CHAPTER 6: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGY OF THE PREDOMINANT ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP\textsuperscript{22} IN SOUTH AFRICA

6.1 INTRODUCTION

As with the previous case studies, the dialogic model of interpretation is made use of here and in this case forms the theoretical framework of the political analysis of the ideology of the predominant Islamic fundamentalist group in South Africa. The focus in this chapter is thus on the ideology of People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), as well as the Islamic fundamentalist organisation Qibla, whose leadership reportedly infiltrated the PAGAD structure in 1996. Structural factors (political, cultural and socio-economic conditions) are also taken into account in order to determine the reasons behind the formation of PAGAD, its initial popularity, as well as the controversial measures it engaged in during the first few months of its existence in order to promote its anti-gangsterism and anti-drugs agenda. These included marches to the houses of known gang leaders and drug lords in the greater Cape Town area, demanding that they change their ways or else face the wrath of the “people”. Attention is also paid to the covert and decidedly more notorious side of PAGAD and its likely involvement (though not proven beyond doubt) in several incidents in a series of bomb attacks and drive-by shootings that shook Cape Town between 1996 and 2001. Interestingly, in terms of this particular case study, what is important is the apparent success of the police and security forces in clamping down on the PAGAD leadership, by means of a number of arrests and trials that have taken place over the last few years, thereby bringing the spate of urban terrorism in Cape Town under control. It is, however, imperative that such short-term measures be backed up by a serious and effective effort on the government’s behalf to address the severe socio-economic problems faced by the populations of the townships of the Cape Flats area in order to counter both gangsterism and drug abuse, which, as PAGAD has justifiably argued, have proven to be major destabilising factors in the region.

\textsuperscript{22} Here it is important to point out that the ideological orientation of People Against Gangsterism And Drugs (PAGAD), the group to be explored in this chapter, is by no means clear-cut. While the group professes itself to be a multi-religious, multi-racial organisation, the overriding majority of its membership is Muslim. Furthermore, there are indications that its leadership was largely infiltrated by members of Achmid Cassiem’s Islamic fundamentalist group Qibla in 1996 and, furthermore, that the result of this alleged infiltration has been the formation of a military faction in PAGAD, the G-Force, which has been implicated in a number of urban terror attacks in Cape Town. Despite this apparent link with Qibla, however, PAGAD’s professed ideology is distinctly anti-crime, rather than advocating Islamic fundamentalist ideas. The somewhat confusing ideological character is looked at in more detail below.
6.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF AND EVENTS LINKED TO PAGAD\textsuperscript{23}

6.2.1 Muslims in South Africa

According to historical evidence, Muslims first arrived in South Africa from three different directions and during three different periods. The first group, consisting of labourers, political exiles or prisoners and slaves, came from various parts of the East and arrived in South Africa either in the company of or shortly after the first colonists landed in the Cape in 1652. In the Cape, this community gradually started comprising a sub-group of the “coloured community” and is characterised by an essentially working or professional social class base. The second group of Muslims to arrive in South Africa came in 1860 and consisted of indentured labourers of Indian origin. The descendants of this group today mostly live in the northern provinces of Gauteng, North West, Mpumalanga, Northern and Kwa-Zulu Natal. A minority is located in the Cape, in areas such as Gatesville and Cravenby. The third group of Muslims consisted of 500 liberated slaves who were brought to Durban between 1873 and 1889 and settled there (Esack 1996: 7). Muslims in South Africa are divided into two groups. The majority of Muslims in the Western Cape and South Africa as a whole are Sunni Muslims (99 percent of Muslims in the Western Cape), while Shi’a Muslims make up only some one percent of the Muslim community in the Western Cape (Botha 2001: 39). This demographic factor may well explain why Qibla, which is an Islamic fundamentalist group based on the ideological principles of the Shi’ite Iranian revolution, has not garnered a large support base in South Africa. Instead, as several commentators argue, it was necessary for Qibla to infiltrate the less ideologically extreme PAGAD in order to increase its support base and thereby create a more effective instrument to realise its objectives.

\textsuperscript{23} In this section of the case study, the most central events and developments related to PAGAD’s activities and incidents of urban terrorism linked to the organisation in the Western Cape are pointed out to give a general background picture of the situation that characterised Cape Town and its surrounding areas at the height of PAGAD’s campaign. This chapter thus differs from the preceding case studies on Algeria and Sudan, as it does not deal with the key events of post-independence South African history as a whole (such a comparatively broad focus would be inadequate here), but only focuses on the period since the formation of PAGAD (while at the same time of course also taking into account historical factors, such as the history of the Muslim community in the Western Cape, who make up majority of PAGAD’s support base). Furthermore, as a result of this narrower focus, it is also possible to immediately include a more in-depth analysis of political, economic and social factors contributing to the rise of PAGAD and by implication its Islamic fundamentalist-inspired military wing (rather than deal with this issue in a separate section, as was done in the preceding chapters). A closer look is also taken at the ideologies of both Qibla and PAGAD, as well as, importantly, the measures the South African government has taken to bring the threat of urban terrorism under control.
It is important to note that despite only constituting 2.5 percent of South Africa’s population, Muslims nonetheless have a very important part to play in the country’s socio-economic and political affairs. Here follow a few examples: in 1996 more than ten percent of all members of Parliament and Cabinet were Muslims. In addition, among the many Muslims in influential positions have been Mandela’s legal advisor, autobiographer and political adviser, the head of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Committee, the secretary of the South African Police Services, the director general of the Constitutional Assembly, the deputy president of the Constitutional Court and the director general of the National Intelligence Service (Esack 1996: 7).

Overall, the Muslim population’s role in South African society has been overriding positive. As Muslims have been a part of the country for 340 years, they are generally not regarded as alien or foreign. In addition, their contribution to South Africa has been substantial in the fields of law, health, education and business (though in terms of the last sector, Muslims have been the object of resentment by many black people, particularly in the northern parts of the country). Also, Muslims in South Africa have seldom, if ever, used their privileged position in society to bring others “of their kind” into positions of power, nor has religion ever played a significant part in their political positions. The Muslim community then, while arguably being one of the most religious and traditional in the country, can certainly not be classified as fundamentalist. Importantly, however, and relevant to the existence of PAGAD and the vehement protests by the Muslim community at the arrests and detention of its members during the period marked by urban terrorism, is the fact that while many Muslims in South Africa do not strictly live according to the tenets of Islam, most are prepared to die for their religion (Esack 1996: 8).

An emergent South African Islamic discourse began in the 1950s, and was first formulated by teachers and professionals in the Western Cape. It derived its religious inspiration from modern movements in Pakistan and Egypt, and its South African political dimension from a variety of local political movements and trends. The religious dimension of this discourse empowered members of South Africa’s Muslim youth who sometimes challenged the religious leadership’s practices in relation to its complicity or silence when it came to the apartheid state, and sometimes, more conservatively, demanded a more rational organisation of Muslim society. As South African society approached the dawn of democracy in 1994, two broad political tendencies started to emerge among South Africa’s Muslim population. The first was represented by the Call of Islam (established in 1983) and the Muslim Youth Movement (established in 1970), both of whom joined
the larger democratic movement and were in favour of the new dispensation. The approach of these two groups, which could be described as nationalist, was linked to an intensive critique of traditional Islamic political thought, which they regarded as utopian, un-South African, and completely inadequate to address real social and political inequalities in South Africa. The second was represented by Qibla, an Islamic fundamentalist group established by Achmat Cassiem in 1980. Cassiem rejected the negotiated settlement between the former apartheid government and liberation movements, and instead called for Islamic unity and exclusivism, often employing the universal discourse of an Islamic state. Qibla’s calls for Muslim unity and a pure Islamic solution seemed increasingly attractive to members of South Africa’s Muslim population, as it soon became apparent that the new South Africa was facing immense socio-economic challenges. The Western Cape in particular faced the prospects of drastic cuts in education and health, and subsequently also faced rising levels of dissatisfaction among the coloured constituency, a substantial percentage of whom are Muslims (Tayob 1996: 24).

6.2.2 PAGAD and its initial anti-crime initiatives

PAGAD was formed in 1995, in response to popular dissatisfaction with the high crime rate in the Western Cape (and in the country as a whole) and the perceived inability on behalf of the government to address this disconcertingly large problem that has characterised South Africa in the post-1994 era. In 1996 the country’s crime record was labelled one of the worst in the world: 45 out of every 100 000 South Africans were murdered each year, eight times the international norm of 5.5 (Canada 2.0; New York City 26.5), a woman was raped every six seconds and nearly 200 armed robberies were committed on a daily basis. Tourists were hit regularly, and foreign investors were increasingly losing confidence (Erasmus 1996: 24). How has the government managed to cope with such alarming statistics? The answer is, not very well at all. In 2001, for instance, according to the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, the police opened 2.3 million criminal cases, of which only 562 821 were taken to court. Of the cases which made it to court, only 257 391 were prosecuted, from which only 202 000 convictions resulted. A total of 1 269 077 cases thus still remained unresolved. This lack of efficacy, as far as the South African criminal justice system is concerned, a belief that the law protects criminals instead of punishing them, lack of feedback on cases under investigation by the police, police corruption and inefficient delivery in the criminal justice system have thus resulted in many people turning to vigilantism, which is how PAGAD’s initially high levels of popularity can be explained (South African Press Association 2001).
PAGAD’s initial stated primary objective was to serve as a broad anti-crime front. Under its banner a variety of organisations and concerned citizens of a range of ideological, political and religious persuasions made it their aim to combat criminal gangs and drug dealers who had for many years posed a massive problem to the impoverished communities of the townships of the Cape Flats area on the outskirts of Cape Town (Botha 2001: 38). During the apartheid years, the government relocated the coloureds to what is known as the Cape Flats outside Cape Town. The resulting disruption of family life contributed to the rise of gangsterism, which originated from what was originally a form of community self-protection. While during the apartheid days, many gangs were broken up and their members detained by government forces, the introduction of political freedom in South Africa has meant the reorganisation of gangs with greater militance and their increasing involvement in murder, extortion, drug dealing and armed robbery. This has resulted in a situation where money and well-connected gang bosses preside over vast business empires (Hawthorne 2000: 31). Between 35 000 and 80 000 gang members are active in the Cape and make up the membership of 137 gangs. Effectively, rape, drug abuse, murder and crime are the daily experience of South Africans living in these townships (Haefele 1998: 10). A particular tendency that can be linked to the formation and rise of PAGAD is the fact that the consumption of drugs and involvement in the sale of drugs among young Muslims in the Western Cape (Muslims make up the overriding majority of PAGAD’s membership) has increased considerably over the last two decades. In fact, it is commonly accepted among the Muslim youth that while drinking alcohol is expressly forbidden according to Islamic practices, it is practically more acceptable to smoke marijuana (and from there on most likely to experiment with other drugs), which is perceived as the lesser of the two evils. The rise of drug consumption and abuse by young Muslims has thus probably meant an increased concern on behalf of parents and the more traditionally religious members of the Muslim population in the Western Cape (Pillay 2002: 62). Furthermore, PAGAD appealed to the Muslim middle class (to which many parents of drug-abusing young Muslims would belong), as it proposed to reverse the perceived moral decline that was said to be one of the root causes of much of the gang activity and crime plaguing the greater Cape Town area (Botha 2001: 38).

