CHAPTER 2  CONCEPTUALISING POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM

2.1  Introduction

The term politico-security regionalism is composed of two different concepts: ‘political security’ and ‘regionalism’. That is, politico-security regionalism is concerned with political security in its regional context. By politico- or political security, on the one hand, is meant the ‘security politics’ of conflict and cooperation as social reality, which is defined and redefined by states as main actors. By regionalism, on the other hand, is meant a bundle of political ideas, norms and interests, which are socially (re)constructed by regional states. In this context, it is important to note that ‘regional states’, which denote the member states of regional grouping, should be distinguished from both global states and nation-states. In terms of the agents of regionalism, in fact, both terms ‘global states’ and ‘nation-states’ are not sufficient to explain the concept of politico-security regionalism.

From a globalist perspective of Wallerstein’s world-system theory, states are normally seen as a substructure of international system to maintain a capitalist world system that contains a core, a periphery, and a semi-periphery (Viotti and Kauppi 1999:341-360). From a neo-realist perspective of Waltz’s structural realism, states (which can be regarded as a major component of anarchical international structure) are powerless to change the structure in which they find themselves (Viotti and Kauppi 1999:66-76). Both perspectives are deterministic in character in which individual policymakers can do little to affect events despite a differing degree. In exploring the concept of politico-security regionalism driven by regional states as main actors in this study, however, the term ‘regional states’ is often used from a perspective of social constructivism so that it can be seen as constitutive elements in which intersubjective factors such as norms, identities and interests are not treated as fixed, but as being flexible, to be made and remade (cf Söderbaum 1998:75-92). Given the aforementioned assumptions, thus, the concept of politico-security regionalism can be understood in the open-ended context of political projects to be constructed by ‘regional states’ in response to external, as well as internal forces.

In fact, both concepts of security and regionalism seem to encompass widely diverging definitions. In terms of security, as Buzan (1991:7) points out in People, States & Fear,
the concept has an ‘essentially contested nature’. A number of scholars contest the definition of the term because at its core, there are moral, ideological, and normative elements that render empirical data irrelevant and prevent reasonable people from agreeing with one another on a fixed definition (Lipschutz, 1995:7). Despite the lack of an agreed definition, Buzan et al. (1998) suggest a typology for analysing security comprised of five major sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. The authors attempted to broaden the definition of security to include freedom from military, political, societal, economic and environmental threats. Yet, given that all security threats are constituted politically (Ayoob, 1995:8-12; Buzan et al., 1998:141-162), it becomes possible to see the concept of security in the political context.

As indicated above, thus, given that ‘all [security] threats … are … defined politically’ (Buzan et al. 1998:141), the influence of the other sectors on matters that affect security must be filtered through the political sector and must be relevant to that sector: namely, when developments in other sectors threaten to have political meanings, contexts and consequences such as threats to state boundaries, political institutions, or governing regimes, these other variables must be taken into account as a part of politico-security calculus (Ayoob, 1995:8). In this sense, it can be argued that the political sector needs to be informed by the other areas of human activities, including military, economic, social and environmental (Buzan 1991:19). However, as Ayoob (1995:8) points out, the politico-security realm should retain its distinctiveness from other realms: that is, phenomena such as economic deprivation and environmental degradation can be viewed as events, occurrences, and variables that may be linked to, but are essentially distinct from, the realm of politico-security as defined for purposes of this study.

In terms of regionalism, as mentioned earlier, the concept is also contested and complex. As Hurrell (1995a:333; 1995b:38) notes, ‘the range of factors that may be implicated in the growth of regionalism is very wide and includes economic, social, political, cultural and historic dimensions’. In addition, Fawcett (1995:10) argues that ‘just as there are no absolute or naturally determined regions, there is no single explanation that encompasses the origins and development of the regional idea’. Nonetheless, given that regionalism becomes a state or political project (Hettne, 1994; Gamble and Payne, 1996; Grugel and Hout, 1999), regionalism can also be studied in the context of political dynamics that are socially constructed through various interactions among states. Thus both terms ‘security’ and ‘regionalism’ can be
understood in the political context of states as main actors. However, the assumptions above need to be argued more fully in this chapter.

Therefore, this chapter will focus on the term ‘security regionalism’ in the political context by illuminating related concepts, including region, regionalism, regionalisation, regional security, and politico-security. In reviewing the literature on these topics, this chapter seeks to address key issues which are at the heart of a debate on politico-security and regionalism: what is meant by these terms? what does link the two different concepts such as ‘politico-security’ and ‘regionalism’? and why is it that the multi-level approach is necessary to utilise these concepts? In exploring these central questions, firstly, the chapter will try to define politico- or political security with exploring the related concepts, including weak states, states-making, sovereignty and the state as the primary referent/agent of politico-security.

Thereafter, it will discuss the characteristics of ‘regionalism’ in particular context of ‘new’ regionalism. In doing so, in this chapter, I suggest the three different levels (including the domestic, regional, extra-regional levels) so as to assist in clarifying the concept of politico-security regionalism. Under the assumption that such regional organisations as ASEAN and SADC(C) are primarily driven by the ‘member’ states respectively, nonetheless, I attempt to stress the regional level through holding the political sector as primary and regional states as the focal point to analyse security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC(C). In conceptualising the term ‘politico-security regionalism’ in this chapter, it is important to note that the concept will be seen as regional (political) projects which can be shaped and reshaped by the regional (member) states.

### 2.2 Defining Security: Politico-Security

As mentioned above, politico- or political security concerns the politics of conflict and cooperation amongst states as main actors. In general, the politics of conflict and cooperation is socially constructed by human agency (Vasquez, 1995:221). According to Buzan et al. (1998:141-162), politico-security is about relationships of political authority, recognition and such a means of managing conflict as compromise and consensus. In this context, that is, Buzan et al. (1998:7-8) argue that politico-security concerns the organisational stability of such social order(s) as states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. In more detail, Buzan
defines politico-security as follows:

Political threats are aimed at the organisational stability of the state. Their purpose may range from pressuring the government on a particular policy, through overthrowing the government, to fomenting secessionism, and disrupting the political fabric of the state so as to weaken it prior to military attack. The idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organising ideology, and the institutions which express it, are the normal target of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones. This is particularly so if the target is a weak state.

Threats to politico-security in developing states come mainly from within their borders. Political systems in many developing states, including the member states of ASEAN and SADC, generate autocratic practices embodied in a minority regime, which manipulates the apparatus of the state in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner that furthers the interests of the minority. As a result, regimes in power face challenges from domestic opposition in the form of strikes, riots, rebellions and even armed resistance. Consequently, such regimes generate oppressive and repressive violence, which endangers the security of excluded populations or those advocating alternative policies (Fall, 1993:76).

South Africa during apartheid provided a good example of an illegitimate regime since the ruling regime was racially exclusive and thus based on minority rule. The regime security was maintained at the expense of the security of the majority of South Africans. However, SADCC as a response to apartheid South Africa appropriated such norms as racial equality which were supported not only by continental forces but also by global forces (see Klotz, 1995; also Chapter 5). Consequently, for SADCC, the security of the region was believed to be achieved by attaining a non-racial political system in South Africa which at the same time represented the insecurity of the Pretoria government and its apartheid regime (Booth and Vale, 1995:307; also Chapter 5).

