Die doel van dié studie is om die militêre betrokkenheid van die VSA by veiligheid in sub-Sahara Afrika (SSA) tydens die Clinton-era (1993-2001) te ondersoek en te ontleed. Dit is gegrond op die aannames dat die VSA tydens die Clinton-era nie veel belang by veiligheid in SSA gehad het nie en daarom veral nie op militêre gebied in SSA betrokke wou raak nie. Uit die aard van die VSA se posisie as die enigste oorblywende supermoondheid in die post-Koue Oorlog-era, het daar egter 'n verantwoordelikheid op die VSA gerus om militêr betrokke te wees by die daarstelling van veiligheid in SSA. Die studie steun op twee teoretiese vertrekpunte. Aan die een kant word die veranderende aard van veiligheid wêreldwyd, in die besonder ook in SSA, tydens die post-Koue Oorlog as teoretiese vertrekpunt benut. Aan die ander kant word dit ondersteun deur 'n teoretiese fokus op die aard van militêre betrokkenheid op globale vlak met spesifieke verwysing na SSA in die era na die Koue Oorlog. Laasgenoemde staan in noue verband met die veranderende aard van militêre mag, sowel as die aanwending daarvan, in die post-Koue Oorlog-era.

Die militêre betrokkenheid van die VSA in die hantering van SSA se veiligheidsprobleme tydens die Clinton-era word ondersoek teen die agtergrond van die VSA se belange, beleid, en strategie – spesifiek die veiligheidstrategie. Daar word gewys op die realiteit dat die VSA geen konkrete belange in SSA gehad het nie. Gevolglik is SSA nie as 'n prioriteitsgebied in die VSA se buitelandse beleid beskou nie. Die VSA se beleidsdoelwitte in SSA was daarom gerig op die bevordering van demokrasie, die verbetering van die veiligheidsituasie en die ondersteuning van ekonomiese vooruitgang. Die VSA se onwilligheid om militêre magte in SSA te ontploo, het gevolglik sy veiligheidstrategie en militêre betrokkenheid in SSA onderlê. Genoemde veiligheidstrategie was in wese voorkomend van aard in dié sin dat dit stabiliteit in die streek moes bevorder ten einde te voorkom dat bedreigings teen die VSA manifesteer.

Die VSA was egter op 'n verskeidenheid wyse militêr in SSA betrokke, waaronder die verskaffing van opleiding, militêre oefeninge en operasies. Dit was egter hoofsaaklik gerig op die bemagtiging van weermagte in SSA. Die argument was dat weermagte in SSA die kapasiteit moes ontwikkel
om demokratiese owerheidsvorms en ekonomiese vooruitgang in SSA te ondersteun. Die VSA-weermag se kapasiteitsbouprogramme in SSA was toegespits op verdedigingshervorming, militêre professionalisering, konflikoplossings en vredesmagvermoëns, die voorsiening van uitrusting en die verbetering van gesondheids- en omgewingstoestande.

ABSTRACT

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The aim of this study is to investigate and analyse the military involvement of the USA in the security of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the era of the Clinton administration (1993-2001). The study is based on the assumption that the US did not have that much interest in the security of SSA during the Clinton era and that it did not want to become militarily involved in SSA. Its position as the only remaining superpower in the post-Cold War era, however placed a responsibility on the US to be militarily involved in the creation of a more secure SSA. The study relies on two theoretical constructs. On the one hand the changing nature of security in the post-Cold War world in general, but specifically in SSA, serves as a theoretical starting point. This is, on the other hand, supported by a theoretical focus on the nature of military involvement globally, but also specifically in SSA in the era after the Cold War. The latter is to a large extent related to the changing nature of military force and the use thereof in the post-Cold War era.

The military involvement of the US in the management of the security of SSA during the Clinton era is analysed against the background of the US interests, policy, and strategy – specifically its security strategy – in SSA. The reality of the absence of concrete US interests in SSA is highlighted. This lack of interest led to a situation whereby SSA could not be a priority in US foreign policy. The US policy objectives in SSA were nevertheless aimed at the promotion of democracy, the improvement of the security situation and the support of economic progress. The reluctance of the US to deploy military forces in SSA underpins its security strategy and military involvement in SSA. The security strategy of the US was in essence preventive in nature since it aimed at preventing the manifestation of threats from SSA against the US by promoting the stability of SSA.
However, the US was still militarily involved in SSA in a variety of ways, from the provision of military training and the conduct of military exercises to military operations. Military involvement centred around the empowerment of armed forces in SSA. It was argued that the capacity of the armed forces of SSA should be developed to support democratic governance and economic progress. The capacity building programmes of the US armed forces in SSA concentrated on defence reform, military professionalism, the creation of indigenous conflict resolution and peace support capabilities, the provision of equipment, and the improvement of health and environmental conditions.

**SLEUTELTERME / KEY TERMS**

Afrika veiligheid / African security
Clinton-administrasie / Clinton administration
Gewapende konflik / Armed Conflict
Militêre betrokkenheid / Military involvement
Militêre mag / Military force
Post-Koue Oorlog-veiligheid / Post-Cold War security
Sub-Sahara Afrika / Sub-Saharan Africa
VSA-veiligheidsbeleid / US security policy
VSA-veiligheidstrategie / US security strategy
VSA-weermag / US armed forces
1. Primère Bronne

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