CHAPTER 4

4. LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL ISSUES IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The historical development of the South African Constitution and its intergovernmental relations (IGR) system indicates that future reform and restructuring should be based on sound theory. The theoretical underpinnings of past IGR interventions were clearly informed by the apartheid political philosophy, particularly its native control bias. The movement towards considerations such as the Development Bank of South Africa’s nine economic development nodal points, as prime regional demarcation criteria, ushered in a science-informed era of constitutional solutions. This era subjects to inquiry a number of issues around IGR and these vary from the terminological nature of IGR to the historical pattern it denotes.

This chapter investigates the origin of IGR as a concept in government, wherein the various government systems, as they impact on IGR, will be explained through the employment of authority relationship models. The chapter will also focus on the distinctive features of IGR, the normative guidelines in IGR and factors that influence them. These will be supported by specific South African experiences both from a historical and current perspective.
4.2 ORIGIN OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW

There is insufficient evidence regarding the exact historical moment when the concept of IGR originated. According to Wright (1988:13), IGR originated in the United States, during the Roosevelt’s New Deal era. The origin was however a result of the challenges posed to the different tiers of government in the co-ordination of State affairs. The author argues that the challenge of welfare states to concern themselves with effectual service delivery within limited means, stringent macroeconomic frameworks and chronic societal imbalances, during the course of history, has influenced governments to improve on centralised regulatory control in favour of sufficiently devolved and decentralised service delivery systems.

IGR as a concept has been an operational term employed by public officials in an attempt to explain their day to day activities within multi-jurisdictional service delivery mandates. The prevalence of the term in most federal states has resulted in IGR being confused with federalism, co-operative federalism and the new federalism (Wright, 1988:13). The establishment of an IGR Commission in the United States of America repositioned the notion of IGR in academic discourse, research, and governmental resource allocation activities. This development had a global impact on all multi-sphered and multi-tiered regimes.

Increased use of the term IGR has created the impression that it may be equated to or is synonymous with federalism (Agrannof and McGuire, 2002:2). In multi-tiered or multi-sphered unitary systems, there is an equivalent tendency to equate IGR with decentralisation or a form of allocating certain constitutional or any other form of power to sub-national units. Federalism instead, is defined to mean a league formed by a treaty
amongst sovereign states, that can be either be after a war or a product of constitutional negotiations (Wright, 1988:37). This research contends that the sovereignty of states within a federation may be compromised in recognition of the sovereignty of a central authority, whilst retaining certain residual powers of government. These vary from exclusive executive authority over some state/province/region (SPR) specific matters to concurrent authority.

The critical feature of federalism is its reliance on clearly demarcated legal powers, formality in action as well as insistence on written agreements, protocols and treaties (De Villiers, 1993:1-2). Whilst most federations want to be seen as not having a hierarchical relationship with sub-national units, in practice there is a clear hierarchy whereby officials display super-ordinate and sub-ordinate tendencies. In other words, national authorities perceive themselves as having a monitoring and/or supervisory role over sub-national authorities and sub-national governments have an almost perpetual expectation for the central authorities to build their capacity. Sections 100, 139, 154 and 155 of the South African 1996 Constitution, in prescribing supra-ordinate intervention in case of crises as well as performance monitoring emphasises this fact (Constitution Act 108, 1996).

Federalism has a deep-rooted ideological history in terms of it being used to define power relations between and amongst societies. The author contends that the 16th century voyages of discovery that resulted in the redrawing of the world map regarding the imperial and colonising authority has, in many countries, created geographical units that are defined by resources class, race and colonial loyalty. The historical reality of the decentralisation inherent in federalism, and the bringing of government closer to the people, has resulted in most post-colonial governments considering federalism with suspicion. This study submits that most liberation movements in Africa, including South
Africa’s ruling African National Congress, may have suspected this. Some liberation movements in Africa understand the federal option to be a product of colonial dismemberment of African “nations” thus, perpetuating some form of imperialism. The prospect of viewing pure regionalisation as a foundation for future stability in African states becomes the first casualty, amongst many, in the hostility toward federations. The imprecise intentions of federalism yielded within its own ranks a need to qualify it as co-operative federalism, competitive-federalism and new federalism: these have put the need for IGR squarely on the government/governance faculty.

Notwithstanding the above, IGR concerns itself with interactions and transactions conducted by executives (in a constitutional sense) between and amongst governments in a country. The author argues that IGR does not restrict itself to government entities but recognises relations amongst officials from all combinations of government entities, it stresses the human dimension of governance as it transcends the legalistic focus (often prevalent in –ism systems) and includes within it a range of informal and otherwise submerged actions and perceptions of officials. Furthermore, the equality of stakeholders within an IGR environment removes the hierarchical status in favour of providing an operational platform where no level assumes superiority except that of ultimate accountability. The accountability element of defining superiority relegates super-ordinate and sub-ordinate political undertones to the level of a managerial tool, where both can assume each other’s position as per circumstantial dictate.

The apparent ideological neutrality of IGR removes the emotional tendencies usually associated with the extremes of unitary and federalist government systems. IGR ideologically concerns itself with the operating currencies of the governance exchange market that manifests itself best within a networked environment governed by service
delivery as an application protocol. The ideological position of IGR is aptly put by Hanfas cited in Agrannof (1990:3) when he states that “the ability of individual decision units to achieve their own objectives will depend not only on their own choices and actions but also on those of others; actions at any one level of decision making will be influenced by the relationship that exists between levels as well as across functional boundaries”.

A major task confronting political systems in any country is therefore that of securing co-ordinated policy actions through networks of separate but inter-dependent organisations where the collective capabilities of a number of participants are essential for effective problem solving, or where the activities of individual units are to be guided by more general policy considerations. The above quotation confirms that IGR brings to the public eye the political and administrative landscape within which service delivery has to occur. The study of IGR is therefore not synonymous with that of federalism because as much as IGR is one of the critical platforms upon which federal political systems must operate, it is also equally critical in multi-sphered or multi-tiered political systems within the extreme confederal to the extreme unitary continuum of political systems.