Meanwhile, for ASEAN, the East Timor crisis (1999-2000) is a case in point in explaining the characters of politico-security in the developing world. The political instability caused by external forces (the Asian economic crisis during 1997-1998) as well as internal forces (growing riots against human rights violations during 1999) in
Indonesia and the impact of the crisis on Indonesia’s neighbours were also a threat to other regimes in the region. In fact, many ASEAN member states were worried that East Timor’s separation would destabilise the whole region by promoting other discontented groups to push for independence: owing to this kind of fear, the ASEAN states attempted initially to stick to the principle of non-interference and objected to intervening in the East Timor crisis (Dupont, 2000:164). Yet, although the ASEAN states were largely reluctant to intervene in the East Timor crisis, later on, they decided to join such external intervention as the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) with a view to enhancing regional solidarity and consensus within ASEAN on how to address regional problems (see Chapter 6).

Politico-security in ASEAN and SADC(C) can therefore be understood in the context of political interactions amongst the member states in relation to internal (domestic) and external (global) forces. Given the assumption that the term political is composed of historicity, change and temporality (Walker, 1995:307-309), the concept of politico-security needs to be seen as an open-ended process in which security (as a socio-political construct) can be constructed and continually reconstructed.

However, traditionally, security was almost unhesitatingly understood to refer to the security of states and military security: in this way, security came to mean national security and was synonymous with defence (Booth, 1994:3). In fact, the traditional concept of security focused on nation-states as both agents and objects of the most important occurrence in international politics. Here, two underlying assumptions are important to note: first, that threats to a state’s security principally arose from outside its borders; and second, that these threats were primarily, if not exclusively, politico-military in nature and usually required military responses if the security of the target state was to be preserved (Ayoob, 1994:225). The political element of warfare as an instrument of state policy has been most famously summarised by Clausewitz ([1832], 1996:317), who argued that: ‘[w]ar is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means’. This Clausewitzian conceptualisation of security is also manifest in the following definition of security by McLean (1996:521): war, which can be defined as ‘[a]rmed conflict between two or more parties, usually fought for political ends’, is considered by neo-realists as ‘a consequence of the anarchic structure of the international system’.
During the Cold War, for structural realists or neo-realists, the idea of the ‘security dilemma’ was prominent. The term security dilemma was first clearly articulated in the 1950s by Herz (1950:157) who argued as follows: ‘a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend … to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening’. In the early 1980s, however, Buzan (1983) introduced the concept of a mature anarchy in terms of moderating the security dilemma. Subsequently, Buzan (1991:177) argued that a mature anarchy would ‘be a highly ordered and stable system in which states would enjoy a great deal of security deriving both from their own inner strength and maturity’. The extreme case of mature anarchy can be regarded as a security community (Deutsch et al., 1957), in which states no longer expect or prepare to use force in their relations with each other. Although a security regime (Jervis, 1982:357-378), in which states still treat each other as potential threats but have made reassurance arrangements to reduce the security dilemma among them, is not categorised into the extreme case of mature anarchy, it can also be considered as being inclined towards mature anarchy.

Yet, during the Cold War, the type of security in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC(C) regions can, to some extent, be better characterised as ‘immature’ anarchy instead of ‘mature’ anarchy. At the immature end of the spectrum lies ‘conflict formation’ coined by Väyrynen (1984:337-359), which was largely considered as the outcome of colonial legacy. In the post-colonial context, Job (1992:11-36) raises the idea of an ‘insecurity dilemma’ confronting developing states. That is, Job (1992:18) explains that the concept of an insecurity dilemma can be seen as the outcome of the competition of the various threats in society being (1) less effective security for all or certain sectors of the population, (2) less effective capacity of state institutions to provide order and services, and (3) increased vulnerability of the state and its people to influence, intervention, and control by outside actors, be they other states, communal groups, or multinational corporations.

Although Job (1992:11-36) argues for the idea of an insecurity dilemma within developing states, it is important to note that he stresses the important differences between developing and developed states rather than just negating the security dilemma itself. That is, Job (1992:11-36) attempted to relate the security dilemma to the domestic (in)security of developing states. Nonetheless, Ayoob (1995) argues that the majority of developing states suffer from a security predicament that is much more
complex and much more driven by domestic factors than the security dilemma that neo-realism posits. As indicated in chapter 1, in fact, such mainstreams of contemporary international relations theory as neo-realism have always been Euro- and Cold-War-centric: that is, contemporary neo-realism starts with the assumption that while all states are basically similar, and that the real problem of international relations is the anarchic structure of international system which might lead to war between the Great Powers, ‘the peripheries are simply unimportant, indeed invisible’ (Holsti, 1998:104).

Therefore, the traditional realist concept of security assumed in contemporary international relations theory focused primarily on being applied to the Western context in which security was externally oriented with neglecting the internal or domestic conditions of developing states. Moreover, in particular, the traditional neo-realist concept of security seeks to explain state behaviour as determined largely by the material structure of the international system. That is, the traditional concept of security focused primarily on such material factors as a logic of anarchy with neglecting the effects and role of such ideational factors as norms, institutions, and identity. Here it is important to note that whereas neo-realism tends to bind up developing states within the structure of the international system which is static, constructivism (which argues ideational factors are as important as material ones in explaining politico-security activities) views the security mechanisms and structures as historically evolved and thus they are dynamic (see Chapter 3).

During the Cold War, furthermore, a state-centric view of security was dominated by military power, which led to the negligence of such non-traditional security issues as societal and environmental security threats. As a result, the end of the Cold War raised growing concerns over a variety of non-military threats to security. As mentioned earlier, according to Buzan (1991:19), the security of human collectivities is affected by threats emanating from five sectors: military, political, economic, social and environmental. These insights have resulted in a revision of traditional definitions of security in the end of the Cold War, which ultimately emphasised the importance and value of non-traditional security issues. Nonetheless, this does not mean that non-traditional security threats did not exist earlier. Rather, they were always present, only they have surfaced with greater attention in the post-Cold War period. Nor does it mean that military threats have completely disappeared. In both regions of Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, in reality, several hidden conflicts and new challenges have emerged: for ASEAN, the

2.2.1 Weak States, States-Making and Politico-Security

Since decolonisation, the newly independent states in the developing world have been labelled as ‘weak states’ by a range of scholars (see Buzan, 1991; Handel, 1990; Migdal, 1988; Thomas, 1987). Although the decolonisation process generated large numbers of new territorial states, ‘for the most part it neither took much account of existing cultural and ethnic boundaries, nor created new nations to fit within them’ (Buzan, 1991:98). Moreover, according to Buzan (1991:99), ‘weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large-scale use of force as a major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation’. This implies that the majority of developing states (which experienced decolonisation after the Second World War) could not create the socio-political unity and cohesion of post-colonial states, but rather they found themselves trapped within European political legacy. In this context of weak states in the developing world, Collins (2000:32) states: ‘[t]he stronger the state the more a regime is able to rule by consent; the weaker it is, the more likely coercion will be required to enforce rules’; that is, ‘... the weaker [the state] ... the less the regime is seen as a provider of security and the more it is seen as the danger’.

