South Africa’s post-conflict and transitional diplomatic efforts in the DRC lessons learnt: 1990 - 2009

By

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In 1994 the Department of International Relations & Cooperation (DIRCO) had to transform and integrate all diplomats from former homelands, apartheid government and liberation movements to represent the new South African values of democracy, respect for human rights etc. As DIRCO marked its position in the global stage, it became clear that the quality of its diplomats had to improve. It then partnered with the University of Pretoria to introduce a Master's degree which will ensure that the experienced diplomats could translate their experience into an academic qualification; and those who had degrees and minimum diplomatic experience could learn from others and through studying for the degree. This project therefore has been a challenging and very informative study for my employer's organizational development and my own intellectual growth. I am grateful and forever indebted to the following:

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ABSTRACT

This study is about South Africa’s diplomatic initiatives in the DRC from 1990 to 2009. It concentrates on the implementation of the transitional phase to prepare for the elections in 2006 and the implementation of the post conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) projects from 2006 onwards. The study argues that South Africa’s ability to facilitate peace which ended a full-scale war in the DRC should be highly commended as one of its diplomatic achievements. Its experience of negotiations and mediation to end apartheid has placed it in a favourable position amongst other global players. It supported its ambition of ensuring that the development of the African Continent is prioritized on the global agenda. However, South Africa does not have any experience in transitional diplomacy and this study has highlighted that it needs sufficient capacity and strategies first before it engages in it. Such capacity should be informed by a full understanding of the receiving country in order to prepare the diplomats accordingly. Clarity of South Africa’s national interest in pursuing transitional diplomacy seems weak and therefore confuses ‘teams on the ground’ as they are not always sure how to manouvre within a very complex and highly contested country like the DRC. The role of the international community, members of the Great Lakes and the Congolese population has been highlighted as being critical to assist the DRC to achieve stability and sustainable peace. Without political will and leadership from the DRC leaders themselves, all diplomatic efforts will be futile. Ten years is a very short time to assess the success of post-conflict reconstruction activities but useful lessons have been drawn from this evaluation. They have enhanced our understanding of transitional diplomacy and some of them can be used as models and guidelines which will improve intervention in future projects.
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ACRONYM

ACSA  Airports Company South Africa
AU  African Union
BNC  Bi-National Commission
CIAT  Comite International d'Accompagnement de la Transition
CNDP  National Congress for the Defence of the People of DRC
CPCA  Conflict-Prone and Conflict Affected
ADB  African Development Bank
DBSA  Development Bank of South Africa
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DG  Director-General
DFA  Department of Foreign Affairs
DFID  Department for International Development of the UK
DIRCO  Department of International Relations & Cooperation
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
DPSA  Department of Public Service and Administration
DTI  Department of Trade and Industry
ENA  Ecole National d'Administration
FDLR  Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda
FARDC  Forces Arme'es de la Republique Democratique du Congo
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GTZ  German Technical Corporation
IDC  Industrial Development Corporation
MDRP  Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
MLC  Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo
MTEF  Medium Term Expenditure Framework
MONUC  United Nations Mission in the DRC
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
NALU  National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs  Non-governmental Organisations
NOCPM  National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OCPT  Congolese Telecoms Network
PCRD  Post-conflict reconstruction and development
PALAMA  Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy
PPRD  People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy
RCD  Reassemable Congolais pour la Democratie
RCD-G  Congolese Assembly for Democracy-Goma
SA  South Africa
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SADAiT  South African Detachment for Integration & Training
SAIIA  South African Institute of International Affairs
SAMDI  South African Management Leadership Institute
SAPS  South African Police Service
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<td>UDPS</td>
<td>Union for Democracy and Social Process</td>
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CHAPTER 1 – RESEARCH APPROACH AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Introduction

Since South Africa achieved its democracy in 1994, the development of the African continent has been part its foreign policy priorities. While South Africa began by using mediation and facilitation in peace negotiations in various African countries during the Mandela era, a more direct approach in peacemaking was witnessed during Mbeki's presidency. Concerns have been raised, though, about whether South Africa has sufficient capacity to sustain its supportive role in the continent which is still riddled with conflict and insecurity. The question of how such policy decisions serve South Africa's national interests has also been asked.

Such concerns are particularly salient when it comes to a country such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with its seemingly intractable problems. Herbst and Mills (2009) mention, amongst others, the inability of the state to exert its authority beyond Kinshasa and the lack of capacity to protect its citizens from internal and external enemies. As a result, over two dozen armed militia groups are said to be running rampant within the DRC. Unfortunately, the Congolese do not have a common language which unites its citizens and consequently, they argue; the Congolese in outlying provinces identify more with neighbouring countries than the DRC, while the same countries have been directly involved in destabilising the DRC. The country's violent history has also led to the death of an estimated four million people between 2004 and 2005 alone. Herbst & Mills therefore conclude by suggesting that the best way for the international community to utilise assistance and aid efficiently for development in the DRC, should not be through the state but to engage the various chiefdoms, social communities, warlords and other sectors of society as they have the power and control in different regions and locations within the DRC provinces.
Their analysis is, however, rather problematic and perhaps devoid of a true appreciation of the complex nature of the conflict – and other conditions – in the DRC.

Firstly, countries in the Great Lakes region such as Rwanda and Uganda have a direct interest in the capacity of the DRC state to exercise its authority over its territory as their own security depends, to some extent, on it. Secondly, critically Herbst & Mills (2009) surmise that the DRC state exists only ‘in theory’ – arguing that the problem with international approaches to the DRC is that these treat the DRC as a state, which does not exist and therefore render state-building efforts pointless. Finally African countries, including South Africa, have invested significantly towards peacekeeping and in creating a democratic government in the DRC and such a contribution should be noted as the assumption is that only western countries contribute significantly towards peacekeeping. South Africa, in particular, has contributed significantly with respect to the soldiers who are part of MONUC¹ and in terms of the various capacity building projects and diplomatic teams which this research project will highlight in order to draw out lessons for other similar situations.

This research project will evaluate the strengths, weaknesses and challenges of South Africa’s diplomacy in assisting the DRC to achieve sustainable peace and to become a strong state with a vibrant society.

2. Clarification of concepts

It is important to clarify the concepts ‘diplomacy’ and ‘foreign policy’ as they can be confused with each other. Although the evolution of diplomacy will be explored in detail in chapter 2 of this study, brief definitions are provided here in order to contextualise the study theoretically.

¹ MONUC is a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC which was established by the United National Security Council’s Resolution 1279 in 1999, to facilitate and monitor the peace process and provide security in the DRC (Solomon, Kelly & Motsi, 2008:49).
2.1. Diplomacy

According to Du Plessis (2006: 125), diplomacy ‘is the master institution of international relations and represents a pacific approach to the management of international relations in pursuit of order and justice; within a foreign policy context, diplomacy is a political instrument with which to maximise the national interest of states and to pursue foreign policy goals and objectives. It is not only a foreign policy instrument during implementation, but it also influences or plays a role in the making of foreign policy as part of the bureaucracy’. Barston (2006:1) argues that political changes have impacted on the character and substantive form of diplomacy as reflected in terms such as ‘oil diplomacy’, ‘resource diplomacy’, ‘knowledge diplomacy’, ‘global governance’ and ‘transition diplomacy’. Furthermore diplomacy today is no longer the sole preserve of foreign ministries and diplomats but is undertaken by a wide range of actors, including political diplomats, advisers, envoys and officials from a wide range of “domestic” ministries or agencies with their foreign counterparts’. The emphasis in this study is focused specifically on ‘transition diplomacy’ and it will be explored in much more depth in Chapter 2.

2.2. Foreign Policy

Webber & Smith (2002:11) assert that foreign policy is directed towards external ‘targets’ and is intimately linked to the notions of statehood and government. It cannot be detached from notions of strategy and action which embody goals, values and decisions which are flexible and vary over time. These authors further argue that ‘there is no rigid definition of what goals, values and decisions count as “foreign policy” and which do not: although there is a substantial body of conventional wisdom as to what should be included and excluded’. The key tasks which are inherent in a foreign policy are those of design, management and control and it is in the implementation of these tasks that problems are experienced in terms of achieving the objectives and values of
a foreign policy, according to Webber and Smith (2002). Diplomacy is the key instrument and an implementation tool of foreign policy and in this study the focus is on the use of transitional diplomacy in order to achieve South Africa's foreign policy goals.

Scholars have written extensively about the role of diplomacy in the DRC and it is worth reviewing existing literature before the South African efforts can be evaluated in chapters 4 and 5.

3. Literature review

Existing literature has been reviewed as part of secondary sources which provide insight into the extent to which various scholars have analysed the conflict, the attempts made to end it and thereafter reconstruct the DRC. This section highlights and reviews a selection of different views and understandings of the state of DRC affairs, the Great Lakes region and the assessment of the contribution of the international community and particularly South African diplomacy in the promotion of peace and stability in the DRC. This review will inform the approach which this study will take in chapters 3 to 5.

According to Moyroud and Katunga (2002:160) the DRC is the third largest country in Africa, with an area of 2 345 000 square kilometres, of which only 3% is arable land and 77% forests and woodland. It is endowed with a unique biodiversity, wide mineral and forest resources and rich soils for agriculture. There are over 250 ethnic groups which have strong links with their environment but the DRC population is dispersed very unevenly, with highest density in the Kinshasa area, the capital city.

Upon obtaining its independence ‘from the Belgians in 1960 the DRC experienced a series of rebellions and secessionist attempts after Lumumba, its first Prime Minister, was assassinated. Subsequently, Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko assumed power and ruled for 32 years with the support of the United States of America (Moyroud and Katunga, 2002: 168-169)’. He was thereafter overthrown by Laurent Desire Kabila in 1997, with the support of a number of other governments in the region. Similarly, Laurent Kabila
was also assassinated in January 2001 and was replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila, as president of the DRC. Various arguments attempt to explain why the DRC has been engaged in many wars since its independence in 1960 and its struggle to achieve sustainable peace. The key ones are the negative involvement of the external players, the complexity and capacity of the state to govern, the democratisation process, poor leadership, governance and lack of economic development. These aspects are discussed in the following sections.

External factors

Some scholars argue that the DRC is caught up in a paradox – of vast land and abundance of immense natural resources, which are highly sought after international commodities, while its citizens live in abject poverty (Myroud and Katunga, 2002). Supporters of this argument inter alia, Human Rights Watch, have termed this ‘a curse of gold’ (2005 Human Rights Report). Others support a general belief by African leaders that the DRC represents a typical aftermath of colonisation where colonisers left with all their resources and expertise but still perpetuate ‘the process of dispossession and disempowerment of the people of the DRC’ (Nzongola 1997; Baregu, 2002 quoted in Kabemba, 2006). These arguments essentially assert that the DRC’s problems and civil wars are externally instigated to destabilise in order for foreign interests to illegally loot DRC riches. However, scholars such as Clapham (2006) and Herbst & Mills (2009) have argued that there are additional challenges.

Complexity of the state

Firstly, the complex nature of the DRC state whose ethnic groups spill over (including their conflicts) to its neighbouring countries poses a peculiar challenge. Secondly, the sheer size of the state makes it difficult to effectively provide security and control over the whole country and therefore conclude that conflicts will always be part of the fabric of the DRC society. To illustrate the point, Moyroud and Katunga (2002: 160-161) have pointed out that ‘the recent [2008] disruption of the Congo predominantly affecting the
eastern part of the DRC began with the exodus of some 1,2 m Hutu refugees across the border from Rwanda, following the capture of Kigali by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front in July 1994. Inevitably the ethnic and political conflicts were then exported to the DRC. It is therefore evident that state building is fundamental to safeguard security and sovereignty and should be a priority in seeking sustainable peace in the DRC, without which all attempts will be futile (Herbst & Mills, 2009; Webber & Smith, 2002). In support, Solomon, Kelly & Motsi (2008: 98) conclude that unless the continuing wars are stopped in the eastern part of the DRC and full support from Rwanda and Uganda for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme (DDR) secured, the achievement of peace will be highly unlikely.

The international community also believes that the presence of armed rebel groups in the DRC is a threat to the whole Great Lakes region and in response, regional initiatives have been established. For instance, eleven donor countries formed a Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) with the aim of breaking the cycle of conflict in the greater Great Lakes Region. De Veenhoop (2007: 117) points out that the signed agreements such as the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement in 1999, the Pretoria Agreement in 2002 and the Dar es Salaam Declaration in 2004 as well as a number of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council indicates concerted attempts by the international community to effect ‘disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reinsertion and reintegration of foreign armed groups’ in order to eliminate what is believed to be an inherent risk to peacekeeping attempts in the Great Lakes region. De Veenhoop (2007: 103) further argues that unless diplomacy recognises the magnitude of the military threat in the DRC and the Great Lakes region, reconstruction and development initiatives will not succeed. The author calls on the international community to ‘apply more systematic and consistent political and military pressure on the FDLR (formed by Rwandese refugees in DRC), the Burundian rebel group FNL, and ADF/NALU rebel movements from Uganda (De Veenhoop, 2007: 103)’. He further calls

2 The eleven donor countries were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the European Commission involving thirty partner organisations, including UN agencies. The funds for the MDRP come from the World Bank/IDA funds and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The targetted members of the greater Great Lakes Region were Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda (De Veenhoop, 2007: 21).
on the international community to ensure that the FDLR members in particular are brought to the International Criminal Court in The Hague or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha, to account for their participation in the Rwanda genocide in 1994.

De Veenhoop (2007: 104) surmises that ‘the government of the DRC should develop a policy, strategy and an appropriate mechanism to coordinate and guide the efforts of other departments, ministries and foreign or UN initiatives’ with respect to the implementation of the Demobilisation and Repatriation process.

However, cooperation in the region between states will not necessarily resolve all DRC challenges. Clapham (2006: 292 - 294) argues that the largest states in Africa are unable to reach all its citizens and govern effectively. They are also not able to maintain democratic systems of government which allow participation by citizens to influence their own future; hence they resort to violence. Democratisation of the state therefore is another key component which should be part of reconstructing the DRC although Clapham (2006: 292 – 294) acknowledges ‘the medieval mixture of local fiefdoms and contested territories’ in the DRC which will be an obstacle to achieving an effective decentralized modern state.

**Democratisation process**

Notwithstanding, in his study De Veenhoop (2007: 35) found that ‘in the DRC, the core issue is the political system that discourages individuals from developing activities and policies that would change it’. He argues that in the Kivu region, where communities are regularly attacked by the FDLR, local organized groups have sometimes intervened between the FDLR leaders and communities and also in assisting MONUC in the implementation of the demobilization and repatriation programme. However, the government of DRC has mostly excluded these groupings from being involved in any peacemaking initiatives.
In support of this argument Solomon, Kelly & Motsi (2008: 97) contend that community involvement is a key element in the disarmament and demobilization programme in the DRC in order to end the historical tensions between former rebel groups and communities, between communities and government and also between communities and MONUC. The authors refer to a lesson from Guatemala: while local communities were angered by international assistance which did not invest in local projects and therefore benefit them, ‘the creation of the National Transition Volunteers Programme involved locals who verified and inspected sites and generally promoted peace through the creation of mutual trust’ (Solomon, Kelly & Motsi, 2008: 97).

Drawing from South Africa’s experience, another important aspect of democratization is that processes should be structured in such a way that community members are empowered with skills for gainful employment and have a voice to participate in the reconstruction process. Such initiatives should be clearly linked to a development strategy. In Bosnia for instance, Solomon, Kelly & Motsi (2008: 95) highlight that the DDR programme included training, education and skilling of ex-combatants to facilitate alternative and legal employability in order to dissuade them from rejoining armies. However the new skills did not match the market needs and therefore did not assist soldiers in the long term. Consequently, as unemployment increased, historical ethnic tensions also intensified and impacted negatively on the peace process.

Relevant training, which is part of a DDR programme, is significant for another reason. Lack of opportunities for young males to find profitable employment will encourage them to seek any activity which will allow them to make a living. Ironically, joining a rebel group in the DRC is often the only alternative until other legal economic opportunities are available. Similarly, for communities to have a voice, resources and space are required to mobilise people and form active organizations. For such organizations to survive there should be political will and democratic systems which allow them to function accordingly. None of these are available in a fragile state like the DRC which has been at war for many decades.
It is evident then that it is a democratic government, good and active leadership and political will by the DRC government that will bring a positive impact while building confidence of its citizens and that of the international community. Hence it is the quality of the DRC leadership which concerns Kabemba (2006: 155) as he argues that Mobutu’s leadership style and mismanagement contributed significantly to the collapse of the DRC state.

**Poor leadership**

Kabemba (2006: 155) points out that Mobutu’s government lacked leadership, was riddled with corruption, political violence and mismanagement of state and public resources. As far as Kabemba (2006) is concerned such a culture of political leadership still continues into the present day and is the main stumbling block to achieving peace, democracy and development in the DRC.

Kabemba (2006: 116) further argues that careful decisions need to be made by African governments on constitutional and institutional arrangements to ensure that there is meaningful political representation, a consolidation of peace and a general belief in the legitimacy of the political process. While Kabemba (2006:118) contends that poor leadership is typical of general leadership in Africa which results in dysfunctional states, he also points out that constructive lessons are gradually emerging from the African continent which indicates that:

1. The rebuilding of the state in Congo will have to start by reinstituting the capacity of the state to collect tax in order to facilitate economic development and foreign direct investment which is directed towards the reconstruction of the country’s infrastructure.

2. There is an urgent need to create a relatively strong and professional army capable of exercising power over the entire territory. A well coordinated
integration of the different armies which are now controlling different parts of the country could achieve this.

3. A decentralized state administration, within one national state, will not only distribute resources evenly across different provinces and ethnic groups but will also facilitate the monitoring of the presence of the state in all parts of the territory and also enhance the democratization process.

4. Regional integration which includes an agreement on a common security mechanism and tighter border controls should be prioritized as the conflict in the DRC has highlighted the need to view the political economy of the conflict in its regional context to avoid illegal trade in the DRC’s resources, using neighboring states as transit routes.

In support of this argument, Solomon, Kelly & Motsi (2008: 95) believe that the international community and the African Union (AU) in particular, should be putting more pressure on the Great Lakes region’ members such as Uganda and Rwanda to stop the violation of the DRC’s sovereignty. Such a move will contribute towards strengthening and demonstrating strong leadership in Africa by the AU in order to combat the weaknesses which Kabemba (2006) and others have highlighted.

It is worth noting however the positive and sometimes innovative contribution and leadership which the international community has made through its diplomatic efforts. For instance, De Goede & van der Borgh (2008: 115-116) point out that the establishment of the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT) in the DRC categorically defined, for the first time, the role of diplomats in implementing the Sun City Peace agreement\(^3\) in 2002. Its role was to facilitate the organisation of the

\(^3\) The CIAT was the product of the Brahimi Report which called for more integrated missions that coordinate political, humanitarian, military and development aspects. CIAT worked closely with MONUC to ‘form a national, restructured and integrated army, hold free and transparent elections as a basis for the installation of a democratic government, and putting in place governance structures that will lead to a new political order’. CIAT in particular, ‘was the result of continuing insecurities and mutual distrust of the belligerents at the negotiation table in Sun City. CIAT was therefore a diplomatic mechanism and a transitional institution which represented fifteen countries
elections, manage spoilers and coordinate the activities of the international community involved in the PCRD process. The CIAT experience begins to highlight one of the significant roles that transitional diplomacy plays in ‘an extremely complex transition process’ by ‘demilitarising politics’ (Lyons quoted in de Goede & van der Borgh, 2008: 116). Over time, good leadership however manifests itself in the type of governance, policies, structures and principles that the state beneficially applies.

**Good governance and economic development**

It should be accepted that irrespective of size any fragile state which is emerging from a protracted war like in the DRC, will have many obstacles which will challenge any diplomatic efforts aimed at stabilisation. A pluralist perspective which recognises the proliferation of issues and actors involved in foreign policy and the importance of economic, social and environmental issues, in addition to military and security concerns is useful in understanding conditions in the DRC.

Putzel, Lindemann & Schouten (2008: iii) warn that ‘a standard template of “good governance” involving the devolution of power and the promotion of private and non-governmental agents of development may be positively counter-productive if not accompanied by singular efforts to support elite coalition formation and significantly increase the capacity at the level of the central state’. They argue it is imperative for the international community involved in the promotion of reconstruction and development of the DRC to acknowledge that the integration of political, social and economic aspects will pose a huge challenge ‘in the face of deeply rooted regional and local identities, networks of power and patterns of patronage’. Assuming that the state has sufficient capacity to govern effectively, good leadership which is committed to democracy and has political will to develop good governance systems, the next crucial component for ensuring that peace is sustainable in the DRC will be economic reform and development.

*(including France, UK, US and SA) and international organisations. It was chaired by the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) of MONUC (de Goede & van der Borgh, 2008: 116-117).*
Solomon, Kelly & Motsi (2008: 99, 101) believe that another important driver of war in the DRC is the war economy. They argue that unless the war economy is uprooted, conflict will not end. They further point out that the main challenge is to convince those involved that there is more benefit and profit in peace rather than in the war economy. They conclude that the international community, including multinational corporations, therefore will have to create a climate which creates such incentives. They also suggest that a strict regulatory framework should be established and the DRC government should join the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme\(^4\) not only to eliminate illicit trade in conflict diamonds but also extend it to coltan, which is one of the major profitable resources in the DRC. To tighten the regulatory framework further, the authors suggest that the DRC and the international community should adopt the ‘publish what you pay’ campaign\(^5\) to encourage financial regulators to force corporations in various states ‘to publish their involvement within extractive industries as a prerequisite for listing on stock exchanges’. Opposing views to those of Solomon, Kelly & Motsi’s (2008) could be explored but they are beyond the scope of this study.

Given the difficulties which have been outlined in this section, with regard to ending war in the DRC, questions have been raised about South Africa’s capacity and interest in getting involved in the reconstruction and development of the country. Southall (2006:3) has argued that South Africa has historical baggage and a moral obligation to ‘repay Africa for the sins of the apartheid regime’. He further contends its own experience of negotiating a political settlement has put it in a position to share its conflict resolution capacity. Added to this, is the expectation of its support of peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the African continent because of its ‘middle power’ status globally and ‘great power’ status continentally.


\(^5\) The campaign by the Open Society Institute and Global Witness which seeks to ‘create greater transparency in the trade of commodities by having multinational corporations publish fees, taxes, kickbacks and concessions that they pay, to belligerent groups and corrupt government officials, for in order to gain the rights to mine for commodities and resources (Solomon, Kelly & Motsi, 2008: 101).
However, South Africa’s interest in the reform of the DRC has been observed with suspicion. In its defense, Kagwanja (2006: 47) argues that ‘although SA has been accused of entrenching its commercial and trade interests …with some of its companies accused of playing on SA’s lead in the peace process, to take unfair advantage in securing contracts and business deals, it is clear that SA’s involvement in the DRC transcends beyond these interests and its efforts includes stabilizing the Congo through training the future Congolese army and police and laying foundations for a working civil bureaucracy’. It is plausible then to argue that the understanding of South Africa’s capacity, motivation and interest for participating in the reconstruction of the DRC can only be achieved by continuously assessing its activities in that country. Subsequently, best practices can be drawn in order to enhance its capacity to engage in other countries.

In 2008 the Departments of Defence, Security Services and International Relations & Cooperation embarked on their first attempt to compile lessons and best practices from South Africa’s peacekeeping activities in Africa. Pax Africa was therefore commissioned to assess South Africa’s experience in peace missions in the African Continent, including the DRC. Although the study concentrates only on security reform, it is important to highlight some of its key arguments. The Pax Africa Report (hereafter referred to as “the report”) notes that South Africa’s diplomatic attempts in bringing peace to the DRC were started by President Mandela who tried to bring Mobutu and Kabila together to negotiate power sharing. Positive developments however were only realised when the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement was signed in 2002 and eventually culminated in the historic national and democratic elections of 2006.

The report acknowledges the positive role and impact South Africa has made in bringing peace to the DRC, during and following the conflict. Although the report does not analyse other South African diplomatic efforts in the DRC it warns that current initiatives might be too extensive and overstretch South Africa’s resources (Pax Africa, 2008: 45-51). The Report also argues that South Africa should be better prepared strategically and politically before engaging in a complex process such as in the DRC. It further
notes that there is a need for greater coordination between all government departments and also between government and South Africa's civil society organisations who are also involved in the processes.

The Pax Africa Report provides an initial and useful understanding of South Africa's diplomatic efforts in the DRC. However, it does not include the reform of the police, the development of the justice system or any other projects which South Africa is implementing in the DRC. In chapters 3 and 4 of this study a comprehensive analysis will be undertaken of all key South African diplomatic efforts in the DRC.

The literature reviewed in this chapter is therefore helpful in highlighting the complexities facing the reconstruction and development of the DRC. It highlights the fact that the conflict is regionally based and only a solution which involves all Great Lakes members will assist the DRC to achieve sustainable peace. The review also highlights the fact that efforts to establish democratic governance and a regulatory framework is fundamental to deal with the war economy and the empowerment of communities to support the reconstruction process and also to offer suitable employment for the youth. The long-term nature of the regulatory framework means that achievements might take longer to be realised although incorporation of training into DDR programme, is possible immediately. It is also clear that the DRC will require a lot of support and resources to achieve peace and stability. Fortunately the international community has been heavily involved in the process through the various initiatives which form part of the PCRD process.

This review also indicates that strong African leadership is fundamental in reversing all failures and inappropriate systems and tendencies which were introduced by leaders such as Colonel Mobuto sese Seko. An important argument is made that the AU should be actively involved in applying diplomatic pressure to its members such as Rwanda and Uganda, to support plausible PCRD policies. While historical challenges and possible solutions to reconstruct the DRC have been presented, a warning has also been sounded that the international community should be cautious in importing its
concept of democracy without a full understanding of the particular entrenched conditions in the DRC. This review indicates that, on one hand, the size of the DRC will make it impossible to project its power over large distances in order to function as an effective state. On the other hand, it is only when the regional networks, which are based on ethnicity and their stranglehold on the state apparatus have been destroyed that equal opportunities and stability can be attained. The argument begs the question about whether South Africa has the capacity to deal with such enormous challenges unless it has its own selfish interests. It is evident however that South Africa will have to invest extensively in the DRC PCRD process before it can enjoy any benefits from it.

Apart from the Pax Africa Report which analyses South Africa’s efforts in security sector reform in the DRC, no other systematic analysis has been attempted aimed at other South African initiatives, except the work of Rankhumise and Mahlako (2005), which provided a brief analysis. However, this is a rather dated source. This study aims to fill that gap.

4. Research Approach

4.1. Research problem

South Africa’s direct involvement in peace making and development in the continent is relatively new. It also involves an expanded role for its diplomats with the Department of Foreign Affairs taking responsibility for an ambitious and comprehensive reconstruction and development effort in the DRC. This approach expands the traditional role of diplomacy and diplomats considerably and, at the same time, constitutes a definitive stance on the part of South Africa vis-à-vis its perception of what its commitment to the continent entails and what it expects its diplomats to achieve. It is therefore worth examining the implementation of South Africa’s peace-building policy in the DRC during

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6 During this study the name of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) changed into the “Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). For the purpose of easy reference DFA will be used in this study.
the transition and the post-reconstruction and development (PCRD) phase after the
democratic elections in 2006, especially with a view to identifying the lessons to be
learnt for its future diplomatic efforts in other conflict prone societies. For this purpose
the study will utilise the concept ‘transitional diplomacy’. Inherent in this investigation will
be the following subsidiary research questions:

(a) What has been South Africa’s foreign policy behaviour in facilitating peace and
    post-conflict reconstruction in the DRC?
(b) What were the foreign policy objectives and instruments used to contribute
towards post-conflict reconstruction and development in the DRC? In particular,
how has diplomacy been used to effect South Africa’s contribution to PCRD in
the DRC?
(c) What lessons could be drawn from the diplomacy employed during the PCRD
    and transitional phase in the DRC?
(d) More broadly, how does the role of the foreign ministry, through its diplomats;
differ in transitional and PCRD contexts as opposed to more ‘conventional’
contexts and situations?

4.2. Research methodology

4.2.1. Primary sources

The study is primarily qualitative in nature and South Africa’s involvement in the
DRC is used as a case study. Primary sources, in the form of agreements and
media statements made by South Africa and the DRC have been used in this
study, as well as all relevant government reports. A semi-structured
questionnaire was used to interview South African government officials, as
confidential respondents, who were involved in implementing the capacity
building projects in DRC (see Addendum A). The questionnaire was used as a
guide to draw out the core information for this study while it allowed the
respondents to express their views as much and as broadly as possible on the
topic. In order to protect the anonymity of the interviewees, they will only be referred to as ‘Respondent 1’ or ‘Respondent 2’ etc in this study. The author of this study also played a participant observer role as she was part of the South African delegation in the meetings which dealt with the training of DRC diplomats.

4.2.2. Secondary sources

Secondary sources have been utilised by examining existing scholarly literature on various aspects of diplomacy, peacekeeping and those proving an overview and analysis of the post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) process in the DRC.

4.3. Structure of the study

Chapter one contains a discussion of the research theme and problem, together with the research question and sub-questions, based on a review of the relevant literature and available scholarly assessments of South Africa’s involvement in the DRC.

Chapter two will highlight the importance of the peace agreement as it sets out the terms and principles which guided the transitional process. It will then indicate a set of enabling conditions which are fundamental and support reconstruction activities. The evolution and role of diplomacy in creating such conditions and in supporting the post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) process will be highlighted. The relationship between PCRD process and transitional diplomacy will be presented by outlining the objectives of PCRD processes and how these rely on diplomacy. Such an analysis will therefore provide an analytical framework to be utilised in discussing South Africa’s diplomatic efforts in the DRC. The framework developed in chapter two will inform the analysis of South Africa’s diplomatic role in the DRC in chapter four.
In chapter three, the results of South Africa’s diplomatic efforts in resolving conflict in the DRC will be presented by providing an overview of the transitional period, the resources and capacity projects which South Africa offered to the DRC in 2006; and the structure of diplomatic engagement between these two countries.

In chapter four the contribution and role of South African diplomats in the various capacity building projects will be assessed in terms of their objectives, approach, implementation process and the results obtained to date. The analytical framework developed in chapter two will be utilised with an added objective of improving the understanding of what ‘transitional diplomacy’ entails.

In the concluding chapter, the findings will be evaluated in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the South African approach and to draw lessons for South Africa’s diplomats with a view to their continued efforts in the DRC. Recommendations will therefore be made in order to assist policy-makers and also contribute towards existing knowledge with regard to the DRC. The impact of these projects on the traditional role of diplomats will be examined to determine the difference with transitional diplomacy and research questions for future projects will be highlighted.

5. Conclusion

Since colonisation, the DRC has never been well managed but ruled to serve the interests of those who were in power. Even Mobuto’s attempts at building the state during his first decade were meant to develop a small group of elitists, based on ethnic regional networks that are loyal to him at the expense of local and regional development and growth. When the central state collapsed, the elite groups in provinces entrenched their support through tribal patronage and corruption. Poor governance and service delivery are therefore based on corrupt systems which allow the exploitation of ordinary
citizens. The economy is also trapped in the illegal activities which are not controlled by the state. As a result, the state depends heavily on official assistance in order to transform and democratise its systems.

The high levels of insecurity in the DRC have been exacerbated by the freedom which foreign armed groups enjoy while they also attack and destroy Congolese communities. Paradoxically, these groups are also a threat to the whole Great Lakes region and any effort to stabilise the DRC should also address this threat. The Multi-country group involved in the stabilisation of the greater Great Lakes Region is constantly monitoring what each member in the region is doing and what its responsibility should be in bringing about peace.

It is however evident from the literature review undertaken in this chapter that all those involved in the region have a political role to play but all role-players should work coherently and compliment their efforts. To relate specifically to the DRC, this review presents the history and the challenges which the state faces during the reconstruction phase. The emphasis has been on ensuring that the state and its citizens are secure first in order to be able to concentrate its efforts on developing sustainable peace and stability in the DRC. It should be noted that the challenges of human security, in terms of democracy, respect for the rights and dignity of citizens, justice, economic development and public sector reform are issues which have not been addressed in this review as a comprehensive set of important factors which are necessary for the reconstruction of the DRC.

While the roots of the DRC conflict have been analysed in this chapter, the challenges which are highlighted relate to the historical causes of the state collapse. For instance, the proliferation of uncontrolled arms, in a vast country like the DRC, is an issue that has not received sufficient attention in this chapter. It is therefore unclear how stability and security will ultimately be achieved and sustained before the weapons, particularly small arms, have been dealt with. What is missing in the literature is the study of attempts which have been made to reconstruct the DRC. This study aims to fill this gap
by evaluating South Africa’s role in the reconstruction of the DRC in order to draw lessons for similar initiatives in the future. Some of the recommendations made in the reviewed literature in this chapter will also guide the evaluation of South Africa’s activities in the DRC in the following chapters. Chapter 2 will highlight the evolution process which has made diplomacy responsive to such situations and provides an analytical framework for this study.
CHAPTER 2 – CONSTRUCTING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: 
PCRD AND TRANSITIONAL DIPLOMACY

2.1. INTRODUCTION

In Chapter 1 conditions which pose a challenge to and also provide opportunities for bringing about sustainable peace in the DRC were highlighted. It is against this background that an analytical framework will be developed in this chapter, to inform Chapters 4 and 5.

In developing the analytical framework the first part of this chapter sets out the conditions necessary and required for PCRD in order to contextualise the discussion of transitional diplomacy in the second part. It will be argued that there are conditions which can be regarded as a priori to the environment within which PCRD and diplomatic processes are implemented, without which sustainable and democratic peace will not be achieved. These conditions are developed during the negotiations process in a way which will allow the reconstruction and development processes to take place after conflict. They are usually outlined in the Peace Agreement of each country.

Secondly, it will be shown how diplomacy has evolved from traditional to increasingly “modern forms” which allow states to intervene in conflicts through transitional diplomacy. Lessons will be drawn from other countries to indicate how contributing and inexperienced states, such as South Africa in the DRC, should prepare themselves before they engage in a PCRD process.

Thirdly, this chapter will argue that the international community and the receiving state need common principles and values, clear objectives and understanding of the structure of the PCRD system in order to engage successfully. This analysis will therefore assist in drawing up an analytical framework to be utilised in Chapter 4.
2.2 ENABLING CONDITIONS FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

Conditions and terms for ending conflicts are usually negotiated, agreed to and outlined in the Peace Agreements which kick-off the transition period towards stability and peace. In the DRC for instance, the terms for ceasefire, transition and the reconstruction process were captured in the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement signed in 2002. Amongst these, are general conditions and issues which are fundamental to any reconstruction and development process and they are outlined by Stedman (2001: 1) as follows:

The number of warring parties

Stedman (2001: 1) asserts that the number of warring parties impact heavily on the ability to implement PCRD policies and strategies. A multiplicity of warring parties, such as in Somalia and Liberia, exacerbates difficulties in achieving success as all interests of all parties cannot be addressed simultaneously. The risk of violent opposition to a peace agreement by those who feel excluded therefore increases.

As discussed throughout this study, the DRC had a plethora of rebel groups some of which are small, unorganised and lack strong leadership. Even those who were established sufficiently to be consulted during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City and beyond did not sign the Global All-Inclusive Agreement. Even the CNDP, which had signed, pulled out of the peace process several times claiming that the implementation was no longer based on the principles which had been agreed to. During this time, its soldiers would re-arm and re-start the violence on the eastern side of the DRC.

Ownership of the peace agreement by all warring parties

Stedman (2001:1) points out that a peace agreement which is owned by all parties facilitates commitment to solving the problem and confidence in the document and the process thereof. Otherwise some parties might prefer the pre-intervention phase and
will therefore oppose any attempts which seek to create an agreement while the intervention is already in place.

It can be argued however that sometimes not all warring parties will be interested in ending the war if they believe that the peace process will not be beneficial to them in the short term. Some warring parties have stalled the ceasefire negotiations so much that at a certain stage the negotiators and the facilitators would agree to take the risk and exclude them as it happened in the DRC (see chapter 4). Unfortunately, they could then become spoilers.

The presence of spoilers

Stedman (2001:10) argues that spoilers are always present during peace building but their ‘behaviour depends on the existence of a special opportunity structure’. For instance, in an environment where spoilers believe that they would receive support from neighbouring countries, ‘through supply of guns, fuel and capital, they will spoil the opportunity for attaining peace’. Paris (2005:774) concludes that it is because of this reason that peace-builders should ‘prepare for instability in the post-conquest period’. The main focus therefore should be to ensure that a peace agreement is developed with the participation of the local and warring parties from the onset. The extent to which South Africa’s efforts have impacted positively on these challenges will be discussed in chapter 4. It can be argued however that the inability of the state to deal with spoilers presents a particular challenge.

Collapsed states

The inability of state institutions to govern a sovereign territory places great stress on the process of implementing peace agreements and in addressing existing threats. Therefore it is critical that such capacity is put in place at the beginning of the reconstruction process to ensure sustainability. Paris (2005: 772-773) warns that the international community should not think that it is safe to exit the fragile transitional state
once the institutions and infrastructure are in place. He continues that on one hand the international community should be careful not to risk ‘squandering the goodwill and hopes of the host population and discrediting the idea of democracy in their eyes’ by leaving too early. On the other, it should build the relationship with the local citizens in such a way that they do not, over time, ‘start perceiving the peace builders as ‘occupiers rather than facilitators’. Therefore he advocates for a longer-term commitment which has clearly defined timeframes and specific goals including the goal of handing over authority to local people as quickly as the situation allows.

This is a critical argument for an inexperienced country like South Africa with respect to transitional diplomacy. The question which influences “the willingness score” that Steadman (2000:10) presents below is - at what point can a country with limited resources exit once it starts engaging in a transitional process of a collapsed state? This issue will be addressed in Chapter 4 and 5.

**Number of soldiers**

Stedman (2000: 10) argues that where there are more than 50 000 soldiers to be disarmed, more resources will be needed to verify, evaluate and monitor the process. The chances for cheating therefore also increase. The proliferation of small arms and an arms industry or interested parties who support conflict could also facilitate revival of rebel groups (see “number of warring parties” above).

**Hostile neighbouring states or networks**

Quoting Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg who observed that ‘many civil wars today intersect with regional conflicts and interstate competition’, Stedman (2001: 11) argues that the attitude of the neighbouring states play a significant role in undermining or supporting PCRD processes. For instance, where 'weak states have little control over borders, well-organised private and semi-official networks’ can mobilise neighbouring countries to take advantage and support spoilers within the
unstable state. Equally, Paris (2005: 774) warns that lack of commitment from the international community to build a functioning state can lead to a situation which, for instance, led ‘Afghanistan to become the world’s leading narco-mafia ‘enterprise zone’ which facilitated the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. The extent of progress made in building state capacity in the DRC against the background of the role of other Great Lakes member states will be examined in chapter 4.

The hostility between the DRC and its Great Lakes and SADC regions are historical and were discussed in chapter 1. Other key arguments mainly pertain to the complex ethnic conflicts amongst the DRC nationalities and also those which are waged by rebel groups of the Great Lakes states in general whilst based on DRC soil. Ethnicity is therefore a huge driver of conflict in the DRC and has to be addressed to achieve positive outcomes.

**Wars of secession**

Stedman (2001: 11) argues that where warring parties share a national identity, the chances of a peace agreement’s success is higher than in instances where national sovereignty is contested. He suggests it is easier to reach agreement in a situation where the parties can envisage a unitary future. Supporting this argument, Paris (2005: 770-771) points out that where there is ethnic conflict for instance, it is important to ‘promote “good” civil society which in turn promotes cross-factional civil society groups such as the OECD’s culture of peace programmes in Rwanda and El Salvador, (which were) designed to increase grassroots dialogue and cooperation among formerly warring communities.’ He also suggests that political systems which seek to consciously break down strong ethnic lines while addressing constituencies’ will be required. He further warns that legitimate traditional and cultural systems of decision making should be combined with modern democracy principles in order to ensure local ownership and buy-in.
As was pointed out in Chapter 1 the DRC has been riddled by ethnic wars and because of the ineffectiveness of the state, ethnic based networks have become entrenched and have extended to government activities at local level. This is indeed a huge challenge in reconstructing the DRC, as will be discussed in later chapters.

**Commitment by the international community**

In addition to the above, Stedman (2001: 11) argues that ultimately the will, interest and commitment of the international community is crucial. To illustrate his argument, he then developed what he calls the "willingness score", comprising

- Major or regional power interest which indicates a high level of commitment, especially if the interests are declared publicly as important to their own vital security interests’.

- Resource commitment naturally determines the success or failure of a mission and sufficient and constrained resources can mean a difference between the partial successes in Cambodia compared to the failure and ultimate tragedy in Rwanda.

- The mood and attitude of each country’s citizens and their perceptions towards a particular conflict will inform the decision of the contributing powers. Stedman (2001: 12) argues that what motivates policy makers to make financial commitment is different to what informs their decision with respect to the perceived risk to soldiers.

Given this argument, a positive attitude and support from the international community for PCRD process is therefore important and to ensure their success, all actors should agree on the expected outcomes. Comprehensive mechanisms and processes should be established in order to align all activities to the agreed needs and objectives (AU Policy on PCRD 2006; de Goede 2008). This argument also
highlights the importance of the countries participating in such a process to articulate how their individual interests would be served in order not to lose the support of their constituencies at home.

**Bridges to peace-building**

Stedman (2001: 12) contends that it is important to ensure civilian security as the PCRD process offers unique opportunities to redesign and reform civilian security institutions. As pointed out in Chapter 1, many scholars argue that members of civil society should be included in peace-building operations as part of inculcating democratic and participatory governance (see also Paris 2005; de Veenhoop 2007; Solomon, Kelly & Motsi, 2008). Through various case studies Stedman (2001: 19) draws important lessons, such as the need to design and implement judicial, penal, and police reforms in tandem; and the importance of creating specialised police units, especially criminal Investigative units and oversight offices such as Civilian Commissions. Paris (2005: 768) however, warns that the situations, history in which peace missions operate and the problems they encounter, vary.

The conditions listed above however, are fundamental to all situations as they create an environment conducive to attaining sustainable peace and stability, failing which, they will revert to war. What is therefore important is to ensure that diplomats address these issues sufficiently during negotiations before the peace agreement is signed. Given the huge challenges which the DRC has been experiencing since 1960, particularly with regard to all the conditions outlined in this section, Chapter 4 and 5 will examine whether South African efforts indeed contributed towards achieving sustainable peace in the DRC. That begs the question however, of whether South Africa has the diplomatic capacity necessary to implement transitional diplomacy, given the significant changes which the institution of diplomacy has undergone since 1648.
2.3. THE EVOLUTION OF DIPLOMACY

2.3.1. Evolution of diplomacy

The institution of diplomacy is as ancient as the interaction amongst local and traditional authorities all over the world before the signing of the Westphalia Treaty which formalised it in 1648. Coolsaet (1998: 22) argues that a historical understanding of the evolution of diplomacy is important in order to deal with current changes. He says that the pre-Westphalia era was characterised by diffusion of power while the Westphalia era ushered a modern and international state-centred system of diplomatic relations. The modern system is therefore characterised and governed by legitimate and sovereign states.

Subsequently, in 1961 the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations defined and formalised diplomatic functions in the context of established diplomatic missions. They consist of six key elements, namely, representation of the sending state in the receiving state, protecting the interests and nationals of the sending state by the receiving state, negotiations with government of the latter, collecting information and reporting on the activities of the receiving state and promoting friendly relations between the two states by developing economic, cultural and scientific relations and the contribution towards an international order which is characterised by a set of international rules of a normative and regulatory nature that provides a structure to the international system (Feltham: 3; Barston, 2006: 4). Borrowing from Adam Watson, Barston (2006: 4) argues that ‘the central task of diplomacy is not just the management of order, but the management of change and the maintenance of continued persuasion of order in the midst of change’. This point is particularly important in understanding the nature of transitional diplomacy which will be discussed extensively in Chapter 4.

Notwithstanding, diplomacy has changed over time both in form and substance due to key historical and political circumstances such as the impact of the Cold War which was characterised by ideological conflict. While some schools of thought will argue that rapid
globalisation has eroded sovereignty and transformed economic production structures, it has also led to the ‘democratisation of diplomacy’ and has expanded the type and number of actors and issues in the international arena (Coolant 1998; Holsti 2004). Ramarajan & Bezrukova (2002: 3) conclude that consequently, during intra-state war and post-conflict reconstruction and development processes, the ‘mandates of peacekeepers and NGOs have begun to overlap and can sometimes result in competition over scarce resources. Despite this, for successful intervention in conflict and peace building, it is necessary for NGOs and peacekeepers to work together’.

Changes have also posed a challenge to the centrality of diplomats and the authority of ambassadors. For instance, the role of specialists in areas such as economic, environmental and energy diplomacy has led to a decline in the decision making powers of ambassadors. While diplomats increasingly became specialised in key areas, the Ambassador became a supervisor of a multi-disciplinary team of technicians, particularly in industrialised countries such as Britain, France and USA. (Coolseat 1998: 17). The participation of experts in PCRD processes also adds another dimension to the composition of actors involved in diplomacy. One area in which diplomats still have complete authority over is in choosing the form and style of diplomacy they will apply when implementing foreign policy.

2.3.2. Form and style of diplomacy

Barston (2006:37) defines the form of diplomacy ‘as the preferred framework within which states and other actors seek to carry out their external relations. Form can be bilateral or multilateral; transnational, economic, open, private or secret’. The diplomatic style defines the state’s preference for a particular form of diplomacy, such as preference for multilateral institutions or limited to open diplomacy. The diplomatic style essentially results in an international identity and diplomatic reputation (e.g. mediation or quiet diplomacy). It is therefore important to understand the multilateral and bilateral forms of diplomacy as they are crucial in analysing South Africa and the international community’s engagement in the DRC.
(a) Multilateral diplomacy

Coolsaet (1998: 19) argues that the popularity of multilateralism emerged following the euphoric nature of the post Cold War period in which an ‘ambitious global diplomatic agenda for the sustainability of mankind’ characterised by issues such as human rights, environment and social development, was formulated. Consequently, diplomacy evolved as diplomats had to increasingly deal with a multilateral agenda while paying similar attention to national interests. It also encouraged a multilateral agenda and cooperation as it was realised that the scale of the problems needed collective efforts with binding rules and obligations. Since the post-Cold War, multilateral diplomacy has become important as the entrance of new non-state actors has led to the improved role of the United Nations (UN) in particular, with regard to extending peace keeping directly into the states, which suffers from intra-conflict, in order to protect and facilitate human security.

The support and commitment of the international community is therefore mobilised through international structures such as the UN and its Security Council. While the UN has been deploying its peacekeeping troops to intervene in various countries, states continue to engage directly with each other through bilateral relations.

(b) Bilateral diplomacy

A number of reasons can be suggested why some states prefer to conduct foreign policy through bilateral relations but its strength lies in the fact that states are able to select strategically which interests the relations will serve. For instance, relations with actors in a particular country could be for political, economic, medical, technical or strategic purposes (Barston, 2006: 37). Coolsaet (1998) and Malghaes (1988) contend that it is through bilateral arrangements that a state is still able to exert its sovereign power to pursue its national interests particularly through economic diplomacy. It is also simpler and easy to control better than the multilateral approach.
On the contrary, critiques of bilateral diplomacy have pointed out to the fact that it can be time consuming, needing significant commitment of organisation resources and it limits international contact (Barston, 2006: 37). Notwithstanding, bilateral diplomacy applied in post/conflict areas (through permanent resident diplomats) provides a framework, infrastructure and institutional capacity to apply transitional diplomacy. Transitional diplomacy therefore is undertaken mainly through bilateral agreements as it clearly defines the role of a particular state in the PCRD process of the receiving state.

2.3.3. Transitional diplomacy

According to Barston (2006: 90):

*Transitional diplomacy is concerned with the reconstruction of a state following the end of hostilities in an intra-state conflict or an external military intervention. It illustrates the changing nature of modern diplomacy through its involvement in domestic political – institutional reconstruction, alongside traditional areas such as aid, refugees, humanitarian aid, ceasefires and conflict mediation. Transition diplomacy involves a range of players, including lead members of the Security Council, directly interested states operating as so-called “Groups of Friends”, military force/economic donor states, international organisation officials or representatives and NGOs. The central elements of transition diplomacy are building political and administrative structures, setting up electoral systems, economic-physical reconstruction, human rights and other capacity building measures.*

Transitional diplomacy therefore forms part of the implementation phase of the post-conflict reconstruction and development process. It presents a further evolution process of diplomacy by including active implementation of programmes as part of diplomatic functions and creates the conditions, systems and structures which lead to transformation of states. To support the democratisation process which ensures that justice systems are developed to address the root causes of the war; and also protect citizens against possible future injustices, transitional diplomacy may include ‘the reintroduction of war crimes tribunals and the activation of International Criminal Court to address aspects such as genocide and abuse of human rights’ (Barston, 2006: 90).

As pointed out under ‘multilateral diplomacy’, transitional diplomacy is shaped and informed by the nature of political authorisation for peace operations at UN level in
countries such as in Mozambique, East Timor and Bosnia (Barston, 2006: 90). Other military transition operations such as in Iraq and Afghanistan also influence the nature of transitional diplomacy.

Since transitional diplomacy is a relatively new concept, Barston (2006: 91) points out that the success record of its application is mixed but has been more successful in areas where the major causes of instability have either been isolated and/or removed from a relatively complex and conflictual environment. Even though the current US intervention in Iraq is regarded more as international occupation than facilitation for PCRD processes, the following lessons presented by Rathmell (2005: 1037-1038), can be drawn the US experience:

- Early planning must be adequate and mission leadership must build planning and reporting processes into a system that they routinely use for decision-making.

- A thorough understanding of the abilities and limitations of central and local government is important as it is imperative to build true partnerships with government at all levels. Rathmell (2005) argues that an integrated political/military plan should be based on assumptions which have been effectively challenged in order to inform the understanding of local conditions (such as the status of administrative institutions, physical infrastructure and attitudes before an intervention can be made.

- Planning for possible failure as well as auditing of performance must be integrated into all plans which should distinguish between international, head office and local level planning and management in a permanent resident mission while ensuring transparency and feedback up and down the chain of command.
• Planning processes need to be integrated with the resource allocation and management processes if the mission is to be able to sensibly align priorities with resources.

• Continuous mobilisation of additional international expertise is imperative particularly for establishing coalition with critical experts who are committed and capable of making sustainable difference to government institutions.

• A coordinated planning mechanism need to be established between security, public service and diplomatic programmes and should be better integrated in the field. Because of constant rotation of staff in residence diplomatic missions and in military personnel, the learning of joint coordination and planning should be continuous and built into the day-to-day activities in the field.

• Funding should be continuously directed towards activities that support long-term, sustainable political and economic reform and development. Commitment and allocation of resources over some years is crucial to ensure that short-term interventions are not wasted.

