



CONTENTS


**RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY  
IN SOUTH AFRICA:  
A GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE**

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree D.Phil. in the Faculty of Humanities,  
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# CONTENTS

<b>LIST OF FIGURES</b>	8
<b>LIST OF TABLES</b>	9
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b>	10
<b>SUMMARY</b>	11
<b>OP\$OMMING</b>	13
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>	
<b>GENERAL ORIENTATION OF \$TUDY</b>	15
1.1 INTRODUCTION	15
1.2 CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA: A GENERAL OVERVIEW	17
1.2.1 Trends in crime statistics	17
1.2.2 Impact of crime	20
1.2.3 Factors contributing to crime in South Africa	20
1.2.4 Problems in criminal justice system	22
1.2.5 Crime prevention initiatives in South Africa	24
1.2.5.1 Government initiatives	24
1.2.5.2 Initiatives of the corporate/business world	25
1.2.5.3 Private security industry	26
1.2.5.4 Community and individual initiatives	26
1.2.5.5 Role of research institutions	27
1.3 GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIME STUDIES	27
1.4 FORMULATION OF RESEARCH PROBLEM	32
1.4.1 Research questions	33
1.5 AIM OF THE STUDY	33
1.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY	34
1.7 THE SCALE OF THE STUDY	34
1.8 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY	35
1.9 RESEARCH APPROACH	38
1.10 RESEARCH DESIGN	39
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>	
<b>THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY</b>	42
2.1 INTRODUCTION	42



2.2	ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY	42
2.3	OVERVIEW ON THEORIES, MODELS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS	44
2.3.1	The burglary process	44
2.3.2	Burglars' motivation	45
2.3.3	Target selection	46
2.3.4	Territorial approach	51
2.3.5	Residents' activities and lifestyles	55
2.4	THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME PREVENTION	56
2.4.1	Defensible space	56
2.4.2	Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)	57
2.4.3	Situational crime prevention	58
2.4.4	Research findings with regard to environmental crime prevention	62
2.5	CRITICAL REVIEW ON ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACH	63
2.6	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	65
2.6.1	Terms of reference of the conceptual framework	67
2.6.2	Explanation of conceptual framework	69
2.6.2.1	Environmental setting and location of potential target/residence	69
2.6.2.2	Motivated burglar(s)	71
2.6.2.3	The residents	73
2.6.2.4	Situational conditions	73
2.6.2.5	Burglary event	75
2.6.2.6	Responses	75
2.7	RESEARCH EXPECTATIONS	76
2.7.1	Research expectations relating to the meso-environment	77
2.7.2	Research expectations relating to the burglar	77
2.7.3	Research expectations relating to the situational conditions	77
2.7.4	Research expectations related to the burglary event	78
2.7.5	Research expectations related to residents' responses	78
2.7.6	Research expectations related to the burglars' responses	78
2.8	CONCLUSION	78

## **CHAPTER 3**

<b>METHODOLOGY</b>	79	
3.1	INTRODUCTION	79
3.2	RESEARCH STRATEGY	79
3.2.1	The case study approach	80
3.2.1.1	Rationale	80
3.2.1.2	Multiple-case design	81



3.2.2	Phases in the research process	82
3.3	BOUNDING OF CASE STUDY TERRITORY	83
3.3.1	Defining the case	83
3.3.2	Demarcation of the case study areas	83
3.4	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	87
3.5	METHOD OF ENQUIRY	88
3.6	COMPILATION OF INTERVIEW SCHEDULES	90
3.7	PILOT STUDY	91
3.7.1	Selection and conducting of pilot study	91
3.7.2	Results of the pilot study	92
3.7.3	Application of lessons learned on the other schedules	95
3.8	SELECTION OF CASES FOR INTERVIEWING	96
3.8.1	Selection of burglary victims	96
3.8.2	Selection of convicted burglars	97
3.8.3	Selection of people with expert knowledge	97
3.9	CONDUCTING OF INTERVIEWS	98
3.10	PROFILING OF BURGLARS AND VICTIMS INTERVIEWED	99
3.11	PROCESSING OF INFORMATION	99
3.12	ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION	101
3.12.1	Primary data analysis	101
3.12.2	Secondary data analysis	103
3.13	CRITERIA FOR TRUSTWORTHINESS	104
3.14	CONCLUSION	105

## **CHAPTER 4**

<b>RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE MACRO AND MESO-ENVIRONMENT</b>	106	
4.1	INTRODUCTION	106
4.2	RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AT A MACRO-LEVEL	107
4.2.1	Nationally	107
4.2.2	Residential burglary in the SAPS Pretoria area	108
4.2.3	Impact of residential burglary	109
4.3	RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AT A MESO-LEVEL	110
4.3.1	Distribution of residential burglary in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area	110
4.3.2	Accuracy of residential burglary rates	112
4.3.2.1	Population estimates	113
4.3.2.2	Reporting of crime	113
4.3.2.3	Insurance	114



4.3.3	Relationship between site values and burglary rates	114
4.4	RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE CASE STUDY AREAS	116
4.4.1	Crime statistics	116
4.4.2	Spatial patterns	117
4.5	ENVIRONMENTAL TRAITS OF THE TWO CASE STUDY AREAS	118
4.6	CONCLUSION	120

## CHAPTER 5

### RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE MICRO-ENVIRONMENT 122

5.1	INTRODUCTION	122
5.2	INITIAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE BURGLARS	122
5.2.1	Burglars' motivation	124
5.2.2	Burglars' search for suitable targets	124
5.3	SITUATIONAL CONDITIONS	128
5.3.1	Vulnerabilities relating to the residents	128
5.3.2	Vulnerabilities relating to the surveillance	130
5.3.3	Vulnerabilities relating to the physical design	134
5.3.4	Vulnerabilities relating to security	136
5.3.4.1	Responses from the burglary victims	136
5.3.4.2	Responses from the convicted burglars	137
5.3.4.3	Responses from the experts	138
5.4	THE BURGLARY EVENT	140
5.4.1	Time that burglaries occur	141
5.4.2	Extent and nature of burglaries	141
5.4.3	Types of goods stolen and the disposal thereof	146
5.5	RESIDENTS' RESPONSES	148
5.5.1	Feelings of safety	148
5.5.2	Improving security	150
5.6	BURGLARS' RESPONSES	152
5.6.1	Feelings of guilt	152
5.6.2	Crime displacement	153
5.7	CONCLUSION	154

## CHAPTER 6

### PREVENTION OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 156

6.1	INTRODUCTION	156
-----	--------------	-----



6.2	DEFINING CRIME PREVENTION	156
6.3	THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME PREVENTION	158
6.3.1	Classification of Brantingham and Faust	158
6.3.2	Classification of Barkan	159
6.3.3	Classification of Walklate	161
6.4	A HIERARCHICAL APPROACH TOWARDS CRIME PREVENTION	163
6.5	AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO BURGLARY PREVENTION	166
6.6	BURGLARY PREVENTION IN THE MICRO-ENVIRONMENT	171
6.7	CRITICAL REVIEW OF CRIME PREVENTION INITIATIVES AT THE MACRO- AND MESO-LEVELS IN SOUTH AFRICA	173
6.7.1	Macro-level initiatives	173
6.7.2	Meso-level initiatives	178
6.7.2.1	Community Policing	178
6.7.2.2	Private community initiatives	180
6.7.2.2.1	<i>Enclosed neighbourhoods and security villages</i>	180
6.7.2.2.2	<i>Community organisation and citizen patrols</i>	183
6.7.2.2.3	<i>Vigilante activity</i>	183
6.8	CONCLUSION	184

## CHAPTER 7

<b>CONCLUSION</b>	186	
7.1	INTRODUCTION	186
7.2	INTEGRATED BURGLARY MODEL	188
7.2.1	Location of residence in a specific environmental setting	189
7.2.1.1	The affluence of neighbourhoods	189
7.2.1.2	Accessibility of neighbourhoods	189
7.2.2	Burglars and their modus operandi	191
7.2.2.1	Motivation of burglars	191
7.2.2.2	Selection of suitable targets	191
7.2.3	Situational conditions	192
7.2.3.1	Residents' activities and characteristics	193
7.2.3.2	Surveillance and visibility	194
7.2.3.3	Design features	195
7.2.3.4	Security protection	196
7.2.4	Burglary event	197
7.2.4.1	Financial loss	197
7.2.4.2	Market for stolen goods	197
7.2.5	Residents' responses after the burglaries	198
7.2.5.1	Residents' feelings of safety	198
7.2.5.2	Implementation of security measures	199
7.2.6	Burglars' responses after the burglaries	199



7.2.6.1	Burglars' feelings of guilt	199
7.2.6.2	Crime displacement	200
7.2.7	Burglary prevention	201
7.3	EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES	202
7.4	CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCIPLINE OF GEOGRAPHY	205
7.5	RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO BURGLARY PREVENTION	206
7.6	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	208
7.7	CONCLUSION	209

**REFERENCES CITED** 211

**APPENDIX 1:**

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR BURGLARY VICTIMS	220
-----------------------------------------	-----

**APPENDIX 2:**

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CONVICTED BURGLARS	226
-------------------------------------------	-----

**APPENDIX 3:**

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR PEOPLE WITH EXPERT KNOWLEDGE ON BURGLARY	232
-----------------------------------------------------------------	-----



# LIST OF FIGURES

---

1.1	THE FUNNEL EFFECT OF CRIME CONVICTION IN SOUTH AFRICA	23
1.2	VARIABLES IN THE OFFENCE ENVIRONMENT AT A MICRO-LEVEL	31
2.1	CAUSAL CHAIN OF A CRIMINAL EVENT	44
2.2	INITIAL INVOLVEMENT MODEL	48
2.3	EVENT MODEL	49
2.4	ILLUSTRATION OF THE BURGLARY PROCESS	66
3.1	THE MULTIPLE-CASE DESIGN	82
3.2	ORIENTATION MAP OF THE TWO CASE STUDY AREAS	84
3.3	GARSFONTEIN POLICE STATION AREA	85
3.4	PRETORIA WEST POLICE STATION AREA	86
3.5	RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE BURGLARS	99
3.6	AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURGLARS	99
3.7	AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE VICTIMS	100
4.1	RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION FOR THE PROVINCES DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1999	107
4.2	PRIORITY CRIMES IN THE SAPS PRETORIA AREA: 1998 AND 1999	109
4.3	RANKING OF PRIORITY CRIMES IN CASE STUDY AREAS: 1999	117
5.1	RESIDENTS' PRESENCE OR ABSENCE DURING THE BURGLARIES	129
5.2	TIME OF THE CASE STUDY BURGLARIES	131
5.3	SEASONAL VARIATIONS IN RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY	142
6.1	LEVELS OF CRIME PREVENTION	164
7.1	INTEGRATED BURGLARY MODEL	188



## LIST OF TABLES

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1.1	A COMPARISON OF CRIME RATIOS IN SOUTH AFRICA BETWEEN 1994 AND 1999 (PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION)	18
1.2	UNDER-REPORTING OF CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA	19
1.3	RESEARCH DESIGN: RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN SOUTH AFRICA	40
2.1	REWARDS AND RISKS OF THEFT	50
2.2	ENVIRONMENTAL CUES ASSOCIATED WITH STREETS, SITES, AND HOUSES	54
2.3	CRITERIA FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF DESIGNS IN THE NETHERLANDS	59
2.4	TECHNIQUES OF SITUATIONAL PREVENTION	61
2.5	FORMS OF CRIME DISPLACEMENT	65
3.1	FEATURES OF CASE STUDY AREAS	87
3.2	SOURCES OF DATA AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION	88
3.3	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES SELECTED	97
4.1	POLICE STATIONS IN THE GREATER PRETORIA METROPOLITAN AREA	111
4.2	RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES PER POLICE STATION AREA IN THE GREATER PRETORIA METROPOLITAN AREA: 1995-1999	112
4.3	CATEGORIES OF POLICE STATIONS IN THE GREATER PRETORIA METROPOLITAN AREA ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES	113
4.4	RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SITE VALUE AND BURGLARY RATES	115
4.5	COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY AREAS	120
5.1	REASONS GIVEN BY BURGLARS FOR SELECTING A SPECIFIC TARGET	127
5.2	VISIBILITY FACTORS IN CASE STUDIES	133
5.3	ENTERING OF BUILDINGS IN THE CASE STUDIES	135
5.4	DESIGN FEATURES RELATING TO THE ENTERING OF BUILDINGS	135
5.5	SECURITY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO BURGLARIES	137
5.6	BURGLARS' RESPONSES CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY MEASURES	137
5.7	EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE STUDY BURGLARIES	143
5.8	TYPES OF BURGLARIES IN THE CASE STUDY AREAS	145
5.9	TYPE OF GOODS STOLEN	147
5.10	DIFFERENT RESPONSES OF RESIDENTS	149
5.11	NEW SECURITY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED AFTER THE BURGLARY	151
6.1	TYOLOGY OF CRIME PREVENTION APPROACHES AND METHODS	159
6.2	CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR BURGLARY PREVENTION INITIATIVES	168



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## SUMMARY

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I am grateful to the Lord for giving me the talents and the perseverance to complete the study.

The opinions expressed in this thesis and the conclusions reached, are primarily those of the researcher.



## SUMMARY

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**TITLE OF THESIS:** Residential burglary in South Africa:  
a geographical perspective

by

George Sebastiaan van Zyl

**PROMOTER:** Prof. G.D.H. Wilson

**CO-PROMOTER:** Prof. R. Pretorius

**DEPARTMENT:** Geography, Geoinformatics and Meteorology

**DEGREE:** D.Phil.

Residential burglary is a serious problem in South Africa, taking into account its high occurrence rate and the financial and psychological impact it has on peoples' lives.

The aim of this study was to investigate residential burglary in a micro-environment in order to identify, describe and explain the key elements and factors that play a role in the burglary process, and to formulate guidelines that could be followed to develop prevention measures and initiatives to curb residential burglary.

The objectives of this study centred primarily around the construction of a conceptual framework, based on a theoretical explanation of residential burglary, and to apply the conceptual framework in two case study areas in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area. From a theoretical perspective, the study focussed on environmental criminology, known in Geography as the 'geography of crime'.

The realist approach was adopted, instead of a positivistic approach, often associated with geographical studies. The research design and methodology were based on qualitative research techniques and the case-study approach. Research data were gathered through primary (semi-structured interviews) and secondary (statistics and documents) sources. The analysis strategy could be described as "pattern-matching logic", where the initial conceptual framework served as a model against which the codified data could be evaluated.



In the research phase the conceptual framework was tested and validated through the research findings. The research findings confirmed the usefulness of the conceptual framework in that it provided an integrated understanding of the burglary process, and gave a structured and systematic description of the components and elements involved in the burglary process.

The realisation of the research objectives culminated in the final construction of an integrated burglary model, a revised and enriched version of the conceptual framework. The value of this model is vested in its application to conceptualise the burglary process, to identify and analyse the risk factors that determine the vulnerability of a specific target, and to suggest appropriate burglary prevention measures and initiatives.

Based on the findings of the research, an integrated framework for the prevention of residential burglary was developed. By 'integrated' is meant that the prevention initiatives should focus on the main elements of the burglary process, namely, the burglar, the neighbourhood environment, the residents and the situational conditions, and that the implementation of prevention initiatives at the macro, meso and micro levels should complement one another.

This study advocates an integrated approach to investigate residential burglary and to implement prevention measures that combine the efforts of individual households with those of the local communities, law enforcement and development agencies.

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**Key terms:** residential burglary, environmental criminology, geography of crime, burglary patterns, environmental design, residential burglary prevention, crime prevention, situational crime prevention, community policing, enclosed neighbourhoods.



## OPSOMMING

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<b>TITEL VAN PROEFSKRIF:</b>	Residensiële inbraak in Suid-Afrika: 'n geografiese perspektief  deur  George Sebastiaan van Zyl
<b>PROMOTOR:</b>	Prof. G.D.H. Wilson
<b>MEDE-PROMOTOR:</b>	Prof. R. Pretorius
<b>DEPARTEMENT:</b>	Geografie, Geoinformatika en Meteorologie
<b>GRAAD:</b>	D.Phil.

Residensiële inbraak is 'n ernstige probleem in Suid-Afrika, gesien in die lig van die voorkoms van misdaad en die finansiële en sielkundige impak daarvan op die lewens van mense.

Die doel van hierdie studie is om ondersoek in te stel na residensiële inbraak in 'n mikro-omgewing deur die sleutelemente en -faktore wat verband hou met inbraak te identifiseer, te beskryf en te verklaar, en om riglyne te formuleer wat gevolg kan word in die ontwikkeling van inbraakvoorkomingsmaatreëls en -inisiatiewe.

Die doelwitte van die studie is hoofsaaklik afgestem op die ontwikkeling van 'n konseptuele raamwerk, gebaseer op 'n teoretiese verklaring van residensiële inbraak en die toepassing van die raamwerk in twee gevallestudie-gebiede in die Groter Pretoria metropolitaanse gebied. Die teoretiese perspektiewe is ontleen aan omgewingskriminologie en wat in Geografie as die 'geografie van misdaad' bekend staan.

Die realisme ("realist") benadering is in hierdie studie gevolg, in plaas van die meer positivistiese benadering wat meestal in geografiese studies gebruik word. Die navorsingsontwerp en metodologie is gebaseer op kwalitatiewe navorsingstegnieke en die gevallestudie-benadering. Navorsingsdata is ingesamel deur gebruik te maak van primêre (semi-gestruktureerde onderhoude) en sekondêre (statistieke en dokumente)



inligtingsbronne. Die metode van analise wat gevolg is, is gebaseer op die 'passing van patrone' ("pattern-matching logic"), deurdat die konseptuele raamwerk gedien het as 'n model aan die hand waarvan die gekodifiseerde data geëvalueer kon word.

Die konseptuele raamwerk is getoets en gevalideer deur die navorsingsbevindinge. Die bevindinge het bevestig dat die konseptuele raamwerk 'n geïntegreerde teoretiese verklaring vir die inbraakverskynsel bied en dat dit 'n gestruktureerde en sistematiese beskrywing gee van die komponente en elemente betrokke in die inbraakverskynsel.

In die finale instansie kon 'n geïntegreerde inbraakmodel gekonstrueer word, wat 'n hersiene en verrykte weergawe van die konseptuele raamwerk is. Die waarde van die model lê daarin dat dit aangewend kan word om die inbraakproses te konseptualiseer, om die risikofaktore wat die kwesbaarheid van 'n spesifieke teiken weerspieël, te identifiseer en te analiseer, en om toepaslike voorkomingsmaatreëls en -inisiatiewe aan die hand te doen.

Gebaseer op die navorsingsbevindinge kon 'n geïntegreerde inbraakvoorkomingsraamwerk ontwikkel word. Met 'geïntegreerd' word bedoel dat voorkomingsmaatreëls afgestem behoort te wees op die hoofelemente van die inbraakproses, naamlik die inbreker, die omgewing, die inwoners en die omstandighede, en dat die implementering van voorkomingsmaatreëls en -inisiatiewe op die makro-, meso- en mikro-vlakke mekaar behoort aan te vul.

Na aanleiding van hierdie studie kan die standpunt gehuldig word dat 'n geïntegreerde benadering om inbrake te ondersoek en te voorkom wat die pogings van individuele huishoudings kombineer met dié van plaaslike gemeenskappe, die polisie en ontwikkelingsagentskappe, die beste resultate sal lewer.

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**Sleutel terme:** *residensiële inbraak, omgewingskriminologie, geografie van misdaad, inbraakpatrone, omgewingsontwerp, voorkoming van residensiële inbraak, misdaadvoorkoming, situasionele misdaadvoorkoming, gemeenskapspolisiëring, geslote woonbuurtes.*

## CHAPTER 1

### GENERAL ORIENTATION OF STUDY

*Crime casts fear into the hearts of South Africans from all walks of life and prevents them from taking their rightful place in the development and growth of the country. It results in the deprivation of the rights and dignity of citizens, and poses a threat to peaceful resolution of differences and rightful participation of all in the democratic process.*

- National Crime Prevention Strategy (Summary)  
(South Africa, 1996:2)

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Residential burglary is a property crime that has the highest occurrence rate of all crimes in South Africa. It may therefore have a significant impact on people's perceptions and feelings of safety. The picture that the media portrays of South Africa, locally and abroad, is that the country is burdened with high crime levels. This poses a real challenge to the safety and security of ordinary citizens, and to tourists visiting the country. Crime in South Africa is seen by both political elites and the media as a threat to the stability of the new democracy, and a deterrent to investment (Shaw, 1997:7). Crime has the potential to derail the transformation process in South Africa and to deepen the already existing divisions within society.

According to Glanz (1995:2) crime is given as the reason, for *inter alia*, the lack of foreign confidence and investment in South Africa, for the great exodus of highly skilled and professional persons to other countries and for the problems related to community development. Media-coverage of the "crime problem" is extensive and the fear of becoming a victim of serious, violent crime has become a reality of everyday life. The fear of crime and the consequences of victimization are two of the gravest problems facing ordinary citizens in South Africa (Glanz, 1994: xiii).

Since 1994 crime prevention has become a key challenge to government in post-apartheid South Africa, and various initiatives have been undertaken to strengthen the law enforcement capabilities of the State, and to encourage the private sector and research institutions to make a contribution towards crime prevention.

Recognizing the need for research on the 'crime problem' in South Africa, the decision was

taken to focus this study on a specific type of crime that has a geographical manifestation and also impacts on the daily lives of many citizens. **Residential burglary<sup>a</sup>** was therefore chosen as the central research theme of this study, for the following reasons:

- Residential burglary has the highest frequency of all crimes in South Africa and the current trend in the number of residential burglaries indicate that this type of property crime will probably remain a serious problem in society for the foreseeable future.
- Residential burglary has a strong geographical association, because every offence can be traced to a specific location and time of occurrence, and involves environmental and social processes of interest to the geographer. It is also believed that the study can contribute not only towards a better understanding of the phenomenon, residential burglary, but also and simultaneously make a contribution to the 'geography of crime', a relatively unknown sub-field of academic endeavour in South Africa.
- Burglary is not only an intrusion of privacy and a way of depriving people of valuable property, it also fosters a climate of fear and anger. Law enforcement agencies on the contrary tend to regard residential burglary as a less serious crime, due to its non-violent nature. In most burglary offences lost property is never recovered, and the protection of property falls primarily within the domain of private security (Brown *et al.*, 1996:443).
- Most of the crime research registered at the National Research Foundation (NRF) since the 1970s was directed towards other types of crime and not residential burglary, creating a much needed opportunity for further research in this area. Only seven studies regarding burglary were registered, of which three were for non-qualification purposes, three for Masters degrees and one D.Phil. study entitled: "Burglary and theft: a criminological investigation of a hundred burglars" by Barnard (1986). One of these studies with the title "The crime of burglary with intent to commit a crime in South African law - a critical analysis" is still work in progress that commenced in 2001. The other two Masters degrees were completed in 1992 and 1997 with the titles "Burglaries in blocks of flats and group housing schemes at Stellenbosch" (Terblanche, 1992), and

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<sup>a</sup>Burglary can be defined as "the unlawful entry of a house or other structure, with the intent to commit a felony" (Beirne & Messerschmidt, 1995:150). In turn, burglary, forms a subcategory of property crime, which can be defined as "the unlawful damage to, or taking of, the property of another, regardless of whether the threat of or actual use of physical violence occurs" (Beirne & Messerschmidt, 1995:144). Other types of property crimes include robbery, larceny, vehicle theft, fencing, arson, and fraud. The literature usually distinguishes between two types of burglary, namely: residential burglary and business burglary, depending on the type of target. In the South African context the term housebreaking is used as synonymous to burglary. Under South African Criminal Law provision (Geldenhuys, 1992:142) "housebreaking is committed by a person who unlawfully and intentionally breaks into a building or similar structure, and enters or penetrates it with part of his body or with an instrument with which he intends to control something on the premises, with the intention to commit a crime on the premises."

“Fear of burglary in the Honeydew police district” (Watt, 1997). Although relevant to this study, none of these studies were undertaken in the subject field of geography.

Residential burglary is only one type of crime that is a major problem in South Africa and should therefore not be viewed in isolation. In the following section a general overview is given of developments on the crime scene after 1994 – the beginning of a new democratic dispensation in South Africa – as a background to the study of residential burglary.

## **1.2 CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA: A GENERAL OVERVIEW**

According to Shaw and Louw (1998:4) transitions to democracy are often accompanied by high levels of crime. They argue that, in South Africa, progressing towards a democratic order has broken down old forms of control – formal and informal, legitimate and illegitimate – without any immediate replacement measures. This situation is further compounded by high levels of economic inequality, the presence of large numbers of firearms (both legal and illegal), and a history of political violence.

### **1.2.1 Trends in crime statistics**

Comparative evidence suggests that crime also increases markedly in periods of political and social transition coupled with instability and violence. According to Shaw (1995:217) this was the case in Eastern Europe during the transition to democracy and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The same phenomenon was experienced in South Africa after the 1994 elections, where the transition to a new democratic order was initially associated with an increase in criminality. Recent statistics from the South African Police Service (SAPS)(South Africa, 1999) however, indicate a stabilising trend, although most of the crime categories remain at a high level.

A comparison of the crime ratios for the 16 most serious crime categories for the period 1994 to 1999, provided by the Crime Information Analysis Centre (CIAC) of the SAPS, is given in Table 1.1. An analysis of the figures pertaining to the crime data shows that in none of the 15 areas did the crime ratios increase or decrease significantly over the six year period. Changes in the crime tendencies remain marginal, confirming that crime has stabilised on relative high levels.

From Table 1.1 it is evident that residential burglary (housebreaking) had the highest occurrence rate compared to the other crimes.

**TABLE 1.1: A COMPARISON OF CRIME RATIOS IN SOUTH AFRICA BETWEEN 1994 AND 1999 (PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION)**

CRIMES	RATIO PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION (1996 CENSUS)					
	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
<b>VIOLENT CRIMES</b>						
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	219,8	202,8	166,7	169,0	209,6	226,3
Attempted murder	70,7	67,2	70,7	68,3	69,8	66,7
Murder	69,5	67,5	63,9	59,6	59,0	55,3
<b>SOCIAL FABRIC CRIMES</b>						
Assault (serious)	544,3	559,8	571,2	568,9	555,6	595,1
Common assault	501,6	519,5	509,0	489,6	473,1	515,3
Rape	109,8	120,3	125,1	126,5	117,0	119,1
<b>PROPERTY RELATED CRIMES</b>						
<b>Housebreaking - residential</b>	<b>590,3</b>	<b>618,2</b>	<b>610,9</b>	<b>604,9</b>	<b>633,3</b>	<b>663,4</b>
Theft - out of/from vehicles	472,7	480,8	446,7	427,5	447,3	447,7
Theft - motor vehicle	270,0	256,0	239,7	244,1	255,2	240,4
Housebreaking - business	230,5	218,8	217,8	214,9	223,4	216,4
Other robbery	83,9	103,6	127,7	127,8	147,4	166,8
Shoplifting	173,6	159,7	154,2	154,7	149,5	153,1
<b>COMMERCIAL CRIME</b>						
All fraud, forgery, mal-appropriations, embezzlements, etc	162,0	154,6	154,1	154,3	147,4	155,1
<b>VIOLENCE AIMED AT PROPERTY</b>						
Malicious damage to property	317,4	325,2	323,0	308,1	302,8	308,7
Arson	29,4	24,7	24,9	23,8	24,0	23,0

Source: *Monthly Bulletin on Reported Crime in South Africa: SAPS (CIAC): 12/99*

The 1995 Nedcor Project Survey (1996:70) found that 18 per cent of all households reported at least one crime during 1995. When evidence of this nature is compared to the statistics of other countries (such as Norway, Austria, France and Australia), South Africa does not stand out as substantially more 'crime-ridden'. However, the difference lies in the incidence of violent crime. South Africa has a "violence index" significantly higher than the international average for countries that provide reasonably reliable data (The Nedcor Project, 1996:70). The crime statistics of the CIAC (1999), confirm that South Africa had one of the highest violent crime rates in the world, especially with regard to murder, rape and robbery.

Cognisance should also be taken of the fact that under-reporting of crime in South Africa, as

in the rest of the world, is so extensive that it may contribute to an incorrect reflection of official reported crime figures. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC, 1997) included a number of questions regarding the under-reporting of different crimes in a representative countrywide survey among adults in February 1997, representing 2 220 South African households. The results of this survey are presented in Table 1.2.

**TABLE 1.2: UNDER-REPORTING OF CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA**

<b>PROPERTY RELATED CRIME</b>	<b>PERCENTAGE UNDER-REPORTING</b>
Property snatched from victim of his/her household	46
Bicycle theft/motorcycle theft	30
Fraud, forgery, embezzlement, etc.	29
Robbery with aggravating circumstances	25
Housebreaking (residential)	21
Theft from or out of vehicles	16
Vehicle theft (excluding motorcycles)	12
<b>VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST ADULTS</b>	
Common assault	40
Rape/attempted rape	37
Murder	22
Serious assault/attempted murder	19
<b>VIOLENT CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN</b>	
Serious assault/attempted murder	41
Rape/attempted rape	30
Common assault	20
Murder	6

*Source: HSRC, 1997*

With regard to property related crimes, under-reporting varied between 12 per cent for vehicle theft, 21 per cent for housebreaking, and 46 per cent for property snatched from households. Property crimes that are usually covered by insurance policies, such as vehicle theft, tend to be less under-reported. As far as crime against adults and children is concerned, under-reporting varied alternatively between 19 per cent for serious assault and 40 per cent for common assault, and for children, it varied between 6 per cent for murder and 41 per cent for serious assault and attempted murder.

According to Shaw and Louw (1998:2), victim surveys conducted in the late 1990s by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, however, suggest that aggregated police statistics indicating general trends and crime patterns, may be more accurate than had previously been assumed.

## 1.2.2 Impact of crime

According to The Nedcor Project's National Crime Survey (1996:73), the estimated cost of crime for the national 1996/7 budget year amounted to a minimum of R31,3 billion (18,02% of the total budget of R173,659 billion). These calculations do not include the cost of injury or loss of life nor the associated trauma suffered by friends and families. The cost of crime to business alone in 1995 was estimated by the The Nedcor Project (1996:73) at R15,8 billion, whilst those against households at R1,7 billion. There is little doubt that the current level of crime and violence in South Africa is draining resources from families, households, business and government, which may have an inhibiting effect on future development initiatives. The high rates of crime also impact negatively on the way in which foreign investors perceive the country as a market for long term investment.

According to a national public attitude survey, administered by the HSRC, the maintenance of law and order was rated, after job creation, the most important problem to be solved in South Africa. Comparable surveys done by the HSRC over several years have shown that only 44 per cent of respondents in 2000 indicated that they felt safe or very safe, compared to more than 70 percent in 1994 (Schönteich, 2001:6). Deteriorating public confidence in the government's ability to solve the crime problem may lead to an upsurge in vigilante action, as demonstrated by People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) in the Western Cape. Adverse perceptions of deteriorating crime may also be a reason why South Africans are leaving the country.

## 1.2.3 Factors contributing to crime in South Africa

Crime is an extremely complex social and economic problem in any society. It is probably more true for South Africa than elsewhere as a result of its unique political history and previous system of Apartheid. South Africa has surmounted the particular risks of instability during the initial stages of radical political transformation exceptionally well. The unfolding of the transformation process with regard to economic and social dimensions is not only complex and multi-dimensional, it is also a prolonged time-consuming process that must be strategically planned and well managed. Crime levels are influenced by a whole range of variables such as the economy, political and social stability and the effectiveness of the criminal justice system as a whole. The extent of poverty and inequality for example is of such a nature that it cannot be rectified overnight. More than 53 per cent of the South African population are considered as living in poverty (Business Futures, 1996:6-54).

According to the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) (South Africa, 1996:13-22) the following factors contribute to crime in South Africa:

- The rapid political transition in South Africa had the unintended consequences of breaking down the existing mechanisms of social control - without immediately replacing them with legitimate and credible alternatives. This weakness has been exacerbated by the historical breakdown of other institutions, such as schools, the family and traditional communities.
- The Government of National Unity inherited the public service, including a racially-based, disproportionate distribution of criminal justice resources, outdated systems and fragmented departments that contributed to a system unable to cope with the demands created by the need to provide services to all people of South Africa.
- The political transition also generated substantial material expectations - many of which were largely beyond the immediate delivery capacity of the new government. This resulted in frustrated expectations. The very high, and often unrealised, expectations associated with transition have contributed to the justification of crime.
- South Africa's history of Apartheid has contributed to a 'culture of violence', which exacerbates the high levels of violence associated with criminal activity in South Africa. Violence in South Africa has come to be regarded as an acceptable means of resolving social, political and even domestic conflicts.
- Historically shaped poverty and under-development provide key contextual factors in understanding increasing crime levels. Although poverty does not directly lead to higher crime levels, together with a range of other socio-political and cultural factors, it can contribute to conditions for an increase in crime and the growth of criminal syndicates and gangs.
- The historic marginalisation of the youth combined with the slow growth in the job market, could also contribute to the creation of a large pool of "at risk" young people.
- While economic growth and development are crucial in addressing the factors which lead to crime, poorly managed development can itself contribute to increased crime rates.
- The absence of services to victims of crime means that the negative impact of crime on an individual, family and community is largely ignored. Not only does this contribute to the incidence of repeated victimisation, but may lead to retributive violence, or the perpetration of other crimes displaced into the social or domestic arena.

- The number of and easy accessibility to fire-arms is a major contributor to violent crime. The fact that a large proportion of the citizens are armed, serves to escalate the levels of violence associated with robbery, rape and car theft.
- Gender inequality, both in terms of popular attitudes and the inadequate service offered by the criminal justice system to women, can contribute to the high levels of violence perpetrated against women.

The NCPS also correctly states that there is no single cause of crime in South Africa. The search for single causes will merely lead to simplistic and therefore ineffective solutions. At the same time, different types of crime have different root causes, and hence require different approaches to prevention.

#### **1.2.4 Problems in the criminal justice system**

Perceptions that crime is a fundamental and growing social problem are compounded by perceptions that the government is simply unable to control crime (HSRC, 1997). According to a national attitude survey administered by the HSRC (1997) to approximately 2 200 respondents, more than 60 per cent of the respondents disapproved of government's handling of crime.

Analysis of conviction figures by Shaw and Louw (1998:22) between 1991 and 1996 suggests that weaknesses in the ability of detectives to investigate crime and of the Department of Justice to prosecute offenders, led to a decline in the conviction rate. Burglary convictions, for example, declined from 37 334 in 1991/2 to 23 256 in 1995/6. The reasons for this decline were attributed to poor police investigations and also to severe staff and resource shortages in the Department of Justice.

Even the Department of Correctional Services finds it difficult to control the overcrowding in prisons that could ultimately contribute to an already existing crime problem. According to *The Star* (1998) the overcrowding, low warder morale, violent gangs, and the escape of dangerous detainees are hallmarks of a prison system which is unable to cope.

Against this background, the new Safety and Security Draft White Paper (*The Star*, 1998) on crime released in May 1998, invites civil society to play a role in resourcing, supporting and even conducting local social and crime prevention programmes. Crime prevention and control can no longer be regarded as the sole responsibility of the police or the criminal justice system as a whole, but should also be the responsibility of every citizen as a potential victim in society. This in effect implies a shift from an offender-orientated approach to a victim-orientated approach.

propagated in the NCPS, have a better chance to succeed if executed in close partnership with local communities and the private sector.

According to research done by Oppler (1998:18), property crimes, with the exception of shoplifting, are difficult to solve, with between 80 and 90 per cent of burglaries and theft out of motor vehicles going undetected. Of the cases which do eventually reach court, a large proportion are withdrawn during proceedings as a result of insufficient evidence. The lack of evidence relates to poor detection by investigating officers, confirming the notion that most detectives, during 1997, did not have specialised training, with only a quarter being previously on a detective course and a mere 3 per cent fully trained (The Star, 1997).

In a study by Coupe and Griffiths (1998), evaluating the effectiveness of police activities and operations in the UK, similar results were found in that few residential burglary cases were solved by primary investigations, and little of the property stolen was recovered. They found that in more than 66 per cent of the incidents, there was not enough evidence available to justify an investigation.

### **1.2.5 Crime prevention initiatives in South Africa**

The following section provides a broad description of various initiatives undertaken since the mid 1990s to improve the crime prevention capabilities in South Africa. The increase in initiatives was a direct response to the rising levels of crime that the country experienced in recent years. Crime prevention approaches, strategies and methods, and how it relates to the South African situation and residential burglary in particular, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. A broad distinction can be drawn between the different levels of crime prevention, namely; government initiatives, initiatives of the business world, private security industry, community and individual initiatives, and the role of research institutions.

#### **1.2.5.1 Government initiatives**


In addition to the normal policing and criminal justice functions, the acceptance of the NCPS in 1996 by Cabinet, for the first time, laid the foundation for properly planned joint action to address specific crimes. A summary of the main objectives are (South Africa, 1996:5):

- The establishment of a comprehensive policy framework which will enable government to address crime in a co-ordinated and focussed manner which draws on the resources of all government agencies, as well as civil society.
- The promotion of a shared understanding and common vision of how South Africans are

From a criminal justice perspective crime deterrence in South Africa is weak and lacks credibility. Analysing the country's poor conviction rate, Glanz (1996:14) warns that improved policing and other crime prevention efforts will be negligible if police and courts do not improve the sentencing rates. The 'funnel effect' as illustrated in Figure 1.1 depicts the poor conviction rate in South Africa.

The alarming situation is that the number of violent offences is steadily increasing while the number of offenders sentenced to imprisonment is decreasing. A crucial question is whether the SAPS and Department of Justice have the human resources and capacity to arrest, prosecute and convict the increasing number of offenders. Current crime prevention efforts at various levels – such as the National Business Initiative, the Nedcor Project or even the NCPS – will not show tangible results in the form of a reduced crime rate if more offenders are not arrested and convicted (Glanz, 1996:14).

**FIGURE 1.1: THE FUNNEL EFFECT OF CRIME CONVICTION IN SOUTH AFRICA**



The 'failure' of police action and the criminal justice system is not surprising since the efforts of the police, the courts and correctional services only have limited impact on the levels of crime as reflected in the crime rates. Glanz (1996:14) is of the opinion that crime prevention can only be achieved through a partnership approach between organs of the state and private initiatives. The facet of proper neighbourhood design and social networks, also

going to address crime. This vision should also inform and stimulate initiatives at provincial and local government level.

- The development of a set of national programmes that focus on various government departments to deliver quality services aimed at solving the problems leading to high crime levels.
- The maximisation of civil society's participation in mobilising and sustaining crime prevention initiatives.
- Creation of a dedicated and integrated crime prevention capacity which can conduct ongoing research and evaluation of departmental and public campaigns as well as facilitating effective crime prevention programmes at provincial and local level.

Since the adoption of the NCPS, one of the main priorities was to re-engineer the criminal justice system to make it an effective deterrent to crime. Whether the NCPS will succeed in its objectives, will depend on how budgetary and managerial constraints, as well as the perception that the criminal justice system itself is near collapse, will be overcome.

The establishment of Community Police Forums (CPFs) is a direct consequence of the community policing approach, which implies a partnership between communities, private organisations and the police to solve safety and security problems at a local level. Government has the objective that every police station should have a CPF. Through the CPFs communities can participate in setting priorities, offering advice on local policing problems and help to ensure police accountability, transparency and effectiveness in the community (South Africa, 1998:3).

#### **1.2.5.2 Initiatives of the corporate/business world**

Business Against Crime (BAC) grew out of a business conference convened by Business South Africa (BSA) and the Council of SA Banks (COSAB) at the World Trade Centre in Johannesburg, in August 1995. The aim of BAC is to empower state agents and to strengthen existing initiatives. In the process the business community could make a valuable contribution towards the combatting and prevention of crime in South Africa, following a partnership approach with government (Fourie & Mhangwana, 1996:6).

BAC in Gauteng, for example, has established task groups dealing with specific areas of need, such as local crime prevention, communication, education, security, crime, criminal justice courts, community opportunity, performance measurement and fundraising (The Star,

1998). Another initiative is to financially support police stations, which offers a formal intervention at a community level, in partnership with the CPFs.

Such an example was a pilot project in Sunnyside, Pretoria, where the crime rate had dropped by 25 per cent after the installation of 10 closed circuit television (CCTV) sets in December 2000. These were erected with the financial assistance of the business community in the area (Beeld, 2001). A further 76 CCTV surveillance cameras were planned for the Pretoria CBD and five other suburban areas by the end of March 2002 (Pretoria News, 2002).

### **1.2.5.3 Private security industry**

In the prevailing climate of rising insecurity, an upsurge of the private security industry is taking place. The industry is a fast-growing reality - expanding at about 30 per cent a year and now far outnumbering the public police force in numbers (Shaw, 1995:219). According to the Security Officers' Interim Board, the controlling and regulatory body of the private security industry, there were 166 000 registered security officers in March 2000, with 80 000 vehicles at their disposal, compared to the SAPS who has approximately 90 000 uniformed police officers, with 28 000 vehicles at their disposal (Schönteich, 2000:16). The private security industry has a annual turnover worth R11 billion (in 1999) and represents services such as security guards for buildings, guard services for domestic property and reaction guard forces for cash-in-transit protection, as well as vehicle security devices, in-house security and access control measures.

The private security industry is profit driven and exclusively targeted at the middle to higher-income citizenry, excluding the poor and lower income groups in society. Furthermore, the same accountability and transparency is not demanded of private security companies as of government institutions. However, during the course of 2002, the Security Officers' Interim Board will be replaced by the Security Regulatory Authority, established under the new Private Industry Regulation Act to regulate the private security industry (Business Day, 2002).

### **1.2.5.4 Community and individual initiatives**

In reaction to increased levels of crime and feelings of unsafety, and bearing in mind the limited capacity of the SAPS to prevent crime, communities and individual households have started making their own arrangements to improve their security and to create a safer environment. The concept of new security villages and enclosed well-established neighbourhoods has gained in popularity. At an individual level there was a significant

growth in the installation of alarm systems connected to armed reaction units (Mail & Guardian, 2001).

### **1.2.5.5 Role of research institutions**

In addition to the crime research capacity situated within state departments such as the SAPS, Justice, and the National Intelligence Agency, numerous academic, private, semi-state institutions, like the HSRC and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), are active in crime research and the publication of crime related journals or reports. These institutions play an invaluable role in the generation of new information, insight and understanding of the crime problem, although they have no executive powers.

The Nedcor Project on Crime, Violence and Investment (1996) was a response to the seriousness of the crime situation in South Africa and in accordance with universally found evidence that governments cannot succeed in crime prevention and control without active co-operation with other agencies (including business) and the community as a whole. The Nedcor Project was based on a combination of extensive research and consultation in the private and state sectors.

Another example is the Criminal Justice Information Centre (CJIC), a joint venture of the ISS and Nedcor, that publishes the Nedcor/ISS Crime Index as a reference source relating to crime issues.

## **1.3 GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIME STUDIES**

Crime is an inherently geographic phenomenon, referring to the scene of the crime as a particular point in space (Shelley, & Clarke, 1994:390). Traditionally, geographers' interest in crime studies focussed primarily on the mapping of crime rates and developing of explanations for observed crime patterns. There was also a focus on ecological relationships and to identify highly criminalized 'hot spots' where police activity could be concentrated (Barr & Pease, 1992:200).

The first models of the 'geography of crime' date back to the early twentieth century when researchers, who developed the concentric-zone model of urban structure, noticed that crime rates also tended to fit concentric patterns. Crime rates tended to be highest in those areas of the city that were associated with physical deterioration and land-use change from residential to commercial (Shelley & Clarke, 1994:390).

According to Clark (1982:15), geographers in the 1970s were extremely active in measuring

and mapping poverty, homelessness, deviance and unemployment, but although spatial analysis could identify some basic ecological relationships, it proved unable to account for urban deprivation and to suggest appropriate remedies. Geographers' involvement in social area analysis and factorial ecology are extensions of the basic ecological approach which dates back to the work of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, between 1916 and 1940, which interpreted intra-urban structures in terms of general theories of social and economic change.

A geographical perspective on crime would best be described within the paradigm of social geography that developed as a distinct division in geography, alongside other divisions such as physical and economic geography. According to Otok (1988:7) it is generally accepted that social geography deals with social phenomena taking place in space. Johnston (1986:4) also reasoned that human geography is a social science, therefore, one that studies particular aspects of society relating to space and place, including the physical environment. Herbert (1988:19) distinguishes three roles of social geography, namely: "descriptive, in the sense that they seek to depict accurately the spatial expressions of urban conditions; explanatory, in that they need to investigate cause and effect relationships, and evaluative, in that they need to recognise the inequities arising from the spatial allocation of scarce resources and to identify those alternative states which might more closely satisfy the criteria of efficiency and/or social justice."

Herbert (1983:85) argues that most empirical work in human geography continues to focus upon pattern, process and response in the local environment as the spatial outcomes of a societal system. Further, that the act of burglary can be regarded as a people-environment interaction when burglars, through the process of cognitive mapping, acquire information about their spatial environment that can assist them in the selection of a suitable target. According to Walmsley and Lewis (1993:18), it is only recently, as part of a growing desire to understand behaviour at the micro-level, that studies of the link between place and behaviour have acquired a more central position within geography. These authors further argue that the renewed interest geographers have in the study of place and behaviour can be attributed to the growing realisation among planners and designers that the creation of the built environment is inextricably tied to behavioural and social processes. Micro-level research is therefore in growing demand among practitioners in the field of planning.

From the long-established literature of criminology, psychology and sociology, it has been possible for geographers to identify and advance a set of approaches in crime studies which basically reflect a multi-disciplinary character. In this regard Herbert (1982:29) argues that the 'geography of crime' can have no separate existence either from criminology or from human geography, relating to the former for evolving theoretical bases and conceptual

positions and for much of its crime-specific research literature, and the latter for basic methodologies to which geography can relate, for example spatial ecology. Studies within the spatial ecology tradition strongly focussed on the identification of high crime and delinquency areas (concentrations of delinquent's residence), which were then attributed to physical, social, economic and demographic features of an area. Delinquency areas were viewed as products of social disorganisation, lack of social cohesion, and differences in social values, norms and attitudes (Dunn, 1980:7).

According to Bartnicki (1988:159), the 'geography of crime', in view of the historical development of spatial crime studies, can be divided into three groups:

- The first period is called the cartographic school in criminology - merely representing spatial crime rate distributions on maps, and lasted from about the 1830s to the 1920s.
- The second period can be divided into two stages. The first dates back to studies of the Chicago School of social ecology of the 1920s and the 1930s, which represents the work of Burgess' ecological model of urban population and its application in the crime studies of Shaw and McKay (1942). The second stage represented the period from the 1950s onward when scientific techniques were used in urban crime spatial differentiation studies. During the period from 1950 to 1960 research in human geography was mainly of a positivist nature and most often linked with model-building and quantitative methods, as was the case in numerous spatial analysis studies (Herbert, 1982:25).
- The third period which commenced in the early 1970s introduced a new, substantially different research trend to spatial crime studies, called environmental criminology. During the 1970s there was a shift away from the positivist approach towards a more 'humanistic' geography that was more focussed on qualitative and subjective facets of human behaviour, for example the interest in cognitive mapping, environmental perception, and values and meanings attached to places (Herbert, 1982:25). It was also during this period that environmental criminology gained prominence, which attracted the interest of social geographers.

The scope of this study falls within the third category, which is closely associated with the 'geography of crime' as conceptualised by Herbert (1982) and 'environmental criminology' as conceptualised by environmental criminologists such as Brantingham and Brantingham (1981). Environmental criminology offers an approach to the study of crime which is less concerned with theories of causation and more focussed on criminal events and places where they occur, the focus is the offence rather than the offender (Herbert, 1987:146).

In the study of burglary the residence of the burglar is not an all-pervasive variable, instead the criminal's search behaviour to locate a suitable target is of greater importance. In this regard Rengert (1980:50) argues that the criminals, in searching for locations for criminal acts, are rationally attempting to approximate a set of criteria which they have established in the planning process. According to Bartnicki (1988:168), the site of burglary should not be treated as a point or an area, but rather as a 'milieu' full of symbols, values and inherent senses, which contain certain cues of features prompting the criminal to consider a given site convenient or inconvenient for an unlawful act.


