The Mechanisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC

by

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ABSTRACT

The central question addressed by this thesis is whether and to what extent ASEAN and SADC provide a regional response to security challenges from within and without the region respectively. In the examination of a regional response to security challenges in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, this study investigates each regional organisation’s efforts and methods of how to approach and deal with regional security problems. In examining the processes and patterns of ASEAN and SADC regionalism in terms of the security dimension, the focus is on political security in its regional context. In doing so, the mechanisms of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms are explored.

This study also aims to compare SADC and ASEAN to find similarities and differences in terms of the way in which ‘politico-security regionalism’ as a regional project is used to respond to global challenges, as well as to internal needs. Moreover, this study seeks to explore what can be learnt from the experiences of both ASEAN and SADC with regard to regionalism and regionalisation in response to political security threats. This will, as a result, be conducive to understanding the character, nature and type of contemporary regionalism and regional security in the South, including Southeast Asia and Southern Africa.

Furthermore, in discussing the question of whether and how ASEAN and SADC attempt to shape and modify or change the process of globalisation and regionalisation in politico-security terms, this study emphasises a multi-dimensionality of contemporary regionalism – so called ‘new regionalism’ – which would normally be based on constructivism. Therefore, this study argues that the theoretical problem relates to the insufficiency of neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist accounts that call for a much needed attempt to bring ASEAN and SADC into contemporary discussions about the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms within the context of a (social) constructivism of international relations (IR) theory.

**Key Terms:** Regionalism, New Regionalism, Politico-Security Regionalism, Regionalisation, Regional Security, Political Security, Regional Cooperation/Integration, Constructivism, ASEAN, SADC, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa
Die kernvraag wat deur hierdie tesis aangespreek word, is of, en indien wel, in watter mate, ASEAN en SADC ’n streeksrespons verskaf vir die sekuriteitsuitdagings van binne en buite hul onderskeie streke. In die ondersoek na ’n streeksrespons op die sekuriteitsuitdagings in Suid-Oos Asië en Suider-Afrika, analyseer die studie die pogings en metodes van ASEAN and SADC met betrekking tot die aanspreek van die onderskeie streke se sekuriteitsprobleme. Die ondersoek na die prosesse en patrone van sekuriteitsregionalisme in ASEAN en SADC fokus op politieke sekuriteit in streekkonteks. Sodoende word die politiko-sekuriteitsmeganismes van beide streeksorganisasies bestudeer.

Hierdie studie vergelyk ook SADC en ASEAN om ooreenkomste en verskille uit te lig in terme van die wyse waarop ‘politiko-sekuriteitsmeganismes’ as ’n streeksprojek gebruik word in reaksie op globale uitdagings, sowel as interne behoeftes. Verder poog die studie om te bepaal wat geleer kan word uit die ondervindinge van ASEAN en SADC in verband met regionalisme en regionalisasie as ’n reaksie op sekuriteitsbedreigings. Die studie bevorder begrip van die karakter, aard en tipe kontemporêre regionalisme en streeksekuriteit in die Globale Suide met spesifieke verwysing na Suid-Oos Asië en Suider-Afrika.

Voorts, in die bespreking van die vraag of en hoe ASEAN en SADC hul beywer om die proses van globalisasie en regionalisasie in politiko-sekuriteitsterme te vorm en te verander, beklemttoon die studie ’n multi-dimensionaliteit van kontemporêre regionalisme – die sogenaamde “nuwe regionalisme” – wat normaalweg gebaseer is op konstruktivisme. Daarom voer die studie aan dat die teoretiese probleem verband hou met die ontoereikendheid in die neo-realistiese en neo-liberale geïnstitusionaliseerde benaderings om die tipe meganismes van politiko-sekuriteitsregionalisme, doeltreffend te ondersoek en dat dit met welslae bestudeer en ontleed kan word deur gebruik te maak van (sosiale) konstruktivisme as ’n teorie van Internasionale Verhoudinge.

**Kernbegrippe:** Regionalisme, Nuwe Regionalisme, Politiko-Sekuriteitsregionalisme, Regionalisasie, Streeksekuriteit, Politieke Sekuriteit, Streeksamewerking/-integrasie, ASEAN, SADC, Suid-Oos Asië en Suidelike Afrika.
CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1
   1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
   1.2 Research Problem and Aim ................................................................................ 2
   1.3 Theoretical Orientations ..................................................................................... 7
   1.4 Demarcation of the Study .................................................................................. 10
   1.5 Research Methods ............................................................................................. 12
   1.6 Limitations .......................................................................................................... 14
   1.7 Levels of Analysis ............................................................................................. 15
   1.8 Structure of the Study and Outline .................................................................. 15

CHAPTER 2  CONCEPTUALISING POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM ............. 19
   2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 19
   2.2 Defining Security: Politico-Security ................................................................. 21
      2.2.1 Weak States, States-Making and Politico-Security .................................... 26
      2.2.2 Sovereignty and Politico-Security .............................................................. 27
      2.2.3 The State: Primary Referent/Agent of Politico-Security ............................ 30
   2.3 Defining Regionalism: Politico-Security Regionalism ....................................... 34
      2.3.1 The Domestic Level .................................................................................. 42
      2.3.2 The Regional Level .................................................................................. 43
      2.3.3 The Extra-Regional Level ....................................................................... 45
   2.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 47

CHAPTER 3  THEORISING POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM ................ 49
   3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 49
   3.2 Neo-realism ........................................................................................................ 49
   3.3 Neo-liberal institutionalism ............................................................................... 52
   3.4 Constructivism ................................................................................................... 55
      3.4.1 Institutions ................................................................................................... 58
      3.4.2 Norms ......................................................................................................... 60
      3.4.3 Collective Identity ....................................................................................... 62
   3.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 64

CHAPTER 4  POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ‘ASEAN WAY’ IN THE COLD-WAR ERA .............. 66
7.3 Conflict Management in the DRC Crisis (1998-2004) ................................ 170
    7.3.1 The Zimbabwe-led Intervention in the DRC: Collective Self-Defence? ....................................................................................................................... 170
    7.3.2 The Unilateral Intervention in the DRC: Pursuing the legitimacy of operation ........................................................................................................ 175
    7.3.3 Peacemaking in the DRC Conflict: From unilateral intervention to multilateral diplomacy ....................................................................................180
7.4 Restructuring SADC’s Security Architecture .............................................. 192
    7.4.1 From OPDS to OPDSC: Towards regional security integration...... 192
    7.4.2 The Politics of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact ......................... 200
7.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 204

CHAPTER 8 A COMPARISON OF THE TWO CASE STUDIES ....................... 208
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 208
8.2 Comparative Findings ............................................................................ 210
    8.2.1 Institutionalisation ............................................................................. 210
    8.2.2 Norm-based Conflict Management .................................................. 214
    8.2.3 Collective (Regional) Identity as Exceptionalism.............................. 219
    8.2.4 Bringing In Multi-level Approaches to Politico-Security Regionalism 224
8.3 Theoretical Findings ................................................................................ 233
    8.3.1 Neo-realism ...................................................................................... 233
    8.3.2 Neo-liberal institutionalism ............................................................... 235
    8.3.3 Constructivism .................................................................................. 239
8.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 243

CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 245

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................. 249

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACM African Common Market
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>African Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALC</td>
<td>African Liberation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF-SOM</td>
<td>ARF Senior Official Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASAS</td>
<td>Association of Southern African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASC</td>
<td>ASEAN Standing Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDT</td>
<td>Timorese Social Democratic Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPAC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLNS</td>
<td>Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland group of states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAF</td>
<td>Central African Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAO</td>
<td>Communaute economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (West African Economic Community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSAS</td>
<td>Constellation of Southern African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCM</td>
<td>Maghreb Permanent Consultation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>Confidence and Security-Building Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAEC</td>
<td>East Asian Economic Caucus</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>Early Warning System</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Forces armies congolaises</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLS</td>
<td>Frontline States</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FNL</td>
<td>Forces Nationales de Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertacao de Moçambique (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRETLIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force for East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>UN Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISDSC</td>
<td>Inter-State Defence and Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISPDC</td>
<td>Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCBC</td>
<td>Lake Chad Basic Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLA</td>
<td>Lesotho Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAPHILINDO</td>
<td>Malaya-Philippines-Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN Mission in the DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRU</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement (official title is Movement of Non-Aligned Countries)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North American Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>New Partnership for Africa's Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPDS</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPDSC</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie</td>
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<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistencia Nacionale Moçambicana (National Resistance Movement of Mozambique)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACU</td>
<td>Southern African Customs Union</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SADCC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Coordination Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>SANDF</td>
<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPA</td>
<td>South African News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEANWFZ</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOM-PMC</td>
<td>Senior Officials Meeting-Post-Ministerial Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Treaty of Amity and Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC</td>
<td>Union douanière et économique de l’Afrique Centrale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMET</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCLOS</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União para a Independência Total de Angola (Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZOPFAN</td>
<td>Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality</td>
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</table>
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION

1.1  Introduction

The Cold War has ended, and its demise signals the end of a broad structure defined by the major division of East and West, which has brought with it a ‘new world order’. A multitude of interrelated structural transformations of the global system, often associated with globalisation as its main feature, forced the South or the developing world to react to the global challenges and their own internal needs through regionalism. During the Cold War era, in fact, regionalism was subsumed under the hegemonic logic of bipolarity, which not only impeded a development of regional organisations, but also created the fundamental cleavage of the system (Hettne, 2000b:163). As Buzan (1991:208-209) has pointed out, however, the shift away from bipolarity towards multipolarity contributed to an international system in which regional arrangements can be expected to assume greater significance. In this context, Pugh and Sidhu (2003:6) argue that ‘[r]egionalism as a force for the management of international relations gained a new impetus with the end of bipolarity’.

Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of a number of regional approaches to security problems particularly in the developing world regions, with a better balance between the regions of the world (cf Alagappa, 1993:439-467; Hettne, 2001:1-53; Pugh and Sidhu, 2003:1-7). Since the end of the Cold War, nonetheless, these regional approaches to security problems in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions appear to go beyond the example of Europe by taking on forms of regionalism which are (radically) different from the integrationist model of the EU. In this context, Held et al. (1999:76) argue as follows:

Indeed, to date the rest of the world has largely rejected the EU model as something to emulate directly. Unlike the Westphalian principle of sovereign statehood, the Brussels principle of ‘pooled sovereignty’ has found little resonance in Kuala Lumpur, Brazília or Lagos. Instead, beyond Europe, a more open form of regionalism has developed, referred to by the notion of the ‘new regionalism’. This is evident ... explicitly in [both ASEAN and SADC regions].
Within the context of new regionalism in ASEAN and SADC, thus, it can be assumed that both regional organisations are promoting regionalisms which are taking place as different kinds of transformation beyond Europe. Based on this assumption, furthermore, Fry (2000:130) describes ‘regionalism’ as follows:

[R]egionalism has ... been promoted as a way of countering or mediating intervention from what is seen as these hegemonic Western influences. Here [security] regionalism is used to protect local cultural mores. [Security regionalism] is seen as an anti-hegemonic strategy to control great power and particularly American or Western dominance. This is most prominently demonstrated in the promotion of Asian values.

In line with the aforementioned circumstances, the subject matter of this study is a comparative analysis of the reaction of a number of states in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia to regional security challenges. Regionalism, in terms of the reaction, is an attempt to respond to external demands and internal needs in such a manner that it enhances the position of these states in the context of global forces. Indeed, the states of these two regions are attempting to address regional security problems through ‘politicosecurity regionalisms’ in the form of SADC (Southern African Development Community) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) respectively. In each region, SADC and ASEAN are the primary institutional vehicles for any regional project.

1.2 Research Problem and Aim

The central question addressed by this dissertation is whether and to what extent ASEAN and SADC provide a regional response to security challenges from within and without the region respectively. In the examination of a regional response to security challenges in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, this study investigates each regional organisation’s efforts and methods of how to approach and deal with regional security problems. In examining the processes and patterns of ASEAN and SADC regionalism in terms of the security dimension, I have restricted myself to focusing on political security in its regional context. In doing so, I attempt to explore the mechanisms of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

Moreover, this study aims to compare SADC and ASEAN to find similarities and
differences in terms of the way in which ‘politico-security regionalism’ as a regional project and/or strategy is used to respond to global challenges, as well as to internal needs. Furthermore, this study seeks to explore what can be learnt from the experiences of both ASEAN and SADC with regard to regionalism and regionalisation in response to political security threats. This will, as a result, be conducive to understanding the character, nature and type of contemporary regionalism and regional security in the South, including Southeast Asia and Southern Africa.

All the countries of Southeast Asia, except Thailand, had been colonised by either Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA during the 18th and 19th centuries. According to Than and Singh (2001:178), ‘Southeast Asia has been a magnet to the great powers, attracted by its resources and its strategic location between the Indian and Pacific oceans. It was a region of rivalry among the great powers at various times during the colonial period. The region remained a cockpit of great power rivalry during the Cold War, even though most of the colonial empires had been dismantled in the 1940s and 1950s’. During the ‘first wave’ of regionalism (Asante, 1997:2-3) or ‘old’ regionalism (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998:6), which, so to speak, began in the 1950s and ended by the early 1970s, the formation of ASEAN was necessitated by exogenous and internal factors such as the threat of communism, political instability, socio-cultural disruption, and inter-ethnic conflict (cf Frost, 1990:2-18; Thambipillai, 1994:106-108).

Similarly, Swatuk expounds that the ‘old’ regionalism in Southern Africa could be understood in the context of the climate of the Cold War and apartheid and ‘in terms of a series of oppositional positionings: inside/outside; black/white; us/them; good/evil; etc’ (Swatuk, 1996:3). Today, however, the Cold War, colonialism and/or apartheid (formally) are gone, implying that these two regions are in the process of being transformed from a vulnerable and an unstable situation with conflictual confrontations towards something ‘new’, or at least different (cf Swatuk, 1995:70-85; ÖJendal, 1998:112-129; Söderbaum, 1998:75-94).

According to Hettne (1997:84-85; 2000a:xix-xx), some notable differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalism are that not only economic, but also security imperatives push countries and communities towards cooperation within new types of regional frameworks. Furthermore, the ‘old’ regionalism, which was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, is apt to focus on a power-based or material based structure, whereas the
‘new’ regionalism, which is taking shape in a more multipolar world order, focuses not only on material incentives, but also ideational forces such as norms, institutions and identity (Schulz, Söderbaum and Ojendal, 2001:3-17).

Above all, a defining characteristic is that new regionalism can be better understood in an open-ended or process-oriented context than in a fixed or deterministic one. In the post-Cold War era, thus, what is important is that a constructivist perspective of international relations is useful for explaining the dynamics of ASEAN and SADC regionalism in the new regionalist context. Unlike rationalists such as neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists who view actors’ interests, motives, ideas and identities as being exogenously given, constructivists view them as being subject to change and thus being socially constructed by reflective actors who are capable of adapting to (security) challenges imposed by the actions of others (Bøås and Hveem, 2001:101; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002:37).

Within this context, it can be assumed that since there are no given regions, there are no given regionalist interests either, but the interests and identities are defined and redefined in the process of interaction and intersubjective understanding (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002:36). Given that both terms politico-security and regionalism can be seen as constitutive concepts (see Chapter 2), the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms in this study need to be understood in a constructivist perspective of international relations.

In the post Cold War era, furthermore, the comparative analysis of regional groupings like ASEAN and SADC in developing countries is becoming more important in terms of investigating the complex process of interrelated structural change of regions and the various features of the ‘new regionalism’ in order to clarify the most appropriate approach to regionalism and regionalisation in respective region. Although there have been challenging examples of EU (European Union) influence on the theory and practice of regional cooperation in the South, little comparative analyses of regional cooperation among developing countries have been undertaken to date except for only a few cases in the developing world (see e.g. Langhammer and Hienmenz, 1990; Gambari, 1991; Axline, 1994; Van Nieuwkerk, 2001; Mutschler, 2001). In the meanwhile, since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN and SADC have been striving to find a new role and function in a new world order.
In the post-Cold War world order, ASEAN has intensified its political security cooperation. It extended its functions, enlarged its members, and kept a championship in Asia’s nascent multilateral security forums – (the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which was established in 1993). The ARF provides the region with an institution for multilateral dialogues on security and for developing confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in the region (Than and Singh, 2001:167-68).

Than and Singh (2001:167-184) argue that ASEAN has experienced both successes and failures throughout the development of the organisation. By some accounts, ASEAN is the world’s second and the developing world’s most successful organisation, praised not only for its longevity but also for the peace and spirit of cooperation it has brought to Southeast Asia (Busse, 1999: 39-40). By other accounts, however, ASEAN cooperation has been slow and fraught with difficulty, and lack of formal institutionalisation (Severino, 1998:3-5). The interesting enigma of ASEAN is not why it has not been more productive, but rather why members keep pursuing ASEAN regionalisation, particularly with regard to security in its political context, considering their diverse interests and conflicts of cooperation.

Likewise, in Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)’s transformation in 1992 into SADC has demonstrated

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1 In 1992, the Singapore Summit brought forth several important changes to ASEAN’s basic framework. For instance, the heads of government now meet every three years, with informal gatherings in the interim. In addition, the secretary-general of the ASEAN Secretariat was renamed the secretary-general of ASEAN and given ministerial (as opposed to the previous ambassadorial) status. The secretary-general’s new responsibilities were to initiate, advise, coordinate and implement ASEAN activities. Moreover, ASEAN institutionalised an annual Senior Officials Meeting-Post-Ministerial Conference (SOM-PMC) as part of its effort to increase discussion of regional security initiatives with non-ASEAN governments in the region. Finally, in 1992, an ASEAN Senior Official Meeting that brought together officials from foreign and defence ministries to discuss regional security was also institutionalised (see ASEAN 1992).

2 Vietnam became the first of the four mainland Southeast Asian countries to enter ASEAN in July 1995. Two years later, ASEAN admitted Laos and Myanmar as members of the organisation. After the restoration of political stability, Cambodia was admitted to the organisation on 30 April 1999 (see Gates and Than, 2001:1).
challenges as well as opportunities (Gibb, 1998:302-06; Van Aardt, 1997b:145; Alao, 1998:117-27). With the demise of apartheid, the most important security threats based largely on racial conflict have disappeared in Southern Africa. However, there is neither security nor peace in Southern Africa. This is reflected in the tragedies in Angola and the DRC as well as the “new” security threats that have occurred throughout the region during the last decade (Söderbaum, 2001: 108).

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid, the one critical issue SADC needs to address is its capability in its present structure to adapt to changing circumstances and new challenges (Ramsamy, 2001: 36). In fact, as ASEAN attempted to enlarge its members around this period, SADC also took into account the acceptance of new members³. As mentioned above, moreover, ASEAN made efforts to establish the ARF in 1993 in order to enhance regional security by increasing security cooperation with other states in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, SADC attempted to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS)⁴ in 1996 with a view to ‘allowing more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations’ (SADC Communiqué, 1996). Given the circumstances above, therefore, it is evident that both ASEAN and SADC as developing countries’ organisations have attempted to increase regional security in reaction to a changing international environment in the post-Cold War era.

The study hypothesis can be stated as follows: first, in constructing the politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC, ‘regional (member) states’ become major actors to shape and modify globalisation and regionalisation; second, particularly in terms of conflict management, the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms are best represented and utilised at the regional level; third, the politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC are constantly evolving and thus flexible in character; fourth, the


⁴ The name of the Organ is seen by some as ‘borrowed’ from the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (see Cilliers, 1996:2).
politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC are socially constructed; fifth, each politico-security regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa is positive to the peace and stability of the region respectively with providing a regional defensive response to global challenges as well as internal problems; finally, ASEAN and SADC can serve as conduits for this realisation.

1.3 Theoretical Orientations

Some scholars have argued that the theories of regional integration that have dominated the analysis of the EC (presently, EU) provide only a partial and incomplete guide to understanding contemporary regionalism, particularly developing world regionalism (see e.g. Jorgensen-Dahl, 1982; Hurrell, 1995a,1995b; Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998; Oden, 1999). Thus, in discussing the question of whether and how ASEAN and SADC attempt to shape and modify or change the process of globalisation and regionalisation in politico-security terms, it is necessary to utilise a multi-dimensionality of contemporary regionalism, so called ‘new regionalism’, which would normally be based on constructivism as ‘one theoretical building block’ (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002:45). By a multi-dimensionality of contemporary regionalism based on constructivism, I mean that social structures such as norms and ideas are just as important as material structures, such as the balance of military power in shaping the patterns of regionalism. In this inclusive and multi-dimensional context of contemporary regionalism, according to Hurrell (1995a:357; 1995b:72), a constructivist perspective of international relations ‘provides a theoretically rich and promising way of conceptualising the interaction between material incentives, inter-subjective structures, and the identity and interests of the actors’.

Given the aforementioned assumptions, thus, there are three reasons for using a multi-dimensional approach of constructivism in this study. The first is that the concepts like ‘regionalisation’ imply the multi-dimensional process of influence or change in particular terms of regional security. The interactions between the trend and the analysis of ‘new regionalism’ in the South do not fit easily into any one particular theory or perspective of international relations (IR). Rather, in order to perform this study, it is necessary to utilise an inclusive and multi-dimensional perspective of constructivism for exploring the various approaches to regional security cooperation in its broader sense.

The second reason for utilising a multi-dimensional perspective of constructivism is that
as Smith (1996:13) argues, ‘theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention’. According to Zalewski (1996:345), to think of theory as critique, means it ‘is assumed to be actively interrelated with the ‘real world’ and, as a tool, is wielded with a different purpose’. This perspective on theory most closely aligns itself with transformative and constitutive approaches to the study of IR. It is an approach that according to the arguments of Linklater, ‘we do not have to accept that the world is inevitably unequal and hierarchical; we can use theory … as a base for changing them’ (Zalewski, 1996:345).

Cox (1995:31) also argues that ‘there is no theory in itself, no theory independent of a concrete historical context’. According to Scholte (1993:141), ‘theories of social change have implications for the process of transformation itself; reality is not separate from theory as positivism asserts, nor is it reducible to theory as subjectivism suggests; instead, theory is a part of reality, and one that interrelates with its other parts as both cause and effect in a unity captured by the term ‘praxis’’. In this light, Cox (1992:133) has affirmed that ‘theory follows reality. It also precedes and shapes reality. That is to say, there is a real historical world in which things happen; and theory is made through reflection upon what has happened’.

A last but important reason for using a constructivist perspective of international relations in this study is that neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism have limited relevance for both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms. Although the two theories not only remain the dominant paradigms in international relations, but also are still influencing world politics, traditional thinking has been criticized in terms of the insufficiency of the applicability to the South in the post-Cold War international system. The change of the bipolar Cold War structure and alliance systems towards a multi-polar (or perhaps tri-polar) structure, with a new international division of power (NIDP), created the new environment and context which have invoked a number of debates for reconsiderations of international relations theories (Smith, 1997:1-32; Sinclair, 1996:3-15).

Hettne (1995:251) asserts that the current trend may be interpreted as a broader change in the social sciences towards creating a more general convergence with a unified social science. In other words, good social science theory is global social theory in today’s world (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002:35-36). Global social theory illustrates the fundamental social value beyond anarchic ‘power’ in international relations’ basic
Many scholars recognise the multi-dimensionality of contemporary regionalisms and regionalisations. They argue that the transformation processes shaping emerging regions need to be understood in a global, multi-dimensional, historical, and constructivist perspective (Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel, 1999; Hettne and Söderaba, 1998). Thus, for a better understanding of contemporary regionalisms and regionalisations in the South, it is necessary to open a space for alternative explanatory perspectives and prompt us to move away from a narrowly-defined and Western-centred view of rationalist theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, which are based on rational choice theory (Smith, 1997:23-24; Reus-Smit, 2001:216).

In terms of the insufficiency of neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism in particular, these rationalist theories have not given serious attention to the questions of social or ideational structures, but mainly to the questions of material structures. With regard to shaping the character, type and nature of regionalism in its politico-security context, nevertheless, social structure can play a crucial role in various ways: ‘by constituting identities and interests, by helping actors find common solutions to problems, by defining expectations for behaviour, by constituting threats, and so on’ (Wendt, 1999:24). What is noted, however, is that how ‘process’ shapes ideas, interests, motives, and the fundamental character of relationships are not questions generally addressed by rationalist accounts: yet, according to Wendt (1992:395), ‘structure has no existence or causal power apart from process’.

Moreover, constructivism contrasts with rationalism in terms of the argument of Wendt (1992:394) that ‘cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioural one in which they are exogenous’. For instance, for both neo-realists and neo-institutionalists, identities, interests, and the types of relationships states have are mostly, if not entirely, the products of material structure, that is, one’s position in the international hierarchical order. However, constructivists argue that political communities are not exogenously given but constructed by historically contingent interactions (Ruggie, 1998:35).

Constructivists are, to some extent, closer to neo-institutionalists, and both share an interest in norms, ideas, and institutions. As noted above, however, unlike neo-liberal institutionalists, constructivists argue that social and material structures affect not only
behaviour, but also actors’ identities and interests (Wendt, 1995:71-72). In exploring the processes of SADC and ASEAN politico-security regionalisms beyond the consideration of power and anarchy, it is important to focus on how ideas, norms and institutions can provide intervening variables that influence calculations of interest, as well as how states interpret or react to changes in the world system. According to constructivists, anarchy matters, but by itself, it explains very little. Within this context, hence, it can be assumed that the insufficiency of such rationalist accounts as mentioned above led to ‘the rise of constructivism’ in understanding and explaining how the processes and motives of regional security cooperation impact on forming the type and style of ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms in the post-Cold War era (cf Reus-Smit, 2001:216).

1.4 Demarcation of the Study

This study is demarcated according to conceptual, geographical and temporal criteria. In terms of conceptual criteria, the study is differentiated with reference to two central concepts – politico-security and politico-security regionalism. Politico- or political security concerns the politics of conflict and cooperation amongst states as main actors. According to Vasquez (1995:221), the politics of conflict and cooperation can be considered as (political) ‘reality which is a social construction’. That is, politico-security is about relationships of political authority, recognition and such a means of managing conflict as compromise and consensus (Buzan et al., 1998:141-162). In terms of ASEAN and SADC(C), thus, politico-security can be understood in the context of political interactions amongst the member states in relation to internal (domestic) and external (global) forces.

Within the context of politico-security defined above, regionalism in this study is limited to a set of state projects which can be distinguished from other forms of state projects such as globalism (Gamble and Payne, 1996:250). Given that regionalism is defined as a states-led project which may be too weak for the developing states to transform the process of global forces (Grugel and Hout, 1999:12), however, politico-security regionalism in the South cannot simply be understood as a distinct alternative to national interest and nationalism, but is often best explained as a tool to supplement and protect the role of regional (member) states and the power of their governments in an interdependent world (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998:9).
Considering that states are now becoming spokespersons for the hyperliberal tendency promoted by globalisation, rather than protecting their own populations and their cultures against these forces (Cox, 1996:191-207), that is, regional groups may become actors to shape or modify the forces of globalisation (Hettne, 2000a:1-51;2001:83-108; 2003:22-41). In this context, politico-security regionalism can be defined as the political project of region building which is made and remade by regional (member) states as main actors, with a view to promote and maintain security within a given region, utilising a particular regional organisation for this purpose.

Geographically the study covers both the Southeast Asian and Southern African regions. Given that the states of these two regions are attempting to address regional security problems through ‘politico-security regionalisms’ in the form of SADC (Southern African Development Community) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) respectively, as mentioned earlier, the focus of this study is on each primary institutional vehicle – ASEAN and SADC – as regional security projects.

ASEAN is now made up of ten members. It was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original member countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on January 1984, Vietnam on July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on July 1997, and Cambodia on April 1999. The ASEAN region has a population of about 500 million and a total area of 4.5 million square kilometres (see Chapter 4).

Currently SADC consists of fourteen members. SADC came into existence in August 1992 with ten founding members which are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa (1994), Mauritius (1995), the DRC and Seychelles (1997) have since joined them. But the Seychelles departed from SADC in July 2004 and Madagascar became a new member of SADC in August 2005 following the country’s application for membership at the 2004 Summit in Mauritius. SADC has a population of about 190 million people and a total area of 9.3 million square kilometres (see Profile: SADC, 2005; also African Development Report, 2000).

The study covers the period from the end of the Cold War to 2004 with emphasis on

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5 SADC grew out of a former Southern African regional organisation, SADCC (see Chapter 5).
SADC and ASEAN politico-security regionalisms in the context of the new regionalism in the South in response to regional security challenges. In examining the processes and patterns of ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms, however, the study focuses on the most important changes in this period. In this period, in particular, ASEAN developed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in order to advance its role and position in international politics. While in the 1970s and 1980s the increasing economic strength of ASEAN members highlighted the distinctive character of Southeast Asian regionalism, yet, the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and the resulting crisis of East Timor (1999-2000) challenged the ASEAN style of (security) regionalism (Palmujoki, 2001:1).

In this period SADC emerged out of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was formed in 1980 as part of the strategy of the Frontline States (FLS) to counter apartheid destabilisation and promote decolonisation in the Southern African region. SADCC attempted to reduce its members’ economic and transportation dependence on South Africa and to coordinate foreign aid and investment in the region (McGowan, 1999:230-258). SADCC finally evolved into SADC in 1992. SADC was created as a socio-economic and development organisation, but for the successful accomplishment of development and socio-economic prosperity we cannot estimate the value of peace and security in the region to excess. In this period, in particular, SADC attempted to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security (OPDS) in 1996 in order to advance regional security in reaction to changing international milieu and a recognition that many of the problems and threats faced by the region which ‘can only be addressed through increased cooperation’ (Van Aardt, 1997:23)

Because both concepts ‘politico-security’ and ‘politico-security regionalism’ in this study are meant to be historically evolving, the development of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms in the post-Cold War period cannot be grasped without understanding and explaining the historical development of both regional groups. Thus, this study provides a historical background to each of these two regional organisations which originated during the Cold War.

1.5 Research Methods

In searching for useful answers to the central question addressed in this study, the
research approach entails a comparative and theoretical analysis of ASEAN and SADC within a qualitative paradigm. In terms of a qualitative paradigm, this study seeks to show differences and similarities of politico-security regionalisms between ASEAN and SADC in type, style, character and nature. In this study, in theory, the comparative method is inductive due to the empirical observation of social reality. In fact, induction is conducive to understanding and explaining the social construction of knowledge through which social reality is constructed and reconstructed by social interactions amongst various actors. Yet, because it is necessary to reflect the three contending theories of international relations such as neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism, this study permits a deductive approach to core theoretical assumptions which will be given in chapter 3. Therefore, in practice, the comparative method in this study will synthesise both inductive and deductive approaches in order not only to project ‘general trends, propositions, and findings’ out of inductive methods, but also to strengthen my own argument to confirm and disconfirm through the theories mentioned above.

Given that a comparative method is the means by which a theory is derived and tested, including the collection of evidence and the arrival at substantive conclusions (Landman, 2003:15-16), it can be assumed that the comparative problem is closely related to the focus of the theoretical problem. In light of this fact, one can raise the following question: what are the advantages of the comparative method in understanding and explaining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC? Related to a theoretical framework, in fact, the comparative method improves the scholars’ ability to understand, describe, and explain trends – in some cases, even predict the complexity of human experience (Green and Luehrmann, 2003:4). That is, the comparative method is useful for identifying relationships and patterns of human behaviour and interactions between individuals and groups (Green and Luehrmann, 2003:4). Importantly, as Peters (1998:1) notes, ‘[c]omparative politics is central to the development of political theory. For most sciences, experimentation is the way to test theory, but for political science, comparison is the principal method’. More importantly, the study of comparative politics is useful because it provides us a broader perspective of political trends and political behaviour (Mahler, 1992:4). In this context, Mahler (1992:4) argues as follows:

[T]his broader perspective can contribute a great deal both to our understanding and our appreciation of the phenomena we are studying.
We compare to escape from our ethnocentrism, our assumptions that everyone behaves the same way we do, to broaden our field of perspective. We compare to discover broader rules of behaviour than we might find in more narrow studies.

Within an integrative approach to both comparative and theoretical perspectives, thus, this study will begin by conceptualising politico-security regionalism not only with defining security and regionalism respectively, but also with linking security with regionalism in its political context. Secondly, it will theorise politico-security regionalism within a constructivist perspective of international relations with asserting that such rationalist perspectives as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are short of explaining politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC. Thirdly, it will explore the similarities and differences between these two groups (ASEAN and SADC(C)) in terms of the character, type and nature of politico-security regionalism. Thereafter, the prospect and potential, as well as limitations for politico-security regionalisms in SADC and ASEAN, will be analysed and evaluated.

This thesis is based on a range of source material:

- Theoretical sources dealing with political security, regionalism, new regionalism, and regionalisation.

- Primary documents, such as international treaties and agreements between and amongst states in the Southeast Asian region and the Southern African region.

- Sources dealing with Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, their history and with ASEAN and SADC.

1.6 Limitations

Being a comparative and multi-dimensional study, the inevitable consequence is to paint with very broad brushstrokes. As such the emphasis is on broader trends, similarities and differences, rather than a detailed analysis of any one particular case. Although I allude somewhat to the impact of global forces as well as internal problems upon regional groups, further research is required to examine whether and how ‘new’ regionalisms in developing countries exhibit the feasibilities and prospects of regional
(security) community building compared. Moreover, one of the limitations of the study is that the comparative analysis of the ASEAN and SADC(C) politico-security regionalisms is not primarily designed around the empirical perspectives of international relations (IR), but the theoretical ones of IR.

This thesis does not provide an in-depth study of every aspect of ASEAN and SADC covered. The constraints of time and length to some extent determine the content and comprehensiveness of a thesis.

The dynamic condition of Southeast Asia and Southern Africa is another constraint of the study. This study deals with contemporary efforts and processes of the regional groups to respond to global force and internal needs. Therefore, the situation and context that shape the theme of this study continuously change, and the ongoing process of change in these regions will influence the recommendations and conclusions of this study.

1.7 Levels of Analysis

A number of scholars argue that regionalism seems to require a multi-level form of analysis (Alagappa, 1995:359-387; 1998:615-624; Ayoob, 1995:189-196; Hurrell, 1995a:331-358; Nagle, 1998:7; Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001). Thus, it is assumed that politico-security regionalism can be better understood at the multi-level context of domestic, regional, and extra-regional levels. In this study the three different levels are utilised to clarify the concept, function, and capacity of politico-security regionalism in both ASEAN and SADC. Nonetheless, as Lake and Morgan (1997:6) note, ‘the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs’. Moreover, Pugh (2003:40) argues that the regional level of analysis is a site not only where domestic and extra-regional levels interplay, but also where regional ideas such as institutions, norms and identities will prevail. In this context, thus, this study regards the regional level as a focal point to explain politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC.

1.8 Structure of the Study and Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction
In the first chapter the main problem to be examined in this thesis is introduced, explained and motivated.

Chapter 2: Conceptualising Politico-Security Regionalism

This chapter will examine the term ‘security regionalism’ in the political context by illuminating the related concepts, including region, regionalism, regionalisation, regional security, and politico-security. In reviewing the literature on these topics, this chapter seeks to address central questions which are at the heart of a debate on politico-security and regionalism: what is meant by these terms? What links the two concepts ‘politico-security’ and ‘regionalism’? Why is it that the multi-level approach is necessary to utilise these concepts?

Chapter 3: Theorising Politico-Security Regionalism

This chapter seeks to explore theoretical approaches to regionalism in its political context (which will be based on earlier chapter’s conceptualisation of politico-security regionalism) with providing the three contending theories of international relations, including neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. In doing so, it will illuminate the significance and applicability of the social constructivist approach, at the same time emphasising the insufficiency of both neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches for the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

Chapter 4: Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia: The emergence of the ‘ASEAN Way’ in the Cold War era

The historical backdrop, and the functions, activities, and the changing patterns of security in the ASEAN region will be analysed. The chapter will deal with the creation, evolution and process of ASEAN politico-security regionalism up to the end of the Cold War. In particular, it will highlight the idea and method of the ‘ASEAN Way’ which has been considered as the core mechanism to drive the organisation since its inception.

Chapter 5: Politico-Security Regionalism in Southern Africa: SADCC as a response to apartheid South Africa in the Cold War era
The history, activities and mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in the SADCC region will be examined. In doing so, it will analyse the creation, evolution and process of SADCC politico-security regionalism in Southern Africa up to the end of the Cold War and apartheid. In particular, this chapter will utilise the previous chapter to reflect on the differences and similarities of the nature, character, and focus of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalism.

Chapter 6: Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Continuity and challenge to the ‘ASEAN Way’ in the post-Cold War era

This chapter examines the processes and patterns of ASEAN security cooperation in the context of politico-security regionalism in the post-Cold War era. In this period, the consequence of the changed pattern of regional alignments and the emergence of new security threats in the ASEAN region evoked the need to re-evaluate ASEAN’s role, which was even more acutely than in times past. Hence, the question of how the response of ASEAN to the impact of both external and internal forces upon regional security in the context of the transfigured environment of the post-Cold War will be highlighted.

Chapter 7: The Remaking of SADC Politico-Security Regionalism in the post-Cold War era

This chapter will analyse the politico-security mechanisms of SADC with a special focus on the SADC Organ, conflict management in the DRC (1998-2004), and the emergence of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact in 2003. In this chapter, SADC politico-security regionalism which is made and remade by regional member states in the post-Cold War era will be highlighted. In doing so, the case of ASEAN which will be studied in chapters 4 and 6, will be instrumental in reflecting the differences and similarities of the nature, character and type of regional security cooperation in ASEAN and SADC. This will, as a result, be conducive to understanding the mechanisms of contemporary politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC.

Chapter 8: A Comparison of the Two Case Studies

Based on the earlier comprehensive analysis of ASEAN and SADC, this chapter will provide the core findings of this study.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

This final chapter will provide some suggestions for further research on the broad topic explored in this thesis.
CHAPTER 2 CONCEPTUALISING POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM

2.1 Introduction

The term *politico-security regionalism* is composed of two different concepts: ‘political security’ and ‘regionalism’. That is, politico-security regionalism is concerned with political security in its regional context. By politico- or political security, on the one hand, is meant the ‘security politics’ of conflict and cooperation as social reality, which is defined and redefined by states as main actors. By regionalism, on the other hand, is meant a bundle of political ideas, norms and interests, which are socially (re)constructed by regional states. In this context, it is important to note that ‘regional states’, which denote the member states of regional grouping, should be distinguished from both global states and nation-states. In terms of the agents of regionalism, in fact, both terms ‘global states’ and ‘nation-states’ are not sufficient to explain the concept of politico-security regionalism.

From a globalist perspective of Wallerstein’s world-system theory, states are normally seen as a substructure of international system to maintain a capitalist world system that contains a core, a periphery, and a semi-periphery (Viotti and Kauppi 1999:341-360). From a neo-realist perspective of Waltz’s structural realism, states (which can be regarded as a major component of anarchical international structure) are powerless to change the structure in which they find themselves (Viotti and Kauppi 1999:66-76). Both perspectives are deterministic in character in which individual policymakers can do little to affect events despite a differing degree. In exploring the concept of politico-security regionalism driven by regional states as main actors in this study, however, the term ‘regional states’ is often used from a perspective of social constructivism so that it can be seen as constitutive elements in which intersubjective factors such as norms, identities and interests are not treated as fixed, but as being flexible, to be made and remade (*cf* Söderbaum 1998:75-92). Given the aforementioned assumptions, thus, the concept of politico-security regionalism can be understood in the open-ended context of political projects to be constructed by ‘regional states’ in response to external, as well as internal forces.

In fact, both concepts of security and regionalism seem to encompass widely diverging definitions. In terms of security, as Buzan (1991:7) points out in *People, States & Fear*,
the concept has an ‘essentially contested nature’. A number of scholars contest the
definition of the term because at its core, there are moral, ideological, and normative
elements that render empirical data irrelevant and prevent reasonable people from
agreeing with one another on a fixed definition (Lipschutz, 1995:7). Despite the lack of
an agreed definition, Buzan et al. (1998) suggest a typology for analysing security
comprised of five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental.
The authors attempted to broaden the definition of security to include freedom from
military, political, societal, economic and environmental threats. Yet, given that all
security threats are constituted politically (Ayoob, 1995:8-12; Buzan et al., 1998:141-
162), it becomes possible to see the concept of security in the political context.

As indicated above, thus, given that ‘all [security] threats … are … defined politically’
(Buzan et al. 1998:141), the influence of the other sectors on matters that affect
security must be filtered through the political sector and must be relevant to that sector:
namely, when developments in other sectors threaten to have political meanings,
contexts and consequences such as threats to state boundaries, political institutions, or
governing regimes, these other variables must be taken into account as a part of
politico-security calculus (Ayoob, 1995:8). In this sense, it can be argued that the
political sector needs to be informed by the other areas of human activities, including
military, economic, social and environmental (Buzan 1991:19). However, as Ayoob
(1995:8) points out, the politico-security realm should retain its distinctiveness from
other realms: that is, phenomena such as economic deprivation and environmental
degradation can be viewed as events, occurrences, and variables that may be linked to,
but are essentially distinct from, the realm of politico-security as defined for purposes of
this study.

In terms of regionalism, as mentioned earlier, the concept is also contested and
complex. As Hurrell (1995a:333; 1995b:38) notes, ‘the range of factors that may be
implicated in the growth of regionalism is very wide and includes economic, social,
political, cultural and historic dimensions’. In addition, Fawcett (1995:10) argues that
‘just as there are no absolute or naturally determined regions, there is no single
explanation that encompasses the origins and development of the regional idea’.
Nonetheless, given that regionalism becomes a state or political project (Hettne, 1994;
Gamble and Payne, 1996; Grugel and Hout, 1999), regionalism can also be studied in
the context of political dynamics that are socially constructed through various
interactions among states. Thus both terms ‘security’ and ‘regionalism’ can be
understood in the political context of states as main actors. However, the assumptions above need to be argued more fully in this chapter.

Therefore, this chapter will focus on the term ‘security regionalism’ in the political context by illuminating related concepts, including region, regionalism, regionalisation, regional security, and politico-security. In reviewing the literature on these topics, this chapter seeks to address key issues which are at the heart of a debate on politico-security and regionalism: what is meant by these terms? what does link the two different concepts such as ‘politico-security’ and ‘regionalism’? and why is it that the multi-level approach is necessary to utilise these concepts? In exploring these central questions, firstly, the chapter will try to define politico- or political security with exploring the related concepts, including weak states, states-making, sovereignty and the state as the primary referent/agent of politico-security.

Thereafter, it will discuss the characteristics of ‘regionalism’ in particular context of ‘new’ regionalism. In doing so, in this chapter, I suggest the three different levels (including the domestic, regional, extra-regional levels) so as to assist in clarifying the concept of politico-security regionalism. Under the assumption that such regional organisations as ASEAN and SADC(C) are primarily driven by the ‘member’ states respectively, nonetheless, I attempt to stress the regional level through holding the political sector as primary and regional states as the focal point to analyse security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC(C). In conceptualising the term ‘politico-security regionalism’ in this chapter, it is important to note that the concept will be seen as regional (political) projects which can be shaped and reshaped by the regional (member) states.

2.2 Defining Security: Politico-Security

As mentioned above, politico- or political security concerns the politics of conflict and cooperation amongst states as main actors. In general, the politics of conflict and cooperation is socially constructed by human agency (Vasquez, 1995:221). According to Buzan et al. (1998:141-162), politico-security is about relationships of political authority, recognition and such a means of managing conflict as compromise and consensus. In this context, that is, Buzan et al. (1998:7-8) argue that politico-security concerns the organisational stability of such social order(s) as states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. In more detail, Buzan
(1991:118-119) defines politico-security as follows:

Political threats are aimed at the organisational stability of the state. Their purpose may range from pressuring the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to military attack. The idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organising ideology, and the institutions which express it, are the normal target of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state.

Threats to politico-security in developing states come mainly from within their borders. Political systems in many developing states, including the member states of ASEAN and SADC, generate autocratic practices embodied in a minority regime, which manipulates the apparatus of the state in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner that furthers the interests of the minority. As a result, regimes in power face challenges from domestic opposition in the form of strikes, riots, rebellions and even armed resistance. Consequently, such regimes generate oppressive and repressive violence, which endangers the security of excluded populations or those advocating alternative policies (Fall, 1993:76).

South Africa during apartheid provided a good example of an illegitimate regime since the ruling regime was racially exclusive and thus based on minority rule. The regime security was maintained at the expense of the security of the majority of South Africans. However, SADCC as a response to apartheid South Africa appropriated such norms as racial equality which were supported not only by continental forces but also by global forces (see Klotz, 1995; also Chapter 5). Consequently, for SADCC, the security of the region was believed to be achieved by attaining a non-racial political system in South Africa which at the same time represented the insecurity of the Pretoria government and its apartheid regime (Booth and Vale, 1995:307; also Chapter 5).

Meanwhile, for ASEAN, the East Timor crisis (1999-2000) is a case in point in explaining the characters of politico-security in the developing world. The political instability caused by external forces (the Asian economic crisis during 1997-1998) as well as internal forces (growing riots against human rights violations during 1999) in
Indonesia and the impact of the crisis on Indonesia's neighbours were also a threat to other regimes in the region. In fact, many ASEAN member states were worried that East Timor’s separation would destabilise the whole region by promoting other discontented groups to push for independence: owing to this kind of fear, the ASEAN states attempted initially to stick to the principle of non-interference and objected to intervening in the East Timor crisis (Dupont, 2000:164). Yet, although the ASEAN states were largely reluctant to intervene in the East Timor crisis, later on, they decided to join such external intervention as the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) with a view to enhancing regional solidarity and consensus within ASEAN on how to address regional problems (see Chapter 6).

Politico-security in ASEAN and SADC(C) can therefore be understood in the context of political interactions amongst the member states in relation to internal (domestic) and external (global) forces. Given the assumption that the term political is composed of historicity, change and temporality (Walker, 1995:307-309), the concept of politico-security needs to be seen as an open-ended process in which security (as a socio-political construct) can be constructed and continually reconstructed.

However, traditionally, security was almost unhesitatingly understood to refer to the security of states and military security: in this way, security came to mean national security and was synonymous with defence (Booth, 1994:3). In fact, the traditional concept of security focused on nation-states as both agents and objects of the most important occurrence in international politics. Here, two underlying assumptions are important to note: first, that threats to a state’s security principally arose from outside its borders; and second, that these threats were primarily, if not exclusively, politico-military in nature and usually required military responses if the security of the target state was to be preserved (Ayoob, 1994:225). The political element of warfare as an instrument of state policy has been most famously summarised by Clausewitz ([1832], 1996:317), who argued that: ‘[w]ar is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means’. This Clausewitzian conceptualisation of security is also manifest in the following definition of security by McLean (1996:521): war, which can be defined as ‘[a]rmed conflict between two or more parties, usually fought for political ends’, is considered by neo-realists as ‘a consequence of the anarchic structure of the international system’.
During the Cold War, for structural realists or neo-realists, the idea of the ‘security dilemma’ was prominent. The term security dilemma was first clearly articulated in the 1950s by Herz (1950:157) who argued as follows: ‘a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend ... to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening’. In the early 1980s, however, Buzan (1983) introduced the concept of a mature anarchy in terms of moderating the security dilemma. Subsequently, Buzan (1991:177) argued that a mature anarchy would ‘be a highly ordered and stable system in which states would enjoy a great deal of security deriving both from their own inner strength and maturity’. The extreme case of mature anarchy can be regarded as a security community (Deutsch et al., 1957), in which states no longer expect or prepare to use force in their relations with each other. Although a security regime (Jervis, 1982:357-378), in which states still treat each other as potential threats but have made reassurance arrangements to reduce the security dilemma among them, is not categorised into the extreme case of mature anarchy, it can also be considered as being inclined towards mature anarchy.

Yet, during the Cold War, the type of security in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC(C) regions can, to some extent, be better characterised as ‘immature’ anarchy instead of ‘mature’ anarchy. At the immature end of the spectrum lies ‘conflict formation’ coined by Väyrynen (1984:337-359), which was largely considered as the outcome of colonial legacy. In the post-colonial context, Job (1992:11-36) raises the idea of an ‘insecurity dilemma’ confronting developing states. That is, Job (1992:18) explains that the concept of an insecurity dilemma can be seen as the outcome of the competition of the various threats in society being (1) less effective security for all or certain sectors of the population, (2) less effective capacity of state institutions to provide order and services, and (3) increased vulnerability of the state and its people to influence, intervention, and control by outside actors, be they other states, communal groups, or multinational corporations.

Although Job (1992:11-36) argues for the idea of an insecurity dilemma within developing states, it is important to note that he stresses the important differences between developing and developed states rather than just negating the security dilemma itself. That is, Job (1992:11-36) attempted to relate the security dilemma to the domestic (in)security of developing states. Nonetheless, Ayoob (1995) argues that the majority of developing states suffer from a security predicament that is much more
complex and much more driven by domestic factors than the security dilemma that neo-realism posits. As indicated in chapter 1, in fact, such mainstreams of contemporary international relations theory as neo-realism have always been Euro- and Cold-War-centric: that is, contemporary neo-realism starts with the assumption that while all states are basically similar, and that the real problem of international relations is the anarchic structure of international system which might lead to war between the Great Powers, ‘the peripheries are simply unimportant, indeed invisible’ (Holsti, 1998:104).

Therefore, the traditional realist concept of security assumed in contemporary international relations theory focused primarily on being applied to the Western context in which security was externally oriented with neglecting the internal or domestic conditions of developing states. Moreover, in particular, the traditional neo-realist concept of security seeks to explain state behaviour as determined largely by the material structure of the international system. That is, the traditional concept of security focused primarily on such material factors as a logic of anarchy with neglecting the effects and role of such ideational factors as norms, institutions, and identity. Here it is important to note that whereas neo-realism tends to bind up developing states within the structure of the international system which is static, constructivism (which argues ideational factors are as important as material ones in explaining politico-security activities) views the security mechanisms and structures as historically evolved and thus they are dynamic (see Chapter 3).

During the Cold War, furthermore, a state-centric view of security was dominated by military power, which led to the negligence of such non-traditional security issues as societal and environmental security threats. As a result, the end of the Cold War raised growing concerns over a variety of non-military threats to security. As mentioned earlier, according to Buzan (1991:19), the security of human collectivities is affected by threats emanating from five sectors: military, political, economic, social and environmental. These insights have resulted in a revision of traditional definitions of security in the end of the Cold War, which ultimately emphasised the importance and value of non-traditional security issues. Nonetheless, this does not mean that non-traditional security threats did not exist earlier. Rather, they were always present, only they have surfaced with greater attention in the post-Cold War period. Nor does it mean that military threats have completely disappeared. In both regions of Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, in reality, several hidden conflicts and new challenges have emerged: for ASEAN, the

2.2.1 Weak States, States-Making and Politico-Security

Since decolonisation, the newly independent states in the developing world have been labelled as ‘weak states’ by a range of scholars (see Buzan, 1991; Handel, 1990; Migdal, 1988; Thomas, 1987). Although the decolonisation process generated large numbers of new territorial states, ‘for the most part it neither took much account of existing cultural and ethnic boundaries, nor created new nations to fit within them’ (Buzan, 1991:98). Moreover, according to Buzan (1991:99), ‘weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation’. This implies that the majority of developing states (which experienced decolonisation after the Second World War) could not create the socio-political unity and cohesion of post-colonial states, but rather they found themselves trapped within European political legacy. In this context of weak states in the developing world, Collins (2000:32) states: ‘[t]he stronger the state the more a regime is able to rule by consent; the weaker it is, the more likely coercion will be required to enforce rules’; that is, ‘... the weaker [the state] ... the less the regime is seen as a provider of security and the more it is seen as the danger’.

Under the circumstances above, regional leaders in both the ASEAN and SADC(C) regions sought to search for internal stability and regime security as newly independent countries engaged in state-making. In terms of state-making, however, unlike European states where ‘state-makers constructed, then imposed, strong national governments before mass politics’, in the developing world, ‘these two processes tend to occur together’ (Tilly, 1975:69). Drawing on the work of Tilly (1975), Ayoob (1991:266) argues that in Western Europe and North America, state-making ‘went through a long period of gestation’ and it is seen as ‘the “finished” product’. But the state-making of the developing world is largely seen to be an on-going process to be made and remade so that the regimes are ‘highly insecure and regard attempts by different groups to maintain their separate identities as a challenge to its authority and legitimacy’ (Collins, 2000:50). Given the circumstances above, therefore, it makes sense why regimes in the developing world, such as the member states in both ASEAN and SADC(C), opted for and prioritised the goal of state-making in territories inherited after decolonisation.
which were an ‘artificial construction that grouped together different ethnic groups’ (Collins, 2000:49).

Given the aforementioned idea of state-making, the nature of national or state security in the developing world can, to some extent, be understood within the different context from the one of the developed world. In general, the concept of national or state security usually means the protection of the core values of the state, especially its political sovereignty and territorial integrity: core values in this sense are the basic attributes and functions of the state, supported by the overwhelming majority of its population, and more importantly expected to survive any change in its regime or government (Acharya, 1992:143). Yet, unlike Western societies, wherein the questions of governance are settled through well-defined constitutional procedures and mediated by stable institutions, the regimes in the developing world tend not to escape challenges to their hold on power because of the lack of indigenous institutions to cope with political reform and liberalisation (Acharya, 1992:144). For states in the developing world, in this way, politico-security in the context of nation-states (which tends to be equated with state and regime security) is likely to be oriented toward preserving the political power of the regime suffering from a low level of legitimacy so that political institutions become weaker and unstable.

2.2.2 Sovereignty and Politico-Security

Given the aforementioned core values of the state in terms of national security, in particular, the concept sovereignty needs to be illuminated more fully now in order to understand the basic function and character of politico-security in both ASEAN and SADC. With regard to (political) security in relation to sovereignty, Buzan et al. (1998:141) assert that the heart of politico-security is composed of ‘threats to state sovereignty’. In this context, Wendt (1992:414-415) also argues that there are at least three ways in which state(s) may transform their approaches to ‘security and power politics’ through the ‘practices of sovereignty’: first, states will define their security in terms of preserving their ‘property rights’ over particular territories; second, states will define their security in terms of receiving a sovereignty norm of mutual recognition; finally, given that the intersubjective understandings embodied in the institution of sovereignty may redefine the meaning of others’ power for the security of the self, states come to rely more on the institutional fabric of international society and less on individual national means – especially military power – to protect their security. The
The aforementioned argument of Wendt indicates that sovereignty can be regarded as a complex notion of being composed of both material and ideational factors, including territory, recognition and institutional norms and/or identity of political interactions.

Under the complex notion of sovereignty, Wendt (1992:412) continues to argue as follows: ‘[s]overeignty is an institution, and so it exists only in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no sovereignty without an other. These understandings and expectations not only constitute a particular kind of state – the “sovereign” state – but also constitute a particular form of community, since identities are relational’. In fact, within the constructivist perspective of international relations, the term ‘sovereignty’ can be viewed as historically evolved and malleable. In this sense, Biersteker (2002:158) argues that ‘different forms of state have constituted different meanings of sovereignty and been associated with different conceptions of territoriality over time and across place’. That is, as Ashley (1988:227-262) notes, the sovereign state is not a fixed and unchangeable creation of norms that exist apart from practice, but rather an open-ended product to be constructed and reconstructed through various political interactions.

By and large, the concept of sovereignty can also be viewed as a ‘double-sided notion’, in addition to the internal-external dimension of the state (Brown, 2001:127). This distinction can be referred to as that between ‘juridical’ and ‘empirical’ or ‘political’ statehood (Jackson, 1990:197). In terms of international relations, however, the emphasis was usually on the external dimension which can be referred to as the ‘juridical’ sovereignty in its legal-political sense. This juridical sovereignty remains a basic principle of international law today. For Hinsley (1986:26), sovereignty is ‘the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community’ and that ‘no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere’. Indeed, given that nation-states recognise the territorial integrity of others and, in theory at least, refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states, external or juridical sovereignty is an important principle that protects us from the aggression of and intervention by other, more powerful states (Adar, 2002:100). In fact, both ASEAN and SADC(C), which are considered as groups of (fairly) newly independent countries, tend to depend on external or juridical sovereignty by committing themselves to principles of the modern Westphalian state system, including ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of all states’ and ‘non-interference in the affairs of States’. In this context, nonetheless, for the developing world, sovereignty often leaves a room for dictatorial leaders to ‘hide, and continue to oppress and exploit their people, while claiming that no one has the right to interfere in their domestic affairs’ (Adar, 2002:100-101).

The second dimension concerns sovereignty as a ‘political concept’ (Brown, 2001:128) and refers to a state’s capacities and ability to act in certain ways. Juridical sovereignty does not necessarily mean that a state possesses these capacities and abilities. But, as Falk (1999:21) notes, the formulation of a world of equal sovereign states as reflected in the Westphalian vision was never descriptive of political reality: rather, it needs to be interpreted as a world order project (in terms of a world to be created rather than one that exists), and a mystifying ideology that provides a juridical mask for inequality. The question that arises is, of course, whether this internal or political sovereignty bears any relevance to the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions. This question brings one to a further distinction between positive and negative sovereignty raised by Jackson (1990).

In brief, Jackson (1990:29) argues that positive sovereignty ‘presupposes capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters: it is a substantive rather than a formal condition’ and is not a legal but a political attributive distinctive of a ‘developed’ state. Negative sovereignty, on the other hand, is a distinctive feature of developing states. In fact, at the heart of negative sovereignty lies the idea of non-intervention and/or non-interference in the domestic affairs. In this sense, negative sovereignty can be defined as ‘freedom from outside interference’ which is a static, formal-legal condition (Jackson, 1990:27). Hence, negative sovereignty can be understood in the context of juridical, as opposed to political or empirical statehood.

Unlike external or juridical sovereignty, thus, internal or political sovereignty facilitates

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6 The aims and objectives of ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states’ and ‘non-interference’ were firmly enshrined in the Charter of the UN. Article 2(1) of the Charter states: ‘The organisation is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members’. Non-interference is affirmed in article 2(7) of the Charter. It has also been recalled in resolution 2131(XX) on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty (see Internet: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r/03.htm, Accessed: 13 August 2004).
the normative dimensions of sovereignty in which such moral duties of states as human security and/or well-being of their own people are imposed and practiced. By the end of the twentieth century, particularly following the end of the Cold War, this internal sovereignty not only provided a new vehicle for such external intervention as humanitarian intervention, but also suggested a potentially profound departure from such beliefs as a final and absolute political authority that had prevailed throughout the course of the twentieth century (Biersteker, 2002:163). Within the context of internal or political sovereignty, nonetheless, developing world states, including the ASEAN and SADC states, were recognised as legitimate if they were capable of fulfilling their international commitments and duties (Biersteker, 2002:162-164). That is, political institutions like the nation-state and government can increase the level of sovereignty through gaining their legitimacy by fulfilling the safety, identity, and welfare needs of people. In this sense, by and large, ‘positive sovereignty’ (which is not a static concept, but a dynamic one implying the feasibility for change) can be seen as a building block to ‘(positive) politico-security’ in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions.

2.2.3 The State: Primary Referent/Agent of Politico-Security

Given the circumstance above, politico-security in the context of positive sovereignty in the developing world also needs to be seen as ‘political survival’ which can be defined to include not only international autonomy and territorial integrity but also one or more of the following: national unity, political stability, social harmony, law and order, protection of the existing political system, and survival of the incumbent government (Alagappa, 1998c:625). Today, indeed, most definitions of security are broader and focusing on the security of people as well as state. For instance, as Ullman (1983:133) notes, a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.

Under the growing concerns over non-traditional security issues, international relations scholars such as Buzan (1991) and Booth (1994) raised such questions as ‘What is security, whose security, and security from what threats?’ In respect of the question, Whose security?, Booth (1994:5) asserts that traditional security studies are primarily
oriented toward ‘equating “security” exclusively with state security’: this traditional perspective of realists in international relations is mainly associated with 'old' security thinking with neglecting the imperatives of justice and freedom of people in developing states, including the ASEAN and SADC states. That is, while traditional security had as its prime referent the state (and, in practical terms, this meant the security of a particular regime in many cases), ‘new’ security thinking privileges people with assuming that this is a broadening of referents of security (Van Aardt, 1998:108). In this sense, Van Aardt (1998:108) argues that ‘the state is not excluded, but it is no longer the only ... referent of security’. However, given the importance of state-making and nation-building facing most of the countries of the South or the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, the primacy of the state prevails (Du Plessis, 1998:18).

In terms of broadening the security agenda, as mentioned earlier, Buzan (1991:19) suggests that the security of human collectivities is affected by threats emanating from five sectors: military, political, economic, social and environmental. Having accepted the multi-dimensional or holistic definition of security, Buzan in People, States & Fear (1991) attempts to examine security from the perspectives of the individual, the regional and the international system as well as of the state; but he concludes that the analysis of security framework is mainly preoccupied with the security of states because the most important agent of security is likely to remain the sovereign state.

Indeed, because the state has long been the only central agent on the world stage (Walker, 1993:126) and because the meaning of security is deeply linked to the sovereign claims of state (Walker, 1993:139), the understanding of security is likely to continually remain almost entirely preoccupied with the security of states. In this context, Holsti (2004:71-72) argues as follows:

> The state is both a foundational institution and exclusive agent of international political relationships. … The state as an agent was never static in terms of practices, norms, and ideas. But … [e]ntire international organisations have as their main purpose the protection of states, that is, guaranteeing or protecting their independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. We define “international security” primarily in terms of the security of states rather than the security of other forms of human association and organisation.
Although some globalists such as Ohmae in *The End of the Nation-State* (1995) and Strange in *The Retreat of the State* (1996) argue that sovereignty is ‘eroding’ and the territorial basis of the state as a political community is ‘withering away’, as Clark (2001:645-646) notes, globalisation does not make the state disappear but rather bring forth a transformation in the nature of states themselves. In this context, moreover, having argued that globalisation is associated with a transformation, Ruggie (1993:139-174) points out that the process of ‘unbundling’ territoriality in the era of postmodernity made it possible for the ‘new’ territorial states to form a ‘society’ of states\(^7\) in world politics. But even Ruggie (1993:167) also notes that the state ‘has succeeded in driving out substitutable alternatives more effectively than any other prior form’. Thus, the form and system of states are not fixed to be mutually exclusive, but open-ended to be socially constructed (Biersteker, 2002:161; Ruggie, 1993:152), it seems that for the foreseeable future states will continue to be the major form of political organisation and the primary actor in the domestic and international realms (Alagappa, 1998a:32).

Meanwhile, in answering the question of ‘security from what threats’, Booth (1994:6) argues that ‘the more broadly one conceives security – vertically and horizontally – the fuller will be the threat agenda’. In this context, Ayoob (1995:189) also points out that the security predicament of developing states has ‘domestic, regional, and global dimensions’; nonetheless, he argues that the primary dimension of security in the developing world is the ‘domestic’ one. That is, the security problematic of developing states is much more complex and much more driven by domestic than outside threats (Ayoob, 1998:47). However, it is important to note that the range of issues and dimensions of (in)security in the developing world can be identified and categorised according to their internal, regional and extra-regional nature and scope, as well as to their functional (political, military, social, etc.) nature and scope (Du Plessis, 1998:18). In line with this argument, Du Plessis (1998:19) provides a useful issues – and – dimensions framework of security analysis which can be applied to the politico-security mechanisms of the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions:

\(^7\) The concept of a ‘society’ of states (or international society), used by Bull (1977), can be understood in a similar line with such a statement as that of Wendt (1992) that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. That is, states are regarded as main actors to provide for their own security in the condition of anarchy (see Bull, 1977; Wendt, 1992).
at an internal level, to the problems emanating from state-making and nation-building such as legitimacy, capacity to govern, social compacts between different groups in society, democratic necessity, and the problem of political succession;

- at a regional level, to the problems emanating from concurrent state-making and nation-building by contiguous and proximate states, such as overlapping territorial and demographic claims, disjuncture and fundamental contradictions between (competing) state ideologies, the favourable balance of power in the region, the role of pivotal power(s) in the region, security regime-building and scenarios relating to regional restabilisation, break-up or peripheralisation; and

- at an extra-regional level, to the problems generated by the policies of major powers, by the overlap and reciprocal interaction of the different levels, in as much as they constitute a ‘boundary’ problem, by increasing globalisation, by intervention, by marginalisation, and by the impact of continuous parametric change in the international system.

The main point of these issues and dimensions at the three different levels of security analysis is that they emphasise the continued relevance and primacy of the state in international politics and of enduring modalities generally associated with so-called ‘old’ security thinking (Du Plessis, 1998:19). That is, although the state can, to some extent, be seen as an insufficient and problematic agent as well as referent of security in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, it still remains the primary ones of security for central decision makers. As mentioned earlier, both Bull in *The Anarchical Society* (1977) and Wendt in *Anarchy is what states make of it* (1992) stress the importance of states’ role in international politics. That is, whereas Waltz in *Theory of International Politics* (1979) argues that the anarchical nature of international system prevents states from entering into cooperative agreements to end the state of war, both Bull (1977) and Wendt (1992) believe that international anarchy can be (re)defined by states that have the capabilities to deter other states from aggression, and that are able to construct such international institutions as a common set of rules in their relations with one another.

Thus, the concept ‘politico-security’ in both ASEAN and SADC should be understood in the context of political interactions amongst ‘states’ in the region respectively. This indicates that the member states of ASEAN and SADC are considered as primary actors in addressing regional security problems. Yet, frequently the security concerns in
both the internal (domestic) and international arenas are interconnected, and the interface is particularly important for understanding the security practice of certain countries (Alagappa, 1998c:615). Here, it is important to note that given that region lies at the intermediate level to connect the internal and extra-regional level, it can be assumed that the regional arena can play a crucial role in explaining the politico-security mechanisms in the ASEAN and SADC regions.

Nonetheless, in fact, these three different levels will be helpful for this study not only to answer the question of ‘security from what threats’ in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, but also to develop a analytical framework for thinking about politico-security and regionalism. Thus, in elaborating upon the aforementioned issues and dimensions of security analysis at the three different levels involving domestic, regional and extra-regional, the next section will conceptualise the term ‘politico-security regionalism’ with highlighting the definitions of regionalism in its politico-security context. This is to show how the two different concepts such as politico-security and regionalism can not only be linked to each other, but also be applied to this study of regional security mechanisms in both ASEAN and SADC.

2.3 Defining Regionalism: Politico-Security Regionalism

‘Region’, ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalisation’ are imprecise and ambiguous terms. The concepts seem to encompass widely diverging definitions. Hurrell (1995a:333; 1995b:38) states that ‘the terrain is contested and the debate on definitions has produced little consensus; [t]he attempts to define and delineate regions scientifically produced little clear result; [t]he range of factors that may be implicated in the growth of regionalism is very wide and includes economic, social, political, cultural and historic dimensions’. Fawcett (1995:10) also argues that ‘just as there are no absolute or naturally determined regions, there is no single explanation that encompasses the origins and development of the regional idea’.

Despite the above remarks about the various definitions of ‘region’, ‘regionalism’, and ‘regionalisation’, there are widely used understandings of the concepts. There are at least three ways to define ‘regions’. First, regions can be defined by geographical spatial indicators. Delimitation by geography is a long tradition that characterises many or most utilitarian theorists. However, regions are not naturally constituted geographical units although territoriality is a sine qua non of regions. Second, regions can be defined
by social networks or structures of transaction and communication. Deutsch's classical study of the North Atlantic area is the most popular example of the idea that social networks may constitute a region. Thus, it can be presumed that all regions are socially constructed and politically contested. Finally, regions can be defined by way of cognitive maps and collective identities. In this case a region may exist in the minds of people but is not necessarily an objective, institutionalised community (see Grugel and Hout, 1999:9; Hettne, 1999:10; Hurrell, 1995a:334; 1995b:38-9; Hveem, 2000: 72).

As implied above, the concept *region* seems to encompass not only widely diverging definitions, but also a range of other definitions in between. That is, as Nye (1968:vi) has pointed out: '[r]elevant geographical boundaries vary with different purposes; for example, a relevant region for security may not be one for economic integration'. In fact, the relevant region for various regional security arrangements can differ according to the in-depth and/or degree of cooperation and integration through the different measures of categorising (for security complex, amity/enmity, interdependence of rivalry; for security community, interdependence of shared interests and identity including conflict avoidance and the peaceful resolution of disputes).

In politico-security terms, however, 'region' in international relations and also as used in this study implies that 'a distinct and significant subsystem\(^8\) of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other' (Buzan, 1991:188). Although 'geographical proximity' and 'contiguity in themselves' may not tell one much about the dynamics of a region, indeed, they do help in distinguishing regionalism from other forms of 'less than global' organisations (e.g. the Commonwealth) (Hurrell, 1995b:38). That is, this indicates that geographical proximity and contiguity do play a role in a region. As Yong (1969:487-488) notes, ‘… a conception of region that abandons the notion of physical contiguity as a necessary characteristic opens up the possibility that entities related to each other with respect to one or more attribute will meet the requirements for consideration as a region [thus] the term ‘region’ is apt to become so inclusive that it is useless’.

Given the core argument of Anderson (1991) in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on\(^8\)*

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\(^8\) The literature on regional systems, or ‘subsystems’ flowered in the 1960s and then withered in the 1970s. For the major contributions to this literature, see Zartman, 1967:545-564; Cantori and Spiegel, 1969:361-380; 1970; Thompson, 1973:89-117.
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, nevertheless, as with nations, so regions can be seen as imagined communities which are brought into existence by human agency. In similar terms, Neumann (1994:58) also argues that through the political project of region building, spokespersons for the community ‘imagine a certain spatial and chronological identity for a region and disseminate their imagined identity to others’. In this context, I argue that politico-security regionalism in this study can be seen as a political project of region building which is made and remade by regional member states as main actors who attempt to deal with ‘security politics’ surrounding conflict and cooperation.

Within this context, some scholars like Gamble and Payne (1996:250) see regionalism as a set of state projects which can be distinguished from other forms of state projects such as globalism. They explain that state projects generally emerge as the product of negotiation and bargaining among domestic political actors. In this context, Grugel and Hout (1999:10) also define regionalism as ‘a states-led project which has as its aim that of reorganising particular ... spaces’. Yet they assert that the occurrence of a state strategy for regionalism does not necessarily mean the policy capacity to implement it. It implies that although state strategies for regionalism attempt to shape or modify the process of globalisation and regionalisation, they may fail to do so (Grugel and Hout, 1999:12). Within this context of regionalism as a states-led project, therefore, politico-security regionalism cannot simply be understood as a distinct alternative to national interest and nationalism, but is often best explained as a tool to supplement, enhance or protect the role of regional states and the power of their government in an interdependent world (cf Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998:9).

Like the concept region encompassing broad definitions, regionalism has also been used as an imprecise label to denote ‘almost anything regional – regionalisation of world politics, regional international relations, interests and policies of regional states, regional conflict and regional cooperation’ (Alagappa, 1995:362). Although the terms of regionalism and regionalisation are sometimes used as synonyms in the literature on these topics, regionalisation can be distinguished from ‘region’ which indicates space and place and from ‘regionalism’ which denotes an idea and a purpose, as being the ‘process that leads to patterns of cooperation, interaction, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographical space’ (Schulz et al., 2001:238).
That is, in contrast to regionalism as the body of aims, goals and projects promoting an identified space as well as the building of an identity that represents one specific region, the widely used sense of regionalisation, thus, can be denoted by the processes of social interaction and by the pursuit of a strategy, aimed at creating a regional system in a specific area, geographically contiguous or not (see Hettne, 1994:7; Hurrell, 1995a:334; Bøås et al, 2001:94). This implies that ‘regionalisation may be caused by regionalism, but not necessarily regionalist project-led: because for those agents who are not directed by regionalism, the boundaries of the ‘region’ are rather pragmatically defined and regional action is temporary’ (Hveem, 2000:72).

Nonetheless, given that regionalisation is an evolving process which represents different levels or stages of regionness making up, as it were, ‘a natural history of regionalisation’, it can be seen as a stepping stone to making and remaking regionalisms, including politico-security regionalism (see Hettne, 1994:11; 2001:88-89; 2003:28-29). In terms of increasing regionness, moreover, regionalisation can be envisioned in the dimension of regional security. In defining regional security, according to Buzan (1991:188-189), the principal elements are the distribution of power and capabilities between the states within a regional subsystem, and the patterns of amity and enmity among states. Given that by definition security complexes are about the relative intensity of interstate security relations that lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity (Buzan, 2000:2), both ASEAN and SADC as sub-regional organisations had experienced security complexes during the Cold War (Hwang, 2002; Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Positively viewed in security communities (Deutsch et al., 1957:1-4), states no longer expect, or prepare, to use force in their relations with each other. Here it is argued that both ASEAN and SADC in the post-Cold War era are moving from security complexes toward pluralistic security communities, at least in theory (Hwang, 2002; cf Acharya, 2001; Ngoma, 2005).

As mentioned earlier, ‘regionalism’ can be distinguished from ‘region’ which denotes space and place and from ‘regionalisation’ which indicates process as being an idea and an aim or objective. In the literature, in fact, the idea of ‘regionalism’ largely viewed

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9 According to Hettne (2003:28-29), for example, there exist five levels of regionness such as a regional space, a regional complex, a regional society, a regional community, and a regional institutionalised polity.
can be understood in both a descriptive and a prescriptive concept (cf Poku, 2001:70-4; Poku and Edge, 2001:8-11). As a descriptive term, regionalism can be understood within the concept of ‘regional integration’ as the outcome of the process or as both the process and the outcome. In Deutsch’s *The Analysis of International Integration* (1988), he considers integration as a process and sums up the four strands of goals of integration: first, attaining peace; second, maintaining peace, third, accomplishing some specific tasks; finally, gaining a new image and role identity. For him, the process leads either to an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community relying upon the main goals.

On the other hand, Etzioni sees integration as an outcome and not as a process. He defines integration as a self-sustaining mechanism that helps a community to maintain itself, its existence and its form by its ‘own processes’ without having to depend on external processes of its member units (Etzioni, 1965:4). He argues that there are three factors of integration which are ascribed to a political community: first, it has a capacity of control over the use of the means of violence; second, it has a central right of decision-making that is able to affect the allocation of resources and rewards through the community; finally, it is the dominant type of political identification for a large majority of politically aware citizens (Etzioni, 1965:8). Although the differences of definitions exist according to the concepts of different scholars, regionalism, in a descriptive sense, can be defined as the end result of the process of regional integration, or as both the process and the end result.

Within a prescriptive concept, Evans and Newnham (1990:346) define regionalism as a ‘complex of attitudes, loyalties and ideas which concentrates the minds of people upon what they perceive to be their region’. In this sense, the idea of regionalism can be related to the recent fashionable works of Hettne and his colleagues, referred to as ‘new regionalism’. In exploring the patterns and nature of integrative process for global order and structure, Hettne applies the ideas of Polanyi (1957) to the recent developments in the global political economy. Hettne thinks that there will emerge a political movement to halt, modify or reverse the process of globalisation, in order to protect some degree of territoriality, civic norms, cultural diversity, and human security, principles that we conventionally associate with organised society. He argues that if globalisation can be viewed as a ‘first movement’ in a Second Great Transformation that is characterised by a double-movement, regionalism, of a more or less neomercantilist type, may be said to constitute part of a ‘second movement’ together
with other types of resistance to globalisation (Hettne, 2001:87).

In explaining the ‘new regionalism’ in nature, as implied above, it is necessary to understand the concept ‘globalisation’. In brief, the term ‘globalisation’ in international relations and used in this study refers not only to ‘a process rather than an end state’ (Brown, 1995:55), but also to ‘the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and societies which make up the modern world system’ (McGrew, 1992:23). From a constructivist perspective of international relations, thus, globalisation can be defined as ongoing structural transformations of the global system which is identified with constitutive elements such as norms and institutions.

In order to understand the character and nature of politico-security regionalism in response to globalisation in the post-Cold War era, given the circumstances above, it is also worth explaining how the new regionalism can be distinguished from the old regionalism. In fact, the concept ‘new regionalism’ can be viewed as a ‘second wave’ of regional cooperation and integration that had started already by the mid-1980s but took off only after 1990 when the Cold War came to an end (Asante, 1997:3-8). According to Hettne (1994:1-2), the new regionalism differs from the old regionalism in the following respects: ‘whereas the old regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, the new is taking shape in a more multipolar world order; whereas the old regionalism was created from outside and from above (i.e. by the superpowers), the new is a more spontaneous process from within and ‘from below’ (in the sense that the constituent states themselves are main actors); whereas the old regionalism was specific with regard to objectives, the new is a more comprehensive, multidimensional process’.

Based on these differences between the new and the old regionalism, Hurrell (1995a:332) suggests some other important characteristics of the ‘new regionalism’: first, there is the very wide variation in the level of institutionalisation, with many regional organisations consciously avoiding the institutional and bureaucratic structures of conventional international organisations and of the regionalist model represented by the EU; second, it is ever harder to draw the line between political and economic regionalism as the new regionalism is fed both by the end of the Cold War and the decentralisation or regionalisation of security concerns, and by developments in the global economy; finally, many parts of the world have seen a significant increase in regional awareness or regional consciousness, even if this is not always easily or unproblematically translated into concrete schemes for regional cooperation.
According to Amin (1999:54), the role of new regionalism differs more radically from the open regionalism alternative. He regards the new regionalisms as a building block for constructing an entirely different global system and thereby an antagonistic alternative to ongoing globalisation. In Oden’s (1999:156) view of the new regionalism, regional constellations of states could constitute building blocks in the world order, and some of those would do not necessarily have to be linked to one of the three dominating trading blocs (EU, Nafta, Asia-Pacific area).

As Mistry (1995:46) notes, moreover, one of the reasons for the emergence of new regionalism is that the current multilateral system is dysfunctional in accommodating the kaleidoscopic political transformations that are occurring in the world. Thus Mistry (1995:47), in comparing Hettne (1994) and Braga (1994), states that it is becoming clear that the non-trade parts of regionalism – which have always been dominated by trade economists who have monopolised study on regional integration since the creation of Vinerian analysis in the early 1950s – may even be more important than the trade related aspects of the process.

Above all, what is important is, as Hettne (2001:84-88) notes, that new regionalism focuses on the multiple responses to globalisation manifest at regional level. As mentioned earlier, drawing on the work of Polanyi (1957), Hettne (2001:84-88) concludes that the new regionalism marks a concerted response against the forces of globalisation in the same way that, in an earlier era, social democratic forces organised at state level in order to reign in the worst aspects of the free market: ‘[t]he struggle against peripheralisation’ he states, ‘is the struggle for increasing regionness’.

Furthermore, what Hettne (1994; 2001; 2003) argues for the new regionalism in security terms, in fact, is based on a security framework of Buzan (1991) and Buzan et al (1998) which represents regional security in the context of globalisation in nature, including political, military, economic, social and environmental aspects. What is important in explaining the new regionalism in security terms, therefore, is that ‘globalisation is seen as the major exogenous challenge, provoking a regionalist response’ (Hettne, 2003:29). In this sense, the term ‘new regionalism’ in its security context can be seen as a ‘regional approach’ to global forces (Hettne, 2003:29). In line with this assumption, I argue that politico-security regionalism can be referred to as a regional states-led project which attempt to shape or modify the forces of globalisation.
Here it is important to note that politico-security regionalism focuses on a regional response to global forces, including internal and external challenges.

In terms of contemporary security regionalism in the post-Cold War era, indeed, regional organisations are increasingly expected to take the ‘region-centric position’ due mainly to the fundamental transformation of the global structures and processes within which regionalist doctrines prevail (Fry, 2000:120). In the post-Cold War international system, in reality, although there has been a growing demand for external engagement and crisis management for humanitarian and other political reasons, neither US nor the UN has shown a willingness to undertake the full responsibility for addressing these regional crises (Väyrynen, 2003:29; also Alagappa, 1995:359). These structural transformations of the global security system in the post-Cold War era were to expect and encourage regional arrangements to manage conflicts in their own regions. In other words, within the context of both the possibilities and limitations of UN action as well as the reluctance of such major powers as US to intervene in regional conflicts, the post-Cold War milieu both dictated and demanded greater regional involvement in the maintenance of peace and security (Fawcett, 2003:16). By implication, thus, this means that contemporary security regionalism can and should be illuminated at the regional level as a focal point to understand and explain the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in the post-Cold War era.

In the post-Cold War era, nevertheless, as Fawcett (2003:16-17) notes, security regionalism can also be studied within the extra-regional level at which regionalisms (such as intrusive regionalism) are viewed as not only driven by external forces based on coercion as well as consent, but also driving the practice of humanitarian intervention, as illustrated in both cases of the UN engagement in the East Timor crisis and the DRC crisis (see Chapter 6 and 7). Yet, as some scholars such as Acharya (1992; 2000; 2001; 2003), Ayoob (1995) and Job (1992;1997) argue, domestic factors in security analysis cannot be omitted so as to understand and explain the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in the developing world. Given that the security problematic of developing states seems to be much more complex and much more driven by domestic than outside threats (Ayoob, 1998:47), as mentioned earlier, the security problems of developing states need to be examined at the level of ‘domestic’ as well as ‘global dimensions’.

Given that politico-security regionalism in this study is argued to be the political project
of region building which is made and remade by regional (member) states as main actors, nonetheless, regional factors need to be emphasised. Regional factors (which drive politico-security regionalism at least in theory), in fact, are composed of intra-regional needs and interests, such as a desire for greater autonomy among developing countries and a more assertive regional role and effect (Fawcett, 2003:17). In particular, regional factors play an important role in providing the concept *politico-security regionalism* with ‘a way into a … “globalising” order, a means of interaction, influence, even norm creation and agenda setting’ (Fawcett, 2003:17). As mentioned in chapter 1, that is, the regional level of analysis is a site not only where domestic and extra-regional levels interplay, but also where regional ideas such as institutions, norms and identities will prevail (Pugh, 2003:40). Yet, it is important to note that politico-security regionalism can be better understood in the multidimensional context of domestic, regional, and extra-regional levels even though the regional level should be regarded as a focal point to explain politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC. Based on this perspective, in short, the next will suggest the three different levels not only to clarify the conceptualisation of politico-security regionalism, but also to guide the explanation of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC.

### 2.3.1 The Domestic Level

As mentioned earlier, in many ways the most serious security problems in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, can be found at the domestic level (Ayoob 1995). It is becoming true that many of these problems in the post-Cold War era result not from the lack of legitimacy between states, but from the still greater lack of legitimacy within them (Hurrell 1995a:354). In fact, domestic conflicts often spill over into neighbouring countries and/or invite external intervention, threatening regional peace and security as well (Alagappa 1995:379-380). Thus, the possibilities of regional cooperation and integration seem to rely on the coherence and viability of states and state structures (Hurrell 1995a:354). By implication, thus, this means that the emergence of regional institutions such as ASEAN and SADC may be viewed as possible contributions of regionalism to security and peace at the domestic level.

Given that institutions can be defined as ‘social practices consisting of easily recognised roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing the relations among the occupants of these roles’ (Young 1989:32), nonetheless, ASEAN and SADC
as regional institutions should be explored in the context of such norms and rules as non-interference and the protection of incumbent regimes promoted by these regional institutions. Despite some failures to prevent conflict at the domestic level, at least in theory, regional norms may ‘discourage secessionist and irredentist movements and prevent violent political change’ (Alagappa 1995:381).

However, in particular, such regional norms as non-interference in domestic affairs were often purchased at the expense of human rights, specifically in the cases of the East Timor crisis (see Chapter 6). That is, rigid adherence to the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference and denial of any further right to self-determination may intensify and prolong conflict, increasing human suffering. Within this context, the sanctity of the principle of non-interference and/or intervention is now under challenge. For the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, therefore, harmonising and implementing such norms as non-interference in domestic affairs seem to be increasingly difficult in the post-Cold World era. That is, the absence of viable states (in terms of both effective state apparatuses and mutually accepted territorial boundaries) renders the construction of politico-security regionalism difficult, if not impossible (Hurrell 1995a:354). As Hurrell (1995a:354) notes, nonetheless, regionalism and state strength do not stand in opposition to each other, but rather even nation-states at the domestic level can be integrated into regional states when states at the domestic level remain the essential building-blocks with which regionalist arrangements are constructed.

2.3.2 The Regional Level

A number of conflicts at the regional level may be addressed by regional (member) states of regional groupings that are searching for regional identity built through ‘politico-security regionalism’. In terms of regional identity, politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC can also be seen as regional ideas which are socially constructed in an evolutionary or transformative context. Unlike power-based approaches to conflict management, sociological approaches to conflict management provide a useful tool to see how regional institutions may affect and transform state interests and identities which are not a ‘given, but themselves emerge from a process of interaction and socialisation’ (Checkel, 1998:326).

By providing an environment in which socialisation and learning can occur, regionalism
contributes to the internationalisation of ‘new understandings of self and other, of acquiring new role identities’, and over the long term makes for a gradual transformation of identity and interest, and of power politics (Wendt 1992:417). Given the circumstances above, politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC can be understood in the intersubjective context of an evolving regional (political) ideas which are made and remade by regional states at the regional level.

Given that the world was not organised into any single international system or society, but comprised various regional systems, in fact, the effect and role of shared norms, rules and institutions (which are reflecting a dominant regional (politico-security) culture) will strengthen international society (Bull and Watson, 1984:1). This considerable potential of regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC, however, needs to be examined in their own politico-security context.

Politico-security regionalism at the regional level can also be examined in the context of an evolving regional security structure. Here it is important to note that a regional security structure is not only composed of material, but also ideational factors. For instance, for ASEAN, regional leaders attempted to develop a regional security structure through promoting the mechanisms of the ‘ASEAN Way’ as regional ideas and identity (see Chapter 4 and 6).

Moreover, although extra-regional forces such as the UN in both crises of East Timor for ASEAN and the DRC for SADC were meant to allow a retreat from the non-intervention principle, the sovereignty of member states at the regional level of both ASEAN and SADC was not extinguished by external interventions, but rather was temporarily compromised (see Chapter 6 and 7). As the Cold War came to a close, in fact, even though globalisation can, to some extent, lead to a transition of ‘sovereignty-eroding form of regionalism’ from ‘sovereignty-bound regionalism’ (Acharya, 2002:24), globalisation does not simply make a (regional) state disappear but does transform the extent and scope of states’ functions and capacity within the different or new contexts and ways of doing things (cf Clark, 2001:645-646).

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, politico-security regionalism at the regional level can be understood in the constitutive and transformative context of regional norms which are often borrowed from global norms. As Katsumata (2003:105) notes, in fact, the basis of the ‘ASEAN Way’ is constituted by the norms at the global level, whose
elements are stipulated in the United Nations (UN) Charter, such as the principles of territorial integrity, non-intervention and selective interpretation of the non-use of force. By implication, this indicates that the constitutive effect of global norms impacted not only upon the reconstruction of regional norms, but also upon the processes and characters of both ASEAN and SADC(C) security mechanisms. Therefore, it is argued that an important role of politico-security regionalism can be understood in the reconstruction of global norms in a regional context.

### 2.3.3 The Extra-Regional Level

The goal of politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level is the protection of the member states from external threats created by other states and organisations outside the regional bodies (Alagappa, 1995:376). At this level, regional bodies such as ASEAN and SADC have to deal with external challenges that may be threatening regional order. In this sense, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level can be viewed as a counter-balancing mechanism to address security problems originated from the outside.

At the extra-regional level, politico-security regionalism may be perceived by hostile countries or groups as being ‘directed against them, provoking counter-groups and exacerbating the security dilemma’ (Alagappa, 1995:376). During the Cold War era, for example, South Africa, regarding SADCC as a major threat to its regime security, sought to destabilise the newly independent SADCC states in the region by supporting rebel groups (e.g. UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique) economically and militarily (see Chapter 5). As a result, despite a SADCC’s major objective of reducing economic dependency on South Africa, South Africa’s economic and military pressures on its neighbours made several SADCC’s states increased, rather decreased, their economic dependence (Lee, 1989:5; see also Chapter 5). In SADC, the civil war in Burundi had spill-over effects for a number of states in the region.  

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10 Burundi, like its neighbour Rwanda, has had a history of conflict revolving around ethnic tensions between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi population. In early 2002, in this context, Forces pour la Defence de la Democratie (FDD) and Forces Nationales de Liberation (FNL), which demanded power-sharing in the Tutsi-dominated Burundian army, ran joint operations against government forces with pro-Kinshasa Hutu militias. At the same time, the Burundian Army joined Rwanda and its allies in eastern DRC. In addition, senior Congolese and
Although regional (political) schemes can, in theory, be considered as a feasible tool to equip the regional bodies with the collective power to address regional security problems on their own strength, regional organisations in the developing world, including ASEAN and SADC(C), in practice, often compromise such regional objectives, principles and values as regional autonomy and self-reliance. At the extra-regional level, in other words, politico-security regionalism in the developing world tend to seek to enhance ‘flexibility’ in resolving regional security problems.

Politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level, however, tends to be seen as viable only when global powers and institutions such as US and the UN do not oppose but support or at least recognise such regional initiatives (Alagappa, 1995:378). That is, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level is likely to depend on such external forces as the UN in order to garner the resources necessary for guaranteeing the way of addressing regional conflicts. In this sense, it may be argued that given that the conditions of contemporary globalisation has exacerbated the difficulties of states seeking to develop unilateral responses to regional security problems (Tan and Boutin, 2001:5), the capacities of states in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, are eroded and reduced.

Within the context of ‘globalising’ order in security discourse, nonetheless, such regional groupings as ASEAN and SADC have attempted to increase their institutional capacities and diplomatic leverages in the post-Cold War era (see Chapter 6 and 7). Moreover, through promoting socialisation such as UN engagement, regional groupings may find some advantages in addressing regional security problems, specifically in the cases of the East Timor crisis and the DRC crisis. As mentioned earlier, furthermore, promoting ‘flexibility’ in responding to external forces at the extra-regional level may ‘breed [regional] exceptionalism’ (which implies compromising or deviating regional norms such as the doctrine of non-interference) as a way of addressing regional security problems (Acharya 2002:30). By implication, thus, this means that the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms at the extra-regional level may be seen as an open-ended process to be made and remade through various interactions between

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Zimbabwean military officers supplied and trained the FDD; in turn, the Burundian army crossed into eastern DRC to attack FDD bases in south Kivu and Katanga (see Strategic Survey 2002-2003:311-312).
regional states and extra-regional forces.

2.4 Conclusion

The structural transformations of the global security system in the post-Cold War era seem to have made it more difficult for the developing countries' regional organisations, including ASEAN and SADC, to maintain politico-security regionalisms at the extra-regional level. Rather, the end of the Cold War and a partial US withdrawal from some of these regions have led to an emphasis on regional states-led ‘security regionalism’ in which regional organisations are expected to manage regional conflicts within their own strengths. Given the fact that the desire for regional autonomy is an important feature of several regional organisations in Asia and Africa, however, adopting regional solutions to regional problems is predicated on the fact that regional actors assume they are well suited to mediate in local conflicts, as they understand the dynamics of strife and cultures better than outsiders (Anthony, 2003b:195). That is, like slogans such as ‘Asian solutions to Asian problems’, the words ‘African solutions to African problems’ remain the motto of the West – and also of many Africans (Kent and Malan, 2003:7).

As mentioned earlier, though, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level is likely to be seen as viable only when global powers and institutions such as the US and the UN do support or at least recognise regional initiatives such as the ARF for ASEAN and the OPDS(C) for SADC. In other words, the scope and extent of politico-security regionalism’s function at the extra-regional level is relatively limited to the regional states’ capacity of garnering the resources necessary for managing conflict in the region.

Given that norms such as sovereignty and non-interference/intervention have been the preferred strategy of most developing countries' regional organisations, including ASEAN and SADC, the role of politico-security regionalism would appear to be much more limited at the domestic level compared to the other two levels. Furthermore, such domestic factors as human rights violations (which call ultimately for global forces as intrusive regionalism in the name of humanitarian intervention) tend to put regional organisations on trial, testing the viability of politico-security regionalism at the domestic level.
Given that politico-security regionalism can be defined as the political project of region building which is (re)constructed by regional (member) states as main actors, nonetheless, the regional level of analysis is gaining strength to explain the characters and nature of politico-security regionalism. However, as Väyrynen (2003:44) notes, ‘[w]ith the shrinking of the state, the national level has lost some of its influence, which in turn has fostered new links between the global and regional levels on the one hand and between them and the local level on the other hand’. This means that politico-security regionalism can be better understood in the multidimensional and integrative context of domestic, regional, and extra-regional levels although the regional level should be regarded as a focal point to explain the politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC.

Above all, what is important in this study is that while the regional approaches to security problems in the developing regions such as ASEAN and SADC will be highlighted, at the same time, the internal as well as extra-regional issues and dimensions should be brought together into the analysis of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC. The primary purpose of this chapter has been to clarify the conceptualisation of politico-security regionalism. Given that a theory is ‘an ordered set of ideas, assumptions and concepts which tells us something about the world, ourselves, or an aspect of reality’ (Craig et al., 1994:193), thereafter, what has been conceptualised regarding politico-security regionalism will be conducive to theorising politico-security regionalism which will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3  THEORISING POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter attempted to conceptualise politico-security regionalism not only with defining security and regionalism respectively, but also with linking security with regionalism in its political context. This conceptualisation is helpful for this study to develop theoretical approaches to regionalism in politico-security terms. All three contending theories of international relations such as neo-realist, neo-liberal institutionalist and constructivist claims (which emphasise the major roles of states) will be debated in this chapter. In doing so, this chapter will illuminate the significance and applicability of the social constructivist approach, at the same time emphasising the insufficiency of both neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches for the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

As pointed out in chapter 2, in fact, the term ‘politico-security regionalism’ in this study represents regional projects, including institutions, norms and identities, which are socially constructed by regional states as main actors. In this context of the concept ‘politico-security regionalism’, therefore, this chapter attempt to theorise politico-security regionalism with focusing on the scope and extent of constructivism’s function to explain the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC. In explaining the function of constructivism, in particular, this chapter will highlight the effects and roles of ideational structures such as institutions, norms and collective identities in which politico-security regionalisms are constructed and reconstructed.

3.2 Neo-realism

Neo-realism belongs to systemic theories or approaches to regionalism. Systemic theories stress the significance of the broader political structures within which regionalist schemes are embedded and the impact of outside pressures working on the region. Given the anarchical and conflictual nature of the international system, neo-realism seeks to explain why states cooperate at the regional level. Neo-realism underlines the importance of external configurations of power, the dynamics of power-political competition, and the constraining role of the international political system (Hurrell, 1995a:339-40; 1995b:47). Discussing neo-realist assumptions, neo-realists argue that the international security environment is too anarchic and the intentions of
others too uncertain for states to stay in any arrangement that might constrain unilateral initiative and/or benefit others more than it does themselves. From this perspective, the fear that others will utilise their relative gains against oneself in the near or distant future is enough to discourage states from cooperation even for mutually beneficial rewards; that is, relationships between states are always competitive. The logic of a state’s concern with relative gains is best explained by Waltz (1979:105):

> When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not, ‘Will both of us gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?’ If an expected gain is to be divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities…The condition of insecurity…the uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions … works against their cooperation.

Neo-realists argue, as noted above, that international politics is competitive and conflictual. In this context, neo-realists are likely to believe that both logics of common threat perceptions and balance of power are indispensable in not only explaining regionalism, but also guaranteeing regional security as well as national. During the Cold War era, yet, ASEAN lacked any specific threat common to all (see Chapter 4). Moreover, although SADCC had the threat perception of South Africa’s destabilisation policy which was relatively common to most of its members (see Chapter 5), in fact, it experienced a deeper and broader instability and insecurity in the region instead of assuring stability and security. As shown in the case of the Cambodian crisis (1978-1989), furthermore, the different threat perceptions of ASEAN members did not cause war, but rather could be settled through the methods of consultation and consensus as well as the inclusion and exclusion of the principle of regional autonomy (see Chapter 4).

In terms of the logic of balance of power, neo-realists also believe that it will prevail whenever the system is anarchic and the units want to survive (Powell, 1994:313-344). This implies that neo-realism places an emphasis on power, particularly military power that is regarded as a desirable means to guarantee the peace and security of a state.
However, when the Southern African region witnessed increased militarisation within the regional conflictual framework (which evolved particularly out of the rivalry (in 1979-1980) between the FLS and South Africa), it was placed in a zero-sum game with hampering regional stability and security. That is, the mechanism of balance-of-power politics in the Southern African region played a role in endangering regional security instead of guaranteeing it (see Chapter 5).

Notwithstanding the disappearance or change of ‘balance of power’ in the post-Cold War, the SADCC states did make the effort to evolve SADCC into SADC in 1993 and attempted to establish the SADC Organ (OPDS) in 1996 with a view to advancing regional security in reaction to changing international environment. In this period, likewise, although neo-realists foresaw the bipolar instability with a decline of U.S. involvement in the ASEAN region, ASEAN members attempted to renew their interests by pushing for the leading role of multilateral activities in the ARF. Thus, by implication, this means that even though neo-realism is sceptical of cooperative security strategies, both ASEAN and SADC in the post-Cold War era have increased, not decreased, regional security cooperation which led to push for institutionalisation in a different level, extent and scope (see Chapter 6 and 7).

For some neo-realists, multipolarity is inherently more destabilising than hegemony or bipolarity. Hegemonic stability theory is conventionally concerned with the neo-realist. Within this perspective, Gilpin (1987) expounds that hegemony is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence and maintenance of order and cooperation in world affairs. Emphasising the important role of hegemonic leadership with regard to the stable regionalism, as Grieco (1997:173) also notes, ‘regionalism is at a less pronounced pace in those areas where local hegemonic leadership is less visible’. However, some arguments provide the insufficiency and ambiguity of hegemonic stability theory or benevolent hegemonic leadership for explaining the ASEAN and SADC regionalism: for Southeast Asia, ASEAN in politico-security dimension is hoping for the US military presence in order to balance the China’s or Japan’s military might in the area, whereas ASEAN in economic-security dimension opts the widening and deepening of ASEAN integration into an East-Asian economic system in order to resist US economic imperialism (Palmujoki, 2001:16); for Southern Africa, ‘South Africa may be a regional hegemon, but is not necessarily benevolent so long as market forces which are clearly beyond the control of the state continue to play such an important role in its policies as well as those of its neighbours’ (Iheduru, 1996:26).
In brief, it can be concluded that neo-realism leads to three assumptions with regard to security regionalism in political context: first, the focus of neo-realists will be on warding off external fear and threats. That is, regional security arrangements will be predominantly military power-related; second, security regionalism in political context will be affected by the relative gains accruing to the different partners in the regional security arrangement, which will ultimately deter the member states from cooperating among themselves; finally, the existence of regional hegemonic state will promote the creation of regional security arrangements (Hout, 1999:16). By this reasoning, as noted earlier, the debate of the neo-realists on regionalism provides weaknesses as well as the strengths for explaining the SADC and ASEAN politico-security regionalisms.

3.3 Neo-liberal institutionalism

Neo-liberal institutionalists place much more stress on cooperation among states than do neo-realists. In fact, neo-liberal institutionalists tend to argue that the declining US hegemony and the collapse of the Cold War do not necessarily mean a return to an anarchical and antagonistic international condition. They believe that states are concerned with absolute gains, not relative gains, and that states come to appreciate how institutional arrangements can promote cooperation by improving inter-state communication and extending relationships into the future, thus lessening mutual suspicions and helping states attain mutually beneficial rewards that might not be had otherwise. For neo-liberal institutionalists, that is, security cooperation within ASEAN and SADC respectively is not only possible, but even likely under conditions of anarchy as long as rational actors overcome the problems of imperfect information and poor communication (Hurrell, 1995a:349-352;1995b:61-64; Müller, 2002:374-376).

Indeed, both ASEAN and SADC have attempted to enhance regional security cooperation through increasing the level of self-restraint, which is conducive to reducing the likelihood of conflict amongst the member states in the region respectively. For example, both ASEAN in the ARF and SADC in OPDS(C) and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact sought to promote regional confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) with placing an emphasis on reinforcing transparency and openness in the regions through growing involvement of defence and military officials in the areas of security cooperation and military exchanges (see Chapter 6 for ASEAN and Chapter 7 for SADC).
Neo-liberal institutionalism’s challenge is directed at the neo-realist claims that cooperation is difficult to achieve and even more difficult to sustain (Grieco, 1988:485-506; 1990:27-50). Nevertheless, as neo-realism asserts that hegemony can provide a better condition for regional security, neo-liberal institutionalism also argues that regional institutions, including ASEAN and SADC(C), can facilitate security cooperation by allowing hegemonic leadership to constrain state behaviour through norms and rules of their own institutions. In this sense, Keohane (1984:7-10) argues that considering transaction costs to be lower when a hegemon exists, hegemony is necessary for maintaining and facilitating institutionalised cooperative regimes. Thus, although neo-liberal institutionalism puts more emphasis on the interdependence and cooperation among states than neo-realism, both theories share the assumption that hegemony can provide a better condition for stable regionalism. In fact, neo-liberal institutionalists argue that institutions facilitate ‘cooperation’ by constraining state behaviour through norms, rules and agreed-upon ways of sanction, by allowing hegemonic leadership, and by limiting sovereignty via formal and coercive mechanisms.

As Keohane (1993:274) notes, ‘institutionalists do not elevate international regimes to mythical positions of authority over states: on the contrary, such regimes are established by states to achieve their purposes; facing dilemmas of coordination and collaboration under conditions of interdependence, governments demand international institutions to enable them to achieve their interests through limited collective action’. In terms of regimes, Krasner (1983:3) argues that facilitating cooperation is primarily to create international regimes which can be defined as ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’. In addition, Keohane (1984:85) regards regimes as a response to ‘political market failure’, which can be understood as ‘institutional deficiencies that inhibit mutually advantageous cooperation’. Thus neo-liberal institutionalists are likely to view regionalist arrangements as regimes through which the allocation of certain public goods can be attained. This implies that regional arrangements, including ASEAN and SADC, seek to develop the norms, interests and expectations of the states as members of the regional institution with a view to enhancing the common good of the member states by tackling regional problems.

Given that both the SADC and ASEAN states are interested not in economic and
political integration, but mainly in ‘cooperation’ between national states, neo-liberal institutionalism seems to have relevance for both ASEAN and SADC in explaining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in the region respectively. Nevertheless, neo-liberal institutionalism has limited relevance for the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms. Unlike the neo-liberal institutionalists’ argument of limiting sovereignty for increased cooperation, the SADC and ASEAN states are more interested in state-building by strengthening their sovereignty instead of limiting it. In particular, as Narine (2002:194-5) notes, ASEAN prohibits its members from using force to settle disputes: in other words, the institution encourages the members to adhere to the basic norms primary among which is the principle of non-intervention and respect for each other’s sovereignty.

Even though neo-liberal institutionalists are interested in legalistic norms, coercive rules and material interests, both the ASEAN and SADC states are inclined to retain informal and non-legalistic norm-based rules which are considered as problems and challenges to overcome in a changed international environment after the Cold War. ASEAN members have continued to maintain informal and non-legalistic security approaches within the ASEAN Way context (see Chapter 6) and SADC members also appear not to completely orient their organisation towards a legally binding security architecture as shown in the case of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (see Chapter 7).

Like neo-realism, furthermore, neo-liberal institutionalists take up rationalist and materialist conceptions of state behaviour, often neglecting the ‘sociological and intersubjective processes underlying the emergence of cooperation’ (Acharya, 1998:198-219). That is, while neo-liberal institutionalists, who emphasise material factors, argue that the emergence of cooperation is largely a function of ‘measurable linkages’ and ‘utility-maximising transactions’ (Acharya, 1998:200), intersubjective factors, including ideas, norms and beliefs (which are conducive to developing collective interests and identities in the regional group) also play an important role in explaining both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms. This implies that it would be difficult to understand both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms without explaining the ‘processes’ which are conducive to developing collective interests and identities in their own regional group. In this context, a constructivist perspective of international relations is helpful for this study to explain politico-security regionalisms of both ASEAN and SADC within the ideational as well as material factors.
3.4 Constructivism

Constructivism is a label given to a wide variety of approaches to International Relations (IR) that range from modernist constructivism to critical constructivism\(^{11}\). Despite the various strands of constructivism in IR theory, what all varieties of constructivism share is a belief that no objects of our knowledge are independent of our (re)interpretations which produce social reality. Rather, social meaning is constructed and reconstructed by social interaction which creates certain mechanisms of norms, identities and interests that guide human actions (Adler, 1997:319-363).

According to Reus-Smit (2001:216), constructivism can be identified with three basic claims that serve as a useful starting point: first, normative and ideational structures are just as important as material structures; second, understanding how non-material structures condition actors’ identities is important because identities inform interests and, in turn, actions; third, agents and structures are mutually constituted. The first claim implies that instead of focusing solely on material incentives, constructivists emphasise the importance of shared knowledge, learning, ideational forces and normative and institutional structures (Hurrell, 1995a:353). In this sense, as Hurrell (1995a:352) argues, the constructivist approach ‘focuses on regional awareness and regional identity, on the shared sense of belonging to a particular regional community, and on what has been called ‘cognitive regionalism’.

As Ruggie notes, ‘at bottom, constructivism concerns the issue of human consciousness’ (1998:33), its central matter concerns the role of ideas, norms and identities, as opposed to material factors, in the study of regionalism. For constructivists, ideas are not just rules for action, rather ideas operate to shape actors and action in world politics (Wendt 1999:92-138). This means that ideas not only constrain actors but also constitute actors and action. In fact, where neo-realists stress the material structure of the balance of military power which can determine the way that states should act, constructivists argue that systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics, and that they exert a powerful influence on social and political action (Reus-Smit, 2001:216-217). As discussed in chapter 4 and 6, for example, the ideas and values of the ‘ASEAN Way’ are crucial to understanding and

\(^{11}\) By and large, there are four constructivist approaches to International Relations (IR): modernist, modernist linguistic, radical and critical constructivism (see Adler, 2002:97-98).
explaining the ASEAN politico-security regionalism in Southeast Asia. In this context, Wendt (1995:73) argues that although rationalists such as neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists believe that material structures are the driving force behind international politics, indeed, ‘material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded’.

The second claim indicates that identities are important because they frame the interests of actors: that is, ‘identities are the basis of interests’ (Wendt, 1992:398). For the relationship between identities and interests, Hopf (1998:175) argues that ‘in telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors’. In fact, constructivism focuses on the intersubjective nature of regional bodies, in which developing a shared sense of belonging or regional identity/interest is regarded as a significant part of institutionalising regional cooperation. Unlike a rationalist approach, with the state very much as a given, the constructivist approach examines how the identities and interests of actors are constructed within the context of different processes of interaction, cultures and histories. Within this sense, the constructivist approach is more than an economic approach to regionalism; it is, rather, a social approach. In this context, the constructivist approach attempts to explore how the sharing of norms, ideas and identities is conducive to the character and emergence of regional cooperation and regional arrangements.

Thus, it can be argued that constructivists do not take identity and interests as a given and fixed result, but rather as a constitutive open-ended process. In this context, Wendt (1999:170) describes the process by which identities are formed and come to frame interests as ‘socialisation’: that is, ‘socialisation is in part a process of learning to conform one’s behaviour to societal expectations’. In fact, such rationalists as neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists say nothing about who the actors are or how their interests are constituted; they only explain how states should choose or how they should bargain; they just offer answers to some questions about when states should cooperate and when they might be expected to fight (Kowert, 1998/99:2). Constructivists, in contrast, assert that understanding how actors form their interests is crucial to explaining a wide range of international political dynamics that rationalists neglect or misunderstand (Reus-Smit, 2001:217).

As discussed in chapter 5, for example, SADCC could form a consensual collective-
identity as response to apartheid South Africa in order not only to protect each member
country’s national dignity and sovereignty, but also to garner support for the norm of
racial equality (Klotz, 1995). During the apartheid era, that is, SADCC as a consensual
collective-identity opted often for a flexible approach to seeking substantial security aid
from the Western as well as the Eastern bloc even though the organisation aimed to
reduce the economic dependence of member states, especially but not exclusively, on
South Africa (see Chapter 5). In this context, thus, it can be argued that as
constructivists like Wendt (1992:394) note, ‘identities and interests are endogenous to
interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioural one in which they are exogenous’.

The third claim is closely related with the ‘agent-structure problem’ better known as
social structuration theory of Giddens (1984). This agent-structure problem arises from
‘two uncontentious truths about social life: first, that human agency is the only moving
force behind actions, events, and outcomes of the social world; and second, that
human agency can be realised only in concrete historical circumstances that condition
the possibilities for action and influence its course’ (Dessler 1989:443; Wendt
1987:337). As discussed in chapter 6 and 7, for example, both the ARF and the
OPDS(C) were constructed by the member states of ASEAN and SADC respectively in
order to meet the external as well as internal demand for advancing regional security in
reaction to changing international environment.

Within this context, it can be assumed that the politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN
and SADC are produced by the member states of each organisation respectively. Given
that human action can be realised in certain historical circumstances that
condition the possibilities for action and influence its course (Dessler 1989:443; Wendt
1987:337), as mentioned above, it can be argued that for both ASEAN and SADC, the
emergence of the ARF and the SADC Organ (OPDS) could be realised in a new and
changing international milieu and a recognition that many of the problems and threats
faced by the region which ‘can only be addressed through increased cooperation’ in the
post-Cold War era (Van Aardt, 1997:23). Nonetheless, both the ARF and the OPDS(C)
were constructed by the member states of ASEAN and SADC respectively in their own
ways: for the ARF, ASEAN rejected Western ideas on the forum and tried to develop
security regionalism on the basis of the regional political norms of the ASEAN Way; for
the OPDS(C), although SADC leaders sought to consolidate a formal regional security
structure with signing the OPDSC Protocol, SADC committed itself to the principle of
‘national sovereignty’ by opting for the consensual decision-making structure within
SADC (see Chapter 6 and 7).

Given that politico-security regionalisms not only evolve from conscious political projects by the regional (member) states, but also create new ideational structures that socialise both members and non-members into unique types of practices (Bellamy, 2004:20), therefore, the third claim which is closely related with ‘agent-structure problem’ should be emphasised for understanding and explaining the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

Although there is considerable division between different brands of constructivism, all constructivists – with the exception, perhaps, of the extreme postmodernist wing of radical constructivism – agree that reality is socially constructed (Adler 2002; Guzzini 2000), that ideational structures condition the identities and interests of agents and hence form their actions, and that the relationship between agent and structure is mutually constitutive (Wendt 1987; 1992; 1999). With regard to the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC, it is worth illuminating three concepts that emanate from constructivism that inform us important things about the way that politico-security regionalisms are constructed and reconstructed. These concepts are: institutions, norms and collective identity.

3.4.1 Institutions

From the rationalist or utilitarian perspective of international relations, including neo-liberal institutionalism, ‘institutions exist because they could have reasonably been expected to increase the welfare of their creators’ (Keohane 1984:80): that is, institutions are ‘persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Keohane 1989:3). In this way, neo-liberal institutionalism sees regional institutions emerging in response to the concrete needs of states to manage regional problems and as an instrument of helping to reduce the costs of strengthening intra-regional linkages, as in the case of economic transactions amongst regional states (Hook and Kearns 1999:3).

As mentioned earlier, neo-liberal institutionalists argue that institutions facilitate cooperation by constraining state behaviour through norms, rules and agreed-upon ways of sanction, and by limiting sovereignty via formal and coercive mechanisms. With regard to the effect and role of institutions, however, constructivism focuses on the
intersubjective nature of regional groups, including ASEAN and SADC, where developing a regional identity or shared sense of belonging is seen as an essential part of institutionalising regional (security) cooperation (Hook and Kearns 1999:3). By implication, thus, this means that institutions not only take such a rationalist or utilitarian role as the calculation of costs and benefits, but also constitute (regional) identity and interests through interactions among actors who are affecting the idea of each other (Acharya, 2001:22-24).

Unlike the neo-liberal institutionalists' argument of limiting sovereignty for increased cooperation, constructivists emphasise institution-building which does not necessarily entail diminishing national sovereignty (Palmujoki 2001:8). Even though neo-liberal institutionalists are interested in a legally binding institutionalisation, in fact, both the ASEAN and SADC states are inclined to retain informal and non-legalistic institutionalisation. As ASEAN members have continued to maintain informal and non-legalistic security approaches within the ASEAN Way context (see Chapter 6), for example, SADC members also appear not to completely orient their organisation towards a legally binding security architecture as shown in the case of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (see Chapter 7).

As Adler and Barnett (1998:42) argue, although international relations theory traditionally views international institutions as constraints on state actions, institutions may be seen as ‘structures’ or as ‘processes’: in fact, ‘a key constructivist point is that norms, rules and institutional contexts constitute actors and constrain choices’. Thus, using a constructivist perspective of international relations to study the development of politico-security regionalism would mean going beyond the study of ‘how states should choose or how they should bargain’ (Kowert 1998/99:2). Rather, studying the effect and role of institutions from a constructivist perspective of international relations helps us to examine how institutions promote four factors: first, the development of mutual trust; second, the forming of shared identity; third, the creation of regional culture or value system, involving democracy and human rights; finally, the cultivation of social learning which represents the capacity of social actors to manage and even transform reality by changing their beliefs of the material and social world and their identities (Adler and Barnett 1998:42-44).

Furthermore, while neo-liberal institutionalists, who stress on material factors, argue that the emergence of cooperation is largely a function of ‘measurable linkages’ and
'utility-maximising transactions' (Acharya, 1998:200), intersubjective factors, including ideas, norms and beliefs (which are conducive to developing collective interests and identities in the regional group) also play an important role in explaining the mechanisms of regional institutions, including ASEAN and SADC. This implies that it would be difficult to understand both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms without explaining the impact of intersubjective factors upon the processes of institutionalisation in both ASEAN and SADC. In this context, it is important to note that a social constructivist perspective of international relations is helpful for this study to explain politico-security regionalisms of both ASEAN and SADC within the ideational or intersubjective factors beyond the material or rationalist ones.

3.4.2 Norms

The concern with norms makes constructivists to see actors and structure much differently from the rationalist approaches to the study of politico-security regionalism. Although there exist different views between neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism in terms of the possibilities for interstate cooperation in regional and global structure, both approaches assume a world controlled by rational actors, whose relations are formulated by the balance of material power (Jervis, 1999:42-61). Nonetheless, according to renowned constructivists, norms are intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action. Norms are beliefs rooted in and reproduced through social practice (Wendt, 1995:73-74; Jepperson, et al. 1996:54).

According to Krasner (1983:2), ‘norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations’. In fact, the definition and functions of norms vary. Kratochwill (1989:70) offers three ordering functions of norms: first, by ‘ruling out’ certain methods of individual goal seeking through the stipulation of forbearances, norms define the area within which conflict can be bounded; second, within the restricted set of permissible goals and strategies, rules that take the actors’ goals as given can create schemes or schedules for individual or joint enjoyment of scarce objects: third, norms enable the parties whose goals and/or strategies conflict to sustain a ‘discourse’ on their grievances, to negotiate a solution, or to ask a third party for a decision on the basis of commonly accepted rules, norms and principles.

Although many theories of international relations, including neo-liberal institutionalism,
recognise the importance of norms, constructivism allows for a much deeper understanding of norms in forming international relations (Acharya 2001:24). As Katzenstein (1996:5) notes, norms play two particular roles within international organisations and regional mechanisms. First, norms prescribe the proper enactment of an already defined identity, thus having ‘regulative’ effects that specify standards of proper behaviour. This means that the regulative effects of norms contribute to constraining the activities of actors. Second, norms define the identity of an actor, thus having ‘constitutive effects’ that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognise a particular identity. That is, norms not only prescribe and regulate behaviour (the regulate effect), they also define and constitute identities (constitutive effect). To put it differently, given that the concept of state is not only constituted by international norms, but also constrained by them (Biersteker 2002:157-176), norms can be seen as fulfilling a constitutive function as well as a regulative one.

Given the aforementioned arguments, it can be summarised that, according to March and Olsen (1989:51), norms do not simply serve instrumental purposes; behaviour is shaped not only by goals and rules of maximisation, but also by roles and norms that define standards of appropriateness; improvisation and strategic behaviour are embedded in a social environment that constitutes the identity of the actors and their interests and that shapes the norms that also help to define their interests.

In Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, the norms that underpin both ASEAN and SADC(C) have, to a varying degree, been utilised in shaping each politico-security regionalism in the region respectively. In particular, for both ASEAN and SADC, such norms as non-interference are not fixed in their definition and functions, but rather open to be structured and restructured in the member states’ own intent and interest. That is, norms not only regulate behaviour, they also constitute new interests and identities (Katzenstein, 1996:5). In this context, it can be argued that the norm of non-interference for both ASEAN and SADC should be understood in the constitutive context as well as the regulatory.

Given the fact that both regional groups are political entities with ‘weak’ state structure and a lack of strong regime legitimacy, the norm of non-interference can and should be understood in the context of the domestic security concerns of regional member states in ASEAN and SADC respectively. As noted in chapter 6 and 7, that is, one of the main reasons for both ASEAN and SADC to adhere to the norm of non-interference can be
found in the context of each organisation’s search for internal stability and regime security. After the end of the Cold War, in fact, it is largely argued that the primary sources of threat to the national security of both ASEAN and SADC states are not external, but internal (for ASEAN, see Acharya, 2001:57-58; for SADC, see Nathan and Honwana, 1995:6).

In this regard, it can be assumed that such political norms as the non-interference/intervention in addressing regional crises are open to be restructured and applied to its own historical and social context. In terms of managing conflicts in ASEAN and SADC, furthermore, it is important to note that when the norm of pacific settlement of disputes is applied to regional context, it is not automatically given, but rather produced and reproduced through the various interactions of the political elites of regional group respectively (see Chapter 6 and 7). Given the aforementioned arguments, the constitutive effects of norms seem to be playing a crucial role in constructing the collective identities of ASEAN and SADC, which will be discussed in the next section.

3.4.3 Collective Identity

Collective identity refers to ‘positive identification’ with the welfare of the other, which is regarded as a ‘cognitive extension’ of the Self rather than as independent: in this context, collective identity can be regarded as an essential element for the sense of ‘solidarity, community and loyalty’ (Wendt, 1996:52). According to Hasenclever, et al (1997:186), collective identity implies that regional actors respect each other as members of a community in which decisions are taken on a consensus basis. By implication, for both ASEAN and SADC, this means that collective (regional) identity can be understood as the basis of regional consensus such that peace and stability in the region cannot be realised without regional solidarity on security problems.

As mentioned above, collective identity is a basis for ‘feelings of solidarity, community, and loyalty’ and for ‘collective definitions of interests’. Yet, this does not mean that state actors no longer calculate costs and benefits, but that they do so on a ‘higher level of social aggregation’; this then facilitates collective action by ‘increasing diffused reciprocity and the willingness to bear costs without selective incentives’ (Wendt, 1996: 53). This means that each collective identity of ASEAN and SADC rests primarily on the feeling of solidarity (namely ‘we feeling’) in dealing with regional security problems, as
was indicated in a number of cases, including the Cambodian conflict and the East Timor Crisis for ASEAN, and SADCC’s response to apartheid South Africa and the conflict management in the DRC for SADC (see Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7).

Elaborating collective identity, Wendt (1996:53) also used as an example the difference between alliances and collective security arrangements, which are both instructive. On one hand, he considers alliances as ‘temporary coalitions of self-interested states’ who join together for instrumental reasons in response to a specific threat. As soon as the threat is gone, the basis for the coalition also evaporates and the alliance gets disbanded. With collective security arrangements, on the other hand, states make commitments to multilateral action against non-specific threats. In such multilateral institutions, collective identity is not a sine qua non for its creation, but it nevertheless provides an important foundation for member states to increase the willingness to act based on ‘generalised principles of conduct’ and diffuse reciprocity (Wendt, 1996:53; also Job 1997:167-168).

With regard to military alliance, both ASEAN and SADC(C) did not form a formal military alliance like NATO owing mainly to the lack of military capabilities, but rather they have opted for their own styles to respond to regional security problems. This implies that both ASEAN and SADC(C) seem to have searched for a collective regional identity respectively so as to consider themselves as distinct regional groups from the European ones, in which they could redefine regional security mechanisms within their own regional context (see Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7).

In terms of collective security arrangements, both ASEAN and SADC(C) did not establish a true meaning of collective security system in the region respectively although SADC seems to have largely focused on collective security and/or collective defence under the SADC Organ within the region (Hough, 1998:25-26; also Cawthra, 1997:211). Given that collective identity is not equivalent (or essential) to such multilateral institutions as a collective security arrangement (Wendt 1996:53), it should be noted that collective identity can become the basis for developing collective security arrangements, but not vice versa. Thus, the meaning of collective security (defence) system in the SADC region should be understood in the context mentioned above\textsuperscript{12}.

\textsuperscript{12} The adoption of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact will be dealt with in chapter 7.
Given the circumstances above, furthermore, it is important to note that both the ASEAN and SADC(C) states have searched for building collective (regional) identities by paving the way for them to approach conflict management in flexible terms. For instance, in resolving the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN utilised China’s intervention and support against Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its use of force in Cambodia at the expense of its norm of regional autonomy providing a ‘regional solution to regional problems’ (see Chapter 4) Likewise, although SADCC sought the doctrine of self-reliance through reducing the influence of (particularly but not only) South Africa, the organisation also avoided the fixed framework of conventional (East-West) rivalry with a view to seeking substantial security aid from the Western as well as the Eastern bloc (see Chapter 5). For both ASEAN and SADC, in fact, what is important for a collective regional identity is the processes of such positive identification as the spirit of rising or enhanced cooperation among regional actors, which are reproduced and transformed by their intersubjective ideas and practices.

3.5 Conclusion

In searching for regional identity, although most of the ASEAN and SADC states are contending with a number of divisive forces which centre around diverse and fragmented ethnic, religious, and linguistic identities (Narine, 2002:199-200; Mandaza, 2001:133-139), the regional ‘collective identity’ may be conceived as a process through which its member states adapt to a ‘regional existence’ in order to reduce the possibility of use of force in inter-state relations (Acharya, 1998:208). In fact, one of the primary catalysts of the evolutionary identity of ASEAN and SADC(C) as regions can be found in intra-regional interactions which have been existent, albeit in a different degree at different times, even before each organisation was established, which will be examined in the following chapter 4 and 5.

As noted in the previous sections (3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3), moreover, the important features (such as institutions, norms and identity) of constructivism can be utilised to reflect the differences and similarities of the nature, character, and focus of regional security cooperation in ASEAN and SADC. Through this comparative analysis based on the constructivist perspective of international relations, this study will focus on exploring the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC.

Furthermore, in examining the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms, as
was shown in this chapter, what is important for this study is that whereas both neo-
realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are taking the identities and interests of actors as given, constructivism focuses on how intersubjective practices between actors project identities and interests being formed in the processes of interaction rather than being formed prior to interaction. That is, whereas both neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theories focus on how given and fixed structures affect the instrumental rationality of actors, a constructivist perspective of international relations opens up the possibilities of actors to consider international structures as historically evolved and thus flexible. Within this context, the following chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 will be presented through the explanation of the roles and effects of ideational structures as well as material ones.
CHAPTER 4  POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE EMERGENCE OF THE ‘ASEAN WAY’ IN THE COLD-WAR ERA

4.1   Introduction

In 1967, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established, its members (then Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand; Brunei joined in 1984) found themselves plagued by a wide range of security problems. These included intra-regional conflicts, domestic instability, extra-regional intervention, and latent inter-ethnic tensions. These states were disparate in terms of their geographical size, ethnic composition, socio-cultural identity, colonial experience and post-colonial polities (cf Legge, 1992:1-50). ASEAN, typical of post-colonial developing states' organisation, reflected that its composition was of ‘weak states’, whose ‘…domestic insecurity frequently spills over to disrupt the security of neighbours’ 13 (Buzan, 1991b:46).

Since socio-cultural diversity and political heterogeneity in Southeast Asia had militated against the search for regional identity built through ‘regionalism’, i.e. regional cooperation or a regional scheme, it had to be constructed through ‘interactions’. According to Acharya (2001:47), ‘such interactions could only be purposeful if they were consistent and rule based. … To this end, ASEAN's founders over a period of a decade from its inception adopted and specified a set of norms for intra-regional relations'.

It was not accidental that the ASEAN states as a group of newly independent (with the exception of Thailand, which had never been a colony) developing countries prioritised ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states’ and ‘non-interference in

13 Buzan asserts that while weak or strong powers refer to the traditional distinction among states in respect of their military and economic capability in relation to each other, weak or strong states refer to the degree of socio-political cohesion within a state. According to Buzan’s definitions of ‘weakness’ and ‘strength’ as state characteristics, all ASEAN’s members except Singapore could be categorised as ‘weak states’ (see Buzan, 1991a:96-107; 1991b:45-6).
the affairs of States’. Rather, the commitment of ASEAN members to the principle of the modern Westphalian state system should be understood in the context of the search for internal stability and regime security as newly independent countries engaged in nation-building and state-making. What made ASEAN politico-security regionalism (driven by nation-state centrism) really distinctive were the norms and values which came to be known as the ‘ASEAN Way’, that will be discussed in the following sections.

Within the ASEAN Way context, in particular, this chapter explores ASEAN’s role in the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989) for the purpose of tracing the scope of which it contributed to the consolidation of ASEAN’s norms and principles regarding the way of conflict management in Southeast Asia. Indeed, ASEAN had considered the feasibility of accepting Vietnam (as well as Laos and Cambodia) within its group. However, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 undermined an initial idea on the part of ASEAN to include Vietnam within its regional grouping (see 4.5). Therefore, by 1978 the intensifying conflict between Vietnam (supported by the Soviet Union) and Cambodia (backed by China) was a great difficulty to ASEAN for achieving the goal of ‘One Southeast Asia’ concept through including the rest of Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2000:133-157).

In order to highlight ASEAN’s approach to conflict management in the Cambodian crisis, this chapter analyses the creation, evolution and process of ASEAN politico-security regionalism up to the end of Cold War. In the course of the formation and development of the organisation in this period, the idea and method of the ‘ASEAN Way’, (which has

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14 The aims and objectives of ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states’ and ‘non-interference’ were firmly enshrined in the Charter of the UN. Article 2(1) of the Charter states: ‘The Organisation is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members’. Non-interference is affirmed in article 2(7) of the Charter. It has also been recalled in resolution 2131(XX) on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty (see Internet: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r03.htm. Accessed: 13 August 2004).

15 When ASEAN was established, the newly independent member states were new political entities with ‘weak’ state structures (e.g. lack of a close congruence between ethnic groups and territorial boundaries) and an equally problematic lack of strong regime legitimacy (see, Acharya, 2001:57-8).
been considered as the core mechanism to drive the organisation since its inception) emerged. Norms such as *musyawarah* (consultation) and *mufakat* (consensus), which were seen as important components to form the idea of the ‘ASEAN Way’, brought forth the sense of collective identity based primarily on regional politico-security, instead of economic, cooperation. Under the great powers’ influence, moreover, ASEAN states sought to make a strong commitment to other important norms and principles such as mutual non-interference, non-intervention, non-use of force and regional autonomy.

During the Cambodian crisis (1978-1989), the value and meaning of these norms were tested by the policy of not only isolating Vietnam, but also engaging outside powers in regional affairs. Nonetheless, these norms, since the outset of ASEAN, have been instrumental in evolving and shaping ASEAN politico-security regionalism. In this chapter, thus, the emergence of the ‘ASEAN Way’ will be highlighted in order to comprehend the fundamental nature and type of ASEAN politico-security regionalism. This will be discussed by exploring the effects and limits of ASEAN’s collective identity as a response to the regional disputes, tensions and conflicts which took place during the Cold War. This historical and contextual sketch is necessary for the understanding of ongoing processes of contemporary ASEAN politico-security regionalism, which will be further studied in chapter 6.

### 4.2 The Origin of ASEAN

The pre-colonial patterns of Southeast Asia teemed with a great deal of political diversity and external influences. In particular, external influences such as Indian and Chinese cultural influences transmitted through trade were a key factor in polarising the region. These influences contributed to the division of Southeast Asia’s political economy into an inland-agrarian segment, and a coastal commercial segment. Nonetheless, at least two major features of Southeast Asian history before the arrival of the Europeans offer the possibility of a regional framework: ‘the first is an inter-state system which was loosely defined and constantly changing, but it did include much of what we call Southeast Asia today; the second is a highly dynamic pattern of commercial interaction’ (Acharya, 1999a:58-9; 2000:18-29). As was mentioned in chapter 2, it can be said that few, if any, regions, are totally natural and pre-ordained: rather, they are socially constructed. In that regard, the pre-colonial Southeast Asia cannot be considered as having been devoid of any common political, cultural, or
economic space.

A number of aspects of the historical evolution of Southeast Asia, however, militated against the appearance of any sense of regional identity. Indeed, the term ‘Southeast Asia’ which is of recent origin and usage emerged as a visible entity distinct from the rest of Asia only after the Second World War, albeit the term designated the theatre of war commanded by Lord Mountbatten during the war. By the nineteenth century, the Western colonial powers had come to dominate the region and their influence became a barrier to the development of any kind of regional identification or sentiment. In 1940, following the defeat of France by Germany, Germany’s ally Japan expelled the European powers and secured access to French Indochina and took control of the colony’s exports (Rigg, 1991:29-32).

However, once the war ended, the expectations that the independence of the people of Southeast Asia was at hand would ensure that the process of decolonisation continued. With the exception of Thailand, the other countries of Southeast Asia were colonised by foreign powers, but the Southeast Asian states gradually achieved formal independence. Nonetheless, even after its independence, Southeast Asia remained an unstable and volatile area in the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as a battlefield in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union (Narine, 2002:9-10).

The lessons from colonial oppression impacted upon the future ways of how the states of Southeast Asia conceived the regional environment for forming a united front against external forces in terms of political (diplomatic) and ideological dimensions. The colonial experience impressed on the people of the region, in particular the leaders, the reality of the international imperialist system characterised by exploitation and predation. As Narine (2002:10) argues, the suspicions of the Southeast Asian states in the field of international relations, as well as the perception of external threat, played a critical role in the shaping of regionalism in Southeast Asia since the colonial period.

In the post-independence era, Southeast Asian states gradually began to witness a number of intra-regional conflicts which had not emerged earlier because these countries had been too pre-occupied with matters at home to be concerned with their neighbours (Huxley, 1996:228-229). Thus, the differences that began to appear in the post-colonial period illuminated the competing claims over territory, boundaries and
other creations of the colonial period. These problems created other intra-regional
tensions among peoples that had been incorporated into states that did not share their
same identifications. In this period, moreover, of the most serious domestic challenges
in the region were the threats of communist insurgency and ethnic separatism.\(^\text{16}\)

Under these circumstances, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the major features of the
international relations of Southeast Asia were complex interactions between three
important forces: nationalism, the decolonisation process, and the advent of the Cold
War (Acharya, 2000:43-74). While nationalism had helped spur the goal of self-reliance
and autonomy from the colonial yoke, it did not resolve the difficulty of national
integration or regime legitimacy: ‘Southeast Asian countries were ‘weak states’
suffering from the problematic issues of ethnic divisions and separatism and challenges
to regime survival’ (Acharya, 2000:55).

Within the unstable environment of the pre-ASEAN period caused by internal factors as
well as external factors in the region, there were a number of attempts at regional
cooperation in political-security affairs. These attempts began with the establishment of
the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954. SEATO was an American
attempt to deter communist expansion into Southeast Asia. It was considered to be the
Southeast Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), despite the
difference of geostrategic conditions between Southeast Asia and Western Europe.
Comprised of a diverse membership with diverse interests – including, the US, Britain,
France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines – SEATO was
controversial from the beginning, and America was not able to attract broader Asian
membership due to Asian concerns about SEATO’s overtly anti-communist nature and

\(^{16}\) Communist movements derived support from China and the Soviet Union. But they also
relied on cross-border sanctuaries in neighbouring states. For example, the Vietcong’s ability to
survive depended on sanctuaries in Cambodia. North Vietnam’s support of the Pathet Lao and
the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was a major source of interstate tensions in Indochina.
Separatist movements derived some support for Muslim separatists in southern Thailand from
elements in Malaysia, similar Malaysian support for Islamic groups in Mindanao and Thai
sanctuaries for ethnic rebels in Burma (Myanmar). The impact of these in causing severe
conflict was evident in Malaysia-Thailand and Burma-Thailand relations (see Gordon, 1964:222-
235).
the dominant role played by the US. In addition to SEATO, the Asia Pacific Council (ASPAC) established in 1966 was a further attempt to create a bloc of anti-communist states in the region at the height of the US involvement in Vietnam, but it also failed to develop widespread support and was allowed to lapse in 1972 (Frost, 1990:2-4).

In response to the failure of SEATO and ASPAC, Southeast Asian states launched their own initiatives for regional cooperation to serve their security interests. Among the earlier attempts were the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 and Malaya-Philippines-Indonesia (MAPHILINDO) in 1963 (for a comprehensive overview of the formation of ASA and MAPHILINDO, see Antolik, 1990:3-21; Frost, 1990:3-6; Irvine, 1982:8-15; Jorgensen-Dahl, 1982:14-23; 190-212). ASA was the first attempt by the Southeast Asian states to ‘promote regional solidarity’. The members of ASA were Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. The leaders of these countries shared the belief that regional cooperation was an important instrument to serve their interests instead of relying on external powers to meet their security needs.

In 1962, however, ASA was crippled by the Malaysian-Philippine territorial dispute over British North Borneo, or Sabah17, which the British intended to include in the proposed Federation of Malaysia. After the Federation was established in 1963, the ties between Malaysia and Philippines were cut off causing the suspension of ASA until 1965. Nonetheless, as Narine (2002:11) notes, ASA left a legacy to form the basis of the ‘ASEAN Way’, an approach to regionalism that is at the core of ASEAN’s viability.

MAPHILINDO in 1963 was also a regional initiative proposed by Philippines and was referred to by its acronym, which comes from the names of its members, Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. In fact, the Philippines and Indonesia regarded

17 The Philippines claimed Sabah (formerly North Borneo) in 1962, when it learned that Sabah was to become part of the Malaysian federation. The claim strained Philippines-Malaysian ties to the point where diplomatic relations were abrogated for the next three years (1963-66). The Philippines’ claim is that Sabah was leased, not ceded, to Britain by the Sultan of Sulu. As such, when Britain left Sabah, the territory ought to have reverted to the Philippines. Britain, however, based its actions on the title to North Borneo it obtained from the Sultan of Brunei in 1877, and felt that the territory was its to dispose, and it decided in favour of Malaya. The Philippines-Malaysia dispute is thus one of those colonial legacies bequeathed to its former colonies by Britain (see Khong, 1997:329).
MAPHILINDO as a way to block or undermine the proposed Federation of Malaysia, while Malaya considered it as a way to promote the Federation’s acceptance by the others. As Gordon (1966:22-25) notes, due to the Indonesia’s concern about the ‘conspiracy’ of Britain to create Malaysia as a symbol of imperialism in the region, as well as the Philippines’ Sabah disputes, both the Philippines and Indonesia did not recognise Malaysia. In response, Indonesia began its policy of *Konfrontasi* (Confrontation) against the Federation, and MAPHILINDO ceased to exist. Thus, after the establishment of the Federation and appearance of confrontation, MAPHILINDO could not develop into any fruitful institutional formation.

Of the intra-regional conflicts of this period, *Konfrontasi* which was a policy initiated by the Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno, was the most destabilising. *Konfrontasi* highlighted the disruptive power of Indonesia as the largest and militarily most powerful state in the region (Mackie, 1974:318-20). As Alagappa (1991:18) argues, *Konfrontasi* implies that because Malaysia was seen as a symbol of ‘neo-colonialism’, Indonesia considered Malaysia as a threat to the territorial integrity of Indonesia. He argues that Indonesia wished to attain an international reputation as a representative of the ‘emerging forces’ of the developing countries, as opposed to ‘reactionary and repressive old established forces’. However, when Sukarno lost control over state power to General Suharto and his military command in 1966, *Konfrontasi* ended. *Konfrontasi* was shown to be damaging to the countries involved: Indonesian economic sanctions against Malaysia affected Indonesia as much as its intended target; thus, this provided Suharto with the concerns that the weak economic condition in Indonesia might give China and communism an opening into Indonesia (Antolik, 1990:19).

Thus, as an outcome of the conflict in this period, the states of Southeast Asia started to learn how much more easily shaken and injured they could be when they were antagonistic among themselves. This lesson led them to share a common understanding of the significance of interdependence in dealing with their internal security problems. It further helped generate the need for a regional organisation that could tackle the tensions caused by internal as well as external threats. The aspiration for a new organisation in the region ultimately evoked the formation of ASEAN.

### 4.3 The Evolution of ASEAN

ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967. Its five founding members were Malaysia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. As mentioned earlier, although ASA and MAPHILINDO – the predecessors of ASEAN – were short-lived, the main objective of these two initial organisations to promote regional solidarity became the basis for creating ASEAN. Indeed, ASEAN has the same organisational structure as that of ASA, and has received most of its projects for implementation from ASA (Solidum, 1974:34).

As the 1967 Bangkok Declaration (see ASEAN 1967) states, ASEAN’s aims and purpose were to ensure the survival of its members by enhancing regional peace and stability through abiding by the rule of law in the relationship among states in the region and promoting common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields. As Irvine (1982:13) notes, the major objective and purpose of the organisation illustrate the focus on cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural areas. Of these, economic cooperation was given the highest priority because the member countries considered it as an essential prerequisite for the achievement of cooperation in other areas. But the ambitions of ASEAN states in the area of economic cooperation were very modest and futile. In fact, the key factors behind the focus on economic cooperation, as well as social and cultural areas were relatively less controversial compared to political or security cooperation.

Irvine (1982:14) goes on to argue that although political cooperation was played down in the ASEAN Declaration, there are good foundations for the view that they were of primary significance in the minds of most delegations participating in ASEAN’s inaugural meeting. Though the norms and principles that were outlined in the preamble of the Declaration are quite broadly stated, they propose at least the rudiments of a common political programme for the organisation. The fact that security matters or political controversies were dealt with by ASEAN delegates in ‘private sessions’ was considered as ‘informal’ discussions.

From the start, ASEAN’s aims and methods were multi-dimensional: economic prosperity, social equity, cultural progress and regional peace and stability were to be accomplished via joint efforts. The founding document implied that each of these sectors had ‘spill-over effects’. ‘ASEAN was not just a regional economic group like European Community style; nor was economic integration ever a goal. It was also not a military alliance like NATO’ (Khong, 1997:326). In other words, Khong argues that economic growth, consultative ways, methods of consensus, dialogue, cultural
exchanges and diplomatic reassurances were all considered as contributing to the overall idea of security instead of viewing ASEAN security in a completely military or in a deterrence sense.

While ASEAN claimed responsibility for maintaining the region’s stability and peace free from external interference, it rejected military means to achieve this goal. Instead, its approach was encapsulated in the Indonesian concept of ‘regional resilience’, which would stem from ‘national resilience’ based on the strengthening of all the elements in the development of a nation in its entirety, thus consisting of resilience in the ideological, political, economic, social, cultural and military arenas (Henderson, 1999:17; also Leifer, 1989:4). According to Dewitt’s argument cited by Khong (1997:326), in the terminology of post-Cold War expressions on Southeast Asia’s security, from the outset, ASEAN may be perceived to have adhered to the idea of ‘comprehensive security’18.

Although some scholars (Buzan, 1988; Frost, 1990) have argued that the formation of ASEAN was aimed at creating a group of anti-communist states in a volatile region, others (Acharya, 1998; Irvine, 1982; Khong, 1997; Leifer, 1989) have pointed out that ASEAN member countries were not meant to be a military alliance-oriented security group. In this period, as Leifer (1989:5) notes, the member states were only too conscious of the danger of provoking a violent reaction through a premature attempt to confront the problems of regional security head on in forming a military alliance. He continues to argue that an alliance in the region was out of the question not only because of the lack of military capability but also because of the effort to encourage the spirit of non-aligned status.

18 Although the term comprehensive security was coined in Japan during the 1970s, it has also attracted interest in Southeast Asia. In its Japanese formulation, the idea of comprehensive security included a strong economic element. But for ASEAN states, as in the case of many other countries in the developing world, a significant feature of security has been the issue of regime survival. Comprehensive security originated in ASEAN fundamentally as a framework for coping with the danger of insurgency, subversion and political unrest. The attainment of performance legitimacy through economic development is a core component of comprehensive security doctrines in ASEAN. This is different from the Japanese context where the chief concern is protection of state interests from external military threats (see Acharya, 1999b:69-72).
In fact, the significant factor behind the evolution of ASEAN security regionalism, as already noted, was a common sense of vulnerability to the enemy within, for example, the threat of communist insurgency and ethnic separatism. Furthermore, in Alagappa’s argument cited by Acharya (1998:203-204), the security perceptions of ASEAN members were and continue to be, ‘inward-looking’ in which overcoming insurgency and preventing a recurrence of intra-mural disputes\textsuperscript{19} took precedence over organising an alliance against a common external threat.

In the early period of ASEAN, Indonesia and Thailand took the initiative of mediation for resolving the hostile relations between Malaysia and the Philippines caused by the Sabah territorial dispute\textsuperscript{20}. The initiative was facilitated by the institutional context of ASEAN, which made third-party mediation legitimate and unthreatening. For instance, Indonesia’s president Suharto sought to reconcile Malaysia with the Philippines, and his intervention was consultative and an effort to move Malaysia and the Philippines toward a consensus (Khong, 1997:330). From these experiences, a set of procedural norms for the conduct of regional relations began to appear. Norms such as musyawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensual decision making) became important components of security diplomacy of ASEAN (Jorgenson-Dahl, 1982:166-169; Khong, 1997:330-331; Acharya, 1999b:62-66). Indeed, the conflict management of ASEAN is largely based on the Malay cultural practices of musyawarah and mufakat, which the Indonesians introduced to Southeast Asian diplomacy (Narine, 2002:31). Consultation (musyawarah) means that ‘a leader should not act arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather make gentle suggestions of the path a community should follow, being careful always to consult all other participants fully and to take their views and feelings into consideration’: and, consensus (mufakat) is ‘the goal toward which musyawarah is

\textsuperscript{19} A number of sources of intra-regional disputes in Southeast Asia can be divided into two categories: The first relates to the spillover effect of domestic challenges, particularly ethnic, political and ideological conflicts to state structure and regime security; the second concerns disputes over territory. These include the Malaysia-Singapore dispute over the Pulau Batu Puteh/Pedra Branca Island in the Singapore Strait, the Malaysia-Indonesia dispute over the Sipadan and Litigan Islands in the Sulawesi Sea near the Sabah-Kalimantan border, the Thai-Malaysia dispute regarding their common border, the Malaysia-Brunei dispute over Limbang and the Philippines-Malaysia dispute over Sabah (see Acharya, 2001:129-130).

\textsuperscript{20} Just as it had in the case of ASA and Maphilindo, the Philippines’ claim to Sabah threatened the initial stage of ASEAN’s creation (cf Khong, 1997:330; also Acharya, 2000:91).
directed’ (Jorgenson-Dahl, 1982:166).

In fact, the idea of consensus is not an abstract notion, but was conceived as a pragmatic way of advancing regional politico-security cooperation in Southeast Asia. That is, the concept was initially applied to overcome hesitancy and indifference among ASEAN members towards regional cooperation (Acharya, 2001:68-69). In this context of ASEAN consensus, Lee Kuan Yew asserted as follows: ‘When four agree and one does not, this can still be considered as consensus and the five-minus-one scheme can benefit the participating four without damaging the remaining one’ (Cited in Irvine, 1982:62). By implication, thus, this means that the idea of consensus in ASEAN can be seen as a commitment of the members to finding a way of moving forward on the basis of flexibility instead of unanimity. In this context, Solidum (2003:97) argues as follows:

In ASEAN, flexibility accompanies *musyawarah* and *mufakat*, for even if everyone had agreed on a certain matter, not everyone is obliged to actually implement it because ASEAN allows bilateral and other arrangements in cooperation. If a member is not ready to participate, his participation in the consensus does not oblige him to act on it. All that is needed is his agreement in principle.

Starting with the cultural practices of *musyawarah* and *mufakat* in the region, ASEAN has developed the ‘ASEAN Way’. That is, the ASEAN Way is largely viewed as a decision-making process that features a ‘high degree of consultation and consensus’ (Acharya, 2001:64). In the ASEAN Way context, ASEAN also promotes regional socialisation and has facilitated contacts between the governmental elites of its member states. As a result, it has helped construct a sense of regional identity, as well as ties of personal obligation and familiarity among national leaders (Narine, 2002:31). Given the circumstances, it can be argued that the ‘ASEAN Way’ may largely be seen as the process of regional interactions and cooperation based on norms such as *musyawarah* (consultation) and *mufakat* (consensual decision making) which became part of the ASEAN Way.

A number of aspects of the ASEAN Way were succinctly provided by Boyce (1973:175) as follows:

- a disposition to summitry, especially through the 1960s (this underlines the
highly elitist character of ASEAN decision-making process);
- a dependence on *musyawarah* principles and concepts in the conduct of high level meetings;
- a preference for veiled and often ‘unofficial’ preliminary transactions by special agents prior to formal ministerial conferences;
- a preference for an informality and *ad hoc* basis in decision-making procedures;
- an avoidance of legal machinery for the settlement of disputes;
- readiness to accept mediation or good offices from friendly third parties in the region;
- a tendency of at least three ASEAN members (Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) to use the recall of an envoy or down-grading of a mission as a diplomatic practice.

With regard to conflict management, given the elements of the ASEAN Way mentioned above, Amer (1999:1036) argues that ASEAN's approach has been geared more towards conflict avoidance and/or prevention rather than conflict resolution. In reality, that is, neither did ASEAN resolve the Sabah dispute, nor ASEAN play the role of conflict manager in a formal and legalistic way. Through direct and indirect measures of diplomacy, dialogue, restraint and pressure, nonetheless, ASEAN could prevent any further escalation of the tension that might have led to armed hostilities and even war (Acharya, 2000:93; 2001:50).

In this early period of ASEAN, therefore, the outcome of consultations and the movement toward consensus and dialogue may be regarded as a cornerstone of collective identity generated by their security interdependence in ASEAN politico-security regionalism. For ASEAN, as Khong (1997:332) puts it, ‘the sense of collective (regional) identity was based primarily on security, not economic, cooperation'. But ASEAN's ability to continue with its consultations and to create consensus was tested by the policy of isolating Vietnam. Indeed, ASEAN's strategy of isolating Vietnam is a good example of the significance of norms and of ASEAN coherence and solidarity. ASEAN norms which would regulate regional relations – respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of neighbours – had been violated by Vietnam during the times from Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 until the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989 (Khong, 1997:333-335).
Under these circumstances, the ASEAN states also faced the challenges to drive and decide what type of regional (security) order was appropriate based on a set of norms and principles that would be acceptable to external actors as well as internal in Southeast Asia. In other words, notwithstanding all the intra-regional security issues, ASEAN also had to manage external challenges in a Cold War regional environment. In particular, the invasion and the decade-long occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese forces left the challenge of responding to the great powers’ influence and rivalry in the region. Thus, the common sense that regional conflicts not handled at the regional level would open the door to the outside powers’ intervention, which in turn would worsen existing intra-regional tensions.

To this end, ASEAN members emphasised the ASEAN style of security regionalism with highlighting the principles of non-interference, non-intervention, and non-use of force. The focus of ASEAN members on these principles intensified further as the external powers’ influences changed, especially after the withdrawal of US forces in Vietnam. Therefore, as Acharya (2000:98-99; 2001:80-82) notes, through the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia, ASEAN leaders attempted to accomplish regional autonomy by providing ‘regional solutions to regional problems’ and illuminating its concern with the danger of great power intervention and the necessity for enhanced security self-reliance as the basis of ASEAN’s collective regional identity, which will be further discussed in the following sections (see 4.4 and 4.5).

4.4 ASEAN’s Collective Identity: norms and principles

Between 1976 and 1989, ASEAN’s policy against Vietnam required China’s help to keep the pressure on Vietnam at the Vietnamese-Chinese border and to support the Cambodian resistance against Vietnam. However, ASEAN’s strategy of isolating Vietnam conflicted with the different perceptions of member states’ strategic interests. Both Malaysia and Indonesia considered China as a greater threat to ASEAN than Vietnam. Thus, while they wanted Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, they wished to see a Vietnam that was strong enough to play a balancing role against China (Khong, 1997:334). As Henderson (1999:18) notes, ASEAN members were divided over the practical implications of the Bangkok Declaration’s proscription against external interference in managing regional affairs. In 1970, under these circumstances, Malaysia proposed that ASEAN should be ‘neutralised’ under the guarantee of the
major powers. But, the proposal was rejected by Indonesia because neutrality at the ‘diktat’ of the major powers ran contrary to its concept of regional resilience, and was met with concern by both the Philippines and Singapore since it could prejudice America’s regional presence.

Nonetheless, in 1971, ASEAN members agreed to the proposal for the creation of the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. It was supported by the two notable agreements in 1976, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia. Subsequently, in 1995, the idea for a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) was also proposed as a way of realising the goal of ZOPFAN. These declarations and treaties are part of ASEAN’s collective identity for managing the internal as well as external challenges. The essence of these ASEAN norms and principles is the conservation of each member’s national sovereignty and regional autonomy, which are the core values enshrined in the organisation’s declarations and treaties.

The operative paragraphs of the ZOPFAN Declaration are:

- that the member countries are determined to exert efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers;
- that that the member countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship (ZOPFAN Declaration, 1971).

According to the ZOPFAN Declaration in 1971, ASEAN states regarded regional neutralisation or neutrality as a ‘desirable objective’. But the ZOPFAN restated the principle in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration that the member countries would ensure the region’s peace and stability from external interference in any form. Unlike the original neutralisation proposal produced by the Bangkok Declaration in 1967, although the principles regarding foreign military alliance and bases have never been seriously pursued, ASEAN has managed to keep the concept active through ‘verbal manipulation’21 (Acharya, 1998:213; 2001:55). Although the ZOPFAN Declaration did

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21 For instance, Singapore, Malaysia and other ASEAN states supported cooperation with the US navy through ‘access arrangements’, while rejecting the need for foreign military bases,
not achieve genuine neutralisation of Southeast Asia, it was meaningful for being ASEAN’s initial attempt to respond to global and regional environments heavily penetrated by the intervening great power(s). Moreover, the ZOPFAN included all the major security considerations which underpinned the evolution of ASEAN, including the norms of non-interference, non-use of force and regional autonomy.

Under the ZOPFAN Declaration, the ASEAN member countries would be expected to abide by the basic norms and principles in managing their external relations. In addition, the ZOPFAN proposal implied that rivalry among outside powers was the main possible cause of polarisation and instability in Southeast Asia. Moreover, it assumed that member states left to themselves in the region would be able to resolve their conflicts smoothly (Leifer, 1989:7-11; 163-164). However, the tension between the ASEAN members’ hopes for regional security autonomy and the continued dependence of some of them on external security guarantees have remained the major stumbling block in the way of realising ZOPFAN: with the Philippines and Thailand emphasising the need for external security relationship with the US as opposed to the pro-neutralisation views of Malaysia and Indonesia; Singapore preferred to trust its security to a balance of great powers in the region. Each state had a different interpretation of what ZOPFAN meant and implied (Acharya, 1993:54-55; 2001:55; Narine, 2002:22).

Despite the ambiguity and ineffectiveness of ZOPFAN, as well as the tensions between the ASEAN members caused by the different strategic interests of different members, the ASEAN members continued to promote the idea of ZOPFAN. The ZOPFAN committed the ASEAN states to avoid alliances with outside powers, to eschew giving consent to foreign powers’ intervention in the domestic affairs of the regional states, to evade involvement in any conflict of powers outside the zone, and to confirm the removal of foreign military bases in ASEAN (Hanggi, 1991:25 cited by Acharya, 1998:213).

Moreover, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976 underscored the significance of ZOPFAN as an ideal. In this declaration (see ASEAN 1976), the concept of ‘ASEAN resilience’ as an essential component of ASEAN’s approach to regional peace and security was introduced. As mentioned earlier, the ASEAN members regarded regional while an Australian-Indonesia agreement providing for mutual consultations in the event of external threats is described as a ‘security agreement’, not an ‘alliance’.
security as a comprehensive concept that starts from national stability and peace, that is national resilience. In this sense, without national resilience as well as regional resilience, the ASEAN states would be too feeble to manage conflicts caused by outside power rivalries in the region. Hence, ASEAN resilience was seen as the essential component for ZOPFAN to be effective. Although there are criticisms and flaws indicated by some scholars regarding the emergence of ASEAN’s collective identity, as we have seen so far, the collective identity in ASEAN security regionalism can be ascertained within and through a process and framework of ASEAN’s ideal, norms and principles with which the member states gradually stepped up a ‘regional resilience’ in order to lessen the possibility of outside intervention and use of force in international relations.

In the formation of a collective identity in ASEAN, Acharya (1998:208-213) points out four elements. These elements can be summarised as follows. First, the contribution of multilateralism to ASEAN regionalism lies not in providing a formal institutional mechanism for conflict resolution, but rather in promoting the process of elites socialisation. Second, the ASEAN symbols, so called ‘ASEAN Spirit’ and the ‘ASEAN Way’, have been invoked on a number of occasions to reduce intra-mural tensions. Third, the development of basic rules of inter-state relations within ASEAN, for instance, the normative framework of ASEAN served as the basis of its collective opposition to Vietnam’s invasion and occupation of Cambodia during the 1978-89 period. A fourth factor in the formation of collective identity in ASEAN is ASEAN’s quest for regional autonomy with pursuing ‘regional solutions to regional problems’. While the first and second factors were discussed in the previous sections (see 4.3 and 4.4), the third and fourth factors will be further discussed in the next section, highlighting ASEAN’s role in the Cambodian conflict for the purpose of tracing the extent to which it contributed to the consolidation of ASEAN’ norms and principles regarding the peaceful settlement of

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22 Border disputes between Malaysia and Thailand, or Malaysia and the Philippines were handled by bilateral channels. But, such bilateralism has not been exclusionary, or directed against another ASEAN member, but rather has served as a complement to multilateralism. Through the norms of musyawarah and mufakat, as was witnessed in the case of Sabah dispute, Indonesia’s president Suharto as a third-party sought to reconcile the hostile relations between Malaysia and the Philippines.

23 Through the symbol of the ‘ASEAN Way’, ASEAN states have claimed to have developed an approach to conflict-reduction within the grouping instead of an approach to conflict-resolution.
regional conflicts without interference by great powers. In doing so, it will show how ASEAN responded to the Cambodian conflict precipitated by Vietnam's invasion and why it changed its institutional norms which have been prioritised from the first decade of the organisation's existence.


By 1978 the intensifying conflict between Vietnam (supported by the Soviet Union) and Cambodia (backed by China) was a great difficulty to ASEAN for achieving the extension of its framework of regional order to include the rest of Southeast Asia. ASEAN had considered the feasibility of accepting Vietnam (as well as Laos and Cambodia) within its group. The Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN talked of the organisation being 'open for participation to all states in the Southeast Asian region' (see ASEAN 1967). However, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 swept away an initial idea on the part of ASEAN to include Vietnam within its regional grouping. Moreover, the action taken by Vietnam was a major setback to ASEAN's doctrine of regional autonomy. In comparison with the regional disputes and tensions in earlier period of ASEAN, as Acharya (2000:111-113; 2001:80-81) notes, the Cambodian conflict caused by Vietnam's intervention retained much broader implications not only with 'a local conflict' but also with 'Sino-Vietnamese, Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet rivalries'. That is, the heightened great power rivalry crushed the ASEAN's aspirations for a diminished role of outside powers in Southeast Asia.

As mentioned earlier, the Cambodian conflict caused by Vietnam was marked by a tension between two different approaches. One was to seek to address the regional crisis within a regional framework in which the role of external powers would be reduced. This was supported by Indonesia and Malaysia and was upholding ASEAN's norm of regional solutions for regional problems, with minimal interference of great powers. The other was to seek Vietnam's isolation from the international community and to raise the diplomatic and military costs of its occupation of Cambodia. The latter approach, favoured by Singapore and Thailand, included ASEAN's desire to punish Vietnam with forming a resistance coalition front against Vietnam, as well as occasional proposals for intra-ASEAN military cooperation, thereby drawing ASEAN closer to a violation of its norm against military pacts. It also implied pursuing support from the major external powers, thereby deteriorating the norm of regional autonomy. Moreover, as these two polarised divisions were often in conflict, they endangered ASEAN's norm

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However, Huxley (1990:90) points out a number of disadvantages caused by the Cambodian crisis for ASEAN: distracting ASEAN from its original objectives, in particular its aim of national and regional resilience; contributing to the growth of militarism at the expense of political responsiveness; damaging the prospects for peaceful cooperation in the region by dividing Southeast Asia into non-communist ASEAN versus communist Indochinese states; increasing the influence of both China and the former Soviet Union to interfere in the region, which also meant increasing the level of dependence by individual ASEAN states on the US; risking a military confrontation with Vietnam; and exacerbating the Indochinese refugee problems in the
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For ASEAN, a major element in the consensus-building process is the need to offer a united front vis-a-vis external actors. While ASEAN states can disagree on a certain position behind the scenes, they keep from parading these differences in public, in particular while dealing with the outside world. It springs from the recognition that regional unity is essential to overcome the weakness and limitations of individual ASEAN states. ASEAN states conceive themselves as weak states in an international system dominated by strong powers. Acting in their individual capability, they cannot expect to influence the behaviour of outside powers or further their national interests and objectives. Thus, the collective action helps the ASEAN members to achieve consensus on issues over which they might otherwise disagree.

Nonetheless, a significant point about consensus building is that national interests are in part determined by the need to remain part of the consensus, being considered a friendly neighbour, not frustrating the ‘community’, and so forth. In this sense, the definition of what forges national interest may change with the process and progress of interaction and socialisation among the member states, and the possible tension between the national and the community aims may be reduced. This general feature of Constructivist international relations theory, that the ‘social identities’ of the member countries are constructed by their interests, may be applicable to the ASEAN case (Acharya, 1999b:63-66).

With regard to the norms of consultation and consensus in the Cambodian conflict, the communiqués produced at the formal and informal ASEAN meetings were utilised to insulate disagreeing and inharmonious concerns with a view to creating a common understanding of the problem which can be considered as consensus-building in the ASEAN way. For instance, ASEAN appointed Indonesia as the organisation’s official spokesman to Vietnam so that Indonesia’s leadership in the Cambodian issues would reduce the role of external actors and pursue a vision of ‘One Southeast Asia’ which would encompass the Indochinese states (Acharya, 2001:80; 98; Antolik, 1990:135). Hence, the norms of consultation and consensus were ascribed to the need for ASEAN to form a common stance in response to the regional crisis of the Cambodian conflict.

Although ASEAN faced the formidable challenge to seek a conflict settlement within a regional framework that would require sustaining its norms, the ASEAN leaders realised that the political, social and military end-result of Vietnam’s invasion was the limit to their ability to resolve the crisis without the involvement of external actors. As
Huxley (1993:16) points out, ASEAN's stance in opposition to Vietnam's role in Cambodia during the 1980s necessitated that the organisation and its members go against the principle of the ZOPFAN framework by aligning themselves with China and the West against Vietnam and the Soviet Union. This illuminated that ASEAN’s decision to rely on the foreign powers to resolve the Cambodian crisis undermined the ideal of ZOPFAN as an ASEAN’s major framework, which asserted the regional autonomy free from the outside powers’ interference.

Nevertheless, the regional crisis posed by Vietnam motivated the ASEAN leaders to see the need to change their initial norms and principles to deal with much more complex and destabilising effects of the Cambodian issues. Because the Cambodian crisis retained much broader implications than the regional disputes and tensions in an earlier period of ASEAN had. According to Acharya’s (2001:80-81) assertion, as mentioned earlier, the Cambodian conflict implied not only ‘a local conflict’ within the Cambodian society but also ‘Sino-Vietnamese, Sino-Soviet and US-Soviet rivalries’ at the global level. Though the dilemma of ASEAN, under these circumstances, forced the organisation to transform into and to develop new norms with coordinating their strategies towards Vietnam and the international community, ASEAN’s primary norms of consensus and consultation as a regional framework for regional order were preserved.

4.6 Conclusion

ASEAN’s response to the Cambodian conflict during the Cold War had paradoxical effects on its norms and identity. The Cambodian conflict placed ASEAN into the breach of regional autonomy in which ASEAN was obliged to opt for its commitment to a peaceful settlement of the conflict with interference by the outside powers. This means that ASEAN’s regional identity in diplomatic unity (which had been tested and transformed by the Cambodian conflict) was at the cost of its norm of providing ‘regional solutions to regional problems’.

However, ASEAN states responded effectively to the conflict with recognising the sub-regional milieu of Southeast Asia which was heavily penetrated by the great powers. The ASEAN states acknowledged that they were not only weak powers, but also weak states so that they were unable to resolve the Cambodian conflict by themselves. ASEAN’s security priorities were dependent on US and Chinese security guarantees
against Vietnamese threat backed by the Soviet Union. Under the auspices of the outside powers' umbrella, ASEAN could spearhead a diplomatic settlement of the conflict in the international arena with utilising an international campaign to isolate Vietnam.

During the Cold War, therefore, the regional security in Southeast Asia was not static, but dynamic. When decolonisation took place in the region, the European intervention largely diminished. Instead, the great powers' influence over the region relatively increased. Following the Second World War, (especially from the inception of ASEAN), the Southeast Asian region was about to evolve gradually out of the stage of 'regional conflict formation' (Väyrynen, 1984:337-359), which was seen as the by-product of colonial legacy. However, a variety of domestic challenges of newly independent states in the region brought forth divisions and conflicts regionally as well as domestically. Typical of these regional and domestic security matters, was an ideologically-based power struggle (ASEAN versus Vietnam) linked to the East-West rivalry. This left a great possibility for external powers to penetrate the regional security.

However, these local hostilities gave the ASEAN members some impetus not only to establish the Declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia in 1971, but also to take advantage of outside great powers' influence, particularly in the case of Cambodian conflict. As a whole, the creation and evolution of ASEAN did not only reduce threat perceptions among its members with building a collective identity symbolised as the ‘ASEAN Way’, but also polarise the region with aligning the pro-western and capitalist ASEAN organisation against the communist-oriented and Vietnamese-dominated Indochina.

In formulating a regional identity, from the pre-ASEAN era, the idea of region had been expressed and built through a number of interactions made up by the states of ASEAN (for instance, ASA in 1961 and MAPHILINDO in 1963; see 4.2). In this context, the origin of ASEAN security regionalism should not be seen as given, but as constructed by the ASEAN states from the pre-ASEAN era. Moreover, ASEAN (political) security regionalism was shaped in the context of the ‘ASEAN Way’ during ASEAN’s first decade (1967-1976), and reshaped with both a deviation from and a reflection of the principle of regional autonomy, i.e. non-interference, during the period of Cambodian conflict (1978-1989). But this does not imply the renunciation of the sovereignty-bounding regionalism in ASEAN.
Rather, ASEAN states recognised their limits to resolve the Cambodian conflict by themselves so that they could not but manage and settle the conflict with the intention of temporarily allowing the interference of the outside powers. This was ultimately to defend and strengthen ASEAN member states as a group of newly independent (with the exception of Thailand, which had never been a colony) developing countries with putting more emphasis on the idea of sovereignty instead of reducing and abandoning it.

Furthermore, the Cambodian conflict helped pave the way for the much more skilled flexibility of regional organisation in and for ‘the post-Cold War era which would see an unleashing of conflicts which had been effectively suppressed during the colonial era and the subsequent period of great power rivalry’ (Buszynski, 1990:259). Under the new circumstances of the post-Cold War security environment for ASEAN and Southeast Asia, the ‘continuity’ and ‘change’ of the organisation’s principles and norms as a regional framework in response to internal as well as external challenges, (to be discussed in chapter 6), need to be illuminated and reconsidered with a view to analysing the causality of regional security problems and its responses.

In terms of these different approaches, Huxley (1990:91) also identifies them with two strands in ASEAN security thinking: the regionalist and the globalist. The regionalists (Malaysia, Indonesia, and some elements in the Philippines and Thailand) were sympathetic towards Vietnam’s conception of regional order and were concerned about excluding the military influence of outside powers from Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Singapore’s globalist viewpoint, which is also shared by military and political groups in Thailand, considered Vietnam as an expansionist power with close ties to the (then) Soviet Union. The globalists tended to see the importance of linking all the non-communist states of ASEAN with China to organise an anti-Soviet alliance. They did not see China as a threat to the security of the region under its pragmatic leadership. Indeed, both Singapore and Thailand encouraged Beijing to support the anti-Vietnamese Cambodian resistance, with Bangkok organising a de facto strategic alliance with China against Vietnam in the conflict over Cambodian. Thus, as Acharya (2001:96) puts it, the agony for ASEAN was that ‘while the two goals were not mutually exclusive, they created the basis of considerable ambivalence in ASEAN’s approach’.

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The new threats emanating from the Cambodian issue, (identified above by Huxley), made ASEAN to move from its existing norms to new norms to stabilise the changing situation in the region. As Acharya (2001:97) puts it, the ASEAN states utilised China’s intervention and support against Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its use of force in Cambodia at the expense of its norm of regional autonomy providing ‘regional solution to regional problems’. Thus, as Hoang (2002:185-186) argues, ASEAN’s involvement in the Cambodian issue was ‘both a deviation from and a reflection of the norm of non-interference: ASEAN deviated from its norms of regional autonomy and the pacific settlement of disputes with the hope that a combination of political, economic and military pressure would force Vietnam to change its position in Cambodia’. In other words, ASEAN advanced norms that helped the member states forge a common position toward the Cambodian issue.

Hoang (2002:192) argues that in the process of coordinating their strategies toward the Cambodian conflict, the ASEAN members upgraded the norms of consultation and consensus-building with offering a regional framework for conflict settlement while utilising the intervention of outside powers to pressure Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. Apart from coordinating their strategies, the norms were essential because ASEAN states differed on how they should balance a regionalist approach with a globalist one.
CHAPTER 5  POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: SADCC AS A RESPONSE TO APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA IN THE COLD WAR ERA

5.1 Introduction

In 1980, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established, its members (Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola, together with Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland) succeeded the Frontline States (FLS)\textsuperscript{24} in order to counter apartheid destabilisation in the Southern African region. Before and after the inception of SADCC, the terms, South Africa’s apartheid policy, had a significant impact on both the creation and evolution of security regionalism in Southern Africa. These unfriendly terms were deeply embedded in European colonialism and its legacy which had continuously bred a series of fear, enmity and confrontation in terms of ideological and material values. Although Southeast Asia also experienced relations of enmity amongst the ASEAN bloc and the Vietnamese bloc, yet, the major difference of the regional history of Southeast Asia from Southern Africa was the absence of racial conflict based on racism.

The region’s construction, as a site called ‘Southern Africa’, was, according to Vale (2003:30), ‘premised on the discovery of minerals and, equally so, that these were located in South Africa’. Since the discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) in South Africa, copper in Zambia, and coal in Zimbabwe, the regional setting of relations within and among nations have had ‘a long (though infamous) pedigree’ (Hull, 1996:33), even so much as to influence the current regional orders. Therefore, the present and future scenario of politico-security regionalism in Southern Africa can be, to some extent, approached and understood in the context of the past. Given the fact that current SADC politico-security regionalism evolved out of the region’s past experiences – the FLS and SADCC – it is necessary to provide a historical overview of politico-security regionalism(s) which was not only represented as the driving force, aim and strategy of each regional organisation, but also utilised as the defensive instrument of

\textsuperscript{24} The original members of the FLS were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria (briefly), Tanzania and Zambia and after it gained independence in 1980, Zimbabwe joined and acted as chair of the organisation for most of its existence (see Baregu, 2003:20; Nkiwane, 2003:60).
nation-building’ and ‘state-making’ in the name of ‘region-making’ in Southern Africa. Just as ASEAN (as a group of newly independent states) prioritised the state-centric orientations of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of states, SADCC, (which had a strong sensitivity to loss of sovereignty in terms of the group of newly independent states), was also a national interest-driven organisation to address national concerns through regional coordination and cooperation. According to Schoeman (2001:143), in this sense, ‘the attempts to regionalise Africa including the case of Southern Africa has been first and foremost aimed at state-building, … For this reason, any aim and approach that may be considered as threatening sovereignty of a state were destined to dissolve the realm of regionalisation’.

Politico-security regionalism(s) in Southern Africa, which manifested in the FLS and SADCC, evolved over time, with roots being of a nature of nationalist sovereignty orientation and deeply embedded in the colonial history of the region. In this context, Southern African politico-security regionalism (involving the FLS and SADCC) illustrated complex networks in dealing with regional concerns and problems. Whereas the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland) were, despite the various contexts of dependence, interdependence and domination, subordination, deeply linked to and interacted with the hegemonic South Africa’s economic might, the BLNS countries supported the opposition to apartheid South Africa (Vale, 1996:6-13). This implies that military and political state security in this period was placed in a paramount position higher than economic or other concerns. Thus, ‘SADCC’s anti-apartheid stance and its resistance to South African regional hegemony became the organisation’s … source of unity’ (Gibb, accessed on 18 September 2004) to create and enhance a regional identity in the midst of intense ideological diversity among member states and South African destabilisation.

Yet, although one of SADCC’s major objectives was to reduce dependence on South Africa and European imperialists, the member states increased their dependence on South Africa and foreign aid instead of decreasing these influences. By implication, this can be comprehended in the sense that the (then) regional order was aligned against a

25 Prior to Namibia’s membership, the acronym for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was BLS. Namibia joined at independence (1990), formerly being part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as a South African Colony. Throughout the period of apartheid, the BLNS countries remained highly dependent on South Africa (see Hull, 1996:33-34).
background of weak states and powers of (black) majority versus a hegemonic regional power, South Africa. In this regard, Zacarias (1999:171) noted:

The recent history of instability in Southern Africa is not associated with wars caused by border disputes, entrenched rivalry between states, peoples or tribes, but to colonialism and apartheid. Indeed, ... instability and the fear and fragmentation it generated were particularly related to apartheid’s struggle for survival and reflected South Africa’s hegemonic ambitions.

This chapter will analyse the creation, evolution and process of SADCC politico-security regionalism in Southern Africa up to the end of the Cold War and apartheid. In doing so, the case of ASEAN, which was studied in the previous chapter 4, will be instrumental in unfolding the differences and similarities of the nature, character, and focus of both the ASEAN and SADCC politico-security regionalisms. The primary and root causes of current SADC politico-security regionalism, which were intricately embedded in the course of development of the past regional projects including the FLS and SADCC, will be elaborated from the earlier period of European colonialism and its counterforce of Pan-Africanist movement to the ending of the apartheid era. In this chapter, focusing on evolutionary SADCC politico-security regionalism in Southern Africa in times of relations of enmity among and within nation-states, it will highlight the fundamental mechanisms of the regional organisation, its aim, value and *modus operandi*. This will, as a result, facilitate an understanding of the character, nature and type of contemporary SADC politico-security regionalism of post-apartheid Southern Africa (see Chapter 7).

### 5.2 The Origin of SADCC

Before the outbreak of the colonial fervour in the 1890s, Europeans had already made tangible intrusions into Southern Africa\(^{26}\). Before this date, Southern Africa evolved through the growth of pastoralism of the indigenous people and inflows of Bantu-

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\(^{26}\) By the 1880s the stream of settlement (dominated by the expansion of Europeans) was already touching the Limpopo, over a thousand miles into the interior from its base at Cape Town (see Oliver and Fage, 1988:139).
speaking farmers from the north with knowledge of iron-working, together with trade, in fostering large-scale polities (Iliffe, 1996:98; Thompson, 1995:242). Yet, it has often been assumed that during this period the region was ‘economically more underdeveloped, politically more inexperienced and culturally more backward than any of the greater colonies of settlement. After one and a half centuries the colony contained one town worthy of a name and five or six little villages’ (De Kiewet, 1957:30). This situation was greatly changed and transformed following the discovery of mineral wealth such as large deposits of diamonds and gold in the region, specifically in South Africa, in the late 19th century.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, just as the Southeast Asian region was subjected to the exploitative forces of colonial powers, the Southern African region was also suffering predation, resulting from international colonialist and imperialist system. The Southern African region’s history has been, according to Poku (2001:18), ‘more influenced by European colonialism than indigenous factors. … [N]ot only the main components of the Southern African boundary framework but the political status of the regional territories were determined’. In more detail, between 1795 and 1870, radical changes took place throughout Southern Africa. The expansion of the Europeans led to the movement of Africans into different places. During the early nineteenth century, the combined impact of ecological and European pressures and the consolidation of power in some African states generated the *mfecane*, a massive dislocation and movement of peoples which had a profound impact on the size of political communities and their respective distribution (Omer-Cooper, 1994:59-66).

Towards the end of the 19th century, the imperialist powers of Europe competed in a ‘scramble for Africa’ to secure the largest possible areas of control. Their rivalries, however, were resolved at the Berlin conference of 1884-85, which carved Africa into ‘spheres of interest’ and of intended occupation by the Europeans. The national boundaries that were drawn up in Berlin have remained almost unchanged until the

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27 These became later on the majority of the population of the region.

28 There were two major processes. One was a series of significant disturbances among the African farming communities throughout much of Southern Africa. The other was an expansion of White people northward and eastward from the Cape Colony at the expense not only of Khoisan communities, as before, but also of Bantu-speaking Africans. Both processes were punctuated by violence and resulted in the creation of new states (see Thompson, 1995:268).
present time (Ostergaard, 1990:19).

Despite the justification of colonialism in the name of the civilisation of the region, of particular importance is that as these settlers moved further inland, infrastructure was built to meet their needs. In this context, Vale (1996:7) pointed out that ‘the region’s indigenous peoples were excluded from its rewards, and so began the long history of violent suppression and deprivation designed to keep them in their place’.

In the first half of the twentieth century, Southern Africa experienced a number of important developments in the region. In these major developments in the region, the Union of South Africa set up the passage of the Land Act of 1913 which established the ‘native reserves’ or ‘homelands’. The efforts at embedding racial discrimination in the historical-economic framework in the region that were developed into the implementation of apartheid following the National Party’s victory in the election in 1948, ultimately made Southern Africa a ‘raced space’. This raced space could, once produced, limit and channel further efforts at creating the Southern African region (Niemann, 2000:108-109). In this context, in 1944, the issue of racial equality, which was supported by the Pan-African Federation, became an essential part of the spirit

29 (1) the establishment of a Union of South Africa (1910) following the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902); (2) the withdrawal of Germany as a colonial power in South West Africa (now Namibia) after the First World War; (3) the formation there of a South African Mandate under the League of Nations auspices; (4) Portugal’s intensified exploitation of Angola and Mozambique (from the mid-1920s); (5) and the creation of a Federation in Rhodesia and Nyasaland by the present Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi (1953) (see Omer-Cooper, 1994:158-261).

30 The pass laws in South Africa, the housing of labour in hostels and compounds adjacent to mines and, later, manufacturing facilities all reflected the racialisation of space in Southern Africa.

31 In 1944, the International African Service Bureau and twelve other active welfare, students’ and political organisations came together in Manchester to form the Pan-African Federation which played a crucial role in consolidating the ideology of Pan-Africanism. The Federation had the following objectives: (1) to promote the well-being and unity of African peoples and peoples of African descent throughout the World; (2) to demand the self-determination and independence of African peoples and other subject races from the domination of powers proclaiming sovereignty and trusteeship over them; (3) to secure equality of rights for African peoples and the total abolition of all forms of racial discrimination (see Ajala, 1974:9-10).
of Pan-Africanism. Later on, in 1963, when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established, one of the most significant shared perspectives of African leaders was the need to terminate colonialism, racial discrimination and the apartheid system in Southern Africa (Ajala, 1974: 65; 231-233; 356-357; 380-382; also Dumor, 1991: 164-170).

Meanwhile, once the Second World War ended, just as the Southeast Asian states achieved formal independence, in the late 1950s, the 'winds of change' began also to blow over not only Southern Africa but the whole of Africa. In the period 1961-68, the British government agreed to grant independence to Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. But despite the euphoric hopes of the people, the early independence process failed to transform the regional status quo. The newly independent states in the region were unable to dislodge the colonial legacy in which their own security was weaved deeply into the region’s integrated economy, protected and promoted by global capitalism. Moreover, even after their independence, as Southeast Asia remained an unstable and volatile area in the Cold War confrontations, Southern Africa was also put under the complex and insecure milieu of both racial confrontations and great power interventions.

After the Second World War, however, although both regions (Southeast Asia and Southern Africa) saw the importance of decolonisation which was perceived as the most urgent need to restore the regional states in fragments, the depth and length of the process of decolonisation differed. Whereas Southeast Asia experienced unexpectedly a sudden and quick process of decolonisation (e.g. Burma gained independence in 1948; Singapore in 1946; Malaysia in 1948; see Acharya, 2000:44-45), the prospect for the decolonisation in Southern Africa was relatively lingering, spanning approximately three decades from the 1960s to the early 1990s (e.g. Tanzania gained independence in 1961, Mozambique in 1975, Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990). The reason why the decolonisation of Southern Africa was delayed can be seen as a focal point of understanding the root causes of the region’s own character of conflict, that is, racial conflict (white versus the black). Under the auspices of Pan-Africanism, in 1963, when the OAU was established, therefore, the theme of decolonisation and racial equality was treated as a significant unifying force among the competing

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32 The labour migration to South Africa continued, and South Africa’s railways provided cheap routes for the export of primary products to international markets (see Vale, 1996:7).
intergovernmental groups in Africa, e.g. the radical Casablanca group, the moderate Monrovia group and a conservative francophone group (for details see Ajala, 1985:4; 1974:25-43; also Wallerstein, 1967). Although African leaders within these different groups had tensions and disagreements on how to attain the issue of continental unification, they agreed that support for liberation from racial inequality in Southern Africa was a responsibility of all Africans (Klotz, 1995:75).

As an impetus for the Pan-Africanism (of liberation)\(^3\), the organisation known as the Frontline States (FLS) came into being in 1974. The original members were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria\(^4\), Tanzania and Zambia and after it gained independence in 1980, Zimbabwe joined and acted as chair of the organisation for most of its existence (Baregu, 2003:20; Nkwane, 2003:60). Unlike the several short-lived attempts at regional cooperation in Southeast Asia (e.g. SEATO in 1954, ASA in 1961, MAPHILINDO in 1963, and ASPAC in 1966; see Chapter 4), the FLS was not only a long-lived organisation in the Southern African region, but also continually an important entity together with and within SADCC later\(^5\). The FLS, which was established as a loose (military) alliance of the black majority-ruled states of Southern Africa, set as its highest goal that of supporting the liberation forces in their struggle for decolonisation and racial equality\(^6\) (Matlosa, 2001:398). Within an anti-colonial context, thus, the FLS can be viewed as one of the most important mechanisms to appear in the mid-1970s at a time when the ending of colonialism and racial oppression were the hottest issues in the subregion, as well as on the continent (Cilliers, 1999:3).

\(^3\) According to Mazrui and Gordon (1980:186), African leaders attempted to realise two forms of Pan-Africanism: the Pan-Africanism of liberation and the Pan-Africanism of integration. The former seeks to reduce foreign control over African affairs, while the latter seeks to encourage Africans to form larger economic communities or wider political federations.

\(^4\) Nigeria, which was voted as a member of the FLS by Zimbabwe, participated in a number of meetings as an informal associate member (see Matlosa, 2001:399).

\(^5\) The FLS impacted on the establishment of SADCC in terms of the structure, driving force, aim, and strategy. In addition, even after the existence of SADCC, the FLS continued to play a crucial role in attaining the overall objectives of SADCC.

\(^6\) For the first decades since the outset of independence movements in the late 1950s, the focus of efforts was on decolonising and terminating white minority regimes in the former Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa.
The evolution and framework of the FLS was, thus, deeply influenced by the Pan-Africanist influence. The activities of the FLS often took after those of the OAU’s African Liberation Committee (ALC), whose primary goal was to promote the decolonisation process. In addition, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) was, in particular, formed in 1975 as an important structure of the FLS with the mandate to address various security challenges related largely to the South African apartheid ideology facing the member states in the Southern African region (Matlosa, 2001:399).

As the other impetus for the Pan-Africanism (of integration), since the Second World War, the principle of sub-regional economic cooperation was also encouraged by the global as well as continental forces in the Southern African region37. In particular, the vision of African regionalism which was best captured in 1981 by the OAU’s publication of a document, (Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000),38 as well as the establishment of the EEC in 1957, played a crucial role in influencing the creation and evolution of SADCC.

Apart from its ideological underpinnings of Pan-Africanism, the solidarity of the FLS was based on three other factors. First, it operated within an ad hoc fashion of decision

37 The post-war (after the Second World War) progress towards the integration of Europe made a considerable impression on many countries, as the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 proved highly infectious in the countries of the developing world. Influenced by the experiences of European integration and pan-African movement of the 1950s and 1960s, and promoted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) since the early 1960s, the African leaders recognised the significance of establishing economic integration schemes. As a result, this ignited the optimistic enthusiasm that accelerated the flourishing of experiments in regional cooperation and integration during the post-independence period (for instance, UDEAC, CPCM and LCBC founded in 1964, CEAO and MRU in 1973, and ECOWAS in 1975) (see Asante, 1997:2-44).

38 In this document, African leaders committed themselves to the ‘creation, at the national, subregional and regional levels, of a dynamic and interdependent African economy’ and thereby opening the door to the eventual establishment of an African Common Market (ACM) leading to an African Economic Community (AEC). In this regard, the Lagos Plan of Action implies that the creation of regional economic institutions in each of Africa’s five major regions – North, East, West, Southern, and Central Africa – is considered as the best instrument for realising the ultimate creation of a continental AEC (see Schraeder, 1996:140).
making with presidential summitry. The FLS summit would involve heads of state and
government as well as representatives of the liberation movements. Second, the FLS’
self-imposed restriction on membership generated a simplified management structure
and a reduction of intra-FLS conflicts. Third, the informal nature of the FLS afforded
members the flexibility to pursue independent policies. (Khadiagala, 1994:257). These
factors later on impacted substantially upon the structure and nature of SADCC (which
was perceived as an extension of the decolonising resistance to the apartheid system)
in terms of an ad hoc fashion of decision making and informal nature of the
organisation.

The FLS, like SADCC later, aimed not only at fighting for independence of member
states but also at ‘providing these states with an organisational framework for meeting
some of their (political as well as economic) security needs’39. In this sense, it can be
argued that toward the late 1970s, the attempts by the FLS to address their security
problems in Southern Africa evolved into a much broader and deeper search for a
regional institution to enhance ‘political and economic liberation' through coordinated
development initiatives (Khadiagala, 1994:219-248). For the purpose of this, as one of
the roles of the FLS, the ‘internationalist role’ was implicit in the actions of the FLS. The
FLS states sought to arouse the international organisations (such as the United
Nations, the Commonwealth, the European Community, and the Organisation of
African Unity) in various documents not only to condemn apartheid in South Africa, but
also to call for sanctions to isolate the white minority regime (Sesay, 1985:29-31). The
FLS was also a crucial instrument which promoted and strengthened the basis for more
effective (political and economic) security cooperation among the black majority
states40.

However, although the FLS expressed its roles in economic cooperation outside the
region as well as inside, the key to steer the function of the organisation was the
polito-security oriented strategy as a response to destabilisation of an apartheid

39 Hence, the FLS as an antecedent of SADCC was a passage for ‘alternative external access
to the region’ (see Khadiagala, 1990:131).

40 In the period of 1970s, there were some good examples for the achievements of the FLS to
promote political and economic cooperation: the rail link between Tanzania and Zambia, the
closure of the border between Rhodesia and Zambia and improved relations between Tanzania
and Mozambique in the period when Mozambique struggled for liberation from Portuguese rule.
South Africa’s policy. Unlike the policy of *Konfrontasi* (initiated by Indonesia against Malaysia), which only lasted from 1963 to 1966 during the pre-ASEAN period, the policy of destabilisation of the white South African regime against the black states in Southern Africa continued throughout the 1980s till the defeat of South Africa at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola in 1988 (Davies, 1990:198-206). In this period, the destabilisation of the region was led by the Botha regime’s ‘total strategy’. This strategy sought to promote economic and political collaboration with its neighbours on its own terms, and to preserve access to regional resources without compromising its own political system. This policy was formalised early in 1979 in a ‘Constellation of Southern African States’ (CONSAS) programme, to be underwritten by mutual security agreements as well as various forms of political and economic association.\(^{41}\)

The idea of CONSAS was propagated by Pretoria as an instrument for formulating an anti-Marxist group to destroy the perceived ‘total onslaught’\(^{42}\) of Angola and Mozambique against the white South African government, at a time when Western support for South Africa was diminishing. The independence of Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) in 1980 frustrated South African ideas of CONSAS, however, and prompted South Africa’s white regime to adopt a hard-line strategy of destabilisation. Under the circumstances, the black majority states in the region came to draw themselves closer in responding to CONSAS with the BLS states and Zimbabwe choosing not only to reject the South African formula, but also to establish and join SADCC in 1980 (Tow, 1990:65-66; Jaster, 1986:45-48).

5.3 The Evolution of SADCC

\(^{41}\) CONSAS was to include South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (the so-called BLS countries), Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Bantustan states (Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei).

\(^{42}\) The theme of total onslaught was pioneered and led by the USSR and the Eastern bloc with the goal of overturning the South African government and substituting it by a Marxist one. The governments of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe were relatively seen as advocates of the total onslaught. Lesotho, Zambia and Botswana were seen as its tacit supporters by criticising the apartheid system, upholding sanctions and offering South African political liberationists refugees. Only Swaziland and Malawi were seen as moderate regimes with which the apartheid regime could, to some extent, cooperate (see Matlosa, 2001:402).
SADCC was established in Lusaka on 1 April 1980 by nine independent African states: the six Frontline States (FLS), Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola, together with Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland.

SADCC’s founding statement, the Lusaka Declaration of 1980, provided the guidelines for economic liberation in Southern Africa. By adopting the Declaration, the SADCC states’ leaders agreed to create a regional economic organisation that would solidify the members, harmonise their policies, and lessen the influence of South Africa’s hegemony (Khadiagala, 1994:228). As derived from this Declaration, the regional grouping’s goals were as follows:

- reducing the economic dependence of member states, especially but not exclusively, on South Africa;
- creating and rehabilitating the regional network of transport and telecommunications infrastructure as a precondition for genuine and balanced regional integration;
- mobilising resources in order to promote national, bilateral and regional development policies and programmes;
- co-ordinating action so as to secure international cooperation with and support for SADCC projects (Southern Africa Record, 1987:4).

Just as the 1967 ASEAN Bangkok Declaration emphasised the economic cooperation to promote regional solidarity as an essential prerequisite for the achievement of cooperation in other areas, the 1980 SADCC Lusaka Declaration also focused on the economic cooperation to liberate the region from the legacy of colonialism and in particular, its dependence on apartheid South Africa. However, whereas the ambitions of ASEAN states in the area of regional economic cooperation were largely neglected, the SADCC states saw relatively substantial achievements in regional economic (development) coordination initiatives.

In order to achieve the goal of economic liberation in the region, SADCC member states prioritised the pursuance of collective self-reliance as a way of constructing the ‘political emancipation of the region’ (Zacarias, 1999:164). However, as SADCC emerged out of the interactions of regional, continental and global forces, the evolution

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43 Namibia joined in 1990 after winning its independence from South Africa.
of it could (and should) not be limited to Southern African efforts alone either. In fact, both the influence of Western actors and African states themselves were substantially responsible for creating and evolving SADCC (cf Ostergaard, 1990). Thus, it is important to note that the evolution of SADCC was a mixed and intertwined product of African initiatives and European influences. In that regard, Mandaza (1990:143) argues, ‘... Even analysts on the left should remind themselves of the dialectical relationship between imperialist domination and revolutionary pressures’.

Yet, notwithstanding the enormous support that it received from Western donors in the northern hemisphere, SADCC evolved not only out of considerations voiced by African leaders (such as Nyerere, Kaunda and Khama) in the early 1960s44, but also from its unique approach to regional cooperation. The SADCC leaders chose its own way of project or sectoral responsibility which differed from those of other organisations like the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) that pursued mainly economic (market-oriented) integration.

Within this context, as major driving forces to evolve SADCC, two points were highlighted by the leaders of the organisation, which were included in the objectives of the Lusaka Declaration. The first was the reduction of dependence (particularly but not only) on South Africa and the second was the forging of links to generate ‘equitable development’ in the pursuit of balance and equity through regional cooperation. Its two major objectives were, however, in effect contradictory: while the fact that ‘more than 90 percent of financing for SADCC projects came from foreign funding’ (Ramsamy, 1995:202) implies the organisation’s severe dependence, the fundamental theme of SADCC was to liberate the economy from the legacy of colonialism and imperialism. Moreover, it was inconceivable to create a genuine and equitable region while diminishing reliance on South Africa ‘since the entire region had been constructed around South Africa with the peripheral states tightly integrated into the core’ (Niemann, 2000:111).

According to Thompson (1991:65), Southern African economic relations, especially

44 For example, as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was being dissolved in 1963, African leaders were considering how best to develop regional political and economic cooperation out of the imperialist Federation (see Mandaza, 1990:142-151; Khadiagala, 1994:229-248).
trade ties, were products of the colonial system, in terms of economic links and infrastructure, which caused an ‘economic regime’ between South Africa and seven of the nine SADCC countries to develop\(^{45}\). She goes on to argue that:

South Africa also provides a link with western markets, and also serves as an outpost for these markets in terms of multinational corporations within South Africa. … [the] dominant economic regime in the region, between South Africa and SADCC, is reinforced by the dependency patterns which link the region to the Western capitalist system (Thompson, 1991:67).

Although reducing economic dependency on South Africa was identified as the major objective of SADCC, Lee (1989:5) points out that, ironically, that during the SADCC era, several states increased, rather than decreased, their economic dependence\(^{46}\). SADCC should therefore not be considered as having been an attempt to create a totally different region, but as a defensive effort to, paraphrasing Niemann (2000:111), eschew or circumvent the effects of the distorted integrative structure in the region including South Africa. In this way, some argue that the value and ability of the SADCC’s organisation was fundamentally limited and fractured by the nature and framework of SADCC. Mumbengegwi (1987:79-80) summarises this contradiction as follows:

Despite its claim to political strength and unity, the very framework of [SADCC] cooperation chosen indicates the shaky foundation on which SADCC is built. Desire for collective independence from South African domination is one thing but commitment to regional integration is another. …. Consequently, cooperation in SADCC is a loose arrangement from which a member state can opt out without any serious repercussions on its domestic economy. Thus, SADCC’s claim to political strength and unity is its economic weakness.

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\(^{45}\) Although the degree of dependence differs, South Africa played the leading role of trading partner with all of the SADCC countries, with the exception of Angola and Tanzania (see Thompson, 1991:64-65).

\(^{46}\) For details on the extent of the SADCC member states’ economic dependence both on South Africa and on the advanced capitalist nations (see Lee, 1989:66-116).
Nonetheless, SADCC was not only the symbol but the substantial and authentic embodiment of the states of the region in their struggle for liberation. It was a political-economic project of the independent states of the region, which was perceived by apartheid South Africa as a dangerous enemy of its regional hegemony (Green and Thompson, 1986:261). As mentioned in the previous section 5.2, the emergence of SADCC in 1980 can be partly seen as a reaction to South Africa’s proposal of a CONSAS programme in 1979 with a view to preventing the SADCC member countries from being turned into South African satellites. Although economic development was an important goal of the SADCC members, the organisation was, in essence, politically motivated by the FLS not only to ward off South Africa’s hegemonic destabilisation but also to attract (more) foreign aid (Davies and O’meara, 1985:196-211; Ostergaard, 1990:51-79). As a whole, however, the South African threat to SADCC in the region gave the organisation an opportunity to ‘represent the Southern African dream of economic development, self-determination, mass welfare and winning free of South African domination’ (Green, 1989:A25).

During the Cold War, ‘politico-economic security strategy’ and ‘politico-military security cooperation’ largely dominated the SADCC security regionalism. The former was to reduce dependence on the South African economy, and the latter aimed at responding to South African destabilisation policies. The SADCC member states’ response to these dual security issues reflected their Pan-Africanist perspectives that apartheid and racial discrimination brought forth economic exploitation and regional insecurity (Klotz, 1995:80). The norm of racial equality underpinning Pan-Africanism, in this sense, played a crucial role in operating objectives, values and *modus operandi* of SADCC. These were embedded in the two security issues above, which will be further discussed in the following sections (see 5.4 and 5.5).

### 5.4 Politico-Economic Security Strategy

During the 1980s when SADCC was initiated and shaped by neo-liberalism, which advocates the primacy of the market mechanism over government intervention in the economy, was a dominant theoretical approach to development including the issues of regional cooperation. Yet, in terms of regional cooperation, SADCC, from its inception,
rejected neo-classical economic theories that deal only with ‘benefits from trade’. As Davies (1992:63) argued, the neo-liberal approach is indifferent to existing inequalities between the SADCC members, assuming that they are either not serious problems or that they will eventually be solved by the market. However, because colonial legacies linked to apartheid, which tend to reinforce the uneven development among and within the SADCC region, are still prevalent in the region, SADCC members were disinterested in ‘relying solely on exchange relations’ based mainly on trade and market integration to manage their economies (Thompson, 1992:132-133).

Thus, SADCC chose a different approach to regional cooperation from other sub-regional and continental approaches, including both European and ASEAN examples. Although the initiation of SADCC was inspired by the (then) EEC’s success and encouraged by the Lagos Plan of Action, SADCC succeeded, to some extent, in shunning the predominant influence of concepts and strategies alien to their needs and interests: that is, ‘SADCC neither embraced the EEC-type model with its economic-community foundation nor did it adopt concepts emanating either from a CONSAS or from the Lagos Plan of Action’ (Weimer, 1991:80). Given the ineffectual and inefficient outcomes of regional economic integration schemes elsewhere in Africa, as proved especially in the case of EAC, SADCC purposely rejected a common market or free trade approach to integration. Rather, SADCC chose a ‘project coordination approach’ which emphasised the need to promote projects in the areas of industrial production and infrastructure in order to boost cooperation in regional development projects (see SADCC, 1989).

Although the ASEAN states were reluctant to push economic integration and cooperation among and within themselves due to the differences in member states’ levels of development and the high level of competitive exports, they could succeed in achieving a steady economic growth for three decades since its inception of ASEAN through the market-focused economic orientation, more specifically extra-regional

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47 Given a number of attempts such as the Central African Federation (CAF), East African Community (EAC) and SACU, which led to the severe unbalances and inequities in the distribution of gains, it is conceivable why SADCC began to challenge the neo-liberal approach to regional cooperation by encouraging ‘production before trade’ (see Thompson, 1992:130-132).
trade (Lim, 1995:238-245). In terms of economic structure, both ASEAN and SADCC can be characterised by the general lack of complementarities in production and industrial structure among the member countries. This is seen in the fact that the degree of intra-regional trade in both regions was very low and inactive (for the ASEAN case, see Narine, 2002:24-30; for SADCC, see Ndlela, 1987:43). Rather, the member states in both the regional organisations were heavily dependent on the West to sustain their economic development strategies.

Moreover, whereas the economic structure of the ASEAN countries was guided by capitalism, the SADCC economies were a mixture of capitalist (e.g. Botswana), socialist (e.g. Tanzania), and Marxist (e.g. Mozambique) states. The homogeneous economic system of capitalism in ASEAN, which was supported by the U.S.-led Western enterprises during the Cold War, helped ASEAN advance the economies of member states through a favourable access to an increasingly world free trading system. In contrast, the heterogeneous economic systems in the SADCC region are seen as one of critical elements to hinder the regional organisation from aligning its economic security strategy with either liberal market system or socialist. Rather, the SADCC states tried to devise an economic development strategy of regional cooperation in order to enhance the economies of member states through the project coordination approach with each member state taking responsibility for a particular sector. In this respect, the SADCC case is mainly different from the ASEAN.

During the inaugural SADCC Summit in Lusaka 1980, together with the Lusaka Declaration, the organisation adopted a framework for the Programme of Action which concretised and specified economic activities and development projects to be pursued. The Programme of Action explains the initial approach to regional cooperation, which was based on discrete projects, focusing on the promotion of allocating specific sectors (transport and communications, mining, agriculture, energy, tourism, and so on) for coordination by each country (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:31-67). Within this

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48 When ASEAN was created in 1967, most of the member states, with the exception of Singapore, pursued import-substitution policies and used tariffs and regulatory deterrents to protect their economies from external penetration. However, the ASEAN member states gradually shifted import-substitution industrialisation to export-oriented manufacturing toward extra-regional economic partners, primarily the U.S., the European Economic Community (EEC), and Japan (see Narine, 2002:26-27).
context, SADCC adopted a mechanism that was termed ‘sectoral programming’. That is, the founders of SADCC rejected the formulation of a regional economic integration scheme based mainly on a neo-liberal (market integration) approach. Rather, they pursued the economic development through the project coordination approach with each member state taking responsibility for a specific sector.

The SADCC states affected by the policy of destabilisation concentrated a large portion of their material and financial resources on the revitalisation of the transport and communication sector headed by Mozambique (Valigy and Dora, 1992:144). As a top priority, about 75 percent of the proposed projects targeted this sector. SADCC emphasised re-establishing the Beira Corridor route between Zimbabwe and Mozambique (previously cut as a sanction against Rhodesia) and improving the Tazara route connecting Zambia and Tanzania (established during Zambian sanctions against Rhodesia) (Klotz, 1995:82; see also Mongula and Ng’andwe, 1987:102-107). These re-established route played an important role in not only saving the costs and the time of transport (Valigy and Dora, 1992:145), but also guaranteeing and sustaining an intra-regional ‘balanced trade’ which aimed at a widely spread regional development, rather than a ‘free trade zone’ (Hanlon, 1987:20)).

Despite the large efforts of achieving collective self-reliance by the SADCC states, the process of restructuring particularly within transport and communication sector was constrained by the destructive engagement of the South Africa’s destabilisation policy. As Weimer (1991:79-80) put it, ‘the material cost of South African destabilisation for the period between 1980 and 1988 was estimated as high as US$60 billion: this is more than four times the amount the SADCC received as Official Development Assistance (ODA) over the same period’. It can, therefore, be understood why and how the organisation chose the lessening of economic dependence on South Africa as a prime objective of the Lusaka Declaration in terms of facilitating development initiatives through the coordination of each member’s particular sector of responsibility.

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49 Advocates of the sectoral programming were reluctant to use the term ‘integration’. Instead, they viewed this mechanism of SADCC as an instrument of ‘self-reliance’ among developing countries to generate ‘a redistribution of world production, control over the creation and allocation of surplus and the power to make decisions on matters that affect their societies’ (see Chitala, 1987:13).
The project or sectoral responsibility approach as functional cooperation brought forth the de-centralised (and relatively *ad hoc*) structure of SADCC with power resting in the Heads of State Summit and the Council of Ministers (Ostergaard, 1990:58). This created the anti-bureaucratic structure of the organisation, which implies that the political structure of SADCC purposefully placed constraint on the progress of an autonomous bureaucracy. Furthermore, this means that SADCC, from the start, eschewed formal legally-binding mechanism. Rather, SADCC resorted to a consensual decision-making approach, which aimed not at unanimity, but at cohesion within the organisation (Mandaza and Tosten sen, 1994:73). In this respect, the SADCC case is similar to the ASEAN case. Both ASEAN and SADCC preferred to facilitate their regional cooperation through ‘informality’ best understood as a device for minimising the impediments to cooperation, at both the domestic and international levels’ (Lipson, 1991:500).

The decentralised structure of the SADCC institution was linked to the emphasis of national autonomous responsibility for allocated sectors. This implies that the various commitments to regional cooperation in each member state could consequently leave large rooms to generate management problems. In this sense, as Thompson (1992:139-140) states: ‘SADCC was caught up in the term *etatism*, looking to the state to solve all problems’. As in the case of ASEAN, SADCC’s informal structure can therefore be seen in the context of ‘the insistence on the sanctity of national sovereignty which is fundamental to SADCC’s *modus operandi*’ (Anglin, 1983:692). In this sense, Anglin (1983:695) goes on to argue that ‘SADCC’s administrative arm was deliberately kept small, weak and fragmented’, apparently in order to preserve and strengthen each member state’s influence and authority above any other intervention or interference. Under this great challenge to overcome, it was required of SADCC that the member states reconsider the issues of decentralisation (informal and *ad-hoc*-based) versus centralisation (formal and legal-binding) of the organisation. In this context, for SADCC to be much more credited in the post-apartheid era, SADCC (now SADC) was required to do some reformations in order to play a more autonomous role (see Chapter 7).

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50 It is largely referred to as informal agreements and/or informal bargains.
51 According to Thompson, it (the term *etatism*) refers to the exaltation of the state, which leads to subsuming many social and economic activities under a highly centralised state.
Nonetheless, SADCC, which was composed of newly independent states, aimed not at establishing regional (economic) integration but at enhancing regional cooperation placing emphasis on the role of individual states in areas of coordination, such as transport and communication, manufacturing and agriculture. This determined the character of SADCC’s organisational structure focusing on the sectoral responsibility approach in attempting to avoid a supra-national, centralised or bureaucratic system.

The decentralised nature of SADCC, which was an explicit rejection of neo-functionalist regional integration\(^{52}\), ultimately was to help not only to protect each country’s national dignity and sovereignty, but also to soothe the fragmentation and diversity caused by a colonial influence of unequal regional development. That is, in terms of its emphasis and promotion of ‘equality’ among member states, the decentralised structure through a sectoral responsibility approach was advantageous to SADCC which was fighting against apartheid and racial inequality. Moreover, the informality and decentralisation of SADCC contributed to the creation of a Southern African identity through ‘fostering a spirit of ‘we’ among its members, as opposed to excessive centralisation, which would result in SADCC being perceived as ‘they’ by the member states – a factor which weakened regional integration efforts in Africa’ (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:72; see also SADC 2000:23).

### 5.5 Politico-Military Security Cooperation

In the Southern African region, the regional conflictual framework (which evolved particularly out of the rivalry (in 1979-1980) between the FLS and apartheid South Africa) was a focal point to militarise the region. In this period, as pointed out earlier, the two power blocs were promoting SADCC and CONSAS respectively as future regional orders in Southern Africa. Consequently, material (economic and military resources) and ideological (anti- or pro-apartheid) clashing confrontations were a critical event in shaping the politico-military security environment of alliance, conflict, and destabilisation in the region (Evans, 1986:1-2).

\(^{52}\) The neo-functionalist approach is problematic for its ultimate focus on supranationalism for both SADC and ASEAN. For those weak states in these two regions which prioritise state-building/nation-building, not even the least viable state in both regions is willing to abandon sovereignty and/or independence for political integration (for the study of neo-functionalist, see Haas, 1968:24-27; Nye, 1971:224-226; Hurrell, 1995a:348-349; 1995b:59-61).
Both ASEAN and SADCC were unable to form a formal military alliance like NATO mainly due to the lack of military capability. ASEAN largely approached regional security problems through political consultation and consensus building rather than a military alliance strategy (see Chapter 4). While SADCC, as an extension of the FLS\(^53\), played a significant role in the politico-military security arena, with being instrumental in mobilising economic and military assistance from both within and without the region.

Moreover, the absence of regional power\(^54\) in Southeast Asia is seen as an important variable to prevent the two different blocs of ASEAN and Vietnam from forming a military alliance against each other. In terms of power structure, whereas Southern Africa was characterised by a uni-polar system, Southeast Asia had a multi-polar structure without relatively having a dominant power in the region. Although Vietnam had a military power, its power was limited to occupy and communise Indochina alone. And its power was only possible within the Soviet Union’s client. Furthermore, Vietnam was not equipped with a strong ‘econom[y] to support any bid for regional hegemony’ (Buzan, 1988:5). On the contrary, South Africa was a regional superpower that was strong enough to dominate other states in military and economic terms in the region. This point was an important determinant to evoke the emergence of the FLS-led (political and military) alliance against the white South African regime.

Meanwhile, during the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa’s policy of destabilisation of the region left a deeper and broader apartheid legacy of flashpoints. The SADCC’s role in the politico-military security cooperation was largely seen as a defensive response to this policy of South Africa. Though first initiated by military strategists, the destabilisation led by the Total Strategy was not a simple militarist strategy (Davies and O’meara, 1985:185). Rather, the means of destabilisation were comprehensively utilised by the South African white regime in terms of the target (black) states’ political, economic and military vulnerabilities and penetrability (Geldenhuys, 1995:44-45).

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\(^{53}\) The FLS was seen as an informal political (military) alliance (see Khadiagala, 1994:18-45).

\(^{54}\) Although Vietnam was partially seen as a regional power against the ASEAN bloc in Southeast Asia, during the Cold War, the ASEAN states, in particular Malaysia and Indonesia, saw China as a greater threat to the region than Vietnam. Even though Malaysia and Indonesia collaborated in pressuring Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, they preferred to see a Vietnam that would play a balancing role against China (Khong, 1997:334; see Chapter 4).
The destabiliser sought to dissolve the newly independent black states in the region with supporting the rebel groups (e.g. UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique) economically and militarily. The economic and military actions, in this sense, were closely linked. The four surrogate armies 55 all focused on economic targets, particularly transport links including roads, railways, and oil pipelines (Hanlon, 1987:28).

This implies that the region was a battleground in which it was divisive and further fragmented among and within the newly independent states. Consequently, as Zacarias (2003:34) notes, ‘the region witnessed increased militarisation, on the one hand by forces that viewed colonial regimes as hampering their freedom, independence, and security and on the other hand by the colonial powers, who saw their acquired benefits and interests in peril’. This indicates that economic and political stability in the region were deeply connected with the military security.

Despite South Africa’s economic and military pressures on its neighbours, the SADCC states endeavoured to respond to the destabilisation of South Africa. Mozambique was, in particular, a critical point for not only realising the SADCC’s economic development (transport) project, but also responding to the politico- military threats from, in particular, South Africa. On the one hand, the former, as previously mentioned, indicates that the country’s ports and harbours would give the SADCC states the substantial alternative route to diminish dependence on South African transport facilities. On the other hand, the latter indicates that the country served as a military base for both Zimbabwean guerrillas (during the period of sanctions against Rhodesia) and ANC guerrillas against white South African regime.

By 1984, with its mounting military vulnerability to the continually growing insurgency of the rebel group RENAMO, the FRELIMO government of Mozambique was substantially weakened with a great loss of its popularity due to the desperate economic security situation56. In addition, by then, Mozambique’s president Machel was convinced that

55 UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique, LLA in Lesotho, and the so-called ‘super-ZAPU’ in Zimbabwe.

56 The South African-supported RENAMO was spreading havoc in the countryside, and gradually increasing its field of activities. The hardships of FRELIMO government were intensified by the worst drought of the century which had forced over 100,000 peasants to migrate to Zimbabwe in search of food, and left approximately 300,000 people either dying from
once the military support from the Soviet bloc began to diminish, the Marxist government was obliged to turn to the aid from the West (Legum, 1987:93-94). Faced with these complex crises from both military and economic threats, Machel conceded to a security treaty with South Africa, the Nkomati Accord, signed at their border in March 1984. According to the resulting Accord on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness, Mozambique expelled ANC leaders in exchange for South Africa’s pledge to end support for RENAMO (Legum, 1987:95-96).

During the post-Nkomati Accord, though, after noticing that South Africa neither disarmed RENAMO, nor did it dismantle its military bases, Mozambique officially suspended the Accord in October 1985 (Isaacman, 1988:25-26). Nonetheless, the break-up of the Accord led to the further consolidation of military cooperation between Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and later on Malawi. The connection between FRELIMO’s survival and SADCC’s regional security increased pressures for these regional allies’ commitment to Mozambique to resist South African destabilisation efforts57 (Khadiagala, 1994:195-199).

Moreover, the Mozambique government also succeeded in obtaining additional international military assistance. For example, in 1986, Britain offered to arm and train a force of 600 troops, and by 1987 the Commonwealth agreed to provide military aids to protect core economic development (transport) projects (Isaacman, 1988:33). During the late 1980s, whereas the Mozambican government was able to gather security assistances from the West, including Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy (Baynham, 1989:91), RENAMO was unable not only to guarantee its leadership with a cohesive popular support, but also to garner any support from both black and the Western countries (Isaacman, 1988:34).

During the late 1980s, change within South Africa appeared, resulting from, among

57 In terms of regional military self-reliance, there were a number of efforts to increase military assistance to Mozambique. For instance, in 1985, the Tanzanian president, Nyerere, agreed to train Mozambican recruits to fight in the northern provinces. Zimbabwe also committed three thousand combat men, backed by a further two thousand in support troops. Malawi and Mozambique signed the Lilongwe Agreement in 1986, which called for coordinated efforts against RENAMO.
other factors, regional and extra-regional pressures\textsuperscript{58}. South Africa’s own economic and military strengths were substantially damaged and weakened (see Brown, 1991:284-288). Beginning in late 1988, the change inside South Africa contributed to the resolution of regional conflict with ending the policy of destabilisation\textsuperscript{59}. In addition, South Africa renegotiated the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in 1988. By 1989, with Namibian independence and F.W. de Klerk’s election in South Africa, the conditions for regional security had much bettered.

5.6 Conclusion

The end of destabilisation led to the elimination of apartheid in the Southern African region. Despite substantial political and economic differences, together with ideological (politico-economic) diversity\textsuperscript{60}, the FLS succeeded in establishing SADCC in order to tackle the most important dual security problems (economic and military threats). While the SADCC member states, in particular the FLS states, opted to bear considerable economic and military costs for their anti-apartheid resistance to South Africa, they tried to mobilise international support for decolonisation and racial equality in the region. Moreover, the SADCC states did not overlook the importance of the close interconnection between economic and politico-military security cooperation. As was seen in the case of Mozambique, survival of each member state could be the overall security of the organisation.

\textsuperscript{58} By 1986 most of South Africa’s trading partners had exercised some form of international economic sanctions. The U.S congress passed a sanctions package despite the objections of the Reagan administration. Even the Thatcher government in Britain, long considered as South Africa’s strongest Western ally, agreed to Commonwealth and European Community voluntary ‘measures’ restricting trade with South Africa (see Klotz, 1995:3-4).

\textsuperscript{59} In the late 1980s, South Africa reduced, and even eliminated its support for rebel groups such as RENAMO. In addition, South Africa no longer launched commando raids against its neighbours and imposed no new economic sanctions on them (see Brown, 1991:282).

\textsuperscript{60} For example, while the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), which have been members of SACU, emphasised foreign investment and a freely convertible currency, Mozambique and Tanzania stressed respectively Marxist and socialist centralisation and state ownership. Political variations were also substantial, with traditional monarchies, parliamentary systems, and one-party states (see Klotz, 1995:81).
Throughout the origin and evolution of SADCC, the organisation managed to succeed, to some extent, in diminishing and clearing the fears of members of losing their independence by allocating sectoral responsibilities to each member state in order to put more emphasis on the matter of ‘equality’ rather than ‘equity’. Moreover, the SADCC states (particularly the member countries of the FLS) committed themselves to a unique style of alliance\textsuperscript{61} to resist South African destabilisation efforts as evidenced by Mozambique. ASEAN, on the other hand, played the role of conflict manager through a measure of diplomacy and dialogue without forming a military alliance against its common external threat. ASEAN consolidated a collective identity of the ‘ASEAN Way’ which was generated mainly by its political security interdependence, neither by their economic nor military security interdependence. For example, in the case of Cambodian conflict, ASEAN chose to neutralise the Vietnamese threat not through implementing collective (military) defence, but through applying collective diplomacy, (e.g. fashioning anti-Vietnamese coalitions, within the UN and throughout the international arena). In contrast with the non-military way of resolving the regional security problems in ASEAN, SADCC relied largely upon the FLS’ politico-military cooperation by eliciting military assistance not only from inside the region, but also outside.

As ASEAN was approaching the regional security problems by consensus, SADCC also attempted to form a consensual collective-identity based primarily on the principle of racial equality informed by Pan-Africanism. In so doing, SADCC was instrumental not only in promoting the ideology of anti-apartheid consensus, but also in meeting practically the economic and military security needs for the member states. That is, just as ASEAN advanced the norms of non-intervention and non-use of force as an ASEAN consensus that helped the member states forge a common position toward the Cambodian issue, SADCC also shared the belief that as long as apartheid was alive, security in the region was far aloof.

In terms of flexibility in resolving the regional security problems, the ASEAN states were relatively flexible in utilising America’s and, later on, China’s intervention and support against Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its use of force in Cambodia at the

\textsuperscript{61}Unlike conventional alliance, which was largely formed in line with the East-West rivalry during the Cold War, SADCC opted to follow an unconventional alliance that was inclusive to the Western as well as the Eastern bloc.
expense of its norm of regional autonomy providing a ‘regional solution to regional problems’. Likewise, SADCC also avoided the fixed framework of conventional (East-West) rivalry with a view to seeking substantial security aid from the Western as well as the Eastern bloc.

The presence of the apartheid ideology of South Africa was the focal point to distinguish SADCC’s security regionalism from that of ASEAN, which was devoid of that kind of racial conflict. The domestic ideology of apartheid not only led to the value and meaning of norm such as racial equality throughout the African continent, but also affected the creation and evolution of SADCC. Furthermore, it played a critical role in bringing about the counterforce from regional, continental and global arena. Within the dialectic among these forces and with particularly forming the FLS and SADCC, the black-majority states of Southern Africa took the risk of paying a substantial cost to regain regional security of justice and freedom based on racial equality.

The move towards amity in the post-apartheid Southern African region coincided with the transformation of SADCC into SADC (1992) which expanded to include the regional power, South Africa. In the face of a changing, and increasingly complex, regional and global environment, SADCC was challenged to change and transform its cooperative and integrative strategy so that it would enable the countries of the region to cope with the problems from external as well as internal forces more effectively. Furthermore, in the absence of apartheid Southern Africa, it has been asserted that the region’s security should be enhanced by balanced and concerted cooperation to address the region’s new security challenges and/or hidden conflicts (such as the protracted civil war in Angola) which emerged in the post-Cold War era (Van Aardt, 1997:3; also Swatuk and Omari, 1997:90-103; Söderbaum, 2001:108-110).

Within the new circumstances of the post-Cold War security environment for Southern Africa, therefore, it became imperative for SADC to set up its own security mechanism for enhancing regional security. As will be discussed in chapter 7, for instance, although the SADC Organ (OPDS) was not initially integrated into the SADC structure (so that

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62 In the security field in the post-Cold War era, the United States has little strategic interest in Africa so that it is reluctant to be involved: rather, the US government ‘expects … African regional organisations to manage conflicts in that continent’ (see Alagappa, 1995:359; also Fry, 2000:120; Chapter 1).
the security mechanism was deeply divided), the emergence of the Organ can be viewed as the evolutionary process of structures such as the FLS, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), SADCC, SADC, the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), and the OPDS in order to react to the security challenges from both internal and external ones (see Chapter 7).

In the post-apartheid Southern African region, nonetheless, the effect and role of such norms as racial equality (which played a critical role in bringing forth the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa) got relatively weakened. What is important, yet, is that regional norms and ideas are still important for not only constructing politico-security regionalisms in both SADC and ASEAN, but also being constructed and reconstructed by the member states of each regional organisation. In this context, hence, the fundamental mechanisms of SADC politico-security regionalism in the post-Cold War era will be explored by comparing SADC with ASEAN in chapter 7.
CHAPTER 6  POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CONTINUITY AND CHALLENGE TO THE ‘ASEAN WAY’ IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

6.1 Introduction

In Southeast Asia, the collapse of the Cold War initially marked optimistic future prospects for ASEAN's vision of regional order. Of primary importance, Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989 and that conflict's formal settlement in 1991 eliminated the most prominent contradiction to the idea of ZOPFAN in ASEAN (see Chapter 4). It was also hopeful in the fact that the ending of great power rivalries was likely to promise the beginning of a new era in the ASEAN region. Following the Cold War's collapse, moreover, ASEAN extended its functions, enlarged its members, and kept a championship in Asia's nascent multilateral economic and security forums – (the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which was established in 1993). At the same time,

63 In 1992, the Singapore Summit brought forth several important changes to ASEAN's basic framework. For instance, the heads of government now meet every three years, with informal gatherings in the interim. In addition, the secretary-general of the ASEAN Secretariat was renamed the secretary-general of ASEAN and given ministerial (as opposed to the previous ambassadorial) status. The secretary-general's new responsibilities were to initiate, advise, coordinate and implement ASEAN activities. Moreover, ASEAN institutionalised an annual Senior Officials Meeting-Post-Ministerial Conference (SOM-PMC) as part of its effort to increase discussion of regional security initiatives with non-ASEAN governments in the region. Finally, in 1992, an ASEAN Senior Official Meeting that brought together officials from foreign and defence ministries to discuss regional security was also institutionalised (see ASEAN 1992; also Chapter 1).

64 Vietnam became the first of the four mainland Southeast Asian countries to enter ASEAN in July 1995. Two years later, ASEAN admitted Laos and Myanmar as members of the organisation. After the restoration of political stability, Cambodia was admitted to the organisation on 30 April 1999 (see Gates and Than, 2001:1; also Chapter 1).

65 The Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Ministerial Conference, which were held in Singapore on 23-25 July 1993, agreed to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 (see ARF, 1994; also Chapter 1).
however, the end of the Cold War also evoked a number of significant challenges.

Under the circumstances, ASEAN witnessed the transformation of the regional security context which was created by the geo-political shifts. In this regard, Southeast Asia’s primary concern in terms of conventional security challenges was the prospect that ‘China might use its growing military might to challenge the existing regional order and project its influence southwards’ causing anxiety in ASEAN about China’s intentions (Felker, 2001:224). Following the Cold War and the settlement of the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN and China were no longer in alliance confronting Vietnam (for the reasons why ASEAN and China were in alliance during the Cold War, see Chapter 4).

By 1992, moreover, US military retrenchment combined with the closing of US bases in the Philippines once again raised ASEAN concerns about security, while China’s growing military power could well be deployed against the interests of one or more ASEAN states66. In combination with the geo-strategic changes of the ASEAN region after the Cold War, on the other hand, by the early 1990s, ASEAN faced the falling-outs of the globalisation process – that is, the widening and deepening hegemony of the neo-liberal orthodoxy (expressed clearly in the creation of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989); growing fears of exclusive regional blocs such as the European Community (now EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the liberalisation of the Chinese economy, itself competing for scarce financial capital (Kelly, 1999:183).

Within this new and novel context of the political and economic security environment, ASEAN made a number of efforts to resist the aforementioned challenges from both regional and global forces. In terms of politico-security arena, ASEAN pursued a leadership role in the Asia Pacific multilateral forum (ARF) (see 6.2). In terms of economic security cooperation, furthermore, ASEAN members have sought to react to the global forces through utilising such various economic strategies as the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in 1991 and ASEAN + 3 in 1997 (see 6.4).

66 This apprehension was reinforced in February 1995 when it was revealed that Chinese naval forces had seized the unoccupied Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, claimed also by the Philippines, some 130 miles off the coast of the Philippines island of Palawan (see Leifer, 1996:16-20).
Nevertheless, new types of non-traditional security affairs in Southeast Asia appeared in the late 1990s. In particular, ASEAN’s paralysis over regional crises in 1997-2000 (the Asian economic crisis and the problem of East Timor) engulfed Southeast Asia and further reduced ASEAN’s credibility of playing a leadership role in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Thus, the consequence of the changed pattern of regional alignments, the international economic climate as well as the emergence of new security threats in the ASEAN region evoked the need to re-evaluate ASEAN’s role, which was felt even more acutely than in times past.

While the future shape of regional order is difficult to foresee, a number of ASEAN’s actions in the 1990s could affect ASEAN regionalism especially with regard to political security cooperation in an unstable and uncertain time (cf Euarukskul, 1998:248-266). In terms of the political security dimension, as mentioned in chapter 2, Buzan et al (1998:141) argue that ‘[i]n some sense, all security is political. All threats and defences are constituted and defined politically’. In this context, it can be assumed that the political sector, to some extent, is problematic in studying regional security cooperation within ASEAN because of its nature of the broadness. However, given the fact that the contemporary regionalism is composed of multi-dimensional features (Hettne, 1994; Hurrell 1995a; 1995b), the political sector is rather conducive to illuminating the mechanism(s) of ASEAN regionalism especially with regard to regional security cooperation. In that regard, the political security dimension, in particular, remains helpful to examine the extent and scope of the ASEAN’s viability in the post-Cold War era.

This chapter examines the processes and patterns of ASEAN security cooperation in the context of the contemporary politico-security regionalism in the post-Cold War era. In doing so, it will illuminate the mechanisms of regional security and regionalism in ASEAN with focusing on the most important efforts made by the organisation. These can largely be classified with the three different parts of regional security cooperation in ASEAN involving the emergence of the ARF, conflict management in the ASEAN region, and ASEAN’s response to the Asian economic crisis (1997-1998). All of these parts of regional security cooperation in ASEAN will highlight the ASEAN’s continuous adherence to the norms of the ‘ASEAN Way’ such as non-interference, even though ASEAN has been severely challenged to reform the ASEAN Way from both internal and external forces especially since the outbreak of the regional crises during 1997-2000.
In the first part of the ASEAN’s politico-security cooperation (see 6.2), ASEAN endeavoured to advance its role and position particularly in two ways, viz. transferring the expediency of ASEAN diplomatic security culture as regional identity to the ARF, but also engaging China as an emerging regional power through using multilateralism. In this context, the ARF’s efforts in line with ASEAN’s intra-mural diplomatic culture (which avoided formal negotiations and legally binding security commitments) will be examined first. The focus will be on the character and pattern of ASEAN’s regional attempt to transplant the ‘ASEAN Way’ (particularly the style of a non-confrontational, informal and consensual decision-making system) into a wider regional setting and make it the foundation of an ‘Asia Pacific Way’ of multilateralism (Acharya, 1997a; 1999b).

Following the analysis of the aforementioned concerns related to the ARF, the second part of the ASEAN’s politico-security cooperation will focus on conflict management in the ASEAN region. In this section, it will explore the ASEAN’s mechanisms of conflict management in dealing with the two important regional security issues involving the South China Sea conflict (1992-2004) and the East Timor crisis (1999-2000)\(^{67}\). The former will be conducive to understanding the ASEAN member states’ way of approaching regional conflict in the South China Sea which is seen as one of the most contentious issues of current security problems in the region. The latter can also be regarded as an important event for both ASEAN and the ARF which were criticised for their ineffectiveness to address an intra-state conflict within the ASEAN region. In this context, the East Timor crisis will be instrumental in reflecting the effects and limits of the ASEAN Way as a response to the crisis (see 6.3).

Furthermore, the next section (6.4) will explore how ASEAN managed to make the norms of the ASEAN Way viable especially after the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998. By implication, this will be conducive to understanding the capacity of ASEAN to

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\(^{67}\) Although the East Timor crisis (1999-2000) can largely be regarded as one of outcomes resulting from the economic crisis, this chapter will discuss the crisis in the section of conflict management in the ASEAN region. Because the East Timor crisis was not a direct product of economic factors, but rather the crisis that broke out in 1999 can be viewed as the by-product of the Asian Economic crisis that worked as the catalyst of a number of new security threats (see Cotton, 2001:133; Van Ness, 2000:264; Murphy, 2000:225-227; Palmujoki, 2001:124).
fulfil its functions beyond traditional security issues. In terms of the Asian economic crisis, in particular, the chapter will focus on the impact of the economic crisis on the norms of the ASEAN Way such as non-intervention and/or non-interference. In doing so, the chapter will illuminate whether and to what extent the ASEAN Way has been preserved and/or compromised. For the analysis of the character and style of regional politico-security cooperation, in this way, the chapter seeks to look at the relational mechanisms of norms, identity and interests in the ASEAN Way context.

From a constructivist perspective of international relations, given the fact that the identities and interests of actors are constructed within the context of different processes of interactions, norms are not only defined by actors but also (re)defined by them. That is, the norms of the ASEAN Way such as non-intervention, which are the shared beliefs of ASEAN leaders, can be reshaped through political and social interactions. Under the circumstances, this chapter will highlight regional politico-security cooperation practices in ASEAN that deal with the security challenges of (recent) multiple regional problems which impacted on the mechanism of politico-security regionalism in Southeast Asia, often represented as the ‘ASEAN Way’.

6.2 The Emergence of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): The impact of the ‘ASEAN Way’ on the ARF

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established in 1993. It is the first multilateral security forum covering the Asia Pacific region and has eighteen founding members, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, the USA, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the EU, Russia, China, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam and Laos. In a changed context of the post-Cold War era, ASEAN determined to uphold the development of a multilateral security forum in the Asia Pacific region with conforming to its norms of regional autonomy as expressed through the ZOPFAN framework (see Chapter 4). But ASEAN member states began gradually to feel sceptical of maintaining its official adherence to ZOPFAN, especially after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese occupation in Cambodia in 1989. ASEAN’s practice of diluting the norm of regional autonomy in resolving the Cambodian conflict helped increase the questions about its continued relevance in a multilateral security

68 Myanmar, Cambodia and India subsequently joined the group, increasing its membership at the end of 1997 to twenty-one, while North Korea was admitted in 2000.
forum in the Asia Pacific region. This implied, as mentioned in chapter 4, that ASEAN came to turn its attention from ‘inward’ (or exclusiveness) to ‘outward’ (or inclusiveness) orientation in managing the security problems in a number of sectors, which challenged, to some extent, the ASEAN’s primary norm of emphasising the non-intervention principle.

In the post-Cold War context, as mentioned earlier, ASEAN made several efforts to keep the organisation alive, such as: ASEAN’s 1992 decision to identify security as a formal area of ASEAN cooperation toward ‘inclusiveness’; its 1993 creation of the ARF; its ongoing efforts to detail an ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) Protocol; and its 1995 signing of the SEANWFZ Treaty. All of these attempts were ASEAN’s efforts to accomplish a key role of ASEAN in expanded regional processes. Of these records, ASEAN’s most ambitious one – to manage security in a new era – is embodied in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). As Kahler (2000:555) notes, the ARF is composed of heterogeneous participants but with a ‘thin institutional framework’. Its operational practices basically follow the ASEAN’s principle and norms, i.e. consensus (non-voting) and gradual progress comfortable to all members. Although the ARF adopted the ASEAN’s TAC as its code of conduct, the forum’s agenda is not based on legally binding pacts of any kind. However, ASEAN came to face a conflict between the Western style of legal base and the Asian style of consensus. Indeed, this conflict incited ASEAN members to reject the proposals of security framework after Western institutions (Ba, 1997:644-647).

Within the development of the ARF process, there have been different attempts to view the creation of the ARF by different scholars arguing from a range of approaches. The liberal perspective is well pointed out by Evans (1993:16), the former Australian foreign minister, who emphasised the idea of ‘cooperative security’. In defining the idea, he emphasises ‘reassurance rather than deterrence; inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness’ … and ‘assumes that states are primary actors in the security system,

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69 During the ASEAN Singapore Summit of 1992, ASEAN leaders pronounced their common concern about unstable developments in the Asia-Pacific region and ramifications that instability might have in Southeast Asia. In a joint declaration, the ASEAN Heads of States announced ASEAN’s intention to move from purely intra-ASEAN security to enhanced security by increasing security cooperation with other states in the Asia-Pacific region (see ASEAN, 1992).
but accepts that non-state actors may have a significant role to play’ (Evans, 1993:16). In emphasising the idea of cooperative security, Simon (1998:209) also, from a liberal view, pointed out that the creation of joint cooperative military actions, as well as trust and transparency measures would be conducive to the creation of mutual confidence, which would ultimately make the idea of cooperative security possible through the ARF.

However, Acharya (1997a:343; 2001:174-177), from a constructivist approach, argues that the ARF is not just material and interest-driven but ideational and identity-driven as well. Instead of limiting the focus to the structural and material substance of the ARF, he emphasises the importance of the process through which multilateral interactions take place. Hence, he highlights the ideas, cultural norms, and collective identity which play a significant role in understanding the ARF process. In so doing, he contends that the uniqueness of the ASEAN Way is imprinted in several aspects of the evolitional process of the ARF.

Since the inception of the ARF, the ASEAN member states pursued a leading role in the ARF. Although the non-ASEAN states in the ARF expressed unhappiness about ASEAN’s proprietorial claim to the ARF, for the great powers, there were a number of benefits to following ASEAN’s lead in the creation of the ARF70(Narine, 2002:111). Yet, there are also different views pertaining to the leading role of ASEAN in the ARF. For instance, as Leifer (1996:41) noted, the non-ASEAN states conceded the title ‘ASEAN Regional Forum’ as a transitional measure only, expecting that in time the structure would become known as the Asian Regional Forum, reflecting its true scope and membership. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that ASEAN is basically cautious of extra-regional proposals for regional order because of historic vulnerability to manipulations by external powers, including those considered to be their security guarantors (Ba, 1997:644-645). Furthermore, in launching the ARF and setting its initial direction, according to Acharya (1999b:65), ASEAN exercised a form of ‘soft-power leadership’71 which may be regarded as an important feature of the ASEAN Way in

70 ASEAN had a much better chance of getting China to the multilateral table than any Western-inspired institution; and China has been willing to uphold ASEAN’s leadership role in the ARF (see Narine, 2002:111-112).

71 ‘ASEAN’s interest in the ARF was prompted by a realisation that a multilateral forum launched proactively under its own sponsorship would enable it to moderate the rivalry among the region’s major powers, the US, China and Japan, and prevent them from ignoring the
terms of the norms of consultations and consensus. Within this context, Anthony (2003a:9) argues as follows:

These (ASEAN’s) mechanisms [of the ASEAN Way] can therefore be categorised as low-key security approaches that promote trust and confidence-building through established habits of dialogue, observance of regional norms and the building of loose/informal institutions to support these process-oriented approaches to preventing regional conflicts.

From the outset of ARF, the ASEAN members strived to transplant ASEAN norms onto the evolutionary process of the ARF. More specifically, the norms enshrined in ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), along with a number of ASEAN conventions, served as the essential bases of the ARF’s process in its formative years. Of particular note is a document titled ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper’ prepared by ASEAN in 1995. The concept paper highlights a ‘gradual’ and ‘evolutionary’ approach to security collaboration: the paper stipulated that the ARF’s rules of procedure should be based on ASEAN principles and practices and that decisions should be made by consensus (and without voting) after cautious and extensive consultations; it also adopts comprehensive security approaches covering military and non-military issues (see ASEAN, 1995a).

Moreover, the concept paper envisages three stages of security cooperation: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution. However, the paper shows that there are unclear distinctions between confidence-building measures (CBMs), preventive diplomacy (PD) and conflict resolution. In other words, CBMs and the other measures are overlapping in terms of the common use of norms such as non-interference and non-use of force in each measure (see ASEAN, 1995a). Furthermore, while CBMs and PD measures may contribute to preventing conflict, the issue of conflict resolution can be regarded as one of the most contentious aspects on the security agenda of the ARF. Attempts at resolving existing territorial disputes such as the South China Sea conflict among the ARF members can threaten regional order (Acharya, 2001:177;1997b:10-32; see also 6.3.1).

security interests of the region’s weaker states’ (see Acharya, 1999b:65).
Nevertheless, despite a number of practical defects in the concept paper for the ARF, it should be noted that because the ARF is an ASEAN-led process, the development of the ARF will follow an evolutionary approach. As indicated in chapter 4, the origin and evolution of ASEAN – in particular, the development of its norms and principles – provide a clear understanding on how the ARF will be likely to evolve as a multilateral security forum in the years ahead. In this sense, it is important to note that the concept paper used the term ‘participants’ for differentiating it from the status of membership associated with ASEAN.

Under ASEAN’s direction, the ARF opted for a thin institutional structure consisting of its annual foreign ministers conclave, as well as the Senior Officials Meeting (ARF-SOM) that precedes it by a few months. Moreover, through its annual ministerial meetings, the Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs), the inter-sessional activities and the numerous Track I and Track II meetings, the ARF has formed a series of formal and informal networks across the Asia Pacific region. These networks in turn have created important ‘social capital’ – a bundle of trust, familiarity, ease and comfort – which could become a significant asset at critical periods of conflict prevention and management (Anthony, 2003a:10-11).

Given that the ARF decisions are also determined by consensus and not by unanimity, the rule of consensual decision-making is a logical mechanism for reassuring member states that the institution will ‘not undermine sovereignty nor impinge on national unity’ (Johnston, 1999:298). It is argued that in the context of pluralistic cultures, consensus decision-making is viewed as proper because it lessens inter-group conflicts (Johnston, 1999:296-298). Being suspicious of rigid multilateral institutionalisation, China also supports ASEAN’s approach to pursuing a careful and incremental progress in the ARF’s security agenda, in contrast to the fast-track approach favoured by the ARF’s Western members (Acharya, 2001:174). Moreover, the ARF rejected the idea of a secretariat, although especially in the wake of the Asian economic crisis, proposals for an ARF secretariat were made (Acharya, 2001:183). Since the inception of the ARF, therefore, it can be argued that with eschewing rigid institutionalism and accepting informality, the ARF was affected and shaped by important characteristics of the ‘ASEAN Way’.

It is clear that ASEAN has been quite successful in promoting its norms and principles in the ARF. However, some scholars are sceptical about the idea of the ‘ASEAN Way’
within the ARF. For instance, Evans (2000:158) stressed that the ASEAN model on the Asia Pacific multilateral security approach is 'neither as consistent nor as static as it first appears'\(^{72}\). Furthermore, Leifer (1996:55) acutely criticised the ARF as a 'highly imperfect diplomatic instrument for coping with the new and uncertain security context'. Nonetheless, Acharya (1997a:343) supported the future prospects of the ARF in line with the ASEAN Way's value as follows:

> The ASEAN Way, despite its practical limitations, has been a useful symbol for regional policy makers to advance their process of socialisation. It has helped ... us to understand not only why multilateralism is emerging in the Asia Pacific right now, but more importantly, which type of multilateralism is emerging and will prove viable in the end.

