INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN AFRICA 1990-2004: EXTENT AND COUNTER-MEASURES

by

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Our Father in Heaven, for everything I am so fortunate to have in my life, I am sincerely grateful.

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A Posse Ad Esse

Lyle Eugene Pienaar
Midrand
2007
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“It is important to stress: Africa is also a victim of the September 11 attacks”

Omar Bongo

1. BACKGROUND

Terrorism is the systematic use of violence, or the threat of violence, against governments or individuals to attain a political objective. More specifically, it may also have a religious or ethnic motive. Terrorism has been used by organisations with both rightist and leftist policies; by nationalistic and ethnic groups; by revolutionaries and by the armies and secret police of governments themselves. Terrorism has been practised throughout history and throughout the world.

Terrorism is a long-standing political and religious strategy that has gained renewed international awareness following the devastating and unprecedented attacks in the United States (US) on the 11th September 2001 (9/11). Although the events of that day have come to represent a turning point in international concern with the issue, the 9/11 attacks were not isolated events. Nor did these events reflect an unexpected new threat: they were the representative reaffirmation of a tendency that had been apparent for several years. Where terror had previously been a painful accessory to anarchism, liberation wars, counter-insurgency campaigns and the battlefields of the Cold War; the events of that day took terrorism to a new, global level.

Global and African concerns about terrorism have obviously intensified since the 9/11 attacks, but they have existed for several years. As far back as 1992, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted a resolution aimed at enhancing co-operation and co-ordination between member states in order to fight the occurrence of extremism (Cilliers & Sturman, 2002: 1).

Africa recorded 6,188 casualties from 299 acts of terrorism between 1990 and 2003, making it the continent with the second most casualties in the world after Asia (US State
Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990-2003). These figures illustrate only the number of international terrorist attacks which took place on African soil. In addition to this, many African countries have been beleaguered by periods of domestic terrorism, with devastating effects on human life, stability and development. From the early 1990’s there have been warnings of a new stereotype of a terrorist. In contrast to the threat posed by the close-knit, well-organised groups of the 1980’s, the new threat came from loose groupings of people with similar backgrounds and beliefs, who resorted to terror tactics to strike against their enemies. Kenya and Tanzania were the first countries to experience the new manifestation of transnational terrorism with the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. But these were not isolated incidents. Between 1990 and 2003, 6 percent of all international acts of terrorism were committed on African soil. Africa has, since the 1990s, witnessed an increase in the number of terrorist attacks against foreigners or foreign interests. Many of these attacks, however, originate from internal civil unrest and the spill-over from regional wars, as African rebel movements and opposition groups have resorted to terrorism in attempts to further their objectives (Goredema & Botha, 2004: 51-54).

Even though domestic terror is still more prevalent than international terrorism in Africa, no country or continent is immune to the increasing occurrence of international terrorism. This has resulted in the need for more advanced counter-terrorism policies and mechanisms within Africa to curb this growing phenomenon.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main objective of this study is to analyse the concept of international terrorism in Africa from 1990-2004 on a continental level and then investigate the extent of measures developed to counteract this threat. The time framework for the research commences in 1990, at the end of the Cold War. The analysis will explore why international terrorism occurs in Africa, and the factors which facilitate this. To achieve this aim, the study will focus on aspects such as the historical background of international terrorism in Africa; the current international security and terrorist environment; the present African security environment; and the international and continental counter-terrorism policies which exist within Africa. This dissertation aims to illustrate the issues facing Africa in combating and curbing international terrorist activities on the continent. It will describe attempts by
international and continental organisations to develop measures designed specifically to establish counter-terrorist agencies and policies in Africa.

3. DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Africa’s internal political, economic and social instability is due to its lack of institutional legitimacy. This provides an environment in which terrorist organisations can develop their objectives. The questions are, firstly, whether international terrorism has been exported to Africa, whether it arises from the same conditions that promote domestic terror, or both. Secondly, the question should be posed whether the measures to combat international terrorism in Africa are sufficient. Thirdly, it must be questioned whether the current, comparatively limited, extent of the manifestation of international terrorism in Africa is the result of Africa’s relative geographical isolation, or of other factors.

This is the basis for the main assumptions on which the study is based and these can be summarised as follows:

- Africa’s unstable political, economic and social structures cause weaknesses within the continent which international terrorism organisations can exploit and use to their own advantage.

- Africa’s history of civil wars makes the continent an easy target for international terrorist organisations to garner support for their organisations.

- The current counter-terrorism policies and measures are still not effective enough to counter international terrorism on the African continent, as in some countries there is still an ongoing struggle for political control.

- The “Global War on Terrorism” has played a supportive role in Africa’s counter-terrorism policies.

4. METHODOLOGY

The study will be descriptive and analytical in nature, analysing case studies of acts of international terrorism in Africa, and policies developed to counter international terrorism
in Africa. A conceptual framework of international terrorism will serve as a point of departure for the study. Governmental sources, such as the US State Department’s *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, and research publications, such as the internationally published *Terrorism and Political Violence*, are utilised to inform this conceptual framework. Existing counter-measures in Africa will also be assessed to ascertain their contribution to the effective combating of international terrorism. Current global measures to counter international terrorism will be used as a framework for assessing African measures.

Statistics on international terrorism incidents are primarily reliant on US official State Department publications, as these are the only regular (annual) statistics that are publically released. From a certain perspective, this therefore imposes certain limitations on research. On the other hand, the US statistics are based on descriptions of actual terror incidents, and are therefore not merely estimates.

5. SOURCES

The main sources for this study have been inter-governmental and governmental publications, for example the US State Department’s *Country Reports on Terrorism* and counter-terrorism conventions and strategies developed by inter-governmental organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU).

A critical approach has also been followed in the analysis of secondary sources such as books, journal articles, periodicals, monographs and newspapers, in order to provide a theoretical framework as well as a discussion and analysis of case studies. Examples of such publications are the *African Security Review*, the *South African Journal of International Affairs* and the *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* journal. Most studies on international terrorism do not however focus sufficiently on Africa, hence the rationale for this research.

6. STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The structure of the research was based on the following chapter division:
Chapter 1: The first chapter is an introduction in which the objectives of the rest of the study are set out.

Chapter 2: This chapter provides a conceptual overview of international terrorism and counter-measures, and it addresses aspects such as definitions and characteristics of current international terrorism. Changes and challenges within the post-Cold War and post-9/11 security environments are also addressed, indicating new security requirements; new approaches to security policy; as well as the concept of counter-terrorism.

Chapter 3: In the third chapter, an overview of international terrorism in Africa up to the end of the Cold War is given. International terrorism and counter-measures in Africa up to 1990 are analysed to provide a background to the post-Cold War international terrorism situation in Africa to be presented.

Chapter 4: This chapter provides an overview of the occurrence of international terrorism in Africa during the period 1990-2004. The chapter outlines the different characteristics and trends of international terrorism in the world and in Africa over the 1990 to 2004 period, supported by case studies.

Chapter 5: The fifth chapter focuses on the current global and continental counter-terrorism strategies in Africa, and assesses any shortcomings. These counter-terrorist strategies include strategies developed by the UN, US and the AU. The chapter will also include a brief assessment of Africa’s role in the US-led “Global War on Terrorism”.

Chapter 6: The last chapter will summarise the main issues that were addressed in this study and draw certain conclusions. The assumptions formulated in this chapter will also be assessed.
CHAPTER 2

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND COUNTER-MEASURES:
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

“I may not be able to define terrorism, but I will know it when I see it”
Justice Potter Stewart

1. INTRODUCTION

To ensure a common understanding of the issues identified in this study, this chapter provides a conceptual overview of terrorism and its counter-measures, as well as current and past international security environments, with specific reference to international terrorism.

This chapter will address aspects such as the history of terrorism, definitions and characteristics of terrorism. These include different forms of terrorism, such as state, transnational and international terrorism. Changes and challenges within the post-Cold War and post-9/11 security environments and the concept of counter-terrorism will also be addressed, indicating new international security requirements, as well as new approaches to global security policies.

The main point of departure of this chapter and study is that terrorism is an intricate phenomenon which has occurred world-wide for many centuries. This chapter aims to place terrorism and international terrorism in a conceptual framework and to analyse the links between international terrorism and the global security environment. This will set the tone for the following chapters in which links between international terrorism and Africa will be identified and analysed.

2. UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM

Throughout history every terrorist has claimed to be a liberator, battling against dictatorships and appalling cruelties. Gearson (Freedman, 2002:10) feels that terrorism has historically been seen as a strategic occurrence, which fluctuates according to
geography, religion and culture and so cannot be rigidly defined. It has been used as an instrument by revolutionaries and nationalists, and even by governments to maintain state control. Defining and understanding terrorism depends greatly on the perspective of the beholder. While a terrorist act, past or present, would be seen by one person as an act of revolution and ideological freedom, it would be seen by another as a cruel, senseless act of ideological violence.

2.1 Historical Overview

Terrorism is by no means a modern phenomenon. Martin (2003:4) describes the ancient world as a place where many cases - and stories - of political violence were found. References to not only assassinations and conquests are found in the Bible, but also to the complete destruction of enemy forces in the name of faith. During the time of the Roman Empire, incidents of political and state terrorism were rife. Examples of this are the brutal repression of the followers of Spartacus after the Servile War of 73-71 B.C., and the purging and enslavement of the Dacian nation in 106 A.D. The conquests of Roman authorities were often accompanied by a display of terror. This ensured no defiance of their authority.

During the Eleventh and Twelfth Century crusades, assassins who were devotees of a Muslim cult, the Shi’ite Order of Assassins, vowed to expel Christian invaders of Palestine. They travelled in small groups throughout modern Syria, Iraq and Israel, hunting Christian infidels and murdering Sunni Muslims whose beliefs and rituals they considered despicable. This devout group bears a fascinating similarity to today’s Lebanese Hezbollah bombers and to the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. Success, and suicide, for ancient and modern assassins, ensures a place in paradise as well as veneration as martyrs (Whittaker, 2004: 19).

According to Roberts (2002: 1), the French Revolution of 1789 saw the term “terrorism” being used for the first time. The revolutionary government in France attempted to enforce its new order on an unwilling population through the use of violence. As a result, the first definition of the word “terrorism”, as recorded by the French Academy in 1798, was “system of terror”. The use of terror during the French Revolution is a good example of state terrorism being carried out to further the objectives of a revolutionary idea. Those who were found guilty of being enemies of the new revolutionary state were
executed by guillotine. Martin (2003: 5) states that the “struggle meetings” in revolutionary China and revolutionary “people’s committees” in Iran are all contemporary equivalents of the revolutionary tribunals of the French Revolution.

Rapoport (2001:419-422) identifies four waves of contemporary rebel terrorism. The first wave occurred, between 1880 and the First World War. Originating in Russia from partial political reform, it later manifested in anarchist movements in Western Europe and nationalist activities in the Balkans. An example of such a movement was the small band of Russian revolutionaries of “Narodnaya Volya” (The People’s Will) which proclaimed the word “terrorist” proudly. These revolutionaries developed certain ideologies that were to become the trademark of subsequent terrorism in many countries. During this period, terrorism was primarily associated with the assassination of political leaders and heads of state. The killing of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand, in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, is a clear example of this (Roberts, 2002: 2).

The second wave of terrorism (approximately 1920-1960) saw nationalist movements in the European colonies using terrorist activities to hasten the departure of their colonial rulers (Rapoport, 2001:420). New states, including Ireland, Israel, Cyprus, Yemen, Kenya and Algeria developed as a result of nationalist movements. Violence was destined to be a primary tool for those setting out to destroy, at all costs, the colonial rule of Britain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal in Africa and Asia. Those advocating this were regarded as “freedom fighters” by the masses hungry for revolution. London, Paris, the Hague and Lisbon, however, regarded these freedom fighters as terrorists breaking the colonial rules of law; terrorists to be hunted and imprisoned (Whittaker, 2004: 23).

Anti-colonial terrorism was, however, not the only form of terrorism that occurred during this period. Sinclair (2003: 193) states that after the First World War, modern Europe saw state-orchestrated terror in Russia that was unprecedented on that continent. The newly-formed Communist regime under Lenin initiated the Red Terror across Russia. This set in motion a campaign of horror which was extended by Lenin’s successor, Stalin, to the whole of Russia. More menacing and effective than Ivan the Terrible, Stalin had modern communications at his disposal. After the purges of the 1930’s, he set the pattern for the new barbarism of the Twentieth Century, which killed innocent people in their tens of millions, whereas previous regimes had orchestrated the slaughter of
merely tens of thousands of victims. Sinclair (2003: 247) further elaborates that during
the Second World War, Hitler implemented a systematic campaign of horror across
Europe. By 1942, the extermination of the Jews had become official policy. Heinrich
Himmler, the SS leader, stated that “In accord with the will of the Führer, a simple
decision has been made, and the decision is that the Jew must die in agony”.

The third wave of terrorism began in the 1960s and was developed by ideologically-
based European and American groups such as the German Red Army Faction (RAF)
and the Italian Red Brigades (Rapoport, 2001:421). The geographic characteristics of
this wave were considerably different from those of the previous two waves. National
figures such as politicians, businessmen and judges, for example, were targeted
because of global geopolitical issues. Rapoport (2001: 421) further states that
“international terrorism” was used to describe the third wave of terrorism. The
revolutionary culture created relationships amongst different national groups.
Duyvensteyn (2004: 444) gives an example of this when she describes how the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) trained with the Palestinian Liberation Organisations (PLO)
fighters in the Middle East. Several of these terrorist groups also carried out more
attacks abroad than in their own regions. Terrorist attacks in the terrorists’ own territories
also often had some form of international link. The Munich Olympic Massacre of 1972
and the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 are both examples of such
terrorist acts occurring during this period.

The world is currently experiencing the fourth wave of terrorism. Rapoport (2001: 421)
states that the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran introduced a new religion-based
separatist movement to the world. Ronczkowski (2003: 25) describes how, shortly after
the Islamic Revolution, the Ayatollah Khomeini declared a holy war (*Jihad*) against all
Westerners. This *Jihad* is still being carried out today by international and transnational
terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Islamic *Jihad*, which focus on Western
targets. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York are the paramount example of this.
Laqueuer (2004: 74) describes Al Qaeda as an international terrorist movement that has
moved to the “vanguard” of global terrorism. This organisation has terrorist cells or
affiliated groups that are operating in more than 60 countries worldwide. Al Qaeda sees
itself as being engaged in a global struggle against a treacherous and tyrannical enemy,
the West.
The wide-ranging history of terrorism throughout the world has, without a doubt, contributed to how present governments, academics, nations and individuals observe, understand and define terrorism. The next section expands the understanding of terrorism by aiming to define the term.

2.2 Defining Terrorism

Poland (1988: 2-3) states that the first logical task facing researchers of terrorism is to define the term. Initially, the definition of terrorism appears to be uncomplicated. Hostage-taking for political reasons, the elimination of military and diplomatic personnel, or the suicidal car bombing of an embassy are considered to be acts of terrorism. Problems however arise as soon as one goes beyond these obvious examples. The term “terrorism” can evoke extreme emotions, partly as a reaction to the indiscriminate nature of the violence and the fear associated with it. Morris (1987: 22) argues that there seems to be little accord amongst the experts when it comes to defining terrorism. He claims that the term is very “pejorative”, as it is a label used mainly by only those threatened by terrorism. Developing a definition that is both brief enough to provide an intelligent and logical foundation yet general enough to be agreed upon by all relevant parties, has been a difficult task.

Terrorism is not a set of beliefs or a political association. It can be viewed as a weapon or a process, which has been used throughout history by both state and sub-state institutions for a range of political causes or purposes. This notion is supported by Wilkinson (2001: 106) when he describes terrorism as “a special form of political violence”. The concept of terrorism is, however, a broad one. Due to its intricate nature, defining it has never been an easy task. In the past, terrorism occurred in various frameworks such as crime, politics, war, propaganda and religion. Understanding and defining terrorism will then clearly depend on the framework from which it originates. Each framework focuses on specific, as well as different, aspects of terrorism. The definition of terrorism by a fanatical religious leader will thus differ radically from that of a law enforcement agent (Schmid, 2004: 197).

A definitive and holistic definition of terrorism is hard to achieve in the contemporary world. One person’s definition of terrorism is sometimes another’s definition of a freedom fighter. Martin (2003: 31) argues that governments have developed definitions of
terrorism; individual agencies within governments have adopted definitions; non-
governmental organisations have developed their definitions; and academic experts
have suggested and analysed definitional constructs.

This lack of accord, which exists throughout the public and private sectors, is an
acknowledged reality in the study of political violence. Academics, such as Stern and
Gearson, who have developed definitions of, and viewpoints regarding, terrorism, have
illustrated this discernible lack of concurrence. Stern (1999: 11) defines terrorism as “an
act or threat of violence against non-combatants with the objective of exacting revenge;
intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience”. Her definition avoids circumscribing
a perpetrator or purpose. It allows for a range of possible actors (states or their deputies,
international groups, or a single individual), pursuing their assumed goals (political,
religious, or economic), and for murder for its own sake. Gearson (Freedman, 2002: 9)
states that the question of what terrorism is, has disappeared into an academic dead-
end, never to return in a meaningful way for policy-makers or the public. The uncertainty
over a suitable definition still exists within individual governments.

Governments, government departments and governmental organisations, as well as
academics, tend to differ when attempting to define the act of terrorism. The US State
Department defines terrorism in its Patterns of Global Terrorism of 2003 as:
“premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets
by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience”. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has, however, defined
terrorism somewhat differently in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorism Report
of 2000/2001 as: “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property, or
the threat to use such violence, to intimidate or coerce a government, the public, or any
section of the public in order to promote political, social or ideological objectives”. The
objectives of the acts of terrorism in the two definitions are marginally different.

Differences in definition also exist between countries and their allies. The United
Kingdom (UK) defines terrorism in its Terrorism Act of 2000. The Act states that
terrorism can mean the “threat of, as well as the use of, an action”. The Act dictates that
this “action” can occur anywhere within, or outside of, the UK. Similarly, the persons,
property or government affected by the threat or action itself can be situated anywhere in
the world. The purpose of the action or threat is important for the definition of terrorism.
The purpose must be to influence government or “to intimidate the public or a section of the public” for any “political, religious or ideological cause”.

In South Africa terrorist activity is defined in the *Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act* of 2004 as an act, in or outside the Republic, which “involves the systematic, repeated or arbitrary use of violence by any means or method…”. The definition includes not only acts of terrorist violence, but also the threat thereof when it states that terrorist activities are intended to “intimidate, or to induce or cause feelings of insecurity within, the public, or a segment of the public…”.

The AU, formerly known as the OAU, defined an act of terrorism in the *OAU Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* of 1999 as:

(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons; or cause or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

(i) intimidate, put fear into, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do, or abstain from doing, any act; or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint; or to act according to certain principles; or

(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

(iii) create general insurrection in a State.

(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).

Not even the UN has developed a holistically agreed-upon definition of terrorism. The UN does however use an “academic consensus definition”, which was written by
terrorism expert Schmid. The definition describes terrorism as an “anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action” which is utilised by secretive and partly secretive “individuals, groups or state actors”. These “methods of repeated violent action” are used for “personal, criminal or political reasons”, whereby the “direct targets of violence are not the main targets”. Schmid also recommended the UN’s short legal definition of a terrorism act as the “peacetime equivalent of a war crime”. This short definition is another example of the term “terrorism” being broadly defined (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime).

Terrorism is inevitably about power, the pursuit of power, the attainment of power, and the application of power to achieve political change. Terrorists, present and past, have used violence, or, equally important, the threat of violence, in pursuit of a political aim. Whittaker (2003: 5) states that terrorism, in the most widely-accepted contemporary usage of the term, is “fundamentally and inherently political”. This includes the pursuit of domestic, regional, continental and international political objectives.