4.2.1 The Distinctive Features of Intergovernmental Relations

The definition of IGR and the comparative explanation of the federal-unitary continuum as shown in the distinction between IGR and federalism reflects the following distinctive features of IGR that are encapsulated as follows:

*The first feature is that intergovernmental relations transcend constitutionally recognised patterns of government involvement to include a variety of relationships including national-local, provincial-local, inter-provincial and inter-local.* The South African experiences
reflect a growing number of governmental units involved in IGR. A closer look at the IGR intensity of ministries, agencies and departments within the national and provincial sphere as well as in municipalities with varying jurisdictional types, reflects a staggering need for connections needing to operate like a human nervous system (Agrannoff, 1999:3). The author argues that the need to ensure that these relationships converge at a particular coordinating centre, resembling human nerve centres, makes IGR a transcending platform. The limits of Constitutional precincts and dictates are easily repudiated by the ability of IGR to be enabling and profoundly facilitative.

Secondly, intergovernmental relations is a function which is made operational by the activities of individuals and other functionaries within government, in order to constitute the activities and attitudes of persons occupying official positions for the effective management of the affairs of the respective tiers of government in the nation state. Hence the adage that “there are no relationships between governments, there are only relations amongst officials who govern different units” (Agrannoff, 1999:6). Agrannoff maintains that “it is human beings clothed with office who are the real determiners of what relations between units of government will be”. This leads one to conclude that IGR has to be formulated largely in terms of human relations and behaviour (Agrannoff, 1999:6). This implies that IGR will always be held to ransom regarding attitudes, perceptions, affiliations and the egotistic whims of public officials and politicians.

The complexities of IGR, particularly in multi-sphered governments, confirm the axiom that IGR are, first and foremost, a profoundly human undertaking (Dion, 2000:4). In multi-ethical, multi-cultural and multi-racial societies, IGR will have to be characterised by consensus building, mutual adjustment and pacifying dominant coalitions. The growing realisation that “in diverse societies where inter-group interactions have been
uncooperative, the fundamental problem has been a failure to develop political institutions able to accommodate such diversity” (World Bank Report, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century, 2000:13) lends further credence to the human element dominant in IGR. The regional complexities of racial, ethical, political and per capita geographic domestic product concentrations in South Africa, makes IGR a natural priority for government because such complexities have proved to be the dominant currencies in igniting most regionally defined conflicts in both the developing and the developed world. The chronic nature of ethnic conflicts in The Great Lakes region of Africa and the Balkan states of Central Europe supports this assertion.

Thirdly, the relationship between officials involves their continuous conflicts and exchanges of information and views. IGR practitioners concern themselves with the practical, informal and goal oriented arrangements that can be realised within the official’s formal, legal and constitutional context. The goal orientedness of practitioners is within the realisation of the government’s service delivery objective. However, this is done within the following traditional operating currencies of IGR: regulations, standards, guidelines and interpretations that accompany grants (Agranoff, 1990:6). The South African treasury regulations that regulate the behaviour, conduct and operations of public officials have emerged in the recent period as the most instructive document within the IGR’s landscape of South Africa. These regulations regulate, for instance, the financial management framework, treasury management and accounting officer responsibilities within the broad IGR framework South African Treasury Instructions: 2000, Table of Contents).

All types of public officials are potential or actual participants in the intergovernmental relations’ decision-making process, and this includes all elected and appointed officials. The concept of internal client relationships where units within an organisation identify who
their internal suppliers are as well as to whom do they supply a service has brought into prominence the importance of each official as an IGR participant. This may be illustrated in South Africa through the corporate service role of the Department of Public Service and Administration and certain agencies of the Department of Public Works, Treasury, Provincial and Local Government and The Presidency at the apex. These departments and agencies, as their core activity, have an interacting and transacting role with other organs of state across all spheres. This state of affairs, therefore, attests to the fact that all officials in these departments are IGR practitioners.

**IGR has a policy dimension** defined as the intentions and actions of public officials. This would involve examining interactions of actors across jurisdictions surrounding the formulation, implementation and evaluation of policy. Fiscal issues are at the core of IGR policy concerns (Wright, 1988:42). The policy traffic around development facilitation in South Africa through the Development Facilitation Act, Act 67 of 1995, the Local Government Municipal Structures Act, Act 33 of 2000, the Local Government Municipal Systems Act, Act 32 of 2000, The Public Finance Management Act, Act 1 of 1999 as well as the Local Government Municipal Finance Management Bill, August 2001, has put the questions of intergovernmental (fiscal) relations on the centre stage of rolling out the constitutional development agenda of government. The strategic planning requirements of the treasury regulations and the process of drafting local development objectives within the integrated development planning mandate of local government introduces into the South African intergovernmental policy making process a revenue driven policy implementation dispensation (South African Treasury Instructions, 1999:15).

The features of IGR occur within particular models of IGR operation and these are examined below.
4.3 MODELS OF IGR

The practice of IGR is both a cause and an effect of authority relationships between the different levels, and (in the South African and Australian nomenclature) spheres of government. The manner in which these authority relationships occur creates a continuum of various government forms within which IGR can flourish. The continuum, as will be explained later, provides an analytical framework that is outside the traditionally hostile federal versus unitary discourse often dominant in the study of relationships within multi-sphered government systems. The various authority relationships in government systems have so many complexities that it becomes almost compulsory to provide a model of such relationships.

A model is a simplified (often mathematical, three dimensional or graphic) description of a system to assist calculations, predictions and descriptions (Tulloch, 1993:979). A model is a representation of something else and is designed for a specific purpose. The general purpose of models is to provide readers and analysts with a visual reminder of what may be real. Hogwood and Gunn (1984:42) argue that, historically, models have been used to simulate circumstances within which phenomena may have to operate, thus assisting in hypothesizing and experimentation. The fundamental purpose of abstract model building, particularly in policy analysis and policy making, is to represent, simulate, explain, predict, experiment and test hypotheses of an operating phenomena (Hagwood and Gunn, 1984:42).

Models, therefore, are mental constructs that deal with entities which exist nowhere in real life but can help scientists to understand and explain real phenomena and refine statements of what is desired (Hagwood and Gunn, 1984:43). They are actually
abstractions of realities. Whilst models are designed to assist understanding, they tend to make certain theoretical underpinnings of social science phenomena difficult to describe. In governance, for instance, there are complexities and realities often shaped by societal political values, historical mandates as well as the limitedness of service delivery resources that a simplified model may not clearly explain (Wright, 1988:39). It is the submission of the author that models are pictorial tangibles that interface through abstraction, the reality of thought and imagination with structure. This study will, in this section and within the theoretical limitations imposed by modelling theory, make use of such models to explain IGR.

