CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The Cold War has ended, and its demise signals the end of a broad structure defined by the major division of East and West, which has brought with it a ‘new world order’. A multitude of interrelated structural transformations of the global system, often associated with globalisation as its main feature, forced the South or the developing world to react to the global challenges and their own internal needs through regionalism. During the Cold War era, in fact, regionalism was subsumed under the hegemonic logic of bipolarity, which not only impeded a development of regional organisations, but also created the fundamental cleavage of the system (Hettne, 2000b:163). As Buzan (1991:208-209) has pointed out, however, the shift away from bipolarity towards multipolarity contributed to an international system in which regional arrangements can be expected to assume greater significance. In this context, Pugh and Sidhu (2003:6) argue that ‘[r]egionalism as a force for the management of international relations gained a new impetus with the end of bipolarity’.

Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of a number of regional approaches to security problems particularly in the developing world regions, with a better balance between the regions of the world (cf Alagappa, 1993:439-467; Hettne, 2001:1-53; Pugh and Sidhu, 2003:1-7). Since the end of the Cold War, nonetheless, these regional approaches to security problems in the developing world, including the ASEAN and SADC regions appear to go beyond the example of Europe by taking on forms of regionalism which are (radically) different from the integrationist model of the EU. In this context, Held et al. (1999:76) argue as follows:

Indeed, to date the rest of the world has largely rejected the EU model as something to emulate directly. Unlike the Westphalian principle of sovereign statehood, the Brussels principle of ‘pooled sovereignty’ has found little resonance in Kuala Lumpur, Brazilia or Lagos. Instead, beyond Europe, a more open form of regionalism has developed, referred to by the notion of the ‘new regionalism’. This is evident ... explicitly in [both ASEAN and SADC regions].
Within the context of new regionalism in ASEAN and SADC, thus, it can be assumed that both regional organisations are promoting regionalisms which are taking place as different kinds of transformation beyond Europe. Based on this assumption, furthermore, Fry (2000:130) describes ‘regionalism’ as follows:

[R]egionalism has ... been promoted as a way of countering or mediating intervention from what is seen as these hegemonic Western influences. Here [security] regionalism is used to protect local cultural mores. [Security regionalism] is seen as an anti-hegemonic strategy to control great power and particularly American or Western dominance. This is most prominently demonstrated in the promotion of Asian values.

In line with the aforementioned circumstances, the subject matter of this study is a comparative analysis of the reaction of a number of states in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia to regional security challenges. Regionalism, in terms of the reaction, is an attempt to respond to external demands and internal needs in such a manner that it enhances the position of these states in the context of global forces. Indeed, the states of these two regions are attempting to address regional security problems through ‘politico-security regionalisms’ in the form of SADC (Southern African Development Community) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) respectively. In each region, SADC and ASEAN are the primary institutional vehicles for any regional project.

1.2 Research Problem and Aim

The central question addressed by this dissertation is whether and to what extent ASEAN and SADC provide a regional response to security challenges from within and without the region respectively. In the examination of a regional response to security challenges in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, this study investigates each regional organisation’s efforts and methods of how to approach and deal with regional security problems. In examining the processes and patterns of ASEAN and SADC regionalism in terms of the security dimension, I have restricted myself to focusing on political security in its regional context. In doing so, I attempt to explore the mechanisms of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

Moreover, this study aims to compare SADC and ASEAN to find similarities and
differences in terms of the way in which ‘politico-security regionalism’ as a regional project and/or strategy is used to respond to global challenges, as well as to internal needs. Furthermore, this study seeks to explore what can be learnt from the experiences of both ASEAN and SADC with regard to regionalism and regionalisation in response to political security threats. This will, as a result, be conducive to understanding the character, nature and type of contemporary regionalism and regional security in the South, including Southeast Asia and Southern Africa.

All the countries of Southeast Asia, except Thailand, had been colonised by either Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA during the 18th and 19th centuries. According to Than and Singh (2001:178), ‘Southeast Asia has been a magnet to the great powers, attracted by its resources and its strategic location between the Indian and Pacific oceans. It was a region of rivalry among the great powers at various times during the colonial period. The region remained a cockpit of great power rivalry during the Cold War, even though most of the colonial empires had been dismantled in the 1940s and 1950s’. During the ‘first wave’ of regionalism (Asante, 1997:2-3) or ‘old’ regionalism (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998:6), which, so to speak, began in the 1950s and ended by the early 1970s, the formation of ASEAN was necessitated by exogenous and internal factors such as the threat of communism, political instability, socio-cultural disruption, and inter-ethnic conflict (cf Frost, 1990:2-18; Thambipillai, 1994:106-108).

