A comparative study of the construction of memory and identity in the curriculum in societies emerging from conflict: Rwanda and South Africa

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the PhD (Education)

University of Pretoria

2009

The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation (NRF) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily to be attributed to the NRF.
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Bibliography
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank:

- my two supervisors, Prof. Jonathan Jansen and Dr Jon Nichol, who with their very different perspectives, challenged and stretched my thinking and provided invaluable advice and guidance.

- Karen Murphy and Marc Skvirsky of *Facing History and Ourselves* in Boston. It was through Marc that my first contact was made with FHAO, initiating a series of interactions from which the central focus of my thesis emerged. Karen’s work in Rwanda opened the way for a comparative study. But more than that, her friendship, support and critical engagement with the draft thesis have been greatly appreciated.

- Gill Cowan, who was in from the beginning and became an invaluable critical friend. Her constant encouragement and stimulating discussions kept me going over the four years and enriched my thinking. Thanks are also due to her for the meticulous proof reading of the draft manuscript.

- Sue who generously gave me use of her house in Espedaillac, France where I wrote a major part of this thesis while observing village life as it passed my window.

- Sarah and Fiona who provided friendship and great walks in the countryside around Espedaillac.
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Assessment Standard</td>
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<td>CNE</td>
<td>Christian National Education</td>
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<td>COSATU</td>
<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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ABSTRACT

One of the most common struggles of societies emerging from violent conflict is the struggle to re-invent or re-imagine the ‘nation’. In the process, the critical question becomes: what to do with the traumatic knowledge of the past? Education policy becomes a crucial arena for asserting political visions for a new society and for signalling a clear break with the past - the history curriculum the means through which new collective memories and identities are both reflected and asserted.

The purpose of this study is to understand how two African societies, Rwanda and South Africa, in transition from a traumatic past, re-invent or re-imagine themselves as they emerge from conflict. The particular focus is the intersection between the politics of memory and identity and education policy in the form of the history curriculum.

The construction of curricula in post-conflict societies is an under researched facet in the field of curriculum development and education policy. While there are studies on the curriculum of transition from socialist to post-socialist states or colonial to post-colonial regimes or routine changes of government in capitalist democracies there are very few studies which examine societies that have experienced the transitional trauma arising from internecine racial conflict that was culturally embedded at all levels as the focus of curriculum analysis – and how in such societies issues of memory and identity are both reflected and contested through what is taught.

The main research question for this study focuses on how post-conflict societies re-conceptualise/re-imagine themselves through the medium of the schools’ curriculum. Ancillary questions include the ways in which memory and identity are constructed and to what purpose; how societies emerging from conflict deal with the traumatic knowledge of the past; and how curriculum reflects and asserts the new identities.

The research methodology included historical research; the analysis of key education policy documents; workshop observation and the analysis of evaluations and focussed responses; and group interviews. Being intimately involved in South African curriculum change, the theory of situated learning provided a valuable context for the analysis of the South African data.
The study breaks new ground in that it is the first comparative African case study research on how societies emerging from violent conflict engage with a traumatic past. Secondly, it is the first study to take the legacy of trauma after identity-based conflict into account. What have been underlined by this study are the complexities of educational change and the fragility of post-conflict societies. The deep inequalities which remain after the conflict has been settled need to be taken into account, but seldom are, in the construction of post-conflict education policy and in teacher development. Importantly, the study also raised questions about the extent to which identities formed within a conflict society, filter curriculum knowledge in post-conflict classrooms.

The main findings to emerge from the research are firstly, that the depth, direction and pace of curriculum change in post-conflict societies is conditioned by the terms that settled the conflict; secondly the nature of the emergent state and the character of regional or provincial politics sets limits as well as possibilities for curriculum change and implementation; and that in a post-conflict society, theories of change need to move beyond the formal curriculum to take into account the historical meanings of identity within the national context.

Key words:

Memory, identity, history education, curriculum change, education policy, post-conflict societies, transition societies, trauma, South Africa, Rwanda
The purpose of this study is to understand how societies (Rwanda and South Africa) with a past of internecine (ethnic) conflict resulting in gross human rights abuses, re-invent or re-imagine themselves as they emerge from conflict; and the ways in which the curricula, in particular history, both reflect and assert such struggles for reinvention. In examining the national processes that contributed to curriculum renewal in the two countries, I draw on my personal experience as a participant researcher of curriculum development within South Africa, not only for an analysis of change within this country, but to inform the analysis of curriculum development within Rwanda.

Rationale
During a seminar at Facing History and Ourselves organisation in Boston, USA in 2003, questions were raised in a session by an academic, Henry Theriault, working in the area of genocide denial, that set me thinking deeply about societies in transition and the history curriculum after conflict. He asked what happens to a society that commits genocide and/or gross human rights violations. He wondered how such societies transformed and how they could prevent a repeat of the cycle of genocide or gross human rights abuses. Theriault did not provide answers, but pointed to research being done by psychologists on trauma resulting from genocide and the trans-generational transmission of trauma, that was opening up productive research focusing on the psychological legacy of mass violations of human rights. At the time, I was a member of one of the working groups involved in the revision of the South African curriculum. We were operating within a top-down, politically motivated and driven, human rights framework that had not been discussed or debated at the levels of curriculum construction or implementation. Every member of the working group came with an inherited set of attitudes and values that had been shaped by the apartheid experience. These were not explicitly addressed but were implicit in the
contestations that occurred during the curriculum writing processes. Theriault’s questions had a deep impact on my thoughts about conflict and transitional societies, sparking the initial interest for this research in South Africa. I could not find the answers I sought in the preliminary reading of the academic research literature.

The preliminary research for this study was comparative within the wider context of genocide in Europe in the Nazi era and in the Balkans in the 1990s. A comparative African dimension emerged after participation in a Rwandan-South African dialogue in 1998, organised jointly by the Cape Town Holocaust Centre and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. A number of speakers from Rwanda claimed that the colonial past had a key role in the making of genocide. In particular they highlighted the construction of the ethnic identities of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa within a Social Darwinist and eugenics framework, that had informed white colonial attitudes towards Africans, and on which a hierarchical colonial society of privilege in Rwanda had been constructed. It was further claimed that school history in Rwanda entrenched these imposed identities and was manipulated to create division and hatred and prepare the way for genocide. Was this a just perception? This belief was so firmly held that a moratorium on the teaching of history in schools was declared after the 1994 genocide. What, I wondered, does a country do with history education in the aftermath of genocide, particularly when perpetrators and victims have to co-exist in such close proximity? More than ten years later, the moratorium on the teaching of History in Rwanda was being lifted. Facing History and Ourselves, a Boston-based non-profit organisation, which is involved in a professional development project with the Western Cape Education Department and Shikaya, a Cape Town-based NPO, was invited to run similar teacher workshops in Rwanda. These workshops were to introduce new history materials that had been developed by local writers under the facilitation of the University of California, Berkeley. This provided me with an opportunity to become involved in Rwanda and opened the way to developing a comparative study of memory, identity and the curriculum in South Africa and Rwanda, two developing countries, both African, and both emerging from a violent past.
The construction of curricula in post-conflict societies is an under-researched facet of the research in the field of curriculum development and education policy. While there are studies on the curriculum of transition from socialist to post-socialist states or colonial to post-colonial regimes or routine changes of government in capitalist democracies, there are very few, if any, studies which examine societies that have experienced the transitional trauma arising from internecine racial conflict that was culturally embedded at all levels as the focus of curriculum analysis – and how in such societies issues of memory and identity are both reflected and contested through what is taught. The concept of conflict in this study is that of gross human rights abuses, genocide in Rwanda and crimes against humanity in apartheid South Africa. It is perhaps useful for the purposes of this study to refer to these societies as emerging from violent conflict or de facto civil war. The historical legacy is the ongoing tensions and conflicts within these societies that are a legacy of the violent pasts, and the racialised and ethnic identities imposed by the oppressive regimes.

This study could make a significant contribution to the understanding of this process and the interaction between the history curriculum and the political process of re-imagining the post-conflict state. As internecine conflicts intensified during the 1990s,


4 In 2008 a volume of articles investigating the potential relationship between history education and reconciliation after conflict, highlighting the findings of truth commissions was published. However, none of the article engages with the intersection of the political and educational processes of post-conflict construction of memory and identity. Cole, E. (ed) (2008) Teaching the violent past: history education and reconciliation. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
a growing body of research has tried to understand the link between education and conflict and the potential contribution to post-conflict reconstruction that education can make. However, none of this research has provided an in-depth analysis of the processes of political and educational construction of memory and identity and the engagement with traumatic knowledge in history education, once violent conflict has ended. This study has relevance to countries emerging from conflict around the world, but perhaps particularly to countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia.

**Research focus and questions**
The central focus of this thesis is on how collective memory and identity are reflected and asserted in curriculum in societies emerging from internecine conflict. The main research question for this study is how post-conflict societies re-conceptualise or re-imagine themselves through the medium of the curriculum. Ancillary questions raise issues of how memory and identity are constructed in the conflict and post-conflict states and to what purpose; how societies emerging from conflict deal with the traumatic knowledge of an abusive past; and how curriculum reflects and asserts the new identities after the violent phase of conflict has ended.

**Framework, perspectives and concepts**
While recognising that education can contribute to conflict, governments of societies in transition nevertheless consider education to be a crucial arena for positive change, with education policy signalling that change. When the transition is from a past of gross human rights abuses, the transition takes on a traumatic dimension, bringing together the politics of memory, power and emotion that needs to be dealt with politically and educationally. The struggles over memory in the new society raise issues of remembering or forgetting and of the construction of appropriate new memories and identities, all in service of the new regime. A critical issue is what happens to the ‘old’ memory in the new state. Memory and identity are located within individuals, families, groups and ‘nations’ and are dynamic rather than fixed, particularly when they have political intentions, such as legitimising a regime. For example, in societies emerging from conflict, the once dominant national memories and identities, potentially become Foucauldian counter-memories located in group
identities that could work to undermine the new state - particularly when a minority memory was imposed on the majority such in South Africa.

- **What is memory?**

An understanding of memory and identity and the ways in which these inform this study is an important context for the examination of the construction of memory and identity in South Africa and Rwanda. Memory, defined in various ways, has become a central issue in the contemporary understanding of what it means to do history. Memory operates on many levels within society: individual, group, wider community and is deeply associated with individual and social identity, nation building, ideology and citizenship. Collective memory is the socially shared representations of the past, usually measured by the yardstick of the ‘nation’ – ‘collective’ because it is national. However, smaller identity-based groups within a ‘nation’ can also have shared collective memories. Collective memory can further be defined as:

- an interaction between the memory policies – also referred to as ‘historical memory’ and the recollections – ‘common memory’, of what has been experienced in common. It lies at the point where individual meets collective, and psychic meets social.

Various realities can be taken on by the concept ‘memory’, such as commemoration, monument, political use of the past, personal memories or handed-down experiences.

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8 Ibid
History and memory influence and shape one another through a complementary process—a complementary process—and have political and well as a cultural functions. The meanings given to terms such as memory, remembering and history have differed widely and are still far from clear. Memory has been used to denote the contents of the past as they become present and the process that brings the past into the present; as a substitute for history; and as complementary to history. A distinction has also been made between social and historical memory. Social memory in this context is regarded as the memory of things that one has either experienced personally, or the group to which a person belongs has experienced. Historical memory is that which has been mediated, by films, books, schools and public or religious holidays. For most people in most countries, national experience is overwhelmingly based on such represented memories.

However, this does not help us to understand what happens to memory and identity in societies that have been involved in violent internecine conflict. A number of historians writing about Eastern Europe refer to the concept of ‘traumatic memory’. This was a subject that received increasing attention in the 1980s and 1990s when post-traumatic stress disorder became more widely acknowledged with the acceptance that among us, within our families, there are men and women

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overwhelmed by traumatic recollection or memory. Trauma in the psychology of suffering is the way in which the personal aftermath of atrocity and abuse is understood. The concept of traumatic memory is currently most closely associated with the psychological damage experienced by survivors of the Holocaust.

The notion of traumatic memory is particularly relevant to Rwanda and South Africa as each is coming to terms with a violent past and with the tensions between remembering and forgetting that go with it. The genocide in Rwanda left both survivors and perpetrators with deep emotional and psychological scars and continuing deep identity-based divisions. The challenges of reconciliation are mistrust, suspicion, and fear of revenge. The genocide in Rwanda was particularly traumatic with victims and perpetrators coming from the same neighbourhood, sometimes living under the same roof, as members of families turned on one another. Genocide was accompanied by wide-scale rape and infection with the HIV virus. Theriault in his seminar session referred to this as continuing the genocide through rape and HIV/AIDS. When having to come to terms with crimes of such magnitude, how does a country begin to build a common memory and new identity? There is the need to rebuild hope and confidence at all levels, not only in government but also between neighbours and family members. There is a need to mend the deep divisions and tensions between Hutu and Tutsi, victims and perpetrators and the returning refugees, some of whom left Rwanda during the conflicts of 1959 and 1972. What are the implications for the emerging curriculum?

The post-1994 traumatic and painful memories in South Africa are the legacy of over 40 years of institutionalised racism and oppression, preceded by 300 years of colonial segregation and oppression. The evidence of the trauma might not be as dramatically

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15 Winter, J. (2000) The generation of Memory: Reflections on the ‘Memory Boom’ in contemporary Historical Studies. GHI Bulletin 27. This is the condition known as ‘shell shock’ suffered by many soldiers during and after the First World War. Eva Hoffmann notes that it was only in the mid-1950s that notice began to be taken of the many Holocaust survivors who were demonstrating symptoms of psychological trauma. Hoffmann, E. (2004) After Such Knowledge: A meditation on the Aftermath of the Holocaust. London: Secker & Warburg

widespread as in a country such as Rwanda, but the psychological scars for all South Africans are deep and at times difficult to identify, confront and challenge. For many of those who experienced the brutality of the regime first hand, the trauma of torture, murder and rape have not been given closure. For all South Africans, racialised identities need to be confronted in order to challenge and turn around the continuing legacy of apartheid.

Part of the process of ‘moving on’, is creating a common national identity, which reflects memories that acknowledge the trauma of the past in a way that prevents denial:

The first element…is the need to transform the memory of trauma, the closed memory, which obsessively sends us back to the trampoline memory… once it is established that the past was really true, that it was not a nightmare, that it pervades our skin and that we recognize and accept what happened, we will know that it can be overcome. It is the awareness that it really happened and that we are not willing to let it ever happen again.17

However, when a collective memory is traumatic, there is the tension in societies emerging from conflict between those who feel it is better to forget a traumatic past than remember it, and those who feel that it should be remembered. The work of Simon, DiPaolantonio and Clamen is particularly useful to understanding memory and identity in post-conflict societies in relation to education.18 In a number of articles they raise questions about the ethical, pedagogical and political implications of

various practices of historical remembrance contained in documents, images, testimony and public memory. In particular they argue that public practices of memory not merely contribute to knowledge of the past, but can have a ‘testamentary, transitive function’, bearing an ‘educative legacy to those who come after’. Ethical practices of remembrance are particularly important in the context of legacies of trauma, raising the critical issue of what the second generation should do with the knowledge of the horrors of the particular conflict.

Eva Hoffmann, in her personal reflections as a second generation survivor of the Holocaust in her book, After Such Knowledge, asks:

What are the specific agents in conditions of collective violence, of deep psychic damage? It may seem indecent even to ask such questions, or to look for nuances among modalities of violence. And yet, the questions need to be asked if we are to think about actual forms of human behaviour – including war – and about our moral and emotional responses to them.

‘Forms of human behaviour’ and ‘our moral and emotional responses to them’ are critical issues to be considered in history education in a society emerging from conflict.

- **What is the link between memory and identity?**

Identity is not just rooted in our group, but also in the history of our group. Group identity, fed by national or group myths, can become ‘a bloody business’ that directs individual behaviour and overrides cool, logical, rational empirical thinking making people ‘do unspeakable things to one another’. As with memory, identity is

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19 Simon (2001)
20 Bernhard Schlink in his book, The Reader, wrote: ‘At the same time I ask myself, as I had already begun to ask myself back then: What should our second generation have done, what should it do with the knowledge of the horrors of the extermination of the Jews?’ This is a key question for all societies that have experience internecine conflict that involved gross violations of human rights. Schlink, B. (1997: English Translation) The Reader. London: Phoenix House: 120
constructed on many levels: from individual, to societies and nations. Any one individual lays claim to a number of identities at any one time.

Memory has a political as well as a cultural function – pivotal to the creation of group identity. As official history, collective national memory is a means of legitimating the nation state, as well as of a particular form of government.\textsuperscript{23} Memory is also the means of creating and identifying ‘the other’, the ‘enemy’ that needs to be eliminated in order for the group to survive. Therefore, the concepts of collective identity and its linked memory can be problematic, because collective identity has been so closely associated historically with notions of racial, ethnic and gender stereotypes.\textsuperscript{24} Identity politics based on race and ethnicity, feed into traditions of exclusionary nationalism, even genocide. In a divided society, curriculum becomes one of the tools of division and oppression.

Collective memory and identity can operate on a number of levels within a society. Within a divided society, there are competing group identities. All have associated collective memories that can become ‘imagined communities’ within the larger nation state and in conflict with the state and its national narrative. Such group memories and identities are located within vernacular cultures and can be formed in relation to other groups within the larger ‘national’ community. Murphy in her study on *Reconstructing the Nation* in the United States refers to the work of Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, who argues that for black Baptists in the United States, the ‘imagined community’ was racially bounded and its sovereignty perceived as being free of white control. Higginbotham’s understanding of the formation of a nationalist consciousness as a process of interaction among multiple discourses, including race, gender, religion and race – as a dependent, contradictory and dynamic discourse that gains meaning in relation to other discourses – is particularly useful in trying to understand the way in which racialised identities were formed in South Africa.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{23} Boody: 2005
\textsuperscript{24} King: 2002
\textsuperscript{25} Murphy, K.L. (1996) *Reconstructing the Nation: Race, Gender and Restoration, the Progressive Era*. Unpublished D.Phil. dissertation, University of Minnesota: 4
How does the memory/identity bond inform this study?

In many countries throughout the world, governments have used the history curriculum to reinforce their perceptions of national ideologies and identities. But just as history can be used negatively to incite conflict, it can also become a means of building a positive memory and identity and of supporting democracy. In societies emerging from conflict, the notion of a collective memory and identity that will bring about social cohesion within the new ‘nation’ becomes critical when mediated via the political process.

Collective memory is generally a contested terrain on which competing groups self-consciously struggle to shape and reshape a version of the national past to suit their present political views of the future. The official arenas of contestation include education policy and curriculum, as well as the claiming of public ideological spaces in commemorative events and the construction of memorials. In societies emerging from violent conflict, there are additional layers of tension in the search for a national identity. These emanate from the political negotiations that take place in forging a new political society. Once memory debates become politicised, critical questions are raised: which past should be admitted and which should be rejected; and who has the legitimacy to decide? What is at stake in the debates is not merely the explanation of the past, but its transformation into a reference point for current individual identification with the national polity in the present.\(^\text{26}\) In post-conflict societies, in which the colonial past is relatively recent, the transformation of explanations of the past are fraught with issues of oppressor and oppressed; superiority and inferiority; of internalised oppression; of former dominant narratives; and of the legacy of trauma and pain. History education becomes the terrain on which these competing narratives and emotions intersect.

Historiography, the way historians interpret the past, plays a key role in the construction of a common memory. Those who control images of the past can shape

the present and possibly ideas of the future, making historians important players in the shaping of collective memory and therefore identity, by connecting past and present in particular ways. By extension, history education is a crucial arena for perpetuating national notions of memory and identity, both positive and negative, placing particular responsibilities on curriculum developers in post-conflict societies.

However, curriculum developers do not work in isolation from the political processes that bring about an end to the conflict. The way in which the conflict ends has particular implications for an emerging curriculum. The construction of education policy after a negotiated settlement is more likely to be contested and result in compromises, than a conflict that ends with a military victory. Victory presupposes the right to impose a new vision of national identity and a linked new national narrative on those who have been defeated. However, the implications here include the danger of unfinished business when the past is not dealt with in a way that both victors and defeated can engage in the traumatic legacy of that past together. The new ruling elite may construct a single, politically acceptable, new dominant narrative that can become, in Foucault’s terms, a new regime of truth, equally as oppressive as that of the previous regime.

While there is a growing body of research on the link between education and conflict and rebuilding education after conflict, there are few studies that focus more specifically on history education and the construction of curriculum, in the traumatic aftermath of identity-based conflict. The studies on traumatic memory relating to Eastern Europe cited previously, focus generally on traumatic memory and political processes; memory and transitional justice; and academic questions relating to traumatic memory and the reinterpretation of history. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of communism, opened the way in Eastern Europe

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27 Levy (1999):51
for a re-evaluation of national narratives in school textbooks. This began the process of breaking down the varying degrees of ideological control that the USSR had had on history narratives in communist bloc countries. Research has focussed on the debates generated by the conflicting national narratives between Eastern European countries and Russia and the moves towards reconciling the histories within school texts, rather than locating these debates within a wider context of the dynamics of curriculum change in transition societies. Studies relating to post-Third Reich Germany tend to focus on the political processes of memory or on curriculum, but seldom bring the two processes together. Nor do the studies of German education after the Third Reich provide insight into societies in which victims and perpetrators need to continue to work out new forms of relating to one other in a newly imagined ‘nation’, articulating new values that were diametrically opposed to those of the former state.

Research on school history, nationhood and identity, particularly in Britain, has highlighted the various interpretations of national identity. A particular example is that of Welsh nationalism, which has resulted in revision of regional history textbooks in terms of a new ‘national’ identity that draws on foundational myths of past Welsh history. In countries such as Northern Ireland and Israel, research has underscored the barriers to teaching a common history in countries that have emerged from violent conflict, but are still divided and still within a situation of conflict if defined in its broadest sense. What all of these researchers into history education have in

common, is the view that ‘history and history education becomes a live political issue and concern within nation states at points of evolution or transition’.32

These studies do not make the link between political processes and curriculum change explicit. Furthermore, none examine the changing education systems and curriculum in the context of the legacy of traumatic memory, or the intergenerational transfer of knowledge, which is the inheritance of the second generation in a post-conflict society. The way in which this knowledge is deeply and often unconsciously internalised by children of victims, is movingly described by Eva Hoffman.33 A growing body of research has also revealed that children of perpetrators internalise the damaging ‘knowledge’ of the actions of their parents.34 Research in the field of education policy in post-conflict societies needs to take the effects of trauma into account in attempting to understand the trajectories of education policy renewal in these societies. This is the critical context for this study, providing the lens for examining not only the curriculum changes and the linked construction of memory and identity, but also the associated political processes that influence the trajectory of change.

**The two national contexts for the enquiry**

South Africa and Rwanda are both societies still suffering from the legacy of traumatic conflict. While it is not within the scope of this study to examine the conflicts, it is useful to have a brief overview of each as a context for understanding post-conflict political and educational change and the re-imagining of the state. Post-conflict has been described as those societies undergoing a ‘simultaneous reconstruction and reconciliation’.35 If this definition is taken in its broadest sense, then South Africa and Rwanda can be regarded as post-conflict. However, at times I prefer to regard them as societies in transition rather than post-conflict, as although

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33 Hoffmann (2004)
there has been a political change from one regime to another, the societies are still grappling with the legacies of the past.

- **South Africa**
Apartheid South Africa was a society based on legalised and institutionalised segregation that was a continuum of development from the 17th century. When the National Party won the general elections in 1948, they had put before the mainly white voters, a vision for the country based on white supremacy and the separation of races. Once in power, legislation was introduced that systematically entrenched the power of the National Party and placed the laws that formed the building blocks of apartheid on the statute books. The Population Registration Act classified people as belonging to different ‘races’; the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act banned marriages across the racial divides; the Group Areas Act identified separate residential areas; and the Separate Amenities Act, in theory, provided equal separate amenities such as park benches, beaches, toilets for the different ‘races’. Apartheid’s authoritarian system of racial domination and ethnic segregation permeated all aspects of life, resulting in deep-rooted racialised identities. But underpinning this was a view of identity that had strong historical links.

The implementation of the apartheid policies tore families apart, resulting in large-scale forced removals and ‘resettlements’, which in rural areas, led to deep-seated poverty and widespread malnutrition among children. The policing of free movement of black South Africans led to the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of men and women, for not having the necessary identity documents that permitted them to be in a particular place at a particular time. Resistance to apartheid was brutally suppressed. The scale of repression, including states of emergency, banning, house arrest, detention without trial, imprisonment, torture and murder, increased with the increasing scale of resistance. In 1973 the United Nations General Assembly declared apartheid a ‘crime against humanity’.

Segregated education reinforced inequality and the racialised identities, which lowered the self-esteem of the majority of South Africans and enhanced the self-
esteem of the minority. Thus, education during apartheid was an instrument of division and oppression. The institutional ethos of the education departments was highly authoritarian. The vast majority of those within the top level of all bureaucratic hierarchies were white Afrikaner males, and virtually all bureaucrats supported the apartheid system or would not challenge it. The education system deliberately set out to inculcate notions of superiority and inferiority; of those born to rule and those born to follow (delineated along racial lines).

Apartheid education was Christian and National. It was ostensibly a policy for white Afrikaans-speaking children, but also spelled out the features of education for black South Africans that clearly articulated the racist ideology nurtured in the 1930s of the ruling National Party. This was clearly expressed in a pamphlet distributed by the National Party during the 1948 election campaign:

The white South African’s duty to the native is to Christianise him and help him culturally. Native education should be based on the principles of trusteeship, non-equality and segregation; its aim should be to inculcate the white man’s way of life, especially that of the Boer [Afrikaner] nation, which is the senior trustee…Native education should not be financed at the expense of the white…

In this view ‘the native’ was in a state of ‘cultural infancy’ and ‘the sacred obligation’ of the Afrikaner was to base black education on Christian national principles. In 1953 the Bantu Education Act formalised the system of unequal education for black South Africans, who were to be educated to the level of manual labour. Bantu Education resulted in unequal teacher education programmes. Black colleges of education provided inadequate training; there were too few schools; and classes in black schools were large, with sometimes up to 100 learners in a class.

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36 The well-used quote of Hendrik Verwoerd when he introduced the Bantu Education Act in 1953 illustrates this point: ‘There is no place for [the ‘Bantu’] in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour…What is the use of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice?’ Quoted in Morris (2004)

Christian National Education was supported by a South African version of fundamental pedagogics developed in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{38} Fundamental pedagogics viewed education as a science, able to establish universally valid knowledge about education. In any education system that aims to develop conformity and obedience it is not only what is taught that is critical, but also how it is taught. In fundamental pedagogics there was no culture of problem solving, free enquiry or active learning – content was delivered to be rote learned.

History was also considered to be a science, consisting of verifiable, indisputable, objective ‘facts’.\textsuperscript{39} As an uncontested body of knowledge, it became a major tool for legitimising the apartheid state. The dominant ‘conflict’ narrative\textsuperscript{40} was that articulated by Afrikaner nationalist historians, with the central theme being the triumph of the Afrikaner ‘volk’ or people, chosen by God to rule South Africa.\textsuperscript{41} Afrikaner nationalist history included a number of ‘foundational’ myths, presented in history texts as ‘facts’. For example, one of the central myths of Afrikaner nationalist history, the myth of the ‘empty land’, appeared in a Grade 12 history textbook that was used until very recently:

The most significant of [the major tribal wars] was the Mfecane, initiated by Shaka in the region between the Drakensberg and the Limpopo River in 1818. Large numbers of Blacks were put to death, tribes were annihilated or so disintegrated that they became part of other Black groups. Large parts of the country were depopulated as a result of the Mfecane and several White pioneers settled in these areas.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{39} The idea that history is a science and can be objective is still a firmly held belief by some Afrikaner academics and South Africans, white and black, who had Afrikaner nationalist history lecturers at university.
\textsuperscript{40} By ‘conflict’ narrative I mean the dominant national narrative in textbooks that was considered to have contributed to the identity-based conflict in each country.
\textsuperscript{41} Leonard Thompson in his book, The Political Mythology of Apartheid published in 1985, identified the vow taken before the ‘Battle of Blood River’ as the defining moment in the perceived favoured relationship with God and a central foundational myth.
Supporting the claim to the legitimacy of land occupation, was the myth that all peoples of South Africa were immigrants, arriving more or less at the same time from various directions. This included Africa and Europe. In this interpretation of the South African past, no one could be said to have a prior claim to the land; *ipso facto* no one was displaced during the Boer migrations into the interior from the Cape Colony. This was the privileged historical narrative that was taught in all state schools in one form or another. The histories of the majority of South Africans were marginalized or distorted.

However, at the height of apartheid in the 1970s and 1980s, radical or revisionist academic historians such as Shula Marks, Colin Bundy, William Beinart, Peter Delius and Charles van Onselen to name but a few, became influential in reshaping the understanding of the South African past as a counter to the apartheid narrative.43 Revisionism is used here in the sense of reassessing old and new evidence. These historians provided South Africans with a usable past in the deliberations about the history curriculum immediately after 1994, as well as during the construction of the Revised National Curriculum Statement for General Education and Training and the National Curriculum Statement for Further Education and Training: History, from 2001.

By 1994, the year of South Africa’s first democratic election, the education system was divisive, unequal and fragmented. There were 19 different education departments based mainly on race and ethnicity. Many schools were dysfunctional as many black schools became sites of mass struggle, resisting and rejecting apartheid. There was high dropout rate among black school children. This was the inherited context for educational change in post-apartheid South Africa.

Rwanda

Rwanda had a much shorter period of colonialism than South Africa. It became a German sphere of interest in 1980 and in 1897 German administrators arrived in Rwanda. The country was taken over as a mandate by Belgium after the First World War. While South Africa could be described as a settler colony, Rwanda experienced indirect rule. Colonialism entrenched ethnic identities in Rwanda, although there is considerable debate among historians about the extent to which these identities had been formed or were forming before colonial rule. Longman argues that the concepts of ethnicity developed by the missionaries, fed into German and Belgian colonial policies and that after independence, leaders trained in church schools, exploited ethnic identities to gain support, helping to intensify and solidify, ethnic divisions. Colonial education in Rwanda was largely controlled by Catholic missionaries. It first favoured Tutsi and then Hutu. Ethnicity was incorporated into the curricula of the schools and was also used to limit access to education.

History and history education in Rwanda reinforced notions of inequality. First German and then Belgian colonial rulers drew on pseudo-scientific notions of the hierarchy of races which gained popularity in the late 19th century. Constructing a mythological version of the Rwandan past, they ranked the ‘Hamitic’ Tutsi, supposedly later immigrants to the region, above ‘indigenous’ Hutu, ascribing to them a biological and cultural superiority as a group. Colonialism brought the first written histories of Rwanda in the 1950s. Most influential was the collaboration between the Rwandan intellectual, Abbé Alexis Kagame and the colonial ethnographer and anthropologist, Maquet. Their work conflated the ruling Tutsi dynastic court history

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with the colonial history of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{46} This became the substance of the ‘conflict’ narrative. Under the Hutu-led government in the 1950s, this narrative was manipulated within history education to demonstrate Tutsi abuse of power.\textsuperscript{47} Some decades later, in the 1990s the state media used the narrative to fuel the hate speech that contributed to genocide.

Current official (equally mythological) versions of Rwanda’s past constructed by the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), simplify and romanticise the pre-colonial past and deny post-independence academic research, particularly by Francophone scholars.\textsuperscript{48} A number of academics have challenged this revisionist version of Rwanda’s past, demonstrating a far more complex history than the official RPF version.\textsuperscript{49} Revisionism here refers:

> to the systematic attempt to discredit and obliterate all post-independence research in order to reinstate Kagame-Maquet’s functionalist account of pre-colonial Rwanda…[going] beyond the RPF’s own use of the term, which denotes disagreement with the view that ethnicity is the ‘creation of colonialism.’\textsuperscript{50}

Pottier claims that the Anglophone ‘instant experts’ on Rwanda, who have little deep knowledge of Rwandan history, have uncritically espoused the RPF version of the past.

There is still no general agreement on the causes of the genocide. Lemarchand, in a recent review on the state of research in Rwanda, highlights the enormous volume of diverse literature that the Rwandan genocide has spawned, and the lack of consensus among researchers on the genocide and its causes.\textsuperscript{51} Certainly, the official emphasis

\textsuperscript{50} Pottier (2002): 222
on ethnicity created by colonial regimes as a major cause ignores a range of possible contributing factors. These include: economic collapse; pressure on land; the determination of the Habyarimana government to remain in power in the face of international pressure to negotiate with the RPF-led invasion forces in the early 1990s; the consequent transformation of the youth group of the governing party, the Interahamwe, into a real militia; the power struggle among the Hutu and the effect of fear and intra-ethnic intimidation, as major contributors to the genocide. Ultimately, according to Des Forges, the genocide resulted from the deliberate choice of modern elite to foster hatred and fear to keep itself in power, carried out by people who chose to do evil.

In the months leading up to the genocide, the discourse that legitimated the genocidal actions was spread across the country in the media and in numerous political speeches. In propaganda reminiscent of Nazi Germany, the Tutsi ‘enemy’ were identified as cockroaches (Inyenzi), as the enemy within, as Hamitic immigrants who had oppressed the Hutu for centuries and who needed to be sent back from where they came or ‘exterminated’. In May 1994 a radio broadcast went out:

Let me congratulate thousands and thousands of young men doing their military training to fight the Inkotanyi. At all costs, all Inkotanyi have to be exterminated, in all areas of our country.

The genocide was carried out with a speed and thoroughness attributed to the use of the well-established hierarchies of the military, administrative and political systems. Soldiers, national police, former soldiers and communal police directed the major killing in many areas, but all over Rwanda, for a complex range of reasons, the local population joined in. The Catholic Church has also been heavily implicated in the

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54 This was a term used to identify the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army or RPF sympathisers.
56 Des Forges (1999) See the section on the genocide.
genocide. In a matter of three months some 800 000 Tutsi and Hutu who resisted participation in the genocide, were murdered, some by members of their own families.

The genocide was brought to an end by the defeat of the government by the invading RPF military forces. At the same time, its troops committed grave violations of international humanitarian law, attacking and killing unarmed civilians. General Paul Kagame who led the RPF forces, is currently President of Rwanda. He has consistently denied that the RPF has committed human rights abuses.

As a result of the genocide and war, the country lost most of its middle class. In 2003 over 50% of Rwandans were children and more than 40% in the 10 – 14 year age group had lost one or both parents. The ‘exile factor’ has become significant in Rwanda today. Returning exiles, mostly from Uganda, have filled top government posts and alleviated the skills shortage left by the death of so many educated middle class Rwandans in the genocide.

Legacy of trauma
For both countries in this study, the conflict has left a legacy of trauma that has continued beyond the formal cessation of the conflict. What sets this study apart from other studies of societies in transition, is the recognition that this legacy has an influence on the way in which the new society is imagined, both politically and within education policy. In accepting that an analysis of the conflict itself helps to inform the understanding of the construction of post-conflict education policy, an analysis of the legacy of the conflict is equally critical to understanding the ways in which memory and identity are engaged with in the transitional and post-conflict state. Ariel Dorfman in the foreword to My Neighbor, My Enemy wrote of the crucial efforts to ‘deal with the unspeakable’ actions that had happened during the violent internecine conflict. He also recognised the ‘dilemmas that flood societies’ after these events, when

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57 Longman (1997)
58 Des Forges (1999) See the section of the report on the Rwandan Patriot Front
survivors have to find a way of living with those who have killed their families, and trust has to be restored to communities. As a Rwandan headmistress told African Rights researchers in 2001:

Most of the teachers are widows of the genocide. At our school we have a widow whose husband and nine children all perished in the genocide. She is the only surviving member of a family of 11. I know she has tried really hard to find another job but had had to content herself with remaining a teacher. Imagine how she must feel standing in front of a class containing children of the génocidaires and having to teach them.\(^61\)

These are the ongoing ‘unspeakables’ in post-conflict societies of which the literature on large group trauma, intergenerational transmission of trauma and the notion of ‘chosen’ trauma help to provide some understanding and insight.

There cannot be comparisons of trauma, but in examining the legacy of violent conflict some have made a distinction between traumatic and painful memories. In this view, all traumatic experiences evoke painful emotions, leaving behind both distressing emotions and memories, but not all painful emotions mean that the person has experienced trauma.\(^62\) Relating that to this study, it could be argued that many Rwandans, including school children, are experiencing the devastating effects of trauma, while in South Africa a significant number of people experienced the trauma of torture, imprisonment and murder of family members, but many more are suffering from deeply painful memories rather than trauma. However, this may be too fine a distinction to make. Though he acknowledges that it could possibly be problematic, the historian LaCapra does distinguish between traumatising events, the experience of trauma, memory, and representation. But he also argues that one may experience aspects of trauma or undergo secondary traumatisation without personally living through the traumatising event to which such effects are ascribed. Secondary

\(^{61}\) African Rights (2001): 73

traumatisation may even occur in those reacting only to representations of trauma. The ‘painful memories’ may indeed be traumatic memories, or become traumatic memories triggered by ‘representations of trauma’, such as media photographs or television reporting.

The emphasis in this research is on historical trauma - on the events in the past that have either left groups traumatised or with the collective memory of a traumatic event. For an event to be traumatic it must seriously disrupt how a person understands, remembers and feels, to such an extent, that the event is usually forced from memory and symbolic understanding. Although the trauma is forced from consciousness, it however, often returns in the form of physical symptoms. One of the first to use trauma as a sociological concept was Kai Erikson, who shifted the notion from an individualised context towards the analysis of ‘traumatised communities’. He suggested that ‘trauma can create community’. Alexander, in linking trauma theory to broader issues of collective, rather than individual, identity, used the concept ‘cultural trauma’. This ‘occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in

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63 LaCapra, D. (2004) History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 115. This phenomenon was demonstrated in a teacher workshop on the xenophobic outbreak in August 2008, held soon after the publication of images in South Africa, of a man burning to death during an incident of xenophobic violence.. It became evident that a teacher who had witnessed a brutal ‘necklacing’ during the 1980s was re-traumatised by the image, and other teachers, without that personal experience, were traumatised by the image and by their colleague’s pain. One participant shared his feelings: ‘So I felt very sick and disgusted when I saw that child burning that human being last week because really it’s not human to do something like that. I think I’m still asking myself today what happened to us that led us to believe that these things should happen and I’m asking what happened to these people that led them to burn a foreign national, what got into us that led us to not see a human being anymore, just see something that needs to be destroyed? And I believe our humanity was taken away, we were dehumanized as people and I think part of what I do now is to reclaim that humanity.’ Transcript of a facing the past teacher workshop, August 2008.


fundamental and irrevocable ways’. The events of September 11 are a recent dramatic example of how a society can experience collective trauma.

Trauma as a cultural phenomenon implies that choices are made and that trauma is constructed by society. A shift in the language of trauma towards a symbolic and institutional context becomes essential for collective and moral identification. This is a highly contested process and as Alexander points out, ‘events are not inherently traumatic. Trauma is a socially mediated attribution’. Sociological investigations of trauma focus on how political communities deal with the construction and representation of trauma in collective rather than individual terms. Through commemorating events, trauma becomes part of a ‘collective consciousness’. According to Levy and Sznaider, to ensure that an event is perceived as trauma, it requires a degree of ‘institutionalisation and routinisation’. The proliferation of museum exhibits and memorial sites representing traumatic events, to them, indicates the centrality of negative foundational moments.

While there is a growing body of research by psychologists and sociologists on the traumatic legacy of the Holocaust, including the intergenerational transfer of trauma, there is a certain lack of interest and even resistance, from historians to using the research in trauma and its effects, as a way of explaining traumatic events in history. Dominick LaCapra, reflects in his book, *History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory*, that:

One would think that in the light of the relation of trauma to extreme or limit events such as the Holocaust, other genocides, terrorism, slavery, aspects of colonialism and so forth, that trauma and its aftermath would be of marked interest to historians. But with some exceptions (for example, Saul Friedlander and myself), the interest in trauma and,

68 Levy & Sznaider (n.d.): 3
perhaps even more so, in dimensions of the post-traumatic, has thus far not been pronounced in the work of historians and there has even been some suspicion of attempts to conceptualise trauma and its aftermath.\textsuperscript{69}

LaCapra criticises an overly positivist approach to historiography, for which the ‘sufficient conditions of historiography’ is ‘gathering evidence and making referential statements in the form of truth claims on that evidence’.\textsuperscript{70} He argues that in this approach, there is a tendency to:

exclude affect (notably empathy) from understanding and to protect a restricted idea of reason and rationality from contact with what might upset it and the self-image of those basing their own identity on it, notably trauma, its aftermath, and its possibly unsettling effects on those who inquire into it.\textsuperscript{71}

He suggests that while ‘truth claims’ are necessary, they are ‘not sufficient conditions’ of historiography. Questions need to be asked about how they do, and ought to, interact with other factors or forces in historiography, in other genres, and in hybridized forms or modes.\textsuperscript{72} Historians, when writing the history of a traumatic event, need to have a consciousness of how the effects of the trauma continue to be felt and may affect the historian’s own work.\textsuperscript{73} The concepts of post-memory, ‘the acquired memory of those not directly experiencing an event such as the Holocaust or slavery’ and the intergenerational transmission of trauma, ‘the way those not directly living through an event may nonetheless experience and manifest its post-traumatic symptoms’, are important to understanding traumatic legacies.\textsuperscript{74} In LaCapra’s view, history has powerful emotional consequences for succeeding generations. LaCapra draws on the work of psychoanalyst Vamik Volkan, whose research on large group identity, the intergenerational or transgenerational transmission of trauma and chosen

\textsuperscript{69} LaCapra (2004): 107
\textsuperscript{70} LaCapra, D. (2001) \textit{Writing History, Writing Trauma} JHU Press: 1
\textsuperscript{71} La Capra (2004): 111
\textsuperscript{72} LaCapra (2001): 1-2
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid
\textsuperscript{74} LaCapra (2004): 108
trauma, informs this study. According to Volkan, an investigation of these concepts and phenomena necessitates the collaboration of psychoanalysts and historians.

Volkan is interested in the indirect traumatisation of the descendents of people who as a group have been subjected to some defeat, shame or humiliation. He locates the transmission of trauma in the connection between the parents/caregivers and the child. It is not about mimicking the behaviour of parents or hearing stories of the events told by older generations, or even sympathy, but the end result of mostly unconscious processes by which children’s core identities are ‘flooded with and therefore influenced by the injured self- and internalised object-images and associated affects that rightly belong to the original victims, their care-givers or parents’. 

Unlike historians, Volkan does not believe that the traumatic memories can be handed down inter-generationally. For him, memory belongs to the survivor of the trauma. What is transmitted - he calls it deposited - to the next generation are the damaged self-images of the parents who have been unable to mourn the damage done to their individual and group selves. The cumulative effect of this self-image deposit, based on the same event or narrative, at the level of a population of millions means that large-group identity is affected. This becomes the chosen trauma.

Chosen traumas are the ‘mental representations’ of past shared historical events that have caused a large group to face drastic losses, to feel helpless and victimised by another group and to share a humiliating injury. Volkan argues that understanding chosen trauma is key to discerning the process of transgenerational transmission of past historical events. Though a group does not consciously choose to be victimised or suffer humiliation, like an individual, a large group can be said to make unconscious choices. Thus the ‘chosen trauma’ reflects a large group’s unconscious ‘choice’ to add

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76 Ibid
a past generation’s mental representation of a shared event to its own identity. A chosen trauma also reflects a traumatised generation’s incapacity for, or difficulty with, mourning losses that are connected to the shared traumatic event, as well as the failure to reverse the humiliation and damage to the group’s self-esteem inflicted by another large group. The chosen trauma becomes part of an individual’s core identity which is inextricably intertwined with the large-group identity and history, and both consciously and unconsciously passed on to the next generation. Because of the enormity of the trauma, survivors are left with psychological wounds and humiliation that they will pass down from one generation to the next. This intergenerational transmission of trauma keeps the sense of injury and desire for revenge alive and if groups do not go through a mourning process, there is a high chance of ongoing cycles of violence.

Much has been written about the trauma of the victims, but there is a further dimension to trauma resulting from violent internecine conflict. Perpetrators may also suffer from trauma, in particular those who were drawn into killing unwillingly. Furthermore, as Sichrovsky’s work on the children of Nazis has revealed, the trauma can similarly be handed down to the next generation. Psychological studies on perpetrators that included Rwanda, found that many people who engage in intense violence against others are deeply affected by their own actions – the act of killing results in psychological and spiritual woundedness and for many, a deep sense of humiliation. Lindner, a psychologist, suggests that the most painful form of humiliation is when you are forced to become a perpetrator and you are too weak to resist, too much of a coward to say no (and face death) and too ignorant to even understand being duped into committing atrocities. Those who killed family members find themselves in an even worse place. Their families had died at their own

78 Volkan (2005)
79 Sichrovsky (1988)
hands; they lost honour, pride and self-respect; they were humiliated not once, but on many levels. They were coerced into becoming perpetrators. The fact that they did not prefer death to succumbing to the pressure to murder their families was deeply humiliating to them.  

LaCapra distinguishes between the traumatic ‘event’ and ‘experience’. A traumatic experience, in contrast to the event, constitutes a past that will not pass away, ‘a past that belatedly invades the present and threatens to block the future’. The event may be ‘history’ in the sense that it is over and in the past. However, the experience is not ‘history’ in this sense, particularly with respect to traumatic memory. This includes not only the Holocaust, but also other genocides, slavery and apartheid all of which carry, in his words, an ‘intense affective and evaluative charge’. Attitudes and actions in post-conflict South Africa and Rwanda in many instances only make sense in relation to the legacy of trauma, humiliation and painful emotions resulting from a brutal past. Too many researchers write of changes in these countries without recognising the significance of such a legacy.

**Organisation of the thesis**

In Chapter One I introduce this research and set it within the current memory and identity debates and the legacy of trauma that is a significant factor in the post-conflict states. The brief analysis of the conflict in each of the countries under study, provides the context for the analysis of the construction of memory and identity in the post-conflict curriculum.

In Chapter Two I deal with the education policy context, the research design and methods and set out the conceptual framework that informed the analysis of the data, which emerged from the research. This chapter also summarises the significance of the enquiry.

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82 Lindner (2006)
83 LaCapra (2004): 124
In the literature review in Chapter 3, I assemble and assess the current research on state, memory and identity in relation to history education in societies emerging from conflict. My purpose was to understand how societies emerging from violent internecine conflict attempt to re-imagine themselves through the powerful medium of curriculum. Curriculum is understood as the set of government curriculum policy documents containing official intentions, as well as policy-in-practice. History education, and therefore curriculum, is set against the wider issue of vernacular history and the record of the past that is culturally transmitted to young people and which filter the way the official curriculum is received in schools.

Chapter 4, the first chapter of the South African case study, examines the historical construction of the conflict narrative, providing the historical context for the examination of the post-apartheid construction of memory and identity in the following two chapters. It introduces the concept of ‘chosen trauma’ as a consciously constructed interpretation of the past in order to construct a particular group identity, in this case, white Afrikaners. The chapter also examines the process whereby this narrative, and expression of vernacular culture, became the official narrative in history education after the National Party took over power in 1948, and the way in which the history education community engaged with the narrative when it became increasingly clear that a transition to a democratic state was imminent.

The second South African chapter, Chapter 5, examines how this conflict narrative of the apartheid years is engaged in the post-conflict curriculum. More specifically, it analyses the way in which the new state took charge of the inherited narrative of conflict, how it sought to change it, and what choices were made in that process. To this end, the curriculum changes during the first phase of transition is examined, particularly the construction of Curriculum 2005 that resulted in a denial of memory, at a time when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was engaged in a memory process that brought the brutality of the South African past into the public arena.

Chapter 6, the third South African chapter examines the second curriculum change with the appointment of a new Minister of Education after the second democratic
elections. Under a changing political discourse which enabled the emergence of a different policy network, a more direct approach was taken to reinserting history in the school curriculum. This chapter explores how and why this restoration of history education took place, how far it could go and with what consequences.

Chapter 7 introduces the Rwandan case study, placing the South African story in comparative relief. It examines the construction of the conflict narrative during the colonial period and how it was appropriated in post-colonial Rwanda, to what purpose and with what effect. This, as with the South African case study, provides the context for understanding how this narrative is engaged in the present.

Chapter 8 examines how the Rwandan state is dealing with the conflict narrative in its recent history and how this grappling with the past emerges in the school curriculum. A moratorium was placed on teaching Rwandan history in schools in 1994 and though this has been lifted, there are no new teaching materials and many teachers are reluctant to engage with the genocide. At the same time, however, there is an aggressive official discourse of the unity of all Rwandans, support by an official narrative of the Rwandan past which has been widely disseminated in alternative education sites and public spaces of memory.

The final chapter, Chapter Nine, provides a synthesis of the data, highlights the key findings and significance of the research, suggests a theory of change, and indicates a major area for possible future research.
CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

The key research question focuses on how the school curriculum provides a window onto the political processes of re-inventing the ‘nation’ in societies emerging from internecine violent conflict. In developing the comparative case studies, I focus on the process of the construction of memory and identity in South Africa and Rwanda, particularly national memory and identity, in the creation of new political visions. I further examine the interface between official and vernacular memories and identities. Critical insights are gained through the analysis of the ideologies and interests of those involved in the curriculum processes, including the internal policy networks that gained ascendancy in South Africa, at various moments of curriculum construction. I have used a range of intersecting approaches to inform my research.

The policy context for this study

This research will investigate the construction of curriculum as a window onto the reinvention of nation in transitional societies, as it emerged in Rwanda and South Africa, in national dialogue and in practice. The focus will not be on history curriculum itself. Rather, it is the view of what the curriculum is about in the educated, political nation as part of the evolving collective identity that will provide the insight into collective memory and identity. Given that nationalisms and distorted histories in school curricula have contributed to oppression, gaining some insight into the ways in which memory and identity are constructed and the manipulation of both for negative ends, is crucial to the process of curriculum construction for prevention if we are to learn anything from the past. But, it also begs the question of what the curriculum means in reality.

In societies emerging from conflict, changing the education system not only signals a new national identity, it is also regarded as a means of reducing societal violence and creating a democratic society. Understanding the changes that take place in curriculum is linked to the broader framework of understanding the bargaining or
exercise of power and influence that took place during political settlements after conflict. This process of negotiation and social dialogue about the way in which a national school education system needs to change is context-specific. The assumption is that processes of curriculum change reflect the ways in which society has changed as a result of violent conflict, or needs to change in order to bring about or reinforce the vision and values of the new society. Curriculum for the purposes of this study will include curriculum as a product or set of government curriculum policy documents containing official intentions, analysed within both an educational and political framework (the formal), as well as informal and non-formal aspects of curriculum that inform history education.

Relevant conceptions of curriculum include those of a society-oriented curriculum, in which the purpose of schooling is to serve society and social reconstructionist-oriented curriculum in which the purpose of schools is to become agents of social change. However, useful as these conceptions may be, they do not go far enough in helping us to understand curriculum in societies emerging from a violent and traumatic past. In these societies, curriculum is as much part of a political as well as educational discourse with curriculum and education policy changes in general, needing to signal a break with the violent past, needing to make choices about how to work with the traumatic knowledge of the conflict, as well as constructing a workable vision of the future. Options open to history curriculum developers in terms of dealing with the violent past, ranges from denial (leaving it out of the curriculum) at the one extreme to confronting the violent past and incorporating it into the new curriculum at the other. If inclusion is the option followed, further choices need to be made in terms of finding ways of working with the past for a positive future. Perhaps this could be termed a transformation-oriented curriculum, the purpose of which is re-envisioning a democratic nation in contrast to the past, with the school curriculum as an agent of change. Such a curriculum would incorporate aspects of both the society-oriented and

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social reconstructionist oriented curricula, but would expand the understanding of both, including an analysis of the interaction between political leadership and bureaucracy in curriculum construction after violent conflict. Education policies in Rwanda and South Africa show that the political vision of the new society informed the curriculum process, articulating a new social and educational order that stands in sharp contrast to the ideologies and pedagogic practices of the past. Curriculum policy is, in general, expressed in the language of human rights and democracy.

Education policy is increasingly constructed within the context of global policy networks and policy borrowing.\(^4\) In South Africa the curriculum changes after 1994 were influenced by the formation of internal policy networks that produced specific policy outcomes in the various phases of post-apartheid curriculum development.\(^5\) There was also significant policy borrowing from New Zealand and Australia, with Canadian advisors shaping the final version of Curriculum 2005, South Africa’s first curriculum change after 1994.\(^6\) In a country such as Rwanda, and to some extent South Africa, the global policy networks of development organisations pressurize governments to meet various targets such as Education for All (EFA) or the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which results in greater focus being placed on education policy for economic development.

Sutton and Levinson’s analysis of curriculum policy as negotiated (political) meaning\(^7\) provides further valuable insights for understanding the development process in the context of the specific societies included in this study. This approach demands researching the powerful and examining the specific social arenas of curriculum negotiation, including the role of values, beliefs and identities in policy formulation and implementation. The shortcoming in Sutton and Levinson’s analysis in relation to developing countries is the underlying assumption, that those involved

\(^6\) See Chapter 4.
in policy and curriculum development form a more or less homogeneous group in terms of background, of knowledge and of ability. In developing countries, and particularly societies emerging from violent conflict, one simply cannot assume that everyone in education is at the same level, or able to exercise effective agency. Nor can one ignore the experiences of a traumatic past.

Education policy, as with history education, is political and ideological. Policy characterised as an authoritative allocation of values that projects images of an ideal society provides further useful insights into curriculum development processes in developing countries, where the political and educational interests are possibly more closely aligned than in developed countries. Policies cannot be divorced from interests, conflict, domination and justice, and even more so in countries in the process of re-inventing themselves. Ball argues that policy might best be understood as responding to a ‘complex, heterogeneous configuration of elements’ including ideologies that are residual, emergent and currently dominant. Within the context of this research, policy formulation must also be understood with relation to the political debates and negotiations that took place to end the conflicts. Ball, aligning himself with Foucault, suggests that power is invested in discourse, with discursive practices producing, maintaining and playing out power relations. He poses the crucial question: How does the state exercise and impose its power in part through the production of truth and knowledge about education? Within a transitional context, bureaucracies that survive the change of political power, provide yet a further level of competing interests that need to be analysed.

And finally, the notion of curriculum as conversation is particularly useful when engaging with history education and the construction of a history curriculum. Applebee suggests that curriculum should be knowledge-in-action constructed around the particular disciplinary traditions of knowing, with pupils learning to enter into the

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‘culturally significant traditions of knowing and doing’ of each subject. In his view, a curriculum provides domains for conversations, and the conversations that take place within those domains are the primary means of teaching and learning. In learning to participate in the traditions, pupils are taking on a dynamic set of tools for being in and making sense of the world.

History is itself an ongoing debate between the present and the past: and history education an ongoing conversation between the formal curriculum (school knowledge), public history (including public testimony, commemorations and memorial sites) and vernacular histories located in the vernacular cultures of family and community. In divided societies, vernacular histories influence the way in which teachers and pupils make sense of the formal curriculum. Visits to sites of traumatic memory by teachers and pupils and the way in which these sites are mediated, inform what is taught and how it is received, in class. As DiPaloantonio, Simon and Clamen argue, in societies with a past of human rights abuses, history in the form of public testimony such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, and official programmes of public memory, have a transitive function, an educative legacy that requires ethical remembrance and critical learning. In societies in transition from violent conflict, the boundaries between these sites and the formal curriculum are fluid. History education, therefore, needs to be understood in its broadest sense to include all forms of memory.

The dilemma for history education in post-conflict societies is recognising the way in which the representations of trauma have been shaped by the politics of memory. Levy and Sznайдer write of ‘witnessing trauma’ as the ‘modern means against the old fear of suppression or forgetting’. This refers to the voices of the survivors and the collecting of eye-witness accounts of atrocities, the stories that Simon and DiPaloantonio suggest, require ethical remembrance and critical learning.

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10Ibid: 36
12Levy and Sznайдer (n.d.): 6
and collective consciousness of trauma merges in memorials and monuments. Questions that need to be asked at these sites of memory are: whose perspective is represented and how the witness perspective has been institutionalised and become politically consequential?

**Conceptual framework**

- **The intersection between vernacular, official and public histories**

Bodnar’s work on the construction of public memory in America and the relation between official, public and vernacular memories, provided a valuable conceptual framework for the case studies in this research. Bodnar differentiates between ‘official’ history (what state institutions want to transmit, embodied in school history and children’s books), ‘vernacular’ history (what people experience as members of communities), and ‘public’ history, which he considers to be a compromise between official and vernacular histories. The articulation between vernacular, official and public history in post-conflict societies, provides the particular focus for the case studies in this research. Vernacular cultures, according to Bodnar, represent an ‘array of specialised interests’ that are ‘diverse and changing and can be reformulated from time to time’, by the formation of new social units which share similar experiences.

‘Defenders’ of particular vernacular cultures are:

intent on protecting values and restating views of reality derived from firsthand experience in small-scale communities rather than the ‘imagined’ communities of a large nation...normally vernacular expressions convey what social reality feels like rather than what it should be like. Its very existence threatens the sacred and timeless nature of official expressions.  

A South African example of a community memory space that expresses what social reality felt like, rather than what it was, is the District 6 Museum in Cape Town. District 6 was a multi-racial suburb close to the city centre, from which the residents were forcibly removed in the 1960s. The museum was constructed in consultation

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14 Ibid: 14
with former residents. However, it privileges a particular memory and identity – that of the ‘coloured’ community – over the others.  

In discussing the debate over the Vietnam memorial in his opening chapters, Bodnar highlights the expressions of official and vernacular interests in attempting to dominate public memory, and the concerns of national political leaders in safeguarding the nation-state. The concept of public memory as emerging from the intersection of official and vernacular cultural expressions, is helpful in understanding the emerging programmes of memory in South Africa and the official commemoration events in Rwanda which, in Rwanda’s case, express the official interests to the exclusion of vernacular memories. Further, in examining the stages of the development of public memory in the United States from the early 19th century and the relation between public memory and the changing nature of structures of power, when the power of a new nation is tenuous, Bodnar provides an entry into thinking about the way in which vernacular memories in relatively new states compete for dominance when there is a change of government and how these narratives become official histories. This occurred in South Africa with the construction of an Afrikaner nationalist narrative in the 1930s and 1940s which became the dominant version of the South African past when the National Party, the political expression of Afrikaner nationalism, came into power in 1948.

I have applied Bodner’s categorisation of vernacular, official and public history to the analysis of the construction of the conflict narratives, as well as to the examination of the post-conflict construction of memory and identity, in both South Africa and Rwanda. However, while this provides a particularly useful conceptual framework, I have extended his concepts of vernacular and official history. Bodner’s analysis applies to a western context and does not sufficiently provide for a more complex, African post-colonial and post-conflict analysis of memory and identity that is rooted

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15 The District 6 Museum in Buitenkant Street, Cape Town is on the edge of the former Cape Town district. It is an excellent example of an expression of community, constructed with the involvement of the former residents of District 6. It is also an interesting example of the mediation of memory. Overwhelmingly the identity of former ‘coloured’ residents, the memories are generally romanticised as the happy times of a caring and united community.
within a pre-colonial past. Within Africa, what constitutes vernacular and official history needs to be conceived of more broadly than Bodnar has done, to include oral histories of families and communities, and the more formal oral traditions which are the official histories of the African ruling elites. Oral histories and oral traditions at times become interwoven with colonial histories to serve various purposes. In Rwanda, royal oral traditions informed the emerging ‘conflict narrative’.¹⁶ A South African example was the construction of Zulu history and the ‘invention’ of Shaka that found expression in school textbooks.¹⁷ The language used for Shaka was invariably of power, chaos and destruction – an image that suited Shaka at the time:

[At that time] pandemonium had raged among the Bantu of South-eastern Africa...The storm-centre lay between the Mkusi and Tugela rivers. There Chaka [Shaka] the Zulu had succeeded his overlord, Dingiswayo...[Shaka] first drove the neighbouring Angoni and Shangaans northwards to carry desolation through the Eastern coastlands...and then stabbed his way through and through Natal...Behind this whirling mass of tribesmen a few scattered European settlements clung to the south-east coast.¹⁸

Oral histories and family traditions also become sources of counter-memories to fuel resistance to authority.

- **The power of emotion**

Boler’s study of emotions as forms of social control and of resistance has provided critical insights into the politics of memory, identity and emotion in both Rwanda and South Africa.¹⁹ In a western context, emotions have traditionally been deemed inappropriate in the ‘hallowed halls of academe’.²⁰ This has been alluded to in relation to historians in the section on traumatic legacy. Challenging this, Boler’s first premise is that within education, as in the wider culture, emotions are a site of social control

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¹⁶ This will be addressed in depth in the first chapter of the Rwandan case study.
¹⁸ Walker, E.A. (1947) *A History of South Africa* London: Longmans, Green and Co.:182-3. Walker was a prominent historian and his work influenced the way Shaka and the mfecane were depicted in generations of textbooks and fed into the myth of the empty land.
²⁰ Ibid (1999): xvi
and she is interested to understand emotions as they are embedded in culture and ideology. She defines emotions not only as actual feeling (sensational or physiological), but also as ‘cognitive’ or ‘conceptual’: shaped by our beliefs and perceptions.

For Boler, emotion is both about control and resistance. Feeling power is about how we learn to internalise and enact roles and rules assigned to us within the dominant culture. We learn the emotional rules of a society, systematically designed to enforce acceptance, that help to maintain a society’s particular hierarchies.\textsuperscript{21} On the other hand, feeling power is the power of feeling as a basis of collective and individual social resistance to injustices.\textsuperscript{22} Foucault’s studies of subject and power offer concepts useful to an historicised approach to the study of emotions and discipline in education. In particular, his pedagogy of discomfort, which entails engaging in the discomforting process of questioning our learned values and assumptions and examining how our modes of seeing have been specifically shaped by the dominant culture of our historical moment.\textsuperscript{23}

I have made use of Boler’s analysis in examining the discourses of the politics of memory and identity in South Africa as well as Rwanda. However, it has been particularly useful in relation to Rwanda’s political and educational discourses which attempt to shape the nation with images of a pre-colonial unity of all Rwandan set against the threats of action against divisionism and genocide ideology.

**Data collection**

- **Autobiographical referencing**

As someone who was fully, professionally involved in the curriculum processes in South Africa, I had a depth of knowledge and understanding that I could not achieve as an outsider observer in relation to Rwanda. As someone situated within the change processes, I was applying the theory of situated learning, acquiring knowledge in

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\textsuperscript{21} Ibid (1999): xx
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid (1999): xxi
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid (1999): xxiv
action within, it could be argued, a community of practice constituted by the history writing groups, but also those who were developing other Learning Areas and subjects. The concept of ‘standpoint theory’ has been also used to consider the position of ‘insider-outsiders’ who seek to cross boundaries between different worlds and knowledge. Standpoint theorists argue that we need to see the world from diverse perspectives, across groups and within individual selves. This is not simply a matter of accumulating different knowledge, from different standpoints, and composing a more diverse mosaic, but attempting to understand a complex set of power relationships between different identities and between what is culturally ‘inside’ and what is ‘other’.

There is a growing trend for autobiographical referencing in research, and declaring a personal position in terms of the research is important. Chisholm suggests that this is particularly so when the subject being researched is a process connected with the state and policy. She notes:

autobiographical referencing has become relatively common in academic writing on the grounds that the relationships between subject and object, or researcher and researched, are intimately linked. In the interests of greater transparency of the relationship between writer and subject, the obligation is on the researcher to profess their connection with and understanding of the events being described and analyzed.

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Foucault offers a rationale for self-study work: ‘if one is interested in doing historical work that has political meaning, utility and effectiveness, then this is possible only if one has some kind of involvement with the struggles taking place in the area in question’.\(^1\) Autobiography challenges the fiction of the detached, objective researcher of others’ histories and the idea that a researcher’s own history and identity play little or no part in constructing the ‘other’s’ story.\(^2\) Fine further argues for the reflexive and self-reflexive potential of experience, in which the knower is part of the matrix of what is known, and where the researcher needs to ask her/himself in what way has s/he grown in, and shaped the process of research. This is a process that strives to surface power relationships, discomforts, dead ends and uncertainties and rather than an absence of rigour, or truth, such auto/biographical methods ask much of the researcher, in terms of self-awareness, social and emotional intelligence, sensitivity, integrity, courage and openness.\(^3\)

My position when writing of South African history education is that of an insider reflecting on a number of ‘moments’ in post-apartheid curriculum construction in which I was to a greater or lesser degree involved. In the period of transition from a racially-organised conflict state, race continues to be important in negotiating the relations between those working on a curriculum. Being white, English-speaking and a woman has very particular connotations in a South African context. I was a history teacher in the independent school system during apartheid, which meant that I had a little more freedom in what I taught than most teachers in the state system. I was involved in the progressive history debates between 1990 and 1994 and in the revision of the apartheid syllabus in 1994. I joined the Western Cape Education Department as the curriculum specialist for history in 1997, and was intimately involved in the last phase of curriculum writing from 2001. In 2002 I became part of the South African

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\(^2\) West (2000)

History Project (SAHP), a national history project set up by the Minister of Education. My portfolio in the SAHP was that of curriculum development.

Though my position as an ‘insider’ has contributed to my understanding of the education processes in South Africa, it needs also to be said that the view from my ‘window’ varies, at certain times becoming relatively limited, and at all times shaped within particular historical social contexts. My wide-ranging personal experiences and contacts and involvement in activities across racial barriers had given me a deeper understanding of the realities of apartheid than most of my white compatriots. However, I essentially had an academic understanding of the inequalities in South African schools. This changed when I began visiting a wide range of schools as part of my job in the Western Cape Education Department. So living under apartheid and, in fact, within the continued legacy of a post-apartheid divided society, an insider is always in certain respects, at the same time an outsider.

Understanding the ‘frames of meaning’ in a racially divided society, as both insider and outsider, requires a complex analysis, taking into account the ‘layers and multiplicity of influences’ which provide the researcher with deep challenges.

While I was able to bring some of the insights from my work in South Africa, as the country emerged from the apartheid conflict, to the research I conducted for the Rwanda case study, my perspective in Rwanda remained that of an outsider with the constraints and perspectives that this brought with it, as I attempted to make meaning of the complexities of a post-genocide society. In thinking about this dilemma, I found the approach to anthropology of Clifford Geertz particularly helpful: to think about the study of other peoples’ cultures as involving ‘discovering who they think they are, what they think they are doing, and to what end they think they are doing it’.

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4 Clifford Geertz provides a useful framework for understanding outsider roles in research. He wrote: ‘To discover who people think they are, what they think they are doing, and to what end they think they are doing it, it is necessary to gain a working familiarity with the frames of meaning within which they enact their lives. This does not involve feeling anyone else's feelings, or thinking anyone else's thoughts, simple impossibilities. Nor does it involve going native, an impractical idea, inevitably bogus. It involves learning how, as a being from elsewhere with a world of one's own, to live with them. Geertz, C. (1999) A Life of Learning, Charles Homer Haskins Lecture for 1999, American Council of Learned Societies, Occasional Paper No. 45

In order to do this it is ‘necessary to gain a working familiarity with the frames of meaning within which they enact their lives’. This is about attempting to develop an empathetic understanding, extremely difficult in any situation. In the process of seeking to understand the legacy of genocide, I also drew on work of the psychologists mentioned previously in the section on traumatic legacy.

- **Historical research**

The methodology I used for this doctorate was grounded in my training as an academic historian. I argue strongly that I am creating an archive, using as many techniques for data collection as possible. The archive is then interrogated in relation to answering the research question.

Historical analysis is gaining recognition in the field of comparative education providing a depth to research that is not always provided by theoretical approaches that ‘are not conducive to understanding historical subtleties’. Developing an historical consciousness involves making linkages between past and present and understanding how the problem under consideration originated and developed. This, in turn, provides insight into the nature of the present problem. In particular it is built on the awareness of an individual’s own place within the context of historical time. By comparing events, ideas and attitudes within one period or between more than one, a researcher is able to reach reasoned conclusions about such matters as continuity, change and development. The researcher is also able to create explanatory narratives that provide a coherent analytical account to explain the contemporary situation.

Sweeting makes a compelling argument for using an historical approach in comparative education, arguing that the significance of the historical dimension is regaining recognition by workers in the field. The role of historical research within

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9 Sweeting (2005)
the comparative discipline enables that work to trace the conceptualisation of ideas and the formation of knowledge over time and space. Quoting Yariv-Mashal, Sweeting argues that one could picture such a theoretical framework for comparative studies as a multidimensional process, in which research is grounded in ‘local histories’, but is based and embedded in different forces, connections, times and places. Historical analysis goes beyond a narrow focus to find connections between the subject under study and the broader political, social, economic, religious and other cultural developments. While this research is based largely on historical research and analysis, it is also interdisciplinary in that it draws on insights from psychology, sociology and anthropology.

This study uses analytical narrative to present the findings of the research. There is a growing interest in the possibilities inherent in narrative inquiry in the field of education research for connecting curriculum development, professional development and educational reform. Narrative enquiry is a form of qualitative research located within the family of reflective practice; it reflects the interest of a community of educational researchers interested in narrative ways of knowing. Narrative understanding is an important, if not the major, cognitive tool through which all human beings in all cultures make sense of the world, being predisposed to organising experience into a narrative form.

- **Education document research**

I examined both political and educational documents. For this research, education policy documents were considered to be political and ideological texts, constructed within a particular historical and political context. The analysis of this context was critical to the understanding of the language and symbols of the education documents in both countries. The documents were analysed in terms of ideology and pedagogy. This provided insight into the articulation between political vision, memory, identity and the construction of curriculum. For South Africa, the analysis of the education

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12 Ibid
policy documents also included the process of the production of the text. The discourse embedded in the education documents was compared with the political vision in the Constitutions of both countries and in selected political speeches: the President of the Republic of Rwanda, President Kagame; the President of the Republic of South Africa, President Mbeki; and the speeches and addresses of the South African Minister of Education, Prof Kader Asmal.

In South Africa, documents relating to education included general policy documents such as the *South African Schools Act* (DoE: 1996); curriculum framework documents such as *Curriculum Framework for General and Further Education and Training* (DoE: 1996); and curriculum documents such as the *Revised National Curriculum Statement Grades R-9 (Schools) Policy, Social Sciences* (DoE: 2002) and *National Curriculum Statement Grades 10 – 12 (General) History* (DoE: 2003). A key set of reports prepared by the Ministerial Committees set up by the Minister of Education after the general elections of 1999 to investigate the state of education in South Africa, provided the framework for the reintroduction of history into the national curriculum after 1999. These included: *A South African Curriculum for the Twenty First Century: Report of the Review Committee on Curriculum 2005*, presented to the Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal on the 31 May 2000; *Values, Education and Democracy: Report of the Working Group on Values in Education* (DoE: 2000); and the *Report of the History and Archaeology Panel to the Minister of Education* (DoE:2000).

In Rwanda, the vision for post-genocide education was set out in the Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (November 2002) document, *2020 Vision, Draft 3* (English Version). While a moratorium had been placed on the teaching of Rwandan history in the primary schools, there was a revision of the senior history curriculum after 1994 and senior schools could choose whether or not to teach history. The main curriculum documents consulted were the Ministry of Education: National Curriculum Development Centre (1998) *Ordinary Level History Programme* Kigali: NCDC and the Ministry of Education: National Curriculum Development Centre (1999) *History programme for advanced level section: languages*. In mid-

**Workshops**

Data was gathered from professional development workshops for teachers in South Africa and Rwanda. The link between the workshops, which made the data comparable, was the United States-based organisation, *Facing History and Ourselves* (FHAO). In South Africa, a partnership between the Western Cape Education Department, Facing History and Ourselves, and the Cape Town Holocaust Centre, led to the development of the *Facing the Past – transforming our future* teacher development programme. In Rwanda, FHAO runs workshops for teachers, college lecturers and government employees in the National Curriculum Development Centre. While the United States course has been adapted in each country, both programmes follow *Facing History’s* ‘Scope and Sequence’ which includes engaging with individual and group identity; examining human behaviour in relation to the Holocaust and apartheid in South Africa and the Holocaust and Rwandan history in Rwanda; judgement, memory and legacy; and choosing to participate.

The *Facing the Past* programme consisted of a series of five-day introductory workshops which were held annually between 2003 and 2006. This was changed to two three-day workshops in 2007 and 2008. There are a number of one-day follow-up workshops during each year. An Advanced Teacher Programme developed out of *Facing the Past* and runs concurrently with *Facing the Past*. An invitation was sent out to teachers to join the project when it was launched. After the first workshop teachers were recruited by their colleagues who had been on the project or by sending

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13 The Cape Town Holocaust Centre is no longer a formal partner. A non-profit organisation, Shikaya, was set up to manage the *Facing the Past* programme on behalf of the remaining partners. Shikaya is now the third partner.
out a general invitation. The project manager handled the recruitment of teachers. A total of 105 teachers have attended the Facing the Past workshops between 2003 and 2008 and, of those, 50 teachers continued beyond the initial year. Of the 50, 18 teachers are part of the Advanced Teacher Programme. All workshops are multi-racial. One three-day workshop in 2006 was triangulated. Extensive notes were taken during two of the longer workshops, one in 2007 and one in 2008, by an independent observer. I co-facilitated all of the workshops.

In Rwanda I observed a five-day workshop in 2005 which I recorded and transcribed. There were 30 participants. Teachers and teacher educators were recruited by the in-country project officer. Facing History and Ourselves conducted an international teacher workshop in London in July 2008 and invited me to co-facilitate. There were 4 teachers from Rwanda and 4 from South Africa attending the workshop and this afforded me the opportunity for further data gathering.

While both countries draw on the approaches of FHAO, there is an essential difference. South Africa has adapted the scope and sequences and embedded it within the existing history curriculum; while Rwanda follows it more closely, making appropriate connections to their own past. This will be explained more fully later.

- **Observation**

  Data was gathered through observation in workshops. In both South Africa and Rwanda, the research was explained at the beginning of the workshop and there were no objections to recording and taking notes. In Rwanda this was done in English, French and Kinyarwanda. Observations were of large and small group interactions. The small group participant observation provided an opportunity of ‘thinking with others’ and ‘giving participants a voice’ in the research\(^\text{14}\) and an opportunity for the

\(^{14}\) Winter, R. (1998) Finding a Voice – Thinking with Others: a conception of action research. *Educational Action Research*, Vol. 6, No. 1: 54. Winter critiques the ‘theory-practice’ link and the literature survey for ‘gaps’ in the context of action research. He uses the phrase ‘developing a theoretical interpretation’ rather than ‘linking practice to theory’ contending that the latter embodies an ‘inert’ conception of the relationship between practice and ‘theory’. Although this study is not fully grounded in action research, there are a number of conceptions, such as this one, and approaches that I believe will be extremely useful in providing insight into the dynamics of societies undergoing change.
researcher to put informal questions to the groups at appropriate times during discussions. Observation of whole group sessions allows the researcher to be an ‘outside’ hopefully ‘invisible’ observer of the interactions between the groups and individuals within the groups, the body language of participants towards one another and when interacting with the source material provided for the workshops.

- **Workshop sessions as data-gathering**

A session in each of the workshops was used as a method of data gathering. Within each of the *Facing the Past* introductory workshops, a session called ‘Silent Conversation’ provided participants with the opportunity of engaging in written response and conversation to a number of appropriate historical sources and to one another’s written comments. The sources covered a range of personal experiences of ordinary people during apartheid. These sessions elicited deep thoughts and responses that participants might not otherwise have felt confident enough or emotionally prepared to voice aloud, and gave an indication of the depth of identity dilemmas and psychological legacy of an oppressive system. After everyone had had an opportunity to engage with all of the sources, discussions were held in groups. Finally all participants came together in a circle with the papers in the centre to discuss their responses. All participation in the open discussion was on a voluntary basis.

- **Interviews and written evaluations**

I originally planned to conduct a number of interviews with teachers and education officials. Being acutely aware of the limitations of an ‘outsider’ researcher in Rwanda, I read widely and the more I read about research in that country, the more uncomfortable I became about one-on-one interviews because of the personal dangers this could pose to respondents. Two passages in Lindner’s thesis, *The Psychology of Humiliation: Somalia, Rwanda/Burundi, and Hitler’s Germany* graphically highlighted the ethical issues of research in Rwanda. In the first, she quotes Michael Patton who wrote in his publication *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*:

> The high esteem in which science is held has made it culturally acceptable in Western countries to conduct interviews on virtually any subject in the name of science. Such is not the case worldwide.
Evaluation researchers cannot simply presume that they have the right to ask intrusive questions. Many topics may be taboo. I have experienced cultures where it was simply inappropriate to ask question of a subordinate about a superordinate. Any number of topics may be taboo, or at least indelicate, for strangers – family matters, political views, who own what, how people came to be in certain positions, and sources of income.\textsuperscript{15}

His caution is even more pertinent to a country such as Rwanda in the aftermath of genocide.

The second passage is the advice that Lindner got before embarking on her research from someone doing research in the Great Lakes region:

Meet for interviews at neutral places; Hutu can be put in danger when you talk to them. Never talk about your topic on the phone. Never ask a person whether he or she is Tutsi or Hutu. Better ask: What is your background? Where were you in 1994? When did your family leave Rwanda? You can then deduct the background because those who left between 1954 and 1960 (or their fathers) are Tutsi; those who left 1994 and were back 1996 are Hutu. Be prepared that nobody will talk to you…Be also prepared that Tutsi are hostile to whites because the UN soldiers just took the Western people out of the country and allowed the massacre to happen; the Hutu are afraid to talk about their suffering...\textsuperscript{16}

As the latter was not an isolated piece of advice\textsuperscript{17}, I felt that it was important to take cognisance of what was being said. I took the decision to work with published interviews, the workshop observations and the open journaling and evaluations filled in by the workshop participants. The anonymity of the participants was of the utmost


\textsuperscript{16} Ibid: 104

\textsuperscript{17} See also, for example, Freedman et.al. (2008) Teaching History after Identity-Based Conflicts: The Rwanda Experience. \emph{Comparative Education Review} Vol. 52, No. 4: 665
importance and no-one was identified at any point in the evaluations, the journaling or in my observation notes. Two publications were a rich source of interviews with teachers: African Rights (2001) *The Heart of Education, Assessing Human Rights in Rwanda’s Schools* Kigali: African Rights and Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (2006) *History and conflicts in Rwanda*. Kigali: IRDP. I also participated in one small group discussion with teacher trainers during the workshop.

Written evaluations were received from the 30 participants in the workshop in Rwanda and four from the Rwandans at the London workshop. I used qualitative methods to analyse the data. I read through the data sets several times looking across all sources for themes related to what counts officially as the history of Rwanda, to the correlation between the teachers’ discourse about the past and the official narrative, for what was said or intimated about Rwandan identity in the past and the present and the tensions that emerged around what should be taught as official history and the way in which it should be taught.

The South African data has been gathered over the years of the *Facing the Past* programme from 2003 to 2008. There were participant evaluations from all of the workshops and open journaling from two workshops. The evaluation forms used in South Africa and Rwanda are very similar. I used external evaluations of the programme compiled in December 2004 and in 2005. Seven teachers were interviewed for the 2006 external evaluation of the programme. I was able to use the recordings of the interviews. Three further interviews for internal evaluations in 2006 were also made available. I looked across all sources for themes relating to what should be taught as official history and the way it should be taught, but also memory, individual and group identity and the apartheid legacy.

One class of pupils in Cape Town was filmed giving a presentation to parents on the work that had been done when their teachers implemented the *Facing the Past* programme of teaching.
Validation
Validation occurred on a number of levels. Firstly, through the use of multiple sources of information such as document analysis, workshop observation and analysis, individual and group interviews. Secondly, through triangulation of workshop sessions at which there was a presenter, researcher and observer. There was always at least one person in the triangulation sessions who knew the local situation intimately. Discussions before the workshop clarified the modus operandi during the workshops, including the particular aspects of the interaction during the workshop to be observed and the framework for the discussions after the workshops.

Significance of the Enquiry
This study breaks new ground in a number of significant areas:
Firstly, it is the first comparative African case study research on how societies emerging from violent conflict engage with the traumatic past, and how the construction of memory and identity is reflected and asserted in the history curriculum in the process of re-imagining the nation. There are a growing number of societies in and emerging from conflict and not enough attention is given to curriculum issues, particularly when development organisations are involved, in the reconstruction of education systems after conflict.

Secondly, it is the first study to take the legacy of trauma after identity-based conflict into account in an analysis of trajectories of political and educational change. This is a crucial element that adds to the complexities of educational change in post-conflict societies. The legacy of trauma is generally acknowledged by psychologists and NGOs working in countries such as Rwanda, but not seen as a context for understanding educational change.

Thirdly, what has again been underlined by this study, are the complexities of educational change and the fragility of a post-conflict society. Donor agencies link funding to evidence of the democratisation of educational practices. However, not only does this ignore the disparities in capacity that is the legacy of a divided society, but it also ignores the real fears of, for example, a society such as Rwanda, in which
the perpetrators were drawn from the majority community and those who overthrew the previous regime are from the minority community. Fully free and fair elections may well return a Hutu government and with it, renewed conflict.

Fourthly, this study has also raised questions about the ways in which identities formed within a conflict society, filter curriculum knowledge. Education bureaucracies and teachers shaped during the conflict are expected to deliver new knowledge and values in the post-conflict classroom. While some attention is generally given to orientating teachers to a changing curriculum, little attention is given to supporting them in personal change.
CHAPTER THREE

STATE, CURRICULUM AND IDENTITY IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES

Introduction
This chapter assembles and assesses the current research on state, memory, identity and curriculum in post-conflict societies. My objective is to understand how societies emerging from a violent and traumatic past, attempt to re-imagine themselves through the powerful medium of curriculum. For the purposes of this study, curriculum is considered to be a product or set of government curriculum policy documents containing official intentions and policy-in-practice, as practitioners and pupils engage with and make meaning of curriculum in the history classroom.

There are few studies relevant to the construction of memory and identity in curriculum in post-conflict studies, particularly in Africa, that examine the intersection between the political and educational processes of change. In the course of assembling and organising these fragments, I identify discourses about the processes through which societies re-invent themselves after conflict, particularly in relation to the politics of memory that attempt to shape national memory and identity and ultimately the nature and content of the school history curriculum. I also identify several silences, gaps and contestations about these politically driven and determined processes.

The sample of literature selected for this review focuses on the following exemplar countries that have had comparable experiences of conflict, trauma and transition: Northern Ireland and Israel as societies in conflict in which the history curriculum is treated as a dimension of political education and related directly to ongoing sectarian conflict; former Soviet controlled east European countries and the Russian federation where the focus is providing new narratives in school textbooks to support new national identities, replacing the old Soviet-determined socialist narratives; Germany, not only because the Holocaust has now become accepted as part of global memory, but because the processes Germany has gone through in attempting to come to terms
with their Nazi past *(Vergangenheitsbewältigung*: confronting/coming to terms with the past), provides insight into both countries under study in this research. These case studies are broadly representative of the research that has been conducted on education and conflict, and more particularly, the history curriculum and the perceived role that school history has played and continues to play in fuelling ethnic and sectarian division and conflict; as well as its role in constructing new interpretive frameworks that relate to a politically determined master narrative mediated via the curriculum and curricular materials.

Because of the political and ideological nature of education policy particularly in states in transition from violent conflict, the central question that becomes relevant to this research arising from the literature review is: who attempts to assert power and control over the conflict narrative as a society emerges from conflict, and for what purpose?

This review ends by demonstrating how my research will address these concerns by raising questions about power, ideology and competing interests in transitional societies (Rwanda and South Africa), and about how these interests attempt to shape emerging education policy in the post-conflict reconstruction of the state and in particular, the nature and content of school history. The particular national context in this research is the legacy of trauma resulting from violent internecine conflict, involving repression and even genocide. This is a critical aspect of transitional states that has received little attention in debates (or lack of them) in relation to what should, or should not, become part of a new history curriculum. This research will draw on inter-disciplinary literature in an attempt to address this gap in education research.

**Limitations of existing knowledge on the construction of memory and identity in curriculum in post-conflict societies**

There is a gap in the literature surveyed that makes links between memory (including traumatic memory), identity, history and construction of curriculum and of the competing interests of those who would shape memory and identity in creating a new society after violent conflict. There is also little focus, in the literature surveyed, on
the ways in which the intersection of political power, ideology and identity informed or determined which knowledge in terms of the history curriculum, is considered to be of most worth. In other words, few questions have been raised about power, ideology and competing interests and how these attempt to shape the emerging collective memory and national identity in post-conflict reconstruction. These questions are crucial to understanding the nature of education policy in transition and post-conflict societies, and are central to this dissertation. Even when a political consensus emerges from the period following trauma and transition, the ideological control that this consensus exerts in the educational arena, can be fiercely contested or subverted on a number of levels, particularly when the new state has an inherited bureaucracy with a strong institutional memory that reflects the previous ‘conventional wisdom’ that was shaped and sharpened during the period of conflict. Here the framers of the new consensus face entrenched values, attitudes and beliefs in the medium’s existing dominant ‘culture’ (the entrenched bureaucracy) for transforming consensus into policy and practice.

Furthermore, most of the case studies of trauma and transition with a research base are outside of the African context, as indicated by the representative sample in this chapter. If the critical theorists are correct that the creation of education policy is historically situated and cannot be divorced from the current political interests, conflict and domination, then the case studies provide analogical evidence or data from other continents which is useful, but cannot be applied out of context to Africa. The formulation and implementation of educational policy, it could be argued, can only be understood in relation to the political debates and negotiations that take place after conflict within particular societal contexts.

**What we already know**

This section attempts to construct a picture, from the evidence in the current research, of the ways in which power and control is exercised over history education in societies in transition from violent conflict. It begins with an examination of history education in Israel, a society still in conflict, in particular the barriers to developing a common narrative of the past. This provides insight into the dynamics of an
An authoritarian society as South Africa was, under apartheid that brooks no challenges to the master narrative. The review continues with research in Northern Ireland that engages with the intersection of vernacular and official history in the history classroom, and the way in which pupil identities serve to filter the official narrative that is embedded in the curriculum. As the concept, traumatic memory, is most recently associated with former eastern bloc countries emerging from Soviet domination, the next section examines the ways in which a number of these countries dealt with the conflict narrative after 1989. Finally, the processes followed in post-Nazi Germany brings the literature review to a conclusion. All these articles bring particular understandings to the processes of change in societies emerging from conflict, which taken together, provide a basis from which to examine the trajectories of transition after violent conflict in South Africa and Rwanda.

Memory and identity in divided societies – Israel

Israel emerged as a ‘nation’ after the Second World War, a state created after conquest of Arab territory and with a national identity to a large extent forged in the traumatic crucible of the Holocaust. The Jewish and Palestinian narratives of the 1948 war are diametrically opposed and, as the PRIME project outlined below revealed, these opposing narratives continue to be an almost insurmountable stumbling block to developing an historical account of the region’s past that both sides can accept. A simple example illuminates the problem: what is known as the War of Independence in Israeli narratives is, in the Palestinian accounts, El Nakba, the Catastrophe.¹

It has been argued that both Israelis and Palestinians define themselves in large part by their historical traumas.² The legacy of the Arab-Israeli wars in terms of the occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel, the ongoing Palestinian-Jewish conflict and the traumatic memory of the Holocaust, provide a complicated context for history

education. Israel has been described as a non-liberal democracy⁸ and an ethnocratic regime⁴ in which the educational agenda is politically driven, promoting national identity through the school curriculum. Research on education in Israel provides an example of a country with strong official authoritarian intervention (Jewish and Palestinian) on a number of levels to ensure hegemonic national (Zionist) narratives in school texts used in Israeli-Jewish schools. Inevitably such texts foster suspicion and distrust towards Palestinians. Indications are that there is equally strong official control of Palestinian narratives in school texts with the same results.⁵

The interpretation of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains ‘a body in the middle of the room’⁶ that is a hurdle to any attempts by educators and NGOs to bring Jewish and Palestinian university students within Israel together in dialogue, or to construct a common narrative about the past. Elbaz-Luwish, in her article on teacher education in Israel, How is Education Possible When There’s a Body in the Middle of the Room?, graphically describes the difficulty of education in a society still in conflict that has at its core identity, the politics of memory. Her article engages with the culture of silence about the ‘body’ that divides Israel and Palestinians living in Israel, and of ‘proper’ discourse - of political correctness - when forced to mention the ‘body’. This is a deeply reflective article on her work, which includes a course on multiculturalism, with prospective and experienced teachers at the University of Haifa in Israel who reflect the diversity of Israeli society. The difficulties in setting up a genuine dialogue among the students led her to reflect on the power of emotion as a tool for understanding the way in which ‘personal expression of feeling is shaped by public discourse’. In the context of Israel, ‘it is apparent that one may come to experience the correct feelings appropriate for a good Israeli or Palestinian’.⁷ While her article does

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⁵ See the discussion on the PRIME project below.
not address memory and identity in relation to the history curriculum, it does provide a picture of the deep divisions that occur when identities are shaped by the use of versions of the past to fuel current conflict, the rational use of emotions to help shape identities, and the constraints experienced when trying to facilitate difficult dialogues. Elbaz- Luwisch writes:

the more problematic disruption in an educational context is of the very possibility for ordinary people on both sides to continue to see that those on the other side are, like themselves, ordinary people. It is this disruption that forces me to question whether education is possible, whether it is still possible to speak about dialogue across cultural differences.\(^8\)

The difficulties not only in setting up ‘real dialogue’ but in overcoming the perceptions of ‘the other’ ‘shaped by public discourse’ in countries in conflict are highlighted in Naveh’s report on the Peace Research Institute on Middle East or PRIME project.\(^9\) His report also provides insight into the lengths to which government in a democracy will go in order to ensure the dominance of governments’ politically controlled or mediated version of the past when the narrative serves as a legitimising foundational myth within a region that is in conflict. This includes counters to any potential challenges to that narrative. Although it is a report on the project, rather than an analysis of the political context or the discourses of power that occur in Israeli society, it does provide a window into the competing political interests and discourses that exist and that exert influence to shape memory and identity through school history.

The aim of the project was to attempt to find a meeting point for Israelis – Jewish and Palestinian - in the interpretation of the history of the region’s recent past. Two teams of history teachers were formed – one Jewish and one Palestinian – with an academic historian heading each group. History education in both Israel and Palestine is

\(^8\) Elbaz-Luwisch (2004): 15
\(^9\) Eyal Naveh (2005)
contentious with the Israeli government claiming that Palestinian textbooks incite hatred against the Jews and the existence of the state of Israel, and Palestinians claiming that they appear in the Israeli textbooks only as terrorists.  

While it has been considered legitimate for academic historians to engage with debates around various perspectives of Israel’s past since the late 1980s, with revisionist historians in Israeli universities being ‘allowed’ to challenge a number of foundational pillars of Zionist historiography, these debates are not considered appropriate for school history. Revisionist historians have criticised ‘Zionist historians’ for ‘ideological scholarship’ and misrepresenting the Arab-Israeli conflict. At that time, the challenge escalated into a public debate about national identity. This disjuncture between academic historiography and what is allowed in school texts is not unique to Israel, but is a reflection of a state under siege, whose very legitimacy could be called into question. This is salient to the South African situation, where there is a need to develop pupil understanding based upon approaches to history education that develops skills, knowledge and understanding for citizens of a plural democracy.

The ongoing political situation in the region made a combined narrative of the Arab-Israeli conflict impossible, so the project proposed writing a school history textbook that carried parallel histories (narratives) of the conflict. As the political situation deteriorated after 2000, the project teachers continued to meet, but under enormous constraints and a number of meetings had to be held outside of the region.

When it came to the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, PRIME found that it was impossible for the teachers to agree on any ‘undisputed historical and ‘objective’ events that could provide a common ground for different interpretations. Naveh notes this without comment, even though it provides fascinating insight into the extent to

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10 Naveh (2005): 2
12 The same happened in South Africa under apartheid. Revisionist historians provided a wealth of alternative histories that clearly ran counter to the official Afrikaner narrative still being taught in the majority of schools.
which the teachers from both sides have accepted and internalised the hegemonic
versions of history (Foucault’s knowledge linked to power, not only assuming the
authority of the truth, but making itself true thus creating a regime of truth) that they
are required to teach in schools and clearly illustrates Elbaz-Luwish experience and
reflection on the power of emotion and the way that personal expression of feeling is
shaped by public discourse. To overcome this, it was decided to encourage each
group to write its own version of national history, their own narrative as a basis for
collective identity. By doing this it was hoped that pupils in the history classes could
understand that there can be two interpretations of events – that opposing sides
interpret historical events in the region very differently.

The development of the project revealed the extent to which a history curriculum
transmits the official view of national identity that is rooted in the past. The Israeli
teachers got unofficial permission from principals to use the material in extra-
curricula sessions after school. However, when the Israeli Ministry of Education got
to hear of the project, an official ‘decree’ was issued forbidding the use of the parallel
texts in schools, and the teachers were personally threatened with dismissal by the
Education Minister. This visceral response underscores the totalitarian side of a
democracy when under threat of survival. It gives some indication of the lengths to
which governments will go when a legitimating narrative, and therefore the
legitimacy of the state, is questioned in times of conflict and contested territorial
occupation. Palestinian principals could not allow the use of the materials in schools
without official permission, so teachers took a group of pupils to their home and
worked through the material. This experience revealed the importance of symbols:
the Palestinian pupils reacted strongly against the use of flags to identify the
narratives in the parallel text, refusing to use material containing the Israeli flag so
both national flags were removed. Here we see the dominance of the vernacular
curriculum: it indicates the extent to which Palestinian youth are politicised within
their cultures.

While the paper comments on the attitudes of the teachers to their national pasts in
relation to ‘the other’, either Palestine or Israel, and the processes of working together
to try to provide acceptable compromises to the most contentious areas, it would have been interesting to have had some discussion on whether the parallel texts had any impact on pupil attitudes and tolerance towards the other side of their history.

Textbook narratives, as induction to the adult world and its shared national consciousness, and therefore, potential contributors to conflict as well as vehicles for signalling new identities and social cohesion, have been widely researched in a number of countries around the world. This was the focus of a study by Majid Al-Haj\textsuperscript{13} who analysed a range of new history textbooks written for Jewish schools in Israel, according to new curriculum guidelines introduced in 1995. Written after the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993, Education Ministry officials who proposed the reform saw a need to modify the goals and content of a curriculum written in early 1980s. Academic historians who spearheaded the change perceived the content as too closed, based on national myths and derived from a conservative Zionist historiography that presented a single narrative, closing down critical engagement with the past.\textsuperscript{14}

The series indicates the level of detailed government intervention in ensuring that an official view of the nation and identity is transmitted via the educational system. Here we see how the government prioritises survival even at the expense of the democratic values that underpin its constitution. The government has de facto continued on a war footing. The series surveyed comprised five core textbooks, three for grade 9 and two for senior high school (interestingly one of the Grade 9 texts was written by Eyal Naveh of the PRIME project). One of the series, after being used for a year, was removed from the list of approved textbooks by the Minister of Education at the recommendation of the Knesset Education Committee. The reasons provided were that the book was not faithful to the classic Zionist narrative and that it overlooked central events in Zionist history. As Al-Haj pointed out, though cautiously, the withdrawal of the book ‘may’ exemplify the ‘problematic relationship between universal values of democracy and freedom of expression on the one hand, and the

\textsuperscript{13} Al-Haj (2005)
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid: 54-55
defense of the national ethos in an ethno-national state on the other. This begs the question whether Al-Haj’s caution is the result of what may be a precarious position as an Arab-Israeli academic. The action of the Israeli Minister of Education in banning the text is in line with his actions reported in Naveh’s paper on the PRIME project – both authors miss the opportunity of analysing the articulation between political processes and education and the shaping of personal expression of feeling by public (political) discourse alluded to by Ebaz-Luwish in her article.

Al-Haj made a detailed analysis of the content and perspectives in the remaining textbooks in the series. He came to the conclusion, that while the new texts to some extent have attempted to introduce a more complex version of recent history, in essence they, like the old, present a typical Zionist narrative that aims to safeguard national-Zionist values and crystallize the collective memory of Jewish pupils on an ethno-national basis. He clearly indicates that the narrative is exclusive leaving no room for acceptance that there could be any legitimacy in a Palestinian narrative.

Al-Haj limited his analysis to history textbooks used in Jewish-Israeli schools. A number of issues in his research indicate problems of top-down curriculum development that involves prescription at the classroom level. Firstly there is the policy gap between the government, the aims of the curriculum developers, the writers of textbooks and the reality of what gets taught in the classroom. His research has indicated that the textbook writers did not entirely fulfil the aims of the curriculum guidelines, returning to the Zionist narratives in instances where it would seem it mattered most. However, Al-Haj also seems to assume that the teachers will teach faithfully to the textbooks, whereas not only has research but personal experience has shown, that teachers will bring their own perspectives and interpretations to the history classroom. Here we see the teachers’ own vernacular history interacting with the curricular history that they are required to teach.

\[15\] Ibid. Again parallels could be drawn between Israel and apartheid South Africa. No history textbook that challenged the dominant Afrikaner nationalist narrative was approved for use in schools.
Memory and identity in divided societies – Northern Ireland

Israel is unusual in that two, contradictory, official histories are taught in their segregated schools. Each narrative is highly nationalistic and emotional, attempting to shape very particular national identities – a potential clash of dangerous memories. Research in Northern Ireland provides a different perspective: that of the way in which vernacular cultures in a divided society shape group memories and identities and the way in which these memories and identities act as filters to the official school history. For example, the work of Barton and McCully with senior school pupils reveals how family and community or vernacular histories, compete with school history in the formation of identities within a politically and historically divided society. The vernacular tradition or element is arguably of equal or even greater importance in the South African and Rwandan contexts with stronger, non-literate oral traditions and cultures.

While there is a substantial body of research on education, including citizenship education, in Northern Ireland, Gallagher, Barton and McCully, focus on school history and individual and collective identity. Gallagher’s analysis of the current political and educational situation is set in a broad historic overview, while Barton and McCully’s work is based on research carried out with history pupils in the first three years of secondary school.

Northern Ireland is a politically and religiously divided society with a ‘fixation with history that characterises, perhaps bedevils, politics’, with embedded ceremonial and ritual such as commemorative events, memorials and annual parades (politically historical events) that are integral to the reinforcement of group identities.

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18 Gallagher (2005a)
and Protestants with differing historical experiences use the past to justify and perpetuate discord.\textsuperscript{19} Schooling is largely segregated and, within such a system, both the formal and hidden curricula have the potential of becoming potent sources for promoting an exclusive group identity that continues to fuel conflict. School history and religion studies have been identified as key subjects that perpetuate group identities. According to Gallagher, history teaching in the past took on a ‘naked partisan character’, though this improved in the 1970s and 1980s with the development of more considered textbooks and better teacher training.\textsuperscript{20}

Though the literature reviewed provides no discussion of the processes of curriculum development in Northern Ireland, Barton states that because of the controversial history of the region, national history is completely avoided in the primary school curriculum as well as in most other settings in which primary-aged children learn about the past. It is only in secondary schools that pupils encounter national history.\textsuperscript{21} In primary school, therefore, the politicised accounts of the past children might receive from families and communities (the vernacular history curriculum) are not reinforced by school history,\textsuperscript{22} but then neither are they challenged. In secondary schools, the curriculum provides for options within the units dealing with the History of Northern Ireland. Generally, teachers in Protestant and Catholic secondary schools make different choices – ones that reinforce their own reading of history.\textsuperscript{23} Pupils are left to draw from it selectively in support of historical identities that arise in their families and communities.\textsuperscript{24} More recent research conducted by Barton and McCully indicates that although pupils are committed to ‘trying to look at both sides of the argument,’ they often have difficulty overcoming commitments to their own community’s historical perspectives.\textsuperscript{25} These pupils just do not have the raw material to think about the history of the other community in relation to their own knowledge.

\textsuperscript{19} Barton & McCully (2005)  
\textsuperscript{20} Gallagher (2005b)  
\textsuperscript{21} Barton (2005)  
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{23} Gallagher (2005a); Barton and McCully (2005)  
\textsuperscript{24} Barton (2005)  
\textsuperscript{25} Barton & McCully (2007)
Barton and McCully’s articles are based on a cross-sectional study of 253 pupils across the three years from different types of schools. Data was collected from open-ended interviews around a picture-sorting task in which pairs of pupils created groupings of a set of 28 historical images, choosing those with which they most identified. The aim of their research, in the context of a divided society with strong community identities grounded in conflicting versions of the past, was to find out how pupils in Northern Ireland connect history taught in schools to their own identities.\textsuperscript{26} Their results of their survey indicated, that pupils neither reject school history outright, nor use it to replace prior, community-based historical narratives, but draw selectively from the school curriculum to support a range of developing historical identities.\textsuperscript{27} They further found that community conflict is a strong influence, but that some 70\% of the pupil responses involved identification with events other than those related to Protestant/Unionist or Catholic/Nationalist history and nearly as many responses indicated a general identification with Northern Ireland’s Troubles.\textsuperscript{28} At all of the schools, a large portion of pupils chose pictures that suggested identification with the community conflict that surrounded them, rather than the specific parties to that conflict.

What is not clear in their account is the political dimension, that is, to what extent the politically determined curriculum choices teachers made influenced the outcomes of the study. All three authors reviewed pointed out that teachers made choices in line with their own historical knowledge, including the interpretations of the substantive curricular content they were teaching. Where teachers draw upon a common cultural capital within the community to which they and their pupils belong, then the history curriculum is an extension of that community’s vernacular curriculum.\textsuperscript{29} If teachers are drawn from the same communities as their pupils, then it would seem probable that in the senior school, history education must, to some extent, reinforce community perceptions of the past. Furthermore, there is no indication of the processes by which

\textsuperscript{26} Barton & McCully (2005); Barton, McCully & Conway (2003)
\textsuperscript{27} Barton & McCully (2005) p.86
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid p.107
\textsuperscript{29} French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu developed the concept of cultural capital to explain disparities in educational attainment of children from different social classes. Cultural capital is acquired in the home and the school via exposure to a given set of cultural practices.
the pairs of students reached agreement about the choices of images; in other words, the extent of peer influence that there may have been (though this might have been balanced by the interviews). Indeed, the sectarian flavour of pupil responses strongly suggests that the teaching of history that they have experienced reflects the social and cultural background of the teaching community from which their teachers are drawn.

As members of their own sectarian community, teachers in Northern Ireland are reportedly reluctant to address the controversial issues in history relating to conflict and division30, ‘seeming to believe that schools in general and the history curriculum in particular, were virtually powerless in the face of popular (vernacular) histories promoted within families and by political activists’.31 Gallagher argues that if schools don’t engage with history responsibly this will open the way for continuing influence of family, entrenching divisive views of the past within a continuing divided society,32 while Barton and McCully’s view is that that history teachers need to challenge more directly the beliefs and assumptions held by students, and provide clearer alternatives to the partisan histories that students imbibe.33

What is interesting is that none of the researchers engage with the issue of teacher identities and the ways in which their identities, shaped by generations of religious and sectarian strife and strong family and community identities, may influence the way in which they engage with the past in their teaching. Teachers are not neutral in relation to the past – which is what Gallagher, Barton and McCully seem to imply. This is the missing vital dimension, because teachers are the medium for the transmission of the culturally determined history curriculum with its overt political messages. Questions need also to be asked about the teaching and learning culture within the schools and classrooms: is it open, discursive, secular or controlling, top-down, sectarian?

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30 Barton & McCully (2005); also Gallagher (2005a) in which he states that there is ‘evidence that teachers in Northern Ireland are reluctant to embrace a social purpose to the teaching of history’:6
31 Gallagher (2005a): 6
32 Ibid
33 Barton and McCully (2005)
Furthermore, although they raise the issue of the use of history for political ends, none has attempted to analyse the discourses of power and contesting interests within the creation of education policy and the history curriculum. While the political context is acknowledged, the research does not locate education policy creation clearly within the political processes – for example, the way in which the negotiations of the 1998 Peace Settlement may or may not have shaped the new history curriculum set to be introduced in 2007 - although Gallagher does articulate his hopes that the peace settlement will enable a curriculum review that will result in a curriculum that can contribute to the promotion of reconciliation and tolerance. This, he hopes, will be achieved through a review of history teaching and religious education and proposals for citizenship education. He also cautions, however, that the nature of the peace settlement could result in further segregation and continuing division by privileging difference. What would be critical here is not so much the content that would be taught, but how it is taught.

These articles also do not engage with political processes of re-imagining the nation after conflict. In fact Northern Ireland, though not expressly stated, has in effect, placed a moratorium on the teaching of national history in the primary school – the route taken by Rwanda in 1994. In Northern Ireland there is neither common identity, nor common trauma as Catholics and Protestants would choose different moments and martyrs from the past. Therefore the lack of an official narrative, even in the senior school, does avoid the clash of ‘martyrological memories’. Similarities can be found in South Africa after 1994. However, unlike South Africa where the new constitution provides a set of shared values for the new society, the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement has not done the same for Northern Ireland.

- **Post-communist states**

The legacy of trauma is a critical context for political and educational change in both Rwanda and South Africa. None of the articles reviewed so far have engaged with

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34 Gallagher (2005b)
35 A phrase used by Hoffman in her book, *After Such Knowledge*.
36 The Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement or Belfast Agreement) was reached in Belfast on Friday, April 10 1998. It set up the process for joint rule under a devolved government.
trauma resulting from the conflict. The research in memory and identity alluded to in Chapter One, argued that recently the notion of traumatic memory has been most associated with the countries emerging from Soviet control. It was logical, therefore, to examine a representative sample of the literature relating to eastern European countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

During the period of Soviet control, governments openly controlled the history curriculum as a key element in political education. With the fall of the communist regimes, there was urgent need in the new polities to re-evaluate the national narratives in school textbooks, breaking down the varying degrees of ideological control that the USSR had had on history narratives in communist bloc countries.

Research has focussed on the debates generated by the conflicting national narratives between eastern European countries and Russia and the moves towards reconciling the histories within school texts,37 rather than locating these debates within a wider context of curriculum change in transition societies.38 This is about the recovery of memory, of the national narratives suppressed under the rewriting of histories during the Soviet era to bring them in line with Soviet ideology.39 The literature reviewed here includes examples from countries in Eastern Europe formerly under Soviet control, as well as republics within the former Soviet Union. The focus of most of the literature relating to history education in post-Communist Eastern Europe has been on the narratives contained in history textbooks and the extent to which they assert new national identities40 in contrast to the previously hegemonic Soviet narrative of the

past. While each study focussed on slightly different perspectives, all analysed the content of a variety of textbooks in each country under review.

The study by Kissane of changes in education policy in Kazakhstan after 1990 introduces a number of issues that are reflected to varying degrees in the other articles in this section: replacing the Soviet narrative with a new national narrative; the search for founding myths and heroes in history to support the new state; education for nation building. But unlike the studies which follow, Kissane locates the changes more firmly in education policy in transition states as she examines the post-socialist transition in the secondary education history programme in Kazakhstan.

Kissane’s interest is in the nature of the policy discourses that affected the development of new educational policy in the subject area of history, with a primary focus on the influence of policy discourse on official educational policy. For her, discovering national discourses through history education provides insights into relations within society, particularly when this is linked to efforts to re-fashion a national identity through the teaching of history. This study is based on 10 months of in-country fieldwork encompassing document review, interviews and classroom observations in Kazakh and Russian medium of instruction schools.

The disintegration of the former Soviet Union compelled authorities to rethink Soviet-inspired economic, political and educational systems. This resulted in 1991 in an upswelling of curricula and pedagogical reform fervour, including questioning past interpretations of historical events and more Kazakh language and history teaching in the general secondary school. In line with a general trend in Eastern Europe, the first phase of changes to history teaching included a list of corrections to existing materials and changes to the old syllabi. This was followed by a shift towards the revision of


41 Kissane (2005)
content, providing a critical opportunity for historians to re-evaluate soviet history and re-interpret the way in which Kazakhstan’s history was portrayed in textbooks and classrooms. This was accompanied by criticism and debates around the nation building strategy and the focus of nationalism, whether to be exclusive or have an inclusive, multi-ethnic view in refashioning national identity.

Educational reform entailed a process of de-Sovietisation (removing symbols and political institutions and representatives of Soviet power), de-Russification (removing Russian language and the focus on Russian history) and the ‘mining’ of the past for a foundational myth. This resulted in explicit links being made between modern Kazakhstan and the nomadic empires and individual khanates, ‘which have existed on the territory of Kazakhstan since antiquity’ mandating the ‘primordial and perennial bond of the Kazakhs to the territory of the state’. De-Russifying the content and historical interpretations and restoring ancient heroes in the service of nationalism and patriotism reflects, according to Kissane, the ongoing potential of history to be subjected to strong ideological pressures and influences. This is nothing new, however, and the understanding of history as ideological underpins this thesis.

The transformation in history teaching in Kazakhstan involved four areas of reform: content revision with new textbooks, teaching programmes and new classroom materials; changing methodology; new government standards for teachers and students of history; the need to foster a national feeling of patriotism for Kazakhstan. This is one of the few studies that outline the process of the construction of education policy after conflict, providing some insight into the structures of power and influence. Policy proposals originate from the Director of the History Programme rather than the Ministry of Education. They are then sent for official government approval. The Director also supervises the rewriting of textbooks, overseeing the selection of authors, identifying content requirements and approving official texts and programmes. This, then, is a powerful position with the potential of shaping memory and identity in Kazakhstan – remembering too, that the Director of History, together with other top education officials, was communist trained, raising questions of

42 Ibid: 52
possible conflicting interests between political players and bureaucrats. This is not, however, addressed in this study.

In 1994 after revisions, reinterpretations, and debates regarding the ‘new history’, students returned to school to encounter new history texts. Historical narratives in textbooks had changed from Soviet-Russian dominated ones, to narratives with a more Kazakh oriented perspective. The writing and publication of new textbooks was one of the chief vehicles for communicating and delivering Kazakhstan’s new curriculum. A small group of four to five historians from the two national universities, one or two officials from the Academy of Education, and a selected group of two to three teachers, have control over policy design and the preparation of textbooks. Financial constraints, in publishing and in particularly in rural schools, limit the use of the few independently-produced teaching materials.

Without orientation or training, teachers trained under the communist system were expected to internalise and deliver a curriculum with a completely new interpretation of history and new classroom approaches. They were asked to develop in their pupils an interest in the study of history, to teach in a democratic and humanistic way, and to revise the way they taught the past to acknowledge crimes against Kazakhstan and to support Kazakhstan’s new position as an independent republic. In a society that appeared to be rapidly changing, teachers were asked to be innovative in their teaching, to adapt to modern methods of pedagogy, teach democratic concepts and develop nationalism and patriotism in their pupils. This was no mean task for teachers working without salaries (and often without texts) for months at a time and struggling to stay afloat in a society where everything seemed to be changing around them.

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43 Ibid: 59
44 The enormity of what was being asked of the Kazakhstan teachers can, perhaps, only be appreciated by those who have faced similar demands. In South Africa in the first phase of curriculum reform after apartheid, teachers were expected to throw out everything that they had done, and to introduce a totally new approach to content and methodology. This disempowered them to an extent that almost irreparable damage was done to the education system.
Ahonen continues the theme of changing narratives in textbooks in the early transition from conflict, but broadens the interest in history textbooks in Estonia and the former German Democratic Republic (DDR) to include the extent to which the history curricula are forms of identity politics. \(^45\) Ahonen alludes to different sites of memory and suggests that controversies around the relationship between school history and a collective memory, be this family or group memory (the issue of vernacular history raised in relation to Northern Ireland), may result in the fading of either or in a double-consciousness of history.\(^46\) With minorities tending to be left out of the master narrative, the question is then raised: how far can a curriculum be socially inclusive? She maintains that national curricula convey narratives that are never inclusive of whole communities, and history curricula in particular need their role in supporting identity politics examined. The choice of Estonia and the DDR provided contrasting examples of the processes of engaging with school history during transition.

In both Estonia and the former DDR the grand narrative of communism formed the core of the history curriculum. When in 1990 the narrative abruptly lost its credibility, the quest began for new narratives. In Estonia where history was explicitly regarded as necessary for nation-building, the new narrative was framed within the grand narrative of nationalism. Estonians wanted a ‘true’ history, framed in a new ideology, with a foundational myth that could provide the genesis of the progress towards the nation-state. One master narrative was replaced by another, with the new history textbooks repeating ‘the history of the imagined national past’ derived from the nationalism of the 19\(^{th}\) century.\(^47\)

In former East Germany, however, the first attempt at curriculum review produced a school history that aimed at critical engagement which, Ahonen suggests, was attempting to make school history into a Habermasian open space for critical communication. Curriculum development in the DDR was decentralised soon after 1989. In a reaction against the past imposed history, some Länder (states) denied the

\(^{45}\) Ahonen, S. (2001)

\(^{46}\) Ibid: 181

uniform collective identity of an historical community, emphasising individual, critical thinking.\textsuperscript{48} Unusually in the eastern European context, the former DDR did not replace one grand narrative with another. However, with the reunification with West Germany, the Western view of the period of the DDR (1949-1989) marginalised the former DDR’s interpretation of its own past.

Ahonen contrasts Foucault’s thesis of ubiquitous power-knowledge that cannot be credited to any single agency, with the Habermasian view that assumes a recognisable personal agency behind curricular power. In her view, Foucault suggests that institutions like the school are simply embodiments and mediators of power-knowledge. In schools, rhetorical power is identifiable with the curriculum: curriculum is power with a potential to create unity of thought and action and a tendency to exclude individuals and groups who hold to an alternative knowledge, with no way out of the grip of power.\textsuperscript{49} However, I would suggest that recognising and deconstructing the power relations operating within curriculum and schools, is the first step towards emancipation from the ‘grip of power’. Moreover, far from suggesting that there is no way out of the grip of power, for Foucault resistance is the irreducible opposite in relations of power, a fundamental element that co-exists with power. In terms of history, Foucault’s ‘counter-memory’ is ‘an insurrection of subjugated knowledges’, the blocks of historical knowledge that in the former communist bloc could regarded as the subjugated histories of eastern European countries.\textsuperscript{50} While not detracting from the analysis of the curriculum revision of the former DDR within the Habermasian open space (though I would suggest that power is exercised even in critical communication), Ahonen’s analysis of Estonia’s curriculum revision would have benefited from a deeper analysis of Foucault’s understanding of the exercise of power within education.

\textsuperscript{48} Ahonen (2005): 188
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid: 190
The next article changes the focus from replacing national narratives and changing textbooks, to an investigation of textbooks as a means of contributing to nationalism by defining the new ‘nation’ in contrast to ‘the other’. Janmaat’s analysis of textbooks in the Ukraine focuses on the construction of the ‘other’ in school history, in this particular instance, the portrayals of Russia and the Russians in two generation of Ukrainian history textbooks. He suggests that the highly negative portrayal of the ‘ethnic other’ in textbooks is a general trend in states with nation-building agendas. Ukraine is a new state emerging from the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual state. As a result of the past subordinate relationship with Russia and the Soviet Union, Russians became a natural target as the ethnic other in the process of identity construction in the Ukraine, universally condemned as the foreign ruler in the two generations of history textbooks analysed in this survey. This is seen as a critical element for fostering a strong sense of patriotism in Ukrainian youth. The danger, of course, as Janmaat points out, is that the same narratives may well produce strong feelings of alienation among Russians and other minorities within Ukraine.

While this article does not analyse power structures and influence on curriculum construction, Janmaat does end with comments that provide some insight into this in the Ukrainian context. Recently, the Ministry of Education has published recommendations for the history curriculum for the new school system that incorporates the cultivation of tolerance, respect for other nations, crucial thinking, responsibility, independent judgment. However, Janmaat raises questions about whether the academics who will write the new curriculum and textbooks, are in fact supportive of a major reform of the history education, as typically these academics belong to the Ukrainian intelligentsia and consider it their lifework to expose the tsarist and Soviet ‘crimes’ against the Ukrainian nation. He also alludes to the different arenas of action pressing for education renewal in the Ukraine. It is not only the civil servants at the Ministry who are pressing for changes. There are grassroots-level movements which suggest a broad support for reform. History and civics teachers, who participated in a survey conducted in 2001, identified making myths of

51 Janmaat (2007)
past events and outdated approaches to the selection of facts and their interpretations, as key problems in the current history curricula. 52

In contrast to the research on transition in the former republics within the Soviet Union, Zajda’s study focuses on history school textbooks in the Russian Federation itself between 1992 and 2004. 53 He analyses the new content of post-Soviet history textbooks used in Russian secondary schools in Grades 9, 10 and 11, examining the ‘ideologically-driven shifts and images of transformation’ and the use of school history texts in the nation-building process. He discusses the shift from the early phase of rethinking the history curriculum which included ideas of ‘competing discourses in historiography, diversity in interpretations of events and a more analytical approach to the process and content of history in school textbooks’ 54 to 2004 by which time the ‘new history textbooks have returned to traditional symbols of nation-building and patriotism’. A major goal of history teaching in Russian schools is values education and patriotism. According to Zajda, the texts are intended to redefine Russia’s identity and inculcate a spirit of patriotism and nationalism, by mining the past for suitable heroes and symbols that will portray a new, post-Soviet national identity, signalling a radical ideological repositioning and a redefinition of what are seen as ‘legitimate’ culture and values in Russia. The history textbooks, he maintains, have an officially defined status as instruments in the Russian process of ideological transformation and nation building, which is currently closely monitored by the State. 55

A weakness in this analysis is that there is no attempt to locate these changes within the shifting political context in the Russian Federation, which means the reader has no concept of the articulation between education policy and political shifts, being left to

52 Ibid
54 Ibid: 295
55 Control of historical narratives is nothing new in Russia. For example, apart from the control of history mentioned in the articles reviewed in relation to former Soviet republics and states in Eastern Europe prior to 1990, see Lucy Dawidowicz (1981): 86 - in The Holocaust and the Historians (Harvard University Press: Cambridge & London). In her discussion about the Soviet Union she notes that in 1971at the height of the Cold War ‘the Soviet dictatorship ordered that the new anti-Zionist line be introduced also into scholarly literature...The Soviet Academy of Sciences was told to establish an Israeli Studies Section and managed to do so by appointing academics who knew no Hebrew’.
make assumptions about these. He makes reference to the texts as instruments in a
government-driven process of ideological transformation and nation-building,
repositioning and redefining of what is considered ‘legitimate’ culture and values in
Russia, but again does not locate this within a theoretical context of the exercise of
power within politics, culture and values. An example of the exercise of political
power within education is given but without further comment: the policy directive
from Vladimir Putin in 2003 to the Russian Academy of Science to examine all
history textbooks used in schools throughout Russia, which resulted in some history
textbooks being withdrawn and even pulped because it was felt that they portrayed
some negative images of the Soviet Union.

The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia after 1989 resulted in a severely
fragmented territory of competing national identities and resurrected histories,
including the memories of ‘ancient’ hatreds (the ‘chosen traumas’), that in the case of
Serbia and Bosnia resulted in genocide in 1994. Since 1995 Bosnia has remained
deply divided. This is a clear example of a peace treaty not ending identity-based
conflict, nor the fears and distrust that were generated during the conflict.

A study by Torsti highlights the ongoing divisions that have complicated history
teaching and curriculum in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the war (1992-1995) the
three major national groups of the country, Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims
(Bosniaks), have used different textbooks and followed different curricula. Torsti’s
analysis of history textbooks concentrating on the presentation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in
the textbooks used in Grade 8, the last year of compulsory schooling, found that ‘the
others’, the members of other national groups of the country, are typically presented
through enemy images. This is occurring in the context of an education system that
has continued to deepen intra-national divisions, and aims to create or consolidate
ethnically-nationalised groups. Segregation is to a large extent supported by

56 Torsti (2007)
57 Ibid: 79
students, teachers and parents of the different ethnic groups in the region.\textsuperscript{58} Based on discussions with teachers in 30-40 schools, it also became clear that the history textbooks carry the role of curricula for history teaching, as teachers typically do not receive any other instruction or information.\textsuperscript{59} This potentially gives enormous power to textbook writers to shape group memory and identities.

Bosnia provides an example of a country driven to change because of external imperatives, in this case a desire for recognition of national independence. A minimum requirement in 1999 for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s recognition by the Council of Europe was the withdrawal of potentially offensive material from textbooks before the start of the 1999-2000 school year. The need to change could not, however, be matched with real transformation of the history curriculum. As there was no time to produce new textbooks, removal of objectionable material was done by blackening text and annotating it with a stamp – ‘the following passage contains material of which the truth has not been established, or that may be offensive or misleading: the material is currently under review’. New books were only partly printed in 2000-2001; consequently the old books were still in use in two of the three schools visited by the researcher in 2002-2003. The analysis of the history texts focused on the representations of ‘them’, the ‘hetero-stereotypes’, the most powerful of these being the enemy images used to legitimise and provoke hostilities among groups.\textsuperscript{60} Torsti found that representations of other national groups are central in 8th grade history textbooks used by the three national communities, though the intensity differed. The national groups that had been enemies in the recent past were portrayed negatively through their actions in history, reinforcing stereotypes which serve to maintain and justify the hostile attitude towards the others. Furthermore, history education in the former Yugoslavia has continued to be as dogmatic as in the Tito era, offering no alternatives for pupils, supplying political elites with legitimacy and


\textsuperscript{59} Torsti (2007)

seeming to pave the way for future conflict. While school history is not the only means through which memory and identity is shaped, in the Bosnian post-war situation, textbooks and other channels of influence such as the media or vernacular history, reinforce and enhance one another’s interpretations and presentations of the ‘enemy’.

Torsti situates the curriculum for and teaching of history in Bosnia in ‘identity politics’, defined as ‘movements mobilising around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose of claiming state power’. Such politics are based on the reconstruction of heroic pasts, the memory of injustices and sometimes psychological discrimination against those labelled differently from ‘us’. In noting that in Bosnia, the divisions created by the politics of history education (divided schooling and history teaching), contribute to mental barriers and hatred, this is the only article reviewed that indicates the trauma and possible traumatic legacy resulting from the conflict. Torsti notes that the mental barriers and hatred engendered by a continued divided history, has inhibited the return of refugees to Bosnia.

- **Facing the past in Germany**

Post-war Germany provides a complex case study of the politics of memory in a society that not only had to confront the legacy of the Holocaust, but of physical and political division during the Cold War. While there are major differences between the post-Nazi German society and the post-conflict societies in South Africa and Rwanda, there is extensive research into stages that the German people moved through as they grappled with the traumatic knowledge of an abusive past, which can provide valuable insights for South Africa and Rwanda.

The literature falls into two broad categories: studies of the politics of memory relating to the Holocaust, mostly in West Germany but more recently in the two

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62 Torsti (2007): 91
Germanys after re-unification, particularly after the opening up of archives in the former East Germany; and studies of curriculum and the place of the Holocaust in the school curriculum. However, links are seldom made in the literature between the political processes and education policy. The primary focus in this section will be on the politics of memory and remembering. The literature reviewed, while it may not address the interaction between political processes and education policy, does engage with questions of political control of memory and identity in coming to terms with a traumatic and violent past. The complexities of the politics of memory in Germany addressed in this section, have relevance to both South Africa and Rwanda, though there is, however, a significant difference between post-Nazi Germany and South Africa and Rwanda in transition: South Africa and Rwanda have a post-conflict situation in which victims and perpetrators interact daily, while in Germany the victims were removed from society and very few remained living in Germany after the end of the Third Reich.

The shaping of post-war memories regarding Nazi Germany and the Holocaust in a divided Germany, was influenced by international pressures - East Germany’s desire to be accepted as a loyal member of the Warsaw Pact and West Germany’s acceptance in Western Europe – as well as internal ‘interpretative frameworks’ that were rooted in pre-Nazi Germany.64

For East Germany, this resulted in official ‘forgetting’ when it came to the Holocaust. The German Communists and the Soviet occupation authorities regarded Soviet suffering and triumph and the narrative of Communist martyrdom as the core of post-war memory. The communist narrative of Soviet suffering and redemption became the dominant post-war narrative in school texts. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR) politicians focused on Russians as victims, picking and choosing from the past in order to emphasise non-Jewish, non-homosexual victims, and particularly

highlighting the communist opposition to the Nazis. The latter was emphasized beyond all proportion to the actual scale of resistance.\textsuperscript{65}

In contrast, the conditions for international recognition for West Germany included public acknowledgement of the truth about Nazi crimes, though this did not mean immediate full acknowledgment and remembering. In the Federal Republic of West Germany (FRG), the official political line since the 1950s has been one of varying degrees of contrition and \textit{Vergangenheitsbewältigung}. Immediately after the war, the elite-centred Nuremberg trials in the 1940s and 1950s, while making it impossible to deny Nazi crimes, provided the new Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and the general populace, with an opportunity of avoiding the acceptance of collective guilt, even while taking some responsibility by providing restitution to Jewish victims.\textsuperscript{66}

Herf suggests that more than the imposition of forms of government in post-war Germany by the victorious allies, the political traditions within East and West Germany were continuations of internal political traditions prior to 1933. He called this the ‘multiple restorations’ of the non- and anti-Nazi German political traditions, suppressed in 1933, by politicians returning from exile to re-enter political life. The ‘inherited traditions and ideologies’ these leaders carried within them, meant that post-war leaders whether Communist in East Germany or democrats in West Germany, interpreted Nazism through ‘long-established interpretive frameworks’.\textsuperscript{67}

Post-war memories rested on interpretations of Nazism which its German opponents had begun to develop in the Weimar Republic, rather than direct experience of the Nazi regime at its height.


\textsuperscript{67} Herf (1997): 4
Herf focuses on political leaders in post-war Germany, maintaining that the history of politics and the history of beliefs, ideas, ideology, discourses, narratives and representations, are inseparable from one another. By writing about politicians and the discourses and memories that they construct, he hoped to illustrate the importance of politics for shaping the way a society thinks about its past, while at the same time drawing attention to the autonomous weight that traditions and interpretive frameworks exert on political life. Methodologically he positions himself at the point where meaning and power intersect. While he is not concerned with education, the issues he raises and insights he provides are just as relevant to the construction of education policy in post-conflict societies.

Remembering in West Germany in the 1950s (at times labelled the Nuremberg interregnum), has been variously interpreted. Herf claims that Adenauer’s ‘silence’ about the extent of popular participation in Nazi crimes was separating memory from the imperatives of justice. His acceptance of moral obligations regarding restitution to Jewish victims coincided with a general policy of silence about the crimes of the Nazi era, which was located in the democratic processes being established in West Germany. Clearly memory was being traded for democracy at a time when West German voters had a lot to lose from an early confrontation with the past and simply would not vote for a leader who demanded it.

Fullbrook, while not downplaying the role of the political elites in shaping and legitimating particular interpretations of the past (Herf), points to a more wide-spread popular complicity in constructing national memory in West Germany. In the 1950s, Christian Democrat (CDU) politicians, representatives of the Wehrmacht (military) and the German churches, all pressed for an end to the question of war criminals.

Moeller argues that West Germany did not engage in a willing forgetfulness in the 1950s and 1960s, but rather in selective remembering in an attempt to shift collective

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69 Fullbrook (1999)
guilt. Immediate post-war West Germany was not dominated by silence, but a carefully manipulated representation of the past which aimed to downplay Germany culpability in Nazi crimes, by focussing on the equally destructive totalitarian system in the Soviet Union. Central to this were the widely circulated stories about two groups of German ‘victims’: the German nationals expelled from the land settled in the East by the encroaching Red Army; and the German POWs interned in Soviet prison camps. By concentrating on Soviet brutality, the Adenauer government could reject the Allied claims that Germany had been the sole perpetrator of crimes against humanity. This also allowed the emergence of a narrative of atrocities in Nazi Germany being perpetrated by evil Nazis at the top – a few sadistic, powerful men – rather than the German people. A war started by Hitler, which everyone lost. According to Moeller, the parliament, media, historians and filmmakers were all complicit in constructing West German identity on images of loss and a common history of suffering, shaping a selective memory of suffering in which German victimhood became the overarching theme.

The core issue raised by all researchers is essentially about when and why countries develop a culture of remembering or forgetting. Kansteiner suggested that the subsequent generations in West Germany, in distancing themselves from the disgrace of the Nazis, took the phrases about remembrance at face value, turning *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* into a serious historic obligation, that had the additional advantage of being an excellent tool for generational political and intellectual strife. From the 1960s, the politics of memory in West Germany certainly became more intense. While this could in part have been a manifestation of what Eva Hoffman has called, the ‘paradox of indirect knowledge that haunts those that come after’ (she was writing from the perspective of a second generation Holocaust survivor, but Kansteiner suggests the knowledge also haunts children of perpetrators), it may also have had something to do with ‘cosmopolitanisation’ of the memory of the Holocaust as a universal measure of ‘good and evil’, which contributed to the creation of a

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70 Moeller, reviewed 2001
71 Ibid
common European (if not global) memory.\textsuperscript{73} The memory of the Holocaust in Germany simply cannot be ignored when so many countries force remembrance not only in memorials and museums, but also in the history curriculum.

Although not expressly stated in the literature reviewed, teaching about the Nazi past appears to have reflected the route taken by politicians in *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*. Since early 1950s, World War II and Hitler’s dictatorship have figured prominently in the curriculum of West German schools, but it was only from the 1960s onwards, that special emphasis was placed on conveying the horrors of the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{74} The primary objective for confronting young Germans with ‘their country’s darkest past and their ancestors’ guilt’, is to make them understand the consequences of Hitler’s dictatorship, the uniqueness of the Holocaust and to appreciate the values and institutions that protect freedom and democracy.\textsuperscript{75} The basic principles of Holocaust teaching in West Germany were introduced into East Germany in 1990.

However, while education guidelines are drawn up nationally by a standing conference of state (*Land*) ministers, education is the responsibility of individual federal states or *Bundesländer*. What is taught in the classroom is determined by the state governed syllabus, drawn up in accordance with the national guidelines or syllabus directives that determine topics to be covered and teaching objectives to be achieved. Textbooks are produced by independent textbook publishers, but approved by individual states. The lack of a national curriculum or syllabus means that the *Bundesländer* are able to interpret and present curriculum topics with different emphases, though there are also significant commonalities, including the influence of the fundamental human rights set out in the German Constitution.\textsuperscript{76} Wenzeler, in her

\textsuperscript{73} Levy, S. & Sznaider, N. (2002) The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory. *European Journal of Social Theory* 5(1): 87-196. This can be seen in the number of Holocaust Museums in countries outside of Germany and Israel. For example, apart from the Washington Holocaust Memorial Museum there are a number of smaller museums in the United States; Beth Shalom in the United Kingdom; and Cape Town Holocaust Centre in South Africa.

\textsuperscript{74} German Information Centre, New York (downloaded 2007/07/24) *Holocaust Education in Germany*
\url{http://www.ieren.org/hgp/aeti-1998-no-frames/holocaust-ed-in-germany.htm}

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid

\textsuperscript{76} Wenzeler, B. (2003) The Presentation of the Holocaust in German and English School History Textbooks – A Comparative Study, *International Journal of Historical Learning, Teaching and
survey of German textbooks, concentrated on the question of culpability for the Holocaust. This became an issue of acrimonious debate in academic history circles in Germany after the publication of Daniel Goldhagen’s thesis, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*, in Germany in 1996.\(^7^7\) Her article notes that until recently, German textbooks had tended to blame the members of the Nazi Party for the Holocaust. In contrast to this, the textbooks reviewed by Wenzeler which were published after Goldhagen’s thesis, interrogated the role of ordinary Germans in contributing to the Holocaust, encouraging German pupils to accept the responsibility for the crimes of the Holocaust and come to terms with its consequences for the German nation. It would be interesting to conduct research similar to that of Barton and McCully in Northern Ireland, to establish to what extent these narratives compete with vernacular histories and the extent to which German pupils internalise guilt and responsibility. Sichrovsky’s interviews with second generation Nazi families provide some insight into the various responses to trans-generational memory and acceptance or rejection of guilt and responsibility in West Germany,\(^7^8\) and the tensions between vernacular and school histories. A weakness in terms of this study is the lack of analysis of the political context of the time as a framework for making meaning of the issues arising from the interviews.

\(^7^7\) Goldhagen, D.J. (1997) *The New Discourse of Avoidance*, a revised version of an article published in Frankfurter Rundschau in response to an article published in Der Spiegel. Goldhagen suggested in his thesis, published in Germany in 1996, that anti-semitism was deeply ingrained in the German psyche which explained why so many ordinary Germans during the Third Reich supported and even participated in the persecution of the Jews.

Conclusion

The literature relating to the intersection between political processes and the construction of the history curriculum and the exercise of power and ideology in societies emerging from conflict is fragmented. Overall there has been little engagement with the discourses of power and contesting interests in the processes of curriculum construction in transition societies. While some research deals with political transition and attempts to come to terms with a traumatic past (for example, Germany), other research explores the processes of curriculum construction and new master narratives in transition societies. Seldom are the two brought together in an analysis of the intersection of power, ideology and history curriculum. The questions raised at the beginning of this chapter remain less than fully answered.

What emerges clearly is that, overwhelmingly, history education is political education aiming at instilling a sense of nationalism and patriotism rather than the values of democracy in support of the new state. In most post-conflict societies, one national narrative replaces another; therefore one form of patriotism is replaced with another. In authoritarian states, the national narrative is closely tied up with issues of legitimacy, resulting in strong action being taken by national governments to counter challenges to the hegemony of the official narrative in history education. While both South Africa and Rwanda reflect aspects of the ways in which post-conflict societies have in general, engaged with the conflict narrative within history education during transition, the literature does not adequately explain the trajectories taken by these countries in dealing with their particular conflict narratives and the paths chosen in constructing new memories and identities.

This research will examine the political and educational processes in these countries as they emerged from violent internecine conflict and engaged with the traumatic knowledge of the past. This study suggests that the changes in education policy and, in particular, the way in which the past is asserted and reflected in curriculum can best be understood by examining the intersection of the politics of memory and identity with the post-conflict changes in education policy. An analysis of who is attempting

79 Northern Ireland is a notable exception to this.
to assert influence over history education and to what purpose provides further insight into the contestations of a society in transition. History education in this study is defined more broadly than in any of the literature surveyed. In post-conflict societies with high rates of illiteracy, the politics of memory and identity and the construction of new narratives go beyond historiography and history education. Furthermore, what the studies of Northern Ireland have demonstrated, but which has not been fully developed in the literature, is the intersection between vernacular memories located in vernacular cultures, public history and the way in which the curriculum is taught and received in the classroom.

Furthermore, little in the existing research engages with teacher identities and the personal legacy of the conflict on teachers who are entrusted within the new society to ‘deliver’ the new curriculum with its new values. This is a serious omission given that it is the transaction in the classroom that gives expression to the transformative ideals and outcomes of education. Teacher identities and the legacy of trauma or a painful past need to be taken into account if it is hoped that a new curriculum will change the values and attitudes of young people.
CHAPTER FOUR

CONSTRUCTING THE CONFLICT NARRATIVE IN APARTHEID EDUCATION: SOUTH AFRICA TO 1994

Introduction

This first chapter of the South African case study provides the historical context for the examination of the post-apartheid construction of memory and identity in the next two chapters. Understanding the particular moment in history in which the construction of the conflict narrative took place and the way in which it gained hegemony in history education, is critical to understanding the political and curriculum responses to that narrative in the post-conflict state.\(^1\) To this end, the first part of the chapter provides an historical analysis of the construction of the conflict narrative, in this case the Afrikaner nationalist narrative, which was imposed as official history after 1948 (when the National Party gained power and introduced apartheid) and the ideologies that informed the narrative. It examines the extent to which the narrative contributed to identity-based conflict during apartheid. The construction of the narrative preceded apartheid, having been shaped during the 1930s and 1940s, at a time when the white Afrikaner community appeared to be in danger of fragmenting and needed a foundational myth indicating group cohesion. In Foucault’s terms, the Afrikaner vernacular narrative could, at this point, be regarded as ‘subjugated knowledge’ – a ‘block’ of masked historical knowledge of the memory of hostile encounters regarded as hierarchically inferior to the current dominant narrative.\(^2\)

By 1989, after forty-years during which the apartheid regime became increasingly authoritarian, the government was facing intense challenges both internally and

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\(^1\) Tawil, S. & Harley, A. (2004) *Education, Conflict and Social Cohesion* Geneva: UNESCO International Bureau of Education. Tarwil and Harley make the point that understanding the ways in which education, and particularly history education, contributed to conflict provides a useful insight for the analysis of post-conflict curriculum reform. This is context specific rooted in the historical, social and political context of each society, in the nature of the conflict and in the nature of the transition.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union and the release of Mandela in 1990, it became increasingly clear that political change in South Africa was imminent. The period of negotiations between the government and the African National Congress for a new political dispensation in South Africa, also opened up debates about history education, bringing challenges to the dominance of the Afrikaner nationalist narrative. The second part of this chapter examines the debates about history education and the challenges to the hegemony of the conflict narrative that opened up after 1990 and the expectations that political transition gave to a number of emerging potential education stakeholders. The conflict narrative now became open to rival narratives: Foucault’s ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges, or counter-memory’.

The underlying assumption throughout is that history education is political education and an arena for competing political ideologies. What gets defined as ‘official’ memory reflects the power of certain groups and ideologies in society to define the past according to their interests. In more established liberal democracies, the basic national narrative remains essentially stable. However in a new nation the structures of power are tenuous and changing, and the hegemonic position of a national narrative can be challenged and even replaced with changes of government. In these states, vernacular histories gain strength in the shadows in opposition to the national narrative, becoming counter-memories. History education encompasses official history, vernacular histories and public history in the extent to which each of these are reflected and asserted in history classrooms.

The construction of the conflict narrative
Although all white South Africans constituted the privileged beneficiaries of apartheid, it was the Afrikaner nationalists, who came into power in 1948, who had

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3 From the mid-1980s there was mass protest which aimed to make the country ungovernable. The largest mass organisation was the United Democratic Front (UDF) which was set up as the internal front of the ANC. Schools became sites of struggle and there was violent conflict in the townships. This was the time of the ‘necklacing’, the murder of suspected government spies by filling a tyre with petrol, placing it around the necks of victims and setting it alight. It was also the time of some of the worst of the government security force torture and murders.

4 Zembylas & Bekerman (2008): 129
political dominance and whose interpretation of the South African past became the hegemonic official ‘conflict’ narrative imposed on schools.

Afrikaner identity is rooted in a small, isolated settlement at the tip of Africa in the mid-17th and 18th centuries. It was constructed in relation to various ‘others’ over the centuries: the indigenous Khoikhoi, slaves, Xhosa and later, the British. While Afrikaner identity was formed over centuries, Afrikaner nationalist identity as it was expressed during apartheid, was forged in the 1930s and 1940s by a powerful combination of foundational myths rooted in a frontier tradition; a belief in a divine right of control over the land; and the firm belief in the superiority of the white Afrikaner ‘race’.

White English-speaking South Africans were later settlers to the Cape and Natal. From the beginning they were, in the Afrikaner view, associated with British control over the former Dutch colony and with expanding British imperialism in southern Africa. English identity was formed within a continuing sense of ties with Britain and the Empire and was generally more ‘outward’ looking, encompassing a broader South Africanism than Afrikaner identity. However, English identity was similarly constructed in relation to an ‘other’. Saul Dubow has argued that there has been an: unconscious disposition on the part of English-speaking South Africans, refined over generations, to define everyone else in the country as either racially or ethnically ‘other’ – while blithely assuming their own identity to be somehow ‘normal’.5

Broader South Africanism and with it the linked English identity, ceased to have relevance after 1948.6

Two events of the mid- and late-19th century are considered seminal to the construction of Afrikaner nationalist identity: the events which became known as ‘The Great Trek’, which began in the mid-1830s in protest against British control at

the Cape; and the concentration camps, set up by the British for Boer women and children in the South African (Anglo-Boer) War of 1899-1902. The former became a narrative of triumph, a ‘chosen glory’; the latter I suggest was consciously constructed as a chosen trauma. As such, they provide easily assimilated reference points for citizen identity: that is, they enable contemporary members of society to easily identify with these key points in the overall identity narrative.

The ‘Great’ Trek of Dutch farmers from the Cape Colony into the interior of South Africa in protest against what was considered to be British colonial oppression, was essentially a disorganised movement of disparate groups. It became a narrative of progress and heroic triumph of the Afrikaner ‘volk’, over adversity in the form of the British and the indigenous peoples of the interior of southern Africa. The narrative in this form was constructed in the early years of the 20th century by filmmakers and writers, in particular Gustav Preller. It became part of a foundation myth, a nationalist narrative presenting a version of the past intended to galvanise action in the present – to unite a fragmenting people into a cohesive Afrikaner volk. This narrative became, in Volkan’s terms, a ‘chosen glory’ to be handed down to future generations.

The history of the Afrikaner ‘volk’ was seen as a form of divine revelation, articulated in part in terms of a heroic mythology in which they portrayed themselves as God’s ‘chosen people’. According to historian, Leonard Thompson, the key

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9 Dubow notes that Preller played a vital role in elevating the voortrekkers to pride of place in Afrikaner mythology.
10 Vorster (2008): 149
11 Dubow (1992): 219
element in the myth of the chosen people, was the taking of Vow before the Battle of Blood River, the battle in which the Zulu regiments were defeated by a small group of Trekkers. Great stress was placed on a covenant made by a preacher, Sarel Cilliers, who promised God that if his people defeated the Zulu, they and their descendents would commemorate the victory every year. Having been given the country by God— it was their God-given task to rule it in the spirit of ‘trusteeship’. This provided the Afrikaner narrative with a certain sacred aura that made it difficult for Afrikaner historians to engage critically with these constructions.

This constituted an Afrikaner nationalist master narrative that grew out of vernacular histories, clustered around a shared body of values, beliefs, significant events and happenings embedded in a broad chronological framework that the Afrikaner community recognised, believed and supported. It fed into the dominant stereotypes of whites as civilized and black as barbarous, mirroring the patterns of inclusion and exclusion from citizenship and contributing to the shaping of social identities. It was a which set Afrikaners apart not only from black South Africans, but also from white, English-speaking South Africans. By 1938, the centenary of the Great Trek ‘both English speakers and blacks were identified as historical enemies and therefore perceived to be contemporary threats in the drive for the unity of the Afrikaners.

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12 Thompson, L.M. (1985) *The Political Mythology of Apartheid*. New Haven: Yale University Press: 112-114 and frontispiece. Thompson points out, that until the end of the 19th century, the covenant and the battle itself were largely ignored by Afrikaners. He argues that its metaphorical significance changed when the British threat to Afrikaner ‘nationhood’ gave way to a perceived black threat.

13 As a textbook for Standard 4 (Grade 6) declared, the two trekker leaders in Natal ‘completely relied on God’s help’. Steyn, J.J. (et.al.) (1987), *Basic History 4* Cape Town: Perskor: 33


16 The extent to which Afrikaners identified personally with the narrative was demonstrated when I wrote an article on identifying the myths in our history textbooks during the first post-1994-election purging of the curriculum. A group of white Afrikaners in the Western Cape Education Department responded by accusing me of attacking ‘the Afrikaners’. Neither I nor others with me could convince them that there was a difference between an Afrikaner nationalist version of the past, and Afrikaners themselves.

This interpretation of history was supported by the powerful combination of ideologies - of eugenics and apartheid theology - also developed and entrenched in the 1930s and 1940s.\textsuperscript{18} The ‘triumph’ of the Afrikaners over indigenous peoples was therefore not only the result of divine favour, but could also be explained in ‘biological’ terms of the hierarchy of races (eugenics) and the superiority of whites.\textsuperscript{19} After 1948 apartheid theology provided a religious sanction for the continued segregation of races and for ideas of racial superiority. According to this view, the different races were ordained by God to be ‘apart’ from one another,\textsuperscript{20} with separation being ‘one of God’s creational motives from the start’.\textsuperscript{21} Thus the notion of racial or ethnic purity became embedded in Afrikaner identity.\textsuperscript{22}

Ironically, Afrikaner nationalist historiography drew on early English settler historiography, which considered all peoples of southern Africa as having migrated into the area at roughly the same time. This, in the minds of Afrikaner nationalists, turned Afrikaner settlers into natives.\textsuperscript{23} As late as 1987, a Grade 12 History textbook identified Afrikaners as the ‘most firmly established, White native-born community in

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{20} Conradie, E.M. (n.d.) Afrikaner Theology and Nature University of the Western Cape \url{http://www.clas.ufl.edu/user/bron/PDF--Christianity/Conradie--Afrikaner%20Theology%20and%20Nature.pdf} The passage from the Bible is Galatians 4:2
\item\textsuperscript{23} The concept of settlers and natives comes from Mamdani, When Victims become Killers. He introduced the notion of Tutsi being cast as settlers and Hutu as natives. In the South African context, George McCall Theal, a Canadian, was the first to be appointed ‘Colonial Historiographer’. He wrote that both the ‘Bantu’ and whites were immigrants to the country. This myth was later enthusiastically appropriated by Afrikaner nationalist historians. An interesting account of the casting of Afrikaners as natives and English as settlers is found in Pillay, S. (2004) The Radical Imagination of Peace: Belonging and violence in South Africa’s past and future. A paper presented to the Second International symposium on Peace Processes in Africa: an Experience for Colombia, in Bogotá, D.C. Colombia.
\end{itemize}
Africa...’ who fought ‘two wars of liberation to free themselves from British rule.’

Being ‘native-born’ distinguished Afrikaners from English-speaking South Africans. The same textbook noted that the ‘English came to South Africa many years after Afrikaners’.

While the Great Trek had become the central foundation myth or chosen glory of Afrikaner nationalism, in the 1930s and 1940s a second, more emotionally powerful, foundation myth was crafted in terms of victimhood and suffering – the chosen trauma of the suffering and deaths of Boer women and children in concentration camps set up by the British during the South African War of 1899 – 1902. The camp experience became, according to one Afrikaner nationalist historian, ‘the great reality of the Afrikaner people’, a symbol of a shared national tragedy providing Afrikaners with ‘common victims to mourn and common grievances to nurture...that had an enduring effect well into the twentieth century’. The transformation of the concentration camp experience into a chosen trauma provides valuable insight into the construction of vernacular histories as well as the deliberate construction of a chosen trauma in forging group identity.

While it is generally accepted that historiography is an important site for the construction of collective memory it is interesting that the concentration camps received little attention from serious Afrikaner historians for more than fifty years
after the South African War.\textsuperscript{29} The memory that emerged in the first decades after the War was shaped by poets and writers closely linked to the Afrikaans language movement and the development of Afrikaans as a ‘standard, respected and written language, distinct from Dutch’\textsuperscript{30} and given tangible and emotional expression by the construction of the Vrouemonument (Women’s Monument) in Bloemfontein. A volume of verses, By die Monument, published by a key author in the construction of Afrikaner nationalism, Totius, to raise funds for the proposed monument articulated the grief of Afrikaner people ‘giving meaning to otherwise futile suffering’.\textsuperscript{31}

The ‘growing vitality’ of Afrikaans as a language and the social dislocation brought about by increased industrialisation, urbanisation and the erosion of what were considered ‘traditional values’ in the 1930s and 1940s led ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ and politicians to attempt to unite a rather disparate constituency of Afrikaans speakers, divided along class and regional lines, under the banner of Afrikaner nationalism.\textsuperscript{32}

The camp experience became a mobilizing theme in the growing body of popular Afrikaans literature, with the Vrouemonument an ideological and emotional symbol and site of nationalist political rallies in the 1940s.\textsuperscript{33} Afrikaans writers and poets drew on the women’s testimonies, diaries and letters presenting them as evidence for the trauma of the camp experience without questioning their veracity and used a small number of images ‘reproduced endlessly to make the point about starving children’.\textsuperscript{34}

The distinction between fact and fiction was often blurred in the attempt to make the camp experience accessible to the urbanising working class and the poor in a

\textsuperscript{29} English-speaking historians such as Theal and Cory wrote histories of the War. Van Heyningen notes that Afrikaner academic history developed slowly after Union and it was some time before some serious research was published. Furthermore, at that time the archives had a 50 year block on the opening of records to researchers.


\textsuperscript{32} Grundlingh (n.d.): 8

\textsuperscript{33} Grundlingh (n.d.): 10 Grundlingh also discusses the burial of a number of Afrikaner heroes and Emily Hobhouse at the foot of the memorial.

\textsuperscript{34} Van Heyningen (2007): 15
deliberate attempt to forge an Afrikaner culture and group cohesion at a time when it seemed that Afrikaner identity was under threat.\[35\]

By the 1930s the constructed vernacular memory of the camps was so firmly established in the popular literature that any attempt to offer an alternative perspective was ignored. When the camps did begin to get the attention of professional historians, Afrikaner historiography was often deeply committed to the ‘nationalist project’. By emphasising ‘objective-scientific’ history,\[36\] they could present the narratives as objective accounts of the past. This was crucial in legitimising the creation of Afrikaner nationalism and a ‘volksgeskiedenis’ [peoples’ history].\[37\] What is significant, is that the popular versions of the suffering in the concentration camps, became part of Afrikaner nationalist historiography and were presented as objective-scientific history, without any critique by Afrikaner historians of the sources on which the narratives had been constructed. This gave them the legitimacy of academy in preparation for, as it turned out, the narratives becoming part of official history. The expression of a common bond in group or ‘volk’ suffering was a powerful, emotional means of creating a sense of group identity in relation to the ‘other’, in this case, the British. This is what Malkki has termed, ‘mythico-history’ - narratives that correspond to record of events, but which are a ‘subversive recasting and reinterpretation [of the events] in fundamentally moral terms’.\[38\] Such narratives are concerned with the ‘ordering and reordering of social and political categories, with the defining of self in distinction to other’, reinterpreting historical events, processes

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36 Van Heyningen (2007): 17 and 19
and relationships and reinterpreting them within a deeply moral scheme of good and evil.\textsuperscript{39}

While Afrikaner historians had been slow in contributing to the collective camp memory, from the 1950s they attempted to interpret the war as ‘the foundation experience of the nation’, though there were difficulties, particularly in writing about the suffering of the women and children in the concentration camps.\textsuperscript{40} This could not be moulded into a heroic narrative in the same way as the Great Trek; and furthermore, the War had actually divided the Afrikaner polity.\textsuperscript{41} What the camp narrative did, was to feed the exclusionary nature of the emerging Afrikaner nationalist identity and the sense of isolation of the Afrikaner in a threatening world. It directed Afrikaner resentment against English-speaking white South Africans, who were identified with Britain and blamed by many Afrikaners for what happened. In any case, white Afrikaans-speaking (mainly rural) and English-speaking (mainly urban) communities were perceived to be too distinct to allow a post-war sense of having a shared destiny.\textsuperscript{42}

The National Party victory in the 1948 elections was considered by many to be the first stage of the journey towards reversing the defeat of the Boer Republics at the hand of the British Empire; the creation of the Republic of South Africa in 1961, the fulfilment of that journey. The Afrikaner nationalist narrative legitimised that journey and sought to instil an unquestioning patriotism amongst the now ruling elite. It was intended to ‘operate as an apparatus for the social (re)production of national identities through linking the individual to the images and narratives of [Afrikaner] nationhood’,\textsuperscript{43} while at the same time defining the ‘other’ in terms of racial, ethnic and gender stereotypes.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid: 55-56
\textsuperscript{41} There was continuing bitterness between the \textit{bittereinders}, those Afrikaners who fought to the bitter end and the \textit{hensoppers}, those regarded with scorn because they surrendered to the British.
\textsuperscript{42} Saunders (2001): 9
The Afrikaner vernacular histories were embedded in the history curriculum as official history and maintained as the central narrative by a closely controlled system of state-approved textbooks,\textsuperscript{45} which were ‘considered to be authoritative bodies of factual knowledge’ presented as an ‘endless flow of undisputed facts’.\textsuperscript{46} Particularly damaging were the racial stereotypes and the prejudices that were integral to the official narrative and regarded as fact. Possibly the most damage was done to primary school children whose textbooks often contained the most blatant examples of stereotyping and racism. Black children who went to school were exposed to these humiliating stereotypes of themselves set against the heroism of the white Afrikaner leaders within the narrative.\textsuperscript{47}

As official history, the narrative was that of the Afrikaner ‘volk’, promoting the values of the apartheid state and deliberately denying the majority of South Africans a history. Denying a group access to memory or history is a powerful means of oppression:

\begin{quote}
If the rulers can make the people believe that they are inferior, wipe out their past history or present it in such a way that they feel, not pride
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{45} Discussions with colleagues in state schools during the 1980s made this very clear. I had a free choice of textbooks as I taught in an independent school; however, I had to use the state-approved textbook for Grade 12 as the examination and the memorandum in the Cape were set on this book. From personal experience, this was the only way that pupils were able to achieve well in the final examinations.

\textsuperscript{46} van den Berg, O. & Buckland, P. (1983) \textit{Beyond the History Syllabus: Constraints and Opportunities} Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter: 3

\textsuperscript{47} For example, a Standard 4 (Grade 6) textbook, Steyn, J.J. et al (1987), \textit{Basic History 4 Cape Town: Perskor}: 1, 3, 4 described the Xhosa as ‘causing trouble by stealing and plundering.’; the Khoi-Khoi as ‘causing trouble’, who ‘could not always be persuaded to work on farms and resorted to plundering and stealing’; after the emancipation of slaves ‘...many slaves joined the Khoi-Khoi in plundering White farms...’ refusing to work for their former owners. However, there were always a number of textbooks which neither supported the Afrikaner nationalist version of history, nor entrenched racial stereotypes, but these generally did not get official approval for use in schools.
but shame, then they create the conditions that make it easy to dominate the people.\textsuperscript{48}

Black South Africans were systematically denied a particular history in schools texts as a means, in Foucauldian terms, by which the state exercised power and control during apartheid:

The history that is…taught to the African, Indian or Coloured denies his existence as it is the heroic tale of the rise of the Afrikaner...by denying blacks a history, it is intended to prevent the growth of a national class consciousness and to reduce as much as possible any desire for a radical alternative.\textsuperscript{49}

Education became the vehicle for indoctrination – of socialising South Africans into their divinely ordained positions in society – thus contributing to the identity-based conflict.\textsuperscript{50} History education was manipulated to legitimise Afrikaner control of the country and to entrench the racialised identities formalised by apartheid legislation. For decades, the majority of South Africans had been the victims of institutionalised humiliation, a form of long-term oppression that included degrading, debasing, subjugating and being treated with contempt by many fellow South Africans.\textsuperscript{51} Under Christian National Education (CNE), the curriculum, and in this case the history

\textsuperscript{48} Majeké, N. (1952) \textit{The Role of the Missionaries in Conquest} Cape Town: Society of Young Africa: Introduction.

\textsuperscript{49} Chisholm (1981): 137

\textsuperscript{50} An article that appeared in Die Burger in May 2007 provides insight into the formation of Afrikaner identity: ‘Ek wonder of in die wêreld een ander bevolkingsgroep is wat só behep met sy identiteit is soos wit Afrikaners...Ek stem saam met Max du Preez dat ‘n mens (dit is nou die generasie wat in sy veertiger- en vyftigerjare is) jou Afrikanerskap met moedersmelk ingekry het deur die praatjies tuis, die leer van nasionalisme in die skool en die preke Sondae in die kerk, en in die geval van jong mans deur indoktrinasie in die weermag... Amanda Gouws, \textit{Die Burger} 24/05/2007 www.dieburger.com/Stories/Opinion/Columns/14.0.2635446347.aspx Accessed 25 May 2007 (I wonder if there is any other population group in the world that is so taken up with its identity as white Afrikaners...I agree with Max du Preez that one (that is the generation which are in their forties and fifties) took in one’s Afrikanerdom with one’s mother’s milk through discussions in the home, the teaching of nationalism in school and the sermons on Sundays in the church, and in the case of young men, through indoctrination in the army...) These are the key areas of socialisation into identities.

This legalised discrimination and hierarchy of privilege and the concomitant attitudes have been deeply entrenched in South African society. Just how entrenched is evidenced by written comments from Facing the Past teacher workshops, which have been organised with an annual cohort of new teachers since 2004. Fourteen years after apartheid these feelings are still very real. Teachers engage in a ‘silent conversation’ activity, responding in writing (in silence), to a set of sources that contain experiences of ordinary people during apartheid. They are always ‘racially’ mixed groups of teachers from a variety of schools:

I can identify! I don’t have any white friends; so I am always suspicious. I’m not quite certain whether I’m prepared to subject myself to a possible ‘ordeal’ as presented in the text. (Teacher A)

I believe many Africans can identify with this. We still feel very much inferior to whites. Such that when you have white friend/speak English fluently, your status is elevated. Sometimes when you do something perfectly they call you umlumgu (white man) as if a white man is capable of doing only good things. (Teacher B)

I get angry with myself when my child’s invited to his ‘white friend’ and we feel honoured! (Teacher C)

I grew up in such a community [Afrikaans]. I was an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. I had mixed emotions, mixed culture, mixed ideologies. I felt both humiliated and angry, as well as supremely embarrassed at how each community: Afrikaans, English, Coloured and Black treated

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each other. It is still part of my consciousness. I was too often a bystander. I felt powerless and afraid. (Teacher D)

It is not politics or ‘political correctness’ that is the hurdle. It is the perceptions of culture that make us afraid to assimilate. We need to be able to make mistakes when interacting without feeling afraid, ashamed or even uneasy. Let us just get to be with one another and acknowledge our ignorance and our pain and learn to be comfortable among all people. Not easy! (Teacher E)

Counter memories - resisting the dominant narrative in history education

This then begs the question: to what extent was the conflict narrative accepted as a true interpretation of South Africa’s past, thereby contributing to identity-based conflict? Evidence from research in Northern Ireland, for example, suggests that in divided societies, official history does not, in fact, have the power to shape identities to the extent that has been claimed. This would be particularly the case in a country with a high rate of illiteracy. Firstly, those who are not exposed to formal history education, continue to transmit vernacular narratives located in oral histories and oral traditions of the different communities. The apartheid policy of separate development was predicated upon ‘ethnic’ identities in ‘homelands’ with traditional leaders. This provided the context for an almost ahistorical ‘freezing’ of ethnic identities and in many cases the continued transmission of oral traditions and histories located in vernacular cultures. This vernacular tradition can also at times take a physical symbolic form, for example, as it did when Buthelezi, leader of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party, dressed in Zulu traditional regalia at political rallies and the carrying of ‘cultural weapons’ by the Zulu men on the mines, which became such a contentious issue in the early 1990s, when they were used as weapons of murder.

53 The ‘silent conversation’ activity has been done every year since 2003. Because of the nature of the activity, the respondents are not identified.

54 The praise singer or imbongi who performed at the inauguration of President Mandela in 1994 amply demonstrated the survival of traditional histories and rituals.

55 This will be dealt with later in this chapter.
Secondly, even in more formal education contexts in divided societies, there is an embedded potential for vernacular histories, nurtured in vernacular cultures, to be constructed in opposition to the official narrative. Again, the Northern Irish studies have shown fairly convincingly, that vernacular narratives have considerable influence on the way young people receive official history as taught in schools. In South Africa, the official narrative may well have been a powerful influence on the shaping of identities of most young white Afrikaners, but the majority of teachers and pupils were not Afrikaners. Vernacular histories located in communities that were often physically isolated from one another, would have contributed to the shaping of the identities of the majority of teachers and pupils in the schools located in those communities. Contrasting historical narratives are most likely to circulate among marginalised groups, whose historical experiences (or the way they remember or construct them) deviate from official accounts. Vernacular histories in this context become a means of expressing resistance to oppression.

By the 1980s an insurrection of subjugated knowledges or counter memories, from two sources, were beginning to influence history education: a rich body of work by radical (or revisionist) South African historians, mostly living in the United Kingdom which provided alternative narratives of social history often drawing on oral histories of people and communities; and the Peoples’ History movement drawing on local oral histories.

The work of the radical historians could be regarded as a top-down western white-driven interpretation of the past, however, there was a considerable vernacular element involved, even though reconstituted in a written discourse that was located outside of the country. However, it has also been claimed that the work of the

56 cf Chapter 3
radical historians became ‘the master tool of intellectual resistance’ to apartheid. While the counter narratives did not pose a serious challenge to the dominance of the official narrative in schools, there were a number of teachers who drew on these radical histories and taught against the grain of apartheid history, particularly in the 1980s.

The Peoples’ History movement, located in universities, emerged from 1985 as part of a broader Peoples’ Education movement that was launched at an education conference convened by the Soweto Parents’ Crisis Committee at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in Johannesburg. Led by a National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), Peoples’ Education drew on the ideas of the ‘pedagogy of liberation’, in particular of Paolo Freire and aimed at providing an alternative to apartheid education. An NECC member expressed the committee’s position:

that since education as we have known it has been used as a tool of oppression, Peoples’ Education will be an education that must help us to achieve peoples’ power.

The history syllabus and history textbooks were identified as major areas of concern, and among the principles of the NECC was the following:

We will formulate our own history syllabus, which will include people’s perceptions of what history is, international and African history.


I experienced this in the Western Cape in the 1980s when I was teaching. I came into contact with a number of teachers in independent schools, English-speaking government schools and teachers at a number of former Coloured schools who taught in this way. I can only assume that it was also happening elsewhere in the country.


From this grew Peoples’ History, drawing on one hand on the philosophy of radical pedagogy of Peoples’ Education, and on the other, on vernacular histories within local communities. To support the new approach, the NECC published an enquiry-based approach to school history called ‘What is History’ in 1987.\(^{64}\) This clearly challenged the Afrikaner nationalist narrative and the unquestioning approach of fundamental pedagogics. The introduction stated:

> History, as a subject, is not just a collection of dead facts about the past...It is the record of the lives, the experiences, and the struggles of those who have gone before – and of how their lives, experiences and struggles have shaped ours. If we do not understand the past, it is more difficult to change the present or look ahead to the future...it should identify the historical sources of dispossession, oppression and exploitation, and should examine the ways in which these were resisted.\(^{65}\)

Peoples’ History was a movement located within the country and outside of overtly white academia and in its limited challenge to the dominant narrative, could be considered to be the production of counter-memory, that according to Aronowitz and Giroux:

> presents an attempt to rewrite the language of resistance in terms that connect human beings within forms of remembrance that dignify public life, while at the same time allowing people to speak from their particular histories and voices.\(^{66}\)

In this vision, the insurrection of subjugated knowledges or counter-memory is an attempt to develop the language of resistance, so as to substitute the subjugated

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\(^{64}\) Though interestingly, this was compiled by a white, University of the Western Cape academic, Melanie Walker. Information from an interview with Rob Siebörger, 22 April 2008.

\(^{65}\) NECC (1987) *What is History? A new approach to History for Students, Workers and Communities* Johannesburg: NECC & Skotaville: 1


history for the official narrative. It could also, in Boler’s terms, be considered an expression of ‘feeling power’ - the power of feeling as a basis for collective and individual social resistance to injustices.\(^67\) Although the influence of Peoples’ History was not widespread,\(^68\) a number of teachers taught the alternative content and approach of peoples’ history in defiance of the attempted continuing tight controls over schools by education departments and officials. However, in contrast to the Afrikaner nationalist ‘volkgeskiedenis’, Peoples’ History drew from diverse vernacular cultures, so it lacked a nationalist-ideological cohesion. Peoples’ History was an ideological expression of populist resistance to apartheid in the 1980s, rather than the construction of collective memory in service of a nationalist-type collective identity. This may have worked against its having a more significant impact.

Generally in a divided society pupils are exposed to three intersecting interpretations of the past which may influence the way in which they receive narratives of the past: the official narrative as well as the vernacular narratives of teachers and the narratives of the pupils’ own families. Appropriation of an official narrative will occur when that narrative is most closely linked to family and community narratives. The experience of white Afrikaner children was that family, school, church and the media all reinforced the Afrikaner nationalist narrative and exclusive Afrikaner identity while casting fellow South Africans as ‘the other’. This was the state of memory and identity within history education in 1990 when Nelson Mandela was released from prison.

**Opening up the memory debates: the interregnum years 1990-1994**

The political transition challenged the entrenched ideologies and power structures of the apartheid regime, providing ideological space for challenges to the Afrikaner nationalist interpretation of history expressed in official textbooks. The negotiations

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\(^68\) Peoples’ History was located in the History Department at the University of the Western Cape, a ‘Coloured ‘preferential area’ during apartheid. By the 1980s the University had opened up to all races and there were a large number of black students and teachers upgrading their qualifications. It was teachers who had been in contact with the programme who were trying alternative approaches to history teaching. White teachers in a number of former white schools in Cape Town were using a similar approach to history teaching drawing on the revisionist work of ‘history from below’. 
for a post-apartheid settlement were launched in December 1991 and continued throughout 1992 and 1993, resulting in the first democratic elections in South Africa on 27 April 1994. The progress of the negotiations and the growing realisation that a settlement could be reached that would alter the political status quo, evoked very different responses within the history community. On the one hand, there was an urgent attempt by the apartheid bureaucracy to ‘reform’ the official history curriculum in order to maintain its Afrikaner nationalist identity and ongoing influence; and on the other the progressive history community embarked on its first sustained and open challenge to the official narrative in history education in recent years, leading to a series of teacher conferences and textbook colloquia in 1992 and 1993. While the progressive history group attempted to make participation in the debates more racially inclusive, the contestations in history education at this time were essentially between white English and Afrikaans interests and identities.

The Afrikaner nationalist response to the shifting political context, came from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in 1991 and 1992 and from within the (apartheid) Department of National Education (DNE) system in 1994, during the run-up to the elections. The Afrikaner nationalist position was strongly reaffirmed in the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) report on *The Teaching of History in the RSA* published in 1992. The report attempted to signal a reforming state, but the authors were unable to free themselves of Afrikaner nationalist ideology and Afrikaner identity. Noting that the teaching of history had become highly sensitive and politicised by the early 1990s, the authors believed that history would be the subject that, ‘among all the subjects taught in a future ‘new dispensation’, will probably be the one most extensively debated as regards its value, objectives and curriculum...’ They advocated a conservative pluralist approach to school history; race was thinly disguised as the ‘cultures’ of various ‘groups’. It noted that ‘each community has its own distinctive historical roots and identity and can rightly demand that this be recognised and respected in the education of its children’. It recommended

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69 This was a loosely constituted group of mainly white, English-speaking historians, history educators at HEIs, and teachers.
that in South African history, ‘justice should be done to all the communities’, that syllabi should be ‘balanced, true and accountable’, and that a syllabus should provide for teaching the ‘cultural history’ of a group and for ‘teaching the cultural history of other cultural groups’ with the proviso that:

the richer a community’s cultural life and the greater its contribution to historical development, the stronger its claim that the teaching of its cultural history be accorded a central place in the syllabus.\textsuperscript{71}

The central place in the proposed South African history modules continued to be given to whites, particularly Afrikaners, which clearly indicated that the compilers believed that ‘the greater... contribution to historical development’ in this country had been that of the Afrikaners. This was a thinly disguised move to privilege the Afrikaner nationalist narrative and to maintain Afrikaner nationalism as a central tenet of history education. The construction of a common collective South African memory and identity was not entertained.

In February 1994, in an apparently urgent last attempt to be seen to be initiating change before the first democratic elections took place in April, the Department of National Education put out a report outlining proposed amendments to the school history curriculum. The Core Syllabus Committee (CSC) for History that drew up the report was composed of eight men, for the most part white and middle-aged. Five of them were either from the still racially separate national or provincial education departments; of the two listed ‘experts’, one was the Afrikaner Nationalist Historian from the University of Stellenbosch who had co-authored the ‘illustrative syllabus’ included in the 1992 HSRC Report, the other was from Vista University; and the final member was a representative of the Committee of University Principals.\textsuperscript{72} With minor differences, the approach to the history syllabus was still firmly situated in an Afrikaner Nationalist approach.

\textsuperscript{71} HSRC (1992): 9
\textsuperscript{72} The membership of the CSC is listed in a paper, CEPD (1994) \textit{Clearing the Decks: Proposals concerning the History Curriculum in SA Schools}, prepared by the Centre for Education Policy Development (CEPD) History Curriculum Committee on behalf of the National Education Conference (NEC) to be tabled at the National Education and Training Forum (NETF) Social Sciences Field Committee (September). The historian from Stellenbosch University was Prof. P. Kapp.
The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) researchers and the Department of National Education officials underestimated the extent to which the political climate had already changed. The HSRC was in political limbo by that time.\textsuperscript{73} Though attempting through the report to show that it still had relevance as a research unit, the HSRC was located structurally, ideologically and politically in a place that could not bring change or establish a credible policy position. Those who compiled the report, did recognise that the history curriculum would have to change, but were unable to imagine a South African narrative that did not have Afrikaner identity as its central organising feature. What the report further revealed is that there was still a very significant group of Afrikaner academics who thought radical change to the history curriculum was not necessary and that all that would be needed was to ‘modernise’ the curriculum that had last been developed in 1987.\textsuperscript{74}

The Department of National Education officials involved in the 1994 attempt to pre-empt changes to the history curriculum, equally misjudged the political context. With the negotiations for a post-apartheid settlement by that time so far advanced, the Department of National Education could not force through any curriculum changes. Furthermore, education policy networks were emerging that would have greater voice and influence in the post-apartheid curriculum revision processes.\textsuperscript{75} In 1992, a National Education and Training Forum (NETF) had been set up, following pressure to address the education crisis in a broad stakeholder forum, which included the

\textsuperscript{73} Established in 1968, the HSRC received funding from the state and its executive officials were known to be Broederbonders (members of a secret Afrikaner society). Vadi, I. (1992) Address to a teacher conference in Johannesburg, in History Education Group (1993): 24-25

\textsuperscript{74} Rob Siebörger – comments 26 March 2008. The 1987 curriculum development process was the first after a new political dispensation was introduced in 1983. In an attempt to still the rising tide of discontent, the Botha government introduced a tri-cameral system of government extending limited political rights to ‘Coloureds’ and ‘Indians’ but still refusing to include blacks. Parliament was reconstituted to include a House of Assembly (whites), a House of Representatives (Coloureds) and a House of Delegates (Indians). This move unleashed unprecedented mass violence as the United Democratic Front (UDF), a front for the ANC, was launched and a call to make the country ungovernable went out. Representatives from the House of Representatives and House of Delegates were given observer status during the process of creating the 1987 syllabuses.

apartheid government and extra-parliamentary organisations. The NETF established a Curriculum Technical Sub-Committee (CTSC) to ensure that the government did not do any unilateral restructuring of the curriculum before the first democratic elections. When the report was submitted to the Curriculum Technical Sub-Committee, it was put on hold. The Report had been, in effect, little more than yet another attempt to ensure continued influence over the national narrative in the new state. As it turned out, the syllabus revision process immediately after the first democratic elections would do this for them.

The progressive history group lobbied for position in three teacher conferences held in 1992, organised by the History Education Group (HEG), based in Cape Town and two textbook colloquia of 1993, supported by the Georg Eckert Institute. They were organised after, and in response to, the publication of the Human Sciences Research Council report and a Department of National Education (DNE) curriculum report, a Curriculum Model for South Africa (CUMSA). CUMSA’s position on school history was that history should disappear in Grades 7 – 9 (Standards 5 – 7) and be replaced with Social Studies.

There was a sense among the progressive history community at that time, that in relation to the Afrikaner nationalist historians, they had the moral high ground as far as influencing a new history curriculum was concerned. A number of the group had also been involved in writing various alternative history textbooks, which they felt really offered a sound model as to what history education could be like. This led to

76 Jansen, J (1999c) The school curriculum since apartheid: intersections of politics and policy in the South African transition. Journal of Curriculum Studies, Vol. 31, Issue 2: 57-67. The setting up of the NETF was in the spirit of the political negotiations that were taking place at the time.
78 History Education Group (1993): 10
79 Interview with Rob Siebörger, 22 April 2008
a real hope that, excluded from history curriculum construction during apartheid, they would be able to influence the direction of history education in a new, democratic South Africa.\(^8\)

A total of 378 teachers attended the three teacher conferences organised by the History Education Group (HEG), held in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban. The HEG felt strongly that conversations across the education departments needed to happen and over two-thirds of the delegates were from African, Coloured and Indian schools.\(^8\) The Cape Town conference was organised for a school day as a deliberate move to stake an alternative claim to any possible in-service training organised by the Education Department. The conferences were the most inclusive to date and the discussions more wide-ranging than had ever occurred publically around the school history curriculum.\(^8\) The general emphasis in all of the conferences was on history as a discipline, on how it should be taught in order to reflect the skills and processes of historians, and on a more inclusive history, rather than the construction of a new national narrative that would reflect a post-apartheid South African identity. The contribution history education could make to democratic values was a further strong focus. However, much of the discussion in the teacher conferences centred on technical issues, such as the proportion of core and optional content in a new curriculum, rather than on what the content should be, although it was noted that the higher the core content the more this would favour the re-building of the nation.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) This optimism was expressed by Neville Alexander, anti-apartheid activist and in 1992 director of the Project for the Study of Alternative Education in South Africa (PRAESA) at the University of Cape Town when he addressed a teacher conference in 1992: ‘We have entered a unique period which gives us the opportunity to change things and change them radically. We are not in this period of transition as passive spectators. We are part of this transition – we can shape it. In shaping and fashioning the history curriculum we are ourselves making history. We are giving shape both to the history of the present and the future.’ Alexander, N. (1992) Critiques of the present curriculum and proposals for change in History Education Group (1993), History Matters Houghton: Heinemann-Centaur: 13; also Siebörger, 22 April 2008

\(^8\) History Education Group, (1993):5

\(^8\) Siebörger, Interview April 2008; HEG (1993): 4

\(^8\) History Education Group (1993): 50
While the teacher conferences were an attempt to draw teachers into the history education debates, the textbook colloquia on 'School History Textbooks for a Democratic South Africa’ brought together historians and history educators with diametrically opposed views on the nature and purpose of history and history education. Given the opposing views of history education, outside facilitation was thought necessary to facilitate the dialogue between the Afrikaner nationalist historians and textbook writers and historians and writers representing the progressive history community. The Georg-Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, Braunschweig, which sponsored the colloquia, had experience in textbook revision in post-conflict societies. This also indicated that the expectation was that South Africa would follow the path of other countries in transition and revise history textbooks as part of the rejection of the old narrative. Clashes and reconciliations took place as Afrikaner nationalist and English historians and history educators confronted one another. F.A. van Jaarsveld, the doyen of Afrikaner nationalist historians, gave what might have been considered elements of an apology, feeling that he needed to explain and justify what they had been doing and why. Alone of the Afrikaner nationalist historians, he had recognised and voiced the need to change how they wrote about the South African past. In 1990 he wrote:

In revised curricula, more room will have to be made for Black history in its own right and a balance must be struck between Black and White history...There must be an awareness...that in the historical unity of South African society there is a spectrum of diverse and contra-distinctive groups, each with its own historical origin...the syllabus content must be presented with emphasis on the diversity...[syllabi]

85 Set up by the Braunschweig historian, Georg Eckert to support UNESCO efforts to address the role of textbooks in shaping views of the enemy. He organised bi- and multilateral textbook conferences with Germany’s neighbours and especially with her previous enemies until his death in 1974. http://www.gei.de/ A board member of the Institute, Jörn Rüsen, was researching in South Africa at the time and made a proposal to the Institute to fund the colloquia.
87 Siebörger, R.: Interview April 2008
will have to be based on consensus among the groups involved, Black, Brown and White.\textsuperscript{88}

In other words, he recognised the presence and potential power of ‘subjugated knowledges or counter-memory’. Indeed, we can argue that he was implicitly recognising not only that they might be an element in an ‘insurrection’ of the non-Afrikaner communities, but also that they might become the master narrative, with the current Afrikaner master narrative in turn taking its place in the ranks of subjugated knowledges and counter-memories. But, however progressive this may have seemed to fellow Afrikaner nationalist historians, the point of departure nevertheless remained grounded in notions of ethnically defined groups or communities. Bundy regarded this to be a conservative pluralist/multicultural model that had little hope of delivering little more than a sanitised version of South Africa’s past.\textsuperscript{89}

There was significant disagreement between the Afrikaner nationalist and progressive historians, over whether or not it was possible to discuss textbooks without considering the wider curriculum framework of which they would form part.\textsuperscript{90} While the progressive group felt the two were inextricably bound together, a leading Afrikaner nationalist historian of the University of Stellenbosch vehemently opposed this and was adamant that curriculum should not be discussed. He held the view that conferences should not be making curriculum; that it was bringing politics into the textbook conference; and that curriculum construction belonged to the government; and that they should not pre-empt what might come out of the constitutional discussions.\textsuperscript{91} His position was interpreted as a rearguard action of Afrikaner nationalism trying to postpone the inevitable, by a person who had been intimately

\textsuperscript{89} Bundy (2007): 88
\textsuperscript{90} Siebörger (1994b): 100
\textsuperscript{91} This was Prof. Kapp, who had contributed to the HSRC Report and was a member of the Core Syllabus Committee which in February 1994 attempted to rush through a revised curriculum. He was on the organising committee of the textbook colloquia which had representation from the three major universities in the Western Cape, Universities of Cape Town, Western Cape and Stellenbosch. The composition of the committee appears as a footnote in Siebörger (1994b): 98
involved in constructing Afrikaner nationalist history, demonstrating a sense of insecurity that the progress of the political negotiations was giving.\textsuperscript{92}

The issue was not resolved and it was decided by the colloquia organisers that a statement released after the second colloquium, would include positions on construction of curriculum as well as on school textbooks. The position of those who drew up the statement was that the role of school history should be ‘inclusive and democratic’; that a new history curriculum should not ‘exclude, diminish or distort the history of particular groups, classes or communities’; and that it should reflect ‘cultural diversity while reconciling national unity’.\textsuperscript{93} Significantly, though the progressive history community distanced themselves from the Afrikaner nationalist thinking, in talking of the ‘history of particular groups’ they similarly displayed a point of departure locked into apartheid-style ethnicity. It was, however, accepted that history education was central to the construction of:

a new national identity [which] would fulfil three roles: keeping the triumph over evil fresh, memorialising the struggles of the past and helping to break down all remaining racism; giving back a history to those who had been denied or robbed of one before; and helping to strengthen democratic and constitutional values.\textsuperscript{94}

The content debates drew on the work of radical or revisionist historians of South African history, rather than engaging in what might constitute a new collective memory and identity for post-apartheid South Africa. These historians had provided South Africans with a ‘usable past’ and the general acceptance of their work as an alternative content source, that provided a more ‘balanced’ and ‘diverse view’ of the South African past, meant that the written body of academic work of white historians effectively silenced any possible emerging vernacular voices.\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{92} Siebörger (2008): Interview April 2008
\textsuperscript{93} Siebörger, R. (1994a) \textit{New History Textbooks for South Africa} Manzini: Macmillan Boleswa; Siebörger (1994b): 100-101
\textsuperscript{94} Siebörger, R. (2000)
\textsuperscript{95} The influence of the revisionist historians was to be critical in future curriculum processes and will be revisited in the last South African chapter.
What was remarkable for conferences involving historians, was that the reports on the three teacher conferences made little reference to the political instability and violence in the country that was at that time threatening to destabilise the negotiations. It was pointed out that the conference in Durban took place against the backdrop of political violence in KwaZulu/Natal. Neither the KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture, nor the Inkatha-aligned Natal African Teachers Union (NATU), took active part in the conference, contributing, it was thought, to an underrepresentation of black, especially African, teachers.  

The conference report also noted that, in the Durban conference, there was a comparatively low participation by African teachers in the discussions. It was suggested that this could have been either because African teachers were in the minority or because of the generally low morale among teachers in KwaZulu/Natal. However, evidence from the Facing the Past teacher workshops mentioned earlier, suggests that this would have had far more to do with the inequalities and conditioning of years of apartheid than with either of the two reasons offered. This would have been twofold.

Firstly, the psychological trauma and humiliation experienced by the majority of South Africans under years of apartheid had left many with a deep sense of inferiority. Experience gained during workshops with teachers, has shown that people only begin to engage with one another at a deeper level across racial divides, when a sense of community has been nurtured and a safe space provided. Attitudes of superiority among white English-speaking South Africans, though at times unconscious, are equally deeply ingrained and constantly transmitted, if not through verbal language, then through body language. This effectively shuts down open communication.

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96 History Education Group (1993): 2
97 Ibid
98 This has been the experience gained in the Western Cape based professional development project, Facing the Past – Transforming our Future, which has been running for the past 6 years.
Secondly, apartheid educated unequally. The conferences were attempting to engage in conversations around knowledge of a particular approach to history and content that may not have been familiar to black teachers. The work of the revisionist historians was largely inaccessible (lecturers at black universities would not have used them) and the syllabus in the Department of Education and Training (DET – black education) for South African history, ended at 1948, while the syllabuses of the other education departments continued to 1970. In addition, the language of the conference was English, a second or even third language for black South Africans. In the context of the decades of humiliation and trauma, it would take more than a single conference for someone to be confident enough to take part in a debate with white South Africans, in a language that was not a first language, and in a debate that had the potential for indicating a lack of sufficient knowledge. Apartheid education resulted in different understandings of history education among South African teachers. Though these conferences may have opened the way for vernacular histories to enter through the front door at last, given the context, they would have been overwhelmed by the literate narratives of white-constructed revisionist historians and the expectations of those who organised the conferences. A further influence may have been at work. Many of the white participants had been exposed to the latest approaches to teaching history and had been trained in universities that rejected fundamental pedagogics. Black teachers on the other hand would not have had similar opportunities to gain the same exposure.

Conclusion

The trajectory of South Africa’s political negotiations during the early transition to democracy, gave rise to expectations among history academics and educationists on both sides of the political spectrum, though mainly located in white politics. The negotiations opened a space, in which both progressive and Afrikaner nationalist historians and history educationists felt that they could intervene to influence the course of the post-apartheid history curriculum.

There was considerable expectation at this stage that the National Party would continue to be able to exercise influence in the new government, which led Afrikaner
historians and education officials to attempt to exercise authority in proposing the syllabus changes even as late as 1994. On the other hand, the progressive history community were convinced that having been excluded from curriculum processes during apartheid, they would be able to exercise influence in the new state. What emerges is that all of those involved in the history debates of the early 1990s, had clearly underestimated the extent to which history education is political and ideological and that any new curriculum would not be left to academics and teachers to develop.

The history debates of the early 1990s were essentially white debates. They had failed to recognise the power of the Foucauldian insight into the role and nature of the master narrative of the political nation and the ‘subjugated knowledges or countermemories’, particularly when the narratives and memories played a central part in both political subjugation by those in control of the state, and the resistance movement of those who considered themselves to be the oppressed. The segregation and relative isolation of South Africans from one another, and the long period of white political hegemony, had contributed to a lack of insight on the part of white academics and teachers into the true locus of political legitimacy that was emerging. As far as history education was concerned, there was too much at stake in the potential of education policy to signal transformation, to leave it in the hands of academics and teachers without ‘struggle’ credentials and appropriate political affiliation to major resistance organisations, which would contest for dominance in the emerging state.

The next chapter will examine the political and educational processes that occurred in South Africa immediately after the first democratic elections with regard to memory, identity and history education. It will examine the shifts in the policy discourses from the first attempt to realign the old apartheid syllabi to the new democratic values, to the construction of Curriculum 2005 which became the flagship curriculum of the new state. Education policy during the first phase of transition after 1994 would be characterised by stakeholder representation and labour dominated policy networks. This would be a radical departure from the accepted modus operandi of curriculum
construction during apartheid. It would also be shaped by the political context of compromise and reconciliation and the tacit understanding that resulted from the political negotiation process that there would have to be compromises within education policy.
CHAPTER FIVE

CURRICULUM, CONFLICT AND CHANGE: EARLY TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Introduction

In the previous chapter I analysed the construction of Afrikaner nationalist memory and identity and its elevation to a hegemonic official narrative in school textbooks. This had two purposes: firstly, to reveal that the nature of identity based conflict provides a context for understanding the post-conflict changes in education policy; and secondly, it helped to uncover the ways in which vernacular histories or counter-memories, strongly linked to particular visions of group identity, arise because of, and in response to, official history in conflict societies.

This second chapter tells how this historical narrative of conflict between the state sponsored official ‘master narrative’ and the counter narratives, with even role reversal, is engaged in the post-conflict curriculum. Specifically, as the new state takes charge of the inherited narrative of conflict, this chapter demonstrates how the state sought to change it, what choices were made about the change in trajectory, who made those choices, and with what consequences. What emerged from the data was that the depth, direction and pace of curriculum change were conditioned by the terms that settled the conflict and the tacit understanding of compromise that resulted from the political negotiations - an understanding of careful, gradual curriculum change that would not work against the spirit of reconciliation by breaking too radically with the curriculum inherited from the apartheid state. This had implications for the ‘curriculum cleansing’ process of 1995 and the construction of the first post-conflict curriculum in 1996, Curriculum 2005. In the first process, the Afrikaner nationalist interpretation of the past was not fully challenged in the curriculum; in the second, history education disappeared from the formal school curriculum. The process of constructing a new memory and identity for the post-conflict state was instead constructed through an alternative process, the very public hearings of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. These literally drew upon a wealth of subjugated knowledges in the form of the testimonies it received.

At the most basic level the memory choice for a country emerging from mass violence is between remembering and forgetting with the central critical question being what should be done with the knowledge of the horrors of the past.\(^1\) The choices become complicated when the post-conflict society is one in which victims and perpetrators, however defined and identified, have to find a way of continuing to work and live together in a fragile political context.

The politics of negotiation and the continuing employment of apartheid education bureaucrats at national and provincial levels meant that the school curriculum, particularly the ‘cleansing’ process, would be a contested process at all levels. In the construction of Curriculum 2005, the emergence of a strong policy network through which the ANC could work, produced the knowledge and policy position for the changing education system, that avoided engaging with the past and focused on the skills and knowledge needed for a modern economy.\(^2\) The concept of policy networks is particularly useful for attempting to understand the curriculum trajectories of a post-conflict state, particularly taking into account not only the ‘actors of politics’ but also the ‘politics of the actors’:

> in other words to the semantic struggles and discursive contexts which define who counts as an actor in a specific setting, and who does not, which institutions are legitimised and authorized to take part in the shaping or implementation of policy-making, and which are not.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) This was a question raised by Bernhard Schlink (1998) in his book *The Reader* London: Phoenix: 102


Amending the conflict narrative: 1994 - 1995

On the 27th April 1994 South Africa’s ‘Rainbow Nation of God’\(^4\) voted in what became thought of as the miracle elections that were conducted in peace and in a countrywide, overwhelming sense of goodwill between South Africans. A negotiated power-sharing deal\(^5\) resulted in a Government of National Unity (GNU) with Nelson Mandela as South Africa’s first democratically elected president was set up after the elections to manage the transition years. Rather than a miracle, the negotiated settlement reached in 1994 had been hard won, with compromises from both the apartheid government and the liberation movements, particularly the African National Congress (ANC) as the largest of the movements. The negotiation process enabled a ‘peaceful’\(^6\) transfer of political power and the new government, in contrast to its predecessor, was widely considered to be legitimate.\(^7\)

What was still not clear in 1994 was what kind of collective memory and identity would define the re-imagined ‘nation’ as it emerged from a divisive and traumatic past. Bundy maintains that in post-apartheid South Africa, the ‘primary enquiry remains the National Question.’\(^8\) He asks a number of pertinent questions: What is the apartheid nation? Who belongs or is excluded and on what basis? How does a national identity transcend the particularities of ethnicity and race? While the ANC assumed a broad and inclusive approach to ‘We the People’, enshrined in the Freedom Charter adopted in 1955, not all South Africans identified themselves with this as was evidenced by the separatist claims during the negotiations of the Afrikaner Right and the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party.\(^9\) Bundy further suggests that attempts ‘to

\(^4\) This is a phrase that was particularly associated with the Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu and taken up by President Nelson Mandela.


\(^6\) While the elections in 1994 went off peacefully, the four years during which the negotiations were taking place saw extreme violence.


\(^9\) Bundy (2007): 83
imagine the nation in post-apartheid South Africa has been heavily freighted with the burden of race.¹⁰

So rather than a people with a cohesive national identity the Government of National Unity inherited a traumatised country of racial inequality, racialised identities and deeply ingrained attitudes of superiority and inferiority; a country in which privilege and power had been racialised,¹¹ and in which there was a broad array of competing subjugated knowledges, each jostling for position, and even primacy, in the official sanitised version of the nation’s past in an emerging new master narrative. The country had been divided geographically into a number of ‘homelands’ for the various ‘tribes’ which were intended to become independent, as well as segregated living areas for those who remained in the towns and cities. The education system had been severely fragmented, divided into 18 different education departments, some located in the ‘homeland’ areas, others controlling white education in the various provinces and still others controlling education for ‘race’ groups nationally.¹² Each of these departments had its own inherited traditions and particular identities grounded in the socio-cultural contexts in which the departments were based. Because of this fragmentation when, in 1995, these ex-departments were amalgamated to become one national and nine provincial education departments, each provincial department had its own inherited memories and distinctive identity.

While all apartheid education departments had been ultimately controlled by white Afrikaners who had occupied the top management positions, the capacity of the ordinary officials differed widely. Not only that, but in setting up the 9 provincial departments, some provinces inherited relatively efficient infrastructure and systems, while others had no infrastructure and little expertise from which to draw. The

¹⁰ Bundy (2007): 79
¹² For example, education for black South Africans within the white area of South Africa was nationally controlled. Apart from the homelands South Africa had four provinces each of which had control of education in their own province aligned to the white national Department of Education.
continued fragmented and unequal state of the education departments makes it extremely difficult to generalise about education in South Africa.\textsuperscript{13}

Education in apartheid South Africa had been highly politicised, not only in its reflection of the Afrikaner nationalist \textit{zeitgeist}, but in black resistance to an inferior system of education imposed on them. From the creation of Bantu Education in 1953, it had been the arena of fierce resistance to apartheid, particularly after the Soweto uprising of 1976. In the mass action of the mid-1980s, schools became sites of youth struggle against the apartheid regime. With such a legacy and the urgent need to make education decisions about what to do with the traumatic knowledge, the choice of the first Minister of Education, the little known Sibusisu Bengu, was puzzling. As a returning exile, it has been argued that he was out of touch with the education policy debates of the early 1990s and with conditions in schools.\textsuperscript{14} To many, impatient for change, he appeared to be unable to take the initiative in launching educational change. However, perhaps his appointment should rather be assessed in the context of the need for a stable transfer of power, and policies that would ensure a smooth transition as much as they would address social transformation.\textsuperscript{15} The political settlement had provided for power sharing for a number of years which in turn guaranteed apartheid bureaucrats job security for five years.\textsuperscript{16} Fataar has argued that this compromise ensconced a conservative hold over the bureaucracy that curtailed

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{13} For example, my particular [insider] perspective is as a curriculum planner from the Western Cape. Of all provinces the Western Cape was the only one to retain a National Party majority in the provincial elections in 1994. During apartheid the Western Cape had been a ‘Coloured preferential area’ of employment. With the amalgamation of education departments, the dominant institutional culture was derived from the ex-Coloured department (the House of Representatives) which had been male and authoritarian and heavily influenced by the top management being white Afrikaner males. The Western Cape was majority Afrikaans-speaking, but with the high population movement into the province from the Eastern Cape, this is changing, as is the racial profile. It is a relatively well-resourced province with more urban than rural schools, so although we have some isolated rural schools, the province does not have, what in education jargon are known as ‘deep’ rural areas. While I have been involved in national processes of curriculum development, my perceptions are inevitably framed by my knowledge of the Western Cape.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ramphela (2008): 157
\item \textsuperscript{15} The fragility of the new democracy was recognised by Blade Nzimande who noted that the situation was explosive and that South Africa was on the brink of civil war. Policies were therefore crafted in a context where ensuring a smooth transition was as important as developing policies for social transformation. Quoted in Christie, P. (2008) \textit{Changing Schools in South Africa: Opening the Doors of Learning}. Cape Town: Heinemann: 157
\item \textsuperscript{16} See Sparks, A. (1994) \textit{Tomorrow is another country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution} Cape Town: Struik Book Distributors. Sparks provides an indepth analysis of the transition.
\end{thebibliography}
the power of the Minister of Education and delayed policy revision.\textsuperscript{17} However, with hindsight, the political context made an immediate radical revision of the apartheid syllabi difficult.

The extent of the fragility of the political stability in South Africa immediately after 1994, and therefore the tacit understanding that compromise was necessary in education policy, did not appear to be widely appreciated beyond the ANC in government. There was pressure from outside of parliamentary and formal education structures for immediate, and in the case of history, radical, revision of apartheid syllabi. Late in 1994, in the absence of any visible moves by the Minister of Education to undertake education reform, the National Education and Training Forum (NETF)\textsuperscript{18} which had been set up as a broad stakeholder forum in 1992, approached Minister Bengu to provide political support for short-term syllabus revisions as the establishment of a long-term curriculum framework was expected to take at least two years.\textsuperscript{19} The broad goal of the syllabus revision that ensued was to remove the most glaring racist, sexist and outdated content inherited from the apartheid syllabi.\textsuperscript{20}

While most post-conflict states attempt to remove offensive content from the history curriculum, the majority do this by focussing on the textbooks. South Africa attempted a ‘cleansing process’ of curriculum without changing textbooks, which had particular implications for the continued dominance of the conflict narrative in history education.

The revision process was significantly different from the more secretive apartheid curriculum development processes carried out behind closed doors without any public scrutiny by the apartheid regime’s curriculum ‘experts’. Responding to the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) calls to democratise curriculum processes, the

\textsuperscript{17} Fataar (2006): 645
\textsuperscript{18} The NETF was set up in 1992 in response to pressure to address the education crisis in a broad stakeholder forum. The NETF included representatives of the apartheid government and extra-parliamentary organizations.
various sub-committees that were set up were constituted around stakeholder representation. This revealed both strengths and weaknesses. The committees consisted of representatives of various teacher and student unions, and representatives from the Committee of Heads of Education Departments. While this did indeed open the process to a wide range of influences and also public scrutiny, stakeholder representation meant that the subject committees might not necessarily include subject experts. The committees also included inherited and emergent interests which in the case of history, led to a number of critical contestations. A further departure was the invitation from the Minister for public participation in the process. The cleansing process had huge symbolic value, demonstrating in the interregnum, in which political manoeuvring was constrained by the politics of compromise, how values like participation, could drive curriculum reform. However it was questionable whether this could be sustained into a new bureaucracy.

The History sub-committee reflected the political compromise as well as the ‘democratisation’ of curriculum processes: it consisted of a national departmental official who had served on apartheid-era syllabus committees as well as five representatives of teacher organisations, a high school and a university student. However, there were no academics and no representatives of professional history bodies or history teaching associations.21 This meant that there was no continuity with the 1992 conferences and 1993 colloquia, and history teachers were left out of the process. As history teachers they did not fit into a ‘constituency’ that could be recognised as a stakeholder, nor were they organised regionally or nationally as a history educator body; there was no clear place, therefore no collective voice, for them in a stakeholder forum.22

The History sub-committee brought together competing interests between the former apartheid bureaucrats and those aligned to the transforming state promoted by the

22 There was a Society for History Teaching but at that time it was an organisation of Afrikaner Nationalist historians and was not specifically a teacher organisation.
Mandela government. The most experienced person on the sub-committee in terms of curriculum processes was the former apartheid Department of National Education official, absorbed into the new national Department of Education (DoE).\textsuperscript{23} He acted as secretary, a position which was to prove critical to maintaining influence over the revision process. His position on the sub-committee generated resentment among some participants and moves were made within the committee to ‘ensure that the secretary did not exercise an undue influence on the proceedings’.\textsuperscript{24} As such, and understandably, he was seen as a potential medium for transmitting the very messages and embedding apartheid ideology in new policies that would give the new state its raison d’
\textit{etre}. In this very early stage of transition, the inherited apartheid era bureaucrats were still able to exercise significant influence through their control of agendas, the relevant documentation and protocols, and their verbal and literary skills and dexterity.

The Minister’s brief to the working sub-committees was:

- the evaluation of existing core syllabuses with regard to inaccuracies resulting, \textit{inter alia}, from the new constitutional dispensation, as well as outdated and contentious content;
- recommendations regarding the adaptation of the above-mentioned syllabuses in the interim period until a fully revised school curriculum is implemented;
- recommendations with regard to the possible consolidation of core syllabuses in cases where more than one core syllabus per subject is currently in use;
- recommendations resulting from the evaluation/consolidation of the syllabuses, with regard to textbooks, bearing in mind the proviso that amendments shall not necessitate new textbooks;
- possible implications resulting from the syllabus proposals, with regard to the evaluation/examination of learners;

\textsuperscript{23} Louis Kriel. He is still with the national Department of Education and was active in the most recent Further Education and Training curriculum writing processes.

\textsuperscript{24} Report of history committee quoted in Jansen (1999c): 57-67
The History sub-committee received many more submissions than any other subject, indicating a rejection of the Afrikaner Nationalist interpretation dominant in the textbooks, as well as the extent of the interest in the construction of new history and identity that is, its major, even dominant role, in the emergent new nationalism that would underpin political and social harmony. At this point, the History Education Group still hoped that the way was open for them to exercise some influence on the syllabus revisions in terms of both content and the skills and processes that History could support in educating pupils for citizenship in a liberal, plural democracy and sent in a submission. However, the Minister’s brief was narrowly interpreted by the ex-apartheid officials on the History sub-committee, effectively ensuring that there would be little change in what was taught in history classrooms in the new South Africa. Because of the narrow interpretation, many of the proposals received by the history sub-committee were regarded as falling outside of the Minister’s brief because they dealt with longer term issues, and were therefore ignored.

The major problem encountered in the history education revision process was the ministerial directive that the revisions were not to necessitate new textbooks. As it was the textbooks approved for school use during apartheid, rather than the history syllabus itself, that contained the Afrikaner nationalist perspective, distorted history and offensive stereotypes, not allowing new textbooks effectively nullified any meaningful revisions that might have been made to the syllabus itself. The process of

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25 Brief from the letter of appointment sent to all participants by the Director General of the Department of Education dated 6 September 1994 quoted in Lowry (1995):2
26 There were about a 100 submissions. Lowry, S (1995) ‘A Review of the history curriculum process’, Paper delivered at a workshop on ‘School History Textbook Writing – from Principles to Practice, Cape Town; See also Siebörger (2001)
27 Record of a public meeting held on 30 July 1995 at the Education Building of the University of Cape Town to discuss the History Curriculum process. The author attended the meeting at the record was circulated after the meeting to those who had attended. There was a question and answer session with Stephen Lowry after he presented his paper, A Review of the history curriculum process, and with John Samuel from the national Department of Education.
aligning the various versions of the core syllabus brought further challenges that were eventually resolved by a compromise. Underpinning the debate were often deeply held implicit beliefs about the power of narratives that school education reinforced. During the apartheid era, only the syllabuses used in white, coloured and Indian education included South African history after 1948. The syllabus for use in black schools ended with the National Party victory of 1948. As a compromise, and after strong protests to the national Department of Education, apartheid and resistance was included in the final version of the revised syllabus, ending in 1976. However, the section was made optional because of the lack of new textbooks. Supplementary resources were, in fact, developed by the History Syllabus Committee for the interim syllabus, but there was strong resistance from the progressive history education community to their dissemination to schools, as the materials once reviewed were considered to be ‘quite useless and probably even harmful...since these simply perpetuate the old ideological and pedagogical baggage’.

Without money to access appropriate resources, black pupils were again denied a history, and teachers in well-resourced white schools could choose to focus entirely on Afrikaner political history as in the past, and avoid engaging with the immediate apartheid past.

The revision process had opened the way for the continued legitimacy of the Afrikaner nationalist interpretation in history education. Apart from the addition of apartheid and resistance which was new to all ex-education departments, the interim history syllabus was essentially that of the existing core syllabus used in white schools. As a result, one of the most offensive textbooks within former white education continued to be in great demand by schools from the former black education departments, as it was perceived to be the key to successful examination results in Grade 12. The last year of Grade 12 pupils to be examined on this syllabus was 2007. The table below indicates the alignment of the syllabi.

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29 Press Statement issued by the Workshop on School History Textbook Writing, Cape Town, 30 July 1995. Copy sent to all participants.
30 At least that was what we experienced in the Western Cape when the Subject Advisers visited schools. The book was Lintvelt, et. al. *Timelines* quoted in the previous chapter
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<td>• SA foreign policy and growth of international opposition to apartheid</td>
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The interim syllabuses were to go through a further process – that of ‘provincialisation’ by the various provincial Departments of Education – which served as yet another political filter. In the Western Cape where the education department was still largely controlled by old apartheid bureaucrats, the provincial

By this time SA 1910 – 24 had been phased out so this book had omitted it although it was in the interim syllabus.
history committee was made up mostly of male officials from the ex-departments.\textsuperscript{32} Within the committee the political legitimacy was with the Chair who was a SADTU representative. However, the white Afrikaner contingent closed ranks when challenges to the Afrikaner nationalist narrative emerged from the group. During the early transition, authority in the Western Cape Education Department was still vested in the old bureaucracy who refused to allow a History Committee newsletter to be sent to history teachers, because attention was drawn to the Afrikaner nationalist myths around the Great Trek in an article on how to use the ‘old’ history textbooks in the classroom.\textsuperscript{33}

The History syllabus revision process revealed the strengths and weaknesses of democratising curriculum revision during transition periods when the agents of the previous regime could effectively subvert change. While the process did indeed open up debate and widen participation, the need to use the experience of the old apartheid bureaucracy, particularly at national level, provided space for the continued promotion of old interests though in less overt, but potentially influential ways. In the case of the history syllabus, the result was that the old bureaucracy ‘spiked any really new approach to the syllabus’ suggested by the committee.\textsuperscript{34} Because of minimal revisions to the history syllabus in 1994 a further generation of pupils would continue to be exposed to the attitudes and values of Afrikaner nationalist history that had supported the apartheid state.

\textsuperscript{32} The Western Cape Interim Syllabus Committee included Jean September (SADTU – Chair), Rob Siebörger (Tertiary Institutions), Charlie Haupt (ex-HOR), Edward Smuts (ex-HOR), Jurie Joubert (ex-DET), Floris Smit (ex-CED), Joop Joubert (ex-CED College of Education), Anton Hendricks (SAOU), Xolani Sonaba (SADTU), Gail Weldon (Independent Schools Association).

\textsuperscript{33} Jansen (1999). The extent to which departmental officials would go to retain control over the Afrikaner nationalist narrative occurred during the provincialisation of the interim curriculum in the Western Cape in 1995. In an attempt to minimise the impact of not having new history material, I was asked by the Chairperson of the WC Interim Syllabus Committee to write an article on how to use the old history textbooks in schools for a newsletter that would be sent to schools. The article referred to Afrikaner nationalist ‘myths’ such as that of the ‘empty land’ in the textbooks that had served to legitimise white occupation of the interior of southern Africa in the mid-1850s. When the newsletter was submitted to the Western Cape Education Department for printing there was a violent reaction. The committee was confronted by a group of Afrikaans officials and I was accused of undermining Afrikaners. There was a clear inability to distinguish between white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and an Afrikaner nationalist interpretation of history. The WCED refused to send the newsletter to schools – to the white, Afrikaner males of the old bureaucracy, a criticism of the national narrative was perceived to be an attack on them.

\textsuperscript{34} Lowry (1995) Lowry identified this as the heart of the conflict that developed within the history subcommittee.
Two trends emerged from the revision process that would have implications for education policy construction in the coming years: the stakeholder process already discussed; and the location of curriculum revision within the national Department of Education. While the stakeholder representation on the interim subject committees had broadened the process in a way that made it more legitimate, it had also to an extent legitimised ‘state-led curriculum initiatives, given the broad base of participation in the committees’\(^{35}\) and through this, legitimised the control over curriculum processes of the bureaucrats of the old order.\(^ {36}\) The principle of stakeholder representation in curriculum development would become a feature of the next curriculum revision.

The compromised process of curriculum change during the early transition set a precedent for subsequent reform of history education. During the 1994 revision process, the strength of experience lay with the apartheid era bureaucrats rather than with the newly politically appointed officials. The senior bureaucrats inherited from the apartheid Department of National Education retained final editorship of the documents, contributing to the narrow technical and limited interpretation of the Minister’s brief.\(^ {37}\) The continuing power of the old bureaucracy to influence the curriculum processes from within, was demonstrated when the recommendations of the History sub-committee for the interim history syllabus were mysteriously changed at Departmental level before publication. This was done without any consultation with the History sub-committee.\(^ {38}\) After understandably strong protest from the sub-committee and threat of legal action, the document was withdrawn for reconsideration. These dynamics were to change with a number of new appointments in key top positions in the national department of education.

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\(^{36}\) Lowry (1995)  
\(^{37}\) Jansen (1999c): 57-67  
\(^{38}\) Lowry (1995)
The experience of the History sub-committee provides an interesting insight into the way in which the inherited bureaucracy was able to influence the process. The report of the chairperson of the History sub-committee, Stephen Lowry and the record of the proceedings of a public meeting to discuss the draft interim syllabus, indicate a lack of time, as most of the committee were full-time teachers, and capacity, a gap seized on by the full-time bureaucracy. It was indicated that the officials interpreted the brief narrowly partly to exclude the public submissions, as the narrow interpretation had come after the History sub-committee had presented a 40 page document to Interim Committee of Heads of Education. It was at this point that the officials took control of the document and redrafted it in terms of their understanding of the brief.\(^\text{39}\) In the view of a new political appointee at the national Department of Education, John Samuel, the NETF had been focussed on short term changes and making proposals on how the curriculum development process could be managed, and did not recognise the power gap created in the Department of Education soon after the establishment of the Government of National Unity. They had therefore failed to take up the challenge in the post-May 1994 period to place the issue of curriculum development firmly on the national agenda.\(^\text{40}\)

The struggles around the interim history syllabus were a reflection of the politics of transition. The nature of the revision process as the result of political negotiation and compromise was explicitly acknowledged by the Chairman of the History Sub-committee at a public meeting in Cape Town in July 1995.\(^\text{41}\) Furthermore, Neville Alexander while strongly criticising the interim history syllabus that had been put out for comment, and calling for an independent curriculum development unit of experts, clearly understood the political dynamics in operation. He noted that:

Curriculum was fundamentally a political issue and that the nature of the compromise settlement in the country necessarily impacted both upon the curriculum itself and the way it developed...While the

\(^{39}\) Response by Lowry to a question. Record of the public meeting, 30 July 1995.
\(^{40}\) Record of the presentation by John Samuel to the public meeting, 30 July 1995.
\(^{41}\) Record of the public meeting held on Sunday, 30 July 1995, at the Education building of the University of Cape Town to discuss the History curriculum process. This document was distributed to all those who had attended the meeting. Stephen Lowry was Chairperson of the History Sub-committee.
government could not abdicate its responsibility, it could also not monopolize the curriculum debate.\textsuperscript{42}

The aspirations of those within the history education community demanding radical change were frustrated as a result of the political context which could not allow a conflict of memories. While the History sub-committee was able to win a skirmish in reversing the unilateral changes made by the Department of Education official, it was not able to win the battle, as ultimately new political appointees in top positions at the Department of Education did not support the calls for radical changes to the history syllabus. As John Samuel stated at the public meeting, the process of curriculum development needed to be developmental, as a phasing-in process was not only desirable but politically expedient. He further did not support the call for a national conference to discuss the history syllabus as ‘it was time to go forward, to have a plan of action and take responsibility, collectively, for future developments’.\textsuperscript{43} The meeting did, however, make a final appeal in a letter to the Director General of Education, calling for a public debate about history before a new curriculum is put in place.\textsuperscript{44}

**Curriculum 2005 and the denial of memory in history education**

By 1996 it had become increasingly imperative to the ANC in government to have a new curriculum in place before the next general election in 1999 as the government had to be seen to be delivering on its promises in education.\textsuperscript{45} A new curriculum was needed that would bring about the realisation of a new society and promote the unity and the common citizenship and destiny of all South Africans irrespective of race, class, gender or ethnic background.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{42} Record of a public meeting, 30 July 1995. Copy sent to all participants.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid
\textsuperscript{44} Letter to the Director General, 7 August 1995. A copy was sent to all who had attended the public meeting.
\textsuperscript{46} ANC Education Department, 1994
Recognising that education policy was a crucial signifier of the re-imagined nation in a post-conflict society, several key new education policies, deriving their values from the South African Constitution had been put in place by mid-1996. One of the first was the White Paper on Education and Training of 1995 which aimed to provide a generic document that framed the core values and vision of the new government and which symbolised the consolidation of political power of the ANC through the education policy process.\(^47\) In it the stated goal of post-apartheid education was the promotion of a democratic, free, equal, just and peaceful society with well-informed and critical citizens.\(^48\) What was now urgently needed was a new curriculum that would give expression to these policies and that would be able to deliver both democratic and effective economic citizens. Significantly, the education discourses did not at any time engage with locating the new South Africa within an understanding and consciousness of the past, in order to strengthen democracy for the present and future. Neither did the first post-apartheid education framework policy that was introduced in 1996.

In July 1996, a draft *Curriculum Framework for General and Further Education and Training*\(^49\), for the development of a new curriculum, was published. Unlike the Constitution and other new education policy documents, it did not take the past as a point of departure. Its discourse was that of the economic nation with the focus on the present and future. The critical skills were considered to be those most needed for citizens in successful modern economies – for commerce and industry. It also included the need to promote the development of a national identity and an awareness of South Africa’s role and responsibility with regard to Africa and the rest of the world – but these were economic roles and responsibilities. It was soon very clear that national identity was not to be located in an understanding of our past, but in the recognition of our diverse society, multilingualism, co-operation, civic responsibility

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and the ability to participate in all aspects of society and an understanding of the national, provincial, local and regional development needs in the present. This document provided the framework for the development of the first post-apartheid curriculum which became known as Curriculum 2005.

The curriculum development process was unwieldy and rushed, and resulted in a highly complicated ‘transformational’ outcomes-based education (OBE) that was adopted as policy (Curriculum 2005) in March 1997. From the beginning an unfortunate trend emerged with the identification of Curriculum 2005 with patriotism towards the new state. It was introduced to the people of South Africa with appropriate publicity, in itself a rite of passage, to signal the change from the old to the new era:

the introduction of OBE as curriculum policy was consummated in a dramatic public relations display in March 1997 when the Minister of Education officially launched Curriculum 2005 (read: ‘outcomes-based education’) in Cape Town with the equivalent number of balloons in the colours of the recently adopted national flag: curriculum and patriotism were firmly linked.

Linking the new curriculum and patriotism undermined any critical engagement with Curriculum 2005 among officials within the provincial education departments and contributed to many curriculum officials adopting an autocratic and authoritarian approach to teachers during the provincial advocacy programmes if there was any hint of teachers wanting to engage in critical discourse. This was particularly prevalent among newly appointed education officials, who had formerly participated in the struggle against apartheid. It was deeply insidious, undermining the very democratisation of South Africa by casting implementation in the mould of totalitarianism.

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50 Ibid: 14
52 Information about the implementation of C2005 comes largely from my personal involvement in it. I was appointed to the Western Cape Education Department in 1997. I never ceased to be fascinated at the way in which former ‘struggle veterans’ became authoritarian when dealing with teachers.
Curriculum 2005 clearly signalled the transition to a state that had broken with the apartheid past. The introduction to the curriculum policy documents contained a vision of the ‘new’ South African citizens who would be able to build social cohesion, support democracy and contribute to an economically prosperous country and set this ideal citizen against apartheid racist ideology:

In the past the curriculum has perpetuated race, class, gender and ethnic divisions and has emphasised separateness, rather than common citizenship and nationhood. It is therefore imperative that the curriculum be restructured to reflect the values and principles of our new democratic society…[supporting the] following vision for South Africa: ‘A prosperous, truly united, democratic and internationally competitive country with literate, creative and critical citizens leading productive, self-fulfilled lives in a country free of violence, discrimination and prejudice.’

However, the new outcomes-based curriculum was complicated and the language impenetrable for those unaccustomed to the academic discourse of curriculum studies, that is, the vast majority of teachers and others involved in implementation. It was characterised by the ‘radical’ integration of knowledge within eight learning areas that took the place of subjects. Across the curriculum there were 66 Specific Outcomes, hundreds of Assessment Criteria as well as Range Statements. History and Geography were subsumed into Human and Social Sciences (HSS) where they did not appear in any recognisable form, mostly mutating into democracy and citizenship education and environment. The three organising principles of HSS which were meant to be used for integration, were Social Processes and Organisation; Environment, Resources, Development; Citizenship and Civics. The design features of Curriculum 2005 were far too complicated to be made sense of by the majority of teachers and curriculum advisers who were given the task of introducing Curriculum 2005 to the teachers. This contributed to the authoritarian approach of curriculum officials as

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there was a deep sense of insecurity in relation to the new curriculum. Curriculum officials were quite simply out of their depth and were having to respond to questions that they could not answer. The easiest response was to retreat into a form of authoritarianism that understandably drew upon apartheid era precedents and practices.\(^55\)

The reason for the complexity probably lay in the overtly political nature of Curriculum 2005 as symbolic of the new state. Jansen makes a strong argument for the making of Curriculum 2005 as part of the ‘struggle for the achievement of a broad political symbolism’ that would signal the shift from apartheid to a post-apartheid society.\(^56\) He argues that policy making during this period demonstrated ‘the preoccupation of the state with settling policy struggles in the political domain rather than in the realm of practice’ and that Curriculum 2005 was symbolic rather than a policy that was intended to be implemented.\(^57\) The then Deputy Director General in the national Department of Education, Ihron Rensburg, concurred when he characterised 1994 to 1999 as a period marked by ‘symbolic change statements and announcements to signal the transition to a new order while managing the fears of national minorities’.\(^58\) Curriculum 2005, he claimed, had its ‘theoretical and epistemological roots within the anti-apartheid and national liberation struggle, rather than in the emerging state though it was legitimated by it. It was the ‘flagship post-apartheid outcomes-based curriculum transformation programme’.\(^59\)

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55 Personal experience and observation of and discussion with colleagues over the years of attempted implementation. As a provincial Human and Social Sciences group we actually set out to subvert the new curriculum in attempting to make sense of HSS through reorganising the specific outcomes to as far as possible, provide history, geography and civic education foci.


59 Rensburg (2000): 122. Critics have pointed to the conceptual confusion of C2005, drawing as it did on both the competency debates and the popular rhetoric of People’s Education. It has been suggested that the radical rhetoric of People’s Education provided an essential legitimacy to a curriculum that is otherwise highly technicist and conservative. See for example, Kraak, A (1999) Competing Education & Training Policy Discourses: A ‘Systemic’ Versus ‘Unit Standards’ Framework, in Jansen, J and
However, the symbolic nature of Curriculum 2005 does not sufficiently explain the disappearance of history education, and by implication master and minor narratives. Curriculum 2005, in signalling a new state and identity, was located in the concept of collective amnesia that implicitly argued that the past was too contentious, too emotionally charged and too great a source of potential conflict to grapple with so soon. While this may have been understandable in, for example, the context of a country such as post-Third Reich Germany in which there were, therefore, few victims to demand remembrance. It was less understandable in South Africa where the victims, living side by side with former perpetrators, were in fact in the majority, not only in society but in the new government. It is only when considered within the context of the tacit agreement for compromise, mentioned earlier, that it begins to make sense. Its not that apartheid was not mentioned in the Human and Social Sciences Learning Area at all, but there was no engagement with apartheid as a system, no sense of moral outrage at a crime against humanity, merely a requirement to analyse the impact of apartheid on [economic] development.

The first Specific Outcome of HSS, which ironically was only included after the Chairperson of the Mathematics Learning Area Committee asked how a Human and Social Sciences Learning Area could be developed without any South African history in it, dealt with the way in which ‘South African Society has changed and developed over time’. Apartheid was mentioned in two of the related six Assessment Criteria of the Outcome:

SO 1: AC 4: The impact of Apartheid on development is analysed
SO 1: AC 5: Patterns of continuity and change in post-Apartheid South Africa are analysed

The failure to include history education lies in the intersection of a number of complex and often competing interests in post-apartheid politics and education: global

Christie, P (eds), Changing Curriculum, Studies on Outcomes-based Education in South Africa Cape Town: Juta & Co: 21-58

60 The HSS policy document; interview with Rob Sieborger
and national policy networks that identified within the economic nation; competing interests and legitimacy in the Human and Social Sciences writing group during the pressurised writing process; post-colonial responses to colonial narratives; and finally, response to a traumatic past.

Firstly, the rejection of history education can be located in South Africa’s attempts to reposition itself in the global order and considerations for boosting the national economy. Stakeholder curriculum processes during this early transition were dominated by the trade unions in close collaboration with sections of business. The choice of outcomes-based education as curriculum technology, according to Fataar, is tied to the hegemonic role played by the labour dominated policy network inside the new government. It can also be understood in the context of global educational policy networks and policy borrowing. According to Spreen:

Experiencing borrowing is instructive because it lodges the analysis of educational policy making within an international context by mapping out the complex ways in which international social and cultural ties, political and economic relationships, democratic imperatives, and shifting roles of global and local participation all influence policy decisions.

There were strong links between Curriculum 2005 and the Studies of Society and Environment for Australian Schools and Social Studies in the New Zealand Curriculum which had gone the route of integrating former subjects into learning areas.

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61 Fataar (2006): 646
62 Fataar (2006): 647
Curriculum 2005 was always overtly economically orientated. The origin of the move towards outcomes-based education within South Africa appears to have been in the National Training Board (NTB) and the labour union, COSATU. The NTB and COSATU produced a policy document, the National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) which laid the basis for a future national training strategy. The aim of the strategy was to provide for the recognition of the skills or competencies workers gained in the workplace. The debates about competencies were, thus, largely situated within the labour movement and business with little integration with educational ideas even though schools were incorporated into the framework. Once taken up into the school system, the competencies became ‘outcomes’, which focussed on the knowledge and skills needed in the world of work should a learner exit the system after Grade 9. The labour representatives were all self-identified leftists, fully supportive of the integration agenda.

A national Department of Education briefing document on the development of outcomes-based education made the economic intentions of the new curriculum very clear:

South Africa has recently undergone a political change which removed the oppressive government of the past forty years. A massive undertaking to reconstruct South African society and create economic growth is being undertaken in order to improve the quality of life of South African citizens and redress the inequalities of the past. In order to achieve this there is a strong focus on economic growth and job creation…the transformation of the Labour Market is seen as being a key step in the creation of growth. This would require a clear change in

67 Fataar (2006): 648
the nature of the South African education system. Hence the move towards an outcomes-based approach to education.\textsuperscript{68}

Rensburg, by stating that the criticism of the lack of History in Curriculum 2005 was misplaced since the curriculum goals of compulsory education differed from that of further education, supported this view. He insisted that the critique should have been within a consideration of the goals of compulsory education.\textsuperscript{69} An analysis of the Critical and Specific Outcomes of Curriculum 2005 reveals that they were predominantly about the economic nation and what was considered to be of value to the job market when exiting the school system. The belief was that transformational OBE would provide learners with the ‘knowledge, competence and orientations’ needed for success in a ‘complex, challenging, high-tech future’ after leaving school.\textsuperscript{70} Bantu Education during apartheid had been about providing basic skills for labour in the economy – Curriculum 2005 emphasized science and technology as a rejection of apartheid education and as a means of providing the knowledge and skills for participation in the global economy. History education in an economic context was considered to be valueless.

In focussing on transmission of a learnt Afrikaner master narrative in history education during apartheid, Afrikaner nationalist history together with fundamental pedagogics, had contributed to a view of history education as content, transmitted to pupils in a Freirean ‘banking system’. Few, it seemed, could conceive of school history as a subject that incorporated a range of skills, protocols, second order concepts and procedures – all of which are central to history education as an investigative discipline. So not only had the official narrative been offensive, and history education used for political indoctrination, the pedagogical content knowledge experienced under apartheid made it seem that history education was therefore irrelevant in a technological age.

\textsuperscript{68} Simpson, L (n.d.) \textit{An Outcomes-Based Approach to Educational and Curriculum Development in South Africa}, presented at a Department of Education Workshop, 30/31 July 1998: 4. Llanley Simpson was a young political appointee to the DoE.

\textsuperscript{69} Rensburg (2000): 124

\textsuperscript{70} Simpson (n.d.): 8
Whether or not Curriculum 2005 could have achieved its economic goals is irrelevant at this point. Many teachers, particularly in under-resourced and rural schools who had suffered the most during apartheid, believed that Curriculum 2005 could bring real economic transformation to the country and assist with job creation.\(^1\) This is the cruelty of producing a curriculum that was visionary and symbolic. Curriculum 2005 was unable to deliver the knowledge and skills necessary for a global world. In a country such as South Africa with its enormous disparities in education, the minority with access to private education or well-resourced and expensive state schools, would continue to be recipients of a close to world class education, while the majority would continue to lack the resources and teaching to close the knowledge gap.

South Africa’s perceived role in a global economy, was also aligned with the then emerging thinking that would enable an African Renaissance. The notion of an African Renaissance, closely identified with Thabo Mbeki, is linked to the vision of a strong economic role for South Africa within southern Africa, as well as Africa as a whole. In Mbeki’s view, the idea of the African Renaissance is as much about a struggle against Africa’s marginalisation in economic and political terms as it is about the celebration and development of African cultures.\(^2\) Science and technology feature strongly, as it did in Curriculum 2005. It is a philosophy which is forward-looking while invoking the romance, rather than the substance, of the past\(^3\) and is more about South Africans having an African identity than about being South African. African Renaissance within South Africa means ‘centring of the majority experience in the national life of South Africa’; about ‘how we can make the diverse instrument of the

\(^1\) Kros, C. (2000) Effacing History: an examination of curriculum development and History textbooks after 1994. A paper presented at Memory and History: Remembering, Forgetting and Forgiving in the life of the Nation and the Community, Cape Town 9-11 August. She quotes a teacher from the then Northern Province as welcoming a ‘more advanced outcomes based education’ believing it would assist in job creation. ‘by the end of Grade 9 the pupil can do something for himself – maybe make a business – run a shop.,


state serve the interests of the newly liberated’.\textsuperscript{74} For Africa, the African Renaissance is about Africans today recognising ‘themselves as a political force and market of the future’.\textsuperscript{75} And the African Renaissance, in focussing on the future, regards ‘yesterday as a foreign country – tomorrow [belonging] to us!’\textsuperscript{76} In this vision, history education is irrelevant. Education is about the skills necessary for participation in the global economy, but more particularly about taking the lead in a new Africa that faces the future and not the past. In Curriculum 2005 the economic development was the overwhelming priority - yesterday was another country, not to be engaged with – a technological tomorrow was what was important.

Secondly, the excision of history education from the new curriculum could be seen to be located in the dynamics of the writing process itself. Within the various education departments, from national to the newly constituted provincial education departments there were contesting interests with the political appointment of senior bureaucrats, particularly in the national Department of Education and the old bureaucracy whose positions had been protected for five years under the provisions of the political settlement. Critical to the analysis of curriculum revision is the ‘competition and negotiation among social actors, who vie to influence the determination of norms and values that the state will uphold over others’.\textsuperscript{77} In national political processes such as curriculum construction ‘authorship and voice’ reflected in the final product is related to ‘both the positioning of the voice and the authority of who speaks’ with the question of power being critical – ‘who exercises power, how and through which voice’.\textsuperscript{78} Any attempt to explain what happened to history needs to take cognisance of ‘the competition and negotiation of social actors’ on a number of levels.

\textsuperscript{74} Ndebele, N.S. (2000) In their own Voices: African Renaissance Beyond Racism: Brazil, South Africa, The United States, (SEF, Atlanta): 21
\textsuperscript{76} Mbeki, T (1999) Prologue to Makgoba, M.W. (1999) African Renaissance Cape Town: Mafube Tafelberg: xxi. The full quote is: Yesterday is a foreign country – tomorrow belongs to us! Mbeki was quoting a delegation of a section of Afrikaner youth leaders who had met with him.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid
Authority and positionality of voice, therefore legitimacy, were key factors at work within the Human and Social Sciences (HSS) working group. The exercise of power and voice during the process was the result of powerful, though often not overt, struggles, that were shaped by the particular context of the apartheid legacy and the negotiated transition after conflict. There was a clear ideological high ground among the newly appointed bureaucrats; and the possibility of subversion from the ‘inherited’ bureaucracy of the apartheid education departments. Therefore evidence suggests that the stakeholder composition of the writing groups and the ‘residual ideologies’ from the past and the emergent ideologies, in particular the Human and Social Sciences Learning Area into which history education was subsumed, played a significant role in the form of the final document. This was further shaped by agency - by what the members of the writing group, within the emergent political context, ‘did and said’ during the course of the writing.

The curriculum writing process was clumsy, unwieldy with the largest writing group being Human and Social Science (over 50 people). Precedent having been set by the cleansing process of the interim syllabus, control of the curriculum development process was located within the national Department of Education. This was a stakeholder process of democratising curriculum development with a mix of new ‘political’ appointees to the national and provincial departments and of old apartheid bureaucrats. Two of the three in overall charge of the process were apartheid era bureaucrats. The majority of those who participated in the various writing groups were from the nine provincial education departments. These too, included a significant proportion of ‘inherited’ bureaucrats. In the interests of ‘neutrality’ a national DoE official was elected Chairperson of Human and Social Sciences Learning Area Committee and the scribe was the same national Department of Education official who had been the secretariat for the interim History syllabus process and who had had an investigation launched against him. Although the roles of the chairperson and scribe were defined, both were from the old inherited

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80 Ibid
bureaucracy with vested interests in attempting to exert influence over the curriculum processes.

The provincial representatives who were part of the inherited bureaucracy were associated with a discarded education system, which would have made them reluctant to take any stance that could be interpreted as opposing the emerging curriculum, whatever they thought about it. The Afrikaners amongst them, given the daily revelations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, no doubt felt easier without history in the curriculum and would certainly not have fought for its inclusion in Human and Social Sciences. However, what is interesting in this instance, is that the group in whose interests it would have been to suppress apartheid memory in history education (old Afrikaner bureaucracy), was not the group that had the voice of power in the creation of Human and Social Sciences in Curriculum 2005. As it turned out, remaining silent was in their best interests as those who were positioned for power were either not historians and/or were fully supportive of the philosophy of Curriculum 2005 and therefore against history in the curriculum.81

For those who had legitimacy, Curriculum 2005 needed to be so far removed from apartheid education that it could be seen to be eradicating apartheid. The representatives of the largest teacher union, the South African Democratic Teacher Union or SADTU, which had its genesis in the struggle against apartheid, fully supported the new curriculum and carried with them the legitimacy of being ANC-aligned and active during the anti-apartheid struggles. SADTU representatives, therefore, had a legitimacy that the other teacher union representatives did not have. However, what is interesting is that many SADTU-aligned teachers at least in the Western Cape must have been part of the Peoples’ History movement which drew on vernacular history and counter memory, as an expression of resistance against the apartheid regime.

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81 For example, Ihron Rensburg, newly appointed Deputy Director General for GET in the DoE, who gave a deputation from the Historical Association short shrift when they appealed to him to rescue history in the curriculum before it was too late, and John Carneson who became the dominant voice within the HSS LAC. Neither were historians but both had strong ANC and anti-apartheid credentials.
The representatives from the South African Society for History Teaching and the Society of South African Geographers were not only male, but also white and therefore lacked legitimacy. When the representative presented a submission from the Society of South African Geographers requesting that Geography be given the status of a ninth Learning Area, he was seen to be making an attempt to derail the integrity of the new learning areas and the submission was rejected out of hand. A later attempt made by the history representatives to have a stronger history focus within the Learning Area led to a major confrontation, again revealing the legitimate/illegitimate fault line. What was clearly demonstrated during this process was the political irrelevance and impotence of the history community. Two delegations to the Department of Education and the Minister of Education were repulsed. They simply had no access to the key figures within the government who were currently determining education policy; and they were talking in a language that ran counter to the entire thinking behind Curriculum 2005.

Other factors reinforced the rejection of history education: although once the basic OBE curricular framework had been determined, this exclusion was axiomatic. A further consideration is that the lack of history education within the Human and Social Sciences Learning Area may simply have been the outcome of the unrealistic writing timeframes and the pressures put on the writing groups:

Participants were requested not to talk in ‘old language’ such as history; the department required the consultancy services of ‘forward looking’ people. There were deadlines, white males with laptops, disks, alienating language and authoritarian voices that demanded ‘products’ by the hour.

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83 Siebörger, R. (2005) email to the author. John Carneson, whose background was integrated studies, led the resistance to anything resembling old subjects within the Learning Area. It may, therefore, have had nothing to do with resistance to history per se.
85 Bam (2000): 4. June Bam wrote from personal experience as a member of the National Reference Group for the Human and Social Sciences Learning Area.
This left unfinished the process of writing by the Learning Area Committees and there was a subsequent rushed finalisation of Curriculum 2005 by an appointed, and paid, 15-member Technical Committee. At this point, power was centralised in a Technical Committee, assisted by Canadian advisers, which was answerable only to the Minister. It was the work of this committee that signalled the failure of the stakeholder process in the construction of education policy. It also had the effect that the Technical Committee was given far more influence over the eventual outcomes than it would, or should, have had, as it reduced the hundreds of outcomes that had been written by the Learning Area Committees by the end of November 1996, to the eventual sixty-six of March 1997. The Technical Committee interacted with the Phase committees and with a small group of nominated people from the LACs (the Reference group), and took significant decisions without seeking endorsement from others. Clearly it was not intended that there should be any debate about the nature of the new curriculum, but even had there been, meaningful debate would not have been possible given the rushed nature of the process.

Thirdly, the rejection of history was also located in a ‘post-colonial’ response to what could have been argued to have been a ‘colonial’ history curriculum under apartheid. Literary critic, Bill Ashcroft, has identified four reactions to the discourse of history in post-colonial societies. Firstly, there is acceptance of the historical discourse and one’s location in it. Secondly, there is rejection of the colonial discourse with the concept of history being challenged as a cultural construct and alongside this, a third reaction and also mode of resistance, which is the interjection of counter-narratives into the popular arena – an acceptance of the basic narrative, but suggesting that there is an alternative, truer picture, than the one being told. This characterises the vernacular narratives of Peoples’ History described in the previous chapter. The fourth reaction he suggests is the strategy of interpolation, interruption of the dominant discourse by destabilizing the very forms through which the dominant

87 Ibid
discourse is produced, consumed and exchanged. It draws attention to history as a representational practice; it is about thinking about how history is constructed.

It is conceivable, that recognising the deeply insidious way in which history education during apartheid reinforced the unequal relations of power and in Freirean terms, may have led the oppressed to be shaped by the discourses of the oppressors, that complete rejection would seem the only reasonable way of decolonising minds. There were certainly those located in the struggle against apartheid who felt such a ‘deep aversion’ to the manipulation of history and history textbooks during apartheid that history education was ‘symbolic of apartheid; removing history was removing apartheid.’ This is Ashcroft’s rejection, though not just of the colonial narrative, but of history education per se. There had been a precedent for the idea of removing history from the curriculum in one of the NEPI reports of 1992 and although the report had not suggested this as a serious option, it gave expression to important concerns about history, which could have influenced the post-1994 curriculum developers to drop history from the school curriculum.

Lastly, and conceivably the most important, reason is closely linked to the politics of compromise: that possibly rejection was because the past was still too contentious, painful, too present and too likely to be a cause of discord and conflict to deal with, particularly when perpetrators and victims had to find a way of moving forward together. So it was easier to suppress the past and to dissolve it into something new than to deal with it – that the misuse of history under apartheid and a fear of confronting the past might have been a strong guiding force for several of the people designing Curriculum 2005 in de-emphasising history.

For the white community, there was the fear of facing the extent to which they had been enmeshed in the crimes of apartheid. Enmeshing is not only about perpetrators

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90 NEPI (1992): 73
91 Cross, et. al. (2002): 171-187
who actually committed the crimes, or encouraged or assisted in them; it is also about bystander behaviour. There is enmeshing through knowing but not acting, through looking or looking away and through not helping. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission revelations, which will be discussed below, made the extent of the criminal activities of the apartheid regime abundantly clear making it difficult for white South Africans not to find evil in what they had lost and, by association, in themselves. They could not deny that crimes against humanity had been committed in their name, but focussing on the most brutal crimes committed under apartheid made it even more difficult for whites to admit to at least some measure of complicity. And for victims, the trauma may have been too fresh, too deep for that traumatic knowledge to be written into a school curriculum. The fact that none of these issues were discussed during the Human and Social Sciences writing process does not mean that they were not present and not deeply real.

Curriculum 2005 had put the past behind it – but with potentially unexpected, even dangerous consequences. Giroux has argued that if we ask history no questions it will remain silent and that it is under cover of such silences that history can be revisited with injustices and inhumanity that have, in the past, placed the world in peril. We need to confront history’s structured silences. In similar vein, psychoanalysts suggest that suppressing a violent past is psychologically dangerous, not only for victims but also for perpetrators as well as the second generation of both. Several studies in Germany have confirmed a relationship between personal problems, even mental disturbances, among post-war Germans and the emotional burdens of an unprocessed Nazi past. Indeed, the logic of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was that its work should be reflected in the new curriculum that would underpin and promote social, political and racial harmony.

94 This concept is discussed in the preface to Mitscherlich, A. & Mitscherlich, M. (1975) The Inability to Mourn New York: Grove Press Inc.
95 Interview with Rob Siebörger.
An important question in any post-conflict society is what to do with the traumatic knowledge; what might constitute too much remembering or too much forgetting and who would have the right to decide. When are societies morally obligated to remember and why? According to a German author and lawyer, Bernhard Schlink, there is only one reason that remembering is morally obligatory:

the right of the victims and their relatives and descendants to be recognised in their identity that has been shaped by that specific past, by those specific crimes, by those atrocities – and also in their right to grant forgiveness and reconciliation, or to refuse it.  

This, in contrast to Curriculum 2005, would be a major focus of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which began its hearings almost simultaneously with the construction of Curriculum 2005. While the formal curriculum denied memory, the extended curriculum, represented by the testimonies of the TRC, was being shaped into the core of a new official memory.

**Broadening curriculum: the TRC and emerging official memory**

A central issue in post-conflict societies is how that society should relate to the past. The politics of compromise in South Africa shifted the locus of relating to the past from history education to public testimony in the form of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings. By broadening the understanding of education and history education, relating to the past through public testimony, however, can be considered an important facet of history education. Such testimonies were powerful carriers of the messages encoded in their transmitters, of ‘subjugated knowledges’ and ‘counter memories’. Such public practices of memory have a testamentary, transitive function bearing ‘an educative legacy to those who come after’. Critically for a post-conflict state, remembrance provides possibilities for ethical learning and confronting and coming to terms not only with the stories of the past, but also with ourselves, as we are in the present.  

It could also be argued that the TRC was able to relieve the...
public school curriculum of the burden of dealing with trauma in the interests of racial accommodation (politically) and economic integration (globally).

The Truth and Reconciliation process was significant, not only because psychologically it was important that South Africans should begin to engage with the traumatic legacy of apartheid but also because it began a very public political process of constructing a ‘foundation myth’ or official narrative and a new chosen trauma at the very time during which the curriculum process was advocating collective amnesia. The TRC raised questions of what practices of response to the testimonies might ‘enable an opening into learning’ creating the possibilities of new histories. It would have been reasonable to expect that the TRC hearings would have had some influence on the formal curriculum being constructed.

The TRC hearings drew together the politics of memory, identity and emotion enabling a confrontation with the apartheid past as no other process did. The interim Constitution laid the foundation for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which was formed on 5 December 1995 under the chairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. On 27 May 1994 Dullah Omar, Minister of Justice, had announced to Parliament that a commission of truth and reconciliation would be set up to enable South Africa to come to terms with its past. He emphasised that reconciliation was not just about indemnity through amnesty and forgetting the past:

We cannot forgive on behalf of the victims, nor do we have the moral right to do so. It is the victims themselves who must speak. Their voices need to be heard. The fundamental issue for all South Africans is therefore to come to terms with our past on the only moral basis possible, namely that the truth be told and that truth be acknowledged.

In the current spirit of reconciliation it was not to be an Afrikaner witch hunt or a ploy to ‘haul violators of human rights before court to face charges’, rather a ‘necessary

100 Ibid
exercise to enable South Africans to come to terms with their past on a morally acceptable basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation’. The underlying concepts were that of reconciliation and restorative justice (in contrast to vengeance and retributive justice).

The South African TRC was not the first, but what set it apart from the others was that perpetrators as well as victims testified before the Commission. It was a product of the negotiated political settlement. On the one hand, the representatives of the still ruling apartheid regime wanted a blanket amnesty; on the other, there were many among the victims who wanted closure through a Nuremberg-style prosecution of perpetrators. The fragile political situation just before the 1994 elections needed the support of the apartheid security forces to ensure a peaceful transition. This was gained through the amnesty provisions of the TRC - amnesty in return for full disclosure of the truth about politically motivated human rights violations during apartheid. Without the amnesty provisions, there would also have been no incentive for perpetrators to reveal the policies, practices and specific crimes committed.

However, the TRC focused on a limited period of the most violent of human rights abuses, thereby containing the narrative that was being forged through the hearings. The hearings began on 16 April 1996 and for the next two years South Africans ‘went through a very public ritual about confronting the past’.

The confrontation with the past was deliberately through the medium of a public space. Witnessing the pain and trauma of the victims were key elements in the psychological reorientation of the perpetrators:

Week after week; voice after voice; account after account...It is not so much the deaths, and the names of the dead, but the web of infinite sorrow woven around them. It keeps on coming and coming.

102 Dullah Omar quoted in Boraine (2000): 45
Throughout apartheid there had been organisations such as Black Sash and the Institute of Race Relations that had tracked the deaths in detention and had made every effort under draconian media laws to bring apartheid brutality into the public eye. For those who had chosen to find out as much as they could about what was happening during the dark days of apartheid, the revelations of the TRC were not a complete surprise, though the extent of the brutality was far wider and deeper than expected. There were those white South Africans who remained defiantly unmoved about accepting joint responsibility for the past, that is, the recognition that they as an ethnic, social and culturally homogeneous group were collectively agents of repression. But for many, and in particular for Afrikaners, there was the trauma and guilt of those ‘recognising evil in oneself’ by association with an evil regime. The Afrikaner poet and writer, Antje Krog, captured the impact the TRC revelations had upon them:

Wordless, lost. While Afrikaner surnames like Barnard, Nieuwoudt, van Zyl, van Wyk peel off victims’ lips... And hundreds of Afrikaners are walking down this road – on their own with their own fears and shame and guilt. And some say it, most just live it. We are so utterly sorry. We are deeply ashamed and gripped with remorse. But hear us, we are from here. We will live it right – here – with you, for you.\(^{106}\)

The uncensored post-apartheid media played a crucial role in ensuring widespread national acceptance. Because the public hearings, broadcast daily on television and radio, included testimonies of both victims and perpetrators, it ensured that South Africans could not deny their violent past. Here, literally, were the suppressed versions of the past – thousands of counter narratives to the official master narrative of the apartheid state. One of the effects the revelations had on white South Africans was that, although they refused collectively to own the past, they in effect moved

\(^{105}\) The psychologists, Mitscherlich, A. & Mitscherlich, M. (1975) *The Inability to Mourn* New York: Grove Press Inc. wrote of the German people who had overwhelmingly supported the Nazi regime, having to come to terms with that evil, and by doing so, recognising the evil in oneself. This, they suggest, led to the inability to mourn in immediate post-war Germany and thus silence about the Nazi past.

\(^{106}\) Krog, 2002: 44 and 99
from saying ‘it could not have happened’ to ‘I did not know it was happening’. While this was also a form of passive denial, it did acknowledge the violence committed in the service of the apartheid regime, and *ipso facto*, in the ‘service’ of white South Africans.

The TRC was a very public process through which the post-apartheid South African regime established its new order by defining that order through judgement on the old. It is recognised that the TRC was shaped by the mandate of political compromise as a political act of ‘nation building’. Though the TRC looked at apartheid through the experience of a tiny minority of political activists and state security forces, of perpetrators and a few thousand victims, the testimonies can be regarded as important knowledge which constitutes a new archive of previously silenced South African history.\(^{107}\) However, this was a deliberately contained and managed process of constructing a particular official memory,\(^ {108}\) perhaps even a foundational myth, for the new ‘nation’; a politically useful narrative of chosen trauma which also opened the way for vernacular memories to flourish.\(^ {109}\) For all its flaws, the TRC process did serve the purpose of sufficiently coming to terms with the evils of apartheid in order for a new state to be formed and a new community [and identity] to be imagined.\(^ {110}\) In a real sense it had a catalytic social function, enabling transition to occur in a peaceful, non-violent way.

Psychologists and political scientists agree that reconciliation between victims and perpetrators is a crucial element of the ability to move forward after internecine violence. A comparative study on transition from authoritarian rule emphasised that:

> It is difficult to imagine how a society can return to some degree of functioning which would provide social and ideological support for


\(^{109}\) For example, the Cape Town Memory Project and the Guguletu Seven and Amy Biehl memorials in Cape Town.

political democracy without somehow coming to terms with the most painful elements of its own past. By refusing to confront and to purge itself of its worst fears and resentments, such a society would be burying not just its past but the very ethical values it needs to make its future liveable.\textsuperscript{111}

Psychoanalysts studying trauma resulting from mass violence point out that the traumatic memories of the past are not forgotten.\textsuperscript{112} Research also suggests that unresolved trauma in the form of memories, will be consciously and unconsciously transmitted from generation to generation - ‘inter- or transgenerational transmission of trauma’ – with the potential for causing and inflaming future conflicts.\textsuperscript{113} The past continues to torment because it is not the past; for such societies, crimes can never be locked in the historical past – rather, they remain locked in the eternal present, crying out for vengeance.\textsuperscript{114} This is Volkan’s ‘chosen trauma’ – the mental and physical representation of an event that has caused a large group to face drastic losses, feel helpless and victimized by another group and share a humiliating injury. He regards this as the key to understanding transgenerational transmission of trauma. Unless the victim group is able to enter a process of mourning, the cycle will not be broken.\textsuperscript{115} Also of importance, however, is the recognition of trauma in the perpetrators and the potential psychological damage if the survivors of that group do not face responsibility and guilt becomes a barrier to mourning that what has been lost.\textsuperscript{116}

According to Minow, a Harvard law professor, people who actually commit atrocities

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{113} Volkan, V. (2006) Trauma, Mourning, Memorials and Forgiveness. An address given at the Cape Town Holocaust Centre, 22 November 2006
\footnote{115} Mourning is the psychic process by with an individual copes with a loss. Mitscherlich, A. & Mitscherlich, M. (1975) The Inability to Mourn New York: Grove Press Inc: xxv
\footnote{116} This is at the core of the Mitscherlich’s book, The Inability to Mourn, writing about post-Nazi West Germany.
\end{footnotes}
do not succeed in getting rid of their post-traumatic symptoms. Rather, they seem to ‘suffer the most severe and intractable disturbances’.  

Psychoanalysts such as Volkan, suggest that the TRC was an emotionally cathartic event, opening up a window for societal mourning and becoming what could be considered to be a public memorial of conscience. These were the stories, the histories that ‘insist remembrance be accountable to the demand for non-indifference’, that should be in the centre of ethical practice and pedagogy of remembrance with the ‘responsibility of memory giving countenance to those who have provided testament’. It would have been reasonable, therefore, to assume that any new political education curriculum would have supported memory against forgetting and included the narratives of the apartheid past.

The TRC process was about the victims of torture and security force brutality; apartheid as a system that divided South Africans and destroyed the lives of millions both economically and psychologically, was not ‘on trial’. Mamdani called this the ‘truth that the TRC is obscuring’. For him it was crucial that the country recognise:

...the experience of apartheid as a banal reality for sixteen million people arrested for pass law violations, for four million victims of forced removals, and for the millions who went through Bantu education.

It could be argued that this was an orchestrated and contained process creating a particular official memory for political purposes that did little to help ordinary citizens to accept responsibility (whites) for having supported or been associated with apartheid:

The TRC invites beneficiaries to join victims in a public outrage against perpetrators. It invites beneficiaries to say: ‘If only we had

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117 Minow (1998): 8
118 Volkan, (2006)
120 Mamdani (1998)
known. We did not know this when we voted time after time for the regime of White power and White privilege.’ So beneficiaries, too, are presented as victims. By reducing apartheid to its worst perpetrators, is not the TRC turning into a rescue operation for beneficiaries?\textsuperscript{121}

The rejection of history education together with the politics of memory located in the TRC meant that the majority of white South Africans were able to engage in the politics of avoidance. They could avoid taking either collective or individual responsibility for supporting the system of apartheid or even of benefiting from apartheid and could even claim not to have known what was going on. It also opened the way for white South Africans to say we should put the past behind us. Curriculum 2005 was doing just that to great effect.

What, then, should the role (if any) of history education have been in the process of remembering and forgetting? What should the curriculum have done with the traumatic knowledge of the testimonies of perpetrators and victims to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission? This moves us into the realm of the ‘ethical practice and pedagogy of remembrance’, of the stories and histories that ‘insist remembrance be accountable to the demand for non-indifference’ (of the ‘banal reality of apartheid’) with the ‘responsibility of memory giving countenance to those who have provided testament’.\textsuperscript{122} For those who provided testament to the TRC, particularly victims, it would have been reasonable to believe that history education in the post-apartheid state would be central to the process of remembrance.

Giroux views history as possibility and believes that teachers, as researchers, assuming the role of transformative intellectuals, need to grapple with concepts such as ‘liberating memory’, uncovering the horror of past suffering and the dignity of resistance. While this is a vision that is far from the realities of the post-conflict classrooms of a country such as South Africa, without history education there was no

\textsuperscript{121} Mamdani (1998): 19
\textsuperscript{122} Simon, R., DiPaolantonio, M., Clamen, M. (2001)
possibility of even dreaming the vision. The power and politics that played out in the curriculum processes had closed the door on the past.

**Renegotiating public memory**

The implementation of Curriculum 2005 began in 1997. Two years later the centenary commemoration of the South African War (1899-1902)\(^{123}\) demonstrated that in spite of the denial of memory in Curriculum 2005, the past continued to have political and ideological relevance in the present. The commemorations provided fascinating insights into what can happen to former hegemonic official narratives constructed to support emerging group identity defined in relation to ‘the other’ when that ‘other’ now has the political power. The Anglo-Boer War camp narratives, for so long so exclusively associated with Afrikaner victimhood and chosen trauma, were recast into a narrative that provided for the inclusion of new victims – the former ‘other’.

The South African War was the first major historical event to be commemorated since 1994. As a narrative that had been cast in a particular mould, the chosen trauma of white Afrikaners, there was no question that the National Party would commemorate the centenary; it was not quite so clear what stand the ANC would take. However, this was an event that was difficult to ignore. It attracted international interest and participation on the one hand, and on the other, it might conceivably have been used, as the 1938 Great Trek celebrations, to stir up right-wing Afrikaner nationalism. The decision was taken by government to adopt the commemorations as a national legacy project, but alongside other projects such as the Nelson Mandela museum, the Constitutional Court and Freedom Park.\(^{124}\)

While there was never any serious threat of re-invigorating right-wing Afrikaner nationalism, the commemorations did, according to the historian, Grundlingh, provide an opportunity for re-negotiating Afrikaner identity after the loss of political power.

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\(^{123}\) Generally known as the Anglo-Boer War, it has come to be called the South African War as more evidence of wider participation of South Africans and of soldiers from other British colonies has been revealed through research.

and the threat to old cultural sureties. Over the years the memory of the war had been cast in the particular mould of Afrikaner group identity, though extensive research by English historians had shown that soldiers from other British colonies had taken part in it, as had black South Africans, thousands of whom had died in concentration camps. Afrikaner historians were faced with two options: to continue to interpret their past in narrow nationalist terms, or to refashion it to conform with a new reality in order to have continued political relevance. Significantly, Afrikaner historians chose the more inclusive path:

There was a strong awareness that the apartheid past had failed and that Afrikaners now had to adapt to a new order. In line with this realisation, for the most part, a deliberate attempt was made to acknowledge the role of black people [in the South African War] and view the conflict not only in local but also in international terms. For Afrikaner ‘culture brokers’ it was also an attempt to project what had become for them a politically uncertain world, a common bond of suffering between Afrikaners and black South Africans, with British imperialism in the dock. But it was also an opportunity, in the face of the disturbing revelations of the TRC, for Afrikaners to ‘showcase a heroic period in Afrikaner history for which they did not have to apologise’.

Public commemorations usually celebrate official concerns more than vernacular ones, containing powerful symbolic expressions – metaphors, signs and rituals – that give meaning to competing interpretations of the past and present reality. For the ANC, with the representatives of other Commonwealth countries present, it was an occasion to highlight the passing of the colonial era and place the focus on the new government. According to Bodnar, public memory is produced from political

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127 Grundlingh (2007): 204
129 Grundlingh (2007): 198
discussions that involve fundamental issues about the existence of a society: its organisations, structure of power, and the very meaning of its past and present. It is a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that helps a public or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future.\textsuperscript{130} However, in a divided society the political discussions and the body of beliefs and ideas are far more complex. In this event the new and the old ruling elite were competing for symbolic spaces in which to claim a particular interpretation of the past and it called for recasting memory on both sides. But this did not mean that all were satisfied with the recast meaning of past and present. While official commemorative events may have been about national identity, there were many local commemorations among Afrikaners which were re-situating the memories of the Anglo-Boer war in vernacular culture.

**Conclusion**

The production of memory, individual and collective, takes place within a complex set of power relations and at times it may be perceived to be in a group’s best interest to alter or suppress certain memories. This has implications for curriculum. The years of the Government of National Unity, when inherited interests had to be accommodated and compromises made in the interests of stabilizing a fragile democracy, shaped the expression of memory and identity in the school curriculum and the public sphere in particular ways.

Curriculum 2005 heralded what Giroux has expressed as ‘a crisis of historical consciousness’ that would affect the ability of South Africans to remember those ‘lessons’ of the past that illuminate the developmental preconditions of individual liberty and social freedom.\textsuperscript{131} This argument insists that history education provides a vehicle for the development of ‘a collective critical consciousness, and that through developing historical consciousness those who study history are enabled to highlight

\textsuperscript{130} Bodnar (1994): 14-15  
the contradictions in society.\textsuperscript{132} And by extension, without history education it would be difficult to develop a critical consciousness, so necessary for a well-functioning democracy. In many ways, the failure to engage in a meaningful way with the apartheid past could be construed as a form of revictimising the victims. However, the victims were given voice in the extended curriculum that encompassed the TRC hearings.

Teachers and pupils were ambivalent about the disappearance of history in Curriculum 2005. There was anger and concern from specialist history teachers, particularly in senior schools.\textsuperscript{133} Not only did they feel cheated by the lack of value placed on history, but they also feared job losses or being forced to teach unknown subjects when the implementation reached their grades.\textsuperscript{134} In fact, the implementation of Curriculum 2005 never did catch up with them, so for them these fears proved to be unfounded. A Grade 6 teacher with 61 pupils in his class was relieved that he would no longer have to teach history and geography as they were ‘too monotonous’ and History, he felt, posed a danger in taking his pupils back rather than forward. Two of his colleagues further felt that History even after the end of apartheid was still propagating ideas of European superiority and old ethnic stereotypes.\textsuperscript{135} However, at the same school, a teacher made a call for History to be retained in order to teach about the apartheid past.

Pupils interviewed in 1998 were unsure about engaging with the apartheid past. It was, for them, a past that was still too present. As one noted, it made them think of revenge on white people, but they didn’t want to think that way. ‘I think history is a wrong subject, just because I’ve told myself that we must make peace in our land’. A fellow student agreed: ‘I think we must forget history and think of the future.’ And yet another felt: ‘I don’t think we can talk about things because it makes pain for other

\textsuperscript{132} Giroux (1997): 5
\textsuperscript{133} At least in the Western Cape where these concerns were voiced in the various curriculum workshops held by the Western Cape Education Department during the implementation of C2005, and during schools visits in support of the interim syllabus.
\textsuperscript{134} Giroux (1997)
\textsuperscript{135} Kros (2000). Interviews conducted in the Northern Province. No page numbers.
people and their families. And then the pain comes again. They must put it in the past and plan for the future.’

A report compiled by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) a year later (1999) included interviews with teachers and students from around the country. Many noted that learning about and remembering the past was important for various reasons:

‘If we didn’t learn about the past it would be much harder to understand why things are the way they are. (Pupil A)

It is important for the younger generation to learn about the past. Otherwise they wouldn’t understand and know where they are coming from. They need to know how things have changed, how it used to be in the old time and how people struggled for them. (Teacher A)

It’s important to know about the past, but [one] can’t cling to the past and be trapped. We should not develop an attitude based on the past. We need to look at the past and see how change has come and that there are now opportunities. (Pupil B)

While at the beginning of 1999 it seemed that there would be no place for history in the curriculum, the situation was to change, South Africa had her second democratic elections, and a new Minister of Education who was passionate about History, Prof. Kader Asmal, was appointed. The following chapter tells of the reassessment of Curriculum 2005 that re-opened the memory debates and allowed for the recovery of memory within history education.

137 Naidu, E. & Adonis, C. (2007) History On Their Own Terms: The Relevance of the Past for a New Generation, CSVR Report. The first quotation was from a Herzlita Student, a private Jewish school in Cape Town, the last two from Kulani High students, a government school in Cape Town: 17-18
CHAPTER SIX

HISTORY EDUCATION AND THE RECOVERY OF MEMORY: THE NATIONAL CURRICULUM STATEMENTS

Introduction

The first chapter of the South African case study examined the construction of the conflict narrative in history. This provided the context for examining the question in the following chapter that is so critical to post-conflict societies: what should be done with the traumatic knowledge? Chapter Five focused on the early transition in South Africa after the first democratic elections of 1994. The negotiated settlement had particular curricular implications in the first phase of the attempts to realign the conflict curriculum with the democratic ideals of the new state. The political imperatives resulted in an almost unaltered conflict narrative continuing in the senior school for the next decade. In the first major post-apartheid curriculum change, Curriculum 2005, under the influence of the labour policy networks and attempts to reposition South Africa within the global economy, the ‘traumatic knowledge’ was avoided in what could be considered to be collective amnesia in the formal curriculum. History education was rejected even while a new official narrative was being constructed through the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

This third South African chapter tells the story of how the initial moves to introduce a new curriculum that signalled the new identity of the post-apartheid society, were revisited under a new political leadership and the influence of a different policy network. This resulted in the reinsertion of history in the school curriculum. This chapter explores how and why this restoration of history in the curriculum now took place, how far it could go, and with what consequences. What emerged from the research was that a combination of the political context after 1999 and the agency exercised by the second Minister of Education provided the critical context for the reintroduction of history education. The emergence of an academic policy network, which called for greater form and structure within school knowledge, would not have
been possible during the early transition, characterised by compromise and reconciliation.

The shifting political terrain and the increased criticism of Curriculum 2005 from a wide range of interest groups provided the context for the emergence of an academic policy network that destabilised the stakeholders’ hold over policy making and sidelined the labour network dominated by trade unions and the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU) that had informed Curriculum 2005.¹ Each network occupied a different ideological and political space: the labour network had influenced the policy process from within the government; the academic policy network that replaced it mobilised knowledge and research in the liberal universities to gain its ascendancy.² Significantly, each was able to acquire the political legitimacy that enabled them to exercise curriculum influence. But, as far as the re-instatement of history education, it needed ANC aligned academics to raise questions about the future of history education in the curriculum to provide the political legitimacy for the return of history education.³

The political discourse that provided the context for the revision of the curriculum was of the democratic values located in the South African Constitution, rather than of memory and identity located in a new official narrative. This in turn had particular implications for the form the history curriculum was to take. Rather than substituting one dominant narrative for another, the curriculum acknowledged the diverse histories that contributed to collective memory in South Africa. It also provided for the development of skills, processes and critical thinking that support democratic practices. However, in the public spaces, the official programmes of commemoration and of memorials and monuments to the heroes of the struggle against apartheid, continued with the construction of a new narrative begun with the TRC process. These public programmes occupy ideological space and provide visible symbolic and emotional acts that speak to the past trauma and are intended to forge a new national

² Ibid: 650
³ Ibid: 654
identity. However, in the same way as an official hegemonic narrative within history education, there are indications that this new narrative is becoming as divisive as the Afrikaner nationalist one. However, the diverse histories approach provides space for the resurrection and acknowledgement of Foucault’s ‘subjugated knowledges’ taking the form of counter memories and vernacular histories.

The struggle of memory over forgetting: the politics of the new curriculum

The second democratic elections in South Africa were held in 1999. The ANC won an outright victory and the period of Government of National Unity came to an end. By 1999 it was becoming increasingly evident that the South African education system was in trouble. A link was made between poor pupil achievement in South Africa and the new curriculum - literacy and numeracy levels were dropping. It became clear that implementation of Curriculum 2005 was not going as planned. Furthermore, the inequalities between well and poorly resourced schools, rather than being addressed, were deepening dramatically with learners in poorly resourced schools falling even further behind those in the well-resourced, well-run schools.

Within the ANC it was becoming a matter of some urgency that there should be a government shift in emphasis in education from the period of ‘symbolic’ policy development to accelerated policy implementation or delivery. Prof Kader Asmal, who had had an excellent record as Minister of Water Affairs, was appointed the second Minister of Education in the hope that he would be able to speed up policy implementation. The flurry of activity unleashed by Asmal, gave an immediate sense of purpose and direction to a ministry that had been desultory to that point. There had been considerable criticism of Curriculum 2005 from a number of leftist academics since its launch. However, Fataar notes that:

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4 Minister Asmal used this quote adapted from Milan Kundera on a number of occasions.
5 Jansen and Chisholm have both written extensively on the failure of C2005 and the revision of that curriculum. The JET report, Getting Learning Right was also influential. As a WCED official I experienced the growing gap between the schools in the Western Cape and the issues that teachers were having with trying to implement C2005.
6 Rensburg (2000): 121
7 For example, from academics at the Education Policy Unit at Wits University; from academics in Faculties of Education in universities around the country; and in particular from Jansen who, Fataar
it was the more strategically coded criticism and positioning by a different group of academics that opened the way for a different network to animate the curriculum policy terrain.\(^8\)

The new Minister’s role in establishing a different policy approach in line with implementation facilitated the academic policy network’s position in the curriculum review process. The crisis in education was officially acknowledged in mid-1999 when Asmal launched his *Call to Action* and the *Tirisano* (working together) framework of principles and strategies for achieving the educational goals of the national Education Department.\(^9\) Asmal supported the principle of outcomes-based education\(^10\) but distanced himself from the transformational OBE of Curriculum 2005 that had resulted in the disappearance of history education. The Tirisano document did not put forward anything that was radically different, but significantly Asmal’s language, in contrast to the vocational, technicist and managerial discourses that were then dominating education, was located in a ‘discourse of revolution, Africanism and humanism’.\(^11\)

Education was seen not merely as an economic good and a necessity for economic growth, but as something both intrinsic to democracy and the right of citizens that needed to contribute to the realisation of the democratic promise – a system of teaching and learning within the context of clearly understood rights and responsibilities and values – rather than education for the economy. As he stated:

> A theme that runs through all our work is the need for South Africans to celebrate their common identity on the basis of a shared set of values and expectations…I want to ensure that our educational system

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\(^9\) DoE (1999) *Tirisano – A Call to Action*


contributes to the shared values on which nation-building will develop
and that the fissures and alienation of the past are eradicated.\textsuperscript{12}

In this view, education is an ethical practice of finding a way of living together in a
post-conflict society which would be framed within the values of the Constitution and
would help to build democracy – in other words, the Constitution would provide the
basis for developing a South African identity.\textsuperscript{13}

Both economic and democratic discourses had co-existed within the ANC since the
1960s. The democratic discourse was associated with the theory of the National
Democratic Revolution (NDR) which by the late 1990s included the notion of a
democratic society as ‘an industrial society, composed of \textit{individuals}, that has
democratic institutions…’\textsuperscript{14} Therefore national identity is not separate from
democracy; rather democracy is treated as a question of nation-building. This was
reflected in the ANC’s \textit{Resolution on the National Question} adopted at the 50\textsuperscript{th}
National Conference in 1997 which defined the NDR as ‘an act addressing the
national question: to create a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society’\textsuperscript{15}
Furthermore, for Mbeki, who became South Africa’s second democratically elected
head of government in 1999, the ‘national question’ is explicitly related to that of the
‘democratic question’.\textsuperscript{16}

The reintroduction of history education was not intended to provide a collective
memory and identity but to provide history education with a strong ethical bias within
a values framework. In his address to parliament on the TRC final report Asmal
noted:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{12} Asmal: Speech to parliament 13 January 2000.
\textsuperscript{13} Address by the Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal, MP, in the debate on the Truth and
Reconciliation Report, National Assembly, Cape Town, 15 April 2003,
\textsuperscript{14} Chipkin, I (2003) The South African Nation \textit{Transformation 51}
\textsuperscript{15} Bundy (2007): 82
\textsuperscript{16} Chipkin (2003): 28
\end{quote}
a simple factual record of the apartheid past, devoid of an ethical basis, would be of little value. What matters is not merely the fact that we remember history but the way in which we remember it.\textsuperscript{17}

Together with Chilean, Jose Zalaquett, Asmal believed that a ‘society cannot reconcile itself on the grounds of a divided memory. Since memory is identity, this would result in a divided identity’.\textsuperscript{18} Reconciliation and national identity could potentially be achieved through the democratic nation.

Three documents developed after the launch of the Tirisano programme, brought history education into the centre of the national debate. They appeared in rapid succession in 2000 and were to be seminal to the reclaiming of history education within the curriculum. The first was the report of the Review Committee, appointed by Asmal to review Curriculum 2005;\textsuperscript{19} the second the report \textit{Values, Education and Democracy} of a Working Group on Values in Education, formed by the Minister;\textsuperscript{20} and the third the \textit{Report of the History and Archaeology Panel to the Minister of Education}.\textsuperscript{21}

In a departure from the previous stakeholder processes, the members of the Curriculum Review Committee were appointed by the Minister in 2000 as individuals and were drawn largely from education faculties of liberal English-speaking universities. Prof Linda Chisholm was appointed Chair of the Committee. The appointment of the Review Committee was controversial.\textsuperscript{22} The Committee represented the academic policy network which contrasted sharply with the labour-led

\textsuperscript{17} Address of the Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal, MP, in the debate on the Truth and Reconciliation Report, National Assembly, Cape Town, 15 April 2003 Accessed 13 June 2008. My emphasis.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid

\textsuperscript{19} Department of Education (DoE) (2000) \textit{A South African curriculum for the twenty first century: report of the Review Committee on Curriculum 2005}. Presented to the Minister of Education, Professor Kader Asmal, Pretoria

\textsuperscript{20} The Department of Education of South Africa (2000), \textit{Values, Education and Democracy} Report of the Working Group on Values in Education

\textsuperscript{21} The Department of Education of South Africa (2000) \textit{Report of the History and Archaeology Panel to the Minister of Education}

policy network that had dominated the creation of Curriculum 2005.\textsuperscript{23} It also deviated from the stakeholder politics of the Curriculum 2005 process.

The Review Committee proposed that the curriculum should be revised and streamlined, retaining a broad outcomes-based framework; that human rights and civic responsibility should be infused into the learning areas; and, most significantly for History, that Geography and History should form the core of a Social Sciences Learning Area, ensuring the distinctive concepts and ‘ways of thinking’ of each is fostered and developed.\textsuperscript{24} There was, however, nothing in this about history as a memory system for constructing a new national narrative and collective identity.

The recommendations of the report triggered intense debates within the ANC and the DoE. The key players were the Minister of Education, South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU), Departments of Education and the Cabinet – all ANC aligned.\textsuperscript{25} The fall-out amongst senior ANC, SADTU and middle-level departmental bureaucrats was significant.\textsuperscript{26} The proposals for change were regarded as displacing Curriculum 2005, the key policy of the Bengu period, which had symbolised South Africa’s political transformation, to which many bureaucrats were emotionally attached. Many of the Department of Education officials saw the proposed changes as a ‘back-to-basics’ move.\textsuperscript{27} The call to bring history back into the curriculum was also controversial; it implied bringing subjects in a recognisable form into the curriculum when the underlying rationale of Curriculum 2005 was the radical integration of knowledge; it implied bringing back content when the constructivist perspective that

\textsuperscript{26} Chisholm (2003a): 277
\textsuperscript{27} Jansen (2000): 53
had informed Curriculum 2005 had been framed in the opposition to content\textsuperscript{28} which was regarded to be the epitome of the undesirable;\textsuperscript{29} and as discussed in the previous chapter, history education had, among others, been rejected because of the political ideologies and orientation of the apartheid era; because it was perceived to be without value for the economy; and because of the traumatic and painful past.

The key initiative within the democratic discourse and of education as an ethical practice was the setting up of the Values in Education working group in February 2000. Their task was to formulate a set of values important for education.\textsuperscript{30} In their report, \textit{Values, Education and Democracy}, the Working Group made a strong appeal for the reinstatement of history in the curriculum as a way of promoting ‘human values’:

\begin{quote}
We are persuaded that the teaching of history is central to the promotion of all human values, including that of tolerance...There is good and bad history...more than any other discipline, good history put to good use taught by imaginative teachers can promote reconciliation and reciprocal respect of a meaningful kind.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

Asmal’s view of the importance of history education for promoting democratic values rather than for the construction of new collective memory and identity was articulated in his introduction to a publication of a series of papers given at a history education conference convened by the Minister in October 2002:

\begin{quote}
the study of history is useful. It helps to empower an informed citizenry; it develops knowledge and skills in creative imagination and critical reflection; and its depth and breadth may actually help sustain a more open, equitable and tolerant society…[this is the] humanising, liberating potential of history…As I have tried to suggest, we must
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{30} The working group came up with a set of six values: equity, tolerance, multilingualism, openness, accountability and honour.
\end{flushleft}
seek the value of history in its humanising capacity…Historical study is an excellent example of education as a public good…teaching and learning in the study of history provides a necessary counter-weight to the prevailing assumption in our contemporary world that all values are necessarily determined by the market.\textsuperscript{32}

The Values in Education Report identified three aspects of history education as particularly relevant to post-apartheid South Africa:

- the teaching of the history of human evolution in order to demystify racial difference;
- a general and comprehensive history of all the people ‘who happen to reside in South Africa who in turn are connected to the people of Africa, Asia and Europe to encourage openness;
- and a history of past abuses of human rights to ‘serve as a powerful reminder of the folly of repetition’.

While apartheid was not specifically mentioned, the ‘record’ left by the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was.\textsuperscript{33}

The Values in Education Report endorsed the Review Committee’s recommendation that history be strengthened in schools and proposed that ‘panels of historians, archaeologists and human biologists be appointed to make recommendations regarding the strengthening of history teaching and teacher training.’\textsuperscript{34} It was the report of the History and Archaeology Panel to the Minister of Education, which appeared in December 2000 that in the renewed history debate, for the first time, located the construction of post-apartheid memory and identity firmly within the construction of memory and identity in history education. The Report noted that:

in historical terms, we are living in a country which is currently attempting to remake itself in time…the study of history is especially

\textsuperscript{34} Doe (2000) Report of the Working Groups on Values in Education: 25
urgent as it helps to prevent amnesia, checks triumphalism, opposes the manipulative or instrumental use of the past...the study of history:

- is important in the construction of identity...[fostering] a proper understanding of the growth of multiple and overlapping human identities...
- enables us to listen to formerly subjugated voices and to redress the invisibility of the formerly marginalised...
- is deliberately about the crucial role of memory in society. In a country like South Africa, which has a fractured national memory, the development of common historical memories...can play an integrative role in our culture and polity’.  

The Report further considered the lack of history in C2005 as having ‘insufficient space and scholarly authority to challenge many of the old racial ideas which were the ideological ramparts of apartheid’ and which were becoming of increasing concern in schools.

The Minister’s commitment to strengthening history education was further demonstrated by the formation of the Ministerial Committee for History and the South African History Project (SAHP), both launched in August 2001. The South African History Project was also located in the Values in Education Initiative becoming part of the Race and Values directorate of the national Department of Education. The Project had five broad objectives:

- to encourage the recording of unwritten histories through the oral tradition
- to create forums which discuss the nature of history and history teaching in schools and devise strategies on how it can be improved and strengthened

36 Report of the History and Archaeology Panel to the Minister of Education: 10
37 Asmal: Speech to parliament 13 January 2000.
to undertake studies and initiate activities that will strengthen history teaching in the context of the National Curriculum Statement

- to establish initiatives that will bring history researchers and scholars together to review, revise and (re)write history textbooks
- to initiate activities that will resurrect interest in the study of history by young people.\(^{38}\)

**Strengthening and streamlining the curriculum: the Revised National Curriculum Statement (General Education and Training) and the National Curriculum Statement (Further Education and Training)**

On the 19 June 2000 the Council of [Provincial] Education Ministers (CEM) issued a statement supporting the establishment of a ‘dedicated team of curriculum experts...to develop the National Curriculum Statements’ and endorsing most of the Review Committee’s report stating that:

> In view of the numerous and compelling representations made about the importance of history...Council directs the above-mentioned team to pay particular attention to the place of history...in the curriculum.\(^{39}\)

By recommending the appointment of a ‘dedicated team of curriculum experts’ the Council of Education Ministers supported the move away from stakeholder involvement in curriculum development to a more centralised control over policy processes.\(^{40}\)

There were two consecutive curriculum writing processes between 2001 and 2004, which resulted in the Revised National Curriculum Statement (RNCS) for General Education and Training (GET) (Grades R – 9) and the National Curriculum Statement (NCS) for Further Education and Training (FET) (Grades 10 – 12). For the most part I will deal with the two processes as one, highlighting differences when they occur.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{40}\) Jansen (2000): 54

\(^{41}\) I will be writing much of this mainly from personal experience. I was a member of the history writing group for the revision of the GET curriculum, and appointed convenor of the history writing
The Minister appointed Ministerial Project Committees (MPC) to coordinate the writing processes. These combined academics with departmental officials, with academics Prof Linda Chisholm as Chair of the first process (GET) and Dr Cassius Lubisi the Chair of the second (FET) process. This was a radical departure from the stakeholder process of curriculum construction of the original Curriculum 2005.

The curriculum revision process was informed by a strong values and human rights framework. The Review Committee had recommended a stronger integration of human rights and civic responsibility into the curriculum. A briefing document for the revision of Curriculum 2005 clearly stated that ‘post-apartheid education is premised on certain core values and the respect for human rights and democracy’. A number of sub-committees were set up by the Human Rights Commission to monitor the emerging Learning Area and Subject Statements. They met with the writing groups, providing guidance in the infusion of human rights into the individual Learning Areas and Subjects. Although all Learning Areas and Subjects were to infuse issues of human rights into their curriculum statements, particular attention was given to the emerging history curriculum as history education was considered to be a one of the most important vehicles for transmission of human rights and social justice.

The ‘Constitution, Values and Nation-building’ was central to the vision of the revised curriculum statements:

The promotion of values is important…to ensure that a national South African identity is built on values different from those that underpinned apartheid education. The kind of learner envisaged…is one who will be imbued with the values and act in the interests of a

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society based on respect for democracy, equality, human dignity, life and social justice.\textsuperscript{45}

The curriculum revision process was contested at the level of the Ministerial Project Committee (MPC) between those members who represented the academic policy network and the Department officials, as well as in the learning area and subject writing teams. At MPC level what was at stake was the control over the entire process, which would mean control over the extent of the revisions to Curriculum 2005. Ironically in this process, those newly appointed Department of Education bureaucrats at the time of the construction of Curriculum 2005 who had represented the emerging ideologies, were within the MPC for the revision process, the inherited bureaucracy whose ‘residual ideologies’ conflicted with those emerging during the revision of Curriculum 2005.\textsuperscript{46} The bureaucrats who had driven the development of Curriculum 2005 had invested emotional energy and ideology into its construction. The revision of Curriculum 2005 implied failure and therefore, on a number of levels and at different times, they attempted to stall the revision process. This included the process of selection of the members of some the Learning Area working group committees, through which the Department attempted to ensure some continuity between the first and second versions of Curriculum 2005 and to prevent ‘outsiders’ from recreating the curriculum from scratch.\textsuperscript{47}

The contestations within the writing groups occurred at various levels. In the General Education and Training revision process, tension emerged between those who had been appointed by the national Department of Education as part of the attempt to stall the revision process;\textsuperscript{48} and those who supported the re-instatement of history education. Two further issues were deeply contested within the writing groups in both General Education and Training and Further Education and Training although they


\textsuperscript{47} Chisholm (2003b): 6

\textsuperscript{48} Personal conversations held with working group members some time into the writing process.
manifested themselves differently: firstly the nature of history education and secondly the selection of appropriate narratives.

In the General Education and Training process, the debates about the nature of history education became entangled with the attempts to ensure that Social Sciences (the name of the new Learning Area) did not differ much from the old Human and Social Sciences. This position was essentially about a learning area that would again integrate history and geography. The contrasting position was developing a history curriculum that took its form from the approach in history education which had become known as ‘doing history’ – history as a process of enquiry and interpretation.\(^49\) In the Further Education and Training writing group, the debate about the nature of history education was whether or not history should be regarded as a science with the possibility of establishing neutral or objective facts. The belief in the scientific approach to history was the inheritance of fundamental pedagogics and the staffing of not only white Afrikaans-language universities, but also the history departments of black universities, with Afrikaner nationalist historians. The debate had been long since settled in English-language universities: history and history education were considered by most to be political and ideological and by all to be open to interpretation. It took the intervention of the ‘Field Expert’, a member of the MPC assigned to the working groups to help provide expertise, who was himself a black academic historian, to mediate the debate and to address the issue of the extent of the Afrikaner Nationalist influence in the black universities.\(^50\) The debate was

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\(^{49}\) The concept of ‘doing history’ derives from J.H. Hexter writing some 30 years ago. Briefly what he suggested is that the discrete facts of history are as a series of points without lines. The historian weaves a web of interpretation between these points to give them shape and meaning to tell a story of the past. In doing this the historian uses the ‘first record’ i.e. all the material remains of the past, but brings to it a ‘second record’ i.e. all the mental attributes and experience the historian brings to bear when working on the first record. Doing history is a process of enquiry, evidence-based interpretation and construction of the past, a debate and the study of the human condition. A good explanation of ‘doing history’ can be found in Dean, J. (2002) Doing History: theory, practice and pedagogy, in Jeppie (ed): 99-116

\(^{50}\) An indication of how strong the view still is of history as facts was illustrated in a recent article in a newspaper about the protest against a cartoon in a History textbook used in KwaZulu-Natal, which, the IFP say, will damage the legacy left by the IFP leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi. “Reverend Musa Zondi, spokesperson for the IFP, told the Mail & Guardian Online on Tuesday: “History is fact. We can’t accept this book as fact. It is biased propaganda. In one of the places [in the textbook] there is a cartoon done by Zapiro showing the leader of the IFP signing on to the new South Africa with [the] blood of the innocents from the political violence. All the other parties have a write-up regarding the agreement
never really settled and black colleagues continued to hold the view that historical research was scientific, but did not re-open the discussions during the writing process.\footnote{Personal communications with group members.}

The debates around appropriate content knowledge were not only about memory, identity but also about legitimacy. Whose narratives would form the new collective memory with its linked collective identity and who had the right to decide? Ironically, however, these were not debates that drew on vernacular memories located in vernacular cultures, but about vernacular memory and identity, filtered through the lens of white revisionist or radical historians researching and writing in the 1970s and 1980s. Historiography plays a key role in the construction of a common memory: those who control images of the past shape the present and possible ideas of the future.\footnote{Levy, D (1999) The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel, \textit{History and Theory} 38, No. 1: 51} Historiography in post-conflict societies generally becomes an important site for the recovery and re-organisation of collective memory suppressed during the previous regime. In South Africa, however, the output of historical research of two decades of revisionist historians had already contributed to organising and shaping counter-memories during apartheid. Their interpretations underpinned the 1992 and 1993 history debates and both the General Education and Training and Further Education and Training history writing groups drew almost unquestioningly on their work to create a content framework. This could be regarded as continued suppression of vernacular narratives by ‘colonial’ historians that might otherwise have been privileged in the post-conflict curriculum.

Spreen has argued that it is useful to examine policy borrowing as it reveals the complex ways in which policy decisions are influenced by the shifting roles of global and local participation.\footnote{Spreen, C.A. (2004) Appropriating Borrowed Policies: Outcomes-Based Education in South Africa. Steiner-Khamsi (ed) (2004) \textit{The Global Politics of Educational Borrowing and Lending} New York:} History in the National Curriculum Statements demonstrates

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for the new South Africa, but, with the IFP, only the cartoon is used. The ANC spilled as much blood." "History must be factual. It is fact the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. If it rose in the north and set in the south, it has to be fact. Events of the past must be tabulated in historical fact. Children who are taught history cannot exercise judgement," said Zondi. \textit{Mail & Guardian Online}, 14 May 2008

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51 Personal communications with group members.
52 Levy, D (1999) The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel, \textit{History and Theory} 38, No. 1: 51
this, reflecting not only the debates within the progressive history community in South Africa in the early 1990s referred to in Chapter 5, but also the influence of the strong links that two of the General Education and Training History writing team had with the developments of history education in the United Kingdom (UK) and with a particular approach developed by the UK-based Nuffield Primary History Programme. Once the internal contestations within the history writing group had been resolved, the dominance of the academic policy network and the high profile given to history education by Minister Asmal, enabled the History writing team to push the boundaries of the brief given to the writing groups. The brief required that each team produce:

- A detailed list of learning outcomes and assessment standards by grade (from Grade R – 9). These elaborate what learners should be able to do and how learners can or should demonstrate their grasp of each learning outcome (evidence of integrated skills and knowledge or understanding).

Furthermore, the form and content of the learning outcomes and assessment were specified.

Learning Outcomes should

- specify the sequence of core knowledge/content and skills to be taught in each learning area at each grade level

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54 June Bam, whose role was the overall Management of the GET Social Sciences Writing Team and myself.
55 While we had support from the academic members of the Ministerial Project Committee, we experienced some antagonism from the DoE officials who had been part of the original C2005 process. The MPC was, however, dominated by the academic network. The members were: Linda Chisholm (Chair), Salama Hendricks (DoE), Edcent Williams (DoE), Lebs Mphahlele (DoE), Prof. John Volmink, Prof. Thembi Magi, Penny Vinjevold, Fathima Dada. Linda Chisholm was appointed as Mentor of the Social Sciences working group, which provided added support for the emerging history curriculum. (DoE (2001) *Briefing Documents*) The Secretariat headed up by Salama Hendricks was composed of DoE officials. My experience in the follow-up processes was that she in particular tried to reassert influence once the Learning Area writing had finished and the supporting documents were being created to try through Learning Programme Guidelines to nudge the new Learning Area Statements closer to C2005. It seemed we had to be tirelessly vigilant to retain the integrity of the new Social Sciences Learning Area.
• represent an integrated skill and content statement

Assessment Standards should

• describe the expected level and range of performance for each learning outcome at each grade.\(^{57}\)

The brief was clearly aligned as closely as possible to the original Curriculum 2005, but was inimical to an enquiry-based history curriculum. The main aspects of the brief were carried out in the new history curriculum – learning outcomes, assessment standards and content per grade. However, the content framework was separated from the Learning Outcomes, abandoning the principle of integrating content within the Learning Outcomes and Assessment Standards demanded by the brief.\(^ {58}\)

The Learning Outcomes that were finally adopted were: Historical Enquiry, Historical [conceptual] Knowledge and Understanding, and Historical Interpretation for the General Education and Training Band (GET); and Enquiry Skills, Historical Concepts, Knowledge Construction and Communication and Heritage for the Further Education and Training Band (FET).\(^ {59}\) There was fierce debate in the FET writing group about the inclusion of a fifth Learning Outcome that would have required pupils to ‘demonstrate knowledge of career opportunities’ for those who took history. This reflected the persistence of the notion that history had to demonstrate economic value in order to be able to compete with other, more commercially orientated subjects.\(^ {60}\)

A basic aim of both the GET and FET was to provide teachers and pupils with the tools (skills and processes) that would enable them to engage in what Applebee has termed ‘knowledge-in-action’ – a curriculum which would allow pupils to take part in disciplinary practices through appropriate activities.\(^ {61}\)

\(^{57}\) Ibid: 5

\(^{58}\) DoE (2002) Revised national Curriculum Statement Grades R-9 (Schools) Social Sciences Policy


\(^{60}\) Own notes during the writing process.

processes associated with historical enquiry and engaging with issues of interpretation and bias, it was hoped that no historical narrative could again become hegemonic, dominating to the exclusion of other narratives. Pupils would be taught to recognise distortions and manipulation in history texts. These could be demonstrated in the context of a content framework that detailed content per grade.

The rewriting of the history curriculum had not followed the predictable course evident in other post-conflict societies, such as Eastern Europe, of denouncing the past and celebrating the present and new heroes; rather what was created was an official history which aimed ‘at permitting the unofficial, the hidden, to become visible’. 62 One official narrative was not replaced by another; rather there was an attempt to provide for diverse memories, usually subjugated knowledges, recognising the South African diversity. The curriculum attempted to redress ‘the invisibility of the formerly marginalized and subjugated voices’ as well as locating South African history more clearly within African continent.63 In the content framework the curriculum reflects two of the four categories identified by Ashcroft as responses to ‘colonial’ history – that of interjection as well as interpolation.64 As far as content was concerned it clearly opened the way for the interjection of counter narratives. It did not reject the old narratives, but placed them in the context of a broader canvas of narratives from vernacular histories, previously marginalised in history education, clearly indicating an alternative, ‘truer’ picture than the one previously told. The content framework when placed in relation to the learning outcomes which required enquiry skills and a critical analysis of narratives of the past to recognise bias in

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62 Chisholm, L (2004): 188
64 Refer to the discussion in the previous chapter. Ashcroft (2001) The curriculum was structured around the interplay between propositional (know that) knowledge and procedural (know how) knowledge – bringing together the narratives of the past with evidence and the enquiry process.
authorship and provide for interpolation or the interruption of the dominant narrative by destabilising the very forms through which the dominant narrative was produced.\textsuperscript{65}

Given the ongoing divisions and racialised identities that are the legacy of apartheid within South African society and the perceived lack of a cohesive national identity, evidence suggests that a history curriculum that has the possibility of constructing identity located in the democratic nation has a greater potential for contributing to post-conflict reconciliation and national identity, than a curriculum that substitutes one dominant official narrative for another. In the aftermath of internecine identity-based conflict in societies in which victims and perpetrators have to co-exist, nation-building can best be served by a curriculum that supports democratic traditions and enables, what Giroux has termed, border crossing. The new ‘official history’ through a commitment to the idea that historical ‘truth’ can be subjected to rigorous analysis by entering conversations structured by the ‘disciplinary traditions’ and that there are complex histories within the South African experience, provided potential opportunities for ‘border crossing’ and for thinking one another’s histories. The history curriculum became an ‘open’ rather than ‘closed’ text.

According to Giroux’s concept of border pedagogy, pupils need to be provided with opportunities to engage with texts that both affirm and interrogate the complexity of their histories. They are not seen as a cohesive group, but young people whose ‘multilayered and often contradictory voices and experiences, intermingle with the weight of particular histories that will fit easily into the master narrative.\textsuperscript{66} It is also about creating classroom (and curriculum) conditions that facilitate pupils’ ability to speak, write and listen in a ‘multiperspectival language’. Within this discourse, pupils are engaged as border-crossers who challenge, cross, remap and rewrite borders as they enter into counter-discourse with established boundaries of knowledge, assisting

\textsuperscript{65} This is about understanding how historical narratives are constructed and for what purpose. The Learning Outcomes for Social Sciences History from as early as Grade 5 require pupils to ‘recognise that there can be more than one version of an historical event; and Grades 8 and 9 to evaluate sources for reliability, to identify bios and stereotypes, to analyse information in sources, construct and justify an argument using evidence from sources.

those deemed ‘other’ to reclaim their own histories and voices. Instead of a common culture, he calls for the construction of a new common language, a democratic language. This is the crux of identity located in the democratic nation: it is a view of national identity that includes diverse traditions, histories, and the expansion of democratic public life. Furthermore, curriculum needs to make the relationship between authority, ethics and power central to a pedagogy that is intended to expand rather than close down the possibilities of a democratic society. It could be argued that the new curriculum has, all things being equal, the potential for delivering on the national democratic revolution. However, things are seldom equal, particularly in a post conflict society of deep division not only along identity but economic lines. Therefore, there are major caveats: in a society with a divided and traumatic past such a history curriculum might allow for avoidance by former perpetrators and the continuation of the previous master narrative on the one hand and/or by traumatised victims on the other; and secondly, with the continued legacy of inequality in education, this is a curriculum that may remain out of the reach of some, both teachers and pupils.

It furthermore goes without saying that the construction of a ‘democratic’ curriculum provides no guarantees that democratic ideals and practices will be transferred to the classrooms. Not only is there the much written-about gap between policy and practice that occurs in any classroom, but in South Africa there are huge gaps between the best and worst resourced classroom; between various forms of teacher training; in the depth of subject knowledge; there are differing understandings about the nature of history education; about democracy; and more important, the legacy of apartheid in our deeply racialised identities influences both interpretation of history curriculum and the way in which teachers engage with the apartheid past in their classrooms.

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69 There has been evidence of this in the evaluations and the opening journaling of the teachers who have participated in the *Facing the Past – Transforming our Future and Advanced Teacher Programme*. One of the components of the programme is to explore the way in which we in South
addition, the pupils bring learned attitudes and values from family and community into the classroom and at times these are in direct contrast to the values of the curriculum as research in the different context of Northern Ireland has revealed. There is a powerful social curriculum operating in South Africa. What pupils learn through observations of public life can be more powerful that what they might learn in schools.  

If the curriculum provides opportunities for ‘border crossings’, these have to be facilitated by the teachers within a democratic space. However, the power relations within South African classrooms by and large continue to be authoritarian and the residual attitudes and values of teachers trained during apartheid are largely unaddressed. Critical pedagogy while providing a wonderful vision of possibility and hope has little to contribute when it comes to the practical issues of implementation particularly within a post conflict and developing world context.

Deriving education values from a negotiated Constitution also does not mean that all citizens will accept such a values-based curriculum. A strong challenge came from a constituency whose values, in contrast to those of the Constitution, revealed narrow conceptions of culture and identity. They also revealed a fear of exposing their children to the intellectual and social diversity that the curriculum promoted. This was the fundamental Christian lobby which voiced objections to values embedded in the new curriculum and in particular, to the emerging history curriculum. The group accused the curriculum of being biased and Marxist and an attempt to indoctrinate learners. In a letter to a Cape Town newspaper, the Cape Times in October 2001, they claimed that the curriculum and history were:

- informed by Marxist presuppositions. Marxism is steeped in an ideology of conflict, believing in the necessity of violent revolution to bring about social change…[and] this continuous focus on domination,

Africa have been shaped by apartheid and the ways in which this, mostly unconsciously, affects the way particularly apartheid is taught.

70 Jansen, J. (2004) Teologie kroniek? Theology Chronicle: The Politics of Salvation : Values, Ideology and the South African National Curriculum VERBUM ET ECCLESIA Jrg 25 (2) In my own experience of visiting schools in an area in which poaching gangs are active, teachers have spoken of some of the academically most promising girls’ ambition is to be the girl friend of a gang leaders.
exploitation and abuse will surely produce a generation of angry young people, primed for violent social action.\textsuperscript{71}

The revision of Curriculum 2005 raises issues of political and personal agency. The Minister had become a powerful political lobby for history education and had opened the way for redefining positions around history education, reopening a discourse that had become taboo. The socio-political context had, however, provided both opportunities and constraints: the National Democratic Revolution debates within the ANC had contributed to the political context which enabled the emergence of an academic policy network resulting in curriculum revision; there was a growing concern about the increased racism in schools and a call from Mbeki to ‘deal frankly with questions of race and racism…pervasive throughout South African society and not least in our schools’;\textsuperscript{72} and the Minister was able to make strategic use of the academic policy network, the Review Committee and the Values in Education Working Group and their reports to counter the opposition from SADTU, from within the ANC and from the Department of Education officials who had played a central role in the construction of Curriculum 2005.

The Minister exercised influence at two other levels to ensure that the history curriculum both reflected and asserted the political discourse of values and the democratic nation. Firstly, he took a personal and often direct interest particularly in the emerging FET History curriculum (National Curriculum Statement) in the work of the subject writing groups during the writing process. He held regular meetings with the field expert and the DoE co-ordinator, to interrogate them on the progress of the work to date. It was on his insistence, for example, that the origins of humans appeared in the FET history curriculum, even though it was already in the GET.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{71} Cape Times, October 2001. What was interesting about the fundamental Christian lobby was that it cut across racial lines.
\textsuperscript{72} Asmal: Speech to parliament 13 January 2000.
\textsuperscript{73} However, he did not always get his way with the insertion of content. He had been given Jared Diamond’s book, \textit{Guns, Germs and Steel}, which broadly suggests that the availability of natural resources were the determining factor in the unequal technological development of continents. He wanted this perspective included in the curriculum. He was dissuaded by the counter arguments of the Field Expert. My own notes of that time as well as information from Yonah Seleti. Interview with Prof Yonah Seleti, 20 May 2008.
Secondly, he was also able to exert influence through the national Ministerial Committee for History and the South African History Project. Three members of the six-member history writing team, including the convenor of the writing team, were on the staff of the South African History Project (SAHP).\textsuperscript{74} The field expert who had been appointed to the Social Sciences in FET was also the Chairperson of the Ministerial Committee for History, a body hand-picked by the Minister.\textsuperscript{75} A sub-committee of the Ministerial Committee for History met regularly with the convenor and the other two members of the SAHP who were on the writing team to review the progress of the FET history curriculum and to make significant input. The perception certainly was that the minister exercised substantial agency during the curriculum writing processes.\textsuperscript{76}

**Public history and the construction of official memory**

While a democratic curriculum can, theoretically at least, contribute to the strengthening of democracy in transitional societies, it does not satisfy the political imperative for a ‘usable past’ that will provide a new official narrative that can serve to legitimise the post-conflict state. The context of the negotiated settlement, the Government of National Unity set up in 1994 and Mandela’s programme of reconciliation meant that South Africa had not followed the expected trajectory of most other post-conflict states in destroying the official monuments and memorials of the previous oppressive regime. The dramatic media images of toppling statues were not repeated in South Africa. As a result, there was an emotional as well as political imperative to claim ideological space in this landscape of colonial and apartheid memorials to white domination in South Africa, and to interpolate the struggle narrative with the official narrative of the apartheid regime in the public history education arena. The History curriculum for the Further Education and Training furthermore, consciously included a learning outcome that requires critical interaction with heritage, which includes monuments and memorials, commemorative events and

\textsuperscript{74} Pototo Sangoni, Claire Dyer and myself.
\textsuperscript{75} Prof Yonah Seleti
\textsuperscript{76} Interview with Prof. Yonah Seleti, 20 May 2008. Also my own perception as convenor of the History writing team.
oral history, among others. This bridges the gap that can occur between history education and history in the public domain.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission process began the construction of a new official narrative located in the traumatic South African past. The Final Report of the TRC released on 21 March 2003, a significant date being the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre and now Human Rights Day, made recommendations about ‘symbolic reparations such as monuments and museums’ to commemorate the victims of apartheid and facilitate the communal process of remembering and commemorating the pain and the victories of the past. The Report emphasized that it had been apartheid as a system that was the crime against humanity and that ‘virtually every black South African’ could be considered to be a victim of human rights abuse. The proposed programme of memorials would locate commemoration within communities drawing on vernacular cultures and memories to help to process the pain and trauma of those who did not testify at the TRC.

However, while the TRC Report emphasised the importance of community involvement in a programme of memorials, when President Mbeki accepted the TRC Final Report in Parliament on 15 April, he spoke rather to official public memory projects, announcing that a trust had been set up to implement the main commemoration project, Freedom Park, near Pretoria. On 16 December 2004, President Mbeki elaborated in an address commemorating the week of reconciliation at the site of the newly-launched Freedom Park. He noted:

The creation of this Freedom Park is in part a response to the recommendations of the TRC, that we should retain the national

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77 TRC Report, volume Six, Section Two, Chapter Seven: Report of the Reparation & Rehabilitation Committee, Implications and Concluding Comments: 163
78 Ibid: 160-161
memory of our past and collectively honour those who fought and
sacrificed for our freedom… 80
Other major monuments in this programme include Robben Island, the Apartheid
Museum in Johannesburg, the Women’s Gaol on Constitution Hill in Johannesburg
and the Hector Pietersen Memorial Museum in Orlando West, Soweto.

Memorials and monuments are intended to preserve carefully selected memories for
the present and future. They are a means of attempting to shape peoples’ perceptions
of the current socio-political order, as well as attempting to forge national identity,
which is particularly important for post-conflict societies. According to Bodnar,
public memory emerges from the intersection of official and vernacular cultural
expressions and is produced from a political discussion that involves fundamental
issues about the ‘entire existence of a society: its organisations, structure of power and
the very meaning of its past and present’. 81 For him, public memory is symbolic,
incorporating a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society
understand its past, present and by implication, its future:
The major focus… is not the past, however, but serious matters in the
present such as the nature of power and the question of loyalty to both
official and vernacular cultures. Public memory speaks primarily about
the structure of power in society because that power is always in
question… 82
Mbeki’s programme of memorials is a visible, symbolic and emotional statement of
power, staking an ideological claim to public spaces. This has resulted in the
emergence of an exclusive official narrative located in the liberation struggle that not

80 President Mbeki (2004), Address at commemoration of the week of reconciliation Freedom Park,
Salvokop, City of Tshwane, 16th December 2004
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/2004/tm1216.html Freedom Park has become a
somewhat confusing monument with the dominant theme being the apartheid heroes and freedom
within democracy, but the part of the memorial is Isivivane, the symbolic resting place of all those
who died in the many significant conflicts that helped to shape South Africa. Among these are the pre-
colonial conflicts, slavery, genocide, wars of resistance, the South African (Anglo-Boer) War, the first
and second world wars, and the liberation struggle and the inscription of names of those who died in all
of these conflicts on a memorial wall. Freedom Park Information website:
http://www.freedompark.org.za/
81 Bodnar (1994): 14
82 Ibid: 15
only excludes white South Africans, but that also excludes many of the victims of apartheid as well. It has also given the perception, at least among a number of principals in Western Cape schools, that one official narrative has replaced another in the school curriculum and because of this they are not encouraging their pupils to take history.\footnote{Information from conversations that I have had with principals.}

While official memorials and commemorations are generally intended to evoke feelings of patriotism and national unity, in a post-conflict and still divided society such as South Africa, there is the potential for conflicting vernacular and official interests over a public memory that has become too exclusive. The implicit purpose of monuments is to foster a particular historical consciousness for transmission to the next generation,\footnote{Marschall, S (2004) Gestures of compensation: post-apartheid monuments and memorials Transformation 55 http://www.transformation.ukzn.ac.za/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=3&i d=61&Itemid=6 : 79} but in interpreting history and fixing the narrative, they tend to close debate about the past. This carries with it the potential for creating deeper divisions. In such cases, local memorials located in vernacular cultures become sites of counter-memory. Examples of such sites include the memorial to those killed in the Trojan Horse incidents or the memorial to Amy Biehl, both in suburbs of Cape Town, which allow for continued discourses about the past in a way that carries greater potential than national official monuments for processing the trauma of ordinary people.\footnote{Michael Miranda, 11, Jonathan Claasen, 21, and 16-year-old Shaun Magmoed were killed on October 15, 1985 in Thornton Road, Athlone, when security force members, hiding in wooden crates on the back of what looked like a SA Transport Services truck, opened fire with shotguns on people they claimed had been throwing stones at the vehicle. The event was dubbed the "Trojan Horse" incident and sparked an international outcry. On August 25, 1993, while Amy Biehl, a Fulbright student from the United States, was driving three black colleagues back to Cape Town's Guguletu Township, a group of youths pelted her car with stones and forced it to stop. Dozens of young men then surrounded the car repeating the militant Pan Africanist Congress chant, "One settler [white person], one bullet!" Amy was pulled from the car, struck in the head with a brick as she tried to flee, and then beaten and stabbed in the heart while she lay on the ground. During the attack, Amy's black friends yelled that she was a "comrade" to no avail. Amy was carried back to the car after the attack by her friends who then drove her to the nearest police station where she died. Amy was 26 years old at the time of her murder.}

\footnote{Information from conversations that I have had with principals.}


\footnote{Michael Miranda, 11, Jonathan Claasen, 21, and 16-year-old Shaun Magmoed were killed on October 15, 1985 in Thornton Road, Athlone, when security force members, hiding in wooden crates on the back of what looked like a SA Transport Services truck, opened fire with shotguns on people they claimed had been throwing stones at the vehicle. The event was dubbed the "Trojan Horse" incident and sparked an international outcry. On August 25, 1993, while Amy Biehl, a Fulbright student from the United States, was driving three black colleagues back to Cape Town's Guguletu Township, a group of youths pelted her car with stones and forced it to stop. Dozens of young men then surrounded the car repeating the militant Pan Africanist Congress chant, "One settler [white person], one bullet!" Amy was pulled from the car, struck in the head with a brick as she tried to flee, and then beaten and stabbed in the heart while she lay on the ground. During the attack, Amy's black friends yelled that she was a "comrade" to no avail. Amy was carried back to the car after the attack by her friends who then drove her to the nearest police station where she died. Amy was 26 years old at the time of her murder.}
Conclusion

What should be done with the traumatic knowledge of the past? In societies emerging from conflict, the politics of memory and identity are integral to signalling a reconstituted nation. The construction of memory occurs on a number of ideological levels, and if curriculum is not considered broadly, as encompassing not only the formal national curriculum but the other sites of memory and ideological spaces, then the educative nature of such programmes may be missed.

There is a close relationship between political discourses and educational discourses and when the structures of state are not entrenched but still shifting, then the official-vernacular history nexus also shifts, as does the relationship between public practices of memory, official and vernacular histories and history education. The ascendency of first the labour, then the academic policy network, and the influence of each on the value placed on history education, was related to the shifting discourses within government and education. What influences the choices made and who has the legitimacy to make the choices about memory and identity is closely linked to dominant political discourses.

The political context, in which the transition from conflict to democracy happens, as well as the ongoing legacy of a painful past, is critical to understanding the education policy choices. In this regard, African states have particular pressures if they need to rely on development aid. South Africa took a deliberate decision not to accept such aid, but the need to participate in the global economy networks had fiscal implications which in turn had implications for education policy. In South Africa, the initial transformation agenda was curtailed with the change in economic policy from Reconstruction and Development to a more conservative fiscal approach. The periods of the two economic policies broadly coincided with the two major education policy developments: Curriculum 2005 and the (Revised) National Curriculum Statements. In the first, history education was perceived as having no economic value and therefore no place in the curriculum. In the second, history education was regarded as central to a values-driven curriculum.
However in the broader history education arena, the question of a new collective memory and identity was never in doubt. Claiming of the ideological memory space is critical to the identity of a new society that has broken with the identity-based conflict of the past. In South Africa, given the negotiated political settlement, some of the ideological spaces had to be shared, but after 1999 there has been an increasingly confident programme of constructing a particular, ANC, version of the past. There is an educative purpose in this programme of commemoration that provides moral and political legitimacy for the current government.

The next chapter places the South African story about curriculum change in comparative relief by examining how these processes unfold in post-conflict Rwanda. The focus of this study is the construction of memory and identity in curriculum in societies emerging from conflict. In order to understand these processes, a brief historical context for each country is provided. In each case, this compared the construction of the conflict narrative and the nature of the conflict. However, it is unethical to attempt comparisons of trauma. There can be no hierarchy of suffering. Further comparisons are made of the links between the political and curriculum processes of the construction of memory and identity in the post-conflict states within the context of the legacy of trauma. My contention is that it is critical to understand this legacy and the intergenerational transfer of trauma in order to gain insight into memory, identity and the history curriculum.
CHAPTER SEVEN

RWANDA: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A CONFLICT NARRATIVE AND HISTORY EDUCATION BEFORE 1994

Introduction

When South Africans went to the polls on the 27th April 1994 celebrating the beginning of freedom and democracy, Rwanda was three weeks into a genocide that would shock the world. While the Hutu Power interahamwe militia were massacring Tutsi, and any Hutu who opposed the genocide, the media was focused on South Africa’s ‘miracle’ transition from apartheid to democracy. By the time the genocide had run its course, some 800 000 people had been killed.

This chapter begins to place the South African story in comparative relief. By examining how the conflict narrative was constructed during the colonial period, and how it was appropriated in post-colonial Rwanda, it provides the historical context for the examination of the construction of memory and identity in Rwanda after 1994. In examining the construction of the narrative, a number of current beliefs in Rwanda about the origins of the ‘ethnic’ categories of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa will be addressed. This chapter further examines the claims about the contribution of the conflict narrative to the genocide, placing these in the social context of Rwanda at the time. This is particularly critical in view of the repeated Rwandan government claims of a direct link between colonially constructed ethnicity, history education and the genocide.1 According to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Rwandan history taught in schools after independence, caused hatred between Tutsi and Hutu providing a context within which genocide was thinkable and possible.2

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1 The Republic of Rwanda (2002) 2020 Vision Daft 3: 13 for example states, ‘During the colonial era, Belgian colonialists applied the contemporary European racist theories to the Rwandan society, deeply dividing Rwandan people on ethnic basis. This inheritance led to the first episode of ethnic cleansing and of genocide orchestrated in 1959 and to periodic pogroms until the early 90s’; in an interview, President Kagame stated: ‘The ethnic divide that was created and heightened by the colonialists...’; http://www.gov.rw/government/president/index.html (Accessed 27 February 2006)

2 For example, Rutayisire, J, Kabano, J. & Rubagiza, J. (2002) Rwanda: Synopsis of the Case Study. This was part of a research project of IBE-UNESCO (2002-2003), Curriculum Change and Social Cohesion in Conflict-affected Societies. The team leader of the Rwanda group was at the time the
History and history education are ideological and political, serving group interests on many levels. This may be official history that aims to legitimise a particular regime, or vernacular history forged in opposition to official histories. Bodnar, in his conceptualisation of official, public and vernacular histories does not engage with oral tradition, a form of history that is critical to understanding the African pre-colonial past. This chapter engages with oral tradition as official history and the appropriation of the oral tradition of the nyiginya royal lineage of the Tutsi as official history in post-colonial Rwanda. Most often, oral traditions contain the genealogies of royal lineages which served to legitimise the current king or chief. Oral traditions also incorporate cultural knowledge, including court rituals. However, ‘real’ history is embedded in oral tradition, and together with archaeology, has become an important source of pre-literate, pre-colonial history. Oral tradition could be said to be as political as written history, and in Rwanda it was a critical element in the construction of the conflict narrative. What emerged from this investigation is the intersection of powerful interests, which converged in colonial Rwanda, to construct a narrative of the pre-colonial past that served the interests of the Tutsi ruling lineage, the colonial power and the Catholic Church in Rwanda. This narrative had unintended consequences when it became the official conflict narrative in independent Rwanda, and Tutsi were cast as foreign invaders to be sent back from where they came. As such, Tutsi were denied Rwandan identity and the possession or ownership of the master narrative, which conferred legitimacy and acceptance as citizens, with associated legal, political, social, cultural and economic rights.

**Pseudo-scientific notions of race and the Rwandan past: creation of a master narrative**

Colonial perceptions about the origins of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, derived from the 19th early 20th century Social Darwinism and pseudo-scientific notions of the hierarchy of races lay at the heart of the conflict narrative. The Nile explorer, John Hanning Speke, the first European to visit the area in 1858, developed a theory of

Director of the Curriculum Development Centre in Kigali. Because of this perception, a moratorium was placed on the teaching of Rwandan history in 1994.
‘conquest of inferior by superior races’ in Africa. Based on pseudo-scientific race theories, the belief that gained currency during the colonial occupation of Rwanda and Burundi was that the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa were three distinct people, representative of three major population groups: Hamitic pastoralists from Ethiopia; Bantu agriculturalists; and Pygmoid. The Tutsi, being ‘Hamitic’ were considered to be closer to Europeans in the racial hierarchy and therefore of superior intelligence to the Hutu and Twa. Missionaries and respected anthropologists of the time gave credence and wide publicity to these theories giving them academic legitimacy. The Tutsi, said to have ‘migrated’ into the region after the Twa (the first people) and the Hutu, were variously described in colonial reports as ‘superb men’, as having ‘Caucasian skulls and beautiful Greek profiles’, as being ‘closer to the white man than the Negro’. These were essentially racial constructs and in defining the Tutsi in this way, it created the possibility of defining Hutu as the ‘other’ who were in all ways inferior. As such, here we have the construction of a minor narrative around a set of definable concrete events and ethnic statements, grounded in a poisonous cocktail of eugenics and fundamental Christianity. The minor narrative was in no sense a subjugated knowledge or counter-memory: it was a deliberate, fictitious construct.

Rwanda was colonised during the late 19th Century ‘scramble for Africa’. Originally a German colony, the Germans instituted a policy of indirect rule in Rwanda from 1897-1916. This was continued by the Belgians when they took over the colonies of Rwanda and Burundi from Germany after the First World War. The period of German colonisation had done little to change the structure of Rwandan society. In

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3 This was explained in his book, The Discovery of the Source of the Nile, Kessinger Publishing 2004, in the chapter on The History of the Wahuma: 174. See also footnote 5 below.
5 Various reports quoted in Eltringham (2004): 16 & 17; Prunier (1997) quotes a number of these descriptions: 6-8. He further notes that the Nile explorer, John Hanning Speke was the first to develop a theory of ‘conquest of inferior by superior races’ in Africa and without any evidence, decided that the Tutsi descendents of the Galla of southern Ethiopia. Later explorers and missionaires shared this opinion. Most respected anthropologists of the time gave these theories credence and wide publicity: 7-8
establishing a system of indirect rule, considerable leeway was left to the Rwandese monarchy, which at the time was in the process of centralising power, to continue its move towards more centralised rule. This included the annexation of Hutu chiefdoms and increasing the power of the Tutsi king.⁶ Therefore Rwanda was colonised by Germany at a critical time in the consolidation of royal power. First the Germans, then the Belgians, used the centralising Rwandan ‘state’ as a tool of colonisation through a system of indirect rule.⁷

During the Belgian colonial period, the pseudo-scientific racial constructs and what became defined as ethnic differences between Tutsi, Hutu and Twa, were merged. The current Rwandan government regards the Belgian colonial period as the critical time when ethnic identities were constructed and entrenched in Rwanda. While historians agree that colonialism entrenched ethnic identities in Rwanda, there is debate about the extent to which these identities were in fact a colonial creation or were in the process of forming before the imposition of colonial rule.⁸ Pottier argues that up to about 1860, historians know very little about how the terms ‘Hutu’, ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Twa’ were used in social discourse⁹, but from about that time the king or mwami, King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri of the then ruling nyiginya dynasty, had begun extending his influence. He broke the political power of formerly autonomous local lineages and institutionalised ‘ethnic’ division between ‘Tutsi’ pastoralists and ‘Hutu’ farmers through the institution of a forced labour service to the king, called uburetwa, that was restricted to Hutu.¹⁰ Essentially, there is broad agreement that European rule

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⁶ Prunier (1997): 24  
⁷ Prunier (1997): 25  
¹⁰ Ibid: 110
did not invent the terms Hutu and Tutsi, but the colonial intervention changed what
the categories meant and how they mattered.\textsuperscript{11}

It was in the interests of Rwabugiri to collaborate with the colonial authorities to
extend his personal power. To colonial authorities, finding what appeared to be a
strong and centralised Rwandan state ruled by a Tutsi royal lineage seemed to be
proof of the superiority of the Tutsi and of their ‘foreign’ origins. So, while the
colonial presence was clearly a strong factor in the consolidation of ethnic identities
in Rwanda, to claim that colonisation imposed ethnic identities on an unwilling
population, suggests a lack of agency on the part of those colonised. Research has
provided evidence of a range of responses across Africa to colonialism. It has also
been argued that ethnicity as a form of collective cultural identity and political culture
is a particular phenomenon in the Great Lakes region.\textsuperscript{12} Jewsiewicki researching
ethnicity in the Belgian Congo writes of the:

dual nature of ethnicity as both structure and process. As a cultural
identity and consciousness laden with possibilities for political
mobilization and as a discourse which arranges collective memory as a
basis for political action, ethnicity is a specific form of historically
grounded relationships between individuals.\textsuperscript{13}

Ethnicity in this explanation is rooted in collective identity, with communities
selectively reinforcing identifying traits, often in times of conflict for reasons of
security, or because there may be some form of material gain in constructing a
particular ethnicity and identity.\textsuperscript{14} In Rwanda, ethnicity was located in the identities of
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa that were already becoming more defined under the expanding

\textsuperscript{11} Scott Strauss has summed up the current debate about ethnicity in Rwanda in his book, \textit{The Order of Genocide}: 18-21. While it is important to note the debate, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage with it in great depth.


\textsuperscript{13} Jewsiewicki, B. (1989): 325

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
power of the mwami, Rwabugiri, after 1860, and in colonial Rwanda, the Tutsi derived influence and material gain from the position of privilege resulting from their particular ‘ethnic’ identity.

The Catholic Church in Rwanda has also been heavily implicated in entrenching the racial hierarchy in Rwanda, and indeed, in complicity in the genocide of 1994. The first mission station in Rwanda was established in 1900 by the White Fathers (the Society of Our Lady of Africa), who also had a presence in Burundi and parts of the Congo. The bond between the Catholic Church and state in colonial Rwanda was powerful. While colonial administrators came and went, the Catholic priests remained in Rwanda, and became almost the only whites to become proficient in Kinyarwanda.\textsuperscript{15} The Church, with ‘on-site’ experience, advised the colonial authorities and had control of education, aligning it to the demands of the colonial state’s indirect rule and collaborating with the colonial authorities to institutionalise the inequality in society according to the ethnic identities. The missionaries played an important role in advising the colonial authorities on setting up the administration on the basis of ethnicity. In 1930, Mgr Classe, a Catholic bishop who had arrived in Rwanda years before as a priest, advised the authorities that the:

\begin{center}
greatest mistake this government could make would be to suppress the Mututsi caste...We will have no better, more active and more intelligent chiefs than the Batutsi. They are the ones best suited to understand progress...The government must work mainly with them.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{center}

Therefore, from the early years of Belgian colonisation of Rwanda, the church through its missionaries and control of education served state interests.\textsuperscript{17} Education was the tool for sustaining the colonial system. The colonial authorities and missionaries in Rwanda determined who would have access to schooling and

\textsuperscript{15} Prunier (1997): 32
\textsuperscript{16} Quoted in Prunier (1997): 26
education on the basis of ethnicity, at the same time defining, on the basis of ethnicity, who would occupy important political posts.\textsuperscript{18}

Belgians reorganised the Rwandan administration between 1926 and 1931. In the 1930s the introduction of identity cards by the Belgians fixed ethnic identities which had before then been relatively fluid in practice if not in theory. From 1927, as a result of the administrative reorganisation the Tutsi élite began to convert to Christianity in significant numbers as Christianity was a prerequisite for appointments to colonial positions. This opened the way for the church to extend its control over the future élite of the country through education.\textsuperscript{19} As the Tutsi were considered by colonial authorities to be the ‘natural born chiefs’, they were the only Rwandans to be given key positions in the colonial administration, to the extent that existing Hutu chiefs were fired and replaced by Tutsi. In the process of administrative reforms, the Tutsi élite had shown how keenly aware they were of the advantages participation in the colonial administration offered them.

It would, perhaps, at this point be valuable to set the construction of ethnic identities in Rwanda within a broader context of the construction of ethnicity elsewhere in Africa during the colonial period. Similar processes were in fact, unfolding throughout colonial Africa in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{20} Leroy Vail, in his introduction to a volume of research papers on the construction of tribalism and ethnicity in Africa, identifies three variables for the creation and implanting of the ethnic message:

- a group of intellectuals (including local intellectuals) who are involved in formulating it – what he calls, ‘culture brokers’;
- a system of ‘indirect rule’ which made use of African intermediaries to administer the subordinate peoples;

\textsuperscript{18} Shyaka, A (2002) quoted in Obura: 98
\textsuperscript{19} Prunier (1997): 32
\textsuperscript{20} Including, for example, Afrikaner identity discussed in Chapter 4.
a real need by ordinary people for ‘so-called traditional values’ which were embodied in the ethnic and tribal constructs at a time of rapid social change, opening the way for the wide acceptance of the new ideologies.\textsuperscript{21}

Vail makes the point, that in all of the case studies in the volume, there was local agency – indigenous African intellectuals were involved in the process of constructing ethnicity, often working hand in hand with their European counterparts. Missionaries also played a critical role in the process, providing the cultural symbols that could be organised into a cultural [ethnic] identity, especially a written language. It was generally the missionaries who provided descriptions of ‘customs’ and ‘traditions’, tending to ‘freeze’ them as ‘traditional’ at a particular moment in time. It was they who researched and wrote ‘tribal’ histories. Missionaries controlled colonial education and included the ‘tribal histories’ in the curricula of the mission schools, reinforcing ethnic identities in pupils and socialising the youth into accepting ethnic membership.\textsuperscript{22} Virtually all of the studies demonstrated the key role of the mission-educated indigenous elite in the construction of the ethnic ideologies.\textsuperscript{23} In Rwanda these variables were represented by the interests of the colonial administrators, the Catholic missionaries and the Tutsi elite.

Vail argues that in many respects, and perhaps more importantly than any of the other aspects, ‘ethnic identity came to be specified by the ‘actual operation of the administrative mechanisms of indirect rule’.\textsuperscript{24} In Rwanda, the Tutsi elite became the ‘intermediaries’ who collaborated with the colonial authorities to administer the territory. They were actively involved in the administration of the country, and it has

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{22} Vail (1989). This was also the case as far south as the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony, South Africa, where missionaries were active in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. See Weldon, G (1984) \textit{The interaction between the missionaries of the Cape eastern frontier and the colonial authorities in the era of Sir George Grey, 1854-1861}, Unpublished MA Thesis, Department of Historical Studies, University of Natal.
\textsuperscript{23} Vail (1989) - Vail further notes that research has shown that in societies where missionaries did not work or where they did work but did not introduce western-style education, or where African intellectuals emerged only at a late period or not at all, the development of ethnic ideologies was either stalled or never occurred: 12
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid: 13
\end{flushleft}
been suggested that it was the Tutsi rather than the Belgians who largely determined the ways in which colonialism shaped the transformation of the pre-colonial relationship between Tutsi and Hutu.\textsuperscript{25} Their ‘right’ to the administrative positions rested in the biological determinism of the Belgian administrators and missionaries who regarded the ‘Hamitic’ Tutsi as ‘born to rule’.

**Constructing the conflict narrative**

An examination of the construction of ethnicity in Rwanda is an important context for the construction of the conflict narrative to which this next section turns. While Vail argues that the actual operation of the administrative system of indirect rule carries most of the responsibility for entrenching ethnic identities, he also highlights the important role of intellectuals, foreign and local, as ‘culture brokers’ for the ethnic message. In Rwanda, the ethnic message became central to the conflict narrative, and two intellectuals, the Rwandan Alexis Kagame, and the Belgian Jacques Maquet, were the key ‘culture brokers’ in the construction of the narrative in the 1950s. In the narrative, the biological explanation of Rwandan ethnicity was reinforced by Tutsi oral tradition, a combination which unwittingly became explosive in post-colonial Rwanda.

Alexis Kagame was a Rwandan intellectual, priest and historian. Kagame’s family were members of the *nyiginya* élite, the Rwandan royal lineage, and had been the traditional court historians. He was thus intimately familiar with the oral traditions of the *nyiginya* royal dynasty. His Catholic colonial education, itself steeped in the notions of Tutsi as racially superior and born to rule, reinforced his traditional knowledge. His first book, published in 1943, was an oral history of ancient Rwanda – a Tutsi oral history. In 1952 he wrote *Le code des institutions politiques du Rwanda*, a defence of the Tutsi monarchy and ‘traditions’; and a doctoral thesis *the Bantu-Rwandese Philosophy of Being* in 1956. His work brought together the oral traditions

\textsuperscript{25} Newbury, C. (1988) *The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960* New York: Columbia University Press. Quoted in Pottier (2002): 118. Also in a rare acknowledgement in documents produced in Rwanda, the authors of the IRDP document, *History and Conflicts in Rwanda*, state that the ‘chiefs had a significant share of the colonial power, using it for their own interests, and even exceeding the requirements of their colonial masters.’: 200
(official history) Tutsi *nyiginya* lineage and the colonial misconceptions of the African past, as well as the ideas of race in the works of anthropologists, such as Pagés, that gained influence in the 1930s. In a discussion of clans he emphasised notions of race:

One should not confuse Banyiginya with Hutu race and Banyiginya with Mututsi race. It is possible that the first group started working for the conquerors [Tutsi] from the beginning of the Hamite immigration and received in turn for the obedience and submission to bear the name of the winners [clan].

Tutsi identity was ideologised within court’s rich oral tradition and reinforced by court rituals or cultural knowledge, during the time of King Rwabugiri in the latter half of the 19th century. Oral traditions are viable sources of evidence and official histories in their own right, but as with all sources, they need to be subjected to critical analysis. Official histories in all societies are about power and influence and legitimising the ruling elite, which attempt to advance their concerns by promoting particular versions of the past. In reifying the oral traditions of the *nyiginya* in written tradition, without any critical analysis, as the history of Rwanda and incorporating the colonial racial ideas into existing understanding of aristocratic ‘Tutsi’ rule, as well as histories of migrations of people in Africa, Kagame helped to create an exclusionary conflict narrative that contributed to entrenching notions of superiority and inferiority among Rwandans.

As a respected priest and historian Kagame’s work was central to the acceptance of a narrative of Rwanda that enshrined the dangerous myths of Tutsi as ancient Hamites

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27 Clans contained members from Tutsi, Hutu and Twa and the Abanyiginya clan in 1970 had a majority of Tutsi but also contained Hutu and Twa. Ibid: 28

28 Newbury (1988): 112

29 At a different level, this is what happened when Afrikaner Nationalist historians appropriated the oral histories of the suffering of Boer women and children in the British concentration camps. They did so without interrogating their sources.

and later migrants to the area. An extract from his writing emphasises power and ‘superior’ technology:

[this clan] represents the category of ancient Hamites, who left the memory of incomparable power in Rwanda...Their civilisation was usually identified with hoes, hammers and other forged tools...These Hamites might have been strongly equipped with tools much more modern than those of Rwandans. They dug wells for their cows in stony places. It is from this sign that the famous wells of Rwanda of today were recognised and traditions attributed to their initial digging. 30

Kagame was regarded as an intellectual of some standing in the international community and his work had a profound influence in the creation of the ideology of Tutsi superiority which became a hegemonic reality. 31

Kagame became a bridge between the European specialists on Rwanda and the Rwandan intellectuals. A colonial-indigenous intellectual partnership developed between Kagame and the colonial ethnographer and anthropologist, Jacques Maquet. Maquet was the first to ‘transcribe [the] aristocratic representation of pre-colonial Rwanda in refined ethnographic language’, who because of an alleged ‘academic distance’ was able to pass his work off as objective. 32 He based his research on Kagame’s work and did not interview a single Hutu in gathering data – just as Kagame had not drawn upon oral traditions of other lineages. The nyiginya oral traditions, reified through written text, became fixed narratives of the past.

The Kagame-Maquet narratives legitimised the structures of indirect rule in Rwanda and the privileged position of the Tutsi elite. Generations of educated Rwandans who

31 Prunier (1997): 39
attended lectures, or conferences, or read Kagame’s books were influenced by him.\textsuperscript{33}

In post-colonial Rwanda, the dangers of Kagame-Maquet narrative was highlighted by the use of the narrative by politicians to politicise the Hutu, identifying the Hutu as the oppressed ‘natives’ and therefore rightful rulers of Rwanda and the Tutsi as the oppressive foreign invaders who needed to be sent back from where they had come.\textsuperscript{34}

Mamdani has emphasised the complicity between colonial authorities and ‘history writing in and about Rwanda’ in entrenching the ‘racial’ myths, arguing that the colonialism racialised the ‘parameters within which most historians of the time pursued knowledge’:

If the colonial state underscored racial origins as a key attribute of citizenship and rights, historians became preoccupied with the search for origins. If official racism presumed that migration was central to the spread of civilization...historians seemed content to centre their scholarly pursuits on the question of migration. And finally, if the colonial state defined the subject population as Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa)...historians presumed an equally unproblematised link between ancestral Hutu and Tutsi and those contemporarily so identified.\textsuperscript{35}

What Mamdani missed was the role played by Alexis Kagame as a local ‘culture broker’ in the ‘racialisation of Rwandans’ by creating a particular version of the past

\textsuperscript{33} Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (2006) \textit{History and conflicts in Rwanda} Kigali: IRDP: 194

\textsuperscript{34} The extent to which this kind of narrative was internalised was demonstrated when a version of the story was repeated by a Hutu farmer interviewed for the 2004 documentary, \textit{The Ghosts of Rwanda}. He had taken part in killing the Tutsi who had gathered in the Catholic Church at Nyarubuye for safety. He narrated as fact that the Tutsis used to abuse Hutus. As he said: ‘My understanding is that Tutsis are not originally from Rwanda. I heard that they might have come from Egypt or somewhere else.’ Frontline/PBS Documentary, \textit{Ghosts of Rwanda}, released 2004 to commemorate the 10\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. Transcript available at \url{http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/froniline/shows/ghosts/etc/script.html} Accessed 8 December 2007

\textsuperscript{35} Mamdani (2001): 269 Original emphasis. While Mamdani’s analysis is contested, I accept his interpretation of ethnicity in Rwanda insofar as the pseudo-scientific notions of ‘race’ were entrenched in the historical narratives. He argues that the Hamitic theory caste Tutsi as ‘foreign’ invaders i.e. a different ‘race’. It is also worth noting that early South African historians were equally engaged in the origin and migrations of South Africans into the area as part of the legitimising myth of the ‘empty land’ occupied by Boers in the mid-19\textsuperscript{th} century and the justification for the homeland policy of apartheid that sought to set up independent ‘states’ based on ‘natural’ regions of pre-colonial occupation.
that both served the interests of the Tutsi elite and validated European assumptions about the racial hierarchy in Rwanda. Social relations and feelings in colonial and post-colonial Rwanda took place in relation to the conflict narrative. It was a narrative that not only cast Hutu in a subordinate position in the social hierarchy, but could also be regarded as a denial of Hutu memory in the form of their own oral traditions. Hutu oral tradition became vernacular memories, forged into chosen traumas of Hutu oppression by Tutsi (foreign) oppressors.

Paul Rusesabagina (of Hotel Rwanda) in his book about the genocide, noted that the doctrine of Tutsi superiority was taught in schools, preached in churches, and reinforced in thousands of invisible ways in daily Rwandan life. The Tutsi were told over and over that they were aristocratic and physically attractive, while the Hutu were told that ‘they were ugly and stupid and worthy only of working in the fields...This was the message that our fathers and mothers heard every day’. What is critical is that the racial or ethnic ‘message’ was reinforced from all sides, including the church. Humiliation is a powerfully negative force that results in deeply internalised attitudes that can erupt into conflict. Once there is institutionalised racism around which the entire administration or government structure is constructed, racial consciousness affects everyone and racial identities become deeply internalised. In Rwanda, even the ‘small’ Tutsi, who did not benefit from the system, started to believe that they were a superior race; and of course the Hutu, deprived of political power and exploited by whites and Tutsi, were told by everyone that they were inferior. Before independence it was far more, as Vail suggests, the actual operation

40 Prunier (1997): 38. Similar attitudes developed among white South Africans. Bloke Modisane, in his book ‘*Blame me on History*’ writes of an encounter in the 1950s with a white woman beggar, who in
of the administrative mechanisms of indirect rule that defined and entrenched ethnic identities.

In Rwanda, the system of education was developed in line with the colonial notions of race and Tutsi superiority. Education was unequal, characterised by injustice based on ethnicity, regionalism, gender disparity and religious discrimination. During the first years of colonial administration the Tutsi were favoured over the Hutu in school admissions. The table below shows the enrolment breakdown by ethnic origin for Astrida (Butare) College prior to independence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tutsi Pupils</th>
<th>Hutu Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, in the post-World War II years, a number of missionaries who came to work in Rwanda were from the working-class and sensitive to the inequalities of class and race. Concerned about the oppression of the Hutu, who were excluded from political office even though they constituted more than 80% of the population, these new ‘progressive’ missionaries admitted more Hutu into secondary schools, cultivating a Hutu counter-élite and helping to raise the consciousness among the Hutu masses of their exploitation. This trend can be seen in the 1959 figures in the table above in which the percentage gap between the Tutsi and Hutu admitted to school is closing. It is this group of missionaries who have been accused of accepting money from him, called him ‘boy’. He wrote: ‘...it was interesting to note that even in her destitute moment she did not lose sight of the fact that I must be reminded that she was a member of the superior race group...’. B. Modisane (1963: 1986) *Blame me on History* (Craighall:AD Donker): 156

41 Rutayisire, J., Kabano, J., & Rubagiza, J. (2003) Rwanda Case Study in *Curriculum Change and Social Cohesion in conflict affected Societies* IBE:UNESCO. Rutayisire was Director of the Curriculum Development Centre in Kigali.
42 Prunier, G (1997): 33
intensifying the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi by teaching a history that identified the Tutsi rather than the colonial power as the oppressors of the Hutu.\textsuperscript{44}

Rwanda became independent on 1 July 1962. Legislative elections had been held in September the previous year. The PARMEHUTU, the main Hutu political movement, gained 78% of the vote.\textsuperscript{45} Education was nationalised and became just as unequal, with the Hutu now the privileged group. There was a rapid reversal of the school admission quotas, and by the 1970s, entry to all government and assisted schools and tertiary institutions was determined by ethnic and regional quotas\textsuperscript{46} which favoured the Hutu above the Tutsi as the quotas were theoretically aligned to the national proportion of the population of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa (90% Hutu, 9% Tutsi and 1% Twa).\textsuperscript{47} The table below shows the ethnic segregation in Secondary Education between 1962 and 1980. It demonstrates the percentage of Hutu and Tutsi of the total intake.\textsuperscript{48}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic year</th>
<th>Abahutu (%)</th>
<th>Abatutsi (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962/63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976/68</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972/73</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973/4</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall illiteracy rates remained relatively high although before 1994, while there was a good record of primary school attendance (about 60% of primary age children entered school), as late as 1991 only 9% of Rwandan children were able to study at secondary school.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{44} Longman (1997)
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid:39
\textsuperscript{47} In her book, *Left to Tell*, a genocide survivor, Immaculée Ilibagiza, provides a graphic example of how she and a Tutsi boy came top of the class in last year of primary education, but neither gained a place in the secondary school. In the fourth grade the teacher frequently held ethnic roll calls. It was at this time that she first knew that she was Tutsi: 13ff
\textsuperscript{48} Included in NCDC (2006):112
\textsuperscript{49} Des Forges (1999): http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/Rwanda/Geno1-3-09.htm
The conflict narrative in history education

The narrative as such, was not part of history education in Rwandan schools during the colonial period but what was contained in the conflict narrative was widely disseminated. As the Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace in Kigali noted:

Before the history of Rwanda was taught in schools, it was taught in an abstract and indirect way, initially through the writings of the colonial and missionary historiography largely commented and broadcast in the embryonic media...⁵⁰

It was the history introduced into the schools after independence that, the current government has claimed, caused the genocide. During most of the colonial period history education focused mainly on the history of Western Europe and in the upper secondary school, the history of the Belgium.⁵¹ When the history of Rwanda was introduced into the curriculum, it was based on the work of colonial and missionary historians and Kagame,⁵² and, it is said, was used by politicians to politicise the Hutu, identifying them as the oppressed and the Tutsi as the oppressive foreign invaders.⁵³ The curriculum also included the triumph of the Hutu in 1959 and the formation of the Hutu extremist party as the table below indicates (contentious areas italicised).⁵⁴

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⁵¹ Ibid: 193
⁵² Ibid: 195
⁵³ An example of a narrative that provoked the feeling of ‘perennial ethnic revenge’ built into the history curriculum is the story of a Tutsi Queen Mother (the Royal lineage was Tutsi) who each time she stood up would lean against a spear on a young Hutu’s foot. Nzamukwereka, A (2004), The Rwanda Forum, Saturday 27th March, CD2, 49’06”
### THEMES

#### Theme 1: Origin of the population
- Sources of history (oral, written, archaeological)
- *The peopling of Rwanda*

#### Themes 2 & 3: Ubwoko & Ubuhake
- *Definition of the terms clan, lineage, ethnicity, tribe*
- *Ubuhake*
- Economic life before colonisation

#### Themes 4 & 5: Evangelisation and Colonisation (Belgium)
- Socio-political situation from the time of the first contact with Europeans
- Social progress (education, health)
- Economic life during colonisation (famines, etc)
- Colonial Rwanda: German colonisation (definition, causes, conquest, resistance...); Belgian colonisation.
- First World War and Rwanda
- 1952 decree, elections of 1953 and 1956
- Visit of the mandates commission of the UNO
  - *Forced labour (akazi) and taxes (imisoro)*

#### Theme 6: The Period 1959-1962
- Social context before 1959
- Political parties (Aprosoma, Parmehutu, Rader, Unar)
- Communal elections in 1960, Referendum and parliamentary elections of 1961
- Revolution of 1959; Hutu Manifesto, victory of Parmehutu

#### Theme 7: Independent Rwanda
- *The First Republic (defence of territorial integrity, satisfying the demands of the masses)*
- First Republic (economic problems)
- Second Republic (problems encountered and solutions supplied)
- Second Republic (coup d’état of 1973)

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The pre-colonial history would have been Kagame’s narrative. However, it is not what is in the curriculum documents, but how it is interpreted in the textbooks and by teachers, that contributes to conflict. There is widespread agreement among teachers that the official narrative in school history textbooks before 1994, entrenched ethnic divisions and contributed to tension between Hutu and Tutsi:
Moreover, the history taught was written with the aim of pleasing the then political regime...Thus under colonisation it was said that Tutsi were the only ones who could rule; one sees at which point the hamitic theories put into practice and spread with the support of missionaries were assimilated even by the popular masses. Under the 1\textsuperscript{st} and 2\textsuperscript{nd} republic, the Hutu kingdoms were glorified at the expense of the Nyiginya kingdom.\textsuperscript{55}

Some teachers insist that the material used in schools was ‘very dangerous’ and created tension amongst the pupils, even making a direct link between history education and genocide.\textsuperscript{56} Others saw the link between the content of courses such as civics and history and the approach of certain teachers. The subject matter in textbooks was given an ideological bias to polarise pupils. According to a teacher currently in prison, the ‘1959 civil war’ which brought, in his terms, victory for the Hutu and defeat for the Tutsis was taught in a way that made Hutu proud and Tutsis feel inferior:

in school textbooks there were entire chapters about the civil war of 1959, the resounding victory of the Hutus, the humiliating defeat of the Tutsis and the exile of the Tutsis and so on...When we taught such things...the Hutu were swelled with pride...whilst the Tutsis felt inferior.\textsuperscript{57}

Still others pointed to the exclusive focus on ethnic division in the textbooks ‘as if they were the only important thing’ and the methodology that required children to learn the facts off by heart as if ‘they were the gospel truth’.\textsuperscript{58}

The colonial world had constructed a narrative in which the Social Darwinist myths about race had become Barthes’ ‘universal truth’.\textsuperscript{59} The ethnic consciousness of both

\textsuperscript{55} IRDP (2006)  \textit{History and Conflicts in Rwanda} (IRDP, Kigali): 195
\textsuperscript{57} IRDP (2006): 196; see also African Rights (2001), \textit{The Heart of Education}
\textsuperscript{58} African Rights: 24
Tutsis and Hutus had been shaped in the context of the colonial experience and mission education with both seemingly deeply internalising the imposed colonial identities. By the late 1950s, ethnicity had become a discourse that arranged collective memory as a basis for political action and a justification for the (oppressed) Hutu, for attacking the (oppressors) Tutsi. The first serious conflict occurred in late 1959 and after independence in 1962 an estimated 10,000 Tutsi were killed between December 1963 and January 1964. Further violence occurred during 1972-3 when Habyarimana took over government after a military coup. Each episode of violence resulted in Tutsi refugees fleeing the country. Both Hutu and Tutsi have constructed versions of the past as chosen traumas that cast them as the victim. The refugee/exile factor became significant in the events of the 1990s with the Tutsi forming their own traumatic collective memory and chosen trauma in exile. This will be examined in the next chapter.

History education and mass participation in the genocide

In the rest of this chapter I will examine the claims that the conflict narrative embedded in history education contributed to the widespread participation of Hutu in the genocide. There have been a number of attempts to explain this phenomenon, few of which are satisfactory. Lemarchand in a recent survey of the current research on Rwanda notes that there ‘are few parallels for the sheer depth of the discords and disagreements the 1994 genocide has generated among observers, survivors and perpetrators’. Adding to the complexity is the enormous volume of literature that has been generated, ranging from journalistic accounts to scholarly works, from first person testimonies by survivors to interviews with convicted killers, from travel writing to in-depth investigations by human rights organisations, from official inquests.

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60 Jewsiewicki, B. (1989): 324
61 Prunier (1997): 56
62 A Rwandan exile (Hutu) in Cape Town told me that all the violence since independence had been the Hutu responding to Tutsi aggression. February 2006. Also Eltringham, N. (2004) Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in Rwanda London: Pluto Press, London. The last chapter deals with the two versions of Rwanda’s past.
by aid agencies and international commission to UN reports. This makes it extremely difficult for a researcher to navigate the literature.

There is general agreement among researchers that the precipitating factor behind the genocide was the direct hit on the plane carrying the president of Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana, as it was about to land in Kigali by the surface-to-air missile. This occurred on the night of the 6 April. Secondly, the first to be killed on the 7 April were all Hutu and included the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana and other prominent ministers in the government. None of them were Hutu Power politicians. However, the causes of genocide as well as the motivation for participation in the slaughter continue to be debated by historians and political scientists. These include massive poverty and ongoing economic crisis in Rwanda; intra-Hutu power struggles; ideological manipulation of the past by Hutu Power politicians and resurrected during 1992-4 in the form of massive state propaganda; the manipulation of fear during war; and the local level of organisation of the state and political party which encouraged and coerced people into participating. It is not within the scope of this study to take these debates further; for the purposes of this research, I will focus on the claims about history education as a motive for participation in mass killings by ordinary Rwandans. The belief in this negative role of history education continues to be widespread in Rwanda today.

Paul Rusesabagina believes that the official history was widely known and had been internalised:

64 Ibid
History is a serious business in my country. You might say that it is a matter of life and death. It is a rare person here, even the poorest grower of bananas, who cannot rattle off a string of significant dates in Rwanda’s past and tell you exactly what they mean to him and his family. They are like beads on our national necklace: 1885, 1959, 1973, 1990, 1994...We are obsessed with the past. And everyone here tries to make it fit his own ends.  

The ‘beads on the national necklace’ are the dates of major historical events from the imposition of colonial rule that would have been included in all textbooks: beginning of colonial rule; the Hutu uprising that began a process which ended in independence in 1962; the coup d’état by Hutu military officers from the north; the invasion of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that began the conflict which was able to mask the preparations for genocide; and of course, the genocide itself. This raises questions about how the ‘poorest grower of bananas’ came to have such knowledge of official Rwandan history and to what extent the conflict narrative of the school history textbooks, particularly about the origins of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa and the oppression of Hutu by Tutsi, had been internalised to the extent to which the narrative caused them to take part in the mass killings. Before the genocide, although Rwanda had more than 60% of children in primary school, access to secondary education was the lowest in Africa and the national illiteracy rate stood at around 56%. Perhaps part of the answer lies in these statistics – the majority of those who were exposed to the official narrative in formal schooling would have received it unprocessed at an impressionable age in the primary school.

Jean-Damascène Gasanabo, in a study of the relationship between narratives in history textbooks and the extent to which these influenced the perceptions of Rwandans about their past, interviewed a cross section of people. He included a range

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66 Rusesabagina (2006):18
of ages and those who had gone to school and those who had not. What emerged from his research was that although the attitudes to the narrative differed, there was a general knowledge of the elements of the official narrative that appeared in the school textbooks, even though many Rwandans had not and did not attend school. He found that those Hutu or Tutsi, who learnt history only in primary and secondary school, believed what they had read in their textbooks. University students were more sceptical. Further, there was a correlation between the official narrative and community vernacular narratives of those who did not go to school. The extent, however, to which the school and community narratives were aligned, differed according to the age of the interviewees. The younger interviewees who had not attended schools, aligned themselves closely with the school narratives, while the older interviewees were less inclined to accept what was being taught in schools. Gasanabo does not, however, engage with the issue of this knowledge of history being a motivating factor in the mass participation in genocide. So although there was knowledge, it cannot be claimed without qualification that direct exposure to the conflict narrative in history education led to mass participation in the genocide.

Gasanabo’s research raises another issue. Given that so many did have knowledge of the official narrative, how did those who had not attended school acquire that knowledge? Part of the answer seems to lie in the use of the media for propaganda and rallying the Hutu behind the cause of genocide. The power of the mass media in inciting mass participation in the genocide was investigated in the trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), of three media executives, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, who had set up the racist radio station Radio Milles Collines, and Hassan Ngeze of the racist newspaper, Kangura. The chief propagandist for popular Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM or Radio Milles Collines) was Ferdinand Nahimana a former history professor at the National University, who studied at the University of Paris. Radio

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Milles Collines began its broadcasts in 1993 and in the months leading up to the genocide, it urged the Hutu to take up arms against the Tutsi, to kill the ‘cockroaches’ and send them back across the river. Radio Milles Collines’ version of Rwandan history as constructed by Nahimana, followed the official history - the Tutsi-Hamite thesis of migration and ‘foreign’ invasion and the ethnic domination and exploitation of the Hutu by the Tutsi. An example of the rhetoric broadcast was that:

Tutsi are nomads and invaders who came to Rwanda in search of pasture, but because they are so cunning and malicious, the Tutsi managed to stay and rule. If you allow the Tutsi-Hamites to come back, they will not only rule you in Rwanda, but will also extend their power throughout the Great Lakes Region.70

Those who could read could also get a dose of anti-Tutsi rhetoric from journalist Hassan Ngeze of the Kangura, a journal founded in 1990 as the mouthpiece of the radical Hutu. The ethnic hatred that permeated Kangura had the effect of poison and its message of prejudice and fear contributed to paving the way for massacres of the Tutsi population.71 From as early as 1991 Kangura was warning Hutu against Tutsi:

Hutu, be united like Tutsi who are one...Don’t you know that it is when Hutu will unite that they will be able to fight the Tutsi? But if we remain divided, we will continue being instruments in the hands of Tutsi who will make us turn in one direction at their will until the monarchy is restored.72

By February 1994 the rhetoric against the Tutsi in the Kangura had intensified. In an article entitled ‘Final Attack’ it was said:

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71 Temple-Raston (2005): 234
We have indications that the RPF will soon launch other attacks in Kigali from all sides. We know where the cockroaches are. If they look for us, they had better watch out.  

The verdict from the trial was that the media, in particular radio, played a significant role in Rwandan society where there were many who were illiterate and telephones were few. Until 1991 Rwanda was a one-party state and the radio, Radio Rwanda, was an important way of making government announcements, including the lists of candidates admitted to secondary schools, but also for disseminating government information and propaganda. The dangerous power of radio was first demonstrated in 1992, when Radio Rwanda was used to promote the killing of Tutsi in Bugesera, south of the capital, Kigali. It was a ‘dress rehearsal’ for Nahimana who had taken up a post with Radio Rwanda on his return from studying in Paris. Since his appointment, Nahimana had repeatedly broadcast his Hutu version of Rwandan history, but his power was not appreciated until the Bugesera killings. On 3 March, Nahimana handed journalists a communiqué, which the radio repeatedly broadcast, supposedly sent by a human rights group based in Nairobi, warning that Hutu in Bugesera would be attacked by Tutsi. Local officials built onto the radio announcement to convince Hutu that they needed to protect themselves by attacking first. Hundreds of Tutsi were killed in the action.

Although the 1992 attack helps us to understand the power of the radio, it still does not tell us whether the message to kill reached all areas of Rwanda in 1994, and whether the broadcasts, and therefore the official narrative, resulted in mass participation. Charles Mironko, a Tutsi who grew up in exile, interviewed a number of Hutu perpetrators in Rwandan prisons. Many of those interviewed claimed that they did not have radios and therefore had not heard the broadcasts. Yet they demonstrated

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73 Quoted in Temple-Raston (2005): 41
75 Ibid. Also Temple-Raston (2005): 27
knowledge of the content of the broadcasts that identified the Tutsi as ‘their enemies, outsiders, invaders and cunning manipulators’ and called them to action against them. When questioned further, many said that they had heard the messages of the radio station through others and responded only when the local leaders threatened them into action against their neighbours. Mironko argues that the unlike those who were educated and therefore exposed to a distorted official narrative at school, uneducated rural peasants needed the radio messages to reinforce the message that ‘the Tutsi is the enemy’ and the local structures to goad them into taking action against the Tutsi. The station needed to make a particular effort to target rural peasants because ‘they were seen as being on the margins of ethnic politics’ and not ‘naturally inclined’ to take action against their Tutsi neighbours.

Mironko further argues that the attacks took place within the context of a social and political mechanism, igitero or ‘mob attack’ that drew on communal hunting traditions and that ‘countless ordinary civilians’ were coerced into taking part in the killing’. The reasons put forward by interviewees for taking part in the ibitero (pl) had little to do with the manipulation of identity through history. Motives articulated by the interviewees included fear of being killed themselves if they did not participate; fear that the Tutsi would seize their land if they were not stopped; greed; coercion; and the use of drink and drugs. Longman and Rutagengwa’s research showed a similar trend: that while the current Rwandan government regards the genocide as deeply rooted in Rwandan history, the study participants were more likely to blame the genocide on more immediate causes such as bad politicians and greed. Straus’s conclusions support and add to the findings of Mironko, Longman and Rutagengwa. Rather than ideological factors behind mass participation in the genocide, Straus argues that the principal mechanisms were wartime uncertainty and

77 Ibid. ‘The Tutsi is the enemy’ was a phrase that was repeatedly articulated in the interviews quoted by Mironko.
79 Mironko (n.d.)
80 Longman & Rutagengwa (2004):169
fear; social pressure; and opportunity. Perpetrators wanted to protect themselves during war and a period of intense fear and uncertainty.\textsuperscript{81} War was the context that was critical to understanding the extent of the violence and why so many individuals agreed to take part in the killing.\textsuperscript{82} Clearly, while there is a general agreement that the history taught in schools was biased; the research weakens the official claim that history education played a central role in the genocide. It also cannot be regarded as the major cause of individual participation in the slaughter at the local rural level.

An interesting omission in all of the research dealing with history narratives and the genocide is the lack of engagement with oral or vernacular history and the way it may have shaped perceptions about the past. African oral languages, apart from being the media of communication, are ‘repositories of culture, history, millennial values and cherished beliefs.’\textsuperscript{83} Colonialism devalued oral traditions and the introduction of European languages de-legitimized the indigenous way of expression. However, more recently oral traditions have been recognised as legitimate sources of information about the past. Colonialism was a relatively recent experience and in the administrative reorganisation, Hutu chiefs at times were deposed and replaced with Tutsi. There is clearly a strong vernacular memory of these events and of Hutu exploitation by Tutsi, but it is ignored. A tantalizing glimpse of the existence of the vernacular histories is provided by Pierre-Damien Mvuyekure in an article discussing a reading of \textit{Ubwiru}, Rwandan oral poetry from the royal court of the \textit{nyiginya} kings. Mvuyekure describes the dynastic drum, \textit{Karinga}, which was decorated with the mummified testicles of defeated Hutu kings (\textit{Abahinza}). He continues:

\begin{quote}
It should be made clear that...most Rwandans...have heard about, \textit{by way of story telling}, the gory images and atrocities that the early Nyiginya kings committed against Abahinza. \textit{I myself learned from my father (who used to work as a servant to a Tutsi chief) and my uncles}...
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{81}] Straus (2006): 9
\item[\textsuperscript{82}] Ibid: 7
\item[\textsuperscript{83}] Abdi, A.A. (2007) Oral Societies and Colonial Experiences: Sub-Saharan Africa and the \textit{de facto} power of the written word, \textit{International Education} (Fall): 42 – 59
\end{itemize}

how Tutsi kings used to castrate Hutu kings to decorate Karinga and other dynastic drums.\textsuperscript{84}

There are indications that Mvuyekure may be a Hutu, and if so, one needs to ask to what extent his comments are nuanced by the existence of the contrasting Hutu and Tutsi narratives about the past and the belief fostered by the Habyarimana regime that it was the Tutsi’s fault that they were killed\textsuperscript{85} Whatever the answer to that is, it is not immediately relevant. What is important is that he demonstrates the existence of a strong vernacular tradition. This is also alluded to in the report of the Kigali-based Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace. In the introduction the Director remarked that the descendants of the local Hutu chiefs provided the authors of the report with information.\textsuperscript{86} The report later notes that although the transmission of knowledge through the family has been diluted by modern media, the ‘family circle’, be it Hutu or Tutsi, still plays a major role in determining what young people think. ‘People check out at home what the teacher said on the history of Rwanda’.\textsuperscript{87} This provides an indication of the extent to which vernacular histories inform the way in which history education is received by pupils. This is a valuable area of research waiting for someone to take up.

The judgement at the ICTR media trial found that the genocide would have happened without the radio station and Kangura, but that the killing could not have spread so efficiently and so quickly had it not been for the Radio Milles Collines’ call to action. This was also helped by the existence of local political structures. The people could not have been so quickly mobilised against the Tutsi had it not been for the local leaders and the ‘civil defence’ units that had been set up in every community.


\textsuperscript{86} Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (2006) History and conflicts in Rwanda, (IRDP, Kigali): iii. As mentioned, many Hutu chiefs were deposed and replaced with Tutsi in the colonial period. The same happened in South Africa during apartheid when ‘homelands’ were created for ‘tribes’. If the hereditary ruler was uncooperative he was simply deposed and replaced with someone who would cooperate with the apartheid government. What is significant is that in South Africa the oral tradition of the rightful ruler continued to be kept alive.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid: 193
throughout the country. The link between the radio broadcasts and the action taken by local leaders in drawing Hutu into the killing squads is born out by the statements made by Mironko’s interviewees. Thus the media broadcasts were not the cause of genocide, but were clearly a major element in a premeditated plan for mass slaughter, conveying orders to militia and groups already involved in the slaughter and manipulating history in the broadcasts to keep passions at fever pitch during the final months before the genocide. The judgement further found that the RTLM broadcasts exploited the history of Tutsi privilege and Hutu disadvantage, and the fear of war, to whip Rwandans into a frenzy of hatred and violence. The Interahamwe and other militias listened to RTLM and acted on the information that was broadcast. RTLM actively encouraged them to kill, relentlessly sending the message the Tutsi were the enemy and had to be eliminated once and for all.

The judgement also found that Ferdinand Nahimana, one of a new generation of Rwandan historians to emerge in post-colonial period, was the driving force behind the anti-Tutsi rhetoric. He had become a Hutu intellectual who used his skills for the cause of ethnic hatred. History had been used as a tool for inciting racial hatred by a professional historian who would have known that the colonial Hamitic theory of the migration of the Tutsi to Rwanda had been discredited, but who chose to use it to incite violence. The slow change in school narratives, and the presence of a vernacular tradition casting Tutsi as oppressors, meant that the majority of Rwandans still believed it. Furthermore, colonialism with its Hutu exploitation and Tutsi privilege was still within living memory of many of the older generation. The radio broadcasts threatened the return of the Tutsi to rule; that all Hutu were at risk of being attacked, overwhelmed, re-colonised and exploited by all Tutsi.

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89 Temple-Raston (2005): 233
90 Des Forges (1999)
Conclusion

Colonial Rwanda saw the construction of an official history that had legitimised minority Tutsi interests at the expense of the majority Hutu. When the Hutu gained control at independence, official history became a narrative of chosen trauma with Hutu as victims and Tutsi as perpetrators. While official history certainly did not cause genocide, what became clear is that memory and identity located in a sense of past injustices and forged into a narrative of chosen trauma, can fuel a hatred that makes violence against ‘the other’ imaginable. The key issue of the spread of Hutu feelings and judgement and the raising of it to the level where it incited genocide is addressed earlier: there were multiple and contested reasons but a major root cause was the Tutsi creation of a view of the Hutu past that led the Hutu to dehumanise the Tutsi and to justify their actions in terms of the threat that the Tutsi posed. However, limiting the official rhetoric to Hutu perpetrators, avoids engaging with a more nuanced analysis of the genocide. Lemarchand, in his overview of scholarly research, refers to the work of Guichaoua into the dynamics of conflict in Butare which suggests that the genocide was not a straightforward Hutu-Tutsi conflict. Even after April 19, when the slaughter got underway, people were killed not because they were Hutu or Tutsi, but because ‘they had already stated openly their opposition to Hutu extremists, and because they challenged or refused to toe the political line of the new authorities promoted on April 8.’ Straus argues that in fact, the involvement of Hutu was not as widespread as some claim and that that most of the killing was done by perhaps 10 per cent of the génocidaires, i.e. “soldiers, paramilitaries, and extremely zealous killers”, while the remaining 90 per cent, made up of “non-hardcore civilians”, might account for no more than 25 per cent of the killings.

The tension between past and present remains very much alive and unresolved. The current challenge facing Rwanda is the construction of a history curriculum that provides for the deconstruction of the myths race and ethnicity and creates a history for the common good. A moratorium was declared on the teaching of Rwandan

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history in primary schools after 1994. There is still no real resolution on what would constitute an acceptable history curriculum even while a new official narrative has been very publicly disseminated. The next chapter examines the tensions in Rwandan society about the past, the debates around history education and the construction of a new official narrative which is being disseminated in alternative sites of education and public spaces.

The next chapter will examine the way in which the post-conflict state engages with the conflict narrative and the construction of memory and identity not only in education policy but in the political arena and in public spaces during commemorative events. It also engages with the dissemination of the new narrative and the implications of this narrative in terms of ongoing cycles of violence when trauma is unresolved.
CHAPTER EIGHT

MEMORY, IDENTITY AND HISTORY EDUCATION IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA

Introduction

The previous chapter examined the construction of the conflict narrative in colonial Rwanda, its use in post-colonial history education to justify Hutu action against Tutsi and alluded to the claims of the current government in Rwanda that history education was a major contributor to genocide. This chapter examines how the Rwandan state deals with the conflict narrative in its recent history and how this grappling with the past is engaged with in the school curriculum.

The genocide ended with a military victory by the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Rwandan exiles from Uganda. The military victory in theory left the new RPF government with the widest discretion to decide how to deal with the past. However, this was not an ordinary military victory: there have been consistent reports of human rights abuses carried out by the RPF; and it was a victory of a minority over the majority. This has meant that the Tutsi-led government continues to feel deeply vulnerable:

The key dilemma [in Rwanda] is how to build a democracy that can incorporate a guilty majority alongside an aggrieved and fearful minority in a single political community...While the minority demands justice, the majority calls for democracy. The two demands appear as irreconcilable, for the minority sees democracy as an agenda for completing the genocide, and the majority sees justice as a self-serving mask for fortifying minority power.¹

The victory of a minority over a majority is a victory that does not allow for vigilance to be relaxed. Mamdani has pointed out that while most recognise that the

precondition for victor’s justice is, clearly, victory, there are few that recognise its price: the victor must remain on constant guard lest the spoils of victory be snatched away. A gaoler is tied to a gaol just as surely as the prisoner – a victor must equally live in anticipation and fear of the next round of battle.²

This has had major implications for post-1994 education policy and for the way in which the conflict narrative is engaged with within the broader context of history education. There are a number of elements to be considered in understanding this particular post-conflict context. Firstly, military victory enables the imposition of education policies, including a new national narrative, without negotiation with those who represent the defeated. Secondly, at a very powerful intersecting level, there is the traumatic legacy of genocide and the fear of the minority of possible unfinished business of the majority. This is discernable in the language of education policy and the moratorium placed on the teaching of Rwandan history. And lastly, the ‘exile factor’ in Rwanda, particularly the dominance of the returning exiles from Uganda in government and education, has had implications for curriculum in general and history education in particular.

The first section of this chapter examines the legacy of trauma as a context for the construction of education policy that signals the break with the past. The fear of ‘the next round of battle’ is tied to the traumatic legacy. Those who survived the genocide live with the memories of the evidence of the killing; the mutilated bodies piled up in the street, the churches, the schools and the fields. Schools had been sites of massacres and many schools and school grounds and been ‘turned into stinking stores of human bodies’.³ The genocide was accompanied by wide-scale rape and infection with the HIV virus. Thousands of traumatised survivors were pregnant with unwanted babies, the enfants de mauvais souvenirs (children of bad memories)⁴ that were born in early 1995. The women allowed to live after being raped were told by the

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² Ibid: 271
³ OAU (2000): 17:6
⁴ Temple-Raston (2005): 154
that they were spared so they could ‘die of sadness’, either because of the AIDS they had contracted or because they would be forced to raise a child conceived in a time of treachery. Of particular relevance to education, an estimated 100,000 children lost their parents or were separated from them. Virtually all children have lived through severely traumatising experiences during the war, either watching family members being tortured and killed, or being themselves wounded or threatened. UNICEF calculated that five of every six of the children who survived had at the least witnessed bloodshed. A decade after the genocide, the trauma was still deep. A psychologist, who attended the 10th anniversary commemorations of the genocide in Kigali, witnessed the breakdown of a number of survivors, screaming in terror in the packed stadium. She noted that ‘indeed, time alone doesn’t heal trauma. For many people, ten years of silent suffering had been just too overwhelming.

By the end of the genocide, Rwanda had become a waste land: of seven million inhabitants before the genocide, about three-quarters had been killed, displaced, or had fled. As the RPF victory became certain, refugees had began fleeing the country - more than a million estimated walking along a stretch of road barely 60 kilometres long. Hutu authorities tried to ‘stampede’ the crowd further towards the Zaire border and soldiers fired their weapons in the air to urge the people on. As Hutu were fleeing the country, small numbers of Tutsi refugees who had spent more than 30

5 The interahamwe militia was set up by the MRND, the single legal political party formed in 1974 by the President, General Habyarimana. The shooting down of his plane in 1994 as he returned to Kigali was the signal that unleashed the genocide. The interahamwe was a paramilitary group and formed the main killing squads during the genocide.
6 Temple-Raston (2005): 155
10 OAU (2000) 17.2
years in Uganda were beginning to move back into Rwanda, driving thousands of head of cattle before them.\textsuperscript{12}

The founding ideology of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in post-genocide Rwanda is the memory of the genocide and the moral compulsion never to let it happen again.\textsuperscript{13} The first two founding principles of the state in Article 9 of the new Constitution adopted in 2003, are to fight the ‘ideology of genocide and all its manifestations’ and to eradicate ‘ethnic, regional and other divisions’ and to promote national unity.\textsuperscript{14} Evidence suggests that the military victory linked to the founding ideology provides the key to understanding the political and educational discourses in Rwanda, and the disjuncture between the political discourse of democracy and the unity of all Rwandans and the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime. Numerous international observer reports have warned against the increasing authoritarianism and intolerance of freedom of speech and political expression in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{15} Political analysts insist that the discourse of unity that stresses the absence of ethnic identities is a means of masking the monopoly by Tutsi military of political power.\textsuperscript{16} This criticism may be true, however evidence suggests, that international calls for greater democratisation of Rwandan society will continue to be ignored while this fear remains an overriding reality.\textsuperscript{17} The practice of democracy is for the RPF, in reality, unthinkable.

\textsuperscript{13} Reyntjens, F. (2004) Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide to dictatorship \textit{African Affairs} 103: 177-210
\textsuperscript{14} The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, 2003
\textsuperscript{15} For example, Human Rights Watch regularly put out reports on Rwanda; academics such as Reyntjens and authors such as Temple-Raston have written of the lack of political freedom and increasing authoritarianism. They have also pointed to the international feelings of guilt about the genocide which seems to prevent any real criticism of President Kagame. However, seeing his response in terms of the fear of renewed genocide does provide some understanding of his dilemma. See also Reyntjens (2004)
\textsuperscript{17} Rwandans express fears of what might happen if there is no strong government and ask whether it is not better to have good governance that is authoritarian than greater democracy with the threat of renewed violence. This was said to me by a Rwandan driver who took me to a number of inland genocide sites.
A major and continuing issue for Rwandan reconstruction of education is the heavy dependency on international aid that impacts on education policy. It has been argued that Rwanda displays a sense of entitlement when dealing with the international community, for not coming to their aid in the dark days of genocide. The donor community feels guilty for failing to do something to end genocide and has tended to provide enormous amounts of aid, closing its eyes to the disturbing signals of increasing authoritarianism within Rwanda. Some analysts believe that the government has exploited the ‘Never Again’ genocide credit that the new regime in Kigali enjoyed in the years immediately after 1994, to get foreign aid. The dependence on aid has significant implications for the shape and recovery of education particularly in the country programmes that have to be aligned to the donor requirements, such as the Education for All (EFA) or the Millennium Development Goals (MDG).

Understanding the trauma and fear in the political context assists in understanding the discourse in Rwanda’s education policy, the way in which Rwanda is dealing with the conflict narrative and the exercise of the politics of emotion in the new official public narrative. It also explains the moratorium placed on the teaching of Rwandan history in primary schools in 1994 and the lack of political will in terms of reintroducing Rwandan history into formal history education and the widespread political re-education programmes at alternative sites of education.

While South Africa had inherited a severely fragmented education system which had to be reorganised, Rwanda had to rebuild an entire infrastructure and system that had been shattered during the genocide. There had been an erosion of faith in the education system. School buildings had been demolished, burned, looted and pillaged, the furniture smashed and looted and documents destroyed, stolen and scattered. Three-quarters of all primary schools had been damaged. Of the 1836

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18 Reyndjens (2004): 103; 177-210; Mamdani also refers to this in his book ‘When Victims become Killers’ (2001). A similar situation developed in Israel in relation to any action taken by Israel against the Palestinians.

19 The three main partners in education are DFID, UNESCO and World Bank. MINEDUC website; Rwanda has over 80 international NGOs working in the country, Directory of Development Organisations (2006) Vol 1: [http://www.devdir.org/](http://www.devdir.org/)
schools before the genocide, by October 1994 only 648 were still operational. The Ministry of Education could not operate. Ministerial staff had fled and many had been massacred.\textsuperscript{20} Rebuilding infrastructure and getting schools up and running, took immediate priority over curriculum issues. The Government of National Unity set up in July 1994 saw its first task as getting children back to school and needed the infrastructure to do this. A Minister of Education was appointed; over the next weeks individual staff trickled back from exile or from hiding; they returned to a shelled building, broken furniture, burnt and torn papers, dust, rubble and stones. There was not one chair to sit on and no one knew how many colleagues had been killed.\textsuperscript{21} Few curriculum documents had survived and textbooks and other resources had been destroyed.

Re-establishing primary education was the first target. Schools were reopened in September 1994, but because neighbours, teachers, doctors and religious leaders had taken part in the genocide, trust in social institutions, including schools, was destroyed and replaced by fear, hostility and insecurity.\textsuperscript{22} There was also profound suspicion amongst parents and children because so many schools had been murder sites. Government representatives travelled around the country trying to re-establish credibility in the education system and entice pupils back into schools using radio, public speeches and regional leaders.\textsuperscript{23} Slowly the parents brought their children back to school. The next target was Grade 12 (Senior 6) which restarted on 12 October 1994. The Ministry considered it vital to keep these pupils in the system, to enable them to complete their year 12 programme properly and to give them a certificate at the end of it. The plan was to use these graduates immediately as new primary school teachers.\textsuperscript{24} Almost simultaneously with reopening schools, the inequalities in the school admission system and the curriculum came under scrutiny.

A first and ideologically important step was lifting the ethnic quotas on school

\textsuperscript{20} Obura (2003): 46-49 gives a detailed description of Rwandan education after the genocide.
\textsuperscript{21} Much of the information in this section is based on the 2003 IIEP Report by Anna Obura.
\textsuperscript{22} Kaun (2000):4/13
\textsuperscript{23} Obura (2003): 46-49
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid: 58
admissions and opening education to all. Almost simultaneously attention was given to the pre-1994 curriculum.

The next section examines the education policy processes embarked on by the new government that signalled the transforming nation; the construction of memory and identity in education policy; and the ways in which the politics of memory, identity and education intersected. The military victory, legacy of trauma and the influence on government policy of the returning exiles have all had an influence on education policy.

Restructuring education and education policy

While the government set up in July 1994 was technically a Government of National Unity, it was dominated by the Rwandan Patriot Front, and in particular, returned Ugandan exiles. The current political discourse is of the unity of all Rwandans: one nation, one language, one culture, and in pre-colonial times, one religion. It has been supported by the construction of a new national narrative which has located the unity of Rwandans in a ‘mythological’ pre-colonial past. Before colonialism, it is asserted, Rwandans were one nation, with one culture, one language and one religion, a ‘highly centralised kingdom’ of peaceful co-existence under a king who ruled for the mutual benefit of all. While there were Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, these were socio-economic identities and all were united by belonging to the same clans. The colonial period divided the ‘nation’ destroying the unity. From 1959 onwards, the population of the Batutsi was targeted, causing hundreds and thousands of deaths, and a Diaspora of some two million Rwandese people. According to the genocide narrative on the official website, the 1994 genocide was a carefully planned and executed exercise and was the culmination of a number of ‘vicious attacks’ and ‘cycles of genocide’ that

27 One document claims that colonisers ‘gnawed, little by little, the unity of the Rwandans, until it was destroyed’. Republic of Rwanda, Office of the President (1999) Group report on the ‘Unity of the Rwandans’, in Report on the reflection meetings held in the Office of the President of the Republic from May 1998 to March 1999: 19
occurred in the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{29} It was a history constructed by Tutsi refugees in forced exile, mainly in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as a way of promoting a narrative of the past that would prevent the Tutsi facing ethnic persecution again in the future.\textsuperscript{30} The narrative has all the elements of Malkki’s ‘mythico-history’. Malkki, in her interviews with Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, noted a pattern of narrative devices which created an interpretive framework of the Hutu past that was neither myth nor history, but a ‘subversive recasting and re-interpretation of [the past] in fundamentally moral terms. It was a narrative that continually explored, reiterated, and emphasized the boundaries between self and other, Hutu and Tutsi, and good and evil.\textsuperscript{31}

Malkki identified clusters of themes in the Hutu narrative connected to historical issues and events. In many instances the interpretation is the obverse of the official Rwandan narrative. Themes include the foundation myth of the pre-colonial golden age of social harmony and equality, the arrival of the Tutsi from the north; their theft of power from ‘native’ Hutu and their institution of a social hierarchy and monarchy; the colonial period and the role of the Belgian colonial authorities as protectors of the Hutu; the post-colonial period and founding of an independent republic; and finally the 1972 massacre and Hutu flight from Burundi.\textsuperscript{32} It a narrative that is both closely aligned to the conflict narrative that was embedded in history education in Rwanda before 1994 and contains elements of the current official version of Rwanda’s past.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid
\textsuperscript{30} Freedman, et. al (2008) and Pottier (2002): 111. Given the relatively small pool of academics in Rwanda it is probably understandable that the few names keep coming up in relation to the new narrative. For example: a religious grouping, Light and Society, that produces pamphlets supporting the RPF include Déogratias Byanafashe (who was in exile in the DRC) and Paul Rutayisire, who are prominent historians from the National University. Byanafashe and Rutayisire were also members of a conference in December 1995 which made recommendations to the Office of the President on ‘Genocide, Impunity and Accountability: Muzungu, Rutayisire and two other members of the Light and Society group were members of the Dialogue for a national and international response’; a series of ‘high-level’ meetings held in the Office of the President of Rwanda from May 1998 – March 1999 to consider issues of ‘The Unity of the Rwandans: Democracy, Justice, Economy and Security, 3 of them members of the sub-group responsible for writing the section on the Unity of the Rwandans; Byanafashe was the chief supervisor and Rutayisire a contributor in the development of a history resource manual, ‘the Teaching of History of Rwanda, a Participatory Approach’ co-ordinated by the University of California in 2006. It is probably fair to suggest that they have played an important part in the shaping of the Rwandan narrative.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid: 58ff
most notably the view of the pre-colonial past. It also reveals an almost stubborn adherence to the colonial interpretation of African history with its Hamitic migration into the region. There is some evidence that Hutu in Rwanda hold to a similar version of the past which carries the potential for future conflict.

The new official master narrative in Rwanda is being widely disseminated in policy documents, the media and National Unity and Reconciliation Commission education camps. Locating memory and identity in pre-colonial Rwanda provides a way of engaging less deeply with the traumatic knowledge of the genocide in the official narrative in the perceived interests of unity. It is, politically and educationally, the only discourse permitted. Those who talk publicly of ethnicity, of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, face being accused of divisionism and genocide ideology and are liable to be arrested.33

Education policy, in contrast to the stakeholder processes introduced into South Africa during the early transition period, was not contested. It is controlled by the government through the Ministry of Education and the National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC) in Kigali. The former and current Directors of the NCDC were in exile in Uganda.34 The returning exiles brought back experiences of the Ugandan education system which informed policy, but the structures of the inherited Belgian and French systems are still largely in place.35

Education, particularly history education, in Rwanda is widely considered to have contributed to conflict; however in post-conflict Rwanda, education is regarded as a major tool for reconciliation and the construction of an economically prosperous country. From the early education policy processes, the stated aims of education have included both reconciliation and education for poverty reduction and a prosperous economy. In 1995, a Conference on Policy and Planning of Education in Rwanda,

33 Freedman, et. al (2008); Reyntens (2004) and numerous reports.
34 Discussions with staff of the NCDC and personal contact with John Rutayisire, former Director and now Director of Examinations.
released a Declaration stating that Rwanda would produce citizens ‘free of ethnic, regional and religious prejudice’ and that the role of education was to contribute to national reconciliation.\footnote{MINEPRSEC/MINESUPRES (1995) quoted in Obura, A (2003): 93} History education, however, particularly in the first ten years after the genocide ended, was not part of the national reconciliation plan. In the stated belief that the manipulation of history education resulted in genocide, the new government in 1994 placed a moratorium on the teaching of Rwandan history in the primary schools and made it optional in the secondary schools.\footnote{IRDP (2006) History and Conflicts in Rwanda. Kigali: IRDP: 196} This put the memory debate on hold within education, opening the way for the dominance of the new master narrative in the public domain.

**Memory and education policy**


Rwanda recovers from an era of events ripe with hardships in its history like the parcelling of its territory, colonization, the exclusion of a part of its population, postcolonial destructive choices, etc. which culminated in an abject genocide. Rwanda is rising from its ashes, healing its wounds and rifts, thinks of its future and formulates its aspirations…National reconciliation constitutes a fundamental challenge for Rwanda. The reconciliation and the reconstruction of the
nation in relation to internal divisions that have marked our history during the last decades are a necessity.\textsuperscript{39}

The values included in the document which identify the new society, are the ‘positive values of the Rwandan culture...strongly disturbed’ during the last century which need to be re-emphasized to instil ‘into citizens values that society considers positive’ and are:

...courage, humanism, patriotism, dynamism, dignity, integrity (\textit{kwanga umugayo}), sense of honour and solidarity, self-abnegation, denial of selfish and partisan interests (\textit{kudashyira inda imbere}, etc.).\textsuperscript{40}

The location of national values in the pre-colonial past is considered critical for attempting to build present-day unity that pre-dates the breakdown of social relations and genocide. It can be claimed that these values belonged to all Rwandans at a time of unity, before colonisation divided the ‘nation’. Vision 2020 also includes elements of the new master narrative, giving it legitimacy by being embedded within an official policy document. These are: the pre-colonial ‘nation’ that existed from the 11\textsuperscript{th} century, the unity of all Rwandans before colonisation; the creation of ethnicity by colonial administrators; the ideology of division that distorted Rwandan values and caused genocide.\textsuperscript{41}

While acknowledging the importance of particular values for the ‘reborn’ Rwanda, the major focus of education policy remains the identity of Rwandans within a prosperous modern economy. Through poverty reduction and economic stability it is hoped that the citizenship goals and national reconciliation will be achieved. This is a future-orientated identity that attempts to put the past behind it. According to the Director of the National Curriculum Development Centre in 2004:

\begin{quote}
Education is seen as major instrument of national development in pursuit of national goals. Education can provide the \textit{human capital}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{39} 2020 Vision (2002): Introduction \\
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid: 50 \\
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid: 20
necessary for poverty reduction, making available the only kind of negotiable capital to which the majority of the population will have access. It can be the single most powerful instrument to combat prejudice, to foster common citizenship and to achieve national reconciliation.  

Vision 2020 also emphasises the importance of skills and knowledge for a ‘modern and prosperous nation’ with a ‘prosperous knowledge-based economy’, literacy and basic education for all, gender equity, science and, technology, professional and managerial training.  

The economic focus is again outlined in the Education Sector Policy of 2002 which states that education and training is considered to be a critical ‘lynchpin’ in achieving development and poverty reduction in Rwanda, with the aims of giving Rwandans skills and values to be good citizens and of improving the quality of human life. Particular attention is to be given to the teaching of science and technology, promoting girls’ education, adult functional literacy and the establishment of career guidance. The ‘priority values’ for lower secondary education were identified as ‘employability, ICT and Science, Vocational and Technical Skills and rural development’. History is mentioned in the document, but its value is considered only in relation to the economy with the ‘priority values’ to be gained through history listed as ‘rural development, vocational skills and social integration’. However, there is a concession to something more to be gained from engaging with the past: included among the ‘priority life skills’ to be gained from studying the past are peace and

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45 Education Sector Policy (2002): Introduction
reconciliation.\textsuperscript{47} By that time, however, a moratorium had been placed on the teaching of Rwandan history in schools.

This strong focus on economic growth and skills to support growth is critical for countries in the developing world, particularly with shattered economies. However, for post-conflict societies with a deeply traumatic past, they serve another purpose. Education policies, which are economically oriented, are emotionally safer options for attempting to build national unity which can look to the future without having to engage with the past. It is significant, however, that although in 1994 a moratorium was placed on the teaching of Rwandan history there has never been a suggestion, as happened in South Africa in 1996, that national history should not be included in a revised curriculum. Rwandans themselves, suggest that for them, the past is constantly present.\textsuperscript{48}

While a moratorium was placed on the teaching of the history of Rwanda in formal primary education, history education in Rwanda continued in a variety of public spaces: government websites, political speeches, the media, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission through their \textit{ingando} ‘re-education’ camps, \textit{gacaca} courts, public commemorations of the genocide, and at genocide memorial sites. Central to all of these sites and practices of memory, is a new master narrative that has taken the place of the conflict narrative. It is being disseminated as the authoritative version of Rwanda’s past and is driving Hutu memory and identity into the realms of subjugated knowledges and counter-memory.

\textbf{Curriculum Revision: History education and re-imagining the nation}

In line with most post-conflict states, Rwanda engaged in a process to modify the pre-1994 syllabuses with the aim of ‘correcting the errors of the past’ and training ‘people free of ethnic, regional, national and religious prejudices, conscious of human

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid
\textsuperscript{48} Rusisabagina (2006) notes that Rwandans are obsessed with the past: 14
\end{flushleft}
rights and responsibilities".49 There was an emergency revision of all primary subjects in 1997 and lower secondary subjects in 1998 and advanced level in 1999. This was regarded as an essential first step in the urgent process of getting the education system working again after the genocide.50 The secondary schools’ history syllabus was included in the revision. The aims of the revised history curriculum are aligned to the broad aims of the new education policies: after the first three years of history education in the secondary school, pupils should not only be prepared enough to avoid any form of ‘divisionism, regionalism, ethnicism and any other forms of discrimination’ but also ‘promote a culture of peace and democracy free from any forms of violence’. Moreover, they should be ‘historically educated and be able to discern the truth from lies...’51 Although the content revisions seem at a superficial level to be insignificant, the changes and the language of the curriculum reveal a move towards the new official narrative constructed from the Tutsi/RPF perspective.52 The table below compares the pre-1994 curriculum with the revisions. The new sections are in italics:53

52 MINEDUC Ordinary level history programme (1998) and History Programme for Advanced Level (1999): Examples include describing the 1990-1994 war as a ‘liberation war’ and the causes provided for the war (hardening of dictatorship and crushing opposition) suggest that the war was forced on the RPF. There is silence concerning the RPF motives for invading Rwanda in 1990 which some historians suggest had more to do with regional instability and the precarious position of the RPF in Uganda than a desire to free the people of Rwanda from oppression. When studying the Arusha Accords teachers are required to ‘expose’ the attitudes of the partisans for the pupils. See the table in the addendum for an overview of the pre-1994 curriculum and the changes made.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMES</th>
<th>Before 1994</th>
<th>After 1994 (Tronc Commun)</th>
<th>After 1994 (Senior Second.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theme 1: Origin of the population</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sources of history (oral, written, archaeological)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The peopling of Rwanda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Themes 2 &amp; 3: Ubwoko &amp; Ubuhake</td>
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<tr>
<td>Definition of the terms clan, lineage, ethnicity, tribe</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of the terms clan and lineage (without talking of ethnicity and tribe). Socio-cultural organisation (family, lineage, clan, social relations e.g. marriage and solidarity...)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ubuhake</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic life before colonisation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Themes 4 &amp; 5: Evangelisation and Colonisation (Belgium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-political situation from the time of the first contact with Europeans</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social progress (education, health)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic life during colonisation (famines, etc)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonial Rwanda: German colonisation (definition, causes, conquest, resistance...); Belgian colonisation.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>First World War and Rwanda</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952 decree, elections of 1953 and 1956</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visit of the mandates commission of the UNO</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forced labour (akazi) and taxes (imisoro)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theme 6: The Period 1959-1962</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social context before 1959</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties (Aprosoma, Parmehutu, Rader, Unar)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communal elections in 1960, Referendum and parliamentary elections of 1961</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolution of 1959; Hutu Manifesto, victory of Parmehutu</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Context of decolonisation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-political troubles of 1959</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal deposition of leaders, the Tutsi and Hutu partisans of UNAR</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Period 1959-1962: one does not talk of revolution but political violence</td>
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<td>X</td>
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</table>
**Theme 7: Independent Rwanda**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The First Republic (defence of territorial integrity, satisfying the demands of the masses)</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>First Republic (economic problems)</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>First Republic (refugee problem, elimination of internal opposition)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>First Republic: Parmehutu, single party, ideological and regional dissension within Parmehutu, purges within Parmehutu, bloody repression (Gikongoro, Bugesera)</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Republic: regionalism and blocking of democratic institutions</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Republic (problems encountered and solutions supplied)</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Second Republic (dictatorship and political exclusion)</strong></td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Second Republic (coup d’état of 1973)</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Second Republic (military dictatorship, single party, regionalism and political exclusion, crisis of national unity)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First and Second Republics: infrastructure (electricity, roads, water, telephone, etc.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>War (1990 – 1994): causes, stages, Arusha Accords, death of Habyarimana, genocide and massacres, consequences of the war, government of national unity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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**Post-genocide period**

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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Genocide, government of national unity, social evolution (housing, health, education)</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Tronc Commun is lower secondary school.

While the senior schools have the option of teaching this curriculum, the lack of new teaching resources and many teachers preferring not to engage with the traumatic past, the curriculum, has for the most part, remained a dead letter. This is exacerbated by the fact that no new textbooks or other supporting resources have been produced to support a new approach to history.\(^{54}\)

In 2004 the moratorium on the teaching of Rwandan history was lifted to coincide with the tenth anniversary of the ending of the genocide.\(^{55}\) Later that year the challenge facing the development of a new curriculum was said to be the need ‘to first

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\(^{54}\) A number of references to the lack of resources have been cited further on in the chapter.

\(^{55}\) In response to the ending of the moratorium, the University of California, Berkeley and a non-profit organisation, *Facing History and Ourselves*, Boston, facilitated the creation of a history resource manual on Rwandan history and organised workshops for teachers to introduce democratic teaching methods. While the teachers have responded enthusiastically to the new teaching methods, the Rwandan government has not responded as enthusiastically, declaring that Rwandans will write their own history. This even though the writing teams facilitated by UCB were Rwandans. I was able to participate in one of the week-long workshops run by FHAO in July 2006.
reach a consensus on how to interpret the events before and after the 1994 genocide and to determine how to look forward to the future.\footnote{Rutayisire (2004): 11} Or as another source put it, history education would be reintroduced once Rwandan historians have ‘scientifically’ reviewed the ‘depiction of the history of Rwanda’ and the ‘true’ history has been written.\footnote{Obura (2003): 100} Since 2004 there have been a number of official announcements that teaching of Rwandan history would be reintroduced and in April 2006, the \textit{Education Sector Strategic Plan 2006-2010} noted that education at all levels is an important means of addressing issues of peace and reconciliation; and that the values of peace, harmony and reconciliation would infuse a revision of history and civic education by the National Curriculum Development Centre.\footnote{Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Education (2006) \textit{Education Sector Strategic Plan 2006-2010} (MINEDUC, Kigali):19} History education and its related problems continue to occupy policy makers, and the desire to establish the ‘true’ history of Rwanda is an often re-iterated goal in policy documents.\footnote{For example, IRDP (2006): 198; Office of the President (August 1999), \textit{Report on the reflection meetings held in the Office of the President of the Republic from May 1998 to March 1999}. Kigali:Office of the President} What is intriguing about these comments is that although there is, in effect, a new master narrative that claims to be the true history of Rwanda, it has not yet been introduced into history education. The master narrative has hegemonic status everywhere but in the school history curriculum.

For a change in the way history is taught and to support a different interpretation, it is not enough to have a curriculum document in place that contains little more than a list of topics. It is critical to have appropriate teaching materials and teacher training. None of the latter has been put in place by the government or ministry of education.

Prior to 2004, aspects of Rwandan history which were closely aligned to the ideology of the RPF narrative were introduced into a civic education curriculum for primary schools and a political education curriculum for secondary schools that was released.
in 2003. Civic education was considered to be a means of informing and empowering citizens to enable them to solve social, economic or political problems affecting them in the country. Among the objectives for the lower secondary school (tronc commun) are understanding the political history of Rwanda, the necessity of safeguarding national independence and contributing to the preservation of the positive values of Rwandan culture. In the upper secondary school pupils are expected to develop a patriotic spirit and contribute to the construction of national unity. The content topics include unity and patriotism in pre-colonial Rwandan society, political divisionism and ethnic discrimination in the colonial period, the ending of the genocide and the liberation of the Rwandan people in 1994, and the programme of good governance, unity and reconciliation of the government of national unity.

While the new civic and political education curriculum encourages group discussion, the formulation of the history topics to be discussed makes it clear to teachers what the ideological slant needs to be, steering teachers and pupils firmly into a circumscribed version of the past that reflects the Rwandan Patriotic Front political discourse, attempting to shape memory and identity within a new reality. For example, among the specific objectives in the second year of lower secondary, pupils have to ‘justify the role of unity and patriotism in safeguarding national sovereignty’; in the second cycle, a suggested teaching activity is to ‘discuss in small groups, the role of each of the positive values of Rwandan culture in reinforcing humane values’. There is no question of engaging in debate about, for example, possible interpretations of patriotism or whether or not the Rwandan values were all positive or

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61 Rutayisire (2004): 9
63 Ibid: 14
64 Ibid: passim
could be contested. Significantly, other than accompanying teachers’ manuals, there were no new teaching resources at the time of the release of the civics curriculum.  

A new history curriculum has just been completed, but will not be released until the teachers’ manual is ready. In the introduction there is still an emphasis on Rwandan values, a Rwandese spirit of patriotism and the love of work. Among the general objectives are to ‘work with a critical spirit’; to live in a world without ethnic, religious distinction or other forms of discrimination and of exclusion that led to genocide of Tutsi in 1994; and to promote the culture of peace, tolerance and of reconciliation and the love of the homeland. While there are similarities with the 1998 curriculum, there is an increased emphasis on the clans, lineages and chiefdoms of pre-colonial Rwanda and organisation of traditional Rwandan society. Colonial Rwanda is examined in some detail, as is the build up to genocide. What is significant, however, is that unlike the civics and political education curricula, there is an attempt to use neutral language in describing the topics and the suggested teaching and learning activities are more interactive than in previous versions of the history curriculum, and less directed. For example, in the section on the ‘Genocide of the Tutsi’, which is clear Rwandan Patriotic Front ideology, the second bullet includes ‘Hutu opposition to the genocide ideology’. In the previous curriculum the genocide appeared merely as ‘Genocide and Massacres’ with no mention of Hutu resisters. In suggested methodology in the 2008 curriculum pupils are asked to ‘mention their clans and what they know about them’; and based on their responses the teacher is asked to explain different clans, lineage and nation.

However, as already pointed out, it is not what is in the curriculum itself that is the issue, rather the textbooks and other teaching materials developed for classroom use. The teachers’ manual has still to be developed, and at the moment of writing, there

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66 Communication with staff at the National Curriculum Development Centre, Kigali.  
68 Ibid: 2  
69 Ibid: 3  
70 History Programme 2008: 49; History Programme Advanced Level 1999: 55  
71 History Programme 2008: 8
are no new textbooks. While there appears to be a real lack of political will to put history education firmly back into the formal education system, a contributing factor could be a sense of fear of losing control over the master narrative.

Disseminating the official narrative

While history education in schools was being debated, the official narrative was in the process of being aggressively disseminated. There is evidence that the contents of the narrative are widely known among adults and youth. The extent to which the official version of the past has apparently been internalised by young people became evident in 2004. Less than a year after the publication of the civics curriculum, the results of a National History Essay Writing Competition for secondary school pupils and university students that had been organised by Never Again International in Rwanda, came in. The competition drew over 3,000 entries from secondary and tertiary students from all over the country. The title of the essay was: ‘Based on the history of Rwanda what can we the youth do so that genocide should never happen again?’ The organisers reported that every single essay was similarly structured and the historical accounts were identical. Every essay entered was divided into three periods: pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial. They all wrote of the pre-colonial unity and patriotism, destroyed by colonialism and the good actions of the current government in attempting to restore Rwandan unity.

As the various curriculum documents do little more than list topics, and there are no new textbooks, the question is how the Rwandan youth became so familiar with the narrative. The most aggressive dissemination of the official narrative occurs at the ‘solidarity’ or ingando re-education camps run by the government-linked National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). Three departments have been set up within the NURC: the Department of Civic Education; the Department of Conflict

Resolution; and the Department of Community Initiative Support.\textsuperscript{74} The Civic Education department of the NURC developed the solidarity or \textit{ingando} camps ‘as a tool to build coexistence within communities’,\textsuperscript{75} with one of its first functions being the social reintegration of ex-prisoners\textsuperscript{76} and those released from prison, to educate youth and to provide military training.\textsuperscript{77} The programme now includes school going youth and students at secondary and tertiary levels. By 2002 the training was extended to informal traders and other social groups including survivors, prisoners, community leaders, women and youth. The NURC also facilitates the setting up of NURC Clubs in schools and higher learning.\textsuperscript{78}

It would appear that the government is still hesitant to entrust the new narrative to teachers, fearing a resurgence of ethnic politics which will give rise to genocide ideology. What goes on in a classroom is notoriously difficult to control. This could also explain why the official version of Rwanda’s past is so aggressively disseminated at alternative sites of education which are controlled by government representatives. It is at the \textit{ingando} camps and public memorial sites that the Ministry of Education and the Rwandan Patriotic Front can maintain complete control over the way in which the official narrative is presented. There is no need to rely on intermediaries, such as teachers, who may not be reliable transmitters of the official narrative. Currently, at each prison release, 1000 prisoners undergo \textit{ingando}. In addition, approximately 3000 pre-University students undergo \textit{ingando} each year.\textsuperscript{79} The Ministry of Education regularly organizes camps in collaboration with the Unity and Reconciliation Commission for students with the aim of instilling ‘in students’ minds the

\textsuperscript{74} Shyaka, A (n.d.): 34
\textsuperscript{76} PRI (Penal Reform International) (2004) \textit{Research Report on the Gacaca Report VI: From camp to hill, the reintegration of released prisoners} (PRI, Paris and Kigali, with support from DfID)
\textsuperscript{78} See the NURC website: \url{http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?view=article&id=50%3Aingando&tmpl=compone...}

In a report commissioned by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, the author noted that for the NURC to realise its aim of unity and reconciliation in Rwanda, it ‘must not focus on the genocide context, but on all the causes of the Rwanda evil by considering the historical and ideological framework’.\footnote{81 Shyaka, A. (n.d.): 35} The Ministry of Education can be sure that those who deliver the NURC programmes will deliver the official narrative as the ‘true’ history of Rwanda. While social reintegration may be the stated aim, critics have suggested that with the planting of the seeds of reconciliation, ingando camps at the same time disseminate pro-RPF ideology through political indoctrination.\footnote{82 Mgbako, C. (2005) \textit{Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda}, \textit{Harvard Human Rights Journal}, Vol. 18: 201- 224; Human Rights Watch reported that the ‘camps were meant to promote ideas of nationalism, to erase the ethnically charged lessons taught by the previous government, and to spur loyalty to the RPF} (Human Rights Watch (2000) \textit{Solidarity Camps}, \url{http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/rwanda/Rwan004-13.htm} (Accessed 8 February 2008))

Topics are covered under five central themes: analysis of Rwanda’s problems; history of Rwanda; political and socioeconomic issues in Rwanda and Africa, rights, obligations and duties and leadership. The official version of the past forms the core of the \textit{Ingando} course ‘the history of Rwanda’.

Evidence from interviews with \textit{Ingando} participants, indicates that this interpretation has, superficially at least, been widely accepted.\footnote{83 PRI (2004): p23ff; IRD (2006): p.199ff} Re-education regarding ethnicity in Rwanda is at the heart of the \textit{ingando} programme for students and pupils.\footnote{84 Mgbako (2005): 218} They learn about the Rwandan nation before colonialism, the damaging effects of colonialism, and the creation of ‘myths of difference’.\footnote{85 Ibid} One participant noted:

I went to solidarity [\textit{ingando}] camps. We learned about the origins of the so-called ethnic groups: Hutu, Twa, Tutsi. We were told that these
don’t really have a historical background; they were brought by Europeans (colonists) in order to rule us. Instead we had the so-called [clan names]: Abasinga, Abanyiginya, Abasigaba...which are the real ethnic groups Rwandans have.\(^8^6\)

In terms of the genocide, the contents of the course are silent on the Hutu who resisted participating in the genocide and on those who rescued Tutsi from the killers.\(^8^7\) The danger in continuing to emphasize the collective responsibility of the perpetrators in the genocide and failing to recognize individual choice and responsibility is the mistrust that this creates between Hutu and the government and will remain an obstacle to unity and reconciliation.\(^8^8\)

**Searching for a true history**

However, there are indications that although the new narrative is widely known, there are still significant differences in the way in which Hutu and Tutsi interpret the past. These interpretations are being constructed into opposing narratives of trauma.\(^8^9\) This may not always be spoken about openly for fear of reprisals. Teaching about ethnic divisions in the past could be construed as divisionism and encouraging genocide ideology with teachers liable to be arrested.\(^9^0\) There is evidence that teachers are fearful and many don’t dare talk about difficult things except with people who have shared the same experience. They are afraid to break a fragile peace.\(^9^1\) There is also the perception that appearing to disagree with the government can be dangerous. During a teacher workshop facilitated by a Boston-based non-government

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86 Quoted in Freedman, et. al. (2004) Confronting the past in Rwandan schools, in Weinstein, et. al. (2004): 253
88 PRI (2004): 35
90 Facing History and Ourselves (FHAO) has been involved in teacher workshops since 2004. Recently a professor of History from the National University at Butare warned her that some of the material she was using was dangerous and could be considered to be encouraging divisionism. Personal communication and Freedman, et al (2008) Teaching History after Identity-Based Conflicts: The Rwanda Experience, forthcoming *Comparative Education Review*, November 2008. There have also been reports that genocide ideology is becoming rampant in schools and the Minister of Education was called to account for this in parliament. Various *New Times* reports during February 2008. This has grave implications for teaching history for democracy.
91 African Rights (2001): 72 Extract from one of the interviews with the teachers.
organisation, *Facing History and Ourselves* (FHAO) at the National University in Butare in 2006, while all agreed that disagreeing with the government is a fundamental democratic principle, most teachers felt that they couldn’t do it. One teacher summarised the general sentiment by saying that:

> when you disagree with the government they can either take you as a rebel or a person who is against it and you are in prison – generally – one way or the other – imprisoned or loss of job.\(^92\)

And yet, in spite of the fear of disagreeing with the government, evidence suggests that the official Rwandan Patriotic Front narrative is not generally accepted without question as the consensus about the ‘truth’ of the Rwandan past. This also reveals cracks in the unity of Rwandan identity that official rhetoric is trying too hard to cement. Rwandans continue to express a deep desire to understand what went wrong in 1994 and generally believe that it is possible to have a ‘scientifically researched true’ (objective) history, that takes ‘what from the past was good and proper and then [makes] a common agreement on our history’.\(^93\) In examining this perception I will draw evidence from documents as well as the interactions of the teachers, teacher educators and curriculum officials during the Facing History and Ourselves workshop in Butare in 2006.

The view that history can be objective is particularly evident in the repeated intentions on the part of those who construct education policy to deliver the ‘truth’ about Rwanda’s past. In a report on meetings convened by the Office of the President the group given the task of reflecting on the unity of Rwandans noted that there is a need to discuss the problems of the past and ‘examine what happened in history in order to know the TRUTH and avoid to follow [sic] distorted history…’\(^94\) The Education Sector Policy of September 2002 included the government’s belief that education should aim to recreate in the youth ‘the values which have been eroded in the course of the country’s recent history’ and insisted that ‘future populations will learn the true

\(^92\) FHAO Butare workshop 2006

\(^93\) Eltringham (2004): 149

\(^94\) Office of the President (August 1999), *Report on the reflection meetings held in the Office of the President of the Republic from May 1998 to March 1999*
history of Rwanda" while the Primary and Secondary School Curriculum Development Policy in 2003, promises to provide ‘an objective and truthful account of Rwandan…history’.

But the official truth does not appear to satisfy the deep desire of all Rwandans to know what really happened. The results of research carried out by a Kigali-based NGO in 2006 showed that teachers also want an ‘objective’, ‘true’ history based on thorough research which has the consensus of all Rwandans and is ‘serene’. They want a history with no bias, that corrects the past, that discovers the ‘true Rwandan civilization and the real Rwandan way of life’, so that the youth can know the ‘origin and causes of hatred between Rwandans’. It is believed that knowing the ‘truth’ could bring an end to the tension, uncertainty and fears around reconciliation, and that an accurate record of the history of Rwanda will ensure that the truth is written without dividing the people more - truth with no sweeping biases.

Teachers express concern at teaching what cannot be established as fact. In the FHAO workshop, in spite of 93% of workshop participants strongly agreeing or agreeing in the workshop evaluations that history is open to interpretation, and 90% strongly agreeing or agreeing that disagreement about history is healthy, participants returned repeatedly to the question of the ‘truth about the past’. This ambivalence about the Rwandan past and wanting to know the truth emerged from the interactions during the workshop when they were encouraged by the Rwandan facilitators to teach about pre-colonial clans to encourage unity in Rwanda today. What follows is a transcript of the interaction between the Rwandan facilitators who were members of the History Department of the National University, one of whom was a senior historian and the
workshop participants who were mostly teachers. The teachers in the workshop were urged by the facilitators to teach the pre-colonial clans in their history classes as a way of encouraging solidarity and patriotism in the present. While the participants were not averse to teaching about clans they were uneasy about teaching something that was not based on ‘facts’. These transcripts were compiled from conversations over a number of days as participants returned repeatedly to the question of the truth about clans and the origins of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.

Facilitator A: Identity – Hutu, Tutsi, Twa – now first Munyarwanda.
Hutu, Tutsi, Twa existed in history, but what about ancient times? In ancient times there was no Hutu, Tutsi, Twa, but clans. You could all belong to the same clan – you didn’t know you were Hutu/Tutsi; you were part of a clan. The Belgians are responsible for ethnicity... This was used for division – now, we are one family and country in districts.¹⁰¹

The Rwandan facilitators constantly returned to the theme of unity through the clan. Teaching pre-colonial history and the value of solidarity within a clan system, it is

writer and co-ordinator of the history materials project facilitated by the University of California Berkeley. These materials though they attempt to provide alternative points of view, show unmistakable elements of the official narrative. The resource manual also has the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial divisions and many of the sources in the pre-colonial section draw on Kagame and Maquet: The Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research & National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC) (2006) The Teaching of History of Rwanda: a Participatory Approach (© The Regents of the University of California). A single academic can have considerable influence in Rwanda. Professor Byanafashe, a senior historian, is for example, also Dean of Humanities and a key member of Light and Society, a religious association that publishes pamphlets on a number of topics in support of the RPF. In one of the 1996 publications for example, Light and Society: Review Rwanda, the various articles repeated aspects of the official narrative: ethnic ideology that was manipulated by colonial powers split the Rwandese Nation making it lose national unity; ‘divisive ideology’ resulted in the genocide of Tutsi and massacre of Hutu who opposed the genocide; and the RPF ended the genocide and made possible the setting up of the government of national unity. The big question was asked: Who will deliver Rwanda from the division ideology?’ The answer was, of course, the RPF: ‘RPF has never believed in the hatred between Hutu and Tutsi. It has never taken any ethnic group as its opponent’

¹⁰¹ A professional development workshop facilitated by Facing History and Ourselves, an NGO in Boston, which I attended. Author’s transcript of the recorded session. There were two facilitators who were francophone, having grown up in exile in the Congo. It has been pointed out that the essence of what was being conveyed was lost in the translation. ‘What about kinship? The version of Facilitator A that I know, is that in ancient Rwanda, when a Hutu, Tutsi or Twa was asked: Uli umucyi? (What are you?) The answer was, e.g. Umutsobe (Tsobe which is a name of a clan) rather than I am a Hutu/Tutsi/Twa): Mironko, comments on the thesis. In fact, this is what the facilitator was trying to convey.
hoped, will give substance to the official political rhetoric of the unity of all Rwandans. The second facilitator emphasised the within the clans, obligations ‘were wider and higher than ethnicity’.\textsuperscript{102} However, the belief that history can be objective, and the search for the ‘truth’ about Rwanda’s past, makes it difficult for teachers to engage with the uncertainties about the history of clans with their pupils. This issue was raised by one of the teachers:

Thinking about yesterday, the main thing was that I was interested in the teaching of clans. I realised deeper [sic] that it was the central focus of the Rwandese before colonisation...But I have a worry. It is not very clear whether we could start teaching about clans when the actual origin of clans is still a myth...Should we tell students that we don’t know the origins of the clans when we are saying at the same time that they have some of the aspects that can contribute to solidarity?\textsuperscript{103}

The official hope is that in accepting the narrative of national unity, Rwandans will be encouraged to abandon the ethnic categories invented by the Belgians. Instead in learning about, and identifying with, the pre-colonial harmony, pride in their ethnic identity will be replaced with pride in the newly constructed national identity.\textsuperscript{104}

However, without the narrative, together with suitable supporting teaching materials being included in formal education, evidence suggests that this is not happening. Furthermore, teachers and pupils bring personal, family and community ‘knowledge’ into the classroom.

Many older teachers were teachers before the genocide. Teacher knowledge in this case is knowledge of the conflict narrative and personal experience of the conflict. Without extensive teacher workshops to engage with the personal legacy of the conflict, individual support or new teaching resources, it is very likely that teachers will continue to teach what they have taught in the past. This has been the evidence

\textsuperscript{102} A professional development workshop facilitated by Facing History and Ourselves, an NGO in Boston, which I attended. Author’s transcript of the recorded session.
\textsuperscript{103} Author’s transcript of the recorded workshop sessions.
that has emerged from research in South Africa. Furthermore, there is also evidence that Rwandan teachers are drawing on the vernacular memories of the communities as well as their own memories when teaching about the genocide. This was highlighted by a conversation with a group of teacher educators in Butare. They were asked what history they taught to their students, and what materials they used for the history classes. The reply was that they used ‘some’ old books to compile notes, and that they and their students ‘go and ask...older people who were living during such a period of history [the genocide].’ As the conversation suggested, without teaching resources vernacular histories, located in the divisive past, are informing history education.

Evidence from research has also shown that the questions raised by pupils in classes indicate that ethnicity is still an issue in the way pupils respond to the past. Teachers have reported that when teaching Rwandan history, pupils ‘react according to their ethnic belonging’ with Hutu pupils asking questions about why the monarchy was Tutsi, while Tutsis are more interested in why the king went into exile in 1959. Clearly this is not what the RPF leadership would want, but in not dealing decisively with history education, including the provision of new resources, vernacular history and the pre-genocide official conflict narratives are likely to continue in schools for some time.

The resurgence of ‘genocide ideology’ in schools is indicative of the intergenerational transmission of knowledge within vernacular communities which is also evident in post-apartheid South Africa. In a number of reported incidents in senior schools across Rwanda, Tutsi pupils who survived the genocide were being targeted by Hutu pupils. One report noted that most of the pupils in the schools were too young to remember or understand the genocide and were therefore learning to hate from their parents. In an attempt to combat the perceived upsurge of genocide ideology in 2008, all teachers in primary and secondary schools were sent to ‘solidarity camps’

105 Teacher workshop run by Facing History and Ourselves, an NGO in Boston, which I attended.
where the ‘fight against the ideology’ is in the programme. The new official narrative is central to the ingando solidarity camp curriculum.

This search for the truth also has implications for pedagogical content knowledge when developing a post-conflict curriculum. Believing in scientific facts in history which have been ‘established’ and embedded in a dominant narrative will mean approaches in history education that are located in historical inquiry will be discouraged. This is problematic, as it is not only what is taught, but perhaps more importantly, how it is taught that will encourage a critical engagement with the past. Believing history to be factual and not appreciating the political and ideological nature of history is a barrier to reconciliation. As Mamdani has argued, it is not possible to think of reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda without a prior reconciliation with history, but this implies understanding the nature of the construction of narratives of the past, of the political nature of collective memory and being able to ‘think each other’s history’. While South Africa, in the latest curriculum revision, was able to develop a history curriculum that opened the way for border crossings and disciplinary conversations, there is no evidence of this possibility in Rwanda yet. Perhaps the South African ‘miracle’ has been the ability to enter into dialogue across historical and racial divides.

Public history education and the claiming of ideological space

The narrative of the Tutsi genocide is powerfully and emotionally reinforced in memorials and public commemorations in Rwanda, particularly during the official week of mourning in April. Ironically, the forced commemorations during July, and the raw evidence of the genocide in the various genocide memorials in the country, work against the official narrative that aims to foster a sense of unity among

\[108\] Hirondelle News Agency (2008) Rwanda/Genocide – Law reprimanding genocide ideology to be taught in Rwandan schools, 10 April 2008


\[110\] This was a phrase used by Edward Said in a presentation at the Saamtrek Values in Education Conference convened by the Minister of Education in Cape Town, South Africa in 2001.
Rwandans. Instead, it causes resentment among Hutu, some of whom express anger and frustration over the one-sided nature of commemoration that focuses on the suffering of the Tutsi while ignoring the suffering of the Hutu. This is exacerbated by the refusal of authorities to allow Hutu to bring human rights abuses carried out by the invading RPF army in 1994 to the gacaca courts.

In Rwanda, memorials and commemorations have become highly emotional forms of propaganda for the RPF version of the past. The official week of mourning brings together the politics of memory, identity and emotion, forcing a particular kind of remembrance and in Boler’s and Foucault’s terms, attempts to shape the subject. This closes down debate about the past and brings enormous tension as all Rwandans are expected to participate in one of the public spaces of mourning. These are events which fail to recognise Hutu survivors and which perpetrators are beginning to regard with antagonism that is sometimes expressed with the murder of Tutsi survivors. Heroes day, accompanied by full page spreads and colour supplements to the newspapers, have only just begun to acknowledge a few Hutu rescuers. Liberation day is celebrated with full page congratulatory spreads to the RPF from a range of businesses and professional organisations.

Fourteen years after the genocide, the genocide master narrative as expressed by the RPF is potentially psychologically explosive. The official refusal to acknowledge that there were Hutu survivors of the genocide or that the RPF committed human rights

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111 Longman & Rutagengwa (2004): 175
112 These are the local community gatherings ‘on the grass’ based on Rwandan tradition, where the lesser crimes committed during the genocide can be heard by the community and dealt with in a more traditional way that formal criminal courts. They are intended to facilitate the process of community healing.
113 For example, the official memorial to the genocide in Kigali was not even conceptualised within Rwanda and, it has been suggested, was built more for international consumption than a peoples’ memorial. The Kigali Memorial situated in the suburb of Gisozi was designed by Aegis Trust, a UK-based NGO that is linked to Beth Shalom, the UK Holocaust Memorial Centre. Beth Shalom was conceptualised and built through the energies of the Smith family, who also advised the Cape Town Holocaust Centre on its interpretation when it was built. I have been closely involved with the CT Holocaust Centre since its inception and have also visited Beth Shalom. When I walked into Gisozi, I could have been walking into either Beth Shalom or the Cape Town Holocaust Centre in terms of the displays. The gardens surrounding Gisozi reminded me of an English stately home garden and I kept asking myself: Where is Rwanda? Where is Africa?
114 I collected a number of New Times newspaper supplements featuring these events in Rwanda in 2006.
abuses and the insistence that the international community and Rwandan society recognise that what happened in 1994 was a Tutsi genocide together with the insistence on collective Hutu guilt, all incorporated in the narrative, feeds resentment among Rwandan Hutu including teachers who would have to teach the new version of history. In a 1999 Report on the reflection meetings convened by the office of the then President Bizimungu, it was stated that ‘the genocide and massacres are a collective offence. No family, no village in Rwanda was not affected’. By characterising all Hutu in Rwanda who lived through the genocide within the country as perpetrators and denying the possibility of Hutu ‘survivors’, the narrative leaves little room for reconciliation, either with history or in the present. What it does is to push Hutu narratives into the shadows to become vernacular narratives of subjugated knowledge that will at some point resurface to challenge the official narrative.

**Conclusion**

A danger in a post-conflict society is that those who have engaged in extreme and premeditated violence may need to maintain psychological distance from their own behaviour to avoid being overwhelmed by guilt and horror. In order to protect themselves from the emotional consequences of their own actions, perpetrators often continue to blame victims, and to hold on to the ideology that motivated and justified their violence. Part of the process of ‘moving on’, is acknowledging the trauma of the past in a way that prevents denial and opens the way to the mourning process. But what is resented by many Hutu, quite apart from the pressure to accept collective guilt, is the fact that the RPF deny the human rights abuses that they committed during the war and refuse to allow these to be brought before gacaca courts.

Evidence suggests that suppressing ethnicity as a route to national reconciliation is not having the desired effect. Hutu-Tutsi distinctions seem still to be deeply internalised,

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115 Office of the President (1999): 6. Although the President also talked of individual or ‘culprit’s offence’ so that it would not be enough to punish such a crime at a high level. Also Thiemessen (2004)  
116 Mamdani (2001) There is official acknowledgement that Hutu were victims during the genocide (but not of the RPF killings), but that there are no survivors as anyone who resists must have been killed. This means Hutu who did survive are regarded as genocidaires or collaborators. As noted previously, Straus’ research has effectively demolished evidence on which collective guilt is based. Straus (2006)  
indicated by the continued acceptance by interviewees for a report compiled by the Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP) based in Kigali, that one could recognise a Tutsi by physical features alone. Instead of teaching acceptance of diversity, this approach appears to be driving ethnicity underground, creating a potentially dangerous situation for the construction of a chosen trauma that will inevitably resurface – as the current ‘genocide ideology’ that is said to have surfaced in schools could well be demonstrating.

There is deep anxiety in Rwanda at the moment about ‘genocide ideology’ in schools with up to 50 school principals and teachers being suspended on suspicion of disseminating the ‘ideology of genocide’. The reports do not mention specific subjects in relation to the incidents, but a parliamentary committee set up in December 2007 to investigate the apparent rapid increase of this phenomenon in schools, condemned the ‘infamous writings and books’ in school libraries which contained speeches of former president, Habyarimana. When the Education Minister said that the Ministry had trained teachers how to use these writings appropriately, one parliamentarian is reported to have said that ‘one cannot give poison to his child’ and that teaching the Habyarimana speeches meant that the ‘ministers had learnt nothing from the Genocide’.

While the reported increase in what is perceived to be genocide ideology is alarming, these reports raise important issues about the nature of history education as well as

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120 Suuna, I. and Buyinza, J. (2008) Education Ministers answer unsatisfactorily – MPs, *The Sunday Times* 20 January, (Kigali) http://www.newtimes.co.rw/index.php?issue=13415&article=767 (Accessed 22 January 2008). A principal of a school and a number of teachers were dismissed as a result of the investigation. I am not saying that they were innocent of sowing the seeds of hatred that characterised the pre-genocide period, but suggesting that if a history teacher engaged pupils with documents from the Habyarimana period in the course of working with historical interpretation it could be misconstrued as teaching genocide ideology. The most recent South African curriculum encourages pupils to engage with various interpretations of the past, though within a moral and ethical framework provided by the South African Constitution. This could include engaging with the racist attitudes embedded in old school textbooks of the apartheid past to deconstruct the ‘false ideologies’ that justified an unjust system.
about the intersections of power and ideology in the attempts to control the shaping of a traumatic past in service of the present political needs. In pedagogical terms it begs the question whether critical debate would be permitted in practice in history classrooms, particularly if engaging with different interpretations of the past is construed as genocide ideology. It would be a brave teacher who persisted in trying new approaches. It also highlights the power of emotional discourses when the genocide is used to justify political action.

Some insight into the extent of the fear of renewed violence or genocide was revealed by the impassioned response of Rwanda’s Presidential Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, Richard Sezibera, to an article by a South African peace facilitator, Jan van Eck, published in The Times. Van Eck argued that unless Rwanda ‘allows freedom of political and ethnic expression’ the ‘ethnic cancer’ will result in further conflict. Sezibera’s retort in the Kigali-based newspaper, The New Times, was that the problem of the Great Lakes Region is not ethnicity, but the ‘activities of post Colonial elites, steeped in unquestioning acceptance of the colonial tactics of divide and rule’, and that Rwandans place emphasis on what unites and not what divides them:

ethnicising politics is just one step away from the acceptance of Bantustans, Xhosastans, Zulustans, Tutsistans, Hutustans and other unacceptable stans as the basis of political communities…[Rwanda] totally rejects the prescription of ethnicity to cure an ‘ethnic cancer’…

The legacy of the genocide cannot be ignored in research on history education in Rwanda, and yet studies do not take this into account. Psychologists warn of the dangers of an unprocessed past of collective trauma which could lead to ongoing cycles of violence. However, critical questions need to be raised about the readiness

123 For example, Freedman et al (2007)
124 Volkan (2006)
of first generation teachers, to teach a traumatic past that they experienced personally, and of pupils, also survivors of the conflict, to engage with that past. A young teacher from Rwanda highlighted this when he wrote: ‘Rwandans fear thinking about our history. It is so terrible.’

Yet Rutayisire maintains that it is important to teach Rwandan children about the genocide of 1994 through history, social studies, civic education and other media, and that memorial sites can also be useful as educational resources. However, what if the traumatic knowledge is emotionally unbearable? As an ‘outsider’ visiting a memorial site at Nyamata, I wrote in an email:

I went to the genocide memorial sites after getting to know our teacher participants so there were very human faces for me when I went to the sites. Skulls, bones and personal possessions at one memorial in particular [Nyamata] were all lying where the people had been killed. Ordered displays of rows of skulls and bones are one thing (though going down into the room of row upon row of skulls just about suffocated me), but the visible chaotic aftermath of frenzied killing, shoes, dolls, remnants of clothing, gathering the red dust of Rwanda in the church where it happened was all but unbearable. I wondered how such a past could yet be taught in schools.

The past is too present. The results of the genocide in human lives are too brutally visible in the piles of skeletons at memorial sites. This not only raises issues of ethical pedagogies of remembrance, but also of the distance needed between experiencing a traumatic past and teaching about it. In 1994 it would have been politically and emotionally unimaginable to have engaged in the immediate past in classrooms that contained severely traumatised teachers and pupils who would have been victims and perpetrators. Furthermore, with the continued lack of resources and textbooks, there are a significant number of teachers who are of the opinion that it is better not to teach

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126 Rutayisire (2004): 13
history at all than to use the old textbooks, which were ‘prepared with the aim of reinforcing ethnic divisions’.128

Rwanda very poignantly raises the issues not only of what should be done with traumatic knowledge, but also how the intergenerational transfer of that knowledge can be interrupted. How best can the overlay of fear be addressed and therefore allayed, to allow for the ‘trampoline memory’ that keeps a person trapped in the past, to be transformed.129 Evidence indicates that the aggressive dissemination of the new exclusionary official narrative, in spite of all rhetoric of unity, is resulting in a continued Hutu counter-narrative of chosen trauma that is keeping alive the injustices of the colonial era and relating them to the present RPF government.

Within the formal curriculum and history education, the South African experience suggests that for effective ‘interruption’ of transferred knowledge, teachers need to engage with the personal traumatic legacies of conflict. Through acknowledging the pain of the past, and the ways in which they are affected by that legacy, teachers are better able to engage with ‘difficult’ histories with their pupils. History education that supports democracy by encouraging debate, enquiry and historical interpretation, would seem to have a greater possibility of allowing for the ‘thinking of each others’ history’ – for addressing the body in the middle of the room – than an approach that supports the dissemination of a hegemonic national narrative.130

Teachers in Rwanda are keenly aware of the responsibility of teaching their subject ‘properly’ and feel the lack of guidance. In spite of the discourse of unity, research reveals that Rwandans remain deeply concerned with issues of ethnicity.131 Questions constantly arise about how to teach their difficult history - the origins of the Rwandan people, the ethnicities, the clans and how to present different points of view to a pupil.

128 IRDP (2006): 196
129 See the section on memory and identity in Chapter One.
During a recent international seminar in London, conducted by Facing History and Ourselves, Rwandan participants expressed the wish to introduce methodologies that would help pupils discuss and share, making classes ‘more participatory’. Indeed, the influence of the methodologies use by Facing History in the workshops can be detected in the latest history curriculum. But these methods, linked to Rwanda’s difficult history, could open teachers to accusations of fostering genocide ideology and are not likely to become widespread.

The closing remarks by one of the lecturers at the National University during the 2006 workshop in Rwanda, reminded the teachers of their role as history teachers in a society like Rwanda:

teachers, all our teachers, have the future of Rwandans actually lying in our hands. As history teachers, you see, there is no history to be changed, but a way of looking at it, you see, and we owe a lot to the next generation.  

As in any post-conflict state, questions need to be raised about appropriate ethical pedagogies of remembrance, that not only provide memory for the future, but that contribute to the processing of traumatic memories in the present.

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133 Butare workshop 2006, closing remarks.
CHAPTER NINE

KEY FINDINGS: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON MEMORY, IDENTITY AND THE POST-CONFLICT HISTORY CURRICULUM

Introduction
The focus of this study was an examination of the processes of change in two societies emerging from violent conflict and the ways in which each sought to construct a post-conflict memory and identity, politically and educationally, that signalled a re-imagined society. Rather than formulating a theory of change to guide the investigation, I sought to develop a theory of change from the emerging research data. A basic assumption I did hold from the beginning was that education policy and history education are both political and ideological and that there would be critical intersections between the politics of memory and identity and history education. In this concluding chapter, I reflect on and assess the data from the two case studies, highlighting the main findings, suggesting a possible theory of change and identifying a major area for future research.

This study was not intended to be a comparison of the conflicts or trauma. It is neither possible nor ethical to attempt to make comparisons of suffering or to suggest that there might be a hierarchy of trauma. Where I did engage with the conflict, it was to analyse the process of the construction of the conflict narrative; to examine the extent to which the narrative may have contributed to the conflict; and the way in which the post-conflict state engaged with the conflict narrative in the process of constructing a new memory and identity that embodied the values of the new state. This is essentially an historical approach – understanding where we come from helps us to understand who we are in the present and provides insight into the nature of the struggles for reinvention. The comparison was of the articulation between the political processes of re-imagining the ‘nation’ after conflict and construction of education policy; and the extent to which new meanings of the past were constructed in the school history curriculum.
What became evident during the course of this research were the complexities involved in undertaking a comparative study. My assumption at the beginning of the study was that research carried out in Western democracies could not simply be transferred to an African context. However, I would argue that specific contexts are critical in post-conflict societies, and that apart from broad principles, policies cannot simply be transferred from one society to the next, even within a continent. This has implications for policy borrowing. The creation of knowledge is context related and influenced by political and ideological motives. To be able to recognise the complex layers of disputed values and ideologies in a post-conflict, divided society requires an understanding of the nature of the conflict and an attempt, in Geertz’s terms, to discover who people think they are, what they think they are doing, and to what end they think they are doing it. This provides an ongoing challenge for a researcher as outsider.¹

A number of broad principles emerged during the research. Firstly, it is critical for those in all levels of the education system to recognise the extent to which identity-based conflict damages all of those whose attitudes and values were shaped by the conflict. In South Africa and Rwanda, the education system and curriculum were designed to educate differently: there were those who were considered to have been born to rule, and those educated for manual labour.² In South Africa stereotypes and attitudes towards ‘the other’ were exacerbated by geographical segregation that resulted in very little contact across the race divides during apartheid, a situation that largely continues today in the poorer areas.³ These deeply held ‘beliefs’ have therefore had few opportunities to be mitigated. In Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi lived in

² This was the rationale of Bantu Education. See chapter 4. For Rwanda, see IRDP: ii
³ Mamphela Ramphele in her recent book, Laying Ghosts to Rest, notes that a ‘complex web of factors drives the perpetuation of stereotypes on all sides of the colour divide. Black and white South Africans’ views of one another are distorted by their successful separation into different worlds. This is particularly true at the lower socio-economic levels. Many black people have not been exposed to white people as ordinary human beings with strengths and frailties. They know white people only as authority figures...Likewise, many white people have little experience of black people as fellow humans, with the same capacity for joy and pain. Their experience of black people has often been limited to contact with them as menial workers.’ Ramphele, M. (2008) Laying Ghosts to Rest: Dilemmas of the Transformation in South Africa. Cape Town: Tafelberg: 79
close proximity to one another, but deep-seated colonial legacies of Tutsi privilege and Hutu oppression, ethnic quotas in education and a conflict narrative that could be manipulated in times of crisis, reinforced notions of difference.

Secondly, peace agreements, whether negotiated or imposed after military victory, do not by themselves end the identity-based conflict or change the feelings of fear, mistrust and hostility that identity-based conflict creates. This means that the re-emergence of conflict and violence in various forms remains probable after such agreements. South Africa and Rwanda are societies still in conflict although the ways in which the conflict is expressed now may be different. In South Africa the legacy of unresolved conflict and trauma can be detected in the continued violent responses to, for example, issues of non-delivery of government, such as housing, or increased fees at tertiary institutions. National news bulletins talk of university students, bus commuters, members of communities ‘going on the rampage’ and ‘trashing’ property, buses or trains when ‘grievances are not met’. Openly articulated racism seems to be increasing in schools, universities and on radio talk shows. The current perceptions of ‘others’, such as refugees and poor immigrants from neighbouring states, expressed in xenophobic violence, is as much about unresolved trauma of the violence of the 1980s as it is about competition for economic resources amongst the very poor in South Africa.

In Rwanda the continuing unresolved conflict is masked by the discourse of national unity. There are Human Rights Watch reports of police and local officials imposing collective punishments as part of the measure for increased protection of genocide survivors – fines, forced labour, and even beatings – on persons who lived near places where survivors had suffered property loss or damage. All discourse about

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4 An example of talk radio is Cape Talk 567. Responses from the public to issues such as the recent xenophobia and the responses to callers revealed the continued racism from a wide spectrum of South Africans. Examples of blogs that have revealed crass racism include the responses to The Times [South Africa] online columnists, in particular to the articles of Jonathan Jansen. Examples of violent responses include the burning and trashing public buses because disputes are not settled to the liking of the commuters; students trashing university property when issues arise; the recent xenophobia; stabbings in schools; racist murders committed by white youths; not to mention the high murder rate and crime rate in general. One of the causal factors I believe is the unresolved violence of the 1980s.

ethnic/racial identity has been silenced and those who do attempt to engage in conversations around identity are accused of fostering genocide ideology. However, ethnic awareness and even prejudice continues to surface in schools. During the research carried out in 2006 by the Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP), teachers admitted to having separated Hutu and Tutsi children in the class. Some had also asked pupils publicly about their ethnic membership. More recently, in 2008, there has been government anxiety about the reported increase of genocide ideology in schools which resulted in the dismissal of the education minister earlier this year.

Thirdly, the educational and socio-economic inequalities that form a major part of the legacy of conflict, need to be taken into consideration not only by policy makers, but more importantly, by teacher educators. Evidence from this research suggests that it is critical to engage with ongoing identity-based conflict and personal legacies of the conflict, creating structures to bridge those divides, particularly when teachers are expected to deliver a new curriculum that requires them to teach new values and change their practice. But equally important for change, is addressing the depth of subject knowledge and classroom confidence that was eroded by the identity-based conflicts. These observations are based on critical findings from this study and will be the focus of the rest of this chapter.

Key findings
In this section I discuss a number of key findings relating to the principles that emerged from the research. The South African data tends to be richer than the Rwandan, since this was the main focus of my research and I was situated within the change processes. South Africa has also been through a deeply nuanced process of change that was contested on a number of levels: politically and educationally; nationally and regionally, and which was complicated by a deeply divided society that

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7 Reports in the Kigali-based The New Times during February 2008. For example, an article in The New Times of February 7, 2008 states that ‘genocide ideology still exists in school and there is no doubt about that...In research conducted...late last year, it was found out that teachers and students in some schools were planting revisionism in several forms.’
both consciously and unconsciously carried the ‘burden’ of what the world regarded as a miracle transition. Certainly reconciliation in those first years of democracy had to be an imperative, but it submerged the discourses of the past and race – both of which re-emerged with a changing political climate after the second elections in 1999. This has had particular implications for education.

Rwanda’s transition has been carefully controlled by the RPF government, which exercises power through emotion both politically and through education policy. The Rwandan ‘miracle’ is the illusion of political and economic stability which is masking the continued legacy of ethnicity. The discourse of unity is intended to bring about reconciliation. However, this is submerging the discourse of ethnicity which, if psychoanalysts are correct, will resurface in a renewed cycle of violence. The researchers for the Institute for Research and Dialogue agree. They criticised the history taught in the ingando camps as denying ‘what was and still is the place of ethnic group in the Rwandan collective consciousness’, and further stated that ‘denying the concept of ethnic identity in attempting to build an alternative Rwandan inclusive identity...does not match reality and tends to obstruct expression within the Rwandan society’.  

The research data from Rwanda has enabled me to engage with the findings that emerged from the South African research through an expanded lens of post-conflict possibilities. This, in turn, expanded my thinking in a way that a single country case study may not have.

A first major finding to emerge from this study shows that the way in which conflict is settled has implications for curricular knowledge. This may seem self-evident; however it is an aspect of research in post-conflict education that has not received sufficient attention. The conflicts in South Africa and Rwanda ended in very different ways. In South Africa there were hard fought negotiations from 1991 to 1994 which happened during a period of sometimes extreme violence that often threatened their progress. The negotiations were therefore not peaceful: most politically related

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8 IRDP (2006): 200
deaths, 14 000, took place in the four years leading up to the first elections in April 2004.\(^9\) At times, negotiations stalled.\(^10\) But the determination of the negotiators on both sides to reach settlement resulted in a peaceful election and transition to democracy. On the other hand, military victory in Rwanda left the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in undisputed control. The unquestionable horror of the genocide and the feelings of guilt of the international community for failing to intervene timeously to prevent or stop the genocide, has, some would argue, resulted in a ‘genocide credit’ that the new regime in Kigali exploited in the years immediately after 1994.\(^11\) This has been used to silence potential international and internal criticism of the increasing authoritarianism of the Rwandan government. These very different country contexts have influenced the ways in which each society engaged in the politics of memory and identity, as well as memory and identity in the history curriculum.

In South Africa the nature of the negotiated settlement and the resultant political compromise created a particular context for the creation of the education policies of particularly the early phase of transition. South Africa’s first White Paper on Education and Training was a fiercely contested document. The ANC and its Education Portfolio Committee regarded the White Paper as a crucial document that would signal the demise of the apartheid education system and celebrate the ‘victory of education struggles’.\(^12\) The intense resistance of the National Party politicians when it was released for public comment led to a compromise which moderated the language of the policy, though without giving ground on the goals of the White Paper. The need to engage in realpolitik at that particular time was expressed by Blade Nzimande:

\(^9\) Figures quoted in Ramphele (2008): 38
\(^11\) Reyntjens, F (2004) Rwanda, ten years on: From Genocide to Dictatorship in African Affairs, 103, 177-210; Mamdani also refers to this in his book ‘When Victims become Killers’ (2001)
It is important to understand our actions as ANC parliamentarians in the context of the times. Remember these were the days of the Government of National Unity (GNU). It was important at that time to secure the transition. The situation was explosive and we were on the brink of civil war. Our policies were therefore crafted in a context where ensuring a smooth transition was as important as developing policies for social transformation.\textsuperscript{13}

This had implications for history education during the early transition period. The reluctance to make radical alterations to the old apartheid syllabi during 1995, and retaining the textbooks, could be seen as a compromise. Certainly apartheid and resistance was included in the interim syllabus, but the Minister’s insistence that the changes to the old syllabi should not entail new textbooks not only left the Afrikaner nationalist interpretation of history education intact, but also meant that some teachers, usually white Afrikaans-speaking, could choose not to teach that section, because of a reluctance to engage with a difficult past. Other teachers, usually black, were unable to teach that section because of the lack of appropriate resources. They also felt more comfortable with the familiar content.\textsuperscript{14}

The situation in post-genocide Rwanda was completely different. After the RPF victory, any policy decisions could be made without consultation with representatives of the previous regime. While policy directions often had to take the requirements of international donor agencies into account, the language of the policy documents was uncontested. What emerges from political and educational policy documents are contrasting discourses: the positive discourse of national unity located in pre-colonial Rwandan values and a negative threatening discourse, clearly employing the politics of emotion strengthened by the ‘genocide credit’ that aims to prevent public criticism. The key policy document, Vision 2020, provides an example of this emotional use of


\textsuperscript{14} It was my experience at least in the Western Cape as a subject specialist and as a Grade 12 provincial examiner. It was also information shared at the annual inter-provincial examination meetings with the external moderator.
language. The powerful statement of rebirth, ‘Rwanda is rising from its ashes, healing its wounds and rifts, thinks of its future and formulates its aspirations’, is followed closely by the negative statement of ‘the risk of political instability born from divisionist speeches of some politicians’. Many of the documents, including the history and civic education curricula, set the ideal of unity and positive Rwandan values against threats of ‘divisionism, negationism, negative forces and genocide ideology’.

Secondly, the nature of the emergent state sets the limits as well as possibilities for curriculum change. The compromise politics in South Africa provided the context for a continuing tacit understanding of compromise in education. I have suggested a number of reasons for the omission of history education from Curriculum 2005, but it could also be argued that it reflected a tacitly understood compromise during a fragile political period when there was a deep need for reconciliation. Omitting history avoided confrontation, or as Hoffman has put it, avoided a potential clash of ‘martyrological memories’.

Avoiding the past in the curriculum allowed for the expression of new values and a national identity located in a vision of an economically prosperous nation. Curriculum 2005’s emphasis on the economic nation enabled policy makers to insert global economic discourses into education policy as a means of re-positioning South Africa in the global and regional economy. In an early national Department of Education background information document intended for educators, in answer to the rhetorical question posed - why are paradigm shifts important? – the answer was that ‘in our education system this shift is inevitable because there is a need for more learning on global awareness’. The ‘irrelevancy of the previous curriculum’ it was noted further on in the document, was ‘illustrated by the need of successful modern economies for citizens with a strong foundation of general education and who could move flexibly between occupations’. The integration of education and training was following a

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17 DoE (1997) Outcomes Based Education in South Africa: Background information for educators
18 Ibid: 10
current ‘major international trend in curriculum development and the reform of qualification structures’. Highlighting the deficiencies in the apartheid education system in terms of appropriateness for the global economy, and re-imagining the identity of the nation in terms of a prosperous modern economy, was at the time less sensitive than locating identity in the past.

A new official narrative of the past was in any event being constructed in another, more public ideological space – the Truth and Reconciliation Commission – which could serve to satisfy the victims’ need for voice and recognition. This was a more dramatic demonstration of past evil and in the short term reached many more first generation South Africans than a curriculum revision would have done. It could be argued that the TRC hearings forced a greater number of white South Africans to recognise the evil in the former regime than happened in Germany in the first decades after the end of the Third Reich when there was a general complicity of silence and denial. The TRC did not prevent denial among white South Africans; merely that it ‘reduced the number of lies that could be circulated unchallenged in public discourse’. On the other hand, the TRC was itself a product of compromise at a number of levels. Not only did the amnesty provisions prevent the alienation of the Security Forces, but focussing on the main perpetrators moved the attention away from the complicity of the majority of white South Africans in a system that the United Nations had characterised as a crime against humanity. Regarded in the light of reconciliation, being able to put aside personal feeling of guilt enabled more white South Africans to feel reasonably comfortable with a government that had a black majority.

In Rwanda, the limits and possibilities were set by the RPF victory after the genocide and the legacy of the genocide. While victory may seem to have provided possibility, the minority government’s fear of true democracy and its dependence on international

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19 Ibid: 11
aid created a tension in education. International aid requires target setting, progress towards Education for All, and Millennium Development Goals. But more and more, development agencies also require progress towards citizenship and democracy education and interactive teaching methodologies that encourage critical thinking. While the language of democracy may be found in Rwandan education documents, in reality, there is a fear that if truly free and fair elections were held, Rwandans would vote according to ethnic allegiances. This implies a Hutu victory at the election polls.

Thirdly, and particularly related to the South African data, the research provided evidence of the impact that changing ministerial personalities can have on curriculum processes. While this could be said to apply to any country, I suggest that ministerial agency in countries in transition has greater impact. The energetic pace of change unleashed by the second Minister of Education, Kader Asmal, contrasted sharply with the lacklustre performance of the first Minister of Education, Sibusisu Bengu. However, their exercise of agency needs to be understood within the particular political contexts, which provided both opportunities and constraints. The ‘exile factor’ in political appointments played a significant role in early political appointments which had a number of policy implications.22 Bengu had been absent from the country for more than ten years which, it has been argued, meant that he was hampered by a lack of knowledge of policy debates in the run-up to 1994.23 The choice of educator reform strategies and Curriculum 2005 demonstrated a lack of in-depth knowledge of practitioners on the ground and the deep inequalities amongst schools. As previously suggested, Curriculum 2005 could also have been partly shaped by the political climate of the first four years of democracy characterised by compromise, reconciliation and symbolic change statements.

Equally, the political contexts provided opportunities and constraints for Kader Asmal. Each of these periods was characterised by contrasting policy networks: a labour-dominated network that produced Curriculum 2005 and the academic network

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22 This is something that Rwanda and South Africa had in common. In Rwanda the exiles, particularly from Uganda, are dominant in political and educational spheres. It would have been interesting to have been able to explore this comparison further.

23 Ramphele (2008): 157
that enabled the ‘strengthening and streamlining’ of Curriculum 2005 to take the particular form that it did. The changing political discourse within the ANC and the considerable support outside of the political domain for a curriculum revision, opened the way for Asmal to set up and work through ancillary academic networks to effect the re-insertion of history education into the curriculum. However, his curriculum reform would have been more far-reaching had his move to radically reform outcomes-based education not been blocked by the ANC ideologues.24

Fourthly, again emerging from South Africa, the character of regional or provincial politics and capacity has an impact on the pace of change. The differences in the capacities of the provinces meant that curriculum implementation did not unfold equally. My experience of curriculum processes came from being situated within the Western Cape Education Department. The Western Cape inherited viable education structures from the old white Cape Education Department and the education section of the coloured House of Representatives. The institutional memory inherited from both was overwhelmingly authoritarian. The new Western Cape Education Department (WCED) was better resourced in terms of available finance, basic equipment such as computers and motor vehicles than the majority of the other provinces. Also, subject advisers in the Western Cape generally had more professionalism and subject knowledge than many advisers in the other provinces. While schools in the Western Cape range from overcrowded, often dysfunctional schools where teachers still do not spend the time they should in the classrooms to extremely well-resourced state schools, and even better resourced independent schools; from urban to rural schools; this does not compare with the poverty and majority of poor rural schools in a province such as the Eastern Cape.

Politically, the Western Cape was out of step with most of the rest of South Africa during the first phase of transition. The National Party retained control of the province, largely through the support of coloured voters. The only other province not to have an ANC majority was KwaZulu-Natal which was held by the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party. Given its history, the politics of identity are more complex

24 Ibid: 177
than in the rest of South Africa. While whites were always at the top of the racial hierarchy, the Western Cape was also historically a ‘coloured preferential’ region for housing and jobs. The migration of black South African in search of employment to the Western Cape after 1994, has contributed to complex political, social, economic and racial tensions.

The politics of the province and the relative curriculum expertise within the Western Cape Education Department (WCED) gave rise to particular dynamics in the relationship between the WCED and the national Department of Education. Firstly, there was a mutual political suspicion which was not generally overtly expressed but in the WCED manifested itself both in defensiveness in relation to national DoE and in a drive to demonstrate compliance with the implementation of the new education policies. Secondly, on the part of the national DoE and other provinces there was an almost palpable antagonism towards officials from the Western Cape. This became evident in inter-provincial working groups during implementation phase of Curriculum 2005. This was often expressed in the immediate open rejection of any Western Cape contribution or more passive ignoring of any input from the Western Cape.\footnote{I experienced this on a number of occasions as did the majority of my colleagues.}

The resources available within the WCED, the curriculum expertise, and the desire to be seen to be implementing the new curriculum, meant that the introduction of Curriculum 2005 and the orientation of teachers to the new curriculum were carried out with a greater measure of efficiency than in more rural and under-resourced provinces.\footnote{Gauteng province generally matched the Western Cape in terms of resources and curriculum expertise, although politically it was very different.} This does not mean that teachers received the depth of support needed for implementation; rather that every teacher in the province could be reached in a series of orientation workshops. It also does not mean that there was a differentiated orientation programme which took into account the different needs of the schools and teachers to address the legacy of the inequalities embedded in the apartheid education system. Implicit in all orientation and implementation programmes was that
curriculum advisers and teachers were starting from the same level of understanding and ability. This was patently not the case. It had major implications for the way in which the curriculum officials understood the new curriculum and carried out the orientation and subsequent training on the one hand, and teachers received and understood the new curriculum, on the other. Orientation to the new curriculum was organised on a cascade model: curriculum officials received training from the national Department of Education and were then expected to cascade to the teachers. The superficial exposure of officials to the new curriculum, led to a shallow understanding and therefore an inability to engage in any real depth with debates around the new curriculum in teacher workshops. They often resorted to emphasising the ‘slogans’ that became integrally associated with Curriculum 2005.\textsuperscript{27} From the first workshops to introduce Curriculum 2005, outcomes-based education was equated with group work, teachers as facilitators, teachers as resource-creators and teaching and learning that is ‘learner-based and learner-paced’ – nothing about understanding the content or nature of the new learning areas.\textsuperscript{28}

There were enough curriculum officials in the Western Cape Education Departments available to carry out relatively extensive monitoring of the implementation in the Foundation Phase during the first year of the implementation of Curriculum 2005 in 1998. However, as none of the officials had entry into classrooms when teaching was actually happening, it was not possible to gain reliable evidence of the understanding that teachers had of the new curriculum or the extent to which their practice had changed in relation to the requirements of the curriculum. The monitoring took the form of discussions with the teachers once a week after school.

By contrast, Rwanda is a small country with more centralised control over education. Theoretically this should facilitate more efficient implementation and ensure greater conformity from teachers. Certainly, although access to schooling is not yet universal, ethnic quotas that controlled entry to all levels of education have been eradicated.

\textsuperscript{27} Examples include: Design Down, Deliver Up! Learner Based and Learner Paced! Be a guide on the side not a sage on the stage!
\textsuperscript{28} Interviews with teachers during the monitoring processes of the WCED – February – June 1998.
However, post-genocide education has continued to be influenced by colonial systems through the return of Tutsi refugees. They have brought models of educational policy and practice from neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Tanzania, and a number of these policies have their origins in British colonial models. Tensions have emerged around teaching methods that reflect ethnicity. Hutu teachers are more likely to encourage debates about history and the Rwandan past in their classroom than Tutsi teachers.

A last major finding from the research is that the implementation of curriculum in South Africa was carried out without the normal structures of supervision and control that are generally accepted as part of education structures in most countries. This had major implications on the way in which the implementation happened in the provinces, as well as on actual classroom implementation.

At the level of policy implementation, the decentralised nature of the education system means that the national Department of Education does not have real power to enforce compliance in provinces. Policy is developed at national level. Provincial education departments have the task of implementing policy, creating provincial policy documents that are intended to make the content of policy more understandable at teacher level. This inability to ensure full compliance means that provinces can either avoid implementation of policy or ‘provincialise’ policy, subverting the original intentions of the policy document. During the orientation phase of Curriculum 2005 in the Western Cape, when generic information was being conveyed to parents and teachers, little change was made to the information in the national documents when provincial manuals were developed. However, when Curriculum 2005 was implemented in the intermediate (Grades 4 – 6) and senior (Grades 7 – 9) phases in the Western Cape, the Human and Social Sciences curriculum advisers, all history or geography subject specialists, reorganised the content of the learning area so that the subjects would be discernable to teachers. It was hoped that this would help to allay

some of the anxiety expressed by subject teachers and gave what we as a learning area team felt was a more educationally sound structure to the learning area.\textsuperscript{31}

Since the late 1980s, there has been no mechanism for monitoring curriculum implementation at classroom level which has major implications for the development of a community of practice. This is a legacy of the mass action of the 1980s when many schools across the country refused to allow education officials access to schools and classrooms. After 1983 black and coloured schools increasingly became sites of struggle against apartheid. As part of the protest against apartheid education and the authoritarian control exercised by the education departments, subject advisers were prevented from entering schools and classrooms. The largest teacher union, SADTU, was formed during this period, taking up the political struggle against apartheid. A legacy of this period has been SADTU’s refusal to support classroom visits by education officials which was then extended to other teacher unions. SADTU’s continued refusal to accept classroom visits and its protection of under-performing teachers has resulted in deepening the inequalities in teaching and learning. In a harsh judgement of this action, Ramphele has argued that:

\begin{quote}
By shielding under-qualified teachers, Sadtu is inadvertently completing the job Verwoerd could not finish [when he introduced Bantu Education in 1953].\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

This is a sensitive issue that still has not been satisfactorily resolved and has had particular consequences for implementation of the new curriculum. Without on-site supervision in schools and classrooms, teachers are able to ignore the new curriculum, continuing to teach in the old, more familiar, ways. Not only has this meant that no common practice has developed, but that the unequal provision of curriculum content in schools has been deepened. In the former white schools with well-qualified teachers, ‘old familiar ways’ include good subject knowledge, access to a wide range of resources, and increasingly interactive teaching methods. In former black schools where many teachers are under-qualified, content transmission continues as a safety-net for the teachers who are insecure in the new content knowledge. This has had

\footnote{WCED Human and Social Sciences training documents from 1998.}

\footnote{Ramphele (2008): 174}
devastating implications for yet another generation of young South Africans who have been unable to access an education of reasonable quality. Evidence of these disparities is seen in the international literacy and numeracy results. South Africa regularly performs below even neighbouring countries such as Mozambique. The country also has the greatest difference between the top performing schools and the lowest performing schools. It is also seen in the matric history results, a subject that demands high literacy levels and the ability to transform knowledge and express it clearly. Thousands of black students continue to fail the final history examination, unable to access the question papers in a second or third language, and unable to express their understanding in a written form in that language.

The next section of this chapter turns to a more specific discussion of curriculum and teacher development within the context of the principles and findings discussed above.

Towards a theory of curriculum change in post-conflict societies

This study has shown that educational change in post-conflict societies is a long, uneven and complex process that is conditioned by the political processes which end conflict as well as the nature of the emergent state. Within this context, the capacities of national as well as regional actors need to be taken into account. This includes the new and inherited bureaucracies and those who are the targets of change, the teachers. At a bureaucratic level the tensions between the inherited bureaucracy and the new political appointees needs to be mediated; at all levels there is an unevenness in terms of curriculum and subject knowledge that needs to be addressed; and equally at all levels there is the legacy of the past that continues to inform the way in which people interact with and respond to one another and the way in which curriculum is engaged in the classroom.

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33 There is a discussion of the results of the TIMMS and SACMEQ tests in Christie, P., Butler, D. & Potterton, M. (2007) *Schools that Work: Ministerial Committee Report to the Minister of Education*: 36
This is also discussed in Ramphele (2008): 179-180

34 My experience as a provincial examiner and marker, and national moderator of Grade 12 history.
When any new education policies are introduced it is always intended that teachers will have to change – the way they teach, their content knowledge and their values and attitudes. What became clear in this study was that the ongoing legacy of the conflict which includes trauma, identity issues and disparities of education, critical issues which should be taken into account, are seldom, if ever, considered. In stable democracies it is generally assumed that teachers move from a more or less equal basis. At this level in a post-conflict society in which the conflict not only created identity-based divisions but systematically created educational and social inequalities, this is never the case. Demands for change need to address both the gap in knowledge and skills, as well as the deeply internalised personal legacy of racialised identities. So change needs to take into account the teachers’ experiences of the conflict, where they teach, what has formed their knowledge and understanding of subject matter and methodologies, and the depth of their content knowledge. Evidence from the implementation processes in South Africa for both Curriculum 2005 and the revised curriculum shows that that neither of these aspects was adequately addressed. Nor were they addressed in Rwanda. Significantly, a recent report on South African schools, *Schools that Work*, noted that:

> historical legacies within the system may diminish, but are *unlikely to disappear of their own accord* as time passes, unless there are targeted interventions to address them.\(^{35}\)

Critically this should include subject content knowledge. While a good grasp of subject knowledge is not the key to changing classroom practice, teachers who are insecure in their subject knowledge are less likely to feel confident enough to venture from their tried and tested classroom methodologies.\(^{36}\)

However, in a society emerging from identity-based internecine conflict, theories of change need to move beyond the formal curriculum to take into account the historical meanings of identity within the national context, as well as the aftermath of trauma.

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\(^{35}\) Christie, et al. (2007): 21 Authors’ emphasis.

Mamphele Ramphele, reflecting on South African society, today wrote of the traumatic legacy of the apartheid society:

we still struggle to find closure on many issues related to the past. This is in part because the wounds are still raw. It is also because we have difficulty acknowledging the depths of our trauma. Our wounds fester partly as a result of our denial of their extent and their impact on attempts to transform our society. Past wounds have a long history...Forging an identity as a non-racial, non-sexist, egalitarian society, the kind of society to which we committed ourselves in our constitution, requires us to lay to rest the ghosts of racism, sexism, ethnic chauvinism and authoritarianism. These are stubborn ghosts that will not be easily exorcised.\(^{37}\)

The traumatic legacy of genocide in Rwanda has also not been addressed, and continues to be a factor in schools. Teachers report of withdrawn, non-communicative pupils, of children with mental health problems, and children afraid to approach one another, fearing that Hutu pupils were *interahamwe*. As one teacher said, ‘these days teaching pupils at primary school is one of the most awful jobs in existence’.\(^{38}\) It is felt that the Ministry of Education in Rwanda is concerned only with the material well-being of pupils, limiting itself to financial matters and checking on head teachers and ignoring moral and intellectual support.\(^ {39}\)

A society emerging from conflict is relationally fragile. Rebuilding what has fallen apart is centrally the process of rebuilding relational spaces that hold society together,\(^ {40}\) and lasting peace requires changes in the attitudes of people in each group towards the other and changes in ways of handling conflict.\(^ {41}\) Personal change in societies emerging from identity-based conflict has a very specific context – that of

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\(^{37}\) Ramphele (2008): 15; 25  
\(^{38}\) Human Rights Watch (2001): 83  
\(^{39}\) Ibid: 82  
confronting the divided identities and mental models that all constructed of ‘the other’ as a result of the conflict, and of coming to terms with the traumatic legacy. Deep personal change cannot happen in isolation, it occurs within the rebuilt relational space in which meaningful interaction can take place.

What is currently being demanded of history teachers in South Africa is that they become change agents for democracy with little regard being given to the years of conditioning into the attitudes and prejudices under apartheid, and the extent to which the trauma is still raw and the ghosts of the past are refusing to be exorcised. The extent of the identity-dilemma and the traumatic legacy of the past have been expressed in comments made by teachers on the *Facing the Past* programme:

We are not admitting enough about how messed up we are. There are angry people out there. We can’t deal with it unless we acknowledge the hatred and anger. We have to work things out ourselves first before going to the learners. We have to get rid of our stereotypes before we can help learners. (Teacher A)

Derogatory terms are being used in townships to describe others, whites, etc – we are passing this on to the children. There is unfinished business in our country. (Teacher B)

We are not just confronting the past, but also the present. This is equipping us with tools to engage minds and to help see what the system has done. This is part of confronting the present. (Teacher C)\(^42\)

Lederach’s concept of moral imagination is particularly helpful in thinking about possibilities for real change after identity-based conflict that can be extended to involve curriculum initiatives. A key element of moral imagination is the capacity to

\(^{42}\) These are comments recorded during the *Facing the Past* teacher workshops. An important focus of the *Facing the Past* project is to facilitate these critical conversations. Interviews with the pupils and working with pupils has provided evidence that the in-service approach of the project is having a valuable impact on the pupils. See the comments from pupils above.
imagine the web of relationships that holds society together and to include even our enemies; and a desire to understand our enemies from their point of view. 43 ‘Their point of view’, however, needs to include both group memory and identity. This is Edward Said’s ‘thinking each others’ history’ – not necessarily agreeing with it, but understanding it from the other’s point of view 44 - or Lederach’s ‘thinking in the presence of others, because the others are still present’. 45

What is particularly pertinent to identity-based conflict is the importance Lederach gives to understanding the past in order to understand the settings of cycles of violent conflict. Peoples’ ‘lived histories’ or vernacular memories encompass the communal experiences, Bodnar’s vernacular cultures, that create and reinforce the stories of their collective lives and shared memories. The history of the formation of the group’s identity, the construction of the group’s future and its very survival are all about finding place, voice and story. 46

Moral imagination does not see the past as something to be overcome, laid aside or forgotten in order to move toward a better future. Instead, the narratives that give meaning to peoples’ lives and relationships must be told and the repetitive patterns acknowledged so that healing can take place. People must attempt to discover where they have been, who they are, where they are going and how they will make this journey together. For teachers, this is a necessary pre-requisite not only to personal change but in order to engage with these difficult conversations with their pupils. Between memory and the potential future, there is the place of narrative, the art of ‘restorying’. 47 Reconciliation is not to forgive and forget, but rather to remember and change. 48 We need to develop a capacity to imagine the past that lies before us, recognising that the past is not dead, but rather alive and present in the identity of the group. Any theory of change needs to take this into account.

43 Lederach (2005)
44 Edward Said’s comment at the Saamtrek Values in Education Conference in Cape Town referred to before.
45 Thank you to Pam Christie for introducing me to this concept and to the work of Lederach.
46 Lederach (2005): 143
47 Lederach (2005): 148
48 Lederach, J.P. (n.d.) Using Imagination and Creativity. Arts and Peace
Related to personal change by confronting the ‘ghosts of the past’ is the question about what should be done with the traumatic knowledge of the conflict within history education? For many that past is still too present. Fourteen years after the genocide in Rwanda the fear of engaging with the genocide is still very real. Many South Africans continue to be traumatised by their apartheid experiences. What emerges from the German experience is that it took decades for ordinary Germans to engage with the traumatic knowledge of the Holocaust in the history curriculum. There is, of course, an essential difference between Germany emerging from conflict and attempting to re-imagine the nation and countries such as South Africa and Rwanda that needs to be taken into account. In Germany, the victims had been removed from society leaving the perpetrators to deal with the past without the presence of victims. However, psychologists insist that not dealing with collective trauma will have dangerous societal consequences in terms of renewed cycles of violence. It is in relation to this that I argue that a curriculum which provides tools for democracy and structures for conversations is more valuable to societies emerging from identity-based conflict than changing a national narrative. This has the potential for interrupting trans-generational transfer of traumatic knowledge and chosen traumas that feed new cycles of violence.

Teachers in South Africa, as first generation survivors of trauma, are expected not only to engender new democratic values, but in a curriculum that includes the traumatic knowledge of the conflict, they are expected to teach it. Little consideration has been given to the retraumatising of teachers during the process. The depth of the legacy of trauma, and possibility of renewed trauma, became evident in a recent teacher workshop on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (an examination question for Grade 12) which used documentary footage of the TRC hearings. One of the teachers was in tears and commented: ‘we worry about our learners, but we should be worrying about ourselves. What is teaching this doing to us?’

In an email to the facilitator after the workshop, the same teacher wrote:

I have been thinking about the TRC and our response to it – and the difficulties I find in dealing with our past. I must admit, I didn’t sleep

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49 Comment during a Facing the Past workshop, 25 August 2008.
so well last night...partly because I felt the need to reflect on our session...I realised that what we are attempting to do is to teach our own nation’s trauma while still in a period of mourning – especially for those of us who experienced apartheid. I don’t have a psyc [sic] background but I suspect that this may not be the wisest course of action. However, the curriculum is the curriculum and teach it we must, but I have a suspicion that some ‘shrinks’ would question our intention to examine our trauma in a formal pass or fail exam.50

This is deeply relevant to both South African and Rwandan teachers and raises questions about the wisdom of including the traumatic past in the South African curriculum so soon and of those encouraging Rwanda to begin teaching about the genocide. This is a complex question, particularly as psychoanalysts insist on the importance of engaging with a traumatic past.

The value of the approach to history followed by the Facing the Past programme and Facing History and Ourselves in post-conflict societies is fourfold. Firstly, it engages with issues of individual and group identity. The latter explores the construction of we and they and the prejudices and stereotype that can result from group identity. Secondly, it opens the way to making connections to a traumatic past through examining a more distant history, that of the Holocaust. Thirdly, it helps to broker conversations that in other circumstances might not be possible. Teachers in Rwanda, for example, can examine the factors that undermined democracy in Weimar Germany in terms of political intolerance and human agency, and implicitly be talking of their own society. Fourthly, and this might be criticised by mainline historians, it enables teachers and pupils to engage with their own past as present history. This occurs through the study of human behaviour, the choice and consequences of those choices, in each of the case studies. Through narratives of real people, pupils learn of victims and perpetrators, of bystanders, resisters and rescuers and of the contexts and choices that can turn bystanders into resisters or perpetrators. Connections are made between the lessons of history and the questions that face young people today. The

50 Email dated 26 August 2008.
final goal is that of ‘choosing to participate’, encouraging young people to take positive action in their own communities.

It was the work of Facing History and Ourselves (FHAO) and the partnership between FHAO and the Western Cape Education Department that originally opened the way for the comparison between Rwanda and South Africa. A major strength of the approach is its adaptability for different post-conflict contexts. In South Africa, the scope and sequence, including the historical case studies, were embedded in the curriculum, providing for deeper historical understanding as well as enabling the critical conversations that linked past and present. In Rwanda, without a history curriculum, a significant contribution was enabling difficult dialogues as well as reflection about their own past, even if open conversations were not always possible. In South Africa, a critical aspect in Facing the Past is the space provided for teachers to engage with personal legacies of the past. This is not possible in Rwanda.

Theories of educational change have been silent on the influence of a traumatic past on teacher identities and the need to take cognisance of the legacy of trauma in theorising about change. There is a body of research that recognises the political nature of education policy. A classic study is Kingdon’s work on agenda setting in United States politics which examines how and why policy issues rise and fall from the agendas of the United States government. He argues that when a country is faced with a crisis, problems, policies and politics converge.51 Others include Smith, et. al. who suggest that change happens when stakes are high and politicians manipulate political power to serve narrow interests or politicians evoke a crisis for political benefit on the political stage;52 and Jansen who examined changing education policy in South Africa as a symbolic statement of transition from the past.53 Ball argues that when political leaders face a crisis of legitimacy governments introduce new policies

that rework the school curriculum.\textsuperscript{54} While Ball’s work has been valuable in understanding policy in a post-conflict society as responding to a complex, heterogeneous configuration of elements, including ideologies that are residual, emergent and currently dominant, neither he nor the others cited, engage with policy as practice and teacher identities.

Sutton and Levinson do engage with policy as practice.\textsuperscript{55} They regard policy as negotiated meaning, with policy as a form of governance constantly being negotiated and reorganised in the ongoing flow of institutional life. They consider state policy to be a discursive mode of governance and policy formation and implementation as a dynamic interrelated period stretching over time. They call this policy appropriation and analyse policy in terms of how people appropriate meaning for themselves in the context in which they are expected to implement it. Change therefore comes through the appropriation of policy – it may not be the intended change, but it is nonetheless change. This is a form of value congruence – changing practice when teacher and policy values are in alignment. However, helpful as their insights are, they do not engage with teacher identity which is such a critical issue in post-apartheid South Africa.

Jansen in \textit{Image-ining teachers: Policy images and teacher identity} does examine teacher identity in post-apartheid South Africa, highlighting the clash between policy images and personal identities of teachers in South Africa.\textsuperscript{56} Jansen argues that policy images make demands that conflict with teachers’ personal identities as practitioners. He points out the complex problems associated with teacher education reform in developing countries and suggests that we have to understand the identity dilemma if we want education reform. The concept of teacher identity is described as the way teachers feel about themselves professionally, emotionally and politically given the conditions of their work. Professional identity relates to subject matter competence,

levels of training and preparation and formal qualifications; how teachers understand their capacity to implement a proposed policy. Emotional identity is about the ways in which teachers understand their capacity to handle emotional demands of new policies in the context of stress and pressure – how do they feel about and respond to a particular policy in terms of how that policy defines their role. Political identity is about ways in which teachers understand and act on their value commitments, personal backgrounds and professional interests in the context of the change demanded. This reflects teacher understandings of their authority to act or withhold action in response to a particular policy reform. This comes closest to understanding the ‘identity dilemma’ of racialised identities in post-conflict societies, but does not go far enough in explaining the impact of identity-based conflict and personal legacy of trauma on teachers in a post-conflict society and the way in which that shapes responses to a new history curriculum and the way in which curriculum is mediated in the classroom.

In South Africa this personal legacy becomes crucial when the nature of the new curriculum is understood. It was developed as a human rights curriculum with issues of human rights, social and environmental justice infused into each subject. Teachers are expected to ‘deliver’ on these promises of human rights. However, policy makers and education officials have failed to engage with what it might mean for teachers, conditioned by conflict, to have to do this. This requires deep personal, as well as professional change, but evidence from research conducted by Harland and Kinder indicates that deep professional change which results in changed teacher practice comes only when there is value congruence between the policy message about ‘good practice’ or in this case required new values and the teachers’ own ‘codes of practice’ or values – that is when policy intentions and teachers’ beliefs about good practice or values coincide. However, achieving value congruence in a post-conflict society is a far more complex process than that outlined in the research of Harland and Kinder quoted above. Expanding on Jansen’s definition of political identity, it is about their value commitments, personal backgrounds, personal experiences during conflict and

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*therefore the ongoing traumatic legacy of that experience*, and professional interests in the context of the change demanded. As evidenced in the extract from the email above, the personal experiences even fourteen years after the demise of apartheid as a system remain very real.

Change at classroom level is the most difficult to achieve, and yet it is here where it matters the most for societies in transition from conflict, not only in terms of curricular knowledge, but for inculcating the democratic values for the new society.

At this ‘smallest unit of the system’ change requires a strategic balance of pressure and support. The support for teachers, who are the key to transforming pupil attitudes and values, needs to be rethought. The implication of this is that for change to succeed, teachers must have the support structures in place that open the way to engaging, in a community of practice, with the personal imprint from the past and the traumatic knowledge that limits the possibilities of retraumatisation. This is the importance of working within a framework of Lederach’s ‘moral imagination’. The value of that support as part of the process of change, the way in which is can facilitate self-reflection as well as challenge the mental models we have of one another, is reflected in a selection of teacher comments below:

I was not always aware of my own prejudices prior to my participation in this project. I always saw myself as a victim of other people’s prejudices and as such generalizations such as whites are racists never bothered me. But when Denis Goldberg told us of his involvement in the struggle against apartheid I decided to re-look at how I view others. (Teacher A)

I have sat with, spoken with, listened to, felt anguish with colleagues from the disadvantaged and privileged schools and we have hugged and cried together. (Teacher B)

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As educators we are the agents of social change...Although the apartheid system is dead and buried, racism is still the main challenge that is facing our country almost daily everywhere. This is a long journey. (Teacher C)\textsuperscript{59}

These reflections by teachers, place into stark relief the need to take into account the historical meanings of identity when thinking about educational change.

**Implications for further research**

One of the most fruitful fields of further research to emerge from this study would be on how exactly the biographies, emotions and beliefs of teachers filter official knowledge in the classroom. Very little is known about this in divided societies. Teachers are not a homogenous body: they lived in different communities; had different experiences during the conflict years. Identities become deeply internalised, bolstered by group memories. While teachers on the *Facing the Past* programme have reflected deeply on the ways in which the apartheid conflict affected them and on the ways in which they have viewed fellow South Africans, there is little evidence of the way in which their pasts acts as filters for curriculum knowledge in the history classrooms. One teacher who has been on the programme for several years has provided a tantalising indication of that filter when he said:

I have just realised how much I still teach resistance to apartheid in a biased way...over the years I have tried to be unbiased in all of my teaching...but I now realise I have to work that much harder when it comes to resistance.\textsuperscript{60}

I have used data from the *Facing the Past* programme quite extensively in this last chapter because I believe that it is the only professional development programme that takes teacher identities and the traumatic legacy of the past into account. There have been extensive evaluations of the programme, both internal and external, and

\textsuperscript{59} Recorded teacher reflections, *Facing the Past* programme, 2007.

\textsuperscript{60} This was a black teacher who thinks deeply about his teaching and continuing racism in South Africa. This was in 2007 – he has been on the programme since 2004.
overwhelmingly the evidence emerging from these evaluations and the workshop observations point to the necessity for education policy makers and department officials, as well as non-governmental service providers, to rethink quite radically the ways in which implementation strategies are conceived and carried out in a post-conflict society.

This study has also opened a fruitful field of possible future research in curriculum studies – that of engaging with curriculum in post-conflict societies. As noted in an early chapter, while there are a growing number of societies in and emerging from conflict, not enough attention has been given to curriculum issues, particularly when development organisations are involved, in the reconstruction of education systems after conflict.
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