POST-GETTIER EPISTEMOLOGY: THE ROLE OF
THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVES

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## CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION

### CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

1.1 Epistemic justification, beliefs, and cognitive subjects.
1.2 The evaluative character of epistemic justification.
1.3 The veridical character of epistemic justification.
1.4 The normative character of empirical justification.

### CHAPTER 2 THE DEONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

2.1 The voluntariness of belief.
2.1.1 Arguments against the voluntariness of belief.
2.1.1.1 Direct control.
2.1.1.2 Indirect control.

### CHAPTER 3 SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION

3.1 The subjective/objective distinction in ethics.
3.2 The subjective/objective distinction in epistemology.
3.2.1 Objective epistemic justification.
3.2.2 Subjective epistemic justification.

### CHAPTER 4 INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM

4.1 Externalism.
4.2 Internalism.
4.2.1 Mediate and immediate justification.
4.3 First-order and second-order internalism.
4.3.1 First-order internalism.
4.3.2 Second-order internalism.
4.3.3 The relationship between first-order and second-order internalism.
4.3.4 ‘Being epistemically within’.
4.4 Internalism and a deontological conception of justification.
4.5 Internalism, externalism and truth.

### CHAPTER 5 THE JUSTIFICATIONAL REGRESS

5.1 The regress problem.
5.2 The regress argument.
5.3 The internalist regress.
5.4 Epistemic externalism and the justificational regress.

### CONCLUSION

### SUMMARY/OPSOMMING

### BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION

The origins of the so-called ‘traditional analysis’ of knowledge can be traced back to Plato’s *Theaetetus*. The contemporary formulation of this tripartite analysis is that of a material biconditional, stating that S (any person) knows that p (a proposition) if and only if:

1. p is true;
2. S believes that p; and
3. S is justified to believe that p.

This analysis of knowledge was widely accepted as satisfactory until the publication of Edmund Gettier’s article *Is justified true belief knowledge?* in 1963 (Gettier, 1963:121-123). In this article Gettier proposed a number of examples aimed at proving that although all three conditions of the tripartite analysis are satisfied, it does not follow necessarily that knowledge that p can be attributed to a person S.

Gettier’s article led to a proliferation of epistemological literature investigating various aspects of the concept of knowledge. The main focus of the largest section of the literature remains the relationship between the analysandum ‘S knows that p’ and the conditions put forward in the tripartite analysis as its analysans. However, some epistemologists take Gettier’s examples to have pinpointed the justification condition as the weak point in the relationship between true belief and knowledge. Consequently tremendous interest in the concept of epistemic justification was raised. The motivation for this was the idea that the traditional analysis of knowledge would be satisfactory once a satisfactory concept of epistemic justification had been developed. William Alston states this aim not as determining what X should be substituted for in ‘True belief + X = Knowledge’, but rather what
X should be substituted for in the formula ‘True belief + X + what it takes to deal with Gettier problems = Knowledge’ (Alston, 1993:535).

As much as Gettier’s article contributed to renewed interest in the concept of epistemic justification, it is held by some philosophers always to have been the most important aspect of epistemology. Michael Williams claims that epistemology is traditionally concerned with the nature of justification, and not with stating necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of ‘S knows that P’ (Williams, 1977:10). In the same vein John Pollock views the justification of knowledge claims as the fundamental problem of epistemology (Pollock, 1974:7). On the view that justification is mainly concerned with providing reasons, evidence or warrant for knowledge claims, it is assumed by Mark Pastin that a full understanding of conditions for warrant is essential to understanding the nature of knowledge, which in turn defines the topic of epistemology (Pastin, 1979:151). As far as the search for the conditions of giving reasons extends to a search for fundamental reasons, or foundations of knowledge, such a search deeply involves the matter of justification. To accentuate the importance of the concept of justification in this respect, John Pollock views the question whether knowledge has foundations as a perennial question of epistemology (Pollock, 1979:93).

It is possibly a combination of this sense of the pivotal importance of the concept of justification in epistemology and the interest raised by Gettier’s article that has led to the notion that the concept of epistemic justification forms an interesting and independent field of investigation. For Marshall Swain it has intrinsic interest because it features in many epistemological contexts other than the analysis of knowledge (Swain, 1981:44). Alston advances a similar motivation for his focusing on the topic of epistemic justification. In his view it is inevitable that critical thinking about human cognition will lead to reflection on
beliefs and conditions under which they are justified (Alston, 1989:3).

Notwithstanding, prominent epistemologists such as Mark Pastin and Hector-Neri Castaneda still maintain that the proper aim of investigating the concept of justification is to illuminate the relationship between belief and knowledge (Pastin, 1980:97 and Castaneda, 1980:193-195). Whether this may be the case does not invalidate an investigation of the concept of justification as preliminary to the study of knowledge. In fact, there seems to be a fair deal of agreement that the concept of epistemic justification at least calls for clarification, and therefore necessitates such an investigation. Taking this as a starting point, what would the aims of such an investigation be? The literature reveals two not necessarily mutually exclusive possibilities:

(1) Necessary and sufficient conditions under which it could be said of a person S that he is justified in believing a proposition p;

(2) A satisfactory definition of ‘epistemic justification’; i.e. an analysans for which X can be substituted in the phrase ‘S is justified to believe that p if and only if X’.

Recently, dissenting voices have been heard concerning these aims of an investigation into the matter of epistemic justification. They also come from epistemologists who do not necessarily advocate the abandonment of the epistemological enterprise or prophesy its demise. William Alston, a leading epistemologist investigating the concept of epistemic justification, proposed in a recent article that the entire project may well have been misguided from the start. Referring to the aim of determining the conditions under which beliefs are justified, Alston suggests in conclusion that it be abandoned in favour of an ‘epistemic desiderata’ approach to epistemology (Alston, 1993:527-551). Others who are equally
sceptical about the project have proposed the replacement of the justification condition with alternative concepts such as reliability, causality, ability to discriminate among relevant alternatives, and inference to the best total explanation (Pastin, 1980:99). They argue that a better understanding of the semantical, syntactical and psychological aspects of belief statements would render explanation of knowledge in terms of a concept of justification superfluous (Pastin, 1979:151).

Recent literature also reveals an increasing awareness of the social and contextual aspects influential upon epistemic situations. Pastin claims that this has led some epistemologists to conclude that the concept of justification does not help to explain the nature of knowledge (ibid.). Others have been prompted by the consideration of these factors to analyze the concept of justification in a wider sense than that which would turn true belief into knowledge. Examples are Pastin’s ‘Multi-perspectival theory of knowledge’ and Castaneda’s ‘Indexical theory of knowledge’ (Pastin, 1980:97-111 and Castaneda, 1980:193-237).

With the above-mentioned in mind, a desideratum for this particular study can now be formulated:

1. As the title suggests, the literature is drawn from the American epistemological scene, consisting mainly of articles and books published after the appearance of Gettier’s article in 1963. The reason for this is that the proliferation of literature on the concept of justification after this event has manifested nowhere else with equal intensity as in the American epistemological field.

2. The concept of epistemic justification forms the focus of this study, and not the relationship between true belief and knowledge. The latter will only be mentioned where it is deemed to be contributory to the topic of discussion. The analysis of the concepts of ‘belief’, ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ likewise falls outside the scope of this study.
(3) The literature covers a range of distinct topics, all of which are intricately related to the concept of epistemic justification. Examples include 'grounds', 'evidence', 'reasons', 'the basing relation', 'defeasibility', 'inference', 'causality', 'induction', 'subjective probability', 'foundationalism', 'coherentism' and 'contextualism'. These topics concern what could be termed the 'structure' of justification. They deal with matters such as the nature of reasons that would be acceptable in order for someone to be justified in holding a proposition, the mutual relationship that must hold between someone's beliefs in order to form a coherent system, the relationship that must hold between a justifying belief and another belief in order for the former to confer justification upon the latter, and other related issues. As such their subject matter contrasts with that of other topics addressing matters relating to the perspective from which justification is carried out, i.e. whether it is carried out from a first-person or from a third-person perspective. Such topics include 'subjectivity', 'objectivity', 'deontological justification', 'internalism' and 'externalism'. Traditionally the concept of epistemic justification involves a first-person perspective. In the words of Mark Pastin:

"Whether or not a proposition is justified for a person at a time, in accordance with a standard justification concept, is determined by features of the person's perspective at that time - by the person's perceptual and memory input and by what the person believes on the basis of that input" (Pastin, 1980:101-102).

A concept of justification such as this one is termed 'perspectival'; it makes a person’s justification turn on what lies within the person’s perspective on the world, whether it be memory states, perceptual states or belief states. However, the question concerning what will serve as valid justificational inputs will not be addressed in this study.
The distinction between the structure of justification and the perspective from which justification is carried out may be a contentious one. For example, foundationalism and coherentism are sometimes construed as internalist theories, implying that they exhibit a perspectival character. However, the distinction is not meant to be a conceptual one, but rather to provide a theoretical tool for analyzing matters concerning epistemic justification which show a family resemblance. More specifically, the emphasis of this study will fall on perspectival justification, meaning justification from a first-person perspective. Historically speaking, perspectival justification has enjoyed philosophical prominence since the time of Descartes, but it is still being discussed in contemporary times under the rubric of ‘internalism’. This fact gives perspectival justification a theoretical edge; theories such as externalism are usually defined only antithetically to their perspectival counterparts. Oppositional theories will only be briefly characterised here, leaving more room for the discussion of perspectival justification as the main focus of this study.

(4) The study will attempt to show that the topics discussed are conceptually related. The order in which they are presented should therefore not be seen as a necessarily epistemological one.

(5) Lastly, the concept of justification will refer to epistemic justification throughout this study, unless specified otherwise.
CHAPTER 1 THE NATURE OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

In this chapter the discussion of the concept of epistemic justification commences with an investigation of the mutual relationships between a cognitive subject, the concept of epistemic justification, and propositions. This is followed by a brief discussion of the evaluative nature of epistemic justification, leading to the topics of truth and the regulative character of epistemic justification.

1.1 Epistemic justification, beliefs, and cognitive subjects

The concept of epistemic justification applies to the beliefs of a cognitive subject. The objects of these beliefs are taken to be propositions, thereby restricting epistemic justification to propositional belief. The contentious matter of propositions and their relationship to beliefs will not receive attention here. The nature of beliefs, for example whether they are acts or states, will also not be investigated in the course of this discussion. This matter is properly discussed under metaphysics and philosophical psychology (Pastin, 1979:151).

Two varieties of justification in terms of propositions are identified:
(i) Doxastic justification: This applies when a person S justifiably believes a proposition p; then ‘S is justified to believe that p’, or, ‘S is justified in believing p’. The minimal requirements for this kind of justification are:
   (a) p is true; and
   (b) S believes that p.
For example, if S believes that it is raining because, looking through the window he can see the rain falling, then S can be said to be justified in believing that it is raining.
(ii) Propositional justification: A proposition itself may be justified for a person, without the person believing the proposition, or with the person believing the proposition for
unacceptable reasons; i.e. reasons other than those for which the proposition is justified. For example, S may be sitting in a room without windows, and not believe that it is raining, while it is in fact raining. The proposition ‘it is raining’ will still be justified for him, although he does not believe it. Suppose S finds himself in the same situation watching television, when it is announced that rain has started to fall. Suppose further that, unknown to S, he is not watching a live transmission but a recording made the previous week. If S believes that it is raining, it will be for the ‘wrong’ reasons; it is doubtful whether S can be said to justifiably believe that it is raining, although the proposition ‘it is raining’ is justified for him.

Propositional justification is a necessary condition for doxastic justification. If it is to be said of S that he justifiably believes that it is raining, the proposition ‘it is raining’ must itself be justified, in other words, it must in fact be raining. Although propositional justification is epistemically basic to doxastic justification, recent epistemological literature focuses on doxastic justification, since this highlights the way in which cognitive subjects appropriate and utilise justified statements. If, for example, a proposition is justified for a person because of certain evidence, then the person is justified to believe that proposition only if his belief is appropriately related to the evidence (Moser, 1985:3). Investigating doxastic justification therefore results in a fuller account of epistemic justification.

1.2 The evaluative character of epistemic justification

‘Justification’ is an evaluative concept. Ascribed to beliefs, it seeks to appraise someone’s holding those beliefs according to certain aims. If this evaluation turns out to be satisfactory, a positive status is awarded (Goldman, 1979:1 and Alston, 1989:58). As an evaluative term, ‘justification’ falls in the same category as terms such as ‘acceptable’, ‘certain’, ‘probable’, ‘improbable’, ‘unreasonable’ and ‘indifferent’. After the publication of
Gettier's article the term 'justification' became standardly used in connection with epistemic evaluation. Epistemic justification can accordingly be described as having to do with the evaluation of beliefs in relation to specific aims. These aims form what is sometimes called the 'epistemic dimension' of evaluation, and this matter will be discussed next.

1.3 The veridical character of epistemic justification
Prominent epistemologists view the 'epistemic dimension', also called the 'epistemic point of view', as defined by, among others:

"...the aim of maximising truth and minimising falsity in a large body of beliefs" (Alston,1989:59); the "cognitive goal of truth" (Moser,1985:5); "truth as objective" (Lehrer,1978:293); the "primary intellectual (duty)... to acquire truth and to avoid error" (Chisholm,1986:90); "... a teleological conception of intellectual virtue, the relevant end being a proper relation to the truth" (Sosa,1985:227); and believing on a truth-conducive ground that is such that it "...confer(s) a high probability of truth on the belief that is based on it" (Alston,1993:528).

In whatever way these formulations may appear to differ, they all state the common claim that the "...epistemic sort of justification is closely related to the truth of what is justified" (Conee,1992:657).

Although it is agreed upon that truth should be the aim of justification, there is dispute as to whether actual truth should be a criterion for justified belief. The troublesome issue of what constitutes the actual truth of a proposition falls outside the scope of this study. Even though truth is a necessary condition for knowledge according to the tripartite analysis, it is claimed that we would be justified in holding very few our beliefs if actual truth is a criterion for justification. For example, S believes that the electricity supply network is in perfect working condition because the radio starts to play when she switches it on. But,
unknown to S the electricity supply was cut off the day before and someone had placed batteries inside the radio, which explains why it starts to play when S switches it on. If actual truth is a criterion for justification, then S will not be justified to believe that the supply network is intact. On the other hand, if actual truth is not taken as a criterion for justification, then S could be justified to believe that it is, for example on the grounds that the radio had always before been powered by the electrical network.

The possibility of someone being justified in holding a belief that is not actually true, seems tenable especially when the justification is carried out from a first-person, subjective point of view. In such cases a person has to decide whether to believe a proposition or not, without knowing whether the proposition is actually true or not. The truth or falsity of the proposition is not available to the person as a criterion for the evaluation of his decision-making; the justification has to proceed on other grounds, perhaps the reasons for accepting or rejecting a proposition. But since epistemic justification is supposed to be committed to the epistemic goal of truth, it is claimed that someone’s justification in cases such as these must at least put that person in a good position to attain the truth; justification must be ‘truth-conducive’.

The question arises how a person would set about achieving the aim of maximising truth and minimising falsity in a set of beliefs, if the truth of these beliefs lies outside his cognitive grasp. For had this not been the case, the person would simply evaluate his beliefs against their actual truth and purge the false ones from his belief-system. Because this is often not possible, the need becomes apparent for guidelines in forming truth-conducive beliefs. It is an indication that a concept of epistemic justification must be ‘normative’, or ‘regulative’ in nature, providing guidelines to that effect. This matter will form the next point of discussion.
1.4 The normative character of epistemic justification

Epistemologists such as Alvin Goldman and Laurence Bonjour point out that the concept of epistemic justification does indeed feature a strong normative component. Goldman claims that such a regulative function is naturally linked to the notion of epistemic justification and aims at "... advising cognizers on the proper choice of beliefs or other doxastic attitudes" (Goldman, 1980:27).

Some epistemologists define epistemic justification in normative terms by forging an analogy between the epistemic situation where a person has to guide his beliefs and the ethical situation where a person has to guide his activities or behaviour (Goldman, 1980:28 and Feldman, 1988:405). Alston claims that epistemic justification is thought of in normative terms exactly because the term ‘justified’ was transferred from the field of ethics to epistemology (Alston, 1993:533). Substantial doubt was raised by R. Firth as to whether epistemological terms can be equated with ethical terms, but that issue will not be pursued here (Firth, 1978:217-218). An analogy between ethics and epistemology is further complicated by the question of the voluntariness of belief; this matter will be discussed later on. Suffice to say that a normative conception of epistemic justification seems to have been employed in epistemology long enough to warrant its firm entrenchment (Alston, 1993:533). Plantinga affirms this by tracing back the use of such a conception to the ‘fountainheads of western epistemological thought’, namely Descartes and Locke (Plantinga, 1990:49).

What would constitute the norms according to which belief is directed on a normative conception of epistemic justification? The ethical situation provides elucidation here, leaving doubts about its applicability aside. In ethics it is accepted that someone’s actions are justified if the person is not violating any rules, obligations or duties that are relevant to those actions. An action that is so justified is not necessarily required or obligated, it
is only permitted. The negation of the action in question, however, is not permitted, and the person would be under obligation to withhold from performing that action. If the person persists in carrying it out (the negation of the action in question), then he would be violating his duty to withhold from performing it, and consequently be unjustifiably performing the action.

The justification of beliefs can be construed analogously in terms of requirement, prohibition and permission. Sometimes it is formulated in terms of duty and obligation, but these are generally viewed as species of requirement. With respect to the normative restraints of requirement, prohibition and permission, the consequences of a person’s doxastic decisions are then defined in terms such as ‘responsibility’, ‘blameworthiness’, ‘reproach’, ‘praiseworthiness’, ‘merit’, ‘being-in-the-clear’, etc. (Alston, 1989:116). A conception of justification phrased in these terms will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 2 THE DEONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTION OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

The construal of normative epistemic justification along the lines mentioned above is properly termed a 'deontological conception of epistemic justification', although the terms 'normative conception' and 'deontological conception' are sometimes used interchangeably (Moser, 1985:125). Such a conception of epistemic justification assigns a positive evaluative status to beliefs when, in holding them, one has fulfilled relevant obligations and refrained from violating such obligations in order to achieve a certain aim. In the context of epistemic justification 'relevant obligations' refer specifically to 'epistemic', 'cognitive' or 'intellectual' obligations in believing. Two examples of such obligations are: doing whatever possible to achieve the aim of maximising truth and minimising falsity in a large body of beliefs, and refraining from believing without sufficient evidence (Alston, 1989:58). Thus a typical deontological definition of epistemic justification reads as follows: "S is justified in believing that p if and only if S had not violated any epistemic duty or obligation in believing that p" (Moser, 1985:125). As in ethical situations, S’s being epistemically justified to believe that p on a deontological conception does not necessarily require or obligate S to believe that p, but at most permits S to do so. Consequently S cannot be blamed or reproached for believing that p.

Carl Ginet formulates the deontological conception in terms of 'ought'; if one is justified to believe that p, it is not the case that one ought not to believe that p. But if one can be justified to believe that p, then one can also be unjustified to believe that p, in which case one ought not to believe that p (Ginet, 1985:182 and 1989:93). Ginet’s formulation brings forward questions generally raised about the deontological conception. These questions concern the voluntariness of belief, and they will be discussed next.
2.1 The voluntariness of belief

A normative deontological conception of justification is frequently applied to doxastic situations in direct comparison with behavioral cases. ‘You ought not to have jumped the traffic light’ is viewed on par with ‘You ought not to have believed that it was a good deal’ (Ginet, 1989:93 and Alston, 1989:119). This type of comparison creates the impression that belief-forming is under equal voluntary control as the motion of certain parts of the body. A deontological formulation of epistemic justification in terms of ‘ought’ particularly highlights this aspect, since it is generally held that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (Alston, 1989:118; Ginet, 1985:182 and Moser, 1985:126). Since the deontological conception does not oblige or require belief, its negation is often used to illustrate this more clearly; if it is possible that one can be justified to believe something, one can also be unjustified to believe something. Phrased in terms of ‘ought’, to be unjustified implies that one ought not to believe a certain proposition. If one ought not to believe a proposition, it in turn implies that one is able to refrain from believing it, thus, one can either believe it or not (Ginet, 1985:182). It is on the basis of this supposed voluntariness that a deontological conception then defines epistemic justification in terms of the violation of epistemic duties in believing a certain proposition (Alston, 1993:530 and Moser, 1985:125).

The assumption that belief is under voluntary control has been widely disputed. Before discussing this, it is important to note that the proposed voluntariness must range over a variety of propositional attitudes in order for it to be a viable notion. This can be best explained using Chisholm’s trichotomy of ‘believing’, ‘rejecting’ or ‘withholding’ a proposition (Chisholm, 1978:225). If a proposition is rejected and its contrary is believed, the propositional (doxastic) attitude is still one of belief. But if a proposition is withheld, neither it nor its contrary is believed; a doxastic attitude different from belief is introduced. This
attitude must also be under voluntary control, one’s control over
a certain propositional attitude (e.g. ‘believing’) must imply
control over a ‘field of incompatible alternatives’ (Alston,1989:120).

2.1.1 Arguments against the voluntary control of belief
In discussing arguments against the theory of doxastic voluntarism,
William Alston’s essay The Deontological conception will be largely
drawn upon for its lucid and detailed analysis of the subject. A
couple of varieties of voluntary control can be distinguished.
These varieties can be categorised in two basic groups; that of
‘direct control’ and ‘indirect control’ over belief. Arguments
against doxastic voluntarism will be discussed under these
headings.

2.1.1.1 Direct control
In this case it is assumed that a person can decide at will whether
to believe or not believe a proposition, much in the same way that
a person can decide to perform a certain action or refrain from
performing it. If this kind of control (termed ‘basic control’)
were possible, a person would be able to accept (believe it to be
true), reject (believe its contrary to be true) or withhold a
belief (accept neither the belief nor its contrary) at will; the
person would be able to take up one of these doxastic attitudes on
the spur of the moment.

This kind of voluntary control has been rejected by most
epistemologists, either as a logical or a psychological
impossibility. Conceptually, it is argued, belief is not a matter
of will in the same way as action; a person cannot simply decide to
believe or not believe something and then forthwith do so
(Ginet,1985:182). Leaving this stronger objection aside, other
epistemologists agree that it is at least psychologically
impossible for human beings to adopt or reject beliefs at will. The
case is usually argued from the example of perceptual belief: it is
claimed that a person cannot simply decide to believe or not believe that he sees a car coming down the street or that he hears a bird singing. Accounting for the involuntariness of these beliefs is their supposed obvious truth. When someone sees a tree it will be virtually impossible for him to refrain from believing that he sees a tree, because the belief ‘seems perfectly obvious’ to him (Alston, 1989:123). On the principle that the voluntariness of belief must range over incompatible alternatives for a deontological conception to be applicable to doxastic attitudes, beliefs that seem obviously false must then also be under voluntary control. Alston then extrapolates from perceptual, obviously true beliefs to obviously false beliefs, such as ‘America is a colony of Britain’. The unlikelihood that a person could be able to decide at will to believe such a proposition is subsequently taken to indicate the impossibility of direct (basic) control over beliefs. Beside perceptual beliefs and beliefs that are obviously false, Alston also includes beliefs formed by introspection, memory and simple inference as beliefs that are clearly not under direct voluntary control.

Granted that these beliefs are not under direct voluntary control, the question arises whether other kinds of doxastic situations exist that would bolster a deontological conception of justification. Cases where it is not clear whether a proposition is true or false are usually employed for this purpose. In religion, philosophy and theoretical science careful investigation of opposing theories often does not lead to a clear decision. This creates the idea that holding a certain viewpoint in such matters is a result of adopting one of two or more competing theories at will.

Alston argues that situations like these do not represent instances of direct voluntary control over beliefs; that voluntary formation of a belief at will has been confused in this case with something else. When a belief seems certain, he claims, believing is
determined by the sense of certainty that the person experiences, or by what leads to a sense of certainty. In the case of subjective uncertainty a person is led to believe as he does by something analogous, for example that one alternative seems more likely than another. Thus, in these cases "....the belief follows automatically, without intervention by the will, from the way things seem at the moment to the subject" (Alston, 1989:125). The philosopher, scientist or religious believer embraces a certain doctrine or theory not at will and because it can be done voluntarily, but because the person is led to embracing it by a sense of certainty, by 'something' that seems obvious. Alston does not explain what he means by 'something obvious', or by 'certainty'. This presents a problem because what 'obvious' means is not immediately clear, and 'certainty' itself is a philosophical state-of-the-art term. 'Certainty' is usually defined in relation to probability, and it is more likely that the situation described by Alston above represents a case of different subjective probabilities (Cornman, 1980:9-10). If this is indeed the case, then it is still not convincing how one belief’s being more subjectively probable than another for a person, and the person believing the former belief because of this, can present a conclusive case against the voluntariness of belief. Certainly one belief’s being more probable than another can lead a person to accept the former belief, and create the impression that it was not adopted voluntarily. At the same time the fact that one belief has a higher subjective probability than another for a person, does not commit the person to hold the former belief. The person can also accept the belief for completely different reasons, or even withhold the belief.

Furthermore, there are cases where the difference in subjective probability between two competing propositions is very small. In such cases, Alston argues, a belief would be accepted conditionally and only as a basis for action, or as a working hypothesis (Alston, 1989:126). A philosopher might, for example, accept the
theory of scientific realism as a working hypothesis in order to
test it in application to various problems, and adopt or reject it
according to the outcome.

Alston’s arguments against cases of subjective probability as
instances of voluntary control over beliefs can be disputed.
However, it would be more profitable at this point to focus on the
main argument that he advances against the application of a
deontological conception to beliefs in general. It is clear from
the discussion above that there are two main classes of beliefs
involved: beliefs which subjectively seem either true or false to
a person, and beliefs that do not clearly seem true or false. To
the first category Alston allocates perceptual beliefs, beliefs
from introspection, beliefs from memory and simple inferences.
Concerning the voluntariness of belief formation, beliefs of this
kind are held undoubtedly not to be subject to free will. To the
second class belong beliefs from the fields of religion, philosophy
and theoretical science. They represent cases where there is no
clear answer at hand; where the ‘objective’ veridical status of the
belief is not available at the time of decision-making. The only
criterion that a person has available here is the subjective
probability that a certain belief may turn out to be more or less
true (or false). It is uncertain whether belief in this case is
voluntary and subject to will. Alston argues that it is not; one is
led in belief-formation by a sense of certainty, thus again by
something that seems obvious, although not the belief itself. But,
and this is the crux of Alston’s argument, suppose this second
class of beliefs does indeed represent instances of voluntary
belief, would it be enough reason to ground the application of a
deontological conception of justification? Alston does not think
so, arguing that they represent only a small portion of the
totality of a person’s beliefs. The number of perceptual beliefs we
form on a daily basis alone outweigh the number of controversial
intellectual issues dealt with far enough not to justify the
general application of a deontological conception of justification
This argument seems to be questionable from more than one point of view. Firstly, if Alston is right it would imply that the majority of people are simple cognitive agents who spend most of their time coping with, or learning to cope with, their physical environment, and that matters such as religion, politics and science form a negligible part of their lives. Secondly, while Alston’s arguments may rule out the general application of a deontological concept of justification, it does not follow that its partial application is out of the question. Such a partial application may appropriately restrict its use to epistemic situations where voluntarism seems more probable. Taking into account the formulation of the deontological conception in terms of blameworthiness, it could be asked whether the matter of freedom from blame in connection with beliefs such as perceptual ones does indeed make sense. Does the question whether or not to reproach somebody for believing rightly or wrongly that he sees a tree indeed make sense?

Take another case where the belief-situation involved concerns an event of which the outcome will only be known in the foreseeable future; any chance-game such as roulette serves as an example. Could a person be reproached for believing that the wheel will stop at a certain number? It seems not, but the fact is that nobody could be reproached for believing as they did about the outcome of the event (except perhaps someone who ‘loaded’ the machine), simply because nobody could know beforehand what the outcome was going to be, and furthermore no amount of information gathered could help them to decide. It appears that in cases such as these it is not so much the involuntariness of belief that prohibits the application of a deontological conception of justification, but the kind of belief-situation involved.

Thus, if diverse sets of belief are to be accommodated in a general definition of justification, then the satisfying of intellectual
obligations as a necessary and sufficient condition for justification will clearly have an inhibiting effect. This could pose a serious problem, unless the aim and strategy of an inquiry into the subject of epistemic justification is radically revised towards some other end than that of generally defining epistemic justification. It was mentioned earlier that recent developments show discontent with the aim of developing a general definition of epistemic justification, or identifying a set of necessary and sufficient conditions under which a belief would be justified. At the forefront of this movement is William Alston himself. In his recent essay *Epistemic Desiderata*, Alston questions the phenomenon that inquiries into various aspects of epistemic justification are presented as a dispute over which one of these conditions will ultimately be necessary and minimal for a definition of epistemic justification. Alston proposes an approach that would acknowledge and accommodate a number of different aspects as highly desirable and minimally required for justified belief, one of these aspects being the satisfying of intellectual obligations (Alston, 1993:527-551).

Does this approach help us at all? Following Alston it could be argued that the normative aspect is useful to describe or analyze certain epistemic situations, without it being forwarded as a necessary approach to dealing with all kinds of belief-situations. With this notion in mind, the discussion of arguments against the theory of voluntarism will now be resumed.

The question was raised earlier on whether it is the involuntariness of belief that is primarily responsible for prohibiting the application of a deontological conception of justification. Although sceptical about the deontological conception, Alston raised the same point in his earlier work. He claims that the involuntariness of belief under direct control does not foreclose construing epistemic justification as freedom from blameworthiness, or even in terms of the absence of obligation-
violations (Alston, 1989:65). If this is the case, and granted that any form of direct control over beliefs is implausible, could there be other forms of doxastic control that would support the use of a deontological conception of justification? This question forms the next point of discussion.

2.1.1.2 Indirect control
Although it is agreed upon that doxastic attitudes cannot be under direct voluntary control, it is widely held that they must be subject to some form of indirect control. It is argued that people normally are in a position to perform certain actions (for example gather more evidence) that will eventually influence their decision-making to some extent. Varieties of this purported kind of control exist. Alston rejects the claim that someone can voluntarily carry out an intention to take up a certain propositional attitude, whether it be in an uninterrupted short-term act or as a complex long-term project (Alston, 1989:136). Cases where someone has an intention to start believing a certain proposition in the near or distant future, before being in a good position to know whether the proposition is true or false, and then through performing certain actions finally coming round to believe the proposition, are too rare and unreliable to prove voluntary control over doxastic attitudes. These cases involve "voluntarily putting oneself in a position to form the most rational attitude, .... rather than voluntarily taking up some specific attitude" (Alston, 1989:132). Consequently, if one does not have effective control to bring about a doxastic attitude, then one can hardly be blamed if it does not occur, even though one has done everything one could to bring it about. The application of a deontological conception of justification is thereby rendered inappropriate.

However, the possibility still exists that one can be blamed for not having done one's best to prevent an attitude that did result, provided one could have and should have prevented it. This means
that a person S can be held responsible for a certain state of affairs (including doxastic states) that results from S’s activities, even though S did not intentionally bring them about. It is presumed here that something S did and should not have done, was a necessary condition to bring about the resulting state of affairs (Alston, 1989:137). Activities that affect the taking up of doxastic attitudes can be of two kinds: those that bring influences to bear upon, or withhold influences from the belief-forming process, and secondly, activities that affect people’s belief-forming habits. Examples of the first kind of activity are: looking for more evidence; considering a matter for a longer period of time; reflecting on an argument, etc. Examples of the second kind are: training oneself to be more (or less) critical of other people’s opinions; training oneself to be more (or less) subservient to authority, etc. (Alston, 1989:138). The point is that these activities are undoubtedly subject to voluntary control, even though believing, rejecting or withholding a belief itself may not be. On these grounds the application of a deontological conception of justification then becomes plausible. However, if a deontological conception is applied to situations of indirect influence, it has to be kept in mind that the notions of blame and responsibility are applied to beliefs only on the ground of the relationship that these beliefs hold with those activities of influence-bearing that form the preliminary stage of doxastic formation.

Starting with the basic formulation of the deontological conception, namely that ‘S is justified to believe that p if and only if S is not intellectually to blame for believing that p’, the notion of blameworthiness is then expanded to accommodate the influence-bearing activities mentioned above. Such a definition of blameworthiness reads as follows:

"S is (intellectually) to blame for believing that p iff If S had fulfilled all her intellectual obligations, then
S's belief-forming habits would have changed, or S's access to relevant adverse considerations would have changed in such a way that S would not have believed that p" (Alston, 1989:141).

(iff = if and only if)

Incorporating this definition of blameworthiness into the definition of deontological justification above yields the following:

\[ J_{DI} : "S \text{ is justified to believe that } p, \text{ if and only if it is not the case that if } S \text{ had fulfilled all } S's \text{ intellectual obligations, } \ldots \text{ then } S \text{ would not have believed that } p", \]

where the space left open is to be filled with the specific obligations regarding activities of indirect influence mentioned earlier on, namely:

(1) changing one's belief-forming habits, and/or
(2) granting oneself access to relevant adverse considerations.

\( J_{DI} = \text{Indirect-influence deontological conception of justification} \)

\( J_{DI} \) is regarded by Alston as the only viable deontological concept of justification. Other epistemologists who favour deontological justification advance similar formulations, for example Laurence Bonjour (Plantinga, 1990:46-47) and Paul Moser (Moser, 1985:4-5).

\( J_{DI} \) is nevertheless discarded by Alston for not amounting to real epistemic justification. 'Real' epistemic justification would be characterised by the goal of doxastic attitude-formation, i.e. the aim of believing truth and avoiding error. Part of what justifies someone to hold a belief on this account is that the belief has to be formed in such a way that it puts the person in a good position to attain the truth. Deontological justification does not comply with this aim, it is argued, because someone can be deontologically justified without being epistemically justified. S could have done everything that can be reasonably expected to influence S's belief-forming activities and consequently be free from blame, but still...
hold a belief on inadequate grounds. A person could even be deontologically justified in holding beliefs that are false. An example frequently put forward to illustrate this point, is the case of cultural isolation. A person who lives in an isolated primitive community acquires beliefs according to the traditions of his tribe, so that the person can hardly be blamed for holding such beliefs, even when other societies do not view them as true (Goldman, 1980:37 and Alston, 1989:146). This brings out the very contentious issues of objectivity and universal truth. Goldman argues that the person is not justified at all because the beliefs are not formed in accordance with the proper procedure, although the person may be free from blame (ibid.). Alston argues in the same vein that there are "objective standards for adequacy of grounds that hold whatever is accepted in one or another culture" (ibid.). Deontological justification is not viable exactly because it allows someone to violate these standards and still be justified to hold beliefs resulting from such violations.

Although the discussion seems to lead to the conclusion that the deontological conception is inadequate as a generally applicable concept of justification, a number of issues are raised that complicate this result. Two of these are:

(1) In discussing epistemic justification, different belief-situations have to be accounted for. Given its historical origins, it is dubious whether the deontological conception, for example, was meant to be applied in the case of perceptual belief. Here comes to mind the fact that Descartes' method of systematic doubt rejects the role of the senses. This creates the possibility of defining a deontological conception in terms of some form of indirect control over belief-formation.

(2) It became clear that the perspective from which justification is carried out must form a part of any discussion of epistemic justification. The perspective from which a person justifies his beliefs may have a limiting effect on his belief-formation. Examples are the first-person case where someone has only his own
beliefs to appeal to, and the case of cultural isolation where a person has only the beliefs of his isolated community to appeal to. Cases such as these raise the problem of subjectivity; the beliefs that someone acquires from these perspectives may be altogether false. The problem with a deontological conception is that it may provide people with justification in these cases on the basis that they are not blameworthy. Perhaps there is something else that would count in someone’s favour in situations such as these. In the next chapter the matter of justificational perspective comes under closer scrutiny in the form of a discussion of subjective and objective justification.
3.1 The subjective/objective distinction in ethics

Plantinga illustrates that a contradiction arises from the application of the deontological conception in ethics:

1) You are blameworthy for failing to do A if and only if it is your duty to do A, and you fail to do it; and

2) If S believes that doing A is (morally) required or permitted, then S is not to be blamed for doing A, and if S believes that refraining from doing A is required or permitted, then S is not to be blamed for refraining from doing A.

If I think I am permitted to do A, then by (2) I am not guilty and not to be blamed for doing A; but by (1) doing A is then not my duty. This leads to the conclusion that if I think it is not my duty to do A, then it is not my duty to do A; and if I think it is not my duty to refrain from doing A, then it is not my duty to refrain from doing A. Similarly it can be argued that if I think it is my duty to do A, then it is my duty to do A; and if I think it is my duty to refrain from doing A, then it is my duty to refrain from doing A (Plantinga, 1990:53-54).

The contradiction arising from this is that different people might think differently about what duty requires. Person A thinks that duty requires of him to free all animals from captivity. Since thinking it is his duty makes it his duty on the above-mentioned argument, he will not be blameworthy for doing so; but he will be blameworthy for not doing so. Person B thinks that duty requires of him to round up all stray animals. Again, thinking it his duty makes it his duty; he will not be blameworthy for doing so, but he will be blameworthy for not doing so. To dissolve the clash of interests embodied by cases such as these, a distinction between subjective and objective rightness is introduced. According to this, blameworthiness and guilt is restricted to subjective duty. Someone is to blame if he knowingly flouts his duty; if you think it is your duty to give money to the poor then you are to be blamed
if you do not do so. On the other hand, you may be unable to understand, or you may be unaware of, an objective principle that requires of you to attend to the poor, in which case you cannot be blamed if you do not do so.

Subjective justification in ethics is typically defined to be dependent on facts about the agent’s perspective on the situation; while objective justification in ethics is taken to be independent of beliefs or cognitive states of the agent. An action is objectively ethically justified if and only if it is the best of all possible actions (Feldman, 1988:407-408).

3.2 The subjective/objective distinction in epistemology

3.2.1 Objective epistemic justification

The subjective/objective distinction in ethical justification is often proposed to prompt the introduction of an analogous distinction in the case of epistemic justification. However, Feldman has pointed out that there is a reluctance to equate objective epistemic justification with truth. Epistemologists do not generally define objective epistemic justification in the following way:

"S is objectively epistemically justified in believing p iff p is true" (Feldman, 1988:409). Concerning the epistemic aim of believing only true propositions and avoiding false ones, this definition of objective epistemic justification would be the perfect one to align someone’s doxastic attitudes with that epistemic aim. What could the reason be for not defining objective epistemic justification in this way? Several explanations exist. Feldman is of the opinion that if objective justification is defined as above, it would give epistemologists less to do, because evaluating whether someone’s beliefs are true or not (i.e. comparing them with what is actually the case) does not create the same amount of interest as the ethical question of what really is the best thing to do (Feldman, 1988:410). Feldman’s remark rests on the assumption that, while people (for example from different cultures) may have
different and often clashing ethical codes, no such differences exist in the case of epistemic belief. It is only on the assumption that epistemic truth is unambiguous that a definition of objective justification such as the one above would not be interesting. But it is precisely because ‘truth’ is a fundamentally problematic concept that there is a reluctance to define objective epistemic justification in terms thereof.

As mentioned earlier, few of our beliefs would be justified if actual truth were taken as a criterion for justification. It now becomes clear that there is an additional reason for this: since the concept of truth is itself problematic, actual truth as a criterion of justification would make a theory of justification dependent on a theory of a truth. To refrain from digressing to a discussion of the relationship between justification and truth, the other reason why there is a reluctance to define epistemic justification in terms of truth is brought to mind. This concerns the fact that we are often in situations where we have to decide upon a doxastic attitude towards a proposition, without being able to assess the actual veridical status of the proposition in question. Cases such as these are of specific importance for a theory of justification as they concern the ‘proper task’ of epistemology described elsewhere as dealing with ‘the first-person problem of what to believe and how to justify one’s beliefs’. In the second chapter it was discussed how the deontological conception attempts to deal with this problem. Without employing deontological terms such as ‘blame’ and ‘obligation’, how else could epistemic justification be defined to account for this situation? The notion of ‘evidence’, or ‘reasons’, since being closely related to the concept of justification, is often employed for this purpose. There is, Feldman points out, a tendency to make objective epistemic justification "...turn on one’s evidence" (Feldman, 1988:410). Described in this way, objective epistemic justification is a function of the subject’s perspective on the world, whereas objective ethical justification is not. An example
of objective epistemic justification defined in this way is: "S is objectively epistemically justified in believing p if and only if S has good reasons to believe p" (Feldman, 1988:411) (leaving criteria for 'good' aside).

3.2.2 **Subjective epistemic justification**

The way in which objective epistemic justification is defined makes it clear that the subjective/objective distinction in epistemology may not be drawn in the same way as in ethics. Objective epistemic justification is defined in terms of the agent’s perspective. How would subjective epistemic justification be defined? Certainly subjective epistemic justification would turn even more strongly on the agent’s perspective than objective justification. The following serves as an example:

\[ J_{S1} : \text{"S is subjectively epistemically justified to believe that } p \text{ if and only if S believes that } p, \text{ and does not believe that he should withhold } p" \]

\( (J_{S1} = \text{Subjective epistemic justification, definition 1}) \)

Defined in this way, subjective justification ties in with a coherence theory of justification. In S’s system of beliefs there is, along with p, no other belief that says ‘withhold p’, making S’s system of beliefs coherent. The problem with such a definition of justification is that it does not rule out mere belief. S can believe any proposition p on the basis of, for example, hearsay. As long as S does not also hold the proposition ‘withhold p’, then S will be justified to believe that p. This has the absurd implication that anyone can be justified to believe anything, a notion that runs against the cognitive aim of believing what is true and avoiding what is false.

Instead of rejecting the idea of subjective justification, there is a contention to distinguish between mere belief and subjectively
justified belief. Pollock, for example, defends a subjective concept of epistemic justification by claiming that there are two senses of ‘should believe’ in epistemology, just as there are two senses of ‘should do’ in ethics. In ethics these two senses are the objective and the subjective judgment of someone’s actions. The objective sense regards judging what a person should have done given the actual consequences of his actions. The subjective sense concerns judging what a person should have done given his beliefs about the consequences of his actions (Pollock, 1980:109). In epistemology the objective sense is what a person should believe given what are in fact good reasons for believing things. The subjective sense is what a person should believe given his possibly mistaken beliefs about reasons (Pollock, 1980:110). With this, Pollock seems to countenance a concept of subjective justification that encourages mere belief, but closer scrutiny reveals that this is not the case. The background to Pollock’s proposal is, once again, a coherence theory of justification where, briefly, all that a person has to go on to justify a belief is the person’s set of beliefs, and the way in which these beliefs mutually support the belief in question. The question remains what count as good reasons in a case like this, and under what conditions can beliefs be said to ‘mutually support’ another belief. A possible answer to this is that the reasons must logically support each other, assuming that there is a common understanding of what this means. However, Pollock proposes an argument describing a case where a person’s beliefs do not mutually support another belief in a supposedly ‘logical’ way, but where it would be difficult to say that the person is not justified. For Pollock his argument presents a good case in favour of a subjective concept of justification, since it does not appeal to intersubjective principles such as logic. Pollock’s argument reads as follows:

(1) Suppose P is a logical reason for S to believe Q;
(2) S believes that P is not a good reason to believe Q;
(3) S believes P, but does not believe Q;
(4) Suppose R is a not good reason for S to believe \(\sim Q\);
(5) S believes R is a good reason to believe \(\sim Q\);
(6) S believes \(\sim Q\);
(7) It would be irrational for S to believe Q, or to refrain from believing \(\sim Q\);
(8) S could not justifiably believe Q on the basis of P, but,
(9) S justifiably believes \(\sim Q\) on the basis of R.

(Pollock, 1980:106)

In this example, that which would normally count as rational for someone to believe, contradicts that which is logical for the person to believe. This is a result of the person’s mistaken beliefs about his reasons; even though P is a good reason, S does not believe that it is, and even though R is not a good reason, S believes that it is. Despite S’s mistaken beliefs about the reasons, S is subjectively justified to believe \(\sim Q\), and what accounts for S’s subjective justification, is S’s believing in a ‘rational’ manner. Pollock’s introduction of the concept of ‘rationality’ at this point is contentious. Although ‘rationality’ is itself a much-discussed concept, Pollock makes his account of subjective justification turn on a supposed general understanding of its meaning.

Feldman rejects Pollock’s argument, claiming that it makes use of a misconstrued conception of rationality. In Pollock’s argument it is rational for S, if S believes that S has good reasons to believe that P, to believe that P, or, if S believes that S does not have good reasons to believe that P, not to believe that P. It is irrational for S, if S believes that S has good reasons to believe that P, not to believe that P, or, if S believes that S does not have good reasons to believe that P, to believe that P. Feldman rejects these claims, pointing out that to match one’s beliefs with one’s reasons is not what constitutes rationality. One is not necessarily committed to believe that P if one believes that one has good reasons to believe that P, or not to believe that P if one believes that one does not have good reasons to believe that P.
Hilary Kornblith raises a similar complaint, based on the issue of the voluntariness of belief. She claims that the idea that having good reasons to believe that P leads to belief that P is based on the assumption that belief is under voluntary control and can be taken up or withheld at will (Kornblith, 1985: 264). It became clear in the second chapter that the case against the voluntariness of belief is not conclusive; the possibility still remains of indirect influence over decision-making. It is therefore not impossible that the beliefs that one acquires about one’s reasons can be part of the influencing process. Suppose S has to decide whether X occurs in a particular situation, given that Y occurs. S reflects upon the matter, and discovers the principle ‘If X occurs then Y occurs’. Upon further reflection, S decides that X will occur, since Y occurs. S’s reflection has provided S with a mistaken belief about his reasons, based on the fallacy of affirming the consequence. But this process of reflection, involving forming a belief about a reason, can influence S to accept the belief that X occurs.

Feldman may be right in his criticism of Pollock’s conception of ‘rationality’, but it does not affect the epistemic situation that Pollock describes. This is a situation where, "In deciding what to believe, we have only our own beliefs to which we can appeal" (Pollock, 1980: 106). We need not take this as applying to all epistemic situations, as Pollock presumably does, but can imagine it applying to a situation where a person has to decide upon a doxastic attitude towards a proposition, without recourse to any other information but the person’s own system of beliefs. Again the primary epistemological question comes to mind, namely how to guide one’s decision-making, in other words, justify one’s beliefs, in situations such as these. Pollock’s argument is designed to show that one cannot appeal to logical or any other intersubjective principles in such cases. Introducing the concept of ‘rationality’ however, leaves the impression that Pollock himself cannot escape from appealing to such a principle; that ‘rationality’ is
introduced to take over the role of 'logic' and do what logic failed to do, namely to provide generally understood and accepted guidelines for subjective decision-making. The question remains whether subjective justification can be defined without appeal to any kind of intersubjective principle. To disallow mere belief and groundless conjecture, it seems to be a necessary feature of a definition of subjective epistemic justification to incorporate intersubjectively 'right' principles of reasoning. But then the nature of such principles remains a problem. In Descartes' philosophy these principles are a priori knowable without recourse to sensory evidence. Upon careful reflection anyone will be able to recognise them, and this fact makes them intersubjectively (i.e. 'objectively') correct. Kornblith contends that in Descartes' epistemology, "Because objectively right principles of reasoning are a priori knowable, the principles which seem right from one's present perspective, given sufficiently careful consideration, are objectively right as well" (Kornblith,1985:265). That these principles are a priori knowable is a much-contested matter. Feldman therefore criticises Pollock's argument, claiming that it supports the idea that there is an "intuitive sense of 'justified'" (Feldman,1988:412). An 'intuitive' sense is akin to an 'a priori' sense of 'justified' since it is also supposed to be privately recognisable and endowed with that special character of first-person reports which makes it not contestable, and consequently, fit to justify other beliefs. Feldman draws his criticism from his interpretation of Pollock's argument as claiming that "....one is justified in believing something if and only if one believes that one is justified" (Feldman,1988:412). This situation is not the same as the one described by J₅₁, i.e. 'S is justified to believe that P if and only if S believes that P'. Feldman's criticism is therefore not levelled against Pollock's argument as expressing mere belief or groundless conjecture; it is levelled against the way in which S, on Pollock's argument, comes to believe that S is justified.
In Pollock's argument S comes to believe that S is justified by way of the mutual support of S’s beliefs about reasons. Briefly again:

1. P is a good reason for S to believe Q;
2. S does not believe P is a good reason to believe Q;
3. R is not a good reason to believe \( \sim Q \);
4. S believes R is a good reason to believe \( \sim Q \);
5. S believes \( \sim Q \).

(1) and (3) are really a good reason and not a good reason respectively, independent of S’s beliefs about them. S’s beliefs about reasons (1) and (3) are the negation of the actual status if these reasons. This provides S with what S believes to be not a good reason, namely (2), the negation of (1), and with what S believes to be a good reason, namely (4), the negation of (3). In other words, S now has a set of two reasons with different subjective probabilities: (2), which S believes does not provide S with a good reason to believe Q, and (4), which S believes provides S with a good reason to believe \( \sim Q \). S’s end-belief that \( \sim Q \) is a result of the way in which these beliefs of S about reasons mutually support each other. Again, (2) and (4) express S’s beliefs about reasons; the situation that Pollock wants to describe is where this is all that S has to appeal to. In this situation S can not, for some or other reason, appeal to the actual status of the reasons, S has only the mutual support of S’s ‘new’ reasons, generated by S’s beliefs about reasons, to count on. In Pollock’s example this mutual support takes on the form of different subjective probabilities, or different relative strengths. R seems to S to be a better reason to believe \( \sim Q \) than what P seems to S to believe Q; reason (4) seems ‘stronger’, or more likely to be true for S than reason (2). Thus S is in fact, in deciding to believe \( \sim Q \), adhering to a principle that says: ‘when faced with a proposition that seems more likely than another contesting one, believe the former’. This is not itself a logical principle, for the fact that one belief seems more likely than another one does not compel one to believe the former, as Feldman has pointed out,
although one will have an incoherent belief-system, containing the belief that $Q$ is a good reason and another belief saying 'withhold $Q$'. You may, for example, believe that you will earn more interest by investing in market shares than you will by opening a savings account. However, you open a savings account because you do not want to take the risk involved in investing in shares. Still, to believe a seemingly more likely proposition does represent a principle one could imagine the majority of people willing to concede to. Feldman’s criticism of Pollock’s argument as relying on an "an intuitive sense of 'justified'" therefore creates the impression that he associates 'intuitive' with capriciousness rather than with intersubjectivity.

Moser also criticises Pollock’s argument but on the account that it represents only prima facie justification. A belief that is justified along the lines described in Pollock’s argument will be justified only as long as there is no other belief that defeats it effectively. Incorporating Pollock’s argument, Moser gives the following account of subjective justification, against which the above-mentioned criticism is directed:

\[ J_{S2}: \text{"S is subjectively justified in believing a proposition } p \text{ if and only if: (i) S believes that he has a good reason to believe that } p, \text{ and believes that } p \text{ on the basis of this supposed good reason; (ii) if S believes that } p \text{ is false, then S’s belief that } p \text{ is based on reasons assumed by S to be either just as good as or better than S’s assumed reasons for believing that } p \text{ is false; and (iii) if S believes that he objectively should withhold } p, \text{ then S’s belief that } p \text{ is based on reasons assumed by S to be either just as good as or better than S’s assumed reasons for believing that he objectively should withhold } p" \] (Moser,1985;64).

Moser argues that S’s belief that $p$ can never be defeated. All that will be able to defeat S’s belief that $p$ is a true proposition entailing that S does not believe that he is justified to believe that $p$. But any such proposition will be outdone as long as S
persists in believing that he is justified to believe that \( p \) (Moser, 1985:64-67). Moser’s criticism against \( J_{S_2} \) boils down to the criticism levelled against \( J_{S_1} \), namely that it allows mere belief, or groundless conjecture. The only difference seems to be that in \( J_{S_2} \) \( S \) has reasons (albeit based on assumption) for his belief. Moser concedes that undefeated subjective justification as expressed by \( J_{S_2} \) represents a valid form of subjective justification, as long as it is not advanced as a condition for knowledge (Moser, 1985:69). The motivation for this is that one could believe a proposition that is not true, but subjectively justify the belief with a set of mutually supporting reasons. However, all of these reasons could be false, but assumed to be good reasons by you. This is surely valid criticism, but which can only be fully expounded in a discussion of coherence theories. Unfortunately that topic falls outside the scope of this study. We rest with Pollock’s reply that:

"... we can reasonably protest against an aberrant reasoner that what he takes to be a good reason for one of his beliefs just is not a good reason. Or if a person’s overall set of epistemological beliefs and inclinations is so abnormal that there is no way we could rationally lead him to agree that a certain set of data is a good reason for believing an inductive generalization \( P \), we can still protest, with perfect justice, that he’s just all screwed up" (Pollock, 1980:110).

The criticism against a subjective concept of epistemic justification is summarised by Cornman when he claims that subjectivist theories face the typical problem of taking

"... certain unjustified beliefs or personal preferences and certain relationships among strengths or relative strengths of these beliefs or preferences to be sufficient for justification" (Cornman, 1980:144).

Cornman is right in criticising unjustified belief and personal preference as a basis for subjective justification, because
allowing that would amount to a definition of subjective justification permitting mere belief, as in the case of J_{S_1}. At the same time, associating ‘relationships among strengths’ and ‘relative strengths’ with ‘unjustified beliefs’ and ‘personal preferences’ represents an oversimplified view of the subjective epistemic situation. Situations where the relative strengths of beliefs are involved, such as described in Pollock’s argument and also in Moser’s definition J_{S_2}, cannot be equated with the situation where someone accepts a false belief in a whimsical manner. Of course, if Moser and Cornman’s criticism is taken to mean that in cases such as J_{S_2} and the one put forward in Pollock’s argument, S’s beliefs about his reasons are false and therefore unjustified in the first place, and that because of that S’s end-belief is unjustified, nullifying any intermediate ‘rationalising’ process, then nothing is to be said in favour of any subjectivist theory of justification. However, this kind of criticism represents a misreading of Pollock’s notion that the subjective sense of ‘should believe’ entails what a person should believe given the person’s possibly mistaken beliefs about reasons. Pollock’s notion claims that, given a person’s possibly mistaken beliefs about reasons, subjective justification should be a function of how the person reasons; of how the person justifies an end-belief, on the basis of those (possibly) mistaken beliefs. It is not saying that subjective justification should depend on whether a person’s beliefs about reasons are mistaken or not.

Moser and Cornman’s criticism thus ignores the possibility of first-person subjective epistemic situations where a person is unable to gather information about the actual status of the person’s reasons. Included among these is the superficial situation of systematic doubt as employed by Descartes to uncover fundamental knowledge. In such a situation the agent deliberately ignores the actual status of beliefs because what constitutes their supposed authority cannot be considered as trustworthy under all circumstances. A similar situation arises when a person has to
choose between two equally probable beliefs (assuming that decision-making can in some way be voluntarily influenced), without having access to supporting beliefs. In these situations the agent has nothing else available to proceed upon except the agent’s own and possibly mistaken beliefs about reasons. Supporting an end-belief in these cases necessarily involves considering relationships between beliefs, relationships such as ‘relative strength’ and ‘difference in subjective probability’.

Lastly, it has to be taken into account that not all epistemic situations are first-person subjective situations. A person’s beliefs can also be evaluated from a second-person or third-person perspective, for example, comparing someone’s subjective belief that it is raining with the actual state of affairs. Therefore it would be wrong to advance subjectivism as a model of justification for all epistemic situations. Consequently Cornman’s following remark misses the point:

"I can find just one reply for a subjectivist, namely, that, as Lehrer has tried to show, the two prime rivals of subjectivism - a foundational theory and an explanatory coherence theory - are even less plausible, and so we should adopt a subjectivist theory" (Cornman, 1980:144).

As pointed out, subjectivism is applicable to particular epistemic situations, therefore it cannot replace, or be replaced by, other theories. It is also not impossible for theories of epistemic justification to be of a more hybridical character than is usually supposed, making it, for example, not altogether implausible that foundationalism can be incorporated within a theory subjectivism. This possibility will not be investigated here.

In this chapter the matter of justificational perspective was further explored in the course of a discussion of first-person subjective justification. This can be seen as an extension of the
discussion of the deontological conception of justification in the second chapter. The main problem of subjective justification emerged as setting conditions for the acceptance of someone’s justificational strategies, given the agent’s possible mistaken beliefs about good reasons. It seems that the person’s belief-forming procedures, when they are acceptable, must in some or other way contribute towards his indemnification. This problem aligns with the normative question, viewed by some to be of primary epistemological importance.

Ideally the subjective evaluative principles that a person adheres to should also objectively be the right ones. How is someone supposed to come by such principles, and to what extent must he be aware of them (of the conditions of justification) in order to be considered justified in holding a belief? In the next chapter two justificational theories dealing with these questions, internalism and externalism, will be discussed.
CHAPTER 4 INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM

The previous chapter concluded with the claim that subjective justification is meritorious where it concerns particular epistemic situations, for example first-person decision-making situations. The necessity emerged for principles to guide decision-making in such situations. Two approaches were mentioned that attempt to determine the correctness of such principles: internalism and externalism. In this chapter these two approaches will be discussed. Externalism will only be briefly characterised, while the main focus will be on internalism. The reason for this is that an in-depth discussion of externalism will extend to a discussion of naturalised epistemology, justificational inference, reasons, the basing relationship, and related matters that properly belong to a discussion of the structure of justification. Externalism involves the perspective from which justification is carried out to a lesser extent than internalism; externalism can be viewed as reaction to the problems resulting from the perspectival character of internalism.

4.1 Externalism

Externalist justification makes a subject’s justification in believing a proposition turn on conditions that the subject may be incapable of recognising (of becoming aware of). For example, suppose that S justifiably believes a certain proposition p, and that p is also true. Furthermore, suppose that S’s belief that p is caused by p’s being true, but that S is not aware of this. Externalists would declare S justified to believe that p, while internalists would demand that S at least be capable of becoming aware of the causal relationship between p and S’s belief that p (Dancy, 1985:46-47). Externalist theories are defined in terms of non-normative concepts, such as the reliability of the belief, which is supposed to indicate the likelihood that beliefs formed in that way will be true. Theories of this kind are therefore naturalistic, in contrast with justificationist theories, which
commonly employ a deontological conception of justification (Audi, 1980:75). A prominent reliability theory is the one advanced by Alvin Goldman in *What is justified belief?* (Goldman, 1979:1-23). This theory utilises the reliability of certain processes of belief acquisition to grant justification to beliefs resulting from that process (Kornblith, 1985:266).

Reliability theories are deemed especially suitable to deal with cases of defeated perceptual belief, for example, that of someone mistaking papier-mâché facsimiles of objects for real ones, or someone hallucinating objects. Upon seeing real objects instead of facsimiles or hallucinated ones, the contentious issue arises whether these persons can be said to know that the objects they perceive are what they actually are (Audi, 1980:75-95). These issues form a broad field of inquiry that cannot be dealt with here, since they mainly concern the relationship between justification and knowledge, and the notion of defeasibility. However, of central importance for this study is the view that externalist theories provide a solution to the problem of justificational regress that is intrinsic to internalism. This matter is discussed fully in chapter 5.

4.2 Internalism

Alvin Goldman argues in *The internalist conception of justification* in favour of a distinction between kinds of theories or principles of justification. One kind of theory might be designed to guide someone in decision-making, or as Goldman puts it, 'in regulating or choosing his doxastic attitudes'. This kind of justificational principle has a regulative or normative function. The main criterion of such a theory is the extent of a person’s access to justification-conferring features during decision-making. A second kind of justificational theory would specify the features of justifiers that confer justification, where such features could or could not be available to a person. Such a theory covers the evaluative or theoretical aspect of justification. These two kinds
of justificational theories are distinct and should not be confused, Goldman claims. The former kind of theory applies mainly to first-person subjective situations, such as the one Descartes describes in his *Meditations*, while the latter makes for objective evaluation, as in the case of the analysis of propositional knowledge (Goldman, 1980: 38-29). The former kind of theory that Goldman describes fits in with what is generally characterised as an ‘internalist’ conception of justification. ‘Internalism’ is the view that epistemic justification can only be granted in the case where a person has cognitive access to what it is that justifies his belief. A wide range of views are held as to what exactly the person must have access to, or to the kind of access involved. Plantinga tries to put these in a nutshell when he states:

"The believer must have cognitive access to something important lurking in the neighbourhood - whether or not he is justified, for example, or to the grounds of his justification, that by virtue of which he justified (Alston), or to the connection between those grounds and the justified belief. .....what is required is some kind of special access; perhaps S can determine by reflection alone, for example, whether he is justified" (Plantinga, 1990: 48-49).

The aspect of reflective access to what justifies a belief thus seems to be an important one for internalism. Audi claims that:

"....the justification is available to consciousness through reflection, including introspective reflection, as opposed to perceptual observation or testimony from someone else" (Audi, 1993: 279),

while Sennett maintains:

"....that which renders a belief epistemically appropriate must be reflectively accessible to the cognizer in question" (Sennett, 1992: 1).

The scope and type of access involved here not only characterise different views of internalism, but also determine distinct ‘levels’ of justification, as will become clear later on.
The gist of internalism then, is that it makes a person’s justificatory status depend on the internalising of certain aspects of the justification (Hetherington, 1991:2). Alston distinguishes two ways in which a person internalises aspects of his justification. The first one makes justification depend on something that is within the person’s perspective on the world, such as something the person knows, believes, or justifiably believes. This he calls ‘perspectival internalism’ (PI for short) (Alston, 1989:188). The second way in which someone can internalise aspects of his justification is to have some kind of special access to what justifies his beliefs (his justifiers). The special access is often specified as direct, incorrigible, and obtainable by introspective reflection. This version of internalism is called ‘access internalism’ (AI for short) (Alston, 1989:211-212). Whether this is a useful distinction is dubious. It would seem possible, for example, that one could have cognitive access to one’s justified beliefs as justifiers. One may, however, not have direct access to the sum total of one’s beliefs. PI is thus not a special case of AI, Alston argues (Alston, 1989:213). Alston’s argument relies on a shift in the meaning of the term ‘direct access’. The term does not refer to the way in which a particular justifier is selected from among a set of justifiers, but to the relationship between a justifier and a person. Even if AI refers to "what the subject can come to know just on reflection" as Alston claims (Alston, 1989:214), then it characterises not the way in which a justifier is accessed, but the access to the justifier itself. A justifier can be stumbled upon by coincidence, and yet the access to the justifier can be special in the sense of being direct, meaning not mediated by other justified beliefs. Alston later on concedes that the relationship between AI and PI may not be one of mutual exclusivity, but that AI may be seen as a broadening of PI (Alston, 1989:214). Nevertheless, Alston’s distinction will be used wherever it promotes simplicity of explanation. At the heart of Alston’s distinction is the distinction between mediate and immediate justification, which will be briefly discussed next.
4.2.1 Mediate and immediate justification

A mediate, or indirectly justified belief, is justified by virtue of its relationship with other justified beliefs of a subject; these other justified beliefs acting as evidence or reasons for the belief in question (Alston, 1989:11,20). The relationship between a belief and its reasons is also a widely discussed topic, often under the term 'basing relations' (Pappas, 1979:51-63). Mediate justification is sometimes called 'inferential justification'. When a belief \( e_1 \) entails another belief \( e_0 \), and a person justifiably believes \( e_1 \), then the person is inferentially justified to believe \( e_0 \), according to Moser (Moser, 1985:24). Pappas argues that inferential basing is distinct from justification-basing (basing on evidence or grounds) (Pappas, 1979:59-63). Consequently mediate justification cannot be equated with inferential justification. However, the basing relationship will not be dealt with in this study.

A belief is immediately justified if it is justified in some other way than mediate, for example if it is justified by experience or by self-evidence (Alston, 1989:11). Such beliefs are not justified on the basis of evidence or reasons, i.e. on the basis of their relationship with other justified beliefs held by the subject. Immediate justification is sometimes called non-inferential justification. Beliefs thus justified are not arrived at on the basis of inference of any sort (Alston, 1989:68). The existence of immediately justified beliefs is a problematic issue. First-person perceptual reports, for example, 'I am now appeared to redly', are often supposed to constitute such a class of beliefs. Sellars maintains that such reports are based on other justified beliefs about relevant facts regarding the circumstances in which they are made, and that these other beliefs give first-person perceptual reports their authority. Such reports are thus not immediately justified (Alston, 1989:69). In a similar way Alston argues that epistemic justification involves evaluation, and that this necessitates a second level belief about an epistemic principle,
for example, the belief that any belief that exhibits a certain feature will be rendered justified by that feature. Epistemic beliefs are thus mediately justified beliefs (Alston, 1989:24). Consequently immediately justified beliefs, if they exist, cannot be of any worth as epistemic justifiers. Controversy also exists regarding the nature of immediately justified beliefs, for example, whether they are incorrigible, as well as regarding what could constitute such a class of beliefs. These matters will not be dealt with here.

Immediately justified beliefs derive the need for their existence from the justificational regress argument. Briefly, it goes that inferential, i.e. reason-based justification, creates an infinite chain of justified beliefs. For a belief to be justified, it must be based on a reason, which is also a justified belief. This reason will need another justified belief for its justification, and so on, \textit{ad infinitum}. The regress can only be blocked by beliefs that are immediately justified; beliefs that do not need other justified beliefs for their justification. This matter will be discussed in chapter 5.

Alston’s distinction between access and perspectival internalism trades on the distinction between mediately and, immediately justification in the following way: the access one has to justifiers on the access internalist conception is special in the sense that it is direct and infallible (Alston, 1989:211-212). Beliefs that are justified on this conception are immediately justified, without relation to evidential beliefs. On the perspectival internalist account, beliefs are justified by something else within the subject’s perspective on the world. Alston claims that this ‘something else’ is best represented by other justified beliefs of the subject (Alston, 1989:192-195), so that beliefs that are justified on a PI conception are essentially mediately justified. The matter of mediacy and immediacy can be viewed as properly relating to the structure of justification. That
it underlies the access/perspectival internalist distinction proves that the distinction between the structural aspects of justification and the perspective from which justification is carried out can only be a theoretical one providing a different angle from which to investigate common problems surrounding the issue of epistemic justification.

Internalism is at the forefront of epistemological discussion concerning justification mainly because of its long-ranging history, according to many writers stretching back to Descartes and Locke. In the following section, the scope of internalist access and the different levels of internalism that it generates will be discussed. Following that, the relationship between these levels is discussed, whereafter the deontological conception of justification in relation to internalism will be dealt with. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the notion of truth in epistemic justification, this time in relation to internalism and externalism.

4.3 First-order and second-order internalism

On the typical characterisation of internalism, justified belief requires introspective awareness of that which justifies a belief. But the extent of this awareness remains controversial. Different approaches to demarcate the extent of this awareness generate distinct ‘levels’ of internalism. Two main categories described by Alston are ‘higher level’ and ‘lower level’ justification, corresponding roughly to Audi’s distinction between ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ internalism. Audi’s distinction is defined in terms of the accessibility requirement for internalism while Alston’s distinction is defined for both the perspectival and access varieties of internalism.

4.3.1. First-order internalism

In terms of the access requirement, the primary idea of internalist justification is that introspective access must be available to
that which acts as the justifier of a belief. But, Audi claims, formulated in this way, internalism does not imply awareness of any particular relationship between a belief \( p \) and its justifier, for example, that \( p \) is caused by, or based on, or grounded by its justifier (Audi, 1993:334). This kind of internalism is termed lower level internalism; it does not place any demand on \( S \)'s awareness of the justifying relationship between the justifier of \( p \) and \( p \) itself. A subject need not form any beliefs about the justifying relationship in order to be justified. 'Having' an internal justifier is considered sufficient for justification. On this view a small child, for example, will be justified to believe, upon seeing a red flash, that there is a red object in front of him, although he does not have the concept of a sensory experience needed to form a higher level belief about the relationship between the experience and the object.

4.3.2. Second-order internalism

Some versions of internalism require the subject to form a belief about the relationship between a justifier and a belief in order to be justified. The person must form, introspectively, a justified belief that his justifier does so. On an access variety of internalism, it is required that the person be capable of becoming aware of how a justifier justifies a belief. This is called second-order internalism (Audi, 1993:337).

Audi identifies another kind of second-order internalism, which requires that a person justifiably believes that a justifier acts as, for example, evidence for one of his beliefs. The person must become aware of his justifier under an epistemic concept; this is called epistemic second-order internalism (Audi, 1993:337). The requirement for second-order internalism corresponds with what Noah Lemos calls the 'high accessibility' requirement of epistemic justification. This states that if one is justified in believing that something has an evaluative property, in other words, that something is a justifier, then this belief is partly justified by
one's believing a general evaluative principle (Lemos, 1989:466). For example, if one recognises a justifier as evidence for another belief because it has a property Q, then the belief that the justifier acts as evidence is justified partly by one's belief in the principle that beliefs with the property Q act as evidence for some other beliefs.

Whether second-order internalism implies belief in such a principle is a controversial matter. Lemos argues that to acknowledge that beliefs about justifiers as evidence must be based on other justified beliefs (must be mediately justified), does not imply belief in a general evaluative principle (Lemos, 1989:466-469). It is an equally problematic matter whether internalism should demand a higher level component. These matters will be discussed in the following section.

4.3.3 The relationship between first-order and second-order internalism

It is often contended that first-order internalism implies second-order internalism. It is argued that someone who is aware of what justifies his belief, for example, that there is a red object before him (it could be a sensory experience of something red), is also in a good position to form a second-order belief about how the sensory experience justifies his belief (Audi, 1993:337). Alston argues that lower level perspectival internalism supports higher level justification. Lower level perspectival internalism requires that the justifier for a particular belief p consists of other justified beliefs of the subject that the subject can become introspectively aware of, without necessarily becoming aware of their justificatory efficacy. Higher level perspectival internalism requires that the subject justifiably believes that these other justified beliefs act as justifiers (e.g. as evidence or support) for p (Alston, 1989:202). In arguing that lower level PI supports higher level PI, Alston claims that PI is essentially and necessarily based on a deontological conception of justification.
If a subject S does not believe that some of his justified beliefs provide adequate support for another of his beliefs, then S would not have adequate support within his perspective, as far as S can tell. In adopting p regardlessly, S would proceed irresponsibly and consequently be accountable for violating intellectual obligations. The difficulties that plague a deontological conception consequently also befall a perspectival internalist conception of justification.

Alston argues that PI cannot be seriously defended on a direct control version of deontology; it can only be consistently described in terms of an indirect control version (Alston, 1989:207-209). This means that only a justified belief that someone has can justify his other beliefs, and then only if the justifying belief (the justifier) does not stem from the violation of any intellectual duties. A higher level requirement imposed on this would also require the person to justifiably believe that his justifying belief acts as a justifier for his other beliefs, in order for the person to be justified (Alston, 1989:209). A problem that now arises comprises the fact that justification in this case depends on the history of the belief in question. Only if S had lived up to his intellectual obligations in the past would his belief be justified. This makes justification no longer a matter of what appears in the subject’s perspective on the world, but it rather depends upon facts about his belief that are ‘external’ to S, in the same sense that, for example, the causal formation of his belief concerns facts external to S. This requirement could be ‘perspectivalised’, making justification depend on whether S’s belief stems from the violations of intellectual obligations, as far as S can tell. This raises the problem that people often do not have the time or cognitive means to investigate the causal history of their beliefs; making many beliefs that lack proper backing justifiable on a combined deontological and perspectival internalist account (Alston, 1989:208). This possibility prompts questions about what could reasonably be expected from someone in
order for the person to be justified, and this in turn relates to the relationship between internalist justification and truth. These matters will not be pursued here, as they are discussed in sections 4.4 and 4.5.

Thus, on Alston’s argument perspectival internalism does imply second-order perspectival internalism, but then on the assumption that a necessary relationship holds between perspectival internalism and deontology. What is the case with access internalism? Does first-order access internalism imply second-order access internalism? In other words, if justification requires of someone to be capable of becoming introspectively directly (immediately or infallibly) aware of the justifier of a belief, is it also required that the person be capable of becoming introspectively directly aware of the justifier as a justifier, i.e. of its justificatory efficacy? Kent Bach is quoted answering this question in the positive:

"Internalism.....treats justifiedness as a purely internal matter: if p is justified for S, then S must be aware (or at least be immediately capable of being aware) of what makes it justified and why" (Alston, 1989:212).

Alston discusses examples from the work of Chisholm and Ginet that share Bach’s view. He argues that their descriptions of access internalism are, just as in the case of perspectival internalism, based on a deontological conception of justification. The argument essentially takes the same form as in the discussion of perspectival internalism:

"Suppose that the sorts of things that can count as justifiers are always accessible to me, but that it is not always accessible to me which items of these sorts count as justifications for which beliefs. I have access to the justifiers but not to their justificatory efficacy. This will take away my ability to do what I am said to have an obligation to do just as surely as the lack of access to the justifiers themselves "

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The problems besetting a deontological conception of justification as set out elsewhere, consequently also plague the access version of second-order internalism. Nevertheless, second-order access internalism escapes certain other difficulties associated with second-order perspectival internalism. This results from the requirement that on a second-order access version of internalism a person be capable of becoming directly aware of the justificatory efficacy of a justifier. The person need not have a conflated body of justified beliefs in order to be justified. This also prevents an infinite regress of justification from taking hold (Alston, 1989: 221). According to Hetherington and others access internalism does give rise to such a regress, but this matter is discussed in a separate section.

Even a moderate higher level access internalist requirement such as the one described by Bach may be too severe, Alston continues. This is because not many people would be capable of its satisfaction; not many people would be capable of determining whether something is genuine justification for the beliefs that they hold. The reason why this may be the case provides an important point of discussion. The requirement to give adequate reasons for claims about justification may descend into circularity since, for example:

"....any otherwise promising argument for a principle laying down conditions under which perceptual beliefs are justified will have to use perceptual beliefs among its premises" (Alston, 1989: 222).

What seems to be required here under Alston’s modest higher level access internalism is not only the ability to become (directly) aware of the justificatory efficacy of a justifier, but also the ability to lay down (to explain) principles for justificatory conditions. This means that in order to become aware of a justifier as a justifier, one must also be able to identify the conditions, or principles, of justification involved, or at least implicitly
become aware of such principles. On this view, internalism requires one to become aware of a justifier as a justifier, and under an epistemic concept such as 'evidence', 'grounds' or 'reasons'. For Alston, second-order internalism thus coincides with what Audi calls second-order 'epistemic' internalism. As mentioned earlier on, someone like Audi denies that second-order internalism must necessarily be epistemic. Audi’s 'strong internalism' only requires of a person to be capable of becoming introspectively aware of how a justifier justifies another belief; it does not require the person to know or to justifiably believe that the justifier provides, e.g., evidence for the belief in question.

Noah Lemos also disputes whether second-order internalism should require a person to become aware of a justificatory principle. It might be possible, he argues, that we have some justified epistemic beliefs which do not depend upon being justified in believing a general justificatory principle (Lemos, 1991:467). A pre-linguistic child who sees a red flash and reaches out to touch the object that causes it, may be justified in its belief that there is something red in front of it, without being able to explain the justificatory principles involved. Alston’s view thus represents something of an overkill, and it is not at all an undisputed matter that it poses necessary conditions even for epistemic second-order internalism. Internalism could require of someone to become aware (introspectively) of the justificatory efficacy of a justifier (a justifier as evidence, for example) without requiring the person to be able to explain (or even to be capable of becoming aware of) the justificatory principles involved. The appropriate question here is one that also turns out to be of fundamental importance for internalism. This concerns the problem whether a justifier can be epistemically within a person without the person appreciating the justifier as epistemically within. In other words, the question whether someone could have a reason without appreciating it as a reason (a justified belief) for another belief. This matter will be discussed next.
4.3.4 ‘Being epistemically within’

In his article On Being epistemically within, Stephen Hetherington poses the question whether internalism necessitates an affirmative answer to what he calls ‘the Transparency Question’. This question asks whether a justifier (any justifier, e.g. beliefs, raw feels, etc.) can be epistemically within a person S without the person appreciating (‘cognitively grasping’, ‘becoming aware of’, etc.) the justifier as ‘epistemically within’ (Hetherington, 1991:3). Consider again the example of the small child who sees a red flash, and the question whether the child is justified or not to believe that there is something red in front of him. If we grant the child justification, it means that the transparency question does not require a positive answer; someone can be justified by only having an internal justifier (such as a raw feel) and without having any further beliefs about the justifier. Justification in this case can only be granted, Hetherington claims, through a confusion of justificational perspectives. Suppose the child is granted justification. Then, since the child ‘has’ the justifier, the relationship that obtains between the child and the raw feel is exploited as a fact epistemically ‘external’ to the child in the same way as facts about the causal history of a belief or facts about the reliability of the belief-formation. If the child is not required to form a belief about his justification internally, then justification can only be ascribed to him on account of the relationship between him and his justifier ‘externally’, in this case meaning from a third-person perspective. Therefore, in order to be consistent epistemic internalism must answer the Transparency Question in the positive: if a justifier is epistemically within S, then S not only has the justifier, but appreciates it as a justifier. If this is not the case, then the epistemic internalist becomes an epistemic externalist (Hetherington, 1991:3-7).

S’s appreciating a justifier as ‘epistemically within’, claims Hetherington, entails S’s describing the justifier as such. This description need not take a verbal form, he continues, but
"...will need to be some awareness of (or cognisance of, or access to) W1 as epistemically internal" (Hetherington, 1991:7). It is not at all clear what exactly is meant by 'description', and on first appearance 'the description of direct awareness' may well seem to be a contradiction in terms. However, the important point that Hetherington makes is that internalism must necessarily be 'epistemic' internalism. One cannot have an internal justifier without being aware of it as a justifier. Suppose it is granted that one can become directly aware of the justificatory efficacy of a justifier under some sort of description, where this minimally means that one’s awareness is not mediated by other justified beliefs about the justifier. Hetherington now argues that this description, or becoming aware of, represents an instance of ‘distancing’ from oneself. To describe one’s epistemic situation, one assumes a detached, ‘objective’ perspective on oneself in the same way as one would do when describing someone else’s justification, or when describing one’s own justification at any other time than right now. In fact, ‘I-now’ situations such as ‘I am now being appeared to redly’ cannot be described at the moment when it is someone’s I-now situation. They can be internal, but to be epistemically internal, they must be appreciated as such at the moment, and that requires interpretation of the situation, which entails a detachment characteristic of external epistemic justification (Hetherington, 1991:8-11). This situation could be compared to one that Thomas Nagel describes in The View from Nowhere. In the chapter titled The Objective Self, Nagel describes a situation attempting to overcome the subjectivity characteristic of a first-person epistemic perspective by considering the self as included in a progressively wider-ranging context. Taking up such an impersonal viewpoint, Nagel claims, brings about a sense of detachment from oneself (Nagel, 1986:60-66).

The ostensive externalist character of epistemic internalism leads Hetherington to conclude that the concept of the epistemically internal is a vacuous one that gives way to epistemic externalism
A few matters complicate Hetherington’s result. First of all, the conclusion is derived from an analysis of directly accessible (immediate) second-order justification. It exploits the anomaly that what is supposed to be directly or immediately accessible cannot, without fear of inconsistency, be represented or described, since this representation manifests as a mediated perspective. In generalising from this insight to conclude that epistemic internalism is a meaningless concept, it is assumed that all epistemic internalism takes the form of direct, immediate justification. The overwhelming problems besetting the concept of direct epistemic (second-order) internalism often leads to ignoring the possibility that second-order internalist justification may also employ other beliefs as justifiers without damaging the character of internalism. In *High accessibility and justification* Noah Lemos states that:

"The claim that justification is directly recognizable should not be taken to deny the possibility of indirectly justified epistemic propositions" (Lemos,1989:472).

One’s becoming aware of justification internally may also "...include other things one is justified in believing" (ibid.), i.e., one’s internally justified belief may also be mediated by other justified beliefs. That this possibility is overlooked results from a fundamental confusion which Alston analyses in *Level confusions in epistemology*. Regarding immediate justification, the confusion that Alston points out consists thereof that it is supposed that for a belief to be immediately justified, the higher level (epistemic) belief, in other words the recognising of the justificatory efficacy of a justifier, must itself be immediately recognised (Alston,1989:155). Such a requirement, Alston points out, is primarily designed to block an infinite regress of justification. Alston argues that this is not necessary, since such a regress can be sufficiently blocked by first level immediate
justification (Alston, 1989: 159). This matter will not be pursued here, since it is discussed in depth elsewhere. Suffice it to say that the level confusion that Alston describes lies at the heart of Hetherington’s arguing that epistemic internalism is a vacuous concept. Furthermore, it is clear that with the term ‘externalism’ Hetherington has a kind of ‘radical externalism’ in mind to which any variety of representation or description belongs; any mediated justification automatically falls outside the description of ‘internalist’. This view does not, for example, allow the kind of ‘quasi-externalism’ advanced by Nagel, according to which self-detachment and objectification form part of an individual’s doxastic decision-making process.

The upshot of this section is that first-order internalism does imply second-order internalism when internalism is employed in conjunction with a deontological conception. Difficulties concerning a deontological conception prompts PI to be defined in terms of an indirect control version; this raises questions about the boundaries of what can reasonably be expected from someone in order not to be blameworthy. Finally this matter concerns the relationship between internalism and truth. The discussion of AI revealed another important point: whether second-order internalism requires a person to be able to explain the conditions or principles of justification, in other words, whether internalism is necessarily ‘epistemic’ internalism. This must be the case, Hetherington argues, in order for internalism to be consistent. And if it is consistently characterised as such, he concludes, it leads to an anomaly; access to justificatory efficacy is not immediate (directly recognisable) any more, it involves a detachment akin to externalism. At the basis of Hetherington’s argument lies a level confusion that expects second-order (epistemic) internalism to be immediate (direct) whenever first-order internalism is. Second-order justification is mediate (indirect) since it involves the giving of reasons in the form of other justified beliefs; it is ‘discursive’. This mediacy Hetherington confuses with externalism,
hence the view that second-order internalism comprises an anomaly. Next, two important issues that emerged in this section will be investigated: the relationship between internalism and deontology, and the notion of truth in relation to internalist justification.

4.4 Internalism and a deontological conception of justification. As indicated earlier, the notion of epistemic justification appears to be traditionally associated with the normative ideal of satisfying intellectual obligations. According to Plantinga in *Justification in the twentieth century*, both Descartes and Locke attach central importance to the notion of duty or obligation in epistemology (Plantinga, 1990: 49). In this section the concern lies with the relationship between deontology and internalist justification. In the above-mentioned essay of Plantinga it is claimed that a necessary relationship holds between deontology and internalism. The following passage from Descartes' fourth *Meditation* is quoted in support:

"But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly....But if I determine to deny or affirm, I no longer make use as I should of my free will, and if I affirm what is not true, it is evident that I deceive myself; even though I judge according to truth, this comes about only by chance, and I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom; for the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will. It is in the misuse of the free will that the privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error is met with" (Plantinga, 1990: 50).

The deontological aspect of this argument consists of a person being blameworthy upon misusing his free will. This can come about through persisting to pass judgment although not perceiving an idea 'clearly and distinctly'. Even if the truth is reached in this way it will have been by accident, and the person will be blameworthy all the same, since the judgment does not stem from clear
perceiving. Undoubtedly a deontological conception of justification is advanced here; error and consequent blame determine the justification of someone's belief. But the question that needs to be addressed is how this conception of justification implies internalism in the way that Plantinga claims:

"His (Descartes') central thought is that being justified in holding a belief is having fulfilled one's epistemic duties in forming or continuing to hold that belief. This thought is the fons et origo of the whole internalist tradition. It is this notion of deontological justification that is the source of internalism: deontology implies internalism" (Plantinga, 1990:52).

Perhaps a fruitful way of approaching the issue is to determine firstly what makes the conception of justification put forward by Descartes (particularly in the fourth Meditation) internalist. The opening paragraph of the fourth Meditation makes it explicit that the method of evaluation that is advanced excludes empirical observation:

"I have been habituated these bygone days to detach my mind from the senses, and I have accurately observed that there is exceedingly little which is known with certainty respecting corporeal objects..." (Veitch, 1887:133).

Further on it becomes clear that 'perceiving something clearly and distinctly' is a matter of what is commonly referred to in contemporary terminology as 'introspection' or 'reflection'; in the vocabulary of the Meditations it involves the 'apprehending of ideas' by 'the understanding'. Whatever dubious mind-body dualism this characterisation is based on (as Gilbert Ryle and Richard Rorty argue in The concept of mind and Philosophy and the mirror of nature respectively), it does draw a clear line between empirical observation and purely intellectual activity, advancing a modus operandi for justification that eschews the former and embraces the latter. But this methodology does not remain a unique feature of Descartes' philosophy; it fundamentally influenced the entire
tradition of western epistemology. Alvin Goldman, amongst others, points out that: "Traditional epistemology....has been predominantly internalist, or egocentric" (Goldman, 1980:32). It is not appropriate to trace the history of that development here. Rorty’s book mentioned above is a fine example of doing just that and at the same time arguing persuasively that epistemic justification is not necessarily internalist, but only historically so. This provides a useful result for evaluating the relationship between deontology and internalism. For it means that if epistemic justification is not necessarily internalist, then a deontological conception of justification is not necessarily internalist either; it leaves the possibility that deontology can be associated with non-internalist forms of justification. Indeed, it happens often that someone is reproached for not having familiarised himself with certain relevant facts before making a statement. In such a case the person is not reproached for not having reflected carefully enough upon the matter, but rather for not having, for example, consulted authoritative opinion.

It is clear that the conditions for blameworthiness are determined by the criteria that hold for the manner in which belief-formation is supposed to be carried out; the manner of belief-formation (and consequently of justification) determines whether a person is blameworthy or not. The same principle is at work in the case of Descartes’ epistemology. In the fourth meditation someone is blameworthy when he persists in passing judgment even though he does not perceive something (a belief, a proposition, an idea) clearly and distinctly; he is blameworthy because he does not comply with the criteria of adequacy for internalist justification. He is blameworthy as a result of this; it is not the case that his blameworthiness results in this. If deontology had implied internalism, he would have been blameworthy for forming his belief in a manner other than internalistically, say, for example, externalistically; not for having performed his internalist belief-formation inadequately. Thus, deontology appears to be determined
by the manner in which justification is carried out (internalistically or externalistically), rather than the other way round, asPlantinga claims. Or, to be more precise, the conditions for blameworthiness are thus determined, and not blameworthiness itself. For example, if someone does not perceive something clearly and distinctly upon reflection, then he is blameworthy (internalistically); or, if he does not form his belief in accordance with popular and authoritative opinion, then he is blameworthy (externalistically). The manner in which justification is carried out is fundamental, the choice of a deontological conception of justification is arbitrary. Once these two notions are employed in conjunction however, the manner of justification will determine when and how someone is blameworthy. The use of a deontological conception is arbitrary because internalism and externalism do not imply deontology either. Someone need not be blamed or praised for having reflected upon something instead of consulting an encyclopedia.

Elsewhere it is claimed that internalism and externalism essentially characterise different perspectives from which justification is carried out. This notion further complicates the view that a necessary relationship holds between deontology and internalism (or externalism). Deontology, even though a conception of justification, does not belong to the same logical category as the other two conceptions of justification. The concept of blameworthiness, namely, is 'perspective-neutral', so to speak. Nothing in the concept of blameworthiness itself makes deontological justification internalist or externalist. Blameworthiness does not imply or determine a perspective from which justification is carried out, it implies at most that justification is carried out. Hence the previous paragraph’s conclusion that deontology is parasitic upon its association with internalist or externalist justification in that the conditions for blame supervene on the criteria for adequacy in both forms of justification. In the light of this it is difficult to concede to
Plantinga’s claim that deontology implies internalism. Traditionally the conception of epistemic justification may be deontological of nature, and internalist of nature as well, but enough doubt has been raised to show that it is only historically, and thus contingently so. Only the assumption that these are logically necessary characteristics of justification can lead to the claim that the notion of blameworthiness is the ‘fons et origo’ of the whole internalist tradition. Only when justification is necessarily deontological and necessarily internalistic can the relationship between deontology and internalism be one of logical necessity. Thus Plantinga’s ‘first internalist motif’, which equates deontology with internalism (subjective justification) in a linear way;

"Epistemic justification (i.e. subjective justification, being such that I am not blameworthy) is entirely up to me and within my power" (Plantinga,1990:55),

can be nothing more than a motif, illuminating a certain historical tendency. But as a proof of a necessary relationship between deontology and internalism, it amounts to a petitio principii.

Even though deontology might not imply internalism, the view that a deontological conception of justification is supported by internalism deserves investigation. Alston argues that a deontological conception of justification is supported by internalism in the following way: if someone is not aware of the existence of a justifier, it is the same as if the justifier does not exist for the person. But then, if the person is not aware of the existence of the justifier, it can not influence what is permissible for the person to believe, or what is such that, in believing it the person will not be blameworthy for transgressing intellectual norms. In this case the deontological constraint is also a sufficient condition for justification, since nothing more could be demanded of the person than to employ all the relevant
facts that fall within his perspective on the world. Whether these facts (beliefs) are actually true is not of concern, the person could not be held responsible for defeating beliefs that fall outside his system of beliefs (Alston, 1989:199).

The particular kind of internalism involved here requires the person to be aware not only of a justifier, but also of the reasons why it acts as a justifier; as Alston states, the person must be aware of the warrant-conferring aspect of a justifier (ibid.). This type of requirement is usually attributed to second-order, or higher level internalism. It differs from what is termed first-order or lower level internalism in that first-order internalism only requires a person to be aware of a justifier, not of its justificatory efficacy also. Thus it appears that if internalism is associated with a deontological conception of justification, a second-order variety of internalism is involved. This confirms Plantinga’s corollary to his second motif of internalism:

"In a large, important and basic class of epistemic cases a properly functioning human person can simply see (can’t make a nonculpable mistake about) whether a proposition has the property that confers justification upon it for her" (Plantinga, 1990:58).

If a person reflects on a belief the reasons for the belief will inevitably and without the possibility of doubt become clear to the person. Consequently, if the person does not believe (refuses to believe) according to what the justifier prescribes, he will be blameworthy; in this case someone cannot make a mistake for which he will not be blameworthy.

An important consequence of this view is that subjects cognitively incapable of forming higher level beliefs about their reasons (justifiers) for believing as they do (subjects incapable of becoming aware of their justifiers upon reflection), are automatically denied justification. Animals, small children and the
mentally defective are excluded; the notion of epistemic justification becomes applicable only to subjects who are cognitively sophisticated enough to evaluate their own and others’ doxastic states (Alston, 1989:144). This restriction is the cause of considerable controversy, because on the view that justified belief is a necessary condition for knowledge these subjects are also denied the ascription of knowledge. The controversy is sharpened by the common practice of claiming, for example, that a baby knows that its mother is near, or that a cat knows that there is a mouse in the room. An ad hoc solution to this problem is to affirm the independence of the notion of justification from that of knowledge, allowing the mentioned subjects to have knowledge but not justification. However, as the matter affects the relationship between justification and knowledge, which falls outside the scope of this study, it will not be pursued further.

The case discussed above represents an example of subjects failing to satisfy an internalist requirement for justification. It represents an extreme example, because due to their cognitive nature the subjects are totally incapable of (we suppose) introspective reflection upon their beliefs and justifiers. Examples exist of less extreme cases. Because of factors beyond his control (for example a lack of time), a normal functioning adult may be incapable of sufficiently thorough consideration of whether the grounds for a belief are adequate. A person may also be only slightly ‘deficient’, just not capable of coming to a clear understanding of his reasons and the way in which they support his beliefs; not everybody is equally reflective. Of course these examples reject the view that internalism implies ‘epistemic’ internalism (the view advanced by Hetherington and entailed by Plantinga’s corollary to his second internalist motif). On that view any ‘amount’ of reflection will reveal the efficacy of a justifier fully; it makes the carrying out (the ‘action’) of introspective reflection the sole criterion of adequacy for internalist justification, since reflection inevitably and
undoubtedly reveals a justifier and its justificatory efficacy.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the range of examples of subjects failing to satisfy the criteria set for adequate internalist justification extends from the extreme to the marginal. On the extreme side, subjects would be unjustified internalistically (e.g. animals, small children and the mentally deficient), while on the marginal side it is less clear whether someone is internalistically justified or not. On a deontological-internalist conception of justification, the question now arises: ‘Are these subjects blameworthy or not?’ ‘Extreme internalists’, as Alston calls them, declare all the subjects across the range not blameworthy; thus deontologically justified. They assume that for someone to be internalistically justified the subject need only ‘have’ an internal justifier; the subject is not required to form adequate beliefs about the justifier and its efficacy in order to be justified. Granting the extreme cases mentioned above justification, can only come about through a radical shift in justificational perspective. The subjects’ ‘having’ a justifier is treated in the same way as other external facts about their justification, facts such as the causal history of their belief-formation. On this account of their having an internal justifier, they are granted justification by somebody else from a second or third-person perspective, so that one can hardly speak of internalist justification any more. If they are deontologically justified, it is we who declare them blameless, and mainly because they could not be anything other than what they are. In the same way, granting the marginal cases deontological justification can only occur on account of the facts concerning the person’s having a justifier overriding the person’s beliefs about his justifier. The internalist aspect is not completely absent as in the extreme cases, but it is largely obscured by the external utilising of the facts about his internal justifier.
Even in cases where the internalist part of the justification is adequately performed the subject falls prey, argues Hetherington, to a ‘distancing’ reminiscent of externalism. We need not subscribe to Hetherington’s sceptical conclusion that internalism is therefore a vacuous concept, but together with the above-mentioned it does lead to a curious result. It seems that, on a deontological-internalist conception of justification, if the net justification is swayed to the positive side on deontological grounds, a shift in justificational perspective occurs which simultaneously tend to lessen the importance of the internalist aspect (Indeed, Alston takes these cases to prove that deontological justification can exist without internalist justification, and vice versa (Alston, 1989:150-152). This only reinforces the notion that a necessary relationship does not hold between deontology and internalism). This effect creates the possibility of an extreme situation where someone can be completely justified in holding beliefs that are entirely false. A popular example of such a case is the so-called Cartesian demon hypothesis. In this case the person’s internalist justification is adequate and complete; as in Descartes’ case the justification is carried out through introspection. Moreover, the person is justified deontologically; he can not be blamed because he believes as he does only upon perceiving something clearly and distinctly. And yet all the person’s beliefs may be false, originating with an evil demon or a malevolent scientist who constructs a world of experience for the subject that he can not distinguish from any other. Examples such as these (the evil demon hypothesis together with the examples of cultural isolation and cognitive deficiency) are often interpreted to prove that deontological justification is not truth-conducive; they illustrate that a discrepancy exists between deontological justification and truth-conducive justification. Alston uses this situation to conclude that a deontological conception of justification is of no value to epistemology since it does not adhere to "the basic concerns of epistemology with truth and falsity" (Alston, 1989:132).
This conclusion does not keep track of the fact that the examples mentioned above involve a conception of justification that is dualistic of nature. It is precisely the doubt surrounding the internalist aspect thereof, in combination with the resolution concerning the deontological aspect that creates the ambivalence. Briefly again, if someone employs all his beliefs (everything within his perspective on the world) in an acceptable way to form a certain belief, is he deontologically justified? What is reasonable to expect from someone in a case like this? If he is declared not blameworthy on grounds that he has proceeded responsibly, then the possibility exists that he may be justified although his belief is false. It is the combinational working of a deontological conception and an internalist conception of justification that allows the possibility of justified false belief. Therefore it need not indicate that either deontology or internalism does not provide an adequate conception of justification. Rather, what these examples indicate is that a deontological-internalist conception does not provide adequate criteria for epistemic justification, if truth-efficacy is taken as the primary goal of epistemic justification. Next the matter of truth in justification will be dealt with again, this time in connection with internalism.

4.5 Internalism, externalism and truth
As mentioned in section 1.3, epistemic justification has as its aim some combination of maximising truth and minimising falsity. On the other hand, one of the subjects of discussion of epistemological theorising is the choice of beliefs, also termed belief-formation or doxastic decision-making. A central problem of epistemology is one of aligning the choice of beliefs with the epistemic goal of finding the truth. Epistemically appropriate beliefs would be those properly directed towards this goal; this would provide a desideratum for epistemic justification. Thus, epistemic justification involves a regulative, or normative function, advising subjects on a proper choice of beliefs. Such a regulative
function calls for guidelines or principles, what Goldman calls 'doxastic decision principles', i.e. "rules for the formation of beliefs or other doxastic attitudes" (Goldman, 1980:29). Someone would be justified in holding a belief in case these principles were adhered to. These principles therefore sometimes 'double' as justificational principles. Of course different sets of principles might exist. According to Goldman, internalism and externalism are two approaches to answering the question: "What makes a set of instructions the right instructions?" (Goldman, 1980:27). For the externalist, whether someone is justified in holding a belief is a matter of taking external factors such as the reliability of belief-formation and the causal history of the belief into consideration. These factors must align the belief-formation with truth 'in a non-ad hoc way' (Sturgeon, 1991:105). According to Sturgeon,

"....a belief's being non-solipsistically justified is simply a function of its truth-value across counterfactual contexts, which function being determined by considerations of strict reliability, causal correlation...." (Sturgeon, 1991:100).

External factors must result in the belief being formed in a 'truth-conducive way' (Sennett, 1992:4). Hilary Kornblith, who supports a naturalistic epistemology, claims that the matter of reliability of belief-formation is 'straight-forward empirical' (Kornblith, 1985:266).

The internalist does not find matters equally straight-forward. As a conception of justification, internalism also subscribes to the epistemic aim of finding the truth (Sennett, 1992:7), but in doing so it generates a unique set of problems. First of all, internalist justification proceeds from a subjective perspective, it makes justification a function of what lies within the subject's perspective on the world, or what the subject has introspective access to. If truth is to be the aim of justification, this
situation is unsatisfactory, because it relativises truth to the perspective of a particular subject. As Weintraub states, "...from the first-person perspective, belief is indistinguishable from truth" (Weintraub, 1991:164). Internalism does not satisfy the requirement of optimal truth production and error avoidance in the way that externalist theories supposedly are capable of doing. But in combination with a deontological conception of justification, internalist reflection is assumed to constitute sufficient conditions for justification on the basis that nothing more could be expected from a person. Epistemic appropriateness, i.e. appropriating truth, becomes a matter of epistemic responsibility. As Sennett states, a person would be justified to believe something to the extent that he has done what he needs to do to confirm for himself that it is true (Sennett, 1992:2).

To overcome the problem of subjectivity, traditional internalism has assumed:
(1) that the justifying features of a belief (its justificatory efficacy) are available to any subject upon reflection; Sennett claims that it is a "major internalist thesis that the fact of epistemic appropriateness....is in some way accessible to S" (Sennett, 1992:3); and,
(2) that such justifying features are a priori features; innate features common to all human beings, and in being so, they constitute objective justification beyond the subjective character of the subject’s perspective. In this way objective truth is supposed to obtain.

Kornblith argues that Descartes ran together the following two sets of questions:
"(a) How ought we, subjectively speaking, to arrive at our beliefs? What processes available to us, if any, are conducive to truth?
(b) How ought we, subjectively speaking, to arrive at our beliefs? What processes available to us, if any, seem conducive to truth?" (Kornblith, 1985:264).
Thus, what seems to be truth-conducive upon reflection, cannot otherwise than be truth-conducive. This is what Plantinga calls an ‘internalist motif’: subjective duty and objective duty coincide in traditional internalism (Plantinga,1990:56-59). In terms of the model of doxastic decision-making principles, it means that a person can introspectively define such principles, moreover, such principles would then also constitute objective principles. Kornblith claims that the question about subjectively correct means to acquire beliefs was believed to be a practical requisite for arriving at beliefs in an objective way (Kornblith,1985:267). Sennett states: "The internalist goal is to discover and do whatever it takes to contribute appropriately to finding truth" (Sennett,1992:7).

A couple of problems characterise this picture. The notion of a priori beliefs has been largely discredited. Apart from that, internalist justification does not prevent one from forming true beliefs in a fortuitous fashion, as the Gettier examples show, or even from forming justified false beliefs, as the Cartesian demon hypothesis shows. One may thus be excused or pardoned, i.e. not reproached on a notion analogous to the ethical one of subjective rightness, but it is not to say that one is epistemically justified (Goldman,1980:37). It does not mean that internalist justification completely renounces the epistemic aim of truth attainment. Foley has labelled internalist theories ‘rational’ for their commitment to attaining truth, despite their inability to guarantee objective truth. On his account,

"A theory of epistemic rationality is one that seeks to describe from the person’s own perspective that it is appropriate for him to believe insofar as he is interested in believing truths and not believing falsehoods" (Sennett,1992:10).

In the light of this, theories of epistemic justification seem to break down into two main categories:

69
"Internalist concerns are best directed at the development of a theory of rationality, while externalist concerns are best directed at the development of a theory of conduciveness" (Sennett, 1992:7-8).

In attempting to determine which decision-making principle is the right one, in other words which one will be truth-efficacious, theories of rationality (theories of epistemically appropriate internalist justification) appeal to a higher level component, i.e. a belief about the justificatory efficacy of a justifier. The connection between solipsistic justification and truth, claims Sturgeon, develops at the doxastic level. Such a connection will be phrased in terms of beliefs about truth, falsity, reliability, etc. (Sturgeon, 1991:100). Sennett interprets Foley as claiming that a belief can be rational for a person only if the person understands, or would understand on proper reflection, that his reasons for accepting the belief render it likely to be true (Sennett, 1992:11). The internalist goal is therefore, according to Sennett, to "discover and do whatever it takes to contribute appropriately to finding truth" (Sennett, 1992:7). The pervasive question underlying this is how one would be able to develop doxastic principles through introspective reflection and with the same means determine whether they are the 'right' ones.

Per definition internalism does not allow contingent matters to influence decision-making. Traditionally epistemology insists, claims Goldman, that doxastic decision-making principles be formulated from the subject’s own individual vantage point (Goldman, 1980:32). Goldman argues at length in The internalist conception of justification that such a program is impossible. Whichever doxastic principle one chooses always turns out to be based on some other doxastic attitude. For example, Descartes’ method of suspending judgment is based on the belief that such an attitude guarantees doxastic neutrality. But what justifies this belief in turn? All doxastic principles that are developed from within, argues Goldman, turn out to be based on a doxastic attitude.
towards some contingent principle, which ought to be in principle unacceptable for internalism (Goldman, 1980:38-42).

This calls to mind the 'problem of the criterion', as expounded by Roderick Chisholm in the 1973 Aquinas Lecture with the same title. Roughly it goes that to distinguish between true and false appearances one needs a criterion. But to determine whether the criterion is really effective, one must already be able to distinguish between true and false appearances, so that a vicious circle arises (Chisholm, 1973:2-3). Applied to the doxastic decision-making situation, it means that one needs a criterion ('principles') to determine which beliefs are justified. But to determine whether one's principle is the 'right' one, one must already know which beliefs are justified and which are not, implying the involvement of a further principle; what Goldman calls a 'doxastic attitude' towards another belief.

One might argue that the problem only arises when it is required of a person to explain the conditions (principles) of his justification, in other words, when internalism is assumed to imply 'epistemic' internalism. Supposedly internalism would escape the problem if it is only required of someone to become aware of a justifier and its justificatory efficacy, but not under an epistemic concept. However, even on these conditions the problem arises, presenting itself in the form of a justificational regress. This will be discussed next.
CHAPTER 5  THE JUSTIFICATIONAL REGRESS

5.1 The regress problem
Some beliefs are best justified by their relation to other beliefs. This relation is normally viewed as inferential; one belief is inferred from another. The belief that is inferred from must also be justified in order to confer justification upon the belief in question. Therefore only justified beliefs can act as justifiers for other beliefs. Inferential justification is conditional justification. A belief p is justified by appeal to a belief q, but this in itself does not justify p; p will be justified only on condition that q is justified. But the justification of q will in turn depend on the justification of another belief r from which q is inferred; the justification of r will depend on the justification of another belief s, and so on. A justificational regress of this kind is endless (Dancy, 1985:55). The regress is described here in terms of propositional justification; beliefs are justified without specifying a subject for whom the beliefs are justified (see section 1.1).

Moser describes the justificational regress in terms of doxastic justification; a person S is specified for whom the beliefs are justified. At the heart of this regress is an ‘evidence chain’ in the form of a series of beliefs e_1, e_2, e_3, ..., e_n, such that e_2 justifies e_1, e_3 justifies e_2, and in general, e_n justifies e_{n-1}. S is justified in believing e_1 because S is justified in believing that e_2 is true, and that e_2 entails e_1. But because e_2 in turn depends for its justification on another belief e_3, S is inferentially justified in believing e_2 on the basis of believing e_3 to be true, and believing that e_3 entails e_2 (Moser, 1985:24). As the evidence chain stretches back infinitely, S’s justification also does, constituting an infinite justificational regress.
5.2 The regress argument

The regress argument is advanced by those who consider an infinite regress of justification undesirable in the search for a satisfactory description of epistemic justification. It is undesirable they claim, mainly because beliefs justified in this way are only conditionally justified. That no belief is actually justified on this model turns the infinite regress into a vicious one with sceptical consequences, claims Dancy (Dancy, 1985:56). It is by no means a conclusive matter whether the main task of a theory of epistemic justification should be to refute scepticism, but that is not of concern here.

The regress argument nevertheless supposes that one of the main tasks of a theory of epistemic justification is to provide a mechanism that would halt an endless justificational regress. The regress is seen as mainly the consequence of the inferential character of justification. Therefore, it is argued, the regress can only be stopped by beliefs that are non-inferentially, or immediately justified. Assuming that such beliefs exist, inferential justification then generates four possible accounts of justification:

1. The evidence chain for a belief (its justification) stretches back infinitely; or
2. The evidence chain forms a closed circle (circles, or loops of justification); or
3. The evidence chain terminates with an unjustified belief; or

(1), (2) and (3) constitute the ‘Münchhausen trilemma’ of justification, so called after the fictitious baron Münchhausen who, according to legend pulled himself out of a swamp by his hair (Vollmer, 1987:174). The metaphor illustrates the impasse to which any one of these approaches to justification leads. Apart from the sceptical implications, an infinite chain of justification is not
practically possible, because one would not be able to prove conclusively one's justification for a belief. The notion of loops of justification is logically faulty because it has the implication that a belief at the top end of a chain of justifiers will in effect justify itself. An unjustified belief at the terminating end of a chain of justifiers will not be capable of conferring justification upon the beliefs making up the rest of the chain. This arbitrary suspension of justification will lead to dogmatism (Moser, 1985:24-25; Alston, 1989:26-27 and Vollmer, 1987:174).

Thus, by way of elimination the regress argument postulates the existence of non-inferentially justified beliefs as the only solution to the conditionality of inferential justification. Such beliefs would be instinctively justified without appeal to other beliefs; they would be immediately justified. Theories that attempt to deal with the justificational regress in this manner are called foundational theories of justification. Such theories typically maintain that there are two forms of justification; inferential and non-inferential justification, with non-inferentially justified beliefs at the terminating end of a chain of justifiers (Dancy, 1985:56). Again, the existence and nature of such beliefs, for example whether they must be infallible or not, will not be discussed here.

Foundationalism, together with coherentism and contextualism (the latter two associated respectively with (2) and (3) above), attempt to deal with the regress problem on a structural level. These theories presuppose that the inferential character of justification is the sole source of the regress problem. That this cannot be the case, is illustrated when the internalist requirement that a person internalises the facts about his justification is applied to supposedly immediately justified beliefs. For example, suppose a belief is non-inferentially justified on account of it having a certain property. Then, on an internalist conception of justification a person's belief can only be justified by appeal to
that property if the person believes that his belief has the property in question. To justify the belief that his belief has the property in question, a further belief of the person is necessary, and to justify this latter belief another belief, and so an endless regress arises again (Dancy, 1985: 130). This type of regress is called 'the internalist regress'. It is clear that the internalist regress is not only the result of the inferential character of justification, but also of the characteristic internalist claim that only a person's own beliefs can justify his other beliefs. The latter requirement concerns the justificational perspective involved. A strategy that attempts to deal effectively with the justificational regress should therefore also take this aspect into account. In the next section the internalist regress will be discussed.

5.3 The internalist regress

The internalist form of the justificational regress results from the demand that a subject internalises the facts which make his belief justified, in order to be justified (Dancy, 1985: 133). The canonical form of the internalist requirement states that a person S is justified in believing that p if and only if S justifiably believes that he is justified in believing that p. Schematically the regress that results from this requirement looks as follows:

TIR: 1. p (a proposition)
2. S believes that p
3. S is justified to believe that p if and only if;
4. S believes 3
5. S is justified to believe 3 if and only if;
6. S believes 5
   and so on.

This form of the internalist regress does not specify the contents of S's higher level beliefs, it makes S's justification conditionally dependent only upon S's holding a belief about his lower level belief. Without requiring reasons for such higher level beliefs it suggests that the mere fact of a higher level belief
lying within S’s perspective is sufficient for justification, neglecting further description of such a belief. This interpretation of the internalist regress can therefore be labelled the ‘trivial internalist regress’ (TIR for short).

Alvin Goldman claims that a theory of justified belief must also be an explanatory theory, meaning that it must clarify the underlying source of justificational status. The conditions of justification that it states must therefore be ‘revelatory’. Goldman gives the following example: if S senses redly and believes that S is sensing redly, then S’s belief that he is sensing redly is justified. Such a principle, he argues, leaves unexplained why a person who senses redly and believes that he does is thereby justified (Kornblith (ed.),1994:106). As the TIR is based on exactly such a principle, the contention is that it does not yield a valuable analysis of the internalist regress.

Perhaps more insight can be gained by demanding that S’s higher level beliefs consist of substantial reasons (e.g. evidence) for his lower level beliefs. Taking the inferential character of evidence into account, an ‘evidence chain’ of propositions ...p,q,r,s,t,..., forms the basis of an analysis in this case. In this chain of evidence, p provides evidence for q, q provides evidence for r, r provides evidence for s, and so on. In terms of propositional justification, the chain of evidence gives rise to a justificational regress such as the one described in section 4.6.1.; t is justified on condition that s is justified, s is justified on condition that r is justified, and so on. In terms of an internalist conception of justification, S will be required to be aware of the relationships of evidence that hold between these propositions. The following kind of regress can result:
EIR: 1. S is justified to believe t if and only if;
   1a. S justifiably believes s, and
   1b. S justifiably believes that s is evidence for t
2. S is justified to believe s if and only if;
   2a. S justifiably believes r, and
   2b. S justifiably believes that r is evidence for s
3. S is justified to believe r if and only if;
   3a. S justifiably believes q, and
   3b. S justifiably believes that q is evidence for r
   and so on.

This regress represents an internalist version of the evidential regress mentioned in section 4.6.1., therefore it is labelled ‘the evidential internalist regress’ (EIR for short). The (a) and (b) parts of each stage form S’s higher level reasons for believing that S is justified to believe the lower level proposition involved. Compare the following:

TIR: 1. S is justified to believe that t if and only if;
   2. S believes 1

and

EIR: 1. S is justified to believe that t if and only if;
   1a. S justifiably believes s, and
   1b. S justifiably believes that s is evidence for t.

On an explanatory theory of justification 1a and 1b in EIR together replace 2 in TIR. The (b) parts in EIR can be viewed as an expression of the requirement for internalist justification; it expresses S’s forming a higher level belief about the relationship between his justifiers and his beliefs. Remove the (b) parts and the following results:

EIR: 1. S is justified to believe that t if and only if;
   1a. S justifiably believes s,
   2. S is justified to believe that s if and only if;
   2a. S justifiably believes r,
   and so on.
This is a purely externalist regress; justification is ascribed to S from a third-person, external perspective. Facts about the relationship between the evidential belief and the belief in question lie outside S’s perspective. It is not required of S to form beliefs about this relationship in order to be justified. Therefore it is labelled the ‘evidential externalist regress’ (EER for short). It is the same as Moser’s regress described in section 4.6.1.

As mentioned earlier on, the (b) parts of the EIR can be viewed as expressions of the internalist requirement that S internalises facts about his justification. It is what could be expected if S is asked to produce non-trivial reasons for his beliefs. To be justified S must form a higher level belief about a relationship of evidence between a justifier and another belief. Thus, steering away from a trivial interpretation of the internalist regress compels one to adopt ‘epistemic internalism’; it is required of S to recognise his justifier under an epistemic concept such as ‘evidence’.

The question that needs to be asked is in what way the partial conditions (a) and (b) of the EIR constitute a justificational regress. Firstly, suppose the (b) parts are ignored and the resulting regress (EER) is ‘internalised’, i.e. EER is subjected to internalist requirements. The following are two possibilities:

1. S is justified to believe that t if and only if S believes that S is justified to believe that t, which amounts to a trivial internalist regress (TIR), or
2. S believes that S is justified to believe that t because S believes that S is justified to believe that s, in which case S forms a belief about the justificatory relationship between s and t. Internalising evidential justification in this way necessarily involves the subject forming a higher level belief about the justificatory relationship between the justifying evidence and the belief that is to be justified. This yields nothing other than EIR.
Thus, if there is indeed a non-trivial regress involved, then this regress can only originate from S’s belief about the relationship between his justifiers and his beliefs. But how could this give rise to a regress that is not itself trivial? In other words, avoiding an internalist requirement such as ‘S is justified to believe that s provides evidence for t if and only if S believes that S is justified to believe that s provides evidence for t’.

A seemingly obvious response would be that S is justified to believe that s is evidence for t if and only if S is justified to believe that r is evidence for s. If this is the case a regress results because S will be justified to believe that r is evidence for s if and only if S is justified to believe that q in turn is evidence for r, and so on, ad infinitum. However, if we want our analysis to be explanatory, we need to ask the question why S would believe that s is evidence for t. A different picture then emerges. For this question involves the principle according to which someone would evaluate one belief as evidence for another belief. And it concerns the person’s competence in applying such a principle, that is, in recognising a belief as evidence. What would this depend upon? Two things that come to mind are the person’s cognitive and analytical powers, if they are indeed distinct factors. However, more important is what it does not depend upon. For S’s recognising s as evidence for t does not depend conditionally upon S’s recognising r as evidence for s. S’s belief that r is evidence for s rests conditionally equally upon S’s competence in applying the general evaluative principle governing ‘evidence’, which in turn again only depends conditionally upon things such as S’s cognitive and analytical powers. And this holds for all ensuing stages of the evidence chain. It is not saying that S’s ability to recognise a belief as evidence for another belief is not in some way dependent upon S’s ability to recognise the preceding stage as evidence. Here the following comes to mind: suppose S is competent in recognising certain features (f-features for example) of beliefs as evidence-characteristic features. S will recognise r as evidence
for $s$ on account of $S$ recognising $r$ as containing an $f$-feature, and $S$ will recognise $s$ as evidence for $t$ on account of recognising $s$ as containing an $f$-feature. Presumably if $S$ fails to recognise $r$ as evidence for $s$ through failing to recognise the $f$-feature for some or other reason, then $S$ will also fail to recognise $s$ as evidence for $t$ for the same reason. In this way the higher level belief of one stage could be dependent upon the higher level belief of another stage, but this is not a necessary relationship; it is not a conditional dependency. $S$ could indeed succeed in recognising $s$ as evidence for $t$ but fail to recognise $r$ as evidence for $s$. Thus there can be no regress of the form:

1. $S$ is justified to believe that $s$ is evidence for $t$ if and only if;
2. $S$ is justified to believe that $r$ is evidence for $s$,
3. $S$ is justified to believe that $r$ is evidence for $s$ if and only if;
4. $S$ is justified to believe that $q$ is evidence for $r$, and so on.

Still we can focus on only one stage of the EIR and then ask under what conditions $S$ would be justified to believe that, for example, $s$ contains the evidence-characteristic feature $f$. Again, here we are enquiring about $S$’s competence in recognising a belief as evidence for another belief. This could be generalised to cover all situations where a belief would be justified on account of it containing a certain epistemic property, say $E$. On an internalist conception of justification a person would be justified to hold a belief containing that property only if the person believes that the belief in question has the property. But to avoid mere belief the person’s belief that his belief has $E$ must be justified. This condition again gives rise to a regress. The following from Dancy serves as an example:
"We are pushed by the internalist to hold that a’s basic belief that p can only be justified by appeal to E if a believes that his belief has E; and then we are pushed further to admit that it is also required that he is justified in believing that his belief has E. But once this is allowed, the regress becomes unstoppable. Even the discovery of some non-inferentially justified beliefs will not stop the regress, since they can only be justified in the presence of a further justified belief" (Dancy, 1985:130).

Although Dancy does not state this explicitly, it seems that the regress results upon the requirement that S’s higher level belief (S’s belief that his belief p has E) can only be justified by another belief of S to the extent that S’s belief that his belief that p has E, itself has E. The regress looks as follows:

FIR: 1. S is justified to believe that p by appeal to E if and only if;
2. S (justifiably) believes that S’s belief that p has E,
3. S is justified in holding (2) if and only if;
4. S (justifiably) believes that (2) has E, and so on.

Dancy is convinced that internalism should be rejected in favour of externalism on account of this, since E can represent any property or feature such as infallibility or even a property on account of which a belief would be immediately justified (Dancy, 1985:130) (Therefore the regress is termed FIR, for ‘feature internalist regress’). Before discussing the FIR any further, we digress to take a look at the solution that externalism purports to offer to the internalist regress.

5.4 Epistemic externalism and the justificational regress
In the previous section it appears that not even non-inferentially justified beliefs can succeed in blocking a justificational regress if the internalist requirement for justification is maintained. Therefore some epistemologists argue that an internalist regress can only be stopped by omitting the requirement that a person’s beliefs be justified only on condition that the person holds a
justified belief about them. However, the omission from a person’s belief-system of beliefs about the facts concerning his justification implies that such facts can bear influence upon the person’s justification only if they are utilised by an external observer. In that case, the facts about the person’s justification are incorporated into a third-person justificational perspective; they become ‘external’ facts.

Alston’s earlier theory of self-warrant is an example of such a case. This theory postulates so-called ‘given-beliefs’ as instances of immediately justified beliefs. Given-beliefs can be beliefs about present conscious states, such as perceptual and sensation states. These given-beliefs are supposed to be self-warranted (self-justified) without appeal to other beliefs; they are justified by virtue of being given-beliefs (Moser, 1985:121). This means that someone can be justified in holding a given-belief without the person holding any other beliefs about the given-belief.

Moser comments that justifiers are justifiers exactly because they satisfy some general evaluative principle. Therefore the belief that given-beliefs are self-justified also implies belief in a general evaluative principle, for example the belief that given-beliefs generally form a reliable class of beliefs (Moser, 1985:122). But according to Alston’s theory a person need not hold a belief about such a general principle; the person need not be aware of such a principle in order to be justified. A person can be justified in holding a given-belief without believing that it is a given-belief, or that it is a reliable kind of belief. Whether the particular given-belief is in fact reliable, remains an ‘external’ fact about the person’s justification. This means that epistemic externalism does not require a person to have cognitive awareness of the justifying conditions of immediate beliefs (Moser, 1985:124). In order to be justified, a person need not be aware of the principles of justification involved. This coheres
with Audi’s view that a person need not form higher level epistemic beliefs about his immediate beliefs (see section 4.3.2).

In this way immediately justified beliefs that are not supported by higher level beliefs could succeed in blocking a justificational regress, but Moser and Bonjour argue that it is only an ad hoc solution to the problem. This is because the relaxation of the inferential-internalist restraint is applied to beliefs at the terminating end of a chain of justifiers only. The question arises why someone would be required to give reasons (in the form of higher level beliefs) for his beliefs further away from the terminating end of a chain of justifiers when he is not required to do so for the terminating beliefs themselves. However, lifting the requirement entirely has absurd implications. A person could then be justified in believing any number of empirical propositions, but all of which are completely without evidential support from that person’s perspective (Moser, 1985:125).

Without the need to give reasons for immediate beliefs someone may also be justified in holding arbitrarily selected beliefs, which amounts to sheer dogmatism (Alston, 1985:36). On this point the externalist is reminded of the normative character of justification, according to which justification is essentially related to the cognitive goal of truth. If someone’s belief-forming does not conform to this goal, the person will be blameworthy for acting epistemically irresponsible. A person who accepts a belief in the absence of good reasons does not qualify as a serious and disinterested seeker of truth. The person may be justified on an externalist conception of justification because from a third-person perspective his belief satisfies necessary and sufficient conditions for justification. But from the person’s own perspective he has no reason to hold the belief, consequently he is epistemically irresponsible and not justified on a normative-internalist conception of justification (Moser, 1985:125).
Also, on an externalist conception of justification such as Alston's account of self-warrant, someone can be justified in holding a belief that is only accidentally true, from that person's perspective. The externalist can formulate conditions to rule out this possibility, but from the subject's perspective it will make no difference; from his own perspective his belief will still be only accidentally true (Moser, 1985:129). Again the normative character of justification can be appealed to, declaring someone epistemically irresponsible who holds a belief for which he has no reason to suppose that it is true. On a normative-internalist conception of justification the person will not be justified in holding such a belief. The externalist objects to this on the grounds that such a conception of justification grants someone justification in believing a proposition only if the person has good reasons to suppose that it is true. This inevitably leads to a regress again, because to justify the higher level belief that the lower level belief is true, the person must form another belief supposing that the higher level belief is true, and to justify this belief another belief, and so on. Therefore the externalist rejects an appeal to the normative character of justification to counter dogmatically acquired beliefs or accidentally true beliefs.

Moser denies that such a higher level belief is involved, claiming that for S to be justified in believing that p, S must at most possess a good reason to believe that p is true; where 'possess' indicates having an awareness of some sort (Moser, 1985:130). In other words this awareness need not be in the form of a justified belief; it does not follow that S must believe some other proposition that justifies his belief that p, in order for S to be justified in believing that p. Thus it does not follow "that to be justified in believing that p, S must be justified in believing that the belief that p is justified" (ibid.). Again, this view raises the difficulty of how something that is not in the form of a belief can serve to justify other beliefs. The problem is all the more acute when the awareness involved is an awareness of a
perceptual experience and the belief it is supposed to justify is a belief about the state of the world. However, this problem will not be addressed here.

It is furthermore difficult to conceive how an awareness of a justifier that is not employed by the subject in a process of justification, i.e. that is not incorporated into a set of beliefs advanced as evidence, can be viewed as part of a subject’s internalist justification. For then it can at most be used by a third person to evaluate the subject’s epistemic situation; as such it can only form a part of externalist justification. This is in line with a view rejected by Goldman, namely that "justification is an argument, defense, or set of reasons that can be given in support of a belief" (Kornblith (ed.),1994:106). It is not necessarily equivalent to Hetherington’s view that when a person has a justifier he is also necessarily aware of the justifier and the conditions of justification, a view that is also rejected by Goldman (ibid.). It is merely saying that someone can have an internal justifier, but without being aware of the justifier and the justifying conditions, such a justifier cannot serve to internalistically justify the person. For on the view that justification involves giving reasons or engaging in argument, internalist justification already implies holding a belief about one’s epistemic situation.

The externalist’s criticism that an internalist conception of justification compels someone to have a higher level belief to the extent that the lower level belief that he holds is likely to be true, touches the Achilles’ tendon of internalist justification; for situations often prevail where it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of such higher level beliefs. Examples are situations where the outcome of an event depends on chance or where introspection is the only method allowed to justify one’s beliefs. Such situations can result in justified false belief, allowing the externalist to score by default. On the other hand, purely externalist justification allows the possibility that a belief may
be only accidentally true as far as the person for whom the belief is justified is concerned.

Regarding the regress problem, it is clear that externalism succeeds in blocking a regress only by sacrificing the cognising subject’s participation in his own justification. Marshall Swain has devised a theory of justification that attempts to combine the best of both the externalist’s and internalist’s worlds. Called the ‘probabilistic-reliability model of epistemic justification’, it ascribes justification to a belief only if the belief is a reliable indicator of the truth. For a person to be justified in holding such a belief the person must have certain reliability-making characteristics such as good eyesight, good reasoning habits, and the ability to discriminate among kinds of entities. If a belief is based upon the right reasons and the person has these reliability-making characteristics, then it is highly probable that the belief is true. Reasons can be causal or evidential. Causal reasons are events or states of a person that cause the person to have certain beliefs. Evidential reasons are believed propositions and are thus not causally efficacious. Causal reasons can consist partly of non-belief states such as perceptual states, sensation states, and the state of being appeared to F-ly. They are internal states providing us with some of our access to the external world, and in this way they overcome the problem mentioned earlier on regarding the schism between beliefs about perceptual states and beliefs about the external world. According to Swain non-belief states are objects of direct awareness, one can be aware of them without having to be aware of something else. Thus one’s awareness of them does not depend on having other beliefs. Swain’s theory of justification requires that every belief be justified only on the basis of reasons, and this includes beliefs that are based on non-belief reason states. In fact, the theory requires that some beliefs be based on non-belief reason states. Such beliefs are immediately justified; their reliability does not necessarily depend on reasons that are beliefs. Swain holds that in general every justified
belief is either immediately justified or based on an evidence chain that ends in immediately justified beliefs (Moser, 1985:130-134).

The probabilistic part of Swain’s theory consists of the concept of reliability being defined in terms of probability. A belief is more reliable, thus more likely to be true, and consequently justified, if its probability is greater than any of its competing beliefs. This part of Swain’s theory cannot be delved into here, as the matter of probability is a complex one. Suffice it to say that it attempts to quantify in an objectively determinable way the likelihood of a person’s beliefs being true. Thus it attempts to transcend the subjectivity characteristic of internalist justification not through appealing to a priori belief in general evaluative principles, but through objective statistical calculation. This, together with the reliability-making characteristics that the subject must have, and which can be objectively determined, constitutes the externalist aspect of Swain’s theory.

The question that needs to be addressed is how this theory deals with the regress problem, for according to it a belief is justified only if it is based on reasons. Presumably these reasons must themselves be based on other reasons in order to be justified, so that a regress arises again. Swain’s theory attempts to stop such a regress by claiming that some of our beliefs are reliable, and thus justified, on the basis of sets of reasons that do not include any belief states at all. For example, a belief that it is raining outside may be based on the perceptual state of seeming to see rain. On Swain’s theory such a state can also serve as a reason. Moreover, such a state is a causal reason because it can cause other belief states. The belief that it is raining outside is immediately justified when it is based on this perceptual state, in the sense that its reliability does not necessarily depend on other reasons that are beliefs. Every justified belief, according to
Swain’s theory, is either immediately justified or based on an evidence chain that terminates in an immediately justified belief. In this way the regress is supposedly solved (Moser, 1985:134).

If a person has the required reliability-making characteristics and his belief that it is raining is based on certain non-belief reasons such as the perceptual state of seeming to see rain, is his belief then immediately justified? If this is granted, Moser argues, then we are returning to some form of externalism, because the person is not required to be aware of the justifying conditions of his belief. From the person’s own perspective it is the same as when his belief is only accidentally true. Consequently, on a normative-internalist view of justification the person will not be justified, although he may be justified from an external perspective (Moser, 1985:135). Of course this kind of justification will then be subject to the same criticism levelled earlier on against externalism.

However, according to Moser, Swain’s theory does not embrace such a pure form of externalism because it involves the subject in the justificatory process. One might have a reliable source of information and have access to it, but that does not render one’s belief justified. One must also justifiably believe that the source is reliable. Moser argues that this view contradicts the notion of immediately justified belief as explained earlier on. A belief that it is raining is not immediately justified on this account, for its justification will depend on the justification of the person’s belief that it is reliably based and that he has certain reliability-making characteristics. This will lead to a regress again. It states that S is justified in holding a reliable belief that p if and only if he is justified in believing that p is reliable. But then S will be justified in believing that his belief that p is reliable, if and only if S justifiably believes that his belief that his belief that p is reliable, is itself reliable. And S will be justified in holding this latter belief only if he
believes that it is reliable, and so on.

Thus, by attempting to escape the problems that plague pure externalism, Swain's theory falls prey to an internalist regress. In fact, Moser continues, this kind of regress confronts any principle of the form:

"S's belief that p is justified only if it is F, and S is justified in holding an F belief that p if and only if he is justified in believing that his belief that p is F" (Moser, 1985:135-136).

Schematically Moser's definition of the regress looks as follows:

1. S's belief that p is F,
2. S is justified in holding an F-belief that p if and only if;
3. S (justifiably) believes that S's belief that p is F,
4. S is justified in (3) if and only if;
5. S (justifiably) believes that S’s belief that S’s belief that p is F, is itself F, and so on.

This returns us full circle to the FIR discussed towards the end of section 5.3, and which Dancy claimed plagues any form of internalist justification. In fact, it now becomes clear that the FIR must be the generic form of the internalist regress that results on the basis of a person recognising certain justifying features of a justifier. When the feature F represents an evidence-characteristic one, then the evidence regress EIR results, while substituting F for a feature that characterises a belief as an immediately justified one results in the kind of internalist regress on account of which Dancy rejects internalism as a valid conception of justification.

As the generic form of the evidence internalist regress, the FIR is not only subject to the same criticism levelled earlier on against the EIR, but a generalised version of that criticism is applicable to the FIR. Briefly it is as follows. On an explanatory theory of
justification (a non-trivial interpretation), justification for the belief that a certain belief has the feature F will consist of substantial reasons advanced by S in support of his higher level belief (the belief that the belief that p has F). This could involve S’s competence in recognising the lower level belief (the belief that p) as an F-belief; in other words S’s ability to apply the general evaluating principle according to which a belief would be an F-belief. This does not conditionally depend on S’s recognising of any other belief as an F-belief. Such recognition will again only depend conditionally upon S’s competence in applying the general principle, which may depend on other things such as S’s cognitive powers. This criticism may be sketchy, but the contention is that there is no real regress involved apart from one that results from a trivial and non-explanatory interpretation.

Furthermore, the FIR also rests upon a level confusion identified by Alston. This comprises the notion that the higher level belief that a certain belief contains the feature F can only be justified by also being an F-belief. For example, for S to be immediately justified in believing that p, it is required that the higher level belief that S is immediately justified in believing that p, itself be immediately justified (Alston, 1989:155). Alston argues that it is not necessary to adopt the thesis that the source of evidence (of justification) must be the same on the two levels. Immediately justified beliefs serve to stop a justificational regress, but for that purpose it is not necessary that higher level beliefs also be immediately justified (Alston, 1989:159). At a glance this may look like the ad hoc solution mentioned earlier on which Bonjour and Moser opposed. They objected to the notion that the immediately justified beliefs at the terminating end of a chain of justifiers do not need reasons in the form of justifying beliefs, while such justification is required for beliefs further away from the terminating end. However, that this is not what Alston proposes will become clear shortly. Furthermore, argues Alston, if higher level beliefs also have to be immediately justified the range of
candidates for justification will be sharply restricted. An unfortunate consequence of the level confusion in this regard is that no aspect of a belief's formation can be included as justification for that belief's being immediately justified. This excludes, for example, a belief's having been produced in a reliable way (Alston, 1989:160).

According to Alston a level confusion also occurs in the case of mediatelly justified beliefs. This takes the form of a belief not only being justified when it is believed on the basis of an evidential belief. It is also required that the subject forms a belief about the justificatory relationship between the belief and the justifier. In other words, S's belief that p is evidentially sustained by q, if and only if S believes that q, and S believes that q is evidence for p (Alston, 1989:164). Phrased in this way, Alston seems to confuse propositional justification with doxastic justification. A belief p's being justified on the basis of q, is held to imply that S is justified to believe that p on the basis of believing that q, only if S believes that p is evidence for q. While propositional justification is neutral with regard to a subject for whom it is justified, the doxastic justificational part described here is typical of an internalist requirement for justification. Thus, what Alston seems to have in mind here is the thesis that a subject cannot have a justifier without also being aware of the justifier as a justifier, i.e. under an epistemic concept such as evidence. As indicated earlier on, this subject may touch on an entirely different field of investigation, namely the relationship between a subject and belief. Lack of space prevents that topic from being discussed here. We will have to rest with Goldman's remark: "I also leave it an open question whether, when a belief is justified, the believer knows it is justified" (Kornblith (ed.), 1994:107). It is nevertheless clear that if there is indeed a level confusion involved here, it is not of the same kind as in the case of immediately justified belief.
The real problem here, according to Alston, is criticism often levelled against internalism. If it is required of a subject to advance reasons and justificational principles in order to be justified, then many cognitive subjects are excluded as justified believers, while only a few that are sophisticated enough (perhaps only epistemologists) will be included (Alston, 1989:164-166). This requirement, he continues, rests on another very important but largely overlooked confusion intrinsic to many discussions of epistemic justification. This concerns the difference between being justified and showing that one is justified. Alston summarises this difference aptly with the following question: "Why must I be able to specify, cite, or formulate what it is that justifies me in believing that p, in order to be justified in supposing that I am so justified?" (Alston, 1989:166). This is not saying that justification never involves giving reasons or advancing arguments. It is only discriminating between two epistemic situations; one where a subject engages in discourse about his beliefs, and one where he does not do so. In being justified the subject is either not required or not capable of evaluating his own beliefs and reasons. Such a situation could only be one where justification is ascribed to a person, for example from a third-person perspective. On the other hand, when a person evaluates his own beliefs, he is the issuer of claims about his justification, whether it was gained through introspection or in any other way. In this case the justification is carried out from a first-person perspective. Therefore Alston’s confusion of being justified with showing one’s justification essentially involves a confusion of two justificational perspectives.

In this and the previous chapter it was suggested that the internalist and externalist conceptions of justification may correspond with the two above-mentioned justificational perspectives. In other words, one could see internalist justification as amounting to a subject evaluating his own beliefs and issuing claims about them, and externalist justification as
someone evaluating someone else’s situation and making claims about that person’s beliefs. This view is supported by descriptions of internalist justification using the locution ‘S (justifiably) believes that S is justified to believe that p......’; whereas externalist justification is described with the locution ‘S is justified to believe that p......’.

Looking at the matter from this angle provides an interesting result concerning the relationship between internalism and externalism. Suppose S has an awareness of an internal justifier. Suppose also that it is said: ‘S is justified to believe that p because S has that particular awareness’. Thus, from a third-person perspective S’s awareness is employed and placed in a relationship with S’s belief. Now it is up to the issuer of the justification to prove that the principle according to which such a relation is made is a valid, i.e. a justifying one. And in this case it is immaterial whether S does or could do the same; S still can be justified from the third-person perspective. However, it is possible that S can do the same. If S is sophisticated enough (cognitively and verbally) S may be able to draw the same relationship between his awareness and his belief. But the fact is that to be justified S does not need to do this. In other words S does not need to justify himself in order to be justified. Somebody else could do that. Internalism and externalism on this view do not preclude one another. They are not rivals. It is not the case that S is justified to believe that p if and only if S believes that S is justified to believe that p. For it is also true that S is justified to believe that p if X believes that S is justified to believe that p. Of course as long as X is regarded as a competent evaluator, as will also be required of S himself.

From the angle of ‘justificational perspective’ the following can be remarked regarding immediately justified beliefs and the justificational regress. Suppose S has an immediate, or direct, awareness of a justifier. Suppose also it is said that S is
justified to believe that \( p \) because of \( S \)'s direct awareness of the justifier. From a third-person perspective \( S \)'s direct awareness and his belief are placed in a relationship that is believed to be a justificatory one. Presumably this situation is phrased from a third-person perspective in order to preserve the immediacy that \( S \), from his perspective, experiences. Should \( S \) speak about his awareness (advance it as a reason/advance reasons for it), it would not be direct anymore. The question is why it is thought that a third-person’s talking about another person’s immediate experiences will not tarnish the immediacy of those experiences, while conversely it is thought that someone’s talking about his own immediate experiences will do so. Why could \( S \) himself not say: ‘I am justified to believe that \( p \) because I am immediately aware of a certain justifier’? The fact is that it is not speaking or not speaking about a justifier that makes it immediate or not. What will an awareness or an immediate justifier be if it is never used, never put forward as a reason, if it is never spoken about? It may well be there and even serve a purpose, but in the act of justification it might as well not exist. As soon as it is talked about, it becomes part of a discourse, part of a set of reasons. This ties in with Hetherington’s thesis discussed in section 4.3.4. When a subject makes use of a justifier he is ‘distancing’ himself from his own epistemic situation, he is describing his own beliefs and justifiers as he would do with those of another person. He assumes a third-person attitude towards himself. However, Hetherington views this as a contradiction in terms, for it cannot be said to represent what is known as ‘internalism’ any more. This leads him to conclude that internalism is a vacuous concept; it is either externalism or nothing. When a person is justified on the basis of an immediate justifier, any description of his justification is an external description. Clearly the above-mentioned notion that the immediacy of a justifier is lost as soon as the subject speaks about it underlies this view.
The idea of someone advancing reasons for his immediate beliefs also corresponds with the 'simple foundationalism' that Alston proposes. The 'simple foundationalist' requires immediately justified beliefs to terminate a regress of justification, Alston claims, but "...his position permits him to recognise that all epistemic beliefs require mediate justification" (ibid.). Epistemic beliefs are evaluated, i.e. justified beliefs; beliefs that can serve to justify other beliefs. Thus, to serve as justifiers for other beliefs, immediate beliefs must be evaluated, i.e. they must be justified; and for this purpose reasons must be advanced in their favour.

What is involved here is propositional justification; beliefs that are immediately justified without reference to a specific subject. But the same holds for doxastic justification. According to Alston, simple foundationalism is not committed to the immediate justification of any higher level beliefs. It does not require someone to accept any belief without a reason for doing so, and consequently also not without a reason for supposing it to be true: "Where a person is immediately justified in believing that p, he may find adequate reasons for the higher level belief that he is immediately justified in believing that p" (Alston, 1989:37). His reasons for the higher level belief that he is immediately justified will be different from reasons for accepting a mediately justified belief, claims Alston. Reasons for accepting a belief as immediately justified are 'meta' in character because they involve reasons for regarding the belief as justified (ibid.).

This ties in with Goldman's idea of an 'explanatory' theory of justification, which demands that higher level beliefs be more than simply beliefs to the extent that one is justified in holding the corresponding lower level belief if one believes that one is so justified. As was mentioned earlier, such higher level beliefs may include a belief about the general evaluating principle according to which immediate beliefs are justified, and the belief that the
belief in question fits the principle. The following quotation from Alston supports this view and simultaneously summarises the preceding paragraphs:

"A foundational belief, b, is immediately justified just because some valid epistemic principle lays down conditions for its being justified which do not include the believer's having certain other justified beliefs. But the believer will be justified in believing that he is immediately justified in holding b only if he has reasons for regarding that principle as valid and for regarding b as falling under that principle" (ibid.).

The net result of this is that higher level beliefs about immediately justified beliefs cannot themselves be immediately justified. To be more precise, S cannot be immediately justified to believe that he is immediately justified to believe that p. This result helps to dispel a common myth surrounding internalistic justification. It is as follows: internalistic justification is immediate justification. For S to be immediately justified to believe that p, S's reasons (higher level beliefs) must also be immediately justified, otherwise they are not internalistically justified. But when they are immediately justified a regress results. This myth, as was seen, is the source of the feature internalist regress (the FIR). The matter of justificational perspective is involved in dispelling this myth through helping to see justification, and especially internalistic justification, as a process of evaluation and giving reasons. It is a process in which S may be involved, even when it concerns immediate justification. It is not the case that S can be immediately justified necessarily only from a third-person perspective. If internalistic justification denotes a process of evaluation, then being internalistically as well as immediately justified does not have to leave S mute.

Another helpful distinction in this regard is the one drawn by Lehrer between explanation of justification and inferential
justification. A perceptual belief, for example, may be immediate and non-inferential, although its justification depends on coherence with a person's system of beliefs. The belief is not justified because it is inferred from the system of coherent beliefs; justification is explained in this case and not generated. Therefore Lehrer claims that 'immediacy arises within the circle of our beliefs' (Lehrer, 1986:21). This idea fits in with Swain's theory of reason-based beliefs discussed earlier on. According to that, all beliefs are finally based on reasons that are non-belief states. Such states, which include perceptual states, may cause beliefs, which would then be immediately justified. On Lehrer's theory such justification would come about as an explanation, which could again comprise advancing 'meta'-reasons of the kind Alston proposes. As Lehrer claims: "...within the circle of our beliefs...particular perceptual beliefs are justified, in part, because they cohere with general principles and theories..." (Lehrer, 1986:21).

Alston's 'meta'-reasons are the explanatory, non-trivial reasons often mentioned before. They concern the general evaluative principle that Lehrer mentioned; the rule according to which a belief is evaluated to be justified or not. The two reasons mentioned by Alston in the quotation above are prominent:
(a) whether the belief in question falls under the principle, and
(b) whether the principle is a valid one.
The relationship between these two questions can only be determined against the background of the ultimate aim of epistemic justification. Should this aim entail the achievement of truth, then the principle will have to be a valid, truth-conducive one, and affirming (b) will be a necessary condition for affirming (a). On the other hand, someone could correctly interpret a belief as falling under a certain principle, which may happen to be an objectively false principle (one that contradicts the actual state of affairs). In this case justified false belief results. But, as indicated at the beginning, this matter may well be ultimately
determined by the relationship between justification and knowledge.

Looking at the matter from the point of view of internalistic justification, the question remains what could reasonably be expected of a person attempting to justify his own beliefs. Is it reasonable to expect someone to also be able to say whether the principle he is employing is a valid one? On the notion that internally justified beliefs must be acquired through introspection, with no resort to empirical observation allowed, it does not seem so. Goldman argues that the central notion of classical internalism which states that a person can (must) determine through introspection whether a certain doxastic decision principle is 'the right one' may even be impossible (This was mentioned in section 4.5.).

If classical internalism demands that all higher level beliefs be introspectively acquired, externalism allows its evaluators the use of all kinds of empirical observation; of the reliability of belief-formation, of someone's reliability-making characteristics, statistical calculation, consulting social and expert opinion, etc. Internalism and externalism become rivals when a person is allowed the methodology of either the one or the other. Internalism in its classical form has gained philosophical perenniality through its historical prominence as a philosophical program to uncover the foundations of knowledge. Perhaps the choice between internalism and externalism is a choice between different philosophical programs, so that naturalised epistemology may one day replace classical internalism. Then the decision does not rest on analytical grounds, but rather on historical ones.
CONCLUSION

Traditionally epistemology is concerned with 'perspectival' justification. This is justification that turns on someone's perspective on the world; on his knowledge, beliefs or justified beliefs. Traditionally epistemic justification also has a normative character. Someone is justified in holding a belief if he is not blameworthy for holding it. On the traditional conception of justification one can determine through introspection whether one will be blameworthy or not; perceiving something 'clearly and distinctly' serves as a criterion in this regard.

A normative (deontological) conception of justification seems to imply that belief-formation can be controlled. Contemporary critics are sceptical about direct control over belief, but concede that some form of indirect control is plausible. Even on that assumption, some argue, a deontological conception still fails to constitute a valid kind of justification, because it allows someone to be justified in holding false beliefs. This is illustrated by the example of cultural isolation. Thus, the deontological conception is not true to the veridical nature of justification that directs belief-formation towards the aim of maximising truth and minimising falsity.

Does this mean that a 'perspectival' conception of justification must be abandoned? Simply the fact that epistemic situations exist where someone has to evaluate his own beliefs seems to indicate that such a conception does have merit. But it also seems that in order to obey the aim of achieving truth perspectival justification must employ evaluative principles that are also 'objective' principles; principles which, when they are subjectively employed by a person will also yield objective truth. The 'clearness and distinctness' criterion proposed by Descartes was thought to be such a principle; it was assumed that what seems right from someone's perspective also is right. But again, the example of
cultural isolation shows that this is not the case, so that normative justification can at most declare someone epistemically not blameworthy.

Theories of subjective justification generalise the case of ‘perspectival’ justification. They seek to formulate principles according to which someone would, when these principles are subjectively adhered to, also be objectively justified. Two such theories are those of rationality and subjective probability. Theories of subjective justification were not fully expounded in this study. However, Pollock’s argument shows that someone can form a belief along lines that are considered to be ‘rational’, while the belief may still be false.

In the light of this some epistemologists argue that epistemic justification should not be construed according to what lies within a person’s perspective on the world. This lines up the two main rival justificational theories of contemporary epistemology against each other; ‘externalism’, as the view that these epistemologists hold is called, and ‘internalism’, the contemporary term for perspectival, or subjective, justification. Internalism maintains that only what lies within the subject’s perspective, whether it be knowledge, beliefs, justified beliefs or direct awarenesses of justifiers, can serve to justify the person. Externalism holds that only facts external to the subject’s perspective, such as the causal relationship between S’s reasons and beliefs, the reliability of the manner in which a belief is formed, etc., can justify a person.

The thesis is advanced that externalism and internalism correspond to two different perspectives from which justification is carried out; a third-person perspective and a first-person perspective respectively. According to this view internalism means justification carried out from a first-person perspective, while externalism means justification carried out from a third-person
perspective. Underlying this view is the notion that justification is a process, an ‘act’ of providing reasons or arguments in favour of someone’s (or one’s own) beliefs. Justification in this light is ‘a matter of higher order evaluation’, as Lehrer puts it (Lehrer, 1986:24). It also entails a doxastic definition of justification instead of a propositional one; it describes a subject’s being justified in holding a belief instead of a belief’s being justified without reference to a subject.

The advantages of this view become clear when the main criticism that externalists level against internalism is considered. Internalism is rejected as a viable conception of justification because in any form it gives rise to an infinite justificational regress. Even on the assumption that immediately justified beliefs exist, it is argued, the requirement that someone internalises the facts about his justification allows such a regress to originate. It was shown that, on a structural level, such an internalist regress arises because it is wrongly assumed that higher level beliefs must be justified by the same features as their corresponding lower level ones. This assumption is in some sense a remnant of the classical internalist notion that one acquires one’s justification through introspection, and that such justification is something one is immediately and directly aware of. It was argued that an explanatory theory of justification does not give rise to such a regress, because it requires higher level reasons to be ‘meta’-reasons, and as such they will not be immediate. This does not prevent them from being advanced in order to ‘explain’ one’s immediate justification, i.e. one’s justification by immediate justifiers. In this way an internalist regress can be blocked.

The matter of justificational perspective assists in achieving this result in the following way: if internalist justification means justification from a first-person perspective, then it means that one gives reasons (higher level beliefs) for one’s own beliefs, or for the relationship of evidence that one becomes directly aware
of. This entails that one assumes a third-person perspective towards oneself, a ‘distancing’ reminiscent of the evaluation of someone else’s beliefs. That one does not necessarily have to advance reasons that are acquired introspectively, implies that ‘external’ facts such as the reliability of belief-formation and causality can be employed from a first-person perspective. On the classical conception of internalism this would be impossible, because one’s higher level reasons have to be immediate justifiers, and furthermore, should they be advanced as reasons (beliefs), an infinite internalist regress results.

Thus, when the notion of justificational perspective is incorporated into a theory of justification, an hybridical theory containing elements of externalism and internalism becomes possible. A concept of justification developed along these lines could in principle also include a normative aspect, but it will differ from classical internalism in that the conditions for blameworthiness are not defined through introspection. Instead, one may evaluate one’s beliefs against a variety of aspects, including expert and social opinion, in order to find out whether one will be blameworthy for holding such beliefs or not.

In this light, differentiating between internalism and externalism only makes sense in the context of different epistemic situations. For example, subjects cognitively incapable of evaluating their own beliefs may be granted justification on somebody else’s assessment of their beliefs. They do not have to evaluate their own beliefs in order to be justified. But this does not exclude the possibility that subjects who are cognitively sophisticated can evaluate their own situations, i.e. carry out justification from their own perspective.

Although internalist justification then will not be a prerequisite for externalist justification, internalist justification, in order to achieve the aim of truth, must include an externalist component.
This component consists of the person’s higher level reasons, which may involve external facts about the person’s situation. This is in line with Lehrer’s view that justification divides into a subjective and an objective component (Lehrer, 1986:9). This view in turn links with Kornblith’s view that in classical internalism the subjective and the objective coincide. The difference is that in classical internalism the objective part consists of higher level reasons that are acquired through introspection, and that are assumed to be objective because they are also assumed to be a priori. With the aid of the notion of justificational perspective, a conception of justification can be developed that allows higher level beliefs to be acquired from whatever is held to be an objective source of knowledge within a community. Internalism and externalism become rival theories upon the application of different restrictions as to what may count as higher level beliefs. The decision for this may be a matter of a choice between different philosophical programs.
SUMMARY

Edmund Gettier's article *Is justified true belief knowledge?* raised substantial interest in the concept of epistemic justification, especially in Anglo-American epistemology. Discussions of the concept of epistemic justification form a large and varied field of study, covering a large number of related aspects. Not all these aspects are dealt with in this study. The distinction between 'structural' and 'perspectival' aspects is introduced as a theoretical tool to limit the scope of the study to covering only 'perspectival' aspects. These refer to aspects related to the perspective from which justification is carried out, i.e. whether it be from a first-person or from a third-person perspective.

The first chapter gives a brief characterisation of the nature of epistemic justification, describing how it is related to the aim of maximising truth and minimising falsity. The concept of epistemic justification also has a normative character, defining justification in terms of blameworthiness. In the second chapter a concept of justification defined in terms of blameworthiness is discussed. A conception of justification construed along normative lines is properly termed 'deontological'. Criticism against such a conception centres around the problem of the voluntariness of belief. Two varieties of control over belief-formation, direct and indirect control, are discussed.

A deontological conception of justification makes it possible for someone to be justified in holding a belief, even though the belief is false. For this reason some epistemologists reject justification defined in deontological terms. The discussion of the deontological conception of justification brings the main problem of first-person justification to the fore, i.e. how to determine, from such a perspective, whether one's belief-formation will lead to truth. Chapter 3 discusses the merit and problems of first-person justification in general. The matter of intersubjective principles
as a means to achieve objective truth from a subjective perspective is investigated. The existence and nature of such principles are much-contested matters. Many epistemologists deny that such principles exist innately. However, without intersubjective, truth-conducive rules that someone can appeal to, the possibility exists that someone's beliefs may constitute mere belief, in whatever way they are supported by the person's other beliefs. This compels some to reject subjective justification as a valid conception of epistemic justification.

In chapter 4 'internalism', the most recent term for subjective justification, is discussed in comparison with internalism's main contemporary rival, 'externalism'. The different levels of internalism that result from different requirements set for someone's awareness of his justifiers are also discussed, as well as the relationship between internalism and deontology, and between internalism and truth. Chapter 5 deals with the main criticism that externalists level against internalism, i.e. that it creates an infinite justificational regress. Analysis of the structure of the internalist regress shows that a vicious regress is not involved. It is concluded that the notion of justificational perspective has to be incorporated into a theory of epistemic justification in order for such a theory to be able to deal with first-person epistemic situations. This also provides a strategy for accommodating immediatejustifiers in an 'internalist' conception of justification without creating an infinite justificational regress. Furthermore it lays foundations for an internalism/externalism integration theory.
OPSOMMING

Edmund Gettier se artikel getiteld *Is justified true belief knowledge?*, het ongekende belangstelling in die kwessie van epistemiese regverdiging veroorsaak, verval in die Engels-Amerikaanse kennisleer. Die bespreking van die begrip ‘epistemiese regverdiging’ vorm ‘n breekstudieveld wat ‘n groot verskeidenheid verwante aspekte insluit. Al hierdie aspekte kon onmoontlik bespreek word in die studie, daarom is ‘n onderskeid getref tussen ‘strukturele’ aspekte en ‘perspektiwiese’ aspekte. Die omvang van die studie is daarvolgens beperk tot die bespreking van aspekte wat verband hou met die gesigspunt waaruit regverdiging plaasvind, dit wil sê, hetsy dit uit ‘n eerstepersoonsgesigspunt of uit ‘n derdepersoonsgesigspunt plaasvind.

In die eerste hoofstuk word ‘n kort oorsig gegee van die aard van epistemiese regverdiging. Epistemiese regverdiging het die verkryging van waarheid en die vermyding van vals oortuigings as doelwit. Epistemiese regverdiging is ook normatief van aard, en dit maak ‘n definisie daarvan in terme van blaam en aanspreeklikheid moontlik. In die tweede hoofstuk word ‘n definisie, wat bekend staan as ‘n deontologiese opvatting van epistemiese regverdiging, bespreek. Die hoofbeswaar teen so ‘n opvatting raak die vraagstuk of dit moontlik is om na willekeur beheer uit te oefen oor die verwerwing van oortuigings. Twee soorte beheer, direkte beheer en indirekte beheer, word bespreek.

‘n Deontologiese opvatting van epistemiese regverdiging maak dit moontlik vir iemand om geregverdig te wees om ‘n oortuiging te hê, selfs al is die oortuiging vals. Party epistemoloë verwerp die deontologiese opvatting vir hierdie rede. Die bespreking van die deontologiese opvatting bring die hoofprobleem van eerstepersoonsregverdiging na vore. Dit is hoe om uit ‘n eerstepersoonsgesigspunt vas te stel of die manier waarvolgens ‘n mens se oortuigings gevorm word, na waarheid sal lei.
Hoofstuk 3 bespreek die probleme omtrent, en die meriete van, eerstepersoonsregverdiging in die algemeen. Die kwessie van intersubjektiewe beginsels, wat na veronderstelling ‘n persoon wat uit ‘n subjektiewe gesigspunt te werk gaan, sal lei na waarheid, word ondersoek. Dat sulke beginsels bestaan en wat hulle aard mag wees, is sake wat baie bespreking uitlok. Baie epistemoloë en ontken dat sulke aangebore beginsels bestaan. Sonder intersubjektiewe beginsels wat ook na waarheid lei, bestaan die moontlikheid egter dat iemand se oortuigings niks meer mag wees nie as blote oortuigings, ongeag hoe hulle ook al onderling saamhang. Op grond hiervan verwerp sommige epistemoloë die moontlike definisie van epistemiese regverdiging in terme van blaam en aanspreeklikheid.

In hoofstuk 4 word ‘internalisme’, wat die jongste benaming vir subjektiewe regverdiging is, bespreek in vergelyking met ‘eksternalisme’, wat internalisme se kontemporêre teëvoeter is. Die verskillende vlakke van internalisme word bespreek. Hierdie vlakke ontstaan as gevolg van verschillende vereistes waaraan ‘n persoon se bewustheid van die gronde van sy oortuigings gemeet word. Internalisme word ook bespreek in verwantskap met die deontologiese opvatting en in verwantskap met waarheid. In hoofstuk 5 kom eksternaliste se hoofbeswaar teen internalisme onder bespreking. Dit behels die bewering dat internalisme ‘n oneindige regressie tot gevolg het. ‘n Ontleding van die internalistiese regressie laat egter blyk dat die beswaar op ‘n foutiewe veronderstelling rus. Die gevolgtrekking word gemaak dat dit noodsaaklik is om die kwessie van die gesigspunt waaruit regverdiging plaasvind in te sluit in ‘n teorie van epistemiese regverdiging. Dit is noodsaaklik ten einde vir so ‘n teorie om by vermôe te wees om ook eerstepersoons epistemiese situasies aan te spreek. Sodoende word ‘n strategie daargestel waarvolgens direkte gronde van regverdiging in ‘n internalistiese opvatting van epistemiese regverdiging ingesluit kan word, sonder om ‘n oneindige regressie te veroorsaak. So ‘n werkwyse lê ook grondslae vir die ontwikkeling van ‘n teorie waarin internalisme en eksternalisme verenig kan word.
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