

**THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S
DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD): EMERGING CONDITIONS
IMPACTING ON THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS**

By

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DICTION

Research is always imperfect. It is part of the scientific tradition, and a very valuable part, that we treat any 'truths' we arrive at as provisional, and open to questions. Quality is defined by the internal logic of a piece of research, and by how well it is defended. There is no absolute standard of right and wrong.

(Laws, Harper, and Marcus, 2003)

STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

Save where otherwise observed, this research study is in all respects, the outcome of my independent lateral thought processes and endeavours.

Eyobong O. Efretuei.

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ABSTRACT

At the turn of the new century, ideas were circularly floated, arising from axiomatic concerns for development particularly in the developing nations. The idea that resonated across the continent was that the 21st century would be an African century, in which a homespun development initiative would be utilised as a central development framework. Nepad was derived from the commonality and convergence of these contentions. Its advent has been embraced with mixed feelings across the divides – thereby generating discourses on its viability and uncertainty, given the development imperatives that have pervaded the continent over the years. The allusion may well be that another of its kind will be superseded that will be better organised and equipped. These debates seemingly enjoy currency without necessarily engaging the relevant theoretical models of policy implementation and the implementation analysis principles for NEPAD. This has created a missing link in the analysis of the implementation process. This standpoint has evidently provided stimulus for a critical examination of the implementation process, as the policy goals are inconsistent with the measures to achieve them. There are certain conditions that indicate the scale and magnitude of the challenges facing the implementation process of Nepad. It appears suspect, nebulous and deeply misleading given over-emphasis on ‘substance’ instead of ‘process’. To direct focus on ‘process’ offers the opportunity for holistic framework analysis of the process to probe possible externalities. This study therefore seeks to present a paradigm shift and argues that Nepad should move beyond rhetoric and rather focus more on the implementation process. The aim is to premise that ‘externalities’ that suffuse the process would in the long term gravely threaten the process and cause fragility of Nepad, but if carefully articulated would strengthen the process over the long term and cause modest, but positive dividends. The externalities provide input functions to create greater momentum in bringing the implementation closer to the policy goals of Nepad. In short, an implementation that prepares for the worst to attain the best possible.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA-SAP	African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme
AA-PAM	African Association of Public Administration and Management
ABRD	African Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ADB	African Development Bank
AEC	African Economic Community
AEF	French Equatorial Africa
AMU	Arab Magreb Union
APEC	Asia and Pacific Economic Cooperation
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CEEAC	Economic Commission for Central African States
COMESA	Common Market for East and Southern Africa
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DI	Domestic Investment
DFID	Department For International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EAEC	East African Economic Community
EC	European Community

EEC	European Economic Community
ECGLC	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
EUROATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOREX	Foreign Exchange
GEAR	Growth, Employment and Redistribution
G8	Group of Eight Highly Industrialized Countries
GNP	Gross National Product
HSGIC	Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority for Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IPA	International Peace Academy
IPEP	Implementation Panel of Eminent Persons
IRTs	Issue Resolution Teams
LAFTA	Latin America Free Trade Association
LAIA	Latin American Integration Association
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MAP	Millennium African Renaissance Programme
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals

MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MNOs	Multinational Organizations
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Unity
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NPM	New Public Management
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
OCAM	Organization Commune Africaine et Mauricienne
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Corporation and Development
OST	Open System Theory
PRSPs	Poverty Reduction and Support Programmes
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SRECs	Sun-Regional Economic Communities
TNCs	Transnational Corporations
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCTAD-DTCI	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development- Development Trade and Capital Investment
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UNECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States of America Information Agencies
USSR	Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

Chapter 1

1 General Introduction

The African continent has witnessed many tragic historical peculiarities starting from the advent of colonialism up to the present day. From the attainment of independence in the early 1960s, most African nations inherited colonial political and socioeconomic institutional legacies through which national development processes were pursued. In the post-colonial period, these institutions have been used by the emergent African elite not only to subvert development efforts, but also had become deeply subservient to the external economic shocks, dependent and vulnerable to foreign interferences. Essentially they served the political needs of both the colonial powers and the emergent African elite. As a consequence debates and schisms began to develop on what African development perspectives should be and imply, as the problems of capacity both human and financial erupted. The continent increasingly faced debilitating and severe economic depression, perpetual political crises, social fragmentation and patchy policy environments in almost all facets of life.

Rather than transform the primitive subsistence that has pervaded the continent, proliferation of internecine wars, ethnocentrism, corruption, diseases, poverty, dictatorial authoritarian styles of governance became the norm. In the mid 1980s the continent was entangled in foreign debt. These incidences have essentially become the scourge of the continent as the pattern continued well into the late 1990s. The nature of these incidences created huge capacity constraints resulting in multiple apathies to development on the continent. It became obvious that development policies of the continent had run into paradigmatic crises and rendered attempts at development problematic. As a result of the continued development dilemma and the adoption of patchy policy models, the continent began to face marginalisation and isolation in the emerging global political and economic systems.

At the end of the Cold War, development initiatives increasingly received international attention. In order to not remain passive, homegrown initiatives to foster development began to evolve, given the persistent development difficulties that have immersed the continent. What ultimately emerged from the plethora of indigenous resourcefulness is the Nepad.

Nepad has produced vitally important sector-specific policy goals as action plans set for implementation. The process through which the policy goals are to be achieved is equally critical but has been subsumed in the current debate and in the implementation domain of Nepad. Yet, the defining moment of any public policy is the implementation process. However, it is of note that, no policy implementation process, and for that matter, development policy programme, are without incidents. The implementation processes are constantly afflicted with complexities and sometimes unique unanticipated contingencies. Major impediments to implementation have always been the deliberate neglect and absence of considerations for peculiar contingencies that underlie the processes.

As Nepad enters its implementation phase, it appears dismissive, indifferent, and underestimates the implicit contingencies underlying its implementation process. In other words, consequential variables that create perceived vacuums have been omitted from the agenda. Examination of the implementation process will create a deeper understanding and highlights the peculiar impact factors that underlie the course of implementation. This is not only ascribable to and a signification of the relevance of policy and implementation analyses but also strategic approaches in policy processes. This study brings fresh perspectives in an attempt to fill the gaps.

This study also seeks to undertake comparative analyses of the precursory regional development policy initiatives, especially the European Union's [EU's] implementation configuration, where applicable, as parameters in the implementation process of Nepad. This is informed by the fact that Nepad, a new

African regional development and economic integration policy programme is not only new but has evolved in the character common to other regional development trends. Conjectural and prognostic propositions as well as recommendations based on the object of study are proffered.

1.1 Historical Background of Nepad

Indigenous development initiatives, it could be argued, had irrupted in the continent at the dawn of the new century. The concepts that enjoyed currency the world over, at the time, had been the globalization process, the sustainable development phenomenon, and the UN MDGs, which immediately emerged from the ashes of the bi-polar world. Expectedly, these concepts took centrality in the highly mainstream socio-economic and political discourses in the continent for the new millennium. Circumstances both internal and external, it could be argued, have significantly contributed to the concepts of the indigenous development initiatives in Africa, particularly the Nepad programme. Amongst the numerous internal factors are:

- The concept of African Renaissance re-introduced by Thabo Mbeki, which led to MAP.
- The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa's (UNECA's) Compact Plan.
- The Omega Plan of Abdoulaye Wade.
- The unfolding fissures between the ruled and the rulers in Africa.

Amongst the various external elements are:

- The collapse of the bi-polar world.
- The evolution and the resultant fervency of the globalization process.
- The evolution of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the General Assembly Resolution 55 /2.
- The dwindling fortunes of the donor aid-for-development.

It could be argued that the convergence and complementarities between these factors, old and new, potential and actual, led to the promulgation of patterned indigenous initiatives that emerged on the continent at the time. Accordingly it has been declared that, 'Nepad's origins lie both in past and recent global and regional events' (Bekoe & Landsberg, 2002:5). These concepts were supposedly drawn from the need for common action, shared historical ties, shared conviction of the eradication of poverty, capacity building, and the allure of proactive participation and relevance in the emerging globalisation process.

The United Nations (UN) accorded these phenomena strategic prominence when it convened the MDGs summit at its Headquarters in New York, USA, for all Heads of state and governments in 2000. These concepts resonated pragmatically throughout the continent as the contemporary African leadership took a cue and proclaimed the new millenium an 'African Century' (Fourie, & Vickers, 2003:11). This presupposes that the continent has to seek a homegrown initiative with a partnership characterization as a legitimate aspiration to foster continent-wide development.

The concept of homegrown development initiatives, it could be argued, began in the late 1990s with the speech made by the then Vice-President and now President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. More has argued that, 'Mbeki had made a speech in which he made I am an African declaration in Parliament on 8th May 1996. Before this speech, Mbeki with a considerable personal initiative had come up with a concept of African Renaissance in 1997, in an address at the United States Corporation Council on Africa. Since then the concept of the "African renaissance" has captured the imaginations of South Africa in particular and the African continent in general' (More, 2002:62).

African Renaissance as a factor that contributed to the emergence of Nepad, More argues that, 'Mbeki's doctrine was a clear interpretation of the enduring conditions that afflict the continent, given the political and the socio-economic

exigencies of the era' (More, 2002:61). More also argues that, 'in defense of the libratory [sic] interpretation, an attempt is made to show, contra current views, that this interpretation is not conservative, nativist or essentialist but in line with Aime Cesaire's *Return to the Native Land* and Amilca Cabral's *Return to the Source* projects, it is directed at reconstructing and rehabilitating the African while forging an identity thought to be appropriate to the exigencies of 'modern' existence' (More, 2002:61).

Furthermore, More has posited that, 'the consequences of this not so novel concept, had been several meetings, major conferences, newspaper debates, publications in academic journals, the establishment of a trust fund to encourage the renaissance spirit to flourish and lately, a volume from the conference proceedings with the title: *African Renaissance: The New Struggle* (1999)' (Ibid.: 62). He argues that, Mbeki by this very concept had called for African regeneration' (Ibid.: 62). Similarly, Melber, *et al.* have argued that, 'the concept of "African Renaissance" may have originated to some extent from the philosophical discourses that became dominant in the mid twentieth century on Pan-Africanism, Negritude, Ubuntu, and Black consciousness' (Melber,*et al.*, 2002:6). They maintain that, 'while the concept failed to materialize as a fully fledged and concise new paradigm, it managed to rally policy-makers, bureaucrats, academia, and intellectuals alike behind the not so new but still highly emotional and culturally, psychologically and politically relevant notion of African self-respect, dignity and pride based on previous achievements' (Ibid.:6)

African Renaissance as conceptualized by Mbeki was envisaged, as an attempt to regenerate and reinvigorate dimensions of new consciousness that required deeper conceptualization *vis-à-vis* Africa's developmental needs at the face of globalization. As Melber *et al.* put it, 'the African Renaissance project contributed in ... important way to the revitalization of values considered and appreciated as both genuinely African and human (in the sense of "civilized" as opposed to the derogatory views of "primitive"). It failed (or maybe was never intended) to

establish a political concept and instrumental strategy in applied policy matters, but it managed to consolidate a philosophical foundation' (Melber *et al.*,2002:6).

African Renaissance, Negritude, Ubuntu, Pan-Africanism concepts had found expressions in the African political lexicon as conscious indigenous political ideological philosophies in the struggle for de-colonization and self-determination. They were oriented as challenges to the imposition of the colonial cultural and spiritual value on the African peoples and their communities. To further this view, Nabudere has argued that, 'the concept is a useful tool in the struggle of the African people to redefine a new political and ideological agenda of Pan-Africanism in the age of globalization' (Nabudere, 2001:11).

At this time, the concept was not indiscernible but had found deep meaning in the African continued underdevelopment discourses *vis-à-vis* the modern day determination for the continent's economic emancipation and development. It had thereon assumed a new interpretation and a different paradigm. It acquired fresh focus with a view to Africa's development. It was a vision waiting to happen and perhaps late in coming.

The concept of African Renaissance witnessed a gradual transformation from the political inclinations of the pre-and post-independence era to that which became dominant in the contemporary socio-economic development policy domains on the continent. Its major publicity took an international turn at the World Economic Forum briefing by Mbeki in Davos, Switzerland in June 2001 on the Millennium Africa Renaissance Programme [MAP]. Melber *et al* have posited that 'At the World Economic Forum in Davos, MAP won the support of other African leaders including Obasanjo and Bouteflika of Nigeria and Algeria respectively who in turn became the promoters of the initiative' (Melber *et al.*, 2000:7).

On the MAP agenda presented by Mbeki in Davos, Melber *et al* have averred that, 'the declaration in Davos noted, among other things, that the initiative was a

declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders to take the destiny of Africa in their hands by claiming ownership and responsibility for sustainable economic development of the continent on the principle of reciprocity and equal partnership with the international community' (Melber *et al.*, 2002:7). Olivier affirms that 'Mbeki's doctrine led to the emergence of MAP stating African Renaissance has recently been augmented by a less amorphous MAP, jointly sponsored by South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria and with the input of Senegal and other states' (Olivier, 2001:43).

Another important event that led to the origin of Nepad is the globalization phenomenon, a concept that has universal appeal. It has been viewed as a credible substitute to the ideological grandstanding of the cold war era between the East and the West. It is a concept that has come to deal with the global political, the socioeconomic, and leadership fundamentals. The political context emphasizes democracy, broad participation in decision making processes, and good governance, while the economic context addresses corporate governance, integration of world economy, new market trends, and their global relations across national boundaries and on the social sphere, the spread of efficient information and communication technologies to complement the world economic activities. According to Bayart in his African regional study, 'globalization is a process, which is situated at the interface between international or trans-national relations and the internal processes of political societies' (Bayart, 2000:234).

Globalization according to Alonso, '... represents a new era in the world system, one that is characterized by the dislocation of national economies and nation-states, and their re-composition on the basis of global relations, in accordance with what the market demands' (Alonso, 2001:86). Alonso further argues that, '... positive factors associated with globalization is the emergence of an increasingly widespread awareness of what is involved in good governance of the planet and of the rights upon which international action must rest. The series of international summits promoted by the UN, and the fact that a new more precise definition ...

is beginning to take a firm root, are evidence of this awareness' (Ibid.: 88). Globalization, he argues, 'provides an interesting input into the concept of sustainable development, one of the primary objectives of Nepad, by situating it and good governance, and integrative global economic practices' (Ibid.:110).

Globalization is about change processes for modernization and progress. Nepad provides a goodness of fit for Africa into the global changes that have emerged within the context of globalization. The collapse of the cold war offered a conducive and fertile ground for these changes not only on negotiated political settlements across regions and states but also new paradigms of development. This background underscores the significance of the contribution of the globalization process in a broader context to indigenous development initiative in Africa. In other words, the globalization process, amongst other conditions, provided an appropriate condition to translate the concept of African renaissance into an African vision for development and regional socioeconomic integration.

At the dawn of the new Millennium, the United Nations (UN) organized a summit for all Heads of state and governments of its member states at its Headquarters in New York, USA, in January 2000, to deliberate on the development imperatives of the era. At this meeting the new Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were set for all member nations including those in Africa. This led to the global agreement on several development goals in a declaration entitled the 'UN Millennium Declaration'. The declaration contains the following goals and in terms of the agreement, all 189 United Nations member states had pledged to meet these goals by 2015.

The Goals and Details are:

- Eradication of poverty and hunger,--(Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day; Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger).

- Achievement of universal primary education - (Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling).
- Promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women–(Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015).
- Reduction in child mortality–(Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five).
- Improvement in maternal health–(Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality rate).
- Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases–(Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS; Halt and begin to reverse incidence of malaria and other diseases).
- Ensuring environmental sustainability–(Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes, reverse loss of environmental resources; Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water; Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020).
- Ensuring a global partnership for development–(Develop an open trading and financial systems that is predictable and non-discriminatory. Include a commitment to good governance, development and poverty eradication–nationally and internationally. Address the least developed countries' special needs. This includes tariff and quota free access for their exports, enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction. Address the special needs of landlocked and small islands developing states. Deal comprehensively with developing countries debt problems through national and international measures. In co-operation with the developing countries develop decent and productive work for youth. In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable drugs in developing countries. In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new

technologies-especially information and communication technologies), (UN millennium development goals. *Enterprise*, September, Johannesburg, 2002:42).

To corroborate the argument, Ohiorhenuan has argued that, 'Nepad also consciously locates itself within the global consensus on development encapsulated in the Millennium Development Goals adopted at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2001' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:12).

The end of the cold war occasioned by the end of communism and socialism and the subsequent disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990 signaled the cessation of ideological patronage of the big powers to the satellite states, including countries in Africa. During the cold war period, aid to the Third World countries centered essentially on political patronages, security, ideological propagation and preservation, and to a minimal extent on development. Increasingly, at the collapse of communism and socialism, aid-based ideological support began to dwindle for most of the Developing Nations between the late 1980s and early 1990s.

African states as subordinates, albeit non-aligned pretentious posturing in the international ideological dichotomy became adversely hit within the ensued interplay of states juggling for scarce resource patronages from the rich nations. The situation inevitably offered opportunities for seeking other means and concepts not only for resources but also sustainable development as a lodestar. Consistent with this view, Olivier has argued that, 'the linkage between support and performance presents a new situation to African countries, now deprived of the leverage they could exercise in the Cold War era to get aid in exchange for strategic or ideological support from either side of the Iron Curtain, irrespective of their domestic political practices' (Olivier, 2003:820). Van de Walle has similarly argued that, '...the end of the Cold War has changed foreign policy priorities in the West and weakened the claims of African states for international resources' (Van de Walle, 1999:337).

Closely linked to the end of the Cold War influence and the ideological patronage was the gradual dearth of foreign donor aid-for-development to Africa prior to the year 2000. Van de Walle has argued that, 'by 1995 most African nations excluding South Africa and Nigeria received equivalent of 13.2 per cent aid ... and had enjoyed constituencies for aid from the West and that ... the volume of foreign aid from the West to Africa has been dwindling since 1994' (Van de Walle, 1999:339). Olivier (2003:821) also notes that, '... development aid to Africa has halved between 1989 and 1990 (from US\$24.4 billion to US\$12.2 billion p.a.)'. Similarly, Riddell has argued that, 'what the figure ... not reveals is the marked decline in aid to Africa which has occurred, indeed accelerated in recent years. In the six years after the Berlin wall came down, from 1990 – 1996, official aid disbursement to sub-Sahara Africa fell in real terms by one fifth (21 per cent), contradicting, on average, by 3.5 percent a year ...' (Riddell, 1999:313).

Another event that led to the emergence of African development initiatives could be premised on the domestic incidences of what Kuye (2003) refers to as 'the crisis of developmental state'. At the tail end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century African populace became tired of bad, corrupt, derelict and remissness of governments whose economic policies saw them worse off and perpetuate their plights. To support this theory, Kuye has argued that, 'there had been fallen export volumes and values, squeezed import capacity, and problems of food supply, which together escalated external borrowing, followed by a decline in their credit worthiness' (Kuye,2003:6).

As a result African populace suffer(ed) economic deprivation and increased social insecurity. They had become vocal on both continental and national issues and critical of their governments as their economies suffered depredation. Restiveness remained largely the order of daily affairs while discontent and civil strife thrived leading in most cases to political crises, intricate and fragile political stability. In examining this condition, Olivier has argued that, '... but after

liberation, many African societies have become their own worst enemies as military dictatorship, single party authoritarianism, political instability and economic decay set in' (Olivier, 2001:41).

These incidences created enormous tensions between the ruled and the rulers which raised further questions on over stay in office, total solutions to the political and socioeconomic problems, and consequences and risks of failure to deliver. The resultant consequences of these events equally gave way to support for conception of indigenous development initiatives by the African political leadership to ameliorate and evade internal political and socioeconomic catastrophes. Mattes has argued that, '...beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall, mass protests pushed dozens of sub-Saharan countries toward political reform, introducing multiparty competition and elections' (Mattes, 2004:7).

To further this argument, Olivier reverted to the speech made by Mbeki at Chantilly, USA, in 1997, as the Deputy President. He quoted Mbeki as having said that, '...in order for Africa to reach its goals, the present generation must resist all tyranny, oppose all attempts to deny liberty, to resort to demagoguery, repulse the temptation to describe African life as the ability to live on charity' (Olivier, 2003:817). In another context, he has opined that 'African people are becoming less tolerant of poor leadership, bad economic and political policies, and enduring hardship, deprivation and marginalization' (Olivier, 2001:43). As a result African political leadership risked civil strife and chaos. At the same time, they became aware of the emerging economic and political dynamics occasioned by the globalization process, the UN MDGs, the dwindling aid-for-development, the rising domestic tensions, and the fervency of sustainable development phenomenon.

The emergence of Nepad could also be based on the few precursory socio-economic subtexts on development of the late 1970s and the mid 1980s. 'Amongst them were: Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of

the New International Economic Order in Africa and the Intellectual Foundation for the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1989-2000, both undertaken by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) under Adebayo Adedeji from the late 1970s through to the late 1980s. Another action programme initiated for the development of Africa was the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) again proposed by UNECA' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:10).

According to Ohiorhenuan, (2002:10) '... although essentially acknowledged, Nepad's antecedents go back at least to the mid-seventies with the publication in 1976 of ECA's Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Order in Africa. The Revised Framework proposed the pursuit of an African development agenda based on four principles – self-reliance, self-sustainment, democratization of the development process and equity in the distribution of the fruit of development (Adedeji 2002). This framework provided the intellectual foundation for The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000 (OAU 1981)' (Ibid.:10). Furthermore, he argues that, 'in 1989, against the background of structural adjustment programmes in Africa, the ECA, with the financial support of UNDP, published 'The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio Economic Recovery and Transformation [AA-SAP]' (Ibid.:10).

In the same vein, Turok argues that, 'the initiatives for development in Africa as enumerated by Ohiorhenuan took place under Adebayo Adedeji, the then Chair of ECA, before the concept of globalization became fashionable' (Turok, 2002:122). He affirms that, albeit the principles contain in these programmes became the standard reference work for critics of IMF policies as essentially external interference, they contributed to the formation of regional economic blocs such as Economic Community of West Africa States [ECOWAS] and the East African Community [EAC] of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. These organs

would become the basis of all African unity, a position not far from what obtains today in the context of Nepad and Africa's development' (Ibid.:122).

Another contributory factor to the emergence of Nepad was 'the UNECA's Compact for African Recovery, Operationalizing the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme drawn from a paper presented as a theme of the conference of African Ministers of Finance in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November, 2000' (Melber *et al.* 2002:7). He maintains that, 'the Commission had on that occasion argued that the insecurity of property rights, badly regulated markets, and dwindling Foreign Direct Investment [FDI] prevalent in the continent would persist and stifle economic growth unless acts of governance improve considerably in the continent. South African government at a conference of Ministers of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa held in Algiers, Algeria, between 8 -10 May 2001, proposed an initiative known as 'Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme [MAP]' (Ibid.:7).

The President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, at the same occasion came up with a plan referred to as 'Omega Plan'. 'The principles stated in the Plan were inclusive of the advocacy that Africa could not afford to pretend to the fervency of the globalization process. Africa according to the plan should pool resources together for infrastructure development, human capital development and to be able to attract more foreign resources from the West for development projects in Africa, while the rich Western nations invest treasury bills in African projects'. (Melber *et al.*, 2002:7). The Omega Plan was a latecomer, initiated in the early months of 2001, focusing on regional infrastructures and educational projects. It received strong support from the Africa's francophone bloc.

According to De Waal, 'Nepad emerged from three parallel initiatives launched in 2000-1. The first of these was the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery Programme [MAP], inspired especially by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. It began with a mandate given by the Organization of African Unity [OAU] to Mbeki,

Obasanjo and Bouteflika, to investigate how Africa could overcome its debt crisis. Mbeki was meanwhile promoting his vision of the 'African Renaissance', which encompassed not just economic development, but cultural, social, and political regeneration too. Hence the opening paragraphs of the MAP document – replicated almost word for word in the Nepad document – stress Africa's artistic and cultural heritage' (De Waal, 2002:466).

At the joint conference of Africa's ministers of finance and economic planning in Algiers in May 2001, the decision was made to merge these initiatives into one. This was named the 'New African Initiative' and at the 37th Organization of African Unity [OAU] summit in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001, an implementation committee of 15 heads of state was mandated to manage it (De Waal, 2002: 467). Ohiorhenuan argues that, 'at the Heads of state Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001, the programme was adopted as a regional development policy for the continent and witnessed a name-change to New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad)' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:9). It was widely regarded as the policy framework and a new continental phenomenon for sustainable economic development for Africa'. (Ibid.:9).

The idea of African Renaissance persuaded and rallied academia, researchers, and policy makers in support of the not so a novel and historic concept. African leadership became influenced and attracted by the globalization process and thereon began to seek, first individually and subsequently in collegiate, credible indigenous initiatives and actions towards sustainable development through which solutions to the continued African underdevelopment dilemma could be situated and addressed. African leadership then shifted the concept of external dependency and demonstrated impartial sense of regionalism.

The damning consequences of continued marginalization, exclusion from the emerging internationalization of the political and economic systems, the urgent need to collectively reverse Africa's development imperatives primarily through

supranational arrangements for a common future and aspirations, and the internal unmitigated catastrophes proved to be the preoccupation of the contemporary African leadership. All the main strands of under-development, primarily the issues of poverty, political decay, social insecurity, economic depression, debt overhang, coupled with the idea of building a stable, progressive, and modernized continent on the one hand and the UN MDGs, the absence of bi-polar world, and the globalization process gave the contemporary African leadership the best possible launch pads to initiate indigenous development concepts and to re-engage the rich North on a newly audacious but voluntaristic partnership for a widespread continental development.

The African project for the new century claims to have been inspired by the all-enduring development imperatives on the continent. It came with a variety of constituent elements supposedly dedicated to the pursuit of the ravages of the continent and to make progress upon them. Shortly after its inauguration, Nepad came to acquire a higher profile as the Group of Industrialized Nations [G8], Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], the UN, and the European Union [EU] largely endorsed the programme. They saw in it, a new and uniquely genuine effort, and a regenerative commitment of the contemporary African leadership to address Africa's development problems. Nepad took its foundation from several degenerative development imperatives that have pervaded the continent since independence. It is a countervailing concept. These occurrences made the concept of indigenous development initiatives inevitably attractive and realistic propositions in the belief that they would eventually become the mainstream development policy programmes for the continent. The cluster of these events, it could be argued, became the conjunction and the critical points of departure ahead of the eventual adoption of Nepad.

1.2 Rationale and Aims of Nepad

Nepad is a response to the contemporary events occasioned by the globalization process, the sustainable development phenomenon and the UN's MDGs. Both the rationale and the aim have taken a firm root from the development imperatives of the continent. The rationale and the aim of Nepad could be categorized into a trinity of reform stages – marginalization, globalization, and economic integration, spurred by strategic developmental needs of the continent anchored on an international partnership for development.

The rationale, among other things, is concerned with seeking relevance and proactive participation in the globalization process through vigorous pursuit of the development policies for the continent. Fourie and Vickers have tried to relativize the rationale, stating that, 'since globalization is the contending ideology and operative environment for engaging in relations amongst groups and states, African countries have had very little option but to align their domestic and foreign policies towards achieving their national objectives within the environment' (Fourie & Vickers, 2003). Chansinga maintains that, 'the rationale is that developing countries, acting individually, cannot survive the vicious forces of globalization and access the attendant benefits and minimize its costs' (Chinsinga, 2001:65).

In addition, one of the aims of Nepad is to strengthen regional economic integration on the continent. 'This means effective co-operation, coordination, liaison, and streamlining of policy frameworks of the existing sub-regional Economic Communities as well as domestic economic policies on the continent. In emphasizing this aim, the Head of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) reiterates that one of the goals of Nepad is the promotion of regional integration. They, therefore, called on the Regional Economic Communities [RECs] as the building blocks, to speed up the implementation of

their integration programmes' (HSGIC Communique, Abuja, March 2002: item 21).

African development concept as reflected by Mbeki's African renaissance, as argued by Oguntande, '...was a response to the regional trading blocs that were being formed as a logical response to the requirements of globalization' (Oguntande, 2003:21). Similarly, Schoeman has explained that, 'economic globalization and particularly its underlying ideology of the free market as the solution to underdevelopment and poverty and poverty alleviation, forms the rationale for the region's choice ... as strategies for accelerated economic growth and development' (Schoeman, 2001:62).

Other rationales of Nepad include, 'sustainable development and economic growth of the continent. This rests with the aim that the member states get better and overcome the problem of underdevelopment and enhance their capacities. It could also be translated in a broader perspective to mean the promotion of good governance and economic regeneration by creating the preconditions conducive for foreign direct investment, a vital channel to procure resources for development. It aims at building a pan-continental emancipatory ideology and consensus for Africans' (Fourie & Vickers, 2003:16). Chabal has argued that 'The premise on which Nepad is built is that the moves made in the direction of democracy are such as to provide the political framework within which better government and greater economic sagacity will combine to make development possible' (Chabal, 2002:454).

The issue of the debt overhang remains first among the critical conditions for which Nepad was initiated. Accordingly, 'this was with the aim to act and speak with a common voice to carry effect. This was also to create greater opportunity to facilitate negotiations not only with the creditor nations but also the international trade on equal trading terms, granting of increasing access to African produce' (Olivier, 2001).

1. 3 Objectives of Nepad

The evolution of Nepad could hardly have been possible without a vision and object of what the programme is set out to achieve *vis-à-vis* the realities of the development constraints in the continent. The question, which then arises, is of what relevance is the programme to the continent? The emergence of the concept has largely brought into sharp focus the development imperatives of Africa and the attempt to attend meaningfully to them. 'The strategic goal of the project is to provide for sustainable development in the region by playing a central role in overcoming regional barriers and creating favourable conditions for the penetration of advanced technologies to facilitate efficient use of the local natural resources (depletable and renewable)' (Kuye, 2003:11).

The principal objectives of Nepad are many folds. Nepad's objectives essentially include:

- To eradicate poverty.
- To place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path to sustainable development.
- To halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process and enhance the integration of its economies into the global economy.
- To accelerate the empowerment of women.

Nepad's objectives, among other things, include the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world and would be defined by the framework of interaction set by the people's homegrown agenda of their own volition in order to be able to exercise control of their destiny as perceived by them. In an effort to actualize the African project and translate the vision from ideal to reality, the following objectives have been drawn up:

- To strengthen the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution and ensure that they are used to restore and maintain peace.

- Promote and protect democracy and Human Rights by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participative governance.
- Restore and maintain macro economic stability by developing standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies and appropriate institutional frameworks.
- Institute transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and auditing of private companies and the public sector.
- Revitalize and extend the provision of education, technical training and health services (with priority to HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases).
- Promote the role of women in social and economic development in Africa.
- Build the capacity of the states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework and maintain law and order.
- Promote the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification (Melber *et al.*, 2002:7-8).

Ohiorhenuan (2002) has conceptualized the objectives of Nepad as:

- Economic growth
- Poverty alleviation,
- Regional trade,
- Environmental protection.

The overriding objectives of Nepad to drive the development processes in Africa could characteristically be described as, Peace and Security; Democracy and Political Governance; and Economic and Corporate Initiatives. The Nepad Vision and Policy Framework fill a vacuum that Africans have been grappling with since the 1970s—a socio-economic development vision to complement the plurality of the African political landscape and vision.

Having postulated the above objectives, the policy attributes and criteria specifics for execution require some patterned framework for action. It is obvious that institutional mechanisms will be necessary not only to carry out the attainment of

the policy objectives but also to accord credibility, draw legal basis for recognition to solicit and ensure the flow of global resources – funding and political good will, from the would be international partners and donor nations.

1. 4 Institutional Mechanisms of Nepad

The institutionalization of mechanisms, to a large extent, not only require a precise action aimed at the attainment of policy objectives but also a more pragmatic way to discern the prospects of the implementation process and to deal ultimately with any resultant problems. The institutional mechanisms perhaps serve the most innovative and critical measures to further the implementation efforts of Nepad. To allude to this view, Chinsinga has stated that, ‘the point is that the institutional framework governing these regional integration initiatives must at the very least be in tune with the intricate policy demands of globalization and economic liberalization’ (Chinsinga, 2001:61). Picard, Liviga, and Garrity (1994) have argued that, ‘institutional development and capacity building need to be considered within the larger context of developing sustainable policies. ...there is an overwhelming need to more effectively balance policy content consideration with institutional development and implementation considerations’.

For Nepad to run the course of its African project, four main organs have been established within its framework. They are to effectively begin the process of working towards the attainment of the set policy goals of Nepad. These institutional mechanisms include:

- The Assembly of the African Union.
- Nepad Heads of state and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC).
- Nepad Steering Committee.
- Nepad Secretariat at Midrand, South Africa.

(Source: Nepad by Structure, 2004).

A fresh organ that has been added among the institutional implementation mechanisms is the APRM initiative with a Secretariat. The APRM comprised of organs as – the Committee of Participating Heads of State and Government (APR Forum), the Panel of Eminent Persons (APR Panel), and the APR Secretariat and the Country Review Teams (APR Teams), (The Dialogue, the Monthly Journal of Nepad, 2003:4). It is equally important to state that these mechanisms are in hierarchical order of importance. The top ranked mechanism is the Assembly of the African Union, which is at the highest levels of government of the African Union member states. This body is charged yet with clearly prescribed functions for the implementation process of Nepad.

According to the Nepad document of October 2001, (item 200), the HSGIC is composed of the five originator Heads of State of Nepad (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) and ten others; two from each sub-region will be appointed for the implementation. The functions of the Implementation Committee will be:

- Identifying strategic issues that need to be researched planned and managed at the continental level.
- Setting up mechanisms for reviewing progress in the achievement of mutually agreed targets and compliance with mutually agreed standards.
- Review progress in the implementation of past decisions and taking appropriate steps to address problems and delays. (item 201 of Nepad document, 2001).

The role of HSGIC in addition to its mandate and responsibilities, the Committee shall be:

- Appoint members of the IPEP and its chairperson.
- Consider, adopt and take ownership of peer review reports submitted by the IPEP.
- Exercise peer pressure to effect changes in country practice where recommended.

- Influence development partners to support the recommendations contained in peer review reports by providing suggested technical and other assistance.
- Transmit peer review reports to the appropriate AU structures in a timely manner.
- Make public, through the Nepad/APRM Secretariat, peer review reports and press releases pertaining thereto.

(Hope, 2002:22).

In a broader context, these mean that the HSGIC is being charged with comprehensive evaluation and monitoring of the implementation process of the policy goals of Nepad. It does not have a permanent Secretariat and is expected to rotate its summit meetings. This has the sole aim of according credibility and legitimacy for soliciting funding and international political goodwill for the programme.

Given the high level of membership of the body, the functions of HSGIC could broadly be divided into two main dimensions. The first is the external relations dimension. It could be argued that the external relations dimension is concerned with development diplomacy essentially to solicit political support and good will from the would-be partners, donor nations, and international organizations. It includes the promotion of the programme with the necessary political symbolism, marketing of the programme to the outside world, and the critical credibility, which the programme requires at its infancy. The second dimension of its activity focuses on the internal African environment (item 201, Nepad document, October 2001) particularly the APRM initiative. Its activity also includes convening of Summits to deliberate on the progression, modification, monitoring, and evaluation of the various phases of the implementation process of Nepad.

The Steering Committee follows the HSGIC. Its membership includes the five founder nations and other sub-regionally zoned members. The functions of the

body cannot easily be gleaned but appear to assume surrogated functions of the HSGIC. The sole functions of this body may rest on the principle of collective action as necessarily complimentary to HSGIC. It appears that when it does have statutory responsibility, they may be subordinated to those of the HSGIC.

The Nepad Secretariat in Midrand, South Africa serves as the institutional administrative Headquarters. It is the operational wing that deals with the day-to-day activities concerned with Nepad. It takes charge of coordination, organization, and the management of the policy programme. It assists in initiation of policy and policy recommendations for the higher implementation bodies.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an adjunct Secretariat to the main Nepad Secretariat in Midrand, South Africa. It has been set up and charged with the responsibility to undertake the complex task of systematic examination and assessment of the internal policies and performance of the member states that would voluntarily submit themselves for the exercise. 'Its functions are with the view to countervail poor and adversarial policies to good governance, respect for human rights, socio-economic policies, tenets of democracy, and broader participation in decision-making process as best practices. This is with a view turn to attract FDI and at the same time to increasingly encourage local investment as well as capital flight back into the continent. The functions of the mechanism include drafting of the accession document which is a legal instrument binding on participating states upon accession' (The Dialogue, The Monthly Journal of Nepad, 2003:4).

1.13 Concluding Reflections

This chapter has highlighted the character and the focus of the study and the historical evolution of Nepad by exploring the incidences that culminated in its emergence. The rationale, aims, objectives, purpose, and the need for this study have been placed in context. This chapter has tended to cast the *raison d'être* for the object of study revealing the context of the various indigenous development initiatives that enjoyed prominence in pre-and post-millennium Africa.

The conflicting development policies that have driven a wedge between developments on the continent remain pertinent to Nepad. The background of this study is informed by several retrospective conditions that lent to the failure of precursory development initiatives on the continent as instructive and seek to spotlight emerging conditions that impact on the implementation process of Nepad with a view to strengthen the prospect of Nepad. It is possible to discern the coherent cycles of events, which underpins the new millennium development arrangements particularly to Africa, as the spontaneous outcome for the new logic for development. Nepad could best be described as an attempt in making the past useful for a pluralistic present and future.

Chapter 2

Research methodology

2 Introduction

In the Human Sciences, researches are conducted typically to study problems, ascertain validity, create new knowledge that has relevance and ultimately impact the lives of people and their societies in the short and long term. Indeed, social scientists are drawn to the study of a particular social phenomenon for their social implications as well as scientific significance. The nature, context, and the scope of a research problem and concept as object of study and the motivation to undertake such studies are inextricably value-laden in research studies. Research methodology, according to Neuman, 'is what makes social science scientific' (Neuman, 2000:63).

Methodology of social research is a procedure employed in research studies to arrive at critical valid findings for such studies. Methodology for social research refers to the adaptation of research procedures and techniques to track the object of study for valid knowledge.

Scientific research consists of specific elements:

- Curiosity to know about the unknown.
- The search for data to explain the unknown.
- Satisfying the curiosity: finding an answer pertaining to the unknown.
- Determining the truth of the answer.
- The practical use of the answer.

(Botes, 1995:2), quoted in Brynard & Hanekom (1997:2).

It could also be argued that it involves the practical use of knowledge power to engage the methodological procedure that proves relevant to the object of study. Methodology therefore presupposes what orderly method of procedure is being utilized to gather, collect, and receive data and information relevant to the object of study. This approach lends such studies a scientific dimension. Leedy and Ormrod have postulated that, 'research methodology is used to extract meaning from the data collected' (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001:100).

Methodological procedure is a critical element in every research project. It entails reading critically and assessing evidence and available data constructively in order to be able to relate the substance to observation of the variable under research. Goldenberg has argued that, 'it is the role of methodology to provide ... a set of guidelines or procedures or conventions that will allow ... to satisfactorily address the criticisms of the skeptic and force him or her to acknowledge, however grudgingly that he or she can think of no reason not to credit ... claim' (Goldenberg, 1992:18–19). Hendrick *et al* (1993) maintains that, 'methodology is simply a possible data collection approach to research study. It deals with data collection issues, sources of data available, the form in which the data are available and whether the data fit the parameters of the research design'.

According to Brynard and Hanekom (1997:28), 'research methodology, or methods of collecting data, necessitates a reflection on the planning, structuring and execution of the research in order to comply with the demands of truth, objectivity and validity. Hence, research methodology focuses on the process of research and the decisions, which the researcher has to take to execute the research project'. Methodology for research is a process model adopted to collect data and or information relevant to the research problem or question, that is, the adoption of research procedures and techniques to track the object of study for new and valid knowledge.

2. 1 Dimensions of Research

There are several types of research but the emphasis is usually placed on the object of study or the research problem, which determines what research method or procedure is to be deployed in conducting research investigations. Bless & Higson-Smith (1995) have categorised social research into the following groups:

- Exploratory
- Descriptive
- Correlational
- Explanatory

According to Bless and Hugson-Smith, 'the characteristics of the problem, the initial level of knowledge, the properties of the variables, as well as the purpose of the investigation, will determine whether the research is descriptive, correlational or explanatory' (Bless & Hugson-Smith, 1995:41). To be able to search for an explanation related to modes and characteristics of the object of study a collection of certain kind background information must be made. In such a case the type of research will be exploratory, which is a particular type of "descriptive study". (Ibid.:41).

In other cases, they argue that 'enough background knowledge is available to permit a fairly precise area of investigation. When a researcher is able to state a hypothesis, expressing the relationship between at least two variables, the result obtained will provide more than just a description of reality. In some cases the relationship between variables cannot be determined precisely, therefore it is expected that co-variation takes place. In other words, the researcher wishes to show that two variables change simultaneously, either in the same or opposite directions. This is called "correlational research". It does not give an explanation about why one variable varies when another also does'. (Ibid.:41). On the contrary, as soon as the cause-effect relationship between variables can be stated, an explanation can be found for the variation of at least one variable,

namely the dependent one. When an explanation is sought for the relationship between variables, one is dealing with “explanatory research”. (Ibid.:42).

By using an explanatory research method more new knowledge is acquired than using, either, correlational or descriptive studies. But, it should be made clear that the choice of the type of research, whether descriptive, correlational or explanatory, cannot be arbitrary. It depends on the following: the object of research; the aims of the research and the nature of the data to be collected. (Ibid.:42).

The two authors explain that these types of research are not free from differences, strengths, and weaknesses and their inherent approaches in the conduct of research studies, given their respective objects and focus. They argue that, ‘exploratory and descriptive researches differ in many respects. They have different aims, arise from different levels of understanding of the area of interest and require different degrees of precision in the data. Both, however, rely on particular forms of data collection’. (Ibid.:43). Neuman (2000:20-23) has also differentiated research into “exploration”, “description”, “correlational”, and “explanation”.

Researches pursue purely the intellectual point of view, which aims in assisting in resolutions of empirical problems. Social researches are focused on the creation of new knowledge from social realities, to deepen understanding, and not just about the study of old ideas and concepts.

2.1. 1 The Use of Research

Neuman has argued that, social research has two fundamental usages. ‘... some focus on using research to advance general knowledge, whereas others use it to solve specific problems. Those who seek an understanding of the fundamental nature of social reality are engaged in basic research (also called academic

research or pure research). Applied researchers, by contrast, primarily want to apply and tailor knowledge to address a specific practical issue. They want to answer a policy question or solve a pressing social problem' (Neuman, 2000:23).

For this study applied research is relevant. The object of study focuses on Nepad as a development policy and specifically targeting the contingencies that inherently constitute implementation complexities. The aim is to apply scientific knowledge to address the particular problems that will ultimately enhance the process of implementation of the policy goals of Nepad.

2.2 Types of Research Approaches

There are two basic kinds of research approaches or methods employed during social scientific research activities. They share fundamental principles of science and vary significantly in context from one object of study to the other. But the principles of adopting any type of research methods remain the same, that is, the creation of new and valid knowledge.

Methodological preferences have relevance in the manner through which investigations are carried out in real life occurrence. They differ in specific fields of academic endeavours, that is, each academic discipline or subject engages which methodological procedure that is useful and valid for application in the particular subject field under investigation.

The major task of engaging any type of methods in research projects is to find answer to a research question or research problem. Hendrick *et al* (1993:68), have argued that, 'in considering data collection approaches, the researcher is seeking to find an economical but accurate way to obtain data to fit the conceptual framework underlying the study'. Selecting a method or communality of methods is informed by the kind of information that is being sought, from

whom, from what source, under what circumstances, and the specific type of research problem which it aims to generate certain contributions.

The preferences for one research method over another are entirely dependent on the concept, context, type of research, and the object of study. Lindegger has written that, ‘... research involves the full spectrum of quantitative research methods (especially survey methods, correlational, experimental, and quasi-experimental designs), as well as a broad range of qualitative methods and designs’ (Lindegger, 1999:291).

There are two types of research methodologies - *qualitative* and *quantitative*. Methodological approaches adopted for research projects could either be quantitative or qualitative or a communality of both depending on the characterization of the research problem and the type of contribution the research hopes to bring to the fore. Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses, which are merely passive in the context of the study. The qualitative method of research is the type of process or procedure that is not based on numerical analysis but analytical; while quantitative method deals largely with numerical data gathering, analysis, and the interpretation of the data in a numerical context.

Qualitative method uses ‘observation and interview as process methods to collect the relevant information some of which may be relevant and some may be irrelevant. It also uses primary and secondary information techniques. It denotes analysis of any written material that contains information about the phenomenon being researched’ (Strydom & Delpont, 2002:21). Brynard and Hanekom have in pursuant of the argument on typologies of research methods or approaches explained that, ‘in human sciences two basic methodological research methods or methodologies can be distinguished: qualitative and quantitative methodology or methodological models’ (Brynard & Hanekom, 1997:29).

Research methods have also been distinguished by Leedy and Ormrod (2001) into two main areas – ‘*qualitative* and *quantitative* approaches. The quantitative research method is used to answer questions about relationships among measured variables with the purpose of explaining, predicting, and controlling phenomena. It is sometimes called the traditional, experimental, or positivist approach’ (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001:101).

Conversely, qualitative research is typically used to answer questions about the complex nature of phenomena, often with the purpose of describing and understanding the phenomena from the participants’ point of view. This approach is sometimes referred to as the interpretive, constructivist, or post positivist approach (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001:101). Both approaches involve similar processes (for example, formation of one or more hypothesis, review of the relevant literature, collection and analysis of data). Yet these processes are often combined and carried out in different ways, leading to distinctly different research methods (Ibid.:102).

Similarly, Neuman has explained that, ‘quantitative researchers describe the technical research procedures they use (for example, a systematic random sample of 300 drawn from a telephone directory; Likert Scaling). The procedures are shared explicit methods. Qualitative approach relies on the informal wisdom that has developed from the experiences of the researchers’ (Neuman, 2000:123).

Accordingly, Neuman has argued that, ‘quantitative method of research has certain characteristics such as – measure objective facts; focus on variables; reliability is key; value free; independent of context; many cases’ subjects; statistical analysis; and research is detached. At the same time qualitative method construct social reality, cultural meaning; focus on interactive processes, event; authenticity is key; values are present and explicit; situationally constrained; few cases’ subjects; thematic analysis; researcher is involved. He

argues that 'just as there are differences they are equally complementary'. (Ibid.: 124).

The applicability and usage of the two research procedures in data collection in social research studies have run into teleological and paradigmatic arguments. Purists from both sides of the divide have placed restrictive and limited measures with regard to the suitability of when qualitative and quantitative methods can be applied. De Vos (1990:169–170) has presented the arguments from the both sides. For instance, he has explained that, Mouton and Marais,(1990:169-170), 'support complementarity and convergence of the two by arguing that the phenomenon that is investigated in social science are so enmeshed that a single approach most certainly cannot succeed in encompassing human beings in their full complexity. It would therefore be futile to behave as though one approach should be fully accepted and another entirely rejected. By adopting the point of view of convergence and complementarity we may eventually be in a position to understand more about human nature and social reality' (De Vos, 2002:364), quoted in De Vos (ed); Strydom, *et al.*(2002).

Posavac and Corey (1989:242) also argue that, 'although purists from both camps would object, the best approach is to mix qualitative and quantitative research methods'. De Vos, in the context of the argument, has explained that, 'Mouton and Marais have not proved beyond rhetoric in their espouse as they have failed to substantiate the empirical paradigms. He argues that qualitative methodology is based on the assumption that valid understanding can be gained at first hand by a single researcher. ... the assumptions and methods of qualitative research lead to products (*inter alia*, research reports) that differ markedly from the products of quantitative research' (De Vos, 2002:364).

Authors such as Crosswell (1994:7-8), Rubin & Babbie (1993:357-403), Grinnel (1994a:53–78) have maintained that 'researchers should use clearly distinctive approach or single research approach for the overall design study', quoted in De

Vos (2002:364). Given both sides of the argument on the apt applicability of either of the two methods or even a single approach, this study argues that in compelling circumstances, say for instance, a multivariate analysis in research studies, commonality of the two approaches could prove indispensably useful. This is because in some research instances it is when data collection has been conducted that the main focus of the study begins to shape up. Social Sciences research subjects with accompanying influencing factors bear some dynamics i.e. they do not remain constant. If anything, they are not absolute neither could they be comprehensively controlled, that is to say events are relational with implicit dynamics of society and so are the foci and purposes.

2. 3 Methodology for the Study

Social researches are conducted for a variety of reasons. 'Some want to do it to change society; some want to answer practical questions while some want to make informed decisions. Those in the scientific community seek to build basic knowledge about society'. (Neuman, 2000:18).

Hendrick *et al* (1993) have argued that, several questions arise at the start of considering data collection approaches (research methodology), such as:

- What are the likely sources of the data?
- In what form are the data?
- Will there be a sufficient amount of data?
- How accurate and reliable are the data?
- How well do the data fit the potential study?

(Hendrick *et al.*,1993:68).

Research methods and techniques are chosen on the basis of the formulation of the questions or research problem that most directly serve the needs of the object of study. In conducting this research and given the conceptualization and the contextualization of the object of study, the qualitative approach has been

utilized. 'Qualitative method used in collection of data is always straightforward. It has the quality of undeniability, which lends verisimilitude to reports' (Smith, 1975), quoted in Robson, (1993:370).

The relevant materials for this study are obtained through purely published works. The techniques through which data have been collected are primary and secondary techniques of qualitative research methodology. What informed the choice of the typology of research methodology is the fact that the data are in relevance to the research problem. They already exist in structured forms - documents, books, journals, news magazines, monographs and stored database materials that are useful for research purposes. There are therefore ample opportunities for flexibility and maneuvering in the collection of data. The choice of selection of information materials is not restrictive, but confining.

2. 3.1 Primary and Secondary Sources

Within the context of methodology for social science research study, there are typologies of methods on offer. According to Strydom and Deport authors such as 'Baily, (1994:294), Baker (1988:270), Cilliers (1973:40), Mouton et al (1987:21-22) and Neuman (2000:395) classify qualitative method source into primary and secondary sources', Strydom and Delpport, (2002:322) quoted in De Vos, *et al.* (2000:322).

These methodologists have explained that, 'primary sources are seen as the original written materials of the author's experiences and observations, while secondary sources consist of the material that are derived from someone else as the original source'. (Ibid.:323). This corroborates the views expressed by Bless and Hugson-Smith, that if a researcher collects his/her own data for study it is known as a 'primary' source. Should they use data collected by other researchers concerning other research problems, such data is referred to as a Secondary source, quoted in Ijeoma, (2002:9), unpublished Ph.D thesis.

The methodology used for this study is the qualitative research method, with primary and secondary techniques. The primary sources are from direct personal knowledge gained from my career background, experience, and observation of the activities and trends of events surrounding Nepad since its inception; and the relational paradigms of international trends in regional development policy programmes and initiatives that have been institutionalized. African studies relevant to African development are intellectually fascinating and therefore events and scholarships on Africa's development have been closely monitored over the years. The effort is in itself a primary source of data for this study.

The secondary sources are the relevant textbooks, journal articles, web based sources, official Nepad documents, published reports, newspapers, news magazines, articles and monographs. In addition, to instill confidence, objectivity, coherence and enhance the study, unstructured interviews were held with selected officials at Nepad Secretariat and other top officials of allied institutions, with the depth of experience and breadth of knowledge not only on Nepad but also in public policy and policy implementation. This implies a one-on-one dialogue situation to obtain detailed responses that are not pre-determined and structured.

The primary reason why this study utilizes primary and secondary techniques of the methodological procedure is that the phenomenon of Nepad has become the new object of various perceptions, studies, and interpretations, which are unquantifiable numerically. Nepad means different things to different people of different orientations and persuasions. A lot has been written and debates are ongoing. The information sought in the research process has a primary and secondary relevance derivable from literature sources. This study is concerned particularly with targeting some emerging conditions *vis-à-vis* the implementation process.

The contextualization of this study also permits the usage of primary and secondary techniques of literature investigations. It gives ample focus on the extent of independent initiative in relation to the activities of Nepad and its overarching objectives. It offers an apt measure to probe further into the action plans of Nepad *vis-à-vis* its implementation process. It affords a more valid method for data collection and analyses to demarcate the truth-value of the study; to obtain relevant background knowledge and offers empirical verification of facts. Ehlers has aptly described it as ‘a content validity approach ... to qualify the degree of commonality of discernible sagacity regarding the appropriateness and validity of certain information, data, procedures, models, and format for the sake of generalization’ Ehlers, (2002:21), unpublished Ph.D thesis.

Welman and Kruger (2001) have explained that, ‘secondary data are used for three research purposes. First, is that they fill the specific reference on some point. They may be used to seek a reference benchmark against which to test other findings. Second, the use of secondary data is as an integral part of the larger research study. Research procedures typically call for some early exploration to learn if the past can contribute to the present study. In essence, the researcher tries to keep from reinventing the wheel’ (Welman & Kruger, 2001:240-241). Data from secondary sources help decide what further research needs to be done and can be a rich source of hypotheses. Lastly, secondary data may be used as the sole basis for a research study. Retrospective research often requires the use of past-published data. In many research situations, one cannot conduct primary research because of physical, legal, or cost limitations. (Ibid.:240).

2. 4 The Purpose of the Study

Nepad has been conceptualized as a programme through which the political (good governance) and the socioeconomic (equal trading conditions, debt cancellation, foreign direct investment, annual economic growth rate of seven percent, eradication of poverty and endemic diseases, develop human capital capacity, build and maintain infrastructure) development of the continent are to be addressed. Nepad has widely been described as the modern touchstone for Africa's development. It has generated considerable debate not only as a concept, but as a genuine African development template and an interventionist approach, given its operational capacities.

Various studies have been conducted on the concept, most of which offer differing views, opinions, and emphases. This study has viewed them as limited analyses, especially on empirical evaluation of the implementation process that sufficiently target the implicit impact factors that underlie the process. This view is aptly captured by the apprehension expressed by Rupiah, amongst others, as he recaps that, 'the complexity of Nepad and the challenges of translating implementation into regional projects has created mixed feelings on its prospects' (Rupiah, 2002:5).

Some arguments have been presented that Nepad be accepted with measured optimism for several reasons, among which are:

- That the policy programme will in time diminish following the way of pre-existing regional development policies in Africa.
- Absence of political will among African leaders to exercise meaningful commitment.
- Inadequate resources.
- Institutional incapacity.
- The patchy policy environment of the continent and

- Political crises, the pervasive feature in the African polity. (source: compile by the author).

From the literature investigations conducted, there are both intellectual and simplistic paradigmatic arguments. Nepad has been perceived as a non-viable programme without prospects to meaningfully and significantly address the African development imperatives. In other words, it is hugely constrained for marginal success and therefore foreboding. It has been branded a kneepad and its interlocutors suffer crisis of confidence and thus needed to solicit funding from the G8 for implementation. The implementation process of Nepad needs to be based on pragmatism devoid of political dogma and symbolism.

The issue here is not the moral desirability of Nepad, but rather, it is a systematic analysis of the implementation process to identify probable contingencies in order to determine their limitation effects and prospects for the implementation process in a long term, given the palpable substance-process dichotomy. In light of the policy goals of Nepad, this requires a broader analysis through research to establish and construct criteria variables for a virtual implementation process as an attempt to bridge the missing link.

Similarly, most of the debate has left out some critical theoretical frameworks of policy implementation in pursuit of their arguments. They have paid less attention to a systematic study to critically scrutinize the process, which remains fundamental to the actualization of the policy goals of Nepad. The focus of this study, therefore, anchors on the following conceptualizations:

- Comparative analyses drawn from the trends of regional development initiatives around five regions of the world.
- Nepad is a regional public policy programme, an institutional framework and a long-term development catalyst.
- To relate policy implementation analysis and implementation theoretical frameworks from the orthodox application on national, institutional, and

organizational environments to a higher policy realm of a supranational policy programme, particularly regional development policy scale of reference.

- To offer critical analysis of the impact factors conjecturally with propositions that are critically fundamental as the multiple gravitating forces towards viable implementation of the Nepad's policy objectives to arrive at the substance of the policy goals.

Others include:

- To recommend that the articulation and integration of the impact factors in time may invigorate the process.
- To provide a window for further academic inquiry into the Nepad initiative.

However, this study is not intended as a critique of the implementation process of Nepad. It is rather a study that seeks a greater catholic approach to the implementation process. This is a choice dictated by the requirements of the unique adaptation of policy implementation analysis to a higher policy realm so as to yield positive outcome. In other words, the purpose of this study is to engage the policy implementation analysis principles and to holistically examine the implementation process of Nepad with a view to prognosticate implicit factors to stem exogenous shocks with disruptive tendencies on the one hand, and to explore the nature of the relationship between the impact factors and the process in order not to strengthen the implementation process to attain sustainably the objectives of Nepad on the other. At this stage, policy implementation riddles need to be overcome in order for Nepad to grow in strength and scope so as to be able to meet the challenges *vis-a-vis* Africa's development imperatives in the new millennium.

2.5 Objectives of the Study

How Nepad envisages the means to the attainment of its policy goals yet remains illusory. Most of the concerned and interested parties remain essentially unenlightened. Can Nepad do better than the previous development initiatives? The answer would be a qualified yes, only if the operators seek sweeping anticipation, forecasting, articulation, and integration of the impact factors with disruptive tendencies and if they adopt 'targeting methodological approach' (Kuye, 2003:2) for implementation. In order words, it should seek spatial linkages with the emerging conditions for implementation.

The objectives of this study are therefore as follows:

- To stimulate and generate a deeper understanding of the essence of Nepad for Africa's development.
- To seek a proactive implementation approach rather than a response-focused or reactive implementation approach to Nepad.
- To seek to premise the weaknesses in the conceptualization of the current implementation process approach.
- To offer prognostic proposals as recommendations to strengthen the implementation process.
- To establish adaptability of implementation analysis to a regional development programme in Africa.
- To enrich scholarship in policy implementation analysis in perceiving cause to effect in public policy domain, particularly in the gradation of Nepad's implementation process.

The study deals with the broad issues of Nepad, such as Africa's development, regional economic integration, partnership, and the general perception of Nepad both within and beyond Africa but not exclusive of the implementation process. The overriding objective is to analyze the implementation process and to identify possible impact factors that are likely to exert negatively greater pressure on implementation process of Nepad in the short, medium, and long terms.

2. 6 Problem Statement of the Study

It has been argued that there is nothing new in Nepad and that it is a rebound or a replication of the episodic pre-existing development programmes adopted to address the enduring development imperatives on the continent. In light of the development dilemma of the continent, Nepad was inaugurated as a central organizing template within which the imperatives of Africa's development and renewal would broadly be streamlined and addressed towards sustainable development. It is also a countervailing concept to the failed initiatives. Nepad's policy goals and its *modus operandi* have roundly been perceived as rather ambitious and unwieldy whose implementation is suspect. Presently the action plan of Nepad is seemingly running far afield with a fore-taste of impact factors. This is contingent upon the dynamics of implicit variables that underlie the Nepad programme.

The high point of any policy inclusive of Nepad, is the implementation process. The guide to derive the positive impact of Nepad is through an effective and efficient implementation process. This is dependent on the systematic analysis of the implementation process, which has received marginal or no analysis. Given this context, the implementation process of Nepad has been placed under a spotlight by this study.

Consequently, the challenges that have arisen in the pursuit of the attainment of the development tasks continent-wide are essentially fundamental but not insurmountable. To do one thing and leave out the other in the context of Nepad is apparently inviting limited success at best and at worse a failure. Thus far, how the implementation process would be conducted remains essentially less defined, ambiguous, and even complex, which opens doors to mix analyses and interpretations. These themes have laid significant background inputs and context for this research study. However, the implementation process and the

implementation complexities underlying the process have constituted the problem for study.

2.7 Research Question

The implementation of the policy goals, therefore, requires a broader, incisive, and all-inclusive implementation analysis framework, given that policy implementation problems have always been overlooked directly and indirectly, on the one hand, and the preponderant development imperatives on the continent, on the other. This implies that fewer and fewer policy considerations have been given to research studies as scanty analyses appeared to have been carried out in investigating the implementation process to identify implicit contingences. Presently, the action plan of Nepad is seemingly devoid of analytical basis of the implementation process to establish critical impact factors. Consequently, the research question in contention is: *'To what extent can Nepad positioned itself to address the fundamental implicit conditions underlying the implementation process, as envisaged from the political, socio-economic, and leadership paradigm'?*

2.8 Significance of the Study

The meaning of Africa's under-development has been perceived in varied context and the conditions that perpetuate the situation even more so. In a given interventionist programme for development, the process of implementation becomes a leading principle in the translation process from idealistic policy goals to realistic variables. The concept of sustainable development concept has become dominant in the contemporary national, regional and international policy discourses. In Africa, the Nepad concept has increasingly enjoyed heated debates at various levels, given what has been widely regarded as its ambiguity, complexities, expansive, and convoluted policy goals. At the same time, the

concept of Nepad as an Africa's Marshall Plan logic and a vehicle for economic re-engineering of Africa's development appears promising and inspiring.

The literature investigations have revealed that the policy programme focuses widely and pays more attention to 'substance' rather than the 'process'. This has created a 'divergence' rather than a 'convergence' of truly systemic approach for the Nepad's implementation.

Given the polarized argumentative turns which have been advanced on the prospects or otherwise of the policy programme, the evidence seems to point to the fact that Nepad is not as given and therefore the implementation process is not on offer. The significance of the study to the body of knowledge in the field of policy analysis and policy development with regard to African and international development studies could be drawn from the following:

- To highlight the necessity of an investigation into the implementation process of Nepad, given the global outlook and over-arching context of its policy goals in the complex African political and socio-economic environments.
- To highlight the fact that unique impact factors underlie the supra-nationalistic policy programme – Nepad.
- To target the probable impact factors, which the study has conceptualized as 'emerging conditions', through the analysis of the implementation process, analyze the impact character of these conditions on the process *vis-à-vis* the attainment of the policy objectives of Nepad in the long-term.
- To seek to offer critical conjectural perspectives that would assist in the strengthening of the implementation process in the quest to deliver and cause dividends and for Nepad to save itself from diminishing its potential.
- To initiate thoughts for consideration by policy makers and operators of Nepad *vis-à-vis* the management and administration of the implementation process.
- To open a debate on extension of policy and implementation analyses in theories and principles to a regional development policy programme through

which certain idiosyncrasies of policy implementation analysis are applicable. This attempt is rather prospective towards an assumption of a more critical juncture of impact factors, that is, the potential realities of the impact of the emerging conditions in the short, medium, long-terms on the implementation process have been presumed. To premise consistency and coherency in the synchronization of policy implementation analysis to probe higher and supra-nationalistic policy programmes.

The study seeks to argue patently and tendentiously on a paradigm shift that is capable of altering individual and institutional behaviour and re-orientates the operators towards a performance-oriented implementation process. It stresses the need for a coalition or an holistic approach to the implementation process in order to render Nepad institutionally effective rather than suffer attenuation. This study is based on the appreciation of the increasing misrepresentations, misperceptions and dim vision of the conflicting problem areas in relation to the operational guiding beliefs of Nepad. It intends to move beyond the simplistic and provide a different framework of analysis for achieving goals and strengthening the prospects of Nepad. This study in that way becomes significant.

2. 9 The Need for the Study

Multiple views have been expressed in the on-going debate on Nepad. It has been argued that Nepad is not a viable and a *fait accompli* development template for Africa, because it does not have the capacity and the potential to transform the continent in a short, medium, and long terms against the background of, not only, the development imperatives of the continent but the high expectations it seeks to portend. For instance, de Waal has argued that, 'there are major constraints on Nepad's prospects of success, but the process of constructing the initiative holds out the hope that these may be minimized. Nepad is properly oriented but has become too ambitious' (De Waal, 2002: 463).

Similarly, Olivier has posited that, ‘the question of whether a policy with the broad sweep as envisaged ... could succeed equally everywhere in a vast, diverse, and problematic continent such as Africa. If it does it may take a long time, too long to bring any relief to the suffering masses of the continent’ (Olivier, 2001:43). He furthers the argument by stating that, ‘doubt about Nepad being a *deus ex machine* or a once-and-for-all panacea also arises from the apparently blind faith of its architects in the mechanisms of central planning, top-down bureaucratic process and what looks like socio-political engineering. Lessons of history, empirical evidence and development theory are largely ignored, and development and modernization are projected as parallel streams in a deliberate and linear process in which “all the good things will go together”. It ignores the fact that certain goals of development (growth, equity, democracy, stability and autonomy), as Samuel P. Huntington has posited, may indeed be conflictual, that the choice of these goals must affect a sequential strategy, and that unique cultural determinants make the whole process difficult to manage and predict’ (Olivier, 2003).

Bala, Rand, Eliades, and Fourie have at the same time and in the same context argued that, ‘Nepad, however, is not infallible. Its objectives and priority sector proposals can be problematic, and are unrealistic, in the long-term. These problem areas, if not addressed, could, and probably would cause Nepad to lose international and local support and to ultimately fail’ (Bala, Du Rand, Eliades, & Fourie, 2003). Rupiah has observed that, mixed feelings are being expressed on ‘... the complexity of Nepad and the challenges of translating implementation into regional projects’ (Rupiah, 2002:5).

Given the rather ambitious and over-arching policy goals of Nepad and the large-scale uneven development of the continent, this study seeks to present argumentation in favour of a paradigmatic shift for the implementation process of Nepad. There are enormous challenges facing Nepad in translating the policy

goals from the idealistic to the realistic. The causal reasons for and the briefs of the study are premised essentially on two main strands:

- The general lack of investigation of the implementation process to locate some fundamental contingencies and their dynamics as a strategic approach to the implementation process, that is, targeting as a methodological approach to address development. ... and a means for implementing policies (Kuye, 2003).
- To draw from the analysis the implications and prospects of the emerging conditions in weakening and/or strengthening the process at the medium and long terms.

In the context of this study ‘targeting’ relates to targeting the contingencies impacting on the implementation process in order to improve the prospects of implementing the policy goals. This is due to the fact that the gravity and scale of development imperatives on the continent underscore the paramount importance of a critical systematic study. ‘Targeting’ is therefore a methodological approach to safeguard the implementation process. The implication of the outcome of this study is to consciously draw the attention of the implementers of Nepad closer and closer to the relevance and utility effect of the potential impact factors on the implementation process. What seems to appear on the horizon is that the promoters and the implementers of Nepad seemingly anticipate a free course of implementation devoid of incidences. The role of, or rather, the constitutive impact and the dynamics of exogenous variables are critical and remain fundamental to an effective operationalization and outcome-based implementation process.

2. 10 Limitations of the Study

It has been consistently argued that Nepad is foreboding, both, in context and concept. It has seemingly prescribed its own operational guiding beliefs at the face of the generic implementation problems. Since the evolution of the concept, it has grown quite spectacular, given the attention and exhortatory it has attracted and received worldwide.

Yet, studies that have been conducted on Nepad forego critical examination of the implementation process that is apparently criss-crossed with impact factors. If anything, studies are essentially ambivalent on the critical analysis of the implementation process. This is perhaps due to the obvious complexities and ambiguities surrounding the concept that may deny a purposive and balance research.

This study attempts to situate critical standpoints on the implementation aspect of the programme and to articulate some conjectural and prognostic propositions as bases for a paradigm shift for the process. However, some important limitations were experienced and they are as follows:

- The utilitarian versions of Nepad, which seem to serve as the backdrop of the concept, leaves nothing as to whether or not it could practically be regarded as the genuine logic of Africa's Marshall Plan or an adjunct to the AU agenda.
- Nepad, being a new phenomenon, renders the object of study futuristic, prospective, and conjectural in scope, context and concept.
- The time frame (between 2001 and 2004), which the object of study focuses for analysis, places huge limitation for the study.
- Inadequate availability of empirical data to assist in the evaluation of the study, that is, the lack of sufficient literature on supra-nationalistic policy implementation analysis especially for development policy programmes in Africa, has limited value on the study.

- The ambiguity surrounding the concept – whether or not it represents a supra-nationalistic policy programme or an intergovernmental arrangement or both.
- Financial sponsorship to effectively carry out a broad-spectrum research for doctoral studies is a critical component for a fulfilled research project. In this instance, this study has been a self-funded project and this has imposed obvious limitations on the scope of the study.

2. 11 Structure of the Study

The structure of any study has to do with the systematic and cohesive account of how the materials collected and the logic articulation of the study are organized and presented to accomplish the task of a constructive scientific study. This study has been divided into six chapters. Each chapter contains sequential sub-topics that are within the textual extrapolations for consistency and coherence.

Chapter one provides the general background of the study. It deals with the antecedent of events, which culminated in the evolution of several development initiatives in the pre and post-colonial; and post 2000 Africa. It has placed, in context how these incidents culminated ultimately in Nepad. It presents the logical sequence with regard to the rationale, aims and objectives of the study. The multi-layered institutional mechanisms to begin the effective implementation process have been discussed. The problem statement of the study, the research question, the significance of the study, the limitations of the study, the structure of the study have been elucidated. The purpose, objectives and the need for the study given the background of Nepad with the implementation process of the policy goals have equally been extrapolated. Chapter one introduces the basic focus of the object of study.

Chapter Two deals specifically with the basic research groundings that guide social scientific inquiry. The chapter addresses the methodology for scientific research, the typologies of research approaches including those that the study has adopted. Definitions of concepts have been dealt with in the chapter. The chapter addresses the conceptual frameworks for the study. These orientations have direct bearings and have given a framework of a scientific study approach and analysis for the study.

Chapter Three deals with the background of the broad theoretical frameworks of policy implementation that are relevant to the object of study and the reviews of the relevant literature with independent critiques. A comparative approach is reflected on the variety of regional development initiatives *vis-a-vis* Nepad. This is with the view to examining the politics of evolution, to draw areas of similarity, rationales, and militating factors of the implementation process of regional policy programmes *vis-à-vis* Nepad. The old and the new paradigms of Africa's regional integration efforts from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) through to the African Union (AU) have also been addressed. A reflection of Public Administration and Policy models, governance and the leadership imperatives of Nepad *vis-à-vis* Africa's development have been made. The determinants and indicators of leadership, governance, public policy and Nepad have been synchronized in the chapter. The imperatives of governance and leadership with the determinants and indicators of leadership for development, governance, public policy in relation to the concept and implications for Nepad have been addressed. This is with the view to deepening understanding of their implications on Nepad as a policy programme.

Chapter Four deals with some critical contextual discourse of Africa's development imperatives and their direct implications for the under-development of the continent. The analysis has sought to situate how these factors have wedged against the continent's development efforts to this day. These have offered the critical highlights of the basis of Africa's continued failed efforts

directed at addressing the underdevelopment problems, which spurred the concept of Nepad and underpin its objectives. It addresses the programmatic frameworks of Nepad's action plans. The purpose is to crystallize the presumptions with the views of both the critics and the proponents that have characterized the concept of Nepad within the context of its viability and suitability. It strives to bring about coherence of analysis and logical specificities to the research problem.

In chapter Five, the focus of analysis begins with the synergies between the programmatic frameworks and policy implementation analysis as unit of analysis to the implementation process of Nepad. This is with a view to identify impact factors and their extensive causative impacts. Africa's development imperatives have been presented. This has broadened understanding on the need for a cautious path to implementation as well as urge a refocus on the critical importance of the impact factors confronting Nepad. The need for synergies between the 'substance' and 'process' as the implementation of Nepad begins to evolve has been pushed forth.

Chapter Six, the concluding chapter focuses on the prognostical implications of the 'emerging conditions' on the process. Propositional frameworks as recommendations have equally been attempted as the basis of justification of the research question.

2. 12 Clarification of Terms

The one noticeable problem of defining social concepts including public policy and development is that they represent different things to different people, at different period of time, occurrences, and environments. In every scientific study, particularly in the social sciences, there is no grand and consensual definition of concepts. Clarification guides a deeper grasp and understanding of concepts and their relevance that underpins coherence and consistency in research studies.

The role and the need to present study-specific clarifications of key concepts in research studies cannot be over emphasized. Therefore, reconfiguration of some key concepts as the operational definitions for the study has been attempted.

(Note: Italicized headings indicate personal definitions of selected concepts throughout this sub-section).

2. 12. 1 *Emerging Conditions*

These could be defined as the new dynamics with inherent multiple determinant variables of high-impact tendencies that may weigh against, or enhance the implementation process of Nepad in the short, medium, and long terms. The concept of *Emerging Conditions* is a derivative of the centripetal factors of both, the internal African political, socioeconomic, and leadership environments, and the external dynamics in relation to Nepad.

2. 12. 2 *New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad)*

In broad terms, this could be defined as a regional public policy initiative, native to Africa and Africans, largely oriented from an international partnership characterization for the political, socio-economic development and regional economic integration of the continent in the twenty-first century.

2. 12. 3 *Implementation Process of Nepad*

This could be defined as the mechanics or a series of actions to operationalize or put into effect a plan, a decision and a system to achieve particular goals or a set of goals of Nepad.

2. 13 Concluding Reflections

In this chapter, the research methodologies, the use and typologies of social research procedures employed by investigators for researches and particularly in this study have been highlighted. Their values and the dichotomies have equally been addressed. The research methodology chosen for the study anchors on the empirical reality of the implementation process of Nepad so as to arrive at comprehensible and valid conjectural propositions. To enhance the role of research in policy processes particularly the process of implementation, an approach could be engaged to present findings in a succinctly coherent manner.

Definitions of the key concepts in the study have been attempted and some have been reconfigured to suitably capture the relevance of the object of study, the objective and purpose of the study. The aim of this chapter is critical in rendering the study the scientific dimension of a systematic, objective, valid and reliable research. This chapter offers a prelude to the theoretical frameworks of policy implementation that are relevant in social science research studies.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Frameworks of Policy Implementation in Relation to the Implementation Process of Nepad

3 Introduction

Theoretical frameworks in social science inquiries enjoy trenchant advantages of versatility and transference, born out of evidently independent validity of each theoretical orientation relational to conceptualization of the object of study. This perspective, is with a view to define the basis which theoretical frameworks are variously applied in social science research studies. The implementation process of Nepad requires a scientific approach as a critical standpoint to attempt a multiple input from diverse policy implementation theoretical framework analysis, given the conceptualization of Nepad, its institutional mechanisms for implementation, the need for incremental implementation, and the patchy African policy implementation environment. This predisposes strategies and rumination of the implementation process at multi-level context to invigorate the process, that is, analysis for, rather than analysis of, policy implementation of Nepad. Preston has argued that, 'theoretical frameworks tell us what sort of world we have, what sort of explanations to provide, of which particular problem'. (Preston, 1996:10).

3. 1 Relationship with Previous Studies

The concept of Nepad is partially attractive to those interested in Africa's development studies, particularly (researchers, scholars, and intellectuals), partly because of its concept, context, principles, timing, and its indigenous frame. The dim interest generated in the concept is due to the huge wave of Africa's developmental imperatives. As a new phenomenon, researchers from the social sciences and related disciplines are increasingly un-fascinated of its prospects. They have not done enough to explore deeper and establish the validity of the

implementation process because keeping tab and up to date with such a complicated theme, presents quite a complex challenge. As a consequence the implementation analysis tends to be left in relative isolation and this receives scant attention.

A study that has systematically analyzed the implementation process that is revealing of the implicit impact factors is yet to come to the fore. If they do, they are rather partial, inadequate, and limited in context and vision. This study therefore strives to present some balanced arguments with futuristic standpoints on the prospects, or otherwise, of the implementation process. The implementation process is therefore to be systematically studied for the reason that it is pivotal and easily complicated by unintended consequences. This is with a view to improving the process to guarantee outcome-based implementation.

Nevertheless, it remains, to this day, near impossible to find a typically similar and significant analytical work that has prospectively caused intellectual exchanges on the object of study. The concept and the context of this study are thus limited and therefore exclusive with no direct relationship with any previous studies after an independent rigorous rational thought process.

3. 2 Conceptual Framework for the Study

Nepad is an organising template for the political and socio-economic development of Africa in the new millennium. Consequently, the study has conceptualized its evolution for the purpose of analysis in five basic characteristics:

- a regional public policy.
- a concept.
- a programme.
- an institution.
- a catalyst for Africa's development and economic integration.

Nepad has been viewed essentially as a regional public policy, owing to its proclamation and promulgation at the highest level of African leadership and governments and evolutionary policy process of policy initiation, agenda setting, policy design, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, monitoring and evaluation as a result of defined policy problems. It is a concept because it is an idea – the ability to identify factors presumed to be causative to Africa's development as values for pursuit. It is a programme, due to its plan of activities for achieving the projected policy content and related objectives. It is a regional institutional arrangement for development, because a Secretariat has been established and staffed with personnel in an organisational structure to undertake prescribed functions. It is a catalyst, due to its policy-relevant character responsiveness to the development imperatives of the continent.

These conceptualizations have been adopted to provide the basis for analysis as well as guide the logic of argumentations central to the theme of the study. At the same time, other aspects have been incorporated as themes in the overall context of analysis to necessarily hold in balance, the dominant object of the study, having taken into consideration the empirical realities of the Nepad's programmatic frameworks *vis-à-vis* the implementation process. This is to offer a conceptual overview of the nature and the role of policy implementation analysis within the reference of Nepad. The communality of these concepts has been adopted both, descriptively and prescriptively, to test the research question and justify their applicability and validity.

Before examining the conceptual frameworks adopted in relation to the object of study, it is vitally important to note that a grand causal concept of policy implementation analysis is *précis* in all public policy contexts. Particular problems in particular circumstances place direct relevance of concepts in context to which they are useful and which have the value of each relative to the specific problem being researched or studied. In this study, some of these concepts have been selected according to their contextual utility to the object of study.

Policy implementation is still being perceived, by practitioners in its classic tradition to provide techniques for implementation in the contemporary policy process environments. This perspective runs against the dynamics of policy process environments within which implementation occurs. The operators of Nepad require good understanding of theoretical groundings drawn from the public policy domain to attempt a rationalization of issues of process, operationalization, and scope of the implementation process environments inclusive of the Nepad's programme.

Given the complexity of the African policy implementation environment and the labyrinth network of the contemporary sustainable development programmes, there seem to be a compelling surge to expand the public policy implementation domain. It is not only far more difficult to determine clearly what form policy implementation ought to adopt but also the attendant encumbrances to attain policy objectives. Every implementation process is dependent on the ever-changing local environment, that is, it is adaptive to its unique environment. Save the congruent policy implementation, theoretical models are engaged as the foundational approach of analysis, effective implementation may remain illusive, adversarial, and antithetical in any circumstances. The elements that imbue implementation process do not by themselves conduct implementation. Rather, effective implementation is as a result of the convergence of variables that lend to the process.

De Coning and Cloete have argued that, 'the development of various theories in disciplines such as political science, sociology, public administration and others is highly relevant to policy application' (De Coning & Cloete, 2000:29). The analysis of implementation process of a supra-nationalistic development programme as Nepad, should engage some of the theoretical frameworks of policy implementation as the basis for not only to test and validate the object of the inquiry but to predicate the logical presumptions within scientific paradigm.

This chapter seeks to render some perspectives on a number of policy implementation theoretical frameworks with approaches that underpin their relevance and interrelatedness to the object of study. Policy implementation theoretical models such as multi-actor/group-actors implementation, top-down implementation, bottom-up implementation, and advocacy coalition approaches will be examined. Thereafter theories of integration would be explained in relation to the object of study. A possible model for the study is the focal point of the argument. The conclusion, therefore, will be based on the resulting implications drawn from some of these theoretical groundings.

3. 3 Critical Explanatory Concepts and Perspectives

There are sets of conceptual variables that serve as explanatory constructs and paradigms for social science research inquiry. They aim at synthesising spontaneous applicability between, and among, competing, seemingly interrelated variables. Before delving into the theoretical models for the study, it is critically important to differentiate between what *theory*, *model*, and *framework* are, and what they are not, as well as their commonality in their application. The essence is that, the context of the adopted theories fit policy implementation process, which have taken on a multi-disciplinary characterization and assumptions.

However, there are various approaches that provide stages of heuristic explanations, which rest on the distinction between frameworks, theories, and models in the policy process. De Coning and Cloete have however explained that, 'there are similarities and differences between concepts, models, theories and paradigms' (De Coning & Cloete, 2000: 24), quoted in Cloete & Wissik (eds) (2000). Ostrom explains that, 'the differences between frameworks, theories, and models are not even generally recognised' (Ostrom, 1999:35-51).

3. 3.1 The Contextual Value of sub-Themes

Frameworks seek to organize inquiry but do not, by principle, in and of, themselves offer explanations for or predictions of behaviour and outcome. 'Frameworks bound inquiry directs the attention of the analyst to the critical features of the social and physical landscape' (Schlager, 1990:234).

De Coning and Cloete have classified theoretical constructs into the following:

A *concept* is an abstract idea (frequently controversial) that serves as a thinking tool to illustrate specific attributes of intangible phenomena.

- A *model* is a representation of a complex reality that has been oversimplified in order to describe and explain the relationship among variables, and even sometimes to prescribe how something should happen. Models can therefore be used in a neutral, descriptive way, or they can be used in a normative way, expressing a preference for a particular value judgment. Models are built around specific concepts.
- A *theory* is comprehensive, systematic, consistent, and reliable explanations and predictions of relationships among specific variables. It is built on a combination of various concepts and models, and attempts to present a full explanation and even predictions of future events. Theories can also be used descriptively or prospectively. While theories are normally assessed in terms of their predictive validity, models are normally assessed in terms of their utility in accurately reflecting reality.
- A *paradigm* is a collection or pattern of commonly held assumptions, concepts, models, and/or theories constituting a general intellectual framework of or approaches to scientific activities (e.g. ideologies like Liberalism, Marxism and Darwinism). A paradigm is dominant if it is widely accepted in the scientific community concerned.

(De Coning & Cloete, 2000: 25).

3. 4 Theoretical Frameworks of Policy Implementation

Models and theories could be said to be the derivatives of frameworks. They could be a construct of specific concepts, which represent more intricate fact that has been rendered rather simple in order to relate, explain, and predict relationship between variables.

The essence of making distinctive differences between these theoretical constructs is to be able to engage in a scientific study, a suitable construct which best suit the context of object of study. Each theory is deemed for a specific type situation, in relation to which it aims to offer relationship, analytical framework, and generate certain contributions. De Coning and Cloete have argued that, 'it is important to know the difference between these uses, and to use models and theories in the correct way and for the correct reasons' (De Coning & Cloete, 2000:25). Both researchers have posited that public policy is normally studied for three reasons:

- To gain better academic knowledge about and insight into public policy (scientific, descriptive, explanatory and predictive objectives).
- To try to improve policy processes, contents and outcomes (a combination of descriptive and prescriptive objectives).
- To try to influence or control policy processes and content in order to ensure the desired outcomes (prescriptive objectives).

(Ibid.:25).

Accordingly, De Coning and Cloete explain that, 'it is important in policy analysis exercises to distinguish which of the above driving forces behind policy actions are the most strongest, in order to assess accurately what is going on'. (Ibid.: 25). This is true of policy implementation analysis, which suggests that theories, models, paradigms, and frameworks typically provide theoretical constructs to construe policy analysis and policy implementation, in specific circumstances, and render them situational. The theoretical frameworks will now be examined.

3. 4.1 Functional Policy Stages / Phases Theoretical Framework

This theory has essentially, as the basis, the gamut of the entire policy process, starting ‘...from policy initiation, agenda setting, policy process design, policy analysis, policy formulation, decision-making, policy diagram, policy implementation, monitoring and evaluation’ (De Coning & Cloete, 2000:49). Similarly, the model has embraced policy process to discretely examine the character of the stages that policy issues may go through. Hogwood and Gunn (1984) emphasize that, ‘this model lends support to a deeper understanding of how various kinds of analysis can be brought to bear at different stages of the policy process and underscore the advocacy of the model being beyond a simplistic analysis where one rung follows the next’ (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984:4), quoted in De Coning and Cloete, (2000:45).

The stage model considers policy process as involving often-existing activities that are often ignored in the modern models. These activities enfold awareness of general policy problems by civic, political or stakeholder action, and agenda setting or placing the issues in the policy agenda and determining priorities. The next stage of process includes the identification of the problem issues, the principal stakeholders and choice of options, identification of the main alternative patterns of action to attend the problem issues. Then one alternative is selected and at the end the decision is publicized. This part of the implementation, resources need be allocated and provision for adjudication, which is partly concerned with policy enforcement through the administrative and legal actions before the full implication evaluations and feedback loop’ De Coning and Cloete (2000:47); Fox et al., (1991:33).

Policy implementation in the overall policy process stages in the context of Nepal reflects the stages model theoretical framework and is relevant when viewed at the macro-level or international understanding of agenda setting. The policy programme of Nepal has been: agenda setting; several options

considered; policy decision taken; initialed; and implementation mechanism adopted [policy process]. The framework provides, though not exclusively, for the Nepad policy context, given the fact that the policy processes of Nepad evolve through the policy stages that correspond with the dynamics and activities in policy process.

To the extent that it is successful in analytical discretion and policy process, it is evidently clear that the policy process cannot conveniently be explicated as existing in a void. It must be seen as involving overall stages, which are largely interrelated, interdependent, and interconnected in a policy-making environment. The model demonstrates some adaptive traits and attributes to varied policy process environments. Given this context, the model is relevant in policy implementation analysis.

The theory falls short of extricating critical complexities and properties that are shared with all stages, that each of the stages of policy process experiences, including actors' customs, interest, and norms that are bound to influence policy making environment. At the same time, it has put into presupposition that all factors remain constant in every policy environment or domain. For example, no policy domain has linear characteristics but a repertoire of extraordinary variables and dynamics to respond to the elements under which they function. Indeed, through these repertoire of institutions and actors in a given policy domain, policy process could be regulated; internal structures transformed, and even a remodel of their essential policy goals. It precludes the target groups and the exogenous conditions of policy implementation in its concept and context.

The implications of the complexities in each stage of the policy process, which influence institutions, actors, and the overall policy environment, have not been set forth and explored by the stages model framework. The model holds out promises of a more intensive, all embracing, and inflexible theoretical imperatives of its own to policy analysis of the sub-systems of the policy process including

policy implementation. It has helped to increase the complexities of theoretical framework choice for analyzing and validating the research questions in public policy studies with regard to implementation of Nepad. To this end it has claimed end-means equation.

It has not made unequivocal prediction and predilection for any subsystem of policy process. It has yet been comprehensively put to test. The strength of the theory is that it adds up as a usable public policy theory to policy analysis.

3. 4. 2 Multi-actor / Group Theoretical Framework

The foundational creed of this model is the creation of the group struggle. Some schools of thought argue that, 'what may be called public policy is the equilibrium reached in this (group) struggle at any given moment, and it represents a balance which the contending factions or groups constantly strive to weigh in their favour' (Anderson, 2003:16). The model is founded on the argument that interaction and struggle among groups are central to the policy process. 'Multi-actors or groups are collections of persons that may, on the basis of shared attitudes on interests, make claims upon other groups of society'. (Ibid.:16).

Multi-actors or group-model plays a critical role in public policy analysis but not in all cases of public policy domain. In a more literal sense multi-actors constitute governments, public opinion, the press, civil society, and non-government groups. Their activities, participation and ideas play out essential influence in the policy-making domains up to the implementation stages.

The critical contention of the framework is the access and effective communication through which the multi-actors seek to posit their request, exercise influence, in order to shape implementation process and possible outcomes. The possibility for the group to attain the communicative access and influence are slim if their interest and viewpoints are not communicated and

influence level of interaction is poor. Public policy at any level reflects the interest and the views of the dominant group vigorously pursued. In other words, it is the dominant groups that possess the means and resources, access, effective communication, effective leadership styles, and organization that may influence and shape public policy in their favour, but those deficient in promoting factors would naturally lose. This situation is true in the implementation process. Groups or multi-actors would strive to exercise influence and seek to shape policy process, so that implementation of policy will yield in their favour.

The contextual significance of group or multi-actor framework emphasis is perhaps overstated. The sole reliance on group-actors appears symptomatic in the entire policy process. For example, the theory seeks to underplay the contributions of policy implementers and public officials in their values, discretion, interest, creativity, and the complex environmental conditions that impact on the policy processes. Public officials and implementers have a stake in the policies and programmes they deal with. Their actions and inactions are deterministic in the policy implementation direction.

The model has failed discrete typologies of groups and multi-actors in specific terms. It assumes policy processes as a monolithic process, whereas the actors in the process do have preferences, imbibe institutional culture, which are critical and overlap during and within policy processes and thus pushes its flexibility. Its group generalization forecloses participation of other groups such as street level actors that are not usually adequately represented in the policymaking process, but may as well be the target group of policies. The inter-group interaction has also missed a mention. However, the model adds up to the universal theoretical frameworks of policy implementation. With good reason, the implementation process cannot be structured solely around the multi-actor and group paradigms in the broadest sense. It appears to go in favour of the bottom-up insights and postulations.

3. 4. 3 Top-Down Theoretical Framework

The top-down model remains phenomenally virile in the contemporary policy process, particularly within the context of policy implementation. 'It is a much more widely quoted version' (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). These researchers perceive the implementation process as a top-down process. The predisposition of this model emphasizes the 'hierarchical control', that is to say, implementation decisions arise from the top, downwards. In other words, greater influence over implementation is wielded from the top-most rung that makes policy than those at the lower rung who are actually involved in the execution of policies.

Policy implementation has been viewed by 'Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) as a top-down process, using three causations of implementation advocated by Kaufman *et al.* (1986), stating that, subordinates do not know what their superiors want, they cannot do what their superior want' quoted in Brynard (2000:171). The authors are of the view that the nature of policy is fundamental in either the success or failure of implementation, and proposed a model which Brynard (2000) refers to as being 'clusters of variables':

- The relevance of policy standards and objectives.
- Policy resources.
- Inter-organisational communication and enforcement activities.
- The characteristics of the implementing agencies.
- The economic, social and political environment affecting the implementing jurisdiction or organization.
- The disposition of implementers for carrying out policy decisions.

(Ibid.:171).

Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) have posited the most consequential deal of top-down model of policy implementation. Their paradigmatic argument on the concept of implementation has ensued in three important findings:

- Policy-making is an iterative process of formulation, implementation and

- reformation, and the distinction between the three should be maintained;
- The focus should be on the attainment of the stated policy goals, although the outputs of the implementing agencies and the outcomes of the implementation process are both important; and
 - Implementation can be viewed from three quite different perspectives - the initial policymaker or the center, the field - level implementing officials or the periphery, and the actors at whom the programme is directed or the target group but a center-focused perspective to implementation is preferred' quoted in Brynard, (2000:172).

The top-down approach emerged as a second generation of studies that sought to be analytical and comparative in orientation to implementation. This is in response to questions such as: What are the preconditions to successful policy implementation? What are the critical impediments to policy implementation? These questions are attempts to offer explanations of variations in the implementation success across programmes by reference to specific variables and conceptual frameworks. The approach is largely as a result of mono-case analysis of studies drawn from successive failures of policy implementation outcomes.

The essential characteristics of this model according to Sabatier are that it begins with a policy decision by governmental (often central government) officials and then asks:

- To what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target groups consistent with (the objectives and procedures outlined in) that policy decision?
- To what extent were the objectives attained over time, that is, to what extent were the impacts consistent with the objectives?
- What were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts, both those relevant to the official policy as well as other politically significant ones?

- How was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience? (Sabatier, 1997:273).

Researchers such as Edward and Sharnkansky (1978) have tried to offer convincing explanations of the assumption of hierarchical control of and influence on policy implementation. Top-down approach focuses on legally mandated aspects and underestimate the politics of street-level actors, organizational interactions, and bargaining in the trajectory of implementation process. They try to synthesize these varied conditions into smaller list of six variables for an effective implementation of legal objectives. These are:

- Clear and consistent objectives.
- Adequate causal theory.
- Implementation process legally structured to enhance compliance by implementing officials and target groups.
- Committed and skillful implementing officials.
- Support of interest groups and sovereign.
- Changes in socioeconomic conditions, which do not substantially undermine political support.

Sabatier (1997),quoted in Hill, (1997:274-5).

The top-down framework appears largely as a linear theoretical framework. It ignores the resourcefulness and the critical roles of those lower rung actors who actively prosecute policies, the basis for which bottom-uppers discountenance its objectivity. The proponents, therefore, fail to obligate the lower rung cadre to the implementation process. Policy process is not complete until policies are implemented and outcomes evaluated. Its strong emphasis on the top hierarchy involvement in the implementation process falls short of the third generation implementation assumptions of multi-actors and multi-level implementation approaches. It appears too bureaucratic and methodical in the context of this study. It invites red-tapism, a characteristic of bureaucratic inertia and dismissive of the concept of subsidiarity.

Formulation of policies generates the means and resources as inputs for policy implementation. The low-level line managers and the field staff normally involved in the virtual execution of policies that cause a flow in the implementation process have seemingly not been subsumed. It also neglects critical variables and capacities that could cope with the complexities of implementation process and influence of environmental factors. The bulwark between exogenous shocks in policy implementation is the line manager and low rung cadre who translate, relate and communicate more directly with the clientele. They are those who constitute the feedback loop to the top policy echelon. This reality has escaped critical attention of the model and its proponents.

It is flexible to the extent that it permeates the conceptual analysis of implementation process and public policy analysis. Of necessity, an analytical model that conceives of a policy implementation in a linear frame must similarly assume the environmental factors and implicit complexities of policy implementation. These are critical and deterministic, if only implicitly, to the implementation success or lack of success.

Another difficulty with the contention of the theory is the notion that all members of an organization have only a mono-goal preoccupation in the policy process as they seek to implement policies, that is, a linear movement in policy execution, in neglect of considerations for other underlying variables. For example, members of a system sometime wish to take positive action and earn, not only recognition and credit, but also reward for good implementation and be held to account. It neglects a feedback loop dimension of system analysis, which interlink in policy process.

Its emphases and empirical objectives dwell largely on local, provincial, and national level implementation processes. This renders it restrictive and localized. Obviously the conterminous emergence of sub-regional and regional political and socio-economic development policy initiatives has prompted the surge for higher-

level policy process and ultimately policy implementation. The model certainly remains and condones static rather than dynamic policy implementation. Policy analysis and implementation should be moved beyond frontiers, territoriality, and boundaries. It asserts a longer time frame as objectified conduct without providing a time frame. The model has become a sustained one with theoretical considerations and norms for implementation analysis as it offers theoretical explanation of empirical nature. In spite of the merit, its theorization falls out of favour for this study.

3. 4. 4 Bottom-Up Theoretical Framework

Almost simultaneously, an increasing surge of scholarship began counter claims to the contextual and conceptual narrative propositions of the top-down concept. Some of the researchers who belong to the counter-claim ideologues are Reig & Rabinowitz (1977) who invoke a converse view to the hierarchical position in policy implementation process. They push forth a bottom-up model through the principle of circularity, which led them to suggest that, 'implementation involves drift from declared purposes and that the process is (often) less one of slow incremental change than of bureaucratic entrepreneurship', quoted in Brynard, (2000:172). Similarly, the views extrapolated by the counter-claimers, such as Nakamura and Smallwood (1980), construct propositions which suggest that from the bottom-uppers paradigms, conception of the implementation process is a system of functional environments, each of which contains a variety of actors and arenas and is connected to the others by various communications and compliance linkages. (Ibid.:172).

Berman (1978) postulates that the real capacity to effect policy outcome rest effectively with the local or the people at the lower rung of the implementation scale rather than the authoritative policymakers. He devised four ways through which implementation could be carried out:

- Non-implementation - no adaptation to the project plan or deliverer

- behaviour;
- Co-optation - no deliverer behaviour, but adaptation in the project to accommodate existing routines.
 - Technologies learning - no adaptation of the project plan but adaptation - adaptation of routinised behaviour to accommodate the plan.
 - Mutual adaptation - adaptation of both the project and deliverer behaviour' quoted in Brynard, (2000:173).

Contrary to the top-down model, Lipsky argues that, 'in numerous cases of implementation, the latitude of those charged with carrying out policy is so substantial that ... policy is effectively "made" by the people who implement it' (Lipsky, 1978:398), quoted in Brynard (2000). These are those he refers to as street level bureaucrats. This set of individuals relates to the grassroots in the course of their duties and possess meaningful discretion in the discharge of their functions.

The bottom-up implementation theoretical model begins with the identification of network of actors that participate and are active in policymaking and service delivery at various sectors in one or more places and asks them about their aims, expectations, problems, activities, strategies and perhaps contacts. These then form policy input functions that are used as vehicles for devising a network mechanism to identify the policy areas at the local, provincial, national and even at regional levels as well as the actors involved in the planning, funding, and operationalization of public and corporate sectors programmes. By this argument, the model thus offers a channel for moving from street-level policymaking 'bottom-up' to the 'top-down' policy formulation-implementation continuum.

This model, as already explicated by its exponents, promises more expansive and an all-inclusive participation in policy processes up to implementation phase. The fundamental strength of the bottom-up model is that, it foils the linearity perspective emphasized by the top-down model and recognizes multiplicity of

actors at various levels and environmental variables in implementation process. It acknowledges the interaction and interconnections of variables that flow in the policy processes. It offers an expansive construct with theoretical imperatives to policy implementation.

A critical difficulty remains, that of the contextual orientation of the framework. How does the potential policy that is to be implemented within an environment get communicated to the implementers? Commonsensical notion tells us that policymakers make policy and pass down the policy for implementation and that implementers do not often participate in the policymaking, which they implement. Do we have to treat each sector specific policymaker and implementer distinctly and separately in a policy process? If this was to be the case, the problem of systematic analysis of systemic policy constraints would virtually be insurmountable and the empirical interpretation lost. The framework abdicates and pays inordinate attention to the comparatively unique challenges that must require hierarchical ordering of rules, implementation, evaluation and a feedback loop to enhance a robust revision and direction of policies regarding implementation where necessary, for useful outcomes. In this context, the model appears more theoretical and more contemplative than practical.

It has failed to accomplish what it set out to do, that is, to offer one neat typical model fit in place of the top-down model. It has provided no adequate counter-theoretical framework claim as a single template of empirical applicability to policy implementation than the top-down model. Where it is applicable, its contributions may be more terminological, less pragmatic and less realistic. Given the weaknesses, it is not ideal for the study.

3. 4. 5 Advocacy Coalition Theoretical Framework

The extrapolation of this theoretical model seeks to acquire a locus that evolves a consummate theoretical implementation framework that ideally embraces the mutual features (comparative advantages) of both the 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up' paradigms. In other words, the conceptual projection is the convergence and synthesis of the best characteristics of the two theoretical models into a mould as a balanced paradigm for policy implementation.

Sabatier has contended that, 'the top-down approach is concerned with the manner in which legal and socio-economic factors structure behavioural options that need to be incorporated into the synthesis, as do their concerns with the validity of the causal assumptions behind specific programmes and strategies. The elements of the bottom-up concerns start from policy problem or sub-system rather than law or other policy decisions and then examine the strategies employed by relevant actors in both the public and private sectors at various levels of government as they attempt to deal with the issue consistent with their objectives' (Sabatier, 1997:287).

The approach advocates the aggregation of these elements into a unique approach in policy implementation. Accordingly, Sabatier argues, '...the synthesis adopts the bottom-uppers' unit of analysis - a whole variety of public and private actors involved with a policy problem as well as their concerns with understanding the perspectives and strategies of all major categories of actors (not simply program proponents). It then combines this starting point with top-downers' concerns with the manner in which socioeconomic conditions and legal instruments constrain behaviour'. (Ibid.:287).

The framework seemly draws heavily from the multi-actor/group and the contingency approaches. For instance, it assumes actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions - each composed of, politicians, agency officials,

interest group leaders, public opinion, civil society, and intellectuals who share a set of normative and causal beliefs on core policy issues. At any particular point in time, each coalition adopts a strategy envisaging one or more changes not only in governmental institutions but policies, which could be perceived as way to further their objectives.

According to Sabatier (1997), the approach is primarily concerned with theory construction rather than with providing guidelines for practitioners or detailed portraits of particular situations. The syntheses that ultimately led to the evolution of the approach as an alternative middle level option to policy implementers provide a near concise framework in policy implementation theoretical groundings. It offers an expanded time span to be able to ascertain why policy succeeds and in some cases their failures, non-implementation, and an ill implementation. Its attempts are aimed at demonstrating 'rational option implementation approach' in the thick of the arguments between the top-down and bottom-up paradigms to achieve a near balance approach.

The framework runs not in the classical tradition of social science theorizing but builds on the resonance of applied systemic approach. Brynard (2000:169) has posited that, '...the most important fault-line in the field is that dividing a 'top-down' view of implementation (e.g. Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975, Edwards, 1980; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Linder & Peters, 1987) from a bottom-up view (e.g. Berman, 1978; Hans, 1978; Scharpf, 1978; Elmore, 1979; Lipsky, 1978; Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Barret & Fudge, 1981; Hjern & Hull, 1981). This perspective has offered critical iterative, but explanatory variables that have intellectual style, foundation, and methodological approach premised on a logical, systematic, objectified, and a valid sequence of debate especially to the top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation. But, Sabatier argues that, 'it may be impossible to relate it to this study because it is a construct that is willing to utilise fairly abstract theoretical constructs and to operate from an admittedly simplified portrait of reality' (Sabatier, 1997:287).

There is also the question of specificity in utilization and applicability in implementation domain. This is because obstacles to implementation are environmentally induced and implementers and authors of policy operate in unique circumstances within economic, political, and socio-cultural levers. These conditions impact heavily against implementation inputs that are deterministic. Implementation is a process that evolves in incremental phases.

It has also failed to, or neglects the policy process and only views implementation as a substitute for other constituent policy processes. The assumptions of the framework cannot always be appropriate and explicit in all the implementation domains. For instance, implementation in country A may be different from how country B prosecutes her own implementation practices. The approach has failed to acknowledge the competing values of stakeholders that sometimes define implementation contagion at various levels of implementation.

The model ceases to provide an adequate template for analyzing implementation process. It is enough to direct a researcher towards empirical analysis of how connections could be formed towards defining units of analysis by observation of the boundaries of interaction and inter-relatedness among factors and units in the implementation process, which may not remain the same in actual implementation domain. Contingencies and unintended consequences or fallout that usually impact implementation process have missed a mention and critical analysis. It is an eclectic type theoretical framework for implementation.

One can use Nepad's implementation process as the progressive integration of a variety of not only the institutional implementation mechanisms but also from the multi-actors to the top-down and bottom-up approaches. But the postulations of the Advocacy Coalition approach seemingly enjoy good favour for the implementation of Nepad, particularly in patchy policy implementation environment of the continent. The above caveats notwithstanding, the model holds out fleeting possibilities that reinforce its relevance to the object of study.

3. 4. 6 The Theoretical Framework for the Study

The object of study focuses on policy implementation in relation to the implementation process of the policy goals of Nepad. The theories reflected in this study, when taken together have done well in providing the bases for the learning process of policy implementation as they provide causal theoretical groundings to analyze the implementation process and, in a greater manner, illuminate the special contributions that each of them makes to the theoretical understanding and the practice of policy implementation. The theoretical framework with the mix of the *top-down* and the *bottom-up* common object-oriented theoretics, are inextricably inter-woven with the concept and the object of study. Therefore, the advocacy coalition theoretical framework that combines the two contending frameworks is implicated, and it is recommended as the sustainable theoretical base of the new era for analysis in the study.

The institutional implementation frameworks put in place for Nepad, from the Assembly of the African Union, Heads of State and Governments Implementation Committee, the Nepad Steering Committee, to the Nepad Secretariat, evidently informs the engagement of this approach. Brynard (2000) has argued that, 'there is a general agreement that implementation is a complex, dynamic, multilevel, multi-actor process influenced both by the content and context of the policy being implemented' (Brynard ,2000:174).

The principle of circularity outlined by Reign & Rabinowitz (1977) quoted in Brynard (2000:174), implies that, the *top-down* and the *bottom-down* forces will often exist simultaneously in most implementation situations, which are framed by pressures from both the top and the bottom. Also, depending on the specific features of particular implementation cases, each approach may be more or less relevant. Finally, there is a growing consensus on the need to synthesize the major features of the two approaches and develop models that capture the strengths of both.

The implementation process of Nepad calls for no other implementation theoretical model than the 'advocacy coalition approach'. The caveats of the approach notwithstanding, the experience so far with regard to the implementation of Nepad indicates clearly that, the model is the necessary choice, given its potential. The model seems to hold in view a structured process of the implementation process for Nepad, in order that it provides an expected outcome.

The coalition framework focuses on various facets of Nepad that are reflective of, and in, consonance with the object of study. It offers the grounds for the contention of the study in relative terms. The advocacy coalition approach's propositions hold out formidable potentials to explain, analyze, and at the same time complement the object of study within the implementation context of Nepad. The implementation of the Nepad's policy goals must be interpreted, not only, in terms of what the implementers understand it to be, but also what the scholars, researchers, and practitioners equally understand and make of it. It is not manifestly an optimal theoretical framework for policy implementation process, but expediently suffices the context.

3. 5 Reviews of Relevant Literature

Literature reviews for any scientific study are to conduct an in-depth appraisal of the existing studies that portray direct relevance to the object of study in order to relate and examine the current state of knowledge in the subject sub-field and detect inconsistencies and gaps to justify a particular object of an academic inquiry. It is a point of departure for the demarcation of problem areas for a study so as to predicate the validity and the cognition of the study with a view to provide a unique perspective of knowledge. The literature reviews in this study take on the concepts of development, partnership, policy analysis, policy implementation, Nepad and the question of African development imperatives and the African patchy policy process and policy implementation environments.

These concepts have received a fair share of specialized scholarships worldwide. The trends have always taken argumentative turns in many respects. Therefore the literature reviews in the study reflect the above concepts and paradigmatic predispositions.

The primary purpose here is to provide a review of some of the books, articles from journals, and monographs that have dealt with core issues relevant and related to the object of study during the last two decades. The basis is not to provide a comprehensive review but rather to illuminate the core trends of argumentations on them to assist in a broader understanding of the concept of the study.

3. 5. 1 A Composite of Related Literature

Jennifer M., Brinkerhoff, (2002), in her book entitled, *Partnership for International Development: Rhetorics or Results*, seeks to clarify the concept of development partnership and in the process identifies typologies of partnership. She categorizes partnership in four dimensions:

- Partnerships for public service.
- Corporate social responsibility.
- Conflict resolution.
- International development.

In her espouse, she argues that all forms of partnership is about the ways and means by which actors look for the most effective and efficient service delivery, minimizing the direct involvement and funding of government bodies at the face of scarce resources both in human, capital and material terms. It is also, according to her, as the result of the felt need to embrace cultural identities in the process and outcome of international problem solving.

She describes partnership as rhetoric without the necessary trappings for result, which is prone to make things worse and lead to cynicism and lack of trust. This,

she concludes, has increasingly discouraged actors or practitioners from embracing and pursuing the partnership approaches and condemns the traditional understanding of partnership for international development.

Daid Callahan and Bruce Jennings (eds.), (1993), in their diatribe, *Interpretive Social Sciences and Policy Analysis*, offer an impressionistic academic evidence of policy analysis usually motivated in the first instance by policy failures. According to them, policy failures are often a function of actors responding insufficiently to the policy processes. They argue that policy analysis should seek to locate the anomalous responses, explicate them coherently in order to permit policy making more realistic way to the conduct of those who are to benefit from the policy and those whom the policies will apply.

Coete, K., Graaf, J., Hendricks, F., Wood, G., (2001) edited a book, entitled *Development Theory, Policy and Practice*. The text has sectional sub titles dealt with by respective authors on various thematics of development and policy studies. Central in this collection, is the need for a shift in development thinking at theoretical, policy, practical, and moral levels as a continuum. It is the conclusion of their contributions to the debate on the concept of Africa's development.

At the theoretical level, the editors have argued that macro-structural theories on development are virtually out of tune or are in dissonance with the actual reality of what people face in the third world countries. Social scientists, they argue, who are disinterested to decipher the practicalities of life and sequentially forecast their future course hide in obfuscation, given the over-emphasis of the macro-societal structures over and above certain capacity, creativity, and insight. On this plane, they argue for a change in perspectives to cater for what they refer to as 'micro-structures', which they regard as 'historical particularity', and 'individual actors'. They consider development as a controversial concept.

On the practical theme, they argue that the policies that emanated from the earlier theories had given themselves as unsustainable in the new era and that development concept driven by macro-agencies such as governments, international financial institutions like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), often fail to create the desired effect in terms of convenient access to human and financial capitals. The macro-agencies fail to engage the civil societies who are meant to be the beneficiaries of the so-called development policies, and often seeking to do development through (in the editors' words) laptop, blue suited, razor-sharp development economists. This typology of development, according to them, is always fraught with series of failure, false start, chains of disaster, downward spirals, mismanagement, cupidity, and institutional complexities. These factors have perpetuated the underdevelopment overhang, particularly for African countries, with a resultant pessimism for any prospective development initiative.

The researchers argue that the involvement of civil society in the development policy and planning processes, as the basis for development, would bring about successful implementation of policies, as this would create opportunity to infuse the aspirations and needs of the target sectors, for development. Most of the themes included in this collection deal with civil society, civil participation, and how to make development sustainable. Another context of their argument deals with the changing development policy perceptions of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, a view that corroborates the arguments by Turok, (2002). He contends that, the way to challenge the development policy of these institutions should be subtly acquired so as to create effect.

The book covers the governmental mechanism that should facilitate civil society participation in decision making *vis-à-vis* development. The argument here stresses the stagnated policy environment often created by the west, which often

tacked down the implementation process of these policies at the global dimension that denies Africa's development policies of meaning and effect.

They highlight the linkages between theory, meta-theory, research methods, policy, and practice as part of the continuum. This deals with the faulty theory syndrome of the so-called practical economists or social scientists because they disregard theory, they argue. The value-free and object of knowledge researches have also been disputed in furthering their arguments in the development theories debate.

A book edited by Hummelstrand Ulf, Kabiru Kinyanjui, and Edward Mburugu,(1994), *African Perspectives on Development*, deals with the mainstreaming of Africa's development imperatives *vis-à-vis* conceptual paradigms. This book is a collection of some studies by scholars who argue on a variety of imperatives that have characterized Africa's development. The book was planned and based on contemporary Africa's development studies, which has run into a paradigmatic crisis and therefore needs a paradigm shift to study development issues in Africa. According to the editors, the word 'paradigm' has become problematical within the context of Africa's development, as are issues of development and policy in the social sciences, which more often run into similar crises but do not technically occur in the natural sciences.

The word 'paradigm' is used in development studies to give special effect to certain concepts as object of knowledge. It is an emphasis that does not discard any other paradigm but specific selection of analytical and empirical research variables, and in terms of the kind of praxis in favour. The editors contend that the defined nature of the concept of development has created a wealth of debate. Given its fluidity, it is subject to multi-perspective interpretations and conceptualizations.

They further contend that, even among African social scientists, there are schisms and digitations on what African perspectives imply in the past and the present development thoughts, theories, and paradigms, given the varying sub-regional conditions, class or personal predicaments which have led to discussions on varying sub-regional initiatives for development. Different development theories, such as *Marxism*, *Modernization*, *Dependency*, and *World System* have, at different periods, been applied to denote what development is, and what empirical development is within different contexts. Empirical accomplishment, and the usage of the paradigmatic approach are of no value for those working within opposing paradigms, they argue. This means, that an object of knowledge as identified by one paradigm may not be exoterical and not for the uninitiated. It presupposes a dichotomy in communication and understanding in spite of the dialectical context of Africa's underdevelopment.

The researchers corroborate the editors' views, that social scientists and development theories are in crises, when applied to the underdevelopment situation in Africa and therefore a paradigm shift is required (Hyden, 1983). They categorize development strategies adopted in African countries in the last two decades into two areas: (a) Integration strategies associated with the modernization perspective and (b) Disengagement strategies associated with dependency and world-system paradigms.

They note that, the existing theories of development and underdevelopment, irrespective of their ideological dispositions are without the transformation of the peasant economy, the emergence of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) into the global ranks and that the eventual liquidation of underdevelopment would continue to be a mirage. These researchers have argued on the Africa's development-underdevelopment imperatives question, the philosophical contributions by African philosophers and the strategic typology of models to deal with the imperatives of Africa's development/ underdevelopment. They identify African philosophical efforts such as ethno-philosophy, Africanism, theory for

African revolution, professional philosophers, and the critics of the professional philosophers as the African theoretical approaches to Africa's development.

A book entitled *Institutional Reform – A Public Policy Perspective*, (1990), written by Jane, Jan-Erik, is a contribution to the debate in the fields of policy analysis and public policy which have come to be characterized and inundated by various paradigms and as a result, a set of propositions, models, and theories, which have won the support of scholars in the field have emerged. Policymaking has acquired a heuristic, motley processes and methods, and has therefore played a variety of roles in understanding the complex policy process in a given circumstance and environment. It has permitted a pluralistic usage of social scientific inquisition for various kinds of policies under various environments.

As a response to the above contention, the author has argued that institutional reforms are about a radical and innovative policy idea that has the prospect to fundamentally alter the behaviour and structure of public institutions, to bring about effectiveness and efficiency. This presupposes that public institutions be armed with certain policies that can be used to cause changes capable of affecting individual and institutional behavior and performance throughout the system. Any development-oriented policy, he argues, should be able to play an effective role and cause change, particularly in public institutions. It should by its initiative, operatives, and strategies stimulate, shape, and broker the implementation of radical public institution reforms and that the exceptional policy programme could bring about reforms by any change agent.

Mutahaba, Gelase and Balogun, M. Jide (eds.), (1992), published a book entitled *Enhancing Policy Management Capacity in Africa*, culled from seminar papers jointly organized by the African Association for Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) between June 1998 and September 1998. The central themes are clearly

a dire search for adequate policy formulation and implementation capacity environments in Africa that requires urgent and sustained attention.

They argue that the socio-economic crises and foreign interference in the internal affairs of African countries are contributory, to a larger extent, to the widening gap in policy design and implementation. They claim that the restructuring approaches in the public policy reformations through public administration were inadequate and fell far short from direction. Attention, they argue, was only given to areas such as organizational design, adoption of modern management techniques and technologies, industrial development, and sometimes the training of personnel. They also argue that attention to the creation and the development of institutions and organizations that would have specifically dealt with policy analysis, assembling data for policy formulation, critical evaluation of policy successes and failures were, and are still lacking.

They contend that policy programmes introduced by several African governments, at the tail end of the 20th century, were essentially as a result of the socio-economic crises that pervaded the continent. These policies were aimed at reform and to correct the abnormalities in their economic, monetary, and fiscal policies that were concentrated on content rather than context. Although important, they deserve some mention and encouragement, in that they were conclusive and exclusive in content, which led to defective and ineffective mechanisms for analyzing, formulating, and implementing policies. They argue that African policy outputs are generally deficient because the identification of strategic choices, assembling, analyzing, data storage, outlining implementation programmes of action, and implementation monitoring are dysfunctional. They call for a refocused policy processes so as to create the necessary capacity and resourcefulness for policy management.

A book entitled, *Policy Within and Across Developing Nations*, (1994), by Nagel, Stuart S., seeks to address African development policy environments. This book is divided into four sections:

- The first section deals with policy within developing nations and suggests the way through which they can be developed to win-win developmental policies, so as to provide a widespread prospective, useful innovation, democracy, and merit treatment.
- The second section takes on policy issues across developing nations – peace studies and research centres, a mini-symposium on international dispute resolution, exportation of democratic rights as a product, a mini-symposium on international prosperity, and global policy studies.
- The third section deals with the teaching of developmental policy studies, policy analysis training for development administrators, United States Information Agencies (USIA), win-win traveling seminars, and the proposed policy analysis training programme.
- The last section contains the relevant bibliography on developmental policy studies, the relevant literature and human rights in developing countries.

He argues that developing countries can be categorized. There are those that are in dire need of development, not necessarily those nations that are most rapidly developing, and that public policy refers, especially to governmental decisions that seek to improve the quality of life, or at least lessen the severity of various social problems. He classifies them as: economic, social, technological, political or legal, depending on what societal institutional or scholarly discipline is involved. He defines policy analysis as a methodology for determining relevant causal relations, generally for the purpose of evaluating alternative public policies in order to decide the best policies, combinations, allocations or a super-optimum solution whereby all sides come out ahead, of their best initial expectations (Nagel, 1994). He argues that the nations of sub-Saharan Africa are those that require, and qualify the truth-value of under-developed nations.

Patel, I.G., (ed.), (1992), in his book entitled, *Policies for African Development from the 1980's to 1990's*, is a collection of papers at a conference held in Gaborone, Botswana, in 1991. The economic crises that traversed the African continent with the advent of several economic adjustment programmes inspired by the IMF and the World Bank appears to be the main theme of the book. Contributors to the book include, among others, Camdesus, Mullei, Boorman of the IMF, and Rulihinda. Others are Berg, Helleiner, Martin, and Gondwe.

The book is divided into four major sections. The first section contains a collection of papers on the structural adjustment programmes in Africa, future approaches, and lessons learned from the past with perspectives from Africa by Mullei, Boorman of the IMF, and Rulihinda. The perspective they present only re-echoes the antecedents of aid funds for development with sudden death caveats. A theme of relevance to this study in the book is the contribution made by Camdesus, who wrote the foreword. Camdesus has argued that any bid to reposition Africa developmentally must rest on three principal strands:

- Regional integration.
- Special responsibility of the industrialized nations to assist Africa.
- A homegrown development initiative by Africans themselves.

The Camdesus's homegrown proposition bears more meaningful and direct relevance to Africa's development imperatives and in good measure lend credence to the emergence of Nepad. At the same time, it corroborates other similar views, on African regional integration, as the mechanism to attain concrete regional development. These argumentations seemingly rest on the experiences of African countries during the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the IMF *vis-à-vis* Africa's development imperatives.

The second section deals with Africa's adjustment and the external debt problem – issues and options. It chronicles how Africa came to acquire the debt burden and the multiplicity of the various cartels of creditors they have to negotiate with

on various fronts and levels. This was identified as placing burden on the economic generative growth for the continent.

Section three, is an exposition that explains *Financing Growth and Development in Africa, Outlook and Issues*. Section four deals with the *Trade, Investment and Growth Prospects for Africa*. The book draws its conclusion with discussions on the *Adjustment, Resources and Growth: How to manage in the 1990's*, and it was treated by Berg, Helleiner, Martin, and Gondwe, as contributors.

Emery Roe's, (1998) book, *Taking Complexity Seriously: Policy Analysis, Triangulation, and Sustainable Development*, is a contribution to the continued debate on methods of policy analysis and their relevance in the field of public policy. He has argued that methods of policy analysis can help produce valid outcomes while high, complex, and uncertain policy issues are being analyzed. He acknowledges policy environment as problematic in which policy analysis takes place. This is an attempt to provide policy makers a formal basis by which policy decisions are premised.

On the issue of sustainable development, he has used four respective perspectives with a focus on various problem areas, demonstrating their capacity. In each of these perspectives, he raises the same set of questions as what sustainable development really is. Why sustainable development? What does sustainable development require?

In the first perspective, a branch of economics called Girardian, examines patterns of what it refers to as 'Mimetic Behavior' among people in an economic transaction situation particularly in the third-world economies. This is a situation, which he describes how economic decisions of one person are affected by the economic choices of others. This pattern of economic choice has become a central variable in increasing economic returns in economic behavior and policies of developed systems. This type of behavior attracts rewards, only to those

whose economic activity is already active and successful. In the second perspective, cultural theory examines sustainable development through the different values that cultures place upon policy issues, and the extent to which these differences in value affect the willingness of policy audiences to explore unknown alternatives for action or pay the cost of potential failures.

Examination of the third perspective has been a critical theory, which explores sustainable development from a basis that governments and bureaucracies tend to foster negativism about issues in order to reinforce their elite position as the most appropriate means of action. Roe cited the example of this pattern from the Worldwatch Institute as one, given the mismanagement evident in the flux of ordinary unordered choices, advocates an elite approach to the management of world resources.

In the fourth perspective, Roe uses the local justice framework to examine the issue of sustainable development from creating a just environment for dwellers of local communities. In using this perspective, Roe contrasts the effects of actions taken locally with that intended to serve the global environment, and vice-versa. His prime reference is based on the framework that for the allocation of scarce resources and the consequences of such allocations for communities, as well as the examination of the cynical misuse of global needs to increase local gains to be effective, social justice must prevail.

3. 5. 2 A Composite Review of Journal Articles

Patrick Chabal's (2002), article entitled *The Quest for Good Governance and Development in Africa: Is Nepad the Answer?* has motivated an argument on several counts on Nepad including the relevance of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the development question in Africa. He bases his arguments on the widespread fragile political stability and watershed economic

crises on the continent. These issues, he argues, pose consistent threats to Nepad.

The questions of the possible mandate or coercive powers, which Nepad possesses to bring about the critical element of enforcement in prescribed sanctions on an erratic and recalcitrant member state through the APRM initiative, given the experiences of electoral politics, in Africa over the past two decades remain problematic, he contends. Electoral politics played out on the continent over the years, in his view, has rendered good governance impracticable and, therefore, left the choice route for enforcement burdensome. The buzzword in currency, claims that Nepad is the basis for sustainable political and the socio-economic development for Africa in the new century. He acknowledges that, democracy could reduce the scope for conflict and stabilise the polity as a framework of attraction for, both, foreign and locally generated investments (Chabal, 2002).

The article entitled *What is New in the New Partnership for Africa's Development* by Alex De Waal, (2002), has argued that the concept of Nepad is no different from the pre-existing policy attempts, claimed to have been directed at Africa's development. According to him, these programmes were broadly constituted as frameworks within an interminable list of projects, which Nepad has now revived. Peer review mechanism, according to De Waal, is a rather ambitious policy, whose constraints Nepad has failed to envisage. Commitment to good governance, he argues, could only be operationalized through government programmes and not through a phantom political initiative to be encapsulated as a new radical approach in a development partnership. APRM therefore faces political hazards. On the question of resources, he admits, that Nepad may unlock additional financing for development, but at the same time warns that it should not be seen as a cash cow. Nepad appears oversold and is trying to attract unwarranted optimism in terms of expectations and even meaningful implementation, he argues.

An article entitled, *Is Funding from Western Countries Detrimental?* by Rozenda Hendrickse, (2003), advances some perspectives on the concept of foreign financing of development programmes in developing countries in general, and uses South Africa as a case study. Most developing and underdeveloped countries, including those in Africa do attract external funding for developmental purposes. Hendrickse argues that external funding of development programmes from the rich North draws, more often than not, sudden death caveats for the third-world countries. He explores the concept of foreign funding through the International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) with seemingly development-focused programmes that are in partnership with the local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Africa. He argues that the INGOs usually arrive with their own interpretation of development for the developing countries, set their own agenda without meaningful consultation and interfaced-programme with the indigenous civil society organizations.

The INGOs, he argues, hold partnerships with their local counterparts without a clear nature and defined roles for the local partners and that they always fail to seek and identify with the local intelligence and experience and more often than not do not collaborate their activities with the local NGOs, which are effectively involved in similar programmes. The article further argues that INGOs, most of the time, provide assistance through loans and grants, avoid identifying the local needs and aspirations; fail to provide in detail what they know about the services they purportedly ready to provide and focus more on what the contracted developers predetermine for the communities.

He argues that funding by INGOs should be provided through proposals only on what they are known and prepared for as well as what communities themselves have decided as their priorities. Funding from the so-called INGOs, he contends, leads not only to an undue recapitulation of the local NGOs but fragments them and rendering them inefficient and disorganised in functional terms, and that in the past the privilege to benefit from funds from the west to provide capacity

building programmes subsisted only for the later to create impediments upon the realisation that the funds provided were use for what they perceive as the wrong use. He contends that western assistance only favours the communities that kowtow to their demands, objectives, and coerced the local civil societies to change and revert to the linkages of efficiency that match the foreign trends which distract their original plans of action. INGOs are set up, according to him, to meet the objectives of the donors, which have the Western perception of development, for the poor countries, for example, democratisation, gender equality, and environmental conservation, as issues orchestrated in the West that become a prophesy in the poor countries.

Another article on Nepad entitled, *Nepad: Objectives and Implications for Investment and Trade* by Links, E., Santam and J., De Gama, (2002), draws largely from the social theory that seeks to chart the thwarted economies of the continent, the role of Nepad to attract FDI, and the continued imbalance between developed and developing nations that impede and aggravate conditions for the development of the continent. The article uses historical and analytical approaches that render accounts, revealing the causative variables of the developmental constraints facing Africa. In the introduction, the researchers seemingly corroborate the arguments made by Vil-Nkomo (2002), that Nepad in all its euphoria and seeming surge to reposition Africa, there is need to explore the exogenous issues and harness them for Nepad to be operationally effective. The article argues that, for Nepad to achieve any meaningful success, investment and trade are of equal significance to attract FDI in an applied development type linkage.

The central issues raised in the text are the international environment, FDI, Africa's continued failure to attract sizeable investment, and the domestic policy environment that seem to negate such attraction. It further argues that FDI is bi-dimensional in approach and that it can acquire a panacea status with an increased strength of policy maker, that is, creating new skills, technology,

increased access to capital base, and external market. At the same time, it can initiate net adverse consequences, like resource transfers, an impediment to the domestic entrepreneurship and internal savings; disregard for the environment when extracting natural resources; and can heighten internal tensions, if not properly controlled and managed. Links, E, Santam, and de Gama, J., (2002) argue that Nepad through investment and trade could generate employment and tax revenue, for the governments, for the provision of social sectors development and services.

The authors also argue that, for Africa to attract meaningful internal and external investments, it must be able to seriously aim at creating competitive, inviting environments, and conditions, drawing largely from the provisions of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development – Development, Trade and Capital Investment (UNCTAD-DTCI) sources which state that Africa as a whole does not compare favourable with regard to a number of basic determinants of FDI. These determinants, according to the arguments, include instability in the political environment, preponderance of small markets, lack of capital resources, inadequate functional infrastructure, and the perilous debts overhang. Africa, they argue, is being perceived as ‘a location risk’ (Links, E., Santam, De Gama, J., 2002).

Simon Maxwell and Karin Christiansen, (2002), have written an article entitled *Negotiation as Simultaneous Equation: Building a new Partnership with Africa*, This article is yet another scholarly corpus, in the ranging debate on Nepad. It raises four major areas of arguments on the question of partnership *vis-à-vis* Africa’s development. Its areas of contention are: (a) who is in, and who is out, both on Africa’s side and on the side of the would-be partners, the G8 nations, (b) what should the partnership cover, (c) how strong should the partnership be and what degree of backstopping, (d) what mechanism should be put in place to monitor the partnership and if necessary arbitrate between the two.

The authors have argued that the 'constituent elements' that led to the emergence of Nepad have been the subject of several debates, but the matrix of the partnership has barely been given any attention in these debates. They contend that the use of international fora to address issues as partnership, is a rather ambitious strategy, but that partnership ought to be dealt with in special circumstances with different arrangements. The authors have advanced a new paradigm they refer to as 'negotiation as simultaneous equation', and argue that the approach, leads to nothing but unnecessary clutter at international conferences. It ultimately dilutes the focus and that it is an opportunity that the developed nations use to draw leverages on issues of interest to them rather than those that affect the poor countries.

They corroborate the view that the concept of partnership is not new, as several models are on offer. They argue that trust and formal contractual agreements mark the distinction between types of partnership. While other models rely on trust, and envision informal methods for mutual accountability, some others specify formal institutions for the same purpose.

They argue that the African partnership for development with the rich North is tenuous, baseless, and born out of ingenuity given the asymmetrical relationship that continue to exist between the two sides, using the provisions of the Cotonou convention agreements, which seemingly are in favour of the developed nations to support their position. They advocate a partnership that requires symmetrical accountability and the conditions guiding the partnership clearly be stipulated, including commitment to the size and the composition of the flow of aid, the pace and sequencing of trade liberalization or debt relief and enforcement mechanisms, with penalties available for the rich countries who give aid to Africa. They support, generously, some schools of thought which regard the partnership for development as a 'hollow partnership' and an 'inflexible partnership' and thus pose a question, as to which of the two is better suited, for Africa.

They put forth the question of multi-lateralism for Africa's development, noting that the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, and France, from the G8 nations support Nepad while United States of America (USA) does not. They argue that, any new form of partnership arrangements with the G8 nations are highly likely to become problematical. On the African part, they argue, Nepad is being criticized for a lack of popular participation and genuine ownership, as it is a leadership-driven concept and that the broad base involvement of all African states would create obvious difficulties and assert that on either side, this partnership is a recipe for selective or limited partnership (Max and Christensen, 2002).

They argue, that the form of partnership, which Nepad seems to seek with the G8 is practically informal, given that the promoters of Nepad are occasionally invited to the G8 Summits. On the issue of the type of structure for the partnership, the authors argue that, some structure already exist which could be useful for the partnership. The structures they indicate are: the African Union (AU) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) on the part of Africa, while on the part of the G8 nations the structures already existence are: the Organization for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU). These structures, according to their arguments, would help to avoid a proliferation of institutions and duplication of functions.

The authors used Rwanda as the case study to argue against any meaningful partnership between Africa and the developed nations. Rwanda, they argue, exemplifies the stereotypical 'Africa' political logjam, socio-economic stagnation, and poverty, on the one hand; and the low government capacity, patchy policy environment, and the dwindling agricultural productivity that are ubiquitous on the continent, on the other. Despite these debilitating factors to Rwandan development, they argue, the developed countries, in their collective judgment front aid provision and failed to mobilise interventionist approach and support at the pre-genocide period in Rwanda. This experience, they argue, has sown discord and distrust between the Rwandan government and the developed

nations. In their view, Nepad may witness a similar experience. In conclusion, they proffer a few recommendations maintaining that genuine development partnership should be all-inclusive, rather than selective.

Kurt Morais and Sanusha Naidu's (2002) article entitled, *Libya's African Policy: What Does it Mean for South Africa?* This article reflects on the current debate, on whether or not Nepad will succeed, given the evolving political and socio-economic conditions on the continent. The authors have cited Libya as being over zealous in approach, implicating Libya in terms of her current financial assistance not only to the French Equatorial African (AEF), but also to some Southern African countries, aimed at extracting multi-level support to her infamous political ambition on the continent. The authors raise concerns on the implication of such assistance to South Africa, which they argue, is at the helm of Nepad implementation and widely perceived as inconsistent and lagging in astute pursuit of her foreign policy objectives in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-region. The article stresses the implication of Libya's further encroachment in Southern Africa, for Nepad, in terms of its avid initiative of a monitoring mechanism for good governance.

It chronicles incidents of attempts at influence peddling and hegemony-seeking by Libya and cited the implicit danger, which Nepad is likely to attract through Libya's ambition, given her pariah status at the international level. The article argues that South Africa must assert intrepid influence more pragmatically *vis-à-vis* her foreign policy objectives than what currently appears to be the case. This would assist South Africa, according to the authors, to appear convincing before the international community and render Nepad as credible before the would-be partners.

Nepad and the Dialectics of African Underdevelopment, an article by John F.E., Ohiorhenuan, (2002), seemingly reinforces the ongoing argumentations on whether or not the concept of Nepad is a genuine African development strategy.

In the overview presented, the author underscores a crucial point by arguing that the programmatic frameworks of Nepad appear as a grandly over-arching development strategy in favour of more realistic strategy, on the one hand, and obscurely ambiguous on the other, given its transitional frames of reference since inception. The article treads on the familiar ground especially when it corroborates B. Turok's (2000) arguments that the Nepad initiative is not all new, and that it is actually evolved from the pre-existing programmes such as the Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Order in Africa; Intellectual Foundation for the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1989-2000, all undertaken by United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) under Adebayo Adedeji, from the 1970's through to the 1980's.

Against the background of the structural adjustment programme, the article argues, that 'UNECA developed action programmes – The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (AA-SAP), the document nodded and identified alternative frameworks to the IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) with recommendations for new policy directions similar to Nepad and that the emergence of Nepad is not precursory to these programmes' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002). The author argues that, 'the only difference between those programmes and Nepad is the partnership characterization with the G-8 countries, donors, and multilateral international organizations and to a lesser extent the devotion of attention to conflict resolution and management in the continent. The article further argues that Nepad has entrenched itself on the global level, by encapsulating the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted at the 56th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2001' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002).

The central arguments in the article, are what he refers to as 'complexity' and 'ambiguity' of Nepad. The 'ambiguity', which the author has noted, is drawn from the nomenclature change, which has negatively characterized Nepad as an

initiative', a 'project', an 'idea', a 'programme', and an 'implementation mechanism' for the African Union (AU). The article argues that, while Nepad is being declared as 'mandated initiative', equal status has therefore been accorded to it, with African Union (AU) and that in the confusion, it has become difficult for it to be the veritable mechanism for the political and the socio-economic emancipation of the continent. He explicates the structure, the specifications of Nepad's programmes, and the conditions for sustainable development that are enshrined in Nepad. The author's extrapolations have led to the identification of deviations in the sectoral priority areas with multi-disciplinary concepts such as poverty alleviation, capital flow, market access, negotiations of new relationships with the developed nations, multi-tier implementation structures, and the poverty reduction strategy, which the author regards as a complexity of Nepad.

The article, having evaluated the complexity of Nepad's programme descriptions, categorizes them into two sections:

- Wide ranging coverage and absence of any criteria for prioritization; and
- The problem of assigning task and coordination.

Given all the initiatives, the author is of the view that, 'Nepad does not emerge as a coherent set of activities to be implemented in the traditional sense. Accordingly, it does not seem to deal effectively with how specific responsibilities are, or would be assigned' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002).

Another area of ambiguity, according to the author, is the organizational structure to assign leadership of task teams to independent, unrelated bodies and sub-committees of member states, which in essence would mean the subordination of the goodwill of some of the UN Agencies, multilateral financial institutions, and the G8 countries. He has, however, acknowledged that good governance is an essential prerequisite for development. He argues that good governance should not have been the issue with the partners, but the African civil societies through guaranteed basic freedom of participation and choice, nurturing of creativity, as these would, in turn, build up the needed domestic resources and attract the

capital flight return and the FDI. He draws his conclusion by stating that the unnecessary, but complex substantive and institutional approaches would compromise the ability of Nepad to coherently prosecute the type of development Africa now requires. A programme such as Nepad with a Pan-Africanist vision needs a broader approach and consideration for the fundamental factors than the normative and the traditional way of dealing with the African development issues in terms of implementation.

Schoeman, N.J. (2003), in his article entitled, *Economic Growth and Development Constraints in Africa*, has argued that the pressure on governments in Africa has tended to exacerbate, not only their policy incapacities but also the funding of meaningful development projects as well as the linkage of their economies to the modern global economic systems. In its approach on the development problems through the political economy paradigm, the article's main findings though not new but nevertheless critical, includes:

- The state playing an appreciable role in the superior macro-economic outcomes.
- The inability to provide corporate governance in terms of social services—education, employment and health delivery.
- Marginalization of the state from FDI and other investments.
- Economic vulnerability to external shocks.

He rates these factors as constraints that increasingly impede Africa's development. He argues that ownership of production is less crucial if governance can be meaningfully administered, and that the constraints in South Africa are on inefficiency scale that pervades the local tiers of government, poor domestic savings, and lack of international competitiveness conditions, which resonate vividly and prevail on the continent.

The article further argues that a favourable economic response to growth can only take place when policy approaches address what it refers to as 'supply side' constraints, for example, decrease in unskilled real wage, enhanced the

education system, human capital development and the FDI, rather than 'demands side' expansion. It calls for clear, bold, innovative, and coordinated policy choices necessary to position the continent on the path to development and concludes that addressing the myriad economic conundrum of Africa requires multiple strategies. The author notes that to evolve and sustain such a policy in African may be rigorous and hugely challenging.

Ben Turok's (2002), article entitled, *The International Response to Nepad*, highlights the recent convergent pronouncements at some international conferences ascribed to the G8 countries, the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) representatives in the realization and appreciation of the growing underdevelopment consequences, stagnated economies, and the appreciable level of global poverty that have threatened international peace. Consequently, he argues on the possible reasons for the change of heart even in the acknowledgement of Nepad as the Africa's development initiative: He has located his contentions on:

- Deplorable economic regression in Africa and the aspirations that have prompted calls for decisive global actions against poverty.
- Unstable equilibrium of the world system and the shift in the world economic power largely to the developed nations.
- The loss of confidence in the crucial world economic institutions.
- The need for decisive action plan to cool the overheated world system.

(Turok, 2002).

He argues that the poorest nations and their populace living below poverty lines are what he refers to as the 'ultimate systemic threat', being the fallout of the slow growth rate in their economies, continued drop in per capita income, increased debt burden, and widespread poverty. This, according to the article, contributes to the change of heart by the developed nations and their consequent endorsement of the Nepad initiative. Other reasons why Nepad has received international acclaim so far are premised on what some schools of thought have

to say that during the cold war, the rich countries were happy to prop up corrupt regimes in Africa, fought proxy wars, sold weapons to suppress their subjects and swelled their foreign debt. These debts, if anything, are crushing Africa, and have resulted in some of the countries spending more than they can internally generate on debt servicing, than they spend on education and health, he argues.

He argues that, foreign aid for development has always been tied to exports of western goods and services. The official aid package to Africa, in particular has dwindled from '\$32 per an African in 1990 to \$19 in 1998', The Economist, (February 20, 2001), quoted in Turok (2002). The article explains further what it refers to as the 'crisis thinking' mentality of the world financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF, and their seeming concerns for poverty alleviation programmes and homegrown development policies, to assist in the reordering and sustenance of a new world political and socio-economic systems as perceived by them and conceal their ineffectiveness.

The perceptions and policy shifts in the G8, the IMF, and the World Bank, on the restructuring of the global economic systems to accommodate the developing economies have become clearer. These institutions seem to worry overmuch about strengthening the macro economic policy base of the developing countries; this shift appears to have given rise not only to the ongoing WTO round table debates but also the development partnership which Nepad seems to hinge on. The question remains as to what concrete steps would add value or impetus to these commonly used proclamation to prop up the fragmented economies in practical terms, he argues.

In another of his articles entitled, *The New Partnership for Africa's Development, (NEPA)* (2002), Turok unearths what seemly precipitated the concept of Nepad. He has argued that the Regional Integration initiative, which Adebayo Adedeji advocated as a radical move to aggressively pursue the continental efforts for development and growth, has become the nucleus of the Nepad's programme.

The initiative, according to Turok, was the 'African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programme (AAFSAP) to the IMF Structural Adjustment Programme'. He notes that Adedeji's futuristic advocacy for regional integration, at the time, led to the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Economic Community (EAEC). These economic groupings, he argues, are attempts toward socio-economic development, and therefore, Nepad could only be a rebound and the renewed Adedeji's Africa's economic development blueprint.

On a separate level, Turok questions the rationale for the exclusion of the South African apartheid government from the membership of the fledgling SADC at the time when the economic imperatives of the continent were dire. He argues that South Africa with her economic and technological comparative advantages and the economies of scale, over the rest of Africa, particularly the SADC sub-region could have had positive stabilizing effects, not only in the economies of the sub-region, but also those of the sub-Saharan nations. He claims that Adedeji had implicitly endorsed this fact at the Windhoek conference of January 1994.

Sibusiso Vil-Nkomo's, (2002), versed article entitled, *Leadership for Development in a Globalized Environment*, discusses the intractable problematic development imperatives, which the continent has faced, and the ubiquitous African leadership crises in the new millennium, which may challenge the realization of Nepad. The author has presented arguments with a new theoretical perspective on what he refers to as leadership for development, operational citizenship (elements which, do or do not, constitute leadership for development), the new scramble to save Africa both internally and externally, and the aftermath of globalization on the quest for Africa's development (Vil-Nkomo, 2002).

The author contends that given the contemporary Africa's development drive, the pertinent question is likely the 'leadership for development' paradigm. In other words, the implementation of the initiatives of Nepad, besides focusing attention

and action plans on the conventional dimensions and orthodoxy of development theorizing, there must be commitment to participatory and people-centred form of governance; the stakeholders must be made to feel being in control so as not only to create an imbalance but a sense of dynamism, adaptation, and a predictable environment, he argues. He notes that the leadership for development bears huge consequences and influence on any development initiative, Nepad inclusive. He further argues, that the pursuit and having individuals perceive themselves as leaders, must have a paradigmatic grounding which is dissimilar to ideology, so that their policy outputs and strategies could be long term and sustainable. The author had been quick to note that, 'Nepad is not as given'.

3. 5. 3 A Composite Review of Monographs

Ian Taylor's, Monograph (2002), entitled, *The Failure of the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development*, presents the evolutionary antecedents and the purposes of Nepad and its possibility for extinction. He motivates that, the socio-political conditions on the continent in the last few years have come to put Nepad to test with its APRM initiative *vis-à-vis* the political realities that have seize the continent through the conduct and utterances of its promoters. For instance, Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda are some of the sticky flashpoints where the African diplomacy has been anything but effective let alone the APRM of Nepad.

He explains that, given the contentious nature of these incidents particularly in Zimbabwe, the Commonwealth of Nations with two important members of the G8, the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada, decided to intervene through the troika made up of Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo and John Howard of South Africa, Nigeria and Australia respectively. The article has argued that Nepad, a veritable apple pie wish list for Africa's development, has seemingly fallen apart, given the fact that it is a partnership driven concept with the rich countries of the

north, which Canada and the UK, whom its promoters oppose and turned against, are strong influential members. He argues that, the race card and dubious democratic credentials of its promoters have rubbed off the interest of the G8. The blatant refusal to own up the APRM ideals particularly with regard to the political logjam and the violent seizure of farmlands in Zimbabwe, for example negates the essence of APRM (Taylor, 2002).

The author argues that, Nepad has been set on the conservative political and economic frameworks through good governance, democratic and economic liberalization principles to attract development partnership and that the promoters have through their political and diplomatic ineptitude rendered Nepad irrelevant, at least in the eyes of the G8 and donor nations. He narrated how Mbeki and Obasanjo tried to block the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, and branded some of the G8 leaders as racists, and the false declarations on the internal political occurrences in Zimbabwe by Obasanjo, matters that should ordinarily have required political and diplomatic savvy, astuteness, and deft. These issues, he argues, render their antics fit into a well-worn pattern that stake out the evolution of Nepad. The goals of Nepad appear laudable. To drive the achievement and the realization of these goals requires openness and commitments of the promoters than their peer support, political symbolism and rhetoric, he argues.

The author also argues that the concept appeared to observers a qualitatively different approach from the previous declarations and that what had attracted the international focus was the promise to checkmate autocrats, dictators, and kleptocrats and rein them in, (Turok, 2002). Furthermore, he argues that, the rest of the world on the basis of honesty, transparency, accountability, mutual respect, recognition of the universal notions of democracy, human rights, and good governance equally perceived the ideal of APRM and that the events, that have taken place in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Zimbabwe, for example, and the

corresponding response of the promoters of Nepad have certainly invited a great deal of skepticism.

He concludes that good governance is an essential ingredient to a coherent programme to tackle the myriad developmental problems of Africa and that the failure of APRM in the first test case to demonstrate its will and cut its teeth is something of a profound disappointment. He observes that any future discourse on Nepad is likely to be in remembrance of a good idea sabotaged by the behaviour of the promoters who seek first political aggrandizement and solidarity with their errant colleagues than those of the hard-pressed people of Africa (Taylor, 2002).

Jerry O. Kuye's, (2003) work, *Targeting NEPAD for Continental Development*, is a paper presented at a workshop hosted at the International Institute for Administrative Sciences (IISA), Regional International Conference, Yaounde, Cameroun in 2003, with the theme: *Shared Governance, Combating Poverty and Exclusion*. The issue of transformation of the African continent, that is, the eradication of poverty, political crisis, diseases, and substituting those with good governance, political stability, and economic growth, so that the continent can, in transition, move from underdevelopment to a developing state, through policy targeting as the theme of the paper. Nepad has come to serve as the template for development in Africa for the 21st century.

Kuye has captured a vivid account that has assumed a special character, in that he focuses on the theme that has so far been excluded from the ongoing debate on Nepad. He argues that for Nepad, and for that matter the AU, to become the mechanisms for Africa's development, public administration principles through policy targeting would have to be brought into a sharp focus. The logic here has opened space for the author's determination to fit public policy process into the context of Nepad and the AU in the quest to implement their onerous developmental policies.

In this respect, the author draws upon a methodological framework to buttress his arguments, which more or less serve an important agenda-setting function for African development programming. He has wittingly drawn attention to the fact that examination of public administration approaches to targeting policy for development as vehicles for AU and Nepad, (Kuye, 2003), are critical for Africa's development policies at all levels. He contends that, for governments in Africa and with the Nepad initiative, the uneven development and complex patterns of social and class differentiation, the need to ensure fiscal budgetary discipline and effective peer review mechanism among other factors, have made it necessary for the adoption of targeting as a methodological approach to address development (Kuye, 2003:2).

3. 5. 4 A Critiquing Overview of the related Literature

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff's, (2002) argument on the issue of actors seeking cultural identities from partnership engagements, and her view of partnership as a concept without the necessary trappings for any advantages are inarguably simplistic. She has not given partnership of any kind any benefits that may have informed the context of partnership for development. She has come away without offering a better option, especially to meet the aspiration of the globalization process and the sustainable development phenomenon.

Then the pertinent question that arises is: What constitute different forms of partnership she has identified? The answer to this question could be based on the fact that, development partnership is for exchanges and to achieve effective, efficient service delivery, attract funding, technical assistance, and government participation, which appear to be the downstream considerations of activities. Brinkerhoff contentions are not ways beyond the context and concept of what international partnership for development seek hard to achieve. Her insights into partnership though, highlight some case studies are inconclusive. In essence, her arguments appear too generic in context. For instance, the policy concept of

Nepad is partnership driven, seeking international funding for regional development, which, as a consequence, will try to reposition Africa strongly globally. Nepad is more global, as it is afrocentric. She has clarified partnership in concept, but fails to address the scope, complex process, range and the context through which the concept is articulated and denies a fusion between the concept and context of partnership. She appears dismissive of any theoretical underpinnings to rationalize her standpoints.

What informs the concept of international development partnership could be mutually reinforcing for the partners with inherent hybrid variables and interests, which are equally deterministic in development partnership. International partnership for development is not mutually exclusive. Her book is useful, as it is one of the few to deal directly with the concept of international partnership for development.

David Callahan and Bruce Jennings (1993) attempt to justify policy failures appears a study in isolation of a particular policy, but various public policy analyses do fully explain what happens in particular places, circumstances, and times in policy process environments. The argument on 'anomalous responses' of policy makers being responsible for policy failures, though plausible, is not all convincing. For instance, the gaps between the policy propositions by policy analysts could be found by questions arising from what policy analysts say and advise, and what the political actors or policy implementers say and do in the course of policy implementation. The questions that arise are: Were the policies contradictory in concept and context? What had necessitated the policy? and What were the set objectives?

The failure of a particular policy in one setting may not necessarily mean it cannot flourish well in another, and vice versa. This is because some policies are conceptualized within different contexts, exigencies of objectives and aspirations, which may be at variance at different times and needs. That is to

say, various policies are conceptualized in different contexts, in different circumstances; at various settings; times; differing opinions of what should be, or not be; what the policy is meant to achieve, priority areas, and the policy environment. Yet, policy analysts have been implicated in the determination of types of policy process, policy options, implementation, and policy outcomes, and even policy failures.

It cannot be safely argued that the failure of policies is a direct responsibility of policy analysis, as Jennings would have us believe. Policy analysis is not an end in itself, but a means to proffer alternative best choice to achieve a set objective. Essentially, it is critically important to reason, from the cause to the effect, rather than the effect to the cause. The text offers lessons already learnt on contemporary policy analysis issues. There is a lot to be done on this paradigm.

Jan K Coetzee, Johan Graaf, Fred Hendricks, Geoffrey Woods, (2002) edited book, does exactly what the title says. The book's central argument is the issue at debate - development imperatives in Africa. It stresses the need to move debates beyond the frontiers of the usual macro-structural paradigms, so as to be able to roundly situate Africa's development dilemmas. This is due to the fact that, most public discourses on Africa's development imperatives, focus largely on macro-agencies of governments and their policies with little or no emphasis on micro-agencies, it argues. The authors contend that, the lack of emphasis on micro-structural agencies is, by implication, developmentally constraining Africa.

The book focuses on policy re-orientation, civil society participation in policy processes for any meaningful development to take place in Africa, with a more emphasis on micro-structures. It corroborates the calls for a paradigm shift, both in, approaches and theories of Africa's development. Notwithstanding the difficulties in an edited study, it would have been more useful if the editors had sought to tackle more directly, the central paradox of contemporary Africa, that is, the fact that the continent is unquestionably modernizing while at the same time

failing to develop. The sympathetic critique, on this piece of work, is that it has failed to analyze the theoretical linkages, which earn their support against the pseudo-theoretical underpinnings of some of the development economists. The book is an eminent resource for those researchers, scholars and policy practitioners with keen interest in Africa's development studies.

The book by Ulf Himmelstrand; Kabiru Kinyanjui; and Edward Mburugu, (1994) have engaged in issues of development within the African perspective, and have, at the same time assessed their real impact on Africa's development imperatives by employing a variety of development theories and paradigms, which underscore their respective arguments. They have failed to relate which specific development theory or the contemporary African regional development initiatives fit the contemporary African development efforts, on the one hand, and the dynamics of exogenous conditions that may or may have impacted the implementation processes of precursory development policy programmes on the continent on the other. The book, has however, generated stimulating thoughts for those engaged in the Africa's development studies.

Jan-Erik Lane's, (1990) work has the theme of 'institutional reform'. The author offers reform proposals that seemingly hold out a promise to address the problems hampering the public institutions' reformation. The concept of a policy instrument for institutional reformation seems inspiring, but the authors' overwhelming dependence on this single concept is a bit of an over-stretch. The book, is readable and uncluttered by jargon, describes several key institutional problems that afflict various institutional reforms, some of which have been proposed in various texts. The author seems to believe, more in the creation of incentive, to increase efficiency and outcome quality. It tends to skip over policy reform details, established theories, and empirical research, while providing a temptingly painless way to reinvent public institutions and render them efficient and effective.

The author seems to have been forced at several key junctures to wish away misaligned incentives, and he is unable to provide evidence that suggest his scheme is a fail-safe work. He oversimplifies and over-generalizes the reformation process and overlooks vital complexities relating to implementation of the institutional reformation process. He avoids addressing numerous significant consequences that his proposals are likely to produce and relies more on good intentions rather than design. Fictional account is not any evidence. The author has sought to explain the issues clearly that generally hamper reformation of public institutions and their performance, an approach that seems to receive little attention from policy studies, but one that can create significant unintended consequences. As a result, the implementation of policy initiative and institutional reforms require thoughtful and broader considerations.

The author takes a bold leap in extending the implications of his findings for prospective policy initiative for institutional change. Unstructured institutional reform can cause a shift in motivation of policy operators from fulfilling bureaucratic mandates, to responding to system demands. How effective institutions translate policy from cause to effect through implementation has escaped mention. The book is eminently readable and a valid contribution to the public policy debate on the relevance of institutional reforms, particularly when those institutions performance fall far short than expected. Nepad has, in this study been conceptualized as a public institution for coordination, management, administration and the implementation of the Nepad's programmes.

Gelase Mutahaba and M. Jide Balogun book (1992) have dealt with the contagion of implementation difficulties on the continent. In as far as these expositions go, with specific reference to strengthening the policy processes in Africa, the arguments are seriously partial, if not prejudicial. They run against African historical past, given the fact that the African policy environments are the legacies of colonialism. The then regional organization, the OAU had failed to introduce effective macro-economic policies, and strengthen management

capacities within the continent. These issues could have assisted in creating viable environment on some of the vexing issues of African development imperatives.

If OAU had a pragmatic policy framework (as has been the case with the EEC) such as multi-criteria decision-making framework, there would have been a spin off effect. System dynamics are not exclusive to nation states. Supra-national institutions are better suited to exercise greater influence in policy formulation, alignment, and implementation, the EU, for example. Similarly, the issue of dysfunctional policy design, policymaking, and policy implementation in Africa are tied to a number of conceptual and empirical questions that have characterized the political, socioeconomic, and leadership conditions which enjoy dubious eminence, and negatively impact public administration and policy processes on the continent.

With the magnitude and character of Africa's development crisis, steps that ought to have been taken, for cause and effect, and the crisis of policy management capacity are some of the likely questions that may arise from the African policy process environment *vis-à-vis* Nepad. The extent to which the domestic policy management capacity could meet the demands, and if the existing capacity falls short of requirements, how far then, should we go in closing any perceived gaps through foreign assistance in policy making and implementation? Others may argue on the appropriate institutional infrastructure to facilitate the achievement of the basic policy objectives. It could be asked that, to what extent have the management development, improvement agencies, and institutions been effectively engaged and challenged in the formulation of domestic policy in strengthening the management, implementation and delivery capacities of both, the macro-and micro-economic policies in the continent in the past four decades? This is a critical juncture with regard to the implementation process of Nepad.

The strength of Stuart S. Nagel's (1994) book lies in the breadth of his cross-fertilized policy studies experiences. He conceptualizes public policy into policy studies, public policy, and policy analysis, as it were and applies a non-dogmatic approach to his arguments, on the intermittent, but patchy development policy environments prevalent in most developing countries, and even worse so in Africa. This nonplussed and persistent situation has undermined the development question based on policy variables and options.

The theoretical framework of analysis of the policy environment in developing countries is well grounded and articulated by the author. What Nagel (1994) has not told us is the causal link between policy within and policy without concepts, which are not explored in relation to developmental policies of the third-world nations. He has also failed to predicate policy implementation analysis and development to regional developmental programmes, particularly in the third-world environment, which appears to be the basis for the book. He has omitted the 'dependency' or the 'interventionist' approaches, which could improve policy formulation and implementation domains, especially in third-world nations.

This book is an informative piece of work done by a renowned author of policy analysis and policy studies; he has offered models for informed scholarship of policy environments in the third-world. Regional integration is not by itself, coalescing of development policy processes especially in the third-world.

I. G. Patel (ed), (1992) edited book deals essentially with three major elements – regional integration, special responsibility of industrialized nations to assist Africa and the homegrown initiative to overcome consequences of the structural adjustment programmes. The regional integration argument does not appear credible enough, for instance, the OAU has been a regional organisation since independence, but could not prove developmentally effective for the continent. It is a truism that development is a process and not an event, which means a direct focus, would mean a step in a right direction for development. The point at issue,

therefore is, did the OAU take any development initiative, and if it did, which one could be ascribed to it? The introduction of the SAPs on the continent is a direct consequence of inept policy mechanisms, which the OAU may not be convincingly, absolved. The effect of the SAPs are still the lingering question of structural economic dependency of a continent on their colonial masters, and the international capitalist operatives, due to limited resources, that is, capital and human resourcefulness, and the scanty and inappropriate development policy environments. This book has an historical orientation. It fails to engage theoretical and empirical paradigms to underpin arguments. It serves the purpose in which African countries, and the international financial institutions interplayed on the way forward in the search for an appropriate strategy for Africa's development. It appears to be a general interest-reading book.

Emery Roe's (1998) thesis on the advantages of 'Triangulation' could be found from the four perspectives that Roe has identified from sustainable development. Although Roe did not innovate or enunciate any fresh policy analysis method in this book, the method of triangulation and use of multiple perspectives on complex policy issues are situated approaches in policy analysis (Dunn, 1987)

Roe (1998) has however, emphasized the seriousness of complexity in policy environment and the need to incorporate them into the analysis of substantive policy issue. Nepal is a complex policy issue within an equally complex policy environment. In spite of this observation, the arguments are relevant to this study. It could be argued that every society is in dynamic evolution. The dynamic nature of each society is dependent on a number of factors that differs from one to the next. Consequently, different levels of complexity and uncertainty may influence policy analysis, policymaking, policy decisions and policy environments. The 'Triangulation' concept has a more useful application in the Western environment than in the developing world. The book is limited on the evenness of policy environments, but has the theoretical and methodological coherence for policy studies.

It is, without gainsaying that the postulations advanced by Chabal (2002) are observable occurrences, which have plagued the continent for decades. The counter argument is: Is it better to sit and do nothing than to do something? The response to the question could be found in the development imperatives of Africa and the willingness to acknowledge and address them, and to learn from doing. Nothing is more vital to implicate than self-correction; nothing is worse than blind preservation, Warwick, (1982). For all the development constraints of the continent, people, particularly the African leaderships, must necessarily exercise optimal concern by initiating measures that could prove effective, in conjunction with the contemporary globalization process, the UN MDGs, and the sustainable development phenomenon. Nepad is one of such efforts. The author has failed to offer any alternative policy choices to replace Nepad, nor examines the conditions that could strengthen their implementation processes.

Nepad may have evoked some particularities of the old programmes, as claimed by De Waal, (2002) but development policy as every other socio-economic concept is dialectical within the context of competing imperatives. The conceptualization of the Nepad programmes may have had implicit grey areas, which has been placed in context. Essentially, the APRM is a radical approach in determining acts of governance among member states with particular reference to their economic and political policies. The peer review mechanism was never initiated and incorporated in the previous agenda of the precursory policy programmes. If it were, it was not mentioned. System dynamics entail new concepts, ideas, and applications including policy dynamics.

Hendrickse's (2003) article has critical relevance to Nepad and the concept of the study. This is because the emphases essentially deal with the issues of development, partnership, western funding for development, and underdevelopment. The overall text underpins the Nepad concept of partnership with international NGOs as case studies.

The visions and missions of the INGOs may be under cloak but remain an explicit agenda in pursuit of their programmes in developing countries. They often tend to the dictates of their sponsors with regard to policy and programmes implementation. But the themes being argued by Hendrickse (2003) are not all conclusive because they are incoherent and dissonance with the international partnership paradigms, aid assistance for development, and the fragmentation of the domestic NGOs. He has established the necessity and the usefulness of partnership with the west within a development context and technical assistance. It may be true that the INGOs adopt different development approaches in different regions of the developing countries and tailor programmes to meet their various perceptions, but this does not erode the overall advantages of partnership. The issues of critical importance are the resource and capacity constraints facing the third-world countries and the local Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), which hamper them to draw leverages from the partnership, a fact Hendrickse omitted in his arguments.

Development partnership in most cases entail interest, engagements, funding and activities. They are in various forms and contexts. Development oriented partnership particularly when it involves the economic relationship between the developed and the under-developed nations, refers to a community of interests and high stakes. The local NGO's must endeavor, as a rule, to embark on training so as to improve management techniques, organization skills, budgeting, prioritizing programmes, defining policy agenda and programmes, in consultation with the civil society they seek to serve and governments, within the resources at their disposal in relation to their developmental objectives. Where they fail to capacitate themselves, either through training or domestic fundraising, the INGOs, which are almost always better organized, better managed, and better resourced, cannot be held accountable.

The article has succeeded in opening up a fresh understanding with a different perspective of development partnership between the International Non-

governmental Organizations (INGOs) and their counterparts in the developing nations especially in Africa. It has added to the debate on the partnership for development. He has failed to recognize the modern theme of negotiated interdependence in development partnership and the winds of globalization.

Hendrickse's (2003) article has waged critiques on the INGOs, using the South African indigenous NGOs as the case studies. He made no specific mention of any local NGOs in any particular Province in South Africa to drive home his contentions. His arguments are seemingly isolated for the simple reason that if the INGOs do not perform in South Africa, it is not given that they are unsuccessful in other third-world locations, irrespective of time period. The basis for comparative analysis is indeed flawed and therefore reduces the value of his arguments. This is because his thesis is limited and non-global, given the imperatives of the UN MDGs, globalization process and the sustainable development fundamentals. Partnership for development seems to be the current theme with global appeal. The view that external aid for Africa's development has, if anything exacerbates the macro-economic and development policies of the developing countries is a hard sell. The local NGOs must be able to solicit adequate funding to be able to detach themselves from the apron string of their Western counterparts, which is not an option.

Hendrickse's conclusion that Western funding undermines democracy and interferes with the governance of South Africa is warped and disjointed. He did not provide empirical evidence, nor prove beyond controversy. The arguments are more like propaganda and they fall below an academic base-point. International NGOs are voluntary agencies, perceived as geo-strategic organizations whose agenda and programmes are multi-focused. They are not multi-national companies and cannot be so perceived. The topic for this article should have read 'Unequal Partnership between the Northern and the Southern NGOs'. The title is rather a miss read.

E. Santam Links and J. De Gama (2002) article appears to be a meta-evaluation of investment possibilities open to Africa through Nepad. The article reflects a neo-liberal economic doctrine. Interestingly though, the emphasis on the development and investment constraints are central to the partnership and development themes as well as the upliftment of the downward trends of the domestic economies. The Nepad initiative has not been adequately dealt with in this article. The authors fail to apply social theory, which they appear to have started out with, to suggest further policy options either at the macro-or micro-levels as an alternative to the Nepad initiative. They rely on macro-economic recommendations with no emphasis on the micro-structures that could generate meaningful internal economic growth for the continent.

The article does not offer a critique on the political and socio-economic theories in tandem with Africa's development, but rather engages the contemporary thoughts to rationalize the economic opportunities that abound through Nepad. In other words, it is a thorough account of the prospects, which Nepad stands to generate for the African economy. The article deserves commendation, in its own right, as a contribution to the ongoing debate on the Nepad initiative.

Simon Maxwell and Karin Christiansen's, (2002) article under review has used analytical and descriptive approaches to strengthen their arguments, which do not appear paradoxical to Nepad. It successfully argues both, for and against, the concept of development partnership and by extension Nepad. The arguments appear plausible to the extent of the Rwandan recent political history and experience. It has dealt not sufficiently, though, with the crucial elements that may complicate the implementation process.

The article is unable to draw out the deterministic variables that could be conducive for partnership engagement, but it has cited types of partnership without, again, proposing any as a substitute for Africa in the age of globalization. It has not advanced any partnership theory as a framework of analysis to seal

their arguments. The crucial point to note is that for any development partnership to occur, attention must be paid, not only, to the palliative measures and the immediate needs, but also to the underlying conditions that could facilitate or militate against the implementation process as well as the direct implementation mechanisms. These are obvious value-laden elements in the implementation of the Nepad ideals.

The truth-value of their arguments, particularly on the overarching action plans of Nepad, which have successfully drawn in multiple stakeholders, cannot be over-emphasized. It is also true that the exigencies that prompted the genocide in Rwanda may not result in a similar magnitude of upheaval elsewhere on the continent, except if the authors mean to impress that there are no success stories in the continent. However, the article remains ambivalent to these issues and offers no propositions on how the partnership may achieve success.

Kurt Morais and Naidu Sanusha's (2002) article is a politically generated knowledge text, aimed at the 'quiet diplomacy' posturing of the South African government on Zimbabwe. The arguments are based on the fact that the quiet diplomacy of South Africa may not attract to Nepad the required assistance from the would-be partners. The article is parsimonious on advancing directions and alternative models, with which South Africa should pursue her sub-regional foreign policy objectives for the benefit of Nepad's implementation. The framework of analysis does not present insightful discussions on the interrelated paradigms of politics and socio-economic development disparities in the sub-region that have warranted Zimbabwe, South Africa, and AEF countries to behave the way they do taking cognizance of the partnership context of Nepad.

By arguing that Libya is ambitiously seeking a hegemonic role in Southern Africa is merely an inexorable tirade and declamation. It is preposterous, at least, in the context of Nepad, to presume the two countries that simultaneously are signatories to AU cannot work together as partners in the realization of the

Nepad's ideals. The import of this assertion is rather subjective. Does it purport to demonstrate that the two countries cannot negotiate in other ways in the breadth of their experiences, even for the sake of a political coalition, to maintain contact and minimal understanding, a role that remains essential and could increase in significance for Nepad?

Is the article saying: How can the differences between the two nations, if any, in the type and manner of their responses to Nepad change the rationale? The inverse seems equally relevant where South Africa's foreign policy on Zimbabwe remains essentially indeterminate and ambiguous. The remark that South Africa has the exclusive role in the implementation of Nepad rather than other member states is a hard sell, if the partnership context and the evolution of Nepad are properly understood. The article is well written and has tried to underscore the conservative viewpoints on the prospects of Nepad.

John Ohiorhenuan,'s (2002) article has provided some critical retrospections on the concept through which he identifies calabashes of challenges to Nepad. Amongst them are what he refers to as ambiguities and complexities of Nepad's conceptualization. The promotion, the implementation process, and the overall success of the Nepad's ideals would best be explained, and understood within the concepts of 'ambiguities' and 'complexities' identified by the author and on which the study has focused. It is only then that the issues that suffer exclusion and are glossed over would receive adequate attention.

The concept of APRM as a measure to instill the practice of good governance and strengthen democratic principles in Africa, which has largely been cited in debates and public discourses as impasse to Africa's development have received no mention in the article. The article uses no theoretical framework to further its arguments. It came away from the critically inherent conditions that could negatively impact the implementation process of the Nepad's ideals.

The article is a valuable resource to student of policy analysis and development, Nepad, AU secretariats, and African development scholars alike. The author writes with great lucidity and brings his breath of experience in development policy management to bear. He examines pointedly, both the complexity and ambiguity empirically and conceptually.

Schoeman, N.J., (2002) postulations on the policy incapacity, limited resources, in relation to the linkage of African economies to modern global economic systems remain insufficient and partially grounded. They could be supplemented by other considerations such as permanency of both policy barriers and institutional insulations that have increasingly led to high transaction costs in international trade, thereby constraining their ability to attract integration prospects in the global market. The specific features common in these economies that have hindered their capacity for expansion and export-driven are limited markets, overburdened policy environments, lack of endowment factors, a huge unskilled labour force and cost.

Economic liberalization, where it exists, has exposed domestic firms to competition from international trade. Expansion and integration prospects, which largely depend on their ability to forge links with international markets, establish distribution networks, market networking, are either in delinquency, depraved, or unstructured. All this taken into account at varied levels sufficiently negate expansion and merit them as location risk and provide the necessary opportunities for development partnership at various levels and increased participation of global businesses. The underside of the world economic arrangements, which reinforces the North-South divide, and perpetuates debt burden, impoverishes the marginalized and reconfigures the global economic power relations to lend credence to liberalization schemes, unfortunately falls outside the article's problematic.

Ben Turok (2002) argues that the issues of global stability, the effective functioning of the global markets and the management of the international financial crisis remain crucial to the global financial institutions but leave out the obvious issues of how to bring Africa into the mainstream of these systems. The problem with this otherwise well-written article, is that it avoids suggesting alternatives as the way forward for the Nepad's pundits. The arguments lose focus on the necessary conditions for the implementation of Nepad.

His conclusion that Nepad may lead to an increase in development aid to Africa appears less convincing and more controversial than what he seems to advocate. Would it not be expedient for Africa to begin to initiate self-reliant programmes than forever seeking aid for development from the G8 and the donor nations thereby recapitulate its initiative. The structural adjustment programmes of the eighties, which brought more hardship to the continent than anywhere else in history, are instructive. Africa should adopt its own aid mechanisms, capacity building measures, and institutions and built on them as a means to directly attract the necessary foreign direct investment and generate domestic investments climates to complement their efforts. Notwithstanding his positive assessment, he offers little of what is new or not obvious.

It is increasingly clear that globalization through economic liberalization neither guarantees that the benefits of free trade trickles down through societies, nor that political liberalisation secure economic stability, particularly in Africa. Turok (2002) has produced a careful study with implications for a wider debate on the concept of Nepad and the concept of partnership for Africa's development in the 21st century.

In another of his articles, Turok (2002) has revealed that Adebayo Adedeji had advocated for an African alternative framework for development and regional integration to strengthen the development aspirations of the continent. It is also true, that, his advocacy brought about the establishment of some of the sub-

regional integration groupings on the continent. All these African initiatives give meaning to development efforts.

In order to be able to understand the logic of the argument, it is pertinent to properly conceptualize regionalism, in the context of the geo-political arrangements, what regionalism is and what it is not. Regionalism and sub-regionalism differ in context and in concept. Geo-politically speaking, regions refer to the principal regions or continents of the world, while sub-region refers to the sub-geographical divides that make up a particular region. On the same token, regional and sub-regional integration differ. Regional integration refers to the integration of the entire continent, which has found expression in Organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU). Sub-regional integration refers to the integration of the units of the sub-geographical divides as Southern African Development Community (SADC) from the Southern Africa and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from West Africa, the Arab Magreb Union (AMU) from North Africa, and the East Africa Community (EAC) from East Africa. This distinction was avoided by Turok (2003), which confuses a deeper understanding of the comparative analysis between Adedeji's concepts and Nepad initiative. Again to liken Nepad to the pre-existing policy programmes, at this time, is an incorrect viewpoint. Nepad is a Pan-African concept, global, and with partnership characterization, this is the unique point of departure. It is a partnership-seeking initiative with a development diplomacy context, as against what old paradigms may have professed.

The essence of Nepad, among others, is on building a constructive partnership with industrialized and donor nations, taken at the recognition from the deep-rooted resource constraints and the significance of development partnership. It has also taken, the fact that for there to be meaningful development in Africa, the human capital base has to be developed, strengthened, and expanded. These fundamentals escape elucidation in a comparative context.

Vil-Nkomo's (2002) article has two contentions, that is, 'leadership for development' and the incorporation of 'exogenous conditions' for effective implementation of development programmes in Africa, Nepad inclusive. The argument on the leadership question, on the continent, and the challenges it poses for Africa's development remains not only factual and relevant but it is also a new paradigm in the broader context of Nepad's implementation. It is revealing of the leadership crisis; constantly inept institutions; mal-administration; bureaucratic inertia; often disarticulated political and socio-economic development policies and programmes that have traversed the continent. In some renderings, it has been argued that, African political leaderships should realize that the world owes Africa no less of a responsibility, than it owes itself.

The process, he argues, requires strategic approaches to systematically investigate the 'exogenous issues' across the spectrum, and move beyond the simplistic. The term, 'exogenous', conveys the notion that there are implicit impact factors or contingencies that are fundamental in the trajectory of the implementation process of the initiative, and to downplay them could vitiate the process.

The article has missed out the crucial point of the mechanism of implementation; neither does it seek to establish critical contingencies that may impact the process. The leadership question in Africa would have been equally grounded if contributory factors such as: monopoly of power, corruption, nepotism, ethnocentrism, injustices, poverty, and ethnic nationalism, which form the bane of the leadership crises on the continent, were also highlighted. The dependency theory principles weigh heavily against the advancement of the African society, as championed and in most cases propagated by the contemporary African political leaders. This has escaped a mention. Leadership is a critical factor in targeting policy for implementation. As far as the conceptualizations of Nepad remain obvious, the contributions made by Algeria remain significant which the article has not reflected.

This is a scholarly article written in high prose, and it deserves a wider audience. It has, by commission, set the framework for research on the concept of Nepad. It reveals the complexities and characteristics of leadership attributes for development in a society whose stereotypical international image rest on location risks, difficulties and failed opportunities.

Ian Taylor's (2003) article is arranged in a logical order and is written with expository prose and analysis. The arguments, though succinct, take the political dimensional analysis and seemingly deliberately miss the socio-economic imperatives equally crucial to Nepad. Although the goals of Nepad and the implementation mechanism have been mentioned, it has glossed over the factors that practically impact on the implementation process. The article is a major exposition in the interest of Nepad and corroborates the question asked by Sibusiso Vil-Nkomo (2003) whether or not Nepad will outlive its proponents, or diminishes with them after office? De Waal (2002) has also endorsed this contention. The arguments are certainly not wrong in term of their context. The upshot of this paradigmatic argument bears the trappings of policy development and by extension policy implementation. Targeting impact factors ought to serve as a critical index in implementation process of development policy of Nepad.

Kuye's (2003) article embodies a focus on targeting policy as a means to the implementation of the development policy programme of Nepad. Nepad has, as its objectives eradication of poverty and diseases, to embark on political renewal and socio-economic regeneration of Africa. Development, in this context, is the effective harmonization and management of social, political and economic resources to transform the continent. Policy-targeting, therefore, becomes an indispensable option of choice for these complex tasks.

This, in part, is drawn from the need for strategic policy decision by government and Nepad to create legitimacy and subordination. On the other hand, what belies the context variable of this paradigm is the patchy policy environment,

weak institutional capacity, poor implementation environment, and limited resources pervading the continent. The continent has continued to struggle with development policy implementation over the years. Kuye (2003) is insightful in terms of the public administration variable when he captures the adaptation of public administration principles to Nepad and the AU implementation domains, to meet Africa's development targets. Contrary to the author's expectation, a supranational organ such as the AU, with political and bureaucratic dominance, over the continent, has not been influential, cohesive, and thus remains essentially subjunctive. In the context of the article and policy development, the converse should have been the case, if the truth-value is to become the prescription. So far no national development policy has enjoyed the articulation of the AU. The basis for Nepad, and AU, to deal with the problem of development through targeting methodology appears the *sin qua non*.

The contentions in the monograph, nonetheless, point out the need for further refinement and application of a methodology, for example, policy targeting for Nepad, given the internal policy dynamics in Africa. The time is ripe to decide how well patterned methodological approaches can be used in relation to the implementation of development policies particularly the supra-nationalistic policy for effective results. Kuye's (2003) proposition will be of immense benefit, to both, Nepad and the AU, in their onerous task of Africa's development. However, the author has refrained from faulting African political leaderships, poor governance, and disarticulated development policy implementation processes as the root causes of the strangulation of African efforts with development. It is worthy to note that, targeting for implementation is an evolving process. The monograph brilliantly fulfils its aims in terms of specificity in conceptualizing public administration principles in relation to Africa's development policies as a methodological approach in their implementation. The analysis is intellectually rigorous, detailed, incisive and objective. It is therefore audacious, timely, and exemplary for Nepad.

3. 6 Regional Development Initiatives: International Experiences

The critical points of note here are that Nepad, and its implementation process are still evolving and the concept of 'development' is not absolute but relative. It is important to begin by stating what this sub-topic purports to do before indicating what it tries not to do. First, the fact that Nepad is upon Africa today means that, it trades among the other pre-existing regional development programmes. This, therefore, compels comparative studies. This sub-topic, therefore, seeks to do a comparative analysis of regional development initiatives in five regions namely, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, South East Asia / Asia Pacific and Africa before the advent of Nepad. This is with a view to draw, in comparative terms, the similarities in politics of evolution, their aims and objectives and the implementation processes where applicable *vis-à-vis* Nepad.

Second, the sub-topic does not seek to offer an all inclusive narrative of the selected development trends around the world, nor offer a log of all the broad spectra of institutional functions, interaction, and the systematic account of all policy domains wherein involved. This is because the imperatives of development vary from one regional context to another. As a consequence, different regions evolve different development paradigms and strategies to meet their unique regional aims and aspirations. This induces the type and quality of policy and implementation styles, given the fact that, regional development initiatives appear in a variety of characters and the surge for them even more.

The significance here is to offer a comparative study of the trends of regional development programmes in concrete terms, specifically on the political, socio-economic development programmes and reforms, through regional institutional arrangements. It is intended to cull, and tell apart, those variables that are seemingly useful and could assist in providing some pointers towards development oriented implementation strategy, with Nepad as the comparator.

Be that as it may, the concept of regional development remains fundamental in all the contexts.

A comparative analysis strives to reflect the imperatives of development in the respective regions, that is, the conditions that necessitate the surge for regional development policy initiatives with regard to the need to improve their societies. Development imperatives are more complex in character, scope, obfuscated in tasks, rigorous in implementation over time, than could possibly be wished away in every region.

The pursuit of development through regional policy programmes and mechanisms could easily be traced to:

- Internal socio-economic and political constraints.
- The need to improve their societies.
- Consideration for relevance, pro-active and sustained participation at the regional and international socio-political and economic arrangements.
- Security concerns and Influence seeking. (Source: compile by author).

These impermanent conditions dictate activities that underscore the evolution of regional development policy initiatives. The objectives and the leverages available to policymakers vary considerably among the regions including Africa. The unique conditions have led the respective regions, from the then USSR, Western Europe, South East Asia/Pacific, and Latin America and Africa, to develop one form of development initiative or the other. These different forms of regional programmes are enumerated and discussed below.

3. 6.1 Development Initiatives in USSR/ Warsaw Pact Countries

There were two varying reformation programmes initiated in the late 1980s in the then Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), under Gorbachev's administration, namely *Glasnot* and *Perestroika*. They were essentially designed

to restructure the political and socio-economic systems of not only the USSR but also the Warsaw Pact countries, and the satellite socialist states around the world, in an incremental pace.

3. 6. 1. 1 Glasnot

Glasnot was initiated against the backdrop of the closed Soviet State practices controlled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Glasnot meant a regional development policy programme that sought an open and free society, where respect for Human Rights and relations between the government and its own citizens are enhanced for the benefit of both. Cohen and Wilson (1990) have argued that, 'Glasnot campaign began its lethargic progress in 1986 to address the plethora of social problems, misdeed, and increasing state failures to meet its obligations. This was easily acceptable to the populace, the Soviet intelligentsia, and the media. Under this initiative, state victims of Stalinism had to be rehabilitated. It even extended to foreign policy and international economic policy advocated by Edward Shevardnadze, the then Foreign Minister, in 1987 and a member of the politburo. This led to the gradual ease in the East / West confrontation, downgraded East / West support for the third world liberation movements, pacification of the global theatre and the Euro-theatre, preponderance advantages were also reduced' (Cohen & Wilson, 1990:65).

It was an era for a new beginning that was hoped to decentralize and remove restrictive laws and restraints to advance an open society. Glasnot was introduced to eradicate cumulatively, the millions of denied or controlled human contacts, even within its own people and the rest of the world. The central characteristics of the initiative were freedom of movement, life and laws of the Soviet Union and its people, secular worship and labour movements as substitutes.

Glasnot was a pilot reform scheme and an experiment at the national and regional levels to generate certain dynamism needed for furthering development initiatives. Manning and Parison (2004) have argued that, 'this required that the central reform team and governments be willing and able to generate incentives within the system for 'national' and 'regional ' units to participate actively and willingly in a broad range of pilot reform activities and experiments' (Manning & Parison, 2004:58).

It could be argued that the increasing internal pressures on the system for change, in order to raise and achieve citizens' restiveness for expectations of, and demand for a better life, goods and services, generated the key issues for the reform measures. To premise this argument, Manning and Parison affirm that, in this respect, it will be important that the reform team be able to publicize widely and effectively the best practice performance and service levels and standards achieved in the most successful experiments and pilots. (Ibid.:59).

3. 6.1. 2 Perestroika

Perestroika was the twin concept to Glasnot, introduced simultaneously. It meant: a gradual or phased reformation and restructuring of the pre-existing economic and political structures and institutions, on the one hand, and the internationalization of both the political and economic systems, inclusive of the Soviet societies to embrace Western type structures, institutions, cultures and values, on the on the other.

On the political front, political pluralism made an ascent. That meant the organization of free and fair elections and the emergence of other multi-party dispensations against the mono-central party system, that had been in place for 70 or so years, coupled with the introduction of economic liberalization, such as: market reforms, private property ownership, and various privatization programmes. It presupposed freedom of speech and freedom of association, a

one person one vote democratic principle, the holding of free and fair elections for a representative and participatory system of government. Although there may have been some peculiarities akin to the emerging democracies in comparison to the existing models of democratic transition, it implied a grand shift from the communist styled government that had been the experience, and therefore differed in both point of departure and swiftness. Perestroika was a gradual widening of universal suffrage for the new democracies to learn basic practices and principles of Western-style democracy.

On the economic sphere of Perestroika, Balcerowicz (1995) has argued that, 'the post 1989 economic reforms in Eastern-Central Europe are fundamentally different from those in the past in that they go beyond socialism, as defined by the overwhelming dominance of the state sector economy. The privatization process in Russia best illustrates (this fundamental change). The general direction of present Eastern-Central European economic transition is therefore, basically in line with the economic reforms elsewhere; less state, more private enterprise and market' (Balcerowicz, 1995:147). 'This sequence particularly in the economy of the socialist nations, implied that market-oriented reforms, which must be exceptionally comprehensive because of the socialist economic legacy, have to be introduced under democratic or at least pluralistic, political arrangements' (Balcerowicz, 1995:146). These changes were as the result of negotiated changes given the authoritarian regimes, which invariably failed to generate or promote rapid economic growth and ultimately economic development, which had disastrous effects on their political and economic systems.

Before the campaign for these multi-faceted themes began, 'the Soviet economy had faced a deplorable recession. The resultant decline in the heavy industrial complex and technology, retreat in labour productivity, deterioration in infrastructure, a primitive and centrally controlled economy, stagflation, rising cost of sustaining subsidy of the Soviet empires, and the high cost of the national

defence complex had become common place'. (Ibid.:148).

The implementation process became cumbersome and patchy due to complexities and contingencies that were unintended. Richard and Wilson argue that, 'indeed the obstacles to future success created by the elements of the program itself had forced a substantial retreat in the implementation of its principal features' (Richard & Wilson, 1990:57). These experiences were true of the Eastern European bloc (Warsaw Pact and other satellite nations, for example, Cuba). The context played out through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), as Moscow exerted greater pressure on the allies to take remedial economic measures aimed at high cost burden reduction that USSR had previously absorbed on their behalf.

In order to provide a support base for the national security sector, the need to remain relevant in the quest for future high politics, future technology strategic environment, a liberalized market economy and the concerns for high workforce skills seemingly became the ultimate strategic goals for the restructuring and the reformation (development) that informed the initiatives of perestroika and glasnot, at least as perceived by the soviet leadership at the time. It could be argued that the 'development' context in the USSR and the eastern bloc meant the reforms and the restructuring of the socialist/communist system, structures, and institutions that held hegemonic sway in the political and the socio-economic underdevelopment of the society and the lives of the populace. Regional development context here, had assumed unique development imperatives by implication.

3. 6. 2 Development Initiatives in Western Europe

On May 9, 1950, Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France declared 'it is no longer the moment for vain words, but for a bold act - a constructive act. With these words, the offer to Federal Republic of Germany specifically and to any

other European state that so wished, the idea of pooling its resources of Coal and Steel into a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), had been launched (Monnet, 1978:304; McAllister,1975:177), quoted in McAllister, (1997: 11). Unbeknown to anyone at the time, 'this was to become the first of three 'European Communities' - European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)'. (Ibid.:12).

The declaration and assertion for the launch of the European Co-operation followed. The needs and aspirations of these reform initiatives were essentially dictated at the time by the perceptions in Europe of collective security for Western Europe (to wade off geo-strategic tensions that became prevalent and diffused the European societies), affording assistance to each other, and resisting the policy of aggression against each other. The starting point was the general common market for the member states. This was to gain some influence and transformation of the political relations of the member states. (Ibid.:26).

The EEC started with six countries, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands and Luxembourg, as the founding members. It expanded to twelve member states, which subordinated to the central authority of the EEC certain areas of their political authorities. The economic dimension of the EEC focused on the elimination of trade barriers between the member states; development of a common tariff for imports from abroad and the creation of a common policy for managing and supporting agriculture. The new Treaty that brought about the launch of EEC, provided for the supranational status of EEC as the economic integration progressed and strengthened each member national government greater role in the initiative than had the earlier (ECSC) treaty (Funk & Wall Encyclopedia, 1988:443-447).

The European Economic Community (EEC) emerged as a supra-national institutional development arrangement for the Western European integration and

unification. The EEC is commonly referred to as the 'common market'. It did not ascend to the Western European political union as rapidly as its interlocutors and promoters had envisaged. It became a European Community composed of, what were previously, three separate organizations: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created in 1951; the European Economic Community (EEC); the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom], the last two were established in 1957. In 1968, the acronym EEC was dropped for European Community (EC) as a process to fashion a new development thinking that would address the impasse of membership, common goals, and aspirations of the member states. The sole purpose of the formation was the need for reformation of development policy initiatives for restructuring Western Europe in order to meet the political and the socioeconomic exigencies of the time.

The process of consolidation for the European Economic Community (EEC) brought into focus the need for Atlantic Alliance involving the United States of America (USA). This alliance, in other words, was partnership seeking for the special mutual interest in collective security and trade, the essential elements in development partnership and the subsequent proclamation by President Kennedy's "Grand Design" for the USA - European interdependence (Ibid.:26). Thus the EEC was born in Rome on 25 March 1957, but only came into effect in January 1958.

Costa and Magnette (2003) have argued that, 'external constraints played a major role in the formation and consolidation of these agreements. The original context of the 'Cold War', American incentives to further economic co-operation and the political will of the European leaders to contain risks of contagion from the socialist revolution, all these factors greatly contributed to the making of durable relations' (Costa & Magnette, 2003:8).

The two authors further argue that, 'sometime later, 'exogenous shocks' encouraged the adoption of new agreements - for example, the new awareness

of economic interdependence and the loss of international competitiveness in the 1980s; the fall of the Berlin Wall and the spreading of the suppose threats (nuclear proliferation, crime, immigration and so on) in the early 1990s; financial speculation on the occasion of the debate on monetary union; international terrorism in the context of enhanced judicial cooperation'. (Ibid.:9). Seeking a counterbalance against centrifugal impacts of externalities on Western Europe at the time necessitated the adoption of new policy goals, objectives, amendments and reforms.

The regional problems, such as the imminent political fragmentation, instability, the need to re-order Western European nations for development void of tension, the changing nature of conflicts in Europe and the need for their mitigation played crucial roles in the formation of a successor union - the EC. Although the membership of the EC was staggered, other vital developments did occur. Besides the quarterly summits, direct elections for the European parliament, institution of European Monetary System that aims to provide some balancing in the currencies of the member states, the decisions to exempt all international economic barriers within EC within a certain time period, and the provision for membership enlargement had been all in the process of implementing the policy goals for the continued development efforts of Europe.

The EC was mandated to administer the statutory EC laws, policies, and regulations that largely were in the interest of the member states and therefore its critical regulatory roles and powers to administer the statutes. In addition, the Commission initiated policies of general nature and served as the protector of the member nations' interests, which at the same time had complimentary role to initiate policies, especially at the Summit level.

Over time, there have been both internal and external factors that have influenced policy reforms, policy decisions, implementation process, and policy agenda of the Community. This has led to subsequent amendment to the

founding treaties - the merger of Commissions of Euratom and ECSC that led to the emergence of the EEC. One of the measures to strengthen the response capacity of Western Europe to the series of the contemporary international conditions, events, and their aspirations, culminated in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which changed EC to the now European Union [EU]. This marked a symbolic step towards yet a new epoch in European integration paradigm as the urgent need to evolve new response initiatives to their contemporary needs and aspirations. The EU deals with new and wider scale of policy reforms as well as providing institutional mechanisms for effective implementation of the policy objectives. The EU effectively replaced EC in 1997 based on three pillars:

- The European Communities.
- A common foreign and security policy (CFSP).
- Cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (JHA).

(Nugent, 1999:67).

Indeed, exogenous shocks, integration for Western Europe, collective security, which marked the political and socio-economic imperatives for development, and partnership with U.S.A., became the critical imperatives for the regional development initiatives in Western Europe. It could be argued that these elements constituted the central development imperatives for Western European to seek reforms and development.

3. 6. 3 Development Initiatives in South East Asia / Pacific

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Association of the South East Asian Nations [ASEAN] are the two major economic and political Association / Programme, among others, in the region. The purpose for APEC and ASEAN initiatives is for the economic development and integration of the nations in the region. They were also conceptualized as development initiatives, which have drawn the attention of this study.

The Bangkok Declaration of August 1967 saw the emergence of ASEAN, when a solemn document was signed into effect. It was a replacement for the Association of South East Asia [ASEA] formed in the early 1960s. The basic goals of the association include:

- Acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development through joint efforts in the spirit of equality and partnership.
- Provision of mutual assistance in training and research facilities in the educational professional, technical, and administrative fields.
- Promotion of political stability in South East Asia.
- The development of close links with other international and regional organization with similar aims.

(Schiavone, 1997:38).

The organization exists within new line of framework of economic co-operation and development with a view to effect greater utilization of opportunities with the rest of the world including similar associations within, and around the region. The association has as its objectives to enunciate policies, set guidelines for the development of the regional co-ordination and co-operation in areas of specific interest with other international and regional organizations.

The promising area of cooperation is 'the association tie with the European Union [EU] Schiavone'. (1997:67). A renewable five-year cooperation agreement, strengthening trade relations and increasing joint action in scientific and agricultural spheres have been entered into in a formal contract partnership. This is with the aim of engagement through the initiative to encourage European investment in the region, identify joint industrial projects and facilitation of access into ASEAN markets. The ASEAN and the EU have participated in areas of their felt needs (increased trade and drug trafficking, promotion of private sector) in both regions for mutual benefit. Other area in which partnership has blossomed is the link made between trade, economic agreements, with social and Human Rights issues.

Not only did a contractual partnership exist between the ASEAN and the EU, it has effective relations with what Schiavone calls 'dialogue partners' comprising USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand. The ASEAN has consultative contact with China, which later became a member. It has drawn unto itself an ASEAN identity and ownership of all its activities, taking serious positions in regional and global contending issues, pressing home their demands for consideration in favour of their objectives.

However, the end of communism created a fresh dimension for key development in term of economic issue and regional integration and cooperation with member states and non-member states. As an effort to strengthen and promote economic and trade cooperation, a Basic Agreement and the Establishment of Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) were entered into which provided a framework for gradual tariff reductions. On the political level, two vital treaties, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established:

- The principles of mutual respect for the independence and sovereignty of all nations;
- Non-interference in the internal affairs;
- Peaceful settlement of disputes; and
- Effective cooperation.

(Schiavone, 1997:33).

3. 6. 4 Development Initiatives in Latin America

Among the several economic development arrangements that abound in Latin America, the one that is of relevance to this study is the Latin American Integration Association [LAIA] otherwise known as Aisociacion Latinoamericana de Integracion [ALADI], a successor to Latin America Free Trade Association [LAFTA]. The Treaty of Montevideo, Uruguay brought into effect in 1980 LAIA. It is made of eleven Latin American founder nations - Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela

(The Europa Directory of International Organisations, 1999:363).

The various commitments under the LAFTA Treaty had been reviewed and that led to the birth of LAIA. At the same time new resolutions with a broader and more flexible nature for the re-organisation, update structure, and mechanisms came on board for integration schemes. The LAFTA Treaty had a vision to establish, within a 12-year period, free trade zones, by progressive elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, which had proved difficult to implement (The Europa Directory of International Organisations, 1999:363); (Sciavone, 1997:188).

The complementation agreements in specific areas of economies of the member states failed to reinforce subsequent policies meant for greater cooperation and industrial integration. In the financial sphere, a common regional bank was established as a sign of cooperation on common financial instruments, it failed to materialize. Following the remarkable failures that accompanied LAFTA protocols, on basic issues and widespread disappointment over the lack of concrete perspectives, LAIA was signed into effect in March 1981. Membership was open to all Latin American countries. Presently there are some member countries with permanent observer status from Latin America, Europe, and Asia, five international agencies: UN Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean Countries (UNECLAC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), European Union (EU), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Organization of American States (OAS). (The Europa Directory of International Organizations, 1999:363).

The aims of the association, among others, are to pursue a long-term common market by establishing sectors of economic preferences. The association was to serve as an economic bulwark to less developed nations in the region and to enunciate partial agreements among member nations in economic, trade, and industrial complementation, agriculture and livestock, and export promotion. All these objectives are to be targeted, bearing in mind, a set of basic principles

such as differential treatment to the members who are categorized according to their respective economic strength, grouped into three divisions - most developed, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico; intermediate, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela; and least developed, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay (Sciavone,19997:189).

Central to the association are the activities of coordinating and co-operating with other countries and their economic groupings especially in Latin America with the conception of Latin American preference on tariff and negotiations of the partial scope agreements. The important framework of the association is the promotion of bilateral and multilateral agreements in economic and financial sectors. All the objectives and activities of the association are aimed at strengthening inter-regional economic integration and cooperation for implicit economic growth and development of the region. The challenges confronting the association are the proliferation of sub-regional arrangements with multiplicity of membership and duplication of functions and activities, which ultimately imperil the implementation process (Ibid.:189).

3. 6. 5 Development Initiatives in Africa

Africa has not experienced a typical regional development policy initiative in the truest and functional terms at the scale, scope, and context that have occurred in the afore-mentioned regions. This could be attributed arguably to three major reasons:

- The late attainment of independence and self determination;
 - Lack of development oriented vision, visioning, and aspiration by the African political leadership;
 - Diminutive capacities and resources (human and capital), political conflict.
- (Source: compile by author).

However, few attempts for the development and economic integration were initiated through UNECA in the mid 1970s to late 1980s. These were parallel initiatives at seeking alternative measures to the IMF and the WB generated development programmes - SAPs for the third-world countries including those in Africa, that resulted in the deepening and perpetuating economic crises, political instability and social fragmentation on the continent. The pre-existing programmes such as the Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of the New International Order in Africa; Intellectual Foundation for the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1989-2000, all were undertaken by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) under Adebayo Adedeji, from the 1970's through to the 1980's. Against the background of the structural adjustment programme, other development plans initiated by UNECA were, The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP).

These were embarked upon to begin the process of stimulating sub-regional economic growth and socio-politico stabilization for the respective sub-regions on the continent. These programmes formed the origin of the sub-regional economic communities. Examples are: the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], East African Community (EAC), Magreb Arab Union (MAU), Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (ECGLC), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). (Ohiorhenuan, 2002); Turok , 2002).

The translation of these initiatives and ultimately their objectives suffered setbacks and experienced limitations. The challenges that impeded the actualization and the subsequent attainment of their objectives, it could be argued were:

- The de-colonization imperatives and the delusion of self-determination;
- Lack of institutional capacity and institutionalized structure as implementation mechanism;
- The tinge question of ownership;

- Projects' activities were down and thus distant, and charting a course of action remained essentially problematic. (Source: compile by author).

3. 7 Traditional Theories of Integration

The concept of integration is best understood when implications of theoretical frameworks of integration are utilized and placed in context as the basis for constructive explanation of the concept. Integration concept bears national, sub-regional, and regional contexts, which have acquired distinctive application variables, teleology, and heuristics. Integration as in development is not an event but a process. Before delving into the theoretical constructs that are traditionally in use to rationalize the concept, it is worthy to explicate the paradigmatic turns of some contending perspectives.

Integration could be classified into both political and economic patterns with theoretical frameworks. This is informed by the contextual and conceptual paradigms of the concept. The theories that are reflected here bear implications to the context in which they are being adopted in the study. The theoretical approaches are 'functional' and 'development' integration approaches.

3. 7. 1 Functional Integration Approach

This approach is also known as integration through project coordination. It is premised on the view that 'underdevelopment production structures and infrastructures and infrastructural deficiencies constitute major barriers both to regional trade and to integration in the 'Third World' regions. It therefore proposes co-operation in the formulation and execution of joint projects in infrastructure and production in order to remove immediate barriers to regional trade' (Cheru, 2002:125). Cheru (2002) has countered the theory by arguing that, '...although project coordination, ...has tremendous impact on trade, such a strategy can only become fruitful when enabling macroeconomic policies are in

place, supported by strong government commitment to harmonize policies across frontiers'. (Ibid.:126).

Functional integration theory's significant contribution to the understanding of the dynamics in economic integration has been a scholarly account of the capacity of factors of production - infrastructure and structures. These factors are of critical consequence in any pattern of economic integration arrangements. But the theory has not recreated the concept of integration useful in scholarship. It follows then that structures and infrastructures agglomeration, as stressed would constantly require periodic upgrading and provision, which is something in the nature of flux and, therefore, constantly under threat to diminish in a patchy policy enforcement environment as Africa, even at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels.

This scenario would discourage integration where these factors of production are dysfunctional. The theory blurs the distinction between the methodologies in integration process, which is a critical commonality of the process. There is not a clear set heterogeneous criterion for integration, especially in Africa. This would mean that the continent might not seek continental integration. It is also restrictive, in that other forms of integration such as military for regional peace and security have been subsumed in the espouse. The theory, as a consequence, is limited in context, having an overemphasis on efficient production, structures, and infrastructures. It does not suggest how best the imbalance could be corrected and streamlined for economic strength in order to provide the infrastructures where they do not exist, and in order to expand the frontiers of integration.

3. 7. 2 Development Integration Approach

Unlike the functional integration approach, the development integration approach stresses the need for both macro-coordination in a multi-sectoral programme, embracing production, infrastructure, and trade. It stressed the need for close political cooperation at an early stage of the integration process in contrast to the market integration approach; it seemingly stresses the need for the equitably balanced distribution of the dividends of integration. It argues that, 'trade liberalization measures should be oriented particularly towards the least developed member countries. It therefore saw a need for trade integration to be complemented by efforts to promote coordinated regional industrial development and for regional funds or banks to be established to give priority to the least developed members. It has granted less developed members greater preference in access to regional markets and facilities, a longer period to reduce tariffs, and some co-ordination of macro-policies to be achieved at an early stage, particularly in relation to fiscal incentives for investment' (Cheru, 2002:126).

The development integration approach has drawn criticism from a number of different perspectives. Supporters of *laissez-faire* approaches have critiqued the approach for its emphasis on political cooperation and state-directed approach. Skepticisms have been leveled on the grounds that the high level of political cooperation required is difficult to achieve in practice. Attempts to implement such programmes have been beset with practical problems of implementation (Cheru, 2002:126).

The approach precludes political integration as a complementary development paradigm, while it tries to approximate its context as the mono-thesis to integration. Development integration could be impossible to attain in the absence of political will and commitment (both critical clichés) of the integrating members, particularly at a supra-national level. The absence of these clichés leaves the converging pattern for integration towards narrowcasting, regional fragmentation

and underdevelopment. The emphasis on production, infrastructures and trade as crucial for integration, places its paradigm in the same context with the Functional Integration school of thought. It, therefore, offers nothing new.

3. 7. 3 Competing Paradigms of the Integration Concept

Integration appears in a bi-contextual pattern of 'political' and 'economic' paradigms. In this study integration is conceptualized as an essential trend of comprehensive development approach for society, which evolves through the convergence of quantitative economic growth and qualitative structural changes of the economies and the political reconfiguration of institutions of the integrating members to achieve set targets. This is predicated on the contention that integration is ultimately society and people driven.

3. 7. 4 Political Integration

Political integration is a political framework arrangement with intergovernmental relations, which in character and statutes, does not pursue and articulate a super-state approach, which is receptive to the participation by interested member states Makgetlaneng (2003), argues that '... political integration is the basis upon which the socioeconomic, financial and trade relations of ... countries will become interlinked' (Makgetlaneng, 2003:1). The thesis of the concept, if it is political, is that of respect for national sovereignty, equality of states before international law, principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another. Equally critical in this arrangement is the political stability of both the integrating states in particular and the sub-region in general.

At the political level the integrating members are expected to pool together, under agreement, their political resources and comparative advantages with a view to forging internal strategic interests at a much higher scale to the centre for mutual benefits. The underlying theme of political integration is the subordination

of tasks that have previously enjoyed exclusivity by the integrating members, which thereafter are executed by the integration mechanism. In other words, this means a fundamental change in the integrating region to foster political stability.

In Africa, what occurred was a loose political integration that brought the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into effect in 1963. Political integration took precedence over economic integration in the post 1960s. The focus then had been to extricate the continent from all vestiges of colonialism, as a result economic integration received less and less attention. The maxim at the period seemed to have been 'political freedom without economic emancipation is more meaningful.

3. 7. 5 Economic Integration

Economic integration, according to Davis (1992), refers to a process in which the economies of individual states are merged (in whole or in part) into a single regional entity. Economic cooperation, on the other hand, is a much more open-ended concept referring to a range of situations in which individual states share or make available to each other resources, technology or expertise, collaborate in joint projects, or act together in external economic relations. Such cooperation may or may not be undertaken with the aim of promoting economic integration' quoted in Cheru, (2002:123).

Economic integration is 'characterized by a fundamental shift from donor aid to trade as a means of cooperation and a focus on commercial links with mutual benefits. It constitutes a fundamental shift from politically motivated agreements to those driven by socio-economic interest' (Makgetlaneng, 2003:38). Economic integration also means expression in terms of subordination of regional trade and arrangements to the World Trade Organization (WTO). (Ibid.:38). It is a process aimed at sub-regional economic stabilization for the integrating members.

Abolin has argued that 'macroeconomic stabilization is directed to overcome economic crisis and, it is linked with the implementation of some structural economic measures and formulation of new economic relations. Measures for economic stabilization include a number of important factors among which are broad participation in decision-making, maintenance of equity and justice, creating a favourable investment climate, facilitation of access to opportunities for all' (Abolin, 1999:3). This argument has offered an un-eclectic rendering of an economic integration paradigm.

It is not yet recorded by any study on 'integration', that has claimed the embrace of both perspectives simultaneously. The European Union (EU), that is experiencing problematic political integration, the dream of its initiators, serves as a clear example. Economic integration could precede a political integration or vice versa. Economic integration is essentially concerned with pooling of economic resources, the gradual elimination of individual national barriers to trade and market for the common good. It also means seeking to generate the gross national product (GNP) along side the stimulation of economic growth. This is with the sole objective of promoting the material well-being and material conditions of the populace.

3. 8 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

The African realities - primordial problems, and the attainment of independence in South East Asia after the Second World War, set the stage for agitation for self-determination in Africa, which was largely under colonial rule, with the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia. The agitation was a major attempt to establish a strong political front for the de-colonization process on the continent. As a result, two major groups emerged - the Casablanca and the Monrovia groups, in the pursuit of a common cause. The activities initiated by the two groups led to Africa's political integration at the regional level at the attainment of political independence with the establishment of the OAU.

3. 8. 1 Formation

A Charter was drafted in 1958 by Ghana and Guinea and later joined by Mali, which was the basis of a Union of African States and led to the Conference held in Casablanca, Morocco in January 1961. (The Europa Directory of International Organizations, 1997:400). This was later to become the *Casablanca* group. Franco-phone African countries held another Conference in Tananarive between 1961 and 1962. These conferences led to the ratification in September 1961, of a Charter establishing the *Union Africaine et malgache*, that later became the *Organisation Commune Africaine et Mauricienne* (OCAM). In the same period a conference was held in Monrovia, Liberia and was attended by 19 heads of state and government and in Lagos, Nigeria in January 1962 with a permanent secretariat and a standing committee. (Ibid.:400). At this conference a draft Charter for the organization of inter-African and Malagasy states was accepted.

A conference was convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 1963. This conference brought about the merger of the three groups under one umbrella, despite geographical spread, religious inclinations, political orientation, and linguistic differences. The Heads of State conference on 23 May 1963 drew up the charter of the OAU, signed into effect by 30 countries on 25 May 1963. The charter emerged as a compromise between the concept of loose association of states, favoured by the Monrovia Group, and the federal idea supported by the Casablanca Group. (Ibid.:400).

3. 8. 2 The OAU as the Old Paradigm of Africa's Integration

The formation of the OAU was a tactical move by African leaders who had already attained independence, to have a common front to seek self-determination in the form of a de-colonization process, to rid the continent of the vestiges of colonialism. Hargreaves has argued that, 'The position of the African political leaders that Africa was a victim of, and not masters of their own destinies

spurred the movements against the colonial powers. Consequently, the Charter reflected: (a) creation of an organization of African states; (b) cooperation among African states in the following fields, economic and social, education, culture and science, collective defence; (c) de-colonization; (d) creation of a permanent conciliation commission; and (e) Africa and the United Nations' (Hargreaves, 1996:219). Hargreaves further explains that Organization of African Unity (OAU), established in Addis Ababa on May 1963, was a practical attempt to find means by which thirty-two African governments of very different inclinations and capacities might continue the struggle for continental decolonisation ...'. (Hargreaves, 1996:219).

The leading principles of the OAU, as defined in Article 111, of its Charter were the sovereign equality of all states; non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state, and for its inalienable rights to independent existence. Article 11 of the Charter proclaimed, among others, eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa; and in the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Special Committee on Decolonisation, it established in 1961, the African group that could exercise influence by virtue of numbers unrelated to the strength of individual states (Hargreaves, 1996:219). Ochieng argues that, 'the idea of unification of Africa originated during the colonial struggle and was mainly associated with the late Kwame Nkrumah who said we are looking forward to solving our problems but this can be only achieved through unification of African States' (Ochieng, 1999: 91).

3. 8. 3 The African Union (AU)

The end of the cold war in the late 1980s, the globalization phenomenon, the United Nations new millennium development goals in 2000, and the dominance of the concept of sustainable development, markedly influenced the beginning of a new era of political integration in Africa. The basic principles that informed the

formation of the OAU, and the urgency to recapture and propagate the relevance of the African integration, in a new context of the world order, and its new realities led to the formation of AU. This had been precipitated on the need for a re-conceptualization of a continental organ to reposition and drive changes in the political, economic, and social spheres of Africa's regional life, in line with the dictates of the contemporary global development-oriented thinking. In addition, Usov has argued that the victory of African National Congress in 1994 democratic elections in South Africa resulted in some exhaustion of objectives of the OAU, mainly political-oriented organization, emphasizing anti-colonial pathos' (Usov, 2002: 29).

3. 8. 3. 1 Formation.

In May 2001 the Constitutive Act of the African Union [AU] came into effect. In July 2002 the AU became fully operational, replacing the OAU. As argued by Kongwa, 'the challenges of globalization and Africa's marginalization from the global economy have been the main motivating factors in prompting African leaders, at the Summit in July 2001 held in Lusaka, to replace the Organization of African Unity with the African Union in a bid for greater economic, political and institutional integration for the continent' (Kongwa, 2002:13).

3. 8. 3. 2 The AU as the New Paradigm of Africa's Integration

At the emergence of globalization and the end of the cold war, the context of Africa's integration and development had shifted from the pursuit of de-colonization, self-determination, and ideological inclination, to sub-regional socioeconomic integration and to regional development and growth. This took a proclamation to eradicate perennial poverty, political instability, economic crises, social fragmentation, and diseases and substitute them with the ideals of good political and economic governance, democratic principles, and strengthening of institutions in pursuit of economic growth and comprehensive development. To

carry out these tasks, certain development denominators and enunciations began continent-wide. Nepad emerged as a result. It has come to represent the regional fulcrum to address at a broader context, the development imperatives of the continent.

The Constitutive Act of the AU contains some new rules aimed at the promotion of political responsibility of African leaders. The AU, in accordance with its principles, reserves right of intervention in a member state where cases of grave circumstances namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity take place. Governments that should come to power through unconstitutional means are not allowed to participate in the activities of the Union (AU Constitutive Acts, Article 4, Principles h, and p).

On the creation of the AU, Usov argues that, 'the creation of the AU could be seen as a next stage in the development of both concepts and practice of African integration. Working out a common position of African countries, which face globalization's challenges, is another side of such approach' (Usov, 2003:29).

Similarly, Kongwa contends that '... there is much promise in that the series of organs established, ... are expected to provide opportunities and platform for African governments, the civil society, the private sector, and the international community to work together in addressing the African challenges posed by poverty, debt burdens, disease and conflict' (Kongwa, 2002:13–14). From the foregoing, it could be argued that the new paradigm of the AU is rested on regional integration, socio-economic development, economic growth, and eradication of poverty and extermination of political crises through good political and economic governance.

3. 9 Public Administration

Public Administration is based on perceived universal principles that constitute management of public institutions in various settings with the acronym, POSDCORB, categorized in an attempt to classify the functions carried out in the public administration. The principles are:

- P - planning: the broad definition of things to be done and methods to do them, in order to realize the objectives of the organization;
- O - organizing: the formal structure of authority through which the division of labour for realizing objectives is arranged, defined and co-ordinated;
- S - staffing: the whole personnel function – supplying and utilizing personnel and ensuring favourable conditions of employment;
- D - directing: the continuous task of serving as leader and making decisions, and of translating them into specific and general commands and instructions;
- CO - co-ordinating: the very important task of uniting the various elements of work;
- R - reporting: informing superiors and subordinates alike on how the things are progressing by means of records, research and inspection; and
- B - budgeting: fiscal planning, accountability and control.

(Fox & Meyers, 1995:99-100).

These seminal vintage principles are not constant in organizational culture and planning. Other elements such as “motivation” in terms of reward for personnel, transparency, accountability and collective bargaining are critically vital in the contemporary public management and administration. Perhaps this has informed the current surge for new public administration in order to strive to re-orientate public administration to meet the increasing needs, demands and challenges of the contemporary times.

The issues and problems that public administration has to address, require methods as well as institutions to develop and manage them, in scale and scope, in a streamlined manner, particularly in the context of political and economic governance. Government does not exist in a vacuum, but in a well define domain, that is, being legitimate and more strategically evolved within an environment to be able to govern, formulate policy by which values could be authoritatively allocated thereby defining public administration and policy through institutions.

Public administration also 'constitutes in a unique scale executive institutions and functionaries; political executive institutions and functionaries, administrative executive institutions, Judicial institutions' (Cloete, 1998:V1). These perspectives embrace public administration and policy models of governance such as an open system, rational model, and incrementalism. The aim is to downplay complacency and generate optimal efficiency through public administration and governance *vis-à-vis* Nepal. Dobuzinskis argues that, '... as a social scientific discipline, public administration asks, "why are public policies formulated and implemented the way they are?" or "why are government agencies operating the way they do?' (Dobuzinskis, 2003:739). The public administration principles as well as its implementation process have imbued Nepal as a regional public policy.

3. 9. 1 Policy

Fox and Meyer viewed policy as 'a guide of action or statement of goals that should be followed in an institution to deal with a particular problem or phenomenon or a set of problems or phenomena' (Fox & Meyer,1995:96). While Meek contends that, '... Public administration ... traditionally defined as hierarchically organized and managed governmental institutions, that are bound to a well-defined jurisdiction' (Meek, 2003:929). Public policy is normally conceived as government action to address some problems. The central focus is

... who gets what, when, and how. 'Policy is the end result of a complex decision making system, encompassing many actors' (Peterson, 2003: 1030). It has already been argued that Nepad is being conceptualized as a policy programme which has gone through a complex decision making process.

3. 9. 2 Governance

In a broad term this 'refers to the ordering of a group, community, or society by a public authority' (Fox & Meyer,1995:55). Conceptually, governance has incorporated lessons from public administration and policy models. This is as the consequence of extensive demands, complexity, and standards for maximization of social equity through effective service delivery in a defined circumstance.

Maheshwari has argued that, 'the concept of governance claims a complex of traits, the principal structural indicators of which are a written constitution, rule of law, limited government, constitutionalism, accountability, transparency, judicial review, decentralization, citizen participation, observance of human rights. Governance thus includes both procedural and substantive formulations' (Maheshwari, 2002:241). Meek argues that, 'With the growth and evolving complexity ..., policy networks have appeared and approach policy problems and solutions side by side with governmental bureaucracies. These networks are forms of governance' (Meek, 2003:928).

Indeed, models have offered the possibility of rationalizing and describing public administration and policy models of governance in an integrated manner. Public administration strengthens the role of governance and what becomes of policy. There is therefore interconnectivity among the models, given their points of departure that overlap in many important ways.

There are public administration and policy models that could be related to governance. These are rational model, incrementalism, and open system, among

others. De Coning and Cloete have argued, ‘there are similarities and differences between concepts, models, theories and paradigms’ (de Conning & Cloete, 2000: 24). In other words, models have causal versatility effect and could be transpositioned (in social science) from one context to another, which offers valid description of components’ relationships or whole of a phenomenon with predictive value. This is an indication of the relative merit of competing models that embraces commonality in application from public administration and policy to governance theoretically.

Public administration models such as “open system”, ‘rational model’ and “incrementalism” retain universal applicability in social sciences. The context with which they are used has to be determined to facilitate exchanges, particularly in public administration and policy models of governance paradigm. The nature and dynamics of socio-political and economic systems require interface of models to bring about reality of human perception in a different kind of perspectives.

3. 10 Public Administration and Policy Models of Governance

A grand unifying model of public administration and governance is yet to come to the fore. Given the increasing growth of multi-jurisdictional, cross-sector policymaking and policy implementation environments and policy demands, scholars have been attracted to evolve and where possible adopt theoretical models, not only in governance but also in other sub-fields of public administration and policy. The root of the model framework is at rendering descriptive techniques and a predictive value to concepts and phenomena with social scientific orientation.

Public administration and policy models of governance have some commonality of elements in environments, objectives, and processes. However, public administration and policy models of governance are a set of concept constructs

for thinking about and describing a phenomenon that is different from ideas drawn from other perspectives. Emphasis is to replace theory with a broader simplification of a phenomenon.

Models of social sciences are not justification-based constructs and therefore suffer numerous interpretive definitions. Weber argues that, 'the term model refers to a representation of a specific set of relationships that are able to be empirically tested and provide some predictive value. Many times the term model is used interchangeably with theory' (Weber, 2003:779). Ostrom has argued that, 'the difference between frameworks, theories, and models are not even generally recognized' (Ostrom, 1999:35). Public administration and policy models of governance are not distinctly delineated from each other. The contention by De Coning and Cloete on models suggests that, 'there are similarities and differences between concepts, models, theories and paradigms' (De Conning & Cloete, 2000:24). The point of departure is to try to expound subtly the models of public administration, public policy, and governance, and to seek the limit and synthesis for universal applicability of the competing models without contrast in relation to Nepad.

3. 10. 1 Open System

The pattern of interaction and relationship postulated by open system relates it as a model of public administration and public policy and governance. In summation, organizations are complex systems that continuously interact with the external environment. They import critical inputs, transforming inputs into valued services and products, and exporting these services and products to the external environment thereby creating a feedback loop.

According to Chisholm, *Open System*, is, a set of interacting units with relationships among them Miller, (1978), quoted in Chisholm, (2003). He explains that organizations are a type of concrete versus abstract living system. Because

all living systems are open (versus closed systems that have no transactions with an external environment}, organisations are by definition open systems: ... According to Open Systems Theory (OST), 'all organizations (public, private, and non-profit) depends on the external environment to provide certain critical inputs to exist and carry out work over time. ... These required inputs include money, personnel, various types of materials and supplies formation Chisholm' (2003).

The concept of OST has attracted various argumentations. For instance, Chrisholm has argued that, 'because of the continuous input-transformation-output process, organizations depend upon the outside environment for their existence. And to remain viable overtime, they must deliver services (products) that meet the requirements of clients and other key decision makers outside the organization. Maintaining viability also requires designing and managing effective feedback processes' (Chrisholm, 2003:851). This context aptly fit the context which Nepad and its implementation could be perceived.

3. 10. 2 Rational Model

The rational model of decision-making, also known as classical or economic model is one among others in public administration. The model is derived from the economic theory that people seek to maximize utility and pursue their self-interests. The model is based on the assumption that people are economically rational and attempt to maximize outputs for a given input or minimize input for a given output in an orderly and sequential process. The steps involved in the model are: (1) identify the problem to be solved, (2) establish the evaluation criteria for problem resolution, (3) propose the various alternatives for solving the problem, (4) analyze the likely consequences of each, (5) compare and evaluate the results of each alternative (6) chose the best alternative (7) implement the chosen alternatives, (8) evaluate the results (Guseh, 2003:317). These steps aptly capture the public policy process. Nepad has been conceptualized in this study as a regional public policy.

A political economy perspective has been used to extrapolate the rationale model of public administration. For instance, Guseh (2003) has presented 'Anthony Down's, (1957), economic analysis of the rational model as an economic analysis thus consists of two major steps: discovery of the ends a decision maker is pursuing and most reasonable that requires the least input of scarce resources... . Thus whenever economists refer to "rational man" they are not designating a man whose thought processes consist exclusively of logical propositions or a man without prejudices or a man whose emotions could be considered rational but the economic definition refers solely to a man who moves towards his goals in a way which, to the best of his knowledge, uses the least possible input' (Guseh, 2003:317). The same could be said in public administration and governance in which the 'economic man ' metaphor reverts to 'policy maker' whose aim is equally to achieve the most with minimal input.

It could therefore be argued that, the 'rational model' refers to a decision-making process that is a rational activity in an organization, followed by rational process for effectively managing organizations and the decisions that flow from there, are for vested public purposes and interests. The challenges to public administration to deal with social equity have led to the galloped interest in the concept of governance in public administration in particular. Governance, basically, is the repository of public administration, so as to be, and retain responsive culture, less expensive, and strengthened to meet service demands, short of impeding reins of bureaucracy. From these perspectives, rational model of decision-making (policy) in governance is the design of work processes to be consciously maximized through efficiency and outcome for social equity, which have been reflected in the concept of Nepad.

3. 10. 3 Incrementalism

Political scientist, 'Charles Lindblom who critiqued the Rational Model came up with this model variously call incrementalism, muddling through, and successive

limited comparison' (Guseh, 2003:318). In contrast to rational model, incrementalism stresses decision making through a series of limited, successive comparison with a relatively narrow range of alternatives rather than a comprehensive range; it uses the status quo not abstract goals, as the key point of reference for decisions. 'Incrementalism focuses primarily on short term rather than long-term effects, on the most crucial consequences of an action rather than on all conceivable results, and on less formalized methods of measuring costs and benefits' Milakovich (2000), quoted in Guseh, (2003:318).

The "incrementalism" model contends that errors that result from employing incremental changes from the status quo may not have serious implications and may be easier to correct. Lindblom has presented several arguments to support the "incrementalism" model. According to Lindblom, politically, incremental solutions are easier to agree upon since this change may fall somewhere between extreme positions, thereby getting plurality support. Lindblom in furtherance of his argument maintains that, 'making continual incremental adjustment in both the problem definition and proposed solutions is a reasonable and effective method of solving problems and making decisions', quoted in Guseh, 2003:319).

The essential elements of this model include the followings:

- Goals are not isolated and determined before analysis begins.
- Goals determination and analysis are closely intertwined, even simultaneously. The means often affect the end, vice versa.
- Decision makers usually consider only a limited number of alternatives – ordinarily only those that differ marginally from existing policy.
- All consequences, even of the more restricted options, are not evaluated. All consequences cannot be known, and the time and effort required for comprehensive assessment normally is unavailable.

Since the means and ends are inseparable, problem redefinition is continuous; analysis is never ending, and policy is never made once and for all but remade

endlessly (Ibid.:319). The incrementalism model has imbued on the concept of Nepad, particularly the implementation process.

3. 11 The Governance and Leadership Imperatives of Nepad on Africa

The increasing use of 'governance' and 'leadership' concepts has acquired varied connotations and interpretations in the contemporary social science scholarships and society at large. There are those who perceive them in a normative sense, while others envision rapid development through efficient and effective bureaucracy particularly as the study of public administration is evolving new techniques and paradigms of NPM in response to the dynamics of the modern societies. These contradictory perceptions dictate broader debate on the appropriate meaning of the concepts of governance and leadership. According to Cloete (1999) the concept of governance refers to the role of the state in society. Like other social sciences concepts, it can and has at different moments been used either descriptively or in a prescriptive way Frischtak, (1994), quoted in Cloete (1999:8). Governance and leadership imperative are some of the critical imperatives of Africa's development, which Nepad has encapsulated and poised to address. These governance and leadership concepts are of critical importance to Nepad.

3. 11. 1 Governance Imperatives of Nepad on Africa

The concept 'governance' in its contemporary context literally means 'good governance' identified with the aspirational level of society. Maheshwari has explained that, 'good governance is promoted by factors like decentralization, participatory management, citizen-participation in decision-making, etc' (Maheshwari, 2002:242). Given Africa's internal dynamics and complexities with regard to Nepad, governance is recognized as critical. This can be adduced to the implementation pattern of Nepad. Governance imperatives of Nepad would mean the orderly organization of society in line with their demands and

aspirations. This must, therefore, include principles, in a partisan sense, creation of equal opportunities, social equity, democratic governance, development, control, and distribution of resources both material and human, wealth creation and control of disparity in allocation, gender empowerment, and information articulation and dissemination. It must, at the same time, strive to protect human and property rights, mitigate internal conflicts and guarantee material social welfare to stem political and economic destabilization in Africa.

Fluctuations of these development imperatives are the apparent symptomatic challenges that may face Nepad. The initiative has to exercise control in the enunciation of policy actions as best practices to address these challenges. To assure success Nepad will have to view itself as promoter of Africa's development (strategically formulating and implementing development focused policies); as manager and distributor of these policies (distribution and allocation of values for social equity); as regulator for social, political, and economic resources; and as protector (development and guaranteeing human capital) for empowerment against poverty.

In the contention with the underdevelopment thesis of dependency theory, Liou has explained that, 'the problem of many least developed countries (LDCs) are related to a situation in which these countries downgraded the central role of their government in the development processes to a dependent and responsive entity' (Liou, 2003:370).

3. 11. 2 Leadership Imperatives of Nepad on Africa

The art of political leadership has eluded the continent since independence and has thereby plunged every development policy into quagmires. As a response to the winds of globalization, collapse of the bi-polar world, and the UNMDGs, African leaders initiated the Nepad programme. The issue, which arises, is the character of leadership that would reasonably be beneficial and relevant to

Nepad, given the political, socio-economic, and cultural imperatives that have created imbalance, divisiveness, and policy enforcement defects in Africa.

The concept of governance and leadership in the context of Nepad include policy implementation direction of the programme. The implementation of Nepad, could, to a reasonable extent, hinge on the implications of the African leadership and governance questions. This presupposes the effective and efficient implementation process and not just policy outcome. The leadership imperatives in Africa for Nepad require the inculcation of transactional leadership styles, leadership for development attributes, and leadership for reform, so as to bring about the much-required sustainable development through the Nepad programme. Vil-Nkomo has argued that, 'the advancement of Africa and Nepad depends entirely on the emergence in this millennium of an African leadership for development' (Vil-Nkomo, 2002:292).

Leadership is often perceived as the ultimate exercise of ascribable power and authority. It should however be viewed in a broader context particularly in a supra-national realm of policy implementation such as Nepad. This would enable robust examination of the context including determinants and indicators – which Kuye (2002) refers to as "vision, visioning", economic capacity, mental strength, social and environmental concerns, people-centred policies, collaboration, boundless adult universal suffrage, freedom for participatory process, conflict resolution, and provision and maintenance of social amenities. These are indicator requisites for the contemporary African leadership and governance to steer African development.

To this extent, the imperatives of governance and leadership of Nepad, that is, the capacity of the institutional arrangement and of the promoters, forced by the development necessity of the continent, should evolve qualitatively rather than quantitative policy measures, survivalist dependency syndrome, and political impropriety. It requires basic capacity to act, forthrightness, followership,

potential intelligence, and sensitivity to rein in the troubled attempts to shape the often-puzzled policy implementation environments in the continent in order to improve Nepad.

3.12 The Determinants of and Indicators of Leadership, Governance, Public Policy, and Nepad

These concepts embrace varied descriptive narrative constructs, which allow for multivariate paradigms. The foundational indicators and determinants of leadership, governance, and public policy are reflections only through qualitative attributes and empirical functions observed and experienced in a given circumstance. They either imply elevation of the structures, characterization, hierarchy and directive principles in goal attainment for the society through policy, governance and leadership. But the daunting task of development has remained un-abated and imminent, by clamouring for solutions. These solutions can come largely through effective and transformative leadership. Maheshwari (2003) argues that, 'this is from who are willing to summon the nations' forces, marshal resources, motivate people to achieve group goals ..., who can inspire and bolster confidence' (Maheshwari, 2002:300).

The African leadership formed the Nepad programme and could be perceived as catalytic to the implementation of the Nepad programme. Nepad and its implementation mechanisms should evolve an institutionalized approach which means leadership must involve team and collaborative efforts. Leadership indicators and determinants refer therefore to a bevy of virtues or traits. Leadership ought to exhibit a team of superior performers.

It could be argued that a participatory form of leadership, respect for rule of law and democratic principles, vision and visioning remain critical leadership indicators that could effectively invigorate the enforcement of people centred development policy for Nepad. The imperatives as argued by Vil-Nkomo for

Africa's development is 'dependent on the participation of individuals and society. ... Political economies that create stability, development, sustainable access to opportunities to society and operational citizenship are the cornerstone for leadership for development' (Vil-Nkomo, 2002:298).

Governance has a critical bearing on Nepad and the implementation of its policy objectives. The implementation of the initiative requires laid down 'fundamental governance principles; right to an adequate means of livelihood; operation and control of material resources of community and distribution at best to subserve the common good; the operation of the economic system which does not result in the concentration of wealth and the means of production to the common detriment, the assurance of equal pay for equal work for both men and women, the health and strength of workers men and women; and the tender age of children are not abused; and the citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter vocation unsuited to their age or strength' (Maheshwari, 2002:240-241). The process of governing, techniques, and capacity to support these conditions are required through governance for Nepad.

The organization, operationalization, management, and implementation of public policy are equally deterministic in the context of indicators and determinants of Nepad. This means more foci on the enforcement and translation of policy programmes into policy outputs and outcomes. No less necessary are the concerns for gender empowerment as well as the environment, actors and their values, and policy content.

3. 13 Concluding Reflections

The contextual backdrop of relevant theoretical frameworks and models implicated in the study renders convergence and offers exploratory perspectives. They have a thematic context to explain the validity of the object of study. They are derived essentially from public administration and policy studies, given their

propriety in public administration and policy analysis that render them explicit and less fuzzy to deploy. Although the models discussed in the study have their strengths and weaknesses, they provide useful theoretical groundings.

The literature reviews deal with the ubiquitous development question, partnership and Nepad, which have provided deeper contextual renderings for deeper understanding of Nepad. They provide detailed development imperatives that confront Africa, but bear significant similarities of fundamental implementation problems for Nepad.

The selected regional initiatives help to draw comparative perspectives in contrast and similarity with Nepad as well as draw in different models, their aims, objectives, and politics of evolution. The concept of regional integration has received theoretical explications in two distinct patterns of political and economic paradigms. This reinforces the fact that regional integration cannot be roundly achieved at both fronts. This has been the Africa's integration experience.

Public Administration creed and Policy models of governance bear cross-criteria significance and offers descriptive and predictive values that deepen their relationships to a greater scale to Nepad. These models hold broader and unique potential application to the object of study.

The myriad of development impediments to Africa requires targeting of development policies to implementation process, which are implicated, so as to be able to effectively deal with the fundamental imperatives of Africa's development. But these factors are not by themselves enough to deal with the issues without acquisition of the relevant principles replicated as determinants and indicators. It is only when these are determined that Nepad could be strengthened and ready to perform. What is strange though is that the actors are negotiating social networks without consideration for the conditions that could impact the implementation process.

Chapter 4

Africa's Development Imperatives: A Critical Discourse of the Case

4 Introduction

This chapter is not an extended analysis of discursive formations and content of the key indigenous development concepts that emerged from the numerous Africa's development debates. The chapter seeks to deal with the critical discourse of the cases of the African development imperatives that represent the key moments in the articulation of Africa's development efforts in relation to Nepad. These imperatives have come to converge with the modern day development-oriented phenomena and processes: sustainable development, the globalization phenomenon and the UN MDGs.

These concepts have increasingly remained influential and phenomenal in public discourses and policymaking domains in the growing expectations to balance social equity in the third-world nations particularly in Africa. This chapter seeks to draw a convergence of thematic feature characteristics of African development imperatives as the background function that informed the emergence of the Nepad initiative. This chapter therefore is directed towards providing the systemic analyses and frameworks within which the concepts of African development vis-à-vis Nepad are interrelated, understood and rationalized and how they were heralded.

African development exigencies have run into a contagion of scholarly debates and public discourses arising from schisms and digitations of perspectives on their character, the causes, the scope, and their effects. In other words, the debate on these themes rely either on objective or subjective criteria, and sometimes both reinforcing one another. Some arguments on the objective criteria rely on commonality of some indicators, while the subjective criteria stress Africa's development impediments. Some development theories, philosophical thoughts, and paradigms have been advanced in an attempt to relate, explain, and interpret their significance for Africa's development. These have led to a varying degree of orientations and

interpretations with a commonality of principles, given the flux of political, socioeconomic, and leadership complexities in the continent. Consequently, they set forth the dialectics of indigenous conceptualizations for Africa's development.

The discourse of African development imperatives deals with the analysis of the critical factors, by means of rational arguments, that are bearing on the African development efforts with regards to some presuppositions, objectives, underpinnings, and their implications that are bequeathed on Nepad. Discourse on development imperatives on the continent has to be given a historical approach so as to offer subrogated arguments to the effect that the themes would be deeply understood without risk of over-generalization of the critical concepts of the subject of the chapter, in the present preoccupation of the study.

The historical challenges of colonialism remain one of the critical factors of Africa's development imperatives. The great independence movements were inspired by African philosophical themes that led to the decolonisation process and self-rule. This imperative heralded African development consciousness for the prospects of political and economic emancipation and the resultant fortunes. The African political consciousness were essentially indigenous attempts influenced by universal themes, which originated from the Africans in Diaspora in the Caribbean and assumed widespread acclaim in the USA and Western Europe. During the anti-colonial era, development was principally perceived as political emancipation, African dignity, identity, and self-determination.

The agitation for decolonisation, African dignity and identity motivated the advancement of ideas and articulation of thoughts such as 'Negritude' propounded by Leopold Senghor of Senegal, 'pan-Africanism' of W.E.B. Du Bois, an African descendant in the USA; the Ghanaian, Kwame Nkrumah's pan-Africanism; and 'renaissant' by Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. This manifestly was the beginning of an era of critical African conceptual thoughts for the political emancipation and advancement of the continent.

These attempts have been identified, first of all, with the issues of the day – decolonisation. They meant to present some dialectical frameworks for African development and sought the realization of the disengagement of the colonialists from the continent. The critical concepts such as ‘Africa for Africa’ of Kwame Nkrumah and ‘Ujama’ by Julius Nyerere also emerged in the post-independence Ghana and Tanzania respectively. The imperatives of Africa’s development could be classified into two phases, the colonial and the post-colonial. It could be premised that the concept of African renaissance was not only to sensitize Africans into conceptual thoughts alone, but a call to action against colonialism as an attempt to shape the political future of Africa. On this score, the concept of African renaissance that emerged on the continent could be viewed as multifaceted and dynamic on several counts.

4.1 African Renaissance as a Political Concept for Development

A research study on Africa’s development imperatives would be incomplete and partial without examining the evolution and perspectives of some African indigenous concepts, which in part, have contributed, to the African development project. In other words, any examination of the African development imperatives would have to be preceded by a problem definition of what constitutes the imperatives as case studies, their character and scale over time.

It is therefore necessary to draw a demarcation when African imperatives are placed in context with regard to Nepad. As a sighting shot and the need to contain imprecision, it is critical to clarify what is and what is not being argued here. The African concepts in this study deal purely, not with the cultural, sociological, anthropological, religious, historical, aesthetical or geographical paradigms, but essentially with the political, socio-economic and leadership fundamentals to Africa’s development. For the purpose of this study, the salient indigenous African concept drawn from the political dimension, which has now adopted an economic nationalism character, given its contextual value, is the ‘African Renaissance’ concept. This provides the opportunity to track the relationship at the theoretical level between the concepts of African

renaissance within the different generations of evolution, on the basis of African development and to explore the implications of their relationships at a wider context of Nepad. The concept of African renaissance was an offshoot of Pan-Africanism, originated by Africans in Diaspora, as a racial sentiment, which expressed a deeply rooted sense of common belonging, identity, and dignity with Africa. Given this contention, Killingray has averred that, 'however, overtime and in Africa itself, Pan-Africanism has come to have other meanings, with African cultural identity being closely tied to ideas of regional or even continental political unity' (Killingray, 2004:496).

The concept of African renaissance could be viewed as a thought structure drawn from the indigenous wisdom for self-determination and an analytical reflection of the western rationality tradition with its very unique connotation and coinage of African significance. The contemporary concept of African Renaissance adduces wider implications from the past, cast in the same conceptual language and share general characteristics of universality, presumptions, pre-suppositions, vision, and prospects. The pre-independence African renaissance came at the heel of colonialism for political liberation, retained uniformity, intrinsic vision, significance, and connotation. The contemporary concept has added development and economic integration, which found expression in the evolution of Nepad.

In simple terms, African Renaissance implies positive transformation, in all spheres of African existence: which includes mentalities and patterns of thought and behaviour, socio-economic, political and culture structures. The concept has been viewed as the nationalistic-ideological trend concerned with the sorts of political philosophy, which arose from African resistance to and liberation from colonialism (Wright, 2000:489-490). African Renaissance was a response to colonialism with the aim to alter the political equation in favour of African political development *vis-à-vis* the world political order at the time.

The concept of African renaissance came to be synonymous with African determination for development through political freedom, dignity, and identity during the late 1940s, late 1950s, and the early 1960s. It practically awakened

black consciousness to engage meaningfully, the fundamentals that belie the attainment of higher goals for the continent, such as the political independence and acquaintance with international actors who have vested interest in the continent.

It played out also when the nations in South East Asia began to experience political freedom and self-determination, while African nations remained largely enigmatical colonies to the European imperialists, the experiences of African slaves in the USA, and the establishments of colonial rules on the continent. This was germane to actions and thoughts, expressed philosophically by Africans, Africans in Diaspora, and the scholars of African descent.

Other African descendants and scholars joined in the fervency that seized the time such as Basil Davidson, Leonard Barnes, Walter Rodney, Ivan van Sertini, and Molefe Asante, and researched extensively using the concept of renaissance as their thesis and theme. Other scholars of the contemporary era, such as, Franz Fanon, Ali Mazrui and Bernard Magubane, to mention but a few, have focused on the concept of providing deeper insights into the possibility of the pursuit of African renaissance in the modern era. (Davidson, 1993; Makgoba, 1999; Vil-Nkomo and Myburgh, 1999).

Duton has argued that, 'I take it that the linkage of past to represent future strategies – an effective and dynamic linkages in which the one informs the other – is integral to the definition of the concept "African Renaissance" ' (Duton, 2003:556). The import of Duton's argument seemingly appears to belie the critical meaning and implicit principles of the nature, scope, concept, context, vision, and the prospect that are linked to the current debate on the African renaissance concept *vis-à-vis* Africa's development imperatives and Nepad. The emergence of Nepad has interconnectedness with the African renaissance paradigm adopted from the Pan-African concept propagated by W.E.B. du Bois, (a hyphenated American of African descent), resonated by Kwame Nkrumah and Nnamdi Azikiwe, on one hand and its rearticulation in

the neo-liberal economic thesis by Thabo Mbeki between 1997 and 1999, on the other (Duton, 2003; Vil-Nkomo and Myburgh, 1999).

Vil-Nkomo and Myburg (1999), have argued that, 'the debate on this subject was much more rigorous in the 1950s into the 1960s, inspired by the independence of Ghana under the leadership of the late Kwame Nkrumah who spearheaded the notion of Pan-Africanism. The emergence of an independent Francophone African also produced leaders like Leopold Senghor, who espoused the notion of the renaissance using the concept of negritude' (Vil-Nkomo and Myburg, 1999:266).

Duton has argued that, 'during the period of anti-colonial struggle terms such as 'renaissance' and 'reawakening' took on a newly potent political significance' (Duton, 2003:558). In furthering his argument he stated that 'in 1995, in a speech on the state of the Nation, one of the principal architects of Pan-African movement of the Nations, Kwame Nkrumah, spoke of the 'awakening' of a giant continent and (with justice) of his own country as being "the symbol and the inspiration of renascent Africa". (Ibid.:559).

The concept of African Renaissance that originated from the concept of Pan-Africanism has assumed currency in debates in the context of political decolonisation processes during colonialism and in the context of socio-economic development in the post-colonial era in Africa. The objectives had been essentially the achievement of political autonomy for African nations and the determination of their political destinies on the one hand, and development and relevance on the other. These efforts saw Ghana and a host of African nations achieve political independence between 1957 and 1963. The attainment of independence paved the way for regional unity through the formation of the OAU, in 1963, the end product of the compromise between the Monrovia and the Cassablanca continental nationalism groupings. The concept has, in the twenty first century, assumed a character of an African economic nationalism.

4. 1. 1 African Renaissance as a Modern Economic Nationalism Concept

The collapse of the ideological bipolarity in the early 1990s, the dwindling donor aid, the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and the increasing influence of globalization and sustainable development render independence liberation movements irrelevant and less populist. It presented a new opportunity to seek relevance in terms of development driven policies to settle into trend with the evolving contemporary processes of globalization and sustainable development phenomena.

Africa today faces the reality where it is engaged in the process of reconstruction in an attempt to reform the continent from its inherent primordial contradictions to one of development. This process has to occur against the backdrop of both globalisation and sustainable development. The legacy of colonialism, political corruption, adverse effect of SAPs, huge-scale poverty, debt overhang, limited resources, and general insecurity have precipitated and rendered the continent underdeveloped and the sobriquet of investment risk. The causative effects have led to what could be termed “Afro-pessimism”, which refers to ‘a conception and image of Africa as a continent in institutional, mental, economic decline’ (Vil-Nkomo & Myburg, 1999:275).

Nabudere has averred that ‘... the concept is a useful tool in the struggle of the African people to redefine a new political and ideological agenda of Pan-Africanism in the age of globalization. The key pillars of the African renaissance are socio-cultural, political, economic regeneration and improvement of Africa’s geo-political standing in world affairs’ (Nabudere 2001:11). The parameters, nature and prospects of the African renaissance concept have found expression in the program of Nepad as a number of features appear exemplary. Duton has argued that, ‘... former achievements of Africans providing a stimulus for current initiatives; there is the emphasis on Africa developing its own distinctive and most appropriate models for revival and growth ...’ (Duton, 2003:569).

In relation to the evolving internal and external dynamics, African renaissance has again emerged in the context of economic nationalism *vis-a-vis* development, which began towards the end of the twentieth century. The African renaissance concept, with the development and economic nationalism paradigms, strives to develop Africa along the lines of what Duton refers to as “universalist thesis” – the desire being for Africa to subscribe to, and participate in modes of production, system of social organization and institutional management, and vision of living that are more or less fully operational in other parts of the world ...’ (Duton, 2003:570).

The emergence of the ANC government in South Africa in 1994, the elections of Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999 in Nigeria and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal in 2000, offered combinatory opportunities for the continent to divert energies into innovative concepts for the development of the continent. Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Abdoulaye Wade traded ideas of indigenous development concepts that took its root from the African Renaissance paradigm. They sought a reconfiguration through deeply held perception of an increasing role of the African continent in the world affairs, at the inception of globalization and sustainable development praxies along the need for concert efforts to initiate indigenous regional development policy programme for Africa’s development.

To support this view, Tiekou argues that, ‘... the leadership role South Africa was expected to play in Africa’s concerted response to the challenges of globalisation meant that a new image had to be created’ (Tiekou, 2004:253). ‘... in 1996, ... made public that its policies would be informed by ‘Growth, Employment, and Redistribution’ (GEAR), a neo-liberal strategy designed to make South Africa a destination for foreign investment and a competitive global trading state’. (Ibid.:253). Upon assumption of office, Mbeki’s neo-liberal economic posturing recaptured the African renaissance thesis. The ANC agenda included, among other things, the propagation within a broader renewalist approach of the neo-liberal economic ethos to entail the rest of Africa. As a result the concept of the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme, (MAP), a constituent of Nepad came alive.

Young avers that, 'The vision of an 'African Renaissance' articulated with eloquence by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, and the summons to a New Partnership for Africa's Development [Nepad] echoed by Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria pledging an economically reformed, politically democratic and governmentally accountable and transparent Africa, offers a normative notion of a renovated African state' (Young, 2004:25).

Taylor and Williams (2001), have argued that 'since late 1996 when Mbeki started to play a more active role in the formulation of Pretoria's foreign policy, South Africa's African policy has coalesced around the notion of an African Renaissance – although Mbeki did not formally use the idea until an address to an American audience in April 1997. Also in 1997, a document entitled "the African Renaissance: A Workable Dream", was released by the Office of South African Deputy President. It suggested five areas of engagement of cultural exchange; the emancipation of the African woman from patriarchy; the mobilization of the youth, the broadening, deepening and sustenance of democracy; and the initiation of sustainable economic development. Since then Mbeki has sought to ... solving Africa's problems through his advocacy of the renaissance concept' (Taylor & Williams, 2001: 267).

They further argue that, 'In an address at the UN University in April 1998, Mbeki expanded on some of the core elements that formed the substance of his renaissance vision. Amongst these were the needs to establish and maintain systems of good governance; to introduce new economic policies, which seek to create conditions that are attractive for the private sector; to reduce the participation of the state in the ownership of the economy and to build modern economies; to establish regional economies arrangements to lesson the disadvantages created by small markets; and to introduce policies that would ensure access to good education, adequate health care, decent house, clean water and modern sanitation' (Taylor & William, 2001:267).

In another respect, both authors argue that, 'It is openly admitted that this version of the African Renaissance accedes to neo-liberal notions of what

constitutes 'best practice' and 'good' economic policy. In return for such restructuring, Mbeki and other elites expect a quid pro quo from international society, in particular, a concerted international effort to provide debt relief for Africa; the introduction of measure to encourage larger flows of capital into the continent; reasonable trade policies, to provide market access for African products; and an assurance that Africa can eventually occupy "her due place within the councils of the world" (Taylor & William, 2001:268/269).

The concept, African Renaissance, in other words reflects the revival and re-awakening of Africa, which successfully links the evolution of Nepad with the past, in which one informs the other as integral. As Duton has argued 'to break from the constraints of the past, yet to relearn its lost or occluded values, so as to find a way to build the future, is an urgent preoccupation in contemporary ... Africa' (Duton, 2003:556).

This evocation is informed by the recognition of the need to stall the African societal and institutional weaknesses, increasing level of poverty, underdevelopment, marginalization, and what Duton calls "singular existential experience" (Duton, 2003:558). This paradigm for African development emerged in the works of notable Africans – Nelson Mandela, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah, and Leopold Senghor, to indicate a few, in one single focus which Duton aptly describes as '... the achievement of Africa as being specific ... achievements and the expectation that Africa's renaissance will be generated from Africa's own will, independent act and resources' (Duton, 2003:558). There is for instance, an emphasis on recuperation of the continent through development and economic growth, human capital and the role of the continent in the global agenda, which have provided stimulus to the current initiative. '... there is emphasis on Africa developing its own distinctive and most appropriate models for revival and growth' (Duton, 2003:569).

Nepad is native to Africa and a need-based approach to Africa's development. Development partnership in the contemporary African context, is about an alternative form of charting development in wider economic and political spheres, other than donor aid, IMF and World Bank loans and assistance and

their stringent conditions, in public funding for developmental projects. The urgency for synergies of vision, issues, and new coalitions, is the dynamic element, which are responsible for developmental partnership. Axworthy has argued that, 'Coalition building among like-minded states and non-state actors is one dynamic element of this "new diplomacy" ' (Axworthy, 2001:19).

Before the UN MDGs were launched, partnership in Africa was essentially based on (1) bilateral contacts between governments and civil societies and the international NGOs, MNCs, on one hand, and at the multilateral levels by the UN Agencies and (2) ideological patronage on the other. International NGOs, often the creation of the developed countries, came into partnership with some governments and local civil society organizations in Africa, primarily focusing on relief functions and project funding, rather than direct development activities. Their activities and funding are always in tune with their perceptions, concepts, and specificities.

The oil price crisis of the mid 1980s created an imbalance in the foreign exchange earnings of most African states. They resorted to external loans and borrowings to square up public goods and services and importations to meet local demands and stem social and political upheavals. This partially contributed to the debt overhang. Inspired by the conditions in the continent, Berry has argued that, 'Many African economies, weakened during the 1970s by oil price shocks, drought, or civil war began to suffer declining standards of living. The rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in sub-Sahara Africa fell from 4.2 per cent per annum in the period 1965-1980, to only 2.1 per cent in the years 1980-1990, while agricultural production, long the mainstay of African economic output and the source of livelihood for the majority of the population, hovered around 2 per cent per annum. Over the same period, average population growth rose from 2.7 per cent in 1965-1980 to 3.1 per cent per annum from 1980-1990. Thus both agricultural output and GDP per capita declined throughout the 1980s' (Berry, 2000:363).

The attainment of independence in Africa gave way to the ideological leanings by African leadership on both sides of the super-powers rivalry (the cold war),

in order to secure national security at the expense of development. Concessional financial aid, technical assistance and trade accompanied it simultaneously. As a result, African political economies and political institutions became dependent, weak, and vulnerable to the antics of the superpowers. Lancaster, (2000:215), has argued that, 'During the cold war competition between the USSR and its allies, on the one hand, and the Western Countries, on the other, was a major motivating purpose behind aid to Africa'. 'Related to this is the difficulty for the African continent to become part of the knowledged economy. Such an economy is driven by sophisticated technologies, which are costly and require maintenance and innovation' (Vil-Nkomo, 2002:281).

The end of the Cold War, exerted undue influence on Africa, because the continent was of imminent strategic importance to the major Cold War actors. But this importance tapered off as the major donor aid patrons from the divides began radical restructuring of their foreign policies and roles on the global stage, and sought to reconsolidate their economies. The aid receiving nations of sub-Saharan Africa suffered decreasing aid for economic development, and crisis after crisis of their socio-political establishments and societies became the order of the day. The African situation became volatile and created a sense of inadequacy, which in turn forced African leaders to participate in the globalization process in order to assuage and dissuade the built up of internal tensions and dissensions.

In the bid to adapt to the changing and expanding world economy, and the surge for political relevance, African leaders launched Nepad, which evolved through public policy processes - conceptualization, agenda setting, formulation, proclamation and implementation. By its partnership context, Nepad could be viewed in two basic dimensions of partnership, (a) fund seeking to the tune of \$64 billion (b) development diplomacy, given the involvement of the highest political contacts. Within these two contexts, it hopes to actualize most of its agenda. The inauguration of Nepad in 2001, was a response to address the political and socio-economic gaps created by the numerous debilitating factors already enumerated in anticipation to

prosecute development that Nepad documents of October 2001 have heralded in relation to globalization, sustainable development, and the UN MDGs.

Riddel has argued that, 'For more than three decades, a key feature of Africa and African relations with the outside world, has been the aid relationship. In recent years, donors have given high priority to using aid resources to help solve Africa's poverty problems' (Riddel, 1999:309).

Berry has contended that, 'Opinion ranged from the view that unless African regimes took complete control of their own economies, African peoples were doomed to poverty and underdevelopment because of their peripheral position in the global economy, to the belief that Africa could develop only if African governments abandoned their attempts to shield their economies from the world market forces' (Berry, 2000:363). In corroboration of this view, it could be argued that, any bid to revive and position the continent in the path to development rest essentially on three main planks: regional unity and integration; unique responsibility of the industrialized nations to assist Africa; and an indigenous development initiatives.

Similarly Himbara has argued that, 'The debate on development and integration is no longer new and therefore no longer about whether social, economic and political transformations at the periphery is possible, but rather about what constitute the social agency, which spearheads the process' (Himbara, 1995:149). These perspectives offer succinctly the underpinnings and principles through which Nepad had been founded.

It could be argued that, the prevailing circumstances in the continent prior to the inception of Nepad had a critical bearing on the need to seek new ways to address the development malaises plaguing Africa. To a greater extent, these circumstances, which range from political, and socio-economic dimensions are the critical elements that form the strategic imperative of cultivating strong links with the developed nations within the context of development

partnership. Development partnership underscores the harkening back to the rich nations to assist Africa in its development efforts.

The emerging trends, shortly after attainment of independence, had been that of political instability and widespread political corruption, monopoly of power, electoral impropriety and fragmentation in policy development and implementation. These conditions lead to outcomes, worst characterized by the scanty strategic interest from foreign investors, which scuttled Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), abating resources and the consequent grinding down of political legitimacy. These have rendered the continent susceptible and vulnerable, to both internal and external cleavages, resource wars and widespread violent conflicts and as a consequence diminish its role and relevance at the global stage.

The normative frameworks that were fringes to the launch of Nepad could be traced to the imperatives of the colonial era. These imperatives motivated not only the anti-colonialism pathos, but has remained to serve even to this day, a conceptual foundation of Africa's response to development, economic growth, and good governance orchestrated by the globalization process, the UN MDGs, and the sustainable development phenomenon. In other words, the political concept has come to serve as an economic nationalism paradigm for Africa's development in the new millennium. The case at hand has ineluctably linked both the character and vision of the concept of African Renaissance of the twentieth century, aimed essentially at the decolonisation of the continent to the 21st century, which has assumed economic interventions for Africa's continued effort at Africa's economic emancipation from a troika: global economic marginalization; internal political insecurity and social crisis.

4. 2 African Renaissance: Implications for the Research Agenda

African Renaissance could increasingly be acknowledged as the meaningful mechanism for the African world, with programmes and policies aimed at development. The concept provides a set of ideas and concepts for systematic analysis about African development paradigms. It has also brought

forth the theoretical premise in which Nepad could be spotlighted, studied, and critically examined, in the context of policy implementation analysis.

Emphasis on modeling Nepad appears as a bargain of exchanges among the principles and objectives that underlie the evolution of the concept and its relative interrelationship to the sustainable development, UN MDGs, and the globalization phenomenon on the one hand, and the public policy domain, on the other. These are drawn from the precipitated preferences of development programme vis-à-vis public policy studies. This has indeed placed Nepad, its implementation and the African development imperatives at the center stage in the contemporary drive to respond to the challenges of the modern development-oriented strategies. Such a framework necessitate study on the ways in which one form of the African development concept has been constructed; on the ways in which individuals and collective means develop internally for common identity and objectives; and the way in which shared history, political and socio-economic experiences are understood and behaviours merged in time to demonstrate a multiple balance and interdependent variables that ultimately evolve into a single development programme.

With such a conception and framework, a direct focal point of study might be drawn on a double critical criteria, which is the implementation process to actualize the espoused policy goals; the adaptability of the implementation process to the ever-changing demands, challenges, and the environment, that is, to seek out new possibilities, probing and exploiting externalities to offset excessive impact dynamics to guide the implementation process environment. To sum up, the amount that has been said on the African renaissance has significantly opened space for the concept to be localized in a viable policy science studies, that is, the nuances of the African Renaissance in relation to Nepad could be systematically analyzed within the public policy context.

4. 3 Perspectives on the Determinants and Indicators of Globalization with regard to Africa

Globalization is a concept whose deterministic definition is elusive. That is to say, it is polemically patronizing for some, while it is subjective to others, given the attendant nuances. As with any other social science concept, it has met with nuances, definitional variations, and characterization. Globalization, as defined by Held and McGrew, with Goldblatt and Perraton, (1999), is 'a process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power' (Held & McGrew, with Goldblatt & Perrato, 1999:483).

They argue that, 'it is not a single process but involves four distinct processes:

- It stretches social, political, and economic activities across political frontiers, regions, and continents.
- It speeds up the world. New systems of transport and communication. It means that ideas, goods, information, capital, and people move more quickly.
- It intensifies our dependence on each other, as flows of trade, investment, finance, migration, and culture increase. It stretches social, political, and economic activities across political frontiers, regions, and continents.
- It means that distant events have a deeper impact on our lives. Even the most local development may come to have enormous global consequences. The boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs can become increasingly blurred' (Ibid.:1999:483/484).

Behind the globalization fad is the critical quest for understanding what drives and underpins the concept and the objectives and indicators. The conditions both political and socioeconomic that confronted Africa had prompted generations of initiatives with a shift from political liberation to socioeconomic integration and development policies in response to the new world order.

4. 3.1 Perspectives on the Concept of Globalization

The concept of globalization has received various interpretations that have imbued the concept, particularly in Africa. Swartz has contended that, 'The changes in the region coincided with, and were influenced by, a series of shifts in the international political and economic system...' (Swartz, 1999:41). The end of the Cold War between the East and the West, and the resultant cessation of hostilities, ultimately ended the ideologically-based and hegemonic empire acquisition, sustenance and expansion. It instantaneously brought with it, the evolution of the concept of globalization. The concept came into a general use in the early 1990s. By natural progression the concept has become appealing and seemingly enjoys considerable adaptability in the social sciences. It could be argued that globalization has effectively substituted the Cold War with development characterization. 'It is therefore, a revolutionary concept, involving the deterritorialization of social, political, economic, and cultural life' (Griffiths & O'Callaghan, 2002:126/127).

Globalization seeks to generate and promote meaningful global socioeconomic and political development at various spheres in the twenty first century, that is, good and corporate governance, a neo-liberal economy; faster, easier, cheaper communication; information technology, and enhancement of multicultural settings. Globalization as a notion is to organize the new world order that focuses on the centrality of institutional and mechanism building for development initiatives at the, national, regional, and inter-regional levels.

Given the postulations above, it could be argued that, the concept from the African standpoint, has to do with a renewed economic nationalism for Africa's economic recovery, that not only views development and economic growth in the wider context of effective governance, public policy, policy development and management, policy implementation, and system structures that are vital to translate the perceived goals into realistic outcomes but also accepts international partnership as critical for development. This refers to a more advanced stage of the process of development. The globalization

phenomenon, an interventionist approach and a major global mainstream response to global development initiatives after the end of the cold war could be premised on the significant approaches adopted by the UN, EU, OECD, and the G8, on the one hand, and the giant conglomerates, on the other, to evolve processes that aim at greatly influencing national economies and political governance styles, with a view to create global common good, growth, and stability.

4.3.2 Development Partnership as an Evolving Determinant of Globalization

The critical theme is the focus on the context of partnership involving all the stakeholders to act in concert through a mechanism to generate and mobilize resources to address the intractable problem of underdevelopment particularly in the third world nations. This form of partnership involves the international financial institutions at the multilateral level: the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO, the UNDP and UNCTAD, multinational corporations, and the UN system on the one hand and international NGOs, civil society organizations, national governments, sub-regional and regional organizations, from both the developed and developing countries on the other.

The first ever world conference to address funding and related issues on the critical aspect of third world development took place in Mexico, convened by the UN. 'The principal goal of the Conference is to find ways to address the various and complex issues affecting the financing of development, as well as the mobilization of resources for the implementation of action plans agreed to at major UN conferences of the 1990s and the Millennium Development Goals of the year 2000. The underlying principle is that developing countries concerns and role in the world economic structure need to be fully taken into account and strengthened' (UN Global Conference Journal, 2001: 23).

The Nepad concept seeks to create opportunities that will eliminate poverty in Africa and help build a future that is less threatening and secure by the regression of the existing mass poverty. Partnership for development could be

viewed as a channel in corporate social responsibility with a coalition approach. It is about a commitment to improving the quality of life in specific terms by all stakeholders. Accordingly, Norman has argued that, 'It is about accepting broader economic and social responsibilities ... about forging new public and private partnerships to create an environment in which Africa's people can realize their potential and achieve prosperity' (Norman, 2003:5).

Given the increasing complex nature of human, environmental, and societal challenges posed to Africa's development, the concept of partnership for development has emerged. Seen in this perspective, partnership that is regarded in an extended paradigm could vary from the intra-regional, inter-regional or even the sub-regional. The extra-national context renders partnership the coloration and assumption that belie what it means and what it seeks to address. Development partnership could be public or private partnership, NGOs, and inter-governmental and in the special circumstances, Nepad, all geared and focused on development of the society and the human species that inhabit society.

It could be argued that with regard to the principles of globalization, the process mobilizes international private sectors at the multilateral levels to adopt inventive and innovative mechanisms in creating faster socio-economic transactional schemes across national borders. This is with a view to create and enhance modern systems of interconnection through communication and information technologies with borderless interaction of people, quick movement of capital, commodity markets and information flows for the ultimate development of the world community, however underdeveloped.

4.3.3 Good Political Governance as an Evolving Determinant of Globalization

This has come to serve as one of the critical issues that drive the globalization phenomenon. Good political governance in third world nations has, to a large extent, been viewed as deterministic in the globalization process, given the recurrent dismal economic performance, and poor policy preferences. It is

necessarily concerned with addressing internal conflicts on the continent, the high scale political corruption, poor accountability, transparency, policy of exclusion, and inordinate policy implementation in the continent. Massiocotte argues that, 'Global governance is not – and does not seek the creation of - a world government. However, its proponents usually converge on the need for common norms, values, principles, and laws to coordinate socioeconomic relations on a global scale' (Massiocotte, 1999:136).

The new world arrangement through globalization seeks to forge a closer link rather than widen the gap between the poor and the developed economies, with a need for capable states, regions to mobilize and target resource-based factor endowments for high-end growth with low-end social imperatives for development. This focus has become a critical strategic imperative within and beyond regional and sub-regional fiscus for economic integration and development. It has led regional groupings to initiate policies that enhance the surge for partnership for development as even demonstrated by the UN.

With regard to the governance concept, especially in Africa, Cerny and Evans argue that, 'It could be argued political engineering undertaken through the concept of good governance particularly in the third world and specifically in Africa with regard to globalization and sustainable development refers to reforms of political institutions and structures, functions and processes at the face of the globalization process. ... State intervention itself is aimed at not only adjusting to but also sustaining, promoting and expanding an open global economy in order to capture its perceived benefits' (Cerny & Evans, 2004:59).

Governance has four major dimensions, namely: economic, corporate, administrative, and political. Good governance and the principles of new public management would mean the adaptability of the African policy environment and public administration though with universal appeal to influence development and socio-economic policy programme implementation. In other words political dimensions are expressed within the context sensitive to sociopolitical, economic, environmental, gender and cultural conditions.

As a result institutional arrangements are to initiate policy actions that are peculiar to its own socio-economic, political, and cultural needs, value systems, and interrelationships to organize, promote, and regulate patterns of development and human and institutional behaviours. The new global order suggests that alliances, development partnership and regional integration inform the context of corporate pattern of interactions directed at the socioeconomic and political policy programmes that will evolve the principles of good governance and those of the New Public Management (NPM) to bring about better efficiency and effectiveness (entrepreneurship) in the delivery of public goods and services to the clientele.

Politically, globalization arguably deals with the development and sustainability of effective political institutions such as the legislature and strong judiciary that are deemed necessary for governing a state, free from political corruption, free from institutional weaknesses to match the modern political frames of reference. Africa reflects the stated constraints and therefore requires good political governance for Nepad's implementation *vis-à-vis* the globalization objectives.

4. 3. 4 Socio-economic Determinants of Globalization in Africa

The development of the world economy has a long history and could be associated with economic and imperial expansionism of the great powers. Cheru corroborates and states that, 'The ... interest in development and economic growth is as the result of the advent of powerful trading blocs across the globe' (Cheru, 2002:122).

The global economy is one in which all aspects of the economy – raw materials, labour, information and transportation, finance, distribution, marketing – are integrated or interdependent on a global scale (Carnoy *et al.* 1993), quoted in Robins, (1996). By global economy, 'we mean an economy that works as a unit in real time on a planetary basis' (Castells, 1994:21). Cheru also contends that, 'The regional economic integration is not conceived as a counter-hegemonic project to deflect the ill effects of globalization on

weak and vulnerable African economies, but as a necessary vehicle to accelerate Africa's integration into the new knowledge-driven global economy' (Cheru, 2002:122).

Economic imperatives bear on the globalization phenomenon. For instance, the creation of trade and investment barriers and high tariffs, the rationing of capital repatriation and transfers in the name of protectionism had hobbled the economic development and even regional integration in African economies, thereby isolate the continent from the world mainstream economic systems. Economically, Africa's productive systems, trade and commerce with the outside world were being dramatically redefined, driven by the logic of globalisation through WTO.

Van de Walle has argued that, 'Africa's economic crisis has lingered for two decades because state elites have failed to implement thorough going economic liberalization, not because they have been hemmed in by societal resistance to reform, but because elites have persisted in clientelistic politics. The partial reform syndrome, which characterizes Africa's experiences over the past two decades, is the result of persistent clientelism, low state capacity, the elites lack of faith ... as a solution to Africa's development problems, and a pattern of increasing foreign aid flows despite the failure of African states to reform' (Van De Walle, 2003:137-140).

In Africa, the attempt to re-organize and generate economic growth began with the proposed African Economic Community (AEC). Cheru argues that, 'The Abuja Treaty signed at the OAU Summit in June 1991 with the aim of establishing an African Economic Community by the year 2025, is indicative of African resolve to become an important player in global matters' (Cheru, 2002:122). Given the interrelationship between economy and globalization, Cooper has argued that, 'The ideological framework is liberalisation arguments for free trade and free movement of capital' (Cooper, 2002:196). It is also about expansion of integration and spatial linkages which underscores rapidly pervasive multitude of changes for development.

4. 3. 5 Indicators of the Globalization Process

In order to prosecute the tasks of globalization and sustainable development, certain key areas have been targeted for action plan. These could be regarded as the indicators of the globalization phenomena of the new world order. They include among others:

- Mobilizing Domestic Financial Resources – the bulk of a country's development capital comes from effective legal institutions, system of taxation, public administration, and financial infrastructures required for public and private funds deployment to enhance social and economic advancement.
- Mobilizing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in addition to domestic resources, to increase the magnitude and broaden the reach of these flows, while at the same time containing their volatility.
- Active participation in international trade to generate external earnings from major channels for promoting economic growth and eradicating poverty.
- Official Development Assistance (ODA), has entered into a long-term decline but remains essential for the development of many low-income countries. Additional assistance is also needed if the world is to realize its commitment to the Millennium Summit goals of poverty reduction and human development, significant debt relief non-selective extension to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, (HIPC) to solve present debt problems and prevent developing countries from falling into the debt trap.
- International Monetary, Financial And Trading Systems assistance both financial and advisory have led to calls for reform to the International financial architectures. Some improvements have been made but more are required. One challenge is to find ways to strengthen developing countries' participation in the International economic systems. The other is to increase coherence among the key institutions in the areas of international finance, money, trade and development. In this regard,

the UN should be able to play a more effective role in the International economic arena (UN Global Conference Journal, 2001:23).

The issues of HIV / AIDS, environment, and gender empowerment are other indicators for the globalization process due to the international character, repercussions, and the dimensions these factors have come to assumed.

The pattern of these indicators correlates with the globalization principles. They are based on the perception and vision of re-ordering the socio-economic and political interaction patterns of the world for development. This is a shift of emphases from ideological divide to global development, a new paradigm designed by the universality of consensus on the nature of interactions among international actors and governments. These conditions have constituted challenges for as well as the indicators of globalization. International NGOs, Amnesty International, DFID, USAID, Oxfam, to mention a few, have already been in operation in Africa on bilateral bases while UN Agencies, IMF, WB, UNDP, UNCTAD, WTO, are in collaboration at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The aim arises from the need for partnership for development, construction of economic and socio-political infrastructure, strengthening of political institutions, integration of African economies into the world economic system within the principles of globalization and the UN MDGs.

Given the aforesaid background, the need for a collective effort became urgent and inevitable. Nepad eventually came to represent the mechanism, not only to fill the gaps but also to address the imperatives of development in the continent. Although this may be belated in comparison with other regions of the world, it is better late than never particularly at the emergence of the globalization and sustainable development phenomena. Perhaps if it had emerged before now, there is a possibility that, it would have remained effectively dysfunctional likened to the moribund OAU, mired in the Cold War divisive propaganda. All this would have guaranteed its incompetence and inefficiency. Van de Walle has argued that, 'Despite a recent spurt in the mid-1990s, most African countries are poorer today than at independence. Most economies appear stagnant, still dependent on a small number of primary

commodities and seemingly incapable of undertaking the kind of structural transformation that is taking place in much of Asia and Latin America' (Van de Walle, 1999:340).

These conditions as noted above underscores the introduction of indigenous development programme, such as Nepad with its policy goals. In corroboration, Alemayehu posits that, 'Cooperation at multi-country and sub-regional levels offers African countries the possibility of mitigating constraints arising from small and fragmented national markets, economies of scale, and lack or inadequacy of natural resources' (Alemayehu, 2000:378). The implication here, among others, is that development partnership ought to bring about established principles that guide and facilitate the optimal dividends, through comparative advantages. This tends to enhance the basis for cooperation and necessarily preconditions for development partnership. Alemayehu further argues that, '... no matter what arrangements are put in place among member countries, the involvement of foreign collaborators and partners, both at the individual country and group-of-countries levels, is fundamental and unavoidable at least within the not so distant future, if African countries are to develop, achieve without option' (Ibid.:378).

Given the huge level of development imperatives on the continent, Van de Walle has argued that, '... everyone pays lip-service to the idea that development is an indigenous affair, in which outsiders can play at best a small role. It could indeed plausibly be argued that the situation would have been considerably worse without the substantial flow of resources to the region provided by aid' (Van de Walle, 1999:340). The real challenge left unattended for development in Africa is the development partnership, which has elucidated much enthusiasm from the globe, at least notionally. Accordingly, it could be argued that these accounts constitute important stages in the realization of an ultimate portrait of development policy programme in the age of globalization.

4. 4. The Principles and Rationale underlying African Development Partnership in the Globalized Environment

The concept of development partnership draws on the lessons of several decades of such experience and the promotion of more international partnership for sustainable development. The primacy that underlie the concept is based on the need for sustained economic growth through multiple factors in which developing countries, particularly those in Africa can match, in the 21st century. As it is apparent from development experiences, a piecemeal approach or development without partnership consideration would fail to optimize the principles of globalization and sustainable development for the benefit of the continent.

Several forerunner development initiatives were characterized by implementation problems and ill successes. These, it could be argued, were constructs in isolation and therefore could not be properly implemented. The partnership framework with the rest of the world was non-existent, if not utterly dismissed. While some had dramatically transformed their economies in terms of the outputs, structural and institutional reforms, in many cases through partnership – APEC and LAFTA for example. So far there has been no evidence of ill success or poor development of these initiatives based on development partnership strategies. Various modalities underpin development partnership as acknowledged even by the UN. One of the critical criteria of development partnership is funding.

Given the predominant shortage of capacities in Africa, these modalities remain largely the essential ingredients for development partnership. From the UN MDGs (2000) and the Conference on Financing Development (2001), cooperation or partnership for development has seemingly gained currency as the new trend of activities in the absence of ideological warfare. The trend of economic activities and socio-political developments even from the colonial era had witnessed domination by foreign partners in most African countries through joint ventures and the advent of the multi-national corporations, where they invest capital and product marketing along with the indigenous sectors.

To this extent, partnership from the development perspective appears mutually desirable, beneficial, and advantageous to the participating African countries.

Financing for development requires a pragmatic involvement of the G8, the EU, donor nations, and some UN Agencies in critical areas such as political governance, strengthening of public institutions, and democratic principles in the developing countries, which go beyond mere bilateral donor aid practices, but provide new partnership modalities. This has put the concept of partnership into a new context, which could be regarded as the extended or expanded partnership. It has created the scenarios in which the partners play a greater role, ownership in prioritizing and coordinating approaches. The extended partnership concept *vis-à-vis* Nepad therefore would necessarily implicate coordination and liaison with international bodies such as UN, OECD, IMF, WB, and the African sub-regional bodies - ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, IGAD, and the Arab Magreb Union, and tap into the experiences of other regional economic and political institutional arrangements, for example, the EU, to benefit from their experiences.

Previously, partnership in Africa was essentially focused on donor aid from international NGOs, relief efforts, loan and grants for project development, carried out at the center and mostly within the context of technical assistance programme. Consequently, partnership has provided the developed countries the necessary window to meaningfully assist in funding regional development programmes in Africa in particular, in order to exterminate poverty and generate development that is sustainable. These criteria define the overall context in which development partnership could occur, as well as the conditions of the game. The followings could therefore be conceptualized as some of the basic principles for development partnership:

- Strategies for global economic development expansion in form of partnership for development.
- Promotion of investment outlook, Communication and information technology.

- Ensuring environmental sustainable development.
- Strategic policy, institutional reform and expansion.
- Policy targeting for development; Human capital and sharing of leadership responsibility, i.e. transformation from a position of almost exclusive authority to one prone to facilitation and motivation.
- Good political and economic governance.
- Promotion of social equity, inclusive policy-making process, strategic policy implementation, and gender equality.

(Kuye, 2003; Brinkerhoff, 2002; Maloka & Le Roux, 2001; Vil-Nkomo, 2001; Makgoba, 1999).

Development partnership holds out the potential to become the central approach in this century for the promotion of sustainable development and globalization principles. The partnership concept embraces a more mutually independent nature due to its indigenous context in the tie-in between the actors than in joint initiatives under contractual, principal-agent, or governing-governed relationships, that is to say all parties involved participate on the basis of the recognition of absolute mutual interdependence; the contribution of which is considered essential to the whole, regardless of the variation in the strengths and weaknesses of the parties (Fizbein & Lowden, 1999:4).

Arboleda and Villar, (1996) have argued 'development partnership is characterized by (i) a common objective (ii) active partnership (iii) interdependent contributions and (iv) horizontal relations', quoted in Fizbein & Lowden, 1999:12). The partnership character of Nepad denotes that the partners, particularly the G8 and donor nations, would not only contribute resources (financial, and intangibles such as information and political support) but also participate in the process. The focus being that the development challenges of the continent has to be addressed and systematically reduced.

Fizbein and Lowden, (1999), have further argued for two basic criteria of partnership –Maximalist and minimalist. The maximalist dimension, according to them, is when the parties that are in partnership are recognized and are at

total correlative interdependence. While the minimalist denotes members of the partnership are interacting and making useful contributions to the interest of the partnership. There is an implication here with regard to Nepad. As a case study of partnership and policy implementation at the supra-national level, the criterion of the minimalist approach reinforces the outlook of Nepad.

The reason being that, the aggregate effect to mobilize the potentialities and resources of the partners in a broadest sense, appear collective to find solutions to the development imperatives of Africa. At the same time, partnership either at the minimalist context or at its classic form, share correspondingly certain intrinsic features central to understanding the critical nature of partnership as a recourse to development.

Brinkerhoff, (2002) has identified the typologies of partnership and groups them into four formations - partnership for public service; partnership for corporate social responsibility; partnership for conflict resolution; and partnership for international development. To this end partnership from the Nepad's perspective denotes all, in which the progenitors seek the most effective and efficient service delivery, minimizing the direct involvement and funding of government bodies at the face of scarce resources both in human capital and material terms and acquiring external funding, for implementing its policy objectives.

Partnership for development comes with its unique demands and characteristics in terms of scope, complex processes, and context within a given circumstance. This tries to serve the basis for which Brinkerhoff, (2002), argues that partnership of any kind is more of rhetoric than pragmatic and without the necessary trappings, as it is prone to making things worse. This contention draws huge cynicism and builds up mistrust. This arises out of the least sustained African progress in development, failure to stem the tide against frivolous and unnecessary self-inflicted crises and depressions, and inability to stay out of extractive economic relations with the rest of the world.

Partnership for development could be classified as a mechanistic function, which means that certain public mechanisms could be inducted as measures of willingness to act. At some instances, effective development partnership might be operational and not in others. There is the possibility that partnership for development is mutually reinforcing with inherent hybrid variables.

However, there is widely divergent empirical evidence on the concept of partnership and the effectiveness of partnership, albeit not within the purview of this study but it is critical to note certain implications. The first is, even when the participants in the partnership are observable, the development programmes may not be measured at what ever level in terms of a measured period of time, appropriate quality in a given environment, for instance the Nepad's policy programme. Second, delicate variations abound if the de facto partnership becomes practicable beyond the partnership continuum. Thus fragmentary (lack of formal authority and contact) development partnership would appear to be the norm.

Please see below a reconfigured 'Modeling Frame of Nepad's International Partnership for Development': Actors and their relationships. It is adapted for the purpose of this study from Murrell's, (2002:76), *Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*. In Martens, Mummert, Murrell, Seabright, *The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid*. Cambridge University Press.




Figure 4.1: Partnership Relationship Model between Actors of Nepad.

The links indicated are less formal, emphasize relationships between actors in Nepad partnership as they are pressed together in the same African project. This archetype development partnership model reflects that each actor comes into it with its own interest, which rules out fully formal contractual agreement. There exists much capacity and latitude for multiple engagements and negotiations among the actors. In other similar patterns of partnership either between INGOs and local or between governments and civil society, the arrangement remains the same, particularly in the third world except in exceptional circumstances.

The focal point in the model (Fig. 4.1) is the dependent relationship and links that the actors – principal partners and the recipients are under less formal contract and are in bargaining exchanges with each other. It pinpoints who

and who are relating within the partnership environment at various levels. All the participants in the model are independent entities that try to exercise optimal influence, on the one hand and extract benefits, on the other. For instance, the G8 and donor nations are urged to facilitate the implementation process by advancing capital grants and technical expertise that they possess and which are not readily available in Africa.

Partnership for development has unique advantages and conversely its drawbacks, given its emergence as a revivalist or interventionist programme particularly in the African environment. Its advantages include exchanges of information and initiatives, infusion of resources, facilitation, political support, sharing and transfer of technical skills and technology. It seeks to influence autocratic leaderships and exclusive decision-making; it allows for dialogue and consensus building, enhances institutional development and capacity building. It induces a multiplicity of actors, interactions, interdependency and interrelationships. As it is with other social scientific concepts, its shortcomings are imminent. The major partners could withhold or withdraw sponsorship facility at will. There is also the fragility dimension, wherein the weaker members are economically vulnerable. This ultimately creates subordination to the powerful hegemon member states.

While the G8, as principal actors acquire the capital and technical means and the capacity to ease the implementation of the policy objectives of Nepad, the recipient lacks the resources to do so. This type of partnership draws unique difficulties. For instance, the question of capital resources, expertise, and information flow that the G8 acquires, accumulates, and disseminates in large scale, remain greatly in their favour, to wield extensive political and socioeconomic influence on the African partner, Nepad.

The interlocutors of Nepad are misrepresenting the cultivation of good governance, respect for democratic principles and the rule of law, political credibility, which are of significance to the G8 partners. The Zimbabwean political crisis provides the ready example. This is what Taylor, (2002) has reflected as a failure of Nepad. Thus, the partnership with the G8 can slide

into diminishing of the focus, perception, and the expectations of Nepad, which is already facing radical widespread critiques, if ethics that appeal to the major partners suffer subtlety and subterfuge.

Notwithstanding, partnership allows capacity for the actors to engage in trade-offs between devoting resources, requirements and contributions to match focal points of interest and building consensus. Within the context of partnership for development, the recipients owe themselves the responsibility in the pursuit of problem definition and guidelines that they seek to regulate and create an enabling environment for sustained partnership. The facilitators would have to deal with both political support and resources. This poses the question as well as challenges as to whether or not partnership can be articulated in a singular approach that defines partnership types. It is often the case, which particular priorities prevail over individualistic ones on issues that are defined both within regional and international jurisdictions, in a given partnership context.

These contentions seemingly capture the delicate nature of development partnership and relationship with partners in which all parties reserve the capacity to differentiate between the issues of implementation and non-implementation. The implicit element in this partnership of choice is that, the actors have to maintain constant interaction and recurrent dialogue, if they don't, it will fail to build up trust to enhance the implementation process. Sustaining the trust and expectations of the partners is essentially critical in development partnership when the recipients honour the principles of and commitment made in the partnership. Consequently, the equilibrium outcome of partnership for development would rely on the level of trust and the quality of relationship between the donor principal and the recipient.

Given the unpredictable nature of the African political milieu, depressed economies, acute shortage of functional infrastructural and social facilities, poor policy and implementation environment, the partnership consideration of Nepad seem propitiously optimal and unavoidable. To ensure sustainability,

the African project must be partnership-driven. It may lead to better policy and implementation management as well as resources.

Development partnership, particularly in Africa, requires more of interaction, specificity, than episodic activity. This could enable (a) quick gain of access to technology, knowledge, and skills brought in from external societies (b) increase economies of scale by pooling various resources together (c) manage interdependencies (d) share strategic information among themselves. (Kogul, 1998; Oliver, 1990; Powell, 1990), quoted in Mitsuhashi (2002:109). These criteria are all true in a partnership-driven development policy programme such as Nepad. The development imperatives and socioeconomic challenges that perennially confront the continent leave no other option and/or demonstrate the necessity for development partnership to earn greater leverage in terms of resources for implementation.

4. 5 The Globalized World Order: Formations and Transformations in Africa

The concept of globalization, in simple terms, means the modern system of connection of people, capital, commodity markets, information flow and borderless interaction, with a view to actualize the end by the means. Wealth distribution is unevenly distributed in the international system, given states classification in the development index. Nations have always made various declarations with the policy focus on development to transform their societies with regard to political institutions, infrastructure, increased social schemes and economic growth policies, and resource allocation to generate growth from within.

Behind the globalization fad is the critical quest for understanding the new world arrangements and transformation in development terms. These are diffused in several important ways, which have brought certain interdependencies with spatial elements in focus. It is critically important to note that sustainable development could be viewed as a generic function of globalization. There is seemingly a growing interest in the prospect of the

concept as a strategy to fast-track global economic integration, not the least in relation to third world sustainable development agenda and even Nepad.

A variety of development related imperatives ranging from the possible role of poverty, human and physical capital resources, trade and commerce, communication and information technologies, capital investment, environment, and good political and economic governance have come to generate a great deal of universal appeal through international organizations, private sector INGOs, MNCs, and civil society. Of more concern are the obvious implications of these conditions in the developmental policies in the third world nations, particularly in Africa. This clearly affects the changing role and global perceptions of formations and transformation for sustainable development and globalization processes, and by extension in Africa.

Some major changes in reinventing the continent may be taking place through the programme of Nepad. It emphasizes critical themes that merge with the globalization framework and the sustainable development phenomenon. Nepad has come up with initiative such as APRM, human development, and regional security initiatives, with a nexus to trade and commerce negotiations with the WTO, as well as major international trading partners to offer not only funding, but more detailed attention and agreements for access to new markets for African produce, with a view to advancing international economic transactions, develop regional marketing strategies, for perceived economic benefits. Le Roux refers to these factors as, 'cooperative partnerships to capture the benefits of shared knowledge' (Le Roux, 2003:2).

This has led to increased pressure on governments to initiate policy development programmes and an efficient policy implementation process, linking such programmes through methodology to acquire modern management systems through globalization. This approach, will in turn, promote and secure through political economy paradigm, the integration of African economies into the global economy.

4. 5. 1 The African Political Environment

The motivation for globalization lies in, among other things, the achievement of political goals through good governance, in the need to reform and democratize political systems and strengthen political institutions as obtained in the Eastern European countries, including Russia, understandably due to the command economic system which were common features in these countries and more importantly in Africa, where monarchy, authoritarianism, dictatorship and military regimes were rife. Taylor, (2002) and Ohiorhenuan, (2002), have argued that democracy is a fertile ground for development to take place in Africa so as to attract foreign direct investment. This perspective resonates in the principles espoused by the globalizers – UN, EU, OECD, EU, MNCs, INGOs, other aid donor nations and organizations, and international conglomerates to provide the necessary incentives for development. These bodies have tended to tie down assistance to basic conditions, such as, respect for democratic principles, good political governance, human rights, liberal economic pathos in exchange for funding, a critical shift towards globalization and sustainable development frameworks.

The donor aid in bilateral and multilateral formations have emerged in Africa since the 1960s, to assist in manpower training, technical assistance, and research studies, funding development of social and administrative infrastructures and in some cases in annual budgeting. The cessation of aid flows, the lifeline to most sub-Saharan African nations, as the main beneficiaries of the donor aid would mean the creation of official chaos and political instability in most cases. As a result, democratization dispensations had to be imposed on them so as to create conducive environment for FDI flows. For example: The Gambia, Burkina Faso, Benin Republic, Togo, Congo Brazzaville, Chad, Uganda and Ethiopia have been forced to democratize, though the military potentates in these countries changed uniforms and civilianized, as an indication of embrace of democratic norms and principles. To this extent, democratic principles and norms have to become transformational, but transgressional in Africa.

As observed by Nieryinck and Rogers, ‘... the virtue in the approach of the late John Wiseman, who argued for ‘demo-optimism’ in Africa on the grounds that, although obstacles to democracy were legion and democratic progress is highly uneven, comparative review indicates that the continent’s political systems were overall, more pluralistic by the late 1990s than they were at the beginning of that decade’ (Wiseman, 1999), quoted in Nieryinck & Rogers, (2003:6).

The Nepad programme as already observed has instituted the APRM initiative in an effort to emphasise the critical need of democratic appeal for development. Fourie and Vickers (2003), have premised that, ‘An African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) consisting of Nepad member states will keep an eye on how their African brethren are sticking to the Nepad game-plan, implementing appropriately pre-agreed political and economic governance’ (Gelb, quoted in Fourie & Vickers, 2003:11). To corroborate this argument, Harbeson has posited that, ‘...USAID has accomplished a change of emphasis from support for initial multiparty elections, ... to a broader range of objectives ... to follow the school of thought that holds that broadening the scope of democratization is at least as critically important to effective democratic consolidation ...’ (Harbeson, 2000: 249).

These standpoints have revealed a clear pattern of appreciable political transformation in Africa in the context of the globalization process. The flow of ideas, contacts, and culture opens in national, sub-regional, and inter-regional policy mechanisms interfaces, in order to promote competition at sectoral stages. The existential implications of globalization have played out in the capacity functions for development in the continent, some of which are evident in the Nepad official document. Given this perspective, effective political reforms in African nations have been occasioned by globalization, which offers opportunities for some good policy formulations, but experientially are not viable in an implementation order likened to the globalization processes.

4. 6 Africa's Globalization Strategy: the Nepad Initiative

African leadership initiated indigenous development programmes, which ultimately led to the evolution of Nepad. Sako, (2003) has described Nepad 'as an attempt by Africans to create conditions for sustainable development through programmes for strengthening peace, security, democracy, political governance, and enhance regional and sub-regional approaches to development; promote the growth of priority sectors such as infrastructure, human resources, agriculture, environment, culture, and science and technology; and mobilize resources for development with a focus on capital flows and access by African exports to markets in industrialized countries' (Sako, 2003:iii).

An important programme of Nepad initiative according to Sako, 'is the declaration on democracy, political, economic and corporate governance that was adopted during an African Union Summit in Durban in July 2002' (Sako, 2003:iii). Sciavone has argued that, 'The variety of approaches and interest, largely unconditioned by traditional ideological tenets, presents unprecedented challenges to international cooperation in all areas, from security, trade and financial issues to environmental protection ...' (Sciavone, 1997:2).

In an effort to render an understanding of the dynamics of Africa's development paradoxes, Africa's marginalization, the need to map future strategies as recourse for action, the state of the political economy and the antecedents of development jigsaws in Africa need to be properly located. It could be argued that part of the problem lies in lack of motivation and incentive for research studies to carry out systemic analyses across the public sector policy processes so as to offer such deep knowledge on both the endogenous and exogenous impact factors that bear on the implementation process of development policies on the continent. But limited resource capacities and the inadaptability of the implementation process to environmental dynamics have persistently exposed Africa's policy development environment to fragility. With the acclamation of the globalization

process, the continent began with a concert of indigenous strategies to respond to the globalization process, a shift from 'dependency theory' to 'development theory'.

Behind the "nepadization" Kuye, (2002) fad, there is an important quest for understanding the interconnectedness of different strategies of Africa's development *vis-à-vis* the globalization and sustainable development. This offers explanations of the new mechanism being utilized for shaping the strategies of development in Africa and the transnational partnerships. The structures necessary for functional strategies have been established to coordinate and diffuse activities given the challenges posed to policy implementation dilemmas in the continent. African strategy is typically expressed in the Nepad programmes of action. These functions are entirely based on mutual understanding among the African leaderships, spatial linkages, and the focus on the UNMDGs, and the process of globalization.

The emphasis from ideological patronage to globalization has precipitated Africa's policy development patterns and policy action to shift to regional development policy programmes. This perspective underscores the obvious certainty that development in whatever concept and context does not come through any immutable and ordered form of activity, but rather relies on vision, active collaboration, and a concert of ideas to cause development and economic integration patterned activities.

Nepad has come to represent an institutionalized building block for the economic, social, political dysfunctions on the continent, that is, to purportedly deal with the imperatives of Africa's development. Young argues that, 'The webs of conflicts, violent social patterns and governmental dysfunctionalities in many parts of Africa make the state a far less dominating, agenda-setting actor than in the first post-independence decades' (Young, 2004:24). The end of the super powers' rivalry, in the 1990s, provided opportunities for Africa to seek programmes to meet the challenges ahead by the account of the past and the opening up of new frontiers with equally new enthusiasm for regional

programmes drawn from new cooperation and interdependency principles of sustainable development and the UNMDGs.

The concern about poverty eradication, development, integration of African economies into the global economies, and the rapid deterioration of the environment contribute to and bring forth the concepts of sustainable development and globalization. In light of the contention, Sciavone has averred that, 'Sustainable development, ... is development that does not threaten the well-being and survival of humanity itself. Sustainable development involves, in fact, not only the protection of natural resources and the physical environment but also the protection of future economic growth and future human development. Radical changes will be necessary in both policies and institutions if the needs and option of unborn generations are to be taken into account' (Sciavone, 1997:2).

There have been arguments, that the emergence of Nepad is not short of ahistorical, but it is without doubt creating institutions with broad political, economic and social aims for social equity, in line with globalization frameworks. However, a clear-cut classification of the Nepad policy goals, according to the main objectives of the globalization process, neo-liberal economic thesis, preservation of peace and security, economic growth and development, good political governance through APRM, transparency and accountability and the principles of the new public management, external funding, technical and humanitarian assistance and exchanges have essentially lend credence to Nepad, which are active strategies in the globalization process.

All these paradigms, in the context of African strategy, focus on development policy spaces and policy areas that are likely to be enhanced by institutional reforms and innovations, bringing sustainable development to the forefront of the continent in the quest for active participation in the globalization process. In furtherance of this contention, Dongoyaro has argued that, '... Nepad marks and demonstrates to the rest of the world, a paradigm shift in development policy planning in Africa. Nepad guarantees accountability

through its political, and good governance programmes. As a strategy, it focuses primarily on human capital investments, the creation of effective institutions, integration of Africa into the world economy and the overhauling of national strategies and goals towards Africa's development' (Dogonyaro, 2000:285).

Dogonyaro has further explained that, 'It is a commitment by our leaders to work together to extirpate poverty, to integrate markets and productive forces of the continent in partnership with the rest of the world... . It is driven by the realisation of African leaders as to where the continent is today and the accompanying perception, conviction and vision to change the negative status of the continent. ... it underscores the centrality of the African person, both as the subject and object of development. At its center is the emphasis on collective self-reliance, and a political and economic approach to Africa's development' (Dogonyaro, 2002:285). He argues that, 'Nepad has adopted the millennium development goals (MDGs) applicable to these, that is, poverty reduction in all programmes, and the undertaking to support existing poverty reduction initiatives at the multilateral level (in the form of PRSPs); achieving universal primary education by 2025; and regarding health to reduce infant and child mortality ratios by two-third; reducing maternal mortality by three-quarter and providing access to all who need reproductive health services by 2015'. (Ibid.:2002: 286).

Herbst and Mills, quoted in Vil-Nkomo, (2002:304), have paraphrased their understanding of Nepad as, 'Nepad is modeled on America's Marshall Plan, targeting annual investment of \$64 billion (R717 billion) to achieve a growth rate of seven percent to reverse African economic decline and arrest poverty. It is a simple bargain with the international community; in return for increased aid investment and debt relief and improved trade access. Africa will commit itself to good governance and the rule of law'.

All these extrapolations elevate the arguments that African leadership having experienced underdevelopment for decades have adopted a development policy programme that encapsulates, not only the millennium declaration

goals, but also the principles of globalization. Within this context, Nepad seemingly appears as the strategic template for Africa's development in the new millennium. Accordingly, Matisson (2002) has captured the scenario as, 'Nepad is based on this exchange; in return the West opening doors to aid and trade, Africa through "peer review", will police its own adherence to standards of good governance, the protection of human rights and the rule of law, and the progress of economic globalisation' (Sunday Business Report, quoted in Vil-Nkomo, 2002:303).

The principles of globalization, sustainable development, and MDGs have all been argued as the essential elements in the policy programme of Nepad. Given the contentions that have been rendered, it could be summed up that 'Nepad, has four character composite foci, as the African strategies for the globalization process: neo-liberal principles that lie at the heart of the vision; antithesis of Africa's underdevelopment; regional integration; and partnership both internal and external. Ignatius has argued that, 'Africa needs more globalization not less', quoted in Brownell, (2004:316).

In corroboration of the African strategies, Fourie and Vickers have this to say: 'Nepad's key aim of sustained economic growth for Africa is premised on participating countries overcoming the "problem of weak and incapable states". This translates into broad prescriptions for so-called good political and economic governance, specifically at the state/governance level: an embrace of the neoliberal principles underlying that prime motive force post-1989, globalisation' (Fourie & Vickers, 2003:11/12). It could be argued that the Nepad's main objectives are the African outlook strategies for the globalization process.

4. 7 Concluding Reflections

For each new way of life there must be a social base uprooted from its previous identity, available for a new identity that could be drawn into the new context. The African renaissance concept is one example, which again has demonstrated the intersection between Africa's development through Nepad,

the UN MDGs, sustainable development phenomenon and the globalization process. The concept of Nepad has been fortuitous in encapsulating the sustainable development and globalization principles. The relational analysis of African Renaissance as a causal link to Nepad emphasizes the significance of its contextual variables.

African Renaissance has created changes and developmental aspirations than development causing the concept. A case has therefore been made, the theoretical premise of the concept can no longer be separated between political (transfer of power) and economic nationalism (development and economic growth prospects) as distinct categories of analysis: it is critical (and as this chapter shows) to explore the intersection and synergy of the two. The point of departure in understanding the 'how' and 'why' of the intersection and synergy is the attainment of political independence in Africa on the one hand and the evolution of Nepad on the other. These scenarios could aptly be termed 'between Exit and Engagement' with the developed nations.

The criteria and the factors that constitute the development imperatives of the continent have been highlighted as the conditions that led to the emergence of Nepad. The imperatives assume the political, socio-economic, and leadership characters that presuppose the concept of Nepad. The African Renaissance concept has become the function through which the African Renaissance concept has become the philosophy through which African political imperatives had been reined in and thus generated the regional development and economic integration opportunities in the 21st century.

Chapter 5

The Analysis of the Research Findings in Synthesis with the Programmatic Frameworks of Nepad

5 Introduction

The emergence of Nepad has captured the moment and captures the time and, as a result, generated new controversies and debates. As the rhetoric deepens, the concerns of academics and policymakers have heightened. Naturally some searching questions have arisen. The questions have led to the search for appropriate models, focus on policy instruments, methodologies, and approaches for the implementation of Nepad. The programmatic frameworks of Nepad have put the implementation process on the spot for critical analyses.

For instance, Thabo Mbeki has acknowledged the critical importance of the implementation process when he declares that, ‘... Africa has to get rid of the notion that once a good resolution had been agreed, implementation would come automatically’ Mbeki, (2002:10). This observation by Mbeki, presupposes a problem definition of the implementation process. In other words, the causative process to achieve explicit policy outcomes is not sufficiently guaranteed. It has inadvertently invited the urgency for an investigation of the implementation process to establish the risk potentials of implicit externalities bearing on the implementation process, which is the object of study. Put differently, there are seemingly perceived labyrinth lacunae in the implementation process which ultimately emphasizes that Nepad is not as given and its implementation process is not on offer.

Implicit in Mbeki’s remark are critical assumptions which are more complex and crucial to the implementation process that require vigorous intellectual foci / empirical research study as a realistic option to isolate some of the underlying proximate and remote impact factors, essentially the

implementation-process-generated problems so as to render implementation of Nepad near implementable. Ronidelli has argued that, '... design concepts specifically formulated to deal with questions of risk and uncertainty can become important management tool' (Ronidelli, 1979:22). Accordingly, Pretorius argues that, '... even well designed and widely acclaimed policies can, and often do, fail to produce the intended results' (Pretorius, 2003:7).

5. 1. Policy Implementation Analysis and the Implementation Process of Nepad: The Strategic Nexus

The concept of this study is inspired by the policy implementation analysis principles, which emphasise the examination of the implementation process for some underlying impact factors to determine the 'missing links' while cautiously avoiding over-generalization and oversimplification. The analysis with regard to Nepad is a 'gap analysis' between plan and actual performance and how to bridge the gaps that have occurred. The essence is to discover the conditioning factors and to stimulate policy consideration against them in order to bring into fruition useful outcomes through policy action. The study argues that a comprehensive analysis on one hand is to seek out the implicit implementation problems that criss-cross the process and on the other a contingency approach that may favour adoption for the implementation process of Nepad.

The implementation process of Nepad seems to have been offered a high degree of predictability and certainty, shrugging off imminent challenges. Commonsense analysis dictates that keeping the implementation problems away from decision-making considerations critical for implementing the ideals would neither benefit the operators or the programme. What remains strategic to the process are anticipation, identification, articulation, and harmonization of the implicit impact factors, notably the 'emerging conditions', which in character may be disruptive to the overall implementation process, given that Nepad is a long-term development template for the continent.

The policy-analytic procedure of implementation provides information about the likelihood that the future intended policy actions would end up with certain intrinsic and extrinsic consequences that may be valuable or even invaluable. It presupposes forecasting future course of implementation, that is, to provide policy relevant knowledge that is, in principle about the state of events for a programme on the basis of complex interplay between impact factors and the implementation. This has explicitly drummed up the interrelationship between the implementation process of Nepad and policy implementation analysis.

The analysis of the implementation process of Nepad within the context of policy implementation becomes necessary. Two concepts, implementation analysis and implementation process, would be used to help in this direction. The first is what Honadle says it is, 'implementation analysis, which is an investigation during design of factors that can affect the implementation process and can alter project impact' (Honadle, 1979:6). The second is, 'implementation process which covers capacity resources conversion in order to influence the translation of the policy goals into realistic and discernible end-results and behavioural adaptation' (Ibid.:6).

However, it is of note that old answers, as a response to new questions, do not often create value, but risk. The objective of the policy implementation analysis is anything but subjective. Implementation analysis response to Nepad's implementation process in this study, is aimed at the overall improvement of the process for useful policy outcomes. The analysis is focused on:

- The traceability of impact factors that may underlie the implementation of Nepad's policy goals in order to strengthen its capacity for implementation and improve the quality of delivery.
- The critical implications of impact factors that should be articulated and harmonised in the implementation processes, the need to address these problems collectively in precise sequence.
- To uphold the set rules of the game.

- The need for a paradigm shift for the implementation process of Nepad. (Source: compile by the author).

There are however no set principles of a policy implementation process or for that matter, those of the implementation analysis. They are conjectural assumptions that are critically important to the analysis of the study. The analysis is, therefore not concerned with taking all the problem-issues in a particular order and examining them concurrently, but to opt for some that appear more critical to the implementation process. The emerging conditions assume similarities and are interrelated in character.

Conceptually, the emerging conditions have been identified as the political, socio-economic, and leadership fundamentals that constitute maximal requirements for the implementation process of Nepad based on a more pragmatic focus on the process. This implies that deep but open questioning approach has been maintained in the examination of the implementation process of Nepad, with the objective of learning, from doing. The pressure for visible, short-term success and the avoidance of implementation problems may produce tension that render such a perspective compelling.

Levitt has argued that, 'policy analysis can, ... contribute to ... practical components of the policy system, provide some of the support now needed to enable the system to operate legitimately and acceptably' (Levitt, 1980:15). This is true of the implementation analysis. Given this exposition, this study, having presumptuously conceptualized Nepad as an African regional public policy, focuses on the implementation process as part of a public policy process.

Policy implementation has been viewed by Honadle as a 'process of converting resources (such as materials, technologies, and funds) into goods and services, which support behaviour changes in beneficiary groups' (Honadle, 1979:6). This clearly elicits the parameter of policy implementation analysis, which according to Honadle has become one with decision-making and its use especially promising in development administration. It could be

interpreted to mean a retrospective, prospective, and integrated process of inquiry for solving policy implementation problems in policy (re)structuring to assist in forecasting, recommendation and monitoring.

The implementation process of Nepad is being examined to determine its viability or otherwise. The examination is to locate some potential impact factors which the emergence of Nepad, the dynamics of the global trends and couple with the internal exigencies in Africa have elicited. Some schools of thought have referred to them as 'exogenous factors', 'process factors', 'externalities', 'contingencies', and 'complexities'.

Policy implementation is never an incident-free process. In the case of Nepad, a particular group of conditions have been identified through implementation analysis, in terms of their characteristics. These characteristics have political, socio-economic, leadership, and spatial dimensions; each reserves a potential that could negatively impact the process against the realization of the set goals. This suggests a significant disjuncture and gap in the interrelationships between the 'process' and the 'substance' in achieving the set goals.

Targeting these conditions for implementing the Nepad programmes would be a design strewn in the objectives of strengthening and affording the process additional impetus to achieve the desired outcomes. The support of this notion could be drawn from Kuye's (2003) argument that, '...policy targeting has often been emphasized in poverty alleviation programs or projects. Not only is targeting widely recognized as a means for implementing policies, but also for ensuring an equitable distribution of projects such as infrastructure and the Nepad initiative' (Kuye, 2003:2). Similarly, it could be argued that targeting implementation problems serves as the critical requirement and prerequisite in the design and redesigning of implementation process vis-à-vis Nepad as a strategic approach.

If the implementation process is unsuccessful or only half successful, it is purely dependent on undue attention accorded by policy operators to implicit impact factors overbearing on the implementation process. Implementation

analysis seeks to draw into context some of the impact factors with a view to enhance the process. In other words, it is about the regeneration of the implementation process with regard to rendering it incident-free for tangible outcomes. Implementation and operationalization of a regional development policy programme are not only about mobilizing resources, rhetoric, claims of ownership and programming, but equally important is the critical examination of the implementation process to be able to anticipate, identify, interpret, and articulate the externalities in relation to the implementation process. The fact is that the process of translating policy goals into credible policy outcome, especially the ultimate transformation of the African political economy by Nepad renders the state-centric paradigm and principles of policy analysis and policy implementation restrictive, in the strictest sense of policy implementation analysis.

The critical paradigm of policy implementation analysis is to draw from analyses evidence of implications or risk values, which impact factors 'emerging conditions', would constitute (impacts) and contribute (opportunities and prospects) to the implementation process, given the conceptual framework of the study. Montgomery has posited that, 'Implementation analysis, in short, is itself an intellectual venture, requiring both subtle applications of social theory and the development of refined indicators of performance. Its practice is giving responsible operating officials a perspective that improves their capacity to learn from their own experience and to respond quickly to shortcomings in current procedures and activities' (Montgomery, 1979:57).

To corroborate this viewpoint, Pretorius has posited that, '... A primary focus of the field is the identification and explanation of gaps between policies and their implementation' (Pretorius, 2003:7). It would be of critical importance, in the context of the study, to add that anticipation of implementation problems is also a necessity in implementation analysis.

Understanding the policy implementation process through implementation analysis is both an art and a science. It is just what Thomas Dye says of

understanding public policy. According to Dye (1998), 'understanding public policy is both an art and a craft. It is an art because it requires insight, creativity, and imagination in identifying societal problems and describing them, in devising public policies that might alleviate them, and then in finding out whether these policies end up making things better or worse. It is a craft because these tasks usually require some knowledge of economics, political science, public administration, sociology, law, and statistics' (Dye, 1998:11). The elaboration of Dye's extrapolations in relation to public policy is valid and grounded in policy implementation and implementation analysis tradition and relational to the Nepad's implementation process.

Implementation analysis of Nepad, could be regarded as an art, a science as well as a craft. It is an art because it entails insight, creativity, and imagination in identifying impact problems, gaps, and contingencies that underlie implementation process and describing them, in devising ways that might alleviate the problems and in finding out whether the implementation process ends up making things better or worse. It is a craft because these tasks usually require some knowledge of economics, political science, public administration, sociology, law, and statistics. It is a science because implementation analysis could be studied under a systematically organized body of knowledge, tested, examined and proven with social science principles and postulations, from idealism to realism of social occurrence. Given these postulations, it could be argued that the study of the implementation process of Nepad could be predicated presumptuously within the art, craft, and science continuum.

The implementation process of the Nepad programme does not seem to command so much pre-eminence of a wide-range of issues, which are concomitant with the development foci of Nepad. According to Levitt, 'It is reasonable to assume that the less this aspect of the policy process is left to chance, the less likely there are to be unforeseen difficulties in the implementation arising from the specific aspects' (Levitt, 1980:160). Montgomery has equally argued that, 'The greater the ... constraints, the

greater is the need for designing policies that can be effectively implemented' (Montgomery, 1979: 56).

Emerging conditions are externalities and or contingencies that are capable of impacting the implementation process of Nepad. They reserve the potential to infiltrate and alter the programme direction, boundaries, character and scope that can affect behaviour and the implementation process nearest the point of dysfunction. Some are interrelated and may cancel each other over time and therefore have no impact. The rationale for reasoning from what is prior, logical, and chronological, that is, a priori, has to be established to predicate a deeper context of 'cause' and 'effect'. This is due to the fact that it is not enough to know what the policy specificities are and what goes on in the policy process only, but how to bring them about efficiently successful with minimal impacts has to be paramount as part of the policy process.

It has increasingly become difficult to determine clearly what form policy implementation ought to take as well as attendant encumbrances in striving to attain self-set policy objectives. This is due to the fact that the strategic components that demonstrate effective implementation do not by themselves constitute and conduct implementation. Every implementation process is dependent on the ever-changing local environment and external conditions. Within this context, the implementation process needs to adopt a contingency approach, that is, being adaptive in response to the dictates of the internal and external dynamics. Save the congruent policy implementation theories are engaged as the foundational basis of analysis, right and effective implementation remains illusive, adversarial, and antithetical in a given circumstance.

The implementation process of Nepad should employ a more anticipatory stance. The nuances of policy implementation and implementation analysis should be understood and appreciated with regard to Nepad. This allows for the implementation process to be well adaptive in a modified form to fit the environmental dynamics. Central to this is the notion of what has emerged as

important conceptual factors in the build-up or the evolving implementation process.

For all the ideals of Nepad to be achieved, there is need for a catholic or holistic analysis of the implementation process with a view to reinforce the measures aimed at the implementation process. This will have to include:

- An encompassive framework, vision, problems definition, and approach for the actors and partners around common implementation objectives.
- Deeper focus on the implementation process to unlock delivery logjam and enhance outcomes.
- Addressing the consequences of political transition, the socioeconomic integration, and development.

The optimism generated by Nepad ought to draw caution in the implementation exercise. This caution has partially created a reminder of the failures of the previous decades when surrealistic performances as well as the misunderstanding of the gravity and underestimation of the many complex implementation problems confronting the development programmes were followed by various unrealistic promises. As Honadle has argued, 'such experiences then dictate that serious attention be given to the gaps between plans and results; unless we can learn better how to do, we cannot benefit from knowing how to plan; unless we can implement what we design, we cannot have reasonable confidence in public policy' (Honadle, 1979:3). This contention is all the same true of the Nepad programme, where it takes aim at African recovery programme.

The concept of Afro-centricity is equally critical and relevant in the implementation analysis of Nepad. The case for Afro-centricity has largely to do with the usage of home-based approach in addressing the implementation challenges confronting Nepad. It is to do with the points of departure and modes of relating. The basis of the concept has been premised by Reuel Khosa, where he argues that, '... Afro-centricity is about Africans putting Africa at the centre of their existence. ... In its theoretical aspect, it entails

interpretation and analysis from the perspective of African people In its practical implications, Afro-centricity entails authentic Africa-based behaviour in the sociocultural, economic, and political arena' (Khoza, 1993:117). The Afro-centricity paradigm becomes an analytical imperative because the orthodox policy implementation theoretical models' foci on conceptual, analytical and theoretical questions of policy implementation have on the occasion of Nepad's implementation process neglected, the transference character of policy and implementation analyses to a higher realm, such as, a supra-national policy implementation domain.

In this study, it is clearly obvious that, the Afro-centricity paradigm, reserves integral role that need be replicated in the analysis of the implementation process of Nepad. The analysis need be interpreted in terms of what Africans themselves (at this instance, the author) understand(s) of it rather than how it is viewed and understood externally. Granovetter (1985) has argued that, 'success in implementing projects will often require taking into account local idiosyncrasies or embeddedness', quoted in Murrel, (2002:70). The implementation of Nepad elicits the need for an Afro-centric analytic approach as a phenomenon. In addition, it is valid to increasingly argue that, the process of translating policy goals of Nepad renders the conventional state-centric conceptions of policy and implementation analyses redundant, while seeking to draw a causal link between the state-centric and supra state-centric policy implementation domains with complex cross-cutting series of impact factors.

Central to this Chapter is the problematization of the implementation process through critical implementation analysis paradigm based on the programmatic frameworks of Nepad. The implementation analysis therefore seeks to extrapolate some impact factors that have been identified, which the study has conceptualized as '*the emerging conditions*'. These conditions would therefore be analysed in these perspectives with regard to the implementation process. They are drawn from a range of context to reflect key attributes of a greater extent.

5. 1. 2 The Context of Analysis and Synthesis for the Study

Analysis and synthesis are common concepts in any scientific research studies. Hamilton has argued that, 'in the analytical process the thing to be explained is treated as a whole to be taken apart. In the synthesis process the thing to be explained is treated as a part of a containing whole. The former reduces the focus of the investigator; the latter expands it' (Hamilton, 1997: 12). The two concepts therefore lend credence and coherence to a complex reality, which the study seeks to unravel. Susser has argued that, '... axiomatic assumptions of interdependency appears to be eminently reasonable, and it holds out the promise of effectively ordering research and categorizing findings' (Susser, 1992:182).

Within the context of analysis and synthesis, Roux (2002) has argued that, 'during policy analysis, it is not advisable that we use the retrospective or prospective approach, that is, the empirical or normative method of approach, alone. We should follow a more comprehensive or integrated method of approach. In this way, we can consolidate the advantages of both the empirical and the normative methods of approach to policy analysis. Finally the importance of both the factual and the value considerations of the community becomes evident, in order to come to a balanced conclusion after analysis' (Roux, 2002:84/85). The contention by Roux is valid for implementation analysis, which is a sub-field of policy analysis.

The alignment of the concepts of the research findings and their analyses with the programmatic frameworks of Nepad need be seamlessly integrated to generate a cohesive contextual approach and logic value in the context of the argumentations in order to offer a significant coherence to the concept of the study. The research inquiry uses policy implementation analysis to establish first, the impact factors and their characteristics and second, the significant scope of their potential impacts on the implementation process of Nepad.

The underlying emphasis here is to set the assumptions and evidence in context and make the most of the linkages, that they shed more light on what may possibly take place both at the intermediate and long term stages of the implementation process. The argumentation is therefore cast on the critical analysis of the implementation process in order to unravel the impact factors *vis-à-vis* what are to be implemented and the scope at the implementation.

5.1.3 The Conceptual Synthesis of the two Concepts for the Implementation Analysis

The concept of implementation analysis in this study means very little if the fundamental elements, that is, the programmatic frameworks for implementation are in disjuncture in the analytic context of the research findings. However, the complementarity and convergence between the programmatic frameworks and the implementation process render it compelling to present the two in unison for a coherent analysis. This is based on the assumption that valid understanding can be gained through a synthesis of the two concepts in accumulated knowledge acquired first hand on the inherent or lingering impact factors that fester the process of achieving the aims and the objectives of the policy programme of Nepad.

However, it is to be emphasized that the programmatic framework of Nepad and implementation analysis though distinct overlap and mutually reinforce the argumentation of the study, that is, presenting some analytic lenses for examining implementation process dynamics to ultimately emphasis the very empirical need for realistic consideration of impact factors that may be deterministic in significant ways that would set the implementation process in an unplanned direction. When taken together, they illuminate the special focus that the concept of the study seeks to offer for deeper and cohesive analysis for policy considerations. This is because policy implementation is volatile, that is, every implementation process differs from one to the other, and so are the attendant implementation problems.

On this score, de Vos has argued that, ‘... the phenomenon that is investigated in social sciences are so enmeshed that a single approach most certainly cannot succeed It would therefore be futile to behave as though one approach should be fully accepted and another entirely rejected. By adopting the point of view of convergence and complementarity, we may eventually be in a position to understand more about ... social reality’ (De Vos, 2002:364). This in essence refers to the intensification of analysis of conceptual assumptions and characterization of how one concept taps into another to forge greater consistency and coherence of new knowledge.

Central to the analysis is to characterize the implementation process of Nepad and determine the dynamics, synergy, and the conflict that it evokes. It is also to determine how they are likely to become manifest in the implementation process. This would afford the analysis unassailable logic, consistency, robustness, and rationale for the research findings without limiting the programmatic frameworks.

In order to examine the implementation process critically, it is essentially fundamental to highlight the context and character of the programmatic frameworks reflected in Nepad’s document of October 2001. The creation of Nepad had been more a matter of process and function (policy process) than just an evolution.

5. 2 Programmatic Frameworks of Nepad

Despite the current exhortatory on Nepad, its contemporary experiences remain largely enigmatic, thereby rendering Nepad agenda vague, suspect, and complicated specifically on the process to attain the programmatic frameworks sustainably. The programme of activities earmarked by Nepad broadly indicates the objectives and principles to move the continent to a competitive level through sustainable development. These programmes offer the template to attract a wide range of activities, interest, resources, and focus both from within and outside the continent. They form the bases for Africa’s development with a partnership character with the G8, in particular, and the

international community in general. They have been rapidly established and ingrained in the Nepad's development agenda.

Accordingly, areas of action plans have been mapped out as strategies to embolden and secure the economic development of the continent. These areas of activity could be sub-divided into three planked agenda. The aggregate programmatic frameworks of Nepad are the essential objectives in which all other subgeneric action plans are encapsulated to advance Africa's preparedness and generate the continent's capacity for development in the new millennium and all deserving implementation perhaps simultaneously. They are (a) creating conditions for sustainable development; (b) sectoral priorities; and (c) resource mobilization. They have been referred to by Sako as Nepad's core plan of action, viz:

- Democracy.
- Peace, security.
- Political governance.
- Science and Technology.
- Environment.
- Education – Agriculture.
- Resource mobilization.
- Human Resources.
- Infrastructure Development. (Sako, 2003:iii).

Ohiorhenuan (2002), has equally categorized them into Nepad's strategic framework of five main elements:

- First is the insistence on African ownership, responsibility and leadership and the building of capacity to play this role.
- Second is the focus on developing a new partnership with the industrialized countries and multilateral organizations on the basis of mutual commitments and obligations.
- Third is the commitment to nurturing an enabling socio-political environment by minimizing conflict and promoting democracy and human rights.

- Fourth is the commitment to enabling economic environment by ensuring macroeconomic stability and maintaining transparency and accountability in institutional support mechanisms for the market.
- Fifth is promoting sub-regional and continental economic integration. (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:10).

5. 2.1 The Model of the Programmatic Frameworks for Nepad

This model (refer to page 221) is adopted from the conceptualization of the programmatic frameworks of Nepad, compile by John Ohiorhenuan, (2002:11). Nepad and Dialectics of African Under-development. In *New Agenda*, (7), *South African Journal of Social and Economic Policy*, Third Quarter 2002.

The compilation has divided programmatic frameworks into socio-economic and political dimensions. They deal essentially with the creation of conditions for sustainable development that highlights political conditions; sectoral priorities for social aspects; and mobilization of resources for economic dimensions.

It deals with the new character of global partnership for development, implementation of some programmes to be fast-tracked, the needs assessment, as well as management mechanisms. The study hopes to assess the implementation process of Nepad on these areas of activity based on a more detailed study required to draw and link these programmes of action with the contemporary dynamics in the socio-economic, political, and leadership trends in both the continent and the global community.

These are being viewed as ambitious, although they are not anachronistic to the globalization process, the sustainable development phenomenon, and the principles of the UN MDGs. In as much as the fundamentals of the programmatic frameworks are meant for Africa's development, descriptive overviews are relevant.

5. 2.1.1 Creating Conditions for Sustainable Development

Creating Conditions for Sustainable Development is reflected in Nepad document, October 2001 divide into: (A) Items A1- The Peace, Security, Democracy, and Political Governance Initiatives: (i) peace and security initiative, (ii) Democracy and political governance initiative; A2 – The Economic and Corporate Governance Initiative – sub-regional and regional approaches to development.

Nepad has slated peace and security as its action programme. This is with a view to create conditions of stability in the region to attract foreign direct investment and generate internal economic growth and development. Ohiorhenuan has argued that, 'to a lesser extent, Nepad is also new in the extent to which it pays particular attention to conflict prevention and management' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:10). A commitment has also been made 'that a rapid deployment force would be set up for peacekeeping missions. In addition, an early warning system and a peace and security council would be established to manage conflict' (Munusamy, 2003:16).

The scourge of political instability has assumed unprecedented character and has been critical to the development of the continent. Africa has long been a place synonymous with political instability, where development factor relations remain largely uneven and at worst problematic. Nepad has therefore adopted a programme for good political governance to address the issue, through its policy instrument of African Peer Review Mechanism, (APRM) as a complementary agenda. Munusamy explains the concept of APRM as, 'the system - which allows African states to appraise each other's adherence to good political, economic and corporate governance' (Munusamy, 2003:19). 'It

also means constructive engagement and quiet diplomacy but emphatically not big-stick tactics such as sanctions or covert destabilisation' (Africa Confidential, 2002:1).

The policy instrument of APRM broadly defines the objectives to ensure full participation of African states in the process as a responsibility to an act of good political governance. This is a formidable challenge, given the high level of political corruption, electoral impropriety, sovereignty propriety, monopoly of power, ethnic nationalism, limited transparency and lack of accountability in the conduct of governance within Africa. In corroboration of this contention, Lemaitre has argued that, 'On the political level, the European messages on democracy, human rights, "good governance", have always had a hard time getting through to the South of the Sahara' (Lemaitre, 2001:125).

In other words, the messages on good political governance, respect for the basic human right principles of the citizens and credible democratic dispensations are often met with neglect and faced with denigration afterwards. Coupled with this, is the prevalent and consistent internal insecurity problems caused by political conflicts in all the sub-regions of the continent fuelled by intra-regional and domestic power struggles, policy of exclusion and the quest for territorial expansion. The frequent occurrence, the scale and nature of these factors underlie the political, socio-economic and leadership development imperatives in Africa.

5. 2.1.2 Sectoral Priorities

Sectoral Priorities is Item B of Nepad's document of October 2001, subdivided into: B1 – Bridging the Infrastructure Gaps: (i) All infrastructure gaps; (ii) bridging the digital divide – investing in information and communications technologies; (iii) energy; (iv) transport; (v) water and sanitation; B2 – Human resources development Initiative, including Reversing the Brain Drain: (i) poverty reduction; (ii) bridging the education gap; (iii) reversing the brain drain; (iv) health. B3 – Agriculture; B4 - The environmental Initiative; B5 - Culture; B6 - Science and Technology Platforms. The sectoral priorities

framework is evidently what political malfeasance has imposed on the continent, and thereby creates development imperatives on the continent. The operationalization of the sectoral priorities is critically required as part of the effort to set the continent on the path to the globalization process as well as tackle the development imperatives. But the process to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in the sectoral priorities entails other kinds of implementation challenges and complexities.

5. 2.1.3 Resource Mobilization

Resource Mobilization is the item C of the Nepad document of October 2001, divided into: C1 - Capital Flows Initiative, (i) increasing domestic resource mobilisation; (ii) debt relief; (iii) ODA reforms; and (iv) private capital flows. C2 – The market access Initiative: (i) diversification of production; (ii) Agriculture; (iii) mining; (iv) manufacturing; (v) tourism; (vi) services; (vii) promoting the private sector; (viii) promoting African Exports; and (ix) removal of non-tariff [*sic*] barriers. To attain these objectives would require addressing the economic dependency and diminutive markets of the African economies through structural restructuring and macro-economic policies and their reformations in order to reposition the economic imbalance and marginalization.

The global compact on the UN MDGs expressly include vital aspects of partnership for development and financing for development both of which offer elaborate frameworks for an extended concept of partnership, and significantly reflects the context of Nepad. To corroborate this view, Short has posited that, ‘... with a recognition that rich countries must take the lead as well as a commitment to national (including regulatory) and international action to encourage accountable and responsible corporate behaviour’ (Short 2002:6).

Furthermore he argues that, ‘... moving away from funding a proliferation of projects to backing poverty reduction strategies drawn up by developing countries themselves. This is the true meaning of partnership: developing

countries in the lead in developing their own poverty reduction strategies; development assistance from supporting these strategies in building national capacity rather than undermining it. It represents a new approach to development assistance – ... to being part of the process of building modern, effective states and strengthening local communities in order to deliver long-term improvements in the lives of the poor' (Short, 2002:6).

The vision that seemingly inspires this resource mobilization is clearly not only the urge to capacitate the implementation activities and service delivery but also seek to consolidate the human, political, and socio-economic development of the African society. This, however, assumes that a common understanding of partnership expansive model *vis-à-vis* regional development policy programme has to be well developed and articulated.

5. 2.1.4 The New Global Partnership

A New Global Partnership is item VI of the Nepad document of October 2001. It deals with the establishment of a New Relationship with Industrialized Countries - the G8, Multilateral Organizations, and the sub-regional economic groupings. These are concerned with and fit the classic context of international partnership for development that underpins the evolution of the programme, and underscores the orientation of development funding in the context of the UN.

The focus is to seek resource capacity from external sources in the first instance, particularly from the G8 nations, so as to be able to undertake a groundswell implementation of the policy goals, given the resource limitations both human and capital prevalent on the continent. In the broader view, it is also meant to generate local private capital flows in terms of savings and investment within and capital flight return to the continent. These set objectives require the post October 2001 declaration by the African leaders, that African society be made competitive and turned around for the challenges induced by the globalization process, UN MDGs, and sustainable development phenomena. The restructuring of African political economy is to

make it more relevant to the globalization experiences to maximize the attendant benefits for Africans and their societies.

5.2.1.5 Implementation and the New Partnership for Africa's Development

Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development is listed as item VII of the Nepad document of October 2001, as part of the programmatic frameworks. It is inclusive of Projects divided into (i) Agriculture; (ii) promotion of the private sector; (iii) infrastructure and regional integration; Needs assessment; Management Mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa's Development; Heads of State Implementation Committee. This is the critical aspect that draws the focus of the study among other areas of the programmatic frameworks already listed above.

The programmatic frameworks have reflected the international partnership for development and most importantly the implementation criteria – programmes (fast tracked); needs assessment; and the management mechanisms. As could be gleaned from the schematic model, the principles, the programmes for action, the implementation and management of the process have been reflected in a meaningful way. It fervidly emphasizes the concept of “we want to get there now” than the “how to get there” paradigm, thereby characterizes the implementation process an illusory mental image.

The implementation process of Nepad appears nebulous and deeply misleading for assuming coherence and substance instead of process. This is due to the absence of a consistent policy implementation analysis for new dynamics – emerging conditions. Focusing on the concept of ‘process’ offers the opportunity to probe the implementation process for and anticipate possible impact factors that may be underlying the implementation process.

The African development imperatives, which the programmatic frameworks of Nepad seek to address, have evoked uncertainty and render the process suspect. The impact factors, which are inherent in the implementation

process, are abjectly obscured in the Nepad document of October 2001 nor reflected in the Constitutive Act of the AU. This has remained the trend even in most literature and discourses on the concept of Nepad and has invariably created a gap and deficiency for the implementation process. Otherwise Nepad would tend to risk defining the problems it is meant to solve.

5. 3 The Analysis of the Research Findings

A futuristic view of Nepad presupposes the existential undercurrents that may be bearing on the implementation process, so that if we lose sight of the process and if deep questions are not asked, a systematic analysis not conducted, we will never know what scale of threat they constitute to the implementation process in the long term. The contemporary literature on the concept of Nepad, the policy foci, and the Nepad document of October 2001 remain inexorably passive, un-enquiring, and thin on the inner recesses of the implementation process to make an anticipatory attempt at defining the implementation problems with complex variables, that may influence the operationalization of the policy goals.

At the same time, the literature, the progenitors and the policy operators of Nepad have clearly remained, if anything, largely descriptive of the breadth of the substance of the programmatic frameworks, the extent of which does not reflect the analytical depth of the implementation process. The analytical framework envisions the dialectics of the implementation process of Nepad as critical to the realization of the set objectives, with a view to determine possible impact factors that could negate the process, and if properly managed would enhance the implementation.

At present, the implementation process of Nepad is possibly a “top-down” approach. At the same time a “bottom-up” approach could occur; and at the end, there may be instances of a convergence of the two. This approach is a fitting end to the Advocacy Coalition Theoretical Framework. Keeping this in mind, the overview of the character and the environment in which

implementation takes place might be considered necessary under implementation analysis.

Nepad, based on the principles of the global development initiatives has engendered pressures on, and contradictions for the implementation process as well as pressures for possible adaptation. The analysis has revealed a number of new dynamics as emerging conditions that may impact on the implementation process. A number of these conditions are heterogeneous in scope, character, and context. The new dynamics which are veritable and imminent could be classified into political, socio-economic, and leadership relational equations. The study would therefore strive to identify them as follows: protocol of engagement; ascension of membership; the pooling of political sovereignties; political leadership capacities; the implementation mechanisms; authority of Nepad; clientelism; capital resources; and the issue of structural economic dependency. These conditions, though trans-generational and interwoven could possibly bear down different implementation problems.

Hence the action plans of Nepad are not fortuitous occurrences. The attainment therefore depends on how effective and functional the implementation process may turn out. In looking at the bigger picture of the implementation process in the intermediate and long-term contexts, the study seeks to highlight conjecturally the conditions that may negatively impact the implementation process at worse, and at best, ensure its sustainability.

5. 3. 1 Protocol of Engagement

This is being conceptualized as the formal set of rules of engagement agreed upon and entered into by the participating parties as the *modus operandi* and the criteria for the operationalization of Nepad. They include codifications of the procedural clauses, modes and principles of participation, membership, limitations, subsidiary matters, and authority with regard to the organization, cooperation, coordination, operationalization, partnership, and negotiations in the Nepad's African project. In other words, to provide the legitimate basis of

engagement, given the character and concept of the programme, so as to provide assurances of varying degrees. They remain fundamental in the sense that development partnership at international context for regional development programmes evokes a new generation of commitments, ideas, values, objectives, as well as challenges from the evolving external and internal environmental dynamics. They could be interpreted in three basic dimensions: political, socio-economic, and legal. Protocol of engagement could be regarded as what Igue (2003) refers to as 'Instrumentalization' (Igue, 2003:43).

Politically, African states, international organizations, sub-regional economic groupings are in participation with Nepad. Protocol of engagement deals with what codes of political behaviour, policies, and attitudes that are universally acceptable in principle and serve as the code for guiding, organizing and coordinating the operations of Nepad.

Socio-economically, it explains the purpose of the partnership, the content of the programmatic frameworks, and social contracts between the active participants, stakeholders and actors. Legally, it is interpretive, to serve as the basis of recognition, obligations, acknowledgement, and commitment for actions and inactions, modes of participation, exit and entry procedures, and sanctions and privileges. Leftwich has argued that, 'human societies cannot endure, prosper, or especially develop without broadly agreed and appropriate rules and convention governing the conduct of social, economic, and political affairs, and about how human and other resources are to be used and distributed' (Leftwich, 2005:140).

Engagement and operations of international development partnership bears a unique departure from a donor aid paradigm. It requires multiple resource mobilization, negotiations, economic diplomacy, collaboration, consultation, institutions, political behaviours, cultural perceptions and strategies together in order to move vision to action, from ordinary concept to a base implementation. So far, there are protocols on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Pan-African Parliament, for example, of the AU that have been

proposed to address continent-wide political insecurity and good governance respectively, which are yet to be fully acceded to by the AU member states. These symbolic protocols, which are to serve as the commitment of and deterrence to the members and condemnation of political instability, remain yet significantly rhetorical.

Within this context, Maxwell and Christiansen have posed two pertinent questions, 'how strong should the partnership be, and with what degree of contractual backstopping? What mechanisms should be put in place to monitor the partnership and if necessary arbitrate between the partners?' (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002:480/81). Colas posits that, 'many bodies have worked at standard terms, clauses, and conditions in order to facilitate international transactions. The most widely used are those of the ICC, ... which parties can make reference Being widely applied and uniformly interpreted, they can often reflect international ... customary practices' (Colas, 1994:386). Participation, operations, procedures, and full membership of any International, regional, and sub-regional policy programmes require actors' agreements that are under ratification in recognition and commitment to the provisions guiding such programmes before ascension. A voluntary declaration in the nature of an international programme and non-ratification of its provisions among interested members seemingly create risk culture, risk value and less substance to such programmes, Nepad inclusive.

Protocol of Engagement is meant to serve as formal instruments with wide applicability and uniformly interpreted specifying the purposes and incorporating composite stakeholders' visions, views, prospects, obligations, to allay misconceptions, generalizations, and misgivings in pursuit of the set policy goals. They could be categorized in three basic forms: application; content; and scope.

The *application* explains the distribution of programmes, the methodology, the beneficiaries, who receives preferential treatment, who qualifies as a partner both external and internal; what implementation mechanisms and statutory authority for purposes of actions or inactions; accountability and evaluation;

the asymmetrical or symmetrical regulations for the operation process; to establish regulatory structures and procedures. It is to play the role of the regulator; arbitration of disputes; to relate charter to the immediate environment and provisions for a review or amendment on incremental basis when it is expedient to do so.

On the *content*, the protocol specifies and elaborates the purpose, the standard requirements, and agenda items for operationalization and activities of the programme; how to serve and enhance the interest of the clientele, stakeholders, providers, and incentives. The viewpoint is to emphasize the use of the content region-wide and the limitations on the stakeholders, to provide a new environment to deal with the implementation strategies and the process factors in the immediate and long-term.

On the *scope*, the protocol determines from time to time the areas of operation, those to be involved, the application and the content. It also includes what programme to cover, the priorities, and the budgetary provisions. The staff strength and their extent of involvement are entailed in the scope. It is concerned with the entire clienteles and their stakes.

The ascended member states of Nepad have acquired set political, socio-economical, and cultural attributes and convictions diverse in character, and dominant in their agenda for action, through which they seek to serve those interests, values, and belief systems in order to extract from the system more equitable benefits and relations from Nepad. Nepad maintains, accedes, and shares not only authority but also policy objectives and goals with a range of non-state, interstate, sub-state, international actors, NGOs local and international, and other concerned international development programmes in a whole host of various settings and circumstances. Understanding these multiplicity of actors and their influence constitute complexities and externalities along with the political, socioeconomic and cultural imperatives in the continent.

In a regional development and integration agenda, Sciavone contends that, 'as a rule, the constituent instruments ... provide that the original signatories may become members upon ratification or acceptance of the instruments themselves, while other states may be admitted to membership by a special majority vote of the competent organs' (Sciavone, 1997:4). Since legal rights and obligations are the same both for original and subsequent members, the distinction between the two categories is essentially of implementation value.

Similarly, Tromp has explained that, 'it was further decided that each member state should have five staffers in Nepad and thereafter, depending on contributions, additional members of up to 13 for the highest paying members. This would mean that the wealthiest countries of the continent, South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt, who already account for more than 40% of the AU's income, would dominate Nepad representation' (Tromp, 2003:5).

The protocol to guide the operations of Nepad in its relationships with the respective regional, sub-regional economic groupings in the continent, the international partners and actors (The G8, the UN, EU, OECD, and donor aid nations and organizations) have not been initiated besides adequate clarification and rationalization. These groupings remain critical in the realization of its vaunted policy goals *vis-à-vis* the implementation process. To further underscore the argument, it has been argued that, 'this African-owned agenda that will only work if Africa and donor work simultaneously – is a formulation with plenty of scope for both sides to walk away, each blaming the other' (Africa Confidential, 2003:3).

5. 3. 2 Accession of Membership

The issue of membership is a critical factor in a regional development initiative, Nepad inclusive. Using the EU context, Murrel has argued that, 'A potential EU member is acquiring the *Acquis Communitaires*, the set of laws that must be adopted to qualify for membership' (Murrel, 2002:79). Progressive transnationalization of the political and the socio-economic forces do not mean a movement towards supra-national authority, but adoption of

their obligations, regulatory, policy coordination, and investment of a great amount of resources and authority in the supra-national development programme. Cox and Furlong have argued that, 'few political institutions can claim a history which pursues a straight line without pause, but that of the EC is more than usually littered with deviations and unscheduled halts' (Cox & Furlong, 1992:3).

In the case of the Nepad, African member states of the AU have earned automatic membership. This clearly elicits a character of considerable complication and skepticism on the implementation process. Ohiorhenuan has argued that, 'A certain tension arises from the fact that Nepad was initially envisaged as a club (membership of which had to be earned), but ended up as an inclusive association with membership deriving from the AU. The former appears to be preferred by many of Africa's powerful external partners' (Ohiorhenuan, 2003:6).

Makgotho has argued that, 'it is imperative that the AU develop a clear set of principles of membership which would guide the organisation into admitting states into and excluding them from membership of the AU' (Makgotho, 2002: 7). This contention resonates implicitly in Nepad's membership ascendancy scenario.

The contention has been furthered as Ohiorhenuan argued that, 'Indeed, there are several references in the Nepad document to "participating countries" arising, perhaps, from an earlier perception of a "recovery plan" for Africa in which participation would be based on specific criteria' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:15). To corroborate this view Maxwell and Christiansen have argued that, '...more seriously, it will be difficult to involve all African countries in a partnership process, which emphasizes peace, security and political governance. Can Somalia be an automatic member of a new partnership? The Democratic Republic of Congo? Liberia? Zimbabwe? Even, on some accounts, Kenya?' (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002:480/81). However, given the open membership criteria, all the African member states of the AU, inclusive of the failed and the failing states, have ascended the membership

of Nepad. Schiavone argues that, 'the proliferation of independent sovereign countries and the resulting sharp increase in membership of intergovernmental organizations, are inevitably leading to the fragmentation of decision-making centres' (Schiavone, 1997:2).

Subsidiarity and disproportionate power equation presuppose the anchoring of denationalization and renationalization of policies of the member states with retaining the tendency to de-emphasize the corporate significance of the programme. Maxwell and Christiansen have averred that, 'partnership starts with a coalition of the willing, but explicitly sets to expand as fast as possible. Partnership principles would support this approach of starting small and growing. The fabric of sustainability has to be woven over time' (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002:482).

Given this contention, Sunmonu has argued that, 'the European Union started the process some few decades ago with the Treaty of Rome; beginning with six members it expanded to nine, then to 12 and to 15 European countries. Within the next five years, the membership of the European Union might extend to 28 countries' (Sunmonu, 2004:69). The EU typifies a classic example of a phased or incremental membership enlargement into a regional development programme and integration arrangement. It started out with six member states – France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, and the Netherlands, and has now enlarged into twenty-six European member states over the years. The membership enlargement of Nepad does not call to question the stakes and the exigencies of African development imperatives in the face of the globalization trends, the UN MDGs, sustainable development but essentially reflects greater policy-decision foci.

The pre-requisites and pre-qualifications criteria for membership of Nepad have yet to be set and met as a clear mandate for membership with respect to entry and exit criteria. Enlargement process as typified by the EU is cautiously incremental and staggered as it is progressive, which helps to control complex web of attendant implementation problems and challenges. For instance, Schiavone has explained that, 'Greece joined the EU in 1981, followed by

Portugal and Spain in 1986' (Schiavone, 1997:15). How could an implementation be meaningfully carried out at the stage where there is *carte blanche* membership in Nepad?

5. 3. 3 Pooling of Political Sovereignties

Closely linked to the ascension of membership is the pooling of political sovereignties into Nepad. The issue of sovereignty in the implementation process draws in complexities, controversies, and intricacies based on the grand vision of a continent-wide development agenda in the climate where there are urgent pressures of political instability, historical peculiarities, varied cultural values, ethnicity and racism, economic depression, and the continuing pattern of discrimination on the one hand and the general lack of compelling interest to respond to them on the other, in a programme that lacks protocols of engagement. There is a general absence of any regional criteria, synergies, and action plans for specified resources and programmes distribution, that is, the benefits to the stakeholders and internal contribution of resources for Nepad as well as who should be in or out in the membership configuration.

Similarly, every African nation assumes a sense and right of entitlement to its membership due to lack of clear-cut criteria for entry and exit, privileges and measures to enforce sanctions. Ohiorhenuan has argued that, '... most African leaders, however, there is a sense of entitlement to participate in Nepad as an African initiative, even as they are somewhat resentful of not themselves being in frontline. This entitlement claim propels the notion of an inclusive association' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:15).

For instance, the Peace and Security Council Protocol is yet to be ratified by many AU members who draw automatic membership of Nepad. Tromp has explained that, 'as Africans try to bring peace to the beleaguered continent, many countries are dragging their feet in ratifying protocols, key among them the protocol for the 'Peace and Security Council' (PSC). ... At present 15 countries have ratified the protocol, leaving it 12 short of a simple majority to bring the PSC into being' (Tromp, 2003:7).

Nepad, presents the African nations and the sub-regional economic arrangements as a potential source of new resources and therefore everyone attempts to draw in as many advantages as presented. This could be generally referred to as a 'hidden agenda'. They may strive to import to the new programme, a new character, focus, and context as they deem them, which is what Honadle, (1979) refer to as "mutation".

Pooling of different political settings particularly in the African context could exert undue pressure on implementation process considering the nature of the African. For instance, it has been argued by Peterson that, '... implementation is based on political settings characterised by conflicting values, strategic bargaining, and efforts to advance set of interest' (Peterson, 2001:xiii). Regional development programmes involve several approaches and stages of regional integration. Agubuzu has argued that, 'economic integration, it is well known, can take various forms, depending on the degree of integration of the member countries. ... each stage of integration has its distinguishing features' (Agubuzu, 2004:199).

On the issue of individual member sovereignty *vis-à-vis* AU's policy instrument, Tromp has reported that, 'many countries are dragging their heels because they are concerned about how the PSC would impact on their national sovereignty' (Tromp, 2003:13). On the same score, Herbert has explained that, 'national sovereignty was deemed absolute and a state's internal affairs off limits, even if those affairs involved instability, human rights abuses and failed economic policies' (Herbert, 2003:22). In reference to the possible jostling for resources, controversies, contentions, and limited loyalty to Nepad, Mbeki had at one of the numerous Summits on AU and by extension Nepad, made an observation and urged his peers, as reported by Tromp 'to place our individual national interests within the context of our continental and collective interests' (Tromp, 2003:13).

Controversy is rife that the big five of Nepad exercise political hegemony over the small poor member countries, which may likely be interpreted as infringement on the sovereignties of the smaller members. Before

international law, the UN as well as the AU principles every nation state enjoys equality. Honadle (1979) have referred to this contention as “encapsulation”, a process whereby a more powerful entity surrounds and dominates a less powerful one. For instance the core group members of Nepad – Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa have been viewed critically in scholarships and by other African nations as the elitist club because a wide consultation with other African states was absent during the processes that resulted in the emergence of Nepad. Yet the sovereignties of the smaller and poorer member nations remain absolute at the international law. How does Nepad hope to proffer neutrality, among other things in the implementation of the mainstream programmes, distribution of values, social equity, distribution and allocation of resources and scare off group claims of sovereign state members? This could prove a sore point for the implementation process of Nepad.

5. 3. 4 African Political Leadership Question

As capital resource is a dire impediment to the actualization and operationalization of the Nepad’s programmes of action, so does the question of African political leaders. The political leaders question on the continent has manifested in multi-faceted perspectives from, territorial expansion, political corruption, electoral impropriety, monopoly of power, ethnocentrism, nepotism, mismanagement, incompetence, patchy policy process environments, to a narrow vision that leads to misplaced policy prioritizations.

The combination of these factors has constantly bedeviled and generated political tensions and remained a sticky source of instability which perpetuates economic stagnation and economic crisis, political and leadership crises and as a result, poverty and under development become clearly entrenched. The available lean resources are coveted and converted into the prosecution of these conflicts, examples include Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe, DRC, Somalia, Central African Republic, on the one hand, and Morocco - the Sarahawi Arab Republic boundary conflict, Ethiopia and Eritrea

border conflicts, and the Sudan genocide in Darfur, Burundi and Rwanda genocides, Nigeria and Cameroun Bakassi peninsular boundary dispute.

Some of these countries have been widely perceived as failed and failing states in Africa. Similarly most of these states appropriate national policy environment through the logic of monopoly of power and ultra-nationalism. The more immediate daunting task is the determination of taxes, immigration, visas, free movement of people policies on the continent. These are areas of exclusive preserve and responsibilities of sovereign states. The pooling of sovereignty, and an all-inclusive membership paradigm for Nepad may prove unrealistic for the implementation of Nepad.

A conglomeration of sovereign nation states is an option to the implementation of Nepad. As argued by Ignatius that, 'Strong African states are needed not to stand athwart the tide of globalisation but to harness it in a democratic fashion for the social and economic benefits of their citizens' (Ignatius, 2004:316). Accordingly, Onimode has contended quite persuasively that, 'the lack of will and vision is one of the most serious weaknesses of the political leaderships in Africa – they are mostly neo-colonial and comprador elements with crippling loyalty to foreign masters' (Onimode, 2004:20). In support of the argument Serageldine has averred that, 'Strong effective and efficient governments are essential to development for they can create the requisite enabling environment that allows the private sector and civil society, policies, to flourish' (Serageldine, 1994:V). Also Rondinelli has upheld this view. He has argued that, '...in explaining differences between successful venture and failures was the presence or absence of strong and persistent political leaderships ... and higher level authorities' (Rondinelli, 1979:47).

Mistry avers that, 'sadly, even as a new century begins, Africa faces considerable difficulty making the transition from a failed statist paradigm to a market-based alternative. The main obstacles to progress are the vested interests that have profited from development failure. These mainly include Africa's leaderships and the state apparatus' (Mistry, 2000:557).

Nepad also has a peer review mechanism through which African governments will be able to evaluate each other's performances on good governance and policies. So far, 'only 15 of the 53 members have signed up for peer review. They are especially skeptical about the ability of the Nepad's APRM to improve standards of governance, especially in the face of those they diplomatically describe as the 'egregious delinquents outside the process' (African Confidential, 2002:3).

Still in support of the argument, Mbaku (1999) has argued that, 'most states activities in Africa have involved primarily the management of crises in order to help the incumbent to (1) maintain a monopoly on power; (2) continue to control the allocation of resources; (3) plunder the economy for the benefit of the ruling coalition and its supporters; (4) appease competitive ethnic and social cleavages, in order to maintain a semblance of political stability and continue to attract foreign resources' (Mbaku, 1999:298/99). In furtherance of the argument he declared that, 'The state's preoccupation with crises management has prevented it from serving as an engine of social, political, and economic transformation. In fact most post-independence African states have been so pre-occupied with survival that they have not been able to devote adequate effort to economic development and the elimination of mass poverty. In their efforts to monopolize power at all costs, many of the post-independent governments have actually exacerbated poverty and deprivation in their countries' (Ibid.:298/99).

Vil-Nkomo has argued that, 'the critical challenges which confront most middle developing countries ... is how to create a development oriented leadership' (Vil-Nkomo, 2002:295). Nepad so far has not clearly indicated its interventionist approach to the leadership crisis as an attempt that would assist the implementation of its African project.

5. 3. 5 Structural Economic Dependency

All forms of economic exploitation has dual connotations – external and internal strands. Africa's development remains captive to the colonial linkages as a result of historically skewed economic arrangements, and the emergent indigenous bourgeoisies in both the political and the socio-economic spheres. This has created fault lines in African economic policy environments and the resultant aberrant behaviour towards development programmes. In other words, it has thrown up challenges and created disharmonization in respective African economies, given especially the structural adjustment programmes introduced by the IMF and the World Bank that created the debt overhang and precipitated the socio-economic and political crises, entrenched the asymmetric economic relations and an uneven development trends between the continent and the rest of the world. In corroboration of this contention, Maseti (2004) has implicated and explored the economic conditions in rather polysemous contexts, of three African countries, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania as typical case studies. He has explained that, 'the post-colonial African states' main challenge during the first decade of liberation was to make sure that the African masses were freed and truly liberated from all forms of economic exploitation' (Maseti, 2004:2).

He argues that, 'through the creation of indigenous national or patriotic bourgeoisie, ... the African economies would be indigenised. This became the buzzword in the literature of the early sixties and seventies. At the center of the indigenisation strategy was the liberation of the African economies from foreign domination' (Maseti, 2004:2).

At the post-independence era most African economies had been mortgaged to the colonial powers and the international capitalist systems. Masetti argues that, 'The Kenyan government launched a scheme ... known as Million Acre Settlement Scheme in January 1961. The British ... got Kenyan leaders to agree that Africans pay the full market value of whatever European land was transferred to them. The indigenisation of the Kenyan economy became too costly for the state, whose material base was very narrow or almost non-

existent. Another problem was that the British determined the pace and content of the indigenisation policy. In order for the Kenyan government to finance this programme, it had to rely on foreign borrowings and loans. This situation exacerbated the debt burden of the state and recycled economic dependency. The British government took over the process and gave credit to the politically connected and already rich Africans' (Maseti, 2004:2).

The situation in Nigeria was no different. For instance, Masetti has stated that, 'In Nigeria, the indigenisation policy took off ... after the state enacted the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. The marginal sectors ... reserved exclusively for the Nigerians. The most vital sectors of the economy ... to aliens under certain conditions. ... 40 per cent ... total loans had to be made available to the Nigerian Businessmen. The irony was that ... only the most affluent Nigerians could afford to apply for loans. The indigenisation decree ... demarcated ... economic activities between the indigenous bourgeoisie and international capitalism, and diluted the potentially dangerous economic nationalism of the African bourgeoisie' (Maseti, 2004:2).

The situation had remained the same in Tanzania. Again Masetti has contended that, 'In Tanzania, the indigenisation strategy was fraught with a number of problems. The post-colonial state opted for the parastatal system to achieve the indigenisation of the economy. The problem started when Tanzania ... decided to nationalize foreign assets and had to pay for the acquisition of foreign equity as part of the settlement. This was indeed sad and painful as the state had to buy back its economy from international capital and had to rely more on foreign capital and expertise' (Maseti, 2004:2).

Given these scenarios, which subsist, even to this day on the continent, it could be argued that, both the capitalist and the colonial systems, on the one hand, and the African emergent policymakers, on the other, took over the economies of the continent, as the situation became widespread. Maseti contends that, 'There are a number of lessons that the people ... have learnt. They were wrong to assume that the African bourgeoisie would remain loyal to the strategic objectives of the national liberation movement and owe

allegiance to the rural peasants, urban poor and the working class. To put it crudely, there is no way that the African bourgeoisie would have committed class suicide and delinked from international capital after it mastered the art of wealth accumulation' (Maseti, 2004:2).

To further corroborate the structural economic dependency contention, Mistry has argued that, 'prior to independence Africa's economies were geared to extraction. Their development did not aim at internal growth and self-reliance or at the creation of an indigenous industrial and technological base. At the time, most African countries were integrated with globally dispersed imperial economies – an arrangement partially maintained in francophone West Africa even after independence' (Mistry, 2000:554).

Dependency theorists like Frank and So, (1969, 1984; So 1990) have argued that '... this form of economic modernisation is a power relation of capitalist financial centres over peripheral or semi-peripheral ones. These capitalist power relations organised the peripheral countries to produce commodities geared towards consumption at the centre. ... the combined effect of each of these processes has been increases in poverty, unemployment, and national debts', quoted in Rundell, (2004:659).

The structural economic dependency also played out significantly from the 1970s to the 1990s, in Africa, during the ideological patronage of the cold war era and the SAPs on the one hand, and the pressures from the Western bilateral and multilateral aid donor nations and organizations, on the other. The SAPs were regarded as the measures for economic reforms and prerequisites for international loans and aid funds – unique features of structural economic cooptation, exclusion and marginalization, which straddled both the public and the private sectors. Leftwich has noted that, 'the aim of the adjustment was to shatter the dominant post-war, state development paradigm and overcome the market economies, supervised by minimal states', quoted in Hoogvelt, (2001:181). The adjustment measures included currency devaluation, deregulation of prices and wages, reduction of public spending on social programmes and state bureaucracies, removal of

food subsidies, and others on basic necessities, trade liberalization, privatization of parastatal enterprises, and the expansion of the export sectors; the latter – in the case of agriculture – often at the expense of food production.

What have emerged from the case study analyses are therefore the continued economic dependency, under-development, and the consequent marginalization of the continent through the complicity of the local and international capitalist classes. These scenarios evidently subsist with palpable socio-economic implications even to this day in most Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone African states, and by extension Nepad.

The recent development in the action of the colonial powers, equally resonates the structural economic dependency contention. For instance, the Secretary of Finance of the British Government, which has created the Commission for Africa in February 2004, parallel to, and independent of Nepad, had undertaken in January 2005, official visitations to four African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa), all of which are members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Other non-members of the Commonwealth of Nations on the continent could draw negative connotations and sectional inferences from such an attempt, which may aggravate sentiments and further complicate the implementation process of Nepad. As it stands, it remains incongruous in the context of Africa's development in the 21st century. This has raised highly disturbing question as to which of the two programmes is in, and which one is out, as they are both indicative of Africa's development focus as well as international partnership for funding, political support, and a tacit acknowledgement of Africa's development imperatives.

5. 3. 6 Financial Capital Resource Capacity

The limited and inadequate necessary resources and the collaterals to support the implementation of Nepad inform this standpoint. The very essence and context of Nepad has to do with funding the policy goals through a handsome financial support from the industrialized nations, the G8, to draw

capacity for implementation. An external capital flow of \$64 billion is expected annually from external resources to aid the implementation of Nepad.

The request for capital resource of \$64 billion from the G8 as the take off grant and as an annual remittance reinforces the structural dependency syndrome. As argued by Ohiorhenuan, 'it is surprising that Nepad expects the bulk of its annual estimated \$64 billion investment requirements to come from outside the continent. Unfortunately, it is this naïve optimism regarding the logic of capital flows that has pushed Nepad into a trajectory of extraversion' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:16). Where does this place the implementation agenda of the Nepad? The answer lies in the theory of the structural economic dependency of the post-colonial and post-millennium Africa as elicited in the Nepad's resources mobilization strategy.

This condition has been supported by the argument postulated by Rundell (2004). He has argued that, 'These scenarios entail that the appropriation of occidental institution patterns, ways of thinking and acting, and the human self image that accompanying these or for example of capitalist has never been immediate nor straight forward' (Rundell, 2004:660). This situation has led to what Kuye (2003), refers to as 'crisis of the developmental state in Africa'.

On this count, Munusamy has reported that, 'Wade, for example, would prefer Nepad to place greater emphasis on African investment in Africa. His concerns related to the logic that whoever paid the piper called the tune – as things stood, the G8 could have a grip on the African agenda' (Munusamy, 2003:16). As Makgotho puts it, 'after all, it took the European Union more than five decades to achieve what the AU is planning to do in mere months' (Makgotho, 2002:1).

Similarly, Ohiorhenuan, has argued that, '... Nepad's resource mobilization strategy does not seem to have been based on historical reality or on a full apprehension of the dynamics of investment and growth. On capital flows, Nepad argues that:

To achieve the estimated 7 per cent annual growth rate needed to meet the IDGs... Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of ... \$64 billion ... the bulk of the needed resources will have to be obtained from outside the continent (para 147), [sic].

In the same vein he declares, 'This claim about the source of developmental resources is not sustainable historically' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:16).

To demonstrate this critical condition, 'the UN estimates that Africa needs up to \$35-million a year to meet its millennium goals, aimed at halving world poverty by 2015' (Unsworth, 2003:17). Ohiorhenuan argues that 'Given its limited resources, but unequivocal place in the African Union (AU), Nepad should focus on becoming an agency of change and restraint. ... Then there is the question of Nepad's grand ambition versus its weak capacities' (Ohiorhenuan, 2003:6).

On the same question of capital resources, arguments could also be drawn from the AU's paradigms, as explained by Munusamy that, 'in a bid to rescue the continental body from its financial morass, it is to be proposed that membership fees of rich states be increased by 1% of the total AU budget, which is an [sic] estimated at \$41-million. Member states were, until now, required to contribute what translates into 7.25% of the AU budget. ... the AU inherited debt of R42.4 million in outstanding membership contributions to the Organisation [sic] of African Union. ... the AU requires more fund for the running of the secretariat and eight commissions' (Munusamy, 2003).

Against the background of capital resources, Munusamy (2003) has further explained that, 'Mbeki proposed the establishment of an implementation arm for Nepad to ensure that capacity constraints don't hamper the rolling out of funds. Although Mbeki did not broach the subject, some internal differences exist between the Nepad's merchants' Munusamy (2003).

In addition Wray has explained that, 'money has been a problem since the AU's predecessor the Organization of African Unity was founded in 1963. Currently the bulk of the organization's income comes from member states.

But these are too low and are often neither paid at all or are paid late. ...According to the funding report, the method of assessing and collecting members contributions should be revamped, budgeting improved and penalties for late payment charged' (Wray, 2003:7).

Another standpoint on the issue of capital resource capacity has posited that 'experts from South Africa's Institute for Global Dialogue also sound warning notes about the organizational and financial capacity of most African governments to become the kind of active partners the Nepad formula conceives of them to be' (African Continental, 2002:3). The lack of capital is not in itself capital to douse the economic realities of the continent to undertake the implementation of Nepad, so capital availability is a critical problem.

5. 3. 7 The Institutional Implementation Mechanisms of Nepad

Multi-tier and proliferated implementation structures have been instituted for the sole purposes of implementing the overarching policy goals of Nepad. These mechanisms are ordered hierarchically from the highest level of the Regional Organization, the Summit of the AU, the HSGIC, the Steering Committee, the Secretariat, the Task Teams, to the sub-committees. (source: compile by the author).

The AU Summit comprises all Heads of state and Governments on the continent. The HSGIC membership comprises the founder members (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) whose roles were critical in the conceptualization, formation, formulation, and eventual emergence of Nepad along with the sub-regional zoning memberships. Ohiorhenuan has explained that, 'the HSGIC comprises 15 states (3 states per OAU region), including the 5 initiating states (i.e. South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt}'. Currently the 15 states are: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, (representing North Africa}, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali (representing West Africa), Cameroun, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe (representing Central Africa), Ethiopia, Mauritius and Rwanda (representing East Africa), and South Africa, Botswana and

Mozambique (representing Southern Africa). It will meet three times a year and report annually to the OAU/AU Summit. Its mandate is to set policies, priorities and the Programme of Action' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:13).

He has also enumerated the structure of the implementation arrangement as having, 'The Steering Committee is composed of two personal representatives of each of the five initiating Presidents, and one personal representative each of the 10 non-initiating members of the Implementation Committee. Its role is to develop terms of reference for identified programmes and projects and to oversee the Secretariat. It is also mandated to develop a strategic plan for marketing and communications at the national, sub-regional, continental and international levels' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:13).

Other institutional framework for the implementation of Nepad is as explained by Ohiorhenuan. He has stated that, 'The Secretariat consists of a small core of full-time staff in South Africa. Its primary functions are liaison / co-ordination and administration / logistics. It is mandated to outsource work on technical detail to lead agencies and / or continental experts. Further, a number of Task Teams and Sub-Committees have been established. The Task Teams are to develop specific detailed implementable projects and programmes in the priority areas identified, and the Sub-Committees are to co-ordinate certain thematic initiatives. The Five Task Force Teams are: (1) Capacity building for peace and security with OAU as the lead agency; (2) Economic and corporate governance with ECA as the lead agency; (3) Infrastructure with ADB as the lead agency; (4) Central bank and financial standards with ADB as the lead agency; (5) Agriculture and market access with OAU as the lead agency' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:13).

Ohiorhenuan further explains that, the implementation arrangement also comprised of; 'The five Sub-Committees are (1) Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance co-ordinated by South Africa; (2) Economic and Corporate Governance / Banking and Financial Standards / Capital Flows co-ordinated by Nigeria; (3) Market Access and Agriculture co-ordinated by Egypt; (4) Human Resources Development co-ordinated by Algeria; and (5)

Infrastructure co-ordinated by Senegal. The AU Chair and Secretary General are *ex-officio* members of the Implementation Committee, and the AU Secretariat participates in Steering Committee Meetings' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:13/14).

These implementation mechanisms are purportedly configured to fit the overarching policy programmes of Nepad, so as to offer universal coverage on the wide-ranging items and any identified programme. They are so specified, in order to fast track in some cases the implementation of some of the prioritized sectors, such as communications, HIV/AIDS, communicable diseases, and debt reduction consultations. The emphasis that continues without abating is what has come to be the catch phrase of the initiators and promoters of the programme, 'concrete implementation programmes', at all levels of the policy programmes. The desired outcome is to establish the potential role of each mechanism in the implementation of the commitments of Nepad for Africa's development.

The legitimacy of these mechanisms for existence and actions prevail within the context of Nepad. The distinction between them seem to be blurred by the existence of bodies and initiatives which are intermediate in their independence, for example, APRM Initiative, the quagos, and the concurrent quangocracies.

Sullivan and Harper (1996) once stated that, 'if an organisation is to strive towards the achievement of set objectives, the possibility lies in breaking down outmoded structures and creating an organisation that can thrive in tomorrow's uncertainty ...'. (Sullivan & Harper, 1996:84), quoted in Kuye (2003:3). Guess and Farnham have posited that 'policies and executing institutions have a symbiotic relationship: the system created by policies becomes the institution that then implements the policies' (Guess & Farnham, 2000:14). In corroboration of this perspective, Montgomery has argued that, 'the procedures to be followed by this exotic being were ordained as well: he was to define the problem, develop alternative solutions for it, appraise their

costs, risks, and probable outcome, and choose the one that conferred the greatest benefits in terms of his multiple mission' (Montgomery, 1979:55).

Questions have been asked as to why this overcrowded and costly laissez-faire implementation structures for Nepad, given their composition and the economic conditions of both Nepad and the AU? How will this measure helpfully draw value, efficacy, and effectiveness for the implementation process of Nepad? Perhaps Levitt's question is weighty and equally pertinent here. He asks, 'what is the relevance of the hierarchical relationships between organizations involved in implementation?' (Levitt, 1980:16). There are no indications of who is the reference point with the authority this confers to determine what implementation approach is to be adopted? Who has the proclivity of know-how and doctrinal inspiration and culture to mobilize stakeholders, the African civil society and the partners and even generate the needed capital resources?

In a functional context, Guess and Farnham have argued that, 'for effective policy implementation, institutions must generate process, and transmit useful information to managers responsible for delivery. Systems of budget allocation and allotment, personnel administration, operations and maintenance, planning, programme evaluation, cost and managerial accounting, payments to vendors, and cash management must all function as an integrated unit. Accurate and useful information must be available in a timely fashion' (Guess & Farnham, 2000:16).

On the structural context, they argue that, '... the structural issues include whether delivery should be carried out on contractual methods to vendors with the relevant agency monitoring and regulating or through the implementation organs that are involved in the policy programme, as they are the ones who set the standards, rules, coordinates implementation activities. Management issues are also a problem of the structural context' (Guess & Farnham, 2000: 17). They further argue that, 'it may be evident that structural features will doom the policy failure unless institutional constraints are considered beforehand' (Ibid.:17). Sako has posited that, '... it is important to bear in mind

that regulatory institutions can easily become sources of red tape and economic inefficiency' (Sako, 2003:4). Furthermore, Rodrik (1996) has argued that, 'bureaucracies are prone to two problems that are fatal to economic performance: they can be captured by the interests they are supposed to regulate, and they can create extreme red tape, which discourages economic activity', quoted in Sako (2003:5).

5. 3. 8 The Authority Question of Nepad, HSGIC, and the AU

The issue of authority in the Nepad configuration is critical and fundamental yet it is steeped in ambiguity and complexity. It is closely linked to the implementation mechanisms of Nepad. The question of authority between Nepad, the AU, and the HSGIC has evoked much hype that has fraught Nepad with objectively rife controversy and has come to dog the programme. It is yet unclear whether or not Nepad is substantively a parallel regional development programme or under the auspices of the AU. For instance, there are overlapping roles reflected in the Constitutive Act, Articles 3(c), (e), and (i), of the AU which correspondingly deal with the action plans and policy objectives of Nepad reflected in the creation of the conditions for sustainable development subdivided into (i) peace and security; (ii) democracy and political governance initiative, yet Nepad has been conveniently excluded in the Articles of both the Constitutive Acts of the AU and the 1991 Abuja Treaty which established the African Economic Community [AEC].

While the logic and the underlying context of Nepad are clear, the translation into effect of its programmatic frameworks is less so. The concept itself is problematic, shifting as it does between initiative, programme, idea, and project. Ohiorhenuan, has argued that, 'the question of authority, is perhaps, the fundamental challenge of Nepad. Nepad emerged as a proposal of a few African Heads of state. While it was approved by the OAU, its status is still not clear. It is referred to in various documents as an "initiative" of the OAU, a "project" of the OAU or "the implementation mechanism" for the AU' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:12).

In furtherance of his contentions, Ohiorhenuan has explained that, 'At the April 2002 meeting of the Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria, Nepad was declared a "mandated initiative" of the African Union. This clearly suggests its subsidiary relationship to the AU. But, by urging greater co-operation and co-ordination between the AU and Nepad Secretariats, the meeting implied a somewhat more co-equal relationship. With such ambiguity of institutional form, Nepad can hardly become the "veritable mechanism for the reconstruction of Africa" that its champions want it to be' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:15). This contention reflects a critical dimension with regard to the implementation process because it is through a substantive arrogation of specific authority that Nepad could derive legitimate authority and exercise full implementation to serve as a veritable template for the Africa project. Who deals with what, when, and how assist to mobilize for implementation, that is, authoritative allocation of values and resources.

It has been argued whether, '... Nepad is the "socio-economic programme" of the AU, or whether it includes a political element ...' (Institute for Strategic Studies Conference Report, 2003:3). It remains unclear if AU or Nepad retains the exclusivity in certain areas of function and their justifiability to do so. As argued by Ohiorhenuan, 'this roadmap does not deal, however, with how specific responsibilities are assigned; how the multitude of agents will be co-ordinated; who the approving agent(s) is/are, and indeed, with what specific authority Nepad's activities are being undertaken' (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:16).

Similarly, the APRM Initiative reflects this contention. This appears simultaneously conflicting in duplication of functions and responsibilities between both bodies, which are ambiguous in institutional functions. Within the same context, Makgotho has averred that, '... there was still considerable confusion about the relationship between the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad) and the AU. Is Nepad a programme of the AU? If the former, why are the AU Commission and Nepad Secretariat not integrated? If the latter, we risk the prospect of costly duplication' (Makgotho, 2002:1).

Herbert observes that, 'lack of priorities is another weakness. ... Nepad must choose between competing priorities' (Herbert, 2003:22). He further argues that, '... failure to meet the plain-English test dooms Nepad to a kind of limbo in which it cannot truly claim credit for anything because it has never been clear about who specifically would deliver on its grand aims' (Ibid.:27). The non-delineation of clear-cut authority between Nepad and the AU has run Nepad into a paradigmatic arguments, suspect, and sceptical perceptions persist and the implementation even more so.

5. 3. 9 The Clientelism Question

This has to do with strategic alliance between Nepad and the African clientele in the continent. The clientele are reportedly the target groups for Africa's development and the focus of economic growth. It has been argued that the relationship and contact between the clientele and the Implementers of Nepad is abject and barely existent as it is un-constructive in terms of organization, role, composition, communication, dialogue, and information. It has also been emphasized that Nepad operates within personalized context and it is elitist in scope. As expressed in a Conference Report, 'people have to know and understand the concept of Nepad, in order to have ownership of it. ... Nepad seemed to involve only a few driving personalities...' (Institute for Strategic Studies, Conference Report, 2002:5).

It has been premised that the clientele in Africa are unaware of the prospects, the concept, and the context of Nepad because they have not been popularized and the participation of the clientele presumed insignificant. If anything, Nepad seemingly appears as an exclusive club involving only the African leadership whose primary preoccupation is to maintain the status quo. This infers that communication gap has been consciously created by lack of consultation and engagement with the African clientele (the local NGOs, the civil society, trade unions) to mobilize support, and derive ownership and credibility. As argued by Makgotho, 'After all, African Union is not the possession of Africa's Heads of State and Government, but the property of all Africa's 800 million inhabitants'

(Makgotho, 2002:1). Makgotho's contention is true of the African clientele and Nepad relationship.

On the question of clientelism, Pott's argument has significant relevance. He argues that, 'Vibrant democratic institutions depend upon the consent and support of the governed' (Potts, 1998:86). To corroborate this contention, Kankwenda has averred that, '... the enlargement of the social base of development signifies, on one hand, that relationships of surplus exchange are established between the different components of the population through the economic and social sectors that they represent. And on the other hand, it signifies that the people participate fully in the development process in its political, economic and social dimensions' (Kankwenda, 2004:17). Herbert has argued that 'without widespread participation and public pressures in supports of reform, Nepad will achieve little ...' (Herbert, 2004:26).

In the same context, Rondinelli has argued that, 'Moreover, organizational relationships that insure beneficiary participation in project decisions can help create the condition necessary for the resource-to-services and the service-to-behaviour linkages. Therefore local organizations are mechanisms for both identifying and managing critical contingencies. In fact they can help to minimize communication gaps that obstruct the implementation process while helping to assure that desirable results will emerge from that process' (Rondinelli, 1979:16).

On this score, Ohiorhenuan has argued that, '... the strength of civil society lies in holding governments and the establishment accountable in their promises to the people they govern. ... Nepad's focus on African ownership is constantly reaffirmed by its leadership. Africa's external partners have unequivocally embraced the idea that Africa's destiny lies in its own hands' (Ohiorhenuan, 2003:6).

5. 4 Concluding Reflections

The chapter has drawn a convergence between the programmatic frameworks with the implementation process in a bid to forge inherent consistency and objectify the concept of the study. The need for improved causal relationship between the 'process' and the 'substance' is vital and critical with regard to policy implementation of Nepad. The critical issues arising from this is that 'emerging conditions' bear causal relationship to the implementation process of Nepad. The critical standpoint is that, policy implementation cannot be successful with inadequate attention given to implementation process analysis to target impact factors, (contingencies). The impact factors bearing on the implementation process have been examined and highlighted.

Nepad takes aim at African recovery in a range of policy goals for development and economic integration, that is, political and corporate governance, socio-economic growth through creation and redistribution of wealth and factors of production; eradication of poverty; and the revamping of economies in the continent. But a conscious attempt to seek and describe more fully, the process on question with regard to impact factors, which may not have received the necessary analysis and readily appreciated in various respect by the Nepad's progenitors and implementers have been elucidated. Recognising implementation problems implies that they will be encountered. But they could be managed through decision-making process that should by extension include research findings. This chapter has therefore tried to link concepts to cases with strict and direct implications.

Chaper 6

The Implications of the Research Findings on the Implementation Process of Nepad

6 Introduction

The conceptualization of the study is with recourse to the Nepad's goal specifications - sustainable development, partnership, creating conditions for development, capacity limitations, political governance, poverty eradication, and competitive economies *vis-a-vis* African development imperatives. The focus is a critical analysis of the implementation process in relation to the expected outcomes with the approximation of the policy goals. The attempt has been discussed in chapter five, of the strategic character of the impact factors underlying the implementation process. In other words, their magnitudes have been highlighted *vis-à-vis* the implementation process. Having located the attributes of the emerging conditions, this chapter will strive to demonstrate and present their implications that may determine the viability of the implementation process and conclude with recommendations that would strengthen the implementation process.

6.1 Emerging Conditions and the Implementation Process of Nepad: A Conceptual Perspective

Policy implementation is a dynamic activity. It has the potential to develop from policy perspectives and forecasting of implementation complexities to proposals that help to shape implementation process against incidents. It holds promises in pushing the boundaries of policy programmes' domains. The ostentation of the policy goals of Nepad has conferred a compelling rationale to focus special attention on the implementation process. It has unveiled a quest for a more rational and enterprising analytic inventiveness for its implementation.

Nepad by its very evolution has a motion of its own. And because it does have this motion, it brings it closer to certain complex constraints that could mitigate its implementation. These constraints could at the same time be regarded as prospective elements whose conversion may strengthen the process. The emerging conditions, besides being interlinked, are basically trans-generational as more highly tap into and overlaps each other. Nonetheless the critical question must be asked as to the negative impact they pose and bear on the implementation process. A useful point of departure in answering this question is provided first by, an holistic examination of the implementation process within the context of the contemporary trends of development imperatives at the political, socio-economic, and the leadership paradigms, in the continent and beyond, which present at least one possible scenario. Second, the critical examination of the conditions already carried out in chapter five and the imperative of implicating them on the implementation process beyond technical virtuosity.

The failures of past development programmes have compelled some discernible examination of the implementation process of Nepad for potential causes and effects of implementation problems that may abound. Indeed, this has led to an appropriate framework or unit of analysis to predicate the implications of the impact factors on the implementation process. The emphasis on the 'emerging conditions' is based on the characterization and the implicit (but misplaced) belief in the benignity of the Nepad's policy goals.

Regional development policy programme implementation could be substantially understood by structural and procedural problems that underlie the process. This is due to the character, which implementation problems imbue on the process. In this context the implementation process of Nepad has assumed the character that it is conditioned on some emerging conditions that may determine its brittleness. In other words, they either render the process a dead duck and a liability or viably successful. These are the main contexts in which the emerging conditions are elaborated herein.

6. 2 Implications of the Emerging Conditions on the Implementation of Nepad: Strategic Perspectives

The process to promote and cause multiplier effects of the Nepad's policy goals is dependent on how effective and efficient the implementation process could be conducted. An effective implementation process is based on targeting impact factors, having recognized that implementation process ordinarily entails import content of contingencies. Long-term development policy plans hinge on learning from problems, which experience yields.

From the implementation analysis paradigm, the study has identified 'emerging conditions', in chapter five as some of the impact factors, which characteristically hold out potentials that may impact negatively on the implementation process of Nepad. This in relative terms is indicative of the Nepad's implementation process. In order to deal meaningfully with the implications or risk associated with the emerging conditions, a range of implications and proposals as new approaches and paradigm shift have been offered and it is useful at this stage to explicate what these might mean to the implementation process.

6. 2. 1 Protocol of Engagement

Past experiences are indicative that once rules and codification of procedure have been made and adopted, they are there to stay with a tinge possibility of amendments, review, and modification over time. These rules are remarkably resistant to manipulations and maneuverings. The fortuitous advent of Nepad in Africa in the twenty first century ought to earn esteem, legitimacy, integrity, innovation, prudence, popularity and influence. Interested members and actors could achieve all these for Nepad through a protocol of engagement that has been ratified and acceded to by interested actors. Protocol of engagement takes the process of a treaty that requires accreditation and full powers from interested state parties, negotiations, authentication and signatures of the text, ratification, acceptance, accession or adherence, exchange or deposition of instruments of ratifications, registration and

announcement of the development partnership programme. These are the main anchors in international relations and engagements. It remains binding on signatory members. It is intended to spell out and enforce principles, objectives, operationalization, membership, and sources of funding, authority, ethics, behaviors, obligations, and implementation.

Protocol is viewed here as the instrument(s) for ratification by interested parties that should declare the purposes of Nepad, guide operations, and set codes of conduct that are binding on actors to avoid any misgivings, generalisation, and oversimplifications. It is necessary to understand fully the provisions of the Nepad's document in relation to the international partnership context on the one hand and the functions, activities, memberships, actions and inactions, budgets, resources, structures, management, engagement with the sub-regional groupings, international actors, social contract with the clienteles and the political leaderships on the other, in order to guide not only the appropriation of its social equity values but the implementation process.

It is equally critical to seek statutory interpretation of and lawfully base the content of the policy goals of Nepad. Protocol seeks to establish an organic relationship of the actors and institutional mechanisms within the contemporary international development partnership programme. It is an instrument that has been commonly agreed upon and freely entered into by members, partners, interested blocs, and international actors. It is seemingly a contractual agreement between, and among the participating parties.

It has been premised that the Nepad programme emerged from voluntaristic acquiescence, lateral ascension from the AU, declarations, and public statements by the founding member states. In the views expressed so far and in the Nepad's October 2001 official document, that has listed out the policy framework of Nepad, the Constitutive Acts of the AU, and the Abuja Treaty of 1991 for African Economic Community, no protocol has been formulated, ratified, and adopted in support of and legitimization of Nepad as truly a regional policy programme with international agenda character as reference articles of engagement and mandatory commission of Nepad as the legitimate

development policy programme to act beyond the traditional territorial nation-states' frontiers. This has been fundamentally downplayed.

Even in a minimalist version, an international policy programme requires organizing principles, procedures, and binding agreements to clearly provide the basic characterization, securing rights, *modus operandi*, and the purpose of a programme, because it relies on internationalization -transnationalization - multilateralization linkages. Similarly, Nepad is an expression of international relations, negotiations, economic diplomacy, it takes the form of regional development initiative(s), it is participatory, it is transnational.

The rationale for protocol of engagement rests on the character and the nature of the Nepad's evolution. Human interactions particularly at the international and multilateral contexts cannot endure, prosper, and develop without an orderly set of broadly agreed and appropriate codes and conventions set to govern, influence, and direct conduct and behaviour at the political, socio-economic, and leadership dimensions; and about how human and other resources are drawn, used, and allocated. The concept of protocol of engagement and the recognition of its inevitable role at the international interactions and relations are universal in context and character. The gravity and scale of the development imperatives in the continent and the partnership context of Nepad underscore the paramount importance that the organisation and implementation of Nepad be carefully programmed and ordered in such a way as to set forth some safeguards for the implementation process.

Protocols are the usual themes with seemingly irreversible roles and amendable provisions for increasing levels of operations and in integration of functions among partners and actors. The inter-relationships between nation states in the continent, international actors, sub-regional blocs, donor nations, and INGOs are not static and permanent but immutably dynamic. Protocol on the one hand reflects the regional aspirations while on the other incorporates people's contract by bringing a new wind of change for new lease of life. Protocol of engagement is viewed as assuming an all important context in initiating a process of complete international engagement where no parties

lays death caveats for others but having commonality of objectives and commitments. Nepad has defined what it considers a desirable pattern of development indicators to meet the development imperatives in Africa, without locating its contexts, concepts, and formation within internationally agreeable procedures to derive a mandate governing obligations, behaviour of parties, setting agenda and benchmarks which must be strictly adhered to with sanctions as option.

6. 2. 1. 1 Implications.

There are certain oddities *vis-à-vis* the ruled based evolution of Nepad. The founding criteria of Nepad have been loosely articulated. The declarations may remain non-binding in effect because Nepad's evolution is not grounded on protocol that has been wilfully ratified and freely entered into by the participating parties. The non-provision of protocol of engagement may enable member states escape accountability, encourage mismanagement and incompetence. Checks and balances may be eroded on the part of the operators. Assurance of responsibility and transparency would be difficult in a broadened membership of Nepad.

The lack of organizing and an orderly codes and principles predispose Nepad to fragmentation because there are no clear criteria to determine admission and exit, suspension and sanctions, coordination, membership, actions and inactions, and ensure transparency in the decision-making, operations, in terms of resources and programme distributions and allocation, individual or group behaviour, coherence, privileges and entitlements. The absence of protocol of engagement renders Nepad as a confederation with no legitimate reference and influence to act. The institutional functions, programmes and Committees, staffing, have not been orderly codified and streamlined, and therefore the operation and implementation of Nepad would appear haphazard and disarticulated.

The nature of participation and membership has been left at the discretionary basis and this has overridden effect for support for Nepad's operations before

the international programme operators. This is attested to, it could be argued, by the lack of interest in funding by the G8 and lack of financial contributions by the International financial institutions and the African member states for the implementation and the matrix management of the Nepad's Secretariat respectively.

It gives room for rule breaking behaviour from the members and actors. The commitment, loyalty, and obligation of the members cannot be tested and guaranteed because it has taken the nature of the pro forma African approach and this has predisposed the implementation as a fragile process. Absence of protocol, could in future, elicit arguments that the provisions of the Nepad Document of October 2001, and the implementation process are not located within juridical jurisdictions. Yet, it is precisely those matters that, in the light of the past experiences, are highly likely to agree to legitimization principles. But so far, this is yet to come to the fore and as a consequence Nepad has become subject of controversies and the implementation process a suspect.

The arrangement labels Nepad as a passing fad and transitory programme. Voluntary acquiescence of states and stakeholders to affirm an international proclamation, unanimous agreement, and consensus for the evolution and operationalization of Nepad create structural, organizational, and operational gaps, tension, and render the programme procedurally tenuous, subsumed and non-consummation. The implementation process may enter into uncharted waters without some 'holy grails' as reference base, because of the continuity character of Nepad. This would naturally inform that the implementation process has been located in a wider scale of complex nihilism and vacuity. In its present form, parties in Nepad may decidedly indulge in abnegation whenever convenient and wherever possible without fear of being sanctioned in any form. Nation states are governed under constitutional arrangements and even the Holy See has Concordat with Nation States as *modus operandi* in their relations. The essence is to secure procedure of relations, rule of law, functionality, orderliness, and engagement. Nepad has yet to take a turn to protocol of engagement and this has fallen far short of the conventional standards of international and intergovernmental engagements.

In all of these cases, the implementation process has been put at risk. They could negatively impact and create a deep disorder in the implementation process.

6. 2. 1. 2 Recommendations.

For Nepad to remain viable and an enduring African development and economic integration policy programme, it requires a set of grounded codifications as a guide to derive greater international significance, reference, authority, and legitimacy. Protocol will serve as the mandate within which strategic decisions for implementation of programmes are based, so that it becomes fiducial, influence behaviour, attitude of actors and corporatism, It would anchor deeply the commitments of parties so that they honour their obligations than abnegation. The encapsulation of the UN MDGs, Sustainable development, and the globalization process and the international and multilateral characters of Nepad increasingly put pressure of saliency for new prescription criteria for engagement. Therefore, it would be necessary for the implementation process that:

- The emergence and organization of Nepad should have, in the first instance, should have been based upon the inception and initiation of protocol of engagement and ratification of same by interested parties and actors.
- With strong political will and commitment, protocol of engagement should be enacted as the standard regulatory frameworks that are necessary for the management of common resources, guide against exploitation, and the distribution of social equity. Other areas of co-operation, negotiation, collaboration, coordination and standardization could also draw positively from the imperatives of the protocol as leverage for the implementation process.
- On the basis of protocol instruments, the relations, activities, implementation of the programme could be streamlined through encompassiveness formulations (incorporating structures, activities, functions, decision-making, interpretation, and membership) and

legitimacy restored for implementation. It will offer a lingo in which the policy goals and the modus operandi can be interpreted and through which the programmes could be evaluated and adjudged.

- Within the protocol of engagement instrument, Nepad would be better positioned to enforce and influence member governments and their policy fields that are contrary to those encapsulated in the Nepad's ideals and the global aspiration of sustainable development. It will equally be able to sanction egregious members if they veered from the implementation process.

6. 2. 2 Accession of Membership

The next condition is the number of African states that have directly assumed full membership of the Nepad programme. The accession of membership appears as if it should go ahead at whatever the cost to Nepad's ideals and implementation. Economically most of the member states of Nepad are faced with resource, human capital and natural endowments constraints, with small markets and population of less than one million. The membership profile and methodology do not typify the international context and experience in membership systematization of an international engagement.

For instance, countries whose policy practices contravene or are in breach of the policy objectives of Nepad even at political realms remain members. The ascension of membership has not been based on any pre-determined and pre-qualification measures and criteria, which should have determined participation. Membership in a regional development programme has to be drawn up within universally agreed criteria. It should be optional and open to those who are genuinely interested and qualified parties and not mandatory to all.

6. 2. 2. 1 Implications

Nepad albeit, not completely without political connotations, its membership should not have, in the first instance, been politicized and regarded as a full

right of any African member country of the AU. The confederation sets the stage for deep old political rivalries and divisions as old and new political tensions on the continent and abroad may re-start and could obscure the focus of implementation of Nepad. For instance the political jigsaw in Zimbabwe and other failed or failing states on the continent have earned the APRM a subdued initiative before the international partners. This is not what is required at the nascent phase of Nepad's implementation. It may encourage shifting of emphases for implementation, which may suffer negative consequences such as delay and inversion. The amalgam is a process that engenders political differentiations and is likely to fan the flames of hyper-nationalism, which Nepad is attempting to remodel. The logic denies the possibility of progress in the implementation process.

There would be differing attitudes of the member states reflecting different political ideologies and economic integration modelling, not the least will give way sooner than later to differing agitations against the Nepad's implementation process. As the profile of Nepad grows, rivalries will become deepen with rising demands and stakes. Cooperation, collective action, and consensual agreements for creative strategies to make for much more convenient planning and decision-making may become not only difficult but also intensified at economic costs. In a sense, this indicates that a collective identity has lost emphasis to a strong individual interest and identity, which may constitute a systemic threat to the implementation process. The arrangement may lead to the mobilization by individual or group members to seek to maintain the momentum and stay the course against the implementation. Promotion of political partisanship, which is not required at this stage, cannot be completely ruled out. A case in point is the influence seeking Libya for political relevance in the continent. With the free-fall membership of Nepad, it would be difficult to ascertain and shape anti-democratic stance of some its members and monitor obligations at the implementation stages.

Politically, each African client state would seek to wield and articulate its own development perceived paradigms, taking into account their past and contemporary history of individual political, socio-economic and cultural milieus. Political differences may prevent a member or group of member states to either seek to justify or contest and undermine issues of implementation of the programme which run contrary to their domestic policy domains based on the political expediency prevailing in a given circumstance. For example the issue of Zimbabwe and Libya with South Africa has caused some political imbroglios, which are diversionary and attract needless contradictions in policy coherence of Nepad, and largely the implementation.

Taken from the contentions put forward, it could be argued that, direct “membership accession” from a regional political organization into a regional development policy programme is anachronistic in any counts. This is because as more nations have become members, Nepad has become unwieldy and complex to the extent that the agenda would require a rhythm of critical analysis and numerous rigorous, costly follow up for implementation. As a result Nepad would not attract an acceptable standard of implementation principles and therefore opens itself to fragility. It could also be argued that all-inclusive and unbounded membership without deterministic criteria for membership qualification does not ensure stability in the implementation process and may render regional economic integration implementation impracticable.

The multiple actor participation, which has characterised Nepad, reflects an expression of a very loose form of coalition and alliance, which could impact against the organisational functions *vis-à-vis* implementation. Direct accession from the African Union (AU) to Nepad appears ill-timed, ill opportuned, and ill propitious. The accession is a formation between revisionists / reformers bloc and a counter-revision / non-revision bloc, some with apathy to democratic principle and foreign anti-apathy, hegemonic hankerings and economic and political patronage to dictatorships, factors which are not in tune with Nepad’s ideals. It would ultimately allow for fragmentation, disintegration, and failure to maintain an effective implementation process. This is the context in which the

accession of membership has been premised as an emerging condition that could negatively impact the implementation process of Nepad. This consortium of membership is less feasible for the attainment of the set goals.

6. 2. 2. 2 Recommendations

In order for Nepad to be able to manage its programmes effectively and create useful policy outcomes, it should review its African Nation States membership. Nepad's African project is a process with no fixed time frame. In pursuant to its membership a pre-qualification measure is required in accordance with pre-defined and evaluative criteria, which prospective country candidates will be required to fulfill before accession. To this end:

- Membership of Nepad is not irreversible and with a strong development will, this all-embracing membership could be reversed and revised to fit an incremental enlargement process. The maturation for membership enlargement process insofar as Nepad is concerned should be staggered and restrictive. Only states, which accept in principles the Nepad's version of *Acquis Communaitre*, including observance of the rule of law, respect for democratic principles, good political, economic and corporate governance, respect for inalienable human rights and fundamental freedom, reciprocal obligations and commitment to Nepad's ideals by all persons within their jurisdiction should become members. This could be developed in a discernible comparative context of the practical experiences of other regional development policy programmes particularly the EU. Nepad should at least have, for the time being, remained a regional caucus group arrangement of the founding member states within a framework open to participation enlargement proviso for negotiated membership in the future for other African and non-African nation states, economic blocs, and international development actors.
- This technique and methodology of incremental membership enlargement with further reduction will lessen the burden on resources, capital and human for the implementation exercise; will direct focus,

assist in the organization, planning, labour, budgeting, and the implementation specificities. It will embolden organizational effectiveness and efficiency because membership is based on scheduled and phased criteria. This would assist significantly the implementation process.

6. 2. 3 The Pooling of Political Sovereignties

The idea of national sovereignty is generally understood or perceived as self-autonomy or independence within a defined border and a legitimate authority over a given territory, which include the right to self-defence and self-determination of its destiny. The principles of sovereignty imply, among other things, a degree of non-interference in the internal affairs of a state, freedom to act, equality of states before the international law, recognition by the UN and the AU as the case may be.

Popular sovereignty and liberal democracy have come to be the norms of the contemporary global order. But in Africa elimination of political opponents, intolerance through autocracy, monocracy, and dictatorships dictate the political pace and space rather than strive to meet the modern rationalization of multi-party politics, a new concept definition towards development. The Assembly that can make decisions with no limits other than those of their sovereign will or judgment raises a typical question.

The provisions that are encapsulated in the Nepad document of October 2001, seems to limit sovereignty in controversial cases that will generate tension –human rights abuses, abuse of rule of law, political improprieties, which are reminders of systemic political impediments to economic growth and development in the continent. These problems continually beset Africa, which are not new but may haunt the implementation process of Nepad. They are still the reminder questions from African contemporary political histories that are yet surrounding Nepad with regard to controversies over how and when to intervene in the internal affairs of members states, where cases of abuse of political nature abound. The nature of membership and participation

in Nepad in its present state is mandatory which is likely to be overridden by the domination of incompatible and unwilling members and partners.

Despite the exhortatory of Nepad, these problems continue to take place unabated. Then the pertinent questions arise. What does sovereignty mean in the context of Nepad? Does sovereignty constitutes the overriding importance over Nepad? How is Nepad justified to act for the interest of its policy goals against the national sovereignty principles of its members? How would the action be coordinated and monitored in view of its implementation agenda? To what degree will these problems deserve attention and necessitate Nepad's intervention and under what condition? Through what protocol and mechanisms would Nepad intervene in the members' internal affairs? Does the plurilateral approach and membership, involving a regional policy programme necessarily render Nepad's intervention the required legitimacy in international context?

The response to these questions remains the obvious criteria to dramatically alter the common pooling of sovereignty in which a supra-national policy programmes are dealt with, should seek to perceive its roles, positions, and determine operationilizations both in implementation of policies and administrative matters. Nepad is certainly not a regional economic bloc, nor a free trade area or a customs union, and a common market neither by its very conceptualization nor a defensive response to globalization but a combination of all of these. It is a framework for Africa's development and a regional economic integration programme with no definite period of duration that encapsulates multiple issues and purposes. The multiple issues and purposes of Nepad capture the pooling of sovereignties in matters of political significance in the continent, including APRM as a complementary agenda. This has then brought to the fore some unintended consequences arising from the political saliency of sovereignty in the alliance of Nepad in the effort to move the continent beyond the grandstanding of countries with old but continuing political inclination to the concept of sovereignty, for example, Zimbabwe.

In another context, there existed a generation of real and imagined perceptions and fear of domination arising from the political configurations that seem to hold the view that the founding members of Nepad are out to peddle political influence and acquire hegemony over the small poor member countries, and therefore their interference in the domestic affairs of the poor member countries which are held sacrosanct are held in suspicion. Suspicion of externally induced interference in the internal affairs of member state may be extended to mean support for internal political oppositions (dissensions and insurgencies). Agitation against the subordination of national policy making preserve to Nepad has become critically imminent and virulent. This leads to the view that Nepad's implementation is a matter of convenience for the non-core members and necessity for the core members.

Nepad seeks to become an influencing factor, and a hands-on approach to strengthen democratic principles, and a watch-dog through the APRM initiative among other goals of Nepad. So far many member states are disinterested to sign up for possible review, implicitly using dogmatically the concept of sovereignty as an excuse. Nepad is, therefore constrained to enforce the objectives of the APRM. This would have been easier with consenting members who may have sought membership and ratified protocol as the basic requisite for accession.

6. 2. 3. 1 Implications

Nepad has generally made little or no headway against the cold realities of competitive national identities and sovereignties. Although the African states are for the first time seemingly speaking with similar voices about supranational collaboration for integration and development, deep suspicions and tensions abound.

On the continent, the characteristic negotiating attitude, dialogue, policy priorities are often more at variance as demonstrated during the Monrovia and the Casablanca continental political integration campaigns of the early 1960s. The situation is not any different now. The member states of Nepad would

compete for their national sovereignty, socio-economic, cultural, and political space within the Nepad's policy exchanges and implementation process. This defines an agenda to promote repressive power relations' structure and hegemonic practices in attaining political leverage from altering or reinforcing systems of structured inequality between, and among member states, a character of mutation in an implementation process. As a result juggling for the key political and economic opportunities becomes the key strategies of the political actors. An uneasy equilibrium between the supra-national and national authorities would then ensue.

The process of harmonization of various instruments to facilitate an intra- and extra-Nepad programme would become difficult in trans-border networking, cooperation, coordination, and harmonization, which would remain uncertain in promoting the implementation process if the sovereignty question is not tampered down at the national levels. If any, or group of, national governments refuses to place within their policy networks the objectives of Nepad or subordinate their policy preserves and render the necessary political will in support of the implementation of the Nepad's then the process will be put at a risk in those areas.

The macro-policy convergence criteria will be difficult to achieve due to a process character of such convergence. This is clearly indicative in Nepad's context, which, if not cautiously managed could render the implementation process dysfunctional. The issue of subordinating an individual member state's national sovereignty in the operationalization of the supra-national authority is sensitive and could attract repulsion and defiance on the part of the subordinated states. Libya, Sudan and Zimbabwe, which are ascendant member states of Nepad, serve as ready examples. The role of nation states in Africa to make Nepad what is imagined is hard to endorse, given that many of them have a visibly over-stated the concept of sovereignty with dysfunctional institutional frameworks for capturing the ideals, which Nepad is set to embark upon.

The pooling of sovereignties will remain a matter of frustration and will implicitly allow members to engage in the Machiavellian diplomacy, that is, quest for national objectives by conspiratorial and deceitful maneuvers motivated solely by self-interest and influence peddling, for example, the dynamics of the current diplomatic imbroglio involving the three key founders of Nepad - South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt, in the quest for the two UN Security Council seats allotted for Africa; the respect for democratic principles and the rule of law which are the critical objectives of Nepad, but viewed as optional by nation states in Africa. The implementation would be impeded by the continued vitality of sovereignty, political identity, and nationalism factors, which Nepad is not at this stage competent to deal with. Equality of state and freedom of action in a loose form membership confederation of Nepad could prove rather complex and beyond the present realm of Nepad's mandate. States would readily employ the sovereignty concept in order to subvert the implementation process, a matter already obvious in many respects.

Issues over matters such as interpretations, context of rules, provisions, actions and inactions in almost every agenda item, and of course the programme distributions and resource allocations, which are not ingrained in Nepad, may be hotly contested in reverence for sovereignty. Political values and change that could be expressed collectively may resonate with partiality in the course of the implementation process.

The highly political nature of the programme may create room for deliberate causation (generation) of conflicts in an attempt to exact concessions such as an immediate pay-off of action programmes, or greater control over the implementation process and resources. Mutual compromise and consensus building have been left to chance, which could lead to an enduring intricate process of political bargaining to take place. The hybridity of stakes and contentions, making of critical assumptions for inappropriate exceptions and additions are likely, in order to satisfy the interest of the powerful groups to offset potential political dissatisfaction, and members' claims. This will create highly volatile conditions, thereby rendering the implementation process complicated. For example Libya and South Africa over the location of the Pan-

African Parliament is a quick reminder. This soon became a potential source of friction and tension between all-inclusive member states and is capable of destroying the spirit of collegiality in the process.

The political and socio-economic systems in operation on the continent derived and inherited from the respective colonial powers remains a sore point and has persistently generated continental tension between the Francophone and the Anglophone African nations with high allegiance levels and bent unquestionably subscribe to the dictates of their colonial masters. The border problem between Nigeria and Cameroun on the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula, for example, has generated a revocation, at the international level, of this contention as concerns about the possibility of political crises in the sub-region had then heightened.

Common standards of action and norms have yet to be put in place for Nepad, this has granted member countries the latitude to conduct themselves in a manner that defies the policy objectives of Nepad, since they are convinced that condemnation and sanctions are unlikely to arise from Nepad. The arrangement, therefore, allows state members the ultimate choice of which and what programmes to support and those of interest and importance to them. Autocracies and semi- democracies, monarchical political dispensations in the continent with varying political orientations are involved on Nepad and these have manifestly demonstrated themselves in pervasive suspicion, division, tensions, and the paradoxes that accompany the inception of Nepad.

All this renders horizontal and vertical coordination very difficult for the implementation process. The assemblage of these countries renders the programme unwieldy and makes management difficult, as they constitute frameworks for systemic risk, strategic dilemma, and threat to the implementation process.

6. 2. 3. 2 Recommendations

African development and economic integration cannot be left to the common pooling of sovereignties correspondingly with the AU. For example the EU's memberships from the EEC to EC has witnessed a periodic enlargement over the years. If Nepad is to remain the viable template for Africa's development and economic integration, the concept of sovereignty has to be de-emphasized, and membership be opened only to those nations who are genuinely motivated and practically committed to the policy objectives of Nepad. The difficulties that are likely to arise need to be dealt with through the unification of substantive and basic rules of engagement that involve all the stakeholders, development actors and the operators of Nepad. Given these contentions:

- Nepad should initiate the appropriate criteria for engagement to secure and strengthen the rights of actors through strong statutory prescriptions, defining their character and behaviour appropriately and create an appellate body for redress, adjudication, appeal, right, dispute, reconciliation, claims, conflict, and overlap. This will create a basis for a functional, efficacious, and sustainable implementation process in relation to development planning, infrastructure, and service delivery
- Nepad should bring influence to bear on national parliaments, the media, organized labour unions, and NGOs on intransigent African governments for good political and economic governance and against political impropriety with a possibility of economic sanctions.

6. 2. 4 African Political Leadership Question

Africa is now at the threshold of intertwined, but dual transition processes – a political transition to democracy as well as an economic transition towards a liberalized economy as a result of pressure from the universal compacts, whose prospects for real change has received universal appeal. The strategic role of the African client states in guaranteeing collective well-being through

enabling policy environment and good governance are based on the strong principles of leadership as an indicator for development.

Nepad alone will not be able at its nascent stage to fully address the imperatives of African development. National governments are expected to embark on broad and effective policy networks, including awareness programmes, liaison with the clienteles and coordination in favour of the implementation of the ideals of Nepad. Nepad requires policy-level planning and execution in such a way that all member states exercise at domestic policy levels the congruence of the Nepad's ideals. The objective lies in consensus building for implementation.

National governments reserve the political and fiduciary responsibilities with more scope and latitude. The implementation of Nepad requires broad ranging political programmes at the national levels. The dynamics of the programme present some critical junctures that should involve specific tasks at national and sub-regional levels. A broad consensus has to be developed across the respective member states as well as in the policy imports of the sub-regional groupings such as ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, AMU, IGAD, and CEEAC.

African political leadership has made spectacular advancement towards development through the inauguration of Nepad. Political and economic governance issues that are critically important, given the context for which Nepad had emerged. Governments owe the responsibility of the creation of institutional structures of economic exchanges where the role of the wielders of political powers is most prominent.

6. 2. 4. 1 Implications

It would be a costly mistake to think that Nepad alone can undertake the development programmes continent-wide. The integration drive on the continent has always been estered with political conflicts, abject poverty, endemic economic depression and diseases, and an unstable policy

environment. African political leadership and the policy makers have so far not taken NePAD in the right perspective. All the more, African leadership is engrossed in the monopoly of power, cultural influence, divide and rule political dispensation, disregard for the rule of law, nepotism, self-aggrandizement, corruption, electoral impropriety, and political supremacy in reverence for economic growth and development on the continent.

Implementation draws a strategy that is an operation-driven activity to get things done. It is a make-things happen task that tests leaders' ability to direct; test organizational ability and drive for change which involves design, monitoring, motivation and the achievement of performance targets. These standpoints in the contemporary political leadership context remain essentially haphazard and are yet to tie up with the African leadership's governance styles. Member countries of NePAD continue to hold fast to their identity politics and distinctive but contrary views on contemporary fundamentals of development as they relate to their national policy perceptions and directions including economic and political growth, threats to security and sovereignty. Most of these member states are under autocracy, one party system, and dictatorship. They operate dirigiste and control the media – electronic and print, and are intolerant of an independent free press and judiciary. They sit over the ruination of political and socio-economic institutions and infrastructures of their states.

Similarly, the political elite and policy makers acquire, a contagious infection of aversion to set their economies through indigenous paths for development and growth, that is to say they have directly and indirectly permitted non-Africans more leverage and access to manage their economies at the expense of promoting indigenous entrepreneurs. They dogmatically perceive their countries and people as personal estates for personal acquisition and enterprises for exploitation. They practice policy of exclusion that encourages and perpetuates sycophancy, intimidation, and denials. Some are currently steeped in political conflicts, for example, Zimbabwe and Swaziland in the Southern Africa; Liberia, a failed state and Cote D' Ivoire

which has refused a multiparty dispensation and policy of exclusion and Durfur-Sudan with the racial and discriminatory policies resulting in genocide.

More significantly, harassment of political opponents and peer support among the autocratic political leadership has been symptomatic of the overall cautious response of the G8 and the donor nations for Nepad. Rather than forge workable political policies they demonstrate complacency and prevaricate over the true position of their economies. The way economic policies and laws affect the populace and their participation are most often regulated against and deny access to available economic resources, opportunities, and management to ensure socioeconomic and political cohesions in the African society. This very breadth, of course, constitutes a substantial impediment to the implementation process of Nepad. These characteristics do not constitute the basis of leadership for development and ultimately bear against achieving viable implementation of the African project.

Equally important is the existence on the continent of deep-seated systemic, structural, historical, and ideological differences since independence, to the credulity of African society, which has generated political mistrust, rivalries, and tensions, and which the nascent Nepad, alone may not be able to effectively address. There are yet competing demands and interests, both local and foreign alike on the continent. In African states, there is a large presence of reciprocal intolerance continent-wide. Between them lie decades dense with experiences charged with highly emotive memories with a relatively common narrative thread that has run through them with different personations in public authority at national levels.

For instance, some of the political leaders resist their parliament and change cabinets as frequently as they wish. They continue to view their countries as their private estates, pursue settlement with oppositions with all of the sectors to their best and maximum advantage. Scarce resources are coveted, diverted, and deployed at will for the prosecution of needless political conflicts and internecine wars. They become intolerant of political plurality, victimize and deny order of freedom for the minority tribes, as well as members of the

opposition, these factors are incongruent with the objectives of Nepad. All these have served as grounds for the socio-economic and political conflicts, which have perpetuated instability and development imperative on the continent.

The interplay between these images reveals an arena for a profound crisis for Nepad. Therefore, the assembly of these political leaders in Nepad may have significant implications for the implementation, given the nature of African political leaders and the rhythms of their politicking, and the proper weight of their styles of governance. Implementation of Nepad under these conditions is likely to remain controversial, and in turn fragmentary.

6. 2. 4. 2 Recommendations

The role of the African political leadership cannot be dismissed in the implementation process of Nepad. In the process to attain the policy objectives of Nepad, national governments and their public institutions are the vehicles, which lie within the scope and capacity of political leadership. The roles, nature, and significance of the national governments and their institutions are essentially critical for the varied stages of implementation. What this means is that the role of Nepad is inextricably linked with the role of the national political leadership in policymaking, policy coordination, policy harmonization, monitoring, fundraising activities at domestic levels, and awareness programming through national institutions for the implementation regulatory frameworks. To this end:

- African leadership should be made to enforce through the Nepad implementation process policy incentives for the free movement of people and capital across the continent, to move towards common passport and visa regimes as already in practice in the ECOWAS sub-region to encourage transnational investments; right of residence and property ownerships in member states to reduce economic disincentives should be part of the economic integration. This will play a comparable role and reflect the encapsulation of the globalization principles and the Nepad's objectives on the one hand and ensure

formation of cross-cultural community linkages, promote visible and invisible trade and investments, and guarantee freedom of people as well as promote secularity that will reduce ethnic versus the settler tensions in the continent.

- Nepad should work towards influencing the orthodox styles of the African political leadership to void monopoly of power, that is, frequent changing of constitutions and not more than a-two term in office, to give way to new kind of leadership manifestly short term of office, based on the new realities. In other words, the new kind of political leadership means that policy makers are expected to be transactional and adaptive within the domestic policy agenda to reflect their commitment and responsiveness to political and socio-economic transformations. This also includes enlightened leadership styles, active economic diplomacy among themselves and beyond. Therefore responsibilities should be assigned to energetic, determined, and persuasive political leadership with charisma, political savvy and motivational capacity to influence policy decisions and actions, for example, to make some of them board members for Nepad. This will be an effort to conform states' actions more precisely to the evolving global political, socio-economic and cultural trends. No single leadership characteristic is sufficient but combinatory characteristics with transformational traits would assist in the implementation process of Nepad.
- Nepad should work towards harmonization of proportionate allocation of public expenditure to gender promotion and productive health to practically guarantee the resources for women's restitution, participation, and eliminate poverty and gender prejudices in Africa. This could be prosecuted by institutionalization of effective and steep regulations to protect women against rape, access to valuable assets after divorce, and option for abortion and productive health and child welfare. This means the repeal of obnoxious and discriminatory customary and statutory laws against women's rights to own and inherit properties, enjoy universal suffrage, limit their political and

economic potentials, and forced marriages. This is with a view to ensure that women satisfy their motivational needs to active participation in development efforts.

- Nepad should stress against political persecution, prosecution, extra-judicial trial and execution, political assassination, practices that enthrone warlordism, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and political thuggery; the systematic pattern of repression should be halted while a universal and civilized conduct of good governance, dialogue between perceived opposition, the governed and the rulers are encouraged. Electoral impropriety should attract heavy condemnation as well as economic and political sanctions to encourage wider participation and political pluralism as solution to socio-political tensions and crisis.
- African political leadership whose regimes create a failed or failing state must be denied political asylum in any African countries through Nepad. This is to serve as a deterrent for deliberate political conflicts, policy of exclusion, deprivation, and policies that promote them.
- Nepad's ideals could be translated into indigenous languages and dialects through the political leaders and institutions to keep the communities informed and ensure participation in Nepad. National television networks, radio stations, conferences, sporting activities and billboards advertisements be drafted into the awareness programmes. The implementation process of Nepad requires doing things right rather than doing the right things.

6. 2. 5 The Structural Economic Dependency

Structural economic dependency has both external and internal dimensions with greater emphasis on economic development policy particularly in integrating economic capacity in decision-making. Prior to the advent of the lofty global economic development evocative slogans expressed in the globalization process and sustainable development, and the UN MDGs, African economies have been ingrained in the globally diffused imperial

economies, which has subsisted even to this day. It was therefore certain that the structural economic dependency paradigm became the norm. Economic policies came to be designed basically without technological development and achievement in mind, at least at the scale beneficial to the national economies but for the emergent elite who wield internal political and policy-making powers and the external capitalist powers.

The colonial administration bequeathed to most African states economic linkages to the metropolitan economic institutions. The post-colonial experience is a more recent phase in the longer colonial history. This history is nothing, but a continuous history of capitalism. There have been spatial and long-term power-relations, which is afortiori to the context of Nepad.

But it is not enough to continually apportion blame and hold colonialism and the international capitalist institutions solely responsible for the African development malaise. The extent of the African economic dependency has to be viewed with circumspection, given the politics and history of national economic mismanagement on the continent, which has led to poor economic planning and deprivation on the one hand, and the dynamics of the international economic system on the other. Economically, it could be argued that the structural dependency is mutual. The difference here is that one side uses more of its technology and expertise to draw leverages from the mutuality of the structural dependency.

For one thing Africa enjoys a near monopoly and semi monopoly (comparative advantages) in natural resources with high economic value. Africa is blessed with natural resources and raw materials of high economic value such as, gold, diamond, copper, bauxite, tin ore, coal, petroleum, and cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, tobacco, sugar, and tea. This list stands extension. But this does not normally translated into economic power in terms of capital out lay for development. The continent continue to remain fundamentally lacking in capital resource base, human capital, technology, and development-driven policy environment.

The developed countries have acquired monopoly in technology, production, and trade, which readily serve the market needs of Africa. This is due mostly to over-regulated macro-economic policies, which tend to discourage both FDI and local investment climate. As a result the economies remain extractive and dependent. For one thing, most developed continents lack abundant natural resources yet they have come to achieve formidable economic wealth and are donor nations, for example, Germany and Japan. They are dependent on importation of raw materials that service their industries. Their achievements are attributable to a commitment to and development of advance technology for industrialization, human capital and national discipline that lack in Africa.

The importers of African economic goods depend on the African raw materials while African economies depend on export to earn forex, and payment for importations at huge cost on the finished products of their raw materials. In good economic times African governments resort to the expensive habit of food imports, machineries, white elephant projects, and military hardwares at the expense of technological investment, by tapping from the expertise of the African Universities and the research institutes in technological development for processing and production of the raw materials. In bad times, they appeal to the global community for food and donor aid. This scenario presupposes that Nepad lacks the much-required capital resources for its implementation, as the central themes are not mutually exclusive. Abundance of natural resources of high economic value in Africa indeed has perversely led to economic decline, crises and detached from international entrepreneurs.

The critical factor to the modern day economic development is the acquisition of technology, its sustainability and advancement. The African economies and policies are mono-dimensional export of raw materials. The agricultural produces and raw materials are exported in a hurry to acquire and conserve foreign exchange much of which has to be expended on the payment of imported goods and services in neglect of development and economic growth.

On the one hand, the IMF and the World Bank caveats also remain critical in the Africa's development imperatives, as the conditions had given the

international financial institutions a stranglehold on the African states, and their economies. This has led to the debt overhang and the consequent servicing thereof which has witnessed a huge capital export from the continent. The outcome has created poverty, unemployment and destabilized the economic planning in most recipient countries on the continent. The imbalance of the structural dependency therefore has some critical implications for the implementation of Nepad.

6. 2. 5. 1 Implications

The economic dependency of the African economies, which has resulted in economic misfortunes for the continent, will evidently interfere in the implementation process of Nepad if African economies continue to remain primarily extractive. The concentration in the export of primary commodities over the years has aggravated the capital base of the African economies. Economic incentives and priorities are not directed at technology development for the processing of the primary commodities and mineral resources, but on the consumption of imports. The primary commodities from Africa are processed and refined abroad and resold to Africa at a high cost. This is not only a drain on the capital base but serves the structural dependency, which perpetuates economic under-development and capital flights.

Due to the extractive nature of the African economies the competitive pricing of African agricultural produce and mineral resources on the global trading systems, denies African economies capital earnings, investment opportunities. Dependency has equally led to economic deprivation, economic cycle, and poor economic planning. Poor and mis-placed economic policies by the African elite that allow formal and private economic ownerships to foreigners, economic mismanagement, graft, and mis-appropriation of public funds stashed away in European Banks, all drain the capital resources on the continent. The linkages of economic growth and development policies of the African economies to the mainstream international economic system, has provided the room for the Nepad operators to fall back on the G8 for funding. This however has come to be expected.

The adoption of different structural and institutional administrative arrangements during and after colonial rule has thus shaped the existing economic policy environment and evoke old allegiances. These patterns have led to uneven-typed and differentiated economic development policies in Africa. It has created socio-economic relations of systemic and unparallel beliefs and orientations about development policy programme in Africa. The policy makers, given the over-regulated macro-economic policies, have not prepared African economies for full participation in the global economic system. Concerted efforts have not been made to diversify into productive economies.

This situation persists even in the post-millennium Africa as Nepad has been driven into a trajectory of extroversion for implementing its policy goals. The diminutive and extractive economies would render African states incapacitated to contribute financially to an annual membership registration and unable to pay subscription fees, nor make the required financial deposits to participate effectively in Nepad's activities. In a larger context, these scenarios equally subject them to vulnerability and a possible reversion to the international financial dependency. Dependency only succeeds to create and articulate competing claims and stakes for participation in shaping a particular model for the implementation of Nepad.

The over-reliance on external funding for development programmes on the continent smirks structural dependency. The trend fosters a culture of allegiance and dependency linkages to the imperialist masters as opposed to that of entrepreneurship in the development efforts for Africa by Africans. Be this as it may, the undercurrent effects would remain a telling impact and would constitute a threat to the true ownership of the programme as well as a fail-safe implementation process.

6. 2. 5. 2 Recommendations

African development and economic growth cannot take place based solely on the structural economic dependency without inward looking measures to reverse the imbalance and begin incremental development with structural remodeling of the economies. There is therefore the need to introduce, under the Nepad programme a near absolute measure of economic value of African composite restructuring to scale back the over-dependency, vulnerability, and extractive economic system and stimulate economic growth to generate African indigenous capacity funding for Nepad. It would be highly unlikely for Nepad to embark on its African project without the diversification exercise as the economic base for the African economies in terms of technological development or possibly transfer of technology, formation of mineral and agricultural cartels to source inward capital generation to address the imbalance and create capital base. Bearing these in mind:

- Nepad should work towards the restructuring of the economic dependency condition by introducing reforms in liaison with sub-regional economic groupings. More focus need to be directed at country producers to make local productive investments in technology revolution to process raw materials, be it mining, agricultural, or refining on the continent. This is, with a view to develop relevant technology or encourage technology transfer so as to process the raw materials through to end products for international markets. This will facilitate creating and saving capital, exploit fully the comparative and competitive advantages and render African economies competitive within international trading systems. It will add value by higher prices for African raw materials. The value through local processing will be the source of profits derivable from the processed end products. African economies will then become the producers, processors, consumers, and earn and conserve capital and decide on what to export to earn forex. Nepad should negotiate with its members to establish National Provident Funds for implementing domestic policies of Nepad.
- The strategy for African economic emancipation and sustainable development in terms of creating new economic institutions and cartels

to streamline policy-making for production and processing, that will explore and exploit the comparative advantages of the African economies should be launched without further delay by Nepad. Through Nepad, in order to maximise the comparative advantage of the African economy African Marketing and Grains Board for production and marketing of African agricultural produce; such as cotton, cocoa, maize, tea, and coffee to determine their price index with flat scales of levy to generate funding for Nepad shall be initiated. An independent Solid Minerals and Petroleum Resources Management Board should be established for the African producers of petroleum, gold, diamond, copper, bauxite and tin to streamline production quotas to protect rights, extract royalties and flat tax rates of purchase by foreign and local clients, contractors, drilling companies and their subsidiaries, and to protect manufacturing against external forces and competitive pricing to tap funds for Nepad. These bodies have to maintain tariff classifications for international trade and conformance services. In promoting intra-African trade common Customs regimes should be established.

- An African Central Bank should be established through Nepad, whose responsibility would be to scale back economic cycles and false economic planning on the continent and to coordinate trade and monetary reserve, and harmonize monetary and fiscal policies as a move to introduce a common regional currency and exchange rates control, towards the creation of an African Monetary Zone for regional economic integration.
- ADB should be transformed into an African Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ABRD) directly under Nepad for matrix management of Nepad Fund (to be established) with the richer member states extending credit to the Fund with arrangements to lend to the poor country members on mutually agreed pre-qualifications and country proposals.
- Harmonization of African Common Customs Union and tariffs for intra- African trade along with free-trade zones should be expanded

through COMESA to encourage expanded intra-African trade as well as foreign trade. African Social Charter for workers should be integrated in Nepad's protocol of engagement. This is to enable and ensure a fair wage for African workers, equal treatment of men and women in the labour force, freedom of association and collective bargaining power, training, assisting disabled workers, and a guaranteed standard of living for workers, including retirees. A machinery for enforcement should be simultaneously instituted.

6. 2. 6 Financial Capital Resource Capacity

The one pervasive difficulty that recurringly scuttles implementation is a weak capital resource base. One of the rationales for the partnership character of Nepad is the capital resource constraint facing the continent. The necessary capital inputs required for budgetary provisions for the agenda items and the scope for which they would be implemented are lean and meagre. The resources are yet to be secured, from both internal and external sources to accommodate cost and price fluctuations with regard to the implementation process. This situation had been aggravated by economic crises resulting from the pervasively perennial political conflicts, cupidity, embezzlement, economic over-dependency, poor local investment and savings climates, and the lack of vision on behalf of the political leaderships on the one hand, and the after effects of the SAPs and the continued dwindling of FDI and donor aid on the other. Most members of Nepad are dependent on the donor aid even for their annual budgetary provisions.

Funding of development programmes in the developing world has been orchestrated and encouraged by the UN since the inception of the UN MDGs in 2000. Nepad, as a new programme, has no fixed assets, terms of capital investment to draw from, it lacks operating costs as a result of African countries debt overhang to international creditors.

The funding resource constraint typically reflects the dearth of capital resources for Nepad to tackle the myriad development imperatives on the

continent. This condition is equally worsened by the acute lack of enabling protocols, regulatory and organizing principles. The African debt servicing and corruption generate massive foreign accounts holdings, not only for the creditors but African political and policy maker elite, which have led to a huge capital flight from the continent. These developments have incapacitated the continent economically to bankroll the Nepad programme. The capital resources that are being exported from the continent, both by the African political elite and MNCs, could have been injected into economic generative programmes for the development of the continent.

The common economic crises that have afflicted the continent could be viewed at two-dimensional strands – economic and social fundamentals that are interconnected with the ‘structural economic dependency’ condition already discussed in paragraph 6. 2. 4. For instance, foreign investors (MNCs) and international financial institutions (IMF and the World Bank) exercise an effective sphere of influence on the African economic policy arena both at the private, and formal sectors, leaving the primary sector to the African indigenes. As a result, African economies have become extractive and have witnessed significant erosion against the backdrop of the structural adjustment programmes and the dynamics of international capitalism operatives.

At the same time, the neo-liberal economic ideological pressures on African countries by their bilateral donor aid nations and organizations tended to serve the metropolitan interest against the continent. The ceasing of the ideological aid patronage during the cold war era from the West and the East, equally reduced capital and material flows into the continent. In turn, the African economic systems and policies have resulted in skewed growth and under-development, open exploitation, vulnerability, and exclusion with a resultant marginalization. This has translated into shortages of economic opportunities, economic space, and underdevelopment on the continent.

The second strand is Africa’s internal macro economic policies, structures, elite, and institutions that have essentially remained exploitative. A great deal

of the African economic conundrums are caused by the poor policy environments that have deliberately failed to promote and strengthen the local economic policies and entrepreneurship aimed at diversifications of the internal economic structures in reverential awe for graft, sleight, and ineptitude. The majority of what they consume are imports from abroad with a huge capital underlay. Africa's development to them, remains essentially a theory to be assumed. In other words Africa exist, exclusively for their individual exploitation and remains unfit for meaningful development and growth.

In pursuant to consolidate and monopolize power, African political leaders view public offices as a recourse to wealth accumulation and tend to a policy of extraversion. They buy their way through the patronage of the multinational corporations (MNCs) in franchises, indulge in economic impropriety and are repressive to the detriment of development. Some of them have continued in the path of profligacy and cynical indifference to development. The economies, as a result, lack the absorptive capacity and goodness of fit, in the international competitive arena.

While these are on going, more and more peasants are created, poverty becomes entrenched, the economies stagnate, and underdevelopment becomes the trademark. Accordingly, the requirements for a formal and secondary sector economy remain largely the central challenge of economic restructuring and at the same time highlight the critical dimensions of economic deprivation that pervades the continent. Funding is a substantial component of policy implementation.

6. 2. 6. 1 Implications

These scenarios, both external and internal, have rendered most African states under-resourced, economically limp-wristed, and incapacitated in meaningful capital contributions to the implementation of Nepad. The goals of Nepad are laudable and well intended, but the inadequate capital base, human and social capitals would impede the implementation to get off the ground.

For so long, development policy programmes have been designed to stem poverty and the underdevelopment question in Africa, but funding barriers have all rooted firmly against their implementation. As a result, it has come to serve as a constraint to the implementation process as already evident in the annual subscription contributions to the regional body, the AU.

From interviews held with some Nepad staff at their Secretariat in Midrand in late 2004, it can be understood that South Africa is the only member state that is continually funding the Secretariat. Meaningful financial contributions are yet to come through from other member states for the matrix management of the Secretariat, let alone the implementation contributions. It stands to reason; for how long will South Africa continue with its magnanimous capitalization of the continental programme. This is where the crux of the implementation lies limited resources will generate tension and complicate the implementation of Nepad. It will cast the implementation at a risk of captivity beyond the reach.

These scenarios replicate and reinforce the implementation dilemma and will undermine and scuttle the African development project. There is a prodigiously unrealistic expectation to prosecute the agenda of Nepad from external funding. Funding an African homegrown programme in the twenty-first century mostly with external sources, is limiting the opportunities for inward looking measures for the implementation process. It has, therefore, trapped the African project in reverence for thoroughly mis-constructed policy choices, lack of targeting possible impact factors, and ultimately the implementation process. This would lead to marginality, alienation, and obscure the 'African ownership' contention. This is another way in which limited capital resources negatively influence implementation process.

6. 2. 6. 2 Recommendations

All policy programmes are formulated with the aim of achieving multiple objectives. Nepad has been created to address development imperatives and economic integration in Africa. But all the objectives cannot be simultaneously implemented. Nepad would therefore have to scale back its programmatic frameworks, to areas where it can immediately create a meaningful impact in congruence with the available resources. In short, the implementation of its policy goals should be staggered and prosecuted in an incremental manner, given its financial resource incapacities. Therefore Nepad should encourage and work towards:

- The capitalization of the implementation through internally generated resources. This could be done through the establishment of a Nepad Funds under ABRD to infuse grants, treasury bills, for capitalization. It will help free Nepad from death caveats of contractual obligations.
- The ABRD should also serve as the African Financial Facility for implementation and provide sources of financial services such as cooperatives, credit unions, and governments' savings. It should be responsible for auditing African external and internal investments to ensure adequate legislation and regulations in profit-driven financial instruments of member countries, to generate favourable terms of trade and commerce to mitigate risk and fraud. Any states aspiring to Nepad's membership should ratify the accession protocol instrument with non-refundable deposits of a specified amount subject to review, registration fees, annual membership and subscription fees as may be determined by the HSGIC in stipulated evolving periods.
- Nepad should target infrastructure investment, (transport – railways and aviation; ICT; marine), institutions, and capital investments to attract taxes and levies to form capital base for implementation. All donor aid and international donations should be channeled into the Nepad Fund, including flat levies and taxes from financial institution of member states.
- Nepad should organize African Trade Fares and embark on Fundraising programmes within and outside the continent to draw funds for implementation. Tourism taxes could also be levied on travels

particularly from travelers to and from the continent on regular basis over a period of time.

- All member states should be asked to draw flat levies from the rich private elite and corporate incomes, business registration tax both domestic and foreign, as well as licensing rates in the member states and accrue a certain percentage to Nepad.
- Nepad should work towards a moratorium on Military hardware purchases with the member states, for two years in the first instance and the accrued percentage turned over to Nepad to consolidate its capital base for implementation.
- In liaison with the affected countries, Nepad should work assiduously for the freezing and repatriation of the misappropriated public funds stashed away in foreign banks, in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. These funds should be used for implementing identified Nepad's programmes in affected countries.
- Among other things, the macro-economic stabilization that reduces budget deficits and credit economic growth with regard to both economies of scale must create the necessary conditions that could reduce dependency on external aid.
- Nepad should adopt economic empowerment frameworks such as South Africa's GEAR and the Nigeria's NEEDS, and harness and communicate them effectively as specific strategic programmes for poverty reduction and employment creation.

6. 2. 7 The Institutional Implementation Mechanisms

The need for efficient institutional implementation mechanisms arises from the recognition of the structural, institutional weaknesses and imperfections in policy implementation experiences on the continent. There are several aspects to this condition that could be viewed on the functional authority of Nepad, streamlining decision-making, and specialization, which are central to the themes of the study. The human and material capacity deficiencies, organisational culture, the exigencies of co-operative cross-sectional and

cross-cultural relations are causal issues that heighten intrigues in organisations. All this has characterised the implementation mechanisms of Nepad as indicated in Chapter Five.

The implementation mechanisms on the continent, let alone those of Nepad, are yet to evolve to the point where the ethical public policy processes and norms means the lowering of undue political pressure from the participants and actors during policymaking and policy implementation environments. It has always been common practice at the national and sub-regional levels that actors claim not only self-serving credit for policies but also seek programme locations at their immediate localities. The arrangement of implementation mechanisms for Nepad seemingly appears set to not escape from the mantra as an exception in degree and context.

While it is critical to have in place effective institutional mechanisms to deal with the implementation of the ostentatious policy agenda of Nepad, effective implementation can seldom rely on multiple-level implementation mechanism arrangements. This could hardly be of significant value to implementation, due to over subscription.

6. 2. 7. 1 Implications

In another context, the implementation mechanisms as they are presently constituted appear to evolve and focus around inoperative declarations that seek to gratify self-esteem and sense of political propriety of the African political leadership. This confederated implementation approach is overly paternalistic in context. It has precluded the African clientele and other critical actors of significant participation.

The economic cost of assembling the Heads of State and Governments for the purposes of authorizing issue specifics for implementation far outweighs the cost of implementing the issue agenda in a given section of the continent. The opportunity cost of travels on a trip by the members of the HSGIC if

subjected to cost-benefit analysis, the cost will be inordinate, substantial and would outweigh their significance.

The objectives and the role of the implementation mechanisms are ill-defined in terms of authorization, job ascriptions, and appropriation in pursuance of the implementation. Time and political pressures are increasing, often not on the side of the members of the HSGIC, the main implementation organ for Nepad and therefore opportunities for error, risk, and bureaucratic delay remain visibly high. For example, the AU Summit and the HSGIC may be engrossed with routine matters rather than ensuring that the implementation process is effectively coordinated. Loss of time may be the bane of this condition as the entire process may come to a halt waiting for one party's input for furthering actionable programmes.

It may create a sense of superiority and paternalistic behaviour on the part of the HSGIC over and above other organs and this may play down the effectiveness and the efficient execution of programmes on a large scale. The layers of the implementation mechanisms are overlaid on top of one another – a situation of fundamental conflict between the layers. The institutional economics, that is, the transaction/operating cost of the over-layered implementation mechanisms do not reflect the true indigent funding condition of Nepad.

This arrangement could stall creative and professional initiatives for the implementation and therefore constitute an impediment to the process. Nepad, as a programme that has been institutionalized is limited in terms of initiating valid decisions and actions. This seemingly may complicate the implementation process.

The set up denies the clientele access to articulate their views and present their priorities for implementation. The arrangement seemingly rests upon the theoretical assumptions of a top-down approach evocation and validates its paradigmatic interpolations. It does not promote subsidiarity, which is what the Bottom-Upper and the Advocacy Coalition contentions de-emphasize as they

deny the top-down approach, the centrality position in the implementation process. It is therefore antithetical to the implementation process of Nepad.

This arrangement gives the notion of some organs moving towards general implementation prospects, while some others move towards sectoral activities and yet none is a specialized organ. It appears more a transitory arrangement whereas Nepad is not, at least given its symbolic concept as a processual programme, that is, Nepad is presumably a high return regional development policy programme with multiyear programmatic frameworks. Under this arrangement, the implementation process could be threatened by a certain network, which is keen to control the set up, but minimally remain open to the lesser implementers; and monitoring unpredictable effects of interactions between the members and their agents with no focus on those of the emerging conditions. The structuring of the implementation mechanisms essentially emphasizes a differentiation character in hierarchy, an indication of a conscious vision to maintain the status quo, which is unnecessary at this early stage of implementation.

The multiple-tier institutional mechanisms are not an automatic guarantee of successful implementation. The convergence of functions may reflect fundamentally different political and philosophical interpretations that are difficult to reconcile within a complex framework for implementation. The fact of the matter is that, the arrangement has a tendency that may in time become an oversized patrimonial and predatory organ, with more political bent than development.

Implementation will suffer diseconomies of scale – the disadvantages resulting from large, as opposed to small-scale operations in an organization. These include difficulties of coordination, communication, information flow, and adaptation to changing circumstances. A massive bureaucracy encourages entropy – lack of degree of openness in a system.

The weakness of this arrangement may further manifest itself in the quality and rational decision-making because it has circumscribed and subordinated

the decision-making for the implementation. It may also be lined with bureaucratic politics; though the bane of every organisation, it could be more aggravated due to the nature of their composition. Within this implementation framework, the implementation process of Nepad appears eroded and faulty, rendering the process rather inclusive -faulty, than exclusive - professional. This jigsaw can play out and evoke an unpredictable pattern of outcome. The arrangement is indicative of a *laissez-faire* structure as it promotes policy divergence for any effective implementation process. It fails to enhance the interactive performance feed back loop, a strong contention of the 'system model analysis' in public policy process.

Flexibility and obligatory exercise of the permanent membership of Nepad is not a guarantee that is to say that the progenitors of the programme may remain permanently in Office. Their successors may choose to dishonour their predecessor's international obligations. This would create fragmentation in the process. It is therefore critical to argue that the arrangement would not address competently, professionally the underlying impact factors with causal relationships with the implementation process. This may consequently lead to an unproductive intervention.

6. 2. 7. 2 Recommendations

The regional development and economic integration programme is not only a matter of constituting a multi-tier implementation mechanism but it also needs to be understood in the professional context of implementation. Whereas the purpose of an institutional arrangement for implementation would be that of continuity, a specialised organ, a coherent whole should be statutorily provided and charged with the implementation functions. The establishment of a specialized implementation organ would be cost effective in terms of operation and implementation activities. The implementation mechanisms of Nepad ought be a specialized organ charged with all stages of the process. Be this as it may:

- With a strong political will, an independent organ of Nepad should be carefully plotted as a specialized organ that draws special privileges

and prerogatives under the AU, in a cluster concept, where a combinatory talents, skills, and expertise of personnel will be grouped and harnessed into a holistic and multi-sectoral implementation organ. That is to say Nepad could be corporatized to streamline the decision-making, operations, and implementation process. With the growth of specialization in development matters and organizational structuring, this specialized organ should be under executive management, a board, and appointed figures from the clientele. The specialized organ will be better positioned to organize, monitor, plan, budget, staff, direct, coordinate, evaluate, and report on the implementation.

- Nepad Specialized organ should be integrated with Issue Resolution Teams (IRTs) allotted to SRECs, that is, decentralised sub-units assigned to the sub-regional economic communities. In other words, the specialised organ could be mandated to initiate and work towards the standardization of sub-regional and national policies for the implementation of Nepad's objectives. A turnkey arrangement could also be planned where it is visibly necessary, this will improve its efficiency level and delivery. Specialized organ will be able to provide creative responses within their areas of expertise. As a result it will be able to provide integrated solutions tailored towards the implementation process. It will avoid proliferation of institutions and encourage the use of the specialised organ. This is because the implementation of Nepad is a process that requires time, huge capital resources, and a continuity of efforts to prevent process crisis.
- Staffing of the proposed specialized organ should not only reflect proportionate representation on the continent - regional balance but also international actors at technical assistance levels. Crossbreed of staff will inspire and modulate initiatives, encourage teamwork, free flow of communication, and integrated decision-making. It will reduce ambiguity; ensure financial stability as well as mainstream and streamline implementation functions, encourage accountability and should be held accountable. It will ensure a more direct performance and evaluation, control, delegation of functions, decentralization, and facilitate flexibility; it

will improve quality of policies and strengthen steering functions, and stress quality outputs.

- Given the nature and the character of Nepad, it should aspire to the attainment of special privileges, such as, diplomatic status to draw leverage as accreditation, that is, liaison representations at international institutions such as the UN, WTO, UNCTAD, OECD, and selected regional development bodies such as ASEAN and the EU. This will enable Nepad to tap into, and glean from different programming and implementation experiences, in greater depth from these bodies, and to project and defend positions of interest in relation to its African project. Diplomatic privileges, and immunities can be extended to the specialized organ and personnel in terms of status, liaison and *laisser passer* respectively to facilitate the discharge of their responsibilities (safe passage, representation, diplomatic protocol, negotiations, trade, communication, reporting, monitoring and implementation functions in host states).
- The HSGIC should serve as the custodian of the protocol of engagement, set and preserve standards for entry and exit by the recommendation of Nepad, sanctions, certification and approval of memberships, standard conformance, conduct economic diplomacy, budgetary approval and ensure inter-functionality between the Nepad specialized organ and the AU Commission.
- HSGIC should be charged with the responsibility to receive and consider annual performance reports, review progress, adopt annual work plans in ensuing years as well as approve annual financial and budgetary outlays. Appoint the Chief Executive and the Board members through the recommendation of the Nepad's specialized organ.
- Nepad organ will reduce the high tendency of paternalistic and rule-violating behaviours of the implementers and instead draw mutual respect, promote trust, promote streams of policy convergence, which are critical intangible inputs in policy implementation. Coherence of policy programming would suffice in reverence for complexity in the policy foci and the implementation process. All this will go a long way to facilitate the implementation process.

6. 2. 8 The Authority Question between Nepad, HSGIC and the AU

There are obvious differences between the AU, HSGIC and Nepad, with regard to role and role relationships in promoting the African project. While the AU is essentially a continental political arrangement with a political agenda, a political style, and a political temperament, Nepad is for regional development and economic integration of the continent, which is purposefully goal-directed. The role differentiations and duplications have offered the criteria on how the span of authority is defined between the institutional implementation mechanisms that have been arranged on the one hand, the AU and Nepad, on the other. How does Nepad been located in this power – authority equation? The response to this question lies in the compartmentalisation and programming of functions which determine what goes where, who does what, how and to refrain, in an organisation, for the purposes of prosecuting charters or areas of functions. The rationale is centred on efficiency, effectiveness, and policy coherence of a single-line authority for implementation. The issue of ambiguity and complexity with regard to authority are evidently the exclusive responsibilities of good governance and peace and security provisions for implementation between Nepad and the AU.

In both the AU and the Nepad programmes, there are long lists of stated objectives slated as the actionable policy goals. At the same time they lack clearly delineated lines of authority between the AU and Nepad; where it does, they are either in duplication or imperceptible. Authority remains vague and concertinaed due to the lack of distinct clarity on the respective roles of the AU and Nepad. Two possible reasons could be deduced from these contradictions, one is that Nepad has assumed various descriptive names – initiative, programme, concept, and implementation mechanism of the AU, the second is drawn from the duplication of functions between some of the policy objectives of the AU and programmatic frameworks of Nepad.

The implementation process is affected by how well authority is defined, specified, and delineated in given tasks to fit a particular context and

environment. Authority configuration that is fluid and diverse demonstrates multiple equilibria effects, which may range from effective to ineffective implementation. Authority would mean exercise of power to allocate and use resource inputs, among others, as a tool to ensure viable implementation. It is about placing responsibility more squarely on an institution. But, between the AU and Nepad, the power - authority equation seems to be a bane for implementation.

6. 2. 8. 1 Implications

In the context of a clearly delineated authority for Nepad, there are areas of possible conflict with the AU. The ambivalence on criteria specifics with regard to independent authoritative decision and powers on what to implement and authoritative allocation of resources, where and how and by whom, raises objectively some ambiguity and complexity in the process of the implementation on both bodies. Rather than improve the prospect of Nepad's implementation, authority has become problematic which could dwindle the institutional capacity to co-ordinate the implementation process. This perhaps would in time, push Nepad into a trajectory of legitimacy. There are obvious areas where duplication of functions could lead not only to fragmentation but also raises power struggle and burden budgetary allocations.

The overlap of functions may seemingly decrease the chances of independent authority for action, which may increase the fragility of the implementation process. Without a defined lined of authority, the programmes of Nepad will go through a spaghetti bowl of different rules and conflicting tunes for the implementation. The mechanisms are not far off a command type implementation arrangement. It is an over-regulated implementation arrangement and is seemingly reliant on anecdotes and precepts.

Coordination and decision-making for implementation will suffer attenuation. The relevance and the urgency for who is to initiate, advise, control, monitor, inform, budget, staff, and report, have not been adequately streamlined. In a sense, authority has been emphasized as an exclusive identity that has

appeared the strongest and may actually constitute a systemic threat to the fundamental implementation objectives. This scenario will lead to a more complicated institutional and interests balancing acts with varied accompanying institutional deficiencies. The arrangements constitute a potential source for non-cooperation, tension, waste, friction, and competition that may undermine coordination and harmonization of policies, taking into account prevalent political contentions and the poor governance styles of African leadership in many African states. Collective bargaining looms as complicated and complex in the multi-tier authority situation.

It will create delay and red tape, bogged down by the implementation process for lack of urgent responsiveness. This will promote bureaucratic inertia that may disrupt the implementation process. It lacks a redistributive potential. It is an insidious logic to any known approach for 'implementation' to move over to "implementable" process. It could lead to reduction in the range of activities required at early stages of programme implementation.

It also constitutes a political approach and hence a potential unit of political discourse. But the implementation process of Nepad needs to be moved away from this entwined loop to a more specialized process. The cumulative impact of this condition would add up and hobble the process. The question of 'authority' and 'power' has, therefore, become a strong condition for the implementation of Nepad.

6. 2. 8. 2 Recommendations

The authority-power relationship between the HSGIC, AU and Nepad needs to be clearly defined to facilitate decision-making, policy coherence, and streamlined functions before it can become more harmonious for the implementation process. It has already been recommended in the implementation mechanisms paragraph 6. 2. 7 that a specialised organ for Nepad should be established for the efficient administration, coordination, decision-making, and the matrix management of the implementation process. To this end:

- Nepad will have to enjoy independent authority and powers to initiate policies, take decisions, delegate functions, budget, organize, coordinate, staff, direct, and evaluate the entire implementation programmes as a specialised organ. This has to do with coherent articulation of the implementation policies, deal directly with the international donors, sub-regional economic groupings, and clientele without political interference. Nepad should be allowed to operate in a consociation paradigm.

6. 2. 9 The Clientelism Question

Clienteles are organically linked to development in contemporary development thoughts and practice, and more so in Africa. Development, in whatever context, takes place in organized human groups, that is, organizations, institutions, and societies that form the clientele base. Clienteles have interests and demands that are aligned in front of different principles, objectives, and aspirations. These objectives and aspirations are often times potentially contradictory and competitive from political, socio-economic interest groups and lobbies. The competing interest and aspirations in society are attainable through compromise, concessions, and consensus in order to translate the stakes adequately into sustained development parameters. Engagement of the sub-groups of the society in the activities of Nepad is the basis for social covenant, legitimacy, and provides an explicit rationale for true African ownership, which previously had not been adequately thought out and had not received deep consideration.

The people's contract is concerned with ensuring that development is people-driven and people-centred as the strategic approach in the implementation of development programmes, Nepad inclusive. The devolution and decentralization of policy delivery in a wider context from a single authority to multiple actors' arrangement has motivational and positive implications for the manner through which the clientele, authorities, and interest-holders objectives and demands could be comprehensively and systematically balanced. This involves policy choices for implementation. This requires the gathering of information on the policy goals and implementation. The rationale

is to learn from them the most effective means of implementing the programmes, exchange ideas, as well as to establish their priority areas rather than begin implementation with preconceived solutions.

The agenda of Nepad needs to be located within the public space to afford the opportunity to scrutinize and debate the context and modalities, suitable and tailored to the needs and aspirations of the African society, in general. What is critical is not the notional concept of the programmatic frameworks, but the measure of depth from which the clientele could claim true ownership, informed, and fully participate in the programmes. This condition bears a strategic alliance between the clientele and Nepad. It requires the aggregate functions of the implementers to relate to the grassroots and communities to extract how best the implementation in different areas could be tailored to meet their needs and aspirations.

The Nepad's objectives are matters for public debate and policy. The African civil society, the local NGOs, communities, and the grassroots organizations are the major economic, political, social, and cultural stakeholders in the Nepad programme. In other words, these sub-groups remain principally the political, socio-economic, cultural clientele of the African project of Nepad. The level of exchanges that flow from relationships between these groups and authorities determine the level of support derivable for public programmes.

6. 2. 9. 1 Implications

There are numerous claims that the clientele were neither consulted nor have participated in the policy processes that led to the evolution of Nepad, leaving the field to the Nepad-sceptics and cynics alike to regularly debate its viability. Ignorance of the African clientele on the programme and the inculcation of their expectations and priorities in the African project mis-match the principles of the UN MDGs, sustainable development, and the globalization process. In its most pervasive and entrenched forms, the non-participation of the clientele disaggregate the contemporary focus of the

critical importance of clienteles in policy-making processes, be it at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels for a widespread effect.

This situation gives primacy and monopoly of people-centred development to Nepad alone, which means development implementation done from preconceived solutions at Nepad's Secretariat. It would provoke determined resistance and apathy, near irrevocable resolve, which Nepad has to wrestle with in the near and distant future. It will increasingly create an opportunity for the clienteles to be easily swung away from, and could lead to estrangement in the Nepad's implementation programmes. The African clienteles could become antagonistic to the implementation process if they do not know anything about, and participate in the activities actively.

It elicits discrepancy and structural weakness to the operationalization of Nepad. To a reasonable extent, it could be argued that this is a reflection of alienation of the African clienteles, on the one hand, and the insulation of the elite, on the other, even before the implementation process begins in earnest. It reflects the view that the needs, values, priorities, participation, opinion, and contributions from the civil society are subsumed and subordinated rather prematurely. This remains problematic as well as prodigious as to how best the programme could secure far-reaching effects in the respective societies who are unaware of the action programmes so that they come out best against their initial state. The exclusion of the clienteles could undermine the very legitimacy of Nepad in terms of true African ownership. If the condition is dismissed, the implementation process could be in jeopardy.

The aspirations and the priorities of the clienteles are not in disjuncture with the objectives of the contemporary development phenomena. The political and socio-economic imperatives of the clientelist pressures from below hold out a radical potential impact to the Nepad implementation.

6. 2. 9. 2 Recommendations

The African clienteles have to be sensitised in order to create a deeper sense of the African ownership of the Nepad programme. The greater goals of Nepad would have to be communicated to the clienteles in a way that is understandable to all. Clienteles are trans-national, trans-institutional, and trans-organisational agents for development and economic integration in the continent. Given these contentions:

- Nepad needs to work toward the establishment of a strong role for the clienteles in participatory policy-making process and in the operational functions of the implementation process. Nepad has the responsibility to popularize its ideals through awareness programmes so as to be able to prosecute through consensual agreement the implementation process. This will have to focus on broad active participation, networking, collaboration, and coordination between Nepad and the sub-groups of the society for a broad based support. It will open up the space for engagement with the credible figures from the clienteles for the proper management of social tensions and misunderstanding whenever they arise during the different phases of the implementation process.
- Clienteles should be thought of as the galvanizing factors in a close conjunction for the implementation process. This is to reduce the monopoly of African development and integration processes and programmes from any group, so as not to serve any particular agenda and genus interest.
- For an effective implementation to be achieved, it is important that the process begins with a strong sense of African ownership and acceptance as an additional impetus to legitimization through the active participation and support of the African clienteles. Nepad should employ and deploy the information and communication technologies (ICT) to create and raise the awareness levels and contacts; communicate the policy goals to reduce group and sub-group biases and to influence behavioural patterns for the implementation process. The local representatives should be elected by the clienteles to make

them accountable while participating in Nepad's activities, to be able to expel them from power for any official acts of impropriety and make them decide policies in consultation and dialogue with the clientele.

- Most African nations are traditionally patriarchic with deep-seated prejudices and customary codes promulgated directly at women, and therefore women are not entitled to own land, properties and have no rights of inheritance. These laws are specifically targeted at women in a systematic and conscious approach to delineate women from active participation in the socio-economic development of their societies. These are policy inadequacies that lead to a massive insecurity and abuse. These scenarios have directly presented harsh policy implications to development in Africa. To be consistent, a social contract with the clientele must include measures to address deeply entrenched gender-based prejudices. Bringing women into a mutual policymaking interaction as proactive agent of change could strengthen developmental efforts. An expanded agenda of social contract that include regulatory instruments to address the systemic anti-social laws and policies prevalent in most African male-centric societies be established through Nepad. Women's individual rights are inalienable with property rights; to recognize that such rights provide structure for women's interpersonal interactions in society for socio-economic emancipation and political growth. Women constitute a large percentage of the African labour force, both in the rural and urban areas.

6. 3 Concluding Reflections

The chapter has argued that the main impulse of implementation of Nepad rest on the implementation analysis based on assumptions drawn from anticipation and identification of the underlying impact factors. The analysis has predicated the implications of the emerging conditions on the implementation process, on the one hand, and the possibility of harnessing them in policy consideration to enhance the implementation process, on the other. The Nepad agenda is inherently value-laden, but political, socio-

economic and leadership factors interact with each other as the driving forces, privileging them to an extent that is set to render the implementation empirically un-viable and cannot guarantee success. Recognising uncertainties imply that they will be encountered and managed through decision-making processes that should by extension implicate research findings.

This chapter has highlighted the implications of the emerging conditions as they may impact the implementation process of Nepad. It succinctly captures the dilemma of the implementation process. Nepad could move towards an unsustainable quality and recapitulate if the operators do not pay the deserved attention to the identified conditions.

The fortuitous evolution and the implementation process of Nepad *vis-à-vis* the programmatic frameworks compels locating Nepad within the context of some pre-existing regional development institutional programmes, typically the EU. This is necessary to allow for possible areas of interventions where applicable, in the wider set of decision criteria for the implementation. Therefore the dynamics of development management tailored towards uncertain local conditions is an essential part of the implementation design.

The implementation process of Nepad should be evolutionary and incremental. A series of stages must be in the planning, and managing the implementation process to ensure that uncertainties and contingencies are gradually reduced and built upon from new knowledge gained from research studies at each successive stages of implementation.

Chapter One of this study has elucidated the antecedents of the evolution of Nepad. Chapter Two has brought the concept into a systematically organized body of a scientific study, while Chapter Three has captured and related the social scientific theories and their relevance to scientific study to predicate the concept of Nepad and its implementation process as a social phenomenon that could be studied as a science. Chapter Four has brought in significant contexts of the development imperatives in the continent as the basis for the

emergence of Nepad in relation to the concept of the study. Chapter Five lays out the research findings contingent upon the emerging scenarios and conceptualises them as the emerging conditions that reserve the potential to scuttle or strengthen the implementation process of Nepad. Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, offers renderings and argumentations of the implications of the emerging conditions to the implementation process.

Although the emerging conditions that have mis-characterised the implementation process cannot by themselves guarantee fail-safe implementation of Nepad, they could however be considered as the basic prerequisites for envisioning the implementation process. By working through designs sequentially to reduce uncertainties and test concepts, implementation becomes instrument and the means of learning from doing. Indeed they could become training channels, which by themselves mean development for implementation of development initiatives. Given these perspectives, while looking into the future, it is therefore argued that, implementation process is never absolute, but variable, not constant, but adaptive. To preclude what is notably empirical is not a substance but the weakening of a process.

The operators of Nepad should ask the right and incisive questions on the pattern which the implementation process should go, given its objectives as the attainable end-points. If the operators of Nepad are sensitised to the underlying implementation problems, it could be possible for them to make early, meaningfully structured and constructive policy adjustments for the implementation process. Overly fast-tracking the implementation of the programmes would risk the possibility of a viable implementation process.

It should however be noted that the assumptions of the study based on the implementation analysis of the Nepad implementation process *vis-à-vis* the 'emerging conditions' may not be appropriate and explicit in all regional policy implementation environments. Weak or strong and successful or failed implementation, or even half implementation, it could be argued, is a function

of the environmental factors (political, socio-economic, cultural, and leadership) ensuing from multiple circumstances and levels.

The recommendations offer wide-ranging opportunities for the operators to adopt and apply a policy schema that will adequately position Nepad to respond to the research question, so as to keep pace alongside the contemporary global development evocations. Nonetheless, it is strongly emphasized that this study does not foreclose nor argue against further study on the implementation process of Nepad.

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