NIETZSCHE’S TRAGIC JUSTICE AND THE REHABILITATION OF DIKÉ

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree

Doctor Philosophiae

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

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Pretoria, November 2007
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Der Antichrist</td>
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<td>DD</td>
<td>Dionysos-Dithyramben</td>
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<td>EH</td>
<td>Ecce Homo</td>
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<td>FW</td>
<td>Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft</td>
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<td>GD</td>
<td>Götzen-Dämmerung</td>
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<td>GT</td>
<td>Die Geburt der Tragödie</td>
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<td>JGB</td>
<td>Jenseits von Gut und Böse</td>
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<td>PHG</td>
<td>Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen</td>
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<td>GM</td>
<td>Die Genealogie Der Moral</td>
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<td>IM</td>
<td>Idyllen aus Messina</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Menschliches, Allzumenschliches</td>
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<td>Nachgelassene Fragmente</td>
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<td>WA</td>
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<td>WL</td>
<td>Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im Aussermoralischen Sinne</td>
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INTRODUCTION: THE CRUELLEST ILLUSION

Man has never been the same since God died.
He has taken it very hard. Why, you’d think
It was only yesterday, the way he takes it.
Not that he says much, but he laughs
Much louder than he used to.
And he can’t bear to be left alone
Even for a minute, and he can’t
Sit still.
Edna St. Vincent Millay, Conversations at Midnight

There is such a thing as trying to be too just, and the inevitable result, as any tragedian will testify, is injustice. Or Christianity, which according to Nietzsche is but injustice by a special name. Christianity in this context stands here metonymically for the cluster of values that attempts to insulate man from tragedy and tries to turn justice into Justice: an immanent principle into an absolute and transcendental condition. Nietzsche, the lover of masks and the defender of illusion, could never forgive Christianity for introducing one illusion in particular to the world: the illusion that the source of ‘all our woe’, namely the world itself, and the subject that suffers in it, can be rendered transparent and brought under rational control. This ascetic ideal raises an untenable and ultimately inhumane hope of justice sans reserve, an unworldly egalitarian standard that holds that justice is only achieved when the claims of everybody have been met, and pain as absolute and unconditional evil has been eradicated. Not for nothing has Nietzsche called Christianity the religion ‘unable to cope with reality’.

Eine Religion, wie das Christenthum, die sich an keinem Punkte mit der Wirklichkeit berührt, die sofort dahinfällt, sobald die Wirklichkeit auch nur an Einem Punkte zu Rechte kommt, muss billiger Weise der ‘Weisheit der Welt’, will sagen der Wissenschaft, todt feind sein. (AC 47, KSA 6.225).

Such broad, naïve hopes were bound to be met with disappointment and would eventually culminate in nihilism. But it would take a remarkably long time, because the Platonic-Christian tradition succeeded in providing an answer to one of the most fundamental of all human problems, a problem to which only the Greeks could respond satisfactorily. And then only for a lamentably short time.
The Platonic-Christian tradition departs from a position that takes pain – its mere existence as well as unfair distribution – as the ultimate philosophical problem. This moralistic position, which is especially fierce in its secular form, recognizes in all forms of pain a variation of injustice and derives from it a program for its redress. This tendency would eventually become the basis for every grand narrative that graces the history of political philosophy.

From Plato’s idea of the best regime as the one that frees humans from the pain of longing after those earthly goods whose possession can never be guaranteed absolutely and for all, to Locke’s insistence upon the orderly satisfaction of those needs and Marx’s prophecy of socialist revolution as the revolution through which the entire history of human suffering will finally be redeemed, suffering has been posed as a problem to which philosophy and politics must offer some kind of solution. Or at least some kind of meaning. For as Nietzsche reminds us:

According to Nietzsche, morality itself is an interpretation of human vulnerability, be it physiological pain, socio-political conditions or the fundamental character of existence in itself. With the advent of morality, he argues, suffering was given an ‘interpretation’ (GM III, 28). The most popular response hitherto – and despite Nietzsche’s valiant efforts, the shadow of this idea is still going strong – has been some or other form of soteriology. Soteriology – from the Greek soter meaning ‘salvation’ – can take many forms, but be it religious, psychoanalytical, philosophical or economical, such narratives usually begin with a grand claim that humanity (or in some cases, only part of it, as the obvious case of Marxism suggests) has become estranged or alienated from something of fundamental importance and then proceed to describe the remedy by which this estrangement is to be overcome. Although
perfected by Christianity, the soteriological model is at least as old as Plato and as contemporary as the latter-day romantic concern for the environment. In the case of justice, soteriology manifests itself as the hope for a secret, solid, stable element that will manifest itself if certain rules are identified and obeyed, and as a result thereof, injustice and disaster will be forever exiled.

The great irony – perhaps tragedy in a very particular sense – in this misinterpretation of suffering is that it does not eliminate suffering or what it perceives as injustice, but exacerbates it. It appears to make suffering and injustice more meaningful and hence tolerable, but at the same time, moral interpretations of suffering compounds suffering in that it occasions the suffering associated with ressentiment, guilt, asceticism, and bad conscience. But that is not to say that it does not have a remarkable capacity for survival. The moral hope engendered by the Christian myth proved stronger than the myth itself. From the mid-nineteenth century, the Christian tradition itself was taken to task for ‘not being Christian enough’, and attacked by a plethora of proto-socialist ‘improvers of mankind’ – from the meliorists to the Fabian society. George Eliot will serve as perfect example: ‘G. Eliot. — Sie sind den christlichen Gott los und glauben nun um so mehr die christliche Moral festhalten zu müssen’ (GD 9.5, KSA 6.113). Remembering a conversation held with Eliot shortly before her death, F.W.H. Meyers writes: ‘Taking as her text the three words which have been used so often as the inspiring trumpet-call of men – the words God, Immortality, Duty – she pronounced with terrible earnestness, how inconceivable was the first, how unbelievable the second, and yet how peremptory and absolute the third. Never, perhaps, have sterner accents affirmed the sovereignty of impersonal and unrecompensing Law’.1 This kind of metaphysical thinking is of course precisely Nietzsche’s problem. It is only an illusion that after the death of God his moral law remains untouched and solid, ready to serve as transcendental foundation in his place. For a long time of course, the shadow of God was to be happily embraced in the form of moral remnants:

Die ausklingende Christlichkeit in der Moral. – ‘On n'est bon que par la pitié: il faut donc qu'il y ait quelque pitié dans tous nos sentiments’ – so klingt jetzt die Moral! Und woher kommt das? – Dass der Mensch der sympathischen, uninteressirten, gemeinnützigen, gesellschaftlichen Handlungen jetzt als der

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Christianity required its founder to die again, this time so that its morality can live. Karl Löwith, for example, sees modernity as the secularization of the Christian view on world history. For Löwith the Christian notion of a divine intervention that would bring an end to mundane history becomes translated into the modernist ideology of progress, according to which at some time in the future humanity will have reached some kind of perfection, and history will effectively come to a halt. There is a strong Nietzschean parallel to this: morality in the Nietzschean sense is a form of ideology, and like all forms of ideology it tends toward the absolute. In the name of absolute justice, the moral, secular ideology of Christianity – as opposed to the faith itself – has one particular ‘taboo’ that sustains it, namely any form of ‘discrimination’ or exclusion. Often, the faith itself that gave birth to these values is regarded as one of the main obstacles to a universally just state, because of its capacity to engender difference and dissensus.² There are other examples that embody this vice as well: all moralities of good and evil that take themselves to be the embodiment of an ultimate principle – the Law of laws, the will of God, the ethical principle at the heart of being – are ultimately doomed to commit injustice. Concomitantly, so is any idealization of justice as a state or condition ontologically prior to the human lifeworld. Every absolute or universal moral framework, precisely because it sets itself up in such a way as to exclude the negative, creates the possibility of being disrupted by it. The fixed parameters that define the limits of every universe of meaning are put in place to

² See for example A. C. Grayling’s *Against All Gods*. London: Oberon 2007. It is highly ironic that much of the criticism against religion from the contemporary atheist movement sees Christianity as too ‘Nietzschean’, i.e. a source of passion and conflict.
prevent ingress or egress, to separate outside from inside, above all, to seal the safe off from the dangerous. Such separation, however, sets up the very possibility it was developed to prevent, namely the invasion of human life by pain, disaster and injustice. Those who have reconciled themselves to the inevitability of tragedy are of course much wiser:


The only referential framework that could achieve the purpose for which such frameworks are designed, would be one that would include the outside within itself, an all-encompassing structure that would leave nothing outside itself. This is what Emmanuel Levinas refers to as a ‘totality’. A totality is the dream-structure that would be immune to deconstruction, the center that would not only hold, but be immovable, the irrefrangible archē against which anarchy does not stand a chance. This is the ascetic ideal at its most destructive.

Ascetic ideals in general posit a domain of high value, towards which humanity should strive, that is in conflict with the current domain or value system which is less highly regarded, and must therefore be suppressed, transcended, or even destroyed. This polarity of superior and inferior value domains determines to a great extent conceptions of the functions, priorities and aims of the living, especially definitions of suffering. According to this way of thinking, a ‘meaningful’ life is one dominated by the idea that a worthwhile life consists of striving towards attaining unity with the ‘higher’ domain, and by implication, taking a stand against the ‘lower’ domain. The ascetic ideal is no mere ordinary hierarchy of values; it sets the terms according to which all other values are determined – ethical, aesthetic, political, religious and so on – and is therefore the ‘foundational’ framework for all other values. In ascetic thinking, the ‘lower’ domain is not simply to be ignored, but is to be overcome or repudiated if the higher domain is to be attained at all. Here man adopts ‘[d]ie ganze Attitüde ‘Mensch gegen Welt, der Mensch als Welt-verneinendes

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Princip, der Mensch als Werthmaass der Dinge, als Welten-Richter, der zuletzt das Dasein selbst auf seine Wagschalen legt und zu leicht befindet –’ (FW 346, KSA 580). In other words, the higher value is taken as an ideal extrinsic to life, which means that temporality and contingency are automatically devalued. Values structured by the ascetic ideal therefore tend towards ressentiment, and justice understood as an underlying order of fairness beyond the contingencies of life is a prime example.

For Nietzsche, asceticism tends to be an aspect of the life of the great, the fruitful and the inventive: ‘die eigentlichen und natürlichsten Bedingungen ihres besten Daseins, ihrer schönsten Fruchtbarkeit’ (GM III 8, KSA 5.352) and not its ultimate aim. This is especially true of philosophical asceticism. Intellectual energy cannot be expanded sensually, and the philosopher prefers intellectual expenditure for selfish rather than moral reasons. This is not a problem as long as the ascetic ideal remains restricted to the intellectual class. Ascetic ideals should under no circumstances become moral or transcendental. When this happens, man turns against life and creates untenable ideals, static, eternal ideals completely at odds with the world of becoming. This is the priest’s morality, not the philosopher’s. Nobody puts it better than Nietzsche himself:


The ascetic ideal in its most life-denying guise reflects the human will, ‘der Wille, ein Ideal aufzurichten’ (GM II 22, KSA 5.332) and ‘seiner absoluten Unwürdigkeit handgreiflich gewiss zu sein’. Here the higher valuation denotes a realm of the absolute and the timeless, and the lower valuation equals the human, the animal, the sensual, the material, and other features of ordinary life. This valuation is driven by ‘einen Willen zum Nichts, einen Widerwillen gegen das Leben, eine Auflehnung gegen die grundsätzlichsten Voraussetzungen des Lebens’ (GM III 28, KSA 5.412), and is usually catalysed by the priest. The issue is the low valuation the priest places on this life, which is outrightly opposed to a better mode of existence, to which this life is merely a means, and a means only through its own denial. The ascetic ideal is
not limited to religious ideals. In the modern age, no one makes better priests than political revolutionaries and utopians. They are the ‘politische und sociale Phantasten, welche feurig und beredt zu einem Umsturz aller Ordnungen auffordern, in dem Glauben, dass dann sofort das stolzeste Tempelhaus schönen Menschenthums gleichsam von selbst sich erheben werde’ (MA I 463, KSA 2.229). Although Nietzsche discusses this phenomenon specifically by referring to the French Revolution, his critique also applies to any great ideal that offers a this-worldly utopia. Utopian ideals are as part of the ascetic ethos as their religious counterparts: in both cases one finds a general dissatisfaction with the world as it is, and a hope for a better one.

Even the Enlightenment itself would qualify. Nietzsche shows a general skepticism towards progress as ideal, not however towards those who simply go ahead and overcome themselves: ‘Wenn man den Fortschritt rühmt, so rühmt man damit nur die Bewegung und die, welche uns nicht auf der Stelle stehen bleibentlassen’ (MA 554, KSA 3.324). Any ideal that strives to ‘improve’ humanity by removing the negative, the unjust or just the unpleasant in the name of creating a more ‘just’ world is stupidity personified: ‘Die Nothstände aller Art überhaupt als Einwand, als Etwas, das man abschaffen muss, betrachten, ist die naiserie par excellence, ins Grosse gerechnet, ein wahres Unheil in seinen Folgen, ein Schicksal von Dummheit – beinahe so dumm, als es der Wille wäre, das schlechte Wetter abzuschaffen – aus Mitleiden etwa mit den armen Leuten... (EH ‘Warum ich ein Schicksal bin’, KSA 6.368). This is at the heart of the ascetic ideal and an important part of our problem: the insistence upon defining justice as the ‘absence of all evils’. In order to function and thrive, however, the world – and humanity – needs the exact opposite:

In a remarkable essay ‘Vernunft als Grenzreaktion. Zur Verwandlung der Vernunft durch Theodizee’⁴ Odo Marquard describes the development of the notion of theodicy and the demise of evil or negativity. Theodicy seeks reasons for evil and generally tries to demonstrate that evil is simply good in disguise. The first instance of theodicy is of course Plato’s doctrine of the good. It is the very source of Plato’s moralist censure of the poets in the Republic: Given his understanding of God as Good, Plato states that we must devise an interpretation of tragic literature that shows that the hero properly deserved his fate as chastisement by a good and just God, otherwise it must be censored. In other words, divine justice must be vindicated in the face of the existence of evil – human suffering must be rendered as theodicy. In the modern age, Leibniz would attempt something similar. The answer to the existence of evil and injustice that Leibniz provides is simply that the end justifies the means: ‘the optimal as end, justifies evil as the means of its possibility’. Reason in its most inclusive variation attempts the ‘rehabilitation’ of all that was traditionally considered mala or evil. There is first of all epistemological evil, or falseness or the lie. Even before Nietzsche, as one can see in the hermeneutic tradition, for example, a rigid distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ was no longer possible. As we shall see in chapter three, Nietzsche has a complex relationship with this history. Then there is negativity in the aesthetic sense, or the ugly, the perverse and the horrific. This is largely a twentieth century phenomenon, but one can point to precursors like Goya, and even Rembrandt (e.g. ‘Slaughtered Ox’). A side effect of the liberation of the development of an aesthetics of the ugly is of course the obsolescence of taste: when everything has aesthetic value, what is the point of making aesthetic distinctions? The most obvious example though is the sanitization of evil in the ethical sense, which began with the development of the ‘bohemian’, but really reached its peak with psychoanalysis. Now the only evil is repression. If that is overcome, the ‘true’ nature of the so-called evil would come to pass, in the form of the ‘creative’, the ‘emancipatory’ or simply the ‘different’. This is the most deceptive of all the ‘rehabilitations’. As Foucault has demonstrated, it leads to new power formations and new limitations on freedom. Important for our purpose, however, is the fact that the ‘abolition’ of negativity generates a society scarcely capable of judgement. For Nietzsche, modern man is

immoderate and unbridled, and in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* the Christian faith is characterized as the generator of this measurelessness:


This is even truer of our cosmopolitan age in which the self is overwhelmed by a diversity of standards, tastes and options. The other side of the coin is of course dogmatism, where a particular standard is imposed upon everything and everybody, a standard or measure that developed from a particular world or lifestyle. The main reason for the development of a dogmatic attitude towards life is the dominance of science of the lifeworld. Science not only measures according to what it perceives to be universal standards, but even with the human being as the definite and final standard, a ‘der Mensch als eine *aeterna veritas*, als ein Gleichbleibendes in allem Strudel, als ein sicheres Maass der Dinge vor’ (*MA* 2, KSA 2.24). The result is a petrification, a narrowing and a reduction not only of the human world, but of the human being himself. We can state right at the beginning that for Nietzsche, this is injustice:

**Du solltest vor Allem mit Augen sehn, wo die Ungerechtigkeit immer am grössten ist: dort nämlich, wo das Leben am kleinsten, engsten, dürftigsten, anfänglichsten entwickelt ist und dennoch nicht umhin kann, sich als Zweck und Maass der Dinge zu nehmen und seiner Erhaltung zu Liebe das Höhere, Grössere, Reichere heimlich und kleinlich und unablässig anzubröckeln und in Frage zu stellen […]** (*MA Vorrede* 6, KSA 2.12).

Not even Nietzsche himself escapes modernity’s sanitizing touch. Although there has been in recent times a remarkable effort to recover the ‘political’ Nietzsche, the ‘postmodern’ Nietzsche is generally a domesticated, reconfigured proto-democrat who is pushed into service of a blasé, post-philosophical discourse in which rarely anything is at stake or truly momentous. Walter Kaufman’s Nietzsche is more of a cultured European, uncontroversial and of course rather liberal^5. This is a Nietzsche

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^5 Naturally, it has to be taken into account that Kaufman faced the difficult task of having to rehabilitate Nietzsche from association with the Nazis.
who, in the words of Richard Wolin, ‘resembles a mildly dyspeptic Voltaire’.\(^6\) This is not the philosopher who philosophized with a hammer, who described his work as ‘assassination attempts’, the prophet of active nihilism who held that if contemporary Europe is collapsing, one should give it a final shove. Even Richard Rorty, a self-described ‘postmodern’ bourgeois liberal would be comfortable with this Nietzsche. Consider too, Arthur Danto’s description of the Übermensch:

The Übermensch, accordingly, is not the blond giant dominating his lesser fellows. He is merely a joyous, guiltless, free human being, in possession of instinctual drives which do not overpower him. He is the master and not the slave of his drives, and so he is in a position to make something of himself rather than being the product of instinctual discharge and external obstacle.\(^7\)

While this definition of the overman certainly has its merits (especially the notion of the mastery of the drives), he is certainly not simply a harmless model of Maslowian self-actualization. He is also a Nay-sayer, capable of despising what he considers to be unworthy.

Another way of referring to the dual problem of dogmatism and measurelessness is nihilism. Nihilism emerges when the false promises held out by metaphysics reveal themselves to be empty and unsustainable. Because the history of morality is for Nietzsche the history of nihilism, our investigation into the Nietzschean conception of justice cannot proceed without a brief summary of the different forms of nihilism in his work. Although there are paragraphs where Nietzsche tends to speak of nihilism as merely a transitional pathological stage in human history, to underestimate the importance of nihilism would lead to a misconstruction of Nietzsche’s thinking on creation, lawgiving and its function in human willing. Nihilism in its final state opens up possibilities for new beginnings, for recovering the evaluative will to power, and a new justice. Dispensing fully with nihilism, in its most robust sense, would mean to eliminate the possibility for beginning anew, or to recover a more mature or sophisticated sense of justice.

What began as the moral cleanliness of the Christian trying to live his life as cleanly and transparently as possible (‘die Psychologie alles Verantwortlichmachens’ (GD 7, KSA 6.95), gradually transformed itself into the intellectual cleanliness of the

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scientific/philosophical consciousness. This apostate conscience then discovers that contrary to the fabrications of the metaphysicians, the world has no unity, no truth, and ultimately no justice. According to Nietzsche, no living thing can be healthy, strong or productive, except by living within a certain horizon – a set of values and beliefs that are unconditionally, uncritically accepted, because without it ‘kein Künstler wird sein Bild, kein Feldherr seinen Sieg, kein Volk seine Freiheit erreichen, ohne sie in einem derartig unhistorischen Zustande vorher begehrt und erstrebt zu haben.’ (UB II, KSA 1.254). Nihilism emerges when these life-enhancing horizons disappear.

In Aphorism 11828 (KSA 13.46) in which Nietzsche gives a brief ‘genealogy’ of nihilism, he defines nihilism as the condition that occurs ‘wenn wir einen ‘Sinn’ in allem Geschehen gesucht haben, der nicht darin ist’. Nihilism is here the recognition of ‘der langen Vergeudung von Kraft’, the agony of the in vain, of goalessness. At this stage, disappointment regarding an absent or lost goal of existence is the main characteristic of nihilism. Nietzsche characterizes nihilism at this stage as pessimistic.

The second form of nihilism is reached ‘wenn man eine Ganzheit, eine Systematisirung, selbst eine Organisirung in allem Geschehn und unter allem Geschehn angesetzt hat: so daß in der Gesammtvorstellung einer höchsten Herrschafts- und Verwaltungsform die nach Bewunderung und Verehrung durstige Seele schwelgt’ (Aphorism 11828, KSA 13.46). This may be called transcendental nihilism. Nietzsche holds that this metaphysical faith in unity gives man the feeling of being dependent upon something that is infinitely superior to him, and he sees himself as a kind of representative of a deity, and ascribes value to himself accordingly. No such universal exists, however, and by losing faith in this unity, man is no longer able to sustain value in infinitely valuable wholes. Whereas the first form of unity was characterized by pessimism, this one is typified by skepticism. Platonism posits a realm of true Ideas allows access to this rarefied world, but only for the assiduously schooled ‘knowers’. Christianity also posits an otherworldly realm inaccessible in this world, though the repentant sinner may attain it in the next world. Kantianism locates it in the Ding-an-sich and the a priori structure of consciousness.

The third form of nihilism can be called ‘passive’ nihilism’. Intimidated by the fact of meaningless becoming, no opportunity of a unity in which the individual can immerse himself is offered. The Platonic escape of dismissing the world and of fabricating a whole, stable and true world behind the apparent one, disappears:
‘Sobald aber der Mensch dahinterkommt, wie nur aus psychologischen Bedürfnissen diese Welt gezimmert ist und wie er dazu ganz und gar kein Recht hat, so entsteht die letzte Form des Nihilismus, welche den Unglauben an eine metaphysische Welt in sich schließt, – welche sich den Glauben an eine wahre Welt verbietet’. The source of this passive nihilism is what Nietzsche refers to as ‘faith in categories’: we have, in pseudo-Platonic\(^8\) fashion, measured the world according to categories that refer to an entirely fictitious realm.

In antithesis to the three incomplete or passive forms of nihilism stands what Nietzsche terms active nihilism. The symptoms of nihilism are ambiguous and could also indicate strength:


The difference between active and passive nihilism lies in the fact that, while both forms of nihilism aim at devaluating the categories of aim, unity and reality, active nihilism is not restricted to destruction, but aims at the same time at opening up the possibility for creating new values. Nietzsche notes that every major growth is accompanied by an equally great major crumbling and passing away: suffering, the symptoms of decline, belong to the times of tremendous advances. Active nihilism means legislating anew, the erasure and replacement of existing values, or else their sublimation. With the abolition of the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘apparent’ worlds, men are faced with the challenge of overcoming themselves as they have hitherto existed, and embracing Übermenschlichkeit.\(^9\) This is however much more difficult than it sounds. Overcoming nihilism is not simply an easy recovery of the ‘sensuous’ and the ‘real’. This leads far too easily to positivism (epistemologically

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\(^8\) The role of Plato in ‘falsifying’ the world is far more complex than appears at first sight, and this fact is also acknowledged by Nietzsche. It is not possible to examine this topic here in depth, but this will be done in later research.

\(^9\) I use the word Übermenschlichkeit instead of Übermensch, in order to stress that a quality, and not a readily identifiable subject, is indicated.
speaking) or to the inability to negate. To use an example from Also Sprach Zarathustra: After Zarathustra informed the higher men of what is to be their singular duty in overcoming the last men, he moves off to commune with his animals. His musings are, however, interrupted by the sweet-smelling vapour of incense. When he returns to his guests, he is, like Moses before him, enraged to find them kneeling around an ass, praying to it. The all-affirming ass is the caricature of Zarathustra’s teaching on affirmation. The ugliest man describes the animal as one who is ‘patient from the heart’, and importantly for our purpose, never says nay. The ‘higher man’ of Book Four is clearly not yet ready to take on his duty to legislate. Because he longs to affirm, but cannot bear the pain of nay-saying, he has relapsed into permanent reactivity and therefore dispensed utterly with his role as negator. And without negation, there are neither values nor justice.

This is an element of Nietzsche’s thought that is rather underappreciated in Nietzsche’s French afterlife. While thinkers like Bataille and Derrida have rightly put Nietzsche to use in order to think beyond the metaphysical tradition (we shall see in chapter four how Nietzsche’s subversion of metaphysics inspired Foucault’s reconfiguration of the self), their ethical thinking tends to continue rather than to subvert the Christian-cum-modern ideal of a moral totality at all costs. Derrida’s notion of ‘justice beyond the Law’ is as much an instance of ‘Christian’ measurelessness as the form of Christianity under attack in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches 114. Derrida goes as far as to equate the act of legislation with injustice, relishing in Force of Law: On the Mystical Foundation of Authority Kierkegaard’s famous adage that ‘The moment of decision is madness’. For Derrida, there is a sharp divide between justice and the law. The latter, being founded upon something, such as traditions, conventions, norms or ‘nature’ can and should be deconstructed. This is not true of justice. Because justice is for Derrida the experience of the aporia, the undecidable, the impossible. Deconstruction is justice for Derrida. From Derrida’s perspective, general laws and maxims are ‘logocentric’, they are representative of the tyranny of the logos instead of remaining open to the otherness of the other. It appears that for Derrida, justice is not only deconstruction, but also ethics:

The deconstruction of all presumption of all determinant certitude of a present justice, itself operates on the basis of an infinite ‘idea of justice’ infinite because it is irreducible, irreducible because it is owed to the other, owed to the other, because before any contract, because it has come, the other is coming as the singularity that is always other.\textsuperscript{11}

This conception of justice may be valuable in its own right, but here Derrida and Nietzsche part ways. In this extract, Derrida joins the measureless tradition that began, but is not reducible to, Christianity. For Nietzsche, justice is something extra-moral, and the moment of decision-making or lawmaking is of cardinal importance. For Nietzsche, \textit{this} is justice. From a Nietzschean perspective, Derrida’s hope for a ‘justice to come’ is but a continuation of moralism. And his notion of the ‘mystical’ as the mysterious process by which the merely factual (the law) is suffused with something supramundane and transcendent, would not be a major improvement on the Christian ideal.

What makes Nietzsche such a remarkable – and even today still controversial thinker – is that he cuts through the Gordian knot of moralism that has plagued modernity since its inception. He is the only thinker to reverse the relationship between morality and life: instead of deriding life from the perspective of an eternally dissatisfied moral ideal, he began to observe morality from the perspective of an eternally unimprovable life, bringing all utopian ideals to a drastic halt. Nietzsche’s algo
dicy\textsuperscript{12} stands in opposition to all programs of moral abrogation. Drawing inspiration from ‘untimely sources’ he develops a tragic ethic of affirming negativity against the modern desire to abolish it. Because he conceives of justice in a radically immanent fashion, as opposed to the transcendent, as an aesthetic law governing change beyond the complete control of the individual, he eschews all metaphysics of redemption, including its modern manifestations in programs for the elimination or negation of pain. For justice defined in its broadest terms, namely as the ideal, ethically correct state of things and persons also allows for an alternative conception of justice that returns to its tragic roots. This view does not see pain or injustice as something to be made obsolete by successful socio-economic planning, but as essential for personal and collective self-creation. Nietzsche insists – against Plato, against Marx and against Locke – that far from being a defect, a flaw or disorder in

\textsuperscript{11} Derrida, J. \textit{ibid.} p. 32.

\textsuperscript{12} A justification of morality after the death of God.
the organization of society, there is something genuinely transformative about the chaos into which we are thrown in the experience of suffering. In failure, frustration and loss we are faced with our vulnerability, our dependence on others and on our bodies, but also our strength and resilience and our remarkable capacity to re-organize anew. The playwright Eugene O’Neill proclaims that ‘the tragedy of man is perhaps the only significant thing about him… the individual life is made significant just by the struggle.’¹³ This however is still perhaps a little too moralistic for Nietzsche: man is not redeemed by his suffering, and tragedy is less a condition to be repaired than a condition to aspire to. If Kant urged his readers ‘only to think!’ then Nietzsche dares his readers only to be tragic. Suffering is a kind of crucible in which the unique human capacity for self-creation and legislation is revealed in all its splendor. Nietzsche’s aesthetic exoneration of life is grounded in an algodicy that attempts to draw pain into the immanence of life that no longer requires redemption, but rather acceptance of the inherent ‘lawfulness’ of the world. This is why Nietzsche’s revaluation of justice consists of two parts: the recovery of generosity and playfulness, but also the recovery of man’s most essentially human function, that of lawgiver.

Chapter one examines Nietzsche’s engagement with the ancient tragic and immanent conception of justice. I argue that tragedy presented the option of a disinterested, and therefore a non-moralistic conception of justice. My examination of Nietzsche’s use of tragedy is not confined to Die Geburt der Tragödie, for Nietzsche’s treatment of tragedy is not limited to his study of tragic drama. Indeed, the tragic is one of the few themes that are consistently present in all his books, in one form or another, even when, as we shall see in chapter five he chose to call it by another name. In chapter one I also examine the ways in which the tragic, as an apparently ‘untimely’ phenomenon, operates as inspiration to a form of justice greater than the narrow definitions surrounding the modern legalistic subject, and how the interest in the tragic paved the way for what were to become Nietzsche’s most celebrated and famous concepts: the will to power, amor fati and the eternal recurrence.

Chapter two traces the roots of the transformation of justice from an immanent concept to a transcendental one in Platonism. It is here that justice becomes, if not

exactly moral yet, then at least static. It is during this period that man first began to abandon his role as artist and legislator, an abandonment that would culminate in flat-out denial during the rise of the moral subject.

Chapter three illustrates the untenability of a metaphysical conception of justice. I argue that there is no ‘original’ justice from which man has become alienated, but that the very concept of justice itself depends on humanity’s inherent capacity to legislate. I illustrate this point by turning to the origin of justice in the debtor/creditor relationship, Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his view on the origin of language.

Chapter four is an examination of the moralization of justice through a genealogical study of the subject. It describes the ‘fall’ of justice from a healthy pre-modern virtue to a mask for modern ressentiment. Continuing the themes of chapter three, it is demonstrated that what is commonly understood as justice in the liberal tradition is but the product of a slavish morality, driven by ascetic ideals and a bad conscience. According to this morality, there is somehow something wrong with the world; somewhere along the line there should be a better explanation for the pain, struggle and blatant injustice that characterizes life in the human world. Along with the rest of the moral edifice, justice in this sense of the word developed out of a spirit of revenge. It was fashioned by the weak and disempowered in an effort to gain conceptual solace – or hope of otherworldly compensation – for the slings and arrows of their outrageous (mis)fortunes on earth. This ensured the slave revolt in morality: here the pursuit of justice became a sublimated, rationalized cruelty. It developed as a means of causing others, especially the strong, to suffer because they reminded the weak – by their words, deeds, or mere existence – that the world was not made to fit cleanly into conceptual or moral categories. What is more, the world was not made with them in mind. And such an indifferent, hateful world needed to be transformed in terms of their morality. Nietzsche maintains that the rule of this justice would lead to the dwarving, levelling, animalization, and castration of man.

‘Justice’ – of the moralistic variety – is thus a form of vengeance, sometimes explicitly enacted (retributive justice), sometimes cunningly hidden in social institutions (distributive justice). To supersede the ‘reactive’ metaphysics of justice, Nietzsche proposes the rule of ‘higher types’ who would overcome justice and recover it as virtue again. With a great goal, after all, one is superior even to justice, not only to one’s deeds and one’s judges. What currently passes under the name of justice in the modern world, however, is a corruption and a debasement of the original virtue. As it is, it brings out the worst possible kind of ressentiment in those who proclaim to be just:

Justice is firstly about the creation or development of a framework that makes sense of the world, that ‘humanizes’ or ‘justifies’ it, and secondly, maintaining the order thus established or created. Nietzschean justice is not a moral concept. Nietzsche overcomes the moralization of justice in three distinct ways. First, by recognizing the inherently legislative dimension to human life, and that the possibility for a lifeworld
depends on this capacity. Justice is a principle that manifests itself in the workings of the cosmos and the human lifeworld, and is not a given, transcendent principle to look for. Secondly, he overcomes morality by developing a richer economy than the one that produced the subject: a non-moral ethic of gift-giving and generosity. But thirdly, he also recognizes the importance of setting laws and limits and that their abolition is as tantamount to a nihilistic condition as is clinging to rigid dogma. A new justice would be as dependent on exclusions and hierarchies as any previous conception of justice, but for much better reasons.

Chapter five describes Nietzsche’s recovery of tragic justice. I argue that notions like amor fati, the Übermensch and the eternal recurrence can best be understood in terms of the recovery of a tragic framework, but a newly forged tragic framework that should under no circumstances be regarded as identical to the ancient framework. A mere resurrection of the ancient ideals of justice and tragedy would be a crude betrayal of one of Nietzsche’s most important points, namely that an excess of history is as bad for creativity as a lack of it. In order to create an außermoralische sense of justice, however, it is necessary to think justice on a greater scale. In order to do this, it is necessary to re-think the self’s relationship to time. Beginning with Nietzsche’s examination of justice and time in the second Untimely Meditation, I argue in this chapter that the eternal recurrence is an attempt to place man again within a grander, cosmological framework. This allows man to think tragically, that is, to reconcile himself to the indifference of the universe without submitting to fictions like laws of necessity. This is the task of the Übermensch, Nietzsche’s re-conceived just man. This figure is a legislator at ease with his role, and able to think justice in terms beyond morality. He is capable of legislation in post-metaphysical terms, certainly over the world, but firstly over himself.
CHAPTER 1: TRAGEDY CONTRA JUSTICE

It was at present a place perfectly accordant with man's nature – neither ghastly, hateful, nor ugly; neither commonplace, unmeaning, nor tame; but, like man, slighted and enduring; and withal singularly colossal and mysterious in its swarthy monotony. As with some people who have long lived a past, solitude seemed to look out of its countenance. It had a lonely face, suggesting tragical possibilities.

Thomas Hardy, *The Return of the Native*

1. The Making of the World

It seems that tragedy is on shaky ground every time man appears not to be. Enlightenment thinking, that epitome of human self-assertion, is essentially optimistic, especially in its modern variation. Reason, objectivity and disinterestedness are on the side of the unfortunate, or can at least be employed to ameliorate their fate. Spinoza wrote that whatever seems to the virtuous individual ‘impious, horrible, unjust or disgraceful, rises from the fact that he conceives these things in a disturbed, mutilated and confused manner, and on this account he endeavours above all to conceive things as they are in themselves’.\(^{14}\) Where godly justice disappointed, mystified or enraged, human reason would create a better world. This is possible because, to quote Spinoza again, ‘in the universe there exists nothing contingent’, a lack of fortuitousness that makes the world untragic. If nothing could have happened other than it did, there is no point in lamenting it. On the contrary, one should try to understand it. After all, who needs tragedy if a little knowledge can make the world just? Philosophy itself has its roots in man’s utopian attempt to conquer Fate with knowledge. Where the gods were, there Justice shall be. In antiquity – at least after Plato – philosophy claimed that it could safeguard man against tragedy. For Plato the goal of the good life is to become rationally self-sufficient, impervious to circumstance, essentially sealed off from events and other

people. Plato does not imply that this will prevent terrible events from happening to
the individual in rational self-control, but rather that these events cannot deprive the
self-possessed individual of his self-control, his sense of well-being and being at
home in the world. Socrates, in particular, is not simply not a tragic figure, he is
decidedly anti-tragic. The Stoic Socrates of the Symposium stands calmly in a
snowstorm – oblivious to external circumstances and quite the opposite of Lear who
rages against the elements. Plato appears to have set out to create a character to whom
tragedy could never happen. Through the subsequent history of ‘Platonism for the
people’, this dream continues. For although Fate, like the dead God of FW 108, still
manages to cast its shadow over human thought for a very long time, it formally
comes to an end with the anti-fatalism of Christianity. With the death of fate arises the
possibility of what will eventually become the modern liberal subject. The early
Church Fathers wrote ‘contra fatum and contra mathematikos – that is, against the
astrologers, the learned predictors of fate’, as protest against the excuse of fate in
ethical matters. For fate is really God’s rival in matters of omnipotence and divine
love. Tatian writes: ‘We Christians are raised above heimarmene and know only one
Lord, who never strays’. After the Renaissance, this ‘God’ is replaced with the
‘subject’ – a fiction implicated in power games even to a greater extent than the God
of the Middle Ages. In the twentieth century, this dream of a highly rationalized (now
also de-sacralized and highly technologized) culture with a firm grasp of, and control
over, practical problems was brutally deflated. Michel Foucault wrote that ‘humanity
does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal
reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of
its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination’.17

The dream of progress may have been dampened down, but was not
extinguished. Despite the fact that the dream of a world fully under human control has
ultimately resulted in fascism and the commoditisation of everyday life, belief in a
malleable, controllable world persists. Faith in pluralism of every possible kind, in
plasticity, dismantlement, destabilization, re-creation and the power of endless self-

15 Neue Kämpfe. – Nachdem Buddha todt war, zeigte man noch Jahrhunderte lang seinen Schatten in
einer Höhle, – einen ungeheuren schauerlichen Schatten. Gott ist todt: aber so wie die Art der
Menschen ist, wird es vielleicht noch Jahrtausende lang Höhlen geben, in denen man seinen Schatten
zeigt (FW 108).
p.178.
invention continues to flourish in a post-capitalist world led by the United States where a strenuously self-affirming moulding of ‘Nature’ has always gripped the imagination more than values like self-doubt or determinism.

These values are not limited, of course, to the New World alone. According to Odo Marquard, the concept of fate is antiquated, obsolete. Modern man has met Kant’s challenge to become emancipated from traditional authority, but this was possible because man has – even before Kant – been emancipated from an interconnected cosmological order characterized by a logic of ambiguity, contagious pollution and insoluble paradox, a universe governed by maleficent gods and impish sprites, where human transgression can cause upheavals of the entire order. Modern life is seen as shaped and produced by human self-determination, and a concept like fate does not appear to carry much weight against this perception. In the words of the ultimate believer in the human capacity to make a world less hostile to its inhabitants, Karl Marx, ‘men make their own history’. Similarly, the early Fichtean, Novalis, sees the historical world as a ‘handiwork’. During the nineteenth century, fate migrated to the artistic preserve: Die Macht des Schicksals survived only in what Nietzsche has contemptuously called ‘the culture of opera’, and there only in reference to romantic love, the world of Strauss and Der Zigeunerbaron.

The desire to have the totality of the world submit to the power of modern technology is not a dominant theme in Nietzsche, but he was certainly aware of its implications. Speaking of machines, for instance, he writes:

Prämissen des Maschinen-Zeitalters. – Die Presse, die Maschine, die Eisenbahn, der Telegraph sind Prämissen, deren tausendjährige Conclusion noch Niemand zu ziehen gewagt hat (MAM 278, KSA 2.228).

In this passage, Nietzsche expresses an awareness of the fact that the modern age, especially during the nineteenth century with its industrial revolution, has created the condition for a global domination of the earth. This condition is characterized by the explosion of possibilities of controlling nature and humans. The full meaning of this event can be surmised only when taken in conjunction with the death of God and the nihilism this engenders. The convergence of nihilism and technology makes the contemporary age a period incomparable with any other in the history of the Western

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18 Concepts like these have made their return to the philosophical stage in the form of Derrida’s aporia.
world. The covert nihilism of Western existence since the Renaissance made possible with its destructive force, the re-organization of historical life according to the imperatives of the mobilization of potential energy. The Will to Power is never at rest. However, this mobilization is not simply the result of the nihilistic movement of European history, but also of the project of the subject announced at the onset of the modern age. Both events, the murder of God and the mobilization of potential energy in the form of technology, are manifestations of the original project of modernity, namely the freedom of the absolute subject.

Hans Blumenberg is one of the few thinkers who still defend, albeit carefully, emancipated man and the form of subjectivity that accompanies it. He views modern ‘self-assertion’ – an active, reconstructive engagement with the world – as a legitimate response to the challenges posed by the theological absolutism of late nominalism. Nominalism prioritizes God’s omnipotence over his wisdom and goodness, so appeal can no longer be made to divine reasons for the creation of this world order, such as, ‘it is as it is because God willed it so’, just as no reason can be given for the mysterious workings of God’s grace. Reality at the end of the Middle Ages came to be regarded more and more as an inexplicable fact (in the sense of factum, something done or made) confronting mankind, a contingent state of affairs no longer necessarily adapted to human needs. At the same time the intensification of divine omnipotence in the arena of human salvation, reflected in the doctrine of predestination, deprived human beings of the meaningfulness of an otherworldly orientation.

This experience of being left to the brute facticity of the world became an irritation and provocation for self-interested activity aimed at extorting from this faceless and indifferent reality a new humanity. Nominalistic explanations of the world provided a new structural framework for the understanding of reality, which gradually became re-occupied by early modern materialistic and mechanistic explanations of reality: ‘The radical materialization of nature is confirmed as the systematic correlate of theological absolutism. Deprived by God’s hiddenness of metaphysical guarantees for the world, man constructs for himself a counterworld of elementary rationality and manipulability’. 19 Since the actual quality of the world escapes man’s grasp, pure, quality-less matter is postulated as the minimal substrate.

of nature, since the postulated material substratum is meaningless in itself, it is potentially available to man’s rational disposition. It presents itself as a malleable substratum susceptible to human rationality and technical mastery. We may not know how nature actually operates, but we can construct mathematically sound models that can accurately predict its behaviour. The production of desired phenomena then becomes a matter, sometimes complicated, sometimes simple, of the reconstruction of, or the artificial intervention in observed processes.

This shift in man’s relation with the world is characterized by the surrender of the traditional claim to truth as adequatia and by the new use of theory to recreate the world. The measure of human knowledge is now located within the human mind as a ‘principle of economy’. Blumenberg locates the truly modern aspect of Descartes’ thought in his reduction of the process of doubt to the final regaining of an absolute fundament in the immanence of the cogito. The deus absconditus is brought down and driven inwards. It becomes the cogito, which is to say the embodiment of the requirements that must be met by reason in the face of theological absolutism if it is to find a new ground in itself.

Divine spirit and human spirit, creative and cognitive principles operate as though without taking each other into account. The gratuitousness of Creation implies that it can no longer be expected to exhibit any adaptation to the needs of reason. Rather than helping man to reconstruct an order given in nature, the principle of economy (Ockham’s razor) helps him to reduce Nature forcibly to an order imputed by man.20

When God as measure becomes absolutely transcendent and hence unavailable, the words of Protagoras ring true again: man is recognized as the measure of all things. However, this is precisely where the possibility of nihilism enters, for man is by no means the stable, grounding source for knowledge and moral laws that modernity supposed, and so the yardstick itself eludes the grasp of the would-be measurer. In addition, as we shall see, the world is constantly in the process of being measured, and not by man alone. As Nietzsche asks in JGB 3: ‘Gesetzt nämlich, dass nicht gerade der Mensch das “Maass der Dinge” ist –’ (KSA 5.18).

Nietzsche was even more untimely than he supposed, for in raising this question he staged a confrontation between what can best be described in terms

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20 Blumenberg, H, ibid, p.154.
borrowed from Claude Levi-Strauss\textsuperscript{21}, namely a separatist cosmology and an interconnected cosmology. A separatist cosmology, such as that which followed the rise of Cartesianism in Europe during the seventeenth century, is characterized by the separation of entities and categories and their subsequent unification. In an interconnected cosmology, such as that of the ancient Hellenic world, entities and categories are also distinguished but the distinctions are not so absolute; they hide various implicit connections. This dual categorization is of course not a precise distinction; all cultures apply principles of differentiation, categorization, and ordering. Without such differentiation, man would be lost in a chaos of shifting impressions. As S.K. Lange renders it, ‘man can adapt himself somehow to anything his imagination can cope with, but he cannot deal with Chaos. Because his characteristic function and highest asset is conception, his greatest fright is to meet what he cannot construe – the uncanny, as it is popularly called’.\textsuperscript{22}

Now Modern European cosmology sought to deal with this problem in a specific way, by separating entities from all obscurities until they are totally transparent, and by attempting to separate them from all implicit metaphorical comparisons with other things until they are completely distinct from one another. The separation of the unclear from the clear and of the indistinct from the distinct takes the shape of an abstractive reduction, disregarding the diversity of the individual. Confusing aspects of entities are eliminated until a clear and distinct hard core has been distilled. Such a description does not speak of a ‘threatening thunderstorm’ but of ‘electric discharges’, a concept stripped of all connotations of fear of cosmic violence and reduced to its molecular or physical skeleton. When abstractive reduction succeeds, entities tend to be identified with their ‘hard core’. Unification again becomes possible, but in a radically new way. Newton was able to fuse falling apples and falling stars in one law of nature.

This Cartesian\textsuperscript{23} view of nature endeavours to separate what is perceptible and changeable from what is constant and can therefore be known rationally. Descartes stands in the tradition of Kepler, who reduced all aspects of the universe that might make it comparable to something holy and organic to parts of an immense clockwork.

\textsuperscript{23} The word ‘Cartesian’ here only means that Descartes is the most obvious exponent of this tradition. It did not originate with him and its roots can be traced back to the twelfth century.
This stripped the universe of its vital and religious connotations. Whoever believes the clockwork to be animated confuses it with its maker. The cosmos was now unified under a single mechanistic banner. In a similar fashion, Descartes stripped nature of its resemblances to the organic and the divine. Essentially, nature is but ‘nombre, poids et mesure’ and acts mathematically. Unlike the Aristotelian physis and the scholastic natura, Descartes denies nature’s divine power:

First of all, you must realize, by Nature I do not mean a Goddess or another kind of imaginary power, but that I use it to designate Matter itself. Descartes does not, of course, deny divine impact upon nature. He is convinced that the whole of nature, even all mathematical truths, are permanently dependent upon God’s creatio continua. Nevertheless, although God upholds the whole of nature, he does not manifest himself in it. He is the cause of nature, but does not influence individual chains of causation; otherwise, clear and distinct knowledge of nature would be impossible. God is transcendent and has no properties that can be found in nature. Cartesian cosmology postulates a mechanical and internally secularized nature, implying that man possesses a great deal of freedom from nature, and freedom of action over and towards nature. If the universe is ordered in eternal laws, there are no limits to man’s ability to obtain rational knowledge of nature. Man can become its master and possessor.

By contrast, interconnected cosmologies such as that of the Hellenic world of antiquity do not know such a rationalist separation of nature from the divine. For them, nature is permeated with religious significance, as is the world in general. Aristotle, in De partibus animalium, tells the following story:

A story is told of Heraclitus, that visitors came, wanting to meet him, but hesitating when they saw him warming himself at the stove in the kitchen. He told them to be bold and enter, ‘for there are gods even here’ (645A: 20-24).

This view does not preclude man’s intervention in the processes of nature, but insists that technical knowledge touches on only one aspect of nature’s divine power, the whole of which is conceived of as too powerful to be mastered.

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In Descartes’ cosmology, the separation of the natural from the organic and the divine is repeated on a microcosmic scale in man himself. In Cartesian philosophy, man is divided into two substances, extension and thought, the natural and the rational. Man’s true essence is reached by abstractive reduction, and only the thinking subject is essential. Man’s essence is separated from every material substance, every situation, though not, for the time being at least, from God – at least, not entirely. In essence, in Descartes, relation to God is reserved for man as a rational being. God is no longer reached through vision or imagination; he is a necessity of thought. When man reaches his finiteness, and opposes it to the idea of the infinite, which can be no mere negation of the finite, he realizes there can be only an infinite cause of this idea: God. Here, as elsewhere, Descartes emphasizes the transcendence of God, not only with respect to the world, but also with respect to man. God’s properties are now – in true Christian fashion, as Nietzsche would hold – the exact opposite of those of man: God is infinite, eternal, immovable, omniscient, almighty. In addition, he is purified from all possible obnoxiousness and fallaciousness once the hypothesis of the genius malignus is discarded. This means that man is not able to attribute qualities to God in the same sense he is able to ascribe them to man. The fissure between God and man is so deep that real understanding of God is precluded.

There is one property however, that, according to Descartes, man undoubtedly shares with God. Like his creator, man is endowed with an infinite will. This is why it is possible for Descartes to agree that man is indeed created in God’s image. Here, however, the danger of confusion between the human sphere and that of the divine crops up again. Despite his limitations, man has an infinite will that spurs him on to the hubris of trying to be God-like. However, once more, rational separation is able to avoid confusion. The finite can be divided from the infinite. Man accomplishes this by making a rational separation within his will, and reducing it to striving for what is clear and distinct. If man controls his own will in this manner, he will inevitably stay within his limits and avoid hubris, because God is the author of clear and distinct truth, which precludes the dangers of error. In Descartes’ cosmology, the divine is thus rationally separated, both from the natural and human spheres. Where confusion threatens, further separation is the answer. That God is known rationally and not through public worship is another exemplification of his transcendence.

This methodical device of separating clear ideas from ‘unclear’ ones presupposes a thorough individualism. To be rational, man has to be independent,
conscious of his own existence. When dependent upon others, man tends to follow ingrained habits, which leads to error. To make rational separation possible, yet another separation is necessary, that of the individual from others. The rational man withdraws into himself, until he cannot even be sure that others exist. Rational knowledge implies isolation: no one can do my understanding ‘for me’.

Like the rationally reduced entities of nature that can subsequently be unified, the rationally isolated subject forms an ideal unity as well. After his salutary isolation, every rational subject, that is, every human being, is capable of coming to the same conclusion. Because all human beings share man’s essence, rationality, abstractive reduction of the ego results in perfect inter-subjectivity: ‘la puissance de bien juger et de distinguer le vrai d’avec le faux est naturellement égale en tous les hommes’.

This idea has found extensive application in the development of the modern European cosmology. Stripped of accidental variation, every person is regarded as a unique, free subject, qualified to make his own free decisions. At the same time, all subjects are taken as a community of equals, in which there are no ingrained structural differentiations. Here we encounter the two pillars of modern conceptions of justice: liberty and equality. The individual is an independent monad, conscious of existence, while the community is a community of monads, whose pre-established harmony is pre-supposed. There is therefore a deep analogy between Descartes’ methodological isolation of clear and distinct ideas, his isolation of the rational individual and the premises of democracy. As Jean-Paul Sartre puts it, writing about Descartes:

One human being cannot be more human than another, because freedom is equally infinite in everybody. In this sense, nobody has shown better than Descartes the link between the spirit of science and the spirit of democracy, for no one can base universal suffrage on anything else than the universally disseminated faculty to say no or to say yes.

The longevity of the Cartesian subject is a remarkable phenomenon, especially given the fact that even before Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, the hermeneuticians of suspicion, formally issued a challenge to the rationally self-sufficient self, the rise of Hegelianism had focused attention on the reality of negativity and disorder in the

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realms of thought. It is no accident that Hegel’s notion of the acknowledgement of negativity re-introduced classical tragedy, the Antigone in particular. However, this re-introduction is still set within a rigidly teleological form, and hope for reconciliation with a hostile universe persists.

Ideals like these are no longer feasible. What modern thought has taught us through the masters of distrust is to face the non-identity of man’s thinking about himself and his alienated situation. According to Paul Ricoeur, man is constantly confronted with humanity’s position of alienation from the rest of the cosmos:

The initial position from which reflection sets out is ‘oblivion’: I am lost, ‘gone astray’ among things and separated from the center of my existence, just as I am separated from the others and am the enemy of all. 28

Considering the paradoxical unity of freedom and necessity in man’s life, we are forced to speak of a lesion, or a rift in being. And the suffering that results from this is not merely a feeling; it is a way of discovering man’s diversity and negativity, especially where life and death are concerned. Ricoeur says:

I am diverse, I am legion, and here my future as dust announces itself. Undoubtedly, only a composed being is capable of lesions. This negativity is revealed to me in suffering.29

The existence of evil despite man’s fundamental innocence and supposedly rational nature implies that the unity of man with himself and his world cannot be comprehended within the limits of Cartesianism.

This has important implications for how we view justice, since the modern conception of justice is predicated upon a liberal subject held to be ontologically prior both to the practices and forms of life characteristic to the community to which it belongs, as well as to its own autonomously chosen ends. Liberalism’s traditional conception of subjectivity is based upon the Cartesian-Kantian conception of the subject, and is as such thoroughly metaphysical and essentialist. Liberal theories of justice with their traditional prioritizing of the right over the good – or more crudely put, of equality over quality – are logically committed to particular conceptions of selfhood that can no longer be taken for granted. This means that liberal morality

must either be wholly rejected, or at the very least radically overhauled. This is partly why Nietzsche returns to tragedy, and with it, in his typically ‘untimely fashion,’ to the interconnected cosmology of ancient Greece and its cosmic notions of justice.

2. The First Genealogy

Genealogy can be broadly understood as an attempt to articulate a historical vision of human reality in which humanity is asked to understand itself as a product of its self-made history and to appreciate that its interpretation of history reflects and decisively influences the way in which it understands itself. In light of this understanding of genealogy, Die Geburt der Tragödie and Nietzsche’s early essays on the Greek polis and the pre-Socratic philosophers already contain traces of a genealogical approach. Nietzsche’s genealogy, after all, does not aim at precise historical explanation, but rather at a proper understanding of human excellence or the significance of particular moralities. His method appropriates the story of the past by recounting a series of linear familiar events. The practice of genealogy always risks the temptation to substitute the sequence of events for their significance, or to abstract the significance of events from their sequence. The true genealogical approach, however, is committed to maintaining the relationship of tension between the sequential and the significant by insisting that the ‘story’, though embedded in and inextricable from the events, is nevertheless not reducible to them.

Bonnie Honig describes Nietzsche’s overall philosophical project as one of recovery, in three particular senses of the word: recovery from an illness, rediscovery of past understanding, and re-covering with new layers of meaning. Firstly, Nietzsche hopes to help European man to recover from a self-induced illness, the debilitating disease of nihilism, by identifying the values responsible for this sickness. Against nihilism, Nietzsche posits the ideal of a newly rediscovered health continually fought for:

The second sense in which Nietzsche’s is a project of recovery is that, through his genealogical project, he ‘recovers’ the origins of values that are taken to be universal, transcendent and true, showing that they are in fact conditional and partial. These values, he says, developed out of struggles with alternative forms of life and ethical ideals that have since been lost, silenced, ignored or concealed. The most obvious example here is the major theme of Die Genealogie der Moral, in which Nietzsche attempts to recover the pre-Socratic ethic of the nobles, contrasts it with the current slave morality based on the dichotomy of good and evil, and traces the history of the war of values in which the slaves have triumphed. This project should be seen against the background of the total project of recovery, namely the recovery of an ethic that, strictly speaking, belongs to an interconnectedness, a cosmological framework without rigidly demarcated spheres of life. Nietzsche does not simply resurrect an old ethic. Genealogy does not recover old, forgotten pasts en toto, but aims to disrupt existing sets of conceptual, linguistic, moral and juridical settlements. Thus Nietzsche does not attempt to heal original disruptions or smooth over old wounds. Instead, as genealogist he seeks to wound even more. His wounding in this particular sense consists of showing the inferiority of the Socratic-Euripidean worldview that would eventually become Platonic-Christian optimism.

In his reinterpretation of Schopenhauer’s distinction between ‘will’ and ‘representation’ in the form of the eternal dichotomy of Apollo and Dionysus, Nietzsche brings the separative philosophical order discussed above into contact with its own origin and predecessor, the interconnected cosmos of antiquity. The oldest desire or philia of philosophy is for the archē, the principium or overarching principle, ‘an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities […] this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession’.

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archē provides unity that governs multiplicity, necessity that cancels out chance, order that tames chaos. Justice understood in the traditional philosophical sense is for all practical purposes synonymous with the archē, because where the archē is, there justice shall be. Once the ‘origin’ of reality is found, so the theory goes, it will be possible to bring the human world into accord with it. The Platonic concept hopes for a justice that can be deciphered and captured in law. This philosophical justice loves law, order and regulae.

In practice, of course, as John Caputo points out, ‘justice is less of an archē than an an-archē’.31 Justice is beyond all forms of archē construction. If justice could be captured, there would be no need for an archē. Justice is what rules and laws seek to possess but cannot have, due to their structural limitations. According to Derrida, the reign of justice is not to be confused with the rule of law. Law can be accounted for in terms of a rule applied in a particular case, which Kant would call a determinate judgment. Justice, on the other hand, involves singularity and ‘moments in which the decision between just and unjust cannot be insured by a rule’.32 Since it concerns ‘the other as other’, justice in Derrida’s definition cannot be reduced to principles of duty, rights or objective law. This comes very close to what Levinas calls ‘ethics’. As Levinas puts it, ‘to address oneself to the other in the language of the other seems to be the condition of all possible justice’.33 Later in Force of Law, Derrida explicitly invokes Levinas, and approvingly cites his equating of justice and ethics as ‘the relation to others’.34 In addition, Derrida identifies the propinquity of such an ethics of justice to the Hebrew definition of sanctity, which is a condition of acknowledging the ‘infinite demand of the other’, a demand that is for all practical reasons an infinite right and whose asymmetry transcends the humanist concept of man.

The difficulty about this position is that this notion too requires institutions and constitutions to function, and so justice once more becomes law. The infinite demand of the other at some stage or another inevitably transposes into a legal system of anonymous exchange and equal distribution. Incalculable justice eventually demands calculation. All the same, even in cases where the singular case of the

33 Ibid, p.949.
34 Ibid, p.959.
‘other’ is made subordinate to the universalized code, there remains a crucial trace of justice. Derrida associates this justice with the ‘undecidable’:

The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or tension between two decisions; it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged to give itself up to the impossible decision while taking account of laws and rules. A decision that did not go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmatic application or unfolding of a calculable process. It might be legal, it would not be just.35

Nietzsche’s notion of justice similarly eludes concise definition. But there is an important difference between Nietzsche and his deconstructivist successors: for Nietzsche, though not for Derrida and Levinas, justice is no moral imperative. A far more accurate description of Nietzsche’s conception of justice would be an extra-moral (außermoralische) principle, including but also exceeding personal virtue. As was the case in antiquity, justice in Nietzsche’s understanding is also an impersonal cosmic principle that operates beyond the reach of human desire and ability. In the closest he comes to a definition, Nietzsche says ‘Gerechtigkeit, als Funktion einer weit umherschauenden Macht, welche über die kleinen Perspektiven von gut und böse hinaus sieht, also einen weiteren Horizont des Vortheils hat – die Absicht, etwas zu erhalten, was mehr ist als diese und jene Person’ (Aphorism 9413, NL 84-85 KSA 11.118).36

Contrary to the Kantian position that sees justice as an objective standard that must be found and maintained, Nietzschean justice has as much to do with the establishment of standards as with their maintenance. Establishing standards of justice always involves a harsh act of demarcation, an arbitrary drawing of boundaries between the lawful and the unlawful, something that the slavish upholders of justice hitherto appear to have forgotten, Nietzsche says. This is why Zarathustra challenges his interlocutors at the market-place with the violence of the law-table: ‘Die Stunde, wo ihr sagt: „Was liegt an meiner Gerechtigkeit! Ich sehe nicht, dass ich Gluth und Kohle wäre. Aber der Gerechte ist Gluth und Kohle!” (Z, Vorrede, KSA 4.16). Rather than offering a concise definition of justice, Nietzsche treats the concept the way an artist of the impressionist school might treat his subject matter: he leaves it

35 Derrida, ibid, p.963.
Rather than a complete law, he offers a number of brief examples and subtle hints that enable the careful reader to see a picture emerging gradually but surprisingly clearly, if the trouble is taken to decipher it carefully.

Among Nietzsche’s tactics is the resurrection of an ancient idea of justice, commonly but not exclusively rendered as dikē. But nothing resurrected remains unchanged: *Noli me tangere*, said the resurrected Christ, I have returned, but I am different now. By inserting elements that in the passing of time had become strange, foreign, other to the rigid separative cosmos of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche introduces his own miasma, confronting comfortable bourgeois ideals of justice with their necessarily unjust origins. According to Foucault, Nietzsche frequently employs the concept of ‘origin’ (*Ursprung*) in a stressed opposition to those of ‘descent’ (*Herkunft*) and ‘emergence’ (*Entstehung*). He sets up this opposition not as part of a philosophical quest, but in search of a new form of history. ‘Descent’ invokes the intermingling of biological and social characteristics and the body as the ‘inscribed surface of events’, while ‘emergence’ suggests the ‘non-place’ of an agonal contest between forces which deprives the phenomenon of a single source. Nietzsche’s genealogy, with its concern with descent and emergence, shatters the identity of the subject and the ideal of ‘apocalyptic objectivity’. His version of historical sense is explicit in its perspective and acknowledges its system of injustice…. It is not given to a discreet effacement before the objects it observes and does not submit itself to their processes, nor does it seek laws, since it gives equal weight to its own sight and to its objects.39

All values have murky rather than clear-cut origins, and Nietzsche’s new values are no different. If tragic justice is to live again, it will be under new terms. An entirely new worldview is necessary:40

Ein andres Ideal läuft vor uns her, ein wunderliches, versucherisches, gefahrenreiches Ideal, zu dem wir Niemanden überreden möchten, weil wir Niemandem so leicht das Recht darauf zugestehn: das Ideal eines Geistes der

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37 ‘Impressionism’ was originally used to denote a painting that was considered ‘unfinished’ by the standards of the French academy.