Similarly, Swatuk expounds that the ‘old’ regionalism in Southern Africa could be understood in the context of the climate of the Cold War and apartheid and ‘in terms of a series of oppositional positionings: inside/outside; black/white; us/them; good/evil; etc’ (Swatuk, 1996:3). Today, however, the Cold War, colonialism and/or apartheid (formally) are gone, implying that these two regions are in the process of being transformed from a vulnerable and an unstable situation with conflictual confrontations towards something ‘new’, or at least different (cf Swatuk, 1995:70-85; ÖJendal, 1998:112-129; Söderbaum, 1998:75-94).

According to Hettne (1997:84-85; 2000a:xix-xx), some notable differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalism are that not only economic, but also security imperatives push countries and communities towards cooperation within new types of regional frameworks. Furthermore, the ‘old’ regionalism, which was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, is apt to focus on a power-based or material based structure, whereas the
‘new’ regionalism, which is taking shape in a more multipolar world order, focuses not only on material incentives, but also ideational forces such as norms, institutions and identity (Schulz, Söderbaum and Ojendal, 2001:3-17).

Above all, a defining characteristic is that new regionalism can be better understood in an open-ended or process-oriented context than in a fixed or deterministic one. In the post-Cold War era, thus, what is important is that a constructivist perspective of international relations is useful for explaining the dynamics of ASEAN and SADC regionalism in the new regionalist context. Unlike rationalists such as neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists who view actors’ interests, motives, ideas and identities as being exogenously given, constructivists view them as being subject to change and thus being socially constructed by reflective actors who are capable of adapting to (security) challenges imposed by the actions of others (Bøås and Hveem, 2001:101; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002:37).

Within this context, it can be assumed that since there are no given regions, there are no given regionalist interests either, but the interests and identities are defined and redefined in the process of interaction and intersubjective understanding (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002:36). Given that both terms político-security and regionalism can be seen as constitutive concepts (see Chapter 2), the ASEAN and SADC político-security regionalisms in this study need to be understood in a constructivist perspective of international relations.

In the post Cold War era, furthermore, the comparative analysis of regional groupings like ASEAN and SADC in developing countries is becoming more important in terms of investigating the complex process of interrelated structural change of regions and the various features of the ‘new regionalism’ in order to clarify the most appropriate approach to regionalism and regionalisation in respective region. Although there have been challenging examples of EU (European Union) influence on the theory and practice of regional cooperation in the South, little comparative analyses of regional cooperation among developing countries have been undertaken to date except for only a few cases in the developing world (see e.g. Langhammer and Hienmenz, 1990; Gambari, 1991; Axline, 1994; Van Nieuwerkerk, 2001; Mutschler, 2001). In the meanwhile, since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN and SADC have been striving to find a new role and function in a new world order.
In the post-Cold War world order, ASEAN has intensified its political security cooperation. It extended its functions ¹, enlarged its members ², and kept a championship in Asia’s nascent multilateral security forums – (the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which was established in 1993). The ARF provides the region with an institution for multilateral dialogues on security and for developing confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in the region (Than and Singh, 2001:167-68).

Than and Singh (2001:167-184) argue that ASEAN has experienced both successes and failures throughout the development of the organisation. By some accounts, ASEAN is the world’s second and the developing world’s most successful organisation, praised not only for its longevity but also for the peace and spirit of cooperation it has brought to Southeast Asia (Busse, 1999: 39-40). By other accounts, however, ASEAN cooperation has been slow and fraught with difficulty, and lack of formal institutionalisation (Severino, 1998:3-5). The interesting enigma of ASEAN is not why it has not been more productive, but rather why members keep pursuing ASEAN regionalisation, particularly with regard to security in its political context, considering their diverse interests and conflicts of cooperation.

