

CHAPTER 5

A NARRATIVE ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF URBAN PLANNING IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF THE GREATER PRETORIA REGION (NOW TSHWANE) DURING THE PERIOD 1992 TO 2002

5.1 THE CITY OF TSHWANE: OPPORTUNITY FROM DISASTER

It was just after midnight, 3 March 1997, when a colleague phoned me to tell me that Munitoria was on fire. Munitoria (a word derived from Muni-cipality and Pre-toria)¹ was the official council building and headquarters of the former City Council of Pretoria. Before the fire, the 11-storey building accommodated some 2 200 workers in 13 council departments. It also housed the council chambers and most of the public offices. At that time the City Council of Pretoria was responsible for the largest component of the former Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area and formed the core of the new Tshwane Metropolitan Municipal Council that was established in December 2000. The Munitoria blaze destroyed a large portion of the building. Most of the municipal infrastructure and information went up in flames.

Although this fire had an impact on the operation of the Council, the effective delivery of services and the morale of the staff, it also created many opportunities for the Council. It gave the Council the opportunity to actually rebuild and develop a new, more appropriate and effective local authority². The fire ultimately destroyed many of the old municipal planning and administration systems, which were associated with the old patriarchal planning system. The Munitoria fire also created a new opportunity for planners to advance the transformation of urban planning and the development of the Integrated Development Planning System, which was then well underway in the City of Pretoria³.

¹ The word 'Munitoria' was the result of a public competition that was held in 1964 to find a suitable name for the new Council building, which was to be occupied in February 1969 (Tindall 2000).

² See Tindall (2000) on the Munitoria fire.

³ See also a publication on the Munitoria fire, entitled *Opportunity from disaster: The 'great' Munitoria fire*, which was dedicated to the staff of the City Council of Pretoria (Leitch 1997).

5.2 UTOPIA⁴ AND SCIENCE F(R)ICTION

The old planning system in the City of Pretoria (prior to transformation in the 1990s)

Since the origin of the City of Pretoria in 1855, urban planning had mostly been performed by the engineering and land surveying professions and was mainly aimed at the management and control of land use⁵. Although the basic forms of urban planning always existed in some form or other in the former City of Pretoria, the first formal planning/policy documents date back to the 1940s when the first Pretoria Town Planning Scheme (Scheme No 1 of 1944) was promulgated on 29 November 1944⁶. These Town Planning Schemes, which mainly stemmed from the British *Land Use Zoning and Control system*, formed the basis of land use planning and management in most parts of the country.

Following the introduction of the town planning schemes, the City of Pretoria embarked on other forms of comprehensive and rational planning, which then permeated the South African planning scene. These forms of planning, with their strong emphasis on technical rationality, developed strongly in the City of Pretoria, in tandem with the development of the apartheid ideologies⁷. The former City of Pretoria was labelled by many South Africans as the *cradle of apartheid* for the role it played as the administrative capital in developing and promoting apartheid⁸. This apartheid system ultimately played a major role in shaping the autocratic, dominatory and discriminatory power structures in the country, not only on the National and Provincial levels, but also in Local Government. These powers and power structures were widely criticised by proponents of the anti-apartheid movement(s). This reaction, similar to “*the defense reaction to the Lifeworld*” as referred to by Hillier (2002), resulted in conflict, ongoing struggles and even violence in many urban areas in the country.

As the urban planning system developed and became more relevant during the mid-1900s, planners made various efforts to establish a separate and independent planning department. This

⁴ The term *Utopia* is originally borrowed from Sir Thomas Moore's book with the same title (written in 1516), in which he conceived it to be the heart of an ideal republic. The term is derived from the Greek “*Ou*”, actually meaning “*not*”, and “*topos*”, meaning place. Ironically, it means no place, or alternatively, nowhere (Gruke 2000: 159; and Badenhorst cited by Steyn & Van der Westhuizen 1995:34).

⁵ See also Oranje (1997).

⁶ This first Town Planning Scheme was later followed by the Pretoria-Noord Dorpsbeplanningskema (1950), the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme (No 2 - 1952) (Herculus), the Silverton Dorpsbeplanningskema (1955) and the Pretoria Region Town Planning Scheme (1960). In 1974 these schemes were integrated and consolidated into the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme, 1974, which became the first consolidated scheme for the whole city (Tindall 2000).

⁷ Although ‘formal planning’ only emerged in Pretoria during the 1940s, many planning actions in this city (prior to 1940) were governed by national planning legislation and policies such as the Public Health Act of 1919 and the Housing Act of 1920. For more information on the emergence and history of South African planning, see Oranje (1997) and Harrison (1998).

⁸ When major political decisions were taken by the former South African government, reference was often made to statements such as “Pretoria announced...” or Pretoria decided...”.

ultimately resulted in a Council resolution on 31 March 1964, which stated that a new independent department should be established to manage the various aspects related to city planning and development⁹. This department was known as the Planning and Architectural Department. Its first Director was Mr NT Cooper, a land surveyor by profession who held the position of City Town Planner¹⁰. After much debate the name of the department was later changed to the Town Planning and Architectural Department, as it was argued that the word 'planning' was too broad and that the department had to focus on town planning *per se*.

During the early 1960s, this delimitation of planning (which was probably prompted by the land surveyor's focus) detracted the focus from the broader spectrum of planning. Although this detachment and separation of the planning function from the engineering function was seen as a step forward for urban planning (in view of the fact that it enhanced the status of the planning function), it later became so isolated that it was criticised for not integrating and 'talking' to the other departments concerned. This attitude of working in silos, and not communicating with or integrating other sectors, was very typical of the isolated urban planning system that dominated the planning scene during the 1950s/1960s.

Some years later (in 1972), after progress was made to develop a new planning system, the first major future-oriented planning framework - the 1972 Pretoria Master Plan or Policy Plan was completed and approved by the former City Council of Pretoria in November 1973¹¹. This plan (which is incidentally largely based on the principles of comprehensive planning and the development plan concept as discussed in Chapter 4) emphasised, *inter alia*, the need for the planning process to maintain a balance "...between the purely analytical on the one hand and the intuitive and philosophical approach on the other"¹². It also focused on a much broader scale and mostly dealt with strategic issues and the spatial conceptualisation of the city. Although the Pretoria Master Plan was seen as groundbreaking work at the time and a major step forward for spatial planning in Pretoria, it had a number of shortcomings, reminiscent of the general critique on modernist planning as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4. It focused primarily on the physical environment (more specifically land use and transportation) and did not focus sufficiently on social, economic and institutional issues. Furthermore, it was largely dominated by technical and scientific planning processes and neglected the notion of community participation and social rationality,

⁹ According to Tindall (2000), this department was only established on 1 May 1964.

¹⁰ According to Tindall (2000), the driving force behind the establishment of the planning department was Mr SWR Gildenhuys, a city architect and building surveyor.

¹¹ This plan, which was drafted in conjunction with the Pretoria planning firm PLAN Associates, Prof CJ Vlijoen (Specialist Planning Consultant) and Dr PWB Kruger (Traffic Engineering Consultant), was also commonly referred to as the 'Silver Fish' – a name derived from the graphic presentation of the cover page of the document.

¹² See City Council of Pretoria (1972).

which at the time (1972) almost did not exist in South Africa. Notwithstanding the above, these plans only focused on the old 'White Pretoria' and did not address the integration of different cultural and ethnic groups. The Pretoria Master Plan, which was seen as the policy framework for the planning department, was largely aimed at guiding spatial planning and land use management during the 1970s.

Soon after the Master Plan was published in 1974, the first consolidated Pretoria Town Planning Scheme (TPS) for the 'whole' Pretoria was approved (City Council of Pretoria, 1994). This TPS was seen as an extension of the initial master plan and later structure plans and policies, and aimed to control and manage land use applications and zoning, within the overall structure and policy framework¹³. Although the Pretoria TPS was criticised for contributing to the fragmented urban structure, it constituted an important part of the urban planning system in the former City of Pretoria. This system, however, did not change much during the following decades - not even during the transformation process of the 1990s.

As the Pretoria Master Plan and TPS matured during the 1970s, a more detailed (supporting) Pretoria Structure Plan was developed and eventually completed in 1980¹⁴. This structure plan inherited and further magnified many of the problems contained in the original master plan (as discussed above). In the 1980 Structure Plan, the City of Pretoria, which then still excluded the traditional non-white areas,¹⁵ was divided into 19 planning/structure plan cells. Each of these cells (managed by a particular town planner) was described in terms of its general characteristics, population profiles and development trends. They mainly proposed, in very great detail (on the scale/level of street blocks and erven), land uses expressed in terms of the structure plan cell maps. These structure plans, however, provided very limited information on policy *per se*.

This piece-meal planning in many ways contributed to the non-integrated nature of the planning of the city and also to the lack of an overall holistic and strategic focus in terms of the whole city/region. Although the council planners provided much of the base information and assisted in compiling the 1980 Structure Plan, it was mainly compiled by planning consultants (Plan Associates) with limited participation from council officials and the relevant communities and concerned stakeholders.

¹³ The purpose of the Town Planning Scheme (TPS) is to "co-ordinate a harmonious development of a municipality in such a way as will most effectively tend to promote health, safety, order, amenity, convenience and general welfare as well as efficiency and economy in the process of such development" (City Council of Pretoria 1974).

¹⁴ See City Council of Pretoria (1980).

¹⁵ These areas included the former 'black' Mamelodi and Atteridgeville townships, the Indian communities of Laudium and the Coloured community of Eersterust.

This plan was amended, updated and published as *The 1993 Structure Plan*, in almost exactly the same format as the previous structure plan¹⁶. From the 1970s until the early 1990s, the planning department developed a number of more detailed plans and policies in support of the structure plans¹⁷. This (structured) planning framework played an important role in the planning and development process in Pretoria, specifically with regard to guiding and managing land use applications and new commercial and residential developments. These plans, in view of their physical/land use nature, could unfortunately not deal effectively with the broader perspective of urban planning as discussed in Chapter 4.

This planning system, which was largely informed by the international planning trends that developed from 1920 to 1950, dominated the spatial planning field for most of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s in the City of Pretoria and largely shaped the spatial structure of the city. Planners generally saw the structure plans as “*a good guide for development*” and as the framework and skeleton for other ‘subsidiary’ planning actions in the city (see Perception Survey, 1999)¹⁸. The majority of planners (who always had to compete with the technical/ professional status of the engineering profession) strongly supported and promoted this technical and scientific process approach¹⁹.

Unfortunately, the structure plan became a type of blueprint for planning and development during the 1980s and early 1990s - a very authoritative and rigid guideline document which was used/abused by planners in a very rigid and authoritative way. Very little space was provided for flexibility, creativity and interpretation. This almost artificial authority and power obviously created tremendous frustration amongst consulting planners and developers.

As the structure planning system matured during the late 1980s, it was widely criticised by planners, politicians and developers. It was overly rigid and had a blueprint nature. It

¹⁶ See City Council of Pretoria (1993).

¹⁷ Structure Plans included the structure plans for Hatherley, Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, and Nellmapius. Guideline Plans included the guideline plans for Garsfontein-South, Willow Glen, Wapadrand, Waterkloof Agricultural Holdings and environment, The Willows/Lynnwood Ridge, Erasmuskloof, Valley Farm, Brummeria, Garston, Willow Park/Willow Brae, Montana/Magalieskruin, Wonderboom Agricultural Holdings and environment, Wonderboom Regional Recreational area, Zandfontein/Andeon, and Samcor Park. Action Plans were compiled for Riviera West, Daspoort, Rietfontein/Gezina, Bellevue, East Lynne, Middle Street-Nieu Muckleneuk, Erven 221-224 Lynnwood Glen, Sunnyside East, Erven 268-273 and 491 Erasmuskloof extension 3, Pretoria West, Hillcrest, Hatfield, a portion of Lynnwood and Brooklyn Avenue, Brooklyn Circle, a portion of Les Marais, Walkerspruit, Erf 757 Menlo Park. Planning Policies included policies for the location of filling stations, a policy for guest houses, a policy for home offices in Arcadia/Hatfield, a policy for group housing, a conservation policy for the Magaliesberg, etc. (Information obtained from Louis Robinson of the City Planning and Development Department 1999).

¹⁸ During this period, this type of modernist/structure planning was also successfully applied and respected in other South African cities and in many other countries in the world.

¹⁹ Oosthuizen (1999: 32 - 35) also refers to the rigid procedures and the problems of the control-oriented and detailed scientific approach to planning in Pretoria during the 1970s and 1980s.

overemphasised the rational, scientific and systems approach and development control. It lacked, among others, democratic and social properties; community participation; strategic direction and vision; and an emphasis on the management of growth and development (see Perception Survey, 1999).

This critique is reminiscent of the critique of the modernist planning approach as discussed in Chapter 2. The rigid structure plan, which was closely associated with the rigid Town Planning Scheme, in many ways established a confined planning system (within an already confined socio-economic environment). This planning system largely (de)confined the thinking and planning style of the Pretoria planners - one of the main reasons why planners found it so difficult to escape from their iron cages (Webber) during the 1990s. Not only did this planning system become a powerful tool (or an “*instrument of power*” as referred to by Foucault) that was used to direct and control development, but it also provided the planners with a “*rationality*” or “*professional power*” (as defined by Forester and Hoch), which became dominant in the web of power relations as described by Foucault.

The concept of structure planning/land use planning/physical planning in the City of Pretoria almost reached its peak when the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning published the *Greater Pretoria Guide Plan (GPGP)* in 1984, in terms of the Physical Planning Act, 1967 (Act 88 of 1967)²⁰. The purpose of the guide plan was, *inter alia*, to lay down guidelines for the future spatial development of the particular area; to provide an overall planning policy; and to serve as a planning framework for provincial and local government (Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1984). As in the case of the structure plans, concerned stakeholders and communities were not involved in the drafting of the GPGP. It was a rigid, statutory document with very little flexibility. The GPGP did not really focus on strategic directions and development options. It was a typical example of a land use plan that aimed at directing future development and growth within, or outside, certain clearly demarcated, almost non-negotiable land use zones, for example, an industrial zone. In spite of its shortcomings, the guide plan resulted in a new regional focus outside the boundaries of the old Pretoria²¹.

These two dominant planning functions or main pillars of planning - Land Use Management and Zoning (Development Control) and Structure Planning (Forward Planning) - ultimately resulted in

²⁰ In 1975 the Physical Planning and Utilisation of Resources Act, 1967 (Act 88 Of 1967) was amended to give the guide plan action legal status. This Act was later renamed the Physical Planning Act, 1967 and further amended in 1981 by the Environment Planning Act, 1981 (Act 51 of 1981) (Department of Constitutional Development and Planning, 1984)

²¹ Although the guide plan study area did not include the more remote urban and rural areas (such as Stinkwater and Hammanskraal), it did include the previously excluded non-white (group) areas as mentioned previously.

the development, in 1975, of two distinct and separate planning divisions in the planning department of the former City Council of Pretoria, each with its own unique web of powers and power relations. These were the Development Control Section (restructured in 1994 and referred to as the Land Use Rights Division) and the Forward Planning Section (restructured in 1994 and referred to as the Guideline Planning Division).

The Development Control Section was initially headed by Rocco Fullard (March 1975 to September 1986)²². Fullard, a land surveyor by profession, was a knowledgeable, experienced and respected land use manager/planner and an expert in the Pretoria Town Planning Scheme. Furthermore, he was extremely peculiar on the finest details, procedures and legalities - typical of the rigid planning system. He was mostly involved with land use management and had very little exposure to the broader Structure Planning (Forward Planning) or the later transformation of urban planning during the 1990s. In March 1987, Fullard was promoted to Deputy Director and in August 1988 to Senior Deputy Director. He retired in January 1993.

In March 1987, Mike Yates was appointed as the new head of the Development Control Section. Yates was a qualified town planner who also held a postgraduate degree in landscape architecture. Although Yates was initially mainly involved with land use management (largely in view of his particular responsibilities and position), he became extensively involved with strategic planning and IDP during the 1990s. Yates was generally regarded as a strong 'systems manager' who was much concerned with procedures, proper discipline, performance and strong professional and ethical conduct. In April 1994, Yates was succeeded by Tony Walker, a qualified town planner (April 1994 to July 2001). Walker was also regarded as a performance-oriented manager who managed his division with strong discipline and rules. Although Walker was initially mostly involved with land use management, he later became more involved with strategic planning and the development of the IDP, mainly as a result of the emerging integrated and strategic approach to planning. Although these managers (Walker and Yates) contributed to the development of the land use management system, their rigid and procedural management style largely supported the rigid and control-oriented planning system, which allowed little space for innovation and creativity. This organisational culture became so established in the 1990s that planners had difficulty shaking off their policing image to engage with more holistic and integrated forms of planning.

The Forward Planning Section, on the other hand, was largely concerned with the so-called forward planning or guideline planning; scientific processes and analysis; policy planning and

²² These timeframes were obtained from Henriette Scheffer of the administrative section of the planning department during 2002. The breaks in the time frames present the periods in which acting managers were appointed while the positions of permanent managers were being considered.

formulation; the compilation, management and maintenance of structure plans, guide plans, land use plans, action plans, and development plans; the establishment and management of planning data and information; and scenario planning.

The Forward Planning section was initially headed by Jean Malherbe (July 1975 to January 1987), a qualified architect and town planner. Malherbe contributed significantly to establishing and promoting the 'forward planning' culture and also the notion of urban design in the City of Pretoria. In February 1987, Malherbe was promoted to the post of Deputy Director - a position he held until his retirement in June 1994. Malherbe was respected as a leader in the field of structure planning and urban design. Although he was also extensively involved in the structure plan processes, he tended to be more interested in projects on a more detailed 'urban design/architectural' scale. He incidentally played a major role in facilitating the planning, design and ultimate re-development of the Pretoria CBD area (the so-called Pretoria City Core Project) in the 1980s. Malherbe was always very popular as a colleague and friend amongst the planners, specifically of the Forward Planning Section. Some planners and people from outside the Council often referred to Malherbe's bombastic and autocratic style of management - a 'powerful' management style that seemed to have suited the patriarchal planning system. His style of planning also had an impact on the development of the rigid structure(d) planning approach with its strong design and 'plan' nature. These 'plans' were more concerned with the spatial structure, rather than the effect they would have on social and economic development, for example.

Malherbe often used 'the plan' as an "instrument of power" (Foucault), as well as the "the power of the better argument" (Habermas) to challenge supreme powers or "infra power" (Foucault) and political powers to approve certain plans and planning initiatives in the council. His concerted efforts (and sometimes good, rational arguments) often led to successful plan implementation. This not only indicates the types of dominatory autocratic powers present in the power web and the "micro physics of power" (Foucault), but it also indicates (in contradiction to Flyvbjerg's argument) how good arguments and rational actions, if effectively exercised, can challenge political power structures. Malherbe's continued and persistent argumentation also indicated that effective communicative action can dominate/define political power - the inversion of Flyvbjerg's theory.

As a result of Malherbe's promotion, Nic van der Westhuizen, a qualified town planner was appointed head of the Forward Planning Section in February 1988. Van der Westhuizen is commonly regarded as 'the gentleman' of the planning division in view of his exceptional tact and diplomacy, strong values and principles. He was extremely dedicated in his work and always inclined towards proper management, performance and strong discipline. Unlike Malherbe, who

focused mainly on the detail and structural aspects of planning, van der Westhuizen was mainly involved in high-level strategic work, policy formulation and metropolitan planning. He continuously liaised with national departments on matters pertaining to planning and policy. He was incidentally one of the first persons in the planning department to talk of strategic planning and initiated a Physical Development Strategy in the late 1980s. Nic van der Westhuizen was highly respected as a planner and also recognised by the Pretoria planning fraternity for the contribution he made to promote the bigger picture of planning. In October 1988, van der Westhuizen was promoted to Deputy Director - a position he held until 31 July 1993 when he took an early retirement. Many planners, officials and managers from other council departments argued that van der Westhuizen's retirement on the eve of the transformation process in the early 1990s was a major loss to the City of Pretoria and the planning profession in general.

In October 1988, Wilhelm (Skaap) Mouton, a qualified town planner and former chief planner in the Forward Planning Section was appointed as the new head of this section. Mouton was commonly regarded as a 'people's manager'. He had a very flexible and relaxed management style. Many planners often stated that Mouton was too relaxed in his management style and that he created a somewhat slack working environment with insufficient discipline and professionalism. However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, he played a major role in the Forward Planning Section, specifically with regard to structure planning. He was strongly guided and supported by the forward planners, as well as the structure plan consultants at the time (Plan Associates). Even during the late 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, Mouton was always a strong supporter of the technical/scientific land use/structure planning approach and was strongly influenced and supported by the planners in his section.

Although each of the planning managers (as discussed above) had their strengths and weaknesses, few of them really had the attitude, skill, inclination and planning style required for the emerging strategic and integrated developmental planning system, as they were too concerned with rigid structures, detail and procedures. Van der Westhuizen was perhaps the only planner to exhibit a broader strategic perspective on planning.

The Forward Planning Section was a very isolated and close-knit family with a tight culture. These planners formed a very strong bond and strongly supported each other, both in the private and work domains. Throughout the transformation process (during the 1990s) it was evident that the planners, as a group, wanted to protect their comfort zone, each other's positions and their hallmark of planning practice. They specifically had difficulty accepting the new liberal forms of planning that seemed to have threatened the structure planning domain and the structure of the

department. It was fairly obvious that the so-called forward planners during the years had worked out a planning system that they strongly supported. The planners became well entrenched in the structure plan approach and were almost inseparable from this plan. It was clear that it would not be easy to change this well-established planning system or culture.

Some planners also argued that the majority of planners in the Forward Planning Section deliberately resisted any new planning initiatives that were introduced by the 'new' managers who did not enjoy their full support - more specifically, Mike Yates. Planners from the other planning division (Development Control) often referred to the comfort zone within which the forward planners found themselves. It was fairly easy for the planning professionals to come and go as they wished. The extended Friday afternoon pub lunches were, for instance, seen as a popular "team-building exercise" for 'the boys'. There was always a perception that planners of the Forward Planning Section were doing 'real planning' and the more challenging parts of planning, while the planners of the Development Control Section were mostly involved in boring administrative tasks related to land-use applications. Reference was often made (in a somewhat offensive fashion) to the 'scheme mechanics' - or the mechanical process of maintaining and 'fixing' the Town Planning Scheme. The Forward Planning Section, in view of its culture and structure, attracted mostly senior planners in the department, which resulted in a 'culture of seniority'.

This bond and social alliance that developed in the Forward Planning section is much proof of the strong social and power relations which existed in this section (see discussion on the social alignment and Wartenburg in Chapter 2). This alignment was so strongly supported and maintained by 'the agents' in the alignment that it resulted in a powerful social group. See also the relationship between social relations, social alignments, and power as discussed in Chapter 2. As will be discussed in later sections of this chapter, the power of this group became much evident in the way in which the group continued to defend the structure plan system, and the way in which it reacted to, and 'protested' against the transformation of the urban planning system and the ongoing attempts to restructure the Forward Planning Section.

The planning department with its two strong separate divisions (Development Control and Forward Planning) was often criticised for its many shortcomings and problems: the lack of integration between the two functions, specialisation of functions, office politics, unequal distribution of work, professional jealousy, duplication of work, lack of unity in department, and unhealthy rivalry (see Perception Survey, 1999). The separateness of the structure also hampered integration and coordination between these two closely related functions and divisions. The strong distinction between the two functions was largely amplified by the different personalities, cultures and

management styles of the respective managers. The separateness also resulted in a poor working relationship between officials from these two divisions, and conflicting power relations within (and between) the two planning sections.

The overall city planning and development function in the City Council of Pretoria was initially (prior to 1994) the responsibility of the Town Planning and Architectural Department (TPA). This department was restructured in 1994 and renamed the City Planning and Development Department. As part of this restructuring exercise, the Development Control Section changed to the Land Use Rights Division; and the Forward Planning Section changed to the Guideline Planning Division.

However, these two separate functions continued to exist separately until mid-1997 when a new integrated structure and planning function was established, mainly for the purpose of the IDP processes²³. Although these two dominant functions or sections formed the main pillars of the planning function, the planning department was also concerned with other primary functions related to city planning and development, such as cartographic services, land surveying, building control, architecture, urban design, physical development services, project management and quantity surveying.

From the time when the planning department was established, this department was mainly dominated by land surveyors, quantity surveyors and architects²⁴. These professions focused mostly on detail issues (and scientific measurements) and not so much on the broader picture of planning and development. Fritz Kraehmer, although an architect by profession, was the first person with a planning qualification to head the planning department. In spite of his planning background, Kraehmer was more concerned with detail architectural and urban design projects than with broader urban planning. He was a very strong autocratic 'leader' who found it difficult to communicate with people. His 'closed-door policy' was also reminiscent of the planning approach during his 'reign'. The type of power exhibited by Kraehmer can be closely associated with the "dominatory forms of infra power" referred to by Foucault and Machiavelli. This type of infra power exhibited by Kraehmer and some of the other managers resulted in a resistance by some officials against these powers. See also Foucault on "the struggle against forms of domination" in Chapter

²³ The White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Management (2001) is also very specific on the integration of planning functions and argues that: *"The key to successful local spatial planning, land use management and land development is the establishment of an effective link between the forward planning and development control functions."* (Republic of South Africa 2001b: 77).

²⁴ Since its inception in 1964, the planning department was headed by Mr N.T. Cooper, a land surveyor (1964 - 1967), Mr S.W.R. Gildenhuys, a building surveyor (1967 - 1972), Mr B.W.B. Ball, a land surveyor (1972 - 1978), Mr L.D. Breytenbach, a building surveyor (1978 - 1986), Mr F Kraehmer, an architect and town planner (1986 - 1993), and Mr M.W. Yates, a town planner and landscape architect (1993 - 6 December 2000). See Tindall (2000).

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Following the retirement of Kraehmer, Mike Yates was appointed as the head of the newly established City Planning and Development Department on 1 November 1993. The appointment of Yates had a huge and positive influence on the course of planning during the 1990s, as will be discussed in sections to follow.

During much of the planning department's history, most of the planners, including the top management, were white Afrikaans-speaking males²⁵. Most of the planners completed their planning studies either at the University of Potchefstroom or the University of Pretoria. Both these universities were still strongly Afrikaans-orientated at that time and more conservative in their thinking than the English universities.

During the apartheid years, many of these planners and managers were associated with the old apartheid government regime and the former leading National Party. In general, the organisational culture (and management styles) that existed in the planning department was largely characterised as conservative, autocratic, narrow-minded and rigid - a culture that seemed to have suited the modernist style of planning, and also the type of infra power associated with such a system.

As a result of the well-established relationship and affiliation with the old planning methodologies, it was difficult for many of these (mostly the older planners) to adapt to the new democratic and developmental style of government and urban planning that emerged during the 1990s. Although the majority of planners argued that the old planning system was good at the time, and that effective, good and sound planning was done, it was widely criticised during the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the new integrated approach towards planning emerged (Perception Survey, 1999; Interview Survey, 2001). Various planners in and outside the City Council, consulting town planners, developers and academics criticised the old planning department and old planning approach for its fragmented and ad-hoc approach to urban planning. The old planning system was criticised, amongst other things, for its overemphasis of technical and physical issues; the lack of community participation; the reactive way of planning; the rigid and fragmented approach; lack of integration; and lack of vision (Perception Survey, 1999)²⁶ - and also the power(full) ways in which plans and policies (Foucault's instruments of power) were (ab)used to shape the structure and growth of the city.

²⁵ Of the ±30 qualified planners in 1985, there was only one female planner in the Forward Planning Section and another two female planners in the Development Control Section and no black planning staff. The black and female staff in the planning department was mainly restricted to administrative positions and technical support roles.

²⁶ Only two respondents noted the lack of emphasis on the neglected areas and the spatial segregation that was directly caused by apartheid planning (Perception Survey, 1999).

As the principles of community participation emerged in South Africa during the late 1980s, planners realised that they were not paying sufficient attention to community participation and consultation in the planning, development and decision-making processes²⁷. This lack of meaningful community participation was probably one of the most important points of critique against the old planning approach in the City of Pretoria and also elsewhere in South Africa (see Perception Survey, 1999).

The old planning approach in the City of Pretoria (and also in many other South African cities or regions), with its primary focus on the physical aspects, did not effectively focus on aspects such as equity and fair distribution of resources; human needs and priorities; the poor, marginalised minorities and previously disadvantaged groups; women, children and the disabled (Oosthuizen, 1999; Perception Survey, 1999; and Interview Survey, 2002). This critique of the old Pretoria planning system is largely reminiscent of the critique expressed of the modernist planning system that dominated the planning scene in countries such as the USA and UK during the 1950s.

As the Pretoria planning system evolved during the 1960s to late 1980s, very little progress was made to transform and improve the urban planning system - specifically when compared with the transformation that took place during the same time in other parts of the western world. Although the planners were involved in a wide array of planning work, their work mainly related to day-to-day tasks such as commenting on rezoning applications and the evaluation of new township applications. Very few Pretoria planners were involved in research and, in general, very limited efforts were made to study and practice emerging trends. This in many ways resulted in planners becoming isolated and too entrenched in their rigid planning methodologies. This also later made it difficult for planners to broaden their horizons and take on board new planning methodologies.

In summary, the planning function in the former City Council of Pretoria developed into a strong and well-established planning function in the late 1980s with a particular organisational structure and male-dominated culture²⁸. As the new planning legislation and policies and new approaches to planning began to develop during the 1990s and early 2000 in South Africa, the planning department, its organisational structure, leadership, gender and racial profile, as well as the approach to urban planning, continuously changed and developed as it was influenced by the

²⁷ Some planners and councillors in Pretoria argued that the normal advertising procedures, as prescribed by the rezoning processes or processes for township establishment, were sufficient to allow for public inputs and consultation. Others argued that the role of Ward councillors was to consult with the people and that this was sufficient participation.

²⁸ Oranje (1997: 71) refers to how planning (during the mid-to late-1900s) was promoted as a 'male profession'. Some planning documents produced during this time specifically referred to planners as "*intelligent men*" or "*men with vision*".

contextual realities as discussed in Chapter 4.

The narrative that follows, deals with *the transformation of urban planning in the municipalities of the Greater Pretoria region during the period 1992 to 2002*. The narrative presents a discussion on the emergence and development of community participation; social planning, strategic planning, sustainable development and the new forms of urban management as far as these pertain to urban planning. It specifically focuses on the impact that these approaches had on the urban planning system, organisational structures and processes and the people (planners, officials, councillors, managers and communities), and the various power structures and power relations in the local authority and the planning department. The narrative further unravels and unpacks the complex power structures and power relations associated with the transformation of the urban planning and local government system, see framework for analysis in Chapter 2.

Throughout the narrative reference is made to the planners' efforts (as well as their struggles, failures and successes) to transform the old rigid, apartheid planning system and to establish (and to adapt to) a new, more appropriate and progressive urban planning system. The story is ultimately narrated within the context of the overall (and ever-changing) national government transformation of the 1990s/early 2000s.

5.3 A NEW (DIS)COURSE ON URBAN PLANNING IN THE CITY OF PRETORIA

The beginnings of a new integrated approach to planning in the former City Council of Pretoria (1992)

The majority of planners were mostly concerned with the old rigid forms of urban planning. During the early 1990s, however, a number of planners in the City of Pretoria/Tshwane and planning consultants were exposed to emerging trends such as community participation and strategic planning.

One of the first attempts to introduce some form of integrated and participatory approach to planning in the City Council of Pretoria was the Nellmapius township project, initiated by Nic van der Westhuizen, Chief Town Planner of the Forward Planning Section²⁹ in the beginning of 1989. Van der Westhuizen emphasised the need to integrate and involve all the different disciplines in the planning of the township (through inter-departmental/multi-disciplinary planning teams) and to consult the affected community of Eersterust, for whom the township was earmarked.

²⁹ See City Council of Pretoria (1989).

The focus on integrated planning and community participation, however, gained a new momentum in 1989 after the introduction of Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) as discussed in Chapter 4³⁰. At this time, this extended new form of integrated environmental management was not commonly applied in the city and very little information on the IEM concept was available. In an attempt to obtain more information on the IEM approach, Johnny Coetzee, who was then specifically involved in environmental planning and management in the planning department, attended a short course on Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) at the University of Cape Town's Environmental Evaluation Unit in December 1992.

In February 1992, Coetzee presented two papers on IEM, one to the former Transvaal Branch of the South African Institute for Town and Regional Planners, and one to officials of various departments of the City Council of Pretoria. These papers, *inter alia*, called for the importance of community participation in all the phases of the planning process and the need for planners and professionals from other related disciplines to apply the principles of IEM in their planning and development processes³¹.

Rodney Corin, one of the senior engineers in the Engineering Department, had attended the same IEM course. He presented a paper on community participation and public scoping to the council officials. During the discussions that followed these presentations, some delegates expressed and confirmed the need to integrate the principles of IEM in the planning process, as well as their commitment to the process. These papers, however, merely presented a broad overview. They did not really contain much detail and theory and were probably not significant in terms of the international and national context. They introduced, for the first time however, the principles of IEM, structured community participation and integrated planning in the City Council of Pretoria. Although these efforts were seen by some people as an effort by Coetzee and Corin to aspire to more power through prowess (as in the case of Machiavelli's Prince) and the introduction of new processes, these efforts and introduction of the participative planning processes could also be seen as an effort to challenge and change the dominatory, autocratic powers that characterised the old non-democratic planning system.

Later that same year, the IEM principles (including the community participation process) were

³⁰ Although IEM focuses mostly on impact assessments and environmental management procedures, it also has much in common with urban planning and urban management, largely in view of the fact that it promotes the concept of community participation and integrated planning.

³¹ See Coetzee (1992 a and b).

applied in a major urban renewal project in the City of Pretoria - the Pretoria City Lake project,³² as well as the comprehensive PREMET transportation study aimed at developing a comprehensive transport plan for the City of Pretoria³³. Although the members of these project teams were exposed to the new principles of integrated and participatory planning, they had very little experience of how to facilitate such planning processes.

The City Lake process was specifically criticised by various stakeholders for its shortcomings - the most important being that of limited consultation and the fact that community needs had not been satisfactorily addressed in the planning process. Some participants also argued that this process was done primarily to satisfy the community³⁴. The City Lake project is also a good example of Foucault's "instrument of power" in the sense that "the power of the plans" was used to convince communities to buy in to the plan. In spite of its many shortcomings, this process certainly played a major role in highlighting the various facets and challenges of the multi-disciplinary/cross-sectoral approach to planning and largely stimulated thinking in the direction of an integrated approach to planning in the planning department. The PREMET study, on the other hand, also played a major role in exposing the engineers to integrated and participatory planning.

As the principles of IEM, community participation and integrated planning began to infuse planning in the City of Pretoria during the early 1990s, the well-established principles of strategic planning (as discussed in Chapter 4) also began to prompt urban planning in Pretoria. The first traces of urban strategic planning in the former City Council of Pretoria date back to the early 1990s when Nic van der Westhuizen (Chief Town Planner of the Forward Planning Section in the City Council of Pretoria, who was mainly involved with metropolitan and regional planning at the time), initiated and drafted a discussion document entitled *Physical Development Strategy for the City of Pretoria*³⁵.

The principles of urban strategic planning ultimately shaped the EMPRET planning model (which emerged in 1993), as well as the IDP processes, which emerged in 1996. Although some planners argued that the principles of strategic planning had always been part of planning, the majority of planners argued that the emergence of urban strategic planning led to a new integrated and

³² See City Lake Pretoria (1992 and 1993); Toria (1992); and Robust (1994).

³³ The PREMET transportation study was facilitated by the transportation engineers, in conjunction with a firm of consultants.

³⁴ Due to a prolonged debate between the Council and some objectors to the process, and the lack of interest from the private sector, the City Lake project never came to fruition in its original form and in 2002 the site was allocated for the head offices of the Department of Trade and Industry.

³⁵ The City of Cape Town (Peter De Tolly) started its new planning process, the Strategic Metropolitan Planning process, in June 1989, when a group of planners convened to discuss the future spatial structure of the city. Strong emphasis was placed on the principles of strategic planning, spatial planning, spatial integration, community participation, as well as the non-spatial issues that affected the spatial structure (Watson 2001).

strategic way of planning (Perception Survey, 2002).

Following the famed Rio Summit in 1992, planners, architects and environmentalists in Pretoria indicated a renewed interest in environmental management and more specifically the notion of sustainable development. The planning department of the City Council of Pretoria collected and studied information on the principles of sustainable development and the Local Agenda 21 processes in an attempt to structure a Local Agenda 21 for Pretoria³⁶. Of particular interest to this process, were the urban planning and management principles that were being promoted by the World Bank, and specifically the concept of Sustainable Development Planning (SDP) initially introduced by the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) in 1994. Although this SDP model is closely related to the concept of strategic planning, it provided a new insight on community/environmental strategic planning and the techniques that could be used to facilitate strategic/community planning.

As the new trends of community participation, strategic planning and sustainable development planning permeated the planning scene in the City of Pretoria during the early 1990s, it largely emphasised the opportunities to transform the archaic urban planning system and to challenge the dominatory powers and the bad powers of “the Prince”. However, within the context of the well-established structure plan system, it was unclear how these principles should be integrated into this planning system. In an attempt to harness the new planning principles into one overarching, integrated urban planning/environmental management system, Coetzee drafted a short discussion memorandum entitled *Environmental Management Programme for Greater Pretoria*, EMPRET in short³⁷, in the beginning of 1993.

This memorandum briefly contained principles and thoughts on a new approach to planning for the City of Pretoria. This 1993 EMPRET paper largely emphasised the principles of strategic planning, integrated environmental management, community participation, and sustainable development planning. One of the cornerstones of the proposed EMPRET approach in 1993 was its definition or description of the environment, which emphasised the need to focus on (and integrate) the whole environment and its components, which included the natural, built, social and external environments.

In this way it clearly presented a shift in emphasis from the dominant physical environment to the

³⁶ The 1992 Rio Summit resulted in a world-wide call by the World Bank requesting cities to formulate a Local Agenda 21 for their cities based on the principles contained in Agenda 21.

³⁷ See Coetzee (1993 (a)).

broader city environment³⁸ and a shift from structure planning to integrated urban planning and management. On 22 March 1993, Coetzee made the first formal presentation of the initial EMPRET principles to the deputy Chief Executive Officer/Town Clerk, Dr Lucas Botha, Mike Yates (Acting Director of the Town Planning and Architectural Department), Wilhelm Mouton (Planning Director of the Forward Planning Section), and Hugo de Wet (chief planner involved with planning and environmental management). This presentation was a deliberate, dedicated and power(full) effort to convince the senior management to change the planning system - much in line with Habermas' "power of the better argument" and Foucault's "instrument of power". After the presentation, Botha decided to establish EMPRET as a "special project" within the CEO's department.

Various in-house discussions were held in an attempt to further develop this initial approach. On 16 November 1993, Botha submitted a report entitled *Proposed Environmental Management Plan/Strategy for Greater Pretoria* to the Management Committee of the former City Council of Pretoria, which subsequently approved the report³⁹. On the same day, Coetzee also presented a paper on EMPRET at a consultative conference, hosted by the Pretoria Committee for Cultural Development⁴⁰. At this conference, attended by approximately 100 people representing a large number of stakeholder groups from Pretoria⁴¹, the proposed EMPRET approach was widely accepted and supported⁴². Although EMPRET only contained broad principles and lacked detail in 1993, it was the first stab at a new integrated approach to urban planning and management in the City Council of Pretoria.

While one component of the planning department in 1993 was developing a new integrated/developmental approach to planning (EMPRET), another component was to finalise the 'new' 1993 Pretoria Structure Plan, which was somewhat contradictory to the EMPRET approach. This was almost the first conflict (and clash of powers) between the old structure/physical planning approach and the emerging integrated approach to planning.

Although many of the problems of the old 1980 plan were entrenched in the 1993 plan, the 1993 plan to a very limited extent demonstrated the new thoughts on planning that were beginning to emerge in South Africa and Pretoria in the beginning of the 1990s, such as community participation, social planning and strategic planning. The 1993 Structure Plan, for instance,

³⁸ The DFA (1995) and the LGTA (1996), and the subsequent LDO and IDP processes in 1997 also made a similar division of the environment, namely the physical, social, economic and institutional.

³⁹ See City Council of Pretoria (1993).

⁴⁰ See Coetzee (1993 (b)).

⁴¹ See City Council of Pretoria (1994: 22).

⁴² See Koortz (1994: 15); and Pretoria Committee for Cultural Development (1993: 23).

referred to a vision for the City of Pretoria. It recognised the importance of 'quality of life' and suggested a wider focus than just land use. The 1993 plan, which was compiled by a consortium of planners (Plan Associates, Plan Consult, and EVS), also extensively involved council planners and related council departments in the planning and final compilation of the plan (plans and documents). An important mind-shift of the new plan/process relates to the fact that it at least recognised the *"far reaching constitutional changes..."* that were taking place; as well as the *"... significant socio-economic and spatial consequences for Pretoria and the metropolitan area"*; as well as the fact that these consequences had to *"... influence the development policy and strategies for the area"*⁴³.

On the eve of the transformation (1993), it was obvious that a new integrated approach to urban planning was emerging in the City of Pretoria. The first initiatives towards an integrated new planning system in many ways sensitised the planners, managers and politicians to some of the emerging trends and planning approaches. In view of the fact that most of the new ideas (for instance those contained in EMPRET) were still at a conceptual level, very few planners in the City Council of Pretoria actually reacted to the new approaches. The planners in the Forward Planning Section had often argued that the new approaches were merely a temporary trend or fashion that would go away. Mike Yates, both in view of his personal interest and his position as Executive Director of the Town Planning and Architectural Department, continued to play an important role in the development of the new principles, specifically EMPRET.

Those planners who did not support Yates' management style and personality were always sceptical of the new democratic planning processes that Yates was developing and promoting. He was often criticised for having broken with the age-old-tradition of structure planning. Unfortunately, insufficient effort was made with the conceptualisation phase of EMPRET to promote and involve planners, managers and councillors in the development of the new approach - resulting in a general lack of support and buy-in. This resistance to change was the result of the transformation, and also typical of the resistance to any new powers, or powers that could possibly threaten the existing power structures, see also Hoch and Forester in Chapter 2.

⁴³ See City Council of Pretoria (1993).

5.4 SOME THINGS/PEOPLE NEVER CHANGE

The transformation of the former City Council of Pretoria's planning department (1993/1994)

While some planners in the planning department were trying to establish a new strategic planning and city/environmental management model for the city (EMPRET), the former City Council of Pretoria adopted and approved a new Purpose Directed Management System (PDM) on 21 April 1993. The main purpose of the PDM was to restructure and improve the performance and effectiveness of the City, the City Council of Pretoria and its various departments; and to determine a new vision for the organisation.

The Town Planning and Architectural Department was ultimately restructured and, in 1993, resulted in the City Planning and Development Department, comprising the following divisions: Guideline Planning, Land-use Rights, City Development Control, Physical Development Services, Surveying and Cartographic Services and Support Services⁴⁴. The Guideline Planning Division replaced the former Forward Planning Section and the Land-use Rights Division replaced the former Development Control Section.

The new organisational structure for the planning department, however, included a new Urban Design Section within the newly established Physical Development Services Division. The introduction of this new section was largely inspired by Jean Malherbe - an experienced architect and town planner, the former head of the Forward Planning Section and a former Deputy Director of the planning department.

Malherbe, mainly based on his architectural background, combined with his experience of physical planning and urban design, often expressed the need for the department to have a dedicated urban design section to bridge the gap between the broader planning issues and detail design. To the dismay of some urban planners, only planners who had obtained formal training in the seemingly new 'specialist field' of urban design were considered for the position of Chief Urban Designer. During the early 1990s the concept of urban design in the City Council of Pretoria, as in the rest of South Africa, came to be recognised as a 'distinct profession'. Some universities in South Africa, such as the University of the Witwatersrand and the University of Cape Town, presented postgraduate courses in urban design, specifically for planners and architects. The initial intention was to provide planners and architects with additional specialised knowledge of urban design, urban structure and form, and specifically the overlap between architecture and planning. To the dismay of many experienced town planners (who saw the field of urban design as an

⁴⁴ See also City Planning and Development Department (1993).

integral part of urban planning), some urban designers argued that 'urban design' was a specialist profession that could only be dealt with by qualified urban designers⁴⁵. This resulted in arrogance amongst many urban designers. The 'planner-urban designers' became instant architects; the 'architect-urban designers' became instant urban planners and even urban strategic planners. This emerging emphasis on detail (urban) design unfortunately over-emphasised the confined and rigid approach to urban planning (and certain parts of the city only), *vis a vis* the broader, integrated and holistic focus on the city (and people) as a whole.

As a result of the PDM restructuring, some directors and chief planners accepted retrenchment packages, resulting in several vacancies and new opportunities for emerging leaders in the planning department. The vacant positions were advertised internally only and eventually a number of new appointments were made in 1993 and 1994. Unlike the procedure in the past, where vacant positions in most cases were filled by the following successive candidate in the ranks, or the person most favoured in the department, a new appointment procedure and extensive appraisal process were used to guide the appointment of new managers, creating opportunities for younger planners also to be considered for management positions.

The first appointment that was made on 1 November 1993 was the appointment of Mike Yates (former head of the Development Control Section), as the new Executive Director of the City Planning and Development Department. Although the planners in his former division favoured Yates as the new Executive Director, the planners in the Forward Planning Section favoured Jean Malherbe for this position due to the fact that he was 'in line' for the position, as well as the fact that he was respected as a leader in the field of structure planning and urban design - specialist fields that some planners believed were the prerequisites for such a position.

Soon after his appointment, Yates introduced various strategic interventions and projects such as the Pretoria Capitol Initiative, which was aimed at making Pretoria the Seat of Parliament. During the mid-to late-1990s Yates played a major role in developing suitable and appropriate planning approaches for the City Council of Pretoria, such as the development of EMPRET, the Pretoria Inner Process and the Integrated Development Planning processes. He also played a pivotal role in defining the new developmental role for local government and the strategic direction for the City of Pretoria.

Through the 1990s, Yates demonstrated a specific interest in the fields of strategic planning and

⁴⁵ This aspect was often raised by architects and urban designers during discussions held in the City Council of Pretoria.

environmental management and was also continually involved with strategic planning and corporate issues in the City Council. Many planners in the department often criticised him for focusing too much on strategic and corporate issues and for not focusing sufficiently on the people in the department and the more detailed planning issues and functioning of the department. Yates always had a very strong and uncompromising viewpoint on discipline and professional ethics⁴⁶.

Besides the appointment of Yates, other senior managers were also appointed in the planning department. On 1 April 1994, Tony Walker, Chief Planner of the Development Control Section, was appointed Planning Director of the Land Use Rights Division.

Although Walker mainly focused on the management of his division, he also became involved in strategic planning and contributed to the refinement of EMPRET and the later IDP processes, as well as the later restructuring of the planning department in 1997.

In February 1994, Wilhelm (Skaap) Mouton was reconfirmed in his position as Director of the Guideline Planning Division⁴⁷. Although the functions of strategic planning and IDP originated in the Forward Planning Section (the forerunner of the Guideline Planning Division) and although these functions were mainly the responsibility of this division, Mouton and most of the planners in Guideline Planning contributed very little to the initial development of the new urban planning approach.

On 1 October 1994, a chief urban designer and four new chief town planners were appointed. Jaksa Barbir was appointed as the first Chief Urban Designer of the newly established urban design function. Barbir, a planner/urban designer/architect who had studied in, and emigrated from Croatia at the end of the 1980s, had a sound knowledge of, and vast experience of spatial planning, urban design and strategic planning. During the latter part of the 1990s/early 2000, he played an instrumental role in developing and promoting the principles of IDP and strategic spatial planning. In the middle of 1999 he also became a member of the IDP task team that, amongst other things, refined and promoted IDP in Pretoria.

In the Land Use Rights Division, Annemarie Borsje, Jan Cilliers and Theo Ligthelm were appointed as chief town planners. With the exception of Borsje, who became involved in the IDP processes

⁴⁶ See also later discussion on Yates' role in the department during the late 1990s and early 2000.

⁴⁷ In cases where a certain position did not become vacant, or where the inherent contents of a position did not change significantly as a result of the restructuring process, the incumbents of these positions did not have to re-apply for these positions, as was the case with Wilhelm (Skaap) Mouton, the former Chief Planner of the Forward Planning Section.

in 1997/1998, these planners did not really contribute to the transformation of the urban planning system in the City of Tshwane.

On 1 October 1994, Johnny Coetzee was appointed chief planner in the Guideline Planning Division. The appointments of Borsje and Coetzee frustrated many planners, specifically in the Guideline Planning Division, mainly in view of the fact that the majority of planners in this division preferred other senior/more experienced planners (who were 'in line' for promotion) to be appointed in these positions. These planners often had to face direct critique and sometimes insult from their colleagues. After the appointments, many planners (mostly those who had not been appointed) criticised the adjudication process as being ineffective. Again, this state of affairs presents an example of the so-called resistance to power and the complexity of power relations within the power and social web as described by Foucault.

The Purpose Directed Management (PDM) restructuring process, which was "*one of the most radical changes in the council*" (Tindall 2000) eventually resulted in a much 'flatter' organisational structure, fewer departments, and the downsizing of personnel through natural attrition and voluntary severance packages⁴⁸. The PDM restructuring (apart from the appointment of new managers), however, did not have much affect on the organisational structure and functions of the two planning divisions *per se* in view of the fact that the restructuring process was largely facilitated and 'manipulated' by the departmental and division heads of the department - typical of the dominatory "infra power" (Foucault) or "the power of The Prince" (Machiavelli). These managers mainly protected their powers as well as the existing power structures and power relations in the organisation.

As a result of the above, very little was done to (re)create a new organisational structure that could more effectively accommodate the new forms of urban planning. The new name of the department did, however, place more emphasis on development, while the vision and mission statements of the new department emphasised aspects such as sustainability, environmental management, community participation and service delivery⁴⁹. Although the restructuring process created the opportunity to appoint more people from other cultures and of the female gender, the whole new management, with the exception of Borsje, comprised white males. In the beginning of 2001 this profile was largely criticised by the new political structures, managers and officials as being "too male and too pale".


⁴⁸ See Tindall (2000).

⁴⁹ Information obtained from council reports and notes on the restructuring process.

As the 1990s progressed, and as the transformation processes unfolded in the City, the planners began to adapt to the new management. There were, however, always those planners and officials, specifically from the Guideline Planning Division, who continually expressed their frustrations and concerns regarding the transformation and the ongoing changes in the Council. This negative attitude later hampered the transformation of urban planning, as it made it difficult for the management to promote the new forms of urban planning.

Although this new leadership structure of the planning department initially had a negative affect on the general morale and attitude of the planners, the new leaders provided a fresh impetus in the planning department and a new momentum to the transformation of urban planning.

FIGURE 1: ORGANIGRAM OF THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT (1994)



5.5 THE DAWN OF 'THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA'

The effect of the government transformation on urban planning in the Greater Pretoria Region: 1994 onwards

In South Africa, prior to the government transformation in 1994, an extensive pre-transformation negotiation process was followed, commonly referred to as CODESA, in an attempt to negotiate a new democratic government structure for South Africa. This process, which was done in the midst of volatile political struggles and powers provides proof of the value of effective negotiation, ongoing speech act and the power of communicative rationality - and also the power of "*communicative action*" and "*the unconstrained force of the better argument*" (as described by Habermas⁵⁰).

While the City of Pretoria was investigating and exploring new planning models and organisational structures for the city during 1992/1993 (almost pre-empting the impact of the transformation that was about to materialise), the old National Party government and the African National Congress (ANC) were preparing for the government transformation processes of what was at that time referred to as 'the new South Africa'.

One of the first visible outcomes of the transformation process, particularly in the former City Council of Pretoria, was the integration or inclusion of Mamelodi, Atteridgeville, Eersterust and Laudium (the previously segregated Indian, Coloured and Black group areas) with the traditional, previously white Pretoria area. The area of jurisdiction (and the planning area) of the City Council of Pretoria almost doubled in size, from 400 000 people (in the old Pretoria), to almost one million⁵¹.

Apart from this addition to the planning area at the time, senior officials and councillors strongly emphasised that those neglected areas should receive special attention in order to improve the imbalances of the past. Although some officials expected that this integration would imply a substantial additional workload, as well as an expansion of functions, the planners never really had any major problems coping with the extended municipal area. This, in some ways, created the impression that the planners did not have enough work to keep them fully occupied, or, conversely, that the planners did not devote the necessary attention to these additional areas. It was initially difficult for the planners to engage in these areas that had previously been excluded, in view of the

⁵⁰The CODESA negotiations in South Africa also underline Habermas' challenge of "*making sense together while living differently*". Habermas provided a rich seam of ideas about how to reconstitute the public realm through open, public debate.


⁵¹ These estimated figures were obtained from the data section of the planning department in 1999.

fact that they had very little knowledge and experience of these areas.

However, as the transformation process unfolded during the mid-1990s, these areas became more prominent and more efforts were directed towards them. This integration was also the first major step towards spatial integration in the City of Pretoria. Although many lessons were learned from the apartheid regime, the separation and neglect of these areas emphasised the flaws of the previous planning system and further underscored the need to plan and develop the city as an integrated whole.

When looking back at the overall metropolitan planning system in Pretoria - or the so-called guideline planning function, it is unthinkable that 'contemporary planners' in the late 1990s could plan a metropolitan area without looking at the city as an integrated whole - ignoring and neglecting some of the most important communities in the city.

FIGURE 2: THE INTEGRATION OF THE PREVIOUSLY SEPARATED AREAS WITH THE OLD PRETORIA AREA (1994)



The transformation process in the former City of Pretoria also gained a new momentum in November 1995 when the first democratic municipal elections were held in Pretoria - resulting in a new ANC-dominated electorate. As a result of the ANC's policies and its new focus on integrated planning and development, service delivery, spatial integration and the equal distribution of resources, the newly elected Pretoria Council supported and promoted the new emerging principles of integrated and democratic planning⁵².

The new local government dispensation resulted in an entirely new local government structure for the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area. This structure included, *inter alia*, the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council (GPMC) and three Metropolitan Local Councils (MLCs): Pretoria, Centurion and Akasia/Tswaing. This new local authority structure further implied a new division of functions between the GPMC and the three MLCs. This division of functions mainly implied that metropolitan functions such as bulk services and metropolitan planning had to be transferred to the newly established GPMC. The MLCs were responsible for local or city-wide functions such as planning efforts and development projects within the particular MLC area.

In many areas the GPMC resulted in a costly duplication of functions and sometimes created the impression of a new 'tier' of government, superior to the local councils. The lack of roles and responsibilities and poor relationships between the GPMC and the other MLCs often created friction and a threat to many officials in the City Council of Pretoria and also those in the other MLCs (see Perception Survey, 1999). Although the metropolitan function was seen as another step in the direction of integration and integrated planning, this local authority arrangement, with its dominant local (MLC) focus and the separate local authorities within one metropolitan area, was later criticised as being obstructive to integrated and equitable urban management⁵³. As a result of the GPMC's perceived higher status or coordinating authority over the other "lower tier" MLCs, it created the impression of a super "central power" /authority (similar to the dominatory / infra power as described by Machiavelli and Foucault). This centralised power was strongly resisted by the other smaller/dispersed powers in the power web as described by Foucault. These new power structures not only disrupted the power web and the balance of power relations but it resulted in a power clash between the power structures of the GPMC and the various MLCs, mainly as a result of the problems related to undefined roles, responsibilities and powers.

The new local government dispensation - more specifically the GPMC with its expanded

⁵² See also ANC (1992 and 1994).

⁵³ See later discussion on the unicity.

metropolitan responsibilities - ultimately had a major impact on the transformation of urban planning, particularly the later development of the IDP. The organisational structure of the GPMC was largely developed by Dr Lucas Botha (the same Dr Botha who had been involved with EMPRET in the City Council of Pretoria in 1993). Although EMPRET did not directly influence the GPMC organisational structure, it was obvious that Botha was promoting a more integrated approach to planning and development, as promoted by EMPRET. Botha was also appointed as the first CEO of the GPMC.

Since the establishment of the GPMC, a new Land-use and Transportation Planning Division was established under the leadership of Dr Louis Potgieter. Potgieter was commonly regarded as a very knowledgeable and experienced transport planner, a popular manager and a strong leader. This Division was divided into three planning functions: Transport Planning, Land-use Management and Metropolitan Guideline Planning. Of particular importance to this study, is the Metropolitan Guideline Planning section, and more particularly, the role that the head of this function, Amond Beneke, played in the later transformation of urban planning.

Beneke was a strong leader and an experienced planner who had the ability to change things and make things happen. He was an autocratic leader with a domatory management style. It often looked as if Beneke was making it his mission to get to the top, no matter what the cost (see also Machiavelli's strategies of gaining and maintaining power). Although he often expressed ideas on the new forms of urban planning, he was still very much entrenched in the old rigid and structural ways of planning, as is evident in his rigid style of planning and management. Prior to the GPMC, the Guideline Planning Division of the City Council of Pretoria did most of the metropolitan planning. These planners became frustrated and felt threatened when this key component of their planning function was captured by the GPMC (and Beneke). This state of affairs created friction amongst the planners of the old Pretoria Council and the GPMC and also a clash of powers.

Unlike the former local councils, which only focused on a particular municipal area or an isolated area within fixed municipal boundaries, the GPMC, for the first time, established an integrated urban planning and development framework for the Tshwane Metropolitan planning area as a whole. Throughout the 1990s, the GPMC also initiated and implemented numerous planning and development projects across the spectrum of the urban environment and throughout the whole metropolitan area. The GPMC always played a major role in the process of developing and promoting the IDP in the former Greater Pretoria region. In view of the fact that the GPMC was a newly established organisation, it created an opportunity to appoint a new team of planners from other parts of the province and even the country - and thus a new or different impetus. This new

impetus should, however, not be construed as the impetus of the new planning paradigm.

Although some of the new planners (mostly the younger planners such as Henry Bezuidenhout and Hannelie Barnard) were associated with the emerging planning system, many of the planners (mostly the older planners such as Beneke) were still schooled in and moulded in the old fashioned way of 'NP government planning'. In spite of this, the new group of planners in many ways provided a counterbalance to the existing rigid structure planning system that then seemed to have dominated the planning system in the Greater Pretoria region. As the newly elected politicians and appointed top management were recruiting the new organisation, they used the opportunity to appoint more black people and women in the organisation and specifically in the more senior management positions. As a result of this, the GPMC organisational structure in 1995/1996 presented a more representative staff profile - although this structure was not at all representative of the wider population.

Despite the fact that many organisational and structural changes had taken place since the establishment of the GPMC in 1995, many people today argue that the GPMC (in view of its equity policy) paved the way for the establishment of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM), which was established in December 2000.

As the new forms of urban planning began to emerge and mature in the beginning of 1995, a new Regional Structure Plan for Greater Pretoria, known as the Greater Pretoria Regional Structure Plan (GPRSP)⁵⁴, was published in May 1995. The GPRSP, compiled by PLAN Associates and Stewart Scott Inc, was an attempt by the planners to create a plan for the larger metropolitan area as a whole - an area that included Cullinan, Bronkhorstspuit, Brits, and Hartebeespoortdam. The purpose of this plan was: *"...to satisfy the needs of the community - physical, spatial, economic, social and institutional - in the best possible way"*⁵⁵. This purpose clearly emphasised a new focus on the community and a shift of emphasis away from the limited physical planning and all the critique attached to it. The GPRSP to some extent recognised the RDP principles and emphasised some of the later IDP principles and new trends. These included trends such as the integration and coordination of the different environmental components; the linkage of the plan with the budget; the integration of transport and land use; the emphasis on implementation and strategies for implementation; and the need for community participation. The plan focused on social issues such as education, security, health, community needs and priorities, economic development, employment and functional interaction. It also underscored the importance of development

⁵⁴ This plan was done in accordance with the 'old' pre-transformation/apartheid legislation: the Physical Planning Act (Act 125 of 1991); and the Regional Services Council Act (Act 109 of 1985)

⁵⁵ See City Council of Pretoria (1995).

facilitation as part of the implementation process. In spite of the positive aspects of this plan, it was still associated with the technical structure planning approach of the past, lacked a spatial and strategic vision and followed a strong sectoral approach. The GPRSP, with all its old characteristics, was initiated and developed by the old regime on the eve of transformation, with very limited consultation. This plan consequently received very little support from the new regime and ultimately never got implemented. The GPRSP, although within the context of the structure plan, incorporated some of the emerging principles and underscored the new thinking on urban planning that was unfolding in the city.

Soon after the government transformation in 1994, many planners, managers and officials experienced the impact of the government transformation process, and more specifically its impact on urban planning. They realised that they had reached a point of no return and knew that it was merely a question of 'going with the changes or being left behind'. As can be expected, many people, particularly those who found themselves in a comfort zone, feared the turmoil, uncertainty and unstable conditions that are normally associated with such transformation processes and also the new power structures. Many officials also feared that they might lose their jobs (or their power). Although some officials feared the uncertainty, many officials saw this transformation as a new challenge and a new opportunity. Yates often referred to the "exciting times" and "the window of opportunity". As the new local authority was settling down in the new structures and portfolios, the officials were cautiously observing and anxiously waiting for all the 'new things' to happen...

5.6 A NEW PLANNING MODEL EMBEDDED IN HOLISM

Environmental Management Programme for Pretoria (EMPRET): 1994 to 1995

As the transformation progressed in the country and in the former City of Pretoria, Lucas Botha, Mike Yates and Johnny Coetzee increasingly emphasised the need to develop and implement a new urban planning system for Pretoria that would conform to the requirements of 'the new South Africa'.

To this end, Botha initiated a process in September 1994, aimed at creating forum structures to implement the RDP, and a possible local RDP for the City of Pretoria⁵⁶. Following on this initiative, Botha requested Yates and Coetzee, mainly in view of their involvement with EMPRET and urban strategic planning, to advise him regarding the new RDP forum structures. They subsequently prepared a discussion paper entitled *Proposed Forum Structure for a Reconstruction and*

⁵⁶ Information obtained from notes and reports compiled by Botha in 1994.

*Development Programme for the Greater Pretoria (PRDP)*⁵⁷.

At this time, the Pretoria Structure Plan and its related guideline plans and policies directed all planning and development actions in the City of Pretoria. The City Council also had a corporate strategic plan aimed at directing and managing the organisational functions within the local authority and, to a limited extent, the city functions.

These frameworks all had a common aim: to plan, reconstruct, develop and manage the city and all its components. Yates and Coetzee had often stated that these new approaches and the juxtaposition of different planning and management frameworks created confusion amongst planners and urban managers. In support of this, they again emphasised the need for one overarching framework/plan/policy/programme/strategy that could integrate all components related to urban planning, development and management (including the RDP principles).

Yates and Coetzee, who were then strongly supported by Botha, argued that EMPRET, in view of the integrated, strategic and comprehensive nature of the plan, had the potential to become such an overarching and strategic framework/plan for the city⁵⁸. Coetzee often referred to the above as "*The City Plan*". This realisation led to continued efforts to review and refine the initial 1993 EMPRET principles in an attempt to establish an appropriate planning and city management system for Pretoria.

After numerous discussion sessions with concerned officials and councillors, a new EMPRET discussion document was compiled in December 1995. This document was entitled *EMPRET: A participatory, integrated and holistic approach towards planning, development and environmental management*⁵⁹. In spite of some critique on the riddle of words contained in the title, it encompassed the essence of this construct.

The first draft document was submitted to all councillors and Council Departments for their comments. Unfortunately a very poor response was received from the councillors and the departments concerned. This poor response was a clear indication that Coetzee, who was in charge of this process, had not done enough to prompt the councillors and departments for their comments or to explain the strategic importance of the EMPRET document. The poor response can also be ascribed to the fact that the documents were circulated for comments during the December/January holiday season. The responses that were received, mostly from the key council

⁵⁷ See City Council of Pretoria (1994).

⁵⁸ The above is supported by various discussions that were held between Botha, Yates and Coetzee during late 1994.

⁵⁹ See City Council of Pretoria (1995).

departments, were however, very positive and supportive of the initiative.

In March 1996 a second draft document was finalised⁶⁰. Although many officials and councillors regarded this EMPRET discussion document as an important document, it was never submitted to the City Council of Pretoria or the GPMC for formal approval and always remained an informal discussion document. In retrospect, it can easily be argued that Yates and Coetzee steamrolled the process (through the application and abuse of their “professional powers”), and that they did not want to risk submitting (their) precious new planning approach to the Council for approval, as there was a strong possibility that it could be rejected.

As the EMPRET approach was being developed during the first half of the 1990s - the time within which many of the international trends emerged in South Africa - the EMPRET approach was largely influenced and shaped by these trends. Similarly, EMPRET was developed during the time of socio-political transformation in the country, and was ultimately shaped by this transformation⁶¹.

As a result of the above, it is no surprise that the EMPRET documents that were finalised in 1995/1996 (hereafter referred to as EMPRET) were strongly based on the principles of community-based planning, strategic planning and sustainable development planning (SDP), as discussed in Chapter 4. Within the context of the above, EMPRET promoted an urban planning structure and process that is largely reminiscent of the typical strategic planning processes and plans found in many other parts of the world⁶².

The EMPRET framework (similar to the typical strategic planning frameworks) as a whole provided the outline, structure or skeleton (the framework) within which decisions could be made and proposals implemented. It aimed at providing a democratic and participatory framework for a local authority to plan more responsively, responsibly, interactively and holistically. It also aimed to facilitate multi-disciplinary and cross-sectoral analyses of local problems and issues and to mobilise private and civic resources in the community to meet public service objectives.

Within the context of the strategic planning process, EMPRET reinforced the principle of community participation, the need to focus on community needs and priorities and the need to involve communities in all the phases of the strategic planning process. It also promoted the concept of coordinating mechanisms such as inter-departmental or multi-disciplinary planning

⁶⁰ See City Council of Pretoria (1996).

⁶¹ See also Harrison (1998) on the impact of the international trends and the socio-economic context on the transformation of urban planning in South Africa.

⁶² See City Council of Pretoria (1995 and 1996). See also discussion on strategic planning in Chapter 4.

teams that could facilitate the strategic planning process⁶³.

While developing the EMPRET model, it was realised that the composition and structure of the Greater Pretoria region was too complex and diverse to effectively address and manage diversity in a sustainable manner. It was realised that local issues could not be effectively addressed from a metropolitan or citywide level. This prompted the idea of dividing the city into local planning areas or planning zones and to compile a Strategic Planning Framework (SPF) for each local area, within a hierarchy of frameworks.

This ultimately emphasised the need for a Planning Zone/Community Forum for each of the zones, which could facilitate community participation and coordination⁶⁴ - similar to the community planning forums found in other countries. Some planners, however, argued that the demarcation of such planning areas (and communities) could result in yet another different form of fragmented planning and development - something that could not be afforded in the 'new' urban era. The EMPRET model, however, strongly emphasised the need for integrating/coordinating mechanisms that could ensure integration and coordination between zones (local frameworks) to prevent any fragmentation of the urban area, as well as between the different levels of frameworks. This concept of Planning Zones, Planning Zone Forums and the hierarchy of frameworks and related community forums incidentally became the basis of the Pretoria IDP processes during 1997/1998.

Since the inception of EMPRET in 1993, strong emphasis was placed on the need to focus on the total urban environment and all its components, namely the natural, built, social and the so-called external environment, as well as the integration of these environmental components and their sub-components⁶⁵. This was also reflected by the title of EMPRET, which emphasised the "*...integrated and holistic approach...*" and the need to focus on all aspects related to "*...city planning, development and environmental management...*"⁶⁶. In 1997, many of the EMPRET principles were promoted in a policy document on community participation, which was compiled by Keith Griffiths for the GPMC⁶⁷. This principle of focusing on different environmental components (holistically) was a major step in the direction of Integrated Development Planning. This division (or definition) of the environment also formed the basis of the Pretoria Inner City (SDF) (1996), whilst a somewhat

⁶³ See City Council of Pretoria (1995 and 1996).

⁶⁴ See City Council of Pretoria (1995 and 1996).

⁶⁵ The 1997/1998 IDPs were based on the physical, economic, social and institutional environments. The GPRSP (1995), DFA (1995) and the LGTA (1996), and the subsequent LDO processes in 1997 also promoted a similar division of the environment. See also Coetzee (1993); City Council of Pretoria (1995 and 1996).

⁶⁶ See City Council of Pretoria (1995 and 1996).

⁶⁷ See GPMC (1997:86 - 96).

similar division was used for the later 1997/1998 Pretoria IDPs⁶⁸.

As the EMPRET approach unfolded during 1995/beginning 1996, the planners in the department realised that EMPRET, in view of its strategic nature and the attention it received from top management, was becoming a reality. It was then obvious (within the context of the government transformation) that the urban planning system was changing radically and that a whole new set of power relations were being created.

The majority of planners in the Guideline Planning Division were sceptical about the new approach and argued that this 'liberal/left wing approach' could possibly replace or threaten the structure plan and even possibly those planners involved with the structure plan - again the resistance to new powers and also the fear of losing power. Critique was often expressed of the non-technical/social nature of EMPRET and its lack of focus on spatial planning. EMPRET, in view of the emphasis on the environment, unfortunately and wrongly created the impression that it was a green/environmental plan. Many officials raised their concern on the comprehensive nature of the model, which almost 'tried to be everything to everybody' and, to their view, had minimal practical application possibilities.

A planner in the Guideline Planning Division, who openly expressed her frustrations about the new EMPRET approach that encroached and threatened 'her' planning domain, once referred to EMPRET as 'Johnny's rubbish'. It is ironic to note that another planner also argued that EMPRET was basically the same as the old approach, except for the fact that it was populated with new terminology.

The above highlighted the fact that too little attention was paid to communication, information and education and also the need for more open communication between officials, and between managers and officials. The above also underlined the guideline planners' attachment to the concept of 'space and structures', and also the fear and reluctance of these planners to change, adapt, learn, explore and experiment. Ironically, these aspects are usually associated with the concept of guideline planning or forward planning - to think outside the box (space/structure) and to break new ground, so as to give guidance and guidelines for the future.

The planners from the other planning division (Land-use Rights), apart from some chief planners, were never involved with EMPRET, nor did they give any inputs or comments, mainly as a result of

⁶⁸ See also later critique on this 'artificial division' of the environment.

the fact that they were not invited or requested to participate. On the one hand, the management could be criticised for not officially involving these planners, but on the other hand their lack of action also indicated the general lack of interest and the overall reluctance of planners to learn and explore. Some planners were also sceptical of the involvement of Yates and the fact that he only involved 'certain people' in the process of developing the new model. Yates, however, always stated that he preferred to work with a small group of people on such projects. It was never his intention to perform this project behind closed doors.

Based on the above, it can be argued that more support and possibly enthusiasm could have been generated if more attention had been given to open communication and participation. It is ironic to note that, a planning model founded on participation, communication and transparency was developed in such isolation and by so few people.

Yates, however, soon realised the need to change the perceptions and culture in the department. To this end he requested Coetzee, in view of his extensive involvement with EMPRET, to develop and present a training programme for all the officials concerned (70 officials, mostly from the planning department).

Two one-day training sessions were held during March 1996 at the municipal training centre PREMOS, in Pretoria. These training sessions focused on general aspects related to EMPRET, strategic planning, the strategic planning process, the contents and aims of the plan, community participation, as well as on facilitation and community participation⁶⁹. After the training session the delegates were requested to rate their opinion of the EMPRET process by completing a questionnaire. Although some officials again raised concerns regarding the practical implementation of EMPRET, the majority (90%) of all the officials supported the principles and the continuation of the process. The majority of the delegates also responded positively to the training session and stated that they found the session to be valuable and informative. These training sessions ultimately provided a good basis for the IDP processes in 1997/1998 as they focused to a large extent on the strategic planning process and community participation. The practical training session also sensitised the planners to the new approach and gave them a glimpse of how it could work in practice (Perception Survey, 1999).

While much effort was made to promote EMPRET amongst the officials, it was also realised that this model, which was founded on community involvement, also had to be presented to and

⁶⁹ A part of the training session was in the form of a practical role-playing exercise where the delegates were involved in actually facilitating certain phases or components of the process, e.g. the vision phase and the SWOT analysis.

negotiated with the communities, or at least the key stakeholders of the city. During the period March 1996 to June 1996, the planning department invited more than 100 key stakeholder groups and individuals in the city to attend different information and discussion sessions on the proposed EMPRET process. More than 30 smaller discussion sessions and workshops were held with these stakeholders.

Unfortunately these community workshops and information sessions focused more on presenting the principles and marketing the idea than on work-shopping the contents of EMPRET. Many stakeholder groups and role players raised concerns such as the cost of the process, its time frame, how to ensure involvement from all the role players, and the practical implementation and management of the process. In general the various stakeholders were very positive about the new approach and specifically the fact that it provided for consultation in the various phases of the process. This comprehensive information/consultation phase despite its shortcomings, in many ways established support and buy-in from the many stakeholder groups and sensitised them to the basic philosophy and principles of the emerging approaches.

Apart from the above, this process set a basis for building new relationships between the stakeholders and the local authority - something that was desperately lacking during the transformation. This consultation process, which was also regarded as the pre-process for the Inner City Process, ultimately set the stage for the Inner City Process that was scheduled to begin in July 1996.

By the end of 1995 it became obvious that EMPRET, which in 1992/1993 started off mainly as an environmental plan or Local Agenda 21-type of initiative, was developing into a more strategic, corporate and comprehensive planning and urban management model. It had the potential to address and integrate the aspects related to urban planning, development and management. Although it was only a theoretical framework in a conceptual phase, it acquired many of the characteristics of the international planning trends as discussed in Chapter 4. In this regard it largely succeeded in promoting the new forms of urban planning such as strategic planning, social planning, community participation and urban management in the City Council of Pretoria.

The EMPRET model was also the first real stab at defining and describing the contents of the strategic and community participation processes, specifically within the context of the urban environment. At the time when EMPRET was finalised (1996), the government transformation process was well underway, and various national departments started promoting similar principles,

as those contained in EMPRET⁷⁰.

Although EMPRET did not directly influence the development of the (national) LDO and IDP concepts that emerged in 1996 and 1997 respectively, it had much in common with these concepts - the reason being that all these concepts were inspired by the same emerging trends and socio-economic context as discussed in Chapter 4, and also more or less during the same (transformation) period (1992 to 1995). In the City Council of Pretoria, however, EMPRET largely formed the basis of the Pretoria Inner City Process (1996 to 1997) and the Pretoria IDP processes (1997 to 1998).

After the introduction of EMPRET a number of positive comments were released on EMPRET. The *Muniviro* 1996, official journal of the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism reported, “*EMPRET is a dynamic approach aiming to integrate all components of planning, development and environmental management. This is a programme for sustainable development aiming to achieve economic, environmental and social sustainability.*”

In a local Pretoria newspaper, *Rekord*⁷¹, Greeff stated in 1996 “*If EMPRET is supported and successfully implemented, it has the potential to become the one and only overarching planning and city management system for Pretoria. EMPRET, being a participatory, integrated and holistic approach aiming to achieve sustainable development, is also the Pretoria City Council’s response to the worldwide call by the World Bank, inviting all cities across the globe to formulate an Agenda 21 for their cities before 1996*”.

This same newspaper later reported, “*The City Council of Pretoria has realised the need for a new approach to environmental management in the city to allow all stakeholders to help draw up a planning framework for the city*” (Rekord 1996 (1)). It also stated “*A development programme, known as EMPRET, is one of the most comprehensive projects ever launched by the City Planning Department.*” (Rekord 1996 (2)).

Based on the foregoing, there can be little doubt that the EMPRET approach contributed much to the transformation of urban planning in the City of Pretoria/Tshwane (see also Perception Survey, 1999). After the finalisation of the EMPRET document in March 1996, the EMPRET process “*was looking for a place to be implemented*” - this place was the inner city of Pretoria...

⁷⁰ See ANC (1994); and Republic of South Africa (1995; 1996 (a) and (b)).

⁷¹ *Rekord* is a Pretoria community newspaper, which is distributed to the different regions of the city.

5.7 “CHERISH THE HEART OF THE CITY”⁷²***The Pretoria Inner City Process: February 1996 to February 1997***

At the time that EMPRET was finalised, the inner city of Pretoria was deteriorating rapidly. Crime in the inner city was on the increase. The environmental quality of the inner city was decreasing as a result of littering and pollution. A new concern arose regarding the overall social decay and increase of street children and prostitution.

Major businesses started moving out of the inner city, mostly to the eastern suburbs of Pretoria. Major property groups such as Anglo American Properties (AMPROP) and SANLAM announced that they were going to cease new developments in the inner city areas⁷³. Representatives from the business associations in Pretoria such as the South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA), the Pretoria Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Pretoria Afrikaanse Sakekamer regularly requested the City Council to address the problems of the inner city⁷⁴.

Jill Strelitz, a town-planner who was partially responsible for the planning/property portfolio of AMPROP, approached the planning department in 1995 to suggest mechanisms on how to better manage the inner city of Pretoria. This resulted in various follow-up meetings with Neil Fraser, the Executive Director of the Central Johannesburg Partnership. Fraser presented examples of cities such as Philadelphia, Washington and New York that had managed to reverse the process of inner city decay through effective city planning and management. These discussions not only highlighted the problems and threats; opportunities and challenges of the inner city, but also re-emphasised the need for an integrated and strategic urban management approach that could facilitate the effective development and management of the inner city - an approach similar to EMPRET.

As a result of the growing concerns in the inner city, Yates decided to proceed with EMPRET in the inner city⁷⁵. He was eager to get started with the EMPRET process in the inner city as a pilot project before implementing the process in the other planning zones and local authority areas⁷⁶. To this end, the planning department submitted a report to the Executive Committee of the City

⁷² ‘*Cherish the heart of our city*’ was the slogan of the Pretoria Inner City Partnership (PICP) from 1996 to 2000.

⁷³ See Hasenfuss (1997); Muller (1997 and 1998); Adler (1998); Pretoria News (30 October 1997); and de Nysschen (1997).

⁷⁴ Personal communication, De Beer (Chamber of Commerce), Vorster (SAPOA), De Villiers (Pretoria Afrikaanse Sakekamer), 1996.

⁷⁵ The inner city area became Planning Zone 8 in 1997 and included the CBD, Sunnyside, Arcadia, Berea and Marabastad.

⁷⁶ In the beginning of 1996, when the Inner City Process started, there was still a big debate on the demarcation of planning zones, planning zone boundaries and ward boundaries. It was, however, decided to proceed with the Inner City Process and not to wait for the finalisation of the planning zones, as it was argued that the inner city area of Pretoria should not be limited by fixed boundaries as in the case of the other zones in Pretoria - the reason for this being that the inner city's function permeates all other zones in the city in view of its citywide function (See City Council of Pretoria, 1996).

Council of Pretoria, requesting approval to proceed with the EMPRET process in the inner city of Pretoria. Following the approval of this report on 20 February, a number of actions were taken to prepare for the process in the Inner City. An administrative office for the Inner City was established and a secretariat/public liaison officer, Elize Rautenbach, was appointed on a contract basis to facilitate community involvement and communication. A major marketing and communication campaign was launched in conjunction with the City Council's Directorate of Marketing in order to communicate effectively with the City's stakeholders⁷⁷.

A consultant firm, Keith Griffiths (Associates), was appointed to assist with the structuring of the process and to facilitate the workshops. In addition to this, a comprehensive database was compiled of stakeholders⁷⁸ in the city. An inter-departmental/multi-disciplinary City Council planning team, comprising representatives of the various Council departments concerned, was established to ensure inter-departmental coordination.

Johnny Coetzee developed a Strategic Planning Workbook⁷⁹ to assist the technical teams and participants in the various phases of the strategic planning process. An Interim Steering Committee was established to steer the planning process until a more representative committee could be elected. This committee consisted of a project manager, liaison officer, ward councillors, the Executive Director of City Planning and Development and other officials from the City Council to be appointed as and when necessary⁸⁰. In March 1996, this committee officially started preparing for the Inner City Process. Unlike the former rigid planning processes that were mainly performed by planners, these institutional arrangements presented a new mechanism for integrated planning and community participation. Later that same month, Yates requested Coetzee to manage the Inner City Process. During the many meetings and workshops with the key stakeholder groups (the pre-process phase), valuable information was gathered on how to structure and implement the various phases of the process. As the Inner City Process unfolded, Yates and Coetzee realised that much detail planning still had to be done regarding the various phases and components of the process. The detail regarding the phases and steps in the process (for example, how to involve communities in the formulation of a vision) was literally developed (in many cases on a trial-and-error basis) as the process unfolded.

⁷⁷ See also City Council of Pretoria, 1996 (newsletters); Groenewald (1996); and Muniform (1996)

⁷⁸ This database contained, amongst others, the names, addresses, interest and affiliation and telephone/fax numbers of the various stakeholder groups.

⁷⁹ The workbook explained the various phases and steps in the strategic planning process in layman's terms. The workbook contained a number of worksheets that aimed to assist the participants with the formulation of a vision or a SWOT analysis, for example. This workbook ultimately proved to be a valuable tool in this process. See also City Council of Pretoria (1996).

⁸⁰ See City Council of Pretoria (1996).

For Yates and Coetzee, the Inner City Process was a major challenge and an opportunity for them to prove the value and application possibilities of the EMPRET principles that they had been promoting for the past four years. They soon discovered, however, that the Inner City Process was not a 'trial run'. It was a serious process that involved many stakeholders from various sectors and a dedicated effort (from all role players inside and outside the Council) was required to effectively implement the process, specifically within the context of the many problems of the inner city.

After much preparation by the Steering Committee, the first Inner City Workshop, the Vision Workshop, was held on 28 June 1996⁸¹. One of the major milestones achieved at this workshop was the establishment of the Pretoria Inner City Partnership (PICP)⁸² - in short, the first Planning Zone Forum in the Greater Pretoria Area. The vision exercise that was initiated at the first workshop largely succeeded in uniting the partners and promoted further interest among stakeholders⁸³. After the first workshop, some of the local Pretoria newspapers commented positively on the new approach to planning, the high level of interest in the PICP and the high level of community involvement⁸⁴.

The establishment of the PICP was not only seen as a new (community) power structure in the City, but it also resulted in a number of new power relations between the community and the local authority. Although most people (from the community and the local authority) initially did not see the power (strength) or potential power of this forum, they soon realised the powers as the forum engaged with the urban planning and management processes and municipal affairs of the local authority. These powers also became stronger as the community support base of the forum expanded - the power of alliances or social power as referred to by Kogler and Wartenburg in Chapter 2. The power of the PICP later in the 1990s resulted in a power clash and conflict between the community (powers) and the local authority/political (powers).

On 25 July 1996, a second workshop of the Forum was held to determine community needs and priorities (the second step in the process). One of the outcomes of this workshop was the establishment of 13 inner city working groups - similar to the so-called issue-based task teams

⁸¹ This workshop was attended by □150 people representing a wide spectrum of stakeholder groups and issues

⁸² In 1998, the PICP was registered as a Section 21 company under the name of Pretoria Inner City Association (The replacement of 'partnership' with 'association' was merely due to terminological requirements of the Registrar of Companies).

⁸³ The vision phase usually forms the core component and the basis for strategic planning. The vision phase usually results in a shared community vision, which expresses a local consensus amongst stakeholders. The vision also promotes participation and guides the group or stakeholders throughout the process (ICLEI 1996: 8 and 23; ICLEI 1997; CSIR 1998: D34; Nanus 1992: 3, 16 - 7; Weeks and Lessing 1993: 72; Auckland City Council 1996).

⁸⁴ See Groenewald (1996); Pretoria News (1997); and Muniforum (1996).

found in other countries⁸⁵. These working groups, which were structured around the main critical issues, presented the broader spectrum of planning issues, and more specifically the focus on social and economic issues.

They ultimately played a major role in involving the communities and technical officials in the process of formulating goals, objectives and strategies⁸⁶, and later also in the implementation of projects. They represented yet another mechanism aimed at facilitating integrated planning and community participation⁸⁷.

FIGURE 3: 13 PICP WORKING GROUPS (1996)

BUILT ENVIRONMENT	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT	EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Physical structure * Housing * Transport * Urban conservation and image * Infrastructure and services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Environmental education and marketing * Development and utilisation of open spaces * Holistic environmental management 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Human development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Education - Health - Culture - Homeless - Social * Safety 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * City management and political issues * City promotion * Economic issues

After some six months of planning and extensive consultation, the PICP and its working groups compiled a draft strategic planning document at the end of 1996 entitled *Strategic Development Framework (SDF) for the Inner City of Pretoria: Growing towards 2020*⁸⁸. The draft SDF contained, among other things, a record and description of the community participation process; a vision statement for the inner city and a description of the vision; a description and problem statement of each of the 13 working groups or main issues; a set of goals, objectives, action proposals and strategies for each of the main issues; and proposals regarding the roles and responsibilities of the to-be-established Management Committee of the PICP. In January 1997 the draft SDF for the inner city was sent to the stakeholders and members of the Forum for their comments. The following month, an Inner City Strategic Planning Summit was held at the Sammy Marks

⁸⁵ In many instances, community-based or stakeholder working groups were established to facilitate community participation processes to focus attention on specific issues or groupings of issues or specific sectors. See also ICLEI (1995); Redcliff (1987: 130); GPMC (1997: 114); ICLEI (1997); Department of Transport (1990: 20); and Brynard (1996:14).

⁸⁶ Based on a record of meetings and attendance figures held by Elize Rautenbach, more than 60 different smaller workshops and discussion sessions were held by the 13 working groups from September 1996 to December 1996.

⁸⁷ See also Yssel (1997), Rautenbach (1996) and Groenewald (1996b).

⁸⁸ See City Council of Pretoria (1997).

Auditorium in Pretoria. The main principles of the SDF were thoroughly discussed and eventually accepted, subject to certain proposed amendments. Although the SDF for the inner city was criticised for its shortcomings, many participants regarded it as a good product (see Perception Survey, 1999). After the finalisation of the SDF and the completion of the formulation phase of the process, the many participants were relieved when they realised that the EMPRET process, which initially seemed like a very complicated process, was 'working', even in a complicated planning area such as the inner city of Pretoria.

After the Planning Summit, local newspapers continued to commend the inner city initiative and the PICP on the completion of the SDF for the inner city⁸⁹. The SDF was the first strategic planning document of its kind to be drafted for a local area⁹⁰ in Pretoria and its contents were reminiscent of typical strategic plans that existed in many parts of the USA, UK and Australia. Although the Inner City Process largely presented a shift in emphasis with regard to urban planning, the rest of the planning department was still mostly involved with the old forms of structure planning and land use control. Very few planners in the department actually showed an interest in the Inner City Process or the new SDF. This can be ascribed to the planners' fear for any new forms of power, which could threaten their powers (or the powers of their Prince) and also the resistance associated with such transformation or the introduction of new powers.

This further emphasised the lack of communication and the fact that the top management in the planning department was not doing enough to promote the new principles and to involve the planners in the new approach and to sensitise and educate them. This also highlights the strange 'local xenophobia' that existed amongst so many planners. Unfortunately the Inner City Process, when it started, was mostly seen as just another 'project' or experiment and not really the introduction or 'phasing in' of a new urban planning system. Although the other planning zones had not yet been finalised by the time the Inner City Process was launched, planners could at least have made some effort to adapt to and apply the new principles in their daily work. This implied that planners would have had to expand their focus from the rigid physical and land use planning to a wider focus on social, economic and institutional issues, as well as a new focus on strategic urban management.

As the Inner City Process unfolded during early 1997, the PICP continued to develop its management structures, roles and responsibilities. The Forum members elected the first Inner City Management Committee at the Inner City Strategic Planning Summit held in February 1997. This

⁸⁹ See Beeld, 13 February 1997; Pretoria News, 11 February 1997; and de Nysschen (1997).

⁹⁰ It should be noted that the only similar type of document was the Strategic Metropolitan Development Framework (SMDF), February 1997, which was drafted for the metropolitan area.

management committee was largely structured around the 13 working groups to present the broader spectrum of issues. The main aims of the Inner City Management Committee, within the context of the SDF, were, amongst other things, to represent the larger forum; to oversee the implementation of the SDF (watchdog function); to network support and raise funds for inner city projects; to be the main point of contact between the local authority and the community; and to make recommendations to the local authority with regard to new applications or new developments⁹¹. As discussed in sections to follow, this Management Committee with its strong leadership and supporting working groups became the “power hand” of the PICP and ultimately a big threat to the local authority power structures, and more specifically the political power structures.


At the first meeting of the PICP Management Committee, held on 12 February 1997 in one of the Mayors’ committee rooms in the Sammy Marks Building, Alderman Bob Zylstra, a former mayor and retired quantity surveyor and businessman of Pretoria, was elected as the first Chairperson of the PICP. Joe Ngobeni, a Pretoria businessman, was elected as Vice-Chairperson⁹². Although the Management Committee started off on a very positive note, the PICP structure and process were soon criticised by councillors and members of the community for being too cumbersome and slow, while the management structure was criticised for not representing the wider spectrum of the community, more specifically the black communities from other areas, who mostly worked in the inner city.

Members of the Management Committee regularly discussed the problems and revisited its structure and composition in an effort to improve the functioning of the PICP (see Perception Survey, 1999). Within the context of urban planning, these management structures, with their strong leadership (functioning outside the cadre of the local authority with its rigid structures) formed an important part of the overall urban planning and management process. It formed an important link between the community and the Council. Problems and issues surrounding the structure and composition of the PICP Management Committee became a major point of discussion within the PICP and the local authority during 2000.

⁹¹ See Pretoria Inner City Partnership (1997).

⁹² See Beeld, 13 February 1997; Pretoria News, 11 February 1997.

FIGURE 4: ORGANIGRAM – PICP MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (FEBRUARY 1997)



The PICP and its newly elected management soon realised that the Inner City Process had created many expectations. A major effort was needed to implement the SDF and the strategies and action proposal it contained. After many discussions between members of the PICP, Yates and the incumbent City Councillor for City Planning, Alderman Derick Coetzee, it was decided to establish a new full-time inner city project team⁹³ under the leadership of Coetzee, to facilitate the implementation of the SDF for the inner city. The inner city project team soon structured and geared itself and started preparing for the implementation phase. Unlike the old planning system, where planning was done by the 'scientific' land use planners, the inner city planning team represented an inter-disciplinary approach and a wider range of disciplines: strategic planning, management, economics, marketing, communication, environmental management and social

⁹³ Four qualified and fairly senior town planners (Bernard Hanekom, Chris Swanepoel, Klaus Rust and Albrecht Heroldt) were redeployed from the planning department to deal with the overall planning and management of the inner city. Lodi Venter, also from the planning department, who has a masters' degree in Business Administration, was redeployed to the team and made responsible for economic development in general. Elize Rautenbach, who has a postgraduate qualification in marketing and communication, was appointed, initially on a contract basis and later on a full-time basis, and was made responsible for marketing and communication and the community participation processes. Marike Brown, who has a degree in public administration, was also redeployed from the planning department and made responsible for general administration. In 1998 Elize Rautenbach had resigned and was subsequently replaced by Desiree Homann, who has a postgraduate degree in journalism and had previously worked in the City Council's Marketing and Communications Division. In 1998 Lodi Venter was promoted and deployed in another division and replaced in 1999 by Laura Lourens, who has a diploma in Town Planning. Klaus Rust also left the inner city team in 1999 to assist with citywide planning.

planning.

Unlike the former autocratic approaches in the City Council where officials and politicians mainly decided on the priorities of projects and the allocation of funds, the PICP introduced a new process that allowed the concerned stakeholders to participate in the prioritisation of the inner city projects, as well as the allocation of funds to each of these processes⁹⁴. This inner city prioritisation process, which was performed by the inner city project team, the inter-departmental team and the representatives of the inner city communities, ultimately resulted in a list of projects, weighted and prioritised according to their priorities⁹⁵. The outcome of the prioritisation process or the prioritised list of objectives and projects formed the basis and guideline for later project implementation and budgetary processes and ultimately became a core component of the implementation process⁹⁶.

Following the prioritisation process, a comprehensive submission was made to the City Council of Pretoria to motivate the strategic importance of the inner city and to motivate a budget based on the prioritised list of inner city projects. On 29 June 1997⁹⁷ the City Council of Pretoria (after much debate in the Council meeting), approved the SDF for the inner city of Pretoria and allocated R15 million for inner city projects⁹⁸. The prioritisation process, followed by the PICP in May 1997, was the first of its kind in the City of Pretoria where the community was afforded the opportunity to participate in a process of determining criteria and prioritising projects.

This represented a major step towards integrated planning and democratic local government. The sustained efforts of the community (and the PICP) to get approval for the SDF and to implement the SDF projects, present a good example of community power as discussed in Chapter 2, and also “the power of the better argument” as promoted by Habermas. Initially these new powers that emerged in the Inner City Forum and Management Committee were seen as typical of the “good” community power as described in Chapter 2.

⁹⁴ The PICP was supported by a task team comprising Alderman Bob Zylstra (the Chairperson of the PICP), Councillor Fanie Venter (who was a consulting civil engineer at the time) and Johnny Coetzee. In May 1997 Dr Johan Anderson of AFRICON was appointed to assist the task team in structuring a prioritisation process for the inner city, mainly in view of his experience with similar prioritisation processes.

⁹⁵ The prioritisation process was mostly performed at a prioritisation workshop held in May 1997. Two weeks after the prioritisation workshop (22 May 1997), a follow-up workshop was scheduled to present the results of the prioritisation process to the participants and to allow opportunity for discussion.

⁹⁶ For viewpoints on the prioritisation process see Pretoria News, 23 May 1997; and de Nysschen (1997). See also Perception Survey, 1999.

⁹⁷ See City Council of Pretoria (1997).

⁹⁸ For more information on the media reports on the inner city budget, see Beeld, 30 June 1997; Beeld, 29 August 1997; de Nysschen (1997); Hoffeldt (1997); and Uys (1997).

This inner city prioritisation/budget process emphasised the important link between urban planning and management, and planning and municipal affairs. This process, which deviated largely from the traditional rigid way of budgeting, created a frustration amongst officials of the Treasurer's Department, and amongst certain politicians - mainly in view of the fact that the new participatory processes made it difficult for them to (autocratically) control and manipulate the budget (from the top) and to exercise their powers. They also saw this social power as a threat to the powers (and "the Prince"), which then dominated and controlled urban planning and management in the former Greater Pretoria region. This prioritisation process was also followed in 1998 (in the same format) for the IDP projects (1998).

Following the approval of the inner city budget, the PICP working groups and the inner city project team embarked on the implementation phase⁹⁹. In the first year of implementation (July 1997 to July 1998), the PICP implemented the highest priority projects: the integrated safety and security project; the establishment of City Improvement Districts (CIDs); the management of the informal trade; projects related to the homeless and street children; and the comprehensive marketing and communication strategy for the inner city.

Apart from these development projects, the PICP (during the first year of implementation) also embarked on a number of high priority studies and investigations: the Integrated Spatial Development Framework (ISDF), the Marabastad IDP, and the Economic Development Strategy for the inner city. The reason for this was that very few such strategies and plans existed for the inner city of Pretoria. During the consequent years (July 1998 onwards), the PICP and the project team continued to focus on the implementation of the priority SDF projects.

Although the City Council of Pretoria continued to support the PICP financially, its contributions decreased annually, mainly as a result of the Council's weak financial position at the time, as well as the fact that the Council expected the PICP to raise funds from other sources, specifically from business¹⁰⁰.

As the PICP proceeded with its functions, the members of the project team became more organised and focused. They gained more experience and confidence regarding project

⁹⁹ At this time, the GPMC and the three MLCs had just initiated the formulation phase of the Pretoria IDPs.

¹⁰⁰ In 1998 the PICP, after having submitted a detailed business plan and motivation to the Gauteng Department of Development Planning and Local Government's Vusani Amadolobha Fund, received a contribution of R1 million from this department for the physical upgrading of Marabastad, one of the neglected downtown areas of the inner city. The PICP also received a contribution of R1 million from the GPMC for inner city projects in 1998.

management and facilitation and also operated more constructively. The Management Committee reached greater clarity on its roles and responsibilities and functioned more effectively as well. A strong camaraderie developed between the members of the PICP project team. Many new relationships were forged between the members of the Forum, the Management Committee, the working groups and the project team. This momentum can largely be ascribed to the leadership of the chairperson; the enthusiasm and commitment of the members, officials and concerned politicians who wanted to succeed with this new initiative; the sustained open communication with the various stakeholders; and the financial and logistical support of the Council. In some sense the PICP as a group became more powerful and influential as the leaders and the community became more communicative/active - typical of the power of social groups and alliances as discussed in Chapter 2. The PICP already at an early stage of its existence proved the value and “power of communication and communicative action” and also the “power of communicative rationality” (see also Chapter 2).

As the implementation phase of the SDF for the inner city progressed, the planners increasingly became involved with a number of ‘new’ functions such as urban management, social planning and social development, economic development, community participation, development facilitation and conflict management - functions that were formally not part of these Pretoria planners’ portfolios. Although the PICP planners sometimes found it difficult to adapt to the new working environment and planning methodologies, they were always willing to learn and practice the skills that were required. While the inner city team was making great strides to explore the new approaches to planning, most other planners in the City Council of Pretoria continued with the old forms of structure planning and land use management - showing very little interest in the new urban planning system that was emerging in the City. Apart from a few engineers who formed part of the inner city inter-departmental team, the other Council engineers showed very little interest - probably because of the non-technical nature of the Inner City Process.

As a result of the multi-disciplinary approach (within the context of the working teams), the engineers had to take part in ‘integrated’ discussions, which often focused on topics outside the engineering field. This lack of involvement from the technical departments can also be ascribed to the fact that not enough effort was put into promoting the new approach within these departments. As was expected, the other departments that were involved with economic development, health care, safety and social development, for example, were very supportive of the new holistic and integrated nature of the Inner City Process - as this approach provided the opportunity for them to participate in the planning and development process.

As the PICP became more focused in late 1997, the members of the PICP Management Committee decided to revisit the relevance and priorities of the 13 initial critical issues that formed the basis of the PICP. They realised that the large number of issues and working groups had complicated the process and had diluted the real focus on the most critical issues. After much discussion, the original 13 working groups were restructured and consolidated into five new issue-based inner city working groups - based on the revised critical issues: safety and security; physical development and infrastructure development; human resource development; economic development, city promotion and tourism; and homelessness¹⁰¹. During this time the emphasis of the inner city working groups shifted from strategy formulation to strategy implementation. The new working groups created an important mechanism for stakeholders and communities and interested individuals to become involved with project implementation. Apart from the issue-based working groups, various other partnerships, joint ventures, and ad hoc task teams were established to deal with specific projects, areas or issues, for example, the Marabastad Development Forum. The PICP always aimed to coordinate and integrate the activities of the working groups and task teams; to focus on common goals; and to prevent any duplication of functions or actions. Although the working groups and task teams initially experienced some difficulty getting structured, some of these groups, such as the Safety Working Group, played a major role in the implementation of PICP projects.

During the implementation phase, literally hundreds of Pretorians (from various sectors) became involved with projects and initiatives in the inner city through these working groups. Not only did these working groups result in better and new relationships between the Council and the community, but they also created a mechanism through which different parties (public, private and community) could combine efforts and resources to achieve a common goal - or a goal that would not have been achieved by one particular party only. These working groups ultimately underscored the national government's policy on democratic planning and developmental local government as discussed in Chapter 4.

Since its inception in July 1996, the PICP (which included the various concerned stakeholders of the city, the inner city project team and the various working groups) had achieved several milestones and had successfully completed a number of inner city projects across the spectrum of the urban environment¹⁰². The PICP also made significant progress in marketing itself, as well as

¹⁰¹ Although the main structure of the working groups remained the same, some of the working groups were restructured in 1998, 1999, 2000, and again in 2001. In 1999 a dedicated working group for tourism was created. In 2000 a new working group for CIDs was established, as well as a new Housing working group in 2001.

¹⁰² The most important inner city projects are the comprehensive Kwanoo safety and security project; basic business training programmes for informal traders; life skills and basic education programmes for street children; a comprehensive inner city tourism project; the implementation of several projects and programmes aimed at addressing the problems of

the inner city and the development potential thereof; in protecting existing investments; and in stopping the exodus of business and government functions from the inner city. Judging by the increasing interest that had developed amongst developers and property administrators in the inner city since 1998, the marketing and project implementation efforts of the PICP seemed to have succeeded.

During the period 1997 to 2001 the efforts of the PICP received extensive and regular positive media coverage as expressed through the following headlines: *Already a drastic decrease in crime* (Rekord East, 17 April 1998); *Circle of life opens at zoo* (Botha, 1998); *Economy of the inner city is growing* [translated] (Beeld, 26 February 1998); *Marabastad earmarked for tourism* [translated] (Beeld, 30 June 1997); *Development in the inner city planned with a goal* [translated] (Yssel, 1997); *Working together to make city safe* (Lessing, 1997); *More guards make the inner city of Pretoria safe* [translated] (Beeld, 26 May 1998); *Opportunities created for Government Boulevard* [translated] (Beeld, 26 February 1998); *Security guards bring down Arcadia crime* (Pretoria News, 14 April 1998); *Project to revitalise city centre* (Saviades, 1998); *Security officers deployed at city hotspots* (Pretoria News, 26 May 1998); *City Partnership ensures safer festive season shopping* (Pretoria News, 19 December 1997); *The informal sector well structured* [translated] (Beeld, 26 February 1998); *Cabinet nod expected for Government Boulevard* (Saviades, 1998); *Marabastad publication 'beginning of bigger things'* [translated] (Fourie, 1998); *Marabastad gets its own guards* (Pretoria News, 19 May 1998); *Vacant building needed: housing facility for city's homeless* (Keppler, 1998); *Security highest priority for city centre* (Saviades, 1998); *This is how Pretoria wants to become the Capitol* [translated] (Yssel, 1998); *Bold ideas on the city's future* (Pretoria News, 19 March 1998); *Group has scored since inception* (Hlahla, 1998); *Inner city of great value* [translated] (Doman, 1998); *Urban decay can be turned around* [translated] (Jordaan, 1998); and *Pretoria marches ahead* (F and T Weekly, 23 January 1998).

The Pretoria News (20 April 1998) also reported "*Pretoria's Inner City Partnership has become a model for cities throughout South Africa and fact finding teams from other cities have approached it for advice*". This highlights the fact that the media recognised the new approach to urban management and the efforts of the PICP.

The biggest breakthrough for the PICP was probably the strategic role it played in convincing

the homeless in the city; various public awareness campaigns; the establishment of three City Improvement Districts (CIDs); physical upgrading projects in Marabastad; various city festivals and public events; a comprehensive 'top-up' street cleaning programme; plans for an African informal trade market and an inner city arts and craft market; and the establishment of an inner city environmental centre that implemented various environmental projects. Various studies and research projects were also completed.

national government to halt the outflux of government buildings from the inner city of Pretoria and the resultant cabinet resolutions in this regard¹⁰³. After having learnt that the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was negotiating a property deal in Hatfield (a suburb outside the inner city) for its new head offices, Coetzee and Desiree Homann (who was responsible for the PICP's marketing and communication), without consulting any PICP members, top management or politicians, set up a press conference with the Pretoria media to expose this 'move' (out of the inner city) to the larger public.

On the one hand, this exposure aggravated the private developers who were in the process of finalising a major deal with the Department; and on the other hand, it came as a surprise to the top management of the DTI who did not want any obstacles in the process or any bad publicity. This resulted in a special meeting of the Executive Committee of the former City Council of Pretoria, where this problem was discussed. The officials who were responsible for exposing the plans of the DTI were reprimanded for their unconventional actions. However, it resulted in further negotiations between top-level officials and politicians of the City Council and the DTI, and a decision by the DTI¹⁰⁴ to develop its new headquarters (to the value of R900 million) in the heart of the inner city on the old Trevenna City Lake site¹⁰⁵. These actions, apart from the fact that they underlined the importance of proper urban planning and management, underscored the new facilitating, entrepreneurial, developmental and strategic roles associated with contemporary urban planning. These negotiations (sustained communicative action) also proved the value of good rational arguments and communicative rationality - and the value of "good power".

The inner city project team continued to submit progress reports to the PICP Forum, members of the PICP Management Committee, the GPMC and the City Council of Pretoria¹⁰⁶. While each of the individual efforts contributed (in its own way) to the revitalisation of the inner city of Pretoria, the PICP project team always argued that the major impact resulted from the composite effect or the sum total of the various integrated efforts. The successful completion of all these projects (some of which were completed in a relatively short period of time with limited funds) proved the importance of integrated planning, community participation and the value of combined efforts. Unlike the traditional urban planning system, which in most cases resulted in 'plans' that could not be implemented, the new strategic, democratic, developmental and entrepreneurial type of urban

¹⁰³ See Department of Public Works (1998) and Saviades (1998).

¹⁰⁴ On 27 November 2001, at a meeting held at PREMOS in Pretoria, the Executive Mayor of the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) and the DTI jointly announced that the new DTI development and construction would commence in early 2003.

¹⁰⁵ At this time, the City Lake Project could not attract the necessary interest from developers and investors and was finally abandoned.

¹⁰⁶ See Pretoria Inner City Partnership (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001).

planning and management, as applied by the inner city team, focused more on implementation - much in line with the government's focus on integrated development planning and developmental local government¹⁰⁷.

The successful implementation of the many inner city projects can be ascribed to the fact that the Inner City Process, ever since its inception, emphasised strategy implementation as well as the continued involvement of all stakeholders in this phase. The Inner City Process further emphasised the need to establish supporting structures and support systems that could facilitate the implementation and monitoring of the process. In this regard it is important to recognise the management and 'watchdog' role played by the PICP Forum and its management committee, as well as the logistic and financial support provided by the local authority.

Prior to the Inner City Process (1996), very few planners in the City of Pretoria paid attention to issues such as economic planning or social planning and had very little to do with project implementation. The Pretoria planners believed that these issues fell outside the cadre of planning, which then focused mostly on 'physical' planning. The planners involved with the inner city area (prior to the approval of SDF for the inner city in 1997) were only involved with the processing of rezoning applications, the evaluation of site development plans and new building projects or urban renewal projects.

The previous Pretoria Structure Plan, for example, only contained a brief description and a detailed land use map of the physical spatial pattern of the inner city. This plan did not focus on the broader economic, social and institutional issues of the inner city. It is ironic to note that so many managers and politicians have argued that these functions were only a limited part of local government and should not be seen as a primary local government responsibility. This perhaps explains the poor social and living conditions and environmental quality, as well as the lack of investment in the inner city. Although the inner city projects covered a wide spectrum of issues, the weight of these projects was more towards the social end of the spectrum. This can largely be ascribed to the active involvement of the 'social' stakeholders, the critical social problems of the inner city and the integrated (social) focus of the Inner City Process.

Between 1996 and 2000 the social working group and its related constituencies actively participated in the planning, development, implementation and management of a large number of

¹⁰⁷ See Chapter 4 for a description of these concepts.

social projects and programmes¹⁰⁸ - within the context of the SDF for the inner city. The churches of the inner city - under the strong leadership of Dr Stephan de Beer (a pastor and member of the Pretoria Community Ministries¹⁰⁹) - played a leading role in the implementation of various social development projects and programmes in the inner city.

Unlike the former urban planning system, which largely neglected the focus on social issues, the inner city endeavours increasingly emphasised the need to focus on people's needs and wants; and hence, the appropriateness of integrated planning (which includes a focus on people). In spite of the progress made by the PICP to establish a new social/people-oriented culture and awareness within the urban planning domain (at least within the inner city of Pretoria), this momentum was largely obstructed by the archaic and fatalistic attitude of some of the senior influential managers and politicians in the City Council of Pretoria. Some officials (specifically from the Treasury Department of the City Council of Pretoria) argued that this 'type' of social development was not the responsibility of the local authority and that funds for such programmes had to be obtained from other sources, donors, businesses or the provincial and central government¹¹⁰. This point of view was strongly opposed by the members of the PICP and more specifically the Social Forum, who argued that social development was an integral part of physical or economic development and that it had to be addressed by, or integrated into the overall city building/management process.

Towards the end of 1999, the Social Forum, with the support of the PICP, became more organised and institutionalised in the form of a non-profit organisation. The 'social stakeholders' or members from the social working groups, however, continually and actively stressed the need for more integration, more attention to social issues, the need for better relationships and communication and, specifically, the need for more support and involvement from the local authority. They often criticised the local authority for its lack of participation in the process and for not providing sufficient human and financial support. This Forum increasingly put pressure on the Council to provide funds for new social projects or to at least sustain those projects that had been initiated with Council funds during 1997 and 1998. Although the Council allocated R500 000 (as a Grant-In-Aid) to the PICP's Social Forum at the end of 1999 (mainly because of a previous commitment that had been made by the Council), they eventually withdrew all financial support from the Social Forum.

¹⁰⁸ The most important of these programmes were the inner city homeless and street children rehabilitation programmes, job creation initiatives, Adult Basic Education Training (ABET) programmes, skills development programmes, environmental education programmes, public safety awareness campaigns, social development programmes, a mobile library service for the aged, programmes aimed at combating child prostitution, the development of a comprehensive homeless policy and strategy for the inner city, the homeless/child care centre in Marabastad and various other ongoing social initiatives.

¹⁰⁹ The Pretoria Community Ministries (PCM) is a social organization comprising of a number of inner city churches. The main aim of this organization is to improve the social quality of the inner city and to provide shelter to the destitute.

¹¹⁰ Personal communication: Maartin van Vuuren and Marelise Fourie.

This decision, amongst others, led to the closure of the Boikatsong Child Care Centre in Marabastad and the offices of the Marabastad Development Forum¹¹¹. This created a frustration amongst the PICP members and the social working groups, who were committed to the social development of the inner city. It also seemed clear that very limited funds, if any, were going to be allocated to the PICP. This was the first real power clash between the PICP and the local authority. Unlike the value and power of “communicative action” and “good arguments” as described earlier on, the above actions present a good example of how “power defines rationality” as described by Flyvbjerg in Chapter 2.

Although the PICP members continued to criticise the local authority for its actions and attitude, they could also be criticised for not maintaining a relationship with the local authority, for poor communication, and for not effectively promoting the need for social development (or the need for the new approach to planning). Whilst a group of PICP members worked hard to promote the need for social development in the inner city, other PICP members argued that more could be achieved in the inner city if more funds were allocated to visible physical projects and new developments in the inner city. This in some way resulted in a divide between the members of the PICP. It also further increased the frustration levels of the members of the Social Forum.

Although the PICP was widely commended for its achievements and groundbreaking work, it was widely criticised by councillors, senior officials and members of the community for, amongst other things, not addressing the real issues; for focusing on too many issues; and for not achieving visible results (see Perception Survey, 1999). The PICP’s organisational structure was also criticised for not representing the profile of the majority of the population.

One of the biggest problems of the PICP and its related structures was the undefined relationship between the PICP and the inner city team, and the PICP and the local authority. As a result of the integrated and holistic approach promoted by the inner city team and the PICP, the inner city team was increasingly exposed to and involved with the community and political issues in the inner city. Politicians in the City Council, amongst others, started questioning the relevance of these forums and public private partnerships (PPPs) and their leadership roles as elected councillors within these forums¹¹².

These concerns, on the one hand, underline the poor communication and relationship that existed

¹¹¹ Interestingly enough, one of the PICP members, Desiree Homann, who had left the inner city team, continued to assist this centre in her personal capacity.

¹¹² See also similar critique of some of the inner city initiatives in Johannesburg by Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (2002: 128).

between the PICP and the politicians; and on the other hand, the reluctance of politicians to adapt to the new way of planning and management (and the new types of 'community power'). Some interviewees argued that the community-driven partnership approach and the strong community leadership within the forums were threatening the politicians and leadership structures in the local authority (Interview Survey, 2002). As a result of the mounting critique of the PICP and the realisation that changes had to be made to its process and structure, the PICP team embarked on a process to transform the PICP in the beginning of 1999.

The need for a new PICP structure was further inspired by a study tour to the USA in 1998 where many examples of inner city structures were investigated¹¹³. In an attempt to develop a new structure for the PICP, the firms, Partnership for Urban Renewal (Neil Fraser) and Complex Properties Solutions ('Fuzz' Loubser and Johan Malherbe) were appointed to assist with the PICP transformation process in view of their knowledge of similar processes. After much progress to develop a proposed process and structure, a discussion document was finalised and a preliminary report submitted to the Council by the end of 1999. The Council agreed, amongst other things, that a new PPP structure should be investigated and that a process should be implemented to promote the active involvement of business in this structure¹¹⁴.

During the first half of 2000, the consultants and members of the PICP project team embarked on an extensive consultation process with businesses concerned with the inner city of Pretoria. Based on the inputs of, amongst others, the business people, a proposed structure and process for the PICP were developed, mainly based on a development corporation-type structure, of which business and the local authority would be major partners. After having presented and thoroughly work-shopped this proposal with the members of the PICP Management Committee and key role-players of the Council departments concerned, it was decided to submit a report to the local authority on a new structure and process for the PICP. In view of the complexity of the proposal and report, the PICP Committee decided to organise a preparatory workshop ('bosberaad')¹¹⁵ for the councillors to scrutinise the proposals and the contents of the report. At this workshop, the incumbent councillor for City Planning (and the inner city initiative) and member of the Executive Committee of the Council at that time, Eitel Kruger, who was also convenor of the inner city's transformation process, indicated that he did not agree with the new direction the PICP was taking.

¹¹³ In 1998 members of the PICP and officials and a councillor of the City Council of Pretoria undertook a study tour to the USA to investigate inner city revitalisation programmes and City Improvement Districts in inner cities. This tour was organised and guided by Neil Fraser, a leading role-player in Johannesburg's Inner City Process and one of the leading figures on this topic in the world. Fraser also acted as a consultant to the PICP.

¹¹⁴ See Pretoria Inner City Partnership (1999); and City Council of Pretoria (1999).

¹¹⁵ The term 'bosberaad' is commonly used in South Africa to describe a workshop or meeting that is held in the bushveld or in a natural setting. Such a bosberaad is usually associated with a social function in the typical South African tradition.

To the surprise of the other members of the PICP, he indicated that he was not prepared to support the new structure for the PICP. He argued that it would not be desirable to establish such new initiatives at a time when the entire Tshwane local authority system was going through a transformation. In spite of the merits of this argument, the members of the PICP could not believe that Kruger (who incidentally supported this transformation process) only raised this issue after the whole investigation had been completed. One of the interviewees argued that Kruger had been instructed by his fellow politicians (just prior to the meeting) to halt any further development and transformation of the PICP in an attempt to terminate the PICP as a whole - and to terminate those officials and leaders of the PICP who seemed to have gained too much influence/power. The PICP was subsequently instructed not to submit any reports to the Council regarding a new structure and process for the inner city. This resulted in dissatisfaction and further increased the frustration levels of the members of the PICP and the project team.

This PICP transformation process resulted in many unfulfilled expectations among the communities and particularly business in Pretoria. Again, the above experience shows how rational actions failed primarily because they were divorced from power - the power and rationality issue as discussed in Chapter 2). If more politicians (power), or a different group of politicians (power), were made part of the transformation process from its inception, the above embarrassment for the PICP could have been avoided - or the new structure could possibly have received the support from the power structures.

In many ways this was 'the beginning of the end' for the PICP. Some senior officials and politicians, who have asked not to be mentioned, argued that a new 'political agenda' was emerging and that there was a deliberate strategy to terminate the PICP and to eliminate the Project Manager and the Chairperson. The PICP and its leadership structures were said to have become too powerful politically. It was obvious that the local authority's political powers (and the Prince) were threatened by the emerging community powers (and rationality). One way of dealing with this power clash was apparently to ab(use) the strong political powers, to eliminate those structures and efforts (and people) which created the threatening powers. Some interviewees, on the other hand, stated that there was a perception that the PICP was 'owned' by the opposition party, the National Party¹¹⁶. The PICP and the inner city project team were also continuously scrutinised and pressurised by some people from the community and business sector, as well as councillors. In the beginning of 2001 the PICP, in spite of all the good work, developed a poor image within the local authority. As a result of the above, many members withdrew from the PICP's

¹¹⁶ During this period (1996 to 2000), the opposition party controlled all the inner city wards.

activities. Those senior officials who initially supported the PICP, such as Yates, as well as those politicians who were responsible for establishing the PICP, also slowly began to withdraw from the PICP...

When the new City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) was established in December 2000, the newly elected councillors questioned the relevance and appropriateness of the PICP, as well as the other PPPs in the city, specifically within the transformed and transforming Tshwane local authority. The new council made it clear that it would not just accept and proceed with structures, initiatives and processes that had been established under the 'old regime' or former council, specifically those that were politically sensitive (or powerful), such as the PICP.

In the middle of 2001, Coetzee, the project manager of the PICP, was redeployed to establish and coordinate a new metropolitan planning function within the new Tshwane structure. It was never ascertained whether Coetzee was "removed" from the PICP, as part of the new strategy to eliminate the powers of the PICP, or whether he was really offered a new career opportunity in another department. Bernard Hanekom, one of the senior planners in the PICP team, was initially requested to act as manager and was subsequently appointed as the new manager of the inner city team in the beginning of 2003. In view of the strategic importance of the inner city function, this function was allocated to the office of the Chief Operating Officer (COO), Mr Wonder Nkosi.

Although the inner city team continued with a number of inner city projects, the broad PICP, as a community forum or PPP, was dying a slow death. Fortunately some of the partnership initiatives such as the CIDs could be sustained through the efforts of the business sector, while some of the stakeholders and service providers such as the Inner City Churches and the Berea Forum continued with their efforts to revitalise the inner city (in this case outside the framework of the PICP). When the Inner City Process started in June 1996, Yates, Coetzee and many other planners (and politicians) believed that this process and partnership approach would become the future model for urban planning and management in the City of Tshwane. Never did they realise that this process would be phased out only four years after its inception. While some people concerned with the PICP expected a new type of structure for the inner city, within the framework of the new ward system or new Tshwane structure, this unfortunately never materialised.

However, apart from the above, it can still be argued that the PICP had established and promoted a major shift from the old, rigid, limited structure planning approach, to a more integrated and democratic approach to planning. The Inner City Process also promoted a new emphasis away from service delivery and city building to a more comprehensive community service, which

encompassed economic development, environmental management, sustainable development and social development. This shift in many ways underscored the new entrepreneurial, democratic and developmental role of South African local authorities, as well as the new trends on urban planning as discussed in Chapter 4.

Although the Inner City Process (1996) preceded the concepts of IDP (1997) and Developmental Local Government (1998), it made great strides in establishing and promoting these concepts in the City of Tshwane (Perception Survey). The PICP ultimately became the prototype and role model for many of the Pretoria IDP forums that had to be established during the course of 1997/1998 (Perception Survey). The Inner City Process established and refined the principles of community-based strategic planning and provided experiences on, amongst other things, the logistical preparation of the IDP process; the structuring of the community participation phase; structuring the strategic planning process; the structuring and prioritisation of projects; and the management and implementation of projects. The PICP also made great strides in (re)defining the roles and responsibilities of community forums and PPPs in the City of Tshwane as a mechanism to involve the various stakeholders in the process of formulating and implementing strategies and projects.

This new urban planning approach, with its strong emphasis on community participation and community-based strategic planning, had a major effect on 'the town planner', as it exposed the planner to a variety of new roles that had previously not been part of 'the planner's role'¹¹⁷. The Inner City Process also had an impact on the way in which the local authority dealt with urban planning in general. During the mid-1990s the Inner City Process sparked a new holistic view and social interest, conscience or realisation amongst many planners, politicians, managers and community members in the city. The most important outcome of the process was most probably the many relationships that were established between people from various sectors through the working groups and workshops.

Some people described the Inner City Process as *"the example for planning in other planning zones"*, *"groundbreaking work"*, *"the building block"*, *"pioneer"*, *"front runner"* and *"the process that paved the way"* (Perception Survey, 1999).

¹¹⁷ This aspect will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

5.8 THREE CITIES - ONE PLAN(NER)

The LDO process followed in the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area: February 1996 to February 1997

At the same time that the first (strategy formulation) phase of the Inner City Process was conducted (February 1996 to February 1997), the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council (GPMC), in conjunction with the three Metropolitan Local Councils (MLCs) - Pretoria, Centurion and Akasia, initiated the process of formulating Land Development Objectives (LDOs) for the Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Area - a process that was required in terms of the Development Facilitation Act 1995 (DFA).

Among Beneke, Chief Planner for Metropolitan Guideline Planning of the GPMC was mainly responsible for The Pretoria LDO process. Although Beneke was assisted by the planners of the GPMC and the three local authorities, he was supported by a multi-disciplinary consortium under the leadership of consultant planner Theo Pretorius of PLAN Associates¹¹⁸.

A year later, in February 1997 (incidentally the same time that the Strategic Development Framework (SDF) for the inner city of Pretoria was completed), the Pretoria LDO process resulted in a document that was referred to as the Strategic Metropolitan Development Framework (SMDF). The SMDF consisted of a vision statement, an integrated development framework, development standards with regard to the provision of physical and social infrastructure, physical, social, economic and institutional development strategies and a five-year implementation programme.

The development framework/spatial component of the SMDF was based on a Metropolitan Open Space System, a Primary Metropolitan Node and three additional Secondary Metropolitan Activity Nodes, six Strategic Development Areas and three Service Upgrading Priority Areas¹¹⁹. The SMDF was very much in the form of a strategic planning document that focused on a number of broader non-spatial issues, strategies, objectives and projects as the case with the inner city SDF. It also addressed the most important structural and spatial elements of the metropolitan area. Some planners (mostly those in support of the old structure plan approach) criticised the spatial framework component for being too broad. They argued that the spatial plans did not contain sufficient detail to guide land use decisions.

¹¹⁸ PLAN Associates, often referred to as 'PLAN', was one of the first town planning firms in Pretoria to be involved with structure planning and spatial planning in the City of Pretoria - from as far back as the early 1970s. Pretorius is a respected planner in the country with experience in spatial and metropolitan planning. During the 1990s he also became extensively involved with strategic planning and IDPs in South Africa.

¹¹⁹ See Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council (1997).

However, in view of the metropolitan and strategic nature of the SMDF process, it was never the intention to focus on detail spatial issues. These had to be dealt with by the lower rungs of spatial frameworks. Although the DFA/LDOs resulted in a new, more positive emphasis on spatial planning, many planners argued that this new form of planning had diminished the role of 'real' spatial planning (within the context of structure planning) (Perception Survey, 1999; Interview Survey, 2000).

Although much effort was exerted to involve all concerned stakeholders in the process¹²⁰, criticism was raised of the community participation process, specifically with regard to the lack of involvement from certain sectors. The LDO process was also very much a 'one-person-show', which only involved a few selected planners.

In view the above and the overall dominance of Beneke and the GPMC, the planners from the various MLCs had difficulty taking ownership of the SMDF. Apart from the few planners who were nominated to form part of the process and project team, very few planners from the City Council of Pretoria were involved in compiling or finalising the SMDF. Beneke, who led the LDO processes in 1996/1997, agreed that they did not fully succeed in achieving the set goals, mainly in view of the fact that all the officials and stakeholders concerned did not participate in the process¹²¹.

Looking back, it is ironic to note that during the period February 1996 to February 1997, two significant new (and very similar) processes were lodged in different parts of the city. On the one hand, the LDO process (which resulted from the DFA legislation) for the new greater metropolitan area as a whole was executed by the GPMC. On the other hand, the Inner City Process (which resulted from the former City Council of Pretoria's EMPRET initiative) was implemented for a part of the city only. Although officials from these two different local authorities knew of each other's processes, and in some cases even contributed to each other's processes, there was very little coordination and cooperation between these two 'tiers' of local government. The above not only emphasised the poor coordination and communication, but also the attitude that existed amongst these officials. Some officials were trying to build a new 'higher tier' mega local authority (the GPMC), while other officials of the City Council of Pretoria were trying to protect their domain and comfort zones¹²². Perhaps this was also a deliberate effort from the concerned officials to protect

¹²⁰ A large number of community participation meetings and smaller workshops were held in the various phases of the process during 1996 (24 May; 31 August; 7, 4, 21, and 28 September; 19 October; and four workshops in November 1996. A total of 1066 community representatives attended these workshops. See Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council (1997).

¹²¹ Personal communication, Beneke (2002).

¹²² These arguments were often raised and debated in discussions by officials of the City Council of Pretoria.

their powers and to aspire more power.

Contrary to the expectations of many officials, the LDO process had very little effect on the organisational structures and processes of the local authorities. The LDO process and the first SMDF, however, provided a new impetus to the transformation of urban planning in the City of Pretoria as it underscored many international trends, specifically the focus on community participation and strategic planning that were developing in the city.

It also gave further momentum to the City Council of Pretoria's EMPRET and Inner City Process that were well under way. Prior to the DFA (1996), many of the new planning principles (in the City Council of Pretoria) were either in a conceptual form contained in unofficial documents with limited status, or limited to the Pretoria (inner city) experience. The DFA, for the first time from a national and legal perspective, promoted the importance of the new approach and again emphasised the reality and rationality of the transformation process.

The SMDF, which can be regarded as the first real metropolitan strategic framework in Pretoria¹²³, set a strong platform for the later implementation of IDPs, specifically in Pretoria. It represented "*a dramatic change from the way planning was done in the past, as it requires(d) an integrated approach whereby the coordination of all aspects related to development - physical, social, economic and institutional - has to be attended to*"¹²⁴. (Beneke also stated that the LDO process was the beginning of a '*new generation of planning*'¹²⁵). In 1997 this SMDF received the award from the MEC of the Department of Development Planning and Local Government, Sicelo Chiceka, for being "*the best (set of) LDOs*" in Gauteng.

5.9 THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY STAY THE SAME

The introduction of Integrated Development Planning (IDP): 1997

Although many of the principles of IDP and other related processes such as EMPRET, strategic planning, local development objectives (LDOs), integrated planning and budgeting, were commonly used in Pretoria, it was only after the promulgation of the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA 1996)¹²⁶ late in 1996 that the term Integrated Development Planning or IDP was formally introduced.

¹²³ At the same time (February 1997) the SDF for the inner city of Pretoria (a local area) was completed.

¹²⁴ See Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council (1997).

¹²⁵ Personal communication, Beneke (2002).

¹²⁶ See Republic of South Africa (1996).

Despite the fact that the IDP had much in common with these concepts in 1996/1997, the introduction of the seemingly new concept created a frustration amongst the planners and councillors of the GPMC and the three MLCs as they had difficulty understanding the role, relevance and status of the IDP and its relationship with the SMDF and LDOs¹²⁷. They also had little idea of what the power of the IDP (and its related structures) would be and how it would affect the power relations in the local authority.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the LGTA in 1996 did not clearly spell out the contents and details of the IDP process to be followed, and provided only a very broad indication of the purpose and subject matter of the IDP¹²⁸. The LGTA, however, was very specific on what the IDP was supposed to achieve as a municipal tool. Many local authorities and planners throughout the country interpreted the IDP as a holistic 'urban strategic plan' that aimed, *inter alia*, to (re)direct all development in a particular urban area and to (re)construct the fragmented urban areas¹²⁹.

In view of the fact that the Gauteng Department of Development Planning and Local Government, regarded the IDP mainly as a metropolitan function, it was obvious that the GPMC had to take ownership and responsibility of the IDP process (at least the metropolitan IDP). As was expected, the GPMC again nominated Amond Beneke (Chief Planner for Metropolitan Guideline Planning of the GPMC, involved with the 1997 SMDF) as the manager of the IDP function.

In February 1997 Beneke established a Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) to support him with the IDP function and the IDP processes. This committee included Nikki Ludick of the GPMC; Mike Yates, Tony Walker, Jan Roode and Johnny Coetzee of the City Council of Pretoria; Pieter de Haas of Akasia Town Council; and Leon du Bruto of Centurion Town Council. This committee was also assisted by Theo Pretorius from the PLAN Associates (who was appointed in 1996 as a technical advisor for the Pretoria LDO process). During February and March 1997 the TCC had several meetings at the offices of the GPMC with the aim of developing the contents of the IDP and the proposed phases, steps and principles of the IDP process. The members of the TCC ultimately reached a consensus agreement on the contents and format of the IDP, the process to

¹²⁷ This frustration was often raised at meetings held by councillors and officials of the GPMC and the City Council of Pretoria during 1997.

¹²⁸ Oranje *et al* 2000 labelled this as a minimalist approach and argued that the legislation and provincial planning and development acts/bills deliberately avoided detailing the planning process that should be followed in the preparation, adoption and review of the IDP, and in so doing, providing the opportunity for maximum flexibility, local innovation, experimentation and the flexible evolution of the planning system in South Africa (Oranje *et al* 2000).

¹²⁹ Watson (2001:71) argues that some spatial planners saw this new legislation as the mechanism that offered them the opportunity and status that was needed for them to make a contribution to the efforts of urban reconstruction and development.

be followed and a number of key principles¹³⁰.

Unlike the LDO process, which focused mostly on 'land development', the TCC agreed that the IDP was a much broader process that had to focus on the development (and management) of all the components of the environment in an integrated manner. In this regard the IDP processes were largely braided around the structure of the social, physical, economic and institutional environment - similar to the structure of EMPRET and the Pretoria LDO process.

At the outset of the IDP process in Pretoria, the GPMC and the three MLCs reached a consensus agreement on a logical and simple format and contents for the IDP process and plan. This implied that the contents or components of the IDP (process and plan) would consist of a vision, a description and analysis of issues, a description of community needs and priorities, a statement of goals and objectives, strategies, programmes and projects, a framework for implementation and monitoring and a spatial framework. The TCC further agreed that the IDP process should be structured to allow the participation of all stakeholders in all the phases of the process. This format and the contents were reminiscent of the EMPRET process (1995), the Inner City Process (1996 to 1997) and the SMDF or LDO process (1996 to 1997), mainly in view of the fact that they were largely influenced by Coetzee, Beneke and Pretorius who had previously been involved with these processes.

Apart from the above, the TCC also supported and followed the principle of a hierarchy of IDPs or frameworks as proposed by EMPRET in 1995 and 1996. This hierarchy provided for a Metropolitan IDP, an IDP for each of the three MLC areas (as required in terms of the LGTA, 1996¹³¹), as well as a local IDP for each of the proposed 18 planning zones (in order to better facilitate community participation on a local level and to better address the local issues and diversity through local planning processes). This hierarchy of IDPs aimed to integrate and harness the planning zones into one integrated whole and to create continuity of services across the borders of planning zones. The hierarchy also aimed to bring the plans and implementation closer to the people. The hierarchy of IDPs in Pretoria created the opportunity to integrate technical or community inputs from local levels upwards, and to cascade strategies from higher tiers of plans downwards. This cascading effect implied that higher order strategies and broad strategic guidelines provide a framework and basis for more detailed strategies and ultimately the actual implementation of projects. The different local/planning zone IDPs also created the opportunity for the various

¹³⁰ See Technical Co-ordinating Committee (1997).

¹³¹ The LGTA, 1996, determined among other things, that each local authority should develop its own IDP. This implied that an IDP had to be developed for the GPMC and each of the three MLCs.

areas/zones or local communities to develop a unique plan, vision or strategy for each of their areas.

The primary aim of the Metropolitan IDP was to focus on the metropolitan area as a whole and therefore it had to include a vision for the whole metropolitan area; an analysis of metropolitan issues; metropolitan goals and objectives; metropolitan strategies and projects aimed at developing and managing metropolitan functions; and a Metropolitan Spatial Framework. Similarly, the City IDPs (the Pretoria IDP, Centurion IDP and the Akasia IDP) were to focus on these local authorities' areas of jurisdiction as a whole and on citywide issues, while the local/planning zone IDPs were to focus on the local/planning zone areas and on local issues. The City IDPs were seen as the building blocks for the Metropolitan IDP; and the local IDPs were seen as building blocks for the City IDPs in so far as they provided inputs into these IDPs.

Although each level of IDP was seen as an individual or independent process, the TCC emphasised the integration between these IDPs. The TCC agreed that a uniform planning process should be followed for each of the IDPs to ensure consistency and integration between the various levels and zones (see later critique of this uniform process). Despite the fact that this hierarchy was widely supported by some planners for the reasons mentioned above, it was also criticised for being too idealistic, comprehensive and complicated and also for the fact that it resulted in much duplication (Perception Survey, 1999).

In an attempt to ensure the support and buy-in from the Gauteng Department of Development Planning and Local Government, the findings and proposals by the TCC were also continually work-shopped with this department. A report on the above key points relating to the contents and format of the IDP was prepared by Beneke (on behalf of the GPMC's Technical Committee on Transport and Land-use), and approved by the GPMC in June 1997. Compared with the SMDF, the IDP (as defined by the TCC) had a stronger emphasis on spatial planning. Many planners saw this as a positive move in view of the fact that a perception existed that the traditional form of spatial planning was being threatened by the new planning approaches. This emphasis on spatial planning could be ascribed to the fact that the TCC consisted of town/spatial planners - planners who not only supported spatial planning, but also planners who wanted to protect the power of the plan (Foucault's instruments of power) as well as their professional powers.

Although the spatial planners promoted and welcomed the emphasis on spatial planning, this 'spatial/structure plan influence' detracted the focus from the strategic, holistic view of planning that was envisaged by the emerging trends to planning, as well as the local policies on planning as

discussed in Chapter 4 (see later critique of IDPs). The strong emphasis on spatial planning also highlighted the planners' attachment with the traditional way of spatial/structure planning. In view of the above it can be argued that the TCC was not structured properly and that it should also have included other disciplines such as strategic planning, social planning, economics, etc.

However, in spite of the above critique, the 'new IDP' firmly emphasised the integration of strategic planning, community planning and spatial planning. It also focused more on broader guidelines and mainly on a much wider geographic area. Unlike the previous SMDF, which primarily focused on the metropolitan area as a whole, the IDP also focused on the local levels. This created the opportunity for a bottom-up approach and a basis from which broader strategies or plans could be developed¹³².

The IDP, in view of its strategic and comprehensive nature, gave further impetus to the transformation of urban planning in the City of Pretoria - a process that was well under way during 1997. The LGTA, 1996 (IDP) further underscored the principles of EMPRET, which, some three years ago, was nothing more than a vision for some planners.

After the promulgation of the LGTA and the introduction of the IDP during early 1997, even more planners realised that the planning system and power relations in the local authority were changing, or that it had finally changed. They knew there was no turning back. Despite this, the majority of planners (specifically in the Guideline Planning Division) still continued to criticise the new approach, while clinging to the structure plan. It was difficult for the planners to accept the new 'social and community image' of the urban planning profession - which then seemed to have been less powerful. A question frequently asked by planners relates to whether the new system was going to deliver the goods; whether it was going to address the challenges facing the fragmented City of Tshwane; and whether the new system was really going to be better than the old one.

The new IDP approach undoubtedly opened up a new debate and created an open framework for future urban planning. One of the prominent planners involved with the development of the IDP argued that the IDP had liberated and released planners from the old, technical, autocratic and rigid approach to planning (Interview Survey, 2002). One thing was certain, however, for the first time in many years, the urban planning system in the City of Tshwane had acquired the properties that were associated with international urban planning theory and practice.

¹³² Personal communication, Theo Pretorius.

5.10 PLANNERS RISING FROM THE ASHES

Preparing for the IDP processes: February 1997 to June 1997

As the notion of Integrated Development Planning (IDP) unfolded during the first half of 1997, those planners involved with the process often expressed their views regarding the comprehensive and complex nature of the IDP processes that had to be applied in 22 different areas of the city (metropolitan area, three MLC areas and 18 planning zones¹³³). What made the whole IDP endeavour more challenging was the fact that the concerned stakeholders and the public at large had to be involved in all the stages of all the IDP processes. Those planners involved with the IDP process realised that the IDP processes to be followed in Pretoria called for thorough preparation and a major effort and commitment from all role players. Prior to the implementation of IDPs at the beginning of 1997, the planning department of the City Council of Pretoria also realised that the existing Council structures and processes were not effectively geared to facilitate IDPs and that they had to set the stage, build capacity, and change cultures, attitudes, processes and organisational structures before even thinking of implementing the IDP process¹³⁴.

With the advent of the IDP processes, the majority of planners in the City Council of Pretoria were still confined to the old rigid approach to urban planning as discussed earlier - so much so that it was difficult for them to adapt to new processes. Planners from the Land Use Rights Division often stated that they were too busy with land use applications and that they did not have the capacity to deal with the additional IDP work. The planners in the Guideline Planning Division raised similar concerns. The negative attitude and reluctance to do more work or work that was different and new, largely emphasised the planners' resistance to change, as well as their fear of being moved out of their comfort zones. Planners were also concerned that the new system would disrupt the power structures and power relations in the planning department. They were specifically concerned about losing their professional powers, and /or their powerful plans and instruments.

The Munitoria fire, just four months prior to the scheduled starting date of the IDP processes, not only disrupted the functioning of both the Council and the Department, but also destroyed most of the assets, data, documentation and planning information of the Department. The fire also destroyed a substantial amount of information that had been collected for this study, such as documents, articles, minutes of meetings and recorded comments from various role players. A

¹³³ The metropolitan area was divided into 19 planning zones. In 1997 /1998, the IDP process had not been applied in Planning Zone 8, in view of the fact that a similar process, the Inner City Process had been applied in this zone during the previous year.

¹³⁴ Personal communication, Mike Yates and Tony Walker.

major effort was made to recover planning information from town planning consultants and other organisations. The fire almost instantly created a backlog of land use applications, resulting in increased pressure on planners to process applications (rezoning and land use applications, township applications and the approval of building plans) under difficult circumstances. Many people had to relocate several times to offices elsewhere in the city. Planning teams such as the inner city team and the planning team for Zone 9 established temporary offices at the homes of the managers of these teams - indicative of the commitment of certain planners. There were also those officials who exploited the chaotic situation to take time off from work.

While the planners and officials were trying to build a new department, they also had to prepare for the largest community-driven planning exercise ever performed in Pretoria - a process that was new and somewhat strange to many officials. Although the fire created enormous confusion and disruption, it resulted in a new camaraderie amongst officials in the City Council. The fire also created new opportunities for the Council and the planning department, such as the opportunity to install a whole new and more effective electronic information system for the Council¹³⁵.

Establishing Planning Zones and Planning Zone Forums in the City of Pretoria

Before the IDP processes could commence in July 1997 (the scheduled starting date of the processes), the demarcation of the Planning Zones had to be finalised. Because of the size and diversity of the greater metropolitan area of Pretoria, with its complex composition and social structure, effectively addressing and managing diversity in a sustainable manner would not be easy. Consequently, the larger metropolitan area was divided into 19 Planning Zones, based on a number of criteria such as geographical features, ward boundaries, communities, etc.


Initially some planners and politicians argued that this 'artificial demarcation' of the metropolitan area into different zones was just another way of fragmenting the already fragmented city into different zones that present a particular character or another way of creating different and separate areas. Although this zoned demarcation created the impression of 'non-integrated planning', the boundaries of these zones were drawn in such a way that they would integrate the different cultural and racial areas that had been formed during the apartheid years.

Specific emphasis was also placed on the integration of the wealthier areas into the poorer areas as part of a broader strategy to restructure the fragmented city and to redistribute income. In spite

¹³⁵ See also a publication on the Munitoria fire, entitled *Opportunity from disaster: The 'great' Munitoria fire*, which was dedicated to the staff of the City Council of Pretoria (Leitch J, 1997 (edit)).

of some critique of the boundaries and size of certain zones (by both planners and politicians), the majority of planners and politicians supported the principle of Planning Zones, as they argued that it provided a communication mechanism and resulted in more workable, functional and manageable planning areas, as well as a new opportunity to integrate the 'fragmented components of the city'¹³⁶. The Planning Zones also created a framework and a basis to establish community forums or Planning Zone Forums (PZFs) for each of these Planning Zones¹³⁷. Many politicians saw these forums as another mechanism that could create new power structures for them, while the communities initially did not realise the potential, which these forums had to create also power structures for, and within the community.

FIGURE 5: PLANNING ZONE BOUNDARIES OF THE GREATER PRETORIA AREA (1997 -2000)



While the demarcation of planning zones was being finalised, the local authority and the concerned officials and politicians continued to explore the concept of Planning Zone Forums (PZFs) as a mechanism to facilitate community participation, coordination and communication - in line with the

¹³⁶ See Perception Survey (1999); and Interview Survey (2002). The official newsletter of the former City Council of Pretoria (*Muniforum*, August/September 1996) also stated that: "The Metropolitan Council and the three Primary Local Authorities will probably follow a consensus model to guide development within the various zones" [translated].

¹³⁷ See also later discussion and critique of the PZFs.

proposals contained in EMPRET, 1995.

During December 1996, the GPMC established a technical working group and a Planning Zone Co-ordinating Committee (PZCC), which comprised representatives of the GPMC and the various MLCs, to manage the process of establishing Planning Zone Forums. After many discussions and debates between officials and councillors of the GPMC and the various MLCs, a consensus agreement was reached on the aims, composition and structure of the Planning Zone Forums¹³⁸. Although there was much debate on the status of these forums, and specifically their role within the local authority, the majority of the members of the PZCC and the councillors agreed that the PZFs had to be an advisory/consultative structure and that they should not have decision-making power¹³⁹. This resulted in uncertainty about the power of the forums and also conflict between the forums and the local authority power structures.

Initially (in 1997) the concept of PZFs was mainly aimed at facilitating community participation (within the context of local government) and not so much with the IDP. However, as the notion of PZFs matured, the planners involved with the structuring of the IDP process realised that the PZFs could also provide the ideal mechanism to facilitate community participation in the IDP process (as was envisaged by EMPRET). This resulted in the establishment of a joint IDP/PZF Technical Co-ordinating Committee in March 1997. This committee subsequently established an IDP PZF for each of the proposed Planning Zones/local IDPs, as well as a similarly structured IDP Forum for each of the other IDPs: a Metropolitan IDP Forum for the Metropolitan IDP; and a City-wide IDP Forum for each of the three City IDPs. In this context the Metropolitan Forum would focus on metropolitan-wide issues and interests; the City Forums would focus on the citywide issues and interests; and the local/PZFs on local issues and interests.

The initial aim of the IDP or planning zone forums in Pretoria was to steer and facilitate the IDP process and all its phases/components; to unite role players from across the spectrum to work towards common goals; to ensure effective and meaningful participation; to promote communication between the local authority, the stakeholders and the community; and to act as multi-purpose vehicles to be used by any level of government (national, provincial and local) for the purpose of participation (see also Perception Survey, 1999).


¹³⁸ See Planning Zone Forum Summits, 26 October 1996 and 30 November 1996; Strategic Planning Summit, 9 - 10 April 1997.

¹³⁹ See GPMC, 5 December 1996; GPMC, 20 February 1997; GPMC, 8 May 1997; City Council of Pretoria, 20 May 1997; GPMC, 26 November 1997. See also later discussions on the status of the forums and the associated problems.

These forums ultimately became an important mechanism in local democracy and the backbone for the IDP processes that were followed during 1997/1998. The concept of community forums was the first real asserted effort by the City of Pretoria to establish a joint local authority community mechanism that could support community participation and cooperative governance - in line with government policies.

Although these forums only came into being in the City of Pretoria in the mid-1990s, similar forums have been found in many other democratic countries since the 1960s. Although the PZFs were seen as a good mechanism for community participation and the IDP process, some interviewees argued that these motives were not the real rationale for the establishment of the forums and that the forums were nothing more than 'political window dressing' (to please the community). The whole issue of the PZFs, their status and the role of the politicians in these forums became a very interesting and burning issue at the turn of the millennium (as will be discussed in a later part of the narrative).

FIGURE 6: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES, THEIR AREA OF INFLUENCE, THE RELATED FORUMS AND THE RESPECTIVE IDPs (1997)



Soon after the start of the IDP process in July 1997, the GPMC and the various MLCs established planning zone offices for some of the planning zones and PZFs. The main functions of these offices and their staff were to provide a secretarial and administrative support to the PZF and the Forum Steering Committee and to ensure coordination between the respective local authorities

and the various role players¹⁴⁰. Some of planning zone offices, such as the office for Planning Zone 9, which was initially situated in one of the city's community libraries, became a community/information office where citizens and community groups could enquire about the IDP, proposed planning and development initiatives and general neighbourhood matters.

These community centres played an important role in the IDP process and created a mechanism for the communities and the local authority to effectively communicate with each other. Although the former Pretoria local authorities 'supported' these offices (probably because they had to support them in terms of the agreed IDP mechanism), some officials and politicians expressed their frustration about the fact that they 'had to' support offices and staff that did not form part of the formal local authority structures. Notwithstanding the potential advantages these offices had for the local authority (and the people of the city), the local authorities with their rigid structures had difficulty understanding and supporting the rationale of these offices. Perhaps they saw these offices as yet another "instrument of power" or a power structure that could threaten the power structures and existing power relations in the local authority.

Departmental restructuring in the planning department: 1997

As discussed in Chapter 4, the new forms of contemporary urban planning, with their emphasis on community participation, social planning, strategic planning, sustainable development and urban management, had a profound affect on the organisational structures and processes, and power structures in specifically in local authorities. With the introduction of the IDP process at the beginning of February 1997, the planning department and planning functions of the former City Council of Pretoria were restructured in order to effectively facilitate the implementation of the IDPs.

Firstly, the 11¹⁴¹ newly demarcated planning zones within the City Council's area of jurisdiction implied a new division of the planning functions and planning teams, which were then, still aligned with the old structure plan cells. Secondly, the integrated and holistic nature of the IDP required the establishment of dedicated and integrated (multi-skilled) planning teams for each of the Planning Zones to effectively facilitate the IDP processes.

Following this realisation, a new working group was established in the beginning of 1997 to explore a new organisational structure for the IDP/city planning component of the planning department.

¹⁴⁰ See PZCC 20 February 1997.


¹⁴¹ Although the metropolitan area was divided into 19 zones, only 11 of these were in the City Council of Pretoria's area of jurisdiction.

This new structure would support the implementation of the IDPs in the newly demarcated planning zones. The working group comprised Mike Yates (Executive Director of City Planning and Development), Tony Walker (Director of the Land Use Rights Division), Nico van Deventer (Director of the Support Services Division), and Johnny Coetzee (who was extensively involved with the Pretoria Inner City Process and the IDP process).

After some deliberations, this working group proposed two new divisions: one dealing mainly with strategic planning and citywide issues (metropolitan planning) and one dealing with local development planning in the various planning zones¹⁴². This new structure implied a total integration and re-allocation of planning functions, and more specifically the integration of spatial planning and land use management (within the local development planning function). This structure introduced a new emphasis on strategic planning and the concept of integrated planning, and also recognised the different levels of planning within the hierarchy of plans. Compared to the old structure with its two isolated sections and distinct cultures, this structure, although not perfect, was a major improvement and a step forward for integrated planning.

¹⁴² See City Planning and Development Department (1997).

FIGURE 7: PROPOSED ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT (JANUARY 1997)



The Executive Director of the planning department at that time (Yates) and the various chief town planners finally 'accepted' this structure in January 1997, where after the structure was presented and accepted (in principle) by the planners of both planning divisions. One of the chief town planners, Louis Robinson, initially objected to the new structure as argued that the proposed Strategic Directions Section was threatening the status of the old Guideline Planning Division (and the position of this section's manager) in view of the fact that it appeared to be so much "smaller". Not only does the above, present an example of the omni-present powers in the power web (as described by Foucault), but it also highlights the way in which professionals protect their power (and the power of the Prince) and how they aspired to new and more powers.

During 1997 it was obvious that a strong structure planning bond still existed within the Guideline Planning Division, as is evident from the way in which these planners supported each other and the way in which they jointly protected their function, working environment, comfort zone and

¹⁴³ In view of the strategic importance of the inner city as well as its "citywide" impact, it was decided to place the inner city function with the strategic directions section.

manager. Perhaps these planners wanted to cling together in an attempt to form a united front against the uncertainty and possible threats of the transformation processes.

Although the planners had some concerns about the new structure and the impact it could have on them, it was more a question of doubting and mistrusting the system; the fact that the transformation process was performed in some isolation; and also the *bona fides* of Yates who had involved only a small group of his 'personal favourites' in the transformation process. Yates specifically did not involve all the planners and managers as he probably realised that he did not have the support of all of them, specifically those in the Guideline Planning Division.

He probably also realised, that he was not the preferred Executive Director (in the eyes of these planners). More importantly, however, Yates sensed the negative attitude of these planners and the resistance he would receive from them. He often expressed his frustration with managers such as Skaap Mouton and Jan Roode who (in his opinion) did not fully support the transformation process. He was also concerned about the lack of discipline and professionalism in this division and the way in which this division was managed. For Yates, it was important to transform and (re)structure the planning department and to establish a new culture that could support the new approach to planning. It was (understandably) difficult for Yates to involve those managers and officials in the restructuring process whom he wanted to see being substituted by planners who were younger, more enthusiastic and more supportive of the new planning approaches. In view of his attitude towards strong discipline, he also considered it important to establish a new management structure with stronger discipline. For Yates this possibly meant new managers in certain key positions. This was a deliberate effort of Yates to substitute the seemingly old "bad" power structures with new, "better" power structures.

After the new structure had been presented to the guideline planners, they (surprisingly) easily accepted it - probably realising that it was merely a proposal 'on paper'. The real problems, however, came with the implementation of the structure, when managers, planners and support staff were allocated to the various new positions or functions and the new Planning Zones (and instructed to work in a new function).

The new structure implied that many managers and planners had to be relocated to different functions and Planning Zones in order to balance the workload. Although many planners and managers wanted to move to a different function or planning area, there were also those who resisted any change in their working environment. For these planners it was mostly a question that they just did not want to change; they did not want to support the transformation or give up their

comfort zones.

The planners in the City Council of Pretoria were very comfortable and familiar with this rigid and 'well defined' planning system that, in their opinion, had very few problems. These planners, for very obvious reasons, wanted to protect this familiar, well structured working environment against the unfamiliar, uncertain and seemingly vague new planning system.

As a result of all the conflict and negative attitudes, it was difficult for the managers to effectively implement the new structure and the new IDP planning teams. During this time, it was evident that the management had underestimated the impact that such a seemingly simple restructuring process would have on the morale of the officials. The resistance to the new structure also provided an indication that all the planners had not yet bought into the new planning approach that was developing.

Notwithstanding the above, it can be argued that more attention should have been given to the affected officials: informing them about the new approach and explaining the need for change and the fact that the system "just had to change". Perhaps proper communication and counselling could have eliminated many of the planners' fears and concerns. It could even have spurred a new interest in the transformation process and the new opportunities and challenges.

As the managers and chief planners tried to address the conflict and concerns surrounding the new structure, the documents on the proposed new structure had also been destroyed in the Munitoria fire. At this stage, time was running out and the managers had to finalise the IDP teams before they could get started on the IDP process. Instead of recreating or redrafting the structure and proposals, the management, almost in a state of dispiritedness, threw in the towel and proposed yet another new structure or 'working arrangement'. This structure was far divorced from the abovementioned 'ideal structure'. It is not clear why management did not continue to negotiate the former structure or why they presented an entirely new arrangement that also had a number of problems. Some people believed that management and the department were in a state of disarray as a result of the fire, and ultimately chose to take an easier way out.


Apparently, the easy way out was to forget about the smart 'ideal structures' and to merely divide the managers and staff proportionally between the different Planning Zones so as to create the required IDP team for each of the IDP processes. Unlike the situation with the previous organisational structure where there was some consultation and debate on the design of the structure (and some strategy at least), the new structure was presented and simply imposed as the

final structure without any discussion. Whereas some of the former restructuring processes relied on communicative action and the force of the better argument as discussed by Habermas, Healey and Hillier in Chapter 2, the announcement and implementation of the new structure, without any consultation is more associated with the autocratic and domatory powers of “The Prince”.

Following this decision in July 1997, the two former planning divisions (Guideline Planning and Land Use Rights) were re-organised and re-divided into seven Planning Zone teams (one for each local IDP) and one citywide planning team (for the City IDP). The reason why only eight teams had been established in the former City Council of Pretoria instead of 12 (11 planning zones and the citywide zone) was due to the fact that the head of the department, Yates had argued that these teams had to be managed by the chief town planners in the department. The organisational structure, however, only made provision for eight chief town planner positions and it had not been possible to appoint more chief town planners. This resulted in a situation where some chief planners, such as Henry Nel, Jean le Roux and Laurie Marshall, had to deal with more than one planning zone and more than one IDP. The chief planners responsible for the IDPs were commonly referred to as the Planning Zone or IDP ‘champions’¹⁴⁴.

¹⁴⁴ The term ‘champion’ in this context was used to refer to a person who takes leadership of a project or process and not the literal meanings of conquering, winning or victory.

FIGURE 8: PROPOSED ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT (JULY 1997)



The new structure implied that some planners had to work in a new planning area. It also implied that planners had to do planning work with which they were not familiar or that was not to their liking. In general, the planners in the Guideline Planning Division were reluctant to move out of their comfort zones. Most of these planners did not want to get involved in the new IDP with its new social and political challenges. They argued that their skills could be better applied in the fields of structure planning and the process of establishing townships.

The planners in the Guideline Planning Division, in particular, were not keen to work for Tony Walker with his strict procedures and rules. In particular, they did not want to break away from the well-established 'guideline planning family' and did not want anybody from outside to enter this close-knit unit. This apathy against the new structure and planning roles made it rather difficult to establish new integrated IDP teams and to develop a new urban planning system. Those planners who had previously been responsible for the planning of the safe, rich, white suburbs (close to their homes), often expressed concerns about doing planning work in unsafe, remote and neglected areas such as Mamelodi and Atteridgeville.

Mouton often expressed his concern about the safety of the planners, and more specifically, the safety of the female planners who, in his opinion, were more vulnerable working in those areas. For some planners, the new problem areas also implied more work pressure as a result of the

emphasis that was placed on the restructuring and development of these previously neglected areas. It also implied a different type of work, which many planners did not particularly like, such as the planning of low-cost housing, dealing with other cultural groups, working with poverty areas and informal settlements and working in poor environmental conditions.

It was already obvious that these 'new' areas, with their many social problems, lack of investment and spatial fragmentation required more of the new forms of planning and entrepreneurial thinking that were being promoted. For this reason, it could easily be argued that it would have been better if the management of the planning division had rather allocated younger, more enthusiastic planners to these developing areas. In most cases these younger planners were more accustomed to the new challenges in view of their more recent training (with a greater focus on contemporary urban planning theory). It also seemed as if the younger planners generally had a more positive attitude and open mind towards the restructuring and development of the fragmented urban areas.

The irony of this state of affairs is that any qualified planner (like a medical doctor, for instance), irrespective of his/her field of interest, age or gender, should be able, and 'professionally willing', to work in any area or condition or with any type of professional planning work. In view of this, it can be questioned whether the managers of the planning department did enough to communicate and negotiate the new system and to promote the new challenges and opportunities of the transforming urban planning system.

The planners in the Guideline Planning Division constantly objected to the integration of the two former planning divisions or functions, while the planners in the Land-use Rights Division welcomed this proposal. These planners, who were mainly involved with the processing of land-use applications, saw this integration of functions as a new challenge. They saw new opportunities in their work, namely that of also doing spatial planning, guideline planning, township layouts, design, policy-making, etc. The proposed integrated structure implied that all planners would do all these forms of planning. Planners in the Guideline Planning Division, on the other hand, frequently stated that the planners in the Land-use Rights Division did not have sufficient experience to deal with the establishment of townships.

This emphasised the somewhat arrogant attitude that existed in this section, as well as the reluctance of these planners to share their precious and 'important' work with other colleagues from the same organisation. For many planners, for example the guideline planners, a move to a new IDP team would mean a final break with the old structure plans and the old planning work that was so familiar to them. These planners were not prepared to sacrifice their comfort zones and did

not want these radical changes to affect their planning domain. It further underlines the lack of integration, communication and cooperation between these two (inter-related) planning sections - an aspect that dates back to the inception of the planning department.

This attitude was strongly criticised by the planners in the Land-use Rights Division, who did not agree with this statement¹⁴⁵. These planners rightfully argued that the planners were appropriately qualified to do all planning work and that they could gain the necessary experience in a relative short period of time. In spite of this critique, the planners responsible for townships continued to do the township work, even after the implementation of the new structure.

As a result of personal, cultural, political and professional differences, some planners did not want to work for a specific manager. On the one hand, this emphasised the strong bonds that had developed between certain planners and groups in the department; and on the other, it emphasised the strong opposition between certain groups or individuals. In many ways this resulted in different camps such as the old and young, right and left wing, English and Afrikaans-speaking, men and women - but in most cases it related to those people in support of the transformation of urban planning and the new planning system, and those in opposition to it.

The restructuring process and the establishment of the new IDP teams highlighted a number of issues, specifically with regard to the transformation of urban planning. The reluctance of some people to move and transform indicated their unwillingness to accept the new planning system and their resistance to change. On the other hand, many younger planners almost desperately wanted to shake off the 'old boring' planning work that was associated with apartheid planning. Eventually, after much deliberation and negotiation, all the planning staff was allocated to the various new Planning Zones or planning functions.

Apart from the effect that the constant infusion of new legislation and planning approaches had on the planning department, the ongoing transformation also had a negative impact on the morale and attitude of the officials (See Perception Survey, 1999). Although this structure was still based on the two traditional planning divisions, it was a major improvement compared to the old structure, in view of the fact that it made provision for dedicated planning teams for each of the respective IDP processes, and specifically the fact that these teams within the Planning Zones were responsible for all planning functions within the zone - the former guideline planning and land-use rights functions.

¹⁴⁵ Personal communication, Borsje, Walker, Le Roux

This structure created the opportunity for planners in the City Council to perform planning in an integrated, holistic manner and to form dedicated planning teams that could focus on all aspects of planning in a particular Planning Zone, as required by the national planning policies. This also created the opportunity for planners to take responsibility for all planning and development actions in a particular planning area. During mid-1997, when this structure was finalised, there was already strong pressure on local authorities in the country to correct the racial and gender profiles of their organisations. In the planning department, the 1997 management structure, apart from one white woman, consisted mainly of white males - an aspect that became a major issue in the planning department and the Council in 2000.

In a further attempt to promote integration and coordination within the Council, and within the context of the IDP, an inter-departmental team was also established for each of the planning areas and related IDP processes¹⁴⁶. These teams, similar to those established for the Pretoria Inner City Process (1996 to 1997), represented officials from the various Council departments and included, *inter alia*, engineers, planners, urban designers, safety personnel, health officers and landscape architects. Although these teams met 'occasionally' to discuss and integrate the multi-disciplinary inputs from the IDP, they never functioned effectively, mainly as a result of the rigid and isolated organisational arrangement or 'silositus'¹⁴⁷.

These multi-disciplinary teams also indicated how difficult and frustrating it was, specifically for the technical professions, to integrate and engage with other non-technical disciplines - yet another indication of the autocratic and scientific rigidity and power(s) that existed in the municipalities of the former Pretoria region.

IDP training in the planning department

As the preparation for the IDP processes unfolded, Yates realised the need for training and capacity building, specifically in the new planning approach. Although various efforts went into promoting the principles of IDP amongst communities, councillors, officials and planners throughout South Africa, and to develop training programmes and manuals, most of these efforts only came into being late in 1997/1998 after many local authorities had already started with their

¹⁴⁶ In many parts of the world, such coordinating mechanisms and inter-departmental or inter-disciplinary planning teams were established to promote inter-departmental coordination and integration within the local authority. See McClendon and Quay (1972: 19 -23); Slater (1984:24 and 73); Du Mhango (1995: 917-918); ICLEI (1997); So *et al* (1979: 74-5); and World Bank (1999).

¹⁴⁷ This term refers to a particular type of 'disease' that is found in organisations that are structured around isolated and confined departments or 'silos' (as presented by the graphic representation of the typical organigrams of these departments). This type of structure makes it difficult for departments to integrate with each other.

IDPs.

When the GPMC and the other local authorities in Pretoria started preparing for the IDP process, very limited information or guidelines on IDPs existed in South Africa¹⁴⁸, apart from the experience gained from the LDO and Inner City Processes. In view of the fact that national or provincial government (at the time) provided limited guidelines, the City Council of Pretoria and many local authorities had to interpret the legislation and develop their own guidelines on how to implement these processes. Even for the larger local authorities such as the City Council of Pretoria and the GPMC with all its capacity, this was a difficult exercise and a challenge.

This emphasises how difficult these challenges had to be for the smaller local authorities with no or limited knowledge and resources. Although this 'experimental phase' posed new challenges to the planners as it created the opportunity for them to explore, learn and break new ground, it also created frustration and confusion amongst councillors, officials, planners and communities (See Perception Survey, 1999), specifically during the uncertain and difficult time of transformation.

After consensus was reached on the contents and aims of the IDP process (approximately March 1997), the GPMC and the three MLCs made various efforts to prepare the officials, councillors and community leaders for the IDP process, to get all the role players to 'buy-in' to the process and to establish a culture for this process.

In the City Council of Pretoria, Coetzee and Yates also developed and presented information and training sessions to the officials, councillors and community leaders¹⁴⁹. Amond Beneke, in view of his involvement with the IDP and his IDP responsibility, also presented information sessions to officials and councillors of the various councils and also to the technical advisors of the IDP process¹⁵⁰. Although these training sessions were not sufficient to cover the entire spectrum of the IDP, they contributed to providing planners with the basic information and skills that were needed for them to participate in an IDP process (See Perception Survey, 1999). It also played a role in 'changing the culture' of the planners - a change that was seen as imperative for the success of the

¹⁴⁸ Examples of guidelines or publications were a handbook entitled *Integrated Development Planning - a Handbook for Community Leaders*, published by Planact in October 1997; and an IDP booklet entitled *Integrated Development Planning for Local Authorities - a User Friendly Guide* that was published in 1997 by the Department of Constitutional Development. The first IDP manual, compiled by the CSIR, was published in 1998.

¹⁴⁹ Johnny Coetzee presented a two-day training session for the planners of the planning teams (9 and 10 June 1997), followed by a one-day session for the planning consultants. These sessions focused, *inter alia*, on the local legislation, the IDP process, the contents of IDPs, case studies and guidelines for managing the process of formulating and implementing IDPs. See Coetzee (1997). Keith Griffiths (a professional facilitator), who was appointed by the City Council of Pretoria to coordinate the facilitation of the IDP workshops, also presented a training session on facilitation techniques to some of the planners and planning consultants to assist them with the IDP process.

¹⁵⁰ See Greater Pretoria Metropolitan Council (1997).

new way of doing things in the City Council¹⁵¹.

The appointment of technical advisors for the IDP process

The IDP planning teams of the GPMC and the MLCs soon realised that they did not have the capacity to do all the technical work required for the IDPs, more specifically the status quo reports and the spatial frameworks. After numerous deliberations, various planning firms or planning consortiums were appointed to assist the municipal officials with the IDP processes and, more specifically, the technical inputs¹⁵².

Although some planners and politicians raised their concerns about the involvement of so many different consultants and the possible fragmentation of inputs, it was agreed that the many IDP processes, in view of their extent and nature, could not have been successfully performed by a single consultancy. The planning teams also argued that the IDP endeavour created an ideal opportunity to involve as many consultants as possible in this new learning experience. The consultants worked in close cooperation with the various IDP planning teams. Although the appointment of consultants was a costly exercise and sometimes difficult to manage and coordinate, it ultimately proved to have contributed significantly to compiling the IDPs, as well as developing and refining the new urban planning system.

Many consultants expressed the viewpoint that the IDP had created new opportunities for them in the sense that it had provided them with new knowledge and experience in the field of IDP. The consultants learnt from each other and from the Council planners; and the Council planners learnt from the consultants. Although the consultants clearly stated that they had learned much from the IDP endeavour, some consultants expressed their reservations about the prescribed, rigid IDP process format with its detailed steps and deadlines.

The consultants were not really allowed to experiment or to structure their own processes according to a particular environment. It was argued that more could have been learnt and achieved, and that more effective processes could have been structured if the consultants had been allowed more freedom and creativity. This could, in turn, have resulted in less failures and better IDP outcomes. In spite of various efforts to promote the uniform format, the IDP processes

¹⁵¹ Personal communication, Yates.

¹⁵² Various town-planning/development planning firms throughout Gauteng were invited to attend a briefing session on the proposed IDP process that was held at PREMOS in Pretoria on 6 June 1997. The consultants were requested to submit project proposals for the IDP process. An evaluation committee comprising all the councillors and chief planners of the various local authorities concerned was established to evaluate the submissions.

and the emphasis on the different component parts eventually differed slightly from area to area - mainly due to the varying characteristics of the areas and the varying approaches of the consultants. The prescribed structured process plan, however, played a major role in guiding the planners and consultants through the various phases of the IDP process¹⁵³ and resulted in a uniform set of IDPs (as envisaged by the Technical Coordinating Team).

Various planners and councillors in the former City Council of Pretoria warned against the extent of the involvement of consultants in the IDP processes. They argued that the IDP 'belongs' to the local authority and its communities and that the process is something that should be done by the local authority and in conjunction with the community. It is also argued that the role of consultants is seen to be limited to certain components only, for example, the collection of data or specific assignments that, for some reason or other, could not be done by the local authority or the community¹⁵⁴.

¹⁵³ See also later critique of the IDP guide packs and the rigid process plans (2002).

¹⁵⁴ For similar viewpoints on the role of consultants in the IDP process, see CSIR (1998); Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) (2000); Oranje *et al* (2000) and Harrison (2002). See also Thomas (1995) for similar viewpoints on international practices.

FIGURE 9: LIST OF PROJECT MANAGERS, CONSULTANTS AND RESPECTIVE CONSULTANT FEES FOR THE IDP PROCESSES: 1997/1998

Area and project manager	Consultant	Cost of project
METRO IDP (GPMC)		
Nicola Bezuidenhout/Amond Beneke/ Johnny Mahlala	Theo Pretorius: PLAN Associates	R 500 000
AKASIA/TSWAING: CITY-WIDE IDP		
Pieter de Haas, R Cele, H Koster	Judex Oberholzer: Urban Econ	R 699 600
Planning Zone A1		
Pieter de Haas, R Cele, H Koster	Johan Bierman: Van Der Schyf, Baylis Gericke & Druce.	R 450 000
Planning Zone A2		
Pieter de Haas/R Cele/Hannes Koster	Judex Oberholzer: Urban Econ	Part of City IDP
PRETORIA: City-wide IDP		
Mike Yates/Jan Roode	Peter Dacomb: Plan Practice	R 726 000
Planning Zone P1		
Jean le Roux	Charlie Els: Els Van Straaten and Partners	R 192 000
Planning Zone P2		
L Marshall	Mike van Blommenstein: Van Blommenstein & Associates	R 215 000
Planning Zone P3		
L Marshall	Renier Minnie: Cadre Plan	R 225 000
Planning Zone P4/5		
Henry Nel	Marinda Schoonraad: University of Pretoria	R 350 000
Planning Zone P6		
Louis Robinson	Zelmarie van Rooyen: APS Plan Africa	R 360 000
Planning Zone P7/P11		
Jean le Roux	Piet van Zyl: Van Zyl & Benade	R 200 000
Planning Zone P9		
Annemarie Borsje	Doep Du Plessis/Hubert Kingston: Ferero Beplanners	R 257 000
Planning Zone P10		
Jan Cilliers	Henry Marais	R 200 000
CENTURION: City-wide IDP		
Leon du Bruto	Constand van Deventer: Urban Dynamics	R 355 000
Planning Zone C1		
Leon du Bruto	Constand van Deventer: Urban Dynamics	Part of City IDP
Planning Zone C2		
Leon du Bruto	Shereen Rawat/ZA Shaikh: ZAS	Part of City IDP
TOTAL		R 4 729 600

Council approvals

Before the various local authorities could actually start with the implementation of the IDP processes in July 1997, they had to obtain the necessary Council approvals with regard to the budget for the process and the appointment of the technical advisors, for example. At the end of June 1997, at the last Council meeting of the 1996/1997 financial year, the City Council of Pretoria approved a comprehensive report entitled *Strategic Directions, Systems and Processes*, which was submitted by the Executive Director of the City Planning and Development Department, Mike Yates¹⁵⁵. This report was frequently referred to as the 'omnibus report' as it contained a number of reports related to the new IDP approach. Through the approval of this report, the City Council of Pretoria accepted, amongst other things, the challenge to proceed with IDPs, and approved a budget of R2, 9 million for the formulation of IDPs (for its area of jurisdiction).

The other local authorities (the former GPMC, Centurion Town Council and Akasia Town Council) also prepared and submitted reports to their councils on the implementation of IDPs. These approvals not only confirmed the commitment of the various Pretoria municipalities to the IDP process and the new integrated form of urban planning, but also created the opportunity to proceed with the IDPs and the appointment of technical advisors.

Following Council approvals, the GPMC and the various other municipalities (MLCs) started preparing for the first IDP workshops, which were scheduled for July/August 1997. The various local authorities jointly implemented a comprehensive communication strategy in an attempt to promote the IDP process and to involve the larger public and communities of the Greater Pretoria region. In support of this strategy, a pamphlet (flyer), written in four languages (English, Afrikaans, Northern Sotho and Zulu) was distributed in all areas of the metropolitan region¹⁵⁶, followed by regular progress reports and newsletters, such as *IDP/LDO News* (a newsletter distributed by the GPMC)¹⁵⁷. These efforts were greatly indicative of the various Councils' commitments to promote communication (and communicative action) and to involve the larger public in the community participation process - an aspect that had been grossly neglected in the former patriarchal planning system. After the approval of the IDPs, it became obvious that the IDP system had "the power" to radically transform the local authority planning environment and its related power structures and power relations.

¹⁵⁵ See City Council of Pretoria (1997).

¹⁵⁶ The title of this flyer was "An invitation to all people in the Greater Pretoria Area: Become involved in the compilation of integrated development plans for your area".

¹⁵⁷ Unfortunately, it was not possible to ascertain how many of these flyers were distributed and what the impact was of these efforts.

5.11 THE IDP PROCESS IN PRACTICE: CONFUSION, CONFLICT AND CRITIQUE

The IDP processes followed in the City of Pretoria: July 1997 to June 1998

During the first half of 1997, the transformation of urban planning in the City of Pretoria was gaining momentum as the new principles of strategic planning, social planning, community participation, sustainable development and the new form of public management unfolded in the City of Pretoria.

Apart from the Pretoria Land Development Objective (LDO) Process and the Inner City Process where attempts were made to apply these principles in practice, these principles were still mostly confined to theoretical frameworks and policy statements. Those planners not involved with the previous LDO process or the Inner City Process, were unfamiliar with these principles and the new IDP process, which differed vastly from the old forms of structure planning and land use management that dominated most of their professional domains. The 1997/1998 IDP processes, which were commonly referred to as 'the first round of IDPs', for the first time started applying these new principles in practice, and on a citywide scale.

At the start of the 1997/1998 financial year (July 1997), the GPMC and the three MLCs officially initiated the process of formulating the first IDPs for their respective areas. The Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC), which had been established earlier in February 1997 to structure the IDP process, continued to steer the overall IDP process under the leadership of Amond Beneke, Chief Planner for Metropolitan Guideline Planning in the GPMC. The other members of the committee (all planners) were Nikki Ludick of the GPMC; Mike Yates, Tony Walker, Jan Roode, and Johnny Coetzee of the City Council of Pretoria; Pieter de Haas of Akasia Town Council; and Leon du Bruto of Centurion Town Council.

This committee was specifically responsible for the overall IDP process, and specifically the co-ordination and integration of the various IDPs within the former Greater Metropolitan area. The heads of the planning departments of the respective local authorities were ultimately responsible for the respective Metropolitan IDP, the three City IDPs, and the various Planning Zone IDPs (the IDPs within their area of jurisdiction). In the City Council of Pretoria, Yates was responsible for the Pretoria Citywide IDP and the 11 Planning Zone IDPs within this area of jurisdiction. As discussed earlier, a Planning Zone champion (chief town planner) was made responsible for the local/Planning Zone IDPs. These champions had to manage all aspects related to their particular IDP, such as the community participation phase, the planning consultants and the general logistics related to the process.

It is important to note that, except for one woman, Ludick, the planners involved with the management of the IDP were all white males, predominantly planners who had previously been involved with the old forms of planning during most of the apartheid years. These planners were mostly inclined towards spatial/structure planning and very few of them had experience of integrated planning. In view of the country's national policy at the time, as well as the emphasis on the restructuring of the black townships and the poorer neglected areas, it would have been better to include planners from other racial groups and the female gender, as well as planners with a wider planning interest.

The above town planning influence created the impression that the IDP was mainly a town planning exercise - an aspect that became a major issue in the former City Council of Pretoria. Some people from other departments argued that managers from other divisions, such as transportation engineers, could also have been considered for these positions. This Council's Human Resource Department, which was responsible, amongst other things, for municipal strategic planning, also raised its concern about the fact that the town planners were becoming too involved with municipal affairs. This aspect sometimes made it difficult to get the full support of related departments who also played a role in urban planning and development. In the City Council of Pretoria, the town planners' involvement with the important and strategic IDP process was further questioned by some people who still regarded the City Council of Pretoria's planning department as a department comprising of (many) corrupt, lazy, unprofessional and old-fashioned planners¹⁵⁸.

Soon after the beginning of the IDP processes, Yates emphasised the complexity of the IDP processes and the need to appoint a dedicated project manager who could assist the various Planning Zone champions and planning consultants with the general management and coordination of the various IDP processes in the City Council of Pretoria's area of jurisdiction - an aspect that had also been highlighted by some of the consultants. Yates subsequently requested Coetzee, in view of his experience with EMPRET (1993 to 1997), the Inner City Process (since the beginning of 1996) and his involvement with strategic planning and IDPs at the time, to assist with the overall management of the Pretoria IDPs.

As the preparation for the IDP process unfolded, the IDP champions and the planners in their teams realised that this new IDP process was going to pose many new challenges and

¹⁵⁸ This statement can largely be supported by the ongoing discussions that took place between the top management of the planning department, the politicians, planning consultants and developers during the mid-1990s regarding this issue. See also Perception Survey, 1999.

frustrations. They also knew that they had to learn and apply new skills in order to engage with and facilitate community (and political) participation processes. It soon became clear that not everybody had the skill (and personality) to engage with the community facilitation processes and the public domain.

There were planners like Annemarie Borsje, Lettie Steyn (Planning Zone 9) and Jean le Roux (Planning Zones 1, 7 and 11) who had very little difficulty addressing and facilitating public meetings, coordinating different professions and sectors and engaging with political processes. These planners welcomed the new challenges and seemed to enjoy the new work. There were also those planners like Henry Nel, Louis Robinson and Laurie Marshall who, in view of their particular 'reserved personality' found it more difficult to engage with the public and in the political arena. Fortunately these planners were supported by either planners (in their teams) or planning consultants who could deal with the difficult social and public work on their behalf. Henry Nel, champion for Planning Zones 4 and 5 (Mamelodi), who is probably one of the 'quietest and most reserved' planners in the city and someone who would not easily engage in open discussions, was supported by Marinda Schoonraad (a lecturer at the University of Pretoria and consultant to the 1997/1998 IDP process) - a competent facilitator and public speaker.

In some cases the consultant planners were also confused and threatened by these new challenges. Some planners like Jan Roode, Skaap Mouton, Klaus Rust and Louis Robinson frequently stated that it was not their job to facilitate community workshops and political debates. Although some planners welcomed the new challenges, it seemed that others wanted to hide from the more difficult planning work. The reason why some planners resisted the new approach, or found it difficult to adapt, to open up to the community and to share the planning process with other role players, can largely be ascribed to the fact that so many of them were still entrenched in the old autocratic mindset and rigid top-down planning.

All the IDP processes started during the first workshops that were held during July/August 1997. At these workshops the new form of urban planning (IDP) was formally introduced to the respective communities and stakeholders of the various planning areas in an attempt to promote the involvement and participation of the communities and stakeholders in the process of formulating and implementing IDPs for their areas. For most stakeholders the first workshop was also the first encounter with the IDP process and the new forms of urban planning.

Some planning zone champions indicated that they were concerned that the communities would not support and accept the IDP process, mainly in view of the fact that they had not been

previously consulted or informed of the IDP process to be followed in Pretoria. Although some planners and participants found the process to be logical, simple and well structured, there were also those who frequently expressed their concerns regarding the rigid structure of the process and the lack of flexibility¹⁵⁹. Some community members, although they supported the process, were concerned and unclear about their roles in the IDP process. However, in spite of some critique and concerns raised by the participants, the majority of participants supported the process as they realised that the IDP process, with its extended, strategic focus, and emphasis on integration and (physical, social and economic) development, had the potential to address the development challenges of the urban environment.

It was a major improvement to the old rigid and autocratic way of planning - an aspect that was often highlighted by some participants. The support for the IDP process can also be ascribed to the fact that it provided for extensive participation in all the phases and was structured to focus on the broader spectrum of the environment. The fact that the process was eventually accepted and supported in all the planning areas (the metropolitan area, the citywide zones and the various planning zones), can largely be ascribed to the fact that it was founded on sound planning principles and that it was properly structured and presented to the public. The community also realised that this process had been prescribed by the national government and supported by the various local authorities.

A major step towards creating a democratic urban planning system in the City of Pretoria was when the various Planning Zone Forums (PZFs) and the respective Interim Steering Committees¹⁶⁰ were established (at the first IDP workshops). The City Council of Pretoria initially provided some administrative and technical support to these forums and assisted them in defining their roles and responsibilities. The experience gained from the Pretoria Inner City Partnership (PICP) also contributed to the establishment of the IDP forums and their management committees. These interim forum structures, although not fully representative, already during the visioning phase of the process, ensured some participation and representation, and also ownership amongst the community and stakeholder groups.

Although the various planning zone champions largely facilitated the establishment of the steering

¹⁵⁹ In Planning Zone 9 (the old eastern area of Pretoria), community leaders of this Planning Zone, as well as interested individuals and ratepayers, used the opportunity to criticise the City Council, councillors and officials for not managing the city properly. After the Planning Zone champion, Annemarie Borsje, and the facilitator, Keith Griffiths, explained the components of the IDP process, the forum reluctantly agreed to proceed with the process.

¹⁶⁰ The IDP teams agreed that the 'permanent' or final management committees should only be elected at the end of the process when more clarity had been obtained on the leadership in the zone and the process itself, as was the case with the Inner City Process in 1996.

committees, the elected chairpersons of these forums played a leading role in their management, the community participation processes and the overall IDP processes. This emphasised the need for a formal mechanism for community participation, as well as the advantages of such structured community forums - specifically on the scale of Pretoria with its large population and diverse communities.

Initially the elected politicians saw these forums as a good mechanism for community participation, and something that could even enhance their political status (power). Never did they realise what the impact of these forums would be. Some of the local authorities saw these forums as something (outside the local authority) that they 'had to' support and something which had the potential (and power) to threaten the existing power structures in the local authority.

As the IDP processes progressed through 1997 and 1998, it became evident that the respective roles and responsibilities of the councillors, forum leaders and Planning Zone champions had not yet been clearly defined. The actual status and power of the PZFs and the relationship between the PZFs and the local authorities had not yet been determined either. Communities and stakeholders groups were not sure what was expected of them. These issues had never really been sorted out prior to the process and not enough effort had been made to provide the forums with guidelines on how to structure their forums and management committees. As a result of the history of the City's governance processes, the communities found it difficult to trust the Council and its officials and politicians.

The forum leaders were not sure what their leadership entailed. Some forum leaders such as Alderman Bob Zylstra (Chairperson of Planning Zone 8) had an attitude of 'working with the Council', always trying to limit any unnecessary conflict. Other forum leaders such as Joanne Bing (Planning Zone 9), on the other hand, clearly made the point (or thought) that she was the leader of the particular community, and that she was the (only) one with power. Bing often stated, "*the people shall govern*". She did not have a problem confronting any official or politician, or the local authority as a whole. The elected councillors, on the other hand, argued that they had been elected to represent the community and that they would take the lead in the planning and development of a particular zone. The above is also an indication of the conflict and confusion, which arose between the so-called community/social power (derived from the Planning Zone forums) and the dominatory power of "the Prince" (as described by Machiavelli). In this case, 'good' community power became so strong that it almost changed to a "bad" power. This undefined relationship between the forum leaders and the councillors (particularly of Planning Zone 9) obviously resulted in ongoing conflict between these role players and opened up a new

debate on the actual status of these forums and their role within the urban planning process, and also the power relations within the forums and between the forums and the local authority. Members of the various PZFs often stated that the forums had 'no teeth' and that they should have more powers to deal with matters that affected them directly. Some community members also stated that the community participation process was nothing more than 'window dressing'.

After the completion of the first IDPs and the establishment of the more permanent management committees in the beginning of 1998, the local authority requested all the forums to comment on rezoning applications and development proposals. In one particular case - the application for a McDonald's restaurant in Brooklyn - the forum objected strongly to the application. In spite of the 'consultation' with the 'powerless' community forum, the City Council of Pretoria decided to approve the application. This raised the frustration levels of the forum members and the community¹⁶¹ and led to further discussions between politicians, the various forum leaders and members; and between politicians and the community forums. This aspect was never solved and remained an issue until 2000 when the forums were terminated. From the above, it was obvious that the forums, with their strong leadership, had become a threat and 'power problem' to the local authority's political structure. The elected councillors wanted to protect and exercise their powers; and the community wanted to exercise community power by participating in the planning and governance of the City.

This is yet another example of how political power was used to dominate rational actions, communicative action and the force of the better argument - the issue of "power defines rationality" as described by Flyvbjerg in Chapter 2. This, among other things, implies the domination of politics (or political power) over rational (planning) processes. In a nutshell, this means that rational planning actions cannot be successfully implemented without political support - hence the need to integrate power and rationality. The question that comes to mind however was whether the forum had made enough effort to communicate effectively (communicative action) and to present the better argument, and whether this was not merely the normal/traditional way of exercising dominatory power. A critique against this theory of Flyvbjerg, relates to the fact that he (possibly) underestimated the 'power of rationality' and the fact that rational actions can actually also be very powerful. Within the context of the 'power-rationality' relationship, it would perhaps have been more appropriate to refer to the balance or relationship between 'rational power and political power'. This relationship between power (politics) and rationality (planning), however, highlights the important relationship between urban planning and urban management, and between the

¹⁶¹ Some of the frustrations regarding the above were also recorded in local newspapers (*Rekord East*, 1997; and *Pretoria News*, 1998).

community and the government. These power-planning dilemmas, specifically within the context of the IDP, furthermore emphasises the need for appropriate community structures and processes and clearly defined roles and responsibilities.

As the IDP community participation process evolved during 1997, it became obvious that there was still confusion about how to effectively facilitate and manage meaningful community participation within an urban/local authority environment. This can largely be ascribed to the fact that the local authority (politicians, officials and managers) was still framed by the old way of urban planning and management with its strong autocratic, rigid, technical, command-and-control characteristics. Bearing in mind the 'long history' and maturity of this old urban planning system and the effect that it had on local authorities, it is obvious to conclude that it was not going to be easy to introduce a new participatory urban planning system without conflict. What initially seemed like a fairly easy change to local authority structures and processes, turned out to be a major intervention with impact.

Although some community forums were initially confused and hesitant to accept the new approaches, they increasingly became more receptive to the new approaches and more committed to making the process work. The forums and Forum Steering Committees got more settled during the beginning of 1998 and continued to structure and refine the Forum Steering Committees and its roles and responsibilities. The establishment of the forums and their steering committees was a major step in the direction of participatory planning and decision-making. These formal and structured community participation mechanisms, which were established for all areas in the city, created new opportunities for communities to participate in a more structured way in the planning and management of the city and promoted a new relationship between the Council and the community. The communities that participated in the IDP process by and large welcomed and appreciated the new emphasis on community participation and the opportunity to participate in the planning of their areas (see Perception Survey, 1999)¹⁶².

At the first IDP workshops, held during the course of July, August and September 1997, the various forums formulated the visions for each of the respective planning areas or IDPs. Although many planners and other participants criticised the visioning process for being 'too fluffy'¹⁶³, the majority of participants stated that it had contributed to uniting the various communities in the strategic planning process; it had provided a strategic direction; and it had set the platform for the

¹⁶² After some of the first workshops, the *Pretoria News* (30 July 1997) reported that: "*The spirit of cooperation, consultation and transparency is evident in a new model of municipal management with which Greater Pretoria is taking the lead in the country*" (Uys 1997). See also comments of Fourie (1997) on the first workshops.

¹⁶³ A word used by one of the respondents in the Interview Survey (1998).

further phases of the process¹⁶⁴ (see Perception Survey, 1999). In most cases the visioning process also stimulated the interest of the various stakeholder groups to further participate in the process. In this regard it set the platform for the rest of the participatory planning process. Unfortunately, many of the Pretoria visions presented a view of the future that was too idealistic, ultimately resulting in unrealistic expectations¹⁶⁵.

Following on from the vision workshops (from August to December 1997) the various planning teams and forums proceeded with the rest of the phases of the strategic planning process, namely determining community needs, prioritising issues, formulating goals and objectives, analysing the status quo, developing the spatial framework and formulating strategies. As the IDP processes progressed during late 1997, planners and the communities became more confident and experienced with the new approaches and the notion of working and planning with the people.

There were also those planners who witnessed how their 'structure planning approach' was being diminished and replaced by a new, radically different form of planning. These planners continued to criticise the IDP approach for its lack of focus on spatial planning and the fact that, in their opinion, it was too involved with non-spatial issues. It became increasingly evident that planners, community members and politicians had difficulty adapting to certain phases and components of the process. It was 'difficult' for planners to effectively apply the theoretical principles in practice. The question that comes to mind is whether it really was that difficult, and whether it was not perhaps a case of the planners not wanting to make the effort. Another question relates to whether the local authorities (and the national government) had done enough to prepare and equip the planners to effectively deal with the various IDP processes.

In South Africa, unlike many other parts of the world where these principles were phased in over a period 30 to 40 years, these new principles entered and overshadowed the South African scene in a very short period of time, during a very turbulent transformation phase in the early/mid-1990s. In spite of all the training, preparations and structural changes in the organisation, this process did not always succeed in achieving the set goals of the new urban planning principles (Perception Survey, 1999; Interview Survey, 2002).

¹⁶⁴ Oranje *et al* (1999: 20), with regard to most visions contained in the LDO/IDP documents, stated that "*The statements were very repetitive and often seemed to be a composite of all that is seen as good and praiseworthy at a given time*".

¹⁶⁵ In 2000, two planners, Kestell Serfontein and Johnny Coetzee, questioned the real relevance of visioning, and more specifically its ability to direct planning and development into the future. They argued that the concept of visioning was based on an unpredictable future and that it was not possible to align goals, strategies and projects towards such an unpredictable future. They also argued that it was better to use the more familiar present to shape the future, than to use the unfamiliar future to determine the 'now action' (Coetzee and Serfontein 2002).

Throughout the IDP process, the participants criticised the ways in which the community participation phase was planned and implemented. This critique primarily relates to the undefined roles and responsibilities of the community structures, the time-consuming process, the wish list of projects, the cumbersome nature of the process and the political interference and power play (Perception Survey, 1999)¹⁶⁶. The community participation phase (which was mainly done through structured workshops) was also criticised for only involving certain community groups in the process, for example, those who could (afford to) attend the workshops. In many Planning Zones, the community participation phase resulted in conflict between members of the steering committees, councillors and members of the planning teams on issues such as the structure of the process, the respective role of the planning teams, the role of the Council, and the relationship between the PZFs and the Council.

Notwithstanding the fact that some councillors actively participated in the various phases and components of the IDP process, many role players expected the councillors to have played a more integral part in the process (Perception Survey, 1999). It also became obvious that the planners, community members and politicians did not have sufficient experience and knowledge on the notion of participatory planning and this newly evolving form of local democracy.

After the completion of the first round of IDPs, the concept of democratic planning in the City of Pretoria developed, from almost nothing in the early 1990s, to a significant, well-established and accepted community-local authority planning, management and communication system in 1998/1999. In spite of the critique of the IDP processes, it created many opportunities for communities to participate in the process of planning, development and management of the city. For each of the 22 IDP processes in the City of Pretoria, a formal community forum was established with supporting management structures to promote communication and participation. Various community working groups or issue-based task teams were also established to allow stakeholders groups the opportunity to participate in specific issues of the IDP process. These working groups specifically provided the community the opportunity to become involved in the implementation of IDP projects.

The participatory approach largely improved the community's understanding of planning and development and the Council's organisational structures, processes and priorities (Perception Survey, 1999). The new approach improved the Council's understanding of the community's needs and wants. As the IDP processes unfolded, various communication channels such as newsletters and websites were established to improve communication amongst stakeholders and with the local

¹⁶⁶ See also critique on community participation discussed in Chapter 4.

authorities - something that had never existed before¹⁶⁷. Many of the community forums established Planning Zone offices in some of the Planning Zones to promote communication and participation and to provide an information service closer to the people. The IDP processes ultimately resulted in numerous new relationships between the stakeholders and between the stakeholders and the various Pretoria local authorities - and a total new and even more complex web of power relations.

As will be discussed in later sections, these PZFs were (unfortunately) terminated in 2000 when the new Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) introduced a different mechanism for community participation in the form of Ward Councils.

Although the community participation phase of the IDP process was criticised for its shortcomings, many people regarded it as groundbreaking work and an honest attempt by the local authority to promote democratic planning or local democracy¹⁶⁸. These community-planning processes were a giant leap in the direction of participatory planning and certainly brought the planning system in the former City of Pretoria a step closer to international best practices.

FIGURE 10: HIGH POINTS AND LOW POINTS OF THE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION PHASE OF THE 1997/1998 IDP PROCESSES

HIGH POINTS OF THE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION PHASE (1997/1998)
Excitement of new process
Visible results of the process
New emphasis on participation
Focus on community needs
Break from apartheid planning
New type of democratic planning
Building of relationships
Involvement of community
Positive learning experience for many
New opportunities for officials
Establishment of community forums
Council approval of first IDPs
Community pride and ownership of process

¹⁶⁷ Examples of such newsletters were the *Atteridgeville IDP News*, September 1997; *Ou Ooste - Old East*, Newsletter of Zone 9, October 1997; *Ou Ooste - Old East*, Newsletter of Zone 9, September 1997; *Zone 11 - Newsletter*, October 1997; *Zone 1 - Newsletter*, November 1997.

¹⁶⁸ As the process evolved during the latter half of 1997, extensive media coverage largely assisted in promoting the process amongst communities. Various references were made to the spirit of cooperation, consultation, transparency and active involvement of residents in the IDP process (Yssel in *Beeld*, 1 October 1997 and 19 November 1997; *Muniforum*, December/January 1998. Yssel in *Beeld* (19 November 1997) also reported on the problems that were experienced in some areas and referred to the poor attendance, the uncertainty with regard to the role of the IDP in the future and the way in which residents should be involved with IDPs. The GPMC distributed progress reports on the IDP processes to all consultants, project leaders and steering committees to inform them about the progress of the IDPs in the metropolitan area (GPMC 1997).

LOW POINTS OF THE COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION PHASE (1997/1998)
Poor attendance at meetings
Frustrations and conflict
Political interference and 'power play'
Cumbersome process
Lack of buy-in from councillors and officials
Resistance and reluctance of officials
Negative critique
Lack of visible results
Process created expectations in community
Lack of implementation
Slow implementation

As a result of the particular structure of the IDP, which was based on the concept of the four environments - the social, economic, physical and institutional - as well as the broad spectrum of stakeholders that were involved in the process, the IDP process (formulation phase) largely succeeded in focusing on the social aspects of the city as discussed in Chapter 4. In spite of all the efforts that were made to promote a social consciousness amongst planners and politicians, (unfortunately) some planners and IDP champions were still stuck in the more technical domain, which in some instances, resulted in the social aspects not getting the necessary attention.

As far as the overall IDP process-structure (the phases and steps of the process) is concerned, participants made very few negative comments (Perception Survey, 1999). The structured IDP process was increasingly accepted as a process that could structure and facilitate effective and meaningful community participation. Planners realised that the process was suited to address and integrate the various aspects of spatial planning and land-use management on different levels (metropolitan, regional and local).

The IDP process, with its holistic nature, proved that it could equally address and integrate the various components and sub-components of the urban environment (the physical, social, economic and institutional environments). Planners, politicians, local authority managers and stakeholders increasingly recognised the IDP as a tool that had the potential to harness the distinct components of urban planning and urban management, for example, the planning-budgeting link, determining strategic priority areas and prioritising community needs (Perception Survey, 1999). Unfortunately the IDP processes (phases and steps) followed in Pretoria were to a large extent structured and applied without really understanding the contents, rationale and aim of the process outcome - namely to create a strategic urban planning and management document.

The final process outcomes (the SDFs or the IDPs) were in many cases merely a 'compilation or

consolidation' of the various process outcomes, for example, a compilation of the vision, goals, strategies, etc. As the process evolved, the emphasis changed from the broader perspective on *integrated development planning* to a more rigid and limited perspective on *the IDP*, which is mainly associated with a structured process, *the IDP process*, and the resultant process outcome, *the Integrated Development Plan*. The IDP process was trying to promote a new form of urban planning (*idp*), but it was difficult to achieve this in view of the fact that *the IDP* was inherently concretised in a rigid structure that provided little space for innovation and flexibility (Interview Survey, 2002)¹⁶⁹.

One of the major problems of the first round of IDPs was the lack of strategic focus (Perception Survey, 1999) - an aspect that became an important issue within the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality, as will be discussed in sections to follow. Throughout the process, communities and planners had difficulty distinguishing between the strategic issues and detail issues. This can largely be ascribed to the nature and structure of the community participation process that largely neglected the citywide or strategic stakeholders, and primarily focused on the 'local' stakeholders and local communities who were mainly concerned with local environmental issues. The lack of strategic focus also resulted in comprehensive community wish lists and a large number of goals, objectives and strategies, as well as many expectations that were almost unrealistic and unattainable (Perception Survey, 1999). As a result of the many strategies and projects (which were often not integrated), it was almost impossible to implement them, as it was difficult to link the projects (and wish lists) with the budget.

This lack of strategic focus was further underscored by the cumbersome and detailed technical status quo reports that were largely structured in terms of a rigid format prescribed by the Gauteng Department of Local Government and Development Planning in 1997¹⁷⁰ (see also Perception Survey, 1999). This format, which was also construed by planners as being the prescribed 'report format', resulted in a situation in which almost all IDP documents were structured according to these 'chapters'. This obviously made it difficult to present the IDP in an integrated and interesting manner and resulted in rather boring, cumbersome and complex IDP documents, which were difficult to read and were not easily understood by officials, managers, politicians and the communities.

¹⁶⁹ See also Coetzee and Serfontein (2002).

¹⁷⁰ This format suggested a detailed breakdown and analysis of the urban environment and its components. It provided a rigid structure and framework according to which all IDPs had to be structured. This Gauteng format in many ways presented a detailed checklist of all the issues that had to be addressed during the IDP process - irrespective of the relevance or priority of the issues.

Apart from the overall strategic focus, very few Council planners (and planning consultants) really understood the strategic level and the 'strategic' aim, contents and format of the Spatial Development Framework component, or its role in the IDP process¹⁷¹. The Pretoria planners frequently argued that the extended focus on strategic planning, community planning, community participation, social issues and institutional components, specifically in the case of the IDPs in Pretoria, had led to an under-emphasis of spatial planning or the 'de-spatialisation' of planning (Perception Survey, 1999)¹⁷².

The lack of 'strategic understanding', which existed amongst many planners, made it difficult for them to 'think strategically' and to effectively formulate real strategies based on the set goals and objectives¹⁷³. One of the most challenging phases in the IDP process was the integration phase that aimed to integrate the various inputs/outcomes derived from the strategic planning process¹⁷⁴.

Based on some people's understanding of the legislation and the new IDP approach (which is incidentally based on the premise of integration), "*everything had to be integrated with everything*". This often resulted in complex, forced and artificial integration processes. The integration phase was further complicated by the excessive number of 'isolated' objectives, strategies and projects, as well as the large scale and extent of the IDP processes - to integrate inputs from 22 IDPs. The problem, however, is not related to the many IDPs or the many issues the IDPs sought to deal with, but rather the way in which the integration between these IDPs was done (or not done).

In January 1998, the GPMC, under the leadership of Amond Beneke, held an integration workshop that aimed to integrate the inputs and components, specifically the integration of components between the metropolitan, city, and local IDPs. Although this workshop contributed in some way to harness the City IDPs, it did not succeed in integrating the IDPs and their components effectively. These problems regarding the integration of the IDPs also highlighted the need 'to integrate' - from the inception of the process, throughout the lifespan of the process.

¹⁷¹ The Spatial Development Framework, within the context of the IDP, is generally seen as a broad spatial framework reflecting the most strategic issues of the process and not detailed land use. For more information on the contents of spatial frameworks, see IDP Task Team (1999), Republic of South Africa (2000); Development and Planning Commission (1990); Gauteng Department of Development Planning and Local Government (1997), and Perception Survey (1999).

¹⁷² See also Harrison (2002) on the impact of the IDP on spatial planning.

¹⁷³ The CSIR (1998) presents a discussion on the meaning and relevance of strategy formulation within the context of the IDP and also proposes a process of how to formulate development strategies, which could be used as a guideline for the IDP process.

¹⁷⁴ This integration entails, among other things, the integration within a particular process (functional integration), the integration of issues, strategies, objectives and projects between different IDP processes on the same level, for example, between the three citywide processes, or between the various Planning Zones (horizontal integration), and the integration of issues between different levels of IDPs or plans (vertical integration).

Throughout the IDP process, much emphasis was placed on the notion of sustainable development - a notion that was/is widely promoted by national policies¹⁷⁵. There was hardly a vision statement or a goal that did not include a reference to sustainability or sustainable development. As noted by many participants, these concepts were freely used by planners, communities and even politicians - in many cases without them really understanding the meaning of these concepts (Perception Survey, 1999; Interview Survey 2002). However, apart from the 'lip service', the concept of sustainability had been largely neglected through the IDP processes (see also Perception Survey, 1999; Interview Survey, 2002).

Throughout 1997/1998 it became apparent how the IDP processes began to reflect the theoretical/international principles and trends as discussed in Chapter 4. It became obvious how the emphasis began to shift from the patriarchal planning system to a broader integrated and holistic form of contemporary urban planning.

As the IDP processes came closer to completion towards the end of 1997, some Pretoria newspapers, as well as other publications, recognised and commended the new IDP approach that was being applied in various parts of the city. The media specifically referred to the (democratic) way in which the community was involved in the IDP processes, the Council's new approach to strategic planning, as well as the new way of budgeting (i.e. the involvement of communities in the budget process and the link between the budget and the city plan). This reaction by the media is rather indicative of the progress and the change that took place in the city's urban planning environment during 1997/1998¹⁷⁶.

5.12 "THE PLAN IS COMING TOGETHER"

Finalising and approving the IDP: January to March 1998

During the course of December 1997/January 1998, the IDP teams, consultants and working groups finalised and compiled the various components of their draft IDPs, which had to be submitted to the respective IDP forums (Metropolitan Forum, Citywide Forum and Planning Zone Forum). In most cases, a workshop or planning summit was held to present and discuss the draft IDPs with the communities¹⁷⁷. Eventually, by the end of January, the Metropolitan IDP and the

¹⁷⁵ See discussion on sustainable development in Chapter 4.

¹⁷⁶ F and T Weekly (1998); Yssel (7 October 1997 and 19 November 1997); Business Day (1997); and Muniforum December (1997).

¹⁷⁷ Unfortunately these workshops had not been properly planned, coordinated or scheduled. The Metropolitan IDP and the three City IDPs (Pretoria, Centurion and Akasia) were presented to the Metropolitan and Citywide Forums at the end of January, before the local IDPs were presented to and accepted by the various Planning Zone Forums. This state of affairs created frustration for the planning teams, consultants and Planning Zone Forums.

three Citywide IDPs were accepted in principle by the respective forums.

The communities and PZFs also accepted the various local IDPs at the last workshops or planning summits at the end of February. During these workshops the forums elected or appointed more representative and 'permanent' steering committees for the Metropolitan Forum, the Citywide Forum and the various PZFs to substitute the Interim Steering Committees (ISCs) that had been established at the beginning of the process in July/August 1997. Although this 'community approval' of the IDP did not imply final approval, the communities saw it as an important milestone in the IDP process. This milestone, in many ways, represented a new beginning of participatory urban planning in the City of Pretoria - or at least this was what some people thought.

Following on the 'in-principle' approval of the IDPs by the respective forums, much work still had to be done to finalise and integrate all the IDP documents before submitting the IDPs to the respective local authorities and the provincial department¹⁷⁸. In the City Council of Pretoria, a special procedure had to be formulated to submit the Pretoria City IDP and the 10 local IDPs to the City Council of Pretoria before the end of March¹⁷⁹. Although the councillors, planning teams, consultants and forums all accepted that the IDPs had problems and shortcomings (as discussed earlier), they also realised that the IDPs could not be perfect, given the limited time and budget that was allowed to prepare the IDPs.

By the end of March 1998, all the IDPs (Metropolitan IDP, three Citywide IDPs and the Planning Zone IDPs) were eventually submitted to and approved by the various local authorities¹⁸⁰. The councillors, planners and other officials concerned in the City Council of Pretoria regarded the formal approval of the IDPs as a major milestone for the planning department¹⁸¹. This approval celebrated a new beginning for planners and the beginning of a new urban planning and local authority planning and management system. However, although the planning system was changing, very few planners adapted to the changing system. After the Council approval, two new camps or streams of planners emerged in the planning department - those in support of the new urban planning approach and those in opposition to it. Some Pretoria planners also thought that the IDP approval was the last milestone - the final phase of transformation and the end to all 'the

¹⁷⁸ The DFA, 1995, determined that the LDOs for the area of jurisdiction had to be submitted for approval by the Gauteng Department of Development Planning and Local Government, while the LGTA, 1996 determined that the IDP had to be submitted for approval by the local authority. This provincial department requested the local authorities to submit their IDPs/LDOs by the end of March 1998.

¹⁷⁹ Although there were 11 planning zones in the City Council of Pretoria's area of jurisdiction and 11 IDPs. The inner city IDP or SDF followed a separate process and was submitted for approval in June 1997.

¹⁸⁰ See GPMC (1998) and City Council of Pretoria (1998).

¹⁸¹ This was a very special occasion in the City Council of Pretoria. Mike Yates arranged that the IDP teams could join the councillors for supper during the break of the Council meeting. Mike Yates even popped a few bottles of champagne to celebrate the approval of the IDPs.

new things' - without realising that this was only the beginning of the transformation process.

Following Council approval, Yates stated, *"Compiling these documents through a full public participation process has been achieved through tremendous effort, dedication and commitment within a relatively short time and truly marks a milestone in the developmental history of Pretoria"*¹⁸². Yates specifically commended and acknowledged the role played by officials from the City Planning and Development Department and stated, *"Despite many problems and setbacks, these teams and support staff were determined to make the process work"*¹⁸³.

After the approval of the IDPs, various community leaders, politicians and officials from the Council, developers and planning consultants¹⁸⁴ congratulated the Council planners for their contribution to the IDP process (see also Perception Survey, 1999). A new positive relationship was developing between the planners, consultants, communities and politicians - something that had been lacking in the old planning system. Although the Council approvals construed the 'final approval' of the IDPs, the Metropolitan and City IDPs still had to be approved by the Gauteng Department of Development Planning and Local Government¹⁸⁵.

A special workshop or hearing was held in May 1998 at the Atterbury Park Offices, Menlyn, Pretoria, where the Greater Pretoria LDO/IDP Provincial Evaluation Team evaluated these IDPs. After the presentations of the Pretoria IDPs, Pete Amad, a senior planner in the provincial planning department, and convenor of this evaluation team, commended the Pretoria officials, consultants, councillors and the public of Greater Pretoria for their efforts and the high standard of the IDPs.

On 17 June 1998, the former MEC of the Gauteng Department of Development Planning and Local Government, Mr Sicelo Schiceka, signed the approval of the Pretoria IDPs (Metropolitan IDP and three City IDPs)¹⁸⁶. In a letter, which the MEC sent to the Chairpersons of the Executive Committees and to the Chief Executive Officers/Town Clerks of the respective local authorities after approving the Pretoria IDPs, he also commended the local authority for its efforts¹⁸⁷.

This MEC presented a trophy to the GPMC (and the three MLCs) for the best IDP/LDO process in

¹⁸² See *Muniforum* April/May 1998.

¹⁸³ See *Muniforum* April/May 1998.

¹⁸⁴ It could be possible to argue that the planning consultants had to be positive about the process in view of the fact that many consultants would want to be re-appointed by the Council. However, the positive spirit and manner in which the consultants continuously expressed their views on the contribution of the Council planners, could be an indication of their honesty and the objectivity of their viewpoints.

¹⁸⁵ These plans had to be approved by the provincial department in terms of Section 27(1) of the Development Facilitation Act, (No 67 of 1995), and the Local Government Transition Act, (No 209 of 1993 as amended)

¹⁸⁶ See Gauteng Department of Development Planning and Local Government (1998).

¹⁸⁷ See Development Planning and Local Government 1998 (letter written by MEC, dated 7 June 1998).

Gauteng in 1997 and in 1998. Other cities and provinces approached the City of Pretoria for advice on the IDP approach. This unfortunately created the impression amongst some planners that the City of Pretoria was taking the lead with IDPs in Gauteng and possibly even in the country. Some planners, such as Coetzee and Beneke, even developed arrogance about the progress that had been made with the IDPs. They thought that the Pretoria IDP was the only/best example of an IDP in the country.

After the approval of the IDPs, the planners were so overwhelmed by the 'successful completion' and approval of the IDP that they did not really focus on or want to listen to any negative critique of the IDP. At this point they probably did not fully realise the flaws and shortcomings of the IDPs (as will be discussed in later sections).

It is ironic that so much initial positive critique and comments were raised on plans that were later severely criticised. It should, however, be realised that this positive critique (which was probably on the spur of the moment) came from a few people who had been actively involved with the process themselves. This arrogance about the IDPs, however, not only highlights the pride and positive attitudes that existed amongst some planners, but is also indicative of the positive changes that were taking place - not only in the urban planning system, but also amongst many planners in the local authorities.

Following the approval or completion of the Pretoria IDPs, various discussions were held by the planners and officials of the GPMC and the three MLCs to analyse and evaluate the 1997/1998 IDP processes. On 4 June 1998, the planning department of the City Council of Pretoria held a 'post-mortem' workshop¹⁸⁸ at PREMOS (the official training centre of the City Council). All the planning teams and consultants involved with the City Council of Pretoria's processes were invited to participate. The main aim of this workshop was to identify the shortcomings and problems of the process, as well as its strengths. During the course of this workshop, the majority of delegates stated that the IDPs had been successfully completed, notwithstanding the complexity of the process, the limited funds that had been allocated to the consultants and the limited time that was allowed to complete the IDPs. The participants also expressed concerns about the cumbersome and rigid format of the IDP and the confusion regarding the status of the IDP. As discussed earlier, reference was made to the lack of focus on spatial planning and the lack of strategic focus.

After the first round of IDPs, most of the Pretoria planning consultants involved with the process stated that the IDP process had also been a major experience and learning curve for them. They

¹⁸⁸ It is ironic to note that reference was made to a 'post-mortem' workshop, as if that was the end of the IDP.

argued that the experience obtained through the IDP process could be applied to other future processes in Pretoria and elsewhere in the country¹⁸⁹. The interaction that took place between the council planners and the planning consultants not only improved relationships, but in many ways contributed to shaping the new urban planning paradigm amongst many of these planners - both council planners and planning consultants (Perception Survey, 1999). One of the well-established town planning firms in Pretoria at the time, EVS, who had also participated in the IDP process, regarded it as “... a groundbreaking action that set an example for many other local authorities”¹⁹⁰.

Apart from the City Council of Pretoria's ‘post-mortem’ workshop, the members of the IDP/PZF Technical Coordinating Committee also held a workshop at the offices of the GPMC on 12 June 1998 to evaluate the IDP processes¹⁹¹. This committee incidentally echoed the concerns, which was raised at the ‘post-mortem’ workshop, as discussed above. In addition to this, this joint committee raised a number of other concerns: the implementation of IDPs; the lack of a prioritisation system; the capacity problems in the local authorities; the poor involvement of the councillors; the lack of proper communication and participation; and the poor functioning of the PZFs.

These concerns and issues also became the topic of discussion and debate at numerous discussion sessions, workshops and seminars from 1998 onwards. Although this first round of IDPs fell far short of the ideals, Harrison (2002: 7) argues that a learning process had commenced and that the foundations had been laid for the next round of IDPs¹⁹².

After the approval of the IDP, as the IDP teams began to prepare for its implementation, the aspect of the status of the IDP, increasingly became an area of concern. In view of the above, in the middle of 1998 the City Council of Pretoria requested a Pretoria-based legal firm, Roestoff Venter & Kruse, to present a legal opinion on the status of the IDP. This opinion clearly stated that the Citywide IDPs, and all that was associated with them and had been approved by Council, should be accepted as statutory documents. This viewpoint, therefore, implied that the Planning Zone IDPs could not be regarded as statutory documents in view of the fact that these plans were only supportive to the statutory City IDP and not an integral component of it¹⁹³.

Closely related to the aspect of status, was the confusion about the relationship between the IDP,

¹⁸⁹ Interviews held with various planning consultants.

¹⁹⁰ See EVS (1999).

¹⁹¹ The IDP PZF Technical Coordinating Committee also had a follow-up meeting on 22 June 1998 to discuss the way forward for IDPs.

¹⁹² See also critique of the second round of IDPs and the implementation of IDPs in sections to follow.

¹⁹³ See Roestoff Venter & Kruse (1998). See also Venter (1998) for a supporting viewpoint.

the Spatial Development Framework and the Land-use Management system. This aspect was also thoroughly debated at a workshop organised by the Association of Municipal Town Planners held in Hazyview¹⁹⁴ on 19 and 20 August 1999. As the planners tried to get clarity on the abovementioned, it became apparent that the spatial plan concept or the structure plans in most parts of the country were almost losing their role and status. It was argued, among other things, that the IDPs' extended focus on the broader environment (which then included the physical, social, economical and institutional environments) had detracted the focus from spatial planning (and structure planning).

Towards the end of the 1990s, many of the old generation (structure) planners (in the case of the former City Council of Pretoria) continued to embrace the structure plans and argued that these plans (with their shortcomings) provided a better framework for spatial development and land use management than the confusing IDPs with their limited spatial directions¹⁹⁵. Although the majority of planners agreed that a broad strategic type of spatial plan (possibly as part of the IDP) was needed to provide an overall direction and policy for the city, the point was also raised that such a broad plan does not have the capacity to guide more detailed land use management and local development. Some of the more prominent planning consultancies, such as Plan Practice and PLAN Associates, argued that the broad type of strategic spatial plans that were included in the IDPs (and in some LDO documents), in view of their normative and poor indicative nature, made it difficult for the members of the Townships Board and Tribunals (many of which were not familiar with planning), planners, councillors and lawyers to interpret development proposals - often leading to confusion, poor interpretations and prolonged hearings (Interview Survey, 2002).

Many planners suggested that a more detailed land-use type of plan (something like the old structure plans) had to form part of the lower rungs of plans so as to create a proper framework, specifically for land use management (Interview Survey, 2002). Unfortunately, as the IDP process developed during the 1990s, the land use/development control planners made very little effort to participate in the development of the IDP. This could also be a reason why so much confusion arose about the relationship between the IDP and the Land-use Management system.

By the end of 1998, it was obvious that there was still much confusion about the IDP and its role within the local authority and the overall urban planning process. Although many planners had 'bought into' the new IDP process, there were many planners who resisted this new form of integrated development planning. Notwithstanding all the critique of the IDP and the resistance of

¹⁹⁴ See Association of Municipal Town Planners (1999 a and b).

¹⁹⁵ Personal communication, Roode.

some planners, the planning department as a whole made great strides in establishing the notion of IDP as an integral part of urban planning and local governance.

Planners began to talk freely about aspects such as poverty, community needs, integration, etc. Apart from these transformations, there was also a major transformation in the way local authorities were managing their local affairs - the transformation from a rigid, autocratic way of local governance to a more open, democratic way. These transformations are associated with a radical transformation of political ideologies and attitudes, from the rigid discriminatory apartheid framework to a more equitable democratic framework. Planners, however, often argued that the former Pretoria municipalities, with its many resources, planning capacity and experience, could have done more to transform the urban planning system (Perception Survey, 1999; Interview Survey, 2002). Although some progress was made to promote the IDP, to formulate and compile IDP documents, to set up community structures and to study the critique of the IDPs, the real challenge - that of implementing the IDP - still had to be faced.

Unfortunately, the planners and managers in the former Pretoria municipalities underestimated the importance of the follow-up implementation phase, as will be discussed in the following section.

5.13 THE IDP TAKES A NOSE DIVE

Implementing the IDP: July 1998 to July 1999

The actual implementation of the first Pretoria IDPs eventually started on 1 July 1998 (the beginning of the 1998/1999 financial year), almost one year after the start of the IDP process. Since the inception of the IDP process (February 1997), the importance of ongoing implementation (and visible results) was constantly emphasised by various role players in the process.

Throughout the process, a large number of strategies and projects were formulated and unrealistic expectations created, while the possible implications and obstacles (such as limited funds) were never sufficiently addressed. At the beginning of the implementation phase, communities, stakeholder groups and forums expected visible results and projects to be implemented. The Planning Zone Forums (PZFs) also expected a financial contribution for their community projects. To the disappointment and frustration of many of the planners and other participants in the IDP process, very few IDP projects¹⁹⁶ were implemented during the first year of implementation: July

¹⁹⁶ The number of IDP projects that were implemented varied between the different local authority areas and planning zones. In most cases, less than 10% of the identified IDP projects were implemented.

1998 to June 1999¹⁹⁷ (see also Perception Survey, 1999).

Following the approval of the IDPs in March 1998, the various Pretoria municipalities still had to perform a number of tasks before the IDPs could be implemented, such as the final integration, prioritisation and costing of projects; the allocation of responsibilities; the finalisation of funding and communication strategies; and the general administrative and logistical arrangements. It became evident that the planning teams did not really know how to structure and plan the implementation phase or how to structure a proper implementation framework¹⁹⁸. The lack of such a framework made it difficult, and almost impossible, for the City Council to prioritise strategies and projects; to link the budget process with the IDP and its projects; to effectively implement, manage and monitor the projects; and to monitor and measure the performance of the plan, the city and the organisation. This resulted in a situation where the concerned role players had to enter the (even more complex) implementation phase almost unprepared and with limited knowledge and experience.

Although the IDPs in most cases lacked an Implementation Framework, the City Council of Pretoria and the GPMC, made various attempts to develop a Management Information System (MIS) that could support the ongoing implementation and monitoring of the IDPs (a so-called IDP MIS). In July 1997, the planning department prepared a discussion memorandum entitled *Proposed Framework for an Integrated Management Information System*. This document subsequently led to various follow-up meetings with Plandata - a Pretoria-based firm specialising in information technology - and the CSIR in attempt to involve these specialists in the process of establishing an IDP MIS for the City Council of Pretoria.

This MIS was never finalised and implemented, mainly in view of limited funds and the fact that this MIS was, at the time, not really regarded as a priority. In 1998, the GPMC appointed a consortium under the leadership of Theo Pretorius of PLAN Associates to establish an IDP implementation/monitoring mechanism for the Metropolitan IDP¹⁹⁹. This MIS specifically included all status quo data and information regarding the IDPs, as well as a support system for the implementation of the Metropolitan IDP, the City IDPs and the various Planning Zone IDPs. It also aimed to assist the IDP champions in the overall management and monitoring of the process, and

¹⁹⁷ The GPMC and the City Council of North Shore, New Zealand, within the context of strategic planning, also emphasised the need to implement a few high profile and visible catalyst projects soon after the implementation phase had been initiated, to show to the Council's intent (The GPMC 1997; and City Council of North Shore 1996).

¹⁹⁸ The term 'Implementation Framework' was commonly used in the former City Council of Pretoria to describe that component of the IDP document that provides the framework and guidelines for IDP implementation. This framework, as will be discussed in later sections, was intended to guide and manage all aspects regarding the implementation of the IDP and all its components, as well as the ongoing monitoring and management of the process.

¹⁹⁹ See GPMC (1999 and 2000).

created the opportunity to continually update and maintain the contents of the IDP.

Henry Bezuidenhout, a senior town planner in the GPMC responsible for this MIS, argued that the design of the system was a big success, while the implementation of the system was not at all successful²⁰⁰. In this case, ironically enough, a system that was specifically designed to promote implementation (more specifically the implementation of the IDP), in itself could not even be implemented.

Similarly, the IDP process, which was structured to implement projects and programmes, could not be implemented successfully either. This state of affairs in many ways emphasised the old, rigid, reactive way of planning, and the lack of focus on development, performance and delivery, and plan implementation - aspects that form an integral part of the new form of integrated development planning. As the implementation progressed, it became increasingly obvious that the IDP planning teams experienced difficulty understanding their various roles and responsibilities in the implementation phase. In the former City Council of Pretoria, for instance, the IDP champions and the forums did not really know how to deal with those projects that fell outside the cadre of the local authority's responsibility, for example, the development of a hospital in a particular area. These types of projects were largely neglected in view of the fact that the planning teams did not know how to establish external linkages, relationships, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) or joint ventures. The planning teams, however, later realised that implementing the IDP entailed more than just implementing IDP projects. It also implied the implementation of the vision, for example, the implementation of goals, objectives and strategies, as well as ongoing communication, management and monitoring; and ultimately a new way of urban management.

Some planners were also under the impression that the IDP 'was going to implement itself' - as is evident in the passive way in which the planners dealt with the implementation phase. Perhaps they were so overwhelmed with the 'seeming successes' of the IDP formulation phase that they thought it was sufficient and that they had done enough to prove themselves. Perhaps some of the planners were so 'tired' of the IDP process that they (thought they) did not have the energy to face the challenges of the implementation phase. Then there were also those planners who, after all the transformation, did not want to get involved with IDPs at all - specifically those who did not want to accept the new participatory planning process.

As a result of the Munitoria fire and the additional workload from the IDP process, the backlog of

²⁰⁰ The comments and critique of the above IDP implementation/monitoring mechanism was derived from a personal interview held in Pretoria with Henry Bezuidenhout on 25 June 2001.

land use applications increased further, resulting in 'additional stress' on the planners who were pressurised to process these applications. Some planners, managers and officials saw the IDP process as a 'project' that had ended, or was going to end at some point in time, while others saw it as a new trend or fashion that was (hopefully) going to go away in the near future. The majority of planners had difficulty accepting that a new, transforming urban planning system was emerging and that this system required a new way of doing things, and perhaps a more dedicated effort than they were willing to put in. The lack of commitment and enthusiasm, and also the lack of understanding, knowledge and experience, ultimately resulted in frustration among many planners, and largely contributed to the poor implementation of the IDPs.

When the implementation phase was initiated, the chief planners of the respective local authorities continued to take responsibility for the implementation of the IDP. In the City Council of Pretoria, the Executive Director of the planning department, Mike Yates, initially took the responsibility of implementing the IDP. However, soon after the IDP implementation phase started, Yates was requested to assist with the Council's corporate transformation phase. Some planners in his division argued that this corporate work was not part of his job description and allocated responsibility and that he should have focused all his attention on the department's activities and the new growing IDP challenge.

In July 1998, Johnny Coetzee (who was coordinating the IDP formulation phase) was relieved as IDP coordinator due to increasing responsibilities of the PICP, which was his primary responsibility. Yates argued that it was not desirable to build all the IDP capacity around the few people (Coetzee, Annemarie Borsje and Jaksza Barbir) who seemed to have dominated the IDP scene since its inception in 1996²⁰¹. He also argued that the other managers, more specifically the planning directors (Skaap Mouton and Tony Walker) had to become more involved with the management of the IDP processes.

Yates subsequently requested these managers to take charge of the implementation phase in view of the fact that the City IDP and the 11 local IDPs were divided amongst their respective planning functions. Although it made sense to some to expose these managers to the IDP implementation process and to allocate the responsibilities to 'where they belonged', it is doubtful whether these managers had the knowledge, capacity, experience or attitude that was needed to take charge of the implementation phase. There were also many other planners in the planning department, as

²⁰¹ Personal communication, Yates.

well as officials in other departments, who could be afforded the challenge to manage²⁰² the IDP process. Both Mouton and Walker argued that they had to deal with the IDP almost on a part-time basis in view of other work.

Mouton and his team were mostly concerned with structure planning, guideline planning and township establishment²⁰³ and were not really supportive of the cumbersome IDP approach with its community problems. Walker, on the other hand, was more enthusiastic about the IDP, but expressed his concern about the backlog of applications that were his primary responsibility. This fatalistic attitude clearly highlights the planners' attachment to the old system and their comfort zones and their reluctance to adapt to the new planning systems. It further indicates how easy it is for people to 'support' a theory or ideology, and how difficult it is for some to implement that which they support. It was argued whether or not, the other 'old' work should have received such a high priority, or whether it should not have been subsidiary to the IDP and dealt with within the context of the IDP framework.

The abovementioned also emphasised the confusion of the role of the IDP and its relationship with the Land-use Management system. In the former City Council of Pretoria, a situation was created where the new processes were fitted to an old, almost inappropriate structure, instead of creating a new structure with appropriate people to manage the radically new processes. This confusion regarding the new responsibilities and accountability of the IDP largely contributed to the poor implementation of the IDPs.

As the implementation phase pro(re)gressed, another confusion began to take root, namely that of who, or which department, should have the overall responsibility and accountability for 'the IDP'. Various departmental heads, officials and planners in the City Council of Pretoria involved with the IDP process expressed their concern that the IDP, which was promoted as a corporate plan involving all departments, was mainly steered by one department, namely the planning department (and the planners). Some officials and politicians were concerned that the powers associated with the IDP were allocated to mainly one department (and one person). In the same token they were also concerned that the planners were gaining too much power. Some departments such as the treasury department were also concerned that they would lose some of their powers, e.g. the power to control the budget.

²⁰² This manager must not be confused with the IDP manager. This manager refers to the IDP project or process manager who should be responsible for the coordination and management of the technical and functional aspects of the IDP.

²⁰³ The concept of township establishment is commonly used in South Africa for the process that is applied to subdivide undeveloped farmland for the purpose of any new development in all parts of the city, and must not be confused with the development of new Black townships.

Some officials frequently and somewhat jokingly referred to 'Mike's IDP', or 'IDP Yates'. This placed a new emphasis on the role of the Municipal Manager with regard to the overall management of the IDP²⁰⁴. Unlike the old form of urban planning, which was mainly confined to scientific processes and development control, the new 'extended form' of urban planning is associated to a much greater extent with strategic planning, municipal affairs and municipal management, as discussed in Chapter 4 - hence the need for this function to be managed by the office of the Municipal Manager. As discussed previously, the IDP was a powerful tool and important "instrument of power" (Foucault), and a function which should be managed by the highest order of power in the local authority.

The implementation of the IDP was probably most affected by the lack of funds for IDP projects. For most Pretoria municipalities, it was a major challenge (and problem) to link the approved Citywide IDP with the budget (as required by the LGTA, 1996 and the Municipal Systems Act, 2000²⁰⁵) and to allocate funds for IDP projects. When the IDP was approved in March 1998, the 1998/1999 budget for the former City Council of Pretoria had already been finalised, without direct inputs from the IDPs²⁰⁶. The City Treasurer of this Council argued that the Pretoria IDPs had been completed at too late a stage to fully align the 1998/1999 budget with the IDPs, and that it was not possible to change/amend the Council's budget at such a late stage.

Initially the CEO, officials from the treasury department, including the City Treasurer, as well as some councillors involved with the budget process, expressed concerns about the IDP and the fact that it had to guide the budget. Apart from the fact that these officials (and some politicians) were largely associated with the old, rigid and autocratic way of budgeting, they probably also realised that the new budgeting system would make it difficult for them to manipulate and control the budget (from the top). This attitude of the City Treasurer (which was incidentally supported by the CEO) again highlighted the confusion regarding the role and status of the IDP and the impact of the new urban planning approach. It further highlights the effect of the emerging power relations in the local authority and the conflict associated with it.

²⁰⁴ The need to place the IDP with the highest level of authority was promoted/ prescribed by the Municipal Systems Act 2000 (Republic of South Africa 2000). In South Africa, according to Maria Coetzee of the CSIR, the UGU Plan presents a good example of the active and extensive involvement and support of the Municipal Manager in the IDP process (Interview with Maria Coetzee, CSIR 2002) (See also UGU District Municipality 2002). As discussed in Chapter 4, in many other countries, these types of strategic plans were placed with the highest level of authority within the local authorities.

²⁰⁵ See Republic of South Africa (1996 and 2000).

²⁰⁶ The 1998/1999 budget process had already started in the previous year (October 1998), way before the IDPs were finalised.

In an attempt to ensure at least some linkage between the IDP and the budget, Councillor Dereck Coetzee, the incumbent councillor for City Planning and Development at the time, raised this problem with the Strategic Financial Committee (SFC) of the City Council of Pretoria²⁰⁷. In April 1998 the SFC nominated a task team to investigate the possible integration of the 1998 IDP projects with the 1998/1999 budget. This task team, which was convened by Councillor Coetzee in the following month, submitted a report entitled “*The integration of IDP projects with the Council’s existing budget*” to the Executive Committee of the Council²⁰⁸.

The Executive Committee accepted the fact that the integration referred to above should be phased in over time, and that it was not realistic to expect the 1998/1999 budget to be totally amended. The Executive Committee approved a three-pronged approach, which consisted of a short to medium term strategy to develop the most appropriate budgeting process for the 1999/2000 budget; an immediate strategy to amend the existing budget with regard to capital projects, to include the IDP (capital projects); and an immediate strategy to deal with the newly identified IDP operational projects²⁰⁹.

Following this resolution, a meeting or 'scrutiny workshop' was held with all the heads of departments concerned, under the leadership of the Chief Executive/Town Clerk of the City Council of Pretoria at that time, Henry Henslin, in May 1998, with the aim of scrutinising the budget to create additional savings on the budget; and of re-prioritising all capital projects so as to include at least some of the most important IDP capital projects.

In spite of these efforts, it was argued that more could have been done to get the budget to focus more on the IDPs and that the CEO and the City Treasurer should have played a more integral and important role from the inception of the IDP process²¹⁰. Although it looked, as though the CEO and the City Treasurer had (somewhat reluctantly) bought into the IDP, this was probably not the case, as is evident by some of the follow-up actions related to the budget process.

After the City Treasurer had revisited the budget and programme for capital projects in January 1999, it was realised that a number of capital projects could not be implemented and that an

²⁰⁷ The Strategic Financial Committee (SFC) was a committee comprising members of the Executive Committee, councillors and the City Treasurer, tasked to oversee and monitor the overall budget.

²⁰⁸ See City Council of Pretoria (1998).

²⁰⁹ See City Council of Pretoria (1998).

²¹⁰ In the City Council of Pretoria’s official newsletter *Muniforum*, May/June 1998, the CEO, amongst other things, reported that the City Council’s budget had focused on the IDP and the needs of the communities.

amount of R42 million could be made available for new small-scale capital projects²¹¹. According to the 'IDP philosophy' (approved by the Council in 1997), the process would have been to allocate such funds to IDP projects according to community needs and priorities. The City Treasurer, however, submitted a report to the Executive Committee of the City Council of Pretoria in January 1999, requesting the Council to allocate these funds mostly to the engineering departments. This report, which resulted from discussions between the City Treasurer's department and the respective Council departments, was never discussed with any of the officials involved with the IDP. These actions indicated the lack of communication in the Council and the lack of understanding of the IDP that existed in some key Council departments.

When the item was tabled to the Executive Committee, Johnny Coetzee, who was then still partly involved with the IDP processes, addressed the Executive Committee and expressed his concern about the non-integrated way this budget process, or allocation of funds for small-scale projects, was being dealt with and how the principles of the IDP were being ignored in the process. Coetzee also proposed that these funds should have been allocated to the priority projects contained in the IDPs. After some discussion on this issue, the Executive Committee resolved that a prioritisation exercise²¹² be done to prioritise small-scale capital projects, including the new IDP projects. This prioritisation process involved representatives from the various Council departments, two to three representatives from each of the PZFs (to 'represent' the community) and some concerned councillors. As a result of this process, substantial funds were allocated to the various planning zones for IDP capital projects.

As could be expected, the engineering department of the City Council criticised this process. They argued that funds were allocated to a community wish list of projects, while 'important and strategic' engineering or infrastructure projects could not be implemented²¹³. This further contributed to divorcing the planners (and the IDP) from the other departments as it was argued that the planners were trying to manage the city and control the budget through the IDP - yet another example of the complex power relations and the clash of powers in the council. This further shows how people react to protect and maintain their powers and how they aspire for more power. Some engineers continued to criticise the IDP and the emphasis that was placed on the integration of projects and efforts within the Council - something they believed would hamper the development of infrastructure.

²¹¹ Although R42 million represents a small portion of the Council's total budget, this amount could have been allocated to a large number of small IDP projects.

²¹² This prioritisation process was very similar to the process that was developed and applied for the Pretoria Inner City Partnership in 1997.

²¹³ It is ironic to note that a senior official in the engineering department had argued that they had to continue with certain infrastructure projects, mainly to provide work to construction workers in the Council.

However, in spite of many shortcomings in the Pretoria IDP budget processes, the City Council of Pretoria had made great strides in promoting the important relationship between urban planning and management and more specifically, planning and budgeting, since 1998. These efforts promoted a new focus on community needs and priorities and the involvement of communities in the budget, prioritisation and decision-making processes²¹⁴. This new participatory budget process, and the principle of linking the budget to a plan, was a major shift from the old, rigid, autocratic and non-transparent way of budgeting that was perpetuated by a few managers only.

Just as the implementation phase was hampered by a lack of funds and the poor linkage between the budget and the IDP, so the implementation of the IDP (specifically in the City Council of Pretoria) was also affected by the limitations of this Council's hierarchical organisational structure²¹⁵ with its strong sectoral focus (silos) (see Perception Survey, 1999). This hierarchical organisational structure that resulted from a corporate/top management transformation process, was not aligned with the overall vision and strategy for the city as contained in the IDP. It mainly focused on the typical service delivery functions found in most local authorities, for example, the provision of health services. Strong emphasis was placed on the selective focus and outputs of these clearly defined functions/goals/silos, and not the integrated outcome as envisaged by the IDP. The fragmented structures and processes were not able to effectively harness the diverse components of the integrated and holistic form of planning.

Although the City Council established inter-departmental teams and integration and coordination mechanisms to ensure integration, these mechanisms were never really fully functional, mainly as a result of poor management and leadership and the possible negative attitude against the IDP, which existed at the time. This in many ways highlighted the impact that the transformation of urban planning had on local authorities and more specifically the power structures and power

²¹⁴ Various mechanisms were developed to obtain community inputs during budget preparation and consideration (Brynard 1996:44; Awerbuch and Wallace 1976:1; Ward 1996: 56; McClendon and Quay 1972: 129 - 131; North Shore City Council 1996; Gans in Rondinelli 1983: 376; Abers 1998: 40). In a research report that was recently compiled on Midrand/Ivory Park (South Africa), it was stated, among other things, that one of the reasons for the increase in the payment of services, relates to the fact that the residents of Ivory Park were involved in determining service priorities through the municipal budget (Humphries and Thulare 1999: 6 - 7 and 31).

²¹⁵ In many local authorities the traditional hierarchical organisational structures with their '*separateness of departments*' resulted in a fragmentation of local authority services and had severe shortcomings in the areas of communication, collaboration, coordination and effective control over activities and internal integration (Selman 1996: 89; Agranoff 1983: 329; APS Plan Africa 1999: 3 and 12; Abbott 1996: 52; Wissink 1996:151; Mellors and Copperthwaite 1987: 176 - 181; Steward and Hams, undated: 26; Oranje, Oosthuizen and Van Huyssteen 1999: 28; McAuslan 1992: 100; Gilbert *et al* 1996: 28-29); McClendon and Quay, 1972: 24; So *et al* (edt.), 1979: 74-75; and Vigar *et al* 2000: 257 and 271). This emphasised the need for *system understanding* and the *holistic mode of thinking* (Steward and Hams, undated: 26), and a new form of urban management that could entail a number of inter-related functional units (Abbott 1996: 52; Mellors and Copperthwaite 1987: 177 - 181; Mc Auslan 1992: 98; Vigar *et al* 2000: 271).

relations in the local authority. It further emphasises the need to integrate urban planning with management (as discussed in Chapter 4) and the need to continuously adapt structures to new and changing strategies and new power structures. In the City Council of Pretoria, a major problem occurred when the managers and planners tried to introduce a new urban planning system in the local authority without making the necessary changes to the organisational structures and processes. The inappropriate organisational structures and processes made it difficult to implement the IDP successfully and to develop and manage the city in an integrated manner. The silo structures also supported the isolated and centered forms of powers in the power web and made a more even distribution of power difficult.

As discussed in previous sections, the communities and the IDP forums were actively involved in the formulation and compilation of the IDPs. Unfortunately (as a result of the lack of Council support, funding and poor communication), among other things, the involvement of the communities began to dwindle during the implementation phase. Although much effort was made to establish the PZFs in order to involve communities in the formulation and implementation of IDPs, the Council did not make enough effort to support these forums (logistically and financially) and to ensure their continued involvement (see Perception Survey, 1999). The forums became uncertain and frustrated about their roles and involvement (or lack thereof) in the implementation phase²¹⁶. Notwithstanding the fact that most members of the former PZFs, community members, planners and even politicians agreed that the PZFs were a very good mechanism for community participation and a good mechanism aimed at promoting coordination between the local authority and the community (Perception Survey, 1999; Interview Survey, 2002), all these forums were terminated after the inauguration of the new City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) in December 2000. In many cases, the communities and the forums unfortunately could not succeed in gaining and maintaining the community power as described in Chapter 2. This also presents a good example of how political power or the dominatory power of Machiavelli's Prince influenced and overshadowed rationality and the force of the better argument (and also community power). This could also be ascribed to the fact that the communities did not fully understand and realise their potential powers (as a group or alliance). They further also did not have the experience and support that was needed to effectively communicate (in terms of Habermas' communicative action) and to negotiate and defend their rational goals and actions.

The CTMM seized the opportunity to suspend any further financial support to these forums. The

²¹⁶ As discussed previously, the PICP (1997-1999), through its forum, structured community-based working groups and strong communication strategy, largely succeeded in promoting the involvement of communities in the implementation phase.

reason for this was that the emerging local authority dispensation provided for a different type of mechanism, namely that of Ward Committees that would be managed by elected Ward Councillors. Although the Ward Committees provide a useful mechanism to facilitate citizens' or taxpayers' inputs, or to communicate with a particular electorate, these committees did not focus on the broader spectrum of stakeholders, as had been the case with the IDP forums.

As could be expected, this closure of the PZFs was a major discouragement and frustration to the planning teams and the PZFs. It also impacted negatively on the relationship between the communities and the local authority. This closure of the PZFs largely broke the momentum that had built up in the transformation of urban planning and the development of democratic planning in the former City of Pretoria. Planners and politicians often asked why the CTMM so promptly terminated a well-established community participation mechanism that had been developed through extensive consultation - without any consultation with the affected parties.

Some interviewees argued that the PZFs, in view of their local support base and involvement with the communities, were actually becoming a threat to the political structure. Although the above prompt political decisions by the CTMM supports Flyvbjerg's theory in the sense that 'power defines rationality', it also supports the contrary, namely that 'rational' planning actions (referring to the PZFs) can become so powerful that they threaten the 'power' of the politicians. Some interviewees argued that the new CTMM did not want to support and continue with initiatives such as the PZFs that had been initiated and developed by the former regime.

By the end of 1998, after all the efforts to establish the IDP as part of the urban planning system (and the local authority), it seemed as if the IDP 'was taking a nose dive'. The momentum that had been built up during the early/mid-1990s with regard to the transformation of the urban planning system was now being curbed by the poor IDP performance.

As the planners grappled to implement the IDP and all its components, the sceptical planners in the Council criticised the IDP approach for all that was going wrong - the typical 'I told you so' attitude. These planners argued that the poor IDP implementation 'proved' that the new approach was too idealistic and complex to be implemented throughout the Greater Pretoria region. A question often asked by some officials, relates to, why the initiators and promoters of the IDP, such as Yates, Beneke and Coetzee could not have "saved" the community forums. This could probably be ascribed to the fact that these planners had realised that they did not have the power to challenge the infra powers of the politicians. Perhaps, some combined effort, or social alliance (as discussed in Chapter 2), between all the relevant stakeholders and communities, could have

created sufficient social power to challenge “the Prince”.

As discussed earlier, there was little understanding, recognition and support (amongst councillors, managers and officials in the City Council of Pretoria) for the IDP process and the new form of urban planning and management (Perception Survey, 1999). Although many planners accepted the new way of urban planning, many senior management officials and politicians, who were supposed to take the lead, did not want to accept the new approach. Some managers and councillors criticised everything and anything that was associated with the IDP.

For these people the IDP was seen as a process flawed with problems. The former “guideline planners” regularly emphasised the need to re-instate the old structure plan approach. These planners bluntly argued that the IDP did not have the capacity to guide planning and development in the city, and to effectively manage land uses (Perception Survey, 1999). Although the urban planning system (as a whole) had gone through a significant transformation, it was doubted whether all council officials really accepted the new planning ideology. The overall attitude and perceptions of the Council officials also proved how difficult it was to change ‘old ways’ and old power structures that had developed over a long period of time.

5.14 “QUITE FRANKLY, MIKE, WE’VE HAD ENOUGH!”

More legislation and government directions on city planning and local government: 1998 to 2001

In spite of the resistance to the IDP and the problems of the implementation phase, some planning teams and planning forums continued to try and salvage the IDPs, looking for funds to support their most important IDP projects. The communities, filled with expectations and high hopes, tried to play a role in a democratic process that was struggling to sustain itself. The planners were ‘saturated’ with all the ‘new’ urban planning approaches and requirements. Some of them tried hard to change and to adapt to the new systems.

The local authority managers were also confused about the new organisational processes that were disrupting their functioning and that did not really result in any improvements. Some officials were still battling to get over the trauma of the Munitoria fire. Councillors were somewhat confused about their role in the system and concerned about the non-performance. The old fears about the transformation emerged again as planners raised their concerns about the transformation and the new urban planning system that could have an impact on their positions and comfort zones.

While the councillors, managers, planners and officials were trying to adapt to all the new approaches, and while the respective Pretoria local authorities were trying to restructure the organisation, a number of new national legislations²¹⁷ and government directions on urban planning, environmental planning and local government were being introduced. The most important of these are The White Paper on Local Government (1998), The Local Government Municipal Structures Act (1998), The Green Paper on Development and Planning (1999), The Gauteng Development Planning Bill (1999), The Local Government: Municipal Systems Act or MSA (2000), the Draft Land Use Management Bill (2001) and the White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Management (2001)²¹⁸.

As discussed in Chapter 4, these Acts promoted a new integrated urban planning system that would have a major impact on the local authority-planning environment and the power structures in the local authority. They firmly established the new principles of post-apartheid urban planning. The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) commissioned a number of reports and position papers on aspects related to Integrated Development Planning such as the *Policy Paper on Integrated Development Planning* compiled by Oranje *et al* (2000).

Following the publication of the White Paper (1998), numerous conversations and debates were held in the City Council of Pretoria and specifically in the planning department to unpack the White Paper and more specifically the *new developmental role* of local government²¹⁹ and the concept of the unicity²²⁰. The unicity arrangement specifically aims to promote spatial integration, develop the neglected areas and redistribute resources so that all areas in the city can enjoy equal benefits. Many planners argued that the unicity would be too large to be managed effectively. Reference was made to the diversity within the unicity area and the challenge to effectively manage the

²¹⁷ A number of provincial governments have also produced legislation that provides for variant forms of IDPs, such as the KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Act (1998), the Western Cape Planning and Development Act (1999), The Northern Cape Planning and Development Act (1999) and the Gauteng Development Planning Bill (1999) (Oranje *et al* 2000).

²¹⁸ Other legislation that had an impact on urban planning were The White Paper on an Environmental Management Policy for South Africa (1998), the National Environmental Management Act (1998) the Disaster Management Bill (1999), the Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act (2000), the Local Government: Property Rates Bill (2000), the Local Government: Cross-boundary Municipalities Bill (2000), The White Paper and a Green Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships (2000), later enacted in 2000, and the White Paper on Integrated Pollution and Waste Management (2000).

²¹⁹ In March 1998, Mike Yates, in conjunction with some planners in the planning department, drafted a discussion memorandum entitled *Issues related to the implementation of the Integrated Development Plan for Pretoria*, which aimed to interpret the concept of developmental local government. This memorandum identified, amongst other things, the need for an implementation mechanism for the Council to fulfil its developmental role within the context of the IDP. See City Council of Pretoria (1998)

²²⁰ In this context, reference is made to the concept of the unicity, which implies a focus on the unity of different local authorities, the unity of communities and the integration of services and resources *vis a vis* the mega city concept, which implies a focus on one big/mega local authority. Although the White Paper (1998) initially promoted the idea of the unicity or the '*single city arrangement*', this concept only began to gain momentum after the promulgation of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act, Act 117 of 1998, and the Local Government Demarcation Act, Act 27 of 1999.

diversity in such a large area.

Those planners, councillors and managers, who mainly associated themselves with the 'old school of urban planning and management', specifically raised the concern that the wealthier areas within the unicity would have to subsidise the poorer, neglected areas; whilst others argued that the management and maintenance of the wealthier areas could be neglected or threatened by the new distribution of resources and services throughout the unicity area.

For the 'transformed' or 'transforming' councillors, planners and officials, this new focus on the equal distribution of resources and services, the cross-subsidisation of services and the focus on the neglected and previously disadvantaged areas, was seen as an imperative and a new opportunity for the City. Those officials involved with the unicity concept often argued that the success of the concept largely depended on the type of management model, for example, whether or not the model provided for decentralised regional councils with limited or delegated decision-making powers that could manage the more local affairs of the local authority.

The White Paper on Local Government, with its emphasis on developmental local government and the unicity, largely presented a shift of emphasis from the rigid, fragmented, autocratic, control-oriented form of local government, to a more integrated, equitable, democratic and developmental form. The unicity concept not only had an impact on the municipalities of the Greater Pretoria Region, it also had an impact on the Pretoria IDP system, which had developed during the mid-1990s. The unicity implied, amongst other things, that one new IDP had to be formulated, or that the existing IDPs (Metropolitan IDP and three Citywide IDPs), and particularly the IDP projects would have to be integrated and consolidated into one unicity IDP.

In June 1998 the GPMC activated the original Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) to look, firstly, at the revision of the IDP process in general and, secondly, to look at a new type of unicity IDP. The TCC decided to continue with the implementation of the approved Metropolitan IDP and the three Citywide IDPs (and all the Planning Zone IDPs) for the 1998/1999 financial year, until such time as more clarification was reached on the unicity and the new boundaries (GPMC, 1998; GPMC, 1999).

While the Pretoria local authorities were trying to unpack the new developmental role and impact of the unicity, a Green Paper on Development and Planning was published in May 1999²²¹. This Green Paper not only addressed some of the major problems of integrated development planning,

²²¹ See Republic of South Africa (1999).

but also emphasised the need for appropriate spatial planning, specifically within the context of the IDP²²². This elevated focus on spatial planning (and its relationship with Land-use Management) was well accepted by the planning department and resulted in lengthy discussions on how to make land use management and spatial planning part of the IDP. These spatial planning principles became an important and integral part of the 'new' IDP approach in the Greater Pretoria region.

The Green Paper also (re)positioned and endorsed spatial planning as an important part of urban planning and management and emphasised spatial planning (which was once seen as an apartheid planning tool) as an important mechanism in the spatial reconstruction of urban areas. It not only brought spatial planning back into the planning arena, but also transformed its contents and aims. It shifted the emphasis from the rigid, technical type of spatial planning (that had been so widely criticised before the 1990s), to a much broader, social, developmental and strategic type of spatial planning. Whereas mention had previously been made of the de-spatialisation of planning during the mid-1980s, planners referred to the 'flickering up' or the re-spatialisation of spatial planning (Perception Survey, 1999; Interview Survey, 2002). Although some planners, mainly the supporters of the structure plan approach, saw (or wanted to see) this new emphasis as a return to the structure plan approach, the majority of planners who were actively involved with the transformation of urban planning, realised that this was a step forward in the direction of a new, broader, transformed urban planning system.

As the new legislation and policies on urban planning developed during 1999/2001, the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), which was responsible for the IDP, played a major role in promoting and developing the principles of IDP in South Africa. This Department launched a comprehensive, nationwide training programme for city managers, planners, technical professions and councillors²²³. It also developed a comprehensive IDP manual (commonly referred to as the IDP guide packs) and a number of policy papers and newsletters in an attempt to promote the principles of IDP²²⁴.

Although these IDP guide packs largely contributed to the implementation of IDPs in many parts of the country, they were widely criticised by planners for being too rigid, complicated and

²²² The need for spatial planning, specifically within the context of the IDP, was also emphasised by the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) (1998), the Draft Land Use Management Bill (2001) and the White Paper on Spatial Planning and Land Use Management (2001).

²²³ See Department of Provincial and Local Government (2000 and 2001) and Oranje *et al* (2000).

²²⁴ The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) largely supported the DPLG initiatives. The DPLG was also assisted by the Decentralised Development Planning Task Team (DDPTT) and mostly funded by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ).

comprehensive. Many municipalities found them to be too detailed and technocratic²²⁵. The ‘over-methodologised’, rigorous and sophisticated nature of the IDP made it difficult for the smaller municipalities to implement it²²⁶. Even the larger metropolitans, such as the City of Tshwane, had problems applying the IDP methodology effectively, as is evident from the critique of the Tshwane IDPs that were compiled after 2000²²⁷.

Although the recent guidelines and efforts largely contributed to the successful formulation and implementation of IDPs in various parts of the country, these guidelines alone were not sufficient to guide the entire spectrum of IDP activities and did not provide sufficient information and knowledge on the broader meaning of integrated development planning.

5.15 “MAKING THE SHIP TURN”

The ‘strategic thrust approach’ developed by the former City Council of Pretoria’s IDP task team (1999).

During the period 1999 to 2000, planners, managers and politicians realised that the IDPs were not being implemented successfully. It became obvious that new and additional mechanisms, structures and processes were needed to effectively facilitate and manage the ongoing implementation and monitoring of the IDP. Those planners involved with the IDP realised that the format, contents and methodology of the IDP (the plan and the process) had to be revisited. Planners were also confused about the status of the IDP and its relationship with the local authority²²⁸. These topics or issues became the points of discussion at many meetings and workshops within the Pretoria local authorities during the late 1990s.

Mike Yates, Executive Director of the City Planning and Development Department of the City Council of Pretoria at that time, continued to make submissions to top management, Council departments and the councillors of the City Council of Pretoria concerned, in an attempt to promote *the IDP* as a strategic urban planning document, as well as the broader notion of integrated development planning. It is ironic to note that such information sessions were still necessary, almost three years after the introduction of the concept. This confirms the lack of

²²⁵ See Harrison (2001:189 and 2002:7).

²²⁶ See Harrison (2002:14).

²²⁷ See later critique on the Tshwane IDPs.

²²⁸ In the beginning of 1999, the GPMC appointed Advocate FH Terblanche to draft a legal opinion on *The implications of the Local Government Transition Act Second Amendment Act No 97 of 1996, specifically on the relationship between the GPMC and the Metropolitan Councils*. Based on this opinion, a joint report of the Chief Executive/Town Clerk of the GPMC and the three MLCs was submitted to the Executive Committee of the GPMC on 22 April 1999. Unfortunately, this report, which included the advocate’s opinion, did not provide sufficient clarity on the role and status of the IDP within the local authority, the roles and responsibilities of the CEOs, managers and officials, the implication of the IDP on the budget process or the integration of functions between the GPMC and the MLCs.

understanding and buy-in that existed in the municipalities of the Greater Pretoria region.

As the IDP became more of a reality (in terms of the emerging legislation and policies), the acting CEO of the City Council of Pretoria, Johan Oosthuizen 'accepted' the IDP responsibility. In July 1999, he formally requested Yates to manage the IDP on his behalf. It is not certain whether Oosthuizen had bought into the process and realised the strategic importance and power of the IDP, or whether he just had to serve his responsibility. Departmental heads and officials also increasingly 'supported' the IDP. Again, it is not certain whether they supported it because they had to, or whether they really supported the principle. It was probably a little bit of both.

Although the IDP construct was increasingly gaining support as a strategic/corporate tool in the City of Pretoria, it had difficulty shaking off its 'planning/Mike Yates' image. Instead of locating the IDP function within the CEOs office, or close to this office²²⁹, the IDP function (although supported by a different higher mandate) remained with the planning department (and with Yates). This resulted in a situation where the power of the IDP and the Municipal Manager was devolved to a lower position and a position within the planning department - again creating a clash of powers and conflict between certain departments. This concentration of powers in the lower ranks of the organisation, and the planning department with its sectoral focus and town planning bias made it difficult to effectively exercise "the power" of the IDP. This ultimately hampered the implementation of the IDP.

In October 1999, Yates established an IDP task team²³⁰ to assist him with the overall management of the IDP and the further development and refinement of the IDP principles. Yates argued that the members of this task team had to be 'strategic thinkers' with sufficient knowledge and experience of the IDP and the emerging urban planning principles. The members of the IDP task team became extensively involved with the development, refinement and promotion of the IDP. The team and other officials involved with the IDP had numerous discussion sessions and workshops to analyse the problems and lessons learnt from the IDP experience and the emerging planning principles.

The team investigated, among other things, ways to make the IDP simpler and more focused. As a result of the ongoing critique regarding the strategic focus of the first round of IDPs, the team

²²⁹ In 2000, this principle of locating the IDP within the office of the Municipal Manager or CEO was also prompted by Municipal Systems Act (2000).

²³⁰ At the end of 1999 this team initially consisted of the IDP Manager, Mike Yates; Johnny Coetzee; Jaksa Barbir (Chief Urban Designer of the City Council, who had been extensively involved, specifically with the spatial planning component of the IDP); Annemarie Borsje (Chief Planner for Planning Zone 9); and Manus Basson (senior town planner in the planning department with a masters' degree in Economics, who was involved with economic development planning).

specifically investigated mechanisms to make it more strategic. Having realised that the IDP approach resulted in a lack of focus on spatial planning, the team attempted to develop a suitable spatial planning system within the context of the IDP. In addition to the above, the task team made various efforts to structure appropriate mechanisms that could ensure the effective implementation of the IDP.

After lengthy discussions, the task team ultimately developed a new format and process for the IDP. It is ironic to note that this team developed the new IDP format without liaising with the Department of Development Planning and Local Government, who at the time was extensively involved with the development of a new IDP format. Unlike the previous IDPs, which were made up of a number of components, the new proposed IDP format comprised four distinct frameworks: the Status Quo Framework, a Strategic Framework, a Development Framework and an Implementation Framework.

The Status Quo Framework aimed at providing a summary and description of all the relevant basic information regarding the particular planning area, similar to the environmental profile as proposed by EMPRET in 1995 and 1996²³¹.

The Strategic Framework specifically aimed to increase the strategic level of the IDP through a more focused strategic thrust²³² approach. The strategic thrusts that had to support the vision, aimed to guide the overall planning, growth and management of the particular area. These thrusts, which form the main framework for the IDP, were defined or described by the task team as those absolutely necessary/critical/strategic forces/thrusts that were needed to direct the city towards the desired state, or those very few strategic issues that had to be addressed to “*make the ship turn*”. These thrusts relate to the highest order strategic directions in which the city should be developed or the highest order strategic issues that the local authority should address. The strategic thrusts had to provide the basis for the formulation of more specific strategic guidelines in support of the thrusts. As will be discussed in a later section, the aspect of the strategic focus and the need for such a strategic framework with limited strategic contents became a burning issue in the newly established City of Tshwane. The Strategic Framework, as well as its components, as discussed above, was intended to form the basis for strategy formulation and for the Development Framework component of the IDP.

The Development Framework provided for a wider range of more specific development strategies,

²³¹ See City Council of Pretoria (1996).

²³² The term 'thrust' is intended to emphasise the energy or force that is needed to actually create the motion or movement in the desired direction.

policies and standards, as well as a spatial framework. These components mainly aimed to facilitate and guide the development of the area as defined by the strategic framework. The development framework included a spatial planning system, based on a clearly defined hierarchy of spatial plans, from the highest order strategic metropolitan spatial plan to the lowest level of local spatial plans. Emphasis was placed on the strategic focus of the higher order plan, while it was agreed that the lower tier spatial plans had to include sufficient information so that it could be directly linked to the land use management system - much in line with the proposals made by the Green Paper on Development and Planning (1999).

The IDP format proposed by the IDP task team included a structured, comprehensive Integrated Implementation Framework that could manage and monitor all aspects of the IDP implementation phase. The lack of such a framework was often raised by role players in the IDP processes as one of the reasons for the poor implementation of the IDPs. This framework briefly consisted of two main components: a Project Implementation Programme (PIP) and a Management Framework. The PIP largely focused on the structuring and implementation of IDP projects and programmes (project prioritisation, funding, programming, etc). The Management Framework on the other hand focused on the overall management and monitoring of the IDP - as an overarching strategic 'city plan' (linking the plan with the budget, the human resource plan, budgeting, performance management, etc). This framework emphasised the need for a monitoring mechanism to monitor and measure the performance of the IDP, the organisation and the city and their respective components.

The IDP task team ultimately made great strides in developing a new, more flexible format for *the IDP* that could also address the broader aspects of urban planning such as spatial planning and land use management - aspects that had been largely neglected during the first round of IDPs. The task team also promoted and emphasised the broader notion of *Integrated Development Planning* as an integral part of the overall urban planning and local authority management system in the City Council of Pretoria.

Although the proposed format could also be criticised for its structured nature, it clearly presented a shift from *the IDP* (plan/process) with its cumbersome nature, towards a more open, flexible, strategic urban planning system. At a time when many people started losing interest and faith in the IDP, the IDP task team provided some clarity and stability by proposing a new, more appropriate system. The members of the task team argued (and hoped) that this IDP system would form the basis and point of departure for the IDP process to be followed by the new amalgamated local authority.

In an attempt to promote and implement the new IDP format, the IDP task team compiled a new Strategic Framework (as discussed above) for the City Council of Pretoria's area of jurisdiction²³³. This was very much a pro-active step on the part of Yates to produce a framework that could inform and influence the new unicity IDP process that was scheduled to start in July 2000.

Following the finalisation of this strategic framework (at the beginning of 2000), the members of the IDP task team, specifically Yates and Jaksa Barbir, made various presentations to the Council departments, Council committees, the councillors, officials and top management of the City Council of Pretoria concerned, and later to representatives of the GPMC and the other MLCs. These presentations aimed, firstly, to promote the new 'strategic thrust' approach and new format of the IDP; and, secondly, to promote the contents of the proposed Strategic Framework for the (transforming) City of Pretoria, as a basis on which the new unicity IDP could be built.

