CHAPTER 5
TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE MADANG
PUBLIC DIALOGUE: “THREE MODELS” OF
DIALOGIC COMMUNICATION

This chapter concerns an exploration of an alternative pattern of public dialogue. The main question of this thesis is as follows: how will the church overcome church-individualism and exclusivism? How can the Christian community recover the public sphere, under circumstances in which the church has lost its influence upon others (non-Christian / society) and become itself a private matter? That is a matter of public dialogue. The concrete method to approach this will be found in Jesus’ Great Commission as mentioned in Chapter 1.

“Go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them... and teaching them.”
(Matthew 28: 19-20)

“Go into all the world and preach the good news to all creation.” (Mark 16:15)

Concerning the great commission, this thesis has laid emphasis on the “public dialogue” of the church with others. Simply put, “the public dialogue through madang-theatre” is indeed a practical strategy to perform the great commission. In other words, the madang public dialogue is nothing more than following the commission.

(1) Go! : This is the church's first step in public dialogue or in the great commission. The church community is called upon not to remain within the wall of the church, but to "go" out; that is, not to wait for others, but to go out toward them.
If this is the case, when the Christian community goes out, the question is "where to go" and "where to encounter them." This thesis suggests "Madang" as the "where." The Christian community goes wherever people can come together: open space (madang) for everyone such as the street, park or public square. In other words, the first step is
“to get out of closed space” and “not to enter into it”; not into a house, not into the church, not into the school, not into a building and not onto a stage. Rather, it is “to go” and “to create an open space” in which everyone—family, Christians, students, workers, non-Christians, the young and the old, the rich and the poor—can gather together freely.

(2) To All! : The “all” signifies the object that the church goes to meet. This means that the church’s object of encounter is not only the people whom it wants to meet, but everyone. If so, how will the Christian community encounter the “all”? Theatre is suggested as a means of the encounter here, especially madanggŭk. As observed in the previous chapter, madanggŭk, the theatre performed in “madang,” obtained the open space of “madang” and was a medium of communication itself at the same time. Madanggŭk thus was both the theatre and the open space for encountering “all” others regardless of whether they were rich or poor, old or young, the ruling or the ruled, the privileged or the deprived.

(3) Make disciples, baptize and teach them! : This is possible fundamentally through communicative action. Encounter and relationship are indeed impossible without communicative action. What type of communicative action is necessary? It is very important to follow the commission because the type of communication indeed affects the type of relationship. In the case of one-way communication, the relationship between the church and the other can never be “dialogic.” Jesus’ apostle community was obviously a dialogic community based on mutual communication. The Christian community should explore the way of dialogic communication, that is, the way of effective public dialogue with the “all.”

The communicability of Madanggŭk was researched in Chapter 4. The question is whether the mode of madanggŭk used in the past is still suitable for the church’s public
dialogue with the other in the present day.

Madanggŭk was a cultural mode of communication that contributed to overcoming extremely resistant patterns of public dialogue. It facilitated the Christian community’s participation in reality or society under circumstances of political dictatorship, social inequality and religious privatization. On the other hand, madanggŭk showed dichotomizing attitude of either/or, that is, either artistry or social movement, either the elite or minjung. It inclined toward social movement and minjung, rather than the harmony of the binary opposition. This attitude is evaluated creatively and experimentally, taking the circumstances of those days into consideration. However, in order to become a channel of the church’s public dialogue these days, madanggŭk needs to be renewed. It needs to assume a Christian aspect. Christian madanggŭk means not to deal with or transmit the Christian story and message, but rather to transform it into the pattern of Christian communication. The Christian approach to madanggŭk is therefore to examine Christian public dialogue.

The main concern of this chapter is to explore an alternative public dialogue for the church’s encounter with those outside it. The alternative theatre that the Christian community will use to communicate with others in the open public space of “madang” is different from the madanggŭk performed in the past. It should be a new form of madanggŭk that overcomes previous limitations. Thus, the new form of madanggŭk for public dialogue will be called “madang-theatre," distinguishing it from the madanggŭk of the past. And “the Christian community’s public dialogue with the other through madang-theatre in madang” will be called “madang public dialogue."

This chapter deals firstly with how live theatre (unlike mechanical media such as television, radio and cinema) can be effective in practicing the church’s public dialogue with others, i.e. madang public dialogue. Secondly, when the Christian community fulfills madang public dialogue, a premise is necessary: that is, to change its communication “from one-way monologue to two-way dialogue.” The demand for
change applies to both the Christian community and to madang-theatre as a mode of communication. Thirdly, what is an alternative madang public dialogue based on dialogic communication? Here three alternative models (or patterns) of madang public dialogue are suggested: (1) Incarnational Public Dialogue, (2) Critical Public Dialogue, and (3) Festival Public Dialogue. These are practical strategies for the praxis of madang public dialogue.

As dialogic strategies of madang public dialogue, the three models are basically connected with the communicative principles of madanggŭk researched in chapter 4. But at the same time these models are formulated according to the dialogism of Mikhail Bakhtin, a Russian literary theorist and philosopher. (In fact, Bakhtin’s dialogue theory and the communicative principles of madanggŭk have many points in common.)

The first model, Incarnational Public Dialogue, explores the way the church forms a relationship with the other; how the church can incarnate and accept the other (the audience) as a participative subject; and how the Christian community deals with the matter of difference and conflict between church and others. This is a strategy of creative participative culture in madang public dialogue. It is related to the communicative principles of madanggŭk: rediscovery of minjung and practices outside the theatrical world.

The second model, Critical Public Dialogue, concerns the way in which the incarnational principles of madang public dialogue can be embodied in the content of madang-theatre, and how the Christian community deals with the Christian story and its own voice without merging the other’s stories and voices into the church’s single story and voice; how it develops the audience’s competency in understanding and criticism; how to form “critical detachment” in madang-theatre. This is the strategy of transformative culture in madang public dialogue. It is connected with the features of reality-recognition and reality-criticism in madanggŭk that is mentioned in chapter 4.
The third model, *Festival Public Dialogue*, is suggested as a time-space for fulfilling both incarnational and critical principles. It acknowledges man as the play. Festivity can function as a space for the harmony of rational and sensuous nature. And festivity and its imagination (fantasy) dialogize reality and the Christian vision of the future. To this end, the dialogic characteristics in festivity will be researched. Madanggük is a theatre with the spirit of play and the spirit of madang. The festive dialogue model is a strategy to formulate the culture of laughter, play and the imagination.

5.1 Why Live Theatre?

Communicative modes using drama abound in the present day. Martin Esslin (1978:13) indicates in his *An Anatomy of Drama* that this tendency “does not only apply to such great works of the human spirit as the plays of Sophocles or Shakespeare, but also to the television situation comedy or, indeed, to that briefest of dramatic forms, the television or radio commercial.” Every individual has access to a mode of dramatic expression daily through the mass media: cinema, television and radio (Esslin 1978:20). Nowadays drama is a kind of communicative mode as well as an art. Esslin (1978:12) clarifies the fact that “through the mass media drama has become one of the most powerful means of communication between human beings, far more powerful than the merely printed word which was the basis of the Gutenberg revolution.”

This study on madang public dialogue focuses on live theatre rather than on mechanical media as a means of public dialogue between church and others. That is not because live theatre is superior to other media.

As Esslin (1978:77) indicates, there is “the basic unity of the dramatic mode of communication in the theatre and in the mass media of the cinema, television and radio.” In some respects, cinema, television and radio seem to gain easier access to the audience than live theatre. In fact, people who would never have gone to the
theatre throughout their lives are now exposed to vast quantities of dramatic material on television and radio. Thus mass media are more effective as a mode of dramatic expression (Esslin 1978:127). Mechanical media can vary the venue of the action through mechanical pre-recording, and can structure the content through photographic devices like montage and editing. The media enable the audience to experience the utmost proximity and intimacy with the action, by varying long-shots and close-ups, by cutting from one face, one locale, to another at will and by a whispered internal monologue on radio (Esslin 1978:51,78-79).

In addition, the continuity of the dramas of television and radio, regularly recurring features of set and being grouped in series, allows the audience a familiarity with the main characters of such series over many years (Esslin 1978:82-83). For this reason, Marshall McLuhan (1964:12) underlines that the advent of movies shifted the way people relate to the world. As a medium that addresses many senses at one time, the motion picture translates people “beyond mechanism into a world of growth and organic interrelation.”

What are the reasons for this study's focus on “live theatre in madang” (madanggŭk) as a means of communication for public dialogue, in spite of the advantages of the mechanical media? In fact, the mechanical media need cumbersome and expensive equipment, but in the live theatre of madang (madanggŭk) it is possible to communicate with the audience with a minimum of equipment and expense. However, the most important answer to “why live theatre” lies in the peculiar communicability of theatre which is revealed in the features of theatrical performance.

5.1.1 Three-Cornered Feedback Effect

The first reason for choosing live theatre is because it evokes a direct communicative response from the audience. While in the mechanical media “the director’s power over audience’s point of view is total” (Esslin 1978:79), in live theatre, positive or negative
reaction from the audience has a powerful effect on the performer. This is the "feedback effect" between the performer and the audience. But there is another equally powerful feedback: it is the feedback between the individual members of the audience themselves. These two kinds of feedback are what Esslin terms "three-cornered feedback." The three-cornered feedback effect is an important element in the impact of live theatre, and this is the feature that sets it most apart from mechanically reproduced drama (Esslin 1978:25-26,78). It is the decisive factor in provoking the excitement and spontaneity of the audience. In this way, live theatre allows the audience to participate actively in a dramatic dialogue: the audience is no longer merely a passive spectator looking at a "given" story of theatre.

5.1.2 Immediacy and Concreteness

The second reason for choosing live theatre is related to the features of “immediacy and concreteness” (Esslin 1978:19). Whether or not it is well rehearsed, live theatre has the three-cornered feedback effect because the feedback results from “immediate and concrete encounters” between the performer and the audience, and between the audiences. This immediacy and the concreteness are the prime characteristics of madanggŭk, and they are significant for public dialogue of the church with the world. The public dialogue through madang-theatre aims not “to show” something but “to dialogue” through immediate connection. The nature of immediacy and concreteness is closely related to the following feature of live theatre.

5.1.3 Presence and Present (Existence and Time)

Thirdly, the artistic mode of live theatre has the features of “presence” and “present.” Theodore Shank refers to these features, comparing live theatre with literature. While in literature events necessarily appear to be events of the past, in a work of dramatic art they are actions, which occur in the immediate audible and visible presence (Shank 1969:26,43). Thornton Wilder (1960:106; Shank 1969:58) also notes that one of the
“fundamental conditions of drama” is “its action takes place in a perpetual present time.” Emphasizing the presence and present he indicates that if one assumes that one experiences a work of dramatic art when merely reading its scripts, one is making an error. This is because it is difficult to experience dramatic presence and present only with reading its script, as if only through reading musical scores the music cannot be experienced (Shank 1969:17,24).

But the present actions in live theatre do not remain within the present; rather they cause the audience to be in the future. The present created by dramatic art is always the “perpetual present,” so it is related to the cause of future action. In this way, the present is the “point in time when the causally related past and future are joined” (Shank 1969:44).

Henri Gouhier (1996:22) also considers the dual relation of “existence and time” (that is: “presence and present”) as an essence of the theatre. It means that live theatre makes something “be present by presence.” According to him (1996:20-22), a picture, sculpture, a novel and music are merely a kind of “mediator.” A picture reveals a painter’s thought in a stationary state. A song is not an act, and a player is not an acting person. Cinema communicates with the audience only through a mediator of its visual image. On the contrary, live theatre communicates with the audience through performers’ realistic presence. Therefore, he (1996:24) notes that “to use the very ‘benefit of presence’ is an addresser’s secret, and to base the benefit of presence on the principle of art is an essence of theatre.”

The presence and present of live theatre is important for public dialogue, because anything which belongs to the past cannot produce the dialogic events of the present. For this reason, Esslin (1978:18) asserts that live theatre is “the most concrete form in which art can recreate human situation, human relationship” because “the concreteness of drama is happening in an eternal present tense, not there and then, but here and now.”
5.1.4 Performative-Word (Action-Word)

Finally, the language or words used in live theatre are so-called “action-words” or “performative-words.” According to Gordon Craig (1980:137), performing art consists of action (movement), word, line, colour and rhythm. To the question of which is the most essential element among them, he answers that no element is more important than another, but that an action (a movement) might be the most important in theatre, as a sketch is the most important in a picture, and a melody in music. In one word, the central role of theatre lies on an “action” (movement).

However, in the theatre action (movement) is not separated from word except in silent drama; action and word are closely connected. Henri Gouhier (1996:74) explains the interrelations of action and word: “We listen but, at the same time, we want seeing in order to understand more. We think but we need visual images (or pictures) in order to make clearer. When we speak, sometimes the word can catch the eye.”

What is important here is what kind of the word it is. According to Henri Gouhier (1996:99), as there was the Word in the beginning of the world, and the Word was an “action-Word” creating the world and communicating with the world, so the word of theatre is also an “action-word.” The dramatic word is therefore a word both expressing and causing an action, but it does not remain as a word itself. Auguste Comte, stressing the function of an “action-word,” remarks that when an action-word loses in performing art, the art starts to lose effect (Gouhier 1996:99).

The action-word corresponds to Austin's (1990) “performative” word. In his How to Do Things with Words, Austin makes a distinction between “constative” words and “performative” words and clarifies the importance of a performative discourse/word. A constative word is related to “saying” or conveying information; it concerns a split between true and false, right and wrong. A performative word is related to “doing”; it is the word not just to give information but rather to induce an “action.” The biblical
messages from the Ten Commandments to Jesus’ and Paul’s teachings (sermons) are constituted not by constative words but by the performative words requiring the practice (doing) of faith. Therefore, the public dialogue of churches needs the performative words (or “action-words”) relative to practice (doing), in order to affect the practice of dialogue.

Mikhail Bakhtin, in his *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship* (1985:113), defines every genre as “methods and means of seeing and conceptualizing reality.” For him, a novel is a means of recognizing and criticizing the world, beyond a mere literary genre. In this way, madang-theatre as live theatre will be a means by which to recognize the world and to propose a dialogic relationship through the eye of the theatre, beyond merely performing art. Through the eye of theatre this thesis will attempt to establish a dialogic point of view in which the others (the audience) are accepted as participants in the madang-theatric dialogue, and not merely as passive onlookers.

5.2 From Monologism To Dialogism

A change in Christianity’s communicative method will be a starting point for dialogue with others (non-Christians and society). To explain this, the matter of pattern and competence of communication needs to be dealt with here.

Indigenization theology and Minjung theology were mentioned as theological practices of public dialogue in Chapter 4. Indigenization theology showed the advantage of recognition of traditional cultures, but it was weak in its criticism of reality. Minjung theology had the strength of socio-political criticism, but revealed limitations in comprehending a variety of voices in present society due to its partisanship of dividing the world as minjung and non-minjung.

On the other hand, Madanggük that appeared as a cultural medium of public dialogue
is significant in the sense that it was an artistic communication which accepted audiences as dialogic subjects. Madanggŭk was, in one word, grounded in “openness” and produced communicative method as well as a place for public dialogue. Most madanggŭk, however, showed an inclination toward a kind of socio-political theatre. Therefore, an alternative pattern of dialogue is necessary, one which concerns both the recognition of traditional culture and critical consciousness, and one that helps to harmonize its social aspects and its artistry for public dialogue. This harmonized theatre for public dialogue will be named “madang-theatre” in order to keep it distinct from the madanggŭk of the past.

The public dialogue through madang-theatre is a communicative action with two stories of our (church or Christians) story and your (others or non-Christians) story. The performance of madang-theatre for public dialogue, therefore, becomes an action beyond a genre. It is a word-action, a communicative action, and an interpretive action. It advances toward “praxis” on account of the nature of its action.

Praxis, as William Beardslee (1986:2) notes, “needs a dialogic world.” The necessity of dialogic competence and transactional communication is raised in a spoken word (including a drama) as well as a written word. There are generally two models of communication: “one-way” (linear) and “two-way” (transactional or helical) communication model (Smith & Williamson 1977:27-34). The one-way communication model is divided into two: “action model of linear mechanism” and “interaction model of linear feedback.” The action model lays its stress on the role of speaker/sender as the heart of communication. The interaction model is a communication in which the concept of linear feedback is added to the action model. It looks like two-way (transactional) communication, but “the interaction actually consists of a continuity of responses between sender and receiver” (Smith & Williamson 1977:30). The interaction model, thus, is a merely mechanical linear communication, and lacks a human transactional process.
On the other hand, the two-way model called “transactional” or “helical” communication views communication “as simultaneity of responses” (Smith & Williamson 1977:31). In the transactional model, sender and receiver are not separated in their roles, but they are both participating in the communication situation simultaneously. Meaning arises out of mutual communicative relationships between sender and receiver (Smith & Williamson 1977:40).

The communicative pattern of Korea usually depends on the interaction model in general, even under today’s democratized circumstances as well as in the past dictatorship. Feedback takes place in it, but the audience is nothing but a passive receiver. The lack of transactional communication and the problem of dominant linear utterance are phenomena not only of society but also of school (to realize the whole humanity), church (to create doing-faith events), and family (grounded in unselfish love). In addition, the deficiency of transactional communication prevails in all kinds of dialogue. What is the reason? And how can such “distorted communicative action” be overcome?

Paul Ricoeur indicates the problem of dialogue or discourse in connection with language. Ricoeur (1976:2) asserts: “With the words ‘structure’ and ‘system’, a new problematic emerges which tends, at least initially, to postpone, if not cancel, the problem of discourse that remains problematic for us today.” The central reason for the withdrawal of discourse is that “the main achievements of linguistics concern language as structure and system and not use” since the advent of the structural model by Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure.

Language as a semiotic system is “closed” because it is a mere “self-sufficient system of inner relationships … without relations to external, non-semiotic reality” (Ricoeur 1976:5-6). The closed language tends to “constitute a world of its own” and it is “no longer treated as a ‘form of life,’ as Wittgenstein would call it. At this extreme point language as discourse has disappeared” (Ricoeur 1976:6). Therefore, Ricoer (1976:2)
insists, “Our task will be to rescue discourse from its marginal and precarious exile.”

A scholar who has concentrated on the task of rescuing dialogue from monologic exile is Mikhail Bakhtin, whose representative thought is expressed in the notion of “dialogism.” Bakhtin (1979:260, in Todorov 1984:57) points out that “Saussure ignores the fact that outside the forms of language there exist also forms of combination of these forms; in other words, he ignores discourse genres.” What Bakhtin criticizes here is the slant regarding language as a “thing,” an object, rather than as a medium of human interaction (Forgacs 1982:162). “Linguistics, while building the concepts of language and its syntactic, morphological, lexical, etc. elements, digresses from the organizational forms of concrete utterances and their socio-ideological functions” (Bakhtin 1985:84). He (1984:182-183) acknowledges the fact that “linguistics recognizes the compositional form of ‘dialogic speech’ and studies its syntactic and lexical-semantic characteristics.” But its problem is that “it studies these as purely linguistic phenomena, that is, on the level of language, and is utterly incapable of treating the specific nature of dialogic relationships between rejoinders in a dialogue.”

