

## *Chapter VII*

### *Resistance resources and coping during the guerrilla warfare phase*

*“Although the world is full of suffering, it is full  
also of the overcoming of it ...”*

*Helen Keller, 1904.<sup>1</sup>*

#### **1. Introduction**

The previous chapter deals with the issue of stressors as agents causing stress and in Chapter II reference is made to Antonovsky's belief that although stress is omnipresent and part of our everyday lives, people generally possess resistance resources which assist them to cope with the wide diversity of stressors.<sup>2</sup> This chapter deals with these resources that are the medium by which people cope with the stress and are able to achieve a feeling of “wellness”.

During the guerrilla war stressors were seldom experienced singly, nor were they always of the same dramatic dimensions. At times they would last for no more than a fleeting moment or alternatively they could be prolonged for days or even weeks. Jan Celliers described how he experienced the retreat of burghers and civilians on 29 January 1901 in the vicinity of the Wilge River in the southeastern Transvaal. He vividly portrayed the scene of shells exploding in the mud and of ice cold rain water running down his spine while reluctant horses turned their backs to the wind. He told of fleeing families abandoning their furniture, blankets and chests in a quest to speed up their retreat; of a swollen spruit to be crossed and the nerve-shattering bleating and bellowing of the animals that were being driven away from their homes. “Niets kan zoo sarren en tergen als een oopenhooping van kleine tegenspoeden ...” recounted Celliers.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand he went on to say that the awareness of having successfully withstood the tribulation, agony

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<sup>1</sup> D.J.W. Strümpfer, “The origins of health and strength: from ‘salutogenesis’ to ‘fortigenesis’”, *South African Journal of Psychology* 25 (2), 1995, p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> D.J.W. Strümpfer, “Salutogenesis a new paradigm”, *S.A. Journal of Psychology* 20 (4), 1990, p. 267.

<sup>3</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 30.1.1901, pp. 200-201. [Translated: “Nothing is as exasperating and wearying than the culmination of small adversities.”]

and danger of the incident, left him with a sweet after-taste, making one ashamed of one's impatience and faintheartedness.<sup>4</sup> What he was really saying was that the mere fact that they had been able to manage, or in other words had possessed the necessary resources to cope with the crisis, gave them a feeling of accomplishment. It had created an inner feeling of "wellness".

The model, figure II-3, demonstrates that the individual's ability to cope with stressors depends largely on whether resistance resources are readily available to him. The terms *cope* and *resistance resources* will be examined briefly in order to clarify their use.

The Merriam Webster dictionary defines the word *cope* as meaning to deal with and to attempt to overcome problems or difficulties.<sup>5</sup> Words and expressions with similar meanings which may be used are manage, survive, endure, deal with and manipulate. The opposite or the failure to cope, would be *to yield* to the stress. The term to yield can thus commonly be regarded as *a person's inability to cope*. Expressions with similar meaning, which may be used are relinquish, capitulate, renounce, abandon or surrender. These words will refer to an individual's failure to cope. During the Anglo-Boer War the term "hands-up" was used in a figurative sense, denoting that the person had abandoned the struggle. In Afrikaans the word was promptly turned into *hendsop*. Such a person would be called a "hands-upper" or in Afrikaans a *hendsopper*, which became a derogative expression reflecting on the individual's courage.

According to Sheridan and Radmacher coping can be either problem focussed or emotion-focussed depending on the type of stressor involved. If the manner of coping is problem focussed it signifies gathering information of the problem, considering the available resources and planning the use of the resources. If, on the other hand, coping is emotion focussed the style of the individual involved may vary. A common coping strategy is simply by avoidance or denial of the stressor. Other emotion focussed strategies include exercise, humour, work and hobbies. It is usually adopted when the stressor cannot be changed or eliminated.<sup>6</sup> Both these coping tactics, problem focussed or emotion focussed, will be encountered in this chapter.

The term *resistance resources* also requires some explanation. According to the Merriam Webster dictionary a resource can be a source of supply or of support; it can be a source of

<sup>4</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 30.1.1901, p. 202.

<sup>5</sup> Encyclopaedia Britannica 2002, *Merriam Webster dictionary*, keyword: Cope.

<sup>6</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology challenging the biomedical model*, pp. 160-161.

wealth; it can be an element to which one has recourse to in difficulty and it can be the ability to meet or deal with a situation. The term resource, in its literal sense, means “to raise again” and is derived from the word “resurrection”.<sup>7</sup> Stress resistance resources – also called general resistance resources – refer to those resources which the individual may call upon to help him to deal with the stress he experiences. They are sources from which he can draw, just as water is drawn from a well, when it becomes needed. In this study the term general resistance resources (GRRs) will generally be used.

Sheridan and Radmacher classify resistance resources in a number of categories: Firstly, there are the *material resources* which would include items such as money, food, clothing and shelter. For the burghers in the guerrilla phase of the war it would also have included objects such as arms and ammunition, horses and a variety of everyday articles which would have made their life easier for them. Secondly there are the *physical resources*, which include the positive physical attributes of an individual such as his strength, his health or attractiveness. From the perspective of burghers in the veld, this would have involved qualities such as their physical endurance and the ability to ride and shoot. *Intrapersonal resources* is the next category and refer to the inner strength that helps an individual to withstand life’s daily onslaughts. These include characteristics such as his self acceptance, ego-integrity and ego-identity, giving the individual a stable yet dynamic and flexible sense of the self. These are partly inborn characteristics, but they mostly develop under specific circumstances. This issue is discussed in chapter II under the heading of fortigenesis. Sheridan and Radmacher identify *educational resources* as the fourth category. Knowledge is regarded as a particularly valuable resource, as it is often a tool whereby material resources may be obtained. Possessing a wide-ranging knowledge was of great importance during the guerrilla war. Finally there are *cultural resources* which include traditions, customs and rituals. These resources frequently help the individual to a better comprehension of the implication of the events taking place. It helps to understand that there are certain details that can be relied upon not to change despite the circumstances. At the time of the Anglo-Boer War religion, and spiritual matters, the importance of the republican flag, the observance of 16 December as Dingaan’s Day were all cultural resources which provided important emotional support.

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Encyclopaedia Britannica 2002, *Merriam Webster dictionary*, keyword: Resource.

This classification of resistance resources are not necessarily the only correct one, but it does supply a convenient base from which to work. It is however always vital to realise that certain resources may give rise to others. For example, inborn physical strength would probably induce greater self confidence within the individual. This classification should therefore be regarded as flexible and subject to change.

It should further be appreciated that although during the Anglo-Boer War the inability to cope often induced a burgher to yielding, this was by no means the only reason why Boers relinquished the struggle. Grundlingh mentions several additional factors such as material gain and self-indulgence as reasons why some Boers yielded.<sup>8</sup> Lack of loyalty towards the Boer republics could likewise have been a factor that influenced burghers to capitulate.

## ***2. Material issues***

Whereas all humans have a constant need for the basic material resources which are mentioned above, the burghers who were in the veld during the guerrilla phase of the war were often deprived of these details. They then had to devise other means of overcoming the deficiencies in order to survive. There was no shortage of ingenuity, and there are records of remarkable solutions to some problems.

Even though money is the first material resource mentioned by Sheridan and Radmacher, the lack of money was by no means crucial for the survival of the Boers in the veld. They were not paid soldiers, and furthermore few of them possessed substantial funds of their own to rely on. Roland Schikkerling claimed that he had less than 10 shillings on hand when the guerrilla phase of the war started.<sup>9</sup> But this did not seem to upset him. Because many of the towns were either under British control, as for example larger towns such as Kroonstad and Middelburg, or others had been destroyed, such as Heilbron, Schweizer Reneke and Dullstoom, few businesses remained open. This meant that whatever little money the Boers possessed, essential goods were difficult to come by. Money was nevertheless necessary for buying goods from individual farmers or from black people. As for food and clothes from the farms, by the middle of 1901 the scorched

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<sup>8</sup> A.M. Grundlingh, *Die "hendsoppers" en "joiners": Die rasional en verskynsel van verraad*, p. 170.

<sup>9</sup> R.W. Schikkerling, *Commando courageous (A Boer's diary)*, 16.9.1900, p. 66.

earth strategy had progressed to such a stage that only a handful of isolated homesteads were still standing. After all, this was of course one of the major objectives of the scorched earth policy – to deny the Boers of the support of the rural communities. Therefore to have money may have been convenient but it was definitely not always crucial.

Before the destruction of farms had become widespread and when money was still important, Schikkerling related the episode of a farmer near Bothasberg who “... tried to sell apricots at a very high price, whereat we were mighty indignant and preferred to steal.”<sup>10</sup> This remark reveals that although it was war, where a commodity was still available, the desire to make some money was frequently stronger than patriotism. Naudé disparagingly called these people “... zakpatriotten, die vaderlandsliefde bezaten zolang zij achter de Kommandos konden schuilen ...”.<sup>11</sup> The Boers simply had to be resourceful. Commandeering, looting or even blatant stealing was often the answer and it was even considered permissible due to the extenuating circumstances.

The republic’s inability to sustain the war effort is underscored in De la Rey’s address to his burghers after the battle at Moedwil on 30 September 1901: “... Burghers, our Government has nothing more to give us, our Commissariat has long been exhausted and destroyed. For over a year the commandos have supported themselves. Our only supplier of weapons, munitions and clothing is the enemy.”<sup>12</sup>

This comment with reference to the government’s lack of funds possibly explains why Schikkerling was persuaded to write on 5 July 1901 of the “... worthless receipts and blind blue backs ...”<sup>13</sup> when he turned down the position of Field Cornet.<sup>14</sup> The gold and the money that J.C. Smuts had removed from Pretoria, before the general withdrawal from the ZAR capital was used to promote the republican cause elsewhere.<sup>15</sup> However, towards the end of January 1902 when the Boers in the northeastern Transvaal sensed reluctance among non-combatants and black

<sup>10</sup> R.W. Schikkerling, *Commando courageous*, 17.12.1900, p. 111.