According to the PAGAD website, the early periods of its existence were exclusively dedicated to raising awareness about its aims and objectives, namely the fight against gangsterism and drugs in Cape Town. From 30 December 1995 to 30 April 1996, a series of awareness programmes, public meetings and placard demonstrations dealing with PAGAD’s anti-crime agenda took place. In addition, pamphlets were
distributed, candle light vigils and door-to-door conscientising took place, while panel discussions were held on Radio 786, Voice of the Cape, Bush Radio and Radio C-flat. On 6 March 1996 PAGAD organised a march to the then Minister of Justice Dullah Omar’s house, in order to request him to take harsher actions against gangsters and drug merchants. According to PAGAD, the reason for this was that previous consultations with the minister had ended inconclusively. In addition, PAGAD claimed that the media took two weeks to report the incident, and did so in a rather unbalanced way, implying that the march had taken place to threaten the minister and harm his family. The next crucial event that PAGAD engaged in was a mass march to Parliament to deliver a list of demands to all ministers. This list gave the government 60 days to respond to PAGAD’s demands and to show its willingness to rid the country of drugs and gangsterism. If no decisive action was taken, the people would have to take the law into their own hands. As there was no reaction from the government, PAGAD members started taking action themselves. This took the form of marches to the houses of drug merchants and gangsters, who would be given a 24-hour ultimatum to stop their illegal activities, or otherwise “face the mandate of the people”. A series of marches followed, including one to London Road, Salt River on 4 August 1996, which would signal the start of intense media coverage of PAGAD. According to PAGAD, upon arrival at Hard Livings gang leader Rashaad Staggie’s house to present an ultimatum, marchers were fired on from inside the house. As a result, ten PAGAD members obtained gun-shot injuries. Staggie himself unexpectedly appeared on the scene and was subsequently killed (PAGAD 1996). The story has been treated from a decidedly different angle by the South African press and other commentators. The Daily Mail and Guardian, for instance, in its “catalogue of Cape Town’s reign of terror” describes the event as Rashaad Staggie having been “lynched” during the demonstration “in the presence of police, media and emergency workers” (A catalogue of Cape Town’s reign of terror 2000). The incident was described in Maclean’s as follows, “in early August, 1500 supporters stormed through Cape Town streets, pulled notorious gang leader Rashaad Staggie from his car, threw a flaming Molotov cocktail into his lap and shot him dead” (Erasmus 1996: 24). It is thus evident that caution has to be exercised in the analysis of reports of events which involve or have involved PAGAD. While PAGAD apparently wants to defend itself and claim to be innocent of any acts of urban unrest or terrorism, the media might at times want to sensationalise an event. It can thus be rather difficult to establish a balanced account of the incidents that PAGAD has been implicated in.

According to PAGAD, the march to Staggie’s house was followed by closer co-operation between itself and the police, as justice minister Dullah Omar responded to the events of 4 August with the following
statement: “the tragedy of what happened in Salt River has suddenly mobilised the community and it can have good results. Suddenly communities and authorities including the police were sitting up and planning how to combat crime”. This tendency toward closer co-operation manifested itself in a meeting held on 10 August 1996 to discuss a mass rally which PAGAD had planned for 11 August. The result was the “formation of partnership between police and PAGAD”. The mass rally consequently took place at the Vygieskraal Stadium in Athlone and was attended by approximately 20 000 people, after which PAGAD continued to march to Hanover Park. However, (despite the apparent rapprochement between PAGAD and the police) a strong police presence characterised the march and teargas, birdshots and live ammunition were reportedly fired into the crowd. Simultaneously, PAGAD members were fired on by gangs who marched from Hanover Park towards PAGAD. The police, allegedly, did nothing to stop them. In total, seven PAGAD marchers as well as a press photographer were apparently injured and the police was consequently criticised by PAGAD for having opened fire “on peaceful marchers including women and children” (PAGAD 1996). Here it has to be pointed out, however, that according to Africa Research Bulletin, PAGAD leaders had agreed not to visibly display weapons during the rally. Later, however, members of the crowd did produce weapons and groups left the rally and continued to march to the homes of drug dealers. It was as a result of this unforeseen, and potentially dangerous, turn of events, and not simply because of hostility towards PAGAD as the organisation suggested in its report, that police and troops attempted to stop the PAGAD marchers by opening fire with tear gas and rubber bullets (South Africa: PAGAD 1996).

The rest of August 1996 was characterised by ongoing marches and demonstrations by PAGAD, and the delivery of ultimatums to the houses of various drug lords. Support figures apparently rose, until a split in the leadership of PAGAD took place on 20 September 1996. Ali Parker, until then one of the key leaders of PAGAD, reportedly released a press statement to the Cape Times in which he made the following allegations against PAGAD:

1. Qibla members within PAGAD were trying to assassinate him
2. Qibla was responsible for hijacking the PAGAD movement as they had a “hidden agenda”
3. Qibla members were guilty of blackmail and extortion of businessmen in order to raise funds
4. Qibla was trying to overthrow the government
5. Qibla members encouraged people to burn down mosques in order to “gain momentum for the cause”
This statement resulted in the suspension of Parker from the movement on 21 September 1996, a move that was reportedly the result of consultation with thousands of people present at a meeting held at the Gatesville Mosque. A few days later, approximately 7000-10 000 people marched onto parliament from the Muir Street Mosque in District Six, which PAGAD claimed was proof enough to show that the masses were not in favour of Parker’s “treacherous” statements. The split within PAGAD deepened, when on 29 September 1996 Ali Parker, Farouk Jaffer and Nadthmie Edries held a meeting at the Habibia Mosque. It was during this meeting that Parker alleged that PAGAD was under the control of Qibla, which reportedly was responsible for the militancy within PAGAD. No evidence of these allegations was provided. PAGAD pointed out the irony of the media’s sudden turn of attitude, including re-labelling Parker, who had earlier called for a holy war and suicide bombs, a moderate. In addition, a so-called “top-secret” document marked “Islamic militancy in South Africa” was made public. According to this document, which apparently made up the minutes of a cabinet committee meeting on security and intelligence affairs held on 15 August 1996, PAGAD itself, as an organisation with legitimate concerns should not be stigmatised; however, militant elements within PAGAD should be isolated. These included organisations such as Qibla and the Islamic Unity Convention – which, as is evident from the above, had recently been “identified” by Parker as having “hijacked” the PAGAD movement (PAGAD 1996).

Assuming that Qibla did infiltrate the PAGAD leadership (the likelihood of which is discussed in more detail below), it would appear that the organisation started grouping itself around two major ideological poles after the internal split had taken place in 1996. These constitute the militant Islam of Qibla, effectively underlining the strong anti-gangster, anti-drug stance manifest in PAGAD’s official objectives. Similarly, the militant strand of PAGAD, as represented in the G-Force, seems to embrace para-military style, cell-based operations, as well as urban guerrilla tactics, as possibly also manifest in the urban terrorist attacks in the Western Cape (Pillay 2002: 65). Botha (2001: 44) underlines this point by arguing that the radical faction coalesced under the leadership of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, who was in favour of confronting gang leaders in a violent manner, and even eliminating some of them. The more “democratic” strand, on the other hand, argued for PAGAD protests to operate within the state’s law, demonstrating displays of popular support through marches and mass gatherings (Pillay 2002: 65), and also advocated co-operation with the police in crime prevention functions, while rejecting militant strategies.
6.2.3 Urban terrorism – PAGAD involvement?

PAGAD’s initial focus on drug dealers from the Cape Flats was allegedly expanded later on to include government structures, clerics, security force personnel, restaurants and other business interests, as the organisation became increasingly more militant. Qibla’s take-over of PAGAD’s core leadership meant that calls for the establishment of an Islamic state were increasingly being introduced and also resulted in accusations that the South African society and government were immoral. The establishment of PAGAD’s security wing, the G-Force, later apparently propelled the organisation into the phenomenon which for several years was to plunge the Western Cape into a state of instability and unpredictability: urban terrorism. In 1998, 225 people died and 475 were wounded in 728 incidents involving pipe bombings, drive-by shootings and arson attacks in the Western Cape. Of these incidents, however, only 200 were linked to PAGAD; the remaining ones were attributed to gangsters. In 1999, the number of such attacks dropped to 371, as the focus progressively shifted to Cape Town’s police stations, restaurants, bars and gay venues. In 2000, this particular focus seemingly intensified, as incidents of urban terrorism targeted shopping centres, gay bars, the US Consulate, Cape Town International Airport and magistrates and policemen who were involved investigation of PAGAD-related court cases (Briefing on urban terror in the Western Cape: a PAGAD perspective 2000).

A chronology of the most prominent incidents of urban terrorism reads as follows. On 26 June 1998, a bomb exploded outside the Mowbray police station. No one was injured and no arrests took place. A few days later, on 6 August 1998, a building housing the police task team investigating PAGAD was bombed, killing a street vendor and injuring another. This was followed by another incident on 25 August 1998 in which two people were killed and at least 25 injured when a pipe bomb ripped through Planet Hollywood restaurant on Cape Town’s Waterfront. Although three PAGAD members were detained for questioning, they were all released. On 18 December 1998, a pipe bomb exploded outside the Wynberg synagogue during Chanukkah celebrations. No one was injured and no arrests were made (Shaw 2000: 6).

The government responded to this situation by amending the 1992 Criminal Law Second Amendment Act in January 1999. This amendment outlawed military or paramilitary actions by non-governmental groups, including PAGAD. It also prevented members of political or paramilitary organisations from publicly displaying weapons. The Department of Justice stipulated that members of any organisation would no longer
be allowed to carry weapons, plan campaigns of a military or paramilitary nature, train for operations or manufacture, construct or use any weapon, ammunition, explosive or explosive devices (Chandler 1999: 3).