Under the circumstances above, regional leaders in both the ASEAN and SADC(C) regions sought to search for internal stability and regime security as newly independent countries engaged in state-making. In terms of state-making, however, unlike European states where ‘state-makers constructed, then imposed, strong national governments before mass politics’, in the developing world, ‘these two processes tend to occur together’ (Tilly, 1975:69). Drawing on the work of Tilly (1975), Ayoob (1991:266) argues that in Western Europe and North America, state-making ‘went through a long period of gestation’ and it is seen as ‘the “finished” product’. But the state-making of the developing world is largely seen to be an on-going process to be made and remade so that the regimes are ‘highly insecure and regard attempts by different groups to maintain their separate identities as a challenge to its authority and legitimacy’ (Collins, 2000:50). Given the circumstances above, therefore, it makes sense why regimes in the developing world, such as the member states in both ASEAN and SADC(C), opted for and prioritised the goal of state-making in territories inherited after decolonisation.
which were an ‘artificial construction that grouped together different ethnic groups’ (Collins, 2000:49).

Given the aforementioned idea of state-making, the nature of national or state security in the developing world can, to some extent, be understood within the different context from the one of the developed world. In general, the concept of national or state security usually means the protection of the core values of the state, especially its political sovereignty and territorial integrity: core values in this sense are the basic attributes and functions of the state, supported by the overwhelming majority of its population, and more importantly expected to survive any change in its regime or government (Acharya, 1992:143). Yet, unlike Western societies, wherein the questions of governance are settled through well-defined constitutional procedures and mediated by stable institutions, the regimes in the developing world tend not to escape challenges to their hold on power because of the lack of indigenous institutions to cope with political reform and liberalisation (Acharya, 1992:144). For states in the developing world, in this way, politico-security in the context of nation-states (which tends to be equated with state and regime security) is likely to be oriented toward preserving the political power of the regime suffering from a low level of legitimacy so that political institutions become weaker and unstable.

2.2.2 Sovereignty and Politico-Security

Given the aforementioned core values of the state in terms of national security, in particular, the concept sovereignty needs to be illuminated more fully now in order to understand the basic function and character of politico-security in both ASEAN and SADC. With regard to (political) security in relation to sovereignty, Buzan et al. (1998:141) assert that the heart of politico-security is composed of ‘threats to state sovereignty’. In this context, Wendt (1992:414-415) also argues that there are at least three ways in which state(s) may transform their approaches to ‘security and power politics’ through the ‘practices of sovereignty’: first, states will define their security in terms of preserving their ‘property rights’ over particular territories; second, states will define their security in terms of receiving a sovereignty norm of mutual recognition; finally, given that the intersubjective understandings embodied in the institution of sovereignty may redefine the meaning of others’ power for the security of the self, states come to rely more on the institutional fabric of international society and less on individual national means – especially military power – to protect their security. The
aforementioned argument of Wendt indicates that sovereignty can be regarded as a complex notion of being composed of both material and ideational factors, including territory, recognition and institutional norms and/or identity of political interactions.

Under the complex notion of sovereignty, Wendt (1992:412) continues to argue as follows: ‘[s]overeignty is an institution, and so it exists only in virtue of certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no sovereignty without an other. These understandings and expectations not only constitute a particular kind of state – the “sovereign” state – but also constitute a particular form of community, since identities are relational’. In fact, within the constructivist perspective of international relations, the term ‘sovereignty’ can be viewed as historically evolved and malleable. In this sense, Biersteker (2002:158) argues that ‘different forms of state have constituted different meanings of sovereignty and been associated with different conceptions of territoriality over time and across place’. That is, as Ashley (1988:227-262) notes, the sovereign state is not a fixed and unchangeable creation of norms that exist apart from practice, but rather an open-ended product to be constructed and reconstructed through various political interactions.

By and large, the concept of sovereignty can also be viewed as a ‘double-sided notion’, in addition to the internal-external dimension of the state (Brown, 2001:127). This distinction can be referred to as that between ‘juridical’ and ‘empirical’ or ‘political’ statehood (Jackson, 1990:197). In terms of international relations, however, the emphasis was usually on the external dimension which can be referred to as the ‘juridical’ sovereignty in its legal-political sense. This juridical sovereignty remains a basic principle of international law today. For Hinsley (1986:26), sovereignty is ‘the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community’ and that ‘no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere’. Indeed, given that nation-states recognise the territorial integrity of others and, in theory at least, refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states, external or juridical sovereignty is an important principle that protects us from the aggression of and intervention by other, more powerful states (Adar, 2002:100). In fact, both ASEAN and SADC(C), which are considered as groups of (fairly) newly independent countries, tend to depend on external or juridical sovereignty by committing themselves to principles of the modern Westphalian state system, including ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of all states’ and ‘non-interference in the affairs of States’. In this context, nonetheless, for the developing world, sovereignty often leaves a room for dictatorial leaders to ‘hide, and continue to oppress and exploit their people, while claiming that no one has the right to interfere in their domestic affairs’ (Adar, 2002:100-101).

The second dimension concerns sovereignty as a ‘political concept’ (Brown, 2001:128) and refers to a state’s capacities and ability to act in certain ways. Juridical sovereignty does not necessarily mean that a state possesses these capacities and abilities. But, as Falk (1999:21) notes, the formulation of a world of equal sovereign states as reflected in the Westphalian vision was never descriptive of political reality: rather, it needs to be interpreted as a world order project (in terms of a world to be created rather than one that exists), and a mystifying ideology that provides a juridical mask for inequality. The question that arises is, of course, whether this internal or political sovereignty bears any relevance to the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions. This question brings one to a further distinction between positive and negative sovereignty raised by Jackson (1990).

In brief, Jackson (1990:29) argues that positive sovereignty ‘presupposes capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters: it is a substantive rather than a formal condition’ and is not a legal but a political attributive distinctive of a ‘developed’ state. Negative sovereignty, on the other hand, is a distinctive feature of developing states. In fact, at the heart of negative sovereignty lies the idea of non-intervention and/or non-interference in the domestic affairs. In this sense, negative sovereignty can be defined as ‘freedom from outside interference’ which is a static, formal-legal condition (Jackson, 1990:27). Hence, negative sovereignty can be understood in the context of juridical, as opposed to political or empirical statehood.

Unlike external or juridical sovereignty, thus, internal or political sovereignty facilitates

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6 The aims and objectives of ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states’ and ‘non-interference’ were firmly enshrined in the Charter of the UN. Article 2(1) of the Charter states: ‘The organisation is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its members’. Non-interference is affirmed in article 2(7) of the Charter. It has also been recalled in resolution 2131(XX) on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty (see Internet: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r/03.htm, Accessed: 13 August 2004).
the normative dimensions of sovereignty in which such moral duties of states as human security and/or well-being of their own people are imposed and practiced. By the end of the twentieth century, particularly following the end of the Cold War, this internal sovereignty not only provided a new vehicle for such external intervention as humanitarian intervention, but also suggested a potentially profound departure from such beliefs as a final and absolute political authority that had prevailed throughout the course of the twentieth century (Biersteker, 2002:163). Within the context of internal or political sovereignty, nonetheless, developing world states, including the ASEAN and SADC states, were recognised as legitimate if they were capable of fulfilling their international commitments and duties (Biersteker, 2002:162-164). That is, political institutions like the nation-state and government can increase the level of sovereignty through gaining their legitimacy by fulfilling the safety, identity, and welfare needs of people. In this sense, by and large, ‘positive sovereignty’ (which is not a static concept, but a dynamic one implying the feasibility for change) can be seen as a building block to ‘(positive) politico-security’ in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions.