<sup>11</sup> J.F. Naudé, *Vechten en vluchten van Beyers en Kemp “bôkan” De Wet*, p. 183. [Translated: “... pocket patriots, who had love for their fatherland as long as they could hide behind the Commandos.”]

<sup>12</sup> M. Weber, *Eighteen months under General De la Rey*, p. 133.

<sup>13</sup> E. Levine, *The coinage and counterfeits of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek*, p. 116.

<sup>14</sup> R.W. Schikkerling, *Commando courageous*, 5.7.1901, p. 245.

<sup>15</sup> G. Nattrass and S.B. Spies (eds.), *Jan Smuts Memoirs of the Boer War*, p. 47; E. Levine, *The coinage and counterfeits of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek*, p. 116.

people to accept government notes, the ingenuity of a few burghers led to the minting of nearly 1 000 gold pound coins using machinery recovered from the abandoned mining works.<sup>16</sup> This incident is a fine example of coping by relying on the GRRs of both knowledge and ingenuity.

As De la Rey indicated, the enemy had indeed become the main source of material goods for the Boers. This was so not only in the western Transvaal but throughout the republics. This meant attacking any supply convoys, derailing and plundering trains and even raiding supply dumps and garrisons. In retrospect this might perhaps sound like an easy solution and a profitable undertaking. However, taking provisions from the enemy demanded a high degree of risk. Boers had to jeopardise their lives so that the war effort might continue. A few stout-hearted men had to face the dangers while many others shared in the spoils. Seizing goods from the enemy is however an integral part of guerrilla warfare, even in modern guerrilla conflicts.

The proverbial Boer resourcefulness took over when his material resources fell short. They developed a very basic method of laying mines on railway tracks to derail and capture trains. Schikkerling described exactly how this was done. First they modified a rifle to ignite the dynamite, then two intrepid men carefully approached the spot where the dynamite was to be placed, walked along the rails so as not to leave any footprints.<sup>17</sup> By combining resourcefulness with courage, the Boers were thus able to cope in their quest for material goods. However, it is important to take cognisance of the fact that the pressure involved was by no means equally shared by all the burghers. As always it was a small group who had to shoulder the burden for the benefit of many. The stress involved was not experienced at the same level by all the burghers.

The pillaging of British supplies after the battle of Nooitgedacht on 13 December 1900 – despite General Christiaan Beyers' orders to the contrary – probably boosted the morale of the Boers. Celliers reported on the large-scale looting that took place and that burghers who were previously clothed in rags suddenly appeared in brand new khaki clothes. Reitz also recalled how he and his brother helped themselves to food, clothing and other luxuries.<sup>18</sup> It was a phase emphasized by securing goods from the enemy. Johan Hattingh claims that the sabotage of

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<sup>16</sup> E. Levine, *The coinage and counterfeits of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek*, pp. 69-71.

<sup>17</sup> R.W. Schikkerling, *Commando courageous*, 25.2.1901, pp. 156-157.

<sup>18</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 13.12.1900, p. 180; D. Reitz, *Commando*, p. 137.

railway lines peaked during the months of November and December 1900.<sup>19</sup> Disruptive actions such as these meant that supplies that were expressly meant for the British troops found their way to Boer commandos.

The wave of success in purloining supplies from the enemy probably influenced the ZAR government's thinking in that early stage of the guerrilla phase. While stationed on Tautesberg in the northeastern Transvaal at the end of January 1901, they apparently judged that living off enemy supplies would become the general practice in the months to follow. Bureaucratic reasoning subsequently led them to decide that this system should be regulated. Schikkerling's entry of 24 January referred to the new regulations regarding booty that had been announced: "All spoil is to be equally divided among the members of the commando who were involved in finding it, but guns, ammunition, and money, in large quantities was to go the Government."<sup>20</sup> This might have been well-intended but it proved to be naive and impossible to enforce. Then too the British soon began to implement their counter-measures. They constructed blockhouses to curb the increasing number of rail disruptions and the resulting loss of their much needed supplies.<sup>21</sup> Table VI-1 illustrates that the British indeed countered the derailing and commandeering from trains. The episode early in July 1901 also mentioned in the previous chapter when General Christiaan Beyers and his men captured the train between Naboomspruit and Pietpotgietersrust and seized more clothes and food than they could carry away, was probably one of the last train incidents of the war.<sup>22</sup>

*Uitskud* of British soldiers – in other words taking useful objects from the captive's person – became another regular source of supply for the Boers, not only for weapons and ammunition, horses and saddles, but most importantly for the much needed clothing and footwear. Pretorius described this practice in fair detail. He mentions that by and large the British soldiers accepted this stoically and that some humorous moments even ensued: "There stood the khakies, with their sunburnt noses and spotty faces, neatly lined up wearing old ragged clothes. In some cases their toes stuck out of broken velskoene and in other cases their hair stuck out of the holes in their hats ... One of the more comical Tommies grabbed his friend ... pretended that he wanted to kick

<sup>19</sup> J. Hattingh, "The British blockhouse system", in F. Pretorius (ed.), *Scorched earth*, p. 230.

<sup>20</sup> R.W. Schikkerling, *Commando courageous*, 24.1.1901, p. 138.

<sup>21</sup> J. Hattingh, "The British blockhouse system" in F. Pretorius (ed.), *Scorched earth*, pp. 227, 230, 239.

<sup>22</sup> J.F. Naudé, *Vechten en vluchten*, p. 259.

him, he said: 'Come on, get on you damn Boer!' Both sides burst out laughing...".<sup>23</sup> Perhaps, after all, there is some measure of truth in the cliché that this was a gentleman's war. From a psychological perspective the Boers came out of these encounters not merely wearing better clothes but with an increased sense of superiority, having briefly had the better of their enemy. This momentary psychological boost probably helped to counter some of the many stressors they experienced. *Uitskud* can thus be regarded as a dual coping mechanism.

The Boer's legendary inventiveness of *'n boer maak 'n plan* – literally meaning a farmer makes a plan – did not end at making use of the enemy uniform. President M.T. Steyn's suit created from a blanket, and Schikkerling's "uniform" fashioned from the outside canvas of a disused mine hosepipe with "... epaulettes on the shoulders and flaps over the pockets ..." have also been mentioned in Chapter VI.<sup>24</sup> There is evidence that clothes were made out of animal skins. Not only were the tanned skins of sheep, goats, cattle and horses used, but also those of wild animals such as antelope, ape and leopard. It was said that a well-fashioned pair of trousers made from skin was both durable and comfortable for riding but, on the other hand, it was not designed for wet weather and it also creaked whenever the user moved. Old men who were no longer fit for battle and women in the veld were often involved in the tanning and making of these skin clothes.<sup>25</sup> The co-operation between combatant and non-combatant groups in their common quest to overcome difficulties is what Sheridan and Radmacher call social support of an instrumental nature.<sup>26</sup> The fact that the Boers managed to deal with the problem of clothing in one way or another is irrefutable. Sheer tenacity, refusing to yield to the hardships of life in the veld, inborn creativeness and an intricate knowledge of their environment stood them in good stead. This aspect should be viewed as a form of learned resourcefulness as discussed in Chapter II. Nevertheless they must have appeared a rather motley and often garish spectacle compared to the uniformly khaki-clad British soldier.

Natural creativity and dexterity – the result of their frontier-life – served the burghers well in their effort to cope with the ever recurring periods of inactivity. Many articles that could no

<sup>23</sup> Quoted in F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog 1899 - 1902*, pp. 95-96.

<sup>24</sup> M.C.E. van Schoor, "President M.T. Steyn: Sy rol in die Anglo-Boereoorlog, 1899 - 1902" in *Genl. J.B.M. Hertzogedenklesing XXVIII*, p. 11; R.W. Schikkerling, *Commando courageous*, 4.3.1902, 7.3.1902, 13.3.1902, pp. 366, 368, 369.

<sup>25</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 92.

<sup>26</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology*, p. 157.



longer be obtained were made by hand in these slow times. These “laager-industries” included the manufacture of pocket knives from the steel blades taken from cart-springs, stylish pipes created from stone or wood, neat drinking cups, combs carved from horn and horsewhip handles fashioned with plaited horsehair.<sup>27</sup>

Creativity also extended to more practical spheres when the course of the war forced people to find new ways to secure what they needed. Weber related how, by the middle of 1901, when the Moot west of Pretoria was being wasted in the scorched earth campaign, a few lowly *boslansers* (bushlanders) in a bushy kloof in Damhoek in the Magaliesberg provided a number of essential services to their companions. One man operated the rudimentary *Kloof Mill*, which was well hidden and functioned surprisingly efficiently, grinding 15 to 18 bags of maize within 24 hours. This service was supplemented by a shoemaker’s workshop, which produced the well known *Damhoek velskoen*. His tannery was hidden in an unapproachable *kloof*. There was a smithy, operating with homemade bellows contrived of hide and a rifle barrel. Items such as hoof-nails, knives in leather sheaths, forks and even copper coal-tongs made from looted telegraph wire were produced. Weber added that the smith besides accepted watches for repair and added, tongue in cheek: “These bushlanders were skilful, industrious people. In the spreading of rumours I consider them unequalled. Reports from the Cape Colony, descriptions of battles, news from Europe of which no General ever dreamt ... one simply had to admire them.”<sup>28</sup> In this way these frequently scorned people fulfilled a double function in sustaining the hapless, fleeing Boers. First, by supplying them with the necessary material resources and second, by entertaining them with their incredible stories. This is another example where instrumental social support served as a resistance resource.<sup>29</sup>

The Boers frequently went to great lengths in their quest for survival. On 19 October 1901 Celliers diarised that they had dismantled their steam mill – which had been working all night – and loaded it onto a wagon to take it with them, when they fled once more from the advancing British troops.<sup>30</sup> Under the arduous circumstances, this procedure could not have been a simple task. It also establishes another important fact, namely that the burghers were not prepared to flee

<sup>27</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 129.