For Bakhtin, language is not individual but a “social reality of speech” (Forgacs 1982:161). In other words, the reality of language is “utterance” or “word.” This is revealed in the fact that the Russian term slovo, which he used for “language,” has the connotation of both “word” and “discourse.” “‘Word’ is always a dialogue and the stretch of discourse, rather than the individual speech or the components of sentence” (Forgacs 1982:161-162).

Emphasizing that dialogue is “the totality of human life,” Bakhtin (1984:183) states that “language lives only in the dialogic interaction of those who make use of it. Dialogic interaction is indeed the authentic sphere where language lives. The entire life of language, in any area of its use (in everyday life, in business, scholarship, art, and so forth), is permeated with dialogic relationships. But linguistics studies ‘language’ itself and the logic specific to it in its capacity as a common ground, as that which makes
possible dialogic interaction; consequently, linguistics distances itself from the actual
dialogic relationships themselves. These relationships lie in the realm of discourse, for
discourse is by its very nature dialogic." That is why he insists that dialogue cannot be
“the object of single science-linguistics” and cannot be understood “through linguistic

Thus Bakhtin proposes “metalinguistics” that exceeds the limits of linguistics. The
object of metalinguistics is discourse, while that of linguistics is language itself and its
subdivisions (phonemes, morphemes, propositions, etc.). He (1984:202) explains that
metalinguistics “studies the word not within the system of language and not in a ‘text’
excised from dialogic intercourse, but precisely within the sphere of dialogic intercourse
itself, that is, in that sphere where discourse lives an authentic life. For the word is not
a material thing but rather the eternally mobile, eternally fickle medium of dialogic
interaction.” His concern with metalinguistics or slove (both language and word) is to
express an alternative “dialogic” worldview against monologism. That is why Bakhtin
gave his whole life in the research of dialogic novels.

When dialoguing with someone, we confront the discourse of the other and an alien
word; so we cannot but enter it “in a living, tension-filled interaction” (Bakhtin 1981:79).
Therefore, no dialogue “in general can be attributed to the speaker exclusively; it is the
product of the interaction of the interlocutors, and, broadly speaking, the product of the
whole complex social situation in which it has occurred” (Bakhtin 1976:118).

If the words in theatre and novel belong to the author, and if the author speaks not with
the character or the audience but merely ‘about’ him, the novel or the theatre is, in
Bakhtin’s term, “monologic.” In it, neither encounter nor dialogue takes places between
author and character (audience) on a horizontal dialogic plane. Bakhtin (1984:71)
regards Leo Tolstoy and his works as typical monologism: “The words and
consciousness of the author, Leo Tolstoy, are nowhere addressed to the hero, do not
question him, and expect no response from him. The author neither argues with his
The author’s field of vision nowhere intersects or collides dialogically with the characters’ fields of vision or attitudes, nowhere does the word of the author encounter resistance from the hero's potential word.

On the contrary, if the character is “not an object of authorial discourse, but rather a fully valid, autonomous carrier of his own individual word” (Bakhtin 1984:5) it is a “dialogic” novel or dialogic theatre. In such a dialogic novel and theatre, the characters are “not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own directly signifying discourse” (Bakhtin 1984:7). Therefore the core of a true dialogue lies in the acceptance of different sounds and various voices of the other, which Bakhtin calls “polyphony” of dialogue (this concept will be explained later). In short, polyphony means harmonizing various voices or instruments in music without merging them into one. Bakhtin (1984:6-7) thinks of Dostoevsky as “the creator of the polyphonic novel” because “a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousness, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky’s novels.”

In this sense, dialogue and polyphony are not to do with style but with dialogic relations among author’s, character’s and audience’s voice as well as between author’s and character’s voice. This approach is, as David Forgacs (1982:163-165) explains, “a markedly different one from those we have looked at so far. Rather than seeing literature as knowledge of reality, he sees it as a practice of language within reality. … It is not so much what the work reflects, either about the author or about the objective shape of the world, that matters for Bakhtin, but what the work is as a practice in language.”

Madang public dialogue through which the Christian community dialogues with the other through madang-theatre premises a change in its way of communication and thinking from monologue to dialogue. Monologue means a dominant discourse and one-way communication. In the theatre, monologue is problematic because no
dialogue takes place in a monologic communication. The character (in relation to the author) and the audience (in relation to the author or the character) is nothing but a passive receiver and onlooker, not a participant on the same plane. The theatre is “art for art” which has no relation to the audience’s reality. Monologism, therefore, is criticized as a spirit that runs counter to the dialogic theatre in public dialogue.

Without going beyond the wall of the church to communicate with the other, Christian word/language, Christian communication and Christian education that are confined within the church tend to be “monologic.” The reason for this is that a word that is not used for dialogue with the other cannot be a “performative” word. “Monologism” therefore is equivalent to the “privatization” and the “exclusiveness” of church as well as “church-individualism” which are indicated as basic problems of the Korean church in Chapter 2.

Monologism is the tower of Babel. The tower of monologism in communication, privatization, exclusivity of the church and church-individualism must be destroyed. The reality of polyglot and multi-voices after the event of the tower of Babel is the place for public dialogue. Public dialogue in the church needs to listen to a variety of voices of the other, instead of building a monologic tower.

Walter Brueggemann, in his essay “The Legitimacy of a Sectarian Hermeneutic” (1989:3-34), suggests that “people of faith in public life must be bilingual.” Christians must have a “public language” for public dialogue with the others outside the wall of the Christian community. And they must have a “communal language” for processing behind the Christian community. He (1989:6) urges that “church education must be bilingual, nurturing people to know the language to speak on the wall in the presence of the others and to speak the language behind the wall in a community of faith where a different set of assumptions, a different perception of the world, a different epistemology are at work.”
In the bilingual, the dialogue behind the wall (communal language) takes precedence, for the dialogue outside the wall can be changed completely by the dialogue behind the wall (Brueggemann 1989:27). However, when the dialogue behind the wall ignores the other’s dialogue, and it conducts a single voice, this dialogue behind the wall becomes ideological and idolatrous (Brueggemann 1989:24). This signifies exclusivism and monologism which loses the language and dialogue outside the wall of church. Brueggemann declares that when the dialogue behind the wall decisively impinges on the dialogue outside the wall, it is always a “miracle.” The reason is that “the imagination of the community can break the dominant rationality.” So Brueggemann (1989:27) writes: “I daresay that miraculous turns are in fact what church education is about.”

When the language behind the wall remains only within the wall, it becomes a centripetal language and a closed-door conversation. The language is stagnant within the church and loses the performative capacity of the word. The task of the Christian community here will be demolishing the wall and re-establishing the language outside the wall as well as the language behind the wall. This is the first stage that the Christian community should proceed to for public dialogue with others outside the wall of the church.

The next task for madang public dialogue is to suggest alternative models of the public dialogue through madang-theatre. The alternative models are suggested in the three practical strategies of madang public dialogue. The first model is Incarnational Public Dialogue that is related to the attitude of audience-acceptance; it is the strategy of a creative, participative culture. The second model is Critical Public Dialogue that concerns the audience’s cognitive, critical competency in producing madang-theatre for public dialogue; it is the strategy of a transformative culture. The third model is Festival Public Dialogue that functions as a zone of free, familiar contact where man’s rational and sensuous nature, reason and play, criticism and festivity, incarnational and critical public dialogue are dialogized with each other, and finally realized; it is the strategy of
the culture of festivity, imagination and laughter.

5.3 The First Model: Incarnational Public Dialogue

The change in madang public dialogue from monologue to dialogue starts from the question of how Christianity can incarnate and accept the other (the audience). A basic criterion to judge whether Christianity is “dialogic or monologic” is whether it accepts the other as a subject of the dialogue or not. The reason is that dialogism is fundamentally a matter of audience-acceptance.

“Audience-acceptance” is a matter of primary concern in madanggŭk. It is revealed in the madanggŭk characteristics of “rediscovery of alienated minjung” and “activity outside the artistic world” as mentioned in Chapter 4. In its construction madanggŭk regarded the audience’s active participation in the dramatic dialogue as the core of the theatre. And in the performance-place, that is, an open public space of madang, the madanggŭk aimed to demolish the division or border between the character and the audience, and between the individual members of the audience themselves.

Madanggŭk was a dialogic practice recognizing alienated people not as objects but as subjects, and accepting them as participative beings. The reason madanggŭk took as the performing place not the stage but the people’s place of work or any open place related to them was also because it wanted to accept the audience (all alienated people). In one word, madanggŭk was an “invitation sent” to the others. The mode of communication of madanggŭk was “dialogic” in that it created a “three-cornered feedback effect” among author, performers and audience. Put simply, madanggŭk abdicated its throne of a pure performing art to dialogue with all people. This attitude coincides with the humility and Incarnation of Jesus Christ.

In order to actualize the model of incarnated public dialogue through a communicative...
medium of madang-theatre, there are at least four tasks to be discharged. The four tasks for the incarnational model of accepting others begin with four questions.

Firstly, who is the other? Thus, the first task is to establish a new image of self-identity. Secondly, what are the roles of author, character, and audience in madang public dialogue? Thus, the second task is connected with the change in position of the author, the character and the audience. Here the author implies the church that plans and composes madang public dialogue; the characters can be understood especially as Christians who perform in madang-theatre for public dialogue; and the audience is made up of non-Christians and society. Thirdly, what principle constitutes a dialogic event in madang public dialogue? Thus, the third task is connected with the functions of polyphony and unfinalizability in the dialogic event through madang-theatre. Finally, how will the Christian community accept conflicts and differences between the church and non-Christians? The fourth task is thus to suggest a method of the dialogization of differences. These four tasks will be activated as formative principles of incarnational public dialogue.

5.3.1 Otherness and New Self-Image

How do churches speak and dialogue with the other? This depends on how churches recognize the other. When we dialogue with someone, there are at least two stories: my story (the story of the church, the story of the Bible) and the other’s story. The dialogue between these two stories relies on the way churches define the other. In one word, the matter of dialogue is that of accepting the audience and that of recognizing the other.

The way of recognizing the other is a decisive factor in determining the way of communication. When the Christian community regards the other as a being hostile to itself or unconnected with itself, communication may assume an aggressive or silent feature. On the other hand, if the Christian community approaches the other with the
viewpoint of merging the other’s story into the church’s story, the other will be recognized as a passive being subordinate to the church. This approach will need persuasive or compulsive communication. It can be said that these kinds of recognition belong to a monologism based on absolutism in which only my truth (or voice) is absolute. There is no room for the occurrence of a genuine dialogic event.

There can be no doubt that the Bible is the absolute truth. The Bible, however, is absolute in respect to the truth; it does not mean that it is absolute in the way of communication. God is an absolute being, but His communicative pattern with human beings is not absolute but *dialogic*. God is not coercive; rather, God waits for our responses. God wants a transactional relationship with mankind. Similarly, when conveying the biblical truth in public dialogue to other persons, if the church thinks of them as being subject to the truth and adopts a one-way communication, this obviously constitutes an offense against God’s way of dialogue. Therefore, a matter of recognizing the audience is important in forming a new method of communication.

### 5.3.1.1 General Features of the Audience

What is the essential feature of the audience? Denis McQuail (1997:7) provides a list of the features of the audience mainly attached to the commercial newspaper, the cinema, and television.

1. Audiences are large and widely dispersed.
2. They do not know each other.
3. Their composition is always shifting and they lack any sense of self-identity, due to its dispersion and heterogeneity.
4. They appear not to act for themselves, but to be acted on from outside.
5. The relations between the audience and the mass media are impersonal.

Although this view is a definition of the audience confined to the mechanical media, the five features can also be a reflection of the audience the church contacts in madang
public dialogue; for the audience the church encounters will be a being affected by the
media, and strangers to each other before the occurrence of public dialogue. The
features of the audience can be expressed as “nouns”: (1) Vastness of scale, (2)
Anonymity, (3) Confusion of self-identity, (4) Passivity, (5) Impersonality. These are the
limits of the mechanical media as well as the features of the audience. Considering the
five features, the essential limit of the media or the audience, in one word, is the lack of
dialogue, or transactional communication.

To encounter the other, therefore, is to confront a situation in which there is the lack of
dialogue. Therefore, it needs to create dialogue on the basis of transactional
communication. In order to be public dialogue creating transactional communication
through madang-theatre, a new recognition of the other is required. This new
recognition of the other is ultimately connected with overcoming the five limits of the
audience derived from the lack of dialogue or from a distorted communicative act.
Without the other, there is no dialogue. Thus, a new recognition of the other in
dialogism is that the self is “a being in need of the other” or “a being relative to the
other.”

5.3.1.2 The Surplus of Seeing and the Mutual Answerable Being

What is the image of the other in the madang public dialogue which accepts the
audience as subjects and participants on the same level? In his *Art and Answerability*
(1990:22-61), Bakhtin is emphatic about the need for the other in order to accomplish
self-identity. He (1990:38) explains the correlation of “the image-categories of I and the
other” with “the form in which an actual human being is concretely experienced.” The
form in which I experience (see) my own does not coincide with that of the others’
experience (seeing) of me.

The difference of seeing (experience) between I and the other derives from the
“outsideness” and “surplus (excess) of seeing” of the human being. That is, the
difference between “my own I” (the I that I see) and “the other person’s I” (the I that the other sees) results from the difference in time and space in which I and the other are placed or occupy. All other human beings are situated outside me. I am also placed outside the others. On account of the difference in time and space, my experience is different from the other’s experience. The outsiderness of being allows me to see something that the other cannot see, and allows the other to see something that I cannot see. Therefore, the other has the surplus of seeing for me, and I also have the surplus of seeing for the other. This surplus of seeing is understood as “the surplus of humanness” (Bakhtin 1981:37) constituting the balanced self-consciousness of inner and outer.

One can never see oneself as a whole. The individual can achieve only partially with respect to himself. I myself am not something self-sufficient. In order to accomplish a fully perception of the self, the other is necessary, for the other has the surplus of seeing for myself. Bakhtin (1990:35) says that “in the category of I, my exterior is incapable of being experienced as a value that encompasses and consummates me. It is only in the category of the other that it is thus experienced, and I have to subsume myself under this category of the other in order to see myself.” According to Bakhtin (1990:32), there is, of course, an exception in the case that we can look at ourselves in a mirror. But in a mirror we see “the reflection of our exterior, but not ourselves in terms of our exterior.” After all, “I am conscious of myself and become myself only while revealing myself for another, through another, and with the help of another. The most important acts constituting self consciousness are determined by a relationship toward another consciousness” (Bakhtin 1984:287).

Gibson Winter (1966:85-118) describes as “we-relation” the correlation between I and the other based on the surplus of seeing. “We-relation is a matrix of self-actualization of the 'I' as being-in-the-world, but it is a matrix of mutual dependence” (Winter 1966:96). Therefore, “the 'lived' encounter of I and Thou” should be a prerequisite; and this encounter is the relationship based on “the face-to-face sharing” (Winter 1966:86).
Expressing this direct and immediate encounter with the other as “dancing together” he stresses the dynamic relationship.

What is the meaning of “we-relation” and “surplus-relation” in the church’s public dialogue with the other?

Firstly, if acknowledging the surplus of seeing between I (church, Christian) and the other (society, non-Christian), the Christian community can accept the other who has different seeing, voice and consciousness. It can form dialogic relationships, considering the other’s surplus of seeing as something enriching itself. Self-identity can be formed, developed, and enriched not “within” myself, but “through” the surplus of the other for myself. The self is a being created by the interaction with the other. And the other and I are “answerable” (responsible) beings constituting the self; that is, everyone becomes a participative being by the surplus of seeing. In particular, the other can be recovered as a subject and participant in dialogue as well as in self-identity. This is, in Vitalii Makhlin’s term, the “social ontology of participation” (Adlam & Vitalii 1997:46).

Secondly, the madang public dialogue based on a “being in need of the other” and a “participative and answerable being” resists a “fixed” self-image. This is because the self is not a given-being in a fixed form, but a becoming-being in the process of the mutual relations with the other. “Man is not only being but becoming. … Man is not something completed and finished, but open, uncompleted” (Bakhtin 1968:364). The self-image of madang public dialogue is not an “already or given” image but a “not yet” image that is constituted through the other’s surplus of seeing derived from his outsideness. This “becoming” self-image allows mutual communication with the other.

Thirdly, the “not-yet” self-image of madang public dialogue opposes the submersion of one into the other. The first stage to dialogue with the other is “projecting oneself into the other.” But it does not mean to merge into the other, losing oneself. Bakhtin (1990:26) asserts “in any event, ‘my projecting of myself into him’ must be followed by
‘a return to my own place outside the other. … If this return into myself did not actually take place, the pathological phenomenon of experiencing another’s suffering as one’s own would result—an ‘infection’ with another’s suffering, and nothing more.” What is important in the relationships between I and the other is “to dialogue” with the other, not “to merge” with the other. The dialogic action constituting self-consciousness does “not take place within,” but “on the boundary between one’s own and someone else’s consciousness, on the threshold” (Bakhtin 1984:287). The very threshold or boundary between I and the other becomes the “time and space of dialogue” that brings about the development, change and enrichment of the human being.

Fourthly, the most important contribution of the new recognition of the self-image is that the differences of outsideness and surplus of seeing between I and the other are here not objects to be surmounted; rather, the differences are received as the mainspring of dialogue. The understanding of the human being as a becoming being, not as a completed being, provides room for participation and dialogue, i.e. the place where dialogue takes place between I and the other, and between the human being and the world. The human being is not understood as a simple being. Rather, I myself go toward the other and participate in the experience of the other. In this manner, I myself take part in the dialogic event together with the other. The other also comes to me, participates in my event or my experience. In the process of participative dialogue, the human being can become a creative being making an event of dialogue with the other and transforming the world.

Paul Ricoeur (1976:15) suggests the concept “being-together” as “the existential condition for the possibility of any dialogical structure of discourse.” The “being-together” is “a way of trespassing or overcoming the fundamental solitude of each human being.” But, for Ricoeur, the solitude does not mean an isolated feeling when we are alone or in a crowd. It means “what is experienced by one person cannot be transferred whole as such and such experience to someone else. My experience cannot directly become your experience” (Ricoeur 1976:15-16). “Nevertheless,
something passes from me to you. ...This something is not the experience as experienced, but its meaning. Here is the miracle. The experience as experienced, as lived, remains private, but its sense, its meaning, becomes public.” In this way communication is to overcome “the radical non-communicability of the lived experience as lived.” The very “exteriority of discourse to itself ... opens discourse to the other” (Ricoeur 1976:16).

A being in need of the other signifies that “the very being of man (both internal and external) is the deepest communion. To be means to communicate.” It is because “to be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself” (Bakhtin 1984:287). Consequently, it is to say that “life is dialogic by its very nature. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth” (Bakhtin 1984:293).

When based on the self-image of otherness, public dialogue through madang-theatre has the “answerability/responsibility” to accept the other as a decisive participant in dialogue, and to fulfill mutual communication with the other. At this moment madang public dialogue can be “incarnational.”