40 This is a very problematic notion, and I address it again in chapter 5, which deals with justice and the historical. In that chapter I examine to what extent Nietzsche himself was unable to break free from nostalgia.
naiv, das heisst ungewollt und aus überströmender Fülle und Mächtigkeit mit Allem spielt, was bisher heilig, gut, unberührbar, göttlich hiess; für den das Höchste, woran das Volk billigerweise sein Werthmaass hat, bereits so viel wie Gefahr, Verfall, Erniedrigung oder, mindestens, wie Erholung, Blindheit, zeitweiliges Selbstvergessen bedeuten würde; das Ideal eines menschlich-übermenschlichen Wohlseins und Wohlwollens, das oft genug unmenschlich erscheinen wird, zum Beispiel, wenn es sich neben den ganzen bisherigen Erden-Ernst, neben alle Art Feierlichkeit in Gebärde, Wort, Klang, Blick, Moral und Aufgabe wie deren leibhafteste unfreiwillige Parodie hinstellt – und mit dem, trotzalledem, vielleicht der grosse Ernst erst anhebt, das eigentliche Fragezeichen erst gesetzt wird, das Schicksal der Seele sich wendet, der Zeiger rückt, die Tragödie beginnt... (FW 382, KSA 3.635).

This introduces the third sense in which the concept of recovery animates Nietzsche’s work: recovery as meaning ‘to cover again’. In the context of the Nietzschen project, this means introducing a new layer of meaning, a new veil of significance to cover the naked abyss that appears before the feet of the last man. The recognition that all value systems are palimpsests of interpretation enables the latecomers in history to recognize the self-defeating character of most modern moral frameworks, reject them, and then replace them with more viable and potent alternatives. ‘Wer über alte Ursprünge weise wurde, siehe, der wird zuletzt nach Quellen der Zukunft suchen und nach neuen Ursprüngen’ (Z, III, ‘Von alten und neuen Tafeln’ 25, KSA 4.265).

In the context of Nietzsche’s total project of recovery, in its varied senses, Die Geburt der Tragödie – admittedly one of Nietzsche’s less refined books – is much more than merely an analysis of an ancient art form or even, as Peter Berkowitz41 maintains, a simple treatise about wisdom. It is also a primitive genealogical study of the fall of justice, from Aeschelyean or tragic justice to poetic justice or justice understood as universal fairness on a personal basis.

3. A Detour through the Ancient World

The tale of the fall of justice is no simple one. It appears in fragmented form throughout the Nietzschen oeuvre. The first explicit discussion of the origin of justice occurs in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches I, section 92, in which Nietzsche

describes the egoistic and economic origins of justice in terms of economic exchange and equivalency:

*Ursprung der Gerechtigkeit.* – Die Gerechtigkeit (Billigkeit) nimmt ihren Ursprung unter ungefähr gleich Mächtigen […] wo es keine deutlich erkennbare Uebergewalt giebt und ein Kampf zum erfolglosen, gegenseitigen Schädigen würde, da entsteht der Gedanke sich zu verständigen und über die beiderseitigen Ansprüche zu verhandeln: der Charakter des Tausches ist der anfängliche Charakter der Gerechtigkeit. Jeder stellt den Andern zufrieden, indem Jeder bekommt, was er mehr schätzt als der Andere. Man giebt Jedem, was er haben will als das nunmehr Seinige, und empfängt dagegen das Gewünschte. Gerechtigkeit ist also Vergeltung und Austausch unter der Voraussetzung einer ungefähr gleichen Machtstellung: so gehört ursprünglich die Rache in den Bereich der Gerechtigkeit, sie ist ein Austausch (MA I 92, KSA 2.89).

Since Nietzsche’s postmortem migration to France, the dominant reading of his work on the question of justice sees him as offering an alternative to the economics of exchange in the form of an ethic of gift giving and generosity. George Bataille’s reading epitomizes this tendency:

Nietzsche is on the side of those who give, and his thought cannot be isolated from the movement that tried to promote a resumption of life in the moment, in opposition to the bourgeoisie, who accumulates… Nietzsche’s gift is the gift that nothing limits; it is the sovereign gift, that of subjectivity.42

However, Nietzsche is on no one’s side, except perhaps, as we shall see, on the side of those who measure. To think about justice in Nietzschean terms requires more than a choice between a libidinal economy and an economics of reciprocal exchange. It would be more correct to state that what has come to be known as justice, i.e. justice defined by the slave’s morality, has its origins in an economics of exchange. Nietzsche maintains, however, that the logic of exchange is not originary; it is already a compensatory strategy, and already a mask. If Truth loves a mask, Justice is no different. The origins of justice lie deeper than the quasi-Hobbesian explanation of justice in terms of the law of equal return.

In *Homer's Wettkampf* of 1872, Nietzsche offers a less frequently cited version of the origins of justice. This version, with its Aristotelian-sounding rhetoric, falls harder on the postmodern ear than the friendlier words on gift giving, and is hence

frequently ignored or overlooked. The origins of justice are far more ancient and more violent than any logic of exchange. At first sight, justice in its embryonic form seems to embody its exact opposite:

Und wie sich in Wahrheit vom Morde und der Mordsühne aus der Begriff des griechischen Rechtes entwickelt hat, so nimmt auch die edlere Kultur ihren ersten Siegeskranz vom Altar der Mordsühne. Hinter jenem blutigen Zeitalter zieht sich eine Wellenfurche tief hinein in die hellenische Geschichte (Homer's Wettkampf, KSA 1.785).

The oldest legal principle does not grow from an economic relationship between equals, but from the ultimate relationship of inequality, namely between man and cosmos, or man and God. This relationship is based upon a logic of atonement, and although this is like the economic relationship in that it implies a duty of making reparation for a transgression, the terms of this duty differ radically from the creditor-debtor relationship underlying the concept of justice in separatist cosmological frameworks. Full compensation for injuries against God or the gods is impossible and gifts from a deity or deities cannot be repaid in kind, even if, as was the case in ancient Greece and Scandinavia, humans maintained a certain degree of power over their gods (Morgenröte 130, KSA 3.121). The word ‘atonement’ is an abbreviated form of the expression ‘to set as one’, i.e. to reconcile, to expiate or to bridge a gap. Importantly for our purpose, atonement happens on a larger scale than an economy of reciprocal exchange. Atonement concerns the fate of entire nations, peoples or tribes, even if the transgression is committed by only one individual, and it nearly always affects at least the immediate circle around the transgressor. Boundary transgressions, for example Oedipus’ act of incest, result in pollution, something for which no material restitution is possible. Pollution is not merely contact with something physically dirty or unhygienic; it embodies defilement by what has to be rejected in order to maintain the differentiated categories without which no society can function. The example of murder from Homer's Wettkampf refers to ‘blood pollution’, defilement. The ‘Greek justice’ in question refers to rituals of cleansing and atonement that maintain the cosmological order itself. In other words: the order itself comes into being through ritual and its processes of differentiation. These rituals, which are sometimes themselves violent (as in the case of executions, banishments and sacrifices), cannot be regarded as punishments, but rather as strategies of

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differentiation; the concept of ‘murderer’ has to be defined, the murderer separated from the rest of the law-abiding community.

Because boundaries in such a society are not clearly distinguished, as in a separatist cosmology, but rather dispersed and complex, marginal figures and transgressions cause a great deal of anxiety. The fear of overstepping cosmological boundaries is clear from the frequent use of phrases like ‘stepping over a line’ and ‘trampling underfoot’. Homer calls the breaking of a solemn oath a transgression _parabainein_ ( _Iliad_ III, 107). The same is said of social offences and even of lack of insight, which Achilles displays in the _Iliad_ (IX, 501). This abhorrence of disturbances of the order is condensed into the ubiquitous fear of _hubris_. As an interconnected phenomenon, hubris is not limited to human beings. It concerns natural phenomena too; it may denote an overflowing river ( _uperballousan_ , from Aeschylus’s _Prometheus Vinctus_ 717), or an intrusion into the domain of the gods.\footnote{See for example the Chorus (lines 120-122) from _Oedipus at Colonus_ : ‘None of us here / Would venture into the sacred grove. / The implacable goddesses – Hush! Do not take their name in vain’. Sophocles. _The Theban Plays_. Hammondsowrth: Penguin, 1972, p.75.}

For the Greeks, pollution is closely related to the concept of measurelessness, or the mixing of what should remain separate. The verb _phurein_ , for example, means both ‘to mix’ and ‘to pollute’. In this spirit Herodotus calls Xerxes the temple burner one ‘who made the sacred ( _ira_ ) and the profane ( _idia_ ) alike ( _en homoein_ ), thereby destroying an entire world’.

That pollution was to the Greeks a cosmological and not a physiological concept can be seen from the fact that it concerned every aspect of life. Diseases wreak havoc on the nature/culture distinction because ‘diseases as intrusions from nature into culture soil the body’.\footnote{Parker, R. _Pollution and Purification in Ancient Greek Religion_. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983 p.32.} As we have seen, human intrusion in the domain of the gods destroys the individual concerned (see note 30). Regarding the life/death distinction, Hesiod warns against the polluting confusion of death and procreation.\footnote{Hesiod. _Opera et Dies_ 735-736 in _The Collected Hesiod_. Hammondsowrth: Penguin, 1961, p.177.}

The common factor in all these examples is that the pollution or transgression is not defined by the act itself, such as killing another human being, but depends on the context and spirit of the crime. This is truly a morality beyond good and evil; bad deeds are bad because they are considered to be cowardly, mean-spirited deeds, whereas similar acts in other circumstances can be praised. Therefore, killing on the battlefield can lead to great praise, but slaying a kinsman to pollution and dishonour.
The social distinction between friend and enemy helps determine the degree of contamination, according to the famous pre-Christian maxim, ‘Help your friends and hate your enemies’\(^\text{46}\) (Hesiod, *Theogonia*, 869-872). Pollution is simply a matter of fact, a consequence of action; it does not refer to any ‘inner being’ or the morals of a ‘real’ self behind the actor at all. A polluted object or person spreads pollution around, confusing categories and threatening the established order. Like *hubris* itself, it has to be stopped sooner than a raging fire. This fear of pollution can be seen in the words Antiphon speaks about a murderer:

> It is against your interest to allow this polluted man to enter divine precincts and pollute their sanctity, or pass on his contamination to the innocent by eating at the same table with them. This is the kind of thing that causes crops to fail.\(^\text{47}\)

In cosmologies where the self and his world are strongly interconnected, there is no separation between natural and man-made laws; law and order literally coincide. Cosmic order is pre-eminently embodied in the law of *talion*, the principle that the universal balance of forces is only preserved if every act is offset by an inverse act. The law of *talion* has two complementary sides: it demands that credit be given where credit is due and that violations of the cosmic order be punished by a similar counteraction. The *talion* of credit and that of revenge mirror one another and the system of *talion* regulates all other categories.\(^\text{48}\) The order of nature is conceived of as reflecting a moral order; physical disaster is *talion* for human transgression. Religious sacrifice functions according to the *talion* of credit, by putting the gods under obligation by its gift. A gift or sacrifice is also more symbolic than economic in nature, and often the compensation exceeds the ‘damage’ of the transgression, e.g. the sacrifice of Iphigenia to atone for the slaying of one of Artemis’ protected animals. The duty to atone is also more about maintaining the balance of cosmic forces rather than making reparation. The duty to take revenge, for example in the case of Orestes, is no mere emotional need for a *vendetta* but rather a cosmologically founded duty, the neglect of which may expose the individual or group to danger.

\(^{46}\) Hesiod, *ibid*, p.212.
The order of the *lex talionis* often hides its tragic aspect. Delay in the gods’ retaliation for sin is often so extended that the credibility of the system falters. It operates on the scale of divine lives, not human ones, and the mills of the gods grind so slowly that their movements can become almost imperceptible to the limited scope of mortal eyes. Because *talion* operates on a cosmic scale, it may from the point of view of the human being be grossly unjust. It is only an ironic consolation that an innocent man should suffer for the sins of his forebears,\(^{49}\) while present evildoers continue to thrive.\(^{50}\) It is humanly impossible for humans to adopt the perspective of the law of *talion*.\(^{51}\) As we shall see, this is precisely what interests Nietzsche; how is it possible that a people who found themselves in a blatantly unjust cosmological order can be so much more *cheerful* than others who have devoted themselves to creating a social order that serves the interests of every individual? The solidarity of generations does not always conceal the fact that individuals are often the innocent victims of the grand cosmic movement. The order of *talion* can only be maintained by violence and counter-violence, by violation and counter-violation, which implies that this order is inextricably intertwined with disorder.

As long as mechanisms of substitution and controlled ambiguity are in operation, the essential violence of *talion* can be concealed, but from time to time a ritual crisis sets in, which can only be contained by an appeal to outside authority, as when Athena ends the curse on the house of Atreus in the concluding scene of the *Oresteia*. Other tactics for coping with crisis may include sacrificial killing, which, however, requires careful efforts to prevent retaliation. For example, great emphasis is placed on the willingness of the victim, in what Burkert\(^ {52}\) calls ‘the comedy of innocence’. All these rituals, however, cannot overcome the fact that *talion*, too, is a transgression, and therefore potentially dangerous. This is abundantly clear in the inevitable mixture of purification and violence in the perverted rituals the reader encounters in the *Oresteia*. Little wonder, then, that Aeschylus should speak of the justice within this trilogy as ‘the grace that comes with violence’ (*Agamemnon* 182-183).

The significance of Nietzsche’s challenge to contemporary conceptions of justice can only be appreciated with a little more background information on the


\(^{50}\) Hesiod. *Theogonia* 373-385, *ibid*, p.197.


ancient self that found itself intertwined within the connected cosmological order. Naturally, pace Gadamer, we can make no claim to ‘reconstruct’ the ancient cosmological framework, even if the scope of our project allowed for this, which it does not. What is significant for our purposes, however, is the fact that cultures without distinctive spheres of life are not distinguished from ones where such spheres develop merely by a lack of separation. In cultures with interconnected spheres of life, differentiation is just as important as in separatist ones, but not as a procedure of reduction and re-assembly. In interconnected cosmologies, differentiation does not lead to clear and distinct categories. Demarcation is not clear but cumulative; there are many interconnected modes of expressing the meaning of a cosmological difference, and these modes form a dense pattern of variable, rich meanings. It is almost impossible to speak meaningfully of what we today so easily call the ‘legal subject’, because even at the most basic level, the word ‘self’, let alone ‘subject’, is very problematic. Snell53 points out the lack of Homeric words that can readily be translated as ‘mind’ or even ‘soul’, in the post-Platonic Christian sense of a locus where the individual’s unique thoughts and feelings occur: ‘Any touch of a unitary self in Homer is so lightly expressed that abstract concepts such as psyche, thymos, kradia and physical features such as hands and feet, should likewise be seen as springs of action’. The most familiar of these, psyche, does not simply translate as ‘soul’ or ‘self’. It is closer to ‘life-force’, that entity the absence of which defines death (Iliad V: 696). After death, no return of the psyche is possible, and Achilles complains that he constantly risks his psyche in war (Iliad XXII: 696). Our closest word is élan, but it must be noted that a person and his psyche are separable and not self-identical: Achilles states that ‘not all the treasure in Troy is equal to his psyche’ (Iliad: IX 401). Thymos is equally difficult. It is located in the chest, and conveys an impression of a sudden surge of fire. Etymologically, it is associated with the Latin ‘fumos’. According to Taylor,54 the closest translation would be ‘surge of pride’. Overall, words like thymos, kradia and etor seem to be used to record Homeric man’s experiences as he experiences them. He lacks a conceptual framework that distinguishes between psychological and physical phenomena. This must not be mistaken for the simple reducing of mental and spiritual qualities to material ones or vice versa, because for Homer, as a pre-Christian Greek still deeply steeped in an oral

tradition, such a dichotomy does not exist. This is evident from the passive role given to the more ‘intellectual’ concepts of *phren* and *nōōs*, which suggest something acted upon rather than acting itself. *Phrenes* includes grief (Hector) and lust (Paris). *Nōōs* is more cognitive, noticing the things that *phren* reasons about.

No single word, then, ‘adds up’ to the Homeric man. As Taylor puts it, ‘Homeric man is a being whose parts are more in evidence than the whole, and one very conscious of sudden unexpected excesses of energy.’ Homer has no non-material language; even an ethereal concept like *psyche* is composed of tenuous ‘stuff’ that resides in the body and flies out through some orifice (including a wound) and down to Hades. As a result, there is no clear distinction between inner and outer. The two-way relationship between the two is mercurial, ambiguous, fluid and divine. What is inside and outside are seen in terms both biological and daemonological, that is, related to the suprahuman or the transcendent realm of the gods. In interconnected societies, nature is conceived of as a living whole in which categories such as living/dead, man/animal are recognized as distinct but at the same time as connected by internal links. This interconnectedness makes it difficult to reconcile opposite demands where relations between man and nature are at stake. On the one hand, human civilization has to be kept free from all aspects of wild and polluting nature, but on the other, nature is understood to be part of an interconnected cosmos, implying that nature can be separated from neither the divine nor the human sphere. Men and gods can only maintain themselves thanks to their continuous possession by natural powers. The power of erotic attraction, for example, unites plants, humans and animals, as well as gods, and the same goes for a phenomenon like inspiration.

Snell notes that the Homeric hero is frequently carried to great heights by a surge of power infused in him by a god. The *daimon* is present even in what appears to be the activity driven to the greatest degree by intentionality, namely *poiēsis*, which includes all ‘form-giving’ activities. In the *Apology*, Socrates states that poets do not produce their work through wisdom but rather by some instinct when possessed by *entheos*. The same seems to be true of tragic mistakes; Agamemnon blames his unfair and unwise treatment of Achilles on a certain madness (*menos*) visited on him.

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57 The word literally translates to an ‘indwelling deity’ or *daemon*. Two modern words are derived from this word: ‘enthusiasm’ and ‘enthetic’ (which refers to a class of diseases introduced from without).
by a god. Men frequently act ‘as their kadia and thymos bid them’ (*Odyssey* IX: 320) and Odysseus, when wondering whether to attack the Cyclops, is restrained by ‘another thymos’ (*Odyssey* I: 306). The absence of will forms part of a culture that allows a hero to retain his heroic status even when he turns out to be a mere plaything of the gods.

Thus the Greek self (the usage of ‘subject’ is inappropriate here, because, as has been indicated, the individual was not regarded as a fount of meaning) was more than a collection of soluble ego boundaries. Greek identity is hard-won through outer engagement, a precariously balanced unity under perpetual threat of slipping away. Sloterdijk's description of Nietzsche's *Übermenschlichkeit* also describes the Homeric self: ‘something radical, cybernetic, eccentric, and Dionysian; a site of sensibility within the ruling cycle of forces, as a point of alertness for the modulation of impersonal antagonisms, as a process of self-healing for primordial pain’. The individual’s identity is determined by a greater ordered totality prior to that individual. Charles Taylor describes this position as follows:

In those earlier societies, what we could now call identity was largely fixed by one’s social position. That is, the background that explained what people recognized as important to themselves was largely determined by their place in society, and whatever roles or activities attached to this position.

For Nietzsche, the ancients offer a window into a world where the *principium individuationis*, and the foundational metaphysics that were to follow it, have not yet become absolute. The ego, with its constitutive dream of autonomy, is still merely the unreal seam at which the Dionysian force of irrational vitality encounters the Apollonian vision of order. In this encounter, subjectivity appears as an epiphenomenon within the interplay between great subjectless cosmic forces, in the *interspace* between the tendencies toward self-preservation and self-annihilation that exist within a vivacious yet unintentional and indifferent natural process. Likewise, only in the light of the primacy of the cosmos as a whole is it possible to read Aeschylus’ and Sophocles’ descriptions of the vicissitudes of human life. Reversals of

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58 The word ‘cybernetic’ is derived from the Greek *kuber*, meaning ‘to move’. The use of the word here points to a self unconstrained by the demands of autonomy.


fortune are not primarily human phenomena which are deplored or cheered. Tragic insight shows, mostly without the actors being aware of the fact, that man’s actions are part of the cosmic whole. In this context, the following words from the Messenger in the Antigone are of particular interest:

There is no estate of mortal life that I would either praise or blame as settled (lit. ‘standing’). Fortune (Τúche) sets straight (orthoi) and Fortune lets down (katarrépei) the fortunate and unfortunate from day to day.

And no one is a seer to mortals concerning those things which are established. (Antigone, lines 1156-60)

The messenger is not lamenting pessimistically the terrors of human existence. He is offering a dispassionate description of established cosmic law. He is neither optimistic nor pessimistic: sometimes the lucky are brought down and sometimes the unlucky are raised. The messenger is simply referring to the cosmic movement of generation and destruction.

4. What Nietzsche Found in the Greeks

For Karl Marx, the major fault of philosophers is that they tend only to interpret the world in various ways, whereas ‘the point’, he says in his ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, ‘is to change it’. Quite the opposite is true for Nietzsche: in his view, the greatest fault of philosophers is that they tend to think that they are changing the world when all they actually do is interpret it. And the name they give their attempts to ‘improve’ humanity is morality: ‘Zu allen Zeiten hat man die Menschen “verbessern” wollen: dies vor Allem hiess Moral’ (GD, Die ‘Verbesserer der Menschheit’, KSA, 6.98). For Nietzsche, the true revolutionary (the Üblemensch) does not desperately try to establish justice in a world that furiously resists all such attempts, but learns to reconcile himself with the fundamental injustice that accompanies life in the human world. The Greeks were masters of many arts, but they were especially brilliant at this one. It takes a phenomenally strong people to resist the urge to justify the world in otherworldly metaphysical terms:

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But the world must be justified nevertheless. In the Old Testament, the word ‘justify’ has connotations of acquittal, of rendering innocent in the eyes of God, a status not so much achieved as conferred on those who have obeyed the Law, or have rendered what is due to man and God in terms of God’s revealed will for mankind. The Jewish world is justified in terms of an absolute transcendent standard and requires no further human involvement except obedience to God’s will, particularly in the fulfilment of God’s Law. To justify the world means to render it meaningful, to establish a framework within which an apparently chaotic world makes sense. For the Greeks, as Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes, this is of course not a moral, but an aesthetic experience:


This principle is important enough for Nietzsche to repeat it twice more, in GT 5 and GT 24. In the first two cases, the word ‘justified’ is emphasized. This emphasis only makes sense, however, when we consider the conditions needed before we can speak of a world at all. The most fundamental of these conditions is the absence of a transcendental point of reference to which all questions of meaning refer; the world must be justified in human terms and this, inevitably, is always accompanied by an aesthetic dimension. It is impossible to throw out the matter of taste where judgement is involved; it is by its very nature demiurgic, perpetually accepting, rejecting and evaluating. In the most fundamental sense, this is because of man’s linguistic nature. In denying the possibility of correctly reproducing the world of becoming in language, Nietzsche analyzes the referential theory of meaning and the correspondence theory of truth in a way that opens traditional epistemological inquiry to the freedom of the creative play of interpretation. Language emerges not as a tool for mirroring reality, but as an anthropomorphic creation through which human beings
delineate their relatively idiosyncratic relationships with each other and ‘nature’. The ‘world’ is what comes into being as a result of these interpretations. Heidegger makes this central to his interpretation of Dasein as a being that only exists as Dasein because it shares the world with others in an interpretative manner.

For Nietzsche, all interpretation is creation inasmuch as it is engaged in the re-interpretation and re-configuration of the world. As will be demonstrated later, every intellectual construction or category imposed upon the world, claims to ‘objectivity’ notwithstanding, has an artistic and therefore subjective dimension to it. Art carries out a selective, world-constitutive operation in the manner of that ultimate impersonal ‘artist’, the will to power. And this means that both the negatives and positives of the world can only be explained in terms of preliminary categories of quality, not permanent moral foundations.

Against the tendency to read the world in simple binaries, Nietzsche posits a polyvalent monist force that distinguishes between degrees and kinds of power. This force is the will to power, neither essence, structure, telos nor meaning in itself, but rather at once the full force of appearance, the continual sublation of every telos and the transgression of all ends. The will to power establishes new hierarchies and then continually undermines them. To impose hierarchies according to which the value of phenomena can be measured is the ultimate artistic endeavour, in which ‘truth’ plays no role whatsoever. Nietzsche’s thought is a perpetual challenge to those who tend to simplify the world, who operate under the illusion that they make the world more accessible by establishing simple dichotomies such as good and evil, spirit and body or, epistemologically speaking, mind and body, truth and error. The announcement that everything is will to power suggests the radically contingent and contextual nature of all conceptual distinctions and throws immediate suspicion on any unexamined dichotomy. This is cause for celebration; the world is at once neither entirely within the reach of the knowing subject, nor entirely beyond its grasp. It is just enigmatic enough to be stimulating:

Tiefe Abneigung, in irgend einer Gesammt-Betrachtung der Welt ein für alle Mal auszuruhen; Zauber der entgegengesetzten Denkweise; sich den Anreiz des ängmatischen Charakters nicht nehmen lassen (Aphorism 11036, NL 85-86 KSA 12.142).
Everything that happens consists of a group of phenomena that are gathered and selected by an interpretative being. Despite Nietzsche’s appeal to a more natural man (GM I, 6), there is no physis without nomos. Nietzsche does not simply unite the two; he has re-thought their relationship entirely, suggesting that what we call physis, nature or the world, is nothing more than an illusion that we create through the nomos, because we forget that the law, or metaphysical framework within which we operate, is itself merely a human convention. Nomos creates physis through generality: we become so accustomed to our rules and habits that they begin to pass for nature.

This is the origin of the ‘idealistic’ conception of culture that began to dominate European thought from the mid-eighteenth century. ‘Culture’ was almost invariably seen as the refined mental and spiritual faculties which the rising middle classes of Europe imagined set them apart from the allegedly brutish, nasty and short lives of manual workers, peasants and savages. The conception of culture as something ‘superorganic’, a self-contained world of reason and manners, served as a token to demarcate, separate, deny and exclude ‘natural’ categories such as workers, women and children. In the words of M. Jackson: ‘A persistent theme is the denial of the somatic, a scotomacizing of the physical aspects of Being where our sense of separateness and distinction is most readily blurred’. 62

Demarcation for purposes of elevation and sublimation is not a problem for Nietzsche. Greek culture, too, is characterized by a series of exclusive – even violent – self-demarcations from nature. This is, after all, the ‘holy simplicity’63 that ennobled the Greeks: ‘Simplicität des Griechischen: die Stimme der Natur den Frauen und den Sklaven gegenüber unverdorben. Der besiegte Feind. Humanität ist ein ganz un griechischer Begriff’ ( Aphorism 373, NL 69-74, KSA 7.127). Violence is instinctual for Nietzsche, a process deeply ingrained in nature, including human nature.

It is necessary to separate the human and ‘natural’ domains, but the absence of ready definitions means that the criteria for this demarcation are open to interpretation – the demarcation is as unfinished as the human animal itself. Nietzsche also writes:

63 This expression O sancta simplicitas was first used by St Jerome, but became more popular when used by Johannes Huss at the stake, on seeing an old peasant bringing a faggot to throw on the pile.
Wir wehren uns gegen den Instinkt, als etwas Thierisches. Darin liegt selbst ein Instinkt. Der natürliche Mensch empfindet eine starke Kluf zwischen sich und dem Thier; im Begriff es sich deutlich zu machen, worin die Kluf bestehe, verfällt er auf dumme Unterscheidungen (Aphorism 286, NL 69-74, KSA 7.102).

In the first essay of Die Genealogie, ‘natural’ operates as synonym for ‘potent and robust’, which is Nietzsche’s interpretation of what constitutes ‘quality’. This value system, like all others, as Nietzsche never ceases to remind us, emanates from a creation. But this creation is not necessarily an individual’s deed, the movement of a will seen as a cause, or a creation in the sense of an imitation of ‘prior’ nature. Rather it is the very creation of nature and life itself. A world comes into being through our selecting features and isolating them from others, by our delimiting areas of life and demarcating spaces, privileging certain concepts, persons, facets and features over others. The world is justified, rendered meaningful or perhaps more importantly, worthy, by the imposition of such an order or framework, and the person associated with this task is he whom Nietzsche calls the lawgiver:


The most obvious example of the operation of the lawgiver through the medium of language is the naming process;64 ‘so beginnt die Philosophie mit einer Gesetzgebung der Größe, ein Namengeben ist mit ihr verbunden.’ (PHG, 3, KSA 1.816). Naming involves an artificial process of designation, differentiation and classification giving rise to concepts. Through giving two different things, which are at best similar, the same name, we render them identical. Whereas tradition would have it that God gave His creation its essential nature by naming it, for Nietzsche naming merely involves creating a surface with neither depth nor reference. He argues that ‘es genügt, neue Namen und Schätzungen und Wahrscheinlichkeiten zu schaffen, um auf die Länge hin neue ‘Dinge zu schaffen’. (FW, 58, KSA 3.422). Things thus created have no reality or reference behind the name. Theologians and metaphysicians make the mistake to

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64 The question of language and naming in Nietzsche is a very complex one, and will be more fully addressed in a subsequent chapter.
assume that ‘big words’, or words that name, are automatically of value. They have, according to Nietzsche, value only as flags in a battle: ‘Christenthum, Revolution, Aufhebung der Sklaverei, gleiches Recht, Philanthropie, Friedensliebe, Gerechtigkeit, Wahrheit: alle diese großen Worte haben nur Werth im Kampf, als Standarte: nicht als Realitäten, sondern als Prunkworte für etwas ganz Anderes (ja Gegensätzliches!)’ (Aphorism 11864, KSA 13.62). Names, like everything else, have a history, which is passed on to whoever appropriates them, whether approved of or not. ‘Knowledge’ emerges as the rapid categorization and classification of similar things. Concepts are born through the equation of things that are not equal. This means that language cannot be seen as representational, for there is nothing to be represented. Whoever goes beneath the surface of language does so at his peril. Representation is illusion. Nietzsche asks


Truth depends to a large extent on comparison and degree, and language is the sum of the concepts that result from the artistic imposition of an image onto other images. As Derrida was to emphasize later, there is no originary presence at the inception of language. The intelligibility we discover in nature can only be achieved with the aid of words and concepts, that is, only through a creation of man, mainly, as we shall see in greater depth in chapter 3, through the operation of language. In the strictest sense, no knowledge of the world is really possible, only the different kinds of knowledge of man.
Knowledge that comes to be regarded as ‘true’ employs language according to conventions and repeats these conventions infinitely. Language masks its origin as anthropomorphism. Realism, as we have seen, is the ultimate symptom of the denial of language as creative imposition. This is why it has become time for man to own up to his status as artist, and make the most of it.
Als Baugenie erhebt sich solcher Maass der Mensch weit über die Biene: diese baut aus Wachs, das sie aus der Natur zusammenholt, er aus dem weit zarteren Stoffe der Begriffe, die er erst aus sich fabriciren muss. Er ist hier sehr zu bewundern — aber nur nicht wegen seines Triebes zur Wahrheit, zum reinen Erkennen der Dinge. Wenn Jemand ein Ding hinter einem Busche versteckt, es eben dort wieder sucht und auch findet, so ist an diesem Suchen und Finden nicht viel zu rühmen: so aber steht es mit dem Suchen und Finden der ‘Wahrheit’ innerhalb des Vernunft-Bezirkes (WL 1.KSA1.883).

Truth is a lie that was repeated enough to lend it the stability it needed to become truth. Jacques Derrida calls this phenomenon ‘iterability’. This word combines the Latin *iter*, meaning ‘again’ and the Sanskrit word *itara* (‘other’). For any word or image – Derrida uses the word ‘mark’ - to have meaning, it must be repeatable in other contexts. The more often it gets repeated, the more stable the word, image or sign becomes. But metaphor remains unavoidable.

Thus, instead of a rationally accessible world with metaphysical foundations, Nietzsche offers a tragic or Heraclitian world, stripped of stability, purpose and predictability. Because every conceptual framework is at bottom arbitrary, it is necessary to create a framework with the greatest possible potential. What makes one framework ‘better’ than another is not its ‘correctness’ but its ability to stimulate life to the maximum, to allow the games of the different forces of power to spill out their energies most powerfully. The major complaint that Nietzsche has against traditional metaphysics is that it works counter to this purpose. In Nietzsche’s universe (perhaps multiverse would be more correct) life becomes a terrifying and tragic experience amid the constant flux of becoming. Such a world, however, also recovers a lost innocence and a resuscitated freedom. Although fearsome, it offers the greatest form of liberty possible, which is *tragic freedom*. In Nietzsche’s world, humanity becomes free to create itself anew; it is constrained to neither a transcendental nature nor a teleological program. Nietzsche champions the absolute necessity of a total liberation from ends; only reconciliation with the innocence of becoming can give us genuine freedom.

This is why culture’s self-demarcation from ‘nature’ is not sufficient to demarcate or define what animated Greek culture. What Nietzsche calls the realm of ‘einer verklärten Physis’ (*UB* III 3, KSA 1.361) is part of ‘nature’ – the ‘superorganic’

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is part of the organic. Differentiation occurs internally, according to the logic of the *agon*. In the simplest sense, *agon* means contest or competition. It is, however, not a contest of annihilation (*Vernichtungskampf*) in which ‘the winner takes all’, but a signature aspect of pre-Socratic Greek culture; and a contained and productive form of contestation (*Wettkampf*), in which adversaries compete with one another in a process of mutual empowerment and provocation, and is contained in the process by mutual disempowerment or restraint. Rather than separating nature from culture, Nietzsche offers an enriched and ennobled concept of nature, inspired by Nature’s own ‘contained’ volatility:


In the phrase of Herman Siemens: 66 ‘The key to Nietzsche’s thought here is a notion of productive and inclusive conflict’. It is through an assimilation and transformation of natural drives into something decidedly *human*, that the *agon* is born. Nietzsche writes on Homer:

Der Dichter überwindet den Kampf um’s Dasein, indem er ihn zu einem freien Wettkampf idealisirt. Hier ist das Dasein, um das noch gekämpft wird, das Dasein im Lobe, im Nachruhm.

Der Dichter erzieht: die tigerartigen Zerfleischungstriebe der Griechen weiß er zu übertragen in die gute Eris (*HW*, KSA 1.783).

The good Eris is the Muse of the *agon*. The point of *Homer’s Wettkampf* is to demonstrate how the Greeks turned the bad Eris of destruction into the ‘good’ Eris of inspiring conflict. In contrast to the ‘measureless’ Christian tradition, which stems from Plato, as we shall see in the next chapter, which tries to *erase* negativity and so

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safeguard itself, the Greeks prevented the destruction of social life by including and eventually sublimating the negative forces of destruction.

The dramatic potential of base, destructive forces were recognized and used as stimulus (Reiz) in a process of measured discharge in contests that ruled all aspects of life, from art and politics, religion and love, to sport and education. This is well depicted in the pan-Hellenic Homer:


From the modern, arch-humanist perspective, with its obsession with ‘equality’, nothing could be more alien. This is perhaps why none other than Gilles Deleuze distances himself so violently from the notion of the agon:

One cannot emphasize the extent to which the notions of struggle, war rivalry and even comparison are alien to Nietzsche and to his conception of power. It is not that he denies the existence of struggle, but he does not see it in any way creative of values. At least the only values that it creates are those of the triumphant slave. Struggle is not the principle or motor of hierarchy, but the means by which the slave reverses hierarchy. Struggle is never the active expression of forces, nor the manifestation of a will to power that affirms any more than its result expresses the triumph of the master or the strong. Struggle, on the contrary, is the way in which the weak prevail over the strong, because they are the greatest number.67

Few readings could do less justice to a key Nietzschean concept. Not only does Nietzsche practise his own version of the agon in his critical contest with the values of his day, but also his references to the Greek agon appear from Die Geburt

der Tragödie to his last notes, sometimes as example, sometimes as sparring partner in its own right. The Greeks were not merely to be imitated, but to be overcome, for that is what fruitful learning is. For as will become clear later, a just man is a fruitful or productive one.

The Greeks answered Greek fire with Greek fire. They believed that every ability must unfold itself in contestation; otherwise the twin evils of tyranny and creative barrenness will follow. As great stimulant, the agon prevents this: a great playwright who envies his predecessor is provoked by the latter’s achievements into producing masterpieces of his own, and even to outshine his rival, living or dead. Nietzsche calls this reciprocal logic of challenge

die ungeheure Begierde als Wurzel dieses Angriffs uns denken, selbst an die Stelle des gestürzten Dichters zu treten und dessen Ruhm zu erben. Jeder große Hellene giebt die Fackel des Wettkampfes weiter; an jedergroßen Tugend entzündet sich eine neue Größe (HW, KSA 1.788).

A great new figure limits the achievements and potential to be dangerous of the other players in the agon without denying or annihilating their achievements. The true participant in the agon is a just figure: he does not seek to destroy or impoverish his opponent, since the agon thrives on a plurality of geniuses. After all, one does not have to choose between Aeschylus and Sophocles – thanks to the genius behind the institution of the agon, the Athenian public could experience the work of both geniuses. It is precisely because of this system of ‘checks and balances’ that chances for tyrannical abuse and injustice are limited. ‘Totalitarian’ genius – a single giant ‘who doth bestride the narrow world / Like a Colossus’ 68 – like Wagner, in Nietzsche’s opinion – is something particular to the modern age, and inimical to the spirit of the ancient agon. There, any individual genius who rose beyond contest to a position of absolute power would be ostracized.

Der ursprüngliche Sinn dieser sonderbaren Einrichtung ist aber nicht der eines Ventils, sondern der eines Stimulanzmittels: man beseitigt den überragenden Einzelnlen, damit nun wieder das Wettspiel der Kräfte erwache: ein Gedanke, der der ’Exclusivität’ des Genius im modernen Sinne feindlich ist, aber voraussetzt, daß, in einer natürlichen Ordnung der Dinge, es immer mehrere Genies gibt, die sich gegenseitig zur That reizen, wie sie sich auch gegenseitig in der Grenze des Maaßes halten. Das ist der Kern der

68 Shakespeare, W. Julius Caesar I.ii line 134.
For the Greeks, victory was never absolute, but always provisional and temporary, for a respected opponent can easily issue a fresh challenge at the next opportunity. According to Nietzsche, reading Heraclitus, this was the condition of justice itself: ‘der Streit des Vielen selbst ist die eine Gerechtigkeit!’ (PHG 6, KSA 1.827). Justice is the antithesis of decay and stasis. Furthermore, at stake was always some form of cultural achievement: laurel wreaths at the Olympics or the theatrical agon. The agonal life is an awe-inspiring adventure beyond the concerns of moralism and commerce, not a house of trade where one can drive a hard moral bargain, fulfilling present obligations and obtaining promissory notes to be redeemed at a later stage. In Nietzsche’s Heraclitian world, human society becomes an experiment; ‘Die Menschen-Gesellschaft: die ist ein Versuch, so lehre ich’s, – ein langes Suchen: sie sucht aber den Befehlenden! – ein Versuch, oh meine Brüder! Und kein ‘Vertrag’ (Z, III, ‘Von alten und neuen Tafeln’, KSA 4.265).

Die Geburt der Tragödie is an agon in its own right: dramatization without dialogue, a dramatization of a terrible subject, namely the disproportionality between the cosmic, Aeschylean demand for justice and the human, Euripidean need for poetic justice. The birth of tragedy from the spirit of music reflects the primordial event of the birth of the anthropocentric world unfolding from its primitive primordial grounds while at the same time reconciling man with the workings of that primeval world of which he, despite his best efforts, is still very much a part. Tragedy is thus a dramatization of one of the most essential features of Greek civilization, the need to establish and police limits. No society can come into being without understanding this need, but the Greeks arguably realized it more fully than all other groups before and after them. Borders and limits establish spaces; the more numerous the spaces or domains, the greater the possibility for freedom.

Unlike proponents of the more nihilistic drives to ‘freedom’ – ‘Die Zuchlosigkeit des modernen Geistes unter allerhand moralischem Aufputz’ (Aphorism 11498, KSA 12.432) – in his age personified by socialists and anarchists and in our own time by the neo-liberals with their tunnel-vision commitment to the idylls of the marketplace, Nietzsche has a healthy respect for the value of the institution and its ability to enhance life, provided of course that it flows from life-
enhancing energies and not life-denying ones. His contempt for Luther, for example, is provoked by the latter’s disregard for the possibilities of a mannered and disciplined institution.

Luther’s Widerstand gegen die Mittler-Heiligen der Kirche (insbesondere gegen ‘des Teuffels Saw den Bapst’) war, daran ist kein Zweifel, im letzten Grunde der Widerstand eines Rüpels, den die gute Etiquette der Kirche verdross, jene Ehrfurchts-Etiquette des hieratischen Geschmacks, welche nur die Geweihteren und Schweigsameren in das Allerheiligste einlässt und es gegen die Rüpel zuschliesst (GM III 23, KSA 5. 394).

The concept of the agon has in recent years finally received the attention it deserves as the ‘key’ that unlocks the spirit of the entire Nietzschean oeuvre. In light of his chosen Greek context, Nietzsche’s belligerent tone, often frightfully misunderstood, makes sense; he seeks to fire up the world, not to end it. Nietzsche revitalized the modern European conception of freedom, on a scale hitherto unmatched, by rejecting the ‘right of subjectivity’, as Hegel described the right of modern individuals to self-determination.69 For Hegel, the ‘right to subjectivity’ is the principal difference between ancient and modern times. Nietzsche agrees, but for him this is all the more lamentable. According to Nietzsche, the ‘passions’ did not present a problem to the Greeks but rather an opportunity for the freedom of creative play. Greek genius did not only ‘tolerate’ great passions like cruelty and the need for struggle, but justified them as being an essential and wonderful part of life.

Das gesammte griechische Alterthum denkt anders über Groll und Neid als wir und urtheilt wie Hesiod, der einmal eine Eris als böse bezeichnet, diejenige nämlich, welche die Menschen zum feindseligen Vernichtungskampfe gegen einander führt, und dann wieder eine andre Eris als gute preist, die als Eifersucht Groll Neid die Menschen zur That reizt, aber nicht zur That des Vernichtungskampfes, sondern zur That des Wettkampfes. Der Grieche ist neidisch und empfindet diese Eigenschaft nicht als Makel, sondern als Wirkung einer wohlthätigen Gottheit: welche Kluft des ethischen Urtheils zwischen uns und ihm! (Homer’s Wettkampf, KSA 1.786).

Nietzsche celebrates the second Eris and the Greek commitment to the belief that ‘contest is necessary to preserve the health of the state. Without the envy, jealousy and ambition of the contest, man degenerates: ‘er wird böse und grausam, er wird

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rachsüchtig und gottlos’ (HW, KSA 7.92). In other words, without contest, man becomes unjust, lacking in virtue.

And on the edge of the agon lies the tragic. The tragic makes its appearance when a hero oversteps the boundaries set by the agon and becomes a threat for the polis. Greek tragedy shows human lives at the mercy of forces over which they have very little or no control. Such is the vulnerability of human beings before the might of fortune that even the strongest individual is powerless to resist its potential for ruining the most considered and honourable attempt to secure a space for human flourishing. But where individuals go under, there their culture flourishes, provided of course that they fall hard enough.

Die Psychologie des Orgiasmus als eines überströmenden Lebens- und Kraftgefühls, innerhalb dessen selbst der Schmerz noch als Stimulans wirkt, gab mir den Schlüssel zum Begriff des tragischen Gefühls, das sowohl von Aristoteles als in Sonderheit von unseren Pessimisten missverstanden worden ist. Die Tragödie ist so fern davon, Etwas für den Pessimismus der Hellenen im Sinne Schopenhauer’s zu beweisen, dass sie vielmehr als dessen entscheidende Ablehnung und Gegen-Instanz zu gelten hat. Das Jasagen zum Leben selbst noch in seinen fremdesten und härtesten Problemen; der Wille zum Leben, im Opfer seiner höchsten Typen der eignen Unerschöpflichkeit frohwerdend – das nannte ich dionysisch, das errieth ich als die Brücke zur Psychologie des tragischen Dichters. Nicht um von Schrecken und Mitleiden loszukommen, nicht um sich von einem gefährlichen Affekt durch dessen vehemente Entladung zu reinigen – so verstand es Aristoteles –: sondern um, über Schrecken und Mitleid hinaus, die ewige Lust des Werdens selbst zu sein, – jene Lust, die auch noch die Lust am Vernichten in sich schliesst ...

As we shall see, this leads the way for a strong link between human justice and the acceptance of the impersonal nature of cosmic justice. In the first text in the Nietzschean oeuvre to explicitly deal with justice, GT 9, the impersonal nature of cosmic justice appears most clearly:

Der aeschyleische Prometheus ist in diesem Betracht eine dionysische Maske, während in jenem vorhin erwähnten tiefen Zuge nach Gerechtigkeit Aeschylus seine väterliche Abstammung von Apollo, dem Gotte der Individuation und der Gerechtigkeitsgrenzen, dem Einsichtigen verräth. Und

The most unnerving element in this passage is the notion that everything that exists is equally justified, that is, even things inimical to human happiness, and this is how it is and how it should be. It is pointless to try, as certain branches of Christianity do, to exorcize ‘evil’ from the world. No particular element can readily be associated with ‘evil’ or even ‘negativity’; all phenomena derive their meaning from their proportional relationships with other phenomena, and are unpredictable, mercurial, pliable and, as we shall see, truly ‘beyond good and evil’. What embodies the evil of excess in everyday life may be an essential activity in the Dionysian festival. Not only is there a place for every possible phenomenon conceivable by man, but also the radical complexity of the world is beyond human power to reduce permanently. The world can be tamed, but not transformed, because eventually an exiled element will show itself again, albeit in a radically different form. The world, like Blake’s strangely ambivalent Love, ‘seeketh but itself to please’. No element can be eradicated to produce a more human or humane world. Brutality, unfairness, ugliness and uncertainty are as much part of life as are more positive aspects. Despite Nietzsche’s perfectionism, he is radically anti- and un-utopian. The ‘ideal’ world is already here, only waiting to be seized. This world justifies itself simply by way of its potency, and the failure to allow a single element to dominate absolutely ensures that there is always a life-enhancing struggle going on, a struggle that reveals different aspects of the world and of the actors who play out their endless games.

It is often said that in Thomas Hardy’s great Wessex novels the countryside becomes a character in itself. In a similar fashion, agonal tension itself may be said to be a ‘character’ in itself in Greek tragic drama; it cuts through the naked stage and allows various oppositions to spring up, like Jason’s dragon teeth from which an army of armed warriors springs. It is Apollo contra Dionysus, Apollo against the Furies and (illegitimately) men against gods – but then the gods never did play fair.

The quote above from GT 9 summarizes one of the key dichotomies in the Nietzschean oeuvre, the eternal struggle between Apollo and Dionysus. Initially, Nietzsche views the Apollonian and Dionysian drives as corresponding to elementary
physiological or psychological states. His contrast between the quiet, peaceful, beautiful world of Apollo ‘the shining one’ and the darker, irrational world of passion and intoxication of Dionysus recalls Socrates’ account of the mixture of sobriety and madness that induces man to philosophize (Phaedrus, 244-257). However, Apollonian power in Nietzsche is not a simple case of hylomorphic or formative power. Instead, it is closer to the power of the imagination, that is, the power to make the invisible visible, to make the void radiant. ‘Apollo, als der Gott aller bildnerischen Kräfte, ist zugleich der wahrsagende Gott. Er, der seiner Wurzel nach der “Scheinende”, die Lichtgottheit ist, beherrscht auch den schönen Schein der inneren Phantasie-Welt’ (GT 1, KSA 1.27). The Apollonian impulse to fashion soothing dreams flourishes only in individuals characterized by ‘maassvolle Begrenzung, jene Freiheit von den wilderen Regungen, jene weisheitsvolle Ruhe des Bildnergottes’ (GT 1, KSA 1.28), which creates a calm fortress of illusion against the senselessness of the world. Apollonian creativity demands a certain self-distancing from the tumultuous striving of the instincts and the whirl of events that constitute everyday life, an almost philosophical detachment and an awareness of the distinction between appearance and reality.

In contrast to the Apollonian artist’s illusionary dreams, the Dionysian artist gives ecstatic expression to his instincts and passions in his characteristic activity, primal song, dance and extravagant physical activity. Rather than forming an image or copy of events, as in a frieze, the Dionysian artist becomes part of the events to such an extent that, as Yeats says, it is no longer possible to distinguish the dancer from the dance. Dionysian art enhances human solidarity, overcomes human alienation from nature, and renders visible the mysterious primordial unity of the world. If the Apollonian dream makes it possible for man to live as man by providing shelter from existential storms, Dionysian ecstasy, by offering him up to the storm, makes man, albeit temporarily, live as a god:

Jetzt, bei dem Evangelium der Weltenharmonie, fühlt sich Jeder mit seinem Nächsten nicht nur vereinigt, versöhnt, verschmolzen, sondern eins, als ob der Schleier der Maja zerrissen wäre und nur noch in Fetzen vor dem geheimnissvollen Ur-Einen herumflattere. Singend und tanzend äußert sich der Mensch als Mitglied einer höheren Gemeinsamkeit: er hat das Gehen und das Sprechen verlernt und ist auf dem Wege, tanzend in die Lüfte emporzufliegen. Aus seinen Gebärden spricht die Verzauberung. Wie jetzt die Thiere reden, und die Erde Milch und Honig giebt, so tönt auch aus ihm
etwas Uebernatürliches: als Gott fühlt er sich, er selbst wandelt jetzt so verzückt und erhoben, wie er die Götter im Traume wandeln sah. (GT 1, KSA 1.30)

Nietzsche’s argument in *Die Geburt der Tragödie* is arguably that ordinary human life is a hell of baseness, meaninglessness and suffering, only rendered bearable by the twin therapies of intoxication and dreams. The substratum of the tragic world is the horrific wisdom of Silenus, which engenders the ‘terrible need’ that produces the ‘illustrious company of Olympian beings’ (*GT* 3). It is Greek folk wisdom, not tragedy itself, that for Nietzsche provides the key to understanding the need for tragedy. The frequently quoted passage on the most famous companion of Hercules shows this:

Es geht die alte Sage, dass König Midas lange Zeit nach dem weisen Silen, dem Begleiter des Dionysus, im Walde gejagt habe, ohne ihn zu fangen. Als er ihm endlich in die Hände gefallen ist, fragt der König, was für den Menschen das Allerbeste und Allervorzüglichste sei. Starr und unbeweglich schweigt der Dämon; bis er, durch den König gezwungen, endlich unter gellem Lachen in diese Worte ausbricht: 'Elendes Eintagsgeschlecht, des Zufalls Kinder und der Mühsal, was zwingst du mich dir zu sagen, was nicht zu hören für dich das Erspriesslichste ist? Das Allerbeste ist für dich gänzlich unerreichbar: nicht geboren zu sein, nicht zum sein, nichts zu sein. Das Zweitbeste aber ist für dich – bald zu sterben’ (*GT* 3, KSA 1. 36).

The Greeks’ greatest creative deed, perhaps the greatest creative deed that the world has ever seen, is their skilful concealing of man’s inherently miserable lot. The Olympic ‘poem’ that is Greek religion represents a valiant response to a truly terrible and authentic threat. Like one of antiquity’s favourite heroes, Odysseus, the Greeks staunchly stood their ground against a world that is not truly fashioned for man. Through tragedy, the Greeks courageously *made* the world in their own image and revealed themselves to be glorious, courageous aesthetes that could meet the world on their own terms.

If the world was not perfect, neither are the deities that ‘redeem’ it. The mysterious unity of Apollo and Dionysus comes from their inherent deficiencies; they are necessarily interdependent and intertwined. Neither Apollo nor Dionysus exists in pure form and neither can be separated from the other. The tragic work of art materializes when the Dionysian and Apollinian elements fuse with each other. The fusion is an element of Dionysian intoxication, because Nietzsche imagines the
Apollinian elements of the drama such as the plot and the mythic fate of the unfortunate hero as the dreams of the ecstatic chorus, which sees in the visible fates of the heroes, manifestations of the tragic god Dionysus.

The less discerning Nietzsche reader may take *Die Geburt der Tragödie* to be a Dionysian manifesto. However, in his first treatise Nietzsche stages the compulsion towards an Apollinian compromise. Just as Apollo cannot do without Dionysus, the latter’s anarchic impulse can only be appreciated when counterbalanced by the Apollinian appearance of law and order. As Paul van Tongeren points out,\(^{70}\) the single question from which Nietzsche began his philosophical enterprise is that of why the Dionysian Greek needed to become Apollinian:

Within this arrangement, the unrepresentable Dionysian elements come as close as possible to being represented, provided that they are willing to submit to ultimate Apollinian rule. Without the limits set by Apollo, there would be no performance at all. Everything that happens on stage is being driven by conflict, firstly a conflict within the actor, who has to choose between the different ethical alternatives presented by his situation, and secondly the conflict between actor and chorus. Nietzsche refuses to settle this conflict. The greatness of Greek culture emerged not because of the victory of Apollo over Dionysus, but within the continuing struggle between them and the right proportional relationship that keeps them in check. In *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Nietzsche thus establishes the principle of equilibrium that includes Greek art but stretches beyond the domain of the aesthetic to form a basic cosmic principle.

The ideal of ‘balance’ is not established conscientiously but emerges surreptitiously and subtly throughout the Nietzschean *oeuvre*. The opposition between

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Apollo and Dionysus is not a turbulent opposition that moves freely between the two radical extremes. Instead, as Sloterdijk points out\(^{71}\), we find here something closer to a stationary polarity that operates with a mysterious *doubling* of the Apollonian: through the mechanism of the quietly established axiom of balance, the Apollonian Subject ensures that the Dionysian never appears as *itself*, but only in some tolerable masked form. The Apollo-Dionysus mask allows but brief glimpses of the abyss before clothing it with the world of appearance. If Dionysus really brought man in touch with the terrible, chaotic reality he represents, he would cease to play an aesthetic and life-enhancing role and simply add to the horror of groundless existence. Similarly, the tragic characters on the Greek stage are not simply characters in the modern sense of the word: the word *caractēr* means ‘stamp’ or ‘mark’, in other words, a pattern or a mask placed over something else.

Seen in this light, Nietzsche’s enigmatic statement in *GT* 10, ‘aber mit der gleichen Sicherheit darf behauptet werden, dass niemals bis auf Euripides Dionysus aufgehört hat, der tragische Held zu sein, sondern dass alle die berühmten Figuren der griechischen Bühne Prometheus, Oedipus u.s.w. nur Masken jenes ursprünglichen Helden Dionysus sind’ (*GT* 10, KSA 1.71) becomes clearer. The tragic hero *represents* Dionysus, but the act of representation itself remains Apollinian. Tragedy is the *playing out* of the Dionysian in the terrible events of the tragedy, which is eventually cut short by the restorative power of the Apollonian. This is why Nietzsche states ‘dass die Griechen überhaupt Individuen auf der tragischen Bühne nicht ertragen konnten’ (*GT* 10, KSA 1.71), and Aristotle in his analysis of contemporary tragedy focuses on the *action*, rather than the characters of a tragic play: tragedy was more about the operation of cosmic forces than the agonies of the character him- or herself. Just as Japanese Noh theatre is about an actor in a *situation*, tragedy is, as Aristotle held, ‘the imitation of an *action* that is worth serious attention’ (*Poetics* 6, 1449b, emphasis mine). Ancient tragedy, as opposed to Renaissance or modern tragedy, was highly impersonal and public: it was about the fate of Greek man as such rather than Oedipus or Orestes as individuals. Or in Nietzschean terms, rather than a number of tragic characters, the Greek audience encountered one Dionysus after the other: as suffering, dismembered, a barbarized demon, a gentle ruler and a joyful youth.

In this fundamental opposition between overweening excess (Übermass) and prudence, between measure and over-measure, lies the significance of the Apollo-Dionysus dichotomy. Apollo is the ethical deity that demands measure (Mass) and prudent self-knowledge. As such, he is the enemy of Selbstüberhebung and Übermass, the principle characteristic of Dionysus. Apollo draws boundary lines, and so the danger which threatens when he dominates is formalism, Egyptian rigidity, which can cut off the free movement of ambiguous Dionysian power. In turn, this sea of power sometimes succeeds in demolishing established boundaries.

The opposition between ambiguous power and order propagates itself through a number of well known cosmological categories. Well known is the Dionysian as unbounded nature versus the Apollonian as culture. Before the bearded satyr, cultured man shrinks into a caricature. But that is not all: Dionysus is also the unbounded force of life that sets itself against the boundary of death. Here ‘life’ must be understood as an unlimited force, not the limited life of the individual. It has to be emphasized, however, that Nietzsche’s Dionysus is not just unbounded life-power; he is not to be equated with chaos or the apeiron. He is not simply uncontrollable, supra-human power, but also signifies the absence of power. This comes to the fore in his guise as Dionysus Zagreus, the god who is torn apart and scattered, both a horrible wild demon and a meek sovereign (GT 10, KSA 1.72). As we have indicated, the fact that Dionysus is no independent power can be seen in its inability to display itself without an Apollinian channel. Nietzsche is convinced that the chorus constitutes tragedy’s original Dionysian element, whereas dialogue represents an Apollonian world of images. One implication is that tragic heroes are conceived of as primarily Apollonian. They are ordered, finite channels of Dionysian power and, as such, deceptive. Spectators tend to identify themselves emotionally with these individuals by pitying the heroes’ destruction. In this way they protect themselves from a confrontation with the Dionysian and, importantly, from a third, even more terrible deity.

5. The Third Tragic Deity

The most significant treatment of the question of justice in Die Geburt der Tragödie occurs in the context of Nietzsche’s reading of Prometheus Bound. Like the tragic Prometheus, Nietzsche does not simply define justice as opposed to injustice, but
engages in the playing of several justice games. Like Lyotard in his attempts to rid philosophy of what he calls ‘terroristic’ or master discourses, Nietzsche reads several different kinds of justice into the ancient world, all operating on different scales and according to different standards and prejudices. His reading of Prometheus Bound reflects upon the function of the boundary or limit that defines each justice game in the ancient Greek world and what the implications for transgressing such a constructed limit are. Aeschylus’s play begins with the theme of the limit: ‘This is the world’s limit that we have come to; this is the Scythian country, an untrodden desolation’ (lines 1-2). The theme of the limit is not limited to geography, but manifests itself throughout the play in the way Prometheus exceeds the Apollinian limits demanded by the Delphic admonition ‘nothing in excess’. The chorus accuses Prometheus ‘Your mind was yours, not [Zeus’s], and at its bidding you regarded mortal men too highly’. Not only is Prometheus’ regard for humans excessive, but he also subverts the natural order of things, placing humans above gods in his regard. Prometheus himself admits to this excess in lines 119-123: ‘You see me a wretched God in chains, an enemy of Zeus, hated of all the gods that enter Zeus’s palace hall, because of my excessive love (ten lian philoteta) for Man’. Prometheus’ Dionysian behaviour (excess, blending of the human and divine domains) is punished and Apollonian order is re-established.

Apollo, als ethische Gottheit, fordert von den Seinigen das Maass und, um es einhalten zu können, Selbstkenntniss. Und so läuft neben der ästhetischen Nothwendigkeit der Schönheit die Forderung des “Erkenne dich selbst” und des ‘Nicht zu viel!’ her, während Selbstüberhebung und Uebermaass als die eigentlich feindseligen Dämonen der nicht-apollinischen Sphäre, daher als Eigenschaften der vor-apollinischen Zeit, des Titanenzeitalters, und der ausser-apollinischen Welt d.h. der Barbarenwelt, erachtet wurden. (GT 4, KSA 1.40).

As we have discussed above, in a separatist cosmology the greatest sin is ignorance, but in a unified cosmology, it is hubris, the overstepping of one’s demarcated place. Prometheus’ theft of fire and, perhaps more importantly, what he did with it, is a sin, a transgression, a violation of boundaries that threatens the stability of the world. Unlike the Semitic concept of sin, which is a crime committed directly against God,

Greek transgression is to a certain extent a transgression against the world, since excess destabilizes and threatens freedom, and it causes anxiety and confusion.

The violation of boundaries threatens the free play of the agon. In Homer’s Wettkampf Nietzsche calls men and gods ‘die zwei Mächte, die nie mit einander kämpfen dürfen’ (KSA 1.7 87). He is not alone in this view. Writing on the power struggle in the Antigone, Reinhardt73 writes: ‘Hier steht nicht Recht gegen Recht, Idee gegen Idee, sondern das Göttliche, als Allumfangendes, mit dem das junge Mädchen sich in Einklang weiss, gegen das Menschliche als das beschränkte, Blinde, von sich selbst Gejagte, in sich selbst Verstellte und Verfälschte’. Such actions throw out the scales and upset the precarious balance of the world. Of course, these battles cannot be avoided – they form the very raison d’être for tragedy. Greek polytheism did not take the form of a quiet, passive pantheon; rather, the Greek world served as a stage upon which the gods could discharge their energies, often with humans as their prey.

The proper tragic reader, following the ‘Aryan’ example that Nietzsche gives in section 9, will not be inclined to reason misfortune away, and the painful and irresolvable contradiction at the heart of the world will reveal itself as ‘ein Durcheinander verschiedener Welten, z.B. einer göttlichen und einer menschlichen, von denen jede als Individuum im Recht ist, aber als einzelne neben einer andern für ihre Individuation zu leiden hat’ (GT 9, KSA 1.70).