<sup>28</sup> M. Weber, *Eighteen months under General De la Rey*, pp. 77-79.

<sup>29</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology*, p. 157.

<sup>30</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 20.10.1901, p. 305.

and save themselves without first securing a piece of machinery vital for their continued survival. As a group, they were not ready to yield to the pressure and they still had faith in their future. The steam mill was a material resistance resource providing them with a method with which to overcome the problem of milling their grain. For the burghers on commando, as well as the civilians in hiding in the kloofs, the milling of maize or sorghum was a general problem. Several sources refer to the existence of hidden mills, and at times even small kitchen coffee mills were used for grinding the grain to be used for porridge or for the customary mealie coffee. In the destruction of Boer homes it became normal for the enemy to smash the kitchen coffee grinders in order to deprive the people of yet another instrument of survival.<sup>31</sup> Some mills did however survive, as Celliers showed in his entry for 25 August 1901. “Er zijn twee molentjes in ons laager; bij het eene moet men een shilling per uur betalen voor het malen en bij het andere moet men een paar bakjes meel afstaan. Heel een dag zijn de molentjes aan den gang.”<sup>32</sup> This remark indicates that, linked with their inborn drive for survival, there was still an element of commercial enterprise present among the Boer people. It should be remembered that the laager which Celliers wrote of, was in fact a *walaer* or wagon laager which consisted primarily of non-combatant and horseless Boers.<sup>33</sup>

Naturally food was an important resistance resource for people who were under constant pressure by the enemy, people who were deprived of their homes and farms and were hiding somewhere in the veld. Another example of such instrumental social support was described by a young Free State woman, Lizzie Geldenhuys. She joined a group of women in the vicinity of Bothaville, and they made it their task to provide food to a number of fighting Boers in the vicinity. In her memoirs she related that during December 1901 they had cooked unripe peaches with honey and served these to replace vegetables. They also dried lamb ribs to preserve the meat and used maize burnt in a black-pot for coffee. They even made soap from mutton fat, using burnt thorn wood for lye ash. Early in 1902 they remained on one farm for three weeks while they dried yellow peaches for their group of Boers, always aware that the construction of blockhouses was

<sup>31</sup> C.H. Muller, *Oorlogsherinneringe van Generaal Chris H. Muller*, p. 187; M.E.R. (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van 'n Transvaalse burger te velde*, 8.5.1901, p. 184.

<sup>32</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 27.4.1901, 21.8.1901, 27.8.1901, 30.9.1901, pp. 237, 279, 281, 296. [Translated: “There are two small mills in our laager; at one a person must pay one shilling per hour for milling and at the other, contribute a few bowls of meal. These mills are busy all day long.”]

<sup>33</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, p. 7.

continuing nearby along the Valsch River.<sup>34</sup>

The availability of salt was an ongoing problem for the Boers throughout the guerrilla phase of the war. In the previous chapter it was mentioned that in the latter months of 1901 a number of Boers travelled by ox wagon all the way from Bothaville to Brandfort in the Free State – about 160 kilometres as the crow flies – just to fetch salt.<sup>35</sup> Schikkerling described how he had obtained salt by taking soil from a site where a burnt out wagon that had been carrying salt, was lying in the veld. He astutely mixed the soil with water, then filtered the mixture, evaporated the water and eventually he was the proud owner of 10 pounds of salt. It must have been a labourious and time consuming task, but throughout his diary it is evident that Schikkerling experienced the lack of salt very keenly. On 19 October 1901 he reported that he had produced salt by creating a chemical reaction between hydrochloric acid and bicarbonate of soda that he had found in a deserted mine store in Pilgrim's Rest. His comrades did not believe that the white powder was salt, until the lack of any adverse effect on Schikkerling satisfied them that it was safe. It is clear that Schikkerling was a well read and knowledgeable young man who used his knowledge as a resistance resource to the benefit of his whole corporalship. Notwithstanding all his ingenuity, on 18 January 1902 he was obliged to end his entry for the day: "All this for a breakfast of coarse porridge, without meat or milk or salt. We have today been twenty-six days without salt."<sup>36</sup> In the same vein, Rothmann mentioned how he discovered a 10 pound tin containing sodium chloride in the melting room of a goldmine near Pilgrim's Rest. Apparently no one else had realised that this chemical was nothing but pure table salt, and Rothmann delightedly reaped the benefit for himself.<sup>37</sup> There are numerous other recorded cases where Boers suffered from the shortage of salt. They even resorted to roasting the meat over a fire, to produce a salty taste from the ashes.<sup>38</sup>

Being without salt was a common daily stressor, and to cope with the problem the GRRs of knowledge, ingenuity and physical ability were frequently brought into effect. The lack of salt was comparable to the lack of coffee or the lack of tobacco, both items which were important to the average burgher but not essential for his survival. Coffee had several substitutes, among them

<sup>34</sup> L. Geldenhuys, *Die oologsherinnering van Lizzie Geldenhuys* (Unpublished), pp. 64-76.

<sup>35</sup> L. Geldenhuys, *Die oologsherinnering van Lizzie Geldenhuys* (Unpublished), p. 65.

<sup>36</sup> R.W. Schikkerling: *Commando courageous*, 7.9.1901, 19.10.1901, 18.1.1902, pp. 299, 319, 346.

<sup>37</sup> M.E.R. (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek*, 21.9.1901, p. 223.

<sup>38</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, pp. 63-64.

mealie coffee and *witgat* coffee. The first was merely coarsely ground, roasted mealies while *witgat* coffee was made from the roots of the shepherd's tree (*Boscia albitrunca*).<sup>39</sup> Tobacco was by times replaced by pumpkin, peach or potato leaves and even by sacking dipped in tobacco extract, then dried and shredded.<sup>40</sup>

As the scorched earth strategy progressed the food situation deteriorated and the plight became a serious stressor. Many sources provide evidence of the pressure that the shortage of food placed on the Boers. General Chris Muller alluded to one method of coping with this stressor, explaining how the burghers would take turns in leaving the commandos and return to their farms to plough and plant.<sup>41</sup> Naudé described how the burghers threshed the grain they had harvested along the Elands and Marico Rivers. They would then either beat the wheat with sticks, or use horses or mules in the traditional manner. To his amazement he saw them using a threshing-machine – which had been assembled from sundry parts collected from all over. Their great concern was that not even the tiniest fraction of the grain should be lost in the threshing process.<sup>42</sup> Celliers, who also mentioned the threshing of wheat on the farm Brakfontein in the period between 17 November and 5 December 1901, referred to the pears, apricots and mulberries that they enjoyed on another farm.<sup>43</sup> Rothmann's entry of 24 October 1901 describes how to their great joy, he and his comrades had come across a patch of sweet potatoes. They immediately cooked a part of their treasure because they had run out of mealie meal three days before.<sup>44</sup> By late January 1902 Schikkerling reported that he and his friends went foraging for food. He found some prickly pears and *stamvrugte* or wild plums, while two of his comrades returned to their laager with a whole wagon loaded with fruit.<sup>45</sup>

For the knowledgeable burgher some form of relief could usually be discovered. Although the availability of grain, vegetables and fruit may only have been sporadic, meat of one kind or another was usually readily available. Taking livestock from the black communities was one way

<sup>39</sup> R.W. Schikkerling, *Commando courageous*, 4.11.1901, p. 326; M. Weber, *Eighteen months under General De la Rey*, p. 87; F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, pp. 72-73.

<sup>40</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 75.

<sup>41</sup> C.H. Muller, *Oorlogsherinneringe*, p. 186.

<sup>42</sup> J.F. Naudé, *Vechten en vluchten*, p. 306.

<sup>43</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 6.12.1901, 18.12.1901, pp. 323, 325.

<sup>44</sup> M.E.R. (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek*, 24.10.1901, p. 236.

<sup>45</sup> R.W. Schikkerling: *Commando courageous*, 26. 1. 1902, p. 347.

of solving this problem. Naudé, Celliers and Weber all mentioned the raid on the black chief Lentshwe in December 1901, where between 2 000 and 3 000 cattle were collected. Weber claimed that although this foray was not meant “... to chastise the blacks, which had become bold, but to obtain meat. In any case it is a punishment to the black man to take away his cattle.”<sup>46</sup> Although the cattle were eventually distributed among or sold to the burghers and officers,<sup>47</sup> Weber maintained that many of the smaller livestock went to the poor people who lived in the surrounding bush.<sup>48</sup>

It is thus clear that despite the pressure placed on the Boers by the British scorched earth policy, their knowledge of the environment, their inborn tenacity and their *hardiness* – the belief in the truth and what they considered right<sup>49</sup> – helped them to cope with a situation which was becoming increasingly problematic. Many of the sources that discuss the food difficulties, also referred to how the burghers longed for peace and their growing doubts about the outcome of the war. The shortage of food was clearly demoralising. But as these works were predominantly written by republicans who did not capitulate, it is impossible to determine the number of Boers who in fact did abandon the struggle due to the hardship suffered of not having enough food. Nevertheless, as the months passed the burghers found it increasingly difficult to cope with the shortage of food.

By the time that the delegates assembled at Vereeniging in May 1902, their views on the food problem varied considerably. The statements of ten of the representatives, chosen at random, are briefly recounted below. Generals C.F. Beyers and J.C.G. Kemp both referred to the fact that the food shortage was alleviated by food confiscated from black communities. One delegate from the northern Free State, Assistant Chief Commandant F.J.W.J. Hattingh, was of the opinion that although Kroonstad could last for another year, the situation in Heilbron was critical as all food supplies had by then been depleted. General T.K. Nieuwoudt from the southern Free State was more positive and claimed that although they only had 70 bags of grain and no stock left, they were living fairly well. Among the delegates from the southeastern Transvaal Commandant H.S.

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<sup>46</sup> M. Weber, *Eighteen months under General De la Rey*, p. 170.

<sup>47</sup> J.F. Naudé, *Vechten en vluchten*, p. 310; A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 16.12.1901, p. 325; M. Weber, *Eighteen months under General De la Rey*, p. 175.

<sup>48</sup> M. Weber, *Eighteen months under General De la Rey*, p. 173.

<sup>49</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology*, p. 328.

Grobler of Bethal, Mr. J. de Clerq of Middelburg and Magistrate H.J. Bosman of Wakkerstroom all declared that the situation in their areas was desperate because the enemy had destroyed most of the grain. In contrast, Mr. J.L. Grobler of Carolina was more optimistic. He claimed that, despite the blockhouses in the area, the people could survive for another seven to eight months. From the western Transvaal General S.P. du Toit of Wolmaransstad claimed that livestock was in a fair condition but that grain was scarce, while Commandant D.J. Schoeman of Lydenburg in the northeastern Transvaal complained that the area which he represented had no grain left and moreover that 800 head of their cattle had recently been stolen.<sup>50</sup>

These statements paint a sombre picture of the situation by May 1902. It is furthermore significant that by the end of the Vereeniging talks, 54 of the 60 representatives finally voted that the peace proposals be accepted. Were the initial optimistic reports given by some delegates only a matter of sheer bravado? Or did they and those who had appointed them not fully comprehend that they had come to the end of the road? When General De la Rey asked his well-known question on the evening of 16 May: “Is dit nie die bitter einde nie?”<sup>51</sup> the majority of those present probably reflected and finally realised that they had coped bravely and as long as they possibly could. While it was humanly possible to overcome the effect of many other stressors, living without food was impossible. Ultimately the lack of food was the one vital stressor to which the Boers were forced to yield.

The high rainfall during the early months of 1901 and the lack of shelter were discussed as stressors in Chapter VI. Material resources were occasionally found to help the burghers cope with the stress caused by constantly being cold and wet. On 16 March 1901 P.J. du Toit mentioned that despite the heavy rains they were comfortably housed on the Afrikander Mine. In the same vein Weber recalled that during a howling gale many of his comrades: “... sought refuge in the undamaged houses of hands-uppers, although we were expecting an attack from hour to hour.”<sup>52</sup> But undamaged buildings were not always available, and many burghers had to make the best use of whatever form of shelter they could find. It often came down to coping through sheer

<sup>50</sup> J.D. Kestell and D.E. van Velden, *Die vredesonderhandelinge tussen die regerings van die twee Suid-Afrikaanse Republieke en die verteenwoordigers van die Britse regering wat uitgeloop het op die vrede wat op 31 Mei 1902 op Vereeniging gesluit is*, pp. 60-68.

<sup>51</sup> J.D. Kestell and D.E. van Velden, *Die vredesonderhandelinge*, p. 83. [Translated: “Is this not the bitter end?”]

<sup>52</sup> J.P. Brits (ed.), *Diary of a National Scout*, 16.3.1901, p. 42; M. Weber, *Eighteen months with General De la Rey*, p. 138.

endurance, a hardship to which many burghers eventually yielded. As mentioned above the rigours of being cold and wet probably cracked the spirit of countless burghers and contributed to the large numbers who capitulated before the winter of 1901. After months of excessive rain and discomfort, the added prospect of having to endure an icy winter, wanting the necessary warm clothes and blankets, no doubt brought large numbers of Boers to that point where their resistance simply snapped – the point where the stage of exhaustion (SE) of Selye’s GAS-theory was reached. Grundlingh’s observation that many Boers preferred luxury to discomfort<sup>53</sup> indeed applied to numerous guerrillas who yielded to the stressors and simply went home.

Coping with the stressors caused by the lack of arms and ammunition usually hinged on the Boers’ boldness and their ability to make use of opportunities. Although it is generally agreed that the Lee Metfords and .303 calibre ammunition that the burghers seized from the enemy were the basic weaponry used during the guerrilla phase, it must be emphasised that these items only came into the possession of the Boers after they had faced considerable danger. If a burgher had a rifle and ammunition it probably meant that he, or a comrade, had been exposed to some degree of danger. This being so it can only be speculated upon just how many of *the fickle and the doubting*, preferred to yield to the pressure, to hands-up and rather return home. Perhaps the message that President Steyn sent to the Boer deputation in Europe in April 1901 – that the Boers were generally armed by the British – should be judged in the context of the time that it was sent. At that stage the blockhouse system and all the other implications of Kitcheners strategy had begun to unfold to counter the Boers’ mobility and their disruption of British transport. This is borne out by Pretorius who pronounced that a shortage of weapons and especially of ammunition was a major problem during the guerrilla phase of the war. It was one of the dilemmas that ultimately led to the decision to accept the conditions for peace. Unsuccessful and infrequent action against arsenals only increased the scarcity of those items which were, after all, a prerequisite for military success. It became a vicious circle. In January 1902 Ben Viljoen admitted to Botha that a lack of ammunition forced his men to flee rather than to fight.<sup>54</sup> This sense of inadequacy, viewed from a military angle, would surely have created the impression of not being in control of matters, with the consequent effect on the “wellness” of the burghers.<sup>55</sup> It is also

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<sup>53</sup> A.M. Grundlingh, *Die “hendsoppers” en “joiners”*, p. 170.

<sup>54</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 367.

<sup>55</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology*, p. 162.

significant that it was soon after making this statement, on 25 January 1902, that Viljoen was captured by the British on his way back to Pilgrim's Rest.<sup>56</sup>

Coping with the recurring stress of keeping their horses well fed and alive was not always possible. Large numbers of burghers ended the war without horses. During the peace talks at Vereeniging Botha declared that 3 296, or 30.5% of the Transvaal burghers were footsloggers.<sup>57</sup> This was a significant factor in determining the Boers' inability to continue the struggle because mobility is such a vital element of guerrilla warfare. Many burghers were not prepared to carry on without their horses and used alternative means to maintain mobility. An example of coping by using an alternative material resource to overcome the dilemma was described by Schikkerling. He used a pack mule called Vos and confessed that he became quite attached to this "dull" animal, adding that the mule possessed qualities superior to that of either of its parents. He claimed that "...in some commandos more than half of the rank and file are mounted on mules ... we come to understand their extraordinary sagacity and endurance ...".<sup>58</sup> Riding on a mule, a "...bastard [that] never was in Noah's ark..."<sup>59</sup>, was certainly preferable to walking or, worse, riding on an ox-wagon.

### **3. Motivational issues**

As the stressors began building up and the burghers were under all manners of pressure, their resistance resources were naturally gradually becoming depleted and coping became progressively difficult. At the same time the will to continue under the difficult circumstances often declined and the need for continual encouragement increased. These factors are discussed below.

Max Weber remarked : "The warrior is ruined by inactivity in the field."<sup>60</sup> This was indeed a profound declaration. It was written with reference to the last phase of the war, when

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<sup>56</sup> P.G. Cloete, *Chronology*, p. 296; M.A. Gronum, *Bittereinders*, p. 41.

<sup>57</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 366.

<sup>58</sup> R.W. Schikkerling, *Commando courageous*, 23.7.1901, p. 264.

<sup>59</sup> R.W. Schikkerling, *Commando courageous*, 23.7.1901, p. 264.

<sup>60</sup> M. Weber, *Eighteen months with General De la Rey*, p. 197.



circumstances caused certain commandos to endure long periods of inactivity, leading to the lowering of morale with many burghers sinking into a crater of despondency. In that final stage the stress that needed to be coped with, was constantly increasing. The situation was aggravated by the inactivity, giving the burghers more time to brood on the multitude of problems and uncertainties.

Idleness had been a scourge in Boer ranks since the early stages of the war. In the 65 days after the battle of Magerfontein, from middle December 1899 to middle February 1900, thousands of Boers were kept inactive on the slopes of Magerfontein-kopje. This led F.D. Conradie to declare that if idleness was not directly to blame for the poor discipline among the burghers, it was clearly to blame for giving them time to yearn for their loved-ones.<sup>61</sup> This phenomenon of intensified longing for home and family during times of idleness, was encountered by many men, including Celliers, during the guerrilla war. In the early summer of 1901 when their laager moved aimlessly hither and thither around Zwarttruggens, he regularly wrote about his longing for his family in his diary.<sup>62</sup> These entries were probably written on days when his yearning became too strong simply to ignore, although there are many indications in his journal that the separation from his loved ones was a constant stressful hassle to him.

The effect of the morale destroying idleness or passivity as it was reviewed in the previous chapter was offset in a number of ways. One unusual event – mentioned by both Schikkerling and Rothmann – was a theatrical production, staged in Pilgrim's Rest at the end of September 1901.<sup>63</sup> The play was a comedy that had been written locally and both General Ben Viljoen and Schikkerling were in the cast. The story was about the entrapment of a family of potential handsuppers in Dullstroom. The audience must indeed have been impressed because Rothmann went to great lengths to explain the plot in his entry of 1 October 1901. The occasion was important for a number of reasons. It took place at the end of September 1901, at a time when it was clear to many Boers that the tide was turning against them and there must have been many who were considering yielding to the increasing pressure. The theme of the play carried the clear message that handsupping was treason. Then too, it supplied the generally apathetic burghers with

<sup>61</sup> F.D. Conradie, *Met Cronjé aan die wesfront*, pp. 89-90.