Herbert (1982:44) is also of the opinion that a concern with the incidence of offences rather than offenders and with crime prevention rather than crime causation, could have distinct advantages. First, broad contexts can still be recognised but active research may focus on narrower and more immediate factors related to criminal activity. Second, these factors involve analyses of the local environments within which offenders, police, and victims interact. Third, the fallibilities of official statistics are reduced to the extent that much more is known about offences than offenders. Fourth, the context of the local environment allows access to the roles of victims and their reactions to crime or fear of it. Lastly, such studies enable a much closer focus upon preventive strategies and on policies which may protect those who live in vulnerable areas.

Herbert (1982:53) formulated a few questions with regard to the 'geography of offences' which could serve as guidelines in future research efforts:

- Can urban environments of particular vulnerability be identified and classified?
- What key elements can contribute to the vulnerability of urban environments to different types of offences?
- What is the balance between physical and social factors in endowing space with levels of vulnerability and how are these related?
- Can the qualities of these areas be characterized in more subjective terms both by their occupants - the potential victims of crime for whom feelings of fear, safety, and security may be uppermost - and by the offenders, whose 'images' of these areas are critical to an understanding of their behaviour?

Figure 1.2 suggests a research framework provided by Herbert (1982:54) for geographers studying offence patterns.

FIGURE 1.2: VARIABLES IN THE OFFENCE ENVIRONMENT AT A MICRO-LEVEL



Since the 1970s the problem of crime and delinquency have become recognised elements for research and teaching in human geography as a social problem and theme, as reflected in the work of social geographers such as Herbert (1987), and Bartnicki (1986). In the South African context the 'geography of crime' still remains a relatively unknown field, although greater emphasis was placed on the need for research of environmental and societal problems in South Africa, since the 1990s. Problems that were mentioned by geographers such as McCarthy and Rogerson (1992:6) include droughts, air and water pollution, the negative environmental conditions endured by the country's shackland dwellers, the need to restructure a more relevant educational curriculum, and the looming threat of an AIDS epidemic.

Although this study adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the investigation of residential burglary, it could also make a unique contribution to the subject geography, especially in the development of an appropriate approach and methodology to investigate residential burglary in the micro-environment. The central focus of this study will be on the burglary event and the geographical or situational context in which it took place, with a secondary interest in the motivational and emotional aspects of the burglars and residents involved.

## 1.4 FORMULATION OF RESEARCH PROBLEM

The degree to which individual residents may feel unsafe, will probably depend on how they perceive their own vulnerability, not only in terms of residential burglary alone, but also of other types of property crime such as armed robbery and hijackings. Residents may not consciously distinguish between the different types of crime that account for their feelings of safety. In reality, however, these crimes have distinct characteristics and may be committed by different kinds of criminals. One common characteristic of burglary, for example, is that it very seldom involves a direct, face-to-face confrontation between the offender and the victim, which is not the case with armed robbery (Beirne & Messerschmidt, 1995:150). The problem to be investigated will be confined to that of residential burglary for the following reasons:

- Residential burglary remains a serious problem in society and will continue to be a problem for as long as people experience poverty and relative deprivation. At an average rate of more than 590 residential burglaries per 100 000 of the population per year, between 1994 and 1999, residential burglary can be regarded as the most common crime in South Africa. People from all spheres of life are exposed to the risk of becoming a victim of residential burglary, the “poor” as well as the “rich”. Residential burglary is not only a violation of privacy, but can also be a factor contributing to heightened levels of fearfulness and anxiety amongst residents.
- The current focus of the SAPS is more on law enforcement than on crime prevention or the protection of individual properties. With limited personnel and resources at their disposal, the SAPS will find it difficult to satisfy the needs and expectations of communities to be protected against burglars and armed robbers. Against this background individual households have become more and more aware of the necessity of self-protection and the initiation of crime prevention actions in their immediate communities. However, these actions are not well planned or pro-active in nature, but rather resemble reactive strategies based on the ‘instinct’ of self-preservation and the building of a fortress society (HSRC 1997). According to Shaw (1995:219) there is evidence that residents of the ‘wealthier’ suburbs may react to crime by seeking to isolate themselves physically from the ‘poor’ who are seen as the perpetrators - this is reflected not only in the use of private security but in the changing architecture of the cities - increasingly characterised by high fenced suburban complexes.
- Most of the existing crime prevention strategies in South Africa are nationally planned and controlled, although the implementation responsibilities are delegated to lower authority levels. This top-down or macro approach is essential for the determination of

priorities and to create a favourable climate for the law enforcement agencies to operate effectively. However, without locally designed crime prevention strategies to supplement the national strategies, it remains doubtful whether they will ever have the desired results. It is in this area of locally designed crime prevention strategies at police station or neighbourhood level, where there is a need for expertise and resources to assist in crime prevention and control initiatives aimed at specific crimes. There is, however, little research available in South Africa to guide this development or to substantiate the theoretical basis on which such initiatives can be built.

- The problem confronted with in this study is to find answers to the question: Why does residential burglary occur in a particular place at a particular time? From the above-mentioned explanation it is evident that there is limited understanding of the situational dynamics and context in which a particular burglary event took place, and consequently a poor scientific basis on which to built appropriate preventative measures. The lack of knowledge and understanding in this regard justifies further research.

#### **1.4.1 Research questions**

Emanating from the research problem, the following research questions were formulated:

- What key elements and factors contribute to the vulnerability of a particular residence?
- What factors play a role in determining the degree/extent of damage that could be experienced during a particular burglary?
- What type of responses could be expected of the residents in reaction to the burglary?
- What type of responses might be expected of the offenders in reaction to the burglary?
- What can ordinary citizens and communities do to minimise the risk of being targeted for burglary?

#### **1.5 AIM OF THE STUDY**

With reference to the research problem and research questions, the aim of this study can be stated as follows:

The aim of the study is to investigate residential burglary in the micro-environment to be able to identify, describe and explain the key elements and factors that play a role in the burglary process, before, during and after the commission of a burglary, and to formulate principles or guidelines that can be applied in the development of burglary prevention measures/initiatives.

## 1.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

To give effect to the stated aim of the study, the following objectives are accepted for the study:

- To provide a theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of residential burglary (*Chapter 2*).
- To construct a conceptual framework (based on the theoretical explanation) with the purpose of conceptualising the residential burglary process (*Chapter 2*).
- To use the conceptual framework to develop appropriate research expectations and methodology to guide and direct the research process (*Chapters 2 and 3*).
- To apply the conceptual framework as a research model to investigate a number of burglary cases in the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area<sup>b</sup>, but also with reference to the broader environment in which residential burglary took place (*Chapters 4 and 5*).
- To formulate principles or guidelines that can be applied in the development of residential burglary prevention measures/initiatives (*Chapter 6*).
- To revise and improve the conceptual framework as an integrated burglary model that can be applied in the study of residential burglary (*Chapter 7*).
- To interpret the value of the integrated burglary model for its ability to analyse and interpret the burglary process, and to give advice on prevention initiatives (*Chapter 7*).

## 1.7 THE SCALE OF THE STUDY

Herbert (1982:53) distinguished between three scales of analysis which he termed: regional, urban, and individual. Under *regional scale* he suggested a variety of observational units, including states, judicial districts, or police force areas. The urban scale is centrally focussed on variations of offence patterns within metropolitan areas and aggregate units of observation that include wards, census tracts, blocks and police patrol districts. At the individual scale, the precise target for an offender, be it a person, a residential dwelling or an alleyway, becomes the unit of observation. According to Herbert (1982:54), the methodology of spatial ecology remains dominant at the regional and urban scales, but that

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<sup>b</sup> After the 2000 local government elections, the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area changed to the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality. For the purpose of this study the term Greater Pretoria metropolitan area has been retained, because the research was undertaken prior to 2000 and has a specific bearing on the geographical boundaries of the former Greater Pretoria metropolitan area.

analysis at the individual scale necessitates new forms of investigation of the situational contexts in which offences occur.

The taxonomy that is preferred in this study is macro-, meso-, and micro-scale analysis, instead of Herbert's taxonomy of regional, urban, and individual scale of analysis. The study of residential burglary can be commissioned at either the macro-, meso-, or micro-level, or a combination thereof, depending on the specific aim and focus of the study. For the purposes of this study, the macro-environment includes, as units of observation, the country as a whole, the provinces and metropolitan/urban/police areas, whilst the meso-environment includes the suburban, neighbourhood, and police station areas, and the micro-environment, the individual plot, site or residence targeted for residential burglary.

According to Bartnicki (1988:168), the 'site' of the crime should not be treated as a point or an area, but as a 'milieu', full of symbols, values and inherent senses, also containing certain cues, or features which may prompt the criminal to consider a given site convenient or inconvenient for an unlawful act. As stated in the aim of this study (par. 1.5), the primary focus is to investigate residential burglary in the micro-environment.

The field research was commissioned at the micro-level in two police station areas of the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area, namely: the Pretoria West, and Garsfontein police station areas. Further detail will be provided in Chapter 3 on the demarcation of the research area, the selection of cases, and the research methodology used in the study.

## 1.8 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY

The subject of residential burglary can be studied through a variety of approaches or a combination thereof, depending on the scale of the study and the specific objectives set out to be achieved. A macro-scale study which focuses on crime patterns and spatial analysis, is best suited to a positivistic and quantitative approach, whilst a micro-scale study with its focus on an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon, will require a more qualitative approach. Social geographers, according to Herbert (1987:158), must be interested not only in the 'where' of social deviance but also in the 'why' it occurred in the first place. With less emphasis on 'spatial analysis' and the positivist-based scientific method, a number of other schools of thought start to emerge in the geographical literature since the mid-1960s and 1970s, which include behaviourist-, humanistic-, structuralist-, realist- and post-modernist approaches (Burt & Barber, 1996:10).

Bearing in mind the micro-scale of this study and the objective to gain in-depth understanding of the burglary process, it was felt that the realist approach would offer the

best philosophical framework to conduct this research. The epistemology<sup>c</sup> of the realist school of thought centres around the position that knowledge is not limited to the content of the mind alone (Griggs, 1998:25). Theoretical abstraction can lead the researcher to approach a real world that exists outside the sense perceptions. The philosophy of realism implies that existence is multi-layered, which can be divided into three ontic<sup>d</sup> classes, namely (Johnston, 1987:197):

- the domain of the empirical, which is concerned solely with experiences, with the world as it is perceived;
- the domain of the actual, which is concerned with events as well as experiences, accepting that an event may be interpreted in different ways by individuals; and
- the domain of the real, which is concerned with structures that are not directly apprehendable, but which contain the mechanisms that lead to the events and their empirical perception.

The main thrust of the ontic direction in this study will fall within the domain of the actual, that is to describe and explain the actual manifestation of a burglary event, taking into account how the event is perceived by different people involved, and the underlying structures that could have caused the event. According to Johnston (1987:224) the realist philosophy argues that “explanations for observed patterns cannot be discovered simply in the analysis of the patterns themselves, but by the development of theories of the underlying processes that generate the conditions within which human agents can create those patterns.”

Framing the aim of this study within a realist approach, is the desire to uncover the mechanisms that drive society and which provide explanations for how people act and how the empirical world is organised (Johnston, 1987:242).

Although other research philosophies and approaches could be relevant to the study of burglary, they were not regarded appropriate for this specific study, for the following reasons:

- The aim of a positivist approach would be to discover common properties, or regularities that would allow the researcher to determine general patterns in the population as a whole (or to draw law-like generalisations) (Burt & Barber, 1996:9). In most cases it

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<sup>c</sup>Epistemology is the theory of knowledge, it provides answers to fundamental questions such as “What can we know?” and “How can we know it?” (Johnston, 1986:5)

<sup>d</sup>Ontology is the theory of existence, or of what can be known (Johnston, 1986:5).

would require extensive research programmes of an empiricist or quantitative nature, e.g. a survey study on residential burglary. The scale of this study does not allow such generalisations. The “scientific method” associated with positivism is one of verifying factual statements or the testing of hypotheses. Gatrell (1983:5) is of the opinion that the positivist approach to spatial analysis neglects human's 'lived-world' of experience and the meaning of having an interactive relationship with the environment in which they live. Further critique on the positivist approach is that it is too mechanistic, not taking full account of all phenomena including human subjectivity, and too deterministic, suggesting human behaviour and activities are predictable (Griggs, 1998:9). In the social sciences such 'regularities' as postulated by the positivist approach, are very unlikely to occur.

- A behaviourist and humanistic approach toward residential burglary would place too much emphasis on people's (whether the offender or the victim) feelings, emotions, perceptions and rational decision-making. Whereas the behaviourists analyse quantitative data, as do positivists, to discover the general laws affecting behaviour and cognition, the humanists are interested in the 'lived world' of human experience, the particular or unique, and the connection between the subjective world and the spaces and places humans create (Griggs, 1998:13-14). Contrary to the positivist approach, the humanistic approach emphasises individuality and subjectivity rather than replicability and truth (Johnston, 1986:5). The central focus of this study is not so much on people's subjective feelings, as on the actual event of residential burglary.
- According to the structuralist approach, the explanation of residential burglary cannot be found in observed phenomena or spatial outcomes, it must be sought in the 'hidden structures' which influence and condition all human actions (Herbert, 1988:25). It is also assumed that the relationships between component parts are more significant than the individual parts themselves. Radicalism, Marxist theory, and realism are closely associated with structuralism. Although relevant to the study of residential burglary, it is difficult to verify theoretical assumptions with regard to 'hidden structures' which underpin the burglary event. The “domain of the real” is in accordance with what is known in structuralism as hidden layers of existence (the 'infrastructure' and the 'deep structure') that cannot be observed, although its existence can be theorised and compared with what is perceivable in the 'superstructure', the level of appearance (Johnston, 1987:195).
- For the post-modernists (Griggs, 1998:22) 'reality' and 'truth' are artificial constructs, they are slow to take position, and everything is acceptable (there is no given state of existence because all phenomena are in flux). Knowledge is constructed by the human

mind and institutionalised through inter-subjective agreement. Whatever is known is relative to the person who knows. Postmodernism rejects empiricist, positivist, and behaviouralist philosophies because no regular laws can predict human behaviour, and there is no such thing as a single reality to measure. As a result of its idealistic and relativist approach, as well as its inability to provide viable policy options, this approach was not regarded as appropriate to study residential burglary.

## 1.9 RESEARCH APPROACH

From a realist perspective, the main focus of the research is on the actual event of burglary, and to build a conceptual framework to analyse and interpret the various environmental and situational factors that were involved in the event. The focus on the micro-environment, and the need for in-depth analysis of the burglary process favours a qualitative approach to the study. For this reason a decision was taken not to use survey questionnaires, but rather a case-study approach.

It is believed that a case-study approach, within the mould of the realist paradigm, will provide a sound and scientific basis from which to conduct this study. It will also enable the researcher to personally observe the locations of burglary, to interview various role-players, and to study the particulars of every case. For Miles and Huberman (1994:18) the case study approach is more than a methodology of collecting data, it also provides the elements in designing a case study, with the understanding that the case study design is a continuous process throughout the study. In this regard the case study approach also provides the research strategy that was followed in this study. The strategy implies:

- building a conceptual framework;
- formulating research questions;
- defining the case: bounding the territory;
- sampling: bounding the collection of data; and
- instruments or methods for data collection and analysis.

The case study as approach and methodology are explained in Chapter 3 in greater detail.

In addition to the case study approach, the following research approaches and principles provided the parameters within which the research was conducted:

- The study was predominantly of a qualitative nature, especially in terms of the methods of data collection, which included personal observations and in-depth interviewing of selected cases and expertise. Although qualitative research is associated with non-

statistical methods of analysis of and reporting, elementary statistical calculations were used in this study. According to Dooley (1990:291), qualitative research is the preferred methodology of scientists who wish to describe everyday life from the point of view of the actors (the phenomenological perspective). The premise underlying this study, was to develop an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of residential burglary and to develop an integrated burglary model in the process (exploratory research), contrary to the testing of prior hypotheses (confirmatory research).

Of relevance to this study was Neuman's (1997:420) viewpoint that "qualitative researchers create new concepts and theory by blending together empirical evidence and abstract concepts. Instead of testing a hypothesis, a qualitative analyst may illustrate or colour in evidence showing that a theory, generalisation, or interpretation is plausible." The data in qualitative research are in the form of words, which are relatively imprecise, diffuse, and context-based (Neuman, 1997:420).

- The researcher made use of both inductive (where general principles or conceptions are developed from specific observations) and deductive reasoning (the drawing of specific expectations from general principles) (Taylor *et al.*, 1990:106). The construction of the conceptual framework was primarily an inductive process, whereas the formulation of the research expectations were deductive. The research process in fact moved back and forth from principles to specific cases and from cases to principles, actually modifying the conceptual framework to take account of cases that did not 'fit' or support the prior principles.
- In accordance with the view of Bailey (1987:24) who distinguishes between basic and applied research, the aim of this study is primarily to make a contribution towards a better understanding of the phenomenon of residential burglary. However, it was anticipated that the study would ultimately contribute to the finding of solutions to the problem of residential burglary (applied research).
- As far as residential burglary was studied in the micro-environment, primary data and authentic information sources were used, whereas the study of macro- and meso-level burglary patterns were based on secondary data and analysis of already existed sources, such as crime statistics from the SAPS, and survey data from other research institutions.

## 1.10 RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design contains the "work plan" or "blueprint" of the study to be undertaken.

and provides a chronologic explanation of the steps or phases to be followed in the research process (Haring *et al.*, 1992). It also provides a framework that assisted the researcher to organise his time and resources.

The research design was developed in such a way that it complied with the aims of the study, namely to explore (to identify important variables and to generate hypotheses for further research), to explain (to identify plausible causal networks shaping the phenomenon), and to describe (to document the phenomenon of interest) (Marshall & Rossman, 1989:78).

For this reason the research design was divided into distinct phases that would provide specific goals to be completed in the progression of the study. Table 1.3 provides a

**TABLE 1.3: RESEARCH DESIGN: RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN SOUTH AFRICA**

PHASE	DESIGN GOALS	CHAPTER
Phase 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Introduction to the research theme, residential burglary</li> <li>■ Background to the crime problem</li> <li>■ Geographical perspective on crime studies</li> <li>■ Formulation of research problem</li> <li>■ Aim of the study</li> <li>■ Objectives of the study</li> <li>■ Scale of study</li> <li>■ Research philosophy and approach</li> </ul>	<b>Chapter 1</b> General orientation of study
Phase 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Literature study on residential burglary</li> <li>■ Reflection on theories and models</li> </ul>	<b>Chapter 2</b> Theoretical explanation of residential burglary
Phase 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Construction of conceptual framework</li> <li>■ Formulation of research expectations</li> </ul>	<b>Chapter 2</b>
Phase 4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ The case study approach</li> <li>■ Demarcation of research area</li> <li>■ Sources of information</li> <li>■ Pilot study</li> <li>■ Compilation of interview guides</li> </ul>	<b>Chapter 3</b> Research strategy and methodology
Phase 5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Selection of cases</li> <li>■ Collection of data (interviews, observations, documents)</li> <li>■ Processing of data</li> <li>■ Criteria for trustworthiness</li> </ul>	<b>Chapter 3</b>
Phase 6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Analysis, interpretation and documentation of residential burglary at the macro- and meso-level.</li> </ul>	<b>Chapter 4</b> Residential burglary at the macro- and meso-level
Phase 7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Analysis, interpretation and documentation of residential burglary at the micro-level:</li> <li>■ Situational conditions</li> <li>■ Burglary event</li> <li>■ Responses</li> </ul>	<b>Chapter 5</b> Cases of residential burglary in the micro-environment
Phase 8	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Overview on crime prevention in South Africa</li> <li>■ Guidelines for the prevention of residential burglary at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels</li> </ul>	<b>Chapter 6</b> Guidelines for the prevention of residential burglary
Phase 9	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Assessment of research objectives</li> <li>■ Reflection on integrated burglary model</li> <li>■ Synthesis, conclusion and recommendations</li> </ul>	<b>Chapter 7</b> Conclusion

summary of the different phases and design goals, as well as an indication of how the contents will culminate in the different chapters.

In Chapter 2 a review of the relevant literature will be integrated to provide a theoretical explanation of the phenomenon residential burglary. It is believed that the research strategy and methodology, as explained in Chapter 3, will provide the researcher with the challenge to make an unique contribution to both disciplines, geography and criminology.

## CHAPTER 2

# THEORETICAL EXPLANATION OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY

*A criminal event is one element in the complex interface between humans and their physical environment.*

- Smith and Patterson (1980:207)

### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

To thoroughly understand the burglary process, three specific objectives were formulated for this study (see par. 1.6.1-1.6.3), namely, to provide a theoretical explanation of residential burglary, to build a conceptual framework explaining the burglary process and to formulate appropriate research expectations.

Chapter 2 provides such a theoretical framework within the paradigm of environmental criminology that can be used to describe and explain the occurrence of residential burglary. Special emphasis is placed on theories, models and other research findings relevant to this study. The latter part of the Chapter contains a critical review of environmental criminology, the construction of a conceptual framework, and the formulation of research expectations.

### 2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY

According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1981:19), environmental criminologists tend to assume that some people are criminally motivated and, instead of focussing their research on the criminal, they begin their research with an analysis of the location of crimes - the when, where and how crimes occur. This is contrary to the 'traditional' approaches where most criminological research focussed on the origins of criminal motivation. In this regard Brantingham and Brantingham (1981:19) cited typical 'traditional' research questions that were asked by well-known criminologists: "Lombroso asked what biological problems motivated individuals to commit crime, while Bonger asked about the economic situations that drove people to crime. Sutherland asked how people learned criminal motivations, while Shaw and McKay asked about the neighbourhood conditions that lead to individual criminal motivation. Merton asked how defects in the social structure produced motivational adaptations that led to crime, while Lemert asked how social labelling changed people's motivations and made them more overtly and consistently criminal."

In practical terms 'environmental criminology' can be regarded as the equivalent of what Herbert (1982) typified as the 'geography of crime'. In this regard the work and research done by geographers and criminologists intertwines to form a multi-disciplinary terrain of shared interest and a common understanding of the phenomenon.

According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1981:18), the environmental approach emphasizes three shifts in criminological research, first, a shift from a disciplinary to a multi-disciplinary approach; second, a shift from concern with offender motives to concern with criminal events; and third, a shift from the sociological to the geographical imagination. By geographical imagination they meant the way in which the offender sees and relates to space and place that surrounded him. Brantingham and Brantingham (1981:21) argue that environmental criminologists "use geographic imagination in concert with the sociological imagination to describe, understand, and control criminal events. Locations of crime, the characteristics of those locations, the movement paths that bring offenders and victims together at those locations, and people's perceptions of crime locations all become substantively important objects for research from this shifted perspective."

According to Smith (1986:82) the rationale underlying environmental criminology gained the support of the British Home Office in the middle 1980s, and provided the main thrust of crime prevention policies in Britain. The reason provided by Smith (1986:82) is that it is easier to alter the distribution of environmental opportunities for crime than it is to influence the complex socio-economic factors motivating offenders.

The shift of emphasis on environmental criminology between the 1960s and 1980s took place mainly as a result of the writings of Jane Jacobs (1961), Newman (1973), Jeffery (1977), Clarke and Mayhew (1980), and Brantingham and Brantingham (1981) who maintained that crime could be prevented more effectively by exercising better control over the physical milieu where the crime was committed. According to Naudé (1988:10) this approach can also be typified as the 'mechanical and physical milieu' approach. This school of thought argues that the opportunities for crime should be prevented in the physical environment, since committing a crime can mainly be attributed to rational decisions rather than being the result of pathological, biophysical, psychological or social factors (Naudé, 1988:11).

The environmental approach to crime control requires measures directed to particular types of crime, taking into account the micro-environment in which they occur. The aim would therefore be to reduce the opportunities for crime as perceived by potential offenders, by introducing, for example, target hardening, target removal, reducing the payoff, and encouraging public surveillance (Smith, 1986:84).


## 2.3 OVERVIEW ON THEORIES, MODELS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS

The theories, models and approaches to be discussed in this section, although coming from different theories, have a common understanding of the importance of 'environmental' and 'situational' circumstances that create opportunities for criminal activity. In order to provide a coherent and meaningful explanation of residential burglary, the different theoretical perspectives were integrated and discussed under the following headings: the burglary process; burglars' motivation; target selection; territorial approach; and residents' activities and lifestyles.

### 2.3.1 The burglary process

The burglary process refers to the causal chain of events, within a specific time and space context, that lead to the commission of a burglary. The causal chain of a criminal event, in this case a residential burglary, can be explained by the causal chain model of Ekblom (1996:47-50), as presented in Figure 2.1. The execution of a burglary reflects the conjunction of: a ready, willing and able offender; a vulnerable, attractive or provocative target; a favourable environment; and the absence of willing, able and credible modulators.

FIGURE 2.1: CAUSAL CHAIN OF A CRIMINAL EVENT



The elements involved in the causal chain of a criminal event, as shown in Figure 2.1, can be explained as follows (Ekblom, 1996:48-50):

- The causes of a criminal event can be remote or 'distal', for example, abuse in childhood may produce a tendency to perpetrate violent assaults in adulthood. Other causes may be the result of structural changes, such as the introduction of electronic banking which create new opportunities for crime.
- The 'proximal' circumstances indicate the presence of a motivated offender in a suitable crime situation immediately before the occurrence of the event - when the diverse structural, social, ecological and psychological causes of the criminal event inevitably converge.
- The 'programmed potential' of the individual refers to past life circumstances which may impact on the likelihood of committing an offence.
- 'Current state' refers to the position of the potential offender at the time, such as being under the influence of alcohol.
- 'Modulators' encompass a range of distinctive factors, such as the possibility of intervention while the offence is being committed (discouraging factor), or circumstances such as leaving a car door unlocked which may make the offence easier to commit.
- The 'environment' describes all those factors relating to the physical context in which an event occurs, such as the visibility or the lack thereof.

### 2.3.2 Burglars' motivation

A study undertaken by Reppetto (1974) on residential burglary in the Boston area (USA), provided valuable information on the motivation of why burglars decide to burgle. According to Reppetto (1974:21) the satisfaction of a perceived need for money appeared to be the prime motive for most burglaries, although offenders did acknowledge that subsidiary satisfactions such as excitement, revenge, curiosity and feelings of group solidarity, also played a role in their decision to burgle.

These results were amplified by another study on burglary by Bennett and Wright (1984), who interviewed 128 convicted burglars on how they came to the decision to commit a burglary during their most recent period of offending. These offenders' responses could be divided into the following six main categories (Bennett & Wright, 1984:31-38):

- Offences were typically triggered by instrumental needs, almost invariably the need for money (46 per cent).

- The influence of other people (46 per cent).
- Opportunities or the incidental discovery of an attractive or vulnerable target (22 per cent). That implies the vast majority of offenders typically had a prior motivation to offend and sought opportunities to commit crime.
- Burglary was part of their lifestyle (20 per cent) - offences were committed frequently or on a regular basis.
- Expressive needs (14 per cent). The minority said that depression, boredom or the desire for excitement precipitated their offences.
- The use of alcohol as an important factor in the decision to commit a burglary (10 per cent).

The research findings of Bennett and Wright (1984) confirm the notion that most offenders are motivated to offend independently of the discovery of a physical opportunity to commit a crime. The original motivation to offend was most frequently stimulated by factors unrelated to the situation of the offence (Bennett & Wright, 1984:40). However, the final decision to offend might be dependent upon situational factors, in terms of finding a suitable target. To the contrary, Wright and Decker (1994) found in a study in St. Louis (USA) that many burglars had a potential target in mind prior to the actual decision to commit a burglary, and in many instances they had prior knowledge of the target, either through personal contact with the victims or information passed on by others.

### **2.3.3 Target selection**

The processes by which criminals recognise potential crime sites, identify opportunities and penetrate a variety of symbolic and physical barriers in order to commit a crime, has attracted a great deal of attention from environmental criminologists. Brantingham and Brantingham (1981:28-29) proposed a model for crime site selection which they described by the following propositions:

- Individuals who are motivated to commit specific offences are present in any society. The sources of motivation are diverse, and different etiological models or theories may appropriately be invoked to explain the motivation of different individuals or groups.
- Given the motivation of an individual to commit an offense, the actual commission of an offence is the end result of a multi-staged decision process which seeks out and

identifies, within the general environment, a target or victim positioned in time and space.

- The environment emits many signals, or cues, about its physical, spatial, cultural, legal, and psychological characteristics. These cues can vary from generalised to detailed.
- An individual who is motivated to commit a crime uses cues, either learned through experience or through social transmission, from the environment to locate and identify targets or victims.
- As experiential knowledge grows, an individual who is motivated to commit a crime learns which individual cues, cluster of cues, and sequences of cues are associated with appropriate victims or targets. These cues, cue clusters, and cue sequences can be considered a template which is used in victim or target selection. Potential victims or targets are compared to the template and are either rejected or accepted depending on the congruence. These processes may be consciously conducted, or may occur in an unconscious, cybernetic fashion so that the individual cannot articulate how they are done.
- Once the template is established, it becomes relatively fixed and influences future search behaviour, thereby becoming self-reinforcing.
- Because of the multiplicity of targets and victims, many potential crime selection templates could be constructed. But because the spatial and temporal distribution of offenders, targets, and victims is not regular, but clustered or patterned, and because human environmental perception has some universal properties, individual templates have similarities which can be identified.


From these propositions it can be concluded that some individuals will have a disposition towards crime (for whatever reason) and will react in a rational way to environmental cues in their search and commission of a specific crime.

Cornish and Clarke (1986:9) made use of the concept 'rational choice theory' to describe and explain the processes involved in the commission of a specific crime. They distinguished between four different decision processes, namely: the offender's initial involvement in crime; the criminal event; the decision either to continue offending, or to desist. Subsequently the processes can be summarised as follows (Cornish & Clark, 1986:9-15):

- Initial involvement.** Cornish and Clarke (1986:10) were of the opinion that the burglar has to make two important decisions in this phase. The first is the individual's recognition of his 'readiness' to commit a burglary offence in order to satisfy certain needs for money, goods or excitement. In reaching this decision, the burglar will have evaluated other ways of satisfying his needs and the decision will naturally be influenced by previous learning experience - moral code, view of the kind of person he is, and the degree to which he can plan and exercise foresight. These variables are in turn related to various historical and contemporaneous background factors, such as psychological, familial and socio-demographic. The second decision, actually to commit a burglary, is precipitated by some chance event, such as an urgent need for cash or the burglar may perceive an easy opportunity for the offence during the course of his routine activities.

Figure 2.2 is a flow diagram that illustrates the decision-making processes during

**FIGURE 2.2: INITIAL INVOLVEMENT MODEL**




the initial stages of a burglary, using the example of residential burglary in a middle class suburb.

- The criminal event.** A further sequence of decision-making follows which leads the burglar to select a particular house, to make an estimate of the likely haul, to make a judgement about whether anyone is likely to be at home, and to assess how easy it would be to effect entry and exit without being seen by neighbours or passers-by.

The final decision to act is shown by the flow diagram (Fig. 2.3), taken from by Cornish and Clarke (1986:11) to illustrate the different decision options the burglar has to consider before the actual commissioning of a burglary.

**FIGURE 2.3: EVENT MODEL**



- Continuance.** The process of continuing involvement in burglary will be the result of generally positive reinforcement and the frequency of offending will increase until it reaches (or subsequently reduces to) some optimum level. This pattern will be influenced by changing conditions and personal circumstances that confirm the offender in his readiness to commit a burglary, for example an increase in professionalism; changes in lifestyle and values, and changes in the offender's network of peers and associates and his relationship to the 'straight' world.

- Desistance.** As a result of aversive experiences during the course of offending, such as being disturbed by a returning householder, being pursued by neighbours and changes in the burglar's personal circumstances (such as age, marital status, financial needs) and the neighbourhood and community context in which he operates (such as changes in policing; depletion of potential targets), the burglar may decide to abandon burglary in favour of some alternative solution, either legitimate or criminal.

According to Cornish and Clarke (1986:15) rational choice theory is capable of providing answers to many questions lying outside the scope of conventional criminology, concerning such matters as temporal and geographical patterns of crime, the isolated offending of otherwise law-abiding people, and changes of course in criminal careers.

Closely related to the rational choice perspective is the reward-risk perspective proposed by Conklin (1995:271), which favours the argument that if the rewards of crime are great and its risks small, and if the rewards from a non-criminal way of life are comparatively small and its risks relatively great, people will choose to violate the law. Potential offenders thus consider the rewards (or benefits) and the risks (or costs) of criminal and non-criminal behaviour before breaking the law. Table 2.1 provides some of these risks and rewards of criminal activity.

**TABLE 2.1: REWARDS AND RISKS OF THEFT**

REWARDS (OR BENEFITS)	RISKS (OR COSTS)
Money earned from crime	Being caught and punished
Freedom from taxation	Loss of benefits from legal work
Excitement of criminal activity	Time to learn criminal skills
Satisfaction in a crime successfully carried out	Costs of equipment to do the crime
Much leisure time	Risk of injury while stealing
Reputation as a successful criminal	Anxiety about punishment
Free room and board if caught and imprisoned	Stigma of being labelled a criminal

Source: Conklin, 1995:272

Repetitive property criminals (Conklin, 1995:275) report that they are motivated to steal by rewards in addition to money, but say that their desire for 'quick, easy money' is the primary reason why they commit crime. Rewards such as excitement, sense of accomplishment, peer respect, vengeance, and control over victims are usually latent by-products of their crimes rather than primary motivational factors. Continued criminal activity may make offenders more expert, thus minimising their chance of being arrested, but with continued success many offenders become overconfident and consequently most criminal careers will eventually be interrupted by arrest (Conklin, 1995:276).

The situational cues mentioned by offenders in a burglary study by Bennett and Wright (1984:153-154) indicated that targets could be grouped into three broad categories, namely: whether they could get away with it ("risk"), whether they could make profit out of it ("reward"), and whether they could do it ("ease"). Over 90 per cent of the statements listed for each offender related to one of these three categories (Bennett & Wright, 1984:62). The following situational cues were mentioned by the offenders:

- Risk factors - cover, presence or proximity of neighbours, occupancy, whether overlooked, passers-by, police patrols, burglar alarms, presence of dogs, distance from the road, escape-routes, and rear access.
- Reward factors - perceived affluence, condition of the property, and whether owned by the council or privately.
- Ease factors - locks, the size of the windows, and design of potential entry-points.

A study by Reppetto (1974:15), who interviewed 97 convicted burglars in the Boston area (USA), showed the following results on target selection:

- Single-family houses were selected most often by burglars over 25 years of age.
- The younger burglars, on the other hand, generally selected housing projects and multi-family homes, and indicated that their choices were dictated much more by the accessibility of the structure than by the probability of substantial gain.
- An overall assessment of the reasons cited by burglars for their selection of particular targets included (Reppetto, 1974):
  - ease of access (chosen by 44 per cent of all burglars),
  - the appearance of affluence (41 per cent),
  - the setting of the target as a guarantee of inconspicuousness (21 per cent),
  - the isolation of the neighbourhood (19 per cent),
  - the absence of police patrols (19 per cent), and
  - the lack of surveillance by other neighbours (12 per cent).

### **2.3.4 Territorial approach**

The conceptual framework of Brown and Altman (1981) was constructed around the concept of territorial behaviour. Altman (Brown & Altman, 1981:58-59) provided a generic definition of territorial behaviour, and stated: "Territorial behaviour is a self boundary-regulation mechanism that involves personalisation of or marking of a place or object and

communication that it is 'owned' by a person or group. Personalisation and ownership are designed to regulate social interaction and to help satisfy various social and physical motives. Defence responses may sometimes occur when territorial boundaries are violated."

Territories are geographical areas that are often marked and personalised, and serve as boundaries that allow selective control over who may see, hear, or participate in an activity (Brown & Altman, 1981:58). Residents for example will try to prevent invaders from crossing territorial lines which they regard as private property. Brown and Altman (1981:59) continue to distinguish three types of territories, namely: primary, secondary and public territories. Primary territories are occupied for long periods and are central to the lives of their owners, for example their homes. Secondary territories are more accessible to a greater range of users, for example the members of a country club, and the limits of occupancy are not solely determined by the users, but by collective owners of secondary territories. Public territories are usually occupied for short times and are typically not very central to the lives of their occupants, for instance, seats on a bus, or tables in a restaurant.

Territories are often personalised, marked, or decorated for the purpose of self-expression. Signs, fences, locks on doors, and other manifest boundary markings are often used in primary territories, along with indicators of personal expressions (Brown & Altman, 1981:61). Usually there is a greater degree of control over accessibility to primary territories, and residents tend to expect respect for their markers, whether it represents actual or symbolic barriers. The owner is free to erect physical barriers, for example walls, or symbolic barriers such as signs, hedges and decorations of various kinds. The invasion or intrusion of territory, especially primary territory, can be regarded as a serious matter for economic, physical, as well as psychological reasons. Therefore, owners of primary territories may assume that any intrusion is more or less intentional, and it is quite legitimate to counter intrusion of primary territories by rather vigorous means, including physical retaliation (Brown & Altman, 1981:62-63).

The conceptual framework of Brown and Altman (1981), explaining the residential burglary process, is built around homes, sites, and blocks of residential communities in relation to the preceding characteristics of territories. Their basic thesis is that neighbourhoods, streets, sites, and houses may communicate different degrees of territoriality. The model emphasises the following elements (Brown & Altman, 1981:64-66):

- The process of residential burglary involves a series of sequential decision-making judgements by the burglar about the probable success he may encounter in crossing a series of boundaries surrounding any residence. At any point in the sequence, a

judgement of potential success will increase the probability of consummating the burglary, and a 'no success' judgement at any point increases the probability of aborting the burglary.

- The decision sequence involves successive judgements about a particular street, a particular house site or lot, or a residence itself. The model assumes, in the ideal case, that a potential intruder makes three decisions about the probable success of boundary crossings. First, the burglar makes a decision about successfully traversing the boundary represented by a street, then judges the likely success of traversing the boundary represented by a home site or lot, and finally determines the likelihood of successfully crossing the boundary of the home itself.
- The model does not necessarily assume that a burglar makes a judgement about the potential success of crossing boundaries one at a time. It is quite likely that assessing a house, involves simultaneous assessments about the neighbourhood, street and site. In addition, it is likely that the process of exiting from a house, across a site or lot, out of a block or neighbourhood is also included as part of the total process.
- The model also assumes that the judgement made by a potential burglar relates to the openness/closeness or degree of accessibility of the street, site, and home.

According to Vito and Holmes (1994:151) the permeability of a neighbourhood, referring to the number of access streets from main traffic arteries into a neighbourhood, will also have an influence on burglary rates. They argued that permeable neighbourhoods are more attractive to burglars, *inter alia* because they provide a better opportunity for escape.

Brown and Altman (1981:67-71) provided a classification of environmental cues (see Table 2.2) that are associated with different boundaries, and which are employed by potential burglars to assess the openness or accessibility of various boundaries before taking the decision to commit the offence.

Based on this taxonomy (Table 2.2), Brown and Altman (1981) provided the following explanations of the five clusters of environmental cues:

- **Actual barriers**, which include physical qualities that impede access to and exit from a site, for example locks, gates, fences, walls, electronic security and other environmental barriers designed to keep intruders physically out of an area.
- **Symbolic barriers**, which are physical variables that do not restrain access directly, but serve to communicate territoriality, ownership and occupancy, for example

decorative mailboxes or doors, which portray a specific character of design.

- Detectability**, deals with the degree to which residents of an area can detect or sense invaders and how well potential intruders can detect territorial users and related neighbours. These include *inter alia* physical design variables such as the positioning of house doors and windows relative to other houses and relative to the position of potential intruders of the street.

**TABLE 2.2: ENVIRONMENTAL CUES ASSOCIATED WITH STREETS, SITES, AND HOUSES**

	BOUNDARIES		
CLUSTERS	STREET	SITE	HOUSE
<b>Actual barriers</b>	Locked gates, fences, guards	Locked gates, fences, guards	Locks, gates Alarm system
<b>Symbolic barriers</b>	Welcome signs,  Distinctive cultivation for streets	Distinctive personalising items in yard - signs  Marking of entry-way from the public street - paths	Signs of neighbourhood watch  Material of house
<b>Detectability</b>	Distance: street to house Window/door positions relative to street  Lighting Weather	Shrubs, trees, walls, fences  Blinds or curtains  Squeaky gate, dogs barking	Window placement:  - to see returning occupants  - visibility by neighbours
<b>Traces</b>	Cars parked on street Mail/newspapers in box/on street	Lawn mower, rake, children's toys  Working sprinklers Appropriateness of lighting  Uncollected deliveries Ringing telephone	Hearing TVs, radios, voices, telephones  Lights Cooking odours
<b>Social climate</b>	Reaction by people: staring, questioning, ignoring, looking	Reaction by people: staring, questioning, ignoring, looking	Reaction by people: staring, questioning, ignoring, looking

Source: Brown & Altman, 1981:69

- Traces**, refer to actual or implied presence of occupants, which is communicated by clues such as the presence of parked cars, mail that has not been pick up, or the accumulation of newspapers.

- **Social climate**, refers to the extent to which people exhibit shared concern for an area and what type of behaviour is permitted by strangers. A positive, shared social climate for example, includes visible interaction between residents, as well as active defence responses to strangers on the street or in the vicinity of a home.

Brown and Altman (1981:74) are of the opinion that their model would apply more accurately to experienced, professionally motivated burglars interested in profit rather than to a variety of secondary motives, such as a desire for excitement, peer group approval, or status needs. They argue that the higher the potential payoff value (the profit motive), the greater the likelihood that a burglar will proceed through the total decision-making sequence.

### 2.3.5 Residents' activities and lifestyles

The lifestyle approach and the routine activities approach were developed distinctly in the 1970s - the former by the criminologists Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo, and the latter by Cohen and Felson (Sheley, 1995:176-177). Although these two approaches were developed separately, they are virtually the same, and have been merged in the work of most researchers and theorists. For both, the explanation for increased crime rates in the USA, since World War II, were to be found in the nature of everyday life and the changes that had occurred in the lifestyles of citizens. Both lifestyle and routine activity theories suggest that the occurrence of crime is a consequence of the fact that people, sometimes willingly and sometimes unwillingly and unknowingly, engage in risky behaviour that exposes them to the potential of being victimised.

The lifestyle theory postulates that certain lifestyles either require or tend to lead to increased movement of people and associated goods across time and space, thereby exposing individuals to more human contact in general and to more contact with potential offenders in particular. According to Sheley (1995:176), certain changes in the daily life and routine activities of people create favourable conditions for increased crime opportunity, for example:

- more couples work outside the home;
- more people are living by themselves in independent households;
- the proliferation of outside-the-home recreational activities; and
- the extension of shopping hours into the night.

A study conducted by Rengert and Wasilchik (1985:45) of burglars' activities in Philadelphia (USA) had found that burglars were most likely to be active when suburban homes were unoccupied. The burglars would watch their victims' movements to determine what periods

the homes were unoccupied.

According to the lifestyle and routine activities approaches, the likelihood of a crime occurring will depend on the interplay between the following three variables (Brown *et al.*, 1996:273):

- motivated offenders;
- suitable targets; and
- the absence of capable guardians.

The absence of one of these variables would reduce the probability of victimization. Guardianship refers to how well the potential target is protected, for example neighbours looking after the home when residents are not there, the use of locks and other security devices, or merely the presence of someone in the household. Another aspect of importance is proximity, implying the physical distance between areas where potential targets of crime reside and areas where relatively large populations of potential offenders are found (Sheley, 1995:196).

## 2.4 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME PREVENTION

The interest in environmental crime prevention in this section is primarily to identify the principles or premises on which these approaches are founded. The elements of importance can be best described by the definition of situational crime prevention, as being “the protection of the potential crime target, the reduction of vulnerability, the placing of obstacles in the path of potential offenders and the influencing of behaviour patterns so as to prevent the development of criminogenic situations” (Naudé, 1988:12). Consequently, special attention will be given to the three approaches known as, first, Defensible Space, second, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and third, Situational Crime Prevention.

### 2.4.1 Defensible space

Oscar Newman's (1973) theory of Defensible Space proposes four elements of physical design which act individually or in combination to contribute to the creation of secure environments, namely: territoriality, natural surveillance, image and milieu. The following comments clarify these terms:

- **Territoriality** refers to the tendency that people perceive certain areas as their own space, which can and should be defended. Proper design can establish real and

symbolic barriers and demarcation lines that foster this sense of territoriality (Murray, 1995:351).

- **Natural surveillance** implies the designing and the use of space to increase the probability that an offender will be seen, thereby aiding law enforcement and deterring criminals (Murray, 1995:351).
- **Image and milieu** refer to the use of building forms (architecture) and idioms to avoid the stigma of public housing associated with criminal elements, and the location of residential projects in areas of the city considered to be safe (Poyner, 1983:8).

## 2.4.2 Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED)

CPTED can be defined as the implementation of measures to reduce the causes of, and the opportunities for, criminal events, and to address the fear of crime through the application of sound design and management principles to built environments (Napier *et al.*, 1998:40). An important aspect of CPTED is that it addresses not only the opportunity for crime but also perceptions of fear on the part of those who may become victims of crime.

Newman's ideas had a significant influence on crime prevention programmes and research supported by the United States Government through the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice in the late 1970s (Poyner, 1983:10). The strategies and tactics that were used in these CPTED - projects can be summarised under the following headings (Poyner, 1983:10-11):

- **Surveillance.** Suggested tactics include improved lighting, the removal of blind spots in movement areas, the use of windows or electronic surveillance devices, locating vulnerable areas near busy places and introducing supervisory personnel, police or security guards or a blockwatch.
- **Movement control.** Specific tactics include reducing the number of entrances, allowing keyed access to zones within a building, street closure, controlled access to neighbourhoods, and management of facilities to reduce congestion.
- **Activity support.** Methods to increase human use of areas include creating activity areas, providing information kiosks, display areas, portable theatres for street activity, clustering commercial establishments with similar operating hours, and diversifying land use.
- **Motivational reinforcement.** This implies the desire of people to engage in crime prevention activity. The tactics suggested include the encouragement of personalised

environments, better maintained public areas, co-operation between businesses, community development programmes, improved police/community relations, and the involvement of citizens in setting police priorities.

In the South Africa context, the NCPS attached special significance to environmental design as an important pillar of crime prevention that should receive attention, although limited information was provided on what it actually entails. Despite the central position given to this concept in the NCPS, the debate around this phenomenon in South Africa has only started in recent years through joint research initiatives of the CSIR and the Institute for ISS (Napier *et al.*, 1998).

In a comparative study on the history of crime prevention through environmental design, Meyer and Qhobela (1998) provided a literature overview on the development of CPTED in various countries, for example, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Netherlands. In all of these countries CPTED is accepted as an inherent part of their crime prevention strategies. The Delft University of Technology (Netherlands) for example, in the early 90s compiled a checklist consisting of criteria (the 'Delft Checklist' - see Table 2.3) which could be applied in the development and assessment of designs in the Netherlands (Meyer & Qhobela, 1998:10).

### 2.4.3 Situational crime prevention

According to Bennett (1986:41) the situational approach is based on the following general key assumptions:

- Offenders freely and actively choose to commit crimes. The approach rejects the positivist view that offenders are in some way predisposed to commit crimes as a result of genetic, social or psychological factors operating in their past. Possible influence of a person's past history on the decision to offend, is not totally ruled out, but its causal significance is seen as conditional upon immediate situational variables and present life circumstances.
- The decision to offend is made in response to the immediate circumstances and the immediate situation in which an offence is contemplated.
- The motivation to offend is not constant nor beyond control. The motivation to offend is seen as dependent on the calculation of costs and rewards rather than the result of
-

inheriting or acquiring a disposition to offend. If the motivation to offend was uncontrollable, then crimes prevented would merely be displaced.