Thus in the clash between Prometheus and Zeus, justice or dikē is on the side of both of the adversaries. Even Prometheus himself admits that the theft of the fire was a transgression (line 265-7). Prometheus’s theft, as the smith Hephaestus points out, ‘went beyond what was just [pera dikes] (line 30). Consequently, Prometheus must pay the penalty [diken] for his transgression. However, Prometheus’ theft of fire can also be seen as an act of kindness and generosity. Each side therefore claims the support of dikē. Prometheus does not deny that the punishment is justified, but holds that it is too severe, engendering a new injustice. Towards the end of the tragedy he even accuses Zeus of acting without dike: ‘O holy mother mine, O Sky that circling brings light to all, you see me, how I suffer, how unjustly [edikia]’ (line 1093).

Focussing on the titanic individual (Prometheus), it becomes apparent that

selbst sein zu wollen, erleidet er an sich den in den Dingen verborgenen Urwiderspruch d.h. er frevelt und leidet (GT 9, KSA 1.70).

In transgressing the limit of individuality, the just boundary determined by Apollo, the ethical deity, the titanic individual suffers not only the consequences of his transgression, but also the painful conclusion that the theft of the fire is both just and unjust, and neither merely just or unjust. Like the best deconstructivist, Prometheus undermines the limit he is transgressing, and therefore moves at the margins of justice. Aeschylus’ interpretation of the Prometheus myth, insofar as it is the study of defiant individualism versus the unchangeable laws of the world, illustrates but does not exhaust the sublime terror of a world whose laws are beyond human comprehension. The double reading of the myth articulates the production of the painful and irresolvable contradiction at the heart of the world, a glance into the inside and terrors of nature.

Nietzsche continues his discussion of Prometheus Bound by drawing attention to the limit of the possibilities offered by the ‘ethical’ deity, Apollo: ‘Wer jenen innersten Kern der Prometheussage versteht – nämlich die dem titanisch strebenden Individuum gebotene Nothwendigkeit des Frevels – der muss auch zugleich das Unapollinische dieser pessimistischen Vorstellung empfinden’ (GT 9, KSA 1.70), that is to say, how Dionysian, or in Dennis King Keenan’s74 Levinassian terms, how otherwise than ethical is the basis for tragedy. Apollo, as Nietzsche reminds us, wants to grant repose to individual beings precisely by drawing boundaries between them and calling upon them through the sacred laws of the world, with his demand for measure and limit. However, there is always a danger of an excess of the Apollinian, leading to intellectual coldness and sterility.

Damit aber bei dieser apollinischen Tendenz die Form nicht zu ägyptischer Steifigkeit und Kälte erstarre, damit nicht unter dem Bemühen, der einzelnen Welle ihre Bahn und ihr Bereich vorzuschreiben, die Bewegung des ganzen Sees ersterbe, zerstörte von Zeit zu Zeit wieder die hohe Fluth des Dionysischen alle jene kleinen Zirkel, in die der einseitig apollinische ´Wille’ das Hellenenthum zu bannen suchte. Jene plötzlich anschwellende Fluth des Dionysischen nimmt dann die einzelnen kleinen Wellenberge der Individuen auf ihren Rücken, wie der Bruder des Prometheus, der Titan Atlas, die Erde. Dieser titanische Drang, gleichsam der Atlas aller Einzelnen zu werden und

The Dionysian always interrupts. It not only transgresses the limit set by the Apollonian, but simultaneously interrupts the limit that allows a transgression to be defined as such. That is, the Dionysian reveals itself not purely as that which is unjust, but also as that which reveals the irresolvable undecidability of the ‘unjust’ and the ‘just’. As Übermass, the Dionysian exceeds the Apollonian demand for justice. However, the Dionysian does not simply oppose the Apollinian; it is not merely apeiron or the lack of boundaries. Instead, it proves that any one system of justice is never complete, never final, and so never really just. The Dionysian interrupts any firm position from which one can make evaluations of justice and injustice, while at the same time refusing to absolve one from the responsibility for making judgments and defining justice.

Tragedy is not simply the restoration of order; it is also the re-establishment of tenable standards according to which human conduct can be measured. Tragedy happens on the edge of a justice game; when a particular system or set of rules is no longer sufficient to provide a sensible framework for dealing with extreme events, tragedy happens, and its resolution is the inscription of a re-defined order. The Oresteia is the obvious example. After the dramatic conflicts between Apollo and the Furies, Orestes and the gods, past and present, male and female, old and young, the goddess Athena shows and embodies the breath and depth of the tragic vision of justice. She unites male and female, new and old. Although she is a young goddess and apparently opts for the male, she, unlike Apollo, shows great reverence for the old, and decides in favour of Orestes only when the fate of the polis is at stake. Not only does she bring warring parties together under a new order, she also institutes the Aeropagus, a human court, which is henceforth to be the institutionalized defender of justice. (This shift from divine to human justice anticipates the move from tragic to poetic justice that Nietzsche detects in the work of Euripides, which will be discussed in the next chapter.)

Tragedy is only possible in a cosmological order that can accommodate such shifts, and the interconnected cosmos of antiquity was far more flexible in this respect than the separatist cosmology described in the introduction to this chapter. The function of the ancient ostrakon was to eliminate those who were trying to be gods, to
be more than human, and who by attempting this feat upset the balance of the *agon* to such an extent that the game could no longer go on. The world can tolerate only so many gods. Even Oedipus, by breaking all the limits of human behaviour, becomes *too* wise, too different for life in Thebes. He has seen too much. But at the same time, after his clash with the divine, the gods disappear (at least explicitly so) and in *Oedipus at Colonus* we see the re-establishment of a *human* order, a space of friendship demarcated by Oedipus and Theseus.

It is of course possible to argue, in a Nietzschean vein, that Oedipus simply continues being a mask for Dionysus, representing the unthinkable wherever he goes, and Theseus, as first citizen of Athens, representing Apollonian reason and law, in this case the law of hospitality. There is no end to the mask on the Greek stage. If this is the case, we could argue that Apollo and Dionysus are *themselves* but Olympian masks for an even older deity, about whom only hints have so far been made. This deity is *Moira*.

First mentioned by Nietzsche in *GT* 3, Moira personifies the titanic, unknowable indifferent dimension of nature, ‘die titanischen Mächte der Natur, jene über allen Erkenntnissen erbarmungslos thronende Moira’ (KSA 1.35). Moira is a divinity beyond the divine, so indifferent to human life and so abstract in nature that she is very difficult to personify. Yet to think the Greek world without her is impossible. She exists prior to the Apollonian limit, which is a mere human or aesthetic creation. Moira represents the *higher law* of the cosmic *agon* itself; humans may set limits to the *agon* in the theatre or the *agora*, but Moira sets the limit to life itself, determines winners and losers on the battlefield, and even limits the role of Zeus himself. According to the higher law of the cosmic *agon*, both limit and excess, Apollo and Dionysus, are equally justified and equally necessary. Moira personifies the free play of the entire cosmos, a game whose proportions are far beyond mortal comprehension.

Although the notion of the *agon* has been thoroughly examined and debated in recent literature,75 these discussions have largely occurred in the arena of political

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philosophy. However, as Siemens points out, Nietzsche did not apply his extensive considerations of the *agon* to democracy specifically, but rather to matters of culture in general. Whereas the preservation of the *agon* is for Hannah Arendt an explicitly political endeavour, for Nietzsche this principle permeates everything, the writing of history and the creation of a flexible metaphysics and aesthetics, not just ethics. Because the *agon* describes the *character* of the world, the operation of justice and the principle that drives aesthetics, it cannot really be described as a new metaphysics. Although agonistic models prove extremely fruitful to political theorists, I argue that agonistic strife is ubiquitous in the Nietzschean *oeuvre*, and operates on aesthetic, metaphysical, epistemological and ethical planes. It cannot be limited to the political, and one would be at a loss trying to explain Nietzsche’s conception of impersonal or disinterested justice without it. The concept appears again in the middle period, in *Morgenröte* 130, where Nietzsche explicitly links Moira with the sublime:

> Die Griechen nannten diess Reich des Unberechenbaren und der erhabenen ewigen Bornrheit Moira und stellten es als den Horizont um ihre Götter, über den sie weder hinauswirken, noch sehen können: mit jenem heimlichen Trotz gegen die Götter, welcher bei mehreren Völkern sich vorfindet, in der Gestalt, dass man sie zwar anbetet, aber einen letzten Trumpf gegen sie in der Hand behält, zum Beispiel wenn man als Inder oder Perser sie sich abhängig vom Opfer der Sterblichen denkt, sodass die Sterblichen schlimmsten Falls die Götter hungern und verhungern lassen können (KSA 3. 121).

It is Moira’s indifference that necessitates the friendlier masks of Apollo and Dionysus. Moira is the name given to the terrible abyss against which humans have to protect themselves.

Like so many ambivalent concepts in the ancient world, she is sometimes presented as plural and sometimes as singular. Homer speaks of a single Moira, a mysterious power to which even the gods are subject, whose decisions are irrevocable. Other authors presents the concept of fate or eternal cosmic law in plural form, Quintus Smyrnaeus remarks for example that ‘to the Moirae (Fates) the might of Zeus must bow; and by the Immortals’ purpose all these things had come to pass, or by the Moirae’s ordinance’ (13.545). The Romans knew the Moirae as the Parcae or Fates. The Moirae were independent goddesses, directing at the helm of necessity and

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watching that the fate assigned to every being by eternal laws took its course without obstruction. Zeus with all other gods and man had to submit to them. The Moirae assigned to the Erinyes, the powers who inflict punishment for evil deeds, their proper functions, and with them directed fate according to the laws of necessity. The decisions of the Fates cannot be altered, even by the gods. This makes the Moirai both so terrible and so wonderful.

The Moirae were portrayed in art and poetry as stern old women or sombre maidens. These women are often weavers; Clotho, the Spinner, spins the thread of life, Lachesis, the Dispenser of Lots, decides the span and assigns a destiny to each person, and Atropos, the Inexorable, carries the dread shears that cut the thread of life at the appointed time. The Fates apportion to each person at birth a share of good and evil, although people can increase the evil by their own folly. Addressing his old nurse Eurycleia, Odysseus declares that it was the moira of the gods, the suitors’ own cruelty (schetlia erga), that tamed them: ‘They maltreated everyone coming near them, whatever his status – and that, and their recklessness, brought them to their end’ (Odyssey XXII 413-416). Moira literally means ‘a man’s lot’ or ‘a man’s share’, the events that will come his way, good or bad. It is independent of the gods, an impersonal ‘fate’. Nietzsche makes the following argument:


The profoundly Aeschelyean demand for justice necessitates the placement not only of the titanic individual – literally Prometheus, and figuratively the titanic Greek artist for whom he stands – but also of the divine Olympian world on the scales of justice. Justice demands a union of the two worlds in the name of an ‘eternal justice’ that stretches far beyond both the human world and the glittering Olympian veil that hides the dark depths of the world into which man is thrown. What Nietzsche calls ‘the very first philosophical problem’, the problem of fire, immediately produces a painful and irreconcilable paradox [einen peinlichen unlösbare Wiederspruch]
between man and god, between the human and divine worlds. Nietzsche views Aeschylean justice as the ultimate justice game. It places the human world, in the form of the tragic individual, in conflict with the divine or Olympic world as a demonstration of the abstract, indifferent and distant principle that governs god and man alike. This justice transcends any human category of ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ and is at a level where this very dichotomy becomes almost meaningless:

Das Beste und Höchste, dessen die Menschheit theilhaftig werden kann, erringt sie durch einen Frevel und muss nun wieder seine Folgen dahnnehmen, nämlich die ganze Fluth von Leiden und von Kümmernissen mit denen die beleidigten Himmlischen das edel emporstrebende Menschengeschlecht heimsuchen – müssen (GT 9, KSA 1.69).

With this sublime view of the active sin, the ethical basis of tragedy is established: ‘die erhabene Ansicht von der activen Sünde als der eigentlich prometheischen Tugend’ (ibid). Human evil is characterised by its fruitfulness. A tree is indeed known by its fruit, and if it is a healthy tree, it will be, if not Promethean, at least Dionysian. What is essential in the just individual is his feeling of increased abundance, of fullness. Like an overflowing cup, insists upon giving. But richness is not identical with the positive and the comfortable; Oedipus is richer at Colonus than in Thebes. Only after his suffering does he have wisdom enough to share with Theseus. There are two kinds of suffering. Nietzsche chastises the Romantics for not seizing the potential embedded in suffering, part of the richness of the world:

The greatest tragic truth that the Greeks showed on their stage was the terrible fact that injustice is often a more potent feature of human life than justice; it generates, stimulates, says and challenges more – as such, it makes more world come into being. Cosmic injustice makes Übermenschlichkeit possible.

If anything, it is the excess of justice, of a sickly, decadent and, above all, poetic sense of justice emanating from humanism and threatening to strangle Europe, which forms the target of the Nietzschean enterprise. This form of justice, has as its central aim the elimination of pain, inequality and misfortune of any possible kind, for the totality of humanity. This form of justice refuses to take the meaning of the classic Latin phrase suum cuique triburere seriously. A single action can have innumerable consequences. Excesses in one aspect of life can severely impair the fruitful functioning of the cosmological order, and may require sacrifice later in an unexpected quarter. What is ‘due’ to the individual is simply that which makes him a useful component in keeping the cosmic game going. Nietzschean justice promotes the maximum play of as many forces as the cosmos allows. A moment of justice reigns when the cosmological order has reached its full potential, when it has shown the power of the world in the most glorious way possible.

As we have seen, the compassion that spectators initially feel for their finite Apollonian heroes is in reality unreal and phenomenal. It brings the spectators in touch with a deeper reality, the lust which through tragic action can be felt in the identification with boundless Dionysian life. As Nietzsche says, ‘Er schaudert vor den Leiden, die den Helden treffen werden und ahnt doch bei ihnen eine höhere, viel übermächtigere Lust’ (GT 22, KSA 1.141). Also,

\[\text{der Held, die höchste Willenserscheinung, wird zu unserer Lust verneint, weil er doch nur Erscheinung ist, und das ewige Leben des Willens durch seine Vernichtung nicht berührt wird.} \]
\[\text{`Wir glauben an das ewige Leben’, so ruft die Tragödie; während die Musik die unmittelbare Idee dieses Lebens ist (GT 15, KSA 1.108).} \]

Individual pain and destruction are thus mere phenomena compared to the reality of supra-individual life. Tragic justice, a unique form of inhuman justice, can bear a great deal of violence.

In an earlier note, Nietzsche says, `das enge Ziel des Individuums wird geahnt als Mittel eines Weltplans. Seine Vernichtung eine Bürgschaft, daß der Weltpplan von
ihm nach seinem Theil gefördert ist’ (Aphorism 599, KSA 7.219). Whereas earlier Nietzschean readings tended to emphasize the actions of an active subject forming the world in its own image, poststructuralist readings tend to portray a post-mortem self intertwined in a network of forces beyond its control. As in Hegel, the individual fate is justified as part of the all-embracing order of the world. But unlike Hegel, however, Nietzsche does not end here. It will become clear that Nietzsche’s self is not a surrendered self captured in the twilight zone of ethical passivity, as can be argued is true of the Levinassian post-mortem self. Rather, Nietzsche’s is a worldly self whose freedom cannot be captured in stale debates on the (non)existence of the will. It is an außermoralische self that exists in a world that defies explanation in moral terms.

A moral interpretation of suffering is one that derives its meaning from the activity of blaming. Blaming makes sense only in a moral context, since it is the action of placing the responsibility for an action, or more broadly, for the condition of the world, upon a particular party. Although Nietzsche mainly targets Christianity for its otherworldliness, the utopian is much older. The Stoics were among the first to propose an ideal standard according to which man should live. The standard in the case of the Stoics was of course ‘Nature’. But as much as Nietzsche admired the Stoics otherwise, he could not agree with them on this particular point.

Nature is far too measureless or, rather, the gap between the human métron and that of nature is too large to allow for practical ethical guidance. From the human perspective, nature is wasteful and indifferent, not lawless certainly, but simply operating by laws on a scale far beyond immediate human concerns and comprehension. The Stoics display their own unique version of hubris by desiring to live according to Nature. A part, however – for humans are but a part of nature – cannot hope to live by the standard of the whole. Nietzsche cuts them down to size:

The tendency to read ‘morality’ into nature, however, appears even in Heraclitus, whom the Stoics claim as their predecessor. Nietzsche criticizes him on the same basis as he attacks the Stoics. In a note from 1888 Nietzsche writes:

Seit Plato ist die Philosophie unter der Herrschaft der Moral. Auch bei seinen Vorgängern spielen moralische Interpretationen entscheidend hinein (bei Anaximander das Zu-Grunde gehn aller Dingen als Strafe für ihre Emancipation vom reinen Sein; bei Heraclit die Regelmaßigkeit der Erscheinungen als Zeugniss für den sittlichrechtlichen Charakter des gesammten Werdens (Aphorism 11259, NL 85-87, KSA 12.259).

Nietzsche’s interest in the Greeks is motivated by his career-long attempt to establish a way of thinking about ethics in which blame is no longer be the decisive factor. Prometheus Bound in particular, and tragedy in general, show that the world and its events cannot be justified in moral terms. Hence the allure of the pre-Socratic tragic world. Consider for example the following extract from Sophocles’ Trachinae:

Grief and joy come round to us all, as the Bear comes round in his circling paths (strophades). This I say since starry night does not abide with men nor calamity nor wealth (lines 129-133).

Man’s fortune is inserted into the circling of the stars. This is no anthropomorphic ‘wheel of fortune’ read into the stars. The ‘symbolic pattern’ of the stars is the primary bearer of significance, a significance which is not transferred to man but of which man is a constitutive part.

The Bear, in contrast to the anthropomorphic wheel of fortune, is a deep-toned reality, up there for all to see, a living power as were all stars to the Greeks, active in bringing seasons. The Bear’s movement relates prosperity symphonically to adversity, making neighbours of these opposites. 77

The cosmic cycle of generation and destruction is not confined to the destruction of wealth, but refers to the reversal of calamity as well. We are confronted with a world that is frightfully but also liberatingly removed from the individual’s fate. The movement of the cosmos is one of eternal returning, and human life is part of this movement, even if individual life is ended by the fact of mortality. A day can bring low all human things, and a day can lift them up again (Ajax 131-2). In one movement, the eternal return embraces the individual, the family, the polis, the earth and life itself.

The obvious question to raise at this point is whether it is possible for man to move in tune with the cosmic law of generation and destruction. The answer is of course no, because man is at once part of the cosmic order and radically opposed to it. The idea that divine order can be embraced is foreign to this world. It consists of an extended duality: On the one hand, man’s movements are in accordance with cosmic law, and on the other, they are inevitably discordant with it. The fundamental problem is that, as the messenger reminds us, man is unable to know the nature of the established ordinances. Therefore he can inadvertently act counter to them and is destroyed in the process. Ironically, in his destruction he fulfils the demands of order. Divine order needs the chaos of boundary transgression in order to fulfil itself. Let us return once more to Sophocles:

But my fate is always circling on the shifting wheel of the god and alters its nature; like the face of the moon is never able to stay for two nights in one shape, but first comes issuing from the dim, and then grows with lovelier face waxing to the full, and when it appears at its comeliest, then forthwith it flows away and comes to nothingness (medèn). (Fragmenta 871R)

From the divine point of view, the eternal cycle moves through generation and destruction, in perfect divine order. Concrete things, like the moon and man, however, experience no such stability. When they are at the peak of their existence, they come to nothing. In tragedy, we are confronted with the simultaneousness of the divine and mortal points of view, and with the fact that these perspectives are irreconcilable. Only when man stops living is he able to adopt the divine perspective. This fact is among the reasons why, apart from never being born, the best thing is to die soon. What tragedy shows is that nature and man have their boundaries apportioned to them, which as finite things they are unable to stay within. We can only exist if we
partake in the power which has engendered us, if we keep sharing in the *deinotes* which has brought us into existence. Power is doubled then. On the one hand, it is divine, apportioning power, and on the other it is manifest in finite entities. This duality is the source of all tragic conflict. The powers concentrated in the finite entities (the tragic heroes) prevent them from accepting the boundaries set to them. A potent cosmos produces potent heroes. But in order for the cosmos to remain potent, heroes who become too great or threaten the established order must be destroyed. As Anaximander puts it, ‘things have to pay for their violations according to cosmic law’.

The significance of Anaximander does not end here, however. The full text of the Anaximander fragment as translated by Nietzsche reads as follows:

> Woher die Dinge ihre Entstehung haben, dahin müssen sie auch zu Grunde gehen, nach der Notwendigkeit; denn sie müssen Buße zahlen und für ihre Ungerechtigkeiten gerichtet werden, gemäß der Ordnung der Zeit (*PHG KSA* 1.818).

The fragment – and it is an open question whether we do justice to the phrase by calling it such – appears to echo the tragic view that there is a fundamental law of equivalence that renders justice possible. It is this law of equivalence that keeps the cosmos *moving*, and by so doing, keeps it alive. In his book on Anaximander, Charles Kahn asks a particularly perceptive question: ‘Did Anaximander envisage an even greater cycle, in which the appearance of this differentiated universe out of the Boundlessness would itself be periodically balanced by the return of all things, including the elements, back into their original source?’ 78 Despite Heidegger’s attempt to do so, it is almost impossible to purge the fragment completely of themes of debt, punishment and penalty. This is not a problem, as long as these themes are not interpreted along moralistic lines. The debt in question belongs to the economy of atonement; it is not a moral one and there is no possibility of its final redemption. This means that Anaximander should be read in the same spirit in which (according to Nietzsche) he wrote:

> wie der typische Philosoph eben schreiben wird, so lange ihm noch nicht durch befremdende Anforderungen die Unbefangenheit und die Naivität geraubt sind: in großstilisirter Steinschrift, Satz für Satz Zeuge einer neuen

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According to Nietzsche, this spirit is that of a pre-metaphysical innocence which refuses to hunt for a single source or cause to which one can ascribe the ‘injustice’ of contingency, tragedy and mortality.

In this context Nietzsche recalls an uneasy Schopenhauerian notion, namely the *harshness* of the gift:

> Der rechte Maßstab zur Beurtheilung eines jeden Menschen ist, daß er eigentlich ein Wesen ist, welches gar nicht existiren sollte, sondern sein Dasein abbüßt durch vielgestaltetes Leiden und Tod: was kann man von einem solchen erwarten? Sind wir denn nicht alle zum Tode verurtheilte Sünder? Wir büßen unsre Geburt erstlich durch das Leben und zweitens durch das Sterben ab. (KSA 1. 818)

We can argue that culture as such has its origins in the desire to compensate for the unbidden but nevertheless bestowed gift of life. This gift is ambivalent, at first taken to be a grand example of generosity, but eventually proving to be almost unbearable. Nearly all cultures play out the theme of sacrifice eventually in their history: some literally, like the bloody human sacrifices in the ancient Mayan civilization, others by substitution, like the animal sacrifices of the Jews. Sacrifice is not for Nietzsche a problem if it is employed as a *measuring* or compensatory device – the sacrifice of Iphigenia, brutally unjust as it is, is also a liberating event, since without it the *agon* at Ilium would never have entered the history books, and would not have been immortalized by Homer. Christianity is at fault only for taking this to be a foundational concept: ‘Der christliche Glaube ist von Anbeginn Opferung: Opferung aller Freiheit, alles Stolzes, aller Selbstgewissheit des Geistes; zugleich Verknechtung und Selbst-Verhöhnung, Selbst-Verstümmelung’ (*JGB* 46, KSA 5.66). At the same time, however, Nietzsche constantly evaluates these compensatory strategies, and time after time it is the Greeks who, in his eyes, prove to be the most successful in justifying their own existence. They achieve this by facing the fact that humans are creatures with no real *right* to existence at all. An inability to do this leads to the fostering of a spirit of resentment, of hatred against the world and existence itself. Philosophy hitherto has been unable to deal with the *innocence* of the world, and has been pre-occupied with justifying formulae based upon suffering and punishment. But
explanations like these are always bound to disappoint, and so nihilism necessarily follows.

In a rare explicit moment, Nietzsche repeats this theme of cosmic indifference. The only thing that concerns justice is that the cosmic game and, by implication, life itself continue. Justice does not carry the scales, weighing crimes and misdemeanours like the Christian God or Dante’s Minos, but in a certain sense is the scales themselves, as we see in a passage from Notebook 5, summer 1886 – autumn 1887:


This should not be read as a straightforward defence of the law of talion. This passage is descriptive, not prescriptive. Unlike other modern lawgivers like Kant, Nietzsche does not demand that every individual take up the position of Justice herself. The law of talion that operates on a cosmic scale is a disinterested principle and as such does not flow from a spirit of revenge. Only humans – indeed those who are too human – can feel the need for revenge.

In this passage, reminiscent of Deleuze, Nietzsche describes the free play of the forces that make up the will to power. The ‘tit for tat’ phrase refers to the human inability to isolate an individual element and call it good, since as soon as a certain element threatens the cosmic agon by being overprivileged, the world rebalances
itself again. Justice has as her sole interest maintaining that Gleichgewicht without which no civilization, indeed no form of life, can flourish. The cosmic game is so complex that no ‘root cause’ or archē can be isolated. It is difficult, almost impossible, to live with this kind of madness. From the human perspective, Justice is indeed ‘madness’.

Der Geist der Rache: meine Freunde, das war bisher der Menschen bestes Nachdenken; und wo Leid war, da sollte immer Strafe sein.

‘Strafe nämlich, so heisst sich die Rache selber: mit einem Lügenwort heuchelt sie sich ein gutes Gewissen.

Und weil im Wollenden selber Leid ist, darob dass es nicht zurück wollen kann, – also sollte Wollen selber und alles Leben – Strafe sein!

Und nun wälzte sich Wolke auf Wolke über den Geist: bis endlich der Wahnsinn predigte “Alles vergeht, darum ist Alles Werth zu vergehn!”

“Und dies ist selber Gerechtigkeit, jenes Gesetz der Zeit, dass sie ihre Kinder fressen muss”: also predigte der Wahnsinn (Z II: 20, KSA 4.180).

Every attempt to demarcate a field of human justice that will at least be in proportion to limited human life fails when confronted by this distant, ultimate law, laconically captured in the French proverb ‘Tout passe, tout casse, tout lasse’. Philosophy, as we have seen in the introduction, is a unique compensatory strategy in an unjust world. But sometimes only madness can answer questions on which philosophy remains mute. Madness is the only response possible to the debt initiated by the first attempt to locate the archē. For no redemption from the condition of universal indebtedness is possible, unless by the death or destruction of the tragic debtor. When Euripides lost his sense of divine madness and started to produce tragic discourse instead of tragedy, a dangerous, final illusion entered on the Greek stage, namely the possibility of reconciling cosmic justice with human justice. Naturally, dialectic and the hope for obtaining ‘truth’ followed, and in the wake of the failure of this enterprise, cynicism and eventually ressentiment followed.

6. A Final Detour through the Ancient World

But the anti-tragic ethic does not emanate from Hellenic reason alone. Before we turn to the death of the tragic consciousness in chapter 2, let us briefly consider the other great source of inspiration for what we today call the Western mind. The experience of violence, death and suffering may be universal, but the voicing of the experience of
horror beyond human control in tragic terms is not. The tragic vision of man is distinctly Hellenic. It is alien to the other major source of Western intellectual life, namely the Judeo-Christian tradition.

The history of Israel is long and complex, but the Jewish vision of the world is not a tragic one, the book of Job notwithstanding. This black fable, which stands on the periphery of the Judaic tradition, is always cited as an instance of tragic vision, yet it ends on an optimistic note:

So the Lord blessed the latter end of Job more than the beginning; for he had fourteen thousand sheep, and six thousand camels, and a thousand yoke of oxen, and a thousand she-asses.

Even if the positive resolution of Job’s tragedy was added to the original story by a later hand, this does not outweigh the fact that an orthodox hand had to assert the claims of justice against those of tragedy before the book was included in the sacred canon. God makes good the disaster wreaked upon the servant, who has been compensated for his agonies.

But where there is compensation for injustice, there is justice, not tragedy. According to George Steiner in *The Death of Tragedy*79 this sense for justice is the pride of the Judaic tradition. Even when Job protests against the suffering of the innocent, God answers by ‘pulling rank’, saying, for example, ‘Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth?’ (*Job* 38:4). Jehovah may not be as playful as Zeus, but He is just, even in His fury. The balance of reward or retribution seems frightfully out of kilter, and the proceedings of God can be almost unendurably slow, but over time, there can be no doubt that God stands in a fundamentally just relationship to man. This also affects the style of the Jewish writers:


Not only does God and his noblest creatures, his chosen ones, stand in a just relationship with each other, but the ways of God are also ‘rational’. The Judaic spirit is almost as vehement as Plato in maintaining the order of the universe and man’s

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place in it are accessible to reason. The ways of the Lord can be neither absurd nor wanton, and they can be apprehended when the Lord’s commands are followed. In this respect, Marxism retains something Jewish in its insistence on Justice and Reason. Marx thoroughly repudiates the notion of tragedy. ‘Necessity’, he states, ‘is blind only insofar it is not understood’.\(^8^0\) Tragedy, however, arises from precisely the opposite assertion; necessity is blind and incomprehensible and can rob man of his eyes, be it in Thebes (Oedipus) or Gaza. There is a crucial distinction between the Fall of the City in the *Iliad* and the destruction of Jericho or Jerusalem. These latter disasters are merely passing instants in the rational design of God’s plan. The city’s walls will rise again either on earth or in heaven, when the souls of men are restored to grace. Nietzsche appreciates this vision:

The fall of Troy remains the first tragic metaphor in Western literature. Its fall is final because it is brought about by fierce godly sport and the wanton, mysterious choice of destiny. The Greeks do of course make attempts to throw the light of reason upon the shadowlands that man inhabits. Fate is given a name, and the gods are brought down to human level. But the Homeric warrior knows that he can neither comprehend nor control destiny. Ajax is destroyed for a mere breach of military etiquette. Patroclus,
Achilles and his noble adversary Hector are slain, while the vile Thersites sails safely for home. Calls for justice are met by the mute clamour of the sea.

The modes in which the histories of the respective traditions are recorded also differ. The wars of the Old Testament are not tragic. The Israelites will carry the day if they have observed God’s will and ordinance. They will be destroyed if they have broken the divine covenant or if their kings have fallen into idolatry. By contrast, the Peloponnesian wars are tragic. Behind them are fatal misjudgements, obscure fatalities and divine withdrawal, for which neither tragedian nor historian can offer a truly satisfactory account. The word of the prophet or priest nearly always disappoints. The tragic poets assert that the forces that shape or destroy destiny lie outside the governance of reason or justice. Even worse, though, are the demonic energies that prey upon the soul from the outside, turn reason into madness and poison human judgement so that even righteous men wreak havoc upon themselves and those they love. Homeric man knew that virtue is no guarantee of divine protection. The valiant Hector knows in his phren (‘soul’) that the gods have abandoned him (Iliad 13: 55). Or to put in terms of the tragic design drawn by Thucydides, Eteocles knows that he will perish at the seventh gate of Thebes, but continues nevertheless.

We are already past the care of gods.
For them our death is the admirable offering.
Why then delay, fawning upon our doom?

Nietzsche is no mere preserver. But for a world that deserves the name of justice, it is necessary to preserve something of this spirit. To be just is not merely to be active or passive, but to be tragic. But if Nietzsche is to be believed, Euripides and Socrates poisoned Justice by trying to be too just. However, like Eros, she did not die, but persisted in some degenerate form.
CHAPTER 2: THE FAILURE OF ART

*I may assert eternal Providence
And justify the ways of God to Men.*
John Milton *Paradise Lost* I.22

*Malt does more than Milton can
To justify God’s ways to Man.*
A. E. Houseman *Bredon Hill*

*There they call me by another name.*
Aslan in *The Last Battle* by C. S. Lewis.

*The time is out of joint.*
Hamlet, I.ii. 188.

1. From Sublime to Poetic Justice

‘Art itself’, writes Joseph Conrad in his most Nietzschean vein, ‘may be defined as a single-minded attempt to render the highest kind of justice to the visible world’. But when art fails at this, the result is metaphysics. Metaphysics is the graveyard of art that has forgotten to be art, taking its own ossified concepts for granted and denying the long process of formation behind its current usage.

An apt rejoinder to Conrad would be that it takes the highest kind of art to render the highest kind of justice in a world filled with misery and pain. The only form of art equal to the task is, as we have seen, tragic art. If Heidegger traced the remains of metaphysics in Nietzsche, Nietzsche traced its beginnings to Euripides.

Tragic art is more than just Apollo, or Apollo understood as the principle of intelligibility. And so was the principle of justice as it unfolded itself in pre-Euripidean drama. In contrast to Hannah Arendt, Nietzsche protests against the traditional translation of *drāma* as action. Ancient drama, Nietzsche notes in *The Case of Wagner*, cared far more about great scenes of *pathos* than about action. The word *drām* or *dran*, as it appears in some forms, is of Doric origin, and means either ‘event’ or ‘history’, both words in the hieratic sense. The oldest dramas always presented the legend of a region, the sacred history of a cult, and had connotations of ‘immersion’. In other words, the oldest dramas referred to a ‘happening’ rather than a deed, to the experience of being overcome rather than the act of overcoming.

Tragic art could only survive as long as it was understood in this way and did not attempt to clarify, rationalize or explain. It eventually did make this attempt, of

course, and as art came down in the world, so did justice. Tragedy became dialectic, and sublime or cosmological justice became poetic, regrettably not in the Heideggerian sense of the word.

Nietzsche illustrates this antithesis in his famous contrast between Dionysus and the Crucified. The latter embodies the universalist moral law of always refraining from harming others, along with the redemptive promise that the present world is imperfect and temporary, a stage rehearsal for the better one following just beyond. This is a future-orientated solution which justifies suffering in terms of its role as a means to a higher and less painful end-state which is not yet present. The older solution, embodied by Dionysus, maintains that suffering is justified simply because it is a necessary aspect of the world. If the present world is to be valued just as it is, then suffering must also be seen in a fundamentally positive light. In what can be regarded as the more extended version of his ‘final’ remark from *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche writes the following:

Dionysos gegen den ‘Gekreuzigten’: da habt ihr den Gegensatz. Es ist nicht eine Differenz hinsichtlich des Martyriums,— nur hat dasselbe einen anderen Sinn. Das Leben selbst, seine ewige Fruchtbarkeit und Wiederkehr bedingt die Qual, die Zerstörung, den Willen zur Vernichtung...im anderen Fall gilt das Leiden, der 'Gekreuzigte als der Unschuldige’, als Einwand gegen dieses Leben, als Formel seiner Verurteilung. Man erräth: das Problem ist das vom Sinn des Leidens: ob ein christlicher Sinn, ob ein tragischer Sinn... Im ersten Falle soll es der Weg sein zu einem seligen Sein, im letzteren gilt das Sein als selig genug, um ein Ungeheures von Leid noch zu rechtfertigen. Der tragische Mensch bejaht noch das herbste Leiden: er ist stark, voll, vergöttlichend genug dazu. Der christliche verneint noch das glücklichste Los auf Erden: er ist schwach, arm, enterbten genug, um in jeder Form noch am Leben zu leiden... der Gott am Kreuz ist ein Fluch auf Leben, ein Fingerzeig, sich von ihm zu erlösen der in Stücke geschnittene Dionysos ist eine Verheißung ins Leben: es wird ewig wieder geboren und aus der Zerstörung heimkommen. (Aphorism 12242, KSA 13. 265).

With this, Nietzsche refuses any reach towards the transcendent. In contrast to the Christian and especially the utopian tradition (the word quite correctly denotes ‘no place’), Nietzsche thinks of the fundamental law of life not in terms of self-preservation, but as a process of enhancing life, of self-overcoming and enhancing power. As we shall see, this notion informs both his morality, an extra-moral thinking beyond good and evil, and his politics, which flows from his affirmation of a ‘grand totality of the whole’ with the ultimate aim of creating the most potent culture through
the richest individuals. Through his affirmation of the whole, Nietzsche invites us to think of life beyond the metaphysical absolutes of fixed moral ideas or absolute moral judgement. *Die Geburt der Tragödie* represents an immature expression of a philosophy of art which is subsequently reformulated in various ways, yet always guided by the recurrent theme of preserving both scepticism and a belief in normativity, ‘die Lehre vom Gesetz im Werden und vom Spiel in der Nothwendigkeit’ (*PGH* 8, KSA 1.835).

Under the Nietzschean gaze the world of political and moral institutions is presented as a sphere of necessary illusion, a kind of self-composition of collective life, which, in order to come into being at all, must symbolize itself, ritualize and subordinate itself to values. This forms the Apollonian backbone of culture. In contrast to the Kantian position, Nietzsche’s view sees the normative sphere of laws, morals, mores and conventions flow from life’s compulsion towards art, not from the autonomy of a universal law of morals or *Sitten*. In order to appear valid, it merely adopts the guise of universality and autonomy. To succumb completely to the Dionysian, to remain immersed is to lose all individuation, all will and remembrance of personal ends, and to be swallowed in an oblivion that destroys all action. Apollo must give form and measure (*peras*) and become the ground for differentiation and individuation, because the possibility of difference is not a cosmic given: difference rests upon Art, not Nature. As we shall see in chapter three, this plays an important role in Nietzsche’s conception of interpretation.

According to Peter Sloterdijk, the Apollonian signifies nothing other than the necessity of imprinting upon the amorphous, chaotic compulsion of Dionysian forces a controlling form, which is ruled by the laws of moderation, individuality and self-limitation. The Enlightenment dream of justice belongs here, a dream of homeostasis or equilibrium born out of unbearably unjust conditions. But homeostasis is always bound to fail: if the Apollonian force of transfiguration subdues the Dionysian life foundation of pleasure and pain, this primitive vigour always rises again. Nietzsche writes the following of the Dionysian form of deification:

> Unter dem Zauber des Dionysischen schließt sich nicht nur der Bund zwischen Mensch und Mensch wieder zusammen: auch die entfremdete,

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Tragedy arises from the spirit of music, from the tragic chorus, to be precise. The original chorus is a satyr-chorus, composed of votaries of Dionysus, reminders of the original primordial force that leads back to ‘nature’. The chorus of natural beings embodies the ‘metaphysical consolation’ that every tragedy leaves behind, that life, at its base, despite all changes of appearance, is indestructibly powerful and pleasurable. Later, this metaphysical consolation proper to tragic culture is similarly characterized as the recognition of ‘der metaphysische Trost, dass unter dem Wirbel der Erscheinungen das ewige Leben unzerstörbar weiterfliesst’ (GT 18, KSA 1.115). As we have seen, the tragic joy in the destruction of the individual can only be understood ‘from the spirit of music’ which expresses ‘das ewige Leben jenseits aller Erscheinung’ (GT 16, KSA 1.108). The eternal life is untouched by the life or death of the hero, the highest appearance of the will. Tragedy affirms belief in eternal life, though life in its immense totality rather than necessarily the life of the individual, and music is the ultimate expression of this idea. Music affirms ceaseless change as eternally creative:

The ‘spirit of music’ that animates tragedy is the ‘greed for existence’ and the accompanying pleasure in existence that animates primordial being itself. Under the spell of such artwork we are united with an immeasurable, primordial pleasure in existence and at one with the indestructibility and eternity of this pleasure: ‘wir werden von dem wüthenden Stachel dieser Qualen in dem selben Augenblicke durchbohrt, wo wir gleichsam mit der unermesslichen Urlust am Dasein eins geworden sind und wo wir die Unzerstörbarkeit und Ewigkeit dieser Lust in Dionysischer Entzückung ahnen’ (GT 17, KSA 1.109). However, even in music, the most Dionysian of the arts there has to be something which remains stable, namely the score. Similarly, even in a work of a typically Apollonian type of art like sculpture, there has to be something that changes. If sculpture were not subject to change, and therefore purely Apollonian, it would have to remain the same forever – like a Platonic form. However, due to the change in the world – due to Dionysus – even every sculpture has to fade away eventually. But is music indeed the most flowing of the arts? Poetry could also be considered as permanently flowing and changing because it too needs to be read or performed, just as music needs to be played. However, what makes music slightly more Dionysian is that music uses tones, whereas poetry is made out of words, and words have a higher degree of order and of abstraction than tones. The higher the degree of abstraction, the closer something is to the principio individuationis which is opposed to the Dionysian unity. Therefore, music is a more Dionysian type of art than poetry, and there is no other type of art which is more Dionysian than musikē.

The fact that the contradiction and pain which is present in the original Dionysian unity is very skillfully employed by proper music is the second reason why Nietzsche links music with Dionysus. Dissonances that are painful to the human ear represent contradictions with respect to the tonal system, in the same way as consonances correspond to the tonal system. The dissonances Nietzsche had in mind were the ones from the prelude to Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde that was first performed in Munich in 1865. This prelude is one of the most decisive pieces for the development of 20th century music. At this point in the history of composition, the process of the dissolution of tonality is at a crucial stage, and it would eventually lead to the compositional order of Schönberg. Since with this piece Wagner distances himself from the principle of the tonal order, and embraces the dissonances, and Nietzsche regards Wagner’s music – at this stage at least – as the highest kind of
music, Nietzsche has good reasons for linking proper music to Dionysus. But that is not all. Dissonance plays as important a role as harmony in justifying the world:

Musik und tragischer Mythos sind in gleicher Weise Ausdruck der dionysischen Befähigung eines Volkes und von einander untrennbar. Beide entstammen einem Kunstbereiche, das jenseits des Apollinischen liegt; beide verklären eine Region, in deren Lustaccoorden die Dissonanz eben so wie das schreckliche Weltbild reizvoll verklingt; beide spielen mit dem Stachel der Unlust, ihren überaus mächtigen Zauberkünsten vertrauend; beide rechtfertigen durch dieses Spiel die Existenz selbst der ‘schlechtesten Welt’ (GT 25, KSA 1.154).

Here the concept of the sublime proves useful. The tragic is a privileged locus of understanding, where the usual categories of knowledge are pushed to their limits and then revealed for what they are, namely schematic forms of representation. In Schiller, Kant and Schopenhauer this knowledge can be disclosed only when the sensory aspects of human existence are stretched to the limit, usually through the inability of the imagination to provide an intuition adequate to the specific concept. All three thinkers reveal an aspect that exceeds sensuous finitude, an aspect that exceeds the phenomenal world. This seems to offer a solution to Schiller and Schopenhauer: Schiller, of course sees art as both reconstructing the divided and alienated subject of modernity and functioning as the medium through which man can express his freedom. Perhaps more importantly for our purpose, Schopenhauer sees art as a matter of coming to terms with the meaningless suffering at the heart of all phenomenal existence. Assiduously avoiding the Christian impulse to impose meaning upon suffering, for example through the concept of original sin, Schopenhauer empties the concept of the sublime of the kind of Enlightenment moralizing one still finds in Schiller and Kant. These two thinkers were of course important in raising the sublime above mere affectivity, but Schopenhauer occupies a pivotal position as mediator between the Romantics and idealism on the one hand and Nietzsche on the other. For Schopenhauer, aesthetic experience, and the sublime in particular, produces a state of insight into the illusionary nature of the phenomenal world dominated by the principle of sufficient reason or *principium individuationis* and the will to live. Aesthetic experience reveals the autonomous self for what it is, a self-objectification of the Will and not much besides. For Schopenhauer ‘the individual is only phenomenon, exists only for knowledge involved in the principle of
The dissolution of individuality that occurs in aesthetic contemplation, where through the dynamic sublime one can savour the prospect of one’s own distinction, shows that the fear of suffering and death are illusionary too, since death is merely a reversal to one’s own true, subjectless state. Contrary to Kant and Schiller, Schopenhauer shows sublimity as presenting the spectator with an actual threat to his continued existence: ‘With the sublime, the state of pure knowing is obtained first of all by a violent and conscious tearing away from the relations of the same object to the will which are recognized as unfavorable, by a free exaltation’. This state of pure knowledge can be obtained either through the dynamic sublime (being confronted by a hostile spectacle) or the mathematical sublime (something truly great).

Like Schiller, Schopenhauer sees tragedy as the genre that best demonstrates the sublime as the mimesis of human catastrophe. In Schopenhauer’s scheme this is an epiphenomenon of the Will itself in its blind, purposeless striving. ‘Tragedy is the description of the terrible side of life. The unspeakable pain, the wretchedness and misery of mankind… It is the antagonism of the Will with itself’. The insidious wickedness, the depths of misery which are the objects of tragic mimesis serve for Schopenhauer to tear away at the veil of Maya, to expose the deceptive truth of the principle of individuation: ‘the motives that were previously so powerful now lose their force, and instead of them, complete knowledge of the real nature of the world, acting as a quieter of the will, produces resignation, the giving up not merely of life, but of the will-to-live itself’. This is why, importantly, it is for Schopenhauer impossible to demand poetic justice. To demand this is to restrict oneself to the concerns of the phenomenal world, to assume that the individual soul of the tragic hero deserves justice. Tragedy renders such claims obsolete. Schopenhauer is keen to eliminate any notion of the self as substance, thereby engendering the ultimate paradox of tragedy that gives consolation to the spectator by providing the dissolution of the ego in the form of a grand spectacle. In the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer moves on to a more idealist form of the sublime without the moral undertones still present in Kant and Schiller. In the section

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85 Schopenhauer, A. *ibid*, p. 252.
on poetry in this volume, he remarks that it is precisely in this way that ‘we become aware that there is still left in us something different that we cannot possibly know positively, only negatively, as that which does not will life’.\textsuperscript{87} Whereas the concept of the sublime had hitherto involved moments of negation as well as affirmation, Schopenhauer now rejects any form of affirmation of the subject, including a dialectical form. Nietzsche’s \textit{Die Geburt der Tragödie} is an attempt to answer both the naïve metaphysics of the tradition emanating from Kant, Schiller and Burke, and the nihilism of Schopenhauer.

Even the most conservative reading of Nietzsche will reveal a modified concept of the sublime. Such claims for its action as revealing the real ‘essence’ of the world, tearing asunder the veil of Maya, or disclosing the immortal super-sensuous self have no place in \textit{Die Geburt der Tragödie}; ‘sie riecht anstössig Hegelisch’ (\textit{EH}, ‘die Geburt der Tragödie’, 1 KSA 6.318). Already in the early text, there is a refusal to accept any metaphysical notions of essence or distinctions between essence and appearance, essential or existential. Even this offensively Hegelian world is one where individuals are caught in a snare of representations, a semiotic universe with no intrinsic meaningfulness to be discovered once an imaginary veil is ripped off. For the veil is all that there is. This realization is apparent in \textit{GT} 7, where Nietzsche shows through the myth of Silenius that the truth of existence cannot be conveyed directly, but has to be mediated in the form of a myth, as the Dionysian Hamlet also knew: ‘In diesem Sinne hat der dionysische Mensch Aehnlichkeit mit Hamlet: beide haben einmal einen wahren Blick in das Wesen der Dinge gethan, sie haben erkannt, und es ekelt sie zu handeln; denn ihre Handlung kann nichts am ewigen Wesen der Dinge ändern, sie empfinden es als lächerlich oder schmachvoll, dass ihnen zugemuthet wird, die Welt, die aus den Fugen ist, wieder einzurichten’ (\textit{GT} 7, KSA 1.57).

The sublime in Nietzsche is clearly not a means of overcoming the limitation of human embodiment through the disclosure of a metaphysical super-sensuous truth underlying all phenomenal existence. The function of the sublime is to dispel the aura of representation. Like Dionysus, Apollo too, is capable of embodying his own particular kind of abundance, the abundance of the surface.

\textsuperscript{87} Schopenhauer, A. \textit{The World as Will and Representation}. New York: Dover Vol II, 1958, p. 433.

In ‘Genesis and Genealogy’⁸⁸ the deconstructivist critic Paul de Man attacks the Platonic paradox he detects in Die Geburt der Tragödie. At the heart of the essay is the Apollo-Dionysons opposition and the rhetoric Nietzsche employs to illustrate this contrast. Nietzsche supposedly brings a ‘negative valorisation’ to the Apollonian category of representation, but at the same time employs Apollonian rhetoric in order to make present the Dionysian insight that purportedly exceeds Apollonian representation in prose. According to de Man, the authority with which Nietzsche writes about tragedy clashes with his claim that textual representation is a form of illusion. If this problem seems familiar, it is because it echoes the Platonic conundrum of having to employ aesthetic devices such as dramatic monologue and metaphor in order to make clear his objections against the arts. Neither Nietzsche nor the early Plato wrote in the treatise style favoured by most philosophers. In fact, Plato borrowed from the stage at least as much as Nietzsche borrows from the poets. Both found it necessary to use a form of writing that has literary merits in order to convey philosophical ideas.

But then, Nietzsche already describes a historical phenomenon, gone forever, and is fully aware that he can but describe an ancient illusion with the aid of a modern one. Against Paul de Man it is possible to argue that the purpose of Die Geburt der Tragödie is precisely to make a case for accepting that being, the world, existence, reality, truth, or whatever metaphysical epithet one chooses – even justice – can never appear as such. It is the refusal to come to terms with this onto-theological condition.

that lies at the heart of the metaphysical project and its need for justice. Apollo’s true function, then, is measure and illusion, not illumination. The term ‘Apollonian’ has two meanings, neither of which refers to undiluted ‘representation’. The first gestures to the impulse to construct meaning, the second to a kind of false naturalization of the human activity of representing. In this sense, representation fails to acknowledge its status as such, masquerading as reality instead. Because there is ultimately nothing to represent, every representation is a misrepresentation. What is more, unless he stands forever locked in creative tension with Dionysus in a dialogue that never ends, Apollo loses his stimulating power and becomes merely theoretical. The sublime becomes merely representational. Nietzsche’s complaint is that his culture was both too Dionysian and too Apollonian because the link between them had been severed. Dionysus without Apollo becomes romantic, baroque and eventually chaotic; Apollo without Dionysus loses his divine power of illusion and becomes the penetrating gaze of theory. According to Nietzsche, modern Apollo can no longer be associated either with life-enhancing illusion or with aesthetic form, but should rather be regarded as the light of theoretical learning seeking to open up every single domain of human experience, trying to create order through nous or understanding. Undiluted Apollonianism in this sense is irredeemably hostile to art. The philosophical expression of this hostility is Platonism. ‘Plato almost always speaks only ironically of the creative force of the poet, insofar it is not conscious insight’. For Nietzsche, conscious insight is not the poet’s forte. On the contrary, poetry demands that the poet become ‘unconscious and bereft of understanding’ (GT 12). It is no accident that the first poet, Homer, is traditionally depicted as being blind.

2. The Abdicated Playwright

First of all, you (Euripides) dress your kings in rags to make them piteous to the people.
Aristophanes, Ranae
Reason can wrestle terror, and overthrow it at last.
Euripides

The honour of formally expressing the change that effected the death of tragedy belongs to Euripides of course, who, with a few stylistic changes and a carefully introduced scepticism, changed the face of tragedy and the public conception of
cosmic justice forever. While Aeschylus and Sophocles also weighed the gods and found them wanting, Euripides destroyed his contemporaries’ ability to be cheerful and creative in the face of cosmic indifference. Before Euripides, Greek theatre knew only actors, and distinguished only between those on the stage and those in the audience. Those in the audience may not have had speaking roles, but through the use of music and poetic rhythm they were drawn into the play until they experienced a loss of self similar to that engrossing the enraptured actors. Even the role between the creative artist and her audience broke down: ‘jetzt ist er zugleich Subject und Object, zugleich Dichter, Schauspieler und Zuschauer’ (GT 5, KSA 1.47).

This is why tragedy cannot be thought of without music. As mentioned above, tragedy arose out of the tragic chorus of satyrs, votaries of Dionysus, remainders of an originary, primordial nature. This chorus of ‘natural beings’ embodies the ‘metaphysical comfort’ every tragedy leaves behind – that life is at bottom, despite appearances to the contrary, powerful and an infinite source of joy. Nietzsche characterizes the metaphysical comfort proper to tragedy as the recognition that ‘beneath the whirl of appearances eternal life flows on indestructibly’. The tragic joy in the destruction of the individual can only be understood from the ‘spirit of music’ which expresses eternal life beyond all appearance and despite all destruction. The eternal life is untouched by the destruction of the hero, the highest expression of the will. Tragedy affirms belief in eternal life while music is the ‘immediate’ idea of this life. Music affirms ceaseless change as the ‘eternally creative’. The spirit of music that animates tragedy is ‘the greed for existence and pleasure in existence that animates the primordial being itself. Under the spell of this art we are united with the immeasurable, primordial pleasure in existence’ and imitate the indestructibility and eternity of pleasure. As such, it is an affirmation of the sublime totality of being: without purpose, sans raison.

It appears, however that man cannot bear the distance of the gods for very long, and if bowdlerization was the answer to Shakespeare’s indifferent boyish divinities (‘Like flies to wanton boys we are/They swat us as they please’), it was not long before even the robust, playful Greeks found it harder and harder to live in a beautiful but bewildering and ultimately unjust world. Eventually, even they began to demand justice.

Tragedy was killed by the two villains Euripides and Socrates, and they almost finished Justice off as well. She, like Eros, was given poison to drink, and like him, did not die of it, but remained living in a certain reduced way, first by becoming poetic and comprehensible and second, as we shall see in the next chapter, by becoming moral.

Writing in 1712, the critic John Dennis complains of Shakespeare’s tragedies that

the good and the bad perish promiscuously… there can be none or very weak instruction in them: for such promiscuous events call the government of providence into question, and by skeptics (sic) and libertines are resolved into chance.89

Dennis defends here what has come to be called ‘poetic justice’, a clear separation of the goats and the sheep, a comfortable system in which virtue is rewarded and vice punished (and are easily distinguished from each other). If this is not exactly what Fiction means, it is what Justice should be. Samuel Johnson, writing about the death of Cordelia at the end of King Lear, holds that ‘since all reasonable beings naturally love justice, I cannot easily be persuaded that the observation of justice makes a play worse’.90

This ‘English’ morality (which is of course not limited to the English) is the apotheosis of a long developed anti-worldly ethos that bluntly refuses to acknowledge the gap between human experience and the independent operation of the world, the world as a realm distinct from and indifferent to the human subject, which realm

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Nietzsche re-thinks as the eternal recurrence. There is a certain small-mindedness, characteristic of the humanist subject at his most petty, to the notion that the world was made to fit man and that it is merely a question of bringing man into harmony with a given worldly order.

Denn jetzt muss der tugendhafte Held Dialektiker sein, jetzt muss zwischen Tugend und Wissen, Glaube und Moral ein nothwendiger sichtbarer Verband sein, jetzt ist die transscendentale Gerechtigkeitslösung des Aeschylus zu dem flachen und frechen Princip der ‘poetischen Gerechtigkeit’ mit seinem Üblichen deus ex machina erniedrigt. (Sokrates und die griechische Tragödie, KSA 1. 632).

Furthermore, these humanists tend to forget that it is their own participation in the world that makes experience of a world possible, the ‘Fiktion einer Welt, welche unseren Wünschen entspricht, psychologische Kunstgriffe und Interpretationen, um alles, was wir ehren und als angenehm empfinden, mit dieser wahren Welt zu verknüpfen’ (Aphorism 11393, NL 85-88 KSA 12.366). Already in his lectures at Basel on Greek tragedy in 1870, Nietzsche contends that the justice of even Sophocles and Aeschylus is poetic and consequently has nothing to do with their tragedy. Later, in *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, as we have seen, Nietzsche maintains that Aeschylus’s eternal or transcendent justice represents one of the most important features of the zenith of Greek tragedy, which Nietzsche explicitly dissociates from ‘dem flachen und frechen Princip der ‘poetischen Gerechtigkeit’ (GT 14, KSA 1.95) which accompany the moralistic interpretation of tragic art.

As Stevens\(^{91}\) comments, however, it is not at this stage of Nietzsche’s career all that easy to distinguish between Aeschylean justice and retributive or punitive justice according to which a figure like Prometheus, for example, is seen to have been punished for stealing from the gods. *Poetische Gerechtigkeit*, after all, is sometimes called *ausgleichende Gerechtigkeit*, which is also the commonly accepted version of Aristotle’s *justitia commutativa*. Although Prometheus’ crime is excess, which is more of an aesthetic transgression than a moral crime, it would still be possible to read his crime of theft in moral terms.

Later, in *Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen* (1876), Nietzsche is better equipped to employ the Heraclitian worldview in an a-moralistic,

artistic metaphors. The concept of eternal justice is here clearly the struggle of conflicting Urqualitäten which are all eternally justified, and every victory and every defeat equally gerechtfertigt in innocent cosmic play. Let us briefly restate the notion of eternal or cosmological justice with a succinct quote from this text:


If the modern world is plagued by nihilism, this is because the modern subject attempts to measure the world according to categories that refer to an entirely fictitious world, and insist upon treating this as final truth. The problem is not measuring the world according to fictitious standards, for nothing else is possible, but rather that man has hitherto failed to take advantage of this fact. Not only has he failed to recognize the enormous potential that a perspectivist existence offers to the truly creative human, but he has also insisted upon restricting experience to one fictitious interpretation. Adding insult to injury is the modernist tendency (epitomized by Johnson) to read even fiction, the last domain of freedom, according to the rigid, fossilized standards of a bourgeois morality without ever acknowledging the creative element or the history involved in establishing what he calls ‘justice’. The will to truth and the desire for a ‘safe’ moral system are thieves that rob man of ‘der ganzen wundervollen Ungewissheit und Vieldeutigkeit des Daseins’ (FW 2, KSA 3.373) which allow the possibility of new creation. Nietzsche’s genealogies expose a subject too frightened within the flux of becoming to create, hopelessly dependent upon the will to truth.

Der Mensch sucht ‘die Wahrheit’: eine Welt, die nicht sich widerspricht, nicht täuscht, nicht wechselt, eine wahre Welt – eine Welt, in der man nicht
leidet: Widerspruch, Täuschung, Wechsel – Ursachen des Leidens! Er zweifelt nicht, daß es eine Welt, wie sie sein soll, giebt; er möchte zu ihr sich den Weg suchen.


In Nietzsche’s opinion, the fatal error was the introduction of reason and dialectics which distorted Justice; like tragedy, this ancient lady came down in the world, first in the sense of losing a privileged position, of becoming ordinary, and second, in becoming part of the human world, as something that can be discovered, attained and captured in human law. Poetic justice, which is ordinarily taken to be the ‘purest’ kind of justice, the version of justice that aims to give everyone _exactly_ what he deserves, is very dangerous, for it implies that the world can be measured by human measures and controlled by human power. In Heideggerian terms, it is thinking of Being purely in terms of beings, and the human being at that. Poetic justice is already the denial of perspective and the beginning of faith in metaphysics, for it implies an underlying order, a hidden standard with which the world has to be brought into accord.

Nun steht freilich neben dieser vereinzelten Erkenntniss, als einem Excess der Ehrlichkeit, wenn nicht des Uebermuthes, eine tiefsoinnige Wahnvorstellung, welche zuerst in der Person des Sokrates zur Welt kam, jener unerschütterliche Glaube, dass das Denken, an dem Leitfaden der Causalität, bis in die tiefsten Abgründe des Seins reiche, und dass das Denken das Sein nicht nur zu erkennen, sondern sogar zu _corrigiren_ im Stande sei (GT 15, KSA 1.99).

Until genealogy arrived on the philosophical scene, philosophers have secretly regarded themselves as code-breakers rather than creators, and their task as uncovering the elusive rational order beneath all chaos. Finding the blueprint to life would naturally enable us to finally control the uncontrollable, and that, of course, is bourgeois or slave heaven:
In allem Ernste: die Unschuld der Denker hat etwas Rührendes und Ehrfurcht Einflössendes, welche ihnen erlaubt, sich auch heute noch vor das Bewusstsein hinzustellen, mit der Bitte, dass es ihnen ehrliche Antworten gebe: zum Beispiel ob es ‘real’ sei, und warum es eigentlich die äussere Welt sich so entschlössen vom Halse halte, und was dergleichen Fragen mehr sind. Der Glaube an ‘unmittelbare Gewissheiten’ ist eine moralische Naivetät, welche uns Philosophen Ehre macht: aber – wir sollen nun einmal nicht ‘nur moralische’ Menschen sein! (JGB 34, KSA 5.52).

This is why Nietzsche in several places calls hope the most dangerous virtue. Hope takes away the necessity for real courage and reduces justice and along with it the scope and magnitude of the world. The stage is set for the second step, the arrival of Christianity, which knows only charity, not justice. Aphorism 934, KSA 7.402, reads:


According to Nietzsche, Euripides carved out an identity as the last tragic poet, the poet who questioned the justification of the justifying Dionysian myth under whose auspices he began his career:


Euripides, unlike Aeschylus and Sophocles, never held a political or religious office nor took part in a military operation as an Athenian soldier. He was far more detached from public life, and this had a decided influence on the more domestic as well as the pessimistic nature of his work. Whereas Sophocles, even during the crises during the final stages of the Peloponnesian War, never lost faith in either Athens or its sense of justice, Euripides suffuses his later work with pessimism.

92 Although Sophocles gives a hint of scepticism in his Philoctetes, he left a lasting memorial to his native city in the form of Oedipus at Colonus.
For Euripides, the old tragic gods are too far removed from human cares, and their standard of measuring human virtue and vice inhuman. From now on they would be human, or not exist all. The world of Aeschylus and Sophocles was a world that only made sense to heroes, who were often regarded as half-divine due to their ability to play a game according to rules set by divinities. These playwrights catered for an audience who could live with the blatant injustices of the world. Euripides shifts the subject matter of tragedy away from the exalted heroic theme of the wisdom of reconciling oneself to incomprehensibility and the inability of mortals to understand the grandeur and indifference of eternal cosmic law, and accepting this fact as a necessary precondition for a flourishing artistic culture. Instead he turns to topics seated within the comfort of the human framework; commonplace civil affairs and the mishaps and common entanglements of ordinary citizens. Homeric heroes are brought down: ‘Odysseus, der typische Hellene der älteren Kunst, sank jetzt unter den Händen der neueren Dichter zur Figur des Graeculus herab, der von jetzt ab als gutmütig-verschmitzter Haussclave im Mittelpunkte des dramatischen Interesses steht’ (GT 11, KSA 1.76). And so too, are Sophoclean ones. The superhuman status of Sophocles’ Heracles in The Trachinian Women predisposes the audience to be indifferent to his suffering; his Euripidean counterpart, by contrast, is portrayed from the outset as a ‘family man’, not an aloof, superhuman demigod. If anything, Euripides’ Heracles lacks sōphrōsyne; he is one of antiquity’s most emotional and loquacious heroes:

Come children, follow your father into the house. You are happier now to be going in then you were when you first came out, aren’t you? But take courage, and don’t let those tears fall from your eyes any longer. Dear wife, pull yourself together, stop trembling, and let go of my robes, all of you! For I have no wings and do not wish to flee from those whom I love. Ha! They will not let me go, but cling more tightly to my clothes! You really were on a razor’s edge, weren’t you, little ones? Well, I’ll take these little boats myself and lead them by the hand. Like a big ship I’ll tow them. I’ll not neglect my children. The affairs of mortals are the same in this respect: everyone, no matter what his standing, loves his child. In wealth, it is true, people are different: some have it, others do not. Yet they all love their children (lines 622-633).

In the highly entertaining verbal exchange between Euripides and Aeschylus in Act II of Aristophanes’ The Frogs, the populist Euripides accuses Aeschylus of writing ‘great galumping phrases, fearsome things with crests and shaggy eyebrows. Magnificent! Nobody knew what they meant, of course’. Aeschylus ‘goes in for high-
flowing Olympian language, instead of talking like a human being’. Tragedy, Euripides complains, was in a terrible state when he inherited it, ‘swollen’ with high diction. It was he who got her weight down, putting her on a diet of finely chopped logic and a special decoction of dialectics. Everyone in his plays is always hard at work, talking. In an almost Brechtian fashion, he boasts that the public have learnt from him to think and question, ‘Why is this so? What do we mean by this?’ Dionysus, who is in on the quarrel, sardonically and with withering bathos concurs that no Athenian can come home these days without asking, ‘What do you mean by biting the head of that sprat?’, or, ‘Where is yesterday’s garlic?’

The dramas of Euripides are overrun by Everymen. Instead of portraying the grand and bold traits of tragic heroes, he depicts ordinary humans with that ‘peinliche Treue, die auch die misslungenen Linien der Natur gewissenhaft wiedergiebt’ (GT 11, KSA 1.76). His taste for the mundane triumphs over the taste for the rare; Euripides is already **democratic** in the worst possible sense of the word. Interest in the infinite variety of human corruption replaces fascination with human perfectability. In Nietzsche’s interpretation, Euripides’ dramas address the daily concerns of the common citizen and endorse the value of her business, public affairs and lack of pretension to cultivation.

The *Ion* can stand as typical example. The story is similar to that of *Oedipus Rex*. Creusa, daughter of the Athenian king Erechtheus, is seduced by Apollo. She becomes pregnant and conceals the pregnancy from her father. Soon after giving birth to her son she exposes him in the same cave in which he was conceived. Thinking that the child is doomed, she placed next to him, as a burial gift, the jewellery of the Erechtheids. But, as Hermes recounts, Apollo instructs him to take the little boy to the temple of Delphi, where he is raised by the Pythia. Years later Creusa, now having married a respectable Athenian, is reconciled with Ion, with Athena appearing as a *deux ex machina* to corroborate her story.

The figure of Apollo has puzzled many interpreters. Did Euripides intend to depict a god without ‘character’ whose conduct is as reprehensible as any human’s? The debate continues. But whatever the purpose of Euripides’ ungodly gods, they made the New Comedy possible: ‘und wenn jetzt überhaupt noch von ‘griechischer Heiterkeit’ die Rede sein darf, so ist es die Heiterkeit des Schlaven, der nichts Schweres zu verantworten, nichts Grosses zu erstreben, nichts Vergangenes oder Zukünftiges höher zu schätzen weiss als das Gegenwärtige’ (GT 11, KSA 1.78). In his
1983 lectures on *parrhesia*\(^9\), Michel Foucault detects something similar. In *Oedipus the King*, Sophocles depicts the shift in responsibility for truth-telling from the gods to human beings, but he meets both groups halfway, allowing the two parties to share the burden. Sophocles’ slaves must confirm a truth that Apollo has already spoken. Euripides’ *Ion*, by contrast, places the responsibility for truth-telling firmly in the hands of the Athenian citizens. Although the goddess Athena confirms Creusa’s story, the representative of divinity is Apollo, who is discredited as a rapist, liar and coward.\(^9\) This tragedy no longer depicts a powerful human being who is punished for failing to heed the truth spoken by a god; instead Ion becomes a victim because a guilty god fails to speak the truth: *Dieu, j’accuse.*

The expanded horizon that Euripides’ tragedy helped to bring about results in a drastic narrowing of a sense of human nobility. Even without formal knowledge of Nietzsche’s views on the three great tragedians of antiquity, it is possible to experience something similar to Nietzsche’s ‘metaphysical joy’ in the progressive annihilation of great characters like Clytemnestra, Prometheus and the Orestes of the *Oresteia*:

Die metaphysische Freude am Tragischen ist eine Uebersetzung der instinctiv unbewussten dionysischen Weisheit in die Sprache des Bildes: der Held, die höchste Willenserscheinung, wird zu unserer Lust verneint, weil er doch nur Erscheinung ist, und das ewige Leben des Willens durch seine Vernichtung nicht berührt wird. ‘Wir glauben an das ewige Leben’, so ruft die Tragödie; während die Musik die unmittelbare Idee dieses Lebens ist (*GT* 16, 1.108).

In the *Oresteia* in particular, a tension is discernable between the annihilation of individuals and the assertion of an abysmal, indestructible cosmic order which encompasses human life. At the end of *Oedipus Tyrannus*, the audience perceives and feels the truth that the hero in *Oedipus Colonus* (line 393) discovers about himself: ‘Just when I am no longer, am I then a man?’ As Oedipus reaches the abyss of human nothingness he asserts that authentic human existence lies in the human ability to experience that abyss in vivo. Because of this experience, a strange confidence arises in Oedipus, a genuine cheerfulness.

There is nothing of this sort in Euripides. His tragedies demonstrate a life that is brutal to mortals and gods, who if they exist, only make matters worse. Apollo is a

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seducer who fails in his paternal duties (*Ion*) and makes inhuman demands (*Alcestis*). Hera and Aphrodite in their jealousy leave destruction of mortals in their wake (*Heracles; Hyppolytus*) and Zeus ignores the woes of the vanquished (*Hecuba*). Figures like these were ripe for Platonic censure.

Therefore, Nietzsche argues, if the gods were to survive *pace* Euripides, it would be in humanized, i.e. *moral* terms. Martha Nussbaum writes that for a Greek to attend one of Euripides’ plays was for him to ‘engage in a communal process of inquiry, reflection and feeling with respect to important civic and personal ends’. Euripides not only makes his deities almost unnecessary, but also far closer to human types than the grand deities of Aeschylus and Sophocles. Euripidean tragedy can be described as a domestication of the gods; the playwright *demands* their descent from Olympus to the *polis*. God became man centuries before Christ, according to Nietzsche. Euripides, he says, could no longer bear the distance between gods and men that made tragedy possible. All the gods begin to share in Hermes’ status; at best they are messengers representing new principles of clarity and fairness, often introducing a play in the form of a prologue, and at worst, they are superfluous.

The one god who remains in Euripides’ work is Socrates, the personification of the theoretical man. He influenced Euripides such that, according to Nietzsche, Euripides no longer just created tragedies unconsciously as Aeschylus did but rather dedicated himself to the analytic *study* of tragedy before he wrote his own tragedies. He had to understand what the older tragedians were doing, to be conscious of the order of the tragedies and from this develop a tragic blueprint which he could follow. In this sense, Euripidean tragedies are Socratic. According to Socrates, the virtuous man needs knowledge to be virtuous and, according to Nietzsche, Euripides applies an analogous principle to his tragedies. Something has to be understandable to be beautiful, and existence comprehensible in order to be justified:

[…]{[...]}und deshalb ist das Bild des sterbenden Sokrates als des durch Wissen und Gründe der Todesfurcht enthobenen Menschen das Wappenschild, das über dem Eingangsthor der Wissenschaft einen Jeden an deren Bestimmung erinnert, nämlich das Dasein als begreiflich und damit als gerechtfertigt erscheinen zu machen (*GT* 15, KSA 1.99).

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Nietzsche refers to this attitude as ‘aesthetic Socratism’, Euripides’ desire to establish Apollonian beauty by means of Socratic reason. Before Euripides, tragedy was always linked to insight into the Dionysian original unity. Euripides brought about the death of tragedy because proper tragedy needs a Dionysian grounding, that is, it has to be based on the insight that the world is self-contradictory, that it is permanently changing, and that in the end humans do not receive any further reward for all the pain they have to bear during their lives. All these aspects are absent from Euripidean tragedies. Euripides replaces the great synthesis of Apollo and Dionysus with a collaboration between Apollo and Socrates, through which the Socratic element masters Apollo’s illusions. This Socratic-Alexandrian culture, according to Nietzsche, reigned unchallenged until the nineteenth century, revealing itself for example in the importance of typical traditional operas before Wagner.

According to Foucault, Euripides is the first to use the word *parrhesia*. In his work it does not denote ‘free speech’ in the modern liberal sense of the word so much as the attitude or mode that a speaker is supposed to adopt when speaking the truth, that is, a temporary abandoning of deliberate ambiguity and irony. In his *Orestes*, Foucault contrasts the ‘good’ *parrhesia* of the honest citizen with the bad *parrhesia* of the demagogue. The first significant modification of the political construal of this term can be found in Plato’s representation of the Socratic dialectic. Instead of opposing human truth-telling to divine truth-telling or, as in the case of the *Ion*, the lack thereof, or opposing political wisdom to political flattery, as in the *Orestes*, Socrates opposes the philosophical quest for truth to the false rhetoric of the Sophists. In tracing the genealogy of these practices from the Hellenistic period to early Christianity and beyond, Foucault implicitly reworks Nietzsche’s idea that the modern practices of truth seeking have their roots in Euripides and Socrates.

The point is not that the theoretical attitude towards the world is not born out of an artistic drive. Rather, Nietzsche holds that the artistic drive behind the theoretical impulse is weak and impotent, a withered and dry leaf growing upon what was once life’s golden tree. This is because Euripides and Socrates refused their status as *artists* and failed to make the most of their artistic possibilities. The question of justice is ultimately one of becoming the most that one can be, which is what it means to be faithful to the will to power.

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96 Foucault, *ibid.* p. 57.
97 Foucault, *ibid.* p. 74.
By avoiding life’s harshness, by glossing it over with the weak illusion of poetic justice, Euripides begins to raise the inhumane hope for a justice to come (but might never arrive), a purified world stripped of its negativity. Art is now truly beyond the world, and art that is not part of the world anymore can no longer reconcile humanity to the world. Tragedy in this form is corrupting. In a remarkable and often ignored section of *Menschliches Allzumenschliches*, Nietzsche wonders whether Plato may not have had a point after all, when he charged that

man durch die Tragödie insgesamt ängstlicher und rührseliger werde. Der tragische Dichter selbst würde dann nothwendig eine düstere, furchtvolle Weltbetrachtung und eine weiche, reizbare, thränensüchtige Seele bekommen, desgleichen würde es zu Plato's Meinung stimmen, wenn die tragischen Dichter und ebenso die ganzen Stadtgemeinden, welche sich besonders an ihnen ergötzen, zu immer grösserer Maass- und Zügellosigkeit ausarten (*MA* 212), KSA 2.173).

Nietzsche sides even more decisively with Plato in *Morgenröte*, suggesting that the philosophers in the age of Plato had good reason to complain of the harmfulness of tragedy once the Athenians had lost the ‘warrior hardness’ of the age of Aeschelus and had become ‘soft’ and ‘sensitive’ as a consequence of the refinements of urbanization, and presumably, democratization:

Ein Zeitalter voller Gefahren, wie das eben beginnende, in welchem die Tapferkeit und Männlichkeit im Preise steigen, wird vielleicht allmählich die Seelen wieder so hart machen, dass tragische Dichter ihnen noth thun: einstweilen aber waren diese ein Wenig überflüssig, – um das mildeste Wort zu gebrauchen. – So kommt vielleicht auch für die Musik noch einmal das bessere Zeitalter (gewiss wird es das bösere sein!), darin, wenn die Künstler sich mit ihr an streng persönliche, in sich harte, vom dunklen Ernst eigener Leidenschaft beherrschte Menschen zu wenden haben: aber was soll die Musik diesen heutigen allzubeweglichen, unausgewachsenen, halbpersönlichen, neugierigen und nach Allem lüsternen Seelchen des verschwindenden Zeitalters? (*M* 172, KSA 3.152).

A world so receptive of the chaos beyond its borders is a world neither capable of producing, nor able to appreciate the potential of tragedy. This is when art becomes decadent and fails to fulfill its primary function, which is to demarcate and justify.

*Die Ernährung des modernen Menschen*. – Er versteht Vieles, ja fast Alles zu verdauen, – es ist seine Art Ehrgeiz: aber er würde höherer Ordnung sein,
wenn er diess gerade nicht verstünde; *homo pamphagus* ist nicht die feinste Species. Wir leben zwischen einer Vergangenheit, die einen verrückteren und eigensinnigeren Geschmack hatte, als wir, und einer Zukunft, die vielleicht einen gewählteren haben wird, – wir leben zu sehr in der Mitte (*M* 171, KSA 3.152).

This is an instance of reactive nihilism, the pessimism of the weak, those who cling to the ideal of a transcendent unchanging truth and who condemn all existence for failing to meet that expectation. The sense of mourning at the loss of such certain truths is accompanied by the conviction of the worthlessness of all existence, since it cannot be justified by some authority. This *ressentiment* can express itself in a variety of ways, even in the work of those characterized by superabundance, such as the Romantics and Epicurus:


Although he does not explicitly mention him, the same could be said for Euripides. There is a tendency in reactive nihilism to turn its energies against cultural order and tradition – Nietzsche regarded the anarchist movement as a contemporary example. As early as 1873 Nietzsche criticized ‘Bakunin der im Haß gegen die Gegenwart, die Geschichte und die Vergangenheit vernichten will. Nun wäre um alle Vergangenheit zu tilgen freilich nöthig, die Menschen zu vertilgen: aber er will nur die bisherige Bildung, das ganze geistige Weiterleben, vernichten’ (*Aphorism* 1414, KSA 7.26). This form of confusion is often accompanied by extreme self-absorption, with the emphasis on ‘introspection at any price’. This self-absorption as we shall see in chapter four, is an integral part of the birth of asceticism that he outlines in *Zur Genealogie der Moral*. It is a dangerous cultural phenomenon because it represents a turning of energies, specifically the will to power, against themselves, rather than directing them outwards in a nobler fashion. Above all, it is a form of neurosis that signifies the inability to bear pain, the root of the *need* for justice.
3. Plato’s trauma and the problem of Socrates

’However, I believe Plato was sick’.

Plato in *Phaedo* 59b10.

It is possible to summarize Nietzsche’s lifelong engagement with Plato and Socrates with a single word: *disappointment* – that Socrates’ ‘ear infection’ or his *daemon* (*MA* I: 126) did not make him sing, and that Plato abandoned his role as tragic lawgiver and become the scribe of a dialectician. Both could have been so much *more* if Socrates could sing and Plato had courage. Socrates’ death in 399 B.C. would single-handedly end tragedy in its ancient form forever (although it was already ailing for a long time) That Athens could condemn her wisest, noblest and most just citizen to the hemlock, was enough to make Plato despair of worldly justice. *Fortuna, j’ accuse.* Henceforth he would describe the domain of worldly virtue in terms of shadow, darkness and confusion and advise those looking for wisdom to search for it in the bright heavens of the Eternal Ideas. The watered-down version of tragedy after Euripides could at this stage no longer truly reconcile man to the fragility of his existence. The gods, once able to shield man from the terrors of his existence, and act as grand vehicles for expressing the sheer *gratitude* towards existence, were no longer enough.

Das, was an der Religiosität der alten Griechen staunen macht, ist die unbändige Fülle von Dankbarkeit, welche sie ausströmt: – es ist eine sehr vornehme Art Mensch, welche so vor der Natur und vor dem Leben steht! – Später, als der Pöbel in Griechenland zum Übergewicht kommt, überwuchert die Furcht auch in der Religion; und das Christenthum. Bereitete sich vor (*JGB* 49, KSA 5.70).

According to Martha Nussbaum, the main motivation for Plato’s philosophical project is to achieve release from the contingencies of Fortune. Plato sought to articulate a self-sufficient and abiding sense of human worth immune from the vagaries of chance and change, or to paraphrase Nussbaum, he wanted a goodness without fragility. The appeal of this project to the Athenians should be obvious. After

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99 The very word ‘vagary’ has a negative connotation. It comes from the Latin *vagarus*, from which the English ‘vagabond’ derives, i.e. someone who disrupts the established order of things with hostile acts.
the disastrous outcome of the Peloponnesian War, the generation in which the
*Republic* was written was one in which the thoroughness and discipline of Sparta prevailed. Critias, leader of the defeated Athenian oligarchy, advocated the abandonment of democracy on the score of its inefficiency during war, and secretly lauded the aristocratic government of Sparta. Critias was a pupil of Socrates and an uncle of Plato, and it is likely that he impressed upon the young Plato the importance of devotion to duty and the difference the right *skill* could bring to the outcome of conflict, be it military or rhetorical. Not long before the Academy was opened, a professional soldier, Iphicrates, had astonished the world by showing what a body of light-armed, professionally trained troops could do even against the heavy infantry of Sparta. Professional oratory started at roughly the same time with the school of Isocrates. What Plato rightly perceived is that the question of training is much more than a military or rhetorical issue: behind the need to train lies the question of what to teach and what to train men to do. The striking thing in Plato is the coupling of training with investigation, or professional standards of skill with scientific standards of knowledge. The basis for locating the locus of value unaffected by the ways of the world is the security of reason and the eradication of all that is subject to the fleetingness of human desire. The most important strategy in Plato’s endeavor consists of establishing a series of distinctions such as soul/body, material/immaterial, eternal/changing, appearance/reality, thereby inaugurating the ‘Grundglaube der Metaphysiker’, *der Glaube an die Gegensätze der Werthe* (*JGB* 2, *KSA* 5.16). By thinking ultimate reality in oppositional terms, the metaphysical tradition hopes to define a space in which all that is worthwhile about being human is insulated from the caprice of Fortune. This space should be no means with confused with the healthy, robust *innocence* that characterizes the tragic outlook. Whereas the comfort zone of morality selects only the features of life that it finds acceptable and deems them real, tragic art reconciles man to what Abbé d’Aubignac called the domain of the domain of disorder and anxiety: ‘c’est là où règnent le désordre et l’inquiétude’. The old world of action and glory was of course precariously balanced upon the knife-edge of Fortune, and as Charles Taylor states, ‘Plato’s work should be seen as an important contribution to a long-developing process whereby an ethic of reason and reflection

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100 Even the word ‘caprice’ has tragic associations: it is related to the Italian *capra* ‘goat’ – the goat, in contrast to the sheep being the ‘uncontrollable’ animal – hence the name ‘tragedy’ or goatsong.
gains dominance over one of action’. But first Plato had to domesticate the unruly old gods of polytheistic Athens. To this end, Plato devised an ultimate standard that could be imposed upon the time-bound changeable world from a point beyond all time and change – and beyond all pain. Against the shining Olympian pantheon Plato introduced the notion of a ‘theological god’ in the *Republic* (379a). This god is an attempt to transcend all tensions and potential for conflict and contradiction inherent in Greek polytheism, for the sake of a unitary principle of meaning and measurement. Against the Nietzschean charge that his ‘cure’ for the fragility of mortal life constitutes a nihilistic withdrawal from the world, destroying the very thing it sought to conserve, Plato would reply that a firm sense of reality was maintained precisely by liberating human perceptions from the constraints of appearance. Genuine reality (*to ontos on*) is only that constituted by changelessness and order. The appearance of things, characterized by change is a deceit, and real reality is apprehended only in as much as one is able to see beyond the appearance of things.

Nietzsche’s criticism of the philosophical tradition of Judeo-Christianity – philosophy half-dead at the top – is not limited to its teleology and anti-worldly character. For Nietzsche it is impossible to separate style and content: to develop a new style is to justify the world entirely. Again, one could reiterate Nietzsche’s attitude towards the Platonic/Socratic dialogue: he was disappointed that it was not more dramatic. He complains first of all that the dialectic is rude trickery:

> Mit Sokrates schlägt der griechische Geschmack zu Gunsten der Dialektik um: was geschieht da eigentlich? Vor Allem wird damit ein vornehmer Geschmack besiegt; der Pöbel kommt mit der Dialektik obenauf. Vor Sokrates lehnte man in der guten Gesellschaft die dialektischen Manieren ab: sie galten als schlechte Manieren, sie stellten bloss. Man warnte die Jugend vor ihnen (*GD* 6, KSA 6.69).

Dialectics possesses no robust illusionary capacity and is merely a weapon that enables the weak and the silly to triumph over their superiors.

> Auch misstraute man allem solchen Präsentiren seiner Gründe. Honnette Dinge tragen, wie honnette Menschen, ihre Gründe nicht so in der Hand. Es ist unanständig, alle fünf Finger zeigen. Was sich erst beweisen lassen muss, ist wenig werth. Überall, wo noch die Autorität zur guten Sitte gehört, wo man nicht ‘begründet’, sondern befehlt, ist der Dialektiker eine Art

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Dialectic is demonstration by conquest, Socrates a sophist in disguise. Dialectic is the alchemist’s activity, hoping to arrive at a pure kernel, stripped of everything polluting and superfluous. Like Sherlock Holmes’ method of elimination (‘How often have I said to you, my dear Watson, that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?’), dialectic conceals as much as it reveals: anything that results as ‘truth’ from an exercise in dielectics, begs for genealogical analysis. Socrates’ contemporaries were justly suspicious of a person who so openhandedly showed his ground.

The second line of criticism is against Plato’s ill-discipline: whoever wants to be a lawgiver, must possess a sense of measure and style himself; being merely a stylistic melting-pot will not do the trick. Plato’s style is anti-Hellenic: his dialogues subsumes every art form, except tragedy: epic, lyric, satire and all the other comic forms.

Tragedy, however stands no chance: Socratic optimism overwhelmed Plato and the tragedians are expelled from the dialogues as much as they are banned from Plato’s ideal city. From now on, man has to hunt – through tools like the dialectic – for a meaningful existence. Plato began to obfuscate the ancient valuing of the world, a flattening of the philosophical cosmos ensues and a programmatic naïvety about the nature of the world would ensue. Until these naïve ideals could no longer bear the burden of enf And so too, are Sophoclean ones raming meaning, and nihilism would ensue.

The other great Socratic virtue, namely irony, is also for Nietzsche a form of decadence. Irony, it goes without saying, accompanies all philosophers: ‘Alles Menschliche verdient in Hinsicht auf seine Entstehung die ironische Betrachtung: deshalb ist die Ironie in der Welt so überflüssig’ (MA 252, KSA 2.209). To make it
the main characteristic of one’s discourse renders that discourse impotent: ‘Die Gewöhnung an Ironie, ebenso wie die an Sarkasmus, verdirbt übrigens den Charakter, sie verleiht allmählich die Eigenschaft einer schadenfrohen Ueberlegenheit: man ist zuletzt einem bissigen Hunde gleich, der noch das Lachen gelernt hat, ausser dem Beissen’ (MA 372, KSA 2.260). The ironist no longer knows how to curse and scold (JGB 212) and therefore is no longer able to make judgements on quality. Irony was the mode of expression of men of ‘fatigued instinct’, the shoulder-shrugging strategy of the old gadfly who tried to find truth rather than to found it:


Tragic art differs from dialectic in that it does not try to overcome tension and contradiction; that is tragedy’s highest wisdom. Art overcomes nature, it does not imitate it. Even the most anti-metaphysical philosopher might fall into the trap of assuming that there is in fact something called ‘Being’, or ‘Nature’ that it can penetrate at least to some extent, the tragic artist by contrast, never even makes this assumption. For the tragic artist, by contrast, there need not necessarily be an underlying substratum: instead, myth is superimposed over mystery or formless nothingness. The artist uses a web of language to cover ultimately – nothing. The ultimate impasse of the rationalistic drive is that it purports to find itself without limits, for all supposed limits are of human origin, born out of a distinct culture, rooted in indigenous myth. (See GT 23). Naturally, it does not take long before the rationalist drive runs itself aground upon aporia, and becomes art.

Dieser erhabene metaphysische Wahn ist als Instinkt der Wissenschaft beigegeben und führt sie immer und immer wieder zu ihren Grenzen, an denen sie in Kunst umschlagen muss: auf welche es eigentlich, bei diesem Mechanismus, abgesehen (GT 15, KSA 1.99).
This is why Nietzsche is convinced that the Socrates presented in the Platonic writings has a definitely positive, preservative, rather than a negative or destructive effect. If anything, Socratic rationality appears to play the same role with respect to the development of tragic civilization as forgetfulness plays in preventing man from being paralyzed by the excess of history in the second *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung*. It also stimulates the lust for life – or rather, it preserves it:

Denn dächte man einmal diese ganze unbezifferbare Summe von Kraft, die für jene Welttendenz verbraucht worden ist, nicht im Dienste des Erkennens, sondern auf die praktischen d.h. egoistischen Ziele der Individuen und Völker verwendet, so wäre wahrscheinlich in allgemeinen Vernichtungskämpfen und fortdauernden Völkerwanderungen die instinctive Lust zum Leben so abgeschwächt, dass, bei der Gewohnheit des Selbstmordes, der Einzelne vielleicht den letzten Rest von Pflichtgefühl empfinden müsste, wenn er, wie der Bewohner der Fidschi-Inseln, als Sohn seine Eltern, als Freund seinen Freund erdrosselt: ein praktischer Pessimismus, der selbst eine grausenhafte Ethik des Völkermordes aus Mitleid erzeugen könnte – der übrigens überall in der Welt vorhanden ist und vorhanden war, wo nicht die Kunst in irgend welchen Formen, besonders als Religion und Wissenschaft, zum Heilmittel und zur Abwehr jenes Pesthauchs erschienen ist (*GT* 15).

It must be mentioned at this stage that, with or without Socrates, a decadence had already fallen over Athens. The Sophists had already spread self-consciousness and the need for justification throughout Athens and the old, ‘instinctual’ aristocrats had already been torn apart by conflicting impulses that could not be harmonized by normal agonal play. With their instincts in chaos, it became necessary to find a new basis for spiritual unity. Rather than to be tyrannized by anarchy, they accepted a new tyrant, Reason. In an atmosphere where no one was master over himself, Socrates, despite the kicking of his own plebeian instincts, who were in control, due to the tyrannical development of Reason. What followed was an understanding that any concession to instinct, the spontaneous and the unconscious, could lead downward. To avoid chaos it was necessary for self-conscious Reason to suppress un-selfconscious instinct. All of life had to be brought into the blinding light of day: the rational gaze – to use a Foucaultian expression – travelled inwards for the first time. This was the price for self-preservation. But Reason cannot justify itself rationally: it is dependent on fictional constructs to begin its operations:
Plato sees a link between the lie and poetry because he is, despite his best intentions, both a liar and a poet. This is Nietzsche’s major complaint against him; rather than the charge most Nietzsche interpreters say he levels at Plato, namely that the sage invents another world, Nietzsche complains that he hides the creative dimension of his philosophy. ‘Imagine’, writes the young philologist, ‘that the writings of Plato had been lost, that philosophy begins with Aristotle; we would not be at all able to imagine the ancient philosopher who was at the same time an artist’.\textsuperscript{102} Nietzsche does not think that Plato himself believed his doctrines:

Plato: ein großer Cagliostro\textsuperscript{103}, – man denke, wie ihn Epicur beurtheilte; wie ihn Timon, der Freund Pyrrhos beurtheilte - Steht vielleicht die Rechtschaffenheit Platos außer Zweifel?... Aber wir wissen zum Mindesten, daß er als absolute Wahrheit gelehrt wissen wollte, was nicht einmal bedingt ihm als Wahrheit galt: nämlich die Sonderexistenz und Sonder-Unsterblichkeit der 'Seelen' (Aphorism 12269, NL 85-87 KSA 13.293).

Plato is well aware of the subversive character of his activity. He therefore teaches what is necessary in order to keep philosophy alive, lest it go the same route as Socrates. Thus, to challenge such a firmly established order as the Athenian establishment of Plato’s time, he had to be, or at least appear to be, a little mad; otherwise he could be condemned as downright wicked. Nietzsche thinks that Plato has given us a splendid description of how the philosophical thinker must within every existing society count as the paragon of all wickedness. Despite his adherence to custom, he was a true subversive, the antithesis of the moral man. Substitute the name ‘Plato’ with ‘Nietzsche’ and the reader will find that the more things change, the more they stay the same. Plato, in a fashion very similar to Nietzsche, adopted an artistic cloak to make the radical nature of his activity more palatable. In a world defined by its moral rules, style becomes the inevitable cloak for the cultural critic.

As complex and multivocal as the tragedy it claims to reject, the Republic has been read variously as positing an ideal utopia, as a critique of idealism, a blueprint for the modern world, a celebration of the human spirit, and a vision of the Just State. What is clear is that the Republic is a work of profound significance, one that continues to engage readers and scholars alike.

\textsuperscript{103} An impostor or charlatan, after Count Alessandro di Cagliostro (1743-1795), really Giuseppe Balsamo.
for totalitarian ideology, a comedy and a tragedy. According to Euben,\textsuperscript{104} Plato invented political philosophy to compensate for the failure of tragedy to educate its citizen audience. The failure was evident in the factionalism that made Athens into many cities rather than one. Philosophy thus had to turn away from existing cities to find another audience, or rather, another \textit{kind} of audience. For the audience were now not conceived of as a whole, but as individual souls whose moral self-ordering is a prerequisite for political re-constitution.

The \textit{Republic} is pervaded by the theme of ‘bringing hidden things to the ‘light’\textsuperscript{105} Socrates begins his famous narrative by recounting a visit to Piraeus to see (	extit{theaisthai}) an inaugural festival of the goddess Bendis. This journey to see the sights and Socrates’ assessment of the spectacle invoke and transform an earlier meaning of the word theory and the vocation of the \textit{theōros}. Originally, the \textit{theōros} was an official envoy sent to a strange and unfamiliar land to report back on the sacred events he had witnessed. Later, the word was used for the city’s representatives at tragic performances. But Socrates’ journey to Piraeus, Athens’s port and democratic stronghold does not conclude with his appraisal of the procession, nor is much time devoted to the festival itself. He quickly proceeds to describe the theoretical vision the \textit{Republic} itself proposes. The initial journey, then, serves as a pretext for the prisoner’s journey out of the cave and into the light – a journey that culminates in the upward ascent of the philosopher to the Good and the Just. In accordance with most of the Greek tragedies, sight serves as a trope for knowledge. With the main character of \textit{Oedipus Tyrannos} it shares a certain impatience with the constraints of tradition, an insistence on exposing unitary patterns behind the phenomenal world. Yet the \textit{Republic} transforms the emphasis in a way that Oedipus only dreamt of and in a way Sophocles probably feared to depict. Where Oedipus only sought to master his own destiny (and paid the most severe price imaginable for this), Plato would re-imagine an entire world in order to master the destiny of mankind. Plato is not a founder like Virgil – he does not ‘found Athens anew’ – but creates an entirely new city that does not resemble his current city - or any real city - in the slightest.

Other than Aristotle’s more ‘political’ notion of friendship, in Plato’s utopia, rulers and the ruled are steered by the same hand of divine intelligence towards their own well-being, and so ‘become alike and friendly’ (\textit{Rep.} 9.950c). Here (in Plato’s

ideal republic) friendship depends on a coincidence of interests. Plato maintains a
Higher Reality, open to the participation by the select few, and the merely sensible
stands in the way. The metaphysical continuities between Plato and for example
Augustine and the entire metaphysical tradition of subjectivity that followed, seem so
obvious, that it is often forgotten that the dichotomy of inner/outer, commonly held to
be the foundation of Western metaphysics, inaugurated by Plato, in fact only makes a
marginal appearance in his oeuvre. The only examples that come to mind are in 401d
of the Republic, where Socrates, in a rare tragic mood lauds music as the most
sovereign art, because its rhythm and harmony find their way into the innermost soul
– eis entos tes psyches – and take a hold there, and at 44d where Socrates says that
true justice is not just about external actions that affect other people (peri ton exo), but
also about that what lies within and concerns oneself (peri ton entos).

The most important artistic duty established by the tragedians and continued
by their dialectical heir is that of legislator. But legislation is not limited to the world
or one’s artistic material. For Plato, as well as for Nietzsche – who would take this
notion to its most radical extreme – to be a legislator not only involves the creation of
a unique world, but also self-legislation. To become aware of this need is the first and
essential step on the way to Übermenschlichkeit. Nietzsche was able to appreciate this
trait even in his non-tragic predecessors: Socrates advocates a strict, even tyrannical
rule of reason, because he found himself in need of it, for he was under threat of being
overwhelmed by his body. When the physiognomist had revealed to Socrates who he
was – a cave of bad appetites – he divised a tyrant that was more than a match to his
body. Nietzsche writes in the Nachlass of 1888:

Das Problem des Socrates.
Die beiden Gegensätze: die tragische Gesinnung - gemessen an dem die
sokratische Gesinnung, Gesetz des Lebens : in wieweit die sokratische
Gesinnung ein Phänomen der décadence is ; in wieweit aber noch eine starke
Gesundheit und Kraft im ganzen Habitus, in der Dialektik und Tüchtigkeit,
Straffheit des wissenschaftlichen Menschen sich zeigt ( — die Gesundheit des
Plejeurs dessen Bosheit, esprit fondeur dessen Scharfsinn dessen Canaille
au fond im Zaum gehalten durch die Klugheit: ‘häßlich’ Verhällichung: die
Selbstverhöhnung:
die dialektische Dürre die Klugheit als Tyrann gegen ‘den Tyrannen’ (den
Instinkt) es ist alles überrieben, excentrisch, Carikatur an Sokrates, ein buffo,
mit den Instinkten Voltaires im Leibe — er entdeckt eine neue Art Agon —
(Aphorism 12245, NL87-89, KSA 13.268).
Any form of excess must be countered with an adversary. That is why Nietzsche is more than any other thinker the *respecter of adversaries*. No domain of human life is in greater need of control by an adversarial force than the instincts. Without such a force there is a mere decadent excess which is bound to lose its richness and vitality. Nietzsche is willing to admit that, in a certain sense, Socrates paid homage to the spirit of the agon.

Nietzsche adds that:

"genau im Widerstreben gegen die Sinnenfälligkeit bestand der Zauber der platonischen Denkweise, welche eine vornehme Denkweise war, – vielleicht unter Menschen, die sich sogar stärkerer und anspruchsvollerer Sinne erfreuten, als unsre Zeitgenossen sie haben, aber welche einen höheren Triumph darin zu finden wussten, über diese Sinne Herr zu bleiben: und dies mittels blasser kalter grauer Begriffs-Netze, die sie über den bunten SinnenWirbel – den Sinnen-Pöbel, wie Plato sagte – warfen (JGB 14, KSA 5.28)."

Plato’s major philosophical flaw is not the attempt to bring order to his own life or that of others, but rather denying his own status as artistic legislator. And he was a legislator – one that succeeded in changing the flow of history forever:

"Der platonische Dialog war gleichsam der Kahn, auf dem sich die schiffbrüchige ältere Poesie samt allen ihren Kindern rettete: auf einen engen Raum zusammengedrängt und dem einen Steuermann Sokrates ängstlich unterthänig fuhren sie jetzt in eine neue Welt hinein, die an dem phantastischen Bilde dieses Aufzugs sich nie satt sehen konnte (GT 14, KSA 1.94)."

If he *disguised* his legislative dimension and embraced his role as artist, the ultimately nihilistic division between poet/artist and philosopher may never have occurred. But to *deny* one’s status as artist-legislator is one of the most nihilistic acts possible. From his earliest unpublished manuscripts to his last writings, Nietzsche consistently presents legislation, or the declaration of the highest values, as the real function of the philosopher. There is a comprehensive kind of thought that gathers together, assigns value to and orders all existing knowledge of the world: *Genuine* philosophers, however, are commanders and legislators. Nietzsche adds the following: philosophers alone determine the ‘whither’ and ‘wherefore’, what is useful and what constitutes utility for men. Plato was such a philosopher. He did not merely dissimulate; he
It is of course entirely possible that Plato did not deceive himself. Few creators are completely unaware of their own tyrannical power:

There is a second complaint too. As we have seen, it is not that Plato did not legislate – Plato and Socrates hold a fascination for Nietzsche in that they show what a philosopher standing between eternities can accomplish – namely the transformation of art, to name but one:

The greatest objection to be raised against both Plato and Socrates is that they sought to legislate but once. That is to say, they sought the highest Good and the purest form of the Just in order to deliver themselves from having to found it over and over again in the uncontrollable world of the Athenian public domain. By locating, or rather
devising a method for locating the true world behind the physical, Socrates and Plato hoped to be the lawmakers that would end lawmaking forever.

According to Nietzsche, because of his pathological hatred for life, Socrates spun for himself the illusion that Reason could ‘cure’ the human condition, only to see towards the end of his life that his Reason was chimerical, and that life was irredeemable. Having destroyed the legitimacy of the instinctive bases for values, in the end, Socrates’ Rationalist faith collapsed. Therein, however, he resurrected Tragedy, if only for a moment. Theoretical man who followed in his wake, however, alienated from a sense of the Dionysian, has no such luck. Bound to a mode of thinking that is by definition hostile to tradition, theoretical man merely lives off the accumulated capital of those in the past who have paid the price for becoming artists – the Dionysiskolakes. They have become rooted and traditional. Theoretical man then spends his time by demonstrating the paradoxes and ‘falsities’ of his inherent traditions, thereby engendering nihilism among a people who can no longer see the stamp of eternity upon their existence:

This is nihilism. This is injustice. This is what has to be avoided at all costs: a meagre existence, a condition where strength can no longer discharge itself as strength, a condition where man stands, strangely and perversely enough, over and against the
world, apparently rationally self-sufficient. In this condition, judgement, the greatest human asset and the gateway to genuine freedom, becomes superfluous. To recover from this condition stands at the heart of Nietzsche’s project. His aim is nothing short of linking man again to eternity, i.e. to make tragic man possible again.

Das Jasagen zum leben selbst noch in seinen fremdesten und härtesten Problemen; der Wille zum Leben im Opfer seiner höchsten Typen der eignen Unerschöpflichkeit frohwerdend – das nannte ich dionysisch, das verstand ich als Brücke zur Psychologie des tragischen Dichters. Nicht um von Schrecken und Mitleiden loszukommen, nicht um sich von einem gefährlichen Affekt durch eine vehemente Entladung zu reinigen – so missverstand es Aristoteles: sondern um, über Schrecken und Mitleiden hinaus, die ewige Lust des Werdens selbst zu sein, jene Lust, die auch noch die Lust am Vernichten in sich schliesst... (EH, GT 3, KSA 6.312).

Nietzsche asserts that the attempt to exorcise the tragic, that is, all mystery, pain, suffering, and contradiction from consciousness is ultimately to destroy the ground for the sense of being linked to eternity, which is part of the rootedness which makes life possible. The twin effort of reason and the dialectic destroys this rootedness. Socrates preferred the most wakeful, self-conscious existence, whereas for Nietzsche life in the twilight of unconsciously created illusion can prove more fruitful, and hence more just. This life is honest about its need for limits and measure. What Socrates set in motion was a process that destroyed the basis for distinctions like those between the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad, the just and the unjust, in favour of the universal pursuit of the easy and the comfortable. According to this reading, Socrates’ real vice was that he was a utilitarian who refused to accept limits. By contrast, Nietzsche is arguing for the unity of life: life and culture understood as ‘Einheit des künstlerische Stils in allen Lebensäußerungen eines Volkes’ (UB II, KSA 1.274). Modern culture, the product of theoretical man, is for Nietzsche not a real culture, a culture that does justice to the possibility that is man, but only a kind of knowledge about culture. Knowledge is consumed with neither hunger nor desire for it, it no longer acts as a means for transforming the external world, but remains concealed within the bland chaos of an inner world, the source of bad consciousness, which man with curious pride calls his subjectivity. In the next chapter we trace how the need for justice drove man further inward. This perverse Apollonianism – it is a distortion of the original Apollonian impulse – was in desperate need of a Dionysian antidote. As I will show in the next chapters, the power of the artist to legislate, to impose order
upon a multiplicity of possible perspectives and to breathe new life where previous patterns have stagnated, became the function of what Nietzsche eventually came to call Dionysus, the post-Socratic artist newly born out of the rabble of metaphysics.
CHAPTER 3: ON THE GENEALOGY OF JUSTICE: LANGUAGE, TIME
AND DEBT

All are crying out, ‘Give us facts, not theories!’ Yet everybody really does theorize for himself. To reason – to deduce is the prerogative of man; and we in truth, take every fact, however mysterious, in connection with a presumed cause. A visible phenomenon forces on us the conviction that there is behind it an adequate agency, even though that agency be occult. Every fact is a theory if we did but know it. The fall of the apple includes the system of the universe.106

We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native language…. Language is not simply a reporting device for experience, but a defining framework for it.

Benjamin Whorf

1. The Resurrection of the Artist as Lawgiver

Nietzsche’s philosophical project can be succinctly summarized as an attempt to get modern men to reclaim their inevitable status as artists. As we have seen in chapter two, despite a continuous effort to deny or escape this condition, human beings are first and foremost interpreting beings, bound to language and a perspectival existence. And this implies existence as artists; we are forever doomed to construct, simplify, add to, cut from and arrange the world in ways determined by our sensory apparatus and psychological needs. This makes us lawgivers as well. Like art, law functions to form and reduce the arbitrariness of life. If we are to speak of a human world at all, we speak in terms of the regulative and imperative. This is the task of law; stability, certainty and predictability are after all the most salient features of law. What Nietzsche wanted to do, however, was to show that the enterprise of morality comprised far more than the universal principles and metaphysical fictions that has up to now been taken to constitute morality per se. This is why genealogy is so important. Before we can turn our attention to Nietzsche’s ‘new’ justice, we need to demonstrate the contingency of the modern moral/legal framework.

Even a brief genealogical probe reveals that no stable concept, not even in its simplest linguistic form, is ever innocent. Behind all apparently clearly circumscribed concepts are the metaphysician’s belief in the principle of identity. This belief is the reason why Michel Haar describes a ‘concept’ as ‘a unit of meaning which comprises and contains, in an identical and total manner, the content it assumes’.  

A concept can thus be understood as a single petrified unit of meaning which is distinguishable from other such units. It is, in other words, an attempt to order our understanding of the world into easily manageable units of meaning.

Nietzsche’s genealogical inquiry is an attempt to undermine this assumption of the solidity of the concepts that make up our world by tracing and analyzing the lines of demarcation between the apparently mutually exclusive concepts that form the traditional moral vocabulary of the West. In this way, he traces the operation of the will to power. The most important aspect of this genealogical tracing is the exposition of how a moral community establishes its boundaries by way of its mode of evaluation and differentiation. This enterprise subjects the history of conceptualization to the volatilising effect of genealogical analysis, and disconnects such treasured metaphysical constructions as good and evil, true and untrue, just and unjust, from any fixed point or reference. From this perspective, the history of language becomes the history of the will to power. The most indispensable concepts that help to order the world are revealed as products of human desire, the more valuable because they are so. After Nietzsche these concepts simply cannot be seen as testifying to an underlying metaphysical reality that determines the ways in which we speak of it. Categories such as ‘causality’, ‘freedom’ and ‘motive’ are to be understood as conventional fictions for purposes of communication and designation, and have therefore limited explanatory power. Even that apparently rock-solid foundation of the Enlightenment, the ego, is but yet another perspective, or a result of particular perspectives on the world:


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As a matter of fact, concepts are *always* false since, for human beings existing in the world, representing the totality of being is impossible. The partial and prejudiced nature of representation means that no event exists ‘in itself’. Everything that happens consists of a number of phenomena that are gathered and selected by an interpreting being. The development of human knowledge has to be understood in terms of a will to power by which the human being increases its form-giving power and mastery over the external world.

Die Form, die Gattung, das Gesetz, die Idee, der Zweck – hier wird überall der gleiche Fehler gemacht, daß einer Fiktion eine falsche Realität untergeschoben wird: wie als ob das Geschehen irgendwelchen Gehorsam in sich trage, – eine künstliche Scheidung im Geschehen wird da gemacht zwischen dem, was thut und dem, wonach dies Thun sich richtet (aber das was und das wonach sind nur angesetzt von uns aus Gehorsam gegen unsere metaphysisch-logische Dogmatik: kein ‘Thatbestand’). (Aphorism 11477, *NL* 85-87 KSA 12.417).

Like Molière’s bourgeois gentleman, who discovers that he has been speaking prose for 40 years without realizing it, we human beings are artists despite our most earnest efforts to be metaphysicians or ‘scientists’ and discover the thing-in-itself, the final truth beyond all interpretation. That elusive final ‘truth’, however, is already something of our own making.


Nietzsche begins his essay *Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne* by describing the invention of knowledge by ‘clever animals’ on a distant star. These animals, for all their cleverness, cannot escape the caprice of nature, which is as indifferent to them as Moira\(^\text{108}\) is to the pain of the individual. No fable, however, can illustrate the vulnerability of human intellect within the chaos of nature well

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\(^{108}\) See chapter 1.
enough: ‘es gab Ewigkeiten, in denen er nicht war; wenn es wieder mit ihm vorbei ist, wird sich nichts begeben haben. Denn es giebt für jenen Intellekt keine weitere Mission, die über das Menschenleben hinausführte’ (WL I, KSA 1.875). Knowledge is above all an instrument, designed in accordance with and limited to human needs in a world that is in a constant state of flux. For Nietzsche, the world is forever becoming, and can therefore never, strictly speaking, be ‘known’. What passes under the rubric of knowledge is in reality only the simulacra of being that we have unwittingly constructed. Thinking is thus possible only in terms of that which remains stable long enough for us to engage with it. Because the world is ‘in a state of becoming’, knowledge about it cannot in the strictest sense truly be formulated, as knowledge and becoming are mutually exclusive: ‘Der Charakter der werdenden Welt als unformulirbar, als ‘falsch’, als ‘sich-widersprechend’. Erkenntniß und Werden schließt sich aus’. What we call ‘knowledge’ therefore differs from our normal definition of it; it is actually a will to make knowable. ‘Folglich muß ‘Erkenntniß’ etwas anderes sein: es muß ein Wille zum Erkennbar-machen vorangehn, eine Art Werden selbst muß die Täuschung des Seienden schaffen’ (Aphorism 11422, NL 85-87, KSA 12.382).

‘Knowledge’ is thus not the correlate of ‘to know’ but the result of our ability to schematize, to legislate, to impose upon chaos as much stability as it can bear. This schematization is imposed according to our practical requirements, since there is no such thing as disinterested knowledge. What is normally experienced as ‘knowledge’ is but the calcified laws in terms of which we are allowed to think. Vital in the evolution of reason, says Nietzsche, was not ‘erkennen’, sondern schematisiren, dem Chaos so viel Regularität und Formen auferlegen, als es unserem praktischen Bedürfnß genug thut. In der Bildung der Vernunft, der Logik, der Kategorien ist das Bedürfnß maßgebend gewesen: das Bedürfnß, nicht zu ‘erkennen’ sondern zu subsumiren, zu schematisiren, zum Zweck der Verständigung, der Berechnung... das Zurechtmachen, das Ausdichten zum Ähnlichen, Gleichen – derselbe Proceß, den jeder Sinnesindruck durchmacht, ist die Entwicklung der Vernunft! (Aphorism12305, NL 87-89 KSA 13.334).

For Nietzsche, all interpretation is creation inasmuch as it is engaged in the re-interpretation and re-configuration of the world. The will to power animates, energizes, moves, and strives to proliferate. This explains why Nietzsche insists upon a new type of knowledge, one that refuses the sedentary and is closely aligned with
the *moving* arts: theatre, dance and music. As will be demonstrated throughout this chapter, every intellectual construction or category imposed upon the world, notwithstanding its claims to ‘objectivity’, has an artistic and therefore legislative dimension to it. Even mere perception is a selective, world-constitutive operation in the manner of that ultimate impersonal ‘artist’, the will to power. This means that there is an aesthetic dimension even to man’s simplest judgments.

Da jener Berg! Da jene Wolke! Was ist denn daran ‘wirklich’? Zieht einmal das Phantasma und die ganze menschliche Zuthat davon ab, ihr Nüchternen! Ja, wenn ihr das könntet! Wenn ihr eure Herkunft, Vergangenheit, Vorschule vergessen könntet, – eure gesammte Menschheit und Thierheit! Es giebt für uns keine ‘Wirklichkeit’ – und auch für euch nicht, ihr Nüchternen. (FW 57, KSA 3.422)

The best way of avoiding the pitfall of defining the mercurial will to power in terms of a determined concept, is to describe it as *interpretation in action*. When Nietzsche describes the will to power with respect to human beings, the term often operates as a metaphor for the act of interpretation.

Der Wille zur Macht interpretirt: bei der Bildung eines Organs handelt es sich um eine Interpretation; er grenzt ab, bestimmt Grade, Machtverschiedenheiten. Bloße Machtverschiedenheiten könnten sich noch nicht als solche empfinden: es muß ein wachsen-wollendes Etwas da sein, das jedes andere wachsen-wollende Etwas auf seinen Werth hin interpretirt. Darin gleich – In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr über etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozeß setzt fortwährendes Interpretirein voraus) (Aphorism 11029, NL 85-87, KSA 12.140).

To interpret is to see in a particular way, at the expense of other possibilities of interpretation. We ourselves are the source of this interpretative injustice, or more correctly, our need for a world in which it is possible to live, is. To a certain extent, then, man is the measure of the world, but only *his* world. In a note from the *Nachlass* he writes: ‘Ist für uns die Welt nicht nur ein Zusammenfassen von Relationen unter einem Maaße? Sobald dies willkürliche Maaß fehlt, zerfließt unsere Welt!’ (Aphorism 5797, NL 82-84, KSA 9.454). Man is thus a contingent measure and our measurements do not refer to an original, underlying reality. What we call reality is the result not only of our limited perspectives upon the world, but the *interplay* of those perspectives themselves. In another note, Nietzsche writes:

Since the will to power is neither an entity nor a metaphysical construct – although the final verdict on that evaluation is not yet in – it will be best to define it as the endless interplay of forces that act on one another through a process of action and resistance. Deleuze, for example, points out that it is a common error to equate the will to power with some schema of representation. Grammatically, in a sentence like ‘the will desires power’, the word ‘power’ denotes an object that the will desires. This kind of misreading is due to a linguistic distortion: ‘pouvoir est ce qui veut dans le vouloir’109 – ‘power is that which wants in the wanting’110. The will to power is the drive to become more, a mode of being that is constantly in the process of becoming. The will to power is thus not a being, but the most elemental condition from which effecting and becoming can emerge. Müller-Lauter describes it in terms of ‘dynamic quanta’ which ‘do not first exist for themselves and then enter a relationship with one another. They exist only in the incessantly changing referentiality of all to all’.111

There is therefore nothing behind the world that occasions the events in it; rather, it is the constant struggle between complex pluralities inherent in the world that allows them to emerge. Human beings are therefore inextricably bound up with the world, and contrary to their strongest desires, cannot escape from it. This allows for neither crude determinism by forces outside the self, nor for a self-sufficient subject that determines the conditions of its own existence, but what Müller-Lauter describes as ‘quantitative particularization’, a ‘complex form of specificity’, and Nietzsche simply calls a perspective. In other words, man can be as acquainted with the world as he can be with himself, which is to say, only to a limited extent: ‘Der Mensch kommt erst ganz langsam dahinter, wie unendlich complicit die Welt ist. Zuerst denkt er sie sich

But this is good news. Creativity, which since Euripides, Socrates and Plato has been treated with such contempt, is in Nietzsche’s eyes not only the last remedy against nihilism but also man’s greatest gift. It is impossible to think of justice without first referring to Nietzsche’s doctrine of perspectivism. Had we access to true objectivity, the question of justice would be superfluous. Despite the obvious impossibility of ever attaining this state, philosophy has tended to treat the question of justice and the unavoidable activity of judgement as something provisional, a question to be suspended once the telos of absolute, self-identical truth is reached, whether in the great beyond or in the ideal state.

From these very perspectival limitations, however, springs the potential for creation, the supreme justification for human existence. As we shall see later, Nietzsche evaluates human ‘types’ according to their ability to face their inevitably perspectival existence and make the most of it. This is of crucial importance for understanding the master/slave dichotomy, the task of genealogy, the operation of the will to power and, for our purpose in particular, the moralization of the concept of justice.

The immediate consequence of affirming the plurality of perspectives is a re-evaluation of the concept of objectivity. The myth of objectivity, whether understood aesthetically, as the ideal of objects that paint or photograph themselves by their own activity on a purely passive medium, or epistemologically, as ‘truth’, is summarily dealt with: ‘[d]ies wäre eine Mythologie’ (UB II, KSA 1.290). Nietzsche is adamant that the ‘will to be objective’ is ‘a modern misunderstanding’. Writing on realism in art, he says, ‘Aber es giebt kein ‘Ding an sich’ – meine Herren! Was sie erreichen, ist Wissenschaftlichkeit oder Photographie d.h. Beschreibung ohne Perspektiven, eine Art chinesischer Malerei, lauter Vordergrund und alles überfüllt’ (Aphorism 8901, NL 84-85, KSA 11.125). The ideal of objectivity is ridiculous in aesthetics, and shallow and decadent in the domain of epistemology: ‘Soweit überhaupt das Wort “Erkenntnis” Sinn hat, ist die Welt erkennbar: aber sie ist anders deutbar, sie hat keinen Sinn hinter sich, sondern unzählige Sinne “Perspektivismus”’ (Aphorism 11315, NL 85-87, KSA 12.315).

The myth of objectivity is also unfruitful, because it makes us forget that the moment of apprehension is a creative moment, the moment when human beings are at
their best. The goal of disinterested contemplation presupposes conceptual fictions and requires the positing of a disembodied disinterested knower, ‘an eye turned in no particular direction’. Nietzsche tries to account for the affective components and influencing factors discounted by traditional epistemology. His re-constituted version of ‘objectivity’, usually indicated by quotation marks, acknowledges that knowledge is a function of the embodied expression of affective investment in the world. This, however, should under no circumstances be equated with relativism. Instead, his ‘panoptics’ is an attempt to salvage the possibility of knowledge in the light of the failure of traditional epistemology to provide a usable body of knowledge based on disaffected, disinterested contemplation:

Perspectives, for Nietzsche, are not disembodied points of view hovering disinterestedly over the world. Instead of trying to do away with the notion of perspective, which Nietzsche describes an act of self-directed castration: we should appropriate the multiplicity of perspectives for a more complete vision of the world.

Perspectivism thus implies that knowledge is only really possible once our affective engagement with the world is acknowledged. Until this happens, we can at best speak of a desiccated, anaemic simulacrum of knowledge. Nietzsche’s rehabilitation of the metaphoric of vision in pluralist form returns the knower to her body, suffused with
affect, inextricably situated in the world and inscribed by the torment and pain inflicted by moralizing mores and disciplining institutions. The task of the Wissenschafiler is to compile as exhaustive an aggregation of radically different perspectives as possible, a chorus of situated voices. The insistence upon locating a single ‘correct’ perspective leads, paradoxically, to a diminution of knowledge and an impoverished, ascetic existence.

But the ghost of nihilism is not banished this easily. As we have seen in the introduction, Nietzsche describes the crisis that is modern nihilism as a ‘calamity’ that has ‘wiped out the horizon’ (FW 125), which leaves human beings bereft of any authoritative reference or shared ground to underpin their understanding of the world, themselves and each other. Nihilism in this context means measurelessness, or the disappearance of a meaning-giving conceptual framework. For Nietzsche, this is the result of an epistemological obsession with detached observation.

Nietzsche returns to man’s situated and perspective-structured existence precisely in order to counter nihilism by re-evaluating man’s most human characteristics, the capacity to judge and the ability to create limits, laws and protective frameworks. What makes Nietzsche truly an optimistic philosopher is his faith in human becoming; in the ability of the ‘as yet undetermined animal’ to rise above his current nihilistic condition and achieve new ideals. Nietzsche’s doctrine of unavoidable
perspectivism is a reminder that the indeterminacy of both the human being and his world is not absolute; nothing in the world can appear as ‘pure’ formlessness. Indeterminacy is always bound to a particular form. These conditions make it possible for man to live and function as judge: the world is malleable enough to operate as playing field for the legislators of the future, yet resistant enough to make the act of legislation meaningful.

Before we begin to explore this idea further by turning to the inherent legislative dimension of language, let us first briefly discuss the other ‘natural’ limits and horizons that make perspective possible. According to Alan Schrift, Nietzsche identifies three basic types of limitation on human knowledge, which Schrift labels physiological, ‘instinctual’ and socio-historical limits. Nietzsche first invokes the role of philosophy’s ancient bête noire, the body, in determining the limits placed on our perspective by our physical existence. In a well-known paragraph from *Daybreak*, entitled ‘In Prison’, Nietzsche writes:


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This rather lengthy quote should make it clear that anything but a perspectival existence is impossible. Sense perception is not neutral, but evaluative:


Because our physiological and sensory capabilities restrict our apprehension of the world, we cannot but have a very limited perspective on the world. The German word for perception, *Wahrnehmen*, means ‘taking-as-true’. Our physical existence acts as a kind of ‘filter’ through which perception is possible. Philosophy tends to treat this as a problem to overcome; at least since the Enlightenment the body has become alien, a strange barrier to the pure knowledge that can be accessed through the mind. Nothing, however, undermines metaphysical dualism as effectively as genuine awareness of physical existence. In its peculiarly enigmatic fashion – Nietzsche might have called it ‘feminine’ – the body refuses to be separated from its secrets. In contrast to the standard dualist assumption that the mind directs the body, Nietzsche claims that the body creates while the soul is merely one of its instruments. ‘Aber der Erwachte, der Wissende sagt: Leib bin ich ganz und gar, und Nichts ausserdem; und Seele ist nur ein Wort für ein Etwas am Leibe’, says Zarathustra (Z I, ‘Von den Verächtern des Leibes’, KSA 4.39).

In addition to physiological limitations, man’s interaction with the world is also conditioned by a collection of impulses that Schrift labels as ‘instinctual’. This includes all the drives, emotions and needs that affect human perception, as well as the instincts proper, a topic that Nietzsche frequently mentions. For Nietzsche, everything that we can know, and all our judgments about what we think we know, have a history in our impulses: ‘Dein Urtheil “so ist es recht” hat eine Vorgeschichte in deinen Trieben, Neigungen, Abneigungen, Erfahrungen und Nicht-Erfahrungen;

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113 Schrift, A. D. *ibid*, p.147.

We are animal before we become human, and how we become human is a different story for each individual, who thus has a unique perspective on the world. Since our experiences are ultimately individual and unique, our knowledge of the world must reflect this inevitable perspective: ‘Ich glaube, dass Jeder über jedes Ding, über welches Meinungen möglich sind, eine eigene Meinung haben muss, weil er selber ein eigenes, nur einmaliges Ding ist, das zu allen anderen Dingen eine neue, nie dagewesene Stellung einnimmt.’ (HAH, 286 KSA 2.223). Even the greatest artist is capable only of producing miniatures of one life, her own. We are doomed always to be in our own company, and this is at once our greatest limitation and the horizon that allows us to focus: ‘Immer in unserer Gesellschaft. – Alles, was meiner Art ist, in Natur und Geschichte, redet zu mir, lobt mich, treibt mich vorwärts, tröstet mich –: das Andere höre ich nicht oder vergesse es gleich. Wir sind stets nur in unserer Gesellschaft’ (FW 166, KSA 4.398).

One of the most important instincts of the instinctual agon, in fact the instinct second only to the desire to discharge one’s power, is the instinct of survival. For this reason we tend to adopt the perspective on the world that enhances our chances of survival: ‘Unsere empirische Welt wäre aus den Instinkten der Selbsterhaltung auch in ihren Erkenntnissgrenzen bedingt: wir hielten für wahr, für gut, für werthvoll, was der Erhaltung der Gattung frommt –’ (Aphorism12256 NL 87-89, KSA 13.281).