The concept of otherness, that is, the other's surplus of seeing, is applicable to every activity of the ethical, social, political and religious as well as the aesthetic. The relations between church and others can be neither antagonistic nor irrelevant. The church and the other are on complementary “dialogic relations” accomplishing and enriching each other with the surplus of seeing. As the “I” myself is consummated and enriched through the other, so the Christian community also is consummated and enriched through the others and their stories. Therefore, the church can no longer remain within the wall; rather, it recognizes the other as a being who has the surplus of seeing for the church itself, and thus requires the encounter with the other. That is why establishing a new self-image is proposed as the first step (or task) of incarnational public dialogue.
5.3.2 The Change of Author, Performer and Audience Position

For madang public dialogue, to accept the other as a participant, an answerable being with a surplus of seeing means not only to equalize the relations between I and the other. Rather, a matter of audience-acceptance requires a positive change of a relationship between two stories or voices from monologic relations based on a vertical structure to dialogic relations based on a transactional structure. The concepts of a surplus of seeing and mutually answerable being signify the problem of relationship: the relations of author-performer, author-audience, performer-audience, or church-Christian, church-nonChristian, Christian-nonChristian and God-human being as well as church-church, Christian-Christian, nonChristian-nonChristian.

As mentioned already, while one-way communication does not accept the audience as a participative being, mutual or transactional communication accepts the audience as an indispensable participative being in dialogue. Dialogism criticizing a monologic structure of communication regards language as a dialogue in which author and audience or speaker and listener take part simultaneously. Therefore, dialogue can be neither speaker-centered nor listener-centered, because each dialogue is jointly produced by both speaker (the author) and listener (the audience).

5.3.2.1 The Audience: an Infinite Interpretative, Dialogic Being

How does mutual communicative public dialogue on the basis of otherness change the audience’s position in the dialogue through madang-theatre? In madanggük, as researched in the previous chapter, the audience is no longer a passive spectator or receiver of a given message. The author and the performers in madanggük were only one half of the total process: the other half was the audience and its reaction. In madanggük, the audience’s actual and potential responses exert a performative effect on the dialogue. In this way, in madang public dialogue “I do not own or produce my words, we all do” (Emerson & Morson 1987:47-48).
Therefore, incarnational public dialogue requires affirming the “competence of infinite interpretation” of the audience. The theatre accepting the audience allows the audience freedom to make up its own mind in interpretation; it does not force the audience merely to receive a given description and message from the theatre. Dialogue is born only at the moment of accepting the other as an answerable subject in a dialogic event. What is interpretation here? Interpretation is beyond the encoding activity of a “given” message of text. Wayne Booth, in his *Critical Understanding* (1979:236), distinguishes two modes of understanding: “understanding” and “overstanding.” “Understanding” means the activity by which the audience understands and decodes the message of the text. Here, the audience is subordinate to the text by “standing under” it. On the other hand, the “overstanding” means the activity in which the audience analyses and criticizes the text. Here, the audience can control the text by “standing over” it. As already stated, madang public dialogue starts with “performative” words affecting the practice of dialogue. The competence of “overstanding” aims to acquire the competence of dialogic practice, beyond simple understanding of the meaning of the text. If the public dialogue through madang-theatre allows the audience to remain within “understanding,” it cannot be an incarnational attitude. The mission of incarnational public dialogue is to restore the audience’s right of critical “overstanding” which has generally belonged only to the author.

In this way, in incarnational public dialogue, the audience changes its position from an isolated being that had nothing to do with the composition and procedure of the theatre, to an interpretive being in the harmony of understanding and overstanding, to a participative subject in dialogue, and to a transformative subject of himself, text, and reality. To consider the audience as an infinite interpretive being is to acknowledge it as a dialogic being, for incarnational public dialogue accepts the audience as a needful being with a surplus of seeing for me (the author or church) outside me. As the other is a needful being in the constituting of the self, so in the fulfillment of madang public dialogue, the audience is accepted as a being enriching this dialogue.
5.3.2.2 The Death of Author and the Return of Audience

How does the position of author (speaker, text, church) change in the incarnational public dialogue that affirms the infinite interpretive, dialogue competence of the audience? If accepting the audience’s faculty of interpretation, the author (church) will no longer be able to hold an all-powerful position over the character (Christian) or the audience (non-Christian), speaking only the church's own story or voice. Generally speaking, text has contained only in the author’s own consciousness, voice and intention. The characters could not but obey the text/intention given by the author. The audience had no choice but to participate in a dramatic discourse; it concentrated on the activity of understanding the given, fixed message of the author; consequently there was no room for the activity of critical overstanding. In this case, no dialogue takes place between the author and the character or the audience.

The emphasis of the omnipotent author belongs explicitly to monologism. It is indifferent to the other who exists outside of the author but with the same rights, and who is capable of responding on an equal footing. In the sphere of the omnipotent author, “another person remains wholly and merely an object of consciousness, and not another consciousness. … Monologue manages without the other. … Monologue pretends to be the ultimate word " (Bakhtin 1984:293).

If the church follows the monologic view of the omnipotent author when communicating with the other, authentic dialogue will never happen. With one voice, no one can make a dialogic event. Dialogue “in principle, cannot unfold on the plane of a single and unified consciousness” of the author, “but presuppose two consciousnesses that do not fuse.” The essential and constitutive element of dialogue is “the relation of a consciousness to another consciousness” (Bakhtin 1979:77-78, in Todorov 1984:100). Therefore, church as the author of the event of public dialogue needs to enter into dialogic relations with the other. As Jesus abandoned his divinity and incarnated to redeem and dialogue with his “others,” so the church as a body of Jesus Christ must
also abandon its almighty divine right and monologic attitude in order to be incarnated in this world of others. This is basic to accomplishing incarnational public dialogue with the other.

In fact, the matter of audience-acceptance denotes the dissolution of the authorial almighty right. The divine right of the author has been problematic especially to Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Raymond Federman and Mikhail Bakhtin.

Roland Barthes (1977:142-148), using the term “the death of the author,” rejects the traditional theory that regards the author as an origin of text, a root of meaning, and a person with the exclusive rights of interpretation. He suggests that writing becomes a neutral, compound and roundabout zone where the almighty power of the author vanishes. Michel Foucault (1991:101-120, esp.102) also denies the omnipotent author in these terms: “In writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears.”

The idea of the death of the author entails a dialogic relationship between dramatic domain and the reality, beyond an authorial action of imitation and representation. Writing relative to the death of the author’s divine power rejects the authorial action of “imitating and representing the reality” in his literary work (Realistic standpoint), or the authorial action of “expressing his own ideas and emotion” through his literary work (Romantic literature). That is, the author can no longer have the function of the representation of reality and the expression of his own consciousness through his work (Barthes 1977:147).

If so, what is the author’s role in his writing? Instead of a simple act of representation and expression, (s)he takes a more creative role. It is a role of “mediator of dialogue.” First of all, the author as a mediator of dialogue helps to form a dialogic event among the author, the character, and the audience. One voice cannot secure superiority over
the other voices. Secondly, the author should help to form an organic interaction between work and reality. The dramatic world of work enters into and enriches the reality. The reality also enters into the dramatic world of work, not only as a part of life but also as participation in the process of production. This dialogue between work and reality is possible only by renewing the work constantly through creative recognition and participation of the audience (cf. Bakhtin 1981:84).

In this way, the death of the author causes a radical change in the position of the author and the audience. The death of the author, who has predominated over the others, allows the emancipation of the audience from a passive object in relation to the author; the audience is liberated from a simple “understanding” act of the fixed and finalized text of the author, and becomes a subject with the competence of interpretation (i.e. both understanding and overstanding). Federman (1975:14) spotlights the role of the audience as follows: “The reader of this fiction will not be able to identify with its people and its material. ... In other words, no longer being manipulated by an authorial point of view, the reader will be the one who extracts, invents, and creates, a meaning and an order for the people in the fiction. And it is this total participation in the creation which will give the reader a sense of having created a meaning and not having simply received, passively, a neatly prearranged meaning.”

On the other hand, the author also becomes a participant in a dialogic event with the audience. The author is only “the point of junction” between the source and the recipient (Federman 1975:13). Federman (1975:14) points out the change of the author’s position as follows: “The writer will no longer be considered a prophet, a philosopher, or even a sociologist who predicts, teaches, or reveals absolute truths, nor will he be looked upon (admiringly and romantically) as the omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent creator, but he will stand on equal footing with the reader in their efforts to make sense out of the language common to both of them, to give sense to the fiction of life.” The death of the author is indeed a starting point for “the return of the reader” (Freund 1987), i.e. the return of the audience.
Through the death of the author, the character is also able to participate in the creation of public dialogue through madang-theatre to the same degree as the author and the audience. All of them are part of the dialogic event; all of them are responsible for it. In this way, the author, the character and the audience form a “trinity” in the creation of a dialogic event.

As mentioned above, the death of the author does not mean the absence of the author in the work. It means the death of a monologic and dictatorial relationship between the author, the performer and the audience. In other words, it does not mean the madang-theatre works without an authorial position, but rather that it denounces the exclusive, individualistic point of view of the author.

The omnipotent author with privilege corresponds to the church based on exclusive and monologic one-way communication. On the contrary, the church based on the model of incarnational public dialogue pursues the resurrection of the others (Christian, non-Christian and society) through the death of its dogma-centered monologism. In communication, a monopolistic, exclusive attitude is a monologue that can never produce a mutual dialogic event. The Christian (the character) and the audience in madang public dialogue is not “the mute, voiceless object” subordinate to the dogma of church, but rather “a carrier of a fully valid word” (Bakhtin 1984:63) in dialogue.

In order to create a dialogic event through madang-theatre it is therefore necessary for the church to speak to its Christian (the character) dialogically, and for the character to speak to the audience dialogically. The most important thing in public dialogue is a dialogic attitude between the church and the character (Christian), and between the church (and character) and the audience. The church as the author must speak ‘not about a character, but with him’ (Bakhtin 1984:71). And the acceptance of someone else’s thought and voice is possible “only on the basis of a dialogic relationship to that other consciousness, that other point of view” (Bakhtin 1984:69). For this reason, madang public dialogue requires an incarnational view of the death of the author.
5.3.3 Unfinalizability and Polyphony

For the resurrection of dialogic relationship through the death of the church’s monopolistic orientation to occur, the establishment of the practical device (or principle) that causes dialogue in madang-theatre work is necessary. For this incarnational public dialogue which actually urges an incarnational Christian community, Bakhtin’s representative concepts of unfinalizability and polyphony are suggested as the principles of madang-theatre.

5.3.3.1 Unfinalizability

The term “unfinalizability,” one of Bakhtin’s central concepts, means “the human tendency to defy all that purports to be fixed and stable” (Emerson & Morson 1987:44). Bakhtin (1984:66) states that “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken; the world is open and free.”

To be described and led only by the author is to be finalized (Emerson & Morson 1987:51). If everything is predetermined, closed-off and finalized by the church as the author of madang public dialogue, and if everything is united in the authorial consciousness, voice and evaluation, the problem is that in it there is no room for the development of a variety of consciousness and voice; rather, it constrains the freedom of the character and the audience. Consequently, anything finalized cannot offer dialogue. Emerson and Morson (1987:50) refer to the problem of finalizing as follows: “When the author plans the ending in advance, significance is guaranteed, but there is a cost: characters must conform to a preset pattern, they can only do what will fit, and each action can lead only in one direction. Monologic narrative cancels the most fundamental aspect of human experience—the openness of each action and moment, which can potentiate many patterns but which need not conform to any.”
Incarnational public dialogue affirms the relational surplus of the other. Dialogue takes place between I and the other, thus no dialogue happens before the other participates in the relationship. As the self cannot be finalized by I myself without the other, so the church cannot be finalized by itself without the other. Thus, madang public dialogue cannot and “should not” be finalized by the church. It can be said that the image of self, the work for public dialogue and its meanings, indeed, are situated between “being” (already) and “becoming” (not yet). They are not anything finalized, predetermined or given, but rather they are in the present progressive form, i.e. in process. Madang public dialogue, therefore, renounces authorial intention and an exclusive one-sided attitude in the composition and conveying of a message. The church needs to invite the performer and the audience as “co-authors” to madang public dialogue, for madang public dialogue can develop through their spontaneous participation and free creativity of dialogue.

Arnold Hauser (1982:9) asserts that “artistic creation is not a hard effort to present an idea, but a struggle against covering up a thing through idea, the nature, and general concept.” What is the “covered thing”? From the point of view of madang public dialogue, it can be understood as the “dialogic relations” that are covered by the authorial church’s own consciousness and single voice. To this artistic creation that helps to recover the covered dialogic relations, unfinalizability is necessary. This is because unfinalizability is a device to denounce “positivist and determinist scientific world views” (Emerson & Morson 1987:45). It serves to rehabilitate the “covered” dialogic relationship between church and others, even including the one between church and Christian.

In fact, madanggŭk had a plot, but the plot was loose and not fixed. It was open to the audience’s participation, through which it became much more enriched. In other words, in some aspects it was characterized by unfinalizability. Text (plot) and its meaning were never finalized. They could be accomplished only after the audience’s participation. Madanggŭk was always located in the dialogic process of the author-the
perFORMers, and the performers-the audience. The performers of madanggûk communicated with its author; its audiences were participative and constitutive beings in dramatic dialogue with the performers and the author.

Unfinalizability is a “blank space” for dialogue in madang public dialogue. For Wolfgang Iser, the unfinalizability or undetermination is implied in his concept of “the blank space” of text. Between segments and cuts in text there is an empty space. The blank manifests that the text and its meaning are neither finalized nor fulfilled. Therefore, it induces and guides the reader’s constitutive activity. The blank is, as Iser (1978:201) describes, considered as a space for “the most important link in interaction between text and reader.” It means that the basic function of “the blank” like “unfinalizability” is communication between text and reader. “As an empty space they (the blanks) are nothing in themselves, and yet as a ‘nothing’ they are a vital propellant for initiating communication” (Iser 1978:195). The unfulfilled and unfinalized vacant space waits for the participative activity of the audience all the time.

In this way, the blank open space of unfinalizability in the composition of madang public dialogue is a space for dialogue, leading the audience to take part in dialogue as a subject of that dialogue. In the unfinalized madang-theatre the audience is indispensable in filling in the blanks with rich dialogue. After all, the principle of unfinalizability is to collapse dominative logic based on one-way monologism in which everything is predetermined and finalized, and to invite the audience to dialogue.

5.3.3.2 Polyphony

According to Bakhtin (1981:337-339), our speech is filled to overflowing with other people’s words, interpretations and responses. In the everyday speech of any person living in society, no less than half (on the average) of all the words uttered by him are other people’s. Therefore, Bakhtin (1981:276) asserts that “the living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in a socially specific
environment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue. After all, the utterance arises out of this dialogue as a continuation of it and as a rejoinder to it—it does not approach the object from the sidelines."

Thus, living dialogue is always “double-voiced discourse” (Bakhtin 1984:190) because it has “a twofold direction”—both toward the referential object of the author’s speech, as in ordinary discourse, and toward other people’s discourse and speech. Dialogue occurs in the double-directed discourse which incorporates a relationship to the other’s utterance as an indispensable element, perceiving the existence of this second context of the other’s speech (Bakhtin 1984:185-186).

Concentrating on a single voice unified into an author is “monologue” in which unitary language is used. Unitary language opposes the realities of heteroglossia. Unitary language is centripetal force which serves one and the same project of centralizing and unifying a diversity of the other’s words into a unitary language of culture and truth in vital connection with the processes of sociopolitical and cultural centralization (Bakhtin 1981:270-271). Insofar as the discourse inclines toward the centralization and unification in a single and unitary language, it can never be a fundamental form of dialogue (Bakhtin 1981:325). This orientation toward unity compels one to ignore “a trope (say, a metaphor) being unfolded into the two exchanges of a dialogue, that is, two meanings parceled out between two separate voices.” After all, it is “never of the dialogic sort” (Bakhtin 1981:327-328).

Public dialogue is connected with the social and historical heteroglossia of the other, as well as in the unitary language (Bakhtin 1981:272). For Bakhtin, “heteroglossia” is used as a concept opposed to a single unitary language. It reflects the centrifugal force of decentralizing and disunifying. Heteroglossia based on centrifugal force carries on “a special type of double-voiced discourse, by expressing authorial intentions but in a
refracted way” (Bakhtin 1981:324). Therefore, “it serves two speakers at the same time and expresses simultaneously two different intentions: the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the refracted intention of the author. In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions. And all the while these two voices are dialogically interrelated, they—as it were—know about each other. …. A potential dialogue is embedded in them, one as yet unfolded, a concentrated dialogue of two voices, two world views, two languages” (Bakhtin 1981:324).

The harmonic co-existence of the two-voiced dialogue expresses “polyphony” which is a contrary concept of monologue or monopoly based on unitary language in centripetal force. Emerson and Morson (1987:49) define the concept of polyphony as follows: “Polyphony goes beyond the mere juxtaposition or sequential sounding of contrary voices and ideas. The musical metaphor implies that many voices are heard at the same time, uttering the same word differently. ... Voices join other voices to produce the timbre and intonation of a given communication.” Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist (1984:12) explain Bakhtin’s point of polyphonic dialogue: “I can mean what I say, but only indirectly, at a second remove, in words that I take and give back to the community according to the protocols it observes. My voice can mean, but with others at times in chorus, but at the best of times in dialogue. Meaning in this view is made as a product.”

Bakhtin’s polyphony of accepting the others’ voices is an alternative suggested in the process of disputing the two most influential theories in the literary world. The first is the classical theory of creativity based on algorithmic theory, in which “the solution of a mathematical problem already exists before it is sought.” Creation here is reduced to simply “discovery”; it never produces anything new. The classical account denies “unfianlizability” and it does not permit different voices. The second is the romantic theory of creativity, which is an alternative to the classical theory. The romantic theory recognizes the possibility of the new, but considers it an unexpected gift resulting from a burst of inspiration. These two algorithmic and inspirational theories are monologic.
They are dependant on a preexisting fixed plan that need only be executed (Emerson & Morson 1987:51-52).

On the contrary, neither the beginning nor the end of a dialogic work exists in the author’s intention. “Both intention and unity are matters of process” (Emerson & Morson 1987:52-53). They develop in the process of dialogue. Thus, the necessity of fundamentally re-conceiving the two theories is raised. A polyphonic creator produces the work which has a plot, but the plot is open, that is, unfinalized. Furthermore, a creative activity in polyphony is regarded not as an exceptional phenomenon by an unexpected inspiration, but as a continuous one in the daily world (Emerson & Morson 1987:51-53).

In the polyphonic dialogue that accepts the other’s various voices as the surplus, the author is just another participant; the characters are free from the author’s all-determining plan. The characters enter into a dialogic relationship with the author, and the audiences also enter into a dialogic one with the work, saying and doing something that the author or the work had not guessed before. In this way, the nature of polyphonic dialogue demonstrates unfinalizability (Emerson & Morson 1987:49-51).

In his Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, Bakhtin characterizes Dostoevsky as the creator of a new novelistic genre, the “polyphonic novel.” Bakhtin (1984:6-7) explains the reason that Dostoevsky’s works are polyphonic as follows:

What unfolds in his works is not a multitude of characters and fates in a single objective world, illuminated by a single authorial consciousness; rather a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world, combine but are not merged in the unity of the event. Dostoevsky’s major heroes are … not only objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own directly signifying discourse. In no way, then, can a character’s discourse be exhausted by the usual functions of characterization and plot development, nor does it serve
as a vehicle for the author’s own ideological position. … The consciousness of a character is given as someone else’s consciousness, another consciousness, yet at the same time it is not turned into an object, is not closed, does not become a simple object of the author’s consciousness.

Madanggŭk as a public dialogue was also a representative performing art that introduced the audience into creative participation with dialogue. Madanggŭk characters threw questions at the audience, asking for their opinion during the performance. The word-exchange and active participation between the character and the audience as well as between the characters themselves served to extend the content and its meaning.

As indicated already, madanggŭk was performed with a plot, but it did not confine itself to this plot. The plot was open and unfinalized. The fact that madanggŭk was “unfinalized” and “polyphonic” in dialogue is proved in that it attached importance to “improvisation.” Starting with only a basic summary of the story, performers used improvisation and all sorts of feats to complete the performance as a work of art. Thus the audience came not to hear the particulars of the story but to exchange voices and opinions through participative action. In truth, the spontaneous original improvisation of the actors, unfinalizability of the text, and polyphonic participation were possible because the madanggŭk story was not only the author’s story, but the story of all of them: performers, audience as well as author. For this reason, it aroused a strong communal spirit among them.

In other words, in madanggŭk, word-exchange, improvisation, the audience-participative composition, and the “madang” of an open public space were all devices for polyphony and unfinalizability, which helped to accept and change the audience, who had been immersed in monologism, absolutism or relativism, to a being with a surplus of seeing, a dialogic being. Polyphonic and unfinalized madang-theatre can lead author, performers, and audience to create and complete a double-voiced dialogic
event through their participation.

If one uses a political metaphor, the character and the audience in this polyphonic dialogue are “not voiceless slaves,” but free people, capable of standing alongside the author, “capable of not agreeing with him and even of rebelling against him” (Bakhtin 1984:6). Emerson and Morson (1987:51) describe the relationship between the author (church) and the character, or between the work and the audience in a religious metaphor: “Substitute ‘God’ for author and ‘man’ for character, and one sees that, in endowing man with free will, God became the first polyphonic creator. He does not command, but engages in dialogue with his creatures.” Polyphonic God is listening to our various voices, and liberating us from monologic worldviews. Polyphonic God is dialogic God.

When speaker and audience are in a subordinate-relationship such as that between subject and object, or master and slave, communication is, in terms of Habermas (1987), “distorted, irrational communicative action.” However, when they are under the inter-subjective relationship based on unfinalizability and polyphonic harmony, there can be “rational communicative action.” While the former is a heteronomous action of feudal communication, the latter is an autonomous action of democratic communication.

Ideal dialogic community is possible through autonomous, democratic communicative action. In this rational communicative action based on the model of transactional communication there is no distinction between speaker and audience (sender and receiver) in the process of creating and sharing meaning. All participants are both source and receiver. From this view, audience-accepting madang public dialogue has to lay its foundation on democratic polyphonic communicative action, in order that the Christian community can be open to various voices and unfinalizability, and to assist audiences to take part in a dialogic event while keeping their autonomy. Insofar as the church approaches the coercive form of “listen, believe, and do it” without any objection, its way of communication and relationship will never move beyond the boundary of the
subordinate, irrational, and heteronomous action of communication because its approach focuses on the centripetal force of ignoring the other’s voices.

The church as the body of Christ exists for the other. The world of the other is the reality that the incarnated Christian community confronts and should enter into. The madang public dialogue incarnated into the other’s world, therefore, has to make the other people’s voices heard on the same plain as the author’s own voice. This is the purpose of polyphony in public dialogue.

The participative action in the dialogue of madang-theatre requires ethical responsibility/accountability because an invitation to public dialogue is an invitation to the dialogue of being expedited on the horizon of our life. What is this accountability? The principle of otherness that the absolute Other, God, created human beings, and the surplus of the other compensates the I myself, requires the biblical ethical answerability of “Do to others what you would have them do to you” (Matthew 7:12) and the creative answerability of “Work and take care of” (Genesis 2:15) all the others including all creatures. The ethical and creative answerability based on the principles of incarnational public dialogue can be understood as “love.” Only the practice of answerability will be able to change not only reality but also the communicative action and relationship from monologism to dialogism.

The main concern here is to go beyond individual responsibility to one’s behavior, and to reach a public answerability creating the new image of the other on the basis of the principle of surplus. The relationship of church and society (the other) is no longer antagonistic and unconnected. Rather, it is a relationship of complementary cooperation in completing and enriching the self-identity of each other. The death of the church’s one-way, monologic intention resurrects the other’s freedom and creativity. Authentic dialogue is therefore open to differences, so it takes unfinalizability as a blank space for dialogue, and pursues polyphonic harmony among different voices and worldviews. Separation is no longer necessary between church and others. What is
needed is “dialogue.” If this is the case, how can the matters of conflict, difference and dualism be solved in the public dialogue through madang-theatre?

5.3.4 Acceptance of Difference and Conflict

When the church practices madang public dialogue with the other, another problem is raised: that is, how to deal with the difference and conflict between the church/Christian and the other/non-Christian. While the first concern of incarnational public dialogue is a matter of acceptance of the other, which concerns the acknowledgement of the other and his voice as surplus and which recovers the audience as an active participant, its second concern is a matter of how to accept the difference and conflict.

To accept the other is to accept a variety of seeing and voices, and to produce different, new meanings in the process of interaction of various consciousnesses. Dialogism based on otherness and polyphony, as seen above, unlike monologism based on one-way and centripetal force, premises different double or multi-voices that are derived from the difference of the surplus of seeing. In other words, incarnational public dialogue comprehends this difference and conflict as a condition making the generation of “dialogue” or a “dialogic event” possible.

James Loder, proposing the five steps of the knowing event in his The Transforming Moment (1981:31-36), insists that “conflict” is an element of the first step of knowledge. A striking discontinuity takes place at the critical juncture of the knowing event. The knowing event begins with the very conflict. In this way, conflict is affirmed as a beginning of the knowing event.

Incarnational public dialogue also considers difference and conflict as the starting-point of a dialogic event. Only through the dialogic relationship can this difference and conflict be overcome. As observed above, the dialogic relationship can be designated as polyphony, that is, an accord of two or more heterogeneous voices as in a musical
score. While monologism pays attention to having one identical voice sound by removing difference, dialogism accepts difference and conflict, because public dialogue experiences the others as beings who have their own voices. Therefore, Clark and Holquist (1984:9) define dialogue as follows:

Dialogue is understood not merely in the obvious sense of two people conversing. Such an everyday occurrence provides an opening into the future reaches of dialogic possibility. … Dialogue is more comprehensively conceived as the extensive set of conditions that are immediately modeled in any actual exchange between two persons but are not exhausted in such an exchange. Ultimately, dialogue means communication between simultaneous differences.

Genuine dialogue, beyond personal discourse, reaches toward interaction of differences: not only personal differences but also the differences of meanings, societies, and so forth. That is, according to them (1984:10), dialogue leads “to meditate on the interaction of forces that are conceived by others to be mutually exclusive. How, for example, can the requirement of language for fixed meanings be yoked together with the no less urgent need of language users for meanings that can be various in the countless different contexts created by the flux of everyday life? How can the requirement of societies for stability be reconciled with their need to adapt to new historical conditions? How can a text be the same and yet different in different contexts? How can an individual self be unique and yet also incorporate so much that is shared with others? Indeed, dialogue is an activity that enacts differences in values.”

How is the dialogic interaction possible in the midst of difference and antagonism? Firstly, dialogue between differences occurs neither through simple juxtaposition of contrary voices and ideas, nor through the attitude of a single plane which deals with the voices and ideas as one and as the same thing. It goes beyond “merging” them into one. The simple juxtaposition and immersion will amount to nothing but exclusivism, subsumption or pluralistic arrangement. The dialogue of accepting differences is
possible not by merging, but by preserving and affirming one’s own position of outsideness and surplus of seeing. It can thus be said that this polyphonic dialogue is a special way of forming a relationship with the others on the grounds of differences.

Secondly, the dialogue of differences does not follow a “dialectical” principle, because it is reduced to a binary opposition that ultimately transcends one voice or two-sided voices (Bialostosky 1989:216,219). Therefore, accepting differences is founded not on a dialectical, partitive principle but on a dialogical, relational principle. Paul de Man (1986:109) demonstrates this point clearly. Polyphonic dialogue among differences and conflicts is “far from aspiring to a synthesis or a resolution as in dialectical systems”; rather it is “to sustain and think through the radical exteriority or heterogeneity of one voice with regard to any other.”

Communication for polyphonic harmony of differences and conflicts, therefore, is expressed not as “a dialectical either/or,” but as “a dialogical both/and” (Clark & Holquist 1984:7). The “dialogical both/and” is against the predominance of a single voice and worldview; it is for entering into dialogue of permitting differences and conflicts.

The dialogic concept of both/and is also a characteristic of “conjunctive faith” that is Stage 5 in the theory of faith development stages proposed by James Fowler (1981:117-214). According to Fowler, while Stage 4 Individuative-Reflective faith takes the dichotomizing logic of “either/or,” Stage 5 Conjunctive faith “sees both (or the many) sides of an issue simultaneously.” The limits of individual and dichotomizing faith of “either/or” are overcome by the movement to the conjunctive and dialogical “both/and” faith of Stage 5. Thus in describing Stage 5’s style he prefers “dialogical knowing” to “dialectical knowing.” An essential feature of Stage 5 is that “dialogue” occurs at this

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stage. “In dialogical knowing the known is invited to speak its own word in its own language. In dialogical knowing the multiplex structure of the world is invited to disclose itself. In a mutual ‘speaking’ and ‘hearing’, knower and known converse in an I-Thou relationship. … Stage 5’s dialogical knowing requires a knower capable of dialogue” (Fowler 1981:185).

From this view, the development of faith is a process toward accepting differences, and the route toward knowledge is a process toward participation in dialogue. Consequently, maturity of faith and knowing is possible on the assumption that even differences and disagreement between speaker (church) and the audience would be permitted and dialogized. In dialogical faith, differences are understood as the surplus of seeing.

5.3.5 Dialogic Conflict in *The Gold-Crowned Jesus*

If this is the case, how can the Christian community constitute the madang-theatre of accepting differences? Observing how madanggūk deals with these differences and conflicts will be very valuable in mapping out strategies of polyphonic dialogue. Madanggūk aimed at dialogical understanding of both/and rather than the binary opposition of either/or, by revealing the differences and conflicts among its characters. Word-exchange as a device of disclosing differences makes continuous dialogue possible. In this process, people have the opportunity of casting away their prejudice that the human being can understand himself as a whole in an individual own world, and recognize instead that they are in need for the other’s surplus of seeing.

Madanggūk used a technique of “dialogic clashes” between characters, by having a character meet another opposing character “dialogically.” The constitution of the character in madanggūk and t’alch’um is based on conflict and difference: the dialogical encounter of conflicts between the ruling and the ruled, the rich and the poor, religious leaders and common people, men and women. It can be said that this binary opposition in character-constitution of madanggūk serves to expose a distorted
dominant paradigm and monologism in reality. Accordingly, the dichotomous structure of character is used ultimately as a device to help the audience to recognize and criticize the monologic reality and to have the eyes of polyphonic dialogue.

For instance, in *The Gold-crowned Jesus* (Kim Chi Ha 1978:85-131), humble and diseased characters are juxtaposed with privileged characters, which is indeed a marked feature of most madanggŭk works. The characters are priest, nun, beggar, leper, prostitute, gold-crowned Jesus Christ, company president, policeman, and university student. A topic of dialogue is an issue of the removal of illegally built shacks, that is, the den of prostitutes, indeed the residence of the poor people.

The first dialogic conflict is seen between the priest of a parish church and the others: (1) the priest and a prostitute; (2) the priest and members of the Peace Committee for the Achievement of Social Justice; (3) the priest and a nun; (4) the priest and a leper, a beggar. While the others understand and are concerned with the removal of the den of prostitutes as a public matter, the priest reduces it to an individual matter and is concerned only with a matter of individual faith.

> Priest: That is a political matter. The church is not supposed to get involved in such things.

> Nun: Why not? … Even if the national laws go against the law of God? (p.90)

The process of constant dialogic conflict gives the priest the opportunity to reflect himself, even if it does not bring about a change in him. This is revealed in his words spoken in a low voice, after the nun leaves:

> “What is to become of me, what will... I wasn’t like this before…”

> I wasn’t like this when I was young. (p.92)

The second dialogic conflict is seen in the encounter between a leper, a beggar and the nun. As the nun is walking briskly, the spiteful beggar stretches out his leg and trips the
nun, who stumbles. The beggar cries out as if his foot were hurt. At this moment, the leper argues with the beggar who sits beside him on the matter of begging for money from the nun. Beggar: “Let’s get it.” Leper: “Let it go.” (p.99) This is a dialogic conflict among the populace.

During the conflict, the nun shows the figure of the Good Samaritan, saying, “I’m sorry. I’ll be back to see you in a little while.” (p.100) This is quite different from the attitude of the priest, who escapes from reality saying “I’m in a hurry.” (p.106) A helping relationship forms between beggar and nun. A beggar is a minjung, a defective common person; a nun is a person who understands the defective. The Good Samaritan means one who participates in reality, that is, in dialogue with reality.

After the priest disappears, other dialogic conflict between leper and beggar arises on the matter of judging church and Christian (which will be dealt with in detail in the topic of Critical Public Dialogue).

In this work, a company president appears to buy a sexy girl with “money” before the leper and the beggar. After that, a policeman appears and demands that the leper and the beggar pay money for the place:

“Hurry up. Slip me a fiver. Quick, before anyone sees us.”
Beggar: “Today was a total flop.” (pp.113–114)

The juxtaposition of characters in The Gold-crowned Jesus reveals binary opposition in reality. Furthermore, it is a mirror reflecting each other through dialogue, that is, manifesting the difference of my own I from the other’s I. The heroes of madanggŭk are usually characterized as “defective” characters as in this work. The defective characters use their defects to show the privileged ruling characters their own deceitfulness.
The defective characters never keep silent about the ruler’s monologic utterance, nor do they antagonize in a fury. The defective heroes carry on dialogue through continuous “word-exchange,” instead of silence or wrath. Through dialogue, the characters experience the strange others in and around themselves in spite of or beyond disagreement and conflict.

In addition, the defectives also have their own different voices, so dialogic conflicts even break out among themselves. Their different voices are not merged into one voice, even into an authorial voice. Rather, in the relationship of dialogic conflict between the self and the other, the self experiences the other as a subject. That is, both the self and the other become subjects producing meanings. The dialogic interaction of opposed points of views and voices provides a momentum to collapse unitary monologic thinking and dichotomizing dominant logic.

In the process of polyphonic dialogue between opposed characters, all characters realize the nature of the statue of the “gold-crowned Jesus” who is waiting for the moment when the gold crown will be removed. They perceive the fact that Jesus will be alive when they remove the golden crown, but Jesus is just a statue when they put the crown on Him. A ruling worldview and monologism that do not accept the others’ voices made the living Jesus into a statue of the gold-crowned Jesus. Only at the moment that polyphonic dialogue occurs can the golden crown of privileged monologism be taken off, and Jesus start his activity for the world.

It is through the constant dialogue between the opposed characters that the golden crown of monologism seems to be demolished. Removal of the gold-crowned monologue does not rely on a dichotomizing way of either/or in right-wrong. Rather, it is possible through the process of polyphonic dialogue of both/and because the polyphonic process helps to accept others by understanding the surplus of seeing of each other, and by realizing or creating genuine meaning autonomously.
In *The Gold-crowned Jesus* the leper helps to remove the crown from the head of the statue. But the priest, the company president and the policeman look on it in astonishment and snatch the crown from the leper. In an instant, the gold crown is returned to the head of Jesus, who grows as stiff as he had been before. The last scene ends in the justification or defense of monologism; that is, the priest, the company president, the policeman and a university student are all busy defending themselves. The last line from the student reveals clearly their monologism and their *evasion of reality*: “Don’t put that spotlight on me. Please, I beg you not to do that.” (p.131) The removal of the crown from Jesus still remains as the Christian’s mission.

### 5.3.6 The Mission of Removal of the Monologic Gold Crown

In a polyphonic encounter, conflict and difference are the starting point of dialogue. The polyphonic approach is not a utopian dialogue that has nothing to do with the reality. Rather, as mentioned above, it begins with recognizing the reality of difference and contradiction, and criticizing monologic reality. The polyphonic approach has nothing in common with relativism. As Bakhtin (1984:69) indicates, “Both relativism and dogmatism equally exclude all argumentation, all authentic dialogue, by making it either unnecessary (relativism) or impossible (dogmatism). Polyphony as an *artistic* method lies in an entirely different plane.”

The polyphonic dialogue moves beyond a mere reconciliation. It is an event of accepting conflicts and differences. Thus, the way the Christian community deals with differences is not a merging of various voices into one, but rather a way of preparing the blank space for polyphonic dialogue through conflict. The blank space is at the boundary of two (or more) voices or two worldviews. If the two are not open to each other, dialogue is impossible. In one word, the occurrence of dialogue is possible neither through monologue nor binary opposition, but in the open space between opposed things.
This public dialogue of accepting differences demands ethical answerability. A dialogic community assumes the responsibility of accepting even the defective others. The dialogic community should have the ability to see the context behind his defects. Jesus’ community accepted even the traitor Judas Iscariot who had an extreme defect. The community with a dialogic eye should help to accomplish his true self through dialogue with the defective others.

Therefore, difference is not something to be removed, but demands an awakening of the community of faith to bear the responsibility for the other dialogically. The truth of God is not one-way monologism, but polyphonic dialogism. Both the truth of God and polyphonic dialogue can be expressed as “love” in Christian terms. Love seems to be a unitary language in the view of Christian ethics, but it has in fact the nature of polyphony in the sense of accepting even the defective others. It thus appears that in Christian love, double-voiced discourse and polyphonic dialogue are possible.

In simpler terms, the polyphonic approach in madang public dialogue is a dialogic attitude to accepting differences and conflicts between the church and the others; so it is the high point of incarnational public dialogue. Incarnational public dialogue resists the logic of dichotomy based on the “fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil” which concentrates its attention on splitting things into good and evil, right and wrong. In the “dichotomy thinking,” dialogue seems to be of secondary importance, or there seems to be no dialogue. On the contrary “Incarnational thinking” places accent on the “Tree of Life” that is a Christian logic of “giving life.” Judging the evil with the good would belong to God in nature. Success and failure of the public dialogue through madang-theatre depend on “how to give life” to the other, and how to lead the other to a dialogic event in transactional (mutual) and polyphonic relationships.

The difference and conflict between church and society, Christian and non-Christian, are not factors that cause an estrangement. Rather, they are prerequisites to produce meaning and a dialogic relationship. Seeing in the light of otherness and outsideness,
the Christian community can accomplish church identity through the dialogic relations with the other. And the reverse is also true. The reason for the praxis of madang public dialogue being based on incarnational principles is that church and society should enter a dialogic relationship of enriching each other through a polyphonic approach. The church sees the other, and, at the same time, the church sees itself through the seeing of the other. Therefore, it can be said that the way toward society (non-Christian) is not only the way toward the other, but also the way toward the church itself. At this moment, the necessity that the church sees its reflection in the other is raised. Hence, society becomes a space and time for delving into church identity. In spite of their differences, the church and the other (society) enter into dialogic relationships through incarnated madang public dialogue.