Just as there are different definitions of terrorism, there are different types of terrorism. These different types have diverse characteristics, causes and outcomes. Experts and critics usually agree on the forms of terrorism found in the modern political environment. Although different tags are sometimes attached, the same typologies are repeatedly found in academic and policy analyses, and these are generally agreed upon by experts. Martin (2003: 33-34) describes the following types of terrorism practised in the modern global environment:

- **State Terrorism**, terrorism which comes “from above”. This is committed by a government against its perceived enemies. State terrorism can be directed externally against adversaries in the international domain, or internationally against domestic enemies.

- **Dissident Terrorism**, which is “from below”. This is committed by non-state movements and groups against governments, ethno-national groups, religious groups, and other perceived enemies.

- **Religious Terrorism**, terrorism encouraged by an integral belief that a spiritual power has endorsed, and commanded, the application of terrorist violence for the
superior glory of the faith. Examples of such terrorist groups are Hezbollah and Hamas.

- **Criminal Terrorism**, terrorism motivated solely by profit. Organised criminal enterprises (such as the Mafia) accumulate profits from criminal activities for personal enhancement. Criminal-political terrorist movements, such as Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers, accrue profits to sustain their movements.

- **International Terrorism**, terrorism that spills across national borders throughout the world. Targets are selected because of their value as symbols of international interests, usually for the purpose of political propaganda. Al Qaeda is an example of such a terrorist organisation, even though it is also driven by religious motives.

Wilkinson (2000: 20-21) broadens the typology of contemporary terrorism by adding the following types of terrorism:

- **Nationalist terrorist groups**: these seek political independence. Their activities can span from the territory they want to govern, to targets abroad. ETA (Spain) and the IRA are both examples of such nationalist terrorist organisations.

- **Ideological terrorists**: these intend to impel the entire political, economic and social structures of a state to the extreme right or left. Italy’s Red Brigade and Germany’s RAF are both examples of ideological terrorist groups which existed in the past.

- **Single-issue terrorist groups**, these do not aim to change an entire political structure, but to change only an explicit policy or practice within a certain community. Violent animal-rights groups can be seen as an example.

Wilkinson (2001: 108) goes further by describing yet another type of terrorism which increased significantly during the 1980s and 1990s, namely **ethnic terrorism**. He describes how mass terror was used during “ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts” whereby many civilians were driven from their livelihoods and countries. Ethnic terrorism was used in the past for purposes of “ethnic cleansing” in countries like Rwanda, Burundi and Kosovo.
The world has also witnessed many different forms of international terrorism over the past few decades. International terrorist groups, even though their objectives are also political, practise a variety of the methods utilised by other terrorist groups. The next section aims to define and describe international terrorism as a contemporary form of terrorism.

2.3 Defining International Terrorism

The very idea of international and transnational terrorism only came into existence in the second half of the Twentieth Century. Wieviorka (1993: 215) states that this occurred against the background of the airline hijackings carried out in the name of the Palestinian cause. Never before these acts, had a terrorist movement, or in this case a national liberation front, ever carried out such forms of terrorist activity on such a global scale. These terrorist acts, which were politically motivated, were not directed at domestic targets, but at foreigners who had nothing to do with the “national liberation front’s” domestic objectives. Hough (2001: 123-124) states that such political terrorism becomes international when it targets “foreigners or foreign targets”. These foreign targets are usually states, or groups of more than one state, which in turn could influence the policies of a foreign government. He also describes transnational terrorism as acts of terrorism whereby terrorists operate internationally with the sole aim of initiating international revolution or of creating a revolutionary “supranational” world order.

The US National Counter-terrorism Centre’s (NCTC) *Country Reports on Terrorism* of 2004 states that Title 22 of the US Code defines the term “international terrorism” as “terrorism involving citizens, or the territory of, more than one country”. It further describes the term “terrorist group” as “any group practising international terrorism or any group with significant subgroups that practise international terrorism”. The US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (1976: 2) defined international terrorism in 1976 as an action which is “carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state” and transnational terrorism as an action which is “carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states”. The differences between the 1976 and 2004 definitions are a clear indication of how international terrorism has evolved the past thirty years.
Terrorism in the past has often been imported into a country or region, at the initiative of a foreign movement, which nevertheless enjoys the support of a sovereign state, with the objective of encouraging the growth of such groups on its own soil. Netanyahu (2001: 52) supports this by defining international terrorism as the “use of terrorist violence against a given nation by another state, which uses terrorists to fight an alternative war as a substitute for conventional war”. This is seen as a reason why international terrorism is so persistent and so difficult to uproot. The support of a modern state can provide an international terrorist movement with everything that the domestic terrorist movements usually lack in the way of cultural and logistical assistance. Wilkinson (1989: xiii) supports Netanyahu’s definition when he refers to “state-sponsored international terrorism”. Several acts of international terrorism in the past have been used as both domestic and foreign policy tools. State sponsors have used their own resources directly, recruited and controlled terror squads, and have chosen to work through “client” movements. Libya, Syria, Sudan, Cuba and Iran have all been sponsors of international terrorist activities.

Defining international terrorism, just as defining terrorism, is an intricate process. The difference between domestic and international terrorism has also steadily become more difficult to explain. Terrorist movements have often attacked domestic targets in an attempt to gain international support, propaganda and exposure. There are, however, also domestic acts of terrorism that manipulate the international arena significantly. Hough (2004: 5) suggests some form of categorisation of international terrorism when he classifies it as follows:

- States carrying out international terrorism by using their own resources and agents.
- State-sponsored international terrorism conducted by individuals who are supported by an independent state.
- Independently operating non-state groups or individuals conducting international terrorism.
- International terrorism as part of a broader domestic insurgency.

Jenkins (Kegley, 1990: 31) feels that international terrorism encompasses only those terrorist occurrences that have had clear international consequences; incidents in which terrorist movements travel to a foreign arena to attack their targets, or when these
terrorist groups stay at home but select victims because of their connections to a foreign state. Examples of this are the assassination of employees of foreign corporations as well as that of diplomats. International terrorism can also include attacks on international transport links such as airliners, trains and busses. Terrorist violence carried out by terrorists operating domestically against their own societies and by governments against their own people is however excluded from the above-mentioned occurrences.

The world witnessed a new form of international terrorism when the 9/11 terrorist attacks were carried out in the US. This new form of terrorism was not that which had been widely predicted by most experts, although indications of it had been emerging throughout the 1990’s. Gearson (Freedman, 2002: 7) proposes that this new form of international terrorism has evolved into acts of “super-terrorism.” Instead of using technologically-sophisticated weapons of mass destruction, the “super-terrorists” of 9/11 utilised the conventional terrorist approach of careful planning, simple strategies and operational surprise to effect the most dramatic terrorist event in history.

2.4 Causes of Terrorism

To conclude this section, as well as to fully understand the concept of terrorism, it is important to briefly look at the motives and causes of terrorism across the globe. The primary method of terrorism has already been outlined as the process whereby fear is created by violence or by the threat of violence. There are, however, many other motives for acts of terrorism besides the creation of fear. Crenshaw (1981: 374) describes several reasons which influence terrorist movements to use terror tactics. Revolutionary terrorists firstly want to seize political power in a country or region; secondly they want to influence public opinion and therefore also control the media; thirdly they want to maintain discipline within the terrorist organisation and enforce obedience and conformity; fourthly they want to discredit and disrupt the everyday operations of the government they are opposing; fifthly they want to win new recruits; and lastly they aim to project an image of greater strength than would be consistent with their numbers.

The above-mentioned motives however represent only one dimension. Describing the causes of terrorism, as is defining the term, is often a very complex exercise. The reason for this is that the causes tend to be influenced by more than one factor. Acts of terrorism can also be carried out for a variety reasons to achieve multiple aims. An
example of this is Al Qaeda’s *Jihad* against the US and its allies. The *Jihad*, and its subsequent terrorist activities, is provoked by not only Al Qaeda’s religious ideologies, but also by the struggle for political and economic power in the Middle East as well as the US’s support of a sovereign Israel. Bjørgo (2005: 3) lists four generic causes of terrorism across the globe. A terrorist group may be connected to one, or two or even all four. The four causes are:

- **Structural causes**: which affect people’s lives in ways that they may or may not comprehend, at a macro level. This includes aspects like demographic imbalances, globalisation, rapid modernisation, transitional societies, class structures, etc.

- **Facilitator (or accelerator) causes**: make terrorism feasible or attractive, without being the prime catalysts. Examples include the evolution of modern news media, transportation, weapon technology and weak state control of territory. It is even claimed by certain academics that terrorism occurs mainly because modern circumstances have made it exceptionally easy to employ terrorist tactics.

- **Motivational causes**: the actual grievances that people experience on a personal level, motivating them to act. Ideologies and political leaders are sometimes able to elevate causes from a structural level to a motivational level, thereby moving people to act.

- **Triggering causes**: the direct precipitators of terrorist acts. They may be momentous or provocative events, a political calamity, an outrageous act committed by the enemy, or other events that call for revenge or action. Even peace talks may trigger opponents of political compromise to carry out terrorist action in order to undermine negotiations and discredit moderates.

Terrorism, as well as guerrilla warfare, is used as a political tool to precipitate broader insurgency across the globe. This includes the use of international terrorism strategies. Terrorist activities do not, as anticipated, always result in broader insurgency. Wilkinson (2000:16) maintains this by stating that the “vast majority of groups using the weapon of
terrorism remain locked in a cycle of individual, usually very spasmodic, acts of bombing, assassination, hostage-taking, etc.” Few terrorist movements, in the past, have developed their operations into broader insurgencies. Both terrorism and guerrilla warfare are used as tactics in targeting civilian and security forces. Urban warfare, such as in Iraq, has resulted in insurgents using terrorist strategies in place of guerrilla tactics (Hough, Kruys & Du Plessis, 2005: 10).

The above sections illustrate the complexity of attempting to holistically define and understand terrorism. International terrorist movements and their activities are also greatly influenced by the international security climate. This influences their ideologies, movements, funding, targets and communication. The occurrence of international terrorism in the post-Cold War international security environment will be the focus point of the next section of this chapter.

3. THE POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The Cold War froze the leading Western view of security into a bipolar model. Ayoob (1995: 6) describes this bipolar model as a “Western concept” of security. “Alliance security” was the term applied to the concept of state security. The security of the major developed states in Europe and North America, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact became the fundamental focus of the international security structure as a whole.

The vast majority of all the states across the globe, independent and independent, developed and developing, were influenced politically and economically by the Cold War. Gardner (2005: 1) believes that during the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union tactically collaborated in restraining, or “double containing”, the power potential and capabilities of both major and minor powers, including developed countries in Europe like Germany, and developing countries across the globe. US-Soviet collaboration in this “double containment” was partly a result of the formation of opposing spheres of influence and security, and partly because of the “wall” dividing Europe. In addition, the US and Soviet Union often kept strategically-positioned states in the developing world as “weak” as possible by pitting the different sides against each other in violent wars. This had a great influence on the political, economic and security environments of the developing world, including Africa. An example of this was the civil war in Angola.
As Figure 1 shows, the post-Cold War world, from 1991 to 2000, witnessed fewer international terrorist incidents than during the last ten years of the Cold War (1981-1990). A total of 5389 international terrorist acts took place across the world between 1981 and 1990. The 1991-2000 timeframe, however, had a total of only 3816 international terrorist acts. This means there was a 29.1 percent reduction in international terrorist acts occurring in the first ten years after the Cold War, in comparison to those which occurred in the last ten years of the Cold War. The statistics in Table 1 clearly illustrate that the collapse of the Soviet Union, and subsequently the end of the Cold War, had a major impact on international terrorist activities across the globe.

The ending of the Cold War saw many terrorist organisations lose one of their primary means of support, the Soviet Union. Wilkinson (2000: 36) states that “state support and sponsorship of various client groups and states which had been so active in the 1970s and 1980s” were forsaken after the ending of the Cold War. It deprived Palestinian terrorist groups of a significant source of money, weapons, and safe havens. German reunification also ended East Germany’s role as an important supplier of money, weapons and sanctuary for terrorists to retreat to after their operations. Aid from Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania also dried up with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Even former Soviet allied states like Syria and Libya, which at times were independent sources of money and weaponry, refrained from overt support of terrorism. This led to terrorist groups seeking new sources and locations, for example Africa (Kushner, 1998: 6).
The superpowers’ involvement in regional conflicts during the Cold War also played an important part in the resolution of those conflicts; or in some cases, their development into larger conflicts. Clutterbuck (1994: 3) states that during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union and most of their allied states were “always anxious” that a regional conflict might lead to a superpower confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, terrorist activities sponsored by countries such as the Soviet Union, Cuba and China; and Marxist terrorism in Europe, largely subsided. Public violence in India; national violence in Sri Lanka, Spain and Northern Ireland; and between rival warlords in Africa, however, continued. Islamic fundamentalism overtook Marxism as the prime ideological generator of international terrorism as well as drug-related terrorism which continued to plague both Latin America and South and East Asia.

The collapse of the Soviet Union unfortunately also created a market that offered extreme terrorist organisations weapons, components, and the related skills which they had not possessed before. Stern (1999: 9) describes the Soviet nuclear-security system as a system that was designed during the Cold War to prevent Americans from stealing secrets, not to prevent theft by insiders. After the end of the Cold War that system largely collapsed. This led to international terrorist organisations continuing to attempt to obtain the most feared weapons known to mankind, so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The development of the US as the only superpower is also one of the primary developments that can be associated with the ending of the Cold War. One can now ask what this superiority means in the context of a terrorism-prone world. Pillar (2001: 50) proposes that terrorism “does not add to the power of any adversary that is challenging the United States for world predominance, or that has a realistic chance of revising the global hierarchy of power”. This notion is undoubtedly exemplified by the US-led “Global War on Terrorism” as well as its invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

The end of the Cold War and its bipolar-based international security regime has brought about profound changes, challenges and constraints to many post-colonial African countries. Hawkins (2003: 61) states that these new security disputes and complications have created more inconsistencies, and developed into both political instabilities and serious regional security problems, for several conflict-ridden African states and regions. This is illustrated by the fact that conflict in Africa was responsible for approximately 90
percent of the total number of war deaths in the 1990’s. Nine of the ten bloodiest conflicts in the 1990’s were African conflicts. This resulted in developed states and organisations like the UN drastically increasing their efforts to end civil and regional wars throughout Africa.

Eleven years after the end of the Cold War the focus of the international security environment, especially regarding terrorism, changed drastically. Global change occurred after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. This change took place on political and diplomatic levels. It also promoted changes in military and intelligence strategies across the globe. In return, these changes influenced economic developments across the world as there were severe reactions from the world’s financial and commercial markets. Even social behaviour altered in most parts of the globe. The next segment of this chapter assesses the post-9/11 international security environment and its impact on international terrorism.

4. THE POST-9/11 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

This section is sub-divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section outlines the number of international terror incidents over this period, while the second sub-section briefly describes the characteristics of, and trends in contemporary international terrorism.

4.1 Number of International Terror Incidents in the Post-9/11 Era

The US-led coalition’s “Global War on Terrorism” has had a drastic influence on the strategies, movements, funding and communication channels of those international terrorist organisations they were targeting. This is also clearly seen by the drastic reduction in international terrorist acts after the events of 9/11. Figure 2 indicates a radical decline in international terrorist activities across the world after 2001. The 2002 statistics show a 42,2 percent reduction in international terrorist acts since 2001. This clearly illustrates that the 9/11 incidents and the subsequent US-led “War on Terrorism” have had a substantial impact on the extent of international terrorism. The events of 9/11 not only altered the way the world viewed international terrorism, but also indicated how international terrorism would be deterred. The 2004 statistics, however, saw a significant increase in incidents. This was largely due to the insurgency in Iraq against US
occupancy forces; conflict in the Middle East with regard to Israel’s sovereignty; and terrorism in South Asia relating to Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan.

Figure 2: International Terrorist Incidents, 1999-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 2003; NCTC's Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004

The number of incidents of international terrorism is, however, not the only factor related to the assessment of international terrorism in the post-9/11 era. Mass casualties have also become a characteristic of single acts of international terrorism over the past couple of years. Examples of this are the 9/11 attacks; the 331 people (including 172 children) killed and hundreds more wounded at a school in Russia in 2004; and the Islamic terrorist attack on commuter trains in Spain in 2004, killing 191 and wounding hundreds of others (NCTC Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004: 52).

Terrorist attacks resulting in mass casualties started occurring in the 1990s. Tucker (2001: 6) describes the rise in the number of mass casualties in the 1990s when he refers to the 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo Subway (12 killed, 5500 casualties); the 1996 truck bombing of the Central Bank in Colombo (90 killed, 1400 casualties); and the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (291 killed, 5000 casualties). Figure 3 illustrates how the number of mass casualties increased even more over the period 2001 to 2004. The post-Cold War and post-9/11 era (1991-2004) saw a total of 41 717 casualties occurring due to international terrorist attacks. The ten year period from 1991 to 2000 saw a total of 22 709 casualties occurring. The four year period from 2001 to 2004 however saw 19 008 casualties occurring due to international terrorist attacks. This means that the three year period of 2001 to 2004, which is less than half of the 1991-2004 period, witnessed 45.5 percent of all casualties due to international terrorism since 1991.
The four year period of 1997 to 2000 saw 1399 international terrorist attacks, while the four year period of 2001 to 2004 accounts for only twenty more incidents, namely 1419 incidents. The 2001 to 2004 period however reflected 19 008 casualties compared to the 9 460 casualties of the previous four years. This is a clear indication that international terrorist attacks in the Twenty First Century have become more severe and deadly than before.

The next sub-section briefly describes the characteristics of, and trends in contemporary international terrorism.

4.2 Contemporary International Terrorism Characteristics and Trends

A number of new global political and diplomatic trends emerged after 9/11. Among these were the creation of a new global alliance against terrorism, and a strengthening of the US-UK political and military alliances. The events of 9/11 resulted in a so-called “new global alliance against terrorism”. The new global alliance was extraordinary and unique as it acquired the backing of organisations such as the UN General Assembly, the European Union (EU), NATO countries, Russia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, and regional groupings such as the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Conference. It even had the support of states that were not supporters of US foreign policy, namely China and Iran (Neuland, Olivier & Venter, 2002: 36)
Many analysts have called the events of 9/11 the turning point in the international concern with terrorism. Cilliers (2003: 91) feels that these events “did not occur in isolation”. Even if they came across as such, they did not reflect an unexpected new danger. They did however illustrate and reiterate an international terrorism trend that had been apparent for a number of years. Whereas terrorism until that time had been regarded as merely a corollary to revolutions, liberation wars, counter-insurgency campaigns and the battlefields of the Cold War; the events of that day took terrorism to a new “global level”. There was not only a drastic change in the intensity with which international terrorism was viewed by the international security environment, but also in how it was deterred. Bunker (2005: 1) supports this notion by stating that “very few people, who were raised and spent most of their lives in the many decades spanned by the Cold War, imagined at that time that the global security environment after 2001 would end up being so drastically different from that of the pre-2001 era”.

New methods and weapons have also been utilised by international terrorist organisations over the past couple of years. The 9/11 attacks took the conventional international terrorist tactic of the 1970s, of hijacking airliners, to a new level when they used commercial airliners as conventional weapons. Other new forms of weapons and technologies at the disposal of international terrorists since the 1990s are for example the internet (cyber terrorism), sophisticated explosives like the Czechoslovakian-made Semtex, Stinger missiles sold on the black market and Global Positioning System (GPS) units. The most sought-after weapons in the international terrorist environment are however WMD, which include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. WMD are seen as the perfect weapons to enable religious terrorists to annihilate all infidels. They can also be used by terrorist groups as weapons to blackmail anyone or any government across the globe (Medd and Goldstein, 1997: 292-299).

The number of incidents of, and casualties resulting from, international terrorist attacks, the type of weapons used during these attacks and the motives behind the attacks, all contribute to current trends in international terrorism. The following itemises some of the main current international terrorism trends:

- Several international terrorist organisations are turning to criminal activities to fund their operations.
Organised crime syndicates are using terror tactics to exterminate anyone opposing their activities.