Crucial among the instincts for survival is the need to communicate. In Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft section 354 Nietzsche speculates:

Gesetzt, diese Beobachtung ist richtig, so darf ich zu der Vermuthung weitergehn, dass Bewusstsein überhaupt sich nur unter dem Druck des Mittheilungs-Bedürfnisses entwickelt hat, – dass es von vornherein nur zwischen Mensch und Mensch (zwischen Befehlenden und Gehorchenden in Sonderheit) nöthig war, nützlich war, und auch nur im Verhältniss zum Grade dieser Nützlichkeit sich entwickelt hat. (FW 354, KSA 3.590)
Through his genealogy of morals, Nietzsche demonstrates that the will to truth is deployed through rhetorical usage, and is closely linked to the development of consciousness. According to Nietzsche, we should not be so quick to connect the development of consciousness to the senses. It is possible to separate sensation and the ideas of consciousness. Our awareness of our condition by no means affects the things we can and must do to survive as a species. We need certain mental means to act in a particular way, but it is by no means necessary to reflect back on those acts, to be conscious of them in order to perform them. Sensation, in particular, is independent of consciousness and can even be said to be prior to it. We need not reflect upon what it means to feel in order to feel. Indeed the whole of life would be possible without ‘seeing itself in the mirror’. By far the greatest portion of our lives actually takes place without this mirror effect; this is true even of our thinking, feeling and willing life, however offensive this may sound to older philosophers.

Consciousness itself is thus always positional, historically situated, bound up with the needs of the herd or group. Consciousness is never purely innocent and, in the strictest sense, does not really belong to the individual himself. This underlines the futility of the modern subject’s obsession to ‘know himself’\textsuperscript{114}. As Hannah Arendt might have concurred, any attempt to know Man is at the same time only knowledge of men. We can at best hope to become more familiar with the average man. The pathos of truth is a slavish epistemology.


Technically, our unconscious could be a set of relations independent of language, but Nietzsche emphasizes that this is not the case. Our thoughts themselves are

\textsuperscript{114} The Delphic order to ‘know thyself’ refers of course to the need to curb \textit{hubris}. Lacan would take this theme of a subject split between immediate self-certainty and its simultaneous representation in language further. He, too, would no longer conceive of the subject as an exclusively private region inside the self, but as an effect of its relation with others within specific cultural contexts.
continuously governed, even developed further, by the subconscious, which is
*communally* developed: ‘Der Zeichen-erfindende Mensch ist zugleich der immer
schärfer seiner selbst bewusste Mensch; erst als sociales Thier lernte der Mensch
seiner selbst bewusst werden, – er thut es noch, er thut es immer mehr’ (*FW* 354,
*KSA* 3. 593). The would-be genealogist should be thoroughly aware of this. Ideas,
formulated in social language, present themselves in the consciousness as
unconscious physiological instincts and drives.

Nietzsche also presents us with a third class of perspectives that determine
what we can know: the socio-historical. This refers to both the individual’s personal
history and the historical context in which he finds himself. This means that what
counts as ‘knowledge’ is coloured as much by individual as by general experience.
This is why Nietzsche holds that ‘[z]uletzt kann Niemand aus den Dingen, die Bücher
ingerechnet, mehr heraushören, als er bereits weiss. Wofür man vom Erlebnisse her
keinen Zugang hat, dafür hat man kein Ohr’ (*EH* III I, KSA 6.300). Socio-historical
factors only help to re-enforce Nietzsche’s conclusion, since it is just as impossible to
escape the collective prejudices that develop historically as it is to escape individual
perspective. What we today call ‘true’ is but what others had loved in other centuries:
‘Immer noch tragt ihr die Schätzungen der Dinge mit euch herum, welche in den
Leidenschaften und Verliebtheiten früherer Jahrhunderte ihren Ursprung haben!’ (*FW*
57, KSA 3.421). This is why Nietzsche speaks of a ‘family failing’ shared by all the
philosophers who preceded him, namely a lack of historical sense (e.g. *MA* 2). This
lack is responsible for the philosopher’s faith in eternal and unchanging truths,
*aeternita veritas*. The metaphysician always hopes for *something* stable in the eternal
world of flux, without realizing that whenever he appears to find something that
matches his criteria for ‘solid truth’, he is responsible for finding it there.

As perspectives are unavoidable, so too are they indispensable to human
existence. Perspectives are what make human life in the world possible. It is not
possible to slip beyond perspective and from an impartial position distinguish
between ‘true’ and ‘false’ perspectives, so different criteria of judgement are needed.
While the possibility of falseness sends the dogmatic metaphysician into nihilistic
despair, Nietzsche actively rejoices in the creative potential of the ‘false’:

Die Falschheit eines Urtheils ist uns noch kein Einwand (objection) gegen ein
Urtheil; darin klingt unsre neue Sprache vielleicht am fremdesten. Die Frage
ist, wie weit es lebenfördernd, lebenerhaltend, Art-erhaltend, vielleicht gar Art-züchtend ist; und wir sind grundsätzlich geneigt zu behaupten, dass die falschesten Urtheile (zu denen die synthetischen Urtheile a priori gehören) uns die unentbehrlichsten sind, dass ohne ein Geltenlassen der logischen Fiktionen, ohne ein Messen der Wirklichkeit an der rein erfundenen Welt des Unbedingten, Sich-selbst-Gleichen, ohne eine beständige Fälschung der Welt durch die Zahl der Mensch nicht leben könnte, – dass Verzichtleisten auf falsche Urtheile ein Verzichtleisten auf Leben, eine Verneinung des Lebens wäre. Die Unwahrheit als Lebensbedingung zugestehn: das heisst freilich auf eine gefährliche Weise den gewohnten Werthgefühlen Widerstand leisten; und eine Philosophie, die das wagt, stellt sich damit allein schon jenseits von Gut und Böse (JGB 4, KSA 5.18).

Through subordinating the question of a perspective’s ‘truth’ or falseness to that of its value for life, Nietzsche is free to resurrect an ethos of playful lawgiving and put his doctrine of perspectivism to work in his effort to effect a trans-valuation of values.

Thus the artist/lawmaker’s position as lawmaker, if it can be traced back to any one feature of the world, is born of the failure or rather the refusal of the world to be represented in language. Language is the final framework that encapsulates all the other perspectives hitherto discussed and is the precondition for their existence. This is because the subject is deeply intertwined with the means of his knowledge. Since human beings’ aesthetic, form-giving powers are present at the origin of language, all forms of knowledge are ultimately a reflection on language, and from language we can extract no more than what we have already incorporated in it. Language itself is the original table of law, the mapping scheme that gives us the world as we know it. Since law-making in the form of the creation of generalities and concepts is midwife to the birth of language, there is no state ‘before the law’, of genuine law-lessness. Language is by its very nature gesetzmässig:

Jetzt wird nämlich das fixirt, was von nun an ‘Wahrheit’ sein soll d. h. es wird eine gleichmässig gültige und verbindliche Bezeichnung der Dinge erfunden und die Gesetzgebung der Sprache giebt auch die ersten Gesetze der Wahrheit: denn es entsteht hier zum ersten Male der Contrast von Wahrheit und Lüge: der Lügner gebraucht die gültigen Bezeichnungen, die Worte, um das Unwirkliche als wirklich erscheinen zu machen; er sagt z.B. ich bin reich, während für diesen Zustand gerade ‘arm’ die richtige Bezeichnung ware. (WL 1, KSA 1.877)

The most obvious example of the operation of the lawgiver through the medium of language is the naming process, since philosophy itself began with nomenclature:
so beginnt die Philosophie mit einer Gesetzgebung der Größe, ein Namengeben ist mit ihr verbunden. „Das ist groß“ sagt sie und damit erhebt sich den Menschen über das blinde ungebändigte Begehren seines Erkenntnisträbes. Durch den Begriff der Größe bändigt sie diesen Trieb: und am meisten dadurch, daß sie die größte Erkenntnis, vom Wesen und Kern der Dinge, als erreichbar und als erreicht betrachtet (PTG KSA 1.817).

Naming involves an artificial process of designation, differentiation and classification giving rise to concepts (WL I). Through naming, things which at best are similar are rendered identical by being given the same name. Whereas tradition would have it that by naming His creation, God gave it its essential nature, for Nietzsche naming merely involves creating a surface with neither depth nor reference. He argues that ‘es genügt, neue Namen und Schätzungen und Wahrscheinlichkeiten zu schaffen, um auf die Länge hin neue Dinge zu schaffen’ (FW 58, KSA 3.422). The thing thus created has no reality or reference behind the name. Theologians and metaphysicians make the mistake of assuming that ‘big words’, or words that name, are automatically of value, whereas in fact, according to Nietzsche, they have value only as flags in a battle: ‘Christenthum, Revolution, Aufhebung der Sklaverei, gleiches Recht, Philanthropie, Friedensliebe, Gerechtigkeit, Wahrheit: alle diese großen Worte haben nur Werth im Kampf, als Standarte: nicht als Realitäten, sondern als Prunkworte für etwas ganz Anderes (ja Gegensätzlichliches!)’ (Aphorism 11864, NL 87-88, KSA 13.62).

Names, like everything else, have a history, which is passed on whether approved of or not to whoever appropriates them. In the case of the erroneous claims metaphysics makes to ‘knowledge’, the motivating force is the ‘pathos of truth’. This pathos demands fixity, static conceptual points of reference around which a network of beliefs can be nurtured. This ‘truth’ comes to be stabilized and eventually fixed by means of concepts and so becomes capable of being owned. ‘Philosophy and religion’, says Nietzsche, arise from ‘a longing for property’ (PHT, 60). Instead, he says, concepts must no longer be taken for granted; the strange moral element in epistemology, with its piety towards what it has inherited, must be abandoned, as must the contradictio in adjecto of trusting in concepts and mistrusting the senses:

Was am letzten den Philosophen aufdämmert: sie müssen die Begriffe nicht mehr sich nur schenken lassen, nicht nur sie reinigen und aufhellen, sondern sie allererst machen, schaffen, hinstellen und zu ihnen überreden. Bisher vertraute man im Ganzen seinen Begriffen, wie als einer wunderbaren Mitgift aus irgendwelcher Wunder-Welt: aber es waren zuletzt die Erbschaften unserer fernsten, ebenso dümmsten als gescheitesten Vorfahren. Es gehört
This means that language cannot be seen as representational, for what is to be represented comes into being with observation and discourse on observation itself. Whoever goes beneath the surface does so at his peril. Representation is illusion. Nietzsche writes:


Language is thus a system of laws, a sum of concepts which result from the artistic imposition of an image on other images. As Derrida later emphasizes, there is no originary presence at the inception of language. At the origin of language is the primal force or Urkraft of the artist-legislator, but, as Barthes may have put it, this artist is dead; the intelligibility we discover in the world can only be achieved with the aid of words and concepts, and any knowledge of these only with the aid of other words and concepts. Far from fully representing reality, language at once hides reality and makes it possible. Only simile can describe this condition; experiencing the world through language is (and will remain) like encountering an iceberg, with two thirds remaining hidden and beyond the grasp of conceptualization.

As we mentioned above, in the strictest sense, no knowledge of the world is really possible, only different forms of knowledge of man. Knowledge that comes to be regarded as ‘true’ employs language according to conventions and rules and repeats these conventions infinitely. Knowledge, in other words, is tautologous. Another way of describing the desire for knowledge is the ‘desire for familiarity’, a desire ‘die Welt zu vermenschlicht d.h. immer mehr uns in ihr als Herren fühlen’ (Aphorism 9050, NL 84-85 KSA 11.92). It is a peculiar kind of ‘homesickness’ in a world that always threatens to become boundless:

Truth is thus a product of linguistic legislation, or a constructed fiction repeated enough times to lend it the stability it needs to become truth. Derrida calls this phenomenon ‘iterability’.115 This word combines the Latin iter, meaning ‘again’ and the Sanskrit word itara (‘other’). For any word or image (Derrida uses the word ‘mark’) to have meaning, it must be repeatable in other contexts. The more often it is repeated, the more stable the word, image or sign becomes. But at the heart of even the most fossilized concept remains metaphor.

For Nietzsche, to use metaphor means to treat something as identical which has been recognized as similar at one point. This ‘lumping together’ of dissimilar things is the definition of metaphor that appears most frequently in Nietzsche’s work, but he does quote another, i.e. Aristotle’s classic conception of metaphor, ‘a metaphor is a carrying over of a word whose usual meaning is something else, either from the genus to the species, from the species to the genus, or from species to species or according to proportion’ (Rhetoric, 317). Nietzsche takes this notion of a linguistic carryin’g-over and, finding it too limited, extends it to include any transference from one domain to another, be it literal to figurative, concrete to abstract, physical to spiritual or subject to object. He famously distinguishes three stages of metaphor. ‘Er bezeichnet nur die Relationen der Dinge zu den Menschen und nimmt zu deren Ausdrucke die kühnsten Metaphern zu Hülfe. Ein Nervenreiz zuerst übertragen in ein Bild! erste Metapher. Das Bild wieder nachgeformt in einem Laut! Zweite Metapher. Und jedesmal vollständiges Ueberspringen der Sphäre, mitten hinein in eine ganz andere und neue’ (WL 1, KSA 1.879). From the sound, the concept is derived: third metaphor.

The process begins with the first metaphor, the transfer of stimuli from unconscious physiological processes to mental images. In this most primal stage, the process uses synecdoche, which allows for ‘inexactitude of sight’, the power within us that allows us to privilege certain features at the cost of others. The operation of synecdoche selects according to its own ‘persuasion’, according to its own relationship with things. It bars certain stimuli so as to create space for other stimuli, those that allow the individual to have a manageable perspective on the world. Thus the individual begins her own contest of power and domination. In other words, in the chaos of stimuli a space of contest is created where certain species can thrive. Deception plays an important role here, so without the ability to lead astray, language would not exist. Metaphor begins with ostracism or exclusion (übersehen, weglassen, überhören) and is followed by activities of displacement, transposition and commutation (umdeuten, übertragen, vertauschen). Language only emerges as a result of an intense agonistic game. Like everything new, it has its origins in violence.

Language is thus the result of a series of metaphorical translations that begins with a nerve impulse and becomes an image, then a sound or word, and only then a concept. This involves transfer through four different spheres, namely the physiological, intellectual, acoustic and abstract spheres. There is no question of a ‘perfect’ translation between the spheres, since the transfer is at best an aesthetic relation, which is of course a relationship that is far from simple. This ‘translation’ is characterized by the move from passive to active. For example, light enters the eye purely passively. It allows us, however, to identify the sensation with the sense and impute causality. The result is the active notion of ‘I saw a light’, which does not really represent what happened. Out of this transposition of cause and effect are born the active subject and the object, from whom all grammatical relations follow.

The contemporary term for describing this process of establishing differences and heterogeneities and subsequently hiding them is Derrida’s neologism différance, which is the word ‘difference’ written with an a. The two words are homophones in French, indicating their closeness. The new word does refer to a difference, but a difference or movement of differences whose identity is always unstable, rather than an absolute, essential difference. As Derrida says, ‘différence is the name we might give to the ‘active’, moving discord of different forces and of differences of forces
against the entire system of metaphysical grammar’.  The series of differences has a
structure, or as Rudolphe Gasché puts it, an *infrastructure*. The infrastructure is a
*weave*, an unordered combination of antagonisms and differences whose very nature
is that of a non-system. The differences that constitute this weave are not dissolved
through the infrastructure, nor are they ordered into a dialectical framework in which
their differences can only become a binary relationship of opposites.

The first two spheres of metaphor exist as the world of pure nerve stimulation
and ‘vivid first impressions’ (*WL* 1). These two spheres operate interactively; the
nerve stimulation is purely physiological, but allows the sphere of images, which is
psychological, to come into being. The next transformation returns to the
physiological, in the creation of sound and other material signifiers that make
communication possible. The final construction, the concept, is a linguistically
created metaphysical sphere, and it is in this sphere that man’s capacity for lawgiving
really begins, because it is only now that he becomes vaguely aware of his capacity to
create. The concept is testimony to man’s capacity to generalize, to fit countless other
possible cases. And this is what ultimately defines the act of lawgiving:

…denn zwischen zwei absolut verschiedenen Sphären wie zwischen Subjekt
und Objekt giebt es keine Causalität, keine Richtigkeit, keinen Ausdruck,
sondern höchstens ein ästhetisches Verhalten, ich meine eine andeutende
Übertragung, eine nachstammelnde Übersetzung in eine ganz fremde
Sprache. Wozu es aber jedenfalls einer freidichtenden und frei erfindenden
Mittel-Sphäre und Mittelkraft bedarf. (*WL* I, KSA I.884)

In this ‘freely intermediate sphere’ the human capacity for metaphor formation
functions, and in this space the interpreted world that we know is born. Our primal
relationship with the world is thus aesthetic. Truth originates when humans forget that
they are ‘artistically creating subjects’ or products of law and begin to attach
‘invincible faith’ to their perceptions, thereby creating truth itself. For Nietzsche, the
key to understanding the ethic of the concept, the ethic of representation, is
*conviction*:

Überzeugung ist der Glaube, in irgend einem Puncte der Erkenntniss im
Besitze der unbedingten Wahrheit zu sein. Dieser Glaube setzt also voraus,
dass es unbedingte Wahrheiten gebe; ebenfalls, dass jene vollkommenen

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117 Gasché, R. *The Taint of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection*. Cambridge, MA:
Methoden gefunden seien, um zu ihnen zu gelangen; endlich, dass Jeder, der 
Ueberzeugungen habe, sich dieser vollkommenen Methoden bediene. Alle 
drei Aufstellungen beweisen sofort, dass der Mensch der Ueberzeugungen 
nicht der Mensch des wissenshaftlichen Denkens ist; er steht im Alter der 
theoretischen Unschuld vor uns und ist ein Kind, wie erwachsen er auch sonst 
sein möge. (*MA 630, KSA 2.356*)

Truth appears now as more than just convention; it takes the Apollonian trick of 
illusion to the extreme. The hope of knowledge as *adequatio intellectus et rei* is 
finally dashed. Instead of simply representing reality, metaphor is active in creating it, 
even at the level of perception. All knowing is mirrored in forms which are 
completely determined, yet not *a priori*.

Was ist also Wahrheit? Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, 
Anthropomorphismen kurz eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, 
poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die 
nach langem Gebrauche einem Volke fest, canonisch und verbindlich dünken: 
die Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie welche 
sind, Metaphern, die abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind, Münzen, 
die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Münzen in 
Betracht kommen. (*WL 1, KSA 1.881*)

Once metaphor becomes established securely enough, a distinction between truth and 
lie now comes into being, a world organized around the principles of representation. It 
is as a system of rules and designations, and only in this sense, that language acquires 
the power of truth and lies. The only difference between the two is that the ‘truth’ is 
simply a much *older* lie, a lie that we have forgotten is a lie. To tell the truth in this 
context is to lie according to convention. This is not a problem, however, but a 
necessity; without the limiting Apollonian veil of forgetfulness, man would never 
have developed consciousness, and would forever have lingered in the dark, pre-
ological world of Dionysian excess:

Nur durch das Vergessen jener primitiven Metapherwelt, nur durch das Hart- 
und Starr-Werden einer ursprünglich in hitziger Flüssigkeit aus dem 
Urvermögen menschlicher Phantasie hervorstömenden Bildermasse, nur 
durch den unbesiegbaren Glauben, diese Sonne, dieses Fenster, dieser Tisch 
sei eine Wahrheit an sich, kurz nur dadurch, dass der Mensch sich als Subjekt 
und zwar als künstlerisch schaffendes Subjekt vergisst, lebt er mit einiger 
Ruhe, Sicherheit und Consequenz; wenn er einen Augenblick nur aus den 
Gefängniswänden dieses Glaubens heraus könnte, so wäre es sofort mit 
seinem ‘Selbstbewusstsein’ vorbei. (*WL 1, KSA 1.884*)
What Nietzsche objects to is the perceived certainty of truth as the primary criterion upon which to judge the value of a concept or statement. He is protesting against the careless habit of valuing purely against representational criteria. In his view, the moment the certainty of truth becomes the only criterion for judging value, we have slipped into the domain of morality or, more accurately, moralism. Ultimately, the quality of anything can only be judged according to aesthetic criteria. This does not mean, however, that all knowledge is tantamount to the illusions of fantasy, but rather that the real manipulation of appearances has been performed by science, morality and religion, the great guardians of the ‘truth’. This, ironically, makes art the only truly moral activity, since only art, by virtue of being frank about its metaphorical status, is ‘true’. Art has the decency to treat appearance as appearance, therefore it does not deceive; it is as close to truth as we can ever come.

The metaphysics that Nietzsche proposes is a metaphysics stripped of its claim to be able to detect absolute truth, a metaphysics that celebrates its aesthetic status and its roots in language. The real function of metaphysics is to manage the world, not to reveal or explain it. ‘Eine artistische Weltbetrachtung eine antimetaphysische – ja, aber eine artistische’ (Aphorism 11067 NL 85-87, KSA 12.160).

Nietzsche readily admits that metaphysics has a certain legitimacy as a stabilizing factor. In his view, truth is valuable as social necessity. Truth becomes indispensable as human beings form communities. The harmony of these communities requires ‘truths’ as universally valid and binding designations. Thus if truth is an evil, it is a necessary one, necessary for the individual’s functioning as social being:

Jene zahllosen Menschen, welche sich für ihre Ueberzeugungen opferten, meinten es für die unbedingte Wahrheit zu thun. Sie alle hatten Unrecht darin: wahrscheinlich hat noch nie ein Mensch sich für die Wahrheit geopfert; mindestens wird der dogmatische Ausdruck seines Glaubens unwissenschaftlich oder halbwissenschaftlich gewesen sein. Aber eigentlich wollte man Recht behalten, weil man meinte, Recht haben zu müssen. Seinen Glauben sich entreissen lassen, das bedeutete vielleicht seine ewige Seligkeit in Frage stellen. (MA 630, KSA 2.356)

In order to maintain itself, communal life must be rendered calculable and regulated. This means that members of a community have to be able to relate to one another in non-arbitrary ways, and communicate according to more or less fixed categories of meaning.
No construction, however, remains potent forever. As we have seen in the introduction, Nietzsche holds the unconditional faith in calcified moral categories such as good and evil responsible for the emergence of modern nihilism. These categories enclose the human experience of the world in a conceptual web of one-dimensional thinking that has finally lost its power to justify the world and human experience. The necessary stabilization of metaphor comes at the price of creativity: metaphor can become so frozen or calcified as to restrict any further sense of legislative movement, just as we shall see later, antiquarian history paralyzes the man of action by making veneration of the past its sole and absolute aim.

Sarah Kofman describes Nietzsche’s use of metaphor as a strategy that re-enforces his affirmation of becoming. Accordingly, Nietzsche, conscious of the inherent danger in language of restricting the fluidity and mobility of sense, refrains from an enduring commitment to any one metaphor to describe the process of metaphoric ‘settling’. Kofman examines a series of architectural metaphors (Bildungsmetapheren) to highlight various aspects of the process of solidification and the various epistemological edifices that a particular culture erects. Using figures such as the pyramid, the beehive, the Roman columbarium and eventually the spider’s web, Nietzsche engages in a genealogical study of the various models of knowledge that human beings have created for themselves. Nietzsche’s aim is not, as might be supposed, simply to destroy these edifices, but to decipher the good or bad taste of the constructors in order to diagnose an underlying malady or healthy condition.
The first in the series is the pyramid. Like a pyramid, conceptual language is constructed according to a rigid schema that makes it possible to demarcate experiences in a consistent way. This means that the use of language can be regulated in order to govern relations between groups of language-users. The pyramid is for Kofman ‘the metaphor of the intelligible world of essences’ organized in geometrical fashion, and ‘functioning as models and norms’.\footnote{Kofman, S. \textit{Looking after Nietzsche}. Translated by L. A. Rickels. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990, p.95.} What makes the pyramid even more compelling a metaphor, is its association with death: the mummified dead are harbored within their walls. Concepts, as we have seen, are the tombs of petrified metaphors. But Nietzsche requires a description of the process of forgetting metaphor that stretches further than the first stage of their death, and at this point he draws upon the Roman columbarium. In contrast to the pyramid which still houses the body in more or less distinct form, the columbarium merely houses ashes of the dead. These burnt-out remains of metaphor have been stripped of all the uniqueness that they knew in life and are mere residue: Ashes represent the total effacement of effigy, the volatilization of any singularity. To conserve ashes is to reduce singularity absolutely. It is the ultimate equalizer, ‘the ultimate injustice’\footnote{Kofman, S. \textit{Nietzsche and Metaphor}. Translated by Duncan Large. London: Athlone Press, 1993, p. 96.} (my emphasis).

As I have mentioned before, and as will become clearer later in the chapter, for Nietzsche, injustice reigns wherever decadence, impotence and a weak will is present. In this case, all the signs of the original legislation have worn away, the metaphor in question has become \textit{banal}, and has limited life-enhancing capacity. In addition to this, no concept is ever neutral. Under genealogical investigation the metaphysical assumption of correspondence between word and thing is rendered suspect. The repressed or forgotten history of the metaphor emerges to challenge the dominant conception of language as correspondence or representation. Taking the theme further, he draws upon the \textit{templum}, the mathematically defined space in the heavens that circumscribes the space of a specific god (which has been the inspiration for many astronomical names). This is not a physical, but a mathematical construction, an interpretation that desires to impart order by superimposing lines, restrictions and boundaries upon that which did not possess these qualities originally. In this \textit{Würfelspiel der Begriffe (WL 1)} the stability of the edifice endures only as long as the practitioners abide by its rules. And the fates of these practitioners are interred
by their creations. Metaphysics tend to teach the belief in separate conceptual entities which are identical to themselves and clearly distinguishable from each other. As the ancient Roman mathematical divisions were designed to house the deities of their time, so the conceptual divisions worshipped today as a result of metaphysical obsession accommodate its own moribund idols: truth, knowledge, identity, justice. Genealogy exposes the ephemeral foundations of these supposedly stable concepts. Like spiders we have spun a web of language for ourselves through scientific, philosophical and theological system building, a web which in the age of nihilism threatens to disintegrate. According to Kofman, the spider’s web is the most frequent metaphor in the Nietzschean *oeuvre* to designate system building and the problems generated by a desire for systems. The spider is a kind of vampire that lives of the blood of those it succeeds luring into its web. The concepts created by the spider merely operate as *simulacra* of life, the spider’s proud apprehension of ‘objective knowledge’ being merely the recognition of a web of concepts it has spun itself.\footnote{Kofman, S. *Looking after Nietzsche*. Translated by L. A. Rickels. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990, p. 98.}

While the architectural metaphors largely remain behind in Nietzsche’s early work on language, the spider continue to crop up again and again as a metaphor of the activities of philosophy, theology and science. Surely the most famous of these references is the reference in *Also Sprach Zarathustra* to the trinity as a black triangle on a spider’s back, and the slavish priest’s revenge as poison.

Da kommt sie willig: willkommen, Tarantel! Schwarz sitzt auf deinem Rücken dein Dreieck und Wahrzeichen; und ich weiss auch, was in deiner Seele sitzt.
Rache sitzt in deiner Seele: wohin du beisest, da wächst schwarzer Schorf;
mit Rache macht dein Gift die Seele drehend! (Z II, KSA 4.128).

In *Der Antichrist* the image appears again in a reference to Kant as a ‘fatal spider’ (*A* 11), and in the form of word-play, linking Spinoza (die Spinne) with metaphysical construction. The target of Nietzsche’s critique is the inhibiting consequences that follow from the arachnoid’s dogmatic postulation of its constructions as adequately corresponding to the infinite complexity of the world. The ultimate spider, and the ultimate defunct metaphor is of course the God of traditional theology. According to Kofman, ‘if God is the architect of the world, he is only so as divine spider’.\footnote{Kofman, S. *ibid*, p. 99.}
Selbst die Blassesten der Blassen wurden noch über ihn Herr, die Herrn Metaphysiker, die Begriffs-Albinos. Diese spannen so lange um ihn herum, bis er, hypnotisirt durch ihre Bewegungen, selbst Spinne, selbst Metaphysicus wurde. Nunmehr spann er wieder die Welt aus sich heraus – *sub specie Spinozae* –, nunmehr transfigurirte er sich ins immer Dünnere und Blässere, ward ‘Ideal’, ward ‘reiner Geist’, ward ‘absolutum’, ward ‘Ding an sich’...

Verfall eines Gottes: Gott ward ‘Ding an sich’... (*AC* 17, KSA 6. 184).

Nietzsche’s series of metaphor is guided by his desire to make explicit the nihilistic will that turned Western thinking away from the sensuous world of becoming into anaemic, abstract formulations and essences. His genealogy reveals the creation of the well-ordered ‘ideal world’ to be an almost perverse *parody* of the process of affirmation, a denigration of the world of becoming that preceded these hallowed concepts. This metaphysical finery, however, could not maintain itself indefinitely: at last, during the nineteenth century – Nietzsche might trace the first signs as true nihilism much earlier – nihilism caught up with metaphysics. The siren-song of life would finally pierce the deaf ears of the old philosophers (*FW* 372).

It should now be clear that for Nietzsche, lawgiving is a constant process. Artistic legislation is an act fit only for a rope-dancer. There are two kinds of nihilism against which the artist-lawmaker must guard. On the one hand, there is the ever-present threat of measureless and excess, when the world threatens to overcome the self. On the other hand, there is the tendency of man’s own creations to fossilize and become useless, even prevent all further attempts to truly *create*. Lawgiving is thus an agon between calcification and excess, or a battle between the world and man who struggles to impose order upon it. Not only does the world always resist, but man’s own constructions reveal the capacity to become his greatest prison. Despite the fact that man ceased to express this basic fact of the human condition in terms of tragedy, the tragic dimension to human life is as present as it always was.


It is important to bear in mind that the linguistic genealogy hitherto discussed is but the first step of his genealogical analysis. For Nietzsche, the important question...
remains the one concerning the kind of life that gives rise to metaphysical constructs that clearly bespeaks fear. There can be no question of justice in a value system intended to barricade a fragile subject against the world: justice is a thing of the world, and a virtue that belongs to those that dare to interpret it well. Nietzsche’s genealogy is intent upon exploring the relations and drives that condition certain modes of evaluation. As Nietzsche reminds his readers: ‘das moralische Werthschätzen ist eine Auslegung, eine Art zu interpretiren. Die Auslegung selbst ist ein Symptom bestimmter physiologischer Zustände, ebenso eines bestimmten geistigen Niveaux von herrschenden Urtheilen. Wer legt aus? – Unsere Affekte’ (Aphorism 11070, NZ85-86, KSA 12.160). How one evaluates is as important as the need to interpret itself. Metaphysical evaluation, the obsession with unity and identity, emerges as a symptom of a life in need of external principles to justify its existence. This has had a distinct effect on how post-Christian man came to define justice, or in Nietzschean terms, came to corrupt it.

2. The Use and Abuse of Genealogy for Life

What has hitherto passed for justice is but the triumph of a certain perspective. As we have seen, there is nothing but perspectives, appearances, and interpretations. There is nothing beyond the multiplicity of perspectives, bodily forces and other positions. Every concept, every framework is in itself a multiplicity of competing and conflicting forces, which through the domination of one came to be a perspective or position, the winner among a number of competing perspectives vying for ascendancy. In a nutshell, genealogy studies how the dominant perspective attained its status.

Contrary to Plato’s method, which consists in gathering sensuous diversity into unities or essences, Nietzsche’s method aims at unmasking, or unearthing, but in an indefinite way. He has no intention to lift the final veil to reveal any originary identity or primary foundation. He thus exhibits a distinct hostility to any form of systematization. Genealogy allows for many different kinds of interpretation, and it

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122 It must be mentioned, even at this stage, that Nietzsche does not simply dismiss or reject Christian morality. He is seldom as crude as to dismiss any cultural phenomenon in total. In many cases, when speaking of Christianity, he readily admits that Christianity did not destroy the greatest creations of antiquity, but made it its own, albeit in an inferior form. Nietzsche is trying to recover its more vivacious versions.
neither discovers nor imposes a ready-made reality, because it is dependent on the indeterminate picture of the world provided by the will to power. Nietzsche sees the sum of elements that make up a genealogy as a vast sum of interrelated objects. Each of those is of course already the product of an earlier grouping or interpretation, and each group is affected by all the others. Genealogy concerns itself with the paths that connect these groupings. Every path reveals an earlier interpretation with its own particular purposes and prejudices, in other words, its own will to power.

If genealogy has to be ‘gray, meticulous and patiently documentary’ as Foucault holds it to be, Nietzsche’s genealogy is anything but. For it is far from being the grey and meticulous gathering of a vast amount of source material and patient attention to detail. Nietzsche’s reduction of the multifarious moral past of mankind to two competing moralities suggests speculative thought painted in black and white, rather than careful documentation. The aim of Nietzsche’s genealogy is not exact historical explanation or uncovering ‘correct’ facts, but a richer understanding of human excellence, and the significance of morality itself. Important for our purpose, his genealogy traces the history of the debasement of justice. Like other domains of life, justice became subject to the moral domain, and when virtue becomes morality, it loses its ennobling aesthetic dimension. It becomes something less, something weaker and baser.

Like Hegel, Nietzsche tends to use words such as ‘unbefriedigt’ to refer to the failure of modern culture to truly ‘satisfy’. He gives new meaning to Schiller’s famous declaration that ‘modernity inflicted this wound upon modern humanity’. As a philosophical physician, he makes the diagnosis that there is ‘a general decrease in vitality’. This weakened condition is manifest in contemporary ideas of equality and altruism, which are merely secularized versions of decadent Christian values. ‘Hence each helps the other, and; hence everyone is a nurse for the sick’. Furthermore, Nietzsche is emphatic about modern culture not being a ‘real’ culture, but a ‘bogus culture’. Like Hegel, Nietzsche detects a division in self-identity in modern culture that results in this ‘disease’, but unlike Hegel, he shows no hope that this division will ‘cure’ itself through dialectical improvement. Instead, Nietzsche’s genealogy is an attempt to show that things can, and should, be different. His genealogy shows that man’s development into modernity is far from (as the genre of the Bildungsroman would have it), a growth into maturity, richness and self-discipline. It is not a tragedy either, for as we have seen in chapter one, Oedipus, Antigone, Prometheus and Lear
retained their dignity, and could even be said to accept the fundamental *injustice* that forms part of the workings of the cosmos. Instead, one could argue, Nietzsche’s genealogy reveals man as fallen from grace, from an ennobling tragic world into the weak, decadent world of the modern subject, with its misbegotten illusions of ‘objectivity’.

As a deconstructivist *avant la lettre*, Nietzsche is under no delusion as from whence the law really hails. Law is always an economy of violence in which some voices are heard and iterated, accepted as ‘a rule, a norm or a universal imperative’, and others are effaced. According to Derrida, the law depends on who produces it, founds it, or authorizes it. In other words, it is a discursive, and therefore inescapably egoistic, performative act. This act can never approach full justice due to the violent paradox inherent in the discursive face-to-face relationship, for all law, like any discursive positioning, is dependent on a ‘posing’, and no such positing can happen without violence. Other than deconstruction, which often claims to be law, genealogy is under no delusions as to its real function. Genealogy is first and foremost a tool, and no tool operates neutrally. Genealogy does not simply exist to be pushed into service of some neglected or repressed ‘Other’. Nietzsche’s genealogy in particular, as opposed to Foucault’s genealogies and archaeologies, often shows what should remain silent or unearthed. This applies especially to whatever can be called mean-spirited or slavish. Genealogy is thus also, among its other functions, a tool of disciplining and silencing, or even chastising.

The role of genealogy as critical instrument is not as obvious as it may seem. Daniel Conway and Richard Schacht, for example, downplay its potential for critique, preferring to read Nietzsche’s genealogical method merely as a diagnostic tool to be put aside once the task of the revaluation of values is attempted. Richard Schacht in particular distinguishes three methodological stages in Nietzsche’s revaluation: a genealogy of values, a critique of values, and the overcoming of values. For him, genealogy is an historical and psychological method that simply investigates and describes the origins of Western values. He claims that ‘the revaluation of values only begins, and does not end, with inquiry into their genealogy’. On the basis of genealogical evidence of historical origins and development of Western values, the very same values are to be critiqued according to two steps. Genealogy reveals the

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presuppositions upon which values are based, and the critique of values calls into question the tenability of those presuppositions. Nietzsche is said to invoke the value of values for life as a critique of all other values. Then, according to Schacht, Nietzsche’s revaluation concludes by the overcoming of these values. In other words, Nietzsche’s genealogy is not in itself critical, but provides material for a further critique. It would appear at first that Nietzsche agrees with him:

Die Frage nach der Herkunft unserer Werthschätzungen und Gütertafeln fällt ganz und gar nicht mit deren Kritik zusammen, wie so oft geglaubt wird: so gewiß auch die Einsicht in irgend eine pudenda origo für das Gefühl eine Werthverminderung der so entstandenen Sache mit sich bringt und gegen dieselbe eine kritische Stimmung und Haltung vorbereitet (Aphorism 11070, NL 85-86, KSA 12.160).

This is however a single remark from the Nachlass, not sufficient to justify such a distinction. Furthermore, if we return to Nietzsche’s most direct statement on his perspectivism in the Genealogie, ‘Es giebt nur ein perspektivisches Sehen, nur ein perspektivisches ‘‘Erkennen’’ (GM III, 12), it becomes clear that Schacht’s position is untenable. He identifies standards of critique reliant on genealogy and makes their epistemic status clear, but fails to relate this to Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Schacht seems to claim that the tenability of presuppositions about human nature and the life-enhancement of values are objectively valid standards of critique. The very notion of objectively valid standards, independent of the specific content of those standards, is at odds with the fluidity of genealogy, and the interpretative nature of Nietzschean epistemology in general. This means that there is an undeniable legislative dimension to the process of genealogy as such. Nietzsche’s genealogy is unabashedly evaluative. His genealogy explores the relation of drives that makes certain modes of evaluation possible, especially the antithetical modes of evaluation typical of modernity. And this happens all the time. It is not necessary to divide Nietzsche’s genealogy into an analytical stage and an evaluative stage. The moment one practises genealogy, one is involved in judging and selecting. Not only Dionysos is a judge, everyone is.

Was bedeutet das Werthschätzen selbst? weist es auf eine andere metaphysische Welt zurück oder hinab? Wie noch Kant glaubte (der vor der großen historischen Bewegung steht). Kurz: wo ist es ‘entstanden’? Oder ist

124 Schacht, R. *ibid* p. 95.
Revelations like these, i.e. the utter impossibility of ever attaining a position of God-like (sic) neutrality, make genealogy a dangerous enterprise: if any human construction is examined for too long and too carefully, it is bound to be found wanting in some respect. Nietzsche’s genealogical exposition of the origins of morality reveals that, contrary to generally held belief, all moral systems hitherto adhered to in the West have been rooted in an immoralism far greater than any such systems sought to prevent. Nietzsche’s ‘campaign against morality’ is, however, much more than an amusing exposition of moral hypocrisy in the vein of Cicero’s *O tempora! O mores!* He effectively demonstrates that immorality cannot be condemned because it is unavoidable. We are doomed to be immoral:


The most uncomforting of all Nietzsche’s untimely insights finally becomes explicit in the *Genealogie*: every attempt to institute justice co-establishes the possibility of injustice. As unavoidable as the devil in the Renaissance theological maxim ‘where Christ erecteth his church, the devil in the same churchyard will have his chapel’,125 is the economy of violence that accompanies the development of man from his primitive pre-historical roots to the modern subject caught in the web of legalism. According to Derek Hillard, ‘exchange is at the heart of Nietzsche’s concept

125 Attributed to Richard Bancroft (1544-1610).
of historical transition’. He shows that Nietzsche employs a concept of economy that operates by way of interaction between a ‘formal’ principle that provides an interpretive framework for meaningful content, and an ‘indeterminate element of domination through which a current interpretation replaces one currently in operation – a Nietzschean paradigm shift’. The important point, however, is that it is the ‘more or less immutable structural precondition for all forms of discourse’. Human society and history in all its diversity emerge from being situated in various economies of power. The significance of Hillard’s observation is not limited to history however: justice cannot be thought without reference to economy. In what follows the focus will be on the importance of Nietzsche’s notion of economy for his development of temporality in general, not just history. The pattern of this development is exemplified by Nietzsche’s account of prehistory. Nietzsche’s speculative version of prehistory is one in which a primordial economy of violence sows the seeds for humanity’s future. Violence is consequently a crucial element of Nietzsche’s conception of economy and, as we have seen in chapter one, an important key to understanding the origins of justice.

3. To pay the debt I promised.

So, when this loose behaviour I throw off  
And pay the debt I never promised,  
How much better than my word I am.  
*Henry IV* Part I, Act I Scene III

Before any questions on masters and slaves, ascetic priests or importantly for our purpose, the development of the legal subjects can be asked, we need to address a far more obvious question, that of the human being itself. In order to answer this question, we need to abandon the neat chronology of the *Genealogie* and turn first to the second essay. Nietzsche begins his essay on the making of the human by asking the age-old question loved by philosophers since Aristotle: What distinguishes humans from other animals? For Christianity and other ideologies of eternity it is the immortal ‘soul’, an entity that Nietzsche believes has not died with God, but has been saved in the nick of time by being successfully secularized, legalized and moralized as

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127 Hillard, *ibid*, p. 44.
the free-willed subject. An essential component to the network that produced the secularization and legalization of the Christian soul is the ability to grasp temporality. It is not their share in eternal life or eternal principles that distinguishes men from animals, but the particularly human awareness of the passing of time. For Nietzsche the proper analysis of morality requires that it be articulated within a temporal framework of past and current costs and future benefits. The value of any kind of good concerns its effect on human futurity. And futurity is not simply given to humanity. Futurity does not simply flow from an objective temporal order. It must be earned, or conquered; it does not precede humanity. Its attainment is linked in crucial ways to the development of human nature ‘before history’, before the ancient conflict between masters and slaves delineated in the First Essay. This is why this problem constitutes for Nietzsche the ‘real’ problem of humanity (GM II 1). It is the famous problem of how human beings ended up being able to make promises.


An animal with the right to make promises, with a memory filled with debts and obligations appears to be an anomaly, something para physin, as Aristotle might have said (though he was speaking of nature’s tendency to produce monsters, something beyond or in excess of nature). Nietzsche locates the primordial or mythical origins of culture in this ability to keep one’s word, to propel into the future an avowal made in the past or present. This ability is an achievement, the result of considerable long-term pre-historic investment. Pre-historic in this context refers to the period of ‘die eigentliche Arbeit des Menschen an sich selber in der längsten Zeittdauer des Menschengeschlechts, seine ganze vorhistorische Arbeit’ (GM II 1, KSA 5.293). Even prior to history, man already stands in an economic relationship, that of laborer. Work stands at the point of emergence of the human race, and humanity’s first task consisted of the production of the human being itself. What this labor involves is equally important. First of all, we are dealing here with the reconfiguration of a particular kind of animal, and forgetfulness is the default setting of animal existence. Nietzsche has already raised the issue in the famous opening of his second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung:
Der Mensch fragt wohl einmal das Thier: warum redest du mir nicht von deinem Glücke und siehst mich nur an? Das Thier will auch antworten und sagen, das kommt daher dass ich immer gleich vergesse, was ich sagen wollte – da vergass es aber auch schon diese Antwort und schwieg: so dass der Mensch sich darob verwunderte (UB II 1, KSA 1. 248).

For a long time forgetfulness has wrongly been regarded as mere inactivity or mental passivity. However, it is much more – a positive forming force and a power of inhibition or repression (positives Hemmungsvermögen) which is responsible for the fact that what is experienced and absorbed enters consciousness (Bewusstsein) to such a small extent while we are digesting it. Nietzsche suggests that we call this a process of ‘inpsychiation’ (Einverseelung). Forgetting is not simply a matter of wish repression as Freud supposed, it is the inhibition of consciousness, its arrested development. Forgetting consists, as the cow-observer will testify, in the immediate consummation of pleasure and the instantaneous gratification of desire. In this respect, forgetting resembles Freud’s pleasure principle. Forgetting is what happens when bodily drives discharge themselves freely, directly and without delay in response to excitations received from the outside. This is why the forgetting animal poses a real paradox. Equal to the puzzle of language – how can beings without language come to feel the need for language? – is the paradox of memory. If one poses the question in the form of eighteenth century contract theory (what is the origin of the social contract?) one is automatically caught in the traps that liberal political theory tries to escape. This escape artistry usually takes the form of tricks like Hobbes’ hypothetical stakeholders giving up their rights at exactly the same time as to allow for the new authority to come into being, even though there was no prior authority to orchestrate the event, or Rawls’s famous veil of ignorance. To apply a similar question of origin to our problem under discussion: How does the forgetful animal remember to remember? As Nietzsche puts it: ‘Wie macht man dem Menschen-Thiere ein Gedächtniss? Wie prägt man diesem theils stumpfen, theils faseligen Augenblicks-Verstande, dieser leibhaften Vergesslichkeit Etwas so ein, dass es gegenwärtig bleibt?’ (GM II 3).

Nietzsche’s unfortmenting answer is that pain is the key element in instituting memory. Civilization instills its basic requirements through a mnemonics of pain.
Memory is carved out of the suffering of the body. The body is not just the host of memory, it is essential to its formation.

According to Nietzsche, the degree of pain inflicted is an index of the poverty of memory. The worse the memory is, the worse the pain inflicted.

Unrelenting suffering and pain were among the tools used to create in the individual member of a community (the first debtor) the memory required to suppress actions regarded as injurious to the communal body (the first creditor). Like all the values
created within it, society itself had its birth in an economy of violence. Members of the first communities, as they do in contemporary societies, learned to observe imperatives based on costs and benefits. The benefit is obviously security, the cost the possibility of merciless violence being turned upon the individual who is perceived as a threat to their security. Nietzsche holds this violence to be justifiable, for out of this autochthonous violence comes the possibility for human futurity. The ability to make promises implies nothing less than having control over the future.

Wie muss der Mensch, um dermaassen über die Zukunft voraus zu verfügen, erst gelernt haben, das nothwendige vom zufälligen Geschehen scheiden, causal denken, das Ferne wie gegenwärtig sehn und vorwegnehmen, was Zweck ist, was Mittel dazu ist, mit Sicherheit ansetzen, überhaupt rechnen, berechnen können, – wie muss dazu der Mensch selbst vorerst berechenbar, regelmässig, nothwendig geworden sein, auch sich selbst für seine eigne Vorstellung, um endlich dergestalt, wie es ein Versprechender thut, für sich als Zukunft gut sagen zu konnen! (GM II 1, KSA 5.292)

As the only animal in which an opposing faculty, an anti-forgetting capacity namely memory has been bred, in whom forgetfulness is checked in those cases where promises are made, the human is the only living animal who has had to make himself into a calculable being, regular and necessary, in order to stand security for his own future. This was the ultimate act of lawmaking: the act of lawmaking that enacted the possibility of legal subjectivity itself. Consciousness of pledges and pain and promises makes thinking itself possible: it is this which allows the human to compute goals and the means to them, to think causally, to distinguish between chance and necessity, to forgo the immediate discharge of bodily drives, or to satisfy them through other means such as the liquidation of debts. Rather like Freud, for Nietzsche civilization begins with the inauguration of a reality principle imposing checks and balances and delays upon the expenditure of drives. It is not even possible to think of the ego or the self, and by implication of the forthcoming legal subject, without reference to economics. Selves initially encountered one another based upon a relationship of calculation:

Das Gefühl der Schuld, der persönlichen Verpflichtung, um den Gang unserer Untersuchung wieder aufzunehmen, hat, wie wir sahen, seinen Ursprung in dem ältesten und ursprünglichsten Personen-Verhältniss, das es giebt, gehabt, in dem Verhältniss zwischen Käufer und Verkäufer, Gläubiger und
Schuldner: hier trat zuerst Person gegen Person, hier mass sich zuerst Person an Person (GM II 8, KSA 5.306).

Identities can only be created through relation to others; an individual can only discover who he is by assessing like and unlike cases, on judgments that spring from relationships of ‘equivalence’. The primitive belief that damage suffered has its equivalent in the form of some kind of penalty is essential to the concept of personhood, because without a ‘you’ there can be no ‘I’. As Zarathustra states ‘Das Du ist älter als das Ich; das Du ist heilig gesprochen, aber noch nicht das Ich: so drängt sich der Mensch hin zum Nächsten’ (Z I Von der Nächstenliebe KSA 4.77). The ‘I’ exists only insofar it is related to a ‘you’. The relation between self and other is thinkable only in terms of a social world where possessions are secured through economic practices of defining, measuring and comparing. The ‘I’ is thus defined through a web of economic practices rather than private thought: as the sum of its possessions (including its body), it is subject to the demands of the Other as creditor, or alternatively, stakes its claim over the Other as creditor. An ‘I’ thus exists to the degree to which an Other has power over it, or it over an Other – a power initially expressed in the creditor’s right to make the debtor suffer. A particular ethic is revealed here: one believes one suffers because of a responsibility towards an individuated Other. This sense of responsibility is the basis of all social relationships. As Hillard puts it: ‘exchange is culture’.128

If this is so, it comes as no surprise that contractual relationship between debtor and creditor is the oldest relationship known to man. As David Owen has noted, ‘Nietzsche gives us here a contractual psychology of power’.129 The possibility of owing someone created a need to install in the human mind some mechanism to allow for the debt to be repaid. This mechanism consists of two parts: first the remembering of the power relationship (the plain brute fact, ‘I owe you’) and then after some experience of paying debts out of fear of punishment, the feeling of guilt if the debt is forgotten or reneged. It should not, however simply be supposed that ‘debt’ smoothly translates into ‘guilt’. The key to understanding the entire Second Essay is the ambiguity of the word ‘Schuld’. It translates at once as ‘debt’, ‘guilt,’ and importantly, ‘blame’. This word is associated with the Gothic word skulan, which

means to ‘owe’ or ‘to be under obligation’, the modern English *should* and the Middle English *sculan*, which also includes a sense of futurity. The word ‘owe’ also originally referred to owning.\(^{130}\)

To Nietzsche the philologist nothing simply goes without saying; every word is laden with nuance. This is why one of his most famous concepts, *schlechtes Gewissen* is often seriously misunderstood. He uses the phrase in the context of two distinct violent economies, namely the *economy of debt* – largely morality or custom which is a universal phenomenon in some or other form – and the *economy of guilt* – particular to Christian asceticism. What is often forgotten is that there is no master-slave relationship, no consciousness of guilt and no ascetic ideal prior to the triumph of the Christian consciousness. The Second Essay distinguishes between two economies of desire, and relates how the first, consciousness of debt, is transformed into the second, consciousness of guilt. Debt denotes an obligation which one may or may not be able to discharge or may or may not recognize. Guilt is engendered specifically by the failure to honor an obligation. In other words, not all debt engenders guilt. Furthermore, the guilt engendered at this stage, as Simon May\(^{131}\) points out, is not yet *moral*. Guilt in its non-moral form is merely ethically experienced regret at one’s failure – intentional or not – to honor obligations, to which one feels genuine commitment. In its moral form, however, guilt becomes constitutive of the human condition in general. In its non-moral form, guilt can even be life-enhancing, such as when it serves as inspiration for action. Achilles, for example, experiences a primitive form of guilt at lending Patrocles his armor, the use of which led to his death. Because of Patrocles’ death, Achilles feels obliged to join the battle again with the hope of killing Hector. As we have seen, the non-moral form of guilt is simply part of the classic debtor-creditor framework. Curiously, the right of the creditor to demand in the place of literal compensation – money, land or possessions – compensation in the form of some or other pleasure (*Wohlgefühl*), e.g. the right to vent his power upon the powerless, can still be part of a non-moral framework. Mere pleasure in inflicting pain itself is of course not the end or *telos* of this process of exchange. While the pleasure will be all the greater the lower the rank of the creditor, because in the act of punishing he will be able to participate for once in the *Herren-Rechte* of the powerful, the true source of pleasure does not lie in making the debtor

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\(^{130}\) For example, ‘The Oxe knowes who owes him, and feedes him’ (Anonymous poet, 1628).

suffer, or in seeing him suffer. Rather, it is the release of built-up tension, and psychological pressure that is the true source of pleasure and a contributing element to health. The relationship of debtor-creditor exchange has become through and through symbolic, so much so that Schuld and Leid have become inseparable. This is why literal compensation for damage is insufficient. The result of this logic of compensation is nothing less than a festival in the Bahktinian sense where power structures are temporarily destabilized, hierarchies overturned and a general expenditure of affects happens.

Yet Nietzschean cruelty is not ‘bestial’ or merely sadistic; the Nietzschean ‘sadist’ is not a psychopath or by any means a ‘pathological’ creature. Cruelty is instead a form of release from pain, a way in which the human being copes with suffering.


In this case, the infliction of pain is assigned a positive and productive power; it is a tool of lawmaking and therefore sets the creative drives free. For Nietzsche, suffering


is not merely an emotional experience, but conflicting plastic forces, the will to power, or life itself that goes through all individuals like a common current. Cruelty serves suffering like an artistic instrument which emancipates its forces into images and deeds, values, virtues and laws. It is man’s most primitive instrument of interpretation, the most elemental artistic aid used to construct definite points of value and desire, e.g. social values. It is during the spectacle of cruelty that measuring happens, through watching the event of suffering, equivalences are contrived, values established, and man’s future is determined.

Interestingly enough, Nietzsche adds two other sources of guilt in the prehistoric stage: the gods and the ancestors of a tribe. Against the prevailing liberal-secular notion that freedom derives from the ‘loosening of ties’, Nietzsche states that the power attributed to the creditor is a sign of the particular society’s strength. In other words, to worship gods is a sign of strength, not weakness. It is however necessary to worship a god out of strength, preferably a tragic god, not the one thus far followed: ‘Man soll das Verhängnis in Ehren halten: das Verhängnis, das zum Schwachen sagt: geh zu Grunde... Man hat es Gott genannt, daß man dem Verhängnis widerstrebte, – daß man die Menschheit verdarb und verfaulen machte... Man soll den Namen Gottes nicht unnützlich führen...’(Aphorism 12393, NL 87-89, KSA 13.412).

Consider too, the genealogy of gods themselves, out of fear for the ancestor:

To the latecomers of history there is undoubtedly something bizarre – *fremdartig* – about the juridical relationship in its most archaic stage. The economy of commerce, cruelty and pleasure accounts for Nietzsche’s classic formulation of the basic hermeneutics of suspicion which characterizes the hermeneutical method. On the subject of justice, as well as on the entire legal/moralistic world-order, we have Nietzsche’s stinging dictum:


Guilt, at the non-moral stage, involves an attempt to reverse the debt towards gods and ancestors. At this stage, there is still hope that the debt could be discharged, and above all, the debt in question is communal, not personal. Furthermore, communal debt often serves as a tool for community-building. Moral guilt arises when the debt is turned back against the debtor by making him think that his debt cannot be discharged or redeemed, and that he alone, in his personal capacity, is responsible for it. Only when this happens does the debtor begin to take revenge on his earthly life, and take his earthly existence as some kind of punishment. According to Nietzsche, guilt is not fully moralized until the debt is turned back upon the creditor too. This was Christianity’s stroke of genius, in which a debt-tortured humanity temporarily found relief:

jenem Geniestreich des Christenthums: Gott selbst sich für die Schuld des Menschen opfernd, Gott selbst sich an sich selbst bezahlt machend, Gott als der Einzige, der vom Menschen ablösen kann, was für den Menschen selbst unablösbar geworden ist – der Gläubiger sich für seinen Schuldner opfernd, aus Liebe (sollte man's glauben? – ), aus Liebe zu seinem Schuldner! (*GM* II 20, KSA 5.330).

The death of the Christian God, however, leaves humanity exposed, and vulnerable to the trappings of its own legal-moralistic framework. This raises another problem: how is it possible, to recover justice at all if it had its roots in *commerce*, the defining activity of the ‘last man’? In *Morgenröte* Nietzsche asks:
It should now be clear that the psycho-social origins of justice bleed over into its functions. That is, in the working out of the basic structure of exchange and recompense, individuals can gain certain pleasures, possessions or power from the social or legal network which is built up from the need to adjudicate certain crimes, claims and disputes. However, which individuals and for what reasons is of crucial importance for Nietzsche. The first function or appropriation of justice which we will address is one for which Nietzsche had nothing but the utmost contempt. It is the function of justice as manifestation of the will to power of the weak, to which Nietzsche will refer in almost conspiratorial terms. Moved by the ressentiment\textsuperscript{132}, which is their fate, the weak will champion the ideal of justice, but only ultimately to act out their rage against their oppressors, or just anybody who does not happen to be weak. The most eloquent instance of Nietzsche’s unmaking of weakness that tries to pass for justice occurs in Zarathustra II, ‘Von den Taranteln’:

Also rede ich zu euch im Gleichniss, die ihr die Seelen drehend macht, ihr Prediger der Gleichheit! Taranteln seid ihr mir und versteckte Rachsüchtige!
Denn dass der Mensch erlöst werde von der Rache: das ist mir die Brücke zur höchsten Hoffnung und ein Regenbogen nach langen Unwettern.
Aber anders wollen es freilich die Taranteln. ‘Das gerade heisse uns Gerechtigkeit, dass die Welt voll werde von den Unwettern unsrer Rache’ – also reden sie mit einander. (Z II, KSA 4.128).

This famous passage may create the impression that Nietzsche is trying to move beyond justice, which is here closely related with revenge. This is however but one form of justice, one that Nietzsche clearly rejects as false. The word ‘justice’ easily lends itself as a mask for the resentful, and should therefore be used with great care,

\textsuperscript{132} It is important to emphasize at this point that weak and slave are not identical terms in Nietzsche. The master and slave moralities are discussed in the next chapter.
because it is hard to escape the tarantulas: ‘Misstraut allen Denen, die viel von ihrer Gerechtigkeit reden! Wahrlich, ihren Seelen fehlt es nicht nur an Honig. Und wenn sie sich selber ‘die Guten und Gerechten’ nennen, so vergesst nicht, dass ihnen zum Pharisäer Nichts fehlt als – Macht!’ (Z II, KSA 4.128). The ideal of justice, with its origin in commerce and cruelty, is here an instrument for the purpose of venting ressentiment. To return to the Genealogie der Moral, this time section 14 from the First Essay:

Jetzt höre ich erst, was sie so oft schon sagten: ‘Wir Guten – wir sind die Gerechten’– was sie verlangen, das heissen sie nicht Vergeltung, sondern den Triumph der ‘Gerechtigkeit’; was sie hassen, das ist nicht ihr Feind, nein! sie hassen das ‘Unrecht’, die ‘Gottlosigkeit’; was sie glauben und hoffen, ist nicht die Hoffnung auf Rache, die Trunkenheit der süssen Rache (– ‘süsser als Honig’ nannte sie schon Homer), sondern der Sieg Gottes, des gerechten Gottes über die Gottlosen; was ihnen zu lieben auf Erden übrig bleibt, sind nicht ihre Brüder im Hasse, sondern ihre ‘Brüder in der Liebe’, wie sie sagen, alle Guten und Gerechten auf der Erde (KSA 5.283).

It is clear that in this case the call for justice is but a hypocritical ideal, characterized by self-deception, the desire to mask, hide, or repress the true nature of a reactive lust for vengeance, and is thus precisely the kind of justice Nietzsche hopes to overcome. What is often missed in this context is that it is not Nietzsche that finds the origin of justice in revenge, but Eugen Dühring, whose ‘socialistic’ conception of justice Nietzsche attacks in the Second Essay. It is Dühring – and others, but not Nietzsche – that traces the origins of justice back to the reactive feelings of revenge. Nietzsche rejects this theory, because it can so easily be used to lend credence or to rationalize that deplorably slavish abuse of justice that sees it as arising from our weaker instincts:

If anything, Nietzsche is trying to save the robust virtue of justice from association with revenge and ressentiment. This overcoming, however, need not entail the rejection of justice in toto. There is a ‘truer’ justice, or rather a justice of superior quality that is much more than a mask for revenge.

In the fourth section of the Vorrede to the Genealogie der Moral, Nietzsche tells us that he is interested in ‘die Herkunft der Gerechtigkeit als eines Ausgleichs zwischen ungefähr Gleich-Mächtigen (Gleichgewicht als Voraussetzung aller Verträge, folglich alles Rechts). Rather than simply reducing its origins to revenge or ressentiment, Nietzsche says that it is more aptly traced to the notion of fairness and proportion. The paradigm of evaluation that Nietzsche favors here, is decidedly non-moral. This suposes that the parties involved start off from a relatively equal position of power, and that justice is the maintenance of equilibrium of this relation through fair exchange, both in distribution and retribution.

By emphasizing the egoistic desire at work in the economic rhetoric of justice, Nietzsche sets up a contrast with the later moralistic misinterpretation of justice, which sees it as a virtue requiring selflessness and altruism.

The legal order that Nietzsche uses here is one that the noble classes need to impose in order to keep ressentiment at bay. It is a form of justice that Nietzsche associates with lawmaking and creating, and as one can see from the passage cited, carries strong agonistic overtones. Arising out of the primitive psychology of trade – so many fair things have filthy origins – the original sense of justice (as opposed to the deviant form, revenge) is the conception of justice as fairness and measure, both between equals as well as measure or proportion which must be impressed upon
unequals. Nietzsche thus *demands* the imposition of laws and adjudication in the name of justice, provided it be done from a position of strength and not weakness, and represents an active interpretation of the world and not a nihilistic or passive one. Not only does he claim that the very existence and function of justice requires a pre-existent state of power parity, but goes on to add that justice cannot even exist between those who do not have more or less equal power. It would thus seem that it cannot exist between the weak and the strong and is therefore not to be pushed into service of the powerless.

It is important to bear in mind though, that Nietzsche appears to give an analysis of the origins of justice and does not intend this particular account to be prescriptive. It is also important to note that Nietzsche believes that a situation of justice between equals is possible, but only between those who are prepared to make *sacrifices* for it. That is to say, justice is for Nietzsche the condition that flourishes between healthy individuals, and should therefore be seen more as a condition to be recognized than a social *telos* to work for.

**Gerechtigkeit als Parteien-Lockruf.** – Wohl können edle (wenn auch nicht gerade sehr einsichtsvolle) Vertreter der herrschenden Classe sich geloben: ‘wir wollen die Menschen als gleich behandeln, ihnen gleiche Rechte Zugestehen’; insofern ist eine socialistische Denkungsweise, welche auf Gerechtigkeit ruht, möglich, aber wie gesagt nur innerhalb der herrschenden Classe, welche in diesem Falle die Gerechtigkeit mit Opfern und Verleugnungen übt. Dagegen Gleichheit der Rechte fordern, wie es die Socialisten der unterworfenen Kaste thun, ist nimmermehr der Ausfluss der Gerechtigkeit, sondern der Begehrliehkkeit. – Wenn man der Bestie blutige Fleischstücke aus der Nähe zeigt und wieder wegzieht, bis sie endlich brüllt: meint ihr, dass diess Gebrüll Gerechtigkeit bedeute?

Nietzsche continues in praising justice by noting that there is in no sense such a thing as ‘pure’ justice.

The concept of justice is a function of the social struggle of the will to power; it is simply a strategic operation of the will to power in its original sense which Nietzsche condones. Justice is thus not ‘objective’ in that it stands ‘outside’ of social struggle. There is simply no such vantage point. Nietzsche is thoroughly aware that justice is not outside or impartial to the fray, when he claims that


Instead, justice is implicated in the struggle, which means that we need to be so much more vigilant in seeking by whom and how justice is being invoked.

In the next chapter, we turn to the case of the subject, specifically the case of master and slave, and how bad conscience reached its apex in the interiorization of the self.
CHAPTER 4: SUBJECTIVITIES AND OTHER PRISONS

He used to wonder at the shallow psychology of those who conceive the Ego of man as a thing simple, permanent, reliable and of one essence. To him, man was a being with myriad lives and myriad sensations, a complex multiform creature that bore within itself strange legacies of thought and passion, and whose very flesh was tainted with the monstrous maladies of the dead.

*The Picture of Dorian Gray*. Oscar Wilde

For a long time ordinary individuality remained below the threshold of description. The disciplinary methods lowered the threshold of describable individuality and made of this description a means of control and domination.

*The Birth of the Clinic*. Michel Foucault

**Introduction: The Problem of the Subject and the Will to Power**

Of all the metaphysical prejudices that litter the history of Western philosophy, the idea of the self as substance behind appearance, formed early in life and waiting for some kind of discovery or liberation is probably the most tenacious. And according to Nietzsche, it is also the greatest crime against humanity, an imprisonment of the self and a denial of the aesthetic possibilities inherent in the human condition. For Nietzsche, even the God-hypothesis (provided that it forms part of the expression of a strong will to power and a healthy culture) has greater legitimacy than the postulation of the existence of a peculiar entity distinct from the body and beyond the ravages of time. Taking the subject apart is a task – to put it in Foucauldian idiom – of upsetting the *order of things*, to show that what has hitherto been taken as a firm foundation for moral and legal constructions is but itself a construct, and a fairly recent one at that. It is far from innocent too, but a postulate that lends itself as an instrument to be used by the weak against the strong in their first – and last – act of legislation: of replacing the strong, extra-moral ethic of the strong with the moralism of the weak. Subjectivity is therefore the product of specific discursive formations that fulfills specific limiting and discursive functions. As we have seen in chapter one and two, the history of subjectivity presents a series of fictive creations and recreations. Accordingly, the self
is first defined by its function in a larger community (the pre-moral stage). The priority of group-identity gradually yields to the formation of the domain of private, inward experience (the formation of the legal subject).

Historically, liberal theories of justice have conceived the self in strong metaphysical terms. The human subject, as ‘anchor’ of liberalism, was seen as possessing an underlying and determinate nature – a deep core of being – that is describable either in terms of materialism or idealism. Whether as the transcendental subject of Kantian idealism, or the materialistic homo economicus of utilitarian and contractarian versions, the liberal self has been seen as ontologically prior to both the forms of life and practices of the community to which it belongs, as well as its own autonomously chosen ends. Liberal justice is thus logically wedded to conceptions of subjectivity and virtue that are untenable in the Nietzschean framework. Or, in its classic version, simply untenable. Michael J. Sandel puts the point as follows: ‘For justice to be the first virtue, certain things must be true of us. We must be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a particular way. We must stand at a distance from our circumstances, whether as a transcendental subject in the case of Kant, or as the essentially unencumbered subject of possession in the case of Rawls. Either way, we must regard ourselves as independent: independent from the interest and attachments we may have at any moment, never identified by our aims, but always capable of standing back to survey and assess and possibly to revise them’.¹³³

Even a form of liberalism that is prepared to ‘revise’ itself, however, would for Nietzsche still belong in the realm of reactive values. The form of subjectivity associated with modernity and concomitantly, liberal justice, is sufficiently problematical to justify a philosophical annihilation. The substantiality and ‘unity’ of this supposed entity presupposes that it is essentially immutable and thus a/historical. This means that a kind of entity is implied that does not become what it is through some contingent developmental process; in other words, the human subject is viewed as a given entity incapable of growth, change and development. This is the kind of imaginative fiction that bespeaks a deep-set resentment against the world, its change and all its contradictions, and a moral world in which justice can only be thought in the narrow terms of bourgeois rights. It is important to realize though, that strictly speaking, ‘the metaphysical subject’ has never existed. Even within the metaphysical

tradition – from Plato to Hegel and Schopenhauer – there has never been a single notion of the subject. The metaphysical tradition has sprouted a plurality of different subjects, always according to need. What has come to be called the ‘subject’ of metaphysics is a synthesis of a number of various metaphysical fictions: political, aesthetic, cognitive, moral, and importantly for our purpose, legal. All of these have had delimited spheres of applicability.

Despite all his efforts to the contrary, Plato already shows difficulty in maintaining a single notion of the subject. In the *Phaedo*, Plato asserts that ‘the soul is most similar to what is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, unvarying, and constant in relation to itself’, in contrast to the body, which is mortal, chaotic and multiform. This is of course a model of the metaphysical dichotomies that Nietzsche tried to undermine. Later, in texts such as the *Republic*, however, Plato viewed the self as a composite of elements frequently in conflict with one another. In this dialogue, a distinction is made between the appetitive, ‘moral’ and rational aspects of the soul, all of which have to be controlled in a hierarchy of the self. Although Plato views the ideal soul as one in which ‘reason and its subordinates are all agreed that reason should rule’ (442 c), his insistence on the soul as a self-disciplined organization of elements is not that distant from Nietzsche’s. The primary target of Nietzsche’s critique is a Cartesian notion of the self, and its equally stifling cousin, the moral subject of Judeo-Christian theology.

As part of his radical overhaul of Western values, Nietzsche posits the complete amoral*ity* of nature. In contrast to the moral conception of nature of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Nietzsche gives us the will to power as the only ‘law of life’:


Throughout Nietzsche’s work after *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* he persistently describes the will to power as the basis for morality. This presents an obvious problem of how a single concept with definitive and substantive meaning can be the root for value systems as divergent as the primitive morality of mores at the dawn of humanity, as well as the morality of master and slave. Before we turn to those
moralties and the form of justice implied by them, let us briefly return to Nietzsche’s conception of power itself.

At first, in the *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* series from 1878-1880, Nietzsche appears to hold the view that power is one desired end among others such as pleasure, utility, and preservation, but came to amend this view, probably during the writing of *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*. The first mention of the will to power as a distinct and special sort of power occurs in *Also Sprach Zarathustra* (1883). At the heart of Nietzsche’s ‘new’ thinking of power is the rejection of three ‘narrow’ conceptions of power. In the first instance, power is no longer merely seen as the same sort of end as preservation, because it is not a stable or unified end desired by an individual. Nietzsche does not see men as pursuing a certain state of powerfulness, a resting place or heightened state analogous to a state of preservation. Secondly, power is not to be thought of as a kind of pool or reservoir to which more can simply be added. Utility and pleasure can be thought of in this way, since one can say that an agent attempts to accumulate utility or pleasure over time. But power cannot be accumulated. As should be clear from the previous chapter, in the third instance power is not sought by an agent as ego or will. If Nietzsche had analyzed the seat of human agency in terms of an ego or a single unified will, we might have conceived of power as something desired by such a will, or by some center of activity of the person. But this is precisely the view that Nietzsche challenges. In *Morgenröte* 119:


In *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* he rejects the notion of a unified will explicitly:

Wollen scheint mir vor Allem etwas Complicirtes, Etwas, das nur als Wort eine Einheit ist – und eben im Einen Worte steckt das Volks-Vorurtheil, das
Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power thus appeared to have developed at the same time that his understanding of agency became settled on the notion that drives and the struggle between them form the basis for human action. In other words, if our actions are grounded in our drives, and are at the same time an expression of the will to power, then there must be some intimate connection. Using as example the drive to knowledge in *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* 6, we read:

In der That, man thut gut (und klug), zur Erklärung davon, wie eigentlich die entlegensten metaphysischen Behauptungen eines Philosophen zu Stande gekommen sind, sich immer erst zu fragen: auf welche Moral will es (will er –) hinaus? Ich glaube demgemäss nicht, dass ein ‘Trieb zur Erkenntniss’ der Vater der Philosophie ist, sondern dass sich ein anderer Trieb, hier wie sonst, der Erkenntniss (und der Verkenntniss!) nur wie eines Werkzeugs bedient hat. Wer aber die Grundtriebe des Menschen darauf hin ansieht, wie weit sie gerade hier als inspirirende Genien (oder Dämonen und Kobolde –) ihr Spiel getrieben haben mögen, wird finden, dass sie Alle schon einmal Philosophie getrieben haben, – und dass jeder Einzelne von ihnen gerade sich gar zu gerne als letzten Zweck des Daseins und als berechtigten Herrn aller übrigen Triebe darstellen möchte. Denn jeder Trieb ist herrschsüchtig: und als solcher versucht er zu philosophiren (*JGB* 6, KSA 5.20).

This implies that the will to power manifests itself in every drive. The will to power of every drive is the will to the enhancement of the activity of that drive. To say that every drive possesses a will to power is to say that it constantly strives to raise the level of its activity. John Richardson writes in this regard: ‘We say that drives are ‘will to power’ in that they essentially pursue the continual enhancement of their distinctive activities, enhancements that consist in increasing their mastery over
others’.

Each drive has a will to power that aims for a higher and higher manifestation of their activity, and it achieves these manifestations through the incorporation of other drives. These drives are incorporated when they are put to work for the dominant drive’s ends, or when their ends are included – often in sublimated form – in the ends of the dominant drive. In other words, a drive either forces another to work in its own interest, or includes another drive’s ends as its own. In the passage cited above, Nietzsche allows that there may be a drive to knowledge, but that it is only a tool (Werkzeug) for another philosophizing drive.

As a further example, one can refer to *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* 9, where Nietzsche presents Stoicism as an example of such a philosophical drive. In describing the Stoics’ drive to self-tyranny, Nietzsche states that they project their morality unto nature while pretending to derive it from nature. Although an example of a passive will, the Stoics still enhance their capacity for self-governance by employing the methods and skills associated with the drive to knowledge. Self-tyranny uses observation, inquiry, argument, and reason to justify and expand itself. None of these epistemological tools, however, is truly at work in grounding the Stoic morality, which is an expression of the tyrannical drive expanding its influence in the sphere of the agent’s life. Drives are blindly or unconsciously striving towards their particular ends and their domination of other drives in the way described is also blind. There is no presiding ego that dictates when a drive can proceed and seek its ends and when it must step back and allow time and resources for the discharge of another. Nietzsche instead imagines a constant struggle between drives, and that a drive expresses itself only at the cost of all the others. Each drive therefore does not only seek to discharge itself, but also to dominate the others so that it can reach its goals more often. In this process, drives synthesize themselves into individuals and communities, so that it is possible to talk – as Nietzsche does – of both an individual and a general will to power. The will to power of the individual is the will to the enhancement of the activities that dominate within the individual in question. The task is now to examine how the will to power, understood as will to the enhanced activities of drives, grounds the three forms of morality that Nietzsche discusses, what form justice takes in each case and how Nietzsche evaluates them.

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1. Primitive Sittlichkeit

Nietzsche’s account of the birth of the modern subject is less one of the emergence of consciousness as such as it is the development of self-consciousness out of a more primitive version of self-consciousness, the latter already having been constituted by a variety of organic and communicative needs. In the first stage, the self acts purely upon instinct and its energies are directed wholly towards engagement with the outside world. In the second stage, the imposition of external constraint, especially the ensnaring of the subject within a legal economy, creates an inner depth in which the subject becomes for the first time fully self-conscious. In the third stage, the legal economy is moralized, giving rise to the subject of modernity.

We have already encountered the notion of a morality of mores in our previous chapter in which we have discussed the primitive moral systems in which the question of justice made its first appearance. As we have seen, these were moralities of customs that demanded the sacrifice of the individual. These moralities had their origin in a concern for community preservation, and it is with this aim in mind that the action of legislating values came into being in the first place. Newly formed communities set up rules and values aimed at maintaining a viable social unit.


At this stage, the individual is of very little importance, as is the reason for the development of a particular community. At this pre-reflexive point in time, the will is healthy and still exteriorizes itself.
… sondern vor Allem zum Zweck der Erhaltung einer Gemeinde, eines Volkes; jeder abergläubische Brauch, der auf Grund eines falsch gedeuteten Zufalls entstanden ist, erzwingt ein Herkommen, welchem zu folgen sittlich ist; sich von ihm lösen ist nämlich gefährlich, für die Gemeinschaft noch mehr schädlich als für den Einzelnen (weil die Gottheit den Frevel und jede Verletzung ihrer Vorrechte an der Gemeinde und nur insofern auch am Individuum straft). Nun wird jedes Herkommen fortwährend ehrwürdiger, je weiter der Ursprung abliegt, je mehr dieser vergessen ist; die ihm gezollte Verehrung häuft sich von Generation zu Generation auf, das Herkommen wird zuletzt heilig und erweckt Ehrfurcht; und so ist jedenfalls die Moral der Pietät eine viel ältere Moral, als die, welche unegoistische Handlungen verlangt. (MA 96, KSA 2.93).

The will to power ‘voices’ or expresses itself in a group or a people. In Also Sprach Zarathustra, the work that introduces the will to power, Nietzsche – through the voice of Zarathustra – notes the fact that different cultures and peoples have different moral codes. These codes differ as a result of the different survival strategies different groups had to adopt according to circumstance: ‘Viele Länder sah Zarathustra und viele Völker: so entdeckte er vieler Völker Gutes und Böses. Keine grössere Macht fand Zarathustra auf Erden, als gut und böse. Leben könnte kein Volk, das nicht erst schätzte; will es sich aber erhalten, so darf es nicht schätzen, wie der Nachbar schätzt’ (Von tausend und Einem Ziele’ Z II, KSA 4.74). Moral actions are those actions which are valued or praised because they are difficult to perform but necessary for the survival of a community. What is difficult for a people obviously depends on what is easy for the same people. From Nietzsche’s perspective – risking crudeness he can be described as a psychological egoist – what is most difficult for a people is overcoming the natural inclination for egoistic activity, that is the kind of activity which serves the immediate interests of the agent. Moral actions are difficult, they do not serve the immediate interests of the agent, and have to be enforced, either forcefully (as we have seen in our discussion on debt), or more gently, through praise and social approval. And the actions that win praise and approval in primitive communities will be unegoistic actions that are necessary for the survival of the community. This is the origin of the herd instinct.

Heerden-Instinct. – Wo wir eine Moral antreffen, da finden wir eine Abschätzung und Rangordnung der menschlichen Triebe und Handlungen. Diese Schätzungen und Rangordnungen sind immer der Ausdruck der Bedürfnisse einer Gemeinde und Heerde: Das, was ihr am ersten frommt – und am zweiten und dritten –, das ist auch der oberste Maassstab für den

It is important to note here, as we have seen in the previous chapter, that the bad conscience in the pre-moral stage is not identical to the bad conscience in the moral period, so too is herd morality not identical to the slave morality of modernity. Nietzsche’s interest in the morality of mores stems from his belief that certain features of contemporary morality grew out of this historical stage. The herd instinct of contemporary morality first had its origins in the morality of mores which was directed towards the preservation of the community itself. The will towards communal preservation (herd instinct) selects among all the available drives and allows the drives it considers to be ‘safe’ and compatible with survival to express itself within the confines it lays down. Other drives are cut off as ‘immoral’. For this reason, the ‘virtues’ of the weak are nothing short of hypocritical. Despite their different physiological and historical conditions, every morality is a form of tyranny. The essence of every moral code is that it constitutes the basis for a long period of compulsion. This compulsion forms what is called in the slave’s argot man’s ‘nature’. Any morality of laissez-aller precludes the possibility of having a ‘nature’. What is essential is ‘das Wesentliche, ‘im Himmel und auf Erden’, wie es scheint, ist, nochmals gesagt, dass lange und in Einer Richtung gehorcht werde’ (JGB 188, KSA 5.109). This is why every moral system hides deeply immoral origins: Without force, which is, according to the slave’s virtues deeply immoral, there can be no morality in terms of which force is to be condemned: ‘Jede Moral ist, im Gegensatz zum laisser aller, ein Stück Tyrannei gegen die “Natur” auch gegen die “Vernunft”; das ist aber noch kein Einwand gegen sie, man müsste denn selbst schon wieder von irgend einer Moral aus dekretiren, dass alle Art Tyrannei und Unvernunft unerlaubt sei ’(JGB 188, KSA 5.108).

This is the operation of the will to power itself: the herd instinct voices itself and dominates the drives that suit its purposes. Nietzsche is explicit about the fact that
the will to power – the will to enhanced activity – of a drive can operate through esteeming or valuing. Through Zarathustra Nietzsche states:

Werthe legte erst der Mensch in die Dinge, sich zu erhalten, – er schuf erst den Dingen Sinn, einen Menschen-Sinn! Darum nennt er sich ‘Mensch’, das ist: der Schätzende.
Schätzen ist Schaffen: hört es, ihr Schaffenden! Schätzen selber ist aller geschätzten Dinge Schatz und Kleinod.

What matters however, is how one evaluates. The question that Nietzsche seeks to answer is how it came about that the herd morality became a fully-fledged slave morality, turned inward, and destroyed the possibility to evaluate according to ideals other than the ascetic ideal of safety and self-preservation. The description of the gradual triumph of the herd morality over that of the noble competitor bears the burden of a two-fold signification. It describes the total victory of the herd morality on the one hand, and on the other, as a legislative instrument in its own right, implies its own dissociation from the thinking of the herd. It describes the victory of the herd over the nobles and rebels against the antithetical structures in terms of which the latter express their value, yet it does so by way of recuperation from excesses of the herd. Gilles Deleuze thus correctly describes the Genealogie as ‘devoted to figures of reactive triumph’.135

2. Master Morality

Nietzsche first introduces the singular concept of a master morality in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches 45:


In Nietzsche's description of the shift from master to slave morality, a number of important observations stand out. The masters do not know guilt, responsibility, or consideration (GM, I), they are born ‘organizers’. The masters exteriorize their will on the environment around them; they form it in their own image, according to what they hold to be of quality. Nietzsche differentiates the masters from the slaves on the basis of the lack of utility of their values. The slaves value certain instincts or actions because they are useful for gaining something. That is why they are despised:

Im ersten Falle, wenn die Herrschenden es sind, die den Begriff ‘gut’ bestimmen, sind es die erhobenen stolzen Zustände der Seele, welche als das Auszeichnende und die Rangordnung Bestimmende empfunden werden. Der vornehme Mensch trennt die Wesen von sich ab, an denen das Gegenheil solcher gehobener stolzer Zustände zum Ausdruck kommt: er verachtet sie. Verachtet wird der Feige, der Ängstliche, der Kleinliche, der an die enge Nützlichkeit Denkende…. (JGB 260, 5.209).

In the case of the masters, where the ruling group determines what is ‘good’, a powerful self is experienced as conferring distinctions and determining orders of rank. In other words, they actively legislate: The noble type of man experiences itself as determining values, it knows itself to be ‘value-creating’.

As practical example of this ‘value-creation’, Nietzsche gives us a brief history of the concept ‘good’. He begins by exposing the naivety of those ‘English psychologists’ who held that ‘good’ originally referred not to the conferrer of the term, but to the benefit enjoyed by the person who was the object of an action. Eventually, so the English psychologists say, those who benefited attributed goodness to the initiator of beneficial actions. This resulted in the establishment of selfless deeds as the ideal of praiseworthy conduct. This vaguely utilitarian theory is, however, for Nietzsche untenable and psychologically speaking unsound. Important for our purpose, this version also downplays the legislative dimension of value creation. Nietzsche contends that something entirely different actually transpired.

Because the term ‘good’ is used by the masters in referring to themselves, what passes under ‘good’ cannot become transcendental. It would be an open-ended, yet contained definition of quality that would leave room for new re-definitions as power-games continue to transform communities. This would constitute a generous economy of power that leaves plenty of room for new legislation and enactments of value. Master morality is sufficient to itself and therefore lacks the sense of a time when things might become conceivably better. Rather, the master seeks to behave in an honorable and unashamed fashion toward those who are his peers in that they too embody their own ‘moralities’: ‘Der Troer und der Grieche sind bei Homer beide gut. Nicht Der, welcher uns Schädliches zufügt, sondern Der, welcher verächtlich ist, gilt als schlecht. In der Gemeinde der Guten vererbt sich das Gute; es ist unmöglich, dass ein Schlechter aus so gutem Erdreiche hervorwachse’ (HAH 45, KSA 2.67).

Nietzsche’s conception of the origin of a morality of good and bad is supported by a survey of the evolution of ‘good’ in a number of languages:


This is supported by the meaning of the common Teutonic root göd, which means ‘to be of high rank or valor’, and interestingly, has associations with the word ‘playful’. In Middle English too, the word badde means ‘of defective quality or worth’, or ‘unfavorable’.

The nobles may be haughty and self-righteous, but also resourceful in consideration, delicacy, loyalty, pride, and friendship. (GM I, 11). Important for our purpose, in Jenseits von Gut und Böse 260, Nietzsche adds:

Die vornehme Art Mensch fühlt sich als werthbestimmend, sie hat nicht nöthig, sich gutheissen zu lassen, sie urtheilt was mir schädlich ist, das ist an sich schädlich’, sie weiss sich als Das, was überhaupt erst Ehre den Dingen verleiht, sie ist wertheschaffend. Im Vordergrunde steht das Gefühl der Fülle, der Macht, die überströmen will, das Glück der hohen Spannung, das Bewusstsein eines Reichthums, der schenken und abgeben möchte: – auch der vornehme Mensch hilft dem Unglücklichen, aber nicht oder fast nicht aus Page Mitleid, sondern mehr aus einem Drang, den der Überfluss von Macht erzeugt (JGB 260, KSA 5.210).

The masters’ creation of values is a direct expression of power, an active form of legislation. The master does not fear the essentially human role of legislator. Nietzsche makes it clear that he thinks that the master creates values out of an abundance of power. He writes in the paragraph cited above that ‘Alles, was sie an sich kennt, ehr sie: eine solche Moral ist Selbstverherrlichung.’ Value does not arise as a means to a given end, but as an expression of delight in oneself and the world one inhabits. Being courageous enough to recognize his own nature and that of his type as the sole ground for his values, he has no need to project his values unto some external authority, secular or transcendent. In other words, the most just definition of master

138 The word is used by Chaucer, for example, to denote quality, not moral goodness: ‘a badde coin’ According to Little, W. et al, the word ‘badde’ could itself be derived from the Old English baeddel, ‘hermaphrodite’, something base or disturbing.
would not be that of one who desires power over others – if anything, that is what the slave desires – but rather a relationship of sovereign self-legislation towards oneself. In the second Essay Nietzsche describes it as follows:

Das von der Sittlichkeit der Sitte wieder losgekommene, das autonome übersittliche Individuum (denn ‘autonom’ und ‘sittlich’ schliesst sich aus), kurz den Menschen des eignen unabhängigen langen Willens, der versprechen darf – und in ihm ein stolzes, in allen Muskeln zuckendes Bewusstsein davon, was da endlich errungen und in ihm leibhaft geworden ist, ein eigentliches Macht- und Freiheits-Bewusstsein, ein Vollendungs-Gefühl des Menschen überhaupt (GM II 2, KSA 5.293).

In his remarkable interpretation of the will to power, Gilles Deleuze reads Nietzsche as contrasting two forms of the will to power. The familiar valuational hierarchies of his (Nietzsche’s) age are seen by Deleuze as reactive and the new conception of the will to power as effective force Deleuze names active. While active forces are not identical to an identifiable master class, and slave similarly not identical to the concept reactive, it can be argued that Nietzsche and Deleuze simply use two different sets of metaphor to denote qualitative differences in evaluation criteria. Whereas active forces are concerned only with their own well-being and expansion, reactive forces by contrast, are concerned with the active forces and find their principle of action outside themselves. Deleuze states in his reading of Nietzsche: ‘Even by getting together reactive forces do not form a greater force, one that would be active. They proceed in an entirely different way, they decompose, they separate active force from what it can do; they take away a part or almost all of its power. In this way reactive forces do not become active, but on the contrary, they make active forces join them and become reactive in a new sense… when reactive forces separate it from what it can do’. Reactive forces are not weaker than active ones; in fact they tend to overpower active ones and turn them into reactive ones, but they are slavish in that they are directed towards the active forces, incapable of legislating meaning on their own. For convenience’s sake we will quote Deleuze’s neat list:

Reactive force is
1. a utilitarian force of adaptation and partial limitation;
2. a force which separates active forces from what they can do;

3. a force that *denies* active forces.

Active force is:
1. plastic, dominant and subjugating;
2. a force which goes to the limit of what it can do;
3. a force which affirms its difference, which makes its difference an object of enjoyment and affirmation. Forces are only absolutely and completely determined if these three pairs of characteristics are taken into account simultaneously.140

Given the plasticity and mobility of active forces and given that these forces are not governed by or directed towards pre-ordained objects, the world itself must be seen as a pliable and potentially infinitely diverse field of energies, whose capacities and advances can never be predicted. It takes a certain kind of human who is able to face up to this condition, and this is why a universal conception of justice is in reality committing injustice towards the best kind of human in the first instance and against the world and its complexities in the second instance.

To make further sense of the master’s justice, it is necessary to return briefly to Nietzsche’s perspectivism. In 1884 he noted the following:


What makes this paragraph important for our purpose is that one finds here two broad perspectival categories. The first is the familiar language of good and evil, which is to say, the moral perspective. Then there is the category of ‘justice’, which can be described as ‘doing that which is appropriate to that which one encounters’. This is truly a move beyond good and evil. ‘Justice’ in this context stands completely apart from any notion of a unified subject but depends on the ability of an organism to

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140 Deleuze, G. *ibid.* p.23.

According to Nietzsche, it is often forgotten that the unity of the world is a double imputation, first from the unity of the knower derived from the process of knowing, and then by the unity of the world as perceived by the knower. In those who rise up to justice, the knower acknowledges his own multiplicity, the fact that he as well as the world that he interprets, requires legislation again and again. It is important to note that the distinction between the perspectives of morality and that of justice does not correspond to a distinction between points of view, but to different kinds of evaluation. Some lack the ability to have a ‘basis’ or a standard according to which they measure, and their judgments are therefore ‘chaos’.

It is important to note at this stage that Nietzsche does not present us here with a problem of false consciousness. As Michael Holquist has noted, false consciousness implies that all claims to knowledge ‘can never express the actual place they occupy among the reigning myths of their own time and place’:\footnote{142 Holquist, M. The Politics of Representation. London: Albany Press, 1994 p. 22.} Nihilism is not a false consciousness whereby our knowledge of the world would be incomplete because of our own involvement in the inevitability of our own place in the world. Hierarchy of perspective places the emphasis on the effects of a perspective on a knower. Nietzsche is concerned more with quality than epistemological accuracy.

The move to a perspective of ‘justice’ implies neither ‘accomplishment’ nor \textit{Vollendung}. Things can only be seen as they ‘really’ are if they are seen as multiple, even to \textit{multiply}. The more composite a knower is, that is, the less likely he is to take a part for the whole and become subject to his own creations, the more ‘eyes’ the self will have, the greater his position to do justice to the world. As Nietzsche writes in \textit{Jenseits von Gut on Böse}:

Man vergisst aber gerne, auch auf Seiten besonnener Geister, dass Unglücklich-machen und Böse-machen ebensowenig Gegenargumente sind. Etwas dürfte wahr sein: ob es gleich im höchsten Grade schädlich und gefährlich wäre; ja es könnte selbst zur Grundbeschaffenheit des Daseins gehören, dass man an seiner völligen Erkenntniss zu Grunde ginge, – so dass sich die Stärke eines Geistes darnach bemässe, wie viel er von der ‘Wahrheit’ gerade noch aushielte, deutlicher, bis zu welchem Grade er sie verdünnt, verhüllt, versüsst, verdumpft, verfälscht \textit{nöhtig hätte} (JGB 39, KSA 5.57).
Unexpectedly, Nietzsche shares something here of the Calvinist epistemology. Calvin argued that man could – and consequently should – not pretend to know the world as it is. That was only for God. Human knowledge was necessarily perspectival, that of the creaturely sinner. Nietzsche espouses a similar viewpoint from as early as *Die Geburt der Tragödie*. This text is a text in the theory of understanding: it is the answer to the question of how the Greeks became who they were and how they attained that way of life without falling either into ‘Asiatic chaos’ or into the rigid prose of Rome. From this text onwards, Nietzsche consistently and explicitly insists upon the incompatibility between truth and life and the necessity of horizons in making meaning possible. In *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* 34 he notes: ‘Man gestehe sich doch so viel ein: es bestünde gar kein Leben, wenn nicht auf dem Grunde perspektivischer Schätzungen und Scheinbarkeiten’. To have a perspective means to have horizons, and such limitations allow us to be defined as beings in the first place. In the 1886 preface to *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* he argues that humans cannot experience the world as other than unjust, and that it was a sign of strength to forgo any attempt to experience the world in any other but tragic terms.

Du solltest die nothwendige Ungerechtigkeit in jedem Für und Wider begreifen lernen, die Ungerechtigkeit als unablösbar vom Leben, das Leben selbst als bedingt durch das Perspektivische und seine Ungerechtigkeit (MA Vorrede 6, KSA 2.20).

In his 1870 lecture on *Oedipus Rex* Nietzsche had already made the point that tragedy presents the deepest conflict between life and thought. Greek tragedy, as we have seen, consisted of the manner in which the Greeks managed to accept the fact that all knowledge, including that of themselves, was perspectival, and yet not call that perspective into question. This is what mastership means, namely the acknowledgement that simply to live as a human means to be situated, or ‘thrown’ into a radically unjust situation. The difference between master and slave morality is that the master does not experience the world as unjust, while the slave’s point of departure is an intense experience of the unfairness and injustice of the world.

\[143\] Nietzsche’s statement in his final letter to Burckhardt, that he was ‘every name’ in history, makes sense in this context; even though he exaggerates, there are very few thinkers from the history of philosophy that do not make an appearance somewhere in the Nietzschean *oeuvre*. 
3. Slave Morality

In *Zur Genealogie der Moral* I section 7 Nietzsche introduces slave morality as a different method of evaluation, one that developed in response to the values legislated by the masters. These values did not develop as the expression or description of a personal richness, but are intrinsically functional in that the very basis for their coming into being depend on them setting a purpose, just as the primitive communal values served the purpose of preserving a community. Slave values represent a reactive form of evaluation, ‘die Sklaven-Moral bedarf, um zu entstehn, immer zuerst einer Gegen- und Aussenwelt, sie bedarf, physiologisch gesprochen, äusserer Reize, um überhaupt zu agiren, – ihre Aktion ist von Grund aus Reaktion’ (*GM* I. 7. KSA 5.271). And it is largely a reaction against suffering.


Slave morality thus develops – to pick up the economical vocabulary from chapter three again – as a kind of compensational strategy against the power of the masters. The masters are of course the founders of society and as such hold sway over almost everything, even the common language bears the traces of the original legislator: ‘Das Herrenrecht, Namen zu geben, geht so weit, dass man sich erlauben sollte, den Ursprung der Sprache selbst als Machtäusserung der Herrschenden zu fassen: sie sagen ‘das ist das und das’ sie siegeln jegliches Ding und Geschehen mit einem Laute ab und nehmen es dadurch gleichsam in Besitz’. (*GM* I 2, KSA 5.260). The reactive spirit can thus be defined as the opposite of a tragic one in that what is

144 Due to Nietzsche’s ambivalence towards the concept of ‘civilization’, which he associates with ‘taming’ I hesitate to use the word here.
resented is fate itself, the fall of the cosmic dice or the cards that fate has dealt it. In this respect, *ressentiment* is different from mere resentment in that it is universal in scope. What is hated is not merely specific sources of fear and pain, such as the masters of *GM I*, but the world in general, including the perceived limitations of space, time and contingency. In other words, it is directed towards the general (unfair) order of things. This makes the slave’s blame universal: his rage is directed towards the suffering that the very fact of existence generates.

In order to repudiate the world as a whole, and so devalue the domain in which the masters find their strength, the slave must convince the master, and importantly, himself, that existence – and by implication strength – is guilty and that such guilt can be punished or avenged. This happens through the falsification not only of the nature of the master, but the totality of existence. An important strategy is the assignation of whatever he resents to a corrupt and corrupting realm that he names the ‘phenomenal’. Keeping in ascetic form, this is contrasted to a ‘truly’ real domain that transcends the world of contingency altogether.

Judeo-Christian morality can be seen as a misinterpretation of morality on two accounts. First, in order to gain control over a world that is forever threatening to slip into chaos, the sufferer (inevitably the suffering *slave*) invents all sorts of philosophical concepts like ‘essence’ and ‘free will’ so that those who possess strength can be made to feel constitutively ‘guilty’ and yet still be able to choose to repudiate, albeit imperfectly, what they inevitably are. The favored ideal that determines these fictions is of course the ascetic ideal, which in its limiting form demands that the entirety of the phenomenal world be repudiated for the sake of a transcendent realm, be it God or Truth. With the aid of such fictions the slave finally gets *his* opportunity to despise and take his revenge upon his enemies ‘in effigie.
natürlich’ (GM I 10 KSA 5.271). Once he has reached this stage, however, he not only hates his masters, but his own fate and the world in general – in effigy.

This brings us to the second instance of misinterpretation, the Judeo-Christian tradition misinterprets suffering as divine punishment:

und siehe da! Er bekommt einen Wink, er bekommt von seinem Zauberer, dem asketischen Priester, den ersten Wink über die ‘Ursache’ seines Leidens: er soll sie in sich suchen, in einer Schul, in einem Stück Vergangenheit, er soll sein Leiden selbst als einen Strafzustand verstehn... (GM, 20).

The priest is of course the instigator of the new system of evaluation. The priests, fallen form their former association with aristocracy, become dangerous:


The priest’s values are specifically designed to turn the strong against themselves in that all things related to health, vitality, growth, reproduction and flourishing are considered wicked. The strong, whose very existence is defined in these terms, now believes himself condemned to hell, unless he can turn away from these vicious elements of existence. The priest clearly falsifies the conditions of existence, but this is not Nietzsche’s major charge. As we have seen in our discussion on perspectivism in the previous chapter, nothing but a falsification of the world is possible. The master thus ‘falsifies’ the world as much as the slaves, but in Nietzsche’s opinion, the slave’s ‘sin’ against reality is far graver:

Wenn die vornehme Werthungsweise sich vergreift und an der Realität versündigt, so geschieht dies in Bezug auf die Sphäre, welche ihr nicht genügend bekannt ist, ja gegen deren wirkliches Kennen sie sich spröde zur Wehre setzt: sie verkennt unter Umständen die von ihr verachtete Sphäre, die des gemeinen Mannes, des niedren Volks; andererseits erwäge man, dass jedenfalls der Affekt der Verachtung, des Herabblickens, des Überlegen-Blickens, gesetzt, dass er das Bild des Verachteten fälscht, bei weitem hinter

What makes the slaves’ falsification despicable is that it falsifies something of high quality which deserves great respect. Against Tracy Strong, who argues that ‘genealogy, as Nietzsche uses it, brackets the things themselves so as to be left only with the constituting human elements’, it is possible to argue that Nietzsche evaluates value systems by reference to an external rank order, and approves of the masters’ value system because they conform better to it, and despises the slaves’ because they promulgate lies about the said rank order. This would mean, as we have also seen in the previous chapter, that there are limits as to what forms perspectives can take. In this case, physical reality itself provides such a limit. There is such a thing as strength, which implies that even if man enjoys tremendous freedom as to the way he can interpret, there are aspects of the world to which he should remain faithful. In his famous parable on power in section thirteen of the first Essay, Nietzsche states:

Doch kommen wir zurück: das Problem vom andren Ursprung des ‘Guten’, vom Guten, wie ihn der Mensch des Ressentiment sich ausgedacht hat, verlangt nach seinem Abschluss. – Dass die Lämmer den grossen Raubvögeln gram sind, das befremdet nicht: nur liegt darin kein Grund, es den grossen Raubvögeln zu verargen, dass sie sich kleine Lämmer holen. Und wenn die Lämmer unter sich sagen ‘diese Raubvögel sind böse; und wer so wenig als möglich ein Raubvogel ist, vielmehr deren Gegenstück, ein Lamm, – sollte der nicht gut sein?’ so ist an dieser Aufrichtung eines Ideals Nichts auszusetzen, sei es auch, dass die Raubvögel dazu ein wenig spöttisch blacken werden und vielleicht sich sagen: „wir sind ihnen gar nicht gram, diesen guten Lämmern, wir lieben sie sogar: nichts ist schmackhafter als ein zartes Lamm’ (GM I 13, KSA 5.279)

At the hand of this parable Nietzsche raises the following problem:

Von der Stärke verlangen, dass sie sich nicht als Stärke äussere, dass sie nicht ein Überwältigen-Wollen, ein Niederwerfen-Wollen, ein Herrwerden-Wollen, ein Durst nach Feinden und Widerständen und Triumphen sei, ist gerade so widersinnig als von der Schwäche verlangen, dass sie sich als Stärke äussere (GM I 13, KSA 5.279).

That this demand was carried out despite its obvious unreasonableness, makes it arguably the greatest revolution in moral history, one great act of legislation that would curb the act of legislation forever. A completely new moral outlook was required in order for resentment to become *ressentiment* and for slaves to develop the desire to escape their allotted role. This is an outlook according to which suffering and human inequality have become to a great degree unacceptable, and in which great expectations exist of ultimately overcoming these conditions. This implies a world picture with two distinct elements. In the first instance, there is the assumption that humans are in the essential respects *equal*, and that they should to this extent be treated as such. In the second instance there is the postulation that ultimate freedom from chance and necessity, and obviously, from the ‘undeserved’ suffering that arise from these features of the world is the supreme – and achievable – good. Furthermore, as we have noted in the introduction, since social roles now have no unchallengeable foundations and human beings have properties in common that is more important than mere luck or accident of birth, suffering has, after the triumph of the slaves, become the Problem of Suffering. The weak deceive themselves, however, if they think that the terms according to which justice is determined are set forever.

To conceive of justice as the recovery of an original fair order is *ressentiment* in action, testimony to the victory of slave morality over the values of the master class. It is a manifestation of the refusal to legislate, a testament to the hope that one day, the *hypokeimenon*, the hitherto obscured *true* order of things will manifest itself, which will provide independent justification of the slave’s *right* to hatred of his masters. Slave values, in dubbing the master evil, gives meaning to the misery of the frail.
Suffering is no longer seen as a meaningless result of random strength differences between humans, but instead as a result of the master’s decision to violate God’s Laws and be evil. The slaves’ suffering is now not a meaningless fact of life, but the work of malevolent forces struggling against goodness and purity. The slave now experiences his pain as the eternal struggle between light and darkness or as Nietzsche puts it, between good and evil. Thus world as it is now has no right to be, it requires massive repair work if it is to contain even a hint of a just order. Man pays an enormous price for living like this.

We see in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches* I that the belief in an underlying moral world-order is one of the prime examples of the metaphysical comfort that has to be abandoned. The passage in question is yet another example of ‘poetic justice’, this time calcified into metaphysical form. This form of metaphysics can be described as an instance of the anthropic principle. Stephen Hawking summerizes this principle as ‘Things are as they are because we are’.146 It means that the world is interpreted as solely existing for *us*.


In *Morgenröte*, Nietzsche again remonstrates again against this equation between justice and morality. In this text he also points out that the belief in an eternal order of justice, whether as recompense for the ‘fall into existence’ *simpliciter* or as

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recompense for more particular acts of injustice or immorality, does more harm than
good in that it raises untenable expectations such as the hope that man can one day be
relieved of the burden of worldly situatedness. Against the logic of compensation,
Nietzsche once again resurrects the *tragic* worldview:

\[\text{Der Wahn der sittlichen Weltordnung. – Es giebt gar keine ewige}
\]
\[\text{Nothwendigkeit, welche orderte, dass jede Schuld gebüsst und bezahlt werde,}
\]
\[\text{– es war ein schrecklicher, zum kleinsten Theile nützlicher Wahn, dass es}
\]
\[\text{eine solche gebe –; ebenso wie es ein Wahn ist, dass Alles eine Schuld ist,}
\]
\[\text{was als solche gefühlt wird. Nicht die Dinge, sondern die Meinungen über}
\]
\[\text{Dinge, die es gar nicht giebt, haben die Menschen so verstört! (M 563, KSA}
\]
\[\text{3.328).}
\]

One of the key issues in the slavish conception of justice is that it assumes the
just position to imply *sameness*.\(^{147}\) This is already an act of violence against strength,
power and the unique. At several places, though, Nietzsche notes that justice, as the
fair settling of disputes in terms of a mutual exchange without any loss to either party,
assumes a position of ‘approximately equal power’. Equal power in this case means
that both parties have the power to enforce their own evaluations upon the situation,
and that there is a balance in the distribution of productive power. In contrast, Justice,
understood as the possibility of mutual understanding, assumes that the selves in
question were constituted by the *same* mode of evaluation. The form that justice (as
an instance of the will to power) takes in this instance is a striving to produce uniform
selves. This is supported by Nietzsche’s analysis of the origins of rights and duties in
*Morgenröte* 112. Important for our purposes, Nietzsche notes that an economy of
power can only come into being on the basis of a shared *belief*, and as we have seen,
beliefs are products of legislation and power games.

\[\text{Unsere Pflichten – das sind die Rechte Anderer auf uns. Wodurch haben sie}
\]
\[\text{diese erworben? Dadurch, dass sie uns für vertrags- und vergeltungsfähig}
\]
\[\text{nahmen, für gleich und ähnlich mit sich ansetzten, dass sie uns daraufhin}
\]
\[\text{Etwas anvertrauten, uns erzogen, zurechtwiesen, unterstützten. Wir erfüllen}
\]
\[\text{unsre Pflicht – das heisst: wir rechtfertigen jene Vorstellung von unserer}
\]
\[\text{Macht, auf welche hin uns Alles erwiesen wurde, wir geben zurück, in dem}
\]
\[\text{Maasse, als man uns gab. So ist es unser Stolz, der die Pflicht zu thun gebeut,
}\]
\[\text{– wir wollen unsre Selbstherrlichkeit wiederherstellen, wenn wir dem, was}
\]
\[\text{Andre für uns thaten, Etwas entgegenstellen, das wir für sie thun, – denn jene}
\]
\[\text{haben damit in die Sphäre unserer Macht eingegriffen und würden dauernd}
\]

\(^{147}\) One is inevitably reminded here of John Rawls’s famous ‘veil of ignorance’.
ihre Hand in ihr haben, wenn wir nicht mit der ‘Pflicht’ eine Wiedervergeltung übten, das heisst in ihre Macht eingriffen. Nur auf Das, was in unserer Macht steht, können sich die Rechte Anderer beziehen; es wäre unvernünftig, wenn sie Etwas von uns wollten, das uns selber nicht gehört. Genauer muss man sagen: nur auf Das, was sie meinen, dass es in unserer Macht steht, voraussetzend, dass es das Selbe ist, von dem wir meinen, es stehe in unserer Macht. Es könnte leicht auf beiden Seiten der gleiche Irrthum sein: das Gefühl der Pflicht hängt daran, dass wir in Bezug auf den Umkreis unserer Macht den selben Glauben haben, wie die Anderen: nämlich dass wir bestimmte Dinge versprechen, uns zu ihnen verpflichten können (‘Freiheit des Willens’). (M 112, KSA 3.100).

A Hobbesian social contract thus depends upon on a shared belief in the similarity of the powers of the participants in the power sphere. This goes for the rights and duties of nations as well as individual human agents. While this conception of justice is inexorable in the modern liberal state (it can perhaps be termed a necessary evil) it is important to realize that our conception of justice does not have to end here. Whereas basic equality is for liberals (and Englishmen, shopkeepers etc.) a final end, it represents for Nietzsche but one moment, or one element in the play of worldly justice, and can therefore not be taken as a final ideal or the embodiment of virtue. An important part of Nietzsche’s deconstructive strategy avant la lettre is the hunting down of reductionisms. All metaphysical forms are reductions, a violation of unacknowledged elements and changes that occur over time. What makes apparent positions of ‘equality’ in the legal and political spheres interesting from a Nietzschean perspective, is that they are results of a long, usually unacknowledged struggle, the will to power at rest. Or to put it in more Nietzschean idiom, these temporary stable ‘platforms’ that occur from time to time is the will to power donning a calm and peaceful mask instead of presenting itself in its usual violent form. This means that the rule of law is the exception rather than the rule.

What is important to note here, is that while rights and duties exist only between equals,\textsuperscript{148} positions or situations in which genuine equality exists are comparatively rare. It should also be noted that in these cases, justice is simply a \textit{characteristic} of the relationships involved that manifests itself in the interactions of the parties involved; it is already there, it cannot be strived for. Instead, those who \textit{demand} equality commit violence against the complexity of the world, and the operation of the greater cosmic justice, the will to power. Rousseau is a perfect example:


Only rarely is it possible to speak of a genuine justice \textit{inter pares} (\textit{GM} II 11), that rare Homeric virtue that we have discussed in chapter one. Furthermore, to speak of ‘equality’ as an ideal is to deny at the same time the perspectival nature of our judgements, because the terms according to which ‘equality’ is determined is not only a slavish \textit{perspective}, but set in terms of only a select \textit{number} of slaves. Little wonder then, that Zarathustra distances himself so violently from this conception of justice:


\textsuperscript{148} We have seen in chapter three that ‘justice’ originates in a position of equality.
To take equality as the telos for a just society, is strictly speaking, a contradiction in terms. The need for justice arose precisely because there is no such thing as ‘natural’ justice. ‘Nature’ is a complex network of radically unequal relationships that are for the most part maintained through violence. It cannot survive without violence and inequality – equality would entail stasis and eventually death. This is why it makes no sense to hold certain parties accountable for the circle of violence that is life.

4. The Narrow Economy of the Subject

If slave morality has its origins in the perverse desire to bring the legislative dimension of human existence to an end, subjectivity is its chief symptom. At the root of Nietzsche’s critique of the subject are two fundamental issues, namely the origin of consciousness and the nature of human agency. As early as Die Geburt der Tragödie in which, as we have seen, the origin of the aesthetic experience can be traced back to the conflict between the Dionysian instinct towards self-negation and the Apollonian drive towards preservation of subjective autonomy. In Morgenröte 116 Nietzsche devotes a long section to the problem of indeterminacy at the heart of the subject:

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There is a clear parallel with the emphasis on the metaphoric leaps that occur between physiological perceptions, their registering in consciousness and their eventual expression in language that is the subject matter of Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne. Now, a further leap is indicated, namely between cognition
and moral agency. The phenomenal inner world is a manifold of various affects of different orders, and the relationship between cognition and volition is highly mediated and obscure. Zarathustra forcefully declares that ‘Ihr habt den Weg vom Wurme zum Menschen gemacht, und Vieles ist in euch noch Wurm’ (Z Vorrede 3, 4.14). The subject is however more than a mere discursive fiction. This is clear from Nietzsche’s distinction between the historicity of consciousness and his recognition of the subject as a problematic existent in modernity. While Nietzsche’s attack on the Cartesian notion of the subject is aimed at the deluded belief in the grammar of subjective agency, it also sets an expanded notion of the self in which the body plays an important part in informing cognitive and ethical activity against the metaphysical conception of the self. True to his general interpretative stance, Nietzsche does not regard conscious subjectivity as an anterior entity that was ‘discovered’ at some point in the history of the West. Instead, his outline of the origins of the subject shows both that it is an emergent phenomenon and that it bears the traces of the various historical practices that produced it. Key among these practices is the process of moralization, the process by which the legal concepts of duty, obligation, guilt, law, and justice, which appeared first in distinct material contexts, became moral.

The evolution of the bad conscience is at once a dangerous and a promising phenomenon, because it contains ambiguous possibilities. As we have seen in chapter three, the bad conscience does not automatically translate into moral terms. Nietzsche describes it at once as ‘Das ‘schlechte Gewissen’, diese unheimlichste und interessanteste Pflanze’ (GM II 14, KSA 5.318), and ‘die tiefe Erkrankung, welcher der Mensch unter dem Druck jener gründlichsten aller Veränderungen verfallen musste’ (GM II 16, KSA 5.321). The bad conscience results from the demands placed upon the individual during the socialization process, especially the curbing of the ‘masterly’ passions, like ‘[d]ie Feindschaft, die Grausamkeit, die Lust an der Verfolgung, am Überfall, am Wechsel, an der Zerstörung – Alles das gegen die Inhaber solcher Instinkte sich wendend: das ist der Ursprung des ‘schlechten Gewissens’. The socialization of man leads to inwardness for two reasons: in order to enjoy what society offers, man needs to become calculable and gentle (GM II 2). Such calculability demands, as we have seen, the ability to guarantee one’s promises, to respect justice and the rules of contracts, especially the duty to make payments in kind, such as punishments in its many forms. In other words, to participate in what is
basically a debtor-creditor relationship, one must first master the outward-straining instincts with its potential for conflict with the rest of society.


The burden of self-consciousness lies in the fact that, merely by being a potentially guilty debtor to society, the newly self-conscious individual has become a liability towards himself. No longer able to discharge his instincts externally, the warrior becomes a clerk, forever weighing and measuring himself against the standards of society. These unfortunate creatures ‘waren auf Denken, Schliessen, Berechnen, Combiniren von Ursachen und Wirkungen reduzirt, diese Unglücklichen, auf ihr ‘Bewusstsein’, auf ihr ärmlichtiges und fehlgreifendstes Organ!’ (GM II 16, KSA 5.322). For reasons of clarification, it must be noted here that ‘schlechtes Gewissen’ is definitely translated as bad conscience, and not as it is sometimes rendered, ‘consciousness’. As can clearly be seen in the extract quoted, when Nietzsche refers to the latter concept, he uses the word ‘Bewusstsein’.

The moralization of the bad conscience occurs when it becomes a total phenomenon. This happens when the relationship between debtor and creditor becomes internalized, or defined in terms of some putatively innate corruption of human nature (or ‘life’ or the ‘world’). Guilt now becomes so absolute, its economy so narrow that there is no hope of ever discharging the debts incurred. On top of that, new debts are continuously added. It becomes a weapon in the hands of the decadent priests who use it to explain the recalcitrance of one’s base or animal nature and the pain involved in the necessary effort to tame it. Debt now becomes part of the human condition, in the form of ‘sin’.

What were before single failures on the part of the individual to pay – a number of bad deeds – are now consolidated as constitutive of the individual’s identity. He is guilt itself, or in the priest’s terms, a sinner. Guilt is now pushed back to become a permanent resident in the mind, and it permeates every aspect of culture:

Feelings of guilt may have had their origins in relationships between real debtors and creditors, but as guilt became moralized, the creditor tends to become more and more abstract: one can become a debtor towards any ideal. This is why the death of God does not abolish the bad conscience. The creditor eventually becomes so abstract and general that it becomes identical to life itself – the ascetic ideal and the hatred of the world universalized.

Nietzsche’s critique of the internalized, guilty subject is fuelled by a number of concerns, the most fundamental one perhaps the primacy of language. As we have seen in the previous chapter, concepts emerge through linguistic legislation, which means that language is a determinant of thought. Subjectivity can therefore not be analyzed without first returning to its linguistic origins. In Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft he writes:

149 This is perhaps why modernist ideals such as the various utopian and Marxist ideals in the twentieth century, generated such fanaticism. Fanaticism (also in the contemporary form of religious fanaticism), could have its roots in a frustrated relationship with an imaginary creditor.
Sprache zur Brücke zwischen Mensch und Mensch dient, sondern auch der Blick, der Druck, die Gebärd; das Bewusstwerden unserer Sinseindrücke bei uns selbst, die Kraft, sie fixiren zu können und gleichsam ausser uns zu stellen, hat in dem Maasse zugenommen, als die Nöthigung wuchs, sie Andern durch Zeichen zu übermitteln (FW 354, KSA 3.592).

It is clear that the specific target of Nietzsche’s critique is the Cartesian notion of the self, together with its equally sickly cousin, the ethical subject of Judeo-Christian theology. Descartes’ theory of cognition relies on a minimalist theory of the self as nothing but a res cogitans. In the famous second of his Meditations on First Philosophy Descartes concludes that ‘I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind or intelligence… a thinking thing’.\textsuperscript{150} In the sixth Meditation, devoted to demonstrating the ‘real’ distinction between mind and body, he makes the even more radical statement that ‘there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as the body is by its very nature always divisible, whereas the mind is utterly indivisible… I am merely a thinking thing, something quite single and complete’.\textsuperscript{151} This thinking being reached its apotheosis in the work of Kant and the freedom of the moral subject to act, or importantly for our purposes, not to act. As such, Descartes’ Cogito begs more metaphysical questions than it solves.


Thus, far from offering an Archimedian point, Nietzsche unmask subjectivity as being but a grammatical inference. It was faith in the structure of the subject and the predicate that inspired Descartes’ certainty that ‘I’ is the subject of ‘think’, whereas it could also be stated as ‘the thoughts came to me’. Faith in grammar thus conveys the desire to be the ‘cause’ of one’s thoughts. The ‘self’, ‘the subject’, and the

\textsuperscript{150} Descartes, R. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume II, Translated by John Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p. 18.

\textsuperscript{151} Descartes, R. \textit{ibid}, p. 59.
‘individual’ are thus mere metaphysical fictions, and have at their genesis only a
linguistic reality. In particular, the ‘self’ brought into being with the will to power has
now, especially through Nietzsche’s French afterlife, been proven a mere illusion
insofar as underlying unity, permanent centre, or source of decision is concerned.
Consciousness is thus a complex web of interrelated emotional and cognitive
dispositions to habitual ways of acting in the world.\textsuperscript{152} Nietzsche can almost be said to
adopt a quasi-behaviorist stance according to which ascriptions of conscious intention
preceding acts can be seen as symptoms of an unwarranted reliance upon cause and
effect.

Nietzsche is interested above all in the value judgments implied by such
ascriptions of intention and by the fact that they have a history. It is precisely the
emphasis on this aspect which prevents him from committing the essentialisms of
many of the postmodern anti-metaphysicians like Deleuze, Derrida and to a lesser
extent Foucault, who end up positing a concept with almost the same characteristics
that they sought to defeat. While Derrida, for example, rejects any notion of a
spontaneous ego, preferring a self mediated by the medium of language, his concepts
of \textit{écriture} and \textit{differance} is very similar to the spontaneity of the classic subject that
he criticizes. Nietzsche’s conception of the self, in my opinion, is superior to that of
his postmodern heirs, because he leaves room for \textit{action}. At first, his notion of the self
may appear to be very similar to that of his twentieth century followers in that it is
only a given inasmuch as it is constituted by the web of contingent relations produced
by the interpreting will to power. It clearly does not have any necessary essence
which may be said to exist independently of the interpretive process of which it is a
result. Nevertheless, this self is fully enmeshed within the web of relations that is the
world and fulfills specific functions and actions within that web. It is as real as the
interpretative fabric of the world, and manifests itself through its actions and deeds.
Similar to the concept of ‘knowledge’ itself, which definitely exists, though not in the
traditional Cartesian-Lockean sense of the word, so too, the self has been viewed
through a distorting glass which has produced a self-negating and oppressive model of
subjectivity and a meager and oppressive sense of justice.

It is far more accurate to suggest that the self and the individual hide
complexities, a plurality of forces in conflict. We are a plurality that imagined itself as

\textsuperscript{152} See for example GD III 5, and GD VI, 3.
singularity, a multiplicity of impulses that have provided themselves with an arbitrary coherent centre. For Nietzsche, as well as later for Freud, the subject is not a centered unity, but a complex of agencies constituted by the play of unconscious drives. Althusser agrees: ‘The Ego, formerly the sole seat of consciousness, itself in large part unconscious, fully participant in the conflict of unconscious repression in which the agencies are constituted’\textsuperscript{153}. Rationalism, and indeed subjective consciousness, is viewed as the consequence rather than the cause of metaphysics. The subject is multiplicity.

By separating the actor from his deed, the slave, or reactive man is able to convince himself that action and identity are fundamentally separable. This is an immensely comforting thought: it enables the reactive man to see his inability to act, his cowardice, as a choice, rather than as constitutive of who he is. This is, of course, as Simon May\textsuperscript{154} points out, also a strategy for alleviating guilt. If the deed is doubled into a doer and the deed that he does, then the possibility for forgiveness is also doubled: firstly for willing the deed (‘intent’) and secondly for doing it. This offers the further possibility for forgiveness even when the deed is condemned. ‘Free’ will also makes the idea of guilt more bearable in that it holds out a possibility for ‘willing’ a change in behavior, and by so doing reducing the debt to a creditor.

Nietzsche’s criticism would not be so severe, however, if the slave’s self-deception remained merely a comforting thought. However, ‘Der Sklavenaufstand in der Moral beginnt damit, dass das Ressentiment selbst schöpferisch wird und Werthe gebiert: das Ressentiment solcher Wesen, denen die eigentliche Reaktion, die der That versagt ist, die sich nur durch eine imaginäre Rache schadlos halten’ (\textit{GM} I 10, KSA 5.270). The assignment of agency allows those who suffer to locate the source of their suffering, and the attribution of responsibility directs the misery and animus of those who suffer to those allegedly responsible for their suffering in the form of \textit{ressentiment} thinly veiled as blame. Thus while every sufferer naturally looks for the source of his suffering, in the Judeo-Christian tradition the sufferer specifically looks for a \textit{guilty} culprit upon whom he can vent his emotions.

At crucial points then, Nietzsche's argument depends on the distinction between doer and deed that he claims in section thirteen of the Genealogy to be a

\textsuperscript{153} Althusser, L. \textit{Writings on Psychoanalysis}. Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1996, p. 120-121.
harmful and absurd invention of the slaves. Consider the following extracts from section 10:

Die ‘Wohlgeborenen’ fühlten sich eben als die ‘Glücklichen’ sie hatten ihr Glück nicht erst durch einen Blick auf ihre Feinde künstlich zu construiren, unter Umständen einzureden, einzulügen (wie es alle Menschen des Ressentiment zu thun pflegen); und ebenfalls wussten sie, als volle, mit Kraft überladene, folglich nothwendig aktive Menschen, von dem Glück das Handeln nicht abzutrennen, – das Thätigsein wird bei ihnen mit Nothwendigkeit in's Glück hineingerechnet (woher eu prattein seine Herkunft nimmt) (GM I 10, KSA 5.272).


Berkowitz\footnote{Berkowitz, P. \textit{Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist}. Cambridge: (Mass.) Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 79.} holds this to be the weakest element of Nietzsche’s argument. For him, the analogy between lightning flashes and strong human beings is not a sound one. The distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ reactions or deeds and imaginary revenge of the slave revolt implies that the slave can be separated and blamed for his deed. Furthermore, the knowledge typical of the noble mode of valuation – that happiness should not be sundered from action – suggests that ‘the character of action is in part under the control of agents inasmuch as action may be ill-advisedly sundered from happiness’.\footnote{Berkowitz, P. \textit{ibid.} p. 80.} Importantly, Berkowitz ascribes a distinction between doer and deed to Nietzsche too, because he continues to honor the nobles for their nobility despite their humiliating defeat, and separates the slaves from their deeds by blaming them for immobilizing the nobler types through their stratagems: ‘If there were no ‘being’ behind doing, if the deed were everything, it would be just as absurd for Nietzsche to

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\item Berkowitz, P. \textit{Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist}. Cambridge: (Mass.) Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 79.
\item Berkowitz, P. \textit{ibid.} p. 80.
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condemn the lambs for disarming and taming the birds of prey, as it was, on his account, for the lambs to condemn the birds of prey’.\textsuperscript{157} It would thus be equally legitimate to blame Nietzsche for ‘succumbing to the seduction of language’ as it is for Nietzsche to blame European man for succumbing to this debilitating disease. Nietzsche, however, does not so much blame the slaves as lament their victory. He does not hold the slaves accountable for promulgating slave morality, but merely ascribes it to them, and characterizes this development as a domestification of man and a debasing of culture. It is also not even so much the victory of the slaves itself that Nietzsche detests, but that this victory is celebrated as victory, and so complete a victory that it managed to set the rules for victory for the past two thousand years. It is not the slaves themselves that Nietzsche seeks to replace, as their criteria for judging strength. Not only has traditional moral paradigms, all language and all systems of valuation been shown to be palimpsests of interpretation, but furthermore, they are no longer viable. In the name of morality itself, that demands honesty, morality itself must be denied. The realization that our values lack transcendent authority, holds open the possibility for freedom, for if the values that have now become impotent are but human creations, they can be created anew.

If the grammatical subject dissolves upon closer scrutiny, the moral-legal one is bound to follow the same route. In \textit{Morgenröte} 148 Nietzsche deals with the question of free will and the virtue of altruism in one fell swoop:

Ausblick in die Ferne. – Sind nur die Handlungen moralisch, wie man wohl definiert hat, welche um des Anderen willen und nur um seinetwillen gethan werden, so giebt es keine moralischen Handlungen! Sind nur die Handlungen moralisch – wie eine andere Definition lautet –, welche in Freiheit des Willens gethan werden, so giebt es ebenfalls keine moralischen Handlungen! – Und was ist also Das, was man so nennt und das doch jedenfalls existirt und erklärt sein will? Es sind die Wirkungen einiger intellectueller Fehlgriffe. – Und gesetzt, man machte sich von diesen Irrthümern frei, was würde aus den ‘moralischen Handlungen’? – Vermöge dieser Irrthümer theilten wir bisher einigen Handlungen einen höheren Werth zu, als sie haben: wir trennten sie von den ‘egoistischen’ und den ‘unfreien’ Handlungen ab. Wenn wir sie jetzt diesen wieder zuordnen, wie wir thun müssen, so verringern wir gewiss ihren Werth (ihr Werthgefühl), und zwar unter das billige Maass hinab, weil die ‘egoistischen’ und ‘unfreien’ Handlungen bisher zu niedrig geschätzt wurden, auf Grund jener angeblichen tiefsten und innerlichsten Verschiedenheit. – So werden gerade sie von jetzt ab weniger oft gethan werden, weil sie von nun an weniger geschätzt werden? – Unvermeidlich! Wenigstens für eine gute

\textsuperscript{157} Berkowitz, P. \textit{ibid}. p. 81.
Nietzsche’s particular scorn is reserved for the concept of free will, derived from the ascetic ideal. According to Nietzsche, the notion of free will is not only incorrect in the epistemological sense of the word, it is inherently ridiculous. Man is the only animal who self-righteously imagines himself above natural necessity, above the flux of events which ultimately culminates, as we have seen, in a dream of existence above tragedy. Nietzsche prefers a conception of the free person as one who is able to master himself through a sufficiently strong set of dominant drives. We are determined, but not inflexibly so. It is our complexity, the fact that we consist of an infinite number of drives which precludes the possibility of rigid determinism that is at the heart of our freedom, not a ‘will’. Furthermore, his metaphysics of flux does not allow for something as crude and metaphysical as the human ‘will’. For our purposes, it is important to note that Nietzsche’s response is framed in a direct rejection of the Kantian doctrine of ‘intelligible freedom’. This in turn yields Nietzsche’s doctrine of Unverantwortlichkeit or unaccountability, which is a precursor to his notion of ‘innocence of becoming’ and a gateway to his tragic freedom. Free will must be an a priori element of the moral-legal subject. However, as Nietzsche demonstrates, volition is not necessarily a primary, but a secondary quality that arises from the interpretation of a specific situation.

Schopenhauer, mit seiner Annahme, dass Alles, was da sei, nur etwas Wollendes sei, hat eine uralte Mythologie auf den Thron gehoben; er scheint nie eine Analyse des Willens versucht zu haben, weil er an die Einfachheit und Unmittelbarkeit alles Wollens glaubte, gleich Jedermann: – während Wollen nur ein so gut eingespielter Mechanismus ist, dass er beobachtenden Auge fast entläuft. Ihm gegenüber stelle ich diese Sätze auf: erstens, damit Wille entstehe, ist eine Vorstellung von Lust und Unlust nöthig. Zweitens: dass ein heftiger Reiz als Lust oder Unlust empfunden werde, das ist die Sache des interpretirenden Intellects, der freilich zumeist dabei uns unbewusst arbeitet; und ein und derselbe Reiz kann als Lust oder Unlust interpretirt werden. Drittens: nur bei den intellectuellen Wesen gibt es Lust, Unlust und Wille; die ungeheure Mehrzahl der Organismen hat Nichts davon (FW 127, KSA 3.483).
The intellect, as a secondary function of organic life, is inextricably linked to the organic functions of the body. Seen in this light, the metaphysics of the mind-body duality is untenable. So is a crude reductive materialism, however. Nietzsche is concerned with re-evaluating the traditional relationship between mind and body, which necessitates the suspension of the traditional relationship between the two. Making definite statements about the body is an almost impossible task. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the selection of impressions that we label for convenience’s sake under the label ‘body’ is already a product of legislation, and at the same time, the body is a participant in the process of interpreting the world. Mental acts are not merely neuro-physiological activity and the mind not merely a collection of neural pathways. Just as mental functions can be seen to originate in physiological impulses, so neural stimuli have to be interpreted by an intellect to be recognized as such. It is only through interpretation that these stimuli can acquire the quality of mental processes. To quote an extract from Nietzsche’s most famous discourses on the body:

Den Verächtern des Leibes will ich mein Wort sagen. Nicht umlernen und umlehen sollen sie mir, sondern nur ihrem eignen Leibe Lebewohl sagen – und also stumm werden.
‘Leib bin ich und Seele’ – so redet das Kind. Und warum sollte man nicht wie die Kinder reden?
Aber der Erwachte, der Wissende sagt: Leib bin ich ganz und gar, und Nichts ausserdem; und Seele ist nur ein Wort für ein Etwas am Leibe.
Der Leib ist eine grosse Vernunft, eine Vielheit mit Einem Sinne, ein Krieg und ein Frieden, eine Heerde und ein Hirt.
Werkzeug deines Leibes ist auch deine kleine Vernunft, mein Bruder, die du ‘Geist’ nennst, ein kleines Werk- und Spielzeug deiner grossen Vernunft.

The body itself has its own form of intentionality, and as such Nietzsche is reluctant to ascribe all intentional behavior to a single rational intellect. He even goes as far as to suggest that the boundary between chemical and organic processes can be problematized, as in both spheres there occurs something that can be interpreted as ‘intentional’. On this account he refers to the will to power as operative in both animate and inanimate events. The description of physical events in terms of intentional action is of course an example of metaphoric transfer, in which terms are
borrowed from one sphere to analyze phenomena in another, similar to the metaphoric transfer that occurs in the process of concept formation, as discussed in chapter three. Nietzsche’s aim in employing such strategies is to open up the terms in the original context for critical analysis, and in this case in particular, he demonstrates the difficulty in making a definite distinction between the phenomenological and the physiological. If such a thing as an autonomous, inner self existed, it would have to choose to interpret stimuli in a particular way, and Zarathustra is explicit about the impossibility of this position.

As we have seen in chapter three, Nietzsche shows that the ideal of autonomy is further undermined by the facticity of the human condition. Not a single individual has complete control over the environment in which he lives. Indeed, they find a world which is always already there, which has shaped the way they are, created the perspective within which they live to such an extent that the notions of guilt and responsibility so central to the Judeo-Christian worldview seem at best irrelevant.

Was kann allein unsre Lehre sein? – Dass Niemand dem Menschen seine Eigenschaften giebt, weder Gott, noch die Gesellschaft, noch seine Eltern und Vorfahren, noch er selbst (– der Unsinn der hier zuletzt abgelehnten Vorstellung ist als ‘intelligible Freiheit’ von Kant, vielleicht auch schon von Plato gelehrt worden). Niemand ist dafür verantwortlich, dass er überhaupt da ist, dass er so und so beschaffen ist, dass er unter diesen Umständen, in dieser Umgebung ist. Die Fatalität seines Wesens ist nicht herauszulösen aus der Fatalität alles dessen, was war und was sein wird (GD ‘Die vier grossen Irrthümer’, KSA 6.96).
The difficulty in making definitive statements about the body is matched by the difficulty in making judgments upon the various forms of punishment inflicted upon it. After giving his extended list of the reasons for punishment in section thirteen of the Second Essay of the Genealogie, Nietzsche concludes that none of these reasons suffices anymore: ‘ersichtlich ist die Strafe mit Nützlichkeiten aller Art überladen. Um so eher darf man von ihr eine vermeintliche Nützlichkeit in Abzug bringen, die allerdings im populären Bewusstsein als ihre wesentlichste gilt, – der Glaube an die Strafe, der heute aus mehreren Gründen wackelt, findet gerade an ihr immer noch seine Stütze’ (GM II 14, KSA 5.318). This trend continued; more than a century after Nietzsche’s death there are few topics that evoke such universal horror in liberal states as legalized cruelty. Edward Peters’ position sums up the standard liberal position. He remarks towards the end of his sombre history of Torture: ‘It may be possible to make torture disappear by making it effectively illegal, but it seems necessary to preserve the reason for making it illegal and dangerous - to preserve a notion of that inner human dignity, common to us all, that although not always so meticulously observed, is generally assumed in the public language, if not the unpublic actions, of most modern societies, and assumed, moreover, in a generally universal and democratic sense.158 The feminist critic Judith Sklar agrees, saying that cruelty should be regarded as the worst of vices.159 A cursorily reading may suggest Nietzsche a close ally of the active Enlightenment tradition that seeks the abolition of pain as the key element in achieving a just society.

But with Nietzsche, of course, nothing is ever that simple. He does not have a simplistic humanitarianism in aim here. Nietzsche opposes punishment because it moralizes cruelty. Cruelty in its non-moralized form, has its place. It is in itself neither good nor bad, its meaning depending purely on the purposes it serves. For Nietzsche, the primary end towards which cruelty must be exercised is the pursuit of

human excellence. Punishment, however, puts it in a carefully regulated relationship of cause and effect, thereby imprisoning man as a legal subject. He continues in the same section:


Punishment is a double-edged sword: it is a symptom of moral subjectivity in that it assumes a simple causal relationship between meting out punishment and the subsequent ‘improvement’ of the individual. Punishment in this sense of the term was originally as much of a symptom of utopian desire as is the current move to abolish all forms of it. Behind every form of punishment, hope springs eternal: the hope that the right form of punishment, correctly applied, will transform both the perpetrator and society at large for the better. Punishment, like so many other vices, thus had its origin in a desire for purity, safety and regularity.

Denken wir aber gar an jene Jahrtausende vor der Geschichte des Menschen, so darf man unbedenklich urtheilen, dass gerade durch die Strafe die Entwicklung des Schuldgefühls am kräftigsten aufgehalten worden ist, – wenigstens in Hinsicht auf die Opfer, an denen sich die strafende Gewalt ausliess. Unterschätzen wir nämlich nicht, inwiefern der Verbrecher gerade durch den Anblick der gerichtlichen und vollziehenden Prozeduren selbst verhindert wird, seine That, die Art seiner Handlung, an sich als verwerflich zu empfinden: denn er sieht genau die gleiche Art von Handlungen im Dienst der Gerechtigkeit verübt und dann gut geheissen, mit gutem Gewissen verübt: also Spionage, Überlistung, Bestechung, Fallenstellen, die ganze kniffliche und durchtriebene Polizisten- und Anklägerkunst, sodann das grundsätzliche, selbst nicht durch den Affekt entschuldigte Berauben, Überwältigen, Beschimpfen, Gefangennahmen, Foltern, Morden, wie es in den verschiedenen Arten der Strafe sich ausprägt, – Alles somit von seinen Richtern keineswegs an sich verworfene und verurtheilte Handlungen, sondern nur in einer gewissen Hinsicht und Nutzanwendung (GM II 14, KSA 5.319).

It is harder to live in a fundamentally innocent world than one that can be subjected to the moral categories of guilt and innocence. In such a world, the standard of judgement is given and static. In contrast, an innocent world is, if not exactly a blank
page, a world in which standards of judgement are made by humans, and are therefore constantly being re-evaluated. It is also a world of surfaces; there are no ‘deep’ reasons behind the play of the world, no hidden plan, or just order. It is precisely for this reason that depth became the ‘dimension of obsession’ in the modern age. Nothing demands more of man than the blatant innocence of a world indifferent to its inhabitants.


Nietzsche fought a metaphysical construction that had more than two thousand years to develop into a formidable fortress. The history of the subject is a long and complex one – not to mention painful – and we would do best to frame the rest of the discussion on the central essentialism of modernity by briefly referring to the work of Michel Foucault. The development of the subject and by implication, modernity, is tied to the production in knowledge of a new portrayal of human being: Man. According to Foucault he is but a recent invention, a fashion that did not exist before the end of the eighteenth century. Classical rationalism and Renaissance humanism were certainly able to allot human beings a privileged position in the order of the world, but they were not able to conceive of ‘Man’. In claiming man’s recent invention, Foucault is pointing to his modern epistemological identity as the ‘being such that knowledge will be attained in him that makes all other knowledge possible’. Accordingly, man is both the difficult object of knowledge and the sovereign subject of knowing, a being whose nature is to know ‘nature and itself, in consequence, as a natural being’. The birth of this new figure of man and his

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161 Foucault, M. ibid. p. 318.
identity is determined by his modern constitution as the being who is describable as the one who ‘produces, who lives, and who speaks’.  

The proliferation of techniques of subjectification was largely linked to the problems generated by the rise of capitalism. As wealth was accumulated in increasing quantities in workhouses, factories and ports, it became increasingly necessary to replace the old system with its lack of definition and tolerated illegalities with something ‘more regular, more effective, more constant, and more detailed in its effects’. Simultaneously, the increasing emphasis on productivity and growth required that the bodies of the workers be rendered disciplined and docile to maximize their utility and to integrate them in the rigid mechanized programs. Foucault calls the sum of these mechanisms, institutions, techniques, and discourses that developed to track, survey, regulate and constitute both individual and population (as well as making them more visible and productive) ‘bio-power’. The growing emphasis on achieving maximum utilization and control of life was accompanied by what Foucault has called ‘the art of light and the visible’. He found that during the Classical age of modernity institutions began to be constructed with greater emphasis on the principle of visibility. Groups were organized in such a way as to facilitate inspection. The perfusion of the ‘general gaze’ was not enough – Foucault states that the threshold of visibility was lowered:

For a long time ordinary individuality remained below the threshold of description. The disciplinary methods lowered the threshold of describable individuality and made of this description a means of control and domination.

Paradoxically, at the very same time that the power of normalization imposes homogeneity, the production of the individual becomes possible. Within an accepted range, the normalizing gaze identifies, separates, orders and thus helps to constitute differences, making possible the ‘continuous individualizing pyramid’.

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Particularities are registered as deviations from the registered norms. The gaze manifests a relentless ‘will to truth’ that seeks to transform the atoms of bodies into objects of knowledge to be examined, classified, ordered around or excluded. Light, vision and visibility are never neutral components in this process. One of the most striking features of normalizing power is the role played by ‘mechanisms that coerces by means of observation’. Observation and illumination ensure the desired behavior. For this reason Foucault compares these techniques with ‘the telescope, the lens and the light beam’. In a similar fashion the observatories of mankind – of which the Panopticon is the most infamous – made it possible to constitute human beings as objects of power. Foucault argues that with the rise of panoptic disciplinary power, it is no longer simply the deviation, visible error, or crime that is judged, but also the drives, instincts, passions, and desires that lurk beneath the visible: ‘these shadows lurking behind the case itself’ (my emphasis). The judgement of the disciplinary gaze is generally characterized by a depth dimension: it deciphers, compares, measures and analyzes all with a view to make visible. Rendering visible is a form of taming, which, for Nietzsche implies, as we have seen, internalization, an idea that in a post-Freudian age seems deceptively obvious.

Alle Instinkte, welche sich nicht nach Aussen entladen, wenden sich nach Innen – dies ist das, was ich die Verinnerlichung des Menschen nenne: damit wächst erst das an den Menschen heran, was man später seine ‘Seele’ nennt. Die ganze innere Welt, ursprünglich dünn wie zwischen zwei Häute eingespannt, ist in dem Maasse aus einander- und aufgegangen, hat Tiefe, Breite, Höhe bekommen, als die Entladung des Menschen nach Aussen gehemmt worden ist. Jene furchtbaren Bollwerke, mit denen sich die staatliche Organisation gegen die alten Instinkte der Freiheit schützte – die Strafen gehören vor Allem zu diesen Bollwerken – brachten zu Wege, dass alle jene Instinkte des wilden freien schweifenden Menschen sich rückwärts, sich gegen den Menschen selbst wandten’ (GM II 16, KSA 5.323).

Here Nietzsche links internalization with the emergence of the soul. The invention of the soul, as we have seen, divides the human animal, pushes back its instinct for freedom, and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself, the organism declares war on itself. Nietzsche describes the inner agon as follows:

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167 Dreyfus and Rabinow, *ibid.* p. 211.
Der Mensch, der sich, aus Mangel an äusseren Feinden und Widerständen, eingezwängt in eine drückende Enge und Regelmässigkeit der Sitte, ungeduldig selbst zerriss, verfolgte, anngaste, aufstörte, misshandelte, dies an den Gitterstangen seines Käfigs sich wund stossende Thier, das man ‘zählen’ will, dieser Entbehrende und vom Heimweh der Wüste Verzehrte, der aus sich selbst ein Abenteuer, eine Folterstätte, eine unsichere und gefährliche Wildnis schaffen musste – dieser Narr, dieser sehnsüchtige und verzweifelte Gefangne wurde der Erfinder des ‘schlechten Gewissens’. Mit ihm aber war die grösste und unheimlichste Erkrankung eingeleitet, von welcher die Menschheit bis heute nicht genesen ist, das Leiden des Menschen am Menschen, an sich: als die Folge einer gewaltsamen Abtrennung von der thierischen Vergangenheit, eines Sprunges und Sturzes gleichsam in neue Lagen und Daseins-Bedingungen, einer Kriegserklärung gegen die alten Instinkte, auf denen bis dahin seine Kraft, Lust und Furchtbarkeit beruhte.

Fügen wir sofort hinzu, dass andererseits mit der Thatsache einer gegen sich selbst gekehrten, gegen sich selbst Partei nehmenden Thierseele auf Erden etwas so Neues, Tiefes, Unerhörtes, Räthselhaftes, Widerspruchsvolles und Zukunftsvolles gegeben war, dass der Aspekt der Erde sich damit wesentlich veränderte (GM II 16, KSA 5.323).

In time, the human being, suing for peace, comes to swear allegiance to a new kind of psychological ‘oligarchy’ with regulation and pre-mediation kept at bay our ‘underworld of utility organs’ working with and against one another. With the aid of the morality of mores and the social straitjacket that accompanies it, the organism’s oligarchy is kept in power, and man learns to be ‘ashamed of his instincts’. Stifling his cruel and murderous impulses, he becomes calculable, regular, automatic [notwendig] even in his own self, a subject of civilized reason and morality.

However, the now more developed organism did not lose his impulses for cruelty. What might otherwise be inexplicable, the pleasure men have apparently taken in the pains that accompanied the process of learning to rule themselves, Nietzsche explains through the survival of internalized cruelty and the paradoxical mixture of pain and pleasure that characterizes it. The horrific oxymoron of self-torture becomes the key to interpret a number of intertwined phenomena in The Genealogy of Morals: the bad conscience, guilt, and above all, the asceticism of Christianity. The process of internalization cripples man’s animal instincts, shared taboos make the exercise of the will to power difficult and sometimes even impossible. At the same time, in some rare souls, the masochistic pleasures of self-rule somehow strengthen the will to power in all its cruel splendour - the old animal instincts cultivated with foresight and transfigured through the use of memory, imagination and reason erupt in new forms of mastery:

Like Nietzsche, Foucault finds the object of disciplinary power in the soul. Far from being a leftover from a more religious age, the soul acts as general referent to disciplinary power: that which is educated, trained, punished, normalized, and identified. It is codified and inhabits the body in which it is produced. The soul is the most supreme form of subjection, because it buries the effects of power deep within the flesh of the subject’s skin.168 A form of power quite consonant with, though not identical to the deployment of the disciplinary gaze, the ‘deep self’ is driven by a hermeneutics of suspicion that delivers it to infinite depths, meaning behind meaning. In endless circles of self-reflection the modern self attempts to discern the deep truths hidden behind the surfaces of everyday existence. ‘For the disciplined man, however, no detail is unimportant, but not so much for the meaning that it conceals within it as for the hold it provides for the power it wishes to seize’. If the panopticon aims at pure light, then what one might call the autopticon, or the deep self, aims at an object that constantly moves beyond reach, at best a ‘dark shimmer’.169 Because this is a truth that continually recedes with every gaze, it demands a confession that can never end. Regarding similarities between the strategy that produced the panopticon, and the one that produced the autopticon, it can be stated that both create a self that is related

168 A theme that fascinated Franz Kafka. Cf. In the Penal Colony.
to itself through a colonized, codified and continuous self-reflection – a self-reflection that normalizes as it observes. This is done via self-definitions constituted by hegemonic discourses that make divisions between certain ‘desirable’ characteristics and those that are isolated as ‘undesirable’ or ‘other’. The conception of the self as deep-harboring hidden truths and secret circuitous causalities, which is tightly bound up with confessional strategies, serves to multiply disciplinary holds over the self. The overlap between the greater disciplinary strategies (this forms the main object of study in *Discipline and Punish*) and the more private self-discipline of the deep self (addressed, among others, in *About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self* at Dartmouth) appears as the background to *Madness and Civilization*. It is visible in the modern treatments of madness as evinced by the nineteenth century ‘moral methods’ which operated through ‘that psychological inwardness where modern man seeks both his depth and his truth’. With the birth of the asylum, guilt was used to produce a deeper and more detailed self-consciousness and responsibility. Foucault noted that our juridical practices have moved towards an examination of ‘the desires, drives and deep personal tendencies that lurk beneath the relevant acts’.\(^{170}\) With practices like these, man himself became an interiorized courtroom, a figure constantly on trial, forever subject to some or other legal discourse. Where the stage once was, there the interior judge now ruled. Nietzsche saw it as his task to relate man to an ‘outside’ again, to turn the legal subject into an actor again. This would mean that even man’s relationship with time and the greater cosmic order would have to be re-invented, and that is what Nietzsche tried to do with his most mysterious concepts, *amor fati*, the eternal recurrence and the *Übermensch*.

\(^{170}\) Dreyfus and Rabinow, *ibid.* p. 179.
CHAPTER 5: THE RETURN OF THE TRAGIC

Lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime,
And departing, leave behind us
Footprints on the sands of time
Let us then, be up and doing,
With a heart for any fate;
Still achieving, still pursuing,
Learn to labour and to wait.

*Psalm of Life*. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow

1. Introduction: The Gift of Injustice

An unjust world is God’s greatest gift to man.\(^{171}\) Christianity – in both its religious and secular variants – is the consistent failure to take advantage of this fact, seeking instead ‘die “Wahrheit”: eine Welt, die nicht sich widerspricht, nicht täuscht, nicht wechselt, eine wahre Welt – eine Welt, in der man nicht leidet: Widerspruch, Täuschung, Wechsel – Ursachen des Leidens! Er zweifelt nicht, daß es eine Welt, wie sie sein soll, gibt; er möchte zu ihr sich den Weg suchen’ (11393, *NL* 87-88 *KSA* 12.363)\(^{172}\) Why indeed, asks Nietzsche, is the eternally-changing world not a source of joy, its injustice a challenge, and its unpredictability an inspiration for action? It is after all the chaos and measurelessness of an indifferent world order that allows man the opportunity to measure, differentiate and individuate: it is the fact that these aspects are not given that gives man, the artist-legislator, the chance to carve out a fully human world by giving form, law and measure (*peras*) to an originally lawless world. Just because there are no *eternal* laws, it does not mean that legislation is

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pointless; on the contrary, the injustice of the world is a wonderful instance of generosity. It means that the liberating act of legislation will never be limited to a single individual, group or time, but that this privilege belongs to all men for all time, waiting to be seized by the strong. It is a mystery that this is cause for lament, and not for celebration. He continues in the same section cited above: ‘Warum leitet er gerade das Leiden von Wechsel, Täuschung, Widerspruch ab? und warum nicht vielmehr sein Glück? Die Verachtung, der Haß gegen Alles, was vergeht, wechselt, wandelt: — woher diese Werthung des Bleibenden?’ By offering as alternative to the liberal conception of justice as a kind of nihilistic escape mechanism, a resurrected form of dikē, or a form of justice based upon tragic optimism, Nietzsche attempts to answer just this question.

Instead of standing its ground in the face of earthly suffering and cosmic indifference by developing a robust aesthetics – after all, there is no form of revenge superior to that of living well – the Christian-modernist discourse sought to tame injustice by developing two important strategies. The first strategy is older than Christianity and consisted of, as we have seen in chapter one, by shrinking the cosmic law of talion to an economy of exchange that is more manageable from a human perspective. However, this economy generated its own particular brand of cruelty, for there is hardly anything more inhumane than having to live in a world where everything can and must be paid for:

Denken der älteren Menschheit eigentümlich ist, langte man alsbald bei der grossen Verallgemeinerung an ‘jedes Ding hat ein Preis; Alles kann abgezahlt werden’ – dem ältesten und naivsten Moral-Kanon der Gerechtigkeit, dem Anfange aller ‘Gutmüthigkeit’, aller ‘Billigkeit’, alles ‘guten Willens’, aller ‘Objektivität’ auf Erden (GM II 8, KSA 5.305).\textsuperscript{173}

\textsuperscript{173} I have dealt with this question in chapter four and therefore include only a brief reference at this stage. The introduction contains a short re-statement of some of the most basic problems discussed in the thesis in order to address Nietzsche’s overcoming of them and the alternatives he posited. As a result, the introduction is a little longer than usual.
At the first level, justice is still ‘innocent’ and pre-moral, but it soon degenerates into the moral conceptual world characterized by guilt: ‘Und dürfte man nicht hinzufügen, dass jene Welt im Grunde einen gewissen Geruch von Blut und Folter niemals wieder ganz eingebüsst habe? (selbst beim alten Kant nicht: der kategorische Imperativ riecht nach Grausamkeit...)’ (GM II 8, KSA 5.300). This brings us to the second strategy, namely the development of the logic of salvation and redemption that offered, or rather, appeared to offer, an escape mechanism from a world marred by violent economies, pain and injustice. Salvation is the attempt to imagine that there is some other form of life for man to have, a life free from the pain and restrictions that accompany embodied existence. And not only embodied existence, but also redemption from the unpayable debt to God or ancestors. This was particularly true of the Jews:


Part of the allure of Christianity was the hope that the need for sacrifice would come to an end. According to Nietzsche, these are however profoundly damaging fantasies, because they are prompted by the idea that our physical and earthly existence is positively shameful. This is the nihilism of Christian soteriology – at the heart of the Christian worldview is a strong counter-factual that asserts that life is meaningful only if there exists a non-worldly realm that invests human lives with significance. Contrasting the Greek world with the Christian one, Nietzsche writes:

Das Christenthum dagegen zerdrückte und zerbrach den Menschen vollständig und versenkte ihn wie in tiefen Schlamm: in das Gefühl völliger Verworfenheit liess es dann mit Einem Male den Glanz eines göttlichen Erbarmens hineinleuchten, so dass der Ueberraschte, durch Gnade Betäubte, einen Schrei des Entzückens ausstieß und für einen Augenblick den ganzen Himmel in sich zu tragen glaubte (MA 114, KSA 2.118).

With the death of God, famously expressed by the madman of Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft 125 (a historical event for which Nietzsche claims no credit), its
underlying patterns of *ressentiment* are clearly exposed. Now without the hope expressed by Saint Paul in Romans 8:18 that ‘the sufferings of the present are not worth comparing with the glory that awaits us’, Western humanity faces a future unglossed by promises of future glory. For Nietzsche, this is an opportunity to recover a second innocence, a chance to find out whether man really does require redemption, whether human life can flourish unsupported by false intrusions of the divine. The window of opportunity was brief, however. Gods are like Hydras: no sooner does an old God die than a new one takes its place. Soon other metanarratives would take over: the most immediate successor was of course nationalism, but it would soon be followed by the even more unshakable faith in free market capitalism. Thus post-Christian cultures who have not come to terms with the roots of their Christian past tend to simply replace ‘God’ with something less theological-sounding, which, to add insult to injury, is even less culturally potent than the idea of God. Nietzsche’s message is less that there is no God than that the very idea that human life requires redemption, that there is a utopian condition to follow the present one, is false and ultimately degrading. This is why Nietzsche refuses to offer new idols. Man has to be redeemed from the need for redemption itself. He promises: ‘Das Letzte, was *ich* versprechen würde, wäre, die Menschheit zu ‘verbessern’. Von mir werden keine neuen Götzen aufgerichtet; die alten mögen lernen, was es mit thönen Beinen auf sich hat. *Götzen* (mein Wort für ‘Ideale’) umwerfen – das gehört schon eher zu meinem Handwerk’ (*EH* Vorrede 2, KSA 6.257). In an important reading of Samuel Beckett’s *Endgame* Stanley Cavell joins this sentiment:

The greatest endgame is Eschatology, the idea that the last things on earth will have an order and a justification, a sense. That is what we hoped for, against hope, that is what salvation would look like. Now we are to know that salvation lies in reversing the story, in ending the story of the end, ending this world of order in order to reverse the curse of the world laid on it in its Judeo-Christian end. Only a life without hope, meaning, justification, waiting, solution – as we have been shaped by these things – is free from the curse of God.174

As we have seen throughout, Christianity re-defined cosmic justice in terms of an economy of compensation for the suffering its adherents had to endure on earth. Its

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narrative of salvation ensures that its legal vocabulary too, bears the stamp of finality: a Last Judgement, the salvation of the just and a final incarceration of the unjust in hell. Christianity turned justice into a pathology, a quality completely alien to the human world. To capitulate entirely to those who seek release from pain, marks the end of a dignified existence, for it is precisely the desire to eliminate suffering at all costs and to make the minimization of suffering a fundamental dimension of one’s evaluative scheme, which generates pathology. Pathology arises where there is no longer any possibility of discharging one’s energies externally.


This passage contains an important directive as to what Nietzsche’s alternative conception of justice would amount to, namely a case of abundant vitality imposing limits upon itself, limits that it can afford to observe. Although Nietzsche’s conception of justice is not identical to his notion of health, qualities associated with health, such as strength and abundance, are important traits of the kind of justice that Nietzsche would posit to overcome the narrow moralism of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Since he employed a medical vocabulary in his genealogical analysis to demonstrate the hereditary weaknesses to which European culture is prone, it makes sense that he would describe his ‘solutions’ or alternatives also in medical terms. One has to mention briefly too, that in this he may have been influenced in by his own medical problems. Malcolm Pasley goes as far as to say that ‘after 1875, matters of sickness and health become themselves a main object of his reflections and medical or pseudo-medical categories come to furnish the very framework of his thinking. Indeed, by the final stage, by 1888, one can almost say that there are no other topics,

175 It is interesting that the Greek pathos can mean both ‘feeling’ and ‘disease’. Other meanings include occasion, event and suffering.
that the question of health has swallowed up everything else’. A crude generalization, certainly, but in even the crudest generalization there is a tiny splinter of truth, and the quasi-aesthetic vocabulary of health certainly offered him a way of discriminating between various positions that do not appeal to notions of good and evil. It also offered him a legitimate means to talk about the totality of life without sounding esoteric or obscure.

Against the Christian – and the Buddhist – tradition that conceives of health, justice and generally, the right order of things as a pain-free state, Nietzsche sees pain and injustice as necessary constituents of a healthy culture, or important for our purpose, constituents of a greater, stronger, more robust form of justice. Indeed, not only does Nietzsche believe pain to play an important part in the life of both a healthy individual and a healthy culture, but at times he suggests that sickness is a necessary prerequisite for genuine health. Traditionally, health is defined negatively and simply as the absence of sickness: the individual is well if nothing is wrong with him. Health is thus understood in the sense of Lockean freedom: the absence of obstacles is the ‘neutral’ or ‘natural’ position. Health according to this position is thus a neutral condition, a golden mean achieved by moderation and the absence of excess. In contrast to this view, sickness can (although it might not necessarily be the case) act as a stimulant to great health, providing both a target to overcome to an even healthier end and something against which the condition of health can be measured and identified. Writing in the preface to the second edition of *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* Nietzsche says:

Man erräth, dass ich nicht mit Undankbarkeit von jener Zeit schweren Siechthums Abschied nehmen möchte, deren Gewinn auch heute noch nicht für mich ausgeschöpft ist: so wie ich mir gut genug bewusst bin, was ich überhaupt in meiner wechselreichen Gesundheit vor allen Vierschrötigen des Geistes voraus habe. Ein Philosoph, der den Gang durch viele Gesundheiten gemacht hat und immer wieder macht, ist auch durch ebensoviele

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Philosophien hindurchgegangen: er kann eben nicht anders als seinen Zustand jedes Mal in die geistigste Form und Ferne umzusetzen, – diese Kunst der Transfiguration ist eben Philosophie. Es steht uns Philosophen nicht frei, zwischen Seele und Leib zu trennen, wie das Volk trennt, es steht uns noch weniger frei, zwischen Seele und Geist zu trennen. Wir sind keine denkenden Frösche, keine Objektivir- und Registrir-Apparate mit kalt gestellten Eingeweiden, – wir müssen beständig unsre Gedanken aus unserem Schmerz gebären und mütterlich ihnen Alles mitgeben, was wir von Blut, Herz, Feuer, Lust, Leidenschaft, Qual, Gewissen, Schicksal, Verhängniss in uns haben. Leben – das heisst für uns Alles, was wir sind, beständig in Licht und Flamme verwandeln, auch Alles, was uns trifft, wir können gar nicht anders. Und was die Krankheit angeht: würden wir nicht fast zu fragen versucht sein, ob sie uns überhaupt entbehrlich ist? (FW Vorrede 3, KSA 3.349).

The most frequently quoted references to ‘fruitful’ illness are, of course, the numerous instances where Nietzsche uses the image of pregnancy and motherhood to describe a condition of creative abundance, for example in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft 369, where Nietzsche describes the life-enhancing horizon that a unique creation brings:


Images like these have made Nietzsche a valuable interlocutor for the feminist tradition, so much so that a tradition has developed that expresses Nietzsche’s overcoming of liberal justice in gender terms. Hélène Cixous, for example, reads Nietzsche’s overcoming of liberal justice in terms of the tension between a restricted masculinist economy based upon the law of equal exchange and a general feminine economy based upon expenditure.178 Like Georges Bataille, she affirms an economy based upon waste and excess in order to counter the automatic utilitarian assumption that all expenditures must be productive and compensated. The latter economy finds its philosophical justification in John Locke’s definition of property in the Second

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177 See too, for example, Also Sprach Zarathustra ‘Die Reden Zarathustras’ (KSA 4.74): ‘und also sich bezwingend wurde es schwanger’ und schwer von grossen Hoffnungen’. See also Z IV, KSA 4.356, and JGB ‘Was ist vornehm’ 292, KSA 5.235.
Treatise of Government where he states that one possesses and has a right to regard as one’s own private property ‘whatever one removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in and he hath mixed his labor with’. ¹⁷⁹

Cixous identifies a different set of practises, drawing among others on Nietzsche’s association of possession with the masculine and giving and plenitude with the feminine, for example FW 363:


The masculine economy has a distinct unease when confronted with generosity. According to Cixous, masculine economies can only make quid pro quo exchanges by means of which a direct profit is to be earned, feminine economies are not constrained to giving as a means of deferred exchange in order to demand a gift in return. Rather, they tend to encourage giving as an affirmation of generosity and a general expression of confidence in the richness of the world. This entails an economy where, Zarathustra-like, profit can be deferred, perhaps infinitely, in order to precipitate an economy of the continuous circulation of giving.

The tendency to read that which exceeds the power of the rational (masculine) subject in feminine terms takes its inspiration from passages like the famous association of Truth with Woman in Jenseits von Gut und Böse and the various associations of excess with the feminine in passages like sections 385, 405, and 415 from Menschliches, Alzumenschliches. There is an enormous body of scholarly work¹⁸⁰ available on this topic; rehabilitating Nietzsche for feminism forms an important chapter in the history of the domestification of Nietzsche.¹⁸¹ While this tradition is problematic in its own right, what concerns us here is that this ‘feminine’ economy of plenitude should not simply be read as a ‘corrective’ of the ‘masculine’

¹⁸¹ See the introduction, p. 7-10.
*ius talionis*. Excess and plenitude – whether expressed in feminine idiom or not, while very important in the Nietzschean universe, should not too readily be equated with justice.


Whether this passage is directly aimed at the opposite sex or at the problems generated by a lack of distance, the feminine, usually associated with richness, mystery, and profound superficiality, in this particular passage is also associated with a lack of justice. That is, a lack of measure and form: pure excess and wildness is not justice. Nietzsche is not Bataille; his overcoming of justice is more than mere liberation of libidinal energy. As has been indicated throughout, Nietzsche’s justice is a great deal more than mere excess.

This does not mean that one cannot express Nietzsche’s ‘new justice’ in terms of a noble, overflowing richness. Indeed, as Schoeman demonstrates, an ethics of generosity forms an integral part of Nietzsche’s overcoming of moralism. As we shall see below, just or ‘sovereign’ man is characterized by qualities like magnanimity and gratitude and above all, by a genuine and sincere respect for his enemies. From the perspective of the slave’s morality, however, the strong and noble appear foolish; they even practise their own particular brand of injustice, an injustice of the ‘self-indulgence’ of their passions at the cost of what is ‘useful’:

Der Geschmack der höheren Natur richtet sich auf Ausnahmen, auf Dinge, die gewöhnlich kalt lassen und keine Süßigkeit zu haben scheinen; die höhere Natur hat ein singuläres Werthmaass. Dazu ist sie meistens des Glaubens, nicht ein singuläres Werthmaass in ihrer Idiosynkrasie des Geschmacks zu haben, sie setzt vielmehr ihre Werthe und Unwerthe als die überhaupt gültigen Werthe und Unwerthe an, und geräth damit in's

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182 See also *JGB* 9 for Nietzsche’s criticism of the Stoic tradition that takes ‘nature’ as its fundamental guiding principle. Nature, like the world, as we shall see, lacks justice.

Unverständliche und Unpraktische. Es ist sehr selten, dass eine höhere Natur soviel Vernunft übrig behält, um Alltags-Menschen als solche zu verstehen und zu behandeln: zu allermeist glaubt sie an ihre Leidenschaft als an die verborgenen Leidenschaft Aller und ist gerade in diesem Glauben voller Gluth und Beredtsamkeit. Wenn nun solche Ausnahme-Menschen sich selber nicht als Ausnahmen fühlen, wie sollten sie jemals die gemeinen Naturen verstehen und die Regel billig abschätzen können! – und so reden auch sie von der Thorheit, Zweckwidrigkeit und Phantasterei der Menschheit, voller Verwunderung, wie toll die Welt laufe und warum sie sich nicht zu dem bekennen wolle, was ‘ihr Noth thue’. – Diess ist die ewige Ungerechtigkeit der Edlen (FW 3, KSA 3.375)

It is however, important to add that for Nietzsche, justice cannot be limited to gift-giving and generosity, nor does it require a complete dissolution of subjectivity or a quasi-Levinassian submission to the other. Indeed, as is the case with the majority of Nietzsche’s most important concepts, his conception of justice can best be explained in terms of its conflict with the most poetic of cardinal virtues, love:

Liebe und Gerechtigkeit. – Warum überschätzt man die Liebe zu Ungunsten der Gerechtigkeit und sagt die schönsten Dinge von ihr, als ob sie ein viel höheres Wesen als jene sei? Ist sie denn nicht ersichtlich dümmer als jene? – Gewiss, aber gerade deshalb um so viel angenehmer für Alle. Sie ist dumm und besitzt ein reiches Füllhorn; aus ihm theilt sie ihre Gaben aus, an jedermann, auch wenn er sie nicht verdient, ja ihr nicht einmal dafür dankt. Sie ist unparteiisch wie der Regen, welcher, nach der Bibel und der Erfahrung, nicht nur den Ungerechten, sondern unter Umständen auch den Gerechten bis auf die Haut nass macht (MA 69, KSA 2.81).

The fall of justice from a grand cosmological quality to a mere feature of a supposedly moral society, is the result of trying to bring love and justice in perfect accord with each other. While one informs the other, and the possibility of the Übermensch depends upon both virtues, they are quite distinct and often in conflict with each other. This is often the theme of tragedy: those, like Othello, who love ‘not wisely, but too well’ (Othello, V.ii. 338) commit injustice. Unwise love is at the root not only of that particular Shakespearean tragedy, but at the root of tragedy itself. Nietzsche is to a far greater extent than, say, Abelard and Heloise, the philosopher of love. Right at the beginning of Also Sprach Zarathustra the epynomous hero justifies his downgoing towards man to the hermit with a simple ‘Ich liebe die Menschen’ (Z Vorrede 2, KSA 4.13). But he is not only a philosopher of love. Without a sense of justice, love degenerates into mere pity or infatuation, and without love, the desire for justice runs the risk of turning into ressentiment.
Like Zarathustra, Nietzsche is both a yea-sayer and a nay-sayer. Loving the
world means to see it as an opportunity or space for exercising judgement in the
domain where love and justice stand forever in a tense but fruitful agonal relationship.
Nietzsche’s affirmation of the whole consists in a yea-saying to the eternal play
between yes and no, the realization that good judgement sometimes requires a timely
suspension of certain aspects of the world. Even good things need to be applied
economically, or in a carefully measured way. But this is too much to ask from a
vulgar audience incapable of comprehending measure or subtlety:

*Oekonomie der Güte.* – Die Güte und Liebe als die heilsamsten Kräuter und
Kräfte im Verkehr der Menschen sind so kostbare Funde, dass man wohl
wünschen möchte, es werde in der Verwendung dieser balsamischen Mittel so
ökonomisch wie möglich verfahren: doch ist dies unmöglich. Die
Oekonomie der Güte ist der Traum der verwegensten Utopisten (*MA* 48, KSA
2.69)

Between love and justice lies a sense of the tragic. Nietzsche’s tragic justice
consists of two distinct elements, namely the resurrection of a greater, impersonal
cosmological order, and a chance for man to interact heroically with it. Pain, suffering
and contradiction are no longer objections to existence, but an expression of the rich
tensions within existence itself. Nor do these terms denote isolation from reality, but
form our most intimate points of union with it. This requires a radical re-conception
of our relationship with time, as well as a new appreciation of the *innocence* of
becoming.

2. The Time of Tragedy

Among Christianity’s many vices counts a certain lack of *ambition.* For Nietzsche, a
single resurrection as part of a single directional history was just not enough; if man is
to be redeemed, he would require a richer, more life-enhancing framework, a *constant*
resurrection, not only of the body, but of everything else as well. Nietzsche’s name
for his more ambitious framework is of course the Eternal Recurrence.

As we have seen in chapter two, modern man merely lives off the accumulated
capital of those in the past who have paid the price required to become rooted, and
have art and traditions that kept them within a life-enhancing horizon. Modern (or
‘theoretical’) man became increasingly rootless by continually demonstrating the
paradoxes that underlie all traditions, even the strongest ones. In this process, rationalism leads to the secularization of a people who can no longer see the stamp of the eternal pressed upon their existence.

Und gerade nur so viel ist ein Volk – wie übrigens auch ein Mensch – werth, als es auf seine Erlebnisse den Stempel des Ewigen zu drücken vermag; denn damit ist es gleichsam entweltlicht und zeigt seine unbewusste innerliche Überraschung von der Relativität der Zeit und von der wahren, d.h. der metaphysischen Bedeutung des Lebens. Das Gegenteil davon tritt ein, wenn ein Volk anfängt, sich historisch zu begreifen und die mythischen Bollwerke um sich herum zu zertrümmern: womit gewöhnlich eine entschiedene Verweltlichung, ein Bruch mit der unbewussten Metaphysik seines früheren Daseins, in allen ethischen Consequenzen, verbunden ist (GT 23, KSA1.148).

It is from this that man must seek recovery: he must step again into Heraclitus’ river and become part of the flow of time again. This does not entail a submission to time; to the contrary, it means that since there is no pre-given ‘meaning’ attached to the endless flow of time, it is up to the artist-legislator to forge this meaning.

Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzuprägen — das ist der höchste Wille zur Macht. 
Zwiefache Fälschung, von den Sinnen her und vom Geiste her, um eine Welt des Seienden zu erhalten, des Verharrenden, Gleichwerten usw.
Daß Alles wiederkehrt, ist die extremste Annäherung einer Welt des Werdens an die des Seins: Gipfel der Betrachtung (Aphorism 11309, NL 85-87, KSA 12.312).

Nietzsche’s project can be succinctly summarized as an attempt to link man again to eternity, or to perform the greatest feat of resurrection possible in the Nietzschean framework: to resurrect a sense of the tragic to aid the creation of a new world. As we have seen, Nietzsche asserts that the attempt to exorcize the tragic from the human consciousness, i.e. all mystery, all sense of suffering and pain, conflict, irrationality and contradiction, is ultimately to destroy the ground for being linked to eternity. This brings us to one of Nietzsche’s most substantial charges against metaphysics, namely that the philosophical faith in logical categories leads to a petrification and impoverishment of life. And an impoverished life is an unjust life. Where life manifests itself at its meanest and in its weakest form, there lies Nietzsche’s conception of injustice. Where multi-dimensionality, plurality and complexity are reduced and denied, the possibility of a rich, overflowing and just life disappears.
A return to tragedy is simultaneously a return to the question of time and history. As we have seen, one of Nietzsche’s most substantial charges against metaphysics is that the philosophical faith in logical categories leads to a cultural calcification. The vital flux of becoming is devalued, and timeless notions like being and stability are valued beyond their merit. Such a desire for unity and stability leads inevitably to a ‘need for inertia’ (‘Die Einheit – der Monismus – ein Bedürfniß der inertia’ Aphorism 10998, NL 85-87, KSA 12.120). The principal cause of this is of course a misrecognition of what the vocabulary of logic and language in general signifies. The crucial error of metaphysics is to have assumed that language refers to a pre-existing reality, awaiting the correct term to be applied to it. This hypostatization and reification of language bequeath necessarily, as we have seen in chapter three, a certain conception of time. It restricts \textit{a priori} what can be considered an existent and what it means to exist. The apparently innocuous Socratic search for definitions eventually culminates in Plato’s ontology. The inability of mundane existence to offer anything that could fulfill Plato’s desire for an adequate definition of notions like the Good or the Just compelled him to think of them as a-temporal Ideas. For this reason Nietzsche employs the notion of ‘becoming’ as a counterweight to the metaphysical fetish of Being.

The Eternal Recurrence is notorious as Nietzsche’s most elusive concept, and any account of it is bound to be highly selective, especially when used within the framework of another topic. Taking his strategy of resistance to conceptualization to the utmost extreme – Nietzsche tends to rival the world itself in providing material for future interpretations and lawgivers – he presents the doctrine in speculative form. When first presented as part of his published \textit{oeuvre}, it is in the following form:


Its various formulations allow it to be interpreted as scientific theory, complete with proofs, a speculative ontology or, importantly, a moral imperative. According to Martin Heidegger, it is central to Nietzsche’s thought, even more important than the will to power. He writes, ‘The doctrine of the Eternal Return is central to Nietzsche’s thought, more fundamental even than the will to power. Bereft of this teaching, as its ground, Nietzsche’s teaching is like a tree without roots’. In addition, he tends to regard this doctrine as a case of full-blown metaphysics, almost equal to Plato’s doctrine of the Forms. According to Karl Löwith Nietzsche oscillates between a voluntarist ‘anthropological’ version compatible with a strong will, and a second, more literal, ‘cosmological’ version, according to which the cosmic cycle of recurrence is indifferent to all human willing. The latter ‘scientific’ version of the argument runs as follows:


This section is less a scientific ‘proof’ than an experiment: Nietzsche is trying to show that a cyclical interpretation of time may be just as easily argued for in scientific terms as the contemporary conception of time as a linear process. In other words, he wishes to emphasize the limitations on reason, the tragic fact that reason will never be able to reach the ultimate core of reality, and thus never be able to bring us in accord with it. This means that justice as it has hitherto been understood is no longer tenable.

In this, he shares something of the Kantian antinomies of ‘pure reason’ in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. In the four Antinomies, Kant asserts that it is possible to both assert and contradict a number of metaphysical beliefs, such as the infinity of space and time, the universality of causality and the existence of an absolutely necessary Being. The purpose is not to argue for either one position, but to show that both positions lead to an insoluble paradox, and that the only solution is to accept the limitations of reason. This might apply to Nietzsche as well.

A fragment from 1885 supports this view. Nietzsche is not trying for any scientific ‘proof’, but tries to counter the Aristotelian conception of time on its own terms:


Instead of trying to go against the ‘scientific’ spirit, Nietzsche goes over and above it by allowing tragedy to ‘swallow’ its rather simplistic and mechanistic framework. This is obvious from the way Nietzsche resurrects the ancient notion of ‘fate’ as a richer alternative to the rather mechanistic ‘chance’. Aristotle, in an attempt to supplement his famous analysis of the four ‘causes’, proceeds by defining chance as an accidental cause in the sphere of those actions that are done for some purpose. Accordingly, spontaneity is the wider term whose scope includes animals and the lower inanimate world incapable of deliberate intention. His example is the rather prosaic one of a stone falling and hitting a man. Because the stone is incapable of deliberate intent, this incident is said to have happened spontaneously, and not by chance. Chance, on the other hand, is defined as something closer to co-incidence: a man is going to the market to meet a friend, and by chance running into another man who owes him money. The latter has the money with him and pays his creditor. The fact that the man was on his way to do something else when he encountered his debtor is called chance.
For Nietzsche, fate is not a providential distribution of meaning and justice, it is simply what befalls us. This means that one should have the power and will to make the most out of it. The aim, Nietzsche says, is to become like those masters of musical improvisation who are able to breathe a beautiful meaning even into an accident (FW 293). Interestingly, in MA 363, man is depicted as mastering fate – a very old theme in Western literature. However, mastering fate is not the same as ridding oneself of it altogether. What makes MA 363 unique is that man is depicted as the ground for the seedcorn, fate. The ‘larger’ image is used for man, while the ‘smaller’ image represents fate in a reversal of literary custom. It is the quality of the soil that determines whether anything will grow.

An important clue as to the meaning of the Eternal Recurrence occurs in a rather short fragment from 1884, dealing with the relationship between chance and creation.


Nietzsche’s conception of chance is far more tragic than that of Aristotle. If we turn to the etymology of the word ‘chance’, we see that it is derived from the Middle English cheaunce, which in its turn hails from the Old French cheance. This word in its turn is derived from the Latin cadentia, which translates as ‘falling’.186 ‘Chance’ is described as ‘the happening of events’, the way things has fallen out’ and ‘fortune’ (my emphasis). This means, as Joan Stambaugh187 points out, that chance does not simply refer to that which cannot be anticipated or calculated, but also implies opportunity, as the final meaning in the list, i.e. fortune, confirms. The Latin root of fortune, fors, also refers to chance, and what makes it important for our purposes is its proximity to fate and necessity. Normally, one tends to think of chance as the antithesis of fate and neccesssity: the unplanned and the unexpected that occurs for no reason at all. Importantly for our purpose, however, is the fact that both the ancient notion of fate and the modern notion of chance refer to a framework that is beyond the control of the subject. For Nietzsche, chance is closer to Cusanus’ notion of chance as co-incidence, but still something less than rigid, iron-clad destiny. Nor is chance simple random arbitrariness. There is a necessary element in chance – human

situatedness limits the contingencies of the world. This is why the self cannot just become *anything*; it is determined by the particular power-quanta that make up the self in question. It is simply up to the latter to see that it reaches its fullest potential: ‘Das Lernen verwandelt uns, es that Das, was alle Ernährung that, die auch nicht blossom ‘erhält’ – wie der Physiologe weiss. Aber im Grunde von uns, ganz ‘da unten’, giebt es freilich etwas Unbelehrbares, einen Granit von geistigem Fatum, von vorherbestimmter Entscheidung und Antwort auf vorherbestimmte ausgelesene Fragen’ (*JGB* 231, KSA 5.172). This unreachable, sublime element, however, does not entail that Nietzsche embraces a straightforward fatalism. Indeed, he warns explicitly against the ‘Turkish Fatalism’ so succinctly captured by the Arab sigh of resignation, commonly uttered when disaster strikes: ‘*Mektoub* – it is written’. This is an *impotent* form of fatalism; a pure fatalism that leaves no room for heroic action. This is a unique form of injustice in its own right. If hubris is the Western refusal to submit to the greater order of things and allow for the free play of the will to power, the Mohammedan version is *inhumane*. It aims to submit to the laws of the cosmos to such an extent that it leaves no room for a *human* domain of freedom.


The fatalist actively resents fate. He has not yet learned to join in when the iron hands of necessity shake the dice-box of chance (*M* 81). The genuine lover of fate, on the other hand, makes sure that everything he meets on his way is in some way or other incorporated in a life of celebration. Pain and misfortune are tools to be honed against the stone of fortune. In this, love of fate is not that different from love of another
person: it is not a mere resignation to a situation, but an active engagement in the realization of potential.

Rather than to understand fate as an absolute Other that imposes itself upon an individual life, as depicted in primitive tragedy, fate is understood as the limit to the extent that one can act as lawgiver upon oneself and one’s circumstances. As Nietzsche puts it, *fatum* acts as as ‘ein fließendes Machtgrenzen-bestimmen’ (Aphorism 10542, *NL* 1884-1885, KSA 11: 638). One’s fate is therefore intimately bound up with who one is, and emerges from one’s situation. This means that fate is a radically open limit. Man, as soon as he acts, determines his own fate, even if this fate should form part of the anonymous workings of the Moirae. What matters is that man experiences this open-ended limit as freedom.

Du selber, armer Aengstlicher, bist die unbezwingliche Moira, welche noch über den Göttern thront, für Alles, was da kommt; du bist der Segen oder Fluch, und jedenfalls die Fessel, in welcher der Stärkste gebunden liegt; in dir ist alle Zukunft der Menschen-Welt vorherbestimmt, es hilft dir Nichts, wenn dir vor dir selber graut (*MA* 61, KSA 2.580).

The Eternal Recurrence is one of Nietzsche’s tactics in attempting to think the human beyond the modernist notion of complete self-mastery that paved the way to modern nihilism. Against the pride of the modern ‘self-made’ man, Nietzsche posits a notion of fate that serves to remind us that we are not capable of fabricating ourselves completely. As we have seen in our discussion on the different ‘types’ of man, ‘Jeder Typus hat seine Grenze’ (Aphorism 12286, *NL*87-88, KSA 13.316). The greatest limit is a self-imposed one. Those that Nietzsche terms slavish or weak demand to become transparent to themselves and bring themselves in perfect accord with the workings of the world. By doing this, they abdicate the uniquely human privilege of legislating to oneself. Genuine freedom is to be found in the space between the framework determined by fate and circumstance, and the complex, open-ended set of characteristics that make up the self. By denying their own complexity, the slaves attempt to renounce the indeterminacy of the human that is the root of his freedom and the space for playing out the ultimate agonal game: that of human (self)-legislation vs. the free play of the cosmic forces.

This is, however, also one of the reasons why the Eternal Recurrence is such a burden: man will never be able to break through the anonymous workings of the will to power and bring the giant clockwork of the world to a standstill. Nietzsche tries to
move beyond the metaphysical cliché of free will and determinism. These terms are generally conceived as something outside the subject as part of the subject-object dichotomy. Nietzsche attempts to re-think them in such a way as to bind them and the self together and remove their oppositional, antithetic character. This is why Nietzsche conceives of the self in cosmic, rather than psychological terms.

Ich bin ein Wanderer und ein Bergsteiger, sagte er zu seinem Herzen, ich liebe die Ebenen nicht und es scheint, ich kann nicht lange still sitzen. Und was mir nun auch noch als Schicksal und Erlebniss komme, – ein Wandern wird darin sein und ein Bergsteigen: man erlebt endlich nur noch sich selber. Die Zeit ist abgelflossen, wo mir noch Zufälle begegnen durften; und was könnte jetzt noch zu mir fallen, was nicht schon mein Eigen wäre! Es kehrt nur zurück, es kommt mir endlich heim – mein eigen Selbst, und was von ihm lange in der Fremde war und zerstreut unter alle Dinge und Zufälle (Z III, ‘Der Wanderer’, KSA 4.193).

The self that Nietzsche has in mind here is not the isolated, self-encapsulated ego, but a self deeply intertwined and ingrained in the world. For this self, the world is just enough:

als ob zierliche Hände mir einen Schrein entgegentrügen, – einen Schrein offen für das Entzücken schamhafter verehrender Augen: also bot sich mir heute die Welt entgegen: –
– nicht Räthsel genug, um Menschen-Liebe davon zu scheuchen, nicht Lösung genug, um Menschen-Weisheit einzuschläfern:

The world is just enough because the self forms part of it. The Eternal Recurrence is a way to think of time and man’s relationship with it in the wake of the failure of the Great Redemption metanarratives, an attempt to join into the play of the the world rather than to try and work against it.


188 In both senses of the word.
Nowhere does Nietzsche so explicitly associate the Eternal Recurrence with images of circularity and renewal. The meaning of the Eternal Recurrence shatters every notion of eternity as static. The wheel of Being is of course an archaic symbol in both the East and the West of an eternal round of existence without meaning, purpose or direction, except insofar as such a way of existence brings atonement from a primal guilt. Zarathustra’s ‘teachers’, his animals celebrate the wheel of time not as a Catherine’s wheel, as wheel of torture, but as a ‘wheel of opportunity’: man does not need to labor so hard in order to create a discourse of redemption, because the world itself provides it. The fact that, as the anonymous French adage goes, ‘tout passe, tout casse, tout lasse’\(^\text{189}\) is an opportunity, not something to lament. The idea of the Eternal Recurrence is the most supreme challenge that man can face, the ultimate test of courage, for it poses the question of whether one’s life can be affirmed as it is in total, in the here and now, without any hope of redemption. That is, without the hope that the world will be improved. This is because the world as it is requires no redemption. Because it is well suited as it is to bring out the best in the best of men, it is sufficiently rich in power to allow human strength to flourish, because even the strongest, the noblest and the most beautiful type of individual will never bring it to an end. It is possible to cite Voltaire’s Dr Pangloss’s\(^\text{190}\) favorite maxim here without intending his irony: this is indeed the best of all possible worlds. Not perhaps for man universally, but it may well be the best of all possible worlds for the strong. All the hardships, all the pain and all the conflicts in it make it possible for strength to flourish as strength. Here is Nietzsche’s categorical imperative – far more challenging than Kant’s because it calls for an ethic of total affirmation.

Nietzsche’s task is thus rightly characterized by Bonnie Honig\(^\text{191}\) as one of recovery, including among others, the resurrection of a healthy respect for what is classified in the slavish moral framework as negative.\(^\text{192}\) Nietzsche seeks to overcome the narrow economy of moral subjectivity by re-inserting the old banished elements in

\(^{189}\) Everything passes, everything perishes, everything palls.

\(^{190}\) From Candide.


\(^{192}\) See the introduction.
a wider economy beyond good and evil. This includes a renewed appreciation for traditionally neglected or devalued aspects of life such as contingency, empirical limitations, temporality and situatedness. That is, he seeks to usher in a period of convalescence from the decadent desire to *exorcize*. Nietzsche would be the first to admit, or rather, to emphasize that the slaves are as necessary as the masters are. They are not merely tolerated as a necessary evil but should be seen as a vital element in the process of forging meaning. The hierarchy of master and slave may have had its origins in a struggle for recognition as Hegel holds; however, for Nietzsche, this battle is not to terminate in a final perfect state, but to continue as the ongoing battle for *differentiation*. And the greater the differentiation, the *Pathos der Distanz*, and the more complex the hierarchies involved, the stronger, the more potent and the more just will a society be.

At this stage it is necessary to state that a key difference between Nietzschean and traditional justice is that the former may judge, differentiate and condemn, but never, as the latter attempts to do, *exorcize* any element completely. Total affirmation does not entail a complete and absolute approval of every element in every context. An element considered vile, unpleasant or just useless, may in time prove itself essential for the enhancement of life. Utopian justice, which hopes to establish a permanent ideal situation with every ‘ugly’ or untenable part removed, is simply untenable and pointless: it is in affirming the painful, the unjust and incomprehensible that man demonstrates his true strength.