**5.4 The Second Model: Critical Public Dialogue**

The first alternative model for public dialogue through madang-theatre is Incarnational Public Dialogue that aims at audience participation and difference-acceptance under the principles of otherness, outsideness, unfinalizability and polyphony. The second alternative model focuses on practical ways to embody the principles of the incarnational public dialogue practically in madang public dialogue. The praxis of incarnational dialogue demands a critical point of view because it starts from recognizing and correcting the distorted communication and relationship of monologism. Therefore, it is directly linked to the ways of bringing to fruition the audience’s critical competency of reality-cognition, reality-criticism and reality-change. That is why the second alternative model is named “Critical Public Dialogue.”

Critical Public Dialogue deals with the following matters. Firstly, madang public dialogue takes the function of reality-recognition and reality-criticism, which enables the audience to be an interpretive being in madang-theatre, by developing the competency of understanding and overstanding (criticism). Secondly, the model of critical public
dialogue concerns how to solve a temptation to convey fixed Christian messages in a monologic way. Thirdly, it deals with how to create the “dialogic” madang-theatre according to the incarnational principles of public dialogue, proposing practical strategies.

In order to produce dialogic madang-theatre, the alternative model of critical public dialogue handles three questions. The first question is how the Christian community will contain two voices (Christian's own voice and the audience's voice), and express two\textsuperscript{62} (or more) sides (i.e. ambivalence or multivalence) of a certain dramatic situation in madang-theatre. The second question is how the Christian community will communicate a Christian story without merging the audience's voices into the Christian’s own story or its single voice. The third question is why empathy and identification with a given story/voice are problematic in forming a true subject and a dialogic event, what the scheme for overcoming the matters of empathy and identification is, and how the Christian community can help the audience to return as a participative subject with an interpretive and critical ability.

5.4.1 Cognition, Criticism, and Change of Reality

One of madanggŭk’s characteristics, as revealed in Chapter 4, is that it was an instrument of a cognitive and critical process of reality. Madanggŭk functioned as an organ that expressed the reality of the common people (\textit{minjung}) and public opinion by informing the truth of reality, and by criticizing and correcting what had been misreported during a period when people were deprived of the freedom of speech (Chae 1985:4).

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\textsuperscript{62} Strictly speaking, there are more voices and sides than “two”, that is, multi-voices and many-sides. But here the “two” will be used as a term that connotes the meaning of “multi” and “many” because madang public dialogue focuses mainly on the dialogic relationship between the “two” of church (including Christians as performers) and others (non-Christian as audiences).
The Christian community of madang public dialogue starts from the point of reflecting and criticizing a distorted church-individualism and its monologic communication and relationships. In fact, it is due to these distorted attitudes that the Christian community can no longer exercise its influence over the others (society or non-Christian). Therefore, cognition and criticism have to aim for “change.”

“Critical” public dialogue is concerned with promoting recognition, criticism and a change in relationships and methods of communication as the first step toward change. The reason is that, first of all, by means of this shift from monologic relationships and communication methods to dialogic ones, the Christian community and society might be structurally transformed themselves from monologism to dialogism.

Bertolt Brecht is a playwright and producer who created modes in the theatre for the cognition, criticism and change of reality. He combined his theatric activity with political alternatives, and considered the utility of art in connection with social reality, rather than with matters intrinsic to art. As a result, he proposed the “Epic Theatre” and “Lehrstuck” (The Learning Theatre)\(^63\) as theatric models to actively advance the reformation of reality. Epic Theatre encourages the audience to see the theatre with an “objective and critical” eye by blocking empathy and merging into it. Brecht adopted the mode of “epic” in which the story of “the past” i.e. history is unfolded. Epic Theatre thus helps the audience to recognize that this theatre is not real but just a fiction. They are related to the action of recognizing and criticizing the reality that art and culture degenerated into a slave of politics, by atrophying the people’s socio-political consciousness through art and culture. In this reality, Brecht attempts to reconstruct theatre as a means of reality-transformation. To start with, he completely discarded the communicative system of “production—transmission—reception” of conventional theatre (Geiger & Haarmann 1996:49-56).

\(^63\) In the case of Lehrstuck participants perform in the theatre without spectators, emphasizing the learning act in the process.
In this sense, Brecht’s theatre of reality-recognition and reality-change has a close resemblance to madanggük. Brecht and madanggük proposed the principle of “the audience-participation in theatre” as an alternative to produce cognitive, critical and dialogic theatre. Their works are constructed around a simple plot and a small number of characters, who are mainly students and amateurs. Their main concern is neither a so-called “art for art” nor “art for showing” but “art for reality.” Therefore, through the participative and dialogic communicative channel of theatre, both concentrated on promoting the reality-cognition and on revealing the contradictions of reality. The criticism implies an “act”, that is, an act of transformation. For this reason, Heinz Geiger and Hermann Haarmann (1996:51) called Brecht’s performing art a “practical negative art” in the sense that it is “a criticizing art with an eye of change-possibility.”

How, then, will the Christian community make madang public dialogue an act of cognition, criticism, and change, on the basis of incarnational principles? And what problems are inherent in this process?

For Esslin (1978:21,23), theatre is the most concrete form in which we can think about human situations; that is, it is “a method by which we can translate abstract concepts into concrete human terms, or by which we can set up a situation and work out its consequences.” Thus he (1978:21) suggests that the best way to argue and discuss a certain theme, for example, “capital punishment is effective or ineffective,” is to write and act out a play about it. In order to make reality-cognitive theatre, the “process” of cognition must be brought to the fore of expression.

However, a problem is raised here if it is implied that themes of theatre may be worked out arbitrarily according to the author’s intention. The reason it is problematic is that it is a monologic communication in which a single authorial voice maintains a superior position over the voices of the others. There is no room for the audience’s participation, i.e. for the dialogic encounter of two stories (our story and the other’s story) and for double-voiced discourse. Consequently, the audience remains a passive consumer. In
one word, it runs counter to the spirit of incarnational dialogue.

In incarnational madang-theatre, the author and the performers are, as already mentioned, only one half of the total process: the other half is the audience and its reaction. For madang public dialogue, moreover, the competency of infinite interpretation and creative participation returns to the audience; the audience thus becomes a producer of meaning and change through the process of cognition and the criticism of reality.

In audience-returned madang public dialogue, the audience can agree or disagree with the author-centered intentional theatre with their competency of infinite interpretation. Therefore, as Esslin (1978:113) said, even though the author makes all kinds of efforts to perceive a theme or scene as invested with authorial special meaning, it will still have a great many different meanings.

The point not to be overlooked here is that the audience’s cognitive, participative acts are not an individual but a “collective” reaction in the theatre. Anyone who has ever performed, including the author, will confirm their collective reaction to theatre. Esslin (1978:100) points out that because of the very collective (unlike individual) responses, “it is very revealing to see how over-propagandist drama defeats its own ends.” The interpretative activity expressed into the collective reaction of the audience reinforces the activity of consensus or criticism to the author’s subjective intention. If the author’s intention turns out to be irrational, it will face strong, collective criticism expressed by the audience, and, in the end, the empathy toward the individual intention will be blocked. That is why Esslin (1978:100) asserts as follows: “Thus the message (political or otherwise) which a play contains always coexists with a demonstration of its reception by a social unit, the collectivity of the audience.”

The example of “the campaign for the abolition of the death penalty” will help to comprehend the relation between the authorial intention and the audience’s critical
reaction. Esslin (1978:96) explains: “A playwright wants to write a powerful piece against hanging. So he may invent a story about a murder, in which the victim is as guilty as the murderer. He will be tempted, in order to achieve his very laudable aim, to weight the case as much against the death penalty, as much in favor of the condemned man as possible. If he does that, the supporters of the death penalty will come out as black villains, determined on punishment as revenge. But, if the author concerned yields to this temptation, the effect of the play will nevertheless be quite different from the one he intended. For his exaggeratedly villainous characters will appear as cardboard figures and in performance the audience will remain unconvinced of the truth of the argument.”

In this case, the author’s irrationality is clearly revealed, so the audience’s criticism can be followed with not too much difficulty. But, in the case of an author’s intention being covered up, it is not easy for the audience to recognize it.

The fact that the audience has the faculty of interpretation and of agreeing or the right of disagreeing with the single authorial voice is not to say that the author’s single intention should be permitted without limitation. Rather, it is obvious that the competency of understanding and overstanding, cognition and criticism cannot be developed automatically. Therefore, it is necessary for the Christian community to make a plan to foster the critical faculty of the audience.

5.4.2 Temptation toward Monologic Communication of Fixed Messages

When practicing madang public dialogue, new “heroism” tempts the Christian community all the time. This is the temptation of the so-called “holy pursuit” of “inculcating” religious values in the audience. The Christian community is always tempted to make the audience subordinate to the church’s single story or voice, ignoring the others’ stories or voices. The reason for this is that the church community
has a tendency to make a deep impression on the audience with messages from the Scriptures or doctrine.

However, as already indicated, the Bible is constructed in “performative” words that provoke actions of praxis, criticism, beyond the dimension of merely “receiving” fixed meanings. The Bible, filled with performative words, throws open its values and meanings to the audience’s interpretive ability. So the audience not only “understands” but also analyzes and practices it by standing over the messages. The development of the two faculties (i.e. recognition and criticism, understanding and overstanding) is a central purpose of critical public dialogue. It seems to be facilitated only by the practice of incarnational principles of public dialogue, that is, by returning the infinite interpretative competency to the audience, by accepting the audience as a participative subject through the death of the church’s monologism, and by accepting the differences between church and audience in polyphonic harmony. If the Christian community makes the audience remain only in “understanding,” it cannot be a real incarnational public dialogue accepting the audience as a participant. It is because, in this process, only the author or speaker is alive; the audience disappears into the passive role.

When the Christian community tries to transmit all meanings in its own voice, it can never move beyond a church-centered monologic world, and never fulfill genuine public dialogue. A critical principle of Christian madang public dialogue, therefore, requires recognition of the temptation of monologic communication, and a criticism of the monologic attitude in which the church despises the infinite interpretive competency of the audience. Therefore, the competency of cognition and criticism becomes a key to open dialogue because it functions to resist a monologic communication and a relationship based on a single voice and unitary centripetal language, and recovers the audience as an active participant in madang public dialogue.

If the Christian community is to comply with the “critical” principle in madang public dialogue, it has to overcome the temptation of making un-dialogic theatre such as
propaganda theatre that carries only an authorial “single intention” and “transmits” “fixed” messages with “dogmatic” attitudes. Henri Gouhier (1996:186) asserts that an edificatory theatre and a propaganda theatre are only to reflect the expression of religious passion and intention. He goes to say that advocacy or propaganda is a spirit of preaching, a political argument, a public prosecutor’s address, and rhetorical justification.

Propagandist theatre is removed from dialogic theatre. It cannot serve dialogue. An effort to make theatre according to the styles of persuasion or testimony cannot but modify dialogic theatre to the theatre of demonstration. Such an edificatory theatre or propagandist theatre does not accept the other’s voice or consciousness. These theatres deprived of dialogic nature will eventually fail to foster the audience’s faculty of recognition and criticism. Considering that madang public dialogue focuses on the praxis of “dialogue,” to select only Christian themes and to dramatize the life of Jesus or the saints is not sufficient to create a dialogic event with others in the theatre.

5.4.3 Expression of Ambivalence

5.4.3.1 Cognition and Expression

During the period of the madanggûk, it is obvious that lack of expression caused lack of cognition and criticism. Under the loss of the freedom of expression, the people lost the opportunity to understand and criticize its reality. So it can be said that cognition and criticism are acquired only at the moment they are “expressed.” Benedetto Croce (1974:40-41; 1992:1-11) asserts that feeling, cognition through intuition, exists within expression; so recognition and expression cannot and should not be separated in nature. For Croce, all art is expression; all expression is art. And the reason an artist can be a person of outstanding stature is not because of the greatness of his technical ability but because of the greatness of his expressive ability (Hauskeller 2003:96-98). Therefore, it is important that the process of cognition and criticism is “expressed” in
the madang-theatre for public dialogue.

If this is the case, what will be expressed in so-called “cognition and criticism-theatre”? And how will it be expressed? The former is a matter of content of expression, and the latter a matter of method of expression. The critical model of madang public dialogue that emphasizes cognition, criticism and change suggests the expression of ambivalence or multivalence, double-voiced discourse, self-criticism, an estrangement effect and a making of critical distance as its content and methodology.

### 5.4.3.2 Ambivalence of Beauty and Ugliness

To begin with, the ambivalence of the beauty and ugliness of reality has to be expressed simultaneously in madang public dialogue. The ambivalence is an actual condition of reality. Hegel (1970:37, 206-208) focused on depicting only beauty as the sole purpose of art. For him, anything revealing the deficiency and darkness of life such as human suffering or difficulties should not be objects of artistic expression (cf. Hauskeller 2003:77-84). On the contrary, Croce (1992:82-90; 1974:49) insists, what is expressed is itself beauty, so there is no ugliness in art. For him, “expression and beauty are not two concepts, but a single concept.” It means that to express the sufferings and ugliness of reality is no less beautiful than to depict pleasure and rightness.

One representative scholar who criticizes “art for beauty” is Karl Rosenkranz who concentrated on the expression of the ambivalence of reality. Deploiring the trend of art that is intentionally silent on the ugliness of reality, Rosenkranz (1990:9, in Hauskeller 2003:86-87) asserts that life is not always beauty; rather “we exist entirely in ugliness. Thus art indeed cannot be restricted within beauty. We should not hesitate to express ugliness.”

This emphasis on the expression of ugliness is not because beauty is highlighted by...
contrast with ugliness, but because to restrict reality within beauty is nothing but a superficial understanding of reality (Rosenkranz 1990:38, in Hauskeller 2003:88). In this way, refusing to acknowledge ugliness not only constitutes passing over reality but also falsifying an idea and a truth. The content of madang public dialogue, thus, should contain the ugliness of the real as well as the ideal of beauty. This ambivalence between ugliness and beauty expressed in madang-theatre will form the groundwork for building up the audience’s balanced ability for cognition and criticism of reality, and transformation toward an ideal at the same time.

5.4.3.3 Ambivalence of Two Sides and Two Voices

Besides the beauty and ugliness of reality, madang public dialogue has to show the ambivalence of two (or multi) sides of a situation in a theatrical work. The two sides of a situation are closely connected with the two voices—the authorial voice and the other’s voice. As reality contains the ambivalence of beauty and ugliness, so a concrete situation of reality has two or more sides and voices.

What are two sides of a situation? How can the ambivalence sides be concretely expressed in the madang-theatre for public dialogue without yielding to the temptation of monologism? It can be clearly explained in the example of “the campaign for the abolition of the death penalty” mentioned above. In this case, one side is the voice of the author who insists on the abolition of the death penalty. In order to drive home his point, the author will declare that the victim is as guilty as the murderer. However, if (s)he is a dialogic dramatist, (s)he will express the ambivalence of the two sides/voices of the situation, that is, the victim’s side/voice and the murderer’s side/voice, regardless of the author’s intention. So “he will have to let us see the sufferings of the family of the murder victim, the consequences of letting a murder go unpunished on other potential murderers, and so on” (Esslin 1978:97).

To express the ambivalence of two sides or two voices is not easy for an author who
manifests self-assertion. The author would feel uneasy about the expression of ambivalence. The author would suspect that the expression of ambivalence spoils his/her plan and intention. However, Esslin (1978:97) believes that with the approach of ambivalence, it is possible to set the theatre against the death penalty, because the effect of theatre depends not on the author’s intention and his/her own voice but on the quality of objective theatre and the so-called ambivalence. If theatre allows the audience to see a dramatic situation from two viewpoints all the time, “it will have a profound effect, but a long-term one. … And that long-term effect may be quite different from the one immediately intended.”

If the Christian community does not transmit fixed messages and their meanings, how can the audience approach meaning? The answer is, in one word, “through dialogue.” Inevitably, a collision between two sides or two voices takes place. And in the process of the dialogic collision, the audience approaches meaning with its faculty of autonomous interpretation. From the critical point of view of madang public dialogue, meaning is, indeed, not an object of possession, but a fruit of the process of dialogic collision between two sides/voices. Meaning does not belong to a certain person; that is, it belongs to neither the author and the character nor the audience. It belongs to a dialogic process. Bakhtin (1984:110) describes the dialogic nature of meaning as follows: “Meaning—truth—is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction.” The audience’s participation and active response to dialogic interaction and collision are a prerequisite for producing meaning.

Therefore, there is no reason to suspect that the expression of ambivalence spoils the church’s voice and plan. Rather, to sound the two voices, to express the two sides, that is, the dialogic encounter between the church’s story and the other’s story, results in the creation of meaning and the return of the audience to an interpretative and participative subject. The activity of interpretation and meaning produced by the audience in the process of a dialogic interaction is, therefore, a creative activity that
supplements and enriches the unfinalized blank of the story. Meaning results from “co-creativity” (Bakhtin 1986:142) of two or multi-voices.

5.4.3.4 Three Types of Double-Voiced Discourse

To express ambivalence (two or more sides) in madang-theatre does not guarantee a cognitive and dialogic theatre. In other words, the discourse accepting the other’s voice, double-voiced discourse, does not always guarantee a participative dialogue. The reason is that the expression of ambivalence or double-voiced discourse can be misused for the purpose of highlighting the author’s single voice. Depending on “the purpose” for which the two voices are expressed, it can be determined whether the madang-theatre is dialogic or not. Therefore, the question of “dialogic or not” relies not on whether it expresses the ambivalence, but on what the purpose of that ambivalence is.

According to Bakhtin (1984:199), two-voiced discourse can be classified into three types. (1) The first type is “uni-directional double-voiced discourse,” which tends toward a fusion of two or multi-voices into one. (2) The second type is “vari-directional double-voiced discourse.” In this type, vari-directional two voices become internally dialogized. But this tends to disintegrate into the first type of discourse, for here are two voices, but the mutual relationship between them is not active. (3) The third type is “the active type”—“vari-directional double-voiced discourse reflecting the other’s voices.” Diverse forms of mutual relationship with the other’s voices are possible here.

In the light of the three types of double-voiced discourse, any intensification of the other’s voices in a certain discourse or in a certain madang-theatre can be only a game, in which the author permits the expression of ambivalence in order that his own single voice and consciousness might be heard more strongly later. All voices here are gathered together in a single speech. The other’s voices are “subordinated to the verbal and semantic dictatorship of a monologic, unified style and a unified tone” (Bakhtin 1984:204). In this case neither authentic dialogue nor polyphonic harmony
takes place between two voices.

How, then, can the Christian community avoid the distorting tendency of the expression of two voices in making a madang public dialogue? How will the Christian community approach the third type, that is, the “vari-directional double-voiced discourse reflecting the other’s voices” in it? For the third type, at least three steps must be followed.

*The first step is to re-check the purpose (or intention) of the expression of ambivalence:* why are two voices reflected in madang-theatre? When the two-voiced discourse aims to form a unified spirit, it reverts to monologism, because it cannot draw the audience’s spontaneous participation in madang public dialogue, and cannot develop its interpretation and criticism. The purpose of the double-voiced discourse for madang public dialogue needs to lie in polyphonic harmony toward dialogic interaction of two different voices and worldviews without one overlapping onto the other or merging into a single voice.

*The second step is to express the two sides and voices as coexisting,* so that the audience can hear and understand all sides and voices immediately and simultaneously. What is important here is the fact that the simultaneous coexistence of two voices can, and should be expressed in the form of not only agreement or consensus, but also of collision or polemic. In this way, not only “the possibility of simultaneous coexistence” but also “the possibility of being side by side one against the other” (Bakhtin 1984:29) is allowed in madang public dialogue. However, to juxtapose and counterpoise two sides/voices should not be for the purpose of fusion into a single voice. It should aim to accept differences and conflicts on the basis of the polyphonic harmony of dialogism.