Likewise, in Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)’s transformation in 1992 into SADC has demonstrated

¹ In 1992, the Singapore Summit brought forth several important changes to ASEAN’s basic framework. For instance, the heads of government now meet every three years, with informal gatherings in the interim. In addition, the secretary-general of the ASEAN Secretariat was renamed the secretary-general of ASEAN and given ministerial (as opposed to the previous ambassadorial) status. The secretary-general's new responsibilities were to initiate, advise, coordinate and implement ASEAN activities. Moreover, ASEAN institutionalised an annual Senior Officials Meeting-Post-Ministerial Conference (SOM-PMC) as part of its effort to increase discussion of regional security initiatives with non-ASEAN governments in the region. Finally, in 1992, an ASEAN Senior Official Meeting that brought together officials from foreign and defence ministries to discuss regional security was also institutionalised (see ASEAN 1992).

² Vietnam became the first of the four mainland Southeast Asian countries to enter ASEAN in July 1995. Two years later, ASEAN admitted Laos and Myanmar as members of the organisation. After the restoration of political stability, Cambodia was admitted to the organisation on 30 April 1999 (see Gates and Than, 2001:1).
challenges as well as opportunities (Gibb, 1998:302-06; Van Aardt, 1997b:145; Alao, 1998:117-27). With the demise of apartheid, the most important security threats based largely on racial conflict have disappeared in Southern Africa. However, there is neither security nor peace in Southern Africa. This is reflected in the tragedies in Angola and the DRC as well as the “new” security threats that have occurred throughout the region during the last decade (Söderbaum, 2001: 108).

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid, the one critical issue SADC needs to address is its capability in its present structure to adapt to changing circumstances and new challenges (Ramsamy, 2001: 36). In fact, as ASEAN attempted to enlarge its members around this period, SADC also took into account the acceptance of new members³. As mentioned above, moreover, ASEAN made efforts to establish the ARF in 1993 in order to enhance regional security by increasing security cooperation with other states in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, SADC attempted to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS)⁴ in 1996 with a view to ‘allowing more flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations’ (SADC Communique, 1996). Given the circumstances above, therefore, it is evident that both ASEAN and SADC as developing countries’ organisations have attempted to increase regional security in reaction to a changing international environment in the post-Cold War era.

The study hypothesis can be stated as follows: first, in constructing the politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC, ‘regional (member) states’ become major actors to shape and modify globalisation and regionalisation; second, particularly in terms of conflict management, the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms are best represented and utilised at the regional level; third, the politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC are constantly evolving and thus flexible in character; fourth, the


⁴ The name of the Organ is seen by some as ‘borrowed’ from the Organisation of African Unity’s (OAU) Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (see Cilliers, 1996:2).
politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC are socially constructed; fifth, each politico-security regionalism in Southeast Asia and Southern Africa is positive to the peace and stability of the region respectively with providing a regional defensive response to global challenges as well as internal problems; finally, ASEAN and SADC can serve as conduits for this realisation.

1.3 Theoretical Orientations

Some scholars have argued that the theories of regional integration that have dominated the analysis of the EC (presently, EU) provide only a partial and incomplete guide to understanding contemporary regionalism, particularly developing world regionalism (see e.g. Jorgensen-Dahl, 1982; Hurrell, 1995a,1995b; Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998; Oden, 1999). Thus, in discussing the question of whether and how ASEAN and SADC attempt to shape and modify or change the process of globalisation and regionalisation in politico-security terms, it is necessary to utilise a multi-dimensionality of contemporary regionalism, so called ‘new regionalism’, which would normally be based on constructivism as ‘one theoretical building block’ (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002:45). By a multi-dimensionality of contemporary regionalism based on constructivism, I mean that social structures such as norms and ideas are just as important as material structures, such as the balance of military power in shaping the patterns of regionalism. In this inclusive and multi-dimensional context of contemporary regionalism, according to Hurrell (1995a:357; 1995b:72), a constructivist perspective of international relations ‘provides a theoretically rich and promising way of conceptualising the interaction between material incentives, inter-subjective structures, and the identity and interests of the actors’.

Given the aforementioned assumptions, thus, there are three reasons for using a multi-dimensional approach of constructivism in this study. The first is that the concepts like ‘regionalisation’ imply the multi-dimensional process of influence or change in particular terms of regional security. The interactions between the trend and the analysis of ‘new regionalism’ in the South do not fit easily into any one particular theory or perspective of international relations (IR). Rather, in order to perform this study, it is necessary to utilise an inclusive and multi-dimensional perspective of constructivism for exploring the various approaches to regional security cooperation in its broader sense.

