CHAPTER THREE
STATE POLICY/STRATEGIES (1965-1979)

INTRODUCTION

The chapter examines the many policy-oriented activities leading to the inception of both the smallholder scheme at Gowe and Estate irrigation agriculture in Sanyati that characterised the UDI period (1965-1979). It discusses government policy procedures or strategies that influenced the direction of agricultural development in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). After investigations into the possibility of irrigating winter and summer crops in the area were completed, it was agreed to set up the Gowe Pilot Irrigation Scheme in 1967. The chapter also argues that, the establishment of Estate agriculture or the Main Estate on whose basis a growth point was implemented in 1977 subsequently followed this development.

This chapter, therefore, discusses the major colonial objectives that dictated the need for irrigation at Gowe and the reasons why so much priority was placed on this scheme in the 1960s and 1970s. The factors leading to the formation of major institutions such as TILCOR, DEVAG and ARDA, together with these organisations’ chief objectives and operational roles, are also explored in order to put agriculture in Sanyati in its proper policy perspective.

The chapter further observes that, in policy circles, irrigation was perceived as a major way of stabilising the rural population, particularly in the wake of the Rhodesdale evictions of the 1950s. The new technology was also adopted as a measure to boost agricultural productivity in an area whose aridity did not inspire much hope in food sustainability without some form of irrigation. However, as the parliamentary debates on the formation of ARDA reveal, there were conflicting views on which type of organisation (between CONEX, DEVAG, TILCOR, the Agricultural Assistance Board/AAB, the Sabi-Limpopo Authority/SLA and ARDA) was best suited to achieving these twin objectives for the colonial government. These debates are covered in full towards the end of the chapter.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SMALLHOLDER SCHEME AND ITS OBJECTIVES

Gowe precedes TILCOR (Sanyati):-

Most of the initial settlers at Gowe comprised the resettled population which had been evicted from Rhodesdale and other southern districts of colonial Zimbabwe in the early 1950s. These included subjects of chiefly lineages such as Wozhele, Mudzingwa and Lozane. The area was generally dry, but surveys on its suitability for irrigation only took place a decade later. Prior to the 1960s, Sanyati was not perceived as an area which was conducive to irrigation farming due to its semi-arid nature. This was proved to be a
fallacy in 1965 when the Department of Conservation and Extension (CONEX),\textsuperscript{451} which fell under the ambit of the Ministry of Agriculture, started investigations into the possibility of irrigating an area of the Sanyati Communal Lands, which became known as Gowe.\textsuperscript{452} The investigations included an assessment of the irrigation potential available not only in the African areas along the Munyati River but also in the European areas in the vicinity of the river.

Investigations were prompted by the fact that some white farmers in the adjacent ranching area along the Munyati (formerly Umniati) River had started irrigation on a small scale.\textsuperscript{453} This was coupled with the fact that the introduction of irrigation was “a natural progression in the agricultural extension work.”\textsuperscript{454} Complemented by the work carried out by the Gatooma (now Kadoma) Cotton Research Centre on pesticides in 1963, extension workers introduced cotton into Sanyati and nearby areas with considerable success.\textsuperscript{455}

The Group Conservation and Extension Officer for Gatooma, Peter G. How, in a letter to the Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South), R. J. C. Hope, observed that there was a great potential for supplementary irrigation in Sanyati from the summer flow of the Munyati River.\textsuperscript{456} Large acreages of very suitable deep sandy loam soil were available close to the river, where pumping would be easy and relatively cheap.

In How’s opinion, owing to the long growing season in this area, crops such as cotton, groundnuts and burley tobacco could be planted with the rains and assisted during and at the end of the rainy season with irrigation from the normal flow of the Munyati river.\textsuperscript{457} As far as cotton is concerned, it can be noted that by 1965 the potential of cotton cropping in Sanyati had already been proved and the desirability of establishing such a scheme (Gowe) from the national point of view could not be over-emphasised. For H. Weinmann, cotton growing together with weaving was a well-established and developed cottage industry among some African communities in Zimbabwe long before the Europeans arrived and this makes it indigenous to the country.\textsuperscript{458} More importantly, a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{451} CONEX was mainly responsible for extension in the white commercial farming sector. With the formation of the Ministry of Agriculture on 1st July, 1963, the responsibility for the management of irrigation settlements was assumed by Agriculture on the understanding that this managerial responsibility was only for a temporary period and was to be reviewed when conditions were opportune for the proposed take over of irrigation schemes in the communal lands by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 1st July, 1966. But due to treasury’s delay in providing the necessary funding, the management of all irrigation schemes was only assumed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs with effect from 1st July, 1967, and responsibility for their proper functioning and expansion devolved upon the control of District Commissioners.
\item \textsuperscript{452} NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, File: “Gowe Irrigation Scheme: Sanyati TTL (EX CONEX),” Preliminary Project Report, 1968, 1.
\item \textsuperscript{453} Response to Questionnaire, R. L. Westcott (Former DC Gatooma) to M. Nyandoro, 6\textsuperscript{th} May 1997.
\item \textsuperscript{454} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{455} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{456} NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, File: “Gowe Irrigation Scheme: Sanyati TTL (EX CONEX),” P. G. How to R. J. C. Hope, 3\textsuperscript{rd} June 1965.
\item \textsuperscript{457} NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, File: “Gowe Irrigation Scheme: Sanyati TTL (EX CONEX),” P. G. How to Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South), 3\textsuperscript{rd} June 1965.
\item \textsuperscript{458} H. Weinmann, \textit{Agricultural Research and Development in Southern Rhodesia 1924 – 1950}, Salisbury:
ready market for cotton existed as a result of the development of textile manufacturing industries since 1945. Cotton growing was also boosted by Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith’s policy of self-reliance after his declaration of unilateral independence (UDI) in 1965.

Peter G. How hoped that part of an estimated annual sum of £100 000 set aside by the government in 1965 for the development of small-scale irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe’s communal areas could be used to implement the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. Nevertheless, in view of the serious drought situation in Matabeleland, the government decided that, for the next few years, these funds should be used in alleviating the “serious position” in that province. Plans for the implementation of Gowe were, therefore, temporarily shelved.

Efforts were resuscitated by the Group Conservation and Extension Officer before the end of 1965. Procedurally, he had to keep the District Commissioner (DC) Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, informed on developments regarding the investigations his Department were conducting into the feasibility of establishing Gowe. To the Group Officer’s relief, the DC (who was stationed at Gatooma from 1961 to 1972) was equally keen on the scheme. His enthusiasm for the scheme was illustrated by his granting of permission for the pump engine and borehole by the DC’s Rest Camp at Sanyati (See Appendix IV) to be used for irrigation purposes at this scheme, and by the many consultations he had with a number of interested players in the matter. For instance, discussions were held on the 10th of August 1965 by the DC with Paramount Chiefs, Neuso and Wozhele, as well as with the local people to solicit their consent. Both chiefs were very much in favour of an irrigation scheme at Gowe, which, as a necessary preliminary to its implementation, would have a small plot of irrigated cotton, for demonstration and training purposes within the Sanyati communal lands.

It is important to note that chiefs Neuso and Wozhele’s approval was often sought in connection with land leases in the Sanyati communal lands. This was so because, traditional chiefs had the prerogative over the distribution of land in the rural areas, and lease applicants often consulted them.


459 NAZ (RC), DC Gatoma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, File: “Gowe Irrigation Scheme: Sanyati TTL (EX CONEX),” J. W. Watermeyer (pp. Director of Conservation and Extension) to the Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South), 24th June 1965.

460 Ibid.

461 NAZ (RC), DC Gatoma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc., P. A. Davies, Assistant Provincial Conservation and Extension Officer (Mashonaland South) to the Provincial Commissioner, (Mashonaland South), 1st October 1965, 1.

462 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158087, Location C19.6.7F, File: LEA Sanyati (July 1963 - March 1970), J. R. Musgrave (pp. DC Gatooma) to J. K. S. Scotty (Lease Applicant - Sanyati), 16th January 1970.
By October 1966, the Provincial Water Engineer, P. G. Wright, had already drafted a preliminary report on the proposed scheme for submission to the Chairman of the Provincial Irrigation Co-ordinating Committee (PICC) for endorsement. The proposed scheme, which was accepted as “technically sound,” was for a pilot scheme of 100 acres with 25 farmers, each being allocated a 4-acre plot. The essence of pilot schemes has been studied quite extensively. For C. Agnew and E. Anderson in their study on irrigation in the arid realm: “Given the complex nature of irrigation it is not possible to design projects involving more than a few households without using pilot schemes. Pilot schemes are vital for establishing both environmental and human responses to proposed changes.”

J. R. Rydzewski proposed a sequence for irrigation development involving identification and pre-feasibility studies; feasibility studies; implementation; monitoring and evaluation. In his view, this ensured flexibility since the success of a project depended on being prepared to modify plans in the light of new information obtained through monitoring. A very radical opinion has been proffered by Palmer-Jones who has demonstrated that pilot studies did not necessarily provide “correct” responses. Citing a case study from Nigeria where problems were reported due to “uncooperative and lazy farmers,” he says this was only tackled through land control, taxation and other coercive measures. An alternative interpretation is that farmers were reluctant to participate in an irrigation scheme that would lead to financial difficulties in the case of wheat production and crop failure due to poor water control for rice fields. His conclusion, therefore, was that “the results of monitoring and pilot studies can … be misleading.” However, for the Ministry of Internal Affairs the establishment of Gowe on a pilot basis was sound because they were using it as a test case for a bigger project they were envisaging. In fact, the idea was more enthusiastically received by Sanyati residents than was the case in the West African area studied by Palmer-Jones. This was so because Sanyati was in dire need of irrigation because of its dry conditions compared to Nigeria. There were also no serious problems of water control in Sanyati because water supply was centrally managed by TILCOR or by pump attendants who were directly supervised by the Ministry of Water unlike in Nigeria where individual farmers grappled to control water.

When irrigation finally got off the ground, there were 18 original plotholders which figure rose to 36 in 1968, owning allotments that ranged in size from approximately 2 to 4 acres each. Plotholders did not have title deeds. Plots were held on a yearly lease

466 It is radical because it offers a far-reaching critic of the necessity of pilot schemes, which counteracts conventional wisdom represented by scholars like Agnew and Anderson about the viability of such schemes.
468 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File;
agreement and sub-leasing was not allowed. 469 The DC provided various figures (e.g. 18, 25 and 36) of the total plotholder population. The seemingly conflicting figures reveal that, on the one hand, plotholder security was not very stable as evictions and voluntary withdrawals took their toll. On the other, there was an overwhelming response and interest by new applicants for plots hence the increase in number by 1968. Because of the small size of Gowe and variations in farming experience among plotholders it was impossible to allocate plots of exactly the same size hence 2 to 4 acres was the standard allocation each plotholder was entitled to since the inception of the scheme. 470 In the final analysis, the approach used was to try and accommodate as many of the farmers who had expressed an interest to join and satisfied the selection criteria. The proposal was that the farmers would farm on a co-operative basis, with the Co-operative Society raising the necessary loans for the provision of spray equipment and other capital costs on the land, and the Government, through the Ministry of Water Development (MOWD), providing, running and maintaining the pumping scheme delivering water on to the land. 471 This in due course would make Gowe a Pilot Co-operative Irrigation scheme in Sanyati.

Discussions and negotiations on the proposed scheme continued. On the 2nd of August 1966, as a matter of routine, K. F. Solberg (Convener of working party - MOWD), A. G. Pilditch (Planning Officer in the Department of Conservation and Extension, Mashonaland South) and D. B. Rowe (Water Engineer - Secretary) visited the scheme. The following day (3rd August, 1966), they convened a meeting of the working party at the DC’s office in Gatooma where the need for the scheme was agreed upon after consultations with the CONEX Irrigation Officer, J. W. Watermeyer. 472 Subsequently, a provisional construction programme was drawn up as shown in Table 3.1.

With everything pointing in the right direction, the Deputy Secretary for Internal Affairs, Noel Robertson, writing on behalf of the Secretary for Internal Affairs, after his visit to Sanyati to inspect the proposed irrigation scheme, asked the DC to start stumping and clearing the site to be irrigated. 473 Labour was sourced from the local community (who perceived it as the reincarnation of the chibaro process of the early 1950s because sometimes some element of coercion was employed), and once the labour force had been procured, it was engaged in the clearing, ploughing and levelling of the land. The purchase of spray equipment also needed to be considered, in as much as the DC had to consult the Health Inspector on the area to be set aside for village settlement. This was

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469 R. L. Westcott, (Former DC Gatooma), Personal Interview, Ramsgate, South Africa, 12th July 2005.
470 Mafumana Mjoli, Gowe Irrigation or Agriculture Committee Chairman, Personal Interview, Gowe Irrigation Scheme, Sanyati, 14th May 2005.
473 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), N. Robertson to the PC (Mashonaland South), 28th February 1967.
necessary in light of the fact that the area earmarked for the project was still dense thicket and a haven to malaria carrying mosquitoes and other insects.

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<th>Table 3.1: Provisional Construction Programme (Gowe Irrigation Scheme)</th>
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By arrangement with the MOWD, minor irrigation projects for the financial year 1966/67 were considered and an allocation of £4 000 was approved for the implementation of Gowe-Sanyati on a subsidised basis. 475 An additional expenditure of £1 500 and £150 for the financial year, 1967/68, was estimated to cover for running costs and fencing respectively. 476

With the stage now set for the beginning of the project, it was gratifying to the Ministry of Internal Affairs to note that there was also no objection on the part of the Tribal Trust Land Board or its Chief Administrative Officer, W. H. H. Nicolle, to the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. 477 By July 1967, the stumping, clearing, ploughing and levelling had been completed. The laying of the pipeline through the lands was also completed at the end of the second week of August 1967. Westcott has argued that Gowe was different from most if not all irrigation schemes in Zimbabwe, in using overhead or spray irrigation, which eliminated the need for constructing canals and facilitated more accurate application of water and fuller realisation of cropping potential. Nevertheless, spray irrigation demanded full co-operation from the plotholders in the moving of spray lines and

475 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), L. G. Leach (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to PC (Mashonaland South), 9th November 1966.
476 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), N. I. Boast, (PC Mashonaland South) to the Secretary for Internal Affairs, 12th April, 1967.
efficiency in ensuring correct delivery of water from the sprinklers.  

Tractor mounted pumps belonging to the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) were to be used.

Thereafter, a pilot irrigation scheme of 80 acres, divided into 2 to 4 acre plots, was implemented at Gowe by the DC Gatooma in September 1967, with the first field of maize planted and completed on the 2nd of November, 1967. This now meant that Gowe would be declared an irrigable area in terms of Section 11 of the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967. The adoption of this Act was informed by the establishment of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage in 1950 which set in motion the International Hydrological Decade, begun in 1965 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) which proposed a 10-year programme for sustained and internationally co-ordinated scientific observations on water resource utilisation. This programme, among other things, sought to accelerate the study of water resources and the worldwide regimen of waters with a view to their rational management in the interest of mankind, and to improve the ability of the developing countries to evaluate their resources and use them to the best advantage.

The DC Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, therefore, established the Gowe Irrigation Scheme on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He was tasked with the responsibility of fully operating the scheme. Some of the first settlers at Gowe have testified to this fact. These include Norman Savata Gwacha, a former Gowe plotholder and Secretary of the Gowe Irrigation Co-operative, who is now concentrating on ploughing his 10-acre dryland plot in Kusi Village (next to Gowe) which is under Chief Wozhele, and E. Munengami, nicknamed “Mayor” by fellow plotholders because he is the only surviving pioneer member of the scheme. Gwacha was allocated an irrigation plot in September 1967 whilst Munengami joined the scheme a year later (September 1968). What then is clear from this is that the Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme pre-existed TILCOR’s main irrigation project at Sanyati, which commenced operations in March 1974.

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478 R. L. Westcott (Former DC Gatooma), Personal Interview, Ramsgate, South Africa, 12th July 2005.
480 N. S. Gwacha (Communal Farmer and Former Secretary of Gowe Co-operative Society), Personal Interview, Kusi Village, Sanyati, 8th January 1997 and E. Munengami, (Gowe Plotholder), Personal Interview, Gowe, 8th January 1997.
481 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 100816, Location 3.13.7F, File: AGR/16. Description of Irrigable Areas (July 1967 - November 1968), L.G. Leach (pp. Secretary for Internal Affairs) to all PCs, 19th July, 1967.
482 Ibid.
Colonial Objectives:-

Gowe was set up with a number of objectives in mind. It was designed to be a test case in smallholder irrigation in the Sanyati communal lands, irrigating 80 acres of various crops, amongst them cotton. Writing to the DC Gatooma on behalf of the Provincial Water Engineer, K. F. Solberg stated that this was intended to be a pilot scheme for the promotion of future development in the area. In his own assessment, Gowe was important as

(a) a training scheme in irrigation for the local inhabitants;
(b) an experimental scheme for a larger project (the establishment of the Sanyati Main Estate was looming in the distance); and
(c) an experimental unit to assess yields with overhead spray.  

From the onset, the need to involve local participants in the scheme was acknowledged. Objective (a) above, together with proven farming experience invariably determined the selection criteria that would be used to lure suitable tenants to Gowe. In the season 1965/66, applications for plots were invited. Chiefs Neuso and Wozhele, after approving the scheme, preferred plots that were allocated on an individual basis, but this did not materialise as the land was owned by the government and, therefore, had to be held on a yearly lease-holding system.