*The third step is the “dialogic interaction” of two voices,* which is the most important essential in madang public dialogue. The key method of critical public dialogue is interaction through the artistically organized “coexistence” and “dialogic collision” of two
or a variety of voices, not the representation of a unified spirit of the Christian community. The interaction of two voices, therefore, will follow not dialectic thinking based on binary opposition of either/or, but dialogic thinking based on polyphonic harmony of both/and. As long as a dialogue remains multi-leveled and multi-voiced, as long as people are still arguing in the dialogue, as Bakhtin (1984:39) remarks, there is no reason to despair over the absence of a solution, because here the collapse of a monologism of the so-called “new Tower of Babel” occurs, instead of a conventional solution that signifies the centralization of various voices in an authorial single voice.

5.4.4 Self-Criticism: How to Communicate the Christian Story

It has been mentioned above that critical public dialogue should show the two voices in madang-theatre for public dialogue, avoiding the transmission of an authorial intention of the Christian community. If so, does it mean that the Christian community can never tell its own story?

The answer is simple. Avoiding a single authorial voice does not mean that the Christian community is prohibited from communicating its own story and message in madang public dialogue. Dialogue is a transactional encounter of the two sides of a situation, the two stories and voices of church and audience. Dialogue thus demands both. The problem is not whether the church speaks the Christian story or not, but “how” it speaks its own story. The Christian community, therefore, has the task of devising how to deal with its own story and voice in madang public dialogue, keeping polyphonic harmony with others.

Critical public dialogue, the second alternative model of madang public dialogue, here proposes a “critical approach” as a method of dealing with Christian messages. In madang public dialogue the Christian community considers madang-theatre as a mirror in which the church looks at itself, and as a time-space of cognition and criticism that contributes to great changes. This critical method of dealing with the church’s own story
allows the church to reflect on and criticize itself in public. Here, the madang-theatre and its madang space function as a place for self-reflection and self-criticism in public.

*The Gold-crowned Jesus* reveals some concrete examples of the church’s self-recognition and self-criticism. Here are presented three examples of church’s self-criticism.

Firstly, through a priest the church criticizes the indifference toward reality of the church leaders, as mentioned above. The priest is reflected as a representative of church-individualism and its privatization. He is careless about social, political matters and the poor, defective people at the same time.

Priest: That is a political matter. The church is not supposed to get involved in such things. (p.92)

Leper and beggars: Give us something, please.

Priest: I’m in a hurry. (Quickly gets out of their way and leaves the stage very hurriedly without looking back.) (p.106)

The second example is the church’s self-criticism through the character of the beggar.

Beggar: …why you think Christians are good?

Leper: I’m not saying that all Christians are good, but I like her kind of Christian: she is different. (She is ‘nun’.)

Beggar: Christians are all the same. They’re all crooks. …I was raised in an orphanage and the Christians there were the biggest thieves of all… They’d robbed the funds. (p.102)

Beggar: Do you still like Christians?... Does Jesus feed you?

Leper: There’s a difference between Jesus and Christians… I feel it. Jesus is okay, but the Christians sold him out.

Who is this Jesus who was sold out by the Christians? (pp.106-107)

The third example is the self-criticism through the dialogue of Jesus and the leper.
Leper: Jesus, Jesus, Jesus, what could I possibly be to Jesus? Why would you even bother with someone like me? Once I was a believer. But… “Don’t complain about being hungry, but suffer it.” Even when they beat and abuse you, torment you, they say this is necessary—if you are to enter heaven—and they call it the “will of God.” When your house gets torn down, “Stay silent, don’t fight, and turn the other cheek…” “Obey them, for these are the true believers.” (p.119)

The leper vomits the soju wine and throws himself down before the statue of Jesus. He examines the statue very closely and removes the crown from the head of the statue. As soon as he has removed it, Jesus breaks the silence and addresses the leper. The dialogue of Jesus and the leper is abridged as follows:

Jesus: I have been closed up in this stone for a long, long time.
Leper: Who put you in prison?
Jesus: They pray using my name in a way that prevents my reaching out to poor people like yourself. In my own name, they nailed me down to the cross again.
Leper: What can be done to free you, Jesus, make you live again so that you can come to us?
Jesus: People like you must help to liberate me.
Leper: Jesus, I am helpless.
Jesus: It is for that exact reason you can help me. Take it and share it with your friends. (pp.121–124)

The relation of madang-theatre with the audience is a surplus-relationship. With the surplus of seeing of the audience, the Christian community can see, enrich and criticize itself. In the same way, the audience can also see, enrich and criticize itself through the surplus of seeing of the Christian community. On the basis of the surplus-relationship, church and audience criticize themselves. The artistically organized self-critical action brings about a change in communication from monologism to dialogism. On the one hand, this self-criticism will lead to an internal change in the Christian community itself, by demolishing both the partitioning wall and the exclusive, monologic way of
communication which concerns only its own voice. On the other hand, it will cause an external change of relationship with the other, by listening carefully to the audience’s different voices and by reflecting the other’s point of view in a madang public dialogue.

Moreover, the Christian community’s self-critical act helps to open the audience’s closed mind to the church. As a result, the audience may also join in self-recognition and self-criticism, and listen to other stories and voices (including the church’s story and voice) which are different from theirs. From this view, critical action in madang-theatre will inevitably induce a dialogic event and a transformative event such as the social innovation of the monologic status quo.

5.4.5 Empathy and Critical Detachment

The last question in the praxis of the incarnational principles through a critical approach is how the Christian community will lead the audience to take a critical point of view as they experience the madang-theatre. This is connected with the task of returning the audience to an interpretive and critical “subject” in order to participate in dialogue and to create a dialogic and transformative event through the madang-theatre.

5.4.5.1 An Interpellated Subject and a Matter of Empathy

To accept the audience as a participative “subject” in the realm of dialogic madang-theatre is not a simple matter. As researched above, all two-voiced discourse is not always a dialogue in which the other’s voices are reflected without overlapping or merging into a single voice. It is because the double-voiced discourse can be misused for the hidden authorial purpose of highlighting the author’s single voice. Through the distorted two-voiced discourse, a distorted subject might be shaped.

Louis Althusser (1984:44-50) studied the process of how a subject is formed by ideology. For him, ideology is not an aggregate of ideas, but a social practice in that the
function of ideology is to “recruit subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or transform the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all).” Then he adopts the concept of “interpellation or hailing” to explain the process of forming a subject by ideology. For example, when police (or others) hailed a man: “Hey, you there!” he (the man) recognized that the hail (interpellation) was really addressed to him, and “it was really he who was hailed.” In fact, the subject who hailed was the police; the man was an object who was hailed by police. But by the interpellation or hailing of police, he became a subject.

Althusser (1984:53) explains the event of “God’s calling of Moses” with the concept of interpellation. God, who interpellated-introduced himself as the Subject, that is, “I am that I am,” interpellated-called Moses. By the very interpellation, Moses recognizes that “he is a subject, a subject of God, a subject subjected to God, a subject through the Subject and subjected to the Subject.” The most important point is that the event that God interpellated-called Moses was the event of not only Moses himself but also the innumerable subjects of God’s people. In this same way, the mission of “interpellated-called church” as a subject is to help God’s people to be subjects, beyond the church’s individual event of calling. Madang public dialogue serves this mission for the church.

However, a serious problem is raised here: that is, the formation of a subject can be “distorted.” If it works through a monologic ideology of communication, the church community will fail in the formation of genuine subjects. Perceiving that “the existence ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing,” Althusser (1984:49) remarks on the necessity of objectivity of ideology: “Ideology is necessary to be outside ideology, i.e. in scientific knowledge.” The limit of ideology is that “ideology has no outside (for itself), but at the same time it is nothing but outside (for science and reality).” This means that without objectivity of ideology, that is, unless ideology has a surplus of seeing from outside itself, the act through which ideology interpellates individuals as subjects may be “distorted.”
If so, how can the madang-theatre as a means of accepting the audience as a subject keep its objectivity or outsideness? Before answering this question, it is necessary to investigate a fundamental cause that makes theatre form a so-called “distorted” subject. The view of forming a subject by ideology or interpellation has been applied to analysis of the cinema (cf. Cho S.D. 2002:132). In the cinema, the audience becomes a subject by identifying and empathizing with the characters through his eyes and standpoint to the camera. For this reason, even though the cinema was made on the basis of a sense of male superiority, the women in the audience, far from criticizing it objectively, gave it a round of applause. The reason this was possible, concretely speaking, is that the women audience took a so-called “men’s subject” by identifying with men’s eyes and empathizing with the men-centered cinema. Empathy and identification with the cinema can be understood as an act of ideological interpellation that may cause “a distorted subject.”

In this way, not only the cinema but also mass media, including madang-theatre, easily yields to the reproduction of a monologic ideology or ruling ideology in the process of shaping the audience as a subject. In one word, the matter of accepting the audience as a subject can be misapplied by a ruling, monologic ideology. That is why critical public dialogue takes a skeptical view of matters of empathy and identification.

Since the time of Aristotle, empathy and identification have been the most important concepts in the artistic world. For Aristotle, mimesis, that is, imitation of action in a drama, signifies a catharsis through pity or horror. The catharsis through empathy and identification in art is problematic in polyphonic dialogue because it focuses on centripetal and mysterious experience, denying the social function of an objective and critical attitude. In his famous essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1999:211-244), Walter Benjamin points out the problem of “art for art” that lays emphasis on empathy and the aesthetic and mysterious spirit, covering up social contradictions. This is the problem of, in his terms, “aura” that signifies a mysterious and subjective experience in art based on the features of “originality,
authenticity and uniqueness” (Benjamin 1999:217). He contends that this “pure” art, or aestheticism, contributed to the birth of Fascism. Simply expressed, the art that loses objectivity and criticism does nothing but produce monologic ideology.

Benjamin (1999:216) remarks that today’s age of mechanical reproduction demands “the mode (or manner) of human sense perception” different from the age of aura based on uniqueness, mystery and empathy. According to his proposition, today’s art requires, instead of mysterious identification, “criticism and enjoyment.” Art is not an object of veneration any more; it becomes an object of criticism and enjoyment by the audience. This new art based on criticism and enjoyment (festivity) is an alternative that sees critically “art for art” having nothing to do with society.

To be a subject through empathy is quite different from being one through criticism of empathy. The former heads toward a single voice and centripetal force of “merging” or “empathizing” the other voices into one. It does not recognize the other’s surplus of seeing: it does not accept differences between I and the other. But the latter heads toward a polyphonic harmony of the two different sounds through co-existence or dialogic collision, instead of empathizing and merging into a single authorial voice.

In dialogism, meaning and even aesthetic value result from the process of participative dialogue among author, characters and audiences. Thus the empathy of the audience to heroes only destroys the participative production of new meaning and aesthetic value. Therefore, criticizing empathy is denying the ideology of fusion or merging into one voice. Consequently, it can be said that to form a genuine subject depends on accepting differences; so it is related to criticizing empathy and immersion.

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64 Benjamin says that the today’s age of mechanical reproduction lays emphasis on “its exhibition value” so “the work of art becomes a creation of new function” (Benjamin 1999:219).
5.4.5.2 The Estrangement Effect and Keeping Critical Distance

In order to form the audience as a genuine subject, the Christian community needs to devise a method of criticizing monologic attitudes in performing art, madang-theatre. It is also a way of helping the audience to become a dialogic subject who participates in madang-theatre without merging into it. Without this method of avoiding empathy and immersion, the practice of the incarnational principles of public dialogue will become invalid. The method is connected with developing the audience's competency for understanding and criticism.

A method of overcoming the matter of immersion and empathy can be seen in Bertolt Brecht's effort. Clarifying his critical attitude about empathy, identification and catharsis distinctive to Aristotelian theatre, Brecht suggested the well-known "Estrangement Effect (Verfremdungseffekt)" which is often called "Alienation Effect" in English. He thus concentrates all his energies on the change from emotional theatre based on empathy to cognitive and critical theatre in order to reveal bourgeois social contradictions and to help new self-development and social transformation. That is why he created Epic Theatre and Lehrstück (educational theatre) mentioned above.

What is the "Estrangement Effect (V-effect)"? It is a way of estranging, alienating or separating the audience from theatre/work itself for the purpose of overcoming the temptation of immersion and empathy. It is a device for intervening in the audience's self-effacing attitude through empathy with the illusion of the theatre. According to Brecht, "the first condition of the V-effect is that stage and auditorium must be purged of all that is 'magical' and that no 'hypnotic fields' come about" (Wright 1989:27). The concrete examples (methods) of the Estrangement Effect are as follows: showing techniques of theatre, revealing the process of theatrical production, interrupting the development of a story by talking to the audience during the performance, or by constituting several acts or scenes each with a different theme and so on. These are also characteristics of madanggük. That is, these show all the positions of subject and
object in the process of production, which are unfamiliar in conventional theatre.

The Estrangement Effect is a device “that remind us that representations are not given but produced” (Wright 1989:19). Thus, its function is to lead the audience to a realization of the fact that the theatre is not real but a mere fiction, and to create a critical distance lest the audience should empathize with the illusion of the theatre. By keeping a critical distance from the illusion of theatre through the V-effect, the audience can criticize the centripetal ideology that subordinates them to the monologic single order of author and characters, ignoring their voices.

Instead of individual, subjective empathy and identification, the Estrangement Effect focuses on relations and communication between theatre and the audience. All individual emotion is changed to an external form, and thus social relationships (such as that between characters and audiences) are naturally constituted in the theatre. In the process, the audience can be formed as subjects who participate in a dialogic theatre with critical, objective eyes, without merging their voices into a single voice through empathy.

Performing art which keeps a critical distance from empathy goes beyond the dimension of just “reflecting” reality, and helps to develop the competency to recognize and criticize distorted ideology and contradictions of reality. And the criticism in theatre entails not only reality-criticism as the content of madang-theatre. In fact, the matter of whether the theme criticizes reality is not vitally important in madang-theatre for public dialogue. What is more important here is whether it helps audiences to develop their competencies of recognition and criticism, instead of the fusion of two voices through empathy. This is the decisive function of criticism in madang public dialogue.

Critical public dialogue is therefore concerned with the change in the audience’s attitude or position as well as the positions of text, author and characters. Text in dialogic madang-theatre has to be unfinalized, for it is accomplished through the
audience’s participation. The author (church) has to create polyphonic theatre that expresses the ambivalence of two voices, two sides; a type of vari-directional double-voiced discourse that reflects the other’s voices without fusion. During the performance, the performers (Christians) should also not identify themselves with the theatrical characters, but should depict characters roughly in order that the audience recognizes the difference between performers and the depicted characters of the theatre. Brecht insists that “he (the performer) never forgets, nor lets it be forgotten, that he is not the subject, but the demonstrator” (Wright 1989:32). Thus, his epic theatre takes a narrator in order to interfere with illusion. These changes will ultimately contribute to a change in the audience’s attitude and position from that of a mere passive receiver to an active participant, and from a voiceless distorted subject to a creative, critical subject of a dialogic event with his own voice.

Through critical public dialogue that ensures that it sees the ambivalence and keeps critical detachment, the audience can be freed from the act of projecting itself into the theatre and from receiving its given meaning, and can approach a new image of being, that is, a dialogic subject in the same position as author or performers. This critical public dialogue implies “a moment of disposssession of the egoistic and narcissistic ego” (Ricoeur 1976:94) and the formulation of a new self-identity welcoming the surplus of the other and its differences.

5.5 The Third Model: Festival Public Dialogue

The first model, Incarnational Public Dialogue, dealt with the church’s attitude to incarnational dialogue, emphasizing the spirit of participative dialogue of the audience. The second model, Critical Public Dialogue, stressed the transformative spirit in making or taking part in dialogic madang-theatre. In this section, the third model—Festival Public Dialogue will focus on “festivity” in madang public dialogue. Madang public
dialogue has been researched as a faith-praxis from the point of view of dialogue (and of communication and relationship). Thus the model of festivity will emphasize the dialogic factors in play, festival or laughter. Festival Public Dialogue begins with some questions.

The first concern of the festival model of public dialogue is to examine how a festival field for public dialogue functions as a praxis-field to practice both incarnational and critical principles of madang public dialogue. How can the festivity deepen the dialogic relations between church and audience based on the incarnational model of public dialogue and enhance the festivity and play of madanggŭk? And how can the madang (an open space for public dialogue) of festival and the spirit of festival be occupied without the critical principles becoming stagnant?

The second concern of the festival model is how the festivity functions as “a zone of familiar contact” (Bakhtin 1984:158) where the church can take off the clothes of monologic and one-way communication, and engage with the other dialogically. In addition, how can the zone of contact be expanded beyond the space of madanggŭk performance to intensify the encounter as well as the festivity?

The madanggŭk as communicability was deep-rooted in festivity as well as in criticism. Thus, Chae Hee-Wan and Lim Jin-Taek (1982:85) summarize the distinctive spirit of madanggŭk as twofold: the “spirit of play” and the “spirit of madang.” According to them, “the spirit of play serves as an intrinsic ground of existence of an aesthetic sense of the common people (minjung) and plays a decisive role in raising communal spirit (shinmyong). In the contemporary madanggŭk as well, the spirit of play is the most fundamental, important spirit to make madang-performance possible.” On the other hand, “madang” (an open space) in madanggŭk is not only a mere playground for amusement, but a place where battles are fought against all outside forces that oppress life. So the spirit of madang is a kind of “openness” and “magnanimity” enabling even the eventual reconciliation and koinonia with antagonists. Thus Lim Jin
Taek (1990:41-42), dreaming of the festival madanggŭk, suggests that madanggŭk has to be a festival theatre as well as a folklore drama, a circumstance drama, a demonstration theatre, and an action theatre.

Considering the fact that the word “play” implies both “play” and “theatre,” the theatre contains the spirit of “play” (festivity). However, under the social activity-centered and minjung movement-oriented atmosphere, the function of play and festival has not been an object of attention. The model of Festival Public Dialogue will explore the possibility of festivity (the spirit of play and the spirit of madang), which contributes to preparing a dialogic field/place for the praxis of both incarnational and critical public dialogue.

5.5.1 Play and Public Dialogue

5.5.1.1 *Homo Ludens* (Man the Player)

Play has not aroused scholars’ interest; rather, it has been disregarded. Freud, who deals with play from a psychological point of view, considers this and art as an instinct and an unconscious libido subject to pleasure. In his book *Jokes and Their Relations to the Unconscious*, Freud (1986:146-147) claims that laughter and jokes are not different from a dream. Jokes, like dreams, serve to discharge mental excitation in the face of obstacles. Laughter results naturally only when oppressed psychic energy like sexual energy and aggressive energy is free from psychical control. As a release from constraint, laughter is nothing but “a phenomenon of relaxation of tension” (Freud 1986:147).

Jean Piaget (1951:87) believes that play or games are not mere psychical phenomena, but essentially acts of intelligence and self-realization. He regards play as an indispensable step in the child’s intellectual development. For him, “play bridges the gap between sensory-motor experience and the emergence of representative or symbolic thought” and it is “the child’s way of assimilating the reality of the world
around him" (Pulaski 1971:96-97). His understanding of play is that it exceeds the domain of mere entertainment or pleasure. However, his study of play, as Roger Caillois (1961:165) indicates, is restricted to children’s play.