Incidents of urban terrorism continued throughout 1999, starting on the first day of the year. Two people were injured when a pipe bomb hidden in a car parked in the parking lot at the Victoria & Albert Waterfront in Cape Town exploded. Later on that month, on 28 January 1999, at least 11 people were injured when a pipe bomb placed in a car outside the Woodstock police station exploded during lunch hour, just days before Operation Good Hope, the state’s latest anti-urban terrorism initiative, was to be launched. No arrests took place. On 30 January 1999, a woman was slightly injured when a pipe bomb placed in a car outside Woodstock police station detonated. No arrests were made. A few months later, on 9 May 1999, a pipe bomb placed in a car outside the Athlone police station exploded. No one was injured and no arrests were made. Later on in the year, on 6 November 1999, nine people were injured in a bomb blast at the gay Blah Bar in Green Point, central Cape Town. This was followed by another attack on 28 November 1999, when a bomb exploded at St Elmo’s Pizzeria in Camps Bay, injuring 48 people and triggering a strengthening of the anti-urban terrorism campaign, Operation Good Hope, which had previously been scaled down. On 24 December 1999, a bomb triggered remotely by a cell phone injured seven police officers at Green Point (Shaw 2000: 6). The St Elmo’s bomb blast came as a particularly nasty shock to police authorities who had been under the impression that they had managed to contain the urban terror threat to a considerable extent through the arrest and refusal of bail to key PAGAD members linked to bombings, drive-by shootings and the manufacture of pipe bombs. They were therefore starting to down-scale Operation Good Hope which was meant to stop functioning by mid-December 1999 (Merten 1999: 10).

It was also in 1999 that PAGAD and Qibla were placed on the US State Department’s list of emerging terrorist groupings, because it was believed by authorities in both South Africa and the United States that these two organisations may have been behind the Planet Hollywood bombing at the Victoria & Albert Waterfront in 1998, as stated in a US State Department report. The same report also stated that PAGAD was suspected of conducting 170 bombings and 18 other violent actions in 1998 alone. In reaction, PAGAD spokesperson Cassiem Parker lashed out at the US government, denying all allegations on the basis that these were “totally subjective and utterly untrue”. He also denied that PAGAD was involved in any terrorist attacks (Washington Correspondent and Staff Reporter 1999: 4).
Incidents of urban terrorism persisted throughout 2000. On 12 January 2000, a bomb attached to a motorcycle exploded outside the Wynberg magistrates court, injuring one person. A few months later, on 22 May 2000, police managed to deactivate a bomb outside a popular Sea Point restaurant, the New York Bagels and Sitdown. They were not equally successful shortly afterwards, however, as on 10 June 2000, three people were injured when a car bomb exploded outside the same restaurant. On 18 June 2000, a bomb placed inside a dustbin at Cape Town’s International Airport exploded. No one was injured. Less than a month later, on 11 August 2000, two people were injured when a bomb exploded outside the Constantia Village shopping centre in Cape Town. On 19 August 2000, one person was injured when a car bomb exploded outside the Bronx Nightclub in Green Point and on 29 August 2000, seven people were injured when a car bomb detonated in Adderly Street, central Cape Town during rush hour (Shaw 2000: 6). On 7 September 2000, Magistrate Piet Theron, one of the judicial officers presiding over urban terror related cases involving members of PAGAD, was fatally wounded outside his residence in Plumstead, in a drive-by shooting (Briefing on urban terror in the Western Cape: a PAGAD perspective 2000). On 8 September 2000, a car bomb exploded outside the OBZ café in Main Road, Observatory, a suburb close to central Cape Town. This was followed, a few days later, on 12 September 2000, by a bomb explosion in a tree outside a meeting hall, injuring seven and narrowly missing the Premier of the Western Cape, who was about to address a political meeting at the venue (Shaw 2000: 6). On 18 October 2000, a blast occurred outside the Something Fishy eatery in Kennilworth, injuring four people. The explosion took place near the offices of South Africa’s official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance. On 3 November 2000 a bomb was defused at the Keg and Swan pub in Bellville. This event was followed by the assassination, on 26 December 2000, of Yusuf and Fahiema Enous, who were enrolled in the witness protection programme. Both were key state witnesses in the trial of alleged PAGAD members, Faizel Waggie and Nazeem Davids, who had been charged with terrorism and attempted murder for placing an explosive device at the Keg and Swan pub in Bellville (Botha 2001: 57). During the period of urban terrorism discussed above, pipe bombs also exploded at the homes of University of Cape Town (UCT) academic Ebrahim Moosa and former Muslim Judicial Council president, Sheick Nazeem Mohammed. In addition, the homes of several businessmen were attacked. Among those killed were Adam Vinoos and his son Faizel, shot dead in two separate drive-by shootings, as well as Rafieq Parker, who was killed in the driveway of his home. A number of top city gang leaders were also killed in various drive-by shootings (Briefing on urban terror in the Western Cape: a PAGAD perspective 2000).
The urban terror incidents which took place in 1999 and 2000 were perceived by many as an outright attack on the state and caused the government to re-think the fast-tracking of new anti-terror legislation, in order to augment the powers of the Security Forces. Among other measures, this legislation would provide for the detention of suspects for longer than the 48 hours allowed by the Criminal Procedure Act; authorities would be allowed to stop and search both people and vehicles, and people suspected of withholding information relevant to terrorist acts, could be interrogated. To date, this legislation is still pending and has received criticism from various quarters, as the measures suggested are reminiscent of the anti-terror legislation employed during the apartheid era, which was and remains notorious for the human-rights abuses and maltreatment of “terrorism” suspects that it gave rise to. The criticism that has been levied against the proposed anti-terror legislation is discussed in more detail in the concluding chapter of the dissertation. Importantly, it has to be noted that there is no proof beyond doubt that PAGAD was solely responsible for the urban terror experienced in the Western Cape. There are, however, certain indications that implicate the group. So, for example, the contents of slogans shouted during trials of PAGAD members was anti-government and aimed at the judges and police investigators involved in these cases, for example, “one prosecutor, one bullet; one policeman, one bullet”. Court trials of PAGAD members were soon, if not simultaneously, followed by bomb explosions. Drive-by shootings and assassinations of police investigators and magistrates who handled PAGAD related investigations took place as well. Also, reportedly, numerous state witnesses in PAGAD trials, as well as police investigators, who investigated PAGAD members for their involvement in urban terror incidents, were intimidated and received death threats. In addition, PAGAD has not denounced the urban terror attacks that took place in the Western Cape between 1998 and 2001. A number of PAGAD members have been jailed, though not for bomb attacks, but instead for murder, attempted murder and the illegal possession of firearms or pipe bombs. Additional convictions have ranged from intimidating a policeman to illegally possessing firearms or pipe bombs. Controversy still surrounds the involvement of PAGAD members in the urban terror incidents, and simultaneously it must be borne in mind that some gangs in the Western Cape also have the capacity to make use of explosives and have in fact been responsible for bomb blasts in the past (Briefing on urban terror in the Western Cape: a PAGAD perspective 2000).

Four distinct operations were launched by security forces to counter the urban terrorism plaguing the Western Cape. The first was Operation Recoil, which was launched on 23 October 1997 in order to counter growing insecurity among the population of the Western Cape. The operational concept defining Operation
Recoil was based on an intelligence-driven factor, a high-density crime prevention factor, investigating task groups and co-ordination and visible force levels. The success of Operation Recoil lay in the latter’s principle of conducting visible high-density operations so as to flush out criminals at particular flashpoint areas. Furthermore, this strategy improved the SAPS’s ability to synchronise and focus high-density employment in flashpoint areas, on the basis of weekly crime pattern analyses. The result of the visible high density contingent of Operation Recoil was that by 22 January 1998, a total of 7 437 arrests had taken place (Boshoff 2001: 70-74).

Operation Saladin replaced Operation Recoil, as by early January 1998 it seemed that the specific focus of PAGAD had changed and that pipe bomb attacks and drive-by shootings aimed at the police, drug dealers and Muslim businessmen were on the increase. The state thus engaged in a more intelligence-driven operation, Operation Saladin, which was formed within Operation Recoil and was aimed at detecting and monitoring the perpetrators of acts of urban terrorism in both gangs and PAGAD. Operation Saladin was aimed at monitoring suspects and, once a movement indicating a possible attack was detected, to inform the Joint Operation Centre (JOC) in Cape Town, which in turn would, as soon as possible, send forces to the area concerned. There was also a quick reaction force, which would be directed to intercept suspected potential perpetrators before they reached their target or, if this was not possible, to do so once the perpetrators returned from their target. In addition, the “high-density” element of Operation Recoil was made use of in order to act as an additional deterrent to would-be perpetrators to frustrate them, to hamper their access to intended targets and thus to also deny them the opportunity of going about their illegal activity unhindered. The successes of Operation Saladin lay in the latter’s role as a deterrent to prevent acts of urban terrorism and gang-related violence, and also led to the arrest of people involved in acts of terrorism (Boshoff 2001: 74-76).

Between December 1998 and January 1999 the nature of the threat of urban terrorism changed in emphasis and target, however. PAGAD spokespersons started making threats against members of both the intelligence and security forces, and an increasing number of attacks were increasingly aimed at the security forces and at businesses – the pipe bomb attacks at the Cape Town police station and the Victoria & Albert Waterfront are two cases in point. An initiative with a different focus was thus required: Operation Good Hope. This operation required an immediate increase in security force levels, which ultimately included more than 1200 members. It contained an intelligence-driven aspect, aimed at focusing on both tactical intelligence and
gathering, but also included an investigative aspect, focusing on urban terrorism, actions resulting from crowd management and other cases, regarding identified suspects. Protection tasks for political and other targets were also organised by the national and provincial protection services. Reportedly, this strategy, in place from January 1999 to January 2000, resulted in a major decline of acts of urban terrorism in the Western Cape, as well as numerous arrests of individuals involved in such acts. PAGAD-related incidents were at a low number of 22, with fifteen arrests having taken place. The success in Operation Good Hope thus mostly lay in the integrated approach, combining intelligence and investigation (Boshoff 2001: 76-80).

Operation Crackdown followed Operation Good Hope and, like the latter, adopted the concept of multidisciplinary interventions. Crackdown’s operational concept was based on a two-pronged approach, on the one hand a serious and violent crime/geographical approach, focused on geographical “hot spots”, clustered into crime combating zones; and on the other an organised crime approach, focused on the identification of syndicates who had the highest impact on organised crime. In high crime areas, multidisciplinary interventions would take place to ensure that the social sector would concentrate its socio-economic development and crime prevention efforts in the same areas as the security forces. Operation Crackdown, like its predecessors, also achieved noticeable successes (Boshoff 2001: 80-82). Nonetheless, despite these reportedly substantial successes, it has to be remembered that most of these operations only contained the urban terrorist threat for a short time, until the focus of the threats changed and adaptations had to be made to the different strategies. In terms of Operation Good Hope for instance, a number of high profile bombings in Cape Town at the end of 1999 revealed the strategy’s prime weakness: it was unable to identify and effectively destroy the groups or cells responsible for these acts of terror (Schontech 2001: 143). In addition, a particularly serious problem faced by those engaged in the fight against urban terrorism was the fact that under South Africa’s very liberal Constitution it is required that those who come forward as witnesses have to submit sworn statements in order to ensure that the transparency and accountability of the legal system are upheld. As the urban terror campaign worked on the basis of intimidation, however, those witnesses willing to testify in court, inevitably placed themselves and their families in grave danger. In addition, the witness protection programme left much to be desired and did not provide adequate protection to people (Ensor 1999: 2). Also, such operations do not address the core basis of the problem which in essence necessitates substantial socio-economic development and education initiatives in order to counter the threat of gangsterism and drug-related crimes.
Despite the shortcomings of the government’s anti-urban terror initiatives, these have nonetheless largely managed to bring the threat of urban-terror attacks under control, mostly, it would seem, as a result of the arrests and prosecutions of a number of leading PAGAD G-force members. A low-point for PAGAD was the harshest prison sentence yet handed down in a South African urban terror case, when the Cape High Court sentenced PAGAD member Mansoor Leggett to 11 life terms, plus ten years for each of seven attempted murders in March 2001. Leggett was convicted of carrying out a series of murders over a period of five months in 1999 and, incidentally, all those murdered were either suspected drug users or dealers or members of Cape Town gangs. What is important to note here is that despite the large number of charges against PAGAD members, the authorities have succeeded in securing only a small number of actual convictions. This has been due to the fact that key witnesses have either been murdered or forced to stay silent, and many potential witnesses have gone into hiding to avoid being subpoenaed. Prosecutors argue that their ability to prove cases against PAGAD members is limited by the public’s fear of testifying against them. Also, several witnesses or members of their families have been shot dead in the past few years. Nor, as has already been mentioned, have the police been able to concretely prove that PAGAD has been solely responsible for the bombings. In the case against Leggett, for example, the conviction was based solely on ballistics and forensic evidence, as, according to the State prosecutor, Helen Booyens, “witnesses simply failed to appear in court.” Other lengthy sentences that have been handed down as far as PAGAD members are concerned, were those of PAGAD member Dawood Osman, who was sentenced to 32 years, and Ismail Edwards, who received a 25 year sentence (South African PAGAD vigilante sentenced to 11 life terms 2001).

Mogamat Isaacs was given jail terms adding up to 180 years for three murders and related offenses on 21 October 2002, after having escaped from custody on 19 September and having been re-arrested in an incident involving shooting. The police had to intervene using pepper spray in order to quell outraged PAGAD supporters, who were yelling slogans and religious chants, outside the Cape High Court where the case was being heard. Isaacs was convicted of three counts of murder and eight of attempted murder in connection with an attack on a group of people at a braai in Hanover Park on 12 June 1999. The state alleged that Isaacs and fellow PAGAD members Faizel Samsodien, Abubakar Jacobs and Gamiedoel Abrahams had opened fire on the group, apparently in revenge for the murder of Isaac’s brother-in-law, Reza Heuwel, son of the leader of PAGAD’s Tafelsig G-force cell, Abdul Heuwel (Schroeder 2002). Other PAGAD trials that received substantial media coverage were those of Ebrahim Jeneker and Abdullah Maansdorp, both of whom were found guilty in the Cape High Court of multiple charges of murder, robbery and the illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition on 17 December 2002. Jenekker was found guilty on 17 of the 52 charges that remained against him, after he had been acquitted of 77 other charges at a previous hearing. The 17 charges included three murder counts, one of attempted murder, five of armed robbery, seven of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, and one for pointing a firearm. Maansdorp, who had been cleared of 126 other charges at a previous hearing, was found guilty on 18 counts, including three of murder, one of attempted murder, six of armed robbery, three of kidnapping, four of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and one of pointing a firearm (Kemp 2002). In October 2002 it was reported that 45 PAGAD members were in jail, while 15 had been killed since 1996 (Rise and fall of PAGAD 2002).

To date, it is generally accepted that the threat once posed by PAGAD has been largely “contained”, as most of the leadership is currently behind bars on cases relating to the spate of bombings and murders in the Western Cape since 1997. Nonetheless, the organisation reportedly, according to South Africa’s national intelligence, continues to be divided between those who want to continue the terror campaign as their objectives have not been met, and those who are in favour of negotiating an amnesty with the government (Michaels 2003: 4). PAGAD, as usual, continues to deny that it was involved in a “terror campaign” at any point in its existence. Rather, its spokesperson, Cassiem Parker, has stated that the government’s attitude towards PAGAD and its hindering of PAGAD’s initiatives to fight gangsterism and drugs, shows how little the government is interested in addressing the country’s crime situation (Smith 2003: 4).

It now becomes important to look at the ideologies of both Qibla and PAGAD, in order to determine the reasoning that informs the existence of the respective organisations and, importantly, again assuming that PAGAD’s leadership has been infiltrated by Qibla, the reasoning that may lie behind the urban terror attacks that PAGAD’s G-force has been implicated in.

6.3 THE IDEOLOGY OF QIBLA

Qibla emerged in South Africa in the 1980s as a militant pro-Shi’ite fundamentalist force, which took its inspiration from the 1979 Iranian revolution. Its creation was aimed at promoting the aims and ideals of the Iranian revolution in South Africa, and, furthermore, at propagating, defending and implementing the strict Islamic principles associated with said revolution among South African Muslims, thereby transforming the country into a fully-fledged Muslim state (theocracy) under the slogan, “One Solution, Islamic Revolution”.
During the apartheid struggle, Qibla simultaneously lent its support to the black consciousness movement in South Africa, in particular Pan Africanism, and the notion of an Islamic revolution in the country. Qibla’s close relationship with the PAC and Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) continued throughout the 1990s. Though the objectives of Qibla are not clearly spelled out, due to a lack of information, it can be assumed that the organisation’s ultimate goal is the possibility of launching an Islamic revolution in South Africa. Much speculation exists about the extent of Qibla’s involvement in PAGAD. Although both the Islamic Unity Convention (IUC) (Cassiem played an instrumental role in its establishment in the mid-1990s) and Qibla have repeatedly distanced themselves from PAGAD, there are many in the Muslim community who are of the opinion that PAGAD is fully under the control of Qibla. According to one commentator, “Whatever Cassiem’s involvement with PAGAD, he remains – as the South African originator of a radical agenda based upon a revolutionary reading of the Quran – the movement’s ideological father” (Botha 2001: 40-41).

Qibla’s members are generally perceived as outspoken supporters of the Islamic jihad and the movement is able to capitalise on issues such as South Africa’s abnormally high crime rate and the government’s apparent inability to deal with this as legitimate reasons for its militant actions in favour of Islamic laws and values. Qibla furthermore sees itself as the true protector of orthodox Islamic values in a decaying Western orientated society and world. Muslims, according to Qibla, owe it to their faith to oppose any corrupt and inefficient state. In the long term, the movement aims to assist pro-Islamic fundamentalist countries in the Middle East, such as Libya and Iran, in the establishment of an Islamic (theocratic) Republic in South Africa. This aim is based on the notion that Western capitalism cannot be reformed or improved, which therefore means that it must be totally destroyed so as to ensure an improvement in the position of the “dispossessed masses”. This, in Qibla’s view, necessitates a replacement of capitalism with a policy of nationalisation without compensation, an idea which is also supported by South Africa national-socialist organisations such as the PAC, AZAPO and others that form part of the Pan-Africanist, Black Consciousness and Black Power movements. In terms of socialist principles then, the “dispossessed masses” represent the only true vehicle for the complete destruction of capitalism and consequently the introduction of an egalitarian state ruled according to the principles and the laws of the Sharia (Le Roux 1997: 55). It is interesting to note how Qibla has merged Islamic fundamentalist rhetoric with the socialist ideology, dating back from Cold War times, propounded by movements such the PAC. The idea of redistributing the country’s wealth among its citizens and thereby establishing an egalitarian state that will be able to destroy...
the unjust and unbalanced legacy of capitalism seems idealistic, as well as unrealistic for several reasons. Firstly, national-socialist ideology has been largely discredited in the post-Cold War era, especially as far as a policy of “nationalisation without compensation” is concerned, which, in the South African context especially, is highly unfeasible, taking into account the painful legacy of highly unequal land distribution. Secondly, again in the South African context, it is unrealistic to talk of the possibility of the establishment of an Islamic state, especially as only 2.5 percent of the population is Muslim and as most of these reject Islamic fundamentalist rhetoric.

Because of its affiliations with the political left in South Africa, Qibla rejects the ANC-led government as it believes the latter to be committed to the “transformation” rather than the perceived necessary “destruction” of apartheid and the “redistribution” of land and wealth. Qibla believes that South Africa’s new dispensation will eventually lead to an economic policy that will be under the exclusive control of the West and its white capitalist interests. An additional argument is that although the government has in the short term managed to create the positive idea of having “liberated” the country, its close association with the capitalist West will in the long run lead to the impoverishment of the masses (Le Roux 1997: 55). Qibla thus seems to be characterised by a decidedly anti-Western rhetoric, which also suggests an element of insecurity and fear at the thought of being a marginalised minority in a country largely open and responsive to Western values and ideas.

Since PAGAD’s establishment in 1995, there have been numerous allegations by the media and members of the Cape Muslim Community that Qibla has infiltrated PAGAD and is using it as a vanguard organisation for mobilising its objectives (Botha 2001: 40). In fact, PAGAD’s formation in 1995 has been directly linked to Qibla’s inability to develop into a mass organisation in order to promote the Islamic fundamentalist values it represents, a problem that was partially aggravated by Qibla leader Achmad Cassiem’s lengthy imprisonment of 11 years on Robben Island and continued subsequent restriction of a further 11 years. Since his release from prison, however, Cassiem has made every effort to form a mass organisation representing the ideals of the Iranian Revolution, an aim which has arguably largely been facilitated by the formation of the IUC in 1994 and PAGAD in 1995. It is thus believed by many, despite Qibla’s persistent denial of any ties with PAGAD, that the latter is the military arm of the IUC and that it has the predominant aim of mobilising support by means of displaying Islamic principles and protecting ordinary citizens. According to this presumption, it could thus be argued that due to the government’s inability to effectively deal with South
Africa’s escalating crime situation, both Qibla and the IUC have found a very legitimate reason around which to mobilise support for their Islamic fundamentalist cause, under the guise of PAGAD’s fight against gangsterism and drugs (Le Roux 1997: 61).