Referring to the US experience in Afghanistan, Marten (2002: 48 - 49) argues that an exit strategy is just as important. He found that another significant and enduring concern by US policymakers was to find a way of avoiding an unplanned expansion of the operation resulting in an unreasonable variety of tasks which would result in increased costs, in the absence of an exit strategy. Marten (2002: 48-49) argues for ‘careful wording of [a] UNSC resolution to set clear limits of the operation and emphasise the receiving country’s responsibility for basic policing and tying the duration of peacekeeping to the military training programmes already in place’. The author (2002: 49) further contends that the receiving country should therefore be responsible for its own security and the ‘danger of anarchy will only sufficiently diminish when the
receiving country’s confidence on its ability to hold together as a nation, has been boosted’. Marten (2002: 49) however warns that this is only possible when the peacekeepers do not impose their particular model of governance but respect existing local authorities such as regional tribal councils in Afghanistan so as to ensure sustainability of peace and stability.

Transitional diplomacy is informed by decisions taken both at multilateral and bilateral levels. The question on when to exit from a PCRD process therefore applies both to the UN members and individual states who are involved in a particular country. The key lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan place emphasis on comprehensive, proper planning and an informed exit strategy which appreciates the complexities of the PCRD process. The emergence of transitional diplomacy signifies the extent to which diplomacy has evolved from traditional to modern forms. Hence the Americans have dubbed the role of diplomats in post-conflict reconstruction and development processes ‘transformational diplomacy’. It is important to note however that ‘transformational diplomacy’ is not synonymous to ‘transitional diplomacy’ as Vaisse (2007) argues below.

2.3.4. Transformational diplomacy

According to Vaisse (2007: 23), Americans coined the phrase ‘transformational diplomacy’ as they grappled with the effects and implications of the security threats which had resulted in the attacks on 11th September 2001. President Bush at the time came to a conclusion that these threats came from within states rather than USA’s foreign policy. It therefore became logical to the US’ state department that ‘nation building and good governance aid were more important than diplomacy’ (Vaisse, 2007: 23. For the Americans, this included the establishment of both physical and virtual presence in war areas which also served to collect better intelligence while developing a better understanding of how reliable the security of a country was to the USA’s interests.
While transformational diplomacy is based on realist notions which prioritise national security above all, its strength is that it is built into a country’s foreign policy and therefore ensures that the required capacity and skills are made available in order to achieve the desired foreign policy objectives. This will provide a necessary lesson for those involved in transitional diplomacy. This includes the repositioning of the foreign ministry within the global arena as new diplomatic missions are opened in countries which are considered to be strategic and support the new foreign policy priorities.

According to Rice (2006: 5) and Vaisse (2007: 23), transformational diplomacy occurs at the ‘critical intersection of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security’. More importantly, it is about a new way of doing business by state departments or ministry of foreign affairs which results in the work of diplomats being redefined. Therefore diplomats need to be trained differently ‘for operational tasks in hardship posts in places like Iraq and Sudan and in new uncommon languages such as Mandarin, Urdu, Farsi and others. Their training, therefore, will not only turn them into specialised political analysts but also into programme managers able to help citizens of other countries on the ground, to consolidate the rule of law and train police on how to build a stronger border security system’ (Vaisse, 2007: 23). Despite the fact that transformational diplomacy is associated with the US’s regime change philosophy, it is still useful in so far as it informs the process of resource allocation and management of diplomacy during the development phase of a foreign policy. It also augments a structured approach to foreign policy management and facilitates effective implementation of transitional diplomacy during the PCRD phases. The PCRD system provides legitimacy to the application of diplomacy in a fragile or collapsed state.

The PCRD system is governed by the terms (and to an extent rules of engagement) of the Peace Agreements which include the list of generic issues which are outlined under 2.2. The PCRD system defines the objectives, actors, activities and processes for construction and development of the country emerging from war. It therefore provides a structure and clearly defines the objectives towards which diplomatic efforts should be targeted.
2.4. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (PCRD)

At the core of transitional diplomacy is the effort to assist with PCRD processes. In order to evaluate the involvement of South Africa in PCRD in the DRC, this section pays attention to various aspects of the PCRD process.

2.4.1. The inherent structure of a PCRD system

A PCRD system is constituted of broad phases which are determined by a wide-range of complex feedback and reinforcement mechanisms. These are discussed below, yet the order does not suggest a ranking of these mechanisms:

- The first is the emergency phase which ranges from 90 days to a year and follows 'the end of hostilities and is concerned with the establishment of a safe and secure environment and provides an emergency response to the immediate consequence of the conflict through humanitarian relief programmes' (Nepad Secretariat 2005: 6).

- The second phase is what is regarded as a transition phase as it focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable internal capacity. For instance ‘the security sector is likely to be engaged in transforming the existing police, defence and other security agencies so that they can become representative of the communities they serve’ and also embody the democratic principles which respects human rights and participatory governance (Nepad Secretariat 2005: 8). This period last between one to three years.

- The developmental phase provides a range of programmes aimed ‘at fostering reconciliation, boosting socio-economic reconstruction and supporting ongoing development programmes across the framework which is outlined above.'
However all the dimensions mentioned above can only be possible if sufficient resources are available and managed effectively and efficiently.

In line with the NEPAD principles of active African leadership in resolving challenges in the African Continent, there is a set of principles which the AU has developed to guide those involved in the PCRD processes in the African continent.

2.4.2. Key principles underpinning successful implementation of PCRD programmes

The AU policy on PCRD (2006: 5) stipulates five core principles which should underpin and constitute basic values and standards that inform all PCRD activities and programmes in the African Continent, namely:

(a) African governments (individually and collectively) are important to provide strategic and political leadership, set the priorities, conceptualise programmes, provide oversight of the activities and mobilise resources, in a way which earns them respect from the international community. Importantly, the AU should remain committed in providing guidance on the framework for PCRD processes.

(b) PCRD activities should be owned by all actors at national and local levels in order to ensure sustainability of projects. These activities should therefore form a catalyst between government and all its citizens.

(c) The processes should be ‘inclusive, democratic and fair’ because the unequal distribution of power and wealth are mainly the root cause of conflict and therefore without this principle peace cannot be sustainable. The participation and the input of the Diaspora are regarded as critical in the PCRD processes to strengthen participatory governance.

(d) Cooperation between all local and international community is critical to form synergies, clarify roles and enhance shared objectives.
(e) Capacity of the state and the empowerment of the local citizens, to drive its institutions, participate actively in its political, economic and social activities, peace and development should be developed.

(f) The resources should be mobilised at national levels, such as the attraction of investment and financial assistance through AU structures or the African Development Bank; at regional level through Regional Economic Communities to provide technical support and share best practices (AU Policy 2006: 23).

These principles therefore underpin all PCRD processes and also inform the approach which those involved use. Once the principles are clarified, it is imperative for those involved to understand the objectives of the PCRD effort in order to prioritize and also support other initiatives which compliment individual activities.

2.4.3. Objectives of the PCRD process

The objective of the PCRD process is to facilitate reconstruction and development through nation-building, state-building and socio-economic restructuring of the collapsed state (Webber & Smith, 2002: 140). These objectives are conceived as follows:

2.4.3.1. Nation-building

The process of nation-building involves the creation of a shared national identity, symbols, traditions and interests. It is mainly characterised by political transition and commitment to and development of a culture and institutions which respect human rights and democracy.

The African Union Policy on PCRD (2006: 13) argues that political transition seeks to facilitate consensus building mechanisms particularly on the type and
structures of governance, policy development, establish institutions and values which promote democracy and also develop human resource capacity.

With respect to human rights, justice and reconciliation, the AU policy states that countries emerging from conflict should pursue policies that establish human and peoples’ rights, justice and reconciliation in line with the prescripts of the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights and the international instruments. Reconstruction after conflict therefore should ensure accessibility of the law to everyone and the healing of divided societies at the individual, community and national level. The main focus here would be to develop policies which incorporate respect for human rights, institutions and mechanisms for dealing with past and ongoing grievances, strengthen the rule of law and ‘provide for remedies and reparations to victims of conflicts’ (AU PCRD Policy 2006: 13). Countries involved in transitional diplomacy will therefore make their diplomats and experts available to share their knowledge and relevant experience in this field. However, a nation needs a capable state in order to flourish.

2.4.3.2. State-building

State-building involves the establishment of internal sovereignty in the form of credible political institutions, security and a form of governance that has authority and legitimacy. The Nepad Secretariat (2005: 11) argues that it usually begins with the appointment of an interim government or body which writes a new constitution and lays a foundation for future political dispensation, and logically ends with an election after which a fully sovereign and legitimately elected government is in power. The main focus of a post-conflict state at this point is to strengthen its ability to defend its territory and also protect its citizens and resources by building state institutions.

According to the AU PCRD Policy (2006:13) the design of the security cluster in a post conflict phase should be guided ‘by the concept of human security as stipulated and defined in the Common African Defence and Security Policy’. It
should also include the building of the human resource capacity and the re-establishment and strengthening of the capacity of security institutions, in defence, police, correctional services, border controls and customs. Furthermore, for democracy to thrive a state needs to build a strong relationship with its citizens.

The arguments in Chapter 1 indicate that without civil society participation (with all its different sectors and varying interests), a PCRD process which is not inclusive in its design and in the way it conceptualises the outcomes, will not deliver a sustainable peace. Scholars such as Steadman (2001) and Paris (2005), in addition to the AU Policy (2006) argue that the guiding principle underpinning all PCRD activities is that the locals should own the reconstruction and development process and believe in it, long after the international community has left. The reconstruction of an effective and democratic state is central in order to address social and economic needs.

2.4.3.3. Socio-economic development

The third area of focus, according to Webber & Smith (2002: 140) is that which targets socio-economic development by harnessing required resources and capacity to harmonise all existing sectors and economic resources in a way that achieves development and growth. It is critical to note however, that all the efforts can only survive within an ‘institutional architecture which promotes service delivery’, good governance and promotes sustainable peace (The African Development Bank Report, 2008: 53). The Report further suggests that a public institution or agency responsible for paying out and monitoring contracts should be considered in order to promote effectiveness and efficiency, particularly in the DRC where the war economy thrives.

The African Development Bank (ADB) Report (2008: 44) emphasises the need for an economic development framework as reconstruction of the economy in post-conflict societies is not only necessary for development but is also fundamental to maintaining
peace. It further argues that since economic reform is usually rapid during the post-conflict reconstruction period, policy makers need to adopt macro economic policies which will strengthen the relations of the state being reconstructed with its neighbours, particularly where infrastructure such as ports are shared, reform taxation systems, create an environment which attracts and supports investments.

The ADB Report (2008: 44) argues that creating a conducive environment for financial institutions and also actively formalising the economy to curb corruption should also form part of the economic reform package. It points out that the informal markets are not always legal and can therefore inhibit the state’s ability to collect taxes. More importantly the policies should actively work towards enhancing the skills and business capacity of the locals and promote peace. For instance, MacDonald (2006:17) found, in the GTZ’s study of the post-conflict in South Caucasus countries, that “cross-border training and dialogue can also contribute to reducing the propensity for return to conflict’. Another important aspect to economic reform according to the ADB Report (2008: 51) is that the countries which have natural resources need to be particularly careful in ensuring that ‘the tax structure ensures profitable extraction but captures a substantial proportion of the economic rents for the government.’ Hence the development of good governance is so crucial.

The AU PCRD Policy (2006: 13) states that it is imperative to formulate policies that address social inequity and target vulnerable groups throughout the PCRD processes. Comprehensive institutions should be built to enhance good economic governance and human resource capacity developed to drive service delivery. Importantly, the technology base should be built to support reconstruction and development as well as key sectors such as the physical infrastructure, transport, communication, energy, water, health and sanitation which should be prioritised. In support of this argument, the ADB Report (2008: 46) points out that to prioritise economic development is not only about achieving rapid recovery but is also geared towards reducing risk of conflict because post-conflict societies experience a high risk of ‘conflict reversion’. The Report therefore suggests that the creation of jobs for young men between the ages of 15 – 29
should be prioritised in order to reduce the risk, as this age group is usually targeted by rebel groups.

It is important to note however that there are usually competing demands between political and economic priorities because resources are limited. For instance, the peace agreement might call for the absorption of former rebels into the army, as part of disarmament and integration of military forces but such a decision may delay infrastructure development which is critical in ensuring connectivity between various regions within a state. The provision of basic social services and the resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of citizens, displaced during the conflict, are also priorities requiring large resources. Hence the contributions by all members of the international community are very crucial in addressing the needs which a post-conflict state has to prioritise in order to achieve integration and effectiveness. (ADB Report 2008, Nepad Secretariat 2005: 11).

The above constitute the objectives of the PCRD processes which form the framework within which all diplomatic efforts should be applied in order to achieve sustainable and democratic peace. When implemented successfully, they form the crux of what makes a state capable, stable and effective.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has drawn together three aspects which are fundamental to the implementation of transitional diplomacy in order to develop a framework in terms of which the analysis of South Africa’s efforts in the DRC will be undertaken in Chapter 4.

The first aspect, highlighted in this chapter, is the set of issues and rules of engagement which are usually outlined in the Peace Agreement during negotiations. These include the ownership of the peace agreement by all warring parties and members of the civil society, sufficient resources to deal and disarm a big number of warring parties, mechanisms for dealing with spoilers, neighbouring countries, possible eruption of war
of secession and the commitment of the international community. Given the nature of negotiations which usually produces compromises and the natural urgency by those involved to end the war, the issues outlined in 2.2. above can be regarded as an inherent risk whose successful management can only be realised over a long period of time. However, in Chapter 4, it will be established to what extent these issues are a barrier or catalyst for sustainable stability.

The second aspect is about the dynamic nature of diplomacy as an institution. This chapter analysed how diplomacy has evolved to respond to challenges of maintaining peace around the world. It indicated that multilateral diplomacy has been used in the UN in particular where, in this instance, various decisions were taken on how to intervene and support peace processes in the DRC. The bilateral diplomacy, of which transitional diplomacy is part of, has been used mainly in the South Africa’s engagement with the DRC through which the various capacity projects which will be outlined in Chapter 3, were agreed to. Transitional diplomacy is indicated to have emerged as a new form of diplomacy after the Cold War. Unlike other forms, transitional diplomacy allows other states to get involved directly in the reconstruction and development of a fragile or collapsed state. However, to guide such an intervention, in this Chapter the AU policy has been presented as a useful guide with respect to the principles and values which should underpin engagement in PCRD processes in Africa. The AU Policy also clarifies the role of the receiving state, the supporting AU members and the rest of the international community.

In this Chapter it is also indicated that although the US philosophy which informed its intervention in Iraq was different, what the Americans have coined ‘transformational diplomacy’ is useful in drawing some of the lessons which could strengthen transitional diplomacy. The chapter has indicated that unless the objectives of the PCRD processes are clearly defined in terms of priority; and conditions set by the Peace Agreement are conducive to positive engagement, transitional diplomatic efforts will not be achieved easily as all aspects are intertwined and form part of a framework within which rules of engagement are established.
This chapter has presented a framework within which the South African diplomatic efforts in the DRC will be evaluated in Chapter 4. This framework will allow the analysis to be guided by the following questions, namely, firstly, were the conditions outlined in the Peace Agreement (as outlined in 2.2) conducive to implement the PCRD processes and apply diplomatic efforts successfully. Secondly, to what extent can the South African diplomatic efforts, and the broader international community, be perceived to be guided by the AU principles and values. Thirdly, has the PCRD process and the overall objectives been clearly understood in the way transitional diplomacy is implemented in the various capacity building projects. Fourthly, did South Africa have sufficient capacity to implement its diplomatic efforts successfully in such a complex environment as outlined in Chapter 1 and finally, what is the outcome and lessons that can be drawn for similar engagements in future. To subject the South African capacity projects to such an analysis, a presentation of each one is presented Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 3 – OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE AND CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECTS

3.1. Introduction

The previous chapter outlined that in the DRC diplomacy created conditions which are conducive to stability and peace, through negotiations. To ensure that the peace agreement was implemented successfully, transitional diplomacy emerged and formed part of the post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) process of the DRC.

Firstly, this chapter will outline the role played by South Africa in the DRC to begin power sharing discussions from 1996 until the first democratic national elections in 2006; 10 years after the peace agreement had been signed.

Secondly, it shall be argued that immediately following successful national elections, South Africa responded to the DRC state’s PCRD priorities by committing resources (financial, human, technical) to create and manage capacity projects which had been mutually agreed between the two countries.

Thirdly, this chapter will demonstrate that South Africa either collaborated with members of the international community or sometimes facilitated discussions and partnerships between the DRC state and relevant stakeholders such as the private sector.

3.2. South Africa’s involvement in the peace building process in the DRC

3.2.1 Approval of resources and capacity building projects

Between 2004 and 2005, 32 Cooperation and Technical agreements and Memoranda of Agreement were signed through which South Africa registered its commitment to the reconstruction of the DRC. These agreements were drafted jointly by South African and DRC government officials and leaders in consultation with their political principals.
South Africa presented its draft agreements to cabinet for approval, particularly for the release of the resources which would be needed. Once the proposals had been approved by parliament, funds were disbursed from the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) except in cases where additional funds had to be raised.

**The African Renaissance Fund (ARF)**

The African Renaissance Fund was established by an act of parliament (Act No. 51) in 2000 to replace the former Economic Cooperation promotion Loan Fund Act of 1968 (DIRCO Annual Report 2008:9). The ARF aims to promote peace, democracy and economic co-operation between the Republic of South Africa and other countries by granting loans and/or rendering of other financial assistance towards democratic peace and development. The Fund is therefore a diplomatic tool that enables the South African government to embark on transitional diplomacy (DIRCO’s Annual Report: 2008-9). DIRCO provides administrative support for the ARF and an Advisory Committee was established to manage the Fund and regularly recommend decisions to the Ministers of DIRCO and Finance.

Once the ARF and proposed projects had been approved, the various government departments took responsibility for the implementation of their relevant projects. Whilst each South African department worked with its counterpart during implementation, implementation teams were combined into clusters and functioned as commissions under the Bi-National Commission (BNC) as follows:

- Public Service Reform was addressed by the Politics and Governance Commission, comprising of politics and diplomacy sub-commissions led by DIRCO and its counterparts; and the sub-commission for governance and administration was administered by the Ministries and Departments of Public Service and Administration.
The Defence and Security Commission comprised the Ministries and Departments of Defence dealing with the military reform sub-commission. Ministries and Departments of Justice dealt with justice reform sub-commission and the Police and Secret Services sub-commissions dealt with the remainder of the security sector reform. Because the reform of the prisons had not been included in the security reform in the DRC, the South African Correctional Services Ministry did not participate in the commissions.

The Socio-Cultural Commission dealt with all projects and proposals which were related to social development issues.

The Commission on Economy, Finance and Infrastructure dealt with its relevant line function issues.

All Commissions reported to their respective Ministers who then submitted their reports to the Ministers of International Relations and Cooperation from both countries. During the summit the Presidents from South Africa and DRC led the discussions and would formally adopt progress reports presented to them by the two Ministers. They would note progress, delays and challenges and thereafter give direction on how to resolve deadlocks. For instance, at the summit held in South Africa in October 2009 the two presidents raised concerns about the slow pace of implementation, following which they mandated that a summit should be held every six months rather than annually with a view to closely monitoring progress in the implementation of co-operation projects. This will be further explored in Chapter 4.

The scope and reach of the programmes discussed in this chapter provide some measure of the demands of transitional diplomacy as will be pointed out in the discussion in 3.2. hereunder. However, only the projects addressing the reform of the security, economic and public sectors will be analysed in this study.
3.2.1. Transitional phase

Given the immense challenges in the DRC, South Africa faced formidable impediments in its attempts to assist the Congo: the first being its involvement in the making of peace in that country. According to Curtis (2007: 253) then South African President Mbeki and then Zambian President Chiluba, helped to persuade rebel movements in the Democratic Republic of Congo to sign the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement as a prelude to a UN peacekeeping deployment in 1999. This achievement was obtained after a number of less productive attempts by South Africa. For instance, an earlier diplomatic intervention in (then) Zaire in 1997 had failed to broker a peaceful exit for the then ruling Mobutu regime. That failure resulted in strained relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, all of which intervened militarily in the country between 1990 and 2000. Despite this, ‘South Africa has always singled out peace in the DRC as its number one priority as it contributed its troops to MONUC and called on the international community to help implement the peace process’ (Landsberg, 2004: 169).
In 2002 the main Congolese parties, including the DRC government, signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement which ushered in a process and mechanism for sharing power at governmental level during the transitional period, during which, elections would be held to usher in democracy⁷ (Solomon, Kelly & Motsi, 2008: 57). In 2006, ‘South Africa rendered extensive support for the election process, it deployed a 108 people per election observer mission in the DRC during the general and presidential elections in July 2006, and for the second round of the presidential election in October 2006’ (SA Yearbook 2007/08: 263). When Joseph Kabila was sworn in, as the first democratically elected president of the DRC in over forty years, the South African media hailed the achievement as an important milestone which indicated the arrival of the DRC at the ‘crossroads of history’ (Curtis, 2007: 253).

From 2002 to 2006, the DRC and the South African government also reached agreement on various sectors which the DRC government had identified as priorities for implementing post-conflict reconstruction and development activities. When President Mbeki congratulated newly and democratically elected President Joseph Kabila in November 2006, he committed the South African state to assisting the Congolese ‘as they embark upon a difficult path to bring about fundamental socio-political transformation of the DRC’ (DFA Media briefing 2006). He declared that ‘South Africa stands ready within its limited resources to assist people of the DRC to embark on the difficult path of transformation’. Other DRC government priorities were to develop institutions and provide delivery in water, electricity, housing, education, health, employment, infrastructure sectors, with the over-arching reform of the security sector and gender equity (DFA Media briefing, August 2008). South Africa therefore started implementing transitional diplomacy in order to align itself with the PCRD process in the DRC and the African Renaissance funds were then used accordingly.

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⁷ ‘Under the terms of the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement, the transitional government was assigned five major objectives: (1) reunification, the re-establishment of peace, reconstruction of the country, restoration of territorial integrity and the re-establishment of the state’s authority over the whole of national territory; (2) national reconciliation; (3) the formation of a restructuring and integrated national army; (4) the organisation of free and transparent elections at all levels with a view to the establishment of a democratic constitutional regime; (5) the establishment of structured aimed at creating a new political order’ (Amnesty International, 2007: 6).
3.2.2. Reconstruction and development phase

Once the peace agreements had been concluded, South Africa was faced with the actual challenge of re-building the DRC. The enormity of this challenge confronted the South African technical teams when they prepared to implement the various projects. They soon learnt that in a post-conflict environment the most basic infrastructure, such as roads, an office, furniture and equipment such as stationery and computers do not exist and buildings which were damaged during the war have to be renovated first; and office infrastructure and furniture be put in place before any project which is geared towards reconstruction can start. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the following capacity building projects were implemented.

3.2.2.1. Public Sector Reform

Development of Decentralization of government and public administration

This project was at the core of restructuring the state and governance in the DRC. To support the decentralization of governance, this project focused on the decentralization and transformation of the public service administration. The activities included the development of an organic law (which was approved in 2009), the vision and the strategy for the DRC public service administration. South Africa collaborated with the governments of Germany, Sweden and the United States Agency.

The project involved institutional development of national ministries, provisional legislature, and executive structures and provided support for municipal local councils. The policy development process involved providing technical inputs and supporting consultative processes which sought to achieve a national consensus on decentralization and cooperation between provinces and the national state. Cooperation Principles and Framework had to be developed and cooperation arrangements were made between South African and Congolese provinces such as Northern Cape and Kasai Oriental; Kwazulu Natal and Bas Congo and Gauteng and Katanga to enhance
sharing of experience and support for the project. In all these activities, officials had to be trained intensively in order to carry out the intended duties once the policies had been approved. The Decree Law was passed in July 2008 creating the National Council for the Implementation and Monitoring of Decentralization Process.

To date, the legislative framework and the policy on administration decentralization have been approved by DRC government and consultative processes undertaken accordingly. However, it is the implementation of these policies and regulations that have remained a challenge (see chapter 4). One of the critical components which South Africa included in the public service reform was the establishment of an anti-corruption legislative framework.

Establishment of anti-corruption legislative and institutional framework

The main objective of this project was to develop a national anti-corruption framework for the DRC to prevent and combat corruption with clear anti-corruption policies and legislation. Prosecutors, investigators and auditors were trained to increase organizational capacity within DRC institutions in order to manage and implement anti-corruption policies and programmes. The process was structured to include members of civil society, grassroots non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the business sector to develop and implement integrity initiatives.

Subsequently, the DRC National Anti-Corruption Summit took place in November 2009 and took resolutions which will inform an Anti-Corruption strategy. The Anti-Corruption Communication and Awareness campaign, organized through the census budget, is still ongoing. To form a firm base to implement the anti-corruption framework, government had to first compile accurate information which indicates who the public service employees were.

Census of public service personnel
South Africa’s main objective, in this project, was to develop strong institutions of governance by normalizing and transforming the public service in the DRC. The activities included the creation of a census database with accurate and secure personnel information that includes personal and employment information about public servants. The process identified possible ‘ghost workers’ and also contributed towards better human resources planning by establishing an employment profile baseline and by identifying a number of public servants that could be considered for retirement.

The process and steps for capturing individual’s data involved, firstly, the registration and the issuance of a temporary card of the individual who produces a letter of employment. Secondly, the collected information would have to be verified by the joint team comprising South Africans and Congolese. Thirdly, the finger prints would require final validation in Kinshasa, as the head office, before being transferred to the payroll system. Because the set of an individual’s data passes so many hands before it is finally captured into the payroll system, it was therefore open to interference. The success of this project will be analysed in chapter 4.

By October 2009 a biometric census of public servants had been conducted in four key provinces, namely, Kinshasa, Bas-Congo, Bandundu and Maniema. When the project started, it was undertaken under trilateral arrangements. The DRC covered the logistical costs of the project, South Africa initially committed to pay for information technology related costs of the project and Sweden and South Africa jointly paid for the resources for the implementation of the project. As will be discussed in chapter 4, trilateral cooperation placed heavy demands on the South African diplomats involved in the project. The project which developed the capacity of the Congolese to deal with immigration however was less complex.

Management of the immigration and population capacity
This project’s main aim was to develop a population register, computerize immigration control system and standardize all certificates issued by civic services. The project then involved installation of computer training centers in the big provinces of Katanga and Kinshasa, training of immigration officials on relevant immigration policies and regulations, computer knowledge, project and human resources management, basic customer service as well as liaison and queue management skills. Key airports and borders such as in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kasumbelesa, at the border with Zambia and in Beach Ngobela, the river post with Congo Brazzaville, were covered by this project.

As will be discussed in the next chapter, this project was perceived as successful by the Respondents consulted during the data collection phase of this research. Training was then extended to the rest of the public service employees.

Skills development for general public service employees

To drive the strategy for reconstructing the DRC government, the relevant skills of the public service employees had to be developed in a structured and consistent manner. South Africa therefore assisted to establish an academy for the DRC public service called Ecole National d’ Administration (ENA). The agreement involved the legal establishment and organizational development of ENA, roll-out of training to senior DRC public servants and the renovation of the premises where ENA was going to function. By 2009 ENA was legally established with a legal management board and permanent employees. Over 1 000 public service servants have been trained in public management and administration skills since 2007 and about 20 were trained as Trainers by the Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA). This project excluded sectoral specific needs such as diplomatic training.
Diplomatic training

The project dealing with training of DRC diplomats included the refurbishment of the Foreign Ministry’s building, in order to establish the Diplomatic Academy, as well as to set it up appropriately to provide computer and foreign language training. The diplomatic training programme involved diplomats and academics from both countries. Some Congolese lecturers returned after years abroad while some came from the University of Congo. South Africans were asked to teach in areas such as conflict resolution and negotiation skills, SA’s foreign policy, management and leadership, mission administration and English language. The Congolese taught their own foreign policy, history, amongst others. The training programme included a trip by the learners to any of the big provinces in order to familiarize themselves with their country. However, this was limited as DRC provinces were generally still disconnected because of poor infrastructure between them. To facilitate sustainability of the project, other donors such as the British, French, Italians and UN Agencies were persuaded into trilateral agreements, with SA and the DRC, to augment funding and technical resources.

Besides this project, the key role of the South African foreign ministry and the department was to coordinate, guide and support all other projects implemented by SA in the DRC. About seven South African government departments had groups of officials who were posted at the SA mission in the DRC for a maximum period of four years while other departments deployed their project officials to the DRC for a period ranging from three days to few weeks. The traditional role of an ambassador was therefore converted into that of a project manager and project strategist and had to ensure at all times that resources were used optimally at all times (see chapter 4). Some of the projects were within the security sector.
3.2.2.2. Security Sector Reform

Military reform

The Security Sector Reform which is broadly led by the UN and the European Union was established in 2005 around a 'governance compact', which envisaged the integration of the military, the demobilization of militias, the reform of the chain of payment in the army, the restoration of discipline, the democratic control of the police and the army, and the independence of the judiciary' (Code: Background 2008: 11).

In 2007 President Kabila invited political and military forces to Round Table discussions with the objective of finding long-term political solutions to the problems in the eastern part of the DRC. Through these discussions, the National Programme for Securitization, Pacification, Stabilization and Reconstruction of the Provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, called Programme Amani and subsequently the Goma Agreement, were agreed to and provided, amongst others, for the integration of the National Congress for the Defence of the People of DRC (CNDP) forces into the regular DRC army (Code: Background 2008: 14). It is within this context that South Africa participated in the SSR.

The South African project dealing with the revival of the state defense capacity involves three areas, namely: the development of a Master Plan by the South African Detachment for Integration & Training (SADAIT) which maps out the transformation of the defense force, management of the demobilization, disarmament of rebels in order to establish a legitimate state army (Operation Teutonic) and training of the defense forces (Mission Thebe) in order to provide security throughout the DRC.

South African Detachment for Integration & Training (SADAIT)

(a) Through the South African Detachment for Integration and Training (SADAIT) a Specialist Advice Team to the Chief of Staff of the national army, the Forces Arme'es de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC), was deployed for
the purpose of developing the DRC Defense Master Plan for army reform in order to deal with the development of a military and HR strategy, mission and vision and also develop capacity of the DRC defense force (FARDC). By November 2009 a roadmap for health services, to compliment skills development, had been drawn up. The challenge was that the South African team was high ranking while the Congolese was junior. This was determined by the trust of the President in the particular officials, unlike in most countries where military rank is associated with experience and age (Respondent 3).

Operation Teutonic

(b) Operation Teutonic is about the practical assistance in the FARDC integration, training and demobilization process. The objective was to integrate ex-combatants into FARDC after demobilization and disarmament. The SANDF and FARDC personnel therefore rendered assistance by managing the identification and registration process.8

By October 2009, the number of ex-combatants who had been demobilized, disarmed and integrated were 20 515 in North Kivu, 1385 in South Kivu, 1403 registered in Maniema, 60 in Kindu, 245 registered in Mai-Mai Raimutimboki and 11 registered in Mai-Mai yakutumba. It was reported at this time that the number of ex-combatants who needed to be demobilized, disarmed and integrated had dropped dramatically to indicate possible positive response of SADAIT as conditions in the eastern part had stabilized after integration had accelerated (Respondent 3).

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8 The process took place as follows: firstly the Armani DRC project data will outline who should be integrated. Soldiers will then receive a temporary identity card and a FARDC temporary document because of the lack of national roll call. During integration physical fitness assessment is undertaken to determine medical fitness. By 2008, 200 000 soldiers had already been assessed, some of which were found to be unfit.
Mission Thebe

(c) Through Mission Thebe, SANDF trained three battalions of the national army and the Rapid Reaction Force. The main objective was to create a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) that would have the capacity to take over from MONUC in 2009. The agreement was that the South African Army would train three battalions, a light 120mm Artillery Battery and one light Intelligence Troop. To augment existing FARDC capacity, South Africa had contributed a number of soldiers who participated in MONUC on a 12 month rotational basis (Respondent 3).

Other donors such as the British government provided financial support for the transportation costs while the Netherlands’ supported the refurbishment of one of the soldiers’ camps. Other training of security forces was provided by China, the US, Belgium and Angola.

In 2009 South Africa was considering the establishment of a medical database to register soldiers’ dependents and their families. The impact of providing medical care to soldiers will be addressed in chapter 4. Another important component of the security sector reform project was the development of the justice system.

Justice and constitutional development

South Africa’s contribution towards the transformation of the justice sector involved training of DRC magistrates, establish information technology and relevant infrastructure, support legislative drafting and develop a legal and constitutional framework. By October 2009, most laws and the administration of justice had been aligned or created. The organic legislation that entrenches a new constitutional court, the State Council, Supreme Court and the Code of Organization and Judiciary Competence had been drafted and submitted to the legislature for consideration (Code: Backgrounder: 9).
Reform of the Police Services

The objective of the project was to capacitate the DRC police service (through police training and the rehabilitation of the Maluku Training Centre), render continuous support and facilitation of police reform, infrastructure and management development. South Africa had a 5 year plan for implementing the project, transfer skills and then exit. The strategy was divided into three phases; the first had to do with professional preparation of the police for national elections. The training comprised of how to police rallies, crowds, voter elections and prepare specialized units. At the point of elections, the South Africans were concerned that the police could unintentionally plunge the country back into war because of lack of proper training. Because of the size of the DRC and political sensitivity in the period during the 2006 elections, a large contingent of South African Police Service (SAPS) members were deployed in the DRC particularly in what was regarded as high risk areas. The first phase also included the control of arms proliferation and the Mozambican model served as a reference (Respondent 2).

The second phase was about police reform which involved demilitarization of the police, professionalization of the occupation to ensure that the requisite skills and the appropriate mindset have been inculcated. The third phase involved developing senior management skills of the SAPS managers, training them on how to protect vulnerable groups, train trainers and also refurbish a training centre.

As part of the exit strategy, it was agreed in 2009 that the DRC police service needed to appoint a Training and Development Officer to coordinate all donations for training and also develop relevant training programmes. Initially, the international community seemed to have adopted ‘a wait and see’ attitude during the elections in 2006 while South Africa supported the transitional phase in every way possible. By 2009 however, Angola, France and Belgium were also involved and were assisting in the same field through bilateral agreements with the DRC as well (Respondent 2). The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) was also initially involved to assist the SA government to mobilize civil society and encourage them to attend policing meetings.
and establish community policing forums (Respondent 2). However, peace can never be sustainable without development.

3.2.2.3. Economic Development and Reconstruction

The economic development projects were strategically chosen, by the DRC government, in those sectors which should either kick-start or transform existing economic activities in the mineral resources, transport, telecommunication, energy and infrastructural development sectors.

Representatives from the DBSA, Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA) and the Pan African Infrastructure Development Fund visited the DRC in 2008 to undertake a financial needs assessment from the different state-owned enterprises in the DRC. Since then engagement has been continuous with regard to the financing institutions assisting, with the South African government support, the Congolese in preparing funding applications.

Institutional building for the trade and industry

Before embarking on economic development activities, relevant capacity had to be developed to manage and supervise the process. The main objective of economic development was to promote development and industrialization, enhance exports through improvement in product quality, standards and trade policy, contribute to growth in GDP through financial support to the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and increase employment. Institutional development therefore took place through training of DRC officials in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), on standardization and quality control, trade policy formulation, competition policy, capacity building on intellectual property and development of micro-finance. South Africa mobilized the DTI agencies, such as the Competition Authority, South African Bureau of Standards and financial institutions to be involved. Once the Congolese government had the required skills and policies, the infrastructure had to be developed.
Infrastructure development

The objective of this project was to build capacity for general management and institutions in areas such as legislation and policy development, civil construction, manufacturing of building materials, job inspection, quality control and the licensing of civil construction agents. The project involved the setting up of information systems including equipment and training, logistics and supply of construction material, expertise, equipment and studies on ways to develop the construction industries. South Africa and the DRC shared construction technologies and encouraged cooperation between members of the private sector of the two countries particularly with respect to sharing knowledge and experience in alternative ways for financing of infrastructure development. A pilot project in the Kinshasa province was undertaken and an asset register for immovable assets was developed to allow government to monitor and evaluate its assets. Some of the Congolese officials involved in the project were sent to SA for practical training.

Special development initiative – Bas - Congo Corridor

The Spatial Development Initiative is one of the key projects which involve all economic sector ministries of the DRC. Its objective was to create investment, increase employment, boost exports, facilitate the diversification of products and exports and thereby essentially improve both rural and urban economic conditions. The activities involved the mining of bauxite, development of an aluminum smelter, generation of hydro-electric energy from Inga Dam, construction of the deep water port at Banana, rehabilitation of Matadi port, rehabilitation of the railway line from Matadi to Kinshasa and the development of the manufacturing industry amongst others. Another spatial development initiative was established in the Zambian Copper Belt.

Spatial Development Initiative - Zambia Copper Belt
The main focus of this project was to facilitate trade and investment promotion by developing transport infrastructure and also link it to the NEPAD projects and objectives.

In all these projects South Africa provided financial support towards the feasibility study, appointment of a project manager, packaging of the investment and bankable projects and also organized an investment conference to present these projects to potential investors. Telecommunications formed part of the value chain.

Telecommunication

Telkom SA signed a Management Service Agreement with its Congolese counterpart in August 2009, the Congolese Telecoms Network (OCPT). The agreement involved ensuring that the OCPT established itself as a business with highly competent staff and management establish its commercial function to run the OCPT wholesale business with information technology business support systems and all logistics which are necessary to run the telecommunication business as a government agency. It was also agreed that Telkom SA would provide technical expertise. In October 2009, South Africa and the DRC started mobilizing resources to implement the project as agreed (Code: Project Fact Sheet 2008-09). In terms of electrification, Kimbanseke, an urban area between Kinshasa CBD and the Kinshasa international airport, was prioritized as one of the projects.

Eskom - Kimbanseke Electrification

A feasibility study was undertaken to determine the resources needed to electrify Kimbanseke depending on the availability of reliable electricity supply. These included social and environmental assessments, tariff and regulatory investigations. South Africa contributed its technical expertise to undertake the studies and develop a business plan. Eskom’s role was to ‘assist in developing a bankable solution for the electrification of Kimbanseke’ (Project Fact Sheets 2008). By October 2009 the World Bank, African
Development Bank and the European Investment Bank had agreed to finance the project. Snel and Eskom however still continue to explore how they can work together in the long term with regard to the supply of electricity between South Africa and the DRC. PetroSA on the other hand hold continuous discussions with Co-hydro, its DRC counterpart also to explore possible partnership (Project Fact Sheets 2008). Discussions relating to transport partnerships however, have been more fruitful.

Transnet transport infrastructure

Cooperation to enhance mobility of people and goods between SA and the DRC, through increased flights and joint arrangements, is another crucial aspect of development. The DBSA was approached to fund the development of the rail infrastructure and the South African government provided equipment. In October 2009 the DBSA and Price Water House Coopers finalized the feasibility study while the DRC was considering modernizing other ports as well.

Furthermore, the Congolese Shipping Council was in talks with South Africa with regard to exploring establishing a dry port in the Katanga province in order to improve easy transfer of goods. Interaction between the Shippers Council from the two countries was agreed upon while the two governments would explore possible funding mechanisms for the project as funding of capital intensive projects has remained a challenge although mobility of people between the two countries could be improve the DRC revenue if managed better.

Airways

An agreement was reached that South African Express Airways should use three routes to fly between Lubumbashi and Johannesburg and share one of the routes with the DRC airline. Subsequently, additional routes were added because of increased demand on these routes but these had to be renewed every six months. Renewing a license every six months is very cumbersome in a bureaucratic system and South Africa had
requested that the routes should be extended to 14 for a longer period. It is therefore one of the issues which cause misgivings for South Africans who feel that South Africa deserves a preferential agreement (see next chapters for further elaboration on this issue). However, the need to implement an open route schedule and the non-regulated regime was being considered to enhance connectivity between SA and the DRC.

Another contentious issue between South Africa and the DRC concerns the renovation of the Ndjile airport in Kinshasa. In 2007, ACSA conducted a feasibility study to reconstruct and modernize the Ndjile airport. Upon receiving the ACSA report, the DRC government gave the contract to the Chinese to build the airport. This incident created tension between the DRC and South Africa and is a point that will be returned to in the next chapters.

3.3. Conclusion

This chapter has indicated that South Africa utilised various diplomatic strategies in pursuing peace and stability in the DRC from 2004. Firstly, it played the role of a peacemaker by encouraging the Congolese to negotiate and solve their own problems through facilitating the negotiations between the warring parties and the state. The efforts were applied from the period of Mobuto sese Seko to Laurent Kabila, the father and later Joseph Kabila. These efforts were arduous; they pitted South Africa against other countries in the Great Lakes and SADC regions and they took a decade to produce positive results. The difference between such approaches of transitional diplomacy is apparent compared with the transformational approach of the US in Iraq for instance. While South Africa embraced the AU principles which were outlined in Chapter 2, it seems that from the scale of the projects which have been outlined in this chapter, that successful implementation of PCRD processes albeit sustainable peace and development, is subject to understanding and being prepared to engage with the conditions which are essential and conducive to attaining such. Whether South Africa succeeded in achieving the planned project outcomes, will be assessed in the next chapter.
Consequent to its involvement in building peace in the DRC, South Africa played the role of a ‘bridge-builder’ by facilitating support and partnerships between the DRC and the international community (see Landsberg & Monyae, 2006). Its activities included forming trilateral agreements, endorsing DRC’s request for financial support to financial institutions such as the IDC and DBSA⁹ and organising an Investors’ conference to assist the DRC to raise funds for their PCRD projects which South Africa had started. Whether such collaboration enhanced or constrained South Africa’s efforts will be analysed in Chapter 4. However, South Africa continued its role of facilitating the creation of conditions which were suitable for the transformation and development of the DRC nation.

The capacity projects which are outlined in this chapter fall under the broad objective of creating a stable and vibrant DRC state which is able to address poverty, security and development. South Africa still continues with its active role in implementing these projects. In all these activities, the idea of transitional diplomacy is being practically realised by building administrative structures which enhance the ability of the state to function effectively.

However, it has been five years since the specific capacity project agreements were reached and some of the projects implemented. The projects which fall under public service and security sector reforms were comprehensive and involved clear outcomes. In these projects it is easy to count the number of people counted and certified as government employees or the number of soldiers who have been disarmed, demobilized and integrated into the state army. The economic development projects however had to have their feasibility ascertained first in order to convince investors that their investment would be profitable. While some projects had clear and short timeframes and outcomes, others are long term in nature. Irrespective of the timeframe however, it is evident from this chapter that South African diplomats and any other

⁹ South Africa used its resources to undertake feasibility studies especially for economic development projects and it used them to demonstrate to prospective funders that the proposed project is a viable investment opportunity, to support the DRC state.
teams which were involved in these projects learnt a lot. In the next chapter assessment will be undertaken to determine whether transitional diplomacy demand new skills and approaches particularly from diplomats and the South African foreign ministry. Chapter 4 will use the analytical framework which is outlined in chapter 2 to examine the strengths and weaknesses of South Africa’s diplomatic efforts in dealing with any challenges, threats and opportunities which it might have encountered when implementing the projects which have been outlined.
CHAPTER 4 – ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S INPUT INTO THE DRC PCRD PROCESS

4.1. Introduction

Chapter 3 outlined key capacity projects which South Africa implemented in the DRC from 2006 to date. In this chapter, the implementation of these capacity projects will be evaluated using the analytical framework which was outlined in Chapter 2.

When reflecting on South Africa’s capabilities when it intervened in the DRC, it will be worth paying attention to the way South Africa managed and implemented its foreign policy as Brighi & Hill (2008: 125) argue that the main issues to consider are firstly, the context in which the policy is developed and the one in which it is targeted for implementation; secondly, the actors who are involved in managing the foreign policy, thirdly, the foreign policy instruments chosen to employ in order to achieve the identified goals and objectives, and fourthly, the ability and capability of the implementing state to manage the policy effectively and efficiently. Considering South Africa’s reputation, economic development status, quality of its public service, robustness of the civil society, this chapter will examine its ability (and failure) to utilise its capacity efficiently towards the expected outcomes.

With respect to South Africa’s efforts in the DRC, it is critical first to examine briefly the notion of nation building in the complex state like the DRC. The second aspect will involve analyzing the implementation of the transitional process prior to the first democratic national elections of 2006. Thirdly, assessment of the peace building phase will be undertaken by evaluating the success, failure and challenges in implementing the projects for the reform of the public, security and socio-economic sectors. The security sector reform process to be evaluated, include the aspects of the military, police, and justice in the Great Lakes region.
The public service reform includes efforts to identify civil servants through the census, establishment of immigration system, decentralization and anti-corruption efforts and training of the civil servants and diplomats respectively. The lessons will then be drawn from these diplomatic efforts which were essentially to rebuild the Congolese nation.

4.2. Nation-building

The notion of a nation which is usually pursued by the international community and fragile states is the one where there are individual and common rights, where the shared goal is that of peace, security and development by everyone who is deemed to be part of the nation. The most important characteristic of a nation however, is that citizens should have a common identity and a sense of belonging. Peace agreements are therefore critical instruments which are used to reconstruct this expectation which most people regard as a given reality of a modern nation. Democracy, peace and development are therefore the main objectives of post-conflict and reconstruction processes. The first challenge, such as in the DRC, is that former belligerents are not only expected to cease fire but to forsake all power and access they had to self-enrichment exploitation systems for the long-term benefit of the nation.

Besides the difficulty of achieving such an ambitious project, the notion of a nation state system itself is contested. For instance, Berger & Weber (2009: 3) argue that the nation state system, through which development and security was believed to be possible, has failed and is undergoing a crisis. Berger & Weber (2009: 5-7) further point out that, in the 1970s, the evolution of the state was expressed by the dominant narrative of promoting national development with a political commitment to redistribution and welfare at its core. Later, the dominant narrative then changed to global development, using neo-liberal development strategies, which is driven and promoted through state institutions that resulted in the concentration of economic power in corporate oligopolies. These authors then conclude that after the Cold War period, this approach has eventually resulted in the rise of increasing number of weak, collapsing and failed states due to the ‘ongoing dynamics of ethnic conflict, economic volatility and empires in
decline’ (Berger & Weber, 2009: 7). Evidently, the DRC is one of those collapsed states which have been riddled by wars of secession for decades.

The collapsed nature of the state is therefore experienced in the dysfunctionality of citizens’ environment. For instance, Respondent 2 (2009) said that in the DRC, a person sometimes will have to drive from one province to the other just to deliver a letter; alternatively, a private jet would have to be hired when it is not possible to drive. Sometimes paper for printing is not available in the entire city. Even the South African soldiers who used helicopters to travel were still constrained and felt unsafe when moving between thick forests in unfamiliar territories because of lack of infrastructure. While these are some of the small things which frustrated the technical teams from South Africa, Congolese had bigger challenges.

For instance, inspiration, motivation and a sense of security in one’s environment are some of the issues which the Respondents to this study (2009) said they noticed lacking in the Congolese. To illustrate the point, Respondent 2 (2009) said that ‘in some areas you could find a building which still had all its walls but would adequately suffice as a training facility with a coat of paint but people in the area would not be motivated to take such an interest in and responsibility for their environment’.

However, to claim their national identity, the Congolese will have to first define who the “Congolese” are and establish their pride as a nation. Inadvertently they will exclude those who are not eligible within the criteria. Whilst the issues of citizenry are always fraught with conflict and the conflicts in the DRC have been mainly ethnic based, formalisation of who is Congolese will assist in providing rights and formal permission to non-citizens who want to live in the DRC for some reason or the other. Naturally, the sharing of scarce resources, whether in the form of land or employment, will always pose huge challenges to those attempting to rebuild the Congolese nation but a legal framework, which has inputs from and recognises local traditions, will provide a mechanism for managing them effectively. Learning from the South African history of the transition from apartheid to democracy, the Congolese also ‘need to create a...
common citizenship by overcoming ethnicity as tools of division, reconciling history; dealing with amnesty and justice, addressing military dominance and minority rule and redressing material inequities’ Curtis (2007: 273). Rwanda and El Salvador also provide excellent examples for establishing culture of peace programmes to increase grassroots dialogues and cooperation among formerly warring communities (Paris (2005: 770).

Further argument can still be made however that given the complexity of the history of the DRC and its demographics, it is worth considering alternative approaches when dealing with nation building. Berger & Weber (2009: 7) argue that we need to acknowledge the crisis in our discourse and then advocate for a new concept of collective citizenship with rights and obligations and common humanity which are recognized in regional and global institutions. Within this framework ‘more attention will be paid to both the political economy of violence and the social and cultural dynamics of globalization’ (Berger & Weber, 2009:7). This is a plausible argument considering the interconnectedness and the overlap between the various ethnic groups across Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and DRC in the Great Lakes region. More creative ways of rethinking the configuration of governance of the region might open up space to explore the regional citizenship approach, which Berger & Weber (2009: 8) advocate. It should also compliment nation building efforts that are important to shape citizens’ positive attitudes and confidence towards their nation. If successful, these could be extended beyond the nation territory through various mechanisms such as regional integration or cooperation.

Currently, the priority and the approach of the DRC state and the international community, is to disentangle the country from political, social, economic practices and activities which are intertwined across the key countries of the Great Lakes region. Given the limitations of the DRC state to reach and control all the Congolese regions and locations, such ambitions are enormously difficult to achieve in the short term. However, the analysis of the regional approach adopted in implementing the security sector reform will highlight the feasibility of working towards regional integration.
The reality is that the Congolese will have to unite and regard one another as fellow citizens with a shared interest, before regional integration can be pursued earnestly at social level. The Global All-Inclusive Agreement was signed primarily to forge that unity.

4.3. Implementation of the transitional peace agreement

The Global All-Inclusive Agreement was signed by key Congolese warring parties with the assistance of South Africa. It was therefore a ground breaking and historical achievement for both the Congolese and South Africa. However, De Goede & van de Borgh (2008: 116) argue that the contestation of authority does not end with a peace agreement or the intervention by an external military but that the implementation of the peace agreement is both volatile and complex. In the DRC case De Goede & van de Borgh (2008: 116) argue that the level of distrust and insecurity was very high amongst the belligerents during peace negotiations in South Africa. Hence 'an international guarantee mechanism' was requested. Similarly, the international mediators were concerned by the lack of full commitment of the belligerents to the peace process and feared that they would renege on the agreement unless there was formal guidance and an external support. Hence the establishment of the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT).

De Goede & van de Borgh (2008: 121) contend that the CIAT was constituted of foreign ambassadors in the DRC and it was chaired by MONUC representative to the secretary general but 'it did not have any decision making powers or any formal role in political decision making processes'. It did not keep any formal minutes of its weekly meetings. It was therefore a diplomatic mechanism which functioned in two ways. Firstly, 'it supported and pushed parties to the conflict by giving (wanted and unwanted) advice, exerting pressure and managing tensions. Secondly, it tried to foster coordination

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10 In his study of the transition period Hesselbein (2007: 47) captured the leaders of the former warring parties saying that ‘We only have a theory of democratisation but no idea how it works. Elections are not really a Congolese initiative’.
amongst the international community members, in order to speak with one voice’ (de Goede & van de Borgh, 2008: 121).

The transitional process which the diplomats engaged in entailed what de Goede & van de Borgh (2008: 118) term ‘Lyon’s strategy of the demilitarisation of politics, namely: formation of interim government, transition of warring parties to political parties and demilitarisation’. De Goede & van de Borgh (120) argue that the first challenge was that the belligerents were not interested in reaching peace and stability in the DRC but that the peace agreement actually allowed them to maintain power and seek self-enrichment. They therefore played every trick possible to delay the conduct of the national elections. For the whole of 2004, the belligerents either tried to unseat the transitional government based on the 1+4 arrangement or some of the members walked out like the Congolese Assembly for Democracy-Goma (RCD-G) because of a political dispute (de Goede & van de Borgh, 2008: 123). It is important to note the implications for the success of the PCDR process. The spoilers were present from the beginning of the transition period, and they were amongst the former warring parties who were expected to lead the country to stability. The diplomats had to therefore ensure that “leaders” of the peace process behaved accordingly.

According to de Goede & van de Borgh (2008: 123) the CIAT diplomats then used the tactics of a ‘departing train; and naming and shaming’. They argued that the peace process would continue even in the spoilers’ absence and they would lose the support of the international community and the DRC public. However, the CIAT’s decisions were not always appreciated by the DRC government. For instance the Minister of Information, Sakanyi, felt that existing Congolese control measures should be used to do CIAT’s work. He also felt that the involvement of CIAT in managing funds earmarked for the transition process would deem the Congolese leaders “infantilized”. Others in government felt that the role of CIAT was justified as most of the national budget came

11 When RCD-G, under Ruberwa walked out of the transitional government the CIAT members fetched him from Goma and returned him to Kinshasa and appealed to his pride as a leader of a significant party and also to him reasoning (de Goede, 123-124). The Union for Democracy and Social Process (UDPS) however refused to participate in the transitional government and it ‘missed the train’ (de Goede, 125).
through donations but they conceded that the DRC’s sovereignty could be deemed to have been lost from that point on (Kabongo, 2005: IPS article). In response MONUC argued that out of the funds which were geared towards the peace building process, US$8m was lost from the government’s coffers due to corruption, resulting in non-payment of soldiers and civil servants (IPS article, August 2, 2005).12 These efforts and difficulties that were encountered early on before the national elections could be held, confirms the argument that, through transitional diplomacy, diplomats do not only create but also manage change.

From this brief outline of the management of the transitional process, it is evident that CIAT was an innovative diplomatic mechanism which improved the implementation of transitional diplomacy. It is interesting to note that because the team did not have any formal political status or formal meeting mechanism for interacting with the president and the rest of government, it had to use ‘the demarché’13 by individual CIAT members or a small delegation to individual members of the presidency and government (de Goede & van de Borgh, 2008: 122). Although South Africa was part of CIAT, de Goede & van de Borgh point out that it played a limited role. Respondent 1 (2008) also said that South African representatives in the DRC were ambivalent in participating in committees which were led by donor countries, for fear of being associated with their (perceived) negative behaviour or politically “incorrect” decisions. The Pax Africa report (2009) however indicates that the high level political team led by President Mbeki played a very significant role, behind the scenes, in persuading the president and DRC government to implement the terms of the peace agreement.

It is evident then that a diplomatic mechanism which ‘demilitarises politics’ by facilitating the transitional process, without leading or directing is needed during transition (de Goede & van de Borgh, 2008: 119-20). The lesson is that transitional diplomacy is still able to play the central diplomatic role of ‘close engagement and influence in the post-

12 http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews 29750
13 Demarche is a diplomatic action (in a form of memorandum) which is served by a foreign government to another government, usually the host of the foreign embassy) to persuade or protest or object to the actions of that government. (http://en.wikipedia.org)
war transition phase’ in order to usher the first democratic elections that lead to legitimacy of the state and real political change (de Goede & van de Borgh, 2008: 119). For South Africa which was intimately involved, and leading most processes, such activities and challenges presented opportunities for learning and inspiration to implement other PCRD projects.

South Africa’s efforts had to be directed to another fundamental requirement for establishing peace and empower the state in the DRC, that is, security sector reform.

4.4. Security Sector Reform

While there is general agreement in literature that development and security goals should be pursued in a mutually reinforcing manner (House of Commons, 2006: 16; Solomon, 221) it is also true that security reform in CPCA states is the basic condition for development to take place and be sustainable. Besides bringing about peace and protecting the state territory and its citizens, it is important to develop a justice system which ensures that ‘grievances, abuses and crimes which are part of the conflict are addressed in a manner which recognises the impact of the conflict on communities, families and individuals, in addition to military and political leaders (House of Commons Report, 2006: 29). More importantly, peace building needs greater local ownership in order to last and the Rwanda Gacaca14 courts experience, for instance, can provide a lesson for success while the Zimbabwean experience provides a lesson of the consequences of failing to address land issues which were part of the conflict. In the DRC, the first weakness of the DDR process is that, there is no vetting procedure for militias who were involved in human rights violations during the process of integration into a new army (Code Background, 2008: 12).

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14 ‘Gacaca court is a system of grassroots legal bodies inspired by traditional power structures. Its objective is to achieve truth, justice and reconciliation in order to promote community healing and build unity amongst Rwandese’ [Link to Wikipedia article]
4.4.1. Reform of the military

The process of developing the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement was the most important one as it established the terms for ending the war and sharing power and authority. It also set the tone and the process by which the reconstruction and development path should take place particularly in the reform of the security sector. Subsequent to the completion of the peace agreement, a ‘governance compact’ was reached in 2005, between the DRC and the international community and produced the Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme which is broadly led by the UN and the European Union (Code Backgrounder 2008: 11). The SSR process envisaged the integration of the military, the demobilization of militias, the reform of the chain of payment in the army, the restoration of discipline, the democratic control of the police and the army and the independence of the judiciary (Code Backgrounder 2008: 11).

The efforts to disarm these groups then involved two processes, one to disarm, demobilise, repatriate, resettle and reintegrate foreign armed groups and the second involves disarmament and demobilisation and integration of militia and local armed groups within the DRC (Solomon, 2006: 59). Naturally, these processes needed extensive resources and abilities to be dealt with effectively.

South Africa then committed its resources and efforts to the programmes outlined in chapter 3. Respondent 3 (2009) pointed out that South Africa’s contribution towards the SSR projects was substantive and therefore expressed frustration that the pace for reform of the security sector was very slow despite the heavy expenditure in the DRC. This research established that the general challenge was the unavailability of legal and institutional mechanism such as the Defense Doctrine, policy paper on defense and lack of proper interpretation and translation of French documents into English and vice versa. Respondent 3 (2009) said that because of the centrality of the military to the president and to the existing political arrangement, the process was fraught with political interference. The delays were therefore not due to the incompetence of the South African military forces but required diplomatic engagement and influence between the DRC and South Africa’s political principals. However there was a feeling that South
Africa had lost its influence on the Congolese government following the change of administration in South Africa. On the other hand, the Chinese were being perceived to have an upper-hand. Respondent 3 believed that South Africa was only called in to provide financial and technical support. The PAX report (2009) confirmed the Respondent’s argument and said that although South Africa initially played a very effective facilitator role behind the scenes to advise the DRC government, and sometimes others in the Great Lakes region as well, it gradually relinquished this role while Mbeki was still the President of South Africa, hence the vacuum being filled by other countries. The criticism of South Africa’s poor ability to follow through peace initiatives which it brokers has been expressed strongly by scholars in the field (Le Pere, van Nieukerk, Zondi, 2009 – meeting with DIRCO Minister Nkoana-Mashabane).

With respect to the actual disarmament and demobilization process, Respondent 3 (2009) said that there were many challenges. First, it was difficult to verify nationality without a national register or a record system which contains finger prints to help verify a person’s identity. Only photos were then used to record soldiers. The second challenge was corrupt leaders, for instance sometimes political parties registered the same person twice or used one who had been rejected to inflate their membership figures. Corruption also extended to the payment of soldiers for participating in the disarmament process. In 2006 for instance, the then Vice President Bemba, revealed that every month the Chief of Staff embezzled about US$5m (Code Backgrounder 2008: 13-14). Hence CIAT was appointed to manage the funds jointly with the army commanders, a decision which caused much discomfort to them as pointed out in 4.3 above.

This experience indicated poor communication between South Africans, inter alia; Respondent 1 was involved in the census project and knew about the payroll which the French had developed which could have been integrated into all other systems to enhance effectiveness and efficiency. The fact that project teams worked in far away provinces, in unpleasant conditions, under a lot of heat in a foreign environment might
have made it less likely for officials to want to share their experiences with others unless a structured mechanism was established by the Ambassador for instance.

The third challenge was the abscondment of some soldiers after integration because of poor conditions of employment for FARDC members. In its report, the House of Commons (2006: 42) found that soldiers were paid out US$410 to disarm while soldiers who remained in FARDC were only paid US$10 per month. ‘That provided a perverse incentive for them to take the payment and use it to purchase another weapon with which they could rejoin a militia group’ (House of Commons Report, 2006: 42). The CNDP rebel members gave similar reasons for refusing to be integrated into FARDC. It is evident therefore that there is a need to create incentives and opportunities for ex-soldiers to disarm permanently and pursue civilian employment. Continued conflict in the DRC therefore should not only be attributed to militia leaders who are afraid of being punished for their crimes against humanity, if they down their weapons, but it is also due to economic reasons and basic needs of ordinary community members. For instance, Respondent 3 (2009) pointed out that some of the FARDC members brought their families along to the camps in order to ensure their protection and also to share their meals with them. The impact of course is that strict principles of the military which need complete concentration and separation from wives, are not honoured and that compromises the effectiveness of FARDC members when under attack.

In its report the African Development Bank also points out that unless employment opportunities and appropriate skills of young men are developed, they will always be open to recruitment by the rebel groups. Creating employment by states also enhances democratization as access to employment opportunities by everyone is increased. The challenge currently in the DRC is that older government employees are reluctant to retire because there is no pension fund to cushion them while young Congolese are not able to enter the public service system unless older public servants retire. A formal and legal economy is also non-existent. It is a conundrum which the DRC government has to address as soon as possible as part of its transformation priorities.
Another inherent challenge for achieving a successful DDR process was the exclusion of some of the rebel groups from the Sun City Agreement followed by unequal representation, between Mai Mai and CNDP members, in the structures set up by the Goma Agreement. This enhanced the inclination of those left out to act as spoilers. CNDP ‘played havoc with the peace process as General Nkunda threatened to capture Goma in 2008 and left thousands of ordinary Congolese, in his wake, murdered, displaced and destitute’ (Code Backgrounder, 2008: 14). The limited mandate given to MONUC exacerbated the problem and exposed citizens to attacks and insecurity as it ‘lacked the power to enforce the international community’s position on recalcitrant players’ (Code Backgrounder 2008: 12). Respondent 3 points out that the negative perception about MONUC members being looters and occupiers in the eyes of the ordinary Congolese, impacted on how the DDR process was perceived particularly by those who felt unprotected from being murdered by rebel leaders when they volunteered to disarm (Solomon, 2006).

Respondent 3 (2009) also expressed frustration with the DRC’s poor leadership and lack of political commitment and policy coherence. He said that these were key issues which were causing delays in achieving the security sector reform in the DRC. For instance, commanders have different visions for the new army; some favour an army involved in nation building (additional duties in the areas of agricultural production and construction of public infrastructure) while others simply want a professional army. Consequently, there is usually little communication between donors and the Congolese authorities who prefer direct military operations such as attack on Bemba’s militia in March 2007 and the offensive against renegade General Laurent Nkunda in North Kivu in September to December 2007, which ended with their complete defeat (Code Backgrounder 2008:14). To illustrate further poor leadership, Respondent 3 (2009) said that when Nkunda of the CNDP walked out of the peace agreement process and started attacking the DRC government on the eastern part of the DRC, it is believed that it (DRC government) began supporting the FDLR as it was also being attacked by Nkunda. The result was that the tension between the DRC government and Rwanda increased (as FDLR leaders are wanted for crimes in Rwanda) and affected any
positive strides which these two governments had taken towards creating peace and security between them.

Respondent 3 (2009) further asserted that poor coordination and competition between donors exacerbated the problem. For instance, a decision had not been taken on who leads between the UN and the EU, and other players such as China, Angola, US, France, took advantage of the situation by seeking to increase their influence through bilateral arrangements in the security sector. Such posturing can only impact negatively on the intended objectives of security reform. He concluded by saying that there is a strong view that South Africa should have taken the leadership, within the international community, in ensuring that a decision is taken in this regard, particularly because it brokered the peace agreement.

Respondents 3 and 6 (2009) felt strongly that SA was pursuing what they called a “foreign policy of guilt”. They argued that its approach was too idealistic and not well thought through. They pointed out that when SA’s interests are not well defined, it becomes difficult for diplomats and security leaders to pursue them in the best way they can. To illustrate the point they asserted that the infrastructural development contract, which had been awarded to the Chinese government, would not assist the Congolese to achieve their sustainable development because the construction material which the Chinese used was not suitable for the heavy rainfall climate. They concluded that because the Chinese government was shrewd and put its national interests first, it made use of the gap which South Africa had opened, for its own benefit. The Respondents (2009) then suggested that South Africa needed to adopt a multi-faceted approach which allowed it to take particular decisions which serve their own interests while also assisting in general terms.

In considering the delays in the implementation of the SSR and to illustrate the urgency of achieving sustainable peace, Respondent 3 (2009) said ‘Ordinary Congolese say they are tired of war and want food on the table, for instance, in most families, family members take turns between adults and children on who should eat on three days
intervals. Hence the soldiers take their families along. Some rebel groups such as Nkunda’s, earn more that FARDC’s members and it therefore pays to join a rebel group than to be in the government army.

Overall the Respondents (2009) said that although relative peace and stability had been achieved in the DRC after decades, the pace for integration was too slow and conflicts and skirmishes still erupted including those in the eastern part of the DRC. They felt that the DRC government was also very slow to provide training equipment and facilities as part of its role in the partnership with South Africa and the international community. However, the availability of South Africa to assist DRC soldiers with medical and health facilities and amenities, when required, was hailed as a success story which helped to boost the morale of the soldiers. Based on this account of the impact and challenges which South Africa experienced in the SSR process, one can deduce the fundamental importance of ensuring that the national DRC has the capacity to provide security. It seems that all the complex challenges which have been outlined in all earlier chapters converge into the SSR process and it then become harder and frustrating. The lesson for South African soldiers is to accept that military power is critical to dictators and democrats alike hence it is so highly contested. It will therefore take longer to witness complete peace and security but South African teams should celebrate the small milestones which have been reached as they are part of the bigger goal. However some visible achievements have been made in police reform.

4.4.2. Police Service reform

From various case studies Stedman (2001: 19) draws important lessons about the need to design and implement judicial, penal, and police reforms in tandem; and the importance of creating specialised police units, especially Criminal Investigative units and oversight offices (e.g. Internal Affairs, Inspectors-General, and Civilian Commissions), to bring about peace. In support Paris (2005: 771) argues that building conditions which lay the foundations for sustainable democratisation are also critical to lasting peace such as including local actors in the management of peace-building
operations. In this regard the weakness of the DDR process in the DRC is that it is partial. It does not include civilians, military intelligence or the border police. According to Respondent 2 (2009), the penitentiary system is also left unchanged despite starving prisoners on routine basis in DRC jails. Typically of the PCRD processes in the DRC, there is lack of cooperation and dialogue between Ministers of Justice and Defense on reorganization of military justice. Moreover, the legislation for the reform of the police has not yet been debated by parliament and the authorities remain reluctant to change the status of the police from a military to a civilian one (see also Code Backgrounder 2008: 11).

As a result, it is reported that in 2008, General Numbi, head of the police, created a new integrated military guard, aimed at finding jobs for soldiers loyal to him while the official line was for unification of the police into one single entity. Another example of incoherence was the Minister of Defense’s push to create 12 new battalions, while the priority was rather to create a proper military administration (Code Backgrounder 2008:12). Consequently, the international community, including South Africa, is caught up within policy incoherence on one hand and the DRC government’s request for US$1billion to reform the police and US$160 million for justice reform, on the other. Even the requested amounts were perceived to be unrealistic by the international community (Code Backgrounder 2008: 12).

Despite this, the South African project towards police reform was very successful in training the police who were utilised during the elections and beyond. The objective of changing military police’s mindset against working to protect dictators to serving ordinary members of the DRC cannot be under-estimated. It might have been achieved at a small scale so far but the impact will be long term on the objective of democratizing the DRC society. Another positive achievement within this project was the involvement of civil society in the process of establishing community policing forums, especially because this was the only project which included ordinary members of the communities at local level. The difficulty of a collapsed governance system, which Respondent 2 pointed out, was that service delivery still depends on politicians rather than on public
servants. Respondent 2 said that it was only the involvement of civil society which would gradually lead to the democratization of the system but warned that a huge effort has yet to be made to address ethnicity and therefore prevent prospective wars in the DRC.

Another important lesson from this project for South Africa is that the police reform project can be used as a model for managing PCRD projects. For instance, during the negotiations of the Memorandum of Agreement in 2005 it was agreed that the project would be managed by two Steering Committee members appointed by the DRC and South African Ministers and a joint project management team would comprise of six members from each side. One steering committee member managed and evaluated the project on daily basis with his/her South African counterpart. The Steering Committee met quarterly and helped to prepare for successive Bi-National Commission meeting. The benefit of the structure is that even during reshuffling some members of the Committee were able to continue with the project. They also assisted to introduce it to the new Minister and seek his/her buy-in to avoid duplication of processes by a new Minister which usually result in the waste or abuse of resources. Respondent 2 pointed out that in this sector; South Africa was able to use its police reform experience quite successfully. The fact that police had moved away from using live ammunition to disperse crowds during rallies was a huge reward in changing mindsets towards maintenance of security for all citizens.

It is important to note that, like the public census project, the police reform one also took place in various provinces and in remote areas. However, relative to counting people in the streets, training is manageable and is relatively contained within a mall target group. The frustration of not having access to decent transportation and accommodation was therefore not as pronounced to the police technical team. Interestingly however, it took a full year for Respondent 2 to learn that a seat or two could be booked in the South African defense helicopter on its weekly visits to provinces. Before then he hired jets to get him where he could not drive. He then suggested that the South African Ambassador resident in the DRC should play a more prominent and leading role to
coordinate all the South African PCRD teams and activities in order to optimize resources.

Notwithstanding these efforts, security reform and transformation can never be achieved in the DRC without the support of the other neighboring countries in the Great Lakes region. South Africa has then pushed for security system which includes the rule of law and regional stability. It has therefore supported constructive engagement and the development of a common policy on regional and international issues of mutual interest (Code Backgrunder 2008: 13).

4.4.3. Security Reform in the Great Lakes Region

Despite the positive strides made in other areas of the DRC to build and keep peace, there are still ongoing tensions in the north-east of the DRC, between FARDC and rebel groups; and the simmering uneasiness between Rwanda and the DRC. In response attempts have been made and mechanisms developed in the Great Lakes region to achieve peace and stability and they are worth mentioning as they support all diplomatic efforts which take place in the DRC. The first one is the Tripartite Plus Joint Commission which is made up of the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda, recently expanded to include Burundi. The objective of this structure is to build trust and confidence amongst the members and is tasked to find a political solution in North Kivu province and in the eastern region of the DRC as a whole. It is backed by the United States and MONUC (Code: Backgrounder 2008: 13).

Another important milestone was the signing of the Goma Peace Accord in 2008 to effect the DDR process and the establishment of state authority throughout the North and South Kivu provinces, as well as the dismantling of all irregular barriers hindering people and goods to circulate freely. For support, the Mixed Technical Commission on peace and security was established and is responsible for the execution of the disengagement plan and integration into the army of the troops from the various armed groups which are signatories to the Goma Act of Engagement (Code: Backgrounder
As a demonstration of lack of trust and the general suspicion which had engulfed the former warring parties, who had signed the All-Inclusive Global peace agreement in 2002, all signatories who had signed the Goma Peace Accord, continued to violate the ceasefire. Unlike the former who, according to de Goede (2008: 121), applied ‘loiter and linger tactics’ in 2002, the latter continued to rearm and recruit for conflict. Even General Nkunda, the leader of the CNDP, who had temporarily ceased his activities in 2006 during elections and had started to integrate some of his troops into FARDC, later changed his mind and started recruiting in North and South Kivu (Code: Backgrounder 2008: 15). Such reaction and breakdown of trust between the DRC and Rwanda governments could be attributed to the outcome of the earlier agreement which was signed in 2007.

Rwanda

To forge peace between Rwanda and the DRC, the Nairobi Communiqué was signed between governments of the DRC and Rwanda in Nairobi in 2007. In addressing the complex configurations of warfare the Nairobi Communiqué rightly acknowledged that all foreign as well as national armed groups in the Kivus are part of the problem and must be tackled in a serious, urgent, concerted and collaborative manner (Code Backgrounder 2008: 18). The main terms of the Agreement were that, on one hand, the DRC government undertook to disarm (by force if necessary) and dislodge the Rwandese armed groups, such as the FDLR which operates in the east of Congo, and prevent them from using Congolese territory to launch attacks on Rwanda. On the other hand, Rwanda undertook not to support the CNDP and ensure that its territory is not used to supply the CNDP with arms. The implementation of the agreement was meant to start in March 2008 but both MONUC and FARDC failed to dislodge the FDLR although the sensitization campaign calling for those concerned to disarm voluntarily was conducted successfully. For those who wanted to settle in the DRC instead of returning to Rwanda, an appropriate site was prepared for settlement in Katanga but the FDLR continued to attack civilians in the east region (Code Backgrounder, 14). As a result, the international community, at the UN level has continued to advocate for financial and
travel sanctions against FDLR militia leaders. To deepen the complexity, the recent developments and concern in the security sector is that the Palipehutu-FNL in Burundi has been recruiting FDLR combatants in the DRC to swell its ranks during the integration process of its forces in the Burundi military (Code Backgrounder 2008:17). As long as the FDLR members do not return to Rwanda and its leaders charged for the crimes against humanity which they committed, it is highly unlikely that the Great Lakes region will achieve sustainable peace.

To exacerbate challenges and efforts between Rwanda and the DRC government, a full scale conflict erupted in August and September 2008 between CNDP rebel armies and FARDC. The CNDP overran FARDC regional Headquarters at Rumangabo, a military base recently refurbished and repaired by South Africa and Netherlands. It is reported that the CNDP captured significant amount of arms and ammunition – gaining access to surface and air missile capacity which could put the MONUC gunships ineffective (Code Backgrounder 2008: 16). Unfortunately, the DRC government believes that the real power behind Nkunda is Rwanda and that presents perpetual threat to its security. The DRC has therefore lobbied SADC members several times to publicly condemn Rwanda’s aggression against the DRC. In its response, Rwanda has expressed lack of faith in DRC’s ability to respect disarmament agreements as it argues that the DRC has failed to do so several times before. Another key country which is important for the stability of the DRC is Uganda.

Uganda

There has been general mutual distrust between DRC and Uganda since the 1998-2003 war, followed by their respective armed forces skirmishes around Lake Albert in 2007. However, international pressure led to the Ngurdoto Agreement between Presidents Kabila and Museveni which made provision for a joint boundary commission, joint oil development cooperation, commitment by the DRC to engage the Lords’ Resistance Army (on insistence of Uganda) and agreement by Uganda to move all Congolese
The situation could lead to increased tensions along the lake borders. There is an urgent need therefore to find a workable relationship between the DRC and Uganda to deal effectively with competition over natural resources. Several Ugandan rebel groups operating from eastern DRC reportedly use the tense security situation in the region to occasionally launch attacks across the border with Uganda (Code Backgrounder 2008: 18).

Mechanisms for engagement between the Great Lakes region members have been established and although the intentions are noble, most of the key terms have not been honored by any of the parties of the agreement. However the house arrest of General Nkunda in Rwanda in 2009, after the full scale attacks in the eastern part of the DRC, including threats to take over the Goma province, has led to relative peace and stability in that area and indicates clearly the importance of collaboration between the members of the Great Lakes region. It can only be hoped that all other leaders in the region will follow suit in making cooperation a reality and only instrument which is available to them to achieve peace in the Great Lakes region. There are general suspicions from those who are involved in the DRC, however, that Rwanda could be using former General Nkunda as a trump card to gain more concessions from the DRC government, particularly in disarming and sending the FDLR leadership to the ICC or Arusha for their crimes in the Rwandan genocide.
It is evident that the frustrations which are experienced by the South African security forces, due to delays and what seems like poor leadership are directly linked to the kind of relations the DRC has with the rest of the Great Lakes region. It therefore follows that besides the internal ethnic conflicts within the DRC, until FDLR and the CNDP are demobilized and disarmed, no peace will be achieved in the DRC. The fact that these two rebel groups are wealthier and have better control of some of the Congolese villages, better than the DRC government, cannot be ignored as it feeds and perpetuates conflict. South Africa's role and the achievement of its efforts should be understood within this huge and complex environment called the DRC and its Great Lakes region. It is then that the enormity of what it has achieved with minimal resources and experience can be appreciated. The main lesson for South Africa is to capture its experience as it will serve as a better model anywhere else as the DRC seems to be the most complex of all environments. Such lessons will also inform South Africa on how to engage with economic development issues.