International terrorism is now being committed by individuals who are working independently. These individuals may be associated to a group, or may not act on behalf of any conventional terrorist movement at all. They are not sponsored by any state and usually receive funding through other channels like crime, illegal trade or private sponsorship.

Civic places are more often becoming targets for international terrorist groups. This includes, for example, holiday resorts, financial centres and basic infrastructures.

Some terrorist movements are less frequently claiming responsibility for attacks or are even denying responsibility totally, as this might disrupt ongoing peace negotiations.

States with weak security structures and states that have very little, or even no, relation to the dispute are being utilised by terrorist movements.

Ideologically-motivated terrorism like Marxism has largely been replaced by religious and ethnic separatist terrorist movements.

Suicide bombings as a terrorist strategy have increased. Martyrdom is usually seen as the incentive for terrorists to sacrifice their lives for the cause of their terrorist movements (Hough, 2004: 25-27).

The above mentioned contemporary international terrorism trends and characteristics clearly illustrate the complexity and difficulty in preventing it across the globe. The next section briefly looks the concept of counter-terrorism.

5. THE CONCEPT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

The term “counter-terrorism” could be described simply as a government, military or any other security strategy aiming to contain and prevent acts of terrorism. Martin (2003:245) refers to counter-terrorism as the “proactive policies that specifically seek to eliminate terrorist environments and groups”. It does not matter which policy is analysed, the definitive objective of counter-terrorism is to prevent the loss of lives by proactively preventing, or decreasing the number of, terrorist attacks. The consequences obviously involve the hunting down of terrorism groups and targeting their movements; enhancing security domestically, continentally and internationally; and any other defensive measures seeking to contain or prevent terrorist attacks.
Martin (2003:346) groups counter-terrorism into three policy categories. The first category is that of “diplomatic interactions, financial controls, military force, intelligence, and covert actions”. An example of this is the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The second category is that of “legal, repressive, and pacifying responses to terrorism”; an example of this being South Africa’s Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act of 2004. The last category is that of “targeted and untargeted prevention”. Untargeted prevention refers to strategies like random law enforcement, road blocks and inspections. Targeted prevention refers to the investigation of specific terrorist movements.

Terrorist activities such as murder, conspiracy to murder, kidnapping and extortion, are all forms of crime. Hence the various acts of terrorism constantly contravene the criminal law codes of all states (Wilkinson, 2000:69). It can now be asked whether a state regards individuals and organisations as terrorists or as normal criminals and how this affects the state’s counter-terrorist strategies. Essential counter-terrorist policies cannot focus only on the criminal activities of terrorism itself, but they also need to take into account the fact that terrorists have a menu of other tactics and behaviour from which to choose, and that the conflicts essential to terrorism invariably have other dimensions that also affect a government’s interests. Pillar (2001: 17) states that terrorism is “but one form of behaviour along a continuum of possible political behaviours of those who strongly oppose the status quo of a state”. There are numerous types of other actions that terrorist movements can resort to. Examples of such actions are other types of violence such as guerrilla warfare; non-violent actions like supporting a terrorist movement’s political party; or even just expressing opinions which are in favour of such terrorist movements and their actions.

Democratic societies find it problematic when considering authoritative action against political violence. Whittaker (2003: 276) feels that this is understandable, considering the public’s high regard for private opinion and action, and its traditional disapproval of censure of any kind. In fact the latter could well be viewed as illegal and irregular authoritarian intervention. Security services in democratic states, which are based on fundamental human rights, find it hard to initiate what is seen as “irregular” police work, for example the placing of “informers” and the carrying out of surveillance.
Any contemporary liberal democratic state needs to commit itself to uphold and maintain the constitutional principle of law and order. Such a commitment can only be truly effective if it has secured the necessary public support. Chalk (1998:386) states that this is most likely to occur if the initiation of counter-terrorist measures is guided by three cardinal principles of action. Firstly, the response needs to be “limited and well-defined”. Secondly, the response needs to be “credible”. Lastly, the introduction, use and continuance of all counter-terrorist measures, especially those initiated by the intelligence services, need to be made “subject to constant parliamentary supervision and judicial oversight”. These principles are based on the fact that the overwhelming majority of conflicts involving the use of terrorism are waged within the borders of nation-states. In theory, if not always in practice, each of these nation-states has sovereignty over its own territory and is responsible for maintaining national security and for upholding law and order. This is a contentious issue in Africa as many African countries have struggled since gaining independence to maintain national security and uphold law and order in their countries.

The prevention of international terrorism across the globe requires international co-operation by all the different role-players involved in the combating thereof. No single state can prevent or combat any form of international terrorism without some form of international co-operation. International terrorist groups have shown that they can easily move across national lines and that they can find sanctuaries in either weak or strong nations, and exploit the differences between religions and cultures in those nations for their own benefit. Francis Taylor, former US Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, supports this notion when he stated in 2004 that “if 9/11 has taught us anything, it’s the strength of international cooperation in defeating terrorism.” The prevention of international terrorism must cut across cultural, ethnic, regional, and religious spheres across the globe (Taylor, 2004). The importance of international co-operation to prevent and combat international terrorism can be seen through the numerous international and regional counter-terrorism conventions and strategies developed by international and regional institutions such as the UN and the AU.

6. CONCLUSION

The common denominators of all the provided definitions of terrorism are fear and violence. Terrorism is generically an action which involves violence with an overall
political motive which may also include religious or ethnic characteristics. There may also be the threat of the use of such violence, which in turn develops fear. It is also evident that these acts of violence and the threat thereof have been utilised by governments and terrorist-based movements for hundreds of years.

This illustrates not only how successfully terrorism has been utilised as a political tool in the past, but also how national, and inter-governmental structures have struggled to contain and deter it. The post-Cold War period and 9/11 events illuminate the growth, diversification and development of international terrorism over the past few decades.

The international security environment needs to be continually assessed as it provides information on current and future counter-terrorist measures. International terrorist movements in the 9/11 environment not only operated very differently from those during the Cold War, but must also be deterred differently. This is applicable to all regions of the world, including Africa.

The next chapter provides an overview of international terrorism in Africa up to the end of the Cold War. International terrorism and counter-measures in Africa up to 1990 will be analysed to present a background to the post-Cold War and post-9/11 international terrorism situation in Africa. Relevant case studies will be analysed for the purpose of gaining an understanding of international terrorism in Africa during the Cold War. The chapter will include the different phases of international terrorism during the Cold War, methods and strategies of international terrorist movements during this period, and counter-terrorism strategies during the Cold War.
CHAPTER 3

AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN AFRICA UP TO 1990

“The Cold War was waged in a particularly brutal and cynical way in Africa, and Africa seemed powerless to do anything to stop it.”

Ryszard Kapuscinski

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes terrorism and international terrorism in Africa during the Cold War period. It will also illustrate Africa’s position in the international security structure of the Cold War regarding international terrorism.

The chapter will commence with an overview of international terrorism across the globe during the Cold War period. The overview will include the beginning of contemporary international terrorism in the late 1960s, as well as international terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s. This section will include the different phases of international terrorism during the Cold War, methods and strategies of international terrorist movements, and counter-terrorism strategies during this period.

This next section starts by briefly looking at Africa during the decolonisation period and the presence and effect of revolutionary and nationalist terrorism during this time. This is done solely for the purpose of providing a background to Africa’s security environment at the beginning of the Cold War. It will also illustrate Africa’s internal political, economic, social and, subsequently, security turmoil, which had been a daily occurrence in the continent since the beginning of the Cold War. This will be followed by the primary focus of the chapter, namely international terrorism in Africa during the Cold War era. This section looks at the incidence of international terrorism in Africa over the period from the 1960s to 1990. Several case studies are discussed as examples of the occurrence of international terrorism in Africa during the Cold War period. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of international terrorism counter-measures up to 1990 with specific reference to Africa. This chapter forms the background to the following chapter where
the post-Cold War and post-9/11 international terrorism situation in Africa will be assessed.

2. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM DURING THE COLD WAR

Contemporary international terrorism developed in the late 1960s. It was especially during the 1970s that it became an international and violent political phenomenon. The US State Department’s statistics on international terrorism reflect the origin of international terrorism in the late 1960s as these statistics were first compiled in 1968. Various incidents in 1968 resulted in movements across the globe turning to terrorist violence, especially pertaining to international terrorism, as a more effective method of achieving their objectives. Examples of these incidents include the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) hijacking of an El Al aircraft and forcing it to fly to Algeria; the Baader-Meinhof’s torching of a department store in Frankfurt and the assassination of Martin Luther King in the US (Kegley, 1990:135). The late 1960s saw international terrorism become a prominent feature of political violence across the international arena.

Revolutionary groups, nationalist movements and other political extremists across the globe realised during this period that international terrorist activities provided them with a higher - and very necessary – level of international propaganda and coverage than domestic terrorist strategies had achieved. International terrorism strategies allowed these groups to gain vital and dramatic propaganda material and revolutionary status through utilising low-cost incidents such as airline hijackings and assassinations. International terrorism also gave terrorist groups the opportunity to highlight their grievances to the rest of the world. International and foreign events, airliners, properties and employees were now seen as targets by the terrorist organisations. Politically-motivated hijackings, bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and other criminal activities became effective political tools for terrorists and they attracted international attention. The growth of global media technology and networks in the 1960s also assisted international terrorist movements to relay their messages across the globe effortlessly and immediately (Martin, 2003: 216).

The statistics in Figure 4 illustrate how rapidly international terrorism, as a violent political tool, grew during the 1970s as the number of international terrorist incidents
increased drastically over this period. International terrorist incidents did not exceed the 200 mark in the years 1968 and 1969. The beginning of the 1970s, however, saw terrorist incidents increase drastically, with the 1980s witnessing far more international terrorist incidents. 1970 to 1979 saw an average of 401 international terrorist incidents taking place annually across the globe. The period 1980 to 1989 saw a sweeping 35.5 percentage increase in the average number of international incidents, which rose to an average of 543 incidents annually across the globe.

Since the first incidents of contemporary international terrorism in the late 1960s, there have been specifically relevant periods of international terrorism. The different periods were characterised by the different objectives and motives of international terrorist groups. As discussed in Chapter 2, the motives were politically-driven, such as ideologies, nationalism, and religion. Political motives also became entangled with economic and criminal motives as time went by. Specific periods that can be categorised are the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s and the post-2000 period. It must, however, also be emphasised that overlaps did occur during these periods (Hough, 2004: 22). The following two sections assess international terrorism during the Cold War by differentiating between incidents experienced during the 1970s and during the 1980s.

2.1 International Terrorism in the 1970s

No academic or government official could have predicted, at the end of the 1960s, the
extent to which terrorist groups would increase during the next ten or so years. The 1970s saw terrorists seize more than 50 embassies and consulates; take athletes hostage and assassinate them at the Munich Olympics; take over the headquarters of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna and hold the oil ministers of 11 nations hostage; kidnap hundreds of diplomats and businessmen and collect ransom of hundreds of millions of dollars; hijack numerous airliners; kidnap and murder the former premier of Italy; and assassinate President Sadat of Egypt. International terrorism in the 1970s proved to be a far more serious problem than the international security environment had anticipated at the beginning of that decade (Wolfgang, 1982: 11-12).

Popular terrorist methods during the 1970s included hijackings and hostage-takings. International terrorist targets included mostly individuals or groups of people who had affiliations to a desired audience. These included political leaders and industrial leaders. Medd and Goldstein (1997: 282) classify these methods as “events of duration”. Mainstream international terrorist attacks during this period were long, drawn-out media events that included even dialogue between the terrorists and the authorities to whom they were making demands. The hostage-taking of the Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympics was one of the first of such terrorist attacks to attract a global audience. The majority of resources allocated to international terrorists in the 1970s derived from states which aimed to spread Marxist philosophies, and Palestinian and special interest groups. Weapons used by the terrorists were mostly small bombs and firearms. The majority of international terrorist groups during this period fell into two groupings, namely nationalist-separatist and social-revolutionary terrorist groups (see Figure 5).

Extreme left-wing philosophies like Marxism and anarchism underlined the ideological basis of the majority of international terrorist groups in the 1970’s. Neo-Nazism and neo-Fascism also played a role in some terrorist groups. International terrorist groups, motivated by these ideologies aimed to change the entire political, economic and social structures of their respective regions through revolutionary violence. These “social revolutionaries” aimed to destroy global capitalist imperialism, especially in industrial countries like Germany and Japan. Another primary motivation of international terrorism in the 1970s occurred as a result of nationalist separatism. Nationalist separatists based their actions on a combination of ideology and nationalism. An example of this was the
PLO which based its objectives on Marxist ideologies combined with a nationalist campaign (Hough, 2004: 10).

The clearly-defined objectives of international terrorists during the 1970s - ideological and nationalist – were, however, to diversify in the 1980’s. The following section assesses how international terrorism as a phenomenon changed during the 1980s.
2.2 International Terrorism in the 1980s

By 1980, the majority of international terrorist groups, their targets, motivations, and sponsors were well documented across the globe. The mainstream of the international terrorist groups was sponsored by two primary groupings, namely the Soviet Union and its allies and Arab states. These countries included the Soviet Union, Cuba, Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Yemen, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The major international terrorist groups originated primarily from Europe, the Middle East, South America and Asia (Kegley, 1990: 172).

The 1980s saw international terrorism resort to activities that occurred too quickly to allow a response by counter-terrorist forces. The attacks were also far more random than those that occurred in the 1970’s. Attacks tended to become more indiscriminate, and the size and lethality of explosives increased. Targets included Western civil aircraft, industry, judicial systems and national leaders. The rise of radical Islam and Marxism in Latin America had a profound influence on the targets of international terrorism in the 1980s. Religious and economic structures developed as primary terrorist objectives over this period. The Islamist international terrorist groups also developed mutually-beneficial relationships with other movements in the 1980s. The relationship between the Palestinian movement and the Islamic movements, and the relationships between the leftist guerrillas of Latin America and the drug cartels are some examples of this (Medd & Goldstein, 1997: 283).

The increase in the number of radical Islamists in the early 1980s resulted in numerous international terrorist organisations developing in the majority of Muslim countries in the Middle East. The most noteworthy of these organisations – concerning their significance in terms of their capacity to carry out terrorist campaigns – were al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (Egypt), Hamas (Gaza) and Hezbollah (South Lebanon). The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 is seen as the general inspiration for the rise of all of these movements. The revolution aimed at developing a new Islamic republic based on fundamentalist principles. The West was blamed for all society’s ills in the Middle East, motivating the disenfranchised in society to produce a steady supply of willing suicide bombers for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. These principles form the basis of many of the radical Islamist terrorist movements (Wilkinson, 2000: 34). State-sponsored terrorism –
especially against Western targets – increased drastically during the 1980s. Both the Islamic terrorist groups and the Soviet Bloc utilised international terrorism to reach their strategic objectives.

Another development in the 1980s regarding international terrorism was the increased co-operation between terrorism and organised crime. Hough (2004: 11-12) states that “narco-terrorism” developed in the 1980s due to the development of co-operation between organised crime and terrorism. Terror groups used the link to organised crime as a source of funding for their operations. These sources included the trading of narcotics, fictitious charities, kidnapping and extortion. An example of this is the utilisation of the cocaine market by Columbian revolutionaries in the 1980s to fund their revolutionary objectives.

The extraordinary prevalence and boldness of terrorist acts in the 1980s – in comparison to those of the 1970s – and government responses to those terrorist acts during that period resulted in many experts concluding that terrorists would, and could, turn to acts of mass destruction. Nuclear terrorism developed as a real strategic threat to the Western powers in the 1980s. The Western powers were especially concerned with the fact that several state sponsors of international terrorism possessed WMD – nuclear, biological, and chemical – or claimed to be entitled to nuclear assistance by virtue of their adherence to the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* or membership of the International Energy Agency (Beckman, 1986: 351-353).

The above-mentioned periods in international terrorism also had a significant influence on the security structures of the Third World. Africa, however, witnessed revolutionary and nationalist terrorism long before the 1970s and 1980s. Terrorism was used as an effective political tool during Africa’s decolonisation period in the 1950s and 1960s. The next section briefly describes the presence of terrorism in Africa during the decolonisation period of the 1950s and 1960s.

3. AFRICA: DECOLONIALISATION AND REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM

When decolonisation started across Africa, it was hoped that the new dawn of independence would bring Africa not only self-rule, but also political, economic and social prosperity for the people of the continent. It was unfortunately not to be.
3.1 Sovereignty in Africa

The end of World War II saw Africa begin a new chapter of its history. African countries at this stage were still dominated by their colonial European authorities. Countries like Great Britain, Portugal and France maintained political and economic control over vast territories and resources in Africa. Mazrui (2002: 18) believes that the Second World War destabilised Britain’s “imperial will, the will to hold on to the Empire”. The first African country, Ghana, gained independence in 1957, and in 1958 Charles de Gaulle, who had returned to power in a France fractured by the Algerian war, offered independence to the French possessions in sub-Saharan Africa. The African countries duly accepted the offer. Gleijeses (2002: 5) points out that in 1960, the so-called “Year of Africa”, sixteen European colonies (French, British and Belgian) became independent. By 1963 when the OAU was established, the tally of independent African states had risen to thirty two. The colonial powers had resisted the termination of colonialism throughout the 1950’s. Their argument was that independence had to be carefully prepared as the people of Africa did not possess the administrative skills to run their own countries. They felt that this would lead to political and economic instability and deterioration (Mayall, 1971: 74). The UN however felt differently about the situation. The UN’s Declaration on Independence for Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960 affirms this by stating that the “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence” (United Nations, 1960).

When colonial powers departed, so did many of their political, economic and social skills, resources and structures, as had been feared. Gordon (1996: 53) states that the departure of the colonial authorities and the expectation of independence and sovereignty in Africa “soon disappeared as the new leadership grappled with the sobering aftermath of colonial rule”. Most of the new African leaders could not ensure economic, social and political stability and progression within Africa. The new independent authorities also inherited unresolved political issues from their colonial predecessors. Many of the African tribal structures did not coincide with the newly-founded sovereign state boundaries. These boundaries were based on those forcibly established by their former colonial masters. Clutterbuck (1994: 9) states that this is just one of the “deep rooted problems” that most African countries, especially the majority of the Sub-Saharan states, have had to face since gaining independence.
There was, however, optimism across the globe concerning the success of African states. This was unfortunately not to be, as Copson (1994: 74) describes how expectations were “disappointed over the passage of time”. Efforts to mobilise independent African societies evolved into dictatorial forms of rule. Mwakikagile (2004: 18) supports this notion by stating that the majority of African leaders, since their countries’ independence; have raided the national coffers; bankrupted their economies; and jailed, tortured and killed their opponents, including innocent civilians; to cement their positions in national office.

3.2 Decolonisation and Terrorism in Africa

Terrorism has already in the second chapter been identified as a strategy so-called “freedom fighters” or “liberators” utilise in aiming to gain political independence. This was no different in Africa during the decolonisation period. The *International Encyclopaedia of Terrorism* (1997: 163) declares that the “most brutal terrorism occurred in countries where the colonial power was determined not to withdraw”. The decolonisation conflicts in numerous African countries were extensive and ferocious. Europeans were also not the only targets of terror during the decolonisation campaigns. People of the same race and culture were also targeted as they were seen as colonial collaborators, or simply as a threat to the nationalists’ political aspirations.

To a revolutionary organisation, the benefits of a strategy of terrorism are related to the political objectives such actions can achieve and the likelihood that they will be accomplished. Hutchinson (1978: 21) describes revolutionary terrorism as a part of the strategy of insurgents who are “attempting to gain political power through the overthrow of an incumbent government.”

Examples of political groups that used terrorism during their campaigns to gain political authority were the Mau Mau movement in Kenya; the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa; the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), and the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) in Zimbabwe; the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) of Namibia and the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria.

At the beginning of the Cold War, domestic terrorism was used as a liberation and revolutionary tool in Africa. Political violence was a daily occurrence across the
continent. Many of the international terrorist organisations of the world during this period had similar objectives – political, religious, revolutionary, nationalistic and economic – to the terrorist organisations of the decolonisation period. International terrorist organisations however used different methods, strategies and targets. Their battlefields were also not confined to one or two countries, but were focused on the international arena as a whole. Africa only started witnessing significant international terrorist activities during the 1970s. The following section assesses the incidence of international terrorism in Africa during the Cold War.

4. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN AFRICA DURING THE COLD WAR

During the Cold War, incidents of domestic terrorism outnumbered the incidents of international terrorism in Africa. International terrorism, however, did occur in Africa. The following section looks at the number of incidents and the casualties of international terrorism in Africa over the 1968 to 1990 period. These incidents are then compared to those that occurred in other regions of the globe.

4.1 International Incidents of Terrorism, and Resulting Casualties, in Africa 1968-1990

Africa was not isolated from international terrorism during the Cold War. Figure 6 illustrates the number of international terrorist incidents that occurred in Africa in comparison to those occurring in other regions of the world during the 1968 to 1990 period. Africa witnessed only 6 percent of the total number of international terrorist incidents that took place between 1968 and 1990. Revolutionary groups operating across Africa during the Cold War period utilised primarily domestic terrorism strategies as part of the insurgency campaigns in their respective countries. Revolutionary groups in Africa relatively seldom turned to international terrorism as part of an insurgency during this period. The Middle East, Western Europe and Latin America were the regions with the highest number of international terrorist incidents over this period. This is largely due to the fact that the majority of international terrorist organisations operated in these areas. These included international terrorist organisations like the PLO, the Red Brigade, RAF, Hamas and Hezbollah. In Africa, on the other hand, there were no significant international terrorist movements. It did, however, have a large number of domestically-driven revolutionary and nationalist terrorist movements. Nevertheless, it must be noted
that Africa accounted for the fifth highest number of incidents over this period. This is an indication of the fact that some of the continent’s domestic terrorist groups targeted foreigners and that the continent was also used as a theatre by foreign-based terrorist groups.

The number of incidents is not the only indicator of the severity of international terrorism across the globe over the Cold War period, the number of casualties resulting from the incidents is another. Figure 7 shows the number of casualties (killed and wounded) that resulted from the above-mentioned international terrorist incidents. Africa had the fourth highest number of casualties resulting from international terrorist incidents over this period.
Although Africa did not experience as many international terrorist attacks as regions such as the Middle East, Western Europe and Latin America, it did however witness several incidents that had significant international consequences. The following section briefly reviews a number of case studies of international terrorist incidents during the Cold War in Africa, in order to obtain a clearer understanding of international terrorism in Africa during the Cold War.

4.2 International Terrorism Case Studies in Africa during the Cold War Period

In the late 1960s, as international terrorism started becoming an international phenomenon, African states witnessed countless acts of political violence – especially assassinations of leaders – which reflected the primary focus of terrorism in the continent up to that period. By the 1980s the continent had, however, also witnessed several acts of international terrorism within its boundaries. Examples of these are the 1976 Entebbe airliner hijacking crisis and the assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat.

Airliner hijacking was one of the primary international terrorist tactics during the Cold War. This was also the general case in most of the international terrorist incidents in Africa during this period. The first aircraft hijacking in Africa occurred in 1961 when six men diverted a domestic Portuguese airliner to Tangier in Morocco. Many other airline hijackings occurred within – or were directed towards – Africa during the Cold War. Some had greater international significance than others. The Pan-American airliner that was seized in 1970 by three Arab men, and later blown up in Cairo, had a much larger impact on international opinion than the seizure of a South African airliner that was diverted to Malawi by two Lebanese men in 1972. Africa did, however, experience airline hijackings that had a considerable impact on the international arena. The Entebbe incident of 1976 and the Mogadishu incident of 1977 were two of the most spectacular airline hijacking incidents Africa witnessed during the Cold War (Igbinovia, 1986: 75-79).

The Entebbe incident started on the 27th of June 1976 when an Air France airliner, its flight having originated in Tel Aviv, Israel, was hijacked by four terrorists. The hijackers, who were members of the PFLP and the German RAF, demanded the release of 40 Palestinians being held in Israel and a dozen other detainees imprisoned across Europe and in Kenya, or they would begin killing hostages on July 1. The hijackers released a
large number of hostages, keeping only Israelis and Jews, whom they threatened to kill if
Israel did not comply with their demand. The aircraft proceeded to a stop-over in
Benghazi, Libya. There it was held on the ground for seven hours for refuelling, and a
female hostage was released; thereafter it took off and arrived the next morning at
Entebbe Airport in Uganda. At Entebbe, the four hijackers were joined by three
additional terrorists, supported by the pro-Palestinian armed forces of Uganda's
President, Idi Amin. At the July 1 deadline, with no rescue mission yet set in motion, the
government of Israel offered to negotiate with the hijackers in order to extend the
deadline to July 4. On July 3, the Israeli cabinet approved “Operation Entebbe”. After
several days of collecting intelligence, and careful planning, four Israeli Air Force C-130
Hercules transport aircraft flew secretly from Israel and landed at night at Entebbe
Airport. During the battle that ensued, 20 Ugandan soldiers, the seven hijackers, three
hostages and one Israeli soldier died. The rescued hostages were flown out shortly after
the fighting to Israel (Thomas, 1999: 149-152).

The Mogadishu incident began on October 13, 1977, when a Lufthansa airliner, flying
from Palma de Mallorca in Spain to Frankfurt, was hijacked by four PFLP terrorists. The
aircraft changed course and landed in Rome for refuelling. The terrorists demanded the
release of eleven RAF terrorists being detained at a German prison, and 15 million US
dollars. The airliner continued its journey, landing in Larnaca, Dubai and Aden. The
airliner then left Aden, where the pilot was killed, and flew to Mogadishu, Somalia. On
October 17 it landed in Mogadishu. An ultimatum was set by the terrorists for the RAF
prisoners to be released. A 60-man team of elite German commandos had been
following the hijacked aircraft closely ever since it had left Larnaca. The commandos
freed the hostages in a daring raid after the hostages had suffered a six-day ordeal.
Only one of the four terrorists survived. A German commando member and a flight
attendant were injured. All the hostages were rescued and the majority were flown to
Germany a few hours later (MIPT Knowledge Base: Incidents Profile, 2006).

State-sponsored terrorism also played a key role in international terrorism in Africa
during the Cold War. Libya – and its leader Gaddafi – was the most notable of the
African states sponsoring international terrorism across the globe. Gaddafi had a long
record of employing his diplomatic service to support any group claiming to be anti-
Israeli or anti-American during the Cold War. Several thousands of African and Arab
volunteers were trained with Soviet weapons in training camps across Libya (Cline & Alexander, 1986: 17).

Libya’s sponsorship of international terrorism can undoubtedly be illustrated by several examples over a period of two decades. One of the most comprehensively-documented examples of Gadaffi’s sponsorship of international terrorism was the Lockerbie disaster of 1988. Pan Am Flight 103, en route from London to New York, exploded midair and crashed into the Scottish village of Lockerbie, fifteen miles north of the English border. Along with the 259 people on board, 11 people on the ground were killed in the crash. Twelve others were seriously injured. Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khali Fhimah of Libya were charged in both the US and the UK for the bombing. Libya initially refused to extradite the suspects, but following sanctions imposed by the UN and extensive diplomatic negotiations, they did so several years later (CNN, 2002).

The above-mentioned case studies emphasise Africa’s role in international terrorism during the Cold War. Africa’s role may not have been as predominant as that of the Middle East, Western Europe and Latin America, but it nevertheless did play a noteworthy role in the occurrence of international terrorism during the Cold War.

As international terrorism escalated across the globe in the 1970s, so did the attempts to counter such acts. While the world was divided ideologically between capitalism and socialism, it was primarily the UN that attempted to bring the globe’s nations together in an holistic approach to develop counter-measures against international terrorism. The US also played a major role in the development of international counter-terrorism measures during the Cold War. The following section explores international counter-terrorism strategies that were developed during the Cold War with specific reference to Africa. It will also serve as a background to the post-Cold War international terrorism counter-measures which are described in Chapter Five of the study.

5. INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM DURING THE COLD WAR WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO AFRICA

Global attempts to develop effective counter-terrorist measures began long before contemporary international terrorism emerged in the late 1960s. In 1937, the Council of the League of Nations – the UN’s predecessor – sponsored and adopted the Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. The convention bound states to undertake measures against criminal actions aimed at creating disorder in international relations by employing violence or creating a state of terror. The Convention on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court to Deal with Cases of Terrorism of 1937 was another step in the same direction. Neither convention had come into force by the time the Nazis invaded Europe. The conventions nonetheless provided the precedent of an international organisation representing the world community of states to unite in an effort to prevent international terrorism from occurring across the globe (Alexander, 1976: 323-324).

The defining moment in the fight against international terrorism and the increase of UN activities in this field was impelled by the significant increase of international terrorist activities in the 1960s and the early 1970s. The UN and its organisational components followed two main directions in countering international terrorism. They firstly arranged a number of international instruments which had the objective of banning and eliminating terrorist activities in certain areas of inter-state relations. Secondly, they took on the issue of international terrorism as an entire international community by drafting normative acts and developing detailed measures (Romanov, 1990: 292-293).

The worldwide threat to air travel by terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s quickly became an agenda issue for the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). This was illustrated by the ICAO's sponsorship of three UN-sanctioned international conventions; namely the Tokyo Convention of 1963, the Hague Convention of 1970 and the Montreal Convention of 1971 (Yoder, 1983: 588).

The Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963 was aimed at prohibiting any activities which could jeopardise the safety of all aircraft and their passengers across the globe. Article 11 of the convention was especially important regarding international terrorism as it spoke out against any form of unlawful seizure of an aircraft. Article 11 describes the unlawful seizure of an aircraft and the consequences thereof as “when a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat thereof an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control of an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about to be committed, contracting states shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.” The unlawful seizure of aircraft did,
nonetheless, develop into an international terrorist phenomenon in the late 1960s and 1970s. This above-mentioned increase in airline hijackings during the late 1960s and early 1970s, led to the 1970 Hague *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft* and the 1971 Montreal *Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation*. These conventions – like the 1963 Tokyo convention – were aimed at dealing with aircraft hijackings and violations of the security of passengers and airlines across the world (United Nations).

International terrorism became a priority security issue within the international community in the early 1970s. The UN demonstrated this by adopting *Resolution 3034* in 1972. The resolution outlined measures to prevent international terrorism, as well as to study and identify the underlying causes of international terrorism. The resolution also ratified the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on international terrorism within the UN (United Nations, 1972).

The increase of assassinations and abductions of politically and economically important people over this period resulted in the UN General Assembly adopting the *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents* in 1973. The primary aim of the convention is the eradication of any acts of terror against heads of states, any other state officials, diplomatic and other officials of international organisations. This includes murder, kidnapping or any form of violation of personal freedoms and attacks on official premises and means of transportation (United Nations, 1973).

The 1979 *Convention Against the taking of Hostages* outlined similar measures in preventing terrorist organisations from taking hostages, as well as outlining the criminal proceedings should such an organisation be found guilty of such acts (United Nations, 1979). Concern over terrorists utilising nuclear weapons resulted in the establishment of the 1980 UN *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material*. The convention required signatories to take steps to protect their nuclear materials and to pay special attention to the transportation of such materials (United Nations, 1980).

Table 1 below illustrates the participation of African countries in these international counter-terrorism conventions between 1963 and 1980.
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Source: NCTC Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004: 17-26
In 1988, various international conventions regarding acts of terrorism were drafted. The most noteworthy of these conventions regarding international terrorism targeting civil and commercial transportation, were the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (United Nations, 1988).

Table 2 below illustrates the participation of African countries in the above-mentioned international counter-terrorism conventions in 1988.

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Source: NCTC Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004: 17-26

The US also initiated several strategies during the Cold War to counter international terrorism. By the 1980s the US response to international terrorism was based on a
complex and broad array of programs designed to enhance the prevention of, deterrence of, response to and prediction of terrorist behaviour. The US’s counter-terrorism programme consisted of overt and covert intelligence operations designed to predict, deter and respond to terrorist incidents; diplomatic efforts designed to foster international co-operation; economic steps to increase the pressure on regimes aiding terrorism; legislative efforts designed to tighten US criminal statutes in order to increase the penalty for involving Americans in a terrorist act; and military operations designed to punish those responsible for attacks against Americans (Celmer, 1987: 12).

Attempts by the UN and US to counter and eradicate international terrorism were hampered by several factors during the Cold War. These factors included, for example, states’ sponsorship of international terrorism organisations and the large number of internal conflicts across the Third World during the Cold War. The fall of the Soviet Union had a vital influence on international terrorism across the globe, as well as the countering thereof. Wilkinson (2000: 36) states that “the ending of the Cold War was the final dramatic event of the 1980s which had a major influence on the patterns of terrorism in the 1990s and into the next century”. The end of the Cold War resulted in the Soviet Union and some of its allies abandoning their state support and sponsorship of various terrorist organisations that had been responsible for numerous international terror acts during the 1970s and 1980s. The fall of communism was also an enormous blow for groups such as the RAF and the Italian Red Brigade. Undoubtedly, older terrorist movements had to change their tactics, methods and operations, as new international terrorist organisations with new objectives, strategies and weapons appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union.

6. CONCLUSION

International terrorism was used as a political tool by those organisations that needed publicity during the Cold War. Revolutionary and nationalist groups across the world gained much more from international terrorist activities than they did from their domestic campaigns. These gains included international recognition, weapons, funds, training and access to several countries across the globe. International terrorism naturally increased as the consequences – political and economic – became more and more profitable for international terrorist groups.
International terrorism also gave enemies of the West the opportunity to attack, damage, harass and terrorise government officials, properties, civilians, and transport and economic infrastructures.

The rise in contemporary international terrorism also led to new ways of countering this phenomenon. This movement was led by the UN as it was the only international organisation recognised by all role players during the Cold War. Several conventions and resolutions were developed to combat all forms of international terrorism during this period of time.

Africa was inundated with revolutionary and nationalist terrorism movements during the decolonisation period. The 1950s and 1960s saw revolutionary and nationalist terrorism move to the forefront of political violence in Africa. This is still the case today in several countries across the continent.

International terrorism occurred predominantly in the Middle East, Western Europe and Latin America during the Cold War. Africa was, however, not isolated from international terrorism. As illustrated in this chapter, several noteworthy international terrorist incidents did occur in Africa over this period. Several African countries – particularly Libya – were also identified as states that sponsored international terrorist organisations during the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War had profound consequences for international terrorism across the globe. International terrorism started to move away from ideological motives as economic and religious motives became more important. The US was left as the only superpower in the world, and US counter-terrorism measures would thus play an important role in the world’s global response to international terrorism after the Cold War.

The next chapter provides an overview of the occurrence of international terrorism in Africa during the period 1990-2004. The chapter outlines the different characteristics and trends of international terrorism in the world and in Africa over the 1990 to 2004 period, illustrated by examples.
CHAPTER 4

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO AFRICA: 1990-2004

“This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism.”

Tony Blair

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter commences with an assessment of international terrorism during the post-Cold War and the post-9/11 eras. This aims at assessing trends in, and characteristics of, international terrorism in the period 1990-2004. Examples of international terrorism strategies, methods, objectives and movements will be used to illustrate the trends.

Subsequently, an overview of the occurrence of international terrorism in Africa during the 1990 to 2004 period is provided. This will include an assessment of international terrorism objectives, organisations, incidents, casualties, and methods, and selected case studies from Africa over this period.

The chapter will conclude with several findings regarding the incidence of international terrorism in Africa in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras.

2. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 1990-2004: AN OVERVIEW

This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section is an assessment of the significant international terrorism trends and incidents between 1990 and 2004. The second sub-section outlines the development of international terrorism from the beginning of the 1990s up to 2004.

2.1 Significant International Terrorism Trends and Incidents: 1990-2004

International terrorism entered a new phase at the beginning of the 1990s. The Cold War
was over and democracies had sprung up throughout the Third World and Eastern Europe. Internationally significant conflicts that began prior to the 1990s, however, continued over this period. These include the violent conflict that ensued in the Middle East and several Third World countries. The 1990s also saw an upsurge in the numbers of ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts across the world. International terrorism was also radically influenced by several military conflicts, for example the two US-led Iraqi invasions, and by numerous historic incidents of international terrorism, for example the 1993 Atlanta bombing, the 1995 Tokyo sarin gas attack, the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, and the 9/11 attacks in 2001. The following section aims to assess international terrorism during the 1990 to 2004 period. It will include international incidents of terrorism, and the motives, tactics and characteristics of international terrorism over this period.

The period between 1990 and 2004 saw numerous international terrorist incidents that had a significant impact on international political, economic and social structures. Figure 8 illustrates that incidents of international terrorism decreased in the 1990s, especially compared to the number of incidents that took place during the Cold War. The 1990 to 2004 period saw a total of 5672 international terrorist incidents taking place across the globe. This constitutes a yearly average of 378.1 incidents. The year with the highest number of incidents was 2004, with 651 incidents, and the year with the lowest number was 2002, with 205 incidents.

![Figure 8: International Terrorist Attacks, 1990-2004](source: US State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism Report 2003 & NCTC's Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004)
As stated above, several significant international terrorism incidents took place during the 1990 to 2004 period that had profound consequences for the world's political, economic and security structures. Wilkinson (2001: 108-110) describes seven major international terrorism trends that became prevalent during the 1990s and at the beginning of the Twenty First Century. The first trend was the rise in the incidence and in the brutality of “ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts in which mass terror was used against the designated enemy civilian population”, forcing the victims to flee their territories and homes. Examples of these conflicts occurred in the Balkans and Central Africa. The growth of terrorist groups motivated by “religious fanaticism” is the second international terrorism trend witnessed over this period. The majority of these groups were driven by Islamic beliefs and carried out terrorist acts as the “will of God or Allah”.

It must, however, be noted that several Islamic terrorist groups are driven not only by religious beliefs, but also by political aspirations. For example, there are “very strong political agendas underlying the campaigns” of international terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) from Algeria. Thirdly, the use of massive bomb attacks on city centres increased over this period, for example the 1998 US embassy bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. Fourthly, there was an increasing trend towards terrorist attacks resulting in mass casualties, as mentioned above. Terrorist attacks aimed at inflicting extensive damage to national economies is the fifth trend. International terrorist attacks on popular tourist destinations are examples of this. The sixth trend is the increase in hostage-taking for the purpose of extortion. The last trend is that of the closer relationship that developed between international terrorism groups and international organised crime syndicates (Wilkinson, 2001: 108-110).

Figure 9 below highlights the incidence of significant international terrorism incidents over the 1990 to 2004 period.
Figure 9: Significant International Terrorist Incidents 1990-2004

1990
End of Cold War; decline in incidents; significant terrorist trials took place in 1990; US identifies numerous international terrorism state-sponsors like Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea and Syria; US embassy bombed in Peru

1991
Increase in incidents due to Gulf War; terror attacks against international coalition forces; Iran strengthens ties with terrorist Palestinian organisations; assassination of former Indian Prime Minister

1992
Lowest number of incidents in 17 years; Latin America experiences most of the attacks; ethnic and separatist groups active across the world; increase in right wing attacks in Germany; Israeli embassy bombed in Argentina

1993
Incidents increase significantly; World Trade Centre bombing; increase in attacks by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party against Turkish interests; attempted assassination of US president Bush by Iraqi intelligence agents

1994
Downward trend in incidents (lowest annual total in 23 years); Hebron massacre where 29 Moslems were killed and 150 injured by Jewish right-wing extremists; Air France hijacking by armed Islamic group

1995
Upwards trend in incidents; Kurdistan Workers’ Party attacks in Germany and Turkey; Tokyo subway station gas attack; Federal building bombing in Oklahoma City

1996
Lowest annual number of incidents in 25 years; IRA bomb in London; Tamil Tigers bombing of Central Bank in Colombo; Khobar towers bombing in Dhahran; Paris subway explosion

1997
Incident trend similar to previous year; HAMAS suicide bombing of an Israeli shopping centre in Jerusalem; Tourist killings in Egypt by Al-Gama’at-Islamiyya gunmen

1998
Declining trend continued, but highest number of casualties yet; US bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; IRA bomb in Banbridge, Northern Ireland; Colombian pipeline bombing

1999
43 percent increase in incidents; decrease in casualties; numerous protest bombings in Europe against NATO bombing in Serbia and imprisonment of Kurdish Workers’ Party leader; abduction of foreign oil workers in Nigeria; Hutu abduction of tourists in Uganda

2000
Slight increase in incidents; bombings of multinational oil pipeline in Colombia; major decrease in incidents in western Europe; attacks on UN personnel in Sierra Leone; attack on USS Cole in Yemen; assassination of British Defence attaché in Greece

2001
Incidents declined considerably; September 11 attacks in US result in highest death toll from international terrorist attacks ever recorded; bombing of multinational oil pipeline in Colombia continued; Tel-Aviv nightclub bombing; suicide bombings in Israel

2002
44 percent decline in incidents; car bomb explosion in Bali; several suicide bombings across Israeli cities; Chechen rebels seized a Moscow theatre; bombing of government buildings in Chechnya; truck bomb at synagogue in Tunisia; car bomb at hotel in Kenya

2003
Number of incidents similar to previous year; major attacks occurred in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Afghanistan, Turkey, Indonesia and Iraq; beginning of terrorist campaign against coalition forces’ occupation of Iraq

2004
Enormous increase in incidents and casualties; high number of attacks against coalition forces in Iraq; attacks on trains in Spain; several attacks in Saudi Arabia

Certain trends can be identified when assessing the incidents highlighted in Figure 9.

- Military conflicts, especially in the Middle East, Africa and Eastern Europe have drastically increased the number of international terrorism incidents taking place in those regions. Examples of this are the two Gulf Wars, conflict between Israel and its Arabian enemies, military conflict in African countries like Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, and the NATO bombings in Serbia.
- A drastic increase in separatist and ethnic terrorist attacks in the 1990s. An example of this is the ethnic-driven attacks in Rwanda.
- Public and commercial structures like hotels, banks, subways and trains were increasingly used as targets by international terrorist organisations.
- Western industries operating in the developing world were increasingly targeted by international terrorist organisations, especially revolutionary groups operating in those countries. Examples of this are the bombings of the oil pipelines in Nigeria and the abduction of foreign workers by South American revolutionaries.
- The 1990 to 2004 period also saw a drastic increase in the abduction and killing of tourists and aid workers in the developing world. This occurred especially in countries where internal political and military conflict was taking place and countries which had revolutionary groups operating within their borders. An example of this is the abduction of aid workers and tourists in countries like Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda.
- The 1990s also saw an increase in suicide bombings throughout the world. This could be seen, for example, by the high number of suicide bombings that took place in Israel.
- High numbers of casualties resulting from individual terrorist attacks also became more common over this period. Examples of this are the 9/11 attacks and the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (US State Department, Significant Terror Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology; Hough, 2004: 17-24).

Modern international terrorist networks utilised several different strategies and methods that differed from those of their counterparts of the 1970s and 1980s. The following section assesses how international terrorism has developed over the past few decades to its current form.
2.2 The Development of Contemporary International Terrorism

International terrorist organisations and their activities, since the 1990s and the beginning of the Twenty First Century, are very different to those organisations which started making global headlines in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The differences are so extensive, that some academics and analysts have started utilising terminology such as “traditional terrorism” and “new terrorism” in describing their differences (see Table 3).

Jenkins (2005:117-123) outlines several of these differences. International terrorism attacks, as mentioned above, have become bloodier in terms of what acts are committed and how many victims are involved. In the 1970s the bloodiest terrorist incidents caused casualties in the tens, while several international terrorist attacks in the post-Cold War era have resulted in thousands of casualties. International terrorist groups also found new ways of financing their activities. During the Cold War it was the Soviet Union, their allies and Arab states who financially supported the majority of the international terrorist organisations. New ways of gathering funds for their operations included kidnappings for extortion, organised crime activities like drug and arms trafficking, extortion, fraud and even legitimate investments. International terrorist groups have also developed new models of organisation. Previous international terrorist groups based their organisation on various models, from urban guerrilla gangs to miniature armies. Al Qaeda has been the first international terrorist group to model itself on an international business model. Their organisational model is “hierarchical but not pyramidal, loosely run, decentralized but linked, able to assemble and allocate resources and co-ordinate operations, but hard to depict organisationally or penetrate” (Jenkins, 2005:123). This illustrates how extensively international terrorist organisations have changed their models of organisation to stay ahead of changing times.

International terrorists have also developed the skills and strategies to launch global campaigns. Modern international terrorist groups’ activities exceed national frontiers. Al Qaeda, once more, is a prime example of this. They operate as a global enterprise, enlisting recruits and collecting funds from across the globe, maintaining links in more than 60 countries and carrying out operations in approximately 20 countries. One of the reasons for Al Qaeda’s global success is the way they and other international terrorist organisations, have effectively utilised modern communication technologies. An example of this is how terrorists perform acts of violence on-camera and then distribute the
images on the internet for the whole world to see. The internet has become the primary method of communication and a popular propaganda tool for international terrorist groups since the 1990s. Terrorists have also become strategically more successful since the Cold War. The best example of this is the 9/11 attack. Never before has an individual terrorist attack had such a strategic impact on the world’s political, economic and military structures. The attack killed thousands of people, caused billions of dollars of damage, had a negative impact on the American economy and led to a “Global War on Terror”. This is in vast contrast to international attacks in the 1970s and 1980s which had very little strategic impact globally (Jenkins, 2005:124-127).

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</table>

Aspects of the so-called “new terrorism” have also been witnessed in post-Cold War Africa. The bombing of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 displayed numerous characteristics of the “new form” of terrorism. The next section of this chapter focuses on the occurrence of international terrorism in Africa from 1990 to 2004. This section will assess several aspects of international terrorism over this period. These include the number of international terrorism incidents in Africa; significant international terrorism incidents and trends in Africa; and international terrorist groups in Africa.

3. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN AFRICA: 1990-2004

Political violence, civil war, guerrilla warfare, revolution, coup d’états and terrorism are all
occurrences that have been associated on a regular basis with Africa since the beginning of the Cold War. This situation has not changed since the ending of the Cold War. At the beginning of the Twenty First Century, some form of political or military violence – be it dormant or active – was affecting numerous African countries. These countries included Angola, Burundi, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Uganda and Zimbabwe (Mills & Sidiropoulos, 2004: 5). International terrorism has been utilised as a strategic tool in several of these armed conflicts. The following section assesses the number of international terrorist incidents in Africa over the post-Cold War period of 1990 to 2004. The figures are compared to those for other regions of the world, and include the number of casualties that resulted from the incidents.

3.1 Number of International Terror Incidents

The figure below illustrates the number of international terrorist incidents that took place in Africa between the 1990 and 2004 period, namely 307. This means that Africa witnessed an average of 20.5 incidents of international terrorism per year over the 1990 to 2004 period. The year 2000 saw the highest number of incidents with 55 incidents taking place, with 1991 witnessing only three, the lowest number of incidents.

![Figure 10: International Terrorist Attacks in Africa, 1990-2004](image)


When comparing Africa’s figures with those of other regions in the world, it is evident, even though Africa is one of the regions with the lowest number of incidents of international terrorism over this period, that international terrorism has had a significant influence on the security structures of the continent.
Figure 11 below illustrates the number of terrorist incidents in Africa over the 1990 to 2003 period in comparison to the number which occurred in other regions in the world. Africa witnessed the fifth highest number of international terrorism incidents over this period, with only Eurasia and North America having witnessed fewer incidents. The Middle East saw the highest number of international terrorist incidents over this period. The connection between international terrorist organisations from the Middle East and Africa is, however, discussed briefly later in this chapter.

Africa, as illustrated in Figure 11, contributed only 6 percent of all international terrorist incidents over the 1990 to 2003 period. This is, however, not the case regarding the number of casualties resulting from international terrorism incidents for this period. Figure 12 shows that Africa had the second highest number of casualties resulting from international terrorism in comparison to those from the other regions, namely 6188. Only Asia had more casualties, with 13 617 reported. North America saw the third highest number of casualties with 5105 casualties reported, this number being even higher than that of the Middle East which had 5083 casualties reported over this period.

These figures clearly illustrate that the region with the highest number of incidents of international terrorism does not necessarily suffer the highest number of casualties. Even though the Middle East had the highest number of incidents over this period, they had only the fourth highest number of casualties. Africa and North America, which experienced very few incidents in comparison to the Middle East and Latin America, had
a much higher number of international terrorism casualties. The reason for this is that both North America and Africa witnessed individual international terrorist attacks which resulted in massive numbers of casualties over this period. The 9/11 attacks and the attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 resulted in thousands of casualties whereas the majority of international terrorist attacks in the Middle East and Latin America over this period did not result in such high numbers of casualties.

The following table illustrates the number of incidents, and associated casualties, by region for the year 2004. Africa experienced only nine incidents resulting in 42 casualties. This means that Africa had the second lowest number of incidents and the second lowest number of casualties resulting from those incidents. This is a clear decrease in comparison with statistics for the 1990 to 2003 period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number of Attacks</th>
<th>Number of Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>2196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Eurasia</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near East</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>2520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: US State Department's NCTC's Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004
The following section analyses significant international terrorism incidents and trends in Africa over the 1990 to 2004 period. This is done to identify the characteristics of international terrorism in Africa over this period, as well as to assess the causes of this phenomenon in Africa.

### 3.2 Significant International Terrorism Incidents and Trends in Africa 1990-2004

Africa has witnessed several significant international terrorism incidents since 1990. Although the majority of the incidents did not have wide international consequences, they did, however, have a significant impact on the security environment of the continent, as well as on the world’s perception of security in the continent. The significant international terrorist incidents that took place in Africa over this period also underlined Africa’s importance in the ongoing global struggle against international terrorism. Figure 13 illustrates the more significant international terrorism incidents in Africa during the 1990 to 2004 period.

**Figure 13: International Terrorism and Political Violence in Africa 1990 - 2004**

- **1990**: Hand grenades thrown into cafes in Djibouti killing a French child and wounding 10; French nationals kidnapped in Angola by Angolan separatist group; terrorist acts against ruling governments took place in Liberia, Mozambique and Somalia

- **1991**: Significant decrease in incidents; a bomb exploded at the Sheraton Hotel in Harare, Zimbabwe, injuring several people; terrorist and Muslim groups increased their presence in Sudan increasing Sudan’s role as a state sponsor of international terrorism

- **1992**: Diminutive increase in incidents; political violence in sub-Saharan Africa regarded as a major problem; attacks and kidnappings took place in Angola targeting its oil-producing industries; Sudan increased its support of international terrorism

- **1993**: Civil wars and ethnic conflict continued in Somalia, Angola and Liberia; members of the UN kidnapped in Angola; a Nigerian Airways plane was hijacked in Nigeria; Sudan was placed on the US’s list of state sponsors of terrorism; Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah continually attempted to develop its presence in Sudan, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Benin and Nigeria

- **1994**: Significant increase in incidents; Western oil company Chevron attacked in Angola; two British engineers kidnapped in Sierra Leone; rightwing Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) detonated a car bomb at Johannesburg International airport; grenade attack in Togo injuring five French citizens and two Beninese; Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacked foreign relief organisations in Uganda

Source: US State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990 to 2003; NCTC Chronology of Significant Terrorism for 2004
Noteworthy reduction in incidents; attempted assassination of visiting Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia by members of an Egyptian terrorist group; other attacks – primarily kidnappings – occurred in Angola, Chad, Sierra Leone and Somalia.

Two deadly bomb explosions at hotels in Addis Ababa; Ethiopia, where several foreigners were killed and injured; Ethiopian Islamic extremists also shot and wounded the Ethiopian Transport and Communications Minister and several foreigners in Ethiopia; gunmen attacked a Sudanese camp in Uganda killing 16 refugees and wounding five others.

Ongoing civil war and ethnic violence across Africa; grenades thrown into hotel in Ethiopia wounding several Europeans; several aid workers, expatriate workers and UN personnel on humanitarian missions in war-torn countries like Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Rwanda and Somalia were kidnapped and/or killed.

Noteworthy increase in incidents; near-simultaneous bomb explosions at the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam resulted in thousands of casualties; several attacks by National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola on foreigners; tourists kidnapped in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo; Shell Oil workers abducted in Nigeria; bomb explosion at US-franchised Planet Hollywood restaurant in Cape Town, South Africa; bombs detonated at two downtown Kampala restaurants in Uganda.

Number of incidents doubled; UNITA responsible for several attacks on foreigners in Angola; kidnappings of foreigners and diplomats in Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone; continued bombings in Cape Town, South Africa, by Islamist extremists; pipe bomb exploded by Islamic extremists in a crowded bar in Uganda; Rwanda Hutu rebels attacked tourists in Uganda; several bombs exploded in Zambia with no-one claiming responsibility.

Increase in the number of terrorist attacks against foreigners or foreign interests, is part of a growing trend since 1995: most attacks stemmed from internal civil unrest and spill over from regional wars; foreigners abducted and/or killed in Angola, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria (oil workers), Sierra Leone and Uganda; continued bombings and urban terrorism in Cape Town, South Africa.

Reduction in incidents; numerous African countries pledged their support of the war against terrorism after the 9/11 incidents; World Food Program convoy attacked in Somalia; several foreign nationals attacked in Uganda by the LRA; UNITA continued their attacks on civilians.

East Africa, particularly Somalia, poses the most serious threat to Western interests due to the presence of active Al Qaeda elements; in Kenya a policeman was killed when a terrorist suspect detonated a hand grenade.

Substantial decrease in incidents; Angola ended its 27-year civil war; Al Qaeda drove a car bomb into a hotel popular with Israelis and fired missiles at an Israeli aircraft in Mombassa, Kenya; bombers of 1998 bombing in Dar es Salaam were sentenced to life in prison in the US; 32 European tourists kidnapped in Algeria by the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSC).

Al Qaeda and affiliated groups active in East Africa, South Africa and Nigeria; Hezbollah continued to engage in fundraising activities in Africa, particularly West Africa; militants attacked aid workers in Somalia; militants kidnapped 24 aid workers and killed 2 humanitarian workers in Sudan; armed men attacked troops from the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The following trends, regarding contemporary international terrorism in Africa, can be identified by assessing the incidents over the 1990 to 2004 period illustrated in Figure 13:

- Civil wars and ethnic conflicts plagued the continent over this period of time. These armed conflicts led to several acts of international terrorism, as foreigners and foreign property became targets during the armed conflicts. Examples of this are the armed conflicts in Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad and Somalia.
- Large numbers of kidnappings; and the abduction and killing of tourists, foreign commercial and industrial workers, aid workers and peacekeeping forces occurred in Africa over this period. Examples of this were the kidnappings and attacks that took place in Uganda, Nigeria and Ethiopia.
- An increase in attacks on Western property such as embassies, oil pipelines and tourist destinations occurred. Examples of this are the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, oil pipelines being attacked in Nigeria and Angola and the bombing of a US-franchise restaurant in Cape Town.
- This period also saw an increase in militant Islamic presence across the continent, especially in the Horn of Africa and West Africa.
- While Sudan increased its sponsorship of international terrorism, Libya abandoned the sponsoring of international terrorism over this period of time (US State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990 to 2003; NCTC Chronology of Significant Terrorism, 2004: 3-78).

The information in Figure 13 clearly illustrates that the majority of international terrorism incidents that occur in Africa, are linked to civil war or domestic armed conflict. Hough (2001: 130-131) states that there are several other factors that have contributed to an increase in the number of international terrorist groups operating in Africa during the 1990s and at the beginning of the Twenty First Century. Africa has increasingly hosted major international events which included major sporting events and international summits and conferences. Such international events naturally offer international terrorists the opportunity to “generate large-scale publicity”. Such publicity on an international scale is very important to many of Africa’s armed groups as many of them do not have much scope to publicise their causes. Hostage-takings and kidnappings are another way of generating funds for these armed groups. Such kidnappings and hostage-takings occur very easily in Africa as vast regions in Africa have weak law
enforcement structures, are controlled by armed rebels and have no formal state structures. The inability of African states to control the movement of their own citizens, as well as ineffective control measures at ports of entry, are also factors contributing to international terrorism in Africa. The situation regarding illegal cross-border movements is also aggravated by the ready availability of small arms that are transported illegally throughout Africa. Foreign property such as embassies, oil pipelines and mines are not always protected as effectively as those in regions such as the Middle East, where acts of international terrorism occur more frequently. The last factor is the development of “criminal insurgencies” in Africa. These groups do not have clear political objectives and tend to target civilians living in, or visiting, their regions (Hough, 2001: 130-131).

The following section of the chapter briefly outlines the different international terrorist groups in Africa, and includes aspects such as the different activities, strengths, and funding of these groups.

3.3 International Terrorist Groups in Africa

International terrorist activities were conducted in Africa, during the 1990 to 2004 period, by primarily two different groups. The first group consists of revolutionary groups seeking political independence, or some form of domestic political or economic objectives. They would then also utilise international terrorism for the purpose of achieving these political and economic objectives. An example of such a group is the LRA in Sudan. The second group is those international terrorist movements that form part of a broader global terrorist network. They commit international terrorist acts in Africa, or receive logistical assistance from countries/communities in Africa to enable them to commit such acts elsewhere in the world. The majority of these international terrorist groups are religiously motivated, with Islam forming the basis of their political objectives (Hough, 2001: 127-128).

The US State Department stated in this regard that the majority of international terrorist attacks in 2000 in Africa “stemmed from internal civil unrest and spillover from regional wars, as African rebel movements and opposition groups employed terrorism to further their political, social or economic objectives”. It further stated that “international terrorist organisations, including al Qaeda, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Egyptian terrorist groups, continued to operate in Africa…” (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000: 3).
Table 5 briefly illustrates the different international terrorist groups indigenous to Africa. The different terrorist groups indicated in Table 5 were listed by the US State Department in 2004 as international terrorist groups. The table includes a short description of the terrorist groups; the different international terrorist activities they are involved in; an estimation of the manpower the terrorist groups have at their disposal; the different locations from which they are operating; and lastly, where and from whom they get their logistical funding and financial aid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrorist Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Location/Area of Operation</th>
<th>External Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)</strong></td>
<td>Islamic extreme group aiming to overthrow Algerian regime since 1992</td>
<td>Attacks against civilians &amp; government workers</td>
<td>Precise numbers unknown, fewer than 100</td>
<td>Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Europe</td>
<td>Members in Europe providing funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)</strong></td>
<td>Emerged in the early 1990’s, aims at overthrowing Muammar Gadaffi’s government; part of Al Qaeda’s leadership structure</td>
<td>Part of the broader international jihadist movement, suicide bombings, attempted assassination of Gadaffi, armed clashes with Libyan security forces</td>
<td>Several hundred active members and supporters</td>
<td>Clandestine presence in Libya; since 1990's members have fled to Asia, Persian Gulf, African and European countries</td>
<td>Through private donations and criminal acts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSC)</strong> a.k.a. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
<td>Splinter group of the GIA, seeks to overthrow Algerian government with goal of installing Islamic regime; currently largest and most effective group inside Algeria, pledged to prevent civilian attacks inside Algeria</td>
<td>Conducts operations aimed at Algerian Government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed, maintains contact with other North African extremists sympathetic to Al</td>
<td>Several hundred fighters with an unknown number of facilitators outside Algeria</td>
<td>Algeria, Northern- Mali, Mauritania and Niger, Canada, and Western Europe</td>
<td>Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad also engage in criminal activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Group</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Location/Area of Operation</td>
<td>External Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)</td>
<td>Rose to prominence in Horn of Africa in the early 1990s, network of compartmentalised cells, factions and individuals, central focus is the establishment of an Islamic government in Somalia, has supplied Al Qaeda with logistical support</td>
<td>Kidnappings, bomb attacks and broadening of religious bases through building businesses and sponsoring orphanages and schools and providing security to the Islamic legal structures where it is active</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Primarily Somalia, with presence in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Kenya, and possibly Djibouti</td>
<td>Funds from Middle East financiers and Somali diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and the Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) a.k.a. Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, (ALIR), Ex-FAR</td>
<td>FDLR replaced the ALIR in 2001. The armed branch of the Party of the Liberation of Rwanda (PALIR), ALIR was formed after the merger of the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) and the army of the ethnic Hutu-dominated Rwandan regime, opponents of the Kigali regime</td>
<td>Kidnapping and killing of foreign tourists, threatened to kill US ambassador, involved in the 1998-2002 Congolese war</td>
<td>Exact strength unknown, several thousand FDLR guerrillas operate in eastern DRC close to the Rwandan border, many FDLR combatants have been repatriated back to Rwanda from the DRC</td>
<td>Mostly in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo has provided them with arms, training and supplies; continued support from local Congolese warlords and militias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)</td>
<td>Formerly established in 1994, succeeding the ethnic Acholi-dominated Holy Spirit Movement and other insurgent groups; aims at overthrowing</td>
<td>Since the early 1990s, the LRA has kidnapped some 20 000 Ugandan children (mostly ethnic Acholi) to replenish its ranks;</td>
<td>Between 500 and 1000 fighters, 85 percent of whom are abducted</td>
<td>Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan government funded them in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Group</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Location/Area of Operation</td>
<td>External Aid</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)</td>
<td>Aims at establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting Al Qaeda’s jihad against the West; emerged in 1990s and comprised of Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps in Afghanistan and some who fought in the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation; members interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe</td>
<td>Part of the broader international jihadist movement; involved in the planning of several suicide bombings, trafficking of falsified documents and arms- smuggling, Spanish authorities have been investigating their involvement in the 2004 Madrid train bombings</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Morocco, Western Europe, Afghanistan, and Canada</td>
<td>Unknown, but believed to include criminal activities abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)</td>
<td>PAGAD and its ally Qibla (Islamic fundamentalist group) view the South African government as a threat to Islamic values; started off as vigilante group in reaction to crime in Cape Town in 1995, but then changed their goals to support a violent jihad to establish an Islamic state since 1996</td>
<td>Bomb attacks included targets including South African authorities; moderate Muslims; synagogues, gay nightclubs, tourist attractions, and Western-associated restaurants</td>
<td>Early estimates were several hundred members; current operational strength is unknown</td>
<td>Operates mainly in the Cape Town area</td>
<td>May have ties to international Islamic extremists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Africa has also witnessed numerous external international terrorist groups operating and developing terror networks across Africa over the 1990 to 2004 period. Firstly, Hezbollah has developed several terrorist networks across Africa, which supplies them with needed resources.
financial and logistical support to continue their anti-US and anti-Israel campaigns. Secondly, Al Qaeda have not only developed terrorist networks across Africa, but have also been responsible for some of Africa’s most significant international terrorist networks over the 1990 to 2004 period, for example the 1998 US embassy bombings. Lastly, Tanzim Qa’idat al-jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (Al Qaeda in Iraq) might be predominantly Iraq-based, but the group has an extensive logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe (NCTC Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004: 92-129).

The 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the bomb explosion in Mombassa in 2002 illustrate the severity of the effects of international terrorism on Africa. The next section briefly discusses these attacks as examples of international terrorist attacks in Africa which have had a profound influence on the international political and security environment. It illustrates that Africa is not immune to international terrorist attacks that cause high numbers of casualties.

4. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN AFRICA, SELECTED CASE STUDIES: 1990-2004

The first case study that will be discussed concerns the bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. These bombings are seen as the worst international terrorist attacks ever witnessed on the African continent. They are also a good example of what international terrorists are capable of achieving in Third World countries. The second case study focuses on the bomb attack in Mombassa in 2002. This is done to illustrate that even though the 1998 attacks led to more effective counter-terrorist strategies across Africa, it was still possible for international terrorists – without much difficulty – to launch subsequent attacks.

4.1 US Embassy Bombings of 1998

On the 7th of August 1998, the US embassies in the East African capital cities of Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were bombed. Car bombs in vehicles next to the embassies were detonated simultaneously at approximately 10:30 am. In Dar es Salaam, the embassy was further from the city centre and the attack killed at least 12 and wounded 85. In Nairobi, where the embassy was located in a busy downtown area,
213 people were killed and an estimated 4000 injured. The terrorist attacks severely damaged or destroyed the embassies, as well as several other buildings. Although the attacks may have been intended to kill employees of the United States government, almost all of the victims were African civilians. Thirty-two Kenyans and twelve Americans were killed in Nairobi, and eight Tanzanian embassy employees were killed. The remainder of the dead and injured were visitors, passers-by, or people in neighbouring buildings. Local members of the Al Qaeda international terrorist network were found responsible for the attacks (US State Department’s Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 1999).

The 1998 bombings instantly escalated Africa’s standing in the battle against international terrorism. The bombings resulted in the US government redirecting more attention – and resources – towards Africa in their worldwide fight against international terrorism. As Susan Rice, a former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, stated in 2001, it has become “painfully obvious even to casual observers after the bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, that terrorism directed against the United States is alive and well in Africa.” She further stated that “Al-Qaeda and other terrorist cells are active throughout East, Southern and West Africa, not to mention in North Africa” (Rice, 2001: 2).

The Mathew B. Ridgway Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh completed an in-depth investigation into the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in 2005. Firstly, the study found that the combination of the suppressed Islamic minority and the ruling Christian majority, coupled with poor border and immigration controls in both Kenya and Tanzania, contributed to an environment conducive to international Islamic terrorist groups operating in these two countries. Christian political and economic interests in these two countries were advanced through the majority Christian-held governments. Both countries also had inadequate law enforcement structures. The political rivalry between the two religions as well as weak law-enforcement structures allowed Al Qaeda to establish cells in the region. Secondly, Al Qaeda operated as an articulate and highly-efficient organisation founded on ideological beliefs (Mathew B. Ridgway Centre for International Security Studies, 2005: 7-21).
The study illustrates how easy it was for an Islamic terrorist group to execute a well-planned international terrorist attack in Africa. Thirdly, Al Qaeda made use of very basic explosive devices during the embassy bombings. This proves that international terrorists do not need hi-tech modern arms to execute international terrorism attacks. This point was proven again in the 11 September 2001 attacks. Fourthly, the study identified Al Qaeda’s means of financing as being practical, mainly undetectable and easily duplicated. For example, Al Qaeda utilised the “hawala” system whereby transactions are carried out solely in cash, thus leaving no paper trail. Fifthly, Africa was viewed by the US as a low priority region in its foreign policy. The US’s unresponsiveness toward Africa as well as its policy deemed insensitive to local and regional conditions, cost them dearly in the end. In the sixth place, the US was not ready to respond to the African bombings in its clean-up, support and recovery operations. Even though African-based emergency services responded to the explosions very quickly, they were unable to deal effectively with attacks of this scale. Lastly, weaknesses in the US’s foreign policy in East Africa were exploited by Al Qaeda, which was able to influence local conditions. The US was not able to timeously identify Al Qaeda’s potential threat in this region. It must also be noted that the weaknesses of the two governments of the African countries involved, also contributed to Al Qaeda’s success (Mathew B. Ridgway Centre for International Security Studies, 2005: 7-21).

The next section discusses the second major international terrorism incident in Africa during the 1990 to 2004 period, namely the Mombassa bombings of 2002.

4.2 Mombassa Bombings of 2002

Western and Kenyan security intelligence agencies failed again in 2002 – as had been the case in 1998 – to prevent an Al Qaeda terrorist attack on foreigners and foreign-owned property in Eastern Africa. Fifteen people died when suicide bombers blew themselves up in the lobby of the Israeli-owned and frequented Paradise Hotel in Mombassa, Kenya, on 28 November 2002. This attack occurred simultaneously with an attempt to down an Israeli airliner full of Israeli tourists bound for Israel from Mombassa. The surface-to-air (SAM) missile however missed its target. Israeli survivors, as well as the three Israelis killed in the attack, were flown back to Israel by an Israeli Air Force plane (SABC News, 2002).
Several Western countries, including Germany and Australia, issued travel warnings to their citizens at the beginning of November 2002, after intelligence pointed Mombassa out as a potential risk. America and Israel, however, considered the information they had as too broad to activate any alert. Burgess (2002: 3) states that “if forecasting such incidents is difficult, preventing them is even trickier.” The Kenyan authorities for example believed that the missiles used in the Mombassa attack were smuggled across the border from Somalia. The explosives used in the 1998 embassy attacks were also smuggled across the same border. This could be an indication that the Kenyan government was not getting adequate support from external sources in assisting them to control the border between Kenya and Somalia. The US government has, however, realised that there is a need for the US to increase its effort in respect to this. They started a process in 2002 to provide the Kenyans with satellite phones, speedboats and four-wheel drive vehicles which aimed to increase their border patrolling capabilities. It must also be noted that Israel’s experience in the past regarding suicide bombers had shown that it is very difficult to prevent suicide bombings, irrespective of the intelligence, military, law enforcement and emergency resources available. The Mombassa attacks further emphasized the danger posed by radical Islamic suicide bombers in and around Africa (Burgess, 2002: 3).

5. CONCLUSION

Africa has an intricate history of armed conflicts, political violence, civil war, state failure and poverty. International terrorism did not play a major role in violence in Africa during the Cold War. It was only in the post-Cold War period that Africa truly witnessed international terrorism at its most fearful. Numerous African governments – with their political, economic and social problems – encountered a new security threat, namely international terrorism. The 1990 to 2004 period saw internationally significant terrorist attacks occurring in Africa as never before. Africa, over this period, started playing a noteworthy role in the activities of international terrorist networks, as well as the combating thereof.

International terrorist groups – such as Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah – penetrated numerous African states over this period to establish networks to provide them with logistical support, new recruits and even possible targets such as embassies, foreign banks and tourist destinations. Many African countries were unable to prevent this from
happening as they do not have the capacity to ensure efficient law enforcement, border control, institutional sovereignty and political, economic and social cohesion and development. This has made them easy targets for international terrorist groups to infiltrate and in which to develop important economic and political networks, especially in the case of those African countries that have Islamic communities residing within their borders. This period witnessed several significant international terrorist attacks by militant Islamic groups in sub-Saharan Africa.

Revolutionary groups in Africa also started utilising international terrorism more often as a political tool over this period. This ensured more international publicity than ever before. Kidnappings and hostage-takings also ensured them financial gain through the ransoms they received. Several revolutionary and Islamic terrorist groups also turned to criminal activities to fund their operations.

International terrorism is not the primary security threat to the African continent. Raging civil wars, armed conflicts, poverty, corruption and HIV/AIDS are all issues that have had far more detrimental consequences on the continent’s political, social, economic and security development. It would, however, be imprudent to disregard the threat that international terrorism poses to Africa.

The next chapter will describe and assess the current global and continental counter-terrorist strategies in Africa over the period 1990 to 2004. These counter-terrorist policies include policies developed by the UN, US and the AU. The chapter will conclude with an assessment of Africa’s position in the US-led “Global War on Terrorism”.
CHAPTER 5

GLOBAL AND CONTINENTAL COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES
IN AFRICA: 1990-2004

“Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You can make a hundred brilliant saves
but the only shot that people remember is the one that gets past you.”

Paul Wilkinson

1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous three chapters it has been shown that international terrorism is an
international security threat that is highly complex and very difficult to prevent.
International terrorism and the prevention thereof has been a focal point of the
international security agenda especially since the late 1960s.

This chapter focuses primarily on the prevention of international terrorism in Africa over
the 1990 to 2004 period. The chapter will describe current counter-terrorism strategies,
which are aimed at preventing international terrorism not only in Africa, but also on a
global scale. This will be done by assessing international and continental counter-
terrorist policies in Africa. The assessment will encompass an overview of counter-
terrorism policies developed by the UN, US and the AU up to 2004. This assessment is
done to illustrate how international and continental entities such as the UN and the AU
and a country such as the US, have developed numerous counter-terrorism strategies to
prevent and deter international terrorism from gaining a hold in Africa in this regard and
what the challenges are.

This chapter will also indicate how counter-terrorism strategies were strengthened in
Africa after several significant acts of international terrorism occurred there during the
1990-2004 period – as described in the previous chapter. It will highlight Africa’s
increasingly significant role in worldwide counter-terrorism strategies. The chapter will
conclude with an assessment of Africa’s role in the US-led “Global War on Terrorism”.

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2. INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES

The following section looks at international counter-terrorism strategies, developed over the 1990 to 2004 period, which aim to prevent, deter, and respond to international terrorism in Africa. This section includes the counter-terrorism strategies developed by a global institution, the UN.

2.1 The Role of the UN in Combating International Terrorism with specific reference to Africa

The UN has been active in the fight against international terrorism for more than four decades. Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, highlighted five elements of a principled and comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism in his keynote address at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in March 2005. He named the five elements the “five D’s”. The elements required all states to:

- *dissuade* disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals;
- *deny* terrorists the means to carry out their attacks;
- *deter* them from supporting terrorists;
- *develop* capacity to prevent terrorism; and
- *defend* human rights in the struggle against terrorism.

The UN and its agencies have developed a wide range of international legal agreements that enable the international community to take action to counter terrorism and bring those responsible to justice. Treaties, mainly in the form of conventions, oblige member states to take stringent steps to root out terrorism across the globe. Dating back to 1963, these agreements provide the basic legal tools to combat international terrorism in its many forms; from the seizure of aircraft to hostage-taking and the financing of terrorism. The conventions are transformed into actions by specialised agencies of the UN, such as the ICAO, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These actions include the development of measures to improve the security of air and sea travel and the safeguarding of vulnerable nuclear material across the globe. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has also carried out intensive research into chemical and biological terrorism, as well as into the development of
treatment methods and aftercare facilities in the case of such attacks (Whittaker, 2004: 132). The following sub-section looks at the international counter-terrorism conventions that the UN initiated between the 1990 and 2004 period and African countries’ participation therein.

2.1.1 African Countries’ Participation in International Counter-Terrorism Conventions 1990-2004

The UN continued its battle against international terrorism in the post-Cold War period by developing three more counter-terrorism conventions. The first of these was the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection signed in Montreal in 1991. This convention was designed to control and limit the use of unmarked and undetectable plastic explosives. Countries who are party to this agreement are obligated, in their respective territories, to take necessary and effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture and stockpiling of unmarked plastic explosives; to prevent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of their territories and to exercise strict and effective control over the possession and transfer of unmarked explosives (United Nations, 1991).

The second post-Cold War agreement that was developed was the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, signed in New York in 1998. This convention creates a system of international jurisdiction to punish perpetrators of terrorist bombings. The convention states that “the offence of terrorist bombing is committed when a person unlawfully and intentionally delivers…a bomb, explosive…against a place of public use, a state or Government facility.” The convention also states that all states which are party to the convention must regard terrorist bombings and related activities as “criminal offences under its domestic law” and make those “offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences” (United Nations, 1998). The third post-Cold War convention is the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, signed in New York in 1999. The convention aims at expanding the legal framework for international co-operation in the investigation, arrest, prosecution, and extradition of persons engaged in terrorist financing. It commits states to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or administratively liable for such acts. The convention states that all state parties shall co-operate in the prevention of all forms of terrorism and the financing thereof by “taking

Table 6 illustrates the participation of African countries in the above mentioned international counter-terrorism conventions between 1990 and 2004. The information in Table 6 shows that 83 percent of African states are party or signatories to the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism*. It also shows that 66 percent of African countries are party or signatories to the *International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings* and that 60 percent of African countries are party or signatories to the *Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection*. This means that 70 percent of African countries are party or signatories to counter-terrorism conventions developed by the UN during the 1990 to 2004 period.

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The above mentioned international counter-terrorism conventions were not the only
counter-terrorism strategies that were developed by the UN over this period of time. The
UN’s General Assembly and its Security Council also adopted numerous counter-
terrorism resolutions over the 1990 to 2004 period. The next sub-section outlines some
of these resolutions.

2.1.2 Counter-Terrorism Resolutions adopted by the UN's General Assembly and
Security Council with specific reference to Africa 1990-2004

The UN General Assembly adopted several resolutions during the 1990-2004 period
regarding international terrorism and the countering thereof. The Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (Resolution 49/60), adopted by the
General Assembly in 1994, condemns all acts and practices of terrorism as being
criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed, and urges all states,
including all African states, to take measures at national and international levels to
eliminate international terrorism. General Assembly Resolution 58/48 was adopted in
2004 and relates to Measures to Prevent terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass
Destruction. This resolution urges all member states of the UN “to undertake and
strengthen national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring mass destruction.
weapons, their delivery means and related materials and technologies”. General Assembly Resolution 58/187, regarding the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, was also adopted in 2004. The main aim of this resolution was to establish a framework to counter terrorism effectively, by legitimatising certain counter-terrorism measures, without negatively affecting the fundamental freedoms individuals enjoy in democracies across the world (United Nations).

The Security Council, as the UN’s principal organ for dealing with international peace and security, has also been actively involved in the combating of terrorism. The Security Council adopted a number of resolutions regarding terrorism and the countering thereof during the 1990-2004 period, including three resolutions pertaining to international terrorism in Africa during the 1990s. The first was Resolution 1044 of 1996. This resolution called upon Sudan to extradite the three suspects wanted in connection with the attempt to assassinate President Mubarak of Egypt, to Ethiopia. The second was Resolution 1054 which called for countries to develop sanctions against the Sudanese government in consequence of their non-compliance with the above-mentioned Resolution 1044 of 1996 (United Nations). The Security Council’s management of the incident was interrupted by US air strikes on a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, wrongly thought to be producing chemical weapons for terrorist use. Soon after, Sudan expelled Al Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden. After requests by the OAU, Egypt and Ethiopia, sanctions were finally lifted by Resolution 1372 of 2001 (Saul, 2005: 151). The third resolution adopted by the Security Council relating to Africa was Resolution 1189 of 1998. This resolution concerned the terrorist bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 (United Nations).

The 9/11 events led to the UN’s Security Council adopting Resolution 1373 in September 2001. The resolution firstly denounces the 9/11 attacks and calls on all member states to work together in a global campaign to end all forms of international terrorism. The resolution secondly outlines certain activities that need to be executed by UN member states in the fight against international terrorism. These activities require that:

- Member states must prevent and contain any form of aid to international terrorist organisations. This includes the member states providing
international terrorists with recruits, money, weapons, safe havens, refugee status, border access and travel documents.

- Members of international terrorist movements residing in member states’ territories need to be brought to justice for their criminal activities.

- Co-operation between member states at domestic, regional and international levels, especially through bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, is essential in countering international terrorism. This will naturally mean that counter-terrorism structures (military, law enforcement and intelligence) must co-ordinate their counter-terrorism strategies and operations (United Nations, 2001).

Resolution 1373 also calls on all states to amend their national laws in order to ratify all the existing international conventions on terrorism. The Security Council also established a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), comprising all of the members of the Security Council. This resolution obliges member states to take measures to prevent terrorist activities and to declare as criminal acts, various terrorist actions; as well as to take measures to assist and promote co-operation among countries including adherence to international counter-terrorism instruments. Member states of the UN are required to report regularly to the CTC on the measures they have taken to implement Resolution 1373 (United Nations, 2001).

The requirements for implementing Resolution 1373 involve considerable levels of training, the purchase and installation of technically advanced equipment, and the development of new administrative systems. Many nations, including the vast majority of African states, require assistance in improving their law enforcement systems, financial regulatory mechanisms and intelligence units. Many developing nations have ratified counter-terrorism legislation but simply do not have the resources to implement the new laws (Cortright, 2005: 63).

The Security Council recognised in 2001 that very few countries – including the majority of African states – have the extensive legal, administrative and regulatory resources needed to counter terrorism effectively. The Security Council consequently adopted
Resolution 1377 in November 2001. This resolution encouraged the CTC to work with a wide range of organisations – including the AU – to explore ways to enable states to receive technical, financial, regulatory, legislative and other forms of assistance to improve their capability to implement Resolution 1373. Almost 100 countries worldwide, the majority deriving from the developing world, have since approached the CTC for technical assistance with their counter-terrorism efforts. This is largely due to these states having realised the extent of their obligations under Resolution 1373 and having recognised their need for assistance to meet those obligations (Cortright, 2005: 63). To further assist the Committee's work, in 2004 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1535, which called for the setting up of a Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373. It also facilitates the provision of technical assistance to those UN member states that require it (United Nations, 2004).

The growing threat of mass casualties resulting from international terrorist acts during the 1990-2004 period – for example the 1998 US embassy bombings – has also resulted in the UN’s increased involvement in countering international terrorism across the globe. The numerous conventions, resolutions and committees established bear testimony to this. The US – and its allies – has been the primary driving force behind the majority of UN counter-terrorism strategies. This is not surprising at all as international terrorist organisations replaced the USSR as the US’s number one threat during the post-Cold War era. The US embassy bombing in Peru in 1990; the World Trade Centre bombing of 1993; the attempted assassination of US President Bush by Iraqi intelligence agents in 1993; the US embassy attacks of 1998; the terrorist attack on the US Cole in 2000 in Yemen; the 9/11 attacks; and the terrorist attacks on coalition forces in Iraq since 2003, are all examples of the ongoing struggle waged by the US against international terrorist groups across the world over the 1990-2004 period. The next section looks at the international counter-terrorism strategies developed by the US, as well as the US’s regional counter-terrorism strategies in Africa, between 1990-2004, in order to assess the role of the US in counter-terrorism efforts in Africa over this period.

2.2 US Counter-Terrorism Strategies

This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first outlines the US’s international
counter-terrorism strategies which were developed in the post-Cold War era. It also briefly looks at the assistance that the US has given to countries across the globe to enable them to strengthen their own counter-terrorism capabilities. The second subsection outlines the US’s counter-terrorism strategies in Africa in the 1990 to 2004 period.

### 2.2.1 International US Counter-Terrorism Strategies 1990-2004

US counter-terrorism policies have since the 1990s been dictated by four long-standing policy principles. The first principle is that the US will make “no concession to terrorists and strike no deals”. This means that it is the policy of the US government to deny a terrorist organisation any form of ransom, policy changes, prisoner releases or any other form of concession. The US government will also use all the resources at their disposal to repatriate safely any US citizens who have been held hostage. The second principle is that the US will bring terrorists to justice for the crimes that they have committed. The means that the US will hunt down terrorists who have committed terrorist attacks against US structures and citizens, no matter how long this takes. The third principle is that the US will isolate, and put pressure on, states that sponsor terrorism to force them to end their sponsorship of international terrorism groups and their activities. In 2003 the US State Department identified seven countries as state sponsors of international terrorism, namely Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. The last principle is that the US will strengthen the counter-terrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the US and which require such assistance. The US developed an Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programme (ATAP), which provides a selected number of foreign governments with training and assistance required for their law enforcement and security services. This training entails, for example, areas such as hostage rescue, airport security, bomb detection and crisis management. The US has also assisted several countries to address terrorist financing within their borders. The US Department of Defence has trained several military forces across the world in military counter-terrorism strategies (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003: ix).

The ATAP was developed in 1983 as part of a key plan against international terrorism. Between 1983 and 2004 the ATAP trained over 48 000 participants from 141 countries. The assistance provided by the ATAP to those countries that qualify focuses on three objectives. The first objective is the enhancement of the counter-terrorism skills of those
countries. This includes providing them with training and equipment to counter any terrorist threats. The second objective is the strengthening of bilateral ties between the US and their partner nations by offering them assistance in areas of common concern. The last objective is the increase of respect for human rights by sharing the US’s counter-terrorism strategies of the US with partner nations. The ATAP’s training is categorised into four areas: crisis prevention, crisis management, crisis resolution and investigation (NCTC Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004: 9). Nine days after the 9/11 attacks, US President George Bush declared war on international terrorism and announced his intent to deploy “every resource at our command” to defeat international terrorist networks and to treat states that harbour and support international terrorists as “hostile regimes” (Steinberg, 2002: 5).

The next sub-section outlines the counter-terrorism strategies that the US developed in Africa since the 1990s.

**2.2.2 US Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a Post-Cold War Africa**

Before the 9/11 attacks, the US government had developed several other counter-terrorist strategies following international terrorist attacks against US property and citizens. The most significant international terrorist acts against US property and citizens in Africa during the 1990-2004 period were the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. Investigations into the bombings indicated that Osama bin Laden’s international terrorist network was responsible for the bombings. The US government thereafter anticipated further attacks by the Al Qaeda terrorist network, and this resulted in the US government launching military strikes against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. Osama bin Laden and his key associates were also added to the US’s list of international terrorists. This meant that all their US assets, including property and bank accounts, were frozen and that they were prohibited from undertaking any US financial transactions. The 1998 bombings resulted in the “most extensive overseas criminal investigations in US history” and strengthened working relations between the US and Kenya and Tanzania. Several suspects were taken to the US to stand trial and a five million dollar reward was announced by the State Department for any information that would lead to the arrest or conviction of any of the 1998 bombing suspects (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998: 2).
Even though the US increased its counter-terrorism policies and assistance throughout Africa after the 1998 bombings, it was only after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent announcement of a “Global War on Terrorism” that the US drastically augmented its counter-terrorism interests across the continent. Several initiatives, strategic assistance programmes and military training programmes have been developed by the US government since the 9/11 attacks to strengthen its – and Africa’s – capability to counter terrorism across the continent.

The Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) is a US State Department-funded program which operates in the northern African countries of Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. It was designed and initiated in 2003, to reinforce border controls throughout the region in order to counter arms smuggling, drug trafficking and the movement of terrorists. It also aimed to boost regional co-operation and stability. Senior police and other officials received counter-terrorism training at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Gaborone, Botswana over this period (NCTC Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004: 28).

Another US-led counter-terrorism initiative in Africa is the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) of 2003. This initiative assisted numerous states in the Horn of Africa to strengthen their counter-terrorism capacities. It included programmes to strengthen control of the movement of people and goods across borders; military training to increase coastal security around the Horn of Africa; measures to increase aviation security; providing assistance to regional efforts against terrorist financing and law enforcement training (Black, 2004).

To further assist states in the Horn of Africa to counter the movement of terrorists in and around their areas, the US State Department instituted the Terrorist Interdiction Programme (TIP) in several East African countries in 2003. The TIP computer system has been installed in countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia. The program was initiated as a result of interaction between Kenyan and US officials after the 1998 Nairobi attack as investigations into the 1998 attack showed that there was no system in Kenya to provide a prompt check on suspects fleeing the country. The TIP system was projected to have a significant impact on intelligence involving the movement of terrorists between East African countries. This is done by providing participating nations with a state-of-the-art computer name-check network enabling immigration and border control
officials to identify without delay suspects attempting to enter or leave the country (Wycoff, 2004).

It must also be noted that the US has not been the only developed country that has strengthened its counter-terrorism strategies in Africa. The UK and France, even though not as intensely as the US, have also intensified their international counter-terrorism strategies in and around Africa. The next section briefly looks at the counter-terrorism strategies developed in Africa by these two countries.

2.2.3 United Kingdom and French Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Africa

The UK’s involvement in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and its ongoing unilateral support of the US’s counter-terrorism strategies have made it one of Al Qaeda’s primary terrorist targets. An example of Al Qaeda’s threat to the UK was Al Qaeda’s attacks on UK interests in Turkey in November 2003. Another major terrorist threat the UK is currently facing is from North African cells, mostly Algerian, which include the GIA and the GSC. UK intelligence agencies have identified and pursued North African networks that have been active on a number of fronts ranging from fundraising activities to planning and preparing attacks in the UK. An example of this was when UK intelligence and law enforcement agencies foiled a plot to release lethal gas into the London underground system. UK intelligence agencies have also created units to investigate terrorist finances. These agencies have played an important role in disrupting the flow of terrorist finances by apprehending North Africans suspected of raising funds and supplying logistic aid to the GIA (Bamford, 2004: 739-746).

France and its interests abroad have also been targeted in the past by North African extremist groups such as the GIA and the GSC. France’s Foreign Legion has for decades been stationed in areas across the world that are notorious for political violence and international terrorism. The Foreign Legion has through this gained a great deal of counter-terrorism experience. The French military has also carried out joint counter-terrorism operations and training exercises with other Western military forces, such as the US Marines, over the past few years. An example of this is when in 2003 in Djibouti, a former French colony in East Africa, US marines attached to the US counter-terrorism unit, the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, took part in a counter-terrorism training exercise co-ordinated by the Foreign Legion (Mazzetti, 2003: 38).
Although Africa has received counter-terrorism support from the UN and Western powers such as the US, UK and France, it has also developed its own continental counter-terrorism strategies. The next section looks at counter-terrorism strategies developed by the OAU and AU between 1990 and 2004.

3. CONTINENTAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN AFRICA

This section is an assessment of OAU and AU counter-terrorism strategies developed in the post-Cold War era. This includes the different counter-terrorism conventions and protocols adopted by the AU over this period. This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section looks at the counter-terrorism strategies that the OAU developed in the 1990s. This focuses primarily on the OAU’s *Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* of 1999. The second sub-section outlines the counter-terrorism strategies developed by the AU in the beginning of the Twenty First Century.

3.1 The Algiers Convention

The OAU and subsequently the AU, have developed several legal instruments to counter terrorism since the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, including the OAU *Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* of 1999 (Organisation of African Unity, 1999); the 2002 *Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*; and the 2002 *Plan of Action of the African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa* (African Union, 2002).

The OAU’s concern with international terrorism dates back to 1992, when the OAU Heads of State and Government adopted the *Declaration against Extremism* in Senegal. This resolution aimed at increasing co-operation and co-ordination amongst member states in order to fight extremism. In 1994 in Tunisia, the OAU Assembly adopted a *Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations*. The Declaration rejected acts of fanaticism and extremism, whatever the nature, origin or form, particularly those based on religion and on terrorist acts, which were unreservedly condemned (Goredema & Botha, 2004: 57-58).
The OAU’s *Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* was adopted in 1999, in Algiers, by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government. The convention contains a definition of terrorism – as stated in Chapter Two of the study – and makes provision for organising co-operation amongst member states, particularly through the exchange of information on terrorist groups and the networks that finance them. It also covers areas such as extradition, investigations and mutual legal assistance (Organisation of African Unity, 1999).

There are four primary commitments the *Algiers Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* requires of member states to improve the capability of the continent to counter the threat posed to it by international terrorism. The first commitment is that member states are required to ratify international instruments and incorporate these instruments into their own domestic legislation. The *Algiers Convention* states in Article 2 (b) that member states must “…implement the actions, including enactment of legislation and the establishment as criminal offences of certain acts as required in terms of the international instruments referred to in paragraph (b)” (Organisation of African Unity, 1999). An example of an international counter-terrorism instrument which the *Algiers Convention* required member states to ratify is the UN’s *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* of 1999. The second commitment is that member states are required to establish and increase inter-agency co-operation at a national level. This means that member states must identify the primary role-players in the enforcement of counter-terrorism strategies before any cross-border efforts are undertaken to counter terrorism (Organisation of African Unity, 1999). An example of such a process is the South African National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee (NICOC). This committee aims at enhancing inter-agency co-operation amongst all intelligence agencies in South Africa.

The third commitment is the improvement of surveillance and border patrol capabilities of member states. Article 4 (2) of the *Algiers Convention* states that countries agree to “develop and strengthen methods of monitoring and detecting plans or activities aimed at the illegal cross-border transportation, importation, export, stockpiling and use of arms, ammunition and explosives and other materials and means of committing terrorist acts” and to “develop and strengthen methods of controlling and monitoring land, sea and air borders and customs and immigration check points in order to pre-empt any infiltration by individuals or groups involved in the planning, organisation and execution of acts committed with the objective of terrorism” (Organisation of African Unity, 1999).
of terrorist acts”. The fourth commitment is that member states are required to take stringent action against the financing of terrorism. Member states agreed to refrain from providing international terrorist organisations with any form of financial or logistical support (Organisation of African Unity, 1999). Sudan is an example of an African state that has financially and logistically supported international terrorist organisations.

Table 7 below illustrates which African countries had signed and ratified the *Algiers Convention* by 2004.

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*Source: African Union, List of Countries which have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2005. Access: 10 January 2007*

In 2001, the AU was formed as a successor to the amalgamated African Economic Community (AEC) and the OAU. The next sub-section outlines the counter-terrorism strategies developed by the AU between 2001 and 2004.
3.2 The AU and Counter-Terrorism at the Beginning of the Twenty First Century

The threat that terrorism poses to Africa’s stability and security was highlighted during the development of the AU from the previous OAU. This is illustrated in the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* of 2002. It states that the AU shall function in accordance with several principles, one of these being “Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities”. One if the first steps the AU took to develop and improve its counter-terrorism strategies was the development of the *AU Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism* of 2002. The Protocol was adopted as a supplement to the *Algiers Convention*. The main purpose of the Protocol is to “enhance the effective implementation” of the *Algiers Convention*. It also describes the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, and the “need to coordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism in all its aspects, as well as the implementation of other relevant international instruments”. Article 4 of Protocol states that the PSC “shall be responsible for harmonising and co-ordinating continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism”. The Protocol states that the PSC is required to:

- establish operational procedures for information gathering, processing and dissemination;

- establish mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of information among State Parties on patterns and trends in terrorist acts and the activities of terrorist groups and on successful practices for combating terrorism;

- present an annual report to the Assembly of the Union on terrorist activities on the continent;

- monitor, evaluate and make recommendations on the implementation of the *Plan of Action of the African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa* (Plan of Action) of 2002 and programmes adopted by the African Union;
- examine all reports submitted by state members on the implementation of the Plan of Action and programmes adopted by the AU;

- examine all reports submitted by the state members on the implementation of the Protocol; and

- establish an information network with national, regional and international focal points on terrorism (African Union, 2002).

The AU’s *Plan of Action* of 2002 describes the commitments and obligations of African countries to combat terrorism and to facilitate access to appropriate counter-terrorism resources. It presents African states with guidelines and strategies on how to – collectively and individually – counter terrorism threats through integrating continental and international counter-terrorism strategies. The *Plan of Action* provides member states with eight specific provisions to which they must adhere. The first provision requires member states to strengthen their law enforcement and border control capabilities. The member states are required to prevent the illegal movement of suspected terrorists in and around Africa. The second provision requires member states to develop the necessary legislative and judicial measures to improve their counter-terrorism capabilities. This includes the development of appropriate extradition measures by member states. The third provision is the requirement of member states to suppress the financing of terrorism. This includes the requirement of member states to “introduce legislation and to criminalise the funding of terrorism and money laundering” (African Union, 2002).

The fourth provision of the AU’s *Plan of Action* of 2002 requires member states to exchange information and intelligence relating to terrorist activities in and around the continent. The fifth provision is to facilitate co-ordination at regional, continental and international levels for which member states are required to “establish contact points at regional level to follow-up and liaise on matters relating to the implementation of the Plan of Action”. The sixth provision describes the role of the PSC. The PSC “shall assume responsibilities for all matters relating to terrorism”. These responsibilities include, for example, the development of lists of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist activities. The seventh provision describes the role the AU Commissioner plays in the AU’s *Plan of Action*. The Commissioner in charge of the PSC must follow up on all
terrorist-related matters and assist all member states to develop appropriate counter-terrorism strategies. The last provision involves the establishment of the African Union's African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT). The Plan of Action states that the ACSRT “shall serve to centralise information, studies and analysis on terrorism and terrorist groups and develop training programmes by organising, with the assistance of international partners, training schedules, meetings and symposia” (African Union, 2002).

The Algiers-based ACSRT was inaugurated in 2004. It serves as a think tank, an information collection and dissemination centre, and as a regional training centre. The AU’s Modalities for the Functioning of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism was published in 2004. The purpose of the ACSRT is described in this document as (African Union, 2004):

\begin{quote}

to contribute to and strengthen the capacity of the AU in the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa, with the ultimate objective of eliminating the threat posed by terrorism to peace, security, stability and development in Africa...
\end{quote}

The AU also relies on regional organisations, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in Africa to contribute to and strengthen the counter-terrorism strategies developed by the AU. The AU Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 2002 states that “regional mechanisms shall play a complementary role in the implementation” of this Protocol and the Algiers Convention. Article 6 of the Protocol states that regional organisations must undertake to do the following:

- to establish contact points on terrorism at the regional level;

- to liaise with the Commission of the AU to develop measures for the prevention and combating of terrorism;

- to promote co-operation at regional level, for the implementation of all aspects in accordance with the Protocol and the Algiers Convention;
- to adopt and co-ordinate national measures to prevent and combat terrorism in their respective regions;

- to establish modalities for sharing information on the activities of the perpetrators of terrorist acts and on the best practices for the prevention and combating of terrorism;

- to assist Member States to implement regional, continental and international instruments for the prevention and combating of terrorism; and

- to report regularly to the AU Commission on measure taken at the regional level to prevent and combat terrorist acts (African Union, 2002).

The different counter-terrorism initiatives in Africa, as illustrated in this chapter, highlight the fact that Africa plays a specific and significant role, and has numerous responsibilities to fulfil, regarding current international counter-terrorism programmes and strategies. Africa thus has a vital role to play in the current “Global War against Terrorism”. The next section briefly assesses Africa’s role in the “Global War on Terrorism” and states what will be required to strengthen Africa’s ability to contribute to the success of this war through the prevention of international terrorism globally and on the continent.

4. AFRICA’S ROLE IN THE “GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISM”

The counter-terrorist strategies at the turn of the Twenty First Century have unavoidably been directed by the events of 9/11. Almog (2004: 6) argues that the US-led “Global War on Terrorism” will not be decided by “a single, overwhelming blow”. It is postulated that this “Global War on Terrorism” will require great persistence, constant determination, international co-operation, and an inventive, harmonised blend of defensive and offensive measures. The “Global War on Terrorism” will also require the drastic improvement of the political, economic and social conditions of those living in places where terrorism is allowed to flourish and martyrdom is encouraged. Incentives that discourage would-be terrorists from carrying out their destructive impulses need to be developed, as well as the creation of free, prosperous, and secure societies.
As have all the continents, Africa has a significant role to play in the current global war being waged against international terrorism and against international terrorist organisations. This section assesses Africa’s role and what additional measures the continent could take to contribute to the global campaign. This includes the short-term and long-term counter-terrorism strategies the continent would have to adopt to strengthen its role in the global war against international terrorism.

Clapham (2003: 36-38) differentiates between short-term and long-term strategies to boost Africa’s counter-terrorism capabilities. In the short-term, military action, which is informed by complex analysis, is essential. Such military action must, however, be executed in conjunction with activities such as intelligence co-operation, effective information collection and management, counter-terrorism training and essential networking. There is a need for appropriate national legislation to be drawn up for co-ordination across the continent. The creation of the AU’s ACRST is seen as a development in the right direction. Another issue that needs to be addressed in Africa regarding effective short-term counter-terrorism strategies is the continent’s ability to effectively use law enforcement agencies to counter any domestic terrorist threats. These agencies are vital in the fight against terrorism in Africa, initially as “first responders” and secondly as information-collecting agents. In the long-term, the environments in and around Africa that allow certain terrorist groups to terrorise citizens and political movements need to be eliminated. Groups such as Al Qaeda must not be allowed to gain any more power or additional following. The need for further democratisation across Africa is also essential in developing the continent’s security structures. The encouragement of democratisation should include diplomatic strategies to strengthen relations with the continent’s Muslim communities (Clapham, 2003: 36-38).

Sturman (2002: 108) states that political, economic and social stability in Africa is essential in countering any terrorist threats across the continent. She states that “promoting stability in Africa is a long-term investment for combating terrorism”. Failed states in Africa cannot be made safe through any military operations, unless these are linked to a “process of reconciliation and reconstruction of a legitimate government.” Thus, a significant effort is essential in order to develop the stability, vigour and legitimacy of African states. She further states that Africa’s fight against international terrorism can “become a wider campaign against conflict and instability on the continent,
and in this way, ensure that the “global war on terrorism” works to the advantage of a truly global community.”

The US government has acknowledged that Africa’s counter-terrorism strategies are directly linked to the political, economic and social challenges the continent is facing. Ambassador Cofer Black stated in 2004 that the US government knows that Africa has other priorities in addition to terrorism. These priorities include economic development, combating AIDS, good governance, health care and alleviating poverty. The concerns mentioned above can, however, not be a reason for the US government or any African state to “bow out of the struggle against terrorism” in Africa. Black further stated that the struggle against terrorism, in Africa and across the world, is also a “struggle for a better society”. Improving the lives of the people of Africa will also help to ensure success against international and domestic terrorism in Africa (Black, 2004). This will improve Africa’s ability to deter any foreign international terrorist organisations from developing networks in Africa or from using the continent as a springboard for international terrorism activities across the world. These factors highlight Africa’s crucial role in the global war against international terrorism.

5. CONCLUSION

International terrorism became an imperative item on political and security agendas throughout the world during the 1990s and at the beginning of the Twenty First Century. Major international terrorist attacks, such as the 1998 embassy bombings and the 9/11 attacks, have had a significant impact on the importance of effective counter-terrorism strategies across the globe. The 1998 embassy bombings in particular, illustrated how vulnerable the developing world is to international terrorist attacks that cause thousands of casualties. They also proved that international terrorists opposing the West would use Third World countries to elevate their war against countries such as the US and the UK.

The need to develop effective counter-terrorism measures in Third World regions such as Africa was thus seen as an important step in the prevention of international terrorism on the global stage. Africa plays an important role in the plans of the UN and the US to counter all international terrorist networks and activities across the globe. The “Global War on Terrorism” cannot afford to exclude Africa as a vital stakeholder. Africa plays a highly significant strategic role in current global counter-terrorism measures. As shown in
Chapter Four of this study, international terrorist organisations are utilising Africa’s weak security, political, social and economic structures to develop terrorist cells across the continent and to obtain logistical and financial support in and around Africa. This has become a security concern for not only global entities and role-players such as the UN and the US, but also for continental organisations such as the AU and for numerous other African countries.

There is a need for Africa’s states to assimilate all relevant international and continental counter-terrorism policies into their domestic legislation. Figure 14 above illustrates the need for African countries to bring in to alignment their relevant legislation, or to develop strategies if none exist, in order to re-inforce counter-terrorism efforts throughout the continent. The capabilities and efficiency of the law enforcement agencies need to be strengthened. The fortification of law enforcement capacity in Africa will improve the continent’s ability to track, prosecute or prevent any potential international terrorist activities or organisations.
The 1998 US embassy and the 2002 Mombassa bombings, illustrated Africa’s problems regarding the prevention of international terrorist attacks. They also highlighted Africa’s need for external assistance to strengthen its counter-terrorism capabilities. An example is the counter-terrorism assistance the US has provided to numerous countries across Africa.

Strengthening political structures across Africa through democratisation, would enhance the continent’s economic and social structures, and would clearly strengthen the continent’s ability to deter the threats posed by international terrorism. Strong democracies, with thriving economies, would ensure that populations would support the development by their governments of necessary counter-terrorism strategies to protect these democracies and economies.

The next chapter will summarise the main issues that have been addressed in this study and draw certain conclusions. The assumptions formulated in the Introduction will also be assessed.
CHAPTER 6

EVALUATION

“The war we are fighting today against terrorism is a multifaceted fight. We have to use every tool in our toolkit to wage this war - diplomacy, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and of course, military power - and we are developing new tools as we go along.”

Richard Armitage

This chapter summarises the research; evaluates the main assumptions of the study; and concludes with some recommendations on how Africa can improve its capability to combat and curb international terrorist activities on the continent.

1. SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

Chapter 1 is an introduction in which the objectives of the study are set out.

Chapter 2 provides a conceptual overview of international terrorism and counter-measures, and it addresses aspects such as definitions and characteristics of contemporary international terrorism. Changes and challenges within the post-Cold War and post 9/11 security environments are also addressed, indicating the need for new security requirements; new approaches to security policy; as well as the concept of counter-terrorism.

Chapter 3 is an overview of international terrorism in Africa up to the end of the Cold War. International terrorism and counter-measures in Africa up to 1990 are analysed to provide a background to the post-Cold War international terrorism situation in Africa.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the occurrence of international terrorism in Africa during the period 1990-2004. The chapter outlines the different characteristics and trends of international terrorism in the world and in Africa over the 1990 to 2004 period, supported by case studies.
Chapter 5 focuses on current global and continental counter-terrorism strategies in Africa, and assesses any shortcomings. These counter-terrorist strategies include strategies developed by the UN, US and AU. This chapter also includes a brief assessment of Africa’s position in the US-led “Global War on Terrorism”.

2. TESTING OF ASSUMPTIONS

This section evaluates the following assumptions:

2.1 First Assumption

“Africa’s unstable political, economic and social structures cause weaknesses within the continent which international terrorism organisations can exploit and use to their own advantage.”

The study has shown that state failure and weak law enforcement structures, coupled with weak economic and social structures, can be directly linked to the occurrence of terrorism in the Third World. It also showed that some of the counter-terrorism policies, such as the US’s counter-terrorism policies in Africa, are driven by the theory that weak economic and social structures and state failure are the primary causes of terrorism across the globe (US National Security Strategy, 2002: ii).

Numerous African states and African communities, especially those with unstable political, economic and social structures, offer refuge and support to international terrorism groups. The lack of law enforcement and border patrol capabilities in several African countries has not only allowed international terrorists to cross their borders, but have also resulted in international terrorist groups terrorising local populations. International terrorist groups have used several of the ineffectively governed parts of Africa as safe havens from which to attack US and other Western targets. Examples of such countries are Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. An environment of alienation and radicalisation has developed across Africa due to the prevalent conditions of conflict and poverty. This has resulted in terrorist groups having easy access to recruits across the continent (Herbst & Mills, 2003: 31-32). Africa has other pressing priorities, such as economic development, AIDS, good governance, health care and alleviating poverty, in addition to the threat posed by terrorism. The improvement of the lives of the people of
Africa will, however, be an important means of achieving success against international and domestic terrorism in Africa.

It must be noted that international terrorism in Africa can also be caused by reasons other than the continent’s economic conditions, social deprivation, political oppression and weak state structures. The development of ideologies, such as Islamic fundamentalism found in certain African countries, can have a direct impact on the presence of international terrorist organisations and activities in Africa. Al Qaeda’s terrorist network in Africa is an example of this. The second factor is the existence of “appropriate agitators”. These international terrorists utilise their ideologies to organise a powerful terrorist force against a common external enemy (Mair, 2003: 107). Examples of this are the 1998 US embassy, and the 2002 Mombassa bombings.

The assumption that Africa’s unstable political, economic and social structures cause weaknesses within the continent which international terrorism organisations can exploit and use to their own advantage can thus be verified. Africa’s weak political, economic and social structures give numerous international terrorist groups a platform to develop their networks on the continent and to obtain financial and logistical support. It also makes it much easier for international terrorist groups to target Western targets situated in Africa.

2.2 Second Assumption

“Africa’s history of civil wars makes the continent an easy target for international terrorist organisations to garner support for their organisations.”

Africa has an intricate history of armed conflicts, political violence, civil war and state failure. The study shows that international terrorism did not play a major role in Africa during the Cold War. Africa was, however, inundated with revolutionary and nationalist terrorism movements during the decolonisation period. The 1950s and 1960s saw revolutionary and nationalist terrorism move to the forefront of political violence in Africa. The 1990 to 2004 period saw Africa plagued with civil wars and ethnic conflicts. These armed conflicts led to several acts of international terrorism, as foreigners and foreign
property became targets during the armed conflicts. Examples of this were the armed conflicts in Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad and Somalia.

The international terrorism trends over the 1990 to 2004 period (as depicted in Figure 13) illustrate that the majority of international terrorism incidents that occurred in Africa, were linked to civil war or domestic armed conflict. International terrorist groups – such as Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah – penetrated numerous African states over this period to establish networks to provide them with logistical support, new recruits and even possible targets such as embassies, foreign banks and tourist destinations. Many African countries were unable to prevent this from happening as civil conflict and corruption within their borders prevented them from having the capacity to ensure efficient law enforcement, border control, institutional sovereignty and political, economic and social cohesion and development. This has made them easy targets for international terrorist groups to infiltrate and in which to develop important economic and political networks. This has especially been the case with those African countries that have Islamic communities residing within their borders (US State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990 to 2003; NCTC Chronology of Significant Terrorism, 2004: 3-78).

Revolutionary groups involved in civil wars across Africa also started utilising international terrorism more often as a political tool over the 1990 to 2004 period. This ensured more international publicity than ever before. Several revolutionary and Islamic terrorist groups turned to criminal activities to fund their operations. This led to numerous organised crime syndicates across Africa developing links with several terrorist groups operating within the continent (Hough, 2001, 127-128).

The second assumption, namely that Africa’s history of civil wars has made the continent an easy target for international terrorist organisations to garner support for their organisations, can therefore also be verified.

2.3 Third Assumption

“The current counter-terrorism policies and measures are still not effective enough to counter international terrorism on the African continent, as in some countries there is still an ongoing struggle for political control.”
International terrorist activities such as kidnappings and hostage-takings occur very easily in Africa as vast regions in Africa have weak law enforcement structures, are controlled by perpetrators of armed rebellions and have no effective state structures. The inability of African states to more effectively control the movement of people, and the ineffective control measures at their ports of entry, are also factors contributing to international terrorism in Africa. The situation regarding illegal cross-border movements is aggravated by the easy availability of small arms that are transported illegally across Africa (Hough, 2001: 130-131).

Numerous international terrorist attacks in Africa between 1990 and 2004 were executed by insurgency groups that were aiming to take over the political control of a specific African country. Examples of such African insurgency groups utilising international terrorism tactics over this period are the LRA attacking foreign relief organisations in Uganda in 1994, UNITA attacks on foreigners in Angola in 1999 and the 32 European tourists that were abducted by the GSC in Algeria in 2003 (see Figure 13).

The 1998 US embassy and the 2002 Mombassa bombings have illustrated Africa’s problems regarding the prevention of international terrorist attacks. This is even though the majority of African states have assimilated all relevant international and continental counter-terrorism policies into their domestic legislation. The problem has been that many states have assimilated the relevant policies into their domestic legislation, yet not all of these states can successfully enforce those strategies within their borders. Several African counties have regions within their borders that are controlled by members of armed rebel movements (Rosenau, 2005: 1).

The study has therefore illustrated that the current counter-terrorism strategies and measures in Africa cannot effectively be implemented on the African continent due to the political instability in numerous countries in Africa. The development of political stability must be seen as a long-term process in combating domestic and international terrorism across the continent. Strengthening political structures across Africa, as well as improving the continent’s economic and social structures, will enhance its ability to combat the threat of international terrorism to the continent. The third assumption of the study can therefore be verified.
2.4 Fourth Assumption

“The “Global War on Terrorism” has played a supportive role in Africa’s counter-terrorism policies.”

The 1998 US embassy and the 2002 Mombassa bombings, highlighted Africa’s need for external assistance to strengthen its counter-terrorism capabilities. An example of this is the counter-terrorism assistance the US has provided to numerous countries across Africa.

The US-led “Global War on Terrorism” has definitely played an effective supporting role in countering terrorism in numerous regions across Africa. The US did increase its counter-terrorism policy measures and assistance throughout Africa after the 1998 bombings, but it was only after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “Global War on Terrorism” that the US drastically intensified its counter-terrorism efforts across the continent. Several initiatives, strategic assistance programmes and military training programmes have been developed by the US government since the 9/11 attacks to strengthen its – and Africa’s – capability to counter terrorism across the continent (Black, 2004). Examples of this, as outlined in Chapter Five, are the Pan Sahel Initiative in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad; the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative in the Horn of Africa; the Terrorist Interdiction Programme in several East African countries; and programmes assisting African countries to strengthen their law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, such as the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Programme and the International Law Enforcement Academy in Gaborone. These initiatives aimed to assist African countries to strengthen their border control in order to counter arms smuggling, drug trafficking and the movement of terrorists; to boost regional co-operation and stability; and to train senior police and intelligence officials in modern counter-terrorism strategies and tactics (NCTC Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004: 9).

The “Global War on Terrorism” is characterised by its focus on fanatical Islamic terrorist organisations across the world, such as Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah. Africa’s position regarding this is highlighted by the fact that it Islamic terrorists were responsible for the most significant international terrorist attacks in Africa in the 1990 to 2004 period. The 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the bomb explosion in Mombassa in 2002, illustrate the severity of the effects which fundamental
Islamic terrorist attacks have had on Africa. The study also briefly noted that the US has not been the only developed country that has strengthened its counter-terrorism strategies in Africa. The UK and France, even though on a much smaller scale than the US, have intensified their international counter-terrorism strategies in and around Africa. The fourth assumption – namely that the “Global War on Terrorism” has played a supportive role in Africa’s counter-terrorism policies – can therefore be verified.

3. CONCLUSION

The main conclusions are as follows:

- The region with the highest number of incidents of international terrorism incidents does not necessarily have the highest number of casualties.

- The 1998 US embassy bombings demonstrated how vulnerable the developing world is to international terrorist attacks that cause large numbers of casualties. They also proved that international terrorists opposing the West could use Third World countries to elevate their war against Western countries. It is therefore vital for all countries in Africa to assess the threat international terrorism poses to them and to develop policies necessary to prevent it from occurring within their own borders.

- International terrorist groups – especially radical Islamic groups such as Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah – penetrated numerous African states over the 1990 to 2004 period to establish networks to provide these groups with logistical support, new recruits and even possible targets such as embassies, foreign banks and tourist destinations. African countries struggle to prevent international terrorist groups from developing terrorist networks within their borders as they do not have the capacity to ensure effective law enforcement, border control and political, economic and social cohesion and development. This has highlighted Africa’s need for external assistance to strengthen its counter-terrorism capabilities. The capabilities and efficiency of law enforcement agencies therefore need to be strengthened across the continent. The strengthening of law enforcement capacity in Africa would also strengthen the continent’s ability to track, prevent and prosecute potential international terrorist activities or organisations.
- Revolutionary groups in Africa started utilising international terrorism as a political tool more frequently over the 1990 to 2004 period. This ensured greater international publicity than ever before. Several revolutionary and Islamic terrorist groups also turned to criminal activities to fund their operations.

- The success of the UN and the AU’s counter-terrorism strategies depends directly on the application thereof by member states in their own domestic environments. It is therefore recommended that member states of the UN and the AU enforce these recommendations accordingly.

- There is a need for better intelligence gathering and sharing between governmental spheres across Africa to prevent the development of international terrorist networks across the continent. This includes the sharing of intelligence between African states who are members of regional organisations such as SADC and ECOWAS; between AU member states; and between African states and the UN. The improvement of intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities in Africa will enable countries on the continent to more successfully detect and deter the threat which international terrorism poses to their national security.

- The fact that Africa began to host more international events in the 1990s – such as sporting events and political and economic conferences – has made it a significant target for any international terrorist organisation aiming to gain international publicity or simply to continue the “Holy War against the West”. The fact that South Africa will host the 2010 Soccer World Cup should be considered in this context.

The recommendations outlined in the above section should contribute to the improvement of Africa’s capability to strengthen its counter-terrorism capabilities across the continent. Africa undoubtedly plays an important role in the worldwide campaign against all forms of terrorism, including international terrorism. It will, however, take much more commitment from the different countries across Africa to ensure that international terrorist organisations are unable to gain a foothold anywhere on the continent.
SUMMARY

Title: International Terrorism in Africa 1990-2004: Extent and Counter-Measures
By: L.E. Plenaar
Study Leader: Prof. M. Hough
Degree: Master of Security Studies
Department: Political Sciences, University of Pretoria

The aim of the dissertation is to analyse the concept of international terrorism in Africa from 1990-2004 at a continental level and then investigate the extent of measures developed to counteract this threat. The dissertation puts forward four assumptions to be explored and tested:

- Africa’s unstable political, economic and social structures cause weaknesses within the continent which international terrorist organisations can exploit and use to their own advantage.
- Africa’s history of civil wars makes the continent an easy target for international terrorist organisations to garner support for their organisations.
- The current counter-terrorism policies and measures are not effective enough to deter international terrorism on the African continent, as in some countries there is still an ongoing struggle for political control.
- The “Global War on Terrorism” has played a supportive role in Africa’s counter-terrorism policies.

The analysis investigates why international terrorism occurs in Africa, and which factors facilitate this. To achieve its aim, the study focuses on aspects such as the historical background of international terrorism in Africa; the current international security and terrorist environment; the present African security environment; and international and continental counter-terrorist policies within Africa. This dissertation aims to illustrate the issues facing Africa in combating and curbing international terrorist activities on the continent. It describes attempts by international and continental organisations to develop measures designed specifically to establish counter-terrorist agencies and policies in Africa.
Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is om die verskynsel van internasionale terrorisme in Afrika vanaf 1990 tot 2004 te ontleed en die omvang van maatreëls wat ontwerp is om hierdie bedreiging teen te werk, te ondersoek. Hierdie verhandeling formuleer vier aannames wat ondersoek en getoets word:

- Afrika se onstabiele politieke, ekonomiese en sosiale strukture veroorsaak leemtes op die kontinent wat deur internasionale terroriste-organisasies uitgebuit kan word en wat hulle tot hul eie voordeel kan aanwend.
- Afrika se geskiedenis van burgeroorloë maak van die kontinent 'n maklike teiken vir internasionale terroriste-organisasies om ondersteuning vir hul organisasies te werf.
- Die huidige teenterrorisme beleidrigtings en –maatreëls is nie doeltreffend genoeg om internasionale terrorisme op die Afrika vasteland te keer nie, aangesien daar in sommige state 'n voortdurende stryd om politieke beheer is.
- Die “Wêreldwye Oorlog teen Terrorisme” het ’n ondersteunende rol in Afrika se teenterrorisme beleidrigtings gespeel.

Die studie ondersoek waarom internasionale terreur in Afrika voorkom en watter faktore dit fasiliteer. Ten einde hierdie doel te bereik, fokus die studie op aspekte soos die historiese agtergrond van internasionale terrorisme in Afrika; die huidige internasionale veiligheids- en terroriste-omgewing; die huidige Afrika veiligheidsomgewing; en internasionale en kontinentale teenterrorisme beleidrigtings in Afrika. Hierdie verhandeling poog om die kwessies te illustreer waarvoor Afrika te staan kom in die bekampting van internasionale terreur-aktiwiteite op die vasteland. Pogings deur internasionale en kontinentale organisasies om maatreëls te ontwikkel wat ontwerp is om spesifieke teenterrorisme beleidrigtings in Afrika te vestig, word beskryf.
KEY TERMS / SLEUTELWOORDE

Counter-Terrorism/ Teen-Terreur
International Terrorism/Internationale Terrorisme
International Terrorist Organisation/ Internasionale Terroriste Organisasie
Law Enforcement/ Wetstoepassing
National Security/Nasionale Veiligheid
Political Violence/Politieke Geweld
Terrorism/Terrorisme
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