In this, he appears to be aided by the very nature of the world itself. Despite the liberal tradition’s most earnest attempts to limit the ‘just man’ to the narrow subjectivity of modern legalism, the world – and the will to power – will simply not allow it. ‘Nature’ (or the ‘world’) not only abhors a vacuum, it cannot bear stasis for
very long either. This is why Nietzsche warns against the reductionistic tendency to interpret the world in terms of static laws. If there is a mysterious law that governs the workings of our world, it is exactly that – mysterious. Although science can achieve much, the ultimate laws of the universe will forever be beyond our reach.


The Eternal Recurrence is no rigid cosmic law. If anything, it testifies to the tragic impossibility of ever finding such laws. Reading time as something opaque would be in keeping with Nietzsche’s general attitude towards the indecipherability of the world. As we have seen in chapter three, Nietzsche repeatedly emphasizes that the laws of physics are but an interpretation. And the aspect of existence most resilient to human interpretation is time.

Die Ordnung der Welt wäre die Regelmäßigkeit der Zeitfiguren: doch müßte man dann jedenfalls die Zeit mit einer constanten Kraft wirkend denken, nach Gesetzen, die wir uns nur aus dem Nebeneinander deuten können. Actio in distans temporis punctum. An sich haben wir gar kein Mittel ein Zeitgesetz hinzustellen (Aphorism 1412, KSA 7.577).

In an Arendtian vein: the Eternal Recurrence testifies to the fact that men can be artists and lawgivers, but that man can never change the fundamental human condition of being situated in an ever changing world. In other words, man forms part of a greater order, a greater justice from which there is no escape, but then, no escape necessary, either.

Diese Attitüde, eine Erfindung unserer letzten Jahrzehnte, heißt sich, soviel ich höre, auch Pessimismus, und zwar Entrüstungs-Pessimismus. Hier wird der
Anspruch gemacht, die Geschichte zu richten, sie ihrer Fatalität zu entkleiden, eine Verantwortlichkeit hinter ihr, Schuldige in ihr zu finden. Denn darum handelt es sich: man braucht Schuldige. Die Schlechtweggekommenen, die décadents jeder Art sind in Revolte über sich und brauchen Opfer, um nicht an sich selbst ihren Vernichtungs-Durst zu löschen (was an sich vielleicht die Vernunft für sich hätte). Dazu haben sie einen Schein von Recht nöthig, das heißt eine Theorie, auf welche hin sie die Thatsache ihrer Existenz, ihres So-
und-so-seins auf irgend einen Sündenbock abwälzen können.

[....]

Es fehlt jeder Ort, jeder Zweck, jeder Sinn, wohin wir unser Sein, unser So-

Utopianism and linear thinking is an attempt to rob history of its fate. The eternal recurrence is an attempt to think history again on a scale large enough in order to restore a sense of the highly impersonal suprahuman workings of the world and the will to power. There is a unique kind of hubris involved in the Christian-cum-
modernist idea that history moves towards a certain identifiable end: it is a unique kind of violence against the complexity that truly characterizes the world; a classic case of *hubris* because the world cannot be captured in a simple progressive narrative.

*Amor fati* can be described as the willingness to live in a world where there is no apparent link between the indifferent forces of cosmic justice and human justice, except in that they are both instances of the will to power that, in its turn, seeks to enhance its own performance. In *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Nietzsche introduces *amor fati* as something yet unachieved. In section 276, where this concept is mentioned for the first time, Nietzsche mentions it as a new year wish:

Verneinung! Und, Alles in Allem und Grossen: ich will irgendwann einmal nur noch ein Ja-sagender sein! \( (FW \ 276, \ KSA \ 3.521) \).

To be a mere Yea-sayer, however, is impossible; as we shall see below, Dionysos is a judge too. To fully engage in the joyful struggle of life, one must be a No-sayer, a judge and a destroyer as well. The drive that drives one to grow and change, to embrace what one is, must also include a love of the No, even if it merely takes the form of a turning away.

3. Seizing the Opportunity: The Übergemensch

Nietzsche thinks of the relationship between self and world in terms of which the human being remains inextricably bound up with the world, which both informs and is formed by our interpretations. It is possible to describe this link as the ‘unlogische Grundstellung zu allen Dingen’ \( (MA \ 31, \ KSA \ 2.51) \). Accordingly, the interpretation of the world is neither simply determined by forces outside the self, nor a function of a self-sufficient self. Nietzsche even goes as far as to find the division between man and world laughable: ‘wir lachen schon, wenn wir ‚Mensch und Welt’ nebeneinander gestellt finden, getrennt durch die sublime Anmaassung des Wörchens ‚und’!’ \( (FW \ 346, \ KSA \ 3.581) \). Müller-Lauter describes the self as a ‘quantative particularization’\(^{193}\) of the will to power, or the place where a number of power drives stabilize into a discernable unity. Nietzsche describes such a ‘stabilization’ as ‘eine komplexe Form der Spezifität’ (Aphorism 12339, \( NL \ 88-99, \ KSA \ 13.373 \)). If the will to power is understood as the struggle between various power-complexes, the human being is deeply involved with this play of becoming.

Nietzsche’s Übergemensch can perhaps be best explored through the enigmatic injunction ‘to become what one is’. This command appears in several forms throughout Nietzsche’s career. It first makes its appearance in one of Nietzsche’s early texts, \( Schopenhauer als Erzieher \), the third \( Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung \) of 1874. Nietzsche says in this text: ‘Der Mensch, welcher nicht zur Masse gehören will, braucht nur aufzuhören, gegen sich bequem zu sein; er folge seinem Gewissen,

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\(^{193}\) Müller-Lauter, \( Nietzsche. \ His \ Philosophy \ of \ Contradictions \ and \ the \ Contradictions \ of \ his Philosophy \). Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1999, p. 133.
welches ihm zuruft: ‘sei du selbst! Das bist du alles nicht, was du jetzt thust, meinst, begehst.’ (UM II, KSA 1.338). Later, in *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, the injunction is repeated in a more concise version: ‘Was sagt dein Gewissen? – “Du sollst der werden, der du bist”.’ (FW 270, KSA 3.519). In the same text, a bit further on, Nietzsche explicitly contrasts those who are willing to take up the challenge and become philosopher-legislators with those who are concerned with ‘moral values’ (FW, 335). Such an important idea has of course to be put in the mouth of Zarathustra, who says


The phrase ‘Become who you are!’ appears like a golden thread throughout the Nietzschean *oeuvre*. Its aim is to transform the idea that the self is ‘like this or that’ into the joyful acceptance that it cannot be found unless it is *created*. The individuals who desire to ‘become who they are’ are the ones who are willing to see the self no longer as entity, but as a site of anarchic forces waiting to be mastered and formed into something beautiful. These are the human beings of the future: ‘Wir aber wollen Die werden, die wir sind, – die Neuen, die Einmaligen, die Unvergleichbaren, die Sich-selber-Gesetzgebenden, die Sich-selber-Schaffenden! Und dazu müssen wir die besten Lerner und Entdecker alles Gesetzlichen und Nothwendigen in der Welt werden: wir müssen Physiker sein, um, in jenem Sinne, Schöpfer sein zu können’ (FW 335, KSA 3.564). The phrase becomes less paradoxical when it is not seen through a teleological lens; i.e. the subject is not to become something different to what he is at present. Rather, Nietzsche is urging his readers to actualize all the capacities for which they might be suited. Since, as a constellation of forces, the self is not a unity as conceived during the period of ‘high’ metaphysics, but a *plurality*. One must resist the tendency to read the soul in atomistic terms, the unavoidable ‘atomistischen Bedürfnisse’ (*JGB* 12) that conceives of ‘die Seele als etwas Unvertilgbares, Ewiges, Untheilbares, als eine Monade, als ein Atomon’. As alternative Nietzsche offers ‘Seele als Subjekts-Vielheit’ and ‘Seele als Gesellschaftsbau der Triebe und Affekte’ (*JGB* 12, KSA 5.26). This, however, by no
means implies chaos or disorder. At least not permanently. A non-teleological framework does not mean that no ideals can be posited. Quite the contrary: it is precisely because the self is not to be found or discovered that he is to be legislated or created. Consider the importance of words like ‘command’, ‘rule’ and ‘aristocracy’ in the following quote:


It should now be clear that the indeterminacy of the self is a result of his inherent plurality and multiplicity. If there is no self, however, there can be no moral self either. This means that any attempt to forge a universal law will by definition ‘smell of cruelty’. If there is an unconditional standard at work in Nietzsche’s writings – an ethic of self-realization is clearly present right through his oeuvre – he certainly does not appear to think that it will be easily communicable in the simple fixity of a universal law. A wiser attempt would be to take a chosen course of life, among other possibilities, as the summary of a person’s attempt to realize or find that unconditional standard. Even in the unlikelihood of anyone ever finding that standard, it would be a life led closer to the reality of moral learning than to follow abstract rules, for example, those of Kant. Mere conceptual interpretation will never convey the creativity open to an exemplary course of life, especially in the light of Nietzsche’s account of the fragility of conscious ratiocination, with its persistent simplification of the complex reality of deeds, not to mention the ineluctable tendency to be pressed into the service of self-deception. Furthermore, the Categorical Imperative, as highest criterion of reasonableness, invites us to ensure that our course of action would be appropriate for any similar agent in similar circumstances – the old Sidgwickian line that ‘a reason in one case is a reason in all cases, or it is not a reason at all’.
A crucial thrust in Nietzsche’s objection to Kant lies in his characteristic assertion that we should not be asked to consider ourselves in such a position of sameness. Instead, he demands that we explicitly distinguish ourselves. He does not simply dismiss our ‘shared humanity’ but looks for a corrective to Kant’s elimination of plurality that forms part of his over-simple universalizing procedures. Rather than to object to the entire enterprise of morality – as most people still think he does – Nietzsche merely rejects the claim of any morality to universal scope and application. Such a morality is not only inhuman in the obvious economical sense – creating laws that forbid the rich and the poor alike to sleep under bridges and to steal bread – but also inhuman in that it denies difference in potential, and in particular, refuses to allow scope for the genuine individual, he who has to create his own world and cannot bear to be fettered to one set of rules. Such a monolithic ideal is responsible for the greatest injustice hitherto known to man: the reduction of a plurality of human kinds and types to the lowest common denominator. This is a crime against humanity if ever there was one. Naturally, ethical laws bind, and should bind collectively, but only across a limited number of individuals, such as a race or community. In Zarathustra’s words: ‘Ich bin ein Gesetz nur für die Meinen’ (Z IV, ‘Das Abendmahl’ KSA 4.353). The liberal dream of a universal ethical community that comprises all human beings is in reality a nightmare. If we look at the following extract from Der Antichrist, we see that Nietzsche suggests that God has died, or at least become powerless – by becoming cosmopolitan:

Er moralisirt beständig, er kriecht in die Höhle jeder Privattugend, wird Gott für Jedermann, wird Privatmann, wird Kosmopolit... Ehemals stellte er ein Volk, die Stärke eines Volkes, alles Aggressive und Machtdurstige aus der Seele eines Volkes dar; jetzt ist er bloss noch der gute Gott... In der That, es giebt keine andre Alternative für Götter: entweder sind sie der Wille zur Macht – und so lange werden sie Volksgötter sein – oder aber die Ohnmacht zur Macht – und dann werden sie nothwendig gut...(AC 16, KSA 6.183).

The laws of such an omni-ethical community express only the commonalities and banalities of the individuals involved in the project, rather than their unique strengths and virtues and viewpoints. The function of morality is to enhance the life of a particular people, rather than the other way around.

Dies widerspruchsvolle Geschöpf hat aber an seinem Wesen eine große Methode der Erkenntniß: er fühlt viele Für und Wider – er erhebt sich zur
Because the human being so complex, these potentialities are in principle inexhaustible. Like a text that has to be interpreted, the self is ‘bottomless’, as generous as a text that always allows for yet another different interpretation. The possibilities of one situated self far exceed what can be done during man’s limited lifespan.

To Karl Marx’s famous complaint that ‘the philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it’, Nietzsche might have replied that on the contrary, the world cannot be changed, except insofar as it is (re)interpreted. Interpretation is, however, the most important form of mastery. This makes the act of interpreting oneself also a form of self-mastery, though obviously an act of self-mastery very different from the self-subjugation that marks the moral ideal. Nietzsche envisages a control over the affects which nevertheless does not deprive them of their vitality. In the summer of 1888 Nietzsche carefully draws a vital distinction: ‘Die Herrschaft über die Leidenschaften, nicht deren Schwächung oder Ausrottung! Je größer die Herren-Kraft unseres Willens ist, so viel mehr Freiheit darf den Leidenschaften gegeben werden. Der große Mensch ist groß durch den Freiheits-Spielraum seiner Begierden: er aber ist stark genug, daß er aus diesen Unthieren seine Hausthiere macht...’ (Aphorism 12507, KSA 13.485). When the genuine master tames his own drives, he neither submits to a universal law nor allows his drives simply to run free. Taming in this sense is also equivalent to pruning or legislating, not to be associated with slavish repression. The Übermensch, as the ideal self-legislating, self-interpreting being, is an aristocracy of the affects. In this figure there is measure: order without subjugation, a goal, a straight line or a purpose without a restricting telos. The affects must be orchestrated in such a way as to maximize their potential; the affects tend to show a permanent readiness to change their configuration. In Ecce Homo Nietzsche captures the art of personal self-legislation in a nutshell:

Zur Aufgabe einer Umwerthung der Werthe waren vielleicht mehr Vermögen nöthig, als je in einem Einzelnen bei einander gewohnt haben, vor Allem auch Gegensätze von Vermögen, ohne dass diese sich stören, zerstören durften. Rangordnung der Vermögen; Distanz; die Kunst zu trennen, ohne zu
verfeinden; Nichts vermischen, Nichts ‘versöhnen’; eine ungeheure Vielheit, die trotzdem das Gegenstück des Chaos ist – dies war die Vorbedingung, die lange geheime Arbeit und Künstlerschaft meines Instinkts (EH ‘Warum ich so klug bin’ 9, KSA 6.294).

Once again one sees an *agon* in action. Competing capacities must be brought into order, yet not an order that robs them of their particularity, but rather, as we shall see below, an interpretation of individual perspectives must be allowed to maximize the operation or workings of a wide range of perspectives.

This means to reject the urge to try to exorcise one’s weaknesses like a pathetic slave frightened of himself. Instead, it is to incorporate these very weaknesses into the composition of the self and to make a ‘melody’ out them. In *Daybreak*, section 218 Nietzsche says the following:

Wenn wir durchaus Schwächen haben sollen und sie als Gesetze über uns endlich auch anerkennen müssen, so wünsche ich jedem wenigstens so viel künstlerische Kraft, dass er aus seinen Schwächen die Folie seiner Tugenden und durch seine Schwächen uns begehrlieh nach seinen Tugenden zu machen verstehe: Das, was in so ausgezeichnetem Maasse die grossen Musiker verstanden haben (M 218, KSA 3.193).

In Beethoven, there is often ‘ein grober rechthaberischer, ungeduldiger Ton, bei Mozart eine Jovialität biederer Gesellen’ (*ibid*). But just at the right moment these composers checked themselves, producing masterpieces. Needless to say, the later Nietzsche denies that Wagner had this talent. As always, Nietzsche turned to the Greeks to emphasize the importance of good judgement, measure and restraint.

Wie aber die zu erziehenden Jünglinge mit einander wettkämpfend erzogen wurden, so waren wiederum ihre Erzieher unter sich im Wetteifer. Mißtrauisch-eifersüchtig traten die grossen musikalischen Meister, Pindar und Simonides, neben einander hin; wetteifernd begegnet der Sophist, der höhere Lehrer Alterthums, dem anderen Sophisten; selbst die allgemeinste Art der Belehrung, durch das Drama, wurde dem Volke nur ertheilt unter der Form eines ungeheuren Ringens der grossen musikalischen und dramatischen Künstler (*Homers Wettkampf*, KSA 1.790).

The Greek affirmation of life was only possible on the basis of a determinate negation. The Greeks could not use their energies unless channeled into a specific purpose, which involved the affirmation of some possibilities and the denial or repression of others. If justice is to be understood as strength, it requires injustice too. This is a theme followed throughout Nietzsche’s career. In *Der Griechische Staat,*
Nietzsche emphasizes the necessity of resistance, negation, and above all, *suffering* in the sublimation of the human being. Humans suffer in the production of a higher culture and suffering, sometimes of the majority, is a precondition of greatness. He writes:


This is of course the main source of socialist ire: ‘Hier liegt der Quell jenes Ingrims, den die Kommunisten und Socialisten und auch ihre blasseren Abkömmlinge, die weiße Race der Liberalen jeder Zeit gegen die Künste, aber auch gegen das klassische Alterthum genährt haben’ (KSA 1.768). But without suffering, there is no greatness, no movement and no creation. And a meager existence, as we have seen, defines Nietzschean injustice. On an individual level too, the self cannot produce a wider horizon of self-interpretation and creation except by suffering, measuring and discipline. In Die Götterdammerung he remarks:


This picture is supplemented by the famous statement in JGB 188 ‘Jede Moral ist, im Gegensatz zum laisser aller, ein Stück Tyrannie gegen die ‘Natur’, auch gegen die Vernunft’ (KSA 5.108). Important for our purpose, tyranny only becomes injustice when it is *unproductive*. Modern culture is an instance of this decadence, since it seeks to deny, in the manner of the Cartesian subject (supposed to be untainted by the flux of the external world) the vital flow of forces that *is* the self.

In explicit contrast to the Romantic idea of freedom as a form of self-expression in which one seeks to expand the powers of the self by extending its reach as far as possible into the outside world, Nietzsche upholds the figure of Epictetus as a model of freedom as self-mastery in which the powers of the self are not so much expanded as they are intensified, in a person who lived without the notion that hope may be coming from the outside. In this respect, Nietzsche argues, the slavery of Epictetus differs radically from the slavery of the Christian in that ‘der Christ in Hoffnung lebt, in der Vertröstung auf “unaussprechbare Herrlichkeiten”, dass er sich beschenken lässt und das Beste von der göttlichen Liebe und Gnade, und nicht von sich, erwartet und annimmt’ (M 546, KSA 3.317). By contrast, it is possible to say that ‘Epiktet nicht hofft und sein Bestes sich nicht schenken lässt, – er besitzt es, er hält es tapfer in seiner Hand, er macht es der ganzen Welt streitig, wenn diese es ihm rauben will’. In an earlier aphorism, Nietzsche comments that Epictetus, like the other masters of the antique art of self-legislation, would be considered immoral from the viewpoint of the contemporary morality of pity: ‘[They] wussten Nichts von der jetzt üblichen Verherrlichung des Denkens an Andere, des Lebens für Andere; man würde sie nach unserer moralischen Mode geradezu unmoralisch nennen müssen, denn sie haben sich mit allen Kräften für ihr ego und gegen die Mitempfindung mit den
Anderen (namentlich mit deren Leiden und sittlichen Gebrechen) gewehrt’ (M 131, KSA 3.122). In the same section, Nietzsche imagines Epictetus giving a sarcastic retort to Christian selflessness: ‘Vielleicht dass sie uns antworten würden: “habt ihr an euch selber einen so langweiligen oder hässlichen Gegenstand, so denkt doch ja an Andere mehr, als an euch! Ihr thut gut daran.” ’ (M 131, KSA 3.123).

Using the model of Stoic self-discipline, Nietzsche celebrates a self who accepts, as Epictetus does, the circumstances in which it finds itself, not passively, but robustly, as an exercise of the sovereign power that is reserved for it alone, and that no other can take away. This self is a bent bow, a self bending over in a titanic effort at self-command. He writes in Morgenröte 114 that it is precisely through suffering that even the weak for once get the opportunity to legislate. Pain can be a tremendous stimulus: even when given the opportunity to avoid it, there will be those who deliberately seek it out, purely in order to demonstrate that they can endure it. They may even end up wishing that they did not have the monstrous pride that put them in the position of pain. Being in pain is experienced as an offense against the mind that lives within the body. It forces an exclusive focus upon the body, and the intellect, that Nietzsche refers to in the passage, does its utmost best to regain proper dominion. As a result, the entire organism undergoes a transformation and invigoration. It is the pain itself separating the sufferer from the world around him that gives the sufferer the opportunity to see the world in a new light, without the ‘lying little charms’ that usually surrounds it. The suffering man has the opportunity to tell himself:


The experience of pain, rather than to turn him against life, has actually given the sufferer the opportunity to enjoy the most human of pleasures known to man, that of judging and evaluating. This makes life even more desirable. Although the passage under discussion does not refer to Übermenschlichkeit, and can even be seen to depict the suffering of weak individuals, it can certainly be argued that pain, correctly understood, has a unique ability to bring out strength. The self attains its highest distinction precisely in circumstances that would seem to be urging towards its complete degradation, seizing the opportunity for re-creating the self that only such circumstances can offer. This is particularly true of Oedipus and Orestes, who get the opportunity to reconcile themselves with their fate after the tragic moment of anagorisis. Important for our purpose, Übermenschlichkeit shows itself not only in a willingness to accept pain and injustice as a necessary part of the order of things, but even to seek it out as providing an opportunity to enhance strength. It is indeed easier to say what the Übermensch is not, than to provide even a working definition, and first on the list of negatives is Buddhism. Although there are certain superficial similarities, the Übermensch does not aim for an ultimate state of harmony as the ideal of a just man. If anything, the just man is an agon on a small scale. Such an individual will deliberately seek out sources for strife: the ugly, the painful, the tragic, as possible material to be sublimated and incorporated into a great life:

The same could not, however, be said of the Christian ascetic. As Nietzsche explains throughout the *Genealogie*,\(^\text{194}\) when man’s protestations against the cruelty of the world fell upon deaf ears, man turned against himself, and actually began to thirst for pain in the rather perverse manner of the modern subject, creating for himself concepts like sin, guilt, and divine punishment. The Stoic by contrast, seeks to overcome the temptation of becoming ‘addicted’ to suffering, preferring instead the opportunity to move on to higher ground.

Among Nietzsche’s many uncomfortable ideas is the notion that even cruelty can be an expression of richness and strength, and this uncomforting thought has often been overlooked, or rather avoided by commentators. Yet cruelty plays a role almost as important as that of mercy in the overcoming of the economy of the subject.\(^\text{195}\) Whether one is speaking of cruelty or mercy is less important as to whether it is interpreted as a force of differentiation or an element in the narrow economy of give and take.

\[
\text{Oh meine Thiere, seid auch ihr grausam? Habt ihr meinem grossen Schmerze zuschaun wollen, wie Menschen thun? Der Mensch nämlich ist das grausamste Thier.}
\]

\[
\text{Bei Trauerspielen, Stierkämpfen und Kreuzigungen ist es ihm bisher am wohlsten geworden auf Erden; und als er sich die Hölle erfand, siehe, da war das sein Himmel auf Erden (Z III, ‘KSA 4.273).}
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Moreover, on the crux of the second essay of the *Genealogy* in *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche says: ‘Die Grausamkeit als einer der ältesten und unwegdenkbarsten Cultur-Untergründe hier zum ersten Male ans Licht gebracht’ (*EH* ‘Genealogie der Moral’, KSA 6.352). This conviction takes shape gradually through Nietzsche’s work and grew from the conviction that the purity and beauty of ancient Greece emerged only after a long comfortless period of dark crudity and cruelty. He adds that one can speak of spring only when there has been a winter that preceded it. When pleasure

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\(^{195}\) Cruelty is defined simply as ‘a disposition to inflict suffering, indifference to, or delight in, pain and misery, heartlessness, especially as exhibited in action’. *(OED)*.
accompanies the infliction of evil – when one strongly feels the joy of stretching one’s power to the limits, only then can one speak of living life to the fullest.

Nietzsche sees the intertwined folie à deux of pleasure and pain as essential to the exercise of the will to power. To exercise this will inevitably implies the courting of cruelty, but even more, the positive enjoyment of the pain and agony that suffering causes. ‘Einst blickte die Seele verächtlich auf den Leib: und damals war diese Verachtung das Höchste: – sie wollte ihn mager, grässlich, verhungert. So dachte sie ihm und der Erde zu entschlüpfen. Oh diese Seele war selber noch mager, grässlich und verhungert: und Grausamkeit war die Wollust dieser Seele!’ (Z Vorrede 3, KSA 4.15).

Nietzsche contends that at first, these pleasures were public. Cruelty is one of the oldest festive joys of mankind. It is not long since princely weddings and public festivals of the more magnificent types were unthinkable without executions, torturing, and perhaps an auto da fe. and no noble household was complete without a creature upon whom one could heedlessly vent one’s malice and cruel jokes.

Jedenfalls ist es noch nicht zu lange her, dass man sich fürstliche Hochzeiten und Volksfeste grössten Stils ohne Hinrichtungen, Folterungen oder etwa ein Autodafé nicht zu denken wusste, insgleichen keinen vornehmen Haushalt ohne Wesen, an denen man unbedenklich seine Bosheit und grausame Neckerei auslassen konnte ( – man erinnere sich etwa Don Quixote’s am Hofe der Herzogin: wir lesen heute den ganzen Don Quixote mit einem bitteren Geschmack auf der Zunge, fast mit einer Tortur und würden damit seinem Urheber und dessen Zeitgenossen sehr fremd, sehr dunkel sein, – sie lasen ihn mit allerbestem Gewissen als das heiterste der Bücher, sie lachten sich an ihm fast zu Tod) (GM II 18, KSA KSA 5.302).

For millennia, societies have been organized hierarchically and allowed the man with prestige to enjoy the cruel pleasure of exciting envy and permitting him to vent his power freely upon the powerless, the voluptuous pleasure, ‘die Wollust de faire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire, der Genuss in der Vergewaltigung: de faire mal pour la plaisir de le faire’ (GM II 18, KSA. 5.300).

The process of internalization cripples man’s animal instincts, while shared taboos make the exercise of the will to power difficult and sometimes even

196 The public announcement and execution of the sentence of the Inquisition, with the attendant ceremonies, such as the burning at the stake. Literally translated from the Spanish it means ‘act of faith’.
197 René Girard confirms this thesis by pointing out the importance of the scapegoat in constructing communal unity.
impossible. At the same time, in some rare souls, the masochistic pleasures of self-rule somehow strengthen the will to power in all its cruel splendour – the old animal instincts cultivated with foresight and transfigured through the use of memory, imagination and reason erupt in new forms of mastery:


Nietzsche’s real objection to cruelty is its abuse in the moralizing context. Cruelty, as a form of violent differentiation, an artist’s weapon of form-giving, has a certain limited legitimacy. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche surveys this history by employing the metaphor of a ladder. The great ladder of religious cruelty, as he identifies it, consists of three rungs. The first leads to the sacrifice of humans for the sake of a god. Next, one sacrificed one's instincts, one's ‘nature’: *this* festive joy ‘lights up the cruel eyes of the ascetic’. Finally, the greatest sacrifice possible: the sacrifice of God himself. This is the form of cruelty proper to the philosopher. Governed by the will to truth, nurtured and preserved by the practice of asceticism, the philosopher appears: Recognizing that the idea of truth is in itself a kind of fiction, he spares nothing in telling his audience that everything they hold dear as solid and certain about the world, is, on closer inspection, demonstrably accidental, contingent or false - religions, laws, moralities, ideas, philosophies.

This brings us to the true purpose of Nietzsche’s resurrection of cruelty in the name of the overcoming of what has hitherto passed as justice. While we have seen that Nietzsche unambiguously condemns punishment as a means to maintain a moral order, he certainly leaves room for cruelty as a means of violent differentiation. The crucial difference is that the cruelty he espouses is a cruelty bereft of any moralistic content: it is an artist’s cruelty. Cruelty is a means for the legislator: it is a way of demarcating what the particular artist deems to be good or bad. It manifests itself
through the cold stare of the aristocrat, the contempt of the strong for the weak, and of course, the healthy hardness of the creator:

– dass alles Böseste seine beste Kraft ist und der härteste Stein dem höchsten Schaffenden; und dass der Mensch besser und böser werden muss (Z II 2, ‘Der Genesende’ KSA 4.271).

Nietzsche’s justice does indeed distinguish between better and inferior, but does not tar the inferior with the label ‘evil’. Instead of hatred, he feels contempt for the inferior, and he describes his own texts as a study in contempt: ‘Man hat meine Schriften eine Schule des Verdachts genannt, noch mehr der Verachtung, glücklicherweise auch des Muthes, ja der Verwegenheit’ (MA Vorrede I, KSA 2.13). In Also Sprach Zarathustra again, he sees the ability to despise as one of the greatest virtues of the ‘higher type’: ‘Dass ihr verachtetet, ihr höheren Menschen, das macht mich hoffen, Die grossen Verachtenden nämlich sind die grossen Verehrenden’ (Z IV, ‘Vom höheren Menschen’ (KSA 4.357). In this way, Homer’s scorn is reserved not for the ‘evil’ Achilles, but for the weak and contemptible Thersites, who, being a coward, lacked the aristocratic strength that would signify his superiority over others. In the Iliad, he is singled out as an object of ridicule.

A particular reason for this could be said to be his inability to be tragic. Cowardice can be expressed as the fear experienced in the face of cosmic injustice, a desperate desire to read something personal in an order that is merely committed to its own ebb and flow. Tragic wisdom – amor fati indeed – is the refusal to submit to pain in a masochistic embrace of suffering, to accept it in a manner of Stoic indifference. Pessimistic resignation is still nihilism. Tragic wisdom, or the love of fate, is to greet the tragic revelation of suffering and strife not merely as ineradicable, but as absolutely necessary to being fully alive to the experience of being one with oneself and the world, at ease with one’s mortality, oneself as situated in time, and subject, just like other creatures, to pain and death. This is what it means to answer in the affirmative to the demon’s question. In the tragic theatre of the most optimistic of tragic peoples, the Greeks, figures like Antigone, Oedipus and Orestes gave dramatic

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198 Not to be confused with the metaphysical desire for a single, solid subject.
presence to one of the oldest questions haunting man, the *injustice* of human existence. The ultimate answer to a cosmos that provides the background to our pain and suffering, yet remains indifferent to our pain, is to declare pain *holy*:


As we have seen in chapter one, in Oedipus we encounter a being who in spite – but *not because* – of his wisdom is destined to suffer, but eventually overcomes this suffering to spread a ‘magical power’ of blessings even as far as Athens. Likewise, in Aeschylus’ *Prometheus* the act of sacrilege through which human culture begins is sublimated and the conflict between the gods is resolved. In the poet’s conception of the Fates as ultimate arbiters of justice in the divine and mortal worlds alike, we find a restoration of order and a sense of meaning and a higher form of piety in both parties. But above all, the fates allow the world to *go on*. Every ‘restoration’ by the fates is like the cleaning of the palate after an over-rich dish: it allows new tastes to be appreciated and opens a space for new adventures to be undertaken. In this sense, Nietzsche’s themes of forgetting and mercy play the same role as ancient *dikē*: it prevents the world from choking on its own eventfulness.199 This is how *dikē* operates in the *Oresteia*, for example: Athena, by pardoning Orestes and placating the Furies, allows the cursed family of Agamemnon to begin on a clean slate. In ancient tragedy, the means for elevating the spirit lies in the very conditions of its disgrace. A discovery of a higher order, a higher form of justice in the midst of chaos and injustice comprises for Nietzsche the heart of ancient tragedy and the essence of ancient justice. It is not enough to pass through the valley of the shadow of death

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199 See next section for a further explanation of this notion in Nietzsche’s conception of the historical.
unharmed. One has to return refreshed and invigorated, with a new lust for life before one can truly claim to have justified existence.

4. Practising Übermenschlichkeit: Examples from History and Philology

Nowhere does Nietzsche discuss the problem of justice more explixitly than in his analysis of the problem that history presents to those who happen to be born in late modernity. History tends to be cruel towards the latecomers: it presents nothing short of itself as a major problem. Even in his critique of the Romantics does Nietzsche see a nihilistic intensification of the general problem of the relationship between the past and the present. The particular neurosis that Nietzsche identified in Romanticism is its peculiar reliance on repetitive and minimalist themes, for example in the music of Wagner, which reflects the minimization of the historical present in modernity. It has been noted that there is a clear link between the avant-garde of the late nineteenth century and the historicism of that period. The latter is saturated by the past, while the former is self-consciously trying to escape from it. While Nietzsche notes that ‘Wir Gegenwärtigen fangen eben an, die Kette eines zukünftigen sehr mächtigen Gefühls zu bilden, Glied um Glied, – wir wissen kaum, was wir thun’ (FW 337, KSA 3.564).

This orientation towards the future is accompanied by an excessive historical sense. It is precisely because modern Europe is so saturated with its own history that Homer can be enjoyed as something exotic. It is however with longing for their ‘fresh’ eyes and ‘clean palate’ that the modern European reads Homer:

Wir geniessen zum Beispiel Homer wieder: vielleicht ist es unser glücklichsten Vorsprung, dass wir Homer zu schmecken verstehen, welchen die Menschen einer vornehmen Cultur (etwa die Franzosen des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts, wie Saint-Evremond, der ihm den esprit vaste vorwirft, selbst noch ihr Ausklang Voltaire) nicht so leicht sich anzueignen wissen und wussten, – welchen zu geniessen sie sich kaum erlaubten. Das sehr bestimmte Ja und Nein ihres Gaumens, ihr leicht bereiter Ekel, ihre zögernde Zurückhaltung in Bezug auf alles Fremdartige, ihre Scheu vor dem Ungeschmack selbst der lebhaften Neugierde, und überhaupt jener schlechte Wille jeder vornehmen und selbstgenügsamen Cultur, sich eine neue Begehrlichkeit, eine Unbefriedigung am Eignen, eine Bewunderung des Fremden einzustehen: alles dies stellt und stimmt sie ungünstig selbst gegen die besten Dinge der Welt, welche nicht ihr Eigenthum sind oder ihre Beute werden könnten, – und kein Sinn ist solchen Menschen unverständlicher, als gerade der historische Sinn und seine unterwürfige Plebejer-Neugierde (JGB 224, KSA 5.159).
Although this section is ostensibly about the eclectic tastes of modern Europe, it is also about the historicization of culture, and the subsequent disappearance of the present in a caleidoscope of ‘pasts’. He argues:

durch dieses Uebermaass wird der jederzeit schädliche Glaube an das Alter der Menschheit, der Glaube, Spätling und Epigone zu sein, gepflanzt; durch dieses Uebermaass geräth eine Zeit in die gefährliche Stimmung der Ironie über sich selbst und aus ihr in die noch gefährlichere des Cynimus: in dieser aber reif sie immer mehr einer klugen egoistischen Praxis entgegen, durch welche die Lebenskräfte gelähmt und zuletzt zerstört warden (UB II 5, KSA 1.279).

Adding insult to injury is the illusion that the latecomers in the process of history ‘die Gerechtigkeit, in höherem Grade besitze als jede andere Zeit’ (ibid). For Nietzsche, an essential part of the crisis of modernity is the strange phenomenon of a metaphysics that is at once intensifying and unravelling. Unravelling, because it is no longer epistemologically tenable, and yet intensifying, because the metaphysical denigration of physical existence is intensified by the temporal consciousness of modernity.

Nietzsche’s ‘Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben’ opens with the famous consideration of a grazing herd that is free from the burden of history:

Betrachte die Heerde, die an dir vorüberweidet: sie weiss nicht was Gestern, was Heute ist, springt umher, frisst, ruht, verdaut, springt wieder, und so vom Morgen bis zur Nacht und von Tage zu Tage, kurz angebunden mit ihrer Lust und Unlust, nämlich an den Pflock des Augenblickes und deshalb weder schwermüthig noch überdrüssig. Dies zu sehen geht dem Menschen hart ein, weil er seines Menschenthums sich vor dem Thiere brüstet und doch nach seinem Glücke eifersüchtig hinblickt – denn das will er allein, gleich dem Thiere weder überdrüssig noch unter Schmerzen leben, und will es doch vergebens, weil er es nicht will wie das Thier. Der Mensch fragt wohl einmal das Thier: warum redest du mir nicht von deinem Glücke und siehst mich nur an? (UB II, 1, KSA 1.248).

This joyful spectacle stimulates the desire in man to emulate it, but the cattle when faced with the human request to reveal the source of their happiness, simply forget to answer and so remain silent. The human being, by contrast, is weighed down with the memory of the past, and one can describe his essential historicity as a fundamental determinant of the human condition. So much so that the human is even surprised by
his own inability to forget. Despite his best intentions to run from it, memory is a primal determinant of the human being. As we have seen in chapter three, Nietzsche’s analysis of metaphysics in ‘Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne’ has demonstrated the constitutive function of memory in the construction of concepts. In UB II, however, he asks:


Paradoxically, then, man needs the ability to remember in order to think, but the ability to forget in order to act. Or as Nietzsche puts it: ‘Dies gerade ist der Satz, zu dessen Betrachtung der Leser eingeladen ist: das Unhistorische und das Historische ist gleichermaassen für die Gesundheit eines Einzelnen, eines Volkes und einer Cultur nöthig’ (UB I, KSA 1.252). Formulating what would later become a fully-blown doctrine of perspectivism, Nietzsche insists upon the necessity of a temporal horizon in order to bring an overwhelming flux of time and history – the excess of history and time – temporarily to a standstill.

Es ist wahr: erst dadurch, dass der Mensch denkend, überdenkend, vergleichend, trennend, zusammenschliessend jenes unhistorische Element einschränkt, erst dadurch dass innerhalb jener umschliessenden Dunstwolke ein heller, blitzender Lichtschein entsteht, also erst durch die Kraft, das Vergangene zum Leben zu gebrauchen und aus dem Geschehenen wieder Geschichte zu machen, wird der Mensch zum Menschen: aber in einem Uebermaasse von Historie hört der Mensch wieder auf, und ohne jene Hülle des Unhistorischen würde er nie angefangen haben und anzufangen wagen. Wo finden sich Thaten, die der Mensch zu thun vermöchte, ohne vorher in jene Dunstschicht des Unhistorischen eingegangen zu sein? (UB II, KSA1.253).

There is a bleak irony in Nietzsche’s reflection on justice in section one of the second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung, in that it is the man with a wider horizon that is unable to reach a state of justice as strength. As we have seen, justice is usually associated with conditions of richness and potency. But this is precisely what a man with a wide
horizon lacks. Made hesitant, tentative by his great learning and wide frame of reference, historical man lacks the single-minded vigor of the unhistorical man. Life itself appears to favor the unjust and the ignorant by giving them the ‘strength of the ignorant’, decisiveness and self-assurance. Ironically, this would constitute a more just position than that of the self-conscious historian:


At the beginning of section six of the second Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung Nietzsche asks two very important questions. Firstly, he raises the question of whether, on account of his much-touted desire for ‘objectivity’, modern man can call himself ‘just’, which Nietzsche then proceeds to identify with strength. He then continues to ponder the question by asking whether this automatic association of justice and objectivity is justified. With regard to the nature of truth and justice, Nietzsche presents the case for strength. Against the contemporary champions of ‘objectivity’ he states in UB II 6:

Nur insofern der Wahrhafte den unbedingten Willen hat, gerecht zu sein, ist an dem überall so gedankenlos glorifizirten Streben nach Wahrheit etwas Grosses.....(KSA1.287).

He goes on to explicitly link justice with truth – ‘Wahrheit, das seine Wurzel in der Gerechtigkeit hat’… in order to correct the erroneous privileging of the disinterested spectator. The disinterested spectator tends to think of Truth almost in quantifiable terms: the truth, which must be hunted down and captured at all costs.200 Nietzsche denies that the quest for objectivity arises from a desire to do justice to the facts because modern man lack the stern will required for just action.

Instead, an evaluative notion of truth is required. As we have seen, truth is created, not discovered, and it should be done based on the needs of the present.

200 See chapter three.
Furthermore, the world presents more than enough matter for the historian to do so: if anything, there is an oversupply of truth, not a lack of it. The world appears to give everything man needs, except justice: like the rain that falleth on the just as well as the unjust, the world gives birth to the just as well as the unjust.

It is up to man, or more precisely, the Übermensch to separate the two. That is why the historian must have ‘the outward tranquil, but inwardly flashing eye of the artist’. Nietzsche therefore makes a similar case as he elsewhere does for the artist: emphasizing creative engagement rather than disinterested spectatorship.

A significant section of UB II is devoted to the discussion of specific types of historiography prevalent in the nineteenth century, namely antiquarian history, monumental history and critical history. Antiquarian history certainly practises the Zarathustrian injunction to love, unfortunately with Othello’s lack of subtlety. Antiquarian history preserves everything without distinction simply because it belongs to the past. It is the quintessential example of the hypertrophic historical sense that haunts modernity: it simply cannot let go. It is characterized by a ‘repulsive’ and blind rage for collecting, a pointless raking together of everything that ever existed. It practises no justice because it does not discriminate and therefore mummifies history into something that is of no real use to the present, thereby committing injustice to both the past and the present.

By contrast, monumental history is capable of exercising a selective appropriation of the past with the aim of making it useful for the present. It operates on a logic of analogy, providing models for those who lack it in the present.

Denn sein Gebot lautet: das was einmal vermochte, den Begriff ‘Mensch’ weiter auszuspannen und schöner zu erfüllen, das muss auch ewig vorhanden sein, um dies ewig zu vermögen. Dass die grossen Momente im Kampfe der Einzelnen eine Kette bilden, dass in ihnen ein Höhenzug der Menschheit durch Jahrtausende hin sich verbine, dass für mich das Höchste eines solchen längst vergangenen Momentes noch lebendig, hell und gross sei – das ist der Grundgedanke im Glauben an die Humanität, der sich in der Forderung einer monumentalischen Historie ausspricht (UB II 2, KSA 1.259).
But an ethic of mimesis is not enough. Not only does it set unreachable goals through a process of mythologizing, it also inspires the courageous to foolhardiness and the spirited to fanaticism. Monumental history depends upon a falsification of history: this is where the demand for truth and justice in the domain of the historical meet.

It is in the practice of critical history that the historian once again uses his art in the service of life. It is highly suggestive that Nietzsche explicitly employs legal language when speaking of the genuine historian’s duty towards his subject matter:

What is important in this rather lengthy quote is the insight that the critical historian is exposed to nihilism. There are no ultimate rules or standards according to which one can measure worth or usefulness for life, everything deserves to perish. This is the ultimate or only law that governs the universe. Against this Silenian wisdom, the genuine historian must draw a protective horizon or limit. By this act of legislation, he would have demarcated a space that is genuinely useful to life. This is why mere objectivity is not enough. The just man is at once the rarest and the most admired figure, the most venerable exemplar of the species man: ‘Wahrlich, niemand hat in höherem Grade einen Anspruch auf unsere Verehrung als der, welcher den Trieb und die Kraft zur Gerechtigkeit besitzt. Denn in ihr vereinigen und verbergen
sich die höchsten und seltensten Tugenden wie in einem unergründlichen Meere, das von allen Seiten Ströme empfängt und in sich verschlingt’ (UB II 5, KSA 1.286). The truth that the just man seeks, differs from mere cold, instrumental knowledge, but serves him to make judgements on humanity, aiding him in his necessary task of legislation and differentiation. Above all, the just man is not afraid to judge:

Die Hand des Gerechten, der Gericht zu halten befugt ist, erzittert nicht mehr, wenn sie die Wage hält; unerbittlich gegen sich selbst legt er Gewicht auf Gewicht, sein Auge trägt sich nicht, wenn die Wagschalen steigen und sinken, und seine Stimme klingt weder hart noch gebrochen, wenn er das Urtheil verkündet. Wäre ein kalter Dämon der Erkenntniss, so würde er um sich die eisige Atmosphäre einer übermenschlich schrecklichen Majestät ausbreiten, die wir zu fürchten, nicht zu verehren hätten: aber dass er ein Mensch ist und doch aus lässlichem Zweifel zu strenger Gewissheit, aus duldsamer Milde zum Imperativ „du musst“, aus der seltenen Tugend der Grossmuth zur allerseltensten der Gerechtigkeit emporzugehen versucht, dass er jetzt jenem Dämon ähnelt, ohne von Anbeginn etwas Anderes als ein armer Mensch zu sein, und vor Allem, dass er in jedem Augenblicke an sich selbst sein Menschenthum zu büßen hat und sich an einer unmöglichen Tugend tragisch verzerzt – dies Alles stellt ihn in eine einsame Höhe hin, als das ehrwürdigste Exemplar der Gattung Mensch (UB II, KSA 1.286).

The just man actively decides what is worth knowing and preserving. Unlike the injustice that nourishes modern man’s obsession with ‘objectivity’, genuine justice demands that history serve the aim of finding and displaying what is beautiful, rare and strong. Nietzsche goes as far as to say that justice and objectivity have nothing to do with one another (UB II 5). More often than not, the claim of objectivity masks a political agenda or reflects the mistaken equation of conventional norms with universal truths. Justice requires the distinction between that which is strong and noble on the one hand, and that which is weak, decadent and insignificant on the other. Objectivity, in the guise of ‘neutrality’ is by definition unable to do justice to strong natures and to respect the ‘truth’ about the difference between base and noble as these qualities manifest themselves in the world. Accordingly, ‘objectivity’ is to be condemned because it springs from a slavish impulse and a weak nature. It distorts facts about the nobler life and conceals its nature.

There is a certain affinity between Nietzsche’s treatment of the question of justice in history and his treatment of the same question in philology. As a master of interpretation and a ‘genius of justice’ (Es gibt freilich auch eine ganz andere Gattung der Genialität, die der Gerechtigkeit, MA 636, KSA 2.361) both fields fall in
his field of expertise. In order to function, this kind of justice, just as the justice of the
good historian, must have a clear, i.e. subtle or nuanced view of things: ‘muss sie es
rein erkennen; sie stellt daher jedes Ding in das beste Licht und geht um dasselbe mit
sorgsamem Auge herum. Zuletzt wird sie selbst ihrer Gegnerin, der blinden oder
kurzsichtigen Uberzeugung’ (MA 636 KSA 2.362). This genius of interpretation has
grasped the element of perspective present in every value judgement, and therefore
does not attempt to restrict the proliferating play involved in the process of
interpretation with untenable notions like ‘objectivity’. Against the shortsightedness of
‘convictions’ Nietzsche posits Argos, the hundred-eyed, who is capable of
experiencing a number of different perspectives simultaneously. Traditional
objectivity is replaced with a more playful version, a more active form of objectivity
than the static version of the past that held onto the objectivity as some kind of golden
mean. As stated before, justice understood in this sense, demands of the just man or
the sovereign individual that he should take up the challenge to judge:

Wider begreifen lernen, die Ungerechtigkeit als unablösbar vom Leben, das
Leben selbst als bedingt durch das Perspektivische und seine Ungerechtigkeit.
Du solltest vor Allem mit Augen sehn, wo die Ungerechtigkeit immer am
größten ist: dort nämlich, wo das Leben am kleinsten, engsten, dürftigsten,
anfälligsten entwickelt ist und dennoch nicht umhin kann, sich als Zweck
und Maass der Dinge zu nehmen und seiner Erhaltung zu Liebe das Höhere,
Grössere, Reichere,heimlich und kleinlich und unablässig anzubrückeln und
in Frage zu stellen, – du solltest das Problem der Rangordnung mit Augen
sehn und wie Macht und Recht und Umfänglichkeit der Perspektive mit
einander in die Höhe wachsen. Du ‘solltest’ – genug, der freie Geist weiss
nunnemehr, welchem ‘du sollst’ er gehorcht hat, und auch, was er jetzt kann,
was er jetzt erst darf… (MA Vorrede 6, KSA 2.221).

This passage contains one of the key goals involved in the process of a just
interpretation: the establishment of an order of rank. The order of rank has a two-fold
purpose. It at once distinguishes qualitatively on the basis of life-enhancing or life-
negating criteria, and it gives form to an infinite number of possible interpretations.
Two elements of justice are therefore captured at once in the quoted passage: the
necessity of measure and imposing of limits on the one hand, and the need to
distinguish qualitatively between the different options available to one. The capacity
to create order where none had existed previously, and to legislate the potential
anarchy of one’s competing and contradictory impulses and perspectives is what it
means to be a just person.
Those who are capable of giving order to themselves and to the world practises what Nietzsche calls the ‘grand style’ (grosse Stil). It is Nietzsche’s hope that a new type of person, a person who views himself and the world which he inhabits – with politics, history and culture included – as an artist views his material. That is to say, as someone who is not afraid of the antithetical or rather chaotic character of existence, and maintains a formative power of discipline over himself and the world, creating a picture of wholeness.

The good historian, for example, is this latter kind of barbarian. He partakes of Übermenschlichkeit if he practises his art well. However, one should be careful not to equate the two concepts (that is, barbarism and Übermenschlichkeit) too easily. After all, the Übermensch does not live by history alone. Because so much is at stake where historical judgement is concerned, historians are easily corrupted and it is likely that the true judge will generate universal hatred. This is why justice is the rarest virtue:

So scheint zwar die Welt voll zu sein von solchen, die ‘der Wahrheit dienen’; und doch ist die Tugend der Gerechtigkeit so selten vorhanden, noch seltener erkannt und fast immer auf den Tod gehasst: wohingegen die Schaar der scheinbaren Tugenden zu jeder Zeit geehrt und prunkend einherzog (UB II 6, KSA 1.287).

201 See also aphorism 10167, NL 1884-1885, KSA 11.457.
202 See the beginning of the chapter: the just, the giving and the strong are nearly always misunderstood.
The disinterested spectator, who vainly aims at ‘objectivity’, as we have seen in chapter three, is bound to be caught in the trap of nihilism: No ultimate values, no ultimate meaning, and radical individualism. However, the ‘facts’ of nihilism can either lead to a denial of the worth of life and spiritual torpor, or an affirmation of life and creative will. It is necessary to include the negative in this process of affirmation. In *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft* 19 Nietzsche emphasizes the necessity of ‘evil’ for a fruitful life:


Poison is not always called poison because its meaning depends upon its use. Poison demands a subtle hand. Similarly, just as there are no actual antipodes of good and evil or good and bad, but only differences of degree, so are all moral and even aesthetic categories used to describe the world but shorthand to describe a myriad different phenomena and conditions. Any attempt to venture into this plethora of ambiguity is bound to place a premium of nuance. According to Nietzsche, the highest thinker, the greatest lawmaker, is able to evaluate without opposites (*JGB* 2), but is able to think in *degrees*. It follows then that the best one could gain from life is to develop ‘die Kunst der Nuance’ (*JGB* 31, KSA 5.49), or the art of judgement.

> Even Dionysos, so easily associated with chaos and measurelessness, is a judge. And to judge is to exercise critique. Judgement entails the capacity to reject, to accept and to set standards according to which this happens. In other words, judgement entails an evaluation according to which inadequacy can be proven. Rather than to simply prove as a positive doctrine that all things repeat endlessly, acceptance of the eternal recurrence was supposed to be the means by which the chaff is separated from the wheat: those who joyfully accept the challenge pass, those who buckle under the great strain of facing up to an unjust world whose only justice would be that legislated by oneself, fail the test. As early as *Die Geburt der Tragödie*, Dionysos is conceived as a judge:
Vor der deutschen Musik aber mag sich der Lügner und Heuchler in Acht nehmen: denn gerade sie ist, inmitten aller unserer Cultur, der einzig reine, lautere und läuternde Feuergeist, von dem aus und zu dem hin, wie in der Lehre des grossen Heraklit von Ephesus, sich alle Dinge in doppelter Kreisbahn bewegen: alles, was wir jetzt Cultur, Bildung, Civilisation nennen, wird einmal vor dem untrüglichen Richter Dionysus erscheinen müssen (GT 19, KSA 1.128).

And:


This brings us to a less obvious distinction between Dionysos and the Crucified: the former seeks no converts. His justice is immanent, not transcendent, and it excludes those who do not pass his test. His is a justice for the strong, not the weak. The Eternal Recurrence must not simply be grasped conceptually and consequently accepted. It must be lived and experienced in an attitude of rapturous affirmation – the joy of the lawgiver. Paradoxically, Dionysos, the god of excess, demands from his followers the capacity to enact their own laws in order to enhance the fruitful working of the world.

Dionysos (especially the later version) represents both the chaotic action of the cosmic strife and the necessity for humans to flourish as lawmakers and judges within it. There is a distinctly Heraclitian quality to this Dionysian conception of justice. As we have seen, Nietzsche identifies two distinct conceptions of justice at play in the work of Heraclitus. First, there is the literal justice of trial by fire in itself, the doctrine that Heraclitus simply adopts from Anaximander. Anaximander, however, sees the operation of this cosmic fire as the operation of retributive justice. Heraclitus rejects this view in favor of an immanent lawfulness and ordering principle which finds expression in the periodic destructiveness that the cosmological order displays. In the second instance, there is the requirement that the just man accepts this ultimately indifferent principle. He can but affirm the necessity of this world-process, for it is impossible to align himself with the intentions of the cosmos. It impossible not
because of a lack on the part of men, but because, as Nietzsche (along with Heraclitus) insists, the cosmos has no intentions. Man lives in a non-teleological cosmos that is best experienced by the artist or the child at play. Whatever supplementary or human justice is required, must be created by that part of humanity that feel themselves up to the task. Nietzsche developed a reading of the Heraclitian dikē as polemos, or the law of the becoming of all things through the balance of strife and counter-strife. This vision of dikē, as we have mentioned in chapter one, does not locate justice in the subjectively-anthropological ‘judgement’, but in the cosmological sphere of conflict. The immanent lawfulness of the cosmic agon comes from Being itself. Hence it is possible to argue that for Nietzsche, Heraclitian logos manifests itself in the gathering of beings as physis through a ceaseless process of countervailing strife, the game that time plays with itself: ‘Und so, wie das Kind und der Künstler spielt, spielt das ewig lebendige Feuer, baut auf und zerstört, in Unschuld – und dieses Spiel spielt der Aeon mit sich’ (PGH 7 KSA 1.830). Dikē in this sense is less judgement than submission to the game in the Gadamerian sense. In Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen Nietzsche reinterprets the world in wholly non-subjective terms as aeon, not simply as ‘time’ but as a force of life, a Heraclitian ‘reine Feuer’; ‘ein Bauen und Zerstören, ohne jede moralische Zurechnung, in ewig gleicher Unschuld’ (PGH 7 KSA 1.830). From time to time the eternal child throws its toys away, but takes it up again soon enough through innocent whim. When it does this, it joins together, conjoins things (fügt) them ‘and measures them according to the inner ordering of lawfulness’ (Gesetzmässigkeit). This game is marked by harmony in strife, where the conflict of different elements, directed by justice, can only be grasped as an aesthetic phenomenon. The moral impulse to view the game in teleological terms is explicitly excluded, for the cosmos – or child – can only be grasped as an aesthetic phenomenon, according to an immanent dikē: ‘In dem höchsten und in dem verkehrtesten Menschen offenbart sich [der Logos] die gleiche immanente Gesetzmäßigkeit und Gerechtigkeit’ (PHG 5, KSA 1.830). The conception of justice here portrayed sees the concept as as immanent force of lawfulness that balances the countervailing forces of Being in a cosmic agon of consonance vs. dissonance. This is justice in its most impersonal form. As we have indicated however, this does not entail that man should be consumed by this anonymous process. Quite the contrary: it is the absence of rigid, ultimate principles that makes the freedom of legislation possible.
CONCLUSION: A NEW JUSTICE

Nietzsche’s philosophy can be described as an attempt to liberate philosophy from the habit of thinking metaphysically. This entails a radical re-evaluation of the terms according to which virtue is conceived. This is especially true of the virtue which, at least since Plato, has been seen as the primary virtue, namely justice. After Nietzsche, justice can no longer be seen as a mere social virtue to be hunted down and contained in neat moral maxims. Justice, après Nietzsche, is no longer even restricted to the human domain: it is more a principle according to which the workings of the cosmos can be described than a social issue. But Nietzsche is no ascetic. Justice is sublimated, not removed from the human domain altogether but bound into a greater, worldly economy beyond good and evil. That is to say, Nietzschean justice is an ennoblement of the concept: a broadening of its scope and a recovery of its aesthetic dimension that has been lost during almost two thousand years of moralizing. Ennoblement is a key element in Nietzschean justice. He is no exorcizing Puritan, but gladly accepts negativities as essential in contributing to the richness of the world. In this, he returns to a classic, particularly Heraclitian notion of justice as dikē, the largely indifferent play of the world, or the world as playing child, the pais paison that adheres only to its own rules, rules beyond the reach of even the strongest human individual or determined metaphysician. The world, because of its Dionysian unfathomableness can never be completely thought, and never completely mastered. To be at ease in such a world, to go with the flow of Nietzschean justice, one has to join the playing child and enhance its game, rather than to try and put an end to it.

Contrary to popular belief, the moralization of justice did not come to an end with the advent of the ‘postmodern’, or rather the late modern period. For although the word ‘justice’ appears frequently in so many contemporary texts on the topic, what seems to be understood by it corresponds more closely to the ethical domain. Postmodernism, as a matter of fact, is best identified by its promotion of a ‘responsibility to otherness’. This responsibility to otherness, and postmodernism’s accompanying embrace of contingency, have been marshalled against the rigidity and closure of certain modernist notions of justice, understood as a rational social order. However, the attempt to bring the ‘subject’ to a close is in the name of a moral discourse that is every bit as restrictive, and yet measureless, as that of traditional
Christianity. This makes Nietzsche, and in particular his conception of justice, more relevant than ever before. If ethics is, according to Levinas and Derrida, the domain of the infinite, then justice is the domain of the limit. And justice, simply understood as ethics, does violence to both justice and the ethical. By over-emphasizing the ethical, the negativity of exclusivity is exchanged for the negativity of the amorphous. For all his usage of the tragic, Derrida ignores the most fundamental Nietzschean tragic lesson: that excess requires at least a degree of a temporary but essential stability. The postmodern use of tragedy in general appears to be very one-sided: the vulnerability of the subject in the face of the events is emphasized at the expense of a richer understanding of tragedy, an understanding that allows for meaningful agency, albeit not in the form of the traditional subject.

It would perhaps be more accurate to describe Nietzsche’s development of a concept of justice as a re-sublimation of justice, because as I have indicated in chapter one, he conceives of justice in terms similar to those of the ancient Greeks. He is, however, at pains to distance himself from his ancient sources of inspiration. After all, nothing would be more nihilistic than a romantic hankering after an ancient past. For this reason, he establishes a new vocabulary that attempts to place man back into the cosmological order from which he vainly attempted to escape for so long through his endless metaphysical constructions. An important element of this ‘reconciliation’ is the rehabilitation of man as an evaluating animal: whereas (according to Nietzsche), the philosophical tradition sought to limit legislation and formation to the discovery of objective ‘truths’, for Nietzsche, the ability to legislate and give names is what makes the human being human. Nietzsche’s vision of the Übermensch is an attempt to get man to seize his long abandoned role as legislator, and make the most of what the world offers. In a nutshell: the demands of Nietzschean justice are fulfilled when healthy strength displays itself as strength, when strength and health unashamedly claim the world for their own. This legislative ability, however, is not absolute. Man stands in a potent relationship between his own power to shape the world and the tendency of the world to ‘push back’, to resist human will and to hide itself from the penetrating rational gaze.

This is why the theme of tragedy remains so important throughout the Nietzschean oeuvre. The tragic artist/actor/thinker is able to reconcile himself to the ultimate unfairness of cosmic justice from a human perspective without the need to read a moral system into the order of things. It is a sign of great strength if one can
face up to the brutal indifference of the world without the need to look for a moral order where there is none:


Nietzschean justice occurs where the will to power is allowed free play and strength, be it in the form of individual power or that of a culture, tradition or art, is allowed to reach its full potential. This will necessarily entail hierarchy, differentiation and inequality. To define justice in any other terms is to risk Nietzschean injustice. The following passage underlines, again, that for Nietzsche a choice has to be made between a noble and aristocratic conception of justice, whose aim is to stimulate richness, and a more ‘democratic’ conception of justice whose goal is equality and compassion, for the two cannot be reconciled:


For Nietzsche, ultimate injustice is generated by an obsession with justice as equality and absence of pain. It is not an injustice merely towards the weak – that could still be tolerated – but an injustice towards the strong, the valiant and the imaginative. This is true injustice indeed. While it is possible for the strong or aristocratic to be unjust towards the weak and slavish – Nietzsche was no mere defender of tyranny – it is a form of injustice more in touch with the greater cosmic forces that seek to assert their strength. Such an injustice would be preferable to what Nietzsche sees as the ultimate form of injustice, namely the triumph of the weak. Ironically, this triumph is
not only aesthetically unpleasing and counter to the desire of the will to power to discharge itself as strength, but it is *inhumane* as well. As it is unjust to demand of strength to manifest itself only as weakness, so it is inhumane to demand of weakness that it maintains itself in the world as strength. This is why there is a unique *honesty* to Nietzsche’s conception of justice: it is far more faithful to the world than any liberal fantasy spawned by modern *demands* for justice.

Finally, the last word on pain and tragic justice. To be just in Nietzsche’s eyes, to count as a truly tragic soul, one must affirm pain in all its forms, the strangest as well as the hardest problems, becoming, passing away and destruction. Nietzschean justice is the very opposite of desiring to live in a pain-free world. Not only must pain be acknowledged, it must actively be sought out. The tragic soul not only acknowledges the existence of pain, but its *necessity*, and affirms it in the strongest way possible. And judgement is a key element in affirmation.


Although the world must be loved, affirmed and approved *in toto*, it is the very *undetermined* quality of the world that makes human freedom possible. *Physis* requires *nomos*, to deny this would make life in the world impossible. Legislation however, is no mere restriction, but *creation*: the most human of all actions and activities.


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