CHAPTER 8  A COMPARISON OF THE TWO CASE STUDIES

8.1 Introduction

The primary research aims of this study were centred around two related problems, one theoretical and the other comparative. As mentioned earlier, the theoretical problem relates to the insufficiency of neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist accounts that call for a much needed attempt to bring ASEAN and SADC into contemporary discussions about the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms within the context of a (social) constructivism of international relations (IR) theory. That is, although both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are still influential in world politics, the main limitation of these theories is a narrow view of what the topics are to debate in international relations theory. However, constructivism has proved useful and valuable as an analytical tool to allow for the possibility of developing world regions to change the disadvantaged situations which contribute to understanding and explaining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC.

In this chapter the findings concerning the core research aims of this study are presented. As shown in chapter 1 and 3, whereas both neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are rationalist theories, based on rational choice theory and taking the identities and interests of actors as given, constructivism focuses on how intersubjective practices between actors result in identities and interests being formed in the processes of interaction rather than being formed prior to interaction. This has been important for both ASEAN and SADC which have been concerned with transforming a competitive regional environment into a more cooperative one: for instance, the emergence of the ARF and the OPDS was mainly to advance regional security in reaction to a changing international milieu and a recognition that many of the problems and threats faced by the region could ‘only be addressed through increased cooperation’ (Van Aardt, 1997:23).

Given the assumption that constructivism heralds a return to a more historical and sociological form and nature of international relations theory (Reus-Smit, 2001:209-230), therefore, chapter 4 and 5 in this study focused on the historical background of ASEAN and SADC(C) with analysing the creation, evolution and process of each organisation’s security regionalism (i.e. the primary motives and/or root causes of
current regional security cooperation) up to the end of the Cold War. Thereafter, chapters 6 and 7 attempted to search for the type and style of regional security cooperation which were highlighted as the fundamental mechanisms of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms. The key point here is the effect and role of a constructivist perspective of international relations in particular terms of the proposition of Wendt (1992) that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. Indeed, despite some splits and divisions among the member states in addressing the issues of the South China Sea conflict and East Timor crisis in ASEAN, and the DRC crisis in SADC, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7, the member states in ASEAN and SADC appeared, later on, to be a driver for responding to the crises in their own ways.

In explaining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC, more importantly, it was argued that the regional level should be regarded as a focal point to explain regional security dynamics in ASEAN and SADC. In the context of new regionalism that emphasises the importance of multidimensional levels involving domestic, regional and extra-regional level, nonetheless, what was shown in this comparative study is that all three levels need to be brought together into a unified analytical perspective of the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

The comparative problem is also related to the focus of theoretical frameworks, including neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism. That is, whereas both neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theories focus on how given and fixed structures affect the instrumental rationality of actors, a constructivist perspective of international relations opens up the possibilities of actors to consider international structures as historically evolved and thus flexible. Given that both ASEAN and SADC are composed mainly of weak and small states, as mentioned in previous chapters, it makes sense why the leaders of ASEAN and SADC committed themselves to political norms such as national sovereignty in which individual members were well positioned to develop regional security cooperation in their favour. In fact, both the acceptance of the ASEAN troika system by the member states and the insertion of Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact can largely be understood within the intersubjective context of regional leaders who tend to highlight state and regime security.

Unlike rationalists, constructivists argue that social and material structures affect not only behaviour, but also actors’ identities and interests (Wendt, 1995:71-72). When ASEAN and SADC are compared in the context of politico-security regionalisms,
therefore, it needs to be emphasised that they should not be treated as unchangeable and fixed entities, but rather as continually evolving and flexible ones to change and transform the international milieu and social context through various interactions. Moreover, as noted in earlier chapters, such non-material factors as norms, ideas and identities, rather than rule-based regulations, occupy a key position in shaping the characters, type and nature of politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC.

Furthermore, despite the unprecedented growth of the regionalism literature, very little attention has been directed to the comparative analysis of regional groupings like ASEAN and SADC in developing countries. As mentioned in chapter 1, in fact, although there have been challenging examples of EU (European Union) influence on the theory and practice of regional security cooperation in the South, little comparative analyses of regional security cooperation among developing countries have been undertaken to date except for only a few cases in the developing world (see e.g. Langhammer and Hienmenz, 1990; Gambari, 1991; Axline, 1994; Van Nieuwkerk, 2001; Mutschler, 2001).

As was shown in this study, the character, style and practice of ASEAN and SADC security cooperation are highly complex, contested, and dynamic. Of the traditional theories of international relations, neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are dominant in seeking to explain the collective logic of ASEAN and SADC security regionalisms. What is important, however, is that both these theories of international relations (which have widely been deployed in analysing regional security contexts) have limited relevance in explaining politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC. In this context, thus, this study has focused on the utility of constructivism in analysing ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

8.2 Comparative Findings

8.2.1 Institutionalisation

The scope and style of institutionalisation in ASEAN have been different from those of SADC. ASEAN members have largely continued to maintain informal security mechanisms within the ‘ASEAN Way’ context since the establishment of the organisation. After the end of apartheid and the Cold War, on the other hand, SADC members attempted to restructure its regional security architecture. Despite a number of flaws in developing the security mechanisms, SADC leaders were, to some extent,
successful in achieving regional solidarity and consensus on integrating their security structures. That is, the SADC member countries have evolved the degree of formalisation and institutionalisation of security frameworks in the region even before SADC was born.

In the post-Cold War era, although both SADC and ASEAN have been striving to invent new regional security frameworks to increase regional security, the SADC Organ (OPDS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have had rather different institutional experiences. As mentioned in chapter 7, the former resulted from the historical development of the FLS, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), SADCC, SADC and the ASAS. The establishment of the OPDS has been a product both of history and evolution. In this context, thus, it should be noted that the member states have sought to develop the ‘institutionalisation of regional security’ within the SADC Organ since the end of the Cold War.

In contrast, the ARF was developed only after the end of the Cold War. Its institutionalisation has largely been limited to ASEAN's informal and consensual mechanisms. As mentioned in chapter 6, the ARF's Concept Paper (which was prepared by ASEAN in 1995) stipulated that the ARF’s rules of procedure should be based on ASEAN principles and practices and that decisions should be made by consensus after cautious and extensive consultations. In addition, whereas the ARF is composed of ‘participants’ involving a mixture of ASEAN and non-ASEAN states, the OPDS consists of ‘members’ defined by SADC. Here, it is important to note that while the members of the OPDS are the same as the members of SADC, the participants of the ARF are differentiated from the status of membership associated with ASEAN.

Given the circumstances above, the character, nature and form of institutionalisation in the case of multilateralism in the ASEAN region can be differentiated from those of the SADC region in the post-Cold War era. Above all, ASEAN rejected Western ideas on the ARF and tried to develop the concept of multilateralism on the basis of the regional norms of the ‘ASEAN Way’. The institutional form of ARF multilateralism does not focus on formal legalistic structures of cooperation, but takes an institutional approach as a long-term process of socialisation and consensus-building (Hill and Tow, 2002:161-179; also Chapter 6). As a result, ASEAN has been quite successful in promoting its norms and principles in the ARF. Indeed, ASEAN was able to utilise its norms and principles in particular in terms of socialising China by inducing it to be engaged in the ARF. In that
regard, most importantly, ASEAN’s approach to socialise China in the forum is also gradual and incremental in nature.

On the other hand, a multilateral approach among SADC members has largely been placed under South Africa’s leadership. That is, since South Africa has projected itself as an emerging (middle) power with support from the West in the post-apartheid period, it is likely that SADC may be influenced by the West constructing its type and style of regional approach to security cooperation in the region. This means that whereas ASEAN has opted for Asian-styled multilateralism in the ARF (which was primarily derived from the ASEAN Way), SADC has attempted to take advantage of multilateral organisations such as the UN which is largely influenced by the West, particularly given the structure of the Security Council.

In addition, the ARF is not a collective security arrangement which requires a legally-binding agreement, but is based on the principles of open-regionalism, soft-regionalism and cooperative security (Acharya, 2001). The principle of open-regionalism implies that an institution such as the ARF should be as inclusive as possible and the institution should be as attractive to states as possible (cf Johnston, 2003:123). In this context, the ASEAN states expressed their intention to adopt an inclusive method in order to increase security cooperation with other states in the Asia-Pacific region during the 1992 Singapore Summit (see ASEAN, 1992).

In this period, though, SADC has not established such an expanded multilateral organisation as the ARF which includes non-ASEAN states. Rather, the SADC member states seem to have largely focused on collective security and/or collective defence under the SADC Organ within the region (Hough, 1998:25-26; also Cawthra, 1997:211). Indeed, the objectives of the SADC Organ (OPDS) laid down collective security arrangements which are largely associated with a ‘regional alliance system’ for the SADC security structure (Hough, 1998:25; also Chapter 7).

Nevertheless, given the fact that the term ‘cooperative security’ tends to connote consultation rather than confrontation and reassurance rather than deterrence, both ASEAN and SADC seem to have committed themselves to cooperative security approaches to addressing regional conflicts. Despite a varying degree, as noted in chapters 6 and 7, both ASEAN and SADC are seeking the principle of non-confrontation and non-use of force with placing an emphasis on the development of
dialogue and consultation with external organisations, including the UN, and various NGOs (namely, second-track or semi-official security dialogue). For ASEAN, in particular, the emergence of ‘second-track’ institutions such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) is conducive not only to facilitating linkages across a broad spectrum of political, economic and social agendas, but also in promoting the use of the multiplicity of international organisations with an interest in Southeast Asia. For SADC as well, Article 11(2) of the OPDSC Protocol (which promotes consultation with the UN Security Council) paves the way for SADC to collaborate with external organisations like the UN in addressing regional security problems.

Moreover, both ASEAN and SADC attempted to contribute to efforts toward regional confidence building through the ARF and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact respectively. Given the fact that cooperative security approaches are geared towards the development of mutuality of security, based on mutual reassurance rather than deterrence, as noted above, reassurance in both ASEAN and SADC has been developed through increased ‘transparency’ of military forces and confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) (see Chapters 6 and 7). Thus, mutual reassurance has been pursued by both ASEAN and SADC, at least in theory, in order not only to reduce the mistrust between member states, but also to build confidence among the regional states through discussion, negotiation, cooperation and compromise.

In the case of the ARF, ASEAN’s commitment to ‘soft regionalism’ has militated against the development of ‘hard regionalism’ as the very idea of conflict resolution. In fact, the ASEAN Concept Paper which laid out the ARF’s approach to security cooperation envisaged three categories: confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. But the term ‘conflict resolution’ has been one of the most contentious issues on the security agenda of the ARF. As a result, this forced the ARF to change the term ‘conflict resolution’ to ‘elaboration of approaches to conflicts’ at the ARF meeting in Brunei in 1995 (Acharya, 2001:177; 2003:261). In particular, this indicates that ASEAN members viewed ‘conflict resolution’ as a too sensitive and formal approach in dealing with China in terms of the South China Sea conflict. Given the circumstances above, ASEAN members seem to have considered the ARF’s approach to regional conflict as one of ‘conflict avoidance’, rather than of conflict resolution. In this context, it makes sense why the ASEAN member states continue to argue that the
1976 Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC), which avoids explicitly using legality-oriented words such as conflict resolution, should play a basic role in underpinning the ARF. Instead of using such hard words as resolution, indeed, the TAC prefers to use softer words, including friendship, good neighbourliness, amity, cooperation and friendly negotiations (see ASEAN, 1976; also Chapters 4 and 6).

On the other hand, even though SADC is also concerned about managing regional conflicts by ‘peaceful means’, it seems to be more interested in committing itself to ‘hard regionalism’ in terms of conflict management. Within the context of a legally binding security architecture, in fact, the SADC OPDSC Protocol stipulates the jurisdiction of the Organ with stressing the approach to ‘resolution’ of regional conflicts. Moreover, according to Article 11(1d) of the OPDSC Protocol, ‘the Organ shall seek to ensure that the Signatories adhere to and enforce all sanctions and arms embargoes imposed on any party by the United Nations Security Council’. In this regard, whereas Article 17 in the TAC appears to ambiguously approach the method of settlement of disputes in terms of any (coercive) measure provided for by the UN, SADC, as both Articles of 11(3a) and 11(1d) of OPDSC Protocol illustrate, explicitly stipulates how and to what extent the UN can intervene in its regional affairs, which opens the door for the SADC member states to rely upon hard security or militaristic approaches to addressing regional conflicts.

With regard to the character and nature of institutionalisation, given the circumstances above, the major difference between ASEAN and SADC can be found in whether and to what extent each organisation is willing to commit itself to ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ regionalism in terms of conflict management. In terms of at least surface views of institutional structure, SADC has attempted to orient itself towards a legally binding security architecture with restructuring not only the SADC Organ but the whole organisation. It seems to be more progressive in moving on the regional security framework than does ASEAN.

8.2.2 Norm-based Conflict Management

Both ASEAN and SADC(C) have, to a varying degree, tried to utilise political norms in conflict management respectively. During the Cold War, for ASEAN, the member states agreed on the 1976 Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC) as a code of conduct among regional states. The TAC provided for the behavioural or legal norms of ASEAN. In
Article 2 of the TAC, in particular, the treaty states four fundamental principles that shall guide the actions of ASEAN members: (1) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, (2) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, (3) settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and (4) renunciation of the threat or use of force (see ASEAN, 1976; also Chapter 4).

Meanwhile, around this period, SADCC established the 1980 Lusaka Declaration for the primary purpose of economic liberation in Southern Africa. By adopting the Declaration, the SADC member states also provided four basic objectives to address regional security problems: (1) reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on South Africa, (2) the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration (3) the mobilisation of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies, and (4) concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation (Southern African Record, 1987:4; also Chapter 5).

As the ASEAN states as a group of newly independent developing countries prioritised respect for national sovereignty, however, sovereignty was also a core norm of SADCC except when it came to apartheid South Africa (which was not a member). Indeed, although Article 2 of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which impacted on the evolution and framework of the FLS as the antecedent of SADCC, stipulates the norms of non-intervention and state sovereignty, the OAU leaders agreed that South Africa should be excluded from the protection of the organisation’s norms because South Africa was (then) a non-member (Klotz, 1995:76). Under the circumstances, SADCC as a response to apartheid South Africa intended not to commit itself to the Westphalian norms such as non-interference in internal affairs, non-use of force in interstate relations and pacific settlement of disputes. Rather, SADCC members appropriated such continental and global norms as racial equality so as to make the organisation to serve as a unifying focus for regional security cooperation.

After the end of the Cold War, despite some similarities, the scope, extent and nature of such norms as non-use of force or pacific settlement of disputes in ASEAN can be differentiated from those of SADC. In this period, in fact, although both ASEAN and SADC pursued the principle of pacific settlement of disputes in their own regions with a view to addressing regional security problems by peaceful means, as mentioned earlier, SADC seems to be more interested in using explicitly legally-oriented words such as
conflict resolution than does ASEAN. Moreover, whereas ASEAN has never seriously contemplated adopting a military pact as a collective defence arrangement, SADC established the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003 in order to make provision for the member states to protect each other from external aggressions on their own intent and purpose.

Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter 7, given the fact that both ASEAN and SADC are unable to form a formal military alliance like NATO owing mainly to lack of military capabilities, both regional groups seem to prefer the method of diplomatic negotiations to the one of militaristic measures (see Chapters 6 and 7). For instance, as both Article 2(d) in the TAC and Article 11(1b) and 11(1c) in the OPDSC Protocol emphasise the importance of peaceful settlement of disputes, it can largely be assumed that the principle of pacific settlement of disputes in ASEAN and SADC is equally important (see Chapter 7). Hence, the emergence of the 2003 SADC Mutual Defence Pact cannot be seen merely as a move toward a more militaristic direction in SADC’s security integration, but rather as a political scheme for the SADC member states to develop the diplomatic means to be applied prior to a scheme of armed force as a last resort. In fact, the primary and root causes of 2003 SADC Mutual Defence Pact (which were intricately embedded in the course of development of the past regional projects, including the FLS alliance, ISDSC, SADCC, SADC, ASAS, OPDS and currently OPDSC) can and should be understood in such unique historical and political contexts as the racial confrontation between South Africa and SADCC members during the apartheid era, and the rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe in the post-apartheid period.

In this regard, it can be assumed that such political norms as the pacific settlement of disputes in regional conflict management are open to be restructured and applied to its own historical and social context. In terms of managing conflicts in ASEAN and SADC, therefore, it is important to note that when the norm of pacific settlement of disputes is applied to regional context, it is not automatically given, but rather produced and reproduced through the various interactions of the political elites of each regional group. As examined in the cases of the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989) and the East Timor crisis (1999-2000) for ASEAN, and the DRC conflict (1998-2004) for SADC, for example, both organisations are equally concerned about managing regional conflicts by ‘peaceful means’. When member states of both organisations recognised their limits to resolve regional conflicts by themselves, though, they attempted to engage external
powers to address the conflicts with the intention of temporarily allowing the intervention of the outside powers, at the same time compromising the norms of non-use of force and/or pacific settlement of disputes (see Chapters 4, 6 and 7; also Subsections 4.5, 6.3.2 and 7.3).

In the post-Cold War era, moreover, both ASEAN and SADC have placed emphasis on conventional international norms such as non-interference in dealing with regional security problems respectively. Given the fact that both regional groups are political entities with ‘weak’ state structures and a lack of strong regime legitimacy, the norm of non-interference can and should be understood in the context of the domestic security concerns of regional member states in ASEAN and SADC respectively. As noted in chapters 6 and 7, that is, one of the main reasons for both ASEAN and SADC to adhere to the norm of non-interference can be found in the context of each organisation’s search for internal stability and regime security. After the end of the Cold War, in fact, it has been argued that the primary sources of threat to the national security of both ASEAN and SADC states are not external, but internal (for ASEAN, see Acharya, 2001:57-58; for SADC, see Nathan and Honwana, 1995:6).

However, the norm of non-interference does not mean a sense of indifference towards each other. In fact, just as ASEAN’s response to the East Timor crisis proved to be more substantial than many outside the region had expected, SADC also took the lead in responding to the DRC conflict after the leaders found that peace and stability in the region could not be realised without regional solidarity on security problems. In addition, regional confidence security-building measures (CSBMs), which have the potential to erode the norm of non-interference, have been advocated by both ASEAN in the ARF and SADC in the Mutual Defence Pact. Nonetheless, given the fact that CSBMs are concerned about the issue of a ‘non-aggression treaty’ (Hough, 1998:28), CSBMs in both the ARF and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact should be understood in the context of norms such as non-aggression and/or non-interference in the region respectively. By implication, thus, this ambivalence leaves room for both ASEAN and SADC not only to apply such complex norms as non-interference to each situation as suitably, but also to develop ‘interactions that are interconnected in unanticipated and non-linear ways’ (Adler, 2002:110).

Given the circumstances above, for both ASEAN and SADC, norms such as non-interference are not fixed in their definition and functions, but rather open to be
structured and restructured in the member states’ own intent and interest. To put it differently, norms not only regulate behaviour, they also constitute new interests and identities (Katzenstein, 1996:5). In this context, it can be argued that while the regulatory effect of norms refers to a rationalist-behavioural conception of process in which identities and interests are exogenous to interaction, the constitutive effect of norms refers to a cognitive, intersubjective one in which they are endogenous (Katzenstein, 1996:5; Wendt, 1992:394). Thus, the norm of non-interference for both ASEAN and SADC should be understood in the constitutive context as well as the regulatory. Despite a varying degree, yet, for both ASEAN and SADC, such constitutive elements as the ideas, identities and interests in driving human behaviour, rather than such regulatory ones as the formal and legalistic rules, play a key role in forming security regionalisms within their own regional context respectively.

In the Cold War era, the constitutive effect of norms impacted significantly upon the processes and characters of both ASEAN and SADCC security mechanisms: as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, for ASEAN, norms such as consensus (mufakat) helped the member states to bring forth the sense of regional identity and interests; for SADCC, the norm of racial equality played a crucial role not only in eliminating apartheid ideology in the region, but also in developing regional consensual collective-identity. In the post-Cold War period as well, the constitutive effect of norms occupied a central role in explaining the type, nature and character of both ASEAN and SADC security mechanisms. That is, as emphasised in chapters 4 and 6, such constitutive and cognitive mechanisms as the ‘ASEAN Way’ are important for understanding not only ASEAN itself but also the expanded context of an Asia Pacific multilateral forum. In this sense, Acharya (1997a:343) argues that the ‘dialogue and … processes involving ideas, regional norms, and the quest for a collective regional identity have played a crucial role in promoting the concept and practice of regional organisations such as ASEAN and the ARF’: thus the ASEAN Way, despite its practical limitations, has been a useful set of norms and principles for regional policy makers to manage regional conflicts.

Likewise, as indicated and in chapters 5 and 7, such constitutive and cognitive elements as a consensual collective-identity based on racial equality during the apartheid era, and the intersubjective ideas of regional leaders who tend to highlight state sovereignty and non-interference in the post-Cold War period, are crucial for understanding the mechanisms of SADC security regionalism. Yet, although the
intersubjective ideas of regional leaders, for both ASEAN and SADC, are instrumental in unfolding to what extent such norms as non-interference/intervention are determined with bringing forth regional identity and interests, they are also subject to the changing processes of interactions amongst regional actors. For instance, as SADC encouraged international community involving the UN to intervene in the DRC conflict although it continues to emphasise the importance of non-interference in the internal affairs of its members, the ASEAN states also compromised, at least reluctantly, the norm of non-interference with utilising external interventions to address the East Timor crisis in the region. For both ASEAN and SADC, by implication, this indicates that such norms as non-interference are flexible to be made and remade by the regional member states on their own intent and purpose.

Given the arguments aforementioned, thus, although the regulatory effect of norms in relation to formal and legalistic rules was pointed out in the TAC for ASEAN and the OPDSC for SADC respectively, the constitutive effect of norms (in relation to such cognitive factors as intersubjective knowledge, ideas and identity) occupies a key position not only in driving political actors’ behaviour, but also in understanding the mechanism(s) of conflict management in ASEAN and SADC(C).

8.2.3 Collective (Regional) Identity as Exceptionalism

In searching for regional identity, as mentioned in chapter 4, ASEAN leaders were, from the start, to discuss regional politico-security matters in ‘private sessions’ which were often couched as ‘informal’ discussions (Irvine, 1982:13-14). That is, ASEAN encouraged its commitment to regional consensus and confidence building by using a rather (institutionalised) form of informal personal relations with a view not only to creating a collective regional identity, but also to facilitating regional as well as national flexibility in terms of decision-makings (cf Kivimaki, 2001:17). Likewise, as mentioned in chapter 5, the informality and decentralisation of SADCC also contributed to the creation of a collective identity in the region. In fact, the orientation of SADCC towards informal and decentralised structure through a sectoral responsibility approach, helped the organisation to construct a spirit of ‘we’ among its members (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:72). As a result, SADCC’s commitment to the informality and decentralisation of the organisation was ultimately conducive not only to protecting each member country’s national dignity and sovereignty, but also to consolidating a collective regional identity through leaving a flexible or exceptional room for regional
Collective identity, as Wendt (1996:52) notes, refers to ‘positive identification’ with the welfare of the other, which is regarded as a ‘cognitive extension’ of the Self rather than as independent. That is, collective identity is a basis for ‘feeling of solidarity, community, and loyalty’ and for ‘collective definitions of interests’. This does not mean, however, that state actors no longer calculate costs and benefits, but that they do so on a ‘higher level of social aggregation’; this then facilitates collective action by ‘increasing diffused reciprocity and the willingness to bear costs without selective incentives’ (Wendt, 1996:53). In this context, it is important to note that although both ASEAN and SADC have kept stressing the value of collective regional identities, it does not mean that both organisations are operating or should be operating in accordance with the realisation of ‘common identity’ shared by their members. Rather each collective identity of ASEAN and SADC rests primarily on the feeling of solidarity (a ‘we feeling’) in dealing with regional security problems, as was indicated in a number of cases, including the Cambodian conflict and the East Timor Crisis for ASEAN, and SADCC’s response to apartheid South Africa and the conflict management in the DRC for SADC (see Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7).

As mentioned in chapters 6 and 7, ASEAN and SADC not only have divided perceptions of what are in their national interests relating to regional conflicts, but also lack such a certain convergence of value systems as liberal democracy. For both regional groups, that is, the members of each organisation remain divergent with regard to their post-colonial political setting, level of economic development, and cultural/ideological make-up. Despite the existence of divergence within each regional group, both ASEAN and SADC sought to forge regional solidarity and consensus within their own organisations on how to address regional security problems. In doing so, both regional groups tried to promote the coordination of the different national interests into a harmonised sub-regional scheme through which their member states gradually began to form collective regional identities with a view not only to increasing the cooperative spirit amongst the member states respectively, but also to reducing the likelihood of use of force in inter-state relations. By implication, thus, the collective identity formation in both ASEAN and SADC cannot be understood simply as an end-result out of a certain convergence of self-interests and/or egoistic values, but rather as a process that leads to the ‘structural transformation of the Westphalian states system from anarchy to authority’ (Wendt, 1994:393). In this context, Acharya (1998:206) argues as follows:
Collective identities among states are constructed by their social interactions, rather than given exogenously to them by human nature ... or ... the international distribution of power. ... regional cooperation among states is not necessarily a function of immutable or pre-ordained variables such as physical location, common historical experience .... Rather, regionalism may emerge and consolidate itself within an intersubjective setting of dynamic interactions ....

With regard to security structures and/or systems, despite differing nature and degrees, both ASEAN and SADC(C) sought to search for their own approaches to conflict management in direct or indirect opposition to the security institutions and practices in Europe. As mentioned in chapter 7, for example, both regional groups did not form a formal military alliance like NATO owing mainly to the lack of military capabilities, but rather they have opted for their own styles to respond to regional security problems. This implies that both ASEAN and SADC(C) seem to have searched for a collective regional identity respectively so as to consider themselves as distinct regional groups from the European ones, in which they could redefine regional security mechanisms within their own regional context. Indeed, although the SADC Mutual Defence Pact, under collective self-defence, makes provision for the member states to protect each other from external aggression, the SADC member countries do not commit themselves to the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’, as is the case for NATO (see 7.4.2).

In terms of collective security arrangements, in addition, although SADC seems to have largely focused on collective security and/or collective defence under the SADC Organ within the region (Hough, 1998:25-26; also Cawthra, 1997:211), neither ASEAN nor SADC established a genuine meaning of collective security system in the region respectively. Given the assumption that the idea of collective security is based on a preponderance of physical force allied against any aggressor as well as a legal agreement to regulate international behaviour (Snyder, 1999:108), in reality, it will be difficult for both the ASEAN and SADC states to develop self-reliant collective security systems owing mainly to the fact that most of members in each regional group are composed of weak states. In this sense, it may be inferred that both ASEAN and SADC are, to some extent, lacking the (complete?) level of collective identity in particular terms of collective security arrangements as a measure of such a collective identity.
Nevertheless, as Wendt (1996:53) argued, collective identity is not equivalent (or essential) to such multilateral institutions as a collective security arrangement. For both ASEAN and SADC, in fact, what is important for a collective regional identity is the processes of such positive identification as the spirit of rising or enhanced cooperation among regional actors, which are reproduced and transformed by their intersubjective ideas and practices. In this sense, as Acharya (2001:29; 202) notes, the emergence of cooperative security can also be considered as an important criterion to examine the meaning and value of a collective regional identity. In this regard, although SADC has not established such an expanded multilateral organisation as the ARF which includes non-ASEAN states, both ASEAN and SADC are attempting to promote ‘inclusive regionalism’ as an important component of the principle of ‘cooperative security’: for ASEAN, the creation of the ARF; for SADC, the promotion of the interoperability between SADC and non-SADC organisations as implied in Article 11(2c) of OPDSC (see Chapter 6 and 7). In this context, thus, it can be argued that both ASEAN and SADC seem to be developing a collective regional identity through such multilateral efforts as positive, inclusive and cooperative approaches to regional security problems.

Although both ASEAN and SADC committed themselves to multilateralism which was relatively instrumental in developing the spirit of collective identity, the type and nature of multilateralism in ASEAN have been different from those of SADC. As mentioned in chapter 6 and 7, indeed, whereas ASEAN attempted to construct multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific region with persistent adherence to the ASEAN Way in the ARF, multilateralism in SADC has largely been shaped by South Africa as a regional power, which helped pave the way for the West to influence the style and character of regional security cooperation in SADC as a multilateral organisation. Nonetheless, just as the collective identity of ASEAN is a process of identity building which relies upon such consensual modes of socialisation and decision making as the ASEAN Way, that of SADC is also likely to be developed through interactions among the members and approaches of its own which are based on regional consensus: for instance, common regional efforts to ‘break the political impasse’ with a view to integrating the SADC Organ into the SADC structure as a whole.

Given the circumstances above, it is important to note that both the ASEAN and SADC(C) states have searched for building collective regional identities by leaving room for them to approach conflict management in flexible or exceptional terms. For
instance, in resolving the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN utilised China’s intervention and support against Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its use of force in Cambodia at the expense of its norm of regional autonomy providing a ‘regional solution to regional problems’ (see Chapter 4). Likewise, although SADCC sought the doctrine of self-reliance through reducing the influence of (particularly but not only) South Africa, the organisation also avoided the fixed framework of conventional (East-West) rivalry with a view to seeking substantial security aid from the Western as well as the Eastern bloc (see Chapter 5).

Even after the end of the Cold War, both the ASEAN and SADC states have continued to approach regional conflict management within the context of flexibility and/or exceptionalism. As was shown in both cases of the East Timor crisis and the DRC conflict, for example, although ASEAN and SADC have stressed the importance of such norms as non-interference/intervention, both the ASEAN and SADC states allowed the norm of non-intervention to be temporarily compromised in order to protect state and regime security.

For both ASEAN and SADC(C), given the circumstances above, collective identity can be understood in the context of regional flexibility and/or exceptionalism, which is developed through constitutive interactions and which form the basis of its collective action. As mentioned earlier, given the fact that collective identity is a basis for ‘feeling of solidarity, community, and loyalty’ (Wendt, 1996:53), it can be assumed that both the ASEAN and SADC(C) states have attempted to forge collective identities in their own regional context. By implication, thus, this indicates that both ASEAN and SADC(C) can be regarded as regional groups that play a critical role not only in bringing forth a sense of collective (regional) identity, but also in constructing the mechanisms of regional security cooperation in their own way.

As was shown in this comparative study of ASEAN and SADC, furthermore, politico-security regionalism can be seen as being constitutive at the three different levels of domestic, regional and extra-regional. The mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC can and should be understood in the context of new regionalism that emphasises the importance of multidimensional approaches to security regionalism (Hettne, 2001; 2003; Söderbaum, 1998; 2003). Although I have argued that the regional level should be regarded as a focal point to explain the politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC, what was shown in this study is
that both domestic and extra-regional levels also need to be brought together into a unified analytical perspective of the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms. Indeed, contemporary politico-security regionalism has been challenged by the structural transformation of the global system, often associated with globalisation as its main feature. In particular, the dynamics of global change, which are concerned primarily with the possible erosion of sovereignty, need to be questioned and thus reconsidered in the context of (re)making politico-security regionalism at the domestic, regional and extra-regional levels.

8.2.4 Bringing In Multi-level Approaches to Politico-Security Regionalism

8.2.4.1 The Domestic Level

As noted in earlier chapters, the prevalence of weak states in ASEAN and SADC means that the dominance of security dynamics in these regions can be found at the domestic level. In the post-Cold War era, it is argued that ‘a much weakened superpower presence leaves more room for local security dynamics to take their own shape and to operate more on the basis of local resources, issues, and perceptions’ (Buzan et al., 1998:66). In fact, the East Timor crisis and the DRC crisis were mainly owing to the domestic instability: as Indonesia was put under serious challenges from internal turmoil during the East Timor crisis, the DRC was also suffering internal rebellions (see Chapter 6 and 7).

As discussed in chapter 3, however, regional institutions (which affect the behaviour of the member states) do not only ‘regulate’ state behaviour, but also ‘constitute’ state identities and interests (Katzenstein, 1996:5). In this context, the creation of such regional institutions as ASEAN and SADC might be viewed as possible contributions of politico-security regionalisms in these regions to domestic conflict management by adhering to regional norms. As was shown in this study, to a varying degree, regional norms have helped to coordinate the aim, value and *modus operandi* of ASEAN and SADC to address a number of conflicts at the domestic level. In this sense, it can be argued that, although such internal conflicts as the East Timor crisis and the DRC crisis have not been prevented, regional norms have been conducive to reducing the number of secessionist movements and thus should, to some extent, be judged as successful in both ASEAN and SADC regions.
 Nonetheless, rigid adherence to the principle of territorial integrity and denial of any further right to self-determination may intensify and prolong conflict, increasing human suffering, as was the case in East Timor. In this context, as Alaggapa (1995:381) notes, regional norms will have no credibility in the eyes of those who contest the legitimacy of the power holders and their institutions and will be rejected. For regional norms to contribute to preventing domestic conflicts in the region, they must not only preserve the status quo, but also enable protection of human rights for minority groups and self-determination in certain situations.

One of the most important norms underpinning both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms at the domestic level is the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Concerned with external intervention, both ASEAN and SADC(C) states pushed for the primacy of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. In these instances the doctrine of non-interference can be understood in the context of the domestic security concerns of both ASEAN and SADC member states. In fact, the salience of the doctrine of non-interference in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa has long predated both ASEAN and SADC.

The sanctity of the principle of non-interference and/or intervention, nonetheless, is currently being challenged. Following the Cold War, universal foreign policy priorities have been redefined, with a new emphasis on issues such as human rights, the environment, and even the promotion of democracy. In this context, Mayall (2004:126) has pointed out that:

\[ \text{[t]he case for humanitarian intervention, like the case for universal human rights that underpins it, is not in principle culture- or region-specific. \dots The arguments for and against humanitarian intervention are general. \dots humanitarian catastrophes demand an exceptional response; or that there are definable circumstances under which sovereignty can be said to have lapsed and the international community to have acquired a duty to intervene. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides a basis on which intervention can be sanctioned but only if the Security Council determines that a threat to international peace and security exits.} \]

The aforementioned case is contested in the ASEAN and SADC regions, but some
change, particularly with regard to gross violation of human rights, may be feasible. Humanitarian intervention is receiving greater attention in the UN and the AU. For instance, the AU adopted the doctrine of humanitarian intervention such that it may intervene in the affairs of member states in order to restore peace and security, or to prevent genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (Ajulu, 2004:270-271; also Thakur, 2002:323-340). But humanitarian concern has yet to be fully accepted as a basis for international intervention in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions. In terms of external interventions in East Timor and the DRC, both member states in ASEAN and SADC seem to be not only concerned about humanitarian issues such as human rights violations, but also interested in political legitimacy based on the consent of the intervened sovereign states (Indonesia and the DRC respectively) (see Chapter 6 and 7). Even if external interventions are to be justified by a legal authorisation of the UN Charter, regional political consensus is also an important consideration for regional states to intervene in domestic conflicts (see Chapter 6 and 7). Given the assumptions above, it needs to raise some questions why both ASEAN and SADC attempted to manage domestic conflicts in the regions through compromising the principle of non-intervention which is adhered to by these regional organisations. Although domestic factors such as internal turmoil tend to demand external interventions to protect regime security, some other possible answers to these questions may also be found in the extra-regional context through focusing on the scope and extent of external forces’ function to mould regional security.

8.2.4.2 The Extra-Regional Level

As implied above, for example, an important motivation for ASEAN to join the international force (INTERFET) could be found in the effects of the Asian economic crisis of 1997. As discussed in chapter 6, Indonesia’s urgent requirement for emergency aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) facilitated the external interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Indonesia (Cotton, 2001:133). This implies that global forces which weakened the regional and national autonomy, were powerful enough to open the way for external intervention. Here it is important to note that although ASEAN was initially reluctant to participate in the East Timor crisis, when the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) formally replaced INTERFET in February 2000, ASEAN was called upon to take the lead in responding to the East Timor crisis (see Chapter 6). By implication, thus, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level, to some extent, is seen to be affected by and then
reinforcing global forces, often noted as globalisation.

As mentioned in chapter 2, nonetheless, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level can also be viewed as a counter-balancing mechanism to manage regional conflicts originating from the outside. In other words, politico-security regionalism may be perceived by such hostile countries as South Africa for SADCC as ‘directed against them, provoking counter-groups and exacerbating the security dilemma’ (Alagappa, 1995:376). Although regional (political) schemes can, in theory, be considered as a feasible tool to equip the regional bodies with the collective power to address regional security problems on their own strength, regional organisations in the developing world, including ASEAN and SADC(C), in practice, often compromise such regional objectives, principles and values as regional autonomy and self-reliance. At the extra-regional level, in other words, politico-security regionalism in the developing world tend to seek to enhance ‘flexibility’ in resolving the regional security problems: for ASEAN, the member states were relatively flexible in utilising America’s and, later on, China’s intervention and support against Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its use of force in Cambodia at the expense of its norm of regional autonomy providing a ‘regional solution to regional problems’ (see Chapter 4). For SADCC, likewise, the member states also avoided the fixed framework of conventional (East-West) rivalry with a view to seeking substantial security aid from the Western as well as the Eastern bloc (see Chapter 5).

Although ASEAN and SADC(C) have been unable to form a formal military alliance like NATO, given the lack of military capabilities, these regional organisations seem to be relatively strong in (re)constructing ideational powers such as regional norms and beliefs for the purpose of strengthening regional consensus and solidarity. For ASEAN, in particular, these ideational forces are practised in taking initiatives such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level, however, tend to be seen as viable only when global powers and institutions such as US and the UN do not oppose but support or at least recognise such initiatives. Moreover, such diplomatic powers as mediation, arbitration and negotiation are only enabling, providing the regional organisations with the power of initiatives supported by global concerns such as the protection of human rights. In this context, Alagappa (1995:378) notes that soft (diplomatic) powers will rely upon the ‘disposition of non-member states, the dynamics of the larger international system and the competence of member states in harnessing the power of external states in the service of their cause’.
SADC’s efforts, for instance, to bring about peace initiatives in the DRC conflict were largely encouraged by the international community involving the UN Security Council, the United States, and the EU.\textsuperscript{163}

Given the circumstances above, it can be assumed that the lack of power and influence to resolve regional conflicts can limit regional organisations’ ability to terminate regional security problems within their own strength. In this context, Alagappa (1995:370) notes that ‘[t]he strategy of internationalisation becomes relevant when conflict prevention, containment and termination are beyond the capabilities of the regional arrangements or when extra-regional actors become involved’. That is, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level is relatively likely to depend on such external forces as the UN in order to garner the resources necessary for guaranteeing the way of addressing regional conflicts. In this sense, it may be assumed that given that the conditions of contemporary globalisation has exacerbated the difficulties of states seeking to develop unilateral responses to regional security problems (Tan and Boutin, 2001:5), the capacities of states in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, are eroded and reduced.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that ‘what globalisation can bring to bear on the topic of security is an awareness of wide-spread systemic developments without any resulting need to downplay the role of the state, or assume its obsolescence’ (Clark, 1999:125). According to Clark’s view of globalisation, states are not withering away, but rather are changing their functionality over times. I agree with his argument partly in terms of states’ viability in constitutive character. Yet, I do not subscribe to the assertion that nation-states (without being members of regional institutions) continue to be intact. But I argue that instead of states without region, states within regions or regional states as members of the organisation can play an important role not only in transforming the type and nature of security cooperation amongst the member states of ASEAN and SADC respectively, but also redefining the interests and goals of the member states in order to advance regional security in reaction to a changing international environment. Indeed, despite some splits and divisions among the member states in addressing the

\textsuperscript{163} In particular terms of the DRC conflict, the Lusaka peace agreement, signed on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka, sought to find an international solution through the UN engagement by calling for a UN peacekeeping force to be deployed under a Chapter VII mandate as well as UN peace enforcement under a Chapter VIII mandate (see Malan, 2000:79; Chapter 7).
issues such as the South China Sea conflict and the East Timor crisis in ASEAN, and the DRC crisis in SADC, the member states in ASEAN and SADC appeared, over time, to play a leading role in addressing the crises in their own ways (see Chapter 6 and 7).

Although politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level cannot guarantee success without the support of external forces, the underlying force for the member states of regional organisations to spearhead conflict management (i.e., the East Timor crisis for ASEAN and the DRC crisis for SADC) may be found in the regional leaders’ beliefs such as ‘regional security cannot be realised without regional solidarity on regional problems’. As mentioned earlier, that is, the role of member states to form a unity of purpose is critical to help regional organisations to initiate and foster the development of conflict management. Despite the limited power and influence of such regional organisations as ASEAN and SADC in conflict resolution, furthermore, inclusive and/or cooperative schemes such as the ARF and the OPDS(C) would, to some extent, be conducive to defending politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level (see Chapter 6 and 7). Therefore, although security challenges from the extra-regional level are powerful enough to compromise (regional) norms such as sovereignty and non-intervention, in reality, the scope and extent of regional (member) states’ functions and capacity to manage crises originated from the outside, cannot help but to be emphasised.

8.2.4.3 The Regional Level

What has been emphasised in this study is that politico-security regionalism can be seen as an evolving political project at the regional level, which is an open-ended process instead of being fixed and given. This indicates that politico-security regionalism can be made and remade through political interactions amongst regional states. In both Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, for example, current ASEAN and SADC security regionalisms evolved out of the region’s past experiences: for Southeast Asia, SEATO in 1954, ASA in 1961, MAPHILINDO in 1963, ASPAC in 1966, and ASEAN in 1967 (see Chapter 4); for Southern Africa, the FLS in 1974, SADCC in 1980, and SADC in 1992 (see Chapter 5).

The central security concern in this evolutionary or transformative context in both ASEAN and SADC stems from the ‘socio-communicative approach to cooperation’ (Keohane, 1988:379-396; also Onuf, 1989). Unlike power-based approaches to conflict
management, sociological approaches to conflict management provide a useful tool to see how regional institutions may affect and transform state interests and identities which are not a ‘given, but themselves emerge from a process of interaction and socialisation’ (Checkel, 1998:326). The thrust of the argument here, for both ASEAN and SADC, is that the definition and pursuit of national interest are not exogenously given but are embedded in regional norms and values. By providing an environment in which socialisation and learning can occur, regionalism contributes to the internationalisation of ‘new understandings of self and other, of acquiring new role identities, and over the long term makes for a gradual transformation of identity and interest, and of power politics’ (Wendt, 1992:417). In terms of evolving regional security structure, for instance, both ASEAN and SADC attempted not only to form regional identity, but also to increase their own interests through a number of transformations such as the rejection of flexible engagement and the acceptance of an ASEAN troika system for ASEAN, and the insertion of Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact for SADC (see Chapter 6 and 7).

Given that the world is not organised into any single international system or society, but comprised various regional systems, moreover, the effect and role of shared norms, rules and institutions (which are reflecting a dominant regional (politico-security) culture) will strengthen international society (Bull and Watson, 1984:1). This considerable potential of regionalism in a politico-security context, however, has been differently realised in ASEAN and SADC respectively. As indicated earlier, in fact, the scope and style of institutionalisation in the case of multilateralism in the ASEAN region have been different from those of the SADC region in the post-Cold War era. Although both ASEAN and SADCC committed themselves to informal or ad hoc security mechanisms during the Cold War, SADC(C) was, to some extent, successful in achieving regional solidarity and consensus on formalising and integrating their security structures in the post-Cold war era (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, ASEAN has largely continued to maintain an informal security structure within the ASEAN Way context since the establishment of the organisation (see Chapter 6).

As mentioned earlier, in particular, while a multilateral approach among SADC members has largely been placed under the leadership of South Africa as an emerging (middle) power under the support of the West in the post-apartheid period (see Chapter 7), ASEAN rejected Western ideas on the ARF and tried to develop the concept of multilateralism on the basis of a thin institutional structure consisting of its annual
foreign ministers conclave, as well as the Senior Officials Meeting (ARF-SOM) that precedes it by a few months (see Chapter 6). This means that the different character, nature and scope of institutionalisation between ASEAN and SADC can be understood in different regional contexts affected by regional ideas which are constructed by various (socio-political) interactions amongst regional (member) states.

A similar situation prevails with regard to collective self-defence. Although SADC(C) has not established a strong and formal military alliance, the organisation attempted to enhance regional security cooperation/integration among the members through creating the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003 so that it could establish a weak or loose form of military alliance as distinguished from the NATO version (see Chapter 5 and 7). On the other hand, ASEAN has never seriously contemplated adopting such a military pact as a collective defence arrangement, rather the extent and scope of member states’ military cooperation have been limited to a bilateral one because of the flexibility it affords (see Chapter 4 and 6).

Nonetheless, in reality, both ASEAN and SADC are unable to form a formal military alliance like NATO given the lack of military capabilities. Moreover, given that a credible collective security arrangement requires the surrender of state autonomy in a certain area which can be illustrated by a number of experiences at the global level of the UN Security Council, the regional level does not appear to have a strong advantage in this collective security arrangement (Alagappa, 1995:373). Yet, although such regional organisations as ASEAN and SADC will be unable to gather the necessary capabilities and the political consensus for effective collective action in the event of external aggression, both ASEAN and SADC seem to have largely advanced regional security mechanisms through increased cooperation on their own intents and interests.

Given the circumstances above, although external interventions at the global level of the UN in both crises of East Timor for ASEAN and the DRC for SADC were meant to strengthen the *raison d’être* of the ‘intrusive regionalism’ in the post-Cold War era, the sovereignty of member states at the regional level of both ASEAN and SADC was not completely extinguished by external interventions. Rather, state autonomy and influence were, to varying degrees, compromised. In fact, given that each organisation – ASEAN and SADC – chose its own approach to managing conflicts in their respective regions, it can be argued that the sovereignty of member states in the regions is, to paraphrase Wendt (1992:396-421), ‘what member states make of it and how they do it’.
In this sense, thus, it can hardly be assumed that the utility of state-sovereignty at the regional level is dead.

Moreover, although different political logics related to security regionalism have been made by the member states of ASEAN and SADC respectively, both organisations placed emphasis on ‘consensus’ as a means of regional solidarity in particular in terms of decision-making mechanisms. In other words, despite varying degrees, both the ASEAN and SADC states chose their own consensus-based approaches to responding to external as well as internal forces. Preferring the method of diplomatic negotiations to the one of militaristic measures, both ASEAN and SADC stress the importance of observing the principle of pacific settlement of disputes in the region respectively. For example, as ASEAN advanced the norm of non-use of force that helped the member states approach the South China Sea conflict by engaging China at the multilateral negotiations of the ARF (see Chapter 6), SADC also evolved the security mechanism in the DRC conflict from a unilateral (military) intervention toward multilateral (diplomatic) interventions (see Chapter 7). In this sense, it can be assumed that both ASEAN and SADC attempt to form their own regional politico-security logics related to collective identities which are reflected from the consensual ideas of regional leaders.

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, politico-security regionalism at the regional level can be understood in the constitutive and transformative context of regional norms which are often borrowed from global norms. As Katsumata (2003:105) notes, the basis of the ‘ASEAN Way’ is constituted by the norms at the global level, whose elements are stipulated in the United Nations (UN) Charter, such as the principles of territorial integrity, non-intervention and selective interpretation of the non-use of force. SADCC as well, for example, by facilitating the global norm of racial equality which played a crucial role not only in eliminating apartheid ideology in the region, but also in developing regional consensual collective-identity, has contributed to the creation of the current SADC as a sense of regional community (see Chapter 5; also Klotz, 1995). This indicates that the constitutive effect of global norms impacted not only upon the reconstruction of regional norms, but also upon the processes and characters of both ASEAN and SADCC politico-security mechanisms. Therefore, it is argued that an important role of politico-security regionalism can be understood in the reconstruction of global norms in a regional context. Here it is important to note that despite the fact that (ideational and material) structures and agents are mutually constitutive (Checkel, 1998:340-342), the focus needs to be on the (re)construction of ideational structures
such as norms by regional (member) states at the regional level.

8.3 Theoretical Findings

8.3.1 Neo-realism

Neo-realists tend to argue that both logics of common threat perceptions and balance of power are indispensable in not only explaining regionalism, but also guaranteeing regional as well as national security. During the Cold War era, whereas SADCC had the threat perception of South Africa’s destabilisation policy which was relatively common to most of its members (see Chapter 5), ASEAN lacked any specific threat common to all (see Chapter 4). Although SADCC had a common threat perception, in fact, it experienced a deeper and broader instability and insecurity in the region instead of assuring stability and security. As was shown in the Cambodian conflict (1978-1989), on the other hand, the different threat perceptions of ASEAN members were not utilised to cause war, but instead to gradually harmonise the divisiveness through the methods of consultation and consensus as well as the inclusion and exclusion of the principle of regional autonomy.

With regard to the logic of balance of power, neo-realists also tend to believe that it will prevail whenever the system is anarchic and the units want to survive (Powell, 1994:313-344; also Chapter 3). Neo-realists emphasise power, particularly military power that is regarded as a desirable instrument to guarantee the peace and security of a state. Although the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodian territory (1978-1989) threatened to militarise the region, a number of the ASEAN states (particularly Malaysia, Indonesia and some elements in the Philippines and Thailand) were concerned about excluding the military influence of outside powers from Southeast Asia. In fact, ASEAN managed to settle the Cambodian issue through diplomatic efforts based primarily on political consultation and consensus building rather than collective military strategy. For Southern Africa, meanwhile, when the region witnessed increased militarisation within the regional conflictual framework (which evolved particularly out of the rivalry (in 1979-1980) between the FLS and South Africa), it was placed in a zero-sum game, hampering regional stability and security. In both Southeast Asia and Southern Africa during the Cold War, thus, it appears that the mechanism of balance-of-power politics played a role in not only creating negative regionalism, but also endangering regional security instead of guaranteeing it.
Given the assumption above, it is argued that neo-realists are likely to consider the military power of states as being far more important in determining international politics than international cooperation such as ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977). For neo-realists, the meaning of security is generally limited to the traditional military concept with neglecting socio-political and socio-economic aspects equally pertinent to security, such as social cohesion, economic stability and justice (Zacarias, 1999:122). In this context, as Waltz (2000:4) notes, ‘[t]he most important events in international politics are explained by differences in the capabilities of states, not by economic forces operating across states or transcending them’. During the Cold War, nevertheless, neither ASEAN nor SADCC could survive without some different degrees of economic-security strategy: for ASEAN, the homogeneous economic system of capitalism helped the organisation advance the economies of member states through favourable access to an increasingly world free trading system; for SADCC, the heterogeneous economic systems made the organisation to devise an economic development strategy of regional cooperation in order to enhance the economies of member states through a project coordination approach with each member state taking responsibility for a particular sector. Notwithstanding the different approaches and styles of economic cooperation, both ASEAN and SADCC have witnessed that the importance and value of non-traditional security issues such as economic security cannot be neglected in not only guaranteeing but also increasing the conditions of national as well as regional security.

Indeed, although regional economic cooperation, during the Cold War, was largely neglected owing mainly to the general lack of complementarities in production and industrial structure among the member countries, the 1967 ASEAN Bangkok Declaration did not ignore the importance of economic aspects, but rather emphasised economic cooperation to promote regional solidarity as an essential prerequisite for the achievement of cooperation in other areas. In order to obtain national as well as regional stability and security, in addition, the ASEAN states made efforts to achieve steady economic growth for three decades after its inception through a market-focused economic orientation, more specifically, extra-regional trade (Lim, 1995:238-245).

During the Cold War, SADCC adopted the two-pronged strategy of economic-security and ‘politico-military security cooperation’, which largely dominated SADCC regionalism and regional security (see Chapter 5). Although SADCC was politically
motivated by the FLS not only to ward off South Africa’s hegemonic destabilisation but also to attract foreign aid (Ostergaard, 19990:51-79), its member states pursued economic development through the project coordination approach with a view not only to reduce economic dependency on South Africa, but also to generate ‘equitable development’ through regional (economic) cooperation which was identified as part of the major objectives of SADCC (see Southern African Record, 1987:4).

In the early 1990s, while neo-realists foresaw the debacle of the bipolar stability with a decline of U.S. involvement in the ASEAN region, ASEAN members made an effort to renew their interests by pushing for the leading role of multilateral activities in the ARF. Notwithstanding the disappearance or change of ‘balance of power’ in the post-Cold War era, the ASEAN states showed their capability to project their interests in broader spaces. Likewise, SADCC evolved into SADC in 1992 and attempted to establish the SADC Organ (OPDS) in 1996 with a view to advancing regional security in reaction to a changing international milieu and a recognition that many of the problems and threats faced by the region could be addressed through enhanced cooperation. Therefore, contrary to what neo-realists might predict, ASEAN and SADC in the post-Cold War era have increased, not decreased, regional security cooperation.

8.3.2 Neo-liberal institutionalism

Neo-liberal institutionalists put much more emphasis on cooperation and interdependence among states than do neo-realists. Neo-liberal institutionalists argue that the collapse of bipolarity does not necessarily imply a return to an anarchical condition. They believe that states come to appreciate how institutional arrangements can enhance cooperation by overcoming insufficient communication, thus lessening mutual suspicions and helping states attain mutually beneficial rewards that might not be had otherwise. Indeed, contrary to what neo-realists would expect (they tend to believe that multipolarity is inherently more destabilising than hegemony or bipolarity) in the post-Cold War, ASEAN and SADC witness, to some extent, multipolarity contributing to the growing level of activity in regional initiatives within and without the ARF and OPDS respectively.

In this context, neo-liberal institutionalism seems to have relevance for both ASEAN and SADC security logics in explaining the mechanisms of regional security cooperation. ASEAN has been attempting to elevate a cooperative spirit through
improving and expanding inter-state relationship and interdependence in line with setting up declarations and treaties such as the 1971 ZOPFAN Declaration, the 1976 ASEAN Concord, and the 1995 Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty as well as a number of the regular and irregular, official and unofficial contacts. Likewise, since SADC has evolved out of SADCC, it also has attempted to enhance regional security cooperation with establishing the politico-security initiatives, including the 1992 SADC Treaty, the 1996 OPDS, the 2001 OPDSC and the 2003 SADC Mutual Defence Pact.

Neo-liberal institutionalists contend that states are concerned with absolute gains, not relative gains. That is, whereas neo-realists believe that the basic goal of states in cooperative relationships is to prevent others from gaining more, neo-liberal institutionalists want to maximise the total amount of gains for all parties involved (Baldwin, 1993:4-5). Since the establishment of ASEAN and SADC(C), in this perspective, both organisations have been instrumental in encouraging security cooperation instead of discouraging it. For both ASEAN and SADC, therefore, as neo-liberal institutionalists argue, security cooperation is not only possible, but even likely under conditions of anarchy as long as rational actors overcome the problems of imperfect information and poor communication (Müller, 2002:374).

In this context, both ASEAN in the ARF and SADC in OPDS(C) and the Mutual Defence Pact promoted regional confidence and security-building measures (CSBM)s with placing an emphasis on reinforcing transparency and openness in the regions through growing involvement of defence and military officials in the areas of security cooperation and military exchanges. This indicates that ASEAN and SADC want to make contributions to better relations among member countries by providing contacts, meetings and/or forums for communication and by expanding the member states’ interactions. Both ASEAN and SADC have attempted to enhance ‘interdependence’ through not only stabilising different threat perceptions, but also increasing the level of self-restraint, which are conducive to reducing the likelihood of conflict amongst the member states in each of these regions.

As examined in chapter 4, the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 ultimately facilitated regional security cooperation by setting up norms, rules and agreed-upon ways of dealing with conflicts in the region. The emergence of ASEAN in Southeast Asia helped the member states to develop such norms and principles as non-confrontation, and
non-use of force in addressing regional conflicts. In particular, the Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC), which was adopted by the ASEAN member states in 1976, provided for formal conflict management in the region emphasising basic norms and principles such as the peaceful settlement of disputes. Indeed, these norms and principles enshrined in the TAC were utilised by the ASEAN member states to address such regional conflicts as the Cambodian crisis (1978-1989). Likewise, as discussed in chapter 5, the establishment of SADCC in 1980 also helped the member states to promote one of the most significant and shared norms of the OAU leaders, which was to support liberation from racial inequality in Southern Africa. That is, the norm of racial equality underpinning Pan-Africanism played an important role in the operating objectives, values and modus operandi of SADCC.

In the post-Cold War era, as discussed in chapter 6 and 7, although the scope and style of ASEAN institutionalisation have been different from those of SADC, both ASEAN and SADC kept maintaining their focus on such political norms as non-interference, sovereignty and equality in terms of increasing regional security. However, such norms as non-interference do not give themselves authority over states, but rather such norms are merely utilised by states to achieve their interests and purposes. For instance, the acceptance of the ASEAN troika system and the insertion of Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact indicate that political norms are selected, determined, and implemented by the member states to improve the level of security cooperation on their own intent and interest. Thus, although neo-liberal institutionalists assert that the principles and rules of international institutions can alter the extent to which governments expect their present actions to affect the behaviour of others on future issues (Axelrod and Keohane, 1993:94), in reality, the norms, principles and rules are, to a varying degree, embodied and affected by the states involved in those institutions.

Furthermore, as neo-realism assumes that hegemony can provide a better condition for regional stability and security, neo-liberal institutionalism also argues that institutions can facilitate security cooperation by allowing hegemonic leadership to constrain state behaviour through implicit or explicit norms and rules of their own institutions. During the Cold War, Indonesia in ASEAN and Zimbabwe in the FLS as an antecedent of SADCC (which played, to some extent, a leading role in addressing regional security problems in their own regions respectively) were not powerful enough to dominate or control other member states in military and economic terms. Instead, their powers were
largely limited to promote the basis for more effective political security cooperation in an *ad hoc* fashion of decision making and the informal nature of their own organisations.

Although both Vietnam (which was partially seen as a regional power against the ASEAN bloc in Southeast Asia) and South Africa (which was strong enough to dominate other states in military and economic terms in Southern Africa) can be regarded as a regional power respectively, each country existed (then) as an adversary as well as a non-member of its region’s main organisation, i.e. ASEAN and SADCC (see Chapter 4 and 5). Within this period, thus, neither ASEAN nor SADCC allowed a regional power to play a hegemonic leadership role in dealing with regional security problems through dominating or controlling other member states.

In the post-Cold War era, neither ASEAN nor SADC is likely to willingly allocate responsibility for security in the region to any (single) member country because of the highly sensitive, political nature of intra-state and inter-state problems (*cf* Venter, 2000:282). In this period, as ASEAN is devoid of regional (hegemonic) power, South Africa in SADC also intends to be a non-hegemonic partner of the other member states although it has widely been believed that South Africa is encouraged in its position and role as an emerging middle power (Habib and Selinyane, 2004:51-52). Within this context, nonetheless, both ASEAN and SADC have, to some extent, been successful in choosing and developing their own approaches to managing conflicts in the region respectively without allowing any member country to play a hegemonic role in improving and guaranteeing regional security (see Chapter 6 and 7).

Given the circumstances above, thus, neo-liberal institutionalism lacks proper explanation of the security mechanisms in both ASEAN and SADC. Unlike the neo-liberal institutionalists’ propensity to reduce sovereignty for increased cooperation, in fact, the member states of ASEAN and SADC appear not to limit sovereignty, but rather strengthen it. In addition, as mentioned in chapter 3, while neo-liberal institutionalists, who stress material factors, argue that the emergence of cooperation is largely a function of 'measurable linkages’ and ‘utility-maximising transactions’ (Acharya, 1998:200), intersubjective factors, including ideas, norms and beliefs (which are conducive to developing collective interests and identities in the regional group) also play an important role in explaining both ASEAN and SADC security regionalisms. Even though neo-liberal institutionalists argue that the existence of formal institutional
structures or legal modes of cooperation are important conditions for the possibility of multilateralism, in particular, the ASEAN approach to the ARF indicates that multilateralism could involve ‘less formal, less codified habits, practices, ideas, and norms of international society’ (Caporaso, 1993:54).

As ASEAN members have continued to maintain informal and non-legalistic security approaches within the ASEAN Way context, SADC members also appear not to completely orient their organisation towards a legally binding security architecture as was shown in the case of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact. Indeed, as mentioned in chapter 7, although SADC established the Mutual Defence Pact in 2003, the member states did not commit themselves to the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’, as is the case for NATO. In this context, as mentioned earlier, even though neo-liberal institutionalists are concerned about material interests, legalistic regulations and formal rules, both the ASEAN and SADC states are inclined to retain informal and non-legalistic norm-based rules in order to maintain a flexible approach to conflict management in the region on the basis of regional consensus, such that peace and stability in the region cannot be realised without regional solidarity on security problems.

8.3.3 Constructivism

Constructivism, which focuses on the intersubjective nature of a regional group, has been highlighted in previous chapters in order to explain the security discourse in both ASEAN and SADC. Constructivism regards intersubjective knowledge and beliefs to have constitutive effects on social and political reality and its evolution (Adler, 2002:102; also Chapter 3). Constructivism allows us to look beyond the effective role of material factors in determining the character, nature and style of politico-security regionalisms within both ASEAN and SADC(C).

In fact, just as ASEAN leaders have since its establishment been committed to common norms such as non-interference in the affairs of states, SADC(C) leaders also have had a strong sensitivity to loss of sovereignty in terms of the group of newly independent states. The creation and evolution of regional organisations, i.e. ASEAN and SADC(C), seem mainly to have been based on (shared) intersubjective sentiment and trust as common values and the identity formed by the leaders of member countries in ASEAN and SADC(C) respectively.
As seen in chapters 4 and 6, for ASEAN's (collective) identity building, the member states attempted to adopt and utilise such shared, cognitive, and intersubjective understandings of region and regional security as the symbolic mechanisms of the 'ASEAN Way' so as to create and develop a set of norms and principles for intra-regional relations. Given the extent of socio-cultural diversity and political heterogeneity in Southeast Asia, it is obvious why ASEAN's founders over a period of a decade from its inception sought to search for regional (collective) identity built through 'regionalism', i.e. regional (security) cooperation (see Chapter 4). In this context, according to Wendt (1994:384), 'through interactions, [the ASEAN] states might form collective identities and interests'. For the ASEAN member states, the development of a collective identity was considered, from the beginning, as an essential means not only to make and redefine state interests, but also to overcome the different threat perceptions that the member countries had.

Similarly, given the fact that SADCC members were placed in the condition of fragmentation and diversity caused by colonial influence of unequal regional development, it makes sense why the elites of SADCC attempted to orient the organisation towards an informal and decentralised structure through a sectoral responsibility approach, which was ultimately conducive to protecting each country’s national dignity and sovereignty (see Chapter 5). Indeed, the informality and decentralisation of SADCC also contributed to the creation of a Southern African identity through ‘fostering a spirit of ‘we’ among its members, as opposed to excessive centralisation, which would result in SADCC being perceived as ‘they’ by the member states – a factor which weakened regional integration efforts in Africa’ (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:72; also Chapter 5).

Unlike neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, which take identity and interest as a given and fixed phenomenon, constructivism views identity as a constitutive and open-ended process. In this context, in particular, constructivists like Wendt (1992:394) argue for a ‘cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioural one in which they are exogenous’. That is, contrary to the argument that constructivism is unconcerned about changing processes in international politics (Hopf, 1998:180), it pays great attention to change and/or process. Just as ASEAN evolved out of ASA and MAPHILINDO in 1961 and 1963 respectively, SADC also came into being in 1993 through the historical evolvement of structures such as the FLS and SADCC in 1974.
and 1980 respectively. As examined in chapter 4 and 5, the evolutionary processes of regional organisations, i.e. ASEAN and SADC, provide for the primary motives and/or root causes of current politico-security regionalisms, which were intricately embedded in the ideas, beliefs and knowledge of the elites of member states in both ASEAN and SADC.

Constructivists also attempt to illuminate how ideas, norms and identities are affecting the processes and characters of regional security mechanisms. For ASEAN, norms such as consensus (*mufakat*), which were seen as important components to form the idea of the ‘ASEAN Way’, helped the member states to bring forth the sense of ASEAN’s collective identity (see Chapter 4). Similarly, the end of destabilisation which led to the elimination of apartheid in the Southern African region became possible owing mainly to the emergence of and support for the norm of racial equality informed by Pan-Africanism (Klotz, 1995; also Chapter 5). That is, as ASEAN was approaching the regional security problems by consensus, SADCC also attempted to form a consensual collective-identity based primarily on the principle of racial equality. Norms such as *mufakat* in ASEAN and racial equality in SADCC were not only constituted by regional leaders, but also constituting regional collective identities which rest primarily on the core of national and regional interests.

In fact, how processes shape identity, interests, norms, and the fundamental character of relationships are not focal points addressed by neo-realism and/or neo-liberal institutionalism. Rather, for neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists, identity, interests and norms that the member states of regional organisation have are mostly, if not entirely, the outcomes of material and anarchical structure which is fixed in the international hierarchy. As mentioned earlier, while neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists tend to treat the identity and interests of their constituent actors as being exogenous and given, constructivists view identity and interests as being endogenous to interactions and made by the different types of relationships among actors.

In terms of evolving regional security structure, for ASEAN, given the rejection of ‘flexible engagement’ and the acceptance of an ‘ASEAN troika system’, it can be assumed that regional identity and interests are not a given but rather made and remade through political interactions. In fact, because ASEAN leaders considered the proposal of flexible engagement as a challenge to dilute the ‘ASEAN Way’, the leaders
took only a limited step in the form of an ASEAN troika system (see Chapter 6). ASEAN leaders attempted to increase their own interests through preserving the mechanisms of the ASEAN Way as regional identity. This indicates that for ASEAN leaders, because the acceptance of flexible engagement would mean a direct threat to collective regional identity as well as unity, they rejected it and rather accepted the troika system as it must be compatible with the principle enshrined in the 1976 Treaty of Amity of Cooperation (TAC) which adheres strictly to the norms of consensus and non-interference.

On the other hand, SADC has indicated an intention to move rapidly in reforming its regional security structure. By adopting the new Protocol on OPDSC, the new SADC Organ was facilitated to upgrade the degree of formalisation as well as institutionalisation within the SADC structure as a whole\(^\text{164}\). Nevertheless, as Article 8(c) of the Protocol stipulates, decisions of the Ministerial Committee shall be taken by ‘consensus’, with a quorum of two-thirds of member states present. For SADC as well, in this sense, the rule of consensual decision-making leaves room for the organisation to pursue an adherence to the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Given the fact that the rule of decision-making by ‘consensus’ is largely based on the principle of ‘national basic rights and equality’, it can be assumed that both ASEAN and SADC are deeply committed to ‘national sovereignty’ which cannot be compromised not only as a paramount national interest but also as a cornerstone to develop regional identity. As mentioned in chapter 6, in this context, both ASEAN and SADC security structures and systems can be defined as ‘what states make of it and how they do it’ (Wendt, 1992:396-421). For both ASEAN and SADC, that is, regional identity and interests are made and remade by the member states respectively through different types of interactions and relationships among actors.

Compared with neo-liberal institutionalists, constructivists, who also emphasise institution-building which does not necessarily bring about diminishing national sovereignty, have neglected ASEAN’s ineffective responses to the regional crises

\(^{164}\) The SADC Organ was integrated into the SADC structure and report to the SADC Summit, rather than acting as an independent institution in the tradition of the Frontline States (FLS). In this way the SADC member states attempted to consolidate a formal regional security structure within SADC in developing a common approach to the SADC Organ and its area of operation (see 7.4.1).
which demand more urgent, structured and rule-based regulations. In this sense, applying the constructivist perspective to ASEAN security logic helps us to understand the reason why member states prevented ASEAN from implementing swift and timely reactions to the regional crises caused by external forces (the Asian economic crisis), as well as internal crises, such as that of East Timor crisis.

In the context of constructivism, it can be argued that ASEAN, which has been attempting to strengthen the features of the ASEAN Way, seems to be ‘too reliant on the ideational values rather than on material values’, thereby requiring a more balanced blending (Hwang, 2003:23). In exploring the ASEAN security mechanisms, furthermore, like rationalists, constructivists also largely stuck to “respect for sovereignty” by failing not only to go beyond a state-centric approach, but also failing to challenge a number of new security threats, including the competition for scarce natural resources, food shortage, drug trafficking and HIV/AIDS (Narine, 2002).

Likewise, in the SADC region, a broad set of new security threats which has also emerged on the security agenda in the post-apartheid and post-Cold War era, challenges constructivism as well as rationalism. In this period, nevertheless, looking beyond the material forces to focus on the ideational context of regional leaders is also conducive to understanding the character, nature and type of contemporary SADC security regionalism. For instance, after the end of apartheid and the Cold War, although SADC members attempted to establish the SADC Organ (OPDS) as a formal regional security structure, in fact, the Organ was mainly motivated to strengthen and guarantee ‘more flexibility’ (SADC Communique, 1996), which leaves room for SADC to opt for ‘regional security management exceptionalism’. Furthermore, as Article 8(c) of the OPDSC Protocol and Article 6(3) of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact imply, the primary motive of regional attempts to restructure SADC’s security architecture can largely be understood not only within the material factors such as the integration of the SADC Organ into the SADC structure, but also within the intersubjective context of regional leaders who tend to highlight state and regime security.

8.4 Conclusion

To sum up, whereas both neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theories focus on how given and fixed structures affect the instrumental rationality of actors, a constructivist perspective of international relations opens up the possibilities of actors
to consider international structures as historically evolved and thus flexible. That is, while both neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists view institutions, norms and identities as the products of material structure, constructivists consider them as being in eternal development and as socially reconstructed and thus malleable. This means that while rationalist perspectives are largely limited to material structures which are placed in the international hierarchy, a constructivist perspective does not see structures as primarily material; rather, material factors can also become part of genuine structural features if they acquire social and political meaning.

Furthermore, as long as such human relationships as social and political interactions among the member states in ASEAN and SADC respectively last over time, neither structure nor agency is unchangeably fixed, but rather, change can be applied to the security dilemma in terms of regional security cooperation (Wendt, 1987; 1992). In this context, it can be assumed that the underpinning mechanism of politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC is, to paraphrase Wendt (1992), ‘what the member states make of it and how they do it’.