It was somewhat strange that Yates and his task team developed a framework for the metropolitan area without involving the planners from the GPMC (the metropolitan municipality), and specifically those planners in charge of the IDP and metropolitan planning. This is just another indication of the poor relationship that existed between the metropolitan and the former City Council of Pretoria, or perhaps it was because the IDP task team (and Yates) did not want to share their new ideas with other people. This could also be seen as a strategy to maintain and protect the existing professional powers and the powers of the Municipal Manager, or a strategy to aspire new and more powers, specifically in view of the fact that the transformation process, which was then well under way, had started to threaten the existing power structures.

It was only in January 2000, when the IDP became a joint effort between the GPMC and the various MLCs, that the task team's new IDP format was exposed to the officials of these local authorities. Amond Beneke, who at the time was responsible for the Metropolitan IDP, was somewhat reluctant to accept the IDP format that was developed and proposed by the former City Council of Pretoria, probably because it had not solely been developed by the GPMC (or by himself). After some discussions, Beneke eventually supported the approach, probably after he noticed that many of his GPMC colleagues (such as Nikki Ludick and Marius Nadel) and senior officials of the other MLCs (such as Verna Nel) supported it. Despite his 'approval', Beneke constantly introduced new additions and amendments (mostly terminological).

²³³ Although this Strategic Framework was mainly based on the 1998 Metropolitan IDP, and Pretoria City-wide IDP, it took into account the contents of the other IDPs and related documents.

This, according to some members, was mainly done to give the approach a new image and to make it look like a GPMC construct. Beneke was not the type of person who would share leadership and power with anyone else. It would have been difficult for him to implement a plan that had been developed by the former City Council of Pretoria, which he considered to be subsidiary to the GPMC. Apart from these efforts to develop a new IDP format, this format was never implemented for a number of reasons, as will be discussed in paragraphs to follow.

While the GPMC and the various local authorities were structuring and debating a new, more appropriate IDP system, they also realised that a consolidated IDP for the to-be-established unicity had to be compiled for the 2000/2001 financial year. In the beginning of 2000, a combined GPMC working group, under the leadership of Beneke, was established to 'compile' the new IDP. At this point it was argued that the existing IDP information was still fresh and relevant and that it was not necessary to repeat all the surveys and processes that had been done for the previous IDPs.

There was also not sufficient time to start a new IDP process or to develop a new IDP according to the format that had been developed by the IDP task team. In this regard it was decided to merely compile the previous IDPs (Metropolitan IDP and three Citywide IDPs) and present this compilation as an interim IDP. The new Interim IDP (IIDP) did, however, include some of the task team's proposals, such as the strategic thrusts. The new consolidated IIDP was firstly submitted and accepted by the interim joint transformation committees, KHORO and CECOM²³⁴, and later, on 5 April 2000, approved by the former GPMC²³⁵.

The Pretoria local authorities saw the IIDP as an interim measure to guide the budget (and the transformation process) until such time as a proper IDP could be compiled for the amalgamated Tshwane area²³⁶. As a result of this compilation, the IIDP reflected many of the problems that were associated with the old IDPs. It became obvious that the IDP, being in the hands of the "powerless" planners and the "not so important" planning department, did not have the power (as envisaged by the LGTA 1996), to guide organisational processes such as the budget process and the transformation.

In this sense the IIDP could not really be seen as a step forward, apart from the fact that it presented a consolidated development framework for the whole metropolitan area. One of the

²³⁴ KHORO was a joint political transformation body established on 25 October 1999, to activate and guide the development and implementation of the transformation up to the election process. This committee was also responsible for coordinating the IDP processes (function approved on 3 December 1999). CECOM consisted of the various CEOs of the GPMC and the three MLCs and was established to advise KHORO on matters pertaining to the transformation, as well as the coordination of the preparation of the new IDP (GPMC, KHORO 1999)

²³⁵ See GPMC (2000).

²³⁶ See also City Council of Pretoria (2000); and City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (2001).

most positive outcomes of the merger between the GPMC and the MLCs was that the planners, officials, managers and politicians from the different previous MLCs started working together to address the problems and challenges of the metropolitan area as a whole.

5.16 THE REBIRTH OF TSHWANE²³⁷

The establishment of the new City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality: 6 December 2000

The amalgamated City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) was officially established on 6 December 2000. Those planners and politicians who were actively involved and supportive of the transformation of the urban planning system expected that this new local government system would provide a new impetus to the transformation of urban planning in the newly established City of Tshwane. Unfortunately, the new CTMM did not provide the impetus and support that many planners and politicians were hoping for.


At the beginning of 2001, soon after the establishment of the CTMM, Father Mkhathswa, the new Executive Mayor, held the first strategic planning session with his Mayoral Committee to discuss, among other things, the future direction of the city and the CTMM. At this workshop, the Strategic Framework component of the IIDP - which contained, among other things, the various strategic thrusts (later referred to as strategic focus areas), as developed by the joint IDP Working Group (2000) and approved by the former Councils in 2000 - was presented as a basis for discussion and accepted 'in principle' after some amendments had been made.

The whole IIDP document, which was prepared by the IDP Working group, was (surprisingly) also later accepted and approved in principle by the new Tshwane Council as the IDP for the 2001/2002 budget²³⁸. Although the new Tshwane Council would most probably prefer to have had an entirely new IDP or strategy, the IIDP, with all its shortcomings, at least provided a basis and some direction for the new Council members and officials.

²³⁷ In the beginning of 2001, official reference was made to the amalgamated city as the City of Tshwane. Many Pretorians and Council officials were confused about whether the new name Tshwane referred to the name of the Municipality or whether this name was also intended to replace the name Pretoria. For the purpose of this study, reference is made to the City of Tshwane and the Tshwane metropolitan area.

²³⁸ See City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (2001(a)).

FIGURE 12: NEW TSHWANE UNICITY AREA (2000/2001)



Following the approval of the IIDP, the acting CEO and acting Chief Financial Officer²³⁹ initiated a dedicated process to prioritise capital projects contained in the IIDP and to link the 2001/2002 capital budget of ± R120 million to the most important IDP projects. Although this prioritisation process was somewhat indicative of the new Council's commitment to the IDP and the planning-budgeting link, it was done almost as an afterthought and undertaken under tremendous pressure and at a very late stage in the budget cycle²⁴⁰. Although it can easily be argued that the new Council did not follow the 'right' IDP procedures, or that it did not respect the IDP, it should, however, be understood that the Tshwane local authority system was in a period of flux and turmoil as a result of the complex local government transition.

The transformation of urban planning in the City of Tshwane gained new momentum after the establishment of the Interim Economic Development Division, which was established in January 2001. This Division was, amongst other things, responsible for functions such as transport planning, urban planning and economic development. During the period January to June 2001, the entire time span of this interim function, it was coordinated and managed by Nomgqibelo Mdlalose²⁴¹.

Although this new function was established without any consultation or involvement of the previous managers and officials concerned, it was a step forward for integrated development planning, specifically in view of the fact that the urban planning, economic development and transport planning functions were grouped in the same division. Unfortunately the typical environmental planning and management functions were not allocated within this division or close to the urban planning functions. Many planners in the Council, specifically some of the planners in former management positions who aspired to this position, argued that Mdlalose did not have the appropriate qualifications or experience for this position and that this was merely an 'affirmative action' appointment. Soon after her appointment, Mdlalose redeployed Pieter Vosloo, a former colleague, to assist her with the operational side of the function and the transformation of the function.

Although Mdlalose had an interest in urban planning, she realised her shortcomings and lack of technical knowledge on urban planning and consulted the Town and Regional Planning

²³⁹ In early 2001, most of the top management positions of the interim structure of the CTMM were held by interim or acting managers.

²⁴⁰ One of the senior planners who worked in the inner city office, Albrecht Heroldt, in view of his former experience with the prioritisation of the inner city projects (1997), was given the IIDP and asked to make a proposal on how the funds should be allocated to these projects – almost as an urgent project that had to be completed.

²⁴¹ Mdlalose, who had a qualification in economic development, was a senior official in the former GPMC's Economic Development Division.

Department of the University of Pretoria to advise her on certain planning matters. This Department, mainly based on its masters' programme, presented a very brief planning course to Mdlalose, aimed at assisting her with the city planning function component, which was then one of her main responsibilities. Mdlalose, in spite of the growing critique of the function and of her, soon began to take on the new challenge with the utmost confidence.

Whilst Mdlalose was establishing and organising the new division, including the planning component of the function, Yates and Beneke, the respective heads of the former planning departments of the City Council of Pretoria and the GPMC respectively, began a process aimed at transforming the planning department within the framework of the new (transforming) corporate structure²⁴². Although they indicated that they had involved and invited Mdlalose and other officials and councillors concerned to attend some of the meetings on the transformation process, the process was criticised for being done in isolation. Belinda van der Merwe, a senior town planner of the former GPMC, who then worked for Beneke, specifically stated that Beneke and some other officials were trying to dominate the transformation process and the divisional manager as they were trying to take over the planning function. The leading members of the transformation process and the task teams denied this allegation. These events in many ways highlight how different actors compete (fight) with each other in order to protect their powers and to obtain more power - very similar to the strategies proposed by Machiavelli, see Chapter 2. It further highlights the complexity and sensitivity of the power structures and power relations in the power web as described by Foucault.

While the planners were trying to restructure the planning department, a major controversy and frustration arose over the delay in the processing and approval of land use applications and the increasing backlog of applications²⁴³. Some of the line-managers and planners stated that Mdlalose could not cope with the division and ascribed this problem to the perceived incompetencies and lack of knowledge and experience of the divisional manager. As a result of this, Vosloo and Van der Merwe (who clearly saw themselves as part of the new management) informed her of the possible threats that were emerging and the negative perceptions against her and her division. It was obvious that these officials were trying to protect the powers of their manager, and indirectly also their own existing and future powers. After consulting the Acting

²⁴² Various task teams were established to develop the various components of the city planning functions, namely the land use management function, urban design, outdoor advertising, spatial planning, planning data, environmental planning and building control. These task teams mainly consisted of some of the chief planners and planners involved with these functions in the former planning departments of the various former local authorities. See Tshwane Metropolitan Council (2001).

²⁴³ This delay largely resulted from the confusion that arose from the transfer of powers and delegations to the newly appointed managers. It should also be noted that a large backlog was inherited from the previous regime (as discussed earlier).

Municipal Manager (CEO) at the time, Mdlalose terminated the so-called 'Beneke/Yates transformation process' and dissolved all the task teams involved with the transformation of the planning function. She almost immediately established a new Interim Management Team in March and April 2001), specifically for the city planning function. This new management team, which 'replaced' all the previous teams and departments involved with planning, was primarily responsible for the operational functions within the planning department, as well as the transformation and restructuring of the new planning department.

Van der Merwe, who was liaising closely with Mdlalose at that time, was appointed as overall function coordinator for the city planning functions. Henry Bezuidenhout, a close colleague of Van der Merwe and a senior planner, also from the former planning department of the GPMC, was appointed to take responsibility of the transformation process and the overall land use management function. Nikki Ludick, a senior planner from the same department, who had previously been extensively involved with the IDP processes in Pretoria, was made responsible for the IDP process. Johnny Coetzee, who at the time was responsible for the inner city, was redeployed to this function to take responsibility of the spatial planning function and to assist with the IDP process. Desiree Homann, who was responsible for marketing and communication at the PICP at that time, was also redeployed to the new planning function to assist with communication and general management functions. Marietjie van Zyl, a town planner from the former Land-use Management Division of the City Council, was requested to join the team, mainly to assist with the backlog of applications.

These new coordinators initially saw this new team and function as a new challenge that also held the prospect of promotion and a permanent management position of some sort. They soon realised, however that these positions were nothing more than a very interim arrangement and that they were balancing on a knife's edge. According to van der Merwe, some effort was made to identify and select suitable and appropriate coordinators who could introduce new ideas, specifically within the context of the new transforming society and the new forms of contemporary urban planning. She stated that the former managers were too entrenched within the old planning paradigm, as discussed previously.

As could be expected, the new interim management structure came as a surprise to many of the former managers and task team members. The majority of the former managers had great difficulty accepting this arrangement and the leadership of the new, mostly younger managers, who literally 'took over' the operations and the transformation of the planning department. The attitude of some of the former managers and officials, and the uncomfortable relationship between the old and new groups, was particularly evident at some of the meetings and discussions between these groups.

The biggest problem with the new arrangement probably related to the confusion about the managerial authority, responsibilities and mandate of the new management team. In spite of all the possible merits of the above selection process, the way in which these interim managers were selected and 'appointed' was typical of the old autocratic management style where dominatory power is (ab)used to reach a certain goal. Some planners quite rightly argued that the top management (and Mdlalose) should at least have created an opportunity for other candidates to apply for these positions. Although this new management team was widely criticised for the way in which it was composed, it presented a new look in terms of its overall structure, specifically its gender, racial and age profile. For the first time in the history of the city, a black woman (Mdlalose) was put in charge of the overall planning functions - but not for long...

Following the establishment of the new team, the members of the team made great progress in speeding up land use management processes; improving client service; integrating the functions and structures of the different local authorities; and addressing the staff and operational issues in the department. The team developed a new organisational structure and purpose portfolio for the planning department and made great strides in motivating the strategic importance of the planning function and the need for a new integrated, developmental approach to planning. The task team responsible for the spatial planning functions, under the co-leadership of Jaksa Barbir and Kestell Serfontein, developed a new spatial planning system, specifically within the context of the new urban planning principles and the IDP.

Although the team was 'led' by Belinda van der Merwe, she was not always involved and most of the leadership and management (and power) came from Henry Bezuidenhout. Bezuidenhout was an experienced planner who performed well with operational and transformation processes. Unlike the former management teams who were largely criticised for their rigid, autocratic, conservative management styles, as discussed previously, the new management had a more flexible, participative and open management style. The management team increasingly gained more support and respect among the officials in the planning department. Mdlalose also gained more confidence, experience, knowledge, support and popularity. Many planners favoured her as the obvious choice for the permanent manager's position of this function and even possibly a higher position in the organisation. In the middle of 2001, it looked as if a new integrated urban planning structure was developing - a structure that could support and enhance the transformation of urban planning in the City of Tshwane.

However, during the second half of 2001, the Council's corporate restructuring started to have a

major impact on the planning structure and the transformation of the urban planning system. While the planning department (and some other departments) were revisiting and reorganising their organisational structures and processes, in June 2001, the CEO announced a new and 'final' organisational structure for the City of Tshwane²⁴⁴. This structure was developed by an independent consultancy, YARONA, which had been appointed by the Council. The announcement of this new structure came as a surprise to many managers and officials who were not even aware of this separate restructuring process, not to mention their involvement (or lack thereof) in this process. Officials, managers and even councillors criticised this restructuring process (and the resulting purpose structure) for not being transparent, and for not involving the Council departments and managers concerned in the process. These actions by the former CEO are reminiscent of the dominatory powers discussed earlier on.

In 1994, prior to the transformation, the former Pretoria local authority and its officials were largely divorced from the people or the community. As the transformation process progressed, this gap between the Council and the community had narrowed as a result of the emerging democracy and the participatory approaches to urban planning. However, after almost a decade of local government transformation, the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality evolved into an organisation that was somewhat divorced from its officials. Some officials argued that the former City Council of Pretoria had been more transparent and open than the new Tshwane Council. Although the new Council (politicians and senior managers) promoted the principles of transparency, it was obvious that many of them were still moulded in the old, autocratic management domain discussed earlier.

When the new top management structure and positions were presented to the officials through the Council's Intranet, and after they had been advertised in the Sunday newspapers, the planning officials and managers realised that the various planning functions were scattered between the Housing Division, the Land and Environmental Planning Division and the Economic Development departments. No provision had been made for a dedicated urban planning department. Some planners argued that the consultants did not really have an understanding of the role of planning and where it should fit into the structure, while others argued that the politicians wanted to group the planning functions with Housing so as to promote integration between these functions²⁴⁵. Some planners, politicians and community members also argued that the so-called YARONA structure,

²⁴⁴ This structure included the top management levels of the organisation, for example the CEO's structure and support functions, the strategic executive functions and the various primary departments (general managers).

²⁴⁵ Soon after the structure was announced, Gerrit Bothma, an architect-technician who was extensively involved with the housing portfolio of the city, informed Johnny Coetzee that the officials involved with housing had had prolonged negotiations with, amongst others, the Executive Mayor to establish a separate Housing Department. These people regularly argued that the city planning functions should be part of housing.

based on instructions from the politicians, had fragmented and 'watered-down' the planning function in order to limit the so-called (political) powers as well the professional powers of the planners.

This uncertainty about the position and status of the planning department within the local authority created frustration for the planners who were going to be affected by it. The new structure created a perception amongst the majority of planners that the senior managers and politicians did not support the new transforming urban planning system.

After the announcement of the new Tshwane organisational structure in July 2001, most of the former interim structures and management positions were abolished. As a result, the economic development division (which included the planning functions) was terminated. This also implied the repeal of Mdlalose's position as Divisional Manager and the end of van der Merwe's planning team. This in many ways highlights' "the power of the Prince" and the dominatory "infra power" of politicians and senior managers. It also shows how the exercise of the stronger powers can eliminate/dominate the weaker power structures. As presented by Foucault, see Chapter 2, this also presents an example of how easily power structures and power relations can change and fluctuate within the power web.

Following the approval of the new organisational structure, the CEO proceeded to advertise the permanent positions of strategic executives and general managers (the first two rungs in the structure), and to make the necessary appointments. In those cases, for example, Housing, where the permanent strategic executive and managers had not yet been appointed, another group of interim managers was appointed to act in this position until the new managers could take over. Simon Bogopa, who had previously worked in the Housing Department of the GPMC, was requested to act as the Strategic Executive for the Housing Directorate, and Yates was requested to act as the General Manager for the Land and Environmental Planning Division.

Initially Yates also took responsibility of the planning functions. Various planners raised their concern about Yates' return to the planning arena, as they argued that he had had his opportunity and that it was time for him to move on. It was also not clear why the CEO could not utilise the previous interim managers, such as Mdlalose, who had built up a significant momentum. When the senior positions were advertised, Mdlalose also applied for the Strategic Executive Officer position in the Housing Department, as well as other senior positions in the Economic Development Department. To the dismay of her partisans, she did not obtain any of these positions and had to

revert back to her former position in the economic development department²⁴⁶.

These new acting managers (Bogopa and Yates) reinstated some members of the former city planning team that had functioned under van der Merwe, such as Henry Bezuidenhout and Johnny Coetzee. Yates argued that it was important to sustain the momentum of the transformation process that this team had built up during the recent weeks. Bogopa and Yates, however, decided to substitute van der Merwe and to appoint Dr Verna Nel, the former chief planner of the Centurion area, to coordinate the planning function. Although Nel was a popular planner and manager in the former Centurion Council, she was not well known in the other former Pretoria councils. Nel was particularly interested in local economic development - a topic that had formed part of her PhD studies. A planner (who requested not to be named) regularly stated that van der Merwe's management style was too brisk and that her vendetta against Beneke and some of the former managers had made her unpopular amongst senior managers and politicians.

In October 2001, after the Strategic Executive Manager's position for the Department of Housing, Land and Environmental Planning and City Planning had been advertised, Nava Pillay was appointed as the new Strategic Executive for this Directorate²⁴⁷ and Janet Loubser was appointed General Manager for the Land and Environmental Planning Division. The appointments of Pillay and Loubser resulted in the replacement of Bogopa and Yates²⁴⁸ respectively. Apart from some changes in the overall departmental structure, Pillay initially did not change the city planning management team that had been established by Bogopa and Yates. The interim city planning team, under the leadership of Nel, continued to motivate the strategic importance of the planning function and its rightful position in the organisational structure - at general manager level.


The members of the team continued to refine and develop the new urban planning system that had been unfolding during the past few years and also continued to promote a new planning culture in the department. It is ironic to note that this (second) interim city planning team, apart from Nel, consisted of white males, and mostly older managers who had previously worked with/for Yates.

²⁴⁶ In 2003 she was, however, promoted to the post of Deputy Manager in the Economic Development Division.

²⁴⁷ Pillay was a councillor in the former City Council of Pretoria (responsible for, amongst other things, city planning), a Director of the former Community Development Department of the City Council of Pretoria - specifically involved with housing, and a former interim Divisional Manager of the Tshwane local authority involved with community development and housing.

²⁴⁸ Both Bogopa and Yates were redeployed as strategic advisors in Pillay's office.

FIGURE 13: INTERIM ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND POSITIONING OF THE CITY PLANNING FUNCTION (2001)



Although the city planning team, and more specifically the metropolitan planning function, was largely involved with strategic planning and the IDP, in July 2001 the IDP function was formally allocated to the Chief Operating Officer (COO), Mr Wonder Nkosi. The IDP was eventually positioned on inter-departmental (strategic) level in the local authority. Unfortunately, this was not the highest level of authority and the IDP found itself between conflicting roles and responsibilities of the CEO and the COO.

In August 2001, the Mayoral Committee approved a new organisational structure to support the IDP. This structure provided, amongst other things, for a dedicated IDP task team in the office of the COO, which was closely linked with the office of the CEO and the Mayor²⁴⁹. Nkosi subsequently deployed van der Merwe and Ludick to manage and coordinate the IDP process on his behalf, in view of their involvement with the IDP at the time.

This was some consolation for van der Merwe, who was initially not accommodated as a manager or coordinator in the City Planning structure²⁵⁰. Although van der Merwe had attended a five-day course on IDP presented by the National Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG), she did not have much experience in the field of IDP as she had not been much involved with the comprehensive first round of IDPs. Perhaps this course (although it only covered the basic IDP

²⁴⁹ See City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (2001 (b)).

²⁵⁰ In 2003, van der Merwe was appointed as a manager in the IDP office.

principles) “empowered” her to take on the IDP challenge. She did, however, have some experience on the overall management of planning and development projects.

Soon after their appointment in July 2001, the members of the newly established IDP project team established all the necessary IDP forums, structures and mechanisms and introduced training programmes to the officials and councillors concerned. Later that same year the team started with the so-called second round of IDPs²⁵¹. The team largely based their IDP approach on the rigid principles and guidelines that had been developed and promoted by the Department of Provincial and Local Government, as contained in the IDP guide packs.

It is somewhat unclear why the IDP team did not follow the IDP format and process that had been developed by the IDP task team during late 1999/early 2000, as this had been specifically structured to address the problems that arose from the first round of IDPs. Perhaps the IDP team wanted to introduce a ‘fresh’ new process and plan. It was also easier for them to follow a process that they knew was at least supported by the national government. Perhaps they just did not want to follow the Yates/Beneke process. It can, however, be argued that they should at least have drawn from the lessons and experiences of the IDP task team.

As the IDP progressed during late 2001/early 2002, some strategic executives (SEOs), and functional managers involved with physical planning and development, infrastructure and services and economic development, realised that the IDP (as interpreted by the IDP team), in view of its holistic nature, did not have the ability to guide the strategic development of the city. They often expressed the need for a city strategy that could inform the IDP and direct the development of the city, specifically the spatial and economic development of the city. As a result of this realisation, an inter-departmental strategic planning team was established at the end of 2001 under the leadership of Yates who was deployed as a strategic advisor to Pillay’s office at the time.

The primary objective and mandate of this team was to produce development strategies and strategic guidelines as an input into the IDP²⁵². During the first quarter of 2002, the team completed a very broad but significant spatial development and restructuring strategy for Tshwane²⁵³. Although this team invited members of the IDP team to participate in the process, the IDP team members showed very little interest in this process. They criticised this team for performing a

²⁵¹ Although the IDP was introduced in 1996, it was the second round of IDPs, following the local government elections of December 2000, which consolidated the new system (Harrison 2002:2). Rauch (2002: 15) states that, unlike the first round of IDPs, the second round was based on a clear legal framework (MSA 2000), supported by a revised methodological guide pack, and a nation-wide targeted training programme.

²⁵² Johnny Coetzee and Kestell Serfontein from the metropolitan planning section also played a major role in the formulation and compilation of these strategies.

²⁵³ See also City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (2002).

parallel process to the IDP and for intervening in the IDP process. The abovementioned largely emphasised the lack of communication between the members of the top management, the lack of inter-departmental coordination and the lack of council policy (and leadership). This state of affairs resulted in conflict between the IDP team, the strategic planning team and the metropolitan planning section and spurred a debate in the top management of the Council. Although the IDP team opposed the efforts of the strategic planning team, they eventually included these strategies (or sectoral inputs) as part of their IDP - not that this was sufficient to make the IDP a strategic planning document!

After many workshops and meetings and much effort by the IDP team, they compiled and submitted to the Tshwane Council²⁵⁴ the first fully-fledged IDP for Tshwane, entitled *The Tshwane 2020 Plan*. To the surprise and frustration of the COO and the IDP team, this IDP was heavily criticised for its shortcomings, the most important being its over-cumbersome nature and lack of strategic focus. Apart from this critique, it is also ironic that after so many IDP efforts and lessons, this IDP was again developed in isolation from the budget process, as the budget had almost been completed before the IDP projects were finalised. Similarly, it is ironic that the Tshwane organisational transformation process also preceded the IDP process and was developed in isolation from the new IDP. The 2001/2002 IDP process (and the Tshwane 2020 plan) in many ways duplicated many of the problems that have been identified earlier through the 1997 to 1998 IDP processes (as discussed previously)²⁵⁵. Harrison (2002) ascribes many of the IDP problems to, amongst other things, 'the difficult context', the lack of clarity as to the nature and purpose of IDPs, the inexperience of newly elected municipal Councils, the confusion in the new municipalities and the overall lack of capacity in some local authorities.

The IDP was subsequently referred back to the team, and was re-submitted in the same format in July, but with a comprehensive list of 'explanations and clarifications'. On 12 July 2002 this plan was approved at a special council meeting. The way in which this IDP was 'approved' largely indicated the council's apathy to the IDP. It was almost as if the council just wanted to get the IDP approved because they had to (in terms of the legislation) - irrespective of the quality of the document. If the council's senior officials and politicians had been more actively involved in the IDP process (as was expected of them), this initial rejection of the IDP could have been prevented.

²⁵⁴ See also City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (2002).

²⁵⁵ The critique of the Tshwane IDP (2002) is reminiscent of the critique of IDPs nationally. This critique relates to the overall lack of policies and guidelines, the undefined roles, responsibilities and confusion within local authorities, the lack of capacity and resources in municipalities, the lack of strategic issues, and the neglect of spatial planning; the poor implementation of IDPs, as well as the poor inter-governmental integration. See also Harrison (2001 and 2002); Adams and Oranje (2002); Rauch (2002) and Pycroft (2000).

After the approval of this IDP, various politicians, departmental managers and planners again raised their concern regarding the lack of strategic focus and the IDP's ability to guide the strategic development of the city. As a result of the abovementioned, two distinct factions developed in the Council. The one faction under the leadership of the COO argued that the IDP had to be the overarching highest order, strategic plan for the city - very much in line with the Municipal Systems Act 2000. This faction was very much against any interference from the city planning department or related departments. They strongly and regularly criticised the spatial planners who got involved in strategic planning. The other faction that was supported by the CEO, the strategic executives concerned with planning and infrastructure and officials from the metropolitan planning section, argued that the IDP process should be informed by an overarching city strategy. This, incidentally, resulted in a new debate: whether the IDP processes should be heightened and expanded to address the strategic issues more effectively, or whether a new, separate, more dedicated strategic planning construct, almost complimentary and supplementary to the IDP, should be developed to focus on the highest level of strategic issues. The challenge and opportunity for top management was to distinguish between 'top level'/critical/strategic planning, development and management (the overall City Strategy) on the one hand; and the more corporate, operational strategies and projects and managerial urban processes normally included in the IDP, on the other. These different approaches also resulted in conflict and a power clash between different departments, between senior officials, and also between the CEO and the COO.

The above viewpoints again emphasised the difference between the so-called 'strategy for the city' or the City Plan *vis a vis* the 'strategy for the local authority' or the corporate strategy²⁵⁶. The confusion regarding the abovementioned can largely be ascribed to the limited definition of strategic planning that was promoted by, amongst others, the DPLG²⁵⁷. As these debates continued, a new insight was obtained from the World Bank on the notion of the City Development Strategy (CDS)²⁵⁸. This CDS process, which was applied as a pilot project in 50 cities all over the world (including the City of Johannesburg as the only city in Africa), also promotes the broader strategic and developmental focus of the development of the city as a whole - similar to the

²⁵⁶ Based on the recent assessments of the second round of IDPs, strong viewpoints were expressed on the ability of the IDP to steer the future development, specifically of the larger metropolitan areas (Harrison 2002: 25 -26). He argued that the IDP has a potential role to play in metropolitan planning, but it would be a mistake to regard it as the sum total of metropolitan planning. Coetzee and Serfontein (2002) also highlighted the need for a separate City Development Strategy, supplementary to, and in support of the IDP.

²⁵⁷ This Department (DPLG 2001), the CSIR and Rauch (2002), describe the strategic planning process as a process comprising five phases: analysis, strategies, projects, integration and approval. According to Rauch (2002: 7) strategic planning means "prioritising crucial issues, focusing analysis, addressing root causes, taking given resources and relevant context into account, identifying and analysing alternative strategic options".

²⁵⁸ See World Bank (1999).

thoughts promoted by the metropolitan planning section²⁵⁹.

The first city development strategy for the City of Tshwane was only finalised in mid-2003, after the IDP team had appointed consultants to prepare a development strategy for the city (in conjunction with the relevant Council departments), mainly in support of an application for a restructuring grant from national treasury. This strategy was largely informed by the spatial development strategies that were formulated by the strategic planning task team and the metropolitan planning section as discussed earlier. It can be argued that it would not have been necessary for the IDP team to appoint outside consultants, in view of the fact that much of the strategic planning work could/should have been done in-house by the inter-departmental strategic planning task team that already existed, or a new extended task team that could also have included the IDP team. It is, however, ironic to note that the CTMM, in the absence of such a strategy, continued with the various transformation efforts and development of new organisational structures and processes. This not only highlighted the confusion and conflict that emerged in the top management and political arena, but also the overall lack of strategic leadership in terms of the IDP/City Strategy - as well as the complexity of power relations.

However, in spite of all the critique, conflict and confusion, more clarity was reached on the role and status of the IDP and the City Strategy and its role within the transforming urban planning system in the City of Tshwane. Although the new CTMM made much progress restructuring the organisation, many officials and managers often expressed their frustration with the slow pace of transformation and the uncertainty that was created by the transformation. Reference was often made to the top-down approach that was followed by top management; the political interference of certain councillors; the power play; the lack of transparency and secrecy; the poor communication between top management and the officials; and the lack of inter-departmental co-ordination²⁶⁰. These problems of the transformation (which can largely be associated with power relations), in many ways negatively affected the culture, morale and attitude of many officials in the Council²⁶¹ - and also the particular power relations in the organisation.

²⁵⁹ See also Coetzee and Serfontein (2002) on the CDS approach.

²⁶⁰ During 2002 and 2003, the planners and managers at the monthly management meetings of the City Planning Division also frequently raised these issues.

²⁶¹ Harrison (2002: 30) also emphasised the need for a quality organisational culture, the commitment of individuals and the need to 'empower individuals and to promote the right ethos'.

5.17 THE EXODUS²⁶²

After the umpteenth effort to submit a report to the Tshwane Council on the structure and status of the City Planning department, the Council eventually approved the structure and purpose portfolio of this department in August 2003 - almost two-and-a-half years after the inauguration of the new local authority. For the first time since the establishment of the new local authority, the 'departmental status' of the planning function (and the importance of urban planning) was formally recognised. The approval of the structure also created the opportunity to 'implement' the organisational structure that was needed to support the transforming urban planning system.

Although many planners and officials in the planning department were somewhat anxious about the impact the new structure could have on their positions, the majority of them were excited about the progress as they realised that the new approved organisational structure could provide stability and certainty in the planning department, and even create new opportunities.


For those acting managers (who had been acting in these positions for the past two years), as well as aspiring managers, the new structure created the long-awaited opportunity for them to obtain a 'real' management position in the planning department and the powers they aspired so desperately. Some planners and officials in the department were hoping that the new structure would result in a 'permanent' or secure position for them. There were also those planners who feared that the new structure could imply the end of their careers in the City of Tshwane, as they might not be promoted or placed in a certain position.

Soon after the approval of the new structure, the various management positions (managers and deputy managers) were advertised internally and interviews held at the end of November/beginning of December 2003. On 11 December all the candidates who had qualified for a position were invited to attend a meeting with the SEO, Mr Nava Pillay, where they were informed of their new appointments²⁶³ (see Figure 15).

²⁶² *Exodus* in this context has a number of multiple meanings. Firstly, it represents the exodus, end or exit of the story. Secondly, it celebrates the exodus or departure of a new planning department in the City of Tshwane. Thirdly, it refers to the exodus, withdrawal or retreat of some urban legends that were not made part of the new transformed/transforming urban planning system. Lastly, the biblical meaning of Exodus refers to the fulfillment and accomplishment of promises; and physical and spiritual redemption.

²⁶³ It is ironic to note that those candidates who did not qualify for any of the manager's positions were not informed of the meeting, or told why they were not invited to the meeting. The Acting General Manager or the SEO also never informed them that they had not qualified for any of the positions.

FIGURE15: MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND PROFILE OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT (DECEMBER 2003)



Current status

Unlike the former management structures that were largely characterised by mostly white males and older managers (mostly from the previous regime), the new management structure reflects a more representative profile in terms of age, gender and race. Although much effort was made to appoint more managers from other racial groups, in line with the Council's policy of affirmative action, only a few such managers could be appointed. This was mainly as a result of the fact that the positions were only advertised internally and the fact that very few officials from these racial groups qualified for these positions. One of the newly appointed managers (who preferred not to be mentioned) stated that there was a deliberate effort to appoint new and younger officials in an effort to break the strong bond and old planning culture that had dominated the planning scene for so long.

As is reflected by the structure and aims of the new Metropolitan Planning section of the City Planning Department, this section presents a totally new, integrated, holistic focus on strategic planning, metropolitan planning, spatial planning, planning research and development facilitation in general - much in line with the national policies and international trends (as discussed in Chapter 4).

The Regional Planning Section, although it aims (and attempts) to do spatial planning on a regional and local level and to facilitate development projects in the city, is still largely concerned with land-use management (and control). By far the majority of planners in this section are involved, on a daily basis, with the evaluation of rezoning applications, applications for the establishment of new townships, consent use applications, etc.

Planners from this section have often stated that they are so involved with these applications that they hardly ever get the opportunity to do 'real' spatial planning. Some of the planning consultants in the City of Tshwane also expressed their frustration with the archaic way in which many planners still evaluate new applications, for example, for change of land use. Reference was also made to the 'powerful', rigid and autocratic way in which some planners deal with applications²⁶⁴. It is also ironic to note that this Land-use Management function has grown so much during the past four years (as a result of the city's natural growth and the amalgamation of the various municipalities) that a new and separate planning section had to be established to support this function.

This section, referred to as Land Use Legislation and Administration (LULA), was positioned on the same level as the Metropolitan Planning section and the Regional Spatial Planning section. This section specifically deals with the administrative functions related to land-use management, the legal aspects, specifically of land use management and the town planning schemes. Throughout the transformation process, reference was made to the problems of the autocratic, rigid planning system with its over-emphasis on 'control' and the need for a more integrated, developmental and flexible planning system that could facilitate development and the restructuring of the city.

As is evident by the number of planners involved with 'real' spatial planning in relation to the number of planners allocated to land-use management and administration, it is evident (from this skew representation), that a rather small minority of planners are actually involved with spatial planning, development and the restructuring of the city.

²⁶⁴ Interviews held with planning consultants during 2003/2004.

When contextualising the contents and aims of the new urban planning system, as required by the national legislation and policies (as discussed in Chapter 4), the question can be asked whether this planning structure is really geared to take on the challenge of the newly established City of Tshwane. Although some progress was made in developing and promoting the new planning principles in the City of Tshwane, it is doubtful whether these principles have really influenced the practice of planning in all sectors of the planning department - yet another indication of how difficult it is to bridge the gap between theory and practice.

In spite of the critique of the planning structure and the newly established planning department, great progress was made in establishing an entirely new, integrated department. For the first time in the history of this city, one integrated planning department has been established and made responsible for the (integrated) planning and development of the metropolitan area as a whole.

The Munitoria fire of March 1997 specifically created a new impetus for change in the City Council of Pretoria and wiped out many of the old structures, plans and habits that were associated with the old/apartheid planning structures. By the end of 2003, seven years after the fire, many officials still operated from the southern part of Munitoria, which had only been partially damaged and subsequently restored after the fire. To the dismay of many 'new generation' planners and officials who were hoping to make a fresh new start in a new building, Munitoria has still not been rebuilt. In the minds of many planners, officials and councillors, a paradigm of old planning still exists that will probably never change. In the vicinity of the Council chambers one can still sense the smoke and fustiness from the Munitoria fire...