<sup>62</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 22.9.1901, 2.11.1901, 1.12.1901, 6.12.1901, pp. 292, 310, 320, 323.

<sup>63</sup> R.W. Schikkerling: *Commando courageous*, 30.9.1901, p. 310; M.E.R. (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek*, 1.10.1901, pp. 224-225.

some welcome entertainment to lighten their mood. The fact that a number of ladies from the vicinity played in the piece would naturally also have been a welcome diversion for the war-weary burghers. Sheridan and Radmacher quote both R.S. Lazarus who claimed that a little illusion is necessary for good mental health, and D. Mechanic, who found that humour can be used as a defence against stress. These issues are regarded as emotion-focussed coping strategies.<sup>64</sup>

Singing, particularly communal singing or group singing, was also more than just a pleasant form of recreation or a way to fill the many idle hours. As the numerous stressors of the guerrilla war accumulated and created ongoing stress, singing became an important coping mechanism, functioning in several ways. First it offered emotional release for burghers who were living in uncertainty and fear for the morrow while they were also worried about and longing for their loved ones. Second it was a form of social support providing companionship with their comrades who shared the same hardships. Third, patriotic songs were motivating and inspirational, uplifting at a time when depression was common particularly in the later stages of the guerrilla warfare when Boer morale was wavering.

It is natural for groups of people who have the same values or culture to turn to song as a way of expressing their feelings. This is particularly true during time of war. During the American Civil War the songs “Dixieland” and “The battle hymn of the republic” were popular among soldiers. During World War I it was “Pack up your troubles...” and “It’s a long way to Tipperary” that aroused soldiers and civilians alike. And during World War II Vera Lynn made songs like “Lili Marlene” and “Wish me luck...” popular. Singing generally evokes a feeling of “wellness” or “feeling good” about life. Examples showing that singing was popular during the guerrilla phase of the Anglo-Boer War are numerous. Patriotic songs such as those written by F.W. Reitz, religious songs from the “Sankey sacred song book”, even traditional English songs and fun songs were frequently sung.<sup>65</sup> Celliers, the loner and at times also the cynic philosopher, questioned the words of a popular song about Christ sitting on a golden throne. To him gold was the great corrupter of men and of nations. It is obvious from his long review on the subject that

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<sup>64</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology*, p. 161.

<sup>65</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 137; A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 23.12.1901, pp.326-327.

the unrighteousness of this song irritated rather than inspired him.<sup>66</sup> However Celliers could not have been adverse to all kinds of singing, because when a group of young women sang to the burghers as they passed them near Pretoria, he declared that it filled his heart with a new resolve as they proceeded into the dark.<sup>67</sup> Lizzie Geldenhuys, who as a young girl had received formal music training, recalled with pleasure that even while their group was forced to move from Bothaville towards Hoopstad during January 1902, the communal singing from the “Globe song book” created a convivial atmosphere. In her case communion singing acted as a source of social support in their group’s stressful life.<sup>68</sup>

In a number of cases singing was a formalised activity, probably in an endeavour to inspire and brace the spirit of burghers. Several choirs were formed during the second half of 1901. The Heidelberg Commando initiated the “Trap Zang Vereeniging” under T.A.H. Dönges (“Trap” literally implied “to get out”, referring to flight from the British). There was also a choir comprising members of the Carolina Commando.<sup>69</sup> It is significant that these formalised cultural activities only took place at a stage when the tide was turning against the Boers. One final example of the significance of singing to the Boers was the makeshift choir which was formed in March 1902 when De la Rey received news that President Steyn and General De Wet were on their way to him. According to Naudé the Boers practised the anthems of the two republics which they planned to sing when their Free State comrades arrived.<sup>70</sup> This incident should not be perceived as singing for recreational purposes, rather as singing within a patriotic or motivating framework and can be regarded as a GRR because it formed a part of their cultural values.<sup>71</sup>

Debating was another activity that formed part of the Boer’s cultural background at the time and by careful selection of the subject could be instrumental in bolstering resistance resources. Van den Berg’s theory on *metablitica* does however have a bearing on this subject because as the leisure media developed over the past century the popularity of debating as a

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<sup>66</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 23.12.1901, pp. 326-327.

<sup>67</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 13.1.1901, p. 196.

<sup>68</sup> L. Geldenhuys, *Die oologsherinerings van Lizzie Geldenhuys* (Unpublished), p. 73.

<sup>69</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 178.

<sup>70</sup> J.F. Naudé, *Vechten en vluchten*, pp. 337-338.

<sup>71</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology*, pp. 152-153.

recreational activity has diminished.<sup>72</sup> To the burghers on commando debating was an accepted and enjoyable social pastime that could readily be adapted to their circumstances. Debating meetings could take place virtually anywhere at a time when burghers were inactive. Celliers mentioned a debate on the afternoon of 14 March 1901, the gathering being held under some large willows. In his diary he related at length how he was to defend the presumably unpopular position that black people were treated inhumanely and unfairly by the Boers.<sup>73</sup> Naudé was also involved in this event, probably as chairman, and Celliers mentioned that he spoke a few words of introduction. To indicate the importance of debating Naudé commented that the burghers under the command of the newly-appointed Combat-General Jan Kemp held debating meetings twice a week. According to Celliers the discussions were lively and the meetings well attended.<sup>74</sup> Another debating society, the *Veld Debat Vereeniging* or Field Debating Society was founded by the Heidelberg Commando in October 1901 near Ermelo. The topics of their debate were usually of a military or a political nature, with the general point of departure that the republics would retain their independence. It is clear that again the aim was to inspire the men but apparently the attendance of these gatherings was relatively poor, ranging between 17 and 33 individuals per meeting.<sup>75</sup> It could be argued that by October 1901, the positive mood among burghers, especially those in the southeastern Transvaal, had dulled considerably and that it was an uphill task to create enthusiasm for an activity that was so obviously intended to improve their sagging morale. Under current circumstances it might well be difficult to visualise debating as a coping mechanism for guerrilla warriors, yet considering the shift in time and the situations of the burghers living in the veld, often bored and disheartened, then attending a debating meeting could well have sparked some feeling of normality among them. Whether issues of a patriotic nature would have served to boost their morale, is highly questionable.

Both Schikkerling and Celliers alluded to occasions when dancing parties were held, but it would seem that these gatherings should merely be regarded as social occasions.<sup>76</sup> Even though

<sup>72</sup> <http://www.reinhoudt.nl/metablica/> [Van den Berg's term "metablica" deals with the theory of change. He maintains that the human being has not been an unchangeable element in the progress of history.]

<sup>73</sup> A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 14.3.1901, pp. 220-222.

<sup>74</sup> J.F. Naude, *Vechten en vluchten*, p. 216; See also F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, pp. 130-131.

<sup>75</sup> Quoted by F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 131.

<sup>76</sup> R.W. Schikkerling: *Commando courageous*, 2. 2.1902, p. 351; A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 26.2.1902, p. 347; See also F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, pp. 337-339.

these would generally only take place when the burghers were in areas where there were still women in the vicinity, there were occasions where men danced with men to the rousing sounds of the concertina.<sup>77</sup> Dancing was frowned upon by the more conservative elderly people, as well as by the church, but this did not stop the parties taking place whenever commandos were within reach of farms or towns where there were young girls.<sup>78</sup> Attending a pleasant dancing party would have been an exhilarating and thrilling experience to young burghers, lifting their gloomy moods and distracting their minds from the daily hardships. In other words it might well have helped improve the burgher's feeling of "wellness". Dancing could well have a salutary effect in generating positive emotions, but whether it could be considered as a serious coping strategy is doubtful.

Another topic that requires attention is the importance of reading as a source of information that might have influenced a burgher's resolve either to cope or to yield. This important issue may however be somewhat distorted, as the burghers who kept diaries, or those who wrote their memoirs after the war, were both literate and usually of a higher intellectual level than the majority of burghers in the veld. On 21 August 1901 Celliers, commented: "Ik schreef ook nooit een aantekening in mijn boekje op of er naderen een of meer die mij vragen wat ik schrijf, en anderen staan mij met open mond en oogen aan te gapen."<sup>79</sup> This is confirmed by Pretorius who claims that the majority burghers were semi-literate or even illiterate.<sup>80</sup>

Nevertheless, the fact remains that whether it was in the form of books, periodicals, newspapers or even the Bible, reading matter was precious to the Boer. P.J. du Toit's entry on 28 December 1900 claimed that he had recently read a number of Australian newspapers, which painted a picture of gloom for the ZAR: "What is there now to save us?" was his conclusion. It presumably helped to influence his reasoning about the significance of the war. On 13 April 1901 Rothmann received a *Cape Argus Weekly* which came from a train derailed at Pan station on the Pretoria to Delagoa line. The prospect of an evening spent reading the news from the outside world, seemed like a feast to Rothmann. Being so isolated as they were at the time, he was hoping

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<sup>77</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 138.

<sup>78</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 337.

<sup>79</sup> A.G. Oberholster (red.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 21.8.1901, p. 279. [Translated: "I can never make a note in my little book without one or more men approaching me, asking me what I am writing, while others merely stand gaping at me with open mouths and eyes."]