**TABLE 2.3: CRITERIA FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSESSMENT OF DESIGNS IN THE NETHERLANDS**

<b>CRITERIA</b>	<b>INDICATORS</b>  - <b>Negative impact</b> + <b>Positive impact</b>
<b>Presence of potential offenders</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Concentration of problem groups in vulnerable places</li> <li>- Presence of undesirable elements, such as drug addicts and vagrants</li> <li>- Concentration of households with youngsters up to 25 years</li> </ul>
<b>Presence of protective eyes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Actual presence of people, depending on the distance of houses and facilities, the degree of functional heterogeneity and the type of routes</li> <li>+ Tangible presence of people, depending on the extent of visual contact between buildings and public space, as well as the vacancy rate</li> <li>+ Formal supervision (police patrol)</li> <li>+ Semi-formal supervision (supervisors, concierges)</li> </ul>
<b>Visibility</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Sufficient lighting both in daytime and at night</li> <li>+ Uninterrupted lines of sight from buildings to extensively used spaces, and vice versa</li> </ul>
<b>Involvement and responsibility</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Acquaintance with fellow residents, depending on the scale of the buildings</li> <li>+ Private area</li> <li>+ Sense of belonging</li> <li>+ Clarity on responsibilities</li> <li>+ User participation in planning, design and management</li> <li>- High frequency of house removals</li> </ul>
<b>Attractiveness of environment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Congruency between user preferences and characteristics of the built environment</li> <li>+ Human scale</li> <li>+ Lively atmosphere</li> <li>+ Attractive colors and materials</li> <li>+ Adequate lighting</li> <li>- Deterioration filthiness</li> <li>- Nuisance (smell, noise)</li> </ul>
<b>Accessibility and escape routes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Clear distinction between public and private spaces</li> <li>+ Closing-off of private and semi-public spaces such as entrance halls and walkways</li> <li>+ Security devices such as quality locks or alarms</li> <li>+ Escape routes for potential victims</li> <li>- Large number of easily accessible entrances</li> <li>- Escape routes for trespassers</li> </ul>
<b>Attractiveness of a potential target</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Presence of money and/or valuables in homes, shops, offices</li> <li>- Concentration of targets</li> </ul>
<b>Physical vulnerability of a potential target</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+ Awareness/defensive attitude of a potential target (target hardening)</li> <li>+ Physical protection of a target against theft/burglary by means of a safe-deposit (money), solid locks, or warning devices</li> <li>- Places frequented by women or elderly people passing alone</li> </ul>

Source: cited in Meyer & Qhobela, 1998:11

These assumptions show that the situational approach is interwoven with perspectives of theories relating to rational choice, routine activities and lifestyle.

According to Lab (1997:153) situational crime prevention can be characterised as comprising measures directed at highly specific forms of crime. The management, design or manipulation of the immediate environment, is set to reduce the opportunities for crime and increase the risks as perceived by a wide range of offenders. These solutions may involve physical design changes, altering social behaviours, improving surveillance, and many other measures that can be applied to protect a potential target (Lab, 1997:22).

Another description of situational crime prevention is provided by Bennett and Wright (1984:19), referring to “any environmental, community or individual based method which aims to increase the risk, decrease the reward or increase the difficulty of committing crime.” This definition emphasises the importance of both physical and social changes or measures to reduce crime. Bennett and Wright (1984:21-29) draw a distinction between three levels of situational measures, namely:

- **Individual-based initiatives.** Measures that individual households can take to make their homes more secure include for example property-marking, fitting locks, fitting burglar alarms, strengthening doors, installing cameras and even employing armed guards to patrol the property.
- **Community-based initiatives.** Initiatives like ‘neighbourhood watch’ and ‘citizen patrol’ aim to increase citizens’ awareness of crime and to encourage surveillance and reporting of suspicious incidents and people to the police.
- **Environmental design.** Initiatives in this category aim to prevent crime by altering the physical environment in which it occurs, for example improving street lighting, controlling access to buildings, restricting pedestrian and traffic flow and dividing open spaces into identifiable areas.

In one of the earliest presentations on situational prevention, Clarke (1983), provided his initial typology on situational techniques, based on the principles of surveillance, target hardening and environmental management. This classification of situational techniques was expanded in 1992, which offered three very general orientations to prevention approaches associated with “increasing the effort”, “increasing the risk” and “reducing the rewards”. This typology was again expanded in 1997 by Clarke and Homel (cited in Lab, 1997:158) to include a fourth dimension of “guilt, shame and embarrassment”, which may arise as a result of participating in deviant activity (see Table 2.4). Table 2.4 provides the expanded list of 16

situational prevention techniques, ranging from target hardening to facilitating compliance. This expanded typology shifts situational prevention away from the original emphasis on physical changes towards a greater reliance on psychological and social factors (Lab, 1997:158). It also makes provision for both actual changes in the four dimensions or altering perceptions on the offender's side. It is possible, therefore, that a situational technique has little physical impact, but a major psychological impact, on the offender (Lab, 1997:160). Fences, for example, are a common form of potential access control, although most fences have little impact on the physical effort to commit an offence.

**TABLE 2.4: TECHNIQUES OF SITUATIONAL PREVENTION**

INCREASING PER-CEIVED EFFORT	INCREASING PER-CEIVED RISKS	REDUCING ANTI-CIPATED REWARDS	INDUCING GUILT OR SHAME
<b>Target hardening:</b> - Slug rejector device - Steering locks - Bandit screens	<b>Entry/exit screening:</b> - Automatic ticket gates - Baggage screening - Merchandise tags	<b>Target removal:</b> - Removable car radio - Women's refuges - Phone card	<b>Rule setting:</b> - Harassment codes - Customs declaration - Hotel registrations
<b>Access control:</b> - Parking lot barriers - Fenced yards - Entry phones	<b>Formal surveillance:</b> - Burglar alarms - Speed cameras - Security guards	<b>Identifying property:</b> - Property marking - Vehicle licensing - Cattle branding	<b>Strengthening moral condemnation:</b> - "Shoplifting is stealing" - Roadside speedometers - "Idiots drink and drive"
<b>Deflecting offenders:</b> - Bus stop placement - Tavern location - Street closures	<b>Surveillance by employees:</b> - Pay phone location - Parking attendants - CCTV systems	<b>Reducing temptation:</b> - Gender-neutral phone lists - Off-street parking	<b>Controlling disinhibitors:</b> - Drinking age laws - Ignition interlock - Server intervention
<b>Controlling facilitators:</b> - Credit card photo - Caller ID - Gun controls	<b>Natural surveillance:</b> - Defensible space - Street lighting - Cab driver ID	<b>Denying benefits:</b> - Ink merchandise tags - PIN for car radios - Graffiti cleaning	<b>Facilitating compliance:</b> - Improved library checkout - Public lavatories - Trash bins

Source: Clarke and Homel, cited in Lab, 1997:159

According to Lab (1997:160) one of the most beneficial aspects of Clarke and Homel's classification is that it places the great array of situational crime prevention activities, and programmes that have been, and are still being used, in a theoretical framework. Lab (1997:160) continues to reason that many specific interventions, such as the installation of

locks and lights, take place with little understanding of the underlying rationale for why they should work. While there are implicit theoretical arguments in many of the programmes, understanding why a programme does or does not work requires more explicit recognition of the mechanisms at work.

#### 2.4.4 Research findings with regard to environmental crime prevention

On the question what would prevent them from burglarising a particular residence, the offenders in the Reppetto-study (1974) mentioned the following:

- full-time occupancy of residence (67 per cent),
- evidence of alarms (36 per cent),
- surveillance by neighbours (23 per cent),
- the presence of a dog (22 per cent),
- police and security patrols (14 per cent),
- good lighting in the area (9 per cent),
- steel doors and frames (5 per cent), and
- strong locks (5 per cent).

Reppetto (1974:49) mentioned that the effectiveness of lighting and police patrols on residential burglaries seemed doubtful from the fact that residential burglaries are, by definition, low-visibility crimes; they take place off the street and generally out of view of police or passers-by, and most often they occur in daytime, which renders the lighting issue irrelevant.

In the Bennett and Wright-study (1984:87), the offenders' reasons for refraining from offending were in most cases vague and in general terms, such as "the feeling was not right", rather than to mention specific cues. However, the following adverse situational factors were described by offenders as reasons for refraining from at least one offence during their last period of offending:

- signs of occupancy,
- presence of neighbours,
- people passing or watching,
- police presence and security guards,
- alarms, and
- dogs.

Vito and Holmes (1994:151) are also of the opinion that burglars will most likely be active

when suburban homes are unoccupied. They argue that offenders' choice of targets is guided by observations of their victims' movements to and from work and play.

According to Bennett (1986:52) a great deal of the accumulated research evidence supports the conclusion that the key situational cues used by burglars relate to surveillability and signs of occupancy. Bennett (1986:52) concluded that burglars rarely mentioned social cohesion, police response times, area access, citizen or police patrols, pedestrian movements or traffic flow as important factors in their decision-making. With regard to the differential distribution of residential burglary rates among residential areas, Reppetto (1974:52) considered the most critical factors as: "the location of the neighbourhood; the affluence of the residents, and the vulnerability of the dwelling (measured by its physical accessibility and protection, occupancy, visibility, and the social cohesion of the neighbourhood)." The proximity of a neighbourhood to a large low-income youth population area may also account for higher crime rates in that specific neighbourhood (Reppetto, 1974:53).

## 2.5 CRITICAL REVIEW ON ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACH

Notwithstanding the merits of the environmental and situational approaches in reducing crime, a number of concerns with regard to these approaches could be found in the literature:

- The environmental approach provides no or little insight in the "root causes" of crime, such as poor education, unemployment, and discrimination (Lab, 1997:162). It therefore fails to explain the causation factors leading to criminality.
- Heal (1992:260) noted that environmental determinism (that is the influence of environmental opportunities on crime) may be a necessary condition for crime to occur but is not of itself a sufficient condition. He stated for example, the difference between those who see an open window as a passport to crime, and those who view the same window as an aid to ventilation.
- The focus on situational prevention also fails to explicitly address the issue of fear of crime, mainly focussing on the perceptions of potential offenders (Lab, 1997: 162).
- For some of the assumptions made in environmental criminology there is little or no research evidence to verify it. An example is Newman's assumption that physical design will engender a sense of community, social support and territoriality. This orientation towards physical design elements may isolate residents into individual

fortresses, causing increasing crime levels. Lab (1997:44) argues: "As the individual withdraws from the rest of the neighbourhood in an attempt to protect himself, the community enters an upward spiral of increased crime, fear, and loss of community."

- With regard to rational choice theory, Wright and Decker (1994) argue that burglars are not totally rational, they rather respond to various factors with little thought, and are faced with limited choices. According to Bohman (1992:225), rational choice theory remains an incomplete theory of social action and that it can remain vital only by incorporating other theories at different levels of explanation.
- According to Wright and Decker (1994) rational choice theory provides too little explanation to the subjective influences of emotions such as anger, desperation, or defiance, as contrasted to logical thinking on the offender's decision-making process. The moods experienced by criminals can also distort the criminal's thinking and make them unconcerned about risks (Brown *et al.*, 1996:444).
- Bennett and Wright (1984:17) are of the opinion that, despite the interest in the situational perspective during the 1980s, it remained largely undeveloped. Since then little additional understanding was added to the already existing literature on situational crime prevention. There is, for example, still ambiguity around the factors operating in the immediate situation that will influence the decision to offend. Trasler (1986:22) argues that a large proportion of crimes such as burglary and robbery are committed by a comparatively small group of persistent offenders who typically show a high rate of offending, a low risk of apprehension, and relatively little specialisation. He considers it a mistake to view situational crime prevention schemes as alternatives to dispositional, incapacitative methods (Trasler, 1986:23).
- Bennett (1986:48) makes a distinction between the initial decision and the final decision to offend. In the case of the initial decision, the motivation to offend, is seldom influenced by physical situational factors, although it is frequently influenced by social, cultural and economic factors. The final decision to commit an offence against a particular target, however, is likely to be influenced by physical situational factors. According to Bennett (1986:51) a major disadvantage of aiming to prevent crimes after the offender has decided to commit an offence is that the motivation might not be controlled and offences prevented might be displaced. Research done by Bennett (1986:49) indicates that about 40 per cent of the sample said that if they were put-off an offence, they would usually commit another offence during the same day and about another 40 per cent said that they would not attempt another offence that day. Possible crime displacement, instead of crime prevention, is a general critique against the

implementation of situational prevention initiatives. Crime displacement can take different forms as described by Lab (1997:75) in Table 2.5.

Most of the abovementioned criticism is aimed at environmental and situational crime prevention projects seen in isolation from other crime prevention strategies. Situational crime prevention is no longer regarded as the only way to address crime at the neighbourhood level, rather it constitutes an important part of an integrated approach which focuses on both the physical and the social environments (Meyer & Qhobela, 1998:20).

**TABLE 2.5: FORMS OF CRIME DISPLACEMENT**

DISPLACEMENT TYPE	DESCRIPTION	EXAMPLE
<b>Territorial -</b>	Movement of crime from one area to another.	A neighbourhood watch program is started and the burglars move to another neighbourhood.
<b>Temporal -</b>	A shift in offending from one time to a different time.	A citizen patrol is instituted at night, prompting burglars to work during the morning hours.
<b>Tactical -</b>	Changing the methods used in the commission of a crime.	The installation of deadbolt locks on doors result in burglars forcing open windows to gain entry.
<b>Target -</b>	Choosing a different victim within the same area.	A neighbourhood watch program is started but only one-half of the homes participate, thereby leading offenders to target non-participating homes.
<b>Functional -</b>	The offender stops committing one offence and shifts to another.	When burglary becomes more difficult due to target hardening devices, the offender decides to commit robbery instead.
<b>Perpetrator -</b>	One offender ceases activity only to be replaced by another offender.	While crime prevention actions cause an individual to desist from further offending, another individual sees opportunities and begins offending.

Source: Lab, 1997:75


## 2.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

According to Taylor *et al.* (1990:130), conceptual frameworks provide 'intellectual maps' for social assessments, and help to identify the boundaries for social analysis, assist in the identification of key variables and provide direction to the whole process.

The conceptual framework (as illustrated in Fig. 2.4), was developed in accordance to the

research questions and objectives of this study (see par. 1.4 and 1.6). It provides an integrated understanding of the theoretical perspectives, as well as insights of the researcher, gained through personal experiences, observations, and interaction with victims of burglary.

FIGURE 2.4: ILLUSTRATION OF THE BURGLARY PROCESS



A distinction should be made between the conceptual framework and the objective to develop a more comprehensive and integrated burglary model through the course of the research process. The primary aim of the conceptual framework was thus: to provide a structured and systematic description of the components and elements involved in the

burglary process, and to formulate research expectations that could guide and direct the research process.

The conceptual framework in itself does not provide a comprehensive understanding of the variables involved in the burglary process, this value-adding process would follow on the field research and analysis of search data. For this reason, the factors and variables identified in the conceptual framework, were postulated as research expectations around which the research and fieldwork could be undertaken.

The final product of this research was to construct an integrated burglary model that could be used to describe and explain the occurrence of a burglary event, to identify and analyse the risk factors that contribute to the vulnerability of a potential target, and to formulate guidelines that can be applied in the development of burglary prevention plans and strategies.

### **2.6.1 Terms of reference of the conceptual framework**

The following principles were adhered to in the designing of the conceptual framework:

- The design of the conceptual framework is based on the principles of the realist approach in terms of what can be observed and experienced (the actual domain), acknowledging that underlying causes, influences and structures (the real domain) may have an impact on the course of the burglary event. According to “transcendental realists” (Huberman & Miles, 1994:429) social phenomena exist not only in the mind, but in the objective world as well, and that there are some lawful, reasonably stable relationships to be found amongst them. Thus “transcendental realism” calls both for causal explanation and for the evidence to show that each entity or event is an instance of that explanation. Huberman and Miles (1994:429) therefore also emphasised the need for giving a descriptive account of each particular configuration of an event.

The researcher took as point of departure the research questions as formulated in Chapter 1 (par. 1.4), namely: What key elements and factors can contribute to the vulnerability of a particular residence? What factors can play a role in determining the extent of financial loss that can be experienced during a particular burglary? What type of responses can be expected of the residents, as well as the offenders, in reaction to the burglary?

The burglary event should be understood and explained in its spatial context. The event is a culmination in time and space of the interaction between the burglar, the victim

(resident), and a suitable target (residence). The primary focus in the conceptual framework is to explain residential burglary in the micro-environment, with reference to the meso- and macro-environments.

- In the conceptual framework the burglary event is described and explained as a process. The actual commission of a burglary is only a short period in the burglary process which consists of a sequence of decisions and actions before, during and after the occurrence of the burglary event. A distinction is made between three time sequences, namely the situational conditions that persisted prior to the burglary event, the burglary event itself, and what responses resulted from the burglary event. The central focus is primarily on the residence, as potential target, with secondary emphasis on the roles of the burglar and the residents (the burglary victims).
- The principles of 'systems thinking' are applied to integrate the different components and interrelated factors into a unified, systematic and meaningful whole, in order to seek an optimal explanation of the burglary process. The burglary process as presented in the flow diagram (see Fig. 2.4), should be seen as an abstraction and limited version of reality, rather than reality itself. The intention was not to make a contribution towards the development of 'systems theory', but rather to use systems thinking terminology in the conceptualisation of an appropriate framework to describe and explain the burglary process.
- The conceptual framework is built on three forms of explanation, namely: causal, structural and interpretive explanation. According to Neuman (1997:49-55), causal explanation implies that there is a cause-effect relationship between factors, which occur in a patterned way or appear to act together. The relationships between the factors or variables and the outcome of the event can be positive or negative. In structural explanation the burglary event can be regarded as only a part or a link in a much larger pattern or system. The argument is that a behaviour will occur when certain patterns or interactions take place, when aspects of social relations overlap in time and space, or when relationships follow a developmental sequence. With interpretive explanation on the other hand, the purpose is to foster understanding, that is, to place an event in a specific social context.

The conceptual framework should serve as a broad theoretical framework against which specific research expectations could be formulated. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (1981:40) the conceptual framework can be regarded as too imprecise to permit the systematic derivation of propositions, but deductions are possible. They argue that the conceptual framework stands above taxonomy because its 'propositions'

summarise and provide explanations and predictions for vast amounts of empirical observations. The assumptions that were made in terms of the conceptual framework, were based on theoretical perspectives, obtained through the literature study and research findings that originated from other studies.

## 2.6.2 Explanation of conceptual framework

The occurrence of residential burglary implies the convergence of various factors in time and space that could create a favourable environment for the burglary to take place. Figure 2.4 provides an illustration of the functioning of the burglary process and how the different components, elements and factors are interrelated.

Taking into account the preceding theoretical perspectives on the burglary process, the researcher is of the opinion that four components can be identified in the burglary process, namely: the **environment** (with reference to the macro-, meso-, and micro-environment) in which the burglary takes place, the **situational conditions** that exist prior the commission of the burglary, the **burglary event**, and the **responses** of the residents, as well as the burglars in reaction to the burglary event. Within the context of the components, three main elements are involved in the burglary process, namely: the **burglar(s)** with the intention to burgle, a suitable **target/residence**, and the **resident(s)** as the burglary victims. These components and elements are dynamic entities, with many differential attributes and possible manifestations, which interact in such a manner that the burglary event resulted from that. The many differential attributes and possible manifestations can be studied through the identification of factors or variables in the conceptual framework.

The integrated conceptual framework can be explained under the following headings: environmental setting and location of potential target/residence, motivated burglars, the residents, situational conditions, burglary event and responses.

### 2.6.2.1 Environmental setting and location of potential target/residence

To understand the role of location in defining the vulnerability of a particular residence, it is necessary to distinguish between the different levels of environment and how the burglar may act according to his perceived environment. Any potential target can be described in terms of its specific location in the micro-environment (its address), within the broader meso- (neighbourhood or suburb) and macro-environment (the metropolis and beyond).

The macro-environment provides numerous opportunities for residential burglaries daily (as

confirmed by the crime statistics - see Table 1.1), given the large number of potential targets, and the presence of motivated burglars (although their numbers are unknown) searching for the right target. The knowledge that the burglar has of the environment is mediated by experience, beliefs, values, attitudes and personality, while interacting with the environment. The end product of his perception and cognition of the environment can be described as his mental map, environmental image, cognitive representation, or schemata of the environment (Walmsley & Lewis, 1993:96). These macro-scale schemata is used by the burglar to select a specific area within the city to search for a suitable target. Through such information the burglar becomes aware of differential environmental opportunities (Carter & Hill, 1980:194).

A study on environmental images by Lynch (1960, cited in Walmsley & Lewis, 1993:97) concluded that the images respondents have of the cities of Boston, Jersey City and Los Angeles (USA) were, to a great extent, organised in terms of the following elements: paths (for example roads), edges (for example rivers), districts (for example neighbourhoods), nodes (strategic points in a city), and landmarks (for example buildings or mountains). The image of a city based on these elements serves as a basis through which the parts of a city can be recognised and interpreted by an individual as belonging to a coherent pattern (Walmsley & Lewis, 1993:98).

According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1984:363) a burglar will pick a target in and around his or her awareness space, depending on whether the target is regarded as a "good" or a "bad" target. These authors argue that the attractiveness of a potential target will thus depend on the environmental cues and the immediate characteristics of the target as perceived by the burglar.

The vulnerability of a particular residence in terms of its location and the probability that a burglar will target that specific neighbourhood can be described by the following factors: affluence of neighbourhood, accessibility of neighbourhood, free movement of people and vehicles, and diversity of enterprises or activities in the neighbourhood.

#### ■ ***Affluence of neighbourhood***

Residential burglary is a property crime and it can therefore be expected that residences in more affluent neighbourhoods will be more vulnerable to residential burglary than residences in less-affluent neighbourhoods. There is a high probability that the goods burglars are searching for could be found in affluent neighbourhoods.

Research evidence (Walmsley & Lewis, 1993:54) indicates a distinct association between low- income neighbourhoods and crimes of violence, whereas middle to upper-income

suburban neighbourhoods were associated with property crimes such as burglary, larceny and car theft. The higher frequency of burglary in one area as opposed to another may therefore be a reflection of greater opportunities, more reward and relative availability of targets.

#### ■ **Accessibility of neighbourhood**

A residence in a neighbourhood that has good access roads and is situated near main roads and/or freeways may be more vulnerable to residential burglary than a residence in a neighbourhood that has limited access roads. Good access roads provide the burglars with the opportunity to gain easy access to and exit from the target area. Residences next to or near open fields, green zones, rivers or parks may also be more vulnerable than residences surrounded by other buildings, because burglars can move more freely and unnoticed in these areas that provide them with shelter. It can also serve as a place to hide the stolen goods. Costanzo *et al.* (1986:77) are of the opinion that the wealthier, easily accessible areas adjacent to the central city are more vulnerable to property crimes than the central city itself.

#### ■ **Free movement of people and vehicles**

Residential areas that allow for free movement of people and vehicles on account of the right all people have to public space and roads, may be more vulnerable than “private” residential areas, so-called security villages or estates, where private home owners have the right to control access and the movement of people and vehicles. In this way potential burglars are deterred from entering a controlled residential area.

#### ■ **Presence of strangers**

Residential areas characterised by a diversity of enterprises or activities, for example, nearby public places, shopping centres, small businesses and new building projects, may be more exposed to the movement or gathering of relatively high volumes of strangers (non-resident in neighbourhood), than residential areas that have a more homogeneous character. It is expected that the movement of strangers will provide an excuse for burglars to move freely and unnoticed in the neighbourhood in search of suitable targets.

### 2.6.2.2 **Motivated burglar(s)**

Burglars are usually motivated by the need for money, more than anything else, whether the need is real or perceived, or out of greed (Repetto, 1974:21; Bennett & Wright, 1984:31; Wright & Decker, 1994:25). Burglars are often involved in alcohol abuse and/or the use of drugs, which often increases the need for money. Burglars will often make use of fences (persons who trade in stolen goods) to dispose of their stolen goods in exchange for money

(Barkan, 1997:324-325).

According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1984:147) it is evident that motivated burglars will be found in societies characterised by, *inter alia*, unemployment and inadequate income on the one hand, and an abundance of goods and wealth on the other hand, together with social factors often associated with crime such as poor family structures and relations, peer-group relations, and poor education. In South African society where these circumstances are prevalent, it can be expected that a great number of motivated burglars will be present in the society.

A motivated burglar will tend to search for a suitable target in those neighbourhoods he knows best and if he has specific knowledge of a particular target and its occupants, or has inside information through a tipster, that target will be more vulnerable than other potential targets of whom he has no knowledge.

A distinction can also be made between burglars who operate as amateurs and those who operate as professionals. According to Beirne and Messerschmidt (1995:153) these two categories of burglars differ in important ways, summarised as follows:

- **Amateur burglars** are more interested in volume than in quality; their style of intrusion is unsophisticated, with little planning involved; they rarely specialise in theft of specific items, but rather steal a variety of merchandise as opportunities arise. Amateurs are part-time burglars who engage in burglary as only a small, episodic part of a life of crime in general. They tend to commit opportunistic burglaries when a suitable target arises, while involved in other routine activities (lawful or unlawful).
- **Professional burglars** tend to be older, are specialists who employ considerable skill and planning in executing a burglary and select targets of substantial value (for example, the stealing of jewellery). They usually learn their trade from other professional thieves and keep themselves informed on the latest "burglary tools", such as drills and saws. Professional burglars often make use of tipsters in the identification of possible burglary targets.

In the South African context, it can be assumed that professional burglars will have a more extended cognition of differential environmental opportunities than the amateur burglars, and be more able and willing to travel longer distances in the search of suitable targets. According to Costanzo *et al.* (1986:79) criminals are generally more prepared to travel further for property crimes than for crimes against persons.

### 2.6.2.3 The residents

Residents, through their daily routines and lifestyles, may engage in risky behaviour that exposes them to the potential of being burgled. Residents that are away from home for regular intervals, either for work, recreational or other purposes increase the risk of being burgled during their absence. A wealthy lifestyle is also associated with valuable goods and articles in the residence that may attract potential burglars who are on the lookout for suitable targets.

It is expected that wealthier residents will be in a better financial position to protect their residences through high security measures, such as alarm systems, security lights, surveillance cameras and armed response units. However, residents may also act in a careless and ignorant manner with regard to safety precautions, especially if they have a false sense of safety and have not been victimised before.

Certain categories of residents may also pose a greater risk of being victimised, because they constitute easier targets, for example, elderly people and single households.

### 2.6.2.4 Situational conditions

When a motivated burglar finds a suitable target, the immediate situational conditions will influence his final decision whether to proceed with the burglary or not. The situational conditions refer to the local conditions prevalent in the micro-environment prior to the commission of the burglary that may have an influence on the course of the event. The more favourable the burglar perceives the conditions, the greater the chance that he will proceed with the burglary. According to rational choice theory (Cornish & Clark, 1986:9; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981:28; Brown & Altman, 1981:58), the process of burglary involves a series of sequential decision-making judgements by the burglar. The initial decision to burgle may be motivated by personal needs, whilst the selection of a suitable target is taken upon a well-established crime template, based on experiential knowledge and environmental cues associated with “good” targets.

The situational conditions which presumably have a significant effect on the vulnerability of a residence, at a specific point in time, are *inter alia* the time of day, the physical design, the absence of guardians and surveillance and the lack of security.

#### ■ **Appropriate time**

The traditional viewpoint of burglars is that they prefer not to make physical contact with the residents or to be seen by anyone during a burglary. The crime is not directed at the

residents, but rather the goods which are seen as a source of income. If contact is made, it will rather be accidental than planned. For this reason most burglars will prefer to commence a burglary at a time they believe the chances would be less to be seen or to make contact with the residents or other guardians. A potential target will thus be most vulnerable at times when the burglar can operate unnoticed.

### ■ **Physical design**

The attractiveness of a potential target will depend on the environmental cues and the immediate characteristics of the target as perceived by the burglar. The burglar will look for design features that fit his description of a “good” target. For the burglar, an attractive target will be one where the perceived rewards outweigh the risks of being caught. The vulnerability of a residence in terms of its physical design will thus depend on features such as:

- The degree to which the building, garden, and vehicles project an image of wealth.
- The degree to which the design features of the building will allow easy access to and from the building, for example, concealed entrances, and easy removable windows.
- The degree to which the surroundings provide easy shelter to hide, for example, high walls, big trees and shrubs, as well as the absence of effective lighting.

### ■ **Absence of guardians and surveillance**

Guardians refer to the presence of residents and neighbours who through formal and informal (natural) surveillance contribute to the safety and security of a particular residential area. Formal surveillance is a purposeful activity in the neighbourhood, for example, neighbourhood watch, citizen or police patrols and the presence of security firms, whilst informal or natural surveillance refers to crime awareness by neighbours, motorists and pedestrians in the area.

The lifestyle and routine activities of the residents and their neighbours will determine the level and pattern of surveillance a particular residence enjoys, and what periods the residence will be unoccupied. A lifestyle as well as routine activities that often leave the residence unoccupied, together with low levels of surveillance, could probably increase the vulnerability of the residence.

### ■ **Lack of security**

Security measures include all the measures aimed at protecting the residence and its people, for example: access control, fences with spikes, electrified fences, entry phones, burglar alarms, burglar-proofing at windows and doors, locks, security guards, armed responses, security lights and dogs.

In the absence of visible security measures a residence could be more vulnerable than in those instances where a residence is protected by a number of measures which are openly observable.

### 2.6.2.5 Burglary event

If the situational conditions are perceived to be favourable, there is a high probability that the burglar will decide to commence with the burglary. How the burglary will progress and the extent of damage or financial loss experienced during the burglary can mainly depend on the following factors:

- The number of burglars involved in the burglary event.
- The ease of gaining entry and exit.
- Whether the burglary was opportunistic or well planned.
- The level of competence of the burglars. Were they making use of sophisticated tools, a vehicle, and a cellular phone?
- The period burglars are allowed to operate without any interference or hindrance from the residents, the neighbours, or an armed response unit.

### 2.6.2.6 Responses

#### ■ *Impact of burglary*

The degree to which the residents may consider the burglary as serious, depend on:

- the extent of financial loss experienced as a result of the burglary, and
- the degree of trauma experienced by residents and to what extent their fear of crime and
- their feeling of safety would have changed.

In cases where residents did not have household insurance, or whose lost goods were irreplaceable or of high sentimental value, the impact of the burglary will even be intensified.

#### ■ *Residents' responses*

Whether residents will respond and in what manner, will depend on how seriously they were affected by the burglary, the prerequisites imposed by the insurance company, and whether they are in a position, for example financially, to react in an appropriate way. Responses that can possibly be expected, include:

- a change in lifestyle and routine activities to make the absence of guardians less obvious, and

- to improve the security measures.

Whether individuals become involved in crime prevention activities will depend on the following factors (Naudé, 1988: 23):

- Fear of crime.
- Crime risk of area (is it a high- or low-crime area?).
- Cost-effectiveness of security measures.
- Life style and aesthetics - security measures must fit in with the life style and activities of those involved.

According to Taylor *et al.* (1986:176), the fear of crime primarily results from the perception that there are not enough neighbourhood resources available to fight the crime problem and the belief that it is not possible to do something about the crime levels in the community. These perceptions can have a greater impact on the levels of fear than the prevailing rate of victimisation.

#### ■ **Burglars' responses**

The burglar's mental image of the environment and the target will be affected by the actual commission of a burglary, because the outcome is either as expected, which confirms his feelings and adds to his learning, or the outcome was unexpected, which also contributes to his learning about the area (Carter & Hill, 1980: 196). If the feedback confirms the expectations of the burglar, there is a likelihood that the burglar will return to that area in future. However, changes in the residents' routine activities and improved security measures may also act as a deterrent for the burglars not to return to the same residence.

Given that learning is a multistage process, Carter and Hill (1980:197) suggest that burglars will continually improve their knowledge in the selection of suitable targets. According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1981:29), the template, once it has been established, becomes relatively fixed and influences future search behaviour, thereby becoming self-reinforcing.

If caught in the act of burglary, successfully prosecuted and imprisoned, the burglar may either, decide to persist in being a burglar or to abandon burglary in favour of becoming a law-abiding citizen.

## 2.7 RESEARCH EXPECTATIONS

As a result of the qualitative nature of the study and the research philosophy adopted, it was

decided not to formulate hypotheses, but to formulate research expectations that would guide the research process. Emanating from the explanations in the conceptual framework and the burglary process as illustrated in Figure 2.4, the following research expectations relating to the meso-environment, the burglar, the situational conditions, the burglary event, the residents' responses and the burglars' responses, were postulated:

### 2.7.1 Research expectations relating to risk factors in the **meso-environment** (the police station area):

- It is expected that the following factors in the meso-environment could increase the risk for burglary:
  - Neighbourhoods perceived as more affluent.
  - Neighbourhoods that have good escape routes.
  - Neighbourhoods where free (unrestricted) movement of people occurs.
  - Neighbourhoods that attract strangers, non-resident in the area.

### 2.7.2 Research expectations relating to the **burglar**:

- Burglars are primarily motivated by the need for money.
- Burglars will tend to follow a patterned routine in the selection of suitable targets.
- Subsequently professional burglars will operate in a well-planned manner.
- Amateur burglars to the contrary will operate in an opportunistic manner.

### 2.7.3 Research expectations relating to the **situational conditions** prior to the burglary:

- It is expected that the following situational conditions (factors) may increase the risk of being burgled:
  - When the residents are away from home.
  - When the residents are at home but asleep.
  - When the residents are single.
  - When the residents are elderly.
  - When the residents act carelessly.
  - During periods when the residence is vulnerable due to poor surveillance.
  - When there is poor visibility around the residence.
  - When there are visible signs of wealth.
  - When design features indicate easy entry to the building.
  - When the residence is poorly protected due to an absence of security measures.

#### 2.7.4 Research expectations related to the **burglary event**:

- The extent of financial loss experienced during a burglary event may proportionately relate to:
  - whether the burglary was professionally executed,
  - the number of burglars involved,
  - the time burglars spend inside the residence, and
  - the level of competency of the burglars.
- It is expected that the financial loss as a result of residential burglary will on average be higher in the more affluent areas than in the less affluent areas.
- Burglars will tend to select those items that they know are marketable.

#### 2.7.5 Research expectations related to **residents' responses**:

- Residents will feel less safe in their immediate environment as a result of the burglary.
- Residents will implement additional security measures after the occurrence of a burglary.

#### 2.7.6 Research expectations related to the **burglars' responses**:

- Burglars will tend to rationalise not to feel guilty about their criminal behaviour.
- Burglars will adapt to changing circumstances that may arise from improved security initiatives to be able to continue their criminal activities.

## 2.8 CONCLUSION

In this chapter a variety of theoretical perspectives were presented under the central theme of environmental criminology, in order to describe and explain the occurrence of residential burglary. Despite its shortcomings, environmental criminology still provides an appropriate theoretical basis for the study of residential burglary and to conceptualise the burglary process. Chapter 3 provides an explanation of the methodology that was used in applying the conceptual framework to the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **METHODOLOGY**

*Geographical analysis must go beyond purely descriptive ecological studies and formulate some theoretical constructs which may lead to explanations of the criminal spatial structure.*

- Rengert (1980:47)

#### **3.1 INTRODUCTION**

The rationale behind Chapter 3 is to describe the methodology that was used to conduct the research. The range of methods and approaches that were applied, fall primarily within the paradigm of qualitative research. The case study approach served as methodological anchor, and was adjusted to suit the specific needs of the study.

Within the framework of the realist philosophy of 'what we can know' and 'how we can come to know about it' (see par. 1.8), the challenge was to develop an appropriate methodology, a set of rules and procedures, that prescribed how the research would be conducted. It was also stated in the objectives of the study (see par. 1.6.3) that an appropriate methodology would be developed that would guide and direct the research process, and that would answer to the requirements formulated in the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6) and the research expectations (see par. 2.7).

#### **3.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY**

To obtain a clear understanding of the complex processes and interactions involved in the burglary process, it was decided to focus the study on the realist domain of the actual event and how it took place (see par. 1.8). Less emphasis was placed on the underlying structures that cause criminal behaviour. In order to undertake a qualitative study of the burglary process, it was necessary to adopt a research strategy that would ensure an in-depth understanding of the many situational and environmental factors that could influence the course of the burglary process and to be able to construct an integrated and holistic picture of what happened before, during and after the burglary event.

The research strategy adopted and adjusted for this study is based on the case study approach, as conceptualised by social theorists such as Robson (1993:146-166), Miles and Huberman, (1994:18-37), Stake (1994:236-247), Yin (1994) and Neuman (1997:29-30).

## 3.2.1 The case study approach

### 3.2.1.1 Rationale

Case studies were previously, prior to the 1990s, closely associated with data collection, as a specific phase in the research process. More recently, the case study approach is advocated as a complete methodology, one that has great flexibility in its application, whether applied to people, communities, institutions or events. According to Robson (1993:146) the case study method can be regarded as “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence”. Residential burglary can be regarded as such a ‘contemporary phenomenon’, which needs to be studied in ‘its real life context’. As indicated in Chapter 1 (par. 1.9), the designing of a case study implies the following elements: building a conceptual framework, formulating research questions, bounding the case territory, bounding the collection of data and instruments or methods for data collection and analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994:18-37).

Robson (1993:149) also pointed out the danger of using a detailed conceptual framework, which could blind the researcher to important features of a case, or may cause the researcher to misinterpret the evidence. For this reason the initial framework should not be regarded as definitive, and the researcher should remain open to alternative formulations, or possible relationships not captured in the initial framework.

On the grounds of the following considerations, the decision was taken to use the case study approach in the research:

- The case study approach provides an alternative to the “scientific method” of quantitative research most often used in geographical studies. Through the case study design and methodology, the researcher can use a relatively small sample of cases to qualitatively investigate a specific phenomenon.
- The case study approach is especially convenient to study burglary events at a micro-level and to answer the questions “why” and “how” a particular burglary event took place, at a specific location, at a specific time (Yin, 1994:6).
- The emphasis is on a ‘contemporary phenomenon’ (burglary event) within some ‘real-life context’, and to examine how the different parts of the case are configured, and not to display a quantified explanation of the phenomenon based on, for example, survey methodology (Robson, 1993:146).

- Through the case study approach events at the micro-level can be linked to patterns at the meso- and macro-level. The logic of the case study is to demonstrate a causal argument about how general social forces shape and produce results in particular settings (Neuman, 1997:30), although the findings cannot be generalised.
- The case study is primarily a qualitative research approach that can be applied to gain in-depth knowledge and understanding of a particular event, and to create the opportunity for personal involvement and observation. Neuman (1997:29) is of the opinion that the case study method provides the logic of analytic instead of enumerative induction. Through multiple-case studies, however, a degree of quantification is possible in the determination of burglary patterns and trends.
- By using a case study approach it is possible to describe and explain the burglary process in order to advance an understanding of the phenomenon, residential burglary, and to build on existing theory so that it becomes more complete (Stake, 1994:237).


### 3.2.1.2 Multiple-case design

A multiple-case design was used in this study because of the abundance of available cases of residential burglary. The multiple-case study should not be considered to be similar to the respondents in a survey study. Instead of a 'sampling' logic in a survey study, the multiple-case study follows a 'replication' logic, that is to determine the degree of 'replication' of results between the different cases (Yin, 1994:47). A 'sampling' logic to the contrary, will be more appropriate when the researcher is interested in determining the prevalence or frequency of a particular phenomenon, in which case the sample represents a larger pool of respondents.

Figure 3.1 provides an illustration of how multiple-case studies can be used as a research design and a method to modify existing theory. The case study method as explained by Yin (1994:49) advocates that the initial step in designing the study must consist of theory development, followed by case selection and the design of data collection process. Each individual case represents a complete study, which culminates in cross-case conclusions, theory modification, policy implications, and the final report.

Stake (1994:237) also distinguishes between "intrinsic" and "instrumental" case studies. The former is undertaken not to represent other cases or because it illustrates a particular trait or problem, but because the case itself is of interest. The purpose is thus not to build theory.

FIGURE 3.1: THE MULTIPLE-CASE DESIGN



On the other hand, the instrumental case study, provides insight into a particular issue or event, or helps to refine a particular theory. When a number of cases are needed in order to inquire into the phenomenon, Stake (1994:237), calls it a “collective” case study. Cases, in a collective case study, are chosen because they will enhance understanding, and perhaps lead to better theorising of a still larger collection of cases.

### 3.2.2 Phases in the research process

Within the realm of the case study approach, the following phases, also reflecting on the methods, techniques, and procedures, could be identified in the research process:

- bounding of case study territory;
- identification of sources of information;
- method of enquiry;
- compilation of interview guides;
- pilot study;
- selection of interview cases;
- conducting of interviews;
- processing of information;
- analysis of information; and
- criteria for trustworthiness.

### 3.3 BOUNDING OF CASE STUDY TERRITORY

#### 3.3.1 Defining the case

In this study an individual case was defined as the burglary event that occurred in a bounded context. The context included the time-space dimensions of what happened before, during and after the burglary, as it occurred at a specific location, in a bounded environment. The individual case also served as the unit of analysis. The year, 1998, represented the period of data collection and analysis, as it was the year in which the fieldwork was undertaken and secondary data collected.

The burglary event as conceptualised in the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6) comprises various dimensions and elements of interest to the researcher for the purposes of information gathering and analysis. These areas of interest could be defined as the neighbourhood environment; the burglars; the residents; the situational conditions; the burglary event; and the responses after the burglary event.


#### 3.3.2 Demarcation of the case study areas

In Chapter 1 (par.1.7) mention was made of the two police station areas of Pretoria West and Garsfontein that were selected for the purpose of the case study fieldwork, and that the selection was done on the grounds of an affluent residential area versus a less-affluent one. The following criteria were used to differentiate between these two areas: The neighbourhoods in the Garsfontein police station area appear on "face value", or in terms of general public knowledge, to be more affluent than the Pretoria West area. These impressions were confirmed by two other indicators, namely the average size and value of residential sites, which were significantly larger in the Garsfontein area than the Pretoria West area. This conclusion is based on the assumption that larger residential sites and higher site values are associated with neighbourhoods that experience higher levels of affluence. Figure 3.2 provides an orientation map of the two case study areas.

The physical demarcation of the case study areas corresponds with the residential neighbourhoods in the Pretoria West and Pretoria East police station areas, as illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.

The Pretoria West police station area includes the following residential neighbourhoods: Pretoria West, Proklamasie Heuwel, West Park, Danville, Kwaggasrand, Elandspoort, Lotus Gardens and Philip Nel Park (see Fig. 3.3). It should be noted that the Pretoria West police

FIGURE 3.2: ORIENTATION MAP OF THE TWO CASE STUDY AREAS



Source of Raw Data: Map Studio, 1999/2000


station area also encompasses rural plots (small holdings) and industrial areas that were not included in the study.

The Garsfontein police station area includes the following residential neighbourhoods: Lynnwood Manor, Lynnwood Ridge, Lynnwood Park, Murrayfield (partly), Die Wilgers, Wapadrand, Faerie Glen, Garsfontein, Constantiapark, Pretoriuspark and Moreletapark (see Fig. 3.4).

Comparative features of the two case study areas are provided in Table 3.1. Further detailed information on the case study areas are provided in Chapter 4 (see par. 4.5).



FIGURE 3.4: PRETORIA WEST POLICE STATION AREA



Source of Raw Data: Map Studio, 1999/2000

**TABLE 3.1: FEATURES OF CASE STUDY AREAS**

FEATURES	PRETORIA WEST SAPS AREA	GARSFONTEIN SAPS AREA
1. Population*	65 000	80 000
2. Average size of residential sites in square metres**	815	1 357
3. Average residential site value in Rand**	R26 000	R65 000
4. Residential burglaries per 100 000 of the population in 1998***	519	2 195

Source:

\* Population statistics provided by the office of the Pretoria Area Commissioner of the SAPS, 2000

\*\* Information provided by the Property Valuation Directorate of the City Council of Pretoria, 2000.

\*\*\* Crime statistics provided by the office of the Pretoria Area Commissioner of the SAPS, 2000.

The information in Table 3.1, is a confirmation of the decision to select neighbourhoods in the Garsfontein police station area as the more affluent area versus the Pretoria West police station area as the less affluent area.

### 3.4 SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Through the formulation of research questions, the conceptual framework and research expectations, the researcher developed a clear understanding of the information needed for the research. The conceptual framework provides a theoretical explanation of the burglary process in the micro-environment, but also in context of the broader meso- and macro-environment. A distinction could therefore be made between primary data sources, focussing on the micro-environment, and secondary data sources, focussing on the meso- and macro-environment. Table 3.2 provides a summary of the sources of data and methods of data collection that were used in the study.

The rationale behind the use of various sources of information (interviews, observations and documentation) was to create a basis for comparison, agreement and disagreement of data, that would strengthen the validity and credibility of the findings and conclusions. According to Yin (1994:10) case studies provide little basis for scientific generalisation, however, case studies are generalisable to theoretical propositions or a conceptual framework.

In addition to the collected research data, the literature study on residential burglary also provided the researcher with numerous sources of information on research findings of

**TABLE 3.2: SOURCES OF DATA AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION**

<b>SOURCES OF DATA AND METHODS OF COLLECTION</b>	
<b>A. Primary information sources:</b>	
1.	Semi-structured interviews with three groups of people: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.2 Burglary victims in the two case study areas.</li> <li>1.3 Convicted burglars (prisoners at the Atteridgeville prison).</li> <li>1.4 People with expert knowledge on certain aspects of residential burglary, including the SAPS, Security Companies, Insurance Companies, and Community Policing Forums.</li> </ol>
2.	Personal observations of the urban environments in the two case study areas, as well as the micro-environments in which the burglary events (the selected case studies) took place.
<b>B. Secondary information sources:</b>	
3.	Documentation of existing data, including: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3.1 SAPS statistics and records, provided by the SAPS Monthly Bulletin on Reported Crime in South Africa, and the office of the Pretoria Area Commissioner.</li> <li>3.2 Publications on crime studies in South Africa, including:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• a victim survey done by the ISS in 1998 of the Greater Pretoria Area,</li> <li>• a survey study on crime patterns in the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area, conducted in 1998 by the Community Safety Unit of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), and</li> <li>• a victims of crime survey conducted in 1998 by Statistics South Africa.</li> </ul> </li> <li>3.3 Maps and residential site values as determined by the Property Valuation Directorate of the City Council of Pretoria.</li> </ol>

studies undertaken in the UK and the USA. Of specific significance were the research publications of Reppetto (1974), Clarke and Mayhew (1980), Poyner (1983), Bennett and Wright (1984), Brantingham and Brantingham (1984), and Heal and Laycock (1986). These sources provided valuable information for purposes of comparisons and cross-references in terms of agreement or disagreement with research findings in this study.

Paragraphs 3.5 to 3.11.1 of this chapter will primarily focus on the methodology used in the collection, processing, and analysis of primary data sources, whereas Paragraph 3.11.2 will explain the use of secondary data analysis in the study.

### 3.5 METHOD OF ENQUIRY

The semi-structured interview technique was used as the method of acquiring information from the people selected for interviewing. The semi-structured interview can be regarded as a middle route between the self-completion of questionnaires in a survey study, and the unstructured, "free-range" interview, with no clear beginning or end. In this regard the researcher supports the view of Robson (1993:227), namely, that the interviewer should have clear defined purposes with the interview, but seeks to achieve them through some

flexibility in wording, greater freedom in the sequencing of questions and in the amount of time and attention given to different topics.

According to Robson (1993:238), the interview schedule for the semi-structured interview can be simpler than the one for the structured interview. The semi-structured interview schedule usually includes the following elements (Robson, 1993:238):

- introductory comments (probably a verbatim script);
- list of topic headings and possibly key questions to ask under these headings;
- set of associated prompts; and
- closing comments.

From the research literature of Neuman (1997:371), the following guiding principles regarding field research interviews were identified that assisted the researcher in the compilation of the interview schedules, and also the conducting of the pilot study, as well as the case study interviews:

- The interview should be conducted like a friendly conversation, but with more interviewer questions.
- The questions and the order in which they are asked are tailored to specific people and situations.
- The interviewer shows interest in responses and encourages elaboration.
- Open-ended questions are common, and probes are frequent.
- The social context of the interview is noted and seen as important for interpreting the meaning of responses.
- The interviewer adjusts to the interviewee's norms and language usage.

According to Robson (1993:229), the use of semi-structured interviews has certain advantages and disadvantages. Advantages are *inter alia* the opportunity to observe the respondent's behaviour and the environmental setting in which the event took place, the possibility to follow up important responses and to investigate underlying motives or feelings. However, semi-structured interviews can also be time-consuming, people may be unwilling to participate, while others may be overeager for conversation that can easily divert the interview to unrelated issues. There is also the question of standardisation and possible biases from the interviewer's side, which require considerable skill, experience and professionalism in conducting of semi-structured interviews.

### 3.6 COMPILATION OF INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

According to Bailey (1987:191), the interviewer has to study the event or phenomenon in advance before drawing up an interview guide or schedule. Robson (1993:241) also argued that the first task in preparing for an interview, is to carry out a situational analysis, by means of observation, or documentary analysis (in this study the conceptual framework). Generally this will include important aspects of the situation, the meaning thereof, and the effects they have on those involved.

The contents of the interview schedules compiled for this study were based on the requirements as stipulated in the research questions (see par. 1.4.1), the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6), and the research expectations (see par. 2.7). In a broad sense, the interview schedules were aimed at answering the research questions of “why”, “how” and with “what” effect a burglary event took place. The research expectations were also formulated in such a way that it covered all the elements in the conceptual framework, and for that reason also served as a guide in the formulation of questions for inclusion in the interview schedules.

Three sets of interview schedules were developed, aimed at three different target groups, namely: burglary victims in the two case study areas; convicted burglars; and people with expert knowledge on residential burglary. Each of the interview schedules consists of a pool of questions that can broadly be divided into three sections, namely: Section 1, containing general questions of a personal nature and descriptions of the situational conditions existing in the micro-environment prior to the burglary; Section 2, containing questions on the actual commission of the burglary event; and Section 3, containing questions on the feelings and responses of the interviewees after the occurrence of the burglary. The three interview schedules (without the spaces for notes) are attached as:

- Appendix 1: Interview schedule for burglary victims;
- Appendix 2: Interview schedule for convicted burglars; and
- Appendix 3: Interview schedule for people with expert knowledge on burglary.

Most of the questions were of a descriptive nature and designed to obtain factual answers from the respondents, although in Section 3 of the interview schedules a few questions on personal feelings and beliefs were included. An example is (Q 3.2 in Appendix 1): *Has your fear of victimisation changed since the burglary?* The reason for the mainly factual nature of the questions was to ensure that the central focus remained on the actual event and how the respondents experienced the phenomenon of residential burglary.

In order to allow the respondents to express themselves freely and to answer in detail or to qualify their responses, open-ended questions were formulated. Other advantages of open-ended questions are that they allow the interviewer to use probes for further explanations, to clear misinterpretations, and to encourage cooperation and rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee (Robson, 1993:233). There can also be disadvantages to open-ended questions, as stipulated by Neuman (1997:241), which *inter alia* include: different respondents give different degrees of detail in answers; comparisons and statistical analysis become more difficult; coding responses is difficult; responses may be irrelevant and time-consuming; and the interviewer may find it difficult to take down verbatim responses.

As a result of the qualitative nature of the study, the use of open-ended questions, the relative small interviewing samples involved, and the fact that no sophisticated statistical methods were planned to be used in the analysis of the data, it was decided in advance not to make use of codified interview schedules.

### 3.7 PILOT STUDY

The pilot study was undertaken prior to the data collection phase in order to refine the contents of the interview schedules and to determine the best practices and procedures to be followed during interviewing sessions (Yin, 1994:74). The pilot study was also useful to evaluate the appropriateness of the research-design and to examine different approaches on a trial basis. According to Robson (1993:164) a pilot study helps to assess the feasibility of what is proposed in terms of time, effort and resources to ensure the best possible results.

#### 3.7.1 Selection and conducting of the pilot study

Although three target groups were identified for interviewing, namely the burglary victims, the convicted burglars, and people with knowledge of burglary (the expertise group), the pilot study only involved the burglary victims in the two case study areas of the Pretoria West and Garsfontein police stations. This decision was taken after considering the following:

- the case study investigations constituted the central focus of the study and the other interviews were conducted to complement the case study findings;
- the interviewing of the convicted burglars could only be arranged over two consecutive days, which made their inclusion in the pilot study difficult; and
- the target group of expertise consisted of people with diverse interests and specialised knowledge in certain aspects of the burglary process and could therefore not be regarded as a distinct grouping.

The researcher was also of the opinion that the lessons learned through the pilot study could be applied to the other target groups, seeing that many of the questions and the design thereof were similar for the three sets of interview schedules.

For the purpose of selecting the pilot cases, the first four interviews (two in each of the case study areas) that were conducted with the burglary victims, were used in the pilot study. The four pilot cases were included in the total number of cases selected for the study as explained in Paragraph 3.8. Members of the Pretoria West and Garsfontein police stations were requested to assist the researcher in the selection of four pilot cases, and to confirm with the residents whether they were prepared to participate in the project.

The four pilot interviews were conducted during March and April 1999. The purpose was specifically to evaluate the interview schedule (with reference to Interview Schedule 1) in terms of:

- whether it covered the full spectrum of the burglary process;
- whether the questions were sufficient and properly formulated, and to make the necessary adjustments;
- what sequence of questioning worked best;
- how to establish good rapport and confidentiality between the interviewer and the interviewee;
- the best way of taking down notes; and
- the time-frame to complete the interview.

### **3.7.2 Results of the pilot study**

It was obvious to the researcher that the respondents in the pilot study did not feel threatened by the interview or the questions posed to them, to the contrary, they easily identified with the objectives of the study as well as that of the interview. The fact that most of the questions were not of a personal nature, but directed at the respondent's experiences of the burglary event and the factors surrounding the event, could be contributory to the creation of an atmosphere of co-operation and openness. Residential burglary was also perceived as an external problem and not a household problem. The researcher realised through these factors how important the introduction was to explain the purpose of the interview, and to establish confidentiality and rapport.

The main section of questions involved the three time slots in the burglary process, namely: the situational conditions prior to the burglary event; the commission of the burglary; and the responses of the residents after the burglary event. The sequence of questioning that

seemed to suit the respondents best, was to begin with the questions on the burglary event of which they have a clear conception, and then to advance to the questions on the situational conditions in the micro-environment that persisted prior to the burglary event, and lastly, to focus on the respondents' feelings and responses after the burglary event.

Because of the semi-structured nature of the interviews and the fact that most questions were open-ended, provided a flexibility in the conducting of the interviews. However, the researcher acknowledged the need for standardisation and therefore realised that the same questions should be posed to all the respondents, although the order of questioning could vary. In this regard the value of probes for further enquiring or to correct misunderstandings were of crucial importance. An example is Question 1.8 (in Appendix 1), where the respondent was asked to describe the accessibility of his/her residence in terms of access roads. Depending on the answer, the interviewer would further probe for clarification on the closeness of busy streets or main roads.

During the pilot study it was found that the respondents had difficulty in answering some of the questions, and because the same information could be gathered through other sources of information, for example, the site values could be obtained at the City Council of Pretoria, it was decided not to include the following questions:

- *What would you say is the current market value of your property/residence?*
- *What is the site value of your property according to the account you receive from the City Council of Pretoria?*
- *What is the improvement value of your property according to the account you receive from the City Council of Pretoria?*
- *Can you give me an indication of your monthly income?*
- *Do you have any idea of what tools were used to gain entrance to the building?*

It was decided to pose the last question to the convicted burglars who were in a better position to provide a more reliable answer to the question and it did not feature in the pilot study.

During the course of the pilot study, the researcher decided to change the following three questions by providing prompts to the interviewees, reading out a list of possibilities on which they could comment. The reason was to make sure that all the items, the researcher regarded as important, were covered in the interview, and to improve standardisation in the sequence of responses. These questions were:

**Question 1.13:** The original question read: *Were other people (workers) present on the*

premise, prior and during the period of the burglary?

Question 1.13 was then extended to include the following prompt: *Were other people (workers) present on the premise, prior and during the period of the burglary? If any, can you give me further particulars about the person(s), whether they were lodging or commuting, and which days they were present?*

Person	Yes or No	Lodging or commuting	Days of the week present
Domestic worker			
Gardener			
Tenant			
Other: Name: .....			

**Question 1.20:** The original question read: *Can you tell me what security measures were in place before the burglary?*

Question 1.20 was then changed to include the following prompt: *Which of the following security measures were in place before the burglary?* (Followed by a list of 18 possibilities, read out to the interviewee)

**Question 2.20:** The original question read: *Can you tell me what items were stolen during the burglary?*

Question 2.20 was then changed to include the following prompt: *Which of the following items were stolen during the burglary?* (Followed by a list of 16 possibilities, read out to the interviewee) (see Appendix 1).

Except for minor editorial changes, the rest of the questions did not provide interpretation problems and were regarded as sufficient to cover the full spectrum of the burglary process. The duration of the interviews varied between one hour and one and a half hour, which is generally regarded as within the expected duration scheduled for the interviews. Robson (1993:229) also suggests interviews of approximately one hour duration, because too lengthy interviews may make unreasonable demands on busy schedules of interviewees, and could reduce the interviewees' willingness to co-operate.

The recording of the interviews was done through the taking of notes, for which provision

was made on the interview schedules. The researcher also realised that for the purposes of standardisation and subsequent analysis of the interview data, the taking of notes should be done in an accurate and consistent way. According to Robson (1993:163), the case study investigator should have an open mind (be a good listener) and a good memory, taking in a lot of new information without bias; noting the exact words said; capturing the mood and affective components; and appreciating the context.

The researcher was of the opinion that taking notes was sufficient to capture the essence of the interviews and that the use of a tape-recorder was not necessary.

As a result of the minor changes to the four pilot cases, the decision was taken to include them into the sample of research cases that were analysed and interpreted.

### 3.7.3 Application of lessons learned on the other schedules

The lessons learned through the pilot study on the burglary victims were also applied to the interview schedules for the convicted burglars (see Appendix 2) and the group with expert knowledge on burglary (see Appendix 3). Questions 2.13 and 3.10 in the interview schedule for convicted burglars, and Questions 1.4 and 2.13 in the interview schedule for people with expert knowledge, were also changed to provide the interviewees with a list of possibilities.

In order to enhance the correctness of the answers provided by the convicted burglars, three sets of control questions were included in Appendix 2, namely:

**Questions 1.4 and 3.1** which respectively read:

*Where/how did you learn to burgle and  
Why did you start to burgle?*

**Questions 2.4 and 2.7** which respectively read:

*How did you gain entrance to the site and the building and  
How did you overcome the security measures?*

**Questions 3.9 and 3.10** which respectively read:

*What would you say are the best security/safety measures one can take to protect his/her house against burglary and  
How effective do you think are the following security measures in preventing a burglary?*

The pilot study was an important phase in the research process that familiarized the researcher with an appropriate interview technique to improve the quality and reliability of the data collected.

## 3.8 SELECTION OF CASES FOR INTERVIEWING

Three sampling populations were identified from which cases were drawn for interviewing, namely: burglary victims in the two case study areas of Pretoria West and Garsfontein; convicted burglars; and people with expert knowledge on certain aspects of residential burglary. The sampling methods applied are explicated in the sections that follows.

### 3.8.1 Selection of burglary victims

The researcher took the decision to select a sample of 24 burglary cases (the four pilot cases were included), 12 from each of the two case study areas of Pretoria West and Pretoria East. The rationale for the relative small sample was based on the qualitative nature of the study and that no need existed to generalise the findings beyond the specific sample studied. The primary purpose of the study was not to determine generalised patterns and trends, but to refine and improve the conceptual framework that could be applied in the study of residential burglary.

A stratified probability sample as well as a snowball sampling method (Bailey, 1987:95) were used in the selection of burglary victims in the two case study areas. The sampling process occurred in stages. Initially the police stations of Pretoria West and Garsfontein were requested to assist the researcher to randomly select a few burglary cases, that occurred during the course of 1998, and to contact the burglary victims to ask their permission to be interviewed by the researcher. A stratified (probability) sampling method was used to select the initial burglary cases in the two police station areas of Garsfontein and Pretoria West. In the stratified sample, each subunit (neighbourhood) of the geographic region (police station area) under investigation was placed on a list from which the cases were then randomly drawn. The neighbourhoods were predetermined, and in this way the samples that reflected the geographical distribution of the research population could be drawn (Haring *et al.*, 1992: 70). The population for this study included all the residential burglaries that were registered at the Garsfontein and Pretoria West police stations, during the period of 1998. By this sampling process 20 burglary cases were identified in the Pretoria West police station area, and 20 cases in the Garsfontein police station area. Of these cases only six burglary victims in the Pretoria West area and eight burglary victims in the Garsfontein area gave their permission to be interviewed. In some instances the residents had sold their residences and could not be located, and in other instances the residents made excuses of being too busy or not interested in being interviewed.

To increase the number of interviews to the required 12 in each of the case study areas, a

snowball sampling method was used to identify more burglary victims to be included in the sample. The selected interviewees were asked if they could provide the names of other burglary victims that could be approached. This method was applied until the required number of interviews were obtained.

### 3.8.2 Selection of convicted burglars

A non-probability or purposive sampling method was used to select convicted burglars for inclusion in the sample. In co-operation with the Department of Correctional Services, eight convicted burglars in the Atteridgeville prison, who volunteered to be interviewed, were interviewed. It is, however, important to note that the convicted burglar interviewees were not in any way linked to any of the burglary cases selected in the two case study areas.

### 3.8.3 Selection of people with expert knowledge

People with expert knowledge on burglary were also purposively selected as the sample. The following eight people agreed to be interviewed:

- Detectives, one from the Pretoria West and one from the Garsfontein police station.
- Employees from two different private security companies in Pretoria.
- Staff of two different insurance companies in Pretoria.
- Representatives from the CPFs in Pretoria West and Garsfontein.

Table 3.3 provides a summary of the number of interviews conducted. The purpose was not to select a statistically representative sample of cases, but to make a selection of cases that

**TABLE 3.3: NUMBER OF INTERVIEWEES SELECTED**

SAMPLE CLUSTERS	SUB-CATEGORIES	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS
▶ INTERVIEWS WITH BURGLARY VICTIMS	Garsfontein SAPS area	12
	Pretoria West SAPS area	12
▶ INTERVIEWS WITH CONVICTED BURGLARS	Convicted burglars	8
▶ INTERVIEWS WITH SPECIALISED PEOPLE/ EXPERTS	Police detectives	2
	Security companies	2
	Insurance companies	2
	CPF's representatives	2
<b>TOTAL:</b>		<b>40</b>

would represent the broad spectrum of role players involved in the residential burglary process, namely: the victim, the burglars, the police, the security organisations, and other role players.

### 3.9 CONDUCTING OF INTERVIEWS

Through the method of semi-structured interviewing, a total of 40 interviews were conducted. As experienced during the pilot study, the interviewer realised the importance of asking questions, listening, expressing interest and recording what was said.

Appointments were made with the prospective interviewees to confirm the date and time before being interviewed. The interviews with the burglary victims and the people with expert knowledge were conducted in the six-month period between June 1999 and November 1999, and were either held with the house owner, tenant or his/her spouse. The interviews with the convicted burglars in the Atteridgeville prison were conducted on two consecutive days during September 1999.

The two main challenges confronting the interviewer during the interviews were the ability to create an atmosphere of participation, and at the same time to record what was said by taking down written notes and in some instances verbatim quotations. These notes were the factual records of the interviews, without inferring or imposing any interpretation to it. Where possible, the interviewer tactfully probed to encourage the respondents to further elaborate on their responses.

The researcher also made use of analytical memo writing after the interviews. According to Neuman (1997:425), analytical memos forge a link between the concrete data and the more abstract, theoretical thinking. It also helped the researcher to elaborate on ideas and observations made during the interviewing sessions. Where the interview notes served as evidence, the analytical memos had a conceptual, theory- building intent. The purpose was not to report data, but to comment on how data were tied together or to identify emerging patterns. Memo writing also helped to establish similarities, differences or causal relationships between factors and cases. This procedure was followed throughout the data collection phase and new insights were periodically revealed and thus noted. The interview notes together with the analytical memos formed the basic input to the data analysis process.

### 3.10 PROFILING OF BURGLARS AND VICTIMS INTERVIEWED

The biographic information on the convicted burglars and the burglary victims added very little value to the research, because of the relative small and non-representative sample sizes. It was, nonetheless, appropriate to include some of the information as a background orientation to the research. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 provide an explanation of the racial composition of the burglars, as well as the age groups to which they belong. The burglars were all male and originally from the following areas: Mamelodi (two), Soshanguve (one), Hammanskraal (two), Eersterust (two), and Danville (one).

FIG. 3.5: RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE BURGLARS




FIG 3.6: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURGLARS





Figure 3.7 provides some background information on the age distribution of the burglary victims who were interviewed. Fifty per cent of the interviewees were male and the other fifty per cent were female.

### 3.11 PROCESSING OF INFORMATION

According to Neuman (1997:421), the qualitative researcher analyses data by organising it into categories on the basis of themes, concepts or similar features. He also stated that the qualitative researcher develops new concepts, formulates conceptual definitions and

examines relationships among concepts. In qualitative research the coding of data has a different meaning than in quantitative research where variables are codified for the purpose of statistical analysis. Researchers using qualitative techniques often conceptualise as they code qualitative data into conceptual categories, which in fact is already part of the data analysis process (Neuman, 1997:421). In this study the data collected through the interviews, personal observations, documentation and secondary sources, were coded into categories created by the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6) and the subsequent research expectations (see par. 2.7) that broadly coincided with the research questions of “why”, “how”, and with “what effect” residential burglaries took place.

FIG. 3.7: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE VICTIMS



Neuman (1997:422-424) distinguished between three forms for coding, which were also applied during the processing of data in this study, namely:

- Open coding.** During the first round of assessing the data, the researcher identified critical terms, key events or themes and attached labels to them in a first attempt to condense the mass of data into categories. This process had already commenced

earlier through analytical memo writing during the interviewing phase. The conceptual framework also provided categories for the coding of data.

- **Axial coding.** During this phase, the researcher began to organise the ideas or themes, and identified the axis of the key concepts in analysis. The aim was either to make connections between themes or to elaborate on the concepts that the themes represent. The themes and data were then integrated in the conceptual framework that represented the burglary process.
- **Selective coding.** Selective coding involves the scanning of data selectively, searching for cases that illustrate themes, and to make analytical comparisons and contrasts possible (Neuman, 1997:424). Here this phase represented the search for empirical evidence to verify the research expectations on residential burglary.

### 3.12 ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION

The purpose of analysis was to establish a coherent understanding of the findings, and to provide an integrated explanation of the burglary process. The analysis strategy that was followed in this study, can be described as “pattern-matching logic”, where the initial conceptual framework served as a “model” against which the codified data could be evaluated. Because the research data originated from both primary (interviews and personal observations) and secondary sources (other crime research data), a distinction is made between primary and secondary data analysis.

#### 3.12.1 Primary data analysis

The case study approach followed in this study provided the researcher with authentic research data that was gathered through interviews with different target groups and through personal observation. According to Huysamen (1994:169) the researcher, when applying a case study approach, would attempt to corroborate findings in terms of at least three different sources of information. In this study three target groups, namely the burglary victims, convicted burglars, and a group of experts, were interviewed.

Through the data coding process, the interview data were categorised according to the themes as identified in the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6), that also corresponded with the main variables in the research expectations (see par. 2.7). Huberman and Miles (1994:436) refer to this search for themes across cases as the variable-orientated strategy. In the process, the researcher would search for confirmatory information, contradictions, or possible rival explanations, derived from various primary sources. Through this procedure a

chain of evidence, confirming or contradicting the research expectations, would be established. There is an affinity here with what Neuman (1997:428) called the illustrative method, where empirical evidence was gathered to illustrate or anchor a theory. In this regard the conceptual framework provided the "empty boxes" for the gathering of evidence to confirm or reject the research expectations.

Through the method of analytical comparison (Neuman, 1997:428), the researcher would develop ideas about regularities and patterned relations from the perspective of the conceptual framework. Instead of searching universal laws, the researcher focussed on regularities or patterned relations within a specific social context. Through the method of agreement the researcher focussed on common features across cases, whilst the method of difference was applied to account for different causal features and outcomes across cases.

According to Stake (1994:241) triangulation has been generally considered a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation. It implies the use of evidence from different sources of information (Robson, 1993:404). The principle of triangulation was applied to the analysis of data to reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation and to improve the credibility of the findings.

The iterative approach implies a learning process through the succession of question-and-answer cycles, that entails the examination of a given set of cases and then refining or modifying those cases on the basis of subsequent ones (Huberman & Miles, 1994:431). After several iterations the research will progress from vague ideas and concrete details in the data toward a comprehensive analysis with meaningful outcomes (Neuman, 1997:427). The sequence in which the data coding was done, as well as the use of various sources of information were in accord with these principles.

Despite the qualitative nature of the research, the use of numbers and frequency counts were regarded as important techniques to verify the research expectations and subsequent judgements of agreement or disagreement. According to Miles and Huberman (1994:253), the "number of times" and "consistency" judgements, almost unconsciously made by the researcher during the analysis phase, are based on counting. Robson (1993:401) is of the opinion that not all qualitative data should be converted into quantitative data, but that if the researcher wants to make statements about frequencies, it is better to use numbers. The researcher also shared Robson's view that not all qualitative data are suitable for quantification. Unique features of a case for example cannot be quantified, although it may support a specific theoretical proposition.

The coding and analysis of data were done manually, as well as the counting of numbers and frequencies, that provided an indication of the degree of agreement or disagreement of variables across cases. The rationale was to establish the amount of evidence confirming or rejecting the research expectations. As a result of the relative small sample and the diversity of the information sources, it was, however, not possible to determine a specific threshold for all the categories of data at which point it could be said that the evidence suggested a specific tendency. In those cases where counting of data was possible, a majority of 50 per cent and more, were interpreted as a tendency in support or against the research expectation.

It should also be recognised that the aim of this study was not to "test" the conceptual framework through quantitative means, but to elaborate on the "usefulness" of the framework as an analytical instrument to describe and explain the occurrence of residential burglary. This approach can be compared with a statement by Dooley (1990:282), that "exploratory qualitative research seeks to build theory rather than test it".

### 3.12.2 Secondary data analysis

Whereas the primary data analysis focussed on the research data, gathered through the case study interviews in the micro-environment, secondary analysis was conducted on official crime statistics from the Department of Safety and Security and research data available through other research institutions. According to Neuman (1997:285) secondary analysis is increasingly used by researchers, for reasons that it is relatively inexpensive; it permits comparisons across groups, nations, or time, and it allows asking about issues not thought of by the original researchers. Possible disadvantages of secondary analysis are that the data may be incomplete for the purposes of the study, or that the original data may contain errors that the secondary researcher is not able to detect (Bailey, 1987:296).

Secondary analysis was applied in this study to describe and explain residential burglary patterns and tendencies in the macro- and meso-environment, where the macro-environment referred to the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area and South Africa as a whole, and the meso-environment, the case study areas in Pretoria West and Pretoria East. The main sources of information were crime statistics from the SAPS, and survey data from crime studies undertaken by, *inter alia*, the ISS, the Community Safety Unit of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), and Statistics South Africa (see Table 3.2). The researcher also made use of secondary data, such as maps and residential site values, obtained from the City Council of Pretoria. The findings that derived from secondary analysis were particularly used in Chapter 4 to describe and explain residential burglary patterns at the macro- and meso-levels.

Although mainly descriptive in nature, the researcher also made use of tables, lists and taxonomies to illustrate the research findings in Chapters 4 and 5.

### 3.13 CRITERIA FOR TRUSTWORTHINESS

Lincoln and Guba (1985:294-301) argued that conventional criteria for quantitative data, namely: 'internal validity', 'external validity', 'reliability', and 'objectivity' are inappropriate when dealing with qualitative case study data. They introduced four categories of criteria or strategies that can be applied to improve the 'trustworthiness' and 'authenticity' of qualitative research, namely: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. The pioneering work that was done by Lincoln and Guba (1985), was later complemented by other social scientists such as Lincoln (1985), Krefting (1991), Robson (1993), and Miles and Huberman (1994).

It is expected of any study to subject the final findings and conclusions to a set of criteria that will judge the quality or standard of the research undertaken. In a quantitative approach statistical methods and tests can be applied to ensure a certain level of validity and reliability, which is not the case in a qualitative approach. It was therefore decided to apply the criteria as advocated by Lincoln and Guba (1985) in this study, which can be summarised as follows:

- **Credibility** (equivalent to 'internal validity'): The goal with credibility is to demonstrate that the research was carried out in a way that ensures that the subject of the research was accurately identified and described. In this way the study should portrait a picture of authenticity, and should make sense to the readers.
- **Transferability** ('external validity'): Transferability tells whether the conclusions of the study have any larger import, or to what extent it can be generalised. The application of a theoretical framework can provide a basis for 'analytical generalisation' in as much as the research (case studies) ties into the framework of theory.
- **Dependability** ('reliability'): Dependability explains whether the processes followed in the research can be regarded as consistent, well documented, and reasonable stable over time and across researchers and methods.
- **Confirmability** ('objectivity'): By confirmability is understood relative neutrality and a minimization of researcher biases.

Miles and Huberman (1994:280) added a fifth dimension to the criteria for trustworthiness, namely: application or utilisation, to indicate the value of the findings and conclusions for

other researchers, institutions or possible consumers. Since one of the main objectives of this study is to provide a conceptual framework that would enhance a better understanding of residential burglary, and which could be applied in the construction of appropriate local crime prevention initiatives, it meets with such a criterion.

Throughout this study the researcher strove to maintain a high standard of research integrity by bearing in mind the five criteria as described. The credibility of the findings were largely embedded in the scientific methodology used for data collection and analysis, and the meaningfulness of the descriptions. There was a purposeful selection of complementary methods and data sources that would enable the researcher to seek for converging conclusions and coherent explanations of the phenomenon under research. This approach is also known as 'triangulation' where multiple perspectives for mutual confirmation of data are used to ensure that all aspects of a phenomenon have been investigated (Krefting, 1991:219). The results and findings were, for example, systematically linked to the theoretical/conceptual framework (see par 2.6).

With regard to transferability, the multi-case approach that was followed in this study did not allow for generalisation to a population wider than that of the cases involved. In as far the findings were congruent with, connected to, or confirmatory of the conceptual framework, it is possible to speak of analytical validity, which may allow for theory-connected transferability of findings to other cases or settings of a similar nature.

Dependability was enhanced by the fact that the research questions, research strategy and conceptual framework were constructed on a strong theoretical basis, within clearly defined research parameters. The data were also collected across a wide range of respondents, settings and institutions to ensure a meaningful parallelism across various data sources.

To increase confirmability, the research design, methodology and procedures that guided the research process, including data collection, processing and analysis were well described and documented, and were executed in the most objective manner possible.

### **3.14 CONCLUSION**

The main objective of this chapter was to describe and explain the methodology used in this study and how it was customised to suit the requirements of the study as a whole. The results and findings of the research are analysed and interpreted in the following two chapters. In Chapter 4 an interpretation is given of the residential burglary patterns in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area (the macro-environment) and in the two case study areas of Pretoria West and Pretoria East (the meso-environment).

## CHAPTER 4

# RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE MACRO AND MESO-ENVIRONMENT

*Given the motivation of an individual to commit an offence, the actual commission of an offence is the end result of a multi-staged decision process which seeks out and identifies, within the general environment, a target or victim positioned in time and space.*

- Brantingham and Brantingham (1984:337)

### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

Although the main focus of this study was to investigate the occurrence of residential burglary in the micro-environment, it was deemed necessary to provide an overview of the spatial patterns of residential burglary at a macro and meso-level (the general environment). For the purpose of this study, residential burglary at a macro-level referred to the Greater Pretoria area, and how it compared with other cities and the country as a whole, whereas the meso-level referred to the police station areas, with specific reference to the two case study areas, in the Greater Pretoria area.

The research on burglary patterns at the meso-level was directed by the conceptual framework (see par.2.6), and to answer to the research expectations as formulated in Paragraph 2.7, namely that it is expected that the following factors in the meso-environment will increase the risk for burglary:

- Neighbourhoods perceived as more affluent.
- Neighbourhoods that have good escape routes.
- Neighbourhoods where free (unrestricted) movement of people occur.
- Neighbourhoods that attract strangers, non-resident in the area.


Burglary patterns at the macro-level, as explained in the following section, only provided an orientation to the study and therefore no research expectations were formulated in this regard. Furthermore, the research data that were collected and analysed in Chapter 4 were primarily obtained from secondary sources (see Table 3.2).

## 4.2 RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AT A MACRO-LEVEL

### 4.2.1 Nationally

Compared to all the types of crime that were reported to the SAPS, residential crime had the highest incidence nationally (see Table 1.1). At a provincial level, four provinces, namely; Western Province, Gauteng, Northern Cape and Mpumalanga, exceeded the average RSA burglary rate for 1999 (see Fig. 4.1).

**FIGURE 4.1: RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY PER 100 000 OF THE POPULATION FOR THE PROVINCES DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY TO DECEMBER 1999**



From Figure 4.1 it was evident that the Gauteng Province, in which the research area was situated, had one of the highest residential burglary rates in South Africa. Gauteng could also be described as the richest province in South Africa with the highest Gross Geographical Product (GGP) per capita of all the provinces. Thus living in Gauteng or the

Western Cape constitute a greater risk of becoming a victim of residential burglary than in any other province in South Africa.

According to a crime victim survey done by the ISS in 1998 of the Greater Pretoria area, 54,6 per cent of the respondents (out of a sample of 2 547 people) indicated that they were victims of at least one crime between 1993 and April 1998 (Louw, 1998:12). Pretoria registered a higher overall victimisation rate than Cape Town, which recorded a 49 per cent rate in a similar study, but registered a lower victimisation rate than Durban (59 per cent) and Johannesburg (62 per cent) (Louw, 1998:15). In the study it was also found that burglary was the most common type of crime in Pretoria (27 per cent of all the crimes), followed by vehicle theft (19 per cent). This trend concurred with other metropolitan areas such as Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town where burglary was also registered as the most common crime.

#### **4.2.2 Residential burglary in the SAPS Pretoria Area**

The SAPS Pretoria area consists of 28 police stations which encompasses an area larger than the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area. Figure 4.2 provides a ranking of the priority crimes in the SAPS Pretoria area, as recorded for 1998 and 1999. Residential burglary was by far the most common crime recorded.

These official figures were confirmed by another survey on crime patterns in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area that was conducted in 1998 by the Community Safety Unit of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) to assist the Pretoria Council in the formulation of a crime prevention strategy for the Greater Pretoria (Rauch, 1998:1). In the IDASA study, interviews were conducted with the station commissioners at each of the 22 police stations in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area during the period of March to April 1998. According to the study, the crime problems most commonly cited by the station commissioners in Pretoria, could be categorised as property crimes, these included the following (Rauch, 1998:5):


- Residential burglary (cited at 21 stations and rated as the “number 1” crime problem).
- Theft of motor vehicles (cited at 19 stations).
- Theft out of motor vehicles (cited at 17 stations).

The next most commonly cited category of crimes was violent crimes, which include armed robbery, rape, street robbery and assault.

The responses from the station commissioners suggested that property crime could be

regarded as more prevalent and more serious than crimes involving inter-personal violence in Pretoria. A possible explanation can be that violent crimes are less visible and generally more concentrated in the black townships, which have traditionally been neglected by the police in respect of crime prevention activities and criminal investigations (Rauch, 1998:6).

**FIGURE 4.2: PRIORITY CRIMES IN THE SAPS PRETORIA AREA: 1998 AND 1999**



### 4.2.3 Impact of residential burglary

As a result of the non-violent nature of most residential burglaries, there may be a tendency to underestimate the effect of residential burglary on people's lives. The high occurrence rate of this type of crime has a significant impact on the number of people experiencing financial losses and their feelings of safety. Despite the possible psychological effects on burglary victims, it can also have a ripple effect on the insurance as well as the private security industries.

In the SAPS Pretoria area alone, 18 171 households were affected by residential burglaries during 1999. Taking into account that a conservative estimate of the average damage

experienced during a single residential burglary event in the Pretoria area, amounts to R10 000 (confirmed by the Pretoria West and Garsfontein police stations, and two independent insurance companies), then the annual financial loss experienced by households in Pretoria during 1999 amounted to approximately R180 million. This figure does not include the cost of the replacement of goods, medical costs as a result of traumatisation, nor increased insurance fees, or expenses with regard to improved security measures.

### **4.3 RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AT A MESO-LEVEL**

Brantingham and Brantingham (1984:365) attributed the actual pattern of burglary within a particular city to “the residential patterning of the people motivated to commit offences; the spatial patterning of the potential targets and victims; and the presence or absence of factors that help criminals to identify targets that will yield a reasonable payoff with little risk”. This suggests the presence of spatial variation in opportunities for different crimes in the greater metropolitan areas.

The spatial patterning of residential burglary will differ from other types of crime. Traditionally, high crime areas (where crimes are committed) are associated with factors such as neighbourhood decay, social disorganisation, economic deprivation, sub-cultural norms, social ecology and the vulnerability of places (Harrell & Gouvis, 1994:4-7). In the case of residential burglary, however, all neighbourhoods should be regarded as target areas, although the nature and extent of the burglaries would differ from area to area. Affluent areas, for example, may be targeted by burglars for the valuable goods, whilst less-affluent areas on the other hand may be targeted due to the absence of appropriate security measures. Even the poorest households could have goods that are in high demand for burglary, for example, a radio or a Hi Fi.

#### **4.3.1 Distribution of residential burglary in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area**

Of the 28 police stations in the SAPS Pretoria area, 22 stations fall within the boundaries of the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area. Table 4.1 provides a list of the police stations in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area, as well as the estimated populations within each of the areas under its jurisdiction. The following six police stations were excluded as are outside the metropolitan area boundary: Boschkop, Bronkhorstspuit, Cullinan, Hammanskraal, Kameeldrift and Welbekend.

The Greater Pretoria metropolitan area constituted three metropolitan local councils, namely

the City Council of Pretoria, the Northern Pretoria Metropolitan Sub-Structure, and the Centurion Town Council. From the estimated population (see Table 4.1), it was evident that the police stations that served former black “townships”, such as Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, Akasia, Rietgat, and Soshanguve, had a higher population density.

**TABLE 4.1: POLICE STATIONS IN THE GREATER PRETORIA METROPOLITAN AREA**

<b>POLICE STATIONS IN THE THREE METROPOLITAN LOCAL COUNCILS OF THE GREATER PRETORIA METROPOLITAN AREA, PLUS ESTIMATED POPULATIONS</b>		
<b>CITY COUNCIL OF PRETORIA</b>	<b>NORTHERN PRETORIA METROPOLITAN SUB-STRUCTURE</b>	<b>CENTURION TOWN COUNCIL</b>
Atteridgeville (280 000) Brooklyn (110 000) Eersterust (80 000) Garsfontein (80 000) Hercules (42 000) Mamelodi (300 000) Pretoria Central (45 000) Pretoria-Moot (30 000) Pretoria North (24 000) Pretoria West (65 000) Silverton (180 000) Sinoville (102 000) Sunnyside (75 000) Villieria (48 000) Wonderboompoort (24 000)	Akasia (310 000) Rietgat (339 000) Soshanguve (201 000)	Erasmia (60 000) Laudium (45 000) Lyttelton (106 000) Wierdabrug (141 000)

*Source: Population estimates per police station area were provided by the SAPS Pretoria area, 2000*

The distribution of residential burglaries per police station area in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area in the period 1995 to 1999 is given in Table 4.2. Burglaries per 100 000 were based on the population estimates as provided by the office of the SAPS Pretoria area (see Table 4.1).

According to Table 4.2, Garsfontein police station area registered by far the highest average residential burglary rate per 100 000 population. Of the 22 police station areas, 12 stations had an average burglary rate above the RSA 1999 burglary rate, of which nine stations were above the Gauteng 1999 burglary rate (see Fig. 4.1). If the actual (crude) burglary figures were taken into account, the four police station areas of Garsfontein, Wierdabrug, Lyttelton, and Brooklyn accounted for nearly 40 per cent of the total residential burglaries committed in 1999 in Greater Pretoria metropolitan area.

Taking the analysis further, police stations were grouped together according to their burglary rates per 100 000 to create four categories, ranging from below 500 burglaries per 100 000 to above 1500 burglaries per 100 000 (see Table 4.3). Most of the police stations that registered a burglary rate below 1000 are located in formerly black areas, or included areas

of informal settlements. Exceptions were Pretoria Central, which included the CBD, and Erasmia, which included farming areas and smallholdings. On the contrary, the police stations that registered a burglary rate above 1000 are located in former white only suburbs, classified as middle to high income areas. Factors that could influence people's decisions to report or not to report a burglary, are explained in Paragraph 4.3.2.

**TABLE 4.2: RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES PER POLICE STATION AREA IN THE GREATER PRETORIA METROPOLITAN AREA: 1995-1999**

Police station areas	Actual burglaries: 1995-1999					Burglaries per 100 000 population					
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	AV
1. Garsfontein	1905	1903	1882	1537	1943	2381	2379	2353	1921	2429	2293
2. Pretoria North	359	399	340	328	362	1496	1663	1417	1367	1508	1490
3. Lyttelton	1329	1459	1350	1323	1564	1253	1376	1273	1248	1475	1325
4. Sunnyside	1098	1126	850	836	1046	1464	1501	1133	1114	1394	1321
5. Wierdabrug	1537	1670	2036	2057	1689	1090	1184	1444	1458	1198	1275
6. Wonderboompoort	297	328	326	307	246	1238	1367	1358	1279	1025	1253
7. Villieria	542	617	640	557	643	1129	1285	1333	1160	1339	1249
8. Brooklyn	1441	1319	1438	1243	1258	1310	1199	1307	1130	1144	1218
9. Hercules	481	586	466	446	465	1145	1395	1110	1062	1107	1164
10. Pretoria-Moot	313	279	299	279	379	1043	930	997	930	1263	1033
11. Pretoria West	519	704	572	571	762	799	1084	881	879	1173	963
12. Pretoria Central	419	458	375	332	504	931	1018	833	738	1120	928
13. Sinoville	808	884	819	834	712	792	866	803	817	698	795
14. Erasmia	366	369	332	301	309	610	615	553	502	515	559
15. Eersterust	355	374	363	332	361	444	468	454	415	451	446
16. Silverton	653	722	681	769	641	363	401	379	428	356	385
17. Laudium	148	183	169	127	146	329	407	376	282	324	344
18. Mamelodi	800	871	923	870	806	266	290	307	290	268	284
19. Akasia	712	731	712	862	867	230	236	290	278	280	263
20. Soshanguve	369	380	424	384	373	184	189	211	191	186	192
21. Rietgat	666	631	669	534	634	197	186	197	158	187	185
22. Atteridgeville	352	481	505	572	548	126	172	180	204	196	176
Total:	15469	16474	16356	15401	16258						

Source of raw data: *Burglary statistics provided by the office of the Pretoria SAPS area Commissioner, 2000*

### 4.3.2 Accuracy of residential burglary rates

When using police crime statistics in a study, it should be recognised that the reported number of burglaries does not necessarily reflect the real levels of burglaries, due to the possibility of under-reporting of crime in general. The reporting and recording of crime events may also vary from one neighbourhood to another. In this study, police crime

statistics for the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area were used to determine crime tendencies and not to provide an accurate measure of crime levels. When the burglary rates per 100 000 of the population are interpreted, cognisance should be taken of the possible effect of the following factors:

**TABLE 4.3: CATEGORIES OF POLICE STATIONS IN THE GREATER PRETORIA METROPOLITAN AREA ACCORDING TO RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES**

GROUPING OF POLICE STATIONS IN THE GREATER PRETORIA METROPOLITAN AREA ACCORDING TO THE AVERAGE RATIO OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES PER 100 000 POPULATION: 1995-1999			
≤ 500	500 - 1000	1000 - 1500	≥ 1500
Akasia Atteridgeville Eersterust Laudium Mamelodi Rietgat Silverton Soshanguwe	Erasmia Pretoria Central Pretoria West Sinoville	Brooklyn Hercules Lyttelton Pretoria-Moot Pretoria North Sunnyside Villieria Wierdabrug Wonderboompoort	Garsfontein

#### 4.3.2.1 Population estimates

In order to be able to compare burglary rates between police station areas, it was necessary to express the burglary rate as per 100 000 of the population in a specific police station area. To obtain accurate population statistics per police station area was difficult, because the boundaries of the police station areas did not coincide with the population census enumeration areas. Another factor was that the census data of 1996 generally underestimated the true population figures for the Pretoria area, and in some of the police station areas informal settlements have sprung up since the 1996 census. The population estimates per police station area that were used in the study were provided by the SAPS Pretoria area. Although the SAPS population estimates might not be accurate, and this could influence the calculation of the burglary rates per 100 000, it nonetheless provided a basis for comparison between police station areas.

#### 4.3.2.2 Reporting of crime

The under-reporting of crimes is a worldwide phenomenon and should be acknowledged when interpreting crime statistics. According to the ISS crime victim survey in Pretoria in 1998, 69 per cent of the victims indicated that they did report the crime incident to the police. This represented a higher reporting rate than other South African cities, for example in Johannesburg, where 61,5 per cent of the respondents said they reported their most recent experiences of crime to the police (Louw, 1998:18). Crime reporting rates for Pretoria are in

line with those of other countries such as Britain and the United States. The most recent British Crime Survey, for example, recorded a reporting rate of 67 per cent for serious offences (Louw, 1998:18).

A racial breakdown of reporting patterns in Pretoria revealed that 73 per cent of the white victims reported crime incidents in which they were involved, in comparison to 69 per cent of black victims, and 47 per cent of coloured victims (Louw, 1998:18). In the ISS Pretoria crime victim survey (Louw, 1998:23), various explanations were given by the victims of crime for not reporting crimes (all types) to the police, of which the following were the most common:

- The crime was not regarded as serious enough (30 per cent).
- The police were regarded as inefficient (25 per cent).
- Thought it was of no use, since the culprit could not be identified (19 per cent).
- Fear of reprisals (11 per cent).
- Dealt with in another way, for example, to report the incident to a private security company, or to take the law into their own hands (11 per cent).
- Felt ashamed (6 per cent).

#### **4.3.2.3 Insurance**

The two crime types in Pretoria that were most often reported to the police were car theft and hijacking (89 per cent), and burglary (81 per cent) (Louw, 1998:20). One important reason for this could be that victims could then make insurance claims, although only 45 per cent of the victims of property crimes in the ISS Pretoria survey said they had insurance cover. Only 15 per cent of the respondents living in the townships in Pretoria said they had insurance cover for their property, compared to 63 per cent of respondents living in traditional white suburbs. From these figures it could be concluded that a significant proportion of people who did not have insurance cover also reported crime incidents. According to Louw (1998:23), an analysis of the International Crime Victim Survey data of fifty nations in 1992 had shown that higher income level was the most important factor related to the reporting of crime, followed by the perceived seriousness of the event.

#### **4.3.3 Relationship between site values and burglary rates**

In order to investigate the relationship between reported residential burglary and the affluence of an area, it was decided to take the average site value of a police station area as an indicator of affluence. Although other measures of affluence also existed, for example, the average income per household, the site values were regarded as an appropriate measure to describe the physical appearance of affluence. In this regard the municipal site

values were a good indicator of the market value of land in a specific residential area. The site values as determined by the Property Valuation Directorate of the City Council of Pretoria were used in this study. The method of calculating the site values is prescribed in the Local Authorities Rating Ordinance of 1977 (Ordinance 11 of 1977) of Gauteng, which states that "the site value of land or the site value of the right in land which shall be the amount which such land or right in land would have realised if sold on the date of valuation in the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer, but on the assumption that the improvements, if any, had not been made". In practice the site value reflects the market price of sites in a specific residential area. It is thus justified to assume that the higher the average site value in a specific residential area is, the more affluent that specific area will be.

Each police station area (see Table 4.4) comprises a number of neighbourhoods, of which some have quite different site values. The Garsfontein police station area, for example, comprises of 12 neighbourhoods, with site values that vary from R45 000 to R110 000. A few police station areas are representative of a more homogeneous residential area, such as Wonderdoornpoort, Pretoria-Moot, Sinoville, Eersterust, and Mamelodi, with less varying site values.

**TABLE 4.4: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SITE VALUE AND BURGLARY RATES**

POLICE STATIONS IN THE AREA OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF PRETORIA	AVERAGE BURGLARY RATE PER 100 000 (1995-1999)	RANKING	RANGE IN SITE VALUES IN POLICE STATION AREAS (IN RAND)	RANKING
1. Garsfontein	2619	1	45 000 - 110 000	3
2. Pretoria North	1490	2	30 000 - 65 000	5
3. Sunnyside	1321	3	115 000 - 140 000	1
4. Wonderboompoort	1253	4	70 000	4
5. Villieria	1249	5	38 000 - 65 000	6
6. Brooklyn	1218	6	65 000 - 140 000	2
7. Hercules	1164	7	18 000 - 25 000	12
8. Pretoria-Moot	1033	8	45 000	9
9. Pretoria Central	928	9	18 000 - 45 000	10
10. Sinoville	795	10	60 000	7
11. Pretoria West	569	11	20 000 - 30 000	11
12. Eersterust	446	12	8 000	14
13. Silverton	385	13	8 000 - 88 000	8
14. Mamelodi	284	14	6 000	15
15. Atteridgeville	176	15	10 000 - 20 000	13

The figures in Table 4.4 confirm the tendency that higher site values correlate with higher levels in residential burglary. Only in one of the cases, namely; Pretoria North, Brooklyn, Hercules and Silverton was a substantial difference between the rankings in the burglary rates and the rankings in the site values noted. These differences could be exaggerated by factors such as inaccurate population figures or the residential composition of the police station areas. The Brooklyn Police station area, for example, includes the University of Pretoria with student residences, as well as affluent neighbourhoods such as Waterkloof that probably enjoy a high degree of security protection, and the presence of many security protected embassies situated in this area.

This tendency corresponds with the findings of the National Victims of Crime Survey (South Africa, 1998:iii), which found that the wealthiest households were at greater risk of falling victim to household-related property crimes than the less wealthy households. According to Schönsteich (2001:6), residents in the wealthiest areas are the most likely victims of individual property crimes but the least likely victims of violent crimes.

#### **4.4 RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE CASE STUDY AREAS**

Within the meso-environment of the Pretoria two police station areas were selected as case study areas, namely, Garsfontein and Pretoria West. In this section attention will be given to the relative importance of residential burglary in relation to other crime types and the interpretation of spatial patterns. For this purpose crime statistics from Mamelodi, a former black residential areas, was included in the research as a basis of comparison with the two case study areas. In Chapter 5 the individual cases will be analysed and interpreted in the micro-environment.


##### **4.4.1 Crime statistics**

Figure 4.3 provides a comparison of the dominant crimes in the three police station areas. It is evident from Figure 4.3 that the Garsfontein police station area was burdened by property crimes, ranging from residential burglary, theft out of motor vehicles, theft of motor vehicles, to the burglary of businesses. Relative to property crimes other types of crime were less prevalent in the Garsfontein area. In the Pretoria West police station area, property crimes also ranked first, with residential burglary as the second most common crime in the area. In the Pretoria West area, however, there was a much smaller gap between the number of property crimes and violent crimes, such as assault, robbery and rape, than in the case of the Garsfontein area. In the case of Mamelodi, violent crimes, such as assault, could be regarded as having the higher incidence rate, although residential burglary also constituted a problem, ranking in second position. Mamelodi also experienced other crime problems, such as the possession of unlicensed firearms and the hijacking of vehicles, when compared

to the case study areas. A similar crime pattern emerged in Atteridgeville, another former black area.

From these figures it could be concluded that residential burglary constituted a grave problem for the three police stations, in fact for most other police stations in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area, yet, when compared to other crimes, residential burglary had a very high profile in the Garsfontein area.

**FIGURE 4.3: RANKING OF PRIORITY CRIMES IN CASE STUDY AREAS: 1999**



Source of raw data: Crime statistics provided by the office of the SAPS Pretoria area Commissioner, 2000

**4.4.2 Spatial patterns**

The plotting of the location of residential burglaries in the two case study areas of Garsfontein and Pretoria West, for the year 1998, displayed a fairly evenly distribution

pattern. Without additional information associated with the location of burglaries, the mere mapping of the burglary incidents did not provide a satisfactory explanation of the spatial patterns. It was, for example, not possible to link the distribution of burglaries to specific physical features, such as the closeness of main roads. This confirms the researcher's view that the spatial distribution of residential burglary in a specific area can only be explained if the situational factors at the micro-level are also taken into account, particularly the vulnerability of a residence at the time of the burglary. The vulnerability of a residence refers to factors such as the physical accessibility, security protection, occupancy, visibility, and the social interaction of the immediate neighbours.

When an attempt is made to explain the spatial patterns of residential burglary, cognisance should be taken of the "criminal opportunities" in the micro-environment. This implies a situation in which a motivated burglar comes across an attractive or vulnerable target, or is told about it by someone else, and then to act immediately or sometime later when it would be more appropriate.