As has already been argued, however, the above rests on speculation rather than concrete proof and Qibla has continuously denied any involvement with PAGAD. In addition, the secretive nature of Qibla’s organisation and its related reluctance to diverge details about its structure and membership, makes it extremely difficult to establish the truth behind any such claims (Botha 2001: 40). At the height of the urban terrorist campaign in February 1999, Qibla leader Achmad Cassiem once again distanced himself from PAGAD, stating that his organisation was not in favour of “isolated bombings and incidents of violence” that did not “involve the masses of the people”. Instead, he propagated something akin to a revolutionary armed struggle, such as the Iranian revolution against the Shah which ushered Ayatollah Khomeini into power. He also said that Qibla had publicly condemned many bombings that had taken part over the years and that such condemnations logically included condemnations of terrorism, of whatever nature. Again, he distanced himself from PAGAD, saying that Qibla dealt with the root causes of the problem (presumably that of crime), while PAGAD merely dealt with its symptoms. He did, however, concede that PAGAD’s anti-drug and anti-gangster agenda formed part and parcel of Qibla’s ideal notion of a society where alcohol and drugs have no place (Mgxashe 1999: 1).

Qibla’s decisively Islamic fundamentalist ideology, coupled with its preference for national-socialist ideas could thus be behind the actions of the militant PAGAD faction that reportedly was formed as a result of the split that took place within the PAGAD leadership. This could partially help explain the targeting of state structures and businesses that exude “Westernisation” and “capitalism”, such as Planet Hollywood. It now becomes important to look at PAGAD’s ideology in order to determine how this differs from the Islamic fundamentalist ideology propounded by Qibla, and how, in this way, PAGAD leaders have continuously managed to deny any links with Cassiem’s movement and its rather more “radical” agenda.
6.4 THE IDEOLOGY OF PAGAD

The supposed covert and militant dimension of PAGAD is not necessarily evident in its general press releases and aims and objectives, which resound with morality and “doing the right thing”. The official PAGAD website states that PAGAD has the following aims and objectives:

1. To propagate the eradication of drugs and gangsterism from society.

2. To co-operate with, and to co-ordinate the activities of people and people’s organisations, who have similar aims and objectives.

3. To make every effort to invite, motivate or activate and to include those people and people’s organisations that are not yet part of the PAGAD campaign.

4. To raise funds to realise the foregoing aims.

These objectives are meant to contribute to PAGAD’s vision of bringing about “a just social order, devoid of the evils of gangsterism and drugs”, by means of “raising the consciousness of the people, mass mobilisations and mass action”. PAGAD’s mission statement underlines both its vision and its objectives and states that PAGAD is a “caring people’s movement, proceeding from a foundation of truth, unity, justice and fearlessness, with the ultimate aim of eradicating the evil scourge of gangsterism and drugs from society”, in accordance with “the Divine Will of the Creator”.

It is also interesting to note the reasoning behind the formation of PAGAD, which boils down to disillusionment with the fact that after almost a year in office (in 1995) the new “democratic government” had not yet addressed any of the issues that had won them the elections. What was particularly worrying was the sudden escalation in the level of crime after the new government was inaugurated, as well as the “inability of the police and justice systems to effectively deal with this increase in crime”. South Africa, in the post-apartheid era, had reportedly also become a house for international drug smuggling, which had resulted in communities living in a permanent state of fear. Simultaneously, as a result of increasing levels of police corruption, people no longer perceived the police as their protectors, but instead it became a well-
known fact that many policemen were on the pay rolls of gangsters and that gangsters were progressively playing a prominent role in the post-apartheid era, working as police informers. In addition, a definite level of mistrust prevailed, as the police force had retained many of the officers who had been high-ranking apartheid personnel and were thus associated with human rights violations committed under the apartheid regime. According to the PAGAD website, the initial strategy adopted was one of consultation with government and its various departments, which, when unsuccessful, became one of confrontation with the drug merchants and gangsters themselves. An education and drug rehabilitation programme was also put into action. Thus, PAGAD claims, its success can be attributed to the fact that the organisation consists of people who are committed to bringing about a new social order based on truth, justice and morality (PAGAD 1997a).

PAGAD’s primarily overt function therefore is that of an anti-crime structure which has the aim of combating and eradicating crime, gangsterism and drugs. As seen above, PAGAD classes its actions as the natural responses of citizens who daily experience the failure of the state to protect them, which after all is one of the state’s most basic, yet also most important prerogatives. In addition, a PAGAD founding member has argued that in contemporary South African society, a non-confrontational approach is simply no longer viable as those who have the mandate to confront gangsterism and drugs, simply do not satisfactorily fulfil their duties. PAGAD thus arose with an agenda that included both confrontation and force, the latter being equated with extreme pressure and therefore not necessarily being violent. From this resulted PAGAD’s two-pronged strategy to combat crime: confrontation directed at the government, and confrontation directed at those who perpetrate crime (Botha 2001: 46).

PAGAD has reportedly also engaged in some important and constructive socio-economic initiatives, such as, for example, its National Conference held in March 1997 that dealt with education in the Western Cape. According to the memorandum of this conference, particular attention should be paid to the need to provide children with counselling when it comes to sexual abuse, which, in turn, often goes hand-in-hand with the misuse of drugs or alcohol. Other issues which were addressed at the conference were the high levels of retrenchment of teachers, an action which apparently took place with very little consultation with the parties involved, the government’s refusal to grant free education to senior pupils and other general practical shortcomings faced by schools, such as a shortage of books and classrooms (PAGAD 1997b).
Another initiative which PAGAD has been involved in is a Drug Counselling Centre which was officially opened on 20 February 1999 and offers a drug rehabilitation programme (PAGAD 2000d).

PAGAD has furthermore categorically denied its involvement in the bombings in the Cape Town area, an accusation which is seen as “an attempt to discredit the PAGAD campaign”. This was especially PAGAD’s reaction to comments made by former president Mandela in his 1999 Address to Parliament, where he reportedly accused PAGAD of being involved in “a murderous offensive against ordinary citizens and law-enforcement agencies” and also said that PAGAD’s campaign had “assumed a form of terrorism”. PAGAD replied by stating that its campaign was aimed at ensuring the safety and security of all the citizens of the country, as well as ensuring effective government. PAGAD also stated that it was not, as the government accused it of being responsible for the fact that police resources were being used to fight its activities, rather than to combat criminals. While it was indeed true that the government was increasingly targeting PAGAD, it could be said at the same time that the government had never made the necessary effort to counter crime and gangsterism in South Africa. PAGAD also accused the government of being guilty of violating the constitutional rights of PAGAD members by means of interrogating and torturing them (PAGAD 1999). A related accusation against PAGAD has been that the organisation has been demanding protection money from businessmen, something which it also strongly refuted. Instead, PAGAD vehemently opposes such policies, stating that business people involved in drug trafficking or related activities have to make sure that whatever money they have acquired in this way must be ploughed back into the community to uplift the situation of innocent victims of drug abuse and drug addiction. These funds have to be used to ensure the rehabilitation of addicts, compensation to families who have suffered loss as a result of the social evil, and psychological treatment for those who have been emotionally affected. PAGAD has also stated that if any one of its members should illegally or unlawfully demand money from business people, this person would be exposed, as well as dealt with in an appropriate manner (PAGAD 1998).

PAGAD has furthermore repeatedly accused the government, and more specifically the police, of treating PAGAD members suspected or accused of terrorism unfairly. So, for example, Dawood Osman, who in December 1999 was sentenced to 32 years in prison, was moved from the Helderstroom Maximum Prison in Caledon to Pretoria Maximum Security Prison in the middle of the night while reportedly having been given false information in terms of being told that he was being transferred to Victor Verster Prison in Paarl. PAGAD alleges that he is being held in a “torturous and degrading inhumane manner” in Pretoria (PAGAD
2000a). Other PAGAD members have apparently also suffered in prisons, which has led some of them to go on hunger strikes to protest their situation. Reasons given are the overcrowding of police cells, public strip searches, being held in a confined space for 23 hours a day, overcrowding in trucks when being transported between prison and court, being allowed only one telephone call per week, and not being allowed any contact visits (PAGAD 2000b).

PAGAD’s ideology is thus based on a strongly moralistic anti-crime, anti-drug stance, aimed at fulfilling those functions in society which the government apparently has not been able to fulfil. It has furthermore become involved in a number of constructive initiatives, such as the drug rehabilitation centre, to address the problems which it has identified in South African society. There is thus little in PAGAD’s official rhetoric that is reminiscent of the Islamic fundamentalist ideology espoused by Qibla, which has made it possible for PAGAD to refute any accusations against it of involvement in urban terror attacks. Nonetheless, as has already been mentioned, there is some evidence that links PAGAD to a number of the attacks that have occurred in Cape Town, which, in turn, reinforces the probability of Qibla involvement in PAGAD’s leadership.

Throughout its existence PAGAD has adopted a dual strategy which on the one hand focuses on “overt” or largely legal activities, such as the drug rehabilitation centre or criticisms levied against the Western Cape education system, as mentioned above, but on the other hand also includes a series of “covert” activities which are both violent and illegal. The leadership of PAGAD, again as also mentioned before, categorically denies the involvement of PAGAD in violent actions against drug lords and gangsters, but, at the same time does not condemn “people within the organisation” who might resort to such attacks. In fact the PAGAD leadership has given people the go-ahead to engage in any kind of measures that “will get rid of crime ... If the people should decide to take the law into their own hands, we wish them the best of luck”. What evidence is there of PAGAD’s involvement? From 1996 onwards, numerous suspected drug dealers and members of gangs were given ultimatums by PAGAD, telling them to cease their illegal activities. When the ultimatums were not complied with, “follow-up” actions took place in the form of violent assaults and attacks on the homes and vehicles of such suspected drug dealers and gang members. Also, some of the victims of such attacks have identified their attackers as active PAGAD members. In addition, a number of explosions have been linked to PAGAD and it has also been established that the bombs which were located at the Blah Bar, St Elmo’s and Mano’s restaurants, as well as at the Wynberg magistrates’ court were all
detonated by means of the use of cellphones. Forensic tests also revealed that the bombs consisted of a combination of pipe and petrol bombs, bound together with cable ties. Shrapnel, consisting of triangular bits of metal and chopped-off nails, was also found at the scene of all these bombings. Furthermore, there have been bomb attacks at court appearances of several PAGAD members (Botha 2001: 58-60).