From the perspective of ASEAN members, it is evident that the emergence of the ARF is identity-driven\(^{73}\) although the members were also motivated by material interests in search for a multilateral security framework for the region. Indeed, the 'ASEAN Way' can, in particular, be regarded as the socialising mechanism for ASEAN in the context of engaging other countries in the region, most notably China, in the process of security dialogue (see 6.3.1.1; and 6.3.1.2).

Yet, for ASEAN, there have been unfruitful attempts to respond to the late 1990s’ crises caused by internal and external forces, which threatened to diminish the credibility of its norms and leading role in the ARF. Under the circumstance, Narine (2002:33; 106-112) repudiates the utility of the ‘ASEAN Way’ implanted in the ARF. He argues that the viability of the ASEAN Way was limited to intra-ASEAN relations in the Cold War era and earlier times. In a new context of a multilateral security forum demanding incrementally binding and strong institutionalised structures, the ASEAN Way will be symptomatic of the non-ASEAN states’ growing complaints caused by the inefficiency and weakness of these institutions. In terms of the politics of the ASEAN Way, nevertheless, it is important to note that the ASEAN members have kept emphasising

\(^{72}\) In this sense, Evans (2000:158) argues that the ‘ASEANisation’ thesis on the current phase of the ARF could be exaggerated.

\(^{73}\) The emergence of Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions (ARF) is ‘not just interest-driven, but identity-driven’ (see Acharya, 1997a:319-346).
the value of enhancing not only collective identity within the region, but also the norm-driven regional ideas as a means of ASEAN’s mechanisms of conflict management.

In the post-Cold War era, meanwhile, the ASEAN member states were confronted with the prospect of diminishing superpower rivalry in the region. Simultaneously, the ASEAN states came to acknowledge the rising military and economic power of China. Because of its potential economic and military power, China would eventually pose the biggest challenge to Southeast Asia as well as the Asia Pacific system. Despite the position of the United States as de facto global hegemon, almost everyone agrees that China is a rising power in the world: whether to accommodate, contain or resist China will depend on future developments that none can foresee, including Chinese ambitions, the policies of other international players (the U.S., Japan), and the cohesion or fragility of the ASEAN member states (Stuart-Fox, 2004:116). As Chinese power grows, therefore, the challenge of China would be felt seriously by the ASEAN states because China, according to Singh (1997:131), ‘is not far away but shares borders with Southeast Asia, indeed has territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea’.

6.3 Conflict Management in the ASEAN Region

Given the above circumstances, in terms of inter-state conflicts in the ASEAN region, section 6.3.1 will focus on how the ASEAN member countries attempted to utilise the Asia-Pacific multilateral forum (ARF) in dealing with the scope and any possibility that China might resort to the threat or use of force to enforce territorial and jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea against ASEAN claimants. In terms of intra-state conflicts in the ASEAN region, thereafter, section 6.3.2 will explore whether and to what extent the ASEAN states responded to the East Timor crisis so as to illuminate the implications of approaching intra-state conflict management in the region. Given the politics of the ASEAN Way as a response to regional security problems, it is opportune to examine the way, approach and modus operandi of addressing the intra-state conflict as well as inter-state conflict in the ASEAN region. In this context, both the South China Sea conflict and the East Timor crisis will be conducive to understanding not only the type and style, but also the extent and scope of the ASEAN’s mechanisms of conflict management in the region (see 6.3.1 and 6.3.2).
6.3.1 The South China Sea Conflict (1992-2004)

6.3.1.1 Historical background: the origin and evolution of the conflict

The South China Sea is an area of competing claims involving China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines in which the determination of sovereignty has become significant for the ability not only to seize a point of military-strategic importance, but also to exploit oil, gas, and fishing resources. The military and economic values of its geographical location as well as at least 6 countries' competing claims of the area has posed a great threat to the peace and security of the Southeast Asian region. China, Vietnam and Taiwan have been the most aggressive in pursuing their claims. Much of the ASEAN states' current conflict with China revolves around Chinese behaviour in the disputed Spratly Islands. China’s claims to the area were initially motivated by the rights on historical grounds to regain the 'lost territories' taken from China during its humiliation under the colonial powers in the 19th century. In this context, Chinese officials argued that ‘at least as early as the Song Dynasty (960-1279 AD), the Chinese government had already … included the (Spratly and Paracel) islands as part of its territory without being challenged by any other state’ (Sheng, 1995:2). However, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, being

74 ‘To safeguard their respective claims to territory, the claimants tried to support their claims in many ways – using military force, showing the flag, …, establishing structures and markers on islands, …, enacting laws, …, publicising maps showing claims, releasing historical documents to substantiate claims, allowing tourists and journalists to visit ‘their’ islands, and granting concessions to oil companies’ (see Valencia, 2001:528-529).

75 The Spratly Islands are an archipelago stretching across more than 250,000 square kilometres of the South China Sea, consisting of more than 230 landmasses. The Spratlys are claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia. In particular, China claims exclusive sovereignty over most of the Spratlys. However, Vietnam controls 21 to 24 islands in the Spratlys, China 9, Taiwan 1, the Philippines 8, and Malaysia 5. The Paracel and Pratas island groups in the South China Sea are also under dispute but are under the effective control of China and Taiwan, respectively (see Chang Pao-Min, 1990:20; Valencia, 2001:528).

76 Vietnam also bases its South China Sea claims on similar historical grounds and rights of discovery. Hanoi argues that the Vietnamese were ‘the first to discover them in the 7th century and has been exercising its genuine ownership over them in a continuous and peaceful manner’. Vietnam also claims that France annexed the Spratlys and Paracels in the 1950s, which Hanoi
littoral states, claim parts of the South China Sea not on the basis of historical grounds, but changes in international law, which ‘provides the legal basis for coastal states to assert national jurisdiction over extended seas beyond the traditional three-nautical mile limit to twelve-nautical miles, as well as the right to exploit ocean resources up to the two-hundred-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf’ (Mak, 1994:3).

Despite its potential conflict, nevertheless, the competing claims in the South China Sea have not caused large-scale military operations or actions by any party77. During the Cold War period, all the claimants were obsessed with other imminent and pressing events in the region, including the Cambodian Conflict related to communist victories in Indochina. However, the year 1992 changed the landscape of the South China Sea dispute.

In February of 1992, Beijing issued the ‘Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone’78. Through this controversial territorial law, Beijing attempted to reaffirm that all of the territorial waters of the South China Sea belong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Since the passage of the law, ASEAN has been alarmed and impressed with China’s aggressive intentions. Without worrying about superpower intervention, China could obtain greater influence in regional affairs in 1992 when US military presence withdrew in Southeast Asia following the closing of US bases in the Philippines in 1991, as previously noted. This implies that US military disengagement from Southeast Asia provided much bigger flexibility and opportunity for China, a situation that it used to enact the 1992 Law on Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone.

However, the decisive motivations for enacting the law were not only a geo-strategic change of the Southeast Asian regional context (which created a more favourable

77 Any skirmishes over the South China Sea that did occur were between Vietnam and China, as had happened in 1974 and 1988.

78 In Article 10 it is asserted that Beijing will be allowed to order the immediate eviction of foreign naval vessels from the area. Article 14 confirms Beijing’s right to exercise sovereign authority over its territorial waters and contiguous zone using military ships and aircraft (see Stockwin, H. 1992).
environment for Chinese foreign policy), but also the 1982 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was to become effective in 1993. The UNCLOS gave maritime (ASEAN) states the chance to extend their jurisdiction over territorial waters. It appeared to motivate Beijing to reaffirm its claims to all of the South China Sea before the law took effect (Ferguson, 2001:127-130). The 1992 legislation, by implication, was created to pre-empt all of which are littoral or island states by way of preventing the other parties from claiming that the sovereignty of their EEZs or continental shelves were uncontested.

The 1992 Chinese Law on Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone prompted ASEAN to issue the ASEAN Manila Declaration on the South China Sea in July 1992, which was hailed as an initial step toward peaceful settlements of feasible conflicts and rules governing the use of natural resources in the area. The declaration stressed the ‘necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force’, and urged ‘all parties concerned to exercise restraint’ (Morse, 1992:2-3). Moreover, in the 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea, ASEAN introduced ‘a code of international conduct over the South China Sea’. Indeed, the declaration pointed to a number of functionalist issues as motives for the code of conduct. In reality, yet, the declaration was not considered to be a substantial step toward functional cooperation (Palmujoki, 2001:67-68).

Notwithstanding the first ASEAN Declaration on the issues of the South China Sea, ASEAN faced difficulty in projecting a united front on this issue because of the ASEAN states’ own competing claims on the Spratlys, as well as their weak (military) powers vis a vis a China’s strong (military) power which were shown in China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef in 199579 (Felker, 2001:225-226).

Given the circumstances above, it seems that ASEAN countries do not have a common perception of what is in their national interest relating to China in particular terms of the South China Sea conflict. In this sense, it has been argued that the pursuit of national interest and the division amongst the member countries ‘has the potential to fracture ASEAN’ as a regional organisation (Narine, 2002:91). In fact, the ASEAN states are attempting to keep all their choices open. They are engaged in economic relations with China, even as they not only strengthen their ties to other powers, but also promote

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79 The Chinese action on Mischief Reef in 1995, claimed by the Philippines, marked the first encroachment by China into an area claimed by an ASEAN member (cf Acharya, 2001:135).
regional unity. Therefore, ASEAN's ambivalence on the South China Sea issue highlights the divergent interests and perceptions regarding China within the organisation, which may 'cripple ASEAN's ability to reach a consensus on how to deal with China' (Narine, 2002:91).

Under these vulnerabilities of ASEAN in forming regional solidarity vis-à-vis China, with the exception of Brunei, all of the claimants deployed troops to the Spratlys and undertook other measures to promote their claims to sovereignty80 (Narine, 2002:89). As noted above, therefore, it is evident that the South China Sea conflict has been a primary consideration behind the military modernisation programmes and contingency planning of the ASEAN states (Acharya, 2001:136). Yet, China's actions attract more coverage than those of the ASEAN claimants, thus creating the myth that only China is engaged in occupation of islands in the South China Sea. This fact has indicated, according to Collins (2000:146), that 'the legacy of China’s history, its irredentist ambitions in the South China Sea and the growth in its economic and military power point out that China is emerging in Southeast Asia as the regional hegemon'. Within this context, Roy (1995:53) further argues as follows:

[P]erhaps the strongest reason to consider China the most likely contender for regional hegemony in the near future is that intentions usually follow capabilities. ...., China will probably possess unprecedented capabilities, including both the largest population and the largest economy in the world.

Since the outset of the ARF, nonetheless, ASEAN, composed of relatively weak states, has gradually sought to make China comfortable to be engaged in the multilateral forum. As mentioned previously, ASEAN has been quite successful in promoting its norms and principles in the ARF so that China supports the ASEAN's approach to

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80 In addition to the Chinese claim, as previously noted, ASEAN states also lay claim to parts of the South China Sea. The occupation of islands in the South China Sea was begun by the Philippines in the early 1970s, and by 1974 Manila had stationed troops on five islands. Vietnam began occupying islands after reunification in 1975 and continued in the 1980s, taking their number to over 20. By 1996, Vietnam occupied 25 islands with 600 troops. Malaysia began its occupation in the 1980s when it occupied three islands and by 1996 had deployed 70 troops. (see Collins, 2000:145; 219).
pursuing a careful and incremental progress in the ARF’s security agenda. Furthermore, ASEAN has kept emphasising and promoting regional solidarity with a view to engaging China in the ARF, particularly on the issues of the South China Sea. Therefore, although there exist variations in the perspective of ASEAN members on how to deal with the South China Sea conflict (Lee Lai To, 1995:531-543), ASEAN has attempted to manage the conflict through engaging China instead of containing by any means, which will be further explored in the next section.

6.3.1.2 ASEAN’s Approaches to the South China Sea Conflict: Inducing China to be engaged in the ARF

Under the emerging hegemony of China (a new regional power after the Cold War) in the Southeast Asian region, as mentioned above, ASEAN tried to deal with the issues of the South China Sea on the agenda of the ARF, despite a strong initial opposition to it by China. Whereas ASEAN pursued a multilateral approach to the territorial dispute in the South China Sea at the ARF meeting, China was reluctant to accept the inclusion of the dispute on the ARF’s agenda asserting that the ARF could not be a proper instrument for handling contentious issues and that it preferred to deal with the dispute through bilateral negotiations (Leifer, 1999:32). In fact, despite China’s opposition to ‘internationalising’ the issues of the South China Sea at the ARF meeting, ASEAN managed to raise these issues in the 1995 meeting of the ARF (Narine, 2002:89).

Interestingly, although ASEAN tried to collectively mobilise a multilateral approach to the South China Sea dispute, indeed, bilateralism has been historically more comfortable with ASEAN’s experience of not managing contentious issues within the formal ASEAN framework. As mentioned in chapter 4, the history of ASEAN proves that bilateralism has been the preferred mode of conflict management and conflict resolution among the ASEAN members. For examples, the ASEAN states have never invoked a provision for the establishment of a multilateral ‘high council’ in order to consider intra-regional disputes. Territorial disputes between Malaysia and Singapore (Pedra Branca), Malaysia and Indonesia (Sipadan and the Ligitan Islands), and Malaysia and the Philippines (Sabah and the Sulu Sea maritime borders) are handled through informal and ad hoc bilateral contacts or through established bilateral institutions such as the Thai-Malaysia and Indonesia-Malaysia border committees (see Chapter 4). In the wider Asia-Pacific context, moreover, bilateral approaches to conflict-management continue (for the time being) to be more practical than multilateral, as is

For the purpose of attaining the norms of informality, non-confrontation and non-use of force in line with the primary norms of the ARF supported by the ‘ASEAN Way’, therefore, ASEAN countries have had to utilise a double-edged sword approach to the South China Sea conflict. That is, the approach that ASEAN tried to use was informally pursuing bilateralism in order to prevent contentious conflict with China, at the same time, formally opting to use the multilateral forum (the ARF) for resolving the dispute in an incremental progress. As a result of these approaches to the conflict, in 1997, ASEAN proceeded to consider a Chinese draft proposal for a framework for political and economic cooperation, which involved ‘norms of conduct’ for their relations and guidelines for the peaceful settlement of the South China Sea disputes: thereafter, a draft code of conduct circulated by Manila at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 1999 was deemed to have been too legalistic; it took the form of a formal treaty, while other members preferred to take the form of guidelines more consistent with the ASEAN Way (Acharya, 2001:135). However, it was not clear how the code of conduct would differ from the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea and the 1997 ASEAN-China joint statement on the South China Sea, though the Philippines suggested that the code would be a more binding instrument. China, nonetheless, has described the code as a political rather than a legal document (Narine, 2002:88).

Importantly, ASEAN has, to some extent, been successful in managing the South China Sea conflict. With both multilateral and bilateral approaches to China in the disputes, that is, ASEAN could bring the disputes into the ‘international limelight suggesting a diplomatic cost for Beijing should it use force’ (Acharya, 2001:135). In particular, ASEAN has gained some successes in dealing with China in terms of the South China Sea issues following the ASEAN Declaration (on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea) which was signed at the 8th ASEAN summit at Phnom Penh in November 2002. The signing of the Declaration, according to Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Blas Ople, ‘was a major leap for peace, stability, and development in our region’ (Quoted in Solidum, 2003:110). In reality, it is significant that China has joined the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Among others, the declaration provides as follows:

- the Parties reaffirm their determination to consolidate and develop the
friendship and cooperation among them to promote a 21st century-oriented partnership of good neighbourliness and mutual trust;
- the Parties need to promote, friendly and harmonious environment in the South China for the peace and prosperity of the people;
- the Parties desire to enhance favourable conditions for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries concerned;
- the Parties are committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and other universally recognised principles of international law which serve as the basic norms of state-to-state relations;
- the Parties affirm their respect and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight above the South China Sea as provided by the principles of international law;
- the Parties concerned shall resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force, through consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned in accordance with the principles of international law;
- the Parties shall exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would escalate disputes and affect peace, refrain from action or inhabiting the presently uninhabited areas, and handle their differences in a constructive manner;
- pending the peaceful settlement, the Parties concerned will seek ways to build trust and confidence among them, including dialogues between their defence and military officials, just and humane treatment of all persons in distress;
- pending settlement of the disputes, the Parties concerned may undertake cooperative activities. These include (a) marine environment protection, (b) marine scientific research, (c) safety of navigation and communication at sea, (d) search and rescue operations, and (e) combating transnational crime, such as illicit drug-trafficking, piracy, armed robbery at sea, and illegal traffic in arms;
- the adoption of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea will promote peace and stability in the region and the Parties concerned agree to work on the basis of consensus (see ASEAN, 2002).

As shown in the Declaration above, in particular, it is important to note that ASEAN has continually stressed the basic norm of the peaceful settlement of disputes which is
enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC) in managing regional conflicts (see Chapter 4). Since ASEAN has particularly urged China to accede to the TAC in managing regional conflicts, including the South China Sea conflict 81, in fact, ASEAN was successful in making China to accede to the TAC on 8 July 2003. As mentioned in section 6.2, the ARF, at its inaugural meeting in 1994, ‘endorsed the purposes and principles of the TAC as a code of conduct governing relations between states and a unique diplomatic instrument for regional confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and political and security cooperation’ (ARF, 1994). During the ASEAN Summit in Bali in 2003, moreover, the ASEAN member states continued to stress the importance of the TAC with a view to promoting peaceful settlement of disputes. According to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (officially known as the Bali Concord II), which was signed at the 9th ASEAN summit in Bali in October 2003, '[t]he TAC is the key code of conduct … for the promotion of peace and stability in the region'; '[ASEAN] is … outward looking in respect of … engaging ASEAN's friends and Dialogue Partners, [including China], to promote peace and stability in the region, and shall build on the ARF to facilitate consultation and cooperation between ASEAN and its friends and Partners on regional security matters'82 (ASEAN, 2003). At the ARF Ministerial Meeting in July 2004, furthermore, reiterating the importance of the implementation of Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the Ministers underlined the importance of confidence building and the need to explore ways and means for cooperative security activities particularly between ASEAN and China, thus creating favourable conditions for settling disputes in South China Sea peacefully (ARF, 2004).

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81 In fact, ASEAN within the ARF was successful in making several states outside Southeast Asia (namely, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea and the Russia) accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (see Chairman’s Statement: The Eleventh Meeting of ASEAN Regional Forum. Jakarta, 2 July 2004. Internet: http://www.aseansec.org/16246.htm. Accessed: 3 September 2005).

82 At the Seventh ASEAN-China summit on 8 October 2003 in Bali, the Plan of Action was formulated to serve as the ‘master plan’ to deepen and broaden ASEAN-China relations and cooperation in a comprehensive and mutually beneficial manner for the next five years (2005-2010) with a particular view to implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (see Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. Internet: http://www.aseansec.org/16806.htm. Accessed: 3 September 2005).
Given the circumstances described above, it can be assumed that ASEAN kept assuring and reassuring the meaning and value of such regional norms as pacific settlement of disputes in order to socialise China to incrementally be tamed within the context of the ASEAN Way. Most important was the achievement of ASEAN to continually pursue its ‘unique multilateralism’ which was linked to the idea of the ‘ASEAN Way’. In terms of the multilateralism in the ARF as an approach to the Asia-Pacific regional order, the nature of multilateralism in the region is quite different from the nature of multilateralism in Europe. According to Narine (2002:103), the ASEAN member countries initially asserted that Asia was too heterogeneous and diverse for the multilateralism of Western style to work.\(^{83}\)

Moreover, in Europe, multilateralism (especially through the Conference (later, Organisation) on Security and Cooperation (CSCE/OSCE)) contributed to the process that resulted in the end of the Cold War: in the Asia-Pacific region, however, the concept of multilateralism began to attract attention only after the end of the Cold War,

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\(^{83}\) Some basic differences between Europe and Asia can be identified as follows:

- formal confidence-building measures (CBMs) are not suitable to the Asian strategic culture because the notion of ‘confidence-building’, as developed in the Cold War European context, can mainly apply to a relationship among ‘adversaries’. But Asians lack the true ‘adversaries’ among themselves, which can be reflected from the non-alignment stance of many Asian states. Rather, their ties, which are more complex and ambiguous than those of Western security-related nature, make it difficult to institutionalise security cooperation of the kind and level common to the OSCE (Organisation on Security and Cooperation), such as formal CBMs;

- all OSCE member states are committed to the promotion of democracy and human rights. This is clearly not the basis of the ARF, given that a number of members including Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos are not fully committed to promoting human rights as a matter of policy;

- notwithstanding national differences, Europe has a strong sense of regional identity centred on common interests, which is lacking in Asia. The latter region’s diverse culture, geography, history and ideology, and its compressed timeframe for regionalism make the construction of common interests rather difficult (see Tan See Seng et al, 2002:56-57).
and it is only at the initial stage to be developed from such norms and/or ideas of the ASEAN Way as a minimal institutional framework (Acharya, 2003:187-188; also 1995:198). Furthermore, multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific is primarily seen not only as a reaction to ‘growing regional insecurity’ of the post-Cold War period, but also as a measure to ‘pre-empt others from imposing a non-ASEAN framework on Southeast Asia’ (Ba, 1997:644-645). Thus, unlike Europe, multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific is being focused on ‘how to deal with the strategic uncertainties of the post-Cold War rather than on a set of specific goals or institutional structures demanding legal agreements’ (Acharya, 1995:198).

Although Western powers attempted to impose their own concepts and frameworks on the ARF, ASEAN rejected it and seized the ARF within the ASEAN initiative. The reason why ASEAN objected to other – especially Western – powers’ wishful approaches to constructing multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region is explained by Ba (1997:645) as follows: ‘Southeast Asia’s historic vulnerability to external domination could make ASEAN … suspicious that other powers, even their great power guarantors, do not have Southeast Asia’s best interests in mind’. With persistent adherence to the Asian way of multilateralism in the ARF, ASEAN endeavoured to induce China to be engaged in the forum. In that regard, the ASEAN member states agreed that the most desirable approach to China, especially in dealing with the South China Sea conflict, should be the strategy of engagement, rather than containment. In this context, as Acharya (2003:210) notes:

ASEAN cannot pursue a containment strategy because the collective capabilities of its members … will not match the military might of China. A containment strategy requires ASEAN to become a military alliance … [which] ASEAN … continue to reject in no uncertain terms. For ASEAN, …accepting a containment strategy under the US leadership will be … acknowledging the limitations and failure of ASEAN’s own political approach to regional order, which is based on the principles of inclusiveness and ‘cooperative security’ (‘security with’, as opposed to ‘security against’, a likely adversary).

With regard to the engagement of China in the ARF, especially in dealing with the South China Sea conflict, China also recognised that a code of conduct resulted from the ASEAN Declaration at the 8th ASEAN summit in 2002 could benefit the Chinese in
terms of reducing the risk of conflict in the area, which could involve the U.S in the dispute. In fact, the experience of Taiwan during 1995-1996 demonstrated to China that the assertion of territorial claims may provoke U.S. involvement, and could encourage ASEAN to collectively oppose the Chinese (Buszynski, 2003:357). Moreover, China’s economic development strategy cannot be sustained in an environment of regional tensions, which would be inevitable if China is to embark on military expansion. This perspective holds that China’s military control over the South China Sea is not yet paramount, and that Beijing cannot exploit the resources in the area without Western technology and capital (Acharya, 2003:204). Therefore, the South China Sea has become strongly connected with other issues which restrain China from acting unilaterally to assert its claims, despite its initial intentions.

Yet, although materialist explanations such as the shift of the power structure and the challenges of the geo-economic strategy in the post-Cold War era can be conducive to understanding the emergence of the ARF, those rationalist and materialist factors alone are not sufficient to explain the genuine mechanism of multilateralism in the forum. As mentioned earlier, the major character of multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region has not only been ‘process-driven’, but also ‘identity-driven’. The ARF could focus on a ‘sociological and inter-subjective dynamic, rather than a legalistic and formalistic one’ (Acharya, 2003:248). ASEAN’s response to the emerging threat of China in dealing with the South China Sea issues was oriented toward gradual and informal approaches to constructing regional security cooperation and regional identity through consensus out of disparate interests and concerns. In this context, it can be argued that ASEAN has attempted to expand the regional idea and concept ‘from the ASEAN Way to the Asia-Pacific Way’ in the post-Cold War era (Acharya, 2003:242-275).

Therefore, several motivations of both material and ideational interests on the ASEAN’s part as well as China’s part, as previously noted, are symptomatic of the impact of the ASEAN Way on initiating and advancing the ARF in terms of the informal and identity-driven negotiations which emphasise the circumspect and gradual betterment in the

84 The major concern of China’s leadership is with economic reform and domestic stability rather than with external military expansion (see Acharya, 2003:203-204). Hence, China currently necessitates ASEAN cooperation over the implementation of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement signed in November 2001 and hopes to utilise ASEAN to balance both the U.S. and Japan in the region (see Buszynski, 2003:357).
new multilateral approach. In the post-Cold War period, that is, with the mode of the
ASEAN Way, ASEAN has attempted to use multilateralism with a view not only to
taming, but also to socialising China to be engaged within the new Asia-Pacific
multilateral forum.

6.3.2 The East Timor Crisis (1999-2000)

6.3.2.1 The Australian-led Intervention in East Timor: Legitimising the
operation

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the release of the overlay effects of the
Cold War on the Southeast Asian regional dynamics (for example, US military
retrenchment with the closing of US bases in the Philippines) resulted in strong local
consequences. It is argued that ‘a much weakened superpower presence leaves more
room for local security dynamics to take their own shape and to operate more on the
basis of local resources, issues, and perceptions’ (Buzan et al, 1998:66) than had been
the case during the Cold War. At the turn of the new century, this argument was

East Timor was part of the Portuguese colonial empire for over a century when
Portugal decided to withdraw from the island in 1975. On November 28, 1975, the
Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT, later the Revolutionary Front for an
Independent East Timor – FRETILIN) had gained ascendancy on East Timor and
proclaimed East Timor’s independence as the Democratic Republic of East Timor
(Thomashausen, 2002:117-118). However, on December 7, 1975, Indonesia annexed
East Timor by force85. This set the stage for the long, bloody and disastrous occupation
of the territory that ended only after an international peacekeeping force was

On September 15, 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1264, creating
the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

85 Indonesia invaded and occupied East Timor in 1975. Indonesia considered Portugal’s
withdrawal from East Timor as a chance to extend its sovereignty and economic benefits: ‘East
Timor was known to have rich oil and gas deposits just off its coast, while there was also a
potentially lucrative coffee and sandalwood trade on the island’ (see Thomashausen, 2002:117).
In doing so, the UN Security Council authorised INTERFET to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)\textsuperscript{86}, and to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations\textsuperscript{87}. This resolution provided the legal basis for INTERFET’s enforcement action in East Timor. Launching INTERFET can largely be regarded as a ‘peace enforcement’ operation which occurs in which the UN Security Council authorises the use of force to protect non-combatants and humanitarian aid workers, and/or to enforce compliance with internationally sanctioned resolutions or agreements\textsuperscript{88}. According to Osman (2002:14), a peace enforcement operation would be mobilised to ‘restore democracy, combat international terrorism, and hunt down warlords … [which] have been deemed necessary to combat threats to international peace and security’.

However, UN Security Council Resolution 1264 did not project a UN intervention force, but rather authorised an Australian-led multinational force under a UN mandate to restore peace and security in East Timor (see United Nations Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999), 15/September/1999). In fact, the UN authorised a peace enforcement operation by a multinational coalition of the willing led not by a superpower, but by a middle power. In this sense, McDougall (2001:174) argues that although Australia was adjacent to East Timor, it required the support of the United States to pressure Indonesia to accept international intervention. Moreover, given the fact that Australia as a non-ASEAN member insisted that it would not intervene without a UN mandate, it can largely be assumed that Australia had concerns about INTERFET’s international legitimacy (Cotton, 2001:129-132).

Nevertheless, it is important to note that Australia did not lead INTERFET within the UN framework only. In fact, instead of depending wholly on the UN that is legally

\textsuperscript{86} In June 1998, Indonesia proposed limited autonomy for East Timor. An agreement between Indonesia and Portugal reached on 5 May 1999 gave the UN Secretary-General authority to administer a popular consultation among the people of East Timor on the question of limited autonomy within Indonesia. In the 30 August elections administered by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) over 78% of the population voted for independence instead of limited autonomy (see Gill and Reilly, 2000:49).


empowered to authorise an international military operation without the consent of the country within which military force is used, Australia also sought to assure INTERFET’s legitimacy within the regional context that it would not intervene in East Timor without Indonesian consent (Bellamy et al, 2004:225-226). Indeed, when Australia claimed a leadership role for itself to become more routinely involved in managing regional order, the ASEAN governments considered the claims as inappropriate and protested against the so-called ‘Howard Doctrine’ (Haacke, 2003:203). In this context, thus, it is implied that Australia was not only insisting on operating INTERFET within the UN framework, but also seeking the consent of the intervened sovereign states, Indonesia.

Initially, in fact, there was great reluctance on the part of Australia’s potential coalition partners to an intervention. Indonesian President B. J. Habibie expressed that an international force might be needed to resolve the East Timor crisis if the disorder could not be contained, but he was ‘adamant that a unilateral action by Australia would be considered warlike’ (Cotton, 2001:132). Although Australia is the regional neighbour of ASEAN member countries, as mentioned earlier, it remains a non-ASEAN member. Moreover, given the fact that ASEAN is very sensitive to the principle of non-interference and/or non-intervention, it makes sense why Australia would not lead INTERFET unless the international force was approved as legitimate at both the regional and international levels. Hence, it is important to note that although the UN as a universal organisation has the potential to embody the international community more convincingly than any other body or group (McDougall, 2001:186), the UN’s claim to legitimacy does not seem to be enough for Australia to turn to the UN primarily out of consideration for international law. In this context, Pugh (2003:33-37) argues that ‘the UN-regional balance’ is an important feature to be considered as an approach to managing and resolving the contemporary conflicts in the world. By implication, that is, it can largely be assumed that peace missions in the post-Cold War era may be successfully carried out within the context of guaranteeing approval, legitimacy and cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.

Nevertheless, both ASEAN and the ARF have been under severe criticism for their inability to address the East Timor crisis. Given a litmus test of its (in)adequacy as a regional institution to act in times of crisis or to prevent crises from happening, in particular, it is argued that the East Timor crisis exposed the ARF as ‘nothing more than a talk-shop’ (Anthony, 2003a:15). In this context, Anthony (2003b:208) argues that because both ASEAN and the ARF have been suited for managing inter-state relations
such as the Cambodian conflict and the South China Sea conflict (see Chapter 4 (4.5) and 6 (6.2; 6.3.1)), the soft and informal nature of regional mechanisms of ASEAN and the ARF may be ‘ineffective and irrelevant to intra-state conflicts like the East Timor crisis which is seen to be requiring decisive action and intervention’.

Under the circumstances, the case of the East Timor crisis presented a key question to be answered: why several countries of ASEAN resolved to join the UN’s intervention in the crisis. The participation of ASEAN countries in a UN peacekeeping operation such as the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) in what was then officially part of Indonesia requires an analysis of whether and to what extent ASEAN has come to renounce the united support of the non-intervention principle in the ASEAN Way context in the post-Cold War period.

6.3.2.2 ASEAN’s Response to the Crisis in East Timor

As previously examined in section 6.3.2.1, in September 1999, the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1264 created the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Launching INTERFET, which is largely regarded as a ‘peace enforcement’ operation, paved the way for external intervention into the ASEAN region under the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention with a view to addressing gross abuses of human rights. In this context, it can be argued that the mechanism of ‘intrusive regionalism’ within the ASEAN region

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89 On October 25, 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1272 to authorise Secretary-General Kofi Annan to establish the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) in order to ‘exercise all legislative and executive authority including the administration of justice’ until the state’s formal independence (see The United Nations and East Timor, Internet: http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.html. Accessed: 25 November 2004).

90 ‘Intrusive regionalism’ may be distinguished from ‘inclusive regionalism’. The latter emerged in the early 1990s as an integral element of the principle of ‘cooperative security’ which rejected exclusionary military alliances and called for multilateral frameworks to all actors. The ARF was the embodiment of the principle of inclusiveness. Intrusive regionalism, on the other hand, calls for closer interaction or cooperation among members of a regional group even though such cooperation may intrude into the domestic affairs of member states (see Acharya, 2003:295-296).
was intensified as a major factor inhibiting the expediency of regional institutions in the East Timor crisis (McDougall, 2001:166-189).

During this period, nonetheless, most of the ASEAN countries regarded the East Timor issue as an internal Indonesian matter in order to maintain ASEAN norms. Within the ASEAN context, in fact, it is important to bear in mind that the primary objective of ASEAN's establishment was, as we have seen in chapter 4, to prevent confrontation between neighbouring countries. Initially, the ASEAN members did not want to have strained relations with Indonesia. Thus, as Dupont (2000:164) notes, ASEAN's belief has always been that keeping good relations with Indonesia as a regional leader must take priority over self-determination for the East Timorese. This conviction was strengthened by two new concerns as the events of 1999 created dilemmas for ASEAN. First, ASEAN feared that East Timor's separation would destabilise Indonesia by promoting other discontented groups to push for independence (Dupont, 2000:164). Second, Malaysian prime minister Mahathir was accusing the West of its hypocritical justification of principles such as humanitarian intervention, and his criticisms brought forth wide sympathy in the region: ‘Southeast Asians generally believe that humanitarian intervention could destroy the region's primary non-intervention norm, enfeebling political and social cohesion and allowing the West to call into question the legitimacy of governments and regimes not of their liking’ (Dupont, 2000:165).

Indeed, several ASEAN states were, thus, uncomfortable with the UN Security Council's decision on 15 September 1999 to permit UN intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter involving ‘action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression’. As mentioned earlier, this allowed the formation of INTERFET and its mandate to use force to fulfil its mission. For ASEAN, although there were a number of practical difficulties of undertaking a peacekeeping mission in East Timor, its response to INTERFET proved more robust and substantial than many outside the region expected (Dupont, 2000:163-166). In fact, once INTERFET was deployed, the Indonesian government promoted substantial ASEAN participation in INTERFET because it wanted to minimise Australian influence (Narine, 2002:173). Moreover, in particular, when the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) formally replaced INTERFET in February 2000, ASEAN officer held the position of Force Commander of its military component, so that ASEAN's involvement was a significant boost to UN peace operations: for instance, a Filipino, Lt. Gen. Jaime de los Santos, became the Force Commander of the UN peacekeeping force, replacing the
former head, Major-General Peter Cosgrove of Australia (Anthony, 2003a:19).

Notwithstanding the fact that the East Timor crisis was ASEAN’s opportunity to prove that it could manage regional security problems without relying too much on external actors playing security roles in the region, yet, ASEAN was divided over East Timor: Myanmar, unsurprisingly, opposed any external intervention in East Timor; and Vietnam was unenthusiastic about the UN’s regional role (Narine, 2002:173-174). In the wake of the East Timor Crisis, major debate within ASEAN was again ignited and focused on the interpretation of non-interference in the context of East Timor (Dupont, 2000:167) as ASEAN’s decision to participate in the UN’s intervention significantly impacted on the ASEAN Way as a means of demonstrating sovereignty, as well as regional solidarity.

For the purpose of understanding the implications of the non-intervention principle in the East Timor Crisis, it is necessary to highlight the root-causes of ASEAN to resolve to join the UN peacekeeping operations. For ASEAN members, the major concern was to consolidate ASEAN as a unified group, which was already fractured following the Asian economic crisis. In fact, ASEAN’s participation in the international force was only available at the invitation as well as with the consent of Indonesia: that is, the intervention in this context came as a response to a call for support by a member state. Although Indonesia was obliged to accept INTERFET authorised by the UN, as mentioned earlier, in order to reduce the direct role of Australia in INTERFET, the Indonesian government called explicitly for the participation of several ASEAN countries, an action that was viewed as ‘making the intervention more palatable for Jakarta’ (Haacke, 2003:202). Although the ASEAN states considered the decision to join the external intervention as a disgrace to Indonesia, they realised that the participation in the crisis would eventually be conducive to maintaining ‘solidarity with Indonesia’ (Haacke, 2003:199). As we have seen in chapter 4, the primary motive for the establishment of ASEAN as a regional group was to preserve a ‘regional resilience’. The goal of regional resilience could be attained through a process of promoting good relations between and among the ASEAN members.

Another important motivation for ASEAN to join the international force can be found in the effects of the Asian economic crisis of 1997 which will be explored in the following section. Indeed, the economic crisis undermined, to a large extent, regime security in Southeast Asia. When the mandates for INTERFET and later the UN Transitional
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) under Resolution 1272 of 25 October 1999 were approved unanimously by the Security Council, Indonesia, weakened by the Asian economic crisis (1997-1998) and thus dependent upon international donors, and in the hands of an uncertain transitional political leadership, approved an intervention (Cotton, 2001:132). In particular, Indonesia’s urgent requirement for emergency aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) facilitated the external interference and intervention into the internal affairs of Indonesia (Cotton, 2001:133). The worsening economic situation in Indonesia arising from the economic crisis propelled the downfall of President Suharto in May 1998.

Moreover, just as there had been various intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations and NGOs particularly those involved with human rights, so there was a need for a broader international response in considering the role of ‘track-two’ institutions\(^9\). The track-two institutions can largely be regarded as instruments for modifying the norms and principles concerning humanitarian intervention (McDougall, 2001:177-187). This implies that although ASEAN was suspicious of Western states’ schemes to interfere in the internal affairs of member states using the principle of humanitarian intervention as justification (Dupont, 2000:164), global forces which weakened the regional and national autonomy, were powerful enough to open the way for external intervention.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that although the decision of ASEAN to support UN intervention in the East Timor crisis indicated a significant breach of the non-intervention principle in the ASEAN Way context, it does not simply imply the complete renunciation of the ASEAN Way. Rather, it can be seen as the consequence of

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\(^{9}\) Established in 1993, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) consists of institutes of strategic and international studies in a number of the Asia-Pacific countries. Participants are mostly academics and officials who speak in an unofficial capacity (although this can vary depending on the country and individuals in question). CSCAP provides a forum for discussing a range of issues relating to Asia-Pacific security, including questions relating to humanitarian intervention in Southeast Asia. Officials can report CSCAP discussions back to their own governments. Ideas, such as those proposed in this paper, relating to the use of the multiplicity of international organisations with an interest in Southeast Asia for purposes of humanitarian intervention could thus have some impact on the thinking of governments within the region (see McDougall, 2001:187; also Evans, 1994:125-139).
pursuing the political solidarity and economic stability of the region suffering from a shattered economy after the Asian economic crisis in 1997. For the purpose of the political solidarity in the ASEAN region, ASEAN permitted its participation in the intervention within the context of the explicit consent of Indonesia with a view to minimising the foreign domination, i.e. the proprietary role of Australia. This means that during the East Timor crisis, ASEAN endeavoured to keep acting upon the ASEAN consensus which is seen as the basic axiom of the ASEAN Way for the members to pursue.

On the other hand, for the recovery of economic instability of the region, in particular following the Asian economic crisis, ASEAN opted temporarily for compromising the principle of non-intervention. That is, the tentative surrender of the ASEAN Way in the case of East Timor was not mainly the result of the political discord of regional identity, but rather the result of the expediency of the Asian economic crisis associated with global forces, often featured as economic globalisation. However, the East Timor crisis would work as a call for rethinking the limitations and constraints of the principle of non-intervention in solving regional crises for ASEAN.

6.4 Continuity and Challenge to the ‘ASEAN Way’

6.4.1 The Asian Economic Crisis and Regional Security: Rethinking the principle of non-intervention

During the Asian economic crisis of 1997-1998, in particular, the emerging norms such as ‘constructive intervention’ within ASEAN increased regional disunity and division between and within the ASEAN member states because the norm was mainly regarded as a challenge to regional identity which reflected from the norms of the ASEAN Way such as non-intervention. Nonetheless, the economic crisis which impacted so negatively on the ASEAN region can be viewed as not only a challenge to modify the major framework of the ASEAN institution as the ASEAN Way, but also as an important opportunity to search for an alternative approach to regional security. In line with this

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92 In July 1997, the deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, called for ‘constructive intervention’ within ASEAN. This implied not only closer co-operation between developed and less-developed ASEAN members to promote regional development, but also proactive interventions in the internal affairs of member states (see Narine, 2002:168).
assumption, this section will highlight possible trends towards changes in the regional security mechanism in the ASEAN Way context of the post-economic crisis period.

In fact, the Asian economic crisis which began in mid-1997 brought about gloomy prospects for regional order and stability, at the same time leaving room for rethinking and reshaping security in the region. Yet, most judgments of its political and security implications are likely to be pessimistic. Although the crisis was the consequence of global events and trends rather than just national or regional, the ‘contagion’ effect of the crisis was most seriously felt in Southeast Asia (Acharya, 2000:154). With regard to the impact of the crisis on regional security, the subsequent economic and political crises following the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia in May 1998, and the intensified mood of inter-state tension in the region are cases in point.

In this complex and mixed situation of political and economic instability, the crisis greatly injured ASEAN’s collective identity and its underlying principles and norms. In 1999, as Singapore’s prime minister Goh Chok Tong noted, ‘the regional grouping was helpless and disunited in the wake of crisis’ (Singapore Window, 1999). This perception of the unravelling of the organisation fundamentally degraded ASEAN’s international prestige and self-image. However, the Asian economic crisis also revealed the extent to which the region was attempting to be cooperative in addressing the crisis. Indeed, in the summer of 1999 a new wave of solidarity was clear, resulting from recognition on the part of the countries involved that they were in this together. There was a realisation that the economic recovery of any one country would help other countries in the region emerge from the economic slump to the benefit of all (Ahmad and Ghoshal, 1999:761).

Nevertheless, Narine (2002:166) considered the effect of Asian economic crisis as the disunity of ASEAN in terms of its failure to do anything, thereby compromising its political credibility and the international perception of regional coherence and solidarity. In fact, the economic crisis impacted differently on each country in the region and fragmented the entire regional system. Of all the ASEAN countries, Indonesia suffered the most severe political outcomes from the economic crisis: indeed, the

93 At the economic level unemployment was its most obvious indicator; at the social level the crisis was marked by the return of migrant labour, impoverishment; and social, political and ethnic unrest (see Palmujoki, 2001:124).
Indonesian domestic situation compelled other ASEAN countries to rethink the basic axioms of ASEAN cooperation with a view to making the organisation operative (Palmujoki, 2001:126-127).

In the ASEAN region, apart from mentioning the prospect of political and social disintegration in Indonesia, Thailand’s economic failure also threatened to shake its neighbouring countries, including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, which ultimately undermined the hope of fostering the Thai economic and political model in their own countries (Dibb, Hale & Prince, 1998:21). In addition to these factors affecting the security in the region, the economic crisis also has strategic implications in terms of its potential to alter the regional balance of power: Southeast Asia’s suspicions of the U.S. role in helping the region out of the crisis, the failure of Japan to provide substantial leadership, and China’s willingness to project itself as an emerging power, are ‘reshaping perceptions about their relative position and role in the regional strategic equation’ (Acharya, 2003:277). In this context, particularly in terms of China’s economic potential to have a direct bearing on the stability of the ASEAN economies, Collins (2000:138) argued as follows:

> China’s decision not to devalue its currency at the height of the economic crisis in 1998 is … regarded as responsible for heading off a further round of damaging currency devaluation in Southeast Asia. This decision, in conjunction with a contribution of $1 billion to the International Monetary Fund’s rescue package for Thailand, created the impression of a responsible economic giant in the decision-making circles within ASEAN. China’s economy … provides Beijing considerable influence in the region.

With the end of the Cold War, as mentioned earlier (see 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3), several scholars already foresaw a decline of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the ascent of China’s political and economic ambitions for regional power (Whiting,1997:299-322). But as the Asian economic crisis demonstrated, China’s ability to be a hegemonic power in Asia should not be overemphasised. During the crisis, although the actions including China’s pledge not to devalue its currency and its contribution to the IMF-led rescue packages for Thailand and Indonesia underscored China’s increasing clout and role in regional economic affairs, these actions were ‘shaped primarily by China’s own sense of vulnerability to the effects of the crisis’
In the wake of the economic crisis, in particular, realism as an international relations theory gained substantial popularity to explain and understand the mechanism of the regional security of ASEAN. Ultimately, realism on the rise in this period threatened to weaken the expediency of the ASEAN Way in dealing with the security problems in the region. Of a number of effects of the crisis in terms of the realist perspective, there are two important points to pay attention to. The first feature is a revived phase of trade-related conflicts between the U.S. and East Asian nations, and the second is the increased reliance of the ASEAN countries on the great powers such as the United States in order to enhance national security.\footnote{The former, the economic dimension, was caused by the devaluation of the region's currencies which led to a flood of cheap Asian exports to the U.S; the latter, the strategic dimension, can be illuminated in both examples of the Philippines and Singapore which attempted to renew and strengthen their security links with the United States during the crisis (see Acharya, 2003:282-290).} (Acharya, 2003:282-285). In terms of the realist perspective, this implies that growing economic interdependence will not necessarily prevent international conflict, but rather it could only result in various conflicts, including trade wars and competition for resources and investment. In this sense, Acharya (2003:285) argues that the ASEAN region’s increased sense of reliance on U.S. security protection is offset by disappointment about its dealing with the economic aspects of the crisis: ‘the United States may be firmly entrenched as a ‘balancer of last resort’ in military security, but enjoys less credibility today as a partner in economic security, which is increasingly vital to the Asian countries in an era of globalisation’.

Under the circumstances, in terms of ASEAN’s defensive economic security strategy in the pre- and post-crisis era, ASEAN made a number of concrete efforts in line with the continued debate on Asian values and the ASEAN Way. These efforts have included the Asian table of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) created in 1995 and the ASEAN+3 framework initiated in December 1997 to formalise a version of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) originally proposed by Malaysia in 1991 (Ferguson, 2001:124). The composition of the Asian countries in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) resembles that of the EAEC. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir proposed that the EAEC would link ASEAN to China, Japan, and South Korea while excluding the United
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In fact, the EAEC was seen as a response to the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreement in 1989, which initially expressed the widening and deepening hegemony of the neo-liberal orthodoxy (mainly advocated by the US and its allies).

In line with the EAEC idea, as mentioned above, ASEAN took another form of cooperation, ASEAN+3 as an immediate reaction to the economic crisis, bringing ASEAN together with China, Japan and South Korea in order to address the region’s economic and security issues. In this sense, Beeson (2003:251-268) viewed ASEAN+3 as a potent trend towards ‘the rise of reactionary regionalism’. Although the initiative projected an East Asian identity similar to EAEC, the ASEAN+3 is politically less radical than the EAEC (Palmujoki, 2001:88). In this context, Stubbs (2002:440-455) also argues that the ASEAN+3 framework has been provided with a number of commonalities, such as the discourse of Asian values and unique style of capitalism, which can serve as a strong foothold for consolidating a regional identity.

Moreover, as one of major effects of the Asian economic crisis, ASEAN members sought to establish a regional framework which would have helped members to enhance cooperation and facilitation in engaging in ‘mutual surveillance’ of each other’s economic policies and creating a pre-emptive measure of ‘early-warning’ (Beggars and Choosers, 1997:43). But these efforts did not bear much fruit. Among a number of proposals set up by ASEAN members to manage the crisis within the group, of primary importance was ‘to address the question of social safety nets and the construction of ASEAN as a caring society’ (Wesley, 1999:59). Yet, initiatives designed to tackle the domestic social welfare concerns of member states ran the risk of compromising ASEAN’s principle of non-interference (Narine, 2002:164).

In July 1997 when the Asian economic crisis occurred, as mentioned earlier, the Malaysian former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim called for a policy of ‘constructive intervention’ within ASEAN. In fact, Anwar Ibrahim argued that ‘the ASEAN countries would start to discuss a new concept and ASEAN rights to interfere in a situation where the threat of spillovers of domestic economic, social and political upheavals can seriously undermine the stability of the entire region’ (Palmujoki, 2001:155-156). With regard to the policy of constructive intervention, however, the Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamed warned strongly against the conspiracy of Western economic neo-colonialism which eventually fractured regional solidarity.
Within this context, thus, the economic crisis led to divisions among and within the ASEAN members concerning the non-interference principle.

The Asian economic crisis not only illuminates the power of globalisation, but also the restraints of regional autonomy, as well as of national sovereignty. Furthermore, it produced different beliefs in, and attitudes towards, economic globalisation within Southeast Asia. Malaysia’s Mahathir challenged the role of the market as an unfettered force: ‘Market forces are not meant to bring benefits, .... But benefits, if they do occur, are merely side issues’ (Mohamad, 1998:31). In contrast, Singapore’s foreign minister, S. Jayakumar argued that ‘[t]he way ahead is not to turn our backs on globalisation. This is no longer a viable or realistic option. To repudiate globalisation will hurt our long term growth prospect......If we try to turn the clock backwards and walk away from free trade, the impact will not just be domestic, nor will it be merely economic... The prosperity resulting from open markets had provided a foundation for national stability, and regional and global peace and security’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 28 September 1998). Although Mahathir and Jayakumar had economically different ideologies in terms of the economic strategies to propose for regional as well as national security, nonetheless, both of them politically advocated that ASEAN should stick to the basics of the ‘ASEAN Way’ in order to strengthen corporate unity, regional stability and security (Haacke, 2003:178-179).

In July 1998, receiving support from only the Philippines, Thailand’s foreign minister, Surin Pitsuwan challenged ASEAN’s norm of non-interference with advancing and promoting the concept of ‘flexible engagement’. But the proposal for flexible engagement faced hostility among ASEAN members because they feared that once implemented, the potential to damage the ASEAN Way would pave the way for various interventions that governments might consider unpalatable (Haacke, 1999:584). According to Haacke (2003:177-183), there are a number of significant reasons why most of the ASEAN states objected to the adoption of flexible engagement as a united regional policy:

- most of the ASEAN members viewed flexible engagement as potentially having the opposite effect of an adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’, to which some regional leaders like Jayakumar and Ali Alatas ascribed three decades of peace and stability in Southeast Asia;
- if flexible engagement were approved without ASEAN members being prepared
to pool their sovereignty, it would drive ASEAN onto a path towards eventual disintegration;
- a weakening of ASEAN cohesion and solidarity carried the danger of divide and rule tactics vis-à-vis the Association by the major powers. For example, China might exploit any ASEAN divisions that might stem from flexible engagement in order to continue its policy of ‘creeping assertiveness’ in the South China Sea;
- given the fact that flexible engagement, unlike the ‘ASEAN Way’, was linked to transparency, political reform, the empowerment of civil society and Western approaches to economic management, most ASEAN governments feared that the adoption of flexible engagement could harm regime security.

The reasons the proposal of flexible engagement was rejected, as we have seen above, are mainly associated with the political aspects of the proposal, rather than the economic. Although the proposal was rejected by ASEAN, the grouping has taken the first tentative measures towards ‘intrusive regionalism’ by establishing a conduct of ‘peer review’ on national economies and a regional financial and macro-economic surveillance process, the so called ‘ASEAN Surveillance Process’ in early October 1998,\(^5\) indicated a shift from the rigid non-interference policy. Importantly, that is, the surveillance process ‘allows for what in the past would have been considered interference by ASEAN leaders but which now ... constitutes legitimate involvement’ (Haacke, 2003:194). By implication, this points out that while the principle of non-interference prevailed over flexible engagement by ASEAN in the political arena, the grouping seems to be too weak to resist calls for reviewing its policy of non-interference in the economic arena (Acharya, 2002:28-29).

Following the Asian economic crisis, moreover, one of the important initiatives established by ASEAN was an ASEAN troika system (consisting of three ASEAN representatives, including the current, previous and forthcoming chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC)), which was formally agreed by ASEAN in July 2000. In fact, Thailand’s premier, Chuan Leekpai, proposed the formal institutionalisation of an ASEAN troika at the Third Informal Summit of ASEAN leaders in Manila in November 1999 in the midst of the East Timor Crisis in the Southeast Asian region. The Troika

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\(^5\) ‘ASEAN Surveillance Process’, as opposed to ‘ASEAN Surveillance Mechanism’, which had been suggested by the US but was rejected by ASEAN for being too intrusive (see Acharya, 2002:29).
proposal attempted implicitly to rekindle Surin Pitsuwan’s proposal of flexible engagement. To this point, we can raise a question why the proposal for an ASEAN troika was not rejected by ASEAN whereas Pitsuwan’s proposal for flexible engagement was rejected by most of the ASEAN member states except the Philippines.

According to the ASEAN troika (see ASEAN, 2000), the primary components of the troika concept are palatable to the ASEAN Way context, which can be seen as a major reason for being approved by ASEAN. These components of the troika can be summarised as follows: first, the ‘ASEAN troika’, originally intended to be a permanent institution at ministerial level, was reconceptualised as an ‘ad-hoc body’; second, the troika would not be a decision-making body and was not intended to represent ASEAN beyond its assigned brief. Instead, it was meant to report and submit recommendations to ASEAN foreign ministers; third, the troika is meant to work in accordance with norms enshrined in the ASEAN treaties and agreements, in particular the norms of consensus and non-interference; fourth, the troika can be established on a consensual basis upon the request of the ASC chair or any other ASEAN foreign minister; finally, the troika would normally be composed of the foreign ministers of the present, past and future chair countries of the ASC, although other compositions might also be considered.

As noted above, although the compromise was achieved over the ‘ASEAN troika’, it clearly re-emphasises the continued validity of the norms of consensus and non-interference. In this context, Haacke (2003:207) argues that the reiteration of these norms as a means for addressing regional crises would appear to ‘constitute a further development of ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture’. In terms of the ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture, it can be argued that the policy makers of ASEAN member states have sought to build and consolidate regional identity upon the shared (security) perceptions of the ASEAN Way which has strictly been adhered to by the majority of ASEAN leaders. ASEAN leaders seem to continually abide by their *modus operandi* in relation to the ASEAN Way by re- emphasising the norm of non-interference.

The Asian economic crisis, nevertheless, has resulted in growing pressure from the international community, including Western countries which had in the past overlooked authoritarian rule to retain economic gains. The crisis challenged political concepts such as ‘performance legitimacy’ which had served as a justification for political repression as long as governments were able to deliver high growth rates (Acharya, 1998:80). In this context, the ASEAN Way as a strong impetus for norm compliance
and regional identity was attacked from external as well as internal forces during the Asian economic crisis. Hence, although such ideas as constructive intervention and flexible engagement were rejected by ASEAN, the projection of these ideas worked, to some extent, as a means of softening the ASEAN Way’s strict adherence to non-interference in the domestic affairs of other member states, which eventually led to the exposure of serious cracks in the politics of regime security in Southeast Asia (Tow, 2001:260).

Given these circumstances, although ASEAN leaders are likely to continually stick to the validity of the norms of consensus and non-interference, as mentioned earlier, they also have compromised the rigid non-interference policy by taking measures towards ‘intrusive regionalism’ particularly in the economic arena. This means that although ASEAN members have adhered to the norms of the ASEAN Way, they also tried to approach regional security problems in a flexible way in order to soothe challenges to their own regime security. Moreover, as mentioned previously, the East Timor crisis opened the door to external interventions such as INTERFET and UNTAET which were largely practiced on the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. In this context, it can be argued that the norms of the ASEAN Way such as non-intervention and/or non-interference are not just ‘fixed’, but rather ‘open-ended’ to be shaped and reshaped according to collective interests and purposes among ASEAN leaders.

It is clear that given the constructivist perspective of international relations, the norms of the ASEAN Way are conducive to constituting regional identity in line with national and/or transnational interests shared by regional leaders. Moreover, with regard to norms, according to constructivists (Wendt, 1995:73-74; Jepperson, et al. 1996:54), they are intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action (see Chapter 3). Therefore, given the fact that the identities and interests of actors are constructed within the context of different processes of interactions and circumstances, norms are not only defining actors but also (re)defined by actors. The norms of the ASEAN Way such as non-intervention, which are the shared beliefs of ASEAN leaders, are reshaped and reproduced through political and social interactions and practices.

6.5 Conclusion

As was shown in this chapter, the decisive response of ASEAN to regional crises,
including the Asian economic crisis (1997-1998) and the East Timor Crisis (1999-2000) was largely contingent upon the impending purpose of the ASEAN member states’ survival and the region’s solidarity, thereby opening the way for external intervention in internal matters, though reluctantly. Nonetheless, the participation of ASEAN in the UN intervention was meant not only to allow a tentative retreat from the non-intervention principle, but also to strengthen the *raison d’etre* of the ‘intrusive regionalism’ in Southeast Asia at the turn of the millennium.

After the Cold War, the ASEAN Way has been challenged in different ways. In particular, various challenges from the politico-security as well as economic security arena have put the ASEAN Way on trial. Nevertheless, ASEAN attempted to revitalise the regional idea in such a way as to adapt itself to a new security environment of both geo-political and geo-economic shifts in the post-Cold War period. In terms of politico-security, ASEAN has accelerated a trend towards ‘outward’ (inclusiveness) orientation from ‘inward’ (or exclusiveness), (which already started from the period of the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989)), in managing regional security problems. In that regard, for ASEAN, the establishment of the ARF in 1993 was a case in point. By implication, this was viewed as the major product of ASEAN’s attempt not only to secure better its role and position in an unstable time, but also to strengthen regional identity through infusing the ASEAN Way into an enlarged Asia-Pacific multilateral forum.

Within the context of geostrategic changes in the ASEAN region after the Cold War, in particular, ASEAN witnessed an emerging hegemony of China in the region, which also projected a ‘China threat’ to the ASEAN member countries in terms of the South China Sea issue. In dealing with this issue, although ASEAN member countries have historically accustomed to turning to bilateral negotiations to manage regional security problems, they also attempted to embrace the multilateralism of the ARF with emphasising ‘inclusiveness’ which was supported by the concept of ‘cooperative security’ emerged in the early 1990s (Acharya, 2003:315; also 6.2). Importantly, this implies that as the ASEAN states were relatively flexible in utilising America’s and, later on, China’s intervention and support against Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its use of force in Cambodia during the Cold War (see Chapter 4), ASEAN in the post-Cold War has continued to utilise ‘flexibility’ of its security diplomacy within an Asia-Pacific multilateral forum to socialise China to be engaged in the ARF. In addressing regional security problems, thus, this implies that the notion of flexibility for ASEAN has evolved out of the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989) into developing the multilateralism of the
ARF out of the habitual and conventional favour of bilateralism.

Most importantly, the impact of the Asian economic crisis upon the ASEAN Way in the specific case of the East Timor (1999-2000) demonstrated the tussle between the regional norm of non-intervention and the global (emerging) norm of so-called ‘justified intervention’ in the name of post-Cold War UN humanitarian mission. Although most of the ASEAN states objected to the adoption of flexible engagement which resulted from the effects of the economic crisis, as noted earlier, the reasons the proposal of flexible engagement was rejected are mainly associated with the political aspects of the proposal, rather than the economic. That is, although ASEAN was quite expedient to reject any policy of threatening the non-intervention principle in the political arena, the economic factor, as was demonstrated in the Asian economic crisis, was likely to wither the doctrine of non-intervention in the ASEAN Way context.

Given these circumstances, it is worthwhile to point out that as Wendt (1999:92-138) argued from the constructivist perspectives, ideas and/or norms are not just rules for action, rather ideas and/or norms operate to shape actors and action in world politics. This means that ideas and/or norms not only constrain actors but also constitute actors and action. That is, the tussle between the conventional norms of the ASEAN Way and the emerging norms such as humanitarian intervention can not only constrain ASEAN policy makers in dealing with regional security problems, but also constitute new actors such as NGOs particularly involved with human rights to have some impact on the thinking of governments within the ASEAN region. In this context, it can largely be assumed that although the basic axiom of the ASEAN Way seems to be promoted by ASEAN member states, the global forces particularly linked to humanitarian intervention and economic globalisation are strong enough to call for rethinking the principle of non-intervention in ASEAN. By implication, this means that the norms of the ASEAN Way leave a room for ASEAN leaders to reconsider the scope and extent of the norms to be practiced within the relational context of interactions among local, regional and global forces.

Therefore, the ideas and/or principles such as intrusive regionalism and humanitarian intervention emerged as new challenges to ASEAN regional security mechanisms in the post-Cold War era. In this period, nonetheless, as was proven in the cases of Asian economic crisis and the East Timor crisis, for most of the ASEAN countries are vulnerable to internal as well as external forces, it is no surprising that they have a
strong intention to prioritise the strict adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’ so as to strengthen the theme of nation-building in line with regime stability and security. Because most of ASEAN members (which are still weak states and powers) would intend to liken the modification or even renunciation of the ASEAN Way to the disunity among the Association’s members. Moreover, because the ASEAN members fear that any intention to destroy the ASEAN Spirit or the ASEAN Way (if its potentials was put into practice) would open the door to the loss of sovereignty caused by diverse external interferences that the ASEAN states think unacceptable. In this sense, as long as ASEAN as a political entity exists, the politics of the ‘ASEAN Way’ does seem to prevail over any other variation, in which the member countries can maintain and advance the raison d’etre of ‘cooperation’ in terms of regional security.

Indeed, as mentioned in chapter 4, it was not accidental that ASEAN members as a group of weak states prioritised such norms as ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states’ and ‘non-interference in the affairs of States’. Rather, the commitment of ASEAN members to the principle of the modern Westphalian state system should be understood in the context of the search for internal stability and regime security. As examined in the cases of the Cambodian crisis (1978-1989), the Asian economic crisis (1997-1998) and the East Timor crisis (1999-2000), therefore, when ASEAN states recognised their limits to resolve regional crises by themselves, they attempted to take advantages of external powers to address the crises with the intention of temporarily allowing the interference of the outside powers. From the start of ASEAN, however, what made regional security cooperation really distinctive were the norms and values which came to be known as the ‘ASEAN Way’, that have not only been created by ASEAN leaders, but also been instrumental in forming the type and character of ASEAN politico-security regionalism. What is noted, in fact, is that regional norms and values are important for not only constructing politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC, but also being constructed and reconstructed by the member states of each regional organisation. In this context, hence, the fundamental mechanisms of SADC politico-security regionalism in the post-Cold War era will be explored by comparing SADC with ASEAN in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7 THE REMAKING OF SADC POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

7.1 Introduction

In the early 1990s, the Southern African region emerged from protracted conflicts, which were primarily connected with the Cold War and apartheid destabilisation. The regional security frameworks since the 1970s had been marked by deep-rooted conflicts, mostly of inter-state character, propelled by a number of internal and external factors (cf Hanlon, 1987; Khadiagala, 1994; Klotz, 1995; Matlosa, 2001; Chapter 5). Under the circumstance, SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) was formed in 1980 as part of the strategy of the Frontline States (FLS) to counter apartheid destabilisation, reduce its members’ economic dependence on South Africa, and coordinate foreign aid and investment in the region (McGowan, 1999:230-58; also Chapter 5).

Following the end of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid, however, SADCC evolved into SADC (Southern African Development Community) through the Windhoek Treaty in January 1992. Around this period, as ASEAN attempted to enlarge its members, SADC also took into account the acceptance of new members96. Moreover, ASEAN made efforts to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum (AFR) in 1993 in order to enhance regional security by increasing security cooperation with other states in the Asia-Pacific region (see Chapter 6). On the other hand, SADC attempted to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS)97 in 1996 with a view to ‘allowing more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations’ (SADC Communiqué, 1996). That is, in a new regional...


97 The term of the Organ is seen by some as ‘borrowed’ from the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (see Cilliers, 1996:2).
and international order, it became imperative for SADC to set up its own security mechanism for striving towards political stability and ensuring collective security (Matlosa, 2001:406). For both ASEAN and SADC, nonetheless, the emergence of the ARF and the OPDS was mainly to advance regional security in reaction to changing international milieu and a recognition that many of the problems and threats faced by the region which ‘can only be addressed through increased cooperation’ (Van Aardt, 1997:23).

Even though the demise of apartheid and the end of the Cold War brought opportunities for reconsidering concepts of ‘peace and cooperation …and the possibility of … building a strong and stable region’, new challenges and/or hidden conflicts (such as the protracted civil war in Angola) also emerged (Van Aardt, 1997:3). In addition, although the SADC member states have evolved the informal alliance of the FLS which has the potential to serve as a building block for the consolidation of the SADC Organ, there is neither security nor peace in the post-apartheid region (Söderbaum, 2001:108). Moreover, although a number of scholars argued that there is little prospect of external aggression against individual states or the region as a whole in the post-apartheid era (Nathan and Honwana, 1995:6), indeed, interstate tensions remain, such as the dispute between Botswana and Namibia over the Chobe River (Vale, 2003:148).

In this context, it can be argued that state policy-makers continue to hold (jealously) to state sovereignty, so restricting the region’s capability to get beyond its weakness and disunity in SADC (Swatuk and Vale, 2001:48). In this perspective, Van Aardt (1997:9) asserts that ‘the supremacy of sovereignty can be transcended on the basis of the existence and promotion of an over-arching regional identity’. Nonetheless, given the fact that the SADC region is increasingly fragmented at a time when it hopes to move toward cohesion\(^9\), the region cannot but enhance the cooperative structure and/or system of the evolving security mechanisms on the basis of regional solidarity and consensus.

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\(^9\) In the presence of largely prostrate states, people are increasingly turning to other loci of identity for aid and support: from warlords in townships to religious movements; from renewed tribalism, to extended, sometimes bi- and tri-continental family relations; from regionally expanding elements of civil society to global social movements (see Swatuk and Vale, 2001:37).
Furthermore, although SADC was mainly created as a socio-economic and developmental organization, but for the successful accomplishment of development and socio-economic prosperity we cannot estimate the value of peace and security in the region to excess. Although SADC defines itself as a developmental body, at the same time it sees itself as a subregional political (security) organisation under the OAU (now AU), that is, essentially a political organisation (Solomon and Cilliers, 1997:200). In this context one commentator argued as follows:

While the old SADCC always portrayed itself as an economic body, the organisation had more political and ideological inclinations than economic concerns. Its policies always portrayed political beliefs, particularly of the founding farther. Still, like other international bodies such as the Organisation of African Unity, SADC failed in many instances to condemn its own members (Sowetan, 25 August 1995, quoted in Solomon and Cilliers, 1997:200).

This chapter will analyse the political security mechanisms of SADC with a special focus on the SADC Organ, conflict management in the DRC (1998-2004), and the emergence of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact in 2003. In fact, Southern Africa has importantly witnessed the two military interventions in Lesotho and the DRC in 1998. However, the case of the DRC conflict is viewed as more appropriate in this study than the case of the Lesotho crisis (1998) because the former strengthens the purpose and argument of this study in explaining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in the context of a multi-level approach to regional security and regionalism. Indeed, it is contended that the DRC conflict can be illuminated at the three different levels involving the domestic, regional and extra-regional level (see 7.3). In particular terms of the regional level, the DRC conflict initially revealed a rift between the politico-security paradigms of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola on the one hand, and South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania on the other. Since the demise of the apartheid era, although the SADC member states such as Angola and Mozambique have, to a certain extent, stabilised, the DRC remains a major threat to regional security and peace (Ngoma, 2004:412).

Moreover, even though the South Africa-led SADC intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was
immediately questioned⁹⁹, the intervention (namely Operation Boleas) was arguably a success in stabilising the security situation in Lesotho, which not only prevented a military coup, but also enabled the political parties to resume negotiations on the issue of governance (Kent and Malan, 2003:3-4). Therefore, this chapter will focus on the DRC conflict which has been prominent and lingering as one of the biggest threats to peace and stability in the SADC region since 1998.

In this chapter, more importantly, the case of ASEAN, which was studied in chapter 4 and 6, will be instrumental in reflecting the differences and similarities of the nature, character, and focus of regional security cooperation in ASEAN and SADC. The primary motives and/or root causes, which determine the type and style of regional security cooperation, will be highlighted as the fundamental mechanisms of both ASEAN and SADC. In particular, this chapter argues that norms and ideas are not only constructing regional security architectures, but also constructed and reconstructed by regional actors (namely state policy-makers) in the context of political interests that the individual member states in ASEAN and SADC make for their own intents and purposes. This will, as a result, be conducive to understanding the character, nature and type of (contemporary) political security cooperation in the South, including Southeast Asia and Southern Africa.

7.2 The SADC Organ (OPDS): The emergence of a formal regional security structure

On the 28th June 1996 in Gaborone, Botswana, the SADC Heads of State and Government established the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). Following the rejection of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS) proposal, the SADC Organ was launched under Article 4 of the SADC treaty, which provides the guiding principles of the Organ such as: the respect for the sovereignty, a commitment to solidarity, peace, security, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and the promotion of economic development (see SADC, 1992). For obtaining these objectives, the leaders of SADC (now includes South Africa) had come to appreciate the need for

⁹⁹ Some observers claimed that the operation went beyond precedent in international law. The only argument which seemed to have clear legal precedence was that South Africa had intervened to protect certain South African interests, such as the Katse Dam water scheme (see Kent and Malan, 2003:3).
replacing the front line states (FLS) with a new regional framework which is more appropriate to the transformed environment in the post-Cold War and post-apartheid era.

Unlike ASEAN’s informal (politico-security) mechanisms – the ‘ASEAN Way’, the establishment of 1996 SADC Organ (OPDS) resulted in the emergence of a formal regional security mechanism out of an informal and an *ad hoc* style of the FLS, which eventually helped the SADC member states to institutionalise political and security cooperation in the form of OPDS. Although the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) was established by ASEAN leaders to provide a formal mechanism for conflict management in the region (see Chapter 4), ASEAN member states have largely tried to maintain informal regional security mechanisms since the establishment of the organisation (see Chapter 4 and 6).

During the ASEAN Singapore Summit of 1992, however, ASEAN leaders announced ASEAN’s intention to enhance ‘regional security’ by increasing security cooperation with other states in the Asia-Pacific region (see ASEAN, 1992). Nonetheless, ASEAN countries did not want to compromise the method of the ASEAN Way, but rather they made efforts to accomplish a key role of ASEAN in expanded regional processes by attempting to transfer such ideas of the ASEAN Way as a minimal institutional framework to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

In the post-Cold War era, although both SADC and ASEAN have been striving to invent new regional security frameworks to increase regional security, in fact, the OPDS and the ARF have rather different institutional experiences. The former resulted from the historical development of the FLS, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), SADCC, SADC and the ASAS. That is, the establishment of the OPDS has been a product both of history and evolution. Despite a number of practical defects in the structure of the OPDS, it should be noted that the member states have sought to develop the ‘institutionalisation of regional security’ within the SADC Organ since the end of the Cold War\(^\text{100}\).

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\(^{100}\) Prior to the creation of SADC, in particular, the ISDSC (which was formed in 1975 as an important structure of the FLS) continued to exist as an institution of the SADC Organ even after dissolution of the FLS. Like the FLS, the ISDSC is not based on a treaty, charter or constitution. Nor does it have a permanent headquarters or secretariat. However, it is more formally
In contrast, the ARF was developed only after the end of the Cold War. Its institutionalisation has largely been limited to ASEAN’s informal and consensual mechanisms. As mentioned in chapter 6, the ARF’s Concept Paper (which was prepared by ASEAN in 1995) stipulated that the ARF’s rules of procedure should be based on ASEAN principles and practices and that decisions should be made by consensus after cautious and extensive consultations. In addition, whereas the ARF is composed of ‘participants’ involving the mixture of ASEAN and non-ASEAN states, the OPDS consists of ‘members’ defined by SADC. Here, it is important to note that while the members of the OPDS are the same as the SADC members, the participants of the ARF are differentiated from the status of membership associated with ASEAN.

Nevertheless, while ASEAN was, to some extent, successful in building the ARF an ASEAN-led process through an evolutionary approach, SADC was initially incapable of placing the OPDS under the structure of SADC as a whole. That is, SADC could not manage to integrate the OPDS into SADC. The 1996 SADC Summit stipulated that the Organ would ‘function independently’ of other SADC structures (see SADC Communiqué, 1996). Owing to this decision, SADC was put to have two summit level bodies with no clear authority relations between them. Indeed, this led to the rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Whereas Zimbabwe insisted that the Organ was an autonomous security mechanism, South Africa argued that the Organ should be subordinate to the SADC Summit, which the SADC Treaty declared ‘the supreme policy-making institution of SADC’ under Article of 10(1) (see SADC, 1992).

Letting the OPDS function outside the SADC framework would lead to two separate organisations with two independent chairs. This implies that the institutional mechanism of SADC regional security was not well established to harmonise and coordinate the work between SADC and the OPDS (Breytenbach, 2000a:85-95; 2000b:93-103). Against this background, Zacarias (2003:38) argued that it was clear that there was ‘no consensus among members with regard to the ways in which this newly created OPDS should function’. Therefore, although the SADC communiqué structured than the FLS. Three sub-committees – Defence, Public Security, and State Security – were set up to facilitate the ISDSC’s work (see Berman and Sams, 2000:160-167; and also Matlosa, 2001:414).
(issued on 26 June 1996) formulated a wide variety of objectives of the OPDS (see SADC Communique, 1996), the communiqué was rather vague on the institutional framework of the OPDS. Brammer (1999:21) argued that ‘[the SADC communiqué] merely stated that the Organ shall operate at the summit, ministerial and technical level, independently of other SADC structure’.

Meanwhile, SADC(C) followed, since its inception, a sectoral approach in terms of its functions and roles (see Chapter 5). However, allocating responsibility for security in the SADC region to a single country would have been dangerous in the extreme because of the highly sensitive, political nature of intra-state and inter-state problems (Venter, 2000:282). In fact, whereas Zimbabwe favoured a sectoral approach to security by maintaining the leadership role it played within the FLS context, Botswana and South Africa, in particular, strongly expressed that the SADC member states are not going to allow a single country to play the role of autonomous actor in the political and security arena (Meyns, 2000:76-77). In this context, according to Van Aardt (1996:21-23), SADC’s sectoral approach is problematic when it comes to regional security: that is, such an approach is by definition a ‘vertical’ one, but the ‘horizontal’ expansion of security cuts across sectors, thus making a sectoral approach to security much more difficult. Here it is important to note that security was never dealt with in terms of a sectoral approach anyway.

At the SADC Extraordinary Summit held in Blantyre, Malawi on 14 January 2002, however, SADC leaders brought forth a turning point in restructuring SADC’s security architecture with adopting the renamed SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) by signing the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (see 7.4.1). At the August 2003 Summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, moreover, SADC heads of state approved the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) which covers four major sectors, including ‘the political, the defence, the security and the public security sector’: the political sector is to promote ‘existing common values and culture’ of SADC community; the defence sector is to reflect similar aspects to those shown by the political sector, namely the need for people to be protected from inter- and intra-state conflicts and aggression; the security sector recognises the challenges, which include the transnational nature of ... HIV/AIDS, ... food security ..., would best be done in a cooperative arrangement; and the public security sector is to ‘increase cooperation between various services responsible for law enforcement and public security, including immigration procedures and the movement
of people among the member states’ (Ngoma, 2005:195-199). In this context, Hammerstad (2004b:237) notes that the SIPO was intended to be an implementation plan providing substance and direction to the goals set out in the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. At this stage, thus, it is important to indicate that the emergence of the SADC Organ (OPDS) did not provide the region with a complete regional security structure – rather, it laid a ‘foundational framework’ within which the ‘institutionalisation of regional security could be developed’ in an evolutionary context (Van Aardt, 1997:15).

Importantly, nonetheless, the SADC leaders attempted to strengthen the OPDS by placing two sub-branches into the institution. One is the defence and security structure operating under the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), and the other is the political leg, which was a proposed Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), reflecting the political dimension of the former FLS. Given that the ISDSC would be dealing with ‘hard security’ issues such as military cooperation101, the ISPDC would be dealing with ‘softer security’ issues such as democracy, governance and human rights (Hammerstad, 2004a:222). In fact, the ‘politics’-leg of the OPDS dealing with softer security issues (when compared to its defence and security leg dealing with hard security issues) was weakly conceptualised and did not exist as an institution in its initial stage (Van Aardt, 1997:15). Although some weaknesses of the SADC Organ were (then) indicated in particular terms of the vagueness on the politics side of the Organ, the SADC member states made efforts to continually develop the capacity of the ISDSC. Van Nieuwkerk (2001:14) argues that the success of the ISDSC could be traced back to the FLS:

Historically, the ISDSC advised and implemented decisions of FLS Summit meetings. When the latter was disbanded, the ISDSC was retained and its membership was expanded to include all SADC member states. Its objectives are to promote regional coordination and cooperation on matters related to security and defence and also to establish appropriate mechanism to this end.

101 The main objectives of the ISDSC include: undertaking joint intelligence exercises; training and logistical preparations for peace operations; development of confidence and security-building measures (see Matlosa, 2001:414).
Thus, although the ISPDC was not initially institutionalised, the defence committee (ISDSC) was well established with a long history of practical security cooperation, which has been operational even when the FLS ceased to exist. This implies that the establishment of the SADC Organ was mainly preoccupied with a traditional approach to security where various aspects related to military and state security were privileged. In this context, Van Aardt (1997:23) argued that ‘[m]ultiple links between the social and economic wing and the Organ did not exist, making for a rather vertical approach and division between development and security’. However, the establishment of the SADC Organ was triggered from the salient debate whether and to what extent the SADC regional security mechanism(s) should be reshaped in accordance with emphasising the importance of broad security concepts beyond a military-oriented one.

The major objectives of the SADC Organ were set out as follows:

- to protect the people and safeguard the development of the region, against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression;
- to promote political cooperation among member States and the evolution of common political value systems and institutions;
- to cooperate fully in regional security and defence through conflict prevention, management and resolution; to mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts;
- to use preventative diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both within and between states, through an early warning system; to promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within member states, and to encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and Conventions of the OAU and the United Nations;
- where conflict does occur, to seek to end this as quickly as possible through diplomatic means. Only where such means fail would the Organ recommend that the Summit should consider punitive measures as a last resort (thus, the possibility of enforcement actions as a last resort is explicitly recognised); to promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security;
- to promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security;
- to develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact
for responding to external threats, and a regional peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon within the region, or elsewhere on the continent;

- to develop close cooperation between the police and security services of the region, with a view to addressing cross border crime, as well as promoting a community-based approach on matters of security; and to address extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa (see SADC Communiqué, 1996).

Given the expanded security concepts manifested in the objectives of the 1996 SADC Organ, it can be argued that vertical (deepening) and horizontal (broadening) approaches to security must be harmonised to attain the full extent of the SADC security mechanisms in line with Article 4 of the SADC Treaty, which shall be the guiding principles for the OPDS (see SADC, 1992). For the purpose of functional security mechanisms in the region, therefore, SADC member states had not only to resolve the dual leadership dilemma (namely the issue of political impasse), but also to attain harmonised and integrated approaches to security under the objectives of the Organ. That is, if the security mechanism (involving its contents and structure) is deeply divided, it cannot be functional and effective.

In terms of security mechanisms, while the ARF did not intend to develop a collective security framework, but rather aim mainly to promote confidence-building measures among the members (Acharya, 2003:190; also Chapter 6), the objectives of the OPDS laid down collective security arrangements which are largely associated with a ‘regional alliance system’ for the SADC security structure (Hough, 1998:25). In this context, Cawthra (1997:211) argues that ‘[m]ost of the provisions of the communiqué regarding the establishment of the SADC Organ are essentially those of collective security, …’. But just as the ARF’s Concept Paper adopts comprehensive security approaches covering military and non-military issues (see ASEAN, 1995a; also Chapter 6), the objectives of the OPDS are also seen as a multifaceted and comprehensive approach to regional security cooperation that entails an expanded security concept. Therefore, whereas the ARF was, to some extent, prepared for developing a common security mechanism without a collective security arrangement, SADC member states attempted, from the start of the OPDS, to devise collective (defence) security based on common security policies in conformity with a newly transformed environment after the Cold War and apartheid, at least in theory.
Moreover, although the ARF’s Concept Paper envisages three stages of security cooperation (confidence-building, preventive diplomacy, and conflict resolution), the ARF has maintained its focus on confidence-building since its formation: that is, it avoids a legal-binding approach to regional security problems, rather fosters dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern (Anthony, 2003b:200; also Chapter 6). On the other hand, Article 11 of the 1996 OPDS Protocol obliges the Organ to operate in terms of international law. The Charter of the UN under this Article envisages that the methods employed by the OPDS are to prevent, manage and resolve conflict by peaceful means. Furthermore, Article 11 argued that the OPDS (in enforcing all sanctions and arms embargoes imposed on any state party) must do so in consultation with the United Nations Security Council and the Central Organ of the African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.$^{102}$

As Article 11 of the OPDS Protocol implies, it is clear that the SADC member states are committed to peaceful resolution of both intra-state and inter-state conflicts which are requiring the respect of territorial integrity and the sovereignty of states. Indeed, the OPDS in its Preamble emphasised respect for good neighbourliness, interdependence, sovereign equality, political independence, non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of the member states. In order to achieve these purposes, according to Nathan (2002:62-102), the SADC member states prioritised the methods of ‘negotiation’ and ‘consensus’ to punitive measures such as military intervention and economic sanction that were only approved as a last resort. For ASEAN, likewise, the main objectives of the TAC (which was established as a code of conduct among regional states) were largely characterised by universal principles (such as sovereignty and equality) as well as provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes (see Chapter 4). However, whereas the TAC committed ASEAN members not only to settling disputes by peaceful means, but also to renouncing use of force, the 1996 OPDS Protocol leaves room for SADC members to allow use of force, such as military intervention as a last resort (see ASEAN, 1976b; SADC Communique, 1996).

$^{102}$ As regards Article 11(1), parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, other than for the legitimate purpose of individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack (see SADC OPDS Protocol, 1996).
Meanwhile, the foundation of SADC’s security architecture created through the OPDS in 1996, was negatively affected by regional tensions and conflicts. In 1998 two years after the OPDS was established, apart from the civil war in Angola, military interventions had occurred in Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In particular, the intervention in the DRC (which will be elaborated in section 7.3) brought tensions within the OPDS to the fore: subsequently with political and economic strain between South Africa and Zimbabwe, the rivalry between these countries threatened to polarize the region into two poles – a South Africa-led grouping with the support of Tanzania, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, sometimes referred to as the ‘peace-making bloc’ and a Zimbabwe-led bloc with its allies, mainly Angola and Namibia as the ‘defence treaty bloc’ (Schoeman, 2002:19).

In this regard, as mentioned earlier, it is contended that the DRC conflict revealed a rift between the politico-security paradigms of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola on the one hand, and South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania on the other. Since the demise of the apartheid era, although the SADC member states such as Angola and Mozambique have, to some extent, stabilised, the DRC remains a major threat to regional security and peace (Ngoma, 2004:412). Moreover, the South Africa-led SADC intervention in Lesotho in 1998 was arguably a success in stabilising the security situation in Lesotho, which not only prevented a military coup, but also enabled the political parties to resume negotiations on the issue of governance (Kent and Malan, 2003:3-4). Therefore, this chapter will focus on the DRC conflict which has been prominent and lingering since 1998.

Furthermore, one year after the regional involvement in the DRC in 1998 as a SADC intervention (which demonstrated the inability of the SADC Organ to fulfil its functions), ASEAN was also involved in external interventions in East Timor in 1999. In fact, whereas the Australia-led intervention in East Timor (namely INTERFET)103 was authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC104 was not authorised by the UN105.

103 On September 15, 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1264, creating the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. And On September 20, 1999, Australia decided to launch and lead INTERFET within the UN framework (see Chapter 6).

104 Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe held the chairmanship of SADC Organ during the
Within this context, the next section (7.3) will explore how the Zimbabwe-led SADC intervention in the DRC was initiated and shaped, which resulted in the legitimacy of the intervention being questioned. In doing so, it will reflect SADC’s role in the intervention of the DRC in 1998 and how conflict management in the DRC has been developed, with the purpose to understand the type and nature of SADC’s security mechanism. This will contribute to an understanding of why SADC leaders opted for restructuring the SADC Organ in 2001 (to be discussed in section 7.4).

7.3 Conflict Management in the DRC Crisis (1998-2004)

7.3.1 The Zimbabwe-led Intervention in the DRC: Collective Self-Defence?

In August 1998, SADC became the focus of international attention when Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia resolved to participate in an intervention operation in the DRC. As mentioned earlier, in fact, the DRC crisis has been referred to as the ‘first African world war’ (Reyntjens, 2001:311), involving thousands of troops from Angola, Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe as well as the DRC. Initially, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia decided to invoke the DRC’s recent SADC membership as a main reason to launch a SADC military intervention to defend the

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105 Because any intervention runs counter to state sovereignty, it is significantly checked by international law. The UN Charter prohibits unilateral uses of military force by individual states for any reason other than self-defence. In Chapter VII of the UN Charter, only the UN Security Council has the legal authority to launch enforcement operations to protect international peace and security. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for regional bodies to undertake peaceful measure to resolve conflicts, but, Article 53 specifies that regional organisations may not undertake enforcement action without authorisation from the UN Security Council (see United Nations, 1993).

106 Term coined by Susan Rice, the former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (see Reyntjens, 2001:311).

107 By December 2000, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundian, Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian deployments in the DRC reached 17-25,000, 10,000, 2,000, 2,500, 11,000, and 2,000 troops respectively (see ICG, 2000).

108 The DRC became a member of SADC at its Blantyre Summit in 1997.
Kabila regime from external aggression (Caraynnis and Weiss, 2003:274). As a result, as ASEAN was divided over East Timor, SADC was also split up in dealing with the DRC crisis. While Australia (as a non-ASEAN member) was the lead nation in the INTERFET under a UN mandate to restore and if necessary enforce peace and security in East Timor, Zimbabwe (as a SADC member) took the leading role in military intervention in the DRC as an application of the principle of ‘collective self-defence’ under Article 51 of the UN Charter (De Coning, 2000:286-288).

The three interventionists (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) asserted that the decision to intervene was based on requests from Kabila (snr.) for military assistance against advancing rebel forces (Neethling, 2004:6-7): that is, they agreed upon Kabila’s assertion that the conflict in the DRC was essentially an invasion by Rwanda and Uganda (IRIN, 19/Aug/1998). In fact, as the Australia-led intervention in East Timor (INTERFET) was only available at the Indonesian acquiescence (see Chapter 6), the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC (Operation Sovereign Legitimacy) was also accomplished on the basis of requests from the DRC government for military assistance against external aggression. Yet, if the Zimbabwe-led intervention was indeed an act of collective self-defence under SADC auspices, one would have expected SADC to have authorised such an operation at the level of the SADC Organ Summit, with a specific mandate, and perhaps that SADC would have appointed the Head of Mission and Force Commander. But SADC took none of these actions associated with an authorising body. In fact, no other country, international or regional body, including SADC itself, recognised the Zimbabwean, Angolan and Namibian

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109 While Myanmar opposed any external intervention in East Timor, Thailand and the Philippines were willing to cooperate with the UN operations in East Timor (see Narine, 2002:173-174; also Chapter 6).

110 The idea with collective self-defence is that when a country experiences an armed attack, two or more states can act together in supporting a victim country (see Dinstein, 2001: 225).

111 According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security’ (see United Nations, 1993).

112 The Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD), which received the support of Rwanda and Uganda, posed a serious threat to the government of President Laurent Desire Kabila’s Forces armées congolaises (FAC).
forces as a SADC force; rather, their actions were consistent with those undertaken by an ‘expeditionary coalition’ (De Coning, 2004:164). In this context, De Coning (2000:281-286) has referred to this new trend as ‘neo-interventionism’, whereby the interventionists do not enter as peacemakers but as allies of one side of the conflict.

Nonetheless, the fact that the DRC occupied Zaire’s seat at the UN and SADC admitted the DRC as a member implies that the Kabila regime was internationally recognised as the legitimate government in 1997. Thus, as mentioned above, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia accepted Kabila’s reasoning, namely that the DRC was the victim of a foreign invasion – by Rwanda and Uganda – and the SADC member states were duty bound to react to a threat against one of its members. In line with this argument, De Coning (2000:286) indicated that the type of intervention in the DRC appeared to be identifiable as ‘part self-defence, part collective security’. In this context, the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC could largely be considered as an incomplete act of collective self-defence although it was carried out by invitation from the DRC.

The causes of the DRC conflict combined both internal (domestic) and external (regional and extra-regional) elements. As Mangu (2003:238-245) pointed out, the conflict in the DRC involved a complex mix of ‘internal rebellions’ against an authoritarian regime and ‘foreign aggressions’ by some of its Eastern neighbours, namely Rwanda and Uganda. It was largely assumed, in particular, that the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC was to back a regime ‘whose legitimacy is highly questionable’ under the circumstances of the internal rebellions in eastern DRC (Soderbaum, 2001:108). It has generally been noted that Kabila (snr.) was a deeply unpopular ruler. In May 1997, only 11% of respondents to a public opinion poll in Kinshasa declared they would vote for Kabila in a presidential election, a percentage that only slowly rose to 33 % by July 1998 (ICG, 1999:11). In terms of a fragile legitimate-regime within the DRC, Mangu (2003:239) described as follows:

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113 In 1996, a violent inter-ethnic conflict broke out in the DRC. This conflict was the backdrop to the Banyamulenge-dominated rebellion that led to the expulsion of Congolese Tutsi from the refugee camps in the Masisi region and eventually to former Zairean (now the DRC) President Mobutu’s ousting. Kabila, who benefited from the Banyamulenge’s revolt against Mobutu, turned out to be their new target, as his regime engaged in a manhunt against the Banyamulenge and other Tutsi (see Mangu, 2003:239-240).
[During the Kabila’s regime], the tribalisation or ethnicisation of power was even faster than it was under Mobutu’s rule. ... After Belgium’s King Leopold II and Mobutu, Kabila was the Congo’s new ‘King’ and the ‘rightful’ owner of the country and its abundant resources. His sense of ownership was so strong that he [did] ... unilaterally change the country’s name from Zaire to the DRC as Mobutu had done the reverse of in 1971. ... Under Kabila, ... [t]he rights curtailed were not only individual rights, but also collective rights, including the rights of minorities such as the Banyamulenge, who were denied their Congolese citizenship.

Similarly, as Indonesia was put under serious challenges from internal turmoil\(^\text{114}\) during the East Timor crisis (see Chapter 6), the DRC was also under the circumstances of the internal rebellions. Thus, although Kabila’s regime was internationally recognised as the legitimate government in 1997, his regime was shaky from the start. In addition, the three countries (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) intervened in the war of the DRC in order to serve their own economic and strategic interests. Angola, for instance, wanted to strengthen its regime in fighting against UNITA in times of Kabila’s anti-UNITA stance. For Angola, the involvement in the DRC conflict created an opportunity to attack UNITA’s bases located in the DRC and to stop the illegal trading in diamonds and weapons which it used to finance its insurgency (Bøås and Dokken, 2002:153, quoted in Soderbaum, 2003:176)\(^\text{115}\). Zimbabwe’s intervention in the DRC was largely to obtain economic interests through various sources controlled by high-ranking military officials and prominent businessmen such as Billy Rautenbach (Maclean, 2003:115). Within this context, Taylor and Williams (2001:273) pointed out as follows:

[The foreign intervention in the DRC] is not only about preserving national security and defeating enemies, it is also about securing

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\(^{114}\) Extensive human rights violations were committed by the Indonesian armed forces against pro-independence activists and their suspected supporters, which brought forth a growing number of NGOs to influence the Indonesian regime to allow the East Timorese to choose between autonomy within Indonesia or independence (see Martin, 2004:143-144).

\(^{115}\) Namibia was also involved in the conflict for similar reasons because of its struggle with the Caprivi separatists (Söderbaum, 2003:176).
access to resource-rich areas … that can emerge and prosper under conditions of war and anarchy. In this sense, war assumes the characteristics of a business venture, ….

Under the circumstance, the type of the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC can, to some extent, be seen as a ‘profit-seeking’ intervention (cf Schoeman, 2000:42-43; also Breytenbach, 2002:6-7). That is, the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC is largely regarded as a resource-based operation related to economic and strategic interests and not an intervention based on collective self-defence. Thus, as mentioned earlier, it is overburdened to define the SADC intervention in the DRC as an act of collective self-defence. From a legal point of view, *inter alia*, although Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the DRC signed a pact among themselves, there was non-existent for a legal agreement encompassing the community as a whole (Field and Ebrahim, 2000:17). The three countries’ (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) participation in the DRC operation was not endorsed at the SADC Summit level; rather, it was approved at a meeting of SADC defence ministers (Field and Ebrahim, 2000:16). This means that SADC Heads of State and Government had not forged consensus around the intervention in the DRC. Rather, by launching the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC under SADC auspices, Zimbabwe took the risk of incurring substantial costs such as other SADC member states’ opposition to and criticisms of the operation. Moreover, this risk increased following Zimbabwe’s tense relations with South Africa116, which could weaken the Zimbabwe’s attempt to assert regional leadership with regard to the DRC conflict.

Furthermore, in the midst of the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC, SADC was not equipped with functioning collective security mechanisms which were supposed to be developed following the establishment of the SADC Organ. That is, only theoretically, the OPDS in 1996 aimed to ‘develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defence Pact for responding to external threats’ (see SADC, Communique, 1996). Once the war in the DRC broke out, in this context, Field and Ebrahim (2000:17)

116 The ‘two summits’ issue has paralysed the SADC Organ since the 1997 SADC Summit in Malawi. In fact, prior to the Malawi Summit, the South African president, Nelson Mandela, wrote a letter to his Zimbabwean counterpart, Robert Mugabe and others to inform them that, while he would abide by a majority decision, South Africa would resign as SADC chair if the Summit agreed to a separate Organ Summit (see Cilliers, 1999:28-29).
argued that SADC members were compelled to develop a Mutual Defence Pact\(^{117}\) (which will be discussed in the section of 7.4.2) as the region had no legal instrument to regulate collective action to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.

### 7.3.2 The Unilateral Intervention in the DRC: Pursuing the legitimacy of operation

In August 1998, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (who held the chairmanship of SADC Organ during the intervention in the DRC) announced ‘Operation Sovereign Legitimacy’ as a regional peace enforcement operation under SADC auspices: ‘We are going to respond positively in a manner that will help the government of President Laurent Kabila restore peace and stability … in the DRC’ (see SAPA (South African News Agency), BBC 19/Aug/1998). As a peace enforcement operation\(^ {118}\), however, the Zimbabwe-led SADC intervention was clearly illegal in terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter proposing that only the UN Security Council has the legal authority to launch enforcement operations to protect international peace and security.

Zimbabwe asserted that it was a peace enforcement operation, undertaken in support of the legitimate government of the DRC against a foreign aggression. Yet, as noted earlier, the Zimbabwean decision to intervene in the DRC was neither approved by the UN Security Council, nor reached out of the consensual authority at the SADC Summit level. In addition, a peace enforcement operation regards the neutrality of the third parties to participate in the conflict as significant elements to be emphasised (cf De Coning, 2000:285). Unlike Australia in East Timor, Zimbabwe in the DRC can hardly be seen as a neutral actor. In fact, the action of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, according to De Coning (2004:163), ‘falls outside the scope of a neutral third-party intervention because they aimed to intervene with a view to supporting one of the parties in the conflict with the aim of defeating the others’.

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\(^{117}\) Mutual Defence Pact was finally approved by the SADC’s Heads of State at its 2003 Summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (see 7.4.2).

\(^{118}\) The aim of the peace enforcement operations is to impose the will of the Security Council upon the parties to a particular conflict. Peace enforcement operations are the closest manifestation of the collective security role originally envisaged for the UN by the authors of its Charter (see Bellamy et. al., 2004:6).
Although Zimbabwean President Mugabe stressed rhetorically that he sought to help the government of Kabila restore peace and stability in the DRC, the SADC intervention in the DRC was not an action to pursue peace *per se* in the region. Rather, there existed some hidden factors to incite the leaders of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to intervene in the DRC as was shown in the previous section (see 7.3.1). Under the circumstance, ‘peace enforcement’ 119 should be distinguished from ‘enforcement’ in that the objective of enforcement does not aim to make peace between two conflicting parties, rather aims to act against a party that has been identified as the aggressor: moreover, whereas neutrality is an important component in peace enforcement operation, neutrality and/or impartiality are not a factor in ‘enforcement’ action (De Coning, 2000:285).

Unlike the Australia-led intervention in East Timor (which could largely be seen as a peace enforcement mission that was authorised by the UN), the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC under SADC auspices could not be regarded as a peace enforcement operation to make peace between two conflicting parties. Rather, the intervention in the DRC could perhaps belong to the ‘enforcement’ category, not in terms of the UN Charter, because they were not authorised by the UN Security Council, but in terms of their own intent and interest (cf De Coning, 2000:285). Nonetheless, launching Operation Sovereign Legitimacy within the SADC framework allowed Zimbabwe to act in the DRC as the fulfilment of its part of the regional duty. As mentioned earlier, the DRC was a SADC member and thus had a right to expect SADC to help in times of crisis. Moreover, SADC members have pledged to ‘act in accordance with the following principles: … [such as] solidarity, peace and security’ (see SADC, 1992).

Moreover, although the SADC Organ had been paralysed since the September 1997 SADC Summit in Malawi, it had not been dissolved, and Zimbabwe kept the OPDS’ Chair from 1996 to 2001. That is, Zimbabwe wanted to use its position as the Organ’s Chair in order to justify its participation in and leadership of Operation Sovereign Legitimacy within the SADC framework allowed Zimbabwe to act in the DRC as the fulfillment of its part of the regional duty. As mentioned earlier, the DRC was a SADC member and thus had a right to expect SADC to help in times of crisis. Moreover, SADC members have pledged to ‘act in accordance with the following principles: … [such as] solidarity, peace and security’ (see SADC, 1992).

Legitimacy. As previously noted, the Organ was created to protect the region ‘against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression’ (see SADC Communiqué, 1996). Even though the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC was not authorised by the UN Charter, therefore, given the fact that Zimbabwe chose to launch Operation Sovereign Legitimacy under SADC auspices, it can be assumed that Zimbabwe attempted to improve and guarantee the legitimacy of operation in the DRC. Hence, while Australia sought to assure INTERFET’s legitimacy under a UN mandate (see Chapter 6), Zimbabwe tried to have Operation Sovereign Legitimacy recognised as a genuine regional initiative under SADC auspices in spite of opposition to this assertiveness. Nevertheless, both Australia and Zimbabwe argued that their interventions in East Timor and the DRC respectively were based on the consent of the intervened sovereign states (Indonesia and the DRC respectively)\(^{120}\). Thus, as Australia was concerned about the legitimacy of intervention in East Timor, Zimbabwe was also interested in enhancing the legitimacy of its operation in the DRC.

Meanwhile, in September 1998, shortly after the Zimbabwe-led SADC intervention in the DRC, South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily in Lesotho in an attempt to stop a possible coup by the Lesotho armed forces and to assist the Lesotho government in restoring law and order following election-related unrest (Neethling, 2004:7). Like the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC, the South Africa-led intervention in Lesotho was also undertaken in breach of international law\(^{121}\). Under the circumstance, the Lesotho crisis in September 1998 gave the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC a more justification for its participation in the conflict, at least within the SADC region.

In fact, after meeting with other SADC Heads of State during the September 1998 Non-Aligned Summit in South Africa, Mandela announced that SADC decided to support the three countries’ intervention in the DRC in order to reflect some form of unity in

\(^{120}\) In fact, Australia insisted not only on gaining a UN mandate to intervene in East Timor, but also on obtaining Indonesian consent (see Chapter 6).

\(^{121}\) Neither of interventions were authorised by the UN Security Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter that provides for enforcement action carried out by regional organisations (see De Coning, 2004:163).
SADC\(^{122}\) (Berman and Sams, 2003:50). That is, the Zimbabwe-led intervention received SADC approval retroactively, but SADC leaders neither forged a true consensus around this intervention nor transformed the coalition into a genuine ‘SADC Allied Force’ (Malan, 2000:82-83). By implication, it is evident that SADC required regional consensus for the regional body to function effectively – a situation which needs the cooperation of both the South African and Zimbabwean leadership: ‘Mbeki [who replaced President Mandela as South African Head of State in May 1999] … needs Mugabe on his side to ensure there is consensus within SADC on how to resolve intractable problems in the region’ (IRIN, 3 September 1999).

As mentioned in Chapter 6, because the ASEAN states considered the decision to join the external intervention as a disgrace to Indonesia, they were largely reluctant to intervene in the East Timor crisis. Later on, however, ASEAN members realised that their participation in INTERFET would eventually be conducive to enhancing regional unity and solidarity as long as Indonesia calls for the participation of ASEAN states. Likewise, SADC leaders began practically to focus on regional solidarity and consensus within SADC on how to address the regional problems. At the same time, in the midst of the DRC conflict, hence, SADC was called upon to rethink the approaches towards the resolution of conflict in the region which will require ‘the coordination of the different national interests and their synthesis into a common and cohesive sub-regional strategy’ (Williams, 1999:171).

In particular, two important events during 1999 created an opportunity for the DRC conflict to be resolved. As noted above, the moves to improve relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe appeared. Firstly, President Thabo Mbeki replaced President Mandela as South African Head of State in May 1999 and secondly, South Africa passed the SADC Chair to Mozambique at the August Summit. Moreover, at the August 1999 Summit in Mozambique SADC decided that all SADC institutions, including the OPDS, needed to be reviewed within six months, thereby creating a sense of ‘urgency and momentum’ (Neethling, 2004:8).

Although the DRC conflict initially pointed to a division between a Zimbabwe-led bloc and a South Africa-led grouping, SADC members did agree upon the objective of

\(^{122}\) Yet South Africa would continue to push for a diplomatic rather than a military solution (see Berman and Sams, 2003:50).
OPDS which is primarily to protect the region ‘against instability, ...inter-state conflict and external aggression’ (see SADC Communiqué, 1996). In this context, as mentioned earlier, although the SADC Organ was not placed under the SADC structure as a whole, Zimbabwe did not attempt to intervene in the DRC outside and/or without the SADC framework. Rather, Zimbabwe as the Organ’s Chair tried to operate the intervention in the DRC under SADC auspices with a view to promoting the legitimacy of operation. Despite a number of problems in the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC, this unilateral intervention, to some extent, was meaningful in remaining the operation within the SADC framework which could facilitate other regional powers to, later on, approach the DRC conflict in proactive ways including multilateral and bilateral negotiations.

Within this context, during the SADC Summit in Mozambique in August 1999, events in the DRC and Lesotho had urged the Summit to look for a compromise arrangement on the OPDS. Importantly, an extraordinary meeting of the SADC ministers involved in the ISDSC, in Swaziland in October 1999, agreed to recommend that the OPDS should in future be part of SADC, thereby ‘breaking the impasse’ that had paralysed the Southern African community (Neethling, 2004:7-8). Following the Swaziland meeting, at SADC’s 2001 Summit in Blantyre, SADC leaders adopted a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation and reached important decisions to resolve the contention around the OPDS’s leadership structure, with a view to making the SADC Organ more firmly part of the SADC structures\(^{123}\) (see 7.4). Around this period, in fact, when the SADC member states tried to make the organisation alive through integrating the OPDS into the SADC structure as a whole, the regional leaders realised that the harsh treatment (meted out to Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe over the intervention) only served to fuel division and disunity rather than promote solidarity and unity within the region (Ngoma, 2004:9). In this context, the SADC member states began to search for practical solutions to resolve the DRC conflict. As a result, while SADC leaders pursued diplomatic paths in dealing with the DRC crisis, they not only allowed South Africa to act as a regional powerbroker, but also attempted to engage multilateral organisations such as the UN in the search for peace in the DRC.

\(^{123}\) Although a Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation was signed on 14 August 2001 by all 14 SADC members, it was only released for public consumption in March 2002 (see Ngoma, 2005:186).
7.3.3 Peacemaking in the DRC Conflict: From unilateral intervention to multilateral diplomacy

Interestingly, while the three interventionists (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) became the belligerents in the war in the DRC, they participated in achieving the Lusaka (peace) agreement, signed on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka. In fact, Ngoma (2004:8) argues that SADC has since the initial stage of the DRC conflict adopted a two-pronged strategy:

Firstly, the Summit in Mauritius [in September 1998] congratulated Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for acting well on behalf of SADC – a … militaristic approach; secondly, by tasking the President of Zambia with pushing for peace initiatives, it meant that the organisation was also pursuing a negotiated path – the preferred strategy by South Africa.

The Lusaka agreement provides for an all-inclusive process with (all) parties allowed at the negotiating table (Carayannis and Weiss, 2003:276). However, with a number of omissions, such as the Mai Mai militias (Congolese armed groups) from the agreement, the Lusaka agreement was, from the beginning, flawed in bringing forth its implementation (Mans, 2003:195-196).

With regard to the nature of the Lusaka agreement, it is important to note that the agreement sought to find a global solution through UN engagement by calling for a UN peacekeeping force to be deployed under a Chapter VII mandate as well as UN peace

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124 The Lusaka agreement identified the governments of Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe as the belligerents (see Carayannis and Weiss, 2003:276).
125 Peace negotiations culminated in the Zambian-brokered cease-fire agreement, signed on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka. Six African nations and the three major rebel groups eventually delivered their signatures, and the diplomatic community celebrated an all-inclusive peace deal for the time being (see Mans, 2003:195; also http://www.usip.org/library/pa/index/pa_drc.html).
126 The Lusaka agreement was signed by all but two belligerents on 10 July 1999. The remaining two, the Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo (MLC) and the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD), signed in August 1999 (see Carayannis and Weiss, 2003:276-277).
enforcement under a Chapter VIII mandate (Malan, 2000:79). However, the dual UN mandate (peacekeeping and peace enforcement) requested by the agreement, made it more difficult to implement\(^{127}\). Furthermore, while the international community has displayed a reluctance to respond in a vigorous and timely manner to African conflicts, the UN appear to prefer to undertake smaller and more specialised operations on the continent\(^{128}\) (Field and Ebrahim, 2000:10). Therefore, despite calls from African leaders for a robust UN force to be deployed, the international community, including the UN, took a minimalist approach in responding to the DRC conflict (cf Field and Ebrahim, 2000:8-9).

In fact, it seems that no major Western powers were willing to settle internal disputes in the DRC as long as their ongoing mineral imports were not endangered (Mans, 2003:213-214). Mans (2003:214) argues that ‘Western engagement, and the UN as a consequence, showed … reluctance to provide substantial support. … Western governments continued to engage on their own terms, … hiding behind the bureaucratic UN decision-making process’. In reality, international actors – especially the US and the UN – withdrew substantially from the African continent after the Somali and Rwandan debacles during the early 1990s\(^{129}\). As a result, the (then) OAU\(^{130}\) was

\(^{127}\) Peacekeepers do not make good peace enforcers, as the former implies a perception of impartiality and usually requires local consent, while the latter demands coercive action against one or more of the belligerents (see Carayannis and Weiss, 2003:278).

\(^{128}\) The UN peace mission seems to continue to be limited to monitoring and observer missions, as well as multi-functional peacekeeping operations in future (see Field and Ebrahim, 2000:10). However, in a commissioned report on the genocide in Rwanda, and through a report of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 1997 and 2002, the UN offered unprecedented and critical accounts of the shortcomings in UN peacekeeping for public debate and reflection: hence, this increased the urgency of demands for reforming the UN system in order to provide better responses to political needs and manage humanitarian intervention operations more efficiently (see Thakur, 2004:68-69; and also Gordenker, 2005:1-14).

\(^{129}\) Although the UN seems to be reluctant to become fully engaged in African conflicts, a number of recent conflicts (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DRC) have shown that the importance of UN cooperation with regional actors, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and SADC progressively increased (see Olonisakin and Ero, 2003:233-250).

\(^{130}\) The OAU was established in 1963 to protect African unity and independence. The end of the
called upon to play a more proactive role in managing conflicts within Africa.

Given the fact that the desire for regional autonomy was an important feature of several regional organisations in Asia and Africa, adopting regional solutions to regional problems was predicated on the fact that regional actors felt they were well suited to mediate in local conflicts, as they understood the dynamics of strife and cultures more closely than outsiders (Anthony, 2003b:195). That is, like such slogans as ‘Asian solutions to Asian problems’, the words ‘African solutions to African problems’ remain the motto of the West – and also of many Africans (Kent and Malan, 2003:7). In this context, the UN hoped that regional organisations in Africa would increasingly fill the vacuum left by the UN’s reluctance to act in conflict management in the region. Under the circumstances, moreover, at their Summit in Cairo in 1993, the OAU Heads of State established the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, comprising a central organ, a peace fund and a conflict management division (see OAU, 1993).

Nevertheless, as the ARF was ineffective in dealing with the East Timor crisis, during pre-Lusaka negotiations about an OAU-led, inter-African peacekeeping force for the DRC, OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim also acknowledged that his organisation lacked the capacity to successfully undertake such an operation (ICG, 1999:8). For its response to the DRC conflict, thus, the OAU merely played a reactive, and at best a limited supportive, role, far removed from its original ambition of anticipating and preventing conflicts (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:44). With regard to promoting Africa’s security and peace, the OAU’s limitations were primarily due to three factors: first, the OAU’s strict adherence to sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states often limited the chances of the organisation’s Cold War brought global and continental changes that made it necessary to restructure the organisation, and in July 2002 it was formally transformed into the African Union (AU). A major goal of the new organisation (AU) is to promote political and economic cooperation and integration amongst the member countries; in this context, it has adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as its central development programme. Both the AU and NEPAD acknowledge that economic growth and human development cannot be realised if the continent continues to be ravaged by violent conflicts, as it has for the past 25 years. Consequently, security matters feature prominently in the architecture of these new institutions, but particularly that of the AU (see van Nieuwkerk, 2004:41; also Ajulu, 2004:265-273).
availability; second, although the OAU Summit established a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution at its Cairo meeting in 1993, it seems that member states lacked the strong commitment to and respect for the machinery; finally, the OAU was confronted with a lack of financial resources (Amoo, 1993:239-262; Foltz, 1991:347-366).

Although the organisation’s transformation from the OAU to the AU in 2002 has included changes to its conflict-related mechanisms, the AU has not played a meaningful peacemaking and/or peacekeeping role in the DRC conflict (Van Nieuwkerk, 2004:53). As a result, the AU’s defects in conflict management generally, and peace enforcement in particular, have implied that, according to Carayannis and Weiss (2003:292), ‘the organisation’s principal roles in the wars in the Congo have been limited to those of legitimiser of UN action, intermediary between extra- and subregional organisations, and ‘moral guarantor’ of the peace agreement’.

SADC therefore had to take the lead in responding to the DRC conflict. For ASEAN as well, although the organisation was initially criticised for its reluctance to participate in the East Timor crisis, when the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) formally replaced INTERFET in February 2000, ASEAN’s response proved to be more

\[\text{131} \quad \text{The AU adopted the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) at its inaugural session in Durban in July 2002. In reality, the AU appropriated the Central Organ of the OAU’s mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and established the PSC as a standing decision-making organ for preventing, managing, and resolving conflict. According to Article 2 of the protocol relating to the establishment of the PSC, the council shall be a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate a timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa, and shall be supported by the AU commission (the AU’s secretariat), a panel of the wise, a continental early warning system (EWS), an African standby force, and a special fund (see African Union, 2002).} \]

\[\text{132} \quad \text{The OAU played a role, on behalf of the region, in nudging, cajoling, and otherwise pressuring the parties involved in the DRC conflict to adhere to the peace settlement. In practical terms, this means that AU staff is present at all meetings between belligerents to observe and monitor the peace process, and on occasion is used by regional leaders to exert pressure on the parties through declarative statements or the convening of meetings (see Carayannis and Weiss, 2003:292).} \]
robust and substantial than many outside the region had expected\textsuperscript{133} (see Chapter 6).

Likewise, SADC as a regional response to the DRC conflict was gradually gaining strength among regional leaders. Although the Lusaka peace negotiations were encouraged by the international community, including the UN Security Council, the United States, and the EU, in fact, regional powers (such as South Africa, Zambia and Tanzania) were the primary actors in pressuring Uganda and Rwanda to acknowledge their military involvement in the Congo and to accept the terms of the agreement (Carayannis and Weiss, 2003:276). Efforts to bring about peace initiatives in the DRC conflict were largely undertaken by leaders in the SADC region. For example, (then) Zambian President Frederick Chiluba led regional efforts to pressure the parties into signing the Lusaka agreement for a cease-fire in the DRC on 10 July 1999. A more proactive regional mediation in the DRC conflict that has led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement (namely the Pretoria agreement signed on 16 December 2002) was largely brokered by South African President Thabo Mbeki. Beyond a militaristic approach, that is, by tasking the Presidents of Zambia and South Africa, SADC attempted to pursue a negotiated way together with peace initiatives in resolving the regional conflict.

For ASEAN, as mentioned in chapter 4, Indonesia took the initiative of mediation\textsuperscript{134} for resolving the hostile relations between Malaysia and the Philippines caused by the Sabah territorial dispute during the Cold War. Moreover, during the Cambodian crisis (1978-1989), ASEAN appointed Indonesia as the organisation’s official spokesman to Vietnam so that Indonesia’s leadership in the Cambodian issues would reduce the role of external actors and pursue regional solidarity and unity (Antolik, 1990:135; also Chapter 4). In terms of the South China Sea conflict, furthermore, since 1990, Indonesia has sponsored a series of annual and multilateral workshops on conflict resolution (entitled ‘Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea) which have contributed to confidence-building and the facilitation of contacts between regional states (Narine, 2002:87; also Chapter 6).

\textsuperscript{133} For instance, a Filipino, Lt. Gen. Jaime de los Santos, became the Force Commander of the UN peacekeeping force, replacing the former head, Major-General Peter Cosgrove of Australia (see Chapter 6).

\textsuperscript{134} The initiative was facilitated by the institutional context of ASEAN, which made third-party mediation legitimate and unthreatening (see Khong, 1997:330; also Chapter 4).
Nonetheless, since the late 1990s, Indonesia appears to have waned in acting as a regional power. Although ASEAN tended to view Indonesia, to some extent, as a regional leader during the Cold War, Indonesia seems to have lapsed into a regional troublemaker in lieu of peacemaker under a series of regional crises including the Asian economic crisis (1997-98) and the East Timor crisis (1999-2000). In fact, neither Indonesia nor other member states in ASEAN were capable of playing the leadership role in shouldering responsibility for stability and order in the regional crises mentioned above (see Chapter 6).

Meanwhile, for SADC(C), although South Africa was strong enough to dominate other regional states in military and economic terms during the apartheid era, South Africa has attempted to transform its position (as a regional hegemon) towards a ‘pivotal’ state in regional order since the demise of apartheid (Habib and Selinyane, 2004:49-60). In terms of peace and security in Africa, by implication, this means that South Africa attempts to pursue a policy of ‘non-hegemonic cooperation’ through multilateral organisations like SADC, AU, the NAM, and the Commonwealth (Habib and Selinyane, 2004:52). In reality, at the same time, South Africa also appeared as a regional powerbroker not only with having the capacity to back up political commitment, but also with the necessary financial resources in addressing regional security problems, including the DRC conflict (cf Kent and Malan, 2003:1-7).

In the post-apartheid period, South Africa has been encouraged by Western powers (such as the US and the UK) to become a regional power which is supposed to shoulder responsibility for stability and order in its neighbouring countries: at the same time, South Africa has played an important role globally as a middle power.

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135 The term ‘pivotal’ gives a significant character to South Africa’s foreign policy that implicitly emphasises multilateralism, non-hegemonic behaviour, and partnership (see Habib and Selinyane, 2004:53).

136 In as far as responsibility for regional peace and security is concerned, South Africa has been targeted by the US and UK to accept Western aid for building peacekeeping capabilities to be utilised in African crises (see Schoeman, 2003:358).

137 South Africa played a leading part in the NAM and various international agencies: in particular, the development or review of international arms conventions are the focus of South Africa’s participation in the field of promoting international peace and security (see Schoeman,
In this context, it can be argued that South Africa is an ‘emerging middle power’.\(^{138}\) Indeed, because a middle power cannot impose its own idea in the presence of superpowers, it attempts to utilise a multilateral approach in order to exert influence as well as to limit the possibility of unilateral actions by big or superpowers (Schoeman, 2003:351). With regard to conflict management in the SADC region, thus, unlike a hegemon that would attempt to mould the region in its own way, and commit resources to this end, South Africa has deliberately attempted to shun from hegemonic behaviour while remaining a pivotal state (Habib and Selinyane, 2004:51-52).

Therefore, unlike ASEAN, multilateralism in SADC has largely been promoted by South Africa as a regional power. In so doing, SADC has attempted to take advantage of multilateral organisations such as the UN which can largely be influenced by the West. Although South Africa intended to be a non-hegemonic partner with other member states in SADC in the post-apartheid era, it is widely believed that South Africa is encouraged in its position and role as an emerging middle power with the emphasis on regional leadership. In contrast, ASEAN is devoid of such a regional power as South Africa in SADC. Indeed, what is important for ASEAN was to construct multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region with persistent adherence to the Asian way of multilateralism in the ARF (see Chapter 6). That is, although Western powers attempted to impose their own concepts and frameworks on the ARF, ASEAN rejected it and seized the ARF within the ASEAN initiative. On the other hand, since South Africa has projected itself as an emerging (middle) power under the support of the West in the post-apartheid period, its position helped pave the way for the West to influence the style and character of regional security cooperation in SADC as a multilateral organisation. In this sense, Schoeman (2003:358) argues that ‘[i]n as far as responsibility for regional peace and security is concerned, South Africa is ...to accept Western support for building peacekeeping capabilities to be used in African crises’.