Modern day computer technology makes it possible to develop powerful Geographic Information Systems (GIS) that can be applied to the spatial mapping of any phenomenon or event, at the macro- or meso- scale, and which can then be linked to many other layers of data, for example, census data, business data or environmental data. The SAPS is currently in the process of implementing a prototype of such an encompassing GIS at various police stations in the Johannesburg area. In future these initiatives may develop into an appropriate 'tool' for the mapping of crimes and to explain crime patterns through the application of link-analysis at the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels.

#### **4.5 ENVIRONMENTAL TRAITS OF THE TWO CASE STUDY AREAS**

The burglar, in search of a suitable target, will act upon previous experiences and his knowledge of a specific residential area. Cognitive mapping of the environment is thus one method burglars can apply to improve their knowledge of an area. From the literature (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981:338) it is evident that burglars who are interested in residential burglary will use environmental markers in their search for suitable targets, what routes to follow, and to identify targets that seem favourable in terms of possible risks and rewards.

From a risk analysis perspective, four factors have been identified in the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.1) that may serve as indicators of vulnerability, and which could be observed in the meso-environment, namely: visible signs of affluence, access and escape routes, free or restricted movement of vehicles and people and the presence of

**TABLE 4.5: COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE STUDY AREAS**

CATEGORY	GARSFONTEIN POLICE STATION AREA	PRETORIA WEST POLICE STATION AREA
1. Visible signs of affluence (see par. 4.3.3)	The designs, styles and sizes of residences are a reflection of a higher income residential area. The majority of residences are surrounded by high walls or fences, and have visible alarm or reaction unit billboards.	The designs, styles and sizes of residences are a reflection of a lower income residential area. Residences are more open to the streets with low walls or fences, and very few residences have visible alarm or reaction unit billboards.
2. Access routes, as well as open spaces, parks, and streams (see Fig. 3.3 & Fig. 3.4)	The area has a well developed road network, linking the neighbourhoods and provides easy access to the N1 and N4 freeways. Important main roads are: Rossouw, Meiring Naude, Simon Vermooten, Lynnwood, Louis Botha, Atterbury, Garsfontein, and Hans Strijdom. No railway line exists in the area. The Moreleta-, Garskloof-, and Faerie Glen-streams are running through the residential areas. The presence of open spaces, parks and open zones along the main roads are a common feature.	The area has a fairly well developed road network, although the neighbourhoods are more isolated between the main roads. Important main roads are: Church, Von Hagen (N4 Toll Road), D.F. Malan, Mitchell, Soutter, Quagga, Roger Dyason, and Transoranje. A railway line is running through the southern and eastern parts of the area. The Skinner-, Kwagga- and Yskor-streams running next to the neighbourhoods and not through them. The presence of open spaces, parks and open zones along the main roads are a common feature.
3. Free movement of people and vehicles within the public domain	At the time of the research in 1998, the case study area had no security villages* or security enclosed neighbourhoods** within its policing district, although some neighbourhoods were in the planning to close off their neighbourhoods. Residential complexes, with security fences and access control, however, were a common feature.	No security villages, enclosed neighbourhoods or residential complexes existed in the case study area at the time of the research in 1998. No restrictions were placed on the movement of people and vehicles in public places and on public roads.
4. Presence of strangers in area. (providing an alibi for intended burglars)	Strangers, non-resident in the area, could be linked to activities such as: - Job-seeking, begging, charity work and selling of goods. - Workers at new building projects in the Woodhill, Moreletapark, Pretoriuspark, Garsfontein, Faerie Glen and Wapadrand areas. - Gathering at large shopping centres in the residential areas of which at least 17 could be identified in the case study area.	According to the SAPS many strangers in the area are illegal immigrants from countries such as Nigeria, resident in flats in the area. Non-resident strangers could also be linked to: - Job-seeking, begging, charity. - New building projects in the Elandspoort, Lotus Gardens and Philip Nel Park areas. Contrary to Pretoria East, only three large shopping centres could be identified in the neighbourhoods.

\* According to Landman (2000:3), security villages are private developments from the outset and the management and maintenance is done by a private management body. These areas are physically walled or fenced off and have a controlled access gate with a security guard.

\*\* Enclosed neighbourhoods refer to existing neighbourhoods that have controlled access through gates or booms across existing roads. Many are fenced or walled off as well, with a limited number of controlled entrances/exits and security guards at these points in some cases.

strangers in the area. The two case study areas are compared and described in terms of visible environmental traits that could have had an influence on the burglar's decision-making process (see Table 4.5). In terms of the four categories of description of vulnerability, it is evident that both the case study areas were ideal targets for burglary, but that the conditions in the Garsfontein police area were perhaps more favourable than those in the Pretoria West police area on account of the more affluent lifestyle people experienced. The convicted burglars, interviewed during the study, also indicated that the residential areas best suited for burglaries were located in the east of Pretoria (Waterkloof, Garsfontein, Moreletapark), as well as in the Centurion area.

## 4.6 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Chapter was to give an overview of residential burglary patterns at the macro- and meso-levels, especially with regard to the frequency and spatial distribution of burglary incidents. In conclusion the following observations are made:

- Residential burglary is the most common crime reported to the SAPS in South Africa. The Western Cape and the Gauteng Provinces, including the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area, experience high levels of residential burglary when compared to the other provinces.
- In the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.1) the assumption was made that a positive correlation exists between the levels of affluence and the levels of residential burglary experienced in the same areas. This tendency was confirmed in the police station areas of the City Council of Pretoria (see Table 4.3), where a positive relationship was observed between the average site values and the residential burglary rates registered.
- Less-affluent areas, such as Pretoria West, also experienced relative high rates in reported residential burglary cases, although significantly lower than in the affluent areas in Pretoria East. Former black residential areas, such as Mamelodi, experienced a higher crime incidence rate in violent crimes than in residential burglary.
- The conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.1) also stipulated three conditions that could serve as ameliorating factors as far as the commission of residential burglaries is concerned: free access to and easy movement within the residential area and frequent presence of strangers. Through personal observation by studying of the street maps of the case study areas, as well as inquiries regarding the presence and movement of strangers in these areas, the researcher came to the conclusion (as summarised in Table 4.5) that both case study areas were relatively accessible to potential burglars, that they could move around freely, and that the presence of strangers was common in

these areas. Thus, the macro and meso-environment can be described as public space in which people have the constitutional right to move around freely.

The spatial pattern of residential burglary in the macro- and meso-environments cannot be properly explained without taking into account the local and situational conditions in the micro-environment that created the opportunity to commit the burglary. Consequently, the spatial plotting of residential burglary has little value if not interpreted alongside the factors that cause or influence the spatial pattern.

In Chapter 5, the focus shifts from the macro- and meso-level to the micro-level, in order to describe and explain the local and situational conditions that created the opportunity for the commission of a residential burglary, how the burglary was executed, and how the victims and burglars responded to the burglary.

## CHAPTER 5

# RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE MICRO-ENVIRONMENT

*For a crime to occur, there must be both an individual who wants to commit an offence and an opportunity to commit that offence.*

- Brantingham and Brantingham (1984:155)

### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Chapter 5 is to analyse and interpret the interview and case study data, with the aim to create a better understanding of what happened before, during and after the burglary event. These time sequences in the burglary process can be described as the situational conditions or risk factors that existed in the micro-environment prior to the burglary; the commission of the burglary event, and the responses of the victims and burglars after the event occurred. The conceptual framework (see par. 2.6) and the research expectations (see par. 2.7) served as the theoretical framework against which the findings could be compared and interpreted. It should be emphasised that the qualitative nature of this study did not allow for generalisations beyond the case studies involved. The findings were interpreted to reflect on the usefulness of the conceptual framework as an analytical 'tool'. Through the method of analytical comparison and agreement, the researcher searched for regularities and patterned relations in the data collected.

The findings of the research are discussed under the following headings: initial involvement of the burglars, situational conditions, the burglary event and the responses from the burglary victims and the burglars.

### 5.2 INITIAL INVOLVEMENT OF THE BURGLARS

#### 5.2.1 Burglars' motivation

In the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.2) the primary motivation of burglars was linked to the need for money, either as a means of subsistence, or to buy alcohol and drugs, or to purchase luxury goods. The corresponding research expectation reads as follows:

- Burglars are primarily motivated by the need for money (see par. 2.7.2).

The convicted burglars interviewed in the study, cited the following reasons for their involvement in residential burglary:

- More than 80 per cent of the burglars stated that they were unemployed and in need of money. In three of the cases the burglars said that they needed money to support their children (they were not married), and in one case the burglar said he bought drugs and alcohol with the money.
- In 50 per cent of the cases the burglars mentioned the influence of friends as a reason for their involvement in burglary.
- In 38 per cent of the cases the burglars indicated that they regarded burglary as a profession ("a work") that pays well. They also indicated that they usually work for a "boss" who pays them for the stolen goods.

These responses from the convicted burglars were further endorsed by the responses from the burglary victims and the experts who were interviewed. Except for one interviewee all the others were of the opinion that burglars are primarily motivated by the need for money. The reasons given by the burglary victims and experts for what they believe burglars need money for, include the following: greed, the need for a regular income, and to buy alcohol and drugs. One of the interviewees ascribed the motive to burgle to the inherent criminal tendencies within the person, and that the burglar usually looks for firearms.

During the hearing of two burglary court cases in 2000 in Pretoria, the accused told the court that they had left school early and that they were unemployed (Pretoria News, 2000). This corresponds with the evidence from the convicted burglars in this study.

A study by Reppetto (1994:21) on residential burglary and robbery in the Boston (USA) metropolitan area in the late 1960s and early 1970s, in which 97 adjudicated burglars were interviewed, the following prompted their actions: "The satisfaction of a perceived need for money ... (was) the prime motive for most burglaries, although interviewees did acknowledge such subsidiary satisfactions as excitement, revenge, curiosity and feelings of group solidarity". Only 10 per cent of the interviewees in the Reppetto study indicated that they would continue with burglary if their financial needs were satisfied.

Further confirmation for the need of money was found in a study by Bennett and Wright (1984:31-33) of 309 convicted burglars in England. According to the responses of the burglars, the following factors could be identified as important motivators:

- Offences were triggered by instrumental needs (almost invariably the need for money) (46 per cent). About half of these respondents stated that the money was needed for subsistence or basic everyday needs, and the remainder claimed that they needed the

money for pleasure pursuits such as entertainment, gambling, drinking or drug-taking.

- The decision to offend was influenced of others (friends and peer-group) (46 per cent).

It became apparent during the course of the interviews associated with this study that all the convicted burglars came from broken background environments, for example, they mentioned factors such as growing up without a father, leaving school early, involvement in gangs, using drugs and alcohol, having illegitimate children, or being unemployed. The unstable environment in which they grew up would undoubtedly have contributed to their inclination toward criminal behaviour.

Brown *et al.* (1991:483) also emphasised the importance of developmental factors that could lead to delinquency. They mentioned the following pathways leading to anti-social behaviour:

- inadequate or ineffective early socialisation processes and weak conventional bonding during childhood;
- antisocial behaviour during childhood;
- a further weakening of conventional bonding during adolescence;
- exposure to illegitimate opportunities and delinquent or criminal persons resulting in pro-delinquent socialisation or bonding; and
- the choice or belief that the “payoff” generally exceeds the risks, culminating in involvement in frequent and /or serious delinquent behaviour.

According to Conklin (1995:183), the youth get involved in delinquency when there is a lack of access to jobs in order to provide the income they need to participate in peer-group activities and to buy the clothes and other things that would win them the esteem of their friends. Taking into account the poor socio-economic conditions in South Africa at this point in time, it is to be expected that residential burglary will continue to be an illegal but viable means for burglars to ‘earn’ a livelihood or to satisfy their need/greed for money.

### **5.2.2 Burglars’ search for suitable targets**

The rational choice model (see par. 2.3.3) is most often cited to explain the search behaviour of burglars, which in essence means that the potential burglar will try to maximise the yield of his actions, in terms of financial gain, and to minimise the risks of loss and judicial penalty (Trasler, 1986:23). Although criminal behaviour cannot always be explained in rational terms, it cannot be denied that burglars make decisions based upon previous

experiences, the advice of others, or to adhere to methods that are well-practised and familiar.

According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1984:344), burglars do not move randomly through space, but follow a patterned information-processing routine in target selection. They argued that the objective world is interpreted by the burglars, and cues are selectively used to construct images or templates of "good" and "bad" crime sites, which the burglars then use predictively to select suitable targets. Once the 'template' is established, it becomes relatively fixed and influences future search behaviour, thereby becoming self-reinforcing.

In the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.2) a distinction was made between amateur and professional burglars as postulated by Beirne and Messerschmidt (1995:153). Amateur burglars were described as part-time burglars who commit unsophisticated, opportunistic burglaries when a suitable target arises while involved in other routine activities (lawful or unlawful). To the contrary, professional burglars tend to be older, more specialised, who employ considerable skill and planning in executing a burglary and select targets of substantial value, for example, the stealing of jewellery.

From the theoretical perspectives in the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.2), the following interrelated research expectations (see par. 2.7.2) relating to target selection were formulated, and served as a reference during the research process:

- Burglars will tend to follow a patterned routine in the selection of suitable targets.
- Subsequently, professional burglars will operate in a well-planned manner.
- Amateur burglars will operate in an opportunistic manner.

During the interviews the burglars were asked to explain the *modus operandi* they followed in the search for a suitable target. From the responses it was possible to identify two basic approaches, which could be explained as follows:

- In the first approach the burglars followed a planned routine to gather information and to identify potential targets. Different methods were used to gather information prior to the selection of a suitable target, which included: driving around in the neighbourhood until a suitable target was spotted; making use of informants, e.g. job-seekers or domestic workers, they would even bribe these workers if need be. After the potential target has been selected, the burglars would continue to observe the target for two to three days to determine the number of residents, their movement patterns or routine activities, or whether they were on vacation. The burglars in this category usually worked in groups

and made use of modern technology such as cellular phones and motor vehicles. This category of burglars also corresponds with Beirne and Messerschmidt's (1995) description of professional burglars. Seventy per cent of the burglars in the present study could be classified in this category.

- In the second approach burglars acted in an opportunistic manner to identify a suitable target. Burglars in this category would usually work alone or with one partner. They moved on foot, looking for the right opportunity to commit a burglary. In the process they knocked on doors, rang the intercom, looking for signs that indicate the absence of residents, for example, no vehicles visible, locked gates, junk mail in the driveway, exterior lights on, or a dog in the house during the day. Sometimes they would only steal a bicycle from the site, not entering the residence. They might even return to a residence where they were previously employed, knowing the area and the movements of the residents. Thirty per cent of the burglars in the present study could be classified in this category.

In this study it was found that some of the burglars who regarded themselves as professionals, would sometimes decide to operate alone and in a more opportunistic manner. Two of the burglars who were interviewed indicated that they might either participate in a more organised burglary operation, or decide to act alone should an opportunity arise. It was therefore not regarded appropriate to distinguish between professional and amateur burglars as proposed in the research expectations (see par. 2.7.2), but rather to distinguish between planned and opportunistic burglaries.

The professional burglars explained their *modus operandi* in selecting a suitable target best. The burglars who were inclined to operate more opportunistically could also describe their *modus operandi*, but in less specific terms. The fact that both categories of burglars were able to describe their *modus operandi* for identifying suitable targets, confirmed the expectation that burglars would tend to follow a patterned routine in the selection of a suitable target. In the burglary study of Reppetto (1974:17), approximately 75 per cent of the burglars interviewed, indicated that they were engaged in some kind of planning prior to the burglary.

Bennett and Wright (1984:148) distinguished between three categories of burglaries, namely "opportunistic", a "search offence" and a "planned" burglary. They defined burglaries as "opportunistic" if the decision to burgle was precipitated by the chance discovery of a suitable target and the offence was committed immediately. The authors further defined the second category, a "search offence" as taking place when the burglars decided to commit a burglary, after seeking an opportunity and then committing the offence on discovery of a

suitable target. A burglary was defined as “planned” if there was a time gap between the selection of the target and the commission of the offence. More than 50 per cent of the burglars in their study described “planned” offences as the typical style of offending, with “search” offending just under 50 per cent, and very few as “opportunistic” offences.

The convicted burglars in the present study were also asked to give reasons why they selected a specific target (Question 1.5 in Appendix 2). Their responses are analysed in Table 5.1. It was possible to create categories of factors from the burglars’ responses and to prioritise them according to the frequency mentioned by the convicted burglars.

**TABLE 5.1: REASONS GIVEN BY BURGLARS FOR SELECTING A SPECIFIC TARGET**

CATEGORY OF FACTORS	RATING	CUES CITED BY THE BURGLARS
1. Burglars had prior knowledge of area and potential victims	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Knowing the area</li> <li>- Worked in the garden before</li> <li>- Information from the domestic workers or gardeners</li> <li>- Knew the movement patterns of the residents</li> </ul>
2. Absence of guardians (residents or neighbours)	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The street was very quiet</li> <li>- No signs of occupants (being afraid of making contact with the residents)</li> <li>- No neighbours/onlookers in sight</li> </ul>
3. Ease of access and escape routes	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Residence is near to main road</li> <li>- Residence is next to open field</li> </ul>
4. Design features of residence	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Signs of affluence</li> <li>- Concealed entrances</li> </ul>
5. Absence of security measures	5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Absence of armed response</li> <li>- Low surveillance (neighbours looking on)</li> <li>- Barking dogs (especially during the night)</li> <li>- Shelter to hide</li> <li>(Burglars indicated that such measures would not necessarily put them off, it would only make them more cautious)</li> </ul>
6. Other factors	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Rainy nights (with lightning, thunder and dogs barking - the break-in events can go unnoticed)</li> </ul>

From the responses the researcher was convinced that the convicted burglars had a good idea of what they perceived as a suitable target, although they were not always consciously aware of all the factors involved, and might even have acted upon an intuitive feeling of what seemed to be an appropriate target. In this regard cognisance should be taken of the fact that the decision-making processes of burglars can be influenced by a combination of driving forces, including environmental factors, personality, socio-economic needs and the level of motivation.

In the burglary study of Reppetto (1974:16), the interviewees gave the following reasons for the selection of a particular target:

- ease of access (mentioned by 44 per cent);
- appears affluent (41 per cent);
- feels inconspicuous - presence will not be questioned (21 per cent);
- isolated neighbourhood (19 per cent);
- few police security patrols (19 per cent); and
- anonymity of neighbours (12 per cent).

Most of the factors identified in this study (see Table 5.1) were in accordance with what Repetto found in his study, for example, ease of access, appearance of affluence, and the absence of guardians, which could intervene in the burglary. For the burglars, the primary focus was on the possible rewards, in terms of stolen goods, and therefore would intentionally try to evade contact with the residents or other guardians, afraid of the risk of being caught.

### 5.3 SITUATIONAL CONDITIONS

When the burglar's path intersects with a potential target, in time and space, the immediate situational conditions influence the burglar's final decision whether or not to proceed with the burglary event. In the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.4), the following situational factors were identified as having a possible effect on the vulnerability of a potential target, namely: a time that suits the burglar, attractive physical design features of the residence and its surroundings, absence of guardians and surveillance and the lack of adequate security and protection.

Against this theoretical background, 24 interviews were conducted within the selected case studies areas (see par. 3.8) to determine the appropriateness of the conceptual framework as an instrument to analyse and interpret residential burglary. For each of the case studies a risk profile was compiled after the interviews had been completed to determine the vulnerability attached to each of the residences. In this section the findings of the case studies, with reference to situational conditions, were grouped and discussed under four clusters of vulnerability factors, namely: vulnerabilities relating to the residents, vulnerabilities relating to surveillance, vulnerabilities relating to the physical design and vulnerabilities relating to security protection.

#### 5.3.1 Vulnerabilities relating to the residents

In the research expectations (see par. 2.7.3), the following situational conditions, relating to


the residents, were postulated as possible risk factors:

- When the residents are away from home.
- When the residents are at home but asleep.
- When the residents are single.
- When the residents are elderly.
- When the residents act carelessly.

It was found in this study that in 66,6 per cent of the burglary cases, the residents were absent from home during the incident. For the Garsfontein area, this percentage was even higher standing at 83 per cent of the burglary cases. For the Pretoria West area, it was 50 per cent of the cases (see Fig. 5.1).

It is significant to note that for the remainder 33,3 per cent of the cases, the burglaries occurred during the night whilst the residents were at home and asleep. The values for the Garsfontein and Pretoria West areas respectively were 17 per cent and 50 per cent (see Fig. 5.1).

**FIGURE 5.1: RESIDENTS' PRESENCE OR ABSENCE DURING THE BURGLARIES**



From these findings it was evident that residences were more at risk of being targeted for burglary during periods when the residents were away from home or during the night when the residents were asleep, confirming the research expectations with regard to residents'

absence or being asleep during burglaries.

In his study, Reppetto (1974:48) found a much higher burglary rate among dwellings with a low occupancy rate, than among dwellings with a high occupancy rate. In the Bennett and Wright (1984:77) study, over 90 per cent of the burglars indicated that they had been “put off” by occupied buildings.

Only 13 per cent of the burglary victims in the present study could be classified as single residents, whilst 17 per cent of the victims could be classified as single mothers with children in the home. Only in one case could the burglary victim, a female in her late 60's, be classified as elderly and single. As a result of the small sample of cases involved, it was not possible to make significant conclusions about the risks involved in being single, except that they all expressed the awareness that they were probably at greater risk as burglary victims. Except for one case, they all experienced at least one previous incidence of burglary in the last three years. The elderly woman, for example, had experienced three burglaries in the last three years, between 1996 and 1998.

With regard to possible carelessness on the side of the residents, it was found that in 25 per cent of all the cases, there were indications of negligence on the part of the residents. In two of the cases the burglars could gain entrance through open windows without burglar bars; in another two cases there were no security gates at the front and back doors; in one case the residents left a note at the front gate notifying their absence over the weekend; and in the last instance the residents left the house unattended for a weekend soon after they had moved in, leaving most of the goods still in crates. The observation was made that residents were not careless on purpose, but unintentionally created opportunities for burglary through their routine activities, or through ignoring adequate precautionary measures by being thoughtless.

### 5.3.2 Vulnerabilities relating to the surveillance


In the research expectations (see par. 2.7.3), the following situational conditions, relating to surveillance, were postulated as possible risk factors:

- During periods when the residence is vulnerable due to low surveillance.
- When there is poor visibility around the residence.

The information that was gathered through the case study interviews suggested two time periods when residences were most at risk in the Garsfontein area (see Fig. 5.2), namely between 24:00 mid-night and 06:00 in the morning (in 42 per cent of the cases), and

between 06:00 in the morning and 12:00 noon (in 33 per cent of the cases). In the Pretoria West area the risk period only centred around the period, 24:00 midnight to 06:00 in the morning, in 84 per cent of the burglaries. Hypothetical, the evenings could also be regarded as a risk period, when residents usually went out for entertainment and social activities, especially over weekends, although the majority of respondents reported that they seldom went out in the evenings.

**FIGURE 5.2: TIME OF THE CASE STUDY BURGLARIES**



The risk periods for burglary coincided with the time of the night and day when most of the residents were either asleep or away at work, whilst the children (if any) were at school or at a day care centre. Over weekends, absence from home usually coincided with activities such as shopping, sport, church attendance or other recreational activities. These risk periods, as portrayed in Figure 5.2, also coincided with time intervals when informal surveillance in the neighbourhoods was at its lowest, due to the reduced outdoor activities or movement of neighbourhood people during these periods. The differences in the burglary rates in the different time slots between the Garsfontein and Pretoria West areas, could be attributed to the fact that, in the Pretoria West area, more houses were occupied during the day; the neighbours were more involved with each other; and the residential sites more open with good visibility, whilst in the Garsfontein area more houses were left unattended during the day time. The visibility factor in the Garsfontein area was lower due to big trees and shrubs in the gardens as well as high walls and fences on the outside.

An analysis of the SAPS residential burglary statistics for 1998, for the Garsfontein and Pretoria West areas, confirmed a more evenly distribution of burglaries between day and night, for the Garsfontein area, whilst in the Pretoria West area, burglaries were more common at night time. Statistics for the Garsfontein area showed that 38 per cent of burglaries took place during the day, 37 per cent during the night, with 25 per cent unknown. In the Pretoria West area, the percentages were 29 per cent during the day, 38 per cent during the night, and 33 per cent unknown.

In none of the case studies investigated did formal surveillance, including police or civilian patrols, Neighbourhood Watch, security guards, or CCTV-cameras, play any significant role in deterring residential burglary. The reason for this was the mere absence or infrequency of these security measures in the areas under investigation. This does not imply that formal surveillance should not be regarded as important. However, contrary to formal surveillance, it was found that informal surveillance had a significant impact on the occurrence patterns of burglaries in the case studies.

The rationale behind visibility in and around residential sites, is that it improves surveillability, for example, through improved lighting and open lines of sight. Exterior buildings, big garden bushes and concealed corners, on the other hand, provide shelter for burglars and reduce the chances of them being observed. The experts from the police and the security companies, who were interviewed during the study, were of the opinion that visibility is an important deterring factor. The convicted burglars did not regard good lighting as an important deterrent, but mentioned the presence of big shrubs in the garden as in their favour.

Taking these visibility factors into account, a table (see Table 5.2) was compiled to identify the differences between the case studies. It could be concluded that the residential sites in the Pretoria West case studies were more open (see factors 1 and 2) than those in the Garsfontein case studies, whilst the exterior lighting was better in the Garsfontein cases. Although it was difficult to estimate what specific impact the visibility factors had on the burglars' decisions, there was an obvious connection between the more noticeable absence of exterior lighting in the Pretoria West cases and the occurrence of burglaries during the night.

According to Lab (1997:32), lighting as a means of increasing surveillability has been one of the most researched individual crime prevention strategies. He cited from various crime studies to show the inconsistency of the results. Reppetto (1974, cited in Lab, 1997:32), for example, comparing differing levels of lighting in Boston, reported no correlation between lighting and robbery or burglary. Wright *et al.* (1974, cited in Lab, 1997:32) on the other hand, found significant reductions in violent crime and some decline, although not statistical significant, in property crimes in illuminated areas. The greatest effect of improved street

lighting appears to be on the fear of crime. Lab (1997:32) made mention of seven research programmes that measured fear of crime, in which all but one, found that residents felt safer as a result of the increased lighting. Good lighting therefore enhances the feeling of safety amongst residents.

**TABLE 5.2: VISIBILITY FACTORS IN CASE STUDIES**

<b>PERCENTAGE CASES RELATING TO VISIBILITY FACTORS</b>		
<b>VISIBILITY FACTORS</b>	<b>GARSFONTEIN</b>	<b>PRETORIA WEST</b>
<b>1. Good street lighting</b>	83%	83%
<b>2. Big plants in front of dwelling</b>	58%	36%
<b>3. Good exterior lighting around dwelling</b>	58%	42%
<b>4. Open to the street (no security fence or wall)</b>	42%	58%

In general, the residences in the Garsfontein area were better lit during the night through exterior lighting than those in Pretoria West. On the other hand, the visibility during the day was better in the Pretoria West area, because the residential sites were more open, surrounded by low walls or fences, and had fewer big trees and shrubs in the gardens. Better visibility increases the chances of a burglar being observed and will therefore lower the vulnerability or risk rating of a particular residence.

In conclusion it can be stated that the residents in the Pretoria West area were in general more alert and involved with each other during the day than the residents in the Garsfontein area, where residents tended to favour a more private lifestyle. The greater presence of adults in and around residences in the Pretoria West area during the daytime, probably as a result of people not working, also increased informal surveillance and more community involvement. If, however, there were criminal elements amongst them, then the same factors that enhanced informal surveillance, could become a risk factor. Two of the respondents in the Pretoria West area, for example, indicated that they suspected people from within their community as being involved in burglary activities.

Although difficult to quantify, the research findings in this study suggests that periods of improved surveillance lowered the risk of being targeted by burglars.

### **5.3.3 Vulnerabilities relating to the physical design**

In the research expectations (see par. 2.7.3), the following situational conditions, relating to the physical design of residences, were identified as possible risk factors:

- When there are visible signs of wealth.
- When design features indicate easy entry to the building.

In this section the focus is on the physical design of the buildings in the case studies, and does not include aspects such as the control and use of space around the buildings, which refers to the more broader concept of environmental design. In this study the concept of situational conditions was preferred to that of environmental design to describe the risk factors in the micro-environment. The rationale behind physical design that constitutes one aspect of the situational conditions, was explained in the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.4), also confirming that the burglar will look for design features that fit his description of a “good” target. For the burglar, an attractive target will be one where the perceived rewards outweigh the risk of being caught. The attractiveness of a potential target will depend on the environmental cues and the immediate characteristics of the target as perceived by the burglar. Physical design features and surveillance factors are therefore closely interlinked with each other.

The residential neighbourhoods in the Garsfontein police station area could be classified as middle to high income areas. The majority of residences portray an appearance of relative wealth in terms of design features. Taking into account the external appearances of the buildings in the Garsfontein case studies, it was not possible to distinguish them in any significant way from the neighbouring buildings in terms of their wealth appearance. The residential area as a whole projected an image of a middle- to high income status. As mentioned previously (see par.4.5), the convicted burglars indicated that the residential areas best suited for burglaries were located to the east of Pretoria (Waterkloof, Garsfontein, Moreletapark), and in the Centurion area. Through their environmental knowledge, the burglars were of the opinion that the goods they were looking for, would be found in the residences in the eastern suburbs of Pretoria.

In the Pretoria West case studies it was different. In 50 per cent of the cases the residences that were targeted were more attractive and reflected greater wealth than the surrounding residences. Generally, these residences were in a better condition as a result of having been recently painted, or renovated, or the garden was well kept. The possibility existed that the wealthier appearance of some of the residences in the Pretoria West area created the impression that such residences would yield higher rewards, and therefore increased the risk of being targeted.

Judging by the external appearance (by the outside), it seemed as if residences in the Garsfontein area had a greater chance of being randomly selected for burglary than the

residences in the Pretoria West area where the better looking residences had a greater chance of being selected.

With regard to the expectation that design features with easy entrance or escape from the building will increase its vulnerability, it was found that burglars preferred to break in from the rear or the side of the residences (see Table 5.3). The reason for this was probably to reduce the chances of being observed. Design features that allowed easy access to the rear part of the building or created concealed entrances, for example patio doors, would therefore increase the vulnerability of that specific residence.

**TABLE 5.3: ENTERING OF BUILDINGS IN THE CASE STUDIES**

PERCENTAGE OF CASES ENTERED FROM THE REAR, SIDE OR FRONT		
	Entering from the rear or side	Entering from the front
GARSFONTEIN	83%	17%
PRETORIA WEST	67%	23%

In the Garsfontein area where more burglaries occurred during the day than in Pretoria West, more than 80 per cent of the burglaries occurred from the rear or side of the residences. These results are confirmed by Reppetto's (1974:49) viewpoint that residential crimes are, by definition, low-visibility crimes, which take place off the street and generally out of view of the police or passers-by.

The preferred way of gaining entry to buildings is summarised in Table 5.4. The most common method of gaining access was through sliding doors, followed by windows, preferably from the rear part or the side of the residence.

In the Garsfontein area, the method most often used to gain entrance to the building was through sliding doors, whilst in the Pretoria West area, it was through windows at the rear or side of the buildings.

**TABLE 5.4: DESIGN FEATURES RELATING TO THE ENTERING OF BUILDINGS**

PERCENTAGE OF CASES RELATING TO SPECIFIC ENTRANCES					
	Sliding doors	Windows at rear and side	Windows at the front	Doors at rear and side	Doors at the front
GARSFONTEIN	41%	17%	17%	25%	-
PRETORIA WEST	25%	41%	17%	8%	8%
AVERAGE:	33%	29%	17%	17%	4%

Windows of bathrooms and laundries were preferred to other windows, probably because burglars suspected that, in most instances, these rooms were not fitted with alarm sensors, which gave them extra time to break in without activating the alarm. Doors, including sliding doors, that exited onto a patio-area or were situated in a concealed area, were also preferred, probably because they were in most instances not visible from the street. Even if these entrances were secured by "target hardening" such as locks, security gates or burglar bars, the burglars would not be deterred, because they usually carry equipment, like a crowbar, to overcome these obstacles.

Another design feature that added to the vulnerability of the residences, was where the burglars could enter the garage through an inside door. In three of the Garsfontein case studies, the burglars gained access to the garages through an inside door, in which cases three vehicles were stolen together with the rest of the goods. In all three cases the garages fronted directly on to the street with no fence or wall in-between.

### **5.3.4 Vulnerabilities relating to security**

In the research expectations, it was postulated that limited security protection (see par. 2.7.3), would increase the vulnerability of a potential target.

In the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.4), the rationale was followed that the lack of visible security measures would increase the vulnerability or risk of a residence of being targeted. On the other hand, the more that security measures were implemented, the more difficult it would become for the burglar to enter the residence, and thus the vulnerability would decrease.

#### **5.3.4.1 Responses from the burglary victims**

The responses from the burglary victims in the case studies, with regard to the security measures that were in place before the burglaries, are summarised in Table 5.5.

From Table 5.5, it is clear that, in most of the case studies, the burglars could enter the residences with relative ease as a result of inadequate security measures. Most of the residences were equipped with security gates at the exterior doors and burglar bars at the windows, in general regarded as standard equipment for every residence in any event. Another observed feature related to security was that residents were inclined to erect fences or walls not only as a means of protection, but also to improve their privacy. More security lights were installed in the Garsfontein area, whilst the presence of dogs was more common in the Pretoria West area. Even with the many deficiencies in security measures, the

residences in the Garsfontein area were better protected than those in the Pretoria West area. The installation of alarm systems and linking-up with armed reaction units were only found in the Garsfontein area, although to a limited extent. The Garsfontein cases with electrified fences and/or guards were part of bigger housing complexes that had electrified fences, as well as access control and guards at the entrance gates. Although more than 70 per cent of the interviewees said they experienced good neighbourliness, none of them were involved in any kind of Neighbourhood Watch or civilian patrols, or could recollect the existence of any such activities in their neighbourhoods.

**TABLE 5.5: SECURITY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO BURGLARIES**

PERCENTAGE CASES WHERE SECURITY MEASURES WERE PRESENT		
SECURITY MEASURES	GARSFONTEIN	PRETORIA WEST
1. Security gates at exterior doors	83%	83%
2. Burglar bars at windows	83%	92%
3. Fences or walls in front of residence	58%	50%
4. Effective exterior lighting	58%	33%
5. Dogs	50%	67%
6. Alarm	25%	-
7. Electrified fences or razor wire on the walls	16%	-
8. Surveillance cameras and/or security guards (at housing complexes)	16%	-
9. Alarm connected to an armed reaction unit	8%	-

#### 5.3.4.2 Responses from the convicted burglars

The convicted burglars were also requested to comment on the effectiveness of certain security or protective measures taken by residents. Three categories could be distinguished according to what they perceived as having an effect on their decision-making. The results are summarised in Table 5.6.

**TABLE 5.6: BURGLARS' RESPONSES CONCERNING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY MEASURES**

SECURITY MEASURES		
LITTLE EFFECT	SOME EFFECT	MORE EFFECT
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Walls and fences</li> <li>- Razor wire or spikes</li> <li>- Security gates at doors</li> <li>- Burglar bars at windows</li> <li>- Police patrols</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Good visibility (including lighting)</li> <li>- Alarm system</li> <li>- Dog (s)</li> <li>- Electrical wire</li> <li>- Security around complex</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Presence of occupants</li> <li>- Alarm plus reaction unit</li> <li>- Neighbours watching or overlooking residence</li> </ul>

None of the burglars who were interviewed showed much concern about any of the security measures. They believed that most security measures can be by-passed or overcome if other factors, such as the absence of guardians, are positive. The effectiveness of security measures should therefore be evaluated in combination, because the effectiveness could increase proportionately when a combination of measures are implemented simultaneously.

The more obstacles the burglar has to overcome, the greater the chances that he might decide to abort the burglary attempt. Other factors, such as the time of day, occupancy, the quality of material used in security equipment all played a role in the final outcome of the burglary. However, the burglars were aware of the fact that they might be faced with unforeseen obstacles or risks whenever they decided to commence with the burglary.

According to Brown *et al.* (1996: 442), sophisticated burglars are not afraid of burglar alarms not connected to reaction units, because they know how to disarm them. Burglars also know that it is highly unlikely that police or security patrols will observe a burglary once it is in progress.

It is also important to note the interplay between security factors and the time of the burglary. Two of the burglars, for example, mentioned that barking dogs were a greater deterrent during the night than during the day, because they believed that residents and neighbours were more alert to warning signals during the night than during the day.

#### **5.3.4.3 Responses from the experts**

For the purpose of this study the interviews that were conducted with the members of the two security companies and the SAPS in Garsfontein and Pretoria West, were regarded as expert opinions on the subject of residential burglary. According to their responses, they were in agreement that the following factors could increase the vulnerability of residences:

- when the residence is unattended;
- when residents are asleep;
- when the residence is near a main road and/or open veld;
- low visibility around the residence (e.g. big shrubs in the garden and poor street lighting); and
- when the resident's routine activities are easy to detect.

A number of other factors were also mentioned by the experts as contributory to the vulnerability of a potential target:

- cul-de-sac streets, with less outside pedestrian and vehicle movement;
- high walls, behind which burglars could hide;

- little contact with neighbours or an understanding to watch over each other's property;
- building activities in the vicinity;
- visible valuables in and outside the residence, e.g. a luxurious car;
- low on security protection;
- near public places where strangers usually gather; and
- buildings with concealed entrances.

In conclusion the following comments could be made about the situational factors that played a role in creating favourable conditions for the burglaries to take place.

The purpose of this section on situational conditions was to identify and investigate the situational factors that existed prior to the burglaries, and to determine in what way they could have contributed to the vulnerability of a particular residence. Although a number of situational risk factors could be identified in the research process, it was impossible to determine how many of them actually played an active role in the decision-making process of the burglars. That would only be possible if the burglar who committed the burglary in a specific case was known and could be interviewed, which was not the case in this study.

The findings of this study, relating to situational conditions, showed that the residences in the case studies were all exposed to varying degrees of vulnerability that made them likely targets at the time of the burglaries. What specific impact these vulnerabilities had on the decision to commence with a burglary or not was impossible to establish. Nonetheless their contribution to the creation of burglary opportunities is clear. The risk profiles based on the findings of the analysis of the case studies in both the Pretoria West and Garsfontein areas, suggested that, in all the burglary cases, there were situational conditions that favoured the burglary event.

It should be emphasised that the risk factors only reflect on the vulnerability of a residence and should not be interpreted in a deterministic way as if they caused the burglary. The interplay of the risk factors, together with other factors such as the weather conditions, as well as the motivational level, skills and knowledge of the burglar, may have created the opportune circumstances, in time and space, for a burglary to take place. The combination of risk and other factors present before the burglary constituted the unique setting, interpreted by the burglar as favourable or not favourable for the burglary. It could be concluded that the final decision depended on the burglar.

Bennett (1986:52) cited numerous studies to show that the 'final decision' by burglars to offend or not to offend was mostly influenced by cues relating to the risk of getting caught. He also stated that burglars were mostly concerned about "signs of occupancy", "surveillability", and "presence of neighbours". Cues relating to the potential 'rewards' of the

offence or the 'ease' or 'difficulty' of entering the building, were mentioned much less often by the burglars in these studies. According to Bennett (1986:52), it should also be emphasised that the final decision to commit the burglary was taken upon the convergence of a number of factors perceived by the burglar as favourable in terms of minimising the risks and maximising the rewards.

In their study on burglary Bennett and Wright (1984:42) also found that most of the burglars were conscious of actively making a decision to offend in response to specific situational stimuli. This does not mean that previous experiences did not influence their current perceptions and the decision-making process. Bennett and Wright (1984:40) also postulated that the original decision to offend was taken independently of situational factors, and was mostly motivated by the need for money. However, they argued that the final decision to actually commit the burglary would be influenced by the immediate situational conditions.

In a study on residential burglary in which Winchester and Jackson (1982:22) compared the experiences of non-victim households (sample size 491) with those of burglary victim households (sample size 434), they found "environmental risk" to be the most important differentiating factor and not security measures. However, the researcher from this investigation, is of the opinion that burglars do not view environmental factors separately from security measures but will, in effect, consider all the available risk factors before making a final decision.


Repetto (1974:52) also came to the conclusion that the most critical factors in the differential geographical distribution of residential burglary are: the location of the neighbourhood; the affluence of the residents; and the vulnerability of the dwelling (measured by its physical accessibility and protection, occupancy, visibility, and the social cohesion of the neighbourhood). However, the relative weight of these factors and how they related to each other in accounting for differential burglary rates, appeared to differ substantially from one area to another.

#### **5.4 THE BURGLARY EVENT**

In this Section, the emphasis shifts from the time period before the burglary commenced to the actual commission of the burglary event with the aim to gain a better understanding of what happened during the burglary. As stated in the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2.5), the final decision to commence with the burglary will depend on the burglar perceiving the situational conditions as favourable.

- whether the burglary was professionally executed;
- the number of burglars involved;
- the duration burglars spend inside the residence; and
- the level of competence of the burglars.

**FIGURE 5.3: SEASONAL VARIATIONS IN RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY**



A further research expectation was postulated, namely:

- It is expected that the financial loss as a result of residential burglary will on average be higher in the more affluent areas than in the less affluent areas (see par. 2.7.4).

In order to evaluate and interpret the data on the extent and nature of the case study burglaries, it was appropriate to develop a typology or schemata to integrate the data into a coherent entity that would also reflect on the research expectations as stated above. The typology is explained in Table 5.7. The tendencies in Table 5.7 are based on the findings in this study and should be interpreted within the limitations of the small research sample. It nonetheless provided a useful framework for the analysis and interpretation of different types of burglaries.

### 5.4.1 Time that burglaries occur

According to the Garsfontein police station burglary statistics for 1998, the occurrence of burglaries peaked on Fridays and Saturdays, with the fewer cases on Mondays, and from Tuesdays onwards there was an increase in the burglaries towards the weekends. In the Pretoria West police station area, the pattern differed slightly with a relative even distribution of burglaries between Tuesdays and Saturdays, peaking on Friday nights, and the lowest occurrence on Sundays and Mondays.

In the Garsfontein area most burglaries from Mondays to Thursdays, were committed during the day, whereas burglaries during Fridays and Saturdays were mostly committed during the night. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that residents go to work on weekdays, leaving their homes unattended, while over weekends there is a greater chance that the residents would leave their homes unattended in the evenings. This tendency was also confirmed by the SAPS burglary statistics for 1998 in the Pretoria West area, except for Wednesdays when more burglaries occurred during the night than during the day. The risk periods during the day and night are shown in Figure 5.2, which indicates that approximately 63 per cent of the burglaries in the case studies occurred during the night between midnight and 06:00 in the morning, and 21 per cent of the burglaries occurred between 06:00 and 12:00.

In the Pretoria West area, the occurrence of residential burglaries were higher during the summer months of October to March, than the rest of the year (see Fig. 5.3). Burglaries peaked during the holiday month of December, which could be regarded as the period when most residents were away on holiday. In the Garsfontein area, burglaries also peaked during December, with no clear pattern for the rest of the year. In an IDASA study of crime patterns in Pretoria during 1998 (Altbeker, 1998:17) it was also found that property crimes as a whole was reasonably evenly spread throughout the year. This was especially the case in the Pretoria Central, Sunnyside and Brooklyn areas, where high property crime rates were recorded throughout the year. However, with regard to residential burglary, the month of December stood out as the period in which most burglaries occurred in Pretoria.

School holiday times do not necessarily coincide with higher burglary rates, as these tend to depend on the residents' activities and movements such as whether they stay at home or go away on holiday, in which case the likelihood for burglary increases.

### 5.4.2 Extent and nature of burglaries

In the research expectations (see par. 2.7.4), it was postulated that the extent of financial loss experienced during a burglary event may proportionately relate to the following factors:

**TABLE 5.7: EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE CASE STUDY BURGLARIES**

VARIABLES	TYPE OF BURGLARY		
	OPPORTUNISTIC BURGLARIES  (TYPE 1)	PLANNED BURGLARIES	
		HIGHER RISK (TYPE 2)	LOWER RISK (TYPE 3)
<b>DURATION OF BURGLARY</b> (time inside the building)	The duration of the burglary is very short - a typical 'smash-and-grab' burglary.	The duration of the burglary is very short - less than 5 minutes. The residence is protected by an activated alarm system, and armed reaction unit, or residents are asleep, or can return at any moment.	The duration of the burglary is longer - more than 5 minutes. Likely that the residents will be absent for longer periods, e.g. at work, or on vacation.
<b>NUMBER OF BURGLARS</b>	In most instances one or two.	In most instances three or more.	In most instances three or more.
<b>COMPETENCY OF BURGLARS</b>	Act in an amateurish way, e.g. throw stone through window. Move on foot.  Minimum skills needed.	Act more professional. Have the necessary skills and equipment to overcome security barriers. Use cell-phones and vehicles for communication and fast escape.	Act more professional. Have the necessary skills and equipment to overcome security barriers. Use vehicles, or hide goods to be picked up later.
<b>EXTENT OF DAMAGE</b>	The burglar is on the lookout for one or two easy removable items, or items that lie around, or placed near a window or door, like a cell-phone, wallet, watch, Hi-Fi, or jewellery.	The time factor is crucial and the burglars are therefore in a hurry and very selective. They focus on high value items, especially electronic items, e.g. Hi-Fi's, TVs, video-machines, CDs, computers, microwave ovens, cameras, as well as jewellery, clothes and firearms.	Burglars have more time and will search more extensively for valuables, e.g. empty cupboards and wardrobes. In addition to the items already mentioned in the other burglary types, the following items are also in demand: fire arms, silverware, cutlery, food/meat, paintings, blankets, Persian carpets, curtains, tools, and when the opportunity arises, even the owner's vehicle.

According to the information gathered on the extent and nature of the burglaries, it was possible to distinguish between three broad categories or types of burglaries, namely: opportunistic burglaries; higher risk, planned burglaries; and lower risk, planned burglaries (from the burglar's perspective). The distinction between opportunistic and planned burglaries was explained in paragraph 5.2.2. The three types of burglaries in the typology

could be constructed in terms of the variables as identified in the research expectations on the extent of financial loss (see par. 2.7.4). The descriptions of the three types of burglaries were based on the findings of the case studies, as well as observations that were made during the field research.

In terms of the duration of burglaries, Brown *et al.* (1996:443) were of the opinion that experienced burglars would minimize the amount of time they would spend in a house, usually not exceeding five minutes and preferably less. In this manner not even the fastest response to a silent alarm would threaten the burglars. They also argued that burglars would first head for the bedroom, due to limited time, knowing that most people keep valuables, especially money, jewellery, and weapons there.

This study showed that burglars would adjust to the situation, for example, when the residents were at home or asleep, they would, however, avoid the sleeping quarters. The time burglars stayed in the residences varied, depending on the type of burglary. If the residence was protected by an alarm system, connected to an armed reaction unit, then the burglars usually had less than five minutes (which is the estimated reaction time) before members of the reaction unit arrived. The possibility also existed that burglars could decide to abort from entering a residence as a result of intervening circumstances, for example, returning residents, a visit from the neighbours or the arrival of an armed reaction unit.

In planned burglaries, the burglars usually operate in numbers of at least three or more to increase their ability to work faster and to maximise their reward.

With reference to competency, the tools most often used by the burglars during break-ins (to force open security gates, door locks and security bars), were crowbars and bolt-cutters, and, to a lesser extent, shifting spanners. The burglar bars at the windows were either cut or bent away, while the glass of the windows was removed or broken. Windows of bathrooms were favourite targets, probably because bathrooms are usually not protected by alarm detectors. In at least two of the cases in the present study, the burglars used a child to climb through the bathroom window to open a door from the inside. With continuous improvements in the security of residences, burglars were also compelled to increasingly make use of vehicles to ensure a fast escape from the crime scene.

Table 5.8 shows the results after the framework (in Table 5.7) was applied to the case studies. It is evident that most (76 per cent) of the burglaries in the Garsfontein area could be classified as Type 3 burglaries, suggesting that they were perceived by the criminals as lower risk burglaries, executed when the residents were absent from home, and the chances

of interference were less. In three of these burglaries a vehicle was also stolen, and in one case, contact was made between the burglars and the resident. According to the victim (a single female resident), the burglars looked surprised to find her in the residence, and they held her hostage for the duration of the burglary.