The multi-faceted nature of government systems has in common three jurisdictional areas – national, provincial and local. The distinguishing factor amongst them all is the degree to which sub-national units receive recognition within the reigning legal and political system. IGR as a platform upon which government systems can transcend constitutional and legal barriers, does not subscribe to legal precincts except where they become an operating currency to get things done. There are a number of authority relationship models, but Wright (1988:40) identifies three generic types, namely, the co-ordinate authority, the inclusive authority and the bargaining models. These models will assist this study in discovering the model within which the South African IGR system operates, although there is always a risk and/or advantage of discovering permutations of the models, given the hybridised South African government system.
4.3.1 The Co-Ordinate Authority Model

In this model sharp, distinct boundaries separate National Government and Provinces. There is generally no formal recognition of local self-government as a distinct tier/sphere of government. Local government is seen as being sub-ordinate to provincial government and may exercise only those powers expressly granted (Wright, 1988:40). The most recognised relationship between Provinces and National Government is that there is a tangential link denoting a relatively high degree of independence and autonomy. The co-ordinate authority model advocates a non-interference paradigm of IGR.

The model however had relevance at particular historical points of national–provincial relations in South Africa. The early colonial governments could manage provincial from the imperial headquarters that acted as a virtual central government for its Southern African colonies of the Cape, Free State, Transvaal and Natal. After de-colonisation,
indigenous governments created a national parliament that operated as an on-site imperial headquarter, since most systems were left intact. The South African 1909 Constitution is one such example because it only created seats for the four provinces at a national level and took over certain imperial responsibilities, though much was still in the hands of a resident Governor-General who by definition represented the imperial government (South Africa Act, 1909:s90). The four provinces remained tangentially linked to the Union Parliament albeit within a repugnancy clause in the Constitution, that amounted to the fact that no provincial law shall override an existing or future determined Union Law. This was despite the original legislative powers that provinces had at that time.

The 1961 Constitution was more focused on national sovereignty than on redefining national-provincial relations; it went to the extent of replacing, in an almost mechanical manner, Her Majesty The Queen and Governor-General, with a State President, and that signified a status quo maintenance approach to changing the type of authority relationship amongst levels of government (Constitution Act 32 of 1961:s3). The recognition of local self-government only evolved as a mechanism of making separate development practical, but the entire national-provincial authority relationship remained within the characteristically tangential mode of the co-ordinate authority model, that clearly displayed an administrative colonial heritage.

The introduction of self-government for Black people in South Africa within the infamous 1913 Land Act parameters, only de-concentrated political, fiscal and administrative powers to newly created self-governing territories. This was despite the need to devolve such powers. However, the requirement of a modern democratic state led to this model becoming obsolete through the need to protect sub-national units from an unrestrained exercise of national power. The requirement of decentralisation of power from the centre
as a good governance practice, limits the development of this model, particularly within the defined criteria of global funding agencies for development aid (World Bank, 49:2000). The co-ordinate authority model, however, is still being pursued in countries like Australia, where state governments have, at least legally, sharp, distinct boundaries that separate them from national government. The only stabilising and reforming factor is the degree to which national and state party political strength can amend the model through practice. It can be conclusively argued that this model belongs to the far end of the federalist axis on the federal-unitary continuum.

4.3.2 **The Inclusive Authority Model**

*Figure 3: The Inclusive Authority Model*

The concentric circles in the figure define an authority relationship shaped by diminishing power as represented in the size of the three circles. The elasticity of the circles is controlled by the dominant and overarching circle of national government by either
expanding its circle of influence and jurisdiction whilst keeping at a constant, other circles, or reducing the size of the internal circles without touching the outer circle thereby expanding its influence through conquest and take-over (Wright, 1988:43). The author argues that slogans such as nation building, redressing historical imbalances as well as addressing emergency situations have been at the forefront in the justification of power contraction and expansion. The rationalisation of inland security in the aftermath of the September 11th bombing in the United States of America illustrates this point.

The power expanding or reducing strategies above were practised over the entire constitutional history of South Africa. The Union of South Africa Parliament, when dealing with native affairs and land questions did not consider the opinions of sub-national units. This is because the provinces of Natal and Cape Province had relatively native-friendly policies that were a threat to the land ownership and resource access policy of the colonial government (Walshe, 1987:43). The collusion of the National Parliament in the process leading up to the 1913 Land Act displays a clear expansion of national influence at the expense of the provinces. The 1948 to 1994 National Party government also expanded and contracted the circles at will, particularly as it related to native affairs. The introduction, for instance, of Bantu Education in 1953 essentially took away the power of provincial government over native education and this amounted to an expansion of the circle of influence whilst keeping internal circles intact. The granting of limited franchise to Coloured and Indian people as well as nominal independence to certain Black self-governing territories was also an expansion of the national circle and contraction of the SPR and Local government circles.

Whilst the above circumstances created IGR intensity on the governmental landscape of South Africa it was also entrenching the expansion and contraction culture predominant in the inclusive authority model. The 1993 interim and the 1996 final Constitutions that
marked the final repudiation of apartheid and its racio-ethnically determined sub-national units sought to create an enabling constitutional model that encouraged bargaining as opposed to dominance of one sphere by another. This, however, did not impact on the established governance cultural pattern of dominance as was reflected in the manner in which the national Department of Public Service and Administration expanded its circle of influence through the reduction of provincial governments’ influence in determining and influencing public service reform. The discontinuance of Provincial Service Commissions marked a decisive move toward centralized public service reform, administration and management.

This model conveys in clear terms the essential hierarchical nature of authority where SPRs and localities become mere minions of national government with little to no impact on national politics and public policy (Wright, 1988:44). The supine nature of sub-national units in this model, as a result of their being governing entities in name only, can be traced to the following four perspectives on sub-national units:

*The first* is that which recognises the existence of an elite group of national leaders that dictate the power and direction of sub-national units. Sub-national political and administrative leaders play a significant role in affecting important political or societal choices, unless they are given political space by their national counterparts (Wright, 1988:45). The appointment of Provincial Premiers and Mayoral candidates by central bodies of political parties in South Africa is at most, a manifestation of this model in the country’s IGR practice. In a comment to show the insignificance of sub-national units within this model, Seepe (Daily Mail & Guardian, www.mg.co.za, 2001: July 27:1) asserts, “the unfettered political control and influence in political appointments at both the national and provincial levels has arguably reduced appointees to tasks better performed by
parrots or puppets. It is this puppetry that has allowed government to go unchallenged and/or dissuaded from its pseudo-intellectual escapades”. The dominance of the national political elite over sub-national elites has an indirect regulatory effect on the ability of premiers and local government leaders to challenge centrally considered decisions.

However, there is a parallel advantage of facilitating development in the short term for governments within transitional economies, like South Africa. The constitutional position of premiers in terms of primary involvement in resource allocation and executive decision-making, reduces such offices to administrative appendages of the national executive. The fact that premiers have hollow executive power as defined in the Constitution and do not sit on the national executive reduces them to being recipients of cabinet decisions and their only recourse is within political party caucuses. This is a historical phenomenon of global proportion.

The second perspective is that of the technocratic-pluralist position that identifies the dispersal of decision-making power into parastatals and sectorally dominant coalitions that are national in scope (Wright, 1988:45). The existence of a strong civil society movement in South Africa (a function of the immediate historical past experience in the fight against apartheid) has further subjugated sub-national units to mere implementers of nationally determined priorities and programmes. These coalitions manifest themselves in the form of organised labour, business, non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) and local government. The access of these powerful coalitions to the ruling elite and opposing elite make them natural spokespersons on almost all matters of public policy. The material conditions governing co-existence in sub-national jurisdictions also tend to be ignored or bankrupted by centrally considered civil society participation and opposition.
The third perspective is that which recognises the central role of the factory community in carrying out certain delegated societal functions such as employment, poverty reduction, and social responsibility (Wright, 1988:46). This perspective acknowledges the inherent strength of private capital, within the private domain of human co-existence, to expand and to contract its circle of influence on sub-national governments. A manifestation of this power is the ability of private firms to relocate within sub-national units as a result of the firms’ nationally considered decision; an activity that can potentially reduce the ability of sub-national governments to perform their duties as a result of shrinking tax bases, reduced consumer spending power, increased social ailments associated with the resultant growth of unemployment, and a reduction of the gross geographic domestic product of sub-national jurisdictions. The strength of this sector can be so dominant in a country to the extent that particular regions can dictate the economic direction and pulse of the state. The headquartering of core capital to the Western Cape region, growth of the Eastern Cape, and the economic dominance of Gauteng would fall into this category.

The fourth perspective sees SPRs and localities such as the administrative province of national governments, effectively reducing political heads of such entities to administrative conduits of the centre. The current rollout of the government’s transformation programme in South Africa, with its associated deployment and redeployment policy of the dominant party in government, gradually centralises and fuses the IGR system to be operated with the expansion and contraction of the political cockpit of a central office.

This model is therefore premised on the following: sub-national governments depend totally on decisions that are nation-wide in scope. The election promise of free water where a nationally considered political party manifesto has put fiscal pressure on relatively under-capacitated municipalities to deliver on this promise, is a classic South African
example (ANC; 2000:2). There is a general atrophy in non-national political institutions and functions of SPR and localities are fused into a centralised, hierarchical system (Wright, 1988:48).

4.3.3 The Bargaining Authority Model

The bargaining authority model plays an important role in bridging the divide that exists between different stakeholders within close polarities (Wright, 1988:49). It attempts to create trade-offs that create viable win-win paradigms in complicated political scenarios.

The bargaining model further represents a combination of the two previous models at the opposite ends of the federal-unitary continuum. An exemplary notation of this scenario is the South African system. Similar scenarios exist in South Africa with the constitutional progression of South Africa from a unitary government of the erstwhile White minority regime to a multi-sphered and quasi-federal system. The existence of nine provincial...
jurisdictions, about two hundred and eighty-four municipal jurisdictions, and a further subdivision of municipal jurisdictions into district, metropolitan and local municipality types, present overlaps in terms of service delivery target areas. The hierarchical and autonomous elements of the previous models characterise the bargaining model in an integrated manner.

The model is represented through an overlay of three non-hierarchical but interdependent, interrelated and yet distinctive circles. The interdependence and inter-relatedness of circles yield four intersecting areas that denote common and/or concurrent jurisdiction. The intersections also reflect the existence of relations between two levels to the exclusion of the third. A closer look at the model shows that there are areas where a particular sphere has exclusive powers. The expansion and contraction of circles at the initiation of a particular sphere has to be negotiated with another sphere. The negotiations and bargaining that characterise this model will result in the primary expansion of the centre intersection. However, in this model there are substantial areas of government operations involving both levels simultaneously, and areas of single-jurisdiction independence and full discretion that are comparatively small (Wright, 49:1988). Further, the power and influence available to any one jurisdiction is significantly limited by its inability to operate unilaterally unless expressly set out by or in law.

The model is chiefly characterised by the exchange and agreement elements of bargaining where supra levels offer grants-in-assistance to sub-levels in exchange for their agreement and co-operation to implement a program or carry out a project. At the adoption of the integrated rural development strategy, a programme to accelerate rural development in South Africa, government declared “it is now in a position to implement a rural development programme for the integrated development of rural areas [which] will bring together all government departments and all spheres of government including traditional
leaders” (Mbeki: 25 June 1999, Cape Town). The declaration defines the relationship between levels as it advocates an implementation strategy that will use and develop existing institutional, planning, management and funding mechanisms to focus the expenditure of government in the three spheres to more effectively respond to needs and opportunities…. thereby increasing the efficiency in the application of public funds in rural areas to create appropriate outputs in the places where they are most needed (ISRDS, November 2000:1).

The quest to achieve synergy and higher effectiveness in departmental programmes through a strengthened integrative mechanism at all levels lends sufficient credence to a bias by the South African government towards the overlapping authority model of IGR (SRDS, 2000:2). The bias towards this model is a direct consequence of the obligatory constitutional IGR parameters that, amongst others, specify that all spheres of government must “respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in other spheres; not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution; exercise their powers and functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere” (Constitution Act 108, 1996:s41).

This model is characterised by the following: limited and dispersed power; modest and uncertain areas of autonomy; a high degree of potential or actual interdependence; simultaneous co-operation and competition; bargaining exchange relationships; and negotiation as a strategy for reaching agreement (Wright, 1988:42), but these need to be reconciled. Critical to this reconciliation are the various organs of civil society with political parties occupying the pyramid’s apex. The growth in appropriateness of party politics, as
a reconciling mechanism does have the disadvantage of obfuscating the dynamics inherent in IGR and in this model in particular. The South African IGR landscape provides a case study as the dominant political party, the ANC and its 2000-2004 government of national unity coalition partner in the Kwa-Zulu Natal province, the Inkatha Freedom Party, attempts to be provide a platform for integration. In this coalition, public policy disputes tend to be resolved through party structures, thus compromising set rules and regulations, service delivery and rendering irrelevant those provincial issues that should underpin South African IGR.

The potential for certain South African sub-national governments to be politically controlled by regional parties may introduce to the IGR landscape a market-type overlapping authority model where multiple agencies, serving the same people with different bundles of public goods and services, are viewed as multiple firms in public service industries. This market, given its competitive character, over time, will be prey to the market rules of supply and demand which are often in conflict with the South African development agenda in particular, and those of transitional and developing economies in general. A closer look at the emerging macro-economic framework in South Africa indicates a shift from the inherited policy positions of the ruling party towards a market driven approach to service delivery and public policy. This shift has a significant impact on governance and on IGR philosophy.

The historical development of the South African IGR system during the period demarcated by the study shows a progression from one end of the IGR models towards the overlapping model. The movement however, shows an erratic navigation from one model to another and backwards. The 1961 Constitution, despite the element of racial exclusion, had already started moving towards the overlapping model. The gradual introduction of
Black self-government within the separate development apartheid philosophy attempted, tangentially to link the National sphere with self-governing territories on the one hand and the four provincial governments on the other, whilst maintaining a grip on the power to expand and contract its sphere of influence on any emerging policy issue not defined in the reigning legislative framework.

This state of affairs persisted through the 1983 Constitution despite the existence of the independent states (Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei), virtual Coloured and Indian self-governing territories and the virtual urban Black territories created in terms of the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982. In all instances, this movement was characterised by a generic IGR maturation process. This growth was further boosted by the adoption of a non-racial Constitution that rationalised the balkanised administrative units into nine provincial governments, 47 district municipalities, six Metropolitan municipalities and 232 local municipalities thereby increasing the intensity of IGR in South Africa.

The form and nature of IGR models yields the following two theoretical questions:

- In a normative sense what should guide IGR; and
- What factors influence IGR?

An exposition of these conceptual issues will inform the broad study particularly in terms of a proposed reform path to be considered as a possibility for the next historical period.

4.4 THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS NORMATIVE GUIDELINES

The interacting and transacting nature of governmental relations is a function of human activity and therefore, subject to norms and standards of humanity. The involvement of people in any activity has a cogent tendency to result in the ignorance of the normative
characteristic of human activities which is sometimes defined in cosmic terms as the ideal of: “what should be”? (Botes et al., 1997:285). The adoption of the interim Constitution in 1993, the 1994 first non-racial democratic elections and the adoption of the 1996 Constitution saw an introduction of a quasi-federal IGR system under the leadership of President Mandela. President Mandela’s attitude towards government may be characterised as being contained in the Jefferson adage that “government which governs best, governs least” (Agranoff, 2001:7). The relationship between the centre and provinces was operationalised through the inherited national minister and provincial Member of Executive Council committees called MinMecs (Thornhill, et al., 2001:27-59).

The fact that IGR is practised within a public administration environment means there are norms and values to which it should subscribe. Normative guidelines are therefore values and norms that a society aspires to live up to, and serve as criteria for public conduct (Botes et al., 1997:285). IGR therefore, should occur within the following five normative guidelines below.

### 4.4.1 Supreme political authority

The interaction of public officials and politicians to co-operate in order to realize a particular programme should be subject to the chief political authority of the state. Political authority is distinguished from political supremacy in that some democracies have their political authority being subject to the supremacy of their constitutions and, subsequently, an independent judiciary, whereas others subject their constitutions to Parliamentary supremacy (Botes et al., 1997:285-87). This often makes societies vulnerable to ideological dogmatism reminiscent of dictatorships, one party states and multi-partied one party states.
The author defines a multi-partied one party state as a state that has a number of political parties with perpetual minorities and yet dominated in size and historical legitimacy terms, by one party. The South African situation has such characteristics. These states are mostly found in transitional economies where a “liberation movement” was converted into a Political party thereby maintaining an electoral dominance that is historically derived as opposed to being a product of electoral market forces.

The condition of a multi-partied one party state, in most instances, is a product of the “nation building and post democratic paradigm” that is often consequential to liberation struggles and wars. It is the observation of the author that, there is a tendency in these dispensations to allow post-democratic challenges and post-war restructuring manoeuvres to supersede the basis of political authority, namely, a public accountability.

The importance of this guideline in IGR is that whilst the need to get things done drives an IGR environment, the decisions of the political authority in the form of legislation, budgets, proclamations, regulations and decisions of the political executive office bearers (Botes et al., 1997:286) should guide the conduct of public officials when interacting and transacting. The South African political authority is vested in the President as head of the executive and leader of the majority and ruling party (Constitution Act 108 of 1996:s85). The influence of The Presidency on IGR, therefore, will be an unavoidable feature in the South African IGR landscape. Conversely, the leadership style of a President in a country will also determine both the pace and heartbeat of its IGR. The successive South African Presidents or Heads of the Executive up till President Mbeki, have all shaped and moved the IGR approach of South Africa to a particular level. These ranged from a centrist Verwoerdian (HF Verwoerd was the first Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa and architect of Apartheid in South Africa) era, characterised by nominal autonomy in so far as
an entrenchment of separate development is achievable, to a Mbekian centralism, characterised by the objective of total emancipation of the African majority as well as loyalty to the central democratic structures of the ruling party.

4.4.2 Public accountability

The interacting and transacting government officials in any state should be publicly accountable and responsible for their activities. The informal nature of IGR created an impression that it is an activity outside the public eye and therefore, not subject to public scrutiny. This misinterpretation, however, is blind to the reality that public officials, by market exchange standards, are a commodity bought by taxpayers to perform functions specified in codified mandates often referred to as legislations. The exchange of information, commodities and public goods for citizen satisfaction, is a contested terrain for the political and economic influence of societies by established coalitions, such as, political parties, business and civil society. The contest would therefore, attract coalitions that aim to serve these interests through IGR transactions and interactions of public officials.

Legislative institutions (as legitimate and legalised coalitions), for instance, have institutionalised processes such as parliamentary debates, parliamentary committee sessions and constituency debates to gather such information. Government departments, on the other hand, have devised internal mechanisms such as inspections, delegation of appropriate authority to ensure decision ratification, annual reporting, regular audits, and daily supervision and management (Cloete, 1988:163). The judiciary ensures this accountability through administrative law trials, judicial inquiries and related juridical proceedings while the public is constantly informed by the media, by access to special
investigatory bodies such as the Public Protector and Human Rights Commission, and by Ombudsman institutions.

4.4.3 **Efficiency and effectiveness**

The bargaining requirement of IGR dictates a need to be sensitive to the balance between effectiveness, efficiency and productivity. The IGR exercise within the socio-political parameters set by issues such as political mandate, development agenda and sovereign hegemonic agendas is vulnerable to excessive compromises and deadlocks (Botes *et al.*, 1997:287). These compromises and deadlocks are catalysts to productivity, efficiency and effectiveness, hence IGR practitioners have to be guided by how effectual their decisions are. South African IGR structures have, in the early stages of the 1996 constitutional era, been prone to transacting outside their budgetary limits, thereby yielding unaffordable and yet potentially effective decisions.

The development assignment of the first Black majority government, with its potentially emotive ideals, required of government, in some instances, to make sentimental as well as practical policy pronouncements. However, these tended to be difficult to cost and therefore, impacted on the efficiency/effectiveness balance sheet such that policy implementation liabilities exponentially exceeded policy implementation assets, thereby resulting in a policy implementation deficit as manifested in the chronic human capital turnover (DPSA Annual Report, 2000:64) experienced at the management echelon of government. Sensitivity to sustaining an effectual balance becomes a critical guideline for IGR practitioners. The decision to embark on a policy process, that is, from conceptualisation to implementation, would require an efficiency and effectiveness quality control system as the various spheres, levels and units of government activity come into
contact with the policy. An education policy, for instance, would have to cascade in a manner that takes cognisance of the plethora of stakeholders from the national executive to a school governing body. In each of these levels, particular authorities, powers and mandates have to be assigned in a way that do not defeat any nationally set guideline.

4.4.4 Legal probity

The intensity of the IGR process, unintentionally, tends to galvanise government decision-makers into the ultra-vires mode thereby undermining constitutionalism and the rule of law. The execution of public service functions must be within the legal rules of the state and administrative law. There is a constant and non-negotiable obligation on any government official to ensure that all actions taken are lawful, and the correct administrative procedures are followed (Botes et al., 1997:287-88). This guideline ensures that, whilst officials pursue jurisdictional as well as multi-jurisdictional ambitions, they are equally bound to protect constitutionalism and the rule of law.

The bastardisation of public administration and management with a cryptic business management approach has created a grey area between the private and the public sector. This grey area is in the legislative and regulatory detail that is dominant in the public sector. This state of affairs often causes public officials to ignore rules and regulations, in their pursuit of service delivery goals that are often classified in the private sector as bureaucratic red tape and as state interference. The growth of quasi-public and commercialised state enterprises lends credence to the need for public officials to respect the rule the law, particularly since these institutions operate within a public sector distanced from regulatory framework. Recognition of the rule of law and legal probity will create a framework conducive to IGR.
4.4.5 **Societal values**

The respect of societal values probably constitutes one of the most important IGR guidelines. Multi-tiered/sphered government systems create an opportunity for the growth and the development of regional and sectoral interests, and these are propelled by the existence of a common language, race, culture, religion, class and so on. These orientations shape the values of a society over long historical periods resulting in bonded coalitions. The fact that the habits of elders, leaders and historically triumphant societies shape the values of new generations, makes values remain a constant set in human relations, and therefore, in IGR. However, one’s value system remains dynamic and subject to societal changes in attitudes and developments.

In South Africa, the existence of divergent historical experiences towards the development of one nation, poses a challenge when considering the crafting of a common value system. The extreme traditional and the uncompromisingly western divide prevalent in South African society puts additional pressure on societal values. The recognition of the oneness in diversity by the Constitution through, for instance, the language clause, offers guidelines for IGR, particularly in terms of representation in the bureaucracy as well as for the eclectic nature of public policy. The issues, as elaborated upon earlier, which are similar to those in other societies, form the basis for an IGR system.
4.5 **FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS**

In the light of preceding discussions, a number of factors influence the IGR process and practice within multi-sphere regimes. Public officials, as potential IGR practitioners should at all times be alert to these factors, some of which will be discussed below.

4.5.1 **Constitutional jurisdiction**

The jurisdictional definitions found in constitutions define the scope and necessary IGR. Issues such as distribution of authority, assigned subject matter, the extent of concurrency in jurisdictions and the national framework within which provinces may exercise authority, become critical (Levy and Tapscott, 2001:27). Other constitutional jurisdictional issues impacting on IGR relate to the degree to which the constitution of a country requires laws to be delegated to another sphere as well as to provisions for voluntary delegation of legislative or administrative jurisdiction.

Multi-sphered governments operate within protocols usually defined in constitutions. The provenance of protocols is in the manner in which national or central governments want to influence the direction of sub-national governments. The South African Constitution, whilst attempting to make spheres of government look equal, also provides for a hierarchy-based relationship. Sections 100, 125, 139 and 154 provide, for instance, for supervisory, monitoring, capacitating roles by super-ordinate spheres as well as national overriding powers (Constitution Act 108: 1996). Constitutions, by their nature, are the primary source of IGR. They lay down the rules of IGR and determine who the players are, what moves are allowed and what stakes are involved (Hanson, 1983:28).
4.5.2 **Form and character of second chambers**

The history of second chambers in parliaments is associated with the feudal character of government where class distinctions define representation. The second chamber would be used to accommodate either a popularly elected class (usually the so-called working class or proletariat) or the dominant aristocratic landowning class. The 18\textsuperscript{th} century social movements that propagated the ideals of Rousseau - namely, liberty, fraternity and equality - triggered a review of second chambers over the subsequent centuries. A revisit of governance, accompanied by a renaissance within the political science theoretical domain, as well as a repositioning of power relations within a state, resulted in second chambers being seen as structures that ensure sub-national representation in centres of decision and policy making. The German Lander governments' representation in the Bundestrat, the USA Senate House, as well as in the South African National Council of Provinces (NCOP), provides living examples of this strategic shift in the role of second chambers, although the degree of the mandate as per constituency represented differs (Levy and Tapscott, 2001,27).

In the German instance, representatives have a positively defined mandate on how they represent Landers, however this is characteristic of the federal nature of a state (De Villiers, 1995:16). The USA Senate also exercises a relatively autonomous mandate, but subject to nationally determined priorities, the unity of the state governs in this instance. The South African National Council of Provinces has a relatively low mandate, although it can influence the second chamber processes in terms of local government oversight functions (Thornhill et al., 2001:2-3). The representation element of second chambers has affected and redefined the role of these chambers in IGR.
4.5.3 The political party systems

The form and character of political parties within a state could have the potential of determining the so-called political “heartbeat” of IGR. In almost all states, the ruling party has the authority to make final policy pronouncements within the parameters of ensuring continued voter and/or citizen favour (Botes et al., 1997:307). The structure of a political party in terms of its regional and local branches dictates internal party policy coalitions that impact on the nature and form of IGR.

The ANC Constitution is introduced as follows: “the ANC constitution defines the character and nature of the organisation, it reflects the ANC’s dual position as a liberation movement and political party” (ANC Constitution Introduction, 1997). This opening statement obliges members of the party, and therefore the majority in the executive of government, to work towards the attainment of the ANC’s party and liberation movement objectives. The oath of acceptance into the ANC further includes a commitment to respect its Constitution and structures, and to work as a “loyal” member of the organisation and to defend the unity and integrity of the organisation and its principles, and combat any tendency towards disruption and factionalism (ANC, 1997:Rule 4.15). The IGR influence is further entrenched in the duties of members whereby it is expected of “members who hold elective office in any sphere of government at national, provincial or local level to be members of the appropriate caucus, to function within its rules and to abide by its decisions under the general provisions of the ANC Constitution and its structures”. The above ANC constitutional provisions may oblige politicians and senior members of the bureaucracy affiliated to the ANC to transact within party lines, thereby compromising normativeness in favour of political correctness.
The organisational structure of the ANC consists of the National Conference, the Provincial Conference, the Regional Conference and the Branch Annual general meeting of which each is the “supreme” jurisdictional ruling and controlling body of the ANC (ANC Constitution, 1997:Rule 6.1,9.1 and 17.1). The organisation of government, since 1994 to the December 2000 local government elections, has been gradually aligned to the organisational structure of the ruling party. It is the submission of the author that the introduction of regional government within provincial government in the form of District Municipalities and Metropolitan Municipalities and their executive-legislative powers, position the party caucus structure, within a party leadership deployment policy paradigm, to centrally influence government policy making, implementation and funding. The above state of affairs becomes a critical factor in IGR because there is an inherent assumption that the jurisdictional entities that are electorally won by the ruling party will co-operate and interrelate with relative ease. The number of jurisdictions contesting cases brought before the constitutional court by ANC-controlled sub-national jurisdictions attest to this assumption.

By the same token, the structure and geographical predominance of the opposition parties determine the relationship between the sub-national and supra-national governments. The authority relationship structure will influence the resource allocation and devolution of power tendencies of the supra sphere. The basic tenets of IGR, namely, asymmetry and subsidiarity within a bargaining authority relationship IGR model, are compromised in the process. It is the author’s view that there is emerging evidence that the structure of the political party and/or ruling coalition, in most multi-sphered/tiered government systems, is nonconformist in organised constitutional structures. Incongruities in the distribution of power amongst party organisational structures undermine the jurisdictional executive
power of sub-national governments with cataclysmic consequences both to representative
government and to service delivery.

4.5.4 The judicial system

The extent to which a country’s judiciary plays a role in an IGR system could shape the
attitudes, approaches and disposition of public officials when dealing with cross-
jurisdictional matters of governance. The reliance of the United States government on
Dilllon’s rule, as early as the 19th Century, positioned the central importance of an
independent judiciary in the refereeing of intergovernmental disputes. The necessity of
legislating IGR disputes is therefore bankrupted by the significance of court judgements on
such IGR disputes. Further to this, the legal and constitutional relations between the
states of United States and their local governments, have been guided for more than one
century by Dillion’s Rule, a rule named after a judgement made by Judge Dilllon in the City
of Clinton v Cedar Rapids and Missouri River Railroad in 1868 (Wright, 1988:41), who,
whilst expressing state-local relations, asserted that there is no common-law right of self
government; local entities are creatures of the state and therefore subject to the unfettered
discretion of the state (Wright, 1988:41). Successive changes to this rule emanated from
court judgements in relation to IGR disputes.

The South African Constitution declares that the judicial authority of the Republic is vested
in the courts, and obligates organs of state to be bound by court decisions. This provision
is equally applicable to persons in those decisions that apply to them (Constitution Act
108, 1996:s165). The implication of these provisions is that conflicts between persons and
institutions (including government) can only be pronounced upon within an independently
constituted court system. However, the constitution further obligates all spheres of
government and organs of state to adhere to specified principles of co-operative government and IGR with a requirement that an Act of Parliament must provide for appropriate mechanisms and procedures to facilitate settlement of intergovernmental disputes (Constitution Act 108, 1996:s41). This appears to be the cause, in the national legislature and the independent judiciary, of fierce debates on the autonomy issue. The fact that courts are independent makes the requirement for a legislated dispute resolution mechanism restrictive. The author contends that, it will therefore be desirable, given the USA experience of the Dillion’s Rule, to allow IGR resolutions to evolve over time and in tandem with the constitutional maturity of the recipient society.

4.5.5 The financial state of each sphere

The ability of a sub-national unit of government to raise its own revenue determines its relationship with supra-national units. The traditional conditioning of intergovernmental grants for loyalty and co-operation by supra-sphere/tiers regulates the jurisdictional rights of sub-national governments in favour of the granting sphere or tier (Levy and Tapscott, 2001:32). This is often a direct result of the degree to which sub-national units have or lack autonomous financial resources to match their expenditure requirements or obligations, and the degree of disparity (created or natural) in the financial resources of different sub-national units requiring corrective arrangements for redistribution of financial resources.

4.5.6 Human behaviour

The author suggests that the appointment of persons into public positions should be based on their specialist knowledge and experience. Therefore, it may be expected that the value
systems of such persons would dominate their approach and attitude toward IGR. The
knowledge base of persons, in terms of the impact of their decisions and activities (or
indecisiveness and inactivity) on the economic growth of a country, will accelerate or
decelerate the speed upon which IGR responds to such challenges. The human
disposition toward an integrative approach as opposed to a hierarchical and fragmented
approach to government, is a function of peoples’ exposure to the bargaining software
associated with IGR. The software includes the bargaining tools of diplomacy,
compromise, win-win approaches, and equal but pecking-order relationships. It is the view
of the author that the experiences of persons, shaped by their value systems, perceptions,
attitudes and pre-career socialisation, in most instances, are in alignment with their
understanding of policy implications and therefore inter-sphere relations. The IGR adage
that persons relate to each other but governments don’t” places emphasis on this factor.

4.5.7 **Circumstances**

Circumstances in a society are created by changes in both *time* and *place*, and they
themselves are not static (Botes *et al*., 1997:308). Circumstances around which IGR
occurs change the policy requirements of government to respond. These often manifest
themselves in the areas listed below.

**Crises** such as threats of war, internal political unrest, natural disasters, economic
depression and disease pandemics may require of government to withdraw certain
devolved powers and to centralise them, thereby reducing the decision making centres
characteristic of IGR. The mayhem surrounding the September 11, 2001, World Trade
Centre disaster, provides a classic example of respect for jurisdictional autonomy by the
Bush Administration. The American President was confined to dealing with issues of
National Security and international relations in terms of building a coalition “against terrorism”, whilst the Mayor of New York was left to deal with issues of disaster management as a metropolitan function. In another vein the Cape Floods in South Africa demonstrated a different scenario whereby responsibility for the management of the Crossroads flood-induced disaster, became a political contestation with no jurisdiction taking ultimate responsibility. The South African HIV/AIDS debate, particularly as it relates to the administration of anti-viral drugs and nevirapine, has drawn attention to the influence of crises within IGR. While the National Ministry of Health debates the approval of the health drug system, Provincial Governments have started to administer the promotion of a healthy society through appropriate hospital management. The IGR interplay of roles and jurisdiction was still not clearly defined at the time of this study and requires further research.

*International protocols and treaties* that countries enter into may change the policy direction of a state and, subsequent IGR structures. The author argues that the decentralisation drive of the World Bank, as well as the structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have not only changed the macro-economic frameworks of loan and grant recipient countries, but also the manner in which they programme their budgets and structure their public sector spending patterns. The accompanying economic restructuring pressures such as public private partnerships brought about by such grant and loan requirements, has necessitated a review of relationships between what were traditionally state enterprises and spheres of government. The process of creating public utilities at the local sphere of government in South Africa, as evidenced in the establishment of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Government’s public utilities, redefines not only the service delivery relationship between citizen and government but also the fiscal complexities around the flow of
intergovernmental grants to the semi-private entities. The above factors form part of the IGR faculty. The human resource funding and per capita cost implications for such services, remain an actuarial exercise, set to impact on the inflationary behaviour of the fiscus.

*Economic paradigms* as they manifest themselves in forms of economic inflection points, often shape the role of government in human interactions and co-existence, from the agrarian to the information economy. The economic inflection points do not only change the power relations between government, business and labour but also between government and citizens and spheres of government. The digitisation of information, growth of cyber-corporations, speed of information dissemination, the one-stop service culture driven by shopping malls, and the virtual retailing community requires an adaptation of government processes to this economy. The growth of cyber corporations implies a silent revolution within the government sector towards cyber government. The flow of information during this era of governance will enable IGR to be based on real time and accurate information. There may, for instance, be an identification system that keeps records of citizen information in terms of migration, health patterns, geographic per capita spending per particular service to be delivered, and so on. This will enable IGR practitioners to interact and transact with relative ease. The speed and availability of information will definitely increase the intensity of IGR and thus redefine its scope and application.

### 4.5.8 Demographic and geographic factors

The size of the country, the size of the population and the distribution of the population on the territory may affect IGR structures and processes (Cameron, 2000:2). States establish
intergovernmental mechanisms to suit their physical and demographic conditions. If a country is relatively small, then there is less of a need for sub-national governments, thereby necessitating an appropriately centralised state (Thornhill et al., 2002:12). Larger states, however, may be obliged to decentralise thereby creating a plethora of IGR challenges. Furthermore, the establishment of these mechanisms may be subject to population distribution. The size of Namibia, for instance, is 825 418 square kilometres with a population distribution of 2,1 persons per square kilometre whereas South Africa has 1219 912 square kilometres of area with a distribution of over 80 persons per square kilometre. Mauritius on the other hand has 634 persons per square kilometre but only occupying an area of 1860 square kilometres (Thornhill et al., 2002:77 and 103). The intergovernmental relations and decentralisation configurations of these countries are indicative of such demographic influences. The above issues and figures provide credence to the fact that the geography and demography of a state dictates its IGR system. The state’s subscribing to regionalisation principles of asymmetry and subsidiarity, neutralises this.

4.5.9 Historical factors

The force of tradition and common political experience will affect the capacity of a state to sustain or overhaul its IGR (Cameron, 2000:4). The political history of a community tends to make its political and governance discourse to default to historical comfort zones. The South African Constitution of 1996 introduced to the South African political landscape, elements of federal government and governance that requires from government functionaries skills of discussion, negotiation, exchange and consensus building. The historical reality, however, provides experience of a centralised state managed by an Afrikaner ethnic bureaucracy that demonstrated over time loyalty to the political ideology of
the day, namely, Apartheid. The inauguration to power of a Black majority government did not neutralise this, since the Black majority know only in practice, the workings of a centralised governing system. The centralist tendencies demonstrated in the office of the current President, Thabo Mbeki, are a further indication of the influence of the British centralised system.

4.6 CONCLUSION

The theoretical co-ordinates presented in this chapter identify IGR as a historical practice of the functionality of government through public officials in the bureaucracy. The statutory use of IGR has fuelled the research impetus into the theory and practice of IGR. The relationship between IGR and federalism lays to rest the federal/unitary political divide often associated with IGR theory in South Africa. However, South Africa has a unitary type of government within a federal growth path as reflected in the political organisation and identities of sub-national jurisdictions, hence it is often referred to as quasi-federal. This chapter has identified, through the various authority relationship models, that IGR is an operating platform for governance and, therefore, ideologically neutral and subject to the computer programming adage of “garbage in-garbage out”, which means that whatever your political system advocates IGR will produce.

The manner in which IGR transcends patterns of government through its human driven form and character as well as reliance on the exchange of information and views to resolve conflicts, removes IGR from the contesting domain into a process facilitation realm. The policy dimension of IGR introduces the reliance on IGR as an operating platform characterised by integrated and interlinked data filled windows on policy pronouncements such as legislation, rules and regulations, standards and guidelines. This
study refers to these as the IGR operating currency. The practice of IGR within the public administration and management discipline requires a link with the normative environment within which the discipline and, therefore, IGR operates. These were identified as supreme political authority, public accountability, public efficiency and effectiveness, legal probity and societal values.

The author has argued that several factors influencing IGR have been identified within the demarcated parameters of the study. Further to this assertion, specific efforts have been made to identify these. These theoretical and conceptual issues introduce this study to the process of IGR reform in South Africa and the associated human functions.

To this end, therefore, it is expedient to investigate the manner and process in which the whole issue of IGR in South Africa continues to unfold. IGR is one of the fastest growing contextual terminologies, with changing constitutional dimensions as it unravels itself for constitutional reform. It is within this context, that the discussion in Chapter Four will need to be observed.