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\(^{138}\) South Africa is often regarded as an emerging power, referring to its position as a regional leader and its position in the international or global political system as a feasible middle power: in terms of its role as a middle power, South Africa (that is considered to be ‘emerging’) would seem to have a role somewhat different from established, developed middle powers such as Canada and the Scandinavian states (see Schoeman, 2003:349).
Nonetheless, the South African government in the post-apartheid era has been careful not to become directly and, especially, militarily involved in regional peacekeeping (with some exceptions such as the South Africa-led SADC military intervention in Lesotho in September 1998) (Venter, 2001:174). By opting for peacemaking rather than peacekeeping, South Africa has attempted to pre-empt speculations from its neighbours that it intended to demonstrate its strong military muscle; rather, South Africa pursued strengthening regional security forums, by sharing security information, early warning of potential crisis, and preventive measures that promote peace and stability in the region (Ralinala and Saunders, 2001:61).

In fact, as an important guideline for South Africa to form a regional security policy, the 1996 South African White Paper on National Defence illuminates that ‘South Africa has a common destiny with Southern Africa; [d]omestic peace and stability will not be achieved in a context of regional instability and poverty’ (Hough and Du Plessis, 2000:80). Moreover, while the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions provides comprehensive policy guidelines for deployment, it highlights that ‘the level and size of South African contribution to any particular peace mission will depend on how closely the mission relates to our national interests’ (see White Paper, 1999). Considering the two South African White Papers, stability in the DRC can be regarded as part of South Africa’s national interest. That is, by implication, the two White Papers indicate that for South Africa, peace and stability in the DRC as a member of SADC should not be neglected, but be emphasised. Under the circumstance, South African President Thabo Mbeki was willing to send 150 technical personnel to the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in April 2001; and later on, South Africa decided to provide 1,268 additional troops to the MONUC (Kent and Malan, 2003:5-6).

At this stage, however, it is important to note that as ASEAN countries do not have a shared perception of what is in their national interests relating to regional security problems, including the South China Sea conflict and the East Timor crisis (see Chapter 6), SADC countries also have different national interests. For instance, the contest between a South Africa-led grouping (namely peace-making bloc) and a Zimbabwe-led grouping (namely defence treaty bloc) re-emerged on the issue of a proposed SADC Mutual Defence Pact at the Blantyre Summit in August 2001. Here, a Zimbabwe-led bloc wanted a defence pact (legally) obliging SADC countries to assist fellow member countries in internal conflicts, while a South Africa-led grouping wanted
to limit the defence pact to external threats (Isaksen and Tjonneland, 2001:43). This means, by implication, that even though South Africa takes a national interest in the security of the DRC, the agreement that includes an automatic military response to an outbreak of war in the DRC ‘would have … drawn South Africa into the conflict, rather than allow it a role as an outside peace mediator and facilitator’ (Hammerstad, 2004a:229-230). Hammerstad (2004a:229) continues to argue as follows:

While it is … in the interest of … a weak and war-torn country like the DRC to have its neighbours guarantee its sovereign borders, the region[al] power, South Africa, hardly needs such a guarantee itself, and it is questionable whether it is in its national interest to provide one for volatile countries such as the DRC.

In terms of the pattern of regional security cooperation, South Africa seems to opt primarily for using diplomatic means to pre-empt conflict in the region, with coercive (militaristic) measures only as a last resort (SADC Communique, 1996). South Africa is likely to prefer a peacemaker through multilateral negotiations to a peacekeeper that is largely supposed to be more directly and militarily involved in the conflict with a bigger role and much more cost. In this context, Schoeman (2004:10) points out that: ‘[t]he idea that conflicts can be solved through negotiation is one strongly adhered to by South African policy makers’. As implied previously, in fact, in an earlier draft version of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (which was finally approved at the 2003 SADC Summit), it bound member states to the requirement of ‘immediate collective action’ in the case of an armed attack against a fellow state. However, some SADC members, including South Africa, objected to this requirement and after a series of consultations Article 6 of the Pact was modified by adding that ‘Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate’, thereby providing a free choice for each member country whether or how to react if a fellow member fell victim to military attack from outside or within its borders. At the core of the Pact, therefore, states have a variety of “tools” to choose from. South Africa has throughout preferred that of diplomacy.

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139 An earlier draft version stated that ‘An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action by state Parties’ (see Draft SADC Mutual Defence Pact, Article 6(1), Maputo: SADC, 23 August 2002).
South Africa's preferred mode of engagement in the DRC remained that of diplomacy. Searching for a breakthrough, Mbeki and his deputy Jacob Zuma decided to broker a bilateral deal to bring about the Pretoria agreement in 2002, which effectively excluded most of Lusaka's main signatories\textsuperscript{140} (Mans, 2003:202-211). As a regional powerbroker South Africa adopted a flexible approach, opting for a less complex and more practical approach to the DRC conflict with taking the risk of political exclusion, instead of getting stuck in the inactive multilateral peace initiatives which at one point appeared to have had little prospect for solution.

Therefore, since the Pretoria of 2002, South Africa claimed the key position in the DRC peace process, and managed to broker bilateral deals with the DRC and Rwanda respectively, playing a mediating role in addressing the DRC conflict through a bilateral approach. Mans (2003:215) argues that ‘South Africa has projected itself as a regional powerbroker and has received widespread support from Western donor governments to sustain its commitment’.

Nevertheless, adopting a bilateral negotiation position in the DRC conflict does not mean that South Africa is willing to abandon multilateral diplomacy as a way of approaching regional problems, including the DRC conflict. Rather, South Africa’s bilateral approach to the DRC conflict in the case of the 2002 Pretoria agreement means that South Africa sought largely to find a breakthrough in the DRC conflict following the subsequent failures of implementing the provisions such as the cease-fire in the Lusaka agreement. In fact, the 2002 Pretoria agreement aimed mainly to form an inclusive, transitional government with Joseph Kabila as president and four vice presidents drawn from rebel and civil society leadership (Carayannis and Weiss, 2003:288)\textsuperscript{141}. Consequently, South Africa’s bilateral approach to the DRC conflict

\textsuperscript{140} In fact, the Pretoria agreement signed on 16 December 2002 took the risk of political exclusion. Interestingly, that same exclusion was a confirmation of what Laurent Kabila that the conflict in the DRC was primarily a problem between Rwanda and the DRC, and that rebel groups should not be allowed in as part of a resolution (see Mans, 2003:203).

\textsuperscript{141} Until his assassination, in fact, Laurent Kabila did not accept the Lusaka agreement’s provision that all parties, including the government, would enjoy the equivalent status in the inter-Congolese dialogue. But Joseph Kabila (who is the son of Laurent Kabila), once in power in January 2001, was willing to cooperate not only with the UN, but also with the dialogue’s
forced the internal belligerents in the Congo’s 1998-2002 war to establish a transitional
government in Kinshasa in June 2003 (ICG, 2004:3). However, the transitional
government’s inability to find a political solution to the division between president
Kabila (jnr.) and several RCD factions re-ignited the crisis in May-June 2004 (ICG,
2004:3-4). The crisis in the Kivus in June and November 2004, to some extent,
revealed the limitation of such regional mediators as South Africa to end the fighting in
the DRC (Terrie, 2005:54).

Nonetheless, it is widely believed that for South Africa, ‘any DRC mission should not be
just a SADC affair. …We know if it is just SADC then South Africa will be left to
underwrite the whole deployment’ (IRIN, 27 August 1999). As was shown in the 1999
White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions, South Africa prefers UN
engagement to disengagement in addressing regional conflicts. Moreover, the White
Paper’s principles include (but are not limited to) collaboration with the UN, the OAU
(now AU), and SADC: that is, South Africa’s fundamental policy to address regional
problems, including the DRC issue, should largely be seen as an ‘inclusive and
cooperative approach’ to regional conflicts (see White Paper, 1999). In this context,
since South Africa has projected itself as a driver of inclusive and cooperative
regionalism in the security arena, South Africa has been able to promote SADC’s
‘advocacy role’ in lobbying in favour of the engagement of multilateral organisations
such as the UN (Caryannis and Weiss, 2003:292-293).

As we have seen so far, the SADC security mechanism in the DRC conflict evolved out
of unilateral (the Zimbabwe-led) intervention toward multilateral diplomacy which was

neutral actor, former Botswana president, Ketumile Masire (see Caryannis and Weiss,

142 The broad transitional government includes, in addition to representatives from the armed
groups such as several RCD factions, political parties opposed to the previous Joseph Kabila-
led government (the ‘political opposition’). The Congo’s civil society movement also plays a key
role in the transition process (see ICG, 2004:3).

143 According to De Coning (1999:18), the 1999 White Paper on South African Participation in
Peace Mission is ‘the first comprehensive …and … holistic multidisciplinary approach to
peacekeeping’.

144 For instance, SADC ambassadors actively lobbied at the UN for the acceptance of the
responsibilities in resolving the DRC conflict (see Caryannis and Weiss, 2003:292-293).
headed by South Africa as an emerging middle power. Thus, this evolvement could largely be attributed to the role of South Africa that tried to utilise bilateral as well as multilateral negotiations. Nonetheless, given the fact that the Zimbabwe-led intervention received SADC approval retroactively, the underlying force for South Africa to spearhead conflict management in the DRC can be found in the SADC leaders’ consensus that peace and stability in the region could not be realised without regional solidarity on security problems.

Indeed, despite the regional split and rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe, the value of regional solidarity in SADC has continued to be developed in the wake of the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC. For instance, although the SADC Organ had been paralysed since the 1997 SADC Summit in Malawi, it had not been dissolved. Rather, the SADC member states sought to manage and resolve the DRC conflict under the objectives of the SADC Organ. As mentioned earlier, moreover, even though the DRC conflict initially revealed a rift between the ‘foreign policy paradigms’ of a Zimbabwe-led bloc and a South Africa-led grouping (Williams, 1999:171), SADC members did agree upon the objective of the SADC Organ which is primarily to protect the region ‘against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, inter-state conflict and external aggression (see SADC Communique, 1996).

In this context, although the SADC Organ was not initially placed under the SADC structure as a whole, as previously mentioned, Zimbabwe did not attempt to be involved in the DRC conflict without SADC approval. Rather, Zimbabwe, as the Organ’s Chair, tried to operate the intervention in the DRC within the SADC framework. As a result, the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC under SADC auspices can, to some extent, be seen as a stepping-stone to facilitate other regional powers to approach the DRC crisis in proactive ways including multilateral and bilateral negotiations. In this context, therefore, it can be argued that the DRC conflict helped pave the way for SADC leaders to restructure the SADC Organ in order to harmonise and integrate the different national perceptions and interests into a unified regional security structure.

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145 According to the objective of the SADC Organ, ‘where conflict does occur, to seek to end this as quickly as possible through diplomatic means. Only where such means fail … the Organ recommend that the Summit should consider punitive measures. … ’ (see SADC Communique, 1996).
Furthermore, a number of new security threats beyond a militaristic point of view have brought forth prominent security challenges to the region in a new era, such as environmental degradation; illegal migration; food insecurity; transnational crime; poor economic development; political instability; and disease including HIV/AIDS. Under the context of these new security threats as well as regional tensions and conflicts, the failure of the OPDS to ‘defend and promote peace and security’ that Article 5 of the SADC Treaty commits members to, called for reviewing and reforming the OPDS. This helped SADC leaders to realize the importance of empowering the institution with protocols, norms and values with the prospect of more effectively activating the work of the OPDS in a formal and legally binding way.

7.4 Restructuring SADC’s Security Architecture

7.4.1 From OPDS to OPDSC: Towards regional security integration

While the SADC Organ, had initially been headed by Zimbabwe’s Mugabe, SADC members at the Blantyre Summit in August 2001 decided to bring the Organ under SADC control. The formalisation of the SADC Organ with the signing of the Protocol (on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation) allowed SADC members to deal with regional security affairs within a legal framework. This implies that the signing of the Protocol would clarify what the member states can and cannot do under the auspices of the “new” SADC Organ. Thus, the structure, mechanisms, and functions of the Organ will be controlled by the new Protocol on OPDSC. The Protocol signed by SADC Heads of State and Governments in August 2001 provides for a fairly elaborate structure of the Organ: 146

- the Organ is guided by a troika (composed of the current, outgoing and incoming Chair) reporting to the SADC Summit;
- under the Troika there is the Ministerial Committee comprising SADC Ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security;
- under this Committee two ministerial subcommittees are devised;
- one is an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) is to be set up

comprising ministers responsible for foreign affairs to fulfil the objectives of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy;
- the other is an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which has been existent for more than 20 years, composed of ministers of defence, public and state security. ISDSC will enhance regional confidence building, including the fields of disaster management, satellite communications, peacekeeping training and doctrine, and public security issues such as drug trafficking and firearm-smuggling.

In terms of the structure and function of the OPDSC, as indicated above, the 2001 Blantyre Summit solved some of the major problems that had hampered the work of the Organ. The new Organ would be run by a leadership troika – following the same principle as the SADC chairmanship. That is, the SADC Organ was integrated into the SADC structure and report to the SADC Summit, rather than acting as an independent institution in the tradition of the Frontline States (FLS). In this way, the SADC member states attempted to consolidate a formal regional security structure within SADC in developing a common approach to the SADC Organ and its area of operation.

In contrast, although ASEAN has also been challenged to reform a structural system of regional security since the Asian economic crisis (1997-98) and the East Timor crisis (1999-2000), member states have largely opted for a minimal and/or thin institutional framework (see Chapter 6). In July 1998, for instance, ASEAN rejected the Thailand’s proposal for ‘flexible engagement’ which challenged to dilute the ASEAN Way. Rather, only a limited step has been undertaken in the form of an ASEAN troika system which was proposed by Thailand’s premier, Chuan Leekpai in November 1999. In fact, as mentioned in chapter 6, the troika would not be a decision-making body, but an ‘ad-hoc body’. Moreover, the troika was accepted by the ASEAN member states as it must be compatible with the principles enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC) which adheres to the norms of consensus and non-interference. SADC, though, has indicated an intention to move rapidly into the progress in institutionalising a regional security structure. By adopting the new Protocol on the OPDSC, the “new” SADC Organ was facilitated to upgrade the degree of formalisation as well as institutionalisation within the SADC structure as a whole.

In this context, whereas the Chair of old SADC Organ provided the secretariat services, the new Protocol on OPDSC (see Article 9) stipulates that the SADC Secretariat shall
provide secretariat services to the Organ. This illustrates that the new SADC Organ seeks to strengthen institutional capacity by firmly locating the Organ within broader SADC structures. However, there remain some problems relating to this structural development:

- the existing SADC secretariat is already overstretched and is currently undergoing rationalisation to reduce costs for the organisation;
- the needs of the Organ are such that a specialised secretariat, trained in security matters, is necessary to provide adequate support (Solomon, 2004:190).

Nonetheless, the historical evolvement of structures such as the FLS, ISDSC, SADCC, SADC, the ASAS, and the OPDS shows that the states of SADC region are concerned with seeking 'structural stability to enhance the [security] community' (Ngoma, 2003:19). Given the haphazard and ad hoc SADC interventions in the DRC and Lesotho in 1998, the signing of the Protocol can be seen as an important development in setting out the primary goals for SADC security integration. That is, the Protocol can be instrumental in clarifying the parameters for SADC’s role in dealing with regional conflicts.

In particular, Articles 11 in the OPDSC Protocol seeks to address SADC security problems by peaceful means under the heading of ‘Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’. In this regard, ASEAN has also attempted to provide for a mechanism of managing the conflict in Southeast Asia. Given the contents of 1976 Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC), Chapter IV in the TAC is largely associated with ‘pacific settlement of disputes’ in the ASEAN region. Here it is important to note that the TAC avoids explicitly using legality-oriented words such as conflict resolution. Rather, it prefers to use softer words, including friendship, good neighbourliness, amity, cooperation and friendly negotiations (see ASEAN, 1976; also Chapter 4).

On the other hand, for SADC, within the context of a legally binding security architecture, the OPDSC Protocol stipulates the jurisdiction of the Organ with stressing the approach to ‘resolution’ of regional conflicts. According to Article 11(2a) of the Protocol, the OPDSC was mandated to seek to ‘resolve any significant inter-state conflict between the Signatories or between a Signatory and another state’\textsuperscript{147}. As

\textsuperscript{147} According to the Protocol, a significant inter-state conflict shall include: ‘a conflict over
regards Article 11(2b) of the Protocol, the Organ may also seek to ‘resolve any significant intra-state conflict within a Signatory’\textsuperscript{148}. Hence, both Article 11(2a) and 11(2b) imply that the SADC member states appear largely to be interested in equipping the OPDSC (in terms of jurisdiction) with a legal instrument in which to provide for the ‘resolution’ of inter-state as well as intra-state conflicts effectively.

However, both ASEAN and SADC are equally concerned about managing regional conflicts by ‘peaceful means’. In this context, as previously shown in the DRC conflict (see 7.3.2), one of the significant attempts by SADC leaders was to mediate a peaceful settlement during the later Congo wars. The SADC leaders such as South African President Thabo Mbeki sought to manage the DRC conflict by ‘peaceful (diplomatic) means’ which was clearly emphasised in Article 11(1) of the OPDSC Protocol. Nevertheless, as regards Article 11(3a), ‘the methods employed by the Organ to prevent, manage and resolve conflict by peaceful means shall include … arbitration, and adjudication by an international tribunal’. In addition, according to Article 11(1d), ‘the Organ shall seek to ensure that the Signatories adhere to and enforce all sanctions and arms embargoes imposed on any party by the United Nations Security Council’. In this regard, whereas Article 17 in the TAC appears to ambiguously approach the method of settlement of disputes in terms of any (coercive) measure provided for by the UN\textsuperscript{149}, SADC, as both Articles of 11(3a) and 11(1d) of the OPDSC Protocol illustrate, seems to be more explicitly stipulating how and to what extent the UN can

territorial boundaries or natural resources; a conflict in which an act of aggression or other form of military force has occurred or been threatened; and a conflict which threatens peace and security in the Region or in a Signatory which is not a party to the conflict’ (see SADC, OPDSC Protocol, 2002).

\textsuperscript{148} According to the Protocol, a significant intra-state conflict shall include: ‘large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights; a military coup or other threat to the legitimate authority of a state; a condition of civil war or insurgency; and a conflict which threatens peace and security in the Region or in another Member State’ (see SADC OPDSC Protocol, 2002).

\textsuperscript{149} According to Article 17 of TAC, ‘… The High Contracting Parties which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations’ (see ASEAN, 1976).
intervene in the regional affairs. In this context, it can be argued that ASEAN is less reliant than SADC upon and less open to external and/or global forces such as the UN.

Within this context, it is important to note that not only Article 11 of OPDSC Protocol but also Article 3 of SADC Mutual Defence Pact took a relationship between SADC and global organisations such as the UN into account in resolving regional conflicts. Put differently, these articles pave the way for SADC to collaborate with external organisations like the UN in addressing international and regional conflicts. In fact, Article 11(2c) of Protocol on the jurisdiction of the SADC Organ stipulates that ‘in consultation with the United Nations Security Council and the Central Organ of the Organisation of African Unity Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, the SADC Organ may offer to mediate in … conflict that occurs outside the region’. That is, Article 11(2c) promotes the interoperability between SADC and non-SADC organisations. As Ngoma (2003:23) notes, the signing of the Protocol opens the door for the SADC member states to participate in ‘peacekeeping operations on the African continent … and as a member of the world community in missions outside the continent’.

However, the cooperative interrelations between SADC and the UN need to be reoriented. As was previously mentioned, neither the Zimbabwe-led intervention in the DRC nor the South Africa-led intervention in Lesotho, was approved by a UN Security Council Resolution. In this context, Solomon (2004:191) argues that the modalities of relationship between the SADC Organ and the UN under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter need to be addressed when it comes to the prior authorisation of the UN Security Council before SADC forces can intervene in any state. Moreover, although SADC leaders sought to consolidate a formal regional security structure with signing the OPDSC Protocol, as the Protocol (see Article 8(c)) stipulates, decisions of the Ministerial Committee shall be taken by ‘consensus’, with a quorum of two-thirds of member states present. In other words, the rule of decision-making by consensus is a right to veto the majority decision within SADC. Under the circumstance, by implication, it can be argued that consensus-based decision-making has largely been practised

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150 Yet, in terms of SADC peacekeeping, the modalities of its force have to be worked out by member states and the questions of common command and control, a common logistics framework, uniformed training, compatible armaments, common military doctrine, and common defence budgeting all need to be factored in (see Solomon, 2004:192).
within the frameworks of SADC.

In this context, similar to SADC, ASEAN also has committed itself to the principle of decision-making through consensus since the establishment of the organisation (see Chapter 4). However, the connotations of the word ‘consensus' in ASEAN are, to some extent, different from those in SADC. In ASEAN, the idea of consensus was conceived as a common understanding of an agenda achieved through ‘lengthy dialogue and consultation’ (Katsumata, 2003:107). But consensus in the ASEAN context need not be the same as unanimity: what is important is, in fact, that ASEAN-style consensus has largely been seen as a way of moving forward by establishing what seems to be broad support despite the reluctance of some of the members to participate in it (Acharya, 2001:68-69). On the other hand, given Article 8 of OPDSC Protocol under the heading of ‘Committee Procedures’ \(^{151}\), the procedural aspects of decision-making – or the actual number of votes – seem to be more important in SADC than in ASEAN. What seems peculiar to ASEAN, when compared to SADC, is the ‘process’ of arriving at a consensus (mufakat) through a consultation (musyawarah): in other words, the process of consensual decision-making is supposed to be practised in a way of making gentle suggestions of the path a community should follow, being careful always to take their views and feelings into consideration \(^{152}\) (Jorgenson-Dahl, 1982:166; also Chapter 4).

Nonetheless, given the fact that the rule of decision-making by ‘consensus’ is largely based on the principle of ‘national basic rights and equality’, it can be argued that both ASEAN and SADC are deeply committed to ‘national sovereignty’ (which is one of universally accepted norms) as a paramount national concern that cannot be compromised. In fact, just as Article 2 of the TAC provides for “[m]utual respect for …sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, …[n]on-interference in the internal affairs of one another…” , the Preamble of the OPDSC Protocol also stresses that “[r]ecognising and [r]e-affirming the…strict respect for sovereignty, …equality, territorial integrity,

\(^{151}\) The following provisions shall apply to the ministerial committees of the Organ: (a) the quorum for all meetings shall be two-thirds majority of the Signatories; (b) the ministerial committees shall determine their own rules of procedure; and (c) decisions shall be taken by consensus (see SADC OPDSC Protocol, 2002).

\(^{152}\) The outcome of consultations and the movement toward consensus and dialogue may largely be regarded as a cornerstone of collective identity generated by ASEAN members in terms of regional security cooperation (see Chapter 4).
...and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs’. Within this context, Hammerstad (2004a:223) argues as follows:

Due to the [consensual] decision-making structure, the [new SADC] Organ has, in practice, no enforcement mandate and can only be...involved in the internal affairs of a member state if invited by it to do so. This … circumscribes the power of the Organ to deal with the most salient security threats in the region, since these do not [largely] arise from inter-state tensions, but from internal issues of governance, legitimacy and power.

Under the circumstance, moreover, it is important to note that although the OPDSC Protocol provides for SADC to deal with such internal security issues in member states as a condition of insurgency or large-scale violence, in reality, the rule of consensual decision-making leaves room for SADC to pursue strict adherence to the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. It can be assumed that although the new SADC Organ can, to some extent, be seen as a legality-driven security mechanism in the region, the Organ faces a number of challenges ahead for translating the Protocol into the implementation of the practical policies in the areas of operation.

Apart from a number of domestic problems and violent conflict in individual SADC countries, therefore, how and whether the member countries will operationalise the new SADC Organ is and should be highlighted as the primary question of building security integration in the region. In particular, given the fact that SADC is reliant on the international donor community for 80 % of its operational costs (SADC, 2000; also Tjønneland, 2004:15), the question of the capacity and expertise in the SADC region comes to the fore. In this context, Schoeman (2002:17-20) raises important questions: will SADC empower the OPDSC with the necessary financial, human and other resources and will it also empower the OPDSC with decision-making power in such a way of abiding by majority decisions in lieu of consensus formula within the institution.

Lastly, although the ISDSC has a good track record of cooperation since, there has been a recent setback: the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare was closed down because Denmark, the principal funder, decided to withdraw all funds
in reaction to developments in Zimbabwe\textsuperscript{153} (Isaksen, 2002:30). Therefore, under the auspices of the ISDSC, although a Mutual Defence Pact was approved at the 2003 SADC Summit, it is likely to be difficult to implement. It usually requires greater supranational authority compared to a mere collective security arrangement and it presupposes a willingness to supply mutual information on e.g. the procurement of defence equipment\textsuperscript{154} which in the end many member countries may be reluctant to do (Isaksen, 2002:31).

Given the integrated nature of the security structure in SADC, nevertheless, the incorporation of the SADC Organ into SADC can be seen as an evolutionary development. According to Solomon and Ngubane (2003:4), moreover, such incorporation into SADC ‘reinforces notions of holistic, expanded and integrated security set-up – emphasising that questions relating to peace and development cannot be separated [and] …it prevents abuse by one state of the Organ for national – or even personal – reasons, as was evident in the decision to intervene in the DRC’. Together with structural formalisation of the SADC Organ, the OPDSC Protocol can largely be viewed as one of the biggest successes in the evolutionary processes of regional security integration. Despite a number of flaws indicated so far, therefore, it can, to some extent, be argued that the adoption of the Protocol by the SADC member states suggests a ‘unity of purpose’ among SADC leaders as well as a ‘preference for collective leadership’: at least in theory, hence, this has potential to translate into a conflict-free environment among member states (Ngoma, 2003:22). In order to cultivate an atmosphere conducive to providing a security mechanism to prevent internal conflicts as well as external aggressions, furthermore, SADC attempted to advance a collective identity among the members through creating the SADC Mutual Defence Pact in 2003 which will be discussed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{153} Apart from mentioning the major problems underpinning Zimbabwe’s current crisis such as the undemocratic and authoritarian type of state, there is also the crucial issue of land redistribution which aggravated the economic crisis and deteriorated governance and lawlessness. The Zimbabwe regime has managed to create a highly politicised debate around the land question. This debate obfuscates legitimate concerns surrounding violence and human rights abuses, and distracts attention of the international community, from the poor governance record of Mugabe and his ruling party, ZAUN-PF (Taylor and Williams, 2002: 548-551).

\textsuperscript{154} See Article 9(c) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.
7.4.2 The Politics of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact

The SADC Mutual Defence Pact was launched to promote regional cooperation in politics, defence and security. The Pact was adopted by the SADC Summit in Tanzania in 2003 (IRIN, 27 August 2003). A mutual defence pact is classically viewed as a collective self-defence strategy that includes such forms as mutual assistance treaties and military alliances (Dinstein, 2001:226-233). Mutual assistance treaties proclaim that ‘an armed attack against one of them will be regarded as an armed attack against all, pledging to help out each other in such circumstances’ (Dinstein, 2001:227). Military alliances are the hallmark of military integration in the areas of the ‘military high command, the amalgamation of staff planning, the unification of ordnance, the establishment of bases on foreign soil, organisation of joint manoeuvres and the exchange of intelligence data’ (Dinstein, 2001:230).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (which was established in 1949 as a Cold War collective self-defence arrangement against a possible attack by the Soviet Union) is a case in point in explaining a classic mutual defence pact. In fact, Article 5 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty lays down the principle of mutual assistance155. Article 3 of the Treaty stipulates that the parties ‘will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack’156. These articles (operating within the collective self-defence provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter) have brought into being NATO, which has evolved over the years into a military alliance (McCoubrey and Morris, 2000:71-72).

But the SADC member countries do not commit themselves to the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’, as is the case for NATO. Article 6 of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact157 (dealing with collective self-defence and collective action), Article 6(1)

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155 According to Article 5 of the Treaty, ‘Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties ... to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’ (see McCoubrey and Morris, 2000:71).

156 Ibid.

notes that ‘An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action’. However, Article 6(3) of the Pact stipulates that ‘Each State Party shall participate in such collective action in any manner it deems appropriate’. In this sense, Hammerstad (2004a:229) argues that whether and how to intervene in the SADC region will be left entirely up to each state to decide.

Indeed, the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, under collective self-defence, makes provision for the member states to protect each other from external aggressions on their own intent and purpose. This implies that the SADC member states want to utilise ‘flexibility’ in their own favour in responding to military attacks from outside or within their borders. In this sense, it may be argued that the SADC Mutual Defence Pact was established as a weak or loose form of military alliance as distinguished from the NATO version. On the other hand, ASEAN has never seriously contemplated adopting such a military pact as a collective defence arrangement, rather the extent and scope of member states’ military cooperation has been limited to bilateral agreements because of the flexibility it affords (see Chapter 4 and 6). In reality, nonetheless, both ASEAN and SADC are unable to form a formal military alliance like NATO given the lack of military capabilities and the clear choice in favour of national sovereignty by members of both organisations.

ASEAN attempted to contribute to efforts toward regional confidence building through the ARF. In fact, as mentioned in chapter 6, although the ARF Concept Paper in 1995 outlined a three-staged approach (including the mechanisms of confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution) in managing conflicts in the region, the ARF has largely focused on confidence building measures (CSBMs). Similar to CSBMs in the ARF, the SADC Mutual Defence Pact is also likely to be concerned about regional confidence building. Article 7 of the Pact (which delves into intra-regional relations in a regional context) deals with non-interference into each other’s internal affairs. SADC leaders seem to continually place emphasis on the issue of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states with incorporating elements of a ‘non-aggression treaty’ into the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. Thus, the Pact can be

158 Non-aggression treaties provide that member states of a regional organisation shall refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression against other members, or from committing or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against each other (see Hough, 1998:28).
seen as a complex agreement that combines elements of collective self-defence as a classic mutual defence pact and elements of a 'non-aggression treaty' seeking to engage in regional confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) for SADC (Hough, 1998:27-28; Solomon, 2004:189). In this context, the provision of Article 9 of the Pact for areas of cooperation in defence matters such as joint military exercises (which also promote CSBMs) needs to be understood in the context of principles such as non-aggression and/or non-interference in the SADC region.

Within this context, Article 1 of the Defence Pact clearly indicates that the Pact continues to view states as sovereign in a desire to ensure and guarantee security for states in conformity with the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Although the statements regarding the protection of people were expressed in the Preamble159, Article 7 (on non-interference) and 8 (on destabilising factors) of the Defence Pact, most of the articles of the Pact160 appear to highlight the security of state and government. SADC leaders seem to be more preoccupied with the matters of state and military issues than with non-military threats such as poverty, disease and inequality in a transformed environment in the post-Cold War and post-apartheid era. Article 1(2) of the Pact is a case in point in arguing for the perspective above, which states that ‘armed attack means the use of military force in violation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of a State Party’161. In this context, therefore, it is argued that the SADC Mutual Defence Pact can primarily be seen as the guardian of ‘state and regime security’ (Swart and Du Plessis, 2004:35).

Although the formative nature and character of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact may be seen to be justified from the earlier historical discussion of the Southern African sub-region (cf Ngoma, 2004:414; also Chapter 4), there can be no denying that the SADC

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159 ‘Seeking to promote peace, security, stability and well being among our peoples; Determined to defend and safeguard the freedom of our peoples and their civilisation, as well as their individual liberties and the rule of law; Convinced that close cooperation in matters of defence and security will be to the mutual benefit of our peoples’ (see SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003).

160 Most of the articles seek to address conflict resolution, military preparedness, consultation, collective self-defence and collective action, defence cooperation, and so forth (see SADC Mutual Defence Pact, 2003).

region should go beyond the state-centric approach to security while at the same time placing greater emphasis on people who are supposed to be primary referents of security as clarified in Article 23 of the SADC Treaty\textsuperscript{162} (see SADC, 1992). Within this context, Schoeman (2004:10) argues as follows:

The mutual defence pact could widen existing rifts and its impact on regional cooperation .... One of its biggest dangers might be its reorientation of SADC’s initial ‘new security’ approach that de-emphasised military-political security and any form of violence as a solution to conflicts towards a more traditional approach in which state security, military-political issues and external (military) threats are given priority.

The SADC Mutual Defence Pact was a product of a long history, starting with the FLS alliance and through the continual development of ISDSC, SADCC, SADC, ASAS, OPDS and currently OPDSC (Ngoma, 2004:412-413). In particular, one of the key objectives of the SADC Organ was to ‘conclude a Mutual Defence Pact to respond to external military threats’ (see SADC Communique, 1996). In the course of evolvement of the regional security architecture, however, the emergence of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact cannot be seen merely as a move toward a more militaristic direction in SADC’s security integration, but rather as an outcome of ‘intense political dynamics’ which refer to the contest in the region for political influence and domination (Van Nieuwkerk, 2003:2-3).

Historically, that is, SADC(C) has primarily dealt with political conflicts and tensions such as the racial confrontation between South Africa and SADCC members during the apartheid era, and the rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe in the post-apartheid period. In line with this argument, Van Nieuwkerk (2003:3) goes on to argue that ‘the significance of the Pact can be seen to be a strengthening of the South African approach to regional affairs – ... the tendency to avoid military in favour of diplomatic intervention’. The adoption of the Pact can be seen, as evidenced in Article 6(3) of the Pact, as a political scheme for the SADC member countries to develop the diplomatic

\textsuperscript{162} Article 23 on Non-Governmental Organisation states that ‘In pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully the people of the Region and non-governmental organisations in the process of regional integration (see SADC, 1992).
means to be applied prior to a scheme of armed force as a last resort. In this context, this argument is conducive to understanding why the SADC member countries do not commit themselves to the principle of 'an attack on one is an attack on all', as is the case for NATO.

Moreover, although the SADC Mutual Defence Pact has the potential to provide increased legitimacy for SADC members who choose to take military action in defence of a fellow member (even if others do not follow suit) for peace enforcement operation under a SADC umbrella, there will have to be (political) consensus on the action within the SADC Organ (Hammerstad, 2004a:230). Hence, as the OPDSC Protocol recommits the member countries to the principle of sovereignty, in fact, the SADC Mutual Defence Pact also continues to stress the political norms of strict respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. In this context, it can be argued that the Defence Pact does not oblige the member countries to defend a fellow member under attack in times of crisis. Nonetheless, the Pact can, to some extent, be seen as having the ability to prevent member states from promoting hostile activities in each other’s territories and encouraging each other’s support in such a collective (mutual) defence (Ngoma, 2003:25). As mentioned earlier, the SADC Mutual Defence Pact was primarily projected by state elites in the SADC region to maintain the closeness of the relationship among the member countries, which is essential to protecting the security of state and government.

Summing up, therefore, although the SADC member countries created the Mutual Defence Pact as an evolutionary evidence of regional security integration and cooperation, the Pact cannot be considered merely as a military approach to resolving regional conflicts. Rather, the Pact can be viewed as a political calculation for SADC leaders to allow for a flexible approach to regional security problems. Although the SADC member countries attempted to enhance the formalisation as well as legalisation of SADC’s security architecture, SADC leaders aimed mainly to advance a political scheme to deal with regional conflicts.

7.5 Conclusion

The emergence of both the OPDSC Protocol in 2001 and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact in 2003 has opened the way for the member states to deal with military conflicts in the region. But the Defence Pact does not go further in legally committing members to
military enforcement action than what the Protocol already did (Hammerstad, 2004a:230). In fact, although the creation of the OPDS(C) and the Defence Pact illustrate that the ‘regional grouping …desires to work as one on matters of defence and security’ (Ngoma, 2003:25), there remain a number of problems in achieving the goal of SADC’s security integration. Both the OPDS(C) and the Defence Pact cannot be viewed purely as legal tools in resolving security conflicts in the region. Instead, they were developed by SADC leaders to provide security mechanisms to be largely utilised as a political rather than legal means.

After the end of apartheid and the Cold War, SADC members attempted to restructure the regional security architecture. Despite a number of flaws in developing the security mechanism(s), SADC leaders were, to some extent, successful in achieving regional solidarity and consensus on integrating their security structures. The SADC member countries have evolved the degree of formalisation and institutionalisation of security frameworks in the region even before SADC(C) was born. In contrast, ASEAN members have largely continued to maintain informal security mechanisms within the ‘ASEAN Way’ context since the establishment of the organisation.

Thus, the scope and style of institutionalisation in ASEAN have been different from those of SADC. Nonetheless, both ASEAN and SADC kept maintaining the focus on such political norms as sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity. The deep commitment of both organisations to these norms can be understood in the context of regional identities which are closely interrelated with their unique historical experiences as well as political dynamics. This means that both ASEAN and SADC have developed their own ideas and norms to shape the member states’ actions in managing conflicts in the regions. As mentioned earlier, for instance, both organisations placed emphasis on ‘consensus’ as a means of regional solidarity in particular terms of decision-making mechanisms. That is, the idea and/or norm of consensus in both ASEAN and SADC were instrumental in defining the nature and character of approaching to regional conflicts. What is noted for ASEAN is the process of arriving at a consensus (mufakat) through a long-winded consultation (musjawarah). In contrast, what is counted for SADC are the end-results of the process of regional security cooperation/integration, such as unanimity of which arrived at the rule of decision-making by consensus. In other words, while ASEAN prefers a process-driven (informal) approach to regional conflicts, SADC opts for an outcome-oriented (formal) approach.
This distinction has, to some extent, helped pave the way for distinguishing the extent and scope of formalisation and institutionalisation in ASEAN and SADC. Although both organisations took consensus-based decision-making into account, different political logics related to regional identities (which are reflected from the ideas of consensus) have been used by the member states. Hence, each organisation chose its own approach to managing conflicts in their respective regions. From a constructivist perspective of international relations, one could argue that managing conflict in these two regions is, to paraphrase Wendt (1992:396-421), ‘what states make of it and how they do it’. Indeed, despite some splits and divisions among the member states in addressing the issues of South China Sea conflict and East Timor crisis in ASEAN, and the DRC crisis in SADC, as mentioned in chapter 6 and 7, the member states in ASEAN and SADC appeared, later on, to be a driver of responding to the crises in their own ways. Thus, by implication, this means that the mechanisms of managing conflicts in ASEAN and SADC are ‘what the members of each organisation make of them and how they do them’.

What is important for both leaders of ASEAN and SADC is to commit themselves to political norms such as national sovereignty in which individual members attempt to allow for a flexible approach to regional security problems. In fact, the commitment of both members of ASEAN and SADC to the principle of the modern Westphalian state system should be understood in the context of the search for internal stability and regime security. As examined in the cases of the rejection of flexible engagement and the acceptance of the ASEAN troika system by the member states (see Chapter 6) and the insertion of Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (see 7.4.2), therefore, both member states of ASEAN and SADC appear to re-emphasise the continued validity of the norm of non-interference not only to protect national sovereignty, but also to improve the level of flexibility in addressing regional security problems.

In terms of external interventions in East Timor and the DRC, member states in both ASEAN and SADC were concerned about the issue of legitimacy. Both INTERFET (led by Australia as a non-ASEAN state) and Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (led by Zimbabwe) were based on the consent of the intervened sovereign states (Indonesia and the DRC respectively). That is, although such external interventions as INTERFET and Operation Sovereign Legitimacy were authorised and justified by the UN Charter, they also required political consensus recognised by regional states in their organisations. Thus, the issue of legitimacy plays a crucial role in determining the
type and character of external (international and regional) interventions in international politics.

Moreover, both ASEAN and SADC attempted to utilise multilateral security frameworks with regard to managing conflicts in the regions. However, the character of the multilateral approach to regional security differed between ASEAN and SADC. ASEAN rejected Western ideas of the ARF and tried to develop the concept of multilateralism on the basis of the regional norms of the ASEAN Way. As a result, ASEAN has been quite successful not only in promoting norms and principles in the ARF, but also to induce China to be engaged in the forum. On the other hand, a multilateral approach among SADC members has largely been placed under South Africa’s leadership. Since South Africa has projected itself as an emerging (middle) power under the support of the West in the post-apartheid period, it is likely that SADC can be put under Western influence for constructing the type and style of regional approach to security cooperation in the region.

Finally, in terms of inclusive and cooperative approaches to regional security problems, the ASEAN states expressed their intention to adopt an inclusive method in order to increase security cooperation with other states in the Asia-Pacific region during the 1992 Singapore Summit (see ASEAN, 1992). For instance, ASEAN has attempted to develop the ARF as the embodiment of the principle of ‘inclusiveness’ since the early 1990s (cf Acharya, 2003:215). In the same period, though, SADC did not establish such an expanded multilateral organisation as the ARF which includes non-ASEAN states. Rather, SADC member states seem to have largely focused on collective security and/or collective defence under the SADC Organ within the region (Hough, 1998:25-26; also Cawthra, 1997:211). However, given the fact that the objectives of the OPDS suggest a comprehensive approach to security cooperation (see SADC Communique, 1996), it can be argued that the Organ also paved the way for the members to orient SADC towards ‘inclusive regionalism’ as an important component of the principle of ‘cooperative security’ (Acharya, 2003:295).
CHAPTER 8 A COMPARISON OF THE TWO CASE STUDIES

8.1 Introduction

The primary research aims of this study were centred around two related problems, one theoretical and the other comparative. As mentioned earlier, the theoretical problem relates to the insufficiency of neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist accounts that call for a much needed attempt to bring ASEAN and SADC into contemporary discussions about the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms within the context of a (social) constructivism of international relations (IR) theory. That is, although both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are still influential in world politics, the main limitation of these theories is a narrow view of what the topics are to debate in international relations theory. However, constructivism has proved useful and valuable as an analytical tool to allow for the possibility of developing world regions to change the disadvantaged situations which contribute to understanding and explaining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC.

In this chapter the findings concerning the core research aims of this study are presented. As shown in chapter 1 and 3, whereas both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are rationalist theories, based on rational choice theory and taking the identities and interests of actors as given, constructivism focuses on how intersubjective practices between actors result in identities and interests being formed in the processes of interaction rather than being formed prior to interaction. This has been important for both ASEAN and SADC which have been concerned with transforming a competitive regional environment into a more cooperative one: for instance, the emergence of the ARF and the OPDS was mainly to advance regional security in reaction to a changing international milieu and a recognition that many of the problems and threats faced by the region could ‘only be addressed through increased cooperation’ (Van Aardt, 1997:23).

Given the assumption that constructivism heralds a return to a more historical and sociological form and nature of international relations theory (Reus-Smit, 2001:209-230), therefore, chapter 4 and 5 in this study focused on the historical background of ASEAN and SADC(C) with analysing the creation, evolution and process of each organisation’s security regionalism (i.e. the primary motives and/or root causes of
current regional security cooperation) up to the end of the Cold War. Thereafter, chapters 6 and 7 attempted to search for the type and style of regional security cooperation which were highlighted as the fundamental mechanisms of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms. The key point here is the effect and role of a constructivist perspective of international relations in particular terms of the proposition of Wendt (1992) that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. Indeed, despite some splits and divisions among the member states in addressing the issues of the South China Sea conflict and East Timor crisis in ASEAN, and the DRC crisis in SADC, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7, the member states in ASEAN and SADC appeared, later on, to be a driver for responding to the crises in their own ways.

In explaining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC, more importantly, it was argued that the regional level should be regarded as a focal point to explain regional security dynamics in ASEAN and SADC. In the context of new regionalism that emphasises the importance of multidimensional levels involving domestic, regional and extra-regional level, nonetheless, what was shown in this comparative study is that all three levels need to be brought together into a unified analytical perspective of the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

The comparative problem is also related to the focus of theoretical frameworks, including neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism. That is, whereas both neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theories focus on how given and fixed structures affect the instrumental rationality of actors, a constructivist perspective of international relations opens up the possibilities of actors to consider international structures as historically evolved and thus flexible. Given that both ASEAN and SADC are composed mainly of weak and small states, as mentioned in previous chapters, it makes sense why the leaders of ASEAN and SADC committed themselves to political norms such as national sovereignty in which individual members were well positioned to develop regional security cooperation in their favour. In fact, both the acceptance of the ASEAN troika system by the member states and the insertion of Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact can largely be understood within the intersubjective context of regional leaders who tend to highlight state and regime security.

Unlike rationalists, constructivists argue that social and material structures affect not only behaviour, but also actors’ identities and interests (Wendt, 1995:71-72). When ASEAN and SADC are compared in the context of politico-security regionalisms,
therefore, it needs to be emphasised that they should not be treated as unchangeable and fixed entities, but rather as continually evolving and flexible ones to change and transform the international milieu and social context through various interactions. Moreover, as noted in earlier chapters, such non-material factors as norms, ideas and identities, rather than rule-based regulations, occupy a key position in shaping the characters, type and nature of politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC.

Furthermore, despite the unprecedented growth of the regionalism literature, very little attention has been directed to the comparative analysis of regional groupings like ASEAN and SADC in developing countries. As mentioned in chapter 1, in fact, although there have been challenging examples of EU (European Union) influence on the theory and practice of regional security cooperation in the South, little comparative analyses of regional security cooperation among developing countries have been undertaken to date except for only a few cases in the developing world (see e.g. Langhammer and Hienmenz, 1990; Gambari, 1991; Axline, 1994; Van Nieuwkerk, 2001; Mutschler, 2001).

As was shown in this study, the character, style and practice of ASEAN and SADC security cooperation are highly complex, contested, and dynamic. Of the traditional theories of international relations, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are dominant in seeking to explain the collective logic of ASEAN and SADC security regionalisms. What is important, however, is that both these theories of international relations (which have widely been deployed in analysing regional security contexts) have limited relevance in explaining politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC. In this context, thus, this study has focused on the utility of constructivism in analysing ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

8.2 Comparative Findings

8.2.1 Institutionalisation

The scope and style of institutionalisation in ASEAN have been different from those of SADC. ASEAN members have largely continued to maintain informal security mechanisms within the ‘ASEAN Way’ context since the establishment of the organisation. After the end of apartheid and the Cold War, on the other hand, SADC members attempted to restructure its regional security architecture. Despite a number of flaws in developing the security mechanisms, SADC leaders were, to some extent,
successful in achieving regional solidarity and consensus on integrating their security structures. That is, the SADC member countries have evolved the degree of formalisation and institutionalisation of security frameworks in the region even before SADC was born.

In the post-Cold War era, although both SADC and ASEAN have been striving to invent new regional security frameworks to increase regional security, the SADC Organ (OPDS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have had rather different institutional experiences. As mentioned in chapter 7, the former resulted from the historical development of the FLS, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), SADCC, SADC and the ASAS. The establishment of the OPDS has been a product both of history and evolution. In this context, thus, it should be noted that the member states have sought to develop the ‘institutionalisation of regional security’ within the SADC Organ since the end of the Cold War.

In contrast, the ARF was developed only after the end of the Cold War. Its institutionalisation has largely been limited to ASEAN's informal and consensual mechanisms. As mentioned in chapter 6, the ARF's Concept Paper (which was prepared by ASEAN in 1995) stipulated that the ARF’s rules of procedure should be based on ASEAN principles and practices and that decisions should be made by consensus after cautious and extensive consultations. In addition, whereas the ARF is composed of ‘participants’ involving a mixture of ASEAN and non-ASEAN states, the OPDS consists of ‘members’ defined by SADC. Here, it is important to note that while the members of the OPDS are the same as the members of SADC, the participants of the ARF are differentiated from the status of membership associated with ASEAN.

Given the circumstances above, the character, nature and form of institutionalisation in the case of multilateralism in the ASEAN region can be differentiated from those of the SADC region in the post-Cold War era. Above all, ASEAN rejected Western ideas on the ARF and tried to develop the concept of multilateralism on the basis of the regional norms of the ‘ASEAN Way’. The institutional form of ARF multilateralism does not focus on formal legalistic structures of cooperation, but takes an institutional approach as a long-term process of socialisation and consensus-building (Hill and Tow, 2002:161-179; also Chapter 6). As a result, ASEAN has been quite successful in promoting its norms and principles in the ARF. Indeed, ASEAN was able to utilise its norms and principles in particular in terms of socialising China by inducing it to be engaged in the ARF. In that
regard, most importantly, ASEAN’s approach to socialise China in the forum is also gradual and incremental in nature.

On the other hand, a multilateral approach among SADC members has largely been placed under South Africa’s leadership. That is, since South Africa has projected itself as an emerging (middle) power with support from the West in the post-apartheid period, it is likely that SADC may be influenced by the West constructing its type and style of regional approach to security cooperation in the region. This means that whereas ASEAN has opted for Asian-styled multilateralism in the ARF (which was primarily derived from the ASEAN Way), SADC has attempted to take advantage of multilateral organisations such as the UN which is largely influenced by the West, particularly given the structure of the Security Council.

In addition, the ARF is not a collective security arrangement which requires a legally-binding agreement, but is based on the principles of open-regionalism, soft-regionalism and cooperative security (Acharya, 2001). The principle of open-regionalism implies that an institution such as the ARF should be as inclusive as possible and the institution should be as attractive to states as possible (cf Johnston, 2003:123). In this context, the ASEAN states expressed their intention to adopt an inclusive method in order to increase security cooperation with other states in the Asia-Pacific region during the 1992 Singapore Summit (see ASEAN, 1992).

In this period, though, SADC has not established such an expanded multilateral organisation as the ARF which includes non-ASEAN states. Rather, the SADC member states seem to have largely focused on collective security and/or collective defence under the SADC Organ within the region (Hough, 1998:25-26; also Cawthra, 1997:211). Indeed, the objectives of the SADC Organ (OPDS) laid down collective security arrangements which are largely associated with a ‘regional alliance system’ for the SADC security structure (Hough, 1998:25; also Chapter 7).

Nevertheless, given the fact that the term ‘cooperative security’ tends to connote consultation rather than confrontation and reassurance rather than deterrence, both ASEAN and SADC seem to have committed themselves to cooperative security approaches to addressing regional conflicts. Despite a varying degree, as noted in chapters 6 and 7, both ASEAN and SADC are seeking the principle of non-confrontation and non-use of force with placing an emphasis on the development of
dialogue and consultation with external organisations, including the UN, and various NGOs (namely, second-track or semi-official security dialogue). For ASEAN, in particular, the emergence of ‘second-track’ institutions such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is conducive not only to facilitating linkages across a broad spectrum of political, economic and social agendas, but also in promoting the use of the multiplicity of international organisations with an interest in Southeast Asia. For SADC as well, Article 11(2) of the OPDSC Protocol (which promotes consultation with the UN Security Council) paves the way for SADC to collaborate with external organisations like the UN in addressing regional security problems.

Moreover, both ASEAN and SADC attempted to contribute to efforts toward regional confidence building through the ARF and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact respectively. Given the fact that cooperative security approaches are geared towards the development of mutuality of security, based on mutual reassurance rather than deterrence, as noted above, reassurance in both ASEAN and SADC has been developed through increased ‘transparency’ of military forces and confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) (see Chapters 6 and 7). Thus, mutual reassurance has been pursued by both ASEAN and SADC, at least in theory, in order not only to reduce the mistrust between member states, but also to build confidence among the regional states through discussion, negotiation, cooperation and compromise.

In the case of the ARF, ASEAN’s commitment to ‘soft regionalism’ has militated against the development of ‘hard regionalism’ as the very idea of conflict resolution. In fact, the ASEAN Concept Paper which laid out the ARF’s approach to security cooperation envisaged three categories: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. But the term ‘conflict resolution’ has been one of the most contentious issues on the security agenda of the ARF. As a result, this forced the ARF to change the term ‘conflict resolution’ to ‘elaboration of approaches to conflicts’ at the ARF meeting in Brunei in 1995 (Acharya, 2001:177; 2003:261). In particular, this indicates that ASEAN members viewed ‘conflict resolution’ as a too sensitive and formal approach in dealing with China in terms of the South China Sea conflict. Given the circumstances above, ASEAN members seem to have considered the ARF’s approach to regional conflict as one of ‘conflict avoidance’, rather than of conflict resolution. In this context, it makes sense why the ASEAN member states continue to argue that the
1976 Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC), which avoids explicitly using legality-oriented words such as conflict resolution, should play a basic role in underpinning the ARF. Instead of using such hard words as resolution, indeed, the TAC prefers to use softer words, including friendship, good neighbourliness, amity, cooperation and friendly negotiations (see ASEAN, 1976; also Chapters 4 and 6).

On the other hand, even though SADC is also concerned about managing regional conflicts by ‘peaceful means’, it seems to be more interested in committing itself to ‘hard regionalism’ in terms of conflict management. Within the context of a legally binding security architecture, in fact, the SADC OPDSC Protocol stipulates the jurisdiction of the Organ with stressing the approach to ‘resolution’ of regional conflicts. Moreover, according to Article 11(1d) of the OPDSC Protocol, ‘the Organ shall seek to ensure that the Signatories adhere to and enforce all sanctions and arms embargoes imposed on any party by the United Nations Security Council’. In this regard, whereas Article 17 in the TAC appears to ambiguously approach the method of settlement of disputes in terms of any (coercive) measure provided for by the UN, SADC, as both Articles of 11(3a) and 11(1d) of OPDSC Protocol illustrate, explicitly stipulates how and to what extent the UN can intervene in its regional affairs, which opens the door for the SADC member states to rely upon hard security or militaristic approaches to addressing regional conflicts.

With regard to the character and nature of institutionalisation, given the circumstances above, the major difference between ASEAN and SADC can be found in whether and to what extent each organisation is willing to commit itself to ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ regionalism in terms of conflict management. In terms of at least surface views of institutional structure, SADC has attempted to orient itself towards a legally binding security architecture with restructuring not only the SADC Organ but the whole organisation. It seems to be more progressive in moving on the regional security framework than does ASEAN.

8.2.2 Norm-based Conflict Management

Both ASEAN and SADC(C) have, to a varying degree, tried to utilise political norms in conflict management respectively. During the Cold War, for ASEAN, the member states agreed on the 1976 Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC) as a code of conduct among regional states. The TAC provided for the behavioural or legal norms of ASEAN. In
Article 2 of the TAC, in particular, the treaty states four fundamental principles that shall guide the actions of ASEAN members: (1) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, (2) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, (3) settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and (4) renunciation of the threat or use of force (see ASEAN, 1976; also Chapter 4).

Meanwhile, around this period, SADCC established the 1980 Lusaka Declaration for the primary purpose of economic liberation in Southern Africa. By adopting the Declaration, the SADC member states also provided four basic objectives to address regional security problems: (1) reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on South Africa, (2) the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration (3) the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies, and (4) concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation (Southern African Record, 1987:4; also Chapter 5).

As the ASEAN states as a group of newly independent developing countries prioritised respect for national sovereignty, however, sovereignty was also a core norm of SADCC except when it came to apartheid South Africa (which was not a member). Indeed, although Article 2 of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which impacted on the evolution and framework of the FLS as the antecedent of SADCC, stipulates the norms of non-intervention and state sovereignty, the OAU leaders agreed that South Africa should be excluded from the protection of the organisation’s norms because South Africa was (then) a non-member (Klotz, 1995:76). Under the circumstances, SADCC as a response to apartheid South Africa intended not to commit itself to the Westphalian norms such as non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force in interstate relations and pacific settlement of disputes. Rather, SADCC members appropriated such continental and global norms as racial equality so as to make the organisation to serve as a unifying focus for regional security cooperation.

After the end of the Cold War, despite some similarities, the scope, extent and nature of such norms as non-use of force or pacific settlement of disputes in ASEAN can be differentiated from those of SADC. In this period, in fact, although both ASEAN and SADC pursued the principle of pacific settlement of disputes in their own regions with a view to addressing regional security problems by peaceful means, as mentioned earlier, SADC seems to be more interested in using explicitly legally-oriented words such as
conflict resolution than does ASEAN. Moreover, whereas ASEAN has never seriously contemplated adopting a military pact as a collective defence arrangement, SADC established the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003 in order to make provision for the member states to protect each other from external aggressions on their own intent and purpose.

Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter 7, given the fact that both ASEAN and SADC are unable to form a formal military alliance like NATO owing mainly to lack of military capabilities, both regional groups seem to prefer the method of diplomatic negotiations to the one of militaristic measures (see Chapters 6 and 7). For instance, as both Article 2(d) in the TAC and Article 11(1b) and 11(1c) in the OPDSC Protocol emphasise the importance of peaceful settlement of disputes, it can largely be assumed that the principle of pacific settlement of disputes in ASEAN and SADC is equally important (see Chapter 7). Hence, the emergence of the 2003 SADC Mutual Defence Pact cannot be seen merely as a move toward a more militaristic direction in SADC’s security integration, but rather as a political scheme for the SADC member states to develop the diplomatic means to be applied prior to a scheme of armed force as a last resort. In fact, the primary and root causes of 2003 SADC Mutual Defence Pact (which were intricately embedded in the course of development of the past regional projects, including the FLS alliance, ISDSC, SADCC, SADC, ASAS, OPDS and currently OPDSC) can and should be understood in such unique historical and political contexts as the racial confrontation between South Africa and SADCC members during the apartheid era, and the rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe in the post-apartheid period.

In this regard, it can be assumed that such political norms as the pacific settlement of disputes in regional conflict management are open to be restructured and applied to its own historical and social context. In terms of managing conflicts in ASEAN and SADC, therefore, it is important to note that when the norm of pacific settlement of disputes is applied to regional context, it is not automatically given, but rather produced and reproduced through the various interactions of the political elites of each regional group. As examined in the cases of the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989) and the East Timor crisis (1999-2000) for ASEAN, and the DRC conflict (1998-2004) for SADC, for example, both organisations are equally concerned about managing regional conflicts by ‘peaceful means’. When member states of both organisations recognised their limits to resolve regional conflicts by themselves, though, they attempted to engage external
powers to address the conflicts with the intention of temporarily allowing the intervention of the outside powers, at the same time compromising the norms of non-use of force and/or pacific settlement of disputes (see Chapters 4, 6 and 7; also Sub-sections 4.5, 6.3.2 and 7.3).

In the post-Cold War era, moreover, both ASEAN and SADC have placed emphasis on conventional international norms such as non-interference in dealing with regional security problems respectively. Given the fact that both regional groups are political entities with ‘weak’ state structures and a lack of strong regime legitimacy, the norm of non-interference can and should be understood in the context of the domestic security concerns of regional member states in ASEAN and SADC respectively. As noted in chapters 6 and 7, that is, one of the main reasons for both ASEAN and SADC to adhere to the norm of non-interference can be found in the context of each organisation’s search for internal stability and regime security. After the end of the Cold War, in fact, it has been argued that the primary sources of threat to the national security of both ASEAN and SADC states are not external, but internal (for ASEAN, see Acharya, 2001:57-58; for SADC, see Nathan and Honwana, 1995:6).