**TABLE 5.8: TYPES OF BURGLARIES IN THE CASE STUDY AREAS**

TYPES OF BURGLARIES IN THE CASE STUDY AREAS				
		TYPE 1 (more opportunistic)	TYPE 2 (higher risks for burglars)	TYPE 3 (lower risks for burglars)
% of cases	Garsfontein	8%	16%	76%
	Pretoria West	50%	16%	34%
Av. R value per burglary	Garsfontein	R10 000	R12 500	R31 800*  * The value of the stolen vehicles excluded.
	Pretoria West	R3 000	R8 500	R24 500*

In contrast to the Garsfontein area, most burglaries (50 per cent) in the Pretoria West area could be described as Type 1 burglaries, suggesting that they were executed in a more opportunistic manner, with no or little prior planning. It was also found, as expected, that the average financial loss experienced in the Garsfontein police station cases was higher than those cases in the Pretoria West police station area. This could partly be attributed to the fact that more Type 3 burglaries occurred in the Garsfontein area.

The two insurance brokers who participated in the research, respectively and independently confirmed that the average financial loss due to a burglary in the Garsfontein area could be estimated between R25 000 and R35 000, and between R30 00 and R40 000. They were not in the position to provide figures for the Pretoria West area, because of the small clientele base that they had in that area. However, according to police statistics for 1998, the average financial loss due to a burglary in the Pretoria West area amounted to between R6 000 and R8 000.

Evidence from the findings of this study showed that, when the opportunity arose, the burglars would steal the resident's vehicle, especially if the keys were found in the house and the stolen goods could be loaded into the vehicle. In the larger scale burglaries, cell-phones were often used to communicate with the waiting vehicle (if not already on the premises), whereas in smaller, less sophisticated burglaries, the burglars had to move on foot and sometimes had to carry the stolen goods, with increased risk of being detected. Leaving the premises and site constituted the greatest risk for the burglars being observed and caught red-handed with the stolen goods. It was *inter alia* for this reason that the burglars who were interviewed, attached so much importance to escape routes.

Because burglaries were executed in a rush, the premises were sometimes left in chaos, although not a single case in this study showed evidence that burglars had purposefully vandalised any property. The burglars also indicated that they did not carry hand weapons during the burglaries and that they preferred not to make contact with the residents or any other person in the vicinity of the burglary scene. Although more than 50 per cent of the burglars acknowledged that they sometimes used alcohol and drugs, they denied the possibility of being under the influence of alcohol or drugs while committing the burglary. According to Conklin (1995:297), factors such as alcohol, drugs and firearms can be regarded as facilitating factors in the commission of a crime, but do not cause crime *per se*. Further research is needed to investigate the specific role of alcohol and drugs in the commission of burglary events.

#### 5.4.3 Types of goods stolen and the disposal thereof

In the research expectations it was postulated that burglars would tend to select those items that they know are marketable (see par. 2.7.4).

Table 5.9 provides a list of items that were stolen in the case studies. From these results it is evident that the easily portable, and easy-to-dispose-of expensive items were the most popular ones, including: electronic products for entertainment; clothing; electronic household equipment; jewellery; linen; food; and chinaware. On average, higher volumes of goods were stolen from the residences in the Garsfontein cases than the Pretoria West cases, especially in terms of high value items such as: TVs, video machines, clothing, jewellery and chinaware. The Pretoria West cases, on the other hand, registered higher volumes of items such as linen, tools and money.

**TABLE 5.9: TYPE OF GOODS STOLEN**

PERCENTAGE OF CASES WHERE SPECIFIC GOODS WERE STOLEN		
TYPE OF GOODS	GARSFONTEIN	PRETORIA WEST
<b>1. Electronic products for entertainment</b>		
- TV	83%	42%
- Video machine	83%	50%
- Hi-Fi	75%	67%
- Radio	42%	8%
<b>2. Clothing</b>	75%	58%
<b>3. Household electronic equipment</b> (e.g. microwave, kettle, toaster, sewing-machine)	67%	50%
<b>4. Jewellery</b>	50%	33%
<b>5. Linen</b>	42%	50%
<b>6. Food/liquor</b>	42%	25%
<b>7. China-/silverware</b>	42%	17%
<b>8. Paintings</b>	25%	17%
<b>9. Tools</b>	25%	33%
<b>10. Vehicles</b>	25%	8%
<b>11. Computers</b>	17%	-
<b>12. Cameras</b>	17%	8%
<b>13. Cellular phones</b>	8%	8%
<b>14. Money</b>	8%	25%
<b>15. Firearms</b>	8%	-

The items that burglars in this study were looking for, showed a large resemblance to burglars' preferences in other countries, although the priority order of the items might differ. In Australia, for example, research has shown that the top ten priority items included: (1) TVs/VCRs, laptop computers; (2) cash, credit cards, handbags/wallets, (3) jewellery, (4) home audio equipment, (5) power tools, including garden tools, (6) household electricals, (7) computers, (8) clothing, especially leather jackets and clothing with brand labels, (9) prescription drugs, and (10) bicycles (Department of Justice and Customs, Australia, 2000).

Burglars normally do not want to keep the stolen goods, and would therefore try to sell them as fast as possible. The main objective of burglars, as confirmed in this study, is to 'earn' money to provide for their basic and social needs, and in many instances to support family members in their livelihood. In this context, Barkan (1997:324), mentioned that burglars need the assistance of 'fences' to help them dispose of their illegal goods in return for money. According to Barkan (1997:325), the 'fences' sell the stolen goods to customers, many of whom are in legitimate occupations. These customers, otherwise law-abiding

citizens, are willing to take the chance of buying the stolen goods for much less than it would otherwise cost, and in the process overlook the fact that they are aiding and abetting burglary.

Information provided by the convicted burglars in the present study also indicated that when they work in an organised manner, they usually work for a 'boss' ('fences') who pay them for the stolen goods. This is probably the reason why so many burglaries are carried out in a selective manner. As one burglar acknowledged, by saying: "If I want a TV set for myself, I would rather sell the stolen one and buy a new one for myself". The burglars will therefore focus on those items they know they have a market for or those that have been requested for by the 'boss'. According to Livingston (1996:224), the burglar needs to get rid of the stolen merchandise as soon as possible as it constitutes incriminating evidence should the police make an arrest. Fences, dealers in stolen goods, will probably pay the burglars only a fraction of the item's value, but the money is better and more certain than what the burglars could get by selling the merchandise themselves (Livingston, 1996:224).

In the South African context very little information is available on the role of 'fences' and the way illegal stolen goods find their way into the open market, for example, to swap shops. Another problem is that fences usually operate in a police area other than the one from where the goods were stolen. This hampers effective co-operation and investigative work between the different police stations. In the combatting of residential burglary far greater emphasis should be placed on the role of 'fences' in the illegal trade of stolen goods.

## **5.5 RESIDENTS' RESPONSES**

In this section, the focus will be on the way in which the residents responded to the burglaries and what additional security measures they took after the burglaries.

### **5.5.1 Feelings of safety**

Brantingham *et al.* (1986:139) distinguished between the fear of victimisation and a feeling of safety. For them the fear of victimisation can be described as an individual's estimate of crime trends in the macro-, meso- and micro-environment, as well as the probability that he/she, personally, will be victimised. Feelings of safety, on the contrary, measure whether people feel safe in specific places, regardless of their fear of crime. It may therefore appear that a person who is afraid of victimisation, may still feel relatively safe in his/her home and known environment. According to Livingston (1996:22), the fear of crime is based on perceptions of crime rather than personal experiences of crime. He argued that fear of

crime originated not just as a reaction to crime but also as part of a person's perception of the immediate environment.

In the research expectations for this study it was postulated that residents would feel less safe in their immediate environment as a result of the burglary (see par. 2.7.5).

During the interviews, the respondents were asked to reflect on how safe they felt in their immediate environment since the burglary had occurred (Question 3.3, Appendix 1), and in what way the burglary changed their routine activities (Question 3.4, Appendix 1).

The different responses were grouped together and summarised (see Table 5.10).

**TABLE 5.10: DIFFERENT RESPONSES OF RESIDENTS**

PERCENTAGE RESPONDENTS WITHIN EACH CATEGORY OF RESPONSES		
CATEGORIES OF RESPONSES	GARSFONTEIN	PRETORIA WEST
1. No significant changes in routine activities	64%	58%
2. Became more safety conscious	58%	50%
3. Felt relatively safe	50%	42%
4. Felt relatively unsafe	50%	55%
5. Experienced sleeping disorder (at least for a while)	25%	17%
6. Avoid returning home late in the evening	25%	8%
7. Feelings of distrust in other people	17%	17%

The findings of this study suggest an approximate 50/50 division between those respondents who experienced increased uneasy feelings of safety and those who said they still felt relatively safe in their immediate environment. A possible reason why not more of the respondents felt unsafe was the fact that in most of the cases no contact was made between the burglars and the residents. The realisation that the burglary was not directed at them personally could make them feel more "distant" from the event. The one respondent who was held hostage for the duration of the burglary expressed the highest degree of trauma and anxiety, and was treated for depression and disturbed sleep patterns afterwards. It is to be expected that people who personally experience the burglary as a close encounter will be more intensely affected by the event. Evidence was also found in this study that certain people perceived themselves as more vulnerable than others, which included single female residents, the disabled, the elderly and the children. According to Barkan (1997:328), female burglary victims are more likely than male victims to be afraid and upset, while male victims are more apt to be angry or annoyed after the experience of a burglary.

According to Livingston (1996:14), the victimisation by burglary is indirect, whilst that of violent or personal crimes, such as rape and robbery, are direct and seem to have a greater psychological impact on their victims, for example, in terms of depression, anxiety and phobias. Livingston (1996:15) also argued that the more indirect the link between cause and effect of a crime between criminal and victim, the weaker the public reaction will be. It is thus understandable that the media will give more prominence to burglary incidents that coincided with personal violence or assault.

More than 50 per cent of the respondents also indicated that the initial heightened feelings of unsafety returned to "normal" after some period, and that they did not make any significant changes to their daily routine activities. The fact that most of the victims had improved their security after the burglary, could also have contributed to returned feelings of relative safety. One important change mentioned by the respondents (more than 50 per cent) was the tendency to be more alert or watchful for potential burglars/criminals. A few respondents also mentioned the inconvenience they suffered as a result of the intrusion of their privacy and the financial losses they experienced.

The same tendencies, with regard to changed feelings of safety and routine activities, were experienced in both the two case study areas of Garsfontein and Pretoria West.

### 5.5.2 Improving security

In the research expectations it was postulated that residents would implement additional security measures after the occurrence of a burglary (see par. 2.7.5).

The respondents were also asked to name the new security measures they implemented after the burglary (Question 3.7, Appendix 1). The range of security measures they implemented, is summarised in Table 5.11.

There was a clear distinction between the security measures that were implemented in the Garsfontein area from those that were implemented in the Pretoria West area. In the Garsfontein area, where the residents were more affluent and had insurance coverage, there was a tendency to improve security through the installation of alarm systems and to subscribe to armed reaction units. In the less affluent area of Pretoria West, the tendency was to improve security through physical measures. These included upgrading of existing burglar bars at the windows, erecting security gates at the front and back doors, installing security lights, acquiring a dog and fostering friendly relations with the neighbours.

The noticeable dominant tendency to acquire alarm systems and subscribe to armed reaction units in the Garsfontein area, could also be ascribed to the role of insurance companies which required specific improvements in security measures after the burglary had occurred. The high cost factor attached to the installation of an alarm system and the running costs of subscribing to an armed reaction unit were probably the reasons why the residents had not implemented these measures earlier.

**TABLE 5.11: NEW SECURITY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED AFTER THE BURGLARY**

PERCENTAGE OF RESIDENTS IMPLEMENTING NEW SECURITY MEASURES		
NEW SECURITY MEASURES	GARSFONTEIN	PRETORIA WEST
1. Installation of alarm system	50%	8%
2. Subscribed to armed reaction unit	50%	-
3. Automatisation of access gate to site	25%	-
4. Security gates at exterior doors	17%	25%
5. Improved existing security gates	17%	33%
6. Improved burglar bars at windows	17%	33%
7. Acquired a dog	17%	25%
8. Subscribed to radio control room	17%	-
9. Became involved with community patrols	17%	-
10. Improved visibility in front of residence	8%	-
11. Erected fence to close residential site	8%	8%
12. Added razor wire to existing walls	8%	8%
13. Elevated existing walls	8%	8%
14. Fostered relations with neighbours	8%	33%
15. Carried a firearm	8%	8%
16. Installed security lights	-	17%

Members of the police and the insurance company representatives who were interviewed, also expressed concern about the alleged involvement of security company members in isolated burglary events. Incidents were reported in the media where security personnel, who were the first to arrive at the scene of the burglary after the burglars had left, removed goods from the premises, making them also guilty of theft. Subsequent to this report security companies had implemented additional precautionary measures to counter possible involvement of their personnel in corruption, for example, they were not allowed to enter the building before the police had arrived.

With regard to the service rendered by the police, the response from all the respondents was that they were relatively satisfied with the initial reaction of the SAPS, which included, the reaction time to arrive at the burglary scene, the completion of the crime report or statement,

the issuing of a case number and the arrangements made for taking fingerprints. The respondents were, however, disappointed in the lack of feedback from the police on whether any progress was made with the investigations. Except for one firearm and one vehicle that were recovered, none of the respondents received any information on whether stolen goods were retrieved or not or whether any arrests were made.

According to a survey study of crime in Pretoria in 1998, by the ISS, the victims of property crimes in Pretoria who notified the police of their offences, were more satisfied with the service they received than victims of violent crimes, such as murder and rape (Louw, 1998:26). The report suggested that cases of serious crimes such as assault and rape were often more difficult for the police to pursue, since victims frequently withdrew charges due to fear of reprisal, the sensitivity of such cases, and the fact that evidence was often more difficult to collect. Residents in the traditional white suburbs also responded more favourable about the police service than the residents in the former black townships, where personal and violent crimes were more rampant. Thirty three per cent of the people living in the traditional white suburbs were positive about the police's ability to control crime, while less than 25 per cent of the people living in the inner city, townships and informal settlements thought likewise (Louw, 1998:31).

What has become clear from this research is that the respondents had little confidence in the police's ability to protect them from burglary, and that they had to take protective measures themselves.

## 5.6 BURGLARS' RESPONSES

### 5.6.1 Feelings of guilt

In the research expectations it was postulated that burglars would tend to rationalise not to feel guilty about their criminal behaviour (see par. 2.7.6).

The burglars that were interviewed in this study showed very little remorse or sense of guilt for the inconvenience and trauma they had caused their victims. They rationalised that the crime was not aimed at the residents and that it was necessary for them to burgle in order to survive or to support their dependents. Furthermore, they felt that the 'rich' could easily recover their losses through insurance claims.

Whether they will continue with burglary after their release was difficult to establish, because they knew the "correct" answer would be to say no. However, one of the convicted burglars

said he would be honest with the researcher, indicating that he would resume his burglary career after being released. Sentences of between four and five years imprisonment for first convictions, taking into account the possibility of early release on parole, would not be sufficient to change the habitual burglar from giving up burglary. As one of the prison warders commented, "imprisonment might even enhance the burglars' skills and knowledge through conversational sharing of previous experiences with other convicted burglars".

It can thus be postulated that burglars will persist with burglary as long as they regard the chances of being caught as slim, and retain the perception that burglary provides the opportunity to earn a good living.

## 5.6.2 Crime displacement

In the research expectations it was postulated that burglars would adapt to changing circumstances that may arise from improved security initiatives to be able to continue their criminal activities (see par. 2.7.6).

According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1981:29), burglars would tend to act according to an established 'template' of cues which were developed through previous experiences. During the interviews with the burglars it became apparent that some burglars (mentioned by three) also exercised a degree of flexibility in their approach to the commission of a burglary. They would, for example, not always "work" in a group, and may decide to go out alone, looking for an opportunity to burgle.

The ability to adjust to changing circumstances is referred to in the literature as crime displacement, which *inter alia* occurred as a result of improved crime prevention measures (Lab, 1997:73). From the responses of the convicted burglars, as well as the opinion of the experts consulted for the present study, it became evident that burglars would continuously adapt to changing circumstances, by improving their skills, moving from one target area to another, and changing the time of committing the offence. According to Lab (1997:73), these forms of 'displacement' have to do with an improving competency and the ability to adjust to changing circumstances, it did not indicate that the burglar had decided to stop being a burglar or to move to another type of crime.

In the Bennett and Wright (1984:50) study on burglary, 43 per cent of the burglars reported that, if they were prevented from committing a burglary, they would usually commit another burglary against another target the same day. Forty-one per cent said that they normally did not attempt to commit another offence the same day, and sixteen per cent said that their behaviour depended on circumstantial conditions. If burglars were prevented from

committing another crime, it could result in a reduction of the total number of burglary offences, otherwise it could only result in the displacement of burglary offences.

The burglars who were interviewed in the present study were of the opinion that the majority of burglars (in general) would not abandon burglary for another type of crime on account of increasing security protection measures taken by residents. According to them there would always be enough opportunities to continue with burglary. In contrast to this, there were police members who suggested that the increase in residential robberies and car hijackings in recent years represented a shift from residential burglary to armed robbery and hijackings. Although an increase in residential robbery and hijackings occurred between 1994 and 1999, according to the police statistics, it was not coupled with a decrease in residential burglary, which on the contrary, also showed an increase (see Table 1.1).

## 5.7 CONCLUSION

The purpose of Chapter 5 was to analyse and interpret the results of the case studies and interviews conducted during the research phase, and to build a better understanding of the phenomenon of 'residential burglary' in the micro-environment. This was done through the application of the 'conceptual framework' and the 'research expectations' as put forward in Chapter 2 (see par. 2.6 and 2.7). The police station areas of Garsfontein and Pretoria West were used as the case study areas. Although the findings were presented by the use of percentages it was not the primary aim to "test" the research expectations in a statistical way but rather to display the variations in the findings and to determine whether confirmatory evidence for the conceptual framework and research expectations could be found.

The findings of the research were grouped under the headings as explained in the conceptual framework and were presented in such a way that it would enhance the understanding of the burglary process, with special emphasis on the following aspects:

- what motivates the initial involvement of the burglar;
- the search for a suitable target;
- the immediate situational conditions that could influence the burglar's final decision to continue or not to continue with the burglary;
- features of the burglary event; and
- responses of the burglary victims and burglars after the occurrence of the burglary event.

In Chapter 6 an overview is given of the different approaches to crime prevention, as well as

an explanation of practical principles that can be applied in the control and prevention of residential burglary at the macro-, meso- and micro-level.

A complete summary of the findings in relation to the research expectations and a refinement of the conceptual framework is presented in Chapter 7.

## CHAPTER 6

# PREVENTION OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

*Situational crime prevention refers to any environmental, community or individual based method which aims to increase the risk, decrease the reward or increase the difficulty of committing crime.*

- Bennett and Wright (1984:19)

### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the objectives of this study was to formulate principles or guidelines that could be applied in the development of residential burglary prevention measures or initiatives (see par. 1.6.5). The aim of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework for residential burglary prevention, based on the application of the research findings, and the insights gained through the theoretical perspectives and the conceptual framework, as explained in Chapter 2. This Chapter also contains a critical review on crime prevention initiatives at the macro- and meso-levels that were regarded relevant to this study.

### 6.2 DEFINING CRIME PREVENTION

The primary focus of this study was to define methods that could be applied to the prevention of residential burglary, with a lesser focus on the control of residential burglary. Lab (1997:19) provides the following explanation of the difference between crime prevention and crime control: "Crime prevention represents those efforts that aim to eliminate crime either prior to the initial occurrence or before further activity, whereas crime control alludes to maintenance of a given level of crime and the management of that amount of behaviour". Edelman and Rowe (1983:391) are of the opinion that crime prevention involves steps taken before and crime control steps taken after the commission of a crime.

According to Lab (1997:19), crime prevention entails any action designed to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime. He further emphasised that prevention activities should not be restricted to the efforts of the criminal justice system alone, but should include activities of both public and private organisations.

In the White Paper on Safety and Security (South Africa, 1998:14), crime prevention is defined as: "All activities which reduce, deter, or prevent the occurrence of specific crimes firstly, by altering the environment in which they occur, secondly by changing the conditions which are thought to cause them, and thirdly by providing a strong deterrent in the form of an effective Justice System".

In the *Manual for Community Based Crime Prevention*, drafted by the National Crime Prevention Centre of the Department of Safety and Security (South Africa, 2000:5), the following inclusive definition of crime prevention is given: "Crime prevention involves responding to a few priority problems, using targeted multi-agency programmes. These programmes aim to address the causes of and opportunities for particular crime problems. They should also enforce laws, ensure that order is maintained in the day to day activities of the community and reduce public fear of crime."

From the mentioned descriptions of crime prevention, the following could be concluded:

- that the aim of crime prevention is to reduce the actual level of crime and/or the perceived fear of crime, and
- to achieve this by means of changing the conditions which are causing crime; altering the environment in which specific crimes occur; and by providing a strong deterrent in the form of an effective criminal justice system.

In the context of this study, burglary prevention initiatives can be defined as any action, taken through public and/or private initiative, that are aimed to prevent residential burglary from occurring, and if occurring, to limit the damage, and to reduce the fear of being victimised. To be able to apply appropriate measures at the individual level, implies that an assessment be made of the vulnerability of that specific location. In this regard, the social geographer, with his/her specific knowledge of the 'geography of crime' and equipped to study spatial patterns and dynamics, can make a useful contribution to the analysis of human-environment interactions and to assess the vulnerability of a specific residential location. The geography of crime prevention can therefore be described as: to assess the vulnerability of specific locations and to suggest counter or security measures that could reduce the occurrence of (burglary) offences.

In the next section, an overview is given of different theoretical approaches and strategies to crime prevention that served as a theoretical basis in the development of an operational approach to burglary prevention as presented in the latter part of this chapter.

## 6.3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME PREVENTION

A brief overview is given on three different conceptual frameworks to crime prevention, as proposed by Brantingham and Faust (1976), Barkan (1997) and Walklate (1996).

### 6.3.1 Classification of Brantingham and Faust

According to Brantingham and Faust (1976:284), crime prevention approaches can be divided into three categories, which they define as:

- **Primary crime prevention** identifies conditions in the physical and social environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts. The purpose of primary crime prevention is to alter the circumstances in such a way that crime will not be committed.
- **Secondary crime prevention** engages in early identification of potential offenders and seeks to intervene prior to the commission of illegal activity.
- **Tertiary crime prevention** deals with actual offenders with the purpose of preventing further criminal offences.

Lab (1997:21) used this typology in his book *Crime Prevention: approaches, practices and evaluations* to provide a comprehensive description of the different approaches and methods to crime prevention. Table 6.1 provides a summary of these approaches and methods. According to Lab (1997:20), primary prevention measures aim at making crime less attractive to and more difficult for the offender to commit. Through the implementation of a wide range of possible methods (see Table 6.1), the attractiveness of crime will diminish accordingly, and hopefully prevent the initial decision to commit an offence.

Inclusive to secondary prevention is the ability of society and the criminal justice system to correctly identify and predict crime predisposed people and situations (Lab, 1997:22). Situational prevention, for example, seeks to identify existing problems at the micro-level and institute interventions that are developed specifically for that given problem. Closely associated with situational prevention is the community approach (policing) which relies on citizen involvement in the solving of neighbourhood problems or concerns. Secondary intervention may also include primary methods of crime prevention. The difference between primary and secondary prevention therefore is that primary prevention aims at keeping problems that lead to criminal activity from arising, whilst secondary prevention focuses on problems that already exist and are fostering deviant behaviour (Lab, 1997:22).

**TABLE 6.1: TYPOLOGY OF CRIME PREVENTION APPROACHES AND METHODS**

EXAMPLES OF CRIME PREVENTION APPROACHES AND METHODS		
Primary prevention	Secondary prevention	Tertiary prevention
Environmental design	Identification and prediction	Specific deterrence
Neighbourhood watch	Situational crime prevention	Incapacitation
General Deterrence (through the criminal justice system)	Community policing	Rehabilitation and treatment
Public education	Crime area analysis	-
Social crime prevention (e.g. addressing poverty)	Substance abuse (e.g. alcohol and drugs)	
Private security	Schools crime prevention	

Source: Adapted from Lab, 1997: 21

From this explanation, the researcher is of the opinion that it will be difficult to distinguish between primary and secondary prevention, because in real life situations it is difficult to collect when crime started to become a 'problem' in a specific area. Perceptions of residents in this regard will also play a role. In as far as secondary prevention is focussed on a specific problem, in a specific area, it is quite different from primary prevention, which has a broader or more general focus.

Within the realm of tertiary prevention (Lab, 1997:23), lie the majority of activities such as arrests, prosecutions, incarceration, treatment and rehabilitation. Non-justice system activities such as private enterprise correctional programmes, also form part of this category of prevention.

### 6.3.2 Classification of Barkan

Barkan (1997:537-546) also proposed three approaches to crime prevention, which almost correspond to Brantingham and Faust's primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention respectively. The three categories can be summarised as follows:

- Social, cultural and community crime prevention.** Barkan (1997: 537) argues that many of the criminogenic values in the United States are rooted in the capitalist economic system and need to be replaced. He mentions societal aspects such as economic inequality, economic deprivation, racial discrimination, and aspects of masculinity that prompt males to be more crime-prone than females. Some of the elements he proposes to be included in crime prevention strategies, are the following:

- social policies to create proper-paying jobs for the poor;
- government economic aid for people who cannot find work or who find work but still live in poverty;
- measures to restore the social integration and strengthen the social institutions of urban neighbourhoods;
- reduce housing and population density;
- reduce urban neighbourhood dilapidation;
- change male socialisation practices so that notions of masculinity move away from violence and other criminogenic attitudes and values; and
- social policies to reduce social and economic inequality between women and men.

■ **Developmental crime prevention.** Barkan (1997:40) is of the opinion that serious crime is disproportionately committed by a small group of chronic offenders whose anti-social behaviour began before adolescence. This approach recognizes that the seeds of juvenile delinquency and adult crime are planted long before delinquency and crime appear, and that it is essential to focus prevention efforts on developmental experiences in early childhood. Intervention policies he suggested, include:

- well-funded, early childhood intervention programs for high-risk children and their families;
- affordable, high-quality child day care for all parents who need to work outside the home, and flexible work schedules to allow parents to spend more time with their children;
- measures to improve the quality of schools, especially in urban areas, where schools are generating criminogenic conditions; and
- expansion of the network of battered women's shelters as well as rape crisis centres, that will reduce the likelihood that any children involved will continue to grow up in violent households.

■ **Criminal justice approaches.** Barkan (1997:545) is very critical of the United States' criminal justice approaches, which he describes as somewhat arbitrary, and where wealthy individuals and organisations committing harmful behaviour generally avoid legal sanctions. According to Barkan (1997:541), current criminal justice strategies and approaches have little if any success in reducing crime rates in the USA. He maintains that crime reduction initiatives sometimes come at great financial cost and are threats to civil liberties and civil rights. He further argues that the prison experience is more likely to make prisoners worse than better, as it is a system where they learn no marketable skills and have no jobs awaiting them when they leave prison.

- Barkan (1997:542) is in favour of the following interventions, of which some might not reduce crime rates but at least could raise public trust and confidence in the criminal justice system and operate in line with democratic values:
- reduce reliance on imprisonment and place more emphasis on community correction;
- prisons and jails should be smaller, overcrowding should be reduced, and decrepit prison and jail conditions should be improved;
- expansion of community policing;
- measures to reduce police brutality;
- steps to increase gun control efforts; and
- increase intolerance of white-collar crime and political corruption.

Although imprisonment has not been shown to be successful for common criminals, it may be more effective as a deterrent for potential white-collar and political offenders (Barkan, 1997:542).

Barkan's view of the United States criminal justice system is not fully applicable to the South African situation where a different system applies, but nonetheless it is worthy of note, seeing that the problems of overcrowding of prisons and the pressures under which the criminal justice system functions, also prevail in South Africa.

### 6.3.3 Classification of Walklate

Walklate (1996:297) made use of different themes in her analysis of crime prevention strategies which she constructed to encourage critical thinking about the different emphases in crime prevention. She distinguished between the followings strategies:

- **Offender-centred strategies.** This school of thought believes that more prosecutions, convictions and punishment will prevent crime. They argue that a prison acts as a deterrent to crime, because it incapacitates offenders from further offending and because it also serves the purpose of retribution (Walklate, 1996:298). This approach could also have a 'softer' edge in the sense that prisons are regarded as institutions for rehabilitation and not punishment. This is based on the premise that offenders are educable, trainable and supervisable and that, by targeting those who are at risk of offending, their behaviour could be redirected.

The effectiveness of offender-centred strategies is significantly limited by the presumption that the cause of crime lies within individual pathology. A critique against

this approach is that available evidence indicates that the causes of crime are also of a social nature, which offender-centred strategies are not designed to address (Walklate, 1996:298).

- **Victim-centred strategies.** The focus of the victim-centred strategies is on the victim, either by way of victim support or to avoid possible victimisation. Victim-centred strategies focus on 'empowerment' - that is, to enable people to engage in positive activities; or they focus on 'blaming the victim' - looking for ways of reducing crime by encouraging individuals to change their risk behaviour, for example, staying at home rather than going out (Walklate, 1996:302).

An example of this approach is the fact that insurance companies lay down criteria before they provide insurance coverage. In doing so, they place the responsibility for the prevention of burglary on the owner (victim), and in failing to comply with these rules, the insurance company does not pay out the claim.

- **Environment-centred strategies.** Environment-centred strategies include approaches such as situational crime prevention and the 'designing out' of crime (Walklate, 1996:303). The strategy is usually aimed at a specific crime, for example burglary, and to manage, design or manipulate the immediate environment with the purpose of reducing the opportunity for crime. This may include measures such as target hardening or increasing surveillance, for example through the use of surveillance cameras.

In environmental strategies criminal behaviour is viewed as a product of the opportunities presented by physical structures, and that the offender engages in a rational decision-making process prior to the offence. Whereas environmental-centred strategies can be regarded as effective in the prevention of property crimes, it is unable to prevent violent crimes such as domestic violence, child abuse and racially motivated crimes.

The increase in private security, as well as situational and environmental strategies has a profound effect on changing the urban landscape. Through private security, the more affluent societies become 'fortress' suburbs, which further reinforce the separation between the wealthy and the poor societies (Walklate, 1996:327). In South Africa there is also an increasing tendency to 'close off' neighbourhoods through security fencing and access control, and the establishment of so-called security villages.

- **Community-centred strategies.** Community-centred crime prevention programmes

focus on the needs and involvement of local communities in terms of crime prevention. It frequently advocates a combination of both situational and social crime prevention initiatives. Social crime prevention, as opposed to situational crime prevention, endeavours to address the root causes of crime. Through Neighbourhood Watch, for example, the presumption is made that increased surveillance could deter criminals by encouraging citizens to be the eyes and ears of the police on the streets. Simultaneously it could enhance social cohesion and greater trust between citizens, and a consequent reduction in the fear of crime (Walklate, 1996:308).

The concept of community safety or safer city programmes is based on multi-agency co-operation between formal agencies, informal agencies and community networks. The establishment of partnerships between private and state agencies is an important element in the supply of financial resources. The aim of these programmes is to reduce crime, lessen the fear of crime, and to create safer environments where economic and community life can thrive (Walklate, 1996:317). It requires the formulation of a locally based action plan, and an implementation process, usually involving a complex combination of situational or environmental measures and social strategies.

Walklate (1996:316) argues that because of the complexity of these initiatives it has proven difficult to evaluate their effectiveness. She further cautions that the central roles of the police and the local authorities in these programmes sometimes lead to a top-down approach, neglecting the real needs of the people living in those communities. These programmes will also have less effect in communities which are often economically deprived and who experience an adverse relationship with the official structures, and who may even try to undermine such initiatives.

#### **6.4 A HIERARCHICAL APPROACH TOWARDS CRIME PREVENTION**


The number of methods and techniques that can be applied to crime prevention are almost unlimited. As Lab (1997:23) observes, "crime prevention techniques are only limited by the imagination of the individuals interested in decreasing the levels of crime and fear of crime." From the three theoretical perspectives described (see par. 6.3), it is evident that a wide range of activities are involved in any crime prevention strategy, which is directed to influence or alter behaviour or situations concerning the offender, the victim, the social and physical environment, and the criminal justice system.

Moreover it is clear that these crime prevention approaches and strategies primarily provide a horizontal perspective to crime prevention and ignore, to a certain extent, the hierarchical (vertical) dimension that emphasise the scale and management of crime prevention

initiatives and programmes. Crime prevention programmes or initiatives at the local level may be more effective if supported by initiatives taken at the macro- and meso-levels, for example, though financial resources or in terms of planning, implementation and monitoring of projects.

The researcher is thus of the opinion that adding a hierarchical dimension to existing crime prevention approaches and strategies would enrich their effectiveness. For this reason, the same rationale as in the case of the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6), to distinguish between the macro-, meso- and micro-levels in the burglary process, was applied to develop an operationalised approach to residential burglary prevention. The hierarchical approach that aims to integrate the horizontal as well as the vertical dimensions of crime prevention strategies, is illustrated in Figure 6.1.

**FIGURE 6.1: LEVELS OF CRIME PREVENTION**



The three levels of crime prevention that coincide with the levels in the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6), can be explained as follows:

- **Macro-level crime prevention initiatives.** Crime prevention at the macro-level is captured in the policies and strategies promulgated through the national, provincial and

local government legislative powers, as well as the plans and strategies of the executive arms of the state, especially the Departments of Safety and Security, Correctional Services, and of Justice. Besides from these main role players, the participation and involvement of other welfare departments and the private sector are essential for the successful implementation of crime prevention programmes.

As a result of the multi-dimensional nature of crime and its impact, it is widely acknowledged that multi-agency programmes are needed to effectively address the problem of crime. The principle of multi-dimensionality also implies that crime prevention initiatives should include elements of primary, secondary as well as tertiary crime prevention measures. Consequently, crime prevention strategies at the macro-level should not only be directed at improving the criminal justice system, but also address the causes of criminogenic situations. Furthermore they should be in the position to prioritise types of crime that need special attention.

Initiatives at macro-level should therefore create the policy framework that will empower the structures at the lower levels to effectively implement crime prevention initiatives. In the South African context, the NCPS of 1996, the White Paper on Safety and Security of 1998 and the strategic and operational plans of the SAPS at national, provincial and area levels, serve as examples of macro-level crime prevention policies and programmes.

■ **Meso-level crime prevention initiatives.** Whereas the macro-approach focusses on policies and strategies that will direct and enable crime prevention agencies, the meso-level is the functional level where crime prevention agencies accept responsibility for the implementation of these policies and strategies. In this study the police station area and community initiatives constitute the meso-level of crime prevention. The Pretoria SAPS area is divided into 28 police station areas and each of them encompasses a number of neighbourhoods or a suburban area.

The meso-level is the level where meaningful partnerships can be forged between official structures, the private sector and the communities. In the South African context, initiatives with regard to community policing, the establishment of Community Police Forums, Neighbourhood Watch and projects of Business Against Crime can be regarded as meso-level initiatives.

■ **Micro-level crime prevention initiatives.** The micro-level of crime prevention is focussed on the individual residence and its immediate environment. The onus for crime prevention at this level is primarily on the individual household alone or in co-

operation with the neighbours, residents in the street, or members in the same residential block. In the South African context, private security companies have become an important role player in the safeguarding of individual residences. Target hardening, improved personal security, good neighbourliness, and the introduction of Block Watch can all be regarded as micro-level prevention initiatives. At micro-level crime prevention is primarily based on private initiatives which have cost implications for those involved.

From a theoretical perspective, initiatives at the micro-level will most often engage situational crime prevention, whereas those at the meso- and macro-level will focus on the criminal justice system (the arrest, prosecution and conviction of criminals), and to create safer communities and cities through a variety of possible crime prevention programmes, including environmental design, community based crime prevention, school projects and social crime prevention.

The distinction between macro-, meso- and micro-level crime prevention should not be regarded as watershed divisions but as an addition to the more horizontally classifications of crime prevention approaches. Considering both the hierarchical (vertical) and horizontal dimensions is the basis of an integrated approach to crime prevention. Such an approach will be better suited to combine the resources and expertise at the different levels in order to realise the aims of crime prevention, that is, to reduce the levels of crime and to create an environment in which people can feel safe and secure.

## **6.5 AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO BURGLARY PREVENTION**

In this section principles for the development of an integrated approach to prevent residential burglary are laid down. By 'integrated' is meant that the approach should focus on the main elements of the burglary process, namely: the burglar, the neighbourhood environment, the residents, and the situational conditions, as well as an alignment in structures and management of prevention initiatives at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels. An integrated approach further implies a multi-agency approach between the different agencies involved in crime prevention in order to have a co-ordinated effort in addressing the many diverse angles to crime prevention.

The purpose is therefore not to construct a burglary prevention strategy or programme, but to provide a framework of guidelines and principles that can be applied in the construction of such strategies or programmes, with the emphasis on the identification of risk factors and possible prevention actions to be taken. The integrated approach to burglary prevention can

also be presented in a matrix format, where the horizontal axis represents the different approaches and methods to burglary prevention, and the vertical axis, the different levels of location and the risk factors attached to the levels of location. The framework of principles and guidelines for burglary prevention initiatives is presented in Table 6.2.

The conceptual framework for burglary prevention (see Table 6.2) proposes a specific sequence of reasoning and includes the following phases:

- First, to describe the location of the residence under investigation in terms of its macro-environment (in the city or town), its meso-environment (in the police station area and neighbourhood), and its micro-environment (in the street, block or complex).
- Second, to identify and assess the risk factors of the specific location that might have a bearing on the vulnerability of that location/residence. The risk factors as listed in Table 6.2, were based on the research findings (explained in Chapter 4 and 5) as having an impact on the vulnerability of a specific residence. Most of the risk factors should be assessed after sufficient information is gathered, for example, to determine the comparative burglary rates (statistics) between provinces, cities, and police station areas. To assist in the assessment, the risk factors can be given a rating from 'high', if regarded as a priority or of great importance, to 'medium' and 'low', if regarded as of lesser importance.
- Third, to decide on the approach and the type of prevention initiatives that should be implemented, and at what levels or combination of levels (macro-, meso-, or micro-) it should focus. This phase implies an in-depth understanding of the different approaches and methods of burglary prevention, as well as expert knowledge of planning, implementation and monitoring of burglary prevention programmes and projects.

The prevention measures or initiatives can take many forms, depending on the goals and objectives set out from the beginning, and can vary from time-specific operations, to medium term projects, to long term programmes, as well as permanent changes to the physical and social environment, including the installation of specific safety devices. The third phase implies that, when a project approach is followed, many considerations should be taken into account, for example, proper planning is needed to determine the aim and objectives of the planned action, what resources would be needed, the time frames and who would be responsible for the implementation and management of the action plans. Furthermore, it is essential to monitor and evaluate the progress made at regular intervals to determine whether or not adjustments are needed.

TABLE 6.2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR BURGLARY PREVENTION INITIATIVES

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR BURGLARY PREVENTION: APPLIED TO THE CASE STUDIES						
	DESCRIBE THE LOCATION OF SPECIFIC RESIDENCE	ASSESS THE RISK FACTORS		SUGGESTED PREVENTION MEASURES		
		Risk factors/ indicators*	Rating: H/M/L**	Aim	Prevention measures/ initiatives	Actors
MACRO-LEVEL	Residence X within the metropole of Pretoria	<b>Relating to burglar:</b> - Burglary rates in Pretoria compared to other cities - Proportion of motivated burglars in society		(a) To address the root causes for criminal behaviour. (b) To address the efficiency of the criminal justice system	<b>Social crime prevention:</b> - Job creation and upliftment - Grants for the unemployed - Developmental program for preschool and school children <b>Criminal justice system:</b> - Capacity building - Rehabilitation program	Multi-agency approach between welfare departments, local authorities, SAPS, Justice, Correctional Serves, and the private sector
MESO-LEVEL	Residence X within the police station area of Pretoria West or Garsfontein	<b>Relating to neighbourhood:</b> - Affluence of neighbourhood - Comparative trends in burglary rates - Accessibility to and from neighbourhood - Proximity to high crime areas - Presence and free movement of strangers - Apathy of neighbours - Insufficient patrols		(a) To <b>observe/ monitor</b> the movement of potential burglar(s) (b) To <b>control</b> the movement of potential burglar(s) from outside (c) To address the fear of burglary	<b>'Hot spot' operations:</b> - Law enforcement activities - Road blocks - Patrols <b>Community policing:</b> - Community Policing Forums - Trauma treatment centres <b>Community organisation:</b> - Neighbourhood watch/ civilian patrols: <b>Enclosed neighbourhoods/ Security villages</b>	Multi-agency approach between police stations, local authority, community organisations, homeowners associations, and private security companies
MICRO-LEVEL	Residence X at a specific street address	<b>Relating to situational conditions:</b> <b>(a) Residents:</b> - Residents are absent from home - Residents are asleep		(a) To <b>deter burglar(s)</b> from selecting a potential target	<b>Situational crime prevention:</b> - Change routine activities - Improve awareness	Individual household, Street committee, Private security companies

Table 6.2 continues

TABLE 6.2 (continued)

	DESCRIBE THE LOCATION OF SPECIFIC RESIDENCE	ASSESS THE RISK FACTORS		SUGGESTED PREVENTION MEASURES		
		Risk factors/ indicators*	Rating: H/M/L**	Aim	Measures	Actors
MICRO-LEVEL	Residence X at a specific street address	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Residents more at risk e.g. being single</li> <li>- Residents' carelessness</li> <li><b>(b) Surveillance:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Poor surveillance</li> <li>- Poor visibility around the residence</li> </ul> </li> <li><b>(c) Physical design:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Visible signs of wealth</li> <li>- Easy entrance/escape e.g. big windows, sliding doors, concealed entrances</li> </ul> </li> <li><b>(d) Security:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Easy access to site e.g. no fence, electrified/ razor wire, surveillance camera</li> <li>- Security gates at doors insufficient</li> <li>- Burglar bars at windows insufficient</li> <li>- Lighting insufficient</li> <li>- Absence of watch dog</li> <li>- No alarm system</li> <li>- Not connected to an armed reaction unit</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(b) To prevent potential burglar(s) from entering residential site</li> <li>(c) To prevent potential burglar(s) from entering the building</li> <li>(d) To limit the damage in case of a burglary</li> <li>(e) To address the fear of burglary</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Improve good neighbourliness</li> <li>- Improve surveillance (formal and informal) e.g. Block Watch</li> <li>- Improve visibility, e.g. open line of sight and effective lighting</li> <li>- Change design features (where possible), e.g. limit sliding doors, improve visibility / surveillance</li> <li>- Safeguarding/control access to site, e.g. surveillance camera, electrified fence, or security guards</li> <li>- Target hardening, e.g. through effective locks, security gates, burglar bars</li> <li>- Install alarm system</li> <li>- Connect alarm system to armed reaction unit</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Individual household,</li> <li>Street committee,</li> <li>Private security companies</li> </ul>

\* The risk factors coincide with the research findings as described in Chapter 5.

\*\* The rating of High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L) can be based on empirical evidence or as being perceived.

Agencies in South Africa involved in crime prevention, have little experience in crime reduction programmes aimed at specific crimes, and can learn from well established institutions in other countries, such as the Policing and Reducing Crime Unit that forms part of the Research, Development and Statistics Directorate of the Home Office in Britain (Bennett & Durie, 1999).

The conceptual framework for burglary prevention, as explained in Table 6.2, makes a clear distinction between the three levels of burglary prevention initiatives. This differentiation can be summarised as follows:

- At macro-level, the primary focus of burglary prevention is to correct, in broader society, criminogenic conditions that are associated with the root causes of burglary behaviour. Success will largely depend on the capacity and efficiency of the criminal justice system (including the police service) to arrest, prosecute and convict burglars, and to institute further measures that are aimed at rehabilitating convicted burglars.
- At meso-level, the primary focus of burglary prevention is to safeguard communities or neighbourhoods from potential acts of burglary, *inter alia* by engaging community organisations in burglary prevention initiatives. Visible, community policing and community actions aimed at observing, monitoring, or controlling the movement of potential burglars may serve as a deterrent to potential burglars, and may also help to create a feeling of safety amongst residents.
- At micro-level, the primary focus of burglary prevention is to safeguard the individual household from potential acts of burglary. Through the implementation of various situational crime prevention measures, the burglar, who intended to break in, may find it increasingly difficult to enter the premises and may be deterred from selecting that specific residence. The more security or safety measures installed, the greater the chance that residents would feel safer in their immediate environment, and the greater the chance that, in the case of a burglary, the damage would be limited. The implementation of security measures at the individual level is the prime responsibility of the owner, sometimes at considerable expense.

In residential areas where individual efforts to improve security are linked with crime prevention initiatives of the local police and the community, there will be a greater chance of success than in those incidents where crime prevention initiatives are implemented in isolation.

## 6.6 BURGLARY PREVENTION IN THE MICRO-ENVIRONMENT

In the Bill of Rights, the Constitution clearly states that everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes *inter alia*, the right to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources (section 12 (1) (c)), and that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property (section 25 (1)). As a result of the limited capacity and other problems experienced in the law enforcement agencies and in the criminal justice system in general, and the subsequent failure to protect all citizens' rights in terms of safety, security and property, there has been a significant growth in self-protection and private security measures in recent years. Over the last decade, for example, the turnover of the private security sector grew from an estimated R1,2 billion in 1990 to R11 billion in 1999. Considering these figures with relation to the national budget of the SAPS of R15,5 billion for the year 2000/2001, the growth is phenomenal (Schönteich, 2000:19).

In the preamble to the Security Industry Regulation Bill (South Africa, 2001:1), it is also stated that "the protection of fundamental rights to life and security of the person as well as the right not to be deprived of property, is fundamental to the well-being and to the social and economic development of every person". It is in this context that the private security industry sees for itself an important role to play in protecting and safeguarding personal rights and property.

In this study it was found that, at the individual level, the residents would decide upon what measures to take after the occurrence of a burglary, depending on their financial position and the level of fear and feelings of safety they had experienced. In most instances the households had opted for security measures that would suit their financial position and that would make them feel safer. The result was that most of the households did not first undertake a risk assessment of possible vulnerabilities before they implemented new security measures.

This study has shown that the residents in the less affluent areas of Pretoria West tended to improve their security by implementing additional target hardening measures such as trellis fences, reinforced burglar bars and security gates. They were also inclined to value good neighbourliness, which in effect served as an informal method of surveillance. Good visibility from the street was another characteristic of most residential sites in the Pretoria West area.

In the more affluent areas of Pretoria East, the residents also tended to implement additional

target hardening measures, but would further improve their security by installing alarm systems and by subscribing to armed reaction units. The residents in these areas also relied on appropriate insurance coverage, which was not the case in the Pretoria West area.

According to Landman (2000:7), individual households in the more affluent areas, tend to "turn their houses into fortified bastions and their neighbourhoods into walled towns". This tendency will most probably weaken community cohesion and create 'distance' between neighbours, which in itself may add to a situation where neighbours are less alert and involved with each other.

In both the case study areas of Pretoria West and Garsfontein (Pretoria East) there was an absence of involvement in community based crime prevention initiatives at either street or neighbourhood levels, like establishing Street or Neighbourhood Watch, or conducting citizen patrols, or promoting awareness programmes aimed at monitoring the movement of strangers. The researcher is of the opinion that much more could be done to involve individual households in community organisation aimed at crime prevention, for instance, to appeal to the local police through the CPF to conduct crime prevention/protective operations in their residential area, such as, road blocks, security patrols, or search operations. It would also be feasible for a community to contract a private security company to conduct regular security patrols.

In applying the approach presented in Table 6.2, the individual household would first have to assess the vulnerabilities of their residence (in terms of the risk factors), before implementing any prevention measures. The principles of situational crime prevention seem to be most appropriate to guide the process and decisions of what type of security measures to implement. These principles imply that the individual household should try to reduce the opportunities for burglary by increasing the effort in which burglars must invest, increasing the risk of being caught and reducing their reward (Murray, 1995:358). The aim would thus be to change the vulnerabilities in such a way that they would reduce the opportunities for burglary.

At the micro-environment level and with the application of situational crime prevention, the focus is on changing the situational conditions and not on the root social or psychological factors that might have caused criminal behaviour in the first place. In Section 6.7 more attention is given to crime prevention initiatives at the macro- and meso-levels that were not only aimed at reducing opportunities for crime, but also aimed at changing criminal behaviour.

## 6.7 CRITICAL REVIEW OF CRIME PREVENTION INITIATIVES AT THE MACRO- AND MESO-LEVELS IN SOUTH AFRICA

In this section special attention is given to crime prevention initiatives at the macro- and meso-level that may have a bearing on the prevention of residential burglary.

### 6.7.1 Macro-level initiatives

Within the Government since 1994 there has been a growing realisation of the need and value of crime prevention that eventually culminated in the acceptance of the NCPS in 1996, and the White Paper on Safety and Security in 1998. These policy and strategy papers did not only provide a clear framework of principles and guidelines with regard to crime prevention, but also suggested structures and processes for implementation.

The NCPS was designed as a comprehensive multi-agency approach to crime prevention. It aims to influence the operations of the Departments of Safety and Security, Justice, Correctional Services, Welfare, Defence, Intelligence, as well as Health and Education. It also established new co-ordination structures, including joint decision making by Directors-General and Ministers of NCPS departments (South Africa, 1998:12). The four focus areas of the NCPS around which projects are undertaken are: the criminal justice process, environmental design, public values and education, and transnational crime. Research, advocacy and facilitation of crime prevention programmes are seen as a priority, although still in its embryonic stages, due to a lack of dedicated capacity and resources. In essence the NCPS provides a national vision and framework for preventing crime.

Although the NCPS-document made mention of environmental design as one of the pillars of the NCPS, it also indicated that Government had no policy on environmental design and that the private sector concerns led the way (South Africa, 1996:67). The NCPS nonetheless emphasises the importance of environmental design, as shown in the following objectives:

- To encourage awareness of the possibility of environmental design in reducing and preventing crime.
- To highlight the importance of environmental design in areas beyond physical architecture, motor vehicle security and urban planning. In particular, environmental design principles could be more widely implemented in the design of delivery systems, the organisation of industries and accounting systems, particularly within the public sector.

The challenge was taken up by the Division of Building Technology at the CSIR that initiated a research project on *Reducing Crime Through Environmental Design*, and which resulted in numerous research publications on environmental design. The publications provide a good overview on the current status of environmental design in South Africa, but contain little empirical evidence on the real nature of environmental design in South Africa. One of the publications, *Environmental Design for Safer Communities in South Africa* (1998), can be used as a manual in the development of crime prevention programmes based on the principles of environmental design.

To give effect to NCPS and the White Paper on Safety and Security, a National Crime Prevention Strategy Centre (NCPSC) was established within the Department of Safety and Security to assist with the initiation, co-ordination and facilitation of crime prevention programmes. Functions of the NCPSC are *inter alia* (South Africa, 1998:21):

- To mobilise other government departments such as Justice, Correctional Services, Welfare, Education, Public Services and Administration and Transport who have a role to play in crime prevention initiatives.
- To assist provincial and local government in preventing crime by providing research, technical guidance, training and the sharing of best practice. This will necessitate a strong research, monitoring and information component.
- To assist in co-ordinating and managing the prevention of certain priority crimes as identified in the annual planning process. This includes to work in partnership with the provinces, local governments and civil society to develop crime prevention programmes.
- To monitor the effectiveness of social crime prevention interventions.

The NCPSC, in co-operation with the CSIR and the ISS, published in 2000 *A Manual for Community Based Crime Prevention*, with the aim to assist local authorities to design their own crime prevention plans.

The White Paper on Safety and Security (South Africa, 1998:14) emphasises two approaches to crime prevention, first, crime prevention through effective criminal justice, and, second, social crime prevention. The first is based on the rationale that effective law enforcement creates a strong deterrent to crime, and that the opportunity for crime will be reduced by making it more difficult to commit crimes, more risky and less rewarding. Focus areas of this approach are:

- to improve the investigative capacity of the SAPS;
- to implement targeted visible policing; and
- to meet the needs of victims through adequate service delivery.

Secondly, according to the White Paper on Safety and Security (South Africa, 1998:19), social crime prevention is a collective term to include various categories of crime prevention strategies, which can be grouped under the following headings:

- **Developmental crime prevention:** Projects include early learning programmes, structured parenting guidance and support programmes for youth at risk, which aim at training and enhancing prospects for employment. This approach requires the commitment and assistance of many government departments, some of whom are already undertaking such projects.
- **Situational crime prevention:** This approach encompasses crime prevention through environmental design, aiming at diminishing opportunities for crime by modifying the situations in which offending occurs. Projects include, for example, improving mechanisms for surveillance through better lighting and layout of urban centres.
- **Community crime prevention:** This approach suggests that communities take responsibility for crime prevention initiatives in their own neighbourhoods. Local programmes include effective rehabilitation through effective community correction aimed at reducing repeated offending.
- **Continuous improvements to the integrated justice system:** An effective justice system acts as a deterrent and improves support to victims and the management of offenders. It is therefore essential that the justice system operates as a single enterprise.

Social crime prevention therefore advocates the implementation of crime prevention as a focussed effort to address specific crime problems, by means of multifaceted strategies that aim to combat and prevent a single offence or category of offences. A multi-departmental or multi-sectoral approach is thus required, that will involve all levels of government and include relevant organisations of civil society (South Africa, 1998:20).

In accordance to the objectives of the White Paper on Safety and Security, the Government announced its strategy on crime in the beginning of 2000. The departments involved in the criminal justice system jointly identified priorities or 'strategic interventions' aimed at addressing the incidence of crime, public disorder and inefficiencies in the justice system. These 'strategic interventions' could broadly be summarised as follows (Schönteich, 2000:7-10):

- To enhance the concept of social crime prevention by addressing the issue of endemic poverty. Government has, for example, adopted an Urban Renewal Programme, which is a multi-faceted approach dealing with problems in high-density poverty ridden urban areas. Pilot projects were also launched in high density crime areas around the country, focussing on high visibility police presence, frequent police patrols, and intelligence driven road blocks and search operations.
- To improve prosecution-led and intelligence-driven investigations, through *inter alia*, the establishment of the Directorate of Special Operations (known as the Scorpions) that will focus its activities on priority crimes such as vehicle hijacking, syndicate drug and arms dealings, transnational crimes, money laundering and corruption within the criminal justice system. Another priority is to improve the methods of intelligence gathering and closer co-operation between the intelligence agencies, the SAPS and the Scorpions.
- To bolster effective border control through a national co-ordinated strategy aiming at combatting cross-border crimes. These include the smuggling of drugs, illegal firearms and other contraband goods, the exporting of hijacked vehicles and the cross-border movement of illegal immigrants.
- To address the problem of overcrowded prisons, the Department of Correctional Services intends introducing an electronic monitoring system, a device locked around the ankle, whereby convicted prisoners can be released and placed under community supervision - a system which is more cost effective than imprisonment.
- To develop human resources and to improve the quality of services to the community, through *inter alia*, training programmes, the upgrading of the infrastructure, improved computerised programmes and the improvement of victim support services.
- To establish and expand partnerships with the private sector, for example, the banks assisting the state with its border control functions, and the combatting of commercial crimes.

During the *Review Debate on Criminal Justice Cluster* in the National Council of Provinces in June 2000, the Minister of Safety and Security made reference to the strategic and operational plan of the SAPS for the next three years. Priorities that he highlighted included

- to eradicate corruption;
- to pay special attention to violent crimes including, gang violence and 'social fabric' crimes with a specific focus on violence against women and children;

- to make major break-throughs into organised crime relating to:
  - vehicle theft and hijacking;
  - drug trafficking;
  - bank robbery and the robbery of cash in transit;
  - illegal plundering of the marine resources;
  - money laundering;
  - high-tech transnational crimes and cyber crime;
  - commercial crime;
  - illegal firearms; and
  - precious metals and stones (South Africa, 2000).

From his address it was evident that the main focus was on law enforcement, whilst no mention was made about the importance of crime prevention activities. This could easily create the impression that the role of crime prevention is played down against that of law enforcement. It was also evident that residential burglary, which is the most common crime in South Africa, was not mentioned as a priority at national level.

There are many reasons why crime prevention is still in its infancy and its impact still limited. The slow pace of implementing crime prevention strategies can be attributed to a number of factors, including:

- Social crime prevention is a relatively new concept for law enforcement agencies and, although the concept is accepted and written into national strategies, the operationalisation and implementation thereof in practical terms has not realised in any significant way. Part of the problem is that the basic orientation of security force members remains towards law enforcement and not crime prevention.
- Crime prevention initiatives will be more successful if they are directed at specific crimes and implemented through multi-agency co-operation. However, the diverse nature of the many priority crimes in South Africa and the problem of interdepartmental co-operation, make it difficult to implement and manage multi-agency programmes/projects aimed at different priority crimes.
- Multi-agency crime prevention programmes are also time-consuming, and dependent on skilled and committed officials who have experience in project planning and management. The capacity problems in terms of personnel and financial resources experienced by most government departments also serve as a constraining factor.

- The absence of effective crime prevention structures at provincial and local government levels, similar to the NCPC, may also hamper the implementation of crime prevention programmes at local government and community level. The current process of transformation and restructuring of state departments and of local governments, may also delay the implementation of crime prevention strategies.
- A further problem is the lack of intelligence and systematic analysis of available information on specific types of crime. Traditionally, law enforcement agencies are more interested in the solving of cases, that is, to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators, and not to understand the underlying dynamics or driving forces behind specific types of crime.

### 6.7.2 Meso-level initiatives

Crime prevention at the police station level (meso-level) can be divided between those initiatives taken by the official structures of the state and those taken by communities to protect themselves against criminal activity. In this section attention is given to the concepts of Community Policing, and private community initiatives.

#### 6.7.2.1 Community Policing

Community Policing has been written into the Police Service Act and has been adopted as the operational philosophy of the SAPS. Community Policing can be defined as “a philosophy of or an approach to policing which recognises the interdependence and shared responsibility of the police and the community in ensuring a safe and secure environment for all the people of the country. Community Policing aims to establish an active and equal partnership between the police and the public through which crime and community safety issues can jointly be determined and solutions designed and implemented” (South Africa, 1998:1). In the *Manual on Community Policing (Policy, Framework and Guidelines)*(South Africa, 1998:2-4) the following elements can be singled out as crucial in explaining the meaning of Community Policing:

- The role of the police officer becomes that of peace officer rather than that of law enforcement officer involved solely in crime control. In the new capacity the police are called upon to enforce the law, to prevent crime, promote public order, resolve conflict, enhance police-community relations, and render general services and assistance to the public.
- Community Policing involves a pro-active approach to policing. The focus of the police

is broadened from a reactive focus on serious crime and a consequent over-emphasis of law enforcement to a pro-active focus on the prevention of crime, the solution of community problems and addressing the causes of crime and disorder.

- Community Policing requires the development of specific tactics to reduce the fear of being victimised, particularly among children, the elderly, and other vulnerable groups in society.

In adherence to the principle of creating partnerships between the police and the community, the institution of CPFs has been entrenched in legislation. The CPFs are intended to assist the police, *inter alia*, to: improve the delivery of police-service to the community; promote joint problem identification and problem-solving; joint crime prevention initiatives; ensure police accountability and transparency; and ensure consultation and proper communication between the police and the community (South Africa, 1998:3).

Although essential, the ideals of Community Policing will only remain a philosophy when the current workload and limited capacity (human and technical) at most police stations are taken into account. The results of an IDASA survey study in 1998 on crime prevention in Pretoria confirmed this conclusion (Rauch, 1998). The station commissioners who were interviewed in the IDASA study, mentioned the following obstacles or problems that hampered effective functioning:

- Seventy-seven per cent mentioned the lack of human resources, referring to the insufficient number of police officials.
- Seventy-three per cent indicated the lack of physical resources, including vehicles for patrol and response work, and technical equipment.
- Fifty-nine per cent referred to the negative community attitudes and lack of co-operation. The police struggle to secure and maintain community involvement and co-operation with crime prevention initiatives in those areas where they find the community hostile towards them. In communities where private security is common (in the more affluent areas), the residents tend to be less co-operative with the police and less inclined to participate in community police forums, because they do not rely on the police as the sole providers of security services. Other obstacles that were mentioned included, communities that are "tolerant" of crime; not reporting crime; and providing a market for stolen goods.
- Twenty-seven per cent mentioned problems with police morale, commitment, skills and training that hampered their ability to deal effectively with crime.

- Twenty-seven per cent were of the opinion that unstable social conditions such as alcoholism and drugs, unstable families, street children, unemployment and relative deprivation also inhibit the police's ability to tackle crime effectively.
- Police corruption was mentioned 18 per cent of the police stations.
- Insurance fraud was also identified as an obstacle, because it consumes police time and resources.

However, from the interviews conducted in this study, it became clear that the two police stations of Garsfontein and Pretoria West both experienced problems with regard to capacity and an overload of work per officer, which forced them to focus more on their law enforcement functions at the expense of crime prevention initiatives. In both areas CPFs were functioning, and although they helped to improve relationships with the communities and to assist in awareness campaigns, they were not in the position to alleviate the work pressures experienced at the police stations.

The establishment of a municipal police service for the Pretoria Metropolitan area, as envisaged after the 2000 municipal elections, could in future assist local police stations with visible policing and other crime prevention functions. According to The South African Police Services Amendment Bill (No 39 of 1998), local governments will have the right to establish municipal police services in their areas, depending on how severe crime is and whether the resources and capacity are available. Municipal police officers will have the same powers as those currently held by traffic officers, which means that they will not be able to investigate crime (South Africa, 2000:13).

## **6.7.2.2 Private community initiatives**

### **6.7.2.2.1 Enclosed neighbourhoods and security villages**

In reaction to the fear of crime and the perceived increase of armed robberies and burglary in residential areas, the construction of enclosed neighbourhoods is regarded by many residents as the best option to prevent crime. In the wealthier residential areas in South Africa there is an increased tendency to close off neighbourhoods. The rationale behind the closure of neighbourhoods is to exercise control over vehicle traffic and the movement of people, especially strangers, that will serve as a deterrent for potential criminals to enter the area, out of fear of being observed and apprehended.

A distinction should be drawn between 'enclosed neighbourhoods' and 'security villages'.

According to Landman (2000:3), 'enclosed neighbourhoods' refer to existing neighbourhoods where access control, through gates or booms across existing roads were instituted, and where in many instances the areas were also fenced or walled off. The roads within these neighbourhoods are still public property and the local authority is still responsible for the provision of public services to the community within its boundaries. On the other hand, 'security villages' are private developments where the entire area is developed by a private developer. These areas are physically walled or fenced off and have controlled access by way of security guards. The infrastructure and maintenance thereof is managed by a private management body.

Other than in the case of 'enclosed neighbourhoods' where security is usually the main consideration, 'security villages' represent a new type of urban development, which, besides from improved security, also offer other benefits to the inhabitants such as higher estate values, private schools, open space, and recreational and sport facilities.

Before an existing neighbourhood can be closed off, the local authority has to approve such a request or application first. The problem in South Africa is that no general policy exists specifically with regard to the enclosure of neighbourhoods for security purposes (Landman, 2000:13). Only a few local authorities have already developed their own policies or are in the process of formulating them. The Eastern Metropolitan Local Council of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, and the Pretoria City Council are two local authorities that have such policies, based on Section 45 of the Rationalisation of Local Government Affairs Act, 1998 (Act 10 of 1998). Currently local authorities set their own procedural requirements according to the legal framework of that specific province. Generally, these requirements entail (Landman, 2000:16):

- Submitting of a formal application from a residents' association. In most cases the residents establish a Section 21 Company to manage the process and to collect fees. The application should include all the necessary documents required, including a traffic impact study if so required.
- Advertising the intention to close a street or streets in the local newspapers.
- Consulting with the SAPS regarding the proposed enclosure.
- The majority of residents (ranging from 66,6 to 90 per cent, depending on the local authority's regulations) within the affected area must be in favour of the closure plan.

No local authority has the obligation to approve the application if they are not in favour of such a development. The local authority may decide that all road closures may only be

temporary closures, approved for a specific period. The application for neighbourhood enclosures and the gaining of approval, has proven to be a lengthy process. The cost factor for the residents in terms of implementation costs and monthly installments to pay for security guards and in some instances for private security companies, should be taken into account. It is also important to note that 'enclosed neighbourhoods' could have different levels of protection, depending on the ability to have total or partial control over the movement of people and vehicles in and out of the security area.

Seeing that 'enclosed neighbourhoods' is a fairly new phenomenon in South Africa, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness thereof in terms of crime prevention. In South Africa initial findings suggest that certain types of crime such as burglary and hijackings have decreased significantly in 'enclosed neighbourhoods' (Landman, 2000:20). Police statistics, however, showed that police stations were regularly requested to attend to crime offences within enclosed areas, which indicated that these areas were not totally crime free. An example is the high security estate of Mooikloof near Pretoria, where seven burglaries were reported during the festive season of December 2001 (Beeld, 2002).

A study by Blakely and Snyder (1997) on 'enclosed communities' in the United States showed that in some cases a reduction in crime was reported, in other cases only temporary reductions were registered, and in some no changes occurred. Professional criminals and syndicates might not be easily deterred by fences and closed entrances, specifically for the reason that residents may develop a false sense of security and become negligent. A reduction in vehicle traffic and pedestrian movement may also reduce natural surveillance, whilst strangers in the area may be accepted as being officially permitted to the area.

Apart from the safety and security benefits of 'enclosed neighbourhoods', there may be also concerns about:

- difficulties with regard to maintenance and services;
- reducing response time of emergency vehicles;
- dividing communities, causing urban fragmentation and separation;
- possible social exclusion, and tensions between urban residents;
- a false sense of security, or to the contrary, increasing the fear of crime; and
- crime displacement, to the detriment of surrounding residential areas (Landman, 2000:25).

An increased tendency towards 'closed neighbourhoods' may become an obstacle in the Government's aim, as spelled out in policy documents such as the Development Facilitation Act and the Green Paper on Planning and Development in 1999, to develop integrated urban areas. On the other hand, if this type of development is an effective way of establishing

safer communities, a conflict of interest may arise between the local residents who have the right to a safer environment and the local authorities who have the dual obligation to develop integrated urban areas and to protect its citizens from criminal activity.

#### **6.7.2.2.2 Community organisation and citizen patrols**

An alternative to the physical enclosure of neighbourhoods is the establishment of Homeowners Associations that may function as a Section 21 Companies, but instead of campaigning for the enclosure of their neighbourhood, they built vibrant community organisations with sub-divisions and street cells that effectively communicate and interact with the residents. The aim is to initiate projects which include safety patrols, regular neighbourhood clean-ups, and sharing information through regular newsletters. The co-operation of the local authority and the police is sought to ensure that the maximum impact is achieved (Landman, 2000:26).

The difference between the Homeowners Association and the traditional Neighbourhood Watch is that the former is better organised through subscribed membership, the payment of monthly levies and the employment of volunteers (e.g. pensioners) to staff the control room on a full-time basis. Sub-committees and structures are established to ensure effective functioning, including: a management committee; a control room; patrolling of neighbourhood; access control; safety houses; newsletter/liaison/marketing; administration; and finances. According to research findings there are initial improvements in the crime situation after the introduction of street patrols by the residents themselves (Landman, 2000:26).

The challenge in the longer term will be to maintain the interest of the residents and their involvement in the execution of civilian patrols and other projects. According to Bennett (1992:281), a study of the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Watch programmes in Hartford, Connecticut (USA) showed that after an initial drop in both burglary and robbery rates, there was again an increase in the rates after two years that indicated no difference between the rates in the experimental area and that of the city as a whole. Bennett (1992:282) also cited research findings in Britain which showed no evidence that Neighbourhood Watch resulted in a sustainable reduction in the levels of victimisation.

#### **6.7.2.2.3 Vigilante activity**

The high level of crime and the government's perceived failure to curb crime had resulted in the emergence of strong community reaction in the form of vigilante actions, where organisations tend to take the law into their own hands. Some of the known vigilante groups

in South Africa are the Mapogo-a-Mathamaga that originated in the Northern Province and Mpumalanga; PAGAD in the Western Cape; and the Umfelandawonye in the Eastern Cape. These groups advocate strong and harsh punishment for criminals.

According to Sekhonyane (2000:21), vigilante actions, although supported by many, are characterised by acts of severe punishment and violence including serious assault and murder, and in some instances involvement in illegal acts such as kidnappings, crimen injuria, malicious damage to property, theft, robbery and sabotage. The methods they use, bring them in disrepute and conflict with State authorities.

Because of the general poor relationships between vigilante groups and the government there is an absence of effective lines of communication lines between these groups and state organs such as the police. If properly regulated, certain vigilante type activities could be incorporated into the concept of community justice or community courts as expounded in a discussion paper by the South African Law Commission (Sekhonyane, 2000:25). It is also expected that public support for vigilante groups will decline if the effectiveness of the criminal justice system improves. However, for the time being, their supporters will continue to use them as a shield of protection against possible criminal attacks and to bring criminals to book.

## 6.8 CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to provide a theoretical perspective on crime prevention and to conceptualise a burglary prevention approach that could be applied in assessing the vulnerability of a specific residential location and to suggest appropriate security measures to counter possible future burglaries.

To curb the problem of residential burglary, an integrated approach towards burglary prevention was suggested, where initiatives taken at the micro-level, were complemented by initiatives taken at the meso- and macro-levels. At the micro-level, burglary prevention initiatives should focus on the elimination of opportunities for burglary through the application of situational crime prevention measures. These measures should then be supported at the meso-level through community organisation and actions, such as Neighbourhood Watch, or access control over strangers. The local police, CPFs and the municipal police services should increasingly focus on applying the principles of community policing.

At the macro-level greater emphasis should be placed on the implementation of already existing policies and strategies relating to crime prevention. Multi-agency planning at the national and provincial level (macro-) should be aimed at facilitating specific programmes or

operations at the community and local level to address a specific crime problem. Greater emphasis on crime prevention would imply a reorientation of thinking, training, allocation of resources, and collection and analysis of information.

Despite the seriousness of residential burglary, and the impact thereof on individuals' lives, it is not regarded as a priority crime by many in the higher institutional echelons, *inter alia*, as a result of its non-violent nature. Consequently, resources in crime prevention and law enforcement activities are often directed at other crimes. To counter this tendency, individual households and communities have started to implement their own security measures and initiatives, which in turn stimulated the current growth in the private security industry.

In Chapter 7 an assessment will be made of the findings of this study, how the objectives were realised, what problems were experienced, and to formulate recommendations for possible further research.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

*Geographers are presented with many opportunities in the study of crime, both in its own right and as a facet of the more general social geography of the city. There is scope to develop the methodology of human geography, to illuminate spatial qualities, and to forge links with criminological theory and ongoing research in other disciplines.*

- Herbert (1982:112)

#### 7.1 INTRODUCTION

The objectives of this study (see par. 1.6) centred primarily around the construction of a conceptual framework (see par. 2.6), based on a theoretical explanation (see par. 2.3) of residential burglary, and to apply the conceptual framework in two case study areas in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area to determine its usefulness as a research model and to formulate principles or guidelines for burglary prevention. The research design and methodology was based on qualitative research techniques and the case-study approach.

The aim of Chapter 7 is to evaluate the research process and, based on the findings of this study, to present the conceptual framework as an integrated burglary model that can be applied in future studies to investigate residential burglary. Attention will also be given to the contribution of the study to the subject field of geography, the limitations of this study, and to conclude with a synthesis on the value of qualitative research in the search for solutions to the crime problem in South Africa.

#### 7.2 INTEGRATED BURGLARY MODEL

The conceptual framework (see par. 2.6) was developed to provide a theoretical and integrated understanding of the burglary process and to guide the research process. For this reason, the factors and variables, as identified in the conceptual framework, were postulated as research expectations around which the research and fieldwork could be undertaken. The integrated burglary model can be regarded as an extension of the conceptual framework, based on the same theoretical premises, and strengthened through

the incorporation of the research findings of this study. In this section the primary focus was on the validation of the conceptual framework through the inclusion of the research findings and to present it as an integrated model to describe residential burglary.

In the explanation of the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6.2), mention was made of four components of the burglary process, namely: the environment (with reference to the macro-, meso- and micro-environment) in which the burglary took place, the situational conditions that existed prior to the commission of the burglary, the burglary event itself, and the responses of the burglary victims, as well as the burglars to the burglary event. Within the context of these components, it was argued that the following elements would always be present in the burglary process, namely: the burglar(s) with the motivation to burgle, a suitable target/residence, and the resident(s) as the victims of the burglary. These components and elements are dynamic entities, with differential attributes and possible manifestations, which interact in such a manner to lead to the burglary event. Figure 7.1 provides an illustration of the functioning of the integrated burglary model as a means of understanding the burglary process, inclusive of the implementation of interventions to prevent residential burglary.


The integrated burglary model, as illustrated in Figure 7.1, can be explained under the following headings: location of target/residence in a specific environmental setting, burglars and their *modus operandi*, situational conditions, the burglary event, responses from residents and burglars and the implementation of burglary prevention initiatives. The following approach was adopted in presenting the model:

First, a summary of the theoretical perspectives or rationale that highlighted the relevance of a specific factor in the burglary process as originally explained in the conceptual framework (see par. 2.6) in Chapter 2.

Second, a summary of the findings recorded in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 that resulted from the application of the conceptual framework, and which were guided by the research expectations (see par. 2.7).

It is important to note that the presentation of the integrated model only contains an abstract or summary of the most important findings, with references to the paragraphs that contain more detailed descriptions.

FIGURE 7.1: INTEGRATED BURGLARY MODEL



### 7.2.1 Location of residence in a specific environmental setting

Any potential target can be described in terms of its specific location in the micro-environment (its address), within the broader meso- (neighbourhood or suburb) and macro-environment (the metropolis and beyond). The vulnerability of a particular residential location and the probability that a burglar will target that specific neighbourhood can be explained in terms of, first, the affluence of the neighbourhoods and second, their accessibility.

### 7.2.1.1 The affluence of neighbourhoods

**Theoretical perspectives:** Residences in more affluent neighbourhoods could be more vulnerable to residential burglary than residences in less-affluent neighbourhoods, because of the possibility of an abundance of goods available in the more affluent neighbourhoods. Walmsley and Lewis (1993:54), for example, produced research results that indicated a distinct association between middle to upper-income suburban neighbourhoods and property crimes such as burglary, larceny and car theft, whereas low-income neighbourhoods were associated with crimes of violence.

**Research findings (see par. 4.3.3):** Confirming evidence was found in this study that indicated a positive relationship between the average site values (as an indication of affluence) in the various police station areas of the City Council of Pretoria (see Table 4.4) and the residential burglary rates registered in the same areas. The police station area of Garsfontein, which was representative of a more affluent area, was singled out as having the highest residential burglary rate in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area. Less-affluent areas, such as Pretoria West, also experienced relatively high rates in reported residential burglary, although significant lower than in the affluent areas in Pretoria East (Garsfontein). Former black residential areas, such as Mamelodi, experienced higher crime rates in violent crimes than in residential burglary.

From the data presented in Table 4.4 and as Figure 4.3, it could be concluded that residential burglary constituted a severe problem for both affluent and less-affluent residential areas in the Greater Pretoria metropolitan area, but in comparison with other crimes, residential burglary had a higher occurrence rate in the more affluent areas than in the less affluent areas.

### 7.2.1.2 Accessibility of neighbourhoods

**Theoretical perspectives:** A residence in a neighbourhood that has good access roads may be more vulnerable to residential burglary than a residence in a neighbourhood that has limited access roads. Good access roads provide the burglars with the opportunity to gain easy access to and exit from the target area. Residences next to or near, open fields, green zones, rivers or parks may also add to the vulnerability of residences, because the burglars can move more freely and unnoticed in these areas. These areas not only provide shelter to the burglars, but can also serve as places to hide the stolen goods.

Residential areas that allow the free movement of people and vehicles on account of the

right all people have to public spaces and roads, may be more vulnerable than so-called security villages or estates, where private home owners have the right to control access and the movement of people and vehicles. In this way potential burglars can be restricted from entering a controlled residential area (see par. 6.7.2.2.1 on 'enclosed neighbourhoods').

Residential areas that are characterised by a diversity of enterprises or activities, for example, proximity to public places, near shopping centres, small businesses and new building projects, may be more exposed to the movement or gathering of relative high volumes of strangers (non-resident in the neighbourhood), than residential areas that have a more homogeneous character. It is expected that the movement of strangers will provide an excuse for burglars to move freely and unnoticed in the neighbourhood in search of suitable targets.

**Research findings (see par. 4.5):** Through personal observation by studying the street maps of the case study areas and analysing the responses from the interviewees, the researcher came to the conclusion (as summarised in Table 4.5) that in both the case study areas of Pretoria West and Garsfontein potential burglars could easily gain access to the area, that they could move around freely, and the presence of strangers was a common feature in both these areas. No restrictions were placed on the movement of people and vehicles in public places and on the public roads.

Both case study areas allowed easy access to the neighbourhoods through well developed road networks, which included access roads, main roads and freeways. Furthermore, the presence of open spaces, parks and open zones along streams and the main roads were a common feature in the case study areas (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4).

At the time of the research in 1998, the restriction of movement through the presence of "security villages" or "security enclosed neighbourhoods" was non-existent, although some neighbourhoods were in the planning stages of closing off their neighbourhoods. However, in the Garsfontein area, residential complexes with security fences and access control were more common than in the Pretoria West area. Taking the total case study area into account their impact on the free movement of people could be regarded as limited.

Feedback from the interviewees indicated that the presence of strangers, non-resident in the areas, was a common feature in both the case study areas. This could be attributed to factors such as the easy access to the areas, as well as activities associated with job-seeking, begging, charity work and the selling of goods by street vendors. Strangers also tended to gather at shopping centres in the residential areas, of which at least 17 could be identified in the Garsfontein case study area, against the three in the Pretoria West area.

New building activities also attracted strangers to the case study areas. It was also mentioned by the SAPS in Pretoria West that many strangers in the area were illegal immigrants from other countries in Africa.

## 7.2.2 Burglars and their modus operandi

### 7.2.2.1 Motivation of burglars

**Theoretical perspectives:** Burglars are motivated by the need for money, more than anything else, whether the need is real or perceived, or out of greed (Repetto, 1974:21; Bennett & Wright, 1984:31; Wright & Decker, 1994:40). Burglars are often involved in alcohol abuse and/or the use of drugs, which increases the need for money.

**Research findings (see par. 5.2.1):** The convicted burglars who were interviewed in this study, confirmed the expectation that money was the prime motivation for their behaviour. More than 80 per cent of the burglars mentioned that they were unemployed and in need of money. Fifty per cent of the burglars also referred to the influence of friends as a reason for their involvement in burglary activity, and 38 per cent indicated that they regarded burglary as a profession (“a work”) that pays well.

### 7.2.2.2 Selection of suitable targets

**Theoretical perspectives:** A motivated burglar would tend to search for a suitable target in those neighbourhoods he knows best and if he has specific knowledge of a particular target and its occupants, or has inside information through a tipster, that target will be more vulnerable than other potential targets of which he has no knowledge. According to the rational choice theory (Cornish & Clark, 1986:9; Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981:28; Brown & Altman, 1981:58), the process of burglary involves a series of sequential decision-making judgements by the burglar. The initial decision to burgle may be motivated by personal needs, whilst the selection of a suitable target is taken upon a well-established crime template, based on experiential knowledge and environmental cues associated with “good” targets. Once the ‘template’ is established, it becomes relatively fixed and can influence future search behaviour, thereby becoming self-reinforcing.

Beirne and Messerschmidt (1995:153) also made a distinction between amateur and professional burglars. According to these authors, amateur burglars act in a rather unsophisticated manner, with little planning involved, and tend to steal a variety of merchandise as the opportunity arises. On the contrary, professional burglars tend to be older, are specialists who employ considerable skill and planning in executing a burglary and

select targets of substantial value (for example the stealing of jewellery).

**Research findings (see par. 5.2.2):** When the convicted burglars were asked to explain the *modus operandi* they followed in the search for a suitable target, two basic approaches came to the fore. Seventy per cent of the burglars in this study indicated that they followed a more planned routine to gather information and to identify potential targets. Thirty per cent of the burglars indicated that they acted in a more opportunistic manner to identify a suitable target.

Furthermore it was found that the burglars who followed a planned routine could explain their *modus operandi* in the selection of a suitable target better than those who did not plan the burglary. Although the burglars who were inclined to operate more opportunistically could also describe their *modus operandi*, it was in less specific terms. The fact that both categories of burglars were able to describe their *modus operandi* in identifying of suitable targets, confirmed the expectation that burglars would tend to follow a patterned routine in the selection of a suitable target.

In the present study it was found that some of the burglars who regarded themselves as professionals, sometimes decided to operate alone and in a more opportunistic manner. Two of the burglars who were interviewed, for example, indicated that they sometimes form part of a planned burglary, and at other times they may decide to act alone and in a more opportunistic way. It was therefore decided that it would be more appropriate to distinguish between planned burglaries and opportunistic burglaries, and not professional and amateur burglars, as proposed in the research expectations (see par. 2.7.2.3 and 2.7.2.4).

### 7.2.3 Situational conditions

When a motivated burglar finds a suitable target, the immediate situational conditions will influence his final decision whether to proceed with the burglary or not. The situational conditions refer to the local conditions prevailing in the micro-environment prior to the commission of the burglary. The more favourable the burglar perceives these conditions, the greater the chance that he will proceed with the burglary.

One of the objectives of this study was to identify and investigate the situational factors that existed just before the burglaries took place, and to determine in what way they contributed to the vulnerability of a particular residence. Although a number of situational risk factors could be identified in the research process, it was impossible to determine how many of them actually played an active role in the decision-making process of the burglars. That

would only be possible if the burglar that committed the burglary in a specific case was known and could be interviewed, which was not the case in this study.

The findings of this study, relating to situational conditions, showed that the residences in the case studies were all exposed to some degree of vulnerability that made them suitable targets at the time of the burglaries. The situational conditions that had a significant effect on the vulnerability of the residences, included the following categories of factors: residents' activities and characteristics, surveillance and visibility, design features of the residence, and security protection.

### 7.2.3.1 Residents' activities and characteristics

**Theoretical perspectives:** Residents, through their daily routines and lifestyles, sometimes engage in behaviour that expose them to the possibility of being at risk. Residents that are away from home at regular intervals, either for work, recreational or other purposes increase the risk of being burgled during their absence. The traditional viewpoint of burglars is that they prefer not to be seen or to make physical contact with the residents during the burglary. If contact is made, it would be accidental rather than planned. It is for this reason that burglary is classified as a separate type of crime from robbery where contact with the victim is intentional.

A wealthy lifestyle is also associated with valuable goods and articles in the residence that may attract potential burglars who are seeking suitable targets. Residents may also act in a careless and ignorant manner with regard to safety precautions, especially if they have a false sense of safety and have not been victims before. Certain categories of residents may also pose a greater risk of being victimised, because they are easier targets.

**Research findings (see par. 5.3.1):** It was found in this study that in 66,6 per cent of the burglary cases, the residents were absent from home during the burglary. For the Garsfontein area, this percentage was even higher at 83 per cent of the burglary cases, whilst in the Pretoria West area 50 per cent of the residents were not at home during the burglary incident (see Fig. 5.1).

It is significant to note that the remaining 33,3 per cent of the cases, the burglaries occurred during the night whilst the residents were at home and asleep. The values in this situation for the Garsfontein and Pretoria West areas respectively were 17 per cent and 50 per cent (see Fig. 5.1).

From these findings it was evident that residences were more at risk of being targeted for

burglary during periods when the residents were away from home or during the night when the residents were asleep, confirming the research expectations with regard to residents being absent or asleep during burglaries.

Only 13 per cent of the burglary victims in this study could be classified as single residents, whilst 17 per cent of the victims were single mothers with children in the home. Only in one case could the burglary victim, a female in her late 60s, be described as elderly and single. As a result of the small sample of cases involved, it was not possible to make significant conclusions about the risks involved in being single, except that the interviewees, who were single, all expressed the awareness that they were probably more at risk of becoming a burglary victim than households with more people. Except for one case, they all had experienced at least one previous incident of burglary in the past three years. In the case of the elderly woman in Pretoria West three burglaries had occurred in her home in the three years between 1996 and 1998.

With regard to possible carelessness on the part of the residents, it was found that in 25 per cent of all the cases, there were indications of negligence. In two of the cases the burglars could gain entrance through open windows without burglar bars; in another two cases there were no security gates at the front and back doors; in one case the residents left a note at the front gate notifying their absence over the weekend; and in the last instance the residents left the house unattended for a weekend soon after they had moved in, leaving most of the goods still in crates. The observation was made that residents were not deliberately careless, but unintentionally created opportunities for burglary through their routine activities, or because of inadequate precautionary measures.

### 7.2.3.2 Surveillance and visibility

***Theoretical perspectives:*** Burglars would tend to avoid residences that are under surveillance or that have good visibility out of fear of being observed and the possibility of being arrested. Improving the surveillance of a residential area, through formal and informal (natural) techniques, will contribute to the safety and security of that particular residential area. Formal surveillance is a purposeful activity in the neighbourhood, for example, through neighbourhood watch, citizen or police patrols and the presence of security firms, whilst informal or natural surveillance refers to crime awareness by neighbours, motorists and pedestrians, as well as good neighbourliness.

The lifestyle and routine activities of the residents and their neighbours could also influence the level of surveillance in a particular residential area. Routine activities that often leave

the residence unattended, together with surveillance, could increase the vulnerability of the residence.

**Research findings (see par. 5.3.2):** The information that was gathered through the case study interviews suggested two time periods when residences were most at risk in the Garsfontein area (see Fig. 5.2), namely between midnight and 06:00 in the morning (42 per cent of the cases), and between 06:00 in the morning and noon (33 per cent of the cases). In the Pretoria West area the risk period only occurred in the period from midnight until 06:00 in the morning, with 84 per cent of the burglaries.

The risk periods for burglary coincided with the time of night and day when most of the residents were either asleep or away at work, whilst the children (if any) were at school or at a day care centre. These risk periods (as shown in Fig. 5.2) also coincided with time intervals when informal surveillance in the neighbourhoods was at its lowest, due to the reduced outdoor activities or less movement of people during these periods.

In the absence of formal surveillance techniques, such as police or civilian patrols, Neighbourhood Watch, security guards, or CCTV- cameras in the case study areas, it was not possible to determine what role formal surveillance played in deterring residential burglary. However, it was found that informal surveillance had a significant impact on the occurrence patterns of burglaries, especially in the case study area of Pretoria West. The better visibility of the residential sites in the Pretoria West case study area, and the presence of people in the neighbourhood, could also have attributed to the lower burglary rates during the day. In the case of Garsfontein, the better exterior lighting during the night could have attributed to the lower burglary rates at night.

### 7.2.3.3 Design features

**Theoretical perspectives:** The attractiveness of a potential target would depend on the environmental cues and the immediate characteristics of the target as perceived by the burglar. The burglar will look for design features that fit his description of a "good" target. This may include design features of the building that could allow easy access to and escape from the building, for example, concealed entrances, and easy removable windows. For the burglar, an attractive target will be one where the perceived rewards outweigh the risks of being caught.

**Research findings (see par. 5.3.3):** The findings of this study confirmed the expectation that residential areas that projected an image of greater wealth, as in the Garsfontein cases, were more frequently targeted than residential areas that projected an image of less wealth,

as in the Pretoria West cases. Through their environmental knowledge, the burglars knew that the goods they were looking for would most likely be found in the residences in the eastern suburbs of Pretoria.

With regard to the expectation that design features with easy entrance to the building would increase its vulnerability, it was found that burglars preferred to break in from the rear or the side ends of the residences (see Table 5.3). The reason for this was probably to reduce the chances of being observed. The most common method of gaining entrance was through sliding doors, followed by windows, preferably from the rear or the side of the residences.

#### 7.2.3.4 Security protection

***Theoretical perspectives:*** In the absence of visible security measures a residence might be perceived as a relatively easy target and therefore more vulnerable to burglary than residences well protected through a range of security measures. Security measures included all the means that could be used to protect the residence and its people, for example: access control, fences with spikes, electrified fences, entry phones, burglar alarms, burglar-proofing at windows and doors, locks, security guards, armed responses, security lights and dogs.

***Research findings (see par. 5.3.4):*** In this study it was found that the residences in the Garsfontein area were slightly better protected by security measures than those in the Pretoria West area. Alarm systems and connections with armed reaction units were only found in the Garsfontein area, although still to a limited extent. In conclusion it could be stated that on average most residences provided relatively easy access to burglars as a result of inadequate security measures.

None of the burglars who were interviewed, were particularly concerned about any of the security measures. They believed that most security measures could be by-passed or overcome if other factors, such as the absence of guardians, were favourable. The effectiveness of security measures should therefore be evaluated in combination, because the effectiveness could increase proportionately when a combination of measures are implemented simultaneously. The more obstacles the burglar has to overcome, the greater the chances that he might decide to abort the burglary attempt. Other factors, such as the time of day, occupancy, the quality of material used in security equipment played a role in the final outcome of the burglary.

## 7.2.4 Burglary event

If the situational conditions are perceived to be favourable, there is a high probability that the burglar will decide to commence with the burglary.

### 7.2.4.1 Financial loss

**Theoretical perspectives:** How seriously residents might take the effect of a burglary on their lives will *inter alia* depend on factors such as the extent of financial loss, the degree of trauma experienced by residents and to what extent their fear of crime and feeling of safety had changed. In cases where residents had no household insurance, or had lost goods of irreplaceable or of sentimental value, the impact of the burglary might be felt more severely.

**Research findings (see par. 5.4.2):** Based on the findings of the case studies, as well as observations that were made during the field research, three types of burglaries could be distinguished (from the burglar's perspective), namely: opportunistic burglaries (type 1); higher risk, planned burglaries (type 2); and lower risk, planned burglaries (type 3) (see Table 5.7).

Seventy six per cent of the burglaries in the Garsfontein area could be classified as lower risk, planned burglaries (type 3), and occurred when the residents were normally absent from their homes, and the chances of interference were less. These findings concur with the expectation that the damage or financial loss would be higher in the case of planned burglaries, when three or more burglars were involved; when the duration burglars spent inside the residence was extensive; and when they possessed the necessary skills. Contrary to the Garsfontein area, 50 per cent of the burglaries in the Pretoria West cases could be described as opportunistic burglaries, which involved little or no prior planning.

It was also found, as expected, that the average financial loss experienced in the Garsfontein police station cases was higher than those in the Pretoria West police station area. This could partly be attributed to the fact that more Type 3 burglaries occurred in the Garsfontein than in the Pretoria West area.

### 7.2.4.2 Market for stolen goods

**Theoretical perspectives:** Burglars normally do not want to keep the stolen goods, and would therefore try to sell or dispose of them as soon as possible. The main objective of burglars, as confirmed in this study, is to 'earn' money to provide for their basic and social needs, and in many instances to support family members in their livelihood. In this context,

Barkan (1997:324), mentioned that burglars need the assistance of 'fences' to help them dispose of their illegal goods in return for money.

**Research findings (see par. 5.4.3):** In the case studies, the most popular items that were stolen included items such as: electronic products for entertainment; clothing; electronic household equipment; jewellery; linen; food; and chinaware (see Table 5.9). On average, higher volumes of goods were stolen from the residences in the Garsfontein cases than the Pretoria West cases, especially in terms of high value items such as: TVs, video machines, clothing, jewellery and chinaware. The Pretoria West cases, on the other hand, registered higher volumes on items such as linen, tools and money. The residents of Pretoria West probably live more on a cash basis, whilst the residents of Garsfontein prefer bank facilities, such as cheques and credit cards.

From these results it was evident that the easy portable, and easy-to-dispose-of expensive items were the most popular ones. Most of these stolen goods found their way into the open market through the hands of fences to whom the burglars delivered the stolen goods in exchange for money, sometimes far below the market price.

## 7.2.5 Residents' responses after the burglaries

### 7.2.5.1 Residents' feelings of safety

**Theoretical perspectives:** The impact of burglary on the residents' feelings of safety will vary from person to person, depending on how seriously they were affected by the burglary. According to Barkan (1997: 328), female burglary victims are more likely than male victims to be afraid and upset, while male victims are more apt to be angry or annoyed after the experience of a burglary.

**Research findings (see par. 5.5.1):** In this study it was found that the time factor played an important role in how people experienced feelings of safety directly after the burglary and after some time had elapsed. More than 50 per cent of the respondents indicated that they initially experienced heightened feelings of unsafety but that these feelings returned to "normal" after some time had passed. This category of people also indicated that they did not make any significant changes to their daily routine activities. However, evidence was also found that certain categories of people experienced more intense feelings of unsafety, this included victims who made contact with the burglars, single female residents, and the elderly.

The fact that the burglary victims improved their security after the burglaries, could also have contributed to the return of feelings of relative safety. One important change mentioned by more than 50 per cent of the respondents, was the tendency to be more on the alert or watchful for potential burglars or criminals in their immediate environment.

### 7.2.5.2 Implementation of security measures

**Theoretical perspectives:** Residents would tend to improve their security after the occurrence of a burglary with the aim to protect them against future burglaries, and to feel safe in the immediate environment. The degree and type of protection residents decided upon would be influenced by factors such as:

- fear of crime;
- crime risk of an area (is it a high- or low-crime area?);
- cost-effectiveness of security measures; and
- life style and aesthetics - security measures must fit in with the life style and activities of those involved (Naudé, 1988:23).

**Research findings (see par. 5.5.2):** More than 90 per cent of the respondents indicated that they implemented new measures to improve their security. The nature of these measures, however, varied vastly between the two case study areas of Pretoria West and Garsfontein. In the Garsfontein area, where the residents were on average more affluent and had insurance coverage, there was a tendency to improve security through the installation of alarm systems and to subscribe to armed reaction units. In the less affluent area of Pretoria West, the tendency was to improve security through physical measures, which included: upgrading of existing burglar bars at the windows, security gates at the front and back doors, installing of security lights, acquiring a dog, and to foster friendly relations with the neighbours.

## 7.2.6 Burglars' responses after the burglaries

### 7.2.6.1 Burglars' feelings of guilt

**Theoretical perspectives:** Clarke and Homel (cited in Lab, 1997:158) presented a classification of situational techniques to prevent crime, which included "guilt, shame, and embarrassment" as one of the categories (see Table 2.4). They argue that these conditions could impact on the psyche of criminals to deter them from offending in the future. However, if criminals do not experience these feelings, they may continue with their criminal activity as

long as conditions are favourable and they have reason to justify their actions.

**Research findings (see par. 5.6.1):** The burglars who were interviewed in this study showed very little remorse or a sense of guilt for the inconvenience and trauma they had caused their victims. They rationalised that the crime was not aimed at the residents and that they needed to burgle in order to survive or to support their dependants. Furthermore, they felt that the 'rich' could easily recover their losses through insurance claims.

### 7.2.6.2 Crime displacement

**Theoretical perspectives:** The burglar's mental image of the environment and the target would be effected by the actual commission of a burglary, because the outcome was either as expected, which would confirm his feelings and add to his learning, or the outcome was unexpected, which would also contribute to his learning about the area (Carter & Hill, 1980:196). If the feedback confirms the expectations of the burglar, there is a likelihood that the burglar will return to that area in future. However, changes in the residents' routine activities and improved security measures may also act as a deterrent and the burglar would not return to the same residence. The burglar might either decide to change his *modus operandi*, or engage in another type of crime, or abandon burglary in favour of becoming a law-abiding citizen.

**Research findings (see par. 5.6.2):** From the responses of the convicted burglars, as well as the experts who were interviewed in this study, it became apparent that burglars would continuously adapt to changing circumstances, by improving their skills, by moving from one target area to another, should the one become too risky, and to change the time of offending, for example, from the night to the day. However, these types of crime displacement did not indicate whether the burglar had decided not to continue being a burglar, or to shift to another type of crime.

The burglars who were interviewed in this study were of the opinion that the majority of burglars (in general) would not abandon burglary for another type of crime, even under circumstances of improved security protection. According to them there would always be enough opportunities to continue with burglary. On the other hand, the police officers who were interviewed, suggested to the researcher that the increase in residential robberies and car hijackings in recent years represented a shift from residential burglary to residential armed robbery and hijackings. Although there was an increase in residential robbery and hijackings between 1994 and 1999, according to the police statistics, it was not supported by a decrease in residential burglary, which on the contrary also showed an increase (see Table 1.1).

## 7.2.7 Burglary prevention

The integrated burglary model could further be expanded to incorporate the search for solutions to the problem of residential burglary. The researcher was thus of the opinion that burglary prevention guidelines or principles could be formulated, based on the conceptual framework and the findings of the research. Chapter 6 was dedicated to the formulation of guidelines or principles that could be applied to the development of appropriate burglary prevention initiatives.

An integrated framework for burglary prevention initiatives was constructed and explained in Table 6.2. By 'integrated' is meant that the prevention initiatives should focus on the main elements of the burglary process, namely: the burglar, the neighbourhood environment, the residents and the situational conditions, and that the implementation of prevention initiatives at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels should complement each other.

At the micro-level, burglary prevention initiatives should focus on the elimination of opportunities for burglary through the application of situational crime prevention measures. Through the implementation of such measures, the burglar, who intended to break in, might find it increasingly difficult to enter the premises and thus be deterred from entering that specific residence. The more security or safety measures that were installed, the greater the chance that residents would feel safer in their immediate environment, and the greater the chance that, in case of a burglary, the damage would be less.

Measures at the micro-level should then be supported by measures at the meso-level, for example, the implementation of community organisation and actions, such as Neighbourhood Watch, or access control over strangers. Visible, community policing and community actions aimed at observing, monitoring or controlling the movement of potential burglars might serve as a deterrent to potential burglars, and also help to create a feeling of safety amongst residents. The local police, Community Police Forums and the municipal police services could play a leading role in applying the principles of community policing.

At the macro-level greater emphasis should be placed on the implementation of already existing policies and strategies relating to crime prevention. Multi-agency planning at the national, provincial, and municipal levels should be aimed at facilitating specific programmes or operations at the community and local level to address a specific crime problem. At the macro-level, the primary focus of burglary prevention in broader society should be to correct criminogenic conditions that are associated with the root causes for criminal behaviour. Success will therefore be largely dependent on the capacity and efficiency of the criminal

justice system (including the police service) to arrest, prosecute and convict burglars, and to institute further measures aimed at rehabilitating convicted burglars.

In residential areas where individual efforts to improve security are linked to crime prevention initiatives of the local police and the community, and are supported by the law enforcement agencies at the macro-level, they will have a greater chance of success than in those residential areas where crime prevention initiatives are implemented in isolation.

### 7.3 EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The development of an integrated burglary model was ultimately a culmination of the realisation of the objectives for this study (as stated in par. 1.6). In the following summary, an evaluation of the realisation of the research objectives is given:

The **first** objective was to provide a theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of residential burglary. In Chapter 2 an overview was given of the most prominent theories and models within the realm of 'environmental criminology' that highlighted the elements and processes involved in the burglary event. This school of thought emphasises the importance of the physical environment in the decision to commit a criminal offence and pays less attention to the impact of pathological, biophysical, psychological or social factors. Much of the conceptualisation was based on the writings of Reppetto (1974), Brantingham and Brantingham (1981), Brown and Altman (1981), Herbert (1982), Bennett and Wright (1984), Cornish and Clarke (1986), Conklin (1995), Murray (1995), Sheley (1995), and Lab (1997).

The **second** objective was to construct a conceptual framework (based on the theoretical explanation) to conceptualise the residential burglary process. The conceptual framework, as explained in Chapter 2 (see par. 2.6), provided an integrated understanding of the burglary process, and gave a structured and systematic description of the components and elements involved in the burglary process.

An integrated understanding of the burglary process, implies an understanding of the main components and elements involved in the burglary process, namely: the environment (with reference to the macro-, meso-, and micro-environment) in which the burglary took place, the situational conditions that existed prior to the commission of the burglary, the burglary event itself, and the responses of the residents, as well as the burglars in reaction to the burglary event. The elements refer to the burglar(s) who have the motivation to burgle, a suitable target/residence, and the resident(s), as the victims of the burglary.

The **third** objective was to use the conceptual framework to develop appropriate research expectations and a methodology to guide the research process. The conceptual framework was used to identify the key factors and variables. A range of research expectations that gave expression to the burglary process, were formulated (see par. 2.7).

A realist approach was adopted for this study, instead of a positivistic approach, often used in geographical studies. The central focus was therefore to gain a thorough understanding of the burglary process, rather than to give a quantitative account of the characteristics of the burglary process. For this reason the case study approach was chosen as the research design, and qualitative techniques in the form of semi-structured interviews were used to collect, analyse and interpret the research data.

It is believed that the research philosophy, design, and methodology (as explained in Chapters 1 and 3), not only provided a scientific basis for the research undertaken in this study, but also broke new ground in the research field of geography of crime in South Africa.

The **fourth** objective was to apply the conceptual framework as a 'research model' to investigate residential burglary in South Africa, with specific reference to selected case studies in the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area. In this regard the application of the conceptual framework and the methodology adopted for this study provided specific outcomes or findings that could be linked to the research expectations accepted for this study.

The findings relating to residential burglary patterns in the macro- and meso-environment were explained in Chapter 4, whilst the findings relating to residential burglary in the micro-environment was explained in Chapter 5.

The **fifth** objective was to formulate principles or guidelines that could be applied to the development of residential burglary prevention measures/initiatives. Based on the research findings and the insights gained through the literature study, a residential burglary prevention framework was compiled and presented in Chapter 6 (see Table 6.2). The aim of the integrated framework was to lay down principles or guidelines that could be applied to the construction of prevention strategies or the implementation of prevention initiatives. In essence the integrated framework implies the assessment of the vulnerability of a specific location and to suggest specific counter or preventative measures that might reduce the occurrence of residential burglary or limit the damage in the case of occurrence, and to enhance a feeling of safety.

The **sixth** objective was to revise and improve the conceptual framework as an integrated burglary model that could be applied to the study of residential burglary. The conceptual framework in itself only provided a theoretical rationale of the burglary process and served as a basis for the formulation of the research expectations. In the research phase the conceptual framework was tested and validated through the research findings. Through qualitative as well as quantitative research techniques the research data and evidence were collected, analysed and interpreted in order to confirm or reject the research expectations. In Paragraph 7.2 the revised and enriched version of the conceptual framework is presented as the integrated burglary model.

The **seventh** objective was to interpret the value of the integrated burglary model for its ability to analyse and interpret the burglary process, and to give advice on prevention initiatives. The realisation of the abovementioned objectives culminated in the final construction of the integrated burglary model. The value of this model is vested in its ability to:

- conceptualise the burglary process;
- predict certain outcomes relating to the factors and variables in the burglary process;
- identify and analyse the risk factors that determine the vulnerability of a specific target; and
- suggest appropriate burglary prevention measures or initiatives.

The trustworthiness (reliability and validity) of the integrated burglary model can be found in the scientific approach and design of this study, the methodology that was used, and the research findings and evidence that confirmed the research expectations. Although the trustworthiness in terms of the research findings is confined to the case studies that were investigated, it is believed that the integrated burglary model has a much broader application value as a conceptual framework. It should also be recognised that the integrated burglary model is a dynamic framework that can be improved and adjusted to changing circumstances.

In conclusion, it is the opinion of the researcher that the aim of the study has been successfully realised in that the understanding of the burglary process has been enhanced and principles for the prevention of residential have been formulated as a result of the way in which this investigation was carried out. It is also believed that the research has made a contribution to the disciplines of Geography and Criminology, and that the research findings could be used in further research and programmes seek to resolve the problems of residential burglary.

## 7.4 CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCIPLINE OF GEOGRAPHY

In this study the central focus throughout was on the burglary event and process, the vulnerability of location and the interaction between people and their environment, a perspective that places this study in the interest field of the geographer. These elements are also of great interest to the environmental criminologist, who has a prime interest in the location of criminal events, rather than in the theories of crime causation. The study of crime events therefore creates the opportunity for multi-disciplinary research under the encompassing concept of social science. According to Herbert (1987:146), environmental criminology as well as the geography of crime offers an approach to the study of crime which is less concerned with theories of causation and more concerned with criminal events and places where they occur: the focus is thus on the offence rather than the offender.

Recognising residential burglary as a social problem needing a solution, this study makes a definite contribution to the study field of Social Geography, conceptually, methodologically and by providing a relevant model. The following aspects could be identified as being particularly significant:

- **Conceptually:** The integrated burglary model provides a systematic explanation of the burglary process and emphasises the geographical dimensions of the burglary event in terms of location, vulnerability and people-environment interaction. Furthermore, the inclusion of the concept of the 'geography of crime' as an integral part of the practice and teaching of social geography in South Africa should be given real consideration.
- **Methodologically:** The study was designed within the paradigm of qualitative research (although quantitative techniques were also used), and to comply with a realist approach to research. Against this philosophical background, the case study approach provided an appropriate methodology for the research in that the geography of the context could be clearly demonstrated. The construction of a conceptual framework, the formulation of research expectations, techniques of data collection and analysis, and the interpretation of the findings have been documented.
- **Model application:** The development of the integrated burglary model was based on scientific research and can be applied in situations where the need exists to analyse and explain the occurrence of residential burglary, and to suggest preventative measures and initiatives to curb the problem of residential burglary.

## 7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO BURGLARY PREVENTION

In Chapter 6 an integrated approach to prevent residential burglary is advocated, and is based on the conceptual framework that explains the burglary process (see par. 2.6), as well as the research findings of this study. No single method or technique would be sufficient to address the problem of residential burglary. Instead, a combination of actions and programmes may have a better chance of success. The following recommendations were formulated with the aim to strengthen the capabilities at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels of preventing residential burglary.

**Recommendation 1:** To investigate possible alternative or additional means of punishment for convicted burglars other than the traditional system of imprisonment, which seems to be failing as a deterrent and in facilitating the rehabilitation of burglars. One option is to develop a new system of community service for convicted burglars, as a partnership programme, involving Correctional Services, local authorities, local police stations and non-government organisations (NGOs). Another option is to institute victim-offender reconciliation programmes in which the victim and offender reach an agreement on the payment of compensation, the return of stolen property or reparations for damage, as well as doing work as redress (Oppler, 1998:52).

**Recommendation 2:** To improve the investigative and detective capabilities of local police stations that may lead to an increase in the rate of successful prosecutions and convictions of burglars. According to Oppler (1998:18), between 80 and 90 per cent of burglaries occurring in South Africa, go undetected and are difficult to solve. To assist in the investigation of burglaries, greater emphasis should be given to the role of fences and “swop shops” in the buying and trading of stolen goods. Proper marking of household goods, including the recording of serial numbers, can also strengthen the investigations into burglaries, if the stolen goods can be traced to a specific owner and location. In this regard insurance companies can play an important role in encouraging home owners to mark and record their property. The building of investigative capabilities, however, is closely linked to the availability of sufficient financial, logistical and human resources, which include skilled and well-trained detectives.

Regular feedback and communication between the police and the burglary victims to inform them on progress made with the investigations will also enhance confidence in the police service and the sharing of crime related information between the community and the police.

**Recommendation 3:** To develop a national policy framework that would assist the provincial governments in drawing up legislation that would standardise and regulate the

establishment of 'enclosed neighbourhoods' in such a way that it would contribute in the creation of safer neighbourhoods, without compromising the objectives of creating integrated, developed cities.

**Recommendation 4:** To implement social crime prevention programmes in areas of poverty and high unemployment, with the aim of addressing the socio-economic conditions that could be linked to the causes of crime. These programmes should integrate the efforts of the law enforcement agencies, local authorities, welfare departments, and the private and business sectors. The primary focus should *inter alia* be on job creation or state allowances for the unemployed; skills development and training; reservist systems to support the police; Neighbourhood Watch; housing projects; and educational and developmental programmes for children. An important aspect of social crime prevention would further be to change the perception in certain communities that advocates the viewpoint that it is acceptable to steal from the "rich", and for the same reason to buy or own stolen goods.

**Recommendation 5:** To establish effective crime prevention centres or units at the functional levels of the Area SAPS and the local police station area, with the primary aim to implement and manage community based and multi-agency crime prevention programmes and projects. The following principles could be applied to direct the functioning of these centres/units:

- the development of an intelligence capacity to analyse and interpret crime statistics, trends and other relevant information to guide the crime prevention initiatives;
- building of partnerships or multi-agency co-operation in the planning and implementation of crime prevention initiatives (the contribution of business, insurance, and private security companies should not be overlooked);
- programmes and projects should be aimed at specific crimes, e.g. residential burglary;
- to involve the local community, *inter alia*, through the CPFs, and to apply the principles of community policing as stipulated in the White Paper on Safety and Security (1998); and
- to apply situational crime prevention, including environmental design, as an approach of diminishing opportunities for crime by modifying the situations in which offending occurs.

**Recommendation 6:** To effectively communicate with ordinary citizens, through the printed and electronic media, with the aim to educate and inform them on the latest developments with regard to crime prevention, and what they can do to protect their property and create a safe and secure environment. The SAPS, Business Against Crime, CPFs, as well as academic and research institutions can play a major role in this regard.

The integrated burglary model (see par. 7.2), based on the conceptual framework and the findings of this study, for example, can be applied in individual cases, or local communities, to identify vulnerabilities or opportunities for burglary, and to suggest specific action or measures to prevent such offences.

## 7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

For reasons mentioned at the beginning of this study, including the cost implications of a quantitative survey study, the decision was taken to rather follow a qualitative approach to research the burglary process in a more confined way. For this purpose the research was based on semi-structured interviews and secondary data sources to verify the conceptual framework and to develop an integrated burglary model. An inherent weakness of this approach was that the findings of the case studies only allowed for analytical generalisations that related to the research expectations based on the conceptual framework.

Although the integrated burglary model has wider application value in terms of its ability to conceptualise the burglary process and to identify key factors and variables, the measurements and patterns of these factors and variables do not necessarily hold true for other residential areas in the South African urban milieu. To increase the reliability and validity of the integrated burglary model, that would allow for broader generalisations, it would be appropriate to apply the model in further studies that are more representative of the population of all types of residential areas in South Africa.

Another possibility would be to incorporate components of the burglary model, especially those that seem to be relevant and of specific interest, into national victimisation surveys that may be conducted in future. An example of such a study is the victims of crime survey that was conducted in 1998 under the auspices of Statistics South Africa.

The availability of modern computer software programmes also creates the opportunity to develop a computerised risk assessment model (based on the integrated burglary model) that can be applied in the assessment of the vulnerability of potential residential targets and to suggest preventative measures to counter such vulnerabilities.

The emphasis on crime prevention has only recently, since the early 1990s, gained prominence in South Africa, and although progress has been made with regard to policy guidelines and the establishment of structures such as the NCPD, there is still need for research to support these efforts and to monitor and evaluate the successes or failures of specific programmes. The opportunity thus exists to initiate crime specific research that

aims to support specific crime prevention initiatives, and to monitor and evaluate their progress over time.

With regard to the issue of 'crime displacement', further in-depth study is needed to determine whether, and to what extent, residential burglars had 'displaced' residential burglary in favour of other types of crime.

## 7.7 CONCLUSION

Residential burglary is a serious problem in South Africa, taking into account its high occurrence rate and the financial and psychological impact it has on peoples' lives. It is also expected that this type of crime will remain a problem for as long as a large part of the population are exposed to poor socio-economic conditions.

This study confirms the notion that most burglars are motivated by the need for money. Thus, for as long as the South African society is burdened with high unemployment and poverty, which is estimated at as high as 40 per cent of the population (Business Day, 2002), and the prospects for economic growth remains at between 2% and 3%, it is expected that the societal conditions will remain favourable for criminals to continue with a 'career' in burglary. In addition to these conditions, other factors may also serve as incentives for burglars, for example, the 'tolerance' towards property crimes in some communities, the tendency to buy stolen goods, and the incapacity of the law enforcement agencies to fulfil their duties.

Based on the findings of this study, it is argued that effective prevention of residential burglary can only be realised through an integrated approach towards crime prevention, which combines the efforts of the individual households with that of the local communities, and the law enforcement and development agencies involved in crime prevention. At the macro-level, crime prevention programmes and initiatives should focus on the criminal, to stop or discourage criminal behaviour through the implementation of deterrent measures and to change criminogenic conditions that may be contributory to criminal behaviour. At the meso- and micro-levels, on the contrary, the focus should primarily be on situational crime prevention, which includes community involvement and residents' participation, together with the local police and private security organisations, to minimise the opportunities for residential burglary in a specific area as well as the vulnerabilities attached to a specific target.

There are no easy solutions for complex situations and the challenge remains to change society in such a way that the population develop a 'zero-tolerance' attitude towards all forms of criminal behaviour.

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Victim nr		Area	
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**INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR BURGLARY VICTIMS /  
ONDERHOUDSKEDULE VIR INBRAAK-SLAGOFFERS**

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**RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE PRETORIA AREA /  
RESIDENSIËLE INBRAAK IN DIE PRETORIA-GEBIED**

I am Basjan van Zyl and is currently busy with a doctorate study in geography at the University of Pretoria. The aim of the study is to describe and explain residential burglary in the Pretoria area and to formulate principles for the control and prevention of residential burglary. Specific objectives of the study are:

- to identify and study the factors that led to a specific burglary;
- to analyse the burglary event;
- to analyse the responses of residents and burglars, and
- to evaluate the effectiveness of security measures.

Most of the information needed will be gathered through interviews, with burglary victims, convicted burglars, police officers, and security companies. I appreciate your willingness to participate in the study and the information provided by you will be regarded as anonymous and confidential.

The purpose of the interview schedule is to guide us in the discussions and to make sure that we cover all the important aspects of the burglary. Feel free to share more information on any other aspect of the burglary if you would like to.

Thank you for your co-operation.

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Ek is Basjan van Zyl en is tans besig met 'n doktorale studie in geografie aan die Universiteit van Pretoria. Die doel van die studie is om residensiële inbraak in die Pretoria- gebied te beskryf en te verklaar, en om beginsels te formuleer waarvolgens inbrake beheer en voorkom kan word. Spesifieke doelwitte van die studie is:

- om die faktore wat aanleiding gegee het tot 'n spesifieke inbraak te identifiseer en te bestudeer;
- om die inbraak self te ontleed;
- om die reaksie van inwoners en inbrekers te ontleed, en
- om die effektiwiteit van veiligheidsmaatreëls te evalueer.

Meeste van die inligting wat nodig word, sal ingesamel word deur onderhoude te voer met slagoffers van inbrake, gevonniste inbrekers, polisie beamptes, en sekuriteitsmaatskappye. Ek waardeer u bereidwilligheid om aan die studie deel te neem, en die inligting wat deur u voorsien word, sal anoniem en vertroulik hanteer word.

Die doel van die onderhoudskedule is om die gesprek te rig en te verseker dat ons al die belangrike aspekte van die inbraak hanteer. U is welkom om meer inligting oor enige ander aspek van die inbraak te verskaf.

Baie dankie vir u samewerking.

## POOL OF QUESTIONS

### SECTION 1: GENERAL QUESTIONS / AFDELING 1: ALGEMENE VRAE

- 1.1 Street address: / Straatadres:
- 1.2 Neighbourhood: / Woonbuurt:
- 1.3 Type of residence (e.g. flat, single house, or duet): / Tipe wooneenheid (bv. woonstel, enkel huis, of duet):
- 1.4 Is residence situated within a security area (e.g. with access control, security fencing, and guards): / Is die woning binne 'n sekuriteitsarea geleë (bv. met toegangsbeheer, sekuriteitsheining, en wagte):
- 1.5 Who is the owner of the residence: / Wie is die eienaar van die wooneenheid:
- 1.6 How long have you been living in the residence: / Hoe lank woon u al in die woning:
- 1.7 Age of the residence: / Ouderdom van wooneenheid:

**Note: The following questions apply to the period just prior to the burglary.  
Let wel: Die volgende vrae is van toepassing op die periode net voor die inbraak.**

- 1.8 How would you describe the accessibility of the residence in terms of access roads: /  
Hoe sou u die toeganklikheid van die woning in terme van toegangspaaie beskryf:
- 1.9 Give an indication of the movement of strangers (not resident) in your street: / Gee 'n  
aanduiding van die beweging van vreemdelinge (nie woonagtig) in julle straat:
- 1.10 To what extent was building activity present in your neighbourhood: / In watter mate  
was bou aktiwiteite aanwesig in julle woonbuurt:
- 1.11 Approximately how far away (in km) are the following places from your residence:  
Ongeveer hoe ver is die volgende plekke vanaf julle wooneenheid:  
The distance (in km) to the nearest .....  
Die afstand (in km) na die naaste .....
- 1.11.1 Neighbourhood shopping centre / Woonbuurt winkelsentrum
- 1.11.2 Big shopping complex / Groot winkelkompleks
- 1.11.3 Garage / Motorhawe
- 1.11.4 Bus stop / Bushalte
- 1.11.5 Taxi stop / Taxi halte
- 1.11.6 Park or green zone / Park of groensone
- 1.11.7 Main road / Hoofpad

1.12 Number of residents, gender, age, and occupation: / Getal inwoners, geslag, ouderdom, en beroep:.

Person / Persoon	Gender / Geslag	Age / Ouderdom	Occupation / Beroep

1.13 Were other people (workers) present on the premise, prior and during the period of the burglary: If any, can you give me further particulars about the person(s), whether they were lodging or commuting, and which days they were present: / Was ander mense (werkers) aanwesig op die perseel net voor en tydens die inbraak: Indien wel, kan u my van die volgende inligting voorsien: besonderhede oor die persoon, of hy/sy inwonend was of daaglik gependel het, en watter dae hy/sy aanwesig was:

Person / Persoon	Yes or No / Ja of Nee	Lodging or commuting / Inwonend of pendel	Days of the week present / Dae van die week aanwesig
Domestic worker			
Gardener			
Tenant			
Other: Name: .....			

1.14 Number and type of vehicles in household: / Getal en tipe voertuie in huishouding:

1.15 Did you have insurance on the contents: / Het u versekering op u huisinhoud gehad:

1.15.1 The value insured: / Die waarde verseker:

1.15.2 If not insured, what was the total value of the contents of the residence: / Indien nie verseker, wat was die totale waarde van u huisinhoud:

1.16 For what period of the day was your residence usually left unattended: / Vir watter tydperk van die dag was u woning normaalweg onbewaak:

1.17 How often did you go out in the evenings for entertainment at places such as restaurants, cinemas, etc. / Hoe dikwels het u in die aand uitgegaan, byvoorbeeld na restaurante en bioskope:

1.18 Give an indication of the volume of vehicle traffic in your street: / Gee 'n aanduiding van die volume voertuig verkeer in julle straat:

1.19 Looking in from the street, what building design features were visible (e.g. sliding doors, large windows): / Watter ontwerpkenmerke aan die gebou was sigbaar vanaf die straat (bv. skuifdeure, groot vensters):

1.20 Which of the following security measures were in place before the burglary: / Watter van die volgende sekuriteitsmaatreëls was in plek voor die inbraak:

1.20.1 Fencing and type / Omheining en tipe

1.20.2 Security gate / Sekuriteitshek

1.20.3 Entry phone or intercom / Toegangsfoon of interkom.

- 1.20.4 Safety gates at doors and sliding doors / Veiligheidshekke by deure
- 1.20.5 Burglar bars at windows / Diefwering aan vensters
- 1.20.6 Effective street lightning / Effektiewe straat verligting
- 1.20.7 Security lighting / Sekuriteitsligte
- 1.20.8 Little shelter between house and street / Min skuiling tussen huis en straat
- 1.20.9 Alarm system / Alarm stelsel
- 1.20.10 Armed responds and billboard / Gewapende reaksie en advertensieborde
- 1.20.11 Marking of property / Merk van eiendom
- 1.20.12 Dog(s) / Hond(e)
- 1.20.13 Razor wire or spikes / Lemmetjiedraad of penne
- 1.20.14 Electrified wire / Geëlektrifiseerde draad
- 1.20.15 Good relationship with neighbours / Goeie verhouding met bure
- 1.20.16 Belong to neighbourhood watch / Behoort aan buurtwag
- 1.20.17 Living in a security enclosed area / Woon in 'n sekuriteitsomheinde gebied
- 1.20.18 Other / Ander

## **SECTION 2: THE BURGLARY / AFDELING 2: DIE INBRAAK**

- 2.1 Day of burglary: / Dag van inbraak: .....
- 2.2 Time of burglary: / Tyd van inbraak: .....
- 2.3 Were anybody at home during the burglary: / Was enigiemand tuis gedurende die inbraak:
- 2.4 If yes, was there any contact with the burglar: / Indien ja, was daar enige kontak met die inbreker:
- 2.5 Did you or any of your household members suffer any injuries as a result of the incident: / Het u of enige lid van u huishouding 'n besering opgedoen as gevolg van die insident:
- 2.6 If no (to question 2.3), what was the period of absence, eg few hours, days or holiday: / Indien nee (op vraag 2.3), wat was die periode van afwesigheid, bv 'n paar uur, dae of 'n vakansie:
- 2.7 Was your absence easy noticeable: / Was julle afwesigheid maklik waarneembaar:
- 2.8 Who discovered the burglary: / Wie het die inbraak ontdek:
- 2.9 How did the burglar gain entry: / Hoe het die inbreker toegang verkry:

- 2.9.1 To the site: / Tot die perseel:
- 2.9.2 To the residence: / Tot die woning:
- 2.10 How many burglars do you think were involved in the burglary: / Hoeveel inbrekers dink u was betrokke by die inbraak:
- 2.11 Did they use force to enter: / Het hulle geweld gebruik om toegang te verkry:
- 2.12 Was the burglary a professional or a amateur job: / Was die inbraak professioneel of amateuragtig uitgevoer:
- 2.13 Were the burglars vandalistic: / Het die inbrekers vernielsugtig opgetree:
- 2.14 Do you think the burglars obtained foreknowledge of your residence and your movements: Dink u die inbrekers het voorkennis gehad van u woning en u huislede se bewegings:
- 2.15 How long do you think the burglars were in the residence: / Hoe lank dink u was die inbrekers in die woning:
- 2.16 From where do you think the burglars originally came: / Vanwaar dink u het die inbrekers oorspronklik gekom:
- 2.17 How soon after the burglary was reported did the police arrive to the scene: / Hoe spoedig na die inbraak aangemeld is, het die polisie by die toneel opgedaag:
- 2.18 If you were subscribed to a security company, how long did it take them to arrive at the scene: / Indien u aan 'n sekuriteitsmaatskappy behoort het, hoe lank het dit geneem voordat hulle by die toneel opgedaag het:
- 2.19 What was the total value of the goods stolen: / Wat was die totale waarde van die goedere wat gesteel is:
- 2.20 Which of the following items were stolen during the burglary: / Watter van die volgende items is gesteel tydens die inbraak:

Category / Kategorie	Items stolen / Items gesteel
1. Fire arms / Vuurwapens	
2. Clothing / Klerasie	
3. Jewellery / Juweliersware	
4. Cameras / Kameras	
5. Electronic commodities / Elektroniese ware	
6. Money / Geld	
7. Furniture / Meubels	
8. China-ware / Porselein ware	
9. Silver-ware / Silwer ware	
10. Paintings / Skilderye	

11. Linen / Linne	
12. Tools / Gereedskap	
13. Liquor / Drank	
14. Food / Voedsel	
15. Books / Boeke	
16. Other /Ander	

2.21 How many burglaries, attempted burglaries, or theft from the premises, did you experience in the two year period prior to this burglary: / Hoeveel inbraake, pogings tot inbraak, of diefstal uit die standplaas, het u in die voorafgaande twee jaar ondervind:

2.22 How many burglaries, attempted burglaries or theft from the premises, did you experience in the period after this burglary: / Hoeveel inbraake, pogings tot inbraak of diefstal uit die standplaas, het u sedert die inbraak ondervind:

### SECTION 3: RESPONSE / AFDELING 3: REAKSIE

3.1 Why do you think the burglars choose your residence to burgle and not your neighbours' residences: / Hoekom dink u het die inbrekers u woning gekies om by in te breek en nie by u bure nie:

3.2 Has your fear of victimisation changed since the burglary: / Het u vrees vir viktimisasie sedert die inbraak verander:

3.3 How safe do you feel on your premise since the burglary: / Hoe veilig voel u op u perseel sedert die inbraak:

3.4 In what way did the burglary change your lifestyle and movements: / In watter mate het die inbraak u lewenstyl en bewegings verander:

3.5 What do you believe motivate criminals to burgle: / Wat sou u sê motiveer misdadigers om in te breek:

3.6 Do you perceive burglary as a serious problem in your neighbourhood: / Beskou u inbraak as 'n ernstige probleem in u woonbuurt:

3.7 What new security measures did you install after the burglary: / Watter nuwe veiligheids-maatreëls het u na die inbraak geïmplementeer:

3.8 Would you say the neighbourhood that you live in is one where people are involved in community actions, helping each other or where people mostly go their own way: / Sou u sê die mense in u woonbuurt is baie betrokke by gemeenskapsaksies en daarop ingestel om mekaar te help, of gaan elkeen maar sy eie gang:

3.9 In what way did your neighbours assist you after the burglary: / Op watter wyse het u bure hulp verleen na die inbraak:

3.10 How satisfied were you with the way that the police dealt with your burglary: / Hoe tevrede is u met die wyse waarop die polisie u inbraak hanteer het:

3.11 To your knowledge, was an arrest been made, or articles been found back: / Is daar na u wete 'n arrestasie gemaak, of enige van die gesteelde goedere teruggevind:

- 3.12 If subscribed to a security company, how satisfied were you with the way they dealt with your burglary: / Indien u aan 'n sekuriteitsmaatskappy behoort, hoe tevrede was u met die wyse waarop hulle u inbraak hanteer het:
- 3.13 How satisfied were you with the way that the insurance company dealt with your claim: / Hoe tevrede was u met die wyse waarop die versekeringsmaatskappy u eis hanteer het:
- 3.14 What makes a residence vulnerable to burglary: / Wat maak 'n wooneenheid kwesbaar vir inbraak:
- 3.15 What would you say are the best security/safety measures one can take to protect his/her residence: / Wat is volgens u mening die beste veiligheidsmaatreëls wat 'n persoon kan tref om sy/haar woning te beskerm:

## APPENDIX 2

Burglar nr	
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### INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CONVICTED BURGLARS / ONDERHOUDSKEDULE VIR VEROORDEELDE INBREKERS

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#### RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE PRETORIA AREA / RESIDENSIËLE INBRAAK IN DIE PRETORIA-GEBIED

I am Basjan van Zyl and is currently busy with a doctorate study in geography at the University of Pretoria. The aim of the study is to describe and explain residential burglary in the Pretoria area and to formulate principles for the control and prevention of residential burglary. Specific objectives of the study are:

- to identify and study the factors that led to a specific burglary;
- to analyse the burglary event;
- to analyse the responses of residents and burglars, and
- to evaluate the effectiveness of security measures.

Most of the information needed will be gathered through interviews, with burglary victims, convicted burglars, police officers, and security companies. I appreciate your willingness to participate in the study and the information provided by you will be regarded as anonymous and confidential.

The purpose of the interview schedule is to guide us in the discussions and to make sure that we cover all the important aspects of the burglary. Feel free to share more information on any other aspect of the burglary if you would like to.

Thank you for your co-operation.

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Ek is Basjan van Zyl en is tans besig met 'n doktorsale studie in geografie aan die Universiteit van Pretoria. Die doel van die studie is om residensiële inbraak in die Pretoria- gebied te beskryf en te verklaar, en om beginsels te formuleer waarvolgens inbraake beheer en voorkom kan word. Spesifieke doelwitte van die studie is:

- om die faktore wat aanleiding gegee het tot 'n spesifieke inbraak te identifiseer en te bestudeer;
- om die inbraak self te ontleed;
- om die reaksie van inwoners en inbrekers te ontleed, en
- om die effektiwiteit van veiligheidsmaatreëls te evalueer.

Meeste van die inligting wat benodig word, sal ingesamel word deur onderhoude te voer met slagoffers van inbraake, gevonniste inbrekers, polisie beamptes, en sekuriteitsmaatskappye. Ek waardeer u bereidwilligheid om aan die studie deel te neem, en die inligting wat deur u voorsien word, sal anoniem en vertroulik hanteer word.

Die doel van die onderhoudskedule is om die gesprek te rig en te verseker dat ons al die belangrike aspekte van die inbraak hanteer. U is welkom om meer inligting oor enige ander aspek van die inbraak te verskaf.

Baie dankie vir u samewerking.

## POOL OF QUESTIONS

### SECTION 1: GENERAL QUESTIONS / AFDELING 1: ALGEMENE VRAE

- 1.1 Age: / Ouderdom:
- 1.2 Home address: / Woonadres:
- 1.3 Why did you break into the house, or participated in the burglary: / Waarom het jy ingebreek, of deelgeneem aan die inbraak:
- 1.4 Where/how did you learn to burgle: / Waar/hoe het jy geleer om in te breek:
- 1.5 Why do you choose the specific residence to burgle (What makes a residence a suitable target to burgle): / Hoekom het jy die spesifieke woning gekies om by in te breek (Wat maak 'n wooneenheid 'n geskikte teiken om by in te breek):
- 1.6 **Burglary patterns: / Inbraak patrone:**
  - 1.6.1 Best time of day: / Beste tyd van die dag:
  - 1.6.2 Best day in week: / Beste dag in die week:
  - 1.6.3 Best period/month in the year: / Beste periode/maand in die jaar:
- 1.7 Explain to me the steps you went through in selecting a suitable target (modus operandi): / Beskryf aan my die stappe waardeur jy gaan om 'n geskikte teiken te kies (modus operandi):

### SECTION 2: THE BURGLARY / AFDELING 2: DIE INBRAAK

- 2.1 After you identified the potential target (house), describe to me the ideal circumstances that will encourage you to burgle: / Nadat jy 'n potensieële teiken (huis) geïdentifiseer het, beskryf aan my die ideale omstandighede wat jou sal aanmoedig om in te breek:
- 2.2 How do you feel about making contact with the residents during a burglary (are you afraid): / Hoe voel jy oor die moontlikheid om kontak met die huisbewoners te maak tydens 'n inbraak (is jy bang):
- 2.3 Were you armed during the burglary: / Was jy gewapen gedurende die inbraak:
- 2.4 How did you gain entrance to: / Hoe het jy toegang verkry tot:
  - 2.4.1 The site / Die perseel:
  - 2.4.2 The building / Die gebou:
- 2.5 How many of you were involved in the burglary: / Hoeveel van julle was betrokke by die inbraak:
- 2.6 What tools did you used to gain entry to the building: / Watter gereedskap het jy gebruik om toegang tot die gebou te verkry:

- 2.7 How did you overcome the security measures: / Hoe het jy die veiligheidsmaatreëls oorkom:
- 2.8 Do you think most burglars are vandalistic: / Dink jy die meeste inbrekers is vernielsugtig:
- 2.9 Did you have foreknowledge of the residence and the household's movements before you broke in: / Het jy voorkennis van die woning en die huislede se bewegings verkry voordat jy ingebreek het:
- 2.10 How long do burglars usually stay in the residence: / Hoe lank bly inbrekers gewoonlik in die woning:
- 2.11 How far from your home are you prepared to go for a burglary: / Hoe ver is jy bereid om vanaf jou huis in te breek:
- 2.12 Were you afraid of being spotted by the police, security vehicles, or the neighbours: / Was jy bang om gesien te word deur die polisie, sekuriteitsvoertuie, of die bure:
- 2.13 Give an indication of the items that you were looking for during the burglary, and what items did you eventually took: / Gee 'n aanduiding van die items waarvoor jy gesoek het tydens die inbraak, en watter items jy uiteindelik geneem het:

Category / Kategorie	Items stolen / Items gesteel
1. Fire arms / Vuurwapens	
2. Clothing / Klerasie	
3. Jewellery / Juweliersware	
4. Cameras / Kameras	
5. Electronic commodities / Elektroniese ware	
6. Money / Geld	
7. Furniture / Meubels	
8. China-ware / Porselein ware	
9. Silver-ware / Silwer ware	
10. Paintings / Skilderye	
11. Linen / Linne	
12. Tools / Gereedskap	
13. Liquor / Drank	
14. Books / Boeke	
15. Food / Voedsel	
16. Other /Ander	

- 2.14 Will you return to the same residence to burgle it again: / Sal jy na dieselfde woning terugkeer om weer daar in te breek:

### SECTION 3: RESPONSE / AFDELING 3: REAKSIE

- 3.1 Why did you start to burgle: / Waarom het jy begin inbreek:
- 3.2 Did you work for yourself or for somebody else: / Het jy vir jouself of vir iemand anders gewerk:
- 3.3 Did you use any alcohol or drugs before the burglary: / Het jy enige alkohol of dwelms gebruik voordat jy ingebreek het:
- 3.4 Describe your feelings just before the burglary: / Beskryf jou gevoelens net voor die inbraak:
- 3.5 Describe your feelings just after the burglary: / Beskryf jou gevoelens net na die inbraak:
- 3.6 In what way do you think the burglary will affect the lifes of the victims: / In watter mate dink jy het die inbraak die lewens van die slagoffers beïnvloed:
- 3.7 Do you perceive burglary as a serious crime: / Beskou u inbraak as 'n ernstige misdaad:
- 3.8 How do you get rid of the stolen goods: / Hoe raak jy van die gesteelde items ontslae:
- 3.9 What would you say are the best security/safety measures one can take to protect his/her house against burglary: / Wat is volgens jou mening die beste veiligheidsmaatreëls wat 'n persoon kan tref om sy/haar woning teen inbraak te beskerm:
- 3.10 How effective do you think are the following security measures in preventing a burglary: / Hoe effektief dink jy is die volgende sekuriteitsmaatreëls in die voorkoming van 'n inbraak:
  - 3.10.1 Fencing and type / Omheining en tipe
  - 3.10.2 Security gate / Sekuriteitshek
  - 3.10.3 Entry phone or intercom / Toegangsfoon of interkom
  - 3.10.4 Safety gates at doors and sliding doors / Veiligheidshekke
  - 3.10.5 Burglar bars at windows / Diefwering aan vensters
  - 3.10.6 Effective street lightning / Effektiewe straat verligting
  - 3.10.7 Automatic lighting switch / Outomatiese ligteskakelaar
  - 3.10.8 Security lights / Sekuriteitsligte
  - 3.10.9 Little shelter between house and street / Min skuiling tussen huis en straat
  - 3.10.10 Alarm system / Alarm stelsel
  - 3.10.11 Armed responds and billboards / Gewapende reaksie en advertensieborde
  - 3.10.12 Marking of property / Merk van eiendom

- 3.10.13 Dog(s) / Hond(e)
- 3.10.14 Razor wire or spikes / Lemmetjiesdraad of penne
- 3.10.15 Electrified fence / Geëlektrifiseerde heining
- 3.10.16 Neighbours watching / Bure wat kyk na woning
- 3.10.17 Neighbourhood watch and patrols / Buurtwag en patrollies
- 3.10.18 Residence is situated in a security area / Woning is binne 'n sekuriteitsarea geleë
- 3.10.19 Occupancy / Bewoning
- 3.10.20 Other / Ander:

APPENDIX 3

Expert nr		Terrain	
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR PEOPLE WITH KNOWLEDGE ON BURGLARY  
ONDERHOUDSKEDULE VIR KUNDIGES IN DIE VELD VAN INBRAKE

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RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY IN THE PRETORIA AREA /  
RESIDENSIËLE INBRAAK IN DIE PRETORIA-GEBIED

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- .2 om die inbraak self te ontleed;
- .3 om die reaksie van inwoners en inbrekers te ontleed, en
- .4 om die effektiwiteit van veiligheidsmaatreëls te evalueer.

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Die doel van die onderhoudskedule is om die gesprek te rig en te verseker dat ons al die belangrike aspekte van die inbraak hanteer. U is welkom om meer inligting oor enige ander aspek van die inbraak te verskaf.

Baie dankie vir u samewerking.

## POOL OF QUESTIONS

### SECTION 1: GENERAL QUESTIONS / AFDELING 1: ALGEMENE VRAE

- 1.1 **Burglary patterns in your area: / Inbraak patrone in u gebied:**
- 1.1.1 Which type of residence is most vulnerable to burglary: / Watter tipe wooneenheid is die meeste kwesbaar vir inbraake:
- 1.1.2 Identify high risk time of day: / Identifiseer hoë risiko tyd van dag:
- 1.1.3 High risk day in the week: / Hoë risiko dag in die week:
- 1.1.4 High risk period/month in the year: / Hoë risiko periode/maand in die jaar:
- 1.2 **Commentary on the following statements wrt the occurrence of burglary: / Kommentaar oor die volgende stellings mbt die voorkoms van inbraak:**
- 1.2.1 The degree of occupancy: / Die graad van bewoning:
- 1.2.2 Presence of building activity in the neighbourhood: / Aanwesigheid van bou aktiwiteite in die woongebied:
- 1.2.3 Movement of strangers in neighbourhood: / Beweging van vreemdelinge in woongebied:
- 1.2.4 Proximity of the following: / Nabyheid van die volgende:
4. Neighbourhood shopping centre / Woonbuurt winkelsentrum
5. Big shopping complex / Groot winkelkompleks
- Garage / Motorhawe
  - Bus stop / Bushalte
  - Taxi stop / Taxi halte
  - Park or green zone / Park of groensone
  - Main road / Hoofpad
- 1.2.5 Volume of vehicle traffic in the area: / Volume voertuigverkeer in die area:
- 1.2.6 Insurance on the contents of the house: / Versekering op huisinhoud:
- 1.2.7 The frequency of going out in the evenings for entertainment at places such as restaurants, cinemas, etc. / Hoe dikwels in die aand uitgegaan word, byvoorbeeld na restaurante en bioskope:
- 1.3 What design features in the building may attract the burglar (eg sliding doors, large windows, concealed entrances): / Watter ontwerpkenmerke in die gebou sal die inbreker aanlok (bv skuifduere, groot vensters, versteekte ingange):
- 1.4 How effective are the following security measures in preventing a burglary: / Hoe effektief is die volgende sekuriteitsmaatreëls in die voorkoming van 'n inbraak:

- 1.4.1 Fencing and type / Omheining en tipe
- 1.4.2 Security gate / Sekuriteitshek
- 1.4.3 Entry phone or intercom / Toegangsfoon of interkom
- 1.4.4 Safety gates at doors and sliding doors / Veiligheidshekke
- 1.4.5 Burglar bars at windows / Diefwering aan vensters
- 1.4.6. Effective street lightning / Effektiewe straat verligting
- 1.4.7 Security lights / Sekuriteitsligte
- 1.4.8 Little shelter between house and street / Min skuiling tussen huis en straat
- 1.4.9 Alarm system / Alarm stelsel
- 1.4.10 Armed responds and billboards / Gewapende reaksie en advertesieborde
- 1.4.11 Marking of property / Merk van eiendom
- 1.4.12 Dog(s) / Hond(e)
- 1.4.13 Razor wire or spikes / Lemmetjie draad of penne
- 1.4.14 Electrified wire / Geëlektrifiseerde draad
- 1.4.15 Neighbours watching / Bure wat toekyk
- 1.4.16 Belong to neighbourhood watch / Behoort aan buurtwag
- 1.4.17 If residence is situated in a security area / As woning binne 'n sekuriteitsarea geleë is
- 1.4.18 Other / Ander:

## **SECTION 2: THE BURGLARY / AFDELING 2: DIE INBRAAK**

- 2.1 Are most residences unoccupied during burglaries: / Is die meeste huise onbewoon tydens inbrake:
- 2.2 How often is there contact between residents and burglars (nature and seriousness): / Hoe dikwels is daar kontak tussen huisbewoners en inbrekers (aard en ernstigheid):
- 2.3 How did most burglars gain entry: / Hoe het die meeste inbrekers toegang verkry:
  - 2.3.1 Site / Perseel:
  - 2.3.2 Residence / Woning:
- 2.4 Are there usually more than one burglar involved: / Is daar gewoonlik meer as een inbreker betrokke:
- 2.5 What tools are used to gain entry: / Watter gereedskap word gebruik om toegang te

verkry:

- 2.6 How did they overcome the security measures: / Hoe het hulle die veiligheidsmaatreëls oorkom:
- 2.7 Are most burglaries a professional or a amateur job: / Is die meeste inbrake 'n professionele of 'n amateuragtige optrede:
- 2.8 Are most burglars vandalistic: / Is die meeste inbrekers vernielsugtig:
- 2.9 Do you think the burglars had foreknowledge of the residence and the household's movements: / Dink u die inbrekers het voorkennis gehad van die woning en die huislede se bewegings:
- 2.10 How long do you think the burglars stay in the residence: / Hoe lank dink u vertoef die inbrekers in die woning:
- 2.11 From where do you think most of the burglars originally came: / Vanwaar dink u kom die meeste inbrekers oorspronklik:
- 2.12 What problems do the police (or security company) experience in reacting to a burglary call: / Watter probleme ondervind die polisie (of sekuriteitsmaatskappy) om op 'n inbraak oproep te reageer:
- 2.13 Give an indication of the items that are most often stolen: / Gee 'n aanduiding van die items wat meestal gesteel word:

Category / Kategorie	Items stolen / Items gesteel
1. Fire arms / Vuurwapens	
2. Clothing / Klerasie	
3. Jewellery / Juweliersware	
4. Cameras / Kameras	
5. Electronic commodities / Elektroniese ware	
6. Money / Geld	
7. Furniture / Meubels	
8. China-ware / Porselein ware	
9. Silver-ware / Silwer ware	
10. Paintings / Skilderye	
11. Linen / Linne	
12. Tools / Gereedskap	
13. Liquor / Drank	
14. Books / Boeke	
15. Food / Voedsel	
16. Other /Ander	

- 2.14 How often do burglars target the same premise: / Hoe dikwels word dieselfde woning deur inbrekers geteiken:

### SECTION 3: RESPONSE / AFDELING 3: REAKSIE

- 3.1 Why do you think burglars choose a specific residence to burgle: / Hoekom dink u het inbrekers 'n spesifieke woning gekies om by in te breek:
- 3.2 In what way do you think the lifestyle and movements of victims are affected: / In watter mate dink u word die lewenstyl en bewegings van slagoffers beïnvloed:
- 3.3 What do you believe motivate criminals to burgle: / Wat sou u sê motiveer misdadigers om in te breek:
- 3.4 Do you think alcohol and drugs play a role in burglaries: / Dink u alkohol en dwelms speel 'n rol by inbrake:
- 3.5 Do burglars usually work alone, or in groups, or in syndicates: / Werk inbrekers gewoonlik alleen, of in groepe, of in sindikate:
- 3.6 How do they get rid of the stolen goods: / Hoe raak hulle van die gesteelde goedere ontslae:
- 3.7 Do you perceive burglary as a serious problem in your area: / Beskou u inbraak as 'n ernstige probleem in u gebied:
- 3.8 Are you satisfied with the number of burglaries reported: / Is u tevrede met die hoeveelheid inbrake wat aangemeld word:
- 3.9 Would you say the area that you serve is one where people are involved in community actions, helping each other or where people mostly go their own way: / Sou u sê die mense in die area wat u bedien is baie betrokke by gemeenskapsaksies en daarop ingestel om mekaar te help, of gaan elkeen maar sy eie gang:
- 3.10 What is your experience with regard to the functioning of community police forums: / Wat is u ondervinding betreffende die funksionering van gemeenskaps-polisiëringsforums:
- 3.11 Do you have a specific plan or strategy to combat residential burglary: / Het julle 'n spesifieke plan of strategie om residensiële inbraak te bekamp:
- 3.12 Are you satisfied with the success rate in prosecutions: / Is julle tevrede met die suksessyfer in vervolgings:
- 3.13 How satisfied are people in general with the way in which security companies dealt with burglary: / Hoe tevrede is mense in die algemeen met die wyse waarop sekuriteits-maatskappye inbrake hanteer:
- 3.14 Do you think most burglary victims are honest with their insurance claims: / Dink u die meeste slagoffers van 'n inbraak is eerlik tov hulle versekeringseise:
- 3.15 What makes a residence vulnerable to burglary: / Wat maak 'n wooneenheid kwesbaar vir inbraak:
- 3.16 What would you say are the best security/safety measures one can take to protect his/her residence: / Wat is volgens u mening die beste veiligheidsmaatreëls wat 'n persoon kan tref om sy/haar woning te beskerm: