CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOMALIA:
LEARNING FROM FAILED MEDIATION PROCESSES

By

LM MAKHUBELE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF DIPLOMATIC STUDIES

Department of Political Sciences,
Faculty of Humanities, University of Pretoria

Supervisor:
Prof. M Schoeman

MAY 2010
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. **Chapter One: Introduction**  
   1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1  
   1.2 History of the Somali conflict ........................................................................... 3  
   1.3 An overview of the peace processes ............................................................... 5  
   1.4 Literature overview ............................................................................................ 6  
   1.5 Problem statement ............................................................................................. 9  
   1.6 Objective and significance of the study ........................................................... 12  
   1.7 Research methodology ..................................................................................... 13  
   1.8 Structure of the study ....................................................................................... 15  

**Chapter two: Theoretical perspectives on conflict**  

2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 17  
2.2 Theoretical concepts pertaining to conflict ...................................................... 17  
2.2.1 The three-dimensional perspectives of conflict .......................................... 18  
2.2.1.1 Conflict as a perception .............................................................................. 19  
2.2.1.2 Conflict as a feeling ..................................................................................... 20  
2.2.1.3 Conflict as an action ................................................................................... 22  
2.2.2 The medical paradigm .................................................................................... 23  
2.2.2.1 The diagnosis phase ................................................................................. 24  
2.2.2.2 The treatment phase ................................................................................. 24  
2.2.3 Phase approach to conflict analysis ............................................................. 25
2.2.3.1 Problem-analysis phase ................................................................. 25
2.2.3.2 Problem-engagement phase .......................................................... 26
2.2.3.3 Problem resolution phase .............................................................. 26
2.3. Theoretical concept of ‘intractable conflicts’ ........................................... 28
2.3.1 Causes of intractability ........................................................................ 30
2.3.1.1 Geography and geopolitics .............................................................. 30
2.3.1.2 Poverty and the denial of basic human needs ................................... 31
2.3.1.3 Avarice of predatory warlords ....................................................... 32
2.3.1.4 Polarised zero-sum notion of identity .............................................. 32
2.3.1.5 Failure at earlier peace efforts ....................................................... 33
2.3.1.6 Local decision-makers who see their battle as a “zero-sum game” .... 33
2.4 Options for settlement ............................................................................ 34
2.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 35

3 Chapter three: Historical background of the Somali conflict
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 37
3.2 Somalia and its people ........................................................................... 37
3.3 The rise and fall of Mohammed Siad Barre (1969 – 1991) ....................... 39
3.4 The militarisation of Somalia .................................................................. 43
3.5 The implications of the Ogaden War ...................................................... 44
3.6 Collapse of the Somali state ................................................................. 47
3.7 The emergence of warlords .................................................................... 48
3.8 Intra-clan war ................................................................. 49
3.9 Warlords and politics ............................................................ 50
3.10 The United Nations (UN) intervention ...................................... 53
3.11 The root causes ..................................................................... 55
3.12 Contributing causes ............................................................... 57
3.13 Intractable Somali conflict ....................................................... 63
3.14 Approaches to intractable conflict ........................................... 64
3.15 Conclusion ........................................................................... 67

4. Chapter four: The Somali peace processes
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 68
4.2 The 1993 Addis Ababa Conference ........................................... 69
4.3 Lessons of the 2000 Arta Peace Process .................................... 76
4.4 Lessons of the 2004 Mbagathi Peace Process .............................. 83
4.5 Lessons learnt from the 1993 Boroma Peace Process ................. 90
4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................... 93

5. Chapter five: Conclusions and recommendations
5.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 94
5.2 Main findings .......................................................................... 94
5.3 Recommendations ................................................................. 102

6. Bibliography ............................................................................. 106
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My interest to complete the MDips programme on schedule could not have been sustained without the help of my staff at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, too many to mention all of them.

My thanks go mainly to Ms Yogi Dheda, Ms Tebogo Khambule and Ms Sindiswa Moguerane, who were always available to assist me in typing my work. I am particularly grateful for their commitment in ensuring the smooth function of my office during my study absence.

I am particularly grateful to Ms Carol Jansen who took time from her busy schedule to go through and edit my research work. The support and encouragement of Dr Yolanda Spies and the staff of the Political Sciences Department at the University of Pretoria was instrumental in my research work. Responsibility for errors and omissions or other sins, however rest solely with the researcher.

Special thanks go to Professors Willie Breytenbach and Maxi Scheoman who were my supervisors at different times of the research work. Their knowledge and professional expertise are gratefully acknowledged. I am particularly grateful to Professor Maxi Schoeman for according me the opportunity to be part of the MDips programme and supervising this final outcome of my work, for that, I shall remain eternally grateful to her.

Last but not least I am most grateful to the Director General of the Department of Intentional Relations and Cooperation, Dr Ayanda Ntsaluba for allowing me and other colleagues the opportunity to benefit from the MDips programme. The new skills acquired will be of strategic value to the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, and the government in general.
Abstract

This study of the Somali conflict resolution process is based on the available body of knowledge about the nature of the conflict and diplomatic initiatives aimed at finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. It provides a brief analysis of the nature and scope of the conflict with a particular focus on key features of the conflict and on the actors and issues driving the conflict since the fall of General Mohammed Siad Barre’s military regime in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of the Somali state. The study concludes that although the nature of the conflict is acute and exceedingly complex, it is not impossible to resolve. In this regard a number of recommendations are provided in the concluding chapter.

The paradox of the Somali conflict resolution processes is the consistent focus on state-building approach by mediation processes despite the failure rate of such an approach. The study argues that the mediation processes should focus on a peace-making approach to the Somali conflict resolution process. State-building should only be considered an integral part of peace-building once the resolution phase has been accomplished. This means that the international community should adopt a long-term approach when mediating the intractable Somali conflict and that such an approach should comply with the basic principles of mediation, chief amongst which is the requirement of utilizing a neutral mediator.

Opsomming

Hierdie studie van die Somali konflikresolusieproses is gebasseer op die beskikbare korpus van literatuur oor die aard van die konflik en die diplomatieke inisiatiewe gefokus op die soeke na ’n vreedsame oplossing daarvan. Dit verskaf ’n ontleiding van die aard en omvang van die konflik met spesifieke aandag aan die
kerneienskappe van die konflik en die akteurs en vraagstukke onderliggend aan die konflik sedert die val van Generaal Mohammed Siad Barre se militêre regime in 1991 en die daaropvolgende ineenstorting van die Somali-staat. Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat alhoewel die aard van die konflik akuut en uiterst kompleks is, dit nie onmoontlik is om ’n oplossing te vind nie. In hierdie verband word ’n aantal voorstelle in die slothoofstuk gemaak.

Die paradoks van die Somali konflikresoulusieproses is die deurlopende fokus op ’n staat-bou proses in bemiddelingsprosesse ten spyte van die bewese mislukking van so ’n benadering. Die studie argumenteer dat die bemiddelingsprosesse op die bou van vrede behoort te konsentreer. Staat-bou behoort slegs as integrale deel van die bou van vrede beskou te word in die stadium wat die konflikresoulusieproses afgehandel is. Dit beteken dat die internasionale gemeenskap ’n langtermyn benadering moet volg in bemiddeling van die konflik en dat so ’n bendering moet voldoen aan die basiese vereistes van bemiddeling waarvan die belangrikste die vereiste van ’n neutrale bemiddelaar is.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODESA</td>
<td>Convention for Democratic South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Government Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDF</td>
<td>Northern Frontier District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORH</td>
<td>Operation Restore Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Protracted Social Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMO</td>
<td>Somali African Muki Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNDU</td>
<td>Somali National Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNU</td>
<td>Somali National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali People’s Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNM</td>
<td>Southern Somali National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFC</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>Union of Islamic Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United National High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United National International Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United National Office for Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United National Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United State of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USF</td>
<td>United Somali Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter one: Introduction

1.1 Introduction
The Somali conflict was initially triggered by the dictatorial tendencies of the Mohammed Siad Barre regime in 1991. Subsequently, the conflict has become destructive with negative consequences for the country’s moral social fibre, as is manifested by the wanton killing of innocent people, particularly women and children. Lately, the conflict has intensified with new actors emerging; complicating the mediation process because of the ever changing issues driving it. Previous research provides the theoretical framework that is relevant for the analysis of the Somali conflict. In addition, a definition of conflict is provided together with the dimensions of conflict to allow the reader to understand at which stage a conflict has actually been resolved. Furthermore, the theoretical definition of “intractable conflicts” lays the foundation for reviewing the characteristics of the Somali conflict, its causes and characterisations, and if it indeed has elements of intractability.

Fourteen peace processes have failed since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991; for any expectations of peace in Somalia, the recognition of these failures should be used as a basis for the study of the Somali conflict to make expectations of peace a realistic possibility in Somalia. Menkhaus (2003: 12) argues that state-building and peace-building are two separate, and in some respects, mutually antagonistic enterprises in Somalia. Nevertheless, it should be noted that both state-building and peace-building are deemed to be necessary. Peace has to be made with and between the warlords and the state should also be rebuilt with the assistance of clans and with the help of interested Islamic parties. Moller (2009: 15) describes the current situation in Somalia where the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is a government without governance as opposed to the anarchic situation of governance without a government.
One reason for the relentless quest for state-building is that the entire international system is constructed around states, to such an extent that it cannot handle stateless territories inhabited by people who cannot be classified as citizens of any state (Møller 2009: 14).

Eighteen years after the state collapse, this study focuses on understanding the successes and failures of the previous peace processes, particularly the 2000 Arta Process and the 2004 Mbagathi Process, with the hope of building on past lessons and not repeating the approaches that led to the failure of a whole series of peace processes in the past. These many peace failures could be indicative of the fact that either the root causes of the conflict were overlooked or that participating actors were invited indiscriminately. Significantly, scholars of conflict resolution have different views on the causes of these failures. Rutherford (2008: 11, 16 & 22) attributes some of the blame to President Moi of Kenya who continued to support Siad Barre even after he had been ousted. In addition, the end of the Cold War also contributed to the lack of initial interest in the problem of the Somali conflict, as was demonstrated by the relegation of the conflict to the periphery by global powers. Elmi and Barisse (2006: 39) allege that Ethiopia has been keeping the Somalis divided in order to maintain its hegemony in the region. Furthermore, the lack of financial resources for transitional governments and the use of food aid as a weapon of war are also among the factors that have contributed to the successive peace failures. Consequently, these and other views are subjected to critical analysis in this study.

The fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991 has created a political power vacuum resulting in anarchy, which has led to a state of civil war between clans, warlords, Islamists, nomads and agriculturalists that are still ravaging Somalia. It seems as if the conflict has also developed into what some scholars would call an “intractable conflict,” also known as a “protracted social conflict” or “moral” or “enduring rivalries.”
Coleman (2006: 533) describes an intractable conflict as destructive as it persists for a long period, resists every attempt to be resolved constructively and appears to take on a life of its own. The point is that the Somali conflict is very complex. However, it can be asked whether this means that only complex solutions would work?

Apart from the obvious benefits that would result from the resolution of the Somali conflict, other advantages hold the potential to impact positively on the Ethiopian and Eritrean conflict and to contribute to the reduction of the proliferation of small arms in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Peace in Somalia also has the potential to end the plundering of the country’s marine resources and to safeguard the sea route, which has become the centre of sinister activities involving armed militants posing as pirates in the recent past. This study explores the complex terrain of attempts at finding a resolution to the Somali conflict in an attempt to learn some lessons from the failure of a range of conflict resolution attempts in that country. Before providing an overview of existing literature on the Somali conflict and presenting the problem statement explored in this study, brief attention is paid to the history of the conflict and the peace processes in order to provide an introductory context.

1.2 History of the Somali conflict
The seeds for the Somali conflict were planted in 1897 and later in 1948 when the country was divided among the British, Italian and French colonial powers and with the British transfer of the Ogaden’s autonomy to Ethiopia (Lewis 2005: 40 & 131; Lewis 1994: 93). Importantly, the 1969 coup by General Mohammed Siad Barre who was a member of the Marehan sub-clan of Darod and the 1978 Ogaden War with Ethiopia were the turning points in the Somali Civil War. Barre’s main rival was the warlord, Mohammed Farah Aidid, who was a Hawiye and who succeeded in gaining control of the capital Mogadishu. The Union of Islamic Council (UIC) also came from this clan.
Tadesse (2002: 19) and Adam (2008: 9) attribute the Ogaden military attack by Siad Barre to Pan-Somali nationalism, which had most of its support in the military establishment. Importantly, Pan-Somali nationalism was based on the notion of a greater Somalia, which included the Ogaden, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (NFD) and Djibouti. The ideology was based on the need to unite the country and restore it to its pre-1897 borders. Bradbury (1994: 11) alleges that the 1978 attempted coup by the Majerten sub-clan members of the Darod clan was indicative of the discontent of this clan with the manner in which Siad Barre had handled the Ogaden War. Lewis (1994: 224) focusses on the impact of the Ogaden War on the economy – it has created immense problems for the Somali state’s dependence on humanitarian aid from Western countries via the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

This has led to substantial amounts of food aid entering Somalia and warlords focussing on food aid and using it as a weapon. The Ogaden War created about 60 000 refugees from the Darod clan who had surrendered their power to the Hawiye. Importantly, all the factors identified by these scholars have contributed to creating conditions conducive to the current intractable state of the Somali conflict.

Subsequently, the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991 led to the collapse of the Somali state, creating what most scholars describe as an intractable conflict fought in terms of clan lineage and patronage. The anarchical nature of the disintegration of the Somali state has generated international sympathy for the civil war. The international response to the conflict has been twofold, firstly, attention was paid to the humanitarian situation by means of food aid especially and secondly, the development of conflict resolution processes from 1991 as follows: Djibouti (1991), Addis Ababa (1993), Cairo (1997) and then Arta (2000) and Mbagathi (2004). The 2000 Arta Peace Process was the first meaningful attempt to create a form of authority in Somalia.
Tadesse (2002) is critical of the Arta Peace Process and alleges that it was a gathering of Al-Ittihad or Islamic parties. His argument is based on the fact that the outcome of the process was the election of the TNG and TNA leadership from the Habr Gedir sub-clan of the Hawiye thought to be the backbone of the Union of Islamic Courts, which emerged in 2006.

Though critical of the TNG, Lewis (2005: 302) attributes some of the TNG and TNA failures to the recalcitrant warlords controlling Mogadishu, the divisive leadership of Abdulqasim Salat Hassan, the TNG president, and the lack of recognition by regional powers. Parallel processes by Ethiopia (supported by the United States (US) are also seen as a factor contributing to the collapse of the TNG.

1.3 An overview of the peace processes
Importantly, the 2004 Mbagathi Peace Process was seen by peacemakers as a breakthrough in the establishment of a legitimate authority in Somalia and a positive development was the recognition of the Mbagathi Peace Process by the regional and international communities. Kiplagat (2006: 35) argues that the “four and a half formula” included the Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Digle and Mirifle, and half of the Bantus. This study critically evaluates whether the formula of clan representation was translated into actual participation in the peace process. Granted, the warlords’ earlier participation in the peace process represented a shift from the Arta Process, which was rightly and initially viewed as a significant achievement by most peace-makers. However, there should have been a balance of power between the warlords and the clan leaders at least. Mbagathi now favours the latter. The neo-liberal concept of a ‘federation government,’ produced by the Mbagathi Process, provided further hope that a federation system of government created along clanship lines was sustainable as it created more political space for clan disputants (Adar 2006: 74).
The challenge of implementing the Mbagathi Peace Process may thus be another positive beginning, because it led to the creation of a system of government. However, before all the dimensions of the conflict are addressed adequately, not only regarding the warlord and clan interests, but also regarding the root causes, the state-building and peace-building processes although necessary, will not be sufficient.

1.4 Literature overview
The literature on the Somali conflict is dominated by scholars from countries in the north, such as Menkhaus (2003 & 2004), Lewis (1994, 1999, 2002 & 2008), Rutherford (2008) and Moller (2009). African scholars such as Othieno (2007a & 2007b), Elmi and Barisse (2006) and Osman (2007) share the same theoretical approach with the above mentioned scholars. These scholars’ conceptual approaches to the resolution of Somalia’s conflict have been driven by the international community’s desire to ensure that Somalis create some form of a central government, hoping that such an authority will bring the anarchical situation to an end. This argument is also recognised by Othieno (2007: 19 – 40), but no particular attention is given to the root causes of intractable conflict states (Osman 2007: 127). Coleman (2006: 534) attributes the root cause of protracted conflicts to the existence of a severe imbalance of power between parties in which the more powerful parties exploit, control or abuse the less powerful. In turn, Dweck and Ehrlinger (2006: 317) state that prejudice (which is evident in the clan rivalries in the case of Somali) is the main root cause of intractable conflicts. Importantly, Deutsch (2006: 43) identifies oppression as the root cause of intractable conflicts. Oppression in the case of the Somali conflict, it can be seen in Siad Barre’s Marehan clan that is a sub-clan of the Darod clan and is an exclusive group, which is opposed by Mohammed Farah Aidid’s Habr Gidir sub-clan and the broader Hawiye clan.
Furthermore, according to Deutsch’s definition, oppression is reproduced systematically in the major economic, political and cultural institutions – Siad Barre did precisely this from 1969 to 1991. In turn, D’Estree (2009: 150) argues that protracted conflicts are a mixture of socio-ethnic and interstate elements that defy traditional settlement methods and generate escalating perceptions and behaviour.

Though the above scholars view the causes of intractable conflicts from different perspectives, their conclusions are the same in that they regard social, political and economic exclusion as the underlying causes of intractable conflicts. In line with this, Osman (2007: 95 – 113) argues that inequality and exclusion are the root causes of the Somali conflict, which is manifested in the conflict between the ruling clans and the nomads on the one hand, and the outsiders and the sedentary clans on the other hand.

Usually, intractable conflicts are not easy to resolve because they occur within what Mayer (2000: 4 – 101) calls the three conflict dimensions, namely the cognitive, emotional and behavioural dimensions. Therefore, the conflict resolution process has to address these various dimensions before embarking on the transitional process, which is a peace-building approach. Mediators should focus on issues pertaining to the resolution phase such as negotiations, before moving to the next phase such as the comprehensive peace-building phase, which includes among others, the building of institutions of governance. Approaching conflict resolution by means of “phases” will provide some guarantee that the conflict dimensions do not permeate the transitional phase of the resolution process. This study pays particular attention to and critically evaluates whether the conflict resolution phase in Somali peace-making attempts has been overlooked in favour of the transitional phase. It should also be determined what should come first, namely state-building or peace-building or should there be a hybrid solution as proposed by Menkhaus?
Both the 2000 Arta Process and the 2004 Mbagathi Process affirm that the Neo-liberal approach has influenced the argument that the establishment of a central government is fundamental for the transformation of the Somali conflict. Weaknesses of the Neo-liberal approach are embedded in the argument that a government modelled along the Western democracy principles is fundamental for the transformation of the Somali conflict. The study will undertake a critical analysis of the failure of previous peace processes, using the 2000 Arta and the 2004 Mbagathi processes as case studies. Essentially, it would seem that these peace processes were concluded without attention to the root causes or analysis of the failure of previous phases and attempts. The legitimacy of a peace process is as important as the outcome, thereby creating a structural framework for clan elders’ participation and not only that of the warlords only. Importantly, the manner in which negotiation takes place may ensure the legitimacy and popular acceptance of the negotiation outcomes.

Embracing indigenous approaches to conflict resolution may also contribute to the legitimacy of the outcomes of the peace process. Lewis (1999: 161 – 196) and Bradbury (1994: 31), state that clanship (Tol) and customary procedure founded upon contractual agreement (Heer/Xeer), provide a framework for clan elders’ participation in the negotiation processes. The Mbagathi Process moved away from warlords and also created a framework for clan representation, although actual participation was not facilitated. For instance, the creation of a structural framework in the form of a house of clan elders, which could create opportunities for meaningful participation in the clan political structures, did not take place.

In this regard, Moller (2009: 13) argues that clan structures have been instrumental in containing both feud and criminal violence through a system of mutual deterrence in which clan elders played a central role in constraining their respective clan members.
He also argues that the traditional approach forms the basis on which Sharia courts are founded and reflects the dominant varieties of Islam in Somalia. Most of them are fairly liberal and syncretic enough in their general outlook to allow sufficient space for customary law.

The field of conflict resolution study has evolved considerably; in this regard, alternative theoretical approaches to the study of conflict resolution and management form a fundamental pillar of this research of the Somali mediation processes. Mayer (2000), Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2009), Deutsch (2006), Moore (2003) and others have developed essential theoretical tools which are relevant for the analysis of the Somali conflict. These sources will be discussed in more detail in Chapter two.

1.5 Problem statement

The conflict in Somalia seems to be intractable. Despite the many peace processes, it has not been resolved. This study analyses the conflict in Somalia in relation to the peace processes, focussing particularly on the Arta (2000) and Mbagathi (2004) processes in order to determine the reasons for these failures and to recommend what could be done to improve them. Accordingly, the literature review provides the researcher with the conceptual analysis framework regarding the dominant theoretical approaches of international diplomacy in the search for a resolution to the conflict. The theoretical approaches are important as they determine the process outcomes. Based on the problem statement, the “what” and “why?” of this study are respectively:

What are the factions and who are the actors causing the protracted conflict in Somalia?


What lessons can be learned from the past history?
Somalia has been a fractured country in terms of clan lineage and patronage since 1897 (Lewis 1994: 93; Lewis 2003: 40 & 131). During the post-colonial period, dating from 1960, when the former Italian colony of Somalia in the south (including Puntland) and British Somaliland in the north united to form the Somali Republic, the issues surrounding clan lineage and patronage were further compounded (Adam 2008: 7). Siad Barre’s repressive regime followed in 1969 and after this, there was a devastating civil war, together with the emergence of a plethora of internal and external actors exacerbating the conflict. Consequently, the Barre regime collapsed in 1991, since then there have been ongoing regional and international attempts at mediation of the Somali conflict. Importantly, several problem areas responsible for the failure of these peace processes involving various actors will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

First, the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 has created a space for the emergence of warlords and religious opportunists. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2009: 495) argue that the avarice of predatory warlords, who profit from the political economy of violence through arms sales, smuggling and other illicit commercial practices and transactions, plays a definite role in intractable conflict situations. Some scholars, like Tadesse (2002: 20), view the establishment of Islamic political parties as a negative development for the Somali body politics. This could be the case because Somalia is a Muslim country and religious leaders may not be key actors in the solution of the Somali problem (Elmi & Barisse 2006: 45 – 57). The support base for many opportunist actors is the clan system. Somalia is a Muslim country and religious leaders are key actors in the process of resolving the problem. Therefore, it may also be essential that a political space be created for the active participation of the clan elders and not only for the warlords (Elmi and Barisse 2006: 47).
A second problem is the lack of clarity and purpose of the mediation processes in the Somali conflict. Mediation processes have often focused on the establishment of a central government before attempting to resolve the issues, which led to the collapse of the state in the first place. The establishment of a central government may be the ultimate goal, but without peace, there is little chance of building government institutions. Therefore, a phased approach to the problem may be desirable (as discussed in chapter two of this study). Coleman (2006: 546 – 555) states that there are three strategic framework approaches to intractable conflict resolutions: the problem analysis phase, the problem engagement phase, and the problem resolution phase. However, these phases are rarely sequential and are often cyclical in practice. Problem analysis should therefore be thought through carefully so that the resulting initiatives address the dynamics of intractability directly.

Third, post-colonial Somalia has only had nine years of civilian rule. The 1969 coup d’état by Mohammed Siad Barre is a factor which most scholars associate with the modern day chaos in Somalia (Tadesse 2002: 19; Lewis 2008: 36). In addition, the Barre military regime became more clannish in character, dominated by the Darod sub-clans of Marihan, Ogaden and Dulbahante (MOD) (Osman 2007:96). The cabal further polarised the already fragmented society along clan patronage and lineage.

Irredentist tendencies are a fourth source of concern in the Horn of Africa region, primarily for Ethiopia and Kenya. Lewis (2008: 29) argues that divisions in the Somali nation are represented in the five-pointed Somali star, the national emblem adopted by the Somali Republic at the time of independence in 1960. The irredentists are driven by pan-Somali nationalism that wants to unite the five areas of Ogaden, Djibouti, the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, Somaliland and the Somali Republic.
The Ogaden is part of Ethiopia and the attempt to secede from Ethiopia in order to re-unite with Somalia led to strong foreign intervention in this conflict with the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR), first siding with Somalia and then with Ethiopia.

Finally, there are a number of additional reasons why mediation has become problematic since 1991:

The colonial legacy.
Siad Barre’s repression.
Competition for land and food resources.
Clan rivalries.
Clan inequality.
Exclusion from power and wealth sharing
The economic decline under Barre.
The hyper-militarisation of the Somali nation due to the abundance of weapons acquired during the years of conflict (Osman 2007: 95 – 113).

1.6 Objective and significance of the study
The main purpose of this research is to find answers to the “what?” and “why?” questions posed above. An important part of the research is to take stock of the peace processes, to investigate why so many failed and to find guidelines for future endeavours for the peaceful settlement of this conflict. As indicated previously, the conflict led to the collapse of the central government in 1991, followed by years of unresolved conflict. Attention is also paid to the root causes of the conflict. This study then investigates the best possible option to finding a peaceful solution acceptable to internal and external stakeholders. It will also provide recommendations for addressing the fears and apprehensions of all the stakeholders.

This study describes the structures of the peace negotiation processes as well as their capabilities and limitations.
Particular attention will be paid to the extent to which these structures have reached out to major internal stakeholder-clans, warlords, Islamists, nomads and farmers in the conflict. Legitimacy of the processes is also a subject of investigation, with specific emphasis on whether the failure to institutionalise successive transitional governments is related to the lack of structural credibility, sufficient representation and participation in the negotiation processes.

This research can serve as a useful resource for South African government policy formulation on conflict resolution in Somalia, given the centrality of conflict resolution in the country’s foreign policy priorities. It is also an integral part of the consolidation of the African Agenda, which is a critical pillar of the South African foreign policy framework. The research will furthermore contribute to the body of knowledge on conflict resolution processes in Somalia. In addition, challenges and opportunities, presented to the mediators, by the peculiarities of the Somali political, social and economic system will be identified and discussed in this study. Lessons learned from the processes of mediating the conflict can serve as a resource for future diplomatic interventions in conflict resolution and management.

1.7 Research methodology
The research method that was used in this study was a survey of the literature available in the field of conflict resolution and mediation:
Primary sources (peace agreements and official documents).
Secondary sources dealing with the sub-discipline of conflict studies and analysis of the scholarship on Somali conflict.
Personal experience as a mediator in the Somali conflict (2000 – 2006) provides a framework to analyse some of the contradictions and dynamics of theory and practice.

Lewis (2008: x) argues for a bottom-up approach for establishing the formal structures of government with which viewpoint the researcher agrees.
He is critical of the European Union (EU), African Union (AU) and the United Nations’ (UN) top-down approach because it negates the decentralisation concept inherent in the Somali clan system of power-sharing. To this end, Adam (2008: 24) argues that the then UN representative for Somalia, Mr Mohamed Sahnoun, had begun to obtain Somali cooperation by advocating a gradual approach in harmony with the traditional mechanism of conflict resolution. Furthermore, he argues that Sahnoun was convinced that establishing a national government working from the bottom-up was the best approach, even though that might take two or more years. These approaches are, in the researcher’s view, key to understanding the failures of many of the earlier peace conferences from Djibouti in 1991 to Cairo in 1997. However, different circumstances prevailed at the Arta Conference (2000) and the Mbagathi Conference (2004) which led, at least, to the formation of transitional federal governments.

The researcher’s personal experience (2000 -2006) in Somalia and interaction with the warlords and other Somali leaders is useful for his analysis of the Somali conflict, even though no specific questionnaire or interview schedule was used in this regard. The period extending from 2002 to 2006 will be covered, with a particular focus on the Eldoret Peace Process, which culminated in the Mbagathi Peace Agreement (2004) and the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) in 2004 that built on the Arta Process of 2000. The researcher acted as a negotiator attempting to reconcile the president, the prime minister and ministers of the TFG with the Mogadishu based warlords such as Mohammed Quanyere Afrah, Musa Sudi, Ali Osman Atto, Omar Finnish and Mohammed Dhere. In the opinion of the researcher, that without the clan leaders’ participation, the peace process may remain unfinished business in spite of all efforts in this regard.
1.8 Structure of the study.

Following on this introductory chapter, is chapter two in which a theoretical framework is developed for the purpose of analysing the Somali conflict and the failure of its peace processes. The study of conflict resolution has generated a considerable body of literature across the academic disciplines. Importantly, this body of knowledge will be a resource base to analyse the intractable Somali conflict conceptually.

Chapter three provides a historical background of the Somali conflict based on the theoretical framework developed in chapter two. In addition, a brief overview of the 1897 partitioning of Somalia by colonial powers identifies this event as the origin of the modern day Somali conflict. The 1969 coup by General Mohammed Siad Barre is examined and its effect on the Somali Civil War, which continues to ravage the country, is analysed critically. Furthermore, the 1978 Ogaden War provides some level of understanding of the clan rivalries that led to the fall of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991. It is also argued that the collapse of the Somali state was triggered by the irredentist pan-Somali nationalism of Siad Barre’s regime, as well as by what Somalis viewed as capitulation in the 1978 war over the Ogaden with Ethiopia. An analysis of the clan system reveals the historical role of the clan elders in the Somali conflict resolution mechanisms, which is covered fully in chapter four, and deals with the post-Barre conflict resolution processes. Importantly, conflict and mediation theories are used to understand what happened and why it is so difficult to resolve the conflict.

In chapter four an analysis is provided of the peace processes with particular emphasis on the 2000 Arta Peace Process and the 2004 Mbagathi Peace Process respectively, again utilising the analytical framework developed in the second chapter. In addition, a description and critical analysis of these processes seeks to deconstruct the main purpose of international mediation. Particular attention is paid to the opportunities and challenges of the processes under review. The chapter also describes and analyses the structure of the two abovementioned
peace processes under review critically with the intent to establish how inclusive these processes have been with regard to the participation of all the key actors, particularly the clan elders. External actors’ interests in the peace process form the basis of an argument that the relentless quest to form an interim government is imposed on the disputants before they could agree on the cognitive resolution of the conflict. Without losing sight of the purpose of the study, this chapter provides a short overview of the Union of Islamic Councils (UIC) and its role in the conflict.

The concluding chapter focusses on a critical evaluation of the preceding chapters’ findings, their implications for future peace negotiations regarding the Somali conflict and outlines proposals with regard to further attempts to resolve the conflict. Recommendations are made concerning the theoretical approach to the conflict based on the overall findings as well as recommendations about the best possible strategy to move the Somali peace process forward.
2. Chapter two: Theoretical perspectives on conflict

2.1 Introduction
Theoretical approaches to conflict analysis and resolution presented and discussed in this study form the basis for developing an intervention strategy, which enables the disputants to deal with the basic procedures of conflict resolution and management. Furthermore, the theoretical conceptual framework allows the mediation process to identify actors, issues and the structure of negotiation. In this regard, this study uses theoretical concepts of conflict and mediation to facilitate an understanding of the Somali conflict and to analyse the mediation processes since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 in chapters three and four.

2.2 Theoretical concepts pertaining to conflict
According to Deutsch (2006: 25), conflict only arises in a situation where people are interdependent – if each group is independent, there is no possibility of conflict and by implication, a conflict therefore presupposes some form of interdependence. Asymmetries may exist with regard to the degree of interdependence in relationships. Suppose that what you do or what happens to you may have a considerable effect on another person, but what that person does or what happens to him/her may have little impact on you. This means that the other person is more dependent on you than you are on that person. In an extreme case, you may be completely independent of that person, whereas that person may be highly dependent on you. Because of such asymmetry, you have greater power and influence in the relationship than the other person. This power may be general if the asymmetry exists in many situations; while it may be specific if the asymmetry only occurs in a particular situation (Deutsch 2006: 25). Idealists contend that conflicting interests is a mutual problem that needs to be solved by a collaborative effort. It facilitates recognising the legitimacy of each other’s interests and the necessity to search for a solution responsive to the needs of everyone involved. This approach tends to limit, rather than expand, the scope of the conflict of interests, according to Deutsch (2006: 27).
However, the prolonged Somali conflict has developed into a state of intractability, which is not related to the initial causes, this change of conflict trend needs to receive more attention by the mediators. In some instances, the changes are elusive for those who are not constantly attuned to the conflict dynamics. The emergence of forces such as the Al-Shabaab is a classical example of the conflict following trends, with which the mediators are ill prepared to deal with.

Mutual recognition of each other’s legitimacy in the conflict is fundamental, particularly in the Somali conflict where the society is divided in terms of clan and sub-clan patronage.

In this regard, Moore (2003: 188) argues that legitimacy refers to a party’s acceptance and recognition that an opponent exists, that an opponent has issues or interests, and that an opponent’s emotions are real, reasonable and conform to recognised principles and accepted rules or standards. Application of these principles is often distorted by the international expectation of the negotiation processes, which are sometimes applied to the detriment of a long-term solution of the Somali conflict (see chapter four). Importantly, mutual recognition should be unconditional to allow Somali parties to own the process and its outcomes. In addition, mutual recognition should recognise and accept that, although the parties are in competition with each other, there is a need to cooperate with each other to create a win-win situation (Mayer, 2000). There are a number of specific theoretical concepts that help shed further light on conflict and conflict mediation. These will be discussed in the following sections.

2.2.1 The three-dimensional perspectives of conflict

According to Mayer (2000: 4), conflict occurs in the cognitive (perceptual), emotional (feeling), and behavioural (action) dimensions. He argues that this three-dimensional perspective can help us understand the complexities of conflict and why a conflict sometimes seems to proceed in opposing directions.
The question can well be asked whether these perspectives can be utilised to help analyse the Somali conflict? (See paragraphs 2.3 to 2.5).

2.2.1.1 Conflict as perception

The fact that perceptions are strongly influenced by predispositions means that it is very difficult to convey messages that are inconsistent with what others already believe (Jonsson 2002: 274). Cognitive theory provides a conceptual framework for developing strategies that focussed on developing mutual trust during the negotiation process, thus enabling the disputants to reach a positive-sum solution to the conflict. Mayer (2004: 04) points out that, as a set of perceptions, conflict is a belief or understanding that one’s own needs, interests, wants, or values are incompatible with someone else’s.

Moreover, there are both objective and subjective elements in the cognitive dimension. He goes on to state that, “...if I believe us to have incompatible interests, and act accordingly, then I am engaging you in a conflict process whether you share this perception or not (Mayer, 2004:04). He also contends that conflict exists if at least one person believes it does. The undeclared conflict, referred by scholars as “frozen” or “abeyant” conflict (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall 2009: 495), has the potential to mature into a full- fledged violent conflict if not addressed in time.

Mayer (2000: 98) states that a dimensional cognitive resolution depends on whether disputants:

View the conflict as having been resolved.
Perceive that the key issues have been addressed.
They think that closure has been reached on the situation.
They view the conflict as part of their past as opposed to their future.

An important aspect of resolution has been reached if these common views do exist. It needs to be noted that the cognitive dimension of conflict resolution develops in tandem with the other dimensions. In analysing the Somali conflict,
attention is paid to the extent that the abovementioned perceptions informed the negotiation of both the Arta (20002) and the Mbagathi (2004) processes.

According to Mayer (2000: 99), resolution of the cognitive dimension is often the most difficult to attain because people cling tenaciously to their perceptions and beliefs about a conflict. Mayer declares that disputants may be locked in a set of behaviours and anchored in emotional responses that often vary in quick succession. Beliefs and perceptions are usually rigid and are at the heart of a person’s sense of stability and order, particularly in confusing and threatening situations. People also equate changing their views of a situation with admitting that they were wrong, something most people do not and will not readily do. He then points out that a national reconciliation strategy is one form of changing people’s perceptions about a conflict. Indeed, this approach has yielded positive results during the 1991 Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in South Africa.

2.2.1.2 Conflict as feeling
According to Mayer (2000: 5), conflict also involves an emotional reaction to a situation or interaction that signals a disagreement of some kind. The emotions felt might be fear, sadness, bitterness, anger or hopelessness, or some combination of these. Often a conflict exists because one person feels that he/she is in conflict with another, even though those feelings are not reciprocated by or even known to the other person. Therefore, the researcher considers the argument crucial in understanding and analysing the Somali conflict. Although the behavioural component may be minimal, the conflict is still very real to the person experiencing the feelings. What makes the Somali conflict even more difficult for peace-makers to comprehend, in the manner in which personal feelings are intertwined with the clan feelings, a matter which mediators often battle to recognise, thus leading to failure in the mediation processes.
For Mayer (2000: 101), the emotional dimension of resolution involves both the way disputants feel about a conflict and the amount of emotional energy they put into it. When people no longer experience the feelings associated with a conflict, or at least not as often or at as high a level of intensity as when they were fully engaged, then an important aspect of resolution has been reached. This may be the most volatile dimension of resolution because emotions change rapidly and repeatedly. Mayer declares that even though disputants may reach a great deal of emotional closure on a conflict, an event or interaction may occur that reawakens their feelings, and suddenly they feel they are right back in the middle of a conflict again.

Mayer’s argument was illustrated by the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, at a time when mediators had reached the understanding that Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) should reconvene in Baidoa town to resolve the issues dividing the Mogadishu Warlord faction of the TFG with that of the president and the prime minister.

The Ethiopian government’s Machiavellian approach of seizing and occupying the Somali territory caused resentment among Somalis who have since embarked on insurgency, which attracted international terrorists groups (see details in chapter three). Ethiopian occupation has also undermined the possible forgiveness processes, in this regard, the role of forgiveness and apology in reaching emotional resolution can be critical. Mayer mentions that a sincere and effective apology must be unconditional. Someone who is genuinely sorry about something is remorseful, regardless of whether someone else forgives him or her or has an apology to make as a response. It is more effective to offer a narrow, but sincere and unconditional apology than a broadly framed, but conditional statement. Although forgiveness is also potentially very powerful, it can be seen as patronising or self-righteous (Mayer 2000: 104).
2.2.1.3 Conflict as action

Mayer (2000: 5) states that conflict also consists of actions taken to express a person’s feelings, articulate his/her perceptions, and get his/her needs met in a way that has the potential for interfering with someone else’s ability to get his or her needs met. He also declares that conflict behaviour may involve a direct attempt to make something happen at someone else’s expense.

Mayer (2000: 106) explains that behavioural resolution entails two aspects: one has to do with discontinuing the conflict behaviour and the other with instituting actions to promote resolution. Stopping the fighting is one part of behavioural resolution. The other part is taking steps to meet each other’s needs and to implement a new mode of interaction with each another. Mayer’s approach is crucial in the Somali conflict resolution process. To this end, demobilisation and cantonment of the combatants is a prerequisite for behavioural change and conflict transformation, this behavioural change is a factor, which contributes to the creation of a climate conducive for peace and security. Similarly, ceasefire agreements are intended to change the behaviour of combatants in a conflict. It is important to stress that intractable conflicts require resolution in terms of the three dimensions that are driving the conflict, particularly those underlying the political, economical and social power relations between Somalis, mainly, and the balance of power between clans and sub-clans.

The heavy-handed manner in which the international community dealt with the Union of Islamic Councils (UIC) in 2006 did not contribute to creating a climate conducive to Somalis experiencing a sense of security, which could have influenced them to refrain from acting in a manner that justified the use of violence as a means of resolving their differences. It is a common practice that Somalis now “preach” peace but resort to violence to resolve their differences.
Continuing religious profiling of the Somali community will not help persuade
them to find alternative ways of settling their conflict, in contrast, profiling may
actually serve to attract external role players to use Somalia as an arena for their
violent conflict, such as the Ethiopians and Eritreans, in particular.

None of these dimensions is static. People can enter into conflict just as rapidly as
they can withdraw from it and the strength or character of conflict along each
dimension can change both quickly and frequently. Even though each of the
three dimensions affects each other, a change in the level of conflict in one
dimension does not necessarily cause a similar change in the other dimensions.
Sometimes an increase in one dimension is associated with a decrease in another
dimension.

An example of this is the occasional decrease in the emotional component of
conflict as people increase their awareness of the existence of the dispute and
their understanding of its nature. This is one reason why conflict can seem so
confusing and unpredictable (Mayer 2000: 6).

In addition, a medical metaphor can be used to analyse conflict resolution
processes in terms of which the illness (problem) must be diagnosed before any
treatment (solution) can be prescribed. This medical paradigm is discussed next.

2.2.2 The medical paradigm
The medical paradigm is based on the viewpoint that intractable conflicts are
pathological disease, and as such, are seen as infections or cancer of the body
politics that can spread and afflict the entire system, and therefore have to be
diagnosed correctly. Essentially, this calls for an understanding of the root causes
of the conflict. Coleman’s (2006: 544) problem-analysis phase of complete conflict
provides a fundamental basis for developing intervention strategies for dealing
with the root causes of the conflict. Here, however, the question is: who
intervened in Somalia (say, during the Ogaden War (1978, the “Black Hawk
“Down” (1993) incident and the recent attacks on Islamists and the Union of Islamic Courts (2006), and with what kind of agenda?

2.2.2.1 The diagnosis phase
Coleman (2006:544) states that the medical paradigm perspective views human and social systems as health-oriented entities that can develop pathological illnesses or tendencies that are destructive due to certain predispositions, neglect or exposure to toxic elements in the environment. Coleman (2006) adds that treatment of these pathologies, particularly when severe; it is seen as both an art and a science, with many courses of treatment resulting in their own negative consequences to the system. Based on the work of Coleman, it is the researcher’s considered view that the Somali conflict is misdiagnosed consistently by mediator and peace-makers.

The transitional arrangements of both the Arta (2000) and the Mbagathi (2004) processes can be seen as a post-trauma treatment of a system undergoing rehabilitation. Instead, this process should be the result of the successful treatment of the conflict, metaphorically speaking. It is important that a diagnosis of the conflict should be undertaken before a prescription is given, while failure to observe this principle will result in the wrong medication for the problem, thus resulting in the continuation of the conflict and loss of human life.

2.2.2.2 The treatment phase
The next stage of the diagnosis is the treatment of the pathological illnesses. The treatment of an intractable conflict does not automatically require a quick-fix approach due to its destructive tendency to resist treatment.

In fact, both peace-making and peace-building may be required depending on the situation. The Somali conflict has shown evidence of resistance to simultaneous the application of both approaches, with disputants using the peace-building approach, of transitional arrangements to display their desire to
capture political power. Inevitably, they resort to violent conflict to settle differences, which are normally the preserve of the negotiation process.

For instance, a systematic peace-making approach that is delinked from peace-building appears to be prudent to those who argue that Somali society does not have the institutional capacity to handle the truth and reconciliation aspect of peace-building at present. This applies in particular to the truth part of the process, given that some key players may feel threatened by such a process and may then become obstacles to the peace-making process.

According to Coleman (2006), the conflict resolution system should be comprehensive, holistic, insightful and equitable. This approach forms the basis of analysing the intractable Somali conflict and the mediation processes.

2.2.3 Phase approach to conflict analysis
Coleman (2006:547) has identified three phases in approaching complex conflicts effectively: the problem-analysis phase, the problem-engagement phase, and the problem-resolution phase, and he argues that they are rarely sequential and are often cyclical in practice, but problem analysis should be undertaken carefully so that the resulting initiatives address the dynamics of intractability directly relevant to the case.

2.2.3.1 Problem-analysis phase
A comprehensive analysis of the conflict system is a paramount requirement for peace-makers. In this regard, there are an increasing number of analytical tools useful for analysing complex conflict systems. Stakeholder analysis has proved to be the most useful tool that is essential to enable the analyst to understand actors, issues, and the objectives of disputants. The Somali peace processes serve as examples of the failure to analyse and develop a strategy before an intervention took place. The two peace processes under review progressed to the problem-resolution phase before there was a detailed understanding of the “who,” the
“what” and the “why” of the Somali conflict. Colman (2006:549) argues for a sequential method for intervention in an intractable conflict that begins by addressing the ripeness (willingness to de-escalate) of the conflict system. He describes ripeness as a commitment to change in the nature of the relations of parties from a destructive orientation toward a more constructive state of coexistence with the potential for mutual gain.

2.2.3.2 Problem-engagement phase

Coleman (2006:548) argues that because of the multidimensionality of intractable conflicts, it is imperative that interveners understand the system of the conflict from various perspectives and approach it comprehensively. The approach to the Somali peace processes does not seem to be holistic in its content.

At a certain point, the researcher received urgent requests for the South African government to provide military capacity to the faction of Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed and Mohammed Ghedi in their fight against the Mogadishu warlords. What was disturbing is that such requests were emanating from East African countries facilitating the Somali peace processes. There is a Realist view in some member states of the East African region that war is an integral feature of Somali politics (Lynn-Jones,1998: preface), therefore, as such, the conflict should be resolved through the strategies of domination, control and counter-control (Coleman 2006:542). Not surprisingly, this Realist paradigm has compromised the mediation efforts of the East African region countries, particularly Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia.

2.2.3.3 Problem-resolution phase

Coleman (2006: 550) emphasises the need to locate and comprehend the various paths to ripeness in a conflict as it constitutes a valuable attempt to understand the dynamic forces that keep a conflict in a state of “unripeness.” The Somali mediation processes have negated this fundamental process of conflict understanding during the problem-resolution phase, thus failing to devise a
mechanism to deal with spoilers, who stand to benefit from the war economy of the Somali conflict. The problem-resolution phase has been confused with the peace-building process (see the diagnosis paradigm).

Moore (2003: 08) argues that mediation is an extension or elaboration of the negotiation process that involves the intervention of an acceptable third party who has limited (or no) authoritative decision-making powers. He argues further that, as with negotiation, mediation leaves the decision-making power primarily in the hands of the parties involved in the conflict. Mediation is described as a voluntary process in that disputants must be willing to accept assistance from the intervener if he or she is to help them to manage or resolve their differences.

Mediation is usually initiated when parties can no longer handle the conflict on their own and when the only means of resolution appears to involve impartial third-party assistance to initiate a peace process. Zartman (2009: 322) defines negotiation as the process of combining conflicting positions into a joint agreement, which is synonymous with conflict resolution and is the most common (although not the only) way of preventing, managing, resolving, or transforming conflict.

He goes on to argue that the negotiation process operates under a loose group of norms that can be termed the “Ethos of Equality.” Like any norm, this ethos is not absolute, but it does underlie the conduct of negotiation around the world. It begins with a formal structural equality of all parties, based on the fact each has a veto over any agreement: therefore, the parties need to recognise each other as equals in the negotiation process (Zartman 2009: 324). In addition, he states that mediation is considered a subset of negotiation, an activity made necessary by the inability of the conflicting parties to overcome their conflict and produce a joint agreement on their own.
2.3 Theoretical concept of ‘intractable conflicts’

Coleman (2006: 542) points out that historically, the Realist paradigm has been the dominant perspective for the study of war and peace in history, politics and international affairs. Essentially a political metaphor, it views protracted conflicts as dangerous, high-stakes games that are won through the strategies of domination, control and counter-control.

Thus, intractable conflicts such as the conflict in Somalia are thought to result from rational strategic choices made under the conditions of “real politics” of hatred, manipulation, dominance and violence in the world. However, and most importantly, Realism deals mainly with inter-state conflicts, whereas the conflict in Somalia is primarily an intra-state conflict.

For the purpose of this study, the specific focus will be on the descriptive definition of the complex nature of the intractable conflict. Coleman (2006: 533) defines intractable conflicts (also known as “protracted social conflicts,” “moral conflicts” or “enduring rivalries”) as destructive conflicts, which persist for a long period and resist all attempts aimed at constructive resolution. He argues that they can appear to take on a life of their own. Azar’s 1978 definition of protracted social conflicts (PSCs) (in D’Estree 2009: 150) as a “mixture of socio-ethnic and interstate elements that defy traditional settlement methods, and generate escalating perceptions and behaviours.” She goes on to comment that because crises are managed to restore the status quo and to keep conflict at only a moderate level of intensity, the conflicts take on an inertial or even a “frozen” quality, remain unresolved despite repeated attempts to achieve a resolution.

In 1981, Azar and Farah (in D’Estree 2009: 150), add that the PSC’s represent deep-seated religious, racial and ethnic animosities set these conflicts apart from those not involving group identities and the rights asserted and sought through these variants.
According to D’Estree (2009: 150), Azar and Farah find that ethnicity is not the sole causative factor in these conflicts. They highlight the role played by structural inequalities and political power differences, particularly when these, in turn, result in the differential distribution of rewards among groups in society. These differentials are typically reinforced through unequal international connections, meaning that uneven and unequal development benefits will actually further exacerbate any prevailing differences.

Similarly, Coleman (2006: 534) argues that intractable conflicts regularly occur in situations where a severe imbalance of power exists between the parties in which the more powerful exploit, control or abuse the less powerful. He comments that the power holder in such situations will often use the existence of salient intergroup distinctions such as ethnicity, class, race and gender to hold on to power. Many of these conflicts are rooted in a history of colonialism, ethnocentrism, racism, sexism or human rights abuses in the relations between the disputants. These legacies manifest themselves in ideologies and practices at the cultural, structural and relational levels of these conflicts, which act to maintain hierarchical relations and injustices and thereby perpetuate the conflict (Coleman 2006: 537).

Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2009: 492) point out that intractable conflict tends to experience episodic, but recurring bouts of violence and appear to be highly resistant to efforts to resolve them. Intractable conflicts, however, are not necessarily impossible to resolve through a process of negotiated settlement or peace-making. They are also conflicts where the main targets are women, children and the defenceless segment of the population and the security establishment of the state. Furthermore, Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2009:492) argue that, even if violence is on the decline or even if it has disappeared completely, intractable conflicts may exist in a suspended state of animation because they refuse to yield to negotiated efforts to secure a more lasting political settlement. These kinds of conflicts are referred to as “frozen” or abeyant
intractable conflicts – this means that the potential for a renewed outbreak of violence exists (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall 2009).

Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, (2009: 493) define intractable conflicts as conflicts that have persisted over time and refuse to yield to efforts – either by the direct parties, or more often, with third-party assistance – to arrive at a political settlement.

Their resistance to a settlement may be attributed to a single cause or principal ingredient, but closer examination usually points to multiple causes and many contributing factors. They state that intractable conflicts are also conflicts in which armed parties enjoy relative autonomy to pursue their unilateral objectives free from considerations of cost and risk. They are not accountable to anyone. Whatever conditions lie behind the dispute, intractable conflicts share a common characteristic: they defy settlement because leaders believe their objectives are irreconcilable and they have a greater interest in maintaining the status quo, which may be violent, than considering their political alternatives.

2.3.1 Causes of intractability

For the purpose of this study, this section will focus on causes relevant to the study of the Somali conflict, such as geography and geopolitics, poverty and the denial of basic human needs, the avarice of predatory warlords, polarised zero-sum notions of identity, failure in earlier peace-making efforts, and local decision-makers who see their battle as a zero-sum game.

2.3.1.1 Geography and geopolitics

Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2009: 494) contend that geography and geopolitics may promote intractability. They comment that, in certain cases, neighbouring wars may engulf a conflict and hold it captive to a resolution of the larger war, similar to the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia in 2006.
Somalia is wedged between Ethiopia and Eritrea that are at war with each other. Importantly, Ethiopia and Eritrea have a specific interest in Somalia and their conflict has a direct impact on the Somali conflict. Wolff (2006: 75) refers to this phenomenon in terms of “bad leaders” and “bad neighbour syndromes.” This concept is also known as the “proximate cause of conflict.” The geographic location of Somalia in a neighbourhood characterised by conflict is a matter, which has introduced what is known as the ‘proximate causes of conflict.’

The concept means that the rough neighbourhood will continue to impact negatively on the conflict resolution process in Somalia by among others, the illicit trafficking of weapons in the already militarised country without a central government, and has become an epicentre for conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

2.3.1.2 Poverty and the denial of basic human needs
Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2009: 495) assert that, though there are examples of conflicts erupting as a result of poverty, there are countries that have endured poverty without falling into conflict. However, the extent to which the basic needs of certain groups in society are systematically denied and/or discriminated against by those in power, can plant the seeds for conflict, especially if there is no legitimate way to channel those grievances through the political process. Deutsch (2006: 43) posits that oppression is the main cause of conflicts and he defines oppression as the experience of repeated, widespread, systematic injustice. He argues that civilised oppression is embedded in unquestioned norms, habits and symbols in the assumption underlying institutions and rules and the collective consequences of following those rules. Mohamed Siad Barre has introduced a pervasive culture of clan domination and hegemony, which has become the feature of the Somali society. Dominant clans have used their position to disregard basic needs and interests of the less dominant, this domination has also found a meaning in the manner in which the peace processes have been structured with regard to clan representation.
2.3.1.3 Avarice of predatory warlords

According to Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2009: 495), the avarice of predatory warlords who profit from the political economy of violence through arms sales, smuggling and other illicit commercial practices, and transactions is another important factor in intractable conflict settings.

They contend that the dividends are such that those who are the chief beneficiaries of the war economy may have strong economic incentives to keep the conflict boiling.

The film “Blood Diamond” is a clear illustration of the relationship between illicit dealings and the financing of intractable conflicts, according to Crocker, Hampson, and Aall. Piracy in the Somali seawaters is another manifestation of the influence of the warlords and the war economy.

2.3.1.4 Polarised zero-sum notion of identity

A polarised zero-sum notion of identity can also produce intractability (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2009: 494). One can argue that the situation between Ethiopia and Somalia regarding the Ogaden shows us that conflicts, which continue over a long period, lead to the accumulation of grievances and these grievances become incorporated into each party’s version of history. In intractable conflicts, violence enters the everyday world of thousands of people and becomes a way of life. Conflict becomes institutionalised as vested interests rise in keeping the conflict going. Violence becomes the norm as parties become committed to the logic and culture of revenge. There are young people who grow up with conflict and know no other way of life.
2.3.1.5 Failure at earlier peacemaking efforts

Failure at earlier peace-making efforts can also result in the promotion of mutually exclusive basic requirements and preconditions for further negotiations. These basic requirements may mask a fundamental unwillingness to negotiate, as both parties know that you cannot satisfy the requirements of one side without contradicting the basic requirement of the other side, argue Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2009: 495). For instance, they argue that, in many internal conflicts the underdog insurgents hold the ability to continue the struggle as a trump card, resisting all attempts at disarmament or demobilisation before a political agreement has been reached. The government insists that disarmament or demobilisation is necessary preconditions for talks to begin.

Conditionality is another hurdle in the Somali conflict resolution processes due to the zero-sum concept of approach.

At times, the Somali conflict presented opportune moments for resolution that peace-makers failed to utilise, mainly due to conditionality imposed by forces that had a relative upper hand during different phases of the Somali conflict. For instance, when the UIC was in control of Mogadishu in 2006, the researcher saw this as an opportunity to transform the conflict, given the fact that it was the first time a single party had been in control of Mogadishu since the fall of the Mohammed Siad Barre government in 1991 (see details in chapter three).

2.3.1.6 Local decision-makers who see their battle as a “zero-sum game”

Local decision-makers who see their battle as a zero-sum game may resist or prevent the emergence of politics as the arena for settling their differences, because in their case, what their opponent gains, they lose (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2009: 498). Resistance to a settlement may appear to be due to a single cause or principal ingredient, but closer examination usually points to multiple causes and many contributing factors. The basic assumptions of intractable conflicts are that they defy settlement because leaders believe their objectives are
fundamentally irreconcilable and parties have more vested interests in the ongoing war than in any known alternative state of being.

Scholars agree that the sources of intractability are not the same as the original causes of the conflict. No matter which issues caused the initial conflict, a number of other elements will play a part in augmenting or even supplanting the original disputes (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2009: 496; Coleman 2006: 534). The emergence of the pirates has created another conflict area, to which the mediation processes have paid no attention thus far. It could well be that the pirates are responsible for financing the conflict and this hypothesis is yet to be tested. The pirates have become sophisticated in carrying out their operations and have demonstrated in the recent past that they are capable of challenging the naval forces of the developed countries.

2.4 Options for settlement

According to Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (2009: 496), one option for the settlement of intractable conflicts is to let the conflict settle itself. This will mean abstaining from intervention while hoping that both parties either reach a compromise or that one side wins. In addition, this approach assumes that disputants will reach a stage of fatigue and develop some resolution strategies without any third party intervention. The argument against intervening in an intractable conflict needs to take the potential consequences of abstention into account, including the negative effects of conflict spread, conflict metamorphosis and the broader consequences for the regional and international orders. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2009: 497) emphasise that any mediation in intractable conflict must start by asking why third parties should be involved at all (given that prior failure is a hallmark of intractability). They argue furthermore, that intractability and state failure appear to be closely related, with one feeding from and the other encouraging this state of affairs.
2.5 Conclusion

The conclusions drawn from the theoretical analysis are that though the Somali conflict is complex and difficult, it is not impossible to resolve. The conflict has become intractable, therefore it is essential that a detailed analysis should be carried out before any intervention strategy can be determined and implemented. The conflict is analysed by using the phase approach, which places the greatest emphasis on a comprehensive analysis of the actors, issue, and other dynamics, which are contributing to make the conflict intractable. The three dimensions of the conflict identified by Mayer are used to measure the level of Somali’s commitment to resolve the conflict. The concepts of ‘peace-making’ and ‘peace-building’ are used to understand the structural approach to the conflict and the mediation processes. In turn, the conflict resolution processes are analysed using a medical metaphor, which places great deal of importance on the diagnosing of the illness (problem) before applying any treatment (solution).

The treatment should be intended to heal the illness; as such, it should recommend the appropriate dosage.

Changes in the root causes of the intractable conflict can be detected through regular check-ups. The option of letting the conflict reach some level of fatigue and resolving itself, is analysed in chapter three and accordingly, due consideration is given to the peace and security challenges in the Horn of Africa region. The following chapter explores the structures of the peace-building strategies of international diplomacy in terms of whether they are created to deal with the resolution phase of the conflict.

The principle of neutrality regarding the mediation process is the most important aspect to consider when analysing the Arta (2000) and Mbagathi (2004) Peace Processes. Critical analysis of the peace processes using the three-phase approach to the intractable conflict of Somalia provides some understanding of why there has been such a high failure rate in the mediation processes. Chapter four also uses the medical metaphor to analyse the strategic focus of the mediation
processes. The peace-making and peace-building approaches are analysed in terms of the conclusions drawn from the theoretical argument that both processes are important in bringing closure to the intractable Somali conflict. However, their application should not be confused, particularly in Somalia, given the high degree of polarisation of clans and sub-clans.
3. Chapter three: Historical background of the Somali conflict

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it provides a broad overview of the various factors influencing the Somali conflict. These factors are important for an understanding of the nature and failure of the various peace processes to be analysed in chapter four.

Second, it deals in detail with the various causes of the conflict, based on the core assumption that it is not possible to understand the conflict – and therefore to attempt a sustainable resolution – without paying close attention to the root causes of the conflict.

3.2 Somalia and its people

Somalia is mainly a semi-desert country located at the north-eastern tip of the Horn of Africa. It covers almost 640,000 square kilometres (Bradbury 1994: 8). From the region of the Awash valley in the north-west, this predominantly arid territory is occupied by the Somali, extends around the periphery of the Ethiopian highlands and along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean coasts down to the Tana River in northern Kenya (Lewis 2005: 1). The areas between the Shebelle and Juba Rivers and the northern escarpment are the bread baskets of the country due to their higher rainfall and rich arable land, which is ideal for agricultural production. The Somalis are essentially a nation of pastoral nomads continually forced by the exigencies of their demanding climate and environment to search for grazing and water for their flocks of sheep, goats and herds of camels and cattle (Lewis 2005: 02).

The Somali-speaking people form one of the largest ethnic groups in Africa, dispersed throughout the Horn of Africa, from the Awash Valley, through the Ethiopian Ogaden, and also found in northern Kenya as far as the Tana River. Somalis belong to the Hamitic group of people – the Oromo, Saho and Beja people from the Horn of Africa (Bradbury 1994: 08; Lewis 2005: 04). Somalis have
a common ancestry, a single language and belong to the Islamic faith (Sunni), yet they are one of the most divided people along clan lineage and patronage. They are divided into six clan families – Darod, Hawiye, Dir, Issaq, Digil, and Mirifle/Rahanweyne, which are further divided, according to agnatic descent into subsidiary clans of lineage groups.

The clan structure is therefore a fundamental political unit essential for individual and group survival, particularly during conflict times. Bradbury (1994: 8) argues that, until the colonial period, the Somali “nation” did not form a single political unit; any concept of political identity was based on clan affiliation. He argues that it was only when the Ethiopian empire and the colonial powers of Britain, Italy, and France divided the Horn and the lands of the Somali people into five states in 1897, did the concept of a nation state begin to grow. These five states were British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Ethiopian Ogaden and the NFD of Kenya and the Somali Republic. The geo-strategic location of Somalia exposed it to imperial competition, particularly its access to the Gulf of Aden. The Ethiopian imperial need for grazing land was another factor that influenced the British government to cede the Haud grazing reserves to Ethiopia in 1954 (Bradbury 1994: 08). The British colonial separation of the Somali people has since become a source of conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia.

The ethos and values of the Somalis is primarily shaped by their common belief in the Islamic faith. They also have a common language, though they draw some distinction between pastoralists and cultivators. Lewis (2005: 05) compares these differences to the Portuguese and Spanish, by pointing out that the differences are not fundamental. In the recent past, the Western world has portrayed the Islamic faith of Somalis as a source of concern regarding the conflict. The concern emanates from the post 11 September attack on the United States of America (USA) by people associated with the Wahhabbi and Salafi sects of Islam. Somalis
do not have any historical links with Wahhabism; they are predominantly Sufists who are adherents of the Sunni sect of the Islamic faith.

Though the sources of the Somali conflict date back to the imperial partitioning of the country in 1897, the modern day Somali conflict is driven by a plethora of issues and it remains mostly intra-Somalis in character. In the recent past, the conflict has assumed a regional dimension with neighbouring countries being drawn in due to fears and apprehension regarding the pan-Somali ideology. Importantly, the Pan-Somali ideology has no regard for international law or for the regulation and recognition of the colonial borders. The conflict is further compounded by the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict, with Somalia becoming the incentive for a proxy war between the two countries. It is also important to note that the rise of Mohammed Siad Barre was the turning point in the Somali civil war.

3.3 The rise and fall of Mohammed Siad Barre (1969 – 1991)

In 1969, General Mohammed Siad Barre, a member of the Marehan sub-clan of Darod, seized power in a military coup and renamed the country the Somalia Democratic Republic, based on Scientific Socialism. This effectively aligned the country with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. He outlawed clans and their structures, but concentrated political power in his Marehan sub-clan, his maternal Ogaden sub-clan and the Dolbahunte sub-clan of his principal son-in-law. All these sub-clans belong to the Darod clan, thus perpetuating the Darod domination of the Somali body politics. The political cabal based on clan patronage and lineage was known by the acronym MOD for Marehan-Ogaden-Dulbahunte in political circles in Somalia. The initial stage of Siad Barre rule may be described as a period characterised by a concentration of problems such as local development and the consolidation of the regimes’ authority (Lewis 2005: 226). Political exclusion of other clans and a crackdown on the religious establishment soon became a source of conflict between the regime and those excluded from the mainstream politics, economics and social spheres of the country.
The sense of discontent and frustration was by no means limited to members of the non-Darod clans. Other sub-clans within the Darod clan also experienced frustration, mainly due to political marginalisation by the dominant MOD cabal. Discontent within the Supreme Revolutionary Council made it indisputably clear that General Siad Barre’s word was law and brooked no defiance or disagreement (Lewis 2005: 213). Repression within the ruling cabal was also prominent as indicated by the public execution of two generals accused of plotting to overthrow Siad Barre’s regime in 1972. According to Lewis (2005:213), the execution of ten religious leaders and Sheikhs in 1975 had wider and more serious repercussions and touched a deeper nerve in the Somali society. Siad Barre’s failure to respect the institutions of Somali’s Islamic faith contributed to the general public’s resentment of the regime, thus it became more and more alienated from society.

When Siad Barre assumed power in 1969, he declared that his Scientific Socialism was fully compatible with the Somali Islamic value system even though his deeds soon proved the opposite (Lewis 2005: 219). Somalis are firmly attached to Islam and are traditionally divided into three main denominations: the Qadiriya, the Ahmadiya, and an Ahmadiya derivative, the Salihiya. These are the Sufi or mystical brotherhoods found throughout the Muslim world, the Qadiriya being the oldest and least puritanical (Lewis 2008: 16). Wahhabi and other Islamic sects with Saudi Arabian, Sudanese or Iranian connections and resources, began to compete for followers among the Somalis who had suffered from the consequences of the civil war in the 1990s (Lewis 2008: 20). Wahhabism cannot therefore be attributed to the Somali Islamic value system. This is despite the infrastructural capacity of formations aligned with Wahhabism, such as the Al-Ittihad al-Islam organisation, to influence the body politics of Somalis. The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 created conducive conditions for Islamist forces to emerge and compete for the centre of the political dynamics in Somalia (Tadesse 2000: 24).
The period leading up to the 21 October coup by General Mohammed Siad Barre was characterised by the ideological nature of the then parliamentary system, which was largely secular and was also characterised by the shifting pendulum of clans and pan-Somali nationalism (Tadesse 2000: 14).

It is important to point out that the weak government of Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke bears the hallmark of a failed state typified by corruption, nepotism and clan loyalty and patronage. The post-colonial state formation and consolidation was another contributing factor leading to General Siad Barre’s seizure of power.

During the era when the majority of the former colonial territories became independent, in the first two decades after World War II, these underlying problems of state maintenance were largely masked by the assumed universality of statehood and by the continued ability of hegemonic powers to intervene when their interests were threatened (Milliken & Krause 2003: 31). The former colonial powers chose not to intervene and prevent General Siad Barre from seizing power from the democratically elected government of President Sharmarke forcefully because their interests were not threatened by the junta.

Siad Barre promised economic development and national unity by espousing the ideology of “Scientific Socialism” and by outlawing the notion of clan and political Islam. He took measures that led to the radical regimentation and militarisation of the Somali society and the imposition of secularism (Tadesse 2002: 16; Bradbury 1994: 9; Lewis 2005: 210). Though Siad Barre espoused the notion of a common Somali national identity, the military regime was based on the three Darod sub-clans of Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbahante or the MOD cabal. Paradoxically, what Siad Barre created in the end was a military and clan dictatorship and he turned out to be more clannish, given the fact that the
political and economic powers were mainly in the hands of the MOD to the exclusion of the other clans. This did not resonate well with the excluded clans and settled the stage for continued confrontation along the clan divides.

By 1977, the military regime was challenged by non-Darod clans and Islamic leaders, driven mainly by the exclusion policies of Siad Barre’s military regime. Siad Barre then launched the Ogaden War as a means of reasserting his political grip, while exploiting the Somalis’ desire to achieve the ideal of a greater Somalia, which encompasses Djibouti, Ogaden, Somaliland, the NFD of Kenya, and Southern Somalia. The desire to reunite the country on this basis was a common denominator among the Somalis.

The turning point against Siad Barre’s military regime was the defeat in the Ogaden War in 1978. It led to a national introspection about the high number of casualties and the resulted in increase questions about the legitimacy of the Barre regime. Rutherford (2008:4) estimates that more than one million Ethiopians of Somali ethnicity flooded into Somalia, fleeing starvation as a result of the regime’s failure to manage relief efforts, even though it controlled the transportation infrastructure networks. This compounded the after effects of the war on the Barre regime. Siad Barre’s defeat in the Ogaden War was the result of the changing balance of military power in the Cold War era. Until 1974, the US had supported Ethiopia, whereas the Soviet Union had found a valuable ally in Siad Barre’s military regime (Møller 2009: 9). When the Soviet Union switched its support to Mengistu Haile Mariam during the Ogaden War, it became clear that Somalia would not be able to sustain a successful military campaign against Ethiopia. Importantly, the Soviet and Cuban human and material support for Mengistu Haile Mariam was a decisive factor in the Ogaden War against Somalia.
3.4 The militarisation of Somalia

Siad Barre was particularly adept at using the tensions of the Cold War and superpower interests to solicit a vast array of armaments for his government (Bradbury 1994: 10). Accordingly, the Barre regime was instrumental in achieving the hyper-militarisation of Somalia since its inception.

Bradbury (1994: 10) argues that not only the Soviet Union and the US contributed arms to the country, but also other countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, East Germany, Apartheid South Africa, Iran, Iraq, Italy and Libya were also arms contributors. The arsenals of weapons driving the current conflict in Somalia are to a certain extent, leftovers of the Cold War arms proliferation, particularly the small arms that can be found in the country. This phenomenon is a source of concern for the security and stability of countries in the Horn of Africa. Weapons that have found their way to civilians are readily available in Somalia and are turned into a means of survival and defence in desperate economic times (Osman 2007: 99). Siad In his desperation, Barre distributed a large quantity of weapons to his Darod clan mainly, thus igniting intra-clan conflict on a scale never seen before.

Foreign military, technical and financial assistance to disputants is a factor that makes peace-making elusive. Somalia was one of the most militarised states in the international system during Siad Barre’s rule. Adam (2008: 55 & 84) argues that in 1977, the country had 25 MIG-17s and MIG-21s, 30 MIG-19s, a Shenyang fighter, a squadron of 24 MIG-21s, a six-plane transport squadron as well as a helicopter squadron. The Soviet Union provided 250 medium tanks, 100 T-54s and T55s, an arsenal of guided missiles boats, assisted in the establishment of the navy and a well-equipped army of 37,000 troops. The United States made an initial contribution of $40 million in military equipment following the expulsion of the USSR in 1977, followed by a consistent pattern of military support until the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.
3.5 The implications of the Ogaden War

The defeat of Siad Barre in the Ogaden War was regarded by the Somalis as a national humiliation in their history. There were naturally bitter recriminations, both regarding the conduct of the military operations, directed at the end by the President himself, and on Somali foreign policy (Lewis 2005: 242). The country’s foreign policy was predicated on the pan–Somali ideology.

The defeat was therefore seen as the end of the desire to unite Somalis across colonial boundaries. The underlying realities were indeed daunting, particularly for the Darod clan that was blamed by other clans for the capitulation of a cause perceived to be noble by most Somalis. The abortive coup by Majerten officers, led by Colonel Abdillahi Amhed Yussuf in April 1978, further polarised the Darod clan cohesion. The coup attempt also alienated the Majerten group from other clans who regarded the abortive coup as a narrow, parochial initiative (Lewis 2005: 246). Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed then formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in 1978. The SSDF collapsed in 1986 when Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed was arrested by the Mengistu Haile Mariam government that was then seeking rapprochement with Siad Barre. The SSDF was subsequently reconstituted as a political entity in 1989 in Rome (Bradbury 1994: 11).

Siad Barre responded to the Majerten abortive coup with a heavy-handed military campaign, focussing on the north–eastern corner of the Somali peninsula in the Mudug, Nugaal and Bari regions. The area is populated by the Majerten sub–clan and they are also found in the coastal city of Kismayo where they are known as Harti (the generic term for the Majerten, the Dolbahunte and the Warsengeli) (Bradbury 1994: 11). The military campaign against the Majerten became a political liability against the military regime at a later stage. The regime then confronted an array of military rebellions across the clan divide with the Hawiye clan taking centre stage in the war against the Siad Barre regime. The final downfall of Siad Barre was precipitated by the emergence, in 1989, of the Hawiye–based military force, the United Somali Congress (USC) led by
Mohammed Wardhigly who initially sought a peaceful solution to the conflict. He died in June 1990 and was replaced by General Mohammed Farah Aidid, a Habr Gedir Saad (Bradbury 1994: 13). General Aidid favoured a military solution as opposed to other leaders such as a businessperson Mohamed Ali Mahdi, an Abgal. Mahdi belonged to a political group known as the “Manifesto Group.” Abdulqasim Salat Hassan, whom later became president of the Transitional National Government (TNG), was included, amongst others, in this group. The USC had become a primarily Hawiye political formation, dominated by the Habr Gedir and Abgal sub-clans. Siad Barre responded once again by urging Darods in Mogadishu to kill the Hawiye citizens whether they were Abgal or Habr Gedir.

The ensuing inter-clan violence, however, threatened Siad Barre’s position further and in desperation, he finally turned his heavy war machinery on the Hawiye quarters of Mogadishu (Lewis 2005: 73). Turning Mogadishu into another military front, he overstretched the military capability to contain the violence that was already spiralling out of control. The Issaq clan, under the Somali National Movement (SNM), had gained popular support in the northern part of the country (Somaliland) and was engaged in an armed rebellion. The SNM combatants attacked government garrisons and briefly captured the northern cities of Burco and Hargeisa. At the time of Barre’s fall, an estimated 50,000 people were killed in Somaliland and 600,000 had fled to Ethiopia (Bradbury 1994: 12).

Ethiopia was serving as a reliable rear base for groups engaged in the armed struggle against the Siad Barre regime. In essence, Ethiopia’s support was not based on any long-term shared political values, but was rather informed by the notion of “an enemy of my enemy is my friend, and the friend of my enemy is my enemy.” This marriage of convenience has become a permanent feature defining the manner in which Ethiopia manages its fears, apprehension and legitimate national security concerns. Cognisant of these dynamics, Siad Barre
reached out to Mengistu and concluded a peace accord with the various parties, obliging each of them to terminate support for the other Somali dissidents. In April 1988, Siad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam signed a peace accord that normalised their relations (Lewis 2005: 71). Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed and other leaders of the SSDF were then arrested by the Ethiopian government as an integral part of keeping their allegiance to the peace accord with the Siad Barre regime.

The Somalis were determined to continue their armed rebellion against the military regime and not even Mengistu could stop the Somalis’ determination to remove Siad Barre’s regime from power.

The assassination of the Bishop of Mogadishu in July 1989, the declining economic situation, and the rising tide of displaced people in the capital created conditions conducive to a popular uprising against the regime (Bradbury 1994: 14). In an attempt to suppress the uprising, the regime arrested prominent religious leaders and killed some 450 people in Mogadishu; this was fatal, as people were no longer prepared to be ruled in the same as before. On 3 December 1990, armed Hawiye combatants attacked the army garrison at Villa Baidoa and the Presidential Palace Villa in Somalia (Bradbury 1994: 14).

Italy and Egypt belatedly offered to sponsor a peace conference in Cairo, but this was rejected by General Mohamed Farah Aidid and other armed groups. General Aidid’s focus was fixed on the military assault on Mogadishu. The next chapter gives a detailed analysis of mediation processes and the reasons for this belated mediation are the subject of analysis. On 4 and 5 January 1991, the US aircraft-carrier Guam evacuated diplomatic and foreign nationals from Mogadishu. The evacuation signalled a major assault on the city by forces loyal to General Aidid. On 26 January, Mohamed Siad Barre together with his son-in-law General Siad Hersi Morgan fled from Mogadishu to Siad Barre’s home area in the Gedo region in the south-west of the country (Bradbury 1994: 14). This marked the fall of the Siad Barre military regime an event that will remain synonymous with the
collapse of the Somali state. Chapter four will provide an analysis of the international diplomatic efforts undertaken since 1991 to re-establish the Somali state.

3.6 Collapse of the Somali state
The fall of the Mohamed Siad Barre regime in 1991 had unintended consequences on the Somali state institution.

The fall of a government does not necessarily signal the collapse of a state in democratic societies. The basic assumption is that the threat of state collapse unsurprisingly arises in countries in which the preconditions for state formation and maintenance were most uncertain in the first place and derives from the relatively recent assumption that the entire world should be divided into states (Clapham 2003: 27). When Siad Barre seized power in a military coup in 1969, the Somali state was nine years into its formation with visible structural weaknesses. The military government destroyed even the rudimentary structures of a functioning state such as the legislature, judiciary and the civil service. Therefore, the collapse of the Somali state was not a chance event, but a process, which began at the time of independence in 1960. Thus, it can be stated that the state’s collapse was triggered when the Siad Barre government fell in 1991.

When the Somali state collapsed in 1991, there was no formidable political formation capable of filling the vacuum left by the weak government of Siad Barre. The country was fragmented in terms of clan lineage and patronage and the devastating drought and ensuing famine introduced food security as a source of conflict. Another element consistent with the concept of an intractable conflict concept was introduced: the changing goalpost in the life cycle of such a conflict. A lack of political vision and the politics of exclusion became the ingredients for the current civil war in Somalia. The absence of a political formation capable of channelling the anger of the Somalis to change the divisive legacy of the Siad Barre regime constructively was another factor in Somalia’s protracted civil war.
3.7 The emergence of warlords

The political economy of violence through arms sales, smuggling, illicit commercial practices and the battle for control of humanitarian food supplies following the drought and famine in what was known as the triangle of death in 1991 set the scene for the emergence of the warlords in Somalia. These warlords, who had much to gain from their activities, had gained prominence by exploiting the inter-clan animosities.

Defeated Siad Barre generals also became warlords at the time that the political structures, which had formerly legitimised them, collapsed. The qat-chewing young gangsters, whose explicit role model was Rambo (Lewis 2005: 265), provided a fertile ground for recruitment by warlords and mayhem, looting and killing became widespread in Mogadishu. Business people were also compelled to establish militia gangs to protect their economic interests in view of the prevailing anarchical situation in the country. Businessman Mohammed Ali Mahdi was among the first people to provide financial support to General Mohammed Farah Aidid’s USC, although these two later fought each other for control of the USC.

Lewis (2005: 264) estimates that 14,000 people were killed in the ensuing battle between the two warlords in 1991 for the control of Mogadishu, following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. Ali Osman Atto is another businessperson who became a warlord; he also started by first providing financial support to General Mohammed Farah Aidid and later fought a fierce battle with him over control of the Habr Gedir Saad. The feud ended with General Aidid losing his life and Ali Osman Atto emerging as the victor.

Musa Sudi Yalaho is also a businessperson who became a warlord. He hailed from the Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye clan family, thus becoming a logical competitor of Mohammed Ali Mahdi in the battle for the soul of the Abgal. Lewis (2005: 276) pronounces that Musa Sudi Yalaho was destined to replace
Mohammed Ali Mahdi as a leading Abgal warlord. Indeed, Musa Sudi became a dominant figure in the Abgal and this dominance would later earn him a seat at the negotiation table and a cabinet post in the Mbagathi Peace Process. This peace process is the subject of analysis in the next chapter of this study – it will provide an analysis of by whom and how negotiators and their constituencies are selected.

Contestation for control and clan manipulation was not only confined to the Hawiye clan and its sub-units. The Darod clan was also facing the same challenge. Ahmed Abdillahi Yusuf, from the Majerten, was engaged in an inter-clan battle with General Muhammad Abshir, the former commander of the Somali police and chairperson of the SSDF. The two formed a united front against Al-Ittihad fundamentalists in Bossaso and eventually defeated them. Al-Ittihad’s defeat is viewed by Lewis (2005: 286) as a turning point in the establishment of the autonomous region of Puntland. The leadership of the SSDF never harboured secessionist tendencies - the internal clan rivalries were rather driven by the issue of how to share Bossaso’s revenue among all the constituents of Puntland. The absence of a formal modern institution of government in the region led to the increase and extension of the duties and power of local lineage elders (collectively known as the Isimadda), especially the enhancement of the duties of those presiding over paying groups and who were directly concerned with the administration of customary law (Lewis 2005: 288). This exposition by Lewis clearly illustrates the centrality of the clan system in conflict resolution. In this regard, the preceding chapter explored how the mediation process has utilised this fact concerning Somalian society, as an asset in the resolution of the conflict.

3.8 Intra-clan war

The feud between the Habr Gedir Saad and the Majerten was caused by General Farah Aidid’s desire to acquire the grazing rights in the Mudug region. General Mohammed Farah Aidid was eventually defeated and the region was then
divided into two parts: the northern Galkayo became inhabited by the Harti and the south became home to the Habr Gedir Saad. Having defeated Aidid, the SSDF leadership decided to participate in the 1993 Addis Ababa Peace Process and accepted its terms (Lewis 2005: 287). The SSDF participation coincided with and is linked with the formation of the government as well as the resurgence of conflict. Menkhaus (2003: 12) proposes that a case can be made that attempts to revive a central state have actually exacerbated armed conflict. In his view, state-building and peace-building are two separate and in some respects, mutually antagonistic enterprises in Somalia. To support these hypotheses, the 2002 armed conflict between Musa Sudi and Omar Finish was directly related to the assumption that whoever emerged victorious would be accorded a seat at the negotiation table as a representative of the Abgal. The war between General Aidid and Ali Mahdi, following the fall of Siad Barre, is perhaps the most fundamental illustration of the argument that state-building and peace-building are mutually antagonistic enterprises in Somalia.

3.9 Warlords and politics

In March 2001, the principal warlords established a coalition called the Somali Reconciliation Council and the Restoration Council (SRRC). The main actors in the coalition were Abdillahi Yusuf and Hassan Muhammad Nur, also known as “Shatigudud” or Red Shirt. Shatigudud comes from the Digle and Rahanweyne clans and was based in Baidoa. Lewis (2005: 302) mentions that Ethiopia was the sponsor of the SRRC, an assertion denied by Ethiopia. Elmi and Barisse (2006: 41) state further that Shatigudud was sent to the Arta Conference by Ethiopia, meaning that he did not attend the conference to make a meaningful contribution, but to inform them of the outcome, thus enabling Ethiopia to make a strategic assessment of the conference. They also allege that he received military assistance from Ethiopia in order to capture Baidoa from Hussein Aidid’s faction. Ethiopia remains opposed to the Arta Process due to its perception that the process was dominated by Islamists with irredentist tendencies that threatened its government and national security. By keeping the
Somali people divided and weak, the current regime in Addis Ababa believes it can eliminate any threat from Somalia (Elmi & Barisse 2006: 42). The 2006 military invasion of Somalia was based on this parochial definition of Ethiopia’s national security interest. It has, however, proven to be unsustainable and led to the unconditional withdrawal of all Ethiopian combat troops from Somalia in December 2008 as well as the eventual resignation of Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed as president of the TFG.

The TNG failures are not only attributed to Ethiopia’s refusal to underwrite it, but exist primarily due to the recalcitrant warlords in Mogadishu and Bossaso. The Mogadishu-based warlords became a force with which to reckon due to Abdulqasim Salat Hassan’s inability to reach out to clan elders and to undercut their support base within the clan structures of the Somali society. In addition, the warlords had a wider clan representation than the TNG. They had Mohammed Qanyere Afrah (representing the Murosade sub-clan of the Hawiye), Musa Sudi Yalaho (an Abgal), Omar Finish (an Abgal), Ali Osman Atto (a Habr Gedir Saad) and Rashid Rage (a Habr Gedir Ayr). One of the shortcomings of the Mogadishu warlords is that they included only the dominant Hawiye clan in their political formation. The TNG failed to rise to the occasion and to appeal to other clans not reflected in the Mogadishu warlord structure. The TNG did well to establish some form of a working relation with the Sharia courts and their militias regarding the addressing of street crime, thus keeping some business areas of Mogadishu functioning, including the Bakara market, which forms the backbone of trade in Mogadishu. However, the Sharia courts experienced certain limitations in addressing core issues of the rule of law. According to Menkhaus (2003: 30) some of the most powerful constituencies in Somalia are those served by the rule of law which controls criminality by the underclass, but not a system which has the regulatory, investigatory, and enforcement capacity to address ‘meta-criminality’ war crimes, incitement of communal violence, expropriation of land and buildings by force, forced labour, distribution of counterfeit currency, money laundering, piracy, drug smuggling,
illegal exportation or charcoal and embezzlement of foreign aid and money from the coffers of regional government or the TNG, to name a few.

When the Sharia courts defeated the warlords in 2006, they were able to establish some law and order, particularly regarding the perennial problem of piracy.

The contention by Menkhaus (2003: 30) that some constituencies were threatened by the narrow scope of the Sharia courts is best illustrated by the manner in which the warlords described them as an “Al Qaeda” and a “terrorist” establishment.

The description appealed to the USA and the Ethiopian government, which led to the former country invading Somalia, under the pretext of fighting Al Qaeda, and limited American air strikes against targets in Somalia with civilian collateral casualties. Ethiopian and American paranoia about the Sharia courts is a factor in the transformation of the courts into a political force that became known as the Union of Islamic Councils (UIC). The UIC’s short stint in power has proven that it is possible for a single political entity to rule Mogadishu and establish the rule of law – something that has been illusive since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. The refusal of Osman Ali Atto to join the war against the Sharia court is yet another indication of the clan centrality in the Somali conflict. Atto’s refusal was based on the fact that the courts were mainly supported by the Habr Gedir Saad, Ayr, Suleiban and Sarur. Being a Habr Gedir Saad, Atto derives his support from the entire Habr Gedir and particularly his sub–clan. The other warlords asserted that Atto was not allowed to join the war against the courts due to his previous links with the Afghan Mujahedeen involvement against the Americans in the 1993 Somali invasion. The argument is further presented that the Americans were not prepared to provide him with their financial resources. Whatever the truth may be, Osman Atto emerged from the situation with his integrity intact in the view of his clan.
3.10 The United Nations (UN) intervention

On the 26 March 1993, the UN Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and unanimously adopted Resolution 814 (1993) to expand the UN’s role in Somalia. The new mandate provide authorisation for the establishment of the United Nations Office for Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

The implication of the resolution is that it entrenches the militarisation of the UN’s engagement in Somalia at the operational cost of $1.5 billion, making it the most expensive UN peace-keeping operation, according to Bradbury (1994: 25).

On 5 June 1993, the Pakistani UN peace–keeping troops used the provision of Chapter VII, which gives powers for peace-enforcement to UNOSOM, to search for weapons at General Aidid’s compound and Radio Mogadishu. The UNOSOM miscalculation led to the killing of 24 Pakistani peace–keeping troops. General Aidid’s action has changed the dynamics of peace–keeping in Somalia permanently– an act that also defines today’s peace–keeping efforts in that country.

The events that led up to 5 June 1993 continue to puzzle peace–makers and scholars alike. One view is that General Aidid, who had never favoured UN military intervention, tried to test the new UN forces when UNOSOM II assumed control (Bradbury 1994: 29). The other view is that the rhetoric from the General Aidid–controlled Radio Mogadishu against the UN was the cause of Pakistani action. The UN may have misread the defeat of Aidid by General Morgan in Kismayo to mean the military weakening of General Aidid, thus attacking Radio Mogadishu to deny him of propaganda capability. Whatever reasons UNOSOM II may give, changing the purpose of the mission without detailed diagnosis of the situation is a recipe for failure.

The UNOSOM retaliatory bombing of Aidid’s headquarters and house on 12 July 1993 resulted in the killing of prominent personalities from the Habr Gedir clan (Adam 2008: 26). Bradbury (1994: 32) argues that those that were killed also included the Ogaden, Dir, Majerten, Murosade and the Sheikal elders. The elders
met to explore their options with regard to the confrontation between Aidid and UNOSOM. Bradbury is of the view that the gathering was intended to put pressure on General Aidid to reach out to UNOSOM and find an amicable solution for both parties. The fact of the matter is that the true purpose of the gathering will forever remain the subject of speculation in analyses of those studying the Somali conflict. The killing has arguably galvanised the Habr Gedir clan in their support for General Aidid.

The transformation of the UN’s humanitarian mission to peace-enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter compromised the centrality of the UN’s diplomatic resolution of the Somali conflict. To date, disputants still argue that the UN is a party to the conflict, thus frustrating all endeavours by the UN to broker a peaceful settlement of the conflict. UNOSOM II-military operations against General Aidid were becoming a battle call to rally support against the UN mission. The UNOSOM II actions led to the destruction of a vaccine factory, a cigarette and a match factory, the National University, Radio Mogadishu, the Ministry of Livestock and other government buildings (Bradbury 1994: 33). This became a source of the Somalis resentment towards the UN mission in Somalia.

The military assault against General Aidid further generated and consolidated the Hawiye solidarity with General Aidid and when Admiral Howe placed a $20 000, reward on General Aidid’s head, the latter did the same in a show of force against UNOSOM. General Aidid felt that the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was tainted by his previous experiences with the Siad Barre regime. He was unhappy with the Egyptian government for having joined the Italian government in holding the Djibouti conferences that favoured Mohammed Ali Mahdi as the new interim President (Adam 2008: 26). The personalities and actions of the UNOSOM gave General Aidid the impression that the UN was against him, although he was correct in this regard. For instance, Admiral Howe had convinced the UN that General Aidid should be
marginalised during the Addis Ababa Peace Conference. The Addis Ababa Conference is the subject of analysis in chapter four of this study and Aidid’s participation will be explored to support this assertion.

The departure of UNOSOM II troops in March 1995 was an admission that a military option has failed to resolve the Somali conflict, although it was not acknowledged by its proponents. The military failure came at a cost of $4 billion from June 1993 to March 1995 plus a further $2 billion for the US mission on behalf of the UN (Adam 2008: 97). Were lessons learned that a military approach to the complex Somali Civil War does not work? Do peacemakers understand the intricacies of the clan system and its impact on the conflict? The argument by Adam (2008: 82) that clannism is the Somali version of ethnicity or tribalism, is an accurate account of the complexity of the clan system. International intervention was not informed by a detailed diagnosis of the nature of the conflict, particularly of the clan dynamics and intricacies of the Somali body politics as well as the system and its impact on the conflict resolution. Disputants used the presence of the UNOSOM as a factor in the conflict, yet the conflict continued unabated after the departure of the UNOSOM. This reinforced the argument that the conflict is basically intra-clan, driven by a plethora of factors and actors.

3.11 Root causes

Domestic factors

The thesis of this chapter is that the Somali conflict is caused by multiple and complex issues, ranging from political factors, economic factors, the colonial legacy, a repressive state and the availability of weapons. The most important factor that has created and sustained the clan-based militia’s conflict, is the competition for power. This is the case especially when one considers how power is acquired and exercised: through economic might and military strength, through demographic resilience, access to natural resources, and through the ability to display, resolve and instil fear without showing it. By means of all those measures, the clan-based warlords are so much more powerful than those who
taunt them with demands for disarmament. If this were a game of poker, rather than a deadly discourse, it would seem oddly asymmetrical. The sources of power in Somalia are the absence of state institutions and manipulation of the clan system.

The relentless quest for the creation of a central government may be inspired by the notion that those who control the state superstructure control the resources. This stems from the manner in which Siad Barre related to state institutions. He used the state to perpetuate the Darod hegemony over other clans. Clans’ fears and apprehensions should be addressed in any arrangements intended to distribute power among them. Elmi and Barisse (2006: 34) contend that current realities confirm the assertion that competition for power and/or resources was the leading cause of conflict among clans and militia groups. The civil war within the Hawiye, the Darod, the Digil and Mirifle, and the Issaq clans was a resource and/or power motivated conflict. The struggle against Siad Barre focussed at its core on the seizure of political power. Adam (2008: 83) points out that the tangible cause of Somalia’s civil wars derives from a militarist state and its brutal repression of a vibrant social reality.

The seeds for the Somali conflict were first planted in 1878 when the country was divided among the British, Italian and French colonial powers. The British transfer of the Ogaden’s autonomy to Ethiopia in 1945 further compounded the already precarious situation (Lewis 2005: 40 & 131; Lewis 1994: 93). The geographical location of the Horn of Africa is a contributing factor in the Somali conflict. Croker, Hampson and Aall (2009: 494) argue that geography and geopolitics may promote intractability. Using the above argument, one concludes that general instability in the area has a negative impact on the Somali conflict. Wolff (2006: 75) calls this phenomenon the “bad leader’s syndrome” and the “bad neighbour syndrome.” This concept is also referred to as the “proximate causes of conflict” – it is more difficult to solve, but by no means impossible. The process of resolving the Somali conflict will be sustainable if it has a built-in
mechanism to address the legitimate concerns of the country’s neighbours. These concerns range from irredentism to national security issues.

3.12 Contributing causes
International actors

The collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 has led to the civilian population’s access to weapons. Osman (2007: 99) argues that civilians turned these weapons into a mode of survival and self-defence during the desperate economic times of the 1990s. The anarchical nature of the Somali state disintegration enabled materials such as weapons and money to become the regime’s power resources and these resources became spoils for the contesting groups. Clans with heavy representation in the military sector and the administration were best positioned to benefit from the disintegration of the state, both materially and politically (Osman 2007: 112). The beneficiaries of the collapsed state spoils are the Darod and the Hawiye, which also signalled bitter rivalry between the two dominant clans in southern Somalia.

The rivalry continues to manifest itself in the manner in which the structure of the negotiations is designed. The two clans have had some form of a veto over the negotiation processes in Somalia, though not overly pronounced. When Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected President of the TFG in 2004, the Hawiye based warlords imposed obstacles on the return of his government to Mogadishu. Abdillahi Yusuf was equally unhelpful by insisting on the disarmament of the four main warlords, that is Mohammed Qanyere Afrah (Murosade), Ali Osman Atto (Saad), Musa Sudi Yalaho (Abgal) and Omar Finish (Abgal). It is important to note that the four warlords were part of the TFG cabinet.

The researcher’s interaction with the four warlords was part of the South African (SA) government’s efforts to make the TFG work and to implement the Mbagathi Agreement, which is seen by some states as the best compromised solution for
the Somali conflict. The four warlords were mainly in control of Mogadishu and they all represented the Hawiye clan family.

Interaction with the four warlords dates back to 2002 when they threatened to abandon the peace conference in the Eldoret Process, which eventually ushered in the Mbagathi Peace Agreement and formation of the TFG and TFC. The researcher’s task was to persuade them to continue participating in the negotiations. Their objections revolved around the extent and level of Ethiopian government involvement in influencing the outcome of who had seats at the negotiation table. At that time, the Eldoret Process was about “talks about talks” and was deadlocked regarding the requirements for becoming a delegate to the peace process. There were all sorts of manoeuvres by various factions to dominate the initial process, thus ensuring the necessary numbers when it comes to decision-making by vote. It was during the same process that Musa Sudi’s dominance of the Abgal clan was challenged by Omar Finish – the two fought a fierce battle, which was eventually resolved by the creation of two militia factions within the Abgal clan. By the time the conflict had been resolved, an opportunity was created for Omar Finish to become a delegate at the Mbagathi Peace Process and also eventually earned him the cabinet position in the TFG.

Menkhaus (2003: 19) observed that these conflicts were triggered by a number of factors, but some can be attributed to political manoeuvring linked to the IGAD-sponsored peace talks in Eldoret. Omar Finish was a commander of Musa Sudi’s militias before establishing his own. Mohammed Qanyere Afrah related the Musa Sudi-Omar Finish phenomenon to the researcher with some amusement, perhaps because it guaranteed him a dominant position within the loose alliance of the Mogadishu based warlords, bearing in mind his relatively small in Murosade clan within the Hawiye family clan. Despite their differences, the Mogadishu-based warlords were united by their opposition to Ethiopia’s involvement in the peace process. Resentment regarding Ethiopia is deep rooted in the colonial and conflict histories of the two countries and these factors have been relegated to the periphery by peacemakers in the Somali conflict.
The inclusion of the Mogadishu warlords in the transitional government did not mean the end of the Somali protracted conflict, but presented new challenges for peacemakers and international diplomacy. The challenge was how to institute a process of changing people’s perceptions about being in perpetual conflict with each other. Mayer (2006: 99) contends that a resolution on the cognitive dimension is often the most difficult to attain because people hang on to their perceptions and beliefs about a conflict tenaciously. Abdillahi Ahmed Yusuf’s inaugural statement that “those who want to fight should know that he too can fight” did not inspire Somalis to work for national reconciliation and forgiveness. Nelson Mandela’s statement that people should “throw their weapons in the sea” was fundamental in conveying a message of national reconciliation compared to Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed’s war statement; consequently, he missed the opportunity to provide leadership to a country ravaged by a protracted civil war.

The ultimatum by Abdillahi-Yusuf Ahmed for the Mogadishu warlords to disarm was premature. Disarmament should have been an outcome of a negotiated process informed by the Mbagathi Agreement, which stipulates that cantonments should be created for all armed groups and militias. The Mogadishu warlords then used Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed’s mishandling of the situation to perpetuate their stranglehold on the situation and engaged in profiteering from the political economy of violence through arms sales, smuggling and other illicit commercial practices (Crocker, Hampson and Aall. 2009: 495). During the researcher’s visit to Mogadishu in 2005, the warlords expressed their intention to ensure that the TFG relocated to Mogadishu as stipulated in the TFC. They were opposed to the idea of sending a protection force as requested by Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed after his inauguration as an interim president of Somalia in 2004. Their opposition was based on the rumour going around that Ethiopia was going to contribute some troops to the protection force. The warlords’ opposition to Ethiopia became a common denominator among them – it united them and
allowed the situation to develop where they even removed the checkpoints in Mogadishu. These checkpoints have served as sources of income for them.

The researcher’s visit to Mogadishu was followed by another one to Jorha where a meeting was held with Mohammed Ali Ghedi, prime minister of the TFG. A similar meeting was also held with Mohammed Dhere, the warlord in control of the upper Shebelle region. The meetings were aimed at reconciling all the factions of the TFG. The Mogadishu warlords were amenable to a dialogue with Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed, in contrast with Mohammed Ali Ghedi’s list of preconditions for a dialogue with them. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian Government was instigating a confrontation between Hassan Mohammed Nur also known as Shatigudud and “Habsade.” A large quantity of small arms was channelled to Shatigudud by the Ethiopian government in an effort to ensure that Baidoa remained in their influence. When Shatigudud was defeated by Habsade, there were celebrations in Mogadishu, a large quantity of arms was seized, and some were sent to the Mogadishu warlords.

The speaker of the transitional parliament persuaded the president, the prime minister, and the president of the TFG to relocate the government from Jorha to Baidoa. Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed accepted the offer from the speaker whose clan lineage showed that he came from the Digil and Mirifle, on condition that some security guarantees were implemented. Ethiopian troops provided security to the TFG and the TFP. The relocation to Baidoa did not enhance the transitional institutions’ credibility among the Somalis, as Mogadishu was still associated with the seat of government even though the country had never had a functioning government structure since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.

The TFG gridlock then assumed different proportions with the Mogadishu warlords who were alleging that the UIC was an Al-Qaeda allied formation. The Ethiopian government, which had made similar allegations against the Mogadishu warlords, was now in agreement with regard to the allegations against the UIC. This was compounded by the US concern that the UIC might constitute a broader threat to international security.
Menkhaus (2004: 69) posits that the overheated American policy towards Somalia provided a glimpse into the Bush administration’s policymaking process in the expanded war on terrorism, dating back to 2001 and 2002. The use of Somalia as a trans-shipment point and a short-term safe haven for foreign terrorists resurfaced again in December 2002, when terrorists bombed a Mombasa hotel and attempted to bring down an Israeli charter plane at the Mombasa airport (Menkhaus 2004: 70).

Menkhaus does not state that the terrorist attack and the attempted attack on the Israeli airplane were blamed squarely on Al-Qaeda. The misfiring of a SAM-7 heat-seeking missile negated the planning and the military precision with which Al-Qaeda had executed its operations in the recent past. The 9/11 attacks, the Bali night club attack, the Madrid train bombing and other attacks exposed a pattern of professionalism in contrast with the Mombasa attacks. Based on this argument, it remains dubious that the operation was carried out by Al-Qaeda. The question still remains as to who was responsible. Lewis (2008: 85) argues that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used the Mombasa attacks to justify backing the Mogadishu warlords’ coalition, named the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism.

While Menkhaus (2004: 71) challenges the conventional wisdom that collapsed states constitute a safe haven for international terrorists, by stating that Somalia appears to have all the ingredients for an ideal safe haven for Al-Qaeda. However, the environment analysts’ assumptions were contradicted by the situation on the ground. He argues that the case of Somalia suggests that researchers may have been partially mistaken in their assumptions about the relationship between terrorism and collapsed states. Significantly, Menkhaus asserts that terrorists preferred and found safety in weak states.

In fact, transitional criminals and terrorists have found zones of complete state collapse like Somalia to be relatively inhospitable territory from which to operate;
instead, they flourish in states where the institutions of governance are weak and easy to corrupt. Somalia is less than ideal given these dynamics. Fundamentally, the continued misdiagnosis of the Somali intractable conflict has lead to an emphasis on the peace-building process before building the foundation of peace. Importantly, the US support for the warlords’ coalition was influenced by a parochial political interest in defeating the UIC in Mogadishu. The UIC support found mainly within the Habr Gedir Saad, Ayr, Suleiban and Sarur was underestimated by the warlords and their sponsors.

Essentially, the UIC were a rather loose and informal collection of local traditional Sharia courts, initially mainly inside Mogadishu and varied regarding the degree of fundamentalism of their sheikhs; in addition, their kinship ties within the local Hawiye clans ensured their cohesion (Lewis 2008: 86). Sheikh Hassan Daahir Aways is the only sheikh known to harbour fundamentalist views, while the majority of the sheikhs are moderate Sunnis. The courts managed to win the support of the people of Mogadishu who were tired of the warlords’ extortion and conflicts. Therefore, it came as no surprise when the warlords were defeated and driven out of Mogadishu. For the first time since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, a single entity managed to establish authority in Mogadishu and ordinary citizens found that it was safe to go about their business in the streets of Mogadishu without fear of attack or molestation. In addition, trade quickly revived and food prices dropped dramatically (Lewis 2008: 88).

Furthermore, for the first time, piracy was controlled and the sea and airports were open for commercial activities. The TFG president denounced the courts and called them Al-Qaeda allies and, for the same reason as the US clients, the Ethiopians reinforced their accusation that the Sharia courts were all full of dangerous terrorists (Lewis 2008: 88).

The Ethiopian government became more hostile to the new authority in Mogadishu and appealed to the Americans to assist in the war against Al-Qaeda.
The appeal struck a chord with the American war on terror policy. Spector (1999: 309) remarks that when the other side has been elevated to the role of villain, demon, rogue or pariah, policy generally dictates that negotiation is not a valid conflict resolution option. By the end of 2006, the Ethiopian army was advancing to capture Mogadishu and the city eventually fell in May 2007. Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed was declared the victor in a war he did not fight. By 2008, the dynamics of the conflict had changed and the Ethiopian army was confronting an insurgency that was becoming more and more sophisticated, showing similarities with the Iraqi conflict. Furthermore, the Hawiye youths were swelling the ranks of the resistance against the Ethiopian occupation.

The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia represents a fundamental misreading of the Somalis’ resentment of the country and failure to acknowledge that the two countries would remain enemies not only by design, but also due to the history over which the current generations has no influence, except to strive to change and refuse to be defined by war.

3.13 Intractable Somali conflict
Using Coleman’s (2006: 533) definition of intractable conflicts (also known as “protracted social conflicts,” “moral conflicts” or “enduring rivalries”), it is possible to classify the Somali conflict. This conflict falls under the category of intractable conflicts because it bears all its hallmarks, such as being destructive, persisting for a long period and resisting every attempt to resolve it constructively. D’Estree’s (2009: 150) definition that a protracted social conflict (PSC) defies traditional settlement methods and generates escalating perceptions and behaviours is a true reflection of the Somali conflict changing behaviour and character. The conflict has since seen a generation of children who grew up knowing that war was the only method of resolving conflicts and settling disputes. Resolving the conflict will also require a paradigm shift in the manner in which the society deals with simple family conflicts.
The conceptual framework for analysing PSCs by D’Estree (2009: 150) finds that ethnicity is not the sole causative factor in these conflicts. The clan structure in Somalia was first used by Siad Barre to perpetuate inequalities and political power differences, particularly with respect to wealth sharing and the right to grazing land, given the pastoral needs of the Somali society. Severe imbalances of power between the Darod and other clans are further factors that characterise the Somali intractable conflict. This is compounded by the abuse of other clans by the dominant powerful clans during the conflict phases, with the Darod under Siad Barre-rule and the Hawiye during the war between General Farah Aidid and Mohammed Ali Mahdi following the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.

The Somali conflict has often deceived mediators by its episodic but recurring bouts of violence, which Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2009: 492) contend is usual for PSCs. Diplomatic mediation in Somalia has sometimes confused these episodic processes with moving to the next stage of the resolution, which is the establishment of a transitional government. The haste to create a central government is perhaps informed by what Møller (2009: 14) describes as the “relentless quest for state-building” because the entire international system is constructed around states to such an extent it is unable to handle stateless territories inhabited by people who cannot be classified as citizens of any state.

3.14 Approaches to intractable conflict
Moving to the creation of transitional arrangements before the resolution phase has been the main challenge of international diplomatic efforts to resolve the Somali conflict. The confusion is sometimes caused by the view that a declining conflict reflects a final resolution. Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2009: 492) point out that PSCs may go into abeyant or frozen stages and then the potential for a renewed outbreak of violence exists. Under these circumstances, there is a need to deploy adequate conflict resolution resources and care must be taken not to rush to the next stage because disputants still experience conflict with each other. The abeyant conflict stage provides a
window of opportunity for the intensification of diplomatic efforts to find a solution acceptable to all the disputants. During this stage, conflict resolution practitioners should ensure that key issues driving the conflict are addressed; these issues may range from the proximate to the root causes of the conflict. Causes of intractable conflict often assume different forms and dimensions.

The initial causes of the Somali conflict revolved around the repressive Siad Barre military regime. They have since adopted different assumptions and objectives. A systematic approach to intractable conflict is fundamental and, to this end, Coleman (2006: 544) contends that intractable conflicts are a pathological disease, an infection or cancer of the body politics that can spread and afflict the system. There is thus the need to diagnose the situation correctly. At times, diagnosing the Somali conflict has been influenced by external factors and interests not relevant to the conflict. When the AU made pronouncements in January 2007 that endorsed the Ethiopian occupation and even went a step further by saying that the occupation presents a unique opportunity to resolve the conflict finally, pronouncements failed to recognise that Ethiopians are blamed by Somali’s for the current state of affairs. This outlook can be traced back to the imperial partitioning of Somalia in 1897 and the defeat of Somalia in the 1978 Ogaden War, which act as catalysts in the current Somali intractable conflict.

The AU analysts also failed to understand pan-Somali nationalism. This ideology is based on the notion of a “Greater Somalia” which includes the Ogaden, Somaliland, the NFD of Kenya and Djibouti.

The AU’s pronouncements were informed by Ethiopia’s subjective view of developments in Somalia. Wolff (2006: 75) refers to this kind of behaviour as the “bad leader syndrome” and the “bad neighbour syndrome” and is also known as “proximate causes of conflict” by conflict resolution practitioners.
The AU’s misdiagnosis of the Somali conflict follows on the earlier diagnosis by the UN in 1992. Intervention by the UN in Somalia was initially intended to provide humanitarian support to what was known as the “Triangle of Death” (Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo). The food crisis was caused by the civil war and famine that were ravaging the country. The crisis was commonly referred to as a manmade disaster due to the conflict implications for the general population.

The UN Security Council resolution 794 (1992), which authorised the deployment of 30,000 US troops in Somalia, had a limited scope. The operation was code-named *Operation Restore Hope (ORH)* by the US. The UN referred to it as the United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF). The primary objective of the operation was to create a secure environment for delivery of humanitarian relief throughout Somalia. The impact of the crisis was so severe that 300,000 Somalis had died, while 3,000 were still dying daily and 500,000 had fled to refugee camps in neighbouring countries by mid-March 1992 (Rutherford 2008: 38). By the end of 1992, Bradbury (1994: 16) estimates that over 400,000 people had died and 1.5 million had fled the country to seek refuge abroad. The magnitude of the crisis made it possible for the UN to mobilise international support to alleviate the impact of the crisis on the civilian population mainly, particularly women and children. The noble cause of the UN was compromised when the situation was misdiagnosed by military commanders on the ground, perhaps because ORH was primarily a military operation with a humanitarian strategic objective.

The argument by Rutherford (2008: 95) that in the case of Somalia, it was the first time that the politically neutral International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had hired armed forces to protect its relief supplies and convoys, which is indicative of the militarisation of humanitarian intervention.

The question is, should the ICRC have protected its neutrality by refusing the idea of hiring armed militias to protect its operation? Only time will tell, once the conflict has finally been resolved.
3.15 Conclusion

Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2009: 496) posit that there are two basic approaches to resolving intractable conflicts. The first is to abstain from intervention and hope that disputants either reach their own compromise or that one side wins. This assumption is predicated on the notion that disputants will reach a fatigue stage and develop some form of resolution or there will eventually be a victor (the zero-sum approach). The other approach is to persuade disputants to accept a third party intervention. In some cases, persuasion may be accompanied by pressure to make compromises and where necessary, coercive diplomacy, such as sanctions, may be a useful tool. If the Somali society is said to be conflict prone, the relevant mechanisms must also exist within the society to mitigate and resolve conflicts (Bradbury 1994: 101). The question then arises: how much did international diplomacy invest in persuasion during the mediation process?

The next chapter analyses the depth, scope and focus of peace processes in Somalia with particular attention on the 1993 Addis Ababa Conference, the 1993 Galkaiyo Conference, the 2000 Arta Conference and the 2004 Mbagathi Conference. The 1992 Boroma Grand Conference on National Reconciliation, which ushered in Somaliland, provides critical lessons regarding the local and home-grown peace processes. The question is again raised as to whether southern Somalia can succeed if the same approaches are pursued given the cultural religious and social similarities of the two regions of the Somali Republic?
4. Chapter four: The Somali peace processes

4.1 Introduction

A negotiated settlement strategy is a viable conceptual approach to the resolution of the Somali conflict. The alternative to this approach is the continuation of conflict that will have further negative effects on the civilian population of that country. Since 1991, disputants have proven to have insufficient capacity to reach a settlement without third-party intervention. Therefore, a mediation process that focusses specifically on the resolution of the conflict has a good chance of succeeding providing the legitimacy of the disputants is recognised by everyone involved in the process. The argument that negotiation is the interaction between people trying to meet their respective needs or accomplishing their goal(s) by reaching an agreement with others who are also trying to get their own needs met (Mayer 2000:142), is particularly relevant when attempting to resolve the Somali protracted conflict, given the ever changing goalposts of the disputants. Negotiation as a process of give and take is in sharp contrast with the zero-sum approach, which does not lead to the sustainable resolution of the conflict.

Diplomacy has always been an integral approach to conflict resolution and according to Jonsson and Aggestam (2009:34) is often seen as the antithesis of war. In this vein, Hamilton and Langhorne (1995:1) explain that diplomacy is the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, while Berridge (2001:1) indicates that diplomacy is the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, or resource to the law, and by other peaceful means. Richelieu (1961: 94) sheds further light on diplomacy by alluding to the fact that it involves continuous negotiations considered innocuous remedies. The basic principle of diplomacy, as articulated by the above-mentioned authors, is that negotiations are fundamental to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This chapter investigates the extent to which international diplomacy has observed these guiding principles in managing the Somali conflict resolution processes since the fall of the Mohammed Siad Barre regime in 1991, starting with the 1993 Addis Ababa Peace Conference on National Reconciliation sponsored by the UN.
4.2 The 1993 Addis Ababa Conference

The 1993 Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation was convened by the UN based on what Bradbury (1994:22) contends was the analysis of the ORH dramatic changes brought about by the US Military presence. Lewis (2005:270) argues that the UN Secretary–General at that time, Boutros Boutros–Ghali, took advantage of the relative lull in fighting, which the considerable American presence had produced and pressed ahead with the so–called “reconciliation” process. Inevitably, one therefore concludes that the Addis Ababa process was not informed by any strategic planning on the part of the UN. At times, failure to analyse the actors involved in the Somali conflict or the nature and scope of the conflict, has obscured the need to ensure that the strategies employed are indeed appropriate for finding a durable solution to the conflict. The process of conflict resolution is as important as the outcome, although this viewpoint is open to debate by conflict resolution workers. Kriesberg (2009: 29) indicates that conflict resolution workers also have different perceptions on the matter. Frequently, conflict resolution analysts stress long–term changes and strategies for conflict transformation; while conflict resolution practitioners tend to focus on short–term conflict management policies. The Addis Ababa Peace Conference was a classical example of the conflicting conceptual approaches to the conflict where the conflict resolution practitioner played a dominant role.

The structure of the Addis Ababa Peace Conference was the subject of criticism even before it was officially inaugurated. Bradbury (1994: 23) reports that the main concern was that the signatories at the conference were the fifteen political faction leaders, who were the warlords that had been responsible for much of the suffering in Somalia and regarded as criminals by many Somalis. The warlords were invited to the conference as the UNITAF needed to protect its own forces in Somalia and not because of the need to ensure a successful outcome, thereby conferring some level of legitimacy on the warlords.
The UN responded to this criticism by also extending invitations to 250 intellectuals, clan elders, religious leaders, women and artists to participate in the conference (Bradbury 1994: 23). This wider participation was the result of efforts by certain conference sponsors, a number of Somalia individuals as well as non-government organisations (NGOs). The conference was also attended by a large number of donors who had also attended the humanitarian donor pledging conference, which took place just before the National Reconciliation Conference.

The fifteen factional leaders, who participated in the conference, signed the final agreement on 27 March 1993. The Addis Ababa Agreement reaffirmed the January 1993 agreement on cease-fire and disarmament and reached an agreement on the formation of transitional mechanisms for the restoration of political and administrative structures. In particular, it agreed upon the formation of:

A Transitional National Council (TNC).

Central Administrative Departments, to re-establish civil administration.

Regional Councils in eighteen regions of the country.

District Councils in all districts of the country.

The TNC was supposed to consist of three representatives and to include one woman from each of the eighteen regions, as well as five seats for Mogadishu, and one seat for nominees from each of the fifteen factions present in Addis Ababa. The structure was to be effective for a period of two years. Subsequently, four committees, namely the charter drafting, the peace settlement of disputes, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and cease-fire and disarmament committees were also established respectively. A charter for the TNC was to be ready for approval at the second session of National Reconciliation on 8 June 1993. In addition, the TNC was expected to be established by 1 July 1993. The signatories of the Addis Ababa Conference were as follows:
The Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) – Mohammed F. Abdulahi.
The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) – Abdi Musse Mayow.
The Somali Democratic Movement (SDM/SNA – Mohammed Nur Aiio.
The Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) – Ali Ismail Abdi.
The Somali National Front (SNF) – Gen. Omar Haji Mohammed.
The Somali National Union (SNU) – Mohammed Rajis Mohammed.
The Somali People’s Movement (SPM/SNA) – Ahmed Hashi Mahamoud ‘Jess.’
The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) – Gen. Mohammed A. Musse.
The Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM) – Abdi Warsame Issaq.
The United Somali Congress (USC) – Mohammed Qanyere Afrah.
The United Somali Front (USF) – Abdurahman Dualeh Ali.
The United Somali Party (USP) – Mohammed Abdi Hashi.

The scope of the Addis Ababa Agreement was generally wide enough to accommodate the interests of the signatories. However, there were no firm commitments by the international community to under-write the process financially.

It was during the implementation process that it became evident that the very same international community that had spent US $1, 5 billion on the ORH was failing to show similar commitment and leadership with regard to the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. It was during the Addis Ababa process that international diplomacy first gravitated towards the idea of establishing a central government as opposed to focussing on the resolution of the conflict before state-building. The international community’s preference was caused by what Moller (2009:14) describes as a relentless quest for state-building because the entire international system is constructed around states to such an extent that it cannot handle stateless territories inhabited by people who cannot be classified as citizens of any state.
Failure to under-write the process financially resulted in delaying the implementation of the peace process, thus creating a breathing space to allow allowed factional leaders to resort to manoeuvring, to realign and strengthen their support bases in the run-up to the formation of the TNC.

The strategic objective of the political realignment of forces was to tilt the balance of forces and power in favour of those who might become powerful with regard to the control and command of key territories. Factional leaders initiated internal regional peace conferences primarily to attain political superiority over their rivals. To this end, two peace conferences were initiated, one focussed on Kismayo and the lower and Middle Juba regions, and the second one focussed on Galkaiyo and the central regions of Mudug and Galgabuud (Bradbury 1994:26). The Kismayo Peace Process led to the Jubaland Peace Agreement and was supported by UNOSOM. The Galkaiyo process was locally driven and did not enjoy UNOSOM support mainly due the involvement of General Mohammed Fara Aidid. It was convened by the predominately Habr Gedir, Majerten and Marehan sub-clan elders in Mudug region. The initiative followed the defeat of General Aidid by the Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed forces. The dispute was over the rich grazing land in Mudug region. Significantly, the SSDF victory over General Aidid was a turning point for the party’s participation in the Addis Ababa Conference (Lewis, 2005: 287). Both General Aidid and Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed participated in the Galkaiyo Peace Conference and Bradbury (1994: 28) points out that it was not clear where the initiative came from for this peace conference. One assumption is that it was initiated by General Aidid and Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed, while another possibility is that it was initiated by the clan elders and was hijacked by the two warlords to strengthen their own support bases with special focus on the Addis Ababa peace process, particularly the transitional political power configuration. General Aidid called a meeting on 29 May 1993 to draft a peace agreement for the central and southern regions of the country with the hope that UNOSOM would provide the financial and logistical support he had requested earlier.
However, UNOSOM had not been involved in the Galkaiyo initiative and refused to recognise the conference as an official process or support it. There were suspicions that Aidid was prepared to bargain over Kismayo, in return for a settlement in Galkaiyo (Bradbury 1994:28). UNOSOM was also concerned about the participation of Omar Jess, who had been marginalised at the Kismayo conference. UNOSOM made a strategic error by trying to marginalise General Aidid in the resolution of the Somali conflict. The marginalisation of General Aidid exposed the lack of clarity regarding a role for General Aidid in the conflict resolution of Somalia. He had the ability to influence the conflict resolution process either positively or negatively. General Aidid was a key stakeholder in the Somali conflict and UNOSOM’s strategy to marginalise him resulted in them sustaining the heavy casualties described in chapter three of this study. UNOSOM support for the Kismayo Peace Conference was intended to undermine the political base of General Aidid rather than to support a peace process. Admiral Howe was determined that General Aidid should be marginalised politically even before his military confrontation with General Aidid triggered by the killing of Pakistani peace-keeping troops took place.

In order to understand the significance of the Galkaiyo and Kismayo Conferences, it is necessary to recall that, after the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991, two blocs emerged in southern Somalia, with General Aidid and Ali Mahdi as central figures. The division between the two had its roots in a dispute between the Manifesto Group of businessmen, politicians and intellectuals who sought to persuade Siad Barre to hand over power peacefully and the more radical military wing of General Aidid, who sought Barre’s removal by force (Bradbury 1994: 26). The division between the two Hawiye leaders became a defining feature of the political formation with clan affiliations assuming a dominant polity in Somalia. The clans affiliated with General Aidid were as follows:
USC – Habr Gedir, Xawadle, Galjaal.
SPM – Ogaden.
SDM – Digil, Rahanweyne.
SSNM – Dir, Biyamal
SAMO – Bantu.
The Ali Mahdi clan affiliation was as follows:
USC – Abgal, Murosade.
SSDF – Majerten.
SPM – Ogaden.
SNF – Marehan.
USP – Dolbahunte.
SDA – Gadabursi.

The clan based political affiliation is a characteristic of the Somali body politics that is encouraged and nurtured by the Siad Barre regime and has become a defining factor in Somali politics. However, the clan based political affiliation changes frequently, thus complicating the mediation process, as the enemy divide is blurred and is often not issue based. Lewis (2005: 287) refers to the division of the SSDF in 1993 following the defeat of General Aidid in Mudug when Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed entered into an alliance with the Hawiye’s Habr Gedir Saad he had just defeated, which was not an unusual practice for the Somalis. There are no permanent enemies in the Somali conflict, a matter which mediators and external stakeholder are unable to manage. The fact that there are no permanent enemies in Somalia provides both challenges and opportunities for mediators; the opportunities arise from the fact there are no cultural, religious, and societal values, which are often difficult to contend with in conflict resolution processes.

The Galkaiyo Conference passed some important resolutions intended to normalise relations between the Habr Gedir and the Majerten.
These included amongst others, the request that UNOSOM should assist in the
demobilisation of encamped militias and, to store and maintain all the technical
equipment (a Land Cruiser cut down and fitted with guns). Importantly, the
conference resolved to reopen the route connecting north and south Galkaiyo
and the return of property seized during the conflict. The most positive outcome
of the Galkaiyo Conference outcome was the return to the Addis Ababa
Conference as far as the UN was concerned. UNOSOM could not look beyond its
parochial interests to assist with the implementation of the conference outcome
aimed at the demobilisation of militia groups as agreed by the conference
participants. Yet, when Ali Mahdi’s faction convened another conference in the
Karaan district of Mogadishu, UNOSOM was quick to support it. Because of the
preferential treatment shown by UNOSOM to the Ali Mahdi conference, General
Aidid began to spread anti-UN propaganda (Bradbury 1994: 29).

The centrality of General Aidid in the resolution of the Somali conflict was
illustrated by the collapse of the Addis Ababa process once he withdrew from it.
It also transpired that UNOSOM had colonial power relations with the Somalis;
this was one of the factors that played a role in the collapse of the Addis Ababa
Peace Process. In addition, the 5 June 1993 killing of the Pakistani peace-keeping
contingent of UNOSOM dealt a heavy blow to the Addis Ababa Peace Process.
The situation in Mogadishu then turned into an urban war of attrition between
the UN and a faction of Somalis loyal to General Aidid. The TNC could not be
conceptualised because of the various role-players’ political manoeuvring and
masquerading, evident in the holding of internal peace conferences, some
supported and encouraged by the UN. The TNC could have been rendered
ineffective if it had been constituted given the fact that the signatories to the
Addis Ababa Conference were still cognitively, emotionally and physically at
war with each other. Resolutions in terms of these three dimensions are critical
for sustainable peace and security in Somalia. This study will now focus on the
2000 Arta peace process and investigate whether lessons were learned from the
Addis Ababa process.
4.3 Lessons of the 2000 Arta Peace Process

The Arta Peace Process is located within the conceptual framework of the peaceful resolution of the Somali conflict resolution approach with a third party as a facilitator. Moore (2003: 61) argues that to deal effectively with conflicts, the intervener needs a conceptual road map or “conflict map” that details why a conflict is occurring, identifies barriers to the settlement, and indicates procedures to manage or resolve the conflict. The mediator works with the disputants to test hypotheses about the sources of the conflict. The crux of the Somali conflict is all about political power and addressing the political power relations and requires a systematic approach in order to ensure the positive outcomes of the process. To a certain extent, the Arta Peace Process was influenced by the Addis Ababa objectives, namely the quest to establish some form of a government system.

Establishment of a government without first resolving the Somali conflict or addressing the sources of the conflict cannot provide guarantees that such a government will survive the test of time. It is important to note that the Arta peace process was an initiative of the President of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelle. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) that included Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda was the main underwriter of the process, though Ethiopia worked actively to undermine the outcome of the process due to the perception that Islamists dominated the outcomes. The argument by Tadesse (2002: 42) that al-Ittihad succeeded in hand-picking representatives for the Arta Peace Conference lacks credibility as it is based on the fact that Abdulqasim Salat Hassan had a relationship with the al-Ittihad group.

The EU, the UN and US as well as Egypt, Italy and Libya, later endorsed the Arta Peace Process. Support of the peace conference was based on the expectations of the international sponsors that out of the process, a form of government structure should emerge.
In this regard, the government formation is seen as a viable approach to drive the conflict resolution process. The assumption that government formation is equal to conflict resolution in Somalia is without any basis whatsoever and this assumption has since driven the conflict resolution processes in Somalia, with the emphasis shifting from conflict resolution to state-building. There are some merits to Moller’s (2009) argument on state-building approach in this regard. The state-building approach to the Somali conflict resolution has introduced challenges with regard to the nature and form of such an eventual government and state.

The top-down process of state-building adopted by the Arta process was flawed given that Somali society has historically enjoyed a decentralised form of government-based power sharing by clans. To some extent, the clan system is an example of an autonomous and cohesive system of government worth revisiting when dealing with government-building process. A positive aspect of the Arta process was the attendance by about 2000 delegates representing a wide spectrum of interests, varying from warlords, to clan and religious leaders. According to Adar (2001:13), the delegates were motivated to create the building blocks of a system of government. Consequently, 44 seats were set up and allocated to the main clans (the Hawiye, Darod, Digil, Mirifle and Dir Clans). Neither the Hawiye military faction nor the Islamic leaders were in favour of the equal balance of clan representation in the created Transitional National Assembly, mainly because they had superior military capability compared to other clans. The establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) with Abdulqasim Salat Hassan (Hawiye) as president was perhaps another compromise to manage and appease the Hawiye opposition to the process outcomes.

The compromise involved with the election of Abdulqasim Salat Hassan as president of the TNG meant that the transitional government was in a crisis management mode before dealing with the challenges of creating a functioning...
system of governance and the pacification of one of the militarised countries in the African continent. Creating a government adhering to some semblance of democratic values in terms of the Arta process, was another challenge as the delegates were not representatives of a democratically constituted body of the Somali Society. Lewis (2008: 81) argues that, in practice, many people who claimed to be legitimately appointed representatives were simply self-appointed, and he views this as the most obvious flaw in the process, which nevertheless sought to appeal to every section of the nation in the widest sense. The delegates did have a role to play in the resolution of the conflict. However, it does not necessarily follow that such a role can be transformed into the formation of a representative government. People who have the means and capability to engage in violent conflict may not necessarily represent any specific constituency in Somalia. The Arta Peace Process elevated groups, which had no strategic vision for resolving the conflict ravaging the country. Abdulqasim Salat Hassan is a former enthusiastic exponent of Siad Barre’s Scientific Socialism and a prominent Minister of Interior, consequently, Somalis associated the process with the vestiges of the Siad Barre regime.

The Arta Peace Process sponsors assumed that appointing a Habr Gidir as president of the transitional government, was expeditious as he was someone who could lead and control his fractious clansmen in Mogadishu. This assumption did not take the political background of Abdulqasim Salat Hassan into account; in addition, 60% of the 245 members came from Siad Barre’s carefully selected parliament (Lewis, 2008: 82). Consequently, the TNG and TNA did not enjoy the support of the Mogadishu citizens, let alone that of the warlords. In reality, the TNG only had control of a few streets in Mogadishu, while the greater parts of the country was divided among the dominant warlords, such as Mohammed Qanyere Afrah, Musa Sudi, Ali Osman Atto, Hussein Aidid and Mohammed Dhere.
During the TNG’s preoccupation with international legitimacy, the Islamic courts flourished in Mogadishu, Benadir and the adjacent Hiran region, Tadesse (2003:43) argues that the cumulative effect was the gradual al-Ittihadisation of Mogadishu and its environs. Abdulqasim Salat Hassan played a pivotal role in the pacification of areas under the control of the TNG. He did this by forging a working relationship with prominent Islamic leaders such as, Shaik Dahir Aweys. The inclusion of Islamic leaders in the TNG strategy had unintended consequences for the country’s body politics. Somali neighbours became suspicious of the TNG long-term vision for the country and decided not to support the transitional government actively. The Sharia courts as they are commonly known proved to be a formidable force in developing some system of governance in areas of Mogadishu under their control.

The monumental failure of the Arta peace process lay in the lack of focus on conflict resolution and failure to create a mechanism to ensure that the underlying causes of the conflict were addressed in a systematic and coherent manner. The focus of the conference on the creation of a government before the resolution phase was short-sighted to say the least. The conceptual framework for creating a government before making peace has since become a defining feature of international diplomacy in the resolution of the Somali conflict despite its shortcomings.

The other lesson of the Arta Peace Process is that the top-down approach of government formation has not resonated well with the Somalis since the Addis Ababa process. The international diplomatic focus on the top-down approach was also not generally accepted by all the international role-players, thus when Mohamed Sahnoun criticised the UN for only focussing on the top-down approach, he was then forced to step down as the UN special representative for Somali. Adam (2003: 24) points out that Mohamed Sahnoun had begun to win Somali cooperation by advocating a gradual approach, in harmony with traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.
Menkhaus (2003:13) contends that the mosaic of local politics and informal social pacts that have evolved in post-state Somalia do not provide Somali citizens with variable levels of “governance” if not “government.” He goes on to say that in some cases, these informal and sub-national politics result in more effective levels of public order than can be found in most neighbouring states in the Horn of Africa. The fact that efforts at state-building and national reconciliation have failed so persistently for more than a decade has made it easy for observers to conclude that politics and governance in Somalia remains mired in anarchy (Menkhaus 2003:13). Despite the protracted collapse of the central government in Somalia since January 1991, Somalia has had some form of governance without government. The obsession to create a central government at the Arta Peace Process did not build on existing form of governance notwithstanding its shortcomings.

Failures of the Arta Peace Process are not only limited to the conceptual approaches of the Somali conflict resolution. Spoilers and external interests are also to blame for the collapse of the agreement. The Mogadishu warlords have been the most active military force involved in sabotaging the agreement as they stand to lose their economic stranglehold on the country, lose their illegally acquired wealth, and political domination of the country’s body politics. In addition, the warlords also stand to lose the advantages they gained from war such as profiteering from the diversion of food aid, exporting scrap metal, and selling guns, particularly small arms to illicit traders in the region. The Ethiopian government failure to underwrite the TNG, encourage those who opposed the Arta process to launch a sustained campaign that was even sponsored by the government in some cases, against the TNG. Although Ethiopia has some legitimate concerns regarding irredentists previously sponsored by the Siad Barre regime, consistently working against the efforts to build peace, cannot be justified or condoned. Keeping Somalia in a perpetual state of anarchy and lawlessness allows the Ethiopian government to intervene without regard to the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Ethiopian concerns about what a strong Somalia might do are quite understandable, especially considering that the Somalis’ claims to the Ogaden has never been abandoned (Moller 2009: 20). Addis Ababa’s preference for a weak Somali state that is completely dependent on Ethiopia support is not sustainable in the long term. A stronger Somalia with the capacity to manage its internal affairs may be beneficial to Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa region in the long term.

The mediator of the Arta peace process and President of Djibouti had powers beyond that of a mediator such as the power to handpick twenty members to the TNA without a clearly defined criteria agreed upon by all role-players in the peace process. The mediator’s role was compromised because of these powers. According to Moore (2006: 8), a mediator is a person who assists the principal parties to reach a mutual acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute voluntarily. The fact that the mediator had decision-making powers went against what was the conventionally accepted as the mediator’s role and responsibilities.

The mediator became part of the problem by usurping some of the decision-making powers of the disputants. It is critically important that decision-making powers should rest with disputants because they are responsible for implementing the Arta Peace Agreement. The practice of handpicking some members of the TNA influenced the power structure of the assembly, particularly with regard to clan representation.

The decision-making powers of the mediator were perhaps indicative of the conference sponsors’ influence on the Arta process. The Arta Peace Process confirms that a solution imposed on the Somali conflict will not resolve the conflict. The negative impact of the imposed solution on the Somali conflict has been the destruction of Somalis’ own legitimate clan institutions and authority structures.
The other challenge concerning the Arta process is that irredentist elements in Somalia still view Djibouti as part of greater Somalia as the two countries share a common clanship, religion and culture. Djibouti could therefore, not be neutral on the issues of clan representation in the TNA and TNG. In the two countries, there are a large number of people belonging to the Dir clan lineage. In this regard, Djibouti still has a sizeable number of the Issaqs, who are an integral part of the Dir clan. Today the Issaqs are found in the Northern Western part of Somalia, Eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti. Sceptical Somali commentators that asserted that the TNG was essentially a vehicle for his business interests in Southern Somalia further compromised President Omar Guelles’ role. Indeed, Lewis (2002: 295) reveals that one senior minister boasted that he was only part of the TNG for the money, thereby confirming the sceptics’ allegation that Djibouti’s interest in the Arta Peace Process was driven by Guelles’ commercial interests.

Theoretically, the Arta Peace Process was a government-making process. The dominant Neo-liberal assumption that creation of a government system would lead to the resolution of the conflict proved to be false during and particularly after the Arta conference. It is important to note that resolution approaches to the intractable Somali conflict straddle across various theoretical paradigms. The conflict has not produced a victor, in spite of the assumption of some Realists that allowing the disputants to engage in a perpetual conflict would lead to some form of fatigue and compel them to reach a resolution agreement on their own without any third party intervention.

The Arta Peace Process made similar mistakes to those made during the Addis Ababa Peace Process by equating the concept of ‘state-building’ with ‘peace-building.’ The Arta Peace Process, like the Addis Ababa Peace Process, failed to persuade disputants to develop concrete measures to resolve the conflict, though it agreed on the ceasefire agreement, which cannot be successful without clearly defined implementation mechanisms involving major role-players in the conflict.
In fact, Arta could not even develop any rudimentary conflict resolution structures. The argument by Moravcsik (2008: 249) that for some, the central liberal claim “What states want determine what they do” is a classical summation of the obsession of international diplomacy with the state-building approach to the Somali conflict resolution. Ironically, the Mbagathi Peace Process is also based on the assumption that building a Somali state institution will translate into peace-making.

4.4 Lessons of the 2004 Mbagathi Peace Process
The 2004 IGAD sponsored Mbagathi Peace Process was also founded on the basis that creating state institutions will transform the Somali conflict. Lewis (2008: 91) alleges that the process that led to the formation of the TFG, had repeated all the major mistakes made during the circular and unproductive Somalia Peace Process. The most critical mistake was the failure to insist on the parties making peace before trying to form a government. The Mbagathi process took place in a period of challenging international security threats, characterised by the post 11 September 2001 attacks in the US. The fact that Somalia is a Muslim state meant that America government would have a strong interest in the direction the peace process was taking, mainly due to the Bush Administration’s global strategy and war on terrorism. Like Afghanistan, the protracted failed state of Somali was viewed by the Bush Administration as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda inspired groups. The US policy exerted considerable pressure on the state-building approach to the Somali conflict resolution efforts. Menkhaus (2003: 19) contends that for external actors, conventional wisdom holds that a responsive and effective state is an essential prerequisite for development, a perfectly reasonable proposition enshrined in virtually every World Bank and UN strategy on development. For Somalis, the state is an instrument of accumulation and domination, enrichment and empowering those who control it; while exploiting and harassing the rest of the population.
The application of this neo-Liberal theoretical approach to the resolution of the Somali conflict has created some opportunities for developing alternative frameworks for the conflict resolution informed by local dynamics.

As mentioned before, external mediation tends to focus on state-building and not on peace-building, despite the fact that the average Somali needs and would benefit more immediately from a state of peace than a revived central government (Menkhaus 2003: 21). The Mbagathi process was initiated in 2002 when it was apparent that the TNG had failed, and the Mogadishu warlords were becoming a dominant force threatening the national security of Kenya and Ethiopia. The European Union (EU) and the UN were once again the financial sponsors of the peace process, which first took place in the Kenyan town of Eldorret. Kenya and Ethiopia are key actors in all the peace processes in connection with the Somali conflict resolution. The involvement of the two countries has to do with their national interests. These interests cover a wide spectrum of issues that are not just limited to security, commercial and political issues; therefore, at times their parochial definition of national interests has become a hurdle to the resolution of the Somali conflict.

The Mbagathi Peace Process applied on the four and a half formula of clan representation first adopted at the Arta Peace Process in 2000. The only addition to the process was the half, which represented the minority group. Significantly, the Mbagathi process created a platform for the participation of the warlords in the negotiation process, which was a departure from the previous processes. The Mogadishu warlords, such as Mohammed Qanyere Afrah, Musa Sudi, Ali Osman Atto, Hussein Aidid, Mohammed Dhere, Omar Finish and others, seized the opportunity to use the peace process as a vehicle for the promotion of their narrow political interests. It is important to note that the centrality of the warlords regarding any strategy aimed at transforming the Somali conflict should not be underestimated, given the strategic location of Mogadishu and the fact that they are militarily better resourced.
In essence, the warlords’ participation offered some hope, particularly when they signed a ceasefire agreement and agreed to the cantonment of their militias. The Mbagathi Conference did not achieve much and failed to address the underlying causes of the conflict, such as food security, unrestrained and irresponsible attacks on the general population by warlords and their armed militias, demobilisation, disarmament and the reintegration of displaced persons back into their communities.

The focus on state-building during the Mbagathi process was a strategic error in terms of mediation as the Somali conflict is not mainly about government formation as this mediation approach appeared to imply. As mentioned earlier, the focus of the conference was determined and driven by external stakeholders who were often too removed from the conflict to understand its dynamics. Therefore, no progress was made with regard to the renewed fighting inside Somalia that was exacerbated in fact, by the posturing during the Mbagathi peace process. Subsequently, the disputants tried to settle the differences that came to the fore during the conference by means of military force on the battlefields. Menkhaus (2003: 12) comments that this state of affairs has persisted for over a decade, from the 1991 Djibouti Peace Accord (which is held responsible for sparking the highly destructive war in Mogadishu in the latter part of 1991 between the militias of General Aidid and Ali Mahdi) to the 2002 Kenya-mediated Peace Process sponsored by the IGAD. The researchers’ first direct involvement in the Somali conflict resolution process was in 2002 when he was requested by the IGAD to persuade Mohammed Qanyere Afrah and other Mogadishu warlords to persist with the negotiations notwithstanding the challenges encountered during the mediation process. Mohammed Qanyere Afrah and his group were known as the Group of Eight and their positions and actions at the peace talks soon revealed a predisposition to the use of threats to walk away from the talks as a weapon to obtain better positions in the proposed transitional government (Menkhaus 2003: 26).
The researcher’s interactions with the Group of Eight made him aware of their resentment of Ethiopia’s role in the design of the transitional government. Importantly, the peace talks were strongly divided in terms of the pro-Ethiopia group led by Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed and the anti-Ethiopia Group of Eight led by Mohammed Qanyere Afrah (representing the Mogadishu warlords).

The selected delegates at the Mbagathi Peace Process created the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), the TFC, a legislative branch TFP and an executive branch, the TFG. The Ethiopians lobbied hard for Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed to become president of the TFG. Once again, the researcher was requested by senior officials in the IGAD secretariat to step in and to convince Mohammed Qanyere Afrah and the Group of Eight, to support the candidature of Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed as President. They made it clear that Ethiopia would not accept the candidature of Mohammed Qanyere Afrah for the presidency of the transitional government.

It needs to be emphasised that Ethiopian support of the process was critical in ensuring the success of the Mbagathi process as indicated by the IGAD desire to address Ethiopia’s interests without due regard to the interests of the disputants. When Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed was elected President of the TFG, his first act was to appoint a pro-Ethiopia Prime Minister, namely Mohammed Ali Ghedi (Abgal). Adam (2008: 180) asserts that Ghedi can be linked with the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi. Significantly, one of the Mogadishu warlords informed the researcher that it was an open secret in Somalia that Ghedi’s father used to work for the Ethiopian intelligence services and was apparently executed for passing on classified military information to the Ethiopian government. Notwithstanding the lack of an independent source to confirm this allegation, it can be speculated that such a perception provides a possible explanation for the consistent undermining of the Prime Minister by the warlords, despite the fact that they were members of the TFG cabinet.
Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden was elected speaker of the transitional parliament in an attempt to strike a balance of power between the two factions in the TFG. The rationale for this was based on the perception that he was not aligned to the pro-Ethiopia faction of the President and the Prime Minister. However, he did maintain some level of neutrality with regard to the two factions that emerged from the Mbagathi peace process. Nevertheless, he did not escape criticism from the pro-Ethiopia group as he was labelled an Islamist because of his proposal that the TFG should start negotiations with the UIC. Reaching out to the UIC was an issue to which the Ethiopian government was opposed; therefore, this led to stigmatisation of the speaker. The US and Ethiopian governments expressed the opinion that the Somali Islamic Movement was under the rule of extremists who were harbouring terrorists, which included the three suspects in the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Adam, 2008:180).

Importantly, the US and Ethiopia’s perceptions of the Somali Islamic Movement have since influenced the foreign policy formulation and implementation of these two countries. Their policies have revealed a neo-realist approach in dealing with the Somali conflict. The Ethiopia invasion of Somalia in 2006 was part of the neo-realist approach, which viewed the conflict as a dangerous, high-stake game that can be won through domination, control and counter control strategies (Coleman 2006:542). The notion that the Somali conflict can be won by means of warfare is disproved by the behavioural pattern of the conflict since the fall of the Mohammed Siad Barre government in 1991. In essence, this realist approach has contributed to the eventual collapse of the TFG as constituted by the Mbagathi peace process.

The Mbagathi constituted TFG was similar to the previous peace processes in that it focussed on a government-building approach to the Somali conflict resolution processes. Because of this approach, the creation of the cabinet was not aligned to the challenge of creating a climate conducive to free and fair political activities when the mandate of the transitional government ends.
During the transitional phase, the cabinet was a bloated structure with ministries that were not relevant such as the creation of a ministry of tourism that defies all basic logic, bearing in mind that the country was at war with itself. The government-building approach could perhaps have focussed on creating a cabinet that concentrated on conflict resolution. Importantly, the conflict-focussed approach could perhaps have laid the foundation for conflict resolution strategies. The reality was that the Mbagathi process was a gathering of disputants who were still at war with each other for all practical purposes. However, the Mbagathi process failed to acknowledge that the conflict resolution process was not yet ripe to allow a fundamental shift to initiate a successful government-building process. Disputants and mediators should have taken advantage of the moment when the warlords and other role-players in the Somali conflict gathered to define a conflict resolution process. The fact that all the stakeholders in the conflict gathered in Mbagathi to negotiate the successful resolution of the conflict, is an affirmation that the conflict was indeed ripe for a negotiated settlement.

Notwithstanding this fact, the mediators failed the disputants by not focussing on the resolution phase of the conflict. The relocation of the TFG to Jorha and eventually to Baidoa was seen by the Mogadishu warlords as an attempt by Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed to marginalise the Hawiye clan. The location of the seat of government became an issue that defined the relations of the two main factions in the TFG. During the researcher’s interactions with the warlords in Mogadishu, the issue regarding the seat of government was the most prominent one raised. The warlords argued that Mogadishu was the seat of government as enshrined in the TFC, and declared that they were not going to compromise on the matter. Moreover, the seat of government had also been an issue during the Arta Peace process and the Digil and Mirifle clan on the understanding that the capital city and the seat of government would move to Baidoa supported Abdulqasim Salat Hassan.
The argument the President Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed raised with the researcher with regard to the TFG’s relocation to Jorha was related to the security of government in Mogadishu. Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed indicated that the TFG could only be relocated to Mogadishu under some form of international military protection in which South Africa was part of the envisaged protection force.

The idea of a protection force did not go down well with the warlords in Mogadishu as they saw it as an attempt by Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed to invite the Ethiopians to invade Somali. The warlords’ fear of an Ethiopian invasion was confirmed in 2006 when Ethiopia under the guise of fighting international terrorism, invaded the country. The invasion took place after the UIC had defeated the warlords and established a functional government temporarily. For the first time since the fall of the Siad Barre regime, the UIC had managed to establish a central form of government in Somalia, short-lived as it was, proving that it was possible to have a single authority in Somalia.

The warlords were sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to form an alliance for the restoration of peace and to counter terrorism (Lewis 2008:85). The dispute around the location of the seat of government was an excuse to hide contrasting visions about the future of the country. The different visions date back to the negotiation process when the warlords preferred a centralised and unitary state, while Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed preferred a federated form of government. The two visions were based on various fears and feelings of apprehension, which emerged during the Mohammed Siad Barre military regime when power was centralised and monopolised by the MOD. The Hawiye felt that it was their turn to dominate the institutions of power in the same manner as the Darods had under Siad Barre. The Darods on the other hand, feared the very notion of absolute power in the hands of the warlords in Mogadishu. Abdillahi Yussuf Ahmed was perhaps influenced by the vision of Meles Zenawi from Ethiopia, who believed that the best way to unite the rest of the tribes was to divide his country along ethnic lines (Ngwane 1996:15).
Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed’s refusal to relocate the TFG to Mogadishu is an indication that he was still at war with the Mogadishu warlords although they were an integral part of his government cabinet. The behaviour and attitudes of the disputants support the argument that the creation of a central government before resolving the conflict would not on be enough to transform the conflict.

It was premature for the TFG to establish a truth and reconciliation mechanism before confronting the immediate need for resolving the conflict. National reconciliation is a model derived from the fact that society is conflict-torn and factions are worlds apart in terms of their views and visions (Ngwane 1996:172). The truth part of national reconciliation is a matter that requires an institutional capacity to deal with it and that has the zeal to act, no matter the extent and impact of the truth on role-players in the process. Of utmost importance is the fact that the persons presiding over the truth part of the reconciliation need to be of good standing in the society. The appointment of Mohammed Ali Mahdi as the chairperson of the process was an indication of the extent to which most Somalis’ credibility is tainted by the conflict. The logical approach to the Somali conflict resolution would be to deal with the reconciliation part of the process and not so much with the truth part, because it has the potential to rekindle the conflict. The Somali peace processes were not yet ripe for a reconciliation strategy; the most fundamental approach would have been to resolve the conflict first before embarking on any form of healing the scars of the past.

4.5 Lessons learnt from the 1993 Boroma Peace Process

The 1993 Boroma Grand Conference on National Reconciliation provided a solid foundation for the entrenchment of the Somaliland secession from the Somali Republic. Boroma is a Gadabursi town chosen to host the peace conference. Bradbury (1994:73) explains that the town provided a relatively secure environment away from Hargeisa, Berbera, and Burco, where security and peace were still fragile.
The conference was convened following the unilateral declaration of independence on 18 May 1991, just after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in the same year. The Boroma conference produced a Peace Charter (a kind of national xeer) to strengthen security and regularise the role of the traditional local elders in all aspects surrounding peace-making (Lewis 2002:283). The Addis Ababa, Arta, and Mbagathi Peace Processes did not have make provision for the structural representation of the clan elders regarding decision making during the peace conferences. Importantly, the focus of these conferences was not on peace-making as we have seen. Empowering the clan elders regarding decision making at the conferences was critical in ensuring ownership of the process during the Boroma peace process.

In effect, the conference created a bicameral legislature, with a non-elected upper house consisting of traditional elders (the guurti), and an elected lower house consisting of public representatives. Lewis (2002:283) argues that the compromise is aligned with the old clan-based SNM and the exigencies of modern government administration. The other achievement of the Boroma process was the agreement that the draft constitution would be tested in a referendum to gauge its acceptance by the general public. The peace processes in Southern Somalia discussed earlier had no mechanism to test their public acceptance. The mediators did not venture to test the acceptance of the outcomes of the processes, perhaps because the conferences were driven by external interests more than internal imperatives; inevitably, this would lead to resentment by the local population.

The Boroma peace conference principles were replicated in other regions of Somaliland, particularly in the Sanag region where the traditionally mutually hostile local Habr Yunis, Habr Ja’lo, Dulbahante and Warsangeli clans had joined the Sanag Grand Peace Conference. The process in the south did not ensure that the bottom-up parallel peace processes that focussed on conflict resolution among the clans were successful.
Instead, the peace processes were used to promote the parochial political interests of disputants. The success of the Boroma peace process was due to the lack of international interest and interference in the negotiation process to some extent. Moreover, the international community did not provide any financial support for the peace conference.

The process was sponsored financially and materially by the local population and the diaspora, thus ensuring local support for the conference outcome. The visionary leaders driving the Boroma process were Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Igal (Habr Awal) and Abdahman Tur (Habr Yunis). Leadership of the process is fundamental to transformation of the conflict. Similarly, Nelson Mandela who provided leadership regarding transformation of the SA conflict in the early nineties was often at risk of losing support from the radical faction in his party. Leaders in the Boroma Peace Process were equally critical of instituting a demilitarisation programme without any contribution from the UN. Lewis (2008:93) points out that, instead, the UN supported the unrealistic and impracticable demilitarisation campaigns in Mogadishu, seeking to re-establish a local police force in the absence of government and political order.

The Peace Charter was the outcome of the conference deliberations on reconciliation and security and was an attempt to rectify past mistakes that had resulted in a situation of insecurity and an ineffectual government, and to promote stability and peaceful co-existence among the communities of Somaliland (see Bradbury, 1994:73). The Peace Charter requires all communities to take a solemn oath not to attack another community and sets out the responsibilities of elders in the mediation process and when settling outstanding disputes and any conflict that might occur in future. The Peace Charter incorporates a local conflict resolution concept, known as xeer in the Somali language. The processes in Somalia were completely different to the approach followed at the Boroma conference.
Contrary to what might reasonably have been expected, the successes of the Somaliland-driven peace process did not influence the processes reviewed earlier in this study. The Peace Charter is a homebrewed conceptual framework of conflict resolution that incorporates the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural dimensions. The question regarding why internationally driven and sponsored processes failed to learn from the Boroma Peace Process, remains to be answered. Perhaps those who were driving these processes will break the silence one day and tell the Somalis why international diplomacy failed them.

4.6 Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the way in which international diplomacy has been in line with the guiding principles of mediation – the core tool of the diplomat – in finding a resolution to the Somali conflict. Attention was paid to a number of the (failed) peace processes in Somali, analysing and critiquing these processes in an attempt to identify the lessons learnt from each of these attempts. Various lessons can be learned from these processes, as pointed out throughout the discussion and from these lessons a number of recommendations could be drawn in terms of which conflict resolution approaches in Somalia could be improved. I now turn to these main findings and recommendations in the chapter concluding this study.
5. Chapter five: Conclusions and recommendations

5.1 Introduction

This study has sought to undertake an analysis of the theoretical concepts of ‘conflict’ and ‘conflict resolution’ applied by international diplomacy, in an attempt to find a solution to the intractable Somali conflict. This study concludes that there is a relationship between peace processes aimed at state-building and the resurgence of conflict as a result of state-building efforts. In fact, the more international diplomacy focusses on state-building, the more the conflict shows evidence of intractability.

Thus far, the focus on state-building has not transformed the Somali conflict; in spite of all the failed attempts that followed the state-building approach as part of the international mediation processes sponsored by the UN, AU, EU, US, and other institutions of global governance. The actions of countries with vested interests in the mediation processes have also compromised the outcome of the negotiations as they elevated their national interest above those of the disputants. The study also concludes that, although the Somali conflict shows unmistakeable signs of complex intractability, it is still possible to resolve it, providing that peace-making approaches are followed in future.

5.2 Main findings

The nature of the roles played by neighbouring countries in the Somali conflict resolution processes has become an impediment and needs to be addressed. Their roles should be limited to providing support to the processes without taking an active role in determining or influencing the direction of the process. Successive Ethiopian governments’ paranoia with Somalis’ irredentism has obscured the fundamentals of peaceful co-existence between the two countries as they share a common ethnic identity. Irredentism is driven by the Pan-Somali ideology which espouses the ideal of a Greater-Somalia founded on pre-imperial partitioning in 1897. The noble aspiration of uniting the Hamitic, Oromo, Saho, and Beja groups of people has since been hijacked by an array of people with sinister political motives.
Similarly, Mohammed Siad Barre used the Pan-Somali ideology to justify the 1978 Ogaden War that has helped to trigger and re-ignite the protracted Somali conflict. The Somali people have never recovered from the crushing defeat they experienced in the Ogaden War (1978) that stirred up feelings of intense anger towards the Siad Barre military regime, which was accused of capitulating too easily to the Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Mariam.

In effect, the Ogaden War defeat was the turning point in the Somali conflict; the MOD was accused of humiliating the Somalis by premature capitulation and this was the beginning of clan accusations and counter accusations culminating in the abortive *coup d'état* by the Majerten clan of the Darod to which Siad Barre belongs. The Hawiye joined the chorus of accusations on how Siad Barre had mismanaged the Ogaden War. The Somali Civil War was sparked primarily by the defeat in the Ogaden, which was associated with the end of the Pan-Somali ideology. There were other underlying causes of the civil war such as the concentration of political and economic power on the MOD cabal, the repression of the military regime regarding the other clans, suppression of the Islamic faith and practice, cultural repression of the Somali society, and other general repressive laws of the Siad Barre regime.

Though the root causes of the Somali conflict can be traced to the imperial partitioning of Somalia in 1897, the contemporary conflict is driven by a plethora of issues, revolving around human security challenges and survival of the cohesive clan structures of governance. The clan political structure is at the very centre of the Somali conflict. Surprisingly, the clan structures have been ignored by peace-makers though the conflict has aligned itself along clan battle lines since the fall of Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991. As the clans have been contesting for the vacuum in the political space created by the collapse of the Somali state, the researcher concludes that a political vacuum provides fertile ground for political opportunism.
Importantly, in the Somali context, political power has assumed the form of clan hegemony associated with the battle for acquiring the scarce resources, which are also linked to the survival of clan influence in determining the future political direction of the country. Thus, the state-building approach to the Somali conflict resolution is associated with competition for scarce resources by clans. The Somali’s concept of a state has been distorted by the prevailing poor economic conditions characterised by despair and destitution.

The state’s responsibilities and obligations to provide basic human security requirements, such protecting human life, providing food security, shelter and other guarantees of a functioning state do not form the understanding of a future state concept at the moment.

The absence of a central government has enabled the clan structures to take centre stage with regard to the collective security of their clans and society in general. The residues of the Cold War, such as small arms proliferation, have compounded the conflict in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region in general. The hyper-militarisation of Somalia has allowed a situation to develop where the access to weapons is much easier than access to basic food and other consumable goods. Consequently, the clan structures have occupied a political vacuum created by the fall of the Siad Barre regime. There is a need for the conflict resolution processes to create space for the clan political unit to make a contribution to the peace-making processes. It is important to note that the clan political unit structures can be effective if implemented from the smallest localised units upwards in terms of the bottom-up approach.

The strength of the clan political units is at grass-roots level where the authority of the elders is enforced and accepted by the community. Failure to incorporate clan structures in the broader conflict resolution strategies has allowed the warlords to use them as recruitment centres for militias. Significantly, warlords have used clan structures as a resource base for their own political survival.
This explains why the warlords are flourishing despite their criminal activities in Somali society. The Boroma Peace Process was successful because it gave clan elders the authority to participate in the decision-making processes during the negotiations. The process was also creative in creating a balance between the clan structures and the structures of the elected representatives of the people.

Neutrality of the mediator is a fundamental prerequisite for the Somali peace processes as the absence of neutral mediators has contributed to the successive failures of peace processes. Mediators who have an interest in the process have consistently proved to lack neutrality on conflict issues affecting disputants. For instance, the UN strategy to marginalise General Mohammed Fara Aidid politically during the Addis Ababa peace process and the ORH was a fundamental mistake regarding the basic principle of mediator neutrality concerning the issues under dispute. The strategy has led to marginalisation of the UN in the processes that preceded the Addis Ababa process.

The other challenge surrounding the Somali mediation processes have been the decision-making powers of the mediators, which, in some instances, have favoured the cohesive approach of forcing a resolution on the disputants resulting in contradictory interpretations of the imposed agreements, thus undermining the matter of ownership of the agreement. When General Aidid realised that the UN was trying to destroy him politically, he used the Habr Gidir Saad clan to argue that the UN wanted to colonise Somalia, a sentiment which resonated well with the Somali population, which had just seen the humiliating defeat of the Pan-Somali ideology during the Ogaden War with Ethiopia. The negative US projection of General Aidid further compounded the relations that had already deteriorated between Aidid and UNOSOM. The UN mission lacked neutrality due to dependency on the US personnel and financial support. The American domination was reflected by the projection of its foreign policy objectives in the UN operations in Somalia.
The UN’s lack of neutrality in the Somali conflict has paralysed its role as a custodian of international peace and security. The net effect is that the UN diplomatic role in the Somali conflict resolution suffered irreparable damage and has never recovered its lost credibility among Somalis. The only role the UN currently plays is in terms of the IGAD and other peripheral regional organisations.

Though the ORH represented the caring part of the international community, the use of the project to achieve the political objectives of external role-players was flawed.

Transformation of the ORH into Chapter VII of the UN Charter was not informed by a diagnosis of the situation in Somalia. The UN should have learned from its own experience that peace-enforcement was not an acceptable option for the Somalis, particularly the Mogadishu dominated Hawiye clan. Currently, the Somalis are suspicious of any UN intervention in their country, which does not augur well for an international organisation responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The 2006 invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia was a major error regarding the significance of the consequences of the IGAD led peace processes. The AU endorsement of the invasion further damaged the credibility of the continental organisation in conflict resolution processes, not only in Somalia, but also in other conflict prone areas of Africa. International support for the invasion ignored the lessons to be learnt from the UNOSOM, namely that peace-enforcement will not yield the desired outcomes, particularly when led by Ethiopia, a country that is blamed for triggering the civil war after the defeat of Siad Barre in the Ogaden War in 1978. The importance of the role of the clan elders was clearly demonstrated by their intervention when they took centre stage during the invasion and persuaded the UIC not to allow Mogadishu to become a battlefield in the conflict with the Ethiopian regular army.
The clan elders’ intervention is an indication of the role they have played in the Somali conflict resolution, although this fact has not been acknowledged by the mediators in the peace processes thus far.

The short-lived UIC rule of Mogadishu and other cities of Somalia brought an end to the stranglehold of the warlords on Mogadishu. The UIC is the only entity to have established some form of authority in Mogadishu since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. The UIC has also been shown to have the capacity to curb the prevalence of piracy in the Somali Seawaters. The popular acceptance of the UIC is attributed to the collaborative manner in which it established the bottom-up forms of government in the areas under its control.

The Ethiopian government labelled the UIC as an Al-Qaeda linked organisation in order to appeal to the US for financial, military and moral support. There is no empirical evidence suggesting that the UIC has a structured and formalised relationship with Al-Qaeda; in reality, the UIC was a fragmented organisation incorporating both moderate and radical Islamic Sheiks. It is a fact that there were radical elements within the court system of government. However, there is also no evidence to suggest that Somalis have structural links with Wahhabism and the Salafi sect of the Islamic faith associated with Al-Qaeda’s conceptual thinking. Somalis are generally Sufis in their Islamic beliefs and practices and Sunni remains the dominant sect of Islam in Somalia. Labelling the UIC an Al-Qaeda organisation has made the peace-makers miss an ideal moment to assist the Somalis to resolve their conflict during the brief rule of the UIC. Recognition of the fact that the UIC had created a grassroots structural form of government would have ensured that the focus no longer fell on state-building but rather on peace-making and peace-building strategies. The Bush Administrations’ war on terror and the general profiling of Islamic organisations as potential Al-Qaeda links did not further the cause of peace-making in Somalia.
Furthermore, deploying the AU for peace-enforcement purposes, did not take
cognisance of the lesson learnt from the UNOSOM, namely that the Somalis are
always united when it comes to external military intervention. The AU military
presence in Mogadishu has actually united and strengthened the UIC on the
ground. Moreover, the emergence of the Al-Shabaab is a reaction to the
deployment of the AU peace-enforcement mission. The Al-Shabaab group is now
entrenched in major cities in Southern Somalia and parts of Mogadishu.
The objective of the group is to thwart the Ethiopian invasion and to resist the
AU peace-enforcement troops in Mogadishu.

The Al-Shabaab demonstrated its power by issuing an ultimatum to the NGOs
and foreign agencies currently operating in Somalia to leave the country.
Humanitarian organisations were also required to leave the country due to the
perception that they were conniving with their enemies. The group’s instruction
was obeyed without hesitation by the relevant organisations, thus confirming
that the Al-Shabaab is indeed a force to be reckoned with in the Somali conflict.
The accusations are perhaps based on the historical behaviour of the Red Cross in
the Somali conflict where the former group hired armed militias to protect its
supply during the ORH. This has led to groups such as the Al-Shabaab regarding
it as a party to the Somali conflict.

The main challenge of the AU Mission to Somalia is the absence of peace to keep,
in the first instance. The other challenge is that the mission is not accepted by all
the disputants to the conflict. The conclusion can therefore be made that the AU
did not learn from earlier interventions by the UN and US that peace
enforcement strategies would not achieve the desired conflict resolution
objective. The lack of resources of the AU Mission is a factor that makes it
possible for external actors to manipulate the process in their favour.
Paradoxically, the AU mission was deployed to keep the UIC out of Mogadishu,
yet the leader of the UIC is the current president of the TFG following the
It appears that there is no permanent enemy divide in the Somalia conflict; today’s enemies may be tomorrow’s friends in the ever changing Somali enemy scenario. Lessons learned from other peace processes as well as in Somalia, suggest that charismatic leadership regarding the peace process is crucial to move the process in the right direction. Furthermore, leadership of the process is fundamental to assisting the mediation process to focus on issues which have the potential to transform the conflict. The absence of charismatic leadership in the Somali conflict resolution processes has allowed international diplomatic initiatives to divert the processes from dealing with the resolution phase of the conflict.

The manner in which the Somali state collapse has distorted the conceptual approach to resolving the conflict is reflected by international diplomacy’s focus on state-building at the expense of peace-making. The adopted state-building approach has proved to be unsustainable in Somalia in the light of the fact that the Somalis have come to view the state as a vehicle of wealth accumulation and clan hegemony. Thus, each time there is a peace process with the focus on state-building the levels of conflict go up because issues which cannot be resolved through negotiation then result in the outbreak of violent conflict in Somalia. Theoretically, although the state is the source of stability in a democratic environment, the Somalia situation is not ideal for focussing on state-building during the conflict phase when disputants are still at war with each other for all practical purposes. In addition, the state-building approach has made the role of mediators more complex in terms of assisting disputants to reach a mutually acceptable compromised solution. The argument that the mediation process should first focus on the resolution phase before the state-building process is embarked upon, resonates well with this study.
As with other protracted conflicts, the sources of the Somali conflict have evolved considerably. Somalis are generally in agreement with regard to matters of peace and security in their country, though they differ on how to achieve peace.

The daily survival of Somalis is driven by their desire to have secure grazing land for their livestock and to have predictable and secure sources of food.

Since 1991, Somalis have lived in a situation of governance without a government and their lives have been disrupted by a conflict driven by warlords who thrive in the current anarchical situation in Somalia. Undoubtedly, warlords have benefited from the Somali war economy associated with the collapse of the state institution in 1991. A proper functioning state is therefore a threat to those who are thriving under the prevailing conflict situation. Importantly, peace-makers have come to perceive Somalia through the lenses of counter-terrorism, counter-irredentism, state-building, and economic development. These categories are so closely linked that you can put them into almost any sequence or combination. You need to resolve the conflict in order to build a state as opposed to building a state in order to resolve the protracted conflict. The state-building approach to Iraq and Afghanistan provide lessons that can be applied to the Somali conflict resolution processes. Learning from these two countries will ensure that peace-makers avoid the pitfalls of government-building as an instrument of conflict resolution in the protracted Somali conflict. The two countries also bear the hallmark of externally dominated conflict resolution processes focussing on issues not critical to the local population. A closer look at the two countries may also reveal some hidden concepts associated with resolving such complex conflicts.

5.3 Recommendations

Lessons learned are not necessarily lessons implemented, but it is hoped that the recommendations provided in this conclusion will go some way in influencing those involved in finding a resolution to the Somali conflict, as well as pointing
out some important areas for future research in efforts to assist Somalia in finding a sustainable peace.

The first recommendation is that the mediation process should consider separating the peace-making process from the state-building process in order to eliminate the cause and effect relationship between conflict and the state-building approach. The bottom-up approach to the conflict resolution process should also be considered in terms of supporting local clan elders to establish indigenous approaches similar to the ones adopted in the Boroma Peace Process. Further research with regard to the indigenous approaches to conflict resolution will assist mediators to focus on any pertinent issues requiring attention during the resolution phase of the conflict.

The centrality of the clan structure as a critical political unit for conflict and stability is another area which requires further research in order to enable peace-makers to maximise such a structure to resolve the Somali conflict. International diplomacy in the resolution of the Somali conflict has failed to utilise the clan structures in peace-making that can eventually lead to peace-building strategies, bearing in mind that the clan elders’ decision-making role is a jealously guarded conferral aspect of the Somali society.

The impact of the Somali conflict on the Horn of Africa is another area for further research. The research should focus on the proliferation of small arms in the region, the Pan-Somali irredentism ideology, and the influence of neighbouring countries on the Somalia conflict. Furthermore, the research should seek to establish the gravity of the effect of the Somali conflict on the national security of neighbouring countries, the Horn of Africa, and the East African region. In addition, the research may also establish if there is empirical evidence that the terrorist attacks in Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia indeed have any links with the Somali conflict as is asserted by the US and Ethiopian governments.
This study did not investigate the emerging phenomenon of piracy in the sea waters of Somalia. Research in this regard, may establish who the main actors are in this new violent development in the evolution of the Somalia conflict. The hypothesis that the piracy may be linked to shipping companies colluding with organised criminal syndicates to defraud insurance companies should be tested by such research.

The ransom paid to pirates may become a source of funding for international criminal syndicates and terrorist groups if this type of crime is not stamped out before it is completely out of control, and becomes another intractable factor in the Somali conflict.

Future mediation processes should also consider the neutrality of the mediator regarding the issues causing the conflict. The mediator should not impose a solution on the disputants, but should rather assist disputants to arrive at a solution acceptable to them and their constituencies. This approach will enable disputants to sell the deal to their constituencies and to implement it without any reservations. Unquestionably, a win-win approach will preserve the integrity of all negotiators.

It is also important to point out that this study did not conduct a detailed analysis of the UIC in the Somali conflict. Further research may help to identify the sources of support as well as the political strength of the UIC. It may also test the hypothesis that the UIC is linked to Al-Qaeda. The sudden emergence of Al-Shabaab as a political force should also be covered by such a study. Identifying the financial and political supporters of the Al-Shabaab and the UIC can shed some light on the degree of sophistication of military capability of the two organisations, which is a matter of concern for peace-makers in the Somali conflict resolution processes. The fact that there are no historical precedents for Wahhabism does not preclude the development of such a phenomenon in
Somalia. As the Somali society, like any other society, is also susceptible to external influences, the extent of such influence with regard to Wahhabism should also be the focus of future research.

The study has provided the reader with the theoretical location of the Somali conflict and the manner in which it has been evolving since the collapse of the state in 1991.

The study concludes that the conflict is complex and appears to be impossible to resolve, yet recognises that the conflict may be resolved, provided external role-players do not impose a solution to disputants. Countries which have previously facilitated peace processes have compromised themselves by taking sides in the conflict, particularly during the 2006 Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Mogadishu. The invasion failed to recognise the fact that the Somalis are still aggrieved by their defeat in the Ogaden War in 1978. To this end, Ethiopia is regarded as an enemy of the greater Somali aspiration of uniting the country along the pre-colonial borders. To a certain extent, failure of the mediation processes can be attributed to the flawed theoretical approach which places major emphasis on using a peace-building framework for creating a transitional government structure that is not geared to address issues related to the resolution phase of the conflict. Finally, future mediation processes should focus on resolving the conflict before embarking on peace-building strategies.
6. Bibliography