<sup>80</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 131.

to stay informed about the outside world. In contrast to these cases Schikkerling mentioned on 11 March 1901 that he had travelled three miles to fetch a few newspapers from General Viljoen's tent to "... find out what is going on in the world and what unkind things are being said about us. What does the world care about us, and who but ourselves, are interested in our fate?"<sup>81</sup> Although he went to much trouble in order to read the newspapers he was sceptical about the content. To him outside opinion became a stimulus to persevere with the war despite the difficulties.

Reading was also a means of escaping from the realities of their situation for many burghers. Sheridan and Radmacher claim that avoidance and denial are common emotion-focussed coping strategies. "Denial involves mentally escaping a stressor by ignoring it or trying to explain it away."<sup>82</sup> The young Schikkerling was one of those engrossed in reading and several entries in his diary mentioned this passion of his. On 27 July 1901 he wrote about the "library" that he and his friends carried in their saddle bags, books that helped them to pass the hours of idleness. "Our literary taste must not be commented upon," he wrote, "since we have no choice. All day in the shade of a thorn tree I lie reading a book called 'First Person Singular'..." Celliers was another burgher who had great love for words. Towards the end of August he deplored the lack of depth in the plot of a book he was reading – one of many mentioned in his diary – entitled "Die Lampenputzer". On 17 November he noted that he had found a number of periodical magazines and books in a deserted house. The magazines were soon distributed among his fellow passengers on their wagon. It delighted him that he was once more the librarian that he had been before the war.<sup>83</sup>

For many burghers the Bible was the most important book to read, as indeed it had always been for their ancestors. For Boers such as President M.T. Steyn, Rev. J. D. Kestell, Rev. J.M. Louw and D.S. van Warmelo reading was of extreme importance.<sup>84</sup> It was not only a method of remaining informed, it was also a welcome diversion. This means that it was a resistance resource at a time when the everyday anguish and uncertainty became prolonged stressors which only led to depression and weariness. This is one example where knowledge *per se* proves to be a

<sup>81</sup> J.P. Brits (ed.), *Diary of a National Scout*, 28.12.1900, p. 32; M.E.R. (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek*, 13.4.1901, p. 165; R.W. Schikkerling: *Commando courageous*, 11.3.1901, p. 161.

<sup>82</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology*, p. 161.

<sup>83</sup> R.W. Schikkerling: *Commando courageous*, 27.7.1901, p. 266; A.G. Oberholster (ed.), *Oorlogsdagboek van Jan F.E. Celliers*, 26.8.1901, 17.11.1901, pp. 281, 316.

<sup>84</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, pp. 131-132.

significant GRR. However, for the majority of Boers, many of whom were illiterate, reading was not an important element in coping with their multiple stressors.

Several routines that were more physical in nature were implemented to deal with the demon of idleness during the later months, when the Boers' offensive tactics reverted to defensive operations. Some of these diversions were contests between commandos or groups of Boers using horsewhips, switches or even ropes of plaited bulrushes, providing plenty of fun.<sup>85</sup> In the same vein Weber related the *kleilat* or clay stick fight that was instigated by "the frolicsome" General Kemp when he considered that the burghers needed bracing of their *esprit de corps*. From a psychological perspective this should be regarded as a social support tool, in other words, it was a resistance resource provided by the interaction with other people.<sup>86</sup>

#### ***4. Intrapersonal resources***

The attributes required of guerrilla leaders have been discussed in Chapter II. To summarise, it is essential that a guerrilla leader should have a genius for leadership, he should be skilful, rapid and bold.<sup>87</sup> Accordingly, it implies that a leader should possess the ability to influence others – either positively or negatively and must have a distinctive visible personality. He must be someone with a unique strong motivation and possess an extraordinary intellectual power which manifests itself in his creative activity. Taber's pronouncement on leaders is worth repeating, namely that they can only be able to inspire the *spirit of sacrifice* in others by themselves having a high measure of selfless dedication and demonstrate a sense of purpose.<sup>88</sup> This corresponds with Kobasa's GRR of *hardiness*, as discussed in Chapter III. Hardiness includes the three elements of commitment to the objective, having control over the events that are involved and accepting the challenge of change.

#### *Military background*

Hans Binneveld briefly outlines the development of organised warfare since the 1500s,

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<sup>85</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 125.

<sup>86</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology*, p. 156.

<sup>87</sup> W. Laqueur, *Guerrilla*, p. 148.

<sup>88</sup> R. Taber, *The war of the flea guerrilla warfare theory and practice*, p. 148.

maintaining that military reform originated in Holland under Prince Maurits of Orange-Nassau (1567–1623). His experiments were carried forward by King Gustav Adolphus of Sweden (1594–1632) who reasoned that the officers corps should receive greater attention than before, while Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658) revolutionised the use of the cavalry in his army. Eventually Frederick the Great of Prussia (1712–1786) brought all these developments together by forming battle units over which control could be exercised at the peak of a pitched battle.<sup>89</sup> Subsequently, in the early 1800s, military academies were established throughout Europe, Britain and the United States of America, where officers underwent training in preparation for their military careers. Most British officers who served during the Anglo-Boer War attended either the Royal Military College at Sandhurst or the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich.<sup>90</sup> The majority of military commanders during the American Civil War had received their training at West Point Military Academy.<sup>91</sup>

It is well known that the leaders and burghers of the two republics were not professional soldiers and were broadly speaking untrained in military matters. Very few Boers had undergone military training in Europe or other countries, although it is known that Major P.E. Erasmus and Major J.F. Wolmarans of the ZAR Artillery Corps both received military training in Holland.<sup>92</sup> Major F.W.R. Albrecht who was the commanding officer of the Free State Artillery Corps, had been a non-commissioned officer in the German army, participating in the French-German War of 1871.<sup>93</sup> However, Albrecht had been captured by the British before the guerrilla war phase. Likewise Colonel Aldolf Schiel, who led the German Corps in the Anglo-Boer War, had served four years in the Prussian army, three of them in the Black Hussars. He emerged as a sergeant, although he referred to himself as a lieutenant, but he too was captured before the guerrilla phase of the war began.<sup>94</sup> The Italian, Colonel C. Ricchiardi, was a foreign volunteer with military training and experience, but he was wounded during the Battle of Colenso in December 1899, and

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<sup>89</sup> H. Binneveld, *From shellshock to combat stress*, pp. 9-12.

<sup>90</sup> <http://www.Google.com>, keyword: Sandhurst.

<sup>91</sup> <http://www.Google.com>, keyword: Westpoint/Civil War.

<sup>92</sup> O.J.O. Ferreira (ed.), *Geschiedenis werken en streven van S.P.E. Trichard Luitenant kolonel der vroegere Staats-artillerie Z.A.R.*, p. 81.

<sup>93</sup> D.W. Krüger and C.J. Beyers (eds.), *Suid Afrikaanse biografiese woordeboek*, III, p. 11.

<sup>94</sup> B. Pottinger, *The foreign volunteers: They fought for the Boers (1899-1902)*, pp. 19-20, 93-108.



likewise took no part in the guerrilla war.<sup>95</sup> It is clear that when the war turned into guerrilla warfare there were few men with any formal military training. One of the handful of foreign volunteers with military experience was Colonel John Blake, an Irish-American who had received his training at West Point Military Academy in the United States of America. Although he was wounded in an early stage of the war, he remained active in the Anglo-Boer War until 1902.<sup>96</sup>

None of the prominent Boer generals who were active during the latter period of the war – men such as Botha, De Wet, De la Rey, Smuts, Hertzog and Beyers – had undergone any formal military training. Whatever military experience they possessed was acquired in the punitive expeditions undertaken against black communities. De Wet was involved in the Battle of Majuba in the 1880-1881 Anglo-Transvaal War. De la Rey was a commandant of the Lichtenburg commando at the time, but he had also fought in the 1865 war against the Basuto.<sup>97</sup> Botha had played a role in conflicts against the Zulu during the 1880s.<sup>98</sup> It thus becomes clear that the military grounding of the Boer leadership was extremely meagre. As a GRR which could support them in their duties as leaders, it could be said to be non-existent. Scholtz states that there were only two prominent republicans who were knowledgeable about military theories, namely Smuts and Hertzog.<sup>99</sup> But their insight was based on their own reading and probably their wider general perception of affairs, rather than on any military training.

It is perhaps significant that members of the two artillery corps who had received military training, albeit principally as artillerists – S.P.E. Trichard, of the ZAR Corps and W.E. Thuynsma of the Free State Corps – were never placed in any senior command positions or even in consulting positions. After the ZAR Corps had been dissolved Trichard became a commandant of a section of the Middelburg Commando<sup>100</sup> and Thuynsma was a captain in President Steyn's body guard when he fell during the battle of Graspan on 6 Juny 1901.<sup>101</sup>

<sup>95</sup> B. Pottinger, *The foreign volunteers*, pp. 173-177.

<sup>96</sup> D.W. Krüger and C.J. Beyers (eds.), *Suid Afrikaanse biografiese woordeboek*, III, pp. 73-74.

<sup>97</sup> W. J. de Kock (ed.), *Suid Afrikaanse biografiese woordeboek*, II, pp. 243, 223.

<sup>98</sup> P. Bateman, *Generals of the Anglo-Boer War*, p. 97.

<sup>99</sup> L. Scholtz, *Waarom die Boere die oorlog verloor het*, p. 20.

<sup>100</sup> O.J.O. Ferreira (ed.), *Geschiedenis werken en streven van S.P.E. Trichard Luitenant kolonel der vroegere Staats-artillerie Z.A.R.*, p. xv.

<sup>101</sup> C.R. de Wet, *Three years war*, p. 251.

Of the Boers who held the rank of general during the final stages of the war it is notable that only three had received any form of military training whatsoever before the war, namely B.J. Viljoen, S.G. Maritz and J.C. van Deventer. It then becomes even more obvious that whatever military expertises the senior Boer officers possessed was probably rather the result of their background as frontiers men than any competence they acquired through formal military training. Therefore the fact that these men were placed into positions of military leadership involving great responsibility without having undergone supportive training and combat experience or grounding that their adversaries would assuredly have relied on, suggests that this shortcoming could well have contributed to much of the stress they experienced. The fact that despite this situation many of them were still able to cope with the stress, suggests that they possessed sufficient alternative GRRs.

#### *Educational background*

It was pointed out in Chapter II that Sheridan and Radmacher claimed that education is a most important GRR.<sup>102</sup> Whether this claim had the same relevance to the Boer society of 100 years ago is debatable, although education as such would generally have led to greater understanding of life and its vicissitudes. However Table VII-1, at the end of this chapter, shows that only seven of the 34 generals who were active towards the end of the war, had enjoyed any post-school training. They were T. Smuts of Ermelo, C.F. Beyers, J.C. Smuts, L.A.S. Lemmer, J. Kemp, J.B.M. Hertzog and J.H.B. Wessels. Other burghers who are mentioned in this study and who are known to have received post-school training are J.F.E. Celliers who had studied as a land surveyor, P.J. du Toit who was trained as a teacher, L. Krause who held four degrees, among them a masters degree in law from the University of Cambridge, J.F. Naudé who had partly completed his studies as a theologian and H. Verloren van Themaat, a Hollander, who had a doctorate in law. Several of the generals had previously held positions as magistrates, prosecutors, post masters and other prominent civilservice posts, which would appear to indicate that they too had enjoyed an adequate education. General Louis Botha attended a small school in the Free State, where an occasional wandering Dutch *meester* or tutor might turn up to fill the teacher's position. Other than this he gleaned what he could from his parents.<sup>103</sup> Several sources mention the fact that Christiaan de Wet only enjoyed a few, some say only three, months of

<sup>102</sup> C.L. Sheridan and S.A. Radmacher, *Health psychology*, p. 152.

<sup>103</sup> J. Meintjes, *General Louis Botha a biography*, pp. 3-4.

school.<sup>104</sup> Most of the generals had been farmers before the war and the status of their education is uncertain.

On the other hand it is interesting to note that D. Reitz, the son of F.W. Reitz, the State Secretary of the ZAR, R.W. Schikkerling, F. Rothmann and H.S. van der Walt, whose works are frequently quoted in this study, did not enjoy any post-school training, although they were well able to describe their experiences. Notwithstanding these few exceptions the majority of burghers were illiterate or only partially literate.<sup>105</sup>

The low level of education, and consequently the lack of knowledge in its wider sense, can assuredly be associated with a lack of cognitive GRRs. Strümpfer quoted Antonovsky when he explained that cognitive GRRs rely on “knowledge intelligence”, which is of course subject to education. Antonovsky furthermore argued that all GRRs facilitate the ability to *make sense* of stressors or of a stressful situation. He argued that the repeated experience of this *sense making* ultimately leads to the development of a sense of coherence (SOC). The three components of a strong SOC which Antonovsky identified as *comprehensibility*, *manageability* and *meaningfulness* logically stem partly from, or are at least linked to, education and knowledge.<sup>106</sup>

The knowledge of matters concerning life in the veld, riding and caring for their horses, of accurate shooting and of the climate to a very large extent sustained the rural burghers during the guerrilla war phase. But their general lack of knowledge – which could primarily be derived from their ability to read – was an obstacle in the development of a strong SOC. The importance that reading material, in particular newspapers, held for those few burghers who could read, has been discussed above. Du Toit, Rothmann and Schikkerling used the newspapers in expanding the basis of their knowledge about the greater war situation as it was developing around them, using it to *make sense* of the circumstances. And the fact that they reacted differently to the news accentuates that they were able to form opinions for themselves. Those who could not read, had to rely on others to form opinions and this would no doubt have led to subjective views. In view of the fact that the majority of representatives at the peace talks at Vereeniging arrived there with the instruction of their constituents not to relinquish the independence of their republics, the

<sup>104</sup> W.J. de Kock (ed.), *Suid-Afrikaanse biografiese woordeboek*, I, p. 243; P. Bateman, *Generals of the Anglo-Boer War*, p. 111; B. Olivier, *Krygsman Christiaan de Wet*, p. 3.

<sup>105</sup> F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 131.

<sup>106</sup> D.J.W. Strümpfer, “Salutogenesis a new paradigm”, *S.A. Journal of Psychology* 20 (4), 1990, p. 268.

question could well be asked how strong the SOC of the Boers in general and of the delegates was.

*Age as a resource of resistance*

After the lack of success during the first phase of the war, the older generation of Boer generals, many of whom held their positions because of their political affiliations and long service to their countries, were replaced by a new, younger group of leaders. According to Scholtz the most important senior officers such as P.J. Joubert (born 1831), P.A. Cronjé (born 1838), M. Prinsloo, E.R. Grobler (born 1861) and C.J. Wessels were either over cautious or simply incompetent.<sup>107</sup> The names of H.J. Schoeman (born 1840), D.J.E. Erasmus (born 1845), J.H.M. Kock (born 1835) and J.P. Snyman (born 1838) would surely also find a place on this list. It is clear that these men were elderly and that a strenuous life, full of physical and psychological demands would have proved too demanding. De Wet, for example, considered the appointment of A.P. Cronjé as Combat-General in November 1899 to be a mistake. He respected him as an old friend and a fellow member of the Volksraad, but he considered that at 66 years of age he was too old for the strenuous physical demands which a general had to meet.<sup>108</sup> In his review of the problems that the young and enthusiastic Captain Koos Jooste encountered while trying to convince the ZAR leadership of his plan to invade Griqualand, J.H. Breytenbach claimed that the authorities of the time preferred to appoint men who had reached a certain prominence in life as senior officers. Generals usually came from the ranks of senior politicians, members of the *Volksraad* or the Executive Council, and he quoted Andries de Wet that men who did not boast long beards were not considered as commanders in the two republics.<sup>109</sup> However, most of the “long beards” had left the scene by the time that the guerrilla warfare phase commenced. Some of them had by then died, some had been taken prisoner and others had simply stepped back into civilian life.

Table VII–1 shows the age of the generals who were still active during the early months of 1902. At this stage the average age of the ZAR’s generals was just under 38 years, those of the Free State just under 34 years and the average age of the generals who operated in the Cape

<sup>107</sup> L. Scholtz, *Waarom die Boere die oorlog verloor het*, p. 41.

<sup>108</sup> C.R. de Wet, *Three years war*, p. 19.

<sup>109</sup> J.H. Breytenbach, *Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 1899-1902*, IV, p. 93.

Colony was only 30 years. This again corresponds well with Laqueur's view that guerrilla commanders should be young, in their late twenties to early forties.<sup>110</sup> Not only are the younger men more energetic, they are normally more enterprising, even more audacious than older men. They are usually more hardy and less prone to the aches and pains that develop during middle age.

This premise did not only apply to generals and senior officers but to the whole guerrilla force. During the strenuous guerrilla phase of the war younger men were generally able to resist physical stressors better than middle-aged or elderly men. As an example the youthful Reitz's ability to triumph over his fractured leg, persevering and eventually reaching his goal to join Smuts' commando in entering the Cape Colony, can be compared with the much older Rothmann who was constantly hampered by his bronchial problems and more than once had to spend time in hospital.<sup>111</sup> It is significant that during those last difficult months of the war many of the burghers were in fact *penkoppe*, or young boys. This was confirmed by Dietlof van Warmelo who outlined his admiration for them. "Er waren ook onder ons dappere kleine jongens, die, ontnuchterd en ontgroend, vroegtijdig in de moeielijkheden van het leven ingewijd werden, doch tintelend van energie in de ontberingen van het commando-leven met een onbezorgd, avontuurlijk behagen deelden."<sup>112</sup> This also corresponds with the statement made in Chapter IV. that the average age of the Cape Rebels was under 25 years.<sup>113</sup>

It should however be noted that although younger men were probably have been more capable to cope with the physical hardships than their older comrades, their general exposure to the stressors of life was limited and their smaller repertoire of experiences in successfully coping with stressors, would probably mean that their SOC had not yet come to full maturity and that eventual burnout could probably result more readily in younger men than it would in older men.

### *Rural background*

Table VI-1 reveals that most of the generals were farmers prior to the war. This was also

<sup>110</sup> W. Laqueur, *Guerrilla*, pp. 397-398.

<sup>111</sup> D. Reitz, *Commando*, pp. 167, 168, 174, 200; M.E.R. (ed.), *Dagboek, passim*.

<sup>112</sup> Quoted by F. Pretorius, *Kommandolewe*, p. 257. [Translated: "There were also among us brave young boys, who, inexperienced and soon to be disillusioned, were introduced into the ordeals of life far too soon. Nevertheless they partook of the hardships of commando life with sparkling energy and carefree, adventurous delight."]

<sup>113</sup> Personal information: Miss E. Wessels, War Museum of the Boer Republics, Bloemfontein, 19 September 2002; Personal information: Dr. R. Kotzé, Jakkalskloof, Redelinghuys, Western Cape, 20 September 2002.

the case with regard to other officers and burghers. Therefore the exposure of the average Boer was primarily to matters directly related to farming, such as familiarity with the veld, horse riding, shooting and even his deep-seated religiousness. Exposure to other issues would have been limited. This rural background, which focussed principally on survival in an untamed, often hostile land, would have had little influence on his general perception of circumstances regarding the war and other war-related affairs. International politics, the power of Britain and her colonies, the British reasoning leading to the scorched earth policy, the importance of discipline and the reluctance of the European powers to intervene, were presumably not part of the average Boer's frame of reference.

#### *Physical appearance and self-image*

A number of closely related issues concerning the way the Boers coped with stressors still need to be examined. These all revolve around the *self-concept* of the individual, namely beliefs and attitudes about themselves.<sup>114</sup> Among these is the concept of *potency* as it has been posited by Professor Zeev Ben-Sira of Jerusalem. According to this concept, a person's confidence in his own capabilities prevents tension which may follow inadequate coping.<sup>115</sup> Potency is related to *self-efficacy* – a person's belief in his or her ability or competency to perform a certain task.<sup>116</sup> Antonovsky argued that the *ego-identity* – the nature or essence of the self – as an emotional GRR, forms part of the individual's coping mechanism.<sup>117</sup> Ego-identity is an inherent trait and does not develop according to circumstances. It is clear that self-confidence plays an important role in successful coping. *Self-image* is another element that forms part of this category. However, a positive self-image may develop as a result of certain ambient conditions such as wealth or status. In other words, the person's inherent self-assurance, his confidence in his own capabilities and his self-image are related features which all become instrumental in helping the individual to overcome obstacles.

Such a person would also frequently be concerned about his or her physical appearance. In the case of guerrilla leaders a sturdy, impressive and dynamic persona is the accepted norm. This

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<sup>114</sup> R.A. Baron and D. Byrne, *Social psychology*, p. 162.

<sup>115</sup> D.J.W. Strümpfer, "Salutogenesis a new paradigm", *S.A. Journal of Psychology* 20 (4), 1990, p. 272.

<sup>116</sup> R.A. Baron and D Byrne, *Social psychology*, p. 180.

<sup>117</sup> D.J.W. Strümpfer, "Salutogenesis a new paradigm", *S.A. Journal of Psychology* 20 (4), 1990, p. 268.

form of non-verbal communication is known in modern psychology by the term *impression management*. This signifies efforts by individuals to produce favourable impressions on others.<sup>118</sup> The impressive individual could presumably rely on his appearance to overcome smaller obstacles. A typical example during the Anglo-Boer War would be Christiaan de Wet, who was always neatly dressed, wearing his distinctive hat and jodhpurs. Even when wearing a greatcoat he projected a formidable image of authority. De Wet apparently enjoyed being photographed and many photographs can still be found in diverse sources. Some are individual poses and in other he is part of a group, almost always as the central figure.<sup>119</sup> His early efforts to obtain his splendid mount, an Arab by descent, the imposing dappled horse Fleur, can probably be interpreted as part of this image-management trait.<sup>120</sup> A formidable outward appearance does not however, necessarily imply that the individual has a strong SOC, as it could also be a facade.

### **5. Resumé**

The variety of coping mechanisms form the wide range of GRRs that have been discussed above does not by any means imply that all the Boers were always able to cope with the stress that assailed them. Had this been the case then there would not have been so many burghers who laid down arms and abandoned the struggle. Notwithstanding the many who did in fact yield to the pressures, there were still more than 20 000 burghers in the field when the peace agreement was signed.<sup>121</sup> In other words, these burghers had been able to cope more or less successfully with the stress brought on by the myriad of stressors during the guerrilla warfare phase of the war.

Table VII –1 Background of Boer generals who were still active in the early months of

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<sup>118</sup> R.A. Baron and D Byrne, *Social psychology*, p. 69.

<sup>119</sup> P.G. Cloete, *Chronology*, p. 94; J. Malan, *Die Boere-offisiere*, p. 12; P.H.S. van Zyl, *Die Helde-album: verhaal en foto's van aanvoerders en helde uit ons vryheidsstryd*, p. 192.

<sup>120</sup> W.J. de Kock (ed.), *Suid Afrikaanse biografiese woordeboek I*, p. 244; P. Bateman, *Generals of the Anglo-Boer War*, p. 112.

<sup>121</sup> F. Pretorius (ed.), *Scorched earth*, p. 21.

*Resistance resources and coping*1902.<sup>122</sup>

	<i>Name</i>	<i>Initials</i>	<i>Age in 1900</i> <sup>123</sup>	<i>Region</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Military Background</i>
ZAR	Alberts	H.G.	45	Eastern Tvl.	Unknown – fair writing ability	Farmer and businessman	
	Beyers	C.F.	31	Northern Tvl.	Stellenbosch Gymnasium & Victoria College	Lawyer	Offered service during Jameson Raid
	Botha	C.	36	Swaziland	Unknown	Farmer	Commandant Swazi Police
	Botha	L.	38	Eastern Tvl.	Limited, mostly informal	Farmer, politician	Served to subdue Zulu unrest
	Bouwer	B.D.	25	Eastern Tvl.	Attended school in Angola & Pretoria/ Spoke five African languages	Dept of Justice as translator and later Prosecutor	
	Brits	C.J.	32	Eastern Tvl.	Unknown	Farmer	
	Celliers	J.G.	36	Western Tvl.	Unknown	Farmer, moved to Witwatersrand - gold mines	ZAR Police
	De la Rey	A.J.C.	55	Western Tvl.	Unknown	Farmer	
	De la Rey	J.H.	53	Western Tvl.	Limited, informal	Land surveyor, Native commissioner, politician	1880-81 War – 1895 Comdt of Lichtenburg Commando
	Du Toit	S.P.	36	Western Tvl.	Unknown	Farmer, politician	
	Emmett	J.J.C.	34	Eastern Tvl.	Unknown	Farmer, politician	

<sup>122</sup> W.J. de Kock (ed.), *Suid-Afrikaanse biografiese woordeboek*, I, II, *passim*; C.J. Beyers (ed.), *Suid-Afrikaanse biografiese woordeboek*, III, IV, V, *passim*, P.H.S. van Zyl, *Die heldealbum*, *passim*; P.J. Nienaber, *Afrikaanse biografiese woordeboek*, I, *passim*.

<sup>123</sup> Approximate age when guerrilla phase began in 1900, given as an indication of the general age-grouping of leaders in the latter stages of the war.



*Resistance resources and coping*

	Fourie	C.E.	42	Eastern Tvl.	Unknown	Farmer	Served in 1880-81 War and several Black wars.
	Grobler	J.N.H.	36	Eastern Tvl.	Unknown	Farmer, Asst. Native commissioner	Served in several Black wars
	Joubert	D.	51	Eastern Tvl.	Unknown	Farmer, politician	
	Kemp	J.C.G.	28	Western Tvl.	High School State Gymnasium, Pretoria	Clerk, Education Dept. & Office of Mining commissioner	Served during Jameson Raid
	Lemmer	L.A.S.	36	Western Tvl.	High school– Studied at Stellenbosch	Teacher, farm school, Tax official (1896)	Served in 1880-81 War
	Liebenberg	P.J.	43	Western Tvl.	Unknown	Farmer, politician	Served in 1880-81 War
	Muller	C.H.	35	N.Eastern Tvl.	Unknown		Served during Jameson Raid
	Myburgh	M.W.	30	Eastern Tvl.	School, Somerset East.	Conveyancer, cattle farmer, politician	
	Smuts	J.C.	30	Western Tvl.	Victoria College, Cambridge, Middle temple, London	Advocate, State Attorney - ZAR	
	Smuts	T.	39	Eastern Tvl.	School education in Stellenbosch	ZAR Public servant, magistrate's clerk, farmer	
	Van Zyl	J.A.	36	Western Tvl.	Studied theology (unfinished)	Teacher, Kuruman	
	Viljoen	B.J.	32	N.Eastern Tvl.	Informal yet fully literate	Limited journalistic experience, politician	Served during Jameson Raid, Established volunteer corps
	Viljoen	P.R.	47	Eastern Tvl.	Unknown	Mine commissioner, magistrate	Served in several black wars
OFS	Badenhorst	C.G.J.	29	Western OFS	Farm school	Farmer	

*Resistance resources and coping*

	Botha	H.N.W.	33	Northern OFS	Informal	Farmer	
	Brand	G.A.	25	Southern OFS	School in Bloemfontein, SA College Cape Town	Prosecutor, Frankfort	
	De Wet	C.R.	46	OFS	Informal	Farmer, politician	Served in 1880-81 War
	Froneman	C.C.	54	Eastern OFS	Informal	Farmer	Served in last Basotho War
	Hattingh	F.J.W.J.	27	Eastern OFS	Informal	Farmer	
	Hertzog	J.B.M.	34	Southern OFS	Victoria College, Univ. of Amsterdam, Doctorate in Law	Advocate and reporter of High Court, Pretoria, Judge, Bloemfontein	
	Krog	P.J.F.	26	Southern OFS	School in Uitenhage		OFS Artillery
	Niewoudt	T. K.		Southern OFS	Unknown	Unknown	
	Prinsloo	A.M.	38	Northern OFS	Limited	Farmer, Bethlehem	
	Wessels	J.H.B.	26	Northern OFS	School in Bloemfontein, Teachers diploma – Grey College	Teacher, Hoopstad	
	Wessels	W.J.	35	Northern OFS	Unknown	Farmer	
Cape	Conroy	E.A.	21	NW Cape	Limited	Clerk, Johannesburg, Shop assistant, Britstown	
	De Villiers	P.J.	47	NW Cape	Unknown	Unknown	
	Kritzinger	P.H.	30	Karoo	Unknown	Farmer	

	Malan	W.C.	28	Karoo	Attended school in Franschoek	Unknown	Afrikaander Cavalry Corps and Theron Scout in early phase of war
	Maritz	S.G.	24	SW Cape	Limited	See military background	ZAR Police, Volunteered service during Jameson raid
	Van Deventer	J.C.	26	Karoo		See military background	ZAR Artillery, Adjutant Officer