It was proposed that prospective applicants had to be residents of Sanyati, preferably with Master Farmer status since high standards were required in irrigation. Selection of applicants was, thus, based on qualification and experience. The former DC for Gatooma, R. L. Westcott, has confirmed this by saying, “Plotholders, who were in the main local Karanga, provided they were acceptable to the Tribal Authority, were selected on farming ability and experience; holders of Master Farmer Certificates [of course] would have had a priority.” He went on to illustrate that the selection criteria was not insensitive to gender considerations when he said “Although at the beginning there was only one female plotholder, [the late Keresina Simon, who was given a plot because her husband was old and frail - plot or allotment No. 16], the criteria for selection was as rational with no discrimination.” The plotholders were given one or possibly two years, in which to decide whether to remain on the scheme permanently or to return to their dryland holding.

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488 Response to Questionnaire, Westcott to Nyandoro, 6th May 1997.
489 The scheme for Master Farmer awards became more important in the 1950’s when prospective African Purchase Area (APA) Farmers were obliged to obtain a Master Farmer certificate before qualifying to purchase a farm.
490 R. L. Westcott, (Former DC Gatooma), Personal Interview, Ramsgate, South Africa, 12th July 2005 and Response to Questionnaire, Westcott to Nyandoro.
491 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969), R. L. Westcott to the PC (Mashonaland South),
between remaining in the scheme or giving up their dryland plot. The Extension Officer for Sanyati/Chenjiri, J. L. Paul, pressed for applications (done on “Purchase Area” application forms) to be submitted by farmers for the irrigation plots. Eventually, a committee consisting of chiefs Neuso and Wozhele, and representatives from CONEX and the DC’s Office selected applicants. Applicants were then interviewed on the 29th of August 1967 by the above panel, with the initial eighteen being allocated plots and residential sites on the 14th of September, the same year. The first successful applicants at Gowe were mainly composed of Sanyati residents (local Karanga) with a few farmers coming from as far afield as Chibi (now Chivi), Selukwe (Shurugwi), Charter (Chivhu), Gutu and Filabusi. As already stated, there was only one female plotholder at Gowe at the time of its inception in September 1967. The second woman, the late Emily Mazise, got a plot (No. 26) in 1968 because she was a widow with enough family labour to help change irrigation pipes. Emphasis, however, seemed to be on keeping the male population on the land.

The general argument on the part of Government was that colonial Zimbabwe was facing a “socio-political-human problem” largely wrought by what the settler government feared was a massive rural-urban drift. This was believed to offset the peace and security of the country as an increasing army of the unemployed and frustrated Africans was seen as potentially troublesome. In the colonial government’s view, for the maintenance of domestic peace and stability, it was essential to create employment, of one kind or another, for the thousands of unemployed Africans, either already in towns or flocking to them. The Secretary for Internal Affairs, W. H. H. Nicolle, felt that, whilst industry was making a valiant effort to absorb them, it was not growing fast enough to absorb all the African job seekers. Hence, it was incumbent on his Ministry to place or keep as many Africans as possible on the land, with the assurance that they would annually reap an abundance of food with a surplus, depending on their own industry, for sale. This could only be achieved through the development of efficiently run irrigation schemes wherever both water and land suitable for this purpose were available, and through their settlement on a subsistence and cash farming basis.

31st October 1966.

492 NAZ (RC), DC Gatooma - Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 158098, Location C19.10.7R, DC’s File: Gowe Irrigation Scheme 1965-1971: Plans etc; “Sanyati Irrigation Scheme: Progress Report No.1,” V. O. Meredith (Acting DC for Gatooma) to the PC, GO, EO and PDO, 25th February, 1967. N.B. African Purchase Areas (APAs) are now known as Small-Scale Commercial Farming Areas.


496 Ibid.

The primary objective of Gowe and, indeed, any other irrigation scheme, was not to make a few farmers rich but to make many self-supporting in food and thus assist the country’s economy by eliminating the almost annually costly famine relief measures. In general, the government was establishing irrigation schemes in the rural areas for the sole benefit of Africans residing particularly in low rainfall areas where drought and famine were almost endemic, but primarily the idea was to use schemes like Gowe, Chisumbanje and others to generate cash crop production to boost the country’s textile industry and exports. In the colonial period, more emphasis was placed on the production of subsistence crops mainly to allay food shortages. Thus, with assured and sufficient irrigation crops, the recurrent famines would be overcome and many thousands of Africans in the country would be kept “busy and contented.” 498 However, as shall be demonstrated later in the next chapter, most farmers were inclined towards accumulation and the Africans in general could derive very little or no contentment at all from the schemes due to the general shortage of land, that is, the smallness of irrigation plots, coupled with the fact that Gowe together with other existing schemes were rather too small to accommodate all prospective irrigation farmers. This could hardly make the schemes self-provisioning entities as projected by the State.

It was also argued that once Gowe had reached a viable stage where it was able to provide optimum economic returns, the plotters would be permitted to take over the scheme from the government, since “all land in a government irrigation scheme will, in the first place, be leased to individuals and companies for a period of ten years with an option to purchase thereafter.” 499 As will be seen later, this principle was never translated into practice.

A more predominant view is that the Government was interested in stifling potential resistance from below (i.e. from the plotters who were not only clamouring for more land but also for ownership of the smallholder scheme), and that it merely wanted to create what was termed, “a stable and satisfied irrigation population” 500 (not a significant middle class strata) in order to gain political mileage. The following statement in the preliminary Project Report on Gowe supports this view: “Politically, the fact that Government is going to considerable expense to provide better living for people, is having a marked effect.” 501

Nevertheless, whatever the colonial government was doing with regard to African irrigation schemes was not altruistic. In this respect, the observation by Simon

501 Ibid.
Pazvakavambwa, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Rural Housing and Social Amenities and the former Director of the Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX - now the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension/AREX), who in 1997 was the Technical Co-ordinator for the Water Resources Management Strategy (WRMS), on the real objectives for setting up, not only Gowe but also other irrigation schemes, like Ngwezi, Chisumbanje and so on, particularly after UDI, is an eye opener. Pazvakavambwa contends that, after 1965, many African irrigation schemes were established, as part and parcel of the post-UDI policies by Ian Smith (leader of the Rhodesia Front Party/RF that came into power in December 1962) of trying to convince Britain that his Government was doing something good for the Africans in this country, contrary to British feelings that he was ill-treating the African populace at large. However, it is important to note that after 1965, Ian Smith was not worried about Britain’s opinions about how he treated Africans in Rhodesia. The schemes were motivated more by the need to make Rhodesia self-sufficient in certain raw materials (e.g. cotton), to strengthen the country’s economy in the face of international sanctions, to promote exports, to provide employment in the rural areas and to stem the rural-urban drift.

In any case, since its establishment, the Gowe Irrigation Scheme was seen as a venture that would spearhead development in the rural areas of Sanyati. In the colonial period, some of the most important agencies to ensure that this goal was achieved in Sanyati were TILCOR (1974-1980) and the Department of Agricultural Development (DEVAG - 1976/81).

**Formation of TILCOR and the spectre of economic development:**

The formation of TILCOR took place against the backdrop of the increased influx of “immigrants” from Rhodesdale into rural Sanyati in the 1950s and early 1960s. In general the TTLs were extremely congested considering the fact that a total of 3 million Africans in Rhodesia resided there. This translated to 60% of the total population of the country at the beginning of the 1970s. Nearly all of them subsisted on the land. Hence, rural economic problems in the Rhodesia of the 1960s and 1970s were steeped in the phenomenal population pressures that either derailed or cancelled out the tempo at which natural resources could be mobilised for sustainable economic development. The apparent prevalence of subsistence farming with low per capita incomes, scattered population and a lack of urban-commercial development to cater for rural needs, inadequate training and extension facilities, an underdeveloped rural infrastructure and a serious lack of trained manpower to sustain an accelerated development initiative combined with exceptionally rapid population growth placed a damper on development. For example, by 1974 when TILCOR, which had been formed in 1968,

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504 Taonga Mushayavanhu, “The Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR): Impact on Rural Development,” MA dissertation, Economic History Department, University of Zimbabwe, May 1989, 5. See also Annexure to “Proposals for a Five-Year Programme of Development in the Public Sector,”
established its Estate in Sanyati, 43% of the population of Rhodesia was under the age of fifteen with only 57% constituting the adult population. 505 What this meant was that the dependence ratio was very high. These problems, coupled with those associated with land degradation and the failure by the NLHA to come up with an enduring solution, forced the government to make concerted efforts to try and stabilise the rural economic situation and at the same time protecting the economic position of the white minority.

It is of paramount importance to note that the development of Rhodesia’s communal areas was not designed to raise the standard of living of the people residing in those areas. Rather, the settler government’s aim was to bring the rural areas up to a state where they not only contributed positively to the national economy but also, more importantly, to a state where they could sustain even larger populations. 506 This is precisely what the first Chairman of TILCOR who was appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs (L. B. Smith) in 1968, Warwick A. Bailey meant when he said, “It surely must be an inflexible part of human relationship that no sector of reasoned life should be allowed to endanger the durable continuance of any other sector.” In his elaboration of this point he maintained that, “It is imperative that the ruination of large tracts of Rhodesia is not only stopped but the land is brought up to a state where it contributes positively to the national economy.” 507 Envisaging a bleak future for Europeans if the TTLs were not developed, Bailey told delegates to the Fifth Conference of Southern African Surveyors held in Salisbury:

> Every white Rhodesian’s duty is to do something for the Tribal Trust Lands … The future for the European in Rhodesia was extremely limited unless the TTLs were developed … The time has come when every white man in Rhodesia must accept that without the development of the tribal areas and the provision of job opportunity for Africans, the future for white people in this country is extremely limited. 508

The major aim was thus to contain the African threat to the “durable continuance” of the white population. Whatever benefit accrued to the African was a bonus as it was always subsidiary to this overall aim.

Negotiations to undertake development in TTLs with the Board of Trustees of Tribal areas commenced in February 1969 less than a year after the establishment of TILCOR’s first development project, namely the Katiyo Tea Estate along the banks of the Pungwe

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506 Ibid.
River in the Mutasa TTL of Manicaland in November 1968. In line with these negotiations, the TILCOR Annual Report for 1971/72 stated that the economic situation of the rural areas could be changed in three major ways, that is, through:

(a) economic development pitched to accommodate population growth or restraint;
(b) diverting pressure from the land to allow the establishment of permanently viable agricultural production units sufficiently flexible to respond to changing needs; and
(c) creating additional internal markets to expand the economic opportunities and incentives.

Another solution that was proposed was decentralisation. In May 1962 a policy of active decentralisation, known as Community Development, was adopted in Rhodesia. This was a carbon copy of the 1960 policy of decentralisation initiated by the Permanent Committee for the Decentralisation of Industry (later named the Board for the Decentralisation of Industries) in South Africa. The Government of the Republic argued that, whereas decentralisation first centred on the borders of “Bantu Homelands,” consideration was now also given to industrial development within the “Homelands” (“Bantustans”). In Rhodesia, Community Development, which has often been equated to economic development, was also adopted as a major instrument for rural development. Just as in South Africa, it aimed to bring development within African areas and reduce concentrating development effort outside them. An increasing need was seen to shift emphasis from central government control of development in the TTLs to “development from below,” which entailed involvement of the local communities in their own development.

Although the term “Community Development” was first formally


511 Decentralisation was a regional development policy aimed at promoting a wider and more balanced distribution of economic activity in the national space.

512 Community Development entailed people of each community being given responsibility for their own development, a responsibility which could only be discharged through communal organisation, formally and informally, for democratic planning and action. This was directly influenced by South Africa’s policy of “separate development.” See M. A. B. Mutiti, South Africa: Is it a Sovereign Independent State? (Harare: Aloe Press, 1985), Chapter 3.


defined at the 1948 Cambridge Conference on African Administration, attempts at decentralisation in Zimbabwe can be traced back to the 1950s. In 1956 the settler government of Southern Rhodesia made initial attempts to address the issue of spatial polarisation of economic development which was increasingly creating political pressures and unrest from both settler communities living away from the major centres as well as urban-based African nationalists and their African clientele in the rural areas.  

In this year, a Select Committee to report on decentralisation was appointed but its recommendations were largely ignored. Two years later, a second committee was nominated which recommended that a wider distribution of industry and urban growth was not only desirable but also essential to the future welfare of Rhodesia as a whole. These recommendations were largely frustrated by the political and administrative complexities of the federal structure to which Southern Rhodesia belonged. Thus, little progress was achieved with regard to implementation.

A third Select Committee was set up to inquire into, and report on ways and means of implementing decentralisation in Rhodesia. It submitted its findings in 1972 but, for the third time, no action was taken. According to Tapela, although this protracted inaction on the part of the settler governments since the 1950s regarding the implementation of the decentralisation policy was part of a more general problem characteristic of the policy formulation-implementation discourse, two specific practical causes of this quiescence are evident. Firstly, in 1974 the government’s ideas on decentralisation were elaborated in the white paper entitled *Policy on Decentralisation*. This paper defined decentralisation as “the economic development of growth points outside the major cities with particular reference to commercial and industrial activities.” The internal inconsistencies within this policy paper as well as its disregard for recommendations of the previous select committees were the major causes of the delay in implementing decentralisation.  

Secondly, there were no positive measures and clear guidelines for implementing such a policy. This was exacerbated by a slow-down in real growth in the economy in the 1970s and the escalation of the national liberation war. In particular, the vagaries of the war economy watered down or neutralised necessary political pressures coming from white representatives from the smaller and distant centres who formed the core of the most vocal and powerful advocacy for decentralisation. From 1974 to 1978, little had been accomplished regarding the implementation of decentralisation. This state of affairs is not surprising if it is recognised that the legal and administrative foundations

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as well as the promotional aspects of urban decentralisation were still inadequate at that time. Similarly, it is doubtful whether there was enough political pressure or will to facilitate the location of economic activities at less favoured points or, worse still, in the TTLs.

The overall effect of the white paper, the Select Committees that preceded it, and subsequent legislation meant that the implementation of decentralised urban development between the 1950s and mid-1970s remained effectively limited to European areas. The concept was spread to the TTLs when TILCOR started promoting irrigation-based growth points in the rural areas. In fact, the ultimate objective of the Sanyati Project was “to create a growth point [and] a commercial centre must naturally be a component of such a growth point.” The formation of TILCOR was to reinforce and complement the policy of Community Development and the work of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority (SLA) in a big way.

Emergence of Sanyati TILCOR Growth Point:-

Although TILCOR established itself in Sanyati in 1974 the problems of adopting decentralisation alluded to above made it difficult to create a growth point at that time. The ARDA growth point in Sanyati was only established in 1977 primarily because of favourable and specific advantages of siting which were linked to the existence of irrigation at Gowe and the Main TILCOR Estate in its vicinity. In fact, in 1974, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was responsible for the Affairs of “TTLs,” appointed TILCOR as its “agent in the initiation, promotion, planning, implementation and administration of growth points” in general. More specifically, TILCOR’s aims and objectives were three-fold. In the first instance, it aimed to create rural growth points in the best possible situations away from the main centres. Secondly, such growth points were intended to profit or benefit the area around them, and lastly, TILCOR was geared to make jobs available, not only on the Estates and in the towns, but through improved conditions in the surrounding area.

Although TILCOR was basically an agricultural authority, these added responsibilities were justified for three main reasons. Firstly, there was a potential for development of urban centres, which could flourish from the agricultural operations of the corporation (e.g. at Gowe and the Main Estate). Secondly, TILCOR was at that time the “unchallenged authority working in communal areas” and therefore stood a better chance of understanding the situation there than any other agency. Thirdly, TILCOR had the financial and organisational ability to undertake the development of towns owing to its

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519 TILCOR, TILCOR History, TILCOR, Internal, 1974, 2. N.B. A growth point, as TILCOR perceived it, entailed the development of primary industry (agriculture), secondary industry (crop processing), commercial services, welfare services and township services.

invested infrastructure and equipment and the presence of skilled personnel already engaged in TILCOR operations in the communal areas. From selected and already established or designated TILCOR estates, the corporation was to be responsible for creating seven initially selected growth points namely, Sanyati, Mashumbi Pools, Muzarabani, Hauna, Tsholotsho, Ngwezi and Maphisa. (See Maps 11 and 12 of potential and established growth points or urban regions in Zimbabwe). TILCOR favoured the setting up of a few large Townships rather than the prevailing situation where there was what it called “ribbon development” (unplanned development) with business centres every three miles or so which meant that the average shopkeeper could not stay in business for a year. What was more preferable to TILCOR was to have Councils and Tribal Land Authorities concentrating on one Township in each “TTL” in an effort to initiate major business ventures in all the “TTLs.” These were the principles which were applied and eventually marked the establishment of Sanyati as the first “New” Town (“Growth Point”) in colonial Zimbabwe under the auspices of TILCOR.

In addition to managing the existing Estate and laying out the town centre, TILCOR also had to operate an annex tenant farming scheme (Gowe) established in 1967 to teach basic principles of agriculture in general and irrigation techniques in relation to cash crop production in particular. As already indicated, schemes such as Gowe were to create a group of local African expert or Master Farmers who could later help spread demonstration effects in their areas by buying their own farms or leasing farms in the Native Purchase Areas or APAs, later known as African Purchase Lands (APLs), or merely practicing such skills in the communal areas. According to K. H. Wekwete, since the 1950s, growth centre planning has been one of the key features of regional development planning. It was initially linked with industrial development and economic growth, but has increasingly shifted towards provision of basic services. In most developing countries, the objectives of the policy included:

(a) a desire to strengthen the settlement hierarchy to promote balanced and equitable development;
(b) promoting physical and social infrastructure development, particularly in rural areas;
(c) strengthening generation of diversified productive employment with linkages to the rural economy; and
(d) improving efficiency and delivery of services within a decentralised planning framework.