4.5. Economic Development in the DRC

The DRC economy is known to be the driver of conflict in that country and in the Great Lakes Region as pointed out in Chapter 1. The economic development efforts are understood to be necessary both for development and maintenance of peace. The Development Bank (2008) argues that while the foundation for development should be to create an enabling environment with clear, consistent and effective micro and macro policies, to maintain peace will need strategies which will create employment that will absorb young men who will otherwise be recruited into various rebel groups. Firstly, the benefits of creating employment and its possible impact on citizens, to regain their dignity and inspiration through gainful employment, were highlighted in 4.2. and 4.3. above. Secondly, economic development is also about the state's ability to deliver basic services to its citizens and therefore depends on good governance and functioning state institutions.
The main actors and those who benefit from the DRC’s war economy are outlined in chapter 1 but it is important to pay attention to those who have suffered as well when developing policies. For instance, civilians have suffered immensely through forced labour for mining, lack of commerce between rebel held and government held areas of the country, shortage of foodstuffs, disruption of trade between rebel held and the neighbouring countries because of monopoly that Rwanda and Uganda have granted themselves in the regions they hold (Lind & Sturman, 2002: 209). Over time, the effects of war can be experienced by the DRC government through the loss in human capital due to migration, displacement and death. The destruction of wildlife has also affected tourism. Inevitably, foreign direct investment decreased sharply as the war economy flourished (Clark, 2002: 207). Hence this has made the DRC state dependent on donations while it has vast resources in its territory.

South Africa’s efforts

The South African efforts towards economic reform are responding to such a need. They are reflected in the basket of projects which South Africa implemented in transport, infrastructure, customs, energy, tourism, and telecommunications. South Africa’s strategy involved infrastructure, economic and rural development through spatial development corridors, the creation of connectivity between provinces through the reform of the telecommunication sector; transport reform which enhances mobility between DRC and South Africa; and other nationalities who seek business in the DRC and also improving supply of energy whether its electricity or water to enhance economic and social development. In this instance South Africa undertook extensive feasibility studies which involved, and were verified by, development financing institutions, like DBSA and IDC, and respectable consultants such as Price Water Coopers. Furthermore, South Africa ensured that the relevant government department contributed towards establishing systems and policies which will eventually regulate, monitor but also incentivise business activities.
South Africa’s successful development of the institutions for creating the construction industry, its regulatory bodies, policies and regulations was quite impressive as the Development Bank (2008: 53) has argued than an ‘institutional architecture which promotes service delivery’, good governance and promotes sustainable peace is critical for sustainable peace and economic development. The key challenges faced by all projects include resource mobilization, concerns for sustainability and the timeous meeting of deadlines. Another funding mechanism which South Africa used, with the intention of taking over some of the donors’ apprehensions, was the trilateral agreements.

Trilateral agreements

Trilateral arrangements have opened up space for partnerships between South Africa, the DRC and traditional donors during the PCRD process. They however create many roles, identities and burden for South Africa, such as being a donor, development partner and a project manager. These arrangements then present both opportunities for South Africa (to augment its resources towards advancing its foreign policy objectives) and dangers and risks for being perceived to condone corruption in the projects when they occur. For instance, the Swedish were stricter in terms of the conditions they attached to their donation but instead of withdrawing their support like the Belgians, they entered into a trilateral agreement with SA and the DRC; and therefore transferred all the risk to South Africa. When the Swedish government conducted an independent evaluation of the project, in terms of its domestic laws, its report was quite harsh on South Africa while the Swedish government did not take much blame for the weaknesses of the programme. This is one area which should be considered for future research in order to determine conclusively what the South African measures were as the South African National Treasury does have strict rules about such arrangements.
DRC’ government’s own efforts

Using the existing resources, the DRC government (supported by International Finance Institutions) attempted to kick-start its economic growth by prioritising the release of forestry contracts during 2004 – 2008 periods. Unfortunately the influx of loggers led to the proliferation of loggers including uncontrolled and illegal ones to such an extent that there was an outcry that the policy had to be revised and that slowed down the economy and negatively impacted on possible revenue (Code Backgrounder 2008: 10).

Besides the historical risks which have been identified, there have been recent global effects on the DRC economy. Firstly, the economic and financial meltdown has affected ‘the expansion of five large programmes by international companies, amounting to US$380, millions, and also DRC’s ability to pay its debt due to decreased access to developmental finance, commercial debt and interest rates’ (Code: Backgrounder 2008: 10). In September 2008, the DRC government had already overspent by at least US$100 million and the international donors were beginning to be concerned about the ability of the state to practise fiscal restraint and prudence. The fact that the government is preparing for elections in 2011 will naturally mean that it will increase its spending. More worrying because of its impact on the long term development of the economy is the need to accelerate infrastructure development in order to facilitate economic growth and the state’s ability to provide security across the country.

However, the DRC state is aware of the urgency with regard to creating conditions which are conducive to development. For instance it has revised the mining and minerals policy which emphasised the principle of ‘use it or lose’. It them pronounced that its objectives were to achieve greater management representation; greater social involvement from companies and greater profits and royalties. The government therefore communicated clearly that those who win contracts should be committed to the provinces. The oil policy is yet to be revised since it was adopted in 1981, but the risk will be to slow down growth and access to revenue during that time. It does not
seem likely then that even if South Africa was only intervening in the DRC for selfish economic gains, it would have gained much in the short term.

South Africa’s interests in the DRC

A debate has been raging between scholars about what South Africa’s interest in the DRC is (Kagwanja 2006; Kabemba 2006). There is scepticism about South Africa’s authenticity in only seeking the achievement of its African development agenda through extensive support of one of the potential giants in the southern and eastern part of Africa. The argument has been made by some that it is all for economic, if not imperialist goals. The Congolese who have participated at the Diplomatic Academy’s training programmes, which South Africa runs jointly with the DRC government have raised similar concerns. It is therefore important to highlight South Africa’s economic penetration and benefits from the DRC economy.

According to Clark (2002: 219) South Africa has been mainly affected by a loss of trade and investment opportunities in the DRC. It is estimated that 9, 4% of Congolese exports went to SA in 1998 but fell to 4% in 1999. Most importantly, South Africa is a leader in all sectors which produce products such as synthetic fuels, capital equipment, foodstuffs and other machinery which the DRC needs (Clark, 2002: 209). Although South Africa’s exports to DRC have steadily increased up to 19,5% in 2009, since 2004, the South African private sector has not been very successful in cracking the DRC market except for retailers such as Nandos and Shoprite Checkers, Standard Bank, Vodacom and the Divine Inspiration Consortium Group, in the oil industry, although some have been accused of misconduct (DTI Annual Report, 2009). Respondent 6 pointed out the substantial resources which these companies had to spend to go through the red tape even with the support of the South African government.

Consequently, the South African government has been disappointed because it expected reciprocal treatment in the DRC after spending extensive resources to contribute to its development. Reciprocal treatment is one of the fundamental principles
of the Vienna Convention which governs relations between countries. The South African government felt that its agencies in particular would be given access especially to those projects which South Africa spearheaded. For instance, the failure of ACSA to secure the contract to build the Ndjile airport, after it had undertaken a successful feasibility study, created tension as South African non-government actors raised their discontent sharply and started questioning the benefits which SA draws from the DRC PCRD projects. It was at this point that the government started worrying about losing its citizens’ support for its commitment to the DRC project. The DRC has defended itself by saying that it did not have enough resources to implement the project and the Chinese government made them available. However, Respondent 6 had a different explanation as he said that

*DRC is like a jungle, only the fittest survive. As a principle South Africa does not pay bribes*\(^\text{15}\) *so the project was given to the Chinese. But a French ACSA counterpart paid more than the Chinese and it is now the one which is responsible for the construction and management of the Ndjile airport. To show that business ethics are different from politics, the French company approached the South African IDC and asked for a loan to do the same project which should have been awarded to South Africa.*

Another example was the experience of the census team. They usually had to order the equipment from abroad to conduct the census in remote areas. Respondent 1 said that, when the ordered goods arrived at the airport, they would be kept for months before they were released and they had to pay exorbitant sums for handling and storage. Even after the DRC government had been made aware of the problem, they did not address it. The lesson is that in a pressured environment which seeks stability, pragmatism takes precedent over idealistic notions of loyalty as the DRC might have believed that there were still many other projects which SA could benefit from. Although South Africa

felt that its commitment was not being appreciated, its interests were implicitly communicated as part of the cooperation agreement with the Congolese government. The latter point has been another subject of main criticism of South Africa’s foreign policy implementation and some of the Respondents’ views are captured under 4.4. Despite popular accusations that South Africa is pursuing imperialist intentions, it is evident that South Africa during 2004 to 2009 spent more in the DRC PCRD process than it has benefited from it.

Realistically, for South Africa to neglect benefiting economically from the DRC, while it faces such high unemployment and a declining manufacturing sector, will make it difficult to justify to its citizens why such amounts are spent there. In both the short and long term South Africa will benefit enormously from the energy sector of the DRC and the discussions between role-players from both countries, in this field have started.

There is also no contradiction in seeking both political and economic development for the continent and South Africa. Since the DRC is also a member of the SADC region, regional integration ambitions could be realised much better and more realistically. According to the Development Bank Report (2008: 44) reconstruction of the economy in post-conflict societies needs macro economic policies which will strengthen its relations with its neighbours, particularly where infrastructure such as ports, borders and roads are shared. Before the region can be reached however, the DRC government needs an effective public service to support its reform ambitions.

4.6. Public Service Reform

4.6.1. Census of public servants

Scope and structure of the census project

The census project was an extensive project which exposed South Africa to a better understanding of DRC challenges and provincial dynamics across different and vast
provinces. It therefore provided most lessons for future institution development projects. According to Respondent 1 (2009), South Africa initially committed itself to buying required equipment for the project and also pilot it in Kinshasa only so that the Congolese could continue with the rest of 11 provinces. When South Africa was about to start the project it learnt that the discussions between the Belgian and the DRC governments had reached an impasse because they could not agree on how the census would be conducted for the whole country. The main point of disagreement was on how funds would be managed, disbursed and reported against.

Feeling frustrated, as the scoping exercise had already taken two years, the Congolese asked South Africa to start the census in the Kinshasa province with the hope that the Belgians would cover the rest of the DRC as soon as the agreement had been reached. When the deadlock could not be resolved sooner between these governments, South Africa entered into a trilateral agreement with the Swedish government which provided US$18m that SA had to manage and oversee on behalf of the DRC. Five years later, South Africa had conducted a census in Kinshasa, Bandundu, Bakongo, and Kasai and was completing Maniema province all of which are very big. The Belgians, who felt snubbed by the DRC, had still not released the funds or technical support.

The project team involved a maximum of two South African project leaders and eight newly trained DRC officials. Generators, computers and servers to undertake the project were bought and carried along provinces. Each time the team moved from one province to the other a private charter had to be hired at US$70 000 for eight people for one trip and a ground transport for travelling within the province had to be provided as well. The DRC officials had to be paid a salary, a general allowance of US$10 a day and a hotel allowance irrespective of whether they stayed at a hotel or not.

Challenges during implementation

Besides the expansion of the project from a small to a huge project covering the biggest and most dense provinces, the scoping and feasibility report which informed the project
was based on a model which collects data, registers each individual and issues an identity card immediately within one process in one meeting and contact. The reality was that there were many steps which involved carrying initial information to Kinshasa for verification before the process could be completed. Subsequently a temporary card had to be issued before the final one and that resulted in more than one trip to the same village and province.

The team members soon learnt that there was no accommodation in most provinces, except for a remote Catholic church. The church would be full in any case because all NGOs involved in the PCRD process would be using it. Consequently, allocated funds were exhausted several times and the project was delayed. Sometimes team members had to rely on trucks taking people to provinces, on the roads which were essentially non-existent because there was no infrastructure in 90% of DRC provinces. It sometimes took the team several weeks to get to their destination, ‘travelling in an open truck, and passing through thick bushes with limited water’ (Respondent 1, 2009).

Findings on this project are that the scoping exercise was inadequate and that proper planning was compromised in the service of political expedience. When the last additional funding was secured from the National Treasury, a new DPSA Minister was appointed, following President Mbeki’s resignation, who felt that the project should be terminated as soon as possible citing that ‘South Africa was not gaining anything anyway from supporting the DRC while spending so much money’ (Respondent 1, 2008).

Approaches to the DRC between South Africa and the international community

This project also highlighted subtle tensions between South Africa, former colonisers and traditional donors and also brought South Africa’s lack of experience in transitional diplomacy into sharp focus. For instance, the Congolese felt that the Belgians were still undermining them and placed many conditions before they could assist them. What was worse for the Congolese, according to them, was that the Belgian project management team comprised of a former nurse and IT specialists who they felt treated them with
contempt and had no political understanding. The Belgians believed that the Congolese were corrupt and wanted to dictate the terms of the partnership and that they (the Congolese) refused to agree to the terms of the contract in order to serve their own interests. According to Respondent 1 (2008), South Africa understood both sides and felt that the reconstruction of the DRC was more important and that where corruption existed, it would be addressed through institutional rules once they had been established. During implementation, South Africa used its technical team to manage the project funds. Where funds had to be transferred to the Congolese government account, it was only transferred per project milestone which would be confirmed by a report endorsed by the South African technical team.

South Africa’s approach was that telling the Congolese what to do was not going to change them but working with them and controlling how the funds were spent would be more productive (Respondent 1, 2008). South Africa’s attitude led to overspending and over-stretching of all its resources including the moral of their technical staff members. Although they said that ‘what we learnt is something other people go through a lifetime without having an opportunity to’, they also expressed their frustration at encountering difficulties from all ends (Respondent 1, 2008)\textsuperscript{16}. In its 6\textsuperscript{th} Report the House of Commons (2005-6: 20, 21) suggests that ‘conflict assessments should be a precondition for engaging in CPCA states and mandatory for all donors. Such assessment usually include an analysis of the causal factors of the conflict, the parties to the conflict, the effects of the conflict on different groups and what policies would be most effective in preventing a return to conflict’. These are some of the best practice principles which Solomon (2006: 221) advocates should underpin all peacemaking efforts in Africa as well.

\textsuperscript{16} ‘…no roads but thick bushes, no accommodation, your water bottle gets stolen in the open truck you are travelling in with many strangers and then you get harrassed by corrupt government officials when you reach your destination and are supposed to start working’ (Respondent 1, 2008).
Trilateral agreement for the census project

Interestingly, South Africa’s concept of being a development partner which provides unconditional development assistance rather than being a traditional donor was challenged by the outcomes of the review report of the trilateral agreement between SA, Swedish government and the DRC. The report highlighted South Africa’s limited experience in overseeing funds which have been donated to a third party by indicating ‘inadequate institutional analysis and interface with similar systems in other ministries in the DRC, limited problem analysis and context and inadequate basis for effective monitoring and evaluation’ (Goransson, 2008: 9). As a result inter-institutional/ministerial linkages and coordination were not done as they are usually done at the project analysis phase. (Goranson, 2008: 8) further asserts that as a result, the database which was developed by the DPSA is not compatible with existing payroll lists developed by the Department of Education for teachers and the one which established by the World Bank when it undertook an analysis to assist with human resources planning. Goransson (2008: 9) therefore concludes, rather sombrely, that such incompetence resulted in newly and formally employed civil servants not being paid while others who should not have been were registered as civil servants, others registered at higher grades than those registered in the ministries’. Goransson (2008) attributed such a performance by South Africa to lack of experience or capacity to manage funding on behalf of the DRC, because, she concludes, South Africa does not really have experience of managing disbursed funds because it is a donor recipient as well.

In response, Respondent 1 (2009) said that it should be borne in mind that a census is the process of collecting information, not to classify it for pay purposes. Either way, government needs accurate and reliable information in order to take decisions. While the South Africans were annoyed by the Goransson (2008) report as they felt that it had some negative connotations towards South Africa, as a developing country, South Africa’s identity (or perception of) seems to have been a crisis for the teams on the ground. For instance, it was reported that the DRC Public Service Ministry had
established a Coordinating Committee for all donors involved in this field and it expected SA to participate and provide leadership but the South Africans, through DPSA, believed that SA was an implementing partner which was different from donor countries which have a different approach and different objectives. While this might have been junior officials’ misunderstanding of the articulation of South Africa’s foreign policy, the fact of the matter is that South Africa is part of the international community in the DRC and it contributes financially, technically, politically and otherwise. To be a donor and a development partner should not be mutually exclusive in the field.

Capacity required to implement projects

With regard to capacity to implement projects, the officials conceded that traditional donors have established institutions and technical expertise to implement and monitor projects in a way which enhances success. They said that South Africa did not adopt a structured approach which allowed it to plan the census project well, install adequate control mechanisms and seek buy-in from all relevant ministries in order to facilitate accuracy and sustainability of the project. They however argued that DPSA had shared a copy of a generic HR plan, competency profile and an organisational structure which it suggested should be used by the DRC to facilitate public sector reform but the DRC counterparts ignored it. They said that the discrepancies between the various sets of information were due to corruption. It can be argued however that if the process was systematic and involved all relevant stakeholders and a system of verification, which was not only for fingerprints but also against existing payroll lists in all ministries, the quality of the database would have been improved and adopted by all.

Despite this, through its commitment and vision (of a reformed DRC public service) South Africa was able to register over 100 000 civil servants within the given period but the government of Sweden report which was only on reasoning concluded that it would not be sustainable. This is one of the cases which indicated that the coordination and structured interaction between the international community members in the DRC can
never be over-emphasised to share information and best practices instead of competing against one another.

During the interviews Respondent 1 (2008, 2009) said that the French government had established an Integrated Management and Payroll system (similar to SA’s public personnel salary system). Its functioning therefore depended on the results of the census, she said. It will be useful in the future research therefore to first verify the Swedish’ report conclusions and also to establish the linkages between all existing systems as they should, if coordinated, be the pillar which the DRC public reform process depends on.

4.6.2. Skills development for all public servants

The project undertaken by SAMDI which later changed to PALAMA was implemented successfully because of relative limited complexities. SAMDI supported all South African projects in the DRC by providing training to all DRC servants for two reasons. Firstly, it had to facilitate the transfer of technical skills from South Africans to ensure that the projects were managed effectively after the South African team had completed implementing them. Secondly, the training covered general management and leadership skills which are necessary in the public service. The third function involved overseeing the establishment of the Public Service Academy (ENA). SAMDI successfully delivered a range a public management and development programmes across all government departments in Kinshasa. It therefore had access to more information with respect to which officials were responsible for which projects in the different departments and therefore understood their priorities better than other teams. If there was a coordination structure amongst South Africans, which ensured that information collected or picked up in the field was fed back to all other project teams, SAMDI’s would have enhanced the understanding of how the various government departments function. Such information would have helped South Africa to review and change its strategies, where necessary, during the implementation phase. It would have also helped to map out the various departments’ needs, activities and progress in
various PCRD projects so that South African teams could respond adequately to the continued requests for more funding by the Congolese.

This study found however that South African government teams, who implemented the various projects outlined in Chapter 3, did not meet to share their experiences in a structured manner while they were in the DRC. To illustrate the point, in some instances South African departments paid different allowance rates to the Congolese who they employed to work in the different projects, even when the activities were similar in all forms. Although the PALAMA team experienced minimal problems relatively, the Respondent 4 (2009) said that the challenge for the Congolese was to sustain the programmes which had already been established and ensure that all DRC government departments embrace the newly established ENA.

This research indicates that in all the projects, except in the SAPS one, South Africa failed to mobilise all relevant stakeholders to support the projects from conception or initial implementation phase of the project. While this can be baffling at face value given South Africa’s consultative culture, it can be attributed to the unfamiliarity of the environment to the officials concerned which makes them rely on their Congolese counterparts. Alternatively South Africans were being cautious not to impose their culture and risk being perceived as an aggressive bully.

It is in this aspect however that diplomats, working with their intelligence counterparts, should step in to facilitate the relations to the extent that structured engagements take place to ensure that projects are successful. For instance, a dedicated facilitator, who is part of the South African diplomatic team at the embassy, is responsible for overseeing the management of the Diplomatic Academy and alerts both the Ambassador and the project managers in head office of any significant issues which emerge or believes that they should be alerted to. The problem is that this facilitator is only responsible for DIRCO projects and other South African project managers, in the DRC, do not have dedicated support from the diplomats, undermining the larger transitional effort.
The disjunction between DIRCO and other officials deployed at the South African embassy in the DRC is a reflection of a broader disconnect between the role of DIRCO in managing South Africa’s foreign policy and those departments who are involved in international relations and implementation of domestic policies. On one hand, it is a reflection of how diplomacy has changed from being the exclusive space for only diplomats employed by the Foreign Affairs Ministries, to being inclusive of all spheres of government, including various experts within and outside the state. On the other hand, DIRCO has not been forthright before in claiming its space to manage and coordinate all South Africa’s relations abroad. Based on this study, it is important to note that transitional diplomacy, which is new to South Africa, carries high stakes for South Africa both abroad and at home. In 2009 a policy entitled “Guidelines and Measures for the Enhanced Coordination of South Africa’s international Relations” was approved by parliament to further clarify roles and empower DIRCO to coordinate all government activities abroad. Implementation, though, is still a challenge as most government departments perceive any DIRCO involvement as unwanted control of their international relations ambitions.

For long-term purpose, DIRCO would need to draw some lessons from transformational diplomacy in action (outlined in Chapter 3). In addition to the traditional diplomatic training, transformational diplomacy puts emphasis on training diplomats in programme and project management in hardship posts and in the local languages spoken in such areas. Given the challenges which were experienced by the teams outlined in this study, the training of all government officials involved in international relations would need to be strengthened and a generic orientation programme to explain South African policy objectives and priorities, the role of DIRCO and its diplomatic missions and the functions of state protocol will need to form part of the content. The implementation process would have to be extended to the broader South African public, especially the private sector, members of the media and other non-governmental organisations which have an interest and stake in the field. The training of diplomats however presented its own lessons for this study.
4.6.3. Diplomatic training

The diplomatic training project was planned on a three-year cycle basis which the Minister and the DG reviewed every year. The various training programmes addressed mostly basic, intermediate and ambassadorial levels. The latter group was only trained once in 2005 as a pilot case and basic groups were trained for three months each, three times a year comprising of the maximum of 35 diplomats in a group while any other intervention training (such as English language and computer skills) was offered in between. The project also included the renovation of the Foreign Ministry section in order to establish the DRC Diplomatic Academy in 2006. A portion of the salary of the personnel who worked at the Academy, the office equipment, including educational learning material and the operational cost, were covered by South Africa.

Regular and quarterly reviews of the functioning of the Academy and the training programmes were undertaken, by joint South Africa and DRC teams. The end of year meetings were utilised to develop a strategy for the following three years. The training projects were implemented successfully and modified whenever necessary. However, the strategic reviews done at the end of each year were perceived as threats by the Congolese as they suspected that South Africa was preparing to exit rather than an exercise of normal due prudence. They said that they preferred that South Africa continue playing a leadership role in all projects pertaining to the reconstruction of the Foreign Ministry. The South Africans however were wary of creating dependency and also feared that the resources which SA had committed towards this project were too limited to carry out all the Congolese’ expectations. Therefore, from the outset, the South African government encouraged the Congolese to find other donors. DIRCO also actively facilitated participation by other donors in order to make it reasonable to exit and ensure that the Diplomatic Academy was sustainable.

Notwithstanding, this project was faced by two major challenges. Firstly, the Congolese managing the Diplomatic Academy often worked as individuals or a separate clique from their Foreign Ministry colleagues. For instance, before the diplomatic training
programme could begin, the Academy had to be established by renovating a section of the Foreign Ministry. The Academy precinct was soon modernised while the rest of the Foreign Ministry offices remained old and unappealing. South Africa paid for both the DRC and South African Lecturers who taught at the Academy and as the funds had to be forwarded to the Academy it was felt that to prevent possible corruption, a minimum allowance should be paid to the managers of the Academy as well because monthly wages payouts were sporadic in the DRC. The unintended consequence was that the officials at the Academy became a new and separate class from the rest of the Foreign Ministry, irrespective of how small the allowance was.

Because government officials in the DRC relate directly to the respective Ministers rather than the directors general, it so happened that the director of the Academy reported to the Minister of Public Services instead of Foreign Affairs while the latter was accountable to South Africa for the Academy. Consequently the breakdown of communication between the ministry and the academy officials, about the implementation progress, increased and caused suspicions and tension. Soon after that the foreign ministry complained that their immediate training needs, for the combination of generic and diplomatic training were not being addressed by the Academy as the content was only on diplomatic training. South Africa then insisted that it would not approve any training programmes unless they had been approved by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As the ministry took the lead in overseeing that the project was relevant and effective, the Director of the Academy got transferred to another ministry in 2008. The downside was that a new Director had to learn how to manage the Academy and the relations with South Africa and the DRC Ministries first. South Africa was concerned that that could delay implementation or result in the introduction of a new and possible negative culture. The second Director turned out to be a unifier between all the stakeholders and came with new feasible ideas on how to develop the Academy into self sufficiency. However, after three months he got promoted to a senior management post for human resources management in the Ministry. Much to South Africa’s apprehension, a new Director was appointed and was soon suspended for corruption in the previous department he had been responsible for.
Subsequently, a young, internationally trained official with a doctorate, who was part of the team who started the Diplomatic Academy, was first appointed to act in the position in 2009. Much to the South African joy, he was later appointed permanently as the new Director for the Academy. Since his appointment, the Chinese, Korean, French and Russian governments have agreed to support the Academy, starting with language training and support for various activities. He also approached the World Bank to assist in financing Congolese who were in the Diaspora to come and share their skills with their fellow citizens if they were willing. While DIRCO insisted that the Foreign Ministry officials should control the information technology programmes which it had donated to the Academy and the Ministry, it refused to extend the renovation of offices to the Ministry area for fear of over-stretching its resources. Subsequently the trained diplomats started being posted due to other political factors but the fundamental problem has still not been resolved.

The second and the most fundamental challenge was the age of the diplomats who were being trained. The groups which started in the first two years were relatively young ranging from late 30s to 50s of age, showing sensitivity to gender parity in all those groups. This also reflected the values of the leaders who had negotiated the agreements (Foreign Minister Mnywamisi had worked closely with the ANC before 1994 and was part of the 1 + 4 political arrangement) at the time of ending the war. However by 2008/2009 the majority of the trainees were very old, the youngest being 50 while the oldest was 69, and they were all male. This was due to the lack of a retirement mechanism such as the employer pension fund which should support people who go on retirement.

Consequently, in an environment where there are no employment opportunities for the youth and retirement measurements for adults, the elders who are employed hold on to their jobs as long as they can as they are the only breadwinners. It soon became evident that the intended impact of developing skills will not be realised with the kind of cohorts who were being made available. Fortunately, a new Minister was appointed who...
has since committed himself to developing the Congolese youth (both men and women) in the DRC diplomatic team. Under his reign, deployment of qualified diplomats was expedited. The World Bank has since funded a project which will develop a government pension fund that will allow those at the retirement age to retire in order to enhance public reform efforts which are already underway. The implementation of this project only started at the end of 2009.

Established institution

The importance of training, and diplomatic training in this instance, contributes towards nation building in the DRC by strengthening the DRC’s source of soft power – its people and build their sense of confidence and pride in their country. It is also important for the Congolese public servants to develop a collective sense of responsibility and confidence in their state and spending time together in training allows team spirit. By ensuring that the project is managed and overseen closely and consistently, it provides an important lesson for developing future models. Fortunately the change of Directors did not affect progress but ultimately proved positive for the self-sufficiency of the Academy. DIRCO was also able to commit to one project and ensure its growth while working towards self sufficiency and therefore resisted the political pressure to extend the renovation to the Foreign Affairs Ministry which could have stretched the resources.

In this project South Africa will leave a positive legacy and visible reflection of progress through the existence of refurbished offices with new computers, learning halls and modernised record system which is fundamental shift from the typical stacks of old files (on every Congolese citizen’s profile) which are usually found in government offices, more so in the DRC. There is visible shift in government offices from finding public servants’ heads sticking above a stack of files in front of them on the desk, looking very exhausted and indifferent, to a new DRC public servant who can be found concentrating on a computer screen in front of him. Even computer games will offer a brain stimulant when the beaurocratic and political wheels take too long to turn and allow civil servants to do their jobs. Infrastructural development whether in the form of roads, stadiums and
offices is always a positive sign of development and that has become visible in the DRC.

4.7. Other socio-economic activities

According to Hesselbein (2008: 30) while independence from the Belgians found a DRC without any educated elite the Mobutu’s initial regime changed the status and produced 92% in enrollment in primary school level while 8,401 students were at university level. Similarly, the national health system also flourished during this period and churned out a substantive number of health care professionals most of which later moved to South Africa. It is the group of Congolese Doctors in Diaspora, in South Africa, who this research found have become organized and are very active in PCRD programmes which seek to restructure the health sector.

The Congolese doctors in the Diaspora regularly mobilize resources from the private sector and government departments to support projects which South Africa and other international donors have put in place to restructure the health system in the DRC. This is a good initiative which draws many interested parties and has also opened up space for the Congolese in Diaspora to play their role. South Africa’s contribution to this aspect is through its SSR project. The South African defense department has put in place mechanisms which ensure that all injured or sickly FARDC members receive excellent care in South African hospitals. Respondent 3 (2009) said that the project did not only save the soldiers’ lives but boosted their moral when their ailments were attended to as soon as possible as they began to feel that the DRC government cared about their well-being.

The partnership between South African and DRC governments and Wits University with respect to the training programme for developing financial management competencies is also plausible but the mismatch between the languages spoken in these two countries has proven to be a huge obstacle. Hence most educated Congolese prefer French speaking countries abroad for continuous skills development.
For a vast country like the DRC and one which is rich in fauna and flora, not enough is done in collaborating in the agriculture, environmental management and tourism sectors. The projects which are being explored are at an infancy stage. It is also in these sectors that local communities can be mobilized and empowered around as these areas depend essentially on community support and protection. The African continent at large has a lot of experience to share in this regard and various case studies can be compiled and be made available for the DRC government. The difficulty in mobilizing ordinary community members where there are strong traditional authorities who are mobilized along ethnic lines and rebel groups which have authority over specific areas cannot be under-estimated but small projects can be piloted in relatively stable areas, such as Kinshasa, across ethnic based sections of the communities.

4.8. Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted that nation building in the DRC is faced with complex challenges. While the DDR process allows foreign rebel groups, such as FDLR and CNDP members, to settle in the DRC if they prefer, a national population register does not exist and a national dialogue to identify who is Congolese and how to deal with those who have been in DRC for some years, has not taken place. This chapter has argued that regional integration, which will accommodate all ethnicities across the Great Lakes Region, should be explored as it might be a better instrument to deal with the interconnectedness of the regional members. It has also been highlighted that the leaders of former warring parties have used the transition process to protect their own interests and has therefore obstructed all attempts to achieve stability and democratic peace for all Congolese. The difficulties which respondents highlighted in implementing the SSR are directly linked to the challenges which were experienced prior to the national elections in 2006. The role of the spoilers, the lack of political will and the ambivalent role which the Great Lakes members play in the SSR process are some of the reasons which impacted negatively on the SSR process. The lack of infrastructure is a huge obstacle and shock which all project teams highlighted. It is in the instances
when the teams tried to deal with such obstacles, whether looking for transport in a remote village or renovating a building, that they felt more exposed to harassment by corrupt government officials. The ability of South Africa to provide much needed medical assistance was one of those projects which may seem small in scale relatively but it helped to boost the morale of sick soldiers.

The lack of alternative employment for the youth in a context that lacks a pension fund, for officials nearing retirement age, has been highlighted as a huge obstacle to progress. The SAPS and Diplomatic training programmes have provided useful lessons on how to structure and manage the partnerships when implementing the two sectoral programmes. The inability for South Africa to use PALAMA to share information about each department’s profile, needs and priorities in the DRC can be regarded as a lost opportunity. The extension of the programme management role from senior managers in Pretoria to the South African Ambassador in the DRC should be considered as such experience already exist, based on the management of the diplomatic training programme in the DRC. Based on the interviews undertaken on the census project a conclusion can be drawn that South Africa should be cautious about trilateral agreements as they transfer the risk from both partners to South Africa. Irrespective of how urgent the project might be, South Africa should not override its scope and the initial plan. If it has to be, it will have to thoroughly understand the new conditions first and change the scope before finalising the implementation plan.

In reforming the public service, work which has been done in all other government departments should be understood fully in order to form necessary linkages. Learning from CIAT’s approach during the transition period, project teams should take the role of cabinet or parliament and develop inter-departmental committees which oversee implementation processes in order to ensure sustainability. With respect to South Africa’s interests in the DRC, contrary to the suspicion that South Africa has benefited economically from the DRC, this chapter has argued that it has suffered losses both in DRC exports to South Africa and in winning business projects for its para-statals or private sector. The inability of ACSA to secure the airport management contract cannot
only be attributed to exigency by the DRC to secure funding but also to corruption which allows those who pay more to get more. The South African’s contribution to the DRC’s economic development however was broad and strategic. The trade and investment promotion projects ranged from small projects such as obtaining shares in a mining company to big construction of development corridors indicate the spread and depth of South Africa’s commitment in reconstructing the DRC.

The role of diplomacy in ensuring that the transition phase is successful in the DRC is a novelty which enhances the effectiveness of transitional diplomacy. It also shows the depth by which South African diplomats have been involved. It is only eight years since the Global All-Inclusive Peace Agreement was signed and it is evident from this chapter that the results will only be more evident over a long period. A spread of lessons has been developed from the projects which were outlined and the facilitation process which took place to ensure that the Global and All Inclusive Agreement was implemented accordingly. It is evident that the role of diplomats has changed. Politically, diplomats are now directly involved in managing change of other countries and in ensuring that ordinary citizens are protected. The management and coordination role has been brought to sharp focus by transitional diplomacy. While diplomacy is usually practiced in air-conditioned conference halls, transitional diplomacy needs diverse teams which include experts who work directly at local level where there are no modern amenities. To learn more however, it means that South Africa will need to include researchers in its technical teams. An improved understanding of what constitutes a hardship post in a collapsed state should be revisited in order to adequately cushion the teams deployed there from the harsh conditions. While this study shows how commendable South Africa’s efforts are, there are issues which were not assessed in this study and should be taken in future research:

- The role and strategies of women in peace-keeping and PCRD at all government levels and in all sectors of the DRC society.
• South Africa’s efforts in the DRC – from the Congolese and the managers’ perspectives – what were the vision, expectations and outcomes.

• Follow up on the progress of the SSR programme – how possible is it that the DRC can revert to conflict.

In conclusion, the study has highlighted the key issues which South Africa should take into account before she embarks into new projects. The one which is implicit is that teams should be open minded but should only commit to manageable projects which can only be modified after thorough evaluation of the implications.
CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 4 has provided an analysis of the implementation of transitional diplomacy undertaken to support the reconstruction and development process of the DRC. Some strengths, weaknesses, challenges and threats have already been highlighted and scrutinised. This chapter will outline the findings of this study in Section A followed by recommendations in Section B.

A. FINDINGS

5.1. Threat of wars of secession

Ethnic conflicts have become part of the DRC fabric and the wars of secession are still a big threat to peace and security. The failure to develop an integrated security reform system which ‘ensures civilian security and also lay foundations for sustainable democratisation’ as pointed out by Stedman (2001: 12) in Chapter 2, is a lesson which should be perceived as a red flag signalling imminent danger. A lesson from other countries such as El Salvador is that it is important to develop a culture of peace through programmes which promote cross-factional civil society groups and also develop a political system which seek to consciously break down ethnic lines (Paris, 2005: 770).

What exacerbates the looming danger in the DRC is the failure to control and put an end to the proliferation of small arms. Disarmament has not been completely successful in retaining all the soldiers who have disarmed in the FARDC or gainfully occupied because firstly, the rebels are paid more than the state soldiers and secondly there are no economic activities to ensure that people can make a respectable living. In Chapter 3 it was indicated that rebels seem to use the reward they are paid to disarm, to buy more weapons and go back and rejoin the rebelling armies.
The main lesson for diplomats is that disarmament should be linked with job creation and mechanisms geared towards the non-proliferation of small arms. It is evident that not all former rebel groups could be absorbed into the national government army. The existence of such uncontrolled groups therefore is an inherent threat and risk to any success in implementing the PCRD as pointed out by Stedman (2000) in Chapter 2. The lesson is that disarmament and demobilisation will not assist in obtaining the ultimate goal of sustainable peace unless there is a system and mechanism for controlling proliferation of small arms.

During the crafting of the peace agreement strategies for keeping former soldiers gainfully employed should be well thought through and be included as part of the agreement.

5.2. Presence of spoilers and hostile neighbouring states

The members of the Great Lakes region and the various rebel groups which are fighting any of these countries for mostly their secession have been identified as spoilers in this study. In Chapter 3 President Kabila’s attempts either through the Goma Agreement or the Nairobi Minute have made some attempts to seek constructive engagement to deal with the challenges faced by the DRC. But lack of trust by all parties and the perceived lack of integrity by the DRC in implementing agreements as agreed have led to futile efforts. The reality however is that the region is so intertwined that it is inconceivable to think of sustainable peace in the DRC without an agreement between all parties on how they will relate to each other.

The Global All-Inclusive Agreement of 2002 guided all the processes and the involvement of all stakeholders who were affected in the conflict although some warring parties such as the CNDP withdrew from the transitional processes at different stages and thereafter rearmed and attacked the national government soldiers, MONUC and Congolese communities. Furthermore, it was highlighted in chapter 1 that African countries, such as Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe have historically been involved in
the DRC conflict although they had supported opposing parties and that itself caused tension amongst the members of the AU. The lesson is therefore that as long as African leaders are not united on one political position, peace will be very difficult to achieve in the Continent. Furthermore, involving all actors both at national and local level in the reconstruction of the DRC is at the heart of sustainable peace and existing efforts should be strengthened even if they counter enormous obstacles.

If the decentralisation project succeeds it is highly likely that once provincial and local government levels feel empowered they will take charge to transform their societies. As indicated in Chapter 3, the decentralisation project has experienced some delays because to succeed it will have to reconfigure and democratise the existing local authorities some of which are either established along ethnic lines or around corrupt former Mobutu officials.

5.3. Collapsed state

The DRC has all the characteristics which make it seem insurmountable to make it function properly. The state and government have collapsed and failed to operate effectively and was by 2006 highly fragile because of the effects of war. It lacked functioning institutions and resources. It is also a country of contradictions using Respondent 3’s assertion that ‘DRC has a lot of money through their mines, its even more than South Africa’s but there is no political will to transform and regulate the economy because the powers that be are benefiting from this chaos’. Whilst there is no political will from the elite warring parties who signed the peace agreement, the broader populace would appreciate democratisation as it will bring stability, safety and development into their lives. Performance of the projects as outlined in Chapter 3 indicates huge difficulties in achieving the outcomes due to lack of political will, lack of infrastructure and institutions and corruption. The absence of civil society organisations to agitate for change with the DRC communities is a huge gap.
The non-availability of transport and poor infrastructure are main causes of frustration for the South African implementing teams in the DRC. It was during the trips in provinces that the technical team for the public service census felt most vulnerable as they would sometimes hitch a hike for days with limited water on dangerous roads. To exacerbate the problem, they will find that there is no decent accommodation in their destination and the corrupt government officials will still want to exploit them by insisting that they hire their personal cars to drive around locally when conducting the census.

The safety of technical teams can be addressed by providing better coordination between all teams but put in place suitable resources, safety mechanisms and the South African embassy should provide physical (such as transport) and emotional support when necessary. The lesson is that South Africa should first accept the fact that collapsed states generally expose everyone in them to insecurity and they take longer to reconstruct. The respondents felt it necessary to have an exit strategy to indicate that South Africa has limited resources. However, a long-term strategy in transforming the DRC is imperative if the South African government envisions a positive impact which the DRC will have on the Continent when it is well developed and function effectively. South Africa should learn how to balance the possibility of the Congolese developing a culture of dependency with the risk of staying so long in the DRC that South Africa could be perceived as another occupier rather than a facilitator.

5.4. Leadership and political will of the DRC government

The experience in the DRC SSR project is that transformation takes longer to implement because of the lack of political will and leadership to own the process. For instance, South Africans felt that the Congolese relied fully on outside advice (expressed by different bilateral partners) and assistance on how the DDR process should be conducted, to an extent that they abdicated their own responsibility. The frustration expressed by the respondents was that the PCRD process would take longer, not because of its nature but because of the unwillingness by the DRC government to make it work. By 2009, those involved in South African’s SSR project
started feeling that South Africa was losing its influence on the DRC because of the change of leadership from President Mbeki to President Zuma as the former used to have a close relationship with President Kabila. Respondent 3 (2008) suggested that the BNC summit should be reduced to Deputy President Level to send a diplomatic signal of South Africa’s unhappiness with the new developments. To raise the stakes Respondent 3 (2008) suggested that the relationship between South Africa and Angola should be elevated to the presidential level instead. In terms of diplomatic practice between countries, the implications of such shift will not be missed to the Congolese. The main lesson for the South African state is that it can never be complacent; there are no permanent allies but permanent interests within the global community.

5.5. Inclusion of the civil society

The lack of institutions in the DRC extends to the absence of organised civil society structures. It was highlighted in Chapter 1 however that there are few informal formations at local government which can be capacitated to engage with the PCRD process. The exclusion of civil society in all the projects, except in policing forums however, is glaring from the South African government projects. It is therefore a weakness because the involvement of communities is critical for success. The absence of programmes which are geared towards collective support and confidence from all Congolese across ethnic divisions is glaring and could demonstrate that the power of those in government is drawn from such divisions and the application of the “divide and rule” principle. The DRC history teaches everyone that unless democracy is established, wars of secession are unlikely to end.

Furthermore, the argument highlighted in Chapter 1 is that exit by international community makes sense only when completed projects are taken over by local communities and/or counterpart departments as soon as it is possible. Although the IGD and Pax Africa were able to mobilize some sections of the civil society it needed to be sustained.
5.6. Cooperation by the international community

The international community is committed to reconstructing the DRC despite each individual member’s interest and motivation. Its commitment is evident in participating in MONUC and also through individual contributions which each country makes through bilateral relations with the DRC. More than one country has been involved in most of the big projects (SSR and infrastructure development) which South Africa undertook in the DRC. However, the lack of cooperation and miscommunication between South Africa, French, World Bank and the various DRC government departments affected the outcomes of the census project negatively as it created inaccurate and distorted information and duplication. The lesson for South Africa is that a situational analysis to determine what kind of information and systems already exist, before a project is started, should be undertaken. A Steering committee which includes all those who have been involved in related projects should be established to guide and monitor the implementation process.

There is a lesson to be drawn from how the CIAT was established to include all international community members, the way it functioned and how the effectiveness of transitional diplomacy can be improved. Although it was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the peace agreement at a high and political level, it is a model which can be formalised and integrated into a peace agreement. Its formalisation might broaden its mandate to also develop the capacity of those who aspire to be parliamentarians, in the absence of democratic and legitimate executive structures. Such an approach would have ensured that the Congolese felt part of the monitoring process rather than being “policed” by outsiders.

However the signing of trilateral agreements between South Africa, donor countries and the DRC was flawed because it shifted the risk away from the donor country to South Africa. During the evaluation of the outcomes, the Swedish government’s review for instance, made pronouncements on the failures of South Africa to adhere to its donor rules, without taking into consideration the complexity of the DRC conditions.
Consequently, South Africa’s positive performance in the public service consensus project has been dampened by over-expenditure due to it taking extra responsibility when the Belgians withdrew from this project. The lesson for South Africa is that donors should not behave like a silent partner in the trilateral agreement, they should also involve technical teams who will familiarise themselves with the implementation process and challenges being encountered.

5.7. South Africa’s capabilities to implement foreign policy

An experience to mediate between warring parties and facilitate a positive outcome was not sufficient to assist South Africa’s diplomatic efforts to succeed in the DRC. Brighi & Hill (2008: 130) argue that capabilities or resources ‘may be seen as the elements which an intelligent government will always seek to improve to give itself a better chance of implementing an effective foreign policy’ and they are listed below.

(a) Balancing interests and aspirations

There is no doubt that South Africa achieved a highly acclaimed recognition by brokering peace amongst the Congolese warring parties after pursuing it for such a long time. Because of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives, of prioritising the development of the African Continent, the Congolese looked up to South Africa to protect and defend their interests when the donors set what the Congolese interpreted as being unrealistic conditions and demands during the implementation of the PCRD process. South Africa therefore put its own experience and related global recognition in mediation and conflict resolution, into good use. The implementation of such experience as a diplomatic tool to influence other countries however was new to South Africa and it manifested itself in the following:

- The Swedish government’s evaluation report pointed out lack of strict mechanisms to monitor expenditure and weak interaction between South Africa, all DRC departments and other donors who are involved in different programmes which were either related or similar to those South Africa was undertaking.
• The lack of clear articulation of South Africa’s interests has seen a lot of criticism of South Africa’s role in the DRC, from its own population, including the officials who were interviewed for this project. The Respondents felt that South Africa is still ‘apologising for what the apartheid government did to the Continent and has therefore lost the plot about the reality of what other actors are benefiting at their expense’.

Despite this criticism from other countries, South Africa did not enjoy as much support from the Congolese as it expected. Firstly it became a victim to corrupt officials who kept its equipment for the census project at the airport unnecessarily long in order to charge exorbitant storage fees. Secondly it lost a lucrative and long-term investment project for renovating and managing the Ndjile airport, to the Chinese and later to the French. The situation then begged the question - whether ‘moral diplomacy’ can work in a context where the rules of engagement are not accepted by all players. This remains unanswered.

Another challenge was that while the ability to network is a core competency of diplomats, South African officials in the DRC felt that penetrating the Congolese society was a big challenge. For instance, South African diplomats could not use the media or engage the broader society to articulate South Africa’s role in the DRC. Besides the language barrier, the media demands payment before it can publish any story in the DRC. Payment for ensuring media coverage should be regarded as part of a broader strategy for dealing with corruption in the DRC. The lesson is that unless South Africa engages realistically with the challenge of corrupt systems in the DRC and also learns from international experience in this regard, it will be extremely difficult to achieve its planned objectives.

(b) South Africa’s Institutional capacity
While South Africa has been accused of punching above its weight because of its commendable role in providing leadership in the African Continent and on the global stage, some of its weaknesses can be attributed to lack of an institutional mechanism which is responsible for directing government’s strategy, coordinating, implementing, monitoring and ensure optimal use of government resources and evaluate in order to develop models and improve implementation. Such weaknesses demonstrate the fact that South Africa is a young player and leader in transitional diplomacy but also reflects the way the African Renaissance Fund is utilised and managed.

(c) Utilisation of the African Renaissance Fund (ARF)

In line with the AU principles which were outlined in Chapter 2, the African Renaissance Fund was established to support South Africa’s foreign policy priorities. It signaled its capability and seriousness in playing its leadership role in peacekeeping and development. As a result since 2006, substantial resources have been spent on development assistance activities in the African Continent. Regarding the DRC in particular, R680m was spent on the national elections alone in 2006 and since then approximately R750m has been spent annually on all DRC projects.

The problem with the ARF is that it has been used as a bank facility in which different government departments apply for funds in order to execute their PCRD activities. The role of DIRCO has therefore been limited to disbursing the funds, with the support of the National Treasury while the ultimate responsibility to monitor the utilization of the funds appropriately has been left to individual departments who initiate the development projects. As a result, resources have not been utilized efficiently and optimally. Wastage has been experienced in instances where better coordination could have prevented it. Best practices and lessons are not collated systematically across government to be used as guidelines for future projects. The lesson therefore is that the ARF needs to be structured as an institution to facilitate cooperation and development and also support South Africa’s capability to use transitional diplomacy successfully as a foreign policy instrument.
(d) Appropriate skills and quality of South African civil servants

It is evident that transitional diplomacy has impacted significantly on traditional diplomacy. Diplomatic training for South African diplomats should therefore prepare them for managing inter-departmental projects in fragile states and this where the restructured ARF will assist in providing guidance. The training of its civil servants, who will form part of the implementing technical teams, should also be improved and include requirements of transitional diplomacy. The South African ambassador should be empowered to play an effective coordinating, project management and supervisory role in all projects which are implemented in the DRC or in similar countries. This is a gap which was identified in the assessed projects in this study and it led to duplication and waste of resources by the various implementing teams.

The lack of clear guidelines on what should be discussed in joint technical team meetings, as part of a team effort to share experiences, resources and attend to any problems which emerge is therefore glaring. The key lesson is that as diplomacy changes, diplomats should be prepared accordingly because the success of any diplomatic efforts depends on their ability to respond to the changes.

5.8. Planning for intervention

Planning comes across in chapter 1 as the most important activity for a country which is preparing to engage in transitional diplomacy. It is argued that it includes developing strategies and tactics for initial intervention, planning to implement programmes successfully, for failure and when to exit. It will therefore take into account both political climate and influential local conditions which will have impact on the diplomatic efforts.

The projects which South Africa undertook in the DRC between 2004 and 2009 ranged from short term outcome based projects such as the renovation of the airports and the census of the five year Kinshasa province, to undefined timeframes for SSR projects in
particular. The finding is that the projects for the reform of the police service, training of civil servants and diplomats and the establishment of the immigration systems were very successful in achieving the objective and in meeting the set deadlines. From studying these projects, the lesson is that the sustainability of the project in the long-term should be well thought through during planning and in developing an exit strategy. These projects were structured in such a way that the DRC government took ownership, and the DRC took pride in them, from the beginning. They therefore remained intact even when new Ministers took even when constant reshuffling of cabinet ministers occurred.

Other projects however were not so successful. Better planning might have made a difference. For instance, the research shows that most officials who were appointed to implement the projects in the DRC 'stumbled upon the DRC conditions'. They did not have full information about the DRC’s history, its dynamics and also did not have a mental picture of what they were going to be involved with. While it can be argued that officials had full access to such information when they needed it, such communication should be structured. Full country conflict profiles which includes information about all interest groups, risks and opportunities, in addition to a general and short country profile, and ongoing trends and lessons learnt from other countries undergoing similar process, should be made available to all those involved in the projects.

5.9. Understanding the culture of the hosting country

Some weaknesses in the implementation of projects were beyond South Africa’s control and the following observations were made by the respondents:

- For instance, delays in implementing projects are not only caused by bureaucracy on the DRC side but the respondents learnt that when the President does not trust some of the opposition party ministers he reshuffled the cabinet and that caused setbacks to the implementation plans and sometimes even reversed achievements already attained.
Because of lack of infrastructure, it is impossible to travel in the DRC when it is raining. During the BNC meeting held in Kinshasa in 2008, DRC could not pitch to finalise the experts’ report despite the fact that 150 of their South African counterparts and senior managers were idling waiting for them. The time lost which could have been used in performing the regular duties in Pretoria is enormous and compounds the frustration felt by those waiting.

When it comes to drafting of agreements however, Congolese are very strict about the structure and meaning of each sentence. On the other hand the South Africans officials would be more concerned in reaching agreements on the principles and then give over to the lawyers to draft the full document. The Congolese’ apprehension can be attributed to their suspicions of external actors and also lack of legal services institution.

With respect to protocol, the Congolese attach a lot of importance to a person’s rank which is usually combined with age, while South Africans consider rank and expertise when assigning tasks. Respondent 2 observed that younger South African officials and women therefore encountered a lot of prejudice and had to work harder to prove themselves (SAPS interview).

5.10. Foreign Policy – pragmatism vs. idealism

South Africa’s reluctance to put forward conditions when assisting the DRC seems to have caused confusion in an environment and process which depends for its success on the recognition and honouring of conditions. Considering that reciprocity in international relations and diplomacy is a concept which is well defined in the Vienna Convention, the Congolese might have expected South Africa to state its expectation in return for its investment. Hence the lack of such articulation led to suspicion. It is ironic that while it is said that 90% of those who benefit from DRC’s natural resources do so through some clandestine deals, South Africa could not secure such space through
ethical means. DRC does seem to be a jungle which needs dynamic diplomats as Responded 6 (2009) exclaimed in chapter 4.

While diplomats observed the difficulty which SA experienced in getting access to the DRC markets, what frustrates them more was the lack of diplomatic instrument which would have allowed them to retaliate when unfavourable treatment was unleashed on South African businesses. The diplomats felt that South Africa’s foreign policy was based on its historical guilt and would therefore not assist to shape the future. Diplomats felt that the Congolese would not honour terms of agreements which had been agreed to and will stall processes for finalising a key milestone or place barriers in completing business partnership even if a verbal agreement had been reached, as long as bribes were not paid. But South Africa will just continue supporting the DRC blindly without even threatening to withdraw.

5.11. Transitional diplomacy and its merits

Transitional diplomacy forms part of the continuum of diplomacy, ranging from the traditional to the modern. As an instrument of foreign policy, it is intrusive on other country’s sovereignty, directly involved in physical reconstruction of the country and more constrained as its shaped by the standards and dynamics of the peace negotiations and the warring parties. Its success depends on the willingness of those who have been affected, to be bound by the agreement and support efforts for establishing peace and security.

It is evident that once a peace agreement is reached, transitional diplomacy continues for quite a while to ensure that peace is entrenched and the appropriate institutions are in place and effective. In the House of Commons Report (2006), it is argued that conditions usually stabilise after four years of ceasing hostilities and it is only then that development projects would be implemented without interruption. The Report (2006) further points out that 50% of recovering states usually revert back to conflict after 10
years. Success therefore should be defined differently from achieving immediately what a country sought out to.

The pluralistic nature of diplomacy which is inclusive and creates space for NGOs, experts and ordinary government officials to get involved in the PCRD process allows collective effort expertise, innovation and ideas mobilised towards a common purpose. Because the implementers are usually not diplomats, it is innovative to use diplomacy for this process although technical teams which are appointed by governments are exposed to conditions which diplomats are protected from because of their privileges. It is still diplomats however who monitor and will renegotiate the terms of engagement or peace agreement when necessary or alert political authorities where applicable. Inevitably the duties involved in implementing transitional diplomacy are such that the role of diplomats has significantly changed.

South Africa has learnt through each case which has been evaluated in this study and should therefore draw lessons for future PCRD projects in other countries. What is plausible therefore are the efforts which are being made to capture such cases. One lesson that is evident is that transitional diplomacy is not about ‘eating for your country through endless glamorous cocktails’ but it is hard work under difficult conditions and it needs patience, clarity of purpose, capacity and capability to implement it. The lack of infrastructure, connectivity between provinces, lack of confidence in the state system by the Congolese themselves and proper functioning of the Congolese society has come out sharply from this study. Transitional diplomatic efforts will not therefore succeed until the Congolese including their leaders, commit to peace and security instead of conflict.

While at political level it might be clear that the commitment and investment in a PCRD process should be long-term, the constituency at home might not share the vision particularly during the time of recession when the levels of unemployment have increased. There should be a balance then between domestic imperatives and foreign policy objectives, in the way resources are allocated.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis and evaluation in the previous chapters, the following are recommended:

B1 The role of the Bi-National Commission

The BNC between South Africa and the DRC is at the presidential level and it signifies the importance of the relations between the two countries. When the DRC changed its attitude therefore and let South Africa down in many fronts, the latter should consider reducing the relations to either the Deputy President or Minister Level. Alternatively, a clear message should be sent to the Congolese about what South Africa's expectations are. An analysis of the relations between South Africa and the DRC was conducted when the administration of President Zuma took over and the report should therefore inform which strategies are suitable to take the relations forward.

Technical teams expressed frustration with the pomp and ceremonial diplomatic processes (i.e. the BNC) which do not take into account the real constraints on the ground. They felt that their voices were not being heard. It is recommended that managers including the Ambassador and his assistants should visit places where projects are implemented regularly in order to articulate well, during the BNC meetings, what the implementers communicate through reports.

B2 Serving of national interests

South Africa's economic interests in the DRC cannot be wished away because of fear of being labelled an imperialist or treated with suspicion by some Congolese and other observers. Financial support for intervention in the PCRD processes should be conditioned on the para-statals such as DBSA, IDC and ACSA being appointed to be the implementers. A strong relationship between diplomats and the relevant DRC ministry is critical to ensure that South African businesses are aware of existing
opportunities. While the private sector has its own standards on how to deal with corruption when seeking investment opportunities, an agreement (between South African and DRC governments) which protects South African's investments in the DRC, should be signed before any investment takes place.

Corruption is rife in the DRC and the powerful political parties have brought their war economies and exploitative measures into government at all levels. This is a reality which South Africa has to face and address. Experienced diplomats who served before 1994 have indicated that the payment of gifts to gate keepers was catered for in the embassy's budget. While the democratic South Africa base its foreign policy on strong principles manifested in its positions in international relations, pragmatism where essential, should be considered. With regard to attempting to end the war economy, penalties for illegal businesses should be improved by the international players. The international community engaged in the DRC, should work together to ensure that the UN reaches an agreement on a definition in order to differentiate between legal vs. illegal means of extraction, similar to the Kimberly Process in order to apply sanctions on the illegal extraction of DRC’s mineral resources.

South Africa’s national interests are broader than economic ones and where projects have facilitated democratisation, peace, stability and processes which restore human dignity and security, its interests have been served. These should therefore be appreciated in each project’s goals and achievements which are outlined in chapters 4 and 5 of this study.

B3 The importance of South Africa's soft power

The limitations of diplomacy to influence warring parties to adopt democratic and honest values should be acknowledged. Fundamentally, South Africa can only succeed in contributing towards sustainable peace and stability in the DRC, when the Congolese own the process and therefore undertake on their own to monitor and protect its planned objectives and outcomes. The technical teams, led by the resident
Ambassador, should form a formal structure with the Congolese counterparts, modelled on the South African cluster system, to ensure that all relevant stakeholders participate in the PCRD projects. Minutes and reports from such structures should be used as controls by which funds can be released (or not) before each project step can be undertaken.

History has afforded South Africa the ability and power which enables it to compete and also influence established as well as fragile states globally. It therefore needs to preserve it by ensuring that experts are drawn from all sectors to form a team which can mediate in all conflicts across the globe. The long-term vision by South Africa and its consistency and patience in supporting the DRC should not be lost although strategies will need constant review.

B4 Support and establishment of a mechanism for learning and strategic review

To support its foreign policy ambitions South Africa needs to develop its capacity to achieve its policy goals and engage in PCRD processes successfully despite its limited resources and experience in transitional diplomacy. The following are therefore urgent:

- Establishment of machinery which enjoys political support and is well structured to deal with conflict prevention and management to support South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. Structurally, the proposed South African Development and Cooperation Agency (SADPA) will enhance coordination, support, oversight and management of the PCRD activities. There is extensive international experience to learn from.

It is plausible to consider restructuring the ARF and incorporate it into such an agency. The agency’s role should include central procurement of all services which are needed by the affected government departments in implementing a PCRD project following its approval. An integrated project management approach, aligning projects to the strategic visions and foreign policy goals,
monitoring the implementation of agreement and establishing a mechanism for developing appropriate models should be some of the functions of the proposed agency. Such an approach will allow DIRCO to provide leadership and guidance to the whole of government and effectively coordinate all foreign policy activities. It will also strengthen South Africa's cooperation with others and its role as a development partner.

- To optimize existing resources, the President and parliament need to approve a strategy for intervention in conflict areas which will also define criteria identifying anchor states and priority countries and areas for intervention.

- The National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions (NCOPM) should have enough capacity which will involve officials from Defense, SASS, Presidency and DIRCO in supporting special envoys and SADPA in monitoring and evaluating the implementation of PCRD projects; and manage peace and security in Africa. It should therefore be an inter-departmental PCRD Unit. Based on thorough analysis, it should, through DIRCO and the International Cooperation & Security Cluster, be responsible for making recommendations to parliament, on which countries should be prioritised.

- Special envoys should be trained in post/conflict, peace and security management so that they can form part of the PCRD teams. They should also cover both specific countries and the regions they are in. While the South African President and most ANC Ministers have extensive experience in mediation and conflict resolution between warring parties, experts in this field exist in other sectors as well such as in the private sector and academia. Collaboration should be strengthened so that the improved capacity can be used to enhance South Africa's soft power.

- Research units from all departments involved in the PCRD activities should work together to collect information, analyze and report on progress and threats to
PCRD projects and peace in the specific areas and the Continent (and globally) in general. Using these reports, an office responsible for lessons learnt from all projects should be established within SADPA to enhance performance in PCRD projects. The UN's model of Best Practice Officers who collect lessons from all peace missions and feed them into the policy development and training system should be considered as a model.

- Embassies and diplomatic missions, under the supervision of the political desks of DIRCO, should form a strong link which feeds into the research units and the NCOPM. They should provide topical and relevant information on regular basis in line with an agreed time-table. Regular reports should be made to the International Cooperation & Security Cluster in order to enhance decision making.

B5 Leadership role of the international community

Poor coordination amongst members of the international community has led to duplication, rent-seeking and policy incoherence by the DRC state that has weakened, rather than strengthened the PCRD processes, particularly the security reform project. South Africa should take it upon itself to lead and coordinate the activities of donors in the DRC, share information including intelligence information which relates to flash points in different parts of the DRC so that they can be better prepared to intervene before conflict erupts. This will ensure that the African leadership role, in the African conflicts, is made into a reality. This role can be played by the South African Ambassador in the DRC.

B6 Establishment of advisory teams
The establishment of the Advisory team (CIAT) comprising all diplomats in the DRC, was an innovative approach and a lesson for future projects. The teams were responsible to oversee the projects and employ diplomatic tactics to push for action where there were changes needed. The Advisory team model should be adopted as a model to coordinate the international community involved in PCRD activities of a country like the DRC and can also be at national level to ensure that a structure and relevant capacity and systems are established during the implementation of the project to ensure that sustainability of the project is achieved.

B7 Development and management of trilateral agreements

The terms of the trilateral agreements which have been used shifted all the risk to South Africa while absolved the donors. Future trilateral agreements should spread the risk evenly between the three governments. They should establish joint monitoring and evaluation structures and technical teams should be involved in the implementation activities from all three countries. Notwithstanding, the scale and depth of the census project should be commended as it provided ‘life time’ lessons to the technical teams irrespective of the challenges. What is critical is that such lessons should be recorded and the acquired skills be retained as long as possible. Developing internal capacity, which can be placed in the NCOPM, should be prioritised instead of relying on consultants with specialised skills.

B8 Creation of a basket of incentives for those implementing projects in a hardship post

Categorisation of the DRC as a ‘Hardship post’ is based on a UN formula which assesses the “Cost of Living Allowance”17 and conditions which UN peace missions encounter in their work. Although technical teams receive substantial allowances when operating in hardship posts, the same cannot be said about the diplomatic immunities and privileges and they usually travel alone or in pairs with the locals. They are

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17 “The purpose of the Cost of Living Allowance is to compensate a designated employee stationed abroad to maintain a standard of living commensurate with the representational standard determined by the RSA government” DIRCO HR Circular
therefore exposed to local conditions and prejudice in remote provinces which regular diplomats do not usually visit. A new formula which directly assesses and provides protection for those building capacity of collapsed states should be developed.

B9 Strategic utilisation of diplomats to support transitional diplomacy

South Africa has the ability to collect information and improve its understanding of DRC conditions through DIRCO, Intelligent officials at the South African embassy and through institutions such as SAMDI. Improved strategy on how to coordinate these activities and capture information as it is communicated, is highly critical otherwise it creates confused messages to the Congolese by the various South African departments; and also weakens South Africa’s implementation strategies. Regular and confidential meetings between the Ambassador and the mentioned officials should be held on weekly basis and should inform decision making.

Counsellors employed at the mission should be given the responsibility of monitoring all South African capacity building projects in the DRC, particularly where the sectoral project manager is not deployed in the DRC. Where s/he does, they should work together as a team. The DIRCO official would feed information to the Ambassador and to SADPA in Pretoria while the sectoral expert will report to his/her immediate supervisor and the director responsible in head office. This will enhance the monitoring of projects throughout the system but will also project one message from a united South Africa team to the Congolese.

B10 Training of diplomats

For transitional diplomacy to succeed, Ambassadors and their officials should be trained accordingly e.g. for hardship posts, programme/project management, management of large and diverse teams and with a lot of emphasis on language acquisition. Intelligence services should be utilised more efficiently by the embassy in order to enhance analysis
made by diplomats as the conditions change and processes of reconstruction and development take place in a post-conflict environment.

Regarding the DRC in particular, the Congolese Ambassador and his officials accredited in South Africa should be utilised to make presentations on their culture to SA’s PCRD teams before they are posted to the DRC. This will include understanding the history and the overall profile of the DRC.

**B11 Orientation for technical teams**

There is a need for a comprehensive programme to provide orientation for technical teams and experts who implement project and foreign policy in a post-conflict environment. The programme should include information collected about the history and feasibility of the project before implementation; induction about the dynamics of the country, protocol, role of the embassy, foreign policy objectives and its implementation by all South Africans in a particular country. A mechanism for ensuring that they receive support when required, for reporting to head office and also for interacting with other South African teams within the embassy in order to share lessons and resources should be made available from the onset. It is important that the embassy takes over the role of the given management office which is in head office in South Africa in order to strengthen, rather than weaken, the coordination and management link between all South African departments (see attached Annexure A).

**B12 Decentralisation**

The decentralisation project is slower than others perhaps due to the complex relations and forms of governance at local level. Distribution of power and ethnicity are at the heart of the DRC conflict and the model adopted to decentralise such power will either lift it out of abyss or send it back to strife. It should therefore remain an important matter to address as part of the PCRD activities.
B13 Integrated security sector reform

Security sector reform has had some successes and various efforts have been made to bring stability to the Great Lakes region. It is clear from this study however that the transformation of the security sector was not addressed in an integrated fashion. While the police reform was successful in terms of achieving what was set out to be achieved, the DDR project did get some modest achievements but the justice system seemed to be ad hoc and not prioritised. Unless the justice system functions effectively to address those who are aggrieved as well as those who are greedy, human security will remain academic including the good policies which seek to deal with corruption. South Africa should offer its interventions in a comprehensive package from the onset in order to ensure that the receiving country does not choose what it prefers. Presently the commitment to justice reform should be intensified.

B14 Employment of former rebel groups

Unless job creation and alternative employment is addressed seriously to respond to the abundance of dis-armed and demobilised soldiers, the DDR programmes will never succeed. Expanded infrastructural development projects should be introduced as effective mechanisms for creating employment in the short term. Long term employment will of course depend on the economic development strategies which are currently being implemented. These are the issues which need to be discussed at the initial stage when the peace agreement is still being drafted.

B15 Providing medical care for sickly soldiers

Reconstruction of collapsed state is a long-term and arduous process. The achievement of short term milestones, such as the provision of medical treatment for government soldiers, should therefore be celebrated and the public from both the DRC and South Africa should be informed. The potential of the DRC to provide energy security to South
Africa must be popularised to garner more support, for South Africa’s efforts in the DRC, from the South African population.

B16 Institutional development and Governance

The projects which are analysed in this study provide very good lessons but it quite early to determine whether they will be sustainable. It will be interesting to follow up these projects after five years to establish whether there are peculiar conditions which determine a life span of activities particularly those related to building of institutions and their policies.

B17 Public Diplomacy

The South African public generally does not understand fully what the foreign policy objectives are and how these impact on their individual lives. The same applies to the private sector, members of the media and the NGOs which are involved in the DRC. DIRCO should, then, popularise its foreign policy and also clearly communicate its objectives and strategies for intervening in the DRC. This should clarify the kind of support the embassy will provide to all South Africans operating in the DRC, and also offer the profile and development plans of the DRC irrespective of whether they already have an understanding of the latter because nuances which diplomats always bring to such a discussion are only captured from diplomatic practice engagements which are not accessible to others.

B18 Involvement of civil society in the DRC PCRD

Because of the divide between ordinary Congolese and government elite, an intermediary is needed to share experience and build the capacity of the civil society to engage the state meaningfully. South African government should consciously mobilize and support its various NGOs as partners, to get involved in the DRC in order to augment its PCRD efforts. Further research is needed to understand how the South
African and Congolese NGOs view the PCRD process and also reasons for not interacting fully up to date.

CONCLUSION

Transitional diplomacy is the development within diplomacy which appreciates the connectivity of countries and regions and the resultant shared negative impact and responsibility when there is conflict. It embraces the notion of the duty and responsibility to protect citizens in war areas; and the AU's principle of “non-indifference” to provide human security. In application however, it is dynamic and is influenced by the conditions of the country and region in which it is implemented. South Africa has embraced transitional diplomacy based on its own experience of conflict resolution through negotiations. However, it did not have sufficient capacity or experience to implement capacity building projects in other countries.

The concept and application of transitional diplomacy is new and lessons from various case studies have only emerged recently. South Africa therefore did not have any models to learn from when it started in the DRC. While it has performed remarkably well, under difficult circumstances, a case has to be made for an effort to improve its capacity and capabilities for successful interventions. The tension between domestic policy priorities and transitional diplomacy cannot be ignored hence it is important to clarify at the initial stages what South Africa's interests are in each case in order to benefit from short term opportunities which can appeal to the domestic needs. It is important to note however that South Africa’s foreign policy vision is to achieve a ‘better life for all’. It therefore expresses the fact that as long as the world is not at peace South Africans cannot continue enjoying a stable, democratic and peaceful life either. Such meanings should be better communicated to the ordinary South Africans as some of the benefits are indirect and others can only be realised in the long-term.

Despite all the challenges and weaknesses of South Africa’s transitional diplomacy in the DRC, unwavering commitment to democratic peace and development, of such a
large scale demonstrates its continued role as a responsible global citizen and the visionary nature of the South Africa’s leadership. When sustainable peace is achieved in the DRC, it will have positive impact firstly in the Great Lakes region, secondly on the SADC region and thirdly on the African continent as a whole. Economically, South Africa will benefit by accessing much needed energy and other markets in the DRC. A positive impact in the Continent will not only serve to advance South Africa’s foreign policy priorities but will automatically positively benefit South Africa in all respects. Individually, the DRC has got untapped potential for making a huge global impact economically which will then increase its political influence within the international community.

While politically South Africa is mature and can stand on its own, administratively it reflects characteristics of a young government. Because of the enormity of the role it has taken for itself, it needs structured mechanisms which will facilitate rapid learning. While politicians negotiate for a peaceful Africa, junior officials draft agreements, there is a layer of experts, researchers and strategists who are needed to reflect on how the agreements would be implemented. Such reflection should also involve risk analysis so that a set of alternative plans could be developed and kept in reserve in case they are needed.

There is no doubt that South Africa has played a pivotal role in assisting the DRC to end war and work towards peace and development. Through this, South Africa has been able to position itself as a leader and key player in international affairs, particularly in peace-building. One could even argue that at the time when it facilitated the negotiations between warring parties and when it spent lots of resources to ensure that democratic elections took place in 2006, South Africa seemed to be on a crusade which was blind to the enormity of the DRC problems and the history of its wars in the region and the extent to which the state had collapsed. South Africa however managed to positively influence the strategies taken by the DRC transitional government in particular. For instance, when the fight broke out again between Jean Pierre Bemba’s militias (leader of the opposition MLC) and President Kabila’s in 2007, Bemba received
protection from the South African embassy while diplomatic negotiations ensued where South Africa persuaded Kabila to cease fire and also allow the release of Bemba unharmed, even when he fled from the DRC.

In conclusion, this study has shown that the foreign policy environment is populated by a range of actors, issues and interests. As Webber & Smith (2002: 31) argue, one of the key tests of an effective foreign policy is whether the diplomats are able to appreciate the shifting balance of forces in order to capitalize on them. The change in the political administration in South Africa in 2008 provided opportunities to evaluate the projects which were already underway. Given the nature of transitional diplomacy and the conditions which South Africans had to deal with in the DRC, the process therefore involved continuous persuasion, negotiations and communication between all actors. Considering that the DRC is a country of contradictions - hope and despair; wealth and abject poverty; big but ineffective state, the success of South Africa’s policy cannot be based on the results which have been achieved in the past few years and on what influence South Africa still has on DRC’s behaviour and ambitions. As much as some respondents felt that some space had been lost, South Africa still enjoys sufficient respect from the DRC President to the extent that he still uses the senior level Advisory team for the SSR process. Considering South Africa’s national interests a stable and developing DRC will serve these interests in the long-term, including the values of respect for human dignity, democracy and the importance of the rule of law.

Caution should be applied however when measuring the successes of foreign policy as the positive achievement of agreed objectives. Webber & Smith (2002: 102) argue that in many instances diplomatic practice can resemble a continuous act of negotiation on several fronts with no final resolution of the central issues. Process therefore is everything and balancing the commitments and capabilities is an unending story rather than a formula with a single solution. What the international community has learnt in the DRC is that it can spend as many resources as possible but it can never be able to make the DRC leadership do what it wants. The competing interests between the international community members are also part of the contradictions which inform
transitional diplomacy. What can be concluded from this study is that transitional diplomacy is indeed a complex process and not an event. South Africa has stayed the course in the DRC, has sometimes paid a hefty price for its weaknesses which were based on ignorance and lack of experience but its reputation as the peace maker in the DRC and the bridge-maker between developed and collapsed states is still intact.
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January 26, 2004 Country Department 9 Africa Region


PRESENTATIONS


List of Interviewees:

Respondent 1 (DPSA official)
23 October 2008, Kinshasa

Respondent 2 (SAPS official)
24 October 2008, Kinshasa and 16 October 2009 Pretoria

Respondent 3 (SANDF official)
24 October 2008 and 20 August 2009, Kinshasa
Respondent 4 (SAMDI official)
20 October 2008 Kinshasa, 24 October 2009 Pretoria

Respondent 5 (DIRCO official)
June - July 2008, August, October 2009 Pretoria

Respondent 6 (Intelligence Official)
30 October 2008, 15 October 2009
ADDENDUM A

SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE DRC RESEARCH PROJECT

Name of the government Department……………………………………………………..

Type of the Agreement with the DRC……………………………………………………

Objective of the programme:………………………………………………………………

How much did SA contribute financially:…………………………………… Other donors?……………………………………

Is there a non-monetary contribution? Yes ( ) No ( )

If yes, elaborate………………………………………………………………………..

When did it start?......................................................................................

Explain the nature and the process for implementing the programme:………………

Any achievements so far?

What have been the highlights of the programme?........................................

What have been the challenges?.................................................................

What has failed............................................................................................

Are there other countries involved in the same project/field/sector?...................

Is their objective the same as yours?.............................................................

What kind of lessons can be learnt from this project?....................................

Can the project be used as a model in the future?...........................................

What will be the criteria for choosing this model? (easy to apply)....................

Has coordination been sufficient on the South African side?...........................

Has coordination been sufficient on the DRC side?........................................

Any other comments.....................................................................................
ADDENDUM B

TEMPLATE FOR PCRD CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECTS – RECOMMENDATION FOR POLICY MAKERS AND IMPLEMENTORS

FOR HEAD OFFICE

Country (and regional) Conflict Profile
Feasibility study
Situational analysis report of the targeted country
Approval of the budget, strategy and the team
South Africa’s understanding of PCRD and its planned role
Lessons from other countries

All these documents should be made available to the implementing team

FOR IMPLEMENTORS

Name of the project: ………………… Sector: …………………

List name of team members: ……………

Duration of the project:

Date of starting the project: Envisaged end date:

How much is the budget: ……………………………

Describe the project: ……………………………

What is the expected outcome: (in qualitative terms): ……………………………

What is the expected outcome (in quantitative terms, if applicable): …………………

Have various milestones been defined? Name them? ……………………………

Which SA departments are you going to work with on the project, if any?

What is SA’s mandate and interest in the project? ……………………………

Which DRC departments are you going to work with:
Which is the primary one?
Which is key department which is the end-user?
Which are other stakeholders within government?
Which are non-government stakeholders?
Do you have a strategy for implementation?
Strategy for seeking buy-in?
Strategy for ensuring sustainability?

Are you going to involve (and how) all stakeholders in the project: Government?
Non-government?

How many other donors are involved in the same project or sector? Name them?
How are you going to link with them?
How are you going to facilitate more funding for the project, if necessary?

How are you going to understand how the SA embassy functions?
How are you going to make sure that you share resources and lessons with other South Africans in the mission?
Do you need any education from the embassy (country profile, history of the project or the sector, induction)

FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND TEAM
Do you have background documents of the project?
Is the mission ready to receive the team?
What does the induction programme entail? E.g. explanation of how the mission functions, SA’s mandate, how the mission will support the teams, expectations from both sides (Do and Don’ts in the mission and in the particular country) and reporting mechanisms
Who will be the PCRD Programme Manager in the mission?
How is the Ambassador going to report to the various departments in Head Office?

REPORTING TEMPLATE
Name of project
Starting date

Duration of reporting: (e.g. from 2nd August to 2nd October 2009)

Describe progress:
Challenges:
Define needed support:
Suggested solution:
Describe relationship between you and your counterpart?
Any threats to reaching outcome or sustainability once project completed?
Have you been engaging with other project managers from SA in mission? Any benefits or negative impact?

Is Head Office or mission responsive to your needs? HO ( ) Mission ( )
Signed by project manager date:
Signed by Ambassador date: