Chapter 5

The Analysis of the Research Findings in Synthesis with the Programmatic Frameworks of Nepad

5 Introduction

The emergence of Nepad has captured the moment and captures the time and, as a result, generated new controversies and debates. As the rhetoric deepens, the concerns of academics and policymakers have heightened. Naturally some searching questions have arisen. The questions have led to the search for appropriate models, focus on policy instruments, methodologies, and approaches for the implementation of Nepad. The programmatic frameworks of Nepad have put the implementation process on the spot for critical analyses.

For instance, Thabo Mbeki has acknowledged the critical importance of the implementation process when he declares that, ‘… Africa has to get rid of the notion that once a good resolution had been agreed, implementation would come automatically’ Mbeki, (2002:10). This observation by Mbeki, presupposes a problem definition of the implementation process. In other words, the causative process to achieve explicit policy outcomes is not sufficiently guaranteed. It has inadvertently invited the urgency for an investigation of the implementation process to establish the risk potentials of implicit externalities bearing on the implementation process, which is the object of study. Put differently, there are seemingly perceived labyrinth lacunae in the implementation process which ultimately emphasizes that Nepad is not as given and its implementation process is not on offer.

Implicit in Mbeki’s remark are critical assumptions which are more complex and crucial to the implementation process that require vigorous intellectual foci / empirical research study as a realistic option to isolate some of the underlying proximate and remote impact factors, essentially the
implementation-process-generated problems so as to render implementation of Nepad near implementable. Ronidelli has argued that, ‘… design concepts specifically formulated to deal with questions of risk and uncertainty can become important management tool’ (Ronidelli, 1979:22). Accordingly, Pretorius argues that, ‘… even well designed and widely acclaimed policies can, and often do, fail to produce the intended results’ (Pretorius, 2003:7).

5. 1. Policy Implementation Analysis and the Implementation Process of Nepad: The Strategic Nexus

The concept of this study is inspired by the policy implementation analysis principles, which emphasise the examination of the implementation process for some underlying impact factors to determine the ‘missing links’ while cautiously avoiding over-generalization and oversimplification. The analysis with regard to Nepad is a ‘gap analysis’ between plan and actual performance and how to bridge the gaps that have occurred. The essence is to discover the conditioning factors and to stimulate policy consideration against them in order to bring into fruition useful outcomes through policy action. The study argues that a comprehensive analysis on one hand is to seek out the implicit implementation problems that criss-cross the process and on the other a contingency approach that may favour adoption for the implementation process of Nepad.

The implementation process of Nepad seems to have been offered a high degree of predictability and certainty, shrugging off imminent challenges. Commonsense analysis dictates that keeping the implementation problems away from decision-making considerations critical for implementing the ideals would neither benefit the operators or the programme. What remains strategic to the process are anticipation, identification, articulation, and harmonization of the implicit impact factors, notably the ‘emerging conditions’, which in character may be disruptive to the overall implementation process, given that Nepad is a long-term development template for the continent.
The policy-analytic procedure of implementation provides information about the likelihood that the future intended policy actions would end up with certain intrinsic and extrinsic consequences that may be valuable or even invaluable. It presupposes forecasting future course of implementation, that is, to provide policy relevant knowledge that is, in principle about the state of events for a programme on the basis of complex interplay between impact factors and the implementation. This has explicitly drummed up the interrelationship between the implementation process of Nepad and policy implementation analysis.

The analysis of the implementation process of Nepad within the context of policy implementation becomes necessary. Two concepts, implementation analysis and implementation process, would be used to help in this direction. The first is what Honadle says it is, ‘implementation analysis, which is an investigation during design of factors that can affect the implementation process and can alter project impact’ (Honadle, 1979:6). The second is, ‘implementation process which covers capacity resources conversion in order to influence the translation of the policy goals into realistic and discernible end-results and behavioural adaptation’ (Ibid.:6).

However, it is of note that old answers, as a response to new questions, do not often create value, but risk. The objective of the policy implementation analysis is anything but subjective. Implementation analysis response to Nepad’s implementation process in this study, is aimed at the overall improvement of the process for useful policy outcomes. The analysis is focused on:

• The traceability of impact factors that may underlie the implementation of Nepad’s policy goals in order to strengthen its capacity for implementation and improve the quality of delivery.
• The critical implications of impact factors that should be articulated and harmonised in the implementation processes, the need to address these problems collectively in precise sequence.
• To uphold the set rules of the game.
There are however no set principles of a policy implementation process or for that matter, those of the implementation analysis. They are conjectural assumptions that are critically important to the analysis of the study. The analysis is, therefore not concerned with taking all the problem-issues in a particular order and examining them concurrently, but to opt for some that appear more critical to the implementation process. The emerging conditions assume similarities and are interrelated in character.

Conceptually, the emerging conditions have been identified as the political, socio-economic, and leadership fundamentals that constitute maximal requirements for the implementation process of Nepad based on a more pragmatic focus on the process. This implies that deep but open questioning approach has been maintained in the examination of the implementation process of Nepad, with the objective of learning, from doing. The pressure for visible, short-term success and the avoidance of implementation problems may produce tension that render such a perspective compelling.

Levitt has argued that, ‘policy analysis can, … contribute to … practical components of the policy system, provide some of the support now needed to enable the system to operate legitimately and acceptably’ (Levitt, 1980:15). This is true of the implementation analysis. Given this exposition, this study, having presumptuously conceptualized Nepad as an African regional public policy, focuses on the implementation process as part of a public policy process.

Policy implementation has been viewed by Honadle as a ‘process of converting resources (such as materials, technologies, and funds) into goods and services, which support behaviour changes in beneficiary groups’ (Honadle, 1979:6). This clearly elicits the parameter of policy implementation analysis, which according to Honadle has become one with decision-making and its use especially promising in development administration. It could be
interpreted to mean a retrospective, prospective, and integrated process of inquiry for solving policy implementation problems in policy (re)structuring to assist in forecasting, recommendation and monitoring.

The implementation process of Nepad is being examined to determine its viability or otherwise. The examination is to locate some potential impact factors which the emergence of Nepad, the dynamics of the global trends and couple with the internal exigencies in Africa have elicited. Some schools of thought have referred to them as ‘exogenous factors’, ‘process factors’, ‘externalities’, ‘contingencies’, and ‘complexities’.

Policy implementation is never an incident-free process. In the case of Nepad, a particular group of conditions have been identified through implementation analysis, in terms of their characteristics. These characteristics have political, socio-economic, leadership, and spatial dimensions; each reserves a potential that could negatively impact the process against the realization of the set goals. This suggests a significant disjuncture and gap in the interrelationships between the ‘process’ and the ‘substance’ in achieving the set goals.

Targeting these conditions for implementing the Nepad programmes would be a design strewn in the objectives of strengthening and affording the process additional impetus to achieve the desired outcomes. The support of this notion could be drawn from Kuye’s (2003) argument that, ‘…policy targeting has often been emphasized in poverty alleviation programs or projects. Not only is targeting widely recognized as a means for implementing policies, but also for ensuring an equitable distribution of projects such as infrastructure and the Nepad initiative’ (Kuye, 2003:2). Similarly, it could be argued that targeting implementation problems serves as the critical requirement and prerequisite in the design and redesigning of implementation process vis-à-vis Nepad as a strategic approach.

If the implementation process is unsuccessful or only half successful, it is purely dependent on undue attention accorded by policy operators to implicit impact factors overbearing on the implementation process. Implementation
analysis seeks to draw into context some of the impact factors with a view to enhance the process. In other words, it is about the regeneration of the implementation process with regard to rendering it incident-free for tangible outcomes. Implementation and operationalization of a regional development policy programme are not only about mobilizing resources, rhetoric, claims of ownership and programming, but equally important is the critical examination of the implementation process to be able to anticipate, identify, interpret, and articulate the externalities in relation to the implementation process. The fact is that the process of translating policy goals into credible policy outcome, especially the ultimate transformation of the African political economy by Nepad renders the state-centric paradigm and principles of policy analysis and policy implementation restrictive, in the strictest sense of policy implementation analysis.

The critical paradigm of policy implementation analysis is to draw from analyses evidence of implications or risk values, which impact factors ‘emerging conditions’, would constitute (impacts) and contribute (opportunities and prospects) to the implementation process, given the conceptual framework of the study. Montgomery has posited that, ‘Implementation analysis, in short, is itself an intellectual venture, requiring both subtle applications of social theory and the development of refined indicators of performance. Its practice is giving responsible operating officials a perspective that improves their capacity to learn from their own experience and to respond quickly to shortcomings in current procedures and activities’ (Montgomery, 1979:57).

To corroborate this viewpoint, Pretorius has posited that, ‘... A primary focus of the field is the identification and explanation of gaps between policies and their implementation’ (Pretorius, 2003:7). It would be of critical importance, in the context of the study, to add that anticipation of implementation problems is also a necessity in implementation analysis.

Understanding the policy implementation process through implementation analysis is both an art and a science. It is just what Thomas Dye says of
understanding public policy. According to Dye (1998), ‘understanding public policy is both an art and a craft. It is an art because it requires insight, creativity, and imagination in identifying societal problems and describing them, in devising public policies that might alleviate them, and then in finding out whether these policies end up making things better or worse. It is a craft because these tasks usually require some knowledge of economics, political science, public administration, sociology, law, and statistics’ (Dye, 1998:11). The elaboration of Dye’s extrapolations in relation to public policy is valid and grounded in policy implementation and implementation analysis tradition and relational to the Nepad’s implementation process.

Implementation analysis of Nepad, could be regarded as an art, a science as well as a craft. It is an art because it entails insight, creativity, and imagination in identifying impact problems, gaps, and contingencies that underlie implementation process and describing them, in devising ways that might alleviate the problems and in finding out whether the implementation process ends up making things better or worse. It is a craft because these tasks usually require some knowledge of economics, political science, public administration, sociology, law, and statistics. It is a science because implementation analysis could be studied under a systematically organized body of knowledge, tested, examined and proven with social science principles and postulations, from idealism to realism of social occurrence. Given these postulations, it could be argued that the study of the implementation process of Nepad could be predicated presumptuously within the art, craft, and science continuum.

The implementation process of the Nepad programme does not seem to command so much pre-eminence of a wide-range of issues, which are concomitant with the development foci of Nepad. According to Levitt, ‘It is reasonable to assume that the less this aspect of the policy process is left to chance, the less likely there are to be unforeseen difficulties in the implementation arising from the specific aspects’ (Levitt, 1980:160). Montgomery has equally argued that, ‘The greater the … constraints, the
greater is the need for designing policies that can be effectively implemented’ (Montgomery, 1979: 56).

Emerging conditions are externalities and or contingencies that are capable of impacting the implementation process of Nepad. They reserve the potential to infiltrate and alter the programme direction, boundaries, character and scope that can affect behaviour and the implementation process nearest the point of dysfunction. Some are interrelated and may cancel each other over time and therefore have no impact. The rationale for reasoning from what is prior, logical, and chronological, that is, a priori, has to be established to predicate a deeper context of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. This is due to the fact that it is not enough to know what the policy specificities are and what goes on in the policy process only, but how to bring them about efficiently successful with minimal impacts has to be paramount as part of the policy process.

It has increasingly become difficult to determine clearly what form policy implementation ought to take as well as attendant encumbrances in striving to attain self-set policy objectives. This is due to the fact that the strategic components that demonstrate effective implementation do not by themselves constitute and conduct implementation. Every implementation process is dependent on the ever-changing local environment and external conditions. Within this context, the implementation process needs to adopt a contingency approach, that is, being adaptive in response to the dictates of the internal and external dynamics. Save the congruent policy implementation theories are engaged as the foundational basis of analysis, right and effective implementation remains illusive, adversarial, and antithetical in a given circumstance.

The implementation process of Nepad should employ a more anticipatory stance. The nuances of policy implementation and implementation analysis should be understood and appreciated with regard to Nepad. This allows for the implementation process to be well adaptive in a modified form to fit the environmental dynamics. Central to this is the notion of what has emerged as
important conceptual factors in the build-up or the evolving implementation process.

For all the ideals of Nepad to be achieved, there is need for a catholic or holistic analysis of the implementation process with a view to reinforce the measures aimed at the implementation process. This will have to include:

- An encompassive framework, vision, problems definition, and approach for the actors and partners around common implementation objectives.
- Deeper focus on the implementation process to unlock delivery logjam and enhance outcomes.
- Addressing the consequences of political transition, the socioeconomic integration, and development.

The optimism generated by Nepad ought to draw caution in the implementation exercise. This caution has partially created a reminder of the failures of the previous decades when surrealistic performances as well as the misunderstanding of the gravity and underestimation of the many complex implementation problems confronting the development programmes were followed by various unrealistic promises. As Honadle has argued, ‘such experiences then dictate that serious attention be given to the gaps between plans and results; unless we can learn better how to do, we cannot benefit from knowing how to plan; unless we can implement what we design, we cannot have reasonable confidence in public policy’ (Honadle, 1979:3). This contention is all the same true of the Nepad programme, where it takes aim at African recovery programme.

The concept of Afro-centricity is equally critical and relevant in the implementation analysis of Nepad. The case for Afro-centricity has largely to do with the usage of home-based approach in addressing the implementation challenges confronting Nepad. It is to do with the points of departure and modes of relating. The basis of the concept has been premised by Reuel Khosa, where he argues that, ‘... Afro-centricity is about Africans putting Africa at the centre of their existence. ... In its theoretical aspect, it entails
interpretation and analysis from the perspective of African people … . In its practical implications, Afro-centricity entails authentic Africa-based behaviour in the sociocultural, economic, and political arena’ (Khoza, 1993:117). The Afro-centricity paradigm becomes an analytical imperative because the orthodox policy implementation theoretical models’ foci on conceptual, analytical and theoretical questions of policy implementation have on the occasion of Nepad’s implementation process neglected, the transference character of policy and implementation analyses to a higher realm, such as, a supra-national policy implementation domain.

In this study, it is clearly obvious that, the Afro-centricity paradigm, reserves integral role that need be replicated in the analysis of the implementation process of Nepad. The analysis need be interpreted in terms of what Africans themselves (at this instance, the author) understand(s) of it rather than how it is viewed and understood externally. Granovetter (1985) has argued that, ‘success in implementing projects will often require taking into account local idiosyncrasies or embeddedness’, quoted in Murrel, (2002:70). The implementation of Nepad elicits the need for an Afro-centric analytic approach as a phenomenon. In addition, it is valid to increasingly argue that, the process of translating policy goals of Nepad renders the conventional state-centric conceptions of policy and implementation analyses redundant, while seeking to draw a causal link between the state-centric and supra state-centric policy implementation domains with complex cross-cutting series of impact factors.

Central to this Chapter is the problematization of the implementation process through critical implementation analysis paradigm based on the programmatic frameworks of Nepad. The implementation analysis therefore seeks to extrapolate some impact factors that have been identified, which the study has conceptualized as ‘the emerging conditions’. These conditions would therefore be analysed in these perspectives with regard to the implementation process. They are drawn from a range of context to reflect key attributes of a greater extent.
5.1.2 The Context of Analysis and Synthesis for the Study

Analysis and synthesis are common concepts in any scientific research studies. Hamilton has argued that, ‘in the analytical process the thing to be explained is treated as a whole to be taken apart. In the synthesis process the thing to be explained is treated as a part of a containing whole. The former reduces the focus of the investigator; the latter expands it’ (Hamilton, 1997: 12). The two concepts therefore lend credence and coherence to a complex reality, which the study seeks to unravel. Susser has argued that, ‘... axiomatic assumptions of interdependency appears to be eminently reasonable, and it holds out the promise of effectively ordering research and categorizing findings’ (Susser, 1992:182).

Within the context of analysis and synthesis, Roux (2002) has argued that, ‘during policy analysis, it is not advisable that we use the retrospective or prospective approach, that is, the empirical or normative method of approach, alone. We should follow a more comprehensive or integrated method of approach. In this way, we can consolidate the advantages of both the empirical and the normative methods of approach to policy analysis. Finally the importance of both the factual and the value considerations of the community becomes evident, in order to come to a balanced conclusion after analysis’ (Roux, 2002:84/85). The contention by Roux is valid for implementation analysis, which is a sub-field of policy analysis.

The alignment of the concepts of the research findings and their analyses with the programmatic frameworks of Nepad need be seamlessly integrated to generate a cohesive contextual approach and logic value in the context of the argumentations in order to offer a significant coherence to the concept of the study. The research inquiry uses policy implementation analysis to establish first, the impact factors and their characteristics and second, the significant scope of their potential impacts on the implementation process of Nepad.
The underlying emphasis here is to set the assumptions and evidence in context and make the most of the linkages, that they shed more light on what may possibly take place both at the intermediate and long term stages of the implementation process. The argumentation is therefore cast on the critical analysis of the implementation process in order to unravel the impact factors vis-à-vis what are to be implemented and the scope at the implementation.

5.1.3 The Conceptual Synthesis of the two Concepts for the Implementation Analysis

The concept of implementation analysis in this study means very little if the fundamental elements, that is, the programmatic frameworks for implementation are in disjuncture in the analytic context of the research findings. However, the complementarity and convergence between the programmatic frameworks and the implementation process render it compelling to present the two in unison for a coherent analysis. This is based on the assumption that valid understanding can be gained through a synthesis of the two concepts in accumulated knowledge acquired first hand on the inherent or lingering impact factors that fester the process of achieving the aims and the objectives of the policy programme of Nepad.

However, it is to be emphasized that the programmatic framework of Nepad and implementation analysis though distinct overlap and mutually reinforce the argumentation of the study, that is, presenting some analytic lenses for examining implementation process dynamics to ultimately emphasis the very empirical need for realistic consideration of impact factors that may be deterministic in significant ways that would set the implementation process in an unplanned direction. When taken together, they illuminate the special focus that the concept of the study seeks to offer for deeper and cohesive analysis for policy considerations. This is because policy implementation is volatile, that is, every implementation process differs from one to the other, and so are the attendant implementation problems.
On this score, de Vos has argued that, ‘… the phenomenon that is investigated in social sciences are so enmeshed that a single approach most certainly cannot succeed … . It would therefore be futile to behave as though one approach should be fully accepted and another entirely rejected. By adopting the point of view of convergence and complementarity, we may eventually be in a position to understand more about … social reality’ (De Vos, 2002:364). This in essence refers to the intensification of analysis of conceptual assumptions and characterization of how one concept taps into another to forge greater consistency and coherence of new knowledge.

Central to the analysis is to characterize the implementation process of Nepad and determine the dynamics, synergy, and the conflict that it evokes. It is also to determine how they are likely to become manifest in the implementation process. This would afford the analysis unassailable logic, consistency, robustness, and rationale for the research findings without limiting the programmatic frameworks.

In order to examine the implementation process critically, it is essentially fundamental to highlight the context and character of the programmatic frameworks reflected in Nepad’s document of October 2001. The creation of Nepad had been more a matter of process and function (policy process) than just an evolution.

5. 2 Programmatic Frameworks of Nepad

Despite the current exhortatory on Nepad, its contemporary experiences remain largely enigmatic, thereby rendering Nepad agenda vague, suspect, and complicated specifically on the process to attain the programmatic frameworks sustainably. The programme of activities earmarked by Nepad broadly indicates the objectives and principles to move the continent to a competitive level through sustainable development. These programmes offer the template to attract a wide range of activities, interest, resources, and focus both from within and outside the continent. They form the bases for Africa’s development with a partnership character with the G8, in particular, and the
international community in general. They have been rapidly established and ingrained in the Nepad’s development agenda.

Accordingly, areas of action plans have been mapped out as strategies to embolden and secure the economic development of the continent. These areas of activity could be sub-divided into three planked agenda. The aggregate programmatic frameworks of Nepad are the essential objectives in which all other subgeneric action plans are encapsulated to advance Africa’s preparedness and generate the continent’s capacity for development in the new millennium and all deserving implementation perhaps simultaneously. They are (a) creating conditions for sustainable development; (b) sectoral priorities; and (c) resource mobilization. They have been referred to by Sako as Nepad’s core plan of action, viz:

- Democracy.
- Peace, security.
- Political governance.
- Science and Technology.
- Environment.
- Education – Agriculture.
- Resource mobilization.
- Human Resources.
- Infrastructure Development. (Sako, 2003:iii).

Ohiorhenuan (2002), has equally categorized them into Nepad’s strategic framework of five main elements:

- First is the insistence on African ownership, responsibility and leadership and the building of capacity to play this role.
- Second is the focus on developing a new partnership with the industrialized countries and multilateral organizations on the basis of mutual commitments and obligations.
- Third is the commitment to nurturing an enabling socio-political environment by minimizing conflict and promoting democracy and human rights.
Fourth is the commitment to enabling economic environment by ensuring macroeconomic stability and maintaining transparency and accountability in institutional support mechanisms for the market.

Fifth is promoting sub-regional and continental economic integration. (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:10).

5. 2.1 The Model of the Programatic Frameworks for Nepad


The compilation has divided programmatic frameworks into socio-economic and political dimensions. They deal essentially with the creation of conditions for sustainable development that highlights political conditions; sectoral priorities for social aspects; and mobilization of resources for economic dimensions.

It deals with the new character of global partnership for development, implementation of some programmes to be fast-tracked, the needs assessment, as well as management mechanisms. The study hopes to assess the implementation process of Nepad on these areas of activity based on a more detailed study required to draw and link these programmes of action with the contemporary dynamics in the socio-economic, political, and leadership trends in both the continent and the global community.
These are being viewed as ambitious, although they are not anachronistic to the globalization process, the sustainable development phenomenon, and the principles of the UN MDGs. In as much as the fundamentals of the programmatic frameworks are meant for Africa’s development, descriptive overviews are relevant.

5. 2.1.1 Creating Conditions for Sustainable Development


Nepad has slated peace and security as its action programme. This is with a view to create conditions of stability in the region to attract foreign direct investment and generate internal economic growth and development. Ohiorhenuan has argued that, ‘to a lesser extent, Nepad is also new in the extent to which it pays particular attention to conflict prevention and management’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:10). A commitment has also been made ‘that a rapid deployment force would be set up for peacekeeping missions. In addition, an early warning system and a peace and security council would be established to manage conflict’ (Munusamy, 2003:16).

The scourge of political instability has assumed unprecedented character and has been critical to the development of the continent. Africa has long been a place synonymous with political instability, where development factor relations remain largely uneven and at worst problematic. Nepad has therefore adopted a programme for good political governance to address the issue, through its policy instrument of African Peer Review Mechanism, (APRM) as a complementary agenda. Munusamy explains the concept of APRM as, ‘the system - which allows African states to appraise each other’s adherence to good political, economic and corporate governance’ (Munusamy, 2003:19). ‘It
also means constructive engagement and quiet diplomacy but emphatically not big-stick tactics such as sanctions or covert destabilisation’ (Africa Confidential, 2002:1).

The policy instrument of APRM broadly defines the objectives to ensure full participation of African states in the process as a responsibility to an act of good political governance. This is a formidable challenge, given the high level of political corruption, electoral impropriety, sovereignty propriety, monopoly of power, ethnic nationalism, limited transparency and lack of accountability in the conduct of governance within Africa. In corroboration of this contention, Lemaitre has argued that, ‘On the political level, the European messages on democracy, human rights, “good governance”, have always had a hard time getting through to the South of the Sahara’ (Lemaitre, 2001:125).

In other words, the messages on good political governance, respect for the basic human right principles of the citizens and credible democratic dispensations are often met with neglect and faced with denigration afterwards. Coupled with this, is the prevalent and consistent internal insecurity problems caused by political conflicts in all the sub-regions of the continent fuelled by intra-regional and domestic power struggles, policy of exclusion and the quest for territorial expansion. The frequent occurrence, the scale and nature of these factors underlie the political, socio-economic and leadership development imperatives in Africa.

5. 2.1.2 Sectoral Priorities

Sectoral Priorities is Item B of Nepad’s document of October 2001, subdivided into: B1 – Bridging the Infrastructure Gaps: (i) All infrastructure gaps; (ii) bridging the digital divide – investing in information and communications technologies; (iii) energy; (iv) transport; (v) water and sanitation; B2 – Human resources development Initiative, including Reversing the Brain Drain: (I) poverty reduction; (ii) bridging the education gap; (iii) reversing the brain drain; (iv) health. B3 – Agriculture; B4 - The environmental Initiative; B5 - Culture; B6 - Science and Technology Platforms. The sectoral priorities
framework is evidently what political malfeasance has imposed on the continent, and thereby creates development imperatives on the continent. The operationalization of the sectoral priorities is critically required as part of the effort to set the continent on the path to the globalization process as well as tackle the development imperatives. But the process to achieve efficiency and effectiveness in the sectoral priorities entails other kinds of implementation challenges and complexities.

5.2.1.3 Resource Mobilization

Resource Mobilization is the item C of the Nepad document of October 2001, divided into: C1 - Capital Flows Initiative, (i) increasing domestic resource mobilisation; (ii) debt relief; (iii) ODA reforms; and (iv) private capital flows. C2 – The market access Initiative: (i) diversification of production; (ii) Agriculture; (iii) mining; (iv) manufacturing; (v) tourism; (vi) services; (vii) promoting the private sector; (viii) promoting African Exports; and (ix) removal of non-tariff barriers. To attain these objectives would require addressing the economic dependency and diminutive markets of the African economies through structural restructuring and macro-economic policies and their reformations in order to reposition the economic imbalance and marginalization.

The global compact on the UN MDGs expressly include vital aspects of partnership for development and financing for development both of which offer elaborate frameworks for an extended concept of partnership, and significantly reflects the context of Nepad. To corroborate this view, Short has posited that, ‘… with a recognition that rich countries must take the lead as well as a commitment to national (including regulatory) and international action to encourage accountable and responsible corporate behaviour’ (Short 2002:6).

Furthermore he argues that, ‘… moving away from funding a proliferation of projects to backing poverty reduction strategies drawn up by developing countries themselves. This is the true meaning of partnership: developing
countries in the lead in developing their own poverty reduction strategies; development assistance from supporting these strategies in building national capacity rather than undermining it. It represents a new approach to development assistance – … to being part of the process of building modern, effective states and strengthening local communities in order to deliver long-term improvements in the lives of the poor’ (Short, 2002:6).

The vision that seemingly inspires this resource mobilization is clearly not only the urge to capacitate the implementation activities and service delivery but also seek to consolidate the human, political, and socio-economic development of the African society. This, however, assumes that a common understanding of partnership expansive model vis-à-vis regional development policy programme has to be well developed and articulated.

5. 2.1.4 The New Global Partnership

A New Global Partnership is item VI of the Nepad document of October 2001. It deals with the establishment of a New Relationship with Industrialized Countries - the G8, Multilateral Organizations, and the sub-regional economic groupings. These are concerned with and fit the classic context of international partnership for development that underpins the evolution of the programme, and underscores the orientation of development funding in the context of the UN.

The focus is to seek resource capacity from external sources in the first instance, particularly from the G8 nations, so as to be able to undertake a groundswell implementation of the policy goals, given the resource limitations both human and capital prevalent on the continent. In the broader view, it is also meant to generate local private capital flows in terms of savings and investment within and capital flight return to the continent. These set objectives require the post October 2001 declaration by the African leaders, that African society be made competitive and turned around for the challenges induced by the globalization process, UN MDGs, and sustainable development phenomena. The restructuring of African political economy is to
make it more relevant to the globalization experiences to maximize the attendant benefits for Africans and their societies.

5.2.1.5 Implementation and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development

Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development is listed as item VII of the Nepad document of October 2001, as part of the programmatic frameworks. It is inclusive of Projects divided into (i) Agriculture; (ii) promotion of the private sector; (iii) infrastructure and regional integration; Needs assessment; Management Mechanism of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development; Heads of State Implementation Committee. This is the critical aspect that draws the focus of the study among other areas of the programmatic frameworks already listed above.

The programmatic frameworks have reflected the international partnership for development and most importantly the implementation criteria – programmes (fast tracked); needs assessment; and the management mechanisms. As could be gleaned from the schematic model, the principles, the programmes for action, the implementation and management of the process have been reflected in a meaningful way. It fervidly emphasizes the concept of “we want to get there now” than the “how to get there” paradigm, thereby characterizes the implementation process an illusory mental image.

The implementation process of Nepad appears nebulous and deeply misleading for assuming coherence and substance instead of process. This is due to the absence of a consistent policy implementation analysis for new dynamics – emerging conditions. Focusing on the concept of ‘process’ offers the opportunity to probe the implementation process for and anticipate possible impact factors that may be underlying the implementation process.

The African development imperatives, which the programmatic frameworks of Nepad seek to address, have evoked uncertainty and render the process suspect. The impact factors, which are inherent in the implementation
process, are abjectly obscured in the Nepad document of October 2001 nor reflected in the Constitutive Act of the AU. This has remained the trend even in most literature and discourses on the concept of Nepad and has invariably created a gap and deficiency for the implementation process. Otherwise Nepad would tend to risk defining the problems it is meant to solve.

5.3 The Analysis of the Research Findings

A futuristic view of Nepad presupposes the existential undercurrents that may be bearing on the implementation process, so that if we lose sight of the process and if deep questions are not asked, a systematic analysis not conducted, we will never know what scale of threat they constitute to the implementation process in the long term. The contemporary literature on the concept of Nepad, the policy foci, and the Nepad document of October 2001 remain inexorably passive, un-enquiring, and thin on the inner recesses of the implementation process to make an anticipatory attempt at defining the implementation problems with complex variables, that may influence the operationalization of the policy goals.

At the same time, the literature, the progenitors and the policy operators of Nepad have clearly remained, if anything, largely descriptive of the breadth of the substance of the programmatic frameworks, the extent of which does not reflect the analytical depth of the implementation process. The analytical framework envisions the dialectics of the implementation process of Nepad as critical to the realization of the set objectives, with a view to determine possible impact factors that could negate the process, and if properly managed would enhance the implementation.

At present, the implementation process of Nepad is possibly a “top-down” approach. At the same time a “bottom-up” approach could occur; and at the end, there may be instances of a convergence of the two. This approach is a fitting end to the Advocacy Coalition Theoretical Framework. Keeping this in mind, the overview of the character and the environment in which
implementation takes place might be considered necessary under implementation analysis.

Nepad, based on the principles of the global development initiatives has engendered pressures on, and contradictions for the implementation process as well as pressures for possible adaptation. The analysis has revealed a number of new dynamics as emerging conditions that may impact on the implementation process. A number of these conditions are heterogeneous in scope, character, and context. The new dynamics which are veritable and imminent could be classified into political, socio-economic, and leadership relational equations. The study would therefore strive to identify them as follows: protocol of engagement; ascension of membership; the pooling of political sovereignties; political leadership capacities; the implementation mechanisms; authority of Nepad; clientelism; capital resources; and the issue of structural economic dependency. These conditions, though trans-generational and interwoven could possibly bear down different implementation problems.

Hence the action plans of Nepad are not fortuitous occurrences. The attainment therefore depends on how effective and functional the implementation process may turn out. In looking at the bigger picture of the implementation process in the intermediate and long-term contexts, the study seeks to highlight conjecturally the conditions that may negatively impact the implementation process at worse, and at best, ensure its sustainability.

5.3.1 Protocol of Engagement

This is being conceptualized as the formal set of rules of engagement agreed upon and entered into by the participating parties as the *modus operandi* and the criteria for the operationalization of Nepad. They include codifications of the procedural clauses, modes and principles of participation, membership, limitations, subsidiary matters, and authority with regard to the organization, cooperation, coordination, operationalization, partnership, and negotiations in the Nepad’s African project. In other words, to provide the legitimate basis of
engagement, given the character and concept of the programme, so as to provide assurances of varying degrees. They remain fundamental in the sense that development partnership at international context for regional development programmes evokes a new generation of commitments, ideas, values, objectives, as well as challenges from the evolving external and internal environmental dynamics. They could be interpreted in three basic dimensions: political, socio-economic, and legal. Protocol of engagement could be regarded as what Igue (2003) refers to as ‘Instrumentalization’ (Igue, 2003:43).

Politically, African states, international organizations, sub-regional economic groupings are in participation with Nepad. Protocol of engagement deals with what codes of political behaviour, policies, and attitudes that are universally acceptable in principle and serve as the code for guiding, organizing and coordinating the operations of Nepad.

Socio-economically, it explains the purpose of the partnership, the content of the programmatic frameworks, and social contracts between the active participants, stakeholders and actors. Legally, it is interpretive, to serve as the basis of recognition, obligations, acknowledgement, and commitment for actions and inactions, modes of participation, exit and entry procedures, and sanctions and privileges. Leftwich has argued that, ‘human societies cannot endure, prosper, or especially develop without broadly agreed and appropriate rules and convention governing the conduct of social, economic, and political affairs, and about how human and other resources are to be used and distributed’ (Leftwich, 2005:140).

Engagement and operations of international development partnership bears a unique departure from a donor aid paradigm. It requires multiple resource mobilization, negotiations, economic diplomacy, collaboration, consultation, institutions, political behaviours, cultural perceptions and strategies together in order to move vision to action, from ordinary concept to a base implementation. So far, there are protocols on the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Pan-African Parliament, for example, of the AU that have been
proposed to address continent-wide political insecurity and good governance respectively, which are yet to be fully acceded to by the AU member states. These symbolic protocols, which are to serve as the commitment of and deterrence to the members and condemnation of political instability, remain yet significantly rhetorical.

Within this context, Maxwell and Christiansen have posed two pertinent questions, ‘how strong should the partnership be, and with what degree of contractual backstopping? What mechanisms should be put in place to monitor the partnership and if necessary arbitrate between the partners? (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002:480/81). Colas posits that, ‘many bodies have worked at standard terms, clauses, and conditions in order to facilitate international transactions. The most widely used are those of the ICC, … which parties can make reference … . Being widely applied and uniformly interpreted, they can often reflect international … customary practices’ (Colas, 1994:386). Participation, operations, procedures, and full membership of any International, regional, and sub-regional policy programmes require actors’ agreements that are under ratification in recognition and commitment to the provisions guiding such programmes before ascension. A voluntary declaration in the nature of an international programme and non-ratification of its provisions among interested members seemingly create risk culture, risk value and less substance to such programmes, Nepad inclusive.

Protocol of Engagement is meant to serve as formal instruments with wide applicability and uniformly interpreted specifying the purposes and incorporating composite stakeholders’ visions, views, prospects, obligations, to allay misconceptions, generalizations, and misgivings in pursuit of the set policy goals. They could be categorized in three basic forms: application; content; and scope.

The application explains the distribution of programmes, the methodology, the beneficiaries, who receives preferential treatment, who qualifies as a partner both external and internal; what implementation mechanisms and statutory authority for purposes of actions or inactions; accountability and evaluation;
the asymmetrical or symmetrical regulations for the operation process; to establish regulatory structures and procedures. It is to play the role of the regulator; arbitration of disputes; to relate charter to the immediate environment and provisions for a review or amendment on incremental basis when it is expedient to do so.

On the content, the protocol specifies and elaborates the purpose, the standard requirements, and agenda items for operationalization and activities of the programme; how to serve and enhance the interest of the clientele, stakeholders, providers, and incentives. The viewpoint is to emphasis the use of the content region-wide and the limitations on the stakeholders, to provide a new environment to deal with the implementation strategies and the process factors in the immediate and long-term.

On the scope, the protocol determines from time to time the areas of operation, those to be involved, the application and the content. It also includes what programme to cover, the priorities, and the budgetary provisions. The staff strength and their extent of involvement are entailed in the scope. It is concerned with the entire clienteles and their stakes.

The ascended member states of Nepad have acquired set political, socio-economical, and cultural attributes and convictions diverse in character, and dominant in their agenda for action, through which they seek to serve those interests, values, and belief systems in order to extract from the system more equitable benefits and relations from Nepad. Nepad maintains, accedes, and shares not only authority but also policy objectives and goals with a range of non-state, interstate, sub-state, international actors, NGOs local and international, and other concerned international development programmes in a whole host of various settings and circumstances. Understanding these multiplicity of actors and their influence constitute complexities and externalities along with the political, socioeconomic and cultural imperatives in the continent.
In a regional development and integration agenda, Sciavone contends that, ‘as a rule, the constituent instruments … provide that the original signatories may become members upon ratification or acceptance of the instruments themselves, while other states may be admitted to membership by a special majority vote of the competent organs’ (Schiavone, 1997:4). Since legal rights and obligations are the same both for original and subsequent members, the distinction between the two categories is essentially of implementation value.

Similarly, Tromp has explained that, ‘it was further decided that each member state should have five staffers in Nepad and thereafter, depending on contributions, additional members of up to 13 for the highest paying members. This would mean that the wealthiest countries of the continent, South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, and Egypt, who already account for more than 40% of the AU’s income, would dominate Nepad representation’ (Tromp, 2003:5).

The protocol to guide the operations of Nepad in its relationships with the respective regional, sub-regional economic groupings in the continent, the international partners and actors (The G8, the UN, EU, OECD, and donor aid nations and organizations) have not been initiated besides adequate clarification and rationalization. These groupings remain critical in the realization of its vaunted policy goals vis-à-vis the implementation process. To further underscore the argument, it has been argued that, ‘this African-owned agenda that will only work if Africa and donor work simultaneously – is a formulation with plenty of scope for both sides to walk away, each blaming the other’ (Africa Confidential, 2003:3).

5. 3. 2 Accession of Membership

The issue of membership is a critical factor in a regional development initiative, Nepad inclusive. Using the EU context, Murrel has argued that, ‘A potential EU member is acquiring the Acquis Communitaires, the set of laws that must be adopted to qualify for membership’ (Murrel, 2002:79). Progressive transnationalization of the political and the socio-economic forces do not mean a movement towards supra-national authority, but adoption of
their obligations, regulatory, policy coordination, and investment of a great amount of resources and authority in the supra-national development programme. Cox and Furlong have argued that, ‘few political institutions can claim a history which pursues a straight line without pause, but that of the EC is more than usually littered with deviations and unscheduled halts’ (Cox & Furlong, 1992:3).

In the case of the Nepad, African member states of the AU have earned automatic membership. This clearly elicits a character of considerable complication and skepticism on the implementation process. Ohiorhenuan has argued that, ‘A certain tension arises from the fact that Nepad was initially envisaged as a club (membership of which had to be earned), but ended up as an inclusive association with membership deriving from the AU. The former appears to be preferred by many of Africa’s powerful external partners’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2003:6).

Makgotho has argued that, ‘it is imperative that the AU develop a clear set of principles of membership which would guide the organisation into admitting states into and excluding them from membership of the AU’ (Makgotho, 2002:7). This contention resonates implicitly in Nepad’s membership ascendancy scenario.

The contention has been furthered as Ohiorhenuan argued that, ‘Indeed, there are several references in the Nepad document to “participating countries” arising, perhaps, from an earlier perception of a “recovery plan” for Africa in which participation would be based on specific criteria’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:15). To corroborate this view Maxwell and Christiansen have argued that, ‘…more seriously, it will be difficult to involve all African countries in a partnership process, which emphasizes peace, security and political governance. Can Somalia be an automatic member of a new partnership? The Democratic Republic of Congo? Liberia? Zimbabwe? Even, on some accounts, Kenya?’ (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002:480/81). However, given the open membership criteria, all the African member states of the AU, inclusive of the failed and the failing states, have ascended the membership
of Nepad. Schiavone argues that, ‘the proliferation of independent sovereign countries and the resulting sharp increase in membership of intergovernmental organizations, are inevitably leading to the fragmentation of decision-making centres’ (Schiavone, 1997:2).

Subsidiarity and disproportionate power equation presuppose the anchoring of denationalization and renationalization of policies of the member states with retaining the tendency to de-emphasize the corporate significance of the programme. Maxwell and Christiansen have averred that, ‘partnership starts with a coalition of the willing, but explicitly sets to expand as fast as possible. Partnership principles would support this approach of starting small and growing. The fabric of sustainability has to be woven over time’ (Maxwell & Christiansen, 2002:482).

Given this contention, Sunmonu has argued that, ‘the European Union started the process some few decades ago with the Treaty of Rome; beginning with six members it expanded to nine, then to 12 and to 15 European countries. Within the next five years, the membership of the European Union might extend to 28 countries’ (Sunmonu, 2004:69). The EU typifies a classic example of a phased or incremental membership enlargement into a regional development programme and integration arrangement. It started out with six member states – France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, and the Netherlands, and has now enlarged into twenty-six European member states over the years. The membership enlargement of Nepad does not call to question the stakes and the exigencies of African development imperatives in the face of the globalization trends, the UN MDGs, sustainable development but essentially reflects greater policy-decision foci.

The pre-requisites and pre-qualifications criteria for membership of Nepad have yet to be set and met as a clear mandate for membership with respect to entry and exit criteria. Enlargement process as typified by the EU is cautiously incremental and staggered as it is progressive, which helps to control complex web of attendant implementation problems and challenges. For instance, Schiavone has explained that, ‘Greece joined the EU in 1981, followed by
Portugal and Spain in 1986’ (Schiavone, 1997:15). How could an implementation be meaningfully carried out at the stage where there is carte blanche membership in Nepad?

5.3.3 Pooling of Political Sovereignties

Closely linked to the ascension of membership is the pooling of political sovereignties into Nepad. The issue of sovereignty in the implementation process draws in complexities, controversies, and intricacies based on the grand vision of a continent-wide development agenda in the climate where there are urgent pressures of political instability, historical peculiarities, varied cultural values, ethnicity and racism, economic depression, and the continuing pattern of discrimination on the one hand and the general lack of compelling interest to respond to them on the other, in a programme that lacks protocols of engagement. There is a general absence of any regional criteria, synergies, and action plans for specified resources and programmes distribution, that is, the benefits to the stakeholders and internal contribution of resources for Nepad as well as who should be in or out in the membership configuration.

Similarly, every African nation assumes a sense and right of entitlement to its membership due to lack of clear-cut criteria for entry and exit, privileges and measures to enforce sanctions. Ohiorhenuan has argued that, ‘… most African leaders, however, there is a sense of entitlement to participate in Nepad as an African initiative, even as they are somewhat resentful of not themselves being in frontline. This entitlement claim propels the notion of an inclusive association’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:15).

For instance, the Peace and Security Council Protocol is yet to be ratified by many AU members who draw automatic membership of Nepad. Tromp has explained that, ‘as Africans try to bring peace to the beleaguered continent, many countries are dragging their feet in ratifying protocols, key among them the protocol for the ‘Peace and Security Council’ (PSC). … At present 15 countries have ratified the protocol, leaving it 12 short of a simple majority to bring the PSC into being’ (Tromp, 2003:7).
Nepad, presents the African nations and the sub-regional economic arrangements as a potential source of new resources and therefore everyone attempts to draw in as many advantages as presented. This could be generally referred to as a ‘hidden agenda’. They may strive to import to the new programme, a new character, focus, and context as they deem them, which is what Honadle, (1979) refer to as “mutation”.

Pooling of different political settings particularly in the African context could exert undue pressure on implementation process considering the nature of the African. For instance, it has been argued by Peterson that, ‘… implementation is based on political settings characterised by conflicting values, strategic bargaining, and efforts to advance set of interest’ (Peterson, 2001:xiii). Regional development programmes involve several approaches and stages of regional integration. Agubuzu has argued that, ‘economic integration, it is well known, can take various forms, depending on the degree of integration of the member countries. … each stage of integration has its distinguishing features’ (Agubuzu, 2004:199).

On the issue of individual member sovereignty vis-à-vis AU’s policy instrument, Tromp has reported that, ‘many countries are dragging their heels because they are concerned about how the PSC would impact on their national sovereignty’ (Tromp, 2003:13). On the same score, Herbert has explained that, ‘national sovereignty was deemed absolute and a state’s internal affairs off limits, even if those affairs involved instability, human rights abuses and failed economic policies’ (Herbert, 2003:22). In reference to the possible jostling for resources, controversies, contentions, and limited loyalty to Nepad, Mbeki had at one of the numerous Summits on AU and by extension Nepad, made an observation and urged his peers, as reported by Tromp ‘to place our individual national interests within the context of our continental and collective interests’ (Tromp, 2003:13).

Controversy is rife that the big five of Nepad exercise political hegemony over the small poor member countries, which may likely be interpreted as infringement on the sovereignties of the smaller members. Before
international law, the UN as well as the AU principles every nation state enjoys equality. Honadle (1979) have referred to this contention as “encapsulation”, a process whereby a more powerful entity surrounds and dominates a less powerful one. For instance the core group members of Nepad – Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa have been viewed critically in scholarships and by other African nations as the elitist club because a wide consultation with other African states was absent during the processes that resulted in the emergence of Nepad. Yet the sovereignties of the smaller and poorer member nations remain absolute at the international law. How does Nepad hope to proffer neutrality, among other things in the implementation of the mainstream programmes, distribution of values, social equity, distribution and allocation of resources and scare off group claims of sovereign state members? This could prove a sore point for the implementation process of Nepad.

5. 3. 4 African Political Leadership Question

As capital resource is a dire impediment to the actualization and operationalization of the Nepad’s programmes of action, so does the question of African political leaders. The political leaders question on the continent has manifested in multi-faceted perspectives from, territorial expansion, political corruption, electoral impropriety, monopoly of power, ethnocentricism, nepotism, mismanagement, incompetence, patchy policy process environments, to a narrow vision that leads to misplaced policy prioritizations.

The combination of these factors has constantly bedeviled and generated political tensions and remained a sticky source of instability which perpetuates economic stagnation and economic crisis, political and leadership crises and as a result, poverty and under development become clearly entrenched. The available lean resources are coveted and converted into the prosecution of these conflicts, examples include Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe, DRC, Somalia, Central African Republic, on the one hand, and Morocco - the Sarahawi Arab Republic boundary conflict, Ethiopia and Eritrea
border conflicts, and the Sudan genocide in Darfur, Burundi and Rwanda genocides, Nigeria and Cameroun Bakassi peninsular boundary dispute.

Some of these countries have been widely perceived as failed and failing states in Africa. Similarly most of these states appropriate national policy environment through the logic of monopoly of power and ultra-nationalism. The more immediate daunting task is the determination of taxes, immigration, visas, free movement of people policies on the continent. These are areas of exclusive preserve and responsibilities of sovereign states. The pooling of sovereignty, and an all-inclusive membership paradigm for Nepad may prove unrealistic for the implementation of Nepad.

A conglomeration of sovereign nation states is an option to the implementation of Nepad. As argued by Ignatius that, ‘Strong African states are needed not to stand athwart the tide of globalisation but to harness it in a democratic fashion for the social and economic benefits of their citizens’ (Ignatius, 2004:316). Accordingly, Onimode has contended quite persuasively that, ‘the lack of will and vision is one of the most serious weaknesses of the political leaderships in Africa – they are mostly neo-colonial and comprador elements with crippling loyalty to foreign masters’ (Onimode, 2004:20). In support of the argument Serageldine has averred that, ‘Strong effective and efficient governments are essential to development for they can create the requisite enabling environment that allows the private sector and civil society, policies, to flourish’ (Serageldine, 1994:V). Also Rondinelli has upheld this view. He has argued that, ‘…in explaining differences between successful venture and failures was the presence or absence of strong and persistent political leaderships … and higher level authorities’ (Rondinelli, 1979:47).

Mistry avers that, ‘sadly, even as a new century begins, Africa faces considerable difficulty making the transition from a failed statist paradigm to a market-based alternative. The main obstacles to progress are the vested interests that have profited from development failure. These mainly include Africa’s leaderships and the state apparatus’ (Mistry, 2000:557).
Nepad also has a peer review mechanism through which African governments will be able to evaluate each other's performances on good governance and policies. So far, ‘only 15 of the 53 members have signed up for peer review. They are especially skeptical about the ability of the Nepad’s APRM to improve standards of governance, especially in the face of those they diplomatically describe as the ‘egregious delinquents outside the process’ (African Confidential, 2002:3).

Still in support of the argument, Mbaku (1999) has argued that, ‘most states activities in Africa have involved primarily the management of crises in order to help the incumbent to (1) maintain a monopoly on power; (2) continue to control the allocation of resources; (3) plunder the economy for the benefit of the ruling coalition and its supporters; (4) appease competitive ethnic and social cleavages, in order to maintain a semblance of political stability and continue to attract foreign resources’ (Mbaku, 1999:298/99). In furtherance of the argument he declared that, ‘The state’s preoccupation with crises management has prevented it from serving as an engine of social, political, and economic transformation. In fact most post-independence African states have been so pre-occupied with survival that they have not been able to devote adequate effort to economic development and the elimination of mass poverty. In their efforts to monopolize power at all costs, many of the post-independent governments have actually exacerbated poverty and deprivation in their countries’ (Ibid.:298/99).

Vil-Nkomo has argued that, ‘the critical challenges which confront most middle developing countries … is how to create a development oriented leadership’ (Vil-Nkomo, 2002:295). Nepad so far has not clearly indicated its interventionist approach to the leadership crisis as an attempt that would assist the implementation of its African project.
5. 3. 5 Structural Economic Dependency

All forms of economic exploitation has dual connotations – external and internal strands. Africa’s development remains captive to the colonial linkages as a result of historically skewed economic arrangements, and the emergent indigenous bourgeoisies in both the political and the socio-economic spheres. This has created fault lines in African economic policy environments and the resultant aberrant behaviour towards development programmes. In other words, it has thrown up challenges and created disharmonization in respective African economies, given especially the structural adjustment programmes introduced by the IMF and the World Bank that created the debt overhang and precipitated the socio-economic and political crises, entrenched the asymmetric economic relations and an uneven development trends between the continent and the rest of the world. In corroboration of this contention, Maseti (2004) has implicated and explored the economic conditions in rather polysemous contexts, of three African countries, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania as typical case studies. He has explained that, ‘the post-colonial African states’ main challenge during the first decade of liberation was to make sure that the African masses were freed and truly liberated from all forms of economic exploitation’ (Maseti, 2004:2).

He argues that, ‘through the creation of indigenous national or patriotic bourgeoisie, … the African economies would be indigenised. This became the buzzword in the literature of the early sixties and seventies. …. At the center of the indigenisation strategy was the liberation of the African economies from foreign domination’ (Maseti, 2004:2).

At the post-independence era most African economies had been mortgaged to the colonial powers and the international capitalist systems. Masetti argues that, ‘The Kenyan government launched a scheme … known as Million Acre Settlement Scheme in January 1961. The British … got Kenyan leaders to agree that Africans pay the full market value of whatever European land was transferred to them. The indigenisation of the Kenyan economy became too costly for the state, whose material base was very narrow or almost non-
existent. Another problem was that the British determined the pace and content of the indigenisation policy. In order for the Kenyan government to finance this programme, it had to rely on foreign borrowings and loans. This situation exacerbated the debt burden of the state and recycled economic dependency. The British government took over the process and gave credit to the politically connected and already rich Africans’ (Maseti, 2004:2).

The situation in Nigeria was no different. For instance, Masetti has stated that, ‘In Nigeria, the indigenisation policy took off ... after the state enacted the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. The marginal sectors ... reserved exclusively for the Nigerians. The most vital sectors of the economy ... to aliens under certain conditions. ... 40 per cent ... total loans had to be made available to the Nigerian Businessmen. The irony was that ... only the most affluent Nigerians could afford to apply for loans. The indigenisation decree ... demarcated ... economic activities between the indigenous bourgeoisie and international capitalism, and diluted the potentially dangerous economic nationalism of the African bourgeoisie’ (Maseti, 2004:2).

The situation had remained the same in Tanzania. Again Masetti has contended that, ‘In Tanzania, the indigenisation strategy was fraught with a number of problems. The post-colonial state opted for the parastatal system to achieve the indigenisation of the economy. ... The problem started when Tanzania ... decided to nationalize foreign assets and had to pay for the acquisition of foreign equity as part of the settlement. This was indeed sad and painful as the state had to buy back its economy from international capital and had to rely more on foreign capital and expertise’ (Maseti, 2004:2).

Given these scenarios, which subsist, even to this day on the continent, it could be argued that, both the capitalist and the colonial systems, on the one hand, and the African emergent policymakers, on the other, took over the economies of the continent, as the situation became widespread. Maseti contends that, ‘There are a number of lessons that the people ... have learnt. They were wrong to assume that the African bourgeoisie would remain loyal to the strategic objectives of the national liberation movement and owe
allegiance to the rural peasants, urban poor and the working class. To put it crudely, there is no way that the African bourgeoisie would have committed class suicide and delinked from international capital after it mastered the art of wealth accumulation’ (Maseti, 2004:2).

To further corroborate the structural economic dependency contention, Mistry has argued that, ‘prior to independence Africa’s economies were geared to extraction. Their development did not aim at internal growth and self-reliance or at the creation of an indigenous industrial and technological base. At the time, most African countries were integrated with globally dispersed imperial economies – an arrangement partially maintained in francophone West Africa even after independence’ (Mistry, 2000:554).

Dependency theorists like Frank and So, (1969, 1984; So 1990) have argued that ‘… this form of economic modernisation is a power relation of capitalist financial centres over peripheral or semi-peripheral ones. These capitalist power relations organised the peripheral countries to produce commodities geared towards consumption at the centre. … the combined effect of each of these processes has been increases in poverty, unemployment, and national debts’, quoted in Rundell, (2004:659).

The structural economic dependency also played out significantly from the 1970s to the 1990s, in Africa, during the ideological patronage of the cold war era and the SAPs on the one hand, and the pressures from the Western bilateral and multilateral aid donor nations and organizations, on the other. The SAPs were regarded as the measures for economic reforms and prerequisites for international loans and aid funds – unique features of structural economic cooptation, exclusion and marginalization, which straddled both the public and the private sectors. Leftwich has noted that, ‘the aim of the adjustment was to shatter the dominant post-war, state development paradigm and overcome the market economies, supervised by minimal states’, quoted in Hoogvelt, (2001:181). The adjustment measures included currency devaluation, deregulation of prices and wages, reduction of public spending on social programmes and state bureaucracies, removal of
food subsidies, and others on basic necessities, trade liberalization, privatization of parastatal enterprises, and the expansion of the export sectors; the latter – in the case of agriculture – often at the expense of food production.

What have emerged from the case study analyses are therefore the continued economic dependency, under-development, and the consequent marginalization of the continent through the complicity of the local and international capitalist classes. These scenarios evidently subsist with palpable socio-economic implications even to this day in most Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone African states, and by extension Nepad.

The recent development in the action of the colonial powers, equally resonates the structural economic dependency contention. For instance, the Secretary of Finance of the British Government, which has created the Commission for Africa in February 2004, parallel to, and independent of Nepad, had undertaken in January 2005, official visitations to four African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa), all of which are members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Other non-members of the Commonwealth of Nations on the continent could draw negative connotations and sectional inferences from such an attempt, which may aggravate sentiments and further complicate the implementation process of Nepad. As it stands, it remains incongruous in the context of Africa’s development in the 21st century. This has raised highly disturbing question as to which of the two programmes is in, and which one is out, as they are both indicative of Africa’s development focus as well as international partnership for funding, political support, and a tacit acknowledgement of Africa’s development imperatives.

5.3.6 Financial Capital Resource Capacity

The limited and inadequate necessary resources and the collaterals to support the implementation of Nepad inform this standpoint. The very essence and context of Nepad has to do with funding the policy goals through a handsome financial support from the industrialized nations, the G8, to draw
capacity for implementation. An external capital flow of $64 billion is expected annually from external resources to aid the implementation of Nepad.

The request for capital resource of $64 billion from the G8 as the take off grant and as an annual remittance reinforces the structural dependency syndrome. As argued by Ohiorhenuan, ‘it is surprising that Nepad expects the bulk of its annual estimated $64 billion investment requirements to come from outside the continent. Unfortunately, it is this naïve optimism regarding the logic of capital flows that has pushed Nepad into a trajectory of extraversion’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:16). Where does this place the implementation agenda of the Nepad? The answer lies in the theory of the structural economic dependency of the post-colonial and post-millennium Africa as elicited in the Nepad’s resources mobilization strategy.

This condition has been supported by the argument postulated by Rundell (2004). He has argued that, ‘These scenarios entail that the appropriation of occidental institution patterns, ways of thinking and acting, and the human self image that accompanying these or for example of capitalist has never been immediate nor straight forward’ (Rundell, 2004:660). This situation has led to what Kuye (2003), refers to as ‘crisis of the developmental state in Africa’.

On this count, Munusamy has reported that, ‘Wade, for example, would prefer Nepad to place greater emphasis on African investment in Africa. His concerns related to the logic that whoever paid the piper called the tune – as things stood, the G8 could have a grip on the African agenda’ (Munusamy, 2003:16). As Makgotho puts it, ‘after all, it took the European Union more than five decades to achieve what the AU is planning to do in mere months’ (Makgotho, 2002:1).

Similarly, Ohiorhenuan, has argued that, ‘… Nepad’s resource mobilization strategy does not seem to have been based on historical reality or on a full apprehension of the dynamics of investment and growth. On capital flows, Nepad argues that:
To achieve the estimated 7 per cent annual growth rate needed to meet the IDGs... Africa needs to fill an annual resource gap of ... $64 billion ... the bulk of the needed resources will have to be obtained from outside the continent (para 147), [sic].

In the same vein he declares, ‘This claim about the source of developmental resources is not sustainable historically’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:16).

To demonstrate this critical condition, ‘the UN estimates that Africa needs up to $35-million a year to meet its millennium goals, aimed at halving world poverty by 2015’ (Unsworth, 2003:17). Ohiorhenuan argues that ‘Given its limited resources, but unequivocal place in the African Union (AU), Nepad should focus on becoming an agency of change and restraint. ... Then there is the question of Nepad’s grand ambition versus its weak capacities’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2003:6).

On the same question of capital resources, arguments could also be drawn from the AU’s paradigms, as explained by Munusamy that, ‘in a bid to rescue the continental body from its financial morass, it is to be proposed that membership fees of rich states be increased by 1% of the total AU budget, which is an [sic] estimated at $41-million. Member states were, until now, required to contribute what translates into 7.25% of the AU budget. ... the AU inherited debt of R42.4 million in outstanding membership contributions to the Organisation [sic] of African Union. ... the AU requires more fund for the running of the secretariat and eight commissions’ (Munusamy, 2003).

Against the background of capital resources, Munusamy (2003) has further explained that, ‘Mbeki proposed the establishment of an implementation arm for Nepad to ensure that capacity constraints don’t hamper the rolling out of funds. Although Mbeki did not broach the subject, some internal differences exist between the Nepad’s merchants’ Munusamy (2003).

In addition Wray has explained that, ‘money has been a problem since the AU’s predecessor the Organization of African Unity was founded in 1963. Currently the bulk of the organization’s income comes from member states.
But these are too low and are often neither paid at all or are paid late. …According to the funding report, the method of assessing and collecting members contributions should be revamped, budgeting improved and penalties for late payment charged’ (Wray, 2003:7).

Another standpoint on the issue of capital resource capacity has posited that ‘experts from South Africa’s Institute for Global Dialogue also sound warning notes about the organizational and financial capacity of most African governments to become the kind of active partners the Nepad formula conceives of them to be’ (African Continental, 2002:3). The lack of capital is not in itself capital to douse the economic realities of the continent to undertake the implementation of Nepad, so capital availability is a critical problem.

5. 3. 7 The Institutional Implementation Mechanisms of Nepad

Multi-tier and proliferated implementation structures have been instituted for the sole purposes of implementing the overarching policy goals of Nepad. These mechanisms are ordered hierarchically from the highest level of the Regional Organization, the Summit of the AU, the HSGIC, the Steering Committee, the Secretariat, the Task Teams, to the sub-committees. (source: compile by the author).

The AU Summit comprises all Heads of state and Governments on the continent. The HSGIC membership comprises the founder members (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) whose roles were critical in the conceptualization, formation, formulation, and eventual emergence of Nepad along with the sub-regional zoning memberships. Ohiorhenuan has explained that, ‘the HSGIC comprises 15 states (3 states per OAU region), including the 5 initiating states (i.e. South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal and Egypt). Currently the 15 states are: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, (representing North Africa), Nigeria, Senegal, Mali (representing West Africa), Cameroun, Gabon, Sao Tome & Principe (representing Central Africa), Ethiopia, Mauritius and Rwanda (representing East Africa), and South Africa, Botswana and
Mozambique (representing Southern Africa). It will meet three times a year and report annually to the OAU/AU Summit. Its mandate is to set policies, priorities and the Programme of Action’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:13).

He has also enumerated the structure of the implementation arrangement as having, ‘The Steering Committee is composed of two personal representatives of each of the five initiating Presidents, and one personal representative each of the 10 non-initiating members of the Implementation Committee. Its role is to develop terms of reference for identified programmes and projects and to oversee the Secretariat. It is also mandated to develop a strategic plan for marketing and communications at the national, sub-regional, continental and international levels’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:13).

Other institutional framework for the implementation of Nepad is as explained by Ohiorhenuan. He has stated that, ‘The Secretariat consists of a small core of full-time staff in South Africa. Its primary functions are liaison / co-ordination and administration / logistics. It is mandated to outsource work on technical detail to lead agencies and / or continental experts. Further, a number of Task Teams and Sub-Committees have been established. The Task Teams are to develop specific detailed implementable projects and programmes in the priority areas identified, and the Sub-Committees are to co-ordinate certain thematic initiatives. The Five Task Force Teams are: (1) Capacity building for peace and security with OAU as the lead agency; (2) Economic and corporate governance with ECA as the lead agency; (3) Infrastructure with ADB as the lead agency; (4) Central bank and financial standards with ADB as the lead agency; (5) Agriculture and market access with OAU as the lead agency’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:13).

Ohiorhenuan further explains that, the implementation arrangement also comprised of; ‘The five Sub-Committees are (1) Peace, Security, Democracy and Political Governance co-ordinated by South Africa; (2) Economic and Corporate Governance / Banking and Financial Standards / Capital Flows co-ordinated by Nigeria; (3) Market Access and Agriculture co-ordinated by Egypt; (4) Human Resources Development co-ordinated by Algeria; and (5)
Infrastructure co-ordinated by Senegal. The AU Chair and Secretary General are ex-officio members of the Implementation Committee, and the AU Secretariat participates in Steering Committee Meetings’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:13/14).

These implementation mechanisms are purportedly configured to fit the overarching policy programmes of Nepad, so as to offer universal coverage on the wide-ranging items and any identified programme. They are so specified, in order to fast track in some cases the implementation of some of the prioritized sectors, such as communications, HIV/AIDS, communicable diseases, and debt reduction consultations. The emphasis that continues without abating is what has come to be the catch phrase of the initiators and promoters of the programme, ‘concrete implementation programmes’, at all levels of the policy programmes. The desired outcome is to establish the potential role of each mechanism in the implementation of the commitments of Nepad for Africa’s development.

The legitimacy of these mechanisms for existence and actions prevail within the context of Nepad. The distinction between them seem to be blurred by the existence of bodies and initiatives which are intermediate in their independence, for example, APRM Initiative, the quagos, and the concurrent quangocracies.

Sullivan and Harper (1996) once stated that, ‘if an organisation is to strive towards the achievement of set objectives, the possibility lies in breaking down outmoded structures and creating an organisation that can thrive in tomorrow’s uncertainty …’. (Sullivan & Harper, 1996:84), quoted in Kuye (2003:3). Guess and Farnham have posited that ‘policies and executing institutions have a symbiotic relationship: the system created by policies becomes the institution that then implements the policies’ (Guess & Farnham, 2000:14). In corroboration of this perspective, Montgomery has argued that, ‘the procedures to be followed by this exotic being were ordained as well: he was to define the problem, develop alternative solutions for it, appraise their
costs, risks, and probable outcome, and choose the one that conferred the greatest benefits in terms of his multiple mission’ (Montgomery, 1979:55).

Questions have been asked as to why this overcrowded and costly laissez-faire implementation structures for Nepad, given their composition and the economic conditions of both Nepad and the AU? How will this measure helpfully draw value, efficacy, and effectiveness for the implementation process of Nepad? Perhaps Levitt’s question is weighty and equally pertinent here. He asks, ‘what is the relevance of the hierarchical relationships between organizations involved in implementation?’ (Levitt, 1980:16). There are no indications of who is the reference point with the authority this confers to determine what implementation approach is to be adopted? Who has the proclivity of know-how and doctrinal inspiration and culture to mobilize stakeholders, the African civil society and the partners and even generate the needed capital resources?

In a functional context, Guess and Farnham have argued that, ‘for effective policy implementation, institutions must generate process, and transmit useful information to managers responsible for delivery. Systems of budget allocation and allotment, personnel administration, operations and maintenance, planning, programme evaluation, cost and managerial accounting, payments to vendors, and cash management must all function as an integrated unit. Accurate and useful information must be available in a timely fashion’ (Guess & Farnham, 2000:16).

On the structural context, they argue that, ‘… the structural issues include whether delivery should be carried out on contractual methods to vendors with the relevant agency monitoring and regulating or through the implementation organs that are involved in the policy programme, as they are the ones who set the standards, rules, coordinates implementation activities. Management issues are also a problem of the structural context’ (Guess & Farnham, 2000:17). They further argue that, ‘it may be evident that structural features will doom the policy failure unless institutional constraints are considered beforehand’ (Ibid.:17). Sako has posited that, ‘… it is important to bear in mind
that regulatory institutions can easily become sources of red tape and economic inefficiency’ (Sako, 2003:4). Furthermore, Rodrik (1996) has argued that, ‘bureaucracies are prone to two problems that are fatal to economic performance: they can be captured by the interests they are supposed to regulate, and they can create extreme red tape, which discourages economic activity’, quoted in Sako (2003:5).

5. 3. 8 The Authority Question of Nepad, HSGIC, and the AU

The issue of authority in the Nepad configuration is critical and fundamental yet it is steeped in ambiguity and complexity. It is closely linked to the implementation mechanisms of Nepad. The question of authority between Nepad, the AU, and the HSGIC has evoked much hype that has fraught Nepad with objectively rife controversy and has come to dog the programme. It is yet unclear whether or not Nepad is substantively a parallel regional development programme or under the auspices of the AU. For instance, there are overlapping roles reflected in the Constitutive Act, Articles 3(c), (e), and (i), of the AU which correspondingly deal with the action plans and policy objectives of Nepad reflected in the creation of the conditions for sustainable development subdivided into (i) peace and security; (ii) democracy and political governance initiative, yet Nepad has been conveniently excluded in the Articles of both the Constitutive Acts of the AU and the 1991 Abuja Treaty which established the African Economic Community [AEC].

While the logic and the underlying context of Nepad are clear, the translation into effect of its programmatic frameworks is less so. The concept itself is problematic, shifting as it does between initiative, programme, idea, and project. Ohiorhenuan, has argued that, ‘the question of authority, is perhaps, the fundamental challenge of Nepad. Nepad emerged as a proposal of a few African Heads of state. While it was approved by the OAU, its status is still not clear. It is referred to in various documents as an “initiative” of the OAU, a “project” of the OAU or “the implementation mechanism” for the AU’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:12).
In furtherance of his contentions, Ohiorhenuan has explained that, ‘At the April 2002 meeting of the Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria, Nepad was declared a “mandated initiative” of the African Union. This clearly suggests its subsidiary relationship to the AU. But, by urging greater co-operation and co-ordination between the AU and Nepad Secretariats, the meeting implied a somewhat more co-equal relationship. With such ambiguity of institutional form, Nepad can hardly become the “veritable mechanism for the reconstruction of Africa” that its champions want it to be’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:15). This contention reflects a critical dimension with regard to the implementation process because it is through a substantive arrogation of specific authority that Nepad could derive legitimate authority and exercise full implementation to serve as a veritable template for the Africa project. Who deals with what, when, and how assist to mobilize for implementation, that is, authoritative allocation of values and resources.

It has been argued whether, ‘… Nepad is the “socio-economic programme” of the AU, or whether it includes a political element …’ (Institute for Strategic Studies Conference Report, 2003:3). It remains unclear if AU or Nepad retains the exclusivity in certain areas of function and their justificiability to do so. As argued by Ohiorhenuan, ‘this roadmap does not deal, however, with how specific responsibilities are assigned; how the multitude of agents will be co-ordinated; who the approving agent(s) is/are, and indeed, with what specific authority Nepad’s activities are being undertaken’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:16).

Similarly, the APRM Initiative reflects this contention. This appears simultaneously conflicting in duplication of functions and responsibilities between both bodies, which are ambiguous in institutional functions. Within the same context, Makgotho has averred that, ‘… there was still considerable confusion about the relationship between the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad) and the AU. Is Nepad a programme of the AU? If the former, why are the AU Commission and Nepad Secretariat not integrated? If the latter, we risk the prospect of costly duplication’ (Makgotho, 2002:1).
Herbert observes that, ‘lack of priorities is another weakness. … Nepad must choose between competing priorities’ (Herbert, 2003:22). He further argues that, ‘… failure to meet the plain-English test dooms Nepad to a kind of limbo in which it cannot truly claim credit for anything because it has never been clear about who specifically would deliver on its grand aims’ (Ibid.:27). The non-delineation of clear-cut authority between Nepad and the AU has run Nepad into a paradigmatic arguments, suspect, and sceptical perceptions persist and the implementation even more so.

5. 3. 9 The Clientelism Question

This has to do with strategic alliance between Nepad and the African clienteles in the continent. The clienteles are reportedly the target groups for Africa’s development and the focus of economic growth. It has been argued that the relationship and contact between the clienteles and the Implementers of Nepad is abject and barely existent as it is un-constructive in terms of organization, role, composition, communication, dialogue, and information. It has also been emphasized that Nepad operates within personalized context and it is elitist in scope. As expressed in a Conference Report, ‘people have to know and understand the concept of Nepad, in order to have ownership of it. … Nepad seemed to involve only a few driving personalities…’ (Institute for Strategic Studies, Conference Report, 2002:5).

It has been premised that the clienteles in Africa are unaware of the prospects, the concept, and the context of Nepad because they have not been popularized and the participation of the clienteles presumed insignificant. If anything, Nepad seemingly appears as an exclusive club involving only the African leadership whose primary preoccupation is to maintain the status quo. This infers that communication gap has been consciously created by lack of consultation and engagement with the African clienteles (the local NGOs, the civil society, trade unions) to mobilize support, and derive ownership and credibility. As argued by Makgotho, ‘After all, African Union is not the possession of Africa’s Heads of State and Government, but the property of all Africa’s 800 million inhabitants’
(Makgotho, 2002:1). Makgotho’s contention is true of the African clienteles and Nepad relationship.

On the question of clientelism, Pott’s argument has significant relevance. He argues that, ‘Vibrant democratic institutions depend upon the consent and support of the governed’ (Potts, 1998:86). To corroborate this contention, Kankwenda has averred that, ‘… the enlargement of the social base of development signifies, on one hand, that relationships of surplus exchange are established between the different components of the population through the economic and social sectors that they represent. And on the other hand, it signifies that the people participate fully in the development process in its political, economic and social dimensions’ (Kankwenda, 2004:17). Herbert has argued that ‘without widespread participation and public pressures in supports of reform, Nepad will achieve little …’ (Herbert, 2004:26).

In the same context, Rondinelli has argued that, ‘Moreover, organizational relationships that insure beneficiary participation in project decisions can help create the condition necessary for the resource-to-services and the service-to-behaviour linkages. Therefore local organizations are mechanisms for both identifying and managing critical contingencies. In fact they can help to minimize communication gaps that obstruct the implementation process while helping to assure that desirable results will emerge from that process’ (Rondinelli, 1979:16).

On this score, Ohiorhenuan has argued that, ‘… the strength of civil society lies in holding governments and the establishment accountable in their promises to the people they govern. … Nepad’s focus on African ownership is constantly reaffirmed by its leadership. Africa’s external partners have unequivocally embraced the idea that Africa’s destiny lies in its own hands’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2003:6).
5.4 Concluding Reflections

The chapter has drawn a convergence between the programmatic frameworks with the implementation process in a bid to forge inherent consistency and objectify the concept of the study. The need for improved causal relationship between the ‘process’ and the ‘substance’ is vital and critical with regard to policy implementation of Nepad. The critical issues arising from this is that ‘emerging conditions’ bear causal relationship to the implementation process of Nepad. The critical standpoint is that, policy implementation cannot be successful with inadequate attention given to implementation process analysis to target impact factors, (contingencies). The impact factors bearing on the implementation process have been examined and highlighted.

Nepad takes aim at African recovery in a range of policy goals for development and economic integration, that is, political and corporate governance, socio-economic growth through creation and redistribution of wealth and factors of production; eradication of poverty; and the revamping of economies in the continent. But a conscious attempt to seek and describe more fully, the process on question with regard to impact factors, which may not have received the necessary analysis and readily appreciated in various respect by the Nepad’s progenitors and implementers have been elucidated. Recognising implementation problems implies that they will be encountered. But they could be managed through decision-making process that should by extension include research findings. This chapter has therefore tried to link concepts to cases with strict and direct implications.