Something along these objectives was, therefore, attempted in Zimbabwe especially after the colonial government had realised in the 1960s that there were vivid signs of

521 TILCOR, TILCOR History, TILCOR, Internal, 1974, 2.
522 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280745, Location R19.10.5.3F, File: DEV/1 Planning Policy, “Township Services,” in Brief Notes on a Meeting Held Between TILCOR and ADA Staff in the TILCOR Board Room on the 23rd November 1971 at 8.30 AM, 4.
underdevelopment in the “TTLs,” which represented poorly developed areas with weak links to the urban centres of the country. In this decade, the European sector had a fairly well developed hierarchy of settlements reflecting its diverse activities represented by agriculture, mining, manufacturing and commerce. The urban settlement hierarchy reflected the “European” economy. The Africans were officially not urban dwellers. They were temporary sojourners in urban areas, who would retire to their rural homes. There were also no urban centres in the African areas, but small business centres providing limited basic necessities, hence it was important to embrace a growth policy geared to achieve a whole range of other social, political and economic objectives. The colonial realisation of the problem of underdevelopment in the rural areas led to the official adoption of the growth point policy, which was spearheaded by TILCOR - a parastatal organisation established by an Act of Parliament in November 1968. The policy was based on the logic of creating “African towns in African areas,” which would generate employment for Africans and halt the influx to European towns. The development of growth points was to take place within a framework that would consolidate the policy of separate development, as was the case with the “Homeland” growth points in South Africa.

Concerned about the dearth of economic development and the failure by the urban sector to absorb all job seekers, the Whitsun Foundation proposed in one of its Programme Support papers that integrating the rural areas (which constitute about 80% of the population) into the national economy was one durable solution to the challenges facing Rhodesia at the time. It argued that “a cornerstone of Rhodesia’s development strategy [was] to bring the TTLs into the mainstream of the economy.” This was essential because the low levels of physical and service infrastructure meant that the areas were characterised by low productivity of both land and labour. Average family incomes were under half that of the wages received at the lowest end of the formal sector and suffered considerable variability. As observed in chapter two, over the years, these areas have come to depend on money transfers from wage earners, but at a price – the able-bodied and those who provide much of the leadership are absent. Thus, the inability of the

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526 The Whitsun Foundation was conceived in 1974 by several leading Rhodesian business and professional men. The name, incidentally, derives from the fact that the first meeting of the prospective founders took place over the Whitsun weekend (holiday) in that year (1974). It was established as a private non-profit development agency in August 1975 and its broad objectives were to pursue the economic development of the country with specific reference to the least developed sectors of the economy. For more detail on the foundation see POZ Library, Box FR 2627-2647, File: FR 2636/49574 “The Whitsun Foundation – An Outline Prospectus,” (Salisbury: Whitsun Foundation, June 1978), 1 and POZ Library, Box FR 2126-2136, File: FR 2132/46950, Rhodesia National Farmers Union: Information Folder No. 16: The Whitsun Foundation, (Salisbury: Whitsun Foundation, November 1977).

527 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 272099, Location R19.3.12.1F: File: ADA/MAR/2 Marketing – General, Whitsun Foundation: Zimbabwe Promotion Council, s.a., 1.
formal sector to generate employment at the level commensurate with the rapid growth in population and especially of new entrants to the labour market meant that the greater part of the solution would have to be found in the countryside.

TILCOR, as the new body responsible for initiating development projects in the TTLs on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, “recognised the need to establish rural growth points as foci for service provision and modernisation of the basically subsistence economy.” When TILCOR came to Sanyati, its functions were subsequently widened from merely those of developing irrigation schemes to include the creation of rural agricultural processing and marketing towns next to its estates. Founded in 1977, Sanyati is the largest of this first generation of irrigation-based growth centres and, by 1980, it had already attained growth centre status. (See Map 12 showing TILCOR/ARDA-promoted growth points). The service region as assessed by TILCOR in 1976 was delineated to include the communal areas of Sanyati, Gandavaroyi, Sebungwe, Gokwe and also incorporated the APLs of Copper Queen and Chenjiri (See Maps 8 and 13). In line with fostering development in the rural areas the Ministry of Internal Affairs had, as early as 1972, confirmed that $200 000 had been earmarked for primary development on growth points and TILCOR had also accepted that they were going to plan accordingly with 1973 in mind although the best prospects in their projection were for 1974 or after. Since the announcement of this capital injection into growth point development, TILCOR representatives started planning to visit the DC Gatooma (A. Cousins) in connection with the continued investigation and planning for the growth point, probably at Gowe. Subsequently, during the week starting 21st May 1973, Messrs D. Ashton and Stu Farrow from TILCOR Head Office paid a familiarisation visit to the areas which were being investigated. The TILCOR Board of Directors comprising W. A. Bailey (Chairman), W. H. H. Nicolle, W. A. Pittman, J. A. M. Smith and W. D. Walker ensured that such visits became more frequent until the growth point was officially commissioned.

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530 NAZ (RC), Ministry Of Internal Affairs, Box 158089, Location C19.6.8R, File: LAN 9 Tribal Trust Lands General, Sanyati, March 1966 – May 1973, “Minutes of the 43rd Meeting of Representatives of TILCOR and Internal Affairs, Held in the TILCOR Board Room on Friday, 6th October 1972,” 2.
It should be pointed out, however, that the growth point policy is essentially a parallel strategy to the 1974 decentralisation policy in the sense that its conception was confined within the other national spatial system - TTLs - and under a separate administrative authority and statute. Using Sanyati growth point as an example, TILCOR launched a massive campaign to galvanise countrywide support for the new rural development package they had unveiled. In May 1978, the statutory body warned stakeholders of the consequences for Rhodesia of failing to seize the opportunity to decentralise and expand their businesses to cover the outlying areas of the country. TILCOR argued: “Major opportunities for industrialists will be found in the TTLs in the future and if existing organisations do not recognise this fact, an invasion of international companies with highly sophisticated management structures will move in to fill the vacuum.”

This was the message TILCOR were going to convey to the Association of Rhodesian Industries (ARnI) at their annual congress to be held at Victoria Falls from May 31 to June 2. A TILCOR spokesman told the Financial Gazette: “These international people will not be slow in recognising the potential and the opportunities that are available, but we believe that existing industrialists have the right to be the early worms in this case.”

This appeal came out of TILCOR’s realisation that their organisation, which started commercial operations in the “TTLs” in 1969, had up to that point (1978), only “scratched the surface” because not many growth points had been established. However, ten potential growth points existed and of these two had reached “urbanisation.” In one of these, namely, Sanyati, approximately 50% of the entrepreneurs involved were African. At that stage, TILCOR employed 130 Europeans and 6 000 Africans and it had capital assets valued at $17 million, 60% of which was government-owned and 40% privately owned. Of its 37 executive members, two were African and one, Robbie Mupawose, had been appointed “group agriculturalist.” To further encourage local investors the spokesman said:

All that this grant-aided organisation [TILCOR] undertakes must, according to its terms of reference, be profitable, but once an enterprise is running it is open for any entrepreneur to take it over [and] African businessmen are becoming increasingly involved in these undertakings.

He went on to say:

Before the escalation of the war and world depression combined to curtail Rhodesian expansion, industry was generating 60-70000 new jobs a year [and] TILCOR envisage[d] a situation where, without the help of external “hand-outs,” Rhodesia could herself provide the necessary broad spectrum of expansion and fulfilment of job expectancy within a period of 15 years.

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533 Ibid.
534 Ibid.
535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
An assessment of development potential throughout the country suggested a figure of $750 million over 15 years as a realistic estimate and that this was a most attractive international investment prospect. TILCOR went on to stress the point that their plans did not take on board developments of the “new town” variety, which had been tried elsewhere. Instead, they envisaged a “natural evolution,” probably of market towns in the first place, followed by the establishment of secondary and tertiary industries, all based on a combination of existing natural resources to provide the necessary “catalyst.” The TILCOR contribution to the ARnI Congress formed part of a forum dealing with the broad theme of “Industry in Transition.” Indeed, the transitional period was not an easy one but once Sanyati had been established it revealed a number of lessons. How TILCOR impacted on the overall development of Sanyati (especially on the basis of its Main Irrigation Scheme) is very evident. The birth of the Main Irrigation Scheme in Sanyati, whose parent body (TILCOR) gave rise to the growth point, will be discussed later in chapter four.

**TILCOR Aims (1974-1980):**

With the advent of TILCOR at Sanyati in March 1974, the insistence on improving the lot of the pilot settler farmers assumed enormous dimensions. Paramount consideration was given to promoting a viable pattern of irrigation settlement at Gowe and to testing this pattern and the individual settlers for an initial period of three years, in which strict control of both the settlers’ production programme and their finances were exercised. In fact, under TILCOR the management of land, capital and labour was thrust into the hands of “technically qualified Europeans” who co-ordinated and made all decisions regarding land preparation, planting, irrigation, reaping, pest control, harvesting and marketing with “African” supervisors to simplify control of the fieldwork of the peasants. This system was perpetuated throughout the colonial era with no consideration of the settlers ever becoming independent decision makers.

The managers of the scheme, who were mainly white, also thought it incumbent upon themselves to ensure that the most suitable applicants (i.e. those of the highest quality) intending to join the scheme were selected. Preferably, the settlers had to have abundant previous farming, especially irrigation, experience. TILCOR’s objectives at Gowe can be equated with its objectives at Ngwezi, Antelope and Chisumbanje smallholder schemes, which had already attained outgrower status. The reasons for establishing these as outgrower schemes were very clear. Gowe, just like the other projects mentioned above, became an outgrower section in 1974 for purely strategic reasons. According to Pazvakavambwa, it was supposed to act as a “captive labour market” for the Sanyati

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539 Ibid, 2-3.
540 Ibid, 4.
Main Estate, which was set up in the same year. In general, the mushrooming of outgrower irrigation schemes between 1965 and 1974 was, as already stated, part of a programme to boost textiles and exports. For M. G. Paraiwa, a former Senior Planner (Economist) with ARDA and a former Director of DDF’s Transport, Plant and Equipment Unit (now retired), the need to promote a viable pattern of irrigation settlement at Gowe was given a boost by TILCOR towards the mid-1970’s as a result of general Government policy to establish outgrower settlements at all its TILCOR and Sabi-Limpopo operated Estates. Nevertheless, TILCOR pursued an apartheid-type of development policy, which was largely designed to curb the massively threatening rural-urban drift. The Bantu Investment Corporation of South Africa Limited was designed to achieve similar objectives in what were disparagingly termed Bantu areas. The Senate and the House of Assembly of the Union of South Africa enacted the BIC Act in 1959. In general, the object of this Corporation was to promote and encourage industrial and other undertakings and to act as a development, financial and investment institution among “Bantu persons” in the “Bantu areas,” and to provide for other incidental matters. Its more specific field of operation was confined exclusively to promoting and encouraging the economic development of Bantu persons and Bantu undertakings in the “Bantu areas”. This included:

(a) the provision of capital or means, technical and other assistance, the furnishing of expert and specialised advice, information and guidance;
(b) the encouragement and extension of existing industrial, financial and other undertakings;
(c) the encouragement and establishment of new industrial, financial and other undertakings;
(d) the encouragement of thrift;
(e) the planning and promotion of capital accumulation;
(f) the promotion of self-help in the economic sphere; and
(g) the undertaking of such further tasks as the Governor-General may determine and define by proclamation in the Gazette.

541 Pazvakavambwa, Personal Interview, 2nd April 1997.
542 M. G. Paraiwa, Personal Interview, Harare, 5th November 1996.
543 Pazvikavambwa, Personal Interview, 2nd April 1997. N.B. TILCOR’s effort in agriculture generally followed and complemented the efforts of the Internal Affairs Agricultural Officers. For more detail on this see NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280745, Location R19.10.5.3F, File: DEV/1 Planning Policy, “TILCOR’s Policy with Regard to Agriculture in the Tribal Trust Lands,” Brief Notes on a Meeting Held Between TILCOR and ADA Staff in the TILCOR Board Room on the 23rd November 1971 at 8.30 AM, 2.
544 NASA (UA), “Bantu person” referred to a “native” (African) as defined in section one of the Population Registration Act, 1950 (Act No. 30 of 1950), and included a “Bantu” company, a “Bantu” corporate body, a “Bantu” association and a “Bantu” partnership.
545 NASA (UA), “Bantu areas” referred to (a) the areas described in the Native Trust and Land Act, 1936 (Act No. 18 of 1936), as scheduled or released “native” areas; and (b) the land and areas referred to in section four of the South-West Africa Native Affairs Administration Act, 1954 (Act No. 56 of 1954). N.B. South-West Africa is now the modern state of Namibia.
Just like the BIC, TILCOR had a mandate to operate in the rural areas and ensure that the African population was content and would not flood the towns in search of employment. This was part and parcel of the South African Government’s policy of separate development, which was a key racial segregationist feature of the Apartheid era.

The conversion, in 1974, of Gowe into an outgrowers scheme was a deliberate effort to retain a reliable pool of labour for the Sanyati Main Estate. In fact, on the whole, outgrowers were created to stop the movement of labour to the towns and cities, which in turn would help maintain a labour reservoir for TILCOR/ARDA schemes.  

Scrutinised further, it can be seen that after 1974 the Gowe Settler Irrigation Scheme was intended to serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, the Gowe plotholders were required to provide labour to the Core Estate on a tenancy basis, whereas on the other, the scheme was meant to be a source of revenue (income generation) for the tenants who received technical assistance from the Main Estate. This symbiotic and often exploitative relationship between Gowe and the Sanyati Core Estate continued to flourish up to 2000. The details of this relationship will be examined later in this study.

**THE DEVAG Era (1976-1981):**

Agricultural extension work has an important and long history in Zimbabwe. A point that has been demonstrated in Chapter two is that, among African farmers, the Rhodesian government’s tradition of extension entailed using this service to enforce government rules and teach general management skills. Since the 1960s up to independence, there was increased use of extension services for the management of irrigation and grazing schemes, for land-use planning in resettlement and communal areas and for the enforcement of conservation rules. Historically, extension efforts for Africans began in 1926, with the appointment of an American former missionary, E. D. Alvord, to constitute the Department of Native Agriculture in the then Ministry of Native Affairs. The focus of early extension efforts was on crop separation, crop rotation, and manure use, through demonstration plots and the training of master farmers. However, these technologies were of limited value. As long as the African and European services remained separate the sharing of agricultural knowledge was not feasible.

Despite considerable extension efforts, at his retirement in 1946, Alvord made an illuminating admission of failure when he remarked that he had found no positive trend in yields either on demonstration plots or on farmer fields. In fact, as already noted in the previous chapter, in the 1950s and 1960s, relations between African farmers and

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547 Pazvakavambwa, Personal Interview, 2nd April 1997.
548 Ibid.
government extension agents were decisively soured by the implementation of the NLHA. The Act imposed harsh restrictions on farmers, aiming “to provide for the control of the utilization and allocation of land occupied by natives to ensure its efficient use for agricultural purposes” and “to require natives to perform labour for conserving natural resources and for promoting good husbandry.” 551 That is why the Act’s major provisions, namely freehold tenure, compulsory destocking and forced labour on soil conservation projects, were extremely unpopular, totally unsuccessful and eventually abandoned in 1961. It was the abandonment of the NLHA and the transfer of extension efforts from the Ministry of Native Affairs to the Ministry of Agriculture, which helped to restore some degree of professionalism to the extension service.

From a technical point of view, TILCOR’s efforts at Gowe were complemented by the Department of Agricultural Development (DEVAG). DEVAG’s activities at Gowe started in 1976. Prior to July 1 1978, the Ministry of Internal Affairs handled rural agricultural matters. From that date onwards, these matters were moved to the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development and renamed the Department of Agricultural Development. 552 DEVAG, whose head office was in Salisbury, had eight provincial offices and 53 district offices. Of its 1 600 staff, about 1 450 were professionally or technically trained. 553 The extension teams at head office and in the provinces could call on specialists in planning, conservation, training, agronomy, irrigation, livestock and pastures. The main objectives of DEVAG were to carry out the policies of government in relation to the agricultural development of the “TTLs”; to promote the development of the people in the “TTLs” through the medium of agricultural extension; and to examine, plan and implement agriculturally based rural development. 554 Through these objectives it was hoped to raise per capita incomes and hence the standard of living and the quality of life of “TTL” inhabitants. It was also hoped that gradually “TTL” farmers would be brought into the cash economy, thereby contributing to the national economy. However, the contemporary wisdom that African farmers were no cash croppers has already been refuted. The wise use and conservation of natural resources was encouraged by DEVAG in the hope that agricultural production on a sustained basis would be raised. The major outcomes expected of this policy were that first it should provide sufficient food for the local population and secondly contribute to national production, particularly of exportable crops. The Gowe Pools Settlement Scheme, which was initiated by the DC Gatooma on behalf of the then Ministry of Internal Affairs, was operated and controlled by this Ministry in conjunction with DEVAG. 555 In the words of M. G. Paraiwa

Originally the scheme was managed by the former Ministry of Internal Affairs through the Gatooma District Commissioner, who continued to

551 Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 59.
554 Ibid.
555 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5:3R, File: P23/2C/GENERAL (Sanyati), E. F. Hanratty (Urban Controller) to S. G. Heilbrown (Water Apportionment Board, Ministry of Works, Power and Communications, Mbabani, Swaziland), s.a., 1. N.B. DEVAG was responsible for communal area extension.
administer it for the Ministry of Home Affairs, the successor to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, up to the end of June 1980. 556

However, he maintains “The day-to-day management of the scheme officially remained in the hands of DEVAG until the end of August, 1980, when this was transferred to TILCOR/Sanyati.” 557

During DEVAG’s tenure of office, the Gowe peasant farmers were trained and provided with extension advice. 558 The promotion of conservation awareness was accorded serious priority. This can be seen in the appointment, in 1976, of a Settlement Officer or a Settler Extension Manager, and Extension Assistants, who helped the farmers with information, inter-alia, on contouring, how to plough, what appropriate crops to grow, their rotation and what amount and type of fertiliser to apply. 559 In general, these Extension Assistants (sometimes referred to as Settlement Assistants) were site or plot supervisors who performed a liaison function between the tenants as a group and the Agricultural Department. The settlement officers imparted knowledge that enabled some plotholders to significantly raise their agricultural output. DEVAG continued to play this role as well as promoting the Master Farm scheme and good yields before the control of Gowe was handed over to TILCOR/Sanyati. Real transfer of control from DEVAG to Sanyati took place in September 1980, but on a managing agency basis, as TILCOR’s report and revenue and capital budgets for operating the scheme was still in the process of being considered by the Ministries concerned, and no final approval had been obtained yet. 560

The decision made in 1980 by the then Secretary for Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development to transfer the administration of Gowe from DEVAG to TILCOR was based on the consideration that TILCOR was already on the ground in the close vicinity of the scheme and so was better suited to providing services to the scheme than DEVAG. 561 Indeed, because Gowe was adjacent to an existing TILCOR project at Sanyati, it was logical that it be administered from this Estate. These developments coincided with the merger in October 1981 of the two pre-independence agricultural extension organisations - CONEX, which had operated only in the commercial farming areas, and DEVAG, responsible for communal area extension - to form a unified agency, the Department of Agricultural, Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX), which has been renamed the Department of Agricultural Research and Extension (AREX) since 2003. 562 This seemed to mark a break in relationship between Gowe and DEVAG. Up to

557 Ibid., 3-4.
558 Ibid., 4.
560 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280742, Location R19.10.5.3R, File: P23/2C/Gowe (Sanyati), B. M. Visser, TILCOR Regional Manager (Mashonaland) to the Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development (Harare), 26th February, 1981, 1.
561 Ibid.
2000, the new agency, AGRITEX (now AREX), which falls under the Ministry of Agriculture, was providing very little or no extension service at all to the Gowe Irrigation Scheme.

It can be noted that both TILCOR and DEVAG had a mission to accomplish at Gowe. Overall, they were, among other things, mandated to promote rural development. In a related development the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Ian Douglas Smith, stressed:

> It is our [RF Government] wish and our intention that we go on developing this country. We realize that it is very important that the country must be developed. We must stimulate the economy and help it to expand in order to take account of the continually increasing population. We must continue to try to maintain the peaceful conditions and the harmonious race relations which we have in Rhodesia and I believe that in these two regards we are an example to the rest of the world. We will try to maintain this. 563

Nevertheless, viewed against the general background that the whites were mainly engrossed in strengthening and consolidating their economic and political grip on the country, the claim by Smith during parliament in 1968 and 1969 that his government was using these agencies to pursue altruistic motives in relation to the general welfare of rural Africans in colonial Zimbabwe is highly deceptive. 564 The Africans were not the major beneficiaries of such colonial policies.

**OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF GOWE (1970-1979)**

**High priority for Gowe:**

Despite the hardships of the late 1960s, the 1970s were viewed as successful years. It is possible that the state was employing new rhetoric to pre-empt the escalating liberation struggle. In 1970, members of parliament, after noticing the success of many smallholder schemes, started to urge the Government to pursue with vigour and on a wider front, the establishment of irrigation schemes for the inhabitants of the poor rainfall areas. 565 Gowe, in particular, was regarded as having huge potential and had to be given high priority for 1970. 566 The scheme deserved priority because it was perceived to be producing excellent results. For example, at Gowe the net profits varied among plotholders from $119 to $493 depending on labour input. 567 The commonest form of labour was household based.

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566 NAZ (RC), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Box 153673, Location C36.18.2F, File: AGR/16/A/15 Vol. 1, Gowe Irrigation Scheme (August 1965 - December 1969).
However, a small group of well-to-do plotholders used the traditional voluntary work group (humwe) if they could not do all the work with the labour of their family. This group often preferred to work the land of rich plotholding irrigation entrepreneurs because they provided ample food and drink to the workers. The income from green maize was $10 per bag. Maize yields varied between 16½ and 45½ bags per acre, wheat between 15 and 21½ and cotton between 1 094 and 3 167 lbs. These were the three major crops grown at the scheme, as it was almost impractical to practise a 4-crop rotation.

These results encouraged the white settler government to hold Gowe up as a “self-provisioning asset” in the drought-stricken area of Sanyati. As already noted, the initial irrigation surveys were concentrated in the low rainfall areas of the country, which was in keeping with the Government’s declared policy. In discussions leading up to the promulgation of the Agricultural Development Authority Act of July 1971, the government considered it necessary to have an agency or corporation to plan, organise, coordinate and implement agricultural development projects in the national interest. In spite of this official pronouncement, in Gowe the plotholders still received a raw deal. By 1972, they hardly afforded their own agricultural machinery. They continued to hire ADF ploughs and sometimes they got these on loan from Modern Farm Equipment Gatooma. The plotholders paid the usual land preparation fee of $15.00. Such charges reduced the plotholders’ potential net income and, hence, Gowe could hardly be a “self-provisioning” scheme. A few better off small-scale irrigators, however, did not struggle to meet their own production costs.

In fact, the cost of production on each plot was quite heavy. The table below illustrates how high the cost of wheat production per plot was in 1973.


569 The Agricultural Development Authority (ADA) is now the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA).
Table 3.2: COST OF PRODUCTION – WHEAT (1973)

COST OF PRODUCTION (WHEAT - 1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPENDITURE</th>
<th>$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Soil Preparation</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fertilisers “D” and “AN”</td>
<td>22.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tokwe Seed</td>
<td>13.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Combining</td>
<td>11.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport of fertilisers</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Transport of wheat at 50c per bag</td>
<td>16.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 33 sacks at 31c each</td>
<td>10.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Water Rates</td>
<td>21.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>114.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECEIPTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average yield 33 bags at $6.40 each</td>
<td>$211.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less cost of production</td>
<td>$114.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated profit per plot</td>
<td>$ 97.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Agricultural Officer, A. R. Harvey, contended that in 1973 the Gowe plotholders produced a total of 1,198 bags of wheat from 63 acres. In this year, the average yield per acre of 19 bags was regarded by the Agricultural Officer as “the best ever achieved at Gowe.” However, the so-called wonderful yields were not matched by the net profits that accrued to the farmers, which were estimated at $97,07 per plot. The relatively huge cost of production siphoned off and limited, to a large extent, the plotholders’ potential profit margin. Some of the plotholders’ accumulation prospects were seriously hampered by circumstances beyond their control.

The plight of the farmers was worsened since 1972 when the policy of giving loans for seed and fertiliser to “all and sundry” was drastically curtailed. In response to what the Secretary for Internal Affairs felt were unsatisfactory yields for the 1971/72 season (no figures have been quoted) as a result of the alleged poor standard of some farmers occupying the irrigation plots, it was declared that each farmer at Gowe was “now expected to pay for his requirements.” Very strong sentiments were also expressed that the Department of Internal Affairs needed to be more selective in future and to thoroughly

573 Ibid.
574 Ibid.
576 Ibid.
assess the farmers’ ability before they were given full-sized plots to cultivate. The Secretary went further to justify his decision against giving loans to these farmers (especially those who were not delivering) when he asserted: “It is apparent that the farmer who has invested his own money in a crop achieves a much higher standard than one who has obtained a loan to purchase his seed and fertiliser requirements.”

Whilst there could be some measure of truth in this assertion, the Secretary for Internal Affairs seems to have overlooked the debilitating effects of the severe drought experienced in the 1972/73 season on the farmers’ performance. Equally ignored was the fact that the establishment of an irrigation holding called for a high level of capital investment by the settlers which was beyond the capacity of most of them. This, coupled with the curtailment of loans for seed and fertiliser, led many of the farmers to leave the Gowe Irrigation Scheme. Obviously, the farmers found themselves in an unenviable position as they were hardly allowed to participate and take a share in the national cake. A point worth noting is that a lot of emphasis was placed on smallholder irrigation as a means of promoting socio-economic development in arid areas. Although output increased in certain cases, it can be argued that this was achieved at the expense of economic efficiency and organisational sustainability. The main reason for this partial success can be attributed to deliberate over-emphasis on centralised, bureaucratic planning and management of schemes, with insufficient attention being paid to the participation of farmers and other stakeholders. It would appear, then, that what were termed “national interests” were, in fact, white settler interests.

In this instance, instead of bringing considerable benefit to the inhabitants of Gowe, settler agricultural policies, therefore, impacted negatively on the economy of this area as a whole. The situation was not ameliorated either by the tense security position as a result of the liberation struggle and the 1972/73 drought. The struggle intensified markedly between 1972 and 1979. During the war Ian Smith tried to appease Africans who had been disgruntled by being forcibly moved to infertile pieces of land by both the NLHA and the Land Tenure Act by setting up more irrigation projects in their areas. It was against this backdrop that TILCOR Sanyati Estate was established by the government in March 1974.

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579 Whilst community participation is crucial for achieving sustainable development, it will not occur unless a conscious effort is made to ensure that the intended beneficiaries are empowered to make their own decisions and are allowed to take risks. N. B. The intended beneficiaries will not always be willing to make their own decisions and take risks unless there are benefits and opportunities to be had. Potential net benefits and opportunities must be demonstrated, where possible, by the development agents concerned or the government. More detail on the merits and demerits of community participation in development and on irrigation as an instrument of sustainable development in developing areas can be obtained from J. A. Thomas and W. J. Stilwell (eds.), Proceedings of the International Workshop on Smallholder Irrigation: Community Participation and Sustainable Development 27-29 April 1993, (Bergendal Camp, Kruger National Park, South Africa: the Water Research Commission/WRC, the Development Bank of Southern Africa/DBSA and the South African Sugar Association/SASA, October 1994), 1-89.
The Sanyati scheme was followed by the creation of several other rural ventures including a few urban ones such as the Seki (Seke) Industrial Projects in Chitungwiza. These developments did not, however, either stop the war or completely halt the process of differentiation but they definitely slowed it down. The Sanyati scheme continued to operate in an economy that was now under siege from two stand points of national magnitude, namely sanctions and the war. A number of factors made the Government to decide to create the Main Estate in spite of the war. The background reasons for this can be seen in the process that culminated in the formation of the Agricultural Development Authority (ADA), which later incorporated the rural aspect to become the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA).

EMERGENCE OF ESTATE AGRICULTURE

Formation of ARDA – functions, powers and organisation:

Parliamentary Debates:

By 1965 when the government declared UDI, agriculture had already become the engine of economic development in Southern Rhodesia. As far as the state was concerned, what was lacking at the time was a coherent and vibrant agricultural organisation which was all embracing and which had a national outlook. It is true that the Sabi-Limpopo Authority/SLA (1965), CONEX and TILCOR (1967) were already on the ground, but in terms of policy formulation an Agricultural Development Corporation or Authority (ADC/ADA) with clear principles and functions was missing.

Contributing to debate in parliament, H. R. Hack, the Chief Planning Officer of the SLA, emphasised the importance of understanding “principles and where we stand at the moment, because if you don’t understand where we stand at the moment, obviously our direction is going to be warped.” 582 He developed his argument by raising three pertinent points. The first one was that “agriculture provides the principal source of livelihood, directly and indirectly, for more than three-quarters of the country’s population [and] if you’re talking about an Agricultural Development Corporation, you’ve got to start right there.” 583 Secondly, he conceded that, “Agriculture’s place in the internal economy is its importance in the export trade and as an earner of foreign exchange.” Hack stated the third point by saying: “… in Rhodesia, the number of European farmers is tending to remain static or declining slightly,” adding that, “In the Phillips Report – and several other reports that have been written on agriculture – it is stated emphatically that agriculture will continue to be our main industry for a considerable time to come by virtue of the resources of land, water and labour which we have…” Thus, great emphasis had to be put on developing this industry on which the success of the economy rested. Hence, “agriculture is the line that this country [Rhodesia] has got to promote if we’re going to get anywhere in the world.” Putting it in a nutshell, Hack observed that, in order to develop agriculture, the sector needed three basic elements, namely, “capital, water

582 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 1.
583 Ibid.
and markets.” How to achieve these three seemed to be the only sticky point in a country where “…the human skills, the research and the land [were] all available in quantity.”

For Hack, capital or finance could only be secured by producing well-documented land development project plans for presentation to outside investors. He argued that, in order “to draw capital in any shape or form [from Europe and the Americas]” project plans were crucial. As far as water is concerned, he believed Rhodesia was well endowed with this resource. However, the big question was “… where and how to harness these [water] resources to best advantage, and having harnessed them, how best to utilize them?” Continuing his argument, he insisted that, “… water harnessed now will double, treble and quadruple in value over the next twenty-five years.” Hence, any commodity that had the capacity to do that was a “sound investment by anybody’s standards.” Citing the example of South Africa to emphasise the value of investing in water, Hack stated that, within a period of three years, water which was conserved for agricultural development at £1 an acre foot in 1971, was being sold to Johannesburg (or brought out of agriculture to Johannesburg) at £30 an acre foot by 1974.

The Chief Planning Officer perceived labour as an essential component which hardly needed elaboration when he said: “I think labour is our biggest single resource, and if not utilized will become an embarrassment and possibly a very costly embarrassment.” On the other hand, he believed that securing markets was also crucial. In his opinion “markets are normally only secured where a quality product is available in volume [at the right price],” and this, he felt, “can only be done in agriculture, and agriculture … is the only thing we’ve got to play with in Rhodesia – industry is way behind.”

By making these submissions, Hack was trying to underscore the point that Southern Rhodesia needed an umbrella organisation that was capable of taking advantage of the availability of capital, labour, markets and water to foster agricultural development. It can be admitted that, although several institutions such as the Rhodesia National Farmers Union (RNFU), the Ministry of Agriculture, Lands Department, the Natural Resources Board, Research and Water Development existed, they were primarily service or administrative departments serving existing structures but not creating an organisation befitting the ADA bill which was being outlined in Parliament.

As the bill went through its various stages, legislators were at variance as to whether an ADA was necessary or not. Some of the questions that pre-occupied them included: 1. Who wants an ADA? 2. Why do we want an ADA? 3. Whose idea is it (who mooted the idea)? 4. What is an ADA going to do? 5. What are its terms of reference? 6. What is it going to fill – are you sure it is not filled already and isn’t it going to overlap something?

584 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 1-2.
585 Ibid. 2.
586 Ibid. 2-3.
587 Ibid. 4.
588 Ibid.
589 Ibid.
Responding to all these questions A. Griffith from the Ministry of Agriculture said: “The present delineation of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority’s area is an arbitrary one … one which does not even include whole river catchments … This arbitrary delineation should be removed and the Sabi-Limpopo Authority should operate over the whole of the country …” In essence, the Ministry of Agriculture were trying to demonstrate their unflinching support for an all-encompassing agricultural organisation. In their opinion, the concept of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority was not wide enough because what applied in the south-eastern Lowveld (where the SLA was situated) – i.e. the need for development – applied equally throughout the country. There was no greater need for development in the south-eastern Lowveld than there was anywhere else. In addition, it can be noted that sound exploitation of natural resources had to be the keynote of development throughout the country and not only in one sector of it. It is a fact that the SLA (the precursor to ARDA) obtained an annual grant of £3 million when other projects such as the Matabeleland Development Corporation and the Insiza Scheme in Bulawayo also required huge outlays of funds. Thus, it was felt that if the Sabi-Limpopo Authority were allowed to continue operating in the confined area of the south-eastern part of the country, there was a danger that there would be a concentration of funds in that area, to the detriment of the highveld and the country as a whole.

In fact, the position of the Ministry of Agriculture was that, instead of inundating them with funds, it would be more beneficial if the Sabi-Limpopo Authority, in the role of an ADA, prepared well-documented project reports or plans over the entire country for submission to interested investors. Since sound and comprehensive planning was essential to interest investors, Government, therefore, needed “an agency or corporation to plan and implement projects to the point where private enterprise can be attracted.” According to Hack who had been sent by CONEX to the United States (US) to do a specialised course on farm planning and land utilisation,

If we set up an ADA, hit the single weakest point in agriculture – assuming agriculture is our biggest resource – what is the single weakest point in agriculture – water – and do it exactly within the frame of our Act. Hit the water, harness the water for a purpose, project the purpose, finance it with sufficient capital. [That is the trick].

Although the Ministry of Agriculture favoured the creation of ARDA, general sentiment against it was also expressed. Referring to what he termed “latest revenue estimates,” E. R. Fothergill, a top executive of the SLA, pointed out that, the Agricultural Revenue Vote (i.e. a grant vote which was not recoverable) was £12 435 000. The Loan Vote,

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590 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 4. N.B. The SLA initially was used to develop the Middle Sabi area in the south-eastern lowveld. It had jurisdiction over the Sabi and Limpopo Valleys only.
591 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 6.
592 Ibid., 6-7.
593 Fothergill was the Secretary of the SLA before his resignation in 1969. See “Herald Insert,” The Rhodesia Herald, Salisbury: Thursday September 10 1970, 1.
which was recoverable, was £13 764 000 – making a total of between £26 million and £26.4 million.\textsuperscript{594} Continuing his argument he noted that, the Ministry of Agriculture had an organisation which could do the functions of the ADA, that is, the Conservation and Extension Section (CONEX). Their revenue vote was £1.6 million. They had a staff of 2179, of which 325 were European, mainly involved in field and research activities. They were also advisory to the Minister and “in their special resources,” they did not do planning and implementation. They did planning to a certain extent and they advised on it. However, of concern to Fothergill was why, “with all this high expenditure going on in Agriculture,” CONEX could not do planning and implementation and the harnessing of water on all the highveld projects.\textsuperscript{595} In addition, he warned: “If an ADA is being formed, let’s face facts, there will be another huge organization built up [after the SLA], and this is the fear of both Treasury officials and of many Senior Agricultural Officials, and there will be a vast duplication of services.”\textsuperscript{596}

In one of the most ferocious attacks on the idea of forming an ADA, Fothergill observed that “… What Agriculture is heading for is three authorities,” namely, a Marketing Authority (the AMA), the Development Authority (ADA), and a Research and Specialist Authority or the Department of Research and Specialist Services.\textsuperscript{597} This, in his opinion, was not a palatable situation, as it was feared that these organisations would end up trampling on each other’s toes. Questioning the rationale for setting up such an Authority he asked and promptly answered himself when he said that, if these three Authorities were set up, Treasury would, once more, spend an enormous amount of money, as it was already financing a vast organisation (CONEX). He proceeded to say, “I was in Treasury when [CONEX] was built and we were horrified at the rate of its growth and what it was doing.” Fothergill further lamented why such a huge organisation “with over 2 000 staff – mainly African, of course,” could not be re-organised under the control of Government to do the job? He insisted that, if this was not possible it would, therefore, be necessary to “fold it up and have an ADA then.”\textsuperscript{598} This was, however, clear demonstration of his lack of support for an ADA, which he equated to “another empire” which would deplete state coffers. In his words, the formation of the new Authority was horrifying because “… it’s going to be millions again – it’s not just going to be thousands of pounds or hundreds of thousands, it’s going to be a colossal sum of money.”\textsuperscript{599}

His criticism of the new organisation did not end there. On learning that ADA would incorporate into its stride the Agricultural and Land Settlement Board, the Agricultural Assistance Board (AAB) and the Rural Land Board, Fothergill became even more vicious in his attack against it. He felt that the Authority had an onerous task to finance the activities of such a broad institution. Taken individually, all were under-performing. The AAB, for instance, was struggling to meet its cost of administration which, up to 1971, amounted to £85 000 annually. In addition, it had “a million pound loan vote for lending

\textsuperscript{594} NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 7.
\textsuperscript{595} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{596} Ibid. , 7-8.
\textsuperscript{597} Ibid. , 8.
\textsuperscript{598} Ibid. , 8-9.
\textsuperscript{599} Ibid.
money out,” but it was facing extreme difficulty in recovering the money from farmers. The costs of running the other two Boards were equally mammoth. After all, agriculture’s function of developing the lowveld, as set out in the SLA Act, had not yet been accomplished, because, by 1971, it was still “virgin ground” which required about twenty five years to put its development plan into effect. Hence, according to Fothergill, “… it’s a full-time job for a handful of specialized people over here.” At the same time, taking over all the three organisations - land settlement, the AAB, the Rural Land Board – was indeed very cumbersome and over-ambitious. For him, thus, “The minute you build an empire, your specialist work goes down the drain,” and this prompted him to categorically announce that, “I’m afraid I’m not a supporter of this ADA.” Furthermore, threatening to resign if ADA was formed, he insisted:

It’s with feeling that I speak on the subject, because I think that we haven’t fulfilled our own function – and our own function is the Sabi-Limpopo Act – it’s a big Act and it’s a big job and it’s a great challenge. If this Board [is] going to go into an ADA, then I’m afraid I lose respect for it, and I would go too.

A more mellow view was presented by the former secretary and chief economist of the SLA, W. D. Mills. In his submission, he advocated for the identification of the difficulties facing agricultural organisations, and in his view, the difficulty confronting the Minister of Agriculture and Government in deciding whether or not to go for this sort of organisation (ADA), was posed by figures like the following:

The Agricultural Assistance Board, including the Grain Committee, has got £2 million invested in a rescue operation. The Farm Irrigation Fund has got £1,7 million invested, again in something of a higher grade than a rescue operation, but nevertheless it is trying to assist Agriculture. There’s £13,5 million outstanding in Land Bank loans, of which £6,2 million is short term, and £11,3 [million] long term. There’s £3,6 million outstanding to the SLA on long term. This is £21 million invested.

These figures reveal that this was no mean expenditure by Government. Such spending, coupled by an unspecified “once in forty year loan” disbursed in 1965, in addition to an announcement in 1968 and 1970 that Government had paid out nearly £3,5 million in drought relief, is indicative of the problem when it is measured against the fact that

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600 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 9.
601 Ibid.
603 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 10-11.
604 Ibid.
drought had hit incomes and necessitated direct grants and subsidies. It also revealed that agriculture was not doing well.

As far as Mills was concerned, the question to be asked was: Was it possible to devise any statutory instrument, any sort of a tool at all, which could remedy this situation – which could have State control take an interest, a financial interest, and possibly write off dead capital, reconstruct the financial structures of farms, put these people back into a position where they could again hold their heads up and start making profits? He appreciated the fact that the AAB, in an effort to alleviate these difficulties, had “found that in many cases all you need to do is lend the man a plough or tractor for deep ploughing and early land preparation, and the next year his head’s up high and his tail’s up.” This would obviously empower the farmers whilst at the same time lessening the burden on the part of government as far as the disbursement of grants and subsidies was concerned.

While suggestions were made to extend, expand or dissolve the SLA and amalgamate it into this new organisation (ADA), it should not be forgotten, firstly, that the former was set up for a specific, identifiable and limited regional development project, including all the infrastructure. A new organisation (ADA) in some instances had to have these powers, but it would be less limited, less identifiable and a good deal less specific than to build dams, sell the water and get farming estates developed. Secondly, it must be remembered that the country’s resources were not unlimited. Such limited resources did not allow money to be put into all the worthwhile projects, hence the emphasis was to concentrate investment resources on a selected number of new growth points until these growth points reached a big enough scale for self-generating growth.

According to Mills it was not wise

To dissipate investment resources in penny packets all over the place …

The Land Bank, in the view of the AAB, has got a lot of farmers into trouble – gentlemen, you won’t repeat that, please – because every year it has merely given him another short term loan, or a little bit of a longer term loan, and it has just put the skids under this chap, instead of taking hold of him and his financial structure and saying, we are going to reconstruct you financially, we are going to write off that dead capital – we are going to give you this – we are going to set you up in a proper way. After all … many Rhodesian farmers have been set up and are comfortable to-day because of that. Two or three farmers have gone bust. Well, what is the sense of making the present farmers go bust – just write off his dead capital … and in the end you have got somebody with less rope around his neck.

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605 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 11.
606 Ibid.
607 Ibid.
608 Ibid., 11-12.
Denouncing further the idea of an ADA, he said “This Agricultural Development Authority might be much more wide open to political influence than the SLA [which had a specific regional project].” This implied that influences aimed at “parceling out what the Americans call ‘pork barrel’” ⁶⁰⁹ were not tolerated. One of the major criticisms of the SLA was that the Authority’s dynamism was causing a disproportionate share of resources to go to the lowveld. However, Mills did not share this sentiment when he unequivocally stated:

If I were in a position where I was formulating a policy as to how I was going to handle this agricultural problem with all these constraints, … I would have something with the SLA’s dynamism operating right through the country – something which is geared specifically to a project, an organization which knows what it is doing, which has got the powers to do it. ⁶¹⁰

Some of the major functions and duties of the SLA were to exploit, conserve and utilise the water resources with the object of promoting, facilitating and expediting the economic development of the lowveld in the national interest. It is true that water was one of the resources that needed to be manipulated in order to get the agricultural industry off the ground but it was felt that the new authority (ADA) should not confine itself solely to the utilisation of water. One of the criticisms directed at the SLA Act was that it was a little narrow in its approach because it started from the concept of water instead of starting with the concept of making a profitable agricultural industry. According to Mills,

It must aim to develop agriculture - dry land and irrigation - … it must not be tied specifically to water, because there are many instances of dry land farms in the country which, with a little bit of – perhaps a tractor here and dead capital written off there – can be put back on to a viable basis … it should not be concerned [just like the AAB] with agricultural debt adjustment, subsidies, drought relief or … crop and livestock research … it should move from a rescue operation – a staving off of creditors type of operation – to an operating department or a supervisory department. ⁶¹¹

He wanted to have a new organisation with very broad powers like TILCOR and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) – powers that entitled it to invest in anything that looked as if it was going to be profitable “to the end that the economic requirements of Rhodesia may be met.” This was an advocacy for a “bankable” organisation with all the assets it needed to carry out its work and which in time could build up sufficient trust

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⁶⁰⁹ In America this term originated between 1905 and 1910 as a government appropriation bill or policy that supplies funds for local improvements designed to ingratiate legislators with their constituencies. This definition can be gleaned from the website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/pork%20barrel

⁶¹⁰ NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 12.

⁶¹¹ Ibid., 13-14.
in Government. Such an organisation needed an asset backing which would allow it to go to any capital market (any source of capital) and raise what funds it required for its operations whether in the highveld or lowveld. Something a good deal less top heavy was preferable.\footnote{612}{NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 14-17.}

R. G. Pascoe, a representative of the RNFU, was in favour of an ADA that was run as a private enterprise. He was against handing it over to a Ministry or the Department of Agriculture. This would ensure that it would not be bogged down by Government or bureaucratic red tape.\footnote{613}{Ibid., 19.} The success of the new authority, therefore, hinged on avoiding to be unduly influenced by Government or political factors.

Contributing to debate in support of ADA Timothy ("Tim") Mitchell (a former president of the RNFU)\footnote{614}{Mitchell was president of the RNFU between 1963 and 1969. See “Former RNFU President Dies,” The Rhodesia Herald, Salisbury: Thursday, December 6 1979, 6.} said that, the Authority would fill in the void left by the Land Bank, the AAB and the Farm Irrigation Fund (FIF) loans, all of which, he denounced as having been “half-hearted sort of efforts to assist agriculture.” Without giving figures, he argued that, under their auspices money had been spent “in entirely the wrong way,” and that farmers had been given “too little to just get them going steadily downhill.”\footnote{615}{NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 20-21.} He continued by intimating that, CONEX\footnote{616}{CONEX’s responsibilities were mainly concentrated in the white commercial farming sector. See Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 59 and NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 19, 21 and 30.} (the brain child of Charles Murray) were not the right people either as they never had the authority. In his view, “CONEX were sitting with a vast amount of knowledge as to what certain areas required,” but “their knowledge went so far that it was never co-ordinated.” For him, the “CONEX system” should be discontinued as it entailed going on “giving out subsidies, drought relief” as well as ensuring that the inefficient AAB would be in “existence [until] eternity.” In light of this, he, thus, envisaged an authority of the nature of ADA “doing very much what [had] been done with the lowveld.” Mitchell went on to say: “I don’t envisage the AAB having to be taken over by this sort of authority, or the Land Bank, or the functions of subsidies at this stage. These are evils, which are with us because of wrong policy of the past.”\footnote{617}{NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 20-21.} By this, he meant, it was necessary to forget the failures of earlier agricultural organisations and that it was imperative to reformulate new agricultural policies and strategies. Hence, “Now, we must start somewhere to get the policy put right and the financial resources of the country used in the right way to get agriculture going. We talk about direction [because] there are areas in this country which are crying out, which are begging for this sort of support – Hartley, Gatooma.”\footnote{618}{Ibid.} On the one hand, he saw ADA as the only viable instrument through which new strategies would be implemented. On the other, he was
calling for a gradualist approach, which would see development spreading from one area of the country to the other. In his view, “if you’re going to start trying to do a whole lot at once, you are going to fall flat on your face.” 619

Thus, instead of availing millions of pounds to ineffectual organisations such as CONEX, this investment could be directed towards ADA. Mitchell must have convinced his colleagues in the colonial government when he summed up his contribution by saying: “Let’s stop giving [CONEX] all these millions … The Government must say straight you can’t go on supporting a great big organisation like this which is not fulfilling the very necessary function that agriculture requires.” 620 His chief message was that, agriculture should not be sacrificed at the expense of inefficiency. Hence, “We cannot go on letting agriculture steadily go down the drain ... with the right sort of people on an authority of this nature [ADA], who will not let themselves be side-tracked, who [will] work very much in the way [the SLA has] worked [in the lowveld] – I think this is going to start putting agriculture in a sound position.” 621 The steady erosion of the economy, through subsidies and drought relief, had to be stopped. In fact, subsidies and food handouts only provide temporary relief as over-reliance on them usually “land the [farmer] in bigger trouble than he ever was before.” 622

Speaking against an ADA, J. J. L. de Kock (MP for Rusape) 623 supported sentiments aired by Mills that an overall development authority for Southern Rhodesia was not ideal because the country would lose the specialisation it had achieved in certain regions. He believed specialisation brought about success in agriculture as revealed by the examples of the lowveld, which specialised in sugar and the Mazoe Valley, which prioritised citrus production. Hence, he suggested that Government should put forward regional authorities instead of putting up a top heavy overall authority. This would bring about competition between different authorities bidding for funds to Treasury and thereby preventing a move towards a system of socialist bureaucracy. In summarising his argument, de Kock insisted that,

We should have regional authorities who [sic] are in direct competition with each other bidding for funds … the final policy making will be made by Government and they will decide on what’s being put forward, and we’ll have a dynamic agricultural future if we could have this element of competition in the country bidding for funds and going flat out on it. 624

619 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a, 22.
620 Ibid.
621 Ibid.
622 Ibid.
Nicolle added his voice to the growing chorus of anti-ADA sentiments. Citing the example of Southern Rhodesia’s two main farming areas – the Mazoe Valley and Hartley-Gatooma – where year after year, more so in the Hartley-Gatooma area, he said:

The poor blokes get a drought. They put in their crop, everything in the garden’s green, and as soon as February comes the tap’s switched off and away they go. What happens? Government comes along and pumps more money in. And actually they’re doing more damage to that chap than if they could write off the whole outfit and let him start from scratch again – it would be cheaper in the long run. You’ve got £3½ million spent here on drought relief – you’re not helping this bloke, because all you’re doing is putting another rope around his neck the following year. 625

Making one of the most scathing attacks on the concept of an ADA, he delivered the following statement, which, ironically, can be used to reflect on ARDA’s performance and achievements since independence:

I’m not happy about the ADA as one big body. I think this would be wrong, it would be top heavy, and I don’t think [just like CONEX] it would ever get off the ground. It would be another organisation of which the overheads would be so terrific that I don’t think it would ever be a success. I think it would be the wrong approach to get all these bodies co-ordinated into one big body. I think it would be much better to have each – to have one going ahead and the rest following behind. 626

The validity or invalidity of this statement will be scrutinised more closely when the performance of ARDA 627 (whose activities were governed by Government policy and by the availability of funds) after independence is compared with that of the pre-independence period.

In the first chairman of the SLA, Herbert Jack Quinton’s opinion, it was imperative to examine what was wrong with agriculture. Observing that, “the keynote to the whole of our agricultural future is obviously water,” he felt that most of the predicament of this industry had been created basically by “a lack of or an uncertain rainfall over the last five years.” 628

The encroachment of drought onto northern Mashonaland, which was always

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626 Ibid., 26-27.
627 The Authority was constituted on July 1 1971 as the Agricultural Development Authority (ADA). However, in 1978 it was decided that since the organisation’s operations focused more on rural development it should be called the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA). In 1983 the then Minister of Agriculture, David Karimanzira, removed the “R” denoting the rural aspect of the organization, but the Prime Minister, Mugabe, insisted the “R” should be reinstated. See Liberty Mhlanga, (Chairman of Land Settlement Board in the new Ministry of Lands and Land Resettlement), Personal Interview, Borrowdale, Harare, 24th December 2006. N.B. Mhlanga is the former General Manager (GM) of ARDA. He was GM from 1981 to 1997.
628 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 27 and 29.
regarded as a fairly safe rainfall area, prompted Quinton to conclude that the first thing that needed to be considered was not the issue of markets but, how to subsidise this rainfall. Thus, he stated “I would rather see Government giving support prices to holding produce to place in markets, than pouring money willy nilly in to try and bolster up an agricultural industry that is tottering from another point of view – not from the point of view of markets [but water].” 629 Lending support to his colleague Mitchell had this to say:

There was no tobacco market at one time. This country produced tobacco and pilled into the market [and later sold it to the Americans, Canadians etc]. So I don’t think unduly worry [sic] about not being able to get the markets when we produce our stuff. We have an advantage over many people, in spite of our geographic situation. 630

Using Matabeleland to emphasise the point that water and not markets was the one that had created the “down draught” (the problem agriculture was facing) and that the construction of dams and weirs was the answer to this problem Quinton proceeded to present the following challenge: “If one goes into Matabeleland and examines carefully the grazing facilities there, especially in the south-eastern corner, less than 40% of the grazing is being used. Why is it only being used? Because there is no water [and] every single time it comes back to water, water, water,” 631 He pointed out that, Rhodesia was blessed with water “even in the poorest of our rainfall,” adding that, “Under normal rainfall conditions, we get higher rainfall than the east of England, but we let it run away … our basic problem is to harness our water supplies which Water Development has done a lot of research on, but they haven’t got the machine to be able to harness it and to sell it.” Quinton decried the absence of proper project plans. In his own words, the Kyle-Bangala-Esquilingwe Weir in Masvingo “would never have been built if it hadn’t been for Hulett, who came with a utilisation plan for that water, and it was only by contractor-finance and Hulett’s making a certain amount of finance available that this dam was actually built.” 632 Clearly, waiting for an individual to come up with such initiative was “no way to develop a country.” The correct approach, he believed, was to have development plans of this nature done at country level “by Rhodesians for presentation to outside capital.” 633 For him, regional authorities were no option either because they were never dynamic enough or pushed enough to be able to get anywhere.

We’ve had a number of regional authorities in this country and [to no avail]. I think you’ve got to have one central body, if you’re going to do anything, that must be small in number [not top heavy], it must have a highly efficient staff, and it must go around and project plan. 634

630 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 34.
631 Ibid, 29.
632 Ibid.
The major regional authority at the time, the SLA, had its own limitations. Quinton himself conceded that, “it is too narrow to work entirely as Sabi-Limpopo. Sabi-Limpopo was [only] a guinea-pig.” 635 In his view, a more detailed, comprehensive and co-ordinated overall plan was important to launch agriculture on a sound footing. This would not be achieved by mobilising individual resources only because according to Quinton “This country was opened up by the cheek of the white man, the [zest] he obtained in agriculture and prices that were controlled for the local market to a very large extent,” adding that

Through the ages, we’ve enjoyed two or three booms in agriculture. We have got off the ground. But now we’re coming to the more mature stage of agriculture, where we are going to compete in the world in volume production at a very low margin of turnover [hence meticulous planning of production was essential]. 636

He was certain that the SLA was not the organisation that would raise agricultural production in a sufficiently impartial and nationally oriented way when he stated: “ … we’ve got to the stage now … [where] we’ve just got to produce, and I don’t see that the organisation [SLA] that we’ve got in being at the present moment will do it.” 637 At this point, the need for another machine that would proactively respond to the ever-changing demands of agriculture could not be over-emphasised. ADA seemed to be the answer.

In the early 1970s, however, no single bill ever raised as much controversy as the proposed ADA Bill. The wide-ranging debate that characterised this period is sufficient testimony to this. The Ministry of Agriculture was convinced that ADA would transform farming operations in the country. In an interview with the Financial Gazette, the Secretary for Agriculture, Adrian Griffiths, revealed that ADA would absorb the SLA during 1971 and called upon the SLA to get rid of some of its holding through the placing of settlers on 300-400 acres of irrigable land. During the interview, he stressed that the SLA was originally intended to be a development authority as opposed to a farming agency, which appeared to be beyond its capacity. He also admitted that it was UDI that had changed the direction of the SLA from a development authority to a farming agency, adding that, at the time of UDI, there were tremendous pressures for the saving and earning of foreign currency and, thus, pressure to go into wheat, cotton and groundnuts. 638

In confidential correspondence to the Secretary for Agriculture the Rhodesia National Farmers’ Union General Manager, J. R. Mellor, submitted comments made by the Union’s Planning Committee on the Third Draft of the ADA Bill, which largely bolstered the position already taken by the Ministry of Agriculture. For example, the Committee felt that it was essential for the ADA not to be constituted as merely another lateral agricultural

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635 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F: File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA’s Extract of Parliamentary Debates, s.a., 29.
636 Ibid., 31.
637 Ibid., 32.
organisation dealing with some aspect of agriculture in isolation but that it should be evolved as a superior authority responsible for overall agricultural control, co-ordination, planning and development with powers of implementation either by itself or agencies or through other organisations. Its activities had to be co-ordinated and its position consolidated so that its relationship to some existing organisations (AFC, SLA, Land Settlement, Water, Research and the AMA which operated in terms of separate legislation and appeared to be quite autonomous) could be used to establish various degrees of subordination of such bodies to it.

The RNFU was aware that the SLA was not subject to the provisions of the Bill, but the ADA Board, as constituted, would become the Board of the SLA. Whilst they appreciated that there might have been factors which precluded the incorporation of the SLA in the Bill, they insisted that,

the ultimate objective must be the full incorporation [notwithstanding the economic consequences of such action on ADA] of that organisation as soon as possible as there appears to be little if anything in the way of powers and functions to prevent this and its future operation as a subsidiary of ADA.

However, the Secretary of the Rhodesia Tobacco Authority (RTA), J. Morten, reacting to E. Woods from the Ministry of Agriculture’s position (during a meeting of the RNFU) that in the case of ADA it was undesirable to guarantee any sectional representation to any authority, be it the Tobacco Act or the Research Act said,

It was essential, in the interests of the successful functioning of the ADA, that there should be close contact and continuous liaison [provision for consultation] with the farming community [because] experience had proved that organisations dealing with agriculture tended, over a period of time, to become removed from the problems of the industry.

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640 The AFC (now the Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe, Agribank) was a parastatal body of the Ministry of Agriculture responsible for agricultural financing.


Despite the Ministry of Agriculture declining to bend over backwards to guarantee consultation with various organisations, the RNFU through their Secretary, C. W. Ball, demanded to be involved in deciding the composition of the new authority’s Board. For them “it was essential that organised agriculture be granted adequate representation on the Board of the ADA.” 643 For instance, they suggested that at least one-third of the Board should consist of nominees from organised agriculture. However, ADA had the prerogative to choose its own Board.

The four major drafts 644 of the ADA Bill gave the Authority enormous responsibilities. Because these responsibilities were broad and generated so much controversy, it is important to examine the most outstanding ones in detail. In the main, the Bill provided that ADA should identify, evaluate, plan, finance, develop and administer new agricultural development projects, e.g. irrigation schemes and new settlement areas. In short, the new organisation had to plan, co-ordinate and implement agricultural development including agricultural betterment schemes. It also had to improve the efficiency of the existing farming industry by means of longer term and structural improvements. These improvements, *inter alia*, entailed buying up and consolidating sub-economic farms; availing the necessary infrastructure; providing risk capital and management services; assisting co-operative ventures between farmers; facilitating research into optimum scales of production and farm management systems as well as the promotion of conservation works in co-operation with CONEX. Among its non-functions ADA would not be concerned with agricultural debt adjustment, agricultural credit assistance, subsidies, drought relief, crop or livestock research, and operating finance (except where it was investing in a new or amalgamated scheme solely or in partnership, or non-risk finance of a non-development character). 645 It should be noted that all schemes had to be evaluated on the basis required of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TTLDC or TILCOR). That is, any project or proposal dealt with by ADA had to be considered on its economic merits, irrespective of other considerations. It should further be noted that the Tribal Trust Lands and the SLA area were specifically excluded from the scope of these functions.


644 The first draft was discussed in Parliament on 27 April 1970, the second on 26 June 1970, the third on 27 October 1970 and the fourth and final draft was on 5 January 1971. See NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, ADA Bill, 1970/71.

To ensure that this set of functions was carried out ADA was bestowed with the appropriate powers, among other things, to raise loans on the capital market; to buy, own, lease and sell or expropriate land; to establish or operate irrigation, farming, ranching, forestry or settlement schemes and agricultural processing and marketing. The Authority was also empowered to establish, own, manage, or operate service companies; to act as the agent of Government in the construction of a new scheme or the reconstruction of an existing scheme and to have all the necessary administrative powers for the carrying out of the above functions and to exercise these powers. These powers, however, were not applicable to Tribal Trust Lands or the SLA area.

To complement these functions and powers ADA had to adopt levels of organisation which were commensurate with its broad mandate. Because the task entrusted to the Authority was a very responsible one this necessitated the appointment of a full-time Chairman and Managing Director, instead of a part-time Chairman. The day-to-day business of the organisation was to be controlled by the General Manager, subject to the policy directives of his Chairman/Managing Director and Board. The two main-line functionaries were the Business Manager (responsible for co-ordination, long-term planning, and priorities between competing projects) and the Operations Manager (responsible for supervising projects and for the day-to-day operation of the regional divisions). Other functionaries were basically service departments. For example, these included the Financial Executive (tasked with raising funds, advising on allocation and settling the manner of finance of any project) and the Engineer (in charge of designing and building dams or any other necessary structures, including housing and sheds, and for maintaining these). There was also provision for the Secretariat whose brief was confined to purely administrative matters, including legal questions, personnel and public relations.

In addition, Regional Divisions were to be set up, as it was felt desirable to have individuals responsible on the ground in certain areas as a PLO exercise and as an identification point for finding projects and making preliminary appraisals. Nevertheless, there were doubts as to the efficacy of this divisional set-up. It was desirable merely to


647 Ibid.

648 ADA had set up some Provincial Land Offices (PLOs) in some parts of the country. It had an officer or office in each province. For example, there was one PLO in Mutare and there were two such offices in Matabeleland, namely one for Matabeleland North with its head office in Bulawayo and another for Matabeleland South with its head office in Plumtree. The idea was part and parcel of the decentralisation exercise where ADA Estate Managers would report to the Provincial Land Officers in their respective areas and not directly to ADA Head Office in Harare. See Liberty Mhlanga, (Chairman, Land Settlement Board – Ministry of Lands and Land Resettlement, and former General Manager/GM of ARDA), Telephone Discussion with Nyandoro, 6 February 2007.
make persons in Head Office responsible for certain regions, and create ad hoc planning teams to write-up projects for the “Project Assessment Committee.” 649

Although this outline made by the Economics Branch of the SLA 650 sets out in commendable detail the functions, non-functions, powers and organisation of the Agricultural Development Authority, as well as making some far-reaching policy statements, it did not, however, at any stage, set out the reason (justification) for its existence or what its terms of reference were. It was largely superfluous primarily because it failed to grant other stakeholders (e.g. the RNFU, the Rhodesian Tobacco Association/RTA and the Associated Chambers of Commerce/ACCOR) sufficient representation on the new organisation’s Board. This seemed to give the Authority enormous powers to plan, coordinate and implement agricultural development projects without necessarily consulting other players in the industry. The mandate it was given to purchase or expropriate land meant for settlement schemes led to fears that the government intended to introduce “State Farming” as opposed to private farming. 651 One of its other weaknesses was perceiving the TTLs and the SLA as falling outside ADA’s functions and powers. This superfluity set the tone for the barrage of criticism of the Authority by numerous Rhodesia Front (RF) back-benchers.

The Agricultural Development Authority Bill and the powers it bestowed on the Authority caused a lot of consternation and indignation among RF members of parliament. Some of the Bill’s provisions, notably the powers given to the Authority, disturbed them and was a major reason for sharp clashes between RF back-benchers at one of the RF caucus meetings. It was generally anticipated that the Bill could cause a rift between the farming and urban business communities. On the one hand, representatives of organised commerce attacked the Bill, while on the other, RNFU leaders came out in favour of it. The Bill’s opponents asserted that the Authority was given unnecessary and dangerous powers in the Bill. They


650 The Economics Branch of the SLA was tasked with the responsibility of making an economic and financial evaluation of the viability of the ADA due to be set up. It also outlined the functions, powers and nature of organisation for the new Authority that was to be created by Act of Parliament. Prior to this, it was the planning organ of the SLA.

651 Whether under capitalism or socialism, a State farm is a farm in which ownership of the farm and its management rests solely with the State. It thus excludes co-operatives in that they tend to be a mixture of individual or communal ownership combined with State involvement. This definition of State farming has been provided by Malcolm Wallis, Executive Dean of the Faculty of Commerce, Durban Institute of Technology, Personal Interview, Westville, Durban, 26th July 2005. See also Rhodesia Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 78, First Session, Twelfth Parliament, 25th August to 16th September 1970; 2nd March to 6th April 1971, (Salisbury: The Government Printer, 1970-71, 1043.
believed that, if the Bill became law, it would amount to State farming. One RF back-bencher described the Bill as “a bad piece of legislation” which gave the Authority “astronomical powers.” It was a common feeling that some of the Bill’s provisions were based on completely new principles and that the effect was to make the Authority “a law unto itself.” Supporters of the Bill within the RF caucus obviously remembered the difficulties experienced in the early days of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority as a result of inadequate legislation. They envisaged that the Bill would cover many of the contingencies met in farming development and that the Bill’s provisions would obviate the need for additional legislation later.

Under the powers given in the Bill, it can be reiterated that the Authority could, with the approval of the Minister of Agriculture or appropriate Minister, build or acquire dams, reservoirs, canals, irrigation works and hydro-electric power stations. It could raise or borrow money by the issue of debentures or debenture stock. It could manage, establish irrigation schemes, farming schemes, farmer training schemes, agricultural research and preparation or the processing or marketing of agricultural produce or any other commodity as it could also acquire interest in companies, whether or not promoted by the Authority. Furthermore, the Authority could also sell water or electricity or both and for its employees it could buy, build or lease houses; give guaranteed loans for house buying or improvements. The loans would not exceed three months’ salary or wages. Its powers under farming operations included the setting up, acquisition and management of farm stores (e.g. Takwirira Trading Stores) and the building of farm roads.

For the RNFU, such a mandate was what agriculture needed for many years. Hence, they did not associate themselves with attacks made by commerce on the Bill to establish an ADA, nor did they share the fears of the Associated Chambers of Commerce (ACCOR) that the Authority would create and maintain State farming projects in competition with farmers. Commenting in Salisbury (now Harare) on a report that organised commerce, industry and agriculture were to hold meetings over the Government’s plans to create the Authority, the RNFU general manager, John Mellor, said no such meetings had been arranged, and there had been no consultation or agreement between organised agriculture and the other two sectors (commerce and industry) that could possibly justify such a claim. Reaffirming his unwavering support for the Bill, he unequivocally stated:

The RNFU played a major part in the emergence of the proposed Authority and it does not therefore associate itself with attacks made by commerce on the Bills … The Bill goes a long way towards creating the concept of an over-all agricultural planning authority that the RNFU has pressed for. It provides the vehicle for co-ordinated development and planning and the

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652 Many white commercial farmers were against state farming because they perceived it as a socialist principle that favoured state control of industry against private ownership.


654 Ibid.
determination of priorities – something which has been needed for a long time.  

Although organised agriculture was not entirely happy with certain aspects of the Bill, the RNFU regarded development schemes as an end to the ultimate aim of earliest possible individual settlement. According to Mellor, this, apparently, was also the aim of the Ministry of Agriculture, and it was, therefore unfortunate that this main purpose was not written into the Bill. This had to be done. Making another comment on the reported statement by ACCOR’s chief executive, Brian Stringer (the MP for Avondale) stated that the Bill meant the Authority would be able to run farms in competition with private enterprise. Mellor said the RNFU did not share these fears, as

Large development schemes, the construction of major dams and irrigation projects must of necessity be financed by the Government. The establishment of these projects in turn creates the opportunity for investment by the private sector – with great benefit to the farming community, commerce and industry.  

In further allaying ACCOR’s fears, he continued:

In terms of the Bill it is understood that the board of the Authority would also be the board of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority and the Agricultural Land Settlement Board. This would be a powerful factor in ensuring co-ordination and rational distribution of development funds … [and] provision was made in the Bill for organized agriculture to be consulted on all appointments to the board of the Authority.  

To guarantee efficient delivery of agro-business service, it was felt that the proposed Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and ADA Bills should have a clear convergence point. For example, if passed into law, the Bills that were to set up the AFC and ADA would go far towards underpinning the agricultural industry. They would also tighten control over it. The powers envisaged for the two bodies by the farming fraternity were formidable. It was believed that the AFC Bill would channel all normal Government financial help to farmers through one organisation, and the ADA Bill would concentrate planning, co-ordination and implementation of all agricultural development outside the Sabi-Limpopo scheme and the Tribal Trust Land into another. The AFC, for instance, could finance any undertaking remotely connected with agriculture, specifically including the acquisition of land, the supply of electricity, the conservation or control of soil or water; lend money to anyone to buy or build a town house; and stand between a farmer and his creditors. In addition, the ADA and any subsidiary company could establish or manage schemes for irrigation projects, farms or ranches; the training and settlement of farmers; the preparation of agricultural produce “or any other commodity” for processing

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656 Ibid.  
657 Ibid.  
or marketing; agricultural research; and would generally be responsible for all agricultural development in the European farming areas.

It was expected that the Rhodesian farmers, ever ready to protest their independence, would have objected in their numbers to these wide and in some cases overlapping powers and responsibilities, but organised agriculture seemed generally to welcome them. This seemed to be what the farmers wanted and what the economics-minded Ministry of Agriculture thought was good for them. Given Rhodesia’s peculiar circumstances, there was probably no harm in the prospect of the Agricultural Development Authority eventually settling and managing the highveld as the Sabi-Limpopo Authority did the lowveld. However, for agriculture to excel, it was imperative to end subsidised farming. In spite of all the bickering over the Bill, there seemed to be a common denominator in agriculture as illustrated by this statement: “But of one thing we have no qualms. If the ADA and the AFC work closely together the day of the subsidized inefficient farmer should be over. What help would the AFC give a farmer who did not measure up to ADA standards?” 659 It is true that subsidies are not good for any economy or organisation because they do not provide it with sustainable competitiveness. Thus, they should be avoided if not abolished at all costs to ensure eternal economic survival.

The end of February 1971 marked the beginning of a significant chapter in support of the ADA. On 25 February, the Centre Party leader, Pat Bashford, concurred with fellow supporters of the Bill when he said the Agricultural Development Authority Bill was “absolutely necessary.” 660 Asked to give his party’s official attitude towards the Bill, the publication of which had resulted in controversy among Rhodesian Front parliamentarians who believed that the ADA was given too much power, he stated that “The dangerously parlous state of the Rhodesian agricultural industry cannot be overstressed and legislation of this kind is absolutely essential to cope with present conditions.” 661 Bashford also disagreed with the Bill’s critics who saw its provisions as amounting to State farming when he said

There was a need to revitalize the agricultural industry. Faced with present circumstances this could not be done by leaving the matter to normal economic forces … the Government was being genuine when it stated that it wanted private enterprise to operate freely in the agricultural sector. I don’t believe it has changed its policy of intervening only when private enterprise is unwilling or unable to cope. 662

He had also accepted in good faith Government statements that controls would be faded out as and when economic conditions improved and allowed private enterprise to re-enter. In his view the Government needed the powers to cope with the present situation facing the country and the agricultural industry and therefore legislation such as the ADA Bill was necessary. Further justifying the Bill Bashford aptly observed:

661 Ibid., 19.
662 Ibid.
I am reminded of the fact that when the RF first came to power it set up an agricultural advisory council. The council sat for about six months and then died because it had neither the money nor the power to do anything … I believe that that example of a top-level body being impotent is what has persuaded the Government to create something with the necessary powers, namely the ADA … if the CP [Centre Party] thought after detailed study of the Bill that the Minister or the ADA had too much power the party’s MPs [Members of Parliament] would deal with this during debates in the House of Assembly. But if in principle the Bill means the necessary powers to cope with the present situation facing the industry then this is what is wanted. 663

Because the agricultural advisory council, which was a precursor to ADA, had failed and more and more organisations were giving the new Bill a thumbs up, all indications were that the Bill would soon become law. Adding their voice to the list of growing proponents of the Bill, the Rhodesian Tobacco Association (RTA), a very influential institution in its own right, joined the RNFU in its support for the Bill to establish an Agricultural Development Authority. 664 The only reservation the RTA had was that they were anxious to see incorporated in the Bill specific provisions for the development and earliest possible settlement of agricultural land. They believed that the provision for the settlement of individual farmers would remove the fears that had led to recent accusations that the Bill would result in State farming.

As support for the Bill continued to strengthen, the President of the RNFU, R. G. Pascoe, questioned the motives of the chief executive of ACCOR in urging farmers to fight the Bill to establish an ADA. Pascoe described views expressed by Stringer as “ridiculous.” “What is this man thinking of?” he asked at a well-attended meeting of the Banket Farmers’ Association. “And why are we to fight this Bill?” 665 The RNFU President gave credit to those who had masterminded the Bill when he stated that organised agriculture and the Ministry of Agriculture had been working on the Bill for three years adding that

The country needed a body to co-ordinate and plan agricultural development. Only the Government, through a statutory body, could undertake the planning and development of projects costing millions of dollars at a reasonable rate of interest. And only the Government, through consultation with interested parties, could decide on priorities. I must make it clear that the RNFU does not favour more and more statutory bodies, but the Agricultural Development Authority is a vital necessity and will remain so for many years. 666

666 Ibid.
Lamenting what he perceived to be the effects of the proposed Bill, Stringer almost cynically suggested that

… acceptance of this Bill would mean acceptance of State farming, that Government will take over our farms and farm them on a State basis, and that we would all be servants of the State. What is obviously more worrying [to Stringer] is that when the Government has taken over all the farms it will then take over all the little shops, cafes and businesses that ACCOR is concerned with, and they will all be working for Government as well. 667

In reassuring Stringer, Pascoe said

Would any Rhodesians allow a Government to do this to us? I can tell Mr Stringer that the farmers of Rhodesia would never stand for that. We are satisfied that it is not the intention of the authority to go in for State farming, and that when it takes over an area for development the intention is to leave the owners on the land or, if they have sold their land, to resettle it at the earliest opportunity. 668

In addition, Pascoe said he had sought and accepted an assurance from the Minister of Agriculture that this would be official policy and that the Minister had also made “the very fine gesture” of agreeing to consult with the RNFU over the appointment of the members of the new board. As far as the RNFU was concerned, he stated

There is basically very little in the Bill that we object to, and it is interesting to note that neither the Association of Rhodesian Industries nor the Chamber of Mines has opposed the Bill. I am sure they can see that the authority will benefit not only agriculture but also their sectors [other sectors of the economy as well]. 669

In a clear message to drum up support for the Bill to sail through Parliament, Pascoe urged farmers (the RNFU) to question the motives of the people who were urging them to attack the Bill. Anticipating strong objections to the Bill by some RF members and ACCOR, which he believed was “continually criticizing and attacking agricultural Bills,” 670 he admitted that, the Minister was not going to have an easy task putting this Bill through the House because of likely dissensions from some RF back-benchers. This prompted him to make an appeal to farmers to “come out 100 per cent in support of our Minister to help in what he and we know is in the interests of the agricultural industry

668 “RNFU Chief Hits at ACCOR Claim,” The Rhodesia Herald, Salisbury: Saturday, February 27 1971, 11.
669 Ibid.
670 Ibid.
and the country.” 671 In an apparent attempt to draw ACCOR and its President, Jack Robinson, to his side, he stated plainly, “Commerce owes its very existence to the primary industries of this country [e.g. agriculture]. If these are sound, healthy and stable, the commercial and industrial sectors reap the benefit.” 672 Based on this statement, it can be observed that, in the first place, Pascoe did not expect that the agricultural industry would have any major objection to the Bill. Referring to his almost direct attack on ACCOR, he sounded rather conciliatory when he concluded by saying: “I don’t believe it is in anyone’s interest for people to wash their dirty linen in public, but this has been forced upon me, and I can assure the president of ACCOR … that I am more than willing to discuss with him any matters which affect our common interests.” 673

ACCOR’s silence on the ADA Bill, following the “outburst” by the President of the RNFU, had caused some surprise among members, reported the ACCOR magazine, Commerce. The reasons for this silence were two-fold; firstly, it was felt that little would be gained by replying to attacks on people rather than principles; and secondly, because the people (apparently referring to the RNFU) whose freedom was being impaired welcomed this legislation. 674 It should be made clear, the magazine added, that ACCOR had at no time opposed the Bill “in toto,” and had only said it believed the farming community would be making a serious error if it allowed this piece of legislation to go through without “substantial amendments which would safeguard the independence and autonomy of the Rhodesian farmer.” 675 It can be argued that one of the most serious aspects of this legislation was that, by delegating wide powers to the Authority, the Minister of Agriculture was insulating the implementation of his policy from direct criticism by the Legislative Assembly, as the affairs of such bodies could only be raised under certain very prescribed conditions, as Members of Parliament (MPs) had found with the Sabi-Limpopo Authority.

Strong support for the ADA Bill came from RF back-benchers only when the Bill had its second reading in the House of Assembly on 3 March 1971. The Minister of Agriculture, David Smith, moved the second reading of the Bill shortly after outlining to the House another major piece of agricultural legislation, the Agricultural Finance Corporation Bill. At this juncture, praise was heaped upon the Minister for his foresight in producing the Bill, which the majority of RF speakers said was essential for the development and planning of agriculture in future. 676 The controversial ADA Bill was, however, criticised in committee by two prominent Government back-benchers, William Bill Irvine (RF, Marlborough) and Theo M. Ellison (RF, Salisbury Central) for the wide powers it proposed to give the authority. These powers particularly referred to generating hydro-electric power, building dams, and establishing enterprises, which might otherwise be run by private enterprise. Irvine asked what the Authority’s reaction would be if private

671 “RNFU Chief Hits at ACCOR Claim,” The Rhodesia Herald, Salisbury: Saturday, February 27 1971, 11.
672 Ibid.
673 Ibid.
675 Ibid.
stores or canning plants were established where it already had established business itself and proceeded to assert that “I do not believe that the Authority has any right to get involved with private enterprise.”

The possibility of overlapping between the planning staff of the SLA, whose functions would be taken over by ADA, and that of CONEX was mentioned by Colonel G. H. Hartley (RF, Victoria). The Minister replied that while the planning staff of CONEX was concerned with Rhodesia as a whole, that of the Authority would be concerned only with particular schemes. By this he meant that, once a scheme had been planned by the Authority’s staff, CONEX would take over. He told Col. Hartley that the Authority would exercise overall control of the Lowveld irrigation settlement scheme and that a committee that would be answerable to the board of ADA would look after the Sabi-Limpopo area. After indicating that the ADA Board would be also the board of the Land Settlement Board, he further assured T. M. Ellison that the importance of land settlement was fully recognised and the Land Settlement Act would continue to operate, hence: “Land is an important and emotional matter and, for this reason, it is not proposed that the Land Settlement Act itself should be repealed.”

At the height of the liberation struggle in the 1970s, these MPs were not oblivious also of the fact that the issue of land was the rallying point of the war.

Save for the few critics of the Bill who condemned aspects of it, notably Bill Irvine and Theo Ellison, the Bill passed its second reading without incident, as there were no major objections. Several RF MPs who had reservations about some of the Bill’s provisions said they would deal with these at the committee stage. In his reply to the debate, Smith said it was the Government’s task to see that no impediments were placed in the path of Rhodesia’s development. With this in mind, agricultural policy ran along three main courses. These were development, reconstruction of the financial structure and marketing policy.

The Minister rejected the accusation that the Bill’s provisions amounted to State farming. Defending the Bill, he said:

Where private enterprise would not venture the State had to start a project or scheme. Experience had shown that once a State-sponsored scheme flourished, private enterprise came in and the State could withdraw. [Thus] Immediately they [State] can get out of it and hand over to private enterprise they will be glad to do it.

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677 “Powers Given To ADA Are Too Wide, Say MPs,” The Chronicle, Bulawayo: Saturday, March 6, 1971, 2.
680 Ibid. See also “Powers Given To ADA Are Too Wide, Say MPs,” The Chronicle, Bulawayo: Saturday, March 6, 1971, 2.
He made no apologies for the wide powers given the Agricultural Development Authority under the Bill, adding that these were necessary in a growing country like Rhodesia as it was also necessary “to have sufficient vision to look far ahead” 681 to prevent impediments to Rhodesian development. However, nothing could be done without the approval of the appropriate Minister, which, in turn, meant Cabinet approval for any scheme or plan.

Nearly all the stages in the processing of this Bill were characterised by a mixture of criticism and support for the new piece of legislation. The first Member to speak in the second-reading debate on the ADA Bill, George Hayman (RF, Mazoe), referring to the accusations of State farming levelled at the Bill, said there had been an outcry from commerce and industry that this would result from the Bill, but it was “somewhat comical” to see that the Bill was supported by the RNFU, which was “an independently minded body of men opposed to State farming.” 682 The Minister himself put any fears to rest when he made a firm statement in the House of Assembly that the ADA Bill was not an attempt to introduce “State farming.” Nevertheless, he hastened to say that the creation of the Authority was not “a magic wand which will transform the industry over-night,” but was a long-term measure whose pace would be governed by what funds were available. 683 Smith reiterated the point that the Bill was very important, not only for agriculture, but also for the country as a whole, since all the economy’s sectors were interdependent. In essence, it would give the whole country, except the “tribal lands,” State forests, and national parks, an authority on the lines of the Sabi-Limpopo one. Although the Bill gave the Authority wide powers to undertake work relating to development of agriculture, it is important to note that where the interests of other Ministries, such as Water Development, were involved, their approval would have to be obtained. Thus, “I hasten to stress as strongly as possible that this is not a move – and I repeat, not a move – to introduce or encourage State farming, for I am sure we are all agreed that farming is best left to the private sector,” said Smith. 684

Clearly the Minister was far-sighted in his mission to transform the agricultural sector, but this did not pre-empt reservations about certain aspects of the Bill. For instance, C. A. R. Savory (RF, Matobo) said he would have liked consideration to be given to a national ecological co-ordinating council and would have been happier if the Government had considered overall aspects of planning before introducing this piece of agricultural legislation. F. A. Alexander (RF, Sinoia/Umvukwes) said the ADA and the Agricultural Finance Corporation would not be a panacea for all farming ills. Unless profitability came back to farming, he felt, neither Bill would do any good. William Irvine (RF,

681 “Powers Given To ADA Are Too Wide, Say MPs,” The Chronicle, Bulawayo: Saturday, March 6, 1971, 2.
683 Ibid.
Marlborough) told the House: “I am utterly convinced that this Bill is not in the interests of existing European farmers in this country.”

Other parliamentarians of course appreciated the merits of the Bill. R. G. S. Simmonds (RF, Mtoko), for example, deplored criticism of the Bill by an official of ACCOR and wondered where some of these critics “would be today were it not for the agricultural industry.” He believed that the State was only going into private enterprise fields where the private sector was unable to take the initiative. A similar point was made by W. de Kock (RF, Rusape), who welcomed the fact that 38 settlers were soon to be settled on Lowveld farms as a result of State Enterprise. On behalf of the Centre Party, M. M. Bhebe (CP, Ntshonalanga) welcomed the Bill, particularly since the new Authority would be able to help farmers in the African Purchase Areas (APAs). He regretted, however, that the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) had been excluded from its operations. Just like Bhebe, R. E. D. Cowper (RF, Wankie) welcomed the Bill, which he described as “one of the most imaginative and forward looking pieces of legislation to come before this House.”

Replying to the debate, the Minister of Agriculture said the Government was not wedded to the principle of State farming. It was whole-heartedly in favour of private enterprise but there were times when the State had to step in to develop schemes for the good of the country. In justifying the exclusion of the TTLs, he said the Tribal Trust Lands already had their own development corporation. Apparently, he was referring to TILCOR. It can be argued that the Bill excluded TTLs because, before independence, responsibility for these areas was vested in TILCOR, which is now ARDA. The new organisation (ARDA), unlike its pioneering counterpart (ADA), now had responsibilities that cover the rural areas or communal areas (formerly the TTLs). Its mandate was broadened to cover these areas especially with the incorporation of these institutions (TILCOR and ADA) into ARDA after independence – a process started by the amalgamation of ADA, TILCOR, SLA and Agricultural Land Settlement into a single Board on June 1 1978.

As the Government’s reorganisation plan for the national development of agriculture was getting into its stride with the formal establishment of the Agricultural Development Authority, speculation was increasing in farming circles about the man who would be chosen to head the new authority. There was a very strong field of potential candidates for the job. At the top of the list of “possibles” for this post was Jack Quinton, the dynamic Irish-born chairman of the Sabi-Limpopo Authority since its inception in 1965. Quinton seemed ideal for selection as its first chairman because the new authority would be similar in many respects to the SLA, which it was going to supersede. The only significant difference was that it would cover the whole country instead of a

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686 Ibid.
687 Ibid.
688 State farms existed in the agriculture of the classical system. In the Soviet Union the name that was used to mean state farms is sovkhozes. See Kornai, *The Socialist System*, 83 and Barry Munslow (ed.), *Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism*, (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1986), 19.
region only. However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that when an existing statutory organisation is superseded or absorbed by a new one, it is customary for the board of the existing organisation to resign on the day the legislation setting up the new body is promulgated. On such occasions, the Government may decide to appoint a member or members of the old board to the board of the new organisation.

As speculation continued to grow there was a strong body of opinion among farmers that the former president of the RNFU, Jeremy Field, would be asked to take on the new job. However, he was deeply involved with large-scale business and farming undertakings and may have felt disinclined to drop these in order to devote all his time to the demands of the new post. Another farmer-cum businessman with an impressive record of achievement in business, farming and administration who was in the running for the post was Nick Cambitzis, chairman of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). He had a wealth of experience in agriculture, business and in the field of statutory bodies. Mike Butler, a prominent Shamva farmer, who had done wonders as head of the Cotton Co-operative, was also favoured for his drive and business acumen which made a favourable impression, not only in farming circles, but also in commerce and industry. 691

In the final analysis, the Minister of Agriculture, David Smith, appointed Nicholas Cambitzis as chairman of the new Agricultural Development Authority which was due to start operations on July 1 1971. 692 Its principal function was to plan, co-ordinate and implement agricultural development throughout Rhodesia as opposed to the SLA, which concentrated on one specific area. Cambitzis served in the 1950s as a member of the Cold Storage Commission (CSC), 693 and was chairman of the Agricultural Production Committee from 1963 to 1965. With him on the board of the Authority were Messrs J. H. Charsley, D. Frost, R. T. Garvin, C. A. Heurtley, L. W. H. McLean, C. Millar, D. S. Morley and H. J. Quinton who all had enormous experience in the field of agriculture.

The inclusion of Quinton was a fitting tribute to his outstanding achievements as head of the SLA. Since the inception of this Authority he had guided the development of the Lowveld from “virgin bush” to large-scale irrigation farming. Charsley was a well-known Nyamandhlovu farmer and member of the Matabeleland North Farm Irrigation Fund Committee. He was also chairman of the Natural Resources Sub-Committee of the Rural Council. Frost was a member of the SLA Board. He was a farmer in Marandellas (now Marondera), a chartered accountant and a director of the Mashonaland Farmers’ Co-op. Garvin was also a member of the SLA Board, a farmer in the Eastern Districts and a

693 The CSC was and still is a residual buyer of cattle and goats as well as the largest processor and sole exporter of beef. See Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 81.
member of the Manicaland Farm Irrigation Fund Committee. Heurtley, a Bindura farmer, was chairman of the Land Agricultural Settlement Board and a former member of the Tobacco Corporation Board. He was a past president of the RTA and a former member of the Rhodesia Tobacco Marketing Board and Tobacco Export Promotion Council. McLean, a prominent dairy farmer of the Midlands, was chairman of the Dairy Producers’ Association and a member of the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) 694 Committee of the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA). Miller, a farmer near Glendale, was a member of the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) Committee of the AMA and chairman of the Wengi Irrigation Proving Unit Committee.

Last but not least was Morley who was a chartered accountant and a member of the SLA Board. 695 This newly elected board had a special mandate to take agriculture, which seemed to be languishing in the doldrums out of the perennial problems besetting it. Their success or failure can best be judged by the extent to which they achieved their original objectives and how their overall performance is comparable to their successors, namely, the new ARDA Board after independence. ARDA’s performance in that period will be discussed in chapter five.

It is important to note that when this organisation was designed, it did not pay heed to the fact that methods of implementing different types of projects, for example, new or reconstruction projects, might require different types of expertise. There was need to introduce supervision for the setting up of “project implementation teams” led usually by the Development Branch, but with other experts seconded from time to time. Another issue facing the new organisation was the problem of over-centralisation. Although less costly in office rents, telephones and clerical staff, it was failing to achieve one of its objectives of covering and representing the whole country. Perhaps a countrywide Board would assist, as regional board members were not necessarily best able to identify promising projects.

Despite the progress that had been made up to this point, calls for an over-all, country-wide agricultural planning authority continued to be made in the Senate. After the Minister, Smith, had outlined the reasons for the Authority, Senator B. S. Ellis noted that the ADA Bill did not cover the TTLs. He would have liked to see a somewhat different Bill, providing mostly for an over-all “super authority” to plan for the whole country, and below this, separate development authorities for the European and African areas. 696 This was typical segregationist rhetoric that was reminiscent of the white position during the UDI period in spite of calls from Senator Chief Ndiweni that all agriculture – African and European – be placed under one Ministry. 697 In addition, Senator Ellis suggested that the Development Authority’s powers in the field of research should be extended beyond agriculture, as there was a need for technological, industrial and applied research on agricultural products in particular. He said there was no adequate research being carried out

694 The DMB was the sole buyer, seller, and transporter of raw milk in most areas and is also the largest processor of milk products. See Masters, Government and Agriculture in Zimbabwe, 81.
697 Ibid.
on canning or storing, and there was no centralised research on the manufacture of tea and coffee.

Senator Olive Robertson said she had arrived at a similar opinion after studying reports of similar bodies in other countries. Referring to one of these reports, she said it had stressed the point that planning must begin on entire river systems, which in Rhodesia were drawn from the African and European land. Like his counterparts, Senator G. Fraser also saw the need for some overriding body, such as a Department of Economic Planning, committed to no particular sectional interest, which could advise the Government on planning and development on a national basis. Another Senator, H. J. van Biljon expressed fears that the Authority would, in effect, be competing against individual farmers, as it would be able to acquire all the best land, and inquired what effect this would have on farmer “immigrants.” He, in fact, thought that this Authority would become a big employer of labour, which would aggravate the serious labour problems already experienced by many farmers. In response, the Minister stressed that the policy of the Government was to “occupy, utilize and develop our land and natural resources for the benefit of all its inhabitants.” It was also proposed to create a National Water Authority to co-ordinate planning of catchment areas for the benefit of all. Dealing with the necessity for a national planning authority to cover the whole country, the Minister reminded Senators that the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR) could deal more satisfactorily with the areas under its control.

Further answering a query by Senator Olive Robertson during the committee stage of this Bill on whether the provision enabling the authority to “acquire” existing businesses, included compulsory acquisition, the Minister assured her that this provision was entirely a voluntary one and explained that there was no power within the ADA Bill for the Government to expropriate. Senator Ellis questioned why board members should be entitled to hefty salaries compared to other Government employees. In his opinion, these higher salaries were not justified because members of boards and authorities such as ADA were very often former civil servants, and their salaries as board members were generally greatly in excess of their former earnings. He added that the recruiting difficulties already experienced by the Civil Service would not be improved by the payment of such disproportionately high salaries. In defending his position the Minister of Agriculture indicated that the answer was a Civil Service salary review to bring the Civil Service salaries up to the level paid to other bodies because statutory boards also had to compete with private enterprise since it was wrong in principle that the salaries of these bodies should be tied to the Civil Service.

Notwithstanding all the defence and justifications for this Authority, ACCOR remained adamant and maintained that agriculture in the years ahead would have cause to regret the creation of ADA. In a special editorial of the latest issue of Commerce, the ACCOR magazine, fears were persistently expressed that the wide powers given to the Authority

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699 Ibid.
701 Ibid.
were “an attack on the very fundamentals of the private enterprise system and would, in the countries to the north of us, be used as a means of taking control of all farms in private hands.” 702 It added,

We do not for one minute believe that this will happen with the present Government, but to have such legislation on the Statute Books should be unacceptable to all in private enterprise, be they merchants, miners, industrialists or farmers. It is easy to be wise after the event, but ACCOR is trying to be wise before the event, and remains convinced that agriculture as a whole will have cause to regret this piece of legislation in the years that lie ahead. 703

Such grave concern was premised, among other things, on the “indecent haste” with which legislation was being pushed through the Legislative Assembly. 704 Despite repeated requests from representative bodies for more time to consider Bills, the situation was, in fact, deteriorating as one unpalatable piece of legislation was followed by another. Legislation that had been recently considered, for example, included the ADA Bill, certain sections of which caused serious concern; the Municipal Amendment Bill, which placed extensive power in the hands of central Government, despite Government’s declared policy of community development; the Road Motor Transportation Bill, which implemented many of the Graylin Commission’s 705 recommendations; the Farmers’ Licensing and Levy Bill, which authorised the farmers’ unions to issue licences and retain the fees and to impose levies on certain agricultural products; and the Income Tax Amendment Bill, which closed a legal loophole in relation to the claiming of export expenditure for taxation rebate purposes.

Some of ACCOR’s concerns must have been addressed somewhat when towards the end of the 1970s fresh debate started on whether to amend the existing legislation so that the two Authorities (ADA and the SLA) could be combined to come up with a single entity for the entire country which could deal with the many overlaps that existed between the two. It was envisaged that such a measure would be implemented by the amendment of the ADA Act and the repeal of the SLA Act since the powers of the two Authorities were in many cases identical in their respective areas, while in some cases, such as those making provision for industrial and township development, the exclusion of such powers would have been

703 Ibid.
705 The Graylin Commission was a Transportation Commission appointed in August 1968 under the chairmanship of John Cranmer Graylin. The Commission, which published its findings in July 1969, had a broad mandate. Among its terms of reference the one that is important for this study is the recommendation whether members of syndicates and other organisations should be allowed to carry each other’s goods and perform other services and, if so, under what conditions, and whether any sector of the agricultural economy should receive special treatment. For detail on its wide terms of reference see POZ Library, Box OR 2514-2530, File: OR 2520/28928 Report of the Transportation Commission/Graylin Commission, (Salisbury, Rhodesia: The Government Printer, 10th July 1969), 1-2.
appropriate. However, the Board of the SLA agreed to inform the Secretary for Agriculture that “in view of the present situation,” it considered that the time was not opportune to change the existing legislation and combine the two Authorities.

Nevertheless, the initial step to amalgamate the two was taken when legislation was published in the Government Gazette of 21st April 1978, which transferred the responsibility for administration of the two Acts together with the Agricultural Land Settlement Act to the new Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development. This subsequently culminated in all land issues being combined through the formation of a single board (from June 1 1978) to administer the functions of the Agricultural Development Authority, the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation, the Sabi-Limpopo Authority and the Agricultural Land Settlement Board which was announced by the joint Ministers of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development, Jack Mussett and Aaron Mgutshini, on May 5 1978. The new board was responsible for each authority and had to ensure that there was no overlapping or duplication of functions. These four bodies had in the past variously promoted the interests of black and white farmers. The “Rural Development” suffix to the Ministry’s title was promulgated probably to stifle or contain racial conflict at the height of the liberation war. The Financial Gazette actually admitted that the new Board, to be known as the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA), would be headed by or constituted under the chairmanship of Nick Cambitzis (chairman of the Industrial


708 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, Confidential Correspondence, “Sabi-Limpopo Authority: Extract from the minutes of the meeting held on Tuesday, 7th February, 1978.

709 NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 280745, Location R19.10.5.3F, File: DEV/1 Planning Policy, “Confidential Correspondence: Agricultural Development Authority – Possible Re-organisation of Ministry and Statutory Board Functions Under Changed Circumstances,” ADA, 30th August 1977. See also Supplement to the Rhodesia Government Gazette, Salisbury: Government Printer, 21st April 1978, 1101; NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, “Transfer Of Responsibility for Administering the Agricultural Development Authority Act (Chapter 100) and the Sabi-Limpopo Authority Act (Chapter 156),” H. W. Botha for Secretary for Agriculture to the Secretary, Agricultural Development Authority, 26th April, 1978, 1-2 and NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, “Agricultural Development Authority Act (Chapter 100), Sabi-Limpopo Authority Act (Chapter 156) and Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 137),” W. H. Dell for Secretary for Agriculture to the Secretary, Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development, 26th April, 1978, 1-3.

Development Corporation of Rhodesia) and was intended to co-ordinate rural development activities throughout the country, as it was also seen as “a logical realignment of development functions along non-racial lines.” 711 At this point, Dennis R. Norman (the vice-president of the RNFU, who later became Minister of Agriculture) said the RNFU had felt that both white and black agriculture’s interests should be combined under one Ministry. 712 In fact, all parties campaigning in the 1980 election that ushered into power the Government of Robert Gabriel Mugabe considered rural development to be a vital aspect of their policies, and the function of the rationalised Ministry and board appeared to arouse considerable interest in the months ahead. In particular, the matter of land use and redistribution was expected to become particularly important under a majority rule government, especially where some of the more “land hungry” TTLs were concerned. The Government believed that “Experience elsewhere in Africa demonstrates that the prior formulation of a suitable authority and of possible action can avert many of the problems faced by the first majority government.” 713

In accordance with the constitution, the members of the Board of ADA and of TILCOR had to resign, but Engineer W. A. Bailey, the Chairman of TILCOR, agreed to serve as a member on the new Board and continued in his capacity as Managing Director of TILCOR. The RNFU expressed qualified approval of the amalgamation of the four rural development bodies announced by the Government. D. R. Norman said that his organisation was in favour of the amalgamation of these bodies, but he believed it would have been more logical to have them under the Ministry of Agriculture, and not under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Rural Development. Clearly, Rhodesia had a surfeit of boards, committees, councils and other organisations. 714 Thus, any measure that would reduce the number was welcome because it would address the difference of opinion about the functions of various ministries concerned with agriculture.

For instance, instead of having the agricultural extension activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs being transferred or falling within the compass of the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development, it sounded logical, as the RNFU argued, to have these, whether for white or black farmers, being under the new super-board under the Ministry of Agriculture. Nevertheless, Norman said, “we have already met the Co-Ministers” 715 of the expanded Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development

715 The idea of Co-Ministers was mooted during the period of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia regime. This country was called Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under the short-lived premiership of Bishop Abel Tendekai Muzorewa of the United African National Council (UANC) who won the elections held in April 1979. It was a compromise government that emerged after the signing on 3 March 1978 of the Internal Agreement between Smith and the so-called moderate leaders who included Muzorewa, Reverend Ndadzani Sithole of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Chief Jeremiah Chirau of Zvimba who led a little known party called the Zimbabwe United People’s Organisation (ZUPO). In 1979 these men together with others from different political parties formed the so-called Government of National Unity, which among other things, was intended to allay the escalation of the liberation struggle. This government whose reign lasted for only a year was presided over by a leader who was generally perceived in Patriotic Front (PF)
and we have offered them and their officials our full co-operation.” He went on to say the RNFU had also met the new Co-Minister of Agriculture, J. Mandaza, to explain the body’s policies and objectives and stressed to him the importance of resolving the present poor viability problems apparent in farming which were the result of producer prices having lagged behind escalating costs of production. 716

Eventually, through a legislative amendment, the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development became the custodian of ADA, which as a result of the Bill of 1978, became ARDA. In fact, it was clause 4 of the Agricultural Development Authority Amendment Bill of 1978, which changed the name of the Agricultural Development Authority to the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority. 717 Clauses 7 and 8 conferred additional functions, duties and powers on the Authority. Whereas clause 11 repealed the provisions establishing a separate Agricultural Settlement Board for the European Area and the African Area and provided for a single Board, clause 12 repealed the provisions relating to co-operation between the Minister of Agriculture and the Minister of Lands, Natural Resources and Rural Development, as the administration of the Act was assigned to the latter Ministry. Last but not least, clause 19 provided that the Board of the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation (TILCOR) would consist of those members who were on the Board of the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority and not of members separately appointed. 718

On the whole, the Bill of 1978 sought to amend 719 the Agricultural Development Authority Act (Chapter 100), the Agricultural Land Settlement Act (Chapter 137), the Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation Act (Chapter 159) by repealing the TILCOR Amendment Act No. 13 of 1976, the Sabi-Limpopo Authority Act (Chapter 156) and to provide for matters incidental to or connected with the foregoing. The earlier Bill of 1970/71 set out to provide for the following: the establishment of an Agricultural Development Authority to promote and undertake agricultural development; to confer powers and functions on such Authority; to provide for a Board to control the operations of the Authority; to amend the Water Act (Chapter 268); to amend the Sabi-Limpopo Authority Act, No. 84 of 1964; to amend the Agricultural Land Settlement Act, No. 59 of 1969; and to provide for matters circles as having betrayed the cause of the struggle.

719 The amendment came in the form of three major drafts. The First Draft was read on 3rd April 1978; the Second on 28th April and the Third and Final Draft was produced on the 8th of May 1978. For more detail on this Bill see NAZ (RC), ARDA, Box 348063, Location R24.9.6.4F, File: ADA/POL/1 Part 1: Formation of ADA, Confidential Memorandum: Agricultural Development Authority Amendment Bill, Salisbury: Government Printer, 1978, 1-6.
incidental to the foregoing. In fact, ADA was a reconstitution of some functions of TILCOR and the SLA.

Therefore, in spite of all the objections from the critics of the ADA, the views of the Ministry of Agriculture and like-minded stakeholders in support of this organisation, in the end, predominated. ARDA was, thus, established by the ADA Act of July 1971 (amended in 1978) and was, subsequently, mandated, on a much broader basis, to promote irrigation agriculture in Zimbabwe. As of 2000, ARDA was still the executive Government agency responsible for overseeing irrigation development in the country. Estate irrigation agriculture in Sanyati, however, was introduced by TILCOR, which became ARDA in the early 1980s. The changeover from TILCOR to ARDA in the post-independence period will further be examined in chapter five. The Main Estate in Sanyati was born amid these debates and ARDA that has been running this scheme since 1978 was not in the first instance mandated to operate in communal areas (formerly TTLs).

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that, between 1965 and 1979, state policy stressed the development of small-scale irrigation projects in the rural areas. In fact, after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 the allocation of irrigation agricultural investment, although still more biased towards the large-scale commercial sector, had shifted from its earlier emphasis on favoured environments to more marginal or frontier regions such as Sanyati. Schemes like Gowe, in particular, were designed to promote rural development centred on irrigation-based growth points. Such efforts at decentralising development, apart from benefiting the inhabitants of outlying areas through, among other things, employment creation, were more inclined towards pre-empting what was considered to be massive rural-to-urban migration by hordes of unemployed Africans living in those areas.

It was this objective that impelled the colonial government to institute measures which culminated in the formation of rural development agencies such as DEVAG and TILCOR, both with a mandate to operate in the previously marginalised rural areas. The latter was subsequently reconstituted to form the Agricultural and Development Authority (ADA), now the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) in 1978. Because the independence government believed that rural development needed to be given priority to try and bring so-called peripheral areas closer to urban areas in terms of standards of living, it insisted on renaming the Authority ARDA to denote its rural development bias.

It has been noted further in this chapter that the creation of ARDA was laced with massive controversy as the parliamentary debates illustrate, but in the final analysis it can be argued that it was better to have a start towards the initiation and evolution of a national irrigation policy than to ignore this idea. The role of colonial policy, extension and demonstration activity, institutions such as DEVAG and TILCOR (now ARDA) cannot be underestimated in producing a regional development economy that was to transform the Sanyati countryside as it also generated new forms of differentiation.
especially based on cotton cultivation. Differentiation, though, as illustrated in this study, was not part and parcel of government intention. The impact of government policy on the Sanyati irrigation community will be discussed in the next chapter.