Johan Huizinga, a Dutch historian and cultural philosopher, looks for human nature in the play instinct. In the foreword of his book Homo Ludens (1949:ii), Huizinga indicates the fact that a human being has been understood as Homo Sapiens (Man the Thinker) since Descartes in the seventeenth century. Since the nineteenth century, to some degree free from the worship of reason and its optimism, the human being is designated as Homo Faber (Man the Maker). However, he says that there is a third function just as important as reasoning and creating; this is “playing.” A human being is Homo Ludens (Man the Player). For him, play is more than a mere physiological phenomenon or a psychological reflex. He (1949:1) says “it is a significant function.” “However we may regard it, the very fact that play has a meaning implies a non-materialistic quality in the nature of the thing itself.” Consequently, he comprehends play as a cultural phenomenon more than a biological phenomenon.

Huizinga's study of play has significance in that by understanding “paly” as the totality of man's expressive action, he aggrandized the concept of play which had been devalued by the confrontation between emotion and reason, and which had been restricted to childhood. Nevertheless, his play-theory is limited in that the essential character of play lies in “rule.” According to Huizinga (1949:11), “as soon as the rules are transgressed, the whole play-world collapses. The game is over. … ‘Real life’ is going again.” He misses the aspect of “play free from rule.”

On the other hand, in Man, Play, and Games, Roger Caillois (1961:8) points out that “many games do not imply rules.” For example, playing with dolls, playing soldiers, cops and robbers, horses, locomotives, and airplane-games are the games that presuppose free improvisation and acting “as if one were someone or something else.” In these instances, no fixed, rigid rules exist. Even though he acknowledges the
existence of play free from rule, however, he puts the nature of play in a category of rules, asserting “despite the assertion’s paradoxical character, ... the fiction, the sentiment of as if replaces and performs the same function as do rules.”

Jean Duvignaud (1980:14, in Kim H. 2003), distinguishing a play from a game, explains that “game” in English means a match or a contest that confirms to special rules, but “play” is free play involving playing or acting without rules. Giving thought to free “play” (not “game”), Duvignaud takes notice of play beyond rules. For him, culture anthropologically represents the totality of taboo, value and duty of a society. Play means to go beyond and protest against an established structure. Duvignaud (1980:42) thus points out that the play-cultural theory of Huizinga commits the error of integrating play into the class order. While play regulated by certain rules reproduces the already given, known rules, “to play with play (les jeu du jeu)” creates a new cognition which destroys an established code system (Duvignaud 1980:42). From Duvignaud’s perspective, play, unlike game, connotes the power of resistance against monologism. In this sphere of play, festival, imagination, double-voiced dialogue and even change can flourish.

5.5.1.2 Dialogic Features in Play

Is play connected in any respect with public dialogue beyond monologism? This will be briefly examined on the basis of the characteristics of play.

Firstly, the “supra-logical nature” of play makes the liberation from determinism possible. According to Huizinga (1949:3-4), play takes place by breaking down absolute determinism. The very fact that there is play in a human being confirms the supra-logical nature of the human situation, and confirms that man is more than a reasonable being. This is because play has the character of non-reason or illogicality. In other words, play is an act that intends an escape from the logical world with its deterministic principles. In this way, play facilitates the prevention of determinism,
finalizability and one-way communication.

Secondly, the “voluntariness” of play can lead to participative dialogue. In fact, “all play is a voluntary activity.” Play is possible, neither by order nor by a forcible imitation of it, but only “by the quality of freedom” (Huizinga 1949:7). This corresponds with the principle of dialogue.

Thirdly, play, like dialogism, sets the other-acceptance and the difference-acceptance as a premise. Play is played between two parties or teams. So the very “playing together,” as Huizinga (1949:47) mentions, “has an essentially ‘antithetical’ character.” Just as playing alone cannot be participative play, so dialogue is impossible by one person. Playing alone and speaking alone are all monologic, and have no place for mutual relationships. Meanwhile, playing together and dialoguing together accept the other as a subject in the same position. Therefore, in this respect, play corresponds with the principles of incarnational public dialogue such as otherness, outsideness and polyphony.

Fourthly, the characteristics of “tension and uncertainty” (Huizinga 1949:47) of play have an affinity with the principles of unfinalizability, ambivalence and critical distance in madang public dialogue. Madang public dialogue, like play, is based on the unfixed or unfinalized text. In addition, there is always a tension in creating polyphonic harmony in the two voices of the author and the other, and in expressing ambivalence and keeping a distance.

In both dialogue and play, producing meaning belongs to participants. However, in a game of pure chance, the tension is very slight (Huizinga 1949:48). If the audience takes a passive attitude in dialogue, such as leaving dialogue to fate and relinquishing its interpretative and critical activity in a dialogic event, the tension (and balance through it) between the two voices will disappear. As a result, the dialogic relationship will be severed, and there will exist only monologism in a single voice.
5.5.2 Madang-Theatre as Play-Art

When madang public dialogue accepts the otherness and practices the principles of incarnational and critical dialogue, the praxis of public dialogue might be restricted only in the rational aspect. But for madang public dialogue the ultimate understanding of the human being lies in a being that is in a synthesis of reason and emotion. That is why madang public dialogue needs the festive model as well as the incarnation and the critical model.

How, then, is it possible that artistic madang-theatre realizes a synthesis of reason and emotion in “festival” public dialogue? For the answer to this question, the art theory of Friedrich Schiller will be discussed. Schiller searched in “play” for the possibility of a synthesis of reason-emotion. For this reason, his study is called “play-art theory.” Man will become both a rational being and a sensuous (emotional) being, only when one acknowledges that man is a playing being. Schiller’s approach deserves further discussion in the matter of festival public dialogue, in that he found out in “play” a point of contact between reason and emotion.

In *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, Schiller (1965:64-67,74) calls the corresponding impulses of rational and sense “formal impulse” and “sensuous impulse” respectively. The sensuous impulse, which proceeds from man’s sensuous nature, furnishes cases, aiming at mutation or variation. On the other hand, the formal impulse, which proceeds from man’s rational nature, furnishes absolute values like laws or rules, aiming at immutability. However, the problem is that the two impulses are out of harmony in man; one impulse rises to predominance over the other. Schiller (1965:86) describes the problem as follows: “But I call a man taut as much when he is under the constraint of sensational as when he is under that of ideas. Every exclusive domination of either of his two fundamental impulses is for him a condition of constraint and of force.” In one word, the disharmony between the two impulses produces a monologic situation.
In order to be a dialogic being, the co-operation of both natures is necessary. It means that man should have “the twofold experience” at the same time, and feel himself both as “matter” and “spirit.” According to Schiller (1965:73-74,86), only when man has a “complete intuition of his humanity” can “freedom” exist. How can the two natures be in harmony? He suggests that there exists a third impulse that makes harmony of both the sensuous and the rational nature, and thus recovers man’s wholeness. The third impulse is “Spieltrieb” (play impulse).

The play (Spieltrieb) is, however, more than mere play; rather, it is an artistic activity. Schiller (1965:78) connects play with “beauty” as well as with “freedom.” “Beauty … it is the common object of both impulses, that is to say of the play impulse. …The term … is accustomed to denote by the word play everything that is neither subjectively nor objectively contingent, and yet imposes neither outward nor inward necessity.” The play impulse (Spieltrieb) aims at “the reconciliation of becoming with absolute being, of variation with identity” (Schiller 1965:74). And beauty lies between rational and sense; that is, it is in an ideal harmonious state without being compelled by one of the two impulses. Therefore, Schiller (1965:80) says that “man shall only play with Beauty, and he shall play only with Beauty.” In conclusion, “he is only wholly man when he is playing.”

Schiller searched for the possibility of harmony between rational and sense in “play-art.” In this way, play is connected with beauty in order to realize both the freedom and the wholeness of the human being.

Madanggük is a kind of play-art. Thus it can be said that madang public dialogue is public dialogue through the play art of madang-theatre. It is Huizinga who lays great emphasis on the play-function of the theatre. Huizinga (1949:144) mentions that “only the drama, because of its intrinsically functional character, its quality of being an action, remains permanently linked to play.” Tragedy and comedy derive from play. Attic comedy grew out of a procession of Dionysus, and tragedy was originally a sacred play.
or a played rite, far from being literature designed for the stage. Huizinga (1949:143) insists that the epic can no longer be play as soon as it becomes something to be read. And the lyric cannot be understood as a play-function when it severs its connection with music. From his emphasis on the play-function of the theatre as an action, it thus appears that the theatre is play-art as well as performing art.

5.5.3 Rediscovery of Festivity for Madang Public Dialogue

The spirit of play as play-art in madanggûk was incarnated in the form of festival. In other words, play and art are encountered in the festival of madanggûk. This means that “festival” became a zone for the encounter of play and art. The task of festival madang public dialogue is to prepare the “festival” as a zone of free, familiar and dialogic contact between the Christian community and others. The concern with festivity is related to the embodiment of both the spirit of play and the spirit of madang, a synthesis of rational nature and sensuous nature, and the fulfillment of both incarnational public dialogue and critical public dialogue.

The great concern of Harvey Cox, in his book *The Feast of Fools*, is the return of festival. He considers the disappearance of “the feast of fools” which flourished in parts of Europe during the medieval era as a signal of a lack in civilization’s capacity for festivity and fantasy. “The demise showed that people were beginning to see their social roles and sacred convictions through eyes that could not permit such strident satire” (Cox 1971:4). Thus Cox (1971:3-6) indicates that the divine right of kings, papal infallibility, and the modern totalitarian state all became rampant after the Feast of Fools disappeared. In addition, he deplores the fact that the present festivals are sporadic or obsessive, the present fantasies predictable and politically impotent. Neither provides the spirit for genuine social transformation.

Harvey Cox and Huizinga are in agreement on the reasons for the decay of festivity (play) and fantasy. The enormous emphasis on Man as Thinker (Aquinas and
Descartes) and Man as Worker (Luther and Marx) resulted in forcing him toward “useful work and rational calculation.” On the other hand, man’s festive and imaginative faculties have atrophied. As a result, man has lost “the joy of ecstatic celebration, antic play, and free imagination” (Cox 1971:11-12). The more industrious the world is, the less playful and imaginative man becomes. Man as Worker with a bent body subject to work schedules uses his “new technologically provided leisure either to ‘moonlight,’ or to plan sober consultation on the ‘problem of leisure,’ or to wonder why we are not enjoying our ‘free time’ the way we should” (Cox 1971:9-10).

The Christian community will have to play an important role in the recovery of man’s humanity. However, Christianity has adjusted very rapidly to the tendency of modernity. Christianity has placed emphasis on the understanding of man as worker and toolmaker, reasoner and thinker. According to Harvey Cox (1971:15), the problem is that “in doing all this, it has often failed to give sufficient attention to vital dimensions of the human reality.” In fact, without protestant ethic and medieval scholasticism stressing the order of creation and the gift of reason, industrialization and scientific civilization might never have developed.

Harvey Cox understands that human is essentially festive and fanciful, that is, “Homo Festivus” and “Homo Fantasia.” Therefore, he (1971:12) suggests that in order to become fully human, industrial person must learn again “to dance and to dream.” He (1971:16) claims that this loss (of capacity for festivity and fantasy) is “calamitous” because “the loss is personal, social and religious loss: (1) it deforms man by depriving him of an essential ingredient in human existence, (2) it endangers his very survival as a species by rendering him provincial and less adaptive, and (3) it robs him of a crucial means of sensing his important place in fulfilling the destiny of the cosmos.”

When deprived of joy and laughter, the human or Christian community will become more isolated from and suspicious toward others. Without fantasy, the Christian community for madang public dialogue cannot accept the other as dialogic companions
in a new heaven and a new earth. That is why festival public dialogue for the rediscovery of festivity (including the spirit of play, madang, and fantasy) is projected as the third model of madang public dialogue.

The communicability of madanggŭk reflects in many respects the “homo ludens” of Huizinga, the “playing art” of Schiller, and the festivity and fantasy of Harvey Cox. Madanggŭk harmonized the rational and sensuous natures by embodying the third impulse, the Spieltrieb (play impulse). And madanggŭk as play art prepared “a space of festival madang” for the polyphonic harmony of thinker, reasoner, worker, toolmaker, festive being and fanciful being. But the festivity of madanggŭk also arouses some criticism.

The t’alch’um, the origin of madanggŭk, was “a folk drama with play nature” (Kim U.D. 1997:261). The madanggŭk creatively inherited from t’alch’um is deeply rooted in play nature as well. The characteristic of play in madanggŭk appeared in the way that madanggŭk and t’alch’um both started with and repeated the saying “Let’s play to the full,” and dance, song and music were its essential elements. According to Huizinga (1949:164), “If in everything that pertains to music we find ourselves within the play-sphere, the same is true in even higher degree of music’s twin-sister, the dance.” In addition, the characters or the content of madanggŭk, as mentioned in Chapter 4, were expressed optimistically and humorously, even when dealing with the sufferings of reality. And the actions and body movements of the characters carried more weight and importance than did their lines in madanggŭk. Furthermore, the procedure of madanggŭk was constituted based on the spirit of play and festivity (which will be dealt with in the following section). In this respect, the communicative madanggŭk functioned as festive performing art.

**5.5.4 Procedure of Festival Public Dialogue**

The next issue is how to prepare the field (place) for festival, that is, how to organize
the festival madang-theatre in order to embody play or festivity (including fantasy) in public dialogue with others. The procedure of festival public dialogue aims at the natural realization of the harmony of play and art, sense and reason, festivity and criticism in madang public dialogue. For this reason, research into the whole procedure of madang-performance is worthwhile.

The procedure of madanggŭk shows clearly that madanggŭk is itself more than play; it is a festival in nature grounded on the nature of play. Madanggŭk, like t’alch’um, is not performance-centered theatre. There are “pre-performance” programs and “follow-up performance” programs before and after main performance. The pre-performance is the opening-play or street parade, and the follow-up is the ending-play. These programs consider “play” as a decisive role, realizing the spirit of play/festivity and obtaining an expanded field for play and festival. In fact, the two programs are more important than the main performance from the point of view of festivity. Through these two programs and the main performance, madanggŭk could develop play nature in a festival atmosphere, expanding it to festival beyond mere play, and could secure an extended space not only for the performance but also for festival.

Madanggŭk has reality-recognition and reality-criticism as its basic function. However, what is important here is that madanggŭk approaches reality-criticism through play and parody. It thus appears that both criticism and festivity are the core of madanggŭk. Lee Young Mi (2001:78-86) explains that the procedure and the function of the pre-performance (beginning-play) program and the follow-up (ending-play) program are different according to whether it is festival madanggŭk or societal madanggŭk.

(1) Festival Madanggŭk:
Street parade → Group dance & singing → Main performance → Festival ending-play

(2) Societal Madanggŭk:
Singing → Main performance → Ending-play for Resolution
In the case of festival madanggŭk, the street parade as pre-performance functions in the role of announcing the opening of madanggŭk. A peasant band goes all around, playing traditional instruments at the head of the procession, waving a peasant flag as a symbol of their prayer for fertility. The performers follow after them. People come together at the performance venue with the street parade. At this moment, the street parade is not simply a parade for public information but a device for creating collectivity and spontaneity. The street play is a procedure originating from traditional mask dance, t’alch’um. Through the street play, the performers encounter people in play and spontaneously invite them to become participants. Then the people begin to dance “the chaotic dance” (i.e. group dance) together with the performers for three or four hours. After establishing a communal spirit (shinmyong) between the performers and the audience through this process, the mask dance begins.

However, as Lee Yong Mi (2001:80-81) indicates, in modern society that is unaccustomed to group dance, “singing together” instead of “dancing together” plays the role of arousing spontaneity and communal spirit among the audience. After main performance the ending also focuses traditionally on group dancing to the rhythm of a peasant band. But modern audiences who are unfamiliar with traditional dances sing and dance by moving around hand in hand. Lee Young Mi (2001:81-82) mentions the function of the ending of the play as follows: “ending play has a function of connecting performance with life of the audience, that is, of sending the recognition and sentiment experienced from madanggŭk back to daily life.”

Meanwhile, societal madanggŭk or social movement-centered madanggŭk starts in the form that the audience has already concentrated on in the theatre. As a result, communal spirit, unification, and spontaneity are to some extent already secured. Thus the street parade and group dancing become unnecessary. Instead, “singing together” suffices to relieve the tense atmosphere of a societal assembly (Lee Y.M. 2001:82). And in the case of societal madanggŭk, a follow-up program is generally set up for the purpose of critical discourse and activity related to the theme of the performance (Bae
S.A. 2003:204-205). Thus most cases of societal madanggŭk often end in a short program urging resolution and assurance. In such cases the ending-play proceeds in the form of singing and marching in line (Lee Y.M. 2001:81).

“The Yesu-Jeon” (Biography of Jesus) is an example of the marrying of criticism and festivity. It was written by Christian students for themselves without the aid of any outside authors. It modifies “The Gold-Crowned Jesus” into something much simpler, so that anyone can perform. For this reason, “The Yesu-Jeon” spread around the metropolitan areas and was performed in a number of churches for several years before madanggŭk entered into the field of labor. It also consisted of three procedures.

1. Beginning-Play:
   1) Performers come out to madang one by one and dance a simplified t’alch’um.
   2) All performer and audience sing a song.

2. Main Performance:
   Act 1: 1) Leper and beggar appear on the stage and criticize reality. They dance the leper’s dance of t’alch’um and sing the traditional beggar ballad.
   2) A priest and a Levite pass them by without helping them, saying “I am in a hurry.”
   Act 2: A prostitute appears, dancing t’alch’um.
   When people are going to throw stones at her, Jesus forgives her.
   Act 3: Military demons appear to destroy Jesus’ popularity.
   They arrest and crucify Jesus.
   (Military demons are a symbol of Chun Doo Hwan’s military power; the crucifixion is a symbol of the Gwangju massacre event.)

3. Ending-Play:
   All dance the “liberation dance” together, expecting the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

From the above research, it is clear that madanggŭk is a comprehensive concept including not only the madanggŭk performance itself but also pre-performance and
ending-play. Considering the whole procedure, madanggŭk has three functions.

First is its critical function. The spirit of play and the spirit of madang/street fulfill the function of keeping a critical distance. By helping the audience to recognize the fact that madanggŭk is a kind of play and thus by preventing the audience from experiencing empathy and immersion, the spirit of play of madanggŭk allows the audience to participate in the dialogic theatre using their objective and critical capacities. It goes without saying that the main performance also allows the audience to take a critical point of view. And the ending-play functions as a time-space of critical discourse as well.

Secondly, there is a festival function beyond the critical one. The audience shares a feeling of communal intimacy and a close relationship with the joyful, festival atmosphere. This festival situation begins in the street play, is established in the main performance, and is strengthened through the ending-play. In this way, the spirit of play of madanggŭk has a critical function on the one hand, and on the other, a festive function.

The third function is to expand from a dramatic space to the street or all around the village; and to expand communication from dialogue between performers to dialogue between performers and audiences. This expanding function of madanggŭk intensifies the dialogic interaction and a mutual relationship between them (cf. Bae S. A. 2003:225).

To sum up, madanggŭk is based on not only criticism but also on festivity; that is, it can be understood as the combination of criticism and festivity. The festivity here is understood as the combination of the spirit of play and the spirit of madang. In the process of these combinations, madanggŭk becomes “play-art” or “festival-art” that promotes the harmony of rational and sensuous impulses.
5.5.5 Carnivalistic Festivity for Madang Public Dialogue

Madang public dialogue desires the return of festivity and laughter based on the spirit of play and madang. For this return to occur, it follows the procedure: “street play→singing together→main madang-performance→ending play.” The next issue to be discussed will be the kind of festival it should be. The festivity of madang public dialogue lies neither in an individual festival nor in a nihilistic festival, and it is not associated with government-initiated festivals. The core of madang public dialogue is spontaneous or voluntary participation of the audience in a dialogic madang-theatre, through which the Christian community contacts and communicates with others in a free and festive atmosphere. Therefore, the festival for madang public dialogue requires a festival based on “popular,” “spontaneous” and “dialogic” characteristics, which are, according to Bakhtin, also considered the features of genuine carnival. This kind of festival for madang public dialogue will here be termed “carnivalistic festival,” in order to distinguish it from other sorts of festival that are not spontaneous or public but individual, nihilistic or government-initiated festivals.

Bakhtin engaged in research on the carnival as the source of a type of dialogic novel. He investigated carnival and the culture of laughter in his Rabelais and His World.65 According to Bakhtin, while an official festival requires adherence to the past, unchangeability, finalizability and permanence of the order of the world, carnival longs for the destruction of formality or officialism and the restoration of true relations among people. In carnival, the boundary between art and life is demolished, the distinction between stage and audience disappears, and a fully-human and a dialogic space are generated. By playing an ideal in the real with fantasy, a peculiar situation occurs in which people can simultaneously experience rational being and sensuous being, working being and playing being, the real and fantasy, criticism and festivity.

65 This is the fruit of Bakhtin’s study on the books Gargantua and the Pantagruel of Rabelais who is a famous writer. Bakhtin considers Rabelais’ literature as the ‘model of the carnivalization of literature.'
But carnival goes beyond enjoyment; it is concerned with the constant renewal and change of reality. Thus, Bakhtin (1984:166) says that carnival is “an extraordinarily flexible form of artistic visualization, a peculiar sort of heuristic principle making possible the discovery of new and as yet unseen things.” It is possible “by relativizing all that was externally stable, set and ready-made.” For Bakhtin, carnival means the combination of criticism and festivity. And carnival means the realization and expansion of the human being, communication, and relationship through the restoration of full humanity. In this sense, the “carnivalistic festival” has validity as a model for madang public dialogue in which the Christian community communicates with others through the principles of incarnational and critical public dialogue.

The carnivalistic festival has often been misunderstood as a frenzy of chaos. Bakhtin (1984:130-131) points out that true carnival has been misunderstood because of the degenerate forms of carnival. After the Renaissance, the high point of carnival life, communal folk carnival began to decline; instead, “a festive court masquerade culture” began to develop, mostly absorbing into itself an externally decorative sort of carnival. Later a broader line of festivals (no longer limited to the court) began to develop which we might call the masquerade line of development. Thereafter many carnival forms were completely cut off from their folk base and left the public square to enter this chamber masquerade line, which exists even today. In the end, carnival lost its meaning of “all-together-playing-dialogue” in the public square.

For a thorough understanding of the problem of carnival, Bakhtin (1984:159-160) suggests, firstly, not seeing the carnival as only a specific characteristic of Romanticism; secondly, not oversimplifying it to the idea of masquerade in modern times, or even more to a vulgar understanding of carnival; thirdly, not identifying it with that narrow theatrical-pageantry concept of carnival, so very characteristic of modern times. “For a proper understanding of carnival, one must take it at its origins and at its peaks, that is, in antiquity, in the Middle Ages and finally in the Renaissance” (Bakhtin 1984:160).
The characteristics of carnivalistic festival (in the sense of a proper understanding of

carnival) are in common with madanggŭk. The place for both carnival and madanggŭk

is the “street or public square,” that is, “outside” all buildings such as stage, house and

church. The festivity of street-play and ending-play in madanggŭk has built up a

worldview similar to that of carnival. In common with carnival, the worldview of

madanggŭk is that all distance between people and hierarchical structure is suspended.

In this festival world free and familiar contact between people and “a new mode of

interrelationship between individuals” on an equal level was possible (Bakhtin

1984:123). Thus, rulers, rich men, thieves, and beggars could come together in

madang, street, or the public square of festival “on equal terms on a single,

fundamentally dialogized plane” (Bakhtin 1984:135). And carnival and madanggŭk

functioned as a time-space for public dialogue, permitting the co-existence and

interaction of a variety of different sounds and beings. In madanggŭk, the so-called

world of “joyful relativity,” in Bakhtin's (1984:107) expression, is opened by the street

play, is revitalized in the main madang-theatre performance, and is heightened through

the ending-play.

5.5.6 Dialogic Principles of Madang-Festival

Does the festivity have a dialogic nature in any respect? Can such an expanded

festival space function as a field for accomplishing the incarnational public dialogue

and the critical public dialogue at the same time? The answer to these questions will be

revealed in the dialogic characteristics of carnivalistic festival which make public

dialogue possible, namely, the principles of carnivalistic festival.

5.5.6.1 The Spirit of Carnival Debasement

By belonging to all people and being filled with festivity, the madang or the public

square could become “a zone of familiar contact” (Bakhtin 1984:158). In madang, “a

special form of free and familiar contact reigned among people who were usually
divided by the barriers of caste, property, profession and age” (Bakhtin 1968:10). All hierarchical worldview stops; instead, people enter into new dialogic relationships.

The carnivalistic festival shows “the spirit of carnival debasings” because “carnival ends debase the hero and bring him down to earth, they make him familiar, bring him close, and humanize him” (Bakhtin 1984:132-133). Saying that Socrates rediscovered the dialogic nature of thought and truth on a carnival basis, Bakhtin (1984:132) explains that the reason Socrates characterized himself as a “pander” and “midwife” was because he constructed himself in the spirit of carnival debasement. The spirit of debasement must be understood in the biblical meaning of “incarnation” that was suggested as the first model of madang public dialogue. The festival based on the incarnational spirit of debasement leads people to be “reborn for new, purely human relations” (Bakhtin 1968:10). All inequality is suspended, and all are considered equal.

The special mass actions, free carnivalistic festival gesticulation and the outspoken carnival word also show and intensify the dialogic nature of festival. During the carnivalistic festival of madang-theatre “a new mode of interrelationship between individuals” is worked out “in a concretely sensuous, half-real and half-play-acted form” (Bakhtin 1984:123).

The nature of public dialogue presumes carnival “familiarization” of relations among people who have entered the dialogue, and presumes the abolition of all distance between them. Therefore, madang public dialogue requires the place of festival-madang and the attitude of incarnation as the first dialogic principle of festival public dialogue. The festival public dialogue possible in the madang as a zone of familiar contact will activate familiarization with not only the relations among people but also the relations between people and the object of thought and truth itself.

5.5.6.2 Everyone is a Participant

In the street-parade and the ending-play of madanggůk, as in carnival, there are no
footlights, and there is no distinction between performer and audience. Everyone is an active participant; everyone communes in the dialogic act of the madang-festival. Nobody needs to comply with the rules of performing art. Everyone is subject only to “the laws of its own freedom” (Bakhtin 1968:7). Thus Harvey Cox (1971:118) remarks that the essence of festival is “participation and equality, the abolition of domination and paternalism.” Carnivalistic festivals are not spectacles seen by the people and, strictly speaking, not even performed. They are life itself formed by play-art. In one word, life plays itself in madanggūk (especially street parade and ending play) and carnival. Play becomes life itself during the festival. Therefore, the whole madanggūk and carnival “belong to the borderline between art and life.” A festive performance can make everyone live in it and participate in it at the same time (Bakhtin 1968:7; 1984:122). This is how festival public dialogue practices the principle of dialogic participation.

5.5.6.3 Dialogization of Differences

The carnivalistic festival of madanggūk serves as a democratic zone in which heterogeneity, ambivalence and difference dialogize one another in free and familiar contact. The democratic madang or public square is a space not that “one” monopolizes, but that “two” (or more) dialogize with each other. Of course, the democracy of carnival does not mean the fusion and unification of a variety of voices; as Ken Hirschkop (1999:294) mentioned, it is rather “the battleground” on which conflicts and struggles take place. According to Hirschkop (1999:252-253), the public square of heterogeneity is grounded on “the peculiar indeterminacy” and “the uneven structuring of language.” “The public square is an image of oral speech-everyday, informal language and conversation, … face-to-face conversation. … There is no single form of language.”

“A striking combination of what would seem to be an absolutely heterogeneous and incompatible element” (Bakhtin 1984:134) is made in carnivalistic festival. The antitheses and contrast in carnivalistic festival are, for example, top and bottom, birth
and death, youth and old age, face and backside, praise and abuse, affirmation and reputation, tragic-comic, stupidity-wisdom, beauty-ugliness, and so forth. In festival public dialogue, these “opposites come together, look at one other, are reflected in one other, know and understand one another” (Bakhtin 1984:176, cf.126). Bakhtin (1984:135) asserts the fact that the Christian genres were so influenced by carnivalization that as in carnivalistic festival, “rulers, rich men, thieves, beggars, hetaeae come together here on equal terms on a single, fundamentally dialogized plane.” Harvey Cox (1971:131) calls the dialogization of differences, which does not smooth over the obvious contradictions, nor merges the differences into one, but accepts and even exemplifies the differences, “the method of juxtaposition.” The juxtapositional approach is “one of the principal ingredients of festivity” and even ”a method for theological jesters” (Cox 1971:131,133). Bakhtin (1984:134) also says that “we can now say that the clamping principle that bound all these heterogeneous elements into the organic whole of a genre, a principle of extraordinary strength and tenacity, was carnival and a carnival sense of the world.”

In fact, through the method of juxtaposition, festival public dialogue “brings closer what was distant and unites what had been sundered” (Bakhtin 1984:134-135). In this way, the madang-theatre for public dialogue can become a play-artistic communication with a so-called “sense of joyful relativity” (Bakhtin 1968:11) to overcome the dichotomy of rational impulse and sensuous impulse, criticism and festivity. The juxtapositional approach in madang public dialogue is neither an outlet of the lazy man nor a random mishmash. It requires “the most skillful and imaginative work” and it is ”a way that will introduce a new critical awareness and a fresh appreciation for both” (Cox 1971:136-137). It aims at the dialogic polyphony of differences in the concretely sensuous forms, not in an abstract thought.

The very dialogic method of juxtaposition in festival can serve the praxis of the principles of polyphony and difference-acceptance suggested in the model of incarnational public dialogue and the principles of reality-recognition and criticism in
critical public dialogue at the same time.

5.5.6.4 Criticism against Monologue and Privatization

Another dialogic characteristic of carnivalistic festival is the criticism of monologue and privatization. Instead, festival public dialogue seeks dialogue and sharing.

Firstly, the dialogic festival demolishes “the sphere of a single and unified monologic consciousness, a unified and indivisible spirit” (Bakhtin 1984:177) that isolates or ignores different voices and consciousnesses. It opposes to the one-sided or dogmatic seriousness that is hostile to change, that seeks to absolutize a given condition of existence or given social order (Bakhtin 1984:160). Bakhtin (1984:132,165) explains that “the carnival sense of the world knows no period, and is, in fact, hostile to any sort of conclusive conclusion.” On the contrary, carnivalistic festival is grounded on “joyful relativity” that does not permit a finalized monologic thought.

Secondly, the dialogic festival destroys privatization, for it does not know the spatial boundaries. It first of all opposes the privatization of space. The space of carnivalistic festival belongs to the public; that is, it becomes public space. And such a festival criticizes the privatization of the festival itself. The festival becomes a public festival for all people. In addition, the carnivalistic festival liberates an individualistic, bourgeois and an isolated existence from the privative sphere, and lets him be born again as a “public” being who encounters and dialogues with other beings in the public space of festival. Moreover, it criticizes the privatization of language (or word) and dialogue. Dialogue also becomes the public dialogue beyond an individual conversation. The dialogic interactions among words, among people, among thoughts, and among conversations take place in the public festival.

In this way, “festivity is the way we cool history without fleeing from it” (Cox 1971:46). “A bodily and popular corrective of laughter” is related to the criticism of the individual
and narrow-minded dogmatic seriousness of the spiritual pretense (Bakhtin 1968:22).

5.5.6.5 Laughter and the Pathos of Change and Renewal

Festival is filled with the gay, liberating and regenerating element of laughter, which is the creative element. Bakhtin (1968:66) describes laughter as follows: “Laughter has a deep philosophical meaning, it is one of the essential forms of the truth concerning the world as a whole, concerning history and man; it is a peculiar point of view relative to the world; the world is seen anew, no less (and perhaps more) profoundly than when seen from the serious stand-point.”

According to Bakhtin’s (1968:11-12) belief, the laughter of carnivalistic festival is, first of all, not an individual reaction to some isolated “comic” event, but popular, that is, the laughter of all people.

Secondly, festive laughter is universal in scope; it is directed at all and every one, including the carnival’s participants. In addition, it is also directed at those who laugh. This aspect of public and universal laughter is quite different from the pure satire of modern times which is negative and places one above the object of one’s mockery. Carnivalistic festival and its laughter are far from negation, for “it denies, but revives and renews at the same time.” “Bare negation is completely alien to folk culture of laughter” (Bakhtin1968:11).

Thirdly, festive laughter is ambivalent. In it, ridicule is fused with rejoicing. That is, it is joyful, triumphant, and at the same time mocking, derisory. It combines death and rebirth, negation and affirmation (Bakhtin 1968:12; 1984:126-128).

Fourthly, festive laughter is characterized as “openness.” The openness in laughter permits much that was impermissible in more serious forms. The reason that the ambivalence is possible is the nature of openness. The openness of festive laughter
results in an expanded communication and relationship among people and among their voices and consciousness. Through the laughter of open festival, strange and different others can be permitted to the dialogic relationship and mutual communication.

The fifth feature of festive laughter is the pathos of change based on dialogic nature. Festive laughter with openness brings about the pathos of shift and renewal. It pursues the change and shift of power from stagnant dogma and monologic rule to a dialogic worldview. Bakhtin (1984:124) describes that the primary carnival act is “the mock crowning and subsequent decrowning of the carnival king.” This ritual act of crowning and decrowning a king reflects the pathos of shift and chang, of death and renewal. In one word, carnivalistic festival and laughter is an “all-annihilating and all-renewing time” (Bakhtin 1984:124).

5.5.6.6 Dialogization of Past, Present and Future

Festivity contributes to dialogization of past, present and future. Human who today has lost his/her festive spirituality is isolated from the three dimensions of time. Human eradicates the past. By expunging the past in the interests of the present or for the benefit of the future, human erases the sense of him/herself as a historical being. For human, the past is a prison to escape or an antique (Cox 1971:32). On the other hand, human disregards the present as mere preparation for the future (Cox 1971:24). And yet human of today takes a dim view of the future. Concerning the problem of human isolated from time, traditional theologies emphasize faith’s dependence on the past; it is historical. Radical theology glorifies the present; it is reality-participative. And the theology of hope wants to restore its future-oriented, expectant stance to faith; it is eschatological (Cox 1971:121-130).

However, the Christian community of madang public dialogue cannot be content to remain within and interpret the past. Nor can it only emphasize the present experience or bind itself wholly to future hope. God “was, and is, and is to come.” The Christian
community should therefore help everyone to hold together the three dimensions of temporality without collapsing one into another. How can this be done?

The Christian community for public dialogue suggests festival. Festivity based on the nature of juxtaposition and accepting differences helps to overcome the isolation, partiality, or immersion relative to time. In festival, the past is embraced with joy as a dimension of reality that enlarges and illuminates the present. And festival leads everyone to delight in the here and now, saying yes to experiencing the present. Festival and its fantasy link human to the future by helping him/her to see something which is not seen. Harvey Cox (1971:130) remarks that “in the life of faith itself it comes with the reemergence in our time of a spirit of festivity and fantasy in religion. This revived sensibility frees human not to fear the past but to sing and dance about it as part of his own story. It enables him to visualize the future as an undiscovered country swarming with terrors and delights, luring him to fantasy.” In this sense, festivity is a zone of dialogue where memory, experience and hope contradict but challenge each other.

In conclusion, festivity is not just a luxury in life. It provides the opportunity for the Christian community and people to reestablish a new mutual communication and relationship with the other in a free and familiar context, and to reestablish their proper relation to time, history, and eternity. This is why a rebirth of festivity can realize the principles of incarnational and critical public dialogue, and can help the church to go beyond the communicative crisis of monologism.

Those who have rejected Christian ideas because of the church’s didactic form may affirm them in festivity. Those who cannot hope may be able to laugh in carnivalistic festival. Therefore, as Harvey Cox (1971:54) states, “the gravity of conventional Christianity is its normal and even normative style. Its terrible sobriety is a distortion of its real genius. A kind of playfulness lies much closer to its heart than solemnity does.”
According to circumstances, carnivalistic festivity and its laughter can these days be reduced in the process of Christian madang public dialogue. But the reduced laughter and festivity should not be regarded as one-sided or dogmatic seriousness that absolutizes a single point of view. The greatest concern of festival public dialogue is whether festivity and laughter are dialogic or not. Therefore, it is also necessary to dialogize authentic carnivalistic festivity with our time.

The territory of festival is, for Bakhtin (1968:154), "a peculiar second world" within the official world, and is "ruled by a special type of relationship, a free, familiar, marketplace relationship. Officially the palaces, churches, institutions, and private homes are dominated by hierarchy and etiquette, but in the marketplace a special kind of speech is heard." The church is also "a peculiar second world" within this world with the great commission to "Go into all and make disciples."

Therefore, the pattern of communication should be dialogic beyond the conventional church’s type of monologue or one-sideness. Its scope should not be in the church. The Christian community needs the public square to encounter people, and requires a free familiar, marketplace relationship to change this world through dialogue. Therefore, festivity is required to provide a dialogic communication and relationship in the public space. This festivity is grounded in imagination in view of the fact that it hopes for a mode of public dialogue for a new heaven and a new earth. The imagination of festivity comprehends both dialogic imagination and critical imagination. Through its openness, joyful relaxation and gay relativity, festivity helps people keep a critical distance from the dramatic festival without becoming immersed in it (but with dialogic participation). On the other hand, dialogic imagination also urges dialogue with other people. Through play and laughter, the wall of the world of dogmatic seriousness and monologue is demolished, and the dialogic world of free and familiar interaction with strangers is created.

Festivity is thus required for the "dialogic" communication of a new heaven and a new
earth rooted in the incarnational and critical principles of public dialogue. This is “play-artistic public dialogue” that the Christian community has to fulfill in order to make the combination of reason and sensibility in humanity, and playfulness and criticism in communication.

The three models of madang public dialogue—Incarnational Public Dialogue, Critical Public Dialogue, Festival Public Dialogue—cannot be separated. The Incarnation model requires and is rooted in the principles of another two models, and the other models are connected with it. If one of them is omitted, it cannot be true madang public dialogue. Therefore, the three models can be called “Trinity” Public Dialogue. The trinity model of public dialogue is practical strategies that serve to realize madang public dialogue between church and others effectively and dialogically.