However, the norm of non-interference does not mean a sense of indifference towards each other. In fact, just as ASEAN’s response to the East Timor crisis proved to be more substantial than many outside the region had expected, SADC also took the lead in responding to the DRC conflict after the leaders found that peace and stability in the region could not be realised without regional solidarity on security problems. In addition, regional confidence security-building measures (CSBMs), which have the potential to erode the norm of non-interference, have been advocated by both ASEAN in the ARF and SADC in the Mutual Defence Pact. Nonetheless, given the fact that CSBMs are concerned about the issue of a ‘non-aggression treaty’ (Hough, 1998:28), CSBMs in both the ARF and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact should be understood in the context of norms such as non-aggression and/or non-interference in the region respectively. By implication, thus, this ambivalence leaves room for both ASEAN and SADC not only to apply such complex norms as non-interference to each situation as suitably, but also to develop ‘interactions that are interconnected in unanticipated and non-linear ways’ (Adler, 2002:110).

Given the circumstances above, for both ASEAN and SADC, norms such as non-interference are not fixed in their definition and functions, but rather open to be
structured and restructured in the member states’ own intent and interest. To put it differently, norms not only regulate behaviour, they also constitute new interests and identities (Katzenstein, 1996:5). In this context, it can be argued that while the regulatory effect of norms refers to a rationalist-behavioural conception of process in which identities and interests are exogenous to interaction, the constitutive effect of norms refers to a cognitive, intersubjective one in which they are endogenous (Katzenstein, 1996:5; Wendt, 1992:394). Thus, the norm of non-interference for both ASEAN and SADC should be understood in the constitutive context as well as the regulatory. Despite a varying degree, yet, for both ASEAN and SADC, such constitutive elements as the ideas, identities and interests in driving human behaviour, rather than such regulatory ones as the formal and legalistic rules, play a key role in forming security regionalisms within their own regional context respectively.

In the Cold War era, the constitutive effect of norms impacted significantly upon the processes and characters of both ASEAN and SADCC security mechanisms: as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, for ASEAN, norms such as consensus (mufakat) helped the member states to bring forth the sense of regional identity and interests; for SADCC, the norm of racial equality played a crucial role not only in eliminating apartheid ideology in the region, but also in developing regional consensual collective-identity. In the post-Cold War period as well, the constitutive effect of norms occupied a central role in explaining the type, nature and character of both ASEAN and SADC security mechanisms. That is, as emphasised in chapters 4 and 6, such constitutive and cognitive mechanisms as the ‘ASEAN Way’ are important for understanding not only ASEAN itself but also the expanded context of an Asia Pacific multilateral forum. In this sense, Acharya (1997a:343) argues that the ‘dialogue and … processes involving ideas, regional norms, and the quest for a collective regional identity have played a crucial role in promoting the concept and practice of regional organisations such as ASEAN and the ARF’: thus the ASEAN Way, despite its practical limitations, has been a useful set of norms and principles for regional policy makers to manage regional conflicts.

Likewise, as indicated and in chapters 5 and 7, such constitutive and cognitive elements as a consensual collective-identity based on racial equality during the apartheid era, and the intersubjective ideas of regional leaders who tend to highlight state sovereignty and non-interference in the post-Cold War period, are crucial for understanding the mechanisms of SADC security regionalism. Yet, although the
intersubjective ideas of regional leaders, for both ASEAN and SADC, are instrumental in unfolding to what extent such norms as non-interference/intervention are determined with bringing forth regional identity and interests, they are also subject to the changing processes of interactions amongst regional actors. For instance, as SADC encouraged international community involving the UN to intervene in the DRC conflict although it continues to emphasise the importance of non-interference in the internal affairs of its members, the ASEAN states also compromised, at least reluctantly, the norm of non-interference with utilising external interventions to address the East Timor crisis in the region. For both ASEAN and SADC, by implication, this indicates that such norms as non-interference are flexible to be made and remade by the regional member states on their own intent and purpose.

Given the arguments aforementioned, thus, although the regulatory effect of norms in relation to formal and legalistic rules was pointed out in the TAC for ASEAN and the OPDSC for SADC respectively, the constitutive effect of norms (in relation to such cognitive factors as intersubjective knowledge, ideas and identity) occupies a key position not only in driving political actors’ behaviour, but also in understanding the mechanism(s) of conflict management in ASEAN and SADC(C).

8.2.3 Collective (Regional) Identity as Exceptionalism

In searching for regional identity, as mentioned in chapter 4, ASEAN leaders were, from the start, to discuss regional politico-security matters in ‘private sessions’ which were often couched as ‘informal’ discussions (Irvine, 1982:13-14). That is, ASEAN encouraged its commitment to regional consensus and confidence building by using a rather (institutionalised) form of informal personal relations with a view not only to creating a collective regional identity, but also to facilitating regional as well as national flexibility in terms of decision-makings (cf Kivimaki, 2001:17). Likewise, as mentioned in chapter 5, the informality and decentralisation of SADCC also contributed to the creation of a collective identity in the region. In fact, the orientation of SADCC towards informal and decentralised structure through a sectoral responsibility approach, helped the organisation to construct a spirit of ‘we’ among its members (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:72). As a result, SADCC’s commitment to the informality and decentralisation of the organisation was ultimately conducive not only to protecting each member country’s national dignity and sovereignty, but also to consolidating a collective regional identity through leaving a flexible or exceptional room for regional
leaders to search for.

Collective identity, as Wendt (1996:52) notes, refers to ‘positive identification’ with the welfare of the other, which is regarded as a ‘cognitive extension’ of the Self rather than as independent. That is, collective identity is a basis for ‘feeling of solidarity, community, and loyalty’ and for ‘collective definitions of interests’. This does not mean, however, that state actors no longer calculate costs and benefits, but that they do so on a ‘higher level of social aggregation’; this then facilitates collective action by ‘increasing diffused reciprocity and the willingness to bear costs without selective incentives’ (Wendt, 1996: 53). In this context, it is important to note that although both ASEAN and SADC have kept stressing the value of collective regional identities, it does not mean that both organisations are operating or should be operating in accordance with the realisation of ‘common identity’ shared by their members. Rather each collective identity of ASEAN and SADC rests primarily on the feeling of solidarity (a ‘we feeling’) in dealing with regional security problems, as was indicated in a number of cases, including the Cambodian conflict and the East Timor Crisis for ASEAN, and SADCC’s response to apartheid South Africa and the conflict management in the DRC for SADC (see Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7).

As mentioned in chapters 6 and 7, ASEAN and SADC not only have divided perceptions of what are in their national interests relating to regional conflicts, but also lack such a certain convergence of value systems as liberal democracy. For both regional groups, that is, the members of each organisation remain divergent with regard to their post-colonial political setting, level of economic development, and cultural/ideological make-up. Despite the existence of divergence within each regional group, both ASEAN and SADC sought to forge regional solidarity and consensus within their own organisations on how to address regional security problems. In doing so, both regional groups tried to promote the coordination of the different national interests into a harmonised sub-regional scheme through which their member states gradually began to form collective regional identities with a view not only to increasing the cooperative spirit amongst the member states respectively, but also to reducing the likelihood of use of force in inter-state relations. By implication, thus, the collective identity formation in both ASEAN and SADC cannot be understood simply as an end-result out of a certain convergence of self-interests and/or egoistic values, but rather as a process that leads to the ‘structural transformation of the Westphalian states system from anarchy to authority’ (Wendt, 1994:393). In this context, Acharya (1998:206) argues as follows:
Collective identities among states are constructed by their social interactions, rather than given exogenously to them by human nature ... or ... the international distribution of power. ... regional cooperation among states is not necessarily a function of immutable or pre-ordained variables such as physical location, common historical experience .... Rather, regionalism may emerge and consolidate itself within an intersubjective setting of dynamic interactions ....

With regard to security structures and/or systems, despite differing nature and degrees, both ASEAN and SADC(C) sought to search for their own approaches to conflict management in direct or indirect opposition to the security institutions and practices in Europe. As mentioned in chapter 7, for example, both regional groups did not form a formal military alliance like NATO owing mainly to the lack of military capabilities, but rather they have opted for their own styles to respond to regional security problems. This implies that both ASEAN and SADC(C) seem to have searched for a collective regional identity respectively so as to consider themselves as distinct regional groups from the European ones, in which they could redefine regional security mechanisms within their own regional context. Indeed, although the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, under collective self-defence, makes provision for the member states to protect each other from external aggression, the SADC member countries do not commit themselves to the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’, as is the case for NATO (see 7.4.2).

In terms of collective security arrangements, in addition, although SADC seems to have largely focused on collective security and/or collective defence under the SADC Organ within the region (Hough, 1998:25-26; also Cawthra, 1997:211), neither ASEAN nor SADC established a genuine meaning of collective security system in the region respectively. Given the assumption that the idea of collective security is based on a preponderance of physical force allied against any aggressor as well as a legal agreement to regulate international behaviour (Snyder, 1999:108), in reality, it will be difficult for both the ASEAN and SADC states to develop self-reliant collective security systems owing mainly to the fact that most of members in each regional group are composed of weak states. In this sense, it may be inferred that both ASEAN and SADC are, to some extent, lacking the (complete?) level of collective identity in particular terms of collective security arrangements as a measure of such a collective identity.
Nevertheless, as Wendt (1996:53) argued, collective identity is not equivalent (or essential) to such multilateral institutions as a collective security arrangement. For both ASEAN and SADC, in fact, what is important for a collective regional identity is the processes of such positive identification as the spirit of rising or enhanced cooperation among regional actors, which are reproduced and transformed by their intersubjective ideas and practices. In this sense, as Acharya (2001:29; 202) notes, the emergence of cooperative security can also be considered as an important criterion to examine the meaning and value of a collective regional identity. In this regard, although SADC has not established such an expanded multilateral organisation as the ARF which includes non-ASEAN states, both ASEAN and SADC are attempting to promote 'inclusive regionalism' as an important component of the principle of 'cooperative security': for ASEAN, the creation of the ARF; for SADC, the promotion of the interoperability between SADC and non-SADC organisations as implied in Article 11(2c) of OPDSC (see Chapter 6 and 7). In this context, thus, it can be argued that both ASEAN and SADC seem to be developing a collective regional identity through such multilateral efforts as positive, inclusive and cooperative approaches to regional security problems.

Although both ASEAN and SADC committed themselves to multilateralism which was relatively instrumental in developing the spirit of collective identity, the type and nature of multilateralism in ASEAN have been different from those of SADC. As mentioned in chapter 6 and 7, indeed, whereas ASEAN attempted to construct multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region with persistent adherence to the ASEAN Way in the ARF, multilateralism in SADC has largely been shaped by South Africa as a regional power, which helped pave the way for the West to influence the style and character of regional security cooperation in SADC as a multilateral organisation. Nonetheless, just as the collective identity of ASEAN is a process of identity building which relies upon such consensual modes of socialisation and decision making as the ASEAN Way, that of SADC is also likely to be developed through interactions among the members and approaches of its own which are based on regional consensus: for instance, common regional efforts to 'break the political impasse' with a view to integrating the SADC Organ into the SADC structure as a whole.

Given the circumstances above, it is important to note that both the ASEAN and SADC(C) states have searched for building collective regional identities by leaving room for them to approach conflict management in flexible or exceptional terms. For
instance, in resolving the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN utilised China’s intervention and support against Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its use of force in Cambodia at the expense of its norm of regional autonomy providing a ‘regional solution to regional problems’ (see Chapter 4). Likewise, although SADCC sought the doctrine of self-reliance through reducing the influence of (particularly but not only) South Africa, the organisation also avoided the fixed framework of conventional (East-West) rivalry with a view to seeking substantial security aid from the Western as well as the Eastern bloc (see Chapter 5).

Even after the end of the Cold War, both the ASEAN and SADC states have continued to approach regional conflict management within the context of flexibility and/or exceptionalism. As was shown in both cases of the East Timor crisis and the DRC conflict, for example, although ASEAN and SADC have stressed the importance of such norms as non-interference/intervention, both the ASEAN and SADC states allowed the norm of non-intervention to be temporarily compromised in order to protect state and regime security.

For both ASEAN and SADC(C), given the circumstances above, collective identity can be understood in the context of regional flexibility and/or exceptionalism, which is developed through constitutive interactions and which form the basis of its collective action. As mentioned earlier, given the fact that collective identity is a basis for ‘feeling of solidarity, community, and loyalty’ (Wendt, 1996:53), it can be assumed that both the ASEAN and SADC(C) states have attempted to forge collective identities in their own regional context. By implication, thus, this indicates that both ASEAN and SADC(C) can be regarded as regional groups that play a critical role not only in bringing forth a sense of collective (regional) identity, but also in constructing the mechanisms of regional security cooperation in their own way.

As was shown in this comparative study of ASEAN and SADC, furthermore, politico-security regionalism can be seen as being constitutive at the three different levels of domestic, regional and extra-regional. The mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC can and should be understood in the context of new regionalism that emphasises the importance of multidimensional approaches to security regionalism (Hettne, 2001; 2003; Söderbaum, 1998; 2003). Although I have argued that the regional level should be regarded as a focal point to explain the politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC, what was shown in this study is
that both domestic and extra-regional levels also need to be brought together into a unified analytical perspective of the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms. Indeed, contemporary politico-security regionalism has been challenged by the structural transformation of the global system, often associated with globalisation as its main feature. In particular, the dynamics of global change, which are concerned primarily with the possible erosion of sovereignty, need to be questioned and thus reconsidered in the context of (re)making politico-security regionalism at the domestic, regional and extra-regional levels.

### 8.2.4 Bringing In Multi-level Approaches to Politico-Security Regionalism

#### 8.2.4.1 The Domestic Level

As noted in earlier chapters, the prevalence of weak states in ASEAN and SADC means that the dominance of security dynamics in these regions can be found at the domestic level. In the post-Cold War era, it is argued that ‘a much weakened superpower presence leaves more room for local security dynamics to take their own shape and to operate more on the basis of local resources, issues, and perceptions’ (Buzan et al., 1998:66). In fact, the East Timor crisis and the DRC crisis were mainly owing to the domestic instability: as Indonesia was put under serious challenges from internal turmoil during the East Timor crisis, the DRC was also suffering internal rebellions (see Chapter 6 and 7).

As discussed in chapter 3, however, regional institutions (which affect the behaviour of the member states) do not only ‘regulate’ state behaviour, but also ‘constitute’ state identities and interests (Katzenstein, 1996:5). In this context, the creation of such regional institutions as ASEAN and SADC might be viewed as possible contributions of politico-security regionalisms in these regions to domestic conflict management by adhering to regional norms. As was shown in this study, to a varying degree, regional norms have helped to coordinate the aim, value and *modus operandi* of ASEAN and SADC to address a number of conflicts at the domestic level. In this sense, it can be argued that, although such internal conflicts as the East Timor crisis and the DRC crisis have not been prevented, regional norms have been conducive to reducing the number of secessionist movements and thus should, to some extent, be judged as successful in both ASEAN and SADC regions.
Nonetheless, rigid adherence to the principle of territorial integrity and denial of any further right to self-determination may intensify and prolong conflict, increasing human suffering, as was the case in East Timor. In this context, as Alaggapa (1995:381) notes, regional norms will have no credibility in the eyes of those who contest the legitimacy of the power holders and their institutions and will be rejected. For regional norms to contribute to preventing domestic conflicts in the region, they must not only preserve the status quo, but also enable protection of human rights for minority groups and self-determination in certain situations.

One of the most important norms underpinning both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms at the domestic level is the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Concerned with external intervention, both ASEAN and SADC(C) states pushed for the primacy of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. In these instances the doctrine of non-interference can be understood in the context of the domestic security concerns of both ASEAN and SADC member states. In fact, the salience of the doctrine of non-interference in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa has long predated both ASEAN and SADC.

The sanctity of the principle of non-interference and/or intervention, nonetheless, is currently being challenged. Following the Cold War, universal foreign policy priorities have been redefined, with a new emphasis on issues such as human rights, the environment, and even the promotion of democracy. In this context, Mayall (2004:126) has pointed out that:

\[\text{t}\]he case for humanitarian intervention, like the case for universal human rights that underpins it, is not in principle culture- or region-specific. ...The arguments for and against humanitarian intervention are general. ... humanitarian catastrophes demand an exceptional response; or that there are definable circumstances under which sovereignty can be said to have lapsed and the international community to have acquired a duty to intervene. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides a basis on which intervention can be sanctioned but only if the Security Council determines that a threat to international peace and security exits.

The aforementioned case is contested in the ASEAN and SADC regions, but some
change, particularly with regard to gross violation of human rights, may be feasible. Humanitarian intervention is receiving greater attention in the UN and the AU. For instance, the AU adopted the doctrine of humanitarian intervention such that it may intervene in the affairs of member states in order to restore peace and security, or to prevent genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Ajulu, 2004:270-271; also Thakur, 2002:323-340). But humanitarian concern has yet to be fully accepted as a basis for international intervention in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions. In terms of external interventions in East Timor and the DRC, both member states in ASEAN and SADC seem to be not only concerned about humanitarian issues such as human rights violations, but also interested in political legitimacy based on the consent of the intervened sovereign states (Indonesia and the DRC respectively) (see Chapter 6 and 7). Even if external interventions are to be justified by a legal authorisation of the UN Charter, regional political consensus is also an important consideration for regional states to intervene in domestic conflicts (see Chapter 6 and 7). Given the assumptions above, it needs to raise some questions why both ASEAN and SADC attempted to manage domestic conflicts in the regions through compromising the principle of non-intervention which is adhered to by these regional organisations. Although domestic factors such as internal turmoil tend to demand external interventions to protect regime security, some other possible answers to these questions may also be found in the extra-regional context through focusing on the scope and extent of external forces’ function to mould regional security.

8.2.4.2 The Extra-Regional Level

As implied above, for example, an important motivation for ASEAN to join the international force (INTERFET) could be found in the effects of the Asian economic crisis of 1997. As discussed in chapter 6, Indonesia’s urgent requirement for emergency aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) facilitated the external interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Indonesia (Cotton, 2001:133). This implies that global forces which weakened the regional and national autonomy, were powerful enough to open the way for external intervention. Here it is important to note that although ASEAN was initially reluctant to participate in the East Timor crisis, when the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) formally replaced INTERFET in February 2000, ASEAN was called upon to take the lead in responding to the East Timor crisis (see Chapter 6). By implication, thus, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level, to some extent, is seen to be affected by and then
reinforcing global forces, often noted as globalisation.

As mentioned in chapter 2, nonetheless, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level can also be viewed as a counter-balancing mechanism to manage regional conflicts originating from the outside. In other words, politico-security regionalism may be perceived by such hostile countries as South Africa for SADCC as ‘directed against them, provoking counter-groups and exacerbating the security dilemma’ (Alagappa, 1995:376). Although regional (political) schemes can, in theory, be considered as a feasible tool to equip the regional bodies with the collective power to address regional security problems on their own strength, regional organisations in the developing world, including ASEAN and SADC(C), in practice, often compromise such regional objectives, principles and values as regional autonomy and self-reliance. At the extra-regional level, in other words, politico-security regionalism in the developing world tend to seek to enhance ‘flexibility’ in resolving the regional security problems: for ASEAN, the member states were relatively flexible in utilising America’s and, later on, China’s intervention and support against Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its use of force in Cambodia at the expense of its norm of regional autonomy providing a ‘regional solution to regional problems’ (see Chapter 4). For SADCC, likewise, the member states also avoided the fixed framework of conventional (East-West) rivalry with a view to seeking substantial security aid from the Western as well as the Eastern bloc (see Chapter 5).

Although ASEAN and SADC(C) have been unable to form a formal military alliance like NATO, given the lack of military capabilities, these regional organisations seem to be relatively strong in (re)constructing ideational powers such as regional norms and beliefs for the purpose of strengthening regional consensus and solidarity. For ASEAN, in particular, these ideational forces are practised in taking initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level, however, tend to be seen as viable only when global powers and institutions such as US and the UN do not oppose but support or at least recognise such initiatives. Moreover, such diplomatic powers as mediation, arbitration and negotiation are only enabling, providing the regional organisations with the power of initiatives supported by global concerns such as the protection of human rights. In this context, Alagappa (1995:378) notes that soft (diplomatic) powers will rely upon the ‘disposition of non-member states, the dynamics of the larger international system and the competence of member states in harnessing the power of external states in the service of their cause’. 
SADC’s efforts, for instance, to bring about peace initiatives in the DRC conflict were largely encouraged by the international community involving the UN Security Council, the United States, and the EU.\textsuperscript{163}

Given the circumstances above, it can be assumed that the lack of power and influence to resolve regional conflicts can limit regional organisations’ ability to terminate regional security problems within their own strength. In this context, Alagappa (1995:370) notes that ‘[t]he strategy of internationalisation becomes relevant when conflict prevention, containment and termination are beyond the capabilities of the regional arrangements or when extra-regional actors become involved’. That is, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level is relatively likely to depend on such external forces as the UN in order to garner the resources necessary for guaranteeing the way of addressing regional conflicts. In this sense, it may be assumed that given that the conditions of contemporary globalisation has exacerbated the difficulties of states seeking to develop unilateral responses to regional security problems (Tan and Boutin, 2001:5), the capacities of states in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, are eroded and reduced.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that ‘what globalisation can bring to bear on the topic of security is an awareness of wide-spread systemic developments without any resulting need to downplay the role of the state, or assume its obsolescence’ (Clark, 1999:125). According to Clark’s view of globalisation, states are not withering away, but rather are changing their functionality over times. I agree with his argument partly in terms of states’ viability in constitutive character. Yet, I do not subscribe to the assertion that nation-states (without being members of regional institutions) continue to be intact. But I argue that instead of states without region, states within regions or regional states as members of the organisation can play an important role not only in transforming the type and nature of security cooperation amongst the member states of ASEAN and SADC respectively, but also redefining the interests and goals of the member states in order to advance regional security in reaction to a changing international environment. Indeed, despite some splits and divisions among the member states in addressing the

\textsuperscript{163} In particular terms of the DRC conflict, the Lusaka peace agreement, signed on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka, sought to find an international solution through the UN engagement by calling for a UN peacekeeping force to be deployed under a Chapter VII mandate as well as UN peace enforcement under a Chapter VIII mandate (see Malan, 2000:79; Chapter 7).
issues such as the South China Sea conflict and the East Timor crisis in ASEAN, and the DRC crisis in SADC, the member states in ASEAN and SADC appeared, over time, to play a leading role in addressing the crises in their own ways (see Chapter 6 and 7).

Although politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level cannot guarantee success without the support of external forces, the underlying force for the member states of regional organisations to spearhead conflict management (i.e., the East Timor crisis for ASEAN and the DRC crisis for SADC) may be found in the regional leaders’ beliefs such as ‘regional security cannot be realised without regional solidarity on regional problems’. As mentioned earlier, that is, the role of member states to form a unity of purpose is critical to help regional organisations to initiate and foster the development of conflict management. Despite the limited power and influence of such regional organisations as ASEAN and SADC in conflict resolution, furthermore, inclusive and/or cooperative schemes such as the ARF and the OPDS(C) would, to some extent, be conducive to defending politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level (see Chapter 6 and 7). Therefore, although security challenges from the extra-regional level are powerful enough to compromise (regional) norms such as sovereignty and non-intervention, in reality, the scope and extent of regional (member) states’ functions and capacity to manage crises originated from the outside, cannot help but to be emphasised.

8.2.4.3 The Regional Level

What has been emphasised in this study is that politico-security regionalism can be seen as an evolving political project at the regional level, which is an open-ended process instead of being fixed and given. This indicates that politico-security regionalism can be made and remade through political interactions amongst regional states. In both Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, for example, current ASEAN and SADC security regionalisms evolved out of the region’s past experiences: for Southeast Asia, SEATO in 1954, ASA in 1961, MAPHILINDO in 1963, ASPAC in 1966, and ASEAN in 1967 (see Chapter 4); for Southern Africa, the FLS in 1974, SADCC in 1980, and SADC in 1992 (see Chapter 5).

The central security concern in this evolutionary or transformative context in both ASEAN and SADC stems from the ‘socio-communicative approach to cooperation’ (Keohane, 1988:379-396; also Onuf, 1989). Unlike power-based approaches to conflict
management, sociological approaches to conflict management provide a useful tool to see how regional institutions may affect and transform state interests and identities which are not a 'given, but themselves emerge from a process of interaction and socialisation' (Checkel, 1998:326). The thrust of the argument here, for both ASEAN and SADC, is that the definition and pursuit of national interest are not exogenously given but are embedded in regional norms and values. By providing an environment in which socialisation and learning can occur, regionalism contributes to the internationalisation of ‘new understandings of self and other, of acquiring new role identities, and over the long term makes for a gradual transformation of identity and interest, and of power politics’ (Wendt, 1992:417). In terms of evolving regional security structure, for instance, both ASEAN and SADC attempted not only to form regional identity, but also to increase their own interests through a number of transformations such as the rejection of flexible engagement and the acceptance of an ASEAN troika system for ASEAN, and the insertion of Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact for SADC (see Chapter 6 and 7).

Given that the world is not organised into any single international system or society, but comprised various regional systems, moreover, the effect and role of shared norms, rules and institutions (which are reflecting a dominant regional (politic-sovec) culture) will strengthen international society (Bull and Watson, 1984:1). This considerable potential of regionalism in a politico-security context, however, has been differently realised in ASEAN and SADC respectively. As indicated earlier, in fact, the scope and style of institutionalisation in the case of multilateralism in the ASEAN region have been different from those of the SADC region in the post-Cold War era. Although both ASEAN and SADCC committed themselves to informal or ad hoc security mechanisms during the Cold War, SADCC(C) was, to some extent, successful in achieving regional solidarity and consensus on formalising and integrating their security structures in the post-Cold war era (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, ASEAN has largely continued to maintain an informal security structure within the ASEAN Way context since the establishment of the organisation (see Chapter 6).

As mentioned earlier, in particular, while a multilateral approach among SADC members has largely been placed under the leadership of South Africa as an emerging (middle) power under the support of the West in the post-apartheid period (see Chapter 7), ASEAN rejected Western ideas on the ARF and tried to develop the concept of multilateralism on the basis of a thin institutional structure consisting of its annual
foreign ministers conclave, as well as the Senior Officials Meeting (ARF-SOM) that precedes it by a few months (see Chapter 6). This means that the different character, nature and scope of institutionalisation between ASEAN and SADC can be understood in different regional contexts affected by regional ideas which are constructed by various (socio-political) interactions amongst regional (member) states.

A similar situation prevails with regard to collective self-defence. Although SADC(C) has not established a strong and formal military alliance, the organisation attempted to enhance regional security cooperation/integration among the members through creating the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003 so that it could establish a weak or loose form of military alliance as distinguished from the NATO version (see Chapter 5 and 7). On the other hand, ASEAN has never seriously contemplated adopting such a military pact as a collective defence arrangement, rather the extent and scope of member states’ military cooperation have been limited to a bilateral one because of the flexibility it affords (see Chapter 4 and 6).

Nonetheless, in reality, both ASEAN and SADC are unable to form a formal military alliance like NATO given the lack of military capabilities. Moreover, given that a credible collective security arrangement requires the surrender of state autonomy in a certain area which can be illustrated by a number of experiences at the global level of the UN Security Council, the regional level does not appear to have a strong advantage in this collective security arrangement (Alagappa, 1995:373). Yet, although such regional organisations as ASEAN and SADC will be unable to gather the necessary capabilities and the political consensus for effective collective action in the event of external aggression, both ASEAN and SADC seem to have largely advanced regional security mechanisms through increased cooperation on their own intents and interests.

Given the circumstances above, although external interventions at the global level of the UN in both crises of East Timor for ASEAN and the DRC for SADC were meant to strengthen the raison d'être of the 'intrusive regionalism' in the post-Cold War era, the sovereignty of member states at the regional level of both ASEAN and SADC was not completely extinguished by external interventions. Rather, state autonomy and influence were, to varying degrees, compromised. In fact, given that each organisation – ASEAN and SADC – chose its own approach to managing conflicts in their respective regions, it can be argued that the sovereignty of member states in the regions is, to paraphrase Wendt (1992:396-421), 'what member states make of it and how they do it'.
In this sense, thus, it can hardly be assumed that the utility of state-sovereignty at the regional level is dead.

Moreover, although different political logics related to security regionalism have been made by the member states of ASEAN and SADC respectively, both organisations placed emphasis on ‘consensus’ as a means of regional solidarity in particular in terms of decision-making mechanisms. In other words, despite varying degrees, both the ASEAN and SADC states chose their own consensus-based approaches to responding to external as well as internal forces. Preferring the method of diplomatic negotiations to the one of militaristic measures, both ASEAN and SADC stress the importance of observing the principle of pacific settlement of disputes in the region respectively. For example, as ASEAN advanced the norm of non-use of force that helped the member states approach the South China Sea conflict by engaging China at the multilateral negotiations of the ARF (see Chapter 6), SADC also evolved the security mechanism in the DRC conflict from a unilateral (military) intervention toward multilateral (diplomatic) interventions (see Chapter 7). In this sense, it can be assumed that both ASEAN and SADC attempt to form their own regional politico-security logics related to collective identities which are reflected from the consensual ideas of regional leaders.

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, politico-security regionalism at the regional level can be understood in the constitutive and transformative context of regional norms which are often borrowed from global norms. As Katsumata (2003:105) notes, the basis of the ‘ASEAN Way’ is constituted by the norms at the global level, whose elements are stipulated in the United Nations (UN) Charter, such as the principles of territorial integrity, non-intervention and selective interpretation of the non-use of force. SADCC as well, for example, by facilitating the global norm of racial equality which played a crucial role not only in eliminating apartheid ideology in the region, but also in developing regional consensual collective-identity, has contributed to the creation of the current SADC as a sense of regional community (see Chapter 5; also Klotz, 1995). This indicates that the constitutive effect of global norms impacted not only upon the reconstruction of regional norms, but also upon the processes and characters of both ASEAN and SADCC politico-security mechanisms. Therefore, it is argued that an important role of politico-security regionalism can be understood in the reconstruction of global norms in a regional context. Here it is important to note that despite the fact that (ideational and material) structures and agents are mutually constitutive (Checkel, 1998:340-342), the focus needs to be on the (re)construction of ideational structures
such as norms by regional (member) states at the regional level.

8.3 Theoretical Findings

8.3.1 Neo-realism

Neo-realists tend to argue that both logics of common threat perceptions and balance of power are indispensable in not only explaining regionalism, but also guaranteeing regional as well as national security. During the Cold War era, whereas SADCC had the threat perception of South Africa’s destabilisation policy which was relatively common to most of its members (see Chapter 5), ASEAN lacked any specific threat common to all (see Chapter 4). Although SADCC had a common threat perception, in fact, it experienced a deeper and broader instability and insecurity in the region instead of assuring stability and security. As was shown in the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989), on the other hand, the different threat perceptions of ASEAN members were not utilised to cause war, but instead to gradually harmonise the divisiveness through the methods of consultation and consensus as well as the inclusion and exclusion of the principle of regional autonomy.

With regard to the logic of balance of power, neo-realists also tend to believe that it will prevail whenever the system is anarchic and the units want to survive (Powell, 1994:313-344; also Chapter 3). Neo-realists emphasise power, particularly military power that is regarded as a desirable instrument to guarantee the peace and security of a state. Although the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodian territory (1978-1989) threatened to militarise the region, a number of the ASEAN states (particularly Malaysia, Indonesia and some elements in the Philippines and Thailand) were concerned about excluding the military influence of outside powers from Southeast Asia. In fact, ASEAN managed to settle the Cambodian issue through diplomatic efforts based primarily on political consultation and consensus building rather than collective military strategy. For Southern Africa, meanwhile, when the region witnessed increased militarisation within the regional conflictual framework (which evolved particularly out of the rivalry (in 1979-1980) between the FLS and South Africa), it was placed in a zero-sum game, hampering regional stability and security. In both Southeast Asia and Southern Africa during the Cold War, thus, it appears that the mechanism of balance-of-power politics played a role in not only creating negative regionalism, but also endangering regional security instead of guaranteeing it.
Given the assumption above, it is argued that neo-realists are likely to consider the military power of states as being far more important in determining international politics than international cooperation such as ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977). For neo-realists, the meaning of security is generally limited to the traditional military concept with neglecting socio-political and socio-economic aspects equally pertinent to security, such as social cohesion, economic stability and justice (Zacarias, 1999:122). In this context, as Waltz (2000:4) notes, ‘[t]he most important events in international politics are explained by differences in the capabilities of states, not by economic forces operating across states or transcending them’. During the Cold War, nevertheless, neither ASEAN nor SADCC could survive without some different degrees of economic-security strategy: for ASEAN, the homogeneous economic system of capitalism helped the organisation advance the economies of member states through favourable access to an increasingly world free trading system; for SADCC, the heterogeneous economic systems made the organisation to devise an economic development strategy of regional cooperation in order to enhance the economies of member states through a project coordination approach with each member state taking responsibility for a particular sector. Notwithstanding the different approaches and styles of economic cooperation, both ASEAN and SADCC have witnessed that the importance and value of non-traditional security issues such as economic security cannot be neglected in not only guaranteeing but also increasing the conditions of national as well as regional security.

Indeed, although regional economic cooperation, during the Cold War, was largely neglected owing mainly to the general lack of complementarities in production and industrial structure among the member countries, the 1967 ASEAN Bangkok Declaration did not ignore the importance of economic aspects, but rather emphasised economic cooperation to promote regional solidarity as an essential prerequisite for the achievement of cooperation in other areas. In order to obtain national as well as regional stability and security, in addition, the ASEAN states made efforts to achieve steady economic growth for three decades after its inception through a market-focused economic orientation, more specifically, extra-regional trade (Lim, 1995:238-245).

During the Cold War, SADCC adopted the two-pronged strategy of economic-security and ‘politico-military security cooperation’, which largely dominated SADCC regionalism and regional security (see Chapter 5). Although SADCC was politically
motivated by the FLS not only to ward off South Africa’s hegemonic destabilisation but also to attract foreign aid (Ostergaard, 1999:51-79), its member states pursued economic development through the project coordination approach with a view not only to reduce economic dependency on South Africa, but also to generate ‘equitable development’ through regional (economic) cooperation which was identified as part of the major objectives of SADCC (see Southern African Record, 1987:4).

In the early 1990s, while neo-realists foresaw the debacle of the bipolar stability with a decline of U.S. involvement in the ASEAN region, ASEAN members made an effort to renew their interests by pushing for the leading role of multilateral activities in the ARF. Notwithstanding the disappearance or change of ‘balance of power’ in the post-Cold War era, the ASEAN states showed their capability to project their interests in broader spaces. Likewise, SADCC evolved into SADC in 1992 and attempted to establish the SADC Organ (OPDS) in 1996 with a view to advancing regional security in reaction to a changing international milieu and a recognition that many of the problems and threats faced by the region could be addressed through enhanced cooperation. Therefore, contrary to what neo-realists might predict, ASEAN and SADC in the post-Cold War era have increased, not decreased, regional security cooperation.

8.3.2 Neo-liberal institutionalism

Neo-liberal institutionalists put much more emphasis on cooperation and interdependence among states than do neo-realists. Neo-liberal institutionalists argue that the collapse of bipolarity does not necessarily imply a return to an anarchical condition. They believe that states come to appreciate how institutional arrangements can enhance cooperation by overcoming insufficient communication, thus lessening mutual suspicions and helping states attain mutually beneficial rewards that might not be had otherwise. Indeed, contrary to what neo-realists would expect (they tend to believe that multipolarity is inherently more destabilising than hegemony or bipolarity) in the post-Cold War, ASEAN and SADC witness, to some extent, multipolarity contributing to the growing level of activity in regional initiatives within and without the ARF and OPDS respectively.

In this context, neo-liberal institutionalism seems to have relevance for both ASEAN and SADC security logics in explaining the mechanisms of regional security cooperation. ASEAN has been attempting to elevate a cooperative spirit through
improving and expanding inter-state relationship and interdependence in line with setting up declarations and treaties such as the 1971 ZOPFAN Declaration, the 1976 ASEAN Concord, and the 1995 Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty as well as a number of the regular and irregular, official and unofficial contacts. Likewise, since SADC has evolved out of SADCC, it also has attempted to enhance regional security cooperation with establishing the politico-security initiatives, including the 1992 SADC Treaty, the 1996 OPDS, the 2001 OPDSC and the 2003 SADC Mutual Defence Pact.

Neo-liberal institutionalists contend that states are concerned with absolute gains, not relative gains. That is, whereas neo-realists believe that the basic goal of states in cooperative relationships is to prevent others from gaining more, neo-liberal institutionalists want to maximise the total amount of gains for all parties involved (Baldwin, 1993:4-5). Since the establishment of ASEAN and SADC(C), in this perspective, both organisations have been instrumental in encouraging security cooperation instead of discouraging it. For both ASEAN and SADC, therefore, as neo-liberal institutionalists argue, security cooperation is not only possible, but even likely under conditions of anarchy as long as rational actors overcome the problems of imperfect information and poor communication (Müller, 2002:374).

In this context, both ASEAN in the ARF and SADC in OPDS(C) and the Mutual Defence Pact promoted regional confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) with placing an emphasis on reinforcing transparency and openness in the regions through growing involvement of defence and military officials in the areas of security cooperation and military exchanges. This indicates that ASEAN and SADC want to make contributions to better relations among member countries by providing contacts, meetings and/or forums for communication and by expanding the member states’ interactions. Both ASEAN and SADC have attempted to enhance ‘interdependence’ through not only stabilising different threat perceptions, but also increasing the level of self-restraint, which are conducive to reducing the likelihood of conflict amongst the member states in each of these regions.

As examined in chapter 4, the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 ultimately facilitated regional security cooperation by setting up norms, rules and agreed-upon ways of dealing with conflicts in the region. The emergence of ASEAN in Southeast Asia helped the member states to develop such norms and principles as non-confrontation, and
non-use of force in addressing regional conflicts. In particular, the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC), which was adopted by the ASEAN member states in 1976, provided for formal conflict management in the region emphasising basic norms and principles such as the peaceful settlement of disputes. Indeed, these norms and principles enshrined in the TAC were utilised by the ASEAN member states to address such regional conflicts as the Cambodian crisis (1978-1989). Likewise, as discussed in chapter 5, the establishment of SADCC in 1980 also helped the member states to promote one of the most significant and shared norms of the OAU leaders, which was to support liberation from racial inequality in Southern Africa. That is, the norm of racial equality underpinning Pan-Africanism played an important role in the operating objectives, values and modus operandi of SADCC.

In the post-Cold War era, as discussed in chapter 6 and 7, although the scope and style of ASEAN institutionalisation have been different from those of SADC, both ASEAN and SADC kept maintaining their focus on such political norms as non-interference, sovereignty and equality in terms of increasing regional security. However, such norms as non-interference do not give themselves authority over states, but rather such norms are merely utilised by states to achieve their interests and purposes. For instance, the acceptance of the ASEAN troika system and the insertion of Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact indicate that political norms are selected, determined, and implemented by the member states to improve the level of security cooperation on their own intent and interest. Thus, although neo-liberal institutionalists assert that the principles and rules of international institutions can alter the extent to which governments expect their present actions to affect the behaviour of others on future issues (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993:94), in reality, the norms, principles and rules are, to a varying degree, embodied and affected by the states involved in those institutions.

Furthermore, as neo-realism assumes that hegemony can provide a better condition for regional stability and security, neo-liberal institutionalism also argues that institutions can facilitate security cooperation by allowing hegemonic leadership to constrain state behaviour through implicit or explicit norms and rules of their own institutions. During the Cold War, Indonesia in ASEAN and Zimbabwe in the FLS as an antecedent of SADCC (which played, to some extent, a leading role in addressing regional security problems in their own regions respectively) were not powerful enough to dominate or control other member states in military and economic terms. Instead, their powers were
largely limited to promote the basis for more effective political security cooperation in an *ad hoc* fashion of decision making and the informal nature of their own organisations.

Although both Vietnam (which was partially seen as a regional power against the ASEAN bloc in Southeast Asia) and South Africa (which was strong enough to dominate other states in military and economic terms in Southern Africa) can be regarded as a regional power respectively, each country existed (then) as an adversary as well as a non-member of its region’s main organisation, i.e. ASEAN and SADCC (see Chapter 4 and 5). Within this period, thus, neither ASEAN nor SADCC allowed a regional power to play a hegemonic leadership role in dealing with regional security problems through dominating or controlling other member states.

In the post-Cold War era, neither ASEAN nor SADC is likely to willingly allocate responsibility for security in the region to any (single) member country because of the highly sensitive, political nature of intra-state and inter-state problems (*cf* Venter, 2000:282). In this period, as ASEAN is devoid of regional (hegemonic) power, South Africa in SADC also intends to be a non-hegemonic partner of the other member states although it has widely been believed that South Africa is encouraged in its position and role as an emerging middle power (Habib and Selinyane, 2004:51-52). Within this context, nonetheless, both ASEAN and SADC have, to some extent, been successful in choosing and developing their own approaches to managing conflicts in the region respectively without allowing any member country to play a hegemonic role in improving and guaranteeing regional security (see Chapter 6 and 7).

Given the circumstances above, thus, neo-liberal institutionalism lacks proper explanation of the security mechanisms in both ASEAN and SADC. Unlike the neo-liberal institutionalists’ propensity to reduce sovereignty for increased cooperation, in fact, the member states of ASEAN and SADC appear not to limit sovereignty, but rather strengthen it. In addition, as mentioned in chapter 3, while neo-liberal institutionalists, who stress material factors, argue that the emergence of cooperation is largely a function of ‘measurable linkages’ and ‘utility-maximising transactions’ (Acharya, 1998:200), intersubjective factors, including ideas, norms and beliefs (which are conducive to developing collective interests and identities in the regional group) also play an important role in explaining both ASEAN and SADC security regionalisms. Even though neo-liberal institutionalists argue that the existence of formal institutional
structures or legal modes of cooperation are important conditions for the possibility of multilateralism, in particular, the ASEAN approach to the ARF indicates that multilateralism could involve ‘less formal, less codified habits, practices, ideas, and norms of international society’ (Caporaso, 1993:54).

As ASEAN members have continued to maintain informal and non-legalistic security approaches within the ASEAN Way context, SADC members also appear not to completely orient their organisation towards a legally binding security architecture as was shown in the case of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter 7, although SADC established the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003, the member states did not commit themselves to the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’, as is the case for NATO. In this context, as mentioned earlier, even though neo-liberal institutionalists are concerned about material interests, legalistic regulations and formal rules, both the ASEAN and SADC states are inclined to retain informal and non-legalistic norm-based rules in order to maintain a flexible approach to conflict management in the region on the basis of regional consensus, such that peace and stability in the region cannot be realised without regional solidarity on security problems.

8.3.3 Constructivism

Constructivism, which focuses on the intersubjective nature of a regional group, has been highlighted in previous chapters in order to explain the security discourse in both ASEAN and SADC. Constructivism regards intersubjective knowledge and beliefs to have constitutive effects on social and political reality and its evolution (Adler, 2002:102; also Chapter 3). Constructivism allows us to look beyond the effective role of material factors in determining the character, nature and style of politico-security regionalisms within both ASEAN and SADC(C).

In fact, just as ASEAN leaders have since its establishment been committed to common norms such as non-interference in the affairs of states, SADC(C) leaders also have had a strong sensitivity to loss of sovereignty in terms of the group of newly independent states. The creation and evolution of regional organisations, i.e. ASEAN and SADC(C), seem mainly to have been based on (shared) intersubjective sentiment and trust as common values and the identity formed by the leaders of member countries in ASEAN and SADC(C) respectively.
As seen in chapters 4 and 6, for ASEAN’s (collective) identity building, the member states attempted to adopt and utilise such shared, cognitive, and intersubjective understandings of region and regional security as the symbolic mechanisms of the ‘ASEAN Way’ so as to create and develop a set of norms and principles for intra-regional relations. Given the extent of socio-cultural diversity and political heterogeneity in Southeast Asia, it is obvious why ASEAN’s founders over a period of a decade from its inception sought to search for regional (collective) identity built through ‘regionalism’, i.e. regional (security) cooperation (see Chapter 4). In this context, according to Wendt (1994:384), ‘through interactions, [the ASEAN] states might form collective identities and interests’. For the ASEAN member states, the development of a collective identity was considered, from the beginning, as an essential means not only to make and redefine state interests, but also to overcome the different threat perceptions that the member countries had.

Similarly, given the fact that SADCC members were placed in the condition of fragmentation and diversity caused by colonial influence of unequal regional development, it makes sense why the elites of SADCC attempted to orient the organisation towards an informal and decentralised structure through a sectoral responsibility approach, which was ultimately conducive to protecting each country’s national dignity and sovereignty (see Chapter 5). Indeed, the informality and decentralisation of SADCC also contributed to the creation of a Southern African identity through ‘fostering a spirit of ‘we’ among its members, as opposed to excessive centralisation, which would result in SADCC being perceived as ‘they’ by the member states – a factor which weakened regional integration efforts in Africa’ (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:72; also Chapter 5).

Unlike neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, which take identity and interest as a given and fixed phenomenon, constructivism views identity as a constitutive and open-ended process. In this context, in particular, constructivists like Wendt (1992:394) argue for a ‘cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioural one in which they are exogenous’. That is, contrary to the argument that constructivism is unconcerned about changing processes in international politics (Hopf, 1998:180), it pays great attention to change and/or process. Just as ASEAN evolved out of ASA and MAPHILINDO in 1961 and 1963 respectively, SADC also came into being in 1993 through the historical evolvement of structures such as the FLS and SADCC in 1974.
and 1980 respectively. As examined in chapter 4 and 5, the evolutionary processes of regional organisations, i.e. ASEAN and SADC, provide for the primary motives and/or root causes of current politico-security regionalisms, which were intricately embedded in the ideas, beliefs and knowledge of the elites of member states in both ASEAN and SADC.

Constructivists also attempt to illuminate how ideas, norms and identities are affecting the processes and characters of regional security mechanisms. For ASEAN, norms such as consensus (mufakat), which were seen as important components to form the idea of the ‘ASEAN Way’, helped the member states to bring forth the sense of ASEAN’s collective identity (see Chapter 4). Similarly, the end of destabilisation which led to the elimination of apartheid in the Southern African region became possible owing mainly to the emergence of and support for the norm of racial equality informed by Pan-Africanism (Klotz, 1995; also Chapter 5). That is, as ASEAN was approaching the regional security problems by consensus, SADCC also attempted to form a consensual collective-identity based primarily on the principle of racial equality. Norms such as mufakat in ASEAN and racial equality in SADCC were not only constituted by regional leaders, but also constituting regional collective identities which rest primarily on the core of national and regional interests.

In fact, how processes shape identity, interests, norms, and the fundamental character of relationships are not focal points addressed by neo-realism and/or neo-liberal institutionalism. Rather, for neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists, identity, interests and norms that the member states of regional organisation have are mostly, if not entirely, the outcomes of material and anarchical structure which is fixed in the international hierarchy. As mentioned earlier, while neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists tend to treat the identity and interests of their constituent actors as being exogenous and given, constructivists view identity and interests as being endogenous to interactions and made by the different types of relationships among actors.

In terms of evolving regional security structure, for ASEAN, given the rejection of ‘flexible engagement’ and the acceptance of an ‘ASEAN troika system’, it can be assumed that regional identity and interests are not a given but rather made and remade through political interactions. In fact, because ASEAN leaders considered the proposal of flexible engagement as a challenge to dilute the ‘ASEAN Way’, the leaders
took only a limited step in the form of an ASEAN troika system (see Chapter 6). ASEAN leaders attempted to increase their own interests through preserving the mechanisms of the ASEAN Way as regional identity. This indicates that for ASEAN leaders, because the acceptance of flexible engagement would mean a direct threat to collective regional identity as well as unity, they rejected it and rather accepted the troika system as it must be compatible with the principle enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC) which adheres strictly to the norms of consensus and non-interference.

On the other hand, SADC has indicated an intention to move rapidly in reforming its regional security structure. By adopting the new Protocol on OPDSC, the new SADC Organ was facilitated to upgrade the degree of formalisation as well as institutionalisation within the SADC structure as a whole\textsuperscript{164}. Nevertheless, as Article 8(c) of the Protocol stipulates, decisions of the Ministerial Committee shall be taken by ‘consensus’, with a quorum of two-thirds of member states present. For SADC as well, in this sense, the rule of consensual decision-making leaves room for the organisation to pursue an adherence to the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Given the fact that the rule of decision-making by ‘consensus’ is largely based on the principle of ‘national basic rights and equality’, it can be assumed that both ASEAN and SADC are deeply committed to ‘national sovereignty’ which cannot be compromised not only as a paramount national interest but also as a cornerstone to develop regional identity. As mentioned in chapter 6, in this context, both ASEAN and SADC security structures and systems can be defined as ‘what states make of it and how they do it’ (Wendt, 1992:396-421). For both ASEAN and SADC, that is, regional identity and interests are made and remade by the member states respectively through different types of interactions and relationships among actors.

Compared with neo-liberal institutionalists, constructivists, who also emphasise institution-building which does not necessarily bring about diminishing national sovereignty, have neglected ASEAN’s ineffective responses to the regional crises

\textsuperscript{164} The SADC Organ was integrated into the SADC structure and report to the SADC Summit, rather than acting as an independent institution in the tradition of the Frontline States (FLS). In this way the SADC member states attempted to consolidate a formal regional security structure within SADC in developing a common approach to the SADC Organ and its area of operation (see 7.4.1).
which demand more urgent, structured and rule-based regulations. In this sense, applying the constructivist perspective to ASEAN security logic helps us to understand the reason why member states prevented ASEAN from implementing swift and timely reactions to the regional crises caused by external forces (the Asian economic crisis), as well as internal crises, such as that of East Timor crisis.

In the context of constructivism, it can be argued that ASEAN, which has been attempting to strengthen the features of the ASEAN Way, seems to be ‘too reliant on the ideational values rather than on material values’, thereby requiring a more balanced blending (Hwang, 2003:23). In exploring the ASEAN security mechanisms, furthermore, like rationalists, constructivists also largely stuck to “respect for sovereignty” by failing not only to go beyond a state-centric approach, but also failing to challenge a number of new security threats, including the competition for scarce natural resources, food shortage, drug trafficking and HIV/AIDS (Narine, 2002).

Likewise, in the SADC region, a broad set of new security threats which has also emerged on the security agenda in the post-apartheid and post-Cold War era, challenges constructivism as well as rationalism. In this period, nevertheless, looking beyond the material forces to focus on the ideational context of regional leaders is also conducive to understanding the character, nature and type of contemporary SADC security regionalism. For instance, after the end of apartheid and the Cold War, although SADC members attempted to establish the SADC Organ (OPDS) as a formal regional security structure, in fact, the Organ was mainly motivated to strengthen and guarantee ‘more flexibility’ (SADC Communique, 1996), which leaves room for SADC to opt for ‘regional security management exceptionalism’. Furthermore, as Article 8(c) of the OPDSC Protocol and Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact imply, the primary motive of regional attempts to restructure SADC’s security architecture can largely be understood not only within the material factors such as the integration of the SADC Organ into the SADC structure, but also within the intersubjective context of regional leaders who tend to highlight state and regime security.

8.4 Conclusion

To sum up, whereas both neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theories focus on how given and fixed structures affect the instrumental rationality of actors, a constructivist perspective of international relations opens up the possibilities of actors
to consider international structures as historically evolved and thus flexible. That is, while both neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists view institutions, norms and identities as the products of material structure, constructivists consider them as being in eternal development and as socially reconstructed and thus malleable. This means that while rationalist perspectives are largely limited to material structures which are placed in the international hierarchy, a constructivist perspective does not see structures as primarily material; rather, material factors can also become part of genuine structural features if they acquire social and political meaning.

Furthermore, as long as such human relationships as social and political interactions among the member states in ASEAN and SADC respectively last over time, neither structure nor agency is unchangeably fixed, but rather, change can be applied to the security dilemma in terms of regional security cooperation (Wendt, 1987; 1992). In this context, it can be assumed that the underpinning mechanism of politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC is, to paraphrase Wendt (1992), ‘what the member states make of it and how they do it’.
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION

It was pointed out in chapter 1 that one of the limitations of the study is that the comparative analysis of the ASEAN and SADC(C) politico-security regionalisms was not primarily designed around the (quantitative-driven) empirical perspectives of international relations (IR), but the (qualitative-driven) theoretical ones of IR. The sections building some links between ASEAN and SADC(C) by cross-references (i.e., what broad similarities and differences are) (see Chapter 5 and 7) have attempted to reflect on the essence of social constructivism in unfolding the character, type and nature of both the ASEAN and SADC(C) regionalisms in particular terms of the political security arena. Firstly, it is recommended, however, that future research should develop the substantive empirical questions of constructivism through incorporating both qualitative and quantitative methods which are more attuned to the identification of mechanisms of contemporary (security) regionalism in the South.

In terms of contemporary security regionalism, future research can also be further studied in light of the classical readings related to security community and security complex. As Hettne (2001:13) argues, the term ‘security regionalism’ implies attempts by states and other actors in a particular geographical area – a region in the making – to ‘transform a security complex with conflict-generating interstate and intrastate relations towards a security community with cooperative external relations and domestic peace’. In this sense of security regionalism, as noted in chapters 4 and 5, historically both the ASEAN and SADC regions had experienced animosity, which could characterise the regions as unstable security complexes with regard to patterns of enmity rather than amity. Thus, given that the historical regional security dynamics (relations) among the local states are the basic elements of understanding regional security complexes, chapters 4 and 5 in this study can be utilised to illustrate such variables of security complexes as the structural patterns of both local and global security dynamics in both ASEAN and SADC(C) (cf Buzan, 1988; 1991).

Both ASEAN and SADC are also seen, to some extent, to be attempting to project themselves as regional security communities in the post-Cold War era (for ASEAN, see Acharya, 2001; for SADC, see Ngoma, 2003; 2005). Indeed, as Acharya (2001:131) argues, ‘security communities are not marked by the absence of conflict per se, but by the ability of societies and governments to manage them peacefully’. As examined in
the previous chapters, despite differing scope and extent, both ASEAN and SADC seem to prefer the method of diplomatic negotiations to the one of militaristic measures so that they are attempting to pursue the principle of pacific settlement of disputes in their regions. Within this context, as indicated in section 8.2, such comparative findings as institutionalisation, norm-based conflict management and collective regional identity as exceptionalism in ASEAN and SADC will be useful to develop a framework for the study of regional security communities in particular terms of ‘evolutionary’ security communities among sovereign states (cf Schoeman, 2002:1-26; Ngoma, 2005). The key point here is the impact of constructivism upon envisaging regional security communities in both ASEAN and SADC. Therefore, it is recommended that future research should reflect on sociological or ideational, rather than power-based or material, approaches to regional security community buildings in the South, including the ASEAN and SADC region. In doing so, one may find the basis for the role of a constructivist perspective of international relations in constructing security communities.

This study has highlighted the interplay of regional states in both ASEAN and SADC, but has neglected the role of non-state actors. In particular, I have limited my study to the (Wendtian) social constructivism or a modernist type of constructivism that focuses on the state as a major actor in terms of shaping and being shaped by the intersubjective ideas of actors through various interactions. Here it is important to note that, however, we are witnessing the growing influence of other political actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which often go beyond the state-centric approach to global politics. In this sense, McGrew (1992:3) argues that the political activity and process (embracing the exercise of power and authority) are no longer mainly defined by national, legal and territorial agents; rather the growing array of issues, which surface on the political agenda, has been joined by the emergence of new kinds of actors involved in political decision-making.

Although the state still remains central in the security arena, it no longer dominates either as the exclusive referent object or as the principal object of threat, in the way it did previously. The changed and different context of both ASEAN and SADC in the post-Cold War era necessitates attention to a range of new referent objects for security and sources of threat from different angles (Buzan, et al, 1998). It is therefore recommended that future research needs, as other constructivists also argue (Reus-Smit, 2001:209-230), to open constructivism to the possibility of state transcendence by including non-state actors as important players in affecting international politics with
a view to better understand the mechanism of contemporary security regionalism.

Drawing critical (heterodox, or counter-hegemonic) constructivism from Cox’s essay ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’ (1981), furthermore, it is important to indicate that humans are not just followers of given structures, but rather they create them. Given that contemporary regionalism can be understood in the context of the ‘new regionalism’ that not only derives its importance from globalisation (Grugel and Hout, 1999:10-11), but also marks a concerted response against the forces of globalisation (Hettne, 2001:84-88), critical constructivism from the perspective of Coxian critical theory will also be helpful for understanding the mechanism of contemporary security regionalism. For critical constructivism, this approach is rooted in a theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a continuing process of historical change. It is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts; and its aims are just as practical as those of problem-solving theory, but it approaches practice from a perspective which transcends that of the existing order, which problem-solving theory takes as its starting point (Cox, 1981:129-30). On this basis, Cox (1981:135-138) proposes a method of historical structures, defined as particular configurations of forces (ideas, institutions and material capabilities) which do not determine actions but nevertheless create opportunities and impose constraints.

In brief, historical structures are the notion of a framework for action in which the three levels (social forces related to production, forms of state and world orders) can be explained in terms of the configurations between material capabilities, ideas and institutions. Cox’s historical structure may be applied to the SADC and ASEAN regions with illuminating regional ‘ideas’, ‘institutions’, and ‘capabilities’ in order to see the regional (hegemonic) order in relation to the current world (hegemonic) order. For instance, with regard to the economic security of trade in SADC and ASEAN, there exists regional dynamics of economic relations among member states, in particular the relations between economic powers (South Africa in SADC and Singapore in ASEAN) and the rest of the member countries. This may help us to find a link between the controlling social forces (e.g. South Africa’s manufacturing capital and their labour force) in the region and the world order.

Given the assumptions above, there are a number of security issues that critical constructivism does not pay attention to, such as drug trafficking, water, arms
smuggling, poverty and health. These cannot be solved ‘technically’ within the prevailing mainstream (problem-solving) approaches (cf Devetak, 2001:155-180; Leysens, 2001:219-236). In other words, the analysis of social forces related to production in the SADC and ASEAN regions may be linked to the expanded notion of security, for instance the position of women or migration, beyond traditional security issues. The fact that critical theory focuses on the historical structures of which these problems are just ‘symptomatic’, means that we need to regard the newly emergent security issues as ‘challenges’ which may require the ‘transformation’ of the historical structure of the regions.

Therefore, given that contemporary security regionalisms in the various perspectives of constructivism in IR are composed of multi-dimensional characteristics, including a modernist type of constructivism and critical constructivism, means that future research should pay attention to the (emancipatory) role of critical theory which is, from a developing world perspective, an aid in changing the existing order, by emphasising equity, justice, freedom and emancipation (Cox, 1995:35). For the South, and particularly for the ASEAN and SADC regions, the issues of equity, justice, freedom and emancipation are not just theoretically significant, but also looming large in reality.
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