2.2.3 The State: Primary Referent/Agent of Politico-Security

Given the circumstance above, politico-security in the context of positive sovereignty in the developing world also needs to be seen as ‘political survival’ which can be defined to include not only international autonomy and territorial integrity but also one or more of the following: national unity, political stability, social harmony, law and order, protection of the existing political system, and survival of the incumbent government (Alagappa, 1998c:625). Today, indeed, most definitions of security are broader and focusing on the security of people as well as state. For instance, as Ullman (1983:133) notes, a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.

Under the growing concerns over non-traditional security issues, international relations scholars such as Buzan (1991) and Booth (1994) raised such questions as ‘What is security, whose security, and security from what threats?’ In respect of the question, Whose security?, Booth (1994:5) asserts that traditional security studies are primarily
oriented toward ‘equating “security” exclusively with state security’: this traditional perspective of realists in international relations is mainly associated with 'old' security thinking with neglecting the imperatives of justice and freedom of people in developing states, including the ASEAN and SADC states. That is, while traditional security had as its prime referent the state (and, in practical terms, this meant the security of a particular regime in many cases), ‘new’ security thinking privileges people with assuming that this is a broadening of referents of security (Van Aardt, 1998:108). In this sense, Van Aardt (1998:108) argues that ‘the state is not excluded, but it is no longer the only … referent of security’. However, given the importance of state-making and nation-building facing most of the countries of the South or the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, the primacy of the state prevails (Du Plessis, 1998:18).

In terms of broadening the security agenda, as mentioned earlier, Buzan (1991:19) suggests that the security of human collectivities is affected by threats emanating from five sectors: military, political, economic, social and environmental. Having accepted the multi-dimensional or holistic definition of security, Buzan in People, States & Fear (1991) attempts to examine security from the perspectives of the individual, the regional and the international system as well as of the state; but he concludes that the analysis of security framework is mainly preoccupied with the security of states because the most important agent of security is likely to remain the sovereign state.

Indeed, because the state has long been the only central agent on the world stage (Walker, 1993:126) and because the meaning of security is deeply linked to the sovereign claims of state (Walker, 1993:139), the understanding of security is likely to continually remain almost entirely preoccupied with the security of states. In this context, Holsti (2004:71-72) argues as follows:

The state is both a foundational institution and exclusive agent of international political relationships. … The state as an agent was never static in terms of practices, norms, and ideas. But … entire international organisations have as their main purpose the protection of states, that is, guaranteeing or protecting their independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. We define “international security” primarily in terms of the security of states rather than the security of other forms of human association and organisation.
Although some globalists such as Ohmae in *The End of the Nation-State* (1995) and Strange in *The Retreat of the State* (1996) argue that sovereignty is ‘eroding’ and the territorial basis of the state as a political community is ‘withering away’, as Clark (2001:645-646) notes, globalisation does not make the state disappear but rather bring forth a transformation in the nature of states themselves. In this context, moreover, having argued that globalisation is associated with a transformation, Ruggie (1993:139-174) points out that the process of ‘unbundling’ territoriality in the era of postmodernity made it possible for the ‘new’ territorial states to form a ‘society’ of states\(^7\) in world politics. But even Ruggie (1993:167) also notes that the state ‘has succeeded in driving out substitutable alternatives more effectively than any other prior form’. Thus, the form and system of states are not fixed to be mutually exclusive, but open-ended to be socially constructed (Biersteker, 2002:161; Ruggie, 1993:152), it seems that for the foreseeable future states will continue to be the major form of political organisation and the primary actor in the domestic and international realms (Alagappa, 1998a:32).

Meanwhile, in answering the question of ‘security from what threats’, Booth (1994:6) argues that ‘the more broadly one conceives security – vertically and horizontally – the fuller will be the threat agenda’. In this context, Ayoob (1995:189) also points out that the security predicament of developing states has ‘domestic, regional, and global dimensions’; nonetheless, he argues that the primary dimension of security in the developing world is the ‘domestic’ one. That is, the security problematic of developing states is much more complex and much more driven by domestic than outside threats (Ayoob, 1998:47). However, it is important to note that the range of issues and dimensions of (in)security in the developing world can be identified and categorised according to their internal, regional and extra-regional nature and scope, as well as to their functional (political, military, social, etc.) nature and scope (Du Plessis, 1998:18). In line with this argument, Du Plessis (1998:19) provides a useful issues – and – dimensions framework of security analysis which can be applied to the politico-security mechanisms of the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions:

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\(^7\) The concept of a ‘society’ of states (or international society), used by Bull (1977), can be understood in a similar line with such a statement as that of Wendt (1992) that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. That is, states are regarded as main actors to provide for their own security in the condition of anarchy (see Bull, 1977; Wendt, 1992).
- at an internal level, to the problems emanating from state-making and nation-building such as legitimacy, capacity to govern, social compacts between different groups in society, democratic necessity, and the problem of political succession;
- at a regional level, to the problems emanating from concurrent state-making and nation-building by contiguous and proximate states, such as overlapping territorial and demographic claims, disjuncture and fundamental contradictions between (competing) state ideologies, the favourable balance of power in the region, the role of pivotal power(s) in the region, security regime-building and scenarios relating to regional restabilisation, break-up or peripheralisation; and
- at an extra-regional level, to the problems generated by the policies of major powers, by the overlap and reciprocal interaction of the different levels, in as much as they constitute a ‘boundary’ problem, by increasing globalisation, by intervention, by marginalisation, and by the impact of continuous parametric change in the international system.

The main point of these issues and dimensions at the three different levels of security analysis is that they emphasise the continued relevance and primacy of the state in international politics and of enduring modalities generally associated with so-called ‘old’ security thinking (Du Plessis, 1998:19). That is, although the state can, to some extent, be seen as an insufficient and problematic agent as well as referent of security in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, it still remains the primary ones of security for central decision makers. As mentioned earlier, both Bull in *The Anarchical Society* (1977) and Wendt in *Anarchy is what states make of it* (1992) stress the importance of states’ role in international politics. That is, whereas Waltz in *Theory of International Politics* (1979) argues that the anarchical nature of international system prevents states from entering into cooperative agreements to end the state of war, both Bull (1977) and Wendt (1992) believe that international anarchy can be (re)defined by states that have the capabilities to deter other states from aggression, and that are able to construct such international institutions as a common set of rules in their relations with one another.

Thus, the concept ‘poliiteo-security’ in both ASEAN and SADC should be understood in the context of political interactions amongst ‘states’ in the region respectively. This indicates that the member states of ASEAN and SADC are considered as primary actors in addressing regional security problems. Yet, frequently the security concerns in
both the internal (domestic) and international arenas are interconnected, and the interface is particularly important for understanding the security practice of certain countries (Alagappa, 1998c:615). Here, it is important to note that given that region lies at the intermediate level to connect the internal and extra-regional level, it can be assumed that the regional arena can play a crucial role in explaining the politico-security mechanisms in the ASEAN and SADC regions.

Nonetheless, in fact, these three different levels will be helpful for this study not only to answer the question of ‘security from what threats’ in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, but also to develop a analytical framework for thinking about politico-security and regionalism. Thus, in elaborating upon the aforementioned issues and dimensions of security analysis at the three different levels involving domestic, regional and extra-regional, the next section will conceptualise the term ‘politico-security regionalism’ with highlighting the definitions of regionalism in its politico-security context. This is to show how the two different concepts such as politico-security and regionalism can not only be linked to each other, but also be applied to this study of regional security mechanisms in both ASEAN and SADC.

2.3 Defining Regionalism: Politico-Security Regionalism

‘Region’, ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalisation’ are imprecise and ambiguous terms. The concepts seem to encompass widely diverging definitions. Hurrell (1995a:333; 1995b:38) states that ‘the terrain is contested and the debate on definitions has produced little consensus; [t]he attempts to define and delineate regions scientifically produced little clear result; [t]he range of factors that may be implicated in the growth of regionalism is very wide and includes economic, social, political, cultural and historic dimensions’. Fawcett (1995:10) also argues that ‘just as there are no absolute or naturally determined regions, there is no single explanation that encompasses the origins and development of the regional idea’.

Despite the above remarks about the various definitions of ‘region’, ‘regionalism’, and ‘regionalisation’, there are widely used understandings of the concepts. There are at least three ways to define ‘regions’. First, regions can be defined by geographical spatial indicators. Delimitation by geography is a long tradition that characterises many or most utilitarian theorists. However, regions are not naturally constituted geographical units although territoriality is a sine qua non of regions. Second, regions can be defined
by social networks or structures of transaction and communication. Deutsch’s classical study of the North Atlantic area is the most popular example of the idea that social networks may constitute a region. Thus, it can be presumed that all regions are socially constructed and politically contested. Finally, regions can be defined by way of cognitive maps and collective identities. In this case a region may exist in the minds of people but is not necessarily an objective, institutionalised community (see Grugel and Hout, 1999:9; Hettne, 1999:10; Hurrell, 1995a:334; 1995b:38-9; Hveem, 2000: 72).

As implied above, the concept region seems to encompass not only widely diverging definitions, but also a range of other definitions in between. That is, as Nye (1968:vi) has pointed out: ‘[r]elevant geographical boundaries vary with different purposes; for example, a relevant region for security may not be one for economic integration’. In fact, the relevant region for various regional security arrangements can differ according to the in-depth and/or degree of cooperation and integration through the different measures of categorising (for security complex, amity/enmity, interdependence of rivalry; for security community, interdependence of shared interests and identity including conflict avoidance and the peaceful resolution of disputes).

In politico-security terms, however, ‘region’ in international relations and also as used in this study implies that ‘a distinct and significant subsystem\(^8\) of security relations exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other’ (Buzan, 1991:188). Although ‘geographical proximity’ and ‘contiguity in themselves’ may not tell one much about the dynamics of a region, indeed, they do help in distinguishing regionalism from other forms of ‘less than global’ organisations (e.g. the Commonwealth) (Hurrell, 1995b:38). That is, this indicates that geographical proximity and contiguity do play a role in a region. As Yong (1969:487-488) notes, ‘… a conception of region that abandons the notion of physical contiguity as a necessary characteristic opens up the possibility that entities related to each other with respect to one or more attribute will meet the requirements for consideration as a region [thus] the term ‘region’ is apt to become so inclusive that it is useless’.

Given the core argument of Anderson (1991) in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on"

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\(^8\) The literature on regional systems, or ‘subsystems’ flowered in the 1960s and then withered in the 1970s. For the major contributions to this literature, see Zartman, 1967:545-564; Cantori and Spiegel, 1969:361-380; 1970; Thompson, 1973:89-117.
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, nevertheless, as with nations, so regions can be seen as imagined communities which are brought into existence by human agency. In similar terms, Neumann (1994:58) also argues that through the political project of region building, spokespersons for the community ‘imagine a certain spatial and chronological identity for a region and disseminate their imagined identity to others’. In this context, I argue that politico-security regionalism in this study can be seen as a political project of region building which is made and remade by regional member states as main actors who attempt to deal with ‘security politics’ surrounding conflict and cooperation.

Within this context, some scholars like Gamble and Payne (1996:250) see regionalism as a set of state projects which can be distinguished from other forms of state projects such as globalism. They explain that state projects generally emerge as the product of negotiation and bargaining among domestic political actors. In this context, Grugel and Hout (1999:10) also define regionalism as ‘a states-led project which has as its aim that of reorganising particular … spaces’. Yet they assert that the occurrence of a state strategy for regionalism does not necessarily mean the policy capacity to implement it. It implies that although state strategies for regionalism attempt to shape or modify the process of globalisation and regionalisation, they may fail to do so (Grugel and Hout, 1999:12). Within this context of regionalism as a states-led project, therefore, politico-security regionalism cannot simply be understood as a distinct alternative to national interest and nationalism, but is often best explained as a tool to supplement, enhance or protect the role of regional states and the power of their government in an interdependent world (cf Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998:9).

Like the concept region encompassing broad definitions, regionalism has also been used as an imprecise label to denote ‘almost anything regional – regionalisation of world politics, regional international relations, interests and policies of regional states, regional conflict and regional cooperation’ (Alagappa, 1995:362). Although the terms of regionalism and regionalisation are sometimes used as synonyms in the literature on these topics, regionalisation can be distinguished from ‘region’ which indicates space and place and from ‘regionalism’ which denotes an idea and a purpose, as being the ‘process that leads to patterns of cooperation, interaction, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographical space’ (Schulz et al., 2001:238).
That is, in contrast to regionalism as the body of aims, goals and projects promoting an identified space as well as the building of an identity that represents one specific region, the widely used sense of regionalisation, thus, can be denoted by the processes of social interaction and by the pursuit of a strategy, aimed at creating a regional system in a specific area, geographically contiguous or not (see Hettné, 1994:7; Hurrell, 1995a:334; Bøås et al., 2001:94). This implies that ‘regionalisation may be caused by regionalism, but not necessarily regionalist project-led: because for those agents who are not directed by regionalism, the boundaries of the ‘region’ are rather pragmatically defined and regional action is temporary’ (Hveem, 2000:72).

Nonetheless, given that regionalisation is an evolving process which represents different levels or stages of regionness making up, as it were, ‘a natural history of regionalisation’, it can be seen as a stepping stone to making and remaking regionalisms, including politico-security regionalism (see Hettné, 1994:11; 2001:88-89; 2003:28-29). In terms of increasing regionness, moreover, regionalisation can be envisioned in the dimension of regional security. In defining regional security, according to Buzan (1991:188-189), the principal elements are the distribution of power and capabilities between the states within a regional subsystem, and the patterns of amity and enmity among states. Given that by definition security complexes are about the relative intensity of interstate security relations that lead to distinctive regional patterns shaped by both the distribution of power and historical relations of amity and enmity (Buzan, 2000:2), both ASEAN and SADC as sub-regional organisations had experienced security complexes during the Cold War (Hwang, 2002; Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Positively viewed in security communities (Deutsch et al., 1957:1-4), states no longer expect, or prepare, to use force in their relations with each other. Here it is argued that both ASEAN and SADC in the post-Cold War era are moving from security complexes toward pluralistic security communities, at least in theory (Hwang, 2002; cf. Acharya, 2001; Ngoma, 2005).

As mentioned earlier, ‘regionalism’ can be distinguished from ‘region’ which denotes space and place and from ‘regionalisation’ which indicates process as being an idea and an aim or objective. In the literature, in fact, the idea of ‘regionalism’ largely viewed

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9 According to Hettné (2003:28-29), for example, there exist five levels of regionness such as a regional space, a regional complex, a regional society, a regional community, and a regional institutionalised polity.
can be understood in both a descriptive and a prescriptive concept (cf Poku, 2001:70-4; Poku and Edge, 2001:8-11). As a descriptive term, regionalism can be understood within the concept of ‘regional integration’ as the outcome of the process or as both the process and the outcome. In Deutsch's *The Analysis of International Integration* (1988), he considers integration as a process and sums up the four strands of goals of integration: first, attaining peace; second, maintaining peace, third, accomplishing some specific tasks; finally, gaining a new image and role identity. For him, the process leads either to an amalgamated or a pluralistic security community relying upon the main goals.

On the other hand, Etzioni sees integration as an outcome and not as a process. He defines integration as a self-sustaining mechanism that helps a community to maintain itself, its existence and its form by its ‘own processes’ without having to depend on external processes of its member units (Etzioni, 1965:4). He argues that there are three factors of integration which are ascribed to a political community: first, it has a capacity of control over the use of the means of violence; second, it has a central right of decision-making that is able to affect the allocation of resources and rewards through the community; finally, it is the dominant type of political identification for a large majority of politically aware citizens (Etzioni, 1965:8). Although the differences of definitions exist according to the concepts of different scholars, regionalism, in a descriptive sense, can be defined as the end result of the process of regional integration, or as both the process and the end result.

Within a prescriptive concept, Evans and Newnham (1990:346) define regionalism as a ‘complex of attitudes, loyalties and ideas which concentrates the minds of people upon what they perceive to be their region’. In this sense, the idea of regionalism can be related to the recent fashionable works of Hettne and his colleagues, referred to as ‘new regionalism’. In exploring the patterns and nature of integrative process for global order and structure, Hettne applies the ideas of Polanyi (1957) to the recent developments in the global political economy. Hettne thinks that there will emerge a political movement to halt, modify or reverse the process of globalisation, in order to protect some degree of territoriality, civic norms, cultural diversity, and human security, principles that we conventionally associate with organised society. He argues that if globalisation can be viewed as a ‘first movement’ in a Second Great Transformation that is characterised by a double-movement, regionalism, of a more or less neomercantilist type, may be said to constitute part of a ‘second movement’ together
with other types of resistance to globalisation (Hettne, 2001:87).

In explaining the ‘new regionalism’ in nature, as implied above, it is necessary to understand the concept ‘globalisation’. In brief, the term ‘globalisation’ in international relations and used in this study refers not only to ‘a process rather than an end state’ (Brown, 1995:55), but also to ‘the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and societies which make up the modern world system’ (McGrew, 1992:23). From a constructivist perspective of international relations, thus, globalisation can be defined as ongoing structural transformations of the global system which is identified with constitutive elements such as norms and institutions.

In order to understand the character and nature of politico-security regionalism in response to globalisation in the post-Cold War era, given the circumstances above, it is also worth explaining how the new regionalism can be distinguished from the old regionalism. In fact, the concept ‘new regionalism’ can be viewed as a ‘second wave’ of regional cooperation and integration that had started already by the mid-1980s but took off only after 1990 when the Cold War came to an end (Asante, 1997:3-8). According to Hettne (1994:1-2), the new regionalism differs from the old regionalism in the following respects: ‘whereas the old regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, the new is taking shape in a more multipolar world order; whereas the old regionalism was created from outside and from above (i.e. by the superpowers), the new is a more spontaneous process from within and ‘from below’ (in the sense that the constituent states themselves are main actors); whereas the old regionalism was specific with regard to objectives, the new is a more comprehensive, multidimensional process’.

Based on these differences between the new and the old regionalism, Hurrell (1995a:332) suggests some other important characteristics of the ‘new regionalism’: first, there is the very wide variation in the level of institutionalisation, with many regional organisations consciously avoiding the institutional and bureaucratic structures of conventional international organisations and of the regionalist model represented by the EU; second, it is ever harder to draw the line between political and economic regionalism as the new regionalism is fed both by the end of the Cold War and the decentralisation or regionalisation of security concerns, and by developments in the global economy; finally, many parts of the world have seen a significant increase in regional awareness or regional consciousness, even if this is not always easily or unproblematically translated into concrete schemes for regional cooperation.
According to Amin (1999:54), the role of new regionalism differs more radically from the open regionalism alternative. He regards the new regionalism as a building block for constructing an entirely different global system and thereby an antagonistic alternative to ongoing globalisation. In Oden’s (1999:156) view of the new regionalism, regional constellations of states could constitute building blocks in the world order, and some of those would not necessarily have to be linked to one of the three dominating trading blocs (EU, Nafta, Asia-Pacific area).

As Mistry (1995:46) notes, moreover, one of the reasons for the emergence of new regionalism is that the current multilateral system is dysfunctional in accommodating the kaleidoscopic political transformations that are occurring in the world. Thus Mistry (1995:47), in comparing Hettne (1994) and Braga (1994), states that it is becoming clear that the non-trade parts of regionalism – which have always been dominated by trade economists who have monopolised study on regional integration since the creation of Vinerian analysis in the early 1950s – may even be more important than the trade related aspects of the process.

Above all, what is important is, as Hettne (2001:84-88) notes, that new regionalism focuses on the multiple responses to globalisation manifest at regional level. As mentioned earlier, drawing on the work of Polanyi (1957), Hettne (2001:84-88) concludes that the new regionalism marks a concerted response against the forces of globalisation in the same way that, in an earlier era, social democratic forces organised at state level in order to reign in the worst aspects of the free market: ‘[t]he struggle against peripheralisation’ he states, ‘is the struggle for increasing regionness’.

Furthermore, what Hettne (1994; 2001; 2003) argues for the new regionalism in security terms, in fact, is based on a security framework of Buzan (1991) and Buzan et al (1998) which represents regional security in the context of globalisation in nature, including political, military, economic, social and environmental aspects. What is important in explaining the new regionalism in security terms, therefore, is that ‘globalisation is seen as the major exogenous challenge, provoking a regionalist response’ (Hettne, 2003:29). In this sense, the term ‘new regionalism’ in its security context can be seen as a ‘regional approach’ to global forces (Hettne, 2003:29). In line with this assumption, I argue that politico-security regionalism can be referred to as a regional states-led project which attempt to shape or modify the forces of globalisation.
Here it is important to note that politico-security regionalism focuses on a regional response to global forces, including internal and external challenges.

In terms of contemporary security regionalism in the post-Cold War era, indeed, regional organisations are increasingly expected to take the ‘region-centric position’ due mainly to the fundamental transformation of the global structures and processes within which regionalist doctrines prevail (Fry, 2000:120). In the post-Cold War international system, in reality, although there has been a growing demand for external engagement and crisis management for humanitarian and other political reasons, neither US nor the UN has shown a willingness to undertake the full responsibility for addressing these regional crises (Väyrynen, 2003:29; also Alagappa, 1995:359). These structural transformations of the global security system in the post-Cold War era were to expect and encourage regional arrangements to manage conflicts in their own regions. In other words, within the context of both the possibilities and limitations of UN action as well as the reluctance of such major powers as US to intervene in regional conflicts, the post-Cold War milieu both dictated and demanded greater regional involvement in the maintenance of peace and security (Fawcett, 2003:16). By implication, thus, this means that contemporary security regionalism can and should be illuminated at the regional level as a focal point to understand and explain the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in the post-Cold War era.

In the post-Cold War era, nevertheless, as Fawcett (2003:16-17) notes, security regionalism can also be studied within the extra-regional level at which regionalisms (such as intrusive regionalism) are viewed as not only driven by external forces based on coercion as well as consent, but also driving the practice of humanitarian intervention, as illustrated in both cases of the UN engagement in the East Timor crisis and the DRC crisis (see Chapter 6 and 7). Yet, as some scholars such as Acharya (1992; 2000; 2001; 2003), Ayoob (1995) and Job (1992;1997) argue, domestic factors in security analysis cannot be omitted so as to understand and explain the mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in the developing world. Given that the security problematic of developing states seems to be much more complex and much more driven by domestic than outside threats (Ayoob, 1998:47), as mentioned earlier, the security problems of developing states need to be examined at the level of ‘domestic’ as well as ‘global dimensions’.

Given that politico-security regionalism in this study is argued to be the political project
of region building which is made and remade by regional (member) states as main actors, nonetheless, regional factors need to be emphasised. Regional factors (which drive politico-security regionalism at least in theory), in fact, are composed of intra-regional needs and interests, such as a desire for greater autonomy among developing countries and a more assertive regional role and effect (Fawcett, 2003:17). In particular, regional factors play an important role in providing the concept politico-security regionalism with ‘a way into a … “globalising” order, a means of interaction, influence, even norm creation and agenda setting’ (Fawcett, 2003:17). As mentioned in chapter 1, that is, the regional level of analysis is a site not only where domestic and extra-regional levels interplay, but also where regional ideas such as institutions, norms and identities will prevail (Pugh, 2003:40). Yet, it is important to note that politico-security regionalism can be better understood in the multidimensional context of domestic, regional, and extra-regional levels even though the regional level should be regarded as a focal point to explain politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC. Based on this perspective, in short, the next will suggest the three different levels not only to clarify the conceptualisation of politico-security regionalism, but also to guide the explanation of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC.

2.3.1 The Domestic Level

As mentioned earlier, in many ways the most serious security problems in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, can be found at the domestic level (Ayoob 1995). It is becoming true that many of these problems in the post-Cold War era result not from the lack of legitimacy between states, but from the still greater lack of legitimacy within them (Hurrell 1995a:354). In fact, domestic conflicts often spill over into neighbouring countries and/or invite external intervention, threatening regional peace and security as well (Alagappa 1995:379-380). Thus, the possibilities of regional cooperation and integration seem to rely on the coherence and viability of states and state structures (Hurrell 1995a:354). By implication, thus, this means that the emergence of regional institutions such as ASEAN and SADC may be viewed as possible contributions of regionalism to security and peace at the domestic level.

Given that institutions can be defined as ‘social practices consisting of easily recognised roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing the relations among the occupants of these roles’ (Young 1989:32), nonetheless, ASEAN and SADC
as regional institutions should be explored in the context of such norms and rules as non-interference and the protection of incumbent regimes promoted by these regional institutions. Despite some failures to prevent conflict at the domestic level, at least in theory, regional norms may ‘discourage secessionist and irredentist movements and prevent violent political change’ (Alagappa 1995:381).

However, in particular, such regional norms as non-interference in domestic affairs were often purchased at the expense of human rights, specifically in the cases of the East Timor crisis (see Chapter 6). That is, rigid adherence to the principle of national sovereignty and non-interference and denial of any further right to self-determination may intensify and prolong conflict, increasing human suffering. Within this context, the sanctity of the principle of non-interference and/or intervention is now under challenge. For the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, therefore, harmonising and implementing such norms as non-interference in domestic affairs seem to be increasingly difficult in the post-Cold World era. That is, the absence of viable states (in terms of both effective state apparatuses and mutually accepted territorial boundaries) renders the construction of politico-security regionalism difficult, if not impossible (Hurrell 1995a:354). As Hurrell (1995a:354) notes, nonetheless, regionalism and state strength do not stand in opposition to each other, but rather even nation-states at the domestic level can be integrated into regional states when states at the domestic level remain the essential building-blocks with which regionalist arrangements are constructed.

2.3.2 The Regional Level

A number of conflicts at the regional level may be addressed by regional (member) states of regional groupings that are searching for regional identity built through ‘politico-security regionalism’. In terms of regional identity, politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC can also be seen as regional ideas which are socially constructed in an evolutionary or transformative context. Unlike power-based approaches to conflict management, sociological approaches to conflict management provide a useful tool to see how regional institutions may affect and transform state interests and identities which are not a ‘given, but themselves emerge from a process of interaction and socialisation’ (Checkel, 1998:326).

By providing an environment in which socialisation and learning can occur, regionalism
contributes to the internationalisation of ‘new understandings of self and other, of acquiring new role identities’, and over the long term makes for a gradual transformation of identity and interest, and of power politics (Wendt 1992:417). Given the circumstances above, politico-security regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC can be understood in the intersubjective context of an evolving regional (political) ideas which are made and remade by regional states at the regional level.

Given that the world was not organised into any single international system or society, but comprised various regional systems, in fact, the effect and role of shared norms, rules and institutions (which are reflecting a dominant regional (politico-security) culture) will strengthen international society (Bull and Watson, 1984:1). This considerable potential of regionalisms in both ASEAN and SADC, however, needs to be examined in their own politico-security context.

Politico-security regionalism at the regional level can also be examined in the context of an evolving regional security structure. Here it is important to note that a regional security structure is not only composed of material, but also ideational factors. For instance, for ASEAN, regional leaders attempted to develop a regional security structure through promoting the mechanisms of the ‘ASEAN Way’ as regional ideas and identity (see Chapter 4 and 6).

Moreover, although extra-regional forces such as the UN in both crises of East Timor for ASEAN and the DRC for SADC were meant to allow a retreat from the non-intervention principle, the sovereignty of member states at the regional level of both ASEAN and SADC was not extinguished by external interventions, but rather was temporarily compromised (see Chapter 6 and 7). As the Cold War came to a close, in fact, even though globalisation can, to some extent, lead to a transition of ‘sovereignty-eroding form of regionalism’ from ‘sovereignty-bound regionalism’ (Acharya, 2002:24), globalisation does not simply make a (regional) state disappear but does transform the extent and scope of states’ functions and capacity within the different or new contexts and ways of doing things (cf Clark, 2001:645-646).

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, politico-security regionalism at the regional level can be understood in the constitutive and transformative context of regional norms which are often borrowed from global norms. As Katsumata (2003:105) notes, in fact, the basis of the ‘ASEAN Way’ is constituted by the norms at the global level, whose
elements are stipulated in the United Nations (UN) Charter, such as the principles of territorial integrity, non-intervention and selective interpretation of the non-use of force. By implication, this indicates that the constitutive effect of global norms impacted not only upon the reconstruction of regional norms, but also upon the processes and characters of both ASEAN and SADC(C) security mechanisms. Therefore, it is argued that an important role of politico-security regionalism can be understood in the reconstruction of global norms in a regional context.

2.3.3 The Extra-Regional Level

The goal of politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level is the protection of the member states from external threats created by other states and organisations outside the regional bodies (Alagappa, 1995:376). At this level, regional bodies such as ASEAN and SADC have to deal with external challenges that may be threatening regional order. In this sense, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level can be viewed as a counter-balancing mechanism to address security problems originated from the outside.

At the extra-regional level, politico-security regionalism may be perceived by hostile countries or groups as being ‘directed against them, provoking counter-groups and exacerbating the security dilemma’ (Alagappa, 1995:376). During the Cold War era, for example, South Africa, regarding SADCC as a major threat to its regime security, sought to destabilise the newly independent SADCC states in the region by supporting rebel groups (e.g. UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique) economically and militarily (see Chapter 5). As a result, despite a SADCC’s major objective of reducing economic dependency on South Africa, South Africa’s economic and military pressures on its neighbours made several SADCC’s states increased, rather decreased, their economic dependence (Lee, 1989:5; see also Chapter 5). In SADC, the civil war in Burundi had spill-over effects for a number of states in the region.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) Burundi, like its neighbour Rwanda, has had a history of conflict revolving around ethnic tensions between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi population. In early 2002, in this context, Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (FDD) and Forces Nationales de Liberation (FN), which demanded power-sharing in the Tutsi-dominated Burundian army, ran joint operations against government forces with pro-Kinshasa Hutu militias. At the same time, the Burundian Army joined Rwanda and its allies in eastern DRC. In addition, senior Congolese and
Although regional (political) schemes can, in theory, be considered as a feasible tool to equip the regional bodies with the collective power to address regional security problems on their own strength, regional organisations in the developing world, including ASEAN and SADC(C), in practice, often compromise such regional objectives, principles and values as regional autonomy and self-reliance. At the extra-regional level, in other words, politico-security regionalism in the developing world tend to seek to enhance ‘flexibility’ in resolving regional security problems.

Politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level, however, tends to be seen as viable only when global powers and institutions such as US and the UN do not oppose but support or at least recognise such regional initiatives (Alagappa, 1995:378). That is, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level is likely to depend on such external forces as the UN in order to garner the resources necessary for guaranteeing the way of addressing regional conflicts. In this sense, it may be argued that given that the conditions of contemporary globalisation has exacerbated the difficulties of states seeking to develop unilateral responses to regional security problems (Tan and Boutin, 2001:5), the capacities of states in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions, are eroded and reduced.

Within the context of ‘globalising’ order in security discourse, nonetheless, such regional groupings as ASEAN and SADC have attempted to increase their institutional capacities and diplomatic leverages in the post-Cold War era (see Chapter 6 and 7). Moreover, through promoting socialisation such as UN engagement, regional groupings may find some advantages in addressing regional security problems, specifically in the cases of the East Timor crisis and the DRC crisis. As mentioned earlier, furthermore, promoting ‘flexibility’ in responding to external forces at the extra-regional level may ‘breed [regional] exceptionalism’ (which implies compromising or deviating regional norms such as the doctrine of non-interference) as a way of addressing regional security problems (Acharya 2002:30). By implication, thus, this means that the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms at the extra-regional level may be seen as an open-ended process to be made and remade through various interactions between

Zimbabwean military officers supplied and trained the FDD; in turn, the Burundian army crossed into eastern DRC to attack FDD bases in south Kivu and Katanga (see Strategic Survey 2002-2003:311-312).
regional states and extra-regional forces.

2.4 Conclusion

The structural transformations of the global security system in the post-Cold War era seem to have made it more difficult for the developing countries’ regional organisations, including ASEAN and SADC, to maintain politico-security regionalisms at the extra-regional level. Rather, the end of the Cold War and a partial US withdrawal from some of these regions have led to an emphasis on regional states-led ‘security regionalism’ in which regional organisations are expected to manage regional conflicts within their own strengths. Given the fact that the desire for regional autonomy is an important feature of several regional organisations in Asia and Africa, however, adopting regional solutions to regional problems is predicated on the fact that regional actors assume they are well suited to mediate in local conflicts, as they understand the dynamics of strife and cultures better than outsiders (Anthony, 2003b:195). That is, like slogans such as ‘Asian solutions to Asian problems’, the words ‘African solutions to African problems’ remain the motto of the West – and also of many Africans (Kent and Malan, 2003:7).

As mentioned earlier, though, politico-security regionalism at the extra-regional level is likely to be seen as viable only when global powers and institutions such as the US and the UN do support or at least recognise regional initiatives such as the ARF for ASEAN and the OPDS(C) for SADC. In other words, the scope and extent of politico-security regionalism’s function at the extra-regional level is relatively limited to the regional states’ capacity of garnering the resources necessary for managing conflict in the region.

Given that norms such as sovereignty and non-interference/intervention have been the preferred strategy of most developing countries’ regional organisations, including ASEAN and SADC, the role of politico-security regionalism would appear to be much more limited at the domestic level compared to the other two levels. Furthermore, such domestic factors as human rights violations (which call ultimately for global forces as intrusive regionalism in the name of humanitarian intervention) tend to put regional organisations on trial, testing the viability of politico-security regionalism at the domestic level.
Given that politico-security regionalism can be defined as the political project of region building which is (re)constructed by regional (member) states as main actors, nonetheless, the regional level of analysis is gaining strength to explain the characters and nature of politico-security regionalism. However, as Väyrynen (2003:44) notes, ‘[w]ith the shrinking of the state, the national level has lost some of its influence, which in turn has fostered new links between the global and regional levels on the one hand and between them and the local level on the other hand’. This means that politico-security regionalism can be better understood in the multidimensional and integrative context of domestic, regional, and extra-regional levels although the regional level should be regarded as a focal point to explain the politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC.

Above all, what is important in this study is that while the regional approaches to security problems in the developing regions such as ASEAN and SADC will be highlighted, at the same time, the internal as well as extra-regional issues and dimensions should be brought together into the analysis of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC. The primary purpose of this chapter has been to clarify the conceptualisation of politico-security regionalism. Given that a theory is ‘an ordered set of ideas, assumptions and concepts which tells us something about the world, ourselves, or an aspect of reality’ (Craig et al., 1994:193), thereafter, what has been conceptualised regarding politico-security regionalism will be conducive to theorising politico-security regionalism which will be discussed in the next chapter.