereby lowering yields and heightening poverty. Poverty manifested itself among women as well as among the hitherto rich irrigators. Women in particular were constrained by a tenure or lease system that disadvantaged them from owning land and other irrigation resources.

The chapter has also illustrated that the considerable benefits the Gowe tenants had derived from the cotton boom were virtually eroded over night with the advent of ESAP and the related socio-economic and political problems it unleashed. The general standard of living was lowered as the traditional cash cow (cotton), was no longer as remunerative as it used to be. Differentiation, which was often spearheaded by the cultivation of cotton, became a rather insignificant process in this period. Thus, between 1991 and 2000 other socio-economic and political developments were more important than differentiation.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This study has explored the extent to which rural differentiation emerged at different stages in the history of Sanyati communal lands on the basis of both dryland agriculture and ARDA irrigation. An analysis of the growth and development of peasant agriculture, its transformation and commercialisation has revealed that the introduction of irrigation was a major policy instrument which spearheaded the intensification of existing forms of socio-economic differentiation in the area although differentiation was an unintended outcome of state policy. The study argues that rural differentiation did not occur in the same way under dryland conditions as it did in an irrigation context. There are different intensities of differentiation between dryland and irrigation farming settings. The differences are largely based on the fact that irrigation agriculture is a more intensive activity which promotes greater levels of commercialisation compared to those existing outside irrigation. The opportunity available to irrigation plot holders to double crop (i.e. grow summer and winter crops) assured them of a saleable crop almost all the time which set them as a class apart. The dryland holders practiced extensive cultivation and the absence of irrigation meant that they were not guaranteed steady flows of income throughout the year. Clearly, this made them poorer than their irrigation counterparts.

Chapter two has noted that the TILCOR/ARDA irrigation idea had not yet been hatched by 1964. Serious debate on this issue was fundamentally a UDI initiative. Sanyati had never been considered irrigable due to its poor soils and inhospitable climate until investigations leading to the establishment of Gowe irrigation started in 1965 two years after a visit to South Africa by a Ministry of Agriculture team that attended a conference there on the “Regulations for the Control of Irrigation Schemes in Bantu Areas.” However, before the advent of irrigation this study has shown how farming was organised around the Native Land Husbandry Act and how the richer peasants made a mockery of NLHA dictates. The reordering of rural life advocated by the Act was not in line with what the well-to-do peasants perceived to be the foundations of prosperity. In a nutshell the NLHA did not support the ownership of large herds of cattle (i.e. 10 head of cattle were considered to be an optimum/maximum number per holder) neither did it sanction the allocation of more than 8 acres of arable land for the Sanyati farmers. These limitations were staunchly resisted especially by the “immigrant” category of farmers who kept relatively larger herds of cattle and were used to ploughing bigger pieces of land in Rhodesdale. It has been demonstrated in this study that the tradition of resistance they imported into Sanyati was instrumental in weakening the power of technocratic interventions. The Act actually produced some “reserve entrepreneurs” who were not only fighting against its adverse prescriptions but also for their own economic betterment. It has been noted that over-emphasis on the negative aspects of the Act has led to the underestimation of the extent of differentiation among the Sanyati peasantry. However, the study has revealed that the rural elites withstood the pressure unleashed on them by the Act; hence differentiation could not be halted. The more authoritarian the Act became the stronger the resistance and the more farmers devised clandestine methods of furthering accumulation.
In fact, it has been demonstrated that, while writings on the NLHA have tended to see the Act as having had a restrictive effect on rural differentiation and accumulation because of its tendency towards equalisation of resources, the outcome was a skewed pattern of access to land. The contradictions inherent in the Act itself made it possible for the better-off to take advantage of these loopholes to enhance their accumulation prospects. While on the one hand, the Act disadvantaged the women, especially single women, and the young men, on the other, it produced a small class of rural accumulators. The ability of this small class of rural entrepreneurs to engage in further accumulation was greatly curtailed by stipulations in the Act (e.g. regarding size of land) but they always sought to fight its stipulations. Although literature on the NLHA has emphasised that bitter opposition to the Act came from the landless young men, this study has demonstrated that fierce opposition also came from immigrant “reserve entrepreneurs” who saw the Act as a constraint on further accumulation. Thus, it is this study’s contention that conventional wisdom on the effects of the NLHA may have overstated the actual impact of the Act, while ignoring the extent of differentiation that emerged among the Sanyati peasantry.

The study has further argued that the adoption of cotton in 1963 was responsible for stepping up the tempo of differentiation in rural Sanyati. By and large it cannot be refuted that the unfolding rural differentiation process was more clearly recognised at the beginning of the 1960s as more and more peasants embraced the values and virtues of cotton growing at a time the government had been forced to abandon the NLHA which was hindering accumulation. Although social inequalities existed in the early twentieth century, as cotton became firmly established, major and intractable forms of differentiation based on commodity production set in. The intrusive effects of a market economy whose basis was cotton gave rise to a differentiation between rich and poor farmers which tended to alter the existing social and economic structure. Old economic forms were quickly giving way to new ones. The local staple crop, maize, was still being grown but greater emphasis was now placed on cotton by many households in Sanyati.

It has also been demonstrated in this study that differentiation, as a process was not an irrigation phenomenon alone. Even in the decades prior to the inception of irrigation technology socio-economic differentiation had started to manifest itself in Sanyati quite clearly in spite of the onslaught by the colonial state machinery to “flatten” or eliminate it particularly at the high watermark of the implementation of the NLHA during the 1950s and early 1960s.

By focusing on development and differentiation the study has helped to disprove conventional wisdom of a unitary and undifferentiated peasantry in Sanyati agriculture as portrayed in the literature of certain scholars on rural development. Indeed, rural communities based on commodity production are not unchanging or static entities. They are fluid and dynamic societies and to say they are undifferentiated is to agree with disproved notions that: “Agriculture in the developing world will continue to limp and stumble as long as its backbone is the peasant [and that] everything is wrong with the peasant …” ⁵⁷⁴ The study challenges these theories and misconceptions about the

⁵⁷⁴ C. M. Arensberg, “Upgrading Peasant Agriculture: Is Tradition the Snag?” Columbia Journal of World
peasantry as a whole and the Sanyati peasants in particular and argues that whilst the farmers were constrained by colonial legislation such as the NLHA and also by the lack of loans/credit and small plots some of them managed to become relatively wealthy or better off than others.

It has been noted in this study that resistance to state measures such as the NLHA was informed by rural farmers’ own inclinations towards accumulation which were invariably compromised by such pieces of legislation. The study has shown that the “immigrant” farmers who took up plots at Gowe had earlier resisted forced eviction from Rhodesdale and the implementation of conservationist procedures such as destocking and contouring. Among them were also the most vociferous plotholders who still embodied the culture of resistance since the Rhodesdale days. These frequently used the various official channels open to them to demand bigger irrigation plots. Sometimes they used informal methods to gain access to more land, for example, clandestine seizures of vacant plots, ploughing in areas designated for grazing and the invasion of estate land became commonplace features.

Cotton irrigation in Sanyati has produced very diverse and distinct forms of differentiation in the area. Literature on peasant cotton production in colonial Africa has demonstrated that wherever cotton was grown, it generated significant social inequalities. This has been confirmed by this study but it goes further to illustrate that irrigated cotton produced even greater disparities among irrigators themselves and between plotholders and the rainland farmers. Irrigation was vital for the plotholders in cases where the rains came late or during intermittent dry spells falling within the rainy season (i.e. intra-season dry spells). The opportunity of artificially applying water to crops during such dry spells during the growing season was not available to dryland peasants. Within the irrigation sector some plotholders were deprived of access to irrigation water due to unresolved farming offences. They also suffered from inadequate capital and lacked other resources to produce at an optimal level. Invariably, they became poor. The main beneficiaries of the cotton programme in ARDA’s schemes were the resource-rich peasants of “immigrant” extraction who had ample access to essential productive resources, the Estate and of course the state. The estate was actually developed more with the interests of the state in mind than of the Gowe tenants.

Various scholars have documented how differentiation has emerged in many peasant economies emphasising the importance of land and labour as its major determinants in the dryland, but this study argues that in the irrigation era the bases of differentiation became more diversified. An array of factors (not only confined to land and labour) ranging from the plotholder’s relationship with the Estate, the DC and his capital base which was also a function of his ability to meet land rent and water rate obligations among other irrigation-related charges increasingly became important bases of differentiation. Plotholders paid water rates and some nominal charges as part of their contribution towards maintenance costs whereas development costs were paid for through subsidies. Subsidies were justified on the grounds that government viewed schemes situated in the communal areas as entities that were socially desirable for food security

*Business*, 2(1), (January/February 1967), 63.
and employment creation but lacking the financial potential to enable farmers to finance capital development, operation and maintenance costs. The literature assumes that these factors are insignificant causes of differentiation, but this study demonstrates that inability to pay these charges incapacitated many less-to-do irrigators. Conversely, ability to pay enhanced the richer farmers’ march towards greater production hence the intensification of income gaps between the two categories of farmers.

On the whole, however, increasing irrigation charges affected the economic potential and welfare of farmers who were allocated small plots with restricted crop choice. This study suggests that the increase in irrigation charges affected farmers with smaller plots more adversely since their total net incomes were low. This reinforced farmer tendencies to rely on dryland cultivation because it promised more security and no such charges. Because under the ARDA system plotholders could not decide what to grow and how to grow it on those small plots this lack of choice and participation in decision-making weakened their position at the same time as it strengthened that of the estate. Therefore, progress was sluggish for Gowe farmers who had small plots as their absolute incomes were also low. In a number of instances as illustrated in chapter five this handicap forced farmers to periodically relinquish their plots in preference for dryland or other non-irrigation activities. For the majority of the Gowe tenants, however, participation in large-scale cotton growing was constrained by lack of adequate land, lack of sufficient productive resources, big enough loan packages and other agricultural support services, which were so generously availed to their white commercial counterparts by the government and agro-finance houses such as the AFC. This disadvantage on their part though did not completely derail the process of differentiation. Thus, while irrigation was riddled by many problems the forms of socio-economic differentiation it engendered in Sanyati are significant. Clearly, in the period after 1967 irrigation differentiated peasant farmers more than the system of agriculture in the 1930s and the early 1960s.

While it is acknowledged that differentiation is an age-old process and that it predated the irrigation era, the study has demonstrated that the introduction of both cotton and irrigation in the 1960s exacerbated socio-economic inequalities among the plotholding households and the dryland farming households in Sanyati. Differential access to inputs and other state provided resources such as extension advice led to the emergence of categories of rich and poor within the irrigation environment. Outside the ARDA schemes farmers were also differentiated into rich and poor, but in comparison it has been shown that irrigation farmers were better off than their dryland counterparts not only because they grew crops throughout the year but also because state assistance in relation to agricultural advice, inputs, tillage and transportation services was concentrated in the irrigated area more than in the rainland area.

Furthermore, this study has shown that crop yields achieved on the ARDA-Sanyati irrigation schemes were higher than those achieved by the surrounding dryland farmers. This is partly why the DC discouraged the dual ownership of dryland and irrigation holdings. For instance, the greater the area under dryland production managed by a plotholder the lower the irrigated crop yields on his/her plot. However, as highlighted in this study some resource-rich plotholders defied conventional wisdom by achieving good
yields even if they had one foot in irrigation and another in dryland. On the other hand, however, the study has also indicated that the sizes of plots allocated in Sanyati irrigation which ranged from 2 to 4 ha per holder did not always deter some enterprising irrigation plotholders who completely shunned dryland farming from doing well.

In addition, this study has explored the rather diverse interests between the core estate and its outgrower section and the various hardships and opportunities available to blacks under irrigation farming in the Gowe Settler Scheme and how all this generated inequalities between the two sectors (i.e. the estate representing the large-scale sector and Gowe the smallholder sector). Although the substantial commercial development of Zimbabwe’s rural areas in general and Gowe in particular has been deemed to be of utmost importance and was to a large extent boosted during the cotton boom of the 1980s, success in this area still remains a pipe-dream given the multiplicity of problems besetting the smallholders. Both the DC Gatooma and TILCOR (ARDA’s predecessor) were initially tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that Gowe became a self-sustaining enterprise. This was not to be as they became the major facilitators of the growers’ exploitation and the entrenchment of settler hegemony in the whole of Sanyati. The estate did not exist for the settlers but the settlers were supposed to exist for the estate. In fact, as demonstrated in this study the plotholders were precluded from seeking any concessions which would give them more say in running their own scheme. This scenario was perpetuated by ARDA, which succeeded TILCOR at Independence. Smallholder farmers continued to experience enormous hardships. The size of their plots, contrary to expectation, was never fundamentally increased. In the majority of cases, the AFC (the major public-lending institution servicing all types of farmers after 1980), has either withdrawn or reduced its lending facilities partly due to loan recovery problems or escalating lending costs it was experiencing. These problems coupled with the unpalatability of the state or scheme management’s decision to prohibit cattle rearing on the schemes – cattle for many regarded as a status symbol - always therefore found expression in the voluntary withdrawal from the scheme by some farmers in favour of either dryland communal or dryland small-scale commercial agriculture.

Even after Independence more government emphasis has been put on the development of the large-scale commercial farming sector to the detriment of smallholder irrigation. For example, development was more skewed in favour of the main Estate than Gowe, as the latter continued to be subordinated to the whims of the Main Estate in almost every respect. Clearly, the impact of irrigation at Gowe, if not in the whole country’s communal lands, has been extremely minimal. Illustrating irrigation’s impact with figures M. Rukuni laments the fact that smallholder irrigation covers a mere 5% of the total irrigated area in Zimbabwe, estimated at 150 000 ha. 1575 Similarly, J. Harvey reveals that the gross output from smallholder irrigation in the 1984/85 agricultural season was only 0.4% of the total agricultural produce. 1576 Under these circumstances, although irrigation

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has tremendous developmental potential, it is unlikely to be a major source of agricultural production in Zimbabwe’s rural areas, unless comprehensive policy changes are implemented at both state agency and governmental levels. Before that is done the disparities in production capacity and wealth between the core estate and the smallholder component will continue to exist if not widen.

One of this study’s major contentions is that to a large extent smallholder irrigation benefited both the local and regional community, and to a lesser extent the national economy. The impact of smallholder irrigation (Gowe) obviously was minimal because of the small size of plots leased out to the irrigators by TILCOR or ARDA. In fact, complex projects like Gowe involving a great deal of administrative control and long-term involvement by the controlling agency (ARDA) were less likely to succeed than small schemes which require low levels of initial capital investment and provide maximum independence to the settlers (tenants). However, the impact of the Main Estate on the development not only of the surrounding community but also of the regional as well as the national economy cannot be underestimated. The impact of the major irrigation estate can be measured against the background that it was responsible for employment creation, provision of housing for its permanent workforce and development of a major irrigation-based growth point in the northwestern part of the country among other things. The Growth Point and the related services that it provides are the brainchild of the TILCOR-Estate irrigation idea which was adopted in the 1960s.

Indeed, there is no doubt that ARDA-Sanyati is contributing to the growth and development of the region it serves by providing employment and technical assistance especially to the Gowe farmers. In fact, ARDA’s scheme at Sanyati is a good successful example of a “Growth Point.” It serves to illustrate the ARDA strategy of integrated rural development. For example, developments in this area include a fully developed irrigation scheme with settlers and a town with basic commercial and industrial services. As already indicated, Sanyati Town was established as a growth point to be supported by the irrigation production from the scheme as well as dryland production of cotton from Sanyati and Gokwe communal lands. The town is well served with retail shops. Commercial services available at the centre include bakeries, butcheries, a Bata shoe shop, grinding mills, supermarkets and mini-markets, banks, garages and fuel stations. Industrial activity has also been developed on the growth point. Some of the industries that have been established there include a COTTCO ginnery, Grafax cotton depot and ginnery, brewery, fertiliser depot, transport firms and a GMB depot. Social services include a primary school and a clinic on the scheme, the Sanyati Baptist Mission School, the Sanyati Mission Hospital, a post office, beerhall, bottle stores, nightclubs, community hall and a police station in the vicinity of the scheme. However, the ARDA growth point could be offering all these services but original objectives will not be met until the government and other development agencies make a substantial additional effort to alleviate the plight of the less privileged African irrigator at Gowe who suffers from lack of land and capital to enhance his/her performance. The Government should also introduce an efficient and effective monitoring exercise to determine the successful operation and viability of schemes like Gowe and many others. Various monetary levies on the plotholders should take into account their capital base. It can be noted that the sound commercial farming sector
in Zimbabwe is, in contrast, a product of many years of effort and investment. If the same attention cannot be paid to the development of the small-scale irrigation sector, the government might as well permanently shelve plans to one day, hand over the management of rural irrigation schemes like Gowe to smallholder farmers (i.e. Irrigation Management Transfer/IMT).

The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the State has a role to play in creating an environment conducive to enterprise development, but looking at both the colonial and post-colonial situation, as it affected the livelihoods of the people of Gowe, it is disconcerting to note that “the public sector” sometimes “lies at the core of the stagnation and decline in growth in Africa.” In this particular regard, therefore, since many operational strategies have been replicated in a number of ways, the manner in which Gowe has been operated, managed and developed illustrates more a case of continuity rather than change.

The major conclusion of this study is that irrigation agriculture precipitated wider forms of socio-economic differentiation than those found under dryland farming. This was partly due to irrigation’s capability to produce both a summer and a winter crop – a very remote possibility in the rain-fed area. It was also partly attributable to the cultivation of a range of cash generating crops such as cotton, wheat, green mealies and beans whereas the communal area farmers mainly depended on maize and cotton for cash. In particular, it has been argued that the decade 1980 to 1990 witnessed broader differentiation processes compared to the two earlier periods because of the cotton boom and the increase in the number of services availed to farmers at independence. As already noted more of these services, for example, credit and mechanical services were distributed on a more intensive though disproportionate basis in the outgrower schemes than in the dry farming area.

This study has further demonstrated that the rural commercialisation process associated with the post-independence cotton boom significantly widened the accumulation gap between plotholders. It also shows that cotton was not the only source of differentiation in Sanyati irrigation. A number of activities ranging from the cultivation of other crops apart from cotton, access to loan facilities and off-farm income made Sanyati farmers relatively wealthy. As demonstrated in this study Sanyati outgrowers were differentiated on the wide basis of (a) personal capacity; (b) political connections; (c) connections with the Estate management and (d) privileged access to vacant holdings, water, irrigation pipes, tillage and extension services. The economic and social status of the plotholder was, thus, determined by how he related to the Main Estate and the state. The relationship with the Estate, though, was a prescriptive one. For instance, a plotholder was told how to

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irrigate his crops. He would plant, weed and harvest when told to do so. Refusal to obey these instructions was perceived as lack of discipline and co-operation on the part of the tenant and it entailed removal from the scheme.

The study has pointed out that one of the government objectives for establishing Gowe was to use it to achieve sustainable production. However, attempting to achieve sustainable production on the basis of limited access to land and other services such as finance was contradictory. Indeed, insufficient land and finance impeded plotholder progress. The ARDA Settlement Officer only recommended for new loans those farmers who had a proven repayment record. The so-called strugglers often found themselves without financial support. Differentiation was, therefore, enhanced by the selective practice of agricultural extension, whose agents limited credit to those who followed “approved farming practices.” Selectivity of this nature meant one particular class of farmers became more affluent than the other hence the inappropriateness of the term egalitarian classlessness for Sanyati. Thus, although notions of an undifferentiated peasantry abound these do not apply to Sanyati.

The study has also discussed the impact of the liberation struggle (Chimurenga II) on ARDA irrigation. By and large the struggle militated against labour supply for the irrigation schemes as people who provided the bulk of casual labour lived in the surrounding communal areas where a wartime curfew had been imposed. They were not allowed to move out of the keeps (protected villages) set up by the colonial government before 8 o’clock in the morning and they were required back by 3 o’clock in the afternoon. The curfew was designed to restrict movement of people at certain times and therefore help the white settler forces to monitor the movement of the fighters or guerrillas. However, this adversely affected the ARDA Main Estate because during peak seasons it required labour from as early as 6 o’clock in the morning. Casual labour was often given a target for a task to be accomplished within a stipulated time. Thus, during the war the parastatal’s operations were hindered by the supply of labour which was no longer determined by the estate but by wartime needs. For both the core estate and the smallholder irrigation scheme the general atmosphere of insecurity did not promote production, but for some time arrested differentiation.

This study has shown how significantly the agricultural boom of the 1980s contributed to heightened forms of socio-economic inequalities by demonstrating that the end of the war ushered in an era of prosperity for some peasant irrigators. Others remained in the doldrums of this same prosperity. Outgrower disenchantment with policies that harmed and proscribed their accumulation prospects in this period became very pronounced. The farmers were agitated not only by lease arrangements that deprived them of land ownership but also by other injustices that continually tied them to the Estate. Demands on their labour did not take into account the fact that they also had plots to attend to. Thus, the plotholders clearly laboured under very serious handicaps as they were exploited by the Estate and this lowered their moral.

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1580 One such village had been established near Sanyati Bridge not far away from the two ARDA irrigation schemes.
Despite the problems experienced by the tenants the relative advantages they derived from independence and the boom period that ensued were considerable. A sizeable number became rich. Proceeds from selling cotton, beans and other crops had a positive effect on their standard of living. However, irrigation did not bestow equal opportunities on the tenants. Some benefited more than others from their participation in this enterprise. Because ARDA still wanted the settler scheme to act as their exclusive labour reservoir it can be concluded that their action was designed to maintain it as such and proscribe the emergence of differentiation. Obviously, accumulation militated against labour supply, but the various tactics employed by outgrowers to challenge Estate authority meant that their march towards accumulation could not be hindered. The post-independence era, therefore, unleashed a flurry of activities that aided accumulation and widened the differential gap between irrigation farmers. In fact, with the cotton boom differentiation as a process transcended any proportions ever witnessed in Sanyati since the 1960s.

In chapter six this study has demonstrated that in Sanyati socio-economic disparities among the dryland and irrigation farmers were intensified by ESAP and a spate of horrendous droughts. The low prices and lack of agricultural markets during ESAP hampered both cotton commodity production and the differentiation process that had gathered so much momentum in the preceding years, but a few plotholders and dryland farmers emerged from ESAP relatively unscathed. Overall, the resource-rich peasants were not as seriously affected as their poorer counterparts.

Although the objective on the part of the IMF and the WB during structural adjustment was to curb state intervention in the economy this study has argued that the state still had a role to play in the development of the country. The period 1980 to 1990 bears testimony to this as it marked arguably the most successful period in the history of state intervention in agriculture in Zimbabwe as the cotton boom benefited many peasants. The study also argues that from 1991 to 2000 when the role of the state was limited by ESAP and post-ESAP policies small-scale agriculture was adversely affected. There were no signs of prosperity for the majority of farmers save for the few well-to-do small-scale irrigators that emerged at that time. The large-scale commercial farmers were the only ones who were not severely crippled by the programme.

The study has also illustrated that the considerable benefits the Gowe tenants had derived from the cotton boom were virtually eroded over night with the advent of ESAP and the related socio-economic and political problems it unleashed. The general standard of living was lowered as cotton was no longer as remunerative as before. Differentiation, which was often spearheaded by the cultivation of cotton, became a rather insignificant process in this period. Thus, between 1991 and 2000 other socio-economic and political developments were more important than differentiation.

The position of women in Sanyati irrigation has always been a precarious one. The colonial government argued that the participation of women in irrigation enterprise was encouraged. In fact, the former DC for Gatooma asserted that female plotholders were considered for land allocation at the Gowe Smallholder Irrigation Scheme. However, this study takes issue
with this argument. The fact that at the beginning of irrigation in Sanyati (1967) there was only one female plotholder shows that the selection criteria was discriminatory as it disadvantaged women. As seen in this study minors and women in particular single women were not given the right to farm in the rural areas. Married women could only acquire land through inheritance.

The study has illustrated in chapter six how the burgeoning economic crisis in the 1990s contributed to cotton suicides by aggrieved spouses of both dryland and irrigation farmers. Money that was not delivered home after selling cotton led to divorce or suicides. Cotton suicides afflicted male-headed households more than female-headed ones. This was partly so because there were few female-headed households in Sanyati irrigation and partly because such households were fewer in both irrigated and dryland agriculture because of the colonial tenure system which did not openly promote the ownership of land by women. Women were often categorised as minors who had no right to land. Although women were the major tillers of the land they were not only disadvantaged by not being allocated land but they also hardly accessed extension advice and loans to purchase farm inputs. Women in male-headed irrigation and dryland households were the main victims of cotton suicides because they lacked independence on the holding and sometimes their men did not share the cotton money with them. It was extravagantly spent on beer and other women. This caused women who had not been allocated land in their own right to despair and commit suicide. In government smallholder schemes like Gowe, women are thus disadvantaged because land “ownership” is largely vested in male household heads by the ARDA lease agreement.

However, the situation is gradually changing. Women are increasingly allocated land, and more women now hold plots at Gowe compared to the DC’s time although the number of female plotholders (i.e. 6 out of 36) is still small. The study, therefore, argues that because of the general failure to access land women are among the poorest irrigators. Their poverty relative to the whole group of irrigators in Sanyati is reinforced by the tenure system (i.e. lease agreement), which has not been fundamentally amended to grant more land rights to women. Their male counterparts were in a much stronger position in that land and other resources such as loans were disproportionately allocated in their favour. On this basis the study thus concludes that the ability to command resources primarily differentiates Sanyati male and female peasants.

On the whole, the study has highlighted problems or misunderstandings between farmers, Estate management, the state agency (ARDA) and the government. These problems most of which are centred on a lease arrangement that has not been amended for very long need urgent redress if ARDA irrigation in Sanyati is to succeed. The productive performance of both the Main Irrigation Estate and the smallholder scheme at Gowe can be boosted if the unnecessary bickering between the major players were eliminated. Such an approach would be instrumental in the attainment of sustained irrigation development as well as raising levels of differentiation to much greater heights in the frontier region of Gowe-Sanyati. In this study, therefore, discussion of Sanyati agriculture in the pre-and post-irrigation periods essentially provides an opportunity to explore, in a comparative

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SANYATI T.T.L

GOKWE T.T.L

BLOCK C

BLOCK B

BLOCK A

MOP PANS

Possible Area for Irrigation Extension

SCALE: 1′25.200
100 ac 10
1″ 700 YDS.

KEY
SP......Sales Pens
RC......Rest Camp
S........Stores
D.......Demonstrator’s House

Source: Ministry Of Internal Affairs
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MAP 1: ADMINISTRATIVE PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS: LOCATION OF SANYATI COMMUNAL LAND IN ZIMBABWE

LEGEND

Sanyati Communal Land
International Boundary
Provincial Boundary
District Boundary
22°S City
Town

Source: Department of the Surveyor-General (2006)
MAP 10: ARDA’S AGRICULTURAL AND OTHER ACTIVITIES IN ZIMBABWE

Key:
IN OPERATION

AT PLANNING

City........................................... GWERU
Town......................................... Chinhoyi
Growth Point............................... Gokwe
International Boundary..................
Main Road.................................
Railway Line..............................
River / Dam...............................
MAP 15: ZIMBABWE - NATURAL REGIONS AND PROVISIONAL FARMING AREAS

1-Specialised & Diversified Farming: Rainfall is high (more than 1000mm per annum in areas lying below 1700m altitude and more than 900mm per annum at greater altitudes).

2a-Intensive Farming Region: Rainfall is confined to summer and is moderately high (750-1000mm).

2b-Intensive Farming sub-region (less reliable rainfall): Is subject either to rather severe dry spells during the rainy season or to the occurrence of relatively short rainy seasons. In either event, crop yields in certain years will be affected.

3-Semi-intensive Farming: Rainfall in this region is moderate in total amount (650-800mm).

4-Semi-extensive Farming: This region experiences fairly low total rainfall (450-650mm).

5-Extensive Farming: The rainfall in this region is too low and erratic for the reliable production of even drought-resistant fodder and grain crops.

Source: Department of the Surveyor-General (2002)