Chapter 1

1 General Introduction

The African continent has witnessed many tragic historical peculiarities starting from the advent of colonialism up to the present day. From the attainment of independence in the early 1960s, most African nations inherited colonial political and socioeconomic institutional legacies through which national development processes were pursued. In the post-colonial period, these institutions have been used by the emergent African elite not only to subvert development efforts, but also had become deeply subservient to the external economic shocks, dependent and vulnerable to foreign interferences. Essentially they served the political needs of both the colonial powers and the emergent African elite. As a consequence debates and schisms began to develop on what African development perspectives should be and imply, as the problems of capacity both human and financial erupted. The continent increasingly faced debilitating and severe economic depression, perpetual political crises, social fragmentation and patchy policy environments in almost all facets of life.

Rather than transform the primitive subsistence that has pervaded the continent, proliferation of internecine wars, ethnocentrisms, corruption, diseases, poverty, dictatorial authoritarian styles of governance became the norm. In the mid 1980s the continent was entangled in foreign debt. These incidences have essentially become the scourge of the continent as the pattern continued well into the late 1990s. The nature of these incidences created huge capacity constraints resulting in multiple apathies to development on the continent. It became obvious that development policies of the continent had run into paradigmatic crises and rendered attempts at development problematic. As a result of the continued development dilemma and the adoption of patchy policy models, the continent began to face marginalisation and isolation in the emerging global political and economic systems.
At the end of the Cold War, development initiatives increasingly received international attention. In order to not remain passive, homegrown initiatives to foster development began to evolve, given the persistent development difficulties that have immersed the continent. What ultimately emerged from the plethora of indigenous resourcefulness is the Nepad.

Nepad has produced vitally important sector-specific policy goals as action plans set for implementation. The process through which the policy goals are to be achieved is equally critical but has been subsumed in the current debate and in the implementation domain of Nepad. Yet, the defining moment of any public policy is the implementation process. However, it is of note that, no policy implementation process, and for that matter, development policy programme, are without incidents. The implementation processes are constantly afflicted with complexities and sometimes unique unanticipated contingencies. Major impediments to implementation have always been the deliberate neglect and absence of considerations for peculiar contingencies that underlie the processes.

As Nepad enters its implementation phase, it appears dismissive, indifferent, and underestimates the implicit contingencies underlying its implementation process. In other words, consequential variables that create perceived vacuums have been omitted from the agenda. Examination of the implementation process will create a deeper understanding and highlights the peculiar impact factors that underlie the course of implementation. This is not only ascribable to and a signification of the relevance of policy and implementation analyses but also strategic approaches in policy processes. This study brings fresh perspectives in an attempt to fill the gaps.

This study also seeks to undertake comparative analyses of the precursory regional development policy initiatives, especially the European Union’s [EU’s] implementation configuration, where applicable, as parameters in the implementation process of Nepad. This is informed by the fact that Nepad, a new
African regional development and economic integration policy programme is not only new but has evolved in the character common to other regional development trends. Conjectural and prognostic propositions as well as recommendations based on the object of study are proffered.

1.1 Historical Background of Nepad

Indigenous development initiatives, it could be argued, had irrupted in the continent at the dawn of the new century. The concepts that enjoyed currency the world over, at the time, had been the globalization process, the sustainable development phenomenon, and the UN MDGs, which immediately emerged from the ashes of the bi-polar world. Expectedly, these concepts took centrality in the highly mainstream socio-economic and political discourses in the continent for the new millennium. Circumstances both internal and external, it could be argued, have significantly contributed to the concepts of the indigenous development initiatives in Africa, particularly the Nepad programme. Amongst the numerous internal factors are:

- The concept of African Renaissance re-introduced by Thabo Mbeki, which led to MAP.
- The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s (UNECA’s) Compact Plan.
- The Omega Plan of Abdoulaye Wade.
- The unfolding fissures between the ruled and the rulers in Africa.

Amongst the various external elements are:

- The collapse of the bi-polar world.
- The evolution and the resultant fervency of the globalization process.
- The evolution of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of the General Assembly Resolution 55 /2.
- The dwindling fortunes of the donor aid-for-development.
It could be argued that the convergence and complementarities between these factors, old and new, potential and actual, led to the promulgation of patterned indigenous initiatives that emerged on the continent at the time. Accordingly it has been declared that, ‘Nepad’s origins lie both in past and recent global and regional events’ (Bekoe & Landsberg, 2002:5). These concepts were supposedly drawn from the need for common action, shared historical ties, shared conviction of the eradication of poverty, capacity building, and the allure of proactive participation and relevance in the emerging globalisation process.

The United Nations (UN) accorded these phenomena strategic prominence when it convened the MDGs summit at its Headquarters in New York, USA, for all Heads of state and governments in 2000. These concepts resonated pragmatically throughout the continent as the contemporary African leadership took a cue and proclaimed the new millenium an ‘African Century’ (Fourie, & Vickers, 2003:11). This presupposes that the continent has to seek a homegrown initiative with a partnership characterization as a legitimate aspiration to foster continent-wide development.

The concept of homegrown development initiatives, it could be argued, began in the late 1990s with the speech made by the then Vice-President and now President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. More has argued that, ‘Mbeki had made a speech in which he made I am an African declaration in Parliament on 8th May 1996. Before this speech, Mbeki with a considerable personal initiative had come up with a concept of African Renaissance in 1997, in an address at the United States Corporation Council on Africa. Since then the concept of the “African renaissance” has captured the imaginations of South Africa in particular and the African continent in general’ (More, 2002:62).

African Renaissance as a factor that contributed to the emergence of Nepad, More argues that, ‘Mbeki’s doctrine was a clear interpretation of the enduring conditions that afflict the continent, given the political and the socio-economic
exigencies of the era’ (More, 2002:61). More also argues that, ‘in defense of the librating [sic] interpretation, an attempt is made to show, contra current views, that this interpretation is not conservative, nativist or essentialist but in line with Aime Cesaire’s *Return to the Native Land* and Amilca Cabral’s *Return to the Source* projects, it is directed at reconstructing and rehabilitating the African while forging an identity thought to be appropriate to the exigencies of ‘modern’ existence’ (More, 2002:61).

Furthermore, More has posited that, ‘the consequences of this not so novel concept, had been several meetings, major conferences, newspaper debates, publications in academic journals, the establishment of a trust fund to encourage the renaissance spirit to flourish and lately, a volume from the conference proceedings with the title: *African Renaissance: The New Struggle* (1999)’ (Ibid.: 62). He argues that, Mbeki by this very concept had called for African regeneration’ (Ibid.: 62). Similarly, Melber, *et al.* have argued that, ‘the concept of “African Renaissance” may have originated to some extent from the philosophical discourses that became dominant in the mid twentieth century on Pan-Africanism, Negritude, Ubuntu, and Black consciousness’ (Melber,*et al.*, 2002:6). They maintain that, ‘while the concept failed to materialize as a fully fledged and concise new paradigm, it managed to rally policy-makers, bureaucrats, academia, and intellectuals alike behind the not so new but still highly emotional and culturally, psychologically and politically relevant notion of African self-respect, dignity and pride based on previous achievements’ (Ibid.:6)

African Renaissance as conceptualized by Mbeki was envisaged, as an attempt to regenerate and reinvigorate dimensions of new consciousness that required deeper conceptualization *vis-à-vis* Africa’s developmental needs at the face of globalization. As Melber *et al.* put it, ‘the African Renaissance project contributed in … important way to the revitalization of values considered and appreciated as both genuinely African and human (in the sense of “civilized” as opposed to the derogatory views of “primitive”). It failed (or maybe was never intended) to
establish a political concept and instrumental strategy in applied policy matters, but it managed to consolidate a philosophical foundation' (Melber et al., 2002:6).

African Renaissance, Negritude, Ubuntu, Pan-Africanism concepts had found expressions in the African political lexicon as conscious indigenous political ideological philosophies in the struggle for de-colonization and self-determination. They were oriented as challenges to the imposition of the colonial cultural and spiritual value on the African peoples and their communities. To further this view, Nabudere has argued that, ‘the concept is a useful tool in the struggle of the African people to redefine a new political and ideological agenda of Pan-Africanism in the age of globalization’ (Nabudere, 2001:11).

At this time, the concept was not indiscernible but had found deep meaning in the African continued underdevelopment discourses vis-à-vis the modern day determination for the continent’s economic emancipation and development. It had thereon assumed a new interpretation and a different paradigm. It acquired fresh focus with a view to Africa’s development. It was a vision waiting to happen and perhaps late in coming.

The concept of African Renaissance witnessed a gradual transformation from the political inclinations of the pre-and post-independence era to that which became dominant in the contemporary socio-economic development policy domains on the continent. Its major publicity took an international turn at the World Economic Forum briefing by Mbeki in Davos, Switzerland in June 2001 on the Millennium Africa Renaissance Programme [MAP]. Melber et al have posited that ‘At the World Economic Forum in Davos, MAP won the support of other African leaders including Obasanjo and Bouteflika of Nigeria and Algeria respectively who in turn became the promoters of the initiative’ (Melber et al., 2000:7).

On the MAP agenda presented by Mbeki in Davos, Melber et al have averred that, ‘the declaration in Davos noted, among other things, that the initiative was a
declaration of a firm commitment by African leaders to take the destiny of Africa in their hands by claiming ownership and responsibility for sustainable economic development of the continent on the principle of reciprocity and equal partnership with the international community’ (Melber et al., 2002:7). Olivier affirms that ‘Mbeki’s doctrine led to the emergence of MAP stating African Renaissance has recently been augmented by a less amorphous MAP, jointly sponsored by South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria and with the input of Senegal and other states’ (Olivier, 2001:43).

Another important event that led to the origin of Nepad is the globalization phenomenon, a concept that has universal appeal. It has been viewed as a credible substitute to the ideological grandstanding of the cold war era between the East and the West. It is a concept that has come to deal with the global political, the socioeconomic, and leadership fundamentals. The political context emphasizes democracy, broad participation in decision making processes, and good governance, while the economic context addresses corporate governance, integration of world economy, new market trends, and their global relations across national boundaries and on the social sphere, the spread of efficient information and communication technologies to complement the world economic activities. According to Bayart in his African regional study, ‘globalization is a process, which is situated at the interface between international or trans-national relations and the internal processes of political societies’ (Bayart, 2000:234).

Globalization according to Alonso, ‘… represents a new era in the world system, one that is characterized by the dislocation of national economies and nationstates, and their re-composition on the basis of global relations, in accordance with what the market demands’ (Alonso, 2001:86). Alonso further argues that, ‘… positive factors associated with globalization is the emergence of an increasingly widespread awareness of what is involved in good governance of the planet and of the rights upon which international action must rest. The series of international summits promoted by the UN, and the fact that a new more precise definition …
is beginning to take a firm root, are evidence of this awareness’ (Ibid.: 88). Globalization, he argues, ‘provides an interesting input into the concept of sustainable development, one of the primary objectives of Nepad, by situating it and good governance, and integrative global economic practices’ (Ibid.:110).

Globalization is about change processes for modernization and progress. Nepad provides a goodness of fit for Africa into the global changes that have emerged within the context of globalization. The collapse of the cold war offered a conducive and fertile ground for these changes not only on negotiated political settlements across regions and states but also new paradigms of development. This background underscores the significance of the contribution of the globalization process in a broader context to indigenous development initiative in Africa. In other words, the globalization process, amongst other conditions, provided an appropriate condition to translate the concept of African renaissance into an African vision for development and regional socioeconomic integration.

At the dawn of the new Millennium, the United Nations (UN) organized a summit for all Heads of state and governments of its member states at its Headquarters in New York, USA, in January 2000, to deliberate on the development imperatives of the era. At this meeting the new Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were set for all member nations including those in Africa. This led to the global agreement on several development goals in a declaration entitled the 'UN Millennium Declaration'. The declaration contains the following goals and in terms of the agreement, all 189 United Nations member states had pledged to meet these goals by 2015.

The Goals and Details are:

- Eradication of poverty and hunger.--(Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day; Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger).
• Achievement of universal primary education - (Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling).

• Promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women–(Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015).

• Reduction in child mortality–(Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five).

• Improvement in maternal health–(Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality rate).

• Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases–(Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS; Halt and begin to reverse incidence of malaria and other diseases).

• Ensuring environmental sustainability–(Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes, reverse loss of environmental resources; Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water; Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020).

• Ensuring a global partnership for development–(Develop an open trading and financial systems that is predictable and non-discriminatory. Include a commitment to good governance, development and poverty eradication–nationally and internationally. Address the least developed countries’ special needs. This includes tariff and quota free access for their exports, enhanced debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries; cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction. Address the special needs of landlocked and small islands developing states. Deal comprehensively with developing countries debt problems through national and international measures. In co-operation with the developing countries develop decent and productive work for youth. In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable drugs in developing countries. In co-operation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new...
technologies—especially information and communication technologies), (UN millennium development goals. Enterprise, September, Johannesburg, 2002:42).

To corroborate the argument, Ohiorhenuan has argued that, ‘Nepad also consciously locates itself within the global consensus on development encapsulated in the Millennium Development Goals adopted at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2001’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:12).

The end of the cold war occasioned by the end of communism and socialism and the subsequent disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990 signaled the cessation of ideological patronage of the big powers to the satellite states, including countries in Africa. During the cold war period, aid to the Third World countries centered essentially on political patronages, security, ideological propagation and preservation, and to a minimal extent on development. Increasingly, at the collapse of communism and socialism, aid-based ideological support began to dwindle for most of the Developing Nations between the late 1980s and early 1990s.

African states as subordinates, albeit non-aligned pretentious posturing in the international ideological dichotomy became adversely hit within the ensued interplay of states juggling for scarce resource patronages from the rich nations. The situation inevitably offered opportunities for seeking other means and concepts not only for resources but also sustainable development as a lodestar. Consistent with this view, Olivier has argued that, ‘the linkage between support and performance presents a new situation to African countries, now deprived of the leverage they could exercise in the Cold War era to get aid in exchange for strategic or ideological support from either side of the Iron Curtain, irrespective of their domestic political practices’ (Olivier, 2003:820). Van de Walle has similarly argued that, ‘…the end of the Cold War has changed foreign policy priorities in the West and weakened the claims of African states for international resources’ (Van de Walle, 1999:337).
Closely linked to the end of the Cold War influence and the ideological patronage was the gradual dearth of foreign donor aid-for-development to Africa prior to the year 2000. Van de Walle has argued that, ‘by 1995 most African nations excluding South Africa and Nigeria received equivalent of 13.2 per cent aid … and had enjoyed constituencies for aid from the West and that … the volume of foreign aid from the West to Africa has been dwindling since 1994’ (Van de Walle, 1999:339). Olivier (2003:821) also notes that, ‘… development aid to Africa has halved between 1989 and 1990 (from US$24.4 billion to US$12.2 billion p.a.).’ Similarly, Riddell has argued that, ‘what the figure … not reveals is the marked decline in aid to Africa which has occurred, indeed accelerated in recent years. In the six years after the Berlin wall came down, from 1990 – 1996, official aid disbursement to sub-Sahara Africa fell in real terms by one fifth (21 per cent), contradicting, on average, by 3.5 percent a year …’ (Riddell, 1999:313).

Another event that led to the emergence of African development initiatives could be premised on the domestic incidences of what Kuye (2003) refers to as ‘the crisis of developmental state’. At the tail end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new century African populace became tired of bad, corrupt, derelict and remissness of governments whose economic policies saw them worse off and perpetuate their plights. To support this theory, Kuye has argued that, ‘there had been fallen export volumes and values, squeezed import capacity, and problems of food supply, which together escalated external borrowing, followed by a decline in their credit worthiness’ (Kuye, 2003:6).

As a result African populace suffer(ed) economic deprivation and increased social insecurity. They had become vocal on both continental and national issues and critical of their governments as their economies suffered depredation. Restiveness remained largely the order of daily affairs while discontent and civil strife thrived leading in most cases to political crises, intricate and fragile political stability. In examining this condition, Olivier has argued that, ‘… but after
liberation, many African societies have become their own worst enemies as military dictatorship, single party authoritarianism, political instability and economic decay set in' (Olivier, 2001:41).

These incidences created enormous tensions between the ruled and the rulers which raised further questions on over stay in office, total solutions to the political and socioeconomic problems, and consequences and risks of failure to deliver. The resultant consequences of these events equally gave way to support for conception of indigenous development initiatives by the African political leadership to ameliorate and evade internal political and socioeconomic catastrophes. Mattes has argued that, ‘…beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall, mass protests pushed dozens of sub-Saharan countries toward political reform, introducing multiparty competition and elections’ (Mattes, 2004:7).

To further this argument, Olivier reverted to the speech made by Mbeki at Chantilly, USA, in 1997, as the Deputy President. He quoted Mbeki as having said that, ‘…in order for Africa to reach its goals, the present generation must resist all tyranny, oppose all attempts to deny liberty, to resort to demagoguery, repulse the temptation to describe African life as the ability to live on charity’ (Olivier, 2003:817). In another context, he has opined that ‘African people are becoming less tolerant of poor leadership, bad economic and political policies, and enduring hardship, deprivation and marginalization’ (Olivier, 2001:43). As a result African political leadership risked civil strife and chaos. At the same time, they became aware of the emerging economic and political dynamics occasioned by the globalization process, the UN MDGs, the dwindling aid-for-development, the rising domestic tensions, and the fervency of sustainable development phenomenon.

The emergence of Nepad could also be based on the few precursory socio-economic subtexts on development of the late 1970s and the mid 1980s. ‘Amongst them were: Revised Framework of Principles for the Implementation of
the New International Economic Order in Africa and the Intellectual Foundation for the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1989-2000, both undertaken by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) under Adebayo Adedeji from the late 1970s through to the late 1980s. Another action programme initiated for the development of Africa was the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) again proposed by UNECA’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:10).


In the same vein, Turok argues that, ‘the initiatives for development in Africa as enumerated by Ohiorhenuan took place under Adebayo Adeleji, the then Chair of ECA, before the concept of globalization became fashionable’ (Turok, 2002:122). He affirms that, albeit the principles contain in these programmes became the standard reference work for critics of IMF policies as essentially external interference, they contributed to the formation of regional economic blocs such as Economic Community of West Africa States [ECOWAS] and the East African Community [EAC] of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. These organs
would become the basis of all African unity, a position not far from what obtains today in the context of Nepad and Africa’s development’ (Ibid.:122).


The President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, at the same occasion came up with a plan referred to as ‘Omega Plan’. ‘The principles stated in the Plan were inclusive of the advocacy that Africa could not afford to pretend to the fervency of the globalization process. Africa according to the plan should pool resources together for infrastructure development, human capital development and to be able to attract more foreign resources from the West for development projects in Africa, while the rich Western nations invest treasury bills in African projects’. (Melber et al., 2002:7). The Omega Plan was a latecomer, initiated in the early months of 2001, focusing on regional infrastructures and educational projects. It received strong support from the Africa’s francophone bloc.

According to De Waal, ‘Nepad emerged from three parallel initiatives launched in 2000-1. The first of these was the Millennium Partnership for Africa’s Recovery Programme [MAP], inspired especially by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. It began with a mandate given by the Organization of African Unity [OAU] to Mbeki,
Obasanjo and Bouteflika, to investigate how Africa could overcome its debt crisis. Mbeki was meanwhile promoting his vision of the ‘African Renaissance’, which encompassed not just economic development, but cultural, social, and political regeneration too. Hence the opening paragraphs of the MAP document – replicated almost word for word in the Nepad document – stress Africa’s artistic and cultural heritage’ (De Waal, 2002:466).

At the joint conference of Africa’s ministers of finance and economic planning in Algiers in May 2001, the decision was made to merge these initiatives into one. This was named the ‘New African Initiative’ and at the 37th Organization of African Unity [OAU] summit in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001, an implementation committee of 15 heads of state was mandated to manage it (De Waal, 2002:467). Ohiorhenuan argues that, ‘at the Heads of state Implementation Committee in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001, the programme was adopted as a regional development policy for the continent and witnessed a name-change to New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad)’ (Ohiorhenuan, 2002:9). It was widely regarded as the policy framework and a new continental phenomenon for sustainable economic development for Africa’. (Ibid.:9).

The idea of African Renaissance persuaded and rallied academia, researchers, and policy makers in support of the not so a novel and historic concept. African leadership became influenced and attracted by the globalization process and thereon began to seek, first individually and subsequently in collegiate, credible indigenous initiatives and actions towards sustainable development through which solutions to the continued African underdevelopment dilemma could be situated and addressed. African leadership then shifted the concept of external dependency and demonstrated impartial sense of regionalism.

The damning consequences of continued marginalization, exclusion from the emerging internationalization of the political and economic systems, the urgent need to collectively reverse Africa’s development imperatives primarily through
supranational arrangements for a common future and aspirations, and the internal unmitigated catastrophes proved to be the preoccupation of the contemporary African leadership. All the main strands of under-development, primarily the issues of poverty, political decay, social insecurity, economic depression, debt overhang, coupled with the idea of building a stable, progressive, and modernized continent on the one hand and the UN MDGs, the absence of bi-polar world, and the globalization process gave the contemporary African leadership the best possible launch pads to initiate indigenous development concepts and to re-engage the rich North on a newly audacious but voluntaristic partnership for a widespread continental development.

The African project for the new century claims to have been inspired by the all-enduring development imperatives on the continent. It came with a variety of constituent elements supposedly dedicated to the pursuit of the ravages of the continent and to make progress upon them. Shortly after its inauguration, Nepad came to acquire a higher profile as the Group of Industrialized Nations [G8], Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], the UN, and the European Union [EU] largely endorsed the programme. They saw in it, a new and uniquely genuine effort, and a regenerative commitment of the contemporary African leadership to address Africa’s development problems. Nepad took its foundation from several degenerative development imperatives that have pervaded the continent since independence. It is a countervailing concept. These occurrences made the concept of indigenous development initiatives inevitably attractive and realistic propositions in the belief that they would eventually become the mainstream development policy programmes for the continent. The cluster of these events, it could be argued, became the conjunction and the critical points of departure ahead of the eventual adoption of Nepad.
1.2 Rationale and Aims of Nepad

Nepad is a response to the contemporary events occasioned by the globalization process, the sustainable development phenomenon and the UN's MDGs. Both the rationale and the aim have taken a firm root from the development imperatives of the continent. The rationale and the aim of Nepad could be categorized into a trinity of reform stages – marginalization, globalization, and economic integration, spurred by strategic developmental needs of the continent anchored on an international partnership for development.

The rationale, among other things, is concerned with seeking relevance and proactive participation in the globalization process through vigorous pursuit of the development policies for the continent. Fourie and Vickers have tried to relativize the rationale, stating that, 'since globalization is the contending ideology and operative environment for engaging in relations amongst groups and states, African countries have had very little option but to align their domestic and foreign policies towards achieving their national objectives within the environment' (Fourie & Vickers, 2003). Chansinga maintains that, ‘the rationale is that developing countries, acting individually, cannot survive the vicious forces of globalization and access the attendant benefits and minimize its costs’ (Chinsinga, 2001:65).

In addition, one of the aims of Nepad is to strengthen regional economic integration on the continent. ‘This means effective co-operation, coordination, liaison, and streamlining of policy frameworks of the existing sub-regional Economic Communities as well as domestic economic policies on the continent. In emphasizing this aim, the Head of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) reiterates that one of the goals of Nepad is the promotion of regional integration. They, therefore, called on the Regional Economic Communities [RECs] as the building blocks, to speed up the implementation of
their integration programmes’ (HSGIC Communique, Abuja, March 2002: item 21).

African development concept as reflected by Mbeki’s African renaissance, as argued by Oguntande, ‘…was a response to the regional trading blocs that were being formed as a logical response to the requirements of globalization’ (Oguntande, 2003:21). Similarly, Schoeman has explained that, ‘economic globalization and particularly its underlying ideology of the free market as the solution to underdevelopment and poverty and poverty alleviation, forms the rationale for the region’s choice … as strategies for accelerated economic growth and development’ (Schoeman, 2001:62).

Other rationales of Nepad include, ‘sustainable development and economic growth of the continent. This rests with the aim that the member states get better and overcome the problem of underdevelopment and enhance their capacities. It could also be translated in a broader perspective to mean the promotion of good governance and economic regeneration by creating the preconditions conducive for foreign direct investment, a vital channel to procure resources for development. It aims at building a pan-continental emancipatory ideology and consensus for Africans’ (Fourie & Vickers, 2003:16). Chabal has argued that ‘The premise on which Nepad is built is that the moves made in the direction of democracy are such as to provide the political framework within which better government and greater economic sagacity will combine to make development possible’ (Chabal, 2002:454).

The issue of the debt overhang remains first among the critical conditions for which Nepad was initiated. Accordingly, ‘this was with the aim to act and speak with a common voice to carry effect. This was also to create greater opportunity to facilitate negotiations not only with the creditor nations but also the international trade on equal trading terms, granting of increasing access to African produce’ (Olivier, 2001).
1. 3 Objectives of Nepad

The evolution of Nepad could hardly have been possible without a vision and object of what the programme is set out to achieve vis-à-vis the realities of the development constraints in the continent. The question, which then arises, is of what relevance is the programme to the continent? The emergence of the concept has largely brought into sharp focus the development imperatives of Africa and the attempt to attend meaningfully to them. ‘The strategic goal of the project is to provide for sustainable development in the region by playing a central role in overcoming regional barriers and creating favourable conditions for the penetration of advanced technologies to facilitate efficient use of the local natural resources (depletable and renewable)’ (Kuye, 2003:11).

The principal objectives of Nepad are many folds. Nepad’s objectives essentially include:

- To eradicate poverty.
- To place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path to sustainable development.
- To halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process and enhance the integration of its economies into the global economy.
- To accelerate the empowerment of women.

Nepad’s objectives, among other things, include the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world and would be defined by the framework of interaction set by the people’s homegrown agenda of their own volition in order to be able to exercise control of their destiny as perceived by them. In an effort to actualize the African project and translate the vision from ideal to reality, the following objectives have been drawn up:

- To strengthen the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution and ensure that they are used to restore and maintain peace.
• Promote and protect democracy and Human Rights by developing clear standards of accountability, transparency and participative governance.

• Restore and maintain macro economic stability by developing standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies and appropriate institutional frameworks.

• Institute transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and auditing of private companies and the public sector.

• Revitalize and extend the provision of education, technical training and health services (with priority to HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases).

• Promote the role of women in social and economic development in Africa.

• Build the capacity of the states in Africa to set and enforce the legal framework and maintain law and order.

• Promote the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification (Melber et al., 2002:7-8).

Ohiorhenuan (2002) has conceptualized the objectives of Nepad as:

• Economic growth
• Poverty alleviation,
• Regional trade,
• Environmental protection.

The overriding objectives of Nepad to drive the development processes in Africa could characteristically be described as, Peace and Security; Democracy and Political Governance; and Economic and Corporate Initiatives. The Nepad Vision and Policy Framework fill a vacuum that Africans have been grappling with since the 1970s—a socio-economic development vision to complement the plurality of the African political landscape and vision.

Having postulated the above objectives, the policy attributes and criteria specifics for execution require some patterned framework for action. It is obvious that institutional mechanisms will be necessary not only to carry out the attainment of
the policy objectives but also to accord credibility, draw legal basis for recognition
to solicit and ensure the flow of global resources – funding and political good will, from the would be international partners and donor nations.

1. 4 Institutional Mechanisms of Nepad

The institutionalization of mechanisms, to a large extent, not only require a precise action aimed at the attainment of policy objectives but also a more pragmatic way to discern the prospects of the implementation process and to deal ultimately with any resultant problems. The institutional mechanisms perhaps serve the most innovative and critical measures to further the implementation efforts of Nepad. To allude to this view, Chinsinga has stated that, ‘the point is that the institutional framework governing these regional integration initiatives must at the very least be in tune with the intricate policy demands of globalization and economic liberalization’ (Chinsinga, 2001:61). Picard, Liviga, and Garrity (1994) have argued that, ‘institutional development and capacity building need to be considered within the larger context of developing sustainable policies. …there is an overwhelming need to more effectively balance policy content consideration with institutional development and implementation considerations’.

For Nepad to run the course of its African project, four main organs have been established within its framework. They are to effectively begin the process of working towards the attainment of the set policy goals of Nepad. These institutional mechanisms include:

- The Assembly of the African Union.
- Nepad Heads of state and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC).
- Nepad Steering Committee.
- Nepad Secretariat at Midrand, South Africa.

(Source: Nepad by Structure, 2004).
A fresh organ that has been added among the institutional implementation mechanisms is the APRM initiative with a Secretariat. The APRM comprised of organs as – the Committee of Participating Heads of State and Government (APR Forum), the Panel of Eminent Persons (APR Panel), and the APR Secretariat and the Country Review Teams (APR Teams), (The Dialogue, the Monthly Journal of Nepad, 2003:4). It is equally important to state that these mechanisms are in hierarchical order of importance. The top ranked mechanism is the Assembly of the African Union, which is at the highest levels of government of the African Union member states. This body is charged yet with clearly prescribed functions for the implementation process of Nepad.

According to the Nepad document of October 2001, (item 200), the HSGIC is composed of the five originator Heads of State of Nepad (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) and ten others; two from each sub-region will be appointed for the implementation. The functions of the Implementation Committee will be:

- Identifying strategic issues that need to be researched planned and managed at the continental level.
- Setting up mechanisms for reviewing progress in the achievement of mutually agreed targets and compliance with mutually agreed standards.
- Review progress in the implementation of past decisions and taking appropriate steps to address problems and delays. (item 201 of Nepad document, 2001).

The role of HSGIC in addition to its mandate and responsibilities, the Committee shall be:

- Appoint members of the IPEP and its chairperson.
- Consider, adopt and take ownership of peer review reports submitted by the IPEP.
- Exercise peer pressure to effect changes in country practice where recommended.
• Influence development partners to support the recommendations contained in peer review reports by providing suggested technical and other assistance.

• Transmit peer review reports to the appropriate AU structures in a timely manner.

• Make public, through the Nepad/APRM Secretariat, peer review reports and press releases pertaining thereto.

(Hope, 2002:22).

In a broader context, these mean that the HSGIC is being charged with comprehensive evaluation and monitoring of the implementation process of the policy goals of Nepad. It does not have a permanent Secretariat and is expected to rotate its summit meetings. This has the sole aim of according credibility and legitimacy for soliciting funding and international political goodwill for the programme.

Given the high level of membership of the body, the functions of HSGIC could broadly be divided into two main dimensions. The first is the external relations dimension. It could be argued that the external relations dimension is concerned with development diplomacy essentially to solicit political support and good will from the would-be partners, donor nations, and international organizations. It includes the promotion of the programme with the necessary political symbolism, marketing of the programme to the outside world, and the critical credibility, which the programme requires at its infancy. The second dimension of its activity focuses on the internal African environment (item 201, Nepad document, October 2001) particularly the APRM initiative. Its activity also includes convening of Summits to deliberate on the progression, modification, monitoring, and evaluation of the various phases of the implementation process of Nepad.

The Steering Committee follows the HSGIC. Its membership includes the five founder nations and other sub-regionally zoned members. The functions of the
body cannot easily be gleaned but appear to assume surrogated functions of the HSGIC. The sole functions of this body may rest on the principle of collective action as necessarily complimentary to HSGIC. It appears that when it does have statutory responsibility, they may be subordinated to those of the HSGIC.

The Nepad Secretariat in Midrand, South Africa serves as the institutional administrative Headquarters. It is the operational wing that deals with the day-to-day activities concerned with Nepad. It takes charge of coordination, organization, and the management of the policy programme. It assists in initiation of policy and policy recommendations for the higher implementation bodies.

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an adjunct Secretariat to the main Nepad Secretariat in Midrand, South Africa. It has been set up and charged with the responsibility to undertake the complex task of systematic examination and assessment of the internal policies and performance of the member states that would voluntarily submit themselves for the exercise. ‘Its functions are with the view to countervail poor and adversarial policies to good governance, respect for human rights, socio-economic policies, tenets of democracy, and broader participation in decision-making process as best practices. This is with a view turn to attract FDI and at the same time to increasingly encourage local investment as well as capital flight back into the continent. The functions of the mechanism include drafting of the accession document which is a legal instrument binding on participating states upon accession’ (The Dialogue, The Monthly Journal of Nepad, 2003:4).
1.13 Concluding Reflections

This chapter has highlighted the character and the focus of the study and the historical evolution of Nepad by exploring the incidences that culminated in its emergence. The rationale, aims, objectives, purpose, and the need for this study have been placed in context. This chapter has tended to cast the *raison d’etre* for the object of study revealing the context of the various indigenous development initiatives that enjoyed prominence in pre-and post-millennium Africa.

The conflicting development policies that have driven a wedge between developments on the continent remain pertinent to Nepad. The background of this study is informed by several retrospective conditions that lent to the failure of precursory development initiatives on the continent as instructive and seek to spotlight emerging conditions that impact on the implementation process of Nepad with a view to strengthen the prospect of Nepad. It is possible to discern the coherent cycles of events, which underpins the new millennium development arrangements particularly to Africa, as the spontaneous outcome for the new logic for development. Nepad could best be described as an attempt in making the past useful for a pluralistic present and future.