THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY HEALTH SERVICE (SAMHS) 1995 - 2000

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BY

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DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER IN POLITICAL POLICY STUDIES IN THE FACULTY HUMANITIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA
DECLARATION

I declare that the dissertation, which I hereby submit for the degree of Masters of Political Studies at the University of Pretoria, is my own work and has not been previously submitted by me for a degree at another university.

SIGNATURE          DATE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere gratitude and appreciation is conveyed to all those people who assisted me in this research.

My supervisor, Professor M. Schoeman and Professor Y. Sadie from the Department of Political Governance at University of Johannesburg for their expert guidance and support.

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To all the Social Work officers for their efforts in the distribution and collection of the questionnaires in all the units.

To my children, Thando and Phethagatso, for having patience with me during the course of my studies.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my community at large, especially to the members of the South African Military Health Service (SAMHS).
ABSTRACT

It is both a Constitutional imperative and the South African government's policy that the historical imbalances of the past be redressed. As a result thereof, the SANDF as a state entity is expected to comply with these stipulations. The objectives of this study are therefore to examine the nature of the policy of affirmative action in the SAMHS, and the nature of the problems experienced with regards to the implementation of this policy within this organisation during the period 1995 - 2000. On examining the nature of affirmative action policy in the SAMHS, it becomes obvious that this organisation did not have blacks as commissioned officers prior 1994. The number of black officers currently found within the SAMHS appears to have resulted from the integration process. Further analysis reveals that the SAMHS did not utilise the opportunity provided by the Defence Review in 1998 to become representative. Strategic positions were therefore still held by former white SADF members during the period under review. The sunset clause which was accepted during the political negotiations (1990 - 1994) seems to have contributed to the non implementation of this policy because the old guards' positions were secured during the first five years of the new democratic dispensation.
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Affirmative Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>APLA</td>
<td>Azanian Peoples Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZANLA</td>
<td>Azanian Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACKS</td>
<td>Africans, Coloureds, Indians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDEO AA</td>
<td>Chief Directorate Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMHFP</td>
<td>Chief of Military Health Force Preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMHFS</td>
<td>Chief of Military Health Force Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMCC</td>
<td>Joint Military Coordinating Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>Non-Statutory Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan African Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>South African Defence Force</td>
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<td>South African Military Health Service</td>
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<tr>
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<td>South African National Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBVC</td>
<td>Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Transitional Executive Council</td>
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1.1 INTRODUCTION

South Africa has a long history of discrimination against blacks. Davenport, (1981:238) purports that on assuming power in 1943, the United Party coalition had inherited the Hertzogian racial policy with its five defensive bastions. These were Communal Representation under the 1936 Representation Act; Territorial Segregation under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act; Urban Segregation with Influx Control; the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937 and lastly, the Riotous Assemblies’ Act of 1930 as the security backstop. With these pieces of legislation in place, the then government became content with the position of Africans in this country.

On the other hand, Hertzog’s policy for coloureds in the Cape entailed better jobs, better trade union rights, better schools, health services and pensions, but unfortunately South African whites at the time never intended that the coloured people should play a positive and a decisive part in the government. They were only initially accorded equal political rights by law with whites (Van der Ross, 1986:200).

Unlike the Africans and coloureds, the 1946 Act stipulated that Indians be confined to Transvaal and Natal and their political liberties were not extended anywhere else in South Africa. The history of Indians in South Africa can be traced in the province of Natal where they were imported mainly to assist settlers in the young British colony of Natal to develop their sugar plantations (Cilliers 1963:57).
When the Nationalist Party assumed control of South Africa in 1948, it therefore only had to refine and further codify the practise of racial discrimination that was already entrenched, (Davenport, 1981:300). The National Party government’s policies further marginalised blacks not only from political power but from economic participation as well. Legislation was used to inhibit the socio-economic advancement of blacks. On the other hand, the state allocated budgets to promote the development of whites through better education, health facilities and housing. The access of the black population to jobs, economic resources, land and technology were also severely restricted through a plethora of laws and regulations. This state of affairs led to great inequalities between whites and blacks (Van der Ross, 1986:115).

Nkuhlu (1993: 23) states that the consequences of discrimination became glaringly evident in the South African economy overtime. By the early 1990s, white males, for example, were heavily over-represented in the key decision-making posts and in the skilled occupational categories of both the public and private sectors. Human (1990:81), takes this point further by indicating that gender discrimination in employment was also anchored in legislative measures. In this regard, the Wage Act, 44 of 1937, subsequently, 45 of 1957, permitted differentiation between categories of employees on the grounds of gender, and laid the basis for discriminatory wage determination, which were also applicable in terms of race.

South African women have generally been employed in a fairly narrow range of occupations, which are subordinate to those of men in terms of pay, power and prestige (Cock, 1991:33). Pillay (1988: 730) reiterates this point by indicating that women in this country earn approximately 70% of men’s earnings. Black women work mainly in the service and agricultural sectors in the least skilled, lowest paid and most insecure jobs of all. The 1985 census revealed that nearly three quarters of the total female work-force was employed in three occupational categories, namely: service; clerical and professional. Three quarters of all female service workers were domestic
workers, and the other three quarters of all professional women were either teachers or nurses at the end of the 1980’s. White women were over-represented in the higher status white-collar occupations (Macconachie, 1985:43). This was as a result of their greater access to schooling and further education.

When the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994, one of the things they wanted to do in the new dispensation was to erase inequalities with regard to race and gender, by adopting the policy of Affirmative Action. The ANC document entitled “Affirmative Action and The New Constitution” adopted the principle that the constitution must facilitate affirmative action as its policy guidelines. However, these guidelines did not go as far as to say that the constitution should make affirmative action mandatory (ANC, 1992:28).

In terms of the Constitution of South Africa and in particular the Bill of Rights (RSA Constitution 1996: 59) the right to equal protection and benefit of the law must be afforded to all persons, or groups of persons. Measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, may be taken.

In pursuance of these Constitutional imperatives, the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) looked into pertinent issues and challenges that would have to be addressed within government departments and provincial administrations. This Department published the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and Affirmative Action for the Public Service. The White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995:38) aims to address the imbalances of the past to the point where state departments would be broadly representative of the demographic composition of the people of South Africa. According to this document, affirmative action is a means to an end and equality and equal opportunities are the desired end. The White Paper on Affirmative Action (1998:10) on the other hand, serves as a testimony of the ANC led government’s commitment to the transformation of
the Public Service into and institution whose employment practices are underpinned by equity.

All the various government departments are expected to comply with the above mentioned policies. As a result thereof the Department of Defence (DOD) promulgated its own policy entitled "Equal Opportunity & Affirmative Action in the SANDF" (OC Pers1/98) so as to align itself with government policy. This policy states that military personnel shall be evaluated, in an unbiased manner, on individual merit on their physical and mental well being and ability, irrespective of but not limited to their race, gender, sex, ethnic, social origin, colour sexual orientation or any other indicator.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

With the above brief background in mind, the purpose of this study is to establish the extent to which the policy of affirmative action has been implemented in the South African Health Military Service (SAMHS) during the period 1995-2000 and the major problems experienced with the introduction of the policy of affirmative action. The concept of affirmative action is not new and has been undertaken in various countries (section 1.6.2). Over the years various scholars have pointed to the requirements of successful implementation of affirmative action policies which include education, training and development. These requirements, discussed in (section 1.6.3), will serve as the theoretical framework according to which the success and problems of the policy implementation in the SAMHS will be evaluated.

The SAMHS is one of four services which comprise the SANDF. It is required to provide and ensure a military health service that is guaranteed, comprehensive and self supporting at all times in order to ensure the physical, psychological and social well being of the entire military community. This organisation presently consists of members from all racial groups in South Africa and provides decentralised support to the SANDF’s combat forces.
According to its strategy, the SAMHS (2000:9) was established because members of a defence force risk physical, psychological and social exposure, injuries, disablement or death in service of their country. They therefore need to depend on a dedicated health service that is guaranteed, comprehensive and available anywhere at all times.

Since the SAMHS is part of the SA National Defence Force, it is expected to comply with and implement government policies. It is therefore imperative that the extent to which this organisation has been able to implement the affirmative action policy be examined and the challenges encountered in relation to this, be explored. Concern has been expressed in the media (Sowetan, 22 August 2000) that transformation in the SANDF seems to be a protracted process because there had been no drastic change in the leadership. In his address in April 2000 at the SANDF parade in Bloemfontein, President Mbeki also reiterated that the DOD needed to be more representative in terms of race and gender. Issues addressed in this study therefore include the following.

- The nature of the policy of affirmative action in the SANDF and SAMHS in particular, and
- The nature of the problems experienced with regards to the implementation of this policy in the SAMHS.

1.3. METHOD OF RESEARCH

The study is based on the analysis of primary and secondary sources related to Affirmative Action and the application thereof in the SANDF and more specifically, the SAMHS. The researcher is a senior officer in the SAMHS and is therefore not only familiar with DOD structures and decision-making processes at all levels, but also has access to official reports, and sits in forums where the implementation of the policy of affirmative action can be gauged.
The analysis of the literature is complemented by a survey conducted amongst SAMHS members, in the year 2000, in order to establish their perceptions and attitude with regards to the implementation of affirmative action policy within this organisation. This data, is however, not used as representative of the general attitude of SAMHS members on this matter, but it must rather be considered as providing a perspective of some members of the SAMHS with regard to implementation of affirmative action. The results of this survey will therefore be used in a qualitative manner. Although 1100 SAMHS members were requested to complete the questionnaires in 11 units, the representivity of the survey cannot be claimed due to some methodological problems. Although 1100 questionnaires were distributed evenly in the units, only 350 could be subjected to analysis. The reason for poor return-rates stem from the fact that the questionnaires distributed by staff officers requested respondents to furnish biographical data. This seems to have influenced the return rate because of the sensitivity of the topic.

The 350 questionnaires that were completed, to some extent reflect the stratification of members of the SAMHS in terms of gender, race, force of origin and rank as table 1 indicates. The largest deviation in terms of stratification in the returned questionnaires exists in terms of gender, because 53% of the female respondents returned completed questionnaires. Asians, Coloureds and former members from APLA and MK are also over represented. A reason for this over-representation stems from the fact that these members believe that the availability of evidence-based data would indicate explicitly how the concept of affirmative action would be applied in a post apartheid South Africa. Ex- SADF members are under-represented. This may be ascribed to their reluctance to participate in the study, because they seemed to regard affirmative action as being discriminatory towards them as they were beneficiaries in the past.

Since the survey is only utilised in a qualitative manner the precise resemblance to the stratification of the population is thus not essential. It
nevertheless must be stressed that those respondents who participated in the survey cannot be regarded as representative of the views of all members of the SAMHS, despite the fact that respondents who have returned the questionnaires are from various segments of the population.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Population SAMHS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Force</strong></td>
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<td>APLA</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
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<td>13.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
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<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Rank</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L Cpl</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>27.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt WO</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt-Major</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>37.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lt Col-Brig-Gen</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.90</td>
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1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

A large body of scholarly research has been conducted within the South African context in both the public and private sector which addresses the subject of affirmative action. This research can broadly be divided into four categories. The first broad category of research mainly centres on emotions evoked by the implementation of affirmative action policies, albeit from different perspectives or points of reference. These include studies by Nesh, (2003) on the “Stress experienced by white males as a result of Affirmative Action” (Jacob, 2003); the “Black Professionals Employees Perception of affirmative action and organisational change” and also that of van Rensberg (1999), “Affirmative action and its role in the cycle of conflict”.

A second category of studies revolves around affirmative action in local government. These studies range from the attitude of white municipal employees of the inner West City Council to affirmative action (Rampersad 2000) to a policy framework for the implementation of affirmative action in local government (Rankhumise, 2000), as well as affirmative action in the greater Johannesburg transitional metropolitan council (Cronje 1997).

Studies conducted in the security sector forms the third category. These include a study on the affirmative action in the South African Police Services. (Pakati 2000), while two other studies mainly focus on the integration of the armed forces, (Ndlovu, 1999) and the management practice in military integration (Taole, 1997).

The fourth category consists of a number of studies on the public sector. The topics range from an evaluation of the effectiveness of affirmative action in the public service (Rabange, 2000) and the selection of affirmative action programs within the Department of Public Service (Makube, 1997) to the development of a model for the successful implementation of affirmative action in the public service (Mashile, 1999) and the fiscal constraints for the transformation of the public service (Sidloyi, 1999).
An important aspect highlighted by all these authors is that the implementation of affirmative action took place in a psychological and emotional ‘climate’ in which many public servants were deeply concerned about their jobs and the prospects in a radically changed dispensation. On the other hand, large numbers of people who, because of circumstances or personal conviction had not joined the public service previously, cherished the hope and expectation of being admitted to the new public service.

In some of the above mentioned studies such as Nesh (2003), Rampersad (2000), and Taole (1997), it is argued that the purpose of affirmative action is to uplift the previously disadvantaged and put them on equal footing with those who oppressed them. After a reasonable period of time, affirmative action will have to fall away and be replaced by the principle of equal opportunity. If affirmative action is to be successful, education and training should weigh as heavily as or even more than representativeness of a workforce. The conclusion reached is that affirmative action is of no use if the workforce is not educated or trained, since this will result in an unproductive workforce, and the country being uncompetitive in the world markets. They further state that the government’s intention to use the public service to promote a better life for all could also be adversely affected if affirmative action policies are not combined with education and training programs.

From the above brief overview, it is evident that there is a paucity of scholarly work on the study of the implementation of affirmative action in the South African context and in particular with regard to the SANDF and more specifically the SAMHS. This study aims to fill this gap.

1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The study is divided into four chapters. Chapter one provides the aim and justification of the study, the method of analysis and a discussion of the meaning of affirmative action. In chapter two the South African government’s
policy on affirmative action is discussed. This discussion is based on various White Papers such as the Transformation of the Public Service, White Paper on Defence and the White Paper on Affirmative Action. Chapter three focuses on the practical implementation of affirmative action in the SANDF and in particular the SAMHS. Chapter 4 addresses guidelines for the future implementation of the policy of affirmative action in the SAMHS, research findings and conclusions.

1.6 THE MEANING AND CONTEXT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

1.6.1 The Concept ‘Affirmative Action’

The concept of affirmative action refers to a variety of programmes and measures, characterised by attempts to redress historical gender and racial inequalities (Maphai, 1992:72). In similar vein Zwane (1995:31) defines the concept of affirmative action as referring to the redressing of historical imbalances which identify employment positions that have been inaccessible and denied to disadvantaged groups; it also includes the launch of special recruitment drives for these groups, as well as engaging in training and development.

Affirmative Action is thus a temporary intervention designed to achieve equal employment opportunity without lowering standards and without unduly trammelling the career aspirations or expectations of current organisational members who are competent in their jobs (Human 1993:3).

The justification for affirmative action in South Africa lies in its past. A section of this country’s population was denied their political and economic rights. As a result thereof the removal of all forms of discrimination and obstacles to equality of opportunity need to be addressed in the post apartheid South Africa. (Nkuhlu, 1993:11) Broad affirmative action or reduction of the racial and gender backlog is an objective that should be fully supported.
The question of how best to proceed and over what time scales is therefore a legitimate matter for debate. Affirmative action has indeed become a much discussed and rather controversial issue in South Africa. Its protagonists argue that affirmative action constitutes a crucial mechanism for overcoming racism and sexism, and its detractors argue that it will lead to reverse discrimination and hostility (Qunta, 1994:21). According to Sonn (1993:1) the advantage of affirmative action is that it will serve both the interests of the oppressed as well as the business sector. It is argued that if social relations are not changed to provide blacks with access to resources, and means to overcome the economic marginalisation of the past, patterns of economic control, ownership and management that have been produced by the apartheid system will remain unchanged even in a non-racial and non-sexist democratic South Africa (Nkuhlu, 1993:11).

Another advantage is that a large section of the population which makes use of the services of the public sector are black and they would be better served by having a black person in that position (Hugo, 1990:113). Last but not least, an integral part of symbols of independence and power is a visible presence of the ruling party's constituency in the civil service (Maphai, 1992:77).

The disadvantages of affirmative action include the haste to right the wrongs of apartheid when standards are dropped to accommodate the "right mix" (Sachs, 1993:38). The second disadvantage would be when the career aspirations or expectations of current organisational members who are competent in their jobs are unduly trammeled (Human, 1993:3). The former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, shared his sentiments on the subject when he warned that there would be no abuse of this system or shameless nepotism: "Nor are we saying just as white skin was a passport to privileges in the past, so a black skin should be the basis of privilege in the future "(Mandela, 1991).
The negative aspects of affirmative action are a matter of degree and should be balanced against the positive aspects. The degree of negativity can be substantially lessened if affirmative action programmes have the right emphasis, the right time scale and the right economic circumstances (Montsi, 1993:11).

1.6.2 Examples of Affirmative Action elsewhere in the world

Affirmative Action is not a new concept and has been undertaken in various countries. The conditions which warranted other countries to embark on this programme are also found in South Africa. As a result thereof, there are lessons that this country could learn from them. An analysis of this study is also based on these countries’ experiences. Affirmative action can mean many things. It can refer to racial preferential treatment for good reasons and could also mean the redistribution of resources and of opportunities by business to institutions of those who have been traditionally disadvantaged (Sonn 1993:1). On examining the historical background regarding the subject of affirmative action, it becomes evident that it has been tackled before in a number of countries in order to achieve equality.

United States of America
The Fourteenth Amendment to the USA Constitution guarantees equal protection under the law, but it affords relief against legislative and executive acts only, not discriminatory conduct by private parties. To remedy this situation, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964. Title VII of that legislation prohibits employers, unions and employment agencies from making employment decisions on the basis of race, sex, religion, colour and national origin.

With regard to blacks in the US Military, Caotes et al, (1998:52) point out that for the greater part of American history, blacks had served in the armed forces under varying degrees of involvement and often with constraints placed upon them. Black participation dates back to the earliest days of the Republic, when over 5,000 blacks served in the American Revolution. In the Civil War, blacks
participated in various capacities from the outset, both in strictly military and support functions. By the end of the Civil War, 400,000 blacks had participated with about half serving as soldiers and the other half as labourers. The great majority of blacks in the Union ranks served in segregated units, usually commanded by white officers. This pattern of segregation became institutionalized in the army in the decades that followed. In a reorganisation of the army after the Civil War, four permanent black regiments were created. Those units, led by white officers, fought Indians and filled outposts in the West. During this period, blacks made up about 10% of total army strength. In 1969, the then Secretary of Defence promulgated the US Department of Defence’s Human Rights Charter which stipulated the rights, worth, and dignity of every individual and reaffirmed the commitment of the Department of Defence to fair treatment of all personnel.

India
Caste inequalities (discrimination against the so-called “untouchables”) have long been a burden of Indian society. In order to redress historical imbalances, the Indian Constitution of 1950 made explicit provision for positive measures in favour of the scheduled Castes and Tribes. According to Friedman (1986) in terms of section 15(4) of the Constitution, nothing shall prevent the state from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially or educationally backward classes of citizens for the Scheduled Caste or the Scheduled Tribes.

Furthermore section 16 (14) stipulates that nothing shall prevent the state from making any provision for the reservation of appointments of posts in favour of any backward classes of citizens which, in the opinion of the state, is not adequately represented in the services under the state.

Menski (1992:43) states that although India has embarked on a well-meaning policy of seeking to achieve greater equality, the road to success is blocked by a mountain of confusion as well as scarcity of resources. On the other hand, India already has a huge pool of educated and well-trained people
many of whom are unemployed or under-employed. It would thus be unrealistic to expect the government to aspire to provide higher educational government jobs for all deserving individuals from the Other Backward Classes (OBC) category.

**Malaysia**

According to Philop (1992:28) in Malaysia statutory affirmative action policies have been adopted in favour of the Malays who currently constitute 54% of the population at the expense of the Chinese 35% and the Indians 10%. Here affirmative action is designed specifically in ethnic terms. The targeted group to be assisted by affirmative action programs belong to a particular ethnic group. A ranked social system is assumed in which ethnic and class boundaries coincide. Furthermore, the group that is expected to benefit from affirmative action programs was also the group with a preponderance of political power. This group was therefore not only in a position to implement affirmative action according to the law but also gave the law the widest possible interpretation.

**Namibia**

In terms of Article 10 of the Namibian Constitution, all persons are equal before the law and no persons may be discriminated against on the grounds of sex, race, colour, ethnic, origin, religion, creed or socio-economic status. Notwithstanding these fundamental rights, Article 23 stipulates that “nothing shall prevent Parliament from enacting legislation providing directly or indirectly for the advancement of persons within Namibia who have been socially, economically or educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices, or for the implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic and educational imbalances in Namibian society arising out of past discriminatory laws or practices, or for achieving a balanced structuring of the public service, the police force, the defence force and the prisons service”. It further states that “the enactment of legislation and the application of any policies and practices shall be permissible to have
regard to the fact that women in Namibia have traditionally suffered special discrimination and they need to be encouraged and enabled to play a full, equal and effective role in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the nation”.

Although the Namibian Constitution has created the legal space for legislative programs incorporating affirmative action, to date no such concrete legislation has actually been enacted.

1.6.3 Requirements for the successful implementation of affirmative action

As noted above, affirmative action has been practised in a number of countries and as a result thereof valuable lessons could be learned by South Africa in terms of what is required for the successful implementation of this policy. Malaysia is perhaps the closest comparator for South Africa in the sense that statutory affirmative action policies have been adopted in favour of the Malays who constitute the majority people of that country.

Puthucheary (1991:18) states that when Malaysia gained independence in 1957 it appeared to have all the characteristics required for rapid and sustained economic growth. It inherited from the colonial past a well developed infrastructure, an effective administrative mechanism and a thriving primary export sector with immense potential for expansion. According to Emsley (1996:7), the Malaysian government endeavoured to address certain direct and indirect requirements which earned them the reputation of having the world’s most extensive and one of the most successful affirmative action policies.

1.6.4 Indirect Requirements for successful affirmative action programs

Indirect requirements to be met for the success of affirmative action programs
refer to national issues which must be addressed by countries dealing with past discrimination and development issues which are not directly or pertinently related to the actual implementation of affirmative action measures themselves, but with “conditions” that are important general requirements. Such requirements include economic growth and education as will be discussed below. According to Puthucheary (1991:20), these issues were specifically addressed by the Malaysian government and contributed to the success of Malaysia’s affirmative action policies.

• Economic growth
In the economic sphere, there was a clear shift from planning and policy making based purely on economic consideration and towards an affirmative action policy based on ethnicity. This policy shift was formalised in the New Economic Policy (NEP). The overriding objective of NEP was to maintain national unity through the pursuance of two objectives: Eradication of poverty among the entire population and the restructuring of society with a view of eliminating the linkage between race and economic status. For the first objective, the overall development strategy was reformulated with the emphasis on export oriented industrialisation, and ambitious rural and urban development programs. For the second objective, long term targets were established for the Malays employed in the manufacturing industry. They were also installed in managerial positions in order to increase the Malay share in corporate assets from two percent in 1970 to thirty percent in 1990, and to have employment patterns in the urban sector reflect the racial composition of this country (Puthucheary, 1991:22). Furthermore, Malay participation in the business sector was promoted in two ways:
  · Through the expansion of the public sector where Malays held most of the key positions and
  · By providing Malays with privileged access to share ownership and business opportunities in the private sector (Puthucheary, 1996:4).

• Poverty and income inequality
Since the mid-1980s, Malaysia’s record of reducing poverty and income inequalities has undoubtedly been a success (refer to Table 2). The incidence of poverty among all households has fallen from 18.4 percent in 1984 to 13.5 percent in 1993. The most important factor underlying the reduction in poverty and increase in overall living standards has been the growing opportunities for non-agricultural work, particularly in the rapidly expanding export-oriented manufacturing industries. Progress achieved in this regard is reflected in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour Force (’000) participation rate</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total No</td>
<td>Total %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>6222</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>6409</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>6622</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>6850</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>7042</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>7204</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>7370</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>7627</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>7846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>8060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>8278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above mentioned statistics show improvements in unemployment rates between women and men. Furthermore, it is also indicative of what could be achieved in the country once there was economic growth.
• **Education**

Education was regarded as crucial to enhancing the development status of the Bumiputra. Public education expenditure was maintained at a high level and secondary enrolment was made universal (Puthucheary, 1991:31).

• **Government of National Unity**

The establishment of the Government of National Unity and the incorporation of opposition viewpoints have been important in ensuring that the Chinese and Indians have been left with sufficient economic space to make cooperation preferable to opposition. Government stability in turn has been an important reason for economic success (Emsley, 1996:9).

• **Macro-economic Management**

Macroeconomic management has also been conducted in an open way and this has resulted in economic success. The Chinese and Indians were permitted to leave with their wealth if they so wished. This offer made them willing to continue to participate in the economy Puthucheary (1991:33).

• **Export-led growth**

The Malaysian economy focused on export led growth and high employment. In this regard, efforts were also directed towards labour intensive growth by reducing the cost of labour. For foreign investors, the export processing zones in particular were made attractive. From the above requirements it is clear that long term changes for the success of affirmative action are also required with regard to improved education and a change in economic policies, (Thompson, 1993:38).
1.6.5 Direct Requirements for successful affirmative action programs

According to Emsley's (1996:10) perspective, the direct requirements for successful implementation of affirmative action programmes refer to aspects or conditions, which are directly linked to the implementation of affirmative action policies. A number of authors have identified such requirements to be met, based on past experiences in a number of countries. These are listed below as follows:

- **Quotas**

In the South African context, quotas are regarded as critical in the implementation of affirmative action because of the belief that one cannot gauge the success of that which can not be measured (Madi, 1993:16). In Malaysia on the other hand, the introduction of quotas to meet affirmative action goals have not been regarded as a positive step in reaching equality targets. They were treated in a very circumspect manner because of the belief that quotas would be difficult to be removed once instituted and would have various undesirable effects such as reducing efficiencies, creating dependency and fostering resentment, (Emsley, 1996:7).

- **Time-scales**

A further lesson to be learnt from experiences of affirmative action policies elsewhere is that a specific timeframe must be set for the duration of the affirmative action policy. The Malaysian Affirmative Action programme stretched over 20 years. Although the ultimate goals were far reaching, relatively modest targets were established for the period 1970-1990. A time span should therefore be established for the temporary intervention designed to achieve equal employment opportunities. Affirmative action must be conducted in a manner that does not lower standards and unduly trammel the
career aspirations or expectations of current organisational members who are competent in their jobs (Human, 1993:3). This point is further supported by Nesh (2003), Rampersad (2000) and Taole (1997) when they argue that the purpose of affirmative action is to uplift the previously disadvantaged and put them on equal footing with those who had oppressed them. After a reasonable period of time, affirmative action will have to fall away and be replaced by the principle of equal opportunities.

According to Nathan (1994:142), affirmative action should be designed and implemented in a manner that takes into account the arguments raised by its opponents, that putting inexperienced people into positions of authority will inevitably compromise professional standards, and undermine the morale of both black and white personnel. The primary aim of affirmative action programmes should be to train blacks rather than fill quotas. Nkuhlu (1993:12) on the other hand states that affirmative action would be futile if its only aim was to compensate for the wrongs of the past. The most obvious issue is the removal of all forms of discrimination, formal or informal, and all obstacles to equal opportunity. However, changing the laws and establishing formal equality of opportunity is not enough, there must be ways and means to tackle the more subtle and informal forms of discrimination, (Nkuhlu, 1993:13).

- **Recruitment and Selection**

Affirmative Action must be seen as increasing the pool of talent available for development. In other words, affirmative action must not be seen simply in terms of recruitment but should rather be viewed as a crucial element of the broader development of people within an organisation. Many organisations make the mistake of viewing affirmative action as an additional policy rather than as a total organisational development intervention which evaluates, and often changes, the way in which people are recruited, selected, trained, developed, promoted and retained (Human, 1993:12).

According to Human, affirmative action should take place at the selection and
recruitment stage; thereafter, all employees should be developed and promoted according to workforce, succession and career plans which take backlogs into account. Recruitment need not be the minimum entry level only; recruitment can take place at any level in the organisation as long as the individual who is recruited is competent to do the job. A check should be kept, however, on the numbers of blacks and women being provided with promotion opportunities. Special training opportunities should be provided where numbers fall short of acceptable targets. A principle of ‘promotion from within’ should be adopted whereby blacks and women are promoted to positions formerly occupied by white men.

In conclusion, (Human, 1993:7) states that the methods of selection and recruitment should be seriously evaluated and assessed in terms of predictive validity with respect to job performance. In other words, selection criteria should be job-related and not simply reflect assumptions about what is required. Furthermore, negative racial and gender stereotypes and expectations should be managed and monitored through both training and performance objectives.

**Training and Development**
According to Human (1993:10), people development should be identified as a key strategic objective and top management should be actively committed to both implementing and monitoring it. Human further argues that the development of blacks and women should be part of the general development of people within an organisation. Once in the organisation, blacks and women should be promoted according to workforce, succession, and career plans which take the backlogs of blacks and women in specific positions into account.

It is further stated by the above mentioned author that development should, however, not be seen simply in terms of providing education and training for the disadvantaged *en masse*. This is due to the fact that development
depends not only on ability but also on motivation and context. Equally important to the process of development are the expectations, prejudices, and people management skills of current managers. Furthermore, as the most significant development generally takes place ‘on the job’ rather than as a carry-over from training programmes, it is important that the context, in the form of managerial prejudice and motivation to develop subordinates, is addressed. Managers should therefore be trained in people management skills and critically evaluated on their performance in relation to the development of their subordinates. Thus the responsibility for development does not lie with the human resources department; but with each and every line manager, who should be trained to manage and motivate a diverse workforce. Furthermore, all employees should be helped to understand the process of development and their responsibility for developing themselves, (Human, 1993:12).

- Organisational Commitment

According to Thomas (1996:8), organisations should embark on experiential programmes aimed at “understanding differences, valuing differences and appreciating diversity”. The understanding of the differences approach assumes that conflict in the workplace arises from a lack of awareness and understanding among employees of the differences, which may exist, between people who are expected to work together. Thomas further argues that programmes based upon this approach have as their goals their promotion of quality relationships and promoting greater respect and appreciation of others and an acceptance of differences in colleagues. She further stresses that emphasis must be placed on the individual and his/her interpersonal issues only. As a result the organisation must provide corresponding and supportive changes in its systems and culture in order to reinforce the individual and interpersonal changes, which have been effected within the organisation.

Thomas (1996:8) further argues that if affirmative action is introduced in
isolation to the organisational environments, where management believes that a few black or female faces will make the organisation appear to look politically correct; this too will not produce the desired outcome and will result in the revolving door syndrome. This syndrome means that the company recruits blacks as a result of pressure exerted from outside and does not create conducive environment for the new recruits to develop and make a meaningful contribution to these companies, and as a result thereof, the new affirmative action appointee resigns. Such companies will again enter into a phase of dormancy which changes when outside pressure is exerted again.

- Monitoring mechanisms

Human (1993:8) advocates that a committee be established consisting of representatives from the employer, employees, and the unions. This committee’s mandate should be derived from consultations held with members of staff and results in the development of an affirmative action strategy based on an organisational assessment. The committee's main responsibility would thus be to continuously monitor, evaluate, and refine the affirmative action strategy.

From the above discussion it is clear that affirmative action is regarded as a temporary intervention designed to achieve equal employment opportunities. Personnel development and training are also perceived as critical in ensuring that the blacks who have been recruited are able to make a meaningful contribution to the organisation's objectives. A positive outcome of properly implemented affirmative action programmes can only be achieved through the better management of human resources.

1.7 CONCLUSION

The purpose of the study, which is an evaluation of the implementation of affirmative action in the SAMHS, and the justification thereof, has been discussed in this chapter. An overview of the scholarly work on affirmative
action has revealed that no research has been done on the subject of affirmative action within the SANDF and in particular the SAMHS.

The second part of the chapter focused on the concept of affirmative action. Examples of affirmative action elsewhere in the world, and the requirements for the successful implementation which then serves as the theoretical framework according to which affirmative action in the SAMHS is analysed, has also been discussed. For affirmative action policies to be successful, requirements such as the setting up of quotas, timescales, recruitment, training and development of blacks and women must be embarked upon by South African organisations. Last but not least, it is also recommended that organisations develop an affirmative action strategy which consists of a policy statement, a detailed plan including communication, monitoring and evaluation procedures.

The policy of affirmative action in South Africa was introduced by means of various policy documents and laws. The following chapter is devoted to a discussion of the South African government’s policy on affirmative action as reflected in various policy documents.
CHAPTER 2: SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

2.1 INTRODUCTION

While the previous chapter paid attention to the concept of affirmative action requirements for its successful implementation as well as its application elsewhere in the world, this chapter provides an overview and analysis of the South African government’s policy on affirmative action as set out in the Constitution, White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and the White Paper on Affirmative Action. Since this study is about affirmative action in the SANDF, and in particular the SAMHS, the policy of affirmative action as contained in the Department of Defence’s White Paper and the Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action policy documents will also receive attention.

The first part of the chapter traces the implementation of affirmative action when the Nationalist Party took over power in 1948, the involvement of non-whites in the SADF prior to 1994, a brief history of the homelands armies, including the liberation movements, and the subsequent integration of the seven armed forces. This is followed by an overview of the ANC’s pre-1994 guidelines as well as the content of affirmative action policies in the above mentioned policy documents and legislation. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the extent to which South Africa’s Affirmative Action policy meets the requirements for the successful implementation of an affirmative action policy as set out in chapter 1.

As has been noted in the previous chapter, a series of laws were adopted after 1924 to favour and economically empower whites over a wide spectrum. The Wage Act of 1925 increased wages for whites, and the Mines and Work Act of 1926 reserved certain jobs for whites (Cilliers, 1963:43). The Apprentice Act of 1944 gave control of entry to the trades to the white unions and the Native Building Act prohibited blacks from doing skills construction in the white
urban areas. Furthermore, the Asiatic Act of 1931 restricted Indians trading in Transvaal and the Pegging Act of 1943, which was amended in 1946, had the effect of curtailing Indians business in favour of whites. When the National Party came to power in 1948, Malan, the then Prime Minister passed legislation based on the principle of separate development to advance whites in general and Afrikaners in particular, to protect them against non-white competition (Adams, 1993:18).

2.2 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE SADF SINCE 1948

Mills (1994:4) states that affirmative action appears not to be a foreign concept in the South African armed forces either and further defines it as the application of preferential treatment for Afrikaners in the post 1948 UDF/SADF period. He also states that from 1948, especially under the Defence Minister Erasmus, the UDF/SADF was transformed to reflect the dominance of Afrikaner nationalism. Blacks were excluded from the armed forces whilst British influences were systematically eradicated. Official policies of bilingualism and informal affirmative action ensured that Afrikaners came to dominate the officer corps (Mills 1994:6).

After 1948, the National Party introduced vigorous affirmative action programmes for Afrikaners within the civil service, including the armed forces. A comprehensive policy was introduced by the first Nationalist Minister of Defence, F.C Erasmus, to give the armed forces “a less British, more South African flavour” (The Star, 12 March 1952). The bulk of promotions to senior rank were politically inspired, leading to many English-speakers feeling unwelcome because aspects of the British Regimental Traditions were being destroyed (Rudburn, 1958:7). As a result thereof, Lt General G.E Brink, wartime Commander of the First SA Infantry Division, was also quoted in the above mentioned article as having said that the once magnificent defence organisation had become a political toy, seething with discontent and frustration. He alleged that men without war service were being appointed to
command active Citizen's Force units "while we have witnessed the supercession, dismissal and degradation of men who played prominent and distinguished roles as leaders in the field". Pickard (1989:32) states that the government attempted to introduce a new rank system, with ranks such as Field Cornet (Lieutenant), Chief Sergeant (Staff Sergeant) and Combat General (Major General).

2.3 NON-WHITE INVOLVEMENT IN THE SADF BEFORE 1994

An overview of non-white involvement in the SADF, the establishment of homeland armies and the history of the liberation movements prior to 1994 are necessary to understand the complicated nature of the eventual integration of the armed forces after democratisation. This has a direct bearing on the implementation of the policy of affirmative action in the SANDF, in particular the SAMHS.

The involvement of blacks in the Defence Force began during the First World War, 1914 to 1919 (Cheminais, 1994:23). In 1915 the coloured infantry battalion, known as the Cape Coloured Corps, was formed. This unit served with great distinction in East Africa and the Middle East during the First World War (Le Roux, 1984:53). In the Second World War, coloured, Indian and African volunteers were deployed in a supportive capacity (Neethling, 1986:47).

Indeed, a strikingly high percentage of the troops (30% in the Second World War) who volunteered for service in both world wars were members of the Indian Malay (IM), Cape Coloured Corps (CC) or Native Military Corps (NMK). However, despite their non-combat role, a high proportion were either killed or captured, and there were also a number of cases of outstanding individual heroism (Le Roux, 1984:53).
Table 3 illustrates that a total of 82,000 Indian, Malay and Cape Coloureds volunteered to join the First World War. Of these 3,190 were killed and 73 received decorations after this war. During the Second World War the number of volunteers increased to 125,000. Of these, 3,274 were killed; 4,626 were held as prisoners of war and after the war, 57 received decorations. About 1,500 Africans were involved in both wars (Neethling, 1986:51).

After the Second World War, the government persistently restated its total opposition to blacks serving in any combat capacity. The Cape Corps, which had been upgraded to a fully fledged Permanent Force Battalion in 1947, was disbanded in 1949 and replaced by an auxiliary service battalion. In 1963, its status once more became that of a Permanent Force (PF) Coloured Corps Unit, although no coloureds were permitted to become officers or serve in an active combat capacity, (Le Roux, 1984:67).

**I. Coloured involvement**

The Rand Daily Mail (11 August 1970) reported that the Minister of Defence had stated that members of the Coloured Corps were to be used for auxiliary
services and certain work within the navy, and further added that “Under no circumstances could Coloureds serve as fighting soldiers, but they would nonetheless be taught to use weapons to protect themselves in wartime. While Coloureds and Indians would be commissioned this would not be in command of white servicemen”. The Race Relations Survey Report (1972:8) further reported that it was possible for coloured soldiers to rise to the rank of Warrant Officers. Despite difficulties experienced with large coloured recruitment, the government established voluntary special service battalions, providing coloured recruits with 10-12 months training, to be followed by posting in the Army and Navy (Heitman, 1985:26). It was ultimately envisaged that the same scheme could be extended to Indians in Natal. With these separated systems of recruitment, in the 1960s and 1970s the SADF was as racist as any institution of Verwoerdian apartheid. These comments were stated in the Race Relations Survey (1972:85).

By the mid-1970s, following Angolan and Mozambican independence, the government reconsidered its opposition to coloureds serving as fighting soldiers, and as a result the Minister of Defence at the time, P. W. Botha, announced that as soon as suitable terrain was found, the training of coloureds as infanteers would begin (White Paper on Defence, 1975:4). The Minister further stated that coloureds could now become officers and steps were taken to bring their service conditions closer to whites.

In 1977, the government approved the establishment of the voluntary Citizen Force Maintenance Unit and an Infantry Training School for coloured recruits (White Paper on Defence, 1977:3). Although the Cape Corps was now officially part of the Permanent Force, P.W. Botha stated that as long as he was Minister of Defence, large coloured units would not be established (Neethling, 1986:91). Nonetheless, by 1979, the SADF formally accepted the need to expand the army to include representatives of other population groups, and began to debate the possibility of extending compulsory national service to Coloureds and Indians. F.W. De Klerk was quoted by the Cape
Times (18 January 1982) as saying:

“You can’t ask a man to fight for his country if he can’t vote. Among the terms of the new dispensation is the guarantee that Coloured and Indians will get full voting rights. It follows that their responsibilities will increase accordingly, which means that they will hold obligations to defend these rights.”

Following the readmission of coloureds to combat status, these recruits were trained and renamed as the Cape Corps Battalion and South African Cape Maintenance Unit (Pickard 1979:19). From 1976, coloureds served combating terrorism in the operational areas and they also received invitations to join command units, whilst the (Citizen Force) Kimberley Regiment opened its doors to those who had trained at Cape Corps (Le Roux, 1984:53).

Despite the re-admission of the Cape Corps as a combat battalion, advancement of coloureds in the upper ranks of the SADF proved slow. Furthermore, limitations in accommodation and training facilities restricted their recruitment (Mills and Wood, 1993:2). There was, however, a modest increase in numbers of coloureds in the defence force because the recruitment increased to 22% in the 1982-84 periods (Race Relations Survey, 1984:745).

During June 1984 a second training unit for coloureds was opened at Nelspoort in the Karoo, which was not only to provide military training, but also skills training for those who were not educationally qualified for admission into the Cape Corps (Le Roux, 1984:53). In addition, a second Cape Corps Battalion was established during December of that year. During 1989, a third Cape Corps Battalion was established in Kimberley (Neethling, 1986:72). Symptomatic of greater integration in the defence force, the Cape Corps School for Junior Leaders was closed, as most coloureds were already receiving officer training at the existing service schools (Race Relations Survey, 1984:745).
II. Indian involvement

Mills and Wood (1993:3) state that in 1972, the South African Navy (SAN) initiated the recruitment of Indian South Africans in their service. This included national service volunteers. The Navy further created a separate training unit, the SAS Jalsena in Durban, for this purpose. Coloureds and Indians formed 20% of Permanent Force members in the Navy. Although there was little increase in the numbers of Indians in the SADF during the first half of the 1980s, this figure had risen to 13% by 1993, (Mills and Wood, 1993:4).

During 1978 the Air Force (SAAF), also began to recruit Indians starting with a modest intake of less than fifty (Heitman, 1985:116). According to the Race Relations Survey (1984:745), by 1986, two intakes totalling 150 men were taking place annually at the Jalsena. Indian sailors were employed in a variety of musterings. This included the Marines until its disbandment in 1990, and the Citizen Force SAS Inkonkoni. The government’s Coloured and Indian policy in the services thus changed from outright opposition to a gradual acceptance of their role, (Mills and Wood, 1993:7). However, it was only during the 1980s that pay and service disparities were addressed and thereafter recruitment of coloureds and Indians rapidly increased (Heitman, 1985:121).

III. African recruitment

The government’s policy towards blacks underwent similarly dramatic changes during this period (Mills and Wood 1993:6). The Rand Daily Mail (10 December 1972) reported that the Minister of Defence had announced that blacks could only serve in the auxiliary services as labourers and further stated that if the Bantu wants to build up a Defence Force, he should do it in his own eventually independent homeland.

In 1973, a group of blacks were trained at the Prisons Service Training Centre at Baviasanskloof for service as security guards in the SADF (Mills and Wood, 1993:6). Similarly, arrangements were also made to train the first black full
Permanent Force Member at the new 21 Infantry Battalion at Lenz. (Heitman, 1985:116). During the same year, the Chief of the SADF, General Magnus Malan, stated that “20% of soldiers serving in the operational area were blacks, and doing outstanding work” (Mills and Wood, 1993:8). In 1977, only 82 of 217 black applications for the Permanent Force were accepted. At this time initial intakes were small as blacks were only permitted to join commands in auxiliary capacities, for service as guards (Heitman, 1985:131).

Despite vigorous resistance from both elements in the Defence Force and within the ruling National Party, the Commandos were shortly thereafter permitted to recruit Africans for service in a combat capacity. (Neethling, 1986:16). In May 1974, African members of the combat elements of auxiliary units were divided up into regional units in line with separate development (Heitman, 1985:16). The SADF assisted with the establishment of national security systems for the envisaged homeland defence forces and involved the training of a regional battalion for each national group, later to be handed over to the new homelands (Mills and Wood, 1993:21). This process was given the greatest priority in Namibia, so that the inhabitants of that country could make a greater contribution to their own protection (White Paper on Defence, 1986:19).

By 1985, many black recruits were still being trained at Lenz, as members of 21 Battalion (Neethling, 1986:16). The SADF’s primary emphasis remained on the "development of ethnic regional units of the various national states, where after independence, such units were absorbed by the Defence Force of the independent state" (White Paper on Defence, 1986: 19). The White Paper further states that such regional units included 111 Battalion (Swazi-speaking, based at New Amsterdam), 113 (Shangaan, Phalaborwa), 114 (mixed-training, Pretoria), 115 (Ndebele, Sustershoek), 116 (North Sotho, Messina), and 121 (Zulu, Jozini); the Venda 112 battalion was handed over to that homeland to form part of the Venda National Defence Force in 1981. Two additional North Sotho battalions were formed, 117 and 118 Battalions. In line
with this, 116 Battalion was converted into a multi-ethnic unit. A South Sotho-speaking unit 151 was formed and operated in Qwa-Qwa. The White Paper on Defence (1986:21) further states that some battalions were allegedly larger than others and their strengths varied, as units completed their service contracts.

Following the outbreak of the Angolan civil war in 1975, refugees of the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) had settled in Northern Namibia as refugees (Neethling, 1986:9). By 1976, many had begun training as members of the SADF and this resulted in the establishment of the controversial 32 Battalion, which consisted of Angolans, Portuguese and other members of the SADF (Mills and Wood, 1993:6). This unit was secretly established and after Namibian independence in 1990, the 32 Battalion was relocated to South Africa, along with the 31 Bushman Battalion (Neethling, 1986:57). Both these units were disbanded during 1992 with many members being posted elsewhere within the SADF (Mills and Wood, 1993:31).

2.4 CONTINUED RACIAL IMBALANCES WITHIN THE SANDF

According to Mills and Wood (1993:41), by 1986 the SADF had 13,600 blacks within their ranks consisting of 12% African, 8% Coloured and 4% Indian. The rest, 76%, were predominantly white Afrikaners. Significantly, 47% of the full time members of the SADF in 1986 were white conscripts and approximately one-third were PF members. This would perhaps account for the government’s reluctance to scrap whites-only conscription, without which the ethnic composition of the Defence Force would be less overwhelmingly white Afrikaners (Mills and Wood, 1993:30). At this time, many of the blacks in the SADF were still serving in an auxiliary capacity, or as civilian labourers (Neethling, 1986:19).

Much as political pressure, such as mass demonstrations from within black
communities, educational qualifications and lack of training facilities limited the numbers of Africans, coloured and Indian soldiers joining the SADF, the central reason remained racial prejudice (Cawthra, 1987:69). According to the Race Relations Survey (1985:271), a major constraint on black recruitment was the lack of facilities in the early 1970s, when rigid apartheid in basic training was still enforced. The Cape Times reported (20 February 1987) that the Ministry of Defence had stated that apartheid in basic training would remain official policy for now but also hinted that some future relaxation was possible.

In 1987 after coloured intakes had been sizeably increased, blacks, coloureds and Indians constituted some 31% of the PF (Neethling, 1986:16). The situation with the border wars necessitated that the SADF consider increasing black manpower, especially for service in operational areas and the townships (Mills and Wood, 1992:7). There were signs that black forces – particularly those recruited in Namibia – were deployed in front line rows to a much greater extent proportionally than whites. This fact was reported in the Race Relations Survey (1985:428).

According to Mills and Wood (1993:31) with the onset of negotiations in the 1990's, the position of blacks appears to have changed substantially, at least numerically. They further state that disregarding traditional white national servicemen, blacks in the 1990’s outnumbered whites in the army, though the SAAF and Navy remained majority white. During this period discrimination was in terms of pay and service conditions between the various service systems (Citizen Force, PF, Auxiliary Service, Service Volunteer System and others) which were allegedly dominated by one race group over another. For example, the poorly paid Auxiliary Service was mostly black (Mills and Wood, 1992:35).

Black advancement in the SADF was slow. In 1990, there were ten black
officers in the SADF; the highest ranking African was a major in the army. Around 1993, the highest-ranking coloured officer was a brigadier, with the highest ranking Indian officer a naval Commander (Mills and Wood, 1992:39).

During 1992, the Chief of Defence Staff, Lt-General Pierre Steyn, announced that the SADF accepted the need for affirmative action in promoting blacks and further stated that whilst black advancement had hitherto been delayed owing to educational difficulties, this problem was now being redressed. This point was reiterated by the Chief of the SAN, Vice-Admiral Robert Simpson-Anderson, in March 1993 after the first two black midshipmen had graduated from the Naval Staff College in 1992, (Mills and Wood, 1993:42).

2.5 HOMELAND ARMIES

The history of the homeland armies was characterised by their close relation with and control by the SADF. The extent of their continued dependence upon the latter for supplies, logistics, intelligence, training and border defence, remained extensive. The assumption made was that these armies would remain forever indisputably loyal to the SADF (Southall 1992:8). Southall further states that apart from being intended to symbolise Bantustan statehood, they were designed mainly for internal security and for the maintenance in power of their unpopular governments. The first of such an army to be established was that of the Transkei in 1975, followed by the creation of the Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF) in 1977, the Venda National Force (VNF) in 1979 and the Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) in 1982 (Cilliers 1993:10). It should be noted that their establishment occurred shortly before these homelands were declared "independent", which further proves and emphasises the point made by Southall earlier.

I. The Transkei Defence Force
Transkei became independent in 1976. Originally the SADF did not plan to provide Transkei with anything except a home guard. Prime Minister Chief
KD Matanzima pushed for an own Defence Force and as a result the Transkei Defence Force (TDF) was established in 1975. The SADF assisted with the training of the TDF until 1978, when the then Transkei State President, Chief Kaiser Matanzima, terminated the services of Brigadier Pretorius and his seconded staff from the SADF. They returned to South Africa amidst accusations of running a parallel administration system, one for whites and another for blacks. Brigadier Pretorius had by then established a Battalion to the west of Umtata and the TDF received a gift of equipment for the infantry from the SADF (Cilliers, 1993:13).

II. Bophuthatswana National Guard
A Bophuthatswana National Guard, the precursor to the Bophuthatswana Defence Force, was trained by the SADF in time for independence in 1977, and handed over together with some equipment. Initially they performed ceremonial duties and resided directly within the Office of the Bophuthatswana President. A seconded SADF Officer, Brigadier Riekert, served as military advisor to President Lucas Mangope. Therefore Bophuthatswana Defence Force was only fully established in 1979 (Cilliers 1993:15).

III. Venda Defence Force
As was the case with the Transkei and Bophuthatswana, a defence force was established upon Venda independence in 1979, combining policing, prison and defence functions. These functions were later separated and the Venda Defence Force was established in 1982. The 112 Battalion in Madimbo was disbanded within the SADF and reorganised as the One Venda Battalion at Manenu. At that stage the Battalion constituted of three companies and was essentially a light infantry Battalion (Cilliers 1993:17).

IV. Ciskei Defence Force
The Ciskei Defence Force (CDF) originated from 141 Battalion of the SADF,
and was reorganised in 1981 with the independence of Ciskei. At that stage, it consisted of about 300 soldiers. An additional 38 members were seconded from the SADF and formed the leadership element. Initially, the seconded Officers from the SADF trained and effectively commanded the CDF. It depended on the SADF for advanced training and its budget was covered by the South African government, (Cilliers 1993:21).

Taking the history of the armed forces of the TBVC countries into consideration, it becomes clear that they represented a significant repository of black officers outside the SADF.

2.6 THE ‘OTHER’ ARMIES

During apartheid years, three liberation armies were established namely Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA) and the Azanian National Liberation Army (AZANLA). These liberation armies fell under the auspices of the ANC, PAC and AZAPO respectively. A brief overview of these armies is important because MK and APLA were also integrated into the new SANDF after 1994. Different to the homeland armies, SADF and liberation armies, was the Inkatha’s armed wing of which a brief overview will also be provided.

I. Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK)

Since its inception by the African National Congress (ANC) in 1961, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) has been a political army. It was established to fight apartheid, at a time when all other forms of resistance had either proved ineffectual or been outlawed. The form of armed struggle at the time was mainly armed propaganda, the targets being the sabotage of electricity pylons and other infrastructure. MK suffered serious setbacks with the arrest of its leadership at the Lilliesleaf farm in Rivonia where the head quarters of MK’s operations have been set up. The subsequent trial resulted in life sentences for the entire leadership including Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu. The
need to establish MK as an externally based army became an imperative.

From 1976 -1988, virtually all MK’s general training occurred in Angola. The instructors were initially Cuban and Soviet from late 1976 to mid 1978, were after MK instructors took over the training of its own cadres. This development also coincided with the establishment of more training facilities in Angola. The initial camp, Nova Katenga, situated in the south of Angola, was evacuated after an SADF air raid. Other camps were started further north of the capital Luanda. These were Quibaxe as well as Funda, Fazenda and later Pango and Caculama. The Pango camp served mainly for the preparation of cadres for infiltration and was also used for providing crash courses for underground operatives who were then re-infiltrated into South Africa. The general training of MK soldiers lasted for six months and was followed by a specialisation for another three to four months, (Motumi, 1994:1).

According to Mills and Wood (1993:5), due to security reasons, it has always been difficult to ascertain the exact strength of MK. At its peak it operated out of four camps in Angola in the 1980s, housing between 500-800 cadres. In addition, some 250 soldiers would be training abroad at any given moment; others would be operating also out of Tanzania and Zambia and within South Africa. A figure of 10 000 soldiers is a reasonable estimate during this time. It is further stated that all these men and women received basic guerrilla training in small arms, field craft and sabotage techniques. Specialised instruction was given in communications, anti-aircraft defence and artillery in the Angolan camps. Most of those selected for further training were sent abroad. Although never fully confirmed, Mills posits that from 1976 to 1986, two groups of 40 students were sent for six-month courses in the former East Germany; two groups of 60 each to the Soviet Union; and smaller units to Cuba, Ethiopia, Algeria and Yugoslavia, (Mills and Wood, 1993:6). Of these cadres, 12,000 were integrated into the SANDF on April 27 1994. This fact is reflected in the Minutes of the 16th Integration Committee Meeting.
II. Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA)

APLA was the military wing of the PAC. Lodge (1994:4) states that one source of APLA recruits seems to have been from the Western Cape Muslim community and the Islamic fundamentalist grouping, Qibla. He further states that it is estimated that 150 APLA members were trained by Libya, its principal backer, by 1986. It was reported in the Citizen 25 March, 1994 that the police estimated the size of this organisation as being 3000; this figure included 2700 members in holding camps in Tanzania and other African countries, the rest of the cadres underwent foreign training elsewhere. According to the Minutes of the 16th Integration Committee Meeting, 6,000 APLA cadres integrated into the SANDF in 1995.

III. Azanian Liberation Army

According to Mills and Wood (1993:6) little is known about AZANLA, AZAPO’s armed wing. Like APLA, AZANLA was probably only a few hundred strong. One of its principal backers was the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Army. AZAPO members have claimed that their military training facilities existed inside South Africa and attacks were regularly mounted on police stations and the like, but not reported by the authorities. Again, there are no reports of domination by any single ethnic grouping. Members of this army did not participate in the negotiation process and as a result their members did not integrate into the SANDF.

IV. Inkatha Armed Wing

The KwaZulu police acted as the armed wing of the IFP. Paramilitary units were however trained in the Caprivi Strip during 1986 by the SADF. An addition of between 5000 and 8000 IFP self-protection units (SPU) members located at the Mlaba Training Camp were the responsibility of Chief Buthelezi. The IFP has been regarded as an ally of the apartheid state since high echelons within the IFP cadre cooperated with the South African Police and the South African Defence Force, receiving both financial and logistical assistance (Zulu, 1994:6). Members of Inkatha also did not integrate into the
2.7 THE INTEGRATION OF THE DIFFERENT ARMED FORCES

On 2 February 1990, de Klerk stood before Parliament to make the traditional opening speech and did something no other South African head of state had ever done. He began to dismantle the apartheid system and laid the groundwork for a democratic South Africa by announcing the lifting of the ban on the ANC, the PAC, the SACP and 31 other hitherto banned organisations, the freeing of political prisoners incarcerated for non-violent activities, the suspension of capital punishment and the lifting of various restrictions imposed by the state of emergency. This process signified the beginning of the negotiations (Shaw, 1995:7).

Cilliers & Reichardt (1995:49) state that during 1992 and 1993, as part of the agreement reached by the negotiations on South Africa’s transition, South Africa’s Multi-Party Negotiating Forum agreed on the establishment of a Transitional Executive Council (TEC), whose task was to oversee the process of transition. Following the enactment of the TEC Act in September 1993 a number of sub-councils were established to report to the TEC, one of these being the Sub-Council on Defence. The Sub-Council on Defence’s brief was to oversee the military transition process at the political level. Central to this task was the planning of the integration of all armed formations represented at the negotiations. The ultimate goal was to design a military for South Africa, which would be affordable, effective and legitimate. The details of the integration process were hammered out by the Joint Military Coordinating Committee (JMCC), consisting of representatives from all the participating armed forces, both statutory and non-statutory. The so-called statutory forces consisted of those forces that had been established by the governments in place at the time, i.e. the SADF and the armed forces of the nominally independent homelands of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC). The so-called non-statutory forces consisted of (MK) military wing of

SANDF en bloc.
the ANC, and APLA of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

According to Shaw (1995:21) the workings of the JMCC comprised a unique joint planning exercise, involving previously implacable enemies. The JMCC elected two chairmen who took the chair in rotation, namely the Chief of the SADF, General George Meiring, and the Chief of Staff of MK, General Siphiwe Nyanda. The JMCC also appointed two co-directors to control the activities of the planning process. For detailed planning the JMCC established six working groups, one each for personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, finance and one for 'non-cardinal issues'. Each work group was staffed by persons from each of the seven military forces and made use of a facilitator to assist with the discussions.

Section 236-(8) (d) of the interim constitution of 1993 provided for the integration of members of the seven different former armed forces into the SANDF by midnight on 26 April 1994. All the personnel of the forces which, in terms of the TEC Act, had submitted a Certified Personnel Register (CPR) by midnight, automatically became members of the new force. The Minutes of the 20th Session of the JMCC reflects that the strength of the integrating forces was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Force</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SADF</td>
<td>90 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>12 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APLA</td>
<td>6 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>3 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bophuthatswana</td>
<td>3 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venda</td>
<td>2 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>2 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>120 000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 indicates that the number of the seven integrated forces consisted of 90 000 from the SADF, 12 000 from MK, 6000 from APLA, 3500 from
Transkei, 3500 from Bophuthatswana, 2800 from Venda and 2200 from Ciskei (Minutes of the 20th Session of the JMCC)

The above mentioned process resulted in a significant number of senior black officers joining the newly established SANDF. Placement boards were established to rank them according to their qualification and military experience; the British Military Advisory Team (BMET) adjudicated during the placement process.

2.8 COMPOSITION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MEDICAL SERVICES BEFORE 1994 ELECTIONS

Since this study focuses on the implementation of affirmative action in the SAMHS, it is also important to highlight the composition of the then South African Medical Services (SAMS) before the 1994 elections. This organisation consisted of white officers in the senior and middle management. Other racial groups were employed as civilians and were recruited as NCOs on the verge of the integration process. The 1993 SADF Annual Report further indicates that the SAMS consisted of white officers only (See Table 5). This indicates that the structure of the SAMS was as follows:-

Table 5: The composition of the SA Medical Services prior to 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gen</th>
<th>Lt Gen</th>
<th>Maj Gen</th>
<th>Brig Gen</th>
<th>Col</th>
<th>Lt Col</th>
<th>Maj</th>
<th>Capt</th>
<th>Lt</th>
<th>2 Lt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1630</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>1806</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 indicates that there were no blacks, coloureds and Indians officers within the SAMS before the integration process. As a result thereof, the highest ranking officer was a Lieutenant General at the time and the lowest
ranking officer a Lieutenant and they were all white.

2.9 THE ANC’S PRE-1994 GUIDELINES ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Part of the ANC’s activities prior to the 1994 elections was to formulate policies for a post democratic South Africa. Its policy guidelines (1992:48), stipulates that “in pursuance of the constitutional imperatives all organs of state at the national, regional and local levels shall pursue policies and programmes aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past discriminatory laws and practices and especially racism to create a non racial democracy”. With regards to the defence force, the policy guideline states, “the Defence Force shall endeavour to reflect the national and the gender compositions of South African society in regard to recruitment, training, deployment and promotions”. Furthermore, the ANC’s constitutional guidelines, which were later captured into the country's constitution and under the Bill of Rights and affirmative action, stipulate that the state and all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to eradicate race discrimination. The document further states that all social institutions shall be under a constitutional duty to eradicate speedily the economic and social inequalities produced by racial discrimination.

An ANC-led alliance in consultation with other key mass organisations developed the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) before it came to power in 1994. During this process, a wide range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and research organisations became actively involved in the development of this programme. As a result thereof it was viewed as a vehicle for social change. With this mandate, it was incumbent upon the elected government to implement this programme for change. Regarding the public service, the (RDP, 1994:126) states all levels of government will be expected to implement a policy that will ensure that the public service is representative of all the people of South Africa, in racial, gender and geographical terms. This document also specifically points out
that special programs will be designed to address the under-representation of specific categories of persons at different levels of the public service.

The above mentioned document further states that while the public service must be based on merit, career principles, suitability of skills, competence and qualifications, these standards should not be interpreted to promote the interests of the minority group as in the past. An extensive program of Affirmative Action should be embarked upon to achieve the kind of public service that would be truly reflective of our society particularly at the level of management and senior employees.

2.10 THE ANC GOVERNMENT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

In line with the pre-1994 policy guidelines discussed in the above section, the ANC’s intention was to eradicate all inequalities in terms of race and gender by adopting policies which would advance this agenda. Through this, the newly elected democratic government intended to bring to the heart of its administration people from those groups who had been marginalised and systematically discriminated against in the past political dispensation.

Section 212(2)(b) of the Interim SA Constitution Act 200 of 1993 stresses the need for “(a) Public Service broadly representative of the South African community”. Section 8(3) stipulates specific measures, which may be taken to “level the playing fields for persons from disadvantaged backgrounds”. Various policy documents and legislation followed in the years between 1994 and 1999 to carry into effect the broad principle of representation in public and other institutions. These include the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, the White Paper on Defence, White Paper on Affirmative Action, the Employment Equity Act and the Skills Development Act, which will be discussed below.
2.11 THE WHITE PAPER ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE

In order to create a public service that is reflective of the composition of the South African population, the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service was promulgated by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) in pursuance of constitutional imperatives. Its purpose was to look into pertinent issues and challenges that would have to be addressed within government departments and provincial administrations (White Paper, 1995:19).

The DPSA’s point of reference stemmed from the premise that the public service inherited by the new government promoted and defended the social system of apartheid. It further pointed out that the public service was characterised by a number of problematic policies and practices which, if left unchanged, could seriously compromise the ability of the new government to achieve its major goals of reconstruction and development, nation building, national reconciliation, community empowerment and democratic participation. On the issue of representativeness, the policy states that in order to meet the new and challenging tasks within which it is faced, and in particular to improve the quality and equity of service delivery, it is absolutely imperative that the public service draws upon the skills and talents of all South Africans, and derives the benefits of the broader perspectives that a more representatives service will bring (White Paper, 1995:19). This policy further emphasises the need for affirmative action by stating that the priority assigned by the government is to increase representativeness, and this would be achieved through the implementation of the affirmative action policy.

The White Paper on Transformation further states that in pursuance of the process of reconciliation, reconstruction and development, the South African public service must play a major role in the transformation process as the executive arm of the government. To fulfil its role effectively the service needs
to be transformed into a coherent, representative, competent and democratic instrument for implementing government policies and meeting the needs of all South Africans (White Paper, 1995: 17). It also pinpoints the role to be played by this sector in the provision of services, which will promote equity. Senior public service officials are responsible for implementing government policies and for managing the delivery of services. This gives them power over what the government does. If they do not support the policies of the government of the day they would simply hold back implementation, for they are in a position to delay reform initiatives (White Paper, 1995:27).

Affirmative action as stipulated in the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995:88) therefore aims to address the imbalances of the past to the point where the state departments would be broadly representative of the demographic composition of the people of South Africa. Affirmative Action is a means to an end, and equal opportunities are the desired end.

2.12 WHITE PAPER ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

It is stated that the goal of affirmative action in the public service is to speed up the creation of a representative and equitable public service and to build an environment that supports and enables those who have been historically disadvantaged by unfair discrimination to fulfil their maximum potential within it so that the public service may derive the maximum benefit of their diverse skills and talents to improve service delivery (White Paper, 1998:39).

Furthermore, the above mentioned paper also serves as testimony of the government’s commitment to the transformation of the public service into an institution whose employment practices are underpinned by equity. If further argues that the public service which is representative and draws on the talents and skills of the diverse spectrum of South African society, will not only be geared towards providing better services for all sectors of the society, but will also enjoy legitimacy in the eyes of South African people. Restoring legitimacy
and credibility through the development of a broadly representative public service has come to be seen as one of the keys to the transformation process.

Last but not least, this White Paper also stipulates that affirmative action should not be seen as actively undertaken in addition to other administrative tasks, but is seen as an essential tool for achieving the organisation’s strategic and operational goals. It follows therefore that affirmative action is not an isolated function carried out only by the specially appointed staff, but rather an integral element of every aspect of the organisation’s management practices (White Paper on Affirmative Action, 1998:67). This document further states that affirmative action programmes must contain as a minimum the following mandatory requirements:

a. Numeric Targets
The broad numeric targets set out in the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service for each of the three target groups must be translated into strategically prioritised targets for each of the Department’s occupational groups and must be broken down by race into African, coloured, Indian and white. Incremental targets must also be included for the period beyond 1999 (2005 in the case of people with disabilities) aimed at achieving full demographic representation within a specified time period.

b. Employee Profile
The White Paper on Affirmative Action (1998:61) further stipulates that departments must maintain accurate and comprehensive statistics on all employees broken down by gender, race and disability information, which is updated annually. The categories women, men, African, Indian, coloured, white and disability must be reflected in statistics collected, which will include:

- The total number of employees broken down by occupation (e.g. nurse, teacher, admin clerk) level of the position (e.g. senior nurse, grade two clerk), salary grade, notch within the grade and status as temporary or permanent employee
• The total number of employees receiving fringe benefits and the type of fringe benefits (e.g. medical aid, home loan, housing subsidy and pension).
• The total number of employees receiving monetary allowances and awards and the type of allowance or award (e.g. danger allowance, performance related pay such as merit awards, or second and third notch improvements).
• The number of employees recruited in the previous 12 months, and the occupation and level within the position to which they were recruited.
• The number of employees promoted in the previous 12 months and the level of the position to which they were promoted.
• The number and type of training and development programmes provided the number of employees and who participated in these and the levels of training provided.

The categories ‘white’ and ‘men’ must be included in the employee profile for reasons of comparison and to ensure that broad representation of all groups is being pursued. As there is a tendency not to apply the race-disability-gender categories to gender and disability information, it needs to be stressed that a race and disability analysis must be applied to the ‘women’ target group while race and gender must be applied to the ‘disability’ target group.

c. Affirmative Action Survey
The programme must include an in-depth survey, repeated at annual intervals, to assess the needs, priorities and perceptions of all staff, both within and outside the three target groups (White Paper, 1998:72).

d. Management Practice Review
The programme must include a regular review of management practices to determine whether these constitute barriers to the recruitment, retention and advancement of members of the three target groups and identify what changes are needed to remedy the defects so that an organisational culture
that respects and appreciates diversity can be developed (White Paper, 1998:76).

e. Performance Management
Implementation of and demonstrable support for the organisation’s affirmative action policies must be included in each employee’s performance assessment criteria (White Paper, 1998:81).

f. Affirmative Action Plan
Furthermore, this document stipulates that an Affirmative Action Plan must be prepared, adopted and promoted throughout the organisation. Financial and other resources must be allocated in order to achieve affirmative action’s objectives and targets. Persons’ responsible for achieving this should also be identified including monitoring and evaluation arrangement. The responsibility of key players within the department for implementing the department’s affirmative action programme must be identified; these must include all Section Heads.

g. Policy Statements
In conclusion, the White Paper stipulates that a policy statement setting out the department’s commitment to affirmative action must clearly state why the embarking on affirmative action makes business sense. The strategies to be used to recruit and retain blacks must also be outlined. This must be approved by the executing authority, marketed and communicated within the organisation and visibly displayed throughout a department or administration.

2.13 EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT 55 OF 1998

The Employment Equity act is one of the important policy documents on affirmative action, which has culminated from the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and the White Paper on Affirmative Action. This Act however, does not apply to members of the Defence Force
because the Defence Act, No 42 of 2002, excludes application to members of the SANDF. The purpose of the Employment Equity Act is to promote equal opportunities and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair discrimination.

2.14 THE WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

While White Papers were drawn up for the Public Service to use as guidelines for implementation of affirmative action, government departments such as the Department of Defence also produced their own departmental specific guidelines on the subject, based on the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and the White Paper on Affirmative Action. The White Paper on Defence (1996) states that the composition of the SANDF shall broadly reflect the composition of South Africa. To this end, Affirmative Action and equal opportunities will be introduced. The Department of Defence promulgated its policy in this regard in 1998 and referred to it as Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action.

The above mentioned document further states that the integration process, which began immediately after elections in 1994, brought together all personnel whose names appear on the Certified Personnel Registers of the statutory and non-statutory forces identified in the constitution. Furthermore, the White Paper stipulates that the Department of Defence has three governing principles for integration: all members of the SANDF shall be treated with respect and dignity; integration shall proceed in a spirit of partnership; and as required by the Constitution and there shall be no discrimination. The overarching goal is to establish a new institution, which is professional, efficient, effective and broadly representative.

According to the above mentioned document, representativeness refers to the racial and gender composition of the SANDF and to the fair integration and equitable representation of the constituents integrating forces at all ranks.
Failure to meet this goal will critically undermine the legitimacy of the SANDF (White Paper, 1996:21).

2.15 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY

The Department of Defence promulgated an instruction on affirmative action in 2002 and refers to it as Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Policy. The aim of this instruction is to address the imbalances of the past, to protect individuals/groups against unfair discrimination, and to ensure an equitable employment environment. (DOD Instruction, 2002:3). The objectives of this policy are to ensure that proactive measures are taken to create a Department of Defence which is broadly representative of the population that it serves. Uniformed members can take legal action against the Department of Defence using this policy document as reference.

The Department of Defence’s Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Policy document further declares that its intention is to break decisively with the discriminatory and under representative policies and practices of the past and instead fully supports the principles, policies and practices outlined in this document. It is also stated that the Department of Defence will take reasonable steps to consult in an attempt to reach agreement on every Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Programme that will ensue from this Policy as required by law. The Department of Defence will further ensure that its members/employees’ statutory rights are protected and that all its activities are conducted according to Constitutional principles (DOD Instructions, 2002:5).

The Department of Defence’s policy outcome is to ensure that equal opportunities practices enhance mission readiness of the SANDF at all times. All military personnel must be provided with opportunities to advance to the highest level of responsibility possible based on their individual ability and
diligence. The Department of Defence will strive to create an environment which values diversity and fosters respect and dignity amongst all persons serving in this organisation. The provisions of this policy are applicable to all members of the SANDF and including its civilian employees whether in the Full Time Component, or the Reserved Force (DOD Instruction, 2002:7).

On examining the government's policies regarding the implementation of affirmative action in all state departments, it becomes apparent that clear guidelines have been issued. The onus is therefore on the leadership to ensure that these policies are adhered to.

2.16 EVALUATION OF SA GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Affirmative action policies have been introduced in a number of countries, some with greater success than others. As a result thereof, an evaluation of SA government's policies in terms of the Malaysian experience would be made. This is because Malaysia can be closely compared to South Africa in the sense that statutory affirmative action policies were adopted in favour of the Malays who constitute the majority people of that country. The stipulated requirements for successful implementations were cited in section 1.6.3 as the following:

- Quotas

In Malaysia quotas were treated in a circumspect manner because they believed they would be difficult to be removed once instituted, and would also have undesirable effects such as reducing efficiencies, creating dependency and fostering resentments. In the South African context, the government stipulated in all its policy documents (RDP; White Paper on Defence; Constitution; White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and the White Paper on Affirmative Action), that the Public Service must be broadly representative of the South African Community. In this regard, the government guidelines are that 64.6% must be African, 24.3% white, 10.1% coloured and
1% Indian. However, much as the government’s policy guidelines are clear in this regard; in practise quite the contrary can be observed.

- Timescales
In Malaysia, timescales were deemed fit for the temporary intervention designed to achieve equal employment opportunities. As a result thereof, their affirmative action programme stretched over twenty years, and modest targets were established for the period 1970 – 1990. In the South African context, the ANC government has stated in its policy documents that by 1999, Public Service senior management positions must be 50% black and 30% to be occupied by women. Unfortunately this requirement could not be met during the specified period.

- Training and Development
Education was regarded as crucial to enhancing the development status of the Bumiputra in Malaysia. Scholars on the subject of affirmative action have also emphasised that people development should be identified as a key strategic objective, and top management should be actively committed to both implementing and monitoring it. In the South African policy documents, people development is also regarded, as a key strategic objective within organisations. The government has also stressed that this responsibility should lie with each and every line manager. It is further stated that line managers should also be trained to manage and motivate a diverse workforce. The lack of effective service delivery in some areas creates the impression that some people placed in strategic positions have not been adequately empowered to tackle the task at hand.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned factors it becomes apparent that the South African government has recognised the requirements for successful implementation of affirmative action as experienced elsewhere before formulating its own. As a result thereof, it seems one of the problems be-devilling this country is the inadequate enforcement of laws and
implementation of policies.

2.17 CONCLUSION

This chapter has firstly provided a brief background on the situation of the armed forces prior to 1994, and the subsequent integration of the seven statutory and non-statutory forces into the new SANDF. An overview of the government's policies of affirmative action has also been made and it states explicitly that in order for the Public Service and the SANDF in particular to gain legitimacy, its membership must be representative of South Africa's demographics in all rank levels. Lastly, guidelines which have been provided by scholars and lessons learned elsewhere regarding successful implementation, such as use of quotas, timescales, training and development have also been reviewed, and the deduction made is that the South African government has taken these experiences into consideration prior to formulating its own policies in this regard.
CHAPTER 3: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE SANDF AND THE SAMHS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Having discussed the government’s policy on affirmative action in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the practical implementation of the affirmative action policy in the SAMHS as stated in section 1.2. The SAMHS is part of the SA National Defence Force, which is part of the Department of Defence, and as such is expected to comply with and implement government policy.

This chapter consists of three broad sections. The first section will specifically focus on aspects such as the rules and regulations governing the practical implementation of this policy in terms of the selection and recruitments policy, set targets in terms of race and gender including guidelines to promotions and the maintenance of standards.

The second part of the chapter focuses on whether the requirements for successful implementation as experienced elsewhere, have been considered within the SAMHS. These include quotas, timeframes, training and development. The last section deals with the extent to which the policy of affirmative action has changed the face of the SAMHS during the period 1995-2000.

3.2 APPLYING THE POLICY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

As stated in section 2.7, the Interim Constitution of 1993 provided for the integration of members from seven different armed forces into the new SANDF by midnight on 26 April 1994. The sunset clause adopted during South Africa’s political negotiations under the banner of the Joint Coordinating Military Council (JMCC), stated that the old guard could keep their jobs in the new democratic dispensation. This point is reflected in the 25th Minutes of the JMCC. This therefore meant that any radical programme to address personnel changes would be ineffective because ex SADF members were assured of
their positions during the first five years of democracy.

I. Integration of forces

From 1994 onwards hundreds of members of the six integrating forces, with the exception of the SADF, appeared before the Placement Board. This Board consisted of senior representatives from the integrating armies. Its brief was to place members into the new SANDF with the adjudication of the British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT). The ranks of former guerrilla cadres were initially determined by their Commanders and thereafter confirmed in the Placement Board. Each member had a choice whether to integrate into the Army, Air Force, Navy or the SAMS. The criteria used were based on command experience, seniority, educational qualifications, military training, military qualifications and the length of services within the guerrilla movements. This information is reflected in the (Minutes of the 5th Meeting of the Integration Committee).

Right from the start it became apparent that the entire SA National Defence Force would have to undergo group therapy to help members bond and cope with the stress of integration. The biggest challenge facing the SANDF during the period of integration was to promote positive attitudes, break down the stereotypes that members had of each other, find a new identity and create group cohesion that would create a unified defence force. The previously implacable enemies were now expected to work together towards a common goal. This situation demanded that conflict be managed accordingly, in order to promote efforts towards national reconciliation and nation building.

Every member of the SANDF from Private to General were put into groups under the supervision of the Directorates Psychology and Social Work to go through intensive self examination, confrontational role-play and team building. This psycho-social program consisted of a five-day intervention during which the following areas were covered:

- Communication which entailed finding and promoting effective ways of communicating.
- Emotional diffusion focused on past feelings, perceptions and stereotypes about each other.
- Cultural diversity addressed the management and understanding the differences among the new SANDF members.
- Group unity focussed on building cohesion among the new members of the SANDF (White Paper on Defence, 1996:15).

The success of this program depended on the ability of the Officers Commanding to implement it on decentralised basis at unit level. This entailed the identification of facilitators, resources and the availability for members to get together and deal with the specific challenges facing their units. Participation in this program was aimed at ensuring that a better understanding of the changed situation would lead to productive and professional working relations.

In terms of the Defence Review Document (1998:6), the DOD needed to embark on the restructuring process because the change in the environment indicated that South Africa was not under threat of aggression from outside. Secondly, the integration process, which has resulted in a 120,000 strong SANDF, was deemed unnecessary during peace times. The Defence Review Document further indicated as mentioned previously, that representivity in the SANDF should be reflected in the following manner, 64% African, 24% white, 10% Coloured and 2% Indian. Packages were then offered to whites who wanted to leave this organisation at the time. The exit of some whites from the SANDF was to be regarded as an opportunity to make the organisation representative of the country’s demographics (Defence Review, 1997:27). The reality on the ground reflected that only few highly skilled whites took the package and thereafter secured jobs for themselves in the private sector.

The other important point to note is that during this period many of the senior black officers were busy with their Bridging Military Training, a process that entailed the conversion of guerrilla skills into conventional warfare. As a result thereof they were not involved in the restructuring process, and thus could not
influence the process of ensuring the representation of blacks in all rank levels. Much as there were already qualified blacks that could be appointed into the vacant posts, this opportunity was not utilized; instead it was utilized to promote whites that chose to remain. For example, a new post, which was created after 1994, the directorate of Occupational Health and Safety, was subsequently filled by a white former SADF male. The restructuring process seems to have maintained the status quo because the SAMHS still remained white at the top.

II. Recruitment

During the integration process a moratorium was placed on the recruitment of new personnel because the focus at the time was to integrate all members from the seven armies into the SANDF. A process of reviewing policies so that they could be aligned with the new Constitution also began. As a result thereof the new DOD Instruction (No 52/02:18) espoused that recruitment, selection and appointment should be executed in compliance with the relevant regulatory criteria for representivity, and special attention should be given to the following:

- **Specialised Musterings**
  The objectives of attaining the representivity reflected in the Defence Review were to be complied with in terms of specialised musterings as well. The recruiting staff was therefore instructed to find innovating ways to increase representivity in mustering such as pilots, navigators, naval combat officers, engineers and health professionals.

- **Middle Management**
  Cognisance was also taken of the fact that the DOD’s middle management was predominately white and male. In terms of a working definition middle management includes the rank levels of Maj/Lt Cdr, Col/Capt (SAN) and Sgt/PO – WO1). This state of affairs was as a result of the historical and division imbalances of the past. Service Chiefs were therefore mandated to
ensure that representivity would be ensured.

- **Entry Level**

Contrasted against a predominantly white middle management, the SANDF experiences an anomaly at the other end of the employment scale, namely a predominantly black and especially African composition amongst the ranks groups Pte/Sea – Cpl/LS. Private/Airmen/Seamen. Currently the SANDF comprises of 97.4% blacks and 2.6% whites at this level. Of these 82.6% are men and 17.4% women. The low percentage in the representation of women stems from the fact that previously SADF policies did not permit women to serve in the armed forces, they were mainly appointed as civilians and in support mustering. This is in contrast to the practice in the liberation armies where women fought side by side with their male counterparts. As a result thereof, the DOD Instruction (No. 52/02:18) stipulated that resources should be employed to attract more women and young white persons, as well as more coloureds and Asians to normalise the composition at lower levels (DOD Instruction, No 52/02:18).

### III. Promotion

The DOD Instruction (No 21/01:4) states that promotion is regarded as an integral part of personnel management and career development of various members of the SANDF. This policy further states that promotion is the formal recognition of the fact that a member has been properly developed and is empowered to perform the functions and accept the responsibilities on a higher rank level.

However, due to the unique requirements of the military, the SANDF has to promote people from within for the filling of vacancies at middle to senior levels. This implies that the application of the promotion policy is expected to adhere to the requirements of achieving representivity within the SANDF. The qualitative requirements for promotion include academic, military and diversity management training.
• **Academic Training**
The DOD adheres to statutory prescripts, academic and professional qualifications for different post levels. This therefore implies that any relaxation of these academic requirements for promotion has to be approved by the Chief of the SANDF. However, the specific qualification prescribed by statutory controlling bodies for certain mustings, for example doctors, nurses, social workers etc, fall outside of the Head of the Department or Chief SANDF’s jurisdiction.

• **Military Qualifications**
The above mentioned DOD Instruction also specifies the requirements for military qualification for each functional classification or occupational class, for example, infantry, personnel, technical, etc. These requirements include functional training; for example, infantry training or flying training for pilots, as well as specified military development courses for staff training. Higher academic and technical education is to be converted to changing technology and may also be specified as a military development requirement.

• **Military Development Courses.**
The DOD Instruction No 21/01:4 further stipulates that in order to ensure that members are able to function at the next higher rank they are expected to pass the Executive National Security Programme (ENSP) military development courses, in addition to any functional specific requirements, before being considered for promotion to Brigadier General/Rear Admiral (Junior Grade). However, the ENSP is also regarded as a promotional requirement, if the post description specifically states it as a requirement.

Colonels/Captains (SAN) on the other hand are expected to undergo a Senior Command and Staff Course (SCSC) or a similar qualification, which has been approved, to be on equal standing with the SANDF’s as accredited by an approval body under control of the Chief of Joint Training. The military rank of Lieutenant Colonel/Commander (military Practitioners) is expected to undergo a Junior Staff Course, or in the case of Reserve Force (Res F) members, a
qualifying course as prescribed by the respective Chiefs of the Services and Divisions. For the Military rank of Lieutenant Colonel/Commander an equivalent functional qualification prescribed by the relevant Personnel Management Code (PMC) for statutory occupational groups is required.

IV. Diversity Management Training
According to the DOD Instruction (No 00001/98:54), all DOD personnel are expected to undergo periodic and mandatory training in equal opportunities and affirmative action from entry level which is the basic military training up to the national executive security programme which is meant for Generals and Admirals. The diversity management training is to be conducted because of the South African nation's differences in terms of language, religion and culture is to be conducted because the DOD is a macrocosm of the country's society. Commanders at all levels are required to be mindful to take diversity which may adversely affect or promote work performance into account when making command decisions. Such decisions must also be justifiable in terms of other relevant prescript and operational requirements.

The above-mentioned DODI further stipulates that SANDF members must be treated equally irrespective of their gender and a gender neutral environment must also be created throughout the DOD. Any discriminatory practices or attitudes, past and present, involving women serving in all roles, including combat, must be identified and dealt with in accordance with this policy. The DODI concludes by stating that all teams, delegations and any other groupings must also give due consideration to ensuring mission accomplishment, yet paying attention to gender representivity.

V. Maintenance of standards
In terms of the DOD Instruction (21/01:32) all members of the SANDF are given job descriptions in order to guide their performance and ensure that the organisational objectives are achieved. Commanders/Managers are expected to monitor individuals' performance and provide quarterly reports. A performance assessment system is available and used to provide guidance
with regard to a member’s development and career planning. Confidential reports on work performance and general day-to-day conduct are written on yearly basis and are thus used as criteria to determine an individual potential for promotion.

VI. Experience and Minimum Period in the Rank

The fore-mentioned DODI also stipulates that in order to gain experience and be considered for promotion to the next higher rank, members are required to serve a minimum period in every rank (see below). However, this is not the only criterion to consider and many members, especially in the middle to senior levels, remain in their ranks for longer than the minimum period. Where a member does not gain the required experience for example, as a result of prolonged absence, the relevant promotion authority may withhold the promotion of that member until the requirements are met.

The DODI indicates that in terms of the Non-Commissioned Officers the minimum period is as follows:-

- Private to Lance Corporal = 1 year
- Lance Corporal to Corporal = 1 year
- Corporal to Sergeant = 3 years
- Sergeant to Staff Sergeant = 3 years
- Staff Sergeant to Warrant Officer Class II = 3 years
- Warrant Officer Class II to Warrant Officer Class I = 3 years.

It is further stated in the DODI that in terms of the Officer Corps the minimum period is as follows:

- Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant = 1 year
- Lieutenant to Captain = 3 years
- Captain to Major = 3 years
- Major to Lieutenant Colonel = 3 years
- Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel = 3 years
• Colonel to Brigadier General = 2 years
• Brigadier General to Major General and all higher ranks, no minimum time periods are prescribed.

The above-mentioned rules and regulations govern the practical implementation of affirmative action within the SANDF and SAMHS. As a result thereof, it becomes imperative to gauge the extent to which the DODI have been adhered to and also to explore reasons for their violations.

3.3 RACIAL AND GENDER PROFILES OF THE SAMHS IN 1994 - 2000

As stated in chapter 1 (section 1.2) the SAMHS was established because members of the defence force risk physical, psychological and social exposure injuries, disablement or death in service of their country. As a result this organisation’s core business is to provide a comprehensive, multidisciplinary military health service that ensures a healthy military community (SAMHS Strategy, 2000:9). The SAMHS has units in all the nine South African provinces and they are referred to as Area Military Health Units. Of these seven are headed by white ex SADF males and two, Western Cape and KZN by blacks, one is a former Apla and the other from the former Ciskei homeland. Three military hospitals are found in Pretoria, Western Cape and Bloemfontein, namely 1, 2 and 3 Military hospitals respectively. White former SADF males head 2 and 3 Military Hospitals, whilst a black former MK male heads 1 Military Hospital.

Other SAMHS Units are the Military Health Base Depot (MHBD), the Institute for Maritime Medicine (IMM), the Military Psychological Institute (MPI) and the Veterinary Institute (VI). White former SADF males head all of these. The Reserve Force Battalion Groups consist of group one, group three and group six. White former SADF males with the exception of 1 Medical Battalion Group headed by a black former MK male command two of these. These are all the Units, which enables the SAMHS to provide decentralised support to the
SANDF. The composition of the SAHMS structure during the period under review is thus reflected below in Table 6.
Table 6. Composition of the SAMHS structure during the period 1995 -2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANKS</th>
<th>ASIANS</th>
<th>AFRICANS</th>
<th>COLOURED</th>
<th>WHITES</th>
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<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>TO</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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</table>
Table 6 reflects that the SAMHS consisted of 5167 members from all races during the period under review. Of these 58 are Asians, 2621 are Africans, 451 Coloureds and 2037 whites. On examining the structure further, it is evident that in terms of the senior ranks, the majority of these are occupied by former SADF members and the black majority is found in lower ranks. It is however important to note that one of the Maj. Generals reflected in the above mentioned structure was an African male from former MK who subsequently became the Surgeon General from 1 December 1997 on the retirement of the previous incumbent.

During his period in office, the new Surgeon General could not do much to pursue transformation within the SAHMS because the old guard's jobs were still secured. As a result thereof, his second in command and advisors ended up being white members from the former SADF, and they were not interested in the furtherance of this Agenda. Out of the 23 staff officers who were newly promoted into the new SAHMS structure, only 6 were black (See Table 6). Lt. Gen. Themba Masuku passed away on 04 April 2000 and was replaced by his second in command, Lt. Gen. Rinus Jansen Van Rensburg.

From the above discussion, it is apparent that the nature of affirmative action in the SAMHS was as a result of the integration process. The challenge facing this organisation would thus be to ensure that the black majority are represented in senior ranks as well.

3.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL

At its headquarters, the SAMHS consists of different directorates whose purpose is to formulate policies which would not only be aligned to the national government's but also address the SANDF's mission readiness issues. The SAMHS organisational structure as reflected in its Strategy Document (2000:19) is outlined in Diagram 1 below.
Diagram 1: STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE SURGEON (SG)

Surgeon General
White ex SADF male

WO SAMHS
IG SAMHS
DMH Plan
White ex SADF male
White ex SADF male
White ex SADF male

CD Def Advisor
CD MHF Prep
CD MHF Support
White ex SADF male
White ex SADF male
White ex SADF male

SSO Med Legal
Reserve Force
White ex SADF male
White ex SADF male

D Med
Indian ex MK male

D Psych
White ex SADF male

D OHS
White ex SADF male

D Anc Health
White ex SADF male

D Env Health
White ex SADF male

D Anim Health
White ex SADF male

SSO Pastoral Service
White ex SADF male

D Nurse
White ex SADF female

D Nurse
White ex SADF female

D PTSR
African ex MK male

SSO Med Supp Ops
White ex SADF male

D Soc Work
African ex MK female

D Pharm
White ex SADF male

D Oral Health
White ex SADF male

D MHHR
African ex APLA female

SSO Pat Admin
White ex SADF female

SO1 Int
African ex MK female

SSO CorpComm
White ex SADF female

SO1 CI
White ex SADF male

Budget Manager
White ex SADF male

SSO HI
White ex SADF female

SO1 Foreign Relations
White ex SADF female
As shown in Diagram 1, the Surgeon General (SG) is at the helm of the SAMHS. According to the SAMHS Strategy (2000:18), the SG and staff ensure the provision of combat ready medical forces and operationally ready infrastructure, as well as the provision of health maintenance services to the DOD. They furthermore develop and update health policy for the DOD and participate in developing the overall DOD policy. The SG also participates in the formulation of national health policy as DOD representative on various statutory and national health bodies. His immediate staff officers consist of the Warrant Officer (WO), who manages all the other ranks in the SAMHS and provides advice concerning discipline, dress codes and uplifting of morale. Inspector General (IG) whose responsibility is to ensure that policies and procedures are followed to the letter, Staff Officer Med-Legal (SSO Med-Legal), addresses all legal issues relating to health care, Director Military Health Plan (DMH Plan), is responsible for all planning activities related to the SAMHS through environmental scanning, costing and strategy forecasting, Chemical and Biological Defence Adviser (CD Defence Adviser) is responsible for CBD policy and, rendering advise on related matters and interprets international agreement and national legislation in this regard. Directorate for Occupational Health and Safety (DOHS) is responsible for drafting policy regarding Occupational Health and safety in the DOD in compliance with the OHS Act 85 of 1993. The Director Reserve Force is responsible for the recruitment of health professionals working outside the Defence Force so that they could be called up whenever the country is in need of extra military personnel. As pointed out in the diagram 1, the Surgeon General’s staff officers are all white former SADF males.

Under the Surgeon General there are two chief directors (or Major Generals). The one Major General’s main function is to perform duties necessary to manage the statutory disciplines of the SAMHS leads chief directorate Military Health Force Preparation (CDMHFP). He is also responsible for force preparation in terms of ensuring that there are constant ready health professionals to support the fighting forces, which are the Army, Navy and Air
Force. Under CD Military Health Force Preparation there is a Director Medicine (D Med) Director Psychology (D Psych), Director Occupational Health and Safety (DOHS), Director Ancillary Health (D Anc Health), Director Environmental Health (D Env Health), Director Animal Health (D Anim Health) and Staff Officer Pastoral Service (SSO Pastoral Service), Director Nursing (D Nursing), Director Physical Training Sports and Recreation (D PTSR), Staff Officer Medical Support Operations (SSO Med Supp Ops), Director Social Work (D Soc Work), Director Pharmacy (D Pharm) and Director Oral Health (D Oral Health).

As further stated in the SAMHS Strategy (2000:19), the main function of the CD Military Health Force Support’s (CDMHFS) is to manage the support disciplines of the SAMHS in order to provide support to the SANDF in terms of landward and maritime defence capabilities. This Chief Directorate consists of a Director Military Health Human Resource (D MHHR), Staff Officer Patient Administrator (SSO Pat Admin), a Staff Officer Intelligence (SO1 Int), Staff Officer Corporate Communications (SSO Corp Comm) and Staff Officer Counter Intelligence (SO1 CI), Director Military Health Logistic (D MH Log), a Budget Manager, a Staff Officer Health Informatics (SSO HI) and a Staff Officer Foreign Relations (SO1 Foreign Relations). The total number of SAMHS directors is 23 of whom only six are black. They are the Chief Director Military Health Force Preparation, the Directors of Medicine, Social Work, Human Resources, Staff Officer Counter Intelligence and the Director Sports & Recreation.

According to the SAMHS Strategy (2000:19), both CD Military Health Force Preparation (CD MHFP) and CD Military Health Force Support (CD MHFS) hold separate meetings once a month to address matters which affect the organisation’s core business and meet bi-monthly in meetings chaired by the Surgeon General.
As reflected in Table 6, the office of the Surgeon General predominantly consists of former white SADF members in senior ranks. Out of the 23 directors, 17 are white and 6 black. It is therefore apparent that the present numbers of blacks within this organisation are purely as a result of the integration process. It therefore means that transformation has not taken place, five years since the promulgation of affirmative action policy.

3.5 PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED IN IMPLEMENTATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

On examining the above-mentioned structures, it is apparent that affirmative action targets have not been reached. There are various reasons for this, of which the sunset clause is the most important. This clause adopted during the political negotiations in Kempton Park stated that the old guard could keep their jobs in the new dispensation (this point is reflected in the 20th Minutes of the JMCC Meeting). It therefore meant that any radical programme to address personnel changes would be ineffective because former SADF officers have been assured of their positions during the first five years of democracy.

Furthermore, in the previous chapter (section 2.13) it is stated that the Department of Defence also produced its own departmental specific guidelines regarding affirmative action based on the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service and the White Paper on Affirmative Action. The DOD's corporate policies should thus be aligned with those of the National governments' and should also be applicable to the four services, which are the Army, Air force, Navy and the SAMHS.

The White Paper on Defence (1996:26) states that the composition of the SANDF shall broadly reflect the composition of the people of this country at all levels. This document further state that to this end affirmative action and equal opportunities will be introduced. The Department of Defence promulgated its operational policies in this regard in 1998 and referred to it as Equal
Opportunity and Affirmative Action. The wording of this policy is a deviation from the norm because in the South African context, the historical imbalances of the past must first be addressed before all members can be treated equally. The Defence Review has pronounced that there should be equitable representation of the constituent integrating forces in all ranks. The DOD’s position can thus be regarded as a violation of the government’s policy. Failure to meet this goal will critically undermine the legitimacy of the SANDF (White Paper 1996: 21).

3.6 EVALUATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICY BY MEANS OF EXPERIENCES ELSEWHERE

On reflecting on the requirements for successful implementation as supported by scholastic work and lessons learnt from elsewhere stated in section 1.6, it becomes apparent that these have not been considered by the SAMHS. As a result thereof an analysis regarding the situation within this organisation will be made based on these set requirements.

**Quotas**
The Malays regarded quotas as undesirable because of their belief that it would reduce inefficiencies, create dependency and foster resentments.

**Time scales**
The Malaysian affirmative action programme stretched over twenty years, and modest targets were established for the period 1970 - 1990. This time scale of 20 years was deemed fit for the affirmative action in Malaysia. There was consensus that affirmative action would only last for 20 years and not beyond that period. In terms of the South African government's policy, the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (1995: 36) stipulates that within four years 1994 –1999 the management echelons of all state entities must be at least 50% black and consist of 30% women. This target could not be achieved because the sunset clause stated that the old guard jobs should be secured during the first 5 years of democracy. Furthermore, primary
evidence also confirms that no time frames were set for affirmative action programs to be implemented within this organisation.

**Training and development**

In section 1.6.5, Human (1993:12) states that people development should be identified as a key strategic objective and top management should be actively committed to both implementing and monitoring it. She further stated that personnel development must take place on the job. Within the SAMHS, the training that was planned during the period under review focussed mainly on the conversion of the guerrilla warfare skills into conventional warfare.

Furthermore, the lack of training and development was also exacerbated by the fact that it was agreed during the negotiations that former SADF systems and procedures will be used after integration (this point is reflected in the 30th Minutes of the JMCC Meeting). As a result thereof former SADF members were placed in advantageous positions because they understood the systems very well, while these were new to the other integrating forces. Last but not least, former SADF members did not see it as their responsibility to familiarise the newcomers with their systems and procedures. Primary evidence reveals that this state of affairs made black members from the liberation armies to feel like they were being absorbed into the SADF. It is therefore obvious that people development was not identified as a key strategic objective after the new dispensation. As a result thereof an opportunity to build capacity for the future was lost at the early stage of the integration process. Line managers did not see it as their responsibility to inform their subordinates about available resources so that they could be able to pursue full time studies in health related fields such as medicine, nursing and physiotherapy.

**Organisational commitment**

Thomas has stated in section 1.6.5 that organisations should not introduce affirmative action in isolation to organisational environments where managers believe that a few black or female faces will make the organisation appear to look politically correct, and further recommends that organisations conduct
programmes aimed at understanding and valuing differences amongst its personnel. On examining the situation in the SAMHS, primary evidence confirms that white officers were not adequately prepared to work with blacks as equals before the integration process. As a result thereof, tensions were experienced in the workplace because of lack of common understanding. This indicates that there was no organisational commitment.

**Establishment of monitoring mechanisms**

Human in section 1.6.5 further advocates that a committee be established consisting of representatives from the employer, employee, and the unions. This committee's mandate should be derived from consultations held with members of staff. Within the context of the DOD, a Chief Directorate Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action (CD EOAA) has been established at the defence headquarters, and its mandate is to monitor the implementation of affirmative action within the DOD. This directorate has unfortunately not been given the necessary authority to take corrective measures and to hold the Service and Divisions Chiefs accountable for the non-implementation of the government's policy on affirmative action. Primary evidence therefore confirms that a committee to monitor the implementation of affirmative action was not established.

### 3.7 CONCLUSION

In the first part of the chapter it has been established that the number of blacks in the SAMHS structure is not as a result of a policy of affirmative action but as a result of the integration of senior black officers from liberation movements and the TBVC homelands. The sunset clause adopted during the political negotiations seems to have contributed in preventing the implementation of affirmative action policy because the old guards' jobs were secured during the first 5 years of the new dispensation.

The Defence Review and the DOD Instruction stipulate that the SAMHS
should reflect representivity in terms of the country's demographics at all rank levels. However, when examining the organisation's structure during the period under review it becomes apparent that white former SADF males are in the majority and also occupy strategic positions.

The DOD's promulgation of the Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action policy has also created a false impression that the playing ground has been levelled and as a result thereof, integrated members can compete equally. Last but not least, the fact that no monitoring and evaluation mechanisms have been placed has also contributed to the non-implementation of this policy. Commanders and Directors have not incorporated affirmative action into their management practice review process. It therefore means that the implementation of affirmative action is not considered as one of the criteria in their performance assessment. As a result, no one can be held accountable for the violation and non-implementation of affirmative action within the SAMHS. The concluding chapter provides guidelines for a more effective implementation of affirmative action policy in the SAMHS.
CHAPTER 4: GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WITHIN THE SAMHS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In chapter 1 attention was paid to the concept of affirmative action, requirements for its successful implementation as well as its application elsewhere in the world. In the second chapter, an overview and analyses were provided of the South African government's policy on affirmative action as set out in the Constitution, the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service, the White Paper on Affirmative Action, the Department of Defence’s White Paper, the Defence Review and the Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action Policy promulgated by the DOD. Chapter 3 examined the nature and practical implementation of the policy of affirmative action in the SAMHS. This chapter will thus provide guidelines for the future implementation of this policy based on the weaknesses pointed out in chapter 3. Despite the problems related to the SAMHS questionnaires on the issue of affirmative action (see chapter 1), this chapter will nevertheless refer to the responses of participants in order to highlight and support the discussion and recommendations. The responses at the very least provide some insight into the perceptions of those members who completed the questionnaires even though responses were received mainly from black staff members.

4.2 SAMHS’ LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE GUIDELINES FOR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

As stated in section 1.6.3, affirmative action has been practiced in a number of countries, some with greater success and as a result thereof valuable lessons were noted by the South African government in terms of what is required for the successful implementation in this country. Malaysia can be closely compared to South Africa in the sense that statutory affirmative action policies were adopted in favour of the Malays who constitute the majority
people of that country. The direct requirements for successful implementation of affirmative action were identified by the Malaysian government as the setting of quotas, timescales, training and development. The South African government too, has also taken some of these factors into consideration in the formulation of its policies. However, on examining the situation within the SAMHS, it becomes evident that the limitations in policy implementation were as a result of the following:

- **Lack of knowledge of the affirmative action policy**
  It was clear from the questionnaires that 28.2% of the respondents from former black SADF and TBVC homelands in lower ranks were not aware of the existence of the policy of affirmative action. 12.8% of white former SADF members and 50% of black members in senior and middle management levels confirmed their knowledge of the affirmative action policy.

Taking into consideration the literature reviewed in section 1.6.5 where Human (1993:12) stipulates that the successful implementation of affirmative action requires the involvement of staff in the formulation of such a policy, it becomes obvious that the SAMHS has overlooked this important factor because black members in lower ranks have not been informed about the existence of this policy. Furthermore whereas the government policy clearly indicates that the historical imbalances of the past must be redressed through affirmative action before everyone is treated as equals, the DOD policy on the other hand refers to Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action. This DOD's reference to affirmative action is a deviation from the norm hence there is confusion and lack of knowledge amongst members in lower ranks. Taking into consideration the fact that the South African government's policy stipulates that all state entities need to be representative of the country's demographics, this implies that the SAMHS must also comply with this stipulation. Therefore, in order to achieve any success in implementing affirmative action strategies, it is imperative for the SAHMS to engage in broad consultations within all levels of this organisation in order to sell the
concept of affirmative action to their members. This process should also result in the name change of the DOD's policy because there can never be equal opportunities unless affirmative action and the historical imbalances of the past have been addressed first.

As the need for the implementation of affirmative action is being sold within the SAMHS, all fears and expectations must be openly discussed whether they are reasonable or unreasonable on this subject. Members' feelings as to why they tend to resist affirmative action must be explored, and openly discussed. It should also be stated in no uncertain terms that the implementation of this policy will not result in the lowering of standards as some detractors of affirmative action tends to believe.

Furthermore, all functional and support directors in the SAMHS must become champions of this cause and lead the debate on affirmative action. Each directorate's plans must also be formulated in this regard. There must be no short cuts which will result in tokenism and window-dressing. Blacks placed in strategic positions must be able and permitted to make meaningful contributions to the organisation's objectives. Personnel functionaries must only play a supportive role.

The eagerness to start on a clean slate within the SAMHS must be regarded as pure cloud-cuckoo-land thinking. There is no clean slate. The majority of SAMHS members carry baggage from their past. A lot of assumptions of racial inferiority and racial superiority are still with them every day of their lives. They therefore need to openly and constructively debate pertinent issues in professionally facilitated forums so that a common value system can be developed from such debates because some of the NSF respondents have stated that their struggle has been in vain as whites are still in power despite the change in government.
**Lack of people development**

It was also clear from the questionnaires that 66% of black respondents did not know about the Human Resource Policy whilst 34% of white members confirmed their awareness on the existence of this policy. This is an unfortunate situation because Human (1993:12) emphasises the importance of people development, and further argues that the responsibility for development does not lie with the human resource department but with every line manager who should in turn be trained to manage and motivate a diverse work force. Section 3.3 indicates that within the SAMHS, the type of training and development that was provided during the period under review, focused mainly on the conversion of guerrilla warfare skills to conventional warfare skills. People development as described by Human was instead relegated to the human resource department. As a result, an opportunity to build capacity for the future was lost at the early stages of the integration process.

This therefore means that the implementation of affirmative action cannot be successful because people have not been adequately empowered. The SAMHS' commanders at all levels have not been trained in people management skills and their performance was not critically evaluated in relation to the development of their subordinates. Human resource development should be regarded as a key strategic issue within the SAMHS and should be linked with the development of competencies needed in order to be able to tackle the work demands and any other related tasks. Directors and commanders must therefore regard the development of subordinates, blacks and women in particular, as critical to the achievement of the organisation's objectives. They should thus be actively committed to both implementing and monitoring the above stated training. Such development is important in order to empower the newly appointed incumbents with the necessary competencies so as to be able to tackle the task at hand.

Furthermore, the backgrounds of former liberation fighters must be taken into account with regards to the fact that their commitment to the total eradication
of the apartheid system was the main criterion for involvement in the liberation struggle rather than their educational qualifications. As a result thereof, directors and commanders should therefore be empowered with diversity management skills in order to bring the best out of these members by encouraging their subordinates and linking them with available resources. All employees should be helped to understand the process of development and their responsibility in developing themselves.

As a result of the unique requirements of the military, the SANDF promotion policy emphasises that the filling of vacancies at middle to senior levels must be from within. Therefore, succession and career plans of blacks and women in particular, need to be developed and monitored on an annual basis.

Last but not least, respect must be regarded as fundamental for a healthy working environment because lack of it bedevils inter race relations. Paternalistic attitudes must be avoided and racism must be eliminated in the day-to-day inter-actions between black and white. Expressions of differences should be allowed, directors and commanders must be sensitive and rational about the use of Afrikaans in meetings, given that it is not commonly understood by the majority of the members, especially in a formal setting.

It is further recommended that the SAMHS conducts a skills audit because many of the black respondents indicated that they were not aware of the existence of the human resource policy within this organisation. This implies that the focus of development during the period under discussion only concentrated on military skills. Black members with tertiary qualifications must be identified so that they could be considered for placement in strategic posts in the short to medium term. There must also be career guidance in order to channel some of them into areas where blacks are under-represented. The SAHMS should allocate resources to train their own health professionals in all musterings and not rely on what is available in civilian society.
• Lack of timescales

It was clear from the questionnaires that 80% of black respondents are of the opinion that timescales have not been stipulated for the implementation of affirmative action because whites are still in power. This point is also illustrated by the Zapiro cartoon in Appendix A that MK and APLA have been absorbed in the old SADF. However 20% of the white respondents indicated that they feel indifferent about timeframes put with regards to the implementation of this policy. It is important to note that in section 1.4, Nesh (2003:28), Rampersad (2000:61) and Taole (1997:45) state that the purpose of affirmative action is to uplift the previously disadvantaged and put them on an equal footing with those who oppressed them. They further purport that after a reasonable period of time, affirmative action will have to fall away and be replaced by the principle of equal opportunity. In section 3.3, it is stated that the Malaysian affirmative action programme stretched for 20 years and not beyond that period. The South African government's policy on the other hand, has not given time frames in that sense. What the ANC led government has stipulated is that within the 5 years of the new democratic dispensation 1994 - 1999, 50% of senior managers must be black and 30% women. On examining the situation within the SAMHS, it becomes obvious that no timescale had been put into place by the Top Executive in terms of targets to be achieved in the short to medium term.

It is thus important that the SAMHS' Top Executive's commitment to the implementation of affirmative action be reflected in the identification and the training of a large number of blacks in all military corps and musterings. This would legitimize all interventions taken by directors and commanders related to these areas. It would also address the anxieties of middle management who are hesitant to engage in this process due to suspicions that they could be entering a dangerous political mine-field, where they will be blown to pieces should they take the wrong step. The leadership must lead by example.
Having done this, the SAMHS' Top Executive must investigate progress achieved periodically in order to identify gaps in implementation and attend to areas of improvement. There must be pre-arranged targets, and in the reviews, adjustments must be made. The question of where the organisation wants to be in five or ten years' time must be tabled on the organisation's agenda, the rationale being that one can only monitor that which can be measured.

It is further recommended that the recruitment and placement of black health professionals in senior positions from outside the SAMHS be explored as one of the measures to achieve representivity in the senior ranks. Combined functional military courses must be designed in order to enable new recruits to understand the military milieu. Vigorous debates on this subject must also be encouraged in the meetings. Decisions must be taken on the basis of consensus, and not through majority rule. The voices of the minority must be accommodated and they must participate freely and actively, because respondents have indicated that they become victimised when they speak out in meetings.

- **Lack of gender equality**

It was clear from the questionnaires that 45% of black respondents are of the opinion that the implementation of affirmative action policy is done on the basis of race. 27% women expressed that gender should influence the application of this policy, and 25% of white former SADF members stated that former force of origin should influence the application. Only 3% indicated that disability should be considered as a criterion in the implementation of this policy. This is unfortunate because Human in section 1.6.5 purports that organisations should implement policies which would take the backlogs of blacks and women in specific positions into account.

On examining the composition of the SAHMS (section 3.3), it becomes apparent that gender representation seems to be almost equal; but further
analysis of the structure of the office of the Surgeon General (section 3.4) indicates that the majority of strategic positions within this organisation are still held by white former SADF males. This fact has also been confirmed by respondents when they were asked which elements of the affirmative action policy they thought were considered during the period under review. The majority of Africans, Coloureds and Asian respondents indicated that race was the criterion used to determine whether a member should be considered for upward mobility within the SAMHS.

The above mentioned respondents also indicated that they understood affirmative action to mean the rectification of racial imbalances and not gender. This therefore implies that the importance of gender equality is not clearly understood and given priority. The South African government's and the DOD's policies encourage the advancement of women in all spheres of life including combat. However, the situation in the SAMHS proves to be contrary. As a result thereof, the guideline provided by the researcher in this regard is that the representation of women must be ensured at all levels of command. The SAMHS is therefore required to regard the development of women as a critical group in the general development of people within this organisation. The fact that the majority of senior positions in the SAMHS are held by men is unacceptable, given that half of its members are women. Therefore women's careers should also be managed accordingly.

- **Lack of monitoring mechanisms**

It was clear from the questionnaires that 100% of black respondents cited the lack of commitment from the military leadership, and the lack of monitoring mechanisms as the reason for the non-implementation of affirmative action within the SAMHS. White respondents on the other hand did not express their opinions with regards to this matter.

In section 1.6.5 Human (1993:8) states that a committee composed of employer, employee and union representatives should continuously monitor,
evaluate and refine the affirmative action strategy. Human further recommends that constant monitoring should be kept on the number of blacks and women provided with promotion opportunities. The problem experienced within the DOD and SAHMS in particular, stems from the fact that the Chief Directorate Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action has not been given the mandate to establish monitoring committees in SANDF units. Furthermore, this Directorate can not hold commanders and service chiefs accountable for the non-implementation of this policy (section 3.6). For example, a new post that was created in 1994, the Directorate of Occupational Health and Safety, was subsequently filled by a white former SADF male when at the time, qualified blacks and women were available to be appointed in that new post. If a monitoring committee had already been established, maybe this would not have been allowed to take place.

With regard to the SAMHS it is therefore important that a committee be established to monitor and ensure that affirmative action policy is implemented. This committee should report directly to the Chief Directorate Equal Opportunities and Affirmative Action and must be mandated to take corrective actions. Commanders and directors must be instructed to develop and produce plans in terms of their medium and long-term intentions, which would indicate how they are going to promote representivity. Realistic racial and gender targets, training, succession and career plans must be monitored on an annual basis. Through this process directors and commanders will be held accountable for the non-implementation of affirmative action within the SAMHS.

Further analysis also reveals that the availability of policy documents does not automatically lead to policy implementation. The recommendation made in this regard is that the SG's performance agreement and also those of his commanders and directors must indicate how they are going to ensure representivity in the short to medium term. It is further recommended that policies must be work-shopped, debated vigorously, and consensus reached
on how best to proceed with successful implementation. It is thus not surprising that the majority of black respondents who completed the research questionnaire regard the non-implementation of affirmative action as a reflection of the lack of leadership’s commitment to this cause.

- **Lack of organisational commitment**

In section 1.6.5 Thomas (1996:8) purports that organisations should not introduce affirmative action in isolation to organisational environments where managers believe that a few black or female faces will make the organisation appear to look politically correct. As a result thereof, she (Thomas) recommends that organisations should conduct programmes aimed at understanding differences, valuing them and appreciating diversity, because this would prevent the revolving door syndrome. According to Thomas, this syndrome is experienced when a company recruits blacks as a result of pressure exerted from outside and does not create a conducive environment for the new recruits to develop and make a meaningful contribution to organisational objectives.

On examining the situation in the SAMHS, table 4 in section 2.7 indicates that a significant number of blacks from former liberation armies and TBVC homelands were integrated into the new SANDF in 1994. However, some of them eventually resigned after having reported to their units. The reason cited was racism and the fact that they experienced the working environment as hostile. It is therefore important that diversity training be continuously conducted in order to reinforce changes which have been affected within the organisation. Racism should be tackled head-on by taking strong actions against those who practice it in the work place. The questionnaires did not address the importance of retaining blacks within the SAMHS however the researcher is of the opinion that their retention would provide this organisation with the necessary legitimacy.
From the above discussion, it becomes obvious that the SAMHS did not address the key factors that are essential for the successful implementation of affirmative action. The government's intentions in this regard have been clear. What seems to be lacking is the establishment of monitoring mechanisms. Former white SADF males who managed this organisation for many years cannot be expected to rid themselves of the power they enjoyed on their own. As a result, representivity can not be achieved unless the recruitment and retention of blacks in senior positions is ensured.

4.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is both a Constitutional imperative and the South African government's policy that the historical imbalances of the past be redressed. The SANDF as one of the state entities is thus expected to comply with the stipulation. The purpose of this study has been to establish the nature of the policy of affirmative action within the SAMHS during the period 1995 to 2000. Secondly, it examined the nature of problems experienced with regards to the implementation of this policy within the SAMHS.

On examining the nature of affirmative action within the SAMHS, it is evident that the organisation did not have blacks as officers prior to the 1994 democratic elections. The numbers of black officers currently found within this organisation have resulted from the integration of the seven armed forces, which are APLA, MK, SADF and the TBVC homeland armies. However, despite the integration process, the SAMHS still did not become representative of the country's demographics in senior ranks. By the year 2000, this organisation still consisted of predominantly black members in lower ranks with a predominantly white leadership. The sunset clause, which was accepted during the political negotiations, seems to have also contributed to the non-implementation of this policy because the old guards' jobs were secured during the first five years of the new dispensation. It was therefore the integration process that made it possible for black officers to serve in this
organisation and not the government's policy of affirmative action.

It is also apparent at this point that during the period under review, the South African government had already promulgated its policies on affirmative action. It therefore means that the challenges experienced with regards to policy implementation seem to lie in policy interpretation. Whereas the government's stance is that equality cannot be achieved before the historical imbalances have been redressed, the DOD policy on the other hand, is written in a manner that assumes that the playing field has already been levelled because the policy is named Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action. The achievement of representivity in order to gain legitimacy was not treated as a priority. As a result thereof, issues pertaining to staff involvement in the development of the affirmative action strategy, people development in order to ensure the placement of black officers in strategic positions in the medium to long term, establishment of monitoring mechanisms, gender equality and their leadership's commitment to the implementation of affirmative action were not tabled in this organisation's agenda.

From the above discussion, it becomes apparent that the SAMHS has not complied with government policy nor has it taken the key factors that are essential for the successful implementation of affirmative action into consideration. According to the respondents, the main reason for non-implementation is that the leadership is predominantly white and are not interested in the furtherance of the transformation agenda. Second, the sunset clause indicated that the old guards' jobs must be secured during the first five years of the democratic dispensation. The structure of the office of the Surgeon General proves that power within this organisation still lies in white hands.

The non-implementation of the affirmative action policy therefore stems from the fact that former white SADF males who managed this organisation for many years are expected to hand over their power on a platter to blacks. This
can not happen because some are likely to resist change. The situation therefore demands that a monitoring committee be established in order to gauge progress periodically because it seems policy alone is not sufficient. The Surgeon General should thus be held accountable for the non-implementation of this policy by his directors and commanders.

Thirdly, lack of monitoring mechanisms has made it possible for the whites in authority to be able to preserve their power and privilege. The fact that there are no timescales that have been allocated by the leadership as to what objectives must be achieved at which point with regards to the affirmative action within this organisation is indicative of the leadership’s non-commitment to this agenda. The majority of the members promoted during this period were from the former SADF. It is thus obvious that the political objectives of making this organisation representative in terms of race and gender have not been achieved as yet.

Fourthly, the staffing guidelines issued by the Chief of the SANDF during the restructuring process alluded to representivity, but did not stipulate that this should be regarded as an imperative in the placement of incumbents in the new posts. As a result thereof, the SAMHS lost opportunities to redress the historical imbalances of the past during this process. The reality is that by 2000, white members were still being advantaged by promotion hence the SAMHS is still not representative at middle and senior management levels. The situation therefore demanded that the question of affirming blacks remained on this organisation’s agenda in order to promote force cohesion and ensure a sense of inclusiveness and belonging amongst all members.

The non-implementation of this policy is impacting negatively on the morale of the members from the former liberation armies and former TBVC homelands because they have been left out deliberately during the initial restructuring process. The reality is that they will now have to wait for the newly appointed incumbents to first leave the organisation voluntarily before new opportunities
could be created for them to be promoted. Unfortunately, many of the newly appointed white incumbents are still young and thus have long careers ahead of them.

Fifthly, the findings of this research are in line with some of the SAMHS' members perceptions with regards to the non-implementation of affirmative action within the organisation. This is also confirmed by the structure of the office of the Surgeon General because the majority of the members who occupy senior ranks and are in the decision-making structures of the SAMHS come from the same race and former force. They are white and from the former SADF. This implies that the government's objectives of making all state entities representative of the country's demographics have not been achieved. This situation therefore demands that creative ways be found to ensure that the SAMHS becomes representative in terms of race and gender in all rank levels.

Furthermore, the fact that black respondents feel that nothing has changed because whites are still in power illustrates high levels of frustrations experienced by these members regarding the non-implementation of this policy. The situation therefore demands that monitoring mechanisms must thus be established in order to monitor progress annually. Directors and commanders who violate policy must be held accountable and challenges regarding the implementation process must be debated and understood by all. Deliberate attempts must also be made by the leadership to empower and encourage black members to enhance their skills level. Black members on the other hand must take responsibility for their own training and development, so that when opportunities become available, they should not be found wanting. In addition, universities such as MEDUNSA must be targeted for recruitment purposes.

When the next process of downsizing the SANDF is initiated, the SAMHS should make deliberate attempts to offer attractive retrenchment packages to
some of the white males in decision making positions in order to create opportunities to become representative. Furthermore, a moratorium on the promotions of whites at senior levels must be implemented immediately. Whites on the other hand should regard this moratorium as the high price that they have to pay in order to promote reconciliation and nation building in this country. Africans, Coloureds and Asians should be exposed to vigorous training so that they could be placed in these strategic positions. Members from former liberation armies on the other hand need not only harp on their disadvantaged past and the injustices that they have suffered. They need to assess their skills levels and come up with appropriate empowerment programs that would enhance their optimal functioning. They must openly tell the organisation the kind of intervention programs that are needed in order to enhance their skills level. There must not be illusions of winning by whining.

Finally, this study covered the era 1995 - 2000 in order to reflect on the early years of transition. It will thus be valuable to conduct a further study covering the period 2001 - 2005 in order to establish whether progress has been made in the implementation of affirmative action in the SAMHS. Specific attention should be paid among others to the extent to which women have become representative in all levels of command. Lastly, it would also be important to note whether training has been introduced in terms of diversity management and people development.
APPENDIX B: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

D SW has been granted permission by Intelligence Division to conduct a study with regards to policy formulation processes and implementation within the SAMHS for academic purposes. The South African Military Health Service is a part of a government department, the DOD, and as such it is expected to comply with and implement government policies. It is therefore imperative that the extent to which this organisation has been able to implement government policies be examined and the challenges encountered in relation to this be explored and addressed.

The purpose of this study is therefore to achieve the following objectives:

- To determine the magnitude of lack of policy implementation within the SAMHS.
- Investigate reasons for lack of implementation.
- Identify common variables in the implementation process.
- Establish the political implications of the non-implementation of this policy.

In testing the hypothesis, the Affirmative Action and the Human Resource Development policies will be examined concurrently. The findings of this study would be useful in determining the reasons for lack of implementation, and in also exposing the challenges regarding implementation. Furthermore the study will recommend the setting up monitoring mechanisms that would ensure that policies are implemented accordingly. This would promote cohesion, ensure a sense of inclusiveness and belonging amongst all members, and ultimately enhance mission readiness.

Keeping this in mind, please complete the following questionnaire, which provides members of the SAMHS with an opportunity to express their views, concerns and experiences with regards to the implementation of government
policies within the organisation, and how it can be improved.

Respondents will remain anonymous, no name is required anywhere.

**DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME ANYWHERE ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.**

Information gathered will be treated with the utmost confidentiality.

I have read the conditions above and agree to complete the questionnaire.

Signed: ........................................ Date: ............ Place:

..............................

Thank you very much for your co-operation.
PART I

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS

INSTRUCTIONS

In this section, please tell us something about yourself. This information will be used for statistical analysis and your responses will be held confidential.

Please mark the following with a cross ("x") in the space provided.

1. Are you:

Female
Male

2. Your racial group is:

African
Asian
Coloured
White

3. In which Command/Unit do you serve?

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<th>SAMHS HQ</th>
<th>WPMed Comd</th>
<th>EPMed Comd</th>
<th>Natal Med Comd</th>
<th>Med Comd</th>
<th>OFS Med Comd</th>
<th>Gauteng Med Comd</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>NWests Med Comd</td>
<td>F North Med Comd</td>
<td>E-Tvl Med Comd</td>
<td>N-Cape Med Comd</td>
<td>1 Mil Hosp</td>
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4. In which former force did you serve?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apia</th>
<th>MK</th>
<th>SADF</th>
<th>SANDF post 1994</th>
<th>TVBC</th>
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5. To which SANDF rank group do you belong?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private</th>
<th>L/Cpl to Cpl</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank Promotion</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sgt to WO</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt to Maj</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Col to Brig Gen</td>
<td>5</td>
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6. Please indicate your job description:

________________________________________________________________________
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PART II:

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

7. Are you aware of the existence of the Affirmative Action policy?

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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

8. What in your view is the implication for the implementation of this policy?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implication</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women are going to be given priority to men with regards to career development.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Race will influence career development because priority will be given to Black people</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your former force will influence your career development because priority will be given to former NSF</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where possible, physically disabled person will be given priority.</td>
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9. Have you presently been a beneficiary of this policy?

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<tr>
<td>a. Yes</td>
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<td>b. No</td>
<td>2</td>
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If yes, give details:

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10. Which elements of this policy were considered?

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<th>Element</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<td>Gender</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Force</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. If you were disadvantaged by this policy, please give reasons.

_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________

12. Which elements of the policy should have been considered?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Force</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. How do you feel about the non implementation of this policy to you, and the fact that you have not benefited from it?

a. Angry     1
b. Frustrated 2
c. Indifferent 3
d. Other      4

Please explain:

_____________________________________________________________
14. What have you done about it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the OC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the Trade Union</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted Ombudsperson</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrote a redress of wrong</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussed with the labour officers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussed with the labour officers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please explain:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

15. What were the results of your action?

________________________________________________________________________

16. What do you think are the reasons for this policy not to be correctly implemented?

________________________________________________________________________
17. How do you suggest this situation be improved?

IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT POLICY

18. Are you aware of the existence of human resource development policy within the SAMHS, which covers academic studies and military courses?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19. What in your view is the implication for the implementation of this policy?

| Women are going to be given priority to men with regards to career development. | 1 |
| Race will influence career development because priority will be given to Black People. | 2 |
| Your former force will influence your career development because priority will be given to former NSF. | 3 |
| Where possible, physically disabled person will be given priority. | 4 |

20. Have you presently been a beneficiary of this policy?

| a. Yes | 1 |
| b. No  | 2 |

If yes, give details:
21. Which elements of this policy were considered?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Force</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. If you were disadvantaged by this policy, please give reasons:

_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
23. Which elements of the policy should have been considered?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Force</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. How do you feel about the non-implementation of this policy to you, and the fact that you have not benefited from it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frustrated</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. What have you done about it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the OC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted the Trade Union</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contacted Omdudsperson</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrote a redress of wrong</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss with the labour officers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took other measures</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please explain:

______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________

26. What were the results of your action?

______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
27. What do you think are the reasons for this policy not to be correctly implemented?

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

28. How do you suggest this situation be improved?

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________

____________________________________________________________________
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