The second reason for utilising a multi-dimensional perspective of constructivism is that
as Smith (1996:13) argues, ‘theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention’. According to Zalewski (1996:345), to think of theory as critique, means it ‘is assumed to be actively interrelated with the ‘real world’ and, as a tool, is wielded with a different purpose’. This perspective on theory most closely aligns itself with transformative and constitutive approaches to the study of IR. It is an approach that according to the arguments of Linklater, ‘we do not have to accept that the world is inevitably unequal and hierarchical; we can use theory … as a base for changing them’ (Zalewski, 1996:345).

Cox (1995:31) also argues that ‘there is no theory in itself, no theory independent of a concrete historical context’. According to Scholte (1993:141), ‘theories of social change have implications for the process of transformation itself; reality is not separate from theory as positivism asserts, nor is it reducible to theory as subjectivism suggests; instead, theory is a part of reality, and one that interrelates with its other parts as both cause and effect in a unity captured by the term ‘praxis”’. In this light, Cox (1992:133) has affirmed that ‘theory follows reality. It also precedes and shapes reality. That is to say, there is a real historical world in which things happen; and theory is made through reflection upon what has happened’.

A last but important reason for using a constructivist perspective of international relations in this study is that neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism have limited relevance for both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms. Although the two theories not only remain the dominant paradigms in international relations, but also are still influencing world politics, traditional thinking has been criticized in terms of the insufficiency of the applicability to the South in the post-Cold War international system. The change of the bipolar Cold War structure and alliance systems towards a multi-polar (or perhaps tri-polar) structure, with a new international division of power (NIDP), created the new environment and context which have invoked a number of debates for reconsiderations of international relations theories (Smith, 1997:1-32; Sinclair, 1996:3-15).

Hettne (1995:251) asserts that the current trend may be interpreted as a broader change in the social sciences towards creating a more general convergence with a unified social science. In other words, good social science theory is global social theory in today’s world (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002:35-36). Global social theory illustrates the fundamental social value beyond anarchic ‘power’ in international relations’ basic
concept.

Many scholars recognise the multi-dimensionality of contemporary regionalisms and regionalisations. They argue that the transformation processes shaping emerging regions need to be understood in a global, multi-dimensional, historical, and constructivist perspective (Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel, 1999; Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998). Thus, for a better understanding of contemporary regionalisms and regionalisations in the South, it is necessary to open a space for alternative explanatory perspectives and prompt us to move away from a narrowly-defined and Western-centred view of rationalist theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, which are based on rational choice theory (Smith, 1997:23-24; Reus-Smit, 2001:216).

In terms of the insufficiency of neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism in particular, these rationalist theories have not given serious attention to the questions of social or ideational structures, but mainly to the questions of material structures. With regard to shaping the character, type and nature of regionalism in its politico-security context, nevertheless, social structure can play a crucial role in various ways: ‘by constituting identities and interests, by helping actors find common solutions to problems, by defining expectations for behaviour, by constituting threats, and so on’ (Wendt, 1999:24). What is noted, however, is that how ‘process’ shapes ideas, interests, motives, and the fundamental character of relationships are not questions generally addressed by rationalist accounts: yet, according to Wendt (1992:395), ‘structure has no existence or causal power apart from process’.

Moreover, constructivism contrasts with rationalism in terms of the argument of Wendt (1992:394) that ‘cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioural one in which they are exogenous’. For instance, for both neo-realists and neo-institutionalists, identities, interests, and the types of relationships states have are mostly, if not entirely, the products of material structure, that is, one’s position in the international hierarchical order. However, constructivists argue that political communities are not exogenously given but constructed by historically contingent interactions (Ruggie, 1998:35).

Constructivists are, to some extent, closer to neo-institutionalists, and both share an interest in norms, ideas, and institutions. As noted above, however, unlike neo-liberal institutionalists, constructivists argue that social and material structures affect not only
behaviour, but also actors’ identities and interests (Wendt, 1995:71-72). In exploring the processes of SADC and ASEAN politico-security regionalisms beyond the consideration of power and anarchy, it is important to focus on how ideas, norms and institutions can provide intervening variables that influence calculations of interest, as well as how states interpret or react to changes in the world system. According to constructivists, anarchy matters, but by itself, it explains very little. Within this context, hence, it can be assumed that the insufficiency of such rationalist accounts as mentioned above led to ‘the rise of constructivism’ in understanding and explaining how the processes and motives of regional security cooperation impact on forming the type and style of ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms in the post-Cold War era (cf Reus-Smit, 2001:216).

1.4 Demarcation of the Study

This study is demarcated according to conceptual, geographical and temporal criteria. In terms of conceptual criteria, the study is differentiated with reference to two central concepts – politico-security and politico-security regionalism. Politico- or political security concerns the politics of conflict and cooperation amongst states as main actors. According to Vasquez (1995:221), the politics of conflict and cooperation can be considered as (political) ‘reality which is a social construction’. That is, politico-security is about relationships of political authority, recognition and such a means of managing conflict as compromise and consensus (Buzan et al., 1998:141-162). In terms of ASEAN and SADC(C), thus, politico-security can be understood in the context of political interactions amongst the member states in relation to internal (domestic) and external (global) forces.

Within the context of politico-security defined above, regionalism in this study is limited to a set of state projects which can be distinguished from other forms of state projects such as globalism (Gamble and Payne, 1996:250). Given that regionalism is defined as a states-led project which may be too week for the developing states to transform the process of global forces (Grugel and Hout, 1999:12), however, politico-security regionalism in the South cannot simply be understood as a distinct alternative to national interest and nationalism, but is often best explained as a tool to supplement and protect the role of regional (member) states and the power of their governments in an interdependent world (Hettne and Söderbaum, 1998:9).
Considering that states are now becoming spokespersons for the hyperliberal tendency promoted by globalisation, rather than protecting their own populations and their cultures against these forces (Cox, 1996:191-207), that is, regional groups may become actors to shape or modify the forces of globalisation (Hettne, 2000a:1-51; 2001:83-108; 2003:22-41). In this context, politico-security regionalism can be defined as the political project of region building which is made and remade by regional (member) states as main actors, with a view to promote and maintain security within a given region, utilising a particular regional organisation for this purpose.

Geographically the study covers both the Southeast Asian and Southern African regions. Given that the states of these two regions are attempting to address regional security problems through ‘politico-security regionalisms’ in the form of SADC (Southern African Development Community) and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) respectively, as mentioned earlier, the focus of this study is on each primary institutional vehicle – ASEAN and SADC – as regional security projects.

ASEAN is now made up of ten members. It was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original member countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined on January 1984, Vietnam on July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on July 1997, and Cambodia on April 1999. The ASEAN region has a population of about 500 million and a total area of 4.5 million square kilometres (see Chapter 4).

Currently SADC consists of fourteen members. SADC came into existence in August 1992 with ten founding members which are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa (1994), Mauritius (1995), the DRC and Seychelles (1997) have since joined them. But the Seychelles departed from SADC in July 2004 and Madagascar became a new member of SADC in August 2005 following the country’s application for membership at the 2004 Summit in Mauritius. SADC has a population of about 190 million people and a total area of 9.3 million square kilometres (see Profile: SADC, 2005; also African Development Report, 2000).

The study covers the period from the end of the Cold War to 2004 with emphasis on

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5 SADC grew out of a former Southern African regional organisation, SADCC (see Chapter 5).
SADC and ASEAN politico-security regionalisms in the context of the new regionalism in the South in response to regional security challenges. In examining the processes and patterns of ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms, however, the study focuses on the most important changes in this period. In this period, in particular, ASEAN developed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in order to advance its role and position in international politics. While in the 1970s and 1980s the increasing economic strength of ASEAN members highlighted the distinctive character of Southeast Asian regionalism, yet, the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and the resulting crisis of East Timor (1999-2000) challenged the ASEAN style of (security) regionalism (Palmujoki, 2001:1).

In this period SADC emerged out of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was formed in 1980 as part of the strategy of the Frontline States (FLS) to counter apartheid destabilisation and promote decolonisation in the Southern African region. SADCC attempted to reduce its members’ economic and transportation dependence on South Africa and to coordinate foreign aid and investment in the region (McGowan, 1999:230-258). SADCC finally evolved into SADC in 1992. SADC was created as a socio-economic and development organisation, but for the successful accomplishment of development and socio-economic prosperity we cannot estimate the value of peace and security in the region to excess. In this period, in particular, SADC attempted to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security (OPDS) in 1996 in order to advance regional security in reaction to changing international milieu and a recognition that many of the problems and threats faced by the region which ‘can only be addressed through increased cooperation’ (Van Aardt, 1997:23)

Because both concepts ‘politico-security’ and ‘politico-security regionalism’ in this study are meant to be historically evolving, the development of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms in the post-Cold War period cannot be grasped without understanding and explaining the historical development of both regional groups. Thus, this study provides a historical background to each of these two regional organisations which originated during the Cold War.

1.5 Research Methods

In searching for useful answers to the central question addressed in this study, the
research approach entails a comparative and theoretical analysis of ASEAN and SADC within a qualitative paradigm. In terms of a qualitative paradigm, this study seeks to show differences and similarities of politico-security regionalisms between ASEAN and SADC in type, style, character and nature. In this study, in theory, the comparative method is inductive due to the empirical observation of social reality. In fact, induction is conducive to understanding and explaining the social construction of knowledge through which social reality is constructed and reconstructed by social interactions amongst various actors. Yet, because it is necessary to reflect the three contending theories of international relations such as neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism, this study permits a deductive approach to core theoretical assumptions which will be given in chapter 3. Therefore, in practice, the comparative method in this study will synthesise both inductive and deductive approaches in order not only to project ‘general trends, propositions, and findings’ out of inductive methods, but also to strengthen my own argument to confirm and disconfirm through the theories mentioned above.

Given that a comparative method is the means by which a theory is derived and tested, including the collection of evidence and the arrival at substantive conclusions (Landman, 2003:15-16), it can be assumed that the comparative problem is closely related to the focus of the theoretical problem. In light of this fact, one can raise the following question: what are the advantages of the comparative method in understanding and explaining the mechanisms of politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC? Related to a theoretical framework, in fact, the comparative method improves the scholars’ ability to understand, describe, and explain trends – in some cases, even predict the complexity of human experience (Green and Luehrmann, 2003:4). That is, the comparative method is useful for identifying relationships and patterns of human behaviour and interactions between individuals and groups (Green and Luehrmann, 2003:4). Importantly, as Peters (1998:1) notes, ‘[c]omparative politics is central to the development of political theory. For most sciences, experimentation is the way to test theory, but for political science, comparison is the principal method’. More importantly, the study of comparative politics is useful because it provides us a broader perspective of political trends and political behaviour (Mahler, 1992:4). In this context, Mahler (1992:4) argues as follows:

[T]his broader perspective can contribute a great deal both to our understanding and our appreciation of the phenomena we are studying.
We compare to escape from our ethnocentrism, our assumptions that everyone behaves the same way we do, to broaden our field of perspective. We compare to discover broader rules of behaviour than we might find in more narrow studies.

Within an integrative approach to both comparative and theoretical perspectives, thus, this study will begin by conceptualising politico-security regionalism not only with defining security and regionalism respectively, but also with linking security with regionalism in its political context. Secondly, it will theorise politico-security regionalism within a constructivist perspective of international relations with asserting that such rationalist perspectives as neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are short of explaining politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC. Thirdly, it will explore the similarities and differences between these two groups (ASEAN and SADC(C)) in terms of the character, type and nature of politico-security regionalism. Thereafter, the prospect and potential, as well as limitations for politico-security regionalisms in SADC and ASEAN, will be analysed and evaluated.

This thesis is based on a range of source material:

- Theoretical sources dealing with political security, regionalism, new regionalism, and regionalisation.

- Primary documents, such as international treaties and agreements between and amongst states in the Southeast Asian region and the Southern African region.

- Sources dealing with Southeast Asia and Southern Africa, their history and with ASEAN and SADC.

1.6 Limitations

Being a comparative and multi-dimensional study, the inevitable consequence is to paint with very broad brushstrokes. As such the emphasis is on broader trends, similarities and differences, rather than a detailed analysis of any one particular case. Although I allude somewhat to the impact of global forces as well as internal problems upon regional groups, further research is required to examine whether and how ‘new’ regionalisms in developing countries exhibit the feasibilities and prospects of regional
(security) community building compared. Moreover, one of the limitations of the study is that the comparative analysis of the ASEAN and SADC(C) politico-security regionalisms is not primarily designed around the empirical perspectives of international relations (IR), but the theoretical ones of IR.

This thesis does not provide an in-depth study of every aspect of ASEAN and SADC covered. The constraints of time and length to some extent determine the content and comprehensiveness of a thesis.

The dynamic condition of Southeast Asia and Southern Africa is another constraint of the study. This study deals with contemporary efforts and processes of the regional groups to respond to global force and internal needs. Therefore, the situation and context that shape the theme of this study continuously change, and the ongoing process of change in these regions will influence the recommendations and conclusions of this study.

1.7 Levels of Analysis

A number of scholars argue that regionalism seems to require a multi-level form of analysis (Alagappa, 1995:359-387; 1998:615-624; Ayoob, 1995:189-196; Hurrell, 1995a:331-358; Nagle, 1998:7; Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal, 2001). Thus, it is assumed that politico-security regionalism can be better understood at the multi-level context of domestic, regional, and extra-regional levels. In this study the three different levels are utilised to clarify the concept, function, and capacity of politico-security regionalism in both ASEAN and SADC. Nonetheless, as Lake and Morgan (1997:6) note, ‘the regional level stands more clearly on its own as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs’. Moreover, Pugh (2003:40) argues that the regional level of analysis is a site not only where domestic and extra-regional levels interplay, but also where regional ideas such as institutions, norms and identities will prevail. In this context, thus, this study regards the regional level as a focal point to explain politico-security regionalisms of ASEAN and SADC.

1.8 Structure of the Study and Outline

Chapter 1: Introduction
In the first chapter the main problem to be examined in this thesis is introduced, explained and motivated.

Chapter 2: Conceptualising Politico-Security Regionalism

This chapter will examine the term ‘security regionalism’ in the political context by illuminating the related concepts, including region, regionalism, regionalisation, regional security, and politico-security. In reviewing the literature on these topics, this chapter seeks to address central questions which are at the heart of a debate on politico-security and regionalism: what is meant by these terms? What links the two concepts ‘político-security’ and ‘regionalism’? Why is it that the multi-level approach is necessary to utilise these concepts?

Chapter 3: Theorising Politico-Security Regionalism

This chapter seeks to explore theoretical approaches to regionalism in its political context (which will be based on earlier chapter’s conceptualisation of politico-security regionalism) with providing the three contending theories of international relations, including neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism, and constructivism. In doing so, it will illuminate the significance and applicability of the social constructivist approach, at the same time emphasising the insufficiency of both neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches for the ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalisms.

Chapter 4: Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia: The emergence of the ‘ASEAN Way’ in the Cold War era

The historical backdrop, and the functions, activities, and the changing patterns of security in the ASEAN region will be analysed. The chapter will deal with the creation, evolution and process of ASEAN politico-security regionalism up to the end of the Cold War. In particular, it will highlight the idea and method of the ‘ASEAN Way’ which has been considered as the core mechanism to drive the organisation since its inception.

Chapter 5: Politico-Security Regionalism in Southern Africa: SADCC as a response to apartheid South Africa in the Cold War era
The history, activities and mechanisms of politico-security regionalism in the SADCC region will be examined. In doing so, it will analyse the creation, evolution and process of SADCC politico-security regionalism in Southern Africa up to the end of the Cold War and apartheid. In particular, this chapter will utilise the previous chapter to reflect on the differences and similarities of the nature, character, and focus of both ASEAN and SADC politico-security regionalism.

Chapter 6: Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Continuity and challenge to the ‘ASEAN Way’ in the post-Cold War era

This chapter examines the processes and patterns of ASEAN security cooperation in the context of politico-security regionalism in the post-Cold War era. In this period, the consequence of the changed pattern of regional alignments and the emergence of new security threats in the ASEAN region evoked the need to re-evaluate ASEAN’s role, which was even more acutely than in times past. Hence, the question of how the response of ASEAN to the impact of both external and internal forces upon regional security in the context of the transfigured environment of the post-Cold War will be highlighted.

Chapter 7: The Remaking of SADC Politico-Security Regionalism in the post-Cold War era

This chapter will analyse the politico-security mechanisms of SADC with a special focus on the SADC Organ, conflict management in the DRC (1998-2004), and the emergence of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact in 2003. In this chapter, SADC politico-security regionalism which is made and remade by regional member states in the post-Cold War era will be highlighted. In doing so, the case of ASEAN which will be studied in chapters 4 and 6, will be instrumental in reflecting the differences and similarities of the nature, character and type of regional security cooperation in ASEAN and SADC. This will, as a result, be conducive to understanding the mechanisms of contemporary politico-security regionalisms in ASEAN and SADC.

Chapter 8: A Comparison of the Two Case Studies

Based on the earlier comprehensive analysis of ASEAN and SADC, this chapter will provide the core findings of this study.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

This final chapter will provide some suggestions for further research on the broad topic explored in this thesis.