Islamic fundamentalists, presumably part of Qibla, have thus apparently used the issues of gangsterism and drugs to garner popular support for PAGAD and even if the government should eventually find ways to combat gangsterism and drugs, it is likely that these fundamentalists will continue to find other issues with which to bolster public support for their violent opposition to South Africa’s liberal-democratic order. PAGAD, despite its likely involvement in acts of urban terrorism and violence, nonetheless has a valid point in raising the issue of gangsterism and drugs, which poses a substantial problem in the poorer areas of greater Cape Town, fostering turf wars between rival gangs, assassinations, kidnappings, murders and general high levels of crime. It also needs to be pointed out here that gang violence is more responsible for instability in the Western Cape than PAGAD and that at the heart of this phenomenon lie large socio-economic problems (Botha 2001: 62-63). Thus, while the threat of urban terrorism has been contained for the moment, lasting solutions need to found in order to counter the crime problem which is detrimental not only to South African Muslims, but to the South African population as a whole. As long as the government appears not to be able to cope with the crucial challenge of making South Africa safer for the average citizen, the possibility of the re-emergence of vigilante groups who decide to take the law into their own hands, as the government does not present a viable law-enforcement alternative, is ever-present.

The dialogic model of interpretation is thus used in this chapter to attempt an open-minded, yet critical analysis of the respective ideologies of Qibla and PAGAD, the organization whose leadership the former has reportedly infiltrated to a large extent. In addition, structural (economic, political and social) factors are taken into account to, among other things, help explain the role of Islam in South Africa and, more specifically, the reasons for the formation of PAGAD. The precarious gangsterism and drugs situation in the Western Cape has been crucial to the initial enthusiasm and popular support for PAGAD before its apparent take-over by Qibla. Ultimately, then, it is necessary for the government to find lasting solutions both in terms of containing threats of urban terrorism, as well as in terms of addressing the immense socio-economic disparities characterising the South African population. It is only through education and socio-economic development that the roots of the crime problem can permanently be addressed, which would enable organisations such as PAGAD to focus more on the positive initiatives that have already been launched, such
as drug rehabilitation. As far as urban terrorism and relatively isolated Muslim extremists are concerned, a number of initiatives can be put in place to effectively continue controlling the situation. These are dealt with in more detail in the dissertation’s concluding chapter.

6.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER SIX

PAGAD was initially formed in reaction to the high crime rate in South Africa and the police and government’s inability to effectively combat this destabilising problem. Its initial actions included marches to the offices of government officials, as well as to the houses of well-known and notorious drug lords. PAGAD members demanded that gangsters stop their activities and said that if they failed to do so they would face the wrath of the people. After the 1996 split within the PAGAD leadership, it was increasingly rumoured that PAGAD had split into a moderate and a more radical faction and that the latter was under the control of Qibla. This is an Islamic fundamentalist organisation which advocates a mixture of Islamic fundamentalist and socialist rhetoric and is decidedly opposed to the system of Western capitalism which it argues needs to be replaced by an egalitarian state ruled according to the principles of the Sharia.

PAGAD, whose official rhetoric show little or no resemblance to that of Qibla, the former being primarily concerned with its fight against crime, refused to admit any involvement in the spate of urban terrorist attacks that hit South Africa from 1996 to 2000. It is interesting to note, however, that bomb attacks often followed the trials of PAGAD members, that anti-government slogans were shouted by PAGAD members during trials of their compatriots and that a number of attacks were made on policemen involved in the handling of PAGAD cases. Whether or not PAGAD is to be held responsible for the incidents of urban terror that once shook the Cape is still only a matter of speculation. What is much more important is for the South African government to find ways in which to alleviate the socio-economic crises that characterise the Cape Flats area and to thereby effectively address the issues which PAGAD professes to make its business: gangsterism and drugs.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion it is possible to look at what has been learned from using the dialogic model of interpretation as a theoretical approach (with an additional evaluation of structural factors) to analyse the ideologies of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Algeria, Sudan and South Africa. What recommendations can be made with regard to each of the respective case studies which may be potentially useful for a future resolution of the conflicts in Algeria and Sudan, and, in the case of South Africa, may help ensure continuing stability as far as the threat of urban terrorism, is concerned?

From the analysis of structural factors, that has accompanied the dialogic model of interpretation throughout the discussion on Algeria, some significant observations regarding Algeria’s current situation can be made. The solutions thus far presented by the Bouteflika government have not managed to resolve the conflict in Algeria. Although, according to the government, the number of radical Islamic fundamentalists has been drastically reduced, (in 2003 it was announced that fewer than 1000 radical Islamic fundamentalists remained active) (Europa World Year Book 2003: 447), violence and unrest persist and there is the potential that the situation may become even more volatile in future. This may especially be argued when one takes into consideration the dire economic circumstances that every-day Algerians find themselves in, as elaborated on in Chapter four. Young men who have not had much of an education and have no prospects for employment find it so much more lucrative to engage in the profitable, but violence- and coercion-ridden parallel economy that forms an integral part of the Algerian conflict. Thus, although the AIS has largely been disbanded and in addition thousands of radical Islamic fundamentalists belonging to other groups have reportedly surrendered, this has not meant a sudden and complete end to the violent attacks by those radical Islamic fundamentalists who are still active. Simultaneously, and again as mentioned in Chapter four, the military and government elites also have an economic stake in the continuation of the conflict. There have also been strong signs of dissatisfaction with the government from other quarters, notably Algeria’s Berber population which has launched violent protests against its unfavourable treatment by the government.

The FIS thus has a point when it states in its 2002 political platform, which is dealt with in detail in Chapter four, that the Law of Civil Concord policy, which over a limited period granted amnesty to radical Islamic fundamentalists who were not guilty of serious war crimes, has not been [entirely] successful. Instead, the FIS states that abuses against its membership and leadership continue and that Algeria’s political, economic
and social crises have been aggravated (Front Islamique du Salut 2002: 3). This statement is justified in that the core problems underlying the Algerian conflict and the grievances of Algeria’s population, including Islamic fundamentalists, have not been addressed. The FIS has not been re-admitted politically, which would be a crucial reconciliatory gesture on behalf of the government, nor have multi-party negotiations which include all of Algeria’s pertinent political actors been organised.

President Bouteflika’s made a potentially significant comment before his re-election in April 2004. In an interview he stated,

I am a man of peace and the purpose of all my efforts is to bolster the Algerian people’s cohesion and urge the Algerians to end the antagonism and unite so as to revive the spirit of tolerance and concern for the nation’s supreme interest. This is the principle on which I based the policy [the Law of Civil Concord] so far and will continue it if the Algerian people renew their trust in me (Sulaymani 2004: 4).

If Bouteflika is to realise the aims expressed in this statement, it will be necessary for the Algerian government to engage in productive dialogue with the FIS, as well as other political actors. Although some negotiations with the FIS have taken place, which resulted in its leaders Madani and Belhadj being released from house arrest in 2003, this was done under the condition that neither be engaged in any political activity whatsoever. Belhadj consequently refused to sign the agreement stipulating these preconditions (La Voix des Opprimés 2003). This kind of “reconciliation” conducted by the Algerian government that continues to withhold basic rights such as that of political engagement or activity from its interlocutors is not a long-term solution to the Algerian crisis. It is bound to breed resentment not only among the leadership of the FIS, but also among its supporters lower down. In addition, ways have to be sought to bring those radical Islamic fundamentalist groups still involved in the conflict to the negotiation table. As pointed out already, this will by no means be easy as the GIA is adamantly opposed to any kind of reconciliation with the government and as its members benefit economically from the ongoing conflict. Nonetheless, if peace is to be returned to Algeria and if there is to be economic and political development, negotiations and co-operation are the only solution.

It is here where the dialogic model of interpretation, in its predominant role of a theoretical tool for the analysis of ideology, which has been employed in evaluating the FIS, proves to be useful. In its 2002 Political Platform the FIS makes a very relevant and important contribution in addressing some of the core
issues that underlie the Algerian conflict. As already discussed in Chapter four, the FIS’s first objective, to dismantle the system of military hierarchy, offers an important rectification to Algerian political life which for decades has been dominated by a military elite. Military officers have benefited from corruption and economic malpractices both before and during the current Algerian conflict. If the living conditions of Algerians are to be improved, a future politically more inclusive Algerian government would do well to restrict the military’s power. The FIS’s second objective which deals with the transfer of power to the people is also very important to a post-conflict dispensation in Algeria, as it seeks to restore basic political rights and liberties, such as the right to expression, movement and political association, to all Algerians. Such measures would be essential to restore the self-respect of Algerians as well as open up the political arena to parties of different political persuasions. The desired next step would be free and fair elections, of which the results would be upheld, regardless of the outcome. The FIS’s third objective is aimed at restoring truth, by means of the establishment of both human rights and economic commissions of enquiry to establish where abuses have been perpetrated. The restoration of justice is also envisaged, through the judicial pursuits, judgement and punishments of those responsible, on both the government and Islamic fundamentalist sides, for serious war and economic crimes. In addition, victims of the war are to be compensated and steps are to be taken to restore Algeria’s collective memory by means of declaring a national day and building monuments symbolising the national struggle for Islam, justice, dignity and human rights and paying witness to the atrocities suffered during the Algerian conflict. It is crucial that Algerians come to terms with their troubled and bloody past and that the thousands of families who suffered are compensated. It will of course be a very delicate matter not to posit “the defenders of Islam” against “the apostates”, which might easily cause sentiments of reconciliation to be replaced by resentment. A number of lessons could be learned from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission process in this regard.

The FIS in its 2002 Political Platform thus presents some realistic and highly important suggestions to be applied in a potential post-war scenario. Some criticisms can be levied as well, such as, for example, as already mentioned in Chapter four, the rather unrealistic notion of excavating and identifying tens of thousands bodies in order to give them a decent burial. This is one of the gruesome realities Algerians would have to accept and learn to deal with in more practical ways, by means of memorial services or by constructing monuments. In general though, the FIS’s suggestions here are sound.
The FIS also advocates the all-important factor of negotiations which are meant to pave the way for a transitional period and a government of national unity. This would be followed by a National Conference, whose members would be elected by the electorate and who would write a constitution in line with the principle of universal suffrage. This provisional government would consequently organise local and national elections (Front Islamique du Salut 2002: 22-25). The idea of a transitional government sounds feasible as this could provide a slow and thorough preparation for elections to take place. The FIS’s negotiation demands are fair and realistic; negotiations cannot go ahead without conditions of relative peace and cooperation having been established between the different groups.

The FIS then presents a set of crucially important points in its 2002 Political Platform, all of which the Bouteflika regime may do well to consider if peace is to be fully restored in Algeria and if economic and political development is to take place. The dialogic model of interpretation has however also served to underline some of the basic shortcomings in the FIS’s Political Programme of 1989 and consequent statements that have been made with regard to its attitude towards democracy and to what degree this would be present in an “Islamic state”. It is not sufficient for the FIS to present only a vague outline of the political and economic reforms it aims to implement. Merely pointing out what previous regimes have done or are still doing wrong is not sufficient. It is important that the Algerian state be built on solid democratic structures which ensure that people, specifically Algerian women, retain their individual rights. It is this notion, after all, which the FIS agreed to support when it signed the 1995 Rome Accords. Religion is and remains an integral part of Algerian society and any future dispensation would have to acknowledge and respect this and provide a significant role for Islam in its laws and functioning. How exactly this is to be done, of course remains a very problematic question. Reference can here be made to the Islamic modernists discussed in Chapter three, and their efforts to reconcile Islam with modernity and democracy.

To briefly recap, a modernist and pluralist Islamist approach accepts the near-universal values of democracy, human rights, pluralism and vibrant civil society as fully compatible with Islam and inherent in Islam’s own original multiculturalism. The problem so far has been the impossibility of these values to emerge in the Muslim world while the theological and power structures were in the hands of authoritarian regimes that interpreted Islamic law to their own benefit. This of course applies to successive Algerian governments and, to a certain extent, also to the FIS. The primary goal of Islamic modernists is to reinterpret texts to create a modern understanding of Islam compatible with most contemporary political values based on the importance
of advocating intellectual freedom (Fuller 2003: 54). Modernists then imaginatively bring together Islamic and Western ideas and have produced a reasonable and relevant reinterpretation of Islamic thought, characterised by cosmopolitan, liberal and realistic perspectives. They also believe that a tolerance for diversity and a willingness to adjust rapidly to a changing environment contributes to the emancipation of individual Muslims and to the progress of Muslim societies (Husain 1995: 110). A future Algerian government of national unity might do well in considering modernist Islamic thought in writing up a constitution and laws that reflect the spirit and tradition of Islam, but at the same time do not impose practices that may compromise individual liberties.

In the case of Sudan, an analysis of structural factors suggests enormous socio-economic difficulties for the country, whatever future political dispensation may be adopted in future. As discussed in Chapter five, these include poverty, urbanisation and unemployment, while at the same time the economy is characterised by a macroeconomic imbalance that is for example reflected in high rates of inflation, excessive balance of payments deficits and a heavy debt burden. These immense problems have of course been aggravated by the long and bloody Sudanese civil war, as well as the recent catastrophe in Darfur, both of which have meant the destruction of property and resources, malnourishment, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese people. The government’s policies of displacing communities in order to secure areas for oil exploration in Sudan’s southern regions, and its policy of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement in Darfur have also served to exacerbate the situation. It is thus important to realise that any attempt to create a political set-up in Sudan which has a chance of being stable and lasting, requires that the country’s severe humanitarian crisis be addressed and that mechanisms are created to ensure the recovery and development of regions such as Darfur, which have suffered severely adverse effects as a result of sustained conflict. Socio-economic underdevelopment as a result of the government’s neglect of the Darfur region was after all one of the reasons why the rebel groups began attacking government targets in the first place. If, as is stated in the Machakos Protocol, the southern regions of Sudan are given autonomy during the six year interim period before the referendum on the question of self-determination is to take place, it is of course also crucial that the national wealth, for instance the country’s substantial oil revenues, should be divided so as to enable the leadership of the south to launch and carry through much-needed development projects.

In terms of the Machakos Protocol, various shortcomings have already been pointed out in Chapter five. To briefly summarise, these include the fact that no definite agreement has yet been reached on the crucial issue
of separating the state from religion, as is particularly evident in terms of the thorny question of the future of Khartoum. Another problematic issue is that of wealth sharing, which, as has been argued, is fundamental in enabling the socio-economic development and autonomous political functioning of Sudan’s southern states during the six year interim period before the referendum on the question of self-determination for the south is to take place. As has been pointed out, the government suspects the SPLM/A’s argument that the land in the south belongs to the respective communities there, which should hence have a say in determining its future, as being an attempt to undermine its access to most of Sudan’s strategic resources which happen to be located in the south. Similarly, in terms of the issue of self-determination, the government suspects the SPLM/A of wanting to break-away from the rest of the country in order to deny the ruling elite control over natural resources, including oil. There is also the question of the kind of political system that is to be followed in north and south Sudan respectively during the interim period. It has been accepted that northern Sudan will retain its Islamic character, while the south will remain secular. While this appears to be a realistic compromise, it may be much more difficult to implement in practice. Related issues are those of what law is to be applied to southerners living in the north and whether it is in fact feasible to create parallel legal systems for minorities living in the north and south respectively. When it comes to power-sharing, significant differences also remain. These pertain to what role the SPLM/A will have as part of the executive and judicial arms of state, and what the composition of parliament should be in terms of the representation of the south and the north. Another crucial issue is that pertaining to Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and the Southern Blue Nile areas. Thus, the real challenges lie not only in resolving tangible and negotiable issues, such as power- and wealth sharing, but also intangible ones which are rooted in the more abstract and interpretative dynamics of history, psychology, culture, values and identity. The resolution of the conflict thus depends on whether and how the tangible and intangible factors can be reconciled.

In terms of the situation in Darfur, various problems persist in hampering the resolution of the conflict there. The rebels have so far refused to sign an accord on greater access for aid agencies, saying the pro-government militias must disarm first. Despite the UN resolution that was passed on 18 September 2004, which calls for Secretary General Kofi Annan to set up a commission to investigate whether the events in Darfur amount to genocide, and which threatens to take measures against Sudan’s oil industry if the government fails to fulfil its pledge of disarming pro-government militias, which the Sudanese government has grudgingly agreed to, the situation in Darfur remains highly unstable. Though the Sudanese government has responded to international pressure to end the violence by sending in thousands of extra police officers to
Darfur, and calls have been made by African Union (AU) president Obasanjo for funding to enlarge the AU’s mediation force in Darfur, people are still subject to attacks, which they blame on the Janjaweed.

This is where the dialogic model of interpretation, which has been used to analyse some ideological formulations associated with the Sudanese regime, is useful when evaluating possible future policies for durable conflict resolution in Sudan. In terms of governing Sudan during the six year interim period before the referendum on self-determination for the south takes place, it is crucial to satisfactorily resolve those issues which remain as crucial to the future of a peaceful Sudan, as they are problematic. The first is that of the relationship between religion and the state, where some form of consensus has been reached in the Machakos Protocol. To avoid further disagreement between the parties, no direct reference is made to the exact status that religion has in Sudan, though protection of basic religious freedoms and diversity is guaranteed. Such guarantees are also present in Article 24 of Sudan’s 1998 Constitution, where it is stated that everyone has the right to disseminate and manifest their religious belief in a number of ways provided that these coincide with the law and do not harm the public order or others’ feelings. Simultaneously, no one is to be coerced to profess a faith or believe or perform rituals or a certain kind of worship that he or she does not voluntarily accept (Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 1998). These guarantees are crucial in Sudan’s future political dispensation, especially in a situation where, as expected, the north is to remain under Islamic rule, and the question of whether Sharia law is to be applied to the non-Muslims living there remains unresolved. The same could be seen to apply to Muslims who in the future could be living under autonomous rule in the south. A mechanism therefore has to be found whereby minority groups will be guaranteed of the freedoms stipulated in the Constitution and will no longer, as in the past, continue to be subjected to the imposition of one particular religion. Similarly, it could be argued that Muslims too should be ensured of a respect for their individual rights under the Sharia. This presupposes that the Sharia, as Turabi suggests, should imaginatively be adapted to modern circumstances in order to enable Muslims to cope with modernity, and also to ensure a respect for and adherence to the near-universal values of democracy, human rights, pluralism and vibrant civil society as fully compatible with Islam. This reflects the view of Islamic modernists. Turabi’s ideology in several respects conforms to that of Islamic modernists who bring together Islamic and Western ideas and have produced a reasonable and relevant reinterpretation of Islamic thought, characterised by cosmopolitan, liberal and realistic perspectives. They also believe that a tolerance for diversity and a willingness to adjust rapidly to a changing environment contributes to the emancipation of individual Muslims and to the progress of Muslim societies (Husain 1995: 110).
It is also important that the remaining problematic issues which form part of the dispute surrounding the Machakos Protocol be resolved. Reference has already been made to the imperative of coming to a conclusive agreement regarding the necessity of wealth-sharing in order to secure sufficient resources for the south to make up for the underdevelopment that it has been characterised with as a result of the war. The socio-economic development of Sudan’s southern regions is crucial for their future, whether they form part of a united Sudan in future, or whether they will eventually become an independent state. Such development would do well to reflect the provisions made in the Constitution, which includes Article 8’s statement that it is essential to provide for the well-being of the Sudanese by means of providing work, promoting a free-market system in order to prevent monopoly, usury, cheating and also to ensure national self-sufficiency, abundance, blessing and establish justice among Sudan’s various states and regions. Similarly, Article 11 advocates justice and social solidarity in order to provide the highest standard of living for everybody and also to ensure a fair distribution of national income. Social issues are dealt with in Articles 12, 14 and 15 which focus on education and the promotion of scientific research and co-operation, as well as the care of children and the youth, and the family and women respectively.

This leads to another important question that has to be addressed, namely whether or not the government and SPLM/A will work towards national unity during the interim period. Yoh (2001: 31) argues that there is a definite need to develop a consensus regarding a foundation upon which national unity could be achieved or maintained. This would also reflect the Constitution’s call for national unity and particularly Article 6 which states that the “state and society shall work together to foster the spirit of reconciliation and national unity among all Sudanese people, to guard against religious parties, political sectarianism and to eliminate ethnic prejudice”. Should the parties be striving for national unity, the concept of a confederation may prove to be a viable form of state, as it may be able to reconcile the problematic relationship between the government’s demands for an Islamic state and those of the SPLM/A for a secular state, while allowing Sudan to remain a single international legal entity. While the south would be allowed to take full control of its security, the oil revenue would be shared equitably between the north and the south. In terms of power-sharing, mechanisms have to be established in order to ensure that during the interim period and afterward, power is distributed in such a way so as to avoid the domination of Sudan by one particular group, which in the past has been the northern elite. This is of particular importance to respect the autonomous position of the south and in order to prepare its leaders to effectively address the southern regions’ massive social and economic problems in a
post-interim set-up. Finally, as has already been discussed in more detail in Chapter five, a consensus has to be found regarding the Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile regions which are particularly prone to become flashpoints of violent confrontations between opposing groups of Arabs and southerners. As Nantulya (2003: 14) argues, though the mediators have managed to bring the peace talks far enough so as to ensure the signing of a peace agreement, “the daunting challenge of confronting the deeper issues, and reformulating a new and flexible formula for nation-building and national cultural accommodation will remain”.

In terms of the crisis in Darfur, a number of recommendations have been made by Human Rights Watch, regarding a permanent resolution to the crisis. It recommends that the government of Sudan should immediately instruct its armed forces and government-supported Janjaweed militias to cease their campaign of ethnic cleansing and attacks on civilians and civilian property in Darfur. These groups should also be disarmed, disbanded and removed from those parts of Sudan which they have occupied from 2003 to the present. In order to restore some measure of justice, prompt, impartial and independent investigations should be launched to investigate the crimes perpetrated by the Sudanese government forces and the Janjaweed militia. Alleged perpetrators should be prosecuted and brought to trial in accordance with international fair trial standards, and reparations should be provided for the victims of such abuses, including the recovery and return of looted property (Darfur destroyed: ethnic cleansing by government and militia forces in western Sudan 2004: 3). To date the government has apparently ceased its campaign of ethnic cleansing.

Nonetheless, the inhabitants of Darfur still live in fear as attacks by Janjaweed militias, now having been given uniforms in order to legalise their status, continue. Similarly, inhabitants reportedly find it close to impossible to return to their villages, as these are guarded and even have been taken over by the Janjaweed. It is important that the perpetrators of human rights abuses be brought to justice and that the people of Darfur should receive some form of compensation for the suffering in terms of loss of lives and property, not to mention the physical and emotional trauma that they have endured. Human Rights Watch also recommends that the government of Sudan and the opposition SLM/A and JEM should facilitate full, safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel and the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need in Darfur. Furthermore, people should be allowed to return to their homes in safety and dignity, and finally, a UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission and an international Commission of Experts should be set up to investigate and reach conclusions regarding crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law that have been committed by the parties involved in the conflict in Darfur in
2003-2004. A Ceasefire Commission should also be set up to by the AU which is to ensure that all violations of the ceasefire agreement are periodically publicly reported, including parties’ compliance with international law. It should be up to UN member states to contribute personnel, equipment, other resources and funding to the AU ceasefire monitoring mission, to contribute to the economic and social reconstruction of Darfur and to support international humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring and investigations in Darfur. A crucial part should also be played by UN humanitarian agencies and humanitarian nongovernmental organisations in order to promote the protection of civilians while being responsible for the distribution of humanitarian assistance. It is also important that aid distribution should be spread out rather than concentrated in only a few areas (Darfur destroyed: ethnic cleansing by government and militia forces in western Sudan 2004: 4). These then are some of the steps that need to be taken in order to deal with the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. Long-term actions need to supplement these emergency measures and would include addressing the grievances of the rebel groups that led to the outbreak of the conflict in the first place. Notably, it is necessary to ensure that socio-economic development takes place and that the region’s political representatives be included in national government so as to have a say when it comes to the administration of Darfur. This issue thus adds an additional burden to the already challenging situation of finding a lasting solution to the north-south conflict and ensuring the effective functioning of administrative organs during the interim period.

In terms of South Africa, as has already been mentioned in Chapter six, an analysis of structural factors demonstrates that the country is suffering from an extraordinarily high crime rate which has caused members of the Cape Muslim community, and more specifically PAGAD, to start taking the law into their own hands. While it is very important for the government to engage in socio-economic development initiatives to combat the root causes of vigilantism and the possibly related phenomenon of urban terrorism, the threat of the latter remains for the moment. Therefore, it is important that the South African government improve its capacity to deal with the threat of urban terrorism, should there be a re-emergence thereof in the future. This is particularly the case as initiatives such as Operation Good Hope were characterised by a variety of shortcomings, including the lack of capacity to ensure the protection of witnesses or legal and police personnel involved in PAGAD trials and their families. People will only come forward with what they know about a particular criminal case, if they know that they can trust the police and that their safety and that of their family is ensured.
Lasting solutions to combat the urban terrorism associated with PAGAD can thus only be achieved through an increased level of trust between local communities, who suffer at the hands of criminals, and the police. Some short to medium-term solutions could include an improved service delivery by the police and courts to the communities they serve, which would mean providing professional assistance to complainants and also giving feedback in terms of the progress that has been made regarding complaints. It would also be constructive for the police to engage with the community in ways other than making arrests, such as, for instance, providing information on how the system functions and where and how communities would be able to constructively engage with it. A shorter court processing time could demonstrate to communities that arrests do yield results, be they acquittals, suspensions or convictions. The inclusion of local government in efforts to ensure that proper services and infrastructure are in place could also yield benefits in terms of greater community trust in the government. Simultaneously, the government could encourage home owners to take measures to protect their homes, thereby “hardening the target” (Sekhonyane 2003: 12).

In addition, to counter urban-terror related threats, the planning of anti-terrorism actions can be executed in two phases: pre acts-of-terrorism reduction and post acts-of-terrorism recovery. The first element relates to prevention, which can only be obtained if intelligence is available. The steps characterising this phase are relatively simple and straight-forward and involve isolating the target from the terrorists (or the terrorists from the target), or sabotaging their plans. Consequently, the terrorists should be arrested as soon as all possibilities of determining their plans, associates and supplies have been exploited. The second element relates to mitigation in order to ensure that terrorists have fewer resources and information available in terms of training, weapons and explosives. This is possible, for instance, by means of executing high density and targeted operations aimed at weapon caches. Finally, in order to be prepared, personnel must be trained and willing to use immense investigation resources in order to investigate any terrorist events targeting South Africans. Prosecutions should also be linked to investigations, in order to ensure a high number of successful prosecutions. The post acts-of-terrorism phase, on the other hand, relates to contingency planning in the case of assassinations, shooting incidents, bomb explosions, hostage situations, sabotage and kidnapping taking place. This phase thus relates to those actions executed after acts of terrorism have occurred (Boshoff 2001: 83-84).

A number of factors influence the state’s operational effectiveness in combating terrorism and therefore need to be addressed in order to ensure maximum effectiveness. The first is its intelligence capacity. The state
necessarily has to be able to collect accurate evidence and intelligence to counter a terrorist threat. The second refers to detection and prosecution skills. Here it is important that the police develop adequate skills in order to take complete and accurate statements from witnesses so as to ensure the successful prosecution of guilty parties. In South Africa, the investigation of crimes by the South African Police Service is largely inadequate, partly because the average workload of a detective is the investigation of 140 cases simultaneously, making any proper and thorough investigation impossible. The third factor that needs to be addressed is that of resources both for the training of police officers as well as providing adequate salaries for state prosecutors, a number of whom have left the South African prosecution service due to the very low salaries they received. The fourth factor, as elaborated on earlier, is the necessity of public cooperation in order to ensure that the community trusts the police sufficiently to want to come forward with information on questions of crime, which includes providing for a functioning and secure witness protection programme. Finally, it is important that the police and the government do not create unrealistic expectations by promising the immediate resolution of a particular crime-related situation, if such a promise cannot be kept. Such statements may lower public morale and enhance the status of terrorists who could continue operating under the impression that the state’s senior representatives are powerless in their efforts to combat crime (Schonteich 2001: 137-150).

There is also the possibility of introducing special terror legislation to curb urban terrorism, noticeably in the form of an anti-terrorism bill that has been the subject of heated debate in the South African Parliament for a number of years. The draft anti-terrorism bill proposes that anyone who commits a “terrorist act” will be liable, upon conviction, for life imprisonment. The bill’s definition includes an act which “does or may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of any person, or causes or may cause damage to property” and is calculated to “intimidate, coerce or induce any government, persons or the general public; disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or create a public emergency; or create unrest or general insurrection in any state”. The bill’s definition of what constitutes a “terrorist act” has understandably been criticised as being too broad. To put it bluntly, even a group of young people who destroy a Post Office letterbox would be guilty of committing an act of terrorism as defined by the bill. As Amnesty International has argued, “if the definition remains vaguely or too widely worded, then the danger exists that the provision of the law will be open to abuse or used for repressive purposes”. In addition, the bill also seeks to punish those who provide material, logistical or organisational support, knowing or intending that such support will be used in the commission of an offense in terms the bill. This could lead to
a period of imprisonment of ten years. In addition, anyone who conceals a person knowing that said person intends to commit or has committed an offence in terms of the bill, also commits an offence. Another major problem that has been identified in terms of the bill is its proposition that anyone who is a member of a “terrorist organisation” has already committed an offense, merely because of being a member. If found guilty on this charge, one could spend up to five years in prison. The bill broadly defines a terrorist organisation as “an organisation which has carried out, is carrying out or plans carrying out terrorist acts”. Judging from the definition of what constitutes a terrorist act, such a provision could of course be used to criminalise the actions of a large variety of people (Schonteich 2001: 129-131).

An aspect related to the bill that has raised a lot of debate is the question of detention. According to the bill, a judge may issue a warrant of detention when “there is reason to believe that any person possesses or is withholding from a law enforcement officer any information regarding any offense” contained in the bill. The bill proposes that a person can be detained for interrogation until a judge orders his release, is satisfied that all questions under interrogation have been answered, or that no lawful purpose is served by further detention. The detention period is not allowed to last longer than 14 days. The areas of concern regarding the bill are obvious. For instance, if brought into action, the bill could easily “turn detention without trial into a blunt instrument capable of being effectively deployed against political opponents – as was the case in the past”, when under the General Laws Amendment Act of 1966, a 14 day detention period was eventually increased to 90 days, 180 days and finally to an indefinite period. Because in the past, detention and torture were often narrowly linked, there are those who believe that that the re-introduction of a detention without trial law carries the grave risk of a repetition of past patterns of human rights violations. A related concern is that a person standing trial on any charge under the bill can be released on bail only if “exceptional circumstances exist which in the interests of justice permit their release”. Again, this provision seems rather harsh, given the broad range of offenses that the bill seeks to create (Schonteich 2001: 131-136).

PAGAD itself, not surprisingly, has strongly objected against the proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill, which it sees as “no better than the ‘detention without trial’ law that existed during the apartheid years”. It argues that the provisions of the Bill are draconian and must be opposed vehemently by all serious citizens of the country. In addition, these provisions, according to PAGAD, are dangerous as they give police the opportunity to force suspects to make confessions or statements in the absence of their attorneys (PAGAD 2000c). PAGAD has a point in that the South African government has to exercise extreme care so as not to
repeat the human rights abuses of the country’s apartheid past. Legislation that gives the government too much of a free reign and opens up the possibility for an even greater restriction of individual freedoms does not bode well for the future of a democratic South Africa. While it is of course essential to combat urban terrorism effectively, every precaution has to be taken to ensure that suspects who may turn out to be innocent or only guilty of minor offenses, such as in terms of the hypothetical Post Office letterbox incident, do not suffer at the hands of the law. In terms of the dialogic model of interpretation, a number of things can be learned from the South African case study, and, specifically the official ideology espoused by PAGAD. It is essential that the government should take its citizens’ fears and concerns regarding the country’s immense crime rate seriously and should be seen to actively engage in efforts preferentially in consultation with the public and community organisations to launch a collective effort to combat one of South Africa’s most destructive problems. It is essential that co-operation replace a situation where groups believe that they have no choice